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The economics of friendship : changing conceptions of reciprocity in classical Athens

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INTRODUCTION

The economics of friendship

MONEY is the measure of all things.¹ Money is the source of all evils.² Money is the man.³ Money is power.⁴ Classical Greek literature abounds in statements, provocative and trivial, positive and negative, about the nature and power of money. The Greeks of the Classical Age were fascinated by the phenomenon of money and what it brought about in the world around them.

One of the fields in which the Greeks felt that money had a profound effect on was interpersonal relationships, *φιλία*. They were highly fascinated by the things money can do to friendships and the ties that bind people. This was a question that tapped into a more general interest in society, social cohesion and interpersonal obligations. During the Classical Age, the topic of interpersonal relationships in general was frequently and extensively discussed. It emerged on the philosophical agenda, being repeatedly discussed in Socratic dialogues by both Xenophon and Plato as well as in substantial parts of Aristotle's ethical work.⁵ In popular discourse too, friendship was much discussed and

¹ Ar. *NE* IX.vii (1167b24-32).

² Soph. *Ant.* 295-301.

³ Pind. *Isthm.* 2.11.

⁴ E.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 438-42; Aristoph. *Plut.* 131: Zeus rules the gods because he has the most money; Thuc. 6.34.2: money makes war and other things thrive. See KALLET-MARX (1993), (1994) on the role of this equation in Thucydides' conception of Athens' military history.

⁵ E.g. Xen. *Mem.* II, III.xi; Pl. *Lysis*, *Rep.* 1; Ar. *NE* VIII and IX, *EE* VII. Apart from the dialogues and treatises by Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, *φιλία* appears to be a prominent topic under the Minor Socratic authors as well, although we only have fragments and (later evidence of) book titles at our disposal. E.g. DL mentions a *περὶ φιλίας* by Speusippus (4,4) and by Xenocrates (4,12), a *περὶ φίλου* by Simmias of Thebes (2,124). The Suda mentions a *περὶ φίλων καὶ φιλίας* by Philippus of Opus. Although to Heraclitus and Empedocles *φιλία* functioned as a metaphor for cosmological forces (such as cohesion), it was the sophists and Socrates who first laid the foundations for the philosophical reflection on friendship as a social phenomenon. Cf.

problematized. Friendship was a matter one could consult the gods or oracles about,⁶ respect for friends was ranked alongside reverence for gods,⁷ and friendships figured in maxims, aphorisms and moral guidelines: friends share everything,⁸ a friend is the greatest boon,⁹ life is not worth living if you do not have at least one friend.¹⁰ A worthy friend is a physician to your pain¹¹ and there is no possession lovelier than a friend.¹² A friend is another self.¹³ But if friends should aid friends in trouble, what need is there for friends when fortune is generous?¹⁴ And will a prosperous friend help a friend in need?¹⁵

One specific field of interest was the role and meaning of money in social life. The sources reflect an abundance of questions, views and dilemmas among the Greeks of the Classical Period. They were cynical about the capacity of money to “buy friends”,¹⁶ reproached relatives with putting money above family,¹⁷ joked about a daughter who affectionately kisses her father only to fish out the triobolus under his tongue.¹⁸ They wondered in despair why, unlike gold and silver that can be tested by means of a touchstone, friends have no mark of validity impressed on them,¹⁹ or they expanded the analogy by remarking that

Aristotle’s demarcation of his treatment of φιλία as solely pertaining to τὰ ἀνθρωπικά, leaving aside τὰ φυσικά (NE VIII.ii; VIII.ix). FÜRST (1996).

⁶ The gods: e.g. Xen. *Mem.* II.vi.8; on oracles see PARKE (1967), 272-3. Friendship could also be the subject of magic spells and curses; e.g. Soph. OC 1192-4. Cf. WINKLER (1990), 77-8.

⁷ Is. 1.16.

⁸ Eur. *Or.* 735. Cf. Eur. *Andr.* 376-7: φίλων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἴδιον, οἵτινες φίλοι | ὀρθῶς πεφύκασ’, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ χρήματα; Aristoph. *Plut.* 234; Plato, *Rep.* IV.424a1-2; V.449c5.

⁹ E.g. Xen. *Mem.* II.iv.2: μέγιστον ἀγαθόν; cf. *Hiero* III.i: μέγα ἀγαθόν, III.iii: μέγιστον ἀγαθόν.

¹⁰ Democr. DK 68b22: ζῆν οὐκ ἄξιος, ὅτω μὴδὲ εἷς ἐστι χρηστός φίλος. Cf. Ar. NE 1155a5ff.

¹¹ Men. *Aphor.* 456: Λύπης ἰατρός ἐστὶν ὁ χρηστός φίλος.

¹² Men. *Aphor.* 575: Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν κτῆμα κάλλιον φίλου.

¹³ Ar. NE 1166a31-2; cf. EE 1245a29-30, MM 1213a11-13.

¹⁴ Eur. *Or.* 665-7: τοὺς φίλους | ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρή τοῖς φίλοις ὠφελεῖν· | ὅταν δ’ ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῶι, τί δεῖ φίλων;

¹⁵ Eur. *Hec.* 984: τί χρή τὸν εὖ πράσσοντα μὴ πράσσουσιν εὖ | φίλοις ἐπαρκεῖν; Cf. Soph. *fr.* 667; Democrit. *Frg.* 101, 106; Eur. *Alc.* 210, *Hec.* 1226, *Andr.* 87, *HF* 559, 1225, *El.* 605, *Phoen.* 403, *Or.* 683, 727, 802, 1095, *Pl. Leg.* 630a.

¹⁶ Soph. *Fr.* 88 (Radt): τὰ χρήματ’ ἀνθρώποις εὐρίσκει φίλους, (...) | ἔπειτα δ’ οὐδεὶς ἐχθρὸς οὔτε φύεται | πρὸς χρήμαθ’ οἳ τε φύντες ἀρνοῦνται στυγεῖν. Cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 829-39; Pind. *Pyth.* 5,5; Bias DK 73a, Eur. *Med.* 561, *El.* 1131.

¹⁷ Lys. 32.17; Isae. 9.25.

¹⁸ Aristoph. *Wasps* 605-12.

¹⁹ Eur. *Med.* 516-9: ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ χρυσοῦ μὲν ὅς κίβδηλος ἦι | τεκμήρι’ ἀνθρώποις ὥπασας

friends are tested by circumstances, just as gold is tested by fire.²⁰ They exclaimed that in times of need a friend is better than money,²¹ and that the exchange value of a genuine friend is incalculable.²² They experimented with the idea that friends may have a price,²³ be treasures,²⁴ commodities,²⁵ possessions,²⁶ profitable,²⁷ or objects of purchase.²⁸

This book is about Classical Greek conceptualizations of “relationships”, the bonds that the Greeks called *φιλία*. It is not so much about the relationships themselves, the web of ties that they were born into and that they developed, expanded and adapted in the course of their lives.²⁹ It is about the ways the Greeks of the Classical Period *thought* they related to each other: about how they preferred to express the nature of their bond and the expectations that go with it, how they preferred to represent obligations to and from, how they talked about relationships that had gone wrong, how they motivated changes in the terms or conditions of relationships or the termination of these. It is about **folk theory** of social relations.³⁰

This book is also about the **conceptual tools** that shape Classical Greek thinking about relationships. Thinking and talking about abstractions such as

σαφῆ, | ἀνδρῶν δ' ὅτῳ χρητὸν κακὸν διειδέναι | οὐδεὶς χαρακτηρ ἐμπέφυκε σώματι. Cf. n.211 below.

²⁰ Men. IX.8-9, cf. XI.2.

²¹ Men. *Aphor.* 214.

²² Eur. *Or.* 1156-7: ἀλόγιστον δέ τοι | τὸ πλῆθος ἀντάλλαγμα γενναίου φίλου.

²³ Xen. *Mem.* II.v.

²⁴ φίλοι as θησαυρός: Eur. *El.* 565, Xen., *Cyr.* VIII.ii.19; as deposits of wealth: Soph. *OT* 232; Men. *Mon.* 810 (Jäkel), Is. 1.29; φίλοι as more secure investments than hoards of money: Men. *Dysc.* 805-12.

²⁵ Φίλοι as χρήματα: Xen. *Mem.* II.iii. Cf. Anaximenes 1.10.4: φίλοι χρήματα κτήματα. τὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητα φίλοι χρήματα κτήματα.

²⁶ Φίλοι as κτήματα: Xen. *Mem.* II.iv.1: the φίλος as πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον; ; Men. *Aphor.* 575: Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν κτῆμα κάλλιον φίλου; Hdt. 5.24.3: κτημάτων πάντων ἐστὶ τιμιώτατον ἀνὴρ φίλος συνετός τε καὶ εὐνοός. Cf. Xen. *Oec.* I.xiv. Cf. DIRLMEIER (1931), 50.

²⁷ Φίλοι as κέρδος: Xen. *Mem.* I.ii.7: μέγιστον κέρδος. Cf. Xen. *Ag.* XI.v: τοὺς γε μὴν διαβόλους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς κλέπτας ἐμίσει, μείζω ζημίαν ἡγούμενος φίλων ἢ χρημάτων στερίσκεσθαι.

²⁸ Xen. *Mem.* II.x; Eur. fr. 934: νοῦν ἔχοντος <τὴν ἄρᾱ> | φίλον πρίασθαι χρημάτων πολλῶν σαφῆ. Eur. *Or.* 1155-7: οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν κρείσσον ἢ φίλος σαφής, | οὐ πλοῦτος, οὐ τυραννίς· ἀλόγιστον δέ τοι | τὸ πλῆθος ἀντάλλαγμα γενναίου φίλου.

²⁹ For historical surveys of *φιλία* in Classical Athens, see KONSTAN (1997), 53-91, MILLETT (1991), 109-126, BLUNDELL (1989), introduction, FOXHALL (1998).

³⁰ Cf. n. 217 below on the emic/etic-distinction in the social sciences.

relatedness, obligations and expectations requires conceptual tools, i.e. metaphors, models and contrastive oppositions. It requires a level of organization and demarcation: what counts as *φιλία* and what does not? Are there differences within the range of “relations”? How do we describe the difference between the relation a lover has to his beloved and a client to a prostitute? Are teachers our friends, because they give us wisdom, or are they slaves because they work for us? Is ritual sacrifice the same as bribing the gods? Are parents creditors who have given us life as a kind of cash advance?

Statements about *φιλία*, positive and negative, reflect and constitute ideals. Statements about social norms (“how does it work in our society”) are almost always closely bound up with normative statements (“how *should* it work”, “how I wished it worked”). Reconstructions of the Greek attitude towards personal relations are reconstructions of their wishful thinking.

Should we suspect that we, as practitioners of the history of ideas, are stuck with fair-weather reports, hypocrisy and political correctness? Not quite. A lot can be learned about people’s convictions, sensitivities, worries and fears if one listens to what they wish for. In fact, the frequent problematization of *φιλία* in the Classical Age is telling in itself, since one of the main issues that people were preoccupied with was the nature of **reciprocity** in *φιλία*.³¹ In 5th- and 4th-century Athens, the prevailing norm was the dual principle of Helping Friends and Harming Enemies.³² The underlying idea is that friendship is a form of solidarity and that solidarity is “a mutual thing”: friendship consists in a continuous process of give and take. “Friends make gifts, gifts make friends.”³³ This idea of reciprocity was central not only in philosophical work; reciprocity in *φιλία* (or the breach and lack of it) was also essential to many tragedy plots³⁴ and served to characterize opponents (anyone who mistreats his *φίλοι*) and

³¹ In this book I use the term “reciprocity” in its widest possible sense as a synonym for exchange of any kind. See section 4.1 below.

³² E.g. *Pl. Rep.* 331e-2a; *Lys.* 9.20; *Eur. Ion.* 1045-7; *Aristoph. Birds* 420ff.; *Soph. Ant.* 643ff.; *Xen. Anab.* I.iii.6, *Cyr.* I.iv.25, *Hiero* II.ii; *Xen. Mem.* II.vi.35. See below in Section 2. The Helping Friends Harming Enemies slogan is coined in the influential study by BLUNDELL (1989) who demonstrates the importance of *φιλία* in Sophocles’ plays. See BELFIORE (2000) on Harming Friends as the most important plot pattern in Athenian drama.

³³ SAHLINS (1972), 186.

³⁴ See BELFIORE (2000) for a study on *φιλία* in the characterization, imagery, and plot structure of fifth-century Athenian drama. Cf. BLUNDELL (1989).

speaker (as someone who has always treated his φίλοι well) in legal or political speeches.³⁵ In several sources we find the norm of reciprocity propagated and repeated,³⁶ to the point where we may seriously question how self-evident this norm was. Why does something that goes without saying have to be said so often?

The motif of reciprocity persists into Hellenistic and Roman literature.³⁷ However, the importance of reciprocity in φιλία bonds seems to be a focus that is peculiar to the Classical era.³⁸ One of the factors that may be at play here is that conceptually speaking the norm of reciprocity is not entirely self-evident and unambiguous. Although proper adherence to the norms of φιλία belongs to the core skills of forming a society,³⁹ these are felt to be less than self-evident: people start to talk about the norms that they live by out of a perceived need to formulate them explicitly. There is much that can be said about the historical causes behind this phenomenon; the scale and complexity of polis life, for instance, may have contributed to an increased interest in the topic.⁴⁰ However, part of the interest in the norms of φιλία is catalyzed by a related but distinct development: the increasing monetization, scaling-up and complexity of the Athenian economy.

³⁵ Aristotle lists τὸ φιλεῖν as one of the effects that a speaker should aim at in his audience. *Rhet.* II.iv. Cf. KONSTAN (2007), 169-184.

³⁶ See section 2.1 below.

³⁷ E.g. Sen. *De Beneficiis*. Although the theme of reciprocity persists, it is supplemented with other preoccupations, such as frankness (παρρησία, as opposed to flattery). E.g. Plut. *Quomodo*, Themistios, Or. 22.276c, Philodemus, *Peri parrhêsias*. Cf. KONSTAN (1998), (1997), 93-148. On παρρησία in friendship, see the introduction in SLUITER & ROSEN (2004); VAN RAALTE (2004) for παρρησία and philosophical friendship in Plato's dialogues; FITZGERALD (1996) and (1997) for an account of the centrality of παρρησία in friendship in Plutarch and Philodemus.

³⁸ SEAFORD (1993), (1994) points out that the theme of violence between φίλοι does not have the central role in Homeric epics that it has in Attic tragedy. BELFIORE (2000) xvi: "The predominance in tragedy of violation of *philia* may reflect a period and social context (fifth-century democratic Athens) in which reciprocal relationships between family members and other kinds of *philois* had become problematic, in a way that they were not in Homer, because of the emergence of new modes of social and economic life." FOXHALL (1998), 67: "In short, philosophers focused on "friendship" because it was a problem for them." KONSTAN (1998), 280 for the idea that the theme of reciprocity between equals is specific for the Classical Age.

³⁹ Φιλία as a cohesive tie: e.g. Pl. *Prot.* 322c: δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί; friendship as concord: Pl. *Rep.* 351d; Pl. *Leg.* VI.757a1-758a2; *Pol.* 311B9-C1; 127C; *Epistula* 6.323b, *Rep.* I.315D; *Alc.* 1.126bc; *Clit.* 409e, *Leg.* III.693b1-5.

⁴⁰ BELFIORE (2000), introduction; SEAFORD (1994).

It is here that money comes in. In the literature of Classical Athens, the concept of money provides the **models and metaphors** that help shaping ideas about relationships. At the same time, the concept of money represents a certain way of dealing with persons and objects that the Greeks felt was at odds with the norms of *φιλία*, of friendship, kinship and ruler-ship. In these situations, money and the monetary economy it represents become a **contrastive model** from which other relationships can be demarcated. Moreover, in 5th- and 4th-century Athens, the idea of money and the cluster of related concepts were recent developments: since coined money and monetary economy were in a process of rapid development, thinking about money and economics was high on the intellectual agenda. One of the issues on this agenda was whether there is a meaningful difference between “economic relations” and “personal relations”.

The economic developments of the Classical Period have often been described as a process of “disembedding”, i.e. an emancipation of the economic realm from social and political structures.⁴¹ On a conceptual level too, we see that for the Greeks economics came to be articulated as a distinct domain of human life.⁴² This book questions the reverse side of the coin: does the disembedding of economics imply that social relationships too begin to be conceptualized as independent of economic factors and structures?

1. FRIENDSHIP: MONEY CAN'T BUY IT?

Our modern everyday language too is imbued with “money talk”. We use economic metaphors, the idea of money, and metaphors of banks and markets to express our ideas about relationships with particular persons or relationships in general. Friendships require personal “investments”, for “time is money”, but there is a “payoff” and it will “cost you” if you do not; you may feel deeply “indebted” to some of your friends, but when it is “payback time” you will “square your account” with a friend who has lost all “credit” with you: he has turned out to be a “counterfeit” friend.

⁴¹ See Section 3 below.

⁴² See Section 3.3 below.

Of course these are only metaphors. But metaphors create realities, as they are among our main vehicles for comprehending abstract concepts and performing abstract reasoning.⁴³ They organize a world of unstructured experiences into concepts we can deal with and make us capable of dealing with them, incorporating them in our world view and drawing inferences from them.⁴⁴ In our present culture and discourse, money provides a powerful system of metaphors that enable us to shape abstract concepts such as value, to comprehend obligations and commitments and to conceive of, approach and handle the world around us as instrumental to our goals.⁴⁵

At the same time, most economic metaphors have a negative ring when applied to personal relationships. They usually refer to problematic relationships, and when applied to healthy relations they may strike us as “cynical” in that they appear to violate the “friendly” nature of the relationship in question. In modern Anglo-American and European culture, there is a tension between economic paradigms and the notion that anything “personal” is “not for sale”—“Money can’t buy me love”, after all, for that would be “pricing the invaluable”.

Moreover, as recent psychological research has demonstrated, in Anglo-American culture merely activating the *concept* of money suffices to change interpersonal behavior. Test subjects primed with bank notes typically switch to an “every man for himself”-attitude: not only are they less helpful and generous

⁴³ In this book the term “metaphor” will be used in the sense of a conceptual metaphor, as defined by LAKOFF & JOHNSON (1980). A conceptual metaphor is a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system, i.e., the phenomenon of understanding one idea or conceptual domain in terms of another.

⁴⁴ Cf. LAKOFF (1993). Metaphors function as framing devices, i.e. as “makers of meaning” (R.T. LAKOFF (2000), 47-8) and “structures of expectation” (TANNEN (1979)).

