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Interpreting particles in dead and living languages

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Translation of the Greek sentence from Plato's *Cratylus* 435b: Both convention and custom must contribute something towards the indication of our meaning when we speak. (Translation: Fowler, 1926)

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Interpreting particles in dead and living languages

A construction grammar approach to the
semantics of Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek *pou*

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Abbreviations

Abbreviation ²	Full form	Abbreviation	Full form
1	first person	LOC	locative
2	second person	LSJ	dictionary of Liddell et al. (1940)
3	third person	M	masculine
ACC	accusative	MED	middle
CL	clitic	N	neuter
CGN	corpus of spoken Dutch	NEG	negation
DAT	dative	NOM	nominative
DU	dual	OPT	optative
IMPF	imperfect	PASS	passive
RPRN	relative pronoun	PERF	perfect
ACT	active	PL	plural
AOR	aorist	PLUP	pluperfect
ART	article	PRS	present
CO	coordinator	PST	past
COMP	comparative	PTC	participle
CONJ	conjunction	PTCL	particle
F	feminine	REL	relative clause marker
FUT	future	RPRN	relative pronoun
GEN	genitive	SG	singular
IMP	imperative	SUBJ	subjunctive
IMPV	imperfective	VOC	vocative
INF	infinitive	WNT	Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal

² Most of these abbreviations follow the list provided by the *Framework for Descriptive Grammars*-project (Bernard Comrie, William Croft, Christian Lehmann, Dietmar Zaefferer).

Part I

Introduction and theoretical
background

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

“You shall know a word by the company it keeps.”

(Firth, 1957, 11)

1.1 Introduction

The study of meaning and disambiguation of poly-interpretable forms in a dead language is sometimes problematic. This is due on the one hand to the lack of native speakers and limited corpus data for a dead language and on the other hand to the fact that we still know little about the disambiguation of poly-interpretable words. As Riemer (2010, 227) formulates it:

In natural language[,] sentences [which are ambiguous because they contain polysemous items [EK]] do not typically create confusion. Why not is still a mystery. We do not yet know how humans succeed in picking the right senses of ambiguous words: the relevant psychological processes are simply not at all understood.

In order to give an empirically well founded description of the Ancient Greek poly-interpretable form $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ ‘somewhere/anywhere’, *modal particle*¹, a new approach to the study of poly-interpretable forms was developed and tested on the Dutch form

¹I will follow the convention as used within Classics to put a description of a form in italics and a translation between quotation marks. A more specific description of the modal function of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and *ergens* will be given later in the respective chapters on both particles.

ergens ‘somewhere/ anywhere’, *modal particle*. The treatment of the Ancient Greek particle in both grammars and translations shows that there are several ways in which the description of a poly-interpretable form in a dead language can be complicated.

First, quite different interpretations have been suggested for modal *που*, both in specific examples and in more general descriptions. However, it is not evident which one(s) is (are) right because there would be good arguments for several of the interpretations that are offered. Second, it is sometimes difficult to decide which of the different types of meanings of *που* (i.e. locative or modal) is relevant for a specific example.

As we will see in section 8.3 there are several descriptions of *που*, which may be quite different from each other. Denniston (1950), for instance, states that the main function of modal *που* is to express uncertainty, whereas Wackernagel (1885) argues that *που* is used in sentences of which the speaker is convinced, even though he² cannot prove them. Some examples may clarify this. The first problem, the different interpretations of modal *που*, is illustrated in example (1).

- (1) (τῇ τε γὰρ παρασκευῇ ἐνδεὴς ἐγένετο, ὥσπερ ἴστε, καὶ οὐχὶ ἐς ναυμαχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐπλέομεν· ξυνέβη δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ὀλίγα ἐναντιωθῆναι.)

καὶ	πού	τι	καὶ	ἡ	ἀπειρία	πρῶτον	ναυμαχοῦντας
and	που	somehow	also	the	inexperience	first	fighting on sea
CONJ	που	ADV		PTCL	NOM.SG	NOM.SG	ADV
							PTC.PRS.ACC.PL

ἔσφηλεν.
cause to fall.
3SG.AOR.

English1: (Preparation for it, as you know, there was little enough; and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were largely against us;) and perhaps also inexperience had something to do with our failure in our first naval action.

English2: (For our preparation was deficient, as you know, and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations on land; and it happened, furthermore, that not a few of the chances of war were against us) and doubtless also our inexperience had something to do with our failure at our first sea-fight.

French: (Les préparatifs, vous le savez, ont alors laissé à désirer, et nous étions moins en mer pour un combat que pour un campagne; à cela s’est ajoutée l’inter-vention du hasard, qui, à bien des égards, a été contre nous,) et, dans une certaine mesure, l’inexpérience, en ce premier combat naval, a contribué à l’échec.

German: (Sie war mangelhaft vorbereitet, wie ihr wißt, da wir gar nicht zur

²In this dissertation, I will refer to both the speaker and the hearer as *he*, except when I refer to a specific speaker in a text of whom I know that she is a woman.

Seeschlacht ausführen, sondern zu einem Feldzug; dazu kam eine Reihe von Zufällen, die gegen uns waren,) und etwas trug wohl auch die mangelnde Erfahrung bei zu diesem Mißerfolg unserer ersten Seeschlacht.

Th.2.87.2^{3 4 5}

In this example, we see that the first English translator chooses the translation *perhaps*, indicating that the speaker presents his argument as a (conjectural or uncertain) possibility.⁶ This suggests that the speaker thinks what he says might not be completely true (i.e. he cannot guarantee its correctness). The other English translator, however, chooses *doubtless*, which according to the Oxford English dictionary has as its weakest sense: *implying that the speaker sees no reason to doubt the truth of an opinion or presumption uttered*. The German translation has chosen *wohl*, which expresses, according to the Duden online dictionary, a reinforcement or strengthening. The French translation takes again a different approach, taking *που* as a scalar adverb.

The second problem, the disambiguation of locative and modal *που* is illustrated in example (2). The English and French translators interpret *που* as modal, whereas the German translation chooses a locative interpretation. An argument in favor of a modal interpretation is the presence of *δή* ‘evidently’, but the locative dative ‘Ομήρω ‘in Homer’ is an argument in favor of a locative interpretation.

- (2) ἔστι μὲν γὰρ δήπου καὶ Ὀμήρω
 is ptcl for δήπου ptcl in Homer
 3SG.PRS PTCL PTCL δήπου PTCL DAT.SG
 (γάνυται δέ τ’ ἀκούων.)
English: Homer, you remember, has the words, (“He joys to hear;)
French: On lit en effet, vous le savez, dans Homère:
German: Denn es steht irgendwo bei Homer.

X. Smp. 8.30.⁷

These two problems are only specific examples of the complications that arise when describing *που*. However, more general issues need to be addressed in order to describe a modal form in a dead language.

The first issue has been described by Kroon (1995, 98). When describing a form in a detailed way, one runs the risk of ending up with an seemingly endless list of ‘special uses’ of that form which describe the smallest deviation of what has been

³Trans.: English1: Crawley (1910), English 2: (Loeb translation, instead of Perseus translation) Forster Smith (1919), French: Romilly et al. (1953), German: Landmann (1960).

⁴Marchant and Wiedemann (1993) say about the use of *που*: καὶ πού τι καὶ—the expression barely does more than suggest the possibility of what was certain.

⁵In order to keep the glosses as readable as possible, it is only indicated if a form is *not* indicative and active/middle voice. In addition, it is not indicated if a form is a (personal) (pro)noun. The abbreviations follow the list provided by the *Framework for Descriptive Grammars*-project (Bernard Comrie, William Croft, Christian Lehmann, Dietmar Zaefferer). The English translations are taken from the editions on the Perseus website (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/>) unless indicated otherwise.

⁶According to the OED *perhaps* expresses a hypothetical, contingent, conjectural, or uncertain possibility: *it may be (that); maybe, possibly*.

⁷Transl. English: Todd (1922), French: Ollier (1961), German: Bux (1956).

postulated to be the core meaning of that form, without any structure as to what the relations between the special uses are.⁸

One way to avoid this, which will bring us to the second issue, is to make the description of the core meaning so vague that it will cover almost all uses, even though they are very different. The problem with this approach, which may arise especially when describing modal particles, is that at some point a description becomes so vague that it is neither provable nor falsifiable, because one can almost always find arguments to attribute a certain attitude to the speaker. This poses the risk that arguments for a certain interpretation become circular. That is, the researcher tends to search for arguments in favor of the interpretation he expects, which, due to the attitudinal nature of the modal category, may be available. However, it may be that in the same context one may find sound arguments as well for another interpretation, if one would be looking for them. This way, the result is in part dependent on the original expectation of the researcher. In the end, however, the answer to the question of which interpretation was the correct one lays in the conventions of the language and thus in the knowledge of the speakers of these conventions. This is exactly the type of knowledge which we lack when dealing with a dead language.

The fact that contextually sometimes more than one interpretation seems to be possible, leads us to a third issue, which is connected to the way language users deal with possible ambiguities: Do language users generally choose one interpretation or can they attribute several interpretations to the same utterance at the same time?

The fourth issue is best formulated by means of the following questions: If the 'meaning' of particles is so vague that they can get so many different interpretations, how do speakers know that some interpretations are not possible, for example, when non-native speakers make mistakes in the eyes of native speakers? Shouldn't this type of knowledge be part of the description of the function or meaning of a particle?

A fifth issue is the question as to how native speakers decide what interpretation to give to a specific instance of use of a poly-interpretable form.

And the last, more general issue is captured by the following question: What is a good description of a particle? Should it take the form of one very general meaning or of several meanings and what kind of relation do these meanings have with each other? Or is it better to take yet another approach?

One way to solve these issues, is to try to find out what information is used by native speakers when they interpret poly-interpretable forms. In addition, a methodology was needed which uses this information in Greek, but which avoids circularity as much as possible. In order to develop such a methodology, I needed to find out how native speakers use the context in their interpretation of poly-interpretable forms. Therefore, I conducted three questionnaires on a form that is comparable to *που* (Dutch *ergens* 'somewhere/ anywhere', *modal particle*). On the basis of this information, a methodology was developed and tested in a synchronic and diachronic corpus study of Dutch *ergens*. The methodology works as follows. On the one hand we will carefully study the recurring patterns in the linguistic and social context of a form. This may provide us with an outline of the functions of that form. On the

⁸For an interesting attempt to solve this problem by means of corpus analysis see Gries (2006).

other hand we can use interpretations that are independent of our analyses, which are native speaker intuitions for *ergens* and scholarly translations for $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ ⁹ to find trends in the interpretation of the form. The last step is to see to what extent it is possible to link the trends in the interpretations to the evidence from the study of the contextual characteristics of the form. This way, we will have used the information a language user probably uses when disambiguating a poly-interpretable form to shed some more light on the interpretation of such a form in a dead language.

This methodology was based upon some assumptions of what kind of contextual information may be used by native speakers for the disambiguation of poly-interpretable forms. These assumptions were based on modern linguistic theories on context, semantic change and the relations between form and meaning as well as on the results of three questionnaires on the interpretation of Dutch *ergens* in different contexts. These linguistic theories will be described elaborately in section 1.3, but for now I can say that the main conclusion will be that the meaning of a form may consist of the knowledge of the speaker of the uses to which a form is put in various linguistic and social contexts. This boils down to this quotation of Firth (1957, 11), which was the motto of this chapter: “You shall know a word by the company it keeps”. This implies that we may be able to find out more about the interpretations of a form by systematically studying its linguistic (i.e. collocational) and situational (social) context and combining this information with interpretations obtained from native speakers or expert translators.

This dissertation has the following structure. First, in section 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 the theoretical assumptions underlying this approach will be explained. In part II of this dissertation, we will study the effects of the context on the Dutch form *ergens*. It will be tested how native speakers use the context to interpret the poly-interpretable form *ergens* by means of three questionnaires, a synchronic corpus study and a diachronic corpus study. At the end of this part we will see whether it is possible to link the interpretations and characteristics of *ergens* to the linguistic features of its context and what role the context may have played in the development of modal *ergens*.

In part III, it will first be discussed why it is useful to compare two languages, especially a dead and a living language. After that, we will use the new methodology to study the contextual features and interpretations of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. We will start with a synchronic prose corpus from the classical period and the English, French and German translations of this corpus. The next step is to see how the situation that was found in the prose corpus may have arisen and whether we find the same contextual features in poetry. We will end this section with a comparison of Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and Dutch *ergens*. The last part will contain the conclusion of this dissertation and some suggestions for further research.

⁹For a discussion of the drawbacks of the use of translations see page (14). Commentaries cannot be used for this purpose because they, inherently to their broad function, generally do not systematically discuss particles like $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and they often rely heavily on Denniston (1950) without much further discussion. The secondary literature on the particle will be discussed in section 8.3. As we will see in this section, the views on $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in the secondary literature differ in many respects.

1.2 Research questions

1. How do people use the context to disambiguate poly-interpretable forms and can we use this information to make an empirically well founded description of a poly-interpretable form in a dead language?
 - (a) What is the role of the context in the disambiguation and development of the poly-interpretable Dutch form *ergens* ‘somewhere/anywhere, modal particle, at some point (in time), about/around’?
 - (b) What is (are) the function(s) of Dutch *ergens* and how did these functions develop?
 - (c) What can we learn from the study of *ergens* for the interpretation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, a poly-interpretable form in a dead language which also has a locative and a modal function?
 - (d) What are the functions Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ ‘somewhere/anywhere, modal particle about/around’, how did these functions develop and are they comparable to Dutch *ergens*?

1.3 Theoretical assumptions

1.3.1 Overview

In this section, I will explain in more detail which basic theoretical assumptions underly this dissertation and why I start off from these assumptions.

The following two assumptions, which are comparable to the ones described in Taylor (2012, 180-187), are at the basis of this dissertation¹⁰:

1. It will be assumed that words are normally not interpreted in isolation. This means that the ‘meaning’ of a word may consist of a language user’s knowledge about the linguistic and social contexts in which a form is regularly used and which effects it generally has on the addressee. The choice of the addressee for a particular interpretation may be triggered by similarity of the situation to some known contexts in which a form is used together with an estimation of the communicative goals of the speaker.
2. Elaborating on the previous assumption, I will assume that language users do not use word meanings, but generalized (cf. Verhagen, 2010) regularities like constructions as their basic building blocks which help them together with their expectations and the overall context to decide on the choice for (speaker), or the interpretation of (addressee) a form.

¹⁰Taylor’s book came out too late for me to fully incorporate his ideas into this dissertation. However, it seems that he follows a line that is comparable to the one that was chosen here independently.

In the following subsections, I will argue that these assumptions are the result of a critical assessment of the synchronic and diachronic data and the literature on the relation between meaning and form.

We will start in subsection 1.3.2 with a discussion of the two main approaches to meaning: monosemy and polysemy. It will be shown that both approaches have their strong and their weak points. In section 1.4, the arguments in favor of a more central role of the context in meaning and interpretation will be discussed. In section 1.5, the theory will be linked to the practical and methodological choices made in this dissertation and some definitions will be given. In section 1.6, I will summarize this chapter.

1.3.2 A critical assessment of the primacy of the word: monosemy and polysemy approaches

One of the basic choices one needs to make when describing the meaning of a form, is what one is searching for. Or, in other words, what is the meaning of a form? Do forms have one meaning or several meanings? And what determines the actual interpretation of a form in a specific usage event? What is the role of the context? This brings us to the very basics of semantic theory, a field in which much research has been done.

The basis of most theories is the Saussurean sign (Saussure, 1916). This is a form that is linked to a concept, for instance the form *tree* that is linked to the concept of 'tree'. However, the form-concept dichotomy is in many ways problematic. One form may, for instance, have rather different interpretations such as *rose* 'flower' and *rose* 'past tense of rise', which have different functions synchronically and no relation diachronically. On the other hand we have forms with several interpretations that do have a historical relationship such as *mouse* 'animal' and *mouse* 'computer accessory' or the phrases *I am going to London* and *I am going to sleep*.

Although most scholars agree that the two meanings of *rose* have nothing to do with each other and are separate meanings (homonymy), the views on the historically related group differ. There are basically three possible connections between a form and its different interpretations: homonymy (one form has one meaning and there is no relation between them), monosemy (historically related forms have only one meaning, the differences in interpretation between instances are all due to pragmatics or derivational rules) and polysemy (historically related forms can have several meanings that are connected to each other). The last two approaches are used frequently and are sometimes also considered to be the norm (i.e. homonymy is seen as an exception both from a monosemy and a polysemy point of view).

In general, we can say that in the current semantic debate there are two basic views on the relation between words and their function. On the one hand we have the monosemy approach, which states that all, or in the weaker forms, most (historically related) forms have one basic meaning out of which various interpretations follow in interplay with the context. As Weydt (2006, 210-211) formulates it, for instance:

Every particle can be assigned a constant basic meaning, which appears in every occurrence of that particle.[...] The basic meaning can be diversified according to its context.

On the other hand we have the polysemy approach, which argues that a form may have multiple (related) meanings. The choice between these meanings is determined by the context. Both approaches have many variants, tackling the problems that both approaches face when trying to account for the language data. Not all of these theories can be discussed here, but it is possible to describe a number of the basic problems. In the following section, both of these theories will be discussed more elaborately with the arguments in favor and against them.

Monosemy

The monosemy approach to meaning postulates a direct word-meaning mapping that leaves room for flexible interpretations by attributing much of the concrete interpretation in a specific usage event to general mechanisms of deriving the actual interpretation of the word from the context (e.g. by universal pragmatic abilities, or by derivational rules in the grammar). This way, the theory can account for *ad hoc* interpretations as well as the slight differences in interpretation that occur when a form is used in different situations. Although the flexibility of interpretation in language is an important feature to be accounted for, there are some issues that continue to raise problems for the theories based on this model, as was pointed out by (among others) Croft (1998).

As we saw above, the monosemy view on semantics (in most variants) does allow for non-related forms to be phonetically similar, but to have different meanings (homonyms), such as the two meanings of *rose* or the various meanings of the morpheme *-s* in English (plural, 3rd person singular, genitive/possessive). This means that, according to this theory, the human mind is able to connect one form to more than one meaning.

This raises the question as to how a child learning a language differentiates between these homonyms and historically related but rather different uses of forms, such as *that* 'demonstrative' as in *That is my Dad at the bar to the left of Tammy Grimes!*¹¹ and *that* 'conjunction' as in *I said that she should have been watching her dog more closely!*¹². Another example that raises problems is *I am going to London tomorrow!*¹³ and *I am going to sleep!*¹⁴. In the former *am going to* is simply an instance of *to go* as a verb of motion and the latter *am going to* is a future auxiliary.

In the monosemy approach, one would generally assume that *be going to*, for example, expresses a movement in general that can be attributed both to space and to time, dependent on the context. However, the auxiliary-use of *be going to* can be pronounced as *I'm gonna sleep*, which is impossible for the variant with *go* as a verb

¹¹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_DadAmhfRM.

¹²<http://www.usmagazine.com/celebritynews/news/martha-stewart-and-jessica-simpson-2009249>.

¹³<http://britishexpats.com/forum/showthread.php?t=616475>.

¹⁴<http://www.sodahead.com/living/it-is-official-i-am-going-to-sleep/blog-159223/>.

of motion. Apparently, there is not only a difference in interpretation, but sometimes also in form. This would be an argument to say that the two uses of *be going to* are homonymous meanings (see also Croft, 1998, 166). The monosemy account also fails to answer the question as to how it is possible that different pronunciations for different interpretations arise if these different interpretations are not part of the knowledge of a language user about the uses of a form, that is, of the meanings of a form.

Another problem that has been described for the monosemy theory is the demarcation of the possible interpretations that a word in a language can have (cf. Croft, 1998, 158). If we compare English *since* with Dutch *sinds*, for instance, we find that in both languages these forms can have a temporal interpretation. In situations in which the temporal relationship is also a causal one, both languages allow for a causal interpretation, but Dutch does not allow for a causal interpretation without a temporal dimension. This means that we need a basic meaning that is on the one hand general enough for both English and Dutch to allow for a temporal and causal interpretation and on the other hand so specific as to block a purely causal interpretation in the Dutch version, but to keep that interpretation open in the English version.

We also find this problem language internally. If we take for instance the Dutch word *maar* ‘but, just, only, *ptcl*’ we find that it has many different functions (e.g. Foolen, 1993). We will discuss two of them here.¹⁵ Weydt (2006, 210), for instance, claims that this word has as its basic meaning ‘It would be wrong to continue the preceding thought in the expected direction. One has to change the direction of the thought’. This particle can be used both sentence internally *hij was niet rood maar wit*¹⁶ ‘it was not red but white’ and on a higher discourse level to mark a new topic *maar wat ik wou zeggen...* ‘anyway, what I wanted to say...’. This description works fine passively, that is, from the perspective of the addressee assuming he is able to infer that *maar* can be used on more than one level of discourse (cf. Kroon, 1995), but the speaker needs to know that these two uses are possible in his language in order to come up with an acceptable sentence for the addressee. This is clear from the fact that a closely related language like German uses two different words for these two types of adversative constructions *Mein Nachthemd war nicht weiss sondern rot*¹⁷ ‘My pyjamas were not white but red’ *Aber was ich sagen wollte...*¹⁸ ‘Anyway, what I wanted to say was...’

A more general phrasing of this problem is: Does the basic meaning of a highly poly-interpretable word not become too vague to count as the only stored knowledge of a language user about that word? If a basic meaning has to be valid for a large number of interpretations, it is in danger of becoming so vague that it is indistinguishable from the basic meaning of other words or that it no longer allows the

¹⁵The particle *maar* can, for instance, also be used sentence internally to urge someone who is hesitating or is scared to do something as in *Ga maar zitten* ‘please sit down’, or as *only* in sentences like *She is only a child*.

¹⁶<http://frm.kijk.nl/phpbb3/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2306>

¹⁷<http://www.wer-weiss-was.de/theme155/article3896565.html>

¹⁸<http://www.gutefrage.net/frage/ist-normal-wirklich-das-was-wir-als-schoen-empfinden>

language user to tell what is not possible in the language. This seems an indication that the knowledge of a language user about his native language is more elaborate than the basic meaning of a form. He needs to know in what way the forms are used and in what contexts, in order to be able to comply with the conventions of the language community and - in the end - to produce the desired effect in the addressee.

From a historical point of view, there are only two ways to end up with a synchronically monosemous basic meaning for a form that has developed a wide variety of uses. The first option is to assume that a meaning has a hierarchical structure, restricting the possible changes to those which will retain the same core meaning as one, most important meaning. In this view, we may end up with only a very small (and probably abstract) overlapping space (cf. Lichtenberk, 1991). The other option would be to allow for many extra cases of homonymy. I will illustrate this with figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1: The development of new meanings from a monosemic viewpoint

The first stage in figure 1.1 is the starting point in which all circles have the same content (i.e. all uses of a form share all properties, there is only one use of a form). It may be that such a stage does not really exist, but for the sake of the argument we will assume it does. At some point, the form acquires new uses, which, from a monosemous point of view, all need to be covered by the basic meaning (stage 2a in figure 1.1, the shaded part is the basic meaning). This implies that the basic meaning becomes less central to the uses of a form and more abstract, but as long as all interpretations show an overlap, we can still speak about monosemy. However, if the new uses do not develop in the same direction, as is the case in the stage 2b in figure

1.1, we do not have one basic meaning anymore, although there still is some overlap with (different aspects) of the original meaning.¹⁹ From a monosemy point of view, such a situation cannot exist, since in that case there would not be a basic meaning for all uses anymore. So as soon as this happens, we are dealing with homonymy, according to the monosemy view.

However, meanings do not need to have developed that far from their source to be in this situation, as can be seen from the example *bank*.²⁰ This can be 1) a financial institution, 2) a building in which a financial institution is located, 3) a verb meaning *to trust* 4) a money box (piggy bank). It is easy to see how these forms have developed their respective meanings (respectively via metonymy, association and metaphor), yet, it is hard to assume that in the example *you cannot bank on those brakes*²¹, there still is the notion of the financial institution. Nor does it seem to be the case that if someone tells you that you will find the entrance of the metro station just on this side of that bank over there, the whole idea of a trustworthy institution is evoked, because it may even be that the institution has moved. In the case of a piggy bank, we again find that the evocation of a building is not part of the meaning of the word *bank*. This suggests that it is possible for relatively closely related forms to develop in different directions, taking from their original meaning only one aspect, which may not overlap with the aspects other (earlier or later) developments took with them.

Apart from the more theoretical arguments above, there is also psycholinguistic evidence showing that a purely monosemic approach does not seem to work. As for instance Sandra and Rice (1995) and Klein and Murphy (2001) show, language users are aware of different uses of forms and their use of core meanings is minimal.

A final and rather general problem is that in monosemous descriptions it is often not completely clear what features of the context lead to the various interpretations of a form. In other words, there is little attention for the way in which we derive all these different interpretations from the basic meaning.

Polysemy

The polysemy approach does allow for multiple meanings of a word, for which, as we have seen above, there are several arguments. However, this theory has, just like the monosemy theory, its own problematic issues (Croft, 1998).

The extreme version of the idea that words can have multiple meanings, homonymy, does not really have ways to account for connections between words, since the separate meanings of one word are just as different from each other as different meanings of other words in this approach. Polysemy approaches solve this problem by assuming related meanings are connected in a network (Langacker, 1987). Langacker's theory states that words can be connected in a network in which some

¹⁹This is the type of situation which has been the focus of *prototype theory* (e.g. Rosch, 1975; Tribushina, 2008; Rademaker, 2005). The solution of this theory is to assume that there is a prototype to which the other forms are linked and which holds a category together. This way, all forms have an overlap with the prototype, but they do not need to have an overlap with each other to belong to one category.

²⁰Since the meaning of *bank* as in a river bank is commonly assumed to be homonymous with the financial institution, it will be left out of consideration here.

²¹The example is taken from the Van Dale professional dictionary English-Dutch online.

nodes can be more closely related than others, thereby allowing language users to see connections between different meanings of words.




Figure 1.2: Related forms in a polysemy network

In figure 1.2, we see that different uses of a form may show different amounts of overlap with one another, some being semantically very closely related with several other uses and others less so. In most theories of polysemy it is assumed that the connection between two forms may be stronger or weaker. This way, there is some hierarchy in the network.

As is argued by, for instance, Janssen (2003), one of the strong points of the monosemy theory is that it gives us flexibility in the interpretation of forms. As is shown by Verhagen (2006), this flexibility is clearly needed in order to account for language use. However, in order to divide the meanings of words into nodes or an interconnected list of meanings, as is done in the polysemy approach, we need to decide if an interpretation is a separate though connected meaning, an ad hoc interpretation or an unconnected meaning (see also Geeraerts, 1993). And when do interpretations become meanings? Is there a clear cut moment in which the knowledge of a speaker that a form may be used in a certain way becomes a separate meaning? Although we may find some indications for the (un)conventionality of certain interpretations by means of corpus studies, there is no objective way (yet) to find out whether people see relations between different interpretations other than psycholinguistic tests for every single form.

For dead languages, like Ancient Greek, the polysemy approach theoretically brings us in the position that if we propose a number of uses, our analysis runs the risk of becoming unfalsifiable, because for every counterexample to our interpretation, we may posit another related meaning. In order to avoid that as well as long, unstructured lists of “meanings” that are supposed to accommodate all uses of a particle that are somewhat different from another, Kroon (1995, 98) has chosen to aim “at maintaining a minimalist position [i.e. monosemy *EK*] as long as possible, without however excluding the possibility of a restricted number of distinct (though related) meanings or functions operating under the same form.” This seems to be a methodological choice rather than a hypothesis on the representation of meaning in people’s minds. This may be very useful from a methodological point of view, but it is of limited use if one wants to know how speakers represent meaning.

As is argued by Croft (1998, 168) the questions posed above simply cannot be answered on the basis of introspective evidence or corpus evidence alone. Especially the question of whether different uses are related, as is the claim of polysemy for

many historically related uses of forms, is a question about the representation of meanings in people's minds. Therefore, in the end, this question can only be solved for specific items with psycholinguistic evidence. In Rice (1996), for instance, evidence is presented that spatial and temporal uses of some prepositions are semantically completely independent. And we may find that for different speakers the relatedness of uses may vary. This implies that we will probably never know whether historically related uses were in fact related for the Ancient Greeks. That we, as academics, are able to see a(n abstract) relation between various uses of a form, does not imply that this relation was perceived as such by the language users. Croft (1998, 158) formulates this as follows:

Although we are trained as scientists to find the most general patterns, we cannot project that methodological imperative onto individual speakers' mental representations. It is often the case that the analyst - formalist or cognitivist - has overlooked or ignored irregularities of various sorts in the relationship between [a/U1] and [a/U2] ([or abU2]) [i.e. various uses of a form, EK], which require the positing of a less general model.

A last point, which is comparable to our last point in the monosemy discussion, is that the addressee needs to decide which of the multiple meanings is applicable in a given case. This is presumably done on the basis of the context. However, generally it is unclear what the basis of this choice is, that is, which elements of the context are responsible for our choice for a particular meaning.²²

As we have seen above, both the monosemy approach and the polysemy approach can be regarded as each having their own problems, some of which are overlapping. Many variants have been proposed to solve these issues, but there are no generally accepted solutions. In cognitive linguistics, for instance, the polysemy approach is more popular (e.g. Cuyckens and Zawada, 2001; Allan, 2003; Rademaker, 2005) but in particle research there are many people favoring a monosemy approach (e.g. Weydt, 2006; Kroon, 1995; Schrickx, 2011). In both groups (i.e. cognitive linguists and particle researchers), however, there are also proponents of the other view (e.g. Diewald (2006a); Fischer (2006b); Janssen (2003).)

The reason monosemy is relatively popular in particle research probably is that particles tend to have a wide array of uses, which are hard to describe anyway, which makes it even harder to draw clear lines so as to demarcate one use from another. Also, particles frequently function on the interactional level (for this term see Kroon, 1995), which means that there is more connection to pragmatics than generally is the case for referential words. For more on particles and particle research see section 1.5.2 below.

²²This is not to say that there are no studies in which the context is considered (e.g. Rademaker, 2005). However, also within the polysemy approach there is a tendency to abstract away from particular features of the context in the representation of meaning and the link between context and meaning is not explicitly part of the theory. However, if we separate a speaker's knowledge of the meaning of a word from the contextual surroundings in which that word is commonly used, we may, in our model, deprive speakers from the information they need to distinguish various interpretations of a form.

An issue that has come up in the past decades, which is challenging for both monosemy and polysemy, is the following. In many languages we find fixed constructions that seem to have a meaning of their own. An often-used example is the English expression *kick the bucket* ‘to die’ (lit. ‘hit the bucket with one’s feet’) or in Greek ὄϊος τέ εἰμί ‘I am able to’ lit. ‘such as PTCL I am’. The meaning of this type of expression cannot be derived from its component parts. In addition, there are all kinds of expressions that are only partly analyzable such as *being a dab hand at something*, in which the meaning or even history of *dab* is unknown or can only be hinted at, according to the OED. And what should we do with verbs that change their meaning depending on the words they are combined with, such as *get over something*, *get to London* or *get a bike*? Or what to think of meaning differences that are linked to a prefix, such as Dutch *trekken* ‘pull’ and *vertrekken* ‘leave’, but cannot be directly connected to a meaning of the prefix? All these examples are hard to fit into a view in which words, or more generally, morphemes are seen as the main meaning-bearing units (i.e. an atomic view).²³ This view is also a problem from a diachronic perspective, as we will see in section 1.4.2.

For now, we may conclude that both monosemy approaches and polysemy approaches seem to have their own problems. This suggests two things. First, as has been recognized more and more in the past years (e.g. Boogaart, 2009), both approaches should perhaps not be seen as options excluding each other (i.e. as the way in which people represent all meanings of all words). An alternative may be that some constructions may have a monosemous relation to each other whereas other uses of this form have a polysemic or even homonymic relation. For instance, a pragmatic inference may be seen as ‘monosemy at work’, whereas other instances of that same form may have other interpretations that are conventionalized and which may or may not be connected for speakers to the other uses of that form (polysemy and homonymy).

Second, we may need to reconsider the primacy of the word/morpheme. That is, the idea that words and, more generally, morphemes are the main meaning-bearing entities in the language system. As I will argue in section 1.4.3 below, there are reasons to think that in many cases the meaning-bearing unit is larger than one word or morpheme.

In the end, however, this discussion is about the representation of form and meaning in people’s minds. We may find indications in corpora, via introspection and historical developments that certain form-meaning connections are non-compositional and therefore conventional, but whether there is a polysemous relation is hard to tell without psycholinguistic evidence. It may be that the only way to decide for a particular use how it is represented is to test what relations are perceived by most language users. This implies that although we may find indications in corpora that certain uses are conventional, it is very hard to prove the existence of a polysemy network in a dead language.

²³The atomic assumption underlies many theories of language. In this view of language it is assumed that there is a mental lexicon and a mental grammar, which can be distinguished from each other, see Taylor (2012, chapter 2).

However, this does not mean that we should stop trying to find out what we can from language data. As was argued above, it may be that the (contextual) knowledge of a language user is much more diverse and fine-grained than is sometimes assumed. Therefore, we will now discuss the types of evidence we have for the role of contextual knowledge in language use. The types of evidence will be divided in three groups: 1. The role of the situational and social context, 2. Semantic change and what it tells us about the use of context in interpretation and 3. The role of linguistic context: a construction grammar approach. We will end this chapter with a summary and an overview of this dissertation.

1.4 Contextual knowledge in language use

The discussion on monosemy and polysemy showed that it is still hard to come up with a coherent description of how people arrive at an interpretation. One of the reasons that this has proven to be so complicated may be that we tend to think too modularly. Semantics is often separated from pragmatics and syntax and words are assumed to be the basic building blocks of language. However, as we will see below, the study of the diachronic development of forms has shown that context is relevant at almost all stages of their development. Since languages change continually, this suggests that words may not have meanings in isolation, but receive their meaning in combination with other elements in the context (i.e. they form constructions). Therefore, in this dissertation I will not search for one or more specific meanings of *ergens* and *που*, but for the knowledge a language user needs in order to be able to use and interpret these forms according to the conventions of the language community they belong to. This includes regularities in the linguistic and social context in which these forms occur.

This still does not solve the question as to what type of things a language user needs to know in order to be able to communicate effectively in his language community. Therefore, I will now sketch which assumptions will be at the basis of this dissertation. In general, I will follow Bybee (2010), although I will put more emphasis on the role of expectation (management) and intersubjectivity (Verhagen, 2005) in language use.

In daily speech, almost everything can be subsumed under the term *context*. From the general situation in which the discourse participants find themselves to the directly adjacent collocations of a form. In this dissertation, I will focus on the linguistic context, but the broader context will not be left out of consideration. Therefore, the term *context* can have its full array of interpretations, although generally, the term *context* will refer to the linguistic context and in particular the forms that occur in the same clause as *ergens* or *που*. The reason that I do not restrict the definition of *context* is that we will see that in some cases the overall context and the expectations of the addressee based on that context play a crucial role in the interpretation of forms.

In the coming subsections, I will discuss three types of evidence for the importance of a language user's contextual knowledge for his communicative success:

1. Evidence from language use and psycholinguistic research 2. Evidence from language change and 3. Linguistic evidence.

1.4.1 The role of situational and social context in language use

In this section, I will discuss the role of situational and social contextual knowledge in language use. Given the right circumstances (camping, hiking etc.) the word *chair* can denote many different things, from a bunch of clothes to a rock or someone else's legs. However, if you send someone to another room to fetch an extra chair, he is normally not supposed to come back with a stone or a bunch of clothes. This shows that the situation in which an utterance is used, may have important systematic effects on the interpretation of words. Pragmatic information like this even may override the standard expectations on the basis of a verb's normal usage (Clifton Jr. et al., 1984) or add new interpretations to forms (contextual constructions Clark, 1996, 78). However, this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the meaning of words needs to be underspecified and their interpretation should be left mainly to pragmatics as is sometimes claimed (e.g. Levinson, 2000, 20).²⁴

It may also be that the final interpretation of a word is a compromise between several types of knowledge: the knowledge of the common use and social effects of the linguistic constructions involved, the knowledge of the situation in the world and related to that the alleged communicative goal of the speaker (see also Croft, 1998, 171). So if people are camping and one of them returns from the bathroom to find the bunch of clothes that he was using to sit on taken by someone else, the utterance, *Hey, get off my chair!* may result in the line of reasoning: a chair is something to sit on, apparently he thinks I am sitting on his chair, I am in fact sitting where he sat before and these are his clothes, so he must mean that I am to come off this bunch of clothes. This is possible because there is some link with the function of a chair and the situation provides enough clues as to what the speaker might mean.

Another type of knowledge a language user needs to have, which is often excluded from semantics, is social knowledge of the conventions in his language (Taylor, 2012, 100-101). In order to be able to use for instance politeness phrases like *How are you?* correctly, some knowledge of the social use of constructions is needed. Since this knowledge is language and expression specific, this needs to be part of the linguistic knowledge of the language user. *Where are you going?* or *How is your health?* are no politeness questions in English, but their literal counterparts in respectively China and Afghanistan are used in this way. Therefore, the meaning of constructions cannot be purely content directed, but also needs a social component and knowledge of the use and social status of words.

One more point is that meanings can change rather quickly and people - given the right social context - tend to use the same words their interlocutor is using, even though a more frequently used option may be available (think of higher and lower registers, newly coined terms that become standard in a particular group). These

²⁴ According to Levinson (2000, 20) a systematically ambiguous form may have a single univocal, semantically broad sense with a defeasible set of generalized pragmatic restrictions.

phenomena are a reason to believe that people store the individual constructions that they hear (exemplars) and base their new utterances (partly) on this information (Goldberg, 2006; Bybee, 2010, 45-58). Depending on the communicative effectiveness and the prestige of the speaker, newly coined words and new uses of already existing forms may persist or not.

When an addressee is in a situation in which someone else is going to speak to him, he will estimate, with all his (social) knowledge of the world, what a speaker's goal will be in communicating with him. With the help of this knowledge he will interpret the acoustic speech pattern of the speaker together with his knowledge of the language and how and why constructions are generally used. That this type of information plays a role in the decipherment of the acoustic speech pattern may be seen from several neurolinguistic and psycholinguistic studies (e.g. Warren (1970); Sivonen et al. (2006)). That expectations also play an important role in semantics can be seen from a study by Nieuwland and van Berkum (2006). In this study the authors showed that a statement about a peanut falling in love gives an N400 effect²⁵, which is normally found when there is a semantic mistake in a sentence (peanuts normally are not agents and do not fall in love). However, when the same statement is embedded in a story in which the peanut is introduced as an agent, this effect does not occur. This suggests that a statement which contradicts the expectations based on world knowledge of the addressee is comparable to a sentence with a semantic mistake in it, except when the addressee has received information which allowed him to adjust his expectations beforehand.

What we can conclude from this section is the following:

1. Contextual information may, to a certain extent, override knowledge of the conventional interpretation of a form. However, a language user needs his conventional knowledge in order to know what is not overridden.
2. Apart from the propositional content of sentences, the language user needs to know how these sentences are used in his social community. This means that information about the social effects of a linguistic unit is part of the knowledge of a language user about that unit.
3. The expectations of an individual language user seem to play an important role in interpretation since information that goes against the expectation of the addressee seems to have the same effect as a semantic mistake.

1.4.2 Semantic change and what it tells us about interpretation

Language change is the outcome of continuous processes of language production and interpretation. This implies that the study of changes in language may well provide evidence on these processes, which cannot be obtained so easily from other sources. Therefore, we will discuss in this section the processes that are involved in language

²⁵This effect is named after the moment in time after the stimulus in which a peak occurs (400 msec.) in an E.E.G.

change and the evidence this may provide for the knowledge a speaker needs to communicate successfully.

Divergence and context-induced interpretations

Hopper (1991) described in his famous article on the characteristics of grammaticalization among other things the common observation that if words develop other functions through grammaticalization, they do not always lose their original function. This results in the synchronic situation that one form has two functions. The original meaning, however, may also develop in a new direction (*divergence*) as is illustrated in figure 1.3.




Figure 1.3: The hypothetical development of a poly-interpretable form and the situation at a certain point in time.

An example is the Dutch word *lijk*, which originally meant ‘body’²⁶. This word developed into a suffix *-lijk* (with a reduced pronunciation) in Dutch which derived adjectives from nouns. The original form continued to exist, but developed the meaning ‘dead body’ whereas a compound that included *lijk* as a component (*lichaam*) became the general word for ‘body’. This results in the current situation in Dutch that the suffix, which speakers do not link to the noun anymore, exists side by side to the form that was its source, although the source form does not have its original interpretation anymore.

Another phenomenon which Hopper describes is *persistence*. This term refers to the phenomenon that although forms may change their meaning, they may re-

²⁶The same stem was also the origin of the English adverbial suffix *-ly*.

tain some restrictions in their usage linked to the original meaning which was lost. An example is the Dutch conjunction *laat staan* ‘let alone’ (lit. ‘let stand’). In many ways these two words function together as a conjunction, but contrary to other conjunctions, *laat staan* does not allow a full finite clause to come after it (Verhagen, 1994).²⁷ The conjunction *laat staan* can only be followed by a phrase or a subordinate clause introduced with a conjunction like, for instance *dat* ‘that’. This is a remnant of the fact that *laat staan* originally was a predicate which could only have an object or a complement clause. Even though nowadays *laat staan* has many properties of a conjunction, some of the restrictions of its original use are still present. This phenomenon is called *persistence*.

These characteristics of language change show us several things. The model of meaning we use must be able to incorporate *divergence* and *persistence*. That is, the model needs to allow the language user to distinguish the older and the new form. Also, the restrictions on the use of certain forms should be passed on to new generations. The former will probably be done by means of properties of the context, as has been shown by many scholars working in grammaticalization (e.g. Hopper and Traugott, [1993] 2003; Diewald, 2002; Heine, 2002; Diewald, 2006a; Traugott and Dasher, 2002; Traugott, 2003). This means that the new uses of these forms have become linked to their occurrence in certain contexts, which allows them to further develop separately from the form carrying their original meaning. An example of such a development we already saw above in the development of *gonna* from *going to* if it was used with an infinitive and thus had the function of an auxiliary.

The requirement that a model of meaning in a language must be able to account for *persistence* implies that we need some way of transferring the restrictions on the use of a form to new generations. This means that a child needs to have access in some way to negative evidence as to in what linguistic contexts a form may not be used to prevent overgeneralization. This implies that a child makes a connection between a form and the linguistic context in which it may occur. One of the ways this may be done is that a child only generalizes on the basis of positive evidence and thus may conclude that some things are not possible if it does not encounter them. For a detailed discussion of how this may work see Goldberg (2006, 93ff).

Since principles like *divergence* and *persistence* are commonly found in the history of languages of the world, there are probably common mechanisms that are at the basis of these kinds of developments, which should be part of the theory on what a meaning is. In general, we need to know why forms change their interpretation and what kind of regularities can be found in semantic change.

The underlying principles of semantic change

Traugott (1989) described three tendencies of semantic change, which can be summarized as (inter)subjectification.²⁸ The first tendency she describes is that mean-

²⁷For more on the syntactic peculiarities of *let alone* see Fillmore et al. (1988, 518).

²⁸The synchronic results of these tendencies can be seen in the description of the way particles may function on three levels of discourse as presented by Kroon (1995): the representational level (propositional content), the presentational level (text structuring functions) and the interactional level (inter-

ings based in the external described situation tend to become meanings based in the internal (evaluative/perceptual/cognitive) situation. For instance, the English word *boor* originally just meant ‘farmer’, but since farmers did not have a very high status in society and were therefore seen as particularly crude, the word *boor* adopted the implication ‘crude person’.

The second tendency Traugott found, was that meanings based in the external or internal described situation tend to become meanings in the textual and metalinguistic situation. An example of this type of change are adverbial phrases such as *in deed*, *in fact* and *(in) any way* that become discourse markers (Traugott and Dasher, 2002; Traugott, 1997, 152ff,).

The third tendency is that meanings tend to become increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief state/ attitude toward the proposition. An example would be the development of a concessive interpretation side by side with the temporal meaning of for instance *while*. These tendencies she called subjectification²⁹. A subset of subjectification is intersubjectification. Intersubjectification is a tendency for meanings to come to express grounding in the relationship between speaker/writer and addressee/reader explicitly’ (Traugott and Dasher, 2002, 6).

If certain expressions occur frequently in situations in which a certain implication can be inferred, this implication may become part of the meaning of a word, which is called *conventionalization* (cf. Keller, 1994; Lewis, 1969) or *hypoanalysis* as it is called by Croft (2000, 126-7). This type of incorporation of implications is also said to be an underlying mechanism of grammaticalization. In the example of *be going to, going somewhere in order to do something* implied that it would happen in the near future. At a certain point, this implication became stronger than the original interpretation, which led to the reanalysis of *be going to* as a future marker. Possibly, analogy to the other auxiliaries in English may have played a role in the process (Fischer, 2007b, 234).³⁰ The importance of inferences in language change shows that flexibility is not only needed to describe the various *ad hoc* interpretations of words synchronically, but also in order to explain diachronic (semantic) change.³¹

Other mechanisms that have been suggested for semantic change are metaphor and metonymy. It is sometimes argued that we should see only one principle (i.e. metaphor, metonymy or pragmatic inferencing) as the main factor in semantic change, but according to Heine et al (1991), metaphorical thinking, metonymic thinking and pragmatic inferencing do not exclude each other and may well work together. With this last view I agree, since metaphorical thinking in itself does not explain why at certain moments in history a change takes place. In pragmatic inferencing, which may take place through metaphorical or metonymical thinking, all kinds of cultural

subjective functions). In Kroon’s description particles may function on one or more of these levels at the same time.

²⁹This is not to be confused with Langacker’s subjectification. For a discussion of this issue see Langacker (1999, 149-150).

³⁰For an elaborate discussion and a new proposal of how this development may have taken place see Garrett (2012).

³¹It has been proposed that also grammaticalization starts off as a semantic change (Hopper and Traugott, [1993] 2003, 82), which implies that the regularities of (some types of) semantic change may also be relevant for studies in grammaticalization and vice versa.

factors may play a role as well as changes in other places in the language system. Therefore, a combination of these principles seems to be functionally the most likely.

Up to this point we have focussed on the processes of change in the individual language user. This is in line with Slobin (1977, 1994, 44-53) and Croft (2000) who have argued that languages change continually, also during the lifetime of speakers. However, a change in one speaker is not yet a change in the community of speakers, that is, in the language. In order for a new meaning to spread through the language community, many speakers need to consider the new meaning or the new implicature socially and communicatively useful, so that its frequency of use will increase. Only in this way will the new expression or interpretation get repeated more and more, which makes it possible that the new expression spreads through the whole community, just like a new fashion or hype. These mechanisms make it possible that a pragmatic development reaches the status of language change.

To summarize, I will give an overview of the most important conclusions from the diachronic studies presented above:

1. The context in which a form is used, including its linguistic context, plays an important role in semantic change
2. In a model of semantics we need the possibility to demarcate different uses of a form, since different uses may develop different pronunciations. This may be done by means of linking an interpretation to a specific context.
3. A semantic model needs to be able to account for form-meaning pairings in which a form consists of more than one morpheme or word.
4. The most commonly described mechanisms of semantic innovation are: metaphorical thinking, metonymic thinking and pragmatic inferencing. These innovations subsequently spread to the whole community, thus becoming a new element of the language of that community.
5. Semantic change tends to go in the direction of (inter)subjectification.
6. In order to account for persistence, restrictions on use need to be part of semantic theory.

1.4.3 Evidence for the role of linguistic context

As we have seen in many of the sections above, the relation between meaning and form is more complex than a direct connection between a word and a meaning. A theory that addresses this issue is the theory of construction grammar (e.g. Goldberg, 1995, 2006; Croft, 2001; Fried and Östman, 2005b; Fillmore et al., 1988). In this theory, form and meaning correspondences can be of all types, from completely fixed phrases to word order patterns and information structural and interactional properties (see figure 1.4 below).

The form-meaning correspondences may be connected by means of a network. In this way it is possible to see similarities in both form and function, but also to




Figure 1.4: The symbolic structure of a construction (Croft and Cruse, 2004, 258, Figure 10.1)

make more fine-grained distinctions in both form and meaning. For example, the more general construction (*Give someone something*) may be connected to more concrete ones (e.g. *Give someone the creeps*) to which they are in some way related and of which they may inherit properties (see figure 1.5 below). These more concrete constructions may or may not be semantically compositional.




Figure 1.5: A part of a hierarchical construction network

This theory may be seen as providing a bridge between monosemy and polysemy, because an individual construction is supposed to be monosemous, but these

monosemous constructions may be connected in a hierarchical network, which allows connections to be made (Boogaart, 2009).

We will make explicit now what we only hinted at on the basis of the evidence that was presented above: in this dissertation it will be assumed that the meaningful units of language are combinations of a word with other elements. These combinations are known to language users. In order to interpret a form correctly, an addressee needs to know the conventional combinations i.e. the constructions. However, this assumption also raises questions, which we will discuss now.

As we will see below in the studies of *ergens* and *rou*, there are regularities in the context of these forms that may be used by the language user to decide on the interpretation of that form. However, there are also exceptions and conflicting contextual features. In addition, there are pragmatic regularities that seem to influence the interpretation. From the point view of construction grammar, the form-function link is quite absolute. The form can be everything from an abstract syntactic structure to a fixed expression, but it has to be perceivable. A construction may show some subconstructions (i.e. variation), but basically the construction needs a form to have a meaning and vice versa. This means that if our form has more than one meaning we have not defined the form precisely enough. Also, pragmatic requirements (i.e. pragmatic features that need to be present in the context in order for a construction to have a certain meaning) are not part of the form of the construction and thus not a defining part of the construction. This does not imply that these requirements may not exist, according to the theory, but they cannot define the construction.

This last statement makes it hard to explain cases that seem extensions of constructions (for a similar observation see Boogaart, 2009, 238). In the chapters on *ergens*, for example, we will see that in most cases the interpretation of *ergens* as *in someone's feelings or thoughts* is accompanied by subjective predicates or mental state predicates and first person pronouns. If one of these is missing, we may say that this is a subconstruction with only one of these two characteristics. However, if there is an example in which the general context makes clear that someone is speaking about someone else's thoughts from the other person's perspective as in example (3), but the example does not fulfill the form criteria of the construction, do we need to assume we are dealing with another construction? In my view, it sounds more plausible that the characteristics of the form elements of the construction have been generalized to a more abstract requirement: subjectivity and access to someone's thoughts of the speaker/narrator.

- (3) maar is dat een stiekem een droom ergens of?
but is that a secret dream *ergens*, or what?³²

Most cases would, in this view, still fulfill the form requirements, but in some cases it may be possible by extension of the more general pattern to leave them implicit. In these cases, an addressee may compare the formal and pragmatic characteristics of a particular instance to the exemplars that are already present. The one that fits best may be seen as the interpretation that is the most likely to be correct. The speaker

³²From: CGN comp-b/nl/fn000105.

who produces such an instance, will leave out the most common formal contextual cues only if he thinks the instance clearly fits one type of exemplars best, because the overall context will unambiguously guide the addressee in the intended direction. In order to know whether this really is how it works, more (psycholinguistic) research is needed. However, as we will see below, the corpus data suggest that it may work this way.

With this last addition, I think construction grammar will be the most useful theoretical framework for this dissertation. This means that I will make the general assumption that speakers do not use word meanings, but generalized (cf. Verhagen, 2010) regularities like constructions as their basic building blocks which help them together with their expectations and the overall context to decide on the interpretation of a form.

1.5 From theory to practice

1.5.1 The methods used

If the semantic knowledge of speakers really consists of the knowledge of constructions and their common use for certain purposes in certain types of situations, as was argued above, we would expect to find constructional and contextual patterns in language use. These patterns may be used by speakers to disambiguate poly-interpretable forms. I will test this on the Dutch form *ergens* which probably plays a role in more than one construction. If this study of *ergens* really shows that this is a plausible hypothesis, we may use the linguistic and situational contextual characteristics also for the disambiguation and interpretation of forms in a dead language. In our case, the form from a dead language will be Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\nu$. The two lexical items $\pi\omicron\nu$ and *ergens* share the fact that they are both used as a locative indefinite adverb and as a modal particle. For these two items I will investigate what their contextual properties are and what these properties may tell us about the functions of constructions in which they participate. Since Dutch is a living language, we will have the opportunity to test several hypotheses in three questionnaires, apart from corpus research and native speaker intuitions. For Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\nu$, we will of course only have access to corpus data and modern translations and studies, but the study of *ergens* will also help us by showing what kind of contextual features may be relevant to a comparable form.

From a descriptive point of view a construction is a pattern. One of the characteristics of a pattern is that it is repeated. This means that frequencies will play a role in this dissertation. Since frequency plays a role in both historical development and in conventionalization³³ it will be expected that if some combinations are more frequent than we would expect on the basis of their respective general frequencies and

³³As is discussed in Bybee (2006a), grammaticalization can be accompanied by drastic increases in frequency. Also, grammaticalization starts in specific contexts which become constructions. These constructions tend to become more frequent, which is the triggering device for more changes in form and function (Bybee (2006a,b, 339)). These effects of frequency include automaticity in production (Kapatsinski, 2010) and faster processing independently of the frequency of the individual words in the construction (Arnon

properties, we may have found an indication for a construction. The exact methodology of this type of corpus research will be discussed in section 4.1.2.

However, if we have found a combination or type of context that is more frequent than was expected both statistically and with respect to other forms, we still need to link these contextual properties to specific types of interpretations. What we will try to find out is to what extent the forms with which *ergens* and *πov* are collocated tell us something about their use.³⁴ The main thought on which this is based was phrased by Firth (1957, 11): “You shall know a word by the company it keeps”. Practically, this means that if you study the conventionalized contexts of a form well enough, you may get an outline of the functions of the constructions in which that form plays a role. This type of information may bring us closer to the type of knowledge a language user has of his language.

The study of *ergens* in part 2 of this dissertation will be the first test to determine whether this approach works and what type of contextual knowledge speakers use when interpreting a form with both modal and indefinite locative interpretations. This will be done by means of three surveys. The first survey will consist of sentences that are only slightly modified corpus examples. The second survey will present the same sentences to other participants, but this time with a reduced context of only two words before and after *ergens*. The third survey will consist of the same sentences that are slightly modified with the goal to change their interpretation. From these three surveys we can see what features of the context were used to arrive at a certain interpretation and how stable these interpretations are across participants.

The results of the surveys are tested by means of a corpus study. We will see whether the interpretations chosen by the subjects can be distinguished by means of contextual characteristics in several corpora of Dutch.

The last step will be to see whether we can also find the contextual characteristics that may have triggered *ergens* to develop other interpretations.

In the third part of this dissertation we will investigate Ancient Greek *πov*. We will use both corpus data and data from modern translations of the corpus in order to use as much as possible the same methodology we used for our corpus study of *ergens*. Instead of native speaker intuitions we will use translations in three modern languages to see how expert readers interpret the form and to what extent they agree. For a more elaborate discussion on the comparison of two languages, the study of a dead language and the use of translations see respectively 8.1, 8.2 and 8.5.

In the last part, the conclusion, we will summarize the results and present some ideas for further research.

However, before we can turn to the second part, there are some definitions to be clarified. In the beginning of this section I called *ergens* and *πov* *modal particles*. These terms have been used in so many ways that I should give a short explanation of what I mean by those terms and place them in context.

and Snider, 2010). This suggests that somehow these frequently used combinations become more of a unity, which may trigger changes in interpretation separately from other instances of the lexical items contained in the combination.

³⁴Not all forms are part of the same construction for semantic reasons.

1.5.2 What is a modal particle?

As is argued by Croft (2001, chapter 2), the actual existence of parts of speech in the mental representation of language in speakers may be less clear than is sometimes suggested by linguists. If this is true for verbs, nouns and adjectives, it is certainly true for the category *particle*.³⁵ This category has been said to comprise everything from all non-inflected forms of a language (think for instance of the English term *particle verbs*) to only discourse particles. In addition, there is the category *adverb*. Sometimes particles are seen as a subcategory of adverbs, but in other cases they are seen as mutually exclusive. However, the category *adverb* is even less clearly a universal category than verbs, nouns and adjectives. In Ancient Greek, it would be possible to make a reasonably clear morphological distinction between adverbs and particles, since adverbs usually have their own morphological characteristics. Most (i.e. the productively derived) adverbs are either marked by the ending $-\omega\varsigma$ or by means of a neuter ending of an adjective that is not dependent on a noun.³⁶ Particles, on the other hand, can be defined as clitics which generally are found in the second position of the clause (the so called Wackernagel position after an article by Wackernagel (1892). For more information on this position see Goldstein (2010)).

Although the distinction above would result in quite a clear demarcation of the notion of *particle* for Ancient Greek, this definition would not cover its common use by classicists or linguists, since the connectors and conjunctions that are found in the first position of the clause are not part of this definition. In addition, this definition would not work for Dutch, because Dutch does not have morphologically marked adverbs and does not have a position comparable to the Greek Wackernagel position. Therefore, the working definition of a particle in this dissertation will be given in functional terms, as follows:

A particle is an uninflected form with no referential function that manages the speaker-hearer interaction on a textual or social level. That is, every form that does not have propositional content, does not belong to the main categories noun, verb or adjective and has its main function on the presentational or interactional level of discourse (Kroon, 1995), is a particle.

This definition is by no means meant as a crosslinguistically valid definition (if such definitions exist), but it seems to work to demarcate the more adverbial (i.e. uses with propositional content) functions of *ergens* and $\piου$ from their more particle-like counterparts, without distancing the definition too much from the ones used in classics and in the linguistic literature.

If we follow this definition, locative *ergens* and locative $\piου$ are adverbs, because they do have propositional content whereas their modal counterparts are considered particles, because they lack a referential meaning.

³⁵For the origin of this category in ancient times see Schenkeveld (1988).

³⁶As is the case for almost all morphological categories, there are exceptions to these rules. Locative and temporal adverbs that are derived from question words, for instance, do not get adverbial marking. Also there are some older forms that do not show the productive endings.

With respect to the term *modal* particle, the definition is even more problematic, since *modal* or *modality* is used for many different things (Nuyts, 2005). I have chosen to use this term anyway, since it is one of the most common terms used in particle studies. In this dissertation, a modal particle can be seen as a particle functioning on the interactional level of discourse and/or having an epistemic function. This means that according to the definition of a particle given above, the subset of particles that have an interactional function are called modal and the remaining subset consists mainly of presentational particles.

According to our own definitions, *ergens* and $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ undergo a category change from a referential word (adverb) to a function word (particle). This raises a question which has not been addressed so far: Is there a difference between function words and words with a more referential meaning?

There are all kinds of ways in which this distinction can be made (e.g. Lehmann, 1995). However, the distinction between referential words and function words is not very clear cut. In fact, according to the studies in grammaticalization, the development of referential words to function words is a cline. This suggests that we can find forms in a language at all stages of the development. If we would assume a way of processing that is completely different for referential words and function words, this cline would at least need to have one point in which everything becomes different. Since there is little historical evidence for such a cut off point, we may assume that the way people handle function words is not fundamentally different from the way they handle other forms in a language. A suggestion as to what may be different between the two types of words, may be the type of contextual information that is used. One could imagine, for instance, that the intersubjective context plays a more important role in the interpretation of particles than in the interpretation of more referential words. However, this is an issue on which further research may shed more light.

Now we have clarified the use of the term *modal particle* we can turn to the second part of this dissertation: the study of *ergens*.

1.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the problems that arise when trying to describe poly-interpretable forms in language. In addition, I have explained which linguistic assumptions are held and which theories will be used in this dissertation. The conclusions will be summarized here.

In section 1.1, it was explained why this dissertation got the form it currently has. The main reason was that there seemed to be a risk of circularity and a proliferation of new functions proposed for $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ with the addition of new examples to the analysis. Because of these problems the need was felt to answer some more general questions about the way people interpret poly-interpretable forms and to develop a more objective methodology. The questions that were posed are repeated below:

1. Can a language user interpret a form both as locative and as modal at the same time or do they choose one of them?
2. How do native speakers know that there are unacceptable uses of a form if there is such a large variety of possible interpretations?
3. How do native speakers decide what interpretation to give to a specific instance of use of a poly-interpretable form?
4. What is a good description of a particle: should it be one very general meaning or more meanings and what kind of relation do these meanings have with each other? Or is it better to take yet another approach?

The methodology used to decrease the chance of circularity is to separate the interpretation from the study of contextual characteristics and to see only after a classification was made whether and how the contextual characteristics and the interpretations may be related. Since some of the questions are also related to methodological choices it seemed best to first test some of the questions and the corpus methodology on a comparable form in a living language. For this purpose Dutch *ergens* ‘somewhere, at some time, *prepositional object*, ‘about, around’, at some point (on a scale), *modal particle*’ was chosen. The results of this study could help in the study of Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. This way, the main question of this dissertation has become the following: how do people disambiguate and interpret poly-interpretable forms like *ergens* and how can the results of the study of *ergens* help us to make an empirically well founded description of a comparable form in a dead language like $\pi\omicron\upsilon$? This question is too general to be studied as such, therefore in 1.2 the research questions were subdivided as follows.

1. How do people use the context to disambiguate poly-interpretable forms and can we use this information to make an empirically well founded description of a poly-interpretable form in a dead language?
 - (a) What is the role of the context in the disambiguation and development of the poly-interpretable Dutch form *ergens* ‘somewhere/anywhere, *modal particle*, at some point (in time), about/around’?
 - (b) What is (are) the function(s) of Dutch *ergens* and how did these functions develop?
 - (c) What can we learn from the study of *ergens* for the interpretation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, a poly-interpretable form in a dead language which also has a locative and a modal function?
 - (d) What are the functions of Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ ‘somewhere/anywhere, *modal particle* about/around’, how did these functions develop and are they comparable to Dutch *ergens*?

In section 1.3 we continued with the theoretical assumptions underlying this dissertation. In section 1.3.2 we discussed both the arguments in favor and against

three ways of conceptualizing the relation between meaning and form: homonymy (one form may have several meanings without a relation), monosemy (one form generally has one meaning) and polysemy (one form may have several related meanings) and we concluded that by themselves none of these approaches covered all linguistic observations.

In section 1.4, we discussed the theoretical assumptions that are made in this dissertation. It will be assumed that words are normally not interpreted in isolation. This means that the 'meaning' of a word may consist of knowledge of the speaker about the linguistic and social contexts in which a form is regularly used and which effects it generally has on the addressee. The choice of the addressee for a particular interpretation may be triggered by similarity of the situation to some known contexts in which a form is used together with an estimation of the communicative goals of the speaker.

Three types of arguments were presented for this approach. In section 1.4.1 we discussed the role of social contextual knowledge in language use, section 1.4.2 was concerned with the diachronic arguments for the way people interpret forms and in 1.4.3 the role of the linguistic context was discussed. A description of a poly-interpretable form is from this point of view a description of the regularities in its linguistic and social contextual features which may be linked to several (generalized) interpretations.

These theoretical notions were linked to concrete methods in section 1.5. In the next part of this dissertation, we will see what the relation between context and interpretation is for the Dutch form *ergens*. This will be done in three ways. We will start with three questionnaires in which participants were asked to interpret instances of *ergens* with varying amounts and types of context. The generalizability of the results of the questionnaires will be tested in a corpus study. To avoid that interpretation and analysis of contextual characteristics influence each other, the interpretation and the contextual characteristics of *ergens* are studied separately and in this respective order. Only when both types of information are gathered, it is investigated to what extent they could be linked to each other. Finally, we will study the role of the context in the development of *ergens* in a historical corpus to see what role the context played in the development of modal *ergens*.

On the basis of the results of the study of *ergens* we will approach Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\nu$ in a comparable way. This study is described in the third part of this dissertation. To avoid circularity, patterns in translations are compared with contextual characteristics of $\pi\omicron\nu$. We start with a synchronic prose corpus and will extend that corpus with the epics and tragedy and comedy to see whether we can say anything about the development of modal $\pi\omicron\nu$. The part on $\pi\omicron\nu$ will end with a comparison of $\pi\omicron\nu$ and *ergens*. The last part of this dissertation consists of the summary, conclusions and some suggestions for further research.

Part II

What information does a language user need to arrive at an interpretation? The case of Dutch *ergens*

CHAPTER 2

Research questions and introduction to *ergens*

2.1 Introduction

If we were to ask Dutch speakers out of the blue what *ergens* means, they would say something like *at some place*.¹ This is not surprising, as *ergens* is the general word for somewhere/anywhere in Dutch.² An example can be found in (1).

- (1) Ik realiseerde me ineens dat ik het mes niet zomaar ergens neer kon
I realized me suddenly that I the knife not just ERGENS down could
leggen.
put.

(De grijpgrage handjes van mijn dochttertje kennende voorzag ik onaangename gevolgen.)

Suddenly, I realized that I could not just put the knife down anywhere (*ergens*). (I knew the grabby little fingers of my little daughter too well, not to foresee unpleasant consequences.)³

However, there are many examples in which this locative interpretation is impossible. For instance in example (2), a locative interpretation is very unlikely, because a location in the physical world does not seem to be appropriate in this context. The

¹This was tested on 8 native Dutch speakers, who all answered immediately with a description of the indefinite locative interpretation.

²Unlike English, Dutch does not have the possibility to differentiate between somewhere and anywhere.

³From: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001047.

interpretation of *ergens* in this example can be paraphrased by *in (some part of) my mind*. Interestingly, we find in the paraphrase another locative element *in* that does not refer to a place in the physical world. Something locative seems to have remained in this interpretation, although it seems to refer to a place in someone's mind.⁴ As we will see in chapter 3, one can even add *inside* to *ergens* without any change to the modal interpretation.

- (2) Maar toch, toch had ik vroeger ergens óók altijd geloofd dat
 But still, still had I when I was a child ERGENS also always believed that
- mijn moeders verhaal maar een verzinsel was, een
 my mother's story only a figment of her imagination was, a
- sprookje zoals alle andere die ze me had verteld, alleen zonder
 fairy-tale like all others that she me had told, only without
- “zij leefden nog lang en gelukkig”.
 ‘they lived ever after long and happily’.

But still, when I was a child I had *ergens* also believed that my mother's story was only a figment of her imagination, a fairy-tale like all the other ones she had told me, only without ‘and they lived happily ever after’.⁵

Apart from this modal interpretation, *ergens* has yet another use:

- (3) Maar hebben jullie niks meegemaakt vandaag? Ik bedoel we moeten 't
 But have you nothing experienced today? I mean we must it
- toch wel ergens (1) over kunnen hebben wat echt ergens (2) over
 PTCL PTCL ERGENS (1) about can have what really ERGENS (2) about
- gaat toch of niet?
 goes PTCL or not?

But did nothing happen to you today? I mean, we should be able to find something (*ergens*) to talk about that is really meaningful, shouldn't we?^{6 7}

The indefinite *ergens* is also used as the indefinite object of a preposition, instead of *something*, as in both instances of *ergens* in example (3). This is not to say that it is impossible to use *iets* ‘something’ in this kind of situation, but it is just not the standard way to do it. When a Dutch speaker wants to use an indefinite pronoun

⁴A location in someone's mind is of course a mental space. This last term is also a technical term from Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier, 1994 [1985]). In chapter 5 we will come back to this and discuss *ergens* from within Mental Space Theory.

⁵From: Dorrestein (2003).

⁶Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000555.

⁷To improve readability, the examples that were used in the surveys have been adapted. Restarts were taken out as well as agreement mistakes. In addition, all examples that were used had 9-15 words on each side of *ergens*, while still being complete sentences.

which depends on a preposition, the locative indefinite adverb will be used instead of the indefinite pronoun *something*.

The three uses above are the ones mentioned in the standard Van Dale dictionary of Dutch, which paraphrases the modal interpretation as *in enig opzicht, onder zeker aspect* ‘in some respect’. The largest scientific dictionary of Dutch, the *Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal* (WNT), in an article published in 1917, does not mention the modal option, but it does give a temporal use paraphrased as ‘ever’. This use is not present in the synchronic corpora used in this study.⁸ What is present, though, is a more concrete temporal use which is more comparable to a metaphorical extension from place to time as in (4). Although *at some point in time* is a very common metaphor, the paraphrase that is used in the dictionaries for locative *ergens, at some place*, cannot be used in this context.

- (4) Speaker 1: Wanneer heeft ze toen ook alweer haar rijbewijs gehaald?
When has she then also again her drivers license got?

Weet je dat nog? Speaker 2: Ergens in 't najaar. Speaker 1: Oktober of
Know you that still? ERGENS in the fall. October or

zo hè? Speaker 2: Ja, oktober, november dacht ik ook.
so PTCL? Yes, October, November thought I also.

Speaker 1: When did she pass her drivers license exam back then? Do you still remember? Speaker 2: *Ergens* in the fall. Speaker 1: October or something, isn't it? Speaker 2: Yes, I also thought something like October, November.⁹

The locative interpretation is not only metaphorically extended to a temporal one, but also more generally to a point on a scale as in example (5).

- (5) Enkele gevallen zei minister Van Boxtel en daarmee bedoelt ie ergens
Several cases said minister Van Boxtel and with that means he ERGENS

tussen de vijf en de tien gevallen van illegaal namaken.
between the five and the ten cases of illegal reproduction.

Several cases minister Van Boxtel said and by several cases he means *ergens* between five and ten cases of illegal reproduction.¹⁰

This last use implies that the speaker is not very precise. A comparable use which evokes less of a scale is found in example (6). In this example, we may paraphrase *ergens* with the interpretation *about/around*.

- (6) Ik speel orgel vanaf mijn tiende ergens, ik heb tot mijn achttiende
I play organ from my tenth ERGENS, I have until my eighteenth

⁸The following corpora were used in this study: the Corpus Gesproken Nederlands (CGN), the Eindhoven corpus and a corpus of novels. For a more elaborate description see chapter 5.

⁹Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000393.

¹⁰Adapted from: CGN comp-f/nl/fn007187.

veel les gehad, hoewel met twee - drie jaar onderbreking.
many lesson had, although with two - three years interruption.

I have been playing the organ from about ten years old *ergens*, until my eighteenth birthday, I took many lessons, though with a break of two - three years in between.¹¹

In total, we have now seen six different uses of *ergens*. This raises the question of how an addressee knows which interpretation to choose.

2.2 Research questions

The main question in this part on *ergens* will be how a language user decides on his interpretation of *ergens* when so many possibilities are available. What knowledge of the language does a language user need, and what kind of properties of the context are required for a specific interpretation? These are not easy questions. As Riemer (2010, 227) states:

"In natural language[,] sentences [which are ambiguous because they contain polysemous items [EK]] do not typically create confusion. Why not is still a mystery. We do not yet know how humans succeed in picking the right senses of ambiguous words: the relevant psychological processes are simply not at all understood."

In the coming chapters, I will focus on the properties of the context of *ergens* and see whether we can link people's interpretation to the presence of specific features of the context. For this study, I will use both surveys and corpus data. In addition, I will try to find out whether the regularities that were found on the synchronic level, can be explained by the historical development of the interpretations of *ergens*.

Theoretically there are many ways people may disambiguate *ergens* using the context. For this study, I have considered three options.

1. A default based approach: The language user assumes *ergens* is interpreted as locative, unless the context forces him to think otherwise.
2. A context based approach: The language user uses his knowledge of the context¹² to determine the interpretation. If there is no context or the context is ambiguous, he will just guess.
3. A combination of both: If there is no context the language user uses as default the most concrete interpretation (i.e. locative). In other cases, his knowledge of the context will be used to decide.

¹¹From: <http://s12.invisionfree.com/organist/ar/t2314.htm>.

¹²By knowledge of the context, I mean both communicative knowledge and conventions as well as knowledge of linguistic conventions and constructions.

As we will see in the coming chapters, there are some indications that the last option could account best for the results of the surveys on *ergens*. However, further research will show whether this conclusion is generalizable over other poly-interpretable forms as well.

In chapter 3, three surveys will be discussed. In these surveys, we will compare the interpretations of *ergens* in minimally modified examples¹³ from a corpus, with the interpretations of the same sentences when very little context was provided and when the context was modified. On the basis of the results we will propose a generalization on which properties of the context lead to which interpretations.

In chapter 4, the generalizations on the properties of the context that seemed to make the difference in the surveys will be tested against more corpus data. In chapter 5, we will look at the pragmatic properties of the examples of *ergens* in the corpora.

In chapter 6 we will investigate whether the types of context that were distinguished in the synchronic corpus also played a role in the historical development of the various interpretations of *ergens*.

¹³Restarts were taken out as well as agreement mistakes. In addition, all examples had 9-15 words on each side of *ergens*, while still being complete sentences.

CHAPTER 3

An experimental approach to the role of the context

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we take an experimental approach to the general question of what determines how people interpret a specific instance of *ergens*. In the previous chapter, we have already seen that many interpretations of *ergens* have a metaphorical relation to each other and that some interpretations show an overlap in their uses. This raises the question as to what extent people actually agree on an interpretation. For overall communicative purposes there is not always a difference between, for instance, a scale interpretation and a temporal interpretation, or between the three modal interpretations. Therefore, the first theoretical question to be answered is the following:

1. Are native speakers as a group consistent in their interpretations?

As we will see below, there is clearly a preferred interpretation among language users, although in some cases there is some variation.

The next step is to find out what features of the context made that the subjects choose that preferred interpretation. The notion *context* is vague and can both refer to actual linguistic elements in the direct environment of *ergens* as well as larger dependencies or even non-linguistic information. Here, we will focus on the linguistic features of the context, although other information probably plays an important role as well. We will adopt a conservative approach in the sense that we will use the direct linguistic context of *ergens* (i.e. two words before and after it) to see to what extent we can account for the interpretation of *ergens* on the basis of this minimal context alone. This way we will try to find an answer to the following question:

2. How much context do language users need to be consistent in an interpretation?

Answering this question will automatically provide us with the data to start answering another question:

3. What linguistic cues guide the choice of an interpretation?

If we really know which features of the context determine which interpretation is chosen by language users, we should also be able to change the context in such a way that the interpretation of *ergens* changes. Therefore, the last question to be answered in this chapter is:

4. Can we influence the interpretation of a language user by manipulating the context?

However, if we succeed in answering these questions, we have only answered them for the experimental sentences that were used. It may be that for other sentences, other features play a role. Therefore, the results of the surveys that are discussed in this chapter will be tested against corpus data in the following chapter.

