Digging holes abroad. An ethnography of Dutch archaeological research projects abroad.

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Chapter Four: The Deir Alla Joint Archaeological Project

4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1.1 INTRODUCTION

> The Deir Alla Joint Project is not a joint project. It is a Dutch project.[59]
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> Archaeologists do their research, not for the development of universal knowledge, nor for local development. They might use the rhetoric of knowledge, shared projects, capacity building and so on – but they do it for themselves.[60]

The above are rather harsh perceptions of the Deir Alla Joint Archaeological Project. They were made, respectively, by the Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities (DoA) at the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, and by an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology of Yarmouk University (YU), both in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. I don't necessarily believe that these perceptions are a correct description of the current archaeological conduct in the Jordan Valley, nor entirely fair in light of the successes and intentions of the individual archaeologists of the Deir Alla Joint Archaeological Project; rather, my aim here will be to try to understand why certain actors in the project could have come to such perceptions.

The above statements are particularly worth exploring considering the intentions and dedication of the Deir Alla Joint Archaeological Project (hereafter also referred to as the 'Joint Project'), which has, for over 50 years, committed itself to the 'decolonisation' of the foreign, biblically oriented archaeological conduct in Jordan. As such, the Joint Project has promoted international collaboration, the development of an independent archaeological institutional capacity in Jordan, and, more recently, the integration of archaeological research with locally sensitive heritage management solutions as well as the development of a 'Regional Research Centre and Museum'.

In order to understand the discrepancy between such policy intentions in relation to the above perceptions of project outcomes, we need a much more detailed understanding of project processes and of the way in which judgments and valorisations of projects are given shape. As discussed in previous chapters, such an understanding would entail an ethnographic and discursive approach of the archaeological process, its actors and their values, of the historic, socio-political and financial frameworks in which these take place, and of the relationship between project policy and representation on the one hand, and actual field-practices on the other.

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[59] Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities (Amman, June 2009).

[60] Associate Professor and Head of Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Irbid, November 2009).

4.1.2 STRUCTURE OF CHAPTER

The first part of this chapter (section 4.2) will provide a general background to the case study, covering the historical and socio-political context of the Jordan Valley and the village of Deir Alla in particular. This section will not provide an extensive overview of the national, historical and archaeological heritage management framework of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan at large (hereafter also referred to as 'Jordan'). I have chosen this approach as to be able to delve straight into the workings of the Joint Project on a regional and local level – instead, wider issues in relation to archaeology, heritage management, tourism and identity formation in Jordan will be dealt with throughout this chapter.[61]

Section 4.3 will outline the history and practice of the Deir Alla Joint Archaeological Project, highlighting the differing perceptions of success and some conflicts and problems that arose over the implementation of the project. It will also provide an overview of the main intentions and policies of the Joint Project towards archaeological research, international collaboration, capacity building, community participation and heritage management. The remaining chapters will then delve deeper into understanding the archaeological project processes within its wider social context, the description of which will follow the order of the research questions as outlined in sections 2.6 and 3.2.2.

Section 4.4 will explore the main values and discourses of the archaeological actors in the project policies of the Joint Project with respect to archaeological research, heritage management and collaboration. It will identify the existence of an *Authorised Archaeology Discourse* (AAD) (cf Smith 2006; see section 2.4) in the field of foreign archaeology in Jordan, which is prominent in the academic institutional frameworks and in the practices and policies of the Joint Project in particular.

Section 4.5 will explore how the Dutch archaeological actors negotiated these values and discourses in relation to local institutional counterparts, government bodies and local communities when developing and implementing the Joint Project. It will illustrate how the AAD, in combination with socio-political and economic power structures in archaeological heritage frameworks and the agency of individual actors, limited opportunities for achieving a sustainable form of collaborative archaeology by prioritising scientific and archaeological values over other values, and by (often unintentionally) postponing and excluding the involvement of other actors in society.

Section 4.6 will focus in more detail on the relationship between processes of policy negotiation with actual project outcomes. It will illustrate how archaeological interventions abroad are not only driven by project policy discourses, institutional agreements, antiquity laws and archaeological theory, but also by the interests, needs and personal histories of the actors involved (cf Van Gastel & Nuijten 2005; Long 2003; see section 2.5). In addition, it will illustrate how 'project policy' (see section 2.6) functions not only to orientate practice but also to legitimise practice (cf Mosse 2005, 14; 2004; and see Latour 1996; 42-43). Whilst the scientific and archaeological values of the AAD have a major impact on project outcomes in terms of a prioritisation of research resources and activities, and whilst especially academic institutional and funding policies play a substantial role in this, we will also see how archaeological practitioners are constantly (re-)producing story-lines and discourse-coalitions in order to mobilise and maintain relationships, support and access to archaeological sites and practices. Processes of 're-presentation' (whereby certain project outcomes and activities are interpreted so that they appear the result of deliberate policy), and processes of 'contextualisation' (whereby projects are produced as either successes or failures through networks of support and validation) play a major role in this (ibid.).

Section 4.7 will tie together some observations on the role, responsibility and power of Dutch archaeologists in relation to the needs and wishes of other actors in the social context of Jordan. It will

[61] This is in contrast to the case study of the Santa Barbara Project in Curaçao, where the difference in scale and context benefitted from starting with a 'national' background approach.

discuss how because of the dominant, institutionalised AAD, the related need for brokering, translation and representation, and the inherent, historical power discrepancies, foreign archaeologists in Jordan are attributed a certain amount of expertise and ownership that puts them in a position in which they have to make management decisions that are broader than their remit of archaeological field research. This does not imply that the foreign archaeologists themselves believe they have this expertise, nor does it imply that they want this role; rather, he or she is attributed expertise in the context of Jordanian archaeology, and this, I believe, brings certain responsibilities.

4.2 BACKGROUND

4.2.1 THE DEIR ALLA JOINT ARCHAEOLOGICAL PROJECT

The 'Deir Alla Project' was initiated in 1959 by the late Professor Henk Franken of the Faculty of Theology of Leiden University in the Netherlands. With the first field season in 1960 at the site of Tell Deir Alla in the Jordan Valley in Jordan, and the latest one conducted in 2009, the Joint Project has run for 50 years with a total of 17 field seasons. As such, it can be regarded as one of the longest archaeological projects that have taken place from both the perspective of Jordan as well as from the Netherlands. At its conception in 1959, the project was one of a handful of foreign projects in Jordan, and only one of two archaeological projects in the Jordan Valley.[62] In 2008/2009, the Joint Project was only one of approximately 70 archaeological projects in Jordan (AlGhazawi 2011, 14), one of seven archaeological projects in the Jordan Valley, and the only Dutch project in Jordan – whereby a large part of these projects were undertaken by foreign expeditions, most notably by archaeological teams from France, Germany and the USA.[63] Still, due to its long-term involvement, it might be regarded as one of the best known archaeological projects in Jordan.

On the basis of its fieldwork practice, the partnerships involved and the wider socio-political events in the region, the project can be divided in four separate phases; phase 1 (1960-67); phase 2 (1976-1980), phase 3 (1980-1987), and phase 4 (1994-2009). Although these periods distinguish themselves in terms of research focus, field methodology, funding schemes and partnerships, the project has always been (co)-directed by archaeologists from Leiden University (with later partnerships with the Department of Antiquities in Jordan and the Faculty of Archaeology & Anthropology of Yarmouk University), including a research focus based upon archaeological excavations at Tell Deir Alla, as well as a certain element of academic education in the sense of training and the transferral of archaeological skills and knowledge.

The first phase of the project started in 1959. During this phase, the project can best be described as a Dutch project, in the sense that there were no official Jordanian institutional counterparts to Leiden University – except the essential representative of the Department of Antiquities (DoA). In 1976, the project was developed into a *Joint Project*, undertaken by Leiden University and the DoA, and it was the first international cooperation project in Jordan with a Jordanian Institution. Since then, it has often been presented by Dutch and Jordanian archaeologists as a success in terms of its contribution to the archaeological field in Jordan, not only because of its long-term involvement and the established

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[62] According to the Jordanian Representative to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee and President of the 'Friends of Archaeology and Heritage' in Jordan. Former Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1976 till 1996 (Amman, May 2009).

[63] These statistics have been distilled by looking at the annual journals of the Department of Antiquities, 'Munjazat', from 2001 - 2008 (see for example Alkhraysheh 2007), and were confirmed during interviews with the Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities (Amman, June 2009) as well as by the Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009).

partnerships, but also because it was actively challenging the contemporary biblical interpretations of that time, providing an independent chrono-stratigraphical approach to the archaeology of the Jordan Valley (see below). The start of the subsequent phase, in 1980, witnessed the strengthening of the Joint project with a third partner, in the form of Yarmouk University (YU) in Irbid. Soon after, the three partners established the Deir Alla Station for Archaeological Studies (DASAS) in the village of Deir Alla at the southwest foot of the site, which greatly facilitated the research by all three partners in the subsequent decades, and which gave access to a small site museum. In the final phase, from 1994 till 2009, the Joint Project consisted basically of the same three institutions, although with a slight change in funding framework, and it increasingly reflected contemporary thinking in archaeological theory and heritage management. The research approach was broadened with regional surveys and a landscape perspective through the research project 'Settling the Steppe', and the project witnessed some initial heritage management work in the form of protection and consolidation measures undertaken at the top of the Tell. Another significant project element of this phase, is that since 1991 the Dutch co-director, in collaboration with his partners, tried to set up a Regional Research Centre and Museum in the Jordan Valley, which was supposed to combine a multi- disciplinary research facility with a museum function, thereby attracting tourism and benefiting the local community. At present, this Regional Research Centre and Museum was however still not established. Before we delve deeper into a more detailed overview of the project, I wish to provide some general background on the Jordan Valley and the village of Deir Alla in particular.

Figure 04. Deir Alla excavation team, 1960 (Deir Alla Archive, Leiden University; courtesy Gerrit van der Kooij).

Figure 05. Map of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan showing the location of Deir Alla.

4.2.2 THE JORDAN VALLEY

The Jordan Valley is characterised by a distinctive geographic setting, a rich archaeological and historical past, and a poor socio-economic development (Tarawneh in press). The Valley is situated ca 200-400m below sea-level, 1000m lower than the two stretches of hills that run from north-to-south alongside it. Because of this, the Jordan Valley is both warmer and drier than its surroundings, and characterised by a semi-arid climate and scarce vegetation growth. The area is suitable for cattle in winter, and even in summer the lower hillsides can sustain modest agriculture. At present, almost all of the valley is suitable for agriculture through intensive irrigation, although until 1950, when the East Ghor Canal was constructed, there were only localised irrigation systems (Van der Kooij 2001b; 2007a; 2007b; Kaptijn 2009; Tarawneh in press). Since the 1980's, the area has witnessed the introduction of portable greenhouses that have increased the productivity and export of large amounts of fruits and vegetables (Khouri 1981; Elmusa 1994), often within the framework of major international and national development schemes that aimed to increase the agricultural and economic development of the Jordan valley (Van Aken 2003).

The population of the Jordan Valley consists mainly of Bedouin and Palestinians, the latter having fled historic Palestine after the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967 (Khouri 1981). Next to a few other ethnic groups, one can find increasing amounts of immigration workers from Egypt and Pakistan (Van Aken 2003, 5). Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, the population of the Jordan Valley was about 60,000 – largely involved in pastoralism and agriculture. By 1971, this number had dropped to ca 5,000 (Khouri 1981). Presently, the population of the Jordan Valley is around 100.000, most of whom are now considered to be farmers – whereby 80% of the farms are constituted of small family farms (Charkasi 2000). The Jordan Valley is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped regions of Jordan. According to the former Jordanian Minister of Water and Irrigation and the Minister of Agriculture for the period 2001-2005, who has also been responsible for all studies related to the development of the Jordan Valley together with Israel since 1997, the main obstacles for development of the region are "a lack of access to water, a lack of regional cooperation, and finally, a lack of investors who are hesitant to come to such a troubled area where peace is constantly under threat".[64]

[64] Email correspondence, November 2009.

Although tourism continues to contribute to a substantial amount of the country's gross national product, tourism and tourism infrastructure is still less developed in the Jordan Valley. Some of the reasons for this are the above-mentioned general underdeveloped state of the Jordan Valley and the area's reputation as a troubled area; still, the area's rich historic, religious and natural resources as opportunities to develop international tourism are increasingly on the agenda of the Jordanian Tourism Board,[65] and it even has been described as "the future backbone of the development of the Jordan Valley".[66]

Having seen changing densities of population since ca 10,000 years ago, the amount of archaeological sites in the Jordan Valley is extensive, with estimates ranging from 15,000 to 30,000 – a number that is increasingly growing with recent surveys and studies undertaken by both the Department of Antiquities,[67] as well as by foreign archaeological surveys (such as Kaptijn 2009). Nevertheless, factors of agriculture, horticulture, infrastructure, housing development, looting, as well as a general lack of awareness of the historic and economic value of these sites, have all been named as some of the major threats to the survival of the rich archaeological and historic resources in the valley, seriously challenging the future development of tourism, scientific research, historic education and local development.[68]

4.2.3 DEIR ALLA

The village of Deir Alla, with at its heart the Tell of Deir Alla, is a small community of ca 500 inhabitants in the middle of the Jordan Valley, slightly to the east of the Jordan River (Van der Kooij 2007b, 10). Today, the village is part of the municipality ('Department') of Deir Alla, which consists of several villages surrounding the administrative centre of the small town Swalha. At the time of research, the municipality of Deir Alla was one of a select few 'priority-areas' by the government in terms of socio-economic development.[69] The population of the municipality of Deir Alla consists of ca 40,000[70] and is comprised mainly of original Bedouin and Palestinians. The village of Deir Alla however, consists mainly of Palestinians that settled around Tell Deir Alla after the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. According to the administration of the municipality of Deir Alla, most of these inhabitants work in farming, mirroring the same overall statistics as those for the entire Jordan Valley. It should be noted however, that the – often external – identification of this community as 'local farmers' sometimes sits uneasily with the self-identification of these Palestinian community members, which is often more related to one of refugees 'facing home' (Van Aken 2003).

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[65] Lecturer in Cultural Tourism at the Jordan Applied University College for Hospitality and Tourism Education. Former member of the Jordan Tourism Board (Amman, June 2009).

[66] Former Jordanian Minister of Water and Irrigation and the Minister of Agriculture for the period 2001-2005. Email correspondence, November 2009.

[67] According to the Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009); the Jordanian Representative to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee and President of the 'Friends of Archaeology and Heritage' in Jordan (Amman, May 2009); and the Director of Archaeological Conservation for Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia of the World Monument Fund (Amman, July 2009).

[68] According to interviews with the Jordanian Representative to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee and President of the 'Friends of Archaeology and Heritage' in Jordan (Amman, May 2009); Lecturer in Cultural Tourism at the Jordan Applied University College for Hospitality and Tourism Education, a former member of the Jordan Tourism Board (Amman, June 2009); and the former Jordanian Minister of Water and Irrigation and the Minister of Agriculture for the period 2001-2005 (email correspondence, November 2009). See also Van der Kooij (2007b).

[69] Van der Kooij, pers. comm. (Leiden University, November 2011).

[70] Based upon an estimate by a local municipal adminstration officer (Swalha, Deir Alla municipality, July 2009). An internet search on official figures ranges from 35,000-46,000.

Figure 06. View from Tell Deir Alla towards the south-west (photograph by author, June 2009).

The houses of Deir Alla are located around the Tell, with some of the houses actually located on the foot of the Tell itself. The majority of the houses were build during the second half of the 20th century at primarily the south-foot of the Tell – to the north of the Tell is currently no occupation, only agricultural lands. To the east of the Tell runs the main north-south road through the Jordan Valley, alongside which a petrol station and several small shops are located; the people working here are mainly from Egyptian descent. The regional Deir Alla office of the Department of Antiquities is situated across the road right in front of the official entrance to the Tell, where a small shelter and a stone stairway give access to the top of the Tell. Located at the western edge of the village, is the Deir Alla Station for Archaeological Studies (DASAS), which has been built in 1982 by the Joint Project. Located a hundred meter south-east from the Archaeological Station, is the Deir Alla Agricultural Station, a research station of the Ministry of Agriculture, established in the 1950's.

Especially the inhabitants of the village of Deir Alla have been employed in the Joint Project in different functions since its first fieldwork in 1960, with long employment traditions in several families – today, it is not unlikely that people are working at the same project as their grandparents. Similarly, it can be confidently said that all occupants of Deir Alla have grown up familiar with the sight not only of the Tell,

but also of archaeologists working in the heart of their village. In this sense, the Tell is considered by many as being an important part of their personal lives.

4.2.4 TELL DEIR ALLA

Tell Deir Alla is located in the middle of the village of Deir Alla. It measures circa 250 by 200m and is max. 30 meters in height, and used to be provided with water from the river Zerqa (Van der Kooij 2007b, 11; Kaptijn 2009). The archaeological work at Tell Deir Alla has uncovered several layers of occupation dating from ca 1700 BC (for an overview, see Van der Kooij & Ibrahim 1989; Kafafi & Van der Kooij 2010). The first occupation that has been uncovered archaeologically consists of a (large-scale) urban setting in the Middle Bronze Age (around ca 1700 BC). In the Late Bronze Age the settlement has been interpreted as including a religious centre in the north as well as crafts- and trading-centres in the south. Some of the more noticeable finds that were uncovered during the so-called 'phase E' in this period, which consists of a burnt occupation layer, includes a temple-complex with luxury goods such as a faience vase of the pharaoh Tausert, Mycenaean and Cypriotic pottery, as well as clay-tablets with as-of-yet un-deciphered writing (Van der Kooij 2007b).

The subsequent Iron Age settlement was smaller in size. The stratigraphic 'phase ix' consisted of small-scale architecture, and is noticeable for archaeological finds that point to trading connections with the Mediterranean coast, but especially for the uncovering of the so-called 'Balaam text' in 1967 (Franken 1991; Hoftijzer & Van der Kooij 1991); an ink-wall inscription which tells of the same Balaam as mentioned in the Old Testament, who prophesised the destruction of the area. Soon after, the village was, noticeably, destroyed by an earthquake, followed by scarce occupation until the 4th century BC. After that time, the Tell has, at least, functioned as the place for a local Islamic cemetery in Mamluk and later times, as well as for sporadic and small-scale military purposes since the 1967 war.

The site of Deir Alla is often identified with either biblical Succoth or Penuel, even though such an identification has not been confirmed by the Joint Project. Still, the identification of Deir Alla with these biblical cities, together with the finding of the Balaam text, has subsequently attracted a relatively small amount of biblical tourists to the site. In addition, the biblical identification of the site is reflected and repeated in several biblical websites as well as in most of the popular tourism guides to Deir Alla. Although the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan moved away from primarily marketing and identifying its tourism assets as part of a 'Holy Land' since the loss of the West Bank in 1967, it has continued, in principle, to support such biblical connotations as to improve foreign tourism (Groot 2008). Importantly, Deir Alla has however never been a major priority in this sense, nor has the biblical connotation been actively sought after by the Joint Project.

Traditionally, the Joint Project has rather focused its archaeological research on the Middle Bronze Age, Late Bronze Age and Iron Age periods through large-scale settlement approaches. A more multi-disciplinary and regionally focused approach was added in research phase 4, centred on the use of the steppe landscape in the Jordan Valley (with surveys conducted in the vicinity of Tell Deir Alla) and on early iron-production (with surveys and excavations undertaken at Tell Hammeh, located 2.2 km to the east of Tell Deir Alla). Due to this general research focus and the 'non-monumental' archaeological remains, coupled with a lack of emphasis on Nabataean, Roman/Byzantine, or 'Hashemite' archaeological

interpretations, the Joint Project has never been heavily involved and utilised in national politics in relation to tourism and identity.[71]

4.3 THE DEIR ALLA JOINT ARCHAEOLOGICAL PROJECT

4.3.1 PERCEPTIONS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

In 1976, after five excavations seasons since 1960, Leiden University signed an agreement with the Jordanian Department of Antiquities to start a 'Joint Project'. At that time, the co-directors of both sides were very enthusiastic and hopeful about the possible mutual benefits such an agreement would foster. From a Jordanian perspective, a formal research collaboration with the Deir Alla project was highly desirable, due to the fact that the methodological and historical focus of the project fitted those of the Jordanian scholar responsible for the initiation of the Joint Project, and because a collaboration would foster the much-needed transferral of skills to an understaffed and under-skilled department. More importantly, the processual methodology and archaeological interpretations of the Deir Alla project were actively distancing themselves from the more orthodox biblical archaeology, in contrast to some of the other archaeological projects in the region. According to the Jordanian co-director of that time, who then was Head of Excavations and Research at the DoA; "on the personal level we needed this type of cooperation for the training of our staff; more importantly, it was not biblical archaeology, it was proper archaeology".[72]

In 1979, the Joint Project was strengthened by a third partner, the Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology of Yarmouk University in Irbid, which soon led to the signing of a formal contract between the three partners for collaboration in research, and subsequently to the establishment of the Deir Alla Station for Archaeological Studies (DASAS) in 1982. The following 27 years, the Joint Project saw a collaboration that produced many archaeological discoveries, led to publications and dissertations, trained many students, had been concerned about mitigating the impacts of development on the destruction of the archaeological resources of Deir Alla, carried out several rescue excavations, conducted conservation and management work at the Tell, and established a small interpretive centre at the archaeological station. In addition, it had contributed to a large exhibition on the archaeology of the Jordan Valley at the National Museum of Antiquities in Leiden in 1989 (Van der Kooij & Ibrahim 1989), opened by Princess Sarwath acting on behalf of her husband Crown Prince Hassan, under presence of Prince Claus of the Netherlands. At this celebration, the late Henk Franken was awarded with the Jordanian Order of Independence.

The Joint Project had also been dedicated to try and develop a Regional Research Centre and Museum in Deir Alla since the early 1990's, which explicitly addressed a desire to promote the research, tourism, and understanding of the Deir Alla region, and to provide more benefits for the local community. Specifically, it aimed to rehabilitate the pride and connection of local people to the Jordan Valley by appreciating the local way of life in a landscape characterised by special, hard circumstances.[73]

In addition, project actors all emphasised the mutual and strong feelings of friendship that existed between the local community and the members of the Joint Project; something that I witnessed, and felt, during my own fieldwork as well. In a recent opinion piece in a Jordanian newspaper, the Jordanian co-

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[71] See Groot 2008 for a comprehensive overview of the role of archaeological heritage in relation to the construction of national identity in Jordan.

[72] Amman, November 2009.