⁴⁵ SIMMEL (1978 [1900]) for a conception of money as both the means and the symbol of processes of atomization in modern society. E.g. LAKOFF & JOHNSON (1980) on the “Time is Money”-metaphor; MIROWSKI (2002) on the metaphor of science as a commodity; GRAMM (1996) on the danger of (more technical) economic metaphors (such as “the invisible hand”, “trickle down”), HOEY (1988) on money as a metaphor for metaphor itself, GRAY (1996) on monetary value as metaphor for linguistic significance; VOSS e.a. (1992), 205 on monetary metaphors for the “costs” of warfare; STRATHERN (1972), 99-120 and (1996), 517-9 on monetary metaphors in the context of marriage and brideswealth in Melanesia. Conversely, there is growing attention for the importance of metaphors in economic modeling, e.g. MCCLOSKEY (1983) & (1985), ch.5; KLAMER & LEONARD (1994) for a distinction between “pedagogical”, “heuristic” and “constitutive” economic metaphors.

towards others; they are also less inclined to ask for help from others.⁴⁶ Representations of money appear to trigger a sense of autonomy and self-sufficiency and to evoke an atomistic individualistic world-view. This is revealing for the place of money in the conceptual architecture of our culture: in our part of the world, there is a tension between other-regarding behavior or sentiments and the set of ideas, norms and expectations evoked by the concept of money.

At first sight, this tension between the conceptual domain of money and the domain of other-regarding sentiments seems to fit into a series of oppositions that figure prominently in our ideologies of friendship and other relations. We tend to distinguish between instrumental relationships and elective affinities, and accordingly call some “formal” and others “personal”: we think we enter some relations predominantly because of ulterior ends (with our colleagues, doctors, cleaning ladies, up to the end of the scale where we may hesitate to speak of “relations” at all, such as nameless plumbers, shopkeepers and bank employees), and enter other relations because we are committed to the unique and irreplaceable person that the other is (our friends, lovers and life-long partners). Correspondingly, we feel that within instrumental relationships it is acceptable to be overtly motivated by self-interest (we make contracts and deals to negotiate and harmonize our respective interests), whereas in other relations we are expected to be motivated by a regard for the interest of the other (we help friends and care for our loved ones because of *them*, not because of ourselves).⁴⁷ We also tend to think that some relations revolve around objective obligations towards one another and others around subjective favors and the sincere intention to benefit the other: we legally or contractually owe a fee to doctors and cleaning ladies, whereas we “feel” that we should help a friend in need. We distinguish between coerced or enforceable duties and good turns that are done above and beyond the call of duty and that are, in the terminology

⁴⁶ VOHS (2006); cf. LEA e.a. (2006). SKINNER (1953), 79 for an early behaviorist theory of money as a “generalized token reinforce”: the incentive power of money derives from the mere association with what it can buy.

⁴⁷ Between instrumentalism and other-directed concern: BLUM (1980), STOCKER (1976), BADHWAR (1991), HURKA (2006); BERGER (1986). Between instrumentalism and valuing the intrinsic worth of a friend: SCANLON (1998). Between appreciating the other as a unique self and regarding the other as a particular instance of a general class: SUTTLES (1970), WISEMAN (1986).

of moral theology, “supererogatory”.⁴⁸ These oppositions reflect distinctions and categorizations that are good for *us* to work with. However, we need to be aware that these oppositions may not be universal or self-evident.⁴⁹ When making cross-cultural comparisons between the ways people conceptualize relationships, most of these oppositions are not so much useful analytical tools, but rather are themselves objects of inquiry:⁵⁰ under what circumstances are these oppositions created, in what contexts are they used, how are they manipulated?

This book is about Classical Greek conceptualizations of relationships in response to the increasing monetization of the Athenian economy. In Classical Athens, the idea of money represents a cluster of concepts that are related to a type of economic actions, events and processes that modern economic theory calls “**disembedded**” economic transactions.⁵¹ Disembedded transactions are economic phenomena that are not embedded in social, religious and political relations.⁵² For instance, the instantaneous exchange of equivalent goods that

⁴⁸ E.g. TITMUS (1970) in an argument for preferring a completely voluntary system of blood donation over commercialized “enforced” systems. Cf. KAWALL (2005) and HEYD (2005) for the ambiguous nature of promising as an act of supererogatory self-enforcement.

⁴⁹ Cf. BOURDIEU (1990 [1980]) on the “debilitating” dualisms, such as subject/object, agency/structure, private/public, nature/culture.

⁵⁰ An example is the current pervasive ideological distinction between relations based on formal obligations and relations that are labeled “personal” because they are supposedly based on a “subjective definition of the situation”. As SILVER (1990, 1997) has argued, this distinction is in an important sense a product of the development of commercial society during the Scottish Enlightenment: the emancipation of the economic from the social realm has produced the norm that personal relationships are axiomatically subjective as opposed to utilitarian, self-serving and inhering in objective obligations. Thinkers such as Adam Smith, David Hume and Adam Ferguson have argued that “commercial society” introduces a “historically unprecedented distinction between self-interested relations and personal bonds that are normatively free of instrumental and calculative orientations” (SILVER 1997, 45). Cf. HELLER (1979) and LASCH (1977) on the emergence of the ideological split between the notions of emotion and interest, expressiveness and instrumentality, and its relation with historical change in social structure as a consequence of capitalism.

⁵¹ The terminology of “embedded” and “disembedded” economies are coined by POLANYI (1968), 84: “[T]he elements of the economy are (...) embedded in non-economic institution, the economic process itself being instituted through kinship, marriage, age-groups, secret societies, totemic associations, and public solemnities. The term ‘economic life’ would have no obvious meaning.”

⁵² VON REDEN (1995a), 171-94, (1997), 154ff., warns against identifying money with trade, commodification and disembedded economy, arguing that Greek coinage in the Classical Period is best understood as part of an “embedded money economy”, in which “money does

takes places in a market economy (and that we would call “commercial”) does not have repercussions for the social or political status of either partner, the relation between them or the religious order in which they participate: the transactors may have been strangers before the exchange and may revert to being so once they each have got what they wanted out of the transaction.

We may feel that this is a very minimalistic account of a “relationship”, as something that can be confined to the short moment of cooperative endeavor between buyer and seller. At the same time, these minimalistic relationships are easy to deal with conceptually: the obligations to and fro are clear and objectifiable (the seller needs to deliver goods, the buyer needs to furnish the price agreed to), there are straightforward procedures for reaching consensus about the terms of the exchange (buyer and seller can negotiate, perhaps while referring to something like a “market price”), and the expectations to and fro are relatively transparent. The Greeks felt that, if one gave it a thought, these minimalistic transactions resembled interactions with parents, friends and gods that were also about “give and take” (there seemed to be **isomorphism**), whereas at the same time they often objected to a notion that they were exactly the same (they resisted **reductionism**).

The sophist Antiphon, for instance, reproaches Socrates with not charging his students a fee in return for the wisdom he allegedly claims to offer them:⁵³ in terms of market rationality, not charging a fee is sheer stupidity. Socrates’ reply is that selling wisdom and virtue to any bidder would make him a prostitute;

not by nature signify anything in particular—economic relationships, egalitarianism, the market etc.—but is symbolized by its repeated usage in particular institutions.” VON REDEN is right in warning against blindly assuming “meanings” of money; money takes on different meanings depending on the functions it performs in a particular society and on the cultural matrix into which it is incorporated. Cf. PARRY & BLOCH (1989), 21. In the case of Classical Greece, it can be maintained that, although economy was never completely “disembedded” (can it ever be?), there were radical changes in the scale, quality and outlook of the Athenian economy that justifies approaches in terms of “disembedding” (as a gradual process rather than an absolute state) or “re-embedding” (economic transactions are increasingly embedded in the life of the polis instead of e.g. kinship structures). Cf. HARRIS (2002), 71-2: “Athens of the fifth and fourth century B.C.E. satisfied the conditions needed to create market exchange. (...) The scale of specialization made it impossible to rely on local networks or the small circle of relations bound together by kinship and *philia*.”

⁵³ Xen. *Mem.* I.vi.11-12. See Chapter Four on this episode.

giving wisdom makes him a friend.⁵⁴ Knowledge economy comes to be reframed as knowledge prostitution. This vignette only works with an audience that is capable of following Antiphon's line of reasoning and acknowledging the formal isomorphism between a market situation and Socrates conversing with young Athenians. Conversely, Socrates' reaction too makes sense to the audience: prostitution is an example of a market situation and the implication that the exchange of wisdom and virtue is a kind of prostitution is repulsive. The same exchanges can be interpreted as a disembedded market exchange and as taking place within the context of friendship, and the two are irreducibly different.

Xenophon's Socrates articulates and defends his model of education and wisdom by exploiting and exploring the twilight zone where the conceptual domain of friendship and that of monetary economics overlap. It is in this overlap between two conceptual domains, each with its own norms and rationality, that many negotiations about and conceptualizations of values and social norms arise in Classical Athens.

2. ΦΙΛΙΑ

2.1. Forms and norms of φιλία-reciprocity

In Classical Greece, typical examples of long-lasting relationships that are expected to sustain and reproduce the long-term social order are the relations within the οἶκος (between husband and wife, master and slave, parents and children), relations with deities, relations with other members of the same group (army, village, deme, polis), relations with members of different social entities (e.g. ξένοι), and some relations between groups (e.g. allies). These relations allow for more than one **conceptualization**. An οἶκος and a polis, for instance, can be conceptualized as a group that shares resources and responsibilities and of which individuals can be a "member".⁵⁵ At the same

⁵⁴ Xen. *Mem.* I.vi.13.

⁵⁵ For the phrase μετέχειν τῆς πολέως and the terminology of "sharing" and "participating" in the conception of Athenian citizenship, see BLOK (2009). For the notion of household as functional unities where members share in, see FOXHALL (1989) and (1998). For the οἶκος as a

time, these relations can also be seen as **exchanges**, i.e. relations between two parties that cooperate by exchanging things: marriage can be conceptualized as an exchange between families and as consisting in a series of exchanges between husband and wife itself;⁵⁶ similarly the popular conception of the relationship between parents and children assumes that the filial obligation to care for one's ageing parents arises from the antecedent care and sustenance that children are provided with in their infancy by their parents;⁵⁷ along the same lines, relationships within the polis, e.g. between a wealthy liturgist and the *demos*, can be represented as a dyadic relation of give and take.⁵⁸

Most relations that allow for such a conceptualization as a relation of give and take can be lumped together as *φιλία*-relations. Whether it concerns parents and children,⁵⁹ husband and wife,⁶⁰ neighbors, lovers,⁶¹ king and servants,⁶² *ξένοι*,⁶³ members of political factions,⁶⁴ mortals and gods,⁶⁵ or even supra-individual entities such as allied poleis,⁶⁶ in Classical Athens one had the possibility to call the relation *φιλία*: a relation that exists between two or more *φίλοι* who are well-disposed to each other, and who have a certain way of

"common stock" to which both husband and wife contribute, see e.g. Xen. *Oec.* 7.13.

⁵⁶ Marriage as an exchange and solidification of bonds between men: ORMAND (1999), 14-8, RABINOWITZ (1993), 21-2; WOHL (1998), 18-22, 128-31, 178-9; LYONS (2003); VON REDEN (1995a), 49-51, 151-8. Marriage as *φιλία* between men and women: e.g. Ar. NE VIII (1162a16-33), Men. *Mon.* 809 (Jäkel). Cf. BLUNDELL (1989), 46, MUELLER (2001); on *χάρις* in marriage, see REDFIELD (1982), 196-8, DOVER (1974), 210, HALPERIN (1985), 162.

⁵⁷ Hom. *Il.* 4.447-8 (=17.301-2), Hes. *W&D* 187-8; Ar. *Pol.* 1332b35-41, [Dem.] 10.40, Eur. *Supp.* 361-4, Eur. *Alc.* 681-4, Eur. fr. 1064. See Chapter Two Section 1. For reciprocity ("generalized reciprocity", see Section 4 below for terminology) within the *oikos*, see FOXHALL (1989). Cf. SCHAPS (1979), 55ff.. For comparable values in modern Greece, DU BOULAY (1974), 15-7.

⁵⁸ OBER (1989), 192-247, CHRIST (2006). See Chapter Two Section 4, Section 6.

⁵⁹ E.g. Lys. 6.23. See DIRLMEIER (1931), 7-21 on *φιλία* between kin. Cf. BLUNDELL (1989), 39-45.

⁶⁰ E.g. Xen. *Hiero* III.vii; Ar. *EN* 1162a20-4, Eur. *Med.* 549.

⁶¹ E.g. Xen. *Mem.* II.vi. See HALPERIN (1985). Occasionally, our sources seem to suggest a tension between conceptualizing a relation in terms of *φιλία* and in terms of *ἔρως*. See Chapter Five (also on the POHLENZ-VON ARNIM-controversy).

⁶² E.g. Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.ii. On this passage see GRAY (2011), 319 ff., NADON (2011), 118 ff., DUE (1989), 215 ff.

⁶³ See n. 84 below.

⁶⁴ E.g. Lys. 31.13.

⁶⁵ E.g. Pl. *Euth.* 14c-15b, *Rep.* 390c; Cf. DODDS (1951), 35; PARKER (1998), 122-5; OSBORNE (1994) cf. the popular address to Zeus as *φίλος* (COOK 2.2.1167). Aristotle objects against conceiving relations with deities as *φιλία* because they are too unequal. NE 1158b33-59a5. Cf. MM 1208b27-35.

⁶⁶ E.g. Lys. 2.21, 2.36, 2.73. See PANESSA (1990), BOLMARCICH (2010).

behaving *vis-à-vis* the other. The terminology of *φιλία* signifies first and foremost a long-term bond of mutual solidarity.⁶⁷ In the specific cultural and social circumstances of Classical Athens, this solidarity is manifested in mutually treating each other well:⁶⁸ *φίλοι* are supposed to help one another and to do good towards one another on a basis of mutuality⁶⁹ that goes beyond the show of good intentions.⁷⁰

This assistance may range from material help to immaterial favors such as speaking well of a friend,⁷¹ but regardless of the precise content, it is structured as a **reciprocal** endeavor.⁷² Friends are imagined and supposed to do each other well on a basis of mutuality; hence the repeated norm of returning a favor, give a counter-gift and react to care and attention by offering care and attention in turn.⁷³ Often this norm of reciprocity is expressed in the vocabulary of “give and

⁶⁷ E.g. Soph. *Aj.* 680; Isoc. 1.1.

⁶⁸ In other historical periods, the emphasis is different. E.g. Hellenistic friendship literature is preoccupied with frankness and free speech (KONSTAN (1997), 93-103); in modern Western societies, intimacy is a decisive criterion for real friendships. SILVER (1990) (1997).

⁶⁹ *βοηθεῖν*: e.g. Eur. *Or.* 671, Ar. *Eq.* 92-4, Lys. 9.20, 19.59, Xen. *Mem.* III.xii.4; *εὖ ποιεῖν*: e.g. Xen. *Mem.* IV.iv.24; Lys. 3.5 (a lover about his *eromenos*); *εὖ ἔρδειν*: e.g. Thgn. 573/4; *εὖ δοῶν*: e.g. Soph. *Phil.* 672; *εὐεργετεῖν*: e.g. Xen. *Mem.* II.ix.8; Men. *Sent.* 219 (Jäkel). *ὠφελεῖν*: Ar. *Eq.* 92-4, Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.2. From the side of the receiver: *εὖ πάσχειν*: Eur. *Or.* 719; Thuc. 3.54.2. See BLUNDELL (1989), esp. 26-59, on the twin principle of Helping Friends/Harming Enemies. Cf. KONSTAN (1997), 56-59; MILLETT (1991), 109-126; DOVER (1974), 180-1; BOLKESTEIN (1939), 159.

⁷⁰ E.g. Soph. *Ant.* 543. Cf. DIRLMEIER (1931), 28. Anthropologists have observed that in cultures where people are more dependent upon reciprocal relations than in ours, people rarely render thank for gifts *verbally*: verbal displays of gratitude (reciprocating on the spot) are seen as shallow substitutes for a deeper sense of obligation to reciprocate with a real gift or favor. PITT-RIVERS (1992), 218, 244n.3; MALINOWSKI (1922), 190, 270-3; VAN WEES (1998), 26.

⁷¹ Helping one's *φίλοι* in court: Isae. 1.7, Hyp. I.10, Lyc. fr. XI, Lys. 5.1, 7.18, 21.22. Cf. DIRLMEIER (1931), 36-8; friends as indispensable for political career: Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.vii.13, Pl. *Ep.* 7.325cd, Ar. *Pol.* 1284a20f, Plut. *Ar.* 1.2.4, *Mor.* 807d. Cf. CONNOR (1971). Cf. DOVER (1974), 177; BOLKESTEIN (1939), 133-48.

⁷² “Reciprocal” need not imply “equal”: the respective parties may have different obligations and expectations, as is for instance the case in the *φιλία* between parents and children (Eur. *IA* 12-56; *Alc.* 302-4) or between mortals and gods (e.g. Soph. *Aj.* 680).

⁷³ E.g. Dem. 20.6: οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς μὴ τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἀμειβόμενοι...; Xen. *Mem.* IV.iv.24: εὖ ποιεῖν... ἀντεεργετεῖν; Aristoph., *Plutus* 1029: τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἀντευποιεῖν; Thgn. 573/4: εὖ ἔρδων εὖ πάσχε; Soph. *Phil.* 672: εὖ δοῶν εὖ παθών; Xen. *Mem.* II.ix.8: εὐεργετεῖν... ἀντεεργετεῖν; Xen. *Mem.* II.viii.3: ὠφελεῖν... ἀντωφελεῖν; Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.iii.49: θεραπεύειν... ἀντιθεραπεύειν; Xen. *Mem.* I.iv.18: χαρίζεσθαι... ἀντιχαρίζεσθαι. Cf. BOLKESTEIN (1939), 159; BLUNDELL (1989), 26-59; MILLETT (1991), 109-26. BOLKESTEIN (1939), 158: “[D]as Prinzip der Gegenseitigkeit [hat] eine der Grundlagen des sozialen Verkehrs der Griechen gebildet.” On the central role of reciprocity in *φιλία*, see MILLETT (1991), 109-59, MITCHELL (1997), 8-9. On the ideology of reciprocity from the Dark Age to the late-Achaic

take", i.e. of giving (διδόναι), receiving (λαμβάνειν, δέχεσθαι) and returning (ἀποδιδόναι) or exchanging (ἀμειβεῖν, (ἐξ)αλλάττειν),⁷⁴ the good turns exchanged to and fro being "gifts" (a δῶρον, or a δωρεά),⁷⁵ or instances of χάρις, i.e. manifestations of generosity and gratitude.⁷⁶ This structure of reciprocity may extend over a longer timeframe:⁷⁷ one receives help and is expected to help the other in turn should the occasion arise. This timeframe is what cements a bond into a φιλία-relation that will extend into the future: φιλία requires and presupposes trust and reliability (both of them aspects of πίστις) and hence it implies trust.⁷⁸ In short, the return of favors and the

period, see GALLANT (1991), 146 ff., QVILLER (1981), DONLAN 1981, 1985, MORRIS 1986a, WALCOT (1970), GALLANT (1982), MILLETT (1984), FIGUEIRA 1985, MORRIS 1986b. More abstract accounts of reciprocity are found in the philosophical writers: Pl. *Lys.* 212cd; Ar. *NE* 1155b27-56a5, 1156b33-57a6, *Rhet.* 2.4.2. Cf. ANNAS (1977).