3.2 The experimental setup

In order to test the questions that were posed in section 3.1, I designed three questionnaires. All three questionnaires ask the subjects what *ergens* means in 43 sentences. The subjects were offered the following eight multiple choice options in random order¹ and an option *Other, i.e.*² The reason that these options were offered as possible interpretations of *ergens* will be given in the following section.

- at some place
- at some moment
- at some point (on a scale)
- on something, about something, towards something, in something
- in someone's own feelings or thoughts
- from a certain point of view

¹The answers are offered in a random order because the pilot participants showed an inclination to stop looking for the best answer as soon as they found an option they could live with. This could be seen by the movements of their mouse. The options lower in the list were also chosen less frequently. Therefore each participant was randomly assigned a questionnaire, and the answers to the questions were offered in a different order, assigned at random.

²From the spatial markers in the modal paraphrases such as *in, point (of view), around* it is clear how widespread the mental space metaphor is. For a more elaborate discussion see chapter 5.

- about/around
- Other, i.e.:

The last option (Other: i.e.) was added to find out whether the participants agreed with the multiple choice options that were offered. This last point is crucial in this experimental setup. One of our questions is how much variation there is within the population of Dutch speakers in their interpretation of *ergens*. However, we run the risk that variation in the answers is not due to variation in the interpretation of participants, but to the lack of the right description to fit their intuition. Therefore, the first thing we need to test is whether the participants agree with the choices they were offered. One way to do that is to give them the option of adding an interpretation, another one is to see whether for every paraphrase there is at least one sentence for which a large majority of the subjects agrees on that specific paraphrase. If there are few additions and the subjects agree that there is at least one sentence for which that paraphrase is almost perfect, we can conclude that a) the subjects do not object to the formulation and b) the interpretation filled a need.

Another thing that could influence our results is the choice of the test sentences. If there is something unnatural about the sentences, our results will not be generalizable. Therefore, I chose to base the sentences on actual corpus data. The sentences had to be modified a bit in order to be suited for a written questionnaire and to make the length of the sentences somewhat comparable. Restarts, which are typical for spoken language, but look very weird on paper were taken out, as well as agreement mistakes. In survey 1, each example of *ergens* was presented in a context of complete sentences of between 9 and 15 words before and after *ergens*. The sentences of survey 1 were the basis of the other surveys. The questionnaires were filled in online and for every sentence an answer had to be provided.

The participants (113 in total, 36 for survey 1, 37 for survey 2 and 40 for survey 3) were all native Dutch speakers and recruited from four main sources. The members of a dancing school in Amsterdam were asked to fill out a questionnaire online. In addition, volunteer teachers of Dutch as a second language were asked to participate. A third group were the members of an allotment garden community in the neighborhood of Amsterdam and the last group were members of the classics department at Leiden university. This way of recruiting subjects made sure there were various ages and (educational) backgrounds represented. However, a majority of the subjects were female and had a higher education diploma. Six participants (out of a total of 113) did not have access to a computer and filled in the questionnaire on paper. The questionnaires themselves can be found in appendix A. Each individual was assigned one of the three surveys at random. They did not receive any remuneration.

We will now turn to the exact goals and hypotheses per survey.

3.2.1 Survey 1

As was described in the previous section, survey 1 consists of minimally modified corpus sentences. Beforehand, I hypothesized on the basis of native speaker intuition which interpretation would probably be the preferred interpretation. Of each

of the eight interpretations offered, five examples were presented in the survey. In addition, it was noted for each sentence whether a high degree of variation between the participants was expected. At least three of the five cases per category were of the type where little variation was expected. Apart from the five instances per category, three extra instances of *ergens* were added. Two because there was more than one instance of *ergens* in the same sentence and one option to balance the number of instances from the three corpora.

Survey 1 is supposed to answer the following questions that were discussed above. I will repeat them here:

1. Do subjects agree with the classification of interpretations made?
2. Are interpretations consistent across language users?

In addition, the results of survey 1 will be used as the 'gold standard' for the other surveys. That is, in order to answer the questions about the effect of the context, we will need to compare the manipulated contexts of surveys 2 and 3 with a standard. The results of survey 1 function as this standard.

Question 1 will be answered by checking whether many participants added options, whether they did so for the same sentences and whether they added comparable options. In addition we will see whether all multiple choice options had a high agreement level between the participants at least once. In addition, it will be tested whether the participants agreed with the option that was hypothesized to be the best description of the sentence.

Question 2 will be answered by looking at the variation in the answers of the participants, both quantitatively and qualitatively. We will see how much variation there is between participants and between which interpretations there is variation. We will also try to explain why this is the case on the basis of the properties of the context.

3.2.2 Survey 2

This survey seeks to answer questions 3 and 4, which are reprinted below. The three surveys were filled out by different participants to avoid interference or recognition of the examples.

3. What context makes language users decide on a specific interpretation?
4. How much context do language users need to be consistent in an interpretation?

These questions will be answered in the following way. In survey 2, the context of the sentences in survey 1 was reduced to two words before and two words after *ergens* to see whether the participants interpret the sentences in the same way they did in survey 1, even though they have far less context. We will try to explain why the interpretations changed or did not change, using the context that remained. In addition, the participants were asked how certain they were of their interpretation.

This may give us insight in whether people become uncertain when they have little context and whether uncertainty correlates with variation.

It was expected that in the cases where the direct trigger (i.e. words or recognizable parts of constructions) of a specific interpretation was cut, the interpretation would change more frequently to a locative interpretation than to other interpretations, because the locative interpretation is the most frequent and concrete interpretation and might therefore function as a default option.

3.2.3 Survey 3

This survey will try to find an answer to question 5 below.

5. Can we influence the interpretation of a language user by manipulating the context?

In survey 3 the sentences of survey 1 were changed in such a way that with minimal adjustments we expected the interpretations to change. This was done mainly on the basis of my intuition, but there were clear patterns in what needed to be changed, such as predicates, temporal and locative phrases and in some cases the whole construction. Words were only replaced if the result would otherwise be nonsense or would give the original interpretation to *ergens*. An example is given in (1). The words in italics were added and the words that are crossed out were deleted. The replacement of *het gevoel* ‘the feeling’ by *read* makes the statement less subjective and introduces the possibility of a locative addition to the verb.

- (1) Steven knikte. Daar heb ik ook al aan gedacht. Maar ergens heb Steven nodded. There have I also already to thought. But ERGENS have

ik *gelezen* ~~het gevoel~~ dat er meer achter steekt.
I *read* ~~the feeling~~ that there more behind is.

Steven nodded. I also thought about that. But *ergens* I have read/ the feeling that there is something behind it.³

The results of this survey will be compared to the results of survey 1 both in whether changes in interpretation occurred and what the direction of these changes was. This will be linked both to the expectation beforehand and to the specific changes that were made.

3.3 A preliminary corpus study: Which interpretations does *ergens* get?

In this section, I will propose a categorization for the main interpretations of *ergens* on the basis of corpus data and native speaker intuition.

³Adapted from: CGN comp-o/vl/fv800158.

The goal of the categories that are distinguished in this section, is to give the subjects enough options to make an intuitive choice, but not so many that for every sentence there is a unique description. I argue that the three or four uses that are mentioned in the dictionaries are not enough for this purpose. Therefore, I propose some additional categories and split up the modal category into three. Some of these new categories are clearly extensions of other uses, but they are common and different enough to make it impossible to set up a survey without them.

The categories at some place and on something, about something, towards something, in something

Two of the interpretations of *ergens* that were mentioned in the Van Dale dictionary are relatively straightforward and clear. These two interpretations are the locative interpretation *at some place* and the prepositional object interpretation *something*. In example (2) and (3) two examples are given.

- (2) Ik realiseerde me ineens dat ik het mes niet zomaar ergens neer kon
I realized me suddenly that I the knife not just ERGENS down could
leggen. (De grijpgrage handjes van mijn dochttertje kennende voorzag
put. The grabby hands of my little daughter knowing foresaw
ik onaangename gevolgen.)
I unpleasant consequences.

Suddenly, I realized that I could not just put the knife down anywhere. (I knew the grabby little fingers of my daughter too well, not to foresee unpleasant consequences.)⁴

- (3) Maar hebben jullie niks meegemaakt vandaag? Ik bedoel we moeten 't
But have you nothing experienced today? I mean we must it
toch wel ergens (1) over kunnen hebben wat echt ergens (2) over
PTCL PTCL ERGENS (1) about can have what really ERGENS (2) about
gaat toch of niet?
goes PTCL or not?

But did nothing happen to you today? I mean, we should be able to find something (*ergens*) to talk about that is really about *ergens*, shouldn't we?⁵

The category at some moment

The WNT also mentions a temporal use, which in their example is comparable to *ever*. However, in the synchronic corpora there were no temporal instances with an *ever* interpretation. The cases of temporal *ergens* that were found, were much more

⁴From: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001047.

⁵Adapted from: Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000555.

comparable to a metaphorical extension from *place* to *time* as in (4). Although *at some point in time* is a very common metaphor, the paraphrase that is used in the dictionaries for locative *ergens*, *at some place* cannot be used in this context. For that reason, we need a new category.

- (4) Speaker 1: Wanneer heeft ze toen ook alweer haar rijbewijs gehaald?
When has she then also again her drivers license got?
Weet je dat nog? Speaker 2: Ergens in 't najaar. Speaker 1: Oktober of
Know you that still? ERGENS in the fall. October or
zo hè? Speaker 2: Ja, oktober, november dacht ik ook.
so PTCL? Yes, October, November thought I also.
Speaker 1: When did she pass her drivers license exam back then? Do you still remember? Speaker 2: *Ergens* in the fall. Speaker 1: October or something, isn't it? Speaker 2: Yes, I also thought something like October, November.⁶

The category at some point on a scale

The locative interpretation was not only metaphorically extended to a temporal one, but also to invoke a scale as in example (5).

- (5) Enkele gevallen zei minister Van Boxtel en daarmee bedoelt ie ergens
Several cases said minister Van Boxtel and with that means he ERGENS
tussen de vijf en de tien gevallen van illegaal namaken.
between the five and the ten cases of illegal reproduction.
Several cases minister Van Boxtel said and by several cases he means *ergens*
between five and ten cases of illegal reproduction.⁷

The category about/around

This last use denotes that the speaker is not very precise. This implication seems to be used for its own sake as well, although generally a scale is still present at the background as in example (6).

- (6) Ik speel orgel vanaf mijn tiende ergens, ik heb tot mijn achttiende
I play organ from my tenth ERGENS, I have until my eighteenth
veel les gehad, hoewel met twee - drie jaar onderbreking.
many lesson had, although with two - three years interruption.
I have been playing the organ from about ten years old *ergens*, until my eighteenth birthday, I took many lessons, though with a break of two three years in between.⁸

⁶Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000393.

⁷Adapted from: CGN comp-f/nl/fn007187.

⁸From: <http://s12.invisionfree.com/organist/ar/t2314.htm>.

The reason I consider this a category on its own is that it has become impossible to replace *ergens* by some locative or temporal phrase. Thus, in order to give the participants a reasonable choice, a new category *about/around* must be added.

The category in someone's feelings or thoughts

The modal instances of *ergens* are harder to categorize. The phrase that is used by Van Dale, *in enig opzicht*, apart from being a register specific phrase which makes it problematic to use in a questionnaire, cannot always be used. For instance in example (7), the point is not that the character only believed that her mother's story was a fairy-tale in some respect but that she did not believe that the story was real in some part of her mind. In another part of her mind she knew that something was different about this story as is shown by the phrase *only without 'and they lived happily ever after'*. However, the conviction that the story was a fairy-tale prevailed as is shown by the sentence that follows this example in the original text *Only when I was six years old, did I coincidentally find out that it was all real.*

- (7) Maar toch, toch had ik vroeger ergens óók altijd geloofd dat
 But still, still had I when I was a child ERGENS also always believed that
 mijn moeders verhaal maar een verzinsel was, een
 my mother's story only a figment of her imagination was, a
 sprookje zoals alle andere die ze me had verteld, alleen zonder
 fairy-tale like all others that she me had told, only without
 "zij leefden nog lang en gelukkig."
 'they lived ever after long and happily'.

But still, when I was a child I had *ergens* also believed that my mother's story was only a figment of her imagination, a fairy-tale like all the other ones she had told me, only without 'and they lived happily ever after'.⁹

What happens here is that *ergens* evokes the image of a mental space. A locative metaphor is used to build an image of a mind as a space in which some beliefs are in some place and other beliefs or information are in another place.

Another reason to believe that this kind of metaphorical place sometimes plays a role in modal *ergens* is the fact that people explicitly talk about places in their thoughts and feelings as in example (8), and sometimes use other expressions that use the same image directly after *ergens* as in example (9). To cover these cases, I have created a category *in someone's feelings or thoughts*.

- (8) Ergens in z'n hoofd groeit 't antwoord. Dat 't boos worden niet kwam
 ERGENS in his head grows the answer. That the angry become not came
 door 't museum maar door de plotselinge verandering.
 because of the museum but because of the sudden change.

⁹From: Dorrestein (2003).

Somewhere in his head grows the answer. The answer that the anger was not brought about by the museum but by the sudden change.¹⁰

- (9) Maar ergens heb ik het gevoel dat er meer achter steekt. Ik kan
But ERGENS have I the feeling that there more behind is. I can

vooral die zaak met die tango niet uit mijn hoofd zetten.
especially that case with that tango not out my head put.

But *ergens* I have the feeling that there is more to it. I especially can't get rid of that case with that tango.¹¹

The category somehow

Another type of modal use seems to be covered by the phrase *op een of andere manier* 'somehow'. This use is considered modal because its main function seems to be to express an attitude of the speaker towards the proposition. This phrase covers most instances in which the paraphrase from the Van Dale dictionary, *in enig opzicht* 'in some respect', is a good option, but, in addition, this formulation covers examples like (10).

- (10) Speaker 1: 't lijkt me ook wel heel raar want als ze die neiging
it seems me also PTCL very strange for if they that urge

hadden dan zou dat uh ergens wel uh ... Speaker 2: ja.
had than would that ehm ERGENS PTCL ehm ... Yes.

Speaker 1: zouden ze ergens wel uitgestorven zijn.
would they ERGENS PTCL died out be.

That seems very strange, because if they would have had that inclination, that would *ergens* ehm... Speaker 2: Yes. Speaker 1: they would *ergens* have died out.¹²

The category from a certain point of view

The last modal category I distinguish is the category *from a certain point of view*. This category is needed for those cases in which there is a clear contrast between two views that are not always shared by the speaker. That last characteristic means that these cases do not fit into the category *in someone's feelings or thoughts*. An example is given in (11).

- (11) Daar staat tegenover dat het ergens niet fair is om bepaalde
There stands opposite that it ERGENS not fair is to specific

¹⁰From: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001555.

¹¹From: CGN comp-o/vl/fv800158.

¹²From: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000610.

kennis te hebben jij als individu en die dan niet vrij te geven
 knowledge to have you as individual and that PTCI not free to give

in bepaalde omstandigheden.

in certain situations.

On the other hand it is *ergens* not fair if you as an individual have specific knowledge and you do not release that in certain situations.¹³

An indication that people see *ergens* as a marker of viewpoint, is the following translation from the Leiden University website. In example (12) we see that English *we would call* is translated with *ergens*, indicating that the translator saw *ergens* as a marker of viewpoint.

- (12) a. A special shape we would call rather bizarre is a ewer in the shape of a crayfish.¹⁴
 b. Een speciale, doch *ergens* vrij bizarre, vorm is een lampetkan in de vorm van een rivierkreeft.

As far as I could see, most examples in the corpora were covered by these categories. The only exceptions were examples I could not interpret or in which I did not have enough information to make a choice. Most of these examples were either from the Belgian part of the corpus or contained many restarts. Together with the fact that there is a specific collocation that is restricted to the Belgian part of the corpus, which will be discussed in our more elaborate corpus study below, this suggests that there may be dialect differences in the use of *ergens*. An example is given in (13). This example suggests that in Belgian Dutch *ergens* can be used as *some* as in *some professor from the KUB*. However, in Netherlandic Dutch the only interpretation would be locative, which is blocked by the fact that this is about a specific event of which the location is known. The affiliation of the two professors is also known to the speaker, which means that there is no location to which *ergens* may refer in this sentence.¹⁵ However, it goes beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate these dialectal differences further.

- (13) Ja dus dat waren uhm allemaal Iraanse films en dat werd dan
 Yes, so that were ehm all Iranian films and that was then
 begeleid door ... dat was ne prof uh filmgeschiedenis uit Rotterdam.
 led by ... that was a prof ehm film history from Rotterdam.

¹³From: CGN comp-a/vl/fv400086.

¹⁴<http://research.leiden.edu/research-profiles/amt/news/15-februari-2012.html>.

¹⁵These conclusions were checked with several speakers of Netherlandic Dutch and Flemish. Most speakers of Netherlandic Dutch (N=10) tried to come up with some scenario in which a locative interpretation would be possible. Some said that they really could not interpret it. All speakers of Netherlandic Dutch said they would not call it normal use of *ergens*. Most speakers of Flemish (N=30), however, accept this use and say that it expresses that the speaker does not have more information about the person he is describing. One speaker of Flemish specifically said: *This use is typically found with nouns and it is indicating that someone/something does not need to be specified or is unknown to the speaker*. This indicates that *ergens* may be part of some sort of modifier construction in Flemish.

uh en dan ook nog ergens ene prof vanuit de KUB.
Ehm and then also PTCL ERGENS a prof from the KUB.

Yes, so those films were all Iranian and that was led by ... that was a professor
ehm film history from Rotterdam. Ehm and also a professor from the KUB.¹⁶

Summarizing, we distinguished eight uses of *ergens*. Paraphrases of *ergens* for each of these uses are: *at some place, at some moment, at some point (on a scale), somehow, prepositional object, i.e.: on something, about something, towards something, in something, in someone's own feelings or thoughts, from a certain point of view and about/around*. The main criterion for distinguishing a new category was whether a subject would intuitively be able to choose an option for the examples in the corpus. This categorization will be tested in survey 1, which will be described in the next section.

3.4 Results of survey 1: The interpretation of original corpus data

3.4.1 Introduction

Survey 1 has the following goals as was described in section 3.2.1.

1. To check whether the experimental setup and semantic categories are accepted by the participants
2. To see whether the categorization which was made on the basis of native speaker intuition is shared by a larger group of speakers
3. To see how much variation exists between the semantic interpretations of native speakers in context and which categories seem to be closely related
4. To create a 'gold standard' in order to be able to compare the interpretations of the same sentences in different contexts

These goals are not all of the same nature. Goals 1, 2 and 4 pertain to the working of the experimental setup itself, goal 3 is of a more conceptual nature. In addition, some questions are mainly quantitative and others also need a qualitative evaluation. The discussion of the results is organized by goal and it starts with an overview of the quantitative aspects of the question at hand and the larger tendencies which are found in the data. Step by step these larger tendencies are refined and studied qualitatively by means of examples. Since all conclusions in the end depend on the validity of the experimental setup, we will start by investigating whether the survey worked as expected. That is, did the participants accept the options offered or did they feel the need to add descriptions? If there are no problems in this respect, we can continue to the question of whether a majority of the participants agreed with the expected interpretation.

¹⁶From: CGN comp-c/vl/fv701295.

3.4.2 The acceptance of the multiple choice options

In this survey, it was expected that the subjects would generally find a good description of their interpretation of *ergens* in one of the options given. However, they were given the option of formulating another interpretation. If the participants chose this option frequently and consistently, we must conclude that they did not accept the choices that were offered. However, there are also other ways of finding out whether people agree with the options given, such as the amount of variation in their choices and the agreement-rate with respect to sentences that were hypothesized to belong to a specific category.

If the subjects disagree with (the formulation of) one of the options given, we would expect that this option is chosen only rarely. As can be seen from table 3.1, all options that were predefined have a highest agreement rate above 60% (i.e. in at least 1 example at least 22 of the 36 subjects chose this option). If we take into account that the subjects had nine options to choose from and an equal distribution would result in only four people agreeing on each option, agreement rates above 60% suggest that the subjects probably did not have a fundamental problem with the description and did not fundamentally reject one of the categories as non-existent.

Category	Highest agreement rate
Place	91-100%
Prep. Obj.	91-100%
Time	81-90%
Manner	81-90%
About/around	71-80%
In someone's feelings or thoughts	61-70%
Scale	61-70%
Point of view	61-70%
Other	11- 21%

Table 3.1: Highest agreement rate per category. Number of subjects: 36

However, it may be that the subjects missed an option that in their view would cover the example better. For that reason the option *Other, i.e.:* was available. In general the subjects used this option only rarely. The sentences with the highest number of subjects that wanted to add something had four comments (11%). This is the number of instances that would have been expected if the answers were chosen randomly. Most of these comments paraphrase the sentence or give a description of one of the options that is more in line with the sentence (e.g. *ergens anders* 'somewhere else' has been described not as the option *at some place* (the option that was given) but as *at some other place*). Still, there are some recurring comments that may point into the direction of a missing option. Six of the subjects mention the interpretation *eigenlijk* 'in fact, actually, really' ten times in total. However, there is only one sentence in which two subjects have added this option for the same sentence. This makes it hard to draw conclusions. Apparently, six subjects thought this interpretation important

enough to add it, but they did not do so for the same sentences.

The only sentence in which two subjects added this interpretation was example (14).

- (14) Ik bewonder mensen wel die de moed hebben om dat te doen. Ik
I admire people PTCL that the courage have so as to that to do. I
zou dat ergens wel willen maar ja we maken keuzes in het leven
would that ERGENS PTCL want but PTCL we make choices in the life
hè?
PTCL?
I do admire people that have the courage to do such a thing. I would *ergens*
want to do that, but we make choices in life, don't we? ¹⁷

All the examples for which the addition *eigenlijk* is suggested, contain some sort of adversativity. Since *eigenlijk* is commonly used in this type of context (Bergen et al., 2011), the presence of adversativity may be a reason for subjects to add this option. What is difficult to assess though, is whether the subjects really wanted to say that *ergens* should in adversative contexts be interpreted as *eigenlijk* or that they would prefer the use of *eigenlijk* over the use of *ergens* in these situations. Because of the lack of agreement on which sentences need to be interpreted as *eigenlijk*, I hesitate to conclude the former and I am inclined to think the latter, but it is impossible to make that decision on the basis of these data. This problem is inherent in the addition of an *Other* field to a questionnaire, without the possibility to ask people in person what they meant. What we can conclude is that, given the right adversative context, the interpretation of *ergens* and *eigenlijk* probably is quite similar. However, I do not consider this enough evidence for the presence of another use of *ergens* meaning *eigenlijk*.

There are two cases in which a participant felt that the presence of *ergens* in the sentence was incorrect. Although the other subjects did not add anything, these sentences were among the ones with the lowest agreement rates (both sentences 47% for respectively 'from a certain point of view' and 'somehow'). Interestingly, as can be seen from (15) and (16), both examples have *ergens* in clause final position and a modal majority interpretation. It may be that not all speakers accept that position in the clause completely.

- (15) Zij kan niet fulltime werken. En huishouden is in principe een
She can not full-time work. And housekeeping is in principle a
fulltime baan ergens. Zeker in haar tempo omdat zij
full-time job ERGENS. Especially in her tempo because she
last heeft van reuma.
bother has of rheumatism.

¹⁷Adapted from: CGN comp-b/vl/fv400101.

She can't work full-time. And housekeeping is in principle a full-time job *ergens*. Especially at her pace, because she has rheumatism.¹⁸

- (16) Hoe nu die elementen eruit komen, is een kwestie van je
How now those elements out come, is a matter of your
persoonlijkheid toch ergens, dat kun je niet wegdrücken.
personality PTCL ERGENS, that can you not push away.
En die persoonlijkheid die heb je zelf.
And that personality that have you self.
How those elements are expressed is a matter of your own personality *ergens*, you can't suppress that. And your personality that is yours.¹⁹

Summarizing, we may conclude that there is no reason to think that the subjects disagreed with the options given or needed other options to choose from. This means that we can use this classification for the other surveys as well.

3.4.3 The results with respect to the expectations

Before survey 1 was carried out, I categorized all instances of *ergens* in the CGN, the Eindhoven corpus and my corpus of novels on the basis of my own intuitions. I also wrote down what I expected the subjects would answer in the surveys and how much variation I expected for each sentence. One of the questions that always arises when annotating corpus data, is whether other native speakers would agree with the categorizations made. This survey is a possibility to test my categorization of a small set of sentences against 36 other Dutch speakers. The results of this test will be presented below.

In 36 of the 43 sentences (84%) the majority of the subjects chose the expected answer, which is a significant result²⁰. All other sentences had the expected answer as the second or third most frequent answer. Five of the seven examples that did not follow the hypothesis were expected beforehand to show variation because of overlapping categories. The only two examples in which the variation was not expected, were hypothesized to be interpreted as points on a scale but were described as *about* and *at some moment* by the subjects. The first example is shown in (17) below, the second one in example (18).

- (17) Ik zag dat ze goed verzorgd haar had. Geen grijs haartje,
I saw that she well-cared-for cared hair had. No grey little hair,
begrijp je wel. Ergens in de veertig dacht ik. Maar ze gedroeg
understand you PTCL. ERGENS in the forties thought I. But she behaved

¹⁸ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn007972.

¹⁹ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus ec\corpus\CGTLE.IH.

²⁰ A binomial test with a test proportion of 0.11 was significant with $p < 0.0001$.

zich nog steeds als een verwend kind.
herself still like a spoiled child.

I saw her hair was well-cared-for. Not a grey hair anywhere, you know the type. *Ergens* in her forties, I thought. But she behaved like a spoiled child.²¹

In example (17), 15 votes (of 36 in total) were for *about* and 13 for *at some point on a scale*. This suggests that the subjects had a hard time choosing between those two options. This may be explained by the fact that the expression *ergens in de* [number] is a common way to express *about*. Literally this expression evokes the image of a point on a scale on which the position is unclear. The communicative effect, however, is that this sentence expresses that the speaker is not very precise. So this may be seen as an example in which the subjects have to choose between the overall effect of a construction (expressing that the speaker is not very precise) and the form of the construction (an indefinite point on a scale). Some of the subjects seem to have chosen for the overall effect and have chosen the option *about*, while others have chosen on the basis of the form of the construction, a point on a scale.

- (18) De Pueblo-indianen gebruikten bakstenen om hun dorpen
The Pueblo Indians used bricks in order to their villages

en stadjes te bouwen. Ergens tussen twaalfhonderd en
and towns to build. ERGENS between twelve hundred and

veertienhonderd na Christus kwamen de Navaho de streek
fourteen hundred after Christ came the Navaho Indians the area

binnen.
in.

The Pueblo Indians used bricks to build their villages and towns. *Ergens* between twelve hundred and fourteen hundred AD the Navaho arrived in the area.²²

In example (18) we have a comparable situation. The whole phrase starting with *ergens* expresses a time period, which is presented as a scale. The subjects chose for the overall interpretation of the phrase, temporal, instead of the scalar form of the expression.

We may conclude that, generally, the results fitted the expectations very well. This allows us to continue with survey 2 and 3, which use survey 1 as their basis and which were constructed under the assumption that the results of survey 1 would support most of the analyses. First, however, we will continue our discussion of survey 1 with the questions on variation between subjects.

²¹ Adapted from: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001142.

²² Adapted from: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001490.

3.4.4 Agreement and confusion: Does ‘the correct interpretation’ exist?

In the previous section, the incidence of agreement between the subjects was already mentioned several times in passing. In this section, I will discuss the extent to which there is a generally accepted interpretation for specific instances of *ergens*.

A quantitative overview

In this survey, the 36 subjects had 9 options to choose from. Eight of those options were multiple choice options and in one option the subjects were offered the possibility to add an interpretation themselves. This means that if the participants had no idea what to choose and therefore chose a random option, each option would be expected to be equally distributed and thus have 4 votes. A distribution like this was found for none of the examples of *ergens*. In fact, every sentence had options that were not checked by any of the participants. This shows that there is a clear direction in the data. Even if we only take into account those options the participants actually checked, in all sentences except one the differences between the options that were checked are statistically significant in a χ^2 test²³. The exceptional example will be discussed below in example (23).

The agreement rate among the subjects is moderate according to the traditional use of Fleiss’ kappa ($\kappa = 0.44$, $p < 0.001$ ²⁴). Fleiss’ kappa is used to measure the agreement between raters of nominal data and has a range of 0-1, in which 0 is an agreement level that is complete chance and 1 is complete agreement between the raters.²⁵

The categories for which kappa is highest are the *at some place* category and the prepositional object category. For those categories κ is respectively 0.69 and 0.71, which is generally considered to be a substantial agreement. The *at some moment*-category has a moderate agreement level of $\kappa = 0.51$ and the other predefined options had a fair agreement level with a κ 0.2-0.4. The *Other*-option had a poor agreement level and a κ of 0.02. This last value of κ shows that the *Other*-option was not chosen more frequently than chance, as we already concluded in the previous subsection. Generally we can conclude that there is more agreement among the subjects on the place and prepositional object categories than on the other categories, but nevertheless the subjects had a moderate agreement level.

If we now zoom in to the level of the sentences, we find that there is no sentence where the option that gets the most votes drops below 36% (13 out of 36) of the votes, whereas the chance level lies at 4 votes for every option. As can be seen from table 3.2, in 70% of the sentences more than 50% of the subjects have checked the same

²³For the individual test results of all 43 sentences see appendix B.

²⁴Since kappa has been shown to be influenced by prevalence in the data, that is, by the distributions of data across the categories (Lantz and Nebenzahl, 1996; Cicchetti and Feinstein, 1990; Feinstein and Cicchetti, 1990), the interpretation of kappa given above may be too conservative.

²⁵An overview of the interpretations that are traditionally given of Fleiss’ kappa as given by Viera and Garrett (2005):

	Slight	Fair	Moderate	Substantial	Almost perfect
Kappa	0.01-0.20	0.21-0.40	0.41-0.60	0.61-0.80	0.81-0.99

option. Therefore we can conclude that in general there is a clear direction in the data in favor of one particular option.

<u>% of agreement between the subjects</u>	<u>% of the sentences in this category</u>
91-100	9.3 (4)
81-90	16.3 (7)
71-80	11.6 (5)
61-70	18.6 (8)
51-60	14.0 (6)
41-50	25.6 (11)
31-40	4.7 (2)
21-30	0.0 (0)
1-30	0.0 (0)
Total	100.0 (43)

Table 3.2: Percentage of agreement of the subjects (N =36) as it is divided over the sentences (N=43). The numbers between brackets are the raw number of sentences.

However, there are always cases in which only very few subjects checked a specific interpretation. It may be that subjects sometimes made a mistake. In some cases, they even wrote at the end of the survey in the *comments* box that they made mistakes but were unable to correct them because they were not allowed to go back. That is why I have decided to take only those cases that have more than 4 votes as potentially meaningful variation. That is, more than the number we would expect if the subjects had chosen an option at random.

If we now zoom in on the potentially meaningful variation, table 3.3 shows that the votes that were given to interpretations other than the most frequent one, were given to a maximum of two other options per sentence. In 33% of the cases (14 of the 43 sentences) there is no doubt at all. That is, all other options received fewer than five votes. In 49% of the cases (21 sentences) there was only one other option that received more than 4 votes and in 19% of the sentences (8 cases) there were two options apart from the preferred one that received more than 4 votes. There were no cases in which there were more than three meaningful options involved.

<u>Variation</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>raw numbers</u>
No doubt	32.6%	14
A second option	48.8%	21
A third option	18.6%	8
More than three options	0%	0
Total	100%	43

Table 3.3: The amount of variation above chance level in percentage of sentences

The existence of a second potentially meaningful option raises the question of how these options relate to each other. Do the subjects choose for both options equally often, or is there also a clear preference between these two options? In 62% (18) of the sentences with a second option (29 sentences) the difference in votes between the preferred option and the second option is more than 5 votes, which shows that the existence of a second option does not automatically imply that there is no preference in the data.

The next step is to find out which options there is variation between and why this is the case. Closer inspection reveals that there are some clear regularities in this respect. There are four groups of options that are found as each other's second or third choices. There is a group of modal interpretations that show some variation between *in someone's feelings or thoughts*, *from a certain point of view*, and *somehow*. The second group varies between *about*, *at some moment* and *at some point on a scale*. The third group consists of cases that have *at some place* as their first choice and the prepositional object as their second choice. The last group consists of one case in which the second option for *at some moment* is *at some place*. An overview of the groups can be seen in table 3.4 below.

Group	1 st choice	2 nd choice	3 rd choice	% of sentences
1: feelings, point of view, somehow	feelings	somehow		7% (3)
	feelings	somehow	point of view	5% (2)
	feelings	point of view		2% (1)
	point of view	somehow		9% (4)
	point of view	feelings	somehow	2% (1)
	somehow	point of view		5% (2)
	somehow	point of view	feelings	2% (1)
	somehow	feelings	point of view	2% (1)
	Total			35% (15)
2: about, time, scale	about	time		9% (4)
	about	time	scale	2%(1)
	about	scale		2% (1)
	time	scale	about	2% (1)
	time	scale		2% (1)
	scale	about		7% (3)
	Total			26% (11)
3: place, prep. obj.	place	prep. obj.		5% (2)
4: time, place	time	place		2% (1)
Total				67 % (29)

Table 3.4: The four groups within which there is variation. N =43. Between brackets are the raw numbers.

The modal options *in someone's feelings or thoughts, from a certain point of view*, and *somehow* show the largest degree of mutual exchangeability. However, this does not mean that the subjects never have clear preferences with respect to these options. The difference in votes between the first and the second option within these modal categories varies from 0 to 24 votes out of a total of 36 votes. Table 3.5 shows the average difference between the preferred and second choice of the subject. Because the first and second choices cover a large majority of the total number of cases, this seems a good way to measure variation. This way of measuring means that the higher the number the smaller variation in the category.

Category	Variation
PrepObj	27,2
Place	23,2
Time	18,6
Somehow	14,8
About/around	12,3
Feelings	8,7
Scale	7
Point Of View	5,2

Table 3.5: The variation per category. The numbers are the average differences in votes between the first and second choices. This means that the higher the difference the less variation there was in the responses of the subjects (N =36).

A closer look at the individual examples

The cases in which the subjects checked the two or even three modal options mentioned above more than four times contain both cases in which there is a lot of variation and cases that show a clear preference for one of the options. I will now discuss examples of both types and from all groups and I will suggest an explanation as to why some of these sentences may be regarded as very clear whereas others show much more variation.

In example (19), for instance, there is a lot of variation. Two options, *from a certain point of view* and *somehow*, were both checked 15 times, suggesting that subjects were not sure which one to choose. The reason for this division may be that *somehow* seems to be the best option in its own clause, but the phrase *aan de andere kant* 'on the other hand' in the second clause suggests that the first clause contained a point of view with which *on the other hand* is contrasted. The interpretation *from a certain point of view* may fit better in such a contrastive environment. A possible explanation for the variation is therefore that some of the subjects have decided to let their clause internal preferences prevail, whereas the others may have thought the overall structure of the two sentences together more important.

- (19) Krakau vond 'k eigenlijk ook heel erg mooi. Warschau viel ergens
Cracow found I PTCL also very really pretty. Warschau fell ERGENS

tegen omdat 't nagebouwd is, maar aan de andere kant was 't leuk om te
short because it rebuilt is, but on the other hand was it nice to to

zien.
see.

Cracow I found also very pretty. Warsaw was *ergens* disappointing, because
it was rebuilt, but on the other hand it was nice to see.²⁶

The votes of example (20) show very little variation. A preponderance of 81% of the participants (29) interpreted this sentence as *somehow*. Only five subjects (14%) voted for *from a certain point of view*.

- (20) In bijna alle talen bestaan woorden voor die emoties. Dat duidt
In almost all languages exist words for these emotions. That shows

toch ergens aan dat inderdaad die verschillende soorten emoties
PTCL ERGENS on that PTCL these different sorts emotions

dus ook universeel zijn.
thus also universal are.

In almost all languages there are words for these emotions. That shows *ergens*
that all these emotions are also universal.²⁷

In example (20) all non-modal interpretations would be nonsensical. Therefore people are forced to assume a modal interpretation. In addition, the main verb in the *ergens* clause is an impersonal epistemic verb. This limits the interpretation of *ergens* to options that can be seen as outside of the speaker's influence. The only modal option that does not refer to someone's personal state of mind is the option *somehow*, which makes this interpretation the most likely. The interpretation *from a certain point of view* would be the least subjective option after that, since it does not refer directly to a person's thoughts or feelings. The lack of variation may therefore be explained by the combination of the impossibility of a non-modal interpretation and the use of an impersonal epistemic verb.

Even though the incidence of agreement varies widely within the modal category, there is only one sentence with a modal interpretation that does not have a second option at all. The other six sentences that show no meaningful variation are all cases of non-modal *ergens*. The only modal example with such a high agreement rate is shown in example (21). Its only possible interpretation is, according to the subjects, 'somehow'.

²⁶ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000678.

²⁷ Adapted from: CGN comp-n/vl/fv400576.

- (21) Zaterdag is er weer een demonstratie en dan gaat ze naar 't
Saturday is there again a demonstration and then goes she to the

eindpunt om toch ergens, ja, mee te tellen.
end point in order to PTCL ERGENS, PTCL, with to count.

Kijk d'r vallen onderweg weer mensen af.
Look there drop underway again people out.

Saturday there is another demonstration and then she will go to the end point in order to *ergens* count. Look, people are dropping out on the way again.²⁸

A possible explanation for the lack of variation in (21) is that the use of *om* 'in order to' already signals that we are seeing the situation from within the thoughts of the person described. To mark something as your own feeling, thought or point of view within your own thoughts is superfluous. Therefore, it seems that the reason for the lack of variation is that the other interpretations are excluded by the implications of the word *om* in the direct environment of *ergens*. Theoretically, however, the subjects could have chosen a locative interpretation as well.

The second group of options that are frequently found as each other's second options is *about*, *at some moment* and *at some point (on a scale)*. The fact that these three options are often each other's second option may be explained as follows. The function of putting something in a non-specified position on a scale is often to denote vagueness of expression, which can also be expressed by (*about*) and time is often portrayed as a scale. In other words, there is some overlap between the categories. However, just as in the example above, this does not mean that the subjects do not have very specific preferences for only one of these options in some sentences. Especially *at some moment* is very frequently chosen without any second options and with the highest percentages of agreement. Example (22), for instance, has very little variation.

- (22) Speaker 1: En wanneer vertrekt ie naar Roemenië?
and when departs he to Romania?

Speaker 2: Ik weet het niet. Ergens in juli.
I know it not. ERGENS in July.

Speaker 1: was 't niet de zesde of zo?
was it not the sixth or so?

Speaker 2: Ik weet het niet.
I know it not.

Speaker 1: And when does he depart to Romania?
Speaker 2: I don't know. *Ergens* in July.

²⁸ Adapted from: comp-a/nl/fn008437.

Speaker 1: The sixth isn't it?

Speaker 2: I don't know.²⁹

Example (22) is said to express *at some moment* by 27 of the 36 subjects. Only five subjects voted in favor of *at some point (on a scale)*.³⁰ The reason for the lack of variation is probably the temporal prepositional phrase *in juli* which follows *ergens* directly.

Example (23), on the other hand, shows a lot of confusion. The temporal interpretation has 16 votes, the scale interpretation 11 and the *about* interpretation has been chosen by 9 of the 36 subjects.

- (23) De Pueblo-indianen gebruikten bakstenen om hun dorpen
The Pueblo Indians used bricks in order to their villages

en stadjes te bouwen. Ergens tussen twaalfhonderd en
and towns to build. ERGENS between twelve hundred and

veertienhonderd na Christus kwamen de Navaho de streek binnen.
fourteen hundred after Christ came the Navahos the area in.

The Pueblo Indians used bricks to build their villages and towns. *Ergens* between twelve hundred and fourteen hundred AD the Navaho arrived in the area.³¹

The confusion in this example might be explained by the fact that the temporal information is presented as a very rough scale, which makes the statement very imprecise. This imprecision points into the direction of the interpretation *about*. This means that there are good reasons to choose either one of the three options. The *ergens* phrase is about time, which would point in the direction of *at some moment*, it is presented as a scale (*at some point on a scale*) and that scale is so rough that it implies that the boundaries may not be very precise (*about/around*).

The third group of options that shows some variation is *at some place* and the prepositional object. Especially when the prepositional object denotes a place or something that implies a place, the choice between a place and a prepositional object becomes a choice between semantics and grammatical function. For instance in example (24) most people (23 out of 36, i.e. 64%) choose for 'at some place' and a smaller group (8 subjects, 22%) chooses for the *prepositional object* option, which was paraphrased as *Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe* 'about something, in something, with something, to something, before something, towards something'. Both options belong to the most homogeneously chosen options, so normally there is no doubt about these categories.

- (24) Carola vroeg of ze Anais even terug mocht geven aan Isabelle, want ze
Carola asked if she Anais a while back could give to Isabelle, for she

²⁹Adapted from: CGN comp-a/vl/fv400500.

³⁰The remaining four subjects voted for *about/around*. However, this number is below our limit for potentially meaningful variation.

³¹Adapted from: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001490.

moest ergens naartoe, maar dat kon niet volgens Isabelle.
had to ERGENS towards, but that was possible not according to Isabelle.

Belachelijk, het is haar eigen kind!
Ridiculous, it is her own child!

Carola asked if she could give back Anais to Isabelle for a while, because she had to go *ergens*, but that was impossible according to Isabelle. Ridiculous, it is her own child!³²

In example (24) the complex preposition/adverb on which *ergens* depends has a strong directional meaning.³³ This is probably also the reason the verb *moeten* does not need a verb expressing ‘to go’ in this construction, while in other constructions *moeten* ‘must, have to’ is an auxiliary that requires a main verb.³⁴ This directional meaning implies a place towards which the direction is headed. This place is, if it is indefinite, expressed by *ergens*. This way, *ergens* is used both as a prepositional object and as a marker of place. Therefore, it is not surprising that there was no complete agreement between the subjects. However, they seem to have a preference for the overall interpretation of the locative option over the option with the preposition, as we saw above, even though *naar iets toe* was mentioned in the options presented to them.

The last example of a second option that has more than 4 votes, occurs only once. In this case, the preferred option is ‘at some moment’ and the second option is ‘at some place’. In example (25) the first clause specifically mentions a time, but the second occurrence of *ergens* is combined with *anders* and *zich afspelen* ‘take place’. Both words are normally used in combination with places when they are combined with *ergens*, but they also allow for a temporal interpretation. The difference between the options *at some time* and *at some place* is only 2 votes (16 votes for the locative option, 14 for the temporal one out of 36). This suggests that the subjects were confused. This confusion would be explained if we assume that two strategies used to determine the interpretation of this form, collocational information/knowledge of conventional use and the expectations raised by the direct context give conflicting information.

(25) De regisseur heeft de actie overgeplaatst zoals u waarschijnlijk
The director has the scene relocated as you probably

al heeft gezien naar ergens (1) in de negentiende eeuw alsof het
already have seen to ERGENS (1) in the nineteenth century as if it

zich nooit ergens (2) anders heeft afgespeeld.
itself never ERGENS (2) else has taken place.

³² Adapted from: CGN comp-a/vl/fv400262.

³³ The adverbial use of forms like *naartoe* is historically the source of the prepositional object use of *ergens*. This use still shows adverbial features although it also requires an argument. Therefore, this may be seen as a construction in which *ergens* still has locative features.

³⁴ For more on this construction see Barbiers (1996, chapter 5) and Zwart (2002).

The director has changed the scene of action, as you probably have seen already, to *ergens* (1) in the nineteenth century as if it never has taken place *ergens* (2) else.³⁵

Summary and conclusion

The goal of this subsection was to find out to what extent language users agree on the interpretation of *ergens* in a natural context. We found that the agreement on which option fits the sentence best, is generally high, although this does not mean that there is no variation at all. In 70% of the sentences more than 50% of the speakers agree on one option, although they were offered a choice of 9 options. Cases in which other options get more votes than would be expected on the basis of chance, generally contain an overlap of categories or conflicting contextual cues. There are some categories that show some mutual exchangeability, especially in the modal domain. However, this does not mean that the subcategories should be abandoned in favor of one large category *modal*, since there are also examples that show a clear preference for one of the modal categories. This suggests that the subjects agree on the classification of the subcategories. We may conclude that the assumption that normally there is agreement between language users on the interpretation of *ergens* seems largely correct, although there is some variation within the population.

3.4.5 Conclusion

In section 3.4.2 we found that there is no reason to assume that the subjects disagreed with the paraphrases they were given. In those cases in which other suggestions were made more than once, this was either an attempt to fit the paraphrase into the sentence or the suggestions were not given for the same sentences.

In section 3.4.3 it was shown that in 84% of the sentences the majority of participants voted in accordance with expectation, which allows us to expect that the other surveys, which were also based on my native speaker intuition will also yield consistent results.

The goal of the last section was to see how much consistency there is between the subjects in their interpretations of *ergens*. Generally, the subjects show clear preferences for one of the options, although in about 23 % of the cases the difference between the first and the second option is very small. It was argued that this may be due to overlapping categories or conflicting contextual cues.

Therefore, the overall conclusion is that the results of survey 1 can be used as a reliable basis for the comparison of the effects of diminished or altered context on interpretation.

³⁵ Adapted from: CGN comp-1/v1/fv600855.

3.5 Results of survey 2: The effect of a marginalized context

3.5.1 Introduction

The main goal of survey 2 is to find out what the effect of a marginalized context is on the interpretation of *ergens*. The subquestions are the following.

1. Do the majority interpretations change?
2. If the majority interpretations change, is that towards a default?
3. Can we explain from the shreds of context that have remained, why the interpretation has changed or remained the same?
4. Does the variation increase with the marginalization of context?
5. Does variation correlate with the perceived uncertainty of the subjects?

The same sentences as in survey 1 were presented to a new group of subjects, but this time all but two words before and after *ergens* were cut off. If the sentence ended directly before or after *ergens* even less context was provided. In addition, the subjects were asked to mark how certain they were about their answers on a Likert-scale. This was done to see whether uncertainty was reflected in the variation in the answers. In this section, I will start with an overview of how many majority interpretations have remained the same and how many have changed. Second, this will be compared to the hypothesis. Third, we will try to explain why some interpretations have remained the same and others have changed. The last point to be discussed is the relation between variation in the data and the certainty of the subjects.

3.5.2 Survey 1 and 2 compared

In 64% (27 out of 42³⁶) of the sentences, the majority interpretation of the sentences did not change between survey 1 and survey 2. In 36% (15) of the cases the majority interpretation did change. The direction of the change can be seen in table 3.6. (A comparison between the interpretations in survey 1 and survey 2 will be made in the next section.)

As can be seen from table 3.6, there is a tendency towards reinterpretation in the direction of place.³⁷ This may point into the direction of a default as was hypothesized, but since there are also cases in which the change is not in this direction, we will need to take a closer look at the individual sentences.

³⁶One sentence had to be discarded, due to an extra word that had remained in the context.

³⁷The sources of these changes will be discussed in the next section.

Direction of the change between survey 1 and 2	number	%
Place	6	40.0
Moment	1	6.7
Scale	1	6.7
Somehow	3	20.0
Prep. Obj.	2	13.3
Feelings	0	0.0
Point of View	2	13.3
About/around	0	0.0
Other, i.e.:	0	0.0
Total	15	100.0

Table 3.6: The interpretations of survey 2 which changed with respect to survey 1.

Why did some sentences change their majority interpretation while others didn't?

The sentences in this survey can be divided in two groups. The first is the group in which the majority interpretation did not change between survey 1 and 2, the second is the group in which the majority interpretation did change.

To explain this behavior, I have distinguished four types of possible explanations. The first type consists of those cases in which the trigger for the interpretation of a form was part of the window of two words before and two words after *ergens*. For those cases nothing really changed from survey 1 to survey 2.

In the second type all triggers were lost. In the third type the original, main trigger was cut off, but the absence of this trigger made it possible for other words that had remained in the context to become a new trigger. Another way of describing this type is to say that a higher order contextual cue originally either blocked or reinforced the standard interpretation of the lower order contextual cue. When this higher order cue was taken away, the lower order cue could be interpreted according to its standard interpretation. An example is a phrase like *somewhere in the spring*. In this case *spring* as a temporal marker is a higher order trigger. However, the default interpretation of *in* is locative, so when the temporal trigger is not present anymore, the preposition *in* will become a (lower order) locative trigger. If the same had happened with a higher order locative trigger, the lower order trigger would have directed the interpretation in the same direction as the higher order trigger. This means that the new trigger (or lower order contextual cue) can both direct the interpretation in the same and in a different direction.

The fourth and last type can in my view only be explained by the assumption that the subjects did not accept the examples with so little context. The categorization of these examples is problematic because there is much variation and little coherence in the answers.

Many of these explanations make use of the concept *trigger*. This concept was used for words that seem to be responsible for the interpretation of *ergens* in that sentence. They were determined before the survey was carried out on the basis of

intuition and a prediction was made as to what would happen if the triggers were cut off or remained in place. In 83% of the cases³⁸ these predictions were confirmed by the survey. One of the interesting questions that remains, is whether we can find any regularities in these triggers. This will also be one of the goals of survey 3 and the more elaborate corpus study.

Although there is a great variety in the triggers that seem to play a role, some regularities are very clear. In those cases in which the trigger remained and the original interpretation was locative, the triggers were locative adverbs or prepositions and in one case a part of a fixed phrase which contained the verb *to go*. The triggers for a locative interpretation seem to be locative phrases and other expressions with a locative component. The same thing can be said for temporal interpretations. Temporal phrases and expressions typically trigger temporal interpretations. There are some exceptions, though, which will be discussed below. Most instances of a scale interpretation contained a scale preposition like *tussen* 'between'. The prepositional object interpretation of course needed a preposition that had scope over *ergens*. In all cases in which option *about/around* was chosen, the numbers were retained. This suggests that one of the triggers for the *about/around* interpretation is numbers.

The modal interpretations will be discussed more elaborately below. Here, I will give only a short overview. The *feelings*-interpretation was almost always accompanied by a first person pronoun. In some cases there were clear features of fixed expressions in the clause. The cases in which the preferred option was *point of view* contained only impersonal fixed expressions. The option *somehow* was rarely accompanied by pronouns, but these sentences did contain other particles like *toch* and *wel*. Although these generalizations are pointing in certain directions, this was too small a number of instances to draw definite conclusions. Survey 3 and the larger corpus study will show whether these generalizations hold. Now we will return to the examples and try to explain the changes by means of the triggers mentioned above.

The first group of examples, that is, the group of sentences that did not change their majority interpretation between survey 1 and survey 2, can for a large part (26 out of 28 examples) be explained by the first explanation type (i.e. the trigger remained in the context). Many of the examples in this group contain prepositions (as in example (26)) or particle verbs (as in example (27)) that show clearly how *ergens* is to be interpreted. The two remaining examples and the variation in the type of triggers will be discussed below.

- (26) ...als ie ergens mee bezig...
 ...when he ERGENS with busy...
 ...when he was busy [...] something³⁹

³⁸ 35 of 42 sentences.

³⁹ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000399.

- (27) ...niet zomaar ergens neer kon...
 ...not just ERGENS down could...
 ...could not down just there...⁴⁰

The second group of examples, which contained the examples of which the majority interpretation did change, can be explained best by means of explanation type 3. Three quarters of the examples in this group (10 out of 15) can be explained by the fact that although the original trigger has been chopped of, another part of the remaining context has taken over its function as a trigger.

- (28) Ergens in het...
 ERGENS in the...
 Ergens in the...⁴¹

In example (28) the temporal marker *voorjaar* 'spring' has been cut off. The absence of the temporal anchoring allows both the preposition *in* and *ergens* itself to be interpreted as locative. The presence of the normally locative preposition *in* can be seen as a trigger for a locative interpretation, even though it can be used metaphorically by a temporal marker as in the original sentence. Another explanation is that the absence of the temporal marker results in a default interpretation of *ergens*, that is, as locative. However, there are other examples of this type in which the lower level trigger is not geared towards the default. This is the case for instance in example (29), in which the absence of the temporal trigger *and fourteenthundred A.D.* resulted in a change from a temporal interpretation into a scale interpretation which was triggered by the remaining preposition *tussen* 'between'.

- (29) Ergens tussen twaalfhonderd...
 ERGENS between twelvehundred...
 Ergens in between twelvehundred...⁴²

However, there are two instances in the remaining examples in which a default interpretation seems a good explanation. In example (30), for instance, the main reason the original was interpreted as modal was that the subject was *housekeeping* in a copular construction. Housekeeping inherently takes place at someone's home, which would make *ergens* superfluous if it was interpreted in a locative sense. In the shortened version, this subject as well as the copular construction are removed and there is no other direct trigger. A full-time job is generally at some place, but a modal interpretation would also be possible. However, 34 of the 38 subjects choose a locative interpretation for this example. What also may have played a role is that, as we saw already above, many subjects do not seem to accept modal *ergens* at the end of a sentence.

⁴⁰ Adapted from: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001047.

⁴¹ Adapted from: CGN comp-g/nl/fn000220.

⁴² Adapted from: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001490.

- (30) ...fulltime baan ergens.
 ...full-time job ERGENS.
 ...full-time job *ergens* ⁴³

The same type of effect can be seen from example (31). The original modal interpretation (*point of view*) was chosen by 53% of the subjects in survey 1, whereas only 2 subjects (6%) chose for a locative interpretation.⁴⁴ The modal interpretation was triggered by the fact that the subject of this clause is *the history of Israel*. This subject cannot really be combined with a locative form and a nominal predicate at the same time. In survey 2, however, the subject was absent, which resulted in 38% of the subjects⁴⁵ choosing the locative interpretation. However, the difference between the options *place* and *point of view* was very small (1 vote). What is clear though, is that in survey 2 the number of votes for a locative interpretation is much higher than in survey 1.

- (31) ...Israël is ergens een beschrijving...
 ...Israel is ERGENS a description...
 ...Israel is *ergens* a description... ⁴⁶

The remaining four instances do not fit the explanations given above. There are two types of problems with these examples. Their interpretation changed even though a clear trigger remained or vice versa and in one case the majority option changed in the second survey by means of syntactic reinterpretation. That is, the option *prepositional object* is chosen although there is another prepositional object in the fragment, apart from *ergens*. In survey 1, the presence of this adverb blocked a prepositional object interpretation, but in survey 2 the adverb is apparently reinterpreted as not dependent on the preposition. We will start the discussion with example (32).

- (32) ...werk moet ergens gebeuren, in...
 ...work must ERGENS happen in...
 ...the work must be done *ergens*, in... ⁴⁷

In example (32) the word *in* was followed in survey 1 by all kinds of periods in which the homework could be done, such as homework periods and free periods. This way the interpretation was steered in a temporal direction, which is clear from the fact that in survey 1 81% of the subjects voted for a temporal interpretation and 3 % for a locative interpretation. However, in survey 2, in which there were no temporal references anymore, there were still 58% of the votes for a temporal interpretation and

⁴³ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn007972.

⁴⁴ The remainder of the votes was for the interpretation 'somehow'.

⁴⁵ 14 out of 37 subjects.

⁴⁶ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CGTL.EIH: a.

⁴⁷ Adapted from: CGN comp-h/nl/fn009223.

only 18% for a locative interpretation. This last interpretation was the interpretation that was expected beforehand. One of the directions in which I thought the answer might be found, was that this phrase is frequently used with a temporal interpretation. However, google searches on "moet ergens gebeuren" or "werk moet" + *ergens gebeuren* all showed mainly locative readings. This makes it hard to understand why the subjects had a temporal preference in this case, especially because *in* is also a locative marker.

In the following two examples the problem is the other way around. The trigger has remained in place, but the interpretation has changed anyway.

- (33) ...januari, daar ergens.
 ...January, there ERGENS.
 ...January *daar ergens*.⁴⁸

In example (33), the temporal marker has remained in place, yet in survey 1 the majority (53%) voted in favor of an *about/around* interpretation and 33% in favor of a temporal interpretation, whereas in survey 2 61% preferred a temporal interpretation and only 26% chose the *about/around* option. The only reason for this change I can think of, is that the absence of any other context except for the temporal marker steered the subjects towards a temporal interpretation. In survey 1, there was also an animate subject whose intentions (i.e. showing that he was not very precise) may have been more important for the respondents than the actual reference to time.

The following example shows a comparable problem. The context that makes *ergens* modal seems to be a combination of a subjective predicate and the combination with the particle *toch*, as will be argued more extensively in the section on the corpus data. Since the noun *persoonlijkheid* maintains the subjectivity in the clause and the particle also falls within the boundaries of the two words of context, we would expect the interpretation to remain the same. And in general this is the case in the sense that we stay within the modal domain. However, the type of modal interpretation changes. In survey 1, 47% of the subjects (36 in total) voted for the *somehow* option and only 25% for *point of view*. In survey 2, the numbers have turned around: 42% out of 37 subjects voted for *point of view* and only 18% for *somehow*.

- (34) ...persoonlijkheid toch ergens, dat kun...
 ...personality PTCL ERGENS, that can...
 ...personality *ergens*, that can...⁴⁹

This change may be explained by the addition of *Dat kun je niet wegdrücken* 'One cannot suppress that' in survey 1. This addition shows that from the point of view of the speaker we are still on relatively certain, factual ground. This means that there is less room for his personal beliefs. Since *ergens* is clearly to be interpreted as modal in this sentence, the most fitting option is *somehow*, for this interpretation is the least subjective.

⁴⁸<http://forum.gamez.nl/index.php?s=4cfe65dfce1ca616a22e4096d6765ef4&showtopic=5072&st=90&p=277833&#entry277833>.

⁴⁹Adapted from: Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CGTL.EIH.

The last example is problematic because there is a clear prepositional object in *daar*. However, the majority interpretation has changed from *somehow* in survey 1 (64% of the votes, i.e. 23 subjects) into *prepositional object* in survey 2 (45% of the votes, which is 17 subjects). In survey 1, the prepositional object option got only 6% of the votes (i.e. 2 people chose this option). In survey 2, 29% (11 people) chose the option *somehow*. What may have happened is that the subjects concentrated on *ergens* and the predicate and thought *daar* was a locative adverb which depended on some predicate in the missing part of the sentence.

- (35) ...daar dan ergens verantwoordelijk voor.
 ...there then ERGENS responsible for.
 ...actually they are *ergens* responsible.⁵⁰

A closer look at the triggers of the modal interpretations

The triggers of the non-modal interpretations are fairly straightforward. The triggers of the modal interpretations, however, are more diverse and less easy to recognize. Therefore, I will discuss the modal categories *feelings*, *point of view* and *somehow* more elaborately.

a) The feelings interpretation

In all cases in which the participants chose the *feelings*-option in survey 2, the original choice was also *feelings*. That is, all instances with a *feelings* interpretation in survey 2 belong to the group of instances that did not change its majority interpretation. This raises the question of what made these interpretations so stable. We will start by looking at the examples. The examples under a) are the examples as used in survey 1, the fragments under b) are the parts of the sentences shown in survey 2.

- (36) a. Steven knikte. Daar heb ik ook al aan gedacht. Maar ergens
 Steven nodded. There have I also already to thought. But ERGENS
 heb ik het gevoel dat er meer achter steekt.
 have I the feeling that there more behind is.
 Steven nodded. I also thought about that. But *ergens* I have the feeling
 that there is something behind it.
- b. Maar ergens heb ik...
 But ERGENS have I ...
 But *ergens* I have⁵¹
- (37) a. Volgend jaar geef ik nog maar één klas les en dat
 Next year give I only one class lesson and that
 vind ik toch ergens wel jammer. Hoewel ik
 am of the opinion I PTCL ERGENS PTCL a pity. Although I

⁵⁰ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/vl/fv400789.

⁵¹ Adapted from: CGN comp-o/vl/fv800158.

regelmatig door de druk vergeet om les te geven.
regularly because of the pressure forget to lesson to give.

Next year I will teach only one class and I think that is a pity. Although I regularly forget to teach because of the stress.

- b. ...ik toch ergens wel jammer.
...I PTCL ERGENS PTCL a pity.
...I do *ergens* [find] it a pity⁵²

- (38) a. Ik kon al liegen voordat ik kon praten. Maar toch had ik
I could already lie before I could talk. But still had I
vroeger ergens óók altijd geloofd dat mijn moeders
when I was a child ERGENS also always believed that my mother's
verhaal maar een verzinsel was.
story but a figment of her imagination was.

I could already lie before I could talk. But still, I had, when I was a child, *ergens* also believed that my mother's story was only a figment of her imagination.

- b. ...ik vroeger ergens óók altijd...
...I when I was a child *ergens* also always...
...when I was a child I always⁵³

- (39) a. Ik bewonder mensen wel die de moed hebben om dat te
I admire people PTCL that the courage have so as to that to
doen. Ik zou dat ergens wel willen maar ja we maken
do. I would that ERGENS PTCL want but PTCL we make
keuzes in het leven hè?
choices in the life PTCL?

I do admire people that have the courage to do such a thing. I would *ergens* want to do that, but we make choices in life, don't we?

- b. ...zou dat ergens wel willen...
would that ERGENS PTCL want...
..would *ergens* want that...⁵⁴

What we can see from examples (36) to (39), is that three out of the four examples have the first person pronoun *ik* 'I' in their 2 word window. The last example does not contain a pronoun, but it does contain a verb form which is used for all singular

⁵² Adapted from: CGN comp-b/nl/fn000119.

⁵³ Adapted from: Dorrestein (2003).

⁵⁴ Adapted from: CGN comp-b/vl/fv400101.

subjects and therefore compatible with a first person pronoun as well. In addition, two of the examples contain strongly subjective forms like an evaluative adjective *jammer* ‘a shame’ and a mental state predicate *willen* ‘want’.

A third factor seems to be word order and knowledge of (the frequency of use of) fixed constructions. Although it is possible to make a sentence with the fragment of example (36) and a locative interpretation, this is a left dislocation. If we type in “*ergens heb ik*” in Google, the results show two large groups. One is of the type *ergens heb ik* [*the feeling, idea, done it wrong*] which has a modal meaning, the other one is *ergens heb ik gelezen* ‘*ergens* have I read’ with a locative meaning. While in general locative interpretations of *ergens* are much more frequent than modal interpretations, the chance that the phrase *ergens heb ik* is part of a modal phrase, is relatively high. This type of constructional knowledge might therefore be an explanation for the modal interpretation of (36).

From these examples we may conclude that first person pronouns, subjective adjectives and verbs and knowledge of (the frequency of) fixed constructions may be triggers for the interpretation *in someone’s feelings or thoughts*.

There are two cases in which the *feelings* interpretation was the majority interpretation in survey 1, while in survey 2 it changed to *somehow*.

- (40) a. Ze misten haar. Baba Baloeek voelde zich vreemd,
They missed her. Baba Baloeek felt himself strange,
ietwat lusteloos, maar ergens ook opgewekt en dan
somewhat listless, but ERGENS also cheerful and then
weer huilerig. Zijn maag was op slot en grendel.
again tearful. His stomach was on lock and bolt.
They missed her. Baba Baloeek felt awkward, somewhat listless but *ergens*
also cheerful and then again tearful. His stomach was locked.
- b. ...lusteloos, maar ergens ook opgewekt...
...listless but *ergens* also cheerful...
...listless, but *ergens* also cheerful...⁵⁵
- (41) a. Na veertien dagen ben ik nog eens om dat ontslagbewijs
After fourteen days am I PTCL PTCL for that notice of dismissal
gaan vragen, want ergens zat het me toch dwars. Maar ik heb
go ask, for ERGENS rankled it me PTCL across. But I have
het nooit gekregen.
it never got.
After fourteen days I went to ask for that notice of dismissal, because it
rankled in my mind. But I never got it.

⁵⁵ Adapted from: Bouazza (2003).

- b. ...vragen, want ergens zat het...
 ...ask, for *ergens* sat it...
 ...ask, for *ergens* it was...⁵⁶

The most likely explanation for the change in meaning in example (40) seems to be that the evaluative adjectives are less directly connected to the experiencer himself, because the reflexive form of the verb *to feel* has been deleted. In (41) the first person pronoun *me* was deleted, producing the same effect.

What these examples suggest, is that in order for an instance of *ergens* to be interpreted as *in someone's feelings or thoughts*, the context must have a direct connection to the experiencer, preferably in the form of a first person pronoun. In addition, a predicate with a subjective content, that is, expressing a feeling, or opinion is often present. In some cases the constructional characteristics of the context may be so closely connected to subjective constructions, that language users choose such an interpretation even though the actual subjective markers are deleted.

b) Point of view

The second modal interpretation that was used in this survey was *from a certain point of view*. Five examples have this interpretation as their majority interpretation in survey 2. The most common characteristics of the examples with a majority interpretation *in someone's feelings or thoughts* were first person pronouns and subjective adjectives and predicates. In the examples (42) to (46) that are interpreted as *from a certain point of view* in survey 2, however, we do not find any first person pronoun and only one subjective predicate. Especially in the examples (42) and (44), of which the interpretation did not change between survey 1 and survey 2, the modal interpretation *point of view* seems to be based mainly on constructional properties. The words that are left within the context are mainly functional and carry very little semantic content. However, their configuration together is very specific. It is, for instance, very hard to find any examples in corpora or on the internet that start with *ergens is dat* which do not have a modal function. In other words, this combination of words, in this order, is part of a fixed construction. The reason that the interpretation is *point of view* and not *feelings* is probably the lack of personal markers in the construction as well as the frequent use of this construction in adversative contexts.

- (42) a. Mijn vrienden zeggen: "dat je dat volhoudt" en "ik zou dat
 My friends say: "that you that keep up" and "I would that
 nooit kunnen." Ergens is dat natuurlijk ook wel lekker om te
 never be able." ERGENS is that of course also PTCL nice to to
 horen, aan de andere kant ook niet.
 hear, on the other side also not.
 My friends say: "the way you manage that" and "I would not be able to
 do that". *Ergens* that feels good of course, on the other hand it doesn't.

⁵⁶ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CGBLE.IH.

- b. Ergens is dat...
 ERGENS is that
 Ergens is that...⁵⁷
- (43) a. Stenen voorwerpen uit een periode die men het mesolithicum
 Stone objects from a period that one the mesolithicum
 noemt. Dat is ergens ja pff laten we zeggen zesduizend,
 calls. That is ERGENS yeah pff let us say six-thousand,
 vijfduizend voor Christus.
 five-thousand before Christ.
 Stone objects from a period that is called the mesolithicum. That is *er-*
gens yeah pff let's say six-thousand, five-thousand before Christ.
- b. Dat is ergens, ja pff...
 That is ERGENS, yeah pff...
 That is *ergens*, yeah pff⁵⁸

Example (43) is different from the previous example in that there are many interpretations other than this modal one that start with these few words. The original interpretation was *about/around*, but this changed in survey 2 into a *point of view* interpretation. The reason for the participants' choice for *point of view* may have been that the expression *ja pff* suggests some hesitation that may be seen as a way to buy time in order to make up your mind about something. However, this is one of the examples with a lot of variation in the answers of the participants. Although most votes are for the modal options, it is clear that the participants were not very certain about this example.

- (44) a. Speaker 1: Daarvoor steunen ze je wel maar daarna niet
 Before support they you PTCL but afterwards not
 meer. Speaker 2: Daar zit ergens wel weer wat in.
 anymore. There sits ERGENS PTCL PTCL something in.
 Ze kunnen aan de andere kant ook bezig blijven.
 They can on the other side also busy remain.
 Speaker 1: Before they support you but afterwards not anymore. Speaker
 2: You *ergens* have a point. On the other hand, there is no end to it.
- b. Daar zit ergens wel weer...
 There sits ERGENS PTCL PTCL...
 That contains *ergens* a bit of...⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Adapted from: CGN comp-b/nl/fn000128.

⁵⁸ Adapted from: CGN comp-f/vl/fv600846.

⁵⁹ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000441.

Example (44) is again of a more constructional nature, which can also be seen from the fact that the interpretation of this example did not change between survey 1 and survey 2. This combination and order of words is part of the common expression *daar zit ergens wel weer wat in* which means 'you/he/they have (has) a point'. The lack of a first person pronoun in combination with the contrast between a new way of looking at something and previous points of view makes *from a certain point of view* the best option.

- (45) a. Hoe nu die elementen eruit komen, is een kwestie van je
How now those elements out come, is a matter of your
persoonlijkheid toch ergens, dat kun je niet wegdrukken.
personality PTCL ERGENS, that can you not push away.
En die persoonlijkheid die heb je zelf.
And that personality that have you self.
How those elements are expressed is a matter of your own personality
ergens, you can't suppress that. And your personality that is yours.
- b. ...persoonlijkheid toch ergens.
...personality PTCL ERGENS.
...personality *ergens*.⁶⁰

What may also play a role in the choice for a modal interpretation is interpretation by exclusion. That is, sometimes other interpretations simply seem to make little sense. In example (45), which changed its interpretation from *somehow* to *point of view*, the fact that a statement about a personality is not a part of a frame that is about place, time or scale, in combination with the position of *ergens* in the clause suggests that a locative, temporal or scalar option is not very likely. This leaves the addressee with a choice in modal interpretations. Since this fragment does not follow the common characteristics of a *feeling* interpretation and the particle *toch* suggest some contrast the *point of view* interpretation seems the most likely. This is also what the division of the votes suggests. Most people (16 out of 37 (43%)) voted for *point of view*, *feelings* came second and *somehow* is the third option that is seriously considered by the participants. The non-modal options are almost never chosen.

- (46) a. Krakau vond 'k eigenlijk ook heel erg mooi. Warschau viel
Cracow found I PTCL also very really pretty. Warschau fell
ergens tegen omdat 't nagebouwd is, maar aan de andere kant
ERGENS short because it rebuilt is, but on the other hand
was 't leuk om te zien.
was it nice to to see.
Cracow I found also very pretty. Warsaw was *ergens* disappointing, be-
cause it was rebuilt, but on the other hand it was nice to see.

⁶⁰ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CGTL.EIH.

- b. Warschau viel ergens tegen omdat...
 Warsaw fell ERGENS short because...
 Warschau was *ergens* disappointing because...⁶¹

In example (46), which did not change its interpretation, there is a subjective verb, but the personal pronoun is left out. Together with the non-animate subject Warschau this makes the *feelings* option less fitting, because there is no direct connection to the experiencer.

There were two examples in which the original interpretation was *point of view*, which changed into a locative interpretation in survey 2. These examples were already discussed above.

c) Somehow

The last modal interpretation is *somehow*. Two of the examples with this interpretation were already discussed above in (40) and (41), because they originally had a *feelings* interpretation, which changed to a *somehow* interpretation.

- (47) a. Dat was vroeger. Als je 'n man hebt ga je toch ergens
 That was in those days. If you a husband have go you PTCL ERGENS
 niet alleen zitten. Dan denken ze dat je sjans zit te zoeken.
 not alone sit. Then think they that you a hit sit to search
 That is how it was in those days. If you had a husband, you were not
 supposed to go somewhere alone. They would think you would be flirt-
 ing.
- b. ...je toch ergens niet alleen...
 ...you PTCL ERGENS not alone...
 ...you *ergens* not alone...⁶²

In example (47) the interpretation of the original version in survey 1 was locative, but in survey 2 this changed to *somehow*. Although all modal options were chosen relatively frequently, the *somehow* option was chosen in 43% of the cases (16 out of 37 votes). The other modal options were chosen 8 and 7 times which is 21% and 19% respectively. One of the factors in the change from locative to modal is the deletion of the verb *zitten* 'sit'. Removing this verb removes the trigger for a locative interpretation. What remains is what looks like a generic you, the particle *toch* and the combination *niet alleen*. There are no direct subjective markers, which makes the *feelings* option less likely. The use of *toch* might be seen as an indication for a contrastive situation, but this particle is also frequently found with other interpretations of *ergens* than a *point of view* interpretation. The *somehow* option is the least subjective modal option, which might be an explanation for the preference for this option.

⁶¹ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000678.

⁶² Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus.

In example (48) the interpretation remained the same between survey 1 and 2. This is probably due to the recognizability of the predicate *aanduiden* ‘indicate’ which is clearly an epistemic modal expression when used in the third person. The epistemic modal function of this expression excludes the *feelings* and *point of view* interpretations, because their subjective implications do not fit the impersonal use of an epistemic expression. The *somehow* interpretation lacks this connection to personal views, which makes it suitable for use in this kind of situation.

- (48) a. In bijna alle talen bestaan woorden voor die emoties. Dat
In almost all languages exist words for these emotions. That
duidt toch ergens aan dat inderdaad die verschillende soorten
shows PTCL ERGENS on that indeed those different sorts
emoties dus ook universeel zijn.
emotions thus also universal are.
In almost all languages there are words for those emotions. This shows
ergens that these emotions of various sorts are also universal.
- b. ...duidt toch ergens aan dat...
...shows PTCL ERGENS on that...
...shows *ergens* that...⁶³

We find a comparable situation in example (49), which did not change its *somehow* interpretation in survey 2. In this example we find a passive construction, which shows that there is little connection to the experiencer. Even though the verb is a mental state predicate, the connection between this predicate and a personal view is weak because of the passive. This makes the *feelings* and *point of view* interpretations less likely. A locative interpretation is possible as well, which can also be seen from the votes of the participants. However, *somehow* gets significantly⁶⁴ more votes than the other options. This may be because it is difficult to comprehend that a lie is believed completely, so it is stressed that the reason people may do so is unknown.

- (49) a. Huldigde ook Hitler niet de zienswijze, dat ook leugens wel
Had also Hitler not the view, that also lies PTCL
ergens worden geloofd? Of wat zij zeggen wáár is, doet
ERGENS are believed? Whether what they say true is, does
er dus niet toe.
there therefore not PTCL.
Didn't Hitler also have the idea that even lies *ergens* are believed? So
whether what they say is true does not matter.

⁶³ Adapted from: CGN comp-n/vl/fv400576.