[73] Such aims were articulated in the unpublished proposal documents 'Regional Museum at Deir Alla' (1991) and 'Jordan Valley Research Centre and Museum' (2001) by the Joint Deir Alla Archaeological Project. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

director also argued how the Joint Project had provided socio-economic and educational benefits for the local community,[74] using the Joint Project as an example to illustrate the fact that academic projects yield more public benefits than the illegal excavations that were going on in Jordan at that time; a view which he expanded upon in an interview during the excavation season;

> I think the project since the time of Franken played a major role in the local community. If you ask some of the people here around the Tell <...> then you can see the people based their life mostly around this dig. For example, in this local community, <the men> were waiting for the archaeological project seasons, to get some money to fund a whole new year <…> This year for example, one of the sons of the old technicians told me that he is studying English literature in the University <...> Since it is a university holiday, he grasped the opportunity to work at the excavation to finance his studies. This means the excavations also help in educating people, not only in schools, but also in universities.[75]

In 2009, the Joint Project was still only one of three international collaborations with Jordanian Universities, out of the 30 foreign archaeological research projects undertaken in Jordan.[76] Together with its long-standing commitment of 50 years, the quality of the archaeological research, and the establishment of an archaeological research station in Deir Alla, the Joint Project has been, and still is, often appreciated on a national level according to Jordanian researchers;

> I liked the way they took people seriously, that they were genuinely interested in our concerns. <...> I'm saying this, because in other occasions when dealing with foreign excavators, you get the impression that they just want to keep you happy. <...> The Deir Alla project was perceived, and still is perceived, as a very positive example of collaboration. It is prestigious mainly because of their long-term involvement and seriousness, it's one of the longest projects in the Near East. They started in the early 1960's, and we now have perhaps the third generation of Dutch scholars working in Deir Alla. This shows seriousness, because in some other cases, we have some foreign professors working here or there, only interested in making a career, excavating in the Near East, getting a better position in Europe, and so on. . <...> The fact that the Dutch take it seriously, gives it weight. Their involvement in building the station, the renovation of the station, the diplomatic involvement – like the ambassador visiting the site – you have students, professors and money coming, and publications being done, and this for 50 years.[77]

In line with these stories of success of the Joint Project, the Dutch co-director was awarded a 'Medal of Honour' by the president of the Yarmouk University at the end of the fieldwork season of 2009 for his (and those of the Leiden University and The Netherlands at large) efforts, contribution and commitment to the

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[74] Pers. comm. by the Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1996 - 2009, Professor of Archaeology at the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University. This newspaper article, in Arabic, was kindly translated to me by this co-director during the fieldseason (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[75] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1996 - 2009, Professor of Archaeology at the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[76] This statistic has been distilled by looking at the annual journal of the Department of Antiquities, 'Munjazat 2010', and was confirmed during interviews with the Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities (Amman, June 2009) as well as by the Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009). See also AlGhazawi (2011, 14).

[77] Deputy Dean of Research and Science, Yarmouk University (Irbid, July 2009). Previously involved with the Joint Project (for example during the early 2000's) as a representative of Yarmouk University.

archaeology and people of Jordan. During this ceremony at the DASAS, the Joint Project was described as an "outstanding example of international archaeological collaboration".[78]

What is noticeable about these representations of the Joint Project as a success is that they are built around concepts such as 'joint collaboration', 'shared responsibility', 'local community benefits', 'proper archaeology' and 'heritage management'. It was, more recently, also labelled as being of 'post-colonial value' during a conference in honour of the retirement of the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project from Leiden University.[79] Such an idea for establishing a shared archaeological project that contributes to wider heritage management issues such as conservation, capacity building, presentation and public involvement, is not only used widely in current literature and policies on the ethics of sustainable postcolonial archaeology and heritage management (see chapter 2), but it is also increasingly mirrored in the project policy discourses of the Joint Project, particularly in the proposals and evaluation reports since the 1990's (see below).

However, not everything is as it seems. Despite the attendance of the ceremony by many high-ranking officials of Yarmouk University and diplomatic representatives such as the Ambassador of the Netherlands, several crucial actors were missing at the ceremony at the DASAS. Most of the invited local representatives, including the local mayor, were absent, as well as the director of the DoA, the third partner of the Joint Project – something to the dismay of the Dutch co-director. Unaware of the honorary ceremony, he had invited the representatives of YU, DoA and the local municipality to hold a meeting on the 'future of the Joint Project'; "now half of the reason, or perhaps the most important reason, for this meeting has gone. It should be about the future management of Deir Alla, involving the local community; not about personal networking."[80]

When looking back at the representations of success, it struck me that whilst the above-mentioned concepts were used abundantly in project policy discourses (such as project proposals, evaluations, grant proposals, and publications), they did not always seem to reflect actual practice – sometimes, they rather seemed to reflect actor's aspirations and policy intentions. In addition, these concepts sometimes obfuscated some of the critiques on the relationship, role and perceived responsibilities between the project actors (see below), as well as some of the actual activities that were undertaken such as integrating the site within its local context in terms of local community involvement and heritage management.

According to the views of some Jordanian partners in the project themselves, and despite its many successes, the Joint Project had for example not 'achieved enough' in terms of conservation, interpretation and presentation to both visitors and the local community, nor was it believed that the Tell is currently protected sufficiently against the threat from infrastructure development;

> Let me say it like this: after 50 years, this site should have been well known around the world. But it isn't <…> Look, 50 years of this project represents a lot of money, if you count all the salaries, excavations and publications. But the site is still not restored and interpreted.[81]

> What did the Deir Alla project bring to the cultural identity of Jordan, locally, regionally, internationally? Did it bring any benefits to the local community? Did it provide dialogue between

[78] President of Yarmouk University (Deir Alla, July 2009).

[79] Archaeologist of the Faculty of Archaeology, speaking at the conference at Leiden University (December 2009).

[80] Dutch co-director of the Joint Project, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University (Deir Alla, July 2009).

[81] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

> cultures? Did it really answer the big questions? I don't see it. Yes, we know a little more about the history of the region. But what good does that do when it sits in university libraries? [82]
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> Many of the sites in the Jordan Valley have disappeared. There is not a single site that is not threatened in one way or another, including Deir Alla and its surroundings. It's not only due to the illegal excavations and infrastructure development; it's also that the sites are under threat because of the lack of community work, and understanding of the local community.[83]

The local community was, according to the perception of some of its inhabitants, as of the time of research also not sufficiently benefiting socio-economically nor educationally from the project, nor were they actively involved in decision-making processes. Interestingly, this is despite the expressed wishes and efforts by the Joint Project to achieve this, and despite the commitment of several local agencies and actors;

> They only come for one month, and not every year, so we don't know what they are doing <…> When I was working there, I was 18. I only used the tools, I didn't learn anything. They also didn't pay us enough. It was two dinars a day, now it is six. It is still not enough. Some of the boys who work there now have told me that it's not enough. They have to take the bus in the morning, and they have to pay for their lunch.[84]
>
> There is not enough contact between the archaeologists and the local community. Only with those who work there. The rest of the village does not meet them, nor do they know what they do. You are the first from the archaeologists to come and visit our school. We never had any visits before – but it is very important. We need more information.[85]
>
> I don't know the history of the Tell. I don't know which people lived here. I only went to primary school <...> I also don't know why I have to wash the pottery. I see them looking at it. My father was good in working at the site, but he didn't know the history I think. He never told me.[86]
>
> People sometimes ask for information, but I need books <for our library>. I don't have any books on archaeology, or on the history of Deir Alla and the Jordan Valley. I have nothing. <...> There is no relationship between the team and the community. They work separately.[87]

Similar critiques and perceptions of exclusion were also expressed by the current mayor of the Deir Alla municipality:

> We are not an official partner in the project, but we should be. <…> Right now, I don't have any power of what happens at the site <…> We should increase the cooperation between the Department

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[82] Associate Professor and Head of Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Irbid, November 2009).

[83] Jordanian Representative to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee and President of the 'Friends of Archaeology and Heritage' in Jordan. Former Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1976 till 1996 (Amman, November 2009).

[84] Imam of one of the four mosques in the Municipality of Deir Alla (Deir Alla, July 2009).

[85] Headmistress of the Deir Alla Primary School for Girls (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[86] Local elderly woman of Deir Alla, employed as household lady at the DASAS for many years. Her house is located on the slope of the Tell (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[87] Director of the Deir Alla Municipal Library (Swalha, July 2009).

> of Antiquities, Yarmouk University, Leiden and the Municipality, to have a museum here, and to give more attention to these sites. Many times I talked and wrote to the formal people who are concerned with this, to involve the municipality in this work.[88]

Accordingly, the representation that the local community has benefited both socio-economically as well as in terms of education seems to sit uneasily with the perception of some community members. Such a view also seems to be in line with the critiques of some of the major project actors themselves. According to the former Jordanian co-director of the project from 1976-1996, the Joint Project did not produce enough benefits for the local community of Deir Alla, despite their efforts;

> We were developing all kind of ideas for the local community on the local level and macro level, we were thinking of starting a regional museum, and we thought the community at large could benefit from projects in the Jordan Valley. <...> The archaeology of the Jordan Valley is very important for the whole region, but it is not appreciated by the visitors and the local community simply because the nature of the archaeology is different, and because the targets of the archaeologists and the teams who were working there was concentrated too much on their own research, not involving the local community and thinking of the long term benefits.[89]

The establishment of the Regional Research Centre and Museum, as well as many of the increased conservation, interpretation and tourism facilities of the site that were envisaged in project policy documents and discussions since the early 1990's did however never come to fruition, despite the efforts of the co-directors at that time. Although the development of the Regional Research Centre and Museum was formally supported by a range of actors in Jordan (for instance through the handing over by the Ministry of Agriculture of a piece of land near to the Agricultural Station in Deir Alla to the DoA and YU on which the envisaged Regional Research Centre and Museum could be build), the envisaged building and maintenance remained financially dependent on external funding sources. Despite some initial informal support for match-funding by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early 1990's, this support however never materialised, partly due to changing funding priorities within this Ministry in the late 1990's (see section 4.6).

In addition, the idea of attracting tourism and bringing economic benefits to the community through the development of a Regional Research Centre and Museum, was also met with scepticism by several representatives from the Ministry of Tourism as well as by academic tourism experts in Jordan.[90] Generally, it was felt that the tourism development of the site was not challenged by the lack of a museum, but rather by a general lack of investment in the social and spatial infrastructure of the Deir Alla region. As an example, the site now attracts around 5000 international visitors per year, mostly of whom come and visit the site for its religious or archaeological connotations, but none of these visitors make actual stops in the Deir Alla village due to lack of local tourism infrastructure, and due to a lack of available time in relation to other, more popular destinations. Such destinations normally consist of monumental, visually attractive sites with tourism potential in 'untroubled' regions of Jordan, especially when these exist of sites with histories relating to Nabataean or Bedouin heritage such as Petra, which better fit the rather pragmatic approach towards identity politics and economic development as supported by the Ministry of Tourism (cf

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[88] Mayor of the Municipality ('Department') of Deir Alla (Swalha, July 2009).

[89] Amman, November 2009.

[90] Senior staff member of Ministry of Tourism (Amman, July 2009); Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009); Lecturer in Cultural Tourism at the Jordan Applied University College for Hospitality and Tourism Education. Former member of the Jordan Tourism Board (Amman, June 2009).

Nasser 2000; Groot 2008). In this sense, it was felt that the Joint Project should communicate more with the Ministry of Tourism and with international tourism operators, since the Jordan Valley was not regarded as a priority for tourism at all.

What is also noticeable is that several local and regional governmental representatives expressed feelings of exclusion, such as from the above-mentioned Deir Alla municipality, in addition to actors from the Regional Authority and the Ministry of Education. However, it is exactly these actors that would have been important to include if one aims to develop a locally relevant, sustainable regional museum and if one aims to challenge the destruction of the archaeological resources in and surrounding the environment of Tell Deir Alla through infrastructure development, farming, looting and damage.[91]

In general, I wish to point out that these critiques on project outcomes were not the result of a lack of dedication and intentions by the Joint Project per se – indeed, the Joint Project was for instance not allowed by the DoA to raise local salaries as not to compete with the need for agricultural workforce in the Valley,[92] and the lack of integration and communication between the DoA, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Education and local community concerns is a more often debated issue (Berriane 1999; Gray 2002; Groot 2008; Maffi 2002; Nasser 2000). For example, the difficulties of developing local support through bottom-up approaches in the tourism and heritage field in Jordan is well documented, such as at the site of Umm Qays where local communities were forced to abandon their livelihoods in advance of tourism development (Brand 2000). We will look at these issues in more detail below, but my point here is to illustrate the different perceptions of success and failure pertaining the implementation of the Joint Project.

Perhaps most illustrative of this, is the fact that not all project partners seem to find themselves in the representation of the Joint Project as a shared collaboration. During a personal interview, the Director of the DoA criticised the Joint Project, and especially its partners Leiden University and Yarmouk University, as being just one of the examples of academic research projects that failed to address the needs of the Jordanian archaeological department and the general public, whilst the Head of Excavation and Research of the DoA expressed similar feelings;

> Archaeologists try to take benefits of everything. <…> They mostly think of their own benefits, not ours. They come here to publish their findings for themselves and to train their students. They see it only as this.[93]

> We as a department, we are giving them everything. It is time they start to think about Jordan. <...> If you look at the amount of students that are trained from Leiden University, Yarmouk University and the DoA, and at the salaries, you can see that it is not in balance, at all.[94]

Several months later, during my second visit to Jordan, it struck me how notions of success and collaboration had changed also dramatically within Yarmouk University. The Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project, now Dean of the Faculty of Anthropology and Archaeology of YU, expressed to me that neither he, nor the president of YU were invited to the conference in Leiden in honour of the retirement of

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[91] cf Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009); Director of Archaeological Conservation for Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia of the World Monument Fund (Amman, July 2009); Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009).

[92] Dutch co-director of the Joint Project, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University (pers. comm. Leiden, November 2011).

[93] Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities, Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

[94] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

the Dutch co-director, something which they regarded as an insult to the Joint Project; "now this is the end of the Project, but is should have been a new beginning."[95] Soon after, the Head of the Anthropology Department of the Faculty of Anthropology and Archaeology of YU gave such feelings of resentment a more dramatic touch by informally stressing out the new intentions of both YU and the DoA to renew their agreement, without Leiden, and to support the re-birth of the local DASAS with the following words; "I believe in the public domain, in Jordan – not in foreigners."[96]

In order to understand why the Joint Project, despite its many successes, and despite its dedication, could not fully achieve its desire for equal partnerships, public archaeology, local community involvement and sustainable heritage management, and in order to understand how the perspectives of success and collaboration could differ and change so drastically, it is necessary to look in detail to the historic development, the socio-economic and institutional frameworks, the discursive practices, and the value-negotiations between the actors in the Joint Project. But before I do this, I briefly wish to focus on the relationship of archaeological theory with its practice, since it helps us in problematizing the notion that the limitations of the Joint Project are simply the result of the applied archaeological theory and methodology, a view that can sometimes be heard in the instrumental critiques on the social context of archaeology (see sections 1.4 and 2.5). In addition, it illustrates the influence of the personal backgrounds of actors on the scope and implementation of archaeological activities.

4.3.2 ARCHAEOLOGICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

If one would analyse the Joint Project purely from the theoretical and instrumental perspective without challenging the implicit assumptions within these perspectives of a one-to-one relationship between theory and practice, and without taking into account the personal and historical backgrounds of the actors involved (see sections 1.4, 2.5 and 2.6), one might come to a conclusion that the Joint Project would be un-sensitive to local collaborative issues. I say this, because the major theoretical framework in which the Dutch archaeologists in the project operate, has always been very much processual in terms of actual field-methodology and interpretation. Postcolonial, post-processual and indigenous archaeologies that call for increasing multi-vocality and local participation (see chapter 2) were not actively sought after in the interpretation of archaeological data, nor were such approaches mentioned in any of the publications since 1960 – which is, in relation to the earliest phases of the project, not so strange considering most of these approaches and methodologies developed from roughly the 1980's and 1990's onwards.

The theoretical and methodological framework in which the Deir Alla Project and later the Joint Project operated, had always at its core a strong positivistic, scientific and chrono-stratigraphic approach to the interpretation of archaeological data, as well as an aim to provide for an independent, neutral, and scientifically 'objective' archaeological science in Jordan. This approach can be traced back to the first initiator of the project (the late Henk Franken), is reflected in the theoretical ramifications of his former student who became the next co-director, and in the writings of those Jordanian academic archaeologists that became involved in the Joint Project. This belief in a 'value-free', neutral archaeology, has however been named as lying at the basis of several marginalising and colonial archaeological heritage practices in post-colonial contexts (see sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). Indeed, one might argue that it is actually the anchor stone against which post-processual, post-modern, post-colonial, social, critical and indigenous archaeological theories have developed. The question at stake therefore, is whether a processual archaeology, and a belief in a neutral archaeological science, is by definition 'un-sensitive' to local

[95] Amman, November 2009.

[96] Irbid, November 2009.

collaborative issues if it does not actively and discursively acknowledge the notion of subjectivity of archaeological interpretations, and the need for encouraging and facilitating multivocal and subaltern views of the past. In other words, does it automatically exclude decolonizing methodologies such as collaborative archaeology?

When Henk Franken (1917-2005) started the project in 1959 out of the Faculty of Theology at Leiden University, he set out to illustrate that the contemporary biblical archaeology was too much dependent, and influenced, by biblical history (Franken 1970; 1976; Van der Kooij 2007b, 10). In response to his critique on the archaeological practice of that time, Henk Franken developed a stratigraphic approach for relative chronology, and an independent type of pottery studies to understand changes and thus to justify pottery-chronology (Van der Kooij 2006, 12; Franken 1969). Franken's critical ideas about the value of archaeology, are probably best reflected in his inaugural speech as Professor at Leiden University in 1964. For him, "biblical archaeology .. would consist of capita selecta from the archaeology of greater Syria, not chosen to throw light upon passages from the bible, but chosen to get an image of the cultures from biblical times" (quoted in Van der Kooij 2006, 11). His approach could probably be defined as an early form of processual archaeology with cultural-historic elements, and one which strongly believed in archaeology as a neutral science as an answer to more religious and politically influenced interpretations. This approach taken by Franken is probably best understood by looking not simply at his archaeological beliefs, but also at his personal background.

Figure 07. Deir Alla excavations, 1960's (Deir Alla Archive, Leiden University; courtesy Gerrit van der Kooij).

Henk Franken studied Theology and Ancient Hebrew at Amsterdam University, after which he undertook courses in Anthropology in advance of becoming a missionary for a protestant church on Bali (ibid., 11). His encounters with local belief systems in a non-western society, together with his background as an active member of the Dutch resistance during WWII, was a period that strongly defined his life. This personal background, together with his interest in the German Critical phenomological approach to the Old Testament, and in combination with his "sceptic or critical attitude to some established authorities and opinions" (ibid., 11) made him not only a creative archaeologist but were probably also at the basis of his increasingly clear opinions about the political connections of archaeology in the Near East; "Franken's critical attitude towards conservative biblical approaches and the political impact of it and justification of it became stronger when the social effects of this approach became visible in the Palestinian drama during and after the 1967 war" (ibid., 12) . These views were expressed clearly in Franken's publications such as 'The other side of the Jordan' (Franken 1970), and 'The problem of identification in Biblical Archaeology' (Franken 1976).

Franken's approach had important implications for the Joint Project. His emphasis on an independence from conservative biblical approaches also meant for him, because of its connection with western interests in the region, contributing to the development of an independent national archaeology in Jordan. As such, it was his alternative approach to biblical archaeology that played an important role in the forming of a Joint Project with the DoA in 1976:

> we started the joint project in 1976. <...> The Deir Alla project was noticeably different from the other projects of that time <...> Most projects were concentrated on the Iron Age, to explore the biblical history or the relationship of archaeology with the biblical account <…> I thought Henk Franken was trying to divert from that line, he was trying to do proper archaeology, proper stratigraphy, proper pottery typology and stratigraphy.[97]

The idea of a 'proper archaeology' that is independent from overly political connotations or biblical interpretations is still an important reason why the Project is appreciated;

> Clearly, many foreigners, like the Germans and Americans, are working with biblical questions. <… > But I can't see this as academic. We have the task to understand the human past. This should be the concern of everybody working in archaeology. Now, it is evident, that most of the teams that work in Jordan, they are not working with academic questions. They dig according to the law, but their interpretations are done by themselves, from a theological perspective. I think this is wrong. Unfortunately, when we give licenses, we can't influence their interpretations. It is just that these teams, they are not concerned with the Jordanian side. So, the Jordanians give them permissions, send representatives on the site to look if everything is done according to the law, but they are not involved in the interpretations, so we are not a partner. We can only be a real Jordanian partner if we are actually really involved, not only in excavation, but also in the interpretation. I think there are only a very few examples of that, like the project in Deir Alla.[98]

The early form of a processual approach by Franken, combined with his aim for an independent archaeology in Jordan, was also reflected in the approaches by his followers. In the words of the current

[97] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project and Head of Excavation and Research at the Department of Antiquities in 1976 (Amman, November 2009).

[98] Deputy Dean of Research and Science, Yarmouk University (Irbid, July 2009). Previously involved with the Joint Project (for example during the early 2000's) as a representative of Yarmouk University.

co-director of the Joint Project from Leiden University, his field-practices and interpretations can best be described as positivistic and processual; "the hypothetical deductive method is holy to me, but I also consider myself as post-modern".[99] The reference to the 'post-modernity' in here, then relates to the belief in how an objective, processual and non-biblical archaeological method can support the creation of an independent Jordanian archaeology "in the fight against irrational, socially damaging views of archaeological 'populists' to claim, or colonise, history for themselves".[100] Influenced not by direct ethical codes, nor reflected in his direct interpretations of the archaeological data in his publications, is the fact that the Dutch co-director combines the processual method with a strong dedication for an independent Jordanian archaeology, without actively seeking a multivocal or post-prosessual approach.[101]

The use of a processual archaeology has subsequently been regarded by the academic archaeologists from both the Dutch side as well as from the Jordanian side, as a 'decolonizing' methodology that provides a value-free interpretation of the past, disconnected from political or religious connotations. Indeed, it is the 'neutral' and 'proper' processual archaeology that is sought after and appreciated by the Jordanian academic counterparts, that was at the basis of the Joint Project, and that played an historic role in the attempts by the Dutch archaeologists to form an independent Jordanian archaeology. In addition, the application of the processual methodology by the Dutch archaeologists has been a fundament of the training of the students and archaeologists of Jordan, something that was, and is, actively sought after by both YU as well as the DoA.

Still, from a critical, theoretical archaeological perspective it would be difficult to label the archaeological theory, practice and methodology of the Joint Project as entirely 'postcolonial', due to its lack of focus on encouraging and facilitating multivocal and local, subaltern views of the past and the active dismantling of power structures in the research process. What is striking in this sense, is that the archaeological interpretation is presently mostly undertaken by academic experts; as of today, the local community is not involved in the interpretation of the data, nor in the active (re-) writing of history, which would be necessary from especially the indigenous, subaltern and multivocal theoretical approaches to archaeology. However, this does not necessarily form an ethical problem from the perspective of identity politics, since the local Palestinian community at Deir Alla is not marginalised by the Jordanian State through means of archaeological interpretations, and since the local community does not identify itself in the first place with the history of the Tell, but rather with its status of a refugee and its desires and hopes of 'facing home' (Van Aken 2003).

However, it is worth repeating here some of the discussions in section 2.2.1 on the issue of community collaboration, where it was proposed that the practical claims that local communities bring to the archaeological process are not necessarily different from those of descendant and indigenous communities. What this means, is that whilst community-based archaeology can be regarded as a 'useful point of entry for a decolonizing methodology' due to its proven capacity to challenge and dismantle research-based power structures (Rizvi 2008, 120; but see also Greer *et al.* 2002; Marshall 2002; Moser *et al.* 2002), this does not always have to include the idea that community-based archaeology should entail the active re-writing of local histories (see e.g. Hollowell & Nicholas 2009; Moser *et al.* 2002). However, what it *does* entail, I believe, is that such a methodology necessitates the active engagement with community concerns;

[99] Dutch co-director of the Joint Project, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University (Leiden, April 2009).