⁷⁴ E.g. Hes. *W&D* 354ff: καὶ δόμεν ὅς κεν δῶι καὶ μὴ δόμεν, ὅς κεν μὴ δῶι | δῶτη μὲν τις ἔδωκεν, ἀδῶτη δ' οὐ τις ἔδωκεν. Dem. 20.64: ὅσους εὖ ποιήσαντας ἢ πόλις ἀντ' εὖ πεποίηκε. Epicharmus fr. 30 (Diels): ἃ δὲ ξεῖρ τὰν ξεῖρα νίζει. δός τι καὶ λάβοις τί κα. Men. *Monost.* 317, 322: λαβὼν ἀπόδος, ἄνθρωπε, καὶ λήψη πάλιν, | λυποῦντα λύπει, καὶ φιλοῦνθ' ὑπερφίλει; Hes. *W&D* 349ff.: εὖ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρὰ γείτονος, εὖ δ' ἀποδοῦναι. Dem. 20.6: τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἀμειβόμενοι. Cf. BLUNDELL (1989), 32-3.

⁷⁵ BLUNDELL (1989), 33: "Any kind of favour or service can be given and repaid like a gift." E.g. [Arist.] *Rhet. ad. Alex.* 1447: δωροῦνται πάντες ἐλπίζοντες ὠφεληθήσεσθαι, ἢ τῶν προτέρων εὐεργεσιῶν χάριν ἀποδιδόντες; [Pl.] *Def.* 414a: δωρεὰ ἀλλαγὴ χάριτος.

⁷⁶ E.g. Eur. *HF* 1134-7: καλὸς γὰρ ἀστοῖς στέφανος Ἑλλήνων ὕπο | ἄνδρ' ἐσθλὸν ὠφελοῦντας εὐκλείας τυχεῖν. | καὶ γὰρ χάριν σοι τῆς ἐμῆς σωτηρίας | τήνδ' ἀντιδώσω· νῦν γὰρ εἰ χρεῖος φίλων. The reciprocal nature of χάρις is brought out by the proverbial expression that "χάρις breeds χάρις" (Soph. *Aj.* 522; cf. OC 779, Eur. *Hel.* 1234, Ar. *Rhet.* 1385a16) and Aristotle's remark that the central position of the temple of the *Charites* in Athens signifies the importance of reciprocal χάρις in polis life (*EN* 1133a3-5). Good turns in a marriage ("sexual χάρις"): see Chapter Five. Cf. REDFIELD (1982), 196-8; HALPERIN (1985), 162; good turns in politics, e.g. Lyc. *Leocr.* 100-1, *Lys.* 21.22-5; good turns in relations with gods: e.g. *CEG* 275, Aristoph. *Thesm.* 275-6 (with FRAENKEL (1962), 118-9 and PARKER (1998), 111); the term χαρίεσσα ἀμοιβή ("graceful return") occurs frequently on votive inscriptions; e.g. *CEG* 326. See VERSNEL (1981), 47ff; VAN STRATEN (1981). See Chapter One.

⁷⁷ Often even preferably so: e.g. Dem. 23.134. Cf. Isoc. 1.30, Pl. *Phdr.* 233bc, Crates 1.5 (Diels). Cf. PEARSON (1962), 151ff. BLUNDELL (1989), 36: "[L]ong-term mutual benefit must take priority over immediate gratification." On the importance of time, see Chapter One.

⁷⁸ E.g. Men. *Aphor.* 100. Absence of trust is one of the greatest sources of worry and lamentation for Theognis, because it makes friendship impossible: Thgn. 65-8, 73f., 77-92, 95ff., 115-28, 415f., 811-4, 857-60. See FOXHALL (1998), BLUNDELL (1989), 34-6; for the close association of the language of friendship and of trust, see TAILLARDAT (1982); HUMMEL (1987) argues for metrical complementarity between φίλος and πιστός in Homeric epic. Cf. EISENSTADT & RONIGER (1984), 27 on the importance of trust in φιλία-relations outside the οἶκος, ranging from patron-client bonds, ξενία-relations to neighbors.

exchange of benefits are believed to create lasting ties of gratitude, goodwill, and trust,⁷⁹ and to secure justice and cohesion in society.⁸⁰

2.2. The scope and charge of *φιλία*-vocabulary: some semantic preliminaries

In the short overview above on *φιλία* and *χάρις*, two key terms in the ancient Greek conceptualization of relatedness, the elements of **emotions** and **affection** are conspicuous by their absence.⁸¹ The terminology of *φιλία* first and foremost signifies a lasting bond of mutual solidarity structured along the lines of reciprocity.⁸² This is obscured by the convention in Anglo-Saxon literature to translate the noun *φίλος* as “friend”, the verb *φιλεῖν* as “to love” and the abstract noun *φιλία* as “friendship” and/or “love”. This convention is justifiable for purposes of translation; in this book there will be much talk about “friendship” and “friends” where in the Greek texts the generic terms *φιλία* and *φίλος* have a larger extension than the specific bonds of elective affinities that are referred to by our modern friendship-vocabulary.

For purposes of analysis however, it is instructive to realize that these translation conventions obscure aspects that are important for an understanding of Classical Greek reflection on human relations. The first is the place of emotions, affection and personal valuation in the conceptualization of

⁷⁹ Trust (πίστις): e.g. Aesch. 1.132, 142, 147, Hes. *W&D* 708f., Xen. *Hiero* 4.1. Goodwill (εὐνοία): Dem. 18.5, 21.282; Xen. *Mem.* VII.vii.46f; Xen. *Anab.* VII.vii.46. Cf. GOLDHILL (1986), 79-107; HERMAN (1987), introduction, KONSTAN (1997), p.53-92, (1998); MILLETT (1991), 109-126, 218ff.. Gratitude (χάρις): see n.76 above, and Chapters One and Two.

⁸⁰ Cf. the popular conception of justice in Pl. *Rep.* 332a of “owing (ὀφειλεῖν) good to one’s φίλοι and evil to one’s ἐχθροί”. Cf. Pl. *Euth.* 14b: gratifying the gods brings salvation to the *oikos* and the *polis* alike. See on this passage Chapter One Section 1. Conversely, failed reciprocation is a serious offense and a breach of justice, and the absence of reciprocity is seen as corrosive for the solidarity and coherence within society. E.g. Thgn. 1.1135-55 (with LEVINE (1985), 193): the departure of Pistis, Sophrosyne and the Kharites are symptomatic for an age of social disintegration; Hes. *W&D* 190 (with WEST (1978), *ad loc*): in the Iron Age, there will be no more χάρις (“no appreciation”) for those who keep their oath—one of the symptoms of a crisis for humanity. Xen. *Mem.* II.ii.13-4: failure to observe χάρις to one’s parents excludes one from all realms of human life.

⁸¹ On the emotional aspects of χάρις, see Chapter One.

⁸² My account of *φιλία* is heavily indebted to the unpublished work of Adriaan Rademaker, Christiaan Caspers and Evelyn van ‘t Wout on the semantics of the verbs *φιλεῖν*, *ἀγαπᾶν* and *στέργειν*.

human bonds. Although *φιλία* is not principally incompatible with affection and emotions, the term in itself does not refer to introspective phenomena: it is first and foremost a **relational** term.⁸³ It primarily refers to the bond that persists between two *φίλοι*.⁸⁴ This is not to say that emotions and affection are altogether absent or irrelevant in *φιλία*-relations;⁸⁵ it only indicates that their presence is not a decisive criterion for calling a relation one of *φιλία*: in some *φιλία*-bonds (e.g. between mother and child or between lovers) it is highly improbable that affection and emotions are absent; in other *φιλία*-bonds the relevance of emotions and affects become more questionable (e.g. neighbors, *ξένοι*), and in some cases it is downright far-fetched to presume the presence of emotions (e.g. between fellow citizens or cities). Just like the English word “mother” may probably evoke strong feelings of affection and care without having the *meaning* of “loved one”, the vocabulary of *φιλία* may, in some contexts, also evoke these positive emotions without referring to them.

This is somewhat easier to grasp for the nouns than for the transitive verb *φιλεῖν*. Still, the verb *φιλεῖν*, although compatible with *φίλοι* having warm emotions, good intentions and positive affects towards one another,⁸⁶ does not

⁸³ Aristotle, however, lists τὸ φιλεῖν as one of the *πάθη* in *Rhet.* II.vii. See Chapter Three on the *status aparte* of Aristotle.

⁸⁴ GOLDHILL (1986), 79-83. There is some discussion about the semantics of Homeric adjective *φίλος* (that often goes with impersonal objects such as one’s limbs, life, clothes, gifts). The adjective is generally taken to be roughly equivalent to a reflexive possessive pronoun. ADKINS (1963), followed by VON REDEN (1995) 45 and SCOTT (1984), argues that the adjective *φίλος* serves to demarcate those persons and things an individual can rely upon. See for *φίλος* = *οἰκεῖος* the T-scholia on *Il.* 2.261, 2.140 and 14.256, 296 and Eustathius 2.261 on Thersites’ *φίλα εἰμάρτα*. Cf. KRETSCHMER (1927) who traces back the Indo-European reflexive pronoun to the Lydian *bilis* (“his own”). The discussion is reopened by HOOKER (1989) and ROBINSON (1990), followed by KONSTAN (1997), who maintain that *φίλος* means “dear/beloved” and “loving” and that Homeric heroes “loved” their limbs, clothes and weapons dearly because they were fully aware that they depended on them for survival. BENVENISTE (1973), 273-288 interprets the Homeric use of the adjective *φίλος* in terms of reciprocity: all objects and persons involved in rituals and processes of “institutionalized reciprocity” are labeled metonymically *φίλος*. The question of Homeric *φίλος* is beyond the scope of this study. I find both the line taken by HOOKER/ROBINSON/KONSTAN and BENVENISTE too “thick” and I have doubts about BENVENISTE’s conception of Homeric *φιλία* as “institutionalized” and as practically equivalent with *ξενία*.

⁸⁵ The reappraisal of emotions in ancient accounts of friendship is the most important contribution (and qualification of existing scholarship) of KONSTAN (1997).

⁸⁶ The fact that the verb *φιλεῖν* sometimes refers to “kissing” should not be taken to imply that it is primarily an emotion word. Kissing may be an expression of a *φιλία*-bond, but not

in itself refer to an emotional disposition comparable to modern English “loving”.⁸⁷ The verb primarily expresses that the subject is related to something or someone, with senses ranging from a vague “belonging to”,⁸⁸ to a stronger sense of “being committed to”, “showing loyalty”⁸⁹ or “depending on”.⁹⁰

The fact that in ordinary language the vocabulary of *φιλία* does not in itself refer to emotions, affects or a valuation of a *φίλος* as the person that he is, does not deny their presence in reality nor does it preclude that authors or characters who reflect on *φιλία* find the presence of emotions and affects desirable, or even crucial, in a *φιλία*-bond. To Xenophon’s Socrates the fact that family members can “rejoice” (*χαίρειν*) again in each other’s presence is an indication that a disturbed *φιλία*-reciprocity is restored.⁹¹ Aristotle objects against understanding the relation between benefactor and beneficiary along the same

necessarily of romantic or erotic love. Cf. Hdt. 1.134.1 where kissing is among the Persian ways of greeting a person equal in status.

⁸⁷ Apart from *φιλεῖν*, there are several other verbs that are conventionally translated with the English verb “to love”, notably *ἀγαπᾶν*, *ἐρᾶν/ἐρασθαι* and *στέργειν*. SCHMIDT (1969 [1879]), 474-91 and COPE & SANDYS (1877) treat the vocabulary of *φιλεῖν/φίλησις/φίλημα/φιλότης en bloc* with *ἐρᾶν/ἐρασθαι/ἔρως*, *στέργειν/στοργή* and *ἀγαπᾶν/ἀγάπη/ἀγάπησις*. A shorthand introduction to the differences between the verbs would suggest that: the verb *ἐρᾶν/ἐραμαι* signify desire rather than love (HALPERIN (1985), cf. Chapter Five); the verb *ἀγαπᾶν* indicates a subject’s positive response (i.e. “appreciation”) of a person, thing or situation (COPE & SANDYS (1877), 296); the verb *στέργειν* is the marked term in relation to *φιλεῖν*, as “unreserved commitment” in relation to “connection” (cf. Soph. *El.* 1102 where Clytaemnestra reproaches Electra that she “πέφυκας πατέρα σὸν στέργειν αἰεῖ”, i.e. she “has the proclivity to *choose* her father’s side.”).

⁸⁸ When the verb *φιλεῖν* is not used to signify a bond between two animate parties, the elements of loyalty and reciprocity are absent. The verb *φιλεῖν* can also be used of direct objects that are inanimate to mark a repeated or repeatable connection between a subject and a concrete substantive (*S φιλεῖ + acc. rei: S is accompanied by*). E.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 642 (διπλῇ μαστιγι, τὴν Ἄρης φιλεῖ): Ares “goes with” the double *mastix*; Soph. *Ant.* 1059 (τὰδικεῖν φιλῶν): Creon accuses Teiresias of being bribed and *to have a tendency* towards *ἀδικία*. This use is ridiculed *ad absurdum* by Aristotle in *NE* VIII.2 (1155b29-31) where he makes the observation that although we say that we *φιλεῖν* wine we are not benevolent towards it. As such the construction *S φιλεῖ + acc. rei* may be roughly equivalent to compounds with prefix *φιλο-* or suffix *-φίλος*. The verb *φιλεῖν* can furthermore be used in a construction with an infinitive to signify a repeated or repeatable (*S φιλεῖ + inf.: S tends to, is prone to*). E.g. Soph. *El.* 320 (φιλεῖ γὰρ ὀκνεῖν πρᾶγμ’ ἀνὴρ πρᾶσσων μέγα): a man who is about to do something great will always recoil.

⁸⁹ E.g. in Eur. *Suppl.* 506 and *Or.* 669 *φιλεῖν* is used with *χρή* (one is obliged to *show solidarity to*) resp. the suppliants or kin who are one’s *φίλοι*.

⁹⁰ This typically works both ways: adjective *φίλος* indicates both that someone “is on your side” and that he “is someone you are committed to.”

⁹¹ Xen. *Mem.* II.vii.9.5. See Chapter One Section 4.1.

lines as one between debtor and creditor: such an understanding is too cold, for it does not take into account that friends positively value each other (ἀγαπᾶν).⁹² In both cases, a healthy φιλία-relationship is expected to bring certain emotions, affects and judgments along with it, without semantically implying these.⁹³

Another point that we need to be aware of is that the extension of the noun φίλος is wider and different compared to English “friend”. In modern Western societies “friends” constitute a distinct category of individuals that we are not related to on other grounds such as the more “stronger” ties of kinship or marriage.⁹⁴ In this modern conception, “friends” are imagined to be chosen rather than ascribed; moreover, friends may have intimate feelings towards one another that are distinct from erotic attraction and romantic love (“My partner is my best friend” is not a tautology but an informative statement.).

By contrast, the Classical Greek φίλος and φιλία do not discriminate between a wide range of associations that we might find categorically distinct. The nouns φίλος and φιλία *can* be used **exclusively** for persons other than kinsmen, in-laws and other more specialized designations of interpersonal bonds (e.g. πατήρ, συγγενής, κηδεστής, σύμμαχος, ξένος),⁹⁵ but they can also

⁹² Ar. *NE* IX.vii (1167b24-32). See Chapter Three Section 2.2.

⁹³ FOXHALL (1998), 66 for affection as both a lubricant that “smooths and soothes” φιλία-bonds, and as a quality which evolves with the relationship itself.

⁹⁴ Cf. RAMSØY (1968), 12 on present-day conceptions: “[M]ost other important social relationships exclude friendship. (...) [Friendship] tends to be incompatible with such relationships as those of mother and child, lovers, and employer and employee.” KONSTAN (1997) uses the opposition “achieved” vs. “ascribed” relationship to classify ancient friendships (as “achieved”).