⁶⁴ $\chi^2(3) = 11.32$ $p < 0.05$.

- b. ...leugens wel ergens worden geloofd.
 ...lies PTCL ERGENS are believed.
 ...lies *ergens* are believed.⁶⁵

What seems to be the recurring pattern in the cases of *somehow* is that there is a lack of non-general personal pronouns and there are many agentive subjects. Contrary to the *point of view* interpretations, there are no contrastive views involved. This survey alone does not allow us to draw more conclusions as to the triggers of a *somehow* interpretation, but survey 3 and the more elaborate corpus study in chapter 4 will provide some more information.

In conclusion, we can say that the modal interpretations seem to be characterized and distinguished from each other by means of the following characteristics:

- *In someone's feelings or thoughts*: First person pronouns, subjective predicates, adjectives and specific fixed constructions, such as *Ergens heb ik*.
- *From a certain point of view*: No first person pronouns, some subjective markers, contrastive elements and some fixed constructions, such as *Ergens is dat*.
- *Somehow*: No agentive subjects, no contrastive markers.

Whether these generalizations hold for other examples as well will be investigated further in the discussion of survey 3 and the more elaborate corpus study in chapter 4.

Conclusion and summary

The main question in this section was what would happen to the interpretation of the sentences from survey 1 if we restricted the amount of context to two words before and two words after *ergens*. We found that the interpretation only changes in about one third of the sentences. The reason most sentences do not change their interpretation seems to be that the trigger of their particular interpretation is part of the 2 words before and 2 words after-window. In most cases in which the interpretation did change, the original trigger was cut off, but another word took over the function of trigger. In those cases in which the secondary trigger was place-oriented, however, it is hard to decide whether we see the effects of this secondary trigger or of a default interpretation, because both processes would reinforce each other.

However, there are two cases in which a default function of the place interpretation seemed the most likely explanation for the change in interpretation, suggesting that this factor might play a role. Although two examples is a rather meager basis from which to draw that conclusion, the fact that in 6 out of 15 cases in which the majority interpretations changed, this was in the direction of a place interpretation, also suggests that a default option may play a role. We might also ask ourselves whether we need to choose between a trigger oriented approach and a default based

⁶⁵ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CPWE.EIH.

one, since both explanations can also be true at the same time. On the basis of this survey it is not possible to draw final conclusions. To do that more extensive surveys we would need more surveys. Lastly, we were left with 4 examples (out of 43) which were difficult to explain. These examples were discussed elaborately.

3.5.3 Variation and certainty

If the context plays an important role in interpretation, this raises the question of whether lack of context results in doubt in the participants. One way to study this question is to look at the variation in the answers and see whether there is a difference between the amount of variation found in survey 1, which had more context and in survey 2, with very little context. However, this assumes that variation in the answers is connected to doubts in the subjects. In order to find out whether the lack of context results in doubt in the participants, we also need to test whether doubt in the participants is correlated with variation in the data. We will start with the question of how much difference there is between the variation in survey 1 and survey 2. As can be seen from table 3.7 the variation in survey 1 and survey 2 are strongly correlated⁶⁶ to variance in survey 1.

% of agreement between the subjects	Survey 1	Survey 2
	% of the sentences in this category	% of the sentences in this category
91-100	9.3 (4)	11.9 (5)
81-90	16.3 (7)	7.1 (3)
71-80	11.6 (5)	19.0 (8)
61-70	18.6 (8)	7.1 (3)
51-60	14.0 (6)	14.3 (6)
41-50	25.6 (11)	26.2 (11)
31-40	4.7 (2)	14.4 (6)
21-30	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
11-20	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
0-10	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Total	100.0 (43)	100 (42)

Table 3.7: Percentage of agreement of the subjects (N =36 for survey 1 and 37 for survey 2) as it is divided over the sentences (N=43 for survey 1 and 42 for survey 2). The numbers between brackets are the raw numbers.

This shows that variation does not increase when subjects are confronted with very little context. This is surprising, since three participants wrote at the end of the questionnaire that they felt they did not always have enough context and one even had to be excluded because he had written that he did not have enough context in

⁶⁶There was a strong correlation between survey 1 and survey 2, $\gamma = 1$ $p < 0.001$.

many cases, instead of answering the question. On average the subjects graded their certainty as 2.2 on a scale from 1 to 5, in which 1 was *very certain* and 5 was *very uncertain*.

Now we are left with the question of whether uncertainty is related to variation. We would expect that if the subjects chose many different options they might be in doubt. As a measurement of the variation in the data I have taken the difference between the preferred option and the second option. If that difference is high there is little variation, if that difference is low the variation is considerable. According to a Spearman Rank test and a Pearson correlation there is a significant correlation between the feeling of certainty of the subjects (mean of the score on the Likert scale) and the amount of variation in the data ($r_s = 0.66$, $p < 0.001$, which is a strong correlation). This means that the variation in the votes of the subjects is a good indicator of their degree of certainty.

If the variation in the votes of the subjects is a good indicator of their degree of certainty and the degree of variation in survey 1 and 2 is comparable, this suggests that language users do not become more uncertain when the amount of context is reduced. A possible explanation for this unexpected outcome is that speakers change their strategy of interpretation. What might be happening is that they rely more on their general knowledge of the conventions of their language and less on actual information about the context.

We can conclude that the existence of a large variation in the data is a good indicator of how certain the subjects were with respect to their answer. In addition, there was a strong correlation between the variation in survey 1 and survey 2. These two results together suggest that the certainty of the subjects does not decrease when the amount of context decreases.

3.5.4 Conclusion

We can conclude that in about one third of the sentences (36%) the removal of the context changed the interpretation of *ergens*. This can be explained by the fact that many triggers were in the four word window around *ergens*. In those cases in which the interpretation did change, the change can generally be explained by the fact that the original trigger was part of the removed context. However, in many cases another word that was still present seems to have taken over the role of trigger, which makes it possible for the interpretation to go in a completely different direction from the original example.

This does not mean that the original hypothesis that the locative interpretation is a default interpretation can be completely dismissed. In some cases new triggers steer the new interpretation in a locative direction, but there are also two cases in which a default interpretation seems the most likely interpretation.

Contrary to expectation, removal of context did not increase the variation in the answers of the participants significantly. However, there was a correlation between the certainty of the participants and the variation in their answers, showing that uncertainty and variation are correlated. This suggests that participants did not

become less certain when they were given less context. This is surprising since several participants complained that they sometimes had too little context to decide on an interpretation in survey 2.

3.6 Results of survey 3: Changing the interpretation

3.6.1 Introduction

Survey 3 was designed to see whether it is possible to change language users' interpretations of *ergens* by changing a minimal number of words in the sentences used in survey 1. The changed words generally were the hypothesized triggers of the original interpretation and the forms dependent on those triggers, since the new sentences had to be grammatical and understandable. This means that not in all sentences the same grammatical elements were changed. In addition, in some sentences more words had to be changed than in others. For instance, in the cases in which a grammatical construction seemed to be the trigger for the interpretation of modal *ergens*, the whole grammatical construction needed to be replaced. In other cases, it was enough to add a temporal or a locative phrase or to change the predicate. This is understandable from a constructionist perspective of language. If words are not (always) the basic building blocks of language, it is to be expected that more than a word needs to be changed in order to change an interpretation. The direction of the change was dependent on what fitted the overall context of the sentence best, since it was our goal to change the interpretation with minimal adjustments to the context. The average number of words deleted while changing the sentences was 3.5 and the average number of words added was 4.4. The average number of words in the original sentences of survey 1 was 25.4, excluding *ergens* itself. This means that on average 31%⁶⁷ of the words in the sentences had to be changed to change the interpretation of *ergens*.

3.6.2 Survey 1 and 3 compared

The result of the comparison between survey 1 and 3 is that in 80%⁶⁸ of the sentences the majority interpretation changed with respect to survey 1. This is a significant result in a binomial test (test value 0.11, $p < 0.001$). Therefore, we can conclude that it is possible to change the interpretation of *ergens* by changing just a few words in the context.

A question that has not been answered yet is what exactly had to change in order to change the interpretation. I will start with some examples of how the sentences were changed. In example (50) there was a replacement in the predicate, in example (60), a temporal phrase was added. In the examples (52) and (53) more extensive

⁶⁷That is, the deleted words + the added words divided by the total number of words of the original sentence * 100. That means that the more words were added the higher the percentage of words that had to be changed, because the total number of words in the original sentences remains the same.

⁶⁸That is, 33 out of 41 sentences.

changes were needed, because the changes that would have effect on *ergens* also had important effects on other parts of the sentence, due to the constructional nature of language. In the following examples, the text that was deleted is crossed out. The text that was added is in italics.

In example (50) the only thing that was changed was the predicate. The subjective noun *het gevoel* 'the feeling' was replaced by *gelezen* 'read'. This is only possible because the verb *to have* is polyfunctional in nature (i.e. it is both an auxiliary and a full verb with an object). This adjustment was enough to change the majority interpretation from modal to locative. The reason this interpretation changed is that *ik heb het gevoel* 'I have the feeling' is a fixed expression with a subjective meaning and a first person pronoun, whereas *reading* is not subjective and allows for a locative adjunct.

- (50) Steven knikte. Daar heb ik ook al ~~aan~~ *aan* gedacht. Maar ergens heb Steven nodded. There have I also already to thought. But ERGENS have
 ik *gelezen* ~~het gevoel~~ dat er meer achter steekt.
 I read ~~the feeling~~ that there more behind is.
 Steven nodded. I also thought about that. But *ergens* I have read/ the feeling that there is something behind it.⁶⁹

In the following example the only thing that was changed is the addition of a temporal phrase. This was possible because the verb *eten* 'to eat' accepts both a locative complement and an implicit location. The change from a locative to a point in time is brought about by the scalar preposition *tussen* in combination with a time.

- (51) Andrew zou me om half zes opwachten en dan zouden we ergens Andrew would me at half six wait for and then would we ERGENS
 tussen zes en zeven gaan eten en daarna zouden we gezellig naar
 between six and seven go eat and afterwards would we enjoyably to
 een theater.
 a theater.
 Andrew would wait for me at five thirty and then we would go and eat somewhere *ergens* between six and seven and afterwards we enjoyably would go to a theater.⁷⁰

In (52) the predicate and the adpositions have been changed. The locative postposition *naartoe* 'towards' has been replaced by *mee* 'with'. This made it possible for *ergens* to become a prepositional object. The verb was implicit in the first version of the sentence, which illustrates the constructional properties of *moeten* and the adverb *naartoe* in this type of clause as was already mentioned above. Therefore the verb *to help* was added.

⁶⁹ Adapted from: CGN comp-o/vl/fv800158.

⁷⁰ Adapted from: Eindhoven corpus gezinsbladen.

- (52) Carola vroeg of ze Anais even terug mocht geven aan Isabelle, want ze Carola asked if she Anais a while back could give to Isabelle, for she moest haar oma ergens mee helpen naartoe, maar dat kon had to her grandmother ERGENS with help towards, but that was possible niet volgens Isabelle. Belachelijk, het is haar eigen kind! not according to Isabelle. Rediculous, it is her own child!
- Carola asked if she could give back Anais to Isabelle for a while, because she had to go help her grandmother/ *ergens*, but that was impossible according to Isabelle. Rediculous, it is her own child!⁷¹

These examples show that there are many cases in which just a few words determine the interpretation of *ergens*. It also shows that there is no standard recipe that can be used to change the interpretation of *ergens*. In order for the result to make sense it is sometimes required to change parts that do not trigger a specific interpretation, but are dependent on another part that does fulfill the role of trigger. An extreme example of such a case is example (53).

- (53) Mijn vrienden zeggen: “dat je dat volhoudt” en “ik zou dat nooit kunnen.” Ergens is dat natuurlijk ook wel lekker om te horen, aan de andere kant ook niet. heb ik zelfs wel eens te horen gekregen dat iemand liever werkloos zou zijn dan voor de klas te gaan staan.
- My friends say: “that you that keep up” and “I would that never be able.” ERGENS is that of course also PTCL nice to to hear, on the other side also not. have I even PTCL once to hear got that someone rather unemployed would be than in front of the class to go stand.
- My friends say “how you manage that” and “I would never be able to do that”. *Ergens* is that of course nice to hear, on the other hand it is not./ I have been told by someone that he would rather be unemployed than to have a teaching job.⁷²

In this example we see that the combination of *ergens* in the beginning of the clause with the the subjective content of the rest of the clause makes it really hard to change the meaning of *ergens* with just a few words. The whole structure of the sentence seems to be dependent on the construction *ergens is dat*.

A google search shows that *ergens is dat* is a fixed construction that is only used with a modal sense. This means that to change the interpretation of *ergens* in this sentence, the whole construction needs to be changed. From a constructionist perspective, this was expected, since the size of the construction in which *ergens* is used, determines how easily the interpretation of *ergens* can be changed.

⁷¹Adapted from: CGN comp-a/vl/fv400262.

⁷²Adapted from: CGN comp-b/nl/fn000128.

However, the majority interpretation did not change for all sentences and those instances that did change, did not all change in the expected direction. Only 49%⁷³ of the sentences changed exactly in the way that was expected. Therefore, we will now study in detail those cases that did not change at all and the cases that changed in an unexpected direction.

Why did some interpretations not change?

About 20% of the sentences in survey 3 (i.e. 8 out of 41 sentences) did not change in their majority interpretation. Within this group there are two types of sentences. In the first type, which consists of 3 cases, the variation is so large that the difference between the majority interpretation and the other major interpretations is not significant anymore when outliers with fewer than 5 votes are excluded.⁷⁴ The second group of five cases has far less variation. We will start the discussion of why examples have not changed their majority interpretation with the first group.

Examples (54) and (55) are hard to explain, since the interpretations that received a (small) majority seem impossible to me. In (54) the majority interpretation is *at some point on a scale*. However, *ergens* is not placed in the same clause as the scalar phrase *tussen de vijf en de tien gevallen* ‘between five and ten cases’.

- (54) Enkele gevallen zei minister Van Boxtel en daarmee ~~bedoelt~~ zegt ie
 Several cases said minister Van Boxtel and with that ~~means~~ says he

 ergens dat er tussen de vijf en de tien gevallen van illegaal
 ERGENS that there between the five and the ten cases of illegal

 namaken zijn.
 reproduction are.

Several cases said minister Van Boxtel and with that he says *ergens* that there are between five and ten cases of illegal reproduction.⁷⁵

In example (55) we have a comparable problem in that the majority interpretation is *prepositional object*.⁷⁶ However, grammatically *ergens* is not the object of a preposition and cannot be paraphrased as *om iets*. Therefore, the only explanation for this outcome seems to be to assume that this example is not accepted by the participants. A possible explanation could be that this position of *ergens* in the clause is not very common in written language.

- (55) Dan ga ik me netjes aankleden. Het is heel wat gemakkelijker
 Then go I myself neatly dress. It is much what easier

⁷³That is: 20 out of 41.

⁷⁴ Sentence 7: χ^2 (3, N = 40) = 2.14 p = 0.54; Sentence 42: χ^2 (4, N = 40) = 1.47, p = 0.83; Sentence 43: χ^2 (3, N = 40) = 6.35, p = 0.10.

⁷⁵Adapted from: comp-f/nl/fn007187.

⁷⁶The term *prepositional object* was not mentioned in the survey, the participants were offered the option *on something, about something, towards something, in something*.

ergens ~~over~~ om te praten dan ~~er~~ over om te schrijven, daar kunnen we
 ERGENS ~~about~~ to to speak than ~~about~~ it to to write, there can we
 het over eens zijn.
 it about agree be.

Then I will go and dress up. It is much easier *ergens* to speak than to write,
 we can agree about that.⁷⁷

Since both examples above also show a high degree of variation, the only conclusion I can draw from these data is that according to the subjects these sentences are not correct.

In example (56) the number of votes in favor of the hypothesized interpretation *somehow* and the interpretation *prepositional object* are the same, but they are also the highest agreement rates for this sentence. Since *ergens* is clearly not a prepositional object, this sentence is apparently also not correct in the eyes of the participants.

- (56) Het zal wel in het Guinness Book of Records komen. Lopen we toch nog
 It will PTCL in the Guinness Book of Records come. Run we PTCL PTCL

ergens *het hardst in-voërop*, want dat voetballen wordt bij ons
 ERGENS the fastest in lead, for that playing soccer becomes for us
 nooit meer iets.
 never more anything.

This will probably get into the Guinness Book of Records. At least we run *the fastest* ergens ~~in the lead~~, since playing soccer will never get us anywhere anymore.⁷⁸

The second group is far less difficult to explain. The subjects seem to agree in their interpretations, but they are different from what was expected. The interpretations chosen by the subjects are also possible and apart from the fact that the subjects agreed more than expected on this possible interpretation, these examples are not problematic.

In example (57), the expectation was that it would be read as *at some point in time or on a scale*. However, the subjects read it as *somehow*. This interpretation is also possible. This example would typically be a possible switch context (Heine, 2002), because both a metaphorical reading and a modal reading are possible. However, there is relatively little variation in the data. A majority of 60% (24 of the 40 votes) voted for *somehow*, and the second option *prepositional object* has only 5 votes (12.5%). This shows that even though theoretically a temporal or locative interpretation was also possible, the subjects seem to agree on the modal option.

⁷⁷ Adapted from: Reve *Op weg naar het einde*.

⁷⁸ Adapted from: Grunberg (2003).

- (57) Dat heb ik opgedaan in het ziekenhuis zelf. En eigenlijk zijn zij
That have I contracted in the hospital itself. And PTCL are they
daar dan ergens *in de fout gegaan* verantwoordelijk voor. Daarom
there then ERGENS *in the mistake gone* responsible for. That is why
zeggen ze niet wat er aan de hand is.
say they not what there at the hand is.
I contracted that in the hospital itself. And basically they are *ergens* thus *the ones who made a mistake* there responsible for that. That is why they won't say what is going on.⁷⁹

The next example is also ambiguous in the sense that if we take the metaphor seriously we would say *ergens* is used in its sense of *at some place*. However, this is clearly about a metaphorical place in someone's mind, so the participants have chosen for the option *in someone's feelings or thoughts*.

- (58) Ik kon al liegen voordat ik kon praten. Maar toch had ik
I could already lie before I could talk. But PTCL had I
vroeger ergens *van binnen* óók altijd geloofd dat mijn
when I was a child ERGENS from inside also always believed that my
moeders verhaal maar een verzinsel was.
mother's story but a figment of her imagination was,
I could tell lies before I could talk. But still, when I was a child I had *ergens inside* always believed that my mother's story was just a figment of her imagination.⁸⁰

What we can conclude is that apart from three examples that may have been badly chosen, even ambiguous examples do not result in a high variation. Three of the four ambiguous cases were originally modal and remained modal, even though they were modified to make a non-modal interpretation possible and non-modal interpretations generally are more frequent.⁸¹ This suggests that the subjects have a preference for a modal interpretation in the case of ambiguity. Apparently, an ambiguous context triggers a different reaction from a lack of context, since in survey 2 we found a preference for a locative interpretation if there were no cues in the context.

As will be discussed more elaborately in chapter 6, the preference for a modal interpretation in an ambiguous context is especially interesting from a historical point of view. An explanation for the tendency to choose a modal interpretation if there is a choice between modal and non-modal may be found in Grice's maxim of quantity (Grice, 1989), which is phrased as follows by Traugott and Dasher (2002)

⁷⁹ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/vl/fv400789.

⁸⁰ Adapted from: Dorrestein (2003).

⁸¹ The fourth example originally was locative and remained locative, due to the continuous presence of locative markers.

‘say no more than you must and mean more thereby’. On the basis of this maxim, addressees would try to infer as much information about the attitude of the speaker as possible. This means that if there is a choice between a literal interpretation that does not add much to the information given in the sentence and an attitudinal (i.e. modal) interpretation, the last interpretation is more informative and thus the one that will be chosen.

If processes like this one really are the background of the tendency we just found, this suggests that this is a more general process. Such a general process would be a very strong pressure towards subjectification in the sense of Traugott (1989) and an explanation for the strongly directional changes we see in grammaticalization processes. However, this experimental setup is too small to draw any definite conclusions.

Why did some interpretations change in an unexpected direction?

The 11 examples that changed in an unexpected direction are very comparable to the examples we just discussed. Most of these examples can be interpreted both as non-modal and as modal, but the subjects choose the modal option in all cases. An example of such a case can be found in (59). In some other cases, a scale that has a temporal reference was considered temporal as in (60).

In example (59) the expected interpretation was locative, since this sentence is about finding a solution in a (metaphorical) place. However, the subjects interpreted this example as *somehow*. A possible explanation is that the overall interpretation that if something happens in an unknown place it will also happen in unknown circumstances (i.e. *somehow*) is thought to be more relevant than the interpretation of an unknown location.

- (59) Ze misten haar. Baba Baloek voelde zich vreemd, ietwat
They missed her. Baba Baloek felt himself strange, somewhat

lusteloos, maar ergens zou hij wel een oplossing vinden ook opgewekt
listless, but ERGENS would he PTCL a solution find also cheerful

en dan weer huilerig. Zijn maag was op slot en grendel.
and then again tearful. His stomach was on lock and bolt.

They missed her. Baba Baloek felt awkward, somewhat listless but *ergens* he would find a solution also cheerful and then again tearful. His stomach was locked.⁸²

We find a non-modal example in (60). The expectation was that this example would be interpreted as scalar, because of the preposition *tussen*. However, since this is about a time, the participants chose for the more overall interpretation of a temporal expression.

⁸² Adapted from: Bouazza (2003).

- (60) Andrew zou me om half zes opwachten en dan zouden we ergens
 Andrew would me at half six wait for and then would we ERGENS
 tussen zes en zeven gaan eten en daarna zouden we gezellig naar
 between six and seven go eat and afterwards would we enjoyably to
 een theater.
 a theater.
 Andrew would wait for me at five thirty and then we would go and eat some-
 where *ergens* between six and seven and afterwards we enjoyably would go
 to a theater.⁸³

What we can conclude from this category of examples is that the overall interpretation is preferred over the original metaphorical basis. For instance, a scalar example that refers to time will generally be categorized by the subjects as temporal, even though a scalar interpretation is also possible. If an instance of *ergens* can be read as modal it will be interpreted that way, even if it is also possible to give the example a more concrete interpretation. This was not what would be expected if the locative interpretation was somehow the primary or default interpretation of *ergens*, which was suggested by the results of survey 2. It may be, therefore, that an almost context-less example is not interpreted in the same way as an ambiguous example. However, this is for future research.

The features of modal ergens

In the previous section, we said that survey 3 might give some more insight into the triggers that lead to a modal interpretation and that distinguish between the various modal interpretations. There are two ways in which the results of this survey may provide some insight into the relation between context and a modal interpretation. On the one hand we have the group of examples in which a modal interpretation was the original interpretation, on the other hand we have the cases in which the interpretation changed into a modal interpretation.

The feelings interpretation

We will start with those cases that had a *feelings* interpretation in survey 1. There are six examples that fall into this category. Five of these examples changed their majority interpretation in survey 3. In three of these cases the majority interpretation was changed by replacing the predicate and its arguments. The original predicates were subjective predicates. In order to change the meaning of *ergens*, they were replaced by less subjective predicates as can be seen in examples (61) to (63).

- (61) Steven knikte. Daar heb ik ook al aan gedacht. Maar ergens heb
 Steven nodded. There have I also already to thought. But ERGENS have

⁸³ Adapted from: Eindhoven corpus gezinsbladen.

ik gelezen ~~het gevoel~~ dat er meer achter steekt.
I read ~~the feeling~~ that there more behind is.

Steven nodded. I also thought about that. But *ergens* I have read/ the feeling that there is something behind it.⁸⁴

- (62) Ze misten haar. Baba Baloeke voelde zich vreemd, ietwat
They missed her. Baba Baloeke felt himself strange, somewhat

lusteloos, maar ergens zou hij wel een oplossing vinden ook opgewekt
listless, but ERGENS would he PTCL a solution find also cheerful

en dan weer southuilerig. Zijn maag was op slot en grendel.
and then again tearful. His stomach was on lock and bolt.

They missed her. Baba Baloeke felt awkward, somewhat listless but *ergens* he would find a solution also cheerful and then again tearful. His stomach was locked.⁸⁵

- (63) Na veertien dagen ben ik nog eens om dat ontslagbewijs gaan
After fourteen days am I PTCL PTCL for that notice of dismissal go

vragen, want ergens bij een instantie vroegen ze erom zat het me toch
ask, for ERGENS at an agency asked they for it rankled it me PTCL

dwars. Maar ik heb het nooit gekregen.
across. But I have it never got.

After fourteen days I went to ask for that notice of dismissal, because *at some agency they asked for it it rankled in my mind*. But I never got it.⁸⁶

Example (61) was already discussed under (50). As we saw above, it was enough to change the predicate from subjective to locative in this example. However, as can be seen from example (58), in which a locative phrase was added but the subjective interpretation did not change, the replacements must unambiguously block the interpretation *in someone's mind or feelings* and they must be about a situation in the world in order for an example to change its interpretation from *feelings* to locative.⁸⁷

We find a comparable situation in example (62), which was already discussed under (59). In this example, the original interpretation, *feelings*, changed into *somehow* even though a locative marker was added and the predicate is also locative. The fact that *finding a solution* does not need to happen at a specific place in the world, but

⁸⁴ Adapted from: CGN comp-o/vl/fv800158.

⁸⁵ Adapted from: Bouazza (2003).

⁸⁶ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CGBL.EIH.

⁸⁷ This could also be phrased as: The replacements have to make sure that the focus of a proposition is not in someone's epistemic space anymore, but in a base space (i.e. in some real or imaginary physical world) in order for an example to change its interpretation from *feelings* to locative.

is mainly a cognitive action, probably makes the subjects choose for a modal instead of a locative interpretation.

The last example that originally had a *feelings* interpretation which changed into a locative interpretation by means of substituting the predicate is example (63). In this example, the subjective construction *dwars zitten* ‘to bother’ was replaced by a locative phrase and a predicate *to ask for*. Again the focus was changed from the subjective view of the speaker towards the physical world.

From these examples we may conclude that the requirements for a *feelings* interpretation which we found in survey 2 (a connection with the speaker and a subjective predicate), seem to overrule other triggers only when they make sure the focus of the sentence is on the subjective view of the speaker instead of on the physical world.

In the cases in which the interpretation *in someone’s feelings or thoughts* was chosen most frequently in survey 3, there are two clear characteristics. The first characteristic we already saw above: a first person pronoun and a subjective verb. The second group consists of cases in which a place within people’s minds was used metaphorically, as in examples (64) to (66). This last example was already discussed under (58).

- (64) Hoe nu die elementen eruit komen, is een kwestie van je
How now those elements out come, is a matter of your

persoonlijkheid *die* toch ergens *in je zit*, dat kun je niet
personality *which* PTCL ERGENS *in you sits*, that can you not

wegdrukken. En die persoonlijkheid die heb je zelf.
push away. And that personality that have you self.

How those elements are expressed is a matter of your own personality *which*
is ergens *within you*, you can’t suppress that. And your personality that is
yours.⁸⁸
- (65) Huldigde ook Hitler niet de zienswijze, dat ook leugens wel ergens *in*
Had also Hitler not the view, that also lies PTCL ERGENS *in*

mensen hun achterhoofd blijven hangen, worden geloofd?
people their back of their head remain dangling, are believed?

Of wat zij zeggen *wáár* is, doet er dus niet toe.
Whether what they say true is, does there therefore not PTCL.

Didn’t Hitler also have the idea that even lies *ergens* are believed? So whether
what they say is true does not matter.⁸⁹
- (66) Ik kon al liegen voordat ik kon praten. Maar toch had ik
I could already lie before I could talk. But PTCL had I

⁸⁸ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CGTL.EIH.

⁸⁹ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CPWE.EIH.

vroeger ergens van binnen óók altijd geloofd dat
when I was a child ERGENS from inside also always believed that

mijn moeders verhaal maar een verzinzel was,
my mother's story but a figment of her imagination was,

een sprookje zoals alle andere die ze me had verteld, alleen zonder
a fairy-tale like all others that she me had told, only without,

“zij leefden nog lang en gelukkig.”
'they lived ever after long and happily'.

But still, when I was a child I had *ergens* also believed that my mother's story was only a figment of her imagination, a fairy-tale like all the other ones she had told me, only without 'and they lived happily ever after'.⁹⁰

For examples (64) to (66), most subjects in survey 3 chose the option *in someone's feelings or thoughts*. However, in all cases there was also a large group that preferred *somehow*. The reason for this confusion is probably a mechanism we have seen before. A majority of the subjects chose the option that came closest to the overall interpretation of the phrase in which *ergens* was found. However, strictly speaking, the meaning of *ergens* itself is either metaphorically locative or modifying the locative phrase as in *somehow*. This is exactly what we find in the responses. Most votes are in favor of a *feelings* interpretation, closely followed by *somehow* and as a strong third option *place*. This means that although a large majority of the subjects interpret this kind of example as a metaphorical place, (both the *feelings* option and the option *at some place* are indications for an interpretation as a metaphorical place) there is a relatively large minority that prefers the interpretation *somehow*. This shows that there may be a connection between the use of *ergens* as a metaphorical locative marker and the use of the phrase as *somehow*. Whether this connection is also the historical source of the interpretation will be discussed in chapter 6

From a certain point of view

In survey 1, the modal category *from a certain point of view* was chosen by the majority of the participants for six of the sentences. All of those six sentences have changed their interpretation in survey 3. In example (67), it was enough to make sure that the other locative expression, *huishouden*, was not connected to *ergens* anymore for the interpretation of *ergens* to change from *point of view* to locative.

(67) Zij kan niet fulltime werken. En voor haar is huishouden is
She can not full-time work. And for her is housekeeping is

~~in principle~~ vergelijkbaar met een fulltime baan ergens.
~~in principle~~ comparable to a full-time job ERGENS.

⁹⁰ Adapted from: Dorrestein (2003).

Zeker in haar tempo omdat zij last heeft van reuma.
Especially in her tempo because she bother has of rheumatism.

She cannot work full-time. And *for her* is housekeeping is ~~in principle~~ *comparable* to a full-time job *ergens*. Especially at her pace because she has rheumatism.⁹¹

This suggests that the presence of a locative marker blocked a locative interpretation for *ergens* in survey 1. In other words, since there was no possibility to interpret *ergens* within the physical world, it was interpreted within the speaker's subjective views. However, there are no other indicators that *ergens* is to be interpreted as modal, so when the possibility was given in survey 3 by removing the locative marker which was blocking the locative interpretation to interpret *ergens* within a base space (i.e. a real or imaginary physical world), there was no ambiguity anymore.

The *point of view* interpretation changed to *somehow* in the following example (68).

(68) Speaker 1: Daarvoor steunen ze je wel maar daarna niet meer.
Before support they you PTCL but afterwards not anymore.

Speaker 2: Daar zit ergens wel een probleem weer wat in.
There sits ERGENS PTCL a problem PTCL something in.

Ze kunnen aan de andere kant ook bezig blijven.
They can on the other side also busy remain.

Speaker 1: Before they support you but afterwards not anymore. Speaker 2:
You *ergens* have a point. On the other hand, there is no end to it.⁹²

In example (68) a subjective construction *daar zit wat in* 'they have a point' was replaced by *a problem*. The interpretation *point of view* still got a relatively high number of votes (14 out of 40) in comparison to *somehow*, which had 18 out of 40 votes. The main reason for a choice for a modal interpretation is that there is no physical place in which this problem is found. Since there is no direct connection to someone's mental space, the choice is between the modal options that do not directly refer to a mental space: *somehow* and *point of view*. The slight preference for *somehow* may be explained by the fact that the statement is an analysis of a situation, which is only partly dependent on a point of view, whereas in the original context the statement really was an evaluation of the validity of someone's line of thought and thus more subjective. The fact that a high number of votes did not change may be the use of the phrase *aan de andere kant* 'on the other hand'.

If we now turn to the cases in which another interpretation changed to a *point of view* interpretation in survey 3, we find that there is only one example of such a case.

⁹¹ Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn007972.

⁹² Adapted from: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000441.

- (69) Ik zag dat ze goed verzorgd haar had. Geen grijs haartje,
 I saw that she well-cared-for cared hair had. No grey hair,
 begrijp je wel. Ergens een sterke vrouw in de veertig dacht ik.
 understand you PTCL. ERGENS a strong woman in the forties thought I.
 Maar ze gedroeg zich nog steeds als een verwend kind.
 But she behaved herself still like a spoiled child.
 I saw her hair was well-cared-for. Not a grey hair anywhere, you know the
 type. *Ergens* in her forties, I thought. But she behaved like a spoiled child.⁹³

In this example the original interpretation *about/around* was replaced by a *point of view* interpretation. This is due to the fact that the numbers were deleted. The replacement by a subjective phrase made it possible for this example to be interpreted as modal. The preference for the *point of view* interpretation was probably triggered by the contrastive element marked by the adversative conjunction *maar* 'but'.

What we can conclude from these examples is that the interpretation *point of view* is generally less connected to the subjective view of the speaker. It is therefore less subjective than the *feelings* interpretation, but more subjective than the *somehow* interpretation. The *point of view* interpretation seems to occur mainly in sentences with a third person subject and adversative markers.

Somehow

Many of the examples with the interpretation *somehow* were already discussed above, since their source interpretation or their goal interpretation was of one of the types already covered. This was for instance the case in examples (70), (71) and (72) below.

- (70) Ze misten haar. Baba Baloek voelde zich vreemd, ietwat
 They missed her. Baba Baloek felt himself strange, somewhat
 lusteloos, maar ergens zou hij wel een oplossing vinden ook opgewekt
 listless, but ERGENS would he PTCL a solution find also cheerful
 en dan weer huilerig. Zijn maag was op slot en grendel.
 and then again tearful. His stomach was on lock and bolt.
 They missed her. Baba Baloek felt awkward, somewhat listless but *ergens* he
 would find a solution also cheerful and then again tearful. His stomach was
 locked.⁹⁴

There are several features that seem to play a role in the interpretation of an example as *somehow*. Most of the examples have third person action verbs, as in example (70). That is, the predicates of these sentences often describe actions or events. In many of

⁹³ Adapted from: CGN comp-o/nl/fn001142.

⁹⁴ Adapted from: Bouazza (2003).

these cases, an interpretation of *ergens* as describing a metaphorical place of action would be possible, but *ergens* is not needed to fill an argument position. This is for instance the case in (71).

- (71) Huldigde ook Hitler niet de zienswijze, dat ook leugens wel ergens in
 Had also Hitler not the view, that also lies PTCL ERGENS in
mensen hun achterhoofd blijven hangen, worden geloofd?
 people their back of their head remain dangling, are believed?
 Of wat zij zeggen wáár is, doet er dus niet toe.
 Whether what they say true is, does it therefore not PTCL.
 Didn't Hitler also have the idea that even lies *get stuck* ergens in *people's minds*
 are believed? So whether what they say is true does not matter.⁹⁵
- (72) Hoe nu die elementen eruit komen is een kwestie van je persoonlijkheid die
 toch ergens in je zit, dat kun je niet wegdrücken. En die persoonlijkheid die
 heb je zelf.
 Hoe nu die elementen eruit komen, is een kwestie van je
 How now those elements out come, is a matter of your
 persoonlijkheid die toch ergens in je zit, dat kun je niet
 personality which PTCL ERGENS in you sits, that can you not
 wegdrücken. En die persoonlijkheid die heb je zelf.
 push away. And that personality that have you self.
 How those elements are expressed is a matter of your own personality which
 is ergens *within you*, you can't suppress that. And your personality that is
 yours.⁹⁶

In addition, examples with as their majority interpretation *somehow* are frequently (8 out of 12 cases) combined with the particles *toch* and/or *wel* (e.g. examples (72) and (71)). Both particles are focal particles. The particle *toch* expresses that although there are reasons not to think something is the case, it is the case anyway.⁹⁷ The particle *wel* expresses a confirmation of something. In many of these cases, *ergens* seems to express that although the statement is the case, the precise background of the situation described remains unclear. This is also illustrated by example (71).

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that the following characteristics play a role in the modal interpretations of *ergens*. The *feelings* category seems to be characterized by first person pronouns, mental state predicates and other subjective predicates. However, the

⁹⁵ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CPWE.EIH.

⁹⁶ Adapted from: the Eindhoven corpus \ec\corpus\CGTL.EIH.

⁹⁷ For more on this particle see Snel (2012).

most important feature of these characteristics is that they change the focus from the physical world to the subjective view of the speaker or, in some cases, the character. The *point of view* interpretation is found with subjective third person predicates and often combined with a contrastive marker. The main point seems to be that there is no direct connection made between the (viewpoint of the) speaker and the metaphor that is triggered by *ergens*. This allows the speaker to suggest that there is more than one subjective point of view involved.

The option *somehow* seems to be characterized generally by third person action verbs and in many cases a metaphorical place would be a possible, but less relevant interpretation.

3.6.3 Conclusion

In survey 3, we found that it is indeed possible to change the interpretation of *ergens* by changing around 30% of the words in the context. Sometimes it was only necessary to delete a word that blocked an interpretation, in other cases a whole construction needed to be replaced. In other words, the number of words that need to be replaced is dependent on the number of words that are dependent on a construction. In order to find out what parts of the context are responsible for changes in meaning, both the cases in which the meaning did change and those cases in which it unexpectedly did not change were discussed. What we found was that in order to trigger a locative interpretation there need to be verbs that allow for a locative complement and locative markers like adpositions and adverbs. In addition, it should not be possible to interpret *ergens* as modal, because in case of ambiguity language users seem to have a preference for modal options.

Temporal interpretations require temporal markers. For scalar interpretations scalar constructions are needed and the overall function of the scale should not fall in the temporal or *about/around* categories, because speakers seem to have a preference for an overall interpretation above formal characteristics like whether something is presented as a point on a scale. The *about/around* is often categorized by the same markers as the scale category, but in this case the scale is generally very rough and vague. Sometimes there are other markers of vagueness present.

The modal options had very different characteristics. The *feelings* category seemed to be characterized by first person pronouns, mental state predicates and other subjective predicates. However, the most important feature of these characteristics is that they change the focus from the physical world to the subjective view of the speaker or, in some cases, the character. The *point of view* interpretation is found with subjective third person predicates and often combined with a contrastive marker. The main point seems to be that there is no direct connection between the (mental space of the) speaker and subjective view expressed. This creates the suggestion that there is more than one subjective point of view involved. The option *somehow* seems generally to be characterized by third person action verbs and in many cases a metaphorical place would be a possible, but less relevant interpretation. A more general pattern was that in ambiguous cases, subjects seemed to prefer a modal interpretation over a locative one. This suggests that the default interpretation that

was found if people have no context at all or have only little context as in survey 2, does not seem to fulfill a function in resolving ambiguity in survey 3.

3.7 Conclusions

The goal of the surveys was to find an answer to the question of what determines a language user's interpretation of the poly-interpretable form *ergens*. We specifically tried to answer the following subquestions:

1. Are native speakers as a group consistent in their interpretations?
2. How much context do language users need to be consistent in an interpretation?
3. What linguistic cues guide the choice of an interpretation?
4. Can we influence the interpretation of a language user by manipulating the context?

We will start with question 1. We found in survey 1 that speakers generally do clearly agree on a preferred interpretation, although there is some variation. In 70% of the cases more than 50% of the subjects chose one single interpretation out of nine options.

With respect to question 2, it was shown in survey 2 that the amount of context needed to arrive at the original interpretation generally does not exceed two words before and after *ergens*, although there are cases in which a trigger outside of this window has a strong influence on the interpretation of that sentence. In addition, it was found that the absence of a more important trigger may clear the way for other forms to fulfill the function of a trigger, sometimes changing the interpretation of *ergens* radically. These triggers seem to be the cues guiding the choice of an interpretation and therefore they are the answer to question 3. Most of these triggers are fairly straightforward: locative markers trigger a locative interpretation, temporal markers trigger a temporal interpretation and scalar prepositions trigger an interpretation as points on a scale. The prepositional object interpretation of course needed a preposition that had scope over *ergens*. The last non-modal option was *about/around*. The trigger of this option seemed to be numbers. In all cases in which this option was chosen, numbers were retained.

The modal interpretation *somehow* was not accompanied by clear triggers, but these sentences did contain other particles like *toch* and *wel*. The *feelings*-interpretation was almost always accompanied by a first person pronoun and other particles. In some cases there were clear features of fixed expressions in the clause. The cases in which the preferred option was *point of view* contained only impersonal fixed expressions.

This is not to say that the default hypothesis is completely refuted. In two examples the hypothesis that *ergens* is by default interpreted as locative seemed the only

reasonable explanation for the change in meaning and in several cases in which there was a secondary locative trigger the default effect may have played a role as well.

Another result of survey 2 was that there was a significant correlation in the variation in the interpretation chosen for particular examples between the participants in survey 1 and 2. That is, the overall amount of variation in the answers did not change between survey 1 and survey 2, although both meaning and the amount of variation for individual sentences did change. This is surprising since some of the subjects in survey 2 complained that they did not have enough context to interpret *ergens* properly.

The certainty of the participants correlated with the amount of variation in survey 2. This means that the variation may be seen as a measure for the certainty of the participants. If we take the variation to be a measurement of the uncertainty we have to conclude that the certainty of speakers is not influenced by the amount of context.

In survey 3, we tried to answer question 4. We found that it is possible to change the interpretation of *ergens* by changing just a few words, depending on what kind of trigger is involved. In addition, we found that if for one sentence there is theoretically a modal and a non-modal interpretation, the participants seem to prefer the modal option. Participants also tend to choose the option that best fits the overall interpretation of the phrase in which *ergens* is found. This means that participants do not see most metaphorical uses as metaphorical. For instance, a point on a scale will not be interpreted as such when the scale is a temporal one. In such a case the participants prefer the interpretation *at some moment* and if a prepositional object expresses a place they will choose the locative option in survey 3. The characteristics of the modal interpretations were made more specific with respect to survey 2. The *feelings* interpretation seemed to be triggered by first person pronouns and mental state predicates/subjective predicates. The *point of view* option was chosen if the predicate was impersonal but subjective and if there were adversative markers in the context. The *somehow* interpretation was found most with third person action verbs in situations in which a (metaphorical) place would also be possible.

If we now go back to question 3.7, we can conclude that in most cases triggers that are in the direct environment of *ergens* play an important role in its interpretation. If triggers are not present in the context, a default interpretation may play a role. However, some triggers may overrule other triggers. If the higher order trigger is deleted, the lower order may become a new trigger, sometimes changing the interpretation of *ergens* radically. In addition, the relevance of an interpretation for the communicative value of the sentence may play a role. If, for instance, the direct context does not contain an element of which locative *ergens* may be an argument, this may be an indication that *ergens* is to be interpreted as modal. A default interpretation may play a role if there is a lack of context, but in cases of ambiguity there seems to be a preference for the modal interpretations.

CHAPTER 4

A corpus study of *ergens*

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we found that in most cases there was a trigger in the direct context of *ergens* which seemed to point the addressee in a specific direction. In some cases, this trigger was found outside the direct context. This raises the question whether collocations and triggers generally are the same thing. In order to find that out, we will compare the collocations of *ergens* in three corpora, which will be described below, with the triggers that were found above. This will also give us the chance to see whether the conclusions that were drawn above about the contextual requirements for a specific interpretation hold for a larger set of examples.

4.1.1 The corpora

The synchronic corpora that were used in this study are the Corpus Gesproken Nederlands (CGN) (Corpus of Spoken Dutch, 1998-2004), the Eindhoven corpus (a corpus from the sixties and early seventies) and a number of literary novels¹ all but one published in the past ten years (A. Grunberg *De Asielzoeker* (2003), G. Reve *Op weg naar het einde* (1963), H. Haasse *Sleuteloog* (2002), R. Dorrestein *Het duister dat ons scheidt* (2003), H. Bouazza *Paravion* (2003)).

The Corpus Gesproken Nederlands is a 8,916,272 word corpus and in total it contains 2757 instances of *ergens*. The corpus has been built out of the components given

¹With thanks to Suzanne Fagel, who was so kind as to let me use her digital versions of these novels.

in table 4.1 below.² These components consist of various settings in which spoken language is used. The frequency scores given in table 4.1 are the number of instances of *ergens* in that component from the Netherlands and Belgium respectively divided by the total number of words from the Dutch or Belgian part of the corpus times 10.000.

Component	frequency ergens BE	frequency ergens NL
a. Spontaneous conversations ('face-to-face')	4.6	3.8
b. Interviews with teachers of Dutch	5.1	2.7
c. Spontaneous telephone dialogues 1	4.4	3.6
d. Spontaneous telephone dialogues 2	4.5	3.2
e. Simulated business negotiations	n/a	(2.0) ³
f. Interviews, discussions, debates (broadcast)	1.9	2.5
g. (political) Discussions, debates, meetings (non-broadcast)	1.0	0.9
h. Lessons recorded in the classroom	2.4	2.6
i. Live (sports) commentaries (broadcast)	1.5	0.2
j. Newsreports, reportages (broadcast)	1.1	2.2
k. News (broadcast)	0.4	0.3
l. Commentaries, columns, reviews (broadcast)	1.4	1.4
m. Ceremonious speeches, sermons	2.4	0.0
n. Lectures, seminars	2.8	1.3
o. Written text	2.3	2.3
Total instances <i>ergens</i>	3.5	2.8

Table 4.1: The components of the CGN and the frequency of *ergens* (number of instances of *ergens*/number of words in that part of the corpus * 10,000) in Netherlandic Dutch and Belgian Dutch.

In table 4.1 we see that the incidence of *ergens* is higher in the Belgian part of the corpus than in the Netherlandic part. This is especially the case in the first part of the corpus (a-h), which consists of spontaneous speech in all kinds of different settings. As we will see later, this might be explained by the broader use of *ergens* in Belgian Dutch. In addition, *ergens* is found more frequently in spontaneous and informal settings, like spontaneous conversations than in more formal settings like the news, ceremonial speeches and broadcasted interviews and discussions.

The Eindhoven corpus, a Netherlandic Dutch corpus, consists of the following genres:

²For a more elaborate description of how this corpus was designed see <http://lands.let.kun.nl/cgn/ehome.htm>.

³There are no Belgian recordings for section e, therefore these instances have been left out of the comparison.

Component	Tot. words	<i>ergens</i>	<i>ergens</i> / Tot.words x10,000
camb (corpus of officials)	56,679	0	0
dbl (daily newspapers)	152,384	13	0.9
gbl (family magazines)	155,771	26	1.7
gtl (spoken language)	183,622	28	1.5
obl (opinion magazines)	157,830	12	0.8
pwe (non-specialist scientific texts)	148,788	8	0.5
rno (novels and short stories)	167,649	30	1.8
Total	1022723	117	1.1

Table 4.2: The components of the Eindhoven corpus and the frequency of *ergens* in each of those components

In table 4.2, we see again the tendency for *ergens* to be used more frequently in informal genres. It is found most frequently in family magazines and in spoken language as well as in novels and short stories.

The corpus of novels consist of Dutch novels that were selected on two criteria: 1. They had to be stylistically as diverse as possible and 2. their publishing dates should be as close as possible while still fitting requirement 1. The corpus of novels has the following characteristics:

Author	Words	<i>Ergens</i>	<i>ergens</i> / words x10,000
H. Bouazza <i>Paravion</i> (2003)	52,862	11	2.1
R. Dorrestein <i>Het duister dat ons scheidt</i> (2003)	87,928	30	3.4
A. Grunberg <i>De Asielzoeker</i> (2003)	120,259	23	1.9
H. Haasse <i>Sleuteloog</i> (2002)	39,403	6	1.5
G. Reve <i>Op weg naar het einde</i> (1963)	55,340	22	4.0
Total	355,792	92	2.6

Table 4.3: The novel corpus and the frequency of *ergens* in its components

In table 4.3 the number of instances of *ergens* is relatively high in the work of Dorrestein and Reve. In the former this can be linked to the frequent use of modal *ergens*, in the latter the theme of the work (travelling letters) is an explanation for the frequent use of locative *ergens*.

As was argued more extensively above, we need more categories of *ergens* than were described by the dictionaries in order to categorize all cases in the corpora. The frequencies of the uses of *ergens* can be found in table 4.4.

	Novels	%	Eindhoven Corpus	%	CGN	%
Place	62	67.4	79	67.5	1863	67.6
Prep. Obj	21	22.8	19	16.2	296	10.7
Time	2	2.2	2	1.7	123	4.5
Modal	7	7.6	12	10.2	139	5.0
<i>Feelings</i>	5	5.4	4	3.4	51	1.8
<i>Point of view</i>	2	2.2	2	1.7	37	1.3
<i>Somehow</i>	0	0	6	7.3	51	1.8
?	0	0	6	5.1	307	11.1
Scale	0	0	0	0.0	14	0.5
Total	92		117		2757	

Table 4.4: The frequencies of the types of interpretations of *ergens* in three corpora. The numbers in the subcategories of modal add up to the total number of modal *ergens*.

As can be seen from table 4.4, the frequency of modal interpretations differs between the three corpora, whereas the frequency of locative *ergens* is almost constant. This suggests that the presence of modal *ergens* may be more dependent on genre and/or register.

What we may conclude from this survey of the three corpora is that *ergens* is relatively frequent in informal language. On the one hand, this may have to do with the indefiniteness of *ergens*. The use of an indefinite may not be appropriate in more formal settings. On the other hand, it may have to do with modal *ergens*, which is characterized by the Van Dale dictionary as colloquial language, suggesting that it is mainly found in informal, spoken language. This last explanation is strongly supported by the fact that 113 of the 139 modal instances of *ergens* in the CGN (81%) occur in the spontaneous speech sections of the CGN, whereas these sections contain only 59 % of the total number of words in the corpus.

4.1.2 Context, collocations and interpretation

A reference to the context of a form can refer to all kinds of information, from the common ground of interlocutors to a specific linguistic phenomenon in the direct environment of that form. All factors that fall under the term *context* may play a role in interpretation. In order to find out which of the various features of the context plays a role in the interpretation of *ergens*, we will start with the linguistic context. More specifically, we will start with the collocational behavior of *ergens*.

The definition of a collocation

Textbooks on collocational analysis (e.g. Manning and Schütze, 1999) generally mention three types of requirements for words to be considered a collocation: 1. the distance between a word and the target word. 2. the statistical probability that forms occur together and 3. the requirement that the collocation is part of a phrase. The

first criterion is mainly a way to define the term collocation, the second has as its main goal to rule out that the frequency of a co-occurrence is due to chance and the third is a way to avoid 'pollution' of the results in terms of clusters of function words that occur very frequently together, but which are due to grammatical rules that are not relevant to the study at hand (e.g. articles that are collocated with nouns, coordinators that co-occur with articles, etcetera).

However, in the case of collocation research on particles, not all of these criteria are applicable. First, there is the fact that particles are not part of a phrase. That would not be a problem, if we knew what other part of speech we are looking for. However, the definition of a construction or a trigger is so broad that we cannot always restrict ourselves to specific parts of speech here. This problem is discussed by Van der Wouden (2001) and he also shows that despite these problematic issues the phenomenon of collocation is highly relevant for particles. Second, the statistically necessary assumption that words are divided randomly over a text, is obviously not correct. Languages do have word ordering principles. For this reason, and because of the large sample size, it is relatively easy to get statistically significant results (Manning and Schütze, 1999, 166). This means that we cannot draw definitive conclusions from the fact that two words occur together significantly more often than chance (Gries, 2010). The best we can do is rank the collocations with respect to each other. This leaves us with the question of how we can adapt the collocational technique to the study of particles.

There are two ways to avoid the pitfalls that are normally avoided by using the criterion of 'being part of a phrase'. The first is to make a contrastive analysis between two groups. For instance, if the co-occurrence of a form with *ergens* may be due to word order principles, we might contrast a group of instances in which *ergens* is in the first position of the clause with a group in which *ergens* is not in this position, to see whether its collocate is restricted to the cases in which *ergens* is in first position. Another option is to compare two groups that are interpreted in a different way and see whether their collocations correlate with each interpretation. This will allow us to see whether the occurrence of a specific form in the context of *ergens* correlates with one specific interpretation.

The second way to avoid overgeneralizing is to be conservative. If two forms occur frequently within 10 words of each other, there may be many explanations for this situation which have little to do with the interpretation of *ergens*. However, if a form occurs very frequently directly next to *ergens* and does not have a very general grammatical function (like an article or an auxiliary), the chance is already higher that we have found a meaningful collocation that plays a role in the interpretation of *ergens*. This is why I will start with a conservative number of words and, when expanding the scope, I will continue to be critical as to why the forms are frequently found together.

A more general way of restricting ourselves is of a more semantic nature. Although it is interesting to see which forms have co-occurrences with *ergens* often enough to be a potential collocation, a semantic relationship between *ergens* and the form under consideration makes it far more likely for a form to be a trigger for a spe-

cific interpretation of *ergens*. Practically, this means that when looking at a list of the most frequent collocations of *ergens*, it is important to remain critical and to investigate whether the frequent co-occurrence may be due to other processes which have nothing to do with the interpretation of *ergens*. The fact that a frequent collocation is part of the same semantic field as one of the interpretations of *ergens* or the frequent presence of the same type of words in the list are indications that there may be a link between the frequent co-occurrence of that form with *ergens* and the interpretation of *ergens*. A closer investigation will reveal whether a specific interpretation of *ergens* correlates with the presence of some of these collocates.

A last question that needs to be answered is when a form can be considered to be the same as another form. In the case of verbs, for instance, it is not uncommon to consider all inflections of a verb as one collocational entity. This raises the question when we consider a group to belong together. Can we, for instance, call the group of mental state predicates one collocational entity? Since in this study the goal is to find the general patterns in language that may be connected to an interpretation, we will look at this more generalized type of collocation as well as at more specific collocations.

4.2 A collocation analysis of *ergens* by category

The first thing I did when I started to work on *ergens*, was to categorize all instances of *ergens* in the CGN. This can be seen as a native speaker judgement on the interpretation of *ergens*. This categorization was not influenced by the results from the surveys and will be used below to test the results of the surveys on a larger set of data.

4.2.1 Locative *ergens*

As we saw in the previous chapter, the presence of locative prepositions and verbs seemed to have a strong influence on the interpretation of *ergens* as locative. It would be interesting to find out whether this generalization can account for a large number of the locative instances of *ergens*. However, if we take all instances of locative prepositions into account that are in a 5 word distance of *ergens*, we run the risk of counting the instances of *ergens* double that have more than one preposition in their direct surroundings or a preposition and a locative verb. Therefore, we will start with just one position at a time. In 28%⁴ of the locative instances of *ergens* in the CGN, *ergens* is directly followed by a locative adposition. Another 4% is added to that if we take into account verbs that are frequently found next to *ergens* and imply a location

⁴There are 1863 instances of locative *ergens* according to my classification. These numbers may be influenced a bit by the fact that there are some instances of locative *ergens* that have non-locative instances of *ergens* in their direct context, which could not be excluded from this count. However, since these cases constitute less than 2% of the locative instances of *ergens* this should not blur the overall picture.

	Number	% with respect to locative <i>ergens</i>
locative adpositions	1125	60%
locative verbs	796	43%
locative adverbs	183	10%
Total locative instances of <i>ergens</i>	1863	100%

Table 4.5: The number of locative word classes five words before and five words after *ergens* in the CGN. The percentages are percentages of the number of that category with respect to the locative instances of *ergens*. The percentages do not add up to 100% because they are not mutually exclusive.

like, for instance, *go, put down, lie, eat and drink*⁵. This means that by taking into account only one position in the sentence and two categories of words, we can already account for almost one third of the instances of locative *ergens*. If we now broaden our horizon a bit and add the adverb *anders* ‘else’, we can add another 12 %. In total we have accounted for 44% of the locative instances of *ergens*, looking only at the position directly after it.

If we do the same for the position directly before *ergens*, we find that this position gives less clear results. All locative adverbs, verbs and adpositions in this position can account for 12% of the instances of locative *ergens*.

What we can conclude from this survey of the two positions directly next to *ergens* is that collocational information is likely to play an important role in the interpretation of locative *ergens*. The words directly before and after it already provide cues for the interpretation of about 50%⁶ of the cases. This suggests that if we broaden our scope to five words before and after *ergens* we are likely to cover an even larger proportion of the data, especially because the total number of locative adpositions, locative verbs and locative adverbs in the ten words around *ergens* is very large, as can be seen from table 4.5.

However, this does not mean that there is always a direct and simple connection between collocations and the interpretation of *ergens*. As was already shown in the previous chapter, some features of the context can dominate over others. For instance, the collocation *daar ergens* ‘somewhere there’ is in most cases a locative expression, but it can also be used as a temporal expression, as in example (1).

- (1) Speaker 1: Vorig jaar was 't een zaterdag. 't is al wat 'k weet.
last year was it a Saturday. It is all what I know.

Speaker 2: uh in alle geval 't moet daar ergens zijn omdat de weekends
in all case it must DAAR ERGENS be because the week-ends

⁵ Although eating and drinking do not automatically imply a location, in Dutch they are often used to express the phrase *go to/be at a restaurant*. In this use they are often accompanied by a location and, if the precise location is not particularly relevant, *ergens*.

⁶ A few of the collocations before and after *ergens* overlap, this is why this percentage is a bit lower than the sum of the percentages mentioned above.

dus een beetje opgeschoven zijn hè? ja.
 thus a bit moved are isn't it? Yes.

Last year it was on a Saturday. That's all I know. Anyway, it has to be *daar ergens*, because the week-ends have moved a bit, haven't they? Yes.⁷

In example (1) the only reason to think that *daar ergens* 'somewhere there' is a temporal reference is the overall context. The speakers are discussing at what date a celebration will be held. Both the text before and after this fragment continues to be about that date, which makes the only reference that makes sense a temporal one. If one isolated the clause *in alle geval... daar ergens zijn* from its overall context, *ergens* would get a locative interpretation due to the presence of the locative marker *daar* 'there'. The date is seen as a point on a time scale, which is again a clear example of the metaphorical nature of the relationships between some of the interpretations of *ergens*.

Examples such as (1) make clear why we need a theory of interpretation that consists of more factors than a meaning and general pragmatic principles. On the one hand, it is clear that this temporal interpretation is dependent on the broader context, which would make it a good candidate for a pragmatic addition to a basic meaning. On the other hand, however, an attempt to translate the phrase into German or Italian already shows that a temporal use of a locative phrase like this is not readily accepted in all languages. This means that Dutch speakers need to know that their language allows for the temporal use of *daar ergens*, which implies that the choice for a temporal interpretation is not purely pragmatic, but has a conventional component.

In addition, example (1) is a good illustration that although collocations may play an important role in the interpretation of a particle like *ergens*, there is by no means an automatic relation between the presence of a collocation and a specific interpretation. The final interpretation is also influenced by the expectations of the addressee, who will choose the interpretation that makes the most sense, even if - given a specific collocation - statistically the chance would be higher that another interpretation was intended.

4.2.2 Temporal, scalar and about/around-functions of *ergens*

In the CGN, the temporal interpretation of *ergens* is always connected to a direct temporal reference in the context, generally directly before or after *ergens*, but as was shown by the previous example, in rare cases it can also be somewhat further away. This means that there is a relatively strong one to one relationship between this type of interpretation and temporal markers in the context.

However, as was also discussed in the previous chapter and illustrated by example (1) the boundaries between the temporal use of *ergens* and its scalar use are

⁷From CGN comp-d/vl/fv700207.

blurry. The connection between the temporal interpretation and the locative interpretation may well be a metaphorical place on a scale and there are many examples in which these interpretations overlap.

However, there are also cases in which *ergens* is used to denote a place on a non-temporal scale. Very frequently (in 8 of 14 instances) the preposition *tussen* 'between' is present. In other examples we find *rond* 'around' or *in de [number]* 'in the [number]'. These expressions generally denote imprecision, which explains why this category also has an overlap with the category *about/around* not only semantically, but also with respect to its collocational characteristics.

The connection between the temporal, scalar and *about/around* interpretations is interesting because it shows that the *about/around* category is more connected to the non-modal interpretations than to the modal interpretations. This suggests that the development to *about/around* was an extension that arose apart from the modal categories.

The category *about/around* is the only category in which there is a clear collocational difference between Belgian Dutch and Netherlandic Dutch. The collocation *ergens iets* 'about/around' is used by speakers from Belgium only. Although there are other Belgian examples that also sound a bit odd to a speaker from the west of the Netherlands (see also section 3.3), this is the only collocation in which there is a clear cut division between speakers from the two countries. An example is given in (2). This interpretation of *ergens iets* is found 19 times in the CGN.

- (2) Speaker 1: Ik bedoel geen superwinsten daar maar dus uh wel wel wel
I mean no super profit there but so ehm PTCL PTCL PTCL

veiligheid. Speaker 2: nee nee maar wel veilige belegging hè.
safety. No, no but PTCL safe investment PTCL.

Speaker 1: en dan ergens iets negentien procent of zo uh beleggen
and then ERGENS IETS nineteen percent or so ehm invest

die maar op de beurs.
they PTCL on the stock market

Speaker 1: I do not mean super profit but some safety. Speaker 2: No, no but you do mean a safe investment, don't you? Speaker 1: and they invest *ergens iets* nineteen percent or something on the stock market.⁸

4.2.3 Modal *ergens*

Now we will turn to the modal interpretations of *ergens*. These interpretations are the most difficult to describe and distinguish, therefore it will be interesting to see whether they show collocational characteristics that are tied to their category. One

⁸From CGN comp-a/vl/fv400809.

CGN	1st	%	2nd	%	3rd	%	eq. 1st	%	Gen 2nd	%	?	%	Total	%
CGN														
Feelings	26	18	1	1	17	11	2	1	5	3	0	0	51	34
Point of view	6	4	0	0	30	20	0	0	1	1	0	0	37	25
Somehow	7	5	3	2	32	22	2	1	6	4	1	1	51	34
?	1	1	1	1	6	4	0	0	1	1	0	0	9	6
													148	100
<u>Eindhoven</u>														
Feelings	1	8	0	0	1	8	2	17	0	0	0	0	4	33
Point of view	0	0	0	0	2	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	17
Somehow	1	8	0	0	5	42	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	50
?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
													12	100
<u>Novels</u>														
Feelings	2	29	0	0	3	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	71
Point of view	1	14	0	0	1	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	29
Somehow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
													7	100

Table 4.6: Person of the predicate in clauses with modal *ergens* in the CGN, Eindhoven corpus and novels. Eq 1st is *equivalent to 1st person*, i.e. constructions that contain a first person pronoun in an oblique case. Gen 2nd is a generically used 2nd person.

of the arguments that we used in the previous chapter was whether the situation described pertained to the propositional content of the clause or to the subjective opinions of the speaker. In other words, whether *ergens* referred to the subjective view of the speaker or to the physical world. It was suggested that the difference between the *feelings*-option and the *point of view* option was dependent on the strength of the subjective connection between the expressed view and the speaker. We also described some features of the context that seemed to be characteristics of the groups of modal interpretations. The *feelings* interpretation seemed to coincide frequently with first person pronouns and mental state predicates/ subjective verbs. From table 4.6 it is clear that 1st person verbs or constructions that contain an accusative first person pronoun (eq. 1st) are much more frequent in this category, as was expected on the basis of the survey results.

In table 4.7 below, an overview is given of the type of verbs or predicates that are used within a clause in which modal *ergens* is found. From this table it is clear that mental state predicates are more frequently found in the *feelings* category, as was expected on the basis of the surveys. Statements with a copula seem to be more frequently used in the *point of view* category. The interpretation *somehow* has the largest number of predicates that do not have a particularly subjective value. These findings confirm our tentative conclusions from the surveys.

A feature that seemed to distinguish the *point of view* interpretation from the other modal options, was the presence of an adversative expression after *ergens* such as *aan de andere kant* 'on the other hand'. The expression *aan de andere kant* 'on the other hand' or a variation on this expression is found 5 times in the CGN in the *point*

CGN	MSP	%	Subj. Pred.	%	Copula	%	Other	%	Total	%
Feelings	40	27	1	1	5	3	5	3	51	34
Point of view	7	5	2	1	23	16	5	3	37	25
Somehow	5	3	5	3	10	7	31	21	51	34
?	1	1	0	0	0	0	8	5	9	6
									148	100
<u>Eindhoven</u>										
Feelings	2	17	2	17	0	0	0	0	4	33
Point of view	0	0	0	0	2	17	0	0	2	17
Somehow	0	0	0	0	4	33	2	17	6	50
?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
									12	100
<u>Novels</u>										
Feelings	4	57	1	14	0	0	0	0	5	71
Point of view	0	0	2	29	0	0	0	0	2	29
Somehow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
									7	100

Table 4.7: The types of verbs in the three corpora split by modal category. MSP is an abbreviation of mental state predicate.

of view category (14% of the instances in this category), 2 times in the *feelings* category (4%) and never in the *somehow* category. Since the total number of instances per modal group is not very high, it is hard to draw any firm conclusions, but we may say that the corpus data do support the results from the surveys.

If we zoom in on the individual collocations somewhat further, it becomes clear that the verb *vinden* ‘be of the opinion, to find, to think’, is frequently found together with the *feelings* interpretation of *ergens* (13 times out of 51 instances in the CGN, i.e. 25%) whereas in the *point of view* and *somehow* categories it is only found 1 time (respectively 3 % and 2% out of 37 and 51 instances).

A collocation that is found in the *somehow* category only is the verb *kloppen* ‘be correct, right’. Within this category *ergens* and *kloppen* are found in each other’s vicinity (5 words before and 5 words after *ergens*) four times (8% of the 51 cases of *somehow* in the CGN). The collocations *wel* and *toch* are more problematic. Although both particles are frequently found around modal *ergens*, this seems to be a general characteristic of (modal) *ergens*, since both particles occur frequently in all three modal categories and in cases of locative *ergens* as well. Therefore, they cannot be used to distinguish the categories from each other.

Summarizing, we have found the following collocational characteristics for each of the modal markers:

For the category *in someone’s feelings or thoughts* the following characteristics are more frequently found than in the other categories:

1. first person pronouns
2. mental state predicates and subjective predicates
3. the verb *vinden* 'to be of the opinion'

The following characteristics are more frequently found in the *from a certain point of view* category:

1. the frequent use of the copula
2. subjective adjectives in combination with the copula
3. variants of the phrase *aan de andere kant* 'on the other hand'
4. the *ergens is dat* 'ergens is that' construction

The following characteristics are more frequently found in the *somehow* category:

1. third person verbs
2. non-subjective predicates
3. the verb *kloppen* 'to be right, correct'

The next step is to see what proportion of the examples is covered by these features. If we take for every category the items of the list of characterizations above and exclude the cases that show these characteristics, we are left with a relatively small number of cases. For the *feelings* category there are 7 cases left out of 51, which is 13 % in this category. For the *point of view* category there are more cases left, 12, which is 32% of this category. In the case of the category *somehow* this is 6 cases or 12%. This means that although the correlation is not perfect, these features allow people to predict which interpretation is likely to be the correct one in most cases. We will now discuss the exceptions which do not show the general characteristics of their category to find out why the exceptions are part of a category.

Four of the seven exceptions within the *feelings* category in the CGN do not contain first person pronouns or mental state predicates. These examples seem to show some sort of free indirect speech. The speaker is talking about the thoughts and feelings of a group of people or another person, suggesting that he has access to their thoughts and feelings. This type of text accounts also for almost all instances of modal *ergens* in the novels.

- (3) en uh dat vermoeit de mensen op een gegeven ogenblik waarschijnlijk
 en ehm that tires out the people at a certain moment probably

dus ook ergens wel. Want om dat jaren vol te houden dat zal dus niet
 then also ERGENS PTCL. For to that years continue that will PTCL not

meevallen.
 turn out for the better
 And ehm that will *ergens* tire people out at some point probably. For it will be hard to continue that for years.⁹

In example (4), *ergens* is found in a question which is putting words in the addressee's mouth. This makes the necessary connection between the addressee's feelings and the sentence.

- (4) Speaker 1: Da 's leuk hoor. Maar is dat een stiekem een droom *ergens* of?
 That is nice PTCL. But is that a secret a dream ERGENS or?
 Speaker 2: Nee joh 'k doe dat nou maar niet meer.
 No dude I do that PTCL PTCL not anymore
 Speaker 1: That's nice. But is that some sort of hidden dream *ergens* or what?
 Speaker 2: No dude I won't do that anymore.¹⁰

In example (5) it seems that with *ergens* the minds of a group of people is meant, but the following sentence shows that the speaker is also talking about him/herself. This makes this use of *ergens* more in line with the other cases of the *feelings* category.

- (5) Maar *ergens* leeft dat idee nog wel zonne. Nee maar ik ja bij mij dus
 Maar ERGENS lives that idea PTCL PTCL PTCL. No but I, Yes with me PTCL

 ook. En we zitten dus op de moment wel in in de juiste omgeving
 also. And we sit PTCL at the moment PTCL in in the right environment

 om publiek daarvoor te vinden.
 to public for that to find.

 But *ergens* that idea is still alive. Also for me. And at this moment we are in the right position to find public for it.¹¹

In the last example the speaker describes the feelings of another person, which in the end results in direct thought. The use of *ergens*, however, is still in the description. The speaker seems to create a mental space in which the person rebels against a certain image he has of himself.

- (6) Ik denk dat hij ook wel uh *ergens* rebelleert tegen de idee 'k ben nu
 I think that he also PTCL ehm ERGENS rebels against the idea I am now

 iemand die elke dag antidepressiva neemt. 'k kan mij dat voorstellen
 someone who every day antidepressants takes. I can me that imagine

⁹CGN comp-b/nl/fn000096.

¹⁰From CGN comp-b/nl/fn000105.

¹¹From CGN comp-c/vl/fv701091.

dan dat je daar niet graag uh al dat dat hij zichzelf zo niet
 then that you there not willing ehm all that that he himself as such not

ziet, 'k zal het zo een beetje uitdrukken hè.
 sees, I will it this way a little express PTCL.

I think he rebels against the idea I am now someone who takes antidepressants every day. I can imagine that you, ehm that he does not see himself that way, let me put it somewhat more that way.¹²

The exceptions from the *point of view* category show either first person pronouns, which is generally a feature of the *feelings* category, or they do not show any other characteristic of the *point of view* category as described above. However, most of these instances do contain a feature that was already described above: contrasts. In many cases the contrastive elements that give rise to a contrastive interpretation are particles: *ook*, 'also'; *ook wel*, 'also focal particle'; *toch wel*, focal particle focal particle; *wel*, focal particle; *maar*, 'but, however'; *maar ja*, 'but particle'. However, these elements have, just like *ergens*, several functions, which means that we cannot separate them so easily from their counterparts with other functions. Much of the contrast also comes from the contrastive content of the sentences.

There are several cases which contain first person pronouns and mental state predicates as in example (7). The only reason they get a *point of view* interpretation instead of a *feelings* interpretation seems to be the contrastive elements. It may be that this is also the connection between the two types of interpretations. Two points of view within one person can be expressed as two places (or points of view) within one mind. If this mind is not explicitly mentioned, we are only left with the points of view, which may or may not belong to the speaker or the character, as in example (8).

- (7) Ik vind 't gewoon provoceren hoor. Maar ja ik
 I am of the opinion it simply provoke PTCL. But PTCL I
 vind ik vind 't ook wel humor hebben ergens.
 am of the opinion I am of the opinion it also PTCL humour have ERGENS.
 I think it is simply provocation. But I think it is also funny *ergens*.¹³

- (8) Speaker 1: Maar ja ergens heeft ze natuurlijk ook wel een beetje gelijk
 But PTCL ERGENS has she of course also PTCL a bit right
 hè. Speaker 2: Ja da 's waar.
 PTCL. Yes that is true.
 Speaker 1: But *ergens* she does of course have a point. Speaker 2: Yes, that is right.¹⁴

¹²From CGN comp-c/vl/fv901155.

¹³From: CGN comp-a/nl/fn000989.

¹⁴From: CGN comp-d/vl/fv900226.

The last category we discuss is *somehow*. Although there are relatively few exceptions to the general collocational trends in this category, they show less uniformity than the exceptions in the other two categories. In example (9) we find a first person pronoun, which normally is one of the characteristics of the *feelings* category.

- (9) Ik heb met mijn bemoeienissen evenveel bedrijven de grond in
I have with my interferences as many companies the ground in

geboord als dat ik er weer op de rails heb gezet. Het één kan
drilled as that I there again on the track have put. The one can

zeker niet los gezien worden van het ander en aangezien
certainly not apart seen be from the other and since

dat een nietig eindresultaat oplevert deug ik dus ergens niet.
that a zero final result results in am any good I thus ERGENS not.

I have brought down as many companies as I have put back on the rails. The
one can certainly not be seen apart from the other and since this results in a
zero end-game, I *ergens* am no good.¹⁵

In this example, it is not completely clear whether *ergens* is to be seen as a point of view from the perspective of the people judging the speaker or that *ergens* modifies the extent to which the speaker is no good. Since in both cases *ergens* is part of the subjective view of the opponents, this is not completely clear. The second interpretation can also be seen as an implication of the first one, but they don't need each other. It is the second reading that allows us to interpret *ergens* as 'somehow' here instead of a *point of view* interpretation.

A comparable example, which also shows a first person pronoun, although it is interpreted as *somehow*, can be found in (10).

- (10) Hoe dan ook vraagt het voor ons een aanpassing om dat te begrijpen
Anyway, asks it from us an adjustment to that to understand

maar ik denk dat uhm dat wij ergens neutraler spreken. Zij
but I think that ehm that we ERGENS more neutral speak. They

beseffen niet dat zij echt een vorm van dialect spreken.
realize not that they really a form of dialect speak.

Anyway, it requires us to adjust to understand it, but I think that we *ergens*
speak more neutral. They do not realize that they really speak some sort of
dialect.¹⁶

¹⁵From CGN comp-o/nl/fn001148.

¹⁶From CGN comp-b/vl/fv400115.

In this example, both a *point of view* interpretation and an interpretation of *ergens* as *somehow/ up to a certain extent* is possible. A reason for this ambiguity may be that *ergens* is not part of the same clause as the mental state predicate *denk* ‘think’. This results in a thought that is expressed in indirect speech. This way, *ergens* may be interpreted either as referring to the personal view of one of the critics or as a modification of the statement in the indirect speech.