[100] Dutch co-director of the Joint Project, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University (pers. comm. Leiden, November 2011).

[101] This view was extensively discussed with the Dutch co-director during an interview in Leiden (January 2009).

"in other words, simultaneous to the archaeological project is a development of heritage, identity, and, in most cases, tourism" (Rizvi 2008, 120-121).

In this sense, it is worth noting that the Joint Project has tried to take this 'decolonisation' on board by stressing the marginalised position of local communities in a wider, socio-economic sense, most notably through its intentions to develop a Regional Research Centre and Museum as to facilitate the appreciation of the local way of life in special, hard circumstances in the Jordan Valley, and by bringing pride and tourism benefits amongst local people. As such, the Joint Project has arguably brought forward a different approach to a postcolonial archaeological conduct, one that combines the belief in a value-free processual archaeology as a form of capacity building with an equal wish, since the early 1990's, for heritage management issues such as presentation, the protection of archaeological resources, and tourism development.

As we will see however, the approach by the Joint Project towards the 'decolonisation' of archaeological practice has focused primarily on institutional collaboration and capacity building with Jordanian counterparts. As such, it is worth noting that the dedication for the development of an independent, Jordanian archaeology has lead primarily to a situation in which academic experts are part of the interpretations and research process. In addition, these experts mostly consist of academic archaeologists from Leiden University and Yarmouk University, and less of archaeologists of the DoA, whose main contribution remains in the field of facilitation and administration.

As we will see, the success of implementing this combined vision of a neutral, independent and 'value-free' archaeology with institutional collaboration and heritage management, was hampered by the fact that it resulted mostly into a situation in which research benefits continued to be geared towards academic archaeologists of LU and YU, and in which the values, desires and needs of other actors in society, such as the DoA and the local community, were (often unintentionally) excluded from the archaeological project process. The underlying reason for this should, partly, be sought in a discourse on archaeology and heritage management that prioritises the archaeological, universal and scientific value of the archaeological record, and that is based upon a notion of archaeological heritage as a material scientific resource, of local community benefits and involvement as an end-product, and of the (foreign) archaeologist as an 'expert' decision-maker.

4.4 THE AUTHORISED ARCHAEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

4.4.1 THE AUTHORISED ARCHAEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

This section will look in more detail at the values and discourses of actors in the project policies of the Joint Project. I will argue that the main project policies and actors bring forward a dominating discourse that inherently favours scientific and archaeological values over other values. I will also illustrate how this discourse, in combination with institutional, historical and political frameworks and the agency of actors, contributes to a project network and value-system whereby other stakeholders' values are excluded and postponed, despite the intentions by the Joint Project to achieve an integrated and holistic collaborative archaeological conduct. Finally, I will illustrate how the discourse works to maintain the privileged position of archaeologists as experts for identifying values of a place, thereby ensuring intellectual and physical access and ownership.

I will generalise the characterisation of this discourse, for practical matters, as the 'Authorised Archaeological Discourse' (AAD) (cf Smith 2006; Waterton *et al.* 2006; see below). It should however be kept in mind that an abbreviation like the 'AAD' does not imply a fixed discourse through both space and time that orientates practice like some 'dictatorial' organising structure in which actors are simply reduced to radars in a tight network. As I have discussed in chapter 2.6, such a notion does not comply with my views on discourses, nor with my interpretations and descriptions of the network realities, nor does it do justice to the intentions and motivations of individual actors. As will be illustrated below, the workings of discourses are far more complex than this.

I wish to stress here that the AAD closely resembles the 'Authorised Heritage Discourse' (AHD) of Laurajane Smith (2006; see section 2.4), and that it shares many of its story-lines, but that it differs in several ways. The AHD focuses primarily on policy discourses in terms of the preservation and conservation of (cultural) heritage, and the way in which archaeologists and politicians have used such a discourse to claim 'expert' privilege over its management, and on how through the hegemony of the AHD over alternative, competing, subaltern discourses, social inequalities have arisen over the interpretation and management of 'heritage' (Smith 2006). Such a discourse will be heavily integrated in my description of the AAD, (in fact, it incorporates many of its values and story-lines, and I wholeheartedly acknowledge the way in which the work by Smith has influenced my interpretations), but my use of the AAD differs in that it primarily focuses not so much on 'heritage policies', but rather on 'archaeological project policies' – that is, more specifically, on the policy discourses surrounding the undertaking of archaeological research projects. As such, the AAD could be regarded as being comprised of a set of discursive story-lines and values; on archaeological research, on heritage (management), and on project collaboration.

I hereby wish to distance myself from a reading of the work of Smith, that archaeologists necessarily would intentionally seek the attribution of ownership and expertise – I think such a reading ignores the personal and historical backgrounds of archaeologists, and the dedication, hopes and desires by these archaeologists to achieve an ethical and public archaeology. Rather, I think that such 'good intentions' (cf LaSalle 2010) are partly limited by a discursive process that is institutionalised in the different organisations, government bodies, funding schemes and policies that frame archaeological research projects abroad. Still, the AAD could also be found in the policies, writings, discussions and practices of the students and archaeologists of the Joint Project – and then sometimes connected to a need to maintain institutional relationships, access and ownership to archaeological research benefits and resources, something that I will illustrate below. First, however, I will summarise the AAD as it appears in the project policies of the Joint Project; subsequently, I will delve deeper into the way in which this discourse relates to alternative values and discourses, by describing the processes by which actors construct, negotiate and translate values and discourses in relation to those of others in society. After this, I will describe how this process of policy negotiation contributed to a system of (often unintended) 'exclusionary mechanisms' (Duineveld *et al*. 2012) that supported a prioritisation of scientific and archaeological values and a relative closure of the project network towards certain governmental and local actors.

The Authorised Archaeology Discourse (AAD) basically prioritises the archaeological and scientific values of a site and/or project over possible other ascribed values – be it social values, tourism values, natural values, educational values, economic values and so on. It does this by bringing forward a discursive story-line that approaches sites with material remains of the past as a fragile, non-renewable resource under threat that has the potential to yield scientific, objective interpretations and knowledge of the past. It is in



Figure 08. Visual conceptualisation of the Authorised Archaeological Discourse.

line with this view, that the concept of 'heritage' is discursively constructed in the AAD; material remains of the past are regarded as 'archaeological heritage', and in turn, 'heritage' is thought of to be constituted of material manifestations of the past. The ascribing of the archaeological value to the site then works in such a way, that it is advocated that such an archaeological value can only be brought to light, 'unearthed' if you like, by undertaking active scientific research, often implicitly favouring archaeological fieldwork. What is noticeable, then, is the belief that the results of such research yield knowledge that is of 'universal value', thereby justifying the resources and activities spent on the archaeological process, and regarding the archaeological process as such as something that yields public benefit. The AAD proposes that an increase in knowledge not only enhances the archaeological value of the resource, but also that knowledge irrevocably raises more research questions, that have to be answered in order to increase the universal value of knowledge for the greater public – a process, that often works in a cyclical fashion until it is agreed that the archaeological value of the resource has reached a 'finished' stage. This stage should, of course, be considered a subjective notion, often ignored during the archaeologist's dedication and heartfelt thirst for more fieldwork, interpretations and analyses. Still, the belief is that once the archaeological value of a resource has been established, it then becomes important to protect, consolidate and manage the site, after which this 'heritage site' as a source of knowledge of the past, can be presented, interpreted and attract visitors, thereby providing even more 'public benefit'. If done correctly, such interaction of the public with the archaeological value of the site will then ideally lead to enlarge their support, awareness and care for 'their archaeological heritage', thereby ensuring the survival of the scientific data set from ignorance, destruction and development.

But what the AAD does (see Figure 08), is effectively excluding other values and actors from the beginning, such as for example educational and social values, because these are regarded as values that should be addressed after the archaeological value and knowledge is produced and the site is protected and presented. The involvement of other actors and values, and the protection, conservation, interpretation and tourism development of the site are hereby often postponed to the final stages of archaeological fieldwork. Unfortunately, as we will see, this can be a phase in which the limited amount of available resources, time and expertise are sometimes not sufficient to do these other values and actors justice – leading, in the worst scenario, to an abandoned, destroyed, perhaps even 'value-less' archaeological site. Secondly, the AAD brings forward a story-line that sees the archaeologist as an expert to identify the archaeological value in the first phases of the cycle, since he or she can 'unearth' the archaeological value. Because archaeologists work at a site for a certain time, because they are dedicated to it, because they are the ones who know much about the history and archaeology of the site, and because they have the most access to the knowledge produced, they are regarded by the AAD as the experts to speak for the past, and are attributed a certain amount of ownership to the site and decision-making power over which values to include and at what stage of the project process. This does not necessarily mean that the individual archaeologist wants this attribution of expertise and ownership – rather, my point here is that they are attributed this through the discursive processes in which they operate. Taken together, the AAD prioritises expert values, knowledge of a universally significant past, and objective scientific research over alternative values when investigating and/or managing a heritage site in a collaborative project.

Again, I don't uphold that all archaeologists advocate this discourse. Rather, I will illustrate that the AAD is embedded in the project policies of the Joint Project; it constitutes a dominant value-system and set of story-lines that are also reflected within the policies of the Faculty of Archaeology of Leiden University, of Yarmouk University (and to a certain degree also the DoA), as well as within the statements and actions of many project actors. As we will see, it is therefore very difficult for individual actors to 'break out' of this discursive process, particularly in relation to the attribution of expertise. We will now look at some examples from the Joint Project to illustrate the existence and workings of the AAD.

4.4.2 ALL VALUES ARE EQUAL, BUT SOME VALUES ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS

This section will provide some examples of the AAD within the Joint Project, focusing in particular on how this leads to discursive processes and practices whereby the academic archaeologists from both the LU and YU ascribe and prioritise mainly the archaeological and scientific values to the Joint Project, to Tell Deir Alla and to archaeological heritage matters in Jordan more generally. In the following sections, I will focus in more detail on how these actors subsequently negotiate, translate and represent the AAD and related value-systems in relation to other actors in society.

In general, the AAD brings forward a story-line that sites with material remains of the past are 'value-less' until archaeological research is undertaken, and that such sites exist primarily of archaeological resources in the form of scientific data as a fragile resource under constant threat. Elements of such a story-line could for example be found in statements by archaeologists from the Joint Project;

> Virgin sites do not mean anything. We need more excavations.[102]

[102] Senior archaeologist of the Joint Project (Deir Alla, May 2009).

> A Tell without archaeology is a dead mountain.[103]

> Further research on Tell-Hammeh is urgent and highly desirable due to the scientific value of research and the threatened situation of the heritage site.[104]

The prioritisation of archaeological and scientific values can also be seen in the definition of an archaeological site or monument in the official institutional policy of the Department of Antiquities in Jordan;

> Archaeological remains are both sites and buildings of archaeological significance. <...> There are also sites that are well known but have not yet had the attention of scholarly research. Finally, there are hundreds of sites <...> whose significance cannot be assessed until they are studied.[105]

The idea that a site is mainly significant because of its archaeological and scientific value, seems perhaps logical when seen from the perspective of the DoA – however, it must be realised that the DoA falls under the Ministry of Tourism, and is, by law, also responsible for the protection and presentation of the archaeological resources in Jordan for tourism, economic development and national identity purposes. I will look at the difficult relationship between the DoA and the Ministry of Tourism, and the complex use of the AAD within the DoA, later in further detail.

Through the prioritisation of scientific and archaeological values, the AAD also inherently favours more excavations, more research and more publications. This is already hinted at within for example the definition of an archaeological site above, but can for example also be found in the project proposals by the Joint Project of 1998 and 2000, which were submitted by LU and YU to the DoA. In these proposals, the 'importance' of the Joint Project and the site of Deir Alla is specifically mentioned;

> The importance of the project, and the site, so far, is shown, <...> in the following fields; – archaeological method; <...> ecological and agricultural archaeology; <...> cultural and social archaeology; <...> history and philology; <...> To this scholarly importance may be added the importance of the project for multidisciplinary teaching and training purposes, both in field-work and study.[106]

The main aims of the Joint Project are as such discursively constructed through stressing the archaeological and scientific values, and by framing further training benefits that can be derived from this. Inherently, this emphasis automatically assumes that benefits will be produced in the form of publications, which will then lead to a necessity of further fieldwork. What is striking about the discourse used in these proposals is the inherent story-line that archaeological and scientific values attributed to the site lead seamlessly to research aims, to necessary excavation, to publications, which then automatically make further research aims and excavations and publications necessary again. According to the 1994 project proposal by the Joint Project,

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[103] Representative of the Department of Antiquities for the Joint Project (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[104] On page 3 of the unpublished Joint Project Project Proposal for the 2000 fieldwork season, handed in to the DoA in 2000. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[105] Institutional policy, Department of Antiquities. Available at: http://www.doa.jo/doa1.htm [Accessed 6 January 2010].

[106] Unpublished Joint Project Project Proposal for the 1998 fieldwork season, handed in to the DoA in 1998, pp. 4-5. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

> the main aim <of the work in the 1960's> was the establishment of a new method of pottery studies <...> This aim resulted in the publications <...> This last publication shows that <...> For that reason the excavated area was extended <...> resulting in the publication of the Balaam text from Deir Alla <which> made it necessary to extend the research area again.[107]

Similar perspectives can be found in other proposals as well, where a story-line is used which implies that research results 'demand', or 'make necessary' further excavations and research; "The Deir Alla results demanded <...> a research-branch of intensive surveying of the neighbourhood .. with site-probing", and "Iron-production data from Tell-Hammeh studies <...> made additional studies necessary".[108]

An emphasis on the production of knowledge can not only be seen in the amount of publications that derived from the Joint Project, but also in the amount of MA-dissertations, PhD's and institutional promotions that followed through this. As stated by a Dutch archaeological supervisor of the Joint Project;

> In 1996 I went for the first time to Deir Alla. I wanted to do something with Iron-production for my MA thesis, so I went to Tell Hammeh. It has been my life since, and it was at the centre of my PhD, and now, as a post-doc, again.[109]

The emphasis on publications as research benefits, as well as on the training of students, is – as we will discuss in more detail in section 4.6 – encouraged by the fact that the institutional and external funding policies of the Joint Project are especially geared toward this, dealing with a notion of archaeology mainly from a scientific disciplinary perspective.

The undertaking of archaeological excavations for scientific benefits is often accompanied by the story-line that knowledge has an inherent, universal public value. The AAD thereby favours short-term research benefits as a means of providing universal, long-term public benefits in the form of knowledge production; "Archaeology produces knowledge, and knowledge is of universal value",[110] according to a senior Jordanian archaeologist of YU related to the Joint Project. Similarly, it was often mentioned by the co-directors and other archaeologists of the Joint Project, that archaeological knowledge belongs to 'the whole world' or 'to all people'. Such a belief in the universal value of knowledge was then often linked to the previously discussed aim of the Joint Project to undertake objective, neutral and scientific research, illustrating its belief in processual archaeology as a valuable means of archaeological collaboration.

The discursive notion of a 'shared universal benefit' deriving out of scientific reports in terms of contributing to the writing of Jordanian history was however not perceived as such by everyone. To understand this, we have to look at the actual beneficiaries of such work.[111] For example, in the perspective of the DoA the process of archaeological knowledge production was not benefiting the writing of Jordanian history;

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[107] Unpublished Joint Project Project Proposal for the 1994 fieldwork season, handed in to the DoA in 1994, pp. 1. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[108] Unpublished Joint Project Project Proposal for the 2000 fieldwork season, handed in to the DoA in 2000. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[109] Dutch Supervisor of Tell Hammeh of the Joint Project (Tell Hammeh, June 2009).

[110] Senior Archaeologist and Surveyor of the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology of Yarmouk University (Deir Alla, July 2009).

[111] I will touch upon some perceptions related to this now, but will discuss this in more detail throughout this chapter.

> Publications are not their best side. But they are never in archaeology. We are still waiting for a lot of reports from the project – without them, what is the benefit for the Jordanian public? Also, all of their publications are academic. There is no public dissemination and awareness.[112]

The possible benefits of archaeological interpretations and research are also, as of yet, not filtering through effectively to the local community in the form of knowledge transfer or educational programmes. We have touched upon this above, where local school teachers, librarians and local workmen of the Deir Alla region mentioned that they had no access to the knowledge produced – a process relating to the fact that 'local' archaeology does not play a significant role in Jordanian curricula (Al-Husban 2006; Badran 2006).

Interestingly, it was mentioned by several Jordanian archaeologists that were not part of the Joint Project, that the present utility of archaeological knowledge in Jordan should also be seen in the personal and institutional benefits that publications yield for the author; "Why do Jordanian archaeologists dig? Because when they dig, they get reports, they get material, they can write articles, they can get promoted. It is an individual thing".[113] Supporting this perspective, is the situation that some Jordanian archaeologists criticised the Joint Project for not yielding equal scientific benefits. Indeed, the amount of publications by Dutch archaeologists deriving out of the Joint Project are greater than those of Jordanian scholars. Unfortunately, the same could be said for the amount of students trained by the Joint Project.[114]

The perception that benefits deriving from research were mainly favouring archaeologists, and not the Jordanian public at large, was also brought forward by the Head of Excavations and Research of the DoA, when he mentioned that archaeologists are only concerned with publishing their findings and training their students.[115] The Director of the DoA brought forward a similar perspective, when he referred to this as "selfish academic interests".[116] We will see below, that such perceptions should be seen in relation to the fact that the DoA felt excluded from these benefits after a certain powerful individual left the DoA – thereby taking the research benefits of the Joint Project with him to YU. Still, it shows how the story-line of the AAD that emphasises knowledge production as a shared universal valued sits in contrast to a perception that the archaeological process primarily creates personal academic benefits. When asked what he thought the main aim of the Joint Project was, the local manager of DASAS in Deir Alla, who has worked at the project for over 15 years, said: "The aim is clear. You bring students, they become doctors and professors."[117]

The project policies also mention the need for conservation and developing the site for tourist purposes, aims that fit the values and discourse of the DoA, as we will discuss below;

> On the other hand care should also be taken of the preservation of the site. This season some consolidations will be prepared, but plans are being made to restore several houses of the phase IX settlement, and some remains of the later phases, as well as buildings of the late Bronze Age

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[112] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009)

[113] Associate Professor of Anthropology, Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Irbid, November 2009).

[114] This statement was based upon a global survey of mentioned publications and project staff members in the Joint Project reports. Since this showed an incomplete picture from especially the Jordanian institutional partners, this statemement was subsequently discussed, and confirmed, by the main archaeological actors of the DoA, YU and LU.

[115] Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities (Amman, June 2009).

[116] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

[117] Local DASAS manager, inhabitant of Deir Alla (Deir Alla, July 2009).

> (temple) complex. This is going together with the care taken by the Department of Antiquities to protect the site and prepare it for extensive tourism visits.[118]

What is striking, is that the emphasis here is not just on future planning, but rather that the same passages were re-used almost unchanged in all project proposals of the 1990's – not only illustrating that it is difficult to implement such heritage management activities, but also inherently emphasising, in my opinion, the idea that site conservation, presentation and tourism development is an end-product rather than an inherent process. The idea in the management proposals of the Joint Project, and one that is reflected in the AAD and in the prioritisation of activities by the DoA (see section 4.5.2), is that first the archaeological value of the site needs to be produced, or enhanced by means of knowledge production, after which the site can be restored – only then can the public be brought into the process. As mentioned by a member of the Joint Project; "We need to know more about history, then we should protect and develop tourism."[119]

The story-line of creating public benefit through education and tourism, after the archaeologists have done their work, is also implicit in the ideas for developing an archaeological interpretation centre at DASAS, as well as in the ideas for establishing the Regional Research Centre and Museum. In this sense, it is worth noting that DASAS was set up in the early 80's with the aim that it might be turned into a museum after 2000. These plans changed however in the early 90's, when it was felt that the vision of a museum would be better served by dedicating the Joint Project's efforts to the establishment of a separate, larger and more holistic Regional Research Centre and Museum. As we have seen, this museum has unfortunately, and despite years of dedication, not come to fruition. Still, it can be noted that, firstly, the production of these interpretive facilities is postponed to the future, and secondly, that it is implicitly assumed that these are the most effective way of ensuring public benefit. That this is not felt per se as such by the local community, could therefore be seen as a critique on the AAD. In the words of a local fieldworker for example; "We don't go to museums – for that, you need time and money. We have other concerns".[120]

Currently, visitors to the small interpretation centre at DASAS mostly exist of a handful of international tourists and archaeological specialists. Still, from a public archaeological perspective, there are other options available, such as involving the community in the actual archaeological process and interpretation, involving them in the formulation of research questions, and in a management approach that continuously provides interpretive materials to the public whilst the archaeological work is in process (cf Williams & Van der Linde 2006). Current insights in archaeological education literature, also call for an interactive, hands-on and evidence-based approach to education by means of involving school groups in the actual process of archaeology (see for example Corbishley *et al.* 2004; Henson 2004; Smardz 2004). The postponing of the public benefit of archaeology after the excavations and publications have been written, has, in contrast, in the case of the Joint Project unfortunately led to a situation where the interpretive and educational opportunities are still underdeveloped after 50 years of excavations.

A related story-line in the AAD is the perception of education of the local community as a means to protect the site, instead of providing educational benefits for the community per se. I believe that this hints at an understanding that the archaeological sites or resources must be protected mainly for their archaeological and scientific value (cf Oliva 1994), which is clearly mentioned in the project proposals of 2000; here it

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[118] Unpublished Joint Project Project Proposal for the 1998 fieldwork season, handed in to the DoA in 1998, p. 5. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[119] Representative of the Department of Antiquities for the Joint Project (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[120] Local field worker of the Joint Project at the Deir Alla excavations (Deir Alla, July 2009)

was mentioned that the project aims "to educate local people to appreciate and protect antiquities".[121] This could also be heard during some of the interviews I had with the Jordanian co-director; "I think the involvement of the local community in Deir Alla helped a lot. There is no illicit excavation on the site, whilst it is happening all over Jordan."[122] Similar perspectives could also be heard by a Dutch senior archaeologist, when discussing the reasons as for why the Joint Project was not allowed to undertake surveys in neighbouring land due to a lack of permission by the local land owners; "These farmers should be educated by the Department of Antiquities – they think we are looking for gold, they always think that. But we want to do surveys, and these are non-destructive. We should educate the community to protect their heritage".[123] I do not want to suggest here that creating a sense of care within the local community and the visitors to an archaeological site can not be an important effect of educational and interpretive programmes; rather, I wish to point out that it is regarded as the main aim of outreach in the AAD, instead of as a by-product of creating educational and socio-economic benefits for the public. Although I will look at this later, it might be interesting to refer to a statement by the mayor of the Deir Alla municipality in this regard;

> I don't think archaeology is one of the highest priorities for the people here, because in their circumstances, and the global crisis now, people are now looking for opportunities, jobs, careers; archaeology comes as a last priority. The first thing people think about is to get a job, the second thing is to get a house, then to get married, to have a family, to organise themselves, then maybe to visit something, then maybe to be concerned about it, this is the last thing.[124]

The postponing of public benefits, and the emphasis on preserving archaeological significance, can, I believe, also be clearly seen in the repeated story-line of the AAD that states that 'archaeological heritage should be preserved for future generations'. This story-line was used by many archaeologists of the Joint Project, but is also reflected in the policies, conventions and charters of heritage organisations worldwide (cf Lafrenz Samuels 2008; Smith 2006; Waterton *et al.* 2006). This story-line could often be heard during my interviews, and I think is reflected in the prioritisation of activities of the Joint Project, where the creation of knowledge and the preservation of archaeological resources gain priority over the education and/or enjoyment of knowledge and the active use of archaeological resources by the public at large. Inherently, this story-line of the AAD also means, by its own logic, that the emphasis on 'future generations' might refer to future generations of 'archaeologists'. In addition, a discursive emphasis on future generations means that the needs and wishes of contemporary generations can become overlooked.[125] In general, my point here is to illustrate how this story-line has become embedded in the AAD, and how it can lead to a situation where short-term archaeological and scientific benefits for archaeologists and future generations becomes prioritised over the educational and socio-economic benefits of the present generations of the Jordanian public at large.