⁹⁵ E.g. in *Lys.* 6.23, φίλων is first contrasted with συγγενῶν to refer to non-kinsmen with whom one shares a bond, but in its second occurrence subsumes the συγγενεῖς. KONSTAN quotes this occurrence in support of his thesis that φιλία typically excludes kin but omits reference to the second occurrence. I disagree with KONSTAN (1996) who argues that although the noun φιλία and the verb φιλεῖν can be applied on kin-relations, in Classical Greek the noun ὁ φίλος “denotes something very like the modern sense of ‘friend’” (71) and excludes blood relatives. Cf. KONSTAN (1996). This dissociation of the noun φίλος from the rest of the ΦΙΛ-wordfield works best for the Aristotelian account of φιλία in *EE* (esp. VII.iv (1239a1-7), but is contradicted in cases such as *Lys.* 6.23 above, numerous places in Attic drama (e.g. *Soph. Ant.* 522-4 where the point is that Polyneices, despite his hostile acts, still remains a φίλος to whom Antigone feels she has obligations; cf. *Eur. Phoen.* 1446, *Aristoph. Nub.* 82-7, 1488, *Aesch. Sept.* 971, *Eum.* 354-9, *Eur. El.* 1230) and in almost every occurrence of the contrast between ἐχθροί and φίλοι. Cf. BLUNDELL (1989). BELFIORE (2000), referring to Ar. *Poet.* 1453b14-23, regards kin (siblings, parents-children) as the most prototypical sort of φίλοι. Cf. DIRLMEIER (1931), EBELING (1963).

be used **inclusively** to cover the full range of interpersonal solidarities.⁹⁶ Phrases such as “φίλοι and kin”⁹⁷ or “φίλοι and one’s household”⁹⁸ are not expressions of polarity⁹⁹ between φίλοι and non-φίλοι; rather, “kin” and “*oikos*” are specific subcategories of φιλία that yield stronger claims in the rhetorical context at hand than non-specific φίλος—but they *are* φιλία-bonds.¹⁰⁰ The modern pedagogic wisdom that “parents should not aspire to be their children’s friends” would probably have been incomprehensible for an ancient Greek.¹⁰¹

This does not preclude the fact that φίλοι were sometimes chosen, nor does it restrict φιλία to ties of blood or other fixed criteria. The kinds of φιλία that dominate our sources, between citizen men of equal status, are constituted by

⁹⁶ E.g. Isae. 1.4: the speakers defend their claims to Cleonymus’ inheritance, because they are his closest relatives (γένει ἐγγυτάτω προσήκοντες) and Cleonymus had given them the right of succession διὰ τὴν φιλίαν. Often persons are referred to as συγγενής and φίλος: Hdt. 2.90.2, 7.39.15, Thuc. 1.71.4, Xen. Mem. 1.2.48, 1.2.53, 4.4.17, Hiero 11.14, Oec. 5.10, Cyr. 1.2.7, 8.5.21, Pl. *Phdr.* 233d, 239e, *Rep.* 487a, *Lys.* 210d, *Leg.* 718a, 730b, *Lys.* 21.6, Is. 5.35, *Andoc.* 1.56, *Antiph.* 1.29. Cf. DIRLMEIER (1931), 7-21 on what he calls the “Doppelinhalt von φίλος”. ADKINS (1963), 33 for the idea that (Homeric) φίλος refers to anyone and anything that an ἀγαθός depends upon for his survival.

⁹⁷ E.g. *Lys.* 6.23; in Is. 4.18, the contrast between συγγενεῖς and ὀθνεῖοι φίλοι (“strange friends”, i.e. φίλοι from outside the οἶκος) does not imply that συγγενεῖς are not φίλοι, but that kinship is a more relevant criterion (recognized by law) in inheritance cases than other types of relatedness (φιλία). Ar. *NE* VIII.xii (1162a6-9) contrasts the φιλία between parents and children (ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία) with “that with unrelated persons” (τῶν ὀθνείων)—both are subcategories of φιλία.

⁹⁸ E.g. Isoc. 15.99.

⁹⁹ KONSTAN (1997), 54.

¹⁰⁰ Similarly, ξενία is a specific subcategory of φιλία, although in *some* contexts “ξένος” and “φίλος” can be framed as opposites or distinct categories. φίλοι and ξένοι are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories: a ξένος, i.e. someone from a social or political unit different than one own’s, can be one’s φίλος, someone with whom one engages in a relation of reciprocal help and dependence. E.g. in *Lys.* 19.19-20 (Διονυσίου φίλου ὄντος καὶ ξένου), ξένος serves as a specification of φίλος; in Xen. *Hell.* IV.i.34, Agesilaus refers to the same people first as ξένοι and next as φίλοι. Cf. KONSTAN (1997), 83ff.. HERMAN (1987) (1996a, b, c) regards φίλος as an antonym of ξεῖνος (“strange”), interpreting the Homeric occurrences of adjective φίλος as reflexive possessive pronouns (“own”), following ADKINS (1963) and CHANTRAINE (1968), *ad loc.*. Cf. BOLKESTEIN (1939), 214-31; BENVENISTE (1973), 273-288. ADKINS (1963) is also followed by VON REDEN (1995), 45 and SCOTT (1984). Cf. KRETSCHMER (1927) who traces back the Indo-European reflexive pronoun to the Lydian *bilis* (“his own”). BENVENISTE (1973) assimilates φιλέω to ξενίζω and φίλος to ξεῖνος. According to BELFIORE (2000) φιλία is distinct from ξενία because ξενία is based on reciprocity, whereas φιλία is an ascribed relationship.

¹⁰¹ Although in Eur. *El.* 265, Electra’s cry that women are the *philai* of their husbands, not of their children (γυναῖκες ἀνδρῶν, ὦ ξέν’, οὐ παίδων φίλαι), seems to approach this sentiment, the point is that Electra expresses disappointment and bitterness over her mother’s loyalty to Aegisthus overruling the loyalty to her children. *Pace* KONSTAN (1997), 59.

choice and imagined as very volatile and uncertain relations,¹⁰² precisely because they are a matter of constant and repeated choice. Conversely, someone related to one by blood can fail as a φίλος too if he does not meet the imposed norms: Eteocles and Polyneices, φίλοι by birth, become each other's ἐχθροί;¹⁰³ Socrates' son Lamprocles, by being ungrateful towards his mother who φιλεῖ him most, runs the risk of showing himself a worthless φίλος.

2.3. Objective vs. subjective ties

Both semantic questions, the scope of φιλία (are parents φίλοι?) and its contents (does it presuppose affectionate bonds?), raise questions about the importance of choice and the nature of obligation. If φιλία-bonds include ties you are born into, does that mean that you cannot choose your φίλοι? And if so, how does one acquire those φίλοι that are not related by blood? Should we see φιλία in the Classical Period as a semi-formal institution with objective rules and obligations? This has been suggested by several scholars who hold that φιλία "is not, at root, a subjective bond of affection and emotional warmth, but the entirely objective bond of reciprocal obligation."¹⁰⁴

This objective duty-driven account of φιλία appears to be confirmed by our sources. There were recognized codes of conduct, including the swearing of oaths,¹⁰⁵ and some of the obligations owed by φίλοι could be passed on from father to son.¹⁰⁶ The principle that one should harm one's enemies and help one's friends is presented as something "ordained" (τετάχθαι) by the speaker of Lysias 9,¹⁰⁷ as a definition of justice by Polemarchus in Plato's *Republic*,¹⁰⁸ and as an unwritten divine law by Socrates and Hippias the sophist in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰² FOXHALL (1998), 56.

¹⁰³ Eur. *Phoen.* 1446. Cf. Soph. *Ant.* 522-4; 543.

¹⁰⁴ HEATH (1987), 3-4. DONLAN (1980), 15; GOLDHILL (1986), 82; RACCANELLI (1998), 20. Cf. SPRINGBORG (1986), 198-99: "Modern classicists (...) have emphasized the extent to which concepts of friendship in antiquity describe quasi-judicial relations between individuals, and only secondarily as a consequence of mutual interaction, bonds of affection."

¹⁰⁵ E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.12; Antiphon VI.39, with FISHER (1976), 18-19.

¹⁰⁶ E.g. Lys. 18.26-7, Is. 2.19, [Dem.] 50.56.

¹⁰⁷ Lys. 9.20.

¹⁰⁸ Pl. *Rep.* I.332. Cf. *Clit.* 410a.

¹⁰⁹ Xen. *Mem.* IV.iv.24.

However, we also find examples that stress the **moral and voluntary nature** of *φιλία*-obligations. Aristotle includes the principle Helping Friends/Harming Enemies amongst the things “deliberately chosen” by people,¹¹⁰ drawing a distinction between reciprocating on the basis of law (*νομική*) and on the basis of character (*ἠθική*);¹¹¹ to the Socrates in Plato’s *Meno* as well as his namesake in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* the Helping Friends/Harming Enemies-principle is the defining mark of a man’s *ἀρετή*—which seems to presuppose an element of choice and autonomy in adhering to the principle.¹¹² Moreover, some sources emphasize the importance of emotions in real friendships,¹¹³ and in various sources it is stressed that the principle of Helping Friends is not based on self-gratification or a promotion of self-interest.¹¹⁴ This suggests a tendency *not* to conflate *φιλία*-obligations with legal duties: *φιλία*-bonds, even when they are realised and manifested in reciprocal behaviour, are not to be entirely reduced to objective exchanges and obligations to and fro.

As will be argued in Part I of this book, the tension between the objectifying definition of *φιλία* and approaches that attempt to preserve subjective elements is not a contradiction or a paradox. They represent two sides of the same coin.¹¹⁵ When *φιλία* is under pressure, for instance because you feel that your *φίλος* has violated some expectation, it is in your interest to objectify your expectations: your *φίλος* has broken a Law of Friendship and has to compensate you according to some Objective Rule. When, on the other hand, your *φιλία*-bond is healthy and well-functioning, you feel that the meaning of your *φιλία* cannot be entirely reduced to the mechanism of reciprocity: there is more to this friendship than give and take, for in your friendship you are helping each other “for free” and “for the sake of the other”. In a functional *φιλία*-bond, favors are subjective, for otherwise they resemble a type of

¹¹⁰ Ar. *Rhet.* 1363a19-21

¹¹¹ Ar. *NE* VIII.xiii (1162b22-31). See Chapter Three Section 3.

¹¹² Pl. *Meno* 71e, Xen. *Mem.* II.vi.35.

¹¹³ FOXHALL (1998); e.g. Dem. 25.52: kindness, courtesy and compassion in personal relations.

¹¹⁴ Cf. O’ BRIEN (1967), 30-8. Contrast ADKINS (1963) on *φιλότης* in Homeric society.

¹¹⁵ Cf. KONSTAN (1998), 283 with a somewhat different tack: “In place of the polar opposition between the purely voluntary actions of the private individual and the objectively constrained behavior enforced by the market and the law, there is a universe of informal interactions and transactions conceived simultaneously as voluntary and enjoined, spontaneous and socially regulated.”

reciprocity that is devoid of *φιλία*: market transactions. We now briefly turn to this market type of reciprocity.

3. AN ECONOMIC MENTALITY

3.1. The transformation of the Athenian economy

Probably towards the end of the 7th century B.C.E. electrum coinage was invented in Lydia.¹¹⁶ The earliest datable archaeological context is the foundation of the temple of Artemis in the Greek city of Ephesos where a hoard of electrum coinage and bullion was found, dated between 590 and 560 B.C.E..¹¹⁷ At some point the Lydian electrum coinage was replaced by coins in silver and gold; some say under Croesus (561-547 B.C.E.), some under the Persians (from 547 B.C.E. onwards).¹¹⁸ From Ephesos, coinage spread to Miletos, Teos and Phokaea, and with mediation of the Eastern Greek diaspora it was taken over by the developing city-states on the Greek mainland, at some point during the last quarter of the 6th century.¹¹⁹ By 480 B.C.E. nearly 100 mints on the Greek mainland, throughout western and eastern Greece, were operative—which points to an extraordinarily rapid spread of the phenomenon. It is this rapid spread throughout the Greek world (and its slowness to take root elsewhere)

¹¹⁶ VON REDEN (2010), 28ff; SEAFORD (2004), 127ff.

¹¹⁷ Traditionally, electrum coinage was believed to date from the 8th century B.C.E.. ROBINSON (1951) and (1956) first downdated the earliest electrum coins to the 3rd quarter of the 7th century. Cf. PRICE & WAGGONER (1975), PRICE (1983), CARRADICE & PRICE (1988). Renewed excavations of the Artemis Temple have further downdated the coins to the secure terminus ante quem of c. 560 B.C.E. (the dating of the temple to which the Lydian king Croesus contributed; BAMMER (1990), (1991)) and a *terminus post quem* between 590 and 580 B.C.E.. LE RIDER (2001). The hoard underneath the Artemision of 560 B.C.E. contains lumps of electrum with various degrees of marking: some are unmarked, some with punch marks, some with striations on one side and punches on the other, some with true designs (e.g. the Lydian lion head). The first coins in Asia Minor were based on highly localized weight systems (VON REDEN (2010), 69; SEAFORD (2004), 114-21); there are indications that the very use of electrum (a natural product of uneven alloy) created the need for authorizing marks (e.g. stamps) and hence paved the way for fiduciarity (the discrepancy between a coins' intrinsic metallic value and its exchange value). SEAFORD (2004), 115-124, 125-146.

¹¹⁸ CARRADICE (1987a).

¹¹⁹ KIM (2002), 8; HOWGEGO (1995), 4.

that has led scholars to interpret coinage as a predominantly Greek phenomenon.¹²⁰

In Athens we find coinage from the mid-6th century onwards.¹²¹ From the last quarter of the 6th century onwards low-value coins were in circulation, which is suggestive of the use of coinage for small transactions on a daily basis: regular retail trade conducted with silver coinage can be dated back into the late 6th/early 5th century B.C.E..¹²² From at least the mid-5th century B.C.E. onwards, we find signs of a thoroughly moneyed economy in Athens.¹²³

Intertwined with the development of early coinage, but not entirely reducible to it, there was a process of monetization in Greek culture.¹²⁴ This monetization of Greek culture not only affected the Athenian economy; it also had profound effects on Greek intellectual life¹²⁵ and on popular culture and

¹²⁰ Given the downdating of its introduction in Greece from the 8th or 7th century B.C.E. down to the second half of the 6th century it seems valid to interpret the spread of coinage in the context of the development of the *polis* as a political entity. See n.154 below.

¹²¹ The first issues of Athenian coins, known to numismatists as *Wappenmünzen*, are characterized by a typeless incuse square punch on the reverse and a variety of types on the obverse, changing for each issue: amphoras, triskeles, horses from different angles, birds, wheels, owls, gorgon's heads. KRAAY (1966), KROLL (1981). This variety of types is sometimes taken to reflect an unsettled stage in the question who had the power to issue coins and who represented the *polis*. VON REDEN (1995a), 180-2. In the period until c. 520 the basic coin was the didrachm; from c. 530 the *Gorgoneia* began to be minted, tetradrachms characterized by the Gorgon's head on the obverse as a standard emblem, and changing types on the reverse (lion's head, bull's head). This heavier coin presumably started to be coined in the period when Athens intensified the exploitation of the Laureion mines for international export. SCHAPS (2004), 105, KRAAY (1964), 80-2; KROLL (1981), 13-17. After this intermediary stage the mint underwent a final transformation at the beginning of the 5th century: the Gorgon's head on the obverse was replaced by the owl, accompanied by an inscription of the ethnic ATHE; the reverse was standardized into the head of Athena. VON REDEN (1995), 181.

¹²² The introduction of low-value *bronze* coinage for small change is recorded at Athens from the 5th century B.C.E. on. KIM (2001), (2002) has discovered that from the early days of coinage on, fractional silver coins of low-denomination were minted. Even the first issues of the *Wappenmünzen* included coins of small denominations.

¹²³ VON REDEN (1997); KRAAY (1964).

¹²⁴ VON REDEN (2010) (1997) dissociates money and coinage and argues that there was a considerable amount of monetization in late Archaic Greece preceding coinage, as the conditions for the universality of conventions and a universal medium of exchanges were prepared in the 6th-century. Within the confines of this definition, it can be argued that Solon played a pivotal role, not in coinage, but in the monetization of Athens. But see SCHAPS (2004) for the argument that "the invention of coinage was the invention of money" (15): with the monetization of the Greek world, money first became equivalent with wealth.

¹²⁵ Cf. SEAFORD (2004) for an argument that the monetization of Greece created the preconditions

morality. One of the areas in which monetization had **conceptual consequences** was the discourse about *φιλία*. The gradual monetization of Greek society produced a new notion of reciprocity that became increasingly prevalent in popular thought as a model to think with: the commercial transaction, i.e. the simultaneous exchange of equivalent goods that does not necessarily yield a lasting relationship between the participants.

With the monetization of the Mediterranean world, the development of a disembedded economy in the city-states, and the development of several judicial institutions, arises a different articulation of the social domain. The disembedding of the economy implies increasing opportunities to exchange “goods” and “services” on a basis that is (increasingly) independent from political and social considerations: exchange need no longer be confined to *φίλοι* (positive reciprocity) and *ἐχθροί* (negative reciprocity), but may also take place in a regulated and neutral sphere, the market, between partners who are neither hostile nor acquainted and who cooperate to reach harmonization of needs on the spot. Transactors do not operate on the basis of a preexisting relationship nor do they aim to establish one. Monetization provides the partners with a tool to objectify value, to compare values, and to quantify with unprecedented precision.¹²⁶ The development of judicial institutions provides partners with the means to enforce obligations upon others or to apply sanctions, even to exchange partners who live outside one’s social field of influence. Together, these historical developments make a relatively new form of exchange prevalent in Greek thought: the momentaneous transaction. This type of exchange becomes potentially **isomorphous** with the reciprocal exchange of care, favors and gifts in the contexts of *φιλία*-relations. Reciprocal

for the monistic and reductionistic philosophical systems of the presocratics.

¹²⁶ In the Homeric poems, cattle is occasionally used as a measure of value, e.g. *Il.* 6.234-36 (a comparison of the value of the armour of Diomedes and Glaucus), 2.459 (a golden tassel on Athena’s aegis), 21.79 (Lycaon as slave), 23.702-5, 885 (prizes in games), *Od.* 1.430-1 (Eurycleia sold as slave), 22.56-8 (compensation proposed by a suitor to Odysseus). Two fundamental differences with the use of coined money as measure of value are: (1) Homeric cattle rarely combines the functions of measure of value *and* means of exchange; (2) by its very nature, cattle is capable only to express relatively high values; it cannot offer precise quantification of low-value objects.

exchanges become potentially ambivalent,¹²⁷ allowing for multiple interpretations of the same exchange events, and yielding conflicting understandings of the relationships based on these.¹²⁸

There are a couple of counterintuitive aspects about the idea that the relatively recently developed money economy triggered reflection about the form and norms of *φιλία*-reciprocity. What makes a money economy so different from the economy that we see in Homeric heroic epic or in Hesiod's depiction of peasant life? Moreover, many metaphors and models that we will see seem to be about exchanges that can also do without money: paid labor (Homer's Poseidon did so without money),¹²⁹ lending and borrowing (Hesiod's peasants did so without money),¹³⁰ commercial exchanges (Homer's Phoenicians did so without money),¹³¹ measuring wealth (Glaucus and Diomedes did so with cattle, not money).¹³² Did money really change the world for the Greeks? And was there ever in antiquity a phenomenon that matches our present-day *concept* of money?¹³³

¹²⁷ I follow APPADURAI (1986), 3-16 and KOPYTOFF (1986), 64 in approaching the distinction between commodity and gift not as a material one but one that inheres in a distinction in modes of exchange. This model allows for the same thing to be both gift and commodity, its meaning shifting with the ideology attached to the situation of exchange.

¹²⁸ See Part I for some reactions and analyses of isomorphism in genres ranging from comedy to philosophical discourse.

¹²⁹ Hom. *Il.* 21.445; cf. Hes. *W&D* 371.