This concludes our survey of the collocational characteristics of modal *ergens*. In the next section, the results of this chapter will be summarized.

4.3 Conclusion

What we can conclude from the study of the linguistic contexts of modal *ergens* is that although collocations do not automatically lead to a specific interpretation, there are patterns that may lead language users in a certain direction. On the basis of the surveys and the corpus study, the following information seems to be used to interpret *ergens*. Within the three corpora, the Corpus Gesproken Nederlands (CGN), the Eindhoven corpus and a corpus of novels, the characteristics that are mentioned below could account for more than two thirds of the modal examples.

When there are locative markers that allow for an indefinite locative interpretation and there are no indications that a speaker is making a subjective statement, the addressee will interpret *ergens* as locative. On the other hand, if there are indications that the speaker is making a subjective statement and *ergens* is not needed in an argument position, *ergens* will be interpreted as modal, even if there are locative elements in the context. When there are temporal markers in the direct context of *ergens* or a locative interpretation does not fulfill Grice’s maxim of relevance, whereas a temporal interpretation would fulfill this requirement, *ergens* will be interpreted as temporal. When there is a scalar preposition or expression in the direct context of *ergens* and the interpretation is not temporal, the interpretation will be scalar. However, if the scale that is used is very rough and there are other indications of estimation, like hesitation, the interpretation will be *about/around*.

Modal interpretations can be recognized from the fact that a locative interpretation is impossible or irrelevant. In addition, there are often subjective markers around. If these markers are directing attention to the personal view of the speaker or another person, for instance by means of first person pronouns and mental state predicates, the interpretation will be *in someone’s feelings or thoughts*. If there is less connection to the personal view of the speaker, for instance in a copular construction or if there is a strong emphasis on contrastive views, for instance by means of the phrase *aan de andere kant*, or one or more of the particles *ook, wel, toch, maar*, and the content of the proposition is still clearly subjective, the interpretation will be *from a certain point of view*.

If the content of the proposition is not strongly subjective, often recognizable by third person verbs, and there is little contrast between views, little connection to a person’s personal view and no relevance in a locative interpretation, the interpretation will be ‘*somehow*’. If there is for some reason very little context and this

At some place:

- locative adpositions
- verbs implying a location

At some point on a scale:

- scalar adpositions
- scalar constructions
- numbers

In someone's feelings or thoughts:

- mental state predicates
- first person pronouns
- subjective predicates
- the verb *vinden* 'to be of the opinion'

Somehow:

- Third person verbs
- Mainly non-subjective predicates
- the verb *kloppen* 'to be right, correct'

At some moment:

- temporal markers

About/around:

- numbers
- scalar adpositions
- scalar constructions
- expressions of vagueness

From a certain point of view:

- frequent use of the copula
- subjective adjectives in combination with impersonal copula constructions
- variants of the phrase *aan de andere kant* 'on the other hand'
- the *ergens is dat* 'ergens is that' construction
- contrastive markers like *ook*, *wel*, *maar*, *toch* also, *focus particle*, but, *focus particle*

context does not provide any (constructional) cues, the most concrete and most frequent interpretation of *ergens* will be chosen: the locative interpretation.

These criteria only work within the general limits of the relevance criterion and the expectations of the addressee from the common ground. That is why the characteristics that were mentioned would not be enough to teach a computer how to interpret *ergens*. In addition, more data and surveys may refine this description.

CHAPTER 5

The pragmatics of modal *ergens*

The descriptions of modal *ergens* in previous chapters used mainly paraphrases like *in someone's feelings or thoughts, from a certain point of view* and *somehow* to express the various interpretations of modal *ergens*. In this chapter, the function and use of modal *ergens* will be discussed more elaborately using Mental Space Theory.

5.1 Introduction to Mental Space Theory

People's ability to speak and think about situations that are not occurring at that moment or are even impossible shows that humans are cognitively able to detach their current perceptual input from their thoughts. People may, for instance, talk about being on the beach when they are actually waiting for the bus in freezing weather. In other words, they build a mental space in which they are on the beach. Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier, 1994 [1985]; Sweetser and Fauconnier, 1996) tries to model the cognitive abilities of people via the study of their linguistic behavior.

Mental spaces are described by Sweetser (2012, 3) as follows:

A mental space is a partial and local conceptual representation, which can be mapped onto or combined with other such spaces to build complex conceptual structure. Mental spaces differ from other constructs, such as possible worlds, in being cognitive.

This means that according to Mental Space Theory people can make and combine all kinds of conceptual representations, which do not need to be linked to an actual real world situation. In order to invite other people to engage in building a mental

space that is not directly connected to the real world, speakers use so called *space builders* which may be used to invite the addressee to imagine a situation. Examples of space builders are *yesterday, if, on Hawaii, in the story* etcetera. By using these words the speaker signals to the addressee that he should not interpret references as pertaining to the situation here and now (i.e. the ground base space¹), but to a conceptual situation, which may not even exist in reality.

A speaker can also introduce more than one space as in the following example:

- (1) If I were rich, I would live in Hawaii and never wear a coat again.

By means of *if* and the past tense the speaker invites the addressee to build a space that is not in line with reality, namely that he is rich. Within this space, the addressee is again asked to build another space, namely one of living in Hawaii, which implies a warm climate. This shows that spaces can be embedded in each other.

It is also possible to let two spaces merge by putting references to two spaces in the same clause. An example is *free indirect speech* as in example (2).

- (2) Morgen zou hij verder lezen, maar nu moest hij echt gaan slapen.
 Tomorrow would he on read, but now had to he really go sleep.
 Tomorrow he would read on, but now he really had to go to sleep.²

In example (2), we are ‘listening’ to the thoughts of a character as described by a narrator. The viewpoint (and thus the mental space) of the narrator is present in the fact that this sentence is in the third person and in the past tense, whereas both *morgen* ‘tomorrow’ and *nu* ‘now’ refer to the situation and the viewpoint of the character. Also the thoughts that are expressed are part of the mental space of the character even though they are in the past tense and the third person. This way of merging two spaces in one sentence is called *blending* (Fauconnier and Turner, 1996, 2002).

A last example of a sentence that builds a complex (blended) space involving different viewpoints is the following:

- (3) Ik wou dat ik twee hondjes was dan kon ik samen spelen.
 I wished that I two small dogs was then could I together play.
 I wish I were two doggies, then I could play together.³

In this example, we have the speaker, I, who expresses the unreal wish to be two doggies. In this part of the sentence, an unreality space (marked by the past tense *wou* ‘wished’) is built, in which the speaker is two doggies. The use of the word *dan* ‘then’ implies that we have to interpret what follows from within the newly built space in which the speaker is two doggies. Normally, we would expect the following sentence to have the viewpoint of the new situation, instead of the viewpoint of the *ground base space* (i.e. the space which the speaker and the addressee perceive each other).

¹For the term see Ferrari and Sweetser (2012), elsewhere this is also just called the *the base space*.

²The example was taken from: <http://terrebel.blogspot.nl/2012/06/slaaptekort-een-verhaaltje.html>.

³From a poem often attributed to Godfried Bomans but which is probably a loan translation by Michel van der Plas from a German poem by Friedrich Torberg (Zaal, 2009, 183-185).

That is, in the next sentence we expect the speaker to speak as if he were two doggies. At first sight this seems to be what is happening because only in that space it is conceivable that the doggies would play together. However, in the new space there is not supposed to be an ‘I’ anymore, only the two doggies. However, the use of the first person singular pronoun and the past tense of the verb *kunnen, konden*, express that from the viewpoint of the speaker in the ground space, this is again an unreal conclusion. This implies that we have two blended viewpoints in the new space: the viewpoint of ‘I’, who is singular and connected to the ground base space and the viewpoint of the two doggies, who happen to be the same ‘person’ as ‘I’, but only in the irreal space. The wish to play together, however, is again the wish of the speaker, not of the two doggies.

This is an example of a very complex blend involving different viewpoints. What we will see below is that *ergens* may function as a space builder which introduces at least two viewpoints.

5.2 *Ergens* as a mental space builder

As was already touched upon in the previous chapter, many instances of *ergens* seem to create the image of a space in someone’s mind or heart in which a particular idea, feeling or thought is located. That this is to be seen as a metaphorical mental space is shown by the fact that we can often add other locative markers, which do not have any modal uses, without a change of interpretation. In example (4) from survey 3, for instance, we found that we can add a locative marker *van binnen* ‘inside’ to modal *ergens* without changing the modal interpretation of the subjects.

- (4) Ik kon al liegen voordat ik kon praten. Maar toch had ik
I could already lie before I could talk. But PTCL had I

vroeger *ergens van binnen* óók altijd geloofd dat
when I was a child ERGENS from inside also always believed that

mijn moeders verhaal maar een verzinsel was,
my mother’s story but a figment of her imagination was,

een sprookje zoals alle andere die ze me had verteld, alleen zonder
a fairy-tale like all others that she me had told, only without

“zij leefden nog lang en gelukkig.”
‘they lived ever after long and happily’.

But still, when I was a child I had *ergens* inside me also believed that my mother’s story was only a figment of her imagination, a fairy-tale like all the other ones she had told me, only without ‘and they lived happily ever after’.⁴

⁴Adapted from: Dorresteijn (2003).

The space builder *ergens* has, however, also an effect on viewpoint, which will become clear if we substitute *ergens* with the epistemic adverb *misschien* ‘maybe, perhaps’ and compare the resulting interpretations. In example (5-a), the speaker suggests that someone else may be bothered by something. *Misschien* expresses that the speaker is not completely sure that what he states is true.

- (5) a. Misschien zat het hem niet lekker
 Perhaps sat it him not nice.
 Maybe he was bothered by it.⁵
- b. Ergens zat het hem niet lekker wat er gebeurd was.
 ERGENS sat it him not nice what there happened had
Ergens what had happened, bothered him.⁶

In (5-b), however, we automatically seem to get some sort of free indirect speech. The viewpoint in this sentence does not lie with the speaker anymore, but with the character of the story. The effect of *ergens* seems to be that the viewpoint switches from the speaker to the character. At the same time, a metaphorical space is set up. This metaphorical space is linked to the mind/feelings of the character and the feeling that bothers the character is located in this space.

The reason for this change of viewpoint seems to be that modal *ergens* requires the speaker to have access to the mental processes of the agentive subject. For instance in example (6-b), there is no change in viewpoint, because the speaker already has access to his/her own feelings. For the same reason, example (6-a) is awkward. A speaker is supposed to know what he feels and a marker of uncertainty does not comply with that assumption. Accordingly, no examples of this last type are found on the internet or in the corpora.

- (6) a. ?? Misschien zat het mij niet lekker.
 ?? Perhaps sat it me not nice.
 ?? Maybe it bothered me.
- b. Ergens zat het mij niet lekker.
 ERGENS sat it me not nice.
Ergens it bothered me.⁷

Native speaker intuitions of three speakers, however, agree that a phrase like (6-a) would be acceptable if we would add a *because*-clause. The reason is that the use of a causal connective suggests some evaluative distance between the speaker and his own feelings. That is, he seems to split himself into a person who is bothered and a person who is explaining that feeling. Making this type of split is, as we will see below, one of the main functions of *ergens* and by means of an epistemic adverb and a *because* clause, we get almost the same effect. As we will see below, creating a distance

⁵http://forum.girlscene.nl/forum.php/Schrijfsels/Verhaal_Ik_had_je_lief/list_messages/142572/4?visitorId=71b8536e78b8205d998603138c75ff3c.

⁶<http://www.bloempje.nl/index.php?itemid=1246>.

⁷<http://forums.marokko.nl/archive/index.php/t-420909-p-4.html>.

between the speaker and the feelings in the *ergens* clause may play an important role in distinguishing the different uses of *ergens* and the possibility of replacing *ergens* with *misschien*.

If we now look at the use of *ergens* in examples that contain a contrast, as in (7), we see that the speaker accommodates two viewpoints within her own mental space. Some part of her thinks it (that is, cloning in order for childless couples to be able to have children) does have some beauty in it, another part of her thinks it is a step backwards.

- (7) ja als je toch speciaal ja een kind wil hebben en zo. ja ja. dan
 Yes if you PTCL especially PTCL a child want have and so. Yes, yes then
- ja ergens vind 'k 't wel mooi. Maar ergens ja 't is
 PTCL ERGENS am of the opinion I it PTCL beautiful. But ERGENS PTCL it is
- uh d... ja. 't is een stap achteruit vind ik uh...
 ehm d... PTCL it is a step backwards am of the opinion I ehm...
- If you especially want a child and all that. Yes *ergens* I think that is beautiful.
 But *ergens* it is.. It is a step backwards, I think, ehm...⁸

The presence of two viewpoints within one person can be described as a *split-self* (Lakoff, 1996). Lakoff shows that people seem to set up locations in their mental space for different values. If they are indecisive about which value they adhere to they even talk about *going back and forth* between them.

Something comparable seems to be the case in example (7). The person speaking seems to split herself into a part that is positive about cloning and a part that is negative about it. This way, the speaker shows her indecisiveness. However, this indecisiveness is not the same as uncertainty on the propositional level. In this case, it is impossible to replace both cases by *misschien* 'perhaps, maybe'.

However, there are also examples in which it is possible to replace *ergens* with *misschien* without the sentence becoming infelicitous. This may have to do with the distance created between the speaker and the values presented. Lakoff says that a speaker knows that one cannot have incompatible values. This means that one has to choose which value one wants to endorse.

- (8) Daar staat tegenover dat het ergens niet fair is om bepaalde kennis
 There stands opposite that it ERGENS not fair is to specific knowledge
- te hebben jij als individu en die dan niet vrij te geven in bepaalde
 to have you as individual and that then not free to give in certain
- omstandigheden.
 circumstances.

⁸From CGN comp-a/nl/fn000968.

On the other hand, it is *ergens* not fair for you as an individual, if you have specific knowledge, not to share that in certain circumstances.⁹

In example (8), the speaker avoids endorsing one of the values he proposes by not committing himself too much to the points of view that he sets up by using *ergens*. The sentence depends on an impersonal construction and there are no other particles. Because of this lack of connection between the mental space that is built by *ergens* and the speaker, bringing up a new point of view is only marginally different from presenting just another option that may be considered. This is relatively close to saying that something may be the case, which explains why in examples like (8) *ergens* can be replaced by *misschien* without changing the overall interpretation of the sentence in a fundamental way. I will explain this further.

In example (8) the use of *daar staat tegenover* which literally means ‘there stands on the opposite side’, suggests that the speaker wants to point out that there is another viewpoint that may be endorsed. By stating that the position is on the opposite side, he not only shows that the view is contradictory to the views that were taken before, but also that his own viewpoint is not (yet) in that position. If he wanted to put himself in that position, he had to say *in my view* or *I think*.

As we already saw above, modal *ergens* directs the focus of the attention to an epistemic mental space to which the speaker has access. In example (8), the use of modal *ergens* suggests that the speaker may take a viewpoint in his epistemic space in which the *ergens* sentence is true, although he does not exclude the possibility to take other viewpoints. The use of *daar staat tegenover*, earlier in example (8), however, has already set up a metaphorical mental space in which the speaker explicitly places himself in a different viewpoint from the two viewpoints he is describing. By not linking his own viewpoint directly to the viewpoint created by *daar staat tegenover*, the speaker has set up two possible viewpoints, that may be separate from his current viewpoint. The first is the viewpoint in which the opinion resides that was discussed before this sentence (i.e. that someone’s DNA-information, including the knowledge about illnesses and time of death is completely private and should be kept from anyone but the person him/herself). The second one contains the content of the complement clause. In addition, we have a third viewpoint, which is the speaker’s own viewpoint, that allows him to evaluate both without taking one of them as his own value. By splitting his own viewpoint from the other possible viewpoints, he creates an evaluative distance from the other possible viewpoints. The use of *ergens* in this sentence adds to this objectively construed metaphorical mental space a notion of subjectivity. The content of the *ergens* clause is only true if the speaker takes a specific viewpoint within his own mental space. From another point of view this would not be true. Because of the objective metaphorical space that is already set up, however, it is suggested that he leaves aside whether he will really choose to take this point of view in his mental space. As we already saw in the discussion of example (6-a), it is exactly this type of evaluative distance that allows *misschien* to be

⁹From CGN comp-n/vl/fv400567.

used, even though it normally cannot be used in a sentence the focus of which lies in the mental space of the speaker himself.

- (9) *Ergens* is dat natuurlijk ook wel lekker om te horen als mensen ja
 ERGENS is that of course also PTCL nice to to hear if people PTCL

't knap vinden dat je toch je je weet te
 it admirable are of the opinion that you PTCL you yourself know to

handhaven op zo'n school en voor zo'n klas. En aan de andere
 keep up at such a school and in front of such a class. And on the other

kant zeggen ze dan toch van nou ik zou dat nooit doen.
 side say they then PTCL of PTCL I would that never do.

Ergens it is nice to hear that people think you do a good job, keeping yourself up at such a school and in front of such a class. And on the other hand they also say like: I would never do that.¹⁰

As is clear from example (9), not all examples of *ergens* that contain an impersonal construction allow *ergens* to be replaced by *misschien*. In this example, the speaker is making an impersonal but subjective statement without distancing herself. This allows *ergens* to be automatically linked to the speaker's viewpoint within her epistemic mental space. Therefore, the function of *ergens* in this example seems to be mainly to evoke the image of a split-self. This split-self is needed because the speaker wants to express a conflict of values. On the one hand the comments people make seem to be compliments, on the other hand they reveal very low esteem for the job of teaching itself. Therefore, the speaker evaluates the same comment both positively and negatively, which she already expresses in the first sentence by means of *ergens*.

Saying that something takes place somewhere can mean that there is an undefined place as opposed to another place, as we saw in the previous examples, but it can also mean that the speaker is not able or willing to give much more information about a place without contrasting it with another place. This use we also find within the modal domain.

- (10) *Ergens* heb ik het gevoel dat veel mensen nu moeten huilen.
 ERGENS have I the feeling that many people now need to cry.

Maar waarom weet ik niet.
 But why know I not.

Ergens I have the feeling that many people will start crying now. But why I don't know.¹¹

¹⁰CGN comp-b/nl/fn000128.

¹¹<http://forums.marokko.nl/archive/index.php/t-3909154.html>.

In example (10), the implication of *ergens* that the speaker does not have or is not willing to give arguments for his statement is made explicit by *Maar waarom weet ik niet* ‘but why I don’t know’. The speaker suggests that this feeling has been found almost coincidentally in his own epistemic mental space without much more background information or argumentation. The effect seems to be that the addressee is not supposed to ask for an argumentation, because this is a purely subjective statement.

We can conclude that an important function of *ergens* seems to be to build a mental space in which one or more subjective views reside. This mental space can be used for split-self constructions, but it can also be used to carefully propose another view, in which case the effects of its use may be compared to the effect of an adverb like *misschien* ‘maybe, perhaps’. A third use is more like an indefinite. The speaker suggests that the source, reasons or arguments for a statement are unknown, which has the effect of warning the addressee not to ask for argumentation, but to consider the statement as purely subjective.

This new view on the function of *ergens* raises the question of how this can be linked to the interpretations that were used in the surveys and the collocational characteristics that were found in the corpus study. These questions will be discussed in the following section.

5.3 The connections between mental spaces, interpretations and collocations

The previous analysis of the pragmatics of modal *ergens* raises the question of what the relation is between the interpretations and the collocational characteristics we found in the previous chapters.

In the previous section, we found that the group of modal senses of *ergens* had one characteristic in common: the directing of the focus of attention to an epistemic mental space which is accessible to the speaker. This common feature may explain the fact that people generally choose consistently between modal and non-modal interpretations, but have much more difficulty choosing a specific modal interpretation within the modal category. It may be that one of the first things an addressee decides, is whether the place to which *ergens* refers is to be found in a base space (i.e. a non-metaphorical location) or in an epistemic metaphorical mental space.¹² The main differences we found between the modal categories and the non-modal categories were respectively subjectivity and relevance of the non-modal interpretations within the sentence. This last feature includes the question as to whether *ergens* is an argument of a verb or preposition. In addition, the non-modal interpretations generally have relatively clear collocations.

Although we found that modal *ergens* changed the focus of attention in all cases

¹²The term *epistemic* is used here in the sense of *based in the speaker's thoughts or beliefs*, contrary to the use of the term in the modal context in which it refers to the estimation of the truth of the proposition. For a discussion of this type of terminological confusion see Nuyts (2005).

to an epistemic mental space to which the speaker has access, we also saw that there were differences in the way this feature was used. In some cases we found split-self constructions, in other cases the subjectivity of the statement lead to the irrelevance of argumentation. We will now see whether and how these different uses of *ergens* correlate with the paraphrases that were used above.

The split-self effects are found in the *feelings* category and the *point of view* category. Generally, however, the split-self is implicit in the *feelings* category, whereas in the *point of view* category, the values within the split-self are explicitly mentioned. That is, in the *feelings* category it is only implied that there are also other points of view, whereas in the *point of view* category they are almost always explicitly mentioned and contrasted with each other. This may be directly connected to the use of adversative markers in the *point of view* category. These markers are used to contrast the two views with each other.

As was mentioned by Lakoff (1996), it is socially not accepted to hold two contradictory values. This problem, which arises most in the *point of view* category because of its explicit description of the two points of view, seems to be resolved either by explicit split-self constructions or by taking an evaluative distance from the two values. This evaluative distance also creates a split between a person's evaluative self and his stance. The explicit split-self constructions are expressed by adversative expressions like *on the other hand*, the more implicit distancing is found most frequently in the form of impersonal subjective copula constructions, which are preceded or followed by a contrastive view.

The function of making the statement so completely subjective that it is almost impossible to ask for any argumentation is mainly found in the *feelings* category. This may be connected to the use of mental state predicates and first person pronouns, because they clearly mark the subjective nature of a statement.

The *somehow* use of *ergens* brings together several of the points mentioned above, but it generally lacks the explicit subjective properties of the other two interpretations. Many cases in this category seem to be very weak cases of the *point of view* type, as in example (11). This is in line with the findings of survey 1, which showed that in 11 cases *somehow* and *point of view* were both chosen more frequently than chance for the same sentence. Only in 3 cases was the variation between the *feelings* interpretation and the *somehow* interpretation only.

- (11) D'r zitten d'r zat op 't IVBO met een goed verstand. Maar ze
there sit there enough at the IVBO with a good mind. But they

krijgen *ergens* de kans niet. Willen ook niet hoor.
get *ERGENS* the chance not. Want also not PTCL

There are a enough smart children at the IVBO, but they *ergens* don't get the chance. Neither do they want it.¹³

¹³From: CGN comp-b/nl/fn000130.

In example (11), the contradictory views are explicitly mentioned, but the connection to the speaker is very weak and there are no adversative markers. This makes the origin of and arguments for this point of view unclear to addressees. This results in the implication that it is unclear for the speaker why the situation described is as it is. This is exactly what modal markers like *op een of andere manier* 'somehow' do, they express that the background of or the reason for a certain situation is unclear, which is why this paraphrase works here. The adverb *misschien*, with which we contrasted *ergens* in the previous section, does not really work here, because it produces a different effect. The speaker does not express that she thinks this is only a possible explanation, but that it is only from some point of view/ partly an explanation, which makes replacement with *misschien* unsuitable.

Summarizing, we can say that the lack of variation in participants' judgements between non-modal and modal interpretations suggests that language users make a clear decision to interpret *ergens* within the ground base space or in an epistemic mental space. This is probably triggered both by the clear collocations that non-modal markers tend to have as well as by the presence of an argument position for *ergens* in the clause. In addition, there are subjective markers that tend to be present in two of the three modal categories, which may play a role in this decision.

The characteristics of modal *ergens* are more closely related, because they all direct the focus of the interpretation to an epistemic mental space to which the speaker has access. In most *feelings* interpretations there are no explicit contradictory views, although the use of *ergens* does seem to imply that the speaker does not reject other views. The frequent use of mental state predicates and first person pronouns may be linked to the use of *ergens* as a marker of complete subjectivity, which makes it pointless to ask for an argumentation, because the speaker suggests that he just found that view in his mental space by coincidence.

The *point of view* interpretation is found with two groups of examples, which are both characterized by the explicit expression of more than one option. On the one hand there are the split-self constructions, which are often characterized by adversative markers, on the other hand there are the cases in which the speaker places his viewpoint at an evaluative distance from the opinions expressed, suggesting that both options may be considered. These cases are characterized by impersonal subjective constructions like copular constructions with subjective adjectives.

In the cases that are interpreted as *somehow*, there is generally very little subjective content in the clause, but both views are mentioned implicitly. Many of these cases can be seen as weak instances of a *point of view* interpretation, but because they lack subjective content and contrasted views, they are not clear representatives of this category. The lack of subjectivity and the presence of action verbs results in almost no connection with the speaker. Often *ergens* implies that the speaker does not really know why the statement in the *ergens* clause is the case, which explains why it can be paraphrased with the modal uses of *op een of andere manier* 'somehow'.

5.4 Conclusion

The main function of modal *ergens* is to move the focus of the interpretation to a mental space to which the speaker has access. In this mental space *ergens* expresses a viewpoint of which the location is unspecified or indefinite. From this viewpoint the content of the rest of the *ergens* clause is endorsed. From other viewpoints, which are implicitly or explicitly acknowledged to exist, the *ergens* clause is not endorsed. This way *ergens* delimits the endorsement of the clause in which it is found.

The connection between the mental space analysis and the collocational conclusions that were drawn from the surveys and the corpus study are as follows: The *feelings* interpretation is characterized by an implicit existence of other options, first person pronouns and mental state predicates or other subjective predicates. The effect of this category is that a speaker suggests that within his own feelings or thoughts he has found a viewpoint, which may be different from the common or expected viewpoint.

The *point of view* interpretation is found in sentences in which the contrastive options are made explicit. This is frequently done by means of adversative markers. This category consists of split-self constructions and constructions in which the speaker evaluates possible viewpoints. These last cases are characterized by impersonal subjective copular constructions.

The examples with the interpretation *somehow* suggest some *point of view* interpretation, but there is very little subjective content and almost no relation to the speaker, due to the use of action verbs and the lack of subjective markers. Often *ergens* has the implication that the speaker does not really know why the statement in the *ergens* clause is the case, which explains why it can be paraphrased with the modal uses of *op een of andere manier* 'somehow'.

The diachronic development of modal *ergens*

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 Research questions, theoretical assumptions and hypotheses

The goal of this chapter is to find out which processes may have played a role in the development of modal *ergens* and during which period of time these interpretations came into existence. In order to do so, I have studied a diachronic corpus of Dutch texts in search for indications of how the change from locative to modal may have come about.

In the literature, several processes are mentioned that have been found to underlie semantic changes. The most common and the most concrete processes are *metaphor*, *metonymy* and *invited inferencing* (Traugott and Dasher, 2002). *Metaphor* is an analogical process which, as it is phrased by Sweetser (1990, 19) operates *between* domains [emphasis original]. For instance, in the case of *someone stumbling upon an idea* the mind is conceived as a space in which ideas can be present unexpectedly. Concepts and words from the spacial domain (the source domain) have been used to express relationships in the mental domain (the target domain).

Metonymy takes a word from one domain to use it for something closely related in the same domain, like saying *finger* when someone means the whole *hand*.

Invited inferencing (Traugott and Dasher, 2002, 29) is the process whereby a form becomes pragmatically polysemous and eventually semantically polysemous (i.e. completely conventionalized and uncancelable). An example is the temporal interpretation of *as/so long as* in English, which became conditional by means of the inference that if something is done as long as it is needed, it is done *provided that* it is needed.

As we saw in the synchronic study of *ergens*, all three processes (*metaphor*, *metonymy* and *invited inferencing*) are at work in the interpretations of *ergens*. We found metaphors that caused *ergens* to be interpreted in the scalar domain (e.g. *somewhere between three and five*) or the mental domain (*somewhere inside myself*). There were also cases in which *ergens* was metonymically used to denote a company or even a working field (e.g. *I work somewhere where they don't have collective bargaining.*).

Part of the processes that allow for invited inferencing are the Gricean maxims of quantity as formulated in Traugott and Dasher (2002, 80) 'Say no more than you must and mean more thereby' and relevance (Grice, 1989). This works as follows. A form is sometimes used in contexts in which certain implicatures arise. These implicatures are often said to arise because of the Gricean maxim of quantity.

When these implicatures arise regularly in specific linguistic contexts they tend to be attributed to that particular combination of forms, especially when this new implicature is more relevant (maxim of relevance) than the original interpretation. This is sometimes the case because a form does not add much to the overall interpretation of the sentence (e.g. *I found it* versus *I found it somewhere*). Over time, the new interpretation of this particular combination of forms becomes entrenched and it may be that either speakers use the combination for its new properties, or addressees think they do so. This means that one of the driving factors behind semantic change is the common habit of people to read more into a statement than is actually said, especially if forms do not contribute very much to the overall interpretation of the sentence (Traugott and Dasher, 2002, 80; Croft, 2000, 126-7).

There has been a long debate about the question of which process is more important, *metaphor* or *metonymy* and whether they should be seen as one phenomenon or separate phenomena. Since in the case of *ergens* the metaphorical uses are clear and concrete, there seems no reason not to use these terms in the conventional way. This means that I will not use the term *metonymy* for processes like *invited inferencing*, *subjectification* or *intersubjectification*, as Traugott and Dasher (2002, 34) sometimes do. I agree with Heine et al. (1991b) that *metaphor*, *metonymy* and *invited inferencing* all play an important role in semantic changes.

In the following chapter, I will argue that two of the processes mentioned above, *metaphor* and *invited inferencing* may have played a role in the development of the modal interpretations of *ergens*. Possibly, there have been several separate developments, that may have influenced each other at a later stage. In other words, we may not be dealing with a change from locative *ergens* to modal *ergens*, but with several separate changes such as the following:

- a. locative *ergens* > *feelings/point of view* (metaphorical change)
- b. locative *ergens* > *marker of imprecision* (invited inferencing)

In these changes, the knowledge that *ergens* does not always need to refer to a place in a base space may have influenced the acceptability of other modal interpretations like the *point of view*, *somehow* or *marker of imprecision* options. However, development b. above into a marker of imprecision seems to have been a separate

development from the other modal interpretations. The other modal interpretations may have developed separately as well, but there is no unambiguous evidence.

As I will argue below, the use of metaphorical *ergens* can be expressed both explicitly (i.e. with an explicit metaphor as in *somewhere at the back of my mind I felt it was a special moment*¹) and implicitly (i.e. semanticized)² in the diachronic corpus (e.g. *Ergens voelde ik dat dit mijn redding was* ‘Ergens I felt this was my salvation’³).

There are also cases that seem to be ambiguous as to whether a locative reading or a *somehow* reading are intended. The marker of imprecision with an indefinite article and a noun (*ergens ne prof* ‘some professor’), which seems to be confined to Flanders, shows both cases that are ambiguous as to whether a locative reading or an imprecision-reading is meant and cases that are unambiguously expressing imprecision.

In the literature, the process of semantic change (and grammaticalization) has been divided in several steps: 1. The use of a form in its original way (the source), 2. The (frequent) use of a form in a context which implies another interpretation (*critical contexts* Dieward (2002) or *bridging contexts* Heine (2002)) 3. The use of the form in a context in which it is impossible to interpret the form in its source interpretation (*isolating contexts* Dieward (2002) or *switch contexts* Heine (2002)). 4. A possible last step is the extension of this use once again to other contexts, which is probably facilitated by the high degree of conventionalization of the new interpretation.

Some of the ambiguous examples may represent bridging contexts, that is, the type of context that triggered a change in interpretation, others may simply have been atypical contexts without playing a direct role in the semantic change of *ergens*. It is hard to determine whether an ambiguous example has played a role in the semantic development of *ergens*, since the diachronic developments of various interpretations of *ergens* cannot always be followed very precisely. However, when *ergens* is still interpreted as locative in comparable contexts in modern Dutch, it will be assumed that this type of context did not play a major role in the development of modal *ergens*.

6.1.2 The diachronic corpus and its limitations

One of the hazards of a historical study is that we cannot ask for grammaticality judgements and therefore we do not have negative evidence. As is argued in Fischer (2007b, 12-14), the fact that a particular form or construction is not present in a diachronic corpus cannot always be taken as proof that it did not exist at that time. One of the reasons that the absence of a form or construction does not provide us with negative evidence is that, generally, the further we go back in time, the more biased our corpus is in terms of number of words, genres and types of texts. To give an example, only 0.002% of the 8,916,272 words in the CGN is a case of modal *ergens*

¹Taken from: http://www.powerplantmall.com/archive_article.php?id=24.

²Because (some of) the metaphoric features are also present in cases in which the metaphor is not explicitly mentioned, that is, because the metaphoric features have become part of the semantics of *ergens* itself, I have chosen to call this an implicit metaphor.

³Taken from: <http://www.paryos.be/paraneoplastisch%20syndroom.pdf>.

(139).⁴ This means that the chance of finding an example of modal *ergens* within a more limited corpus is relatively small. In addition, in 4 of the 15 genres covered in the CGN, modal *ergens* does not occur at all (i.e. in reportage, news, commentaries, columns, reviews, ceremonious speeches and sermons) and 113 of the 139 modal instances of *ergens* in the CGN (81%) occur in the spontaneous speech sections of the CGN, whereas these sections contain only 59 % of the total number of words in the corpus. This distribution of modal *ergens* suggests that it occurs mainly in subjective, informal language. Subjective and informal language is often spoken language and this may explain why modal *ergens* is almost completely absent from more formal or objective texts. These last categories are often written language. This means that a corpus of literary and scientific texts is less likely to contain examples of modal *ergens*. However, it is typically these types of texts which make up historical corpora.

Our earliest Dutch texts tend to consist of narrative, poetic texts, which can be subjective from time to time, but are not of a type in which we would expect a high instance of modal *ergens*. This means that the absence of instances of modal *ergens* in our diachronic corpus cannot be taken as direct evidence for the absence of modal *ergens* in the language.

Another problem, discussed elaborately by Fischer (2007b, 14-25), is that modern speakers of a language run the risk of interpreting older structures anachronistically. Forms or constructions that seem to be the same as in present day language might in fact have been interpreted differently in earlier stages of the language. A careful study of the context of a form may reveal such mistakes. However, since we cannot distinguish between locative and modal forms automatically, checking the larger context of each instance of *ergens* is simply too laborious. To restrict the mistakes that result from a limited amount of context to a minimum, I have studied the larger context of each example that even vaguely seemed as if it could be interpreted as modal. Frequently, this context showed that the correct interpretation was locative or might have been locative, although at first sight the example seemed a perfect case of modal *ergens*. I will discuss two examples in which it is very hard to decide which interpretation was the correct one. The first example in which it is not very clear is found in (1).

- (1) (Zijn kindsheid was vervuld geweest met de smeekende stemmen der kerkmuziek;)

vóór het altaar had hij gebeefd van een verrukking, gemengd met een
 Before the altar had he trembled of a thrill, combined with an
 onuitsprekelijken angst voor dat groote geheime Wezen dat hij ergens
 unspeakable fear for that huge secret Entity which he ERGENS
 voelde, en dat zweefde in zijn kinderverbeelding met stralen van zon
 felt, and which floated in his childish imagination with beams of sun
 omhuld en in de heerlijkste houdingen...
 surrounded and in the most magnificent postures...

⁴To compare: the word *boek* 'book' occurs 4282 times in the CGN, which is 0.05%.

(Ja, naar zijn jeugd moest hij terug om dat alles weer volledig te voelen, toen geen bewustzijn, geen onderzoek de kinderlijke overgave gekrenkt had - en een werk moest hij scheppen met dezelfde aandacht en dezelfde ontheffing als hij toenmaals gevoeld had, wanneer hij vóór dat altaar neergebogen lag en in een wolk God-zelf had meenen te ontwaren, terwijl het orgel dreunende rhythmten door den tempel stroomde...)

(His childhood had been filled with the begging voices of church music;) Before the altar, he had trembled with a thrill combined with an unspeakable fear of that huge secret Being that he *ergens* felt and which floated in his childish imagination surrounded with beams of sunlight and in the most magnificent postures...

(Yes, he had to go back to his youth to completely feel everything again, when no consciousness, no investigation had infringed on his childish devotion - and he had to create work with the same attention and the same relief as he had felt back then, when he had lain down before the altar and had thought to recognize God himself in a cloud, while the rhythms of the organ droned through the temple.)⁵

In this sentence, *ergens* can be interpreted as referring to a metaphorical place in the feelings of the speaker or as referring to a place in which the Entity was actually felt to be. The addition of *en dat zweefde* 'and that floated' suggests that the person speaking may have felt that the Entity was somewhere, whereas the *ergens* clause itself can also be read as modal as in *he felt somewhere (in his feelings)*. In this case, knowledge of the present day language may be misleading in suggesting that this may be interpreted as modal, whereas for speakers at the end of the 19th century this may have been not even an option.

Another example is example (2).

- (2) De school, bruikbaar voor de gezindten, door de kleine minderheid
The school, useful for the denominations, by the small minority
begeerd, wordt eene Protestantsche school genoemd. Eene algemeene,
adhered to, is a Protestant school called. A general,
generieke benaming, omvattende onderscheidene gezindten, en dus
generic name, including various denominations, and thus
in zooverre *ergens* teregt ook eene gemengde school genoemd.
in some sense *ERGENS* rightly also a mixed school called.

The school, which was acceptable for all denominations that were adhered to by small minorities, was called a Protestant school. A general, generic name, including various denominations and, thus, in some sense *ergens* rightly is called a mixed school.⁶

⁵Van Nu en Straks. Nieuwe reeks. Jaargang 1. Antwerpen 1896.

⁶From: Handelingen der algemeene vergadering van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde

In this example, it seems that *ergens* is modal, modifying the subjective form *terecht* ‘rightly, justly’. However, in this period and in this type of text, it is very common to refer to places in texts by means of *ergens*. Therefore, it may well be that the speaker meant a place in some text in which this term was used.

The corpus used in this chapter consists of all texts from the *digitale bibliotheek voor de Nederlandse letteren* ‘the digital library for Dutch literature’.⁷ This is a digital collection of texts dating from the Middle Ages until modern times. It includes both literary works and literary and linguistic journals and commentaries. This corpus also contains some correspondence and novels/stories. However, the DBNL site does not allow easy access to the corpus as a whole, which made it impossible to get word counts of the whole corpus and of the various historical periods. By means of an estimation of the number of titles per period in combination with the total number of instances of *ergens* in a certain period, it was possible to make a very rough guess as to the size of subparts of the corpus, which allowed me to get an impression of the size of the earlier parts of the corpus. The historical corpus in total contained 20593 instances of *ergens*, of which 533 came from the Middle Ages, 1840 from the 17th century, 3060 from the 18th century and 15160 from the 19th century. There may be some double instances in these counts or texts that were not written in the said time period, because editors comments could not be filtered out, but they are not very frequent. On the basis of the synchronic corpus, we may assume that we have the best chance of finding instances of modal *ergens* in the correspondence and novels. As I will show below, this certainly proves to be true. However, the further we go back in time, the fewer texts we have of these genres. The more we go back in time, the more it was normal for stories to be written down in the form of poetry and letters did not always survive or were very formal. This means that we would expect the frequency of modal *ergens* to decline when going back in time purely on the basis of these features of the corpus alone. Consequently, we need to be very careful in positing a starting point for the development of modal *ergens*.

6.2 The secondary literature and the development of *ergens* in the 20th century

The large academic dictionary of Dutch, the *Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal* (WNT) does not mention a modal use for *ergens* in its 1917 lemma on *ergens*. The first time modal *ergens* is mentioned is in the *Van Dale* dictionary of Dutch in 1961. In this edition, the *Van Dale* dictionary calls the modal use of *ergens* a *neologism*, which is continued until the 1974 edition. In later editions it is called *colloquial language*.

However, in the fifties and sixties there was already some scholarly debate in the journal *De nieuwe Taalgids* as to whether modal *ergens* really was a *neologism*. This

te Leiden, gehouden aldaar den 16den Juni 1870, in het gebouw der Maatschappij tot Nut van 't Algemeen. E.J. Brill, Leiden 1870.

⁷The corpus can be found at www.dbnl.org. This site was used to build this corpus from December 2011-March 2012.

discussion started with an article by Japin (1956) about this (in his view) new use of *ergens*. According to Japin, the new modal *ergens* was found mainly among journalists and artists and he wondered whether it would disappear again. Two other scholars, Van 't Veld (1967) and Van Eeten (1968), reacted to Japin's article, showing that modal *ergens* was in fact already in use in the early thirties of the 20th century.

The question as to whether *ergens* would disappear again remained an issue, especially because (older) Dutch speakers tend to connect the modal use of *ergens* to the 1960s. In this period, the *flower power* movement was very popular in the Netherlands and all kinds of spiritual movements directed focus onto people's personal feelings. Older Dutch speakers therefore often think the use of modal *ergens* developed in this period and they sometimes feel it was only used in the spiritual settings of the 1960s. Since these movements have for a large part disappeared, they assume modal *ergens* has disappeared as well. It has been suggested in the literature several times that the modal use of *ergens* was declining or even disappearing (e.g. Van den Toorn, 1997; Van der Wouden, 2002). However, it can be found in the current editions of newspapers, on twitter and it is used in spoken language regularly. Therefore, there is little support in the data for the claim that modal *ergens* is disappearing. A decline since the sixties is of course possible.

As can be seen from table 6.1, there is also no evidence in our recent corpora that modal *ergens* is disappearing. It is found in the corpus of recent novels (355,792 words) and in the CGN (8.916.272 words) as well. In order to see if there is any reason to believe that there is a decline, I have compared the Eindhoven corpus (768,000 words), which is from the sixties and seventies, with the CGN (1998-2004) and the novels, which are for the largest part from 2003.

As is clear from table 6.1, the percentage of modal interpretations of *ergens* with respect to the total number of instances of *ergens* in the older Eindhoven corpus is higher than in the other corpora, which would point in the direction of a decline. However, the percentage of modal instances of *ergens* in the two other corpora, which cover the exact same period (the novels and the CGN) is not the same. In the CGN, which is by far the largest of the three corpora, the percentage of modal instances of *ergens* is much smaller than in the corpus of novels, even though they are from the exact same period. The difference between the percentage of modal *ergens* in the Eindhoven corpus and the novels (2.6) is the same as the difference between the percentage of modal *ergens* in the CGN and the novels (2.6). This means that the variation between the corpora from the same period is so large that we cannot simply compare them with another corpus from an earlier period. As was already noted above, *ergens* is most frequently used in informal, subjective contexts. This may be an indication that there is a large effect of genre or register on the frequency of *ergens*, which could be an explanation for the large differences between two contemporary corpora. Such a large effect of the genre implies that one has to be very careful in comparing corpora that have not been assembled in the same way. Therefore, we cannot draw a firm conclusion with respect to the supposed decline from the 1960s onwards. There is simply too much variation in the data.

The early use of modal *ergens* which was mentioned by Van Eeten (1968) is found

	Novels (2003)		Eindhoven Corpus (1960-70)		CGN (1998-2004)	
	freq. modal <i>ergens</i>	% modal of total <i>ergens</i> in novels	freq. mod.	% modal of total <i>ergens</i> in Eindh. corpus	freq. mod.	% modal of total <i>ergens</i> in CGN
Total inst. of <i>ergens</i>	92	100%	117	100%	2757	100%
Modal	7	7.6 %	12	10.2%	139	5.0%
<i>Feelings</i>	5	5.4%	4	3.4%	51	1.8%
<i>Point of view</i>	2	2.2%	2	1.7%	37	1.3%
<i>Somehow</i>	0	0%	6	7.3%	51	1.8%

Table 6.1: The frequencies of the modal interpretations of *ergens* in three corpora. The percentages express the frequency of the modal instances of *ergens* with respect to the total number of instances of *ergens* in that respective corpus. The numbers in the subcategories of modal add up to the total number of instances of modal *ergens*.

in personal letters between E. du Perron and Menno ter Braak, two Dutch writers who lived in the first half of the 20th century. Modal *ergens* is regularly found in these letters, both on its own as in example (3) and in an explicitly metaphorical context as in (4).

- (3) Zeg gerust als je er niet voor voelt, want ergens heb ik toch nog een
Say feel free if you there not for feel, for ERGENS have I PTCL still a

zwakje voor die 6 dln. Louijs, en ik kan je natuurlijk
little tender spot for those 6 volumes Louijs, and I can you of course

later eens best wat anders geven.
later PTCL easily something else give.

Feel free to say that you don't want it, for *ergens* I still have a weak spot for
those 6 volumes Louijes and I can always give you something else later on.⁸
- (4) Ik heb ergens achterin mijn hoofd het idee om een erg goed
I have ERGENS at the back my head the idea to a very good

stuk te maken,
piece of work to make

Ergens at the back of my head I have the idea to make a very good piece of
work.⁹

⁸E. du Perron, 3 December 1932.

⁹E. du Perron, 23 April 1934.

The explicitly metaphorical cases of modal *ergens* and the instances without a metaphorical context are found almost equally frequently in this letter collection (respectively 9 and 11 times). This is interesting, since the explicitly metaphorical examples are much less frequent in the CGN (about 5 instances in total). This may point in the direction of a metaphorical origin of this use, but first we need to find out whether the modal use of *ergens* really evolved in the beginning of the 20th century.

6.3 The 19th century

In the previous section, we made a distinction between explicitly metaphorical uses of modal *ergens* and implicitly metaphorical uses. Strictly speaking, only the last group provides evidence of the existence of a modal use of *ergens*, since the other instances are metaphorically locative. However, the frequent occurrence of the explicitly metaphorical use may be seen as an indication for the way the implicit use developed.

In the 19th century, I have been able to find very few cases of implicitly metaphorical modal *ergens*, although explicitly metaphorical *ergens* is relatively frequent. The implicitly metaphorical instances can be found in the following examples.

- (5) Zonder zoo vele volken gezien te hebben als de Heer Bowring,
Without so many peoples seen to have as the mister Bowring,

twijfelen wij echter, of het ergens wijsheid is, iets te
doubt we however, whether it ERGENS wisdom is, something to

ondernemen, waarvoor men niet berekend is, of dengd [deugd EK], met
do, for which one not fitted is, or virtue with

denzelfden mond uitbundigen lof en grievende onwaarheden over
the same mouth exuberant praise and grieving falsehoods about

een volk uit te brengen, dat meer dan eenig ander jaloersch op zijne
a people out to bring, which more than any other jealous on his

eer is.
honor is.

Without having seen as many peoples as Mister Bowring, we doubt whether it is *ergens* wise to do something for which one is not equipped, or whether it is a virtue to lavish praise with the same mouth with which you also express grieving falsehoods about a people, which is more than any jealous of his honor.¹⁰

In example (5), *ergens* is used in a copular construction. In addition, the question of whether something is wisdom (wise) is subjective. As we have seen in the synchronic

¹⁰From: *Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen*. G.S. Leeneman van der Kroe en J.W. IJntema, Amsterdam 1829.

description of modal *ergens*, these are the prototypical characteristics of the *point of view* interpretation. However, a locative interpretation would also be possible if the speaker means ‘at some place in which a people lives, no matter which people/place’. This last interpretation seems less likely, but in order to avoid anachronistic interpretations, I will consider this example as ambiguous, because theoretically a locative interpretation would be possible.

Another example, which is more difficult to interpret than the previous one is found in (6).

- (6) (En, als gij nu uwen eed ligtvaardig schenden zoudt, als uw mond de logen zoude spreken, als gij uwe dienaren en vertegenwoordigers zoudt bezigen om dezelve te doen zegevieren over het belang van den staat, ô! gevoelt dan het gewigt van de afbreuk, welke gij hem doen zoudt, en hoe uwe laagheid, uwe ondankbaarheid, uw voorbeeld eenen afgrond zoude openen voor de zekerheid van den staat, die door geenen dwang, noch door de opofferingen der edelsten, kan hersteld of gesloten worden.)

En waant *ergens* de vermetelheid zich daarmede te verschoonen,
And imagines *ERGENS* the boldness himself with this to excuse,

dat het de zaak is van den staat, om den ongehoorzamen burger
that it the concern is of the state, to the disobedient citizen

te achterhalen?
to catch up?

(Waant gij, ô burger! dat de zaak van den staat niet de uwe is, maar dat gij aan hem, als aan eenen vijand, alles moogt onttrekken, wat gij kunt?)

(And if you would violate your oath, if your mouth would speak out the lie, if you would order your servants and representatives to make yourself triumph over the interest of the state, O feel the burden of the damage, you would do to it and how your baseness, your ungratefulness, your example would open an abyss for the security of the state, which by no force, nor by the sacrifices of the most noble could be recovered or closed.)

And does the boldness *ergens* think to excuse himself with the statement that it is the business of the state to catch up with the disobedient citizen?

(Do you think, O citizen, that the concern of the state is not yours, but that you are allowed to withdraw from it everything you can, like from an enemy?)¹¹

In example (6), we find a personification of boldness in a rhetorical question. This makes it unlikely that *ergens* is referring to something written in a text. It may be that *ergens* is used to express *wherever (the person displaying) the boldness is*, i.e. anyone, especially when this is read with a pitch accent on *ergens*.

However, the mental state predicate *waant* ‘thinks’ and the fact that the view that is attributed to the *boldness* seems not very accepted, comply very well with a

¹¹From: *Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen*. G.S. Leeneman van der Kroe en J.W. IJntema, Amsterdam 1814.

split-self construction, in which the bold person would tell himself (secretly) that he is allowed to do what he, in some other part of himself, knows to be bad things, because it is the job of the state to catch a disobedient citizen. The interpretation of this sentence would then be: *And do you, bold person, in some part of yourself think you are excused because it is the job of the state to track the disobedient citizen?*. The first interpretation seems the most likely here, but the second one is in my view not impossible. This means that we cannot say with certainty whether a modal interpretation was already present in the 19th century.

One of the possible explanations for the development of a modal interpretation is a conventionalization of the metaphor *somewhere in someone's mind*. This hypothesis is supported by the presence of these metaphors in the 19th century. Examples of these explicit metaphors are given below.

- (7) Immers, het is mogelijk, dat ik *ergens* in mijn geest het oordeel A = B
For it is possible that I *ERGENS* in my mind the judgement A = B

opgeborgen heb, en later op een andere plaats, ver van de eerste,
put away have, and later at an other place, far from the first,

het oordeel B = C, en er niet toe kom deze twee oordeelen
the judgement B = C, and there not towards come those two judgements

tegelijk te denken;
at the same time to think;

For it is possible that I have put away *ergens* in my mind the judgement A = B and later at another place, far from the first, the judgement B = C, and that I never arrive at the point where I think those two judgements at the same time.¹²

In example (7), we find an almost perfect description of the split-self metaphor. There are two views which together may lead to a certain conclusion. Both views can be found in a different but unspecified place within the mind of the speaker. This example shows an active use of the metaphor, since apart from the use of *ergens*, we find all kinds of other locative expressions which are used to refer to places in the persons mind, like *opbergen* 'put away', *op een andere plaats* 'at another place', *ver van* 'far from'.

An older example is the following.

- (8) Spreekt men veel over den wil, het vermogen van den wil enz.,
Speaks one frequently about the will, the ability of the will etc.,

allengs sluipt het gevoel binnen, dat de wil *ergens* in ons
soon sneaks the feeling inside, that the will *ERGENS* in ourselves

aanwezig is, even als de lever of het hart, en dan gaat men over dien
present is, just like the liver or the heart, and then goes one about this

¹²De Gids. P.N. van Kampen & zoon, Amsterdam 1896.

wil redeneren, afgescheiden van het individu dat willend is.
will reason, separated from the individual that willing is.

If one speaks frequently about the will, the ability of the will etc., soon the feeling will sneak inside that the will is present *ergens* inside us, just like the liver or the heart and then one will start to reason about the will separately of the individual that is wanting.¹³

In example (8), the speaker criticizes the metaphor of the will which is somewhere within a human being. The speaker tries to force a locative interpretation by means of the phrase *even als de lever of het hart* ‘just like the liver or the heart’. However, the speaker himself uses the same kind of metaphor in *allengs sluipt het gevoel binnen* ‘soon the feeling sneaks inside’, showing that it is completely conventionalized to think about the human mind in locative terms.

There is also another category of modal *ergens* present in these data, which was only discussed in passing in the synchronic chapter. The use of *ergens* as a modifier with an indefinite article and a noun, which was in the synchronic corpus only found in the Flemish data, is already present in the same geographic region in the 19th century. Both examples below are written by authors from Flanders. I haven’t been able to find examples from the Netherlands.

- (9) Het vrome meisje moest deze op ergens eene wijze uitdrukken: het gebed
The pious girl had to these at ERGENS a way express: the prayer

was hare toevlucht.
was her escape.

The pious girl had to express them in *ergens* one way or another: prayer was her escape.¹⁴

- (10) (Hoe zoo heerlijk een lot versmaden voor de onzekere terugkomst van eenen
armen drommel, die het misschien nimmer verder zoude brengen dan tot
een paar ellendige honderd duizend frank,)

die welligt ginder in Amerika lang het oog had laten vallen op de
who possibly out there in America lang the eye had let fall upon the

dochter van ergens eenen yankeeschen groot- of kleinhandelaar?
daughter of ERGENS a yankee wholesaler or retailer?

How can you let go such a good fate in favor of the uncertain return of a
poor bastard, who would perhaps never get any further than a few damned
hundred thousand frank,) who possibly already has his eye on the daughter

¹³De Gids. P.N. van Kampen & zoon, Amsterdam 1858.

¹⁴Virginie Loveling, *Sophie*. P.N. van Kampen & Zoon, Amsterdam 1885.

of *ergens* a yankee wholesaler or retailer?¹⁵

Another type of examples is ambiguous between a modal reading and a locative reading. It may be that some of these examples were the critical contexts in which the shift from locative to modal took place. An ambiguous example can be found in example (11) below. In this example, which was already discussed above, it is possible that the speaker refers to some place in a text in which the school is called mixed, but one can also read *ergens* as modifying *terecht* 'rightly', creating an *point of view* reading.

- (11) De school, bruikbaar voor de gezindten, door de kleine minderheid
The school, useful for the denominations, by the small minority
begeerd, wordt eene Protestantsche school genoemd. Eene algemeene,
adhered to, is a Protestant school called. A general,
generieke benaming, omvattende onderscheidene gezindten, en
generic name, including various denominations, and
dus in zooverre *ergens* terecht ook eene gemengde school genoemd.
thus in some sense ERGENS rightly also a mixed school called.

The school, which was acceptable for all denominations that were adhered to by small minorities, was called a Protestant school. A general, generic name, including various denominations and, thus, in some sense *ergens* rightly called a mixed school.¹⁶

There are many examples of *ergens* that refer to a place in a text in the corpus from this period. Generally, these examples are completely transparent. This type of example is also still in use in modern times. The possibility of interpreting *ergens* as modal in example (11) in modern times would be triggered by the subjective adjective *terecht* as we saw from the surveys. The fact that this may also be a reference to a place in a text does not seem to play a role in the decision to interpret this instance as modal. For this reason, I will not consider expressions that refer to a place in a text to be bridging contexts.

Another type of ambiguous examples is still ambiguous in modern times as well. These cases are characterized by the fact that *ergens* does not fulfill a very important role syntactically and semantically if it is interpreted as locative. This creates the possibility to interpret *ergens* as *somehow*, which changes the focus from a description of the base space to an evaluation of the speaker. In example (12), for instance, one can read *ergens* as a metaphorical point in a concatenation of arguments, but one can also read it as *somehow*, that is, as *in some way* or *from some perspective*. This

¹⁵Domien Sleeckx, *Op 't Eksterlaar. Herinneringen van afgestorven en van nog levende vrienden.*, W. Rogghé, Gent 1863.

¹⁶From: *Handelingen der algemeene vergadering van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde te Leiden, gehouden aldaar den 16den Juni 1870, in het gebouw der Maatschappij tot Nut van 't Algemeen.* E.J. Brill, Leiden 1870.

last interpretation is possibly triggered by the expression *het vage besef* ‘the vague understanding’, which already moves the focus to the mental space of the subject. Which interpretation was chosen by the speakers in the 19th century, we don’t know.

- (12) De tegenzin van Hippias tegen Sokrates’ redeneering ontspruit uit
The aversion of Hippias against Sokrates’ argument is based from

het vage besef, dat zij ergens niet in orde moet wezen; gedwongen
the vague sense, that it ERGENS not in order must be; forced

echter om zooveel toe te stemmen, kan hij het gebrek niet ontdekken,
however to so much to agree, can he the mistake not find,

en hij heeft niet veel lust het gesprek voort te zetten.
and he has not much desire the conversation to continue.

The aversion of Hippias against Sokrates’ argument is based on the vague sense that *ergens* it is not correct; However, since he is forced to agree so frequently, he can’t find the mistake, and he does not have much desire to continue the conversation.¹⁷

Example (12), which may be interpreted both as locative and as modal shows that the choice of the interpretation of a sentence is in an important part dependent on the options one has stored. This type of sentence may have been a critical context for the *somehow* interpretation, but since a *feelings/point of view* interpretation is also possible, it may also be just an atypical example of this last category. What does seem clear, though, is that the possibility of a modal interpretation is a clear example of inferencing, that is, reading a more subjective value into a form that can be left out without changing the syntactic or semantic structure of the sentence.

In example (13), the expression *raakt aan* ‘touches upon’ can be taken as the point in which the metaphorical areas of the *kleinigheid* and life touch each other. This interpretation is supported by the metaphorical use of *zijde* ‘side’, which is also locative. However, *ergens* can also be interpreted as *from some point of view* or *somehow*. Especially the fact that this is about someone’s views paves the way for a modal interpretation. However, a metaphorical locative interpretation is also possible.

- (13) Wie onzen Geulincx kent, weet dat er voor hem in het menselijk
Who our Geulincx knows, knows that there for him in the human

leven geene kleinigheid zoo gering is, of zij heeft hare ernstige zijde,
life no trifle so small is, or she has her serious side,

omdat zij ergens raakt aan het zedelijk beleid van dat leven.
because she ERGENS touches on the moral guidance of that life.

¹⁷De Nieuwe Gids. Jaargang 8. W. Versluys, Amsterdam 1893.

Who knows our Geulincx, knows that for him there is no trifle in human life small enough not to have its serious side, because *ergens* it touches upon the moral guidance of that life.¹⁸

These types of examples may have played a role in the development of modal *ergens* as a critical context, especially for the development of the *somehow* interpretation. However, it is hard to link these examples to a specific development directly.

In conclusion, we can say that we have found that modal *ergens* may have already been in use in the beginning of the 19th century, although we do not have completely unambiguous cases. The use of explicit metaphors supports the hypothesis that this was the way the *feelings* interpretation came about, although it is hard to show a direct connection. Some examples were discussed that may have been critical contexts for the development of the *somehow* interpretation, but this remains somewhat speculative. The Flemish use of *ergens* with an indefinite article and a noun as a marker of imprecision was already found in the 19th century in Flanders. Examples of this type from the Netherlands were not found. This makes it likely that this development was confined to Flanders in this period also.

6.4 The 18th century

The 18th century part of the corpus is much smaller than the 19th century part. In the 18th century, we find only one fifth (respectively 3060 vs 15160) of the instances of *ergens* found in the 19th century. There are no implicitly modal instances of *ergens* in this part of the corpus, which may be due to the change in the characteristics of the corpus, but it may also be that in earlier periods modal *ergens* was used less frequently. However, the metaphorical use of *ergens* was already present, since there is an explicitly metaphorical example.

In this example, a weakness is said to be secretly in some place in someone's heart.

- (14) (Hy, die van sterke Gevoeligheid omtrent zyne Medemenschen hoog opgeeft, en nothans geene aandoeningen heeft ten opzichte van de verheevene voorwerpen, welke de Godsdienst hem aanbiedt, geen hart, geschikt om den grooten Vader des Heelals te bewonderen en te aanbidden, mag met alle reden de eegtheid en kieschheid zyner Aandoenlykheid verdagt houden.)

Hy heeft grond, om te vermoeden, dat 'er *ergens* in zyn hart eene
He has reason, to to expect, that there *ERGENS* in his heart a

heimlyke verkeerdheid schuile, die zyn Character bederft. Dat wy
secret badness hides, which spoils his character. That we

ons, derhalven, benaarstigen, om alle de deelen van een deugdzaam
ourselves, therefore, exalt, to all the parts of a virtuous

¹⁸De Gids. P.N. van Kampen & zoon, Amsterdam 1892.

Character, gelyk 't behoort, te vereenigen;
 character, like it is proper, to combine;

(He, who speaks highly of a strong sensitivity with respect to his fellow human beings and yet has no emotions with respect to the holy things, which the religion him offers, he has no heart suited to admire and worship the holy Father of the universe and has good reason to question the sincerity and the delicacy of his emotions.) He has reason to suspect that *ergens* in his heart is a secret badness, which spoils his character. That is why we should make the effort to combine all parts of a virtuous character.¹⁹

The example above suggests that potentially modal *ergens* already existed in the 18th century, but there was only one explicitly metaphorical example and no implicitly metaphorical examples, so we can't be sure.

6.5 The 17th century

In the 17th century, we find several examples that may be interpreted as modal, but other interpretations are generally also possible. There is also one explicitly metaphorical example.

The metaphor of the heart as a house or space in which different views can be present is already found in the 17th century, as can be seen from example (15).

(15) (Wat sullen wy hier dan van Chymon segghen?)

Voorwaer anders niet dan dat de hooghe Hemelsche crachten, die in
 Verily, other not than that the high heavenly powers, which in

zijn edel herte ghestordt waren, door eenrehande nijdich ongheluck vast
 his noble heart poured were, by some bad misfortune fast

ghebonden ende besloten moesten zijn gheweest erghens binnen een
 bound and enclosed must have been ERGENS within a

cleyen hoecxken van sijn herte:
 small small corner of his heart:

What then shall we say here about Chymon? Nothing but that the high heavenly powers, that were poured in his noble heart, by means of some bad misfortune were bound fast and must have been enclosed *ergens* within a small corner of his heart.²⁰

¹⁹ *Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen*. A. van der Kroe en J. Yntema, Amsterdam 1790.

²⁰ D.V. Coornhert, *Vijftigh lustighe historien oft nieuwigheden* Joannis Boccatij. Broer Jansz, Amsterdam z.j. [ca. 1644].

The following example may be interpreted as modal, although the context allows for two other options as well.

- (16) Want de Engel duydelyck seyt, dat Christus niet en sal midden
 For the Angel clearly said, that Christ not NEG will in the middle of
 in de laetste weke (gelijck wy *ergens* gedacht hebben) maer nae de 62
 in the last week (like we *ERGENS* thought have) but after the 62
 weken gedoodt worden, dat is, in ,”t eerste jaer van de laetste weke, oft
 weeks killed be, that is, in the first year of the last week or
 in ’t begin van de laetste weke: in dewelcke Hy (seyt hy) het
 in the beginning of the last week: in which he (said he) the
 verbondt velen sal bevestigen.
 covenant to many will confirm

For the Angel clearly said that Christ would not be cut off in the middle of the last week (like we *ergens* thought) but after 62 weeks, that is, in the first year of the last week, or in the beginning of the last week: in which he (said he) will confirm the covenant.²¹

The first option is very conservative. It would assume that the speaker uses a locative reference to refer to the results of a thinking-process which are written down in another text. However, the use of *ergens* to refer to passages in a text is in this period only attested with the verb *zeggen* ‘to say’. In other periods, we also found other predicates with this function, but we do not find mental state predicates with this function. Mental state predicates do not generally refer to written thoughts outside of the subject himself.

The second option is a temporal interpretation ‘What we thought at some point’. The third option is modal ‘somehow/for some reason/in some part of our mind’, as in the modern example from Google in (17). It is hard to decide which interpretation was chosen by the contemporary speakers.

- (17) Zoals wij *ergens* hadden verwacht is er niets afwijkends op de
 Like we *ERGENS* had expected is there nothing exceptional on the
 scan te zien, er valt dus ook niet te opereren.
 scan to see, there is thus also not to operate.

Like we *ergens* expected, there is nothing exceptional on the scan, so there is nothing to operate on.²²

²¹Lutherse bijbel 1648, eds. N. van der Sijs, H. Beelen.

²²(http://www.rick-en-jelte.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=116&Itemid=88888990).

The following example is difficult to interpret.

- (18) Wijders, geen Koning kan ergens aan zich zelf groter zekerheit
 Furthermore, no king can ERGENS to hem self more security
 beloven, dan die in dusdanige Burgerschap heerscht.
 promise, than the one who in such citizenship rules.
 Furthermore, no King can *ergens* promise to himself more security than the
 one who rules in such citizenship.²³

At first sight, example (18) has the structure of a frequent construction *if anywhere (X is the case), than it is here/ in this case*, in which *ergens* generally receives a pitch accent. However, in example (18) the *than*-clause cannot be read as (metonymically) locative in any way, although normally that is the case in this construction. The reason this is impossible is that the *than*-clause is constructed as an action of the king himself, rather than as a situation. Normally, *ergens* is used metonymically in this construction. A situation is described by means of its place. If this metonymy breaks down, the construction does not function anymore. This forces the reader to either reinterpret the construction or to reinterpret *ergens* as non-locative.

The first option would be to interpret *ergens* as a marker of an indefinite place (*anywhere*) which has the effect of broadening the scope of the statement. This is comparable to an expression of the type 'no king in the world can ...', in which 'in the world' expresses the overall generalizing function of *ergens*. This option seems to get support from the data up to this point, since there are other examples in which *ergens* seems to be used in a comparable way, as in examples (19) and (21).

- (19) (Wat vreucht, o Godt! wat ruste
 Wort ons nu aenghedient,
 En alle menschen?
 Wat troost, wat soete luste,)
 Wat isser ergens meer by ons te wenschen?
 What is there ERGENS more by us to wish?
 (Hier duysent jaer
 Die zijn nu daer Dat Godt ons sprack van dese:
 S'is nu ghesproten
 De bloem van Iessels loten
 Wie sal vreesen?) (What joy, o God, what rest
 is offered to us now
 And all humans?
 What comfort, what sweet joys)
 What is there *ergens* more to wish for us?
 (Here thousand years

²³Baruch de Spinoza, *Nagelate schriften*. z.p., 1677.

They are there now
 That God spoke to us of these
 She has now sprouted
 The flower of Iessel's shoots
 Who will fear?)²⁴

In example (19) *ergens* is used in a rhetorical question of which could be interpreted as equivalent to the expression in example (20) from the 19th century. The expression *ter wereld* 'in the world' in example (20) is used to strengthen the rhetorical question by suggesting that it does not matter how large the pool of things to choose from is, even if it were the whole world, nothing would be more satisfying than to be his wife.

(20) Doch wat ter wereld kon ik meer wenschen ter voldoening van
 But what in the world could I more wish for the satisfaction of

 mijnen trots dan om zijn vrouw te zijn?
 my pride than to his wife to be?

But what in the world could fulfill my pride more than to be his wife?²⁵

(21) Waar vind men *ergens* in de wereld uw's gelijk?
 Where finds one *ERGENS* in the world your equal?
 Where does one find *ergens* in the world your equal?²⁶

This type of strengthening is also found for *ergens* in example (21), which is from the beginning of the 18th century. This suggests that in the 17th century this way of strengthening by means of generalization may have existed for *ergens* as well.

If we now return to example (18), we see that the statement may be strengthened by adding *ergens* in the same way as we would do in modern times by saying *no king in the world*. A paraphrase would be: *No king, no matter where (in the world) he is from, can promise himself more security than the one who reigns in such a citizenship*. Basically, this is a locative use of *ergens*, although some conventionalization of the strengthening function may be required for speakers to understand it.

The second option to interpret this sentence was to interpret *ergens* as non-locative. In this case, this means that we may read *ergens* as 'somehow'. A paraphrase of this interpretation would be *No king can in any way promise himself more security than the one that rules in such citizenship*. Therefore, this may have been a critical context for the development the *somehow* interpretation.

In the following example, *ergens* seems to have lost its locative meaning to become a marker of imprecision, like it did in Flemish and German. Since the Lutheran bible is a translation from German, and the Dutch community of Lutherans consisted

²⁴Christianus Vermeulen, *'t Ronde jaer, of den schat der geestelijcke lofsangen*. Weduwe van Jan Knobbaert, Antwerpen 1644.

²⁵From: *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis*, 1895: 206.

²⁶Maria de Wilde, *Abradates en Panthea*. Pieter van den Berge, Amsterdam 1710.

of many Lutherans from Flanders who had fled the religious oppression, both language varieties may have played a role in the following example. I haven't found any other examples that show this kind of characteristic in this period.

- (22) Spreeckt met de kinderen Israëls, seggende: Wanneer eene ziele sondigt
 Speak with the children of Israel, saying: when a soul sins

uyt onwetenheyt, aen ergens een gebodt des HEEREN, dat
 out of ignorance, to ERGENS a commandment of the Lord, that

sy niet doen en soude:
 she not do and should:

Speak to the people of Israel, saying, If anyone sins unintentionally in any of the LORD's commandments about things not to be done.²⁷

We can conclude that although there are no unambiguous cases of modal *ergens* in the 17th century, there are indications that some modal interpretations, like the *feelings* interpretation and the Flemish use as a marker of imprecision may have existed already, although the latter use may also be due to a literal translation from German. There are also instances of locative *ergens* in which *ergens* seems to be used mainly to express general applicability (i.e. *anyone anywhere*, it does not matter who or where). These uses may have been critical contexts for either the imprecision marker *ergens* or the *somehow* interpretation.

6.6 The Middle Ages

In the Middle Ages there were many morphological variants of *ergens* in use. That is, the parts which together were the basis of *ergens* could still be combined more freely in the Middle Ages than in later periods. The word *ergens* is, according to the etymological dictionary of Dutch of Philippa et al. (2003) derived from Proto-Germanic **io-hwar-gin* in which *io* is the indefinite pronoun from Germanic **aiwa*, the next part *hwar* 'where' was both a question word and a relative pronoun and *gin*, which is built on the Proto-Indoeuropean root *k^we -ne*, is again an indefinite. In Dutch from the Middle Ages, we find both combinations of *io-hwar* without *gin* like *iewers* and instances in which *gin* is present. However, according to the commentaries on the earliest texts, they are both used like *ergens*. Around 1900 there are, according to the WNT, still dialects that use the form without *gin* with this meaning, in for instance the north of the province Noord-Holland. In the standard language, the forms without *gin* do not exist anymore. Since the variants of *ergens* may have merged in later Dutch, it might be useful to see how the variants of *ergens* were used as well. In addition, there were all kinds of spelling variants, which were taken into account.

²⁷Lutherse bijbel, Lev. 4.2 1648.

According to the early middle Dutch dictionary, the first occurrence of *irgen* is found around 1240 in the south of the Netherlands. This first instance is found in example (23) below.

- (23) ic (i.e. Tristan EK) vare na hiele Of ic dien iergen vunde di mí
 I (i.e. Tristan EK) ride to happiness if I him ERGENS would find who me

 gehelpen kunde Weder míner amyen. dor dien wold ic vertien
 help could again my love. Because of him would I renounce

 Muoder vnde vader.
 mother and father.

I (i.e. Tristan) will be looking for my welfare; if I could find a person *iergen* who could help me to get my love back, I would for him renounce my father and my mother.²⁸

Although in example (23) a locative reading is fine, it is interesting to see that in this type of example there is already the possibility of reading *irgen* as ‘somehow’. This possibility is present because the place is already implied by *vunde* ‘find’ and instead of referring back to *irgen* with the statement that he would go and see this person no matter where he had to go, Tristan adds what he would be prepared to do in order to reach his goal. However, in modern times we would still interpret examples like this as locative, which makes it less likely that this is the source of the change to modal.

In the following, comparable example from the story of Mariken van Nieumeghen, from about 1518, the modern editor, Dirk Coigneau, translates *yewers* as *ergens*, *op een of andere manier* ‘somewhere, somehow’. The reason this is possible, is that the sentence is about a situation that may occur in the future. The main point of the statement is to show that no matter where and when the situation might occur, they will defend Emmeken. This makes both temporal and more modal interpretations like ‘somehow’ possible. However, I would not consider example (24) as evidence for a conventionalized modal reading in the Middle Ages, since a locative reading is also unproblematic and would even be a fine reading today. It may be though, that the inference *somehow* was already present in this period.

- (24) Ende, biden rebben, wilt u yemant hinderen oft vercorten,
 whenever, by the ribs, want you someone disturb or do harm

 Wi willen ons bloet voer u storten,
 We want our blood for you shed

 Ende ghi yewers aen onghenoechte gheraectet.
 whenever you ERGENS at sorrow get into

²⁸Tristant, 1250.

If, by God, someone bothers you or does you harm
 We want to shed our blood for you
 If you *ergens* get into trouble.²⁹

We can conclude that although there are some examples that allow for more modal inferences, there is no reason to believe that the modal interpretations were already on their way to conventionalization in the Middle Ages.

6.7 Conclusion

In the introduction, two goals were given for this chapter. The first goal was to see what processes may have led to the development of modal *ergens*, the second goal was to find out when modal *ergens* developed. We will start with the second goal.

Modal *ergens* was definitely already in use in the beginning of the 20th century. In the 19th century there are several examples which seem to be modal, but which can also be interpreted as locative. In the 18th century the corpus becomes much smaller and only one explicitly metaphorical example can be found. In the 17th century there are several examples which may be interpreted as modal *ergens*, although they are not completely unambiguous. In this period, there is one example that may be read as the Flemish imprecision marking interpretation. In the Middle Ages there are no cases of modal *ergens*, although it is interesting to see that some of the contexts in which *ergens* was used already allowed for a *somehow* reading. However, these readings were probably not conventionalized and were meant to be interpreted as locative.