It was discussed above how the AAD implicitly excludes the involvement of other values and actors in the first steps of the archaeological process cycle, effectively postponing the interaction with other values to the final stages of the archaeological process. Inherent to this is the story-line in the AAD that

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[121] Unpublished Joint Project Project Proposal for the 2000 fieldwork season, handed in to the DoA in 2000, page 6. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[122] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1996 - 2009, Professor of Archaeology at the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[123] Dutch senior archaeologist of the Joint Project (Deir Alla, May 2009).

[124] Mayor of the Municipality ('Department') of Deir Alla (Swalha, July 2009).

[125] See section 5.5 for a discussion on these issues in relation to the case study in Curaçao.

archaeologists are the prime experts to act on behalf of the public when dealing with archaeological 'heritage' matters. The Jordanian co-director of the 2009 season for instance questioned; "Why should we include the local mayor? To do what? He does not know anything about archaeology".[126] Such statements are the result of the fact that sites with material remains of the past are regarded as fragile scientific resources (or data) under threat, that takes objective, neutral and professional merit to investigate. Because of the prioritisation of the archaeological value over other values, and because of the belief that an archaeological site's significance can only be assessed by increasing the archaeological knowledge that the resources can yield, the archaeologist is as such often regarded as the actor with the necessary expertise to identify this archaeological value. Inherently, it also puts the archaeological expert into a position where he or she is given a position in which to decide which actions, values and steps in the management of archaeological sites should be given priority; the director of the regional Jordan Valley Office of the DoA for instance mentioned that "we should wait for <the Dutch co-director> to tell us what to do here, what to protect and present, and how to do it".[127] As a consequence, this contributes to a situation in which archaeologists are also given a certain intellectual and physical ownership over the site. The identification of the archaeologist with the archaeological site, and the granting of ownership, access and expertise, is, I believe, not necessarily a deliberate and conscious process by the archaeologists themselves. Rather, I believe that because of this specific story-line of the AAD, the archaeologist is granted this position, despite his or her own views and wishes in this regard – something that became very clear when discussing this issue with the current Dutch co-director.

During my fieldwork in Jordan, but strengthened by my experiences in other countries and archaeological institutions (see section 1.4), I often encountered the fact that archaeologists and students have a tendency to identify themselves with the specific site, square or collection that they work on, but also with the subsequent data and knowledge deriving from such fieldwork. The archaeologists of the Joint Project, for example, often used phrases such as "On my site, Tell Hammeh, my data showed that..".[128] This seems, at first, rather innocent, but it also works through in actual fieldwork practices to a situation in which students and archaeologists felt uneasy to interpret, or deal with archaeological data that 'belongs to someone else'. On a larger scale, and when discussing the Joint Project with other European archaeologists, it was often mentioned that Tell Deir Alla was 'a Dutch site', and that the findings were 'Dutch discoveries'. However, this is not just a European phenomenon – such statements could also be heard by the Jordanian members of the Joint Project. Similarly, during an archaeological field-trip through Jordan, specific Tells were also often identified with the nationalities of the specific archaeological teams working there; "This here, is a French site. That Tell over there is German".[129] I believe however, that such thinking also works through on a more fundamental level, in which certain archaeologists feel uneasy to work on, or interpret, the archaeological resources and findings of other archaeologists; "How could I do anything at Deir Alla? It is the Tell of the Dutch".[130] Likewise, during a short presentation about the Joint Project at a meeting of the 'Friends of Archaeology and Heritage in Jordan' in Amman in the summer of 2009, it was remarked by one archaeologist that another was "interfering with the interpretations of our Tell".[131]

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[126] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1996 - 2009, Professor of Archaeology at the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[127] Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009.

[128] Dutch archaeologist of the Joint Project (Deir Alla, May 2009).

[129] Dutch MA student of the Faculty of Archaeology Leiden University (May 2009).

[130] English archaeologist at the British Institute in Amman (Amman, November 2009).

[131] Dutch archaeologist of the Joint Project (Deir Alla, June 2009).

Throughout this chapter, I will return in more detail on the impact of this element of the AAD whereby archaeologists, as experts, are tied to archaeological resources and scientific by-products. Part of this is due to the way in which actors negotiate, translate and construct the AAD in relation to other actors in society. This will be investigated in the coming section.

4.5 POLICY NEGOTIATIONS

4.5.1 THE TRANSLATION OF VALUES

During the first phase of the project, the site of Tell Deir Alla was valued mainly because of its scientific and archaeological potential. It is difficult to retrieve the exact motivations by Franken for the choice of location of Deir Alla due to a lack of available written personal reflections, but from interviews with some of his former students, I believe it safe to conclude that Franken chose the site of Deir Alla because he believed that it would provide abundant archaeological data that fitted his scientific interest. The pottery found during archaeological surveys in 1960 and 1961, coupled with several small test trenches, together with the size of the Tell, would have provided enough potential to start an archaeological investigation aimed at investigating the transition of the Late-Bronze Age to Early-Iron age (ca 1200BC). In addition, as a 'mudbrick-site', Deir Alla offered the potential for an archaeological methodology that followed a strict chrono-stratigraphical approach based on pottery. The close distance to Tell Es-Sultan, where Franken worked during the 1950's with Kathleen Kenyon, and the relative easy access to the site, coupled with his desire to initiate his own, Dutch research tradition in the Jordan Valley, probably strengthened this choice.[132]

Although Franken never confirmed this explicitly in his writings, some of his former students and colleagues believe that he also choose the site, and the transition period between the Late-Bronze Age to Early-Iron age, as a possible location where the Israelites entered 'the promised land' (Van der Kooij 2007b, 10). However, religious values seem to have played a more significant role in the sense that Franken wanted to provide a critical-historical and scientific approach towards the more orthodox biblical archaeological interpretations of that time. The main choice for the site should therefore be seen as a combination of its scientific and archaeological value in advancing the understanding of cultures of biblical times in this part of the world (see also 4.3.2). As such, the values attributed by Franken to an archaeological project in Deir Alla fitted the motivations and desires of the national governmental research funding body Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO),[133] which saw the Deir Alla project as a means to fulfil its aims of promoting 'pure scientific research'. Franken also succeeded in translating the archaeological and scientific values into that of the Faculty of Theology of Leiden University, where he was a lecturer at that time, by stressing how his approach could fit the Faculty's aims of promoting academic research into biblical times with a teaching element. Soon after, this led to the training of several students of the Faculty, amongst which the present Dutch co-director of the Joint Project.

With 'translation' I refer to the transformation of policy goals into practical interests and vice versa. Similar to the use of the concept of translation by Mosse (2005, 9; Lewis & Mosse 2006), I use it here,

[132] Dutch co-director of the Joint Project of the Faculty of Archaeology of Leiden University (pers. comm. Leiden, November 2011).

[133] Currently the NWO, Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research.

more specifically, as referring to a process of interpretation by actors of one set of values into another set of values that fit the policy discourses, story-lines and motivations of other stakeholders, organisations and actors; constantly creating interest, 'making real' (cf Latour 1996, 86). From such a view, archaeological projects can only succeed if actors can effectively translate their values into other actors' values, and the more values are incorporated into a project, the stronger it gets, since more actors can align themselves through the process of translation. As discussed in section 2.5, this allocation of different values by actors can then lead to the formation of strong, shared 'discourse-coalitions', which refers to a group of actors that shares the usage of a particular set of story-lines over a particular period of time (cf Hajer 2005, 302).

The collaboration between the Faculty of Theology in Leiden and ZWO, was further strengthened because of the friendship that developed in the 1960's between Henk Franken and the chief administrator of ZWO, both of whom shared a passion for furthering not only the archaeological understanding of the Near East, but also for contributing to an independent archaeology in Jordan and Palestine (Franken 1991; 1970; 1976) – an issue that is illustrated by the dedication and resources spent by the chief administrator of ZWO in the safeguarding, restoration and repatriation of the Balaam text in the late 1960's and early 1970's (Franken 1991). A discursive story-line that emphasised the value of pure, scientific research for the creation of an independent, scientific Jordanian archaeology, thereby allowed the effective translation of archaeological, scientific and politically motivated values, and the formation of a discourse-coalition between ZWO and the Faculty of Theology.

The early phases of the Deir Alla project, covering four years of excavation in the 1960's, were undertaken mainly by scholars from the Netherlands, with several workmen from Jericho that were brought to Deir Alla from Franken's earlier fieldwork at Tell es-Sultan (Franken 1991). The permit for excavation was granted by the DoA, who also sent a representative to oversee the quality of the work. However, the role of the DoA in this period consisted mainly of the administrative facilitation of the Dutch project. It was only with the arrival of the Head of Excavation and Research of the DoA at the project in 1976, that the DoA became a real partner in the scientific aspect of the Project. This led, subsequently, to the formation of a 'Joint Project'. This formation of the project was the result of the friendship, shared scientific interests and subsequent successful translation of values between Henk Franken and the Head of Research and Excavation at that time, who had been influenced during his university degree in Berlin by neo-marxist and critical views on biblical archaeology;

> I discovered that Henk Franken and I had a lot in common in terms of methodology, in terms of thinking, in terms of understanding the archaeology of the region – in contrast with the traditional biblical archaeology that was taking place not only in Palestine but also in Jordan. <…> I already had a comprehensive idea of the archaeology of the area, and I thought it would be good to undertake stratigraphy at a key site like Deir Alla, which was explored and we knew about the periods and the representations of certain major periods of the region.[134]

The scientific and archaeological value attributed to the project by the Head of Research and Excavation, led to the fact that a collaboration was made possible. In addition, the methodology of Franken, which was aimed at challenging the current biblical interpretations of that time, was also seen as an important value by the Head of Research and Excavation, since it contributed to an independent archaeology in Jordan. As such, he succeeded in translating the scientific, archaeological and political values of the Dutch actors of the project into 'training' and financial values for the DoA, by using the Joint Project as an opportunity for training the DoA staff in archaeological skills and research techniques;

[134] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project and Head of Excavation and Research at the Department of Antiquities in 1976 (Amman, November 2009).

> I had the feeling Henk Franken was interested in teaming up with locals. It was not possible in the 1960's, when he was working here because there were <almost>[135] no archaeologists to work independently or to research at a proper scale at that time. The Deir Alla project was the first joint project for the DoA. <...> The main problem that we had at that time, was that there were very few people that were capable of doing archaeology, and secondly, the budget for independent archaeological projects was not there, so we needed partners to support us in a technical way and to help financing the project. Taking the methodology and also the goals into consideration, we thought working in Deir Alla could be a right step for a joint project. <…> On the personal level we needed this type of cooperation for the capacity building and training of our people.[136]

This fitted the official aims of the DoA of that time to develop a scientific and independent capacity. As can be read on the website of the DoA:

> Since 1951, the Department of Antiquities was aware of the national and scientific responsibilities that it had to live up to. It was also aware that archaeology was a science that was new to the Arab region, and that it dated back to the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Based on the realisation of these facts, the Department of Antiquities started working on the infrastructure that is necessary for archaeological work. <…> The development in infrastructure went hand in hand with the endeavours to train the employees of the Department, so as to ensure their capacity to carry out their work. <…> This was possible thanks to the training courses that were held both in Jordan and in other countries, and by means of the participation of the Department's employees in archaeological excavation missions organised by the universities and by the foreign scientific institutions operating in Jordan.[137]

The collaboration in this time soon became a success for the actors involved, not only because the values by the actors could be mutually translated, but also because the values themselves became strengthened by the archaeological finds. Especially the discovery of the Balaam-text in 1967 played a significant role in the widespread awareness of the Joint Project, which soon became a well-known site in both academic as well as in biblical, and more modestly, tourism circles. But the Balaam text also allowed the individual archaeologists to increase their academic standing, leading to important publications by several members of the Joint Project (see for an overview Hoftijzer & Van der Kooij 1991). I would therefore argue that we should not only perceive of values as certain qualities that are attributed to an archaeological site by an actor, but rather as the result of the interplay between the actor and the archaeological resource itself (cf section 2.4). In this instance, value-attribution is a two-way process; through the creation and uncovering of the archaeological data and finds, the archaeologist also needs the archaeological finds to become a successful archaeologist, and the greater the perceived significance of the archaeological finds, the greater the benefits for the individual archaeologist (cf Van Reybrouck & Jacobs 2006). For the Joint Project, the archaeological finds played an important role in the perception of the project as a successful collaboration, adding to a perceived need to maintain personal and institutional relationships – something played in hand

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[135] According to the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project of the Faculty of Archaeology of Leiden University (pers. comm. Leiden, February 2012), there were a handful of Jordanian scholars interested in archaeology during this period, although they were not actively following fieldwork methodologies.

[136] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project and Head of Excavation and Research at the Department of Antiquities in 1976 (Amman, November 2009).

[137] Available at: http://images.jordan.gov.jo/wps/wcm/connect/gov/eGov/Government+Ministries+ _+Entities/Department+of +Antiquities/General+Information/ [Accessed 3 February 2012].

by the aforementioned story-line of the AAD that identifies archaeologists with archaeological sites and subsequent research outcomes.

In this sense, it is worthwhile pointing out that the scientific benefits by the partners were not perceived as equal – most of the research benefits were geared towards academic scholars, and less to the DoA at large. Although financial resources and access to international knowledge institutes and networks played an important role in this, it also came because the Head of Research and Excavation, one of the individuals who personally benefited from the scientific publications and training of the project, could not always successfully translate this scientific value into meaningful values for the DoA at large. In fact, the DoA had traditionally been more concerned with administration and the protection of antiquities, and only more recently had started to focus on its aims to develop scientific capacity (see above).[138] In the words of the former Head of Research and Excavation of the DoA;

> When we were working on behalf of the Department, we always had to justify the continuation of the project. In the sense of, we had all kind of directors at that time, directors of antiquities that had nothing to do with archaeology and nothing to do with antiquities, they were just administrators, they didn't see any benefit, and they didn't see also the role of the Department as such. They were often not cooperative in terms of doing archaeology, I always had to fight. [139]

Figure 09. Joint Project team members on top of Tell Deir Alla, late 1970's (Deir Alla Archive, Leiden University; courtesy Gerrit van der Kooij).

[138] See also the website of the DoA (ibid.)

[139] Former Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1976 till 1996 (Amman, November 2009). Head of Excavations and Research at the Department of Antiquities in 1976, and Director of the Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University in 1979.

Soon after, the Head of Research and Excavation of the DoA moved to Yarmouk University in 1979. As a result of the fact that personal and scholarly relationships were maintained, the Joint Project now was strengthened by a third partner in the form of the Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology of YU, which was set up by the former Head of Research and Excavation, now the first Director of the Institute. The result of this move was that the Joint Project became stronger and even more successful in the perception of some of the main Jordanian actors, since the scientific and training values of the project could now easier be translated to the aims and wishes of the YU in the field of science and academic training, which it could further facilitate with a financial contribution to the project. However, it also had as a result that the values of the Joint Project were now even less effectively translated within the DoA, since the former beneficiary actor responsible for this, had now left to YU;

> I was hoping that the Joint Project would be with the Department, but unfortunately it did not develop like that, it was more or less connected to both Henk Franken and myself. I had some personal and budgetary problems in terms of continuity with the Department and Leiden, and I thought it would be more effective and more successful if I could carry on with Yarmouk University and still keep the Department involved. But although the Department was assisting in terms of personnel, and some finances, it was not personnel in the scientific level I would say, but on the technical level, representatives and other staff members. The project was on a more founded level at YU, because we had two academic institutions dealing with a project.[140]

Because there was no archaeologist left at the DoA that translated the scientific and archaeological values into training and public values, and nobody that benefited personally from the archaeological and scientific results of the publications and excavations, the DoA eventually started to feel excluded from the Joint Project, since it no longer could see how the Joint Project fitted their values in terms of a need for training and accessible knowledge production for the Jordanian public;

> If you look at the motivations of the universities, it is all about publications and training. No matter if they call it collaborations; they are selfish academic interests. They focus their training too much on the universities and their students, and too little on building capacity at the DoA.[141]

Interestingly, the actual field practices did not change that much since the early 1970's when the Joint Project was set up. Rather, I believe that because of the transfer of a single archaeologist from DoA to YU, the process of value translation could not be undertaken successfully anymore, which gradually led to a changed perception of the Joint Project within the DoA as one of 'success', to a 'failure'.

Underlying these feelings are, I believe, lingering power discrepancies between the DoA and YU. In general, it was felt by all the Jordanian archaeologists that YU had more resources and administrative capacity to deal with the scientific and archaeological values of the Joint Project; "we had more means for financial support, in the Department we really had to find funds together, at YU they had more understanding for supporting research projects."[142] This view was shared by the current Deputy Dean of Research and Science of Yarmouk University, who was responsible for attributing funds to the Joint Project in the early 2000's; "Money is not, as it may seem, the main obstacle <...> we have more money available

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[140] Ibid.

[141] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009)

[142] Former Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1976 till 1996 (Amman, November 2009). Head of Excavations and Research at the Department of Antiquities in 1976, and Director of the Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University in 1979.

than the Department, and in many cases, we have more money available than universities in other parts of the world, than the institutions in for example Leiden."[143]

During my fieldwork, it also became clear that many Jordanian students of archaeology generally prefer a career within Jordanian universities, than within the DoA. The main reason that was mentioned in this context, was the fact that the universities were considered to offer better career opportunities, and to offer better salary and 'family' conditions – a position at a university for example means that children of staff members can pay reduced fees to start university careers. In addition, an informal survey during my fieldwork showed a picture in which staff members of YU earned substantially more than those of the DoA.[144]

In general, the DoA is believed to be under-skilled and under-resourced to deal with the pressures of implementing archaeological policies and values in comparison with Jordanian universities, which was often seen as underlying the administrative role they adapted;

> If you are so limited with your abilities and human resources, this is the only approach you can take. For years now, they are not allowed to hire good people due to current agreements in the government, which is to cut down on hiring external specialists. Now, the university, their role is to have PhD's, highly qualified people have to teach, they have to do research, publish and so on. The DoA does not have this pressure; their role is to find employees to perform the daily duties, which is different. Perhaps the foreign teams could change this, by focusing their capacity building not only on universities, but also on the Department. The universities make money, through delivering students, so they have bigger salaries – the Department can not do that.[145]

It is in this context, I believe, that the critical comments by the Director of the DoA should be placed. The need for training of DoA staff should therefore be regarded as one of the major values that are ascribed by the DoA to foreign projects, not in the least because it provides economic and educational benefits to individual staff members – something that was emphasised explicitly by the current Head of Research and Excavation of the DoA.[146]

As I will discuss later, this perception was also influenced by the fact that the new Director of the DoA (since 1999) tried to live up more strictly to the aims of the protection of antiquities and the handing out of excavation permits as a means to regain ownership in relation to national and foreign academic research aspirations (see section 4.5.3) as well as in relation to the aims for tourism development by the Ministry of Tourism, of which it became a part in 1989 (see section 4.5.4).

4.5.2 THE DEPARTMENT OF ANTIQUITIES

During an archaeological field-trip with Dutch students around Jordan in the initial phases of my fieldwork, I repeatedly heard critical remarks that the DoA showed a lack of concern over the protection and presentation of the archaeological heritage in the country. However, my subsequent experiences, interviews and observations made me believe that it was no so much a lack of concern that was to account

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[143] Irbid, July 2009.

[144] This was held throughout my first fieldwork season between May-July 2009, and consisted mainly of observations and informal discussions at the DASAS with Jordanian members of the project team.

[145] Former Head of the Queen Rania Institute of Tourism and Heritage, Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, November 2009).

[146] Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities, Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

for the poor state of some of the archaeological resources, but rather the fact that the DoA as an institution was understaffed and under-resourced to cope with the multitude of pressures and demands on archaeological sites, and faced with little agency and power in negotiations with (foreign) academic archaeological projects and internal state politics (see also section 4.6.4). Such an impression was shared by several directors of European archaeological institutions in Jordan, as well as by Jordanian university staff members; "Legally, the government represented by the Department of Antiquities is the owner of the archaeological resources. Culturally, and in reality, they are not – it is the archaeologists who work there".[147]

I have already touched upon the conflicts and inherent power discrepancy between academic archaeologists of YU and the DoA, whereby a certain disagreement over the responsibility and ownership over archaeological excavations and its finds can be distilled: "Basically, the Jordanian universities want to excavate, and the DoA wants to protect, and increasingly makes it more difficult to acquire permits. This tense relationship resembles the problems that European archaeology faced two decades ago".[148]

To understand this in more detail, it is worth highlighting the prioritisation of protection of archaeological resources by the DoA, which is also embedded in the (amended) Antiquity Law of 1988 (see AlGhazawi 2011 for an english translation). In the statutes of the DoA it is written that; "The principal policy of the Department of Antiquities is the protection of antiquities" and that "The second policy is for the presentation of antiquities, including research, survey, excavation and site management".[149] If one looks at the actual type of projects undertaken under the supervision of the DoA in Jordan, a different picture emerges that illustrates the prioritisation of excavation over protection, and of protection over presentation. In these same statutes, the DoA differentiates the following projects;

1. Systematic archaeological field surveys (usually implemented by the DoA or by Jordanian and foreign academic institutions in cooperation and collaboration with the DoA).
2. Rescue archaeological surveys (implemented by the DoA- CRM team).
3. Systematic excavations (usually implemented by either by the DoA teams, or by foreign and Jordanian academic institutions in cooperation and collaboration with the DoA).
4. Projects of restoration and conservation (implemented by the DoA with contributions from some local and friendly foreign academic and other concerned institutions).
5. Presentation of archaeological sites to the public (implemented by the DoA with some contribution from local and foreign academic institutions).[150]

If one looks at the actual archaeological projects undertaken for the years 2001-2008 in the annual journal of the DoA ('Munjazat'), it can first of all be noted that the amount of projects in Jordan is increasing constantly, and secondly, that about half of these projects are still undertaken by foreign missions (AlGhazawi 2011, 13-14; Alkhraysheh 2007). If one takes a closer look a the actual field practices of these foreign missions, of which only 5% has collaborations with Jordanian Universities (AlGhazawi 2011, 13-14), the outcomes of the institutionalised AAD in foreign archaeological project policies emerges. For

[147] Associate Professor and Head of Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Irbid, November 2009).

[148] Director of the Council for British Research in the Levant (Amman, November 2009).

[149] Statutes of the Department of Antiquities, available at: http://www.doa.jo/doa1.htm [Accessed 5 May 2012].

[150] Ibid.

the year 2007 for example (Alkhraysheh 2007), the following amount of projects were undertaken in the different fields;

1.	Excavations	29 projects
2.	Surveys	14 projects
3.	Restoration and Conservation	5 projects
4.	Documentation	1 projects
5.	Presentation	0 projects

Table 01. Type of foreign archaeological projects undertaken in Jordan in the year 2007.