¹³⁰ E.g. Hes. *W&D* 342-63. Cf. MILLETT (1991), 27-35 and 44-52 on the terminology and development of early credit mechanism.

¹³¹ E.g. Hom. *Od.* 15.416, 445, 452, 460-3

¹³² Hom. *Il.* 6.234-36.

¹³³ These questions reflect two of the fundamental debates about the ancient economy. The "primitivist vs. modernist"-debate, also called the BÜCHER-MEYER-controversy centers around the question whether the ancient economy was similar to modern economies, despite differences in size and complexity. The "primitivists" (BÜCHER (1906), WEBER (1968), HASEBROEK (1931)) hold that the ancient economy was a closed household economy in which money was of little economic relevance. The modernists (MEYER (1899)) maintain that 5th-century Athens did know industrial production, international commerce and large-scale monetary exchange. The second debate is the "substantivism vs. formalism"-debate around the question whether the ancient economy can be analysed with the conceptual apparatus of modern economic theories that is developed for modern market economies. The substantivists argue that the ancient economy was incommensurably different from ours that it cannot be understood with modern economic concepts (POLANYI (1944), FINLEY (1985a)); substantivists attribute a limited role to money in the ancient economy. (FINLEY (1985a), 115, 132-5, 166-9). It is crucial that these two debates are not confused (Von REDEN (2010), 9). Cf. CARTLEDGE (1998). Recent defenders of the formalist position acknowledge the significant differences between

To start with the last question: no. As money is a historically embedded phenomenon,¹³⁴ its conceptualization is differently organized and articulated in different cultures. The Greeks did have a term for currency, τὸ νόμισμα, a term that reflects the fiduciary nature of coins—although the term applies to anything sanctioned by established usage, hence including custom and legal measures alike. They also had a term that referred to the material aspect of money, τὸ ἀργύριον, “piece of silver”, a term for wealth, πλοῦτος, which included non-monetary forms of wealth, as well as a term for money in its capacity as a resource, a stand-in-commodity, in the generalized plural τὰ χρήματα—a term applicable to any commodity. Moreover, the terminology for money transactions and credit operations predate the invention of coin money: for instance, the term for “paying”, ἀποτίνειν or τίνειν, originates in the sphere of revenge and compensation.¹³⁵ Finally, several sorts of “proto-money”, i.e. goods that perform some of the functions of later money, were in use long before coinage was invented: cattle functioned as a measure of value, grain as a store of wealth, utensils such as tripods or cauldrons as a means of payment in

ancient economy and the large-scale industrialized capitalist economies of the 19th and 20th century, but nevertheless maintained that the ancient economy too was subject to the market forces of supply, demand, quality and price, and thereby characterized by market economical transactions. E.g. COHEN (1991) on Athenian credit mechanisms regulated by market processes; LOOMIS (1998) who argues that at least from 432 B.C.E. onwards, the economic forces of supply and demand were operative in ancient Athens, as well as monetary phenomena such as inflation and deflation; HARRIS (2002) who argues that the exchange of commodities on the agora was subject to forces of supply and demand. The discussions are summarized in SCHAPS (2004), 18-26, CARTLEDGE (2002), ANDREAU (2002), VON REDEN (2010), 9-12; ENGEN (2010), 6-9, 20-35.

¹³⁴ VON REDEN (2010), 6ff; (1995), 171-94. For the embeddedness of money as a phenomenon, cf. PARRY & BLOCH (1989), 21: “[T]he meanings with which money is invested are quite as much a product of the cultural matrix into which it is incorporated as of the economic functions it performs as a means of exchange, unit of account, store of value, and so on. It is therefore impossible to predict its symbolic meanings from these functions alone.”

¹³⁵ SEAFORD (2004), 23-6; WILSON (2002). The noun ἀποτίμημα is also used in the context of dowries in late Archaic Athens. Cf. VON REDEN (1997). The terminology of τίνειν is also related to ποινή (requit) and ἄποινα (compensation). In 7th- and early 6th-century Crete, cauldrons (λέβητες), were used as ἐπιτίμια or ἄποινα (compensation) in retributive contexts. VON REDEN (1997), 157. There is some discussion about the relation of the field of τίνειν/ποινή to τιμή. According to POKORNY (1959), I.637 τιμή, τίω and ποινή all derive from the common root **k^uehⁱ* (“respect, punishment, expiation”); so too FRISK (1970), II.901. BENVENISTE (1973), 334-345 and BEEKES (2010), II.1490 separate τιμή, τίω with long ī (<**k^uehⁱi*) from τίνω, τίσις with short ī (<**k^uhⁱi*). WILSON (2002), 20-26 argues for a single root.

retributive contexts, iron spits as a medium of exchange in cultic and religious contexts,¹³⁶ metallic bullion as a store of wealth and medium of exchange in foreign trade.¹³⁷ This all seems to suggest that money as we know it did not enter the Greek world as a unified phenomenon nor as something completely novel that enabled the Greeks to do things they were not capable of before.¹³⁸

On the level of **history of ideas**, however, two points need to be made. First of all, whereas there may not be one distinct operation or action (such as “paying”, “borrowing” or “measuring”) that the Greeks were not capable of before the invention of coinage, with the introduction of coined money there came to be **one means** that performed all functions that were previously performed by disparate means (cattle as a measure of value, grain as a store of wealth, tripods as blood-money, metallic bullion as a medium of exchange in foreign trade).¹³⁹ Exchanges that were previously experienced as disparate and

¹³⁶ For a long time, the idea that iron spits were used as a form of pre-coin currency was primarily based on etymology (*obelos* > *obolos*) and later literary stories of dubious reliability. It has been disputed whether iron spits were used as protomoney. COURBIN (1983), FURTWÄNGLER (1980) VON REDEN (1997). More recently there have been some archaeological finds to support the thesis. STRØM (1992), SEAFORD (2004), 109-114, SCHAPS (2004), 82-88.

¹³⁷ There is evidence for the use of gold, silver and electrum bars adjusted to weight standards from c. 700 B.C.E. on. FURTWÄNGLER (1986), 156.

¹³⁸ VON REDEN (1995a), 175: “The absence of a name for the phenomenon of money in Greece suggests that it gradually emerged rather than being imposed from outside.”

¹³⁹ The classical exposition of monetary theory is the one by CARL Menger (1909), who lists the following functions: (1) money is a unit of account, a measure of value; (2) money is a means of payment; (3) money is a store of value; (4) money is a medium of exchange. These functions mutually support one other: to be a means of payment, money probably needs to be regarded as worthy to be a store of wealth, which means that at some point it must be used as a medium of exchange, which in turn requires some sort of commensurability. Objects that performs *some* of these functions (e.g. measure or store of value, or means of payment), or whose acceptability *within* a single function is restricted (utensil being exchangeable for some objects but not for all), can be called “special purpose money” as opposed to “all-purpose money”. Menger’s monetary theory revolves around the assumption that money evolved quite organically from barter and that all monetary functions can be reduced to its primary function as “a medium of exchange”. Distinguishing the same monetary functions, POLANYI (1977) takes the “medium of exchange” function to be the *least* basic one: it is only with the introduction of market exchange that payment comes to be envisaged in terms of the obligation to pay on the spot in exchange. (99, 104-5, 107, 109). Menger and Polanyi represent the two approaches to money that originate in Enlightenment thought: the Anglosaxon tradition adheres to a “commodity theory” (or “metallism”) of money according to which money is in essence a commodity, a market phenomenon, an instrument of trade with a value independent of the context of transaction and only measurable against other objects. E.g. RICARDO (1817), MILL (1848). The German romantic “chartalist” (or anti-metallist) tradition approaches money as debt, i.e. a value “made by law”

distinct (the administration of justice, the payment of mercenaries, the redistribution of resources, the exchange of goods) came to be interconnected in an unprecedented way.¹⁴⁰ Secondly, although money may not have been the only or ultimate cause of the development of trade and commerce, the Greeks did think it was. I will elaborate on both points briefly.

3.2. Money and commerce I: against the creation myth of money

One of the most striking phenomena related to the genesis of the new money-form that combined all monetary functions was the development of **retail trade**.¹⁴¹ The spread of coinage was intertwined with the evolution of retail trade.¹⁴² This contradicts the **market hypothesis**,¹⁴³ the traditional and commonsense creation myth¹⁴⁴ on the origins of money, that consists in the interrelated claims that money developed from barter, that money was invented to facilitate trade and that money functioned primarily as a medium of exchange. Within this view on money, money is only instrumental and hence value-neutral: it is simply the one commodity singled out as a universal equivalent—a privileged commodity, but not a phenomenon with its own dynamics or with a capacity to transform the world.

(BARBON 1690) that derives its value from the trust within a community (MULLER (1816). The value of money is independent of the medium used to represent it, for money is not a commodity but a token; money is not a market phenomenon but a creation of centralized power that issues money as an IOU. E.g. SIMMEL (1978). The relative weight of money's different functions is still subject to debate. See e.g. ROBBINS & AKIN (1999) for emphasis on means of exchange (cf. LAPAVITSAS 2005 for a refinement of the Marxist tradition on money as the Ur-commodity); INGHAM (2004) for money as measure of value/unit of account.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. SEAFORD (2004). OSBORNE (2007), 292: "The utility of coinage rests in the way in which it can serve a number of functions which previously had not been served by a single medium."

¹⁴¹ In Greek there is a distinction between retail trade, *καπηλεία*, and long distance (usually overseas) trade, *ἐμπορία*. Cf. *Pl. Rep.* 371d5-7. See FINKELSTEIN (= FINLEY) (1935, HOPPER (1979), 47-67. In Classical Athens, *ἐμπορία* was presumably a viable activity for (aristocratic) landholders to export their own produce (BRAVO (1977) 1-59); *καπηλεία* was most probably a full-time profession.

¹⁴² VON REDEN (1995), 171-94 warns against the fallacy to identify money unproblematically with trade, commodification and a "disembedded" economy and to oppose it to a traditional non-market gift economy.

¹⁴³ E.g. Menger (1909), 8-9, 47-9, 67-9. This view on money as a pure instrument and commodity still lies at the heart of Keynesian monetary theory. DOWD (2000); KLEIN & SELGIN (2000).

¹⁴⁴ Cf. SEAFORD (2004), 292n.1: "It is easy to be misled by the creation-myth of money (out of barter) into believing that pre-monetary society was based on barter."

Commonsense though the market view may be, it fails to do justice to two remarkable facts: (1) the marginality of barter in pre-monetary Greece,¹⁴⁵ where most exchanges (lending, borrowing and sharing) are conducted with neighbors and other φίλοι along the lines of long-term reciprocity;¹⁴⁶ (2) the **fiduciarity** of Greek coinage, i.e. the excess of the fixed conventional value of pieces of money over their intrinsic value.¹⁴⁷ The exchange-value is enabled to

¹⁴⁵ SEAFORD (2004), 23-47. OSBORNE (2007), 294; MILLETT (1984); DONLAN (1985b); TANDY (1997), 19-111; SNODGRASS (1971). There is little archaeological evidence for retail trade or cash-crop markets before the mid-6th century. SCHAPS (2004), 111-23; there is archaeological evidence for trade overseas, not of subsistence goods, but luxury objects. TANDY (1997), 114. As to literary evidence, there are only three instances in Homer of exchanges of *things* (as opposed to people) that are not to create interpersonal links but for the sake of the things themselves: Euneus' ships from Lemnos that bring wine to the Greek camp (*Il.* 7.467-75), "Mentes'" cargo of gleaming iron to be exchanged with bronze from Temese (*Od.* 1.183-4), the Phoenician cargo, including a gold necklace, that Eumaeus tells about (*Od.* 15.416, 445, 452, 460-3). Exchanges of persons for goods (distinct from ransom) occur more frequently. E.g. *Il.* 21.41, 23.746-7, 21.102, 22.44-5, 24.752, 21.454, *Od.* 1.430-1, 14.115, 15.429, 20.382-3. The evidential value of the absence of retail trade in Homeric epic is of course limited and problematic. In ancient Mesopotamia markets (in the sense of fixed places of retail trade) did exist already in the Old Babylonian period. SCHAPS (2004), 46-7. POLANYI's denial (1957 and 1963) of the existence of markets in the Near East is untenable. Cf. JURSA (2010), esp. 13-25.

¹⁴⁶ MILLETT (1984); DONLAN (1985b); TANDY (1997), 19-111; SNODGRASS (1971).

¹⁴⁷ PEACOCK (2006), 643: "Evidence of this 'fiduciarity' includes: (1) that it was rarely melted down to create bullion (such a change of form would have meant a loss in conventional value); (2) that it circulated at its bullion value only outside Greece, that is, outside the jurisdiction of the states whose authority conferred coin with fiduciary value." According to SEAFORD (2004), 6, fiduciarity is what is unprecedented about Greek coinage. KROLL (1998) argues that from 700 B.C.E. onwards (almost a century before the invention of electrum coinage in the Eastern Greek colonies), silver in the form of weighed lumps or ingots has served a significant number of the functions that would later be performed by coined money: e.g. in the Solonic laws (early 6th century) several forms of payment (payment to victors in games, handling of private debts, the naucrary) were conducted in bullion payment (in "drachmas", i.e. a weight unit later to become a value unit). This is supported by finds of uncoined silver, including low-weight silver fragments and by the formalization of weighing standards that have preceded the invention of coinage. OSBORNE (1996), 253-5; HORSMANN (2000), with the interesting thesis that the introduction of coinage went hand in hand with metrological reforms. The high level of precision that is characteristic of coin money seems to be prepared for by the precise weighing of silver bullion; coinage, by having the advantage that coins can be counted instead of weighed, makes exchange easier. KROLL's hypothesis that the issuing authority profits from the slight overvaluation of coin in relation to its intrinsic value is speculative as KURKE (1999) points out (11-2). SEAFORD (2004) notes that the fiduciarity of ancient Greek coins never reaches the level of modern money (coins are predominantly struck from high-value metals in antiquity). The first mass-produced coins were struck in Britain around 1800; national paper money only appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century (as a substitute for specie and promissory notes); base metal coinage was introduced after the second world war. Cf. HART (1986).

exceed intrinsic value when money, in some form or another, bears a sign that guarantees future acceptability of the conventional value of money. Its degree of circulation depends on a general belief in this future acceptability and presupposes that it circulates among a group of individuals tied by a moral or legal framework.¹⁴⁸ As such, monetary exchanges are conducted on premises radically different than barter: barter, just like theft and plunder, is typically conducted by individuals who are *not* tied together by any social framework,¹⁴⁹ performed in mutual distrust, without any investment in integration—a very unlikely subsoil for exchange based on fiduciarity. There is no recorded case of money developing out of barter in the anthropological field.¹⁵⁰ Barter, i.e. international trade, in the ancient Mediterranean world both predated money¹⁵¹ *and* effectively continued to be conducted without money.¹⁵² Circulation-

¹⁴⁸ SEAFORD (2004), 7: “A group of individuals who know nothing of each other, or who have no shared symbol, have no basis on which the general belief can construct itself.”

¹⁴⁹ SAHLINS (1972), 196-204. Not only was barter historically a marginal phenomenon; it is also commonly conceptualized as hostile exchange. SAHLINS categorizes barter as negative reciprocity: “Persons stand in a relationship of ‘negative’ reciprocity where each strives to outdo the other and acquire as much profit as he can. Such relationships range from situations of ‘barter’ or ‘haggling’ to situations characterized by a succession of reprisals.” (1965: 148-9); cf. (1972), 195: “[Negative reciprocity is] ‘the most impersonal sort of exchange. In guises such as ‘barter’ it is from our own point of view the ‘most economic’.” Cf. HUMPHREY (1985) on the problematic concept of barter that has been classified both as “balanced” and as “negative” reciprocity in anthropology. The fundamental difference between barter and market exchange is that market exchange takes place in a regulated sphere under controlled circumstances between partners who share a political, legal or social framework; barter is socially far less integrated. For a discussion of the place of barter in the development of exchange see HUMPHREYS (1985) and DAVIS (1992). But see DODD (1994), xxii: “In barter the key requirement for transactors is information. This mostly concerns the location and trust-worthiness of co-transactors. Money dispenses with this.” Cf. HUMPHREY & HUGH-JONES (1992), 6-8, 61, 95, 107-41.

¹⁵⁰ There is no historical evidence for a “barter → commodity → money”-transition. INGHAM (2000); WRAY (2000) (2004); CRUMP 1981, 88-90; HUMPHREY (1985). DALTON (1982), 185: “[B]arter, in the strict sense of moneyless market exchange, has never been a quantitatively important or dominant model or transaction in any past or present economic system about which we have hard information.” But note HOWGEGO (1995), 14: “Economic theory is able to demonstrate how money might in principle have evolved out of barter, and it would be unwise to discard the possibility, especially given the ubiquity of barter.” Cf. ANDERLINI & SABOURIAN (1992).

¹⁵¹ International trade in the Mediterranean world had existed for thousands of years before money. SCHAPS (1997), 95.

¹⁵² Trade in the Near Easter World continued to be conducted without money for thousands of years after the monetization of the Greek mainland. SCHAPS (1997), 95. Greek poleis too conducted predominantly barter in international trade: foreign trade did not require money

patterns of early coinage show that money was not used in international trade.¹⁵³

Whereas money did not evolve from international trade and barter,¹⁵⁴ it did facilitate trade,¹⁵⁵ i.e. **retail trade**, trade within the polis. Coinage, the agora and

(because of the great amounts of costly goods that could be easily bartered for other costly commodities, such as bullion and kind) and was not essentially facilitated by use of money, since to the trading partners, foreigners, a coin would be no better than its bullion value.

¹⁵³ KRAAY (1964). KRAAY sees archaic coinage as limited-purpose money, i.e. primarily as a means of administrative payment (instituted for the standardization of payment), not used immediately as a widespread form of money, but predominantly received by the *polis* in the form of taxes (e.g. harbour dues), fines and penalties, and divided among citizens on occasions of surplus, paid to mercenaries or soldiers and experts, and spent on public works —but not used as a means of exchange in retail trade. See PRICE (1983) for the objection that KRAAY's thesis leaves the problem of fiduciarity unaddressed: the thesis assumes "that payment for service was acceptable and this in turn would suggest at least in part that coins were suitable for retail trade." (6). Cf. TULLOCK (1975), 491. PRICE's solution is to postulate a two-phase development of coinage: the first involves the minting of electrum coinage, in Lydia and East Greece, which conceptually may have been more akin to gifts or medals, issued by states, monarchs or private individuals as some kind of bonus payment (in addition to everyday livelihood during their service) for e.g. mercenaries; in the second stage, about fifty years later, the city-states of the Greek mainland, started to mint silver currency, which circulated more widely from their sites of origin and which could be used as a *means of payment* for rewarding political, military and juridical office, because the earlier electrum coinage had already habituated the receivers to the concept of metallic payment.