In order to find out what processes may have played a role in the development of modal *ergens*, I have looked for two types of phenomena. On the one hand I have tried to find ambiguous examples, which may have functioned as bridging contexts, on the other hand I have investigated whether the metaphors that play a role in modal *ergens* were already in use explicitly in the earliest texts. The explicit metaphors were found in the texts from the 19th, 18th and 17th century. Only in the texts from the Middle Ages was this type of metaphor absent. Although this only means that the metaphor THE MIND IS A SPACE OR HOUSE was commonly used at least from the 17th century onwards, in the 19th century there are also examples in which the metaphor is explicitly used to create a split-self, which reminds us strongly of the uses of implicitly modal *ergens*. Since the only step between an explicit use of the metaphor and an implicit one is the degree of conventionalization, this suggests that the source of at least one type of modal *ergens*, the *feelings*-interpretation, may be a conventionalization of the metaphor.

The *point of view* interpretation may have arisen in two ways. The first option is that it has arisen from instances in which the location of some event was not essential for the content of the clause, but which did contain subjective elements like subjective adjectives. There are several examples in which both interpretations, locative

²⁹Mariken van Nieumeghen ed. D. Coigneau, vs 501, 1518.

and *point of view* were possible. In some of these cases, a *somehow* interpretation is also possible, but not in all of them. It may be that the fact that *ergens* was already used in the metaphorical instances, made it easier to change the interpretation of *ergens* from a base space to the mental space of the subject of consciousness, after which both interpretations influenced each other.

The second option is that the *point of view* interpretation is only an extension of the *feelings* interpretation. If this is the case, the examples that are ambiguous between a locative interpretation and the *point of view* interpretation may only have been extensions of an already conventionalized interpretation. The data do not allow us to determine which development really took place.

In the case of the *somehow* interpretation, it is very hard to decide when and how this interpretation came about, because even in modern times many of these examples also allow for locative or *point of view* interpretations. Outside of the 20th century I have not been able to find unambiguous cases. However, the contexts in which this interpretation would not be excluded are already found in the Middle Ages. Therefore, this interpretation may be a 20th century development, but it may also be a very early development.

Most of the developments described above, are directly linked to a locative interpretation of *ergens*. There are several ways this situation may have come about. Apart from the original context in which some interpretation arose, there is often also an extension to other uses when an interpretation becomes really conventionalized. Therefore, it may be that the *point of view* interpretation originally was a pragmatic shade of the *feelings* interpretation, which became semanticized only when its use was extended to cases that were ambiguous between a locative reading and a modal reading. However, the development of the *point of view* interpretation may also be more independent of the *feelings* interpretation in the sense that the ambiguous cases developed through ambiguity of the context (invited inferencing). In that case, the *feelings* interpretation may have played a role only with respect to the basic idea that one could also interpret *ergens* within the mental space of the subject of consciousness.

The development of the Flemish imprecision marker seems to be a completely separate development from the *feelings* interpretation, because the contexts in which this development is found are fundamentally different from the contexts in which the other modal interpretations were found. It may be influenced by the German use of *irgend* though. The only link between the *imprecision* interpretation and the modal interpretations that theoretically may have played a role is the link between the imprecision use of *ergens* and the interpretation *somehow*. However, there is only one example in which both interpretations seemed possible, so this does not seem very likely.

Generally, the imprecision use of *ergens* seems to be a classical example of invited inferencing. In many examples, also in modern times, one may read *ergens* as locative, but the only relevance of the use of *ergens* in the context is to describe that the speaker does not know much about the person or thing he is talking about or does not think more information is relevant. This has become conventionalized in

Flanders, where it can be used of entities of which the location is completely clear.

This means that both metaphorization and invited inferencing may have played an important role in the development of modal *ergens*. In some cases the developments may have been completely unrelated, in other cases the developments may have influenced each other, although the degree of influence is unclear.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion part II

In the introduction to this part, chapter 2, the following three questions were posed. The first two questions pertained to the synchronic properties of *ergens* and the third was of a more diachronic nature.

1. How does a language user decide on the interpretation of *ergens* when so many options are available?
2. What knowledge of the language does a language user need and what kind of properties of the context are required for a specific interpretation?
3. Are the contextual properties of *ergens* that trigger a modal interpretation synchronically the same as the ones that played a role in the development of the various interpretations of *ergens*?

The answers to these questions are all based on the study of *ergens*. Therefore, we cannot automatically generalize the results to other words or other languages. Further research will show whether the conclusions hold for other words and other languages. However, there are several results that may be expected to carry over to other words or particles and others that are confined to *ergens*. Therefore, the results of the synchronic study of *ergens* will be discussed in different sections, one section on the general conclusions and one on the conclusions that are specific to *ergens*. This will be followed by a section on the diachronic development of *ergens*.

7.1 Conclusions synchronic *ergens*

7.1.1 General results

The question of how language users decide on the interpretation of a form when so many options are available, was divided into subquestions. One of the subquestions was whether language users really interpret forms in the same context in the same way, since it may be that there are differences between individuals in this respect. In section 3.4.2, we found that, in general, people tend to agree on the interpretation of *ergens*. In section 3.4.4, we saw that ambiguity between modal and non-modal interpretations of *ergens* is very rare. This suggests that the variation between individuals with respect to their interpretations of *ergens* is not very large.

However, there was some variation in the interpretations. The next step, which we took in section 3.5.3, was to see whether the variation would differ if the amount of context was changed from 9-15 words on either side of *ergens* to only two words on either side (survey 1 versus survey 2). Somewhat surprisingly, the variation did not increase if the subjects had less context even though the interpretations themselves did change.

The next subquestion was whether we may link variation in the interpretation of a sentence between participants with the degree of uncertainty indicated by participants on a Likert scale. We found that there is a strong correlation between the level of uncertainty and the amount of variation. Therefore, if we combine this result with the result from the previous paragraph, we have to conclude that less context does not make participants less certain about their interpretation.¹

Now we turn to question (2) above: What does a language user need to know of his language and what needs to be in the context in order to interpret a specific instance of *ergens*? One of the subquestions was whether native speakers use default strategies while interpreting *ergens*. The main result, which was discussed in section 3.5.2, was that native speakers do seem to use default strategies if there is no hint whatsoever in the context as to how to interpret *ergens*. However, in section 3.6.2 it was shown that if there is some context, but this context is ambiguous, participants do not seem to use the same strategy as in the cases without context. If there is no indication in the context as to how to interpret *ergens*, they will interpret it as locative. If there is some context, but this context is not decisive, the participants tended to choose the modal option. More generally, subjects preferred the overall interpretation (goal domain), for instance a metaphorical interpretation, over the literal interpretation (source domain) e.g. a locative interpretation.

In the previous paragraph we talked about indications in the context of how to interpret *ergens*. This already indicated that the context of *ergens* played an important role in the interpretation of *ergens*. Comparison of the interpretations of survey 1 and

¹This runs contrary to the general comments of the participants, who wrote down several times that they found it difficult to decide on the interpretation of *ergens* when they had only little context, whereas these comments were not present in the survey in which the participants had more context. However, this difficulty did not seem to influence participants' judgement as to how certain they were of their interpretation of specific sentences or the variation in their interpretations.

2 showed that triggers² in the direct context of *ergens* may play an important role in disambiguation. However, some triggers may override other, less important triggers as was shown by changes in the interpretation when the more important trigger was deleted.

Triggers in the context were not the only thing that influenced the interpretation of *ergens*. The overall fit of an interpretation into the situation described also influenced the interpretation of *ergens*. This is probably also one of the reasons for semantic change as we will see below.

7.1.2 Results specific to *ergens*

In the previous section on the general conclusions on synchronic *ergens*, we concluded that triggers play an important role in the interpretation of *ergens*. Each interpretation seemed to feel at home in contexts with particular characteristics. These characteristics do not need to be present all at the same time, but at least one of them is generally found in the context of a form with a specific interpretation. This shows that there is reason to assume that interpretations can generally be distinguished by their own contextual features. Even the locative interpretation, which is the original and the most frequent interpretation has clear contextual characteristics. This suggests that language users are normally guided in their interpretation of *ergens* by these contextual characteristics. For more concrete meanings, contextual triggers show an obvious connection between the interpretation and the semantic value of the trigger itself. However, as was shown in the surveys, the presence of these triggers seems to play an important role in the choice for an interpretation, partly because the presence of, for instance, locative triggers may lead to the exclusion of a modal interpretation or vice versa. This means that knowledge of the triggers for a locative interpretation is also needed if a language user wants to decide on the interpretation of modal *ergens*. Therefore, we need to include the locative cases in our study of *ergens* if we want to know how people decide on its interpretation.

Non-modal uses of *ergens*:

- locative interpretations are frequently connected to locative markers (locative adpositions, locational verbs, locative adverbs)
- temporal interpretations are frequently connected to temporal markers (references to time, days, periods)
- scalar interpretations are frequently connected to scalar markers (e.g. *between*)
- *about/around* interpretations are frequently connected to (imprecise) scalar markers and other markers of imprecision (e.g. *somewhere around thirty*)
- the prepositional object is dependent on a preposition which does not yet have another argument

²E.g. locative markers, mental state predicates etc. For a more specific description of the triggers that played a role with respect to *ergens* see the next section.

Modal uses of *ergens*:

- *feelings* interpretations are often connected to first person pronouns, mental state predicates and subjective predicates
- *point of view* interpretations are often connected to impersonal copula constructions, but they do have subjective predicate complements. In addition, they are often combined with adversative markers
- the *somehow* interpretation is frequently found with third person action verbs³

If we now zoom in on the specific functions of modal *ergens*, we find that the function of modal *ergens* seems to be to set up a (metaphorical) mental space. This is frequently used for explicit (i.e. a *point of view* interpretation) or implicit (i.e. a *feelings* interpretation) split-self constructions.

The modal interpretation of *ergens* does not seem to change between examples in which a metaphorical expression is explicitly present as in *ergens in my feelings* and ones in which the metaphorical expression is absent, as long as the context follows the tendencies described above. This raises the question as to how the modal interpretations have arisen. On the basis of the synchronic polysemies I have developed some hypotheses as to how these interpretations may have come about.

7.1.3 Synchronic indications for the diachronic development of *ergens*

There are several synchronic connections between the interpretations of *ergens*. Some of them can be seen from variation in the experimental results and others from metaphorical connections.

1. place > metaphorical place on a scale such as a temporal scale or other scales (e.g. *volgende week ergens* 'somewhere next week', somewhere between three and four centimeters)
2. scales, (see number 1) > imprecision marker with numbers (i.e. the about/around interpretation as in *ergens rond twee uur* 'somewhere around two o'clock')
3. place > metaphorical place within someone's feelings/mind, creating another point of view (e.g. *Ergens denk ik...* 'ergens I think...')
4. an indefinite (metaphorical) place > by implication a situation about which not everything is known or understood, if that situation is in your own mental space this implies a lack of arguments to defend one's personal view (*Ergens vind ik dat...* 'Ergens am I of the opinion that...')

For all of these connections there are examples that show ambiguities in this respect. An indication for the first change is the fact that other locative markers,

³For an explanation as to why the *somehow* interpretation is considered modal, see page (9).

which do not have temporal implications if they are not combined with *ergens* may be added to an *ergens* phrase without any problems. This suggests that the metaphor is still actively evoked.

The second change is suggested to have taken place because of the fact that scales interpretations and about/around interpretations show a high degree of ambiguity. In addition, this type of marker (still) requires some sort of scale to be present in background.

The third development is both suggested by the fact that *ergens* is interpreted as *in someone's feelings or thoughts* by participants, which basically is a description of a metaphor and by the observation that the interpretations of the participants did not change if an explicit metaphor was added to a *feelings* example.

The fourth development is also suggested by ambiguities that are frequently present in examples of this kind. In many cases the information that something happened at some place is not relevant enough to be added purely for its own sake. Therefore, it is interpreted as a marker which expresses that the speaker is indicating that he is aware of the fact that he is providing imprecise information.

Several of these branches may have evolved relatively independently from each other on the basis of a locative interpretation, since in several cases the source of the modal interpretations seems to be the original locative interpretation in a slightly different context. The next step was to see whether there is diachronic evidence that proves or disproves these hypotheses based on synchronic evidence.

7.2 Conclusions on the diachrony of modal *ergens*

The main processes that seem to have led to modal *ergens* are metaphor and invited inferencing. The presence of the metaphor THE MIND IS A SPACE in combination with the interpretations of *ergens* as *in someone's feelings or thoughts/ from some point of view* suggests that the latter is the conventionalized version of the former, especially, because there are explicitly metaphorical examples that express a split-self.

This explicit metaphor is found in all periods investigated except for the Middle Ages. Before the 19th century examples that are not explicitly metaphorical are often ambiguous. This implies that the development of the *feelings* interpretation of *ergens* occurred far before the 1960s. Modal *ergens* is used regularly up to the present day.

Other modal interpretations may have developed via *invited inferencing*, that is, the over-interpretation of *ergens* in the types of contexts that were described in the synchronic part. The metaphorical use of modal *ergens* may have facilitated the interpretation of *ergens* as modal in underspecified contexts, but the development of the three types of modal *ergens* cannot be linked directly to each other.

The Flemish use of *ergens* with an indefinite article and a noun as a marker of imprecision is already found in that area in the 17th century. There are no Netherlandic Dutch examples of this use in the corpus.

Part III

Comparing Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek *που*

CHAPTER 8

Introduction to the comparative study of Ancient Greek ΠΟΥ

Just like *ergens*, Ancient Greek πού had multiple standard interpretations of which one is an indefinite locative interpretation and another an interpretation as a modal particle. In this part on πού, we will basically use the same techniques as we used in our corpus study of *ergens*. As we have seen in the previous chapters, it was possible to show for *ergens* that there are correlations between specific linguistic features of the context (e.g. first person pronouns, mental state predicates) and specific interpretations. However, in the case of *ergens*, we had access to the interpretations of native speakers which we could link to specific features in the context, whereas Ancient Greek is a dead language. This means that the approach needs to be adjusted at some points.

Based on the assumption that the basic communicative strategies and cognitive abilities of humans are, independently of place and time, the same, we would expect that the way in which speakers of Dutch and Ancient Greek determine which of the possible interpretations is used in a particular situation, is comparable.¹ Therefore, it is plausible that, just as in the case of *ergens*, there are also links between (linguistic) properties of the context and interpretations of πού. This means we expect to find frequently recurring patterns in the linguistic context (i.e. constructions) which can be linked to specific interpretations as well as types of situational context in which πού is frequently used.

¹This can be compared to the principles of Charity and Humanity respectively of Davidson (1973) and Grandy (1973). However, Rutten (2006) criticized the use of these principles in historical linguistics, stressing that there are also many things that may be different over time and place, which is one of the things a scholar must keep in mind.

In the following chapters, I will try to connect regularities in the context of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ to translations of the particle in three different languages: English, French and German.² On the one hand, I will use the translations to find regularities in interpretations and on the other hand I will use patterns in the context to find the triggers of translations and possibly conventional uses of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$. This way, we may learn more about the knowledge a speaker of Greek may have had of the context in which (modal) $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ was used.

In addition, we will study the diachronic development of modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ in chapter 10. Chapter 11 will compare *ergens* and $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ and to what extent they are found in comparable contexts both synchronically and over time. The results of this part will be summarized in chapter 12.

However, we will start with a more general discussion of the reasons one would want to compare forms in different languages (section 8.1) and in a dead and a living language in particular (section 8.2), after which we will turn to a short overview of the descriptions that have been given of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ in the secondary literature. At the end of this part, after the analysis of the contextual features of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$, we will come back to the descriptions in the secondary literature to see how they fit in the overall picture that has arisen of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$.

8.1 Comparing languages

The first question that arises when thinking of a comparison of Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$, is what we can learn from comparing two languages. A large part of the answer to this question is determined by one's view on language. This has become clear from the extensive discussion following the article *The myth of language universals* by Evans and Levinson (2009). In this article, the authors argue that languages show diversity on every level and have very few true universals. This has implications for the way we study language. Evans and Levinson phrase this as follows:

Although there are significant recurrent patterns in organization [of languages *EK*], these are better explained as stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the constraints of human cognition.

This article generated an extensive discussion over several special issues of several journals. From this discussion, it has become clear that what is supposed to be gained from comparing languages is dependent on whether one believes that the basic structure of language is innate or that languages are comparable because they have evolved by means of the same general cognitive principles. The latter implies that generalizations over non-related languages can only be of a general cognitive nature, the former suggests that we may learn more about this innate language structure by comparing specific grammatical features of different languages.

²For a more elaborate discussion of the status of translations in this project see page 175.

In this dissertation, I will use the assumptions that are generally held within cognitive linguistics. That is, it is assumed that unrelated languages show similarities mainly because they have arisen by means of the same cognitive processes and communicative needs. Related languages are similar because of their common source, but if a feature is not traceable to that common source, the explanations of similarities are basically the same as with unrelated languages. What may still be of influence though, are the comparable structure and constructions that are inherited from their common source, which makes it more likely that related languages will develop in a comparable direction.

In the case of *ergens* and *πou* there is a historical relation between the words (*ergens* < *pgm*. **io-hwar-gin* in which *gin* < PIE *k^we-ne*³, which is the same root as *πou* < *k^we/k^wo + ?*). However, the development of a modal function was not a shared development and probably took place when the languages had already become quite distantly related. Therefore, the development of the modal uses can be seen as an independent development, which may be somewhat influenced by the general relatedness of the two languages.

I will give an example of the effect of a similar structure on the development of languages. The Romance languages all developed articles although their common source language, Latin, did not have articles. Some Romance languages use forms based on Latin *ipse* 'self' instead of the form that was more commonly recruited for the function of article *ille* 'this/that' (Carlier and Mulder, 2010).⁴ This suggests that at least some of the languages developed an article on their own, following the same type of development as the other Romance languages, but with a different lexical item. The reason that all these languages developed an article is probably found in the structure of the vulgar Latin language, but their actual development may have been somewhat different for each individual language as is shown by the choice for a different lexical item for the function of article in, for instance, Sardinian.

This brings us to processes of language change as the main explanatory factor for a synchronic situation. The rise of new interpretations of a form or construction is commonly explained by cognitive processes like metaphor, metonymy, analogy, reanalysis and invited inferencing (cf. Hopper and Traugott, [1993] 2003; Traugott and Dasher, 2002), which were discussed in chapter 6. However, these processes are often not applied to all instances of a form, but only to a particular group of cases as we can see from the fact that other instances of the same form retain their original interpretation. This is why it is common in studies on semantic and grammatical change to say that changes in interpretation start locally or in specific constructions. Since the original interpretation remains in some constructions, a poly-interpretable form has arisen. From a synchronic perspective, this may be described as one form playing a role in more than one construction.⁵

The question of how forms become poly-interpretable therefore has two answers on different levels, one on the level of the specific language and the linguistic

³This information was taken over from Philippa et al. (2003).

⁴Perhaps this process may have started in vulgar Latin already with the use of *hic*.

⁵The role of the context in language change from a construction grammar perspective is discussed more elaborately in for instance Bergs and Diewald (2008) and Bergs and Diewald (2009a).

and social conventions in the language community, the other on the level of general cognitive processes. Let us go back for a moment to Dutch *ergens*. The use of *ergens* in explicitly metaphorical contexts may have become a trend among (certain) speakers of Dutch. Although the phenomenon of metaphor itself is a general cognitive process, the actual metaphorical use of *ergens* may have been triggered by the properties of Dutch and trends in the use of the Dutch language. The next step, the use of metaphorical *ergens* without mentioning the actual metaphoric location, can be accounted for by a general cognitive process: attributing features of the context to specific uses of a form (hypoanalysis (Croft, 2000)). The reason a change comes about in a specific language at a specific moment in time and the exact way in which this happens, may be due to social and linguistic factors within the language community, but the mechanisms that play a role in these changes may be very general cognitive principles. Therefore, the properties of an individual language (community) may be an explanation for the fact that changes in languages seldom follow the exact same pattern, but the general cognitive principles behind them explain why we still find certain cross-linguistic tendencies in language change.

Another issue is to what extent the application of pragmatic inferences is language specific. When looking at one language only, it is sometimes hard to decide whether a phenomenon is due to some pragmatic principle only or whether it is also founded on the knowledge of a speaker about his language. As was already argued above, in some cases the interpretation of *ergens* as temporal seems to be dependent on universal pragmatic principles of relevance only. However, if we use an indefinite marker of place in a temporal context in a closely related language like Italian, we see that speakers do not accept a temporal use of a locative indefinite. This means that a universal pragmatic explanation cannot account for the temporal use of *ergens* in Dutch. In order to find that out, comparison with other languages was useful as was also argued by Croft (1998, 159).

In the comparison between *ergens* and *που*, I would like to see whether the same type of contextual cues found for *ergens* can also be found in the case of *που*. In addition, it would be interesting to see whether comparable metaphorical processes may have played a role. Although there are several European languages in which a metaphorical extension of the indefinite locative to a temporal marker seems to have taken place, the extension to a modal interpretation may be less common. Especially since dictionaries are not always reliable in this respect, it is hard to be sure, but it seems that only French and Albanian allow for a(n) (implicitly metaphorical) modal use of their locative indefinite. Examples are given in (1), (2) and (3).

- (1) Je terminerai mon contrat plus tôt que prévu, fin janvier. Quelque part fatigué, mais heureux.
I will end my contract earlier than foreseen, end of January. *Somewhere* tired, but happy.⁶
- (2) Je savais que l'envie ne reviendrait pas en décembre ou en janvier. Quelque part, je suis soulagé.

⁶From: [feed://lagazettetropicale.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default](http://lagazettetropicale.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default).

I knew that the good mood would not come back in December or in January.
Somewhere, I am relieved.⁷

- (3) e ndjeja diku se e kisha gabim
feel somewhere that have mistake
CL.ACC 1SG.PST.IPFV ADV REL CL.ACC 1SG.PST.IPFV SG
I felt *somewhere* that I made a mistake⁸

Although the comparison of two languages may be useful, the comparison of a living language with a dead language raises its own problems, since the types of information that can be used for the two languages are not the same. In the following section, I will explain why it seems useful to make this comparison anyway and how this may be done.

8.2 Comparing a dead language with a living language

Ancient Greek is a dead language and the available corpus of texts is limited. This same corpus, with some additions found on papyrus in Egypt or in inscriptions, has been studied for several centuries. Nevertheless, scholars continue to learn new things about the language and the culture of the Ancient Greeks. This is possible because new insights from other disciplines such as discourse analysis and linguistics are adopted to refine our knowledge of Greek. Earlier researchers sometimes intuitively reached comparable conclusions, but the systematic application of these theories in combination with the older close reading techniques made it possible to see larger patterns in, for instance, narrative techniques and discourse particles.

Still, the study of Ancient Greek semantics is different from the study of the semantics of living languages. There are no native speaker intuitions, surveys or other ways of verifying hypotheses, except for the texts themselves and some comments by ancient writers, who are mainly from several hundreds of years later and not always linguistically accurate. This implies that we, as scholars, are second language learners with a very skewed input of written texts and grammars, which are predominantly written by other non-native speakers.

Second language learners generally have a hard time learning to understand the use of modal particles when learning a new living language (e.g. van Balen e.a. (2010) and Caspers & Van der Wouden (2010)). Although scholars studying a dead language are of course a very special type of second language learners, it is clear that modern scholars making descriptions of Ancient Greek particles are facing a very difficult task.

One way to gain additional information about the use of a particle is to compare Greek particles with other particles in living languages. The contextual characteristics of a particle from a living language can provide insights into the comparability of this particle with a Greek particle. This can be seen as hypothesis testing. If we

⁷<http://breizh-swimmers.over-blog.com/45-index.html>

⁸Source: several native speakers of Albanian, p.c.

think on the basis of close reading that a particle may have had interpretations that are comparable to interpretations of a particle in a living language, we would expect their contextual properties to be comparable as well. If the contextual characteristics are different, the particle may have had extra interpretations that were not yet taken into account or it may have had a (slightly) different function from the particle in the living language.

Now, we turn to the secondary literature on Ancient Greek πού.

8.3 Introduction to Ancient Greek πού

In this section, we will discuss the descriptions of and the literature on the particle πού. I will present the views that are given on πού in the literature, in order to have an idea of the views on πού that have been around and that may have played a role in the choice of translations. In chapter 13, at the end of this part on πού, I will discuss how the often important observations in the literature fit the picture of πού which has evolved in this study.

The standard Ancient Greek-English dictionary (Liddell et al., 1940) (LSJ) gives in its lemma for πού the following information:

I. *anywhere, somewhere*; freq. with other Advs. of Place, οὐχ ἑκάς π. *somewhere not far off*, πέλας π. (anap.); μηδαμοῦ . . π. (dub.l.); “π. πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ”; “ἄλλοθί π.”; “τῆδέ π.” c. gen., ἀλλά π. αὐτοῦ ἀγρῶν in *some part there of the fields*; ἐμβαλεῖν π. (fort. ποι) τῆς χώρας *some part of the country*; “εἴ π. τῆς χώρας ταῦτό τοῦτο πάθος συνέβη”.

II. without reference to Place, *in some degree*, “καί ποῦ τι”: freq. to qualify an expression, *perhaps, I suppose*, Hom., etc.; added to introductory Particles, “οὕτω π. . .”; “Ζεὺς μὲν π. τό γε οἶδε”; “ὡς ὅτε π.”; ἦν π., εἰ μή π.: strengthd., “τάχ' ἄν π.”; “ἴσως π.”: attached to single words to limit their significance, “πάντως κ.”; τί π. δράσεις; *what in the world?*; “οὐδεὶς π.”; with numerals, ἕτεα τρία καὶ δέκα κ. μάλιστα *about thirteen years*, Hdt.1.119, cf. 209,7.22, etc.: οὐ τί πού denies with indignation or wonder, *surely it cannot be . . .*, “οὐ τί π. οὗτος Ἀπόλλων”; οὐ δήπου adds a shade of suspicion, “οὐ δήπου Στράτων”; for δήπου, ἦπου, v. sub vocc.—In late writers ποῦ, πού take the place of ποῖ, ποι, with Verbs of motion, as in Engl. *where* for *whither?* This idiom (condemned by Phryn.30, ποῦ ἄπει . . ἀμάρτημα) is found occasionally in early authors, “ποῦ τοι ἀπειλαὶ οἴχονται;”; “ἐξεθλών πού”; “ἰόντα πού”; but in pure Att. only as f.l. for ποῖ, ποι.

Morphologically, πού is related to ποῦ ‘where?’ since in Ancient Greek most question words have an unaccented version, which expresses the indefinite meaning of the question word, in this case ‘anywhere’.

Several of these translations would also work for some uses of *ergens*, like *anywhere, in some degree*, with numerals *about*. The modal descriptions do not seem to

completely cover the uses of modal *ergens* as it was described above. In section 5.2, for instance, we discussed the differences between *ergens* and *misschien* ‘perhaps’. From this comparison, it became clear that the mental space building properties of *ergens* were different from the epistemic modal adverb *misschien* ‘perhaps’. Also, *ergens* can generally not be translated by *I suppose*. Still, the resemblance of the two particles makes it interesting to see to what extent these particles developed in a parallel way and whether the contexts that speakers used to disambiguate the various uses of *πou* may have been comparable to the contexts that are used for this purpose in Dutch.

The largest work on Ancient Greek particles written by Denniston (1950, 490-1) states the following⁹:

‘From *πou* meaning ‘somewhere’ is developed the sense ‘I suppose’, ‘I think’, the particle conveying a feeling of uncertainty in the speaker. Hence, further, *πou* is used ironically, with assumed diffidence, by a speaker who is quite sure of his ground.’

According to Denniston the main function of (modal) *πou* is for the speaker to convey a feeling of uncertainty. Supposedly, the effect of such a particle is that the addressee is warned that the statement may not be true or that the speaker is not completely committing himself to the truth of the proposition. This view is even strengthened by Wakker (1994, 362), who states that ‘by using *πou* the speaker indicates his (real or feigned) doubt about the truth of the proposition’

The irony in the description of Denniston, which is also mentioned by Bodin and Mazon (1919 [1902], 358-359) and Hartung (1832) has been called into question by Verdenius (1956, 251ff), who does agree that in some cases *πou* is used ‘by a speaker who is quite sure of his ground’, but claims that this has nothing to do with irony. According to Verdenius, *πou* may be used both to strengthen and to weaken, depending on the context.

Another description of *πou*, is by Wackernagel (1885, 21-25). This description is supported by Bolling (1929).

‘Schon bei Homer dient *πou* bekanntlich nicht bloss im lokalen sinne, sondern auch und noch häufiger im sinne von „gewiss“, „doch wohl“ in behauptungen deren richtigkeit man überzeugt ist, die man aber nicht beweisen kann.’

Already in Homer *πou* is used, as is well known, not only with a locative meaning, but also and even more frequently with the meaning “certainly”, “surely”. It is used in statements of whose truth one is convinced, yet one cannot prove. [Transl. EK]

Wackernagel thinks that by using *πou* the speaker presents his statement as true, although the speaker does not have any evidence for it. In other words, the addressee is pressed to believe the speaker, even though there is no direct evidence.

⁹Denniston seems to follow Stephens (1837), who says that *πou* is used when the speaker is in doubt and when he does not possess adequate information.

A third translation, which gives yet another dimension to $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, comes from one of the standard grammars on Ancient Greek. In addition to translations like *doch wohl, gewiss, vermutlich, wohl*¹⁰ (Schwyzer and Debrunner, 1966, 579), Schwyzer and Debrunner (1966, 157 nt 3) translate $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ with *irgendwie* 'somehow' which has in German apart from its manner adverbial interpretation also a particle-like function.¹¹ The particle *irgendwie* expresses that the speaker is not very precise in his formulation or does not know much of the way in which something happened or the reason that it happened.

A comparable translation is given by Slater (1969) in his lexicon on Pindar. The only translation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in this dictionary is 'somehow' and according to Scolnicov (2003) we should also see *somehow* as the only interpretation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. A hint of this interpretation is also given by Italic (1955) in his dictionary on Aeschylus with the translation *aliquo modo*.

A last description of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ is given by Sicking (1993, 59), who is followed by Cuypers (2005) and Caspers (2010). Sicking actually has two sections on $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, one in which he describes the distribution of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in historiography and another describing modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. For $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in historiography Sicking (1993, 57-59) distinguishes the following interpretations:

1) a local use, 2) *expressing an acknowledgement of the lack of further specification*, 3) 'approximately'. The description *expressing an acknowledgement of the lack of further specification* looks very much like the translation 'irgendwie' we saw above, although Sicking's description seems less modal in the sense that *irgendwie* can be used as a way to express that the reason or background of a situation or feeling is not important, thus providing an attitude towards a situation. This possibility does not really seem to be there in Sicking's description. The modal use of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ Sicking (1993, 59) describes as follows :

'a speaker presents his statement as a surmise whose accuracy he does not vouch for (cf. LSJ s.v. "perhaps, I suppose") so that disputing it need not impair the basis for an understanding between the two partners in the conversation.'

In the context of $\delta\acute{\eta}\ \pi\omicron\upsilon$ Sicking (1993, 63) describes the value of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ as 'only surmised and might be called in doubt'. Somewhat further in his description of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, Sicking makes the following comment: 'In Plato $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ very often serves to introduce in a casual way what is obvious or even trivial, so as to avoid any impression of smugness or pedantry' (Sicking, 1993, 57-59). This use is also noted by Bodin and Mazon (1919 [1902], 359) for $\delta\acute{\eta}\pi\omicron\upsilon$, about which they say:

¹⁰These German particles all point in the direction of certainty, adding interpersonal information like *contrary to expectation, contrary to what you may think*. *Vermutlich* may be translated with 'probably', *gewiss* can be rendered by 'certainly'

¹¹This can be seen from the fact that speakers of German say that it has no meaning (pc. 4 native speakers of German). It probably expresses that the reason for a statement is not clear or that the content is not very precisely formulated as in the following example. *Er hat irgendwie gesagt, dass ich die www-dinge in die httpdocs reinmachen muss*. What is important here is that the statement in which *irgendwie* is found is not to be doubted, but that there is some information about which one is (deliberately) vague. (<http://community.games4mac.de/index.php?showtopic=14273&mode=threaded&pid=186936>)

“Il [i.e. *δήπου*] marque l’*affirmation polie* et souvent aussi ironique d’un fait tellement *évident* qu’on ne veut pas supposer qu’il ait pu échapper à l’interlocuteur. On l’emploie comme pour s’excuser de répéter un *truisme* [...] Aristophane s’est servi très heureusement de *δήπου* pour faire ressortir le bon sens un peu court de Chrémyle. Ce brave homme voit partout des *évidences* et la Pauvreté qui lui répond, affecte, elle aussi, de n’avancer que des affirmations *incontestables*.”[emphasis original EK]

As is clear from the description of Sicking and example (4) below, obvious or trivial contexts (i.e. truisms) do not seem to be confined to *δήπου* sentences, but are also characteristic for many *που*-clauses, which is, as will be argued in the following chapters, an important characteristic of many modal *που* contexts.

Modal particles often have functions in more than one domain. In the descriptions above we also find references to domains that are different from the purely epistemic modal domain (i.e. concerning the truth of the proposition). The authors describing *που* introduce several domains in which *που* may have a function. An overview of the domains mentioned is given below. In brackets I have added the authors who addressed this domain in their description of *που*.

1. the epistemic domain of (un)certainly (Denniston, Stephens, Wakker, Sicking, Wackernagel/Bolling, Schwyzer-Debrunner)
2. the evidential domain (i.e. proof) (Wackernagel)
3. the irony domain (Denniston, Bodin & Mazon, Hartung)
4. the domain of interpersonal relations between speaker and addressee (Sicking, Bodin & Mazon)
5. the accessibility of the content of the proposition for the addressee (obviousness/triviality) (Sicking, Bodin & Mazon)
6. the amount of specification/detail provided (*irgendwie*) (Schwyzer-Debrunner, Sicking, Slater, Italie, Scolnicov)

What all these descriptions have in common is that they seem to manage the expectations of the addressee with respect to the certainty of the proposition, the expected evidence, etcetera. However, *που* cannot function in all these domains at the same time. If we take, for instance, Sicking’s observation that in Plato *που* is frequently found in statements that are obvious or even trivial, we may assume that although some politeness effects may be present, the speaker does not indicate that he wants the addressee to think that he seriously doubts the truth of something that is obvious or trivial. It is possible that the speaker wants to downplay his own endorsement of the statement, but he still directs the speaker towards accepting the proposition as true. If that were not the case, it would be impossible to continue the conversation, because the speaker would then have to explain why he doubts something so obvious.

For instance in example (4), a definition is given of a circle. If a speaker would really suggest that he doubts whether this definition is true, the addressee would ask why he thought this was not the case. The speaker may ask for a confirmation, but this context requires the expectation of the speaker that the addressee will confirm what he said.

- (4) Στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο οὗ ἄν τὰ
 round ptcl που is this of which ptcl the
 NOM.SG FOC.PTCL που 3SG.PRS NOM.SG REL.GEN.SG PTCL NOM.PL
- ἔσχατα πανταχῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ.
 extremes everywhere from the middle equally be away from.
 NOM.PL ADV PREP ART.GEN.SG GEN.SG ADV 3SG.PRS.SUBJ.

Ναί.

“The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the center.” “Yes.”

Pl. *Prm.* 137e.¹²

As is clear from examples like (4) above, *που* seems to fulfill a different function from adverbs like ἴσως and τάχα that have their main function solidly in the epistemic modal domain (cf. Koier, 2007). Since *που* is found almost only in direct speech, it may be that *που* also has a more interactional component.

In addition, we may want to make a distinction between the direction of the interpretative effect (positive (true) versus negative (not true)) and the strength of that effect (directs strongly in that direction or does so less strongly). This distinction is made by Verhagen (2005) who calls it the difference between argumentative orientation and argumentative strength. We will now discuss this distinction more elaborately.

In Verhagen (2005) it is argued that we should see the expectations that are raised by a form as part of its meaning. In other words, some expressions in the domain of polarity, such as negations and expressions like *barely* and *almost* not only tell us something about the state of affairs in the depicted world, but also about the conclusions the speaker wants us to draw from this information. Examples given by Verhagen include the following. The setting is a situation in which a seriously ill person is discussing with a doctor whether he wants to undergo an operation. The following sentences may be uttered by the doctor in such a situation.

- (5) There is a chance that the operation will be successful
 (6) There is little chance that the operation will be successful
 (7) There is a small chance that the operation will be successful

¹²In order to keep the glosses as readable as possible, it is only indicated if a verb is not indicative and active/middle voice. Also it is not indicated whether a form is a (personal) (pro)noun. The abbreviations follow the list provided by the *Framework for Descriptive Grammars*-project (Bernard Comrie, William Croft, Christian Lehmann, Dietmar Zaefferer). The English translations are taken from the editions on the Perseus website (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/>) unless indicated otherwise.

(8) There is no chance that the operation will be successful

If we want to draw conclusions from the statements above about whether or not the doctor thinks it is a good idea to do the operation, we find that the formulation of the sentences above is directing the patient to either a positive or a negative answer.

(9) There is a chance that the operation will be successful.

- a. So let's give it a try.
- b. ?So let's not take the risk.

(10) There is little chance that the operation will be successful.

- a. ?So let's give it a try.
- b. So let's not take the risk.

(11) There is a small chance that the operation will be successful.

- a. So let's give it a try.
- b. ?So let's not take the risk.

(12) There is no chance that the operation will be successful.

- a. ?So let's give it a try.
- b. So let's not take the risk.

This shows that the strength of a form is not the only factor involved ('small' and 'little' have about the same strength), but that argumentative orientation, or expectation management plays an important role in likelihood estimations. In a table it looks as follows:

	Orientation	Strength
a chance	+	High
a small chance	+	Low
no chance	-	High
little chance	-	Low

Table 8.1: Argumentative orientation and strength of x-chance (Verhagen, 2005, 45)

What we can see from these English examples is that if we describe a form, we need to pay attention to the expectations raised by that form. If we do not take this into consideration, 'a small chance' and 'little chance' may look like synonyms, although they have a completely different communicative effect. In other words, the communicative effect or argumentative orientation needs to be part of a description of a form or construction.

As we have seen above, it may be that we do not need to be concerned so much with whether the speaker himself thinks the *πou*-sentence is true, but whether he wants the addressee to believe what he has said, that is, with the argumentative orientation of *πou*. This will be discussed further in section 9.3.2.

In the coming sections, we will find many short references to the domains mentioned in the literature. However, for the sake of clarity, I have decided to provide a

discussion of each domain that was mentioned in the literature in the last chapter, together with a discussion of the frequently cited examples in the literature. Now, we will turn to the actual corpus studies of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, starting with an overview of the corpora used.

8.4 Synchronic and diachronic corpora

For the synchronic collocation analysis of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ the following corpus was used:

- Plato (428-347 BC): a random selection¹³ of his works: Cratylus, Hipparchus, Sophist, Symposium, Parmenides.
- Xenophon (about 430-354 BC) dialogic works: Symposium, Apology, Hiero, Economics, Memorabilia
- Thucydides (460-about 399 BC): *Historiae*
- Xenophon (about 430-354 BC) historiographical works: *Anabasis*, *Hellenica*
- Lysias (about 458-380 BC): all works except fragments
- Isocrates (436-338 BC): all works except fragments

In order to make this corpus diverse in genre and to avoid idiosyncratic properties of specific authors, three genres were taken into the corpus. Each genre is represented by (at least) two different authors: socratic dialogue, historiography and oratory. All texts are from what is called the classical period (480-323 BC). I have chosen to incorporate only Attic prose since the meter may influence collocational behavior and other dialects may have differences in meaning and constructions¹⁴. This corpus contains 617,107 words and 381 instances of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$.

The collocation analysis below was made by searching the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG) for the lemmata $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and $\delta\eta\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in context. The collocations were

¹³In order not to steer the selection of the corpus too much and to make my statistical analyses of the collocations as reliable as possible, I chose a random selection of the works of Plato. This was done as follows. All works of Plato were numbered. A random generator chose five of these numbers from the list. These works were taken into the corpus. At this point I had to decide whether I would use the works with disputed authorship (such as the Hipparchus) and if I would exclude them, I needed to choose which works belong to this category, which, if applied rigorously to all works that have been said to be disputed in recent times, would mean that the total number of works of which the corpus could be drawn, would be quite a bit smaller. I decided to use the disputed works anyway for the following reasons. Although a disputed work may be written somewhat later, it is an example of the genre and it provides an opportunity to avoid idiosyncrasies of Plato and Xenophon, because it would add more variety in the authors. In addition, if a disputed work was part of the random selection, I could check whether the results with respect to these works seemed different from the undisputed works and decide to take another sample if necessary. For the Hipparchus, of which the authorship is generally disputed, this proved not to be the case. In addition, the Hipparchus contains only 7 instances of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, so if there were differences that escaped my notice, it would not have a major influence on our analysis if a possibly later origin affected the use of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ a bit. Therefore, the presence of the Hipparchus in the corpus did not seem to be a problem.

¹⁴In fact, in Herodotus there seems to be a collocation that is not found elsewhere in the classical period, only in late Ionic authors: $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha \pi\omicron\upsilon + \text{quantifier 'about'}$.

noted manually. One of the problems with doing the collocation analysis mechanically, is that Ancient Greek is a language with a very rich morphological system. This means that if we want to determine whether a word occurs regularly in the environment of *πou*, we need to make a morphological analysis of that word. This was done by means of a computer program that did a check for every possible collocation in the Greek morphology file made available by the Perseus project¹⁵. However, this program is not perfect yet and is often not able to distinguish homomorphic forms that may come from different lemmata. Therefore, manual additions and correction continue to be needed.

In chapter 10, I have used the works from the following authors¹⁶:

- Homer (around 750 BC)
- Hesiod (around 700 BC)
- Aeschylus (524-456 BC)
- Sophocles (496-406 BC)
- Euripides (485-406 BC)
- Aristophanes (450-385 BC)

The texts in this corpus are all poetic texts, but they cover several genres: epics, tragedy and comedy. This corpus contains 355 instances of *πou*.

8.5 Methods and choices

In the introduction to this dissertation, I described some of the issues that arose while trying to describe a modal particle in a dead language. The most important problem is the risk of circularity. That is, as a scholar you think you know what a particle does and you start looking in the (social) context for indications that this is indeed the case. Often it is possible to find such indications in the context. However, it would also be possible to find indications in the context for other interpretations of the particle. In short, up to a certain extent it is possible to read into a modal particle whatever attitude you want and the (social) context will provide arguments for that attitude.

In example (13), for instance, we see that one English translator chooses the translation *perhaps*, indicating that the speaker presents his argument as a (conjectural or uncertain) possibility¹⁷ which suggests that he has reasons to think that what he says might not be completely true (i.e. he cannot guarantee its correctness). The other English translator, however, chooses *doubtless*, which according to the Oxford English dictionary has as its weakest sense: *implying that the speaker sees no reason to*

¹⁵<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/>

¹⁶The texts of which we only have fragments were excluded.

¹⁷According to the OED *perhaps* expresses a hypothetical, contingent, conjectural, or uncertain possibility: *it may be (that); maybe, possibly*.

doubt the truth of an opinion or presumption uttered. The German translator has chosen to translate *που* with *wohl*, which expresses, according to the Duden online dictionary, a reinforcement or strengthening. The French translation takes again a different approach, taking *που* as a scalar adverb.

- (13) (τῆ τε γὰρ παρασκευῆ ἐνδεῆς ἐγένετο, ὡσπερ ἴστε, καὶ οὐχὶ ἐς ναυμαχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐπλέομεν· ξυνέβη δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ὀλίγα ἐναντιωθῆναι.)

καὶ	πού	τι	καὶ	ἢ	ἀπειρία	πρῶτον	ναυμαχοῦντας
and	που	somehow	also	the	inexperience	first	fighting on sea
CONJ	που	ADV		PTCL	NOM.SG	NOM.SG	ADV
							PTC.PRS.ACC.PL

ἔσφηλεν.
cause to fall.
3SG.AOR.

English1: (Preparation for it, as you know, there was little enough; and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were largely against us;) and perhaps also inexperience had something to do with our failure in our first naval action.
English2: (For our preparation was deficient, as you know, and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations on land; and it happened, furthermore, that not a few of the chances of war were against us) and doubtless also our inexperience had something to do with our failure at our first sea-fight.

French: (Les préparatifs, vous le savez, ont alors laissé à désirer, et nous étions moins en mer pour un combat que pour un campagne; à cela s'est ajoutée l'intervention du hasard, qui, à bien des égards, a été contre nous.) et, dans une certaine mesure, l'inexpérience, en ce premier combat naval, a contribué à l'échec.

German: (Sie war mangelhaft vorbereitet, wie ihr wißt, da wir gar nicht zur Seeschlacht ausführen, sondern zu einem Feldzug; dazu kam eine Reihe von Zufällen, die gegen uns waren,) und etwas trug wohl auch die mangelnde Erfahrung bei zu diesem Mißerfolg unserer ersten Seeschlacht.

Th. 2.87.2^{18 19}

In order to defend the translation of the first English translator we might argue that the speaker does not want to offend the army by saying too strongly that they were too inexperienced to fight a good battle. The argument in favor of the other English translation may be that by stating strongly that the army was too inexperienced the speaker provides a reason for the defeat that lies out of the control of the soldiers and outside of the realm of cowardice, suggesting that they should not feel

¹⁸Trans.: English 1: Crawley (1910), English 2: (Loeb translation, instead of Perseus translation) Forster Smith (1919), French: Romilly et al. (1953), German: Landmann (1960).

¹⁹Marchant and Wiedemann (1993) say about the use of *που*: καὶ πού τι καὶ—the expression barely does more than suggest the possibility of what was certain.

that it was their personal cowardice that led to the defeat. Both translations and the arguments brought forward to defend them are plausible. However, there is no reason to believe that both interpretations were possible for the Ancient Greeks. This shows that although both lines of reasoning are valid, they advocate two opposite interpretations: hedging versus strengthening. Only knowledge of the conventions and common usage of *που* will allow us to decide on which interpretation probably was chosen by the Greeks.

Although the difference between a locative interpretation and a modal interpretation is much larger than the differences in interpretation found in the previous example, we encounter the same difficulties in the choice between locative and modal *που*. In example (14), for instance, the English and French translators interpret *που* as modal, whereas the German translation chooses a locative interpretation. An argument in favor of a modal interpretation is the presence of *δή*, but the locative dative *Ὀμήρω* ‘in Homer’ is an argument in favor of a locative interpretation.

- (14) ἔστι μὲν γὰρ δήπου καὶ Ὀμήρω
 is ptcl for δήπου ptcl in Homer
 3SG.PRS PTCL PTCL δήπου PTCL DAT.SG
 (γάνυται δέ τ' ἀκούων.)
English: Homer, you remember, has the words, (“He joys to hear;”)
French: On lit en effet, vous le savez, dans Homère:
German: Denn es steht irgendwo bei Homer.

X. *Smp.*8.30.3²⁰

These examples show that we need to be as objective as possible to avoid circular arguments. Therefore, I have chosen to approach the question of the function of *που* from two angles. On the one hand, I will try to find linguistic regularities in the context of *που* and see whether they may shed more light on the function of *που*, just like, for instance, the use of first person pronouns and mental state predicates showed that a *feelings* interpretation of *ergens* was strongly connected to someone’s mental space. On the other hand, I will try to use the translations as interpretations of expert readers which may show us tendencies that are less visible on the level of each individual example. By using these two indicators I will try to avoid circularity as much as possible.

However, translations are not the same as interpretations or even meanings. Languages do not use the same means to express things and sometimes people speaking one language just do not express the same things in the same situations as people speaking another language. In addition, particles often have interactional functions that cannot be expressed in the same implicit way in another language. For that reason, it is common in the literature on particles to describe particles by means of paraphrases. These paraphrases often make the implications of a particle too foregrounded to be used as a translation. This means that to speakers of the language in which the paraphrase is given, the use of the paraphrase often sounds awkward and out of place. This is inherent to the fact that the conventions of their language

²⁰Transl. English: Todd (1922), French: Ollier (1961), German: Bux (1956).

do not use that type of marker in that situation. However, this also implies that not translating a particle may be the best translation in some cases. In other cases, a good translation of the particle would imply a (completely) different type of construction or the conventions of the target language require another form to be added, which is not present in the original. Since translators of classical texts in bilingual editions are often hesitant to move too far away from the original texts, in general they either choose something that fits the context well and is acceptable in the target language or they choose a non-translation.

Summarizing, we may say that it is very difficult to assess the interpretations of a modal particle in a dead language because of the risk of circular arguments. In the following chapters, I have tried to reduce that risk to a minimum by studying the patterns in the linguistic context of $\pi\omicron\nu$ as well as the patterns in the translations of the particle in three different modern languages. The use of three languages makes us less dependent on the peculiarities of the modern languages involved, which may give us more insight into the interpretations of the translators.

CHAPTER 9

The contextual features of Ancient Greek *που* in classical prose (480-323 BC)

9.1 Introduction

The results of the study of the interpretation of *ergens* suggest that the interpretation of the Ancient Greek particle *που* may also have been dependent on certain features of the context. In this chapter, we will try to find the contextual features and constructions that may have played a role in the interpretation of Ancient Greek *που*.

In the corpus study on *ergens* we started out with native speaker intuitions on the interpretation of *ergens*. For Ancient Greek these interpretations are of course not available. Therefore, we will adapt our methodology to what is available. We will study a large part of the transmitted corpus and we will use translations as expert interpretations.¹

Just like Dutch *ergens*, Ancient Greek *που* has a locative interpretation ‘somewhere, anywhere’, as in example (1).

- (1) εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἡ μεγίστη
whether and in the Attica or else που the large
CONJ CO PREP ART.DAT.SG DAT.SG CO ADV που ART.NOM.SG NOM.SG
- ἐορτῇ εἴρητο, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἔτι κατενόησε τό
festival was said nor he again thought about the
NOM.SG 3SG.PLUP.PASS NEG=CONJ NOM.SG ADV 3SG.AOR ART.NOM.SG

¹For a discussion on the drawbacks of translations see page 175.

τε μαντεῖον οὐκ ἐδήλου.
 and oracle not made clear.
 CO NOM.SG NEG 3SG.IMPFF.

Whether the grand festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a question which he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer to solve. Th. 1.126.6²

This interpretation is in many cases uncontroversial. Therefore, we would expect the contextual features of locative πού to be comparable to the contextual features of *ergens*. If this is the case, we may limit ourselves in the remainder of this chapter to the more controversial instances of πού, which generally are the modal instances of the particle. However, we first need to determine what cases are to be interpreted as locative πού.

As I said above, many of the cases of locative πού are uncontroversial, but there are also some more controversial cases. It would be interesting to see whether contextual features could help us to decide on these more controversial cases. In order to make the distinction between controversial and non-controversial instances of locative πού as independent of my personal interpretations as possible, I have taken translations of the the Greek texts in my corpus in three different modern languages: English, French and German. I have taken translations in different languages, because traditions may vary from country to country, as well as the capacity of languages to express certain modalities.³ If all three translations considered an instance of πού to be locative or at least one of the translations did so and the other(s) did not show any indication that they did not interpret πού as locative, I have taken this instance to be uncontroversial. This results in 55 out of 381 (14.4%) instances of uncontroversial locative πού in the corpus.

In 22 out of 381 cases (5.8%) there are both locative and non-locative interpretations in the translations of πού. These cases will be labelled as *controversial*. The other 304 instances of πού in the corpus are translated as modal by at least one translator except for 20 cases out of 381 (5.2%) in which none of the translators translated πού.

²In order to keep the glosses as readable as possible, it is only indicated if a verb is not indicative and active/middle voice. In addition, it is not indicated whether a form is a (personal) (pro)noun. The abbreviations follow the list provided by the *Framework for Descriptive Grammars*-project (Bernard Comrie, William Croft, Christian Lehmann, Dietmar Zaefferer). The English translations are taken from the editions on the Perseus website (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/>) unless indicated otherwise.

³These translations were taken from bilingual academic editions as much as possible. A list of the translations used is given in the *translations* section of the bibliography. For English most translations are taken from the Loeb Classical Library series (except for those cases in which the Loeb edition was not available via Perseus), for French they are from the series from Les Belles Lettres, also called the *éditions Budé*. The German translations are not all from one series, but most translations were from academic bilingual editions. For every translation cited below, the translator will be indicated.

9.2 Controversial and non-controversial locative *που*

In the uncontroversial cases of locative *που*, we find that about 55% of the cases (30 out of 55) behave exactly as we expected on the basis of the contexts of locative *ergens*. In these cases, the only type of markers *που* is combined with frequently are locative adverbs, locative verbs and locative prepositions. In the remaining 45%, though, there are also other types of markers with which *που* is frequently found, for instance conditionals (24 times, 8 of which are also combined with the indefinite pronoun *τις*). This may be an indication that we have to do with another (sub)category. In some of these cases there are also markers of place like locative verbs. The frequent presence of *που* in a conditional clause may of course be a coincidence, therefore we will first see whether these cases also show the same characteristics which we found in the other instances of locative *που*: locative verbs, adverbs and prepositions.

In many cases, we find locative markers (16 out of 24) to be present in the conditional clauses. In this respect, most of these forms can be included in the same group as the other locative cases. This does not mean, however, that the group of instances of *που* in conditional clauses does not show clear patterns/constructions. There are, for instance, 5 instances (out of 24) which contain the verb *δεῖ* 'there is need'. In addition, there are 6 cases with verbs of seeing (*ὁράω*, 1 time *αἰσθάνομαι*), which were considered to be locative verbs. A third group of what can be seen as locative verbs, consists of 4 cases and is characterized by existential *be* (*εἰμί*). We are left with three cases which are not part of one of the patterns described.⁴

Overall, this means that in most cases the interpretation of *που* as locative in a conditional clause may be independent of its use in a conditional clause, because the locative markers already point into a locative direction. The expressions containing *δεῖ* are less clear. In many cases the overall context is compatible with a locative interpretation, which would explain why the translators in some cases agree on a locative interpretation.

However, there are also instances with *δεῖ* that are comparable to the ones about which there is agreement, but which are translated differently by the translators. Because there is not always a direct connection to a location, these cases can often also be interpreted as temporal or as 'somehow', options which were also found in the literature on *που* (for temporal see Ellendt and Genthe (1872), for *somehow* see Slater (1969) and Scolnicov (2003)).⁵ An example is given in (2) below.

The main reason the translators do not translate *που* with *somehow* may be that they do not consider this translation to be an option (this option is not mentioned in Denniston or LSJ). This does not mean that these implications were not there for

⁴Th. 4. 11. 4. 3., Th. 8. 27. 4. 5., X. Ap. 23 9.

⁵Ancient Greek had an adverb/particle *somehow*: *πως* which was related to *πῶς* 'how' in the same way as *που* is related to *ποῦ* 'where'. The use of *πως* seems to be much more like a manner adverb than is the case with the English form *somehow*. According to LSJ it is frequently found with manner adverbs and a short survey of the less than 100 examples in our corpus showed that it is frequently combined with verbs like *be able to* (*οἷος τε εἰμί, δύναμαι, ἔχω + inf.*) or *convince* or other action verbs, also when it is found in conditional clauses. There are some cases, especially with verbs of saying that look a bit like uses of *που*, but in general *πως* is used more a like manner adverb.

the Greeks themselves. However, in order to show that this was the case, we would need clear switch contexts (i.e. contexts in which no other interpretation is possible anymore (Diewald, 2002)).

- (2) καὶ ὅτε εἰρήνη ἦν, ὑμεῖς καὶ χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς τούτων ἐπλεονεκτεῖτε καὶ νῦν τοίνυν ἐπεὶ πόλεμός ἐστιν, ἀξιοῦν δεῖ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους τε τοῦ πλήθους εἶναι καὶ προβουλεύειν τούτων καὶ προπονεῖν,

ἦν που δέη.
if που there was need.
CONJ=PTCL που 3SG.PRS.SUBJ

English: while peace lasted, you had the advantage of them alike in pay and in standing; now, therefore, when a state of war exists, it is right to expect that you should be superior to the common soldiers, and that you should plan for them and toil for them whenever there be need.

French: pendent le temps de paix, vous aviez une solde plus forte, vous jouissiez de plus d'honneurs qu'eux. Aujourd'hui donc que c'est la guerre, c'est aussi pour vous un devoir de l'emporter sur leur multitude, de veiller à leur salut, de vous donner du mal en toute occasion pour eux.

German: Und solange Friede war, empfindet ihr mehr Geld und Ehre als sie, und jetzt also, im Kriege, müßt ihr von euch selber verlangen, daß ihr tapferer seid als die Menge, daß ihr für sie mit Rat und, wenn es not tut, mit der Tat euch einsetzt. X. An. 3.1.38⁶ ⁷

In example (2) we find an example with δεῖ. In these examples there is no direct evidence as to which interpretation is best. It would be possible to interpret που as temporal as is suggested by the English translation, but a *somehow* interpretation is also possible and a locative interpretation cannot be excluded either, because the effect would be almost the same. It does not really matter whether it is at some unspecified time or at an unspecified place that the necessity arises. What is most important is that the situation is not specified. The choice for a temporal or a locative interpretation is purely a matter of convention with respect to whether time or place is seen as the relevant parameter.

If we now look at the corpus as a whole for a moment, we see that the combination of δεῖ and που occurs 15 times in the whole corpus, 8 of which are cases of εἰ, δεῖ and που. Some of these cases are translated as locative and some as modal/temporal. Many of the translators do not translate που at all in these examples, so most of them are not part of the category 'controversial' because there is only one translator that seems to have translated the particle at all.

If we now return to the controversial instances of που we see that just like in the group of uncontroversial instances of που, a large part of the controversial instances of που is found in a conditional clause (10 out of 22, 45%). These clauses also contain locative verbs or verbs that at least may be interpreted as locative, which explains

⁶Trans. English: Brownson and Dillery (1998), French: Masqueray (1930), German: Müri (1954).

⁷For a discussion of this type of conditional see Wakker (1994, 277).

why some translators have chosen a locative translation. What is less clear, is why other translators have chosen a modal interpretation even though locative markers were present. In order to find out why that may have been the case, we first need to find out more on the relation between the context and modern and ancient interpretations of *που*. This will be the topic of section 9.2.1. After that, we will discuss the instances of controversial locative *που* from the perspective of ambiguity and compatibility. At the end of this chapter, after an elaborate study of modal *που*, we will return to controversial locative *που*, to see whether the characteristics of both locative and modal *που* may help in the interpretation of controversial locative *που*.

9.2.1 Ambiguity versus compatibility

Before discussing the controversial examples more elaborately, I will first make a distinction between ambiguity and compatibility. As we will see below, many of the cases of controversial locative *που* allow both for a modal reading and for a locative reading. However, the fact that both readings are possible, does not mean that *που* was ambiguous for a speaker of Greek. I will explain this further.

In example (3), I have given an example in English to explain the distinction between ambiguity and compatibility. The sentence in example (3) both allows for the addition of *somewhere* and for the addition of *surely*. They can even be used at the same time. If we assume that *που* can be translated both with *surely* and with *somewhere*, the choice between these two interpretations may be difficult for the translator, because the sentence is compatible with both interpretations. However, this does not mean that a speaker of Greek, who knew the conventions with respect to *που*, felt both options were available.⁸ This means that examples like (3) are compatible with both a locative and a modal interpretation, but it does not imply that they are ambiguous.

- (3) a. I saw you before
 b. I saw you somewhere before
 c. Surely I saw you before
 d. Surely I saw you somewhere before⁹

However, there are also examples in which the effect of the use of an indefinite expression may imply a modal reading (for an example see the next section below). In these cases, the situation is different. Not only does the sentence allow for both a modal interpretation and a locative interpretation, the modal interpretation also can be seen as an implicature of the locative interpretation. These cases may have been part of the development of the locative use of *που* into its modal use and, as such, may have been ambiguous for the Greeks in some stage of the development.

⁸The results on *ergens* show that speakers of Dutch distinguish very clearly between locative and modal interpretations. Although this cannot be generalized to Greek as such, it may be that the lack of ambiguity in the case of *ergens* is due to a feeling of the speakers that there is too much difference in interpretation between a full fledged modal interpretation and an indefinite locative interpretation. This may have been the same for speakers of Greek.

⁹This example was taken from: <http://elric225.deviantart.com/>.

The reason the difference between ambiguity and compatibility is important is that what we miss in a dead language is precisely the knowledge which we need to distinguish between those two. The only guideline to decide whether an instance of *που* is ambiguous or only compatible with several interpretations is our general competence to make implicatures. This competence is, however, strongly influenced by the conventions of our own language. This means that the fact that some translators translate *που* as locative and others translate it as modal does not yet tell us much about the ambiguity of *που* for the Greeks. It only tells us that these contexts are compatible with the translations chosen by the translators.

In example (4), for instance, the German translation uses both the adverb *wo* ‘where, somewhere’ and the particle *wohl*. This makes it hard to decide which of the two is, according to the translator, the translation of *που*. It may also be that the translator translated *που* twice.

- (4) οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἕν, μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ μήτε
 not thus is που the one, nor in itself nor
 NEG PTCL 3.SG.PRS που ART.NOM.SG NOM.SG, NEGCO PREP DAT.SG NEGCO

ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν.
 in other being in.
 PREP DAT.SG PTC.PRS.NOM.SG.

English: Then the one is not anywhere, neither in itself nor in something else.

French: L’Un n’est donc nulle part, ni en soi, ni en autre que soi.

German: Also ist das Eins wohl gar nicht wo, wenn es weder sich selbst noch einem andern einwohnt.¹⁰ Pl. *Prm.* 138b.¹¹

The other translators choose a locative translation, probably because both the position of *που* after the verb and the locative prepositional phrases suggest that this was to be interpreted as locative. A non-locative reading would result either in an existential reading for *ἐστίν* ‘is’ suggesting that the speaker means that the one does not exist, instead of not being anywhere, because *που* functions as the predicative complement of the copula construction, or the scope of the negation has to be interpreted wider by reading a double negation construction in which the two locative phrases are the predicative complement. Such a double negation is possible in Ancient Greek and the two negations would not cancel each other out, but both the word order and the syntactic construction suggest that the locative phrases may be seen as appositions. However, a modal interpretation cannot be fully excluded, since, as we will see later, the context is typical of the type in which we find modal *που* as well. The results on *ergens*, however, suggest that speakers make a clear choice between interpretations that are so far apart. Therefore, I will assume that an individual speaker of Greek chose between a modal interpretation and a locative one, which would make this an example that is theoretically compatible with both a modal and a locative reading, but was probably not ambiguous for the Greeks.

¹⁰I interpreted *also* as the translation of *ἄρα*.

¹¹Transl.: English: Fowler (1926), French: Diès (1923), German: Schleiermacher and Kurz (1983).

What we can conclude from this digression on ambiguity and compatibility is that we need to be careful in drawing conclusions on the basis of compatibility of a specific context with an interpretation. As was clear from the English example, compatibility with more than one interpretation does not mean that a form was necessarily ambiguous for the Greeks, because they had more specific information about the use of *που* in various contexts. In the remainder of this chapter I will try to find out what this specific information on the use of *που* may have been. This will hopefully allow us to get a better insight in the use of modal *που* and the contextual characteristics that play a role in the choice between the various uses of *που*.

9.2.2 Controversial locative *που*

In the previous section, I mentioned cases in which there may have been an implicature involved. In example (5), for instance, a situation is described in which some part of the army was cut off from the rest of the army, without food.

- (5) *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῖς πόνοις οὐ μόνον ἐμοῦ περιῆν, ἀλλὰ*
 first ptcl ptcl the hardships not only me surpassed, but
 ADV PTCL PTCL ART.DAT.PL DAT.PL NEG ADV GEN.SG 3.SG.IMPF CONJ

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων - ὅπότε ἀναγκασθεῖμεν
 also the other all - when be forced
 PTCL ART.GEN.PL GEN.PL GEN.PL - CONJ 1.PL.AOR.PASS

ἀποληφθέντες που, οἷα δὴ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀσιτεῖν,
 being cut off που, like PTCL to campaign, go without food
 PTC.AOR.PASS.NOM.PL PTCL, CONJ PTCL PREP GEN.SG INF.PRS

English: Well, first of all, he surpassed not me only but every one else in bearing hardships; whenever we were cut off in some place and were compelled, as often in campaigns, to go without food,

French: Quand nos communications étaient coupées en quelque point, comme cela arrive en campagne, et que nous devons rester sans manger, ni l'autre n'égalait son endurance.

German: Erstens also war er bei den Strapazen nicht nur mir überlegen, sondern auch allen anderen – wen wir einmal, wie das auf einen Feldzug ja vorkommt, irgendwie abgeschnitten waren und nichts zu essen hatten,

Pl. *Smp.*219e¹²

In this sentence, *που* is translated as *at some place* (English and French) and as *irgendwie* 'somehow' (German). If one is cut off from the rest of the army one can say that this happened *at a place of which the exact location is not specified*, but one can also interpret that somewhat broader as *in some situation of which the exact circumstances, like the place, are not relevant*. In this sentence, *που* is found directly after the participle and before *οἷα* 'like' instead of in the second position in the clause. This position

¹²Transl.: English: Lamb (1925), French: Robin et al. ([1923] 1989), German: Boll and Buchwald (1969).

before a generalizing element *like* may have contributed to the choice for the translation *irgendwie*, but the position after the verb can also be seen as an argument in favor of a locative interpretation. The *irgendwie* interpretation adds an evaluation of the speaker, which is a reason to call it a modal interpretation. In this example, there may have been a direct connection between the locative interpretation and an inference like the one in the German translation. For this reason, it is possible that such examples were ambiguous between a locative and a more generalizing interpretation like *somehow* at some point in the Greek language.

The previous examples were special either because one translation seemed to express two interpretations of *που*, or because the interpretations given to *που* may be seen as implicatures. However, there are also several examples in which the translators differ in their interpretations of *που* without a clearly implicational relationship between the interpretations.

In the following examples *που* is translated either in a locative way or with something like *by chance*. Contrary to the translation *irgendwie*, the interpretation *by chance* is not indefinite anymore. The interpretation *by chance* implies that one does not have control over the situation.

- (6) ἦν δέ που μορίῳ τινὶ προσμείξωσι, κρατήσαντές τέ
 if and που part some engage with overcoming and
 CONJ=PTCL CO ΠΟΥ DAT.SG DAT.SG 3.PL.AOR.SUBJ, PTC.AOR.NOM.PL CO
- τινας ἡμῶν πάντας ἀχούσιν ἀπεῶσθαι καὶ νικηθέντες ὑφ’
 some of us all boast repel and being defeated by
 ACC.PL GEN.PL ACC.PL 3.PL.PRS INF.PERF CO PTC.AOR.PASS PREP
- ἀπάντων ἡσσησθαι.
 all to be defeated.
 GEN.PL INF.PRS.PASS.

English: But if they *by chance* engage with a division of our forces and defeat a few of us, they boast that they have repulsed us all, and if the victory is ours, they claim that they have been beaten by us all.

French: Mais, ont-ils affaire à une fraction d’entre elles, vainqueurs de quelques-uns des nôtres, ils proclament nous avoir tous repoussés, et, vaincus, avoir été battus par toutes nos troupes.

German: Treffen sie dann *irgendwo* auf einen Splitter und besiegen einige von uns, so prahlen sie, sie hätten uns allen geworfen, und unterliegen sie: sie seien der Gesamtheit gewichen. Th.2.39.3.4.¹³

In example (6), the speaker is explaining how the enemy will claim complete victory if they have defeated a small part of the army and if they are defeated themselves by only a part of the army they will claim that they found the complete army against them. This is quite a general statement on how these things work. The locative interpretation is triggered by the locative implications of *προσμείξωσι* ‘to engage with’.

¹³Transl: English: Forster Smith (1919), French: Romilly et al. (1953) German: Landmann (1960).

However, this verb does not require a locative argument, which makes it possible to interpret πού in another way. This other interpretation may be temporal or modal, but an epistemic interpretation like *perhaps*, as is sometimes proposed for πού, is a bit problematic because the situation described is presented as a hypothetical situation for which some hypothetical behavior of the enemy is predicted.

The relationship of locative *ergens* to the interpretation by *chance* might be seen as follows. If a situation will arise somewhere, it is unclear what the exact circumstances are. Therefore, we may interpret πού as *irgendwie* 'somehow'. However, if one does not know what the exact circumstances are that cause such a situation to arise, one cannot prevent that situation from arising, therefore it may be seen as arising by *chance*. This relation between the locative interpretation of πού and the *by chance* interpretation depends on the *somehow* interpretation. This interpretation is not very commonly used, neither translations nor the descriptions of πού mention it very frequently and the *by chance* interpretation even expands that interpretation further. Therefore, I consider this interpretation a case of a compatible interpretation of which it is unknown whether it was a serious option for the speakers of classical Greek. That is, the context of examples (6) and (7) allow for this interpretation, but there is no direct indication that this interpretation was used instead of a locative interpretation.

- (7) (καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι προσέκειτο τὸ καλὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὄντινα ἴδοιμι καλόν, τούτῳ προσήειν καὶ ἐπειρώμην καταμανθάνειν)

εἶ	πού	ἴδοιμι	προσηρητημένον	τῷ	καλῷ
if	πού	I would see	combined	the	beautiful
CONJ	πού	1SG.AOR.OPT	PTC.PERF.PASS.ACC.SG	ART.DAT.SG	DAT.SG

τὸ	ἀγαθόν.
the	just.
ART.ACC.SG	ACC.SG

English: (And, first, because the epithet 'beautiful' is added to 'good,' I went up to every person I noticed, and tried to discover) whether I could anywhere see goodness in combination with beauty.

French: (Tout d'abord parce que ce mot "bien" se dit du moral et du physique, si je voyais un homme bien de sa personne, je l'abordais et j'essayais de me rendre compte) si par hasard il était aussi "bien" au moral qu'au physique.

German: (Und weil das "Schöner" vor dem "Guten" stand, wendete ich mich zunächst, wenn ich einen Schönen sah, an diesen, und versuchte herauszubekommen,) ob ich irgendwo mit dem Schönen das Gute verbunden sähe.

X. Oec. 6.15.3¹⁴

As we have seen above, the verb *to see* is frequently found with a locative interpretation of πού. However, this verb does not require a locative complement. This

¹⁴Transl.: English: Marchant ([1923] 1968), French: Chantraine (1949), German: Audring (1992).

means that another interpretation is also possible. In example (7), the speaker describes how he tried to test the hypothesis that beauty is connected to goodness. First, the speaker looked to see whether someone was beautiful and then he tried to find out whether the beautiful person combined beauty with goodness. Two translators seem to have taken this location to be metaphoric in the sense that *at some place* (within that person) the beauty was connected to goodness. The French translation took a more interpretative approach by adding *par hasard* ‘by chance’. The context allows for this interpretation, but just like in the previous example, there is no clear reason to believe that this instance was ambiguous, or that *που* was commonly used to express ‘by chance’.

In example (8), the translations differ again in another way. In this example, *που* is translated either as locative, which would be triggered by the verb *to say*, or with ‘if I remember correctly’ (French), and ‘as you know’ (German).

- (8) (Stranger: Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὃ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεζῇ τε ὧδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων—
“οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ, φησὶν, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα: [21 paragraphs])

Stranger: ὅτι ὁ μὲν πού φησιν: (οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο
Stranger: because he που says not for never this
CONJ NOM.SG PTCL που 3.SG.PRS: NEG PTCL NEG NOM.SG.

δαμῆ, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα [...]
be proved, be not being
3.SG.AOR.SUBJ.PASS INF.PRS NEG PTC.PRS.ACC.SG

Theaetetus: λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.)

English: (Stranger: But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse: “Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is; [...21 paragraphs...])

Stranger: Because he [= Parmenides *EK*] says somewhere: (Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is; [...])

Theaetetus: Yes, that is what he says.)

French: Il dit, lui, s’il me souvient:

German: Er sagt doch:

Pl. *Sph.* 237a and 258d.¹⁵

Probably, the reason two of the translators have chosen a non-locative way of translating *που* is that the speaker is citing a phrase from Parmenides which he has cited in the exact same way earlier in the conversation with the addition that the citation is found in both prose and poetry. This means that the interpretation *somewhere* is a bit odd, because somewhat earlier the speaker was apparently still aware that Parmenides had said this several times in different types of texts. For the same reason, most other translations that are commonly given for *που*, like *perhaps*, *I think* seem a

¹⁵Transl.: English: Fowler (1921), French: Diès (1923), German: Schleiermacher (1970).

bit out of place. The French translation seems to have tried to add some sort of uncertainty by suggesting that the speaker may have forgotten the exact formulation. This is probably also triggered by the answer of Theaitetos *Yes, that is what he says.* The German translation chooses a more interactive interpretation. Both interpretations are adjustments to the requirements of the context, but the French translation is not a very common translation, whereas the German translation with the particle *doch* is one of the most frequent German translations given to *που* in this corpus.¹⁶

What we can conclude from these cases of controversial locative *που* is the following. In almost all cases of controversial locative *που* there are some markers available that may trigger a locative interpretation. However, these triggers do not require a locative argument, which makes it possible to interpret *που* in another way (i.e. hypanalysis, Croft, 2000). The instances of controversial locative *που* show a variety of modal translations, which in most cases are either not one of the most common interpretations of modal *που* or do not seem to have any relationship (any-more) to the locative interpretation. This raises the question of whether the translations of *που* really reflect interpretations that were possible for the Greeks and if so, which features of the context allowed them to decide. The features of the context that seemed to play a role in locative *που* have been discussed above. Just as in the case of *ergens*, most (possibly) locative instances of *που* are accompanied by locative adverbs, locative verbs or locative prepositions. It may be that the in depth study of the contextual features of modal *που* will provide the insights necessary to decide on the controversial cases. Therefore, we will come back to this group after discussing modal *που*.

9.3 Modal *που*

9.3.1 Contextual characteristics of modal *που*

In the synchronic corpus, there are 304 (out of 381) instances that are not interpreted by any of the translators as locative. We will now investigate the exact contextual features of these non-locative cases.

The first thing that catches the eye when investigating the direct collocations of non-locative *που* (i.e. the forms that are directly before or after *που*), is that several collocations occur very frequently. Most of them are also mentioned in grammars and dictionaries. The most frequent collocation is the particle *δή* 'evidently'¹⁷, which

¹⁶If we count only those cases in which *doch* o.a. 'you know, of course' (Translation Duden-Oxford dictionary) is the only translation of *που*, it is found in 63 out of 304 non-locative instances of *που*.