From this example of figures it can be distilled that excavations and research projects are still undertaken more frequently over conservation and presentation. This prioritisation of excavation and research over other heritage activities by foreign archaeological projects, but interestingly also by Jordanian universities, is also hinted at in the language used in the categorisations of projects; whilst excavations are "implemented by either by the DoA teams, or by foreign and Jordanian academic institutions in cooperation and collaboration with the DoA", presentation and conservation projects are "implemented by the DoA with some contribution from local and <friendly> foreign academic institutions".[151]

It was already discussed how Jordanian and foreign academic archaeologists and institutions can develop strong discourse-coalitions that prefer archaeological excavations over protection as this provides benefits in the field of training, research and knowledge production. In addition to the access to economic resources and international knowledge networks that foreign and Jordanian academic institutions bring to the table in relation to the DoA, there are two other factors that play a role in the idea that (foreign) academic archaeologists are controlling the ownership over archaeological resources in Jordan. The first is the story-line in the AAD that archaeologists are the suitable experts to assess and investigate the value of fragile archaeological resources on behalf of the public, which is supported by an identification of individual archaeologists with archaeological sites and research outcomes. The second factor relates to the historical, economic and political context of foreign archaeology in Jordan.

4.5.3 THE (FOREIGN) ARCHAEOLOGIST AS EXPERT

In section 4.4.2 I discussed some examples of the attribution of expertise and ownership to archaeologists in the research of archaeological sites. In addition, I touched upon the identification between archaeological sites, research outcomes and archaeologists. Taken together, this contributes to the situation that archaeologists are given a position in which to make decisions over what happens at the site in terms of heritage management issues. When I asked the local representatives of the DoA in Deir Alla about what their plans were for the site, something over which the DoA actually has the legal power to make decisions, it was mentioned that he was waiting for the Dutch co-director to tell them what to do at the sites, what to protect and present.[152] This is striking, because the Dutch co-director himself did not feel he had this

[151] Statutes of the Department of Antiquities, available at: http://www.doa.jo/doa1.htm [Accessed 5 May 2012].

[152] Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009

expertise, nor did he actively seek this attribution of decision-making power. When I asked the representatives of the Joint Project why the director of the DoA could not make these decision, it was mentioned that "he was not a real archaeologist" [153]– even though the decisions had to deal with protection, education and tourism development, all issues that archaeologists are not necessarily trained in. There are of course other reasons why the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project was seen as the main actor with expertise to make decisions about the future management planning of the site, such as his personal dedication to the Tell and the community, his long-term involvement with the project and his access to international financial and academic networks. For now, however, my point here is that the AAD implicitly identifies archaeologists with archaeological resources, and that through this process, the archaeologist is attributed expertise, ownership and decision-making power, regardless of the individual wishes and aims by the archaeologist himself.

Another result of the attribution of expertise and the identification of archaeologists with archaeological resources and research outcomes, is that this combines to the perception that it is primarily academic archaeologists who benefit from publication benefits;

> Academics deal with sites as if they are their private property <...> Private property in the sense that they consider all byproducts as their property as well, such as data, publications, even interpretations. You can't do any research on a site without the permission of the main archaeologist – why is that? It's a scientific robbery, a moral robbery, an ethical robbery.[154]

I have already looked at this in section 4.4.2, so this issue will not be explored here any further. For now, my point is that a discourse-coalition between YU and LU, which emphasised the identification of archaeologists with sites and expertise, lead to not only the attribution of access and ownership as well as to a perceived difference in research benefits, and thereby to feelings of exclusion by especially the DoA.

Another reason for this is the idea that foreigners bring status and power to academic research projects, which makes collaborations attractive for individual Jordanian scholars in relation to institutional and personal career motivations. Through their position as foreigners with easy access to international knowledge, resources and political networks, the Dutch archaeologists for example were also attributed a certain power in decision-making in the context of Jordanian archaeology. This was strengthened by the historical power and colonial relationships in archaeology in the region (Maffi 2009; Meskell 1998; Silberman & Small 1997), as well as through the abundance of the archaeological sites in Jordan that the DoA is understaffed and under-resourced to cope with, which means it is often the foreign archaeological teams that have the capacity to invest resources and time in archaeological sites. In this sense, it is worth advancing here some perspectives on the inherent power structures of foreign archaeological projects in relation to the DoA by both Jordanian as well as foreign researchers themselves;

> I know that foreign projects have put in low estimates so as to make sure the preservation fee stays low. <The DoA director> then becomes angry, but can not do anything about it, even though he is in charge <But these foreigners> played out their influence over his head, and the Ministry of Tourism then tells <the director> to stop making problems because these foreigners pay for tourism.[155]

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[153] Similar perspectives could be heard from Dutch members of the Joint Project, as well as by several other European archaeologists when discussing matters of excavation licensing in front of the DoA office (Amman, July 2009).

[154] Associate Professor and Head of Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Irbid, November 2009).

[155] Senior British archaeologist (Amman, November 2009).

> We still allow foreigners permits, even though we sometimes are not happy with it. But we as Jordanians have a tradition of being friendly. We need to be friendly and respectful. If we do, that helps the international view of Jordan, so they will visit our country. We need tourism. The DoA helps in this sense.[156]
>
> Look at the amount of foreign missions in Jordan. Look at who has the most projects, and you will know who makes the decisions in this country, you can see who control the Ministry of Tourism and the Department of Antiquities. These are the people who are controlling even the internal decisions about <archaeology>.[157]

Although I will look below at the power relationship between the DoA and the Ministry of Tourism in more detail, I can unfortunately not go into detail about the specific details and rumours of which foreign institutions and embassies were implicated in these statements due to promised confidentiality. However, it must be clear that there is a strong perception that the DoA does not have the full control over the ownership and responsibility of the archaeological resources and projects in Jordan, especially not when faced with foreign archaeological and political pressures.

In the coming sections it will be explored how the Dutch co-director has tried to take on this attributed expertise and broader heritage management responsibility by trying to accommodate and develop socio-economic and tourism values from the Joint Project, most notably through the aim of developing a Regional Research Centre and Museum at Deir Alla. As mentioned before, the establishment of this museum has unfortunately not come to fruition yet – below, I will discuss some of the reasons behind this, which can, next to a shift in Dutch funding policies which will be discussed in section 4.6, be found in a strict value and power discrepancy between the DoA and the Ministry of Tourism, as well as in broader discursive practices by the institutions and actors involved in the Joint Project. As a result, we will see how in the end the scientific and archaeological values of the Joint Project continue to be prioritised, with an exclusion of local values as a consequence.

4.5.4 THE DOA AND THE MINISTRY OF TOURISM

Integrated and holistic archaeological heritage management approaches are difficult to implement in Jordan. The reason for this must partly be sought in the particular relationship between the DoA and the Ministry of Tourism, of which the DoA is a department since 1989. This relationship is characterised by a firm distinction of priorities and activities as well as by power discrepancies. During my interviews with Jordanian tourism experts and heritage researchers, it struck me that all stressed that the DoA and the Ministry of Tourism were not working closely together, and that different management approaches, such as presentation, restoration, education, local community development, archaeological research and tourism development were not integrated (cf Berriane 1999; Brand 2000; Nasser 2000; Groot 2008). In general, it was believed there exists no such overall integrated strategy, nor an institution that facilitates such an approach effectively. During the time of research, the task and priority of the DoA was one of protection and research, as we have seen above, and that of the Ministry of Tourism was to attract tourism and economic growth – but unfortunately, not in an integrated way according to tourism specialists; "The problem is that nobody is looking at the whole process. The Ministry of Tourism is doing one thing, the

[156] Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities, Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

[157] Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009).

DoA is doing another thing. There is no integration."[158] This view on cultural tourism in Jordan has also been described by Princess Sharifa Nofa Bint Nasser (Nasser 2000), at the time of interviewing a lecturer in cultural tourism at the Jordan Applied University College for Hospitality and Tourism Education, as well as a former member of the Jordan Tourism Board.

The value distinction between protection and tourism development of archaeological sites is also reflected in the way in which some staff members of the DoA talked about the Ministry of Tourism; "The tasks of the Department and the Ministry of Tourism are contradictory. They want to destroy, we want to protect".[159] The result of this perceived strict division, is that the DoA is presently responsible for protection and research, whilst the Ministry of Tourism is responsible for attracting tourism. This has not only contributed to the destruction of archaeological resources and materials at tourism sites such as Jerash (Berriane 1999, 63), but also to a lack of involvement of tourism specialists in archaeological sites which fall outside the current ideological and economic priorities that are laid by the Ministry of Tourism on archaeological resources deemed relevant for tourism development – such as Deir Alla. In general, the Ministry of Tourism seems to prioritise monumental, visually attractive sites that have a national identity and/or an international tourism potential, such as Jerash, Petra and Umm Qays. In fact, some scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that the emphasis on for example Nabataean history as part of a national Bedouin identity for the Hashemite Kingdom, might likely have developed differently if the site of Petra would have been less suitable for international tourism attraction (Groot 2008). A strict emphasis on the economic development of archaeological sites deemed worthy of international tourism has also, in combination with an unusual high level of state control and financing of the tourism industry (Gray 2002) led to a lack of support for bottom-up approaches that favour the needs, wishes and govermentality of local communities (cf Brand 2000) – a view that was also shared by some people in the village of Deir Alla: "The Ministry of Tourism doesn't work for us. They are only interested in Petra en Jerash, in Roman sites. They are only interested in money from foreign tourists."[160] At present, heritage management approaches that call for the reduction of poverty and the inclusion of local community concerns (see for example Cernea 2001; Williams & Van der Linde 2006) are difficult to implement in Jordan, of which the relocation and exclusion of the local community at Umm Qays remains a striking example (see above, and Brand 2001). For a further contextualisation of the problems of sustainability and the exclusion of local communities in Jordanian tourism projects, see for example Berriane (1999), Gray (2002) and (Joffé 2002).

In effect, the prioritisation of sites within the Ministry of Tourism is done by valuating archaeological sites mainly for their potential and ease with which tourists can be attracted – the protection, research and care for the site, are then considered values and responsibilities of the DoA. But the DoA has a relatively small amount of money with which to protect, research and document the more than 100,000 archaeological sites in the country, whilst the Ministry of Tourism has a far larger budget with which to attract tourism to only a hundred sites at most.[161] In addition, the system of the aforementioned preservation fees by the the DoA, where an additional 10% of the total budget of an archaeological project is charged to the operator so as to finance the protection of the site, does not guarantee that this money goes into protection; according to the Director of the DoA himself, this money is also used to work away the backlog in publications of previous archaeological research.

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[158] Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009).

[159] Staff member of the Department of Antiquities (Amman, July 2009).

[160] Jordanian teacher of English at a Primary School in the Jordan Valley (Swalha, July 2009).

[161] Former Head of the Queen Rania Institute of Tourism and Heritage, Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, November 2009)

In general, the DoA and the Ministry of Tourism are perceived as not working together as closely as one would desire from an integrated archaeological perspective. The recently established Cultural Heritage Management division in the Ministry of Tourism, created to deal with this issue, and initiated after consultation with several tourism experts in Jordan that I had interviewed, did however, again, reflect this division in perceived responsibilities. Within this division, the tasks of research and protection are still given to an understaffed and under-resourced DoA; "But that is a contradiction in terms. Cultural heritage management involves archaeology and protection – otherwise they should call it tourism resource management <…> It is the problem of separating something that should be the same thing."[162]

The impact of this division on the Joint Project, is that the Ministry of Tourism, were not involved in the actual archaeological work, nor in the process of developing management plans for the site of Deir Alla. This would, however, especially have been important in light of the initial desires by the Joint Project to establish a Regional Museum, and to attract more tourism to the region as to enhance the need for economic growth by the local community.

Regional Research Centre and Museum

On 31 October 1981, an agreement was signed by YU, DoA and LU with the aim to "co-operate in archaeological prospecting in the Deir Alla region and the digging and study of antiquities in the said region <...> and whereas the parties are desirous of constructing a house in that region for the use of the excavation by study teams relating to the parties hereto."[163] In subsequent years, the Deir Alla Station for Archaeological Studies (DASAS) was built successfully with financial contributions from all three partners, whereby the larger sums of money were donated by Leiden University and Yarmouk University. It was furnished by LU, the ground belonged to the DoA, and the maintenance of the building and furniture was under the responsibility of YU. Subsequently, it was decided that Leiden University could make free use of the station at least till 2000, when the agreement could be revised.

In the following two decades, the building greatly facilitated the scientific and archaeological values of the site, thereby strengthening the Joint Project. In addition, there was also, albeit minor, mentioning of the public and tourist value of the site, and it was decided that the DASAS could later be used as a museum – reflecting the AAD in postponing the educational and tourism benefits to the future in favour of short-term archaeological research. Nevertheless, right from the beginning, a small room was dedicated to the interpretation and presentation of the archaeology of Deir Alla and its wider region; "The Deir Alla Station for Archaeological Studies greatly facilitated archaeological work as a dig-house, field school, and material study and 'first-aid' centre (main storage of Deir Alla objects), as well as provided the public with an access to the archaeological results by an exhibition room".[164]

However, the representation of this educational and interpretive facility was not always perceived as such by local visitors – sometimes even referring to this small 'exhibition' as a 'storage room'; "I went to Deir Alla with my family to enjoy the view on such a historical place. We also visited the museum, but this is not a museum, it is a storage space. It's not really accessible, and we didn't learn much".[165] In addition, it is clear from discussions with the local manager of the station, as well as from the visitor's book entrances at the station, that this interpretive facility was (and still is) mostly visited by archaeological experts and students, as well as by some international tourists – even though most of these

[162] Ibid.

[163] 'Agreement to establish an archaeological Center at Deir Alla for the purpose of mutual excavation and archaeological research' (1981). Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[164] Unpublished Joint Project Project Proposal for the 2009 fieldwork season, handed in to the DoA in 2009, pp 1. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[165] Inhabitant of Swalha (Swalha, July 2009).

visitors often stay in the bus, or at best, visit the top of the Tell, in favour of visiting other, better preserved and presented archaeological sites in the region.

From the early 1990's, the co-directors of the Joint Project expressed a desire to take on board the preservation, presentation and local community values of the site in a more structured way. This desire was best formulated in the attempts to develop a Deir Alla Regional Museum;

> I thought, not at the very beginning but at a later stage, we should look at the community as partners, rather than just workers. We wanted to develop a sense of pride for the local community of the site and understanding, and I think that aspect was covered a little by the people who participated in the project <...> So we tried to explain to them what we found, the interpretations of the finds that sort of thing, it was on a individual level, but we did not do enough to achieve this goal. We thought of having a display in the station, where also the locals could come and view what we had been doing, and the plans and the section drawings, so that they could have a better understanding of the site. <...> But it was not clear <...> on the agenda of the team, from all the three partners, we did not plan for it in a systematic way. But later on we thought that the museum could cover a major part of that.[166]

Interestingly, this idea for a regional museum was a response to a belief that the archaeology and local community of Deir Alla and the wider Jordan Valley deserved a larger, more holistic and integrated approach to site interpretation than the small on-site exhibition in the archaeological station could provide. This was also related to the fact that the station's main aim was that of promoting scientific research; "The Deir Alla Station houses a small museum concerning the archaeology of the site of Deir Alla but there is no possibility to enlarge this facility inside the building during its use as a dig-house <...> Conclusion: a regional museum has to be housed separately".[167]

The aim of the Deir Alla Regional Museum was subsequently to promote the research, tourism, and understanding of the Deir Alla region, and to provide more benefits for the local community. Specifically, it aimed to rehabilitate the pride and connection of local people to the Jordan Valley by appreciating the local way of life in a landscape characterised by special, hard circumstances, as well as to attract economic benefits through tourism. An emphasis on presenting archaeological research in the multidisciplinary, regional context of the Jordan Valley was thought to support this aim, especially by focusing on the daily lives, circumstances and agricultural and cultural contexts of past peoples in the valley.

Indeed, such an emphasis did partly seem to be in line with some of the interpretive wishes and desires of local community members that I interviewed. When respondents stated that they were interested in the history of the Tell, it was focused primarily on the past lives of the people who lived there, how they made their houses, their bread, irrigated their fields, and so on – not on grand cultural and historic narratives. Such a view was also in line with that of an assistant professor in 'Conservation and Heritage Management' at the Hashemite University in Zarqa, who explored such issues in his studies on cultural tourism in the Jordan Valley;

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[166] Former Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1976 till 1996 (Amman, November 2009).

[167] Unpublished proposal document 'Regional Museum at Deir Alla' (1991) by the Joint Deir Alla Archaeological Project. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

> People are interested how they made their bricks, if it looks like what their grandfathers used for instance. What the city used to look like. The daily life is what interests people. Many people who looked at biblical archaeology were trying to proof something, but people here are less interested in proving something.[168]

What is striking also, is that some local community members placed a rather negative self-identification on the past of the Tell; "The people who lived here were poor, just like us. Not like the Romans you see in Jerash – they were rich, just as today. Just like you see in the movies; they had gold, big horses and caravans."[169] In addition, many community members that I interviewed expressed a wish for attracting tourism as to gain economic benefits, although this was often accompanied by a concern that an involvement of the Ministry of Tourism would not automatically lead to benefits on the local level, as discussed previously. As such, an interpretive and tourism plan for the site should therefore not only focus on understanding and interacting with the values and views of the local community, but also with of those of the tourism sector.

Representatives of the tourism sector were however not part of the development of the Joint Project. A closer integration with their perspectives and concerns can however throw light upon some of the reasons as for why the viability of the interpretive plans and the Deir Alla Regional Museum in particular were challenged.

First of all, the idea that a museum would automatically provide economic growth, was seriously questioned by several Jordanian tourism specialists and governmental representatives, since it would first require a large investment in wider tourism infrastructure in the region – at present, there are almost no restaurants, roads, car-parks, hotels and other such tourism facilities that were considered to be suitable from a tourism perspective – a situation which is not likely to change rapidly according to Jordanian governmental studies relating to the development of the Jordan Valley.[170]

Secondly, it was mentioned that the Jordan Valley was not a priority at all for tourism development from the perspective of the Ministry of Tourism, nor was an emphasis on the scientific and archaeological perspectives towards a Bronze and Iron Age site such as Deir Alla considered to match the priorities for selection by the Ministry of Tourism in terms of national identity and tourism attraction (see above). In short, it would require a large amount of investment in conservation, restoration, presentation and infrastructure in order for Deir Alla to become a successful tourism attraction.[171]

In this sense, it is interesting to note that the plans for heritage management and the development of the regional museum do not explicitly consider which types of tourist should be attracted, and which values and narratives should be prioritised. Rather, it is automatically assumed that an emphasis on the scientific archaeological understanding of the Tell, together with a historic narrative based on the cultures of the Late Bronze Age and Iron Age – which had been prioritised by the Joint Project in their fieldwork – will suffice to attract international tourism. However, most tourists who presently come to Deir Alla are visiting for its biblical connotations. It is noteworthy that the archaeological find of the Balaam inscription, and the biblical connotations of the site at large with Succoth – an identification that has never been made

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[168] Amman, June 2009.

[169] Local field worker at the Joint Project (Deir Alla, July 2009).

[170] According to the former Jordanian Minister of Water and Irrigation and the Minister of Agriculture for the period 2001-2005 (Email correspondence, November 17, 2009).

[171] According to interviews with the Jordanian Representative to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (Amman, May 2009); a Lecturer in Cultural Tourism at the Jordan Applied University College for Hospitality and Tourism Education and former member of the Jordan Tourism Board (Amman, June 2009); a senior staff member of Ministry of Tourism (Amman, July 2009); and the Former Head of the Queen Rania Institute of Tourism and Heritage, Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, November 2009).

nor published by the Joint Project –, are presently one of the main reasons why the site attracts international visitors. As can be read on a website with information on the 'biblical history' of Jordan, "archaeologists believe that the Jordanian hill called Tel Deir Alla is the site of biblical Succoth. And, it was here in Tel Deir Alla that evidence of Balaam was found."[172] In short, any interpretive and tourism development plan for the Deir Alla region would have to include the perspectives and needs by tourism representatives and visitors – not just assume that by emphasising the archaeological value and by building an archaeological museum, tourism benefits will follow automatically in the end (Nasser 2000).

This general concern and low attributed priority from a tourism perspective could, in my opinion, contribute to an understanding as of why the Ministry of Tourism did support the establishment of a regional museum formally,[173] but not actively or financially. In fact, the only financial contribution in the 1990's from a Jordanian side were made through the handing over of a piece of land near the Agricultural Research Station by the Ministry of Agriculture to the DoA, and through the expressed dedication by YU to take care of future refurbishment.

A result of this, is that the aims behind the regional museum changed over time. First of all, the function of the centre as a museum was geared more explicitly to a combination with a research function as to accommodate the institutional motivations of the partners involved better, as well as to cope with the increasing 'seriousness of the environmental situation' and development pressure on the perceived fragile cultural and natural resources, leading to the rephrasing of the 'Deir Alla Regional Museum' proposal into the 'Jordan Valley Research Centre and Museum'.[174]

Secondly, it can be noted – perhaps ironically – that the aim by the co-directors of the Joint Project to abandon the idea of a small on-site exhibition – as well as the turning over of the DASAS archaeological station into a full museum in 2000 – in favour of a separate regional museum has lead to a situation in which the station continued to function as an archaeological research facility, whilst the aim for tourism attraction, site presentation and local community development were never realised. This illustrates how the delicate workings of the AAD within the institutional policies and practices of the Joint Project, as well as within the DoA and the Ministry of Tourism, eventually contributed to (often unintended) exclusionary project mechanisms that saw the prioritisation of archaeological and scientific values over local tourism and socio-economic values.

4.5.5 LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

So far, I have discussed some examples of the AAD within the Joint Project policies, and how it related to the values of other actors that could be identified within the social context of the archaeological project at Tell Deir Alla. I now wish to contextualise these discussions by exploring the location of the attributed values of the Joint Project in the framework of a significance assessment of Tell Deir Alla that could be derived from applying a value-based management approach (see section 2.3 and 2.6). I want to be clear here, by stressing once again that the values that I have identified during my fieldwork are by no means exhaustive, nor static, nor intrinsic – since values are dynamic and subjective, they also depended on my specific assessment of the management framework of Tell Deir Alla. My point here is, rather, to illustrate

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[172] 'Biblical Archaeology: Prophet and the Earthquake'. Available at: www.aish.com/ci/sam/48965991.html [Accessed 26 November 2009].

[173] See for example correspondence by the Director General of the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (December 1993). Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[174] This becomes particularly clear when looking at the titles of the proposal documents 'Regional Museum at Deir Alla' (1991) and 'Jordan Valley Research Centre and Museum' (2001) by the Joint Deir Alla Archaeological Project (Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University).

further that the current workings of the AAD in the Joint Project do only cover some of the possible values that could be identified, hereby effectively excluding a range of local values and actors within the process.