¹⁵⁴ Alternative reconstructions of the origins of money include, next to the hypotheses of KRAAY (1964) and PRICE (1983) (see n.153 above), hypotheses about the judicial and sacred origins of money that hold that the primary function of early money was its role as standard of value in early penal law. E.g. LAUM (1924), followed by SEAFORD (1994), 191-234 and (2004), 9-15, 48-59, 102-4, for the thesis that coinage develops out of egalitarian sacrificial distribution (*obeloi*, iron spits, as the forerunner of *oboloi*, metallic coins); WILL (1954), (1955), GRIERSON (1977) and PICARD (1-15) who stress the etymological connection between νομίσμα and νόμος. WILL is followed by VON REDEN (1995a), 171-94, (1997), (2002), (2010): "*Nomisma* was the token which materialized *nomos*." (177). Money stood in a tradition of metallic awards, fines and payments in legal, marital, athletic and political contexts prior to coinage (161-8) and seems to be a product of the public political economy rather than of a private economy of individuals. KURKE (1999), 22ff. reverses the priorities by viewing money not so much as the cause but rather as symptom of a conceptual revolution and a manifestation of systems of social evaluation in flux. The fundamental change was thinking in terms of the *polis*, a public sphere, civic rights and collective decision-making. As this constitution of the polis was not achieved without a struggle, the issuing of coins becomes a sign of the city's self-assertion. KURKE follows MORRIS (1996), 34-5 in the ideological distinction between an elitist tradition (that resents coinage) and a middling tradition for which coinage became a means to challenge elite authority. The evidence for elite hostility to coinage before Plato and Aristotle is scanty and problematic (KROLL (2000), SEAFORD (2002)); moreover, Plato's and Aristotle's views seem to be more ambivalent than KURKE is ready to admit (cf. SEAFORD (2004)). Beyond that, the postulation of a middling tradition is problematic. See VAN WEES (2006) for a persuasive argument against the existence of a class of small farmers, the *mesoi* (postulated by HANSON (1995), 108-26; 181-219, SPAHN (1977),

retail trade developed simultaneously in 6th-century Athens.¹⁵⁶ Within a short time span after its invention, coinage was used not as a specialist currency, but as a widespread form of money in everyday retail trade used by a significant segment of the population.¹⁵⁷ The 5th and 4th century witnessed a revolutionary transformation of the Athenian economy, catalyzed by the spread of coinage that stimulated the processes of commodification, division of labor,¹⁵⁸ rationalization of agriculture,¹⁵⁹ the institution of paid labor,¹⁶⁰ the monetization of politics¹⁶¹ and warfare,¹⁶² the development of credit systems and banking practice,¹⁶³ and the simplification of retail trade.¹⁶⁴ With all due qualifications, it

MEIER (1980)) in Solonian Athens. It is however important to recognize the difference between the social class postulated by HANSON and the ideological construct assumed by MORRIS. See however VON REDEN (1997) for a convincing problematization of a direct and univocal association of money with civic wealth.

¹⁵⁵ The adoption of silver coinage by the Greek *poleis* was in principle a market-exogenous act. Although Greek coinage may have been prepared for by various forms of proto-money (cattle, utensils, grain, bullion—each fulfilling *some* but not *all* of the functions that Greek coinage came to perform), the bestowing of fiduciary, conventional, value on silver coins was an important watershed.

¹⁵⁶ SCHAPS (2004). This is the period in which the agora (presumably after being relocated to the more central position it had in the classical period) developed commercial functions in addition to its older political, social, judicial and religious roles. VON REDEN (1995), 147ff; MORRIS (1991), SNODGRASS (1991). The receptive ground for the emergence of a commercial market and the spread of coinage was probably provided by the radical transformation of the *polis*. The development and growth of a market place should not without qualification be taken to imply the emergence of a full-blown disembedded market economy (VON REDEN 1995, 105-23; MOLLER (2007), 371-3). See n.190 below.

¹⁵⁷ This is supported by recent finds containing large numbers of fractional silver coins (1/10 gr.), from the first quarter of the 5th century, reported by KIM (2001). Fractional silver coins behave differently from large-denomination coins: small coins tend to travel less far and are found in hoards only with similarly small coins. These archaic fractional coins were very likely used in everyday transactions.

¹⁵⁸ LOOMIS (1998), 155; HARRIS (2002), 88-99 for a list of occupations attested in the period 500-250 B.C.E. in Classical Athens (with the sensible words of caution and reservations made on pp. 68-71).

¹⁵⁹ OSBORNE (1991); SCHAPS (2004), 163-74.

¹⁶⁰ LOOMIS (1998); SCHAPS (2004), 150-162.

¹⁶¹ SCHAPS (2004), 124-37.

¹⁶² SCHAPS (2004), 138-49.

¹⁶³ SHIPTON (1997), COHEN (1992) and MILLETT (1991).

¹⁶⁴ Retail trade itself can be seen as a symptom of a process of economical scaling up, caused by the rise and development of the *polis*, a process of urbanization and the emergence of, somehow, an agricultural surplus. Whatever part coined money played *historically* in the complex process of disembedding or re-embedding of the economy, it is uncontroversial that at least from the mid-5th century B.C.E. on, one of its prime functions was to facilitate commercial exchange, as a

can be argued, within certain definitions, that in the late 6th and early 5th century B.C.E. the Athenian economy underwent a transformation that can be described as a process of disembedding.¹⁶⁵ This is not to imply that the Athenian economy was a fully disembedded economy as we know it now and we may even question whether there exists such a thing: market exchange is *always* embedded in political structures—a construct such as fiduciary money could not possibly operate otherwise.¹⁶⁶ However, the fact that within two generations, the whole Athenian population came to use money, implies a disembedding of part of the economy from social structures based on long-term reciprocal relationships (and a *re-embedding*, if you will, of economic activity in the life of the *polis*). However much or little embedded in public, political life this economy may be, it does consist in immediate transactions between *privately* unrelated individuals, between people who do not necessarily have to be each other's φίλοι.¹⁶⁷

The transformation of the Athenian economy was an extremely complex event, interrelated with the settling of *polis* authority, the emergence of a public sphere and administrative apparatus,¹⁶⁸ the institution of the Delian League, the explosive growth of population of Attica, the urbanization of Attica, the growth of interregional trade and increased exchange with the colonies, processes of urbanization, an increased division of labour.¹⁶⁹ However complex the exact

medium of exchange.

¹⁶⁵ On the complex commercialization of 4th-century Athenian economy, see SHIPTON (1997).

¹⁶⁶ Cf. the notion that *money* is always embedded and integrative ("money is always personal and impersonal"), see HART (2007).

¹⁶⁷ Cf. SEAFORD (1998), 3: "Commercial exchange embodies a relationship between the items exchanged rather than between the parties to the exchange, and generally involves a mutual absolute egoism that is by definition incompatible with (beneficial) reciprocity."

¹⁶⁸ From c. 450 B.C.E. pay for jurors and attendance at the council was instituted; from 399 B.C.E. also for attendance in the Assembly.

¹⁶⁹ See OSBORNE (2007) on the transformation of the Athenian economy. Money itself is a sign of surplus wealth—wealth that does not require immediate conversion into subsistence goods, cattle or land. Increase of circulating money, even from external resources such as the allies of the Delian League, must at some point imply an increase of natural produce in Attica. Whether there was an increased import of grain from the Black Sea region (balanced with an increased export of Athenian pottery, oil and wine), or even some kind of agricultural revolution suggested by recent field-survey and developments in palaeoethnobotany (CARTLEDGE (1998), 20), there must have been some increase in the total amount of agricultural products to balance the increased number of manufacturers, labourers and soldiers working for pay in Athens—paid by the increased amount of cash levied from the allies in the Delian league.

mechanisms of historical causation may be,¹⁷⁰ to the 5th- and 4th-century Athenian, money was one of the most visible **symptoms**, and one of the most powerful **symbols**, of these rapid and pervasive changes in political and socio-economic life.

3.3. Money and commerce II: Greek thinking about money

There is a tradition in European thought that maintains that money is a revolutionary force and that credits money with the rise of individualism or the “Western subject”,¹⁷¹ the emergence of abstract thought and rational calculation,¹⁷² the emergence of symbolic thought,¹⁷³ the development of the market and the concept of commodity,¹⁷⁴ the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*,¹⁷⁵ the corrosion of society,¹⁷⁶ with being the root of all evil,¹⁷⁷ or the end of evil.¹⁷⁸

The Greeks had a tradition of their own. Although historically the connection between monetization and the rise of retail trade was complex, from quite early in the Classical period the phenomena of coinage, money, trade and credit formed a conceptual cluster. Aristotle and Plato assumed that money

¹⁷⁰ HOWGEGO (1995), 16: “The interaction of economic, social, and political changes was complex. The spread of coinage may itself be seen both as caused by such changes, and also as an agent in the process.”

¹⁷¹ Money and individualism: SIMMEL (1978), FARENGA (1985); money and the articulation of the Western subject: SEAFORD (2012).

¹⁷² MARX (1962) [1867], 104-108, THOMSON 1955: 175-207, 251-70, 302-47; SHELL 1978; SEAFORD 1994: 220-32; CRUMP (1978). For a problematization of the conception of money as the “most quantifiable expression of commodity” and as the “expression of index, and measure of commensurability”, see LIPUMA (1999), 198; cf. STRATHERN (1992), 191, MAURER (2003). MAURER (2005) on money as *resacralizing* exchanges and conversions.

¹⁷³ SHELL (1992): money as a metaphor for and exemplar of the problem of the relationship between sign and substance. Cf. SAUSSURE (1966), 115.

¹⁷⁴ POLANYI (1944). Cf. KELLY (1992): uniscalar valuation as a hallmark of modern capitalist money; TAUSSIG (1980): universal commodification (and erosion of other systems of value) as consequence of monetization.

¹⁷⁵ SIMMEL (1907). Money as cause and consequence of the transformation from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*: KEISTER (2002), 40.

¹⁷⁶ SIMMEL (1907) for the “money as acid”-hypothesis.

¹⁷⁷ MACFARLANE (1985).

¹⁷⁸ HIRSCHMAN (1977) on seventeenth and eighteenth century capitalist ideology that held that capitalism was capable of accomplishing the repression of the passions in favor of “harmless” interests of commercial life.

developed from barter and was invented to facilitate trade.¹⁷⁹ Although historically this is not correct, it does tell us something about the way people in the 4th-century had come to *see* money: as a medium of exchange and an important instrument for trade. Plato credited the man who invented money as a benefactor who made retail trading (καπηλεία) possible by providing a medium that makes goods “even and commensurable” (ὁμαλήν τε καὶ σύμμετρον).¹⁸⁰ Herodotus, in ascribing paratactically the invention of both coinage and retail trade to the Lydians (they were the first κάπηλοι)¹⁸¹ closely associates money with retail trade.¹⁸² Money and trade were interrelated phenomena in Greek popular thinking.¹⁸³

Moreover, the function of money as a measure of value and a unit of account established an association between money and a distinct kind of mentality: a calculating attitude attuned to economic advantages. Already in early 6th-century inscriptions, we find that χρήματα, resources or commodities, are totaled in monetary terms: the total value of rewards, even if they were in kind (e.g. “public maintenance plus exemption from taxes plus fifty jars of wine plus some other goods”), is expressed in monetary terms, even if no coined money has changed hands.¹⁸⁴ A scene in Aristophanes’ *Wasps* presupposes a calculating economic mentality in the audience: characters count and calculate influxes of taxes and dues.¹⁸⁵ Numerous references to money (pay, cost, bribes) figure in the *Acharnians* where the market is a metaphor for democracy, presupposing monetary numeracy in the audience.¹⁸⁶ Thucydides’ *History* is written for an

¹⁷⁹ Pl. *Rep.* 371d; Ar. *Pol.* 1257a19-40; NE 1133a17-20.

¹⁸⁰ Pl. *Leg.* 918b-c.

¹⁸¹ Hdt. 1.94.1.

¹⁸² OSBORNE (2007), 294: “The way in which Herodotus links the Lydians being the first to mint coins with their being the first retail traders is very suggestive of the implications of coinage as he saw it in the late fifth century.”

¹⁸³ Aristoph. *Plut.* 147: Carion treats wealth and money as synonymous (cf. 131, 194-7).

¹⁸⁴ VON REDEN (2010), 36-41. Cf. SCHAPS (2004) for an argument that the monetization of the Greek world provided the preconditions for the conceptual equation of wealth with money.

¹⁸⁵ E.g. Aristoph. *Wasps* 655-60. KALLET (2007).

¹⁸⁶ KALLET (2007); GOLDHILL (1991) for an argument that the commercial imagery reveals the perversions of political exchange; VON REDEN (1995a), 132-5 for an understanding of the market imagery as a parody on the interconnectedness of market exchange and politics. Cf. MOLLER (2007), 371-3 on the *agora*.

audience that is capable of understanding the equation “money = power”:¹⁸⁷ “money both fuels the polis and becomes the engine of its destruction.”¹⁸⁸ Aristotle expresses ethical concern about what money does to one’s mentality, as it facilitates an unlimited desire for wealth.¹⁸⁹ People living in 5th- and 4th- century Athens had a form of economic rationality: they were calculating citizens living in a complex economy that was much reflected upon. The phenomena of money, trade, credit, pay and calculation were closely associated and represented an economic cluster of ideas and norms, of a way of dealing with resources and the people controlling those resources.

The *agora* was imagined to have a rationality of its own and to impose its own norms:¹⁹⁰ it was the place of weighing and calculating,¹⁹¹ bargaining,¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ KALLET-MARX (1993), (1994).

¹⁸⁸ KALLET (2007), 71.

¹⁸⁹ E.g. Ar. *Pol.* 1256b40; Aristoph. *Plut.* 189-97: whereas of everything else (sex, food, honor, etc.) there is satiety, of money we always want more. Cf. Hdt. 1.187: Darius “insatiable desire for money” makes him reopen a tomb; Xen. *Por.* IV.6-7: of silver nobody can ever have enough.

¹⁹⁰ E.g. Aristotle’s low opinion of the “market mob” (ἀγοραῖος ὄχλος) (Ar. *Pol.* 1328b40). See MILLETT (1998) on the mixing of activities and persons in the space of the *agora*: the *agora* is the place where “individuals gather (...) to get information (official or otherwise), gather a crowd, gamble, torture a slave, get hired as laborers, bid for contracts, accost a prostitute, seek asylum, have a haircut, beg for money or food, fetch water, watch a cock-fight and find out the time. (...) And going on all around was the business of buying and selling.” (215, with references in n.25). Von Reden adopts STALLYBRASS AND WHITE’s notion of the market place as a ‘hybrid place’, arguing that the commercial aspect of the Athenian *agora* was subordinated to its function as a centre of civic exchange. Commerce on the *agora* was firmly imbedded in political life. STALLYBRASS & WHITE (1986), 27; VON REDEN (1995a), 105-123. MÖLLER (2008), 371: “Neither spatial nor linguistic boundaries separated commercial from political activities.” On the symbolic value of the market as a locus of decision-making (“the marketplace of ideas”), see SLUITER (2011). The Athenian *agora* was not a periodic market (cash crop market) serving the needs of a subsistence economy, but a permanent market functioning in a society of specialization. HARRIS (2002). By the 4th century, agricultural products were increasingly being raised for cash sale. The phenomenon of *leitourgia* forced the wealthy land owner to raise large amounts of cash, which made them dependent on selling agricultural produce in town markets. Their political status depended on cash income. Cf. OSBORNE (1991). See BOHANNAN & DALTON (1962), 1-20 for an argument that the principle of market exchange is to be distinguished from the market place; the market principle (defined by the rules of supply-and-demand) can exist independent of the physical market place. See MILLETT (1998) and VON REDEN (1995a), 105-26 on the blending of commercial activity with political activities on the *agora*. Cf. the reactions of Plato and Aristotle on this blending: restricting commercial interactions on the *agora* (Pl. *Leg.* 849b-50a) or dissociating commerce from politics by creating two separate *agoras* (Ar. *Pol.* 1131a30-b14).

¹⁹¹ On the *metronomoi* (market officials), CAMP (1986), 122-6; STANLEY (1976), 36-45. See FINLEY (1985b) 110-11, 116-7 for the influential view that the average Athenian lacked bookkeeping

trickery¹⁹³ and fast information (how's the price of grain?).¹⁹⁴ In a market situation, overt pursuit of self-interest is not only accepted, but normative:¹⁹⁵ giving something away for free is considered stupid¹⁹⁶—mentality that could be constructed as hostile in other areas of life.¹⁹⁷

The ubiquity of money in society was also a controversial and contested issue. It could be questioned whether the market was a suitable metaphor for political administration (as parodied in the *Acharnians*), by insisting that politics is not the same as accountancy,¹⁹⁸ or by ridiculing a Persian king for running the Empire like a shop.¹⁹⁹ Another link that was readily available in the Greek mind was between money and commodification, i.e. approaching objects as things that can be exchanged in a single transaction (the Greek term *χρήματα* refers to both money and commodities).²⁰⁰ The question what items could be treated as a

methods (e.g. double-entry bookkeeping) and skills to compare the profitability of different enterprises. Cf. STE. CROIX (1956). MACVE (1985), 257-8 argues that double-entry bookkeeping is not the only way of calculating profit. Cf. Dem. 36.11. Cf. FARAGUNA (1994), 567-72 for the use of accounts and the importance of ἀκριβεία in being a good οἰκονόμος, estate manager.

¹⁹² Cf. the bargaining scenes in Aristophanes' comedies: e.g. *Pax* 1197-1264, *Ach.* 867-958.

¹⁹³ Cf. the trick of placing ripe figs on top of a basket to mask the bad ones: Alexis PCG 133.

¹⁹⁴ E.g. Aristoph. *Ach.* 758-9; Theophr. *Char.* 4.15. Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 917b-c. HARRIS (2002), 76-7 on price fluctuations on the agora. [LEWIS \(1996\), 13-19 on the agora as "the public appearance par excellence" where information is most visibly circulated.](#)

¹⁹⁵ VAN WEES (1998), 19-20. See MORRIS (2002) for a useful survey of different approaches (liberal humanism, new humanities, economics, sociology, new institutional economics) to the ancient concept of κέρδος, "gain, profit, advantage, desire for gain".