¹⁷Denniston (1950, 203-4) describes *δή* in the following way: The essential meaning seems clearly to be 'verily', 'actually', 'indeed'. *δή* denotes that a thing really and truly is so: or that it is very much so. Van Ophuijsen (1993) describes *δή* as an evidential, which can be justified by what is visible, when quoting the words of the interlocutor, when naming something, when referring to the speaker's own words, in self-evident statements and in arguments. According to Sicking, *δή* conveys to the hearer the speaker's suggestion that the two of them share information, in a wider sense including opinions. Wakker (1997a) on the other hand says that *δή* draws special attention to the importance and interest of the proposition presented. In this dissertation I have chosen to treat *δή* as a particle roughly meaning 'evidently', following

occurs next to *πou* in 121 of the 304 non-locative cases of *πou* (40%). Another frequent collocation is with the particle $\tilde{\eta}$ *expressing certainty*¹⁸, which is found directly before *πou* 23 times (7.6% of non-locative *πou*).

Other particles that are frequently found next to *πou* are: $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ *modal particle*, $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ ‘for’, $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ ‘and, but’, $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ *topic marker* and $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ ‘and, also, even’. Since these particles are among the most frequent particles in Greek, this raises the question of whether the combination of *πou* with these particles is not just a result of their position in the clause, since in Ancient Greek most particles are generally found in a concatenation in Wackernagel position.¹⁹

The placement properties of *πou* and Greek particles in general may explain these collocations to a certain extent, but not all Greek particles are on the list of particles that co-occur frequently with *πou*, although we would expect almost all particles to be on this list if this was purely a matter of word order. A particle like $\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ ²⁰, for instance, which occurs 60% less in the corpus than $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ (respectively 2107 times and 5541 times) is not found together with *πou* in this corpus at all, whereas $\mu\acute{\eta}\nu$, which is much rarer than $\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ in the corpus (566 times) co-occurs with *πou* 3 times.²¹ This suggests that there is some reason *πou* occurs with some of these particles and not with others. One way to find out how big the role of placement rules is in the co-occurrence of these particles, is to compare the frequency with which they co-occur with *πou* with their general frequency. If the ratio of the frequencies of the particles in the corpus as a whole is comparable to their ratio together with *πou*, we may consider the cases together with *πou* as a random sample. In table 9.1 below, the frequency of the co-occurrences with *πou* are related to the general frequency of the particle in this corpus.

Van Ophuijsen, because it seemed that that function fitted the contexts best.

¹⁸Denniston (1950, 279) calls $\tilde{\eta}$ an *affirmative particle*, which is essentially followed by Sicking. Wakker (1997b) says that the function of $\tilde{\eta}$ is to express that there is no denying that the proposition is really, undeniably true, whether speaker and addressee like that or not. In contexts with *πou*, $\tilde{\eta}$ is used in inferences and *a fortiori* arguments, which is best compatible with the reading of this particle as affirmative.

¹⁹This is roughly the second position in the clause and it is named after a famous article of Wackernagel on this subject (Wackernagel, 1892). For more information about this position and its exceptions see Goldstein (2010).

²⁰Denniston says that $\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ either expresses actuality or inferentiality. Sicking describes the particle as marking that what precedes is relevant for what follows, i.e. the preceding is often marked as introductory, explanatory or providing background. Wakker (2009) says that in Lysias $\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ indicates that the speaker proceeds to a new important point (thereby having the effect of indirectly characterizing the preceding unit as relevant but subsidiary to or preparatory for what he is going to say now). Bakker (2009), however, shows that there is a large group of examples in which this description of $\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ does not hold. She suggests that $\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ also has another use presenting the utterance as expected.

²¹The reason $\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ is generally not found together with *πou* may be that, as we will see later on, modal *πou* is found in sentences with content which is accessible (i.e. already known or deducible) to the addressee. These sentences are often found in situations in which the speaker is bringing to the foreground some of their common ground in order to be able to refer to it in his argumentation. (For a general discussion of common ground and the function of lexical markers of common ground see Nemo (2007).) This means that *πou* is almost by definition not found in a new important point to which the preceding was preparatory, because the *πou*-clause itself is preparatory.

		% of total number of words in corpus	% of ptcl + <i>που</i> in modal <i>που</i>	p values
δή	'evidently'	0.3% (1589)	39.8% (121)	0*
γάρ	'for, because'	0.9% (5541)	19.7% (60)	2,7E-263*
ἄν ²²	modal ptcl	1.0% (6421)	9.5% (29)	8,1E-48*
μέν	topic marker	1.5% (9200)	8.9% (27)	4,9E-26*
ἦ	affirmative ptcl	0.3% (130)	7.6% (23)	0*
δέ	topic marker/ conjunction	3.1% (18980)	4.6% (14)	0,1**
καί	connector, focus ptcl	5.4% (33113)	5.3% (16)	0,9**
Total number of words in the corpus			617107	
Total number of modal <i>που</i>			304	

Table 9.1: The particles that form a collocation with *που* with their frequencies.

* means significant on the $p < 0.05$ level in a χ^2 test ($df = 1$ for all tests), ** means not significant on the $p < 0.05$ level. The numbers between the brackets are the raw numbers.

In table 9.1 we see that the co-occurrence of δέ 'and' and καί 'and, also, even' with modal *που* is not significant. This is remarkable, since Greek particles, including *που*, tend to be in Wackernagel position and therefore are expected to be found more frequently next to each other than chance.²³ In addition, it is relatively easy to find significant combinations due to the fact that word order is not completely random, which is assumed by a test like this. What is clear is that the collocation of *που* with δή and ἦ are the most unlikely to be due to chance, followed by γάρ 'for' and μέν *topic marker*. Since the total number of instances of ἄν is not reliable, we will leave this particle out of our quantitative discussion for now. The modal particles δή 'evidently' and ἦ *expressing certainty* may be collocated with *που* because they function in the same modal domain as *που*. For the particles γάρ and μέν it is more difficult to determine why they are so frequently found in the direct environment of *που*. We will discuss these issues more elaborately below on page 202. Now we will continue to investigate the other types of forms which are frequently found in the environment of *που*.

Apart from the particles mentioned, there are also other forms that are collocated with modal *που*, such as the adverb πάντως 'certainly', and the pronoun τις.²⁴ In addition, I have studied the finite verbs of *που* clauses. The most frequently found

²²Due to homonymies of other forms with contractions with ἄν (ἦν (εἶ + ἄν) = ἦν he/I was) it is impossible to determine the total number of instances of ἄν in the corpus. Therefore these numbers are probably too low, which means that the chance of ἄν + *που* is probably larger than these numbers suggest. This implies that the co-occurrence with *που* is probably less significant.

²³The particle καί is an exception in that it often occurs in the first position of the clause or before the word over which it has scope. However, in its first position in the clause we would still expect it to be found frequently next to *που*, if other particles, which may be in between καί and *που*, are not taken into account.

²⁴Both are significantly often found directly next to *που*: πάντως, $\chi^2(1) = 2780,4$, $p < 0.0001$ and τις $\chi^2(1) = 3,2$, $p < 0.0001$.

verbs in *που* clauses are the following, most of these verbs occur in all persons, i.e. 1st, 2nd and 3rd:

- copula (69 out of 304, of which 35 with a subjective adjective and 34 without a subjective predicative complement)
- verbs of knowing (γινώσκω (6), οἶδα (10), ἐπίσταμαι (3))
- verbs of speaking (λέγω (16) φημί (10), καλέω (7))
- modal verbs like δεῖ ‘there is need, must’ (9) and φαίνω ‘seem’ (5).

The next question is what these characteristics of the context tell us about *που*. We will investigate whether the translations of *που* differ depending on the collocation with which *που* is combined. We will start with the particle combinations δὴ *που* and ἦ *που* and compare them. In addition, we will compare the translations of δὴ *που* and ἦ *που* with the translations of the other instances of modal *που*.

δὴ <i>που</i>					
English		French		German	
surely	32	[no transl.]	18	doch wohl	24
[no transl.]	14	certes	10	[no transl.]	23
I presume	12	assurément	8	doch	16
of course	11	évidemment	8	sicherlich	9
you know	7	n'est-il pas vrai?	8	wohl	6
I suppose	6	à coup sûr	7	bekanntlich	4
as you know	5	sans doute	7	ja	4
I take it	4	n'est-ce pas	4	ohne Zweifel	3
I imagine	3	j'imagine	3	doch sicherlich	2
certainly	2	je suppose	3	gewiss	2
Total number of instances of δὴ <i>που</i> : 121					

Table 9.2: The top ten most frequent translations of δὴ *που* in English, French and German.²⁵ NB. This table is to be read vertically, since not all instances of δὴ *που* were systematically translated in the same way for each modern language.

From table 9.2, we can see that the most frequent translations of δὴ *που* are: English: *surely*, *I presume*, *of course*, French: *certes*, *assurément*, *évidemment*, *n'est-il pas vrai?* and in German *doch wohl*, *doch*, *sicherlich*. The dictionary entries of the most frequent translations are given below.

Surely: a) Certainly, assuredly, undoubtedly. Often with less emphasis, as a mere intensive: Truly, verily, indeed.

²⁵For the translations used see the *Translations* section of the bibliography.

b) Used to express a strong belief in the statement, on the basis of experience or probability, but without absolute proof, or as implying a readiness to maintain it against imaginary or possible denial: = as may be confidently supposed; as must be the case; may not one be sure that...? (The chief current sense.)

Oxford English Dictionary, online version March 2012.²⁶

Certes: Marque une affirmation ou souligne une opposition
Marks an affirmation or underlines an opposition

Larousse online

Doch: a) gibt einer Frage, Aussage, Aufforderung oder einem Wunsch eine gewisse Nachdrücklichkeit
Gives a question, statement, (strong) request or wish a certain emphasis
 b) drückt in Ausrufesätzen Entrüstung, Unmut oder Verwunderung aus
expresses in exclamation sentences indignation, irritation or surprise
wohl: drückt in Aussage- und Aufforderungssätzen eine Bekräftigung, Verstärkung aus
expresses in statements and (strong) requests a reinforcement, strengthening
 c) drückt in Fragesätzen die Hoffnung des Sprechers auf eine Zustimmung aus
expresses in questions the hope of the speaker that the addressee will give his approval

Duden online²⁷

These dictionary entries show that there are some regularities in the translations that are chosen δὴ *πou*. The common denominator seems to be that all translations have a positive argumentative orientation. That is, all translations have as their common effect that they invite the addressee to accept the statement as true.

The translations of ἤ *πou* are given in table 9.3. The most frequent translations are English: *surely*, French: *à plus forte raison* 'the more reason there is to', German: *doch, geschweige denn, gewiss, wahrlich*. The translations of ἤ *πou* are comparable to the translations of δὴ *πou* in that they seem to express a positive argumentation. However, they differ in one respect. In the translations of ἤ *πou*, we find many comparison related translations like *à plus forte raison*, 'the more reason there is to', *geschweige denn* 'let alone' and *much less, much more surely*. This suggests that many of the examples involve comparisons of the *a fortiori* type. This is also noted by Denniston (1950, 281-2) and a look at these examples shows that they are for the major part construed

²⁶For a more extensive discussion of the values of *surely* see Downing (2006) and Simon-Vandenberg and Aijmer (2007) and for a more historical perspective see Traugott (2012).

²⁷The Duden-Oxford German-English dictionary translates *doch* in statements as *you know, why (certainly), of course*. For an in depth discussion of German *doch* see Pittner (2007) and for a comparison with Dutch *toch* see Foalen (2006).

		$\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$			
English		French		German	
surely	12	à plus forte raison	12	doch	2
much less	2	[no transl.]	4	geschweige denn	2
certainly	1	?vraiment	1	gewiss	2
depend upon it	1	à coup sûr	1	wahrlich	2
I imagine	1	combien...	1	doch gewiss	1
may be sure	1	en bien??	1	doch wahrlich	1
much more surely	1	question	1	doch wohl	1
of course	1	sans doute	1	ja wohl	1
verily	1	soyez-en sûrs	1	sicher	1
?how, pray	1	—	—	sicherlich	1
Total number of instances of $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$: 23					

Table 9.3: The top ten most frequent translations of $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in English, French and German.²⁸ NB. This table is to be read vertically, since not all instances of $\delta\eta$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ were systematically translated in the same way for each modern language.

as [conditional clause] $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ Since this use of $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ is only very rarely found with $\tilde{\eta}$ alone (and never in this corpus) and in almost all cases some form of conditionality seems to be present, we may assume that the combination [conditional clause] $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$... was a conventional way of expressing an *a fortiori* effect in Greek.

We may conclude that the difference between the translations of $\delta\eta$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ seems to be that $\delta\eta$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ directs the addressee towards agreement, possibly in some emphatic way, whereas $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ feels much more at home in comparisons with a reinforcing character.

Now we will compare the translations of $\delta\eta$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ with the translations of other instances of modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. Are the translations of $\delta\eta$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ fundamentally different from the other interpretations of modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, or are the translations of these frequent collocations closely connected to the translations of the other instances of modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$?

The translations of modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ excluding $\delta\eta$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ show a much larger incidence of non-translations than was the case for $\delta\eta$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. The most frequent translations (English: *I suppose, I think, you know*, French: *j'imagine, sans doute, je crois*, German: *doch, wohl, doch wohl*) still have a positive argumentative orientation, as can be seen from the dictionary descriptions below (the German translations are the same as the translations of $\delta\eta$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and $\tilde{\eta}$ $\pi\omicron\upsilon$).

²⁸For the translations used see the *Translations* section of the bibliography.

		The other cases of modal <i>που</i>			
English		French		German	
[no transl.]	105	[no transl.]	55	[no transl.]	63
I suppose	6	j'imagine	20	doch	44
I think	4	sans doute	12	wohl	18
you know	4	je crois	9	doch wohl	6
I presume	3	en somme	8	ja	3
surely	3	n'est-ce pas?	7	doch irgendwie	2
may	2	peut-on dire	7	ja wohl	2
no doubt	2	en quelque façon	2	vermutlich	1
of course	2	je pense	2	doch auch	1
why	2	peut-être	2	gewiss	1

Total number of instances of modal *που* without *δή* and *ἤ*: 160

Table 9.4: The top ten most frequent translations of modal *που* without *δή* and *ἤ* in English, French and German.²⁹ NB. This table is to be read vertically, since not all instances of *που* were systematically translated in the same way for each modern language.

I suppose: To entertain as an idea or notion sufficiently probable to be practically assumed as true, or to be at least admitted as possibly true, on account of consistency with the known facts of the case; to infer hypothetically; to incline to think: sometimes implying mistaken belief.

Oxford English Dictionary

j'imagine: je suppose, je présume 'I suppose, I presume'
 sans doute: probablement, selon toute vraisemblance 'probably, there is every appearance that'.

Larousse online Français²⁹

The most frequent translations of modal *που* (without *ἤ* or *δή*) were also present in the top ten translations of *δή που* and *ἤ που*. This suggests that the contextual features of modal *που* are not fundamentally different from the ones that are in the context of *δή που* and *ἤ που*, because they all are translated with forms expressing a positive argumentative orientation.

9.3.2 Argumentative orientation and argumentative strength

It is a common habit of people across languages to use markers of certainty more frequently than is justified on the basis of the situation at hand. In other words, people tend to exaggerate (e.g. Millward, 1989, 205). As a result, markers of certainty

²⁹j'imagine: <http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/imaginer/41619/locution>, sans doute: <http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/sans%20doute>.

³⁰For the translations used see the *Translations* section of the bibliography.

tend to weaken with respect to their argumentative strength over time and they frequently express a lower level of certainty than would be expected on the basis of their compositional literal meaning. For instance, in modern French, the expression *sans doute* (lit. ‘without doubt’) is often more comparable to English *probably* than to *without (any) doubt* (Simon-Vandenberg and Aijmer, 2007; Simon-Vandenberg, 2007). However, in older French and in certain contexts it is still used with the original meaning of *certainly*. Many of the French translations used are made early in the twentieth century and are written in an archaic style. This means that the exact intention of the translator is difficult to assess. However, *sans doute* still has a positive argumentative orientation in its modern use and in some translations of *που*, we even find *sans aucun doute* ‘without any doubt at all’. This last reinforcement is now commonly used to make sure the interpretation is stronger than *probably*.

By saying that a marker like *sans doute* is less strong, but still has a positive argumentative orientation, we have made a difference between argumentative orientation and argumentative strength, as was explained in the previous chapter. The question we will try to answer in the following discussion is whether there are reasons to think that *που* may have had a positive orientation.

The most frequently used translations of *που* all showed a positive argumentative orientation, although they did not all have the full argumentative strength. Many of the translations suggest that the belief of the speaker in the proposition is based on a mental construct, for instance argumentation or experience, rather than just objective facts. This is for example the case with the translations *I suppose* and *à plus forte raison*.

Another reason to assume that *που* has a positive argumentative orientation is that verbs of knowing are frequently present in *που* sentences. An example is given in (9). Verbs of knowing have a positive argumentative orientation since they generally assume that the knowledge described is either shared by others or consists of irrefutable facts (Sanders, 1994, 24). Verbs of knowing occur with *δή που* and the other instances of modal *που*, but not with *ἢ που*. This may be due to the frequent presence of *a fortiori* arguments in *ἢ που* sentences. In the next section we will elaborate on the implications of the frequent combination of *που* with verbs of knowing.

- (9) (ἀλλ' ὅμως σύ με φής, ὦ Μέλητε, τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύοντα τοὺς νέους διαφθείρειν;)

καίτοι ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν δῆπου τίνες εἰσὶ νέων
 yet we know δῆπου which are of the youth
 CONJ 1PL.PRS PTCL δῆπου INT.NOM.PL 3PL.PRS GEN.PL

διαφθοραί·
 temptations.
 NOM.PL

(σὺ δὲ εἶπὲ εἴ τινα οἴσθα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γεγενημένον ἢ ἐξ εὐσεβοῦς ἀνόσιον ἢ ἐκ σώφρονος ὑβριστὴν ἢ ἐξ εὐδαιίτου πολυδάπανον ἢ [ὡς] ἐκ μετριοπότου οἰνόφλυγα ἢ ἐκ φιλοπόνου μαλακὸν ἢ ἄλλης πονηρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἠττημένον.)

English: (But in spite of all, Meletus, do you maintain that I corrupt the young by such practices?) And yet surely we know what kinds of corruption affect the young; (so you tell us whether you know of any one who under my influence has fallen from piety into impiety, or from sober into wanton conduct, or from moderation in living into extravagance, or from temperate drinking into sottishness, or from strenuousness into effeminacy, or has been overcome of any other base pleasure.)

French: Nous savons bien pourtant, n'est-ce pas?, comment sont les jeunes gens corrompus.

German: Und doch wissen wir, welches die Verführungen der Jugend sind!

X. Ap. 19.3³¹

As we saw in the discussion of the concept of argumentative orientation as described by Verhagen (2005), one of the indications for the effect of a form on the addressee is the types of answers it invites and actually receives. In those cases in which *που* is found in dialogue (i.e. in some parts of the works of Plato and Xenophon), we see that the reactions to *που* clauses always agree with the speaker and in many cases contain extremely positive reactions (see for instance the answer Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; in example (14) on page 197 below). However, we not only find *που* in sentences that are reacted to, but also in answers together with other markers that have a positive argumentative orientation like πάντως ‘certainly, in all respects’ (which occurs 6 times together with *που* in this corpus) and δὴ *modal particle* as in example (10) below.

- (10) (Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ἤδη οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καλλίονες ἂν τῶν σῶν εἴησαν. Πῶς δὴ; Ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ’ εὐθὺ μόνον ὀρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιοι (5) εἶναι. Λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, καρκίνον εὐοφθαλμότατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων;)

Πάντως δὴπου, ἔφη.
Certainly, of course, he said.
ADV δὴ που 3SG.IMP

ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς ἰσχὺν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄριστα πεφυκότας ἔχει.

English: “In that case, it would appear without further ado that my eyes are finer ones than yours.” “How so?” “Because, while yours see only straight ahead, mine, by bulging out as they do, see also to the sides.” Crit. “Do you mean to say that a crab is better equipped visually than any other creature?” Soc. “Absolutely; for its eyes are also better set to insure strength.”

French: A ce compte, mes yeux seraient déjà plus beaux que les tiens. - Comment donc cela? - C’est que tes yeux voient seulement droit devant eux, tandis que les miens voient aussi à coté puisqu’ils sont à fleur de tête. - Alors, d’après toi, de tous les animaux c’est l’écrevisse qui a les plus beaux yeux? - Assurément; car ses yeux sont aussi les plus puissants.

German: Behauptest du damit, fiel er ein, daß also der Krebs unter den Tieren

³¹Transl. English: Todd (1922), French: Ollier (1961), German: Bux (1956).

die schönsten Augen besitzt? Freilich, ganz gewiß, antwortete Sokrates, da er auch hinsichtlich der Schärfe ganz ausgezeichnet gewachsene Augen besitzt.

X. Smp. 5.5.7³²

In example (10), Socrates is confirming an inference on the basis of his own statement. This means that the addressee expects Socrates to agree and since Critias has made the right inference, Socrates can wholeheartedly agree, using two markers with a positive orientation together with *που*, followed by a short summary of why he thinks that is the case. This agreement is translated by all translators with markers with a strong positive orientation like *absolutely, ganz gewiß, assurément*.

We may conclude that both the translations of modal *που* and its contextual characteristics suggest that *που* has a positive orientation, although it may be that just like in the case of French *sans doute* it does not always have its maximum strength.

9.3.3 Accessible information in *που*-clauses

As we saw above, we frequently find factive verbs of knowing in *δή που* sentences and the other modal instances of *που*. One of the characteristics of verbs of knowing is their factivity. That is, the complement of a verb of knowing is considered to be a fact or generally held belief. Consider, for instance, the following examples:

- (11) a. I don't think he was ill yesterday. -> He was probably not ill.
 b. I think he was ill yesterday -> He may have been ill.
- (12) a. I didn't know he was ill -> it is considered a fact that he was ill.
 b. I know he was ill -> it is considered a fact that he was ill.

The complement of verbs of knowing is always considered to be a fact or commonly held belief (as in cases like 'I know that is wrong'), even if the matrix clause is negated. This implies that when a speaker is using a verb of knowing, the addressee is supposed to accept the information that is given as a fact or share the moral values. Verbs of knowing in *που*-clauses also occur in the first person plural. This is another indication that the content of the matrix clause is presented as shared.

The references to shared information by verbs of knowing and the descriptions and translations of *δή που* raise the question as to whether it is only in sentences with verbs of knowing and *δή που* that shared information or irrefutable facts are found in the context of *που* or that this is a more general feature of the contexts in which modal *που* is found. The latter is suggested by the following translations of *που* in sentences without verbs of knowing: *you know, as you know, as everybody knows, tu le sais, vous le savez, wisst ihr wohl, bekanntlich, selbstverständlich, of course, natürlich, bien sûr*. Most of these examples are cases of *δή που*, but not all of them. There are 12 instances in which *που* is translated with one of the translations above in which *δή* is not present. This suggests that the interpretation of *που* as *this information is generally known/ accessible to (the speaker and) the addressee* is not limited either to the

³²Transl.: English: Todd (1922), French: Ollier (1961), German: Bux (1956).

combination with verbs of knowing or to the collocation with *δή που*. Therefore, it may be connected to (the contextual characteristics of) modal *που* itself. Examples of the sentences in which these translations were chosen are given in examples (13) (*δήπου*) to (15) below (the last two examples are cases without *δή*).

- (13) ἄ δ' αὖ εἶπεν ὡς ἐγὼ εἶμι οἷος ἀεὶ ποτε μεταβάλλεσθαι, κατανοήσατε καὶ ταῦτα.

τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτείαν
 the for in favor of the fourhundred government
 ART.ACC.SG PTCL PTCL PREP ART.GEN.PL GEN.PL ACC.SG

καὶ αὐτὸς *δήπου* ὁ δῆμος ἐψηφίσατο,
 even itself *δήπου* the people voted,
 PTCL NOM.SG *δήπου* ART.NOM.SG NOM.SG 3.SG.AOR

διδασκόμενος ὡς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πάση πολιτείᾳ μᾶλλον ἂν ἢ δημοκρατίᾳ πιστεύσειαν.

English: Again, as to his statement that I have a propensity to be always changing sides, consider these facts also: it was the people itself, as everybody knows, which voted for the government of the Four Hundred, being advised that the Lacedaemonians would trust any form of government sooner than a democracy.

French: Autre propos: je suis homme à changer sans cesse d'opinion; sur quoi je vous prie de considérer ceci: le régime des Quatre-Cents a été, à coup sûr voté, par le peuple lui-même, qui était informé que les Lacédémoniens se fieraient à n'importe quel gouvernement qu'à la démocratie.

German: Zu dem weiteren Punkt aus Kritias' Rede, daß ich ein Mensch bin von der Art, die beständig ihre Gesinnung wechselt, so bedenkt auch dieses: über die Verfassung unter den Vierhundert hat bekanntlich das Volk selbst abgestimmt, da es davon unterrichtet war, daß die Lakedaimonier jeder anderen Regierungsform eher vertrauen würden als einer Demokratie.

X. HG. 2.3.45³³

The reason translations like *as everybody knows* and *bekanntlich* fit the context in example (13) so well, is that the addressees are only reminded of these recent historical facts, which they are supposed to know. This gives them their persuasive argumentative strength as arguments. This fragment is part of a defense speech. Therefore, it is important for the speaker to present his arguments as historical facts which are known to everyone.

- (14) ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὄνομα αὐτῆς οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν δι' ὃ κεῖται. ΕΡΜ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. “Παλλάδα” *που* αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν.
 Pallas *που* her we call.
 ACC.SG *που* ACC.SG 1PL.PRS.

³³Transl.: English: Brownson (1918), French: Hatzfeld (1936-1939), German: Strasburger (1970).

EPM. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

English: Socrates: It is easy to tell the reason of one of her two names. Hermogenes: What name? Socrates: We call her Pallas, you know. Hermogenes: Yes, of course.

French: Socrate: L'autre nom de la déesse, il n'est pas difficile d'en dire la raison. Hermogène: Lequel? Socrate: C'est Pallas, n'est-ce pas?, que nous l'appelons. Hermogène: Évidemment.

German: Sokrates: Vom anderen Namen, den die Göttin trägt, ist es nicht schwer, den Grund anzugeben. Hermogenes: Von was für einem? Sokrates: Wir nennen sie doch auch 'Pallas'? Hermogenes: Ohne Zweifel.

Pl. *Cra.* 406d³⁴

Example (14), which was also mentioned above, is an example without δῆ, showing that this type of interpretation is also found for που itself. Socrates just went a bit too fast for Hermogenes, who then asks to what second name he is referring. Socrates realizes that the term *second name* is perhaps too abstract a reference and reminds his interlocutor that Athena is also called Pallas. This is common knowledge as can be seen for instance from the use of a generalizing first person plural verb. However, just saying that we call her Pallas may imply that Socrates thinks his addressee does not know enough Greek or that he is very stupid. One way to cancel this inference is to express that he is aware that the content of his statement is already known to his addressee. This is exactly what is marked by the English translation *you know* and the German translation *doch*. The French tag-question *n'est-ce pas?* after a statement also indicates that the speaker assumes that the addressee already has access to this information. That this is shared information is also clear from the answer Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 'yes of course' (lit. For how not?).

(15) καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα: οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει. Πῶς;

Στρογγύλον	γέ	πού	ἔστι	τοῦτο	οὔ	ἄν	τὰ
round	ptcl	που	is	this	of which	ptcl	the
NOM.SG		FOC.PTCL	που	3SG.PRS	NOM.SG	REL.GEN.SG	PTCL NOM.PL

ἔσχατα	πανταχῇ	ἀπὸ	τοῦ	μέσου	ἴσον	ἀπέχη.
extremes	everywhere	from the		middle	equally	be away from.
NOM.PL	ADV	PREP	ART.GEN.SG	GEN.SG	ADV	3SG.PRS.SUBJ.

Ναί.

English: (And it is without form, for it partakes neither of the round nor of the straight. "How so?") "The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the center." "Yes."

French: —Pourquoi? —Cela, sans doute, est rond, dont les extrémités sont partout à égale distance du centre. —Oui.

German: —Wieso? —Rund ist doch wohl das, dessen Enden überall von der

³⁴Transl.: English: Fowler (1926), French: Méridier (1931), German: Gigon and Rufener (1912-1998).

Mitte gleich weit abstehen? – Ja.

Pl. *Prm.* 137e³⁵

In example (15) we see the same pattern. One of the interlocutors has just jumped to a conclusion. The addressee does not understand how their discussion about the One is related to straight lines and circles and asks for clarification. The speaker knows that in order to let his interlocutor follow his argument, he has to get back to something which is part of their common ground. In order to do so, he recalls the definition of a circle, a mathematical object which is generally known. This way, he can refer to that definition in his explanation. However, he does not want his addressee to think that he assumes that this definition is unknown to him, because that would imply that he thinks his addressee is stupid. Therefore, he marks the fact that this is common ground by means of *που*. This way, he lets his addressee know that he is aware that this is already part of their common ground, which makes sure the addressee will not draw the wrong conclusions. The *που*-statement does not contain subjective information, but only a factual and non-controversial description. Therefore, this sentence allows for an interpretation of *που* (without *δή*) as shared information. In the English translation, this is marked by the translation with *of course*, in German we find *doch wohl*, in which *doch* marks the sharedness of the information.

Another large group of verbs frequently found with *που* were the verbs of saying. Some of these examples are in the first person singular. This use of the first person singular with *που* is interesting, since one is supposed to know what one just said or is going to say. This implies that modal markers which mark uncertainty generally do not occur with first person singular verbs or the use with a first person pronoun results in a different interpretation. I will give three examples in which *που* is combined with a first person singular or plural. Two of these examples are cases of *που* and one is a case of *δή που*.

- (16) (ΞΕ. Τρίτον τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτήσομαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.)

ΞΕ. Εἶπόν που νυνδὴ λέγων
I said που just now saying
1SG.AOR ΠΟΥ PTCL PTC.PRS.NOM.SG

(ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτ' ἔλεγχον αἰεὶ τε ἀπειρηκῶς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.)

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶπες.)

English(Stranger: Then I have a third little request to make of you.

Theaetetus: You have only to utter it.)

Stranger: I said a while ago (that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

Theaetetus: Yes, so you did.)

French: J'ai avoué, je crois, tout à l'heure, d'une façon expresse, (qu'une telle réfutation a toujours dépassé mes forces et les dépasse assurément encore.)

³⁵Transl.: English: Fowler (1926), French: Diès (1923), German: Schleiermacher and Kurz (1983).

German: Stranger: Ich sagte doch eben (daß ich von dieser Widerlegung schon immer habe ablassen müssen, und so auch jetzt.)

Pl. *Sph.* 242a

In example (16), the speaker is reminding the addressee of something he said before, which is acknowledged by the addressee. This implies that the fact that the speaker said it is shared information. In the German translation this is marked with *doch*. The previously uttered sentence to which the speaker refers contained information about his personal stance. This makes it unlikely that he is now suggesting he is not sure that this is what his stance was, because stance taking is often what a conversation is about (Du Bois, 2007).

In example (17), (an example with *δή*) the speaker, a stranger, is describing a general habit of people by means of a generalizing first person plural.

- (17) (ΞΕ. Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν.) ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ.

ΞΕ. Λέγωμεν ἄνθρωπον δήπου πόλλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες,
we say man δήπου many things naming
1PL.PRS ACC.SG δήπου ACC.PL ACC.PL PTC.PRS.NOM.PL

(τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα, καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἕκαστο ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.)

English: (Stranger: Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names. Theaetetus: What, for instance? Please give an example.) Stranger: We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; (we attribute to him colors and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names. Theaetetus: True.)

French: L'étranger — Expliquons donc comment il se peut faire que nous désignons une seule et même chose par une pluralité de noms. Théétète:— As-tu un exemple? Donne-le. L'étranger:—Nous énonçons "l'homme", tu le sais, en lui appliquant de multiples dénominations. Nous lui attribuons couleurs, formes, grandeurs, vices et vertus; en toutes ces attributions, comme en des milliers d'autres, ce n'est point seulement homme que nous l'affirmons être, mais encore bon, et autres qualifications en nombre illimité. C'est ainsi pour tous autres objets: nous ne posons, également, chacun d'eux comme un que pour le dire aussitôt multiple et le désigner par une multiplicité de noms. Théétète —Tu dis vrai.

German: Fremder: Erklären wir denn auf welche Weise wir doch jedesmahl eine und dieselbe Sache mit vielen Namen benennen. Theaitetos: Wie was

doch? Gib mir ein Beispiel. Fremder: Wir sagen doch von einem Menschen gar vielerlei, indem wir ihn danach benennen, wenn wir ihm Farbe beilegen und Gestalt und Größe, auch Fehler und Tugenden, in welchen hunderttausend anderen Fällen wir denn nicht nur sagen, daß er ein Mensch ist, sondern auch, daß er gut ist, und unzähliges andere, ebenso verhält es sich mit allen anderen Dingen, daß wir jedes als Eins setzen, und hernach doch wieder vieles davon sagen, mit vielerlei Benennungen erklären durch vielerlei Worte. Theaitetos: Wahr gesprochen.

Pl. *Sph.* 251a³⁶

Since the description of the way people speak in example (17) is an everyday fact of life, it is of course known to Theaitetus. This is also expressed by the use of a generalizing first person plural (we = people in general). This is probably why the translators use translations like *you know*, *tu le sais*, *doch*.

In example (18) below, Socrates is telling Eryximachus why his proposal to discuss love-matters will not be rejected.

(18) Οὐδεὶς σοι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἐναντία ψηφιεῖται.

οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐγὼ ἀποφήσαιμι,
nor for ptcl που I am able to reject
NEG=CONJ CO PTCL ΠΟΥ NOM.SG 1SG.AOR.OPT

ὃς οὐδέν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά,
English “No one, Eryximachus,” said Socrates, “will vote against you: I do not see how I could myself decline, when I set up to understand nothing but love-matters;

French: Personne, dit Socrate, ne votera contre ta proposition, Éryximaque! Elle n’a chance d’être combattue, ni sans doute par moi, qui assure ne rien savoir d’autre que ce qui a trait à l’amour;

German: Niemand, Eryximachos, habe Sokrates gesagt, wird gegen dich stimmen. Denn weder könnte wohl ich selbst es ablehnen, der ich, offen gesagt, mich nur in der Welt des Eros auskenne.

Pl. *Smp.* 177d³⁷

Example (18) is again an example of *που* without *δή*. Both the use of *γάρ* ‘for’ as a causal connective and the use of the first person contribute to the impression that what is said is known to both the speaker and the addressee. The causal connective implies that the conclusions that have just been stated are true according to the speaker. He will give the reason they are true in the *γάρ* sentence. This implies that the statement made in the causal sentence is also true according to the speaker. In addition, the speaker uses his own generally known behavior (saying that he does not know anything but love-matters) as an argument. Therefore, the speaker presents it as very implausible, both for himself and for Erymachus, who knows these facts as

³⁶Transl.: English: Fowler (1921), French: Diès (1923), German: Schleiermacher (1970).

³⁷Transl.: English: Lamb (1925), French: Robin et al. ([1923] 1989), German: Boll and Buchwald (1969).

well and is therefore able to follow the same line of reasoning, that he would vote against Erymachus. This explains translations like *I do not see how, sans doute, wohl*.

A frequent collocation which was mentioned above, but not yet discussed is the direct collocation of *που* with *γάρ* ‘for, because’, a particle which is almost exclusively found in Wackernagel position. As we saw in example (18) for *που*, statements which contain accessible information can be used as explanation for a situation or statement. This may be an explanation for the frequent use of *γάρ* with *δή που* (34 out of 60 instances of *γάρ που*). Apart from this last collocation, *γάρ που* is also regularly found with verbs of saying and mental state predicates (respectively 6 times and 4 times). These three characteristics can account for 44 out of 60 instances of *γάρ που*.

Since example (18) was an example of *γάρ που* without *δή*, I will now give an example with *δή* as well. In example (19), an opinion is explained by what seems to be an almost redundant line of reasoning. This means that the speaker presents his view as evident and therefore shared by everyone. This is expressed by the translations *evidemment* and *sicherlich wird doch*.

- (19) τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἐνεργαζομένους πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν μὴ τοῖς μαθηταῖς μάλιστα πιστεῦειν;

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ που περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄντες
not for δή που with respect to the others being
NEG PTCL PTCL ΠΟΥ PREP ART.ACC.PL ACC.PL PTC.PRS.NOM.PL

καλοὶ κάγαθοι καὶ δίκαιοι περὶ τούτους
good and just and righteous with respect to them
NOM.PL CO=NOM.PL CO NOM.PL PREP ACC.PL

ἐξαμαρτήσονται δι’ οὓς τοιοῦτοι γέγονασιν.
will be acted unjustly upon because of whom such they have become
3PL.FUT PREP REL NOM.PL 3.PL.PERF.

English: But men who inculcate virtue and sobriety—is it not absurd if they do not trust in their own students before all others? For it is not to be supposed that men who are honorable and just-dealing with others will be dishonest with the very preceptors who have made them what they are.

French: Mais n’est-il pas illogique que ceux qui inculquent aux autres la vertu et la sagesse n’aient pas la plus grande confiance dans leur disciples? Evidemment ceux-ci s’ils sont honnêtes et justes envers les autres, ne commettront pas de faute à l’égard de ceux grâce auxquels ils ont acquis tout cela,

German: Sicherlich wird doch, wer anderen gegenüber edel und gerecht ist, sich nicht gegen den verfehlen, dem er diese Eigenschaften zu verdanken hat!

Isoc. 13.6.6³⁸

These examples show that *που* may well have had the function of marking that the speaker believes the content of the *που*-clause to be accessible, either because it is part of his knowledge of the world, which includes commonly held values, or because it can be deduced from known information. The function of *που* to mark accessibility may of course also be used for rhetorical purposes. In the following example from Thucydides, a general is trying to calm his soldiers, who are on the verge of mutiny. They have convinced themselves that their general will, once they are in the ships, not bring them home, but to a new battle field. The general follows this line of reasoning in order to show that they do not need to fear that he will deceive the army, because if the army finds out that they have been deceived, they will murder him.

- (20) (ποιῶ δ' ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατηθέντας καὶ γοητευθέντας ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἤκειν εἰς Φάσιν· καὶ δὴ ἀποβαίνομεν εἰς τὴν χώραν·)

γνώσεσθε δῆπου ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἐστέ·
 you will know δῆπου that not in the Greece you are;
 2PL.FUT δῆπου CONJ NEG PREP DAT.SG DAT.SG 2PL.PRS;

(καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἔσομαι ὁ ἐξηπατηκῶς εἷς, ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἐξηπατημένοι ἐγγὺς μυρίων ἔχοντες ὅπλα.)

English: (But suppose you have been deceived and bewitched by me and we have come to the Phasis; we accordingly disembark upon the shore;) you will perceive, likely enough, that you are not in Greece; (and I, who have done the deceiving, will be one lone man, while you, the deceived, will be close to ten thousand, with arms in your hands. Then how could a man bring down punishment upon himself more surely than by planning in that way for himself and for you?)

French: Nous débarquons donc dans le pays. Vous vous apercevrez bien, je pense, que vous n'êtes pas en Grèce.

German: Nun gut, ich bringe es dazu, daß ihr, von mir getäuscht und verzaubert, zum Phasis kommt. Un schon steigen wir an Land. Da werdet ihr doch wohl erkennen, daß ihr nicht in Griechenland seid.

X. An. 5.7.9³⁹

The general's argument in example (20) is based on the assumption that the soldiers will recognize that they are not in Greece when they arrive at the shore. Since the soldiers are from Greece, he can present this as a shared assumption, which will

³⁸Transl.: English: Norlin (1928), French: Mathieu and Brémond (1962), German: Ley-Hutton and Brodersen (1993).

³⁹Transl. English: Brownson and Dillery (1998), French: Masqueray (1930), German: Müri (1990).

make it less likely that the soldiers will argue that they won't recognize Greece. This makes the argument stronger. Any form of hedge here would weaken the general's argument and would increase the chance of mutiny. Therefore, this seems a rhetorically very smart use of the implication of *που* that the information offered is already accessible.

Summarizing, we have seen several types of examples, which were shown to exist both with *που* and with *δή που*, that contained information that was already accessible to the addressee. The translations of *που* show that in the majority of the cases *που* is interpreted by modern translators as having a positive argumentative orientation. In addition, there are indications, from the words that are frequently found in the surroundings of *που* (like verbs of knowing and the particles *δή* and *ἦ*) that modal *που* feels at home in contexts in which the content of the clause is presented as known or deducible to either the addressee or people in general. Also, *που* itself was regularly translated by scholars in all three languages with markers expressing this accessibility of the information presented (i.e. translations like: *you know, as you know, as everybody knows, tu le sais, vous le savez, wisst ihr wohl, bekanntlich, selbstverständlich, of course, natürlich, bien sûr*). This also fits the frequent collocation with the causal connective *γάρ*, which may be found next to *που* so frequently because it introduces arguments that need to be presented as generally known.

We may ask ourselves why *που* is used in clauses whose content is already accessible to the addressee. An explanation may be that, normally, one violates Grice's maxim of quantity (Grice, 1989) if one states something which one knows is already accessible to the addressee. The general effect of such violation is that the addressee gets the impression that the speaker thinks he is stupid. However, in order to highlight certain information and make it part of the common ground in that conversation, it may be useful for the speaker to violate Grice's maxim (cf. Pittner, 2007; Nemo, 2007). To avoid suggesting to the addressee that he thinks his addressee does not know this information, the speaker needs to mark that he is aware that the information is already accessible. Since the obvious or trivial statements, as Sicking called them, do not result in reactions of offense by the addressees, it may well be that, as was apparently also the conclusion of the translators, *που* is fulfilling that function. This use of *που* may of course also be put to use for rhetorical purposes. Suggesting that something is shared information may have the effect that the addressee will not question the information provided, because he does not want to deviate from the norm. For that reason, we often find the particle in *γάρ* clauses in argumentative passages.

On the basis of these four types of indications: 1. the frequent co-occurrence with markers like *δή*, *ἦ* and verbs of knowing 2. the frequent presence of *που*, both with and without *δή* in passages which contain already accessible information, 3. the frequent translation of *που* with forms that indicate shared information by translators in three different languages and 4. the communicative need for this kind of marker in *που* contexts⁴⁰, it is reasonable to think that modal *που* had a conventional

⁴⁰The communicative need is of course related to the presence of accessible information in *που*-clauses and presumably the communicative need for markers of accessibility is also a reason the translators have

implication that the speaker presents the information conveyed in the *που*-clause as accessible to the addressee, either by means of reasoning or because of knowledge of the world, moral conventions or generally held beliefs. Accessibility, especially when based on knowledge of the world, often seems to imply a positive argumentative orientation and is compatible with a relatively high argumentative strength. In the section on the development of *που* we will test this idea against a corpus of poetry, which is partly contemporary with the prose corpus that was studied in this chapter.

9.3.4 General contextual characteristics of modal *που* in classical prose

As we have seen in passing above, modal *που* is found in statements and in answers, as well as in arguments and *a fortiori* arguments. There are also other situations in which *που* seems to be conventionally used. One of these situations may be seen a form of argumentation as well. In most cases it is characterized by *οὐ γὰρ* (δή) *που* and it is used to present some line of reasoning or idea as completely ridiculous by stressing the opposite.

In example (21), for instance, *οὐ γὰρ δή* seems to have the function of presenting the negated sentence as so obviously the right thing to think for everybody, that there is no need for argumentation.

- (21) οὐ γὰρ δήπου,
not for δήπου,
NEG CONJ PTCL,
ὦ Θεόμνηστε, εἰ μὲν τίς σε εἴποι πατραλοῖαν ἢ μητραλοῖαν, ἡξίους ἂν αὐτὸν
ὀφλεῖν σοι δίκην, εἰ δέ τις εἴποι ὡς τὴν τεκοῦσαν ἢ τὸν φύσαντα ἔτυπτες,

ῶου ἂν αὐτὸν ἀζήμιον δεῖν εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν
you would think ptcl him unpunished must be because not one
2SG.IMPF PTCL ACC.SG ACC.SG INF.PRS INF.PRS CONJ NEG

τῶν ἀπορρήτων εἰρηκότα.
the forbidden having spoken.
GEN.PL GEN.PL PTC.PERF.ACC.SG.

English: For I presume, Theomnestus, you would not go so far, (while expecting to get satisfaction from a man who called you a father-beater or a mother-beater,) as to consider that he should go unpunished for saying that you struck your male or your female parent because he had spoken no forbidden word!

French: Voyons, Théomnestos: si on t'appelait πατραλοῖας ou μητραλοῖας (qui bat son père ou sa mère), tu croirais avoir droit à une réparation; mais si

chosen these types of translations, even though many of these translations are not mentioned in dictionaries or descriptions. Therefore, these arguments all seem to point in the same direction and are not completely independent of each other.

quelqu'un disait que tu as frappé ton père ou ta mère, tu le croirais inattaquable, sous prétexte qu'il n'a pas employé un des mots interdits!

German: Du würdest doch wohl, Theomnestos, nicht erwarten, dass jemand dafür zu büßen habe, wenn er dich "Vatermörder" oder Muttermörder nennt, aber straflos davonkommt, wenn er sagt, du habest "die die dich geboren" oder "den, der dich gezeugt" erslagen - dann hätte er ja keine strafbare Beleidigung ausgesprochen.

Lys. In *Theomnestum* 1. 8.1 ⁴¹

In example (21), the use of *δήπου* seems to have the effect that one can already feel general indignation should anyone try to go against this claim, because these are very basic shared values.

Another example, this time from Plato and without *δή*, is given in example (22). There is less indignation in this example, but the main effect, the presentation of the unnegated sentence as ridiculous because it is obvious that this is not the case, is comparable.

- (22) οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν που τῆ ἀληθείᾳ ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου
 not for ptcl που the truth the one the other
 NEG CONJ PTCL ΠΟΥ DAT.SG DAT.SG NOM.SG NOM.SG GEN.SG GEN.SG

φρονιμώτερος εἶη,
 wiser would be,
 NOM.SG 3SG.PRS.OPT,

(εἴπερ ἂν ἑκάστῳ δοκῆ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθῆ ἔσται.)

English: For one man would not in reality be at all wiser than another (if whatever seems to each person is really true to him.)

French: Car l'un ne saurait point sans doute être plus raisonnable que l'autre, (si les opinions de chacun sont pour chacun la vérité.)

German: Denn es wäre ja in Wahrheit nicht Einer vernünftiger als der Andere, (wenn was Jedem schiene auch für Jeden wahr wäre.)

Pl. *Cra.* 386c

Now we have both made a description of the characteristics of locative *που* and have a much clearer picture of the functions of modal *που*, we will go back to the controversial instances of locative *που* to see whether this information may help us decide which interpretation is the most likely to have been the one chosen by the Greeks themselves.

9.4 Back to controversial locative *που*

In section 9.2.2, we saw that in order to explain and disambiguate the controversial cases of locative *που*, we needed both information on the non-controversial cases of

⁴¹Transl. English: Lamb (2000), French: Gernet and Bizos (1955), German: Huber (2004/2005).

locative *που* as well as information on modal *που*. Of the 22 instances of controversial locative *που*, 16 contain a verb with a locative implication, one is combined with the particle *δή*, one has a form of *δεῖ* 'it is necessary, must' as its main verb and one last instance was combined with the verb *say*.

There are four features of the context that were mentioned only in passing that may also have had influence on the interpretation of *που* and which are present in this group of examples. These are: 1) the position of *που* in the clause, 2) the presence of *τις* 'some, something, somehow', 3) the larger context, which may block an otherwise completely sound interpretation, 4) the information status of the content of *που*-clause (i.e. does the *που*-clause contain known information?)

The position of *που* in the clause is in some cases just after the locative verb, which is in the middle of the sentence as in example (23). Since in most other cases *που* is found in Wackernagel position in the second position of the clause, this is an indication that we may be dealing with the adverbial locative *που* instead of modal *που*.

- (23) ἄλλον δέ γε ἴσως ἀπολειπόμενόν που διὰ ῥαστώνην καὶ
 other and PTCL perhaps fall behind που because of indolence and
 ACC.SG CONJ PTCL ADV PTC.PRS.ACC.SG PTCL PREP ACC.SG CO
- κωλύοντα καὶ ὑμᾶς τοὺς πρόσθεν καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς
 preventing also you the at the front and us the
 PTC.PRS.ACC.SG PTCL ACC.PL ACC.PL ADV CO ACC.PL ACC.PL
- ὄπισθεν πορεύεσθαι ἔπαισα πύξ,
 at the back go hit with the fist
 ADV INF.PRS 1SG.AOR ADV

(ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων παίοιτο.)

In still another case, the man, perhaps, who fell behind somewhere out of indolence and prevented both you in the van and us in the rear from going on, I struck such a one with the fist (in order that the enemy might not strike him with the lance.)

French: Il se peut bien encore, si quelqu'un restant en arrière par nonchalance empêchait d'avancer aussi bien vous qui étiez en tête, que nous autres qui étions en queue, que je lui aie donné des coups de poing (pour que l'ennemi ne lui donnât pas de coups de lance.)

German: Einen andern, der wohl aus Bequemlichkeit zurückblieb und euch vorn und uns hinten am Marschieren hinderte, habe ich vielleicht auch mit der Faust geschlagen, (damit er nicht von den Feinden mit der Lanze geschlagen werde.)

X. An.5.8.16.1⁴²

The combination of *που* with *τι* 'some, something, somehow' in a sentence like (24) is an indication that indefiniteness plays a role in the sentence.

⁴²Transl: English: Brownson and Dillery (1998), French: Masqueray (1930), German: Müri (1954).

- (24) οἱ μὲν δὴ δόντες καὶ τρεῖς τριήρεις καὶ ἀφορμὴν εἰς ξένους χιλίους ἐξέπεμψαν τὸν Ἀναξίβιον. ὁ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκετο, κατὰ γῆν μὲν ἀθροίσας ξενικὸν τῶν τ' Αἰολίδων πόλεων παρεσπᾶτό τινας τοῦ Φαρναβάζου καὶ ἐπιστρατευσάσας ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄβυδον ἀντεπεστράτευε καὶ ἐπεπορεύετο καὶ ἐδήου τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν: καὶ ναῦς δὲ πρὸς αἷς εἶχε συμπληρώσας ἐξ Ἄβύδου τρεῖς ἄλλας κατήγεν,

εἷ τί που λαμβάνοι Ἀθηναίων πλοῖον ἢ τῶν
 if somehow που he could take of the Athenians ship or the
 CONJ ADV που 3SG.PRS.OPT GEN.PL ACC.SG CO ART.GEN.PL

ἐκείνων συμμάχων.
 of them allies.
 GEN.PL GEN.PL.

English: Accordingly the ephors gave Anaxibius three triremes and money enough for a thousand mercenaries, and sent him out. When he had reached Abydus, his operations by land were as follows: after collecting a mercenary force, he proceeded to detach some of the Aeolian cities from Pharnabazus, take the field in retaliatory expeditions against the cities which had made expeditions against Abydus, march upon them, and lay waste their territory. On the naval side, in addition to the ships which he had he fully manned three others from Abydus, and brought into port whatever merchant vessel he found anywhere belonging to the Athenians or their allies.

French: d'autre part, après avoir équipé, en plus des navires qu'il avait déjà, trois autres celui fournit Abidos, il faisait la course pour essayer de capturer quelque vaisseau des Athéniens ou de leurs alliés.

German: und nachdem er zu den Schiffen, die ihm schon zur Verfügung standen, noch drei weitere, die Abydos ihm stellte, mit einer vollständigen Mannschaft besetzt hatte, fuhr er an die Küste, um möglichst irgendwelche Transportfahrzeuge der Athener oder ihrer Bundesgenossen zu kapern.

X. HG. 4.8.33.8⁴³

In this example, we may either connect τὶ to πλοῖον, as in 'some ship' or interpret it adverbially as 'somehow'. Often we find the collocation τίς που in descriptions of situations that may occur or have occurred more than once as in example (24).⁴⁴ Because the participants in the event change every time the situation occurs, it is impossible to be definite about the identity or the location of these participants, which would be an argument in favor of a generalizing locative interpretation. The German and probably the French translation choose translations which reinforce the uncertainty expressed by the εἰ clause. However, the εἰ clause expresses a goal, which makes the addition of extra uncertainty communicatively less useful. In addition, we have found very little evidence in favor of a neutral or even negative argumentative

⁴³Transl.: English: Brownson (1918), French: Hatzfeld (1936-1939), German: Strasburger (1970).

⁴⁴For a discussion of conditionals that presuppose that the content of the conditional clause has been (sometimes) realized, like is the case in (24), see Wakker (1994, 276).

orientation for modal *που* in this corpus. Therefore, I would interpret *που* as a generalizing marker of place here, just as the English translation does.

If we take the collocations as a lead, there are only two cases of controversial locative *που* for which there are linguistic, contextual arguments to interpret as modal. The first is the case in which we also find *δή*, which is given in example (25), the other one is dependent on the larger context. This last example was already discussed above under (8), which is reproduced below as (26).

In example (25), the speaker cites a passage from Homer. Since *δήπου* is modal in all other instances in this corpus and is generally interpreted as ‘of course’, it implies that the addressee already knows or should know the content of the *δήπου*-clause. This is also what is expressed by both the English and the French translation. Therefore, it is most likely that *δήπου* was interpreted as modal in the classical period.

- (25) ἔστι μὲν γὰρ δήπου καὶ Ὀμήρῳ
 is ptcl for δήπου ptcl in Homer
 3SG.PRS PTCL PTCL δήπου PTCL DAT.SG
 (γάνυται δέ τ’ ἀκούων.)
English: Homer, you remember, has the words, (“He joys to hear”);
French: On lit en effet, vous le savez, dans Homère:
German: Denn es steht irgendwo bei Homer.

X. *Smp.* 8.30.3⁴⁵

Example (26), which was already discussed under (8) above, is a comparable situation. This time, however, it is clear from the text some paragraphs above that the speaker already mentioned this passage before, even giving information about the texts in which this information was found. This makes it unlikely that he has already forgotten this information and is adding *somewhere*. It is much more likely that he is showing that he is aware that he is repeating himself and thus gives accessible information, which is expressed by *που*.

- (26) (Ξένος: Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ᾧ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ
 τέλος τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεζῆ τε ᾧδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων—
 “οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ, φησὶν, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα:
 [21 paragraphs])

Ξένος: ὅτι ὁ μὲν πού φησιν: (οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο
 Stranger: because he που says not for never this
 CONJ NOM.SG PTCL που 3.SG.PRS: NEG PTCL NEG ACC.SG.

δαμῆ, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα [...]
 be proved, be not being
 3.SG.AOR.SUBJ.PASS 3.SG.PRS NEG PTC.PRS.ACC.SG

Θεαίτητος: λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.)
English: Stranger: (But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we

⁴⁵Transl. English: Todd (1922), French: Ollier (1961), German: Bux (1956).

were children to the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse: “Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is;

[21 paragraphs])

Stranger: Because he says somewhere: (Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is;

Theaetetus: Yes, that is what he says.)

French: Il dit lui, s’il me souvient:

German: Er sagt doch:

Pl. *Sph.* 237a and 258d.⁴⁶

In conclusion, we can say that the contextual characteristics of locative and modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ allow us to argue for one of the two possible interpretations on relatively objective grounds. Locative interpretations generally contain locative markers, whereas modal interpretations often show use of the modal particles $\delta\eta$ and $\tilde{\eta}$, as well as verbs of knowing, verbs of saying and the copula. Modal instances also contain information which is presented as accessible for the addressee.

9.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, it was investigated to what extent it would be possible to link contextual features to the translations of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ which were chosen by translators in three different languages. This was done in order to discover the function of modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ and how speakers distinguished locative and modal uses of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$. It was shown that both locative interpretations and modal interpretations have specific contextual characteristics, which may have allowed speakers to distinguish between those two major interpretations.

The contextual characteristics of locative $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ were generally not very surprising, but they covered a large proportion of the instances that were translated as locative, indicating that speakers really may have used these markers as ways to disambiguate locative from modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$. It was found that locative translations were generally connected to locative markers like verbs implying a location, locative prepositions and locative adverbs. A subgroup of locative $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$, which often also had a generalizing function, was frequently combined with the conditional $\epsilon\iota$ as well as the indefinite pronoun $\tau\iota\varsigma$. The use of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ with numbers ‘about, around’ was not unequivocally present in this corpus, nor did I find any instances in which only the interpretation *somehow* fitted the context.

Modal translations frequently had a positive argumentative orientation. Modal translations were frequently found if $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ was placed next to the particles $\delta\eta$ and $\tilde{\eta}$. The combination of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ with $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ as well as with verbs of knowing, saying and the copula is also very frequent.

By means of the following collocations we could account for 71% of the instances of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ in the synchronic prose corpus.

⁴⁶Translations English: Fowler (1921), French: Diès (1923), German: Schleiermacher (1970).

- δῆ ‘evidently’
- ἦ affirmative particle
- γάρ ‘for, because’
- πάντως ‘certainly, in all respects’
- verbs of knowing (οἶδα, γινώσκω, ἐπίσταμαι)
- verbs of saying (λέγω, φημί)
- εἰ conditional
- τις ‘some, someone, something, somehow’
- locative adverbs
- locative prepositions
- locative verbs

This suggests that knowing these collocations and their common use would already give a speaker a good idea of how to interpret *που*. However, as we see in figure 9.1, the collocates of *που* did not always exclude each other. Sometimes they were used together. However, the figure also shows that the overlap between the collocates that were related to a locative interpretation (the right side of the chart, mostly in pastel colors) and the ones that were connected to the modal interpretations (on the left, mostly in bright colors) is minimal even though some of the forms are quite generally used forms like γάρ ‘for, because’. This suggests again that this division is not coincidental and that these markers may point speakers in the direction of a specific domain of interpretation. In addition, it may be hypothesized on the basis of this distribution that for speakers these domains may have been completely separated.

In figure 9.1, we see that almost one third of the instances of *που* is collocated with δῆ ‘evidently’ and the other collocates also suggest a positive argumentative orientation. These contextual features led us to a feature of many translations of *που*: many of the translations used imply that the information given in the *που* clause is either (generally) known information or deducible information, which is a more general characteristic of many *που*-clauses as was already noted by Sicking (1993). Expressing that information is (generally) known or accessible is also one of the effects of verbs of knowing and compatible with the common descriptions of the effect of the particle δῆ ‘evidently’. Many contexts in which *που* was found without these frequently co-occurring particles and verbs pointed in the same direction. Therefore, a conventional use of *που* may have been to express that the information in the *που*-clause was accessible to the addressee or presented as such by the speaker.

In the theoretical introduction to this dissertation, I said that I would attempt to describe the knowledge of the speaker about the use of *που*. Although the exact




Figure 9.1: The collocates of που with a specification of the overlaps with other collocates. The repetition of the form below the bar within the bar itself indicates the part of the instances of that form that did not have any other collocates. N.B. Due to the overlaps, the total number of collocates is more than the total number of instances of που (381).

level of abstraction is difficult to assess, we can say that it is likely that a speaker of Greek knew that *που* was used regularly in certain constructions and in specific types of situations. He probably needed this knowledge in order to comply with the conventions of his language community. Therefore, I will now summarize some constructional characteristics which were discussed briefly above and which may have helped a speaker of Greek to decide on a specific interpretation.

Locative *που* seems to have been accompanied by locative verbs, adverbs and prepositions. Within this group there is a large subgroup of cases which occur in a conditional clause and which seem to have had the function of making the event repeatable (every time something was somewhere) or generalizable. Although we cannot be sure that (all) speakers saw (all) these connections, it may be useful to present the locative constructions in a constructional network as in 9.2. This network contains all kinds of smaller regularities and some basic abstractions over them, which are probably the basis of everyday language use. The level of abstraction that is presented is just a guess and may have varied between individual speakers.

Modal *που* is very frequently accompanied by the particle *δή* and in cases in which an *a fortiori* argument was needed also with *ἤ*. This last combination generally had the form [conditional clause] *ἤ που* ..., which showed some variation in the choice of the conjunction and some adverbs were regularly added. In the case of *δή που* the collocation was, apart from simply expressing evident accessibility as in 'of course', regularly used with a negation and the particle *γάρ*, which may have served the purpose of expressing some indignation or ridicule. Especially in answers *που* could be combined with *πάντως* in cases in which one is completely sure of oneself. Sentences with verbs of knowing, saying and copular constructions were contexts in which modal *που* was frequently used as well. All in all, this may have been combined into a construction network as is presented in figure 9.3 below. Locative *που* is not incorporated because locative and modal *που* were probably homonyms as is suggested by the lack of connections between the constructions in which locative *που* and modal *που* are used.

These linguistic contextual characteristics could account for over 70% of the instances of *που*. This suggests that conventional patterns may have played a role in the interpretation of *που*.




Figure 9.2: The proposed construction network of rou 'somewhere'




Figure 9.3: The proposed construction networks of modal πού

CHAPTER 10

The diachronic development of $\pi\upsilon$

10.1 Introduction

As we have seen in the previous chapter, $\pi\upsilon$ developed several uses in classical Greek. In this chapter, I will try to shed some light on how these uses came about. I will address the following questions and sub-questions:

1. How did the semantic change from locative $\pi\upsilon$ to other interpretations come about?
 - (a) Are there any differences between the earlier stages of the language and classical Greek?
 - (b) If so, is this due to the limitations of our synchronical corpus, or has the language changed?
 - (c) Can we determine any bridging contexts (Heine, 2002; Diewald, 2006a)?
 - (d) What characteristics do potential bridging contexts have?
2. Do we find regularities in the linguistic and communicative context that can be linked to specific interpretations and that may have belonged to the linguistic knowledge of the speaker?
3. What determines whether an interpretation is likely to have been used by the Greeks?

In order to answer these questions, I will study a diachronic corpus, which will be described below.

10.1.1 The diachronic corpus

The diachronic corpus consists of poetry by the following authors.¹ The fragmentary works of these authors were excluded.

- Homer (around 750 BC, 203,242 words)
- Hesiod (around 700 BC, 16,205 words)
- Aeschylus (524-456 BC, 51,315 words)
- Sophocles (496-406 BC, 59,946 words)
- Euripides (485-406 BC, 160,468 words)
- Aristophanes (450-385 BC, 98,698 words)

The latest part of this diachronic corpus is contemporary with most of the synchronic prose corpus we used in the previous chapter. There are tragedies from 472 BC onwards going on until 405. The last comedy in the corpus is from 388 BC. The synchronic prose corpus ranges from around 430 BC- 355 BC. This overlap may allow us to see whether the differences are due to genre differences between poetry and prose or to the development of modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. If a change is due to historical development, we would expect to find it only in the later texts, but if it is both in earlier and later tragic texts, but not in the prose corpus, or vice versa, it is more likely that the differences are genre related. For this reason, we will study the diachronic corpus in parts. We will start with the epic part of the corpus and after that we will continue with tragedy and comedy. We will also look at the possibility of differences within the tragic genre, because this genre covers the largest period of time.

The diachronic corpus is very different both in terms of genre and types of texts from the synchronic prose corpus which we studied in the previous chapter. First, the diachronic corpus consists completely of poetry. Second, the conventions of Ancient Greek literature, although they were still in development at this time, required different types of poetry to be written in different dialects. This means that choral parts in the plays are written in a literary form of the doric dialect.

Although for another reason, the epic works by Homer are also commonly assumed to contain a mixture of dialects, mainly Ionic, Aeolic and possibly some traces of the Mycenaean dialect (1200 BC) which belongs to the Arcado-Cyprian branch.² This mixture of dialects within the Homeric texts may be an effect of the way these poems originated. As Parry (1971) has shown, it is likely that the Homeric epics have originated in a panhellenic oral tradition, in which it was common to combine fixed, metrical formulas into a story while telling that story. Although there must have been written versions in earlier times, versions remained significantly different, as we can see from papyri, until around 150 BC (Latacz, 2012). This last text is also basically the text we have today.

¹The dates given in this overview are based on The New Pauly online.

²There also may be Atticisms in the text, which are due to later changes to the text before the standardization of the text.

However, most of the text probably originated in the 8th or 7th century BC.³ Even though the Homeric texts were probably written down relatively early, they still show features that link them to the earlier oral tradition. This means that we find exactly the same formulas repeated in different places in the texts, including what may be described as some (metrical) copy-paste errors in the connection of fixed metrical formulas (Bakker (1988, 187) after Parry (1971, 203; 215)). This sometimes resulted in formulas that were less integrated in the situational context, creating discrepancies. Since there are formulas in which $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ is found, the formulas and their use will be referred to in the discussion below.

The combination of a mixture of dialects and both very old and newer forms suggests that we cannot completely trust all Homeric constructions and uses as originating from the 8th century BC. In addition, the Homeric texts and their sometimes archaic language have greatly influenced later authors, especially those writing poetry. This implies that we need to be very careful in drawing conclusions about the development of Greek on the basis of Homeric data in particular and, to a lesser extent, other poetic texts. However, the Homeric texts may provide evidence from very early stages of Greek and we cannot ignore this evidence.

Between the epic authors and the first tragic author, Aeschylus, there is a gap of more than a hundred years in the corpus. This, together with the special history of the epic texts, makes them fundamentally different from the other authors. Therefore, I will first discuss epic poetry, apart from the other works in the diachronic corpus. I will compare the use of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ in the epic texts with the prose authors from the classical period discussed in the previous chapter. Next, we will proceed to the other genres, which are much more directly connected both in time and place of composition to the prose authors.

One of the ways to find out how modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ developed, is to look at the differences in use of the particle between earlier times and in the classical period. It is both interesting to see whether the contextual features are different between earlier texts and the classical period and whether the interpretations were different. However, this would assume that apart from the difference in the period of writing there are no other differences between the texts. As we have seen above, there are many generic and dialectal differences between the synchronic prose corpus and the diachronic corpus. This means that we need to be very careful in drawing conclusions on the basis of differences between the diachronic corpus and the synchronic prose corpus.

10.1.2 Scholars on Homeric $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$

Bolling (1929) has written an article specifically on the meaning of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ in Homer. He follows Wackernagel's interpretation of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ as can be seen from the abstract of his article:

³This overview of the textual transmission of the Homeric texts was based on Latacz (2012).

The etymological meaning ‘somewhere’ of this particle seems obsolete in the Homeric poems, in which it designates an emotional coloring that may be described as confident belief in something that cannot be demonstrated. Nowhere is it the expression of a doubt.

Later on, Bolling (1929, 104) modifies this statement a bit, theoretically allowing for a locative interpretation of *που*.

“There are passages, of course, in which a translation ‘somewhere’ will not offend; but they should be taken to show no more than the way in which the change of meaning was brought about. They do not seem to form a series illustrating various steps in that process, and the probability is that the change was considerably earlier than our records.”

Denniston (1950, 267) has a specific comment on *δήπου* in Homer:

“This combination is already found in Homer, but it is probable that the words do not coalesce as closely in him as in later writers.

Later on, Denniston states on *δήπου* in general:

Strictly speaking, the certainty of *δή* is toned down by the doubtfulness of *που*. But often the doubt is only assumed *μετ’ εἰρωνείας* (not always ‘ironically’ in the modern sense of the word), ‘presumably’, ‘I believe’, ‘I imagine’ being virtually equivalent to ‘of course’.”

This irony has been called into question by Verdenius (1956, 251ff), who does agree that in some cases *που* is used ‘by a speaker who is quite sure of his ground’, but claims that this has nothing to do with irony. According to Verdenius, *που* may be used both to strengthen and to weaken, depending on the context.

In the case of *ἦ που*, however, Denniston (1950, 285) says the two particles form a unity in Homer even when they are not placed next to each other.

Slater (1969), in his specialized dictionary on Pindar translates *που* as ‘somehow’, but the translations of Pindar from English, French and German do not show that translation, they prefer ‘no doubt’ and ‘wohl’ for the Pindaric instances of *που*.⁴ Also, Wackernagel’s interpretation of *που* was originally triggered by passages from Pindar.

In the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, W. Beck follows Verdenius (1956) in the sense that he distinguishes two uses of modal *που*: 1. *probably* used in phrases with indicative whose truth the speaker holds to be probable. This use is frequently found in sentences that are formally explanatory and in statements and 2. *possibly* used to express possibility. In this last option, Beck specifically mentions the use of *που* in *εἰ* clauses⁵, the combination with *τις*, as well as the presence of *που* in *either...*

⁴The translations used were: English: Svarlien (1990), French: Puech (1949, 1952b,a, 1955), German: Werner (1967).

⁵As we already saw above and will see again below, most instances of *εἴ που* and *που* in *either...or...* clauses are either generalizing or locative. Since there are no other indications for an interpretation ‘possibly’, this category will not be used in this dissertation.

or... clauses. The types of sentences which Beck mentions are: 1. clauses that speculate about the state or motivations of third persons, 2. final clauses and 3. prohibitions.

We can conclude from the literature above that we will probably find that $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ did already have a modal value in the epics and that with respect to the earliest texts there is already some discussion about the argumentative orientation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$.

10.2 Differences in the use of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ between epic poetry and classical Greek prose

10.2.1 Introduction to epic $\pi\omicron\upsilon$

Just like in the previous chapter, I used three translations (one in English, one in French and one in German) of the text in the diachronic corpus, mostly from academic, bilingual editions. This way, it was possible to work with judgements that were independent of my personal view on the interpretation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. In addition, this method allowed us to see how consistent the interpretations of different scholars with different mother tongues are. The clearest difference in interpretation is when one translator interprets $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ as locative and another translates it as modal. As before, these will be called the controversial instances of locative $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. Less clear are the cases in which the shades of modal that are used differ, because it is always hard to assess the exact interpretation that was the basis for a choice of a particular translation.

The number of controversial instances of locative $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ is much larger in the diachronic corpus than was the case in the synchronic prose corpus. This is even more extremely the case for the epics. In 30 of the 164 cases of epic $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ (18.2%) translators do not agree whether $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ is to be interpreted as locative or as modal (in the synchronic corpus this was only 5.8%, i.e. 22 out of 304). In addition, 7 times commentaries interpret $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ as locative whereas the translators do not make that choice. This high level of controversy may be an indication that the markers of locative and/or modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ were not as clear in Homer as they were in the classical period. This may be due to an ongoing development. Therefore, we will study these examples in detail in section 10.2.2 below.

According to Bolling (1929), locative $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ does not occur in Homer anymore although in some contexts it is possible to read a locative interpretation. This view is not shared by translators and commentators. For instance in the following example Ameis and Hentze (1879) say that this is to be interpreted as locative and the English and German translators also choose a locative interpretation. A modal interpretation would not be completely impossible, because the other people present may also know that the lyre has been left behind, but since the rest of the relative clause is purely about a location and since there is no communicative reason to mark that people may know that the lyre lies in the halls, a locative interpretation seems the most plausible option.⁶

⁶It is very hard to come up with an example in which it would be contextually impossible to have some

- (1) Δημοδόκῳ δέ τις αἴψα κιῶν φόρμιγγα λίγειαν
οἰσέτω,
ἣ που κεῖται ἐν ἡμετέροισι δόμοισιν.
which που lies in our halls.
REL.NOM.SG ΠΟΥ 3SG.PRS PREP DAT.PL DAT.PL.

English: And let one go straightway and fetch for Demodocus the clear-toned lyre which lies somewhere in our halls.

French: Vite! à Demodocos qu'on s'en aille chercher la cithare au chant clair: elle est restée chez moi.

German: Schleunig die klingende Leier für unsern Demodokos! Sicher liegt sie noch irgendwo daheim in unsrem Palaste.⁷

Od. 8.255⁸

In the following example, translations and the commentary of Ameis and Hentze also agree on a locative interpretation.

- (2) ὄφρ' ἂν ἐγὼν ἔλθω Σπάρτην ἐς καλλιγύναικα
Τηλέμαχον καλέουσα, τεὸν φίλον υἷόν, Ὀδυσσεῦ:
ὅς τοι ἐς εὐρύχορον Λακεδαίμονα πὰρ Μενέλαον
ᾤχετο πευσόμενος μετὰ σὸν κλέος,
εἷ που ἔτ' εἴης.
if που still you were.
CONJ ΠΟΥ ADV 2SG.PRS.OPT.

English: while I go to Sparta, the land of fair women, to summon thence Telemachus, thy dear son, Odysseus, who went to spacious Lacedaemon to the house of Menelaus, to seek tidings of thee, if thou wast still anywhere alive.

French: tandis que je m'en vais jusqu'à Lacédémone, la ville aux belles femmes, rappeler, cher Ulysse, Télémaque, ton fils! car il s'en est allé vers Sparte à la grand'plaine savoir de Ménélas si l'on parlait de toi, si tu vivais encore.

German: Selbst aber gehe ich nach Sparta, das voll ist von herrlichen Weibern, rufe Telemachos auf, deinen lieben Sohn, mein Odysseus. Diesser ist fort, zu erkunden, wo und ob du noch lebest, fragt Menelaos in Sparta, das breite Plätze zum Tanz hat.

Od. 13.415⁹

In example (2), *που* seems to fulfill the function of a predicative complement. Theoretically, it would be possible to read the verb *be* (εἴης) as existential 'whether

sort of modal interpretation, since modal interpretations are inherently subjective. However, I think the examples mentioned here show enough indications for a locative interpretation that the choice for a modal interpretation would be hard to uphold.

⁷This translator uses the same text, that is, with a relative pronoun, not a participle. This means that either *sicher* is a double translation of *που* or this is a rather free translation, which may be connected to the fact that it is a poetic translation.

⁸Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

⁹Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

you still existed' and *που* as 'as you can imagine' but this seems far fetched. Therefore, it seems that *που* did have a locative use in the epics.

In addition to these locative examples, it is methodologically the most sound approach to see whether we can still find some traces of locative *που* and to let go of this interpretation only if the context forces us to do so, since it is morphologically clear that the original interpretation of *που* was locative. In addition, we find some clearly locative examples in later times, suggesting that the locative interpretation had not become obsolete. Therefore, the first question that needs an answer is whether there are instances of *που* in the epic corpus that are unequivocally modal. The next step is whether modern scholars agree on which instances are modal and which ones may be locative and what features of the context influence this decision. This will be discussed in section 10.2.2.