The site of Tell Deir Alla presently has a small tourist value, in the sense that the site attracts ca 5000 international visitors a year. In general, the international visitors to Deir Alla consist of biblical tourists from France, Germany, the USA and Japan, who generally seem to value Tell Deir Alla for the connotations of the site with biblical Succoth.[175] In addition, the Tell attracts archaeological tourists, which visit the site because of the long-standing archaeological research that has been undertaken at the Tell, and because of the historical and archaeological interpretations that have been offered by the Joint Project.[176] However, most of these visitors seem to be disappointed with the fact that there is no interpretive material, and that the stratigraphy and the archaeological remains are presently not restored, conserved nor presented – leading to short visitor stops as well as a low visitor experience;[177]

> In spring, you sometimes get maybe 30 people a day. But most buses go to Pella, they do not stop at Deir Alla. They only do small stops. Some people do not even get out of the bus. There is nothing now to see.[178]

Importantly, this has often been mentioned as a problem from a local perspective as these short visits provide little economic benefits for the local community; "Things like panels, or information, that would be good for us – then they might stop and have coffee, or buy our drinks. But it would also be good for them – now they can learn nothing."[179] The desire for increased tourist visits by the local community, is indeed closely related to their wish to attract more economic benefits to the municipality of Deir Alla. In addition, it can be noted that next to the discussed need to develop economic values in communication with stakeholders from the (governmental) tourism sector, there also is an expressed need for the inclusion of other regional and local government authorities, as well as with the private sector;

> From time to time (we) send a memorandum to remember the government that they should not forget the archaeological site here. We are concerned and we need a partnership from the government and the private sector to try and get benefits and to attract more tourists from outside, to see the sites especially in the winter. We have other sites that tourists come to see like Pella, but we want them to see also the archaeological site in Deir Alla. The Department of Antiquities is part of the Ministry of Tourism, but it works alone in terms of management, but we need all the ministries.

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[175] This is according to interviews with the local DASAS manager, inhabitant of Deir Alla (Deir Alla, July 2009) and the Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009). An example of this could be distilled through several informal discussions that I had with American and German tourists that visited Tell Deir Alla during the field-season as part of a 'Biblical Tour' (June 2009).

[176] This view was distilled though informal conversations with some German archaeologists that visited the Tell during the field-season (Deir Alla, July 2009), as well as with interviews with the local DASAS manager, inhabitant of Deir Alla (Deir Alla, July 2009) and the Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009). A similar perspective was also distilled through looking into the 'visitor books' at the local exhibition room at the DASAS.

[177] This view was brought forward by the Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009), and confirmed through several informal discussions that I had with American and German tourists that visited Tell Deir Alla during the field-season as part of a 'Biblical Tour' (June 2009). A telephone interview with the German Biblical tour operator behind this visit completed this picture (October 2009).

[178] Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009).

[179] Local owner of grocery shop and restaurant, located at the main road through the Jordan Valley, at the east-side of Tell Deir Alla (Deir Alla, July 2009).

> <...> Till this moment, we didn't get any formal reply that something will be done, but we are trying to get the attention from all these ministries to the importance of these sites.[180]
>
> If you want to accomplish something like this, you need all the ministries, non-governmental organisations and the private sector, all of them. Otherwise you will accomplish nothing. There is value to be had in archaeology, as well as in tourism. We need to bridge the gap between the two, by emphasising the economic benefits for the local community. People here have five kids and no jobs – you first have to stress the economic benefits.[181]

Although the above discussed intentions by the Joint Project to develop a regional museum explicitly mentioned potential economic benefits for the local community through tourism development, this has unfortunately not lead to practical outcomes. As a result, the Joint Project presently offers only a relatively small local economic impact in terms of archaeological seasonal employment, whilst, in addition, there is a feeling within the community that this only benefits a handful of individuals. This is particularly worthwhile stressing in light of the fact that most inhabitants in the municipality of Deir Alla have a very low economic living standard.

It can also be noted that local governmental representatives were not involved in the Joint Project. The attribution of expertise by local DoA representatives to the foreign archaeological expert, in addition to remarks by the latest co-director from YU that the local major would not have to be involved as he was not an archaeological expert, are just some examples of this. An identification and involvement of local actors and values could however have thrown some interesting perspectives on the attributed significance to Tell Deir Alla in a local context. In this sense, it is worth noting that whilst local community members welcomed the idea of increased economic value through the development of the envisaged Regional Research Centre and Museum, they were far less interested in the presentation objectives of a museum per se. An emphasis on archaeological finds, multidisciplinary research and heritage awareness might well suit international tourists and archaeologists, but it was much more difficult to align with the views on interpretation and access by local community members themselves. During my interviews, it became clear for instance that local respondents did not feel comfortable with the idea of accessing a museum due to limited educational backgrounds, resources and available free time; "To visit a museum, you need time, education and money. We do not have this. People who have this, people from the city, they can come and visit."[182]

In general, their interest in visiting, understanding and identification with Tell Deir Alla was different. First of all, most people in the village did not seem to identify themselves with the Bronze Age and Iron Age history of the site, in contrast to the views by senior archaeologists of YU in the Joint Project; "The people who lived here at the Tell, I don't know who they are. They were not our grandfathers. My history is in Palestine"[183]. My point here is not necessarily that the Joint Project should focus upon the local histories and historical identifications of the Palestinian refugees that came to Deir Alla in 1950 (although this is an important issue in light of the marginalised emphasis this receives in the process of national identity

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[180] Mayor of the Municipality ('Department') of Deir Alla (Swalha, July 2009).

[181] Lecturer in Cultural Tourism at the Jordan Applied University College for Hospitality and Tourism Education. Former member of the Jordan Tourism Board (Amman, June 2009).

[182] Local inhabitant of Deir Alla (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[183] Local inhabitant of Deir Alla, wife of the local manager of DASAS (Deir Alla, June 2009).

formation by the State of Jordan (Groot 2008), but rather, that cultural identification of the local community with the history of the Tell can not be assumed.

The aim within the Joint Project to establish a local sense of pride, appreciation and cultural identification with the history and archaeology of the Jordan Valley through the establishment of a regional museum could therefore be questioned for its viability. As pointed out by Van Aken (2003) in his ethnography of economically disadvantaged Palestinian refugees in the Jordan Valley and in the Deir Alla region in particular, many national and international development programs failed in their attempt to place new agricultural and cultural landscape identities on these communities, as their primary cultural identification was that of a refugee 'facing home'. Similar remarks could also be found by a Jordanian anthropologist who noted that "people here are very clear about their identity. They know who they are and where their families come from, its part of their life."[184]

Instead, I suggest that the identification of the local community with the Tell exists not so much with the history as interpreted by the archaeologists, but rather with the location and existence of the Tell in the heart of their village, and with the history of the archaeological excavations and the Joint Project itself. This is not only because the municipality carries the same name as the Tell, but also because of the fact that many inhabitants of Deir Alla identify themselves with the fact that there have been archaeological teams visiting the tell for 50 years. As a result, many families in Deir Alla have had members that worked at the Tell, which has lead to several long-standing feelings of personal friendships with the archaeologists. From this perspective, it was noticeable that many interviewees were more interested in old photographs and stories of the Joint Project than they were in the actual archaeological results.

Related to this, is the fact that Deir Alla was often mentioned by many archaeologists as an outstanding example of an archaeological Tell in the Jordan Valley. Belonging to the largest examples of such archaeological Tells in the valley, and situated within a rich cultural landscape (which has been an important archaeological research element in the 'Settling the Steppe Project' of the Joint Project), the Tell offers a very clear view of the cultural, natural and geographic setting of the Jordan Valley – something that, according to archaeologists of the Joint Project, should definitely be taken into account when formulating future presentation plans for the site of Deir Alla.[185] But whilst the scale and setting of the Tell within its landscape has played an enormous role in the way in which the local community valued the Tell, this was often mentioned in a different context – for them, the reason for visiting the top of the Tell was rather to be found in having family picnics, as well as in a place where children could play.

Such perspectives also help in understanding the critiques of several professionals in the field of Jordanian tourism management on the idea that protection of an archaeological site automatically yields public benefit, implicit in the AAD and in the following quotes by the Joint Project; "The recently made site-fencing .., together with a guard, as well as the protecting mudbrick-and-plaster cover of the old sections are favouring the visiting possibilities already".[186] From the perspective of these Jordanian cultural tourism experts, protection should however always be integrated with the presentation and interpretation of the site – a site that is protected, but not presented, has, in their opinion, no use at all. The fence that was created in

[184] Lecturer at the Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Irbid, November 2009).

[185] Such ideas were articulated in the unpublished proposal documents 'Regional Museum at Deir Alla' (1991) and 'Jordan Valley Research Centre and Museum' (2001) by the Joint Deir Alla Archaeological Project. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[186] Unpublished Joint Project Project Proposal for the 2000 fieldwork season, handed in to the DoA in 2000, p. 5. See also the 1998 "Consolidation and Restauration" report. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

the late 1990's at Deir Alla is, most likely, indeed protecting the site from some damage by visitors, looters and animals. But the idea that a fence surrounding the Tell is a viable management option that would also enhance the (local) visitor experience, is questionable; "the DoA does not fully understand cultural heritage management – they think fencing, and doing some consolidation of the excavation, is enough. This is nonsense", according to the former Head of the Queen Rania Institute for Heritage and Tourism. [187] Such an approach is believed to be 'nonsense', since it limits access to the site whilst not enhancing its interpretive potential, and since it limits the active use of the site by the local community. The idea that a fence, although protecting the site, actually limits the feeling of ownership by the community to the Tell, could probably best be illustrated by the perception of the fence as simultaneously saying 'keep off, here are archaeological experts at work'. During my interviews with the inhabitants surrounding the Tell, it became clear that most villagers indeed regarded the fence as a boundary of the archaeological expert, with its main function being to stop children playing on the Tell;

> The fence is there so that children can't play. <...> In springtime, we used to go to the top of the tell and have picnics. We sometimes still do that, but I don't like it that the fence is there, we now cannot just simply go there anymore. [188]

Although local inhabitants can visit the Tell through the access gate on the eastern side, and that as such, actual physical access might not a problem, it became clear to me that the fence particularly played a role in limiting mental access, since it denoted clearly the boundary between the village, and that of the archaeological expert and the DoA; "I know why the fence is there. It is so that children cannot play there and damage the things you study."[189]

The story-line in the AAD that cultural heritage management is similar to the protection of fragile and non-renewable archaeological resources, could also be found clearly in the language used by a Jordanian student of archaeology on the project;

> We need to protect the sites. Children that play on the site are not good, they do damage. It should be better controlled. <...> We don't need courses in management. If it's important, we just protect it, we just put a fence around it. A fence is enough.[190]

Another value that was attributed locally to Tell Deir Alla, related more to the use of the surrounding landscape. The surroundings of the Tell should in this sense not only be considered as very important from an archaeological research perspective of the cultural and social landscape (cf the 'Settling the Steppe' project), but also in relation to other demands and values that are placed on the immediate landscape. The land that was for instance handed over by the Ministry of Agriculture to the DoA in the late 1990's for the potential construction of the regional museum, is currently not used, although it is viable land that could be used for agriculture in the Jordan Valley;

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[187] Amman, November 2009.

[188] Local inhabitant of Deir Alla since 1950, and cook for the Joint Project since 1984. Her house is opposite the west side of the Tell (Deir Alla, June 2009)

[189] Local inhabitant of Deir Alla, employed as household lady at the DASAS for many years. Her house is located on the slope of the Tell (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[190] MA Student of the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University, intern at the Joint Project (Deir Alla, July 2009).

> We have given them land, planted trees, built a road, and looked after it – but nothing has happened since. I'm disappointed – it seems like they are only interested in excavating and excavating more <…> It has been years <since we gave them the land>, and we could have used the land for other purposes. Inshallah.[191]

The site is presently also valued by local community members for its educational potential;

> They should translate some of their books in Arabic. Not only in museums or exhibitions, we don't go there. Most people don't go there. It's very expensive. But most people can read. They should put it in the school library, local libraries. We have a library, you know.[192]

Related to the educational value and the need for translation of research results, is the fact that many schools in the region visit the site at least once a year. However, some representatives of local schools mentioned that there are not sufficient interpretive and educational materials available at the site, nor did they regard the current exhibition room within DASAS as suitable for children. That the site is considered to be of educational value by teachers, can for example be illustrated by the fact that the current Head Mistress of the Deir Alla Primary School for Girls has translated and/or summarised the archaeological reports through a visit to the departmental library of the DoA in Amman into an official plaque at the entrance of the school, and through the fact that she brings students to the top of the Tell at least twice a year [193] – despite the fact that such local archaeology does not appear in the national curriculum (see for example Al-Husban 2006; Badran 2006). According to her, there was a real need for educational visits and programmes to the Tell, based upon evidence-based and hands-on learning – approaches that she already applies in her school in the framework of a World Bank initiated project. It is interesting to note in this respect that the DoA has recently set up an educational departmental facility, and that in the early years of 2000 a visit was made by the local DoA representative and the Jordanian co-director to one school in the municipality of Deir Alla. However, such visits were not considered to offer enough educational value by the teachers that I interviewed, since these were aimed mainly at providing a large historical overview of Jordan, and at emphasising the fact that children should not damage the archaeological resources – mirroring the previous discussed story-line in the AAD of education as a means to protect fragile resources. In summary, according to a local teacher of history, local schools "would love to visit the site, but there is no information in Arabic available, and we can't access the site easily – children are not allowed to touch anything."[194]

Despite these examples of values that are attributed to the tell and its surroundings by a range of local actors, we have seen how the AAD, in combination with local and international institutional power structures and policies, inherently favoured scientific and archaeological values over other values, leading to a situation in which the development of other stakeholders' values and benefits are postponed and excluded, despite the intentions by some of the Joint Project actors themselves. This process is however also dependent on the interests and agency by individual actors themselves. We will look at such processes in more detail below, by focusing in detail on the relationship between project policy and project outcomes.

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[191] Assistant Manager of the National Centre for Agricultural Research and Extension (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[192] Local inhabitant of Deir Alla (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[193] Headmistress of the Deir Alla Primary School for Girls (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[194] History teacher at the Deir Alla Primary School for Girls (Deir Alla, June 2009).

4.6 PROJECT POLICY AND PRACTICAL OUTCOMES

4.6.1 INTRODUCTION

Table 02 shows the different values that have been brought forward in the project proposals, excavation reports and evaluation reports of the Joint Project since its early beginnings in 1959. I have tried to capture these values by looking at the main aims, visions and practices undertaken.

Phase 1 (1960-1967):	Scientific, Archaeological
Phase 2 (1976-1980):	Scientific, Archaeological, Collaboration
Phase 3 (1980-1987):	Scientific, Archaeological, Collaboration, Training
Phase 4 (1994-2009):	Scientific, Archaeological, Collaboration, Training, Tourism, Educational, Local, Socio-Economic

Table 02. The historic development of the main values as mentioned in the project policies of the Joint Project.

What can be seen in the historic development of values, is that the archaeological and scientific values have always formed the backbone of the Joint Project, increasingly incorporating collaboration, training and tourism values, leading to the explicit aim of providing sustainable socio-economic benefits for the local community in the 2000's.

Another trend that can be distilled is the spatial development of the scales of context in which the values were initiated. The early values (scientific, archaeological) were initiated and formulated in the Netherlands by Dutch actors, and reflected mainly the value of the project for the Dutch context whilst stressing the universal and global significance of archaeological research and knowledge. The second and third phases included values that were developed and attributed in partnership with the DoA and YU, and reflected mainly training and collaboration values by means of an aim to contribute to an independent Jordanian archaeology. It took till the mid 1990's, when for the first time local values were explicitly advocated in the project, by emphasising the socio-economic and educational benefits that could be derived from enhancing the tourism potential of Tell Deir Alla. This was advocated for primarily by the Dutch and Jordanian co-directors of that time, something that was strengthened by discussions between the Joint Project and with anthropologists that were undertaking research into the historical and social identities of the people in the Jordan Valley (see for example Tarawneh in press; Elmusa 1994; Van Aken 2003). Still, after the retirement from the project of the Jordanian co-director in 1996, the main driving force behind the call for local community benefits in the Joint Project was at the global scale in the Netherlands, since it was foremost the Dutch co-director that formulated these values, and that tried to involve local partners in the project – such values and involvement were arguably seen as less important by the Jordanian project actors of the DoA and YU in Jordan, as will be discussed below.

According to the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project, this reflected not only the increasing influence of the emphasis on the social and political contexts of archaeology in global academic debates in the 1990's, but also the fact that the Dutch co-director was heavily influenced by discussions that he had

with the Palestinian Director of Antiquities during additional projects in the West Bank in the late 1990's; "from him, I learned that there was a difference between archaeological and public benefit, and that the latter should always be kept in the foreground of what we do as archaeologists."[195] We will see below, however, that the mentioning of values in the project proposals and evaluations not always reflects the actual archaeological conduct of the Joint Project, illustrating the rather difficult relationship between project policy and outcomes, and the need for maintaining coherent project representations regardless of field practices.

Figure 10. Team meeting at the DASAS during the 2009 fieldseason (photograph by author).

4.6.2 PROJECT REPRESENTATIONS

It took till 1996, before a first 'consolidation and restoration report' appeared in the project proposals, which explicitly mentioned that "erosion should be prevented to preserve as much as possible of the

[195] Leiden, April 2009.

ancient site."[196] The resulting years indeed witnessed some conservation and management work at the Tell, such as fencing off the Tell, the protection of several archaeological trenches, and some first visitor facilities in the sense of shelter at the base of the Tell (although this was not supported with maintenance strategies, and not explicitly integrated with the interpretive impact; several visitors that I interviewed interpreted the consolidated excavation trenches on the top of the Tell as a wall with a gate, a mistake easy to make for someone not trained in archaeology).[197] In any case, if one looks at the project policies of that time, the representation of the Joint Project increasingly included not only archaeological and collaboration values, but also the tourism values of the site.

But despite the new values in the project policy discourse of the Joint Project, and despite some work on the conservation and protection of the site, the actual project practice did not change that much – something that can best be illustrated through the fact that the project proposals and evaluations during the second half of the 1990's and the early 2000's largely stayed the same. What is noticeable however is that the policy discourses of the Joint Project, now more clearly geared towards heritage management values and the creation of tourism, allowed the different partners to continue to align themselves with the Joint Project, and to see it as a successful collaboration, despite its lack of clear practical outcomes in this respect. Story-lines that emphasised the protection and tourism development for instance fitted those of the DoA and the wider Ministry of Tourism, and story-lines that stressed local community values through socio-economic development fitted those of possible Dutch funders for the regional museum such as the Dutch Embassy (see below). It was therefore not so much the practices, but rather the policy discourses, or perhaps even intentions, to accomplish such outcomes that allowed for a successful collaboration and representation of the project. This could, interestingly, also be seen more recently when the former Honorary Consul General of the Netherlands (a Jordanian) mentioned, perhaps mistakenly,[198] that the Regional Research Centre and Museum was "the most important accomplishment of the whole project", and even that it was a "wonderful example of scientific and financial co-operation" (AbuJaber 2009, 12-13).

Another example is provided by the representation of the Joint Project as an 'archaeological rescue operation', which was used explicitly in the project policies of the Joint Project from the mid 1990's onwards, such as when referring to the archaeological excavations carried out at the nearby Tell Hammeh. In this regard, both the Jordanian co-directors of the 1990's and 2000's mentioned that the Joint Project was now not undertaken as a research project, but that all excavations in Deir Alla should be seen as a form of 'rescue archaeology' since the site was under increasing threat from infrastructure pressures, and that by doing so, the Joint Project was also contributing to the management and protection of Jordanian cultural heritage.

However, the labelling of the archaeological research work purely as 'rescue archaeology', something which the DoA increasingly regarded as a priority, is perhaps questionable. Although the Joint Project played an important role in making sure that the local municipality stopped with bulldozing parts away from both Tell Deir Alla and Tell Hammeh for infrastructure development in the 1990's, it can be noted that archaeological work at Deir Alla and Tell Hammeh has continued since. As such, I believe that the

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[196] 'Tell Deir Alla: Consolidation and Restoration', unpublished report (1996). Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[197] This misinterpretation came to the fore during conversations that I had with American and German tourists that visited Tell Deir Alla during the field-season as part of a 'Biblical Tour' (June 2009).

[198] It might be possible that the former Honorary Consul General of the Netherlands confused the Deir Alla Station for Archaeological Studies (DASAS) with the Regional Research Centre and Museum.

excavations could be regarded mostly as a continuation of the research archaeology undertaken at the site since the 1960's, but now framed and represented to suit current insights and critiques better - all in line with the AAD story-line that regards archaeological excavations as a necessary response in relation to fragile heritage resources under threat (see section 4.4.2). The excavations at Tell Hammeh, for instance, were represented as being rescue archaeological projects, as such projects were 'explicitly asked for by the director of the DoA'.[199] Still, excavations at Tell Hammeh have continued ever since, up to the 2009 season; the main reason for archaeological research here should therefore, I believe, be regarded primarily in the research aims of the Dutch field supervisor, who has acquired his MA thesis and PhD on the back of the work, as well as in those of Jordanian students who were writing their MA theses on this topic. My point here is not that the excavations did not retrieve important archaeological information in the face of initial imminent threats of looting and destruction at the site, but rather that the original and main scientific aims became effectively represented as 'rescue archaeology'. In addition, it must be noted that other necessary activities in the field of conservation and management, such as the acquisition of land, consolidation of the excavated remains, and public presentation and awareness, had during the time of fieldwork not been undertaken.

Such issues become especially relevant when relating them to statements by several 'external' interviewees of the DoA that were not part of the Joint Project, as well as heritage tourism specialists, which regarded the continuation of archaeological research projects as a 'pollution';

> Foreign archaeologists should take care of proper presentation, conservation and storage. Why? Well, because they are the ones that come and dig holes here, right? In Europe, you have the same system, when the polluter pays if a site is excavated but not threatened.[200]

> It's better not to get a site in trouble, by just excavating and going, when it is not threatened. We have had enough research archaeology now. We now have to preserve and present.[201]

As was discussed before, several senior Jordanian archaeologists also emphasised that the Joint Project was contributing to the local community with socio-economic and educational benefits, mentioning that the people in Deir Alla had 'based their lives around the excavations at the Tell', that they 'identified themselves with the history of the Tell', and that they were benefiting also 'economically and educationally';

> I have the feeling that other joint projects are continuing just for a limited period of time with some strict limitations, where the local community did not benefit very much, and the sites also didn't benefit either. But at Deir Alla the community benefits.[202]

I have already looked above at some of the statements by people from the local community, which suggested that the educational and socio-economic benefits of the Project were actually not perceived as great, that the cultural identification of the local community with the history of the Tell is limited, and that there is a perception in the local community that the project benefits, and involves, only certain individuals

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[199] Such statements were made in the unpublished Joint Project Project Proposals for the 1994 and 1996 fieldwork seasons. Joint Project Archive, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University.

[200] Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009).

[201] Staff member of the Department of Antiquities (Amman, July 2009).

[202] Former Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1976 till 1996 (Amman, May 2009).

and not the community at large. Previous sections have also dealt with how misinterpretations have been made through stressing the fact that the Joint Project was an equal partnership, although this was questioned by several partners and members of the project themselves. Based on the work of Mosse (2004; 2005; cf Latour 1996), I refer to this process as 'representation', whereby project practices are interpreted so that they appear the result of deliberate project policies – in this sense, interpreting some of the by-products of the archaeological fieldwork (such as developed friendships, minor job employment and initial rescue work) as deliberate results of an integrated collaborative archaeological approach.