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Hdt. III.140.1: Syloson resents his own stupidity for giving away a beautiful cloak, regarding the gift as a "loss" (cf. Chapter Two Section 3); Xen. *Mem.* I.vi.11-12: Antiphon regards Socrates' conversations with young Athenians as "free gifts", indicative for his market irrationality. Cf. Chapter Four Section 1. On the ideology of "business" that propagates norms to seek "value for money" and ridicule the "sucker" who pays over or undercharges, see DAVIS (1992), 7-8, 56-8. Cf. POLANYI (1968), 69, VAN WEES (1998), 19-20.

¹⁹⁷ E.g. Aristoph. *Ach.* 28ff.: Dicaeopolis loathes the Athenian market where everybody shouts and praises his commodities for sale and wishes to be back home where they have never heard the words "for sale". HARRIS (2002), 76: "An Athenian might think about politics in the Assembly, cultivate friendships in the gymnasia and at symposia, and at home try to avoid quarrels with family and neighbours. But when he set foot in the agora, the main thing he thought about was *kerdos*, getting a bargain."

¹⁹⁸ Dem. 18.227-9 with CUOMO (2001), 23 and YUNIS (2001), 236.

¹⁹⁹ Hdt. III.89: Darius as a κάπηλος. See also Chapter Two Section 3.

²⁰⁰ Commodities are commonly defined as entities that have use value and that can be exchanged in a "discrete transaction" (i.e.) for a counterpart that has, in the immediate context, an equivalent value. Discrete transactions have as their primary and immediate purpose to obtain the counterpart value; in contrast, "partial transactions" can only be understood in the context of a long-chain of transactions (favors, gifts), containing reference to the relationship between

commodity (Labor? Education? Sex?) was subject to discursive negotiation;²⁰¹ popular discourse reflected on questions such as: “is *everything* for sale?”,²⁰² “can we value art, physical health, patriotism, and love in the same way as we can value shoes and cheese?”²⁰³ On a more metaphysical level, questions were raised to what extent money as a measure is capable of quantifying everything.²⁰⁴

On a political level, market transactions and the use of coin money could be associated with egalitarianism and an affirmation of the polis as an authority;²⁰⁵ market-transactions could be framed as deceit,²⁰⁶ coinage as counterfeit metal (a hostile framing of its fiduciarity).²⁰⁷ Fiduciarity was also dealt with in metaphysical questions about the nature of value: how does conventional value work?²⁰⁸ What is the value of money if one can starve amidst one’s gold like King Midas?²⁰⁹

the exchange partners. APPADURAI (1986), 3-16 and KOPYTOFF (1986), 68 for this definition of commodity; KOPYTOFF (1986), 69 for the terminology of “discrete” and “partial” transactions

²⁰¹ The conservative reactions of Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle on the sophistic movement reflect this question. See Chapters Three and Four.

²⁰² E.g. Ar.*Pax* 375: eternal bliss costs three drachmas; Aesch. Ag. 437: Ares is a trader (χρυσάμοιβός) of lifes. Eur. HF 643-8: youth is not for sale. Eur. fr. 527: virtue cannot be bought. Cf. Eur. El. 253, 372.

²⁰³ E.g. Aristoph. *Frogs* 1368-1410. Cf. VON REDEN (1995), 114 on this scene. On money as a universal means, see SEAFORD (2004), 162-5.

²⁰⁴ E.g. Ar. NE IX.i. (1164a1-2). Cf. Aristoph. *Pax* 1201. See Chapter Three on Aristotle’s account of commensurability; SEAFORD (2004), 283-291 for an interpretation of Protagoras Man/Measure-statement as informed by monetization. Cf. CARRUTHERS & ESPELAND (1998), 1400: money “commensurates incommensurabilities”; MARX (1844), 110: “makes impossibilities fraternize.”

²⁰⁵ Which is the gist of KURKE (1989), (1999) and (2002).

²⁰⁶ E.g. Hdt. 1.153.1 where the Greek *agora* is misrepresented by the Persian king Cyrus as the scene of double-dealing; cf. the Scythian Anarchasis who defines the agora as the place for τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀπατᾶν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν (D.L. I.105) Xen. *Mem.* III.vii.6 were κάπηλοι are represented as suspicious deceitful individuals who buy cheap and sell dear. Cf. the new ἀγαθοί who deceive each other in Thgn. 59-60. See KURKE (1989) for an argument that they are not only to be identified with κάπηλοι (trade as mutual cheating), but more specifically with users of money; in Thgn. 183-92, the “new” circulation of women (cross-class marriages) is compared to the circulation of coins, as opposed to the closed system of aristocratic gift-exchange. Cf. MOLLER (2007). KURKE (2002) understands the association of coinage with καπηλεία (petty huckstering), deceit and profit as a hostile misrepresentation by an elitist tradition. The cluster of associations recurs in Anacreon fr. 358 (PMG). Cf. KURKE (1999), 187-91.

²⁰⁷ KURKE (1995), (1999), 41-100, (2009).

²⁰⁸ E.g. Ar. NE 1133ab: as coinage (νόμισμα) has value not by nature but by convention (νόμος), it is in our power to make it useless. Cf. MM 1194a. Pl. *Rep.* 371b: coinage as a “symbol” for the sake of exchange; [Pl.] *Eryx.* 399e-400c: the currency of one society is useless in another. Cf. Hdt. 3.23: Ethiopians value bronze above gold; Plut. *Lys.* 17.1: The Spartans make iron deliberately useless and use it money because it has no value elsewhere; D.L. 6.20-21, 71: Diogenes the Cynic

It is within this larger cultural discussion about money that statements and problematizations of *φιλία* can be better understood. The statement that money is the measure of all things occurs in a philosophical treatment of friendship.²¹⁰ The theme of the counterfeit friend touches on thinking about fiduciarity.²¹¹ The idea that avarice and *φιλία* are incompatible²¹² is related to both the concern that money has no limit and the norm that friends need to constrain their greed in order to share it with others. The idea that friends can be bought reflects the norm that you can make friends by means of assistance that will have a pay-off as it will be reciprocated. The idea of selling friends is a shorthand for neglecting a friendship by not reciprocating a good turn.

At first sight, the theme of friendship might seem to be a marginal phenomenon of limited importance for an understanding of ancient conceptions of money, trade and economics. In the light of the larger discussions about the ancient economy,²¹³ Greek reflections about the nature of reciprocity and conceptions about the differences or similarities between *φιλία*-reciprocity and market exchange can tell us something about some of the preconditions that enabled the Greeks to increasingly articulate a realm of disembedded market exchanges. Regardless of the question whether these exchanges were ever *really* disembedded, by comparing market exchanges with

defaces the currency because he gave no authority to convention as to natural law. Dem. 24.212-4: law is like currency and the man who debases law must be punished, as civic law must remain purely silver. See SEAFORD (2004), 136-146 on Greek thinking about fiduciarity; KURKE (1999), 299-331 on money as civic image.

²⁰⁹ E.g. Ar. *Pol.* 1257ab.

²¹⁰ See Chapter Three.

²¹¹ See SEAFORD (1998) on the tragic metaphors of the *χαρακτήρ* (the inscribed mark) and the *κίβδηλος φίλος* (the counterfeit friend); KURKE (2009) on the *χρησμός κίβδηλος* (the counterfeit oracle) in Herodotus. Cf. Xen. *Oec.* 19.16 (on the quality of flute-players), 10.3 (*ἀργύριον κίβδηλον* as one of the instruments of trickery to make one appear to be *ἀξιοφίλητος*, worthy of *φιλία*); Eur. *El.* 572 (the *χαρακτήρ* of the stranger who turns out to be Orestes). Falsely stamped coin is a moral image at Aesch. *Ag.* 780. The image of the *κίβδηλος φίλος* occurs as early as Theognis, e.g. 117-124. It is contested whether the image in Theognis already refers to counterfeit coinage (VAN GRONINGEN (1966), 50-51, HANGARD (1963), 62-6; LEVINE (1984), 128-33); see KURKE (1999), 54-5 and (2009) for an argument that the line of thought and other images reveal that the implicit image is that of coinage and not simply about corrupted metallic alloy. On the *κίβδηλος*-metaphor in general, see HANGARD (1963), ALESSANDRI (1998).

²¹² E.g. Pl. *Gorg.* 508a.

²¹³ See the overviews offered in SCHAPS (2004), 18-26, ENGEN (2010), 20-35, ANDREAU (2002).

φιλία-bonds, the Greek not only experimented with different conceptualizations of friendship; they also experimented with the idea of disembedded economics. They were in a process of effectuating a conceptual divide between different types of reciprocity.

4. RECIPROCITY

4.1. Definitions and types of reciprocity

The conceptual domain of φιλία and the domain of commerce meet (and conflict) in the concept of **reciprocity**.²¹⁴ The anthropological concept of reciprocity has been criticized for being too vague and general,²¹⁵ or for being too specific and not cross-culturally applicable.²¹⁶ To begin with the last objection: one might add the problem that there is no precise Greek equivalent to the concept of reciprocity apart from some non-specific idea of trading, swapping, of mutuality (ἀλληλο-compounds), and of giving things in exchange for (ἀντί + genitive case) other things. Still, the use of the term reciprocity is justifiable for analytical purposes.²¹⁷ The term helps us denominating something

²¹⁴ This is a potentially controversial approach to the relation between reciprocity and commerce. Classic economic anthropology follows the work of POLANYI (1944) in defining market exchange and reciprocity as two distinct, exclusive and conflicting categories of modes of allocation (with redistribution as a third category). Cf. DURKHEIM (1933), MAUSS (1925). I use “reciprocity” as a more generic term than both market exchange (commerce) and φιλία—thereby following SAHLINS (1965) and GOULDNER (1960) in approaching reciprocity as a continuum covering a range of exchange types determined by social distance. See below. A risk of my generic approach to reciprocity, making it cover the entire range between market reciprocity and reciprocity in kin relations, is an overmuch emphasis on dyadic exchange relations at the expense of redistribution as a distinct mode of exchange. See BAEHRE (2011) for a criticism on academic debates concerning economic transformation that are overly preoccupied with the tension between the sociality of markets and non-market reciprocity, neglecting the social effects of large-scale redistribution.

²¹⁵ E.g. MACCORMACK (1976), 10, PARRY (1986), 466.

²¹⁶ E.g. DAVIS (1992), 29.

²¹⁷ In anthropological terms: “reciprocity” is not an emic concept (i.e. a phenomenon emerging from an insiders’ perspective, used by insiders to communicate with other insiders) but an etic category (a scholarly definition, a new construct formulated in a language different from the insider’s or a native’s point of view, used by scholars in order to communicate with other scholars). On the emic/etic distinction in the social sciences, see HARRIS (1976). On the need for etic definitions and categories, see SNOEK (1987); on the anthropologist’s task to articulate emic concepts in connection with etic experience-distance concepts of scholarship, see GEERTZ (1976).

that the Greeks themselves did recognize and talk about, but without denominating the concept with one single term:²¹⁸ the give-and-take structure that market transactions and exchanges in the context of *φιλία* had in common. Both types of exchange had a common ground—they were potentially isomorphous—and the Greek recognized this isomorphism (as we will see in Chapter One). The term reciprocity provides us with descriptive meta-language that makes it easier to analyze phenomena that the Greeks were preoccupied with.

Reciprocity can be defined and classified in many different ways.²¹⁹ There is a tendency, for good reasons, to restrict the use of “reciprocity” to those exchanges that are conceptualized as the performance and requital of gratuitous actions.²²⁰ However, in this book, the term “reciprocity” will be used in its widest possible sense as a synonym for exchange of any kind.²²¹ Critics may object that this use makes the concept too general: “[T]he description of all types of exchange as reciprocal easily leads to an obscuring of the significant differences between them.”²²² This is, however, exactly the point, for it is the differences that are at stake, negotiated, denied and created in Classical Athens. Thinkers such as Socrates and Aristotle, but also popular discourse as we see reflected in oratory and drama, were articulating conceptions of the relatively new phenomenon of the market, were negotiating and revising existing conceptions of *φιλία*, and were developing ideas about the demarcation of different types of reciprocal exchange. By using “reciprocity” as a broad generic

Both are followed by BLOK (2002), NAEREBOUT (e.g. 2006) and VERSNEL (1991) who apply the etic/emic distinction to some of the core issues in ancient history of mentality.

²¹⁸ Our term “reciprocity” is a neolatin translation of the Aristotelian neologism *ἀντιπεπονθός*, that started with Guilielmo du Val (1629) who renders it as *perpassio mutua et reciproca*. Initially, the term was translated with the calque *contrapassum* (Robert Grosseteste), *repassio*, *retaliatio* (Feliciano, Averroès). Cf. THEOCARAKIS (2008), KAYE (1998).

²¹⁹ For a useful overview of the vast amount of literature on this topic, see VAN WEES (1998); for a lucid account of the history of scholarship on reciprocity, see WAGNER-HASEL (2003). Often the term “reciprocity” is used in a more restricted sense as the performance and requital of gratuitous action.

²²⁰ E.g. VAN WEES (1998), 20; cf. PITT-RIVERS (1992). See also n.214 above.

²²¹ Cf. LEACH (1982), 150: “All person-to-person relationships entail reciprocity”, 152: “reciprocity is implicit in the very idea of a relationship.”

²²² MACCORMACK (1976), 101; cf. DAVIS (1992), 10-11; VAN WEES (1998), 15-20.

term, we can do justice to the fact that in Classical Athens the distinct modes of exchange were not fixed constructs yet and did have a common ground.

Hence, the term reciprocity as I will use it covers both “positive” and “negative” kinds of exchange, i.e. both the exchange of gifts or favors (*quid pro quo*) and the exchange of injuries (*tit for tat*, an eye for an eye) that is revenge.²²³ The reason why both positive and negative exchange are relevant is that we are discussing the ways in which exchange is presented and perceived. The problem with market exchange is that its conceptualization and valuation is contested and varying depending on the context. Sometimes a market transaction can be seen as a positive exchange as both partners get out of it what they need. Sometimes a market transaction is framed as a negative exchange (“daylight robbery”): traders deceive each other and they want to get out of the exchange as much as possible.²²⁴

Moreover, the term reciprocity will cover both “balanced” exchanges that overtly aim at instantaneous equivalence, as well as “generalized” forms of reciprocity where there is a time lapse between gift and counter-gift, favour and return.²²⁵ Market exchange as *we* know it is a form of “balanced reciprocity”: people standing in no prior relationship meet in a peaceful or legally regulated

²²³ Moreover, in Greek conception, both positive and negative reciprocity could be expressed in terminology of “giving back” (ἀποδίδωμι) and “paying back” (ἀποτίνομαι). Cf. BLUNDELL (1989), 29, 37. E.g. Democr. DK 93: χαρίζομενος προσκείμετο τὸν λαμβάνοντα, μὴ κακὸν ἀντ’ ἀγαθοῦ κίβδηλος ἐὼν ἀποδῶι. “When you do a favor, study the recipient first, in case he prove a scoundrel and repay evil for good.”

²²⁴ SAHLINS (1972), 195: “[Negative reciprocity is] the attempt to get something for nothing with impunity (...). The participants [overtly] confront each other as opposed interests, each looking to maximize utility at the other’s expense.” But VAN WEES (1998), 24: “[I]t is necessary to distinguish to kinds of negative reciprocity: in the first, it is the attitude of the participants which is negative, insofar as they are openly ‘selfish’ and mean’ with positively valued objects of exchange; in the second, it is the objects of exchange, the insults and injuries traded, which are negatively valued.” VAN WEES’ distinction makes sense. However, in Greek conceptualization this distinction is often not made: not only do aristocratic sources frame retail trade as deceit and robbery, also the terminology of “paying” originates from negative retributive contexts.

²²⁵ SAHLINS (1972) poses a “spectrum of reciprocities” based on different degrees of social distance (196-204): all forms of exchange are reciprocal, but the looser the bonds between the exchanging partners become, the less generously or voluntarily equivalence is calculated. The spectrum ranges from the pure gift in “generalized reciprocity” (putatively altruistic, no overt expectation of direct material return), to “balanced reciprocity” (returns of commensurate worth or utility are stipulated) to “negative reciprocity” (the attempt to get something for nothing).

sphere and expect to exchange equivalent values. This is distinct from theft, plunder and barter where anything goes because the partners are not tied by any moral or legal framework.²²⁶ To the Greeks, the status of market exchange was not yet firmly established: depending on whether the legal or political framework provided by polis laws and market institutions was acknowledged, market transactions could be conceptualised as neutral or negative.²²⁷ Something similar goes for the conceptualisation of *φιλία*-reciprocity. At its extreme (parents and children), it could be imagined as selfless and generalized. However, the development of credit mechanisms enabled the Greeks to analyze these relations as balanced transactions: in some conceptions the parents' selfless gift of life and sustenance turns into a balanced loan.²²⁸

The term "reciprocity" also covers both "formal" exchanges, i.e. exchanges according to a set of definite rights and duties (e.g. laws), and "personal" exchanges, i.e. exchanges that are regulated by personal status and relations.²²⁹ Whereas one would expect to find such a distinction between formalized and personalized reciprocal obligations in any society, the concept of "obligation" and "norm" (the "ought" in "one ought to respect one's parents") is itself under construction and negotiation in our Greek sources. Whereas Aristotle distinguishes between reciprocities that are "legal" (i.e. with the backup of legal sanctions) and "character-based" (being a matter of character and morality), we also find a tendency to represent what we would call personal obligations as legal prescriptions: reciprocating good treatment by *φίλοι* is imagined to be an Unwritten Divine Law.²³⁰ Moreover, failure to perform one's filial obligation to take care of one's parents is a formally recognized crime in Athenian legislation.²³¹

²²⁶ On the problematic concept of barter, see n.149 above (cf. n.139, 150, 152).

²²⁷ KURKE (2002), (1999).

²²⁸ See Chapter Two Section 2; Chapter Three Section 2. Whereas modern classifications of reciprocity tend to use (overt) intentions as a criterion, the Greeks of the Classical Period reflected upon (and questioned) the sincerity and reality of these intentions.

²²⁹ GOULDNER (1960), 170, 175 distinguishes along the same lines between "specific and complementary" duties and "generalized and indeterminate" ones.

²³⁰ Xen. *Mem.* IV.iv.24.

²³¹ E.g. Arist. *Ath.Pol.* LV.3; RHODES (1981) *ad loc.*. Cf. DL 1.55; Andoc. 1.74. Cf. GLOTZ (1904) for legal details.