The first thing that catches the eye when comparing the collocations of modal *που* in epic poetry (Homer and Hesiod) with modal *που* in the synchronic corpus (see table 10.1), is that the collocation *δή που* is far less frequent than in the prose corpus. In addition the presence of *που* in *εἰ* 'if, whether' clauses is much higher in the epic corpus and the use of *τις* 'some, someone, something, somehow' is also much more frequent in the epics. High frequencies of *εἰ* and *τις* may be related because they frequently occur together (in the epics in 15 out of 26 *εἰ*-clauses).

		Epic modal <i>που</i>	Classical modal <i>που</i>
<i>δή που</i>	'evidently'	5.7% (7)	39.8% (121)
<i>ἦ που</i>	<i>affirmative ptcl</i>	5.7% (7)	7.6% (23)
<i>εἴ που</i>	'if/whether'	21.1% (26)	2.6% (8)
<i>know + που</i>		2.4% (3)	6.3% (19)
<i>γάρ που</i>	'for, because'	4.9% (6)	19.7% (60)
<i>τίς που</i>	'some, someone, something, somehow'	34.1% (42)	3.6% (11)
<i>μή που</i>	'lest', <i>neg</i>	7.3% (9)	0% (0)
<i>ἢ που...ἢ...</i>	'or...or'	13.0% (16)	3.3% (4)

Table 10.1: The frequency of collocations and verbs with *που* in percentages of the total incidence of modal *που* in the respective corpus. The raw numbers are given between brackets. Total modal *που* in the Epic part of the diachronic corpus is 123 and in the synchronic corpus 304. N.B. These collocations are not mutually exclusive, that is, there are cases in which more than one of the collocations is found in the same clause.

In epic poetry, 7 instances out of 123 instances of modal *που* (6%) are a case of *δή που*, whereas in the synchronic corpus this was 40%. This may be just a difference between genres. However, as was noted above, Denniston has observed that *δή που* seems to coalesce less in Homer than in other authors, which is an indication that we may have to do with a previous stage of the development of *δή* and *που*. The collocation *ἦ που*, on the other hand, seems to be about equally frequent in the epic

texts as in the synchronic corpus. Both the collocations *δί που* and *ἦ που* will be discussed more elaborately in section 10.2.3.

Another difference seems to be that conditional clauses with *που* (*εἰ* ‘if, whether’ clauses) are not mainly translated as locative, as was the case in the synchronic corpus, but are also very frequently translated as modal in epic poetry. This seems to be related to the frequent use of *τις* as well (*τις* is found in 15 of 26 cases of *εἶ που*, 57.7%). The high frequency of *που* in conditional clauses may have played a role in the development of modal *που*. Therefore, we will discuss these two categories more elaborately in section 10.2.4.

There are also collocations with *που* in the epic texts which were not present in the synchronic corpus. The frequent use of *που* in clauses with the conjunctions *μή* ‘lest’ and *ἢ...ἢ...* ‘either... or’ will be discussed respectively in section 10.2.4 and in section 10.2.5.

10.2.2 Variation between locative and modal *που* in translations of the epics

The first question to be answered is whether modal *που* already existed in the epic texts and whether it was used in the same way as in the classical prose corpus. This seems to be the case, as can be seen from the following example.

- (3) Ζεὺς γάρ που τό γε οἶδε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ
 Zeus for που the ptcl knows and immortal gods
 NOM.SG CONJ. που ART.ACC.SG FOC.PTCL 3SG.PRS CO NOM.PL NOM.PL

ἄλλοι,
 other,
 NOM.PL.

εἶ κέ μιν ἀγγείλαιμι ἰδών

English: For Zeus, I ween, and the other immortal gods know whether I have seen him, and could bring tidings;

French: Zeus et les autres dieux immortels savent bien si, l’ayant vu, je puis t’en donner des nouvelles;

German: Zeus wird es wissen und wohl auch die andern unsterblichen Götter, ob ich ihn sah und melden ihn könnte;

*Od.*14.119^{10 11}

In this example, it is irrelevant where Zeus is, although it is theoretically possible that the speaker wants to express that he does not know where Zeus and the other gods are. The use of the name Zeus also makes it impossible to generalize the

¹⁰Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

¹¹Ameis and Hentze (1879) say the following about the use of *που* in this passage: 119= Γ 308. *που* ... οἶδε *weiss wohl, mag wissen*. Aus dem lokalen *πὸ* (v 415. ξ 44) ist ein modales geworden. Zum Gedanken vgl. ο 523. β 332.

statement by means of a locative marker (e.g. *Every few years some manufacturer somewhere puts out a Miller CD*¹²). Therefore, it seems much more plausible to read a modal marker with a positive argumentative orientation for $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ instead of a locative adverb.

The next step is to determine when $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ is modal and what modal value it has. Both on the choice between locative and modal and the exact modal value the translations do not always agree. We will start with the cases in which it is controversial among the translators whether $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ is to be interpreted as locative or as modal.

The high number of controversial instances of locative $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ in the epic texts may be due to an ongoing change. However, it is also possible that we have to do with the compatibility problem that was discussed more elaborately in the chapter on synchronic $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$. That is, the main problem we have is that without the detailed knowledge of the way $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ was interpreted of a native speaker we are dependent on the information the context provides. However, since modal and locative interpretations are so far apart, modal and locative interpretations do not exclude each other, which makes it possible that a context is compatible with both a locative interpretation and a modal interpretation, although this does not mean that these cases were ambiguous for the Greeks. Therefore, the main question is how likely it is that for the Greeks the instances of controversial $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ were ambiguous. If the controversial instances of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ were the effect of a change in progress, that is, if these instances were also ambiguous for the Greeks themselves, we would expect that the group of ambiguous cases formed a distinct type of examples, since new interpretations tend to evolve in specific contexts (Traugott, 2003; Diewald, 2006a; Heine, 2002).

However, one can only categorize groups of examples if there is some agreement on the original interpretations. If there is a lot of variation in the translations of both the non-controversial cases and the types of examples that are considered controversial, it is likely that the problems with the interpretation of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ are due to our lack of knowledge of the conventions with respect to $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ in Ancient Greek.

Variation between locative and modal translations is very frequently found in clauses with a conditional. This conditional often introduces an indirect question or a complement clause. In almost all of these examples, a locative marker (a locative verb or adverb or preposition) can be found in the direct environment of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$. In some cases, however, the value of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ seems too indefinite compared to the specificity of the marker of place.

The modal interpretations in the translations seem to be triggered by the fact that a goal is expressed or in some other way the situation described cannot be verified by the person making the statement. Sometimes there is a modal verb in the direct environment of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$.

I will start with some examples with a conditional:

¹²<http://www.amazon.com/Essential-Glenn-Miller/product-reviews/B0009POI00>.

- (4) ἦ δ' ἀνδρὶ ἰκέλη Τρώων κατεδύσεθ' ὄμιλον
 Λαοδόκῳ Ἀντηγορίδῃ κρατερῷ αἰχμητῇ,

Πάνδαρον ἀντίθεον διζημένη εἴ που ἐφεύροι.
 Pandaros god-like searching if που she could find.
 ACC.SG ACC.SG NOM.SG CONJ που 3SG.AOR.OPT.

English: But Athene entered the throng of the Trojans in the guise of a man, even of Laodocus, son of Antenor, a valiant spearman, in quest of god-like Pandarus, if haply she might find him.

French: Cependant la déesse, ayant pris forme d'homme, plonge dans la masse troyenne. Sous les traits du fils d'Antéonor, Laodoque, puissant guerrier, elle part en quête de Pandare égal aux dieux - où le trouver? -

German: Sie aber mischte sich unter der Troer und war einem Manne ähnlich, Laodokos, Sohn des Antenor, dem mächtigen Krieger. Wie sie nun Pandaros suchte, den göttlichen, ob sie ihn fände,

Il. 4.88^{13 14}

In example (4), we see that the basic question regarding the value of *που* is what is supposed to be the value of X in the following sentence: seeking the godlike Pandarus, if X she could find him. In the position of the X we either have a modal particle or a locative indefinite, which does not take up an argument position. Since *που* is not in an argument position, we have the possibility not to take *που* as a locative marker.

In order to understand this example, we need to know that there are two possible syntactic analyses of this example. The first analysis is that the *εἴ*-clause is a purpose clause¹⁵ 'searching for the godlike Pandarus in order to find him'. The object of *ἐφεύροι* is in that case implicit. The second analysis is that the object phrase is taken out of its syntactic context, which is not uncommon in Ancient Greek, making the *εἴ*-clause dependent on *διζημένη* 'searching' resulting in the interpretation 'searching (to see) if she could find the godlike Pandarus'.

The only reason for a modal reading is that the *που*-clause seems to express a purpose, but otherwise the presence of the verb *to find* directly next to *που* suggests a locative reading. This raises the question of whether an interpretation like *haply*, which is very frequent in the English translation of epic *που* and which does not have good equivalents in the other languages, really is one of the possible interpretations of *που*. In this particular case, the fact that it is a goddess who is searching suggests that the chances of not finding Pandarus are small. This makes it less likely that there was any need for an extra marker to stress the mere possibility of success. The use of the phrase *εἴ που ἐφεύροι* 'if perhaps/anywhere she could find him' may of course just be due to conventionalization of this phrase or it may even have been a fixed formula, since it is found word for word in another passage as well (5.169). This means

¹³Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

¹⁴Ameis and Hentze (1905) say about this passage: 88= E 169 *εἴ που ἐφεύροι* Wunschsatz aus der Seele der Athene: 'wenn sie ihn doch irgendwo fände', erläutert *διζημένη*.

¹⁵For an extensive discussion on this type of conditional clause in Ancient Greek see Wakker (1994, 375).

that with our current information this is a case of compatibility. The only way we may be able to say something more is by getting a clearer picture of the use of modal *που* in this period, which we will do below.

In the following example, we find *που* next to the indefinite *τις* in a list of options of where Odysseus may have gotten a specific garment. In this situation, it would not be strange to add an indefinite marker of place, but a marker of uncertainty would of course also be possible. This use of *που* looks a lot like the use of *ergens* in Dutch as a general marker of place in combination with other indefinite markers.¹⁶ The parallel with Dutch shows that without the knowledge of whether *που* really had the value of *haply*, we can only say that both interpretations are compatible with this context.

- (5) οὐκ οἶδ' ἢ τὰδε ἔστο περὶ χροῖ οἴκοθ' Ὀδυσσεύς,
ἢ τις ἐταίρων δῶκε θεῆς ἐπὶ νηὸς ἰόντι,

ἢ τις που καὶ ξεῖνος,
or some που even stranger,
CONJ NOM.SG που FOC.PTCL NOM.SG

ἐπεὶ πολλοῖσιν Ὀδυσσεύς,
ἔσκε φίλος; παῦροι γὰρ Ἀχαιῶν ἦσαν ὁμοῖοι.

English: I know not whether Odysseus was thus clothed at home, or whether one of his comrades gave him the raiment when he went on board the swift ship, or *haply* even some stranger, since to many men was Odysseus dear, for few of the Achaeans were his peers.

French: J'ignore si, chez lui, Ulysse avait déjà ces mêmes vêtements: sur son croiseur, en route, les avait-il reçus d'un compagnon, d'un hôte? il avait tant d'amis! parmi les Achéens, combien peu l'égalaient!

German: Ob noch daheim diese Kleider Odysseus am Leibe getragen, oder beim Gang auf das eilende Schiff ein Gefährte sie brachte, oder ob es *woanders* ein Gastfreund tat; denn bei vielen war ja Odysseus geliebt, da nur *wenig* Achaeier ihm glichen, all das weiß ich ja nicht.

Od.19.239^{17 18}

In example (6), however, we find an example in an argumentative sentence in which the choice would be between a locative interpretation 'he left to Lemnos somewhere' or an interpretation with a strongly positive argumentative orientation. In this example Ares tries to convince Aphrodite to have an adulterous affair with him, while her husband is away.

¹⁶E.g. *Tegenwoordig is er bijna altijd voor welke gitaar dan ook wel weer ergens een of ander budget merk te vinden wat ze uitbrengt.* 'Nowadays you can find for any guitar some budget brand somewhere that produces them.' From: <http://www.gitaarnet.nl/archive/index.php/t-105901.html>.

¹⁷Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

¹⁸Ameis and Hentze (1879) interpret *που* here as *irgendwo* [*unterwegs*].

- (6) δεῦρο, φίλη, λέκτρονδε τραπέομεν εὐνηθέντες οὐ γὰρ ἔθ' Ἥφαιστος μεταδήμιος,
 ἀλλά που ἤδη / οἴχεται ἐς Λῆμον μετὰ Σίντιας ἀγριοφώνους.
 but που already / has left to Lemnos among Sintians of savage speech.
 CONJ που ADV / 3SG.PRS PREP ACC.SG PREP ACC.PL ACC.PL.

English: Come, love, let us to bed and take our joy, couched together. For Hephaestus is no longer here in the land, but has now gone, I ween, to Lemnos, to visit the Sintians of savage speech.

French: Vite au lit, ma chérie! quel plaisir de s'aimer!... Héphaestos est en route; il doit être à Lemnos, parmi ses Sintiens au parler de sauvages.

German: Komm, Geliebte, aufs Lager; wir legen uns nieder zur Freude; Nicht mehr zuhause ist unser Hephaistos; er weilt schon in Lemnos irgendwo eben; dort hausen die Sintier, kräftige Brüller.

Od. 8.293¹⁹ 20

The locative interpretation could be questioned on the basis of the meaning of the verb οἴχεται 'has departed'. Since there is already a specific location to which Hephaistos is going in the sentence, a locative reading of *που* is somewhat problematic. The other option is to see *που* in this example as modal. In that case, the argumentative orientation of *που* must be positive and the strength of the argumentation must be strong, because this phrase is part of an argumentation. Ares is trying to convince Aphrodite to have an adulterous affair with him now her husband is gone. If the argumentative strength were weak, that would only arouse Aphrodite's worries.

These examples show very clearly that without a very clear picture of the properties of modal *που*, it is impossible to decide which examples were locative, which ones were modal and which ones can be seen as possible bridging contexts. The modal translations of *που* are so different in these examples that either *που* had several modal interpretations, with different argumentative strengths, or (some of) these examples were locative and only one of the two types of modal interpretations was an option. However, all these examples contain locative markers, which would suggest that they may have been locative.

In the following sections, I will describe the contextual features of *που*, starting with the clear collocations (i.e. *δή*, *ἦ*, *εἰ*, *τις*, *γάρ*, *verbs of knowing*, *ἦ...ἦ...* and *μή*) and ending with the less clearly marked examples which have only their situational context in common.

10.2.3 *δή που* and *ἦ που* in epic texts

As was noted by Denniston, the combination of *δή* and *που* in Homer cannot always be read as 'of course', as is the case in classical times. In the following cases *που* cannot be interpreted like a straightforward 'of course', because of a counterfactual

¹⁹Trans. English: Murray (1919a), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

²⁰Ameis and Hentze (1879) say about *που* in this example: *που wohl* bezieht sich auf das Ziel ἐς Λῆμον. ἀλλά που ἤδη= β 164.

situation in example (7) and because of the second possibility that follows in example (8).

- (7) τὸν δ' ἐπικερτομέων προσέφησ' Πατρόκλεες ἵππευ:
ὦ πόποι ἦ μάλ' ἔλαφρός ἀνὴρ, ὡς ῥεῖα κυβιστᾶ.

εἰ δὴ που καὶ πόντῳ ἐν ἰχθυόεντι γένοιτο,
if ptcl που also see in full of fish would be,
CONJ PTCL ΠΟΥ PTCL DAT.SG PREP DAT.SG 3SG.AOR.OPT,

πολλοὺς ἂν κορέσειεν ἀνὴρ ὅδε τήθεα διφῶν
νηὸς ἀποθρώσκων, εἰ καὶ δυσπέμφελος εἴη,
ὡς νῦν ἐν πεδίῳ ἐξ ἵππων ῥεῖα κυβιστᾶ.
ἦ ῥα καὶ ἐν Τρώεσσι κυβιστητῆρες ἕασιν.

English: Then with mocking words didst thou speak to him, knight Patroclus: Hah, look you, verily nimble is the man; how lightly he diveth! If he were on the teeming deep, this man would satisfy many by seeking for oysters, leaping from his ship were the sea never so stormy, seeing that now on the plain he diveth lightly from his car. Verily among the Trojans too there be men that dive.

French: Ah! qu'il est souple, celui-là! quelle aisance dans ses sauts! S'il se trouvait un jour sur la mer poissonneuse, ce chercheur d'huîtres-là nourrirait bien des gens, en sautant ainsi du haut d'une nef, même par gros temps, à voir l'aisance avec laquelle il saute d'un char dans la plaine. Il est vraiment de bons sauteurs chez les Troyens!

German: Seht, wie behende der Mann, wie leicht er taucht in die Tiefe! Zeigte er nur im fischbelebten Meer seine Künste, viele würden gespeist von dem Mann, wenn er hoch von dem Borde spränge nach Austern, und stürmte das Meer auch noch so gewaltig, leicht, wie jetzt er im Felde vom Wagen sich wirft in die Tiefe. Wohl, auch im troischen Volke noch scheint es Taucher zu geben!

Il. 16.746²¹ 22

In example (7), Patroclus is speaking about a man who was just killed and fell off a wagon. We may read *δή* as 'evidently', since from the previous qualification that the man dived so well it follows (according to the speaker) that he would have been a good oyster seeker. An interpretation 'of course' is a bit problematic, because of the condition and the counterfactual situation. However, it is not completely impossible. The presence of a locative phrase *πόντῳ ἐν ἰχθυόεντι* 'in the sea full of fish', however, makes it also possible that *που* was interpreted as locative.

Ameis and Hentze (1879) suggest for example (8) that it may be read as locative, something that also seems possible for example (7). It is possible to read these examples as locative, as they contain references to non-specific places like on the sea

²¹Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

²²Ameis and Hentze (1905) εἰ δὴ που vgl ρ 484, *gesetzt gar etwa*.

(ἐν πόντῳ) in (7) and the mainland (ἠπείρου) in (8). The translators of example (7) did not translate δὴ and *που* at all, in example (8) only the German translator has translated *που* and he has chosen a locative interpretation.

- (8) τούτοισιν μὲν ταῦτα μέλει, κίθαρις καὶ ἀοιδή,
 ῥεῖ', ἐπεὶ ἀλλότριον βίστον νήποινον ἔδουσιν,
 ἀνέρος, οὗ δὴ *που* λεύκ' ὀστέα πύθεται ὄμβρῳ
 of a man, of whom ptcl *που* white bones are rotting rain
 GEN.SG REL.GEN.SG PTCL *που* ACC.PL ACC.PL 3SG.PRS.PASS DAT.SG
 κείμεν' ἐπ' ἠπείρου, ἢ εἰν ἀλὶ κῦμα κυλίνδει.
 lying on land, or into sea wave rolls.
 PTC.PRS.ACC.PL PREP GEN.SG CONJ PREP DAT.SG NOM.SG 3SG.PRS.

English: These men care for things like these, the lyre and song, full easily, seeing that without atonement they devour the livelihood of another, of a man whose white bones, rot in the rain as they lie upon the mainland, or the wave rolls them in the sea.

French: ils vivent chez autrui, mangeant impunément les vivres d'un héros, dont les os blanchissant, pourrissant à la pluie, jonchent quelque rivage ou roulent sous le flot.

German: Die da sind Leute, die halten es gerne mit Leier und Liedern; Leichtthin verzehrt sich ja fremdes Vermögen, da nichts es sie kostet. Dieses gehört einem Mann, dessen weiße Gebeine im Regen irgendwo liegen und faulen, im Meer, wo die Wogen sie rollen, oder im Festland.

Od. 1.161²³ 24

In example (8), we have a comparable problem. In this example, Telemachus, the son of Odysseus, is talking to Athena, who is disguised as a stranger. He has lost all hope that Odysseus will return, as is clear both from this passage and from a statement a few lines below: νῦν δ' ὁ μὲν ὡς ἀπόλωλε κακὸν μῦρον, οὐδέ τις ἡμῖν / θαλπωρή, εἴ πέρ τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων / φῆσιν ἐλεύσεσθαι: τοῦ δ' ὄλετο νόστιμον ἡμᾶρ. / "But now he has thus perished by an evil doom, nor for us is there any comfort, no, not though any one of men upon the earth should say that he will come; gone is the day of his returning."

In the synchronic corpus, δὴ *που* into can generally be interpreted as 'of course', implying that the information is supposed to be shared. However, since Telemachus cannot assume that the stranger to whom he is talking knows all about Odysseus' fate, an interpretation like 'of course' is not possible. This means that we may need to split δὴ *που* in δὴ + *που*. For *που* there are two options. Another modal interpretation or a locative interpretation. Both the passage itself and the extra lines cited above show that it is unlikely for Telemachus to be uncertain about the death of

²³Trans. English: Murray (1919a), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

²⁴Ameis and Hentze (1879): *Που* kann auch hier, wie 94, noch ortlich verstanden werden; vgl. Die Klage γ89.

Odysseus. This means that an uncertainty reading as is sometimes proposed in the literature does not really match this context. The only thing Telemachus may not know is whether Odysseus' bones are on the main land or at sea. On the other hand, a locative interpretation, as is chosen in the German translation fits the context much better. Telemachus may indicate by means of *δή* that he himself believes that it is evident that Odysseus is dead. Because of the verb to lie (*κείμεν'*) and the implication of a location by means of *ὄμβρω* 'in the rain', *που* can be interpreted as locative.

However, there are also instances in the epics that seem to be closer to the classical use of *δή που* and of which it is less likely that they were interpreted as locative, although a locative interpretation remains possible. In example (9) a supposedly common truth about mortals is used in an argument between Zeus and Hera, in which Hera wants to show that her involvement with the Trojan war is completely normal. Theoretically, it would be possible to say that 'some mortal anywhere evidently is likely to accomplish what he can for another man' in which *anywhere* stresses the general validity of the statement, but there is no direct locative marker to support that interpretation. Also the translations do not interpret the passage this way, but they choose a modal interpretation with a positive argumentative orientation (I ween, doch). The fact that this is presented as common knowledge, which is evident for everyone, allows *που* to be interpreted as modal.

- (9) καὶ μὲν δὴ πού τις μέλλει βροτὸς ἀνδρὶ τελέσσαι,
 even ptcl ptcl που some is likely mortal man accomplish,
 CONJ PTCL PTCL που NOM.SG 3SG.PRS NOM.SG DAT.SG INF.AOR,
 ὅς περ θνητός τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τόσα μήδεα οἶδε:
English: Lo, even a man, I ween, is like to accomplish what he can for another man, one that is but mortal, and knoweth not all the wisdom that is mine.
French: S'il est vrai qu'un homme doit, à l'égard d'un autre, achever son dessein, alors qu'il est mortel et sait si peu de choses,
German: Kann doch ein Irdischer selbst einem anderen Mann es vollenden, der nur ein Sterblicher ist und nicht so gewitzigt im Planen.

*Il.*18.362²⁵ 26

The following example has both the particles *ἤ* and *δή*. This is the only time in both the synchronic and the diachronic corpus that the particles *ἤ*, *δή* and *που* are found in the same clause, although *ἤ δή* does occur regularly. The French and German translators have chosen translations which we also find in the classical period for *δή που*. The reason this passage can be interpreted as modal is that it would be normal to assume that your enemy hopes to destroy your besieged city and that this enemy also is aware that you know that he wants that. Example (10) is one of about 4 examples in this corpus that theoretically could be interpreted as an explicitly metaphorically locative use of *που*, because of the presence of *ἐνὶ φρεσὶ* 'in your heart'. This use was probably the source of the modal interpretation of *ergens*. In chapter 11 we will

²⁵Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

²⁶Ameis and Hentze (1905) Που kann auch hier, wie 94, noch ortlich verstanden werden; vgl. Die Klage γ89.

discuss this type of examples more elaborately.

- (10) (ὥς Ἀντήνορος υἱὸς ἀγαυοῦ δῖος Ἀγήνωρ
οὐκ ἔθελεν φεύγειν, πρὶν πειρήσασαί τ' Ἀχιλλῆος.
ἀλλ' ὃ γ' ἄρ' ἀσπίδα μὲν πρόσθ' ἔσχετο πάντοσ' εἴσην,
ἐγχεῖη δ' αὐτοῖο τιτύσκετο, καὶ μέγ' αὐτεῖ')

ἦ δή που μάλ' ἔολπας ἐνὶ φρεσὶ φαίδιμ' Ἀχιλλεῦ
ptcl ptcl που very you hope in heart famous Achilles
PTCL PTCL ΠΟΥ ADV 2SG.PERF PREP DAT.PL VOC.SG VOC.SG

ἦματι τῶδε πόλιν πέρσειν Τρώων ἀγερώχων

English: (even so lordly Antenor's son, goodly Agenor, refused to flee till he should make trial of Achilles, but held before him his shield that was well-balanced upon every side, and aimed at Achilles with his spear, and shouted aloud:) Verily, I ween, thou hopest in thy heart, glorious Achilles, on this day to sack the city of the lordly Trojans.

French: "Tu t'es figuré sans doute en ton coeur, illustre Achille, que tu détruirais aujourd'hui la cité des Troyens altiers?"

German: Sicherlich hast du gar sehr schon gehofft, du stolzer Achilleus, heute wohl noch zu zerstören die Stadt der mutigen Troer.

Il. 21.583²⁷

The examples above show that *δήπου* in the epics had probably not yet become the fixed combination it is in the classical period. The interpretation of *δή* in combination with locative *που* seems possible in all instances, but the types of locative interpretations are not the same. The use of a locative to express the generality of a statement as in example (9) does not have the same relationship to a modal interpretation as a metaphorically locative interpretation as in (10). The only thing these examples seem to have in common is that what is said can be assumed to be generally known or retrievable information. If these contexts were bridging contexts, the process at work seems to be general inferencing, which was projected onto *που*, a form that did not function as an argument within the clause and which did not add much to the overall interpretation of the sentence. However, that would not explain why *που* was found so frequently in these clauses or how this process worked. Therefore, it is hard to say whether this really is the way the modal interpretation of (*δή*)*που* evolved.

ἦ που

Contrary to the examples of *δήπου* discussed above, the cases of *ἦ που* in the epics generally do show a clear modal interpretation, but *a fortiori* arguments which were most frequent in classical prose do not occur in Homer and Hesiod. The cases of *ἦ που* in the epics are mostly conclusions on the basis of indications in the direct context.

²⁷Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

In example (11), for instance, the sound of human voices is a reason to believe that there are humans around. The presence of existential *be* in combination with *σχεδόν* makes it possible to interpret this example as locative, but the type of situation is comparable to example (12).

- (11) (ὡς τέ με κουράων ἀμφήλυθε θῆλυς ἀυτή·
 νυμφάων, αἱ ἔχουσ' ὀρέων αἰπεινὰ κάρηνα
 καὶ πηγὰς ποταμῶν καὶ πίσεια ποιήεντα.)
 ἦ νύ που ἀνθρώπων εἰμὶ σχεδὸν ἀυδήέντων;
 ptcl now που people I am near of human speech;
 PTCL PTCL που GEN.PL 1SG.PRS ADV GEN.PL;

English: There rang in my ears a cry as of maidens, of nymphs who haunt the towering peaks of the mountains, the springs that feed the rivers, and the grassy meadows! Can it be that I am somewhere near men of human speech?
French: qu'entends-je autour de moi? des voix fraîches de filles? ou de nymphes, vivant à la cime des monts, à la source des fleuves, aux herbages des combes? ou serais-je arrivé chez des hommes qui parlent?²⁸
German: Doch eines ist sicher: Menschen mit menschlicher Stimme bin ich jetzt nahe.

Od. 6.125²⁹ 30

In the following example, the speaker suggests a quite general explanation for the unexpected behavior of Hector. He expects that this behavior is a sign that something bad has happened to Hector. Therefore, this example is comparable to the previous example. However, in this case a locative interpretation is very unlikely because trouble, as an abstract concept, generally does not have a place. The only way we could interpret this example as locative is if we implicitly add *in your heart* as was the case with *ergens*. In that case we would read *Did some trouble come upon thee somewhere [in your heart]*. As we will see on page 273, there are some cases in which we may read this metaphor explicitly. However, ἦ που is found in conclusions on the basis of new information more often, which suggests that this is a modal use of ἦ που.

- (12) Ἔκτορ υἱὲ Πριάμοιο, τί ἦ δὲ σὺ νόσφιν ἀπ' ἄλλων
 ἦσ' ὀλιγηπελέων;
 ἦ πού τί σε κῆδος ἰκάνει;
 ptcl που somehow you anxiety attains;
 PTCL που ACC.SG ACC.SG NOM.SG 3SG.PRS;

English: Hector, son of Priam, why is it that thou apart from the rest abidest here fainting? Is it haply that some trouble is come upon thee?

²⁸ According to the French editor, the lines should be reordered. The translator apparently has interpreted ἦ as ἦ and που does not seem to be translated, unless we see a translation of που in the use of the future du passé in *serais*.

²⁹ Trans. English: Murray (1919a), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

³⁰ Ameis and Hentze (1879): ἦ νύ που *oder etwa*.

French: Hector, fils de Priam, pourquoi es-tu là, assis loin des autres, sans force? Un souci te point sans doute.

German: Hektor, Priamos' Sohn, warum so fern von den andern sitztest du kraftlos hier? Hat irgendein Leid dich getroffen?

Il. 15.245³¹

One might argue that a conclusion on the basis of specific information is comparable to the line of reasoning *if x is the case than certainly y*, which would look very much like the instances in the synchronic corpus. However, there is also one example that does not show these characteristics as in example (13).

- (13) Πάτροκλ' ἦ που ἔφησθα πόλιν κεραϊζέμεν ἀμήν,
 Patroclus ptcl που you said city sack our,
 VOC.SG PTCL ΠΟΥ 2SG.IMPf ACC.SG INF.FUT ACC.SG,
 Τρωϊάδας δὲ γυναῖκας ἐλεύθερον ἡμᾶρ ἀπούρας
 ἄξειν ἐν νήεσσι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν

English: Patroclus, thou thoughtest, I ween, that thou wouldest sack our city, and from the women of Troy wouldest take the day of freedom, and bear them in thy ships to thy dear native land.

French: Ah! Patrocle, tu croyais sans doute que tu allais emporter notre ville, ravir aux femmes troyennes le jour de la liberté et les emmener sur tes nefes aux rives de ta patrie.

German: Patroklos, hast du so bald schon gehofft, unsre Stadt zu verwüsten und die troischen Weiber, beraubt der glücklichen Freiheit, fort in den Schiffen zu führen zum lieben Lande der Väter?

Il. 16.830³²

In this example, the speaker, who has just killed Patroclus, stresses that the hopes of Patroclus have been destroyed by repeating them in the past tense. Although functionally this may be seen as a conclusion on the basis of the fact that Patroclus is dead, literally this is not what is said in example (13). Therefore, this example shows that ἦ που can also be found outside of a conclusion.

What might be an explanation for this exception, is that ἦ is part of the words of Patroclus instead of of the matrix clause.³³ In that case Patroclus would have said that, verily, he would destroy the city. However, it is difficult to show whether this really was the case.

Summarizing, we can say that δὴ που does not seem to have its conventionalized modal function in the epics yet. In some examples it seems that δὴ που really consists of δὴ and locative που, in other examples it is possible to interpret both δὴ and που as modal, although not as 'of course' as is generally the case in classical Greek. The modal examples have in common that they are found in clauses that express

³¹Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

³²Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

³³For a more elaborate discussion of focalization in the Iliad, see Jong (1987).

accessible information, but are otherwise very different. Possibly, the development of locative *δή που* into modal *δή που* has taken place by means of inferencing and projecting this inference on the collocation *δή που*.

The collocation *ἦ που* is not used in a *fortiori* arguments, as in the synchronic corpus, but mostly in conclusions drawn on the basis of factual information. In most examples, this collocation is already clearly modal in the epic texts.

In general, we can say that the development of modal *που* probably took place before our first texts began, although *δή που* seems to have developed its conventional meaning only after the epic period.

10.2.4 *εἰ που* and *τίς που* in epic texts

What is comparable between the epics and the classical period, is the frequent collocation of the conditional conjunction *εἰ* and *που*. In the epics, this combination is even more frequent than in classical times: in the epics it occurs in 24% of the instances of *που*, whereas in classical times it is found in only 11% of the *που*-clauses. One of the possible explanations for this collocation, is that it is an effect of word order phenomena (*εἰ* is generally the first word in a clause and *που* the second). To test this, we compare the collocation of *εἰ* and *που* with the use of the semantically relatively neutral connector *δέ* ‘and, but’ and *που* in both corpora. Contrary to *εἰ*, the particle *δέ* ‘and, but’ is generally found in the second position in the clause, but much more robustly so than *που*. This means that *δέ* and *που*, if they are found within the same clause, are expected to occur adjacent to each other. The only intervention between *δέ* and *που* would normally be from other particles with the same word order preferences. These particles were not counted as intervening words. The conjunction *εἰ* ‘if’, which is in the first position in the clause would therefore also be expected to occur adjacent to *που*: the only forms that would normally intervene are other particles, which were not taken into account. This means that as long as *εἰ* and *δέ* are always in their respective positions in the first and second position in the clause, word order principles would have the same effect on their occurrence with *που*.

Since *δέ* ‘and, but’ is one of the most common connectors in Ancient Greek with a very regular position in the clause and a relatively neutral connective function, we will use it as a kind of gold standard, the occurrence of which we do not expect to be influenced by the presence of *που*. We will compare the frequency of *εἰ* and *δέ* on their own in both corpora. If there is no semantic influence of *που*, we would expect *εἰ* and *δέ* to have the same proportion with respect to each other in the corpora as a whole as in the examples with *που*, since if the combination with *που* is due to coincidence, the set of instances with *που* would just be a random sample. However, as can be seen from table 10.2, word order can on its own not explain the high frequency of the collocation *εἰ που*.

		εἶ που	δέ που	εἶ total	δέ total	Total nr. που
Epic poetry	(219,447 wo)	24.4% (40)	5.5% (9)	752 ³⁴	12211	164
Classical prose	(617,107 wo)	11% (43)	7% (25)	3799 ³⁵	18978	381

Table 10.2: The distribution of the collocations εἶ που compared to δέ που and the total frequency of εἶ and δέ in the early Greek epics and classical prose.

In table 10.2, I have given the numbers of the collocations of εἶ που and δέ που in percentages with respect to the total number of instances of που in each corpus (between brackets the raw numbers), as well as the frequencies of εἶ and δέ in the corpora in total. As we see in table 10.2, the proportion of instances of εἶ που and δέ που is the opposite of the situation in the corpora as a whole: although εἶ is far less frequent than δέ in the corpus as a whole, the opposite is true for εἶ που and δέ που in both epic poetry and classical prose. This is a good indication that the collocation εἶ που cannot just be an effect of word order.

From this short survey we can conclude that it would be interesting to see whether the collocation εἶ που can be said to contain one or more constructions and what the reason might be that these forms are so frequently combined.

In the synchronic corpus, examples of εἶ που often receive a locative translation, but a locative translation is not always the choice of the translators in the epics. However, the locative translations still seem overrepresented in the epic instances containing εἶ που. Of the 40 instances of που in epic εἶ-clauses 12 are considered to be locative by at least one translator (30%), whereas in the whole diachronic corpus only 23% (83 out of 355) is considered to be locative by at least one translator.

As was already said above in the section on the variation in the translations of που, the variation in the translations of εἶ που sentences is relatively high. On the basis of the strong preference for a locative interpretation in this context in the synchronic prose corpus we may hypothesize that also in the epics this group was in fact mainly locative. However, there are instances in which a locative interpretation does not really fit the context. This is for instance the case in example (14). In this

³⁴This number is found by a lemmatized TLG search on εἶ and ἐάν, filtering out the irrelevant forms. Because of their homonymy the variants ἦν (1sg, 3sg impf of *to be* and contraction of εἶ + ἄν) and ἄν (= εἶ + ἄν) had to be left out of this count. However, for the sake of this argument this does not matter, since the difference between the frequency of εἶ and δέ is so large that it is very unlikely to be reversed if we were able to take those forms into account. In addition, the total number of cases of ἦν in this corpus is only 32, so this can never change the large differences in frequency.

³⁵This number is found by a lemmatized TLG search on εἶ and ἐάν, filtering out the irrelevant forms. Because of their homonymy the variants ἦν (1sg, 3sg impf of *to be* and contraction of εἶ + ἄν) and ἄν (= εἶ + ἄν) had to be left out of this count. However, for the sake of this argument this does not matter, since the difference between the frequency of εἶ and δέ is so large that it is very unlikely to be reversed if we were able to take those forms into account. In addition, the total number of cases of ἦν in this corpus is only 516, so this can never change the large differences in frequency.

example, Achilles is mourning the death of Patroclus. He compares Patroclus' death to how he would feel if his father died, or his son. When he thinks of his son, he realizes that he does not know whether he is still alive, but continues to imagine how Patroclus, if he had not died, would have shown his son his possessions after he himself had died, as was foretold. Since Achilles has no reason to believe his son to be anywhere else than Scyros, as is shown by the fact that he is talking in the present tense about his son growing up in Scyros in the main clause, the use of *που* 'somewhere' does not seem to be appropriate.

(14) ἤε τὸν ὃς Σκύρω μοι ἔνι τρέφεται φίλος υἱός,

εἴ που ἔτι ζῶει γε Νεοπτόλεμος θεοειδής.
if που still lives ptcl Neoptolemos godlike.
CONJ που ADV 3SG.PRS PTCL NOM.SG NOM.SG.

English: nay, nor though it were he that in Scyros is reared for me, my son well-beloved, if so be godlike Neoptolemos still liveth.

French: Non, je saurais souffrir rien de pis, quand même j'apprendrais la mort [...] de mon fils qui grandit à Scyros - si du moins il vit encore, ce Néoptolème pareil à un dieu.

German: oder vom Tode des lieben Sohns, der in Skyros heranwächst; Wenn er wirklich noch lebt, Neoptolemos, göttlich von Ansehn.

Il. 19.327³⁶

However, Achilles has no specific reason either to believe that his son is dead, except for a possible assumption that if fate had taken Patroclus from him, it might also have taken away his son. The addition of more uncertainty to the conditional clause by means of *που* (*if perhaps*) is therefore not very likely, although the English translation seems to suggest such a reading. A reading like that would suggest that Achilles really has a specific reason to think that his son is dead. The only two remaining interpretations of *που* are either 'if at least godlike Neoptolemos is still alive' as in the French translation, which may also be triggered by the use of *γέ* *focus particle* or an interpretation of the type *if, of course, godlike Neoptolemos is still alive*, with an accent on *if*.

However, 'if he still lives somewhere', seems -out of this particular context- a very common thing to say about someone you haven't heard about for a long time, as can be seen from comparable statements in the *Odyssey* in which the phrase *εἴ που ἔτι ζῶει* 'if he is still alive somewhere' is used three times of Odysseus followed by locative-friendly phrases like *and sees the light of the sun* (e.g. *Od.* 20.207, 4.833, 14.44). Therefore, this expression may be either a formula that is used in a place where it does not completely fit, or in Homer the modal interpretation is completely acceptable in an *εἴ*-clause. The first option may sound somewhat strange, but as has been shown by Bakker (1988, 187), there are all kinds of indications that Homeric formulas are not always perfectly integrated in the context in which they are used. One of the examples given by Bakker (1988, 189) is a case in which a formula mentioning

³⁶Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

olives on a tree is used in the context of edible food. However, olives are not edible directly from a tree, which was presumably known to the poet. In other uses of the formula, it is found in the context of a garden, in which the olives on the tree fit perfectly. The same type of imperfect integration of a formula into the context may be an explanation for the use of *που* in example (14). Achilles is talking about someone he has not seen for a long time, just like in the case of the other uses of the formula, but the fact that he knows where his son is does not completely fit the fixed formula, which makes it less perfectly integrated in the context. From this example, we may conclude that the main reason not to interpret this example as locative, is that the overall context blocks this interpretation. Otherwise, the locative expression in the main clause and verb that implies a location in the *εἰ*-clause would be a good reason to interpret *που* as locative here.

What most of the examples of *εἶ που* have in common is that a locative interpretation of *που* would not be impossible, but it seems superfluous information, as in example (15). We see again that if we try to give a modal interpretation to this kind of use, we soon end up in an interpretation like in the French translation *seulement* ‘if only’. This gives us the choice either to assume on the basis of many of these examples some use of *εἶ που* (*τις*) which is comparable to *at least*, or to assume a locative reading.

(15) ἦ θήν σ' ἐξανύω γε καὶ ὕστερον ἀντιβολήσας,

εἶ	πού	τις	καὶ	ἔμοιγε	θεῶν	ἐπιτάρροθός	ἐστί.
if	που	someone	also	me	of the gods	helper	is.
CONJ	ΠΟΥ	NOM.SG	PTCL	DAT.SG=PTCL	GEN.PL	NOM.SG	3SG.PRS.

English: Verily I will yet make an end of thee, when I meet thee hereafter, if so be any god is helper to me likewise.

French: Sois tranquille; ton compte est bon, si je te rencontre, même dans longtemps. Que je trouve seulement, moi aussi, un dieu pour m'aider!

German: Sicherlich töt' ich dich noch, sobald ich dir künftig begegne, wollte vielleicht auch mir ein Gott zu Hilfe dann eilen!

Il. 11.366³⁷

An interesting feature of many of the examples of *εἶ που* is the presence of the indefinite pronoun *τις* (15 out of 40 (37.5%) examples in total). This implies that not only the location could be unknown, but also other participants (*τις* ‘some, someone, something’) or characteristics of the situation (*τι* *adv.* ‘somehow’). This is very similar to the common Flemish expression *ergens iets* ‘somewhere something’ or the use of *ergens* that was mentioned in section 10.2.2 above in which the main function of locative *ergens een of andere...* ‘somewhere some...’ seems to be to signal that the speaker does not have a specific individual or thing in mind. Of all 40 instances of *εἶ που* in the epics, there are only two examples in which such an interpretation would not fit at all. We will now discuss these two examples.

³⁷Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

In example (16), Nestor starts a request to finish their meal and postpone further stories to the next day. As part of his request he adds the phrase εἴ τί που ἔστι ‘if somehow *που* it is possible’ indicating that he does not want to be as impolite to request the impossible and giving his addressees the possibility to say what is possible and what is not possible.

- (16) καὶ νῦν, εἴ τί που ἔστι, πίθοιό μοι
 and now, if somehow *που* it is possible, listen to me
 CONJ ADV, CONJ ADV που 3SG.PRS, 2SG.AOR.OPT DAT.SG:
 οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ γε/τέρπομ’ ὀδυρόμενος μεταδόρπιος,
English: And now, if it may in any wise be, hearken to me, for I take no joy in weeping at supper time
French: Mais ce soir, si tu veux, écoute mon conseil: je ne trouve aucun charme à ces pleurs après boire;
German: Höre auch jetzt auf mich, wenn es irgendwie möglich!

Od.4.193³⁸ 39

The question here is what the function of *που* is. One of the options, which would fit the majority of the examples, is to say that the combination of *που* and *τις* is so generally used to denote a situation which is not specific that it does not matter that *που* is not directly referring to a place. In that case we would need to say that εἴ ποῦ *τις*, just like the Flemish *ergens iets* has become a marker of an unspecified situation in which the unspecified place is not the main point anymore. Another option is to interpret *που* as modal ‘if somehow -of course- it is possible’, expressing that the speaker suggests that it is generally recognized that he does not want to force anyone to do something that is impossible.

In the following example *που* is not only combined with *εἰ* and *τις*, but also with *δή*. Antinous just hit a wanderer in the home of Odysseus, who is assumed to be dead. In fact, the wanderer is Odysseus in disguise. In the Greek tradition, it is a holy custom that foreigners are treated well. This holy custom is upheld by the gods, who may test humans by appearing on their doorstep as beggars or wanderers to test the hospitality of humans. In example (17), Antinous is reprimanded for his bad behavior towards a guest.

- (17) Ἄντινο’, οὐ μὲν κάλ’ ἔβαλες δύστηνον ἀλήτην,
 οὐλόμεν’, εἰ δὴ ποῦ τις ἐπουράνιος θεός ἐστιν.
 wretched, if ptcl *που* some heavenly god is.
 VOC.SG, CONJ PTCL *που* NOM.SG NOM.SG NOM.SG 3SG.PRS.

English: Antinous, thou didst not well to strike the wretched wanderer. Doomed man that thou art, what if haply he be some god come down from heaven!
French: Antinoos, frapper un pauvre vagabond! insensé, quelle honte!... si c’était par hasard quelqu’un des dieux du ciel!

³⁸Trans. English: Murray (1919a), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

³⁹Ameis and Hentze (1879): εἴ τί που ἔστι *wenn es irgend etwa möglich ist*.

German: Nein, Antinoos, dies war nich schön, dieser Wurf auf den armen Bettler. Verwünschter du! Wenn es ein Gott es, ein Himmlischer wäre!

Od. 17.484⁴⁰ 41

Since the wanderer who may secretly be a god is actually there, it is hard to assume that *που* refers to the place in which the god is. However, the presence of *δή* in a conditional clause is already problematic by itself, because there is nothing in the conditional clause that can be evident. The only sensible interpretation is to let *δή* have scope over more than the propositional content of the conditional clause as in *You doomed (that is what you are), evidently, if this was some god from heaven*. However, if we allow *δή* to have scope over the whole sentence instead of only within the conditional clause, that may also be the case for *που*. In that case it would be possible to read this sentence as *Evidently, as we all know, doomed (as you are) if this is a god from heaven*. A modal interpretation like ‘of course’ is unlikely, because it is unknown whether the content of the conditional phrase is true. On the other hand this is typically a situation in which it does not matter exactly which god may be disguised as the wanderer and therefore this example could also be explained by a conventionalization of *εἴ ποῦ τις* in which *δή* expresses that it is evident that Antinous is in trouble if the wanderer really was a god. This would, again, point in the direction of a generalizing function of *που*.

We may conclude that *εἴ ποῦ τις* may have been a conventionalized expression. This is both shown by its high frequency and its sometimes not completely transparent interpretations, which may be comparable to Dutch *ergens een of andere* or Flemish *ergens iets*. Generally, it is possible to read *που* as a locative marker, which has as its main function to show that the speaker is not speaking about a specific occurrence or thing. There are a few cases, however, in which a locative interpretation is hardly possible. However, also in these cases the feature of not speaking about a specific situation, person or thing is present. This would be an indication that this generalizing use of the locative interpretation really was conventionalized up to the point that it may lose its locative connotation, just like in Flemish. However, it is not impossible to interpret some of these examples as modal, because the information provided is part of the general knowledge of the world.

As we said above, a collocation which is much more frequent in the epics than in the synchronic corpus is *μή ποῦ τις* ‘lest someone somewhere’ as in example (18). This seems to be the negative counterpart of *εἴ ποῦ τις*. None of the translators have translated *που* in this passage.

- (18) Εὐρύλοχ', ἧ μάλα δὴ με βιάζετε μούνον ἔοντα.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν μοι πάντες ὁμόσσετε καρτερὸν ὄρκον·
 εἴ κέ τιν' ἠὲ βοῶν ἀγέλην ἢ πῶυ μέγ' οἴων
 εὔρωμεν,

⁴⁰Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

⁴¹Ameis and Hentze (1879): εἰ δὴ που κτέ. *wenn es nun vielleicht ein Gott ist!* Halb Ausruf halb Frage, wie bei Schiller: "Wenn der Guss misslang?" Die Redeweise des Fremden (469. 475f.) macht die Übermütigen bedenklich.

μή πού τις ἀτασθαλίησι κακῆσιν
 lest που someone recklessness bad
 CONJ=NEG ΠΟΥ NOM.SG DAT.PL DAT.PL

ἢ βοῦν ἢέ τι μῆλον ἀποκτάνη·
 or cow or some cattle kills:
 CO ACC.SG CO ACC.SG ACC.SG 3SG.AOR.SUBJ.

English: Eurylochus, verily ye constrain me, who stand alone. But come now, do ye all swear to me a mighty oath, to the end that, if we haply find a herd of kine or a great flock of sheep, no man may slay either cow or sheep in the blind folly of his mind;

French: Je suis seul, Euryloque, et vous en abusez! Du moins jurez-moi, tous, le plus fort des serments que, si nous rencontrons quelque troupe de vache ou quelque grand troupeau de brebis, nul de vous n'aura l'impiété fatale d'en abattre; sagement, sans toucher ni vaches ni moutons,

German: Da ich allein bin, Eurylochos, könnt ihr ja freilich mich zwingen; Darum kommt un beschwört mir jetzt alle mit kräftigem Eide: Finden wir Herden von Rindern, finden wir Scharen von Schafen, keiner verfall mir dann in den törichten Frevel und schlachte irgendein Rind oder Schaf!

Od. 12.300⁴² 43

Example (18) can be syntactically interpreted in two ways. Either we can read the μή clause as the actual oath depending on the verb ὀμόσσατε 'you have to swear', or we can read the μή clause as a loosely constructed purpose clause. Arguments for that last reading are the evaluative description of the reason some of the soldiers may break their oath ἀτασθαλίησι κακῆσιν 'because of reckless badness' and the use of τις instead of a first person. These properties of the sentence are not likely to be part of the oath taken by the soldiers and the viewpoint clearly lies with Odysseus (the behavior would be a badness), who is advocating his view against protesting soldiers.

On the other hand, the conditional clause does not really seem to have a main clause if we choose the second reading and the conditional clause already contains a locative verb (εὔρωμεν 'we will find') giving the impression that Odysseus is talking about a specific place (i.e. the place in which they see the cattle). From this point of view, it would be problematic to interpret που as locative, since the location is already mentioned. However, from the context it is clear that Odysseus means *in every case in which you see cattle*. The suggestion of repetition makes it possible to give an indefinite locative interpretation to που in the μή-clause.

A modal interpretation is problematic because the που-clause more or less expresses the oath that Odysseus wants his men to swear. Any form of modification would bring in even more of Odysseus' viewpoint. Theoretically, it would be possible

⁴²Trans. English: Murray (1919a), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

⁴³Ameis and Hentze (1879): μή πού τις mit dem Konjunktiv wie σ65, dass nicht etwa einer, als warnendes Verbot zum Ausdruck dessen, was sie schwören sollen nicht zu tun; sonst folgt nach ὀμόσαι der Infinitiv.

to read ‘in order that - as is my wish, as you know by now - no one will slaughter...’ However, a generalizing locative interpretation seems to fit the context and the general use of *που* in repeatable clauses better, since, just like in many *εἴ που*-clauses, it does not matter in this passage who wants to slaughter the cattle or where or when he wants to do it: he is not allowed to do so. Therefore, it seems most likely that *που* has a generalizing locative value here.

Concluding, we can say that the collocation of *εἴ που* is more frequently found than would be expected on the basis of the general frequency of *εἰ* in the corpus and a comparison with the particle *δέ*. In the synchronic prose corpus almost all instances of *εἴ που* were translated as locative, but this was not the case in the epic corpus. However, *εἴ που*-sentences are more frequently interpreted as locative than would be expected on the basis of the frequency of locative interpretations of *που* in the corpus as a whole (30% of the the *εἴ που*-clauses is interpreted as locative whereas in the epics, tragedy and comedy together this was only 23%). The amount of variation in the translations of *εἴ που*-clauses was relatively high. This may be because there are only very few examples in this category in which a locative interpretation is not at least possible. Another characteristic of *εἴ που*-clauses was their frequent co-occurrence with forms of the indefinite pronoun *τις* ‘some, someone, something, somehow’. The combination of *που* with the indefinite pronoun reminded us of the Flemish use of *ergens iets*, which was discussed in our corpus study of *ergens*. In Flemish, this has become a construction to mark that more specific information is not known or not relevant. It can be used both in locative and non-locative contexts. In many of the cases of *εἴ που* in which a locative interpretation did not fit the context very well we also found *τις* or a reference to a person, thing or situation of which the specific details were not important, because the situation frequently reoccurred and the participants changed or because there were other reasons the details did not matter. Therefore, it was proposed that Ancient Greek also used *που* as a generalizing (locative) marker. This use was frequently found in *εἰ*-clauses with *τις*, but not exclusively.

Another collocation, which was not found in the synchronic corpus, is *ἢ που...ἢ...* ‘either *που*... or...’. To this collocation we will turn now.

10.2.5 The collocation *ἢ που...ἢ...* ‘either *που*... or...’

There are 22 examples out of 164 (13%) in which *που* is found in *either... or...* sentences in the epics. This raises the question of whether this was a construction and whether all these examples have the same interpretation. If we look at the translations, we find 6 cases in which at least one translator used a locative translation, there are 13 cases in which only one translator chose a modal translation whereas the other translators did not translate *που* and the types of modal translations differ. This leaves us with 3 cases in which none of the translators translated *που*. Especially the French translators did not generally translate *που* in this type of sentences. Possibly this is because the standard translations of *που* are relatively informal and this translation uses a very high register. The English translator translates almost all cases with *haply*, whereas the German translation uses both locative translations

(e.g. example (19)) and modal translations. These modal translations can have both a neutral/negative argumentative orientation (e.g. (21)) and a positive one (e.g. (20)). The direction or the argumentative orientation and the types of translations used for each particular example of *που* frequently differs between the translators.

In example (19), the English translator has chosen to stress the possibility of the meeting places, but the German translation decided to let the fact that these are two locations be leading. Since I have not found any compelling evidence for *που* ‘haply’, I would prefer the locative reading.

- (19) σιγῆ νῦν, μή τίς με προσαυδάτω ἐπέεσσιν
 ὑμετέρων ἐτέρων, ξυμβλήμενος ἢ ἐν ἀγυιῇ,
 ἢ που ἐπὶ κρήνη
 or που at well
 CONJ που PREP DAT.SG

English: Be silent now, and let no one of your company speak to me, if he meets me in the street or haply at the well,

French: Silence maintenant! que personne jamais ne m'accoste ou me parle, si quelqu'un de vos gens me rencontre soit dans la rue, soit à la source.

German: Jetzt aber still! Kein Wort darf keiner von euren Gefährten, wen er mich irgendwo trifft, an mich richten; nicht auf der Straße nicht an der Quelle.

Od. 15.442⁴⁴ 45

- (20) ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ διοτρεφὲς Εὐρύπυλ' ἦρωας,
 ἢ ῥ' ἔτι που σχήσουσι πελώριον Ἴηκτορ' Ἀχαιοί,
 either ptcl still που hold mighty Hector Achaeans,
 CONJ PTCL ADV που 3PL.FUT ACC.SG ACC.SG NOM.PL

ἢ ἤδη φθίσονται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δουρὶ δαμέντες;

English: But come, tell me this, Eurypylus, warrior fostered of Zeus, will the Achaeans haply still hold back mighty Hector, or will they now perish, slain beneath his spear?

French: Mais, réponds-moi, Eurypyle, divin héros: les Achéens sont-ils encore en mesure de contenir le monstrueux Hector? ou sont-ils donc désormais voués à périr par lui, domptés sous sa javeline?

German: Sage mir dies doch an. Eurypylos, Göttlicher Krieger: Werden die Danaer wohl dem gewaltigen Hektor noch trotzen, oder sinken sie schon, von seiner Lanze bezwungen?
Il. 11.820⁴⁶

In example (21) both the English and the German translation have chosen a translation with a neutral/negative argumentative orientation.

⁴⁴Trans. English: Murray (1919a), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

⁴⁵Ameis and Hentze (1879): *που vielleicht*.

⁴⁶Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

- (21) ὦ φίλοι οὐκ ἂν δῆ τις ἀνὴρ πεπίθοιθ' ἐῷ αὐτοῦ
 θυμῷ τολμήεντι μετὰ Τρώας μεγαθύμους/ἐλθεῖν,
 εἷ τινά που δηΐων ἔλοι
 in order to someone που slaying seize
 CONJ ACC.SG ΠΟΥ PTC.PRS.NOM.SG 3SG.AOR.OPT
 ἐσχατόωντα, ἢ τινά που καὶ φῆμιν ἐνὶ
 straying about the edge of the camp or some που even rumor in
 PTC.PRS.ACC.SG CONJ ACC.SG ΠΟΥ PTCL ACC.SG PREP
 Τρώεσσι πύθοιτο,
 Trojans hear
 DAT.PL 3SG.AOR.OPT

English: My friends, is there then no man who would trust his own venturesome spirit to go among the great-souled Trojans, if so be he might slay some straggler of the foemen, or haply hear some rumour among the Trojans

French: Amis, n'est-il pas un guerrier qui s'assure assez en son coeur hardi pour aller, au milieu des Troyens magnanimes, voir s'il peut s'emparer de quelque ennemi sur leur ligne avancée, ou bien encore saisir quelque rumeur au milieu des Troyens sur ce qu'ils méditent en leur âme?

German: Freunde, möchte denn jetzt kein Mann dem eigenen kühnen Mute vertraun und selbst zu den mutigen Troern sich wagen? Ob er einen Versprengten vielleicht von den Feinden ergriffe, oder vielleicht ein Gespräch der troischen Männer behorchte, was sie untereinander beraten.

Il. 10.207⁴⁷

The translations in example (21) seem to be based on the fact that two options are presented. However, since both instances of *που* are part of purpose clauses, markers with a neutral/negative argumentative orientation seem to stress very strongly that this may not be successful, which is either a rhetorical trick of the speaker, for which there is little evidence, or just not very helpful for his goal (i.e. finding volunteers to do this). Someone who is told that there is little chance that he will be successful, generally does not feel very inclined to do something, unless he feels challenged. In addition, locative markers are present in both clauses (respectively ἐσχατόωντα 'straying about the edge of the camp' and ἐνὶ Τρώεσσι 'among the Trojans'). Again it does not really matter where this person is or what rumor is learned and the function of *που* seems to be to make this situation less specific. This suggests that a (generalizing) locative interpretation is an option in this example.

Many of the cases of *που* in *either... or...*-clauses are combined with the pronoun *τις* and in many respects these examples are similar to the εἷ πού τις examples discussed above. Just like in the εἷ πού τις cases, most of these instances are also accompanied by words that imply locations. There are 14 out of 22 examples in which a locative verb or preposition is found in the same clause and in addition there are

⁴⁷Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

several examples in which other words in the clause imply a location, as in example (22).

In example (22) the speaker asks about the land he has arrived on, whether it is an island or mainland. Since the speaker does not know where this land is located and pieces of land inherently have a place a locative interpretation is possible as well as a more generalizing locative interpretation. The translators do not translate *που*.

- (22) ἦ πού τις νήσων εὐδείελος, ἦέ τις ἀκτὴ
 either *που* some isles clear-seen, or some foreland
 CONJ *που* NOM.SG GEN.PL NOM.SG, CONJ NOM.SG NOM.SG
 κεῖθ' ἀλὶ κεκλιμένη ἐριβόλακος ἠπείροιο;
 lies sea resting very fertile land
 3SG.PRS DAT.SG PTC.PERF.NOM.SG GEN.SG GEN.SG;

English: Is it some clear-seen island, or a shore of the deep-soiled mainland that lies resting on the sea?

French: Est-ce une île pointant sur les flots comme une aire ou, penchée sur la mer, n'est-ce que l'avancée d'un continent fertile?

German: Ists ein Insel, die weithin man sieht, oder lehnt eine Küste hier sich ans Meer, eine Festlandserde voll mächtiger Schollen?

Od. 13.234⁴⁸

In one case there are no locative markers or other indefinite markers and a locative interpretation is not likely. In example (23), fear cannot hold someone somewhere, or be somewhere unless we interpret this instance as metaphorical, like in the case of *ergens*. However, the fact that the fear is the subject in this clause makes it difficult to interpret this as happening within someone's mind. A second option is that the speaker, the goddess Athena, is merely offering a possible suggestion, as is the choice of the English translator. A third option is to interpret *που* as marking that they both know that the last option in fact is the right solution. This is shared information, since this is about the state of mind of the addressee himself. The latter interpretation is largely in line with the interpretation of Bolling (1929, 102), who says that 'The particle then expresses the confidence of the speaker that this time he has hit the truth'. Example (23) is followed by the conclusion and accusation that Diomedes, the addressee, does not live up to his father's standards, which can of course be both about his physical endurance and about his courage.

- (23) ἀλλά σευ ἢ κάματος πολυᾶϊξ γυῖα δέδυκεν
 ἦ νύ σέ που δέος ἴσχει ἀκήριον
 or now you που fear restrains heartless
 CONJ PTCL ACC.SG *που* NOM.SG 3SG.PRS NOM.SG

English: yet either hath weariness born of thy many onsets entered into thy limbs, or haply spiritless terror possesseth thee.

⁴⁸Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

French: est-ce donc la fatigue du combat bondissant qui pénètre tes membres? ou est-ce une terreur lâche qui te retient?

German: Deine Glieder jedoch sind matt vom stürmischen Treffen, oder dich lähmt gar Furcht, die entseelende!

Il. 5.812⁴⁹

Concluding, we can say that most of the examples of *που* in *either... or...* clauses seem to have a generalizing locative interpretation. However, there are some exceptions, which may have received a modal interpretation.

10.2.6 General contextual characteristics of modal *που* in the epics

As we said in the theoretical chapter, we are trying to find out what knowledge a language user may have used when interpreting modal *που*. One of the types of information a speaker may have used, is the kind of situation in which *που* is commonly used. As we already saw above, we find *που* in conditional clauses describing generally occurring or recurring situations, in (negative) purpose clauses and *either... or...* clauses. However, there are also some regularities in the situational contexts of *που* that are not directly connected to a particular collocation. These cases will be discussed in this section.

As was already noted by Wackernagel (1885) and Bolling (1929), we find *που* commonly (8 times) in (fatalistic) statements about the gods in the epics.⁵⁰ Many of these examples are quite fatalistic, which makes it likely that the speaker is presenting what he supposes to be the common view in his community. Two of these examples were already mentioned in (3) and (5) above. They are reproduced below in (24) and (25). Two new examples are presented under (26) and (27).

In example (24) the speaker presents the actual reality of a possible situation as knowledge of the Gods. Both the French and the German translators have chosen a reinforcing translation of *που* (*savent bien*, *wohl*). It seems unlikely that the speaker doubts the knowledge of Zeus and the other gods here because it is a generally shared assumption in (Greek) religion that the gods know what is going to happen.

(24) Ζεὺς γάρ που τό γε οἶδε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ
 Zeus for που the ptcl knows and immortal gods
 NOM.SG CONJ. ΠΟΥ ART.ACC.SG FOC.PTCL 3SG.PRS CO NOM.PL NOM.PL

ἄλλοι,
 other,
 NOM.PL.

εἶ κέ μιν ἀγγείλαιμι ἰδών

English: For Zeus, I ween, and the other immortal gods know whether I have seen him, and could bring tidings;

French: Zeus et les autres dieux immortels savent bien si, l'ayant vu, je puis

⁴⁹Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

⁵⁰That is, in the following passages: *Il.* 10.70; *Il.* 14.69; *Il.* 14.120; *Il.* 21.83. *Il.* 13.225; *Od.* 6.190; *Od.* 14.119.

t'en donner des nouvelles;

German: Zeus wird es wissen und wohl auch die andern unsterblichen Götter, ob ich ihn sah und melden ihn könnte;

Od. 14.119⁵¹ 52

Talents are seen as gifts from the gods in Greek religion, an assumption which is used in example (25) to remind Achilles that his strength is not his personal achievement and therefore not something on which he should pride himself. The argument is more effective because it is based on a generally accepted worldview in Greek society. If this was just the personal opinion of Agamemnon, the speaker, it would be far less effective, because it would just express that Agamemnon is not impressed with Achilles' strength, whereas this statement about the gods implies that no one needs to honor Achilles because of his strength, since it is only a gift from the gods. This would mean that stressing that this is common knowledge is rhetorically making this a more effective way of offending Achilles.

- (25) εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἔσσι, θεός που σοὶ τό γ' ἔδωκεν
 if very strong you are, god που you the ptcl has given
 CONJ ADV NOM.SG 2SG.PRS, NOM.SG που DAT.SG ACC.SG PTCL 3SG.AOR
English: If you are very strong, it was a god, I think, who gave you this gift.
French: Pourtant, si tu es fort, ce n'est qu'au Ciel que tu le dois...
German: Bist du gewaltig, so hat ein Gott wohl die Kraft dir gegeben!

Il. 1.178⁵³ 54

In example (26), we find an explanation of why certain things happened: because Zeus and the gods wanted it that way. This is also commonly assumed in (Greek) religion, that things happen the way they happen because the gods want it that way. This may be assumed to be shared information and a hedge here would mean that this basic assumption is called into question. For this last option, there is no evidence in the broader context.

- (26) ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν αὐτόθι μεῖνε, πατήρ δ' ἔμὸς Ἄργεϊ νάσθη / πλαγχθεῖς:

ὡς γάρ που Ζεὺς ἤθελε καὶ θεοὶ ἄλλοι.
 Such for που Zeus wanted and gods other.
 ADV CONJ που NOM.SG 3SG.IMPF CO NOM.PL NOM.PL.

English: He verily abode there, but my father went wandering to Argos, and there was settled, for so I ween was the will of Zeus and the other gods.

French: Mais cependant qu' OEnée demeurait là, mon père, lui, s'en fut, au bout de ses erreurs, se fixer à Argos. Ainsi sans doute en avaient décidé Zeus et les autres dieux.

⁵¹Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

⁵²Ameis and Hentze (1879): 119= Γ 308. που ... οἶδε weiss wohl, mag wissen. Aus dem lokalen πὸν (v415. ξ 44) ist ein modales geworden Zum Gedanken vgl. ο 523. β 332.

⁵³Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

⁵⁴Latacz and West (2000): wenn du sehr stark bist, hat doch wohl ein Gott dir das gegeben!

German: Dieser blieb daheim, indessen mein Vater nach Argos wanderte, lange verirrt; so wollten es Zeus und die Götter.

Il. 14.120⁵⁵

A last example can be found in (27), in which Nausikaa is explaining why she does not assume that Odysseus is a bad man, because he is ill-fated. She says that Zeus gives ill fate to both good and bad men and he has given Odysseus' fate to him. This last statement clearly is just an implication of the way things are commonly assumed to work according to Nausikaa.

- (27) (τὸν δ' αὖ Ναισικᾶα λευκώλενος ἀντίον ἠΰδα
 ξεῖν', ἐπεὶ οὔτε κακῶ οὔτ' ἄφροني φωτὶ ἔοικας
 Ζεὺς δ' αὐτὸς νέμει ὄλβον Ὀλύμπιος ἀνθρώποισιν,
 ἐσθλοῖς ἠδὲ κακοῖσιν, ὅπως ἐθέλησιν, ἐκάστω')

καί που σοὶ τὰδ' ἔδωκε, σὲ δὲ χρεὶ τετλάμεν
 and που to you this he has given, you and must suffer
 CONJ που DAT.SG ACC.PL 3SG.AOR, ACC.SG AND 3SG.PRS INF.PERF

ἔμπης.

in any case.

ADV.

(νῦν δ', ἐπεὶ ἡμετέρην τε πόλιν καὶ γαῖαν ἰκάνεις,
 οὔτ' οὖν ἐσθῆτος δευήσσαι οὔτε τευ ἄλλου,
 ὧν ἐπέοιχ' ἰκέτην ταλαπεῖριον ἀντιάσαντα.)

English: (Then white-armed Nausicaa answered him: Stranger, since thou seemest to be neither an evil man nor a witless, and it is Zeus himself, the Olympian, that gives happy fortune to men, both to the good and the evil, to each man as he will;) so to thee, I ween, he has given this lot, and thou must in any case endure it. (But now, since thou hast come to our city and land, thou shalt not lack clothing or aught else of those things which befit a sore-tried suppliant when he cometh in the way.)

French: s'il t'a donné ces maux, il faut bien les subir

German: Dir wohl gab er das Deine; da mußt du es eben ertragen.

Od. 6.190^{56 57}

The examples above show that *που* is regularly found in uncontroversial statements about the gods. As was noted by Bolling (1929) and Wackernagel (1885), these examples do not aim to raise doubts about religious assumptions. They are rather religious truisms, that are shared by the whole religious community. This is comparable to many of the examples we saw in the synchronic prose corpus in which we also found that *που* is frequently found in statements of which the content is ac-

⁵⁵Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

⁵⁶Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

⁵⁷Bierl and Latacz (2008): καί που σοί *auch wohl dir*.

cessible to the addressee (i.e. already known or deducible from what is known). The examples above suggest that this use was already present in the epics.

Another type of situation in which *που* is found regularly is, as was also noted in the LfgE, the attribution of actions, thoughts or motives to others. However, most of the attributed actions, thoughts or motives are directly related to the role the people to whom they are attributed are playing: a daughter of whom parents are imagined to be proud, an enemy who is suggested to wish to conquer the city he is attacking, or a family whose head of household is far away, which is supposedly sitting in their home waiting for the head of household to return. This means that these attributions do not really contain guesswork of the speaker. Generally, the speaker is describing situations that he assumes to have occurred on the basis of information that is generally known.

In example (28), for instance, Odysseus is imagining the feelings of pride that he assumes Nausikaa's family to feel for her, because of her beauty.

- (28) εἰ μὲν τις θεός ἐσσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν,
 Ἄρτεμιδί σε ἐγὼ γε, Διὸς κούρη μέγαλοιο,
 εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε φυήν τ' ἄγχιστα εἴσκω·
 εἰ δέ τις ἐσσι βροτῶν, τοὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ ναιετάουσιν,
 τρὶς μάκαρες μὲν σοί γε πατήρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ,
 τρὶς μάκαρες δὲ κασίγνητοι·

μάλα πού σφισι θυμὸς/ αἰὲν εὐφροσύνησιν ἰαίνεται
 much που to them heart/ always with glad thoughts is warmed
 ADV ΠΟΥ DAT.PL NOM.SG ADV DAT.PL 3SG.PRS.PASS

εἴνεκα σεῖο,
 because of you
 PREP GEN.SG

λευσσόντων τοιόνδε θάλος χορὸν εἴσοιχνεῦσαν.

English: But if thou art one of mortals who dwell upon the earth, thrice-blessed then are thy father and thy honored mother, and thrice-blessed thy brethren. Full well, I ween, are their hearts ever warmed with joy because of thee, as they see thee entering the dance, a plant so fair.

French: comme, en leurs cœurs charmés, tu dois verser la joie, chaque fois qu'à la danse, ils voient entrer ce beau rejet de la famille!...

German: um deinetwillen ja wird sich immer und stark ihr Gemüt erwärmen mit guten Gedanken, wenn sie ein solches Geschöpf im Reigen schreitend erblicken.

Od. 6.155⁵⁸

The available evidence (Nausikaa's appearance and behavior as well as Odysseus knowledge of how a Greek family works) leads Odysseus to the conclusion that this must be the case. Since the evidence that is available to him is also available to his

⁵⁸Trans. English: Murray (1919b), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

addressees, he may assume others will come to the same conclusion, which makes this accessible information.

In example (29), Agamemnon is speaking to the assembled warriors, who all know the situation. Agamemnon assumes that their wives and children are in their houses waiting for them, because that is what they are commonly supposed to do. Therefore, this attribution is an imagination of a situation on the basis of shared knowledge, which is already accessible for his addressees.

- (29) (έννέα δὴ βεβάασι Διὸς μεγάλου ένιαυτοί, καὶ δὴ δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν καὶ σάρτα λέλυνται')

αἱ δέ που ήμέτεράι τ' ἄλοχοι καὶ νήπια τέκνα/ εἶατ'
 they and που our ptcl wives and infant children/ are sitting
 NOM.PL CONJ που NOM.PL PTCL NOM.PL CO NOM.PL NOM.PL 3PL.PERF

ένι μεγάροις ποτιδέγμεναι'
 in halls waiting
 PREP DAT.PL NOM.PL

ἄμμι δὲ ἔργον/ αὔτως ἀκράαντον οὔ εἶνεκα δεῦρ' ἰκόμεσθα.

English: (Already have nine years of great Zeus gone by, and lo, our ships' timbers are rotted, and the tackling loosed;) and our wives, I ween, and little children sit in our halls awaiting us; yet is our task wholly unaccomplished in furtherance whereof we came hither.

French: et, tandis que, chez nous, femmes, jeunes enfants, en nos manoirs attendant, la tâche reste inachevée, pour laquelle justement nous sommes arrivés ici.

German: Unsere Weiber indes und unerfahrenen Kinder sitzen daheim und schmachten nach uns; doch gänzlich erfolglos, enden wir nimmer das Werk, um dessentwillen wir kamen.

Il. 2.136⁵⁹

Several other types of recurring situations in *που*-contexts have been discussed in the sections on specific collocations. What we can conclude from the two types of situations discussed here is that in the epics we also find the pattern of *που* occurring in clauses of which the information is accessible, which strengthens the conclusions that were drawn on the basis of the synchronic prose data.

In this section, we have seen that apart from the situational contexts in which *που* was used frequently that were mentioned in the sections on specific collocations such as conditional clauses describing generally occurring or recurring situations, (negative) purpose clauses and *either... or*-clauses, *που* was also frequently used in other types of situational contexts. We found *που* regularly in (fatalistic) statements about the gods, which can be seen as generally accessible information and in sentences in which role related actions, thoughts or motives were attributed to others, which is inferable information.

⁵⁹Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

10.2.7 Conclusion on epic *που*

In this section on epic *που*, we described the contextual characteristics of epic *που* and linked them to tendencies in translations in three languages. We compared these results with the results of the synchronic prose corpus that was studied in the previous chapter in order to see whether we could find traces of the development of modal *που* in the earlier texts. We will start this conclusion with a summary of the results of the contextual study of *που*.

Regularities in the context of epic που and their relations to interpretations

Modal interpretations of *που* are already found in the epics, although the number of instances in which a locative interpretation is possible is somewhat higher than in the synchronic corpus (25% vs 20%). Especially the cases of ἢ *που* seem to provide clear evidence for a modal interpretation of *που*, whereas in many cases of δή *που*, *που* in fact still seems to have a locative function.