This process of representation was also noticeable during the events and discourses surrounding the ceremony at DASAS in the summer of 2009, when the Dutch co-director was awarded a Medal of Honor by the president of Yarmouk University. What I thought was striking, was that the day on which the ceremony took place, was actually planned by the Dutch co-director as a day on which to bring together the major stakeholders of the Joint Project in order to hold a meeting on the future management of the Joint Project. In order to achieve this, not only the current partners of the Joint Project were invited, such as officials from YU and the DoA, but also local and regional governmental representatives, such as the mayor of Deir Alla and the governor of the Salt District. In addition, the Dutch Embassy was invited, as well as further experts and individuals that could strengthen the Joint Project, such as a representative of the Jordanian royal family with strong ties to the wider archaeological and tourism field. In my interviews with the people involved with the organisation of this day, I noticed that the meeting was soon used not for its abilities to strengthen the envisaged partnership by the Dutch co-director, but rather for more personal and institutional gains.

The DoA representative in charge of inviting the local representatives soon started referring to the meeting not as a 'meeting' anymore, but rather as 'the party'. Using the meeting as an opportunity to strengthen his personal bonds with the project network, he soon after pressed for a more luxurious event that would also enhance his own status – something he openly admitted during a talk we had in his car, and something witnessed by myself when he continuously stressed for my presence when meeting local representatives.[203] Not surprisingly, this led to some critique by the Dutch co-director, when he mentioned that "there will be no personal networking on my behalf."[204] Surprising, however, was that the Jordanian archaeologists of YU did not seem to express reservations over this – to the contrary, they also soon after started referring to the meeting as a 'party'. When news arrived on the morning of the meeting that two of the major stakeholders, the mayor of Deir Alla and the director of the DoA were not coming, the reaction of the Dutch co-director was one of dismay, whilst the reactions of the Jordanian archaeologists of YU were rather ambivalent. The reason for this, I believe, should be sought in the fact that YU was planning the day as a ceremony whereby it could strengthen its relationship with Leiden University, and less with the DoA or with local representatives, despite its expressed intentions in this direction.

What was noticeable during the ceremony, and the accompanying field-trips and speeches, was a strong emphasis by the archaeological representatives of YU on the socio-economic and educational benefits that the Joint Project had provided to the local community, and on the further need for conservation, presentation, local community involvement, and tourism development.

[203] Deir Alla, July 2009.

[204] Deir Alla, July 2009.

Figure 11. Guided tour on Tell Hammeh during the 2009 ceremony at DASAS (photograph by author, 2009).

Despite being a likely reflection of their future intentions, I believe that the use of a discourse based on local community involvement and socio-economic benefits functioned primarily as to maintain political, scientific and financial support by strengthening the ties with Leiden University, since especially the Dutch actors had called for such values to be incorporated in the project – something reflected not only in the statements made by the current Dean of the Faculty of Archaeology of Leiden during his visit to Deir Alla earlier during the 2009 excavation season, but also by that of the Dutch Ambassador. In addition, such a discourse fitted the values of other representatives of Embassies and NGO's present during the field-trip, and might even be placed in the fact that the Jordan Valley as a whole has a long history of (international) development programs (cf Van Aken 2003). What struck me was that a situation could develop in which a lot of visitors to the ceremony were talking about the need for community involvement whilst sitting in a bus on a field-trip to Tell Hammeh, whilst none of these local representatives were actually present. In addition, I had in mind the fact that several Jordanian archaeologists of the Joint Project had previously expressed that they did not see any reason to involve the local community in decision-making, as 'they were not archaeologists'. I also knew that the meeting overshadowed some feelings of exclusion by the DoA; "I feel the role of the DoA was not represented well at this meeting. Our role is much bigger. But I could not say anything, it is not my place <…> Something is destroyed now."[205] The under-representation of the DoA was perhaps made most clear, when the DoA representative asked me to write several words of

[205] Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009).

thanks to the Dutch co-director, that he presented to the Dutch co-director together with a small gift on behalf of the DoA – not publicly, but in private, after the ceremony.

What this means, I believe, is that a story-line in which archaeological projects were seen as a way to enhance community benefits through tourism development was used effectively as a means to strengthen and maintain project relationships and ownership by wishing to form a strong discourse-coalition with the LU and (Dutch) Embassy actors, rather than to actually orientate immediate practice. At the end of 2009, a meeting with local and regional actors, as well as with representatives of the tourism industry, had not happened yet, nor were they actively sought after by certain members of the Joint Project. In this sense, the Joint Project was produced and represented as being the result of a successful equal and local partnership through the creation of a network of supporting actors – a process which Latour has referred to as 'contextualisation' (cf Latour 1996, 137). At the ceremony, this success was produced by stressing the intentions of community and tourism development, as well as pointing to the fact that the Joint Project had resulted in many shared academic archaeological benefits. However, whilst such a success easily fitted the values of both YU and LU, it was more complicated to produce this in relation to the values and aims of the local community and the DoA.

4.6.3 THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE JOINT PROJECT

But why exactly was such an event needed at this time, in the presence of so many officials? I think the reason for this should be sought mainly in the idea that the fate of archaeological projects is tied not only to project policies, but also to individual actors, especially in relation to their capacity to acquire financial support from broader funding policies – perhaps best illustrated by focusing upon the events and perspectives during the recent retirement of the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project.

The news that the Dutch co-director would retire soon from Leiden University, seriously impacted upon the perceived chances by Jordanian actors of the survival of the Joint Project. This was especially so, because it had not escaped attention by the Jordanian counterparts that the Dutch Dean of the Faculty of Archaeology of LU, together with the Dutch co-director and with myself, had made a visit a few weeks earlier to the West Bank to sign a new memorandum of understanding for joint collaboration with the Palestinian Department of Antiquities. This was often interpreted, I believe, as a deliberate move by Leiden University, and the Netherlands at large, to shift its archaeological focus westwards, to the West Bank;

> After Jordan signed the peace treaty with Israel <in 1994> the Dutch government increasingly spend more money on the West Bank, and not on Jordan. That's why we might have to stop the project.[206]

The uncertainty over the continuation of LU's involvement in the Joint Project after the co-director's imminent retirement was for example expressed to me during talks with senior archaeologists of YU and the local DoA representative after we came back from the West Bank. I was asked if I knew what the vision of our Dean was on this, and why we were 'abandoning' Jordan in favour of the West Bank. The weeks after our trip to the West Bank, and leading up to the ceremony, the Jordanian co-director thereby increasingly made open statements in front of the whole archaeological team in the dig-house, where he stressed the mutual friendship and collaboration of the Joint Project; "We have a wonderful project. We

[206] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1996 - 2009 (Deir Alla, November 2009).

have found the Balaam text, and the earliest iron-smelting. But it is not enough. We need to continue. <...> you are stuck to this. Leiden has an obligation to continue."[207]

The ceremony where the Dutch co-director was awarded a Medal of Honour by the president of YU, during which the Joint Project was presented as a successful and equal partnership, was therefore regarded as a success by Yarmouk University representatives, the more so because the Dutch Ambassador had publicly stated that "the Dutch will and have to continue"[208]. The imminent danger of a dis-continuation of the Joint Project, became however once again visible a few months later during my second visit to Jordan. The Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project, now Dean of the Faculty of Anthropology and Archaeology of YU, expressed his distress to me over the fact that neither he, the President of YU, nor the Director of the DoA were invited to the retirement conference of the Dutch co-director in Leiden, something which they regarded as an insult to the Joint Project, but especially as a sign that Leiden University would end the collaboration.[209] Such feelings were elaborated upon during a subsequent dinner at the house of the former Honorary General Consul of the Netherlands for Jordan (a Jordanian). Here, it was stressed repeatedly that Leiden University abandoned Jordan and the Joint Project;

> Welcome to our world. Foreign institutions do not take their collaborations serious <…> In many cases, foreign teams come with their agenda, they make us an offer, we accept it, we join them, but actually it's their project, they are doing what they want to do, and at best, we are coping with that. But the main drive for the project remains in most cases the drive given by the foreign archaeologist.[210]

To make a point to the contrary, the Jordanian Dean of the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology stressed that YU had always taken the Joint Project serious; "we always made sure that there would be someone in charge of the Joint Project – when I was not available for several years, YU appointed somebody else to take over the project."[211]

What struck me however, is that the possible dis-continuation of the Joint Project was not only sought in the imminent retirement of the Dutch co-director, but also in a general shift in 'Dutch policy', despite the fact that the Joint Project had already been framed within several historical agreements and institutional collaborations (such as the contract for the DASAS between LU, DoA and YU) and the Memorandum of Understanding between Leiden and YU). This brings to the fore rather different expectations of the way in which project policies, institutions and individual actors relate to each other. In my interviews in Leiden with the Dutch co-director and the Dean of the Faculty,[212] it became clear that the invitation process for the retirement conference, and the setting up of a memorandum of understanding with the Palestinian Authority, was not the result of a deliberate shift in institutional policy, but rather of the academic interest, personal friendships and financial opportunities of the individual archaeologists (see below). Moreover, it was felt that precisely because of the institutional agreements, the Joint Project would continue to exist.

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[207] Deir Alla, July 2009.

[208] Deir Alla, July 2009.

[209] Irbid, November 2009.

[210] Senior official of Yarmouk University (Amman, November 2009).

[211] Amman, November 2009.

[212] Leiden, October 2009.

This was however not interpreted as such by the Jordanian counterparts: "I saw that the Director of the Palestinian Department of Antiquities was invited, and that he will speak. So, Leiden is moving its focus to the West Bank and the future, not to Jordan and their history".[213] A similar interpretation could also be seen in the perceived reasons as for why Leiden University, or 'the Dutch' had not succeeded in finding financial resources for the development of the Regional Research Centre and Museum, which some Jordanian actors saw as the result of a deliberate shift in focus towards the West Bank.

Implicit in these interpretations is the idea that the project policies of the Joint Project, as initiated by the Dutch archaeologists, were a direct reflection of a broader, over-all Dutch policy, or strategy, that administers the undertaking of archaeological projects abroad. In sections 1.4 and 3.2.1, where I touched upon the institutional and political framework of Dutch archaeology abroad (see also Slappendel *et al*. forthcoming), it was discussed that this is not the case. Although the Joint Project has always been undertaken by Leiden University, and framed within several historical institutional collaborations (see above), it has been undertaken by a range of individuals, of different faculties, and with different funding resources, initiating institutional collaborations and agreements when opportunities arose. The funding resources thereby have mostly been derived from the Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO) in the 1960's, to faculty funding in the 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's, to a combination of faculty, university and government funding by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the 2000's – all of which stressed the importance of academic research and the provision of curriculum teaching.[214] The idea of a singular 'Dutch policy' on archaeology in the Near East is therefore misinterpreted – it was the individual archaeologist that initiates and looks for funding sources to facilitate the project vision and policy, instead of the other way around. This is an important point, since several stakeholders in Jordan have expressed their views that 'the Dutch' have an historical obligation to develop the site of Deir Alla;

> Deir Alla is the baby of the Dutch, and I thought the Dutch would have a certain loyalty to their baby. But they don't <...> There is this curse of not really wanting to be generous. [215]

The instigation, outline and funding of the Joint Project was therefore heavily influenced by the individual Dutch archaeologists. The project policies thereby reflected the specific values and discourses of the individual researchers, in response to those of a myriad of funding programs in the field of culture, research and foreign affairs, institutional policies, cultural and archaeological policies and archaeological theory. As we will see, combined with the subsequent processes of value translation and policy negotiation with other actors in the socio-economic and cultural field, this contributed to the fact that Dutch funding and institutional policies do not have a simple one to one relationship with actual project outcomes – let alone that there is a single, overall Dutch strategy behind undertaking archaeological research abroad.

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[213] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1996 - 2009, now Dean of the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Deir Alla, November 2009).

[214] The Joint Project has never been funded within the framework of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the Dutch-co-director has tried to retrieve funds from this source for the development of the Regional Research Centre and Museum in the 1990's.

[215] Honorary General Consul of the Netherlands for Jordan (Amman, November 2009)

Dutch financial policy negotiations

However, this does not imply that project outcomes were not influenced by such wider policies. When asked if the perceived shift in focus of Dutch archaeology from Jordan to the West Bank was the result of a deliberate shift in policy or strategy by Leiden University, the Dean of the Faculty of Archaeology answered: "no, I guess the archaeologists are just following funding opportunities".[216] The Dutch co-director for instance, has had increasing problems since the 1990's to finance the Joint Project due to an increasing shift in internal policies by the Faculty of Archaeology in Leiden, which prohibited the transferral of funds from one financial year to another – a shift that became official policy in 2009. This meant not only that the funds needed to undertake large archaeological fieldworks seasons were not available easily, so that external financing had to be sought – it also meant that activities that were not linked to immediate scholarly research or student teaching could not easily be funded anymore.[217] In short, the instigation of all 'extra-archaeological' activities such as preservation, community development and outreach were all dependent on the individual researcher's desire and his or her available resources. Coupled with the fact that most other funding opportunities for archaeological research in the Netherlands (such as those from wider academic university funds and NWO) were set apart for short-term projects with an increasing demand for accountability, scientific output and student training, this meant that long-term involvement of collaborative academic research projects and the undertaking of extra-archaeological activities became dependent on the individual's commitment and desires.

The increasing attention by the Dutch co-director to the archaeology of the West Bank, was not a deliberate shift in policy of Leiden University – according to his own accounts, this was rather the result of personal friendships that developed, along with a research interest and a dedication to an independent archaeology in the West Bank; a dedication that had its roots in the work and commitment of Henk Franken, the first initiator of the Joint Project in the 1960's. The archaeological projects in the West Bank that focused on research and institutional capacity building, undertaken from 1996 till 2000, were strengthened by these factors, but were primarily the result from a call for help by the Dutch representative for Palestine, who, in his turn, was approached by the Director of Antiquities in Palestine. This director had sought financial and scientific support from the Dutch representation, in order to undertake a '100 endangered sites' project, that was designed to document and rescue these most significant archaeological sites in Palestine. The subsequent Dutch political governmental support for this project therefore provided a funding opportunity that fitted the research aims and commitment for an independent Palestinian archaeology by the Dutch co-director.

The specific funding for this project came from the Dutch budget schemes for 'Culture' and 'Environment', all within the broader funding policy for development aid from the Dutch Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) (Van der Kooij 2003; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). The archaeological projects by Leiden University in the West Bank were as such facilitated by Dutch foreign affairs policy – however, they were not the result of deliberate archaeological aims within these policies. Rather, these funds could be made available mainly because of the personal interests by the Dutch Ambassador and his wife at that time, both of whom saw a great value for Palestinian society in the development of the study of history and archaeology of Palestine. Moreover, both of them recognised the potential of archaeology not solely for its academic and scientific purposes, but rather as part of an holistic and integrated approach towards the environment and towards institutional capacity building.

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[216] Leiden, December 2009.

[217] According to the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University (Leiden, April 2009).

With the arrival of a new Dutch Minister responsible for development aid in 1998, the Dutch policy shifted towards 'priority countries' (Van Gastel & Nuijten 2005; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006), which meant that Palestine could depend on an enlarged budget for development aid, whilst Jordan's budget was stopped completely (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). However, within these policies, 'culture' was not seen as an inherent part nor priority of financial aid anymore, which meant that continuing financial support for archaeological and heritage management projects was complicated.

This however changed again with new Dutch foreign policies for the Palestinian Authority from 2006 onwards, in which 'culture and development' was seen as a fundamental part (Netherlands Representative Office 2007). This provided new opportunities, especially in combination with the arrival of a new First Secretary of the Representative Office of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority. This is because the impact of personal interests and values on the financing of certain projects was, as in the mid 1990's as discussed above, still very great; "The smaller the projects, the bigger the impact and power of individuals. Both myself and the Ambassador still have a great freedom of choice when deciding how to spend our budgets for culture and development."[218] What this means, is that this budget could be spend according to their insights, which made it very much dependent on the historical background and personal interest of individuals. During my stay in Palestine, where I travelled together with the First Secretary through the West Bank, it became clear that the archaeological projects by Leiden, as well as the newly formed memorandum of understanding between Leiden University and MOTA-DACH (2009), could count on his continuing support, not in the least because he was trained as an archaeologist in Leiden himself, and because he was aware of the potential social value of archaeological projects. As such, these projects could only be financed within the budget for culture and development, if archaeological research was interpreted as potentially providing sustainable benefits for the socio-economic development of Palestine. The translation of research values into socio-economic values was however easily made due to the specific values and discourses on archaeology by the First Secretary; "I think of culture, history, and therefore also archaeology, as fundamental elements in development aid".[219]

Because of the personal interest of the First Secretary, and his particular discourse on archaeology as inherently linked to 'culture' and wider heritage management issues such as preservation, site development and capacity building, the research elements of the Leiden archaeological projects were made possible. This discursive story-line, of an archaeology that functions foremost as a path to provide socio-economical and educational benefits to the public instead of prioritising scientific benefits per se, was shared by the Minister of Tourism and Antiquities of the Palestinian Authority as well by the Dean of the Faculty of Archaeology of Leiden University – something that was very clear during the official ceremony in Ramallah on the 8th of June 2009 when the memorandum of understanding was signed. By using the same concepts, values and story-lines, all actors could easily translate their values to the memorandum and contextualized the project by aligning their values and fates to a future collaboration by means of a strong discourse-coalition.

The Dutch Embassy in Jordan, however, does not have a budget for culture and development, which means that the possible financial support for archaeological and heritage projects is more restrictive than those for Palestine. The budget for Palestine that can be used for 'culture and development' is around 150,000 euro per year (Netherlands Representative Office 2007), whilst in Jordan, the budget available for 'culture' at large is around 50,000 euro per year (cf Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009; see below) . The difference in budgets available is mainly the result of the fact that Palestine is a priority country for Dutch development

[218] First Secretary of the Representative Office of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority (Jerusalem, July 2009).

[219] First Secretary of the Representative Office of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority (Jerusalem, July 2009).

aid and international cooperation, whilst Jordan is not. What this also means, is that the budget available for culture in Jordan is not framed within a development aid perspective, which means that it is not linked to the budget available for socio-economic development, which is around 90,000 euro per year.[220] This budgetary shift from the Netherlands in relation to Jordan happened in 1998, when Jordan was no longer perceived as a priority country. It is this policy shift, that is also often referred to by some Jordanian actors of the Joint Project as the major reason why the Joint Project could not find financial support for the Regional Research Centre and Museum;

> <The Dutch co-director> tried to develop the museum on a larger scale. But it started to became lost between the new entity that succeeded the ZWO and the Ministry of Development Aid, and I don't know what and what. <…> the Dutch became more interested in financing, and they started to have their second thoughts about expenditures here and expenditures there. Mind you, Holland was one of the least daring in expending on technical assistance for foreign countries. They had their special countries, <...> these priority countries.[221]

However, the potential for financial support for archaeological projects from the Dutch Embassy in Jordan is not solely dependent on the aims and scope of specific policies, but again, also on the individual's personal values and interests, and his or her discourse on what archaeology entails – or in other words, in which budget category archaeology should be placed;

> Jordan is not a country that receives specific attention from the Netherlands for international cultural policy, so we have to cope with the lowest category in terms of policy and financing. That means that we receive a small budget, 50,000 euros per year to be exact, with which we can do whatever we want in the field of culture, in a broad sense. Cultural heritage is part of this <...> but also the promotion of Dutch culture in Jordan. Primarily to promote the intrinsic value of art itself, to facilitate the development of Dutch art and culture, but also to improve the image of the Netherlands. Financing for archaeological projects therefore should come out of this budget heading. We also have another budget, concerning development, socio-economic development, but archaeology does not fall under this category.[222]

The utility of a story-line of archaeology and cultural heritage as contributing to socio-economic development, is therefore partly dependent on the specific values, discourses and interests of the person in charge of the budgets at the Embassy;

> The influence of personal interest on funding has always been quite substantial. These projects are very much delegated, we don't have to provide much accountability for small projects to The Hague. It also has to interest you personally <...> If you have, for instance, an ambassador who completely loves archaeology, then you will see that the focus shifts to that.[223]

In Jordan, this becomes clear if one looks at the personal interests of the former ambassador of the Netherlands (2003-2007), who was very interested in the history and archaeology of Jordan, and who actually published on this topic (Scheltema 2009). As a result of this personal interest, the former

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[220] Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Dutch Embassy (Amman, July 2009).

[221] Honorary General Consul of the Netherlands for Jordan (Amman, November 2009)

[222] Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Dutch Embassy (Amman, July 2009).

[223] Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Dutch Embassy (Amman, July 2009).

ambassador has been a fundamental influence in re-developing the archaeological museum in Salt, using his personal network – despite the small budgets available for culture in relation to those in the West Bank;

> What the former ambassador did, was to use his personal network. He asked some influential and wealthy families of Salt for financial contributions, and he matched to this some contributions from the Embassy. So, here you see how, through him, the embassy has played an important role; otherwise, the <renewed> museum would never have been there.[224]

Similar views on finding financial support for archaeological projects were expressed by the former Honorary General Consul of the Netherlands for Jordan (a Jordanian), also a passionate scholar in the history and archaeology of Jordan, and a close friend to Henk Franken, the Dutch initiator of the Joint Project;

> Whenever he needed references, I helped Henk Franken. That went on for 20 or 30 years, until he retired. <...> I helped, because I had relations at the highest level. <...> With our royal family, and my relationships with your minister of finance, and Dutch companies and banks. <...> In that time, I developed a keen interest in archaeology, and became the president of the Friends of Archaeology and Heritage in Jordan for five years.[225]

To summarise, I believe that the impact of Dutch funding and institutional policies on the Joint Project has been substantial, but that this has been influenced to a large degree by the personal background, values and discourses of the actors involved. The development and scope of the project policies of the Joint Project has thereby also become dependent to a large degree on the Dutch archaeologists, and upon their subsequent role in processes of value translation and policy negotiation. This also meant that the continuation of the Joint Project became dependent on the fate, interest and values of the individual archaeologist – something that was seen as a limitation to the development of long-term international collaboration projects by stakeholders in Jordan, which increasingly call for firm institutional agreements and accountability.

The case of the Joint Project has also illustrated that the way in which the relationship between project policies and wider institutional and political frameworks are perceived by project partners in the Netherlands, is sometimes different from their counterparts in Jordan. Whilst the latter tended to perceive the project policies and practices as a coherent package, driven by a single vision on archaeological research abroad, these were actually more the result of the individual archaeologists values and discourses as a reflection of a myriad of cultural, institutional and funding policies. The different perspectives on the way in which the combination of Dutch policies related to the archaeological project outcomes, as such contributed to frictions over the perceived role and responsibility of Dutch archaeology in Jordan, and on the success of the Joint Project.

Nevertheless, the impact of the financial policies of the Faculty of Archaeology in Leiden and the scientific funding bodies in the Netherlands played a significant role in challenging opportunities for long-term collaborations and the undertaking of wider public and heritage activities because of their discursive emphasis on academic values. The focus on short-term accountability and archaeology as an academic endeavour, whose success depends on its capacity to produce research and teaching benefits, was one of

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[224] Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Dutch Embassy (Amman, July 2009).

[225] Honorary General Consul of the Netherlands for Jordan (Amman, November 2009)

the major factors in this. The fact that research and institutional funding did as such not easily provide for activities in the sphere of heritage management and collaboration, meant that the development of such activities became partly dependent, again, on the commitment of the individual researcher.