Hence, we see that in Classical Athens (as, arguably, in any culture) the boundaries between different types of exchange and reciprocity are open to debate and context-dependent: the terminology of “generalized”, “balanced”, “positive” and “negative” reciprocity are essentially question-begging. For purposes of analysis, the distinctions that will be used to refer to different types of relations described in texts are (i) between long-term and short-term exchanges and (ii) between embedded and disembedded exchanges.

4.2. Long-term vs. short-term

The distinction between long-term and short-term (instantaneous) exchanges, of course, often remains a category projected by us on the source material. Ancient discussions of *φιλία* or market exchange do not always explicitly designate the reciprocity at hand as a long- or short-term encounter. However, the use of this category is justifiable because it refers to an overtly visible characteristic of an exchange: are objects simultaneously exchanged or is there a time lapse between the two allocations?²³²

The long/short nature of a particular exchange interacts with what in anthropological literature has been identified as two “transactional orders”.²³³ Many societies distinguish between two related but separate orders: some exchanges (e.g. marriage, sacrifice, agriculture) are imagined to contribute to the reproduction of the supra-individual “long-term” social, political or religious order;²³⁴ other exchanges serve the pursuit of short-term individual self-interest. The relation between the two orders is not necessarily one of opposition. Whereas the long-term order is always valued positively, exchanges belonging to the short-term order are morally underdetermined; pursuit of self-interest is often socially accepted, unless it is felt to violate and interfere with the reproduction of the long-term order. Moral conflict arises when individuals are perceived to divert the resources of the long-term order for their short-term

²³² See Chapter Two Section 3 for the role of time in the opposition between commerce and *φιλία*.

²³³ PARRY & BLOCH (1989), 24, applied by KURKE (1999), 6, 15, VON REDEN (1995a), 6-7, SEAFORD (2004), 95.

²³⁴ Reciprocity in its restricted sense is often treated as a subcategory of “reproduction”, i.e. all transactions aimed at reproducing the structure of a group or community over time. E.g. WEINER (1980), GREGORY (1982), 29-35.

interest (prostituting yourself to collect yourself a dowry!)²³⁵ or when there is no consensus over what counts as the long-term order (the polis?).²³⁶

φιλία-bonds and χάρις-exchanges typically belong to the long-term order of things. The breakdown of φιλία-ties is treated as symptomatic for social and religious disintegration in general,²³⁷ respect for φίλοι is on a par with reverence for gods,²³⁸ and the Charites have an altar in a location that is of symbolic significance for the life in the polis.²³⁹ Market-exchanges belong to the short-term order (they are imagined to aim at the overt pursuit of self-interest) and their valuation is ambiguous. When market trade is framed as deceit, individuals are represented to abuse the long-term order. Moreover, there are several sources that contrast long-term φιλία-obligations with one-off transactions between strangers. However, Aristotle offers an interesting alternative conception of retail trade, as he understands the exchange between shoemaker and builder to be an instance of πολιτική φιλία, “friendship of the polis”.²⁴⁰ Friendships of the polis are, in Aristotle’s system, all those ties that underwrite the aims of the polis (living, living together, living the good life).²⁴¹ Retail trade serves to complement the individual’s lack of autarky and enables a society to operate on division of labor and specialization. On an individual level, market transactions are short-lived and ephemeral. On a systemic level, they have a cohesive force for society as a whole and they underwrite the aims of the long-term transactional order. Hence, to Aristotle these short-term transactions are instances of φιλία, as opposed to commercial exchanges between partners from different communities.²⁴²

²³⁵ Hdt. I.93-94.2 on the daughters of the Lydians, with KURKE (1999), 169-171.

²³⁶ See e.g. KURKE (2002) and (1999) for an argument that 5th-century literary representations of coinage reflect a conflict between “elitist” positions (that denies the authority of the public sphere represented by the agora) and “middling” positions over what constitutes the long- and short-term transactional orders. Cf. MORRIS (1994); VON REDEN (1995a), 2-3, 96-7; SEAFORD (2004), 95 for a different application.

²³⁷ E.g. Thgn. 1.1135-55 (with LEVINE (1985), 193); Hes. *W&D* 190 (with WEST (1978), *ad loc.*).

²³⁸ Is. 1.16.

²³⁹ Ar. *NE* V (1133a3-5).

²⁴⁰ Ar. *NE* IX.1 (1163b22-64a2); *NE* V.5 (1132b30); *EE* VII.10 (1242a7-9; 42b22-27; 42b31-7).

²⁴¹ Ar. *Pol.* III.9 (1280a25-31; a31-33; a33-b5).

²⁴² Ar. *Pol.* III.9 (1280a33-b11). Cf. COOPER (1990), 229; IRRERA (2005), 581. Exchanges outside the context of the polis are mere alliances (συμμαχία); friendship of the polis are governed by a common system of court and magistrates, with laws (νόμοι) that are more than just a treaty

4.3. Gifts vs. Commodities

The distinction between two transactional orders is related to the distinction between an embedded and a disembedded sphere of economy.²⁴³ Embedded exchanges occur in the context of pre-existing relations or aim at establishing relations (e.g. with φίλοι) whereas in disembedded exchanges both partners overtly agree to be each aiming at providing for one's own material wants.

This distinction is often symbolized by the distinction between commodities and gifts. Commodities are commonly defined as alienable objects exchanged between two exchange partners in a state of mutual independence;²⁴⁴ they have use value and can be exchanged in a discrete transaction for a counterpart that has, in the immediate context, an equivalent value.²⁴⁵ Gifts, on the other hand, are often seen as inalienable things exchanged between two reciprocally dependent transactors;²⁴⁶ a gift exchange is "partial", in the sense that it can only be understood in the context of the "entire transaction", i.e. the long-term chain of favors and obligations, containing reference to the relationship between the

(συνθήκη), but that are concerned with the moral quality of citizens. I concur with COOPER (1990) in this, *pace* SCHOFIELD (1998) who makes political friendships too contingent by conflating them to economic relations. However, I do believe that this "moral concern" needs to be qualified in that it needs to be internalized to the same extent in every citizen. I follow IRRERA (2005) in this.

²⁴³ The terminology derives from POLANYI (1968), 7: "Man's economy is, as a rule, submerged in his social relationships." 148: "The human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic." But see. the caveat of DAVIS (1992), 7: "[E]mbeddedness is (...) to one degree or another (...) a universal characteristic of exchange." Polanyi mainly applies the terminology for purposes of typology: "embedded" qualifies the entire economy of a society. Cf. SEAFORD (1998), 3: "In noting this polarity we are of course using abstract models. In reality commercial exchange and reciprocity may combine in various ways, so that it may not always be possible to say whether a transaction is one or the other." POLANYI (1968) occasionally acknowledges that different modes of exchange may co-exist in the same single society (149, 156); MAUSS (1925), 54, 68 is unduly evolutionist. ZELIZER (1994), (1998) makes the important observation that modern money often too is socially embedded and special purpose; cf. MELITZ (1970) for a similar criticism on the Polanyist paradigm.

²⁴⁴ MARX (1976 [1867]), 178. Cf. GREGORY (1982), 12.

²⁴⁵ Cf. KOPYTOFF (1986), 68.

²⁴⁶ MAUSS (1954 [1925]), 8-10: the gift is ultimately inalienable and inseparable from the person of the donor; LÉVI-STRAUSS (1969 [1949]); GREGORY (1982), 121: the gift "refers to the *personal relations* between people that the exchange of things in certain social contexts creates."

transactors.²⁴⁷ Commodity exchange is all about the relation between objects; gift exchange about the relation between subjects.²⁴⁸

However, the boundaries between commodities and gifts need not be fixed. In some societies, as was also the case in Classical Athens, the same object could be understood as a commodity in some contexts, and as a gift in others. Secondly, the same object could overtly be presented as a gift while covertly be understood as an alienable commodity with a calculable value.²⁴⁹ Moreover, the monetization of Athenian culture caused a drift towards commodification. The repertory of objects that could be exchanged as a commodity (i.e. in a disembedded context) was expanding, while at the same time causing discussion about the limits of commodification.²⁵⁰ can life be a commodity? Wisdom? Art?

Hence, commodities and gifts are better not approached in an overly positivist way,²⁵¹ but rather as cultural constructs: the distinction between them lies in the **mode of exchange**, the conditions under which an item is understood and presented to be exchanged.²⁵² If the exchange is presented to be embedded,

²⁴⁷ KOPYTOFF (1986), 69 for the terminology of “discrete” and “partial” transactions.

²⁴⁸ On a more systemic level, the terms “gift” and “commodity” are often used to refer to the organization of societies. In “commodity oriented economies” people experience their interest in commodities as a desire to accumulate goods; a “gift economy” revolves around a desire to expand social relations, being “a shorthand for describing a relationship between production and consumption in which consumptive production shapes people’s motivations and the form in which they recognize productive activities”. STRATHERN (1990), 143-4. Cf. GREGORY (1982), 41.

²⁴⁹ MITCHELL (1997), 19-20 on the “latent object value” of gifts. Cf. BOURDIEU (1977), 177: “[P]ractice never ceases to conform to economic calculation even when it gives every appearance of disinterestedness by departing from the logic of interested calculation (in the narrow sense) and playing for stakes that are non-material and not easily quantified.”

²⁵⁰ HOCHSCHILD (2004) introduced the idea of a “market frontier”: on one side of the frontier goods and services are available for sale or rent; things on the other side circulate as gifts. The frontier can move forward and sometimes back

²⁵¹ Of course, as in any society, in Classical Athens too there are boundaries to the repertory of objects that can be exchanged as a commodity. These boundaries are best conceptualized in terms of the “commodity candidacy” of a thing, i.e. the exchangeability of things in a particular social and historical context defined by symbolic, moral and classificatory standards and criteria. See APPADURAI (1986), 13.

²⁵² BOURDIEU (1990 [1980]), 126: “The ‘way of giving’, the manner, the forms, are what separate a gift from straight exchange, moral obligation from economic obligation.” Cf. APPADURAI (1986), 3-16, for the argument that the distinction between gift and commodity lies in a distinction in modes of exchange. This model allows for the same thing to be both gift and commodity, its meaning shifting with the ideology attached to the situation of exchange. For a similar point,

for instance because the transactors sense that there will be social or political repercussions, the allocation may be a gift; if the exchange is felt to be free of consequences, with transactors who both openly aim at providing for their own material wants, the allocation is disembodied commodity exchange. Hence, deciding whether an item is to be understood as a commodity or a gift is a discursive and potentially ideological process.²⁵³ A poet such as Pindar may resent an understanding of his poems as commodities or commission work by emphatically representing his work as gifts with cultural value that is irreducible to commercial value. A teacher such as Antiphon may be in favor of understanding his teachings in political skills as a market commodity because it would enhance dissemination of knowledge and power beyond the barriers of aristocracy. These, and more, are the questions that are at stake in our sources where the commodity-status of virtue, wisdom, sex and art are negotiated.

5. PLAN OF THIS BOOK

Being a good friend and maintaining *φιλία*-bonds according to the social norms of reciprocity is, of course, lived practice. Being a competent participant in the economic life of the polis is so too. In Classical Athens, the capacity to observe the obligations of reciprocity in a socially acceptable way was believed to be indicative of one's social competences at large: it is shameful not to have friends and one is easily victimized.²⁵⁴ As a proper dealing with one's *φίλοι* belongs to the core skills of social life, there are always normative stakes in talk about *φιλία*, however implicit those may be.

Hence, Classical Greek thought about reciprocity in *φιλία* and on the market occurs on various levels of analysis. In this book, two levels of analysis will be discussed. Part I, the Analysis of Exchange, scrutinizes the social rules of

see KOPYTOFF (1986), 64.

²⁵³ Here, and in the rest of this book, I use "ideology" and "ideological" as referring to a "set of principles that delimits the boundaries of values and integrity and informs the patterns of behavior of most people within a society, and which is an ever-evolving and complex matrix of ideas and beliefs which grows out of a society's experience and is coloured by its history." MITCHELL (1997), 179. Cf. OBER (1989), 38-40, GOLDHILL (1990), 97.

²⁵⁴ Is. 1.24; Ar. *Rhet.* 1373a5.

reciprocity as reflected, implicitly and explicitly, in different types of sources. Rules of reciprocity only come to be expressed in situations where they have, somehow, lost their self-evident appeal: i.e. in situations of isomorphism between types of exchange that under normal circumstances were experienced as irreducibly distinct. Part II, the Morality of Exchange, offers analyses of the way the social rules of reciprocity are embedded in larger ethical concerns, such as the status of wisdom (against the backdrop of the sophists' monetization of education) and the morality of sexuality (against the backdrop of prostitution, the monetization of sex).²⁵⁵

Reflection on reciprocity occurs in different forms and scopes: sometimes reflection is contained in isolated linguistic expressions: a maxim, a joke in comedy, an exclamation of despair in tragedy, a reproach in a speech. Sometimes reflection is offered in more sustained discussion, ranging from small (a vignette, a strophe from a poem, a short dialogue or a chapter in a philosophical treatise) to larger compositional units (a book, a work, an ethical system). We will deal with these different scales and scopes, ranging from short relatively self-contained linguistic expressions (in Chapters One and Two) that reflect an available but often largely implicit **folk social theory**, to somewhat larger compositional units (Chapter Five on the Theodote episode in Xen. *Mem.* III.xi, Chapter Four on the second book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*), to longer sustained analyses of friendship that are systematically embedded in **ethical systems** (Chapter Three on Aristotle's philosophy of friendship).

A final remark should be made about the status and the nature of the source material used in this book. As with many studies on ancient history of mentality the views offered by the available literary sources have several biases: for one, they tend to represent views and debates that were prevalent in male-dominated and economically as well as culturally privileged circles.²⁵⁶ These

²⁵⁵ A level of analysis that is only discussed obliquely in this book but that is of great relevance for an understanding of conceptions of reciprocity is the politics of exchange. See also Chapter Two Section 6, Chapter Three Section 5, Chapter Five Section 6.

²⁵⁶ On *φιλία* and women, see FOXHALL (1998), 62-5. A woman's best *φιλία*-bonds are commonly those that are formed in her natal household; these bonds continue to exist and to be sustained in her husband's household. In addition, friendships with neighbors are also important and strong bonds. A woman's "best friend" was "unquestionably her adult son" (FOXHALL (1998), 65), a bond that, significantly, also served as a prototypical example of strong *φιλία*-bonds. See

sources can be expected to favor particular understandings of reciprocity in *φιλία* as well as on the market: they tend to be conservative in ideas about proper allocation of economic, social and cultural resources because they have an interest in reproducing existing structures. To see how this works, let us elaborate a bit on a well-known analogy between talk about social rules and talk about language rules. The analogy works on several levels

First of all, social **competence**, like linguistic competence, is typically practical knowledge: know-how about things that everybody knows how to handle, but only few can express in a knowing-*that*.²⁵⁷ Almost every native speaker of English is capable of forming intelligible sentences that meet with the criteria of the lexicon, of syntax, morphology and pragmatics etc. and of understanding whether a sentence is formulated in a felicitous way. However, the number of people who is capable of formulating the rules of grammar in an articulate and coherent manner is considerably smaller. Practical knowledge, or know-*how*, is a kind of tacit knowledge that manifests itself in competent behavior (analogous to linguistic competence) and hence is distinct from theoretical knowledge that manifests itself in the form of propositions (analogous to grammatical knowledge).

Secondly, just like the grammatical knowledge that we acquire at school is in essence prescriptive (it helps us see whether we are formulating a sentence that is “correct”), generalizing statements about *φιλία* and reciprocity are always, in one way or another, **normative**. Even seemingly neutral or self-evident statements such as “your mother is your best *φίλος*” serve to create, enhance and perpetuate consensus over the norm that one should care for one’s mother.

Thirdly, as one does not need to have theoretical knowledge to be a competent speaker of English, grammar rules usually only come in when

Chapter One Section 3 and Chapter Two Section 1. As to *φιλία* in marriage, marriage is predominantly represented as a homosocial institution (i.e. it solidifies bonds between men, see n.56 above). See MUELLER (2001) for a reading of Euripides’ *Medea* as a contestation of this understanding of marriage: Medea attempts to shape her *φιλία* with Jason as an “aristocratic” *φιλία*, i.e. as a reciprocal bond on equal terms (as opposed to the unequal *φιλία*-bonds that structure the *oikos*). The dichotomy between equal aristocratic *φιλία* and unequal *φιλία* within the *oikos* is potentially problematic because it seems to suggest that equality and inequality are points of departure instead of *results*: “equality” within *φιλία* is better seen as the result of competitive reciprocity. See Chapter Five.

²⁵⁷ On the notion of practical knowledge: BOURDIEU (1977), 27, GERRANS (2005),.

somebody is perceived to make a mistake: rules are only made explicit in contexts where competence is, for some reason, problematized. The same goes for social competence: most of the times, there is no need to talk about the norms we live by, as the very functioning of social norms is premised on their self-evident appeal: what goes without saying need not be said. Conversely, the fact that in the literature of 5th- and 4th-century Athens, the norm of reciprocity is so frequently propagated and repeated, reflects that the norms are not always felt to be self-evident.

Finally, grammar rules are a school teacher's tool to assess a pupil's competence, to control the norms of what counts as good English and to control the transmission of these norms. They are a vehicle for reproducing the standards of proper English and they are the basis for the teacher's authority. Similarly, social norms are always *someone's* norms. Aristotle's understanding of virtue as an activity to be shared in a selective circle of friends instead of a commodity for sale is an attempt to withdraw philosophy from the open market and to control its distribution by marginalizing the teachings by the sophists.

The core of the source material discussed in this book consists in the treatment of *φιλία* by Aristotle and Xenophon in his Socratic works. The justification for this choice lies in the fact that both Aristotle and Xenophon offer longer sustained and explicit analyses of the social workings of exchange. The ancient discussions about the norms of reciprocity that are best detectible for the modern eye are also the most explicit and sustained treatments of *φιλία* and of economic morality—and often also the most polarizing accounts. Both Xenophon and Aristotle have articulated ideas about friendship, market economy, commodification and value and both show persistent attempts to demarcate seemingly isomorphous exchanges from each other. This has a downside. We should not forget that both Aristotle and Xenophon are like grammar teachers: by articulating the rules, they attempt to control rather than merely reflect the norms of what counts as socially desirable behavior and what not. They have been influential, not only as very problematic sources on ancient Greek economy, but also in articulating conceptions of money and the market. They have also been influential for Western philosophical conceptions of

friendship. These two topics are not unrelated. Both Xenophon and Aristotle have been influential in conceptualizing the many ways in which people value the things they exchange and the people with whom they exchange.