Before I continue to reflect upon the role and responsibility of Dutch archaeological researchers in relation to the needs and values of others in society (section 4.7), I will focus in a little more detail on the role of Jordanian individual actors within the relationship between project negotiations and project outcomes. I will do this by arguing how the personal background and values of these actors played an important role in the implementation of archaeological policies, such as for example the Jordanian Law on Antiquities.

4.6.4 JORDANIAN POLICY NEGOTIATIONS: MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP AND ACCESS

"The Law of Antiquities in Jordan is a strong law, but weakly implemented", according to a senior British archaeologist who has worked for several decades in Jordan.[226] During the short field-trip around Jordan in the second week of my fieldwork, I could see the practical results of what was referred to by this statement. Many of the archaeological sites that we visited had an abandoned feel to them; fenced-off sites, with little to no interpretation, damaged architecture, and deserted excavations. What struck me however was not so much the lack of management and interpretation, but rather the critiques expressed by the students and archaeologists in this trip. Surely, it was concluded, the Department of Antiquities did not have an effective control over the management of archaeological sites; something that was more often attributed to a general lack of concern and even corruption, than to anything else; "Jordanians used to have more respect for foreign archaeology, we used to be able to do more. Nowadays, they are not concerned about archaeology anymore, only about money. And we let this happen, because of the postcolonial critiques in archaeology".[227] Such criticisms however seemed to be connected quite often to the way in which the DoA's concerns and activities impacted upon the fate of the research interests of the individual archaeological students and academics themselves, and to the way in which the individual archaeologists influenced the archaeological policies, and vice versa.

The impact of individual interests on the negotiation and enforcement of archaeological policies in Jordan became clear to me after looking in more detail to the history of the Joint Project, as well as after talking to several archaeologists and heritage professionals that were outside the direct sphere of influence of the project.

In the first phase of the Joint Project, in the 1960's and early 1970's, the DoA was responsible for the enforcement of an Antiquities Law that was formulated during the British Mandate (see for example Simpson 2007; Groot 2008; Maffi 2009; AlGhazawi 2011). According to several Jordanian and foreign archaeologists and government officials that worked during that time,[228] this law was not strongly enforced by a DoA that was generally understaffed and under-skilled, but also because the directors of that time were mostly concerned with facilitating the needs and wishes of foreign archaeologists; "one of the

[226] Amman, November 2009.

[227] Dutch MA student of the Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University (May 2009).

[228] This was according to the Director of the Department of Antiquities himself (Amman, June 2009); the Jordanian Head of Excavations and Research at the Department of Antiquities from 1976 – 1979 (Amman, November 2009); the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project (Deir Alla, June 2009); the Director of Archaeological Conservation for Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia of the World Monument Fund (Amman, July 2009); as well as during conversations with several French, American and British archaeologists (Amman, July 2009).

Department directors told me that our role is to facilitate the work of others, not do initiate the work of others."[229]

In an analysis of the marginalisation of the Islamic past in the archaeology of Jordan, this context has also been named as one of the reasons why foreign archaeologists could work on the basis of individual agreements, instead of by law (Simpson 2007). According to the present Director of the DoA, this system attributed to the fact that foreign archaeologists were allowed to export archaeological artefacts and materials out of the country (cf Maffi 2009), and to a situation in which interpretations of archaeological data remained unchallenged by Jordanian counterparts – an historic condition that, in his opinion, still lingered in the present situation; "the new permits should be with institutions, not individuals. And they should work not by habit, but abide by the law <...> But you know, people try to get away with it, it's what they are used to."[230]

In 1976 the DoA developed a new vision and a new temporary Antiquities Law to try and change this situation.[231] This vision, which was geared towards "bringing back the ownership to Jordan" and towards providing more benefits for the public of Jordan,[232] was heavily influenced and supported by the co-director of the Joint Project, the Head of Research and Excavation of the DoA at that time. This new provisional Antiquities Law stated, amongst other things, that from now on artefacts were no longer the ownership of those who found them through excavation, but rather from the Jordanian Government as represented by the DoA (see AlGhazawi 2011 for a translation of the revised Antiquities Law). Henk Franken, the Dutch counterpart of the Jordanian co-director of that time, supported this strongly, several years later also in his capacity as official advisory to Jordanian archaeological matters (Van der Kooij 2006, 13) – which was strongly grounded in his dedication to establish a strong and independent Jordanian archaeology. For a while, this new Jordanian law provided a legal framework for the archaeological activities that were already undertaken at the Joint Project. However, also this law soon became less influential, and less strongly enforced, with the transfer from the Jordanian Head of Research and Excavation of the DoA to Yarmouk University in 1979 (something that was already discussed above), and with a subsequent series of directors that resembled the more administrative line of their predecessors in the 1960's.[233] It is noticeable that the enforcement of the Antiquities Law was also challenged now by the former Jordanian Head of Research and Excavation, but now in his capacity as the first Director of the Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology at YU and co-director of the Joint Project. Advocating the story-line that archaeology should benefit the Jordanian public and unhappy with the fact that the law was not enforced strongly anymore, he started demanding the archaeological finds from the excavations of the Joint Project, so that they could be displayed at the newly formed Yarmouk University Museum.[234] What is striking about this, is that he implicitly challenged the idea of a state ownership of archaeological artefacts, and by doing so, worked against the Antiquities Law that he had been fundamental in setting up himself. The development and enforcement of the Jordanian Law of Antiquities was as such influenced by the

[229] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project and Head of Excavations and Research at the Department of Antiquities from 1976 – 1979 (Amman, November 2009).

[230] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009)

[231] For a concise overview of the history of the DoA, see the website of the DoA: http://www.doa.jo/doa1.htm [Accessed 5 May 2012].

[232] Former Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1976 till 1996 (Amman, November 2009).

[233] According to several interviews and conversations with the former Head of Excavations and Research at the Department of Antiquities from 1976 – 1979 (Amman, May and November 2009); the Director of the Department of Antiquities (Amman, June 2009) as well as with the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project (Deir Alla, May-July 2009).

[234] Former Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1976 till 1996 (Amman, November 2009).

historical backgrounds, values and interests of individual actors, and by the perceived benefits that could be derived from its implementation – a process that was also illustrated when discussing the process of value translation in section 4.5.

Another result of the move by the Jordanian co-director to YU, is that the Joint Project was strengthened by a collaboration with the Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology as a third partner – which soon became a stronger partner in the collaboration than the DoA (see section 4.5). The relatively strong position of the YU in the Joint Project, and the rather weak position of the DoA and its enforcement of the Antiquities Law, became challenged again when another, subsequent Dean of the Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology of YU in the late 1990's became the new Director of the DoA in 2000. It was this director, who started to enforce the Law of Antiquities more strictly again, and who challenged the practical ownership over archaeological sites by academic projects, resulting in a more strict policy on handing out excavation permits[235] – thereby increasing his power over the archaeological field in Jordan.

The enforcement of legal power over the ownership and responsibility of the archaeological process and resources, is however not solely the result of a power struggle between the DoA and the Jordanian universities. The fact that it becomes increasingly more difficult to acquire excavation permits is not restricted solely to Jordanian, but also to foreign academic institutions, reminding us of the difference in attributed values to the archaeological process between the archaeological academic institutions and that of the DoA that I discussed in section 4.5; "Not enough people benefit from these archaeological projects. If we don't get benefit for the general public of these projects, why should we allow the archaeologists to excavate?"[236]

When I was visiting the DoA during the summer of 2009, I heard from several foreign archaeologists that they had difficulty with acquiring the necessary permits for excavation. In response to this, it was suggested that the DoA was ineffective, and/or that they had started the process of acquiring the necessary personal clearance from the 'secret police' too late. Another critique that was heard often was that the current director of the DoA was an epigraphist, and not a 'real' archaeologist. Presumably, this might be reasons as for why foreign teams could not get permits to excavate; not only the Dutch, but also several other American, English and French excavation teams were waiting for a permit; "even famous archaeologists!"[237]. The perspectives of the DoA in this regard were different;

> <They are> always late with their applications and proposals, and send it apart, separate, different times. We have many projects, little staff and time, we are busy. It is a waste of our time and energy. They have an ethical responsibility in that respect as well <...> European and American attitudes and cultures are different <from ours>. The mentality is still very much one of 'we are standing above you, we know what's best'. They play tricks, they try to cheat you.[238]

[235] This was according to the Director of the Department of Antiquities himself (Amman, June 2009), but such a view could also be distilled through interviews with for example the Dutch co-director of the Joint Project (Deir Alla, June 2009); the Director of Archaeological Conservation for Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia of the World Monument Fund (Amman, July 2009); as well as during conversations with several French, American and British archaeologists (Amman, July 2009).

[236] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009)

[237] French archaeologist, whilst discussing matters of excavation licensing in front of the DoA office (Amman, July 2009).

[238] Head of Excavation and Research of the Department of Antiquities (Amman, June 2009).

This situation led to a heated discussion during an archaeological conference in Amman on the Prehistory of Jordan,[239] after the Director of the DoA had heard that Jordanian universities had teamed up with foreign counterparts outside of his knowledge – something about which he expressed reservations to me during an interview, since it would, in his opinion, lead to diminished financial income and capacity building for the DoA, less attention to conservation, and a weaker position of the DoA in relation to Jordanian university demands.[240] One reason behind this, is that foreign archaeological team do not have to pay the 10% preservation fee if they have a partnership with a Jordanian university. From the perspective of the Dutch co-director, this situation was actually regarded as strengthening the partnership with the DoA, since he interpreted this as a sign that the DoA was contributing financially to the Joint Project as well. However, the perspective by the Director of the DoA was different;

> Look, the Dutch have everything. They have an archaeological station, for free, they don't pay the preservation fee. They never have to pay these things, because we have what they call a historical collaboration. Well, that means that they have ethical obligations to do something more with the site, right?[241]

In addition, it is worthwhile repeating here some perspectives on the inherent power structures of foreign archaeological projects by both Jordanian as well as foreign archaeologists themselves;

> I don't think the <DoA> has the means to influence what an archaeologist coming from a foreign country wants to do. I don't think that there is a policy from the DoA that can guide the foreign archaeologists to a certain kind of approach to the archaeology of Jordan.[242]

> The law is enforced by our Department, but it doesn't work. Sometimes it is internal pressure, sometimes external pressure. It has happened that sometimes ambassadors make sure that preservation fees don't have to be paid by putting pressure on the Department.[243]

> As a result, <foreigners> influence the implementation, not so much the policy making. People of the DoA do not have the level of confidence to say 'no' to foreigners.[244]

Such statements and discussions bring us back to the perception that the DoA does not have full control over the ownership and responsibility of the archaeological resources and projects in Jordan in relation to academic demands, especially not when faced with foreign archaeological and political pressures. With this in mind, I will conclude this chapter by further reflecting upon the role and responsibility of foreign archaeological researchers in relation to the values and demands of others in society.

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[239] This conference was called 'Jordan's Prehistory: Past and Future Research', organized by the DoA in collaboration with several foreign research institutes in Jordan from 25 - 28 May 2009.

[240] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

[241] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

[242] Archaeologist of the American Centre for Oriental Research (Amman, July 2009).

[243] Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009).

[244] Italian archaeologist with a long fieldwork experience in Jordan (Amman, July 2009).

4.7 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF FOREIGN ARCHAEOLOGISTS

I have already discussed some of the processes whereby actors produced the Joint Project as being a successful and equal partnership by tying their fate to that of the project, and by representing the project policies and outcomes in such a way that they appeared to be the result of a deliberate integrated collaborative archaeological management approach, processes which I referred to as 'representation' and 'contextualisation'. Similar processes could be discerned, I believe, in the way in which the Joint Project is labelled as being '(un-)ethical' and/or '(post-)colonial' and in the way in which the responsibility of the Dutch actors is represented and played out in the negotiations of the Joint Project.

Jordanian archaeological academics that were currently involved in the Joint Project stated that the project was of 'postcolonial value', and that is was 'sensitive' to the needs of Jordan.[245] When asked what the future of the Joint Project should look like, especially in light of the imminent retirement of the Dutch co-director, the rhetoric suddenly changed into stressing the 'historical obligation', 'ethical responsibility' and 'moral duty' of the Dutch partners to continue the archaeological field-work at Deir Alla; "Can you imagine that other nationalities come and dig at Deir Alla? Continue what work you already started. It's a historical obligation, an ethical responsibility."[246] A story-line on the need to continue archaeological excavations and research for the public benefit, as a reflection of the AAD, could also be discerned by the local DoA representatives that were employed by the Joint Project; "We need to continue excavating with the foreigners, to learn and to discover new things, to increase our knowledge of the history. The Dutch team should stay and help us with this."[247].

It can be noted however that many of these interviewees also had a clear personal benefit by the continuation of the archaeological work, since it would automatically lead to research benefits in terms of publications and training, as well as in job and career opportunities. Such views were for example expressed by the students who were working on the project and who needed the data for their dissertations and essays, and by the archaeologists who were using the data for their publications. This could also be seen for example by the local DoA representatives; "Yes, I need this project to go on. There is a lot of work for me to do <...> People here need two jobs, you know".[248]

In comparison, several people who were not part of the Joint Project (anymore) perceived the future role and responsibility of the Dutch archaeologists as entirely different. These stakeholders, by and large, stressed the fact that it was primarily the Jordanian partners that were accountable for the lack of clear results in the sphere of community involvement, tourism development and site management, and that it was these partners, and not the Dutch, that should address this in the future;

> If the people in Deir Alla don't benefit from the archaeology, then the office of the Department <of Antiquities> is not doing its job well enough <...> I assure you they have more money, and more logistics, not than the Dutch government, but than the archaeological team from Leiden. I think people make it too easy for them.[249]

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[245] Interview with two senior academic archaeologists of the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology of Yarmouk University who were part of the Joint Project team in the 2000's, as well as with the co-director of the Joint Project from 1996 - 2009 (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[246] Jordanian co-director of the Joint Project from 1996 - 2009, Professor of Archaeology at the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[247] Representative of the Department of Antiquities for the Joint Project (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[248] Director of the Middle Jordan Valley Office of the Department of Antiquities (Deir Alla, July 2009).

[249] Jordanian anthropologist specialized in the socio-political and economic context of the Jordan Valley (Amman, November 2009).

> The Dutch co-director has not succeeded in finding Dutch money. But we can't say that because it is an historical obligation, now nothing can't happen. He pushed this, yes, but who said, ok, where is plan B? <...> We have a 50 million dollar university here. <...> Don't we have the responsibility over the people in the Jordan valley? We should not think of Leiden as Santa-Claus.[250]

> This is our country, our people, our history, our problem. Don't think we can not build a museum if we would want to. [251]

> Well, after 50 years we should say thank you. It is the responsibility of the directors here in Jordan. If the Dutch team can help, this is something up to them, but it is our responsibility. [252]

The attributing of responsibility therefore seems not only subjective, but also closely linked to the perceived benefits that could be derived from this – the ethical, historical and moral obligation to continue therefore became often something like a 'card' that was played by certain actors as to pressure the Dutch to continue. Nevertheless, I believe that this does not imply that foreign archaeologists do not have to take responsibility at all – not in the least because they clearly benefit from the undertaking of archaeological projects themselves.

First of all, through the workings of the AAD and related processes of value-translation and policy negotiation, foreign archaeologists are often attributed expertise and ownership to deal with wider management issues in Jordanian archaeology, and to include other values and stakeholders in the process. This process is strengthened by the fact that foreign archaeological teams not only had an historical impact on the development of Jordanian archaeology, but also that they still have a position of power over the degree to which the Antiquities Law in Jordan is implemented – for example also through the fact that those DoA representatives that have to supervise the quality of archaeological fieldwork, are the same who have to be trained in what exactly archaeological methodological and interpretive quality entails; "I'm here to learn, especially the new techniques in archaeology. This year, I learned about ground radar. <...> I also am responsible for quality supervision and the subsequent handling of objects."[253]

In addition, it is the story-lines of the AAD, coupled with a field-work involvement at certain sites, as well as with a global access to academic networks and funding resources that leads to the perception that foreign archaeologists have an ownership and expertise to deal with archaeological sites resources. Moreover, foreign archaeologists are often instrumental in the instigation, development and subsequent value-translation and negotiation of project proposals, such as could be seen with the Dutch archaeologists in the Joint Project. Finally, the inclusion of local actors as equal project partners in archaeological research projects depends for a large degree on the successful brokering of the foreign archaeologist – the local mayor of Deir Alla, for example, needed the contacts and networks of the Dutch co-director in order to be involved in the project process.

In short, through the workings of the AAD and the related value-system in Jordanian archaeology, foreign archaeologists are often attributed a position in which they have to make decisions about if, and when other actors and values are to be included in the archaeological project, apart from the actual archaeological

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[250] Deputy Dean of Research and Science, Yarmouk University (Irbid, July 2009).

[251] Assistant Manager of the National Centre for Agricultural Research and Extension (Deir Alla, June 2009).

[252] Mayor of the Municipality ('Department') of Deir Alla (Swalha, July 2009).

[253] Representative of the Department of Antiquities for the Joint Project (Deir Alla, June 2009).

value that he or she might actually feel comfortable to deal with; "it is a rather absurd reality, but the power that is attributed to western specialists is still very great. It should not be like this – but it is, and that brings responsibilities."[254]

Taking up such a kind of responsibility does not necessarily have to be considered as 'neo-colonial', according to several Jordanian academics that I interviewed. On the contrary, it was felt that this was actually desirable, as long as such taking up the attributed responsibility and expertise would not be used for gaining personal and academic access and ownership over archaeological processes;

> You can make <archaeology> a concern for everybody, for all stakeholders. It can be done, even with this fragmentation. Think about your former ambassador. He had an integrated view. And he had power as a foreigner. Archaeologists can do this as well. This is the duty of the foreign mission. Everyone will tell you that there is problem between the DoA, the Ministry of Tourism <and with local community concerns>. But you can work with this fact.[255]

> You have a system that listens to all agents. And you come here, and see a system that doesn't work. I think it is your duty to work with this. It is not a kind of new ideas you are bringing, enforcing them upon us. No, I'm saying it is the other way around. Some archaeologists are taking advantage of this. They come and dig <...> and they don't care about the fact that the system is not working, which is wrong. And you know that it is wrong. [256]

In addition, it was mentioned by several Jordanian interviewees as well as by a range of senior European archaeologists, that foreign archaeologists should not try and be 'overly sensitive to former colonial relationships', as, in their opinion, this continued to have a negative role on the development of a mature Jordanian archaeological heritage management field. One example of this, is the perception that foreign archaeologists often played along with allowing Jordanian archaeologists to put their names on publications since they were partners, and since they needed these for institutional promotion;

> There is a tendency in Jordan to adopt a colonised attitude. They want you to write papers, so that they can put their names on <it> and increase their personal status and career <...> We as overseas archaeologists have played along with this for far too long; actually, we have contributed to this system by agreeing to it. <...> Overseas archaeologists often do this, I think, for two reasons. They need local partners on paper, because it suits their funding and needs for public relations. But they also are too friendly and go ahead with this game, whilst thinking they play a postcolonial game. They are afraid of criticising their Jordanian colleagues, they are afraid of being colonisers. But by doing so, they actually contribute to this mutual colonial relationship. I think there is a tendency that researchers from overseas are sometimes too delicate in these things.[257]

What this implies, I believe, is that foreign archaeologists should take up their responsibility by facilitating and advocating a value-based approach towards archaeological research, heritage management and collaboration that engages with the values and wishes of actors on all levels of Jordanian public society –

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[254] First Secretary of the Representative Office of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority (Jerusalem, July 2009).

[255] Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009).

[256] Associate Professor of Anthropology, Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University (Irbid, November 2009).

[257] British archaeologist (Amman, July 2009).

an idea, that has been existent in the Joint Deir Alla Project to a certain degree, albeit often implicitly formulated.

This also means advocating for changes in the national academic and governmental archaeological heritage management structure of society by ways of transferring skills, knowledge and power (cf Rizvi 2008, 122) – not only to archaeological academia, but also to the DoA and to local community members. Such an integrated approach towards archaeological projects would also include an involvement with education, site management, tourism and local community development. However, this does not automatically imply that foreign archaeologists should become heritage managers themselves;

> The idea of foreigners taking on the role of heritage managers is not sustainable. As a heritage manager, you have to be on the site all the time. Also, you need an understanding of everybody's role <...> The more people with stakes and ideas, the more problematic it is to find a solution. Foreign archaeologists have to deal with all of them. And they can try to change things. But the ultimate change comes from policies and capacities in Jordan. Still, if they are concerned, they should speak and advocate for the site, its protection, its management, and its excluded stakeholders.[258]

> There should be more reliance on local expertise. Do things with them and for them. We have good expertise in Jordan. [259]

Such an approach would eventually entail challenging and de-constructing the AAD in project policies, through story-lines that do not solely focus on global, future generations and knowledge production, but also on present, local generations by advocating for the inclusion of their values at the start of the archaeological process.

From a Dutch perspective, this would also entail challenging the attribution of expertise, ownership and decision-making power of foreign archaeologists by de-constructing the AAD in archaeological curricula, and by contributing to a change in the institutional and financial frameworks of Dutch archaeological research abroad. This chapter has already discussed the impact of the AAD in Dutch financial frameworks, but I believe it is important here to bring forward some final perspectives on this issue by directors of several European archaeological institutions in Jordan, as well as by Jordanian actors themselves;

> Most of the grants which are coming from Europe to dig in Jordan, generally they give just money for excavation. <The granting agent> should make it compulsory for the excavator to reserve a part of their budget for preservation <...> It's a shared fault, a shared problem. The granting agent and the receiving agents. If this will happen, preservation will finally become a real part of the process.[260]

> In many ways, you know, you shouldn't apply for a grant that simply allows you to excavate, but rather your funding should cover al those aspects as well. Otherwise, it's better not to get the site in trouble, by just excavating and going.[261]

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[258] Former Head of the Queen Rania Institute of Tourism and Heritage, Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, November 2009).

[259] Member of the royal Jordanian family, former member of the Jordan Tourism Board (Amman, June 2009).

[260] Assistant Professor Conservation and Heritage Management at the Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, June 2009).

[261] Former Head of the Queen Rania Institute of Tourism and Heritage, Hashemite University in Zarqa (Amman, November 2009).

> There is a major problem with the university and academic funding of these projects. They all come with one or two year budgets, and so make one or two year plans for the site. As a result, they focus on archaeology and on training their students, because that's what can be achieved and that's what they know and are expected to do from their funders.[262]

> Because of the increasing demands for accountability through the British funders, and the limited time budgets for projects, people find it difficult to include the time <in their projects> to establish meaningful collaborations and to talk to stakeholders; but such things need time, especially in Jordan. These are practical issues that undermine people's best intentions. [263]

The idea that a focus on archaeological and scientific values with an increasing short-term demand for accountability within funding policies contributes to diminished opportunities for heritage management, collaboration and long-term involvement, becomes all the more important when realising that the long-term involvement has been mentioned as one of the main reasons as for why the Joint Project was regarded as a successful project from a Jordanian perspective. Such long-term commitment should however be based upon firm institutional agreements as to make sure that the fate of projects is not overly dependent on the fate of individuals, upon value-based approaches that identify and facilitate the values and wishes of all involved, as well as upon a critical reflection of the AAD in project policies. Taken together, this might even help prevent perceptions that question the sincere commitment of foreign archaeologists – such as those with which I started this chapter.

[262] Director of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan (Amman, June 2009).

[263] Director of the Council for British Research in the Levant (Amman, November 2009).