A category that is very prominent in the epics is the use of *που* with the pronoun *τις*. In most of these cases, we can interpret *που τις* as a way of generalizing the statement. Not a specific instance is meant, but the phenomenon in general. This use is also found in conditional clauses or complement clauses with a conditional, or in *either... or...* constructions. This means that there may have been a connection for speakers between a generalizing (locative) use of *που* and its use together with εἴ (*τις*) ‘if, whether’, μή (*τις*) ‘lest, so that not’, *τις* ‘someone, some, something, somehow, and ἢ (*τις*)...ἢ ‘either...or’.

Just like in the synchronic prose corpus, modal *που* is collocated with ἢ, εἰ and *τις* in the epics. Although they are present, collocations with δή, γάρ and verbs of knowing are less frequent than in the prose corpus. Collocations that are present in epics that were not present in the synchronic prose corpus are: ἢ *που*... ἢ..., and μή *που*.

The locative instances of *που* are generally accompanied by locative verbs and locative adverbs or prepositions.

In total we are left with 45 instances in which the *που*-clause does not contain one of these markers. This means that by only following the collocational patterns described above, a speaker would already be able to interpret 73% (119) of the instances of *που* in the epics (164). This clearly was not (always) an automatic process, since in some cases there are several contradicting cues in the context (e.g. a locative verb in a sentence with a modal marker). However, in general we can say that it seems that much of the interpretative work may have been done by using the speaker’s knowledge about the conventional contexts and its conventional interpretations.

In addition, we found that there were some situational contexts that seemed to occur frequently: 1. *που* was frequently found in (fatalistic) truisms about the gods and 2. *που* was also found in situations in which a speaker imagined a third person to have certain thoughts or be in a certain situation which were easily linkable to that person’s situation. Both types of contexts showed a clear relationship with (generally) accessible knowledge.

The comparison between the epics and the synchronic prose corpus

As was said above, the modal use of *που* seemed to have been present already in the epic period. This made it hard to find out more about the development of modal *που*. However, the interpretation of modal *που* seemed to be in line with our findings in the prose corpus: many contexts clearly indicated that the information presented in the *που*-clause was already accessible to the addressee. However, the collocation *δή που* does not seem to have been a collocation yet. Also there were some collocations which we did not find in the synchronic prose corpus: *μή που* and *ἤ που...ἤ*. Although there was more disagreement in the translations on the interpretations of *που*, I have not been able to find clear bridging contexts. This is probably due to the fact that modal *που* already arose before the textual transmission started.

10.3 The use of *που* in tragedy and comedy

10.3.1 Translations and collocations of *που* in tragedy and comedy

The second part of the diachronic corpus, which consists of tragic and comic works, is for a small part contemporary with the synchronic prose corpus. The main difference is that it is poetry. Because the earliest texts in this corpus are a bit older than the synchronic prose corpus and the genre of tragic poetry is more closely related to epic poetry than the prose texts in the synchronic corpus, we may find some traces of the development of, for instance, *δή που* in this corpus. In addition, this corpus of tragedy and comedy may show us to what extent the characteristics found in the synchronic prose corpus were genre related and thus this corpus of tragedy and comedy may be seen as a test case for the conclusions that were drawn in the chapter on the synchronic prose corpus.

The level of variation in the translations of *που* between locative and modal in tragedy and comedy (+/- 500-390 BC) sits between that of the epic part of the corpus and that of the synchronic prose corpus. The percentage of cases in which the translators did not agree on the choice between locative and modal was 18.2% (30 out of 164) in the epic corpus, 10.5% (20 out of 191) in tragedy and comedy and 5.8% (22 out of 381) in the synchronic corpus. However, the earlier tragic works from Aeschylus do not cause greater variance than the later works, which makes it difficult to say whether this change is due to a diachronic development or to genre differences. What is clear, is that most of the controversial instances in tragedy and comedy contain locative markers like locative adverbs and verbs or are combined with *εἰ* or *τις*.

The top 10 translations of modal *που* (again defined on the basis of the absence of locative translations) do differ from the epic corpus and are much more in line with the synchronic corpus in that the argumentative orientation of the most frequent translations is clearly positive (e.g. surely, no doubt, sans doute, naturellement, wohl, doch).

From table 10.3 it is clear that the translations of this part of the diachronic corpus are much closer connected to the translations of the synchronic prose corpus

English		French		German	
Modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in tragedy and comedy (+/-500BC - +/-390 BC)					
[no transl.]	61	[no transl.]	59	[no transl.]	90
surely	21	sans doute	32	wohl	20
no doubt	8	naturellement	9	doch	9
perhaps	8	je suppose	7	ja	4
I suppose	5	peut-être	5	doch wohl	3
I think	6	donc	3	vielleicht	3
must	4	je pense	3	etwa	2
ever	3	quelque	3	je	2
must be	3	pourtant	3	für sicher	1
somehow	3	certes	2	du begreifst doch	1
Classical modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ (+/- 400 BC - +/-350 BC)					
[no transl.]	119	[no transl.]	75	[no transl.]	87
surely	47	j'imagine	23	doch	62
I presume	15	sans doute	20	doch wohl	31
of course	14	à plus forte raison	13	wohl	23
I suppose	12	certes	10	sicherlich	10
you know	11	je crois	10	ja	7
as you know	5	évidemment	9	gewiss	5
I take it	5	n'est-ce pas?	9	ja wohl	5
certainly	4	à coup sûr	8	bekanntlich	4
I imagine	4	assurément	8	ohne Zweifel	3

Table 10.3: The top ten translations of modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in tragedy and comedy compared to the synchronic prose corpus. N.B. this table is to be read vertically, since the translations in the three languages are not consistent enough to line them up horizontally.

than was the case for the epic corpus. The same is true for the collocational properties of tragedy and comedy as we can see from table 10.4.

In this table, we see that $\delta\eta\ \pi\omicron\upsilon$ is already quite frequent in the tragedy and comedy corpus and clearly more frequent than in the epic corpus (respectively 18.1% and 5.7%), although it is still less frequent than in the prose corpus (40%). This suggests that $\delta\eta\ \pi\omicron\upsilon$ may be developing its modal meaning in this period or is already modal in this stage. The collocations with $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ and $\tau\iota\varsigma$ are more frequent in poetry than in prose, but for $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ we see the opposite. This may have to do with the fact that in prose we find $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ more frequently in argumentative contexts due to the genres in that corpus (oratory, socratic dialogue and speeches in historiography). The presence of verbs of knowing seems comparable in both corpora.

In the following sections, we will see whether $\delta\eta\ \pi\omicron\upsilon$ has already developed its collocational status and whether there are other characteristics of the epic corpus that can also be found in the later part of the diachronic corpus. In addition, we will test the findings of the synchronic prose corpus on the partly contemporary corpus of tragedy and comedy.

Collocates	Translations	% of modal <i>που</i> in tragedy and comedy	% of modal <i>που</i> in synchronic prose
δή	'evidently'	18.1% (27)	39.8% (121)
ἤ	<i>affirmative ptcl</i>	19.5% (29)	7.6% (23)
εἴ	'if/whether'	8.7% (13)	2.6% (8)
know		5.4% (8)	6.3% (19)
γάρ	'for, because'	3.4% (5)	19.7% (60)
τις	'some, someone, something, somehow'	14.8% (22)	3.6% (11)
μή	'lest', <i>neg</i>	2.7% (4)	0% (0)
ἢ...ἢ	'or...or'	2.7% (4)	3.3% (4)

Table 10.4: The frequency of collocations and verbs with *που* in percentages of the total incidence of modal *που* in the respective corpus. The raw numbers are given between brackets. Total modal *που* in the tragedy and comedy part of the diachronic corpus is 149 and in the synchronic corpus 304. N.B. These collocations are not mutually exclusive, that is, there are cases in which more than one of the collocations is found in the same clause.

10.3.2 The status of *δή που* and *ἤ που*

δή που

In the corpus from 500 to 390 BC, *δή που* seems to be used in the same way as in the synchronic prose corpus. That is, the speaker is convinced that what he says is evident and shared by others, although not always by the addressee. For instance in example (30), the comic character Socrates is claiming something that, in his view, is completely evident from observations. Since everyone can make these observations, there is no reason to assume that others have not made the same observation and have drawn the same conclusions.

- (30) Strep.: τί λέγεις σύ;
ἀλλὰ τίς ὕει; τουτὶ γὰρ ἔμοιγ' ἀπόφηναι πρῶτον ἀπάντων.

Socr: αὗται δήπου
those ptcl
NOM.PL PTCL

μεγάλοις δέ σ' ἐγὼ σημείοις αὐτὸ διδάξω.

φέρε, ποῦ γὰρ πῶποτ' ἄνευ νεφελῶν ὕοντ' ἤδη τεθέασαι;
καίτοι χρῆν αἰθρίας ὕειν αὐτόν, ταύτας δ' ἀποδημεῖν.

English: Strepsiades: What do you say? Who rains then? For first of all explain this to me. Soc. These to be sure. I will teach you it by powerful evidence. Come, where have you ever seen him raining at any time without Clouds? And yet he ought to rain in fine weather, and these be absent.

French: Strepsiade: Que dis-tu? Mais qui fait pleuvoir? Explique-moi cela avant

tout. Socrate: Elles, sans doute; et je t'en donnerai des preuves formelles. Voyons, quand l'as-tu jamais vu faire pleuvoir jusqu' à ce jour sans nuées? Il faudrait pourtant qu'il fit pleuvoir par un ciel serein et sans qu'elles fussent là.

German: Strepsiades: Ei, was sagst du? Und wer regnet denn dann? Das muß du nun doch mir vor allen Dingen erklären! Sokrates: Wer? Diese, sonst niemand! Das will ich dir gleich mit gewichtigen Gründen beweisen! Du sag mir einmal, ob du jemals den Zeus hast regnen sehn ohne Wolken? Bedenk doch: ein Regen aus ein blauer Luft, und die Wolken sind dann wohl auf Reisen?

Ar. Nu. 369⁶⁰ 61

In example (31), we have a comparable situation in that the speaker is convinced that society will work in the same way as it always did if the god Wealth will make everyone rich. Since everyone knows that you can buy slaves for money, the use of 'of course' fits this context very well.

(31) ΠΕ. Πόθεν οὖν ἔξεις θεράποντας;

XP. Ὠνησόμεθ' ἀργυρίου δήπου.
we will buy for money δήπου.
1PL.FUT GEN.SG PTCL

ΠΕ. Τίς δ' ἔσται πρῶτον ὁ πωλῶν,
ὅταν ἀργύριον κάκεϊνος ἔχη;

English: Poverty: Your slaves! And by what means will these slaves be got?

Chremylus: We will buy them.

Poverty: But first say, who will sell them, if everyone is rich?

French: Pauvreté: Comment donc auras-tu des serviteurs?

Chrémyle: Nous les achèterons à prix d'argent, naturellement.

Pauvreté: Mais d'abord qui sera le vendeur, si celui-là aussi a de l'argent?

German: Penia: Die Bedienten? Woher bekommst du dann aber die Sklaven?

Chremylos: Natürlich: die kauft man für Geld!

Penia: Doch vor allem - wo werden Verkäufer sich finden, wenn keinem an Geld es gebricht?

Ar. Pl. 519⁶²

There is only one example in which *δή* and *που* are not placed next to each other and in which *που* may, under influence of the verb *κλύω* 'I hear' be interpreted as locative, as can be seen from the French and German translations. In this example, Oidipous is speaking. He is blind and completely at the mercy of Creon, who has

⁶⁰Transl: English: Oates and O'Neill (1938), French: Coulon and Daele (1923-1934), German:Werner and Seeger (1963).

⁶¹Dover (1968): There seems to be no true parallel to this apparently impatient *δήπου*, often diffident, which can be used when the speaker is actually confident (Denniston 267), and Socrates may be using a bland tutorial ploy: 'Well, there is no alternative, is there?'

⁶²Transl: English: Oates and O'Neill (1938), French: Coulon and Daele (1923-1934), German:Werner and Seeger (1963).

taken over his kingdom after Oidipous found out that he had killed his father and married his mother. Creon has entered the room with Oidipous' children, but Oidipous is not aware of the presence of his children until he hears them sobbing. As soon as Oidipous realizes what he is hearing he says the following words:

(32) τί φημί;

οὐ δὴ κλύω που πρὸς θεῶν τοῖν μοι φίλοι
not ptcl I hear by gods the me loved
NEG PTCL 1SG.PRS ΠΟΥ PREP GEN.PL GEN.DU DAT.SG GEN.DU

δακρυροούντοιν, καί μ' ἐποικτίρας Κρέων
ἐπεμψέ μοι τὰ φίλατ' ἐκγόνοι ἐμοῖν;

English: What is this? Oh, gods, can it be my loved ones that I hear sobbing, can Creon have taken pity on me and sent my children, my darlings?

French: n'entends-je pas ici mes deux filles qui pleurent? Créon, pris de pitié, m'aurait-il envoyé ce que j'ai de plus cher, mes deux enfants?

German: Hör'ich nicht, Götter, meine beiden Lieben wo weinen und schluchzen? Hat sich Kreon mein erbarmt und schickt die liebsten mir von meinen Kindern her?

S. OT. 1472⁶³ 64

In example (32), *δὴ* and *που* are not placed next to each other. In fact, *που* is placed directly after the verb *κλύω* 'I hear'. This seems to be an exclamation of the type *Ann, that can't possibly be you!* indicating surprise. The use of *δὴ* seems to suggest that it is evident to the speaker that this cannot be the case. The position of *που* suggests that it should not be read as belonging to *δὴ*, but as locative, which is the interpretation of the French and German translators. However, there is another example of a comparable exclamation in the corpus in which *δὴ που* are adjacent. This example is shown under (33). In this example, a man looks out of his window early in the morning and sees in the dark some man in a colorful garment who is relieving himself. Men did not usually wear such colorful clothes so the speaker can barely believe his eyes when he recognizes his neighbor in women's clothes.

(33) Man: τίς ἔστιν; οὐ δὴ που Βλέπυρος ὁ γειτνιῶν;
Who is? not ptcl=ptcl Blepyrus the neighbor?
NOM.SG 3SG.PRS? NEG PTCL=PTCL NOM.SG ART.NOM.SG NOM.SG?

Blepyrus: νῆ τὸν Δί' αὐτὸς δῆτ' ἐκεῖνος. Man: εἰπέ μοι,
τί τοῦτό σοι τὸ πυρρόν ἔστιν;

English: Who's that? Is that not my neighbor Blepyrus? Why, yes, it's no other. Tell me, what's all that yellow about you?

⁶³Transl. English: Jebb (1914), French: Dain and Mazon (1958), German: Willige and Bayer (1966).

⁶⁴Kamerbeek (1967): οὐ δὴ ...που Soph. eight times has οὐ δὴ, usually followed by *που* or *ποτε*, to introduce a surprised or incredulous question. The idiom seems peculiar to him (Denniston 223 II). Slightly more emphatic than οὐ τι ...που. Dawe (2006): οὐ δὴ ...που this and πρὸς θεῶν, express incredulity. Surely that can't be my daughters I hear crying? The girls had probably entered with Creon at 1422, but only now does a sob betray their presence.

French: Qui est-là? Ce n'est pas je suppose, Blépyros, mon voisin? Blepurus:
Eh oui, par Zeus, c'est lui-même. Dis-moi, qu'as-tu là de roux?
German: Wer da? Doch nicht mein Nachbar Blepuros? Beim Zeus, er ist's leib-
haftig! Sag mir doch! Was ist das braune Zeug da?

Ar. Ec. 327⁶⁵ 66

The existence of this last example makes it even harder to decide on example (32), since it means that it is not impossible for *δή που* to be used in such contexts. Therefore, the position of *που* seems the best indication that this may be interpreted as locative, although a modal interpretation is also possible.

Summarizing, we have seen that *δή που* is already being used as a collocation in this corpus. There was only one example in which there were indications for a locative interpretation.

ἦ που

Just like in the epics, *ἦ που* is not used in *a fortiori* arguments in tragedy and comedy. However, there does seem to be a clear pattern in the use of *ἦ που*. In most instances of *ἦ που*, the speaker draws an inference on the basis of information he just received, as in example (34).

In the following example, the statement of Mnesilochus is the reason for the servant to conclude that he must have been a very insolent fellow in his youth. Examples like these suggest that *ἦ που* was used in inferences of which the basis is very clear. The *a fortiori* arguments may have been a subconstruction of this use.

(34) Mnesilochus: ὄς ἔτοιμος σοῦ τοῦ τε ποιητοῦ
τοῦ καλλιποῦς κατὰ τοῦ θριγκοῦ
συγγογγύλας καὶ συστρέψας
τουτὶ τὸ πέος χοανεῦσαι.

Servant: ἦ που νέος γ' ὦν ἦσθ' ὑβριστῆς
ptcl που young ptcl being you were insolent man
PTCL που NOM.SG PTCL PTC.PRS.NOM.SG 2SG.IMPV NOM.SG

ὦ γέρον.
o old man.
PTCL VOC.SG.

English: Mnesilochus: Take care of yourself and of your sweet-voiced poet!
I have a strong tool here both well rounded and well polished, which will
pierce your enclosure and penetrate you.

Servant: Old man, you must have been a very insolent fellow in your youth!

⁶⁵Transl.: English: Oates and O'Neill (1938), French: Coulon and Daele (1923-1934), German: Seeger (1979).

⁶⁶Ussher (1973): in incredulous questions, Cf. Ach.122

French: Hé, hé! dans ta jeunesse, tu devais être un mauvais sujet, vieillard.
German: Frech, Alter, warst du wohl als Knabe schon!

Ar. Th. 63⁶⁷ 68

Another example can be found in example (35). In this example the woman, after she has been told that Karion farted, infers that the god must not have liked that.

- (35) (Cario: οὐδέπω.
 μετὰ τοῦτο δ' ἤδη καὶ γέλοιον δῆτά τι
 ἐποίησα. προσίοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ μέγα πάνυ
 ἀπέπαρδον ἢ γαστήρ γὰρ ἐπεφύσητό μου.)

Wife: ἦ που σε διὰ τοῦτ' εὐθὺς ἐβδελύττετο.
 ptcl που you because of this immediately felt sick
 PTCL ΠΟΥ ACC.SG PREP ACC.SG ADV 3SG.IMPF.

English: (Cario: He did not tarry; and when he was near us, oh! dear! such a good joke happened. My belly was quite blown up, and I let a thunderous fart!)

Wife: Doubtless the god pulled a wry face?

French: Sans doute pour ce fait il te prit aussitôt en dégoût?

German: Da wandt er sich wohl gleich mit Ekel ab!

Ar. Pl. 700⁶⁹

What we have seen in this subsection is that ἦ που is just like in the epics, used to mark inferences, usually based on recently received or presented information. The *a fortiori* arguments in the synchronic prose corpus may have been a specific subconstruction of this use.

10.3.3 Verbs of knowing

Just like in the synchronic prose corpus, we regularly find *που* in clauses with a verb of knowing as their main verb (8 times). In this corpus we do not find verbs of knowing in the first person, but we do find other indications that the speaker has good reasons to assume that the content of the sentence he is presenting is already known to the addressee. In example (36), for instance, the speaker, a messenger, includes the reason he thinks the addressee already knows what he is telling him: because the addressee was actually present when that part of the story took place.

⁶⁷Transl: English: Oates and O'Neill (1938), French: Coulon and Daele (1923-1934), German: Werner and Seeger (1963).

⁶⁸Austin and Olson (2004): ἦ που ... γε is commonly used in a fortiori arguments (e.g. Lys 13.57), although here "the relationship is implied, the second clause being unexpressed" (Denniston 282): "You must certainly have acted outrageously when you were young, old man [if you're acting this way now]"

⁶⁹Transl: English: Oates and O'Neill (1938), French: Coulon and Daele (1923-1934), German: Werner and Seeger (1963).

(36) (Messenger: ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἤδη κάποθαυμάσαι πρέπον.)

ὥς μὲν γὰρ ἐνθένδ' εἶρπε, καὶ σύ που παρῶν
 how ptcl for from here he went, and you που being present
 ADV PTCL CONJ ADV 3SG.IMPFF, CONJ NOM.SG ΠΟΥ PTC.PRS.NOM.SG

ἔξοισθ',
 you know,
 2SG.PERF,

(ὑφηγητῆρος οὐδενὸς φίλων,
 ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἡμῖν πᾶσιν ἐξηγούμενος.)

English: (Messenger: In that you touch upon what is indeed worthy of wonder.) How he departed from here, you yourself must know since you were here: (with no one of his friends as guide, but rather with himself leading the way for us all.)

French: Au moment où il s'est éloigné d'ici - tu étais là, tu le sais comme moi (- aucun des siens ne lui servait de guide, c'est lui qui nous conduisait tous.)

German: Denn wie er von hier wegging, weißt du selber ja, weil du dabei warst: (nicht von Freundeshand geführt, er selber war es, der uns allen schritt voran.)

S. OC. 1587⁷⁰

This example shows that also in the corpus of tragedy and comedy, *που* is used with verbs of knowing and in contexts in which the content of the clause is presented as already accessible to the addressee.

10.3.4 εἰ πού τις, μή πού τις and ἢ που (τις)...ἢ...

Of all cases of *που* in *εἰ* clauses in the later part of the diachronic corpus (23 in total), 10 are considered locative by at least one of the translators. This is about 43.5%, which is much more than the 23% locative cases in the whole diachronic corpus.

As we have seen in the epic part of the corpus and the synchronic corpus, this is a recurring pattern. Apparently, locative *που* feels at home in conditional clauses or dependent clauses with *εἰ*. If we look now at the translations given to the non-locative cases, we see something that is quite different from the epic part of the corpus, although not incompatible with our findings there.

First, we see a clear selection of cases in the corpus. Except for two examples from Aeschylus, all cases of *εἰ που* with non-locative *που* are found in Aristophanes (the latest author of the corpus). In *εἰ που* clauses with locative *που* only half of the cases came from Aristophanes, most other examples coming from Sophocles (one of the earlier authors of the corpus). The dominance of Aristophanes may have several explanations. It may be a reflection of a development, but it may also reflect the uncertainty of the translators. For instance, English translations of the non-locative

⁷⁰English: Jebb (1928), French: Dain and Mazon (1958), German: Willige and Bayer (1966).

examples are seldom given (10 out of 13 are not translated), and if there is a translation it is *ever*, a temporal expression. The French translations have forms containing *quelque* ‘some’ three times and *quelquefois* ‘sometimes, ever’ once. The German translations seem to translate *που* with *je* ‘ever’ several times. This suggests that *εἴ που* may have had a temporal interpretation in Aristophanes. However, the translations don’t generally use these comparable translations for the same example. Most examples are only translated in one of the languages. There is only one example in which the translations in two languages seem to match. This example is given in (37). In this example two poets compete about who writes the best introductions to a play. The problem is what the criteria should be. Therefore, one may also read *if I somewhere in my text say the same word twice*. Another interesting thing about this example, is that *που* is found directly before an ordinal number. As we will see in the chapter in which *ergens* and *που* are compared, the combination of *που* and a number in Herodotus generally results in the interpretation *about/around*. In example (37), this seems impossible, because the ordinal number *twice* is used to express *more than once*, instead of a specific number which can be modified by *που*.

(37) Εὐριπίδης: ἐγὼ φράσω.

κᾶν που δις εἶπω ταυτόν, ἢ στοιβὴν ἴδης
 and που twice I will say the same, or padding you will see
 CONJ=PTCL που NUM 1SG.AOR.SUBJ ACC.SG, CONJ ACC.SG 2SG.AOR.SUBJ.

ἐνοῦσαν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου, κατάπτυσον.

English: Euripides: I’ll tell you.

And if I ever I say the same word twice, or if you see padding in there irrelevant to the plot, spit on me.

French: Je vais le dire. Et si je me répète, ou si tu y vois du remplissage, une cheville, conspue-moi.

German: Und sag ich je was zweimal oder zeigst du mir ein Flickwort, spei es mir ins Gesicht!

Ar. Ra. 1178⁷¹

What seems to be the point in the *εἴ που*-clauses, is again that it does not really matter exactly what the situation is or where it will take place. This seems to be the case in example (38).

(38) Κλ.: καὶ μὴν εἴ ποῦ τις ἀνὴρ ἐφάνη τῷ δήμῳ μᾶλλον
 and ptcl if που some man seemed the people more
 AND PTCL CONJ που NOM.SG NOM.SG 3SG.AOR DAT.SG DAT.SG ADV

ἀμύνων / ἢ μᾶλλον ἐμοῦ σε φιλῶν,
 warding off / or more than me you loving,
 PTC.PRS.NOM.SG / CONJ ADV GEN.SG ACC.SG PTC.PRS.NOM.SG,

⁷¹Transl: English: Oates and O’Neill (1938), French: Coulon and Daele (1923-1934), German: Werner and Seeger (1963).

ἐθέλω περὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς περιδόσθαι.
 I am willing about the head wager.
 1SG.PRS PREP ART.GEN.SG GEN.SG INF.AOR.

English: Cleon: Never had Demos a defender or a friend more devoted than myself; on my head, on my life, I swear it!

French: Le Paphlagonien: Eh bien, si jamais a paru un homme luttant davantage pour le peuple (à Demos) ou t'aimant plus que moi, j'y veux gager ma tête.

German: Nein, sag ich, wie hat nie sich ein Mann für den Demos gestellt vor die Risse, Nie hat ihn ein Bürger geliebt so wie ich, den Kopf will ich wetten zur Stunde!

Ar. Eq. 790⁷²

In example (38), we find a very general statement. The speaker compares himself to all men in the world and he will bet his head on it that there is none, no matter where or when who is more devoted to Demos than himself. *If some man anywhere or if some man ever* boil down to the same thing. The choice is probably steered by the conventions of the modern languages, in which it is common to stress generality over time *if ever*. Again, just like we found in the synchronic corpus, it would be possible to read examples as temporal, but we do not have unequivocal temporal examples.

In this part of the corpus, there are only four examples of μή που and seven examples of ἢ που... ἢ...and they are all comparable to the εἶ που cases, so we will not discuss them separately.⁷³

We may conclude that, if we accept that one of the functions of using an indefinite locative can be to express that the details of a situation, like the place, do not matter, most of the cases of εἶ που seem to have a generalizing (locative) interpretation, often, but not always, triggered by either locative markers in the clause or other indefinite markers like τις. The same is true for μή που and ἢ που... ἢ... 'either...or' clauses.

10.3.5 General contextual features of modal *που*

In the epics, we frequently found *που* in fatalistic statements about the gods. Although this is not very common in tragic poetry and comedy, there are a few examples, as in (39).

(39) Atossa: μηχαναῖς ἔζευξεν Ἑλλης πορθμόν, ὥστ' ἔχειν πόρον. Dareius: καὶ τόδ' ἐξέπραξεν, ὥστε Βόσπορον κλῆσαι μέγαν'

Atossa: ὧδ' ἔχει' γνώμης δέ που τις δαιμόνων
 such it is for this purpose but που someone of the gods
 ADV 3SG.PRS GEN.SG CONJ ΠΟΥ NOM.SG GEN.PL

⁷²Transl: English: Oates and O'Neill (1938), French: Coulon and Daele (1923-1934), German: Werner and Seeger (1963).

⁷³μή που: A.Pr.247; S.Aj.533; Ar.Ec.482; Ar.V.247. ἢ που...ἢ...: S.Aj.176; S.Aj.1244; S.Ph.215; S.Oc.1059.

ξυνήψατο.
have assisted.
3SG.AOR.

Darius: φεῦ, μέγας τις ἦλθε δαίμων, ὥστε μὴ φρονεῖν καλῶς.
English: (Atossa: By a clever device he yoked the Hellespont so as to gain a passage.
Darius: What! Did he succeed in closing the mighty Bosphorus?)
Atossa: Yes indeed. One of the divine powers must have assisted him in his purpose.
French: Un dieu sans doute avait touché ses esprits
German: Ja, er tat's. Beim Plan war wohl ein böser Dämon mit im Spiel.

A. Pers. 724⁷⁴

In example (39), we find Atossa concluding that if Xerxes managed to close the Bosphorus, this was only possible with help of the gods, since it is generally known that great deeds can only be done with divine help. It may be argued that this interpretation does not work because Aeschylus uses δαίμονες here instead of the more positive term θεοί 'gods'. However, as becomes clear in the following dialogue, Atossa already knows that the expedition ended in disaster, which would color her statement negatively, but this does not change the generally known conclusion that divine powers must have helped him in such an act. This can be seen from the reaction of Darius. Only after another negative expression from Atossa, Darius asks her what happened that she is lamenting Xerxes' action so much. Apparently, her first choice of δαίμονες was not foreboding enough for him to ask that immediately.

Another situation in which *που* is regularly found in tragedy and comedy is in incredulous or reluctant questions as was also noted by Denniston (1950, 492). The reluctance or incredulity is mainly expressed by means of negation. Of all 56 questions in which *που* occurs (including possibly locative instances), 38 (68%) contain a sentence negation. In example (40), for instance, Jason, who has just learned that his new wife was killed by his former wife, is approached by the chorus with some bad news. The worst Jason can think of, but which seems too outrageous even for his former wife Medea, is that she is planning on killing him as well.

(40) Chorus: (ὦ τλήμων, οὐκ οἶσθ' οἱ κακῶν ἐλήλυθας,
'Ιᾶσον: οὐ γὰρ τοῦσδ' ἄν ἐφθέγξω λόγους.)

Iason: τί δ' ἔστιν; οὐ που κάμ' ἀποκτεῖναι
what but is? not που also me kill
NOM.SG CONJ 3SG.PRS? NEG που CO=PRN.ACC.SG INF.PRS
θέλει;
she wants?
3SG.PRS?

⁷⁴Transl. English: Smyth (1922), French: Mazon (1920), German: Werner (1969).

(Chorus: *παῖδες τεθνᾶσι χειρὶ μητρῶα σέθεν.*) *English:* (Chorus-Leader: Poor Jason, you have no idea how far gone you are in misfortune. Else you would not have spoken these words.)

Jason: What is it? Surely she does not mean to kill me as well?

(Chorus-Leader: Your children are dead, killed by their mother's hand.)

French: Qu'y a-t-il? Voudrait-elle, à mon tour, me tuer?

German: Wie? Hat sie mich selber dem Tod bestimmt?

E. Med. 1308 ⁷⁵

The function of *που* in example (40) may be to express that it is commonly known that the situation he is proposing would not be expected to be the case. The fact that this question is posed with a negation suggests that contrary to that expectation, there may be reason to believe it is actually true.

Summarizing, we have seen that just like in the epic corpus, we find *που* in fatalistic statements about the gods in tragedy and comedy, which is again a type of accessible information. Also, we find the particle in reluctant or incredulous questions, which suggests that common sense (or other accessible information) would predict that the content of the question is not true, although the negative question expresses that the speaker has (just) received information implying that it may be true anyway.

10.3.6 Conclusion on *που* in tragedy and comedy

The collocational behavior of the poetic texts from 500-350 BC from tragedy and comedy is comparable to the synchronic corpus, although just like in the epic corpus *either...or* sentences seem to play a role as well. If we take *δή*, *ἦ*, *γάρ*, mental state predicates (mainly verbs of knowing) and verbs of saying as indicators of a modal interpretation, *εἰ*, *ἦ...ἦ* and *τις* as indicators of a generalizing locative interpretation and locative adverbs and verbs as clues that indicate that *που* may be interpreted as locative, we find that 78% (149 out of 191) of the instances of *που* could be interpreted using these cues. This high percentage in combination with the fact that in the three types of corpora used the same collocations tended to show up, suggests that *που* was part of conventionalized constructions containing these cues.

Most examples in the later part of the diachronic corpus show similar behavior to the synchronic corpus. In almost all cases *δή που* seems to have its conventionalized interpretation. There is only one case in which *δή* and *που* were not adjacent.

There is no absolutely compelling evidence for a temporal interpretation of *που*, although some translators use temporal translations and there are many instances in which this interpretation would fit. The use of *ἦ που* seems to be somewhat broader than in the synchronic corpus, because it mainly is found in inferences on the basis of

⁷⁵Mastronarde (2002): *ἦ που* probably carries a tone of sarcasm here, or possibly a tone of bewilderment; the alternative reading *οὐ που* (in a papyrus) would be preferable only if one wishes Jason to adopt a tone of lively concern and fear. On the alternation of these two combinations in MSS. see Mastronarde on Phoen. 1072, with refs. Page (1976): *ἦ που* interrogative: I expect...?, here perhaps sarcastic Denniston 286. For a discussion on the question of whether we should read *ἦ που* or *οὐ που* see Caspers (2010)

recent statements or events in combination with some knowledge of the world. We may see the *a fortiori* arguments that were frequently found in the synchronic corpus, as a special subcategory of this type. Just like in the synchronic prose corpus, verbs of knowing were regularly present in *που*-clauses. There were also other indications that in these sentences, the speaker assumed that the content of the *που*-clause was already accessible information for the addressee.

There is reason to assume that εἴ ποῦ τις (and some constructional variants like εἴ ποῦ, ποῦ τις and ἤ ποῦ (τις)) is a common phrase expressing that no specific person or thing is meant but the phenomenon in general, wherever it is. This would bring us to a threefold classification of the use of *που*: 1. locative indefinite, 2. generalizing (via indefinite location) 3. presenting the proposition as containing accessible information, which has, apart from its general use in statements and arguments, four specific subconstructions: a) on the basis of (recent) information (ἤ ποῦ, as described on page 257) or b) on the basis of (self)evident information (δὴ ποῦ, as described on page 254), c) in sentences in which the speaker attributes knowledge to the addressee (verbs of knowing) or d) in incredulous or reluctant questions with a negation.

Although *που* is used in many situations, both in the epic corpus and in tragic and comic poetry, it is regularly found in (fatalistic) statements about the gods. This is probably comparable to the use of *που* in truisms, which we saw in the synchronic prose corpus, since religious assumptions are also shared in a community. If a speaker presents something as accessible information, this often implies that he wants the addressee to draw the conclusion that what the speaker says is true. Therefore, modal *που* has a positive argumentative orientation.

10.4 The diachronic development of *που* from Homer to Isocrates

Now that we have studied the three periods in detail, we will zoom out and compare the three periods. From the translations in table 10.4, it is clear that the only period that seems to deviate from the others is the epic period. In the latter period we find, to some extent, more translations like *haply, peut-être, vielleicht*.

However, if we look at the examples that are translated in this way in detail, we again run into the problem that the translators do not use the same translations for the same examples. This suggests that it is not the specific characteristics of the individual examples which have triggered the choice for these translations. There are several cases in which one of the other translators chooses a translation with a much more positive argumentative direction than *haply, peut-être, or vielleicht*. We will now discuss the one example in which all three translators do agree and have chosen translations like *haply, peut-être or vielleicht*, that is, translations with a neutral or even negative argumentative orientation.

In example (41), the English translation of *που* is *haply*, the French translation is *peut-être* and the German translation is *vielleicht*. In this example, Penelope is calling her servant, because she wants him to go to Odysseus' old father for help against the

English		French		German	
Epic modal <i>που</i> (+/-800 BC- 650)					
haply	36	[no transl.]	72	wohl	36
I ween	34	sans doute	19	no	35
no	25	peut-être	5	vielleicht	20
methinks	9	par hasard	3	etwa	4
so be	5	bien	2	ja	4
forsooth	4	je crois	2	irgendwie	3
indeed	3	seulement	1	doch	2
surely	2	assurément	1	gewiss	2
full likely	1	n'est-ce pas?	1	schon	2
I think	1	il faut	1	sicherlich	2
Modal <i>που</i> in tragedy and comedy (+/-500BC- 390 BC)					
[no transl.]	61	[no transl.]	59	[no transl.]	90
surely	21	sans doute	32	wohl	20
no doubt	8	naturellement	9	doch	9
perhaps	8	je suppose	7	ja	4
I suppose	5	peut-être	5	doch wohl	3
I think	6	donc	3	vielleicht	3
must	4	je pense	3	etwa	2
ever	3	quelque	3	je	2
must be	3	pourtant	3	für sicher	1
somehow	3	certes	2	du begreifst doch	1
Modal <i>που</i> in classical prose (+/- 400 BC- 350 BC)					
[no transl.]	119	[no transl.]	75	[no transl.]	87
surely	47	j'imagine	23	doch	62
I presume	15	sans doute	20	doch wohl	31
of course	14	à plus forte raison	13	wohl	23
I suppose	12	certes	10	sicherlich	10
you know	11	je crois	10	ja	7
as you know	5	évidemment	9	gewiss	5
I take it	5	n'est-ce pas?	9	ja wohl	5
certainly	4	à coup sûr	8	bekanntlich	4
I imagine	4	assurément	8	ohne Zweifel	3

Table 10.5: The top ten translations of modal *που* in the different parts of the diachronic corpus. N.B. this table is to be read vertically, since the translations in the three languages are not consistent enough to line them up horizontally.

suitors, who want to marry her because they think Odysseus is dead. Until Penelope has made a choice between one of them, they enjoy her hospitality and this way they ruin her.

- (41) (ἀλλά τις ὀτρηνῶς Δολίον καλέσειε γέροντα,
 δμῶ' ἐμόν, ὄν μοι δῶκε πατήρ ἔτι δεῦρο κιούση,
 καί μοι κῆπον ἔχει πολυδένδρεον, ὄφρα τάχιστα
 Λαέρτη τάδε πάντα παρεζόμενος καταλέξῃ.)
 εἰ δὴ πού τινα κεῖνος ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ὑφήνας
 if ptcl που some he in heart plan having weaved
 CONJ PTCL που ACC.SG NOM.SG PREP DAT.PL ACC.SG PTC.AOR.NOM.SG

ἐξελθῶν λαοῖσιν ὀδύρεται, οἷ μεμάασιν
 ὄν καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς φθῖσαι γόνον ἀντιθέοιο.

English: (But now let one hasten to call hither the aged Dolius, my servant, whom my father gave me before ever I came hither, and who keeps my garden of many trees, that he may straightway go and sit by Laertes, and tell him of all these things.) So haply may Laertes weave some plan in his heart, and go forth and with weeping make his plea to the people, who are minded to destroy his race and that of godlike Odysseus.

French: Peut-être le Veillard verra-t-il un moyen de quitter sa retraite et d'émouvoir ces gens qui veulent supprimer sa race dans le fils de son divin Ulysse!

German: vielleicht, daß der einen wirksamen Plan verständig entwirft, auf die Straße geht und zu klagen beginnt vor dem Volk, das daran ist, die Sippe, seine und die des göttergleichen Odysseus, zu tilgen.

*Od. 4.739*⁷⁶ ⁷⁷

The interpretation of *που* is very hard in this example. There are only two other examples ((7) and (17)) in all three corpora in which *δὴ που* is found in a conditional clause. This means that *εἰ δὴ που* occurs only in Homer. However, *δὴ* does occur by itself in conditional clauses fairly often both in Homer and elsewhere. This suggests that the collocation *δὴ που* cannot occur in conditional clauses, whereas the not yet collocated forms *δὴ* and *που* can, by themselves, occur in conditional clauses. This would imply that we need to interpret both particles separately.

The interpretation of example (41) is hard because the content of the plan seems to be given already (i.e. making a plea to the people) which evokes the impression that the *εἰ*-clause expresses a request of Penelope, whether he (would be willing to) go and make a plea to the people. This would require the ellipsis of a verb of asking. The function of *δὴ* would then be to express that, given the news that Penelope just sent him, it is evident why she makes this request. However, it is hard to imagine something being both evident and merely possible as is expressed by the translations *haply*, *peut-être* and *perhaps* unless we go so far as to attribute to *που* the function of a politeness marker in requests even though there is only one other example in which *που* may be interpreted in this way in all three corpora (*Od.4.193* as given in example (16) on page 239). In addition, the translations seem to ignore the conditional conjunction *εἰ* and the particle *δὴ*. Another reading of this example would be

⁷⁶Trans. English: Murray (1919a), French: Bérard (1924), German: Weiher (1961).

⁷⁷Ameis and Hentze (1879): *εἰ δὴ πού* wie *αἶ κέν πως*, *ob denn vielleicht*.

a metaphorical reading as in *somewhere in his heart*, which in my view seems the best option here.

This was the only example in which all three translations interpreted *που* as weakly modal. However, there are some cases (8 in total) in which the English and the German translations agree and in the French translation there is no translation given. These examples almost all come from the epic part of the corpus. This group of examples is quite homogeneous. Five examples contain *τις*, the remaining three examples contain *εἰ* and *ἢ που* and the last one contains *δή*. This means that most of these examples belong to the category that was discussed elaborately above: the group of examples in which *που* seems to express that the situation described is not to be taken too specifically, like in example (42).

- (42) νόστου δὴ μνησαίμεγαθύμου Τυδέος υἱὲ
 νῆας ἔπι γλαφυράς, μὴ καὶ πεφοβημένος ἔλθῃς,
 μή που τις καὶ Τρῶας ἐγείρῃσιν θεὸς ἄλλος.
 lest που some ptcl Trojans arouses god other,
 CONJ=NEG που NOM.SG PTCL ACC.PL 3SG.AOR.SUBJ NOM.SG NOM.SG,

English: Bethink thee now of returning, son of great-souled Tydeus, to the hollow ships, lest thou go thither in full flight, and haply some other god rouse up the Trojans.

French: Songe au retour vers les nefes creuses, fils du magnanime Tydée - à moins que tu ne veuilles qu'il tourne en dérouté: redoute qu'un autre dieu n'aïlle réveiller les Troyens.

German: Denke der Heimkehr jetzt, du Sohn des erhabenen Tydeus, fort zu den räumigen Schiffen, auf daß du nicht gingest als Flüchtling, wenn vielleicht ein anderer Gott die Troer noch weckte!

Il. 10.511^{78 79}

In this example, an indefinite (*τις*) other god is mentioned in a negative purpose clause, which may also be read as *for fear that*. It is possible to say *in order that/ for fear that some other god will not perhaps rouse up the Trojans*, but it is also possible that this is again a more generalizing context *to make sure that some other god somewhere will not rouse up the Trojans*, in which *somewhere* stresses that Diomedes does not have some particular god in mind. This is typically an instance of a bridging context in the direction of a weak locative general indefiniteness like in the case of Flemish Dutch *ergens* 'somewhere, something' or standard Dutch *ergens een of andere* 'somewhere some'. This interpretation would have my preference, because it fits so many other cases of *που τις*.

We already saw some collocations above, but we have not compared the different periods with respect to their collocations. In table 10.6 an overview of the collocations of modal *που* in the three periods is given. We see a clear increase in the

⁷⁸Trans. English: Murray (1924), French: Mazon et al. (1955), German: Rupé (1961).

⁷⁹Ameis and Hentze (1905): μή που τις wie N 293 § 130 dass *nur nicht etwa*, ein selbständiger Befürchtungssatz zur Erklärung der vorhergehenden Warnung; Sinn: leicht könnte ein anderer Gott... Vgl. τ 83, Z96.

collocation δή που, and a decrease in the use of εἶ που and τις. However, we must keep in mind that the three corpora are far from comparable in terms of text types and genres, which means that they do not give a good overview of the Greek language. Still, there seems to be a tendency for the collocations which point in the direction of a positive argumentative orientation to increase, although the variation is very large, as can be seen especially in the case of ἦ που.

	Epic modal που +/-800 BC- 650 BC	Tragedy and comedy +/-500BC- 390 BC	Classical modal που +/- 400 BC- 350 BC
δή που	5.7% (7)	18.1% (27)	39.8% (121)
ἦ που	5.7% (7)	19.5% (29)	7.6% (23)
εἶ που	20.3% (25)	8.1% (12)	2.6% (8)
know	2.4% (3)	5.3% (8)	6.3% (19)
γάρ	4.9% (6)	3.4% (5)	19.7% (60)
τις	34.1% (42)	16.8% (25)	3.6% (11)

Table 10.6: The frequencies of the contextual characteristics of modal που in the different parts of the diachronic corpus in percentages of the instances of modal που in each respective corpus.

10.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we studied the diachronic development of που. There were already modal instances of που in the earliest texts, but the collocations and constructions were not exactly the same as in later periods. For instance the collocation δή που does not seem to have been a collocation in the epic texts as was already noted by Denniston. However, this already seems to have changed in the earliest texts after the epics. There are also collocations that seem to disappear like the collocations with μή and ἦ...ἦ... However, this may be due to the fact that both parts of the corpus contain different genres (i.e. epics vs. tragedy/comedy).

On the basis of these data it seems that there were already basically three uses of που in the earliest texts:

1. the locative use
2. the weakly locative use with a generalizing function
3. the modal use with a positive argumentative orientation and the suggestion that the addressee has access to the information provided (by means of reasoning or knowledge of the world)

The modal use may have arisen as an inference on the basis of the larger context, but that cannot really be shown, because the development has taken place already before the historical period. The weakly locative use seems to have arisen in contexts

with other indefinite markers like τις and possibly also in ει ('if, whether')-clauses and ἢ...ἢ... 'either... or' clauses.

The locative use of που is generally marked by locative markers like verbs implying a place, locative adverbs and locative prepositions. The weak locative use may also be accompanied by locative markers, but is most frequently found with the indefinite τις, the conjunction ει 'if, whether' and ἢ...ἢ... 'either... or' clauses. The modal examples are, especially in later times, accompanied by δῆ, ἦ and mental state predicates like *to know*. In later times, they are also frequently found in assertive sentences with the copula. In general, modal που is found in sentences which contain information that is presented as already accessible to the addressee.

CHAPTER 11

A comparison between Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek του

If we were to make a dictionary entry for *ergens* and του, the headwords within the lemmata would be comparable. The following may be said for both forms.

1. locative indefinite adverb (*original interpretation*)
 - (a) the locative indefinite may be used to express a general applicability of the statement
2. *modal particle*
3. about, around (*with numbers*)¹

For *ergens* the temporal interpretation and the scalar interpretation would need to be added, but on the whole both forms seem very comparable. However, as has already become implicitly clear in the previous chapters and as will be addressed explicitly in this chapter, the actual characteristics of modal *ergens* and modal του are not in all respects comparable. We saw, for instance, in the previous chapter that, although *ergens* and του seem to have had almost the same starting point and both developed into a modal particle, there is little reason to believe that the development of modal *ergens* and modal του followed exactly the same pathway of semantic change. This suggests that apart from general cognitive principles, language specific characteristics play an important role in the semantic development of comparable forms in different languages.

¹For του this interpretation may have only been present in the Ionic dialect.

Already in chapter 8 it was said that the process of contrasting forms from different languages may shed light on the specific characteristics of a form in a particular language, which would otherwise be taken for granted. This means that one of the advantages of comparing forms from two different languages is that it draws attention to both shared and non-shared characteristics, thus highlighting both the language specific properties of forms that from a distance may seem very similar and their shared properties.

In this chapter, I will compare the contextual characteristics of *ergens* and *που* to see which characteristics they share and which ones may be different.

I will first address the historical development of *ergens* and *που* including their contextual properties. Second, I will discuss the contextual features of *ergens* and *που*.

11.1 Pathways from locative to modal

As was argued in the chapter on the historical development of *ergens*, it seems likely that *ergens* developed its modal interpretations via a metaphorical use of the locative use of *ergens*. The mind was seen as a space in which certain positions could be taken. The development path of *που* was less clear, but we might ask the question of whether it would be possible that *που* developed in a comparable way. As was already mentioned in passing in the previous chapter on the development of *που*, there are a few examples in which a metaphorical interpretation would be possible. However, the occurrence of metaphorical uses of the indefinite locative is not enough for a development like the development of *ergens*. We still need some connection to either different points of view or other connections to the later modal use. Therefore, we will now discuss some of the metaphorical examples in detail.

The following example, which was already briefly discussed above, is one of three examples I could find for *που* that theoretically could be interpreted as an explicitly metaphorical locative use of *που*, because of the presence of *ἐνὶ φρεσὶ* ‘in your heart’. The other one we already saw in example (41) in the previous chapter and the third one is mentioned below. In addition, we will see a possibly metaphorical case without *ἐνὶ φρεσὶ* in example (2).²

- (1) (ὡς Ἀντήνορος υἱὸς ἀγαυοῦ δῖος Ἀθήνωρ
οὐκ ἔθελεν φεύγειν, πρὶν πειρήσαιτ' Ἀχιλλῆος.
ἀλλ' ὁ γ' ἄρ' ἀσπίδα μὲν πρόσθ' ἔσχετο πάντοσ' ἔϊσθην,
ἐγχείη δ' αὐτοῖο τιτύσκετο, καὶ μέγ' αὐτεῖ)

ἦ δὴ που μάλ' ἔολπας ἐνὶ φρεσὶ φαίδιμ' Ἀχιλλεῦ
ptcl ptcl που very you hope in heart famous Achilles
PTCL PTCL ΠΟΥ ADV 2SG.PERF PREP DAT.PL VOC.SG VOC.SG

²The negative locative indefinite οὐδαμοῦ can be used in a metaphorical way as in E. *Hipp.* 1012. However, because of the negation this does not allow for an interpretation involving more than one viewpoint, as was the case with *ergens*.

ἤματι τῷδε πόλιν πέρσειν Τρώων ἀγερώχων
 (even so lordly Antenor's son, goodly Agenor, refused to flee till he should
 make trial of Achilles, but held before him his shield that was well-balanced
 upon every side, and aimed at Achilles with his spear, and shouted aloud:)
 Verily, I ween, thou hopest in thy heart, glorious Achilles, on this day to sack
 the city of the lordly Trojans.

Il. 21.583

Example (1) has the particles ἤ, δή and που. This is the only time in both the synchronic and the diachronic corpus that the particles ἤ, δή and που are found in the same clause, although ἤ δή does occur regularly. Both ἤ and δή point strongly in a modal direction. Also, the French and German translators have chosen translations which we also find in the classical period for δή που. The reason this passage can be interpreted as modal is that it is normal to assume that your enemy hopes to destroy your city and that this enemy also is aware that you know that he wants that. None of the translators has chosen the metaphorically locative option. One of the reasons may be that the presence of locative που would not add much to the overall interpretation of the sentence. In Dutch, however, *ergens* is mostly used to express an internal conflict or dilemma. Such a dilemma does not seem to be an issue in this example, since there is no reason Achilles would not want to destroy the city.

In example (2), already discussed above, the goddess Athena speaks to a warrior Diomedes about the reason he is pulling back. The first explanation is a physical one, although not less shameful, but the second relates to Diomedes' state of mind. It is suggested that he is under the spell of fear. This makes it theoretically possible for που to have a function which is comparable to modal *ergens*.

- (2) ἀλλά σευ ἢ κάματος πολυᾷξ γυῖα δέδουκεν
 ἢ νύ σέ που δέος ἴσχει ἀκήριον:
 or now you που fear restrains heartless:
 CONJ PTCL ACC.SG που NOM.SG 3SG.PRS NOM.SG:

yet either hath weariness born of thy many onsets entered into thy limbs, or
 haply spiritless terror possesseth thee.

Il. 5.812

Example (2) is metaphorical because fear is not an individual who can hold someone somewhere, or be somewhere unless we interpret the sentence in a metaphorical way. It would be possible to interpret this sentence metaphorically as in *heartless fear holds you somewhere (in your mind)*, but this would suggest that in other places in his mind Diomedes would be brave, which is not what seems to be Athena's judgement. Although such an interpretation is not impossible, the absence of an animate agentive subject in this sentence makes the connection between the mind of the addressee and the sentence very weak. Also, there are no (other) indications that we should read this sentence this way.

A second option is that the speaker, the goddess Athena, is merely offering a possible suggestion, as is the choice of the English translator. A third option is to

interpret *που* as marking that they both know that the last option is in fact the right solution. This is shared information, since this is about the state of mind of the addressee himself and therefore Athena expects Diomedes to agree (positive argumentative orientation). The latter interpretation is largely in line with the interpretation of Bolling (1929, 102), who says that ‘The particle then expresses the confidence of the speaker that this time he has hit the truth’. Example (2) is followed by the conclusion and accusation that Diomedes, the addressee, does not live up to his father’s standards, which can of course be both about his physical endurance and about his courage, but this implies that there is little room for different viewpoints in Diomedes.

A third example in which a metaphorical interpretation is possible is example (3). It is possible to interpret *που* as metaphorical because of the mental state predicate *ἤλπετο* ‘he hoped’ and the presence of *ἐνὶ φρεσὶ* ‘in his heart’. In this example, there are two instances of *που*. The first I would interpret as (generalizing) locative, but we will now be concerned mainly with the second one.

- (3) εἴ τινά που μετ’ ὄεσσι λάβοι στείχοντα θύραζε:

οὕτω γάρ που μ’ ἤλπετ’ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ νήπιον εἶναι.
 thus for που me hoped in heart silly be
 ADV CONJ που ACC.SG 3SG.IMPFPREP DAT.PL ACC.SG INF.PRS.

English: in the hope of catching anyone who sought to go forth with the sheep—so witless, forsooth, he thought in his heart to find me.

Od. 9.418

This example is not completely like the metaphorical examples of *ergens* for several reasons. First, this is part of a story about another person, told from the narrator’s viewpoint. Therefore, the narrator does not have access to the thoughts of the characters. This means that there is no connection between the mental space of the character and *που*. This was, however, one of the prerequisites for the use of modal *ergens*. In addition, there is no need for different viewpoints. Although the lack of different viewpoints and only a weak connection to the mind of the subject does not exclude a metaphorically locative interpretation like *somewhere in his heart*, the connection with modal uses of this metaphor, like in the case of *ergens* is not very strong. Therefore, it seems hard to take this possibly metaphorical example as a bridge context for the development of a viewpoint marker like *ergens*.

A modal interpretation, on the other hand, fits this sentence well, because it is clear from the actions of the Cyclops that he thought that Odysseus would be silly enough to try to escape with the sheep. This makes it possible to present this as a shared inference between the narrator and his audience as in *For, - as you will have inferred - he hoped in his heart that I would be so silly*.

The discussion of the examples above shows that a metaphorically locative interpretation is possible if *που* is used with phrases like *ἐνὶ φρεσὶ* and in example (41) in the previous chapter a metaphorical interpretation even seemed the most fitting interpretation. However, the metaphor does not seem to be used to express different

points of view or a split self like in the case of *ergens*. In most examples, the modal interpretation of accessible information seems to work better than the metaphorically locative interpretation. This suggests that *που* may have developed its modal meaning in another way.

Another group of examples which is often translated as modal is what we have called the generalizing meaning of locative *που*. The development of this group of examples shows more resemblance to some uses of *ergens* than the metaphorical examples. For instance the Flemish use of *ergens iets* ‘somewhere something’ as well as the more general use of *ergens een of andere...* ‘somewhere some...’, show clear similarities with Greek *που τις* ‘somewhere, some/someone/something/somewhat’. In example (4), for instance, the speaker is not talking about a specific gas leak of unknown location, but about the situation in general. In example (5), the speaker is also talking about the general phenomenon of Agamemnon deceiving other people.

- (4) Als er ergens een of andere gaslek of een andere dreiging is denk
If there somewhere some gas leak or an other threat is think

ik dat ze wel tot de categorie prioritair behoren.
I that they ptcl to the category allowed to use sirens belong.

If there is some gas leak somewhere or another threat, I think they do belong to the type of institutions that can use a siren.³

- (5) τῷ πάντ' ἀγορευέμεν ὡς ἐπιτέλλω
ἀμφαδόν, ὄφρα καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπισκύζωνται Ἀχαιοὶ

εἴ τινά που Δαναῶν ἔτι ἔλπεται ἐξαπατήσειν
if someone που of the Danaans again he hopes deceive
CONJ ACC.SG που GEN.PL ADV 3SG.PRS INF.FUT

αἰὲν ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένος:

English: To him do ye declare all, even as I bid, openly, to the end that other Achaeans also may be wroth, if he hopeth to deceive yet some other of the Danaans, seeing he is ever clothed in shamelessness.⁴

Il. 9.371

In both examples above, it is still possible to read a locative interpretation, although the function of *που* seems to be more to express that the details do not matter, because a frequently occurring situation is described. However, the use of *ergens een of andere* in conditional clauses is very rare. On google it is only found 8 times. The connection with a conditional, therefore, seems to be specific to Greek.

What we can conclude is that *που* probably did not develop into a modal particle in the same way as *ergens* did. There is no evidence that metaphorical extensions

³<http://www.9lives.be/forum/algemene-discussies/854243-je-glimlach-van-vandaag-deel-23-a-191.html>.

⁴This translation was slightly modified.

played a role in the development of *που* although this probably was the case in the development of *ergens*.

However, the development of a more generalizing function of both *που* and *ergens* may have taken place under the influence of other indefinite markers such as *iets* 'something' or *een of andere* 'some' in the case of *ergens* and forms of *τις* 'some, someone, something, somehow' in Greek.

In the next section, we will first study the synchronic contextual characteristics of non-modal *που* and non-modal *ergens* in more detail. After that we will continue with the synchronic comparison of modal *που* and modal *ergens*.

11.2 Non-modal *που* versus non-modal *ergens*

In this section, we will discuss the contextual characteristics of non-modal *ergens* and non-modal *που*, taking the categories distinguished for *ergens* as our starting point. The locative use of both forms is relatively uncontroversial, which may raise the question as to why it would be interesting to study their contextual characteristics. However, there are several reasons we can learn something from studying the locative uses of *ergens* and *που* as well. First, as became clear from the study of *ergens*, the lack of certain characteristics that usually accompany the locative use of *ergens* may function as an indication for a modal use for the speakers. That is, if speakers are accustomed to other locative markers guiding them in the case of a locative use, the lack of overt locative markers may be an indication for a modal use. This implies that the locative use and the non-locative uses are to a certain extent part of one system of disambiguation in which the absence of something that is usually there may also be an indication.

Second, the historical development of modal interpretations may have started out from a use of which a relict may be preserved in some fixed locative expression. Because it was already a fixed expression during the time of the modal development, it may have resisted reinterpretation as modal. These types of expressions allow us to find out more about the development of the modal interpretations.

Third, we can use the study of the contextual characteristics of locative *ergens* and locative *που* as a simple case which may show us whether the approach to the context which was chosen in this dissertation seems to work and what kind of contextual features may play a role in interpretation. This will give us an indication of what we may want to look for in the more complicated, modal cases.

Locative που and locative ergens

The non-modal interpretations of *ergens* can be divided into the following groups: the locative, temporal, scalar and *about/around* interpretations. The characteristics of locative *ergens* and locative *που* are alike in the sense that locative verbs, adverbs and prepositions are frequently found in the direct environment of both locative *ergens* and locative *που*. The generalizing function of locative *που* is comparable to some uses of *ergens* as already mentioned in footnote 16 above. In Dutch it would,

for instance, be possible to say *een of ander bedrijf ergens* ‘some company somewhere’ meaning *some company, it does not really matter which one/where this company is from*. This use is also found for *που*, especially when it is combined with a conditional and an indefinite pronoun.

However, this frequent occurrence in conditional clauses is confined to *που*. *Ergens* is rarely found in conditional clauses in the CGN (only 5 times out of 2757) and in all those cases it was found directly next to a locative marker. The difference between Dutch and Greek in this respect may be due to differences in the use of conditional clauses. Dutch, for example, does not use conditionals to form purpose clauses and Dutch conditional clauses do not express general validity as in example (6).

- (6) Τῷ δ' ἐπιόντι ἔτει [ἐπὶ Ἀρχύτα μὲν ἐφορεύοντος, ἄρχοντος δ' ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἀλεξίου,] Λύσανδρος ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἔφεσον μετεπέμψατο Ἐτεόνικον ἐκ Χίου σὺν ταῖς ναυσί, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας συνήθροισεν,

εἴ	πού	τις	ἦν,
if	somewhere	some	was
COND	PTCL	NOM.SG	3.SG.IMPF

καὶ ταύτας τ' ἐπεσκεύαζε καὶ ἄλλας ἐν Ἀντάνδρῳ ἐναυπηγεῖτο.

In the following year—Archytas being now ephor, and Alexias archon at Athens—Lysander arrived at Ephesus and sent for Eteonicus to come thither from Chios with the ships, while he also gathered together all the other ships that were anywhere to be found; then he occupied himself with refitting these vessels and building more at Antandrus.

X. HG. 2.1.10

A sentence like ‘he gathered all other ships if (idiomatic English: whenever) he could find some somewhere and refitted them’ is often expressed by means of relative clauses in Dutch as in *alle schepen die hij maar ergens kon vinden* ‘all ships that he could find anywhere’. These differences may explain why that although it is possible to use *ergens* for purposes of generalization, we do not find this use in conditional clauses as frequently as is the case in Greek.⁵

Temporal interpretations

The temporal interpretation of *ergens* is generally marked by temporal expressions. In the case of *που*, we do not really have clearly temporal examples, although there are several instances in which a temporal interpretation cannot be excluded and the specialized dictionary on Sophocles (Ellendt and Genthe, 1872) suggests that *που* may have had a temporal interpretation. The indefinite relative which is derived from *που*, *ὅπου*, did develop a temporal interpretation and sometimes translators used a temporal interpretation for *που*. Therefore, there is a chance that *που* had a temporal interpretation in Ancient Greek.

⁵For a more elaborate discussion of conditionals that presuppose that the content of the conditional clause has been (sometimes) realized, as is the case in (6), see Wakker (1994, 276).

In example (7), a description is given of the way the Theban horsemen acted. As I will argue below, there are several reasons to interpret που as temporal in this example.

- (7) οἱ μέντοι τῶν Θηβαίων ἵππεῖς ἐώκεσαν
 the ptcl the Theban horsemen were like
 NOM.PL PTCL ART.GEN.PL GEN.PL NOM.PL 3PL.PLUP
- ὑποπεπωκόσι που ἐν μεσημβρία·
 men who have drunk a little που in midday.
 PTC.PERF.DAT.PL που PREP DAT.SG.

The Theban horsemen, however, acted like men who had drunk a little που at midday;

X. HG. 5.4.40

In example (7), the temporal expression ἐν μεσημβρία ‘on midday’ introduces a temporal dimension, which uses, just like in Dutch, a locative preposition (ἐν ‘in’) to refer to a moment in time. The interpretation of που as *at some point* on midday is also an explanation for the unusual position of που in the clause (i.e. not in the second position in the clause, but after the participle and before the temporal phrase). Although a modal interpretation within the participle phrase is possible as well (the horsemen looked like how we all know people look who have had a little to drink at midday), a temporal interpretation cannot be excluded.

In example (8), που is followed by a noun which sometimes has a temporal interpretation. This makes it possible to interpret the subordinate clause as *if at some moment the right time would be there*. However, due to the variety of uses of καιρός it is also possible to interpret this as *when somewhere there would be an opportunity*, which would result in a generalizing locative interpretation.

- (8) ὡς τάχιστα δὲ ἐκέλευε τούς τε τραυματίας ἀναλαβόντας καὶ τὸν πεζὸν καὶ τῶν σκευῶν ὅσα ἦλθον ἔχοντες, ἃ δ’ ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας εἰλήφασι καταλιπόντας ὅπως κοῦφαι ὦσιν αἱ νῆες, ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Σάμον, κάκειθεν ἤδη ξυναγαγόντας πάσας τὰς ναῦς τούς ἐπίπλους,
- ἦν που καιρός ἦ, ποιεῖσθαι.
 if που critical time would be, make (the naval attack)
 CONJ=PTCL που NOM.SG 3SG.PRS.SUBJ, INF.PRS.

He told them to take up their wounded as quickly as they could and the troops and stores which they had brought with them, and leaving behind what they had taken from the enemy’s country, in order to lighten the ships, to sail off to Samos, and there concentrating all their ships to attack when που the right time would be there. Th. 8.27.4

There are many examples in which a temporal reading for που would not be impossible. However, I haven’t been able to find contexts in which this interpretation is really the only sensible reading, although for the last example mentioned above a

temporal interpretation seems the most likely.⁶ However, this is too little evidence to assume a temporal reading for *που*. Therefore, I do not think *που* had a temporal meaning in Ancient Greek, although many examples are compatible with such an interpretation. Because of this compatibility, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of a temporal meaning.

The about/around interpretation

According to dictionaries and grammars, *που* can, just like *ergens*, also mean *about/around*. This is in line with the same interpretation of *ergens*. However, this use of *που* is very rare or perhaps even non-existent in the classical period except for in Herodotus, in whose work it occurs several times. Herodotus also uses the combination of *μάλιστα που* ‘about, around’, which in other classical authors is not used with this meaning. The only places in which we find comparable uses is in later authors like Pausanias (ca. 115-180 AD). There may be several explanations. It may be that this was a dialectal (i.e. Ionic) use of *που* or this may be a coincidence which is due to restricted corpus of texts available in terms of genres and number of words.

In example (9) it would be possible to read *που* as *about* since it is followed by a number. However, the list of values of slaves suggests that these are examples which do not really require the speaker to indicate how precise he is by means of a form like *about/around*. In addition, the other numbers are not accompanied by *που*.

Apart from the fact that this example contains numbers, it is very comparable to the other examples of *που* in clauses that express obvious information. Also, *που* is found before the number, whereas in Herodotus, in whose works we do find the *about/around* interpretation, *που* is always placed after the number. Therefore, it is hard to decide whether this is a case of *about/around* or a case of modal *που* and this example cannot be used to show that the interpretation *about/around* also occurred outside of Herodotus.

(9) (Ἄρ', ἔφη, ὃ Ἀντίσθενες, εἰσὶ τινες ἀξίαι φίλων, ὥσπερ οἰκετῶν;)

τῶν	γὰρ	οἰκετῶν	ὁ	μέν	που	δυοῖν	μναῖν
the	for	slaves	the		που	two	mina
ART.GEN.PL	CONJ	GEN.PL	ART.NOM.SG	PTCL	που	NUM.GEN.DU	GEN.DU

ἄξιός ἐστιν,
worth is,
NOM.SG 3SG.PRS

(ὁ δὲ οὐδ' ἡμιμναίου, ὁ δὲ πέντε μνῶν, ὁ δὲ καὶ δέκα)
(Antisthenes,) he said, “have friends like servants their own values?” For one

⁶In many modern languages, temporal interpretations of locative indefinites are accepted with months, seasons, years, weeks etcetera, even though in other contexts a temporal use is not (yet) accepted. Therefore, I checked whether these types of expressions were found in Greek, but in classical Greek *που* does not seem to be used in this way. This is another indication that *που* probably did not have a temporal reading in this period.

servant is worth two minas, (another less than half a mina, another five minas, another no less than ten.)⁷

X. Mem. 2.5.2.3

- (10) Ὑστάσπεϊ δὲ τῷ Ἀρσάμεος ἐόντι ἀνδρὶ Ἀχαιμενίδῃ ἦν τῶν παίδων Δαρεῖος πρεσβύτατος,

ἔων τότε ἡλικίην ἐς εἴκοσί κου μάλιστα ἔτεα,
being then age to twenty που about years,
PTC.PRS.NOM.SG ADV ACC.SG PREP NUMBER ΠΟΥ ADV ACC.PL,

Hystaspes son of Arsames was an Achaemenid, and Darius was the eldest of his sons, then about twenty years old;⁸

Hdt. 1.209

In (10) there are several things apart from που (=κου) itself that point in the direction of *about/around*. There is the use of the preposition ἐς ‘to’ and the use of μάλιστα. This last adverb means literally *most*, which suggests that originally it may have meant something like *at most*. This would result in an interpretation like *somewhere in the direction of 20 years at most*. This seems plausible, but although the combination of μάλιστα and κου occurs three times in Herodotus, it is not present with this meaning in other authors up to the classical period. In most other authors μάλιστα is used for this purpose, but it is not combined with που.

- (11) Ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου διὰ εἴκοσί κου σταδίων ἄλλος ποταμὸς τῷ
from and this across twenty που stades other river to which
PREP CONJ GEN.SG PREP NUM ΠΟΥ GEN.PL NOM.PL NOM.PL DAT.SG

οὔνομα κεῖται Δύρας
name lies Dyras
NOM.SG 3SG.PRS NOM.SG

About twenty furlongs from that river is another named Dyras,

Hdt. 7.198

In example (11) που is found within a prepositional phrase, but without any other marker of imprecision. This shows that in Herodotus at least που had developed a special interpretation *about/around*.

I have not been able to find explicitly scalar examples of που neither in the synchronic prose corpus nor the diachronic corpus.

Summarizing, we may say that although it cannot be excluded that Ancient Greek had the same variety of interpretations of non-modal που as Dutch *ergens*, the temporal, scalar and *about/around* interpretations cannot be shown with certainty to exist in the corpora used in this study. The *about/around* interpretation is found

⁷This translation was slightly modified.

⁸κου is Ionic for που.

in Herodotus. This may have been a dialect specific development or just an effect of a relatively small and unbalanced corpus. The locative interpretation, however, showed the same general characteristics as locative *ergens*, although the frequent presence of the particle in conditional clauses seems to be confined to *που*.

11.3 Modal *ergens* versus modal *που*

As we saw in the chapters on *ergens* above, modal *ergens* can have the following interpretations. They are characterized by a preference for particular contexts which are also presented here.

- *feelings* interpretations are often connected to first person pronouns, mental state predicates and subjective predicates
- *point of view* interpretations are often connected to impersonal copula constructions, but they do have subjective predicate complements. In addition, they are often combined with adversative markers
- the *somehow* interpretation is frequently found with third person action verbs

In the previous chapter on *που* we found the following contextual characteristics for modal *που*:

- modal particles like ‘evidently’ or with an affirmative function
- mental state predicates, especially verbs of knowing
- frequent use of the copula, mostly with factual predicative complements
- verbs of saying.

The contextual characteristics of modal *ergens* and modal *που* show a certain amount of overlap, like, for instance, mental state predicates and frequent use of the copula. However, in this list of possibly overlapping features some of the clearest characteristics of modal *ergens*, the use of first persons and adversative markers, are not present. This suggests that there may be some differences between modal *ergens* and *που*. Also, we need to make the comparison more specific in order to see whether the overlapping characteristics really point in the direction of a comparable function.

11.3.1 Comparing modal *ergens* to modal *που*

Mental state predicates

We will start the comparison of the contextual characteristics of modal *ergens* and modal *που* with mental state predicates (MSPs). In general, modal *ergens* is found with mental state predicates more frequently than modal *που*. Within the category

modal the co-occurrence of *ergens* with MSPs is 37% (52 out of 139) and the co-occurrence of *που* with MSPs is 18% (54 out of 304). The most frequently found MSP with *ergens* is the verb *vinden* ‘to be of the opinion’. This verb is the main verb of the *ergens* clause in 17 out of 139 modal cases of *ergens* (12%), followed by *voelen* ‘feel’ (3 times) and *het gevoel hebben* ‘have the feeling’ (4 times). This may of course be due to the general frequency of *vinden* in the CGN. In order to exclude that possibility we will look at the verb *zeggen* ‘to say’ and see whether its co-occurrence with *ergens* shows the same distribution as its general frequency in the corpus. That is, if *vinden* is much more frequent than *zeggen* in the corpus as a whole, we would expect the same proportions in the cases in which they are combined with *ergens*. Because *vinden* can be interpreted both as ‘to find’ and ‘to be of the opinion’, it is impossible to count the instances of *vinden* ‘to be of the opinion’ separately from *vinden* ‘to find’. This means that we cannot calculate what the chance is that this frequency is the effect of the general frequency of *vinden* in the corpus. What we can do though, is compare the total of both interpretations of *vinden* with the verb *zeggen* ‘to say’. The latter is 2 times as frequent as *vinden* in the whole corpus (respectively 50297 versus 23669), but verbs of saying are found only 16 times within a five word window around *ergens*. The verb *vinden*, however, is found 37 times within a five word window around *ergens*, which shows that it is far more frequent than we would expect.

The most frequent MSP found in *που*-clauses is the verb οἶδα ‘to know’ which occurs 10 times in the synchronic prose corpus (381 instances of *που*). The second most frequent MSP is another verb of knowing γινώσκω, which occurs 6 times. Since in Ancient Greek verbs of saying are also used to express opinions it would be interesting to investigate these verbs as well. The verb λέγω ‘to say’ occurs 16 times in 304 instances of non-locative *που* (5.3%). This verb is followed in frequency by the other verb of saying φημί, which occurs 10 times, which is just as frequent as οἶδα ‘to know’. For these verbs we could calculate the chance that they would occur randomly together with *που*, which showed that they were significantly more frequently found with *που* than we would expect on the basis of chance.⁹ However, if we compare the general frequencies of the verbs of saying with the verbs of knowing, we see that in the synchronic prose corpus as a whole verbs of saying are 2 (φημί)-4 (λέγω) times as frequent as verbs of knowing.¹⁰ We can conclude that verbs of knowing are relatively much more frequent in *που* clauses than verbs of saying.

The verb *weten* ‘to know’ occurs only once together with *ergens*.¹¹ This suggests that there is a difference in the type of MSPs *ergens* and *που* prefer. It may be, however, that the verbs of saying in Greek are comparable to the verbs expressing opinions and feelings in Dutch. For this reason, we will compare the characteristics of these verbs.

In Dutch, all instances of *vinden* ‘to be of the opinion’ are combined with a first person singular pronoun. In Greek, there are only 2 cases (out of 26) in which verbs

⁹Fisher exact tests had the following values: οἶδα: $p < 0.0001$, γινώσκω $p < 0.001$ λέγω: $p < 0.0001$; φημί: $p < 0.001$.

¹⁰According to a TLG lemma search λέγω occurs 4469 times in the synchronic prose corpus, φημί 2707 times, οἶδα 1151 times and γινώσκω 887 times.

¹¹The example is as follows: *nou ik had 't 'm ook al uitgelegd in die discussie hoor dus hij wist dat ergens al*. ‘I had already explained this to him in that discussion, so he knew that *ergens* already’.

of saying are combined with first person singulars. In most cases the verbs of saying are in the first person plural or in the third person. If we now zoom in on the first person singular, we see that verbs of saying in the first person singular are never used in their function of opinion verbs as can be seen in example (12). The interpretation of *που* seems to be modal, since both speaker and addressee know what has been said before, which makes the *που*-clause shared information and therefore accessible to the addressee.

- (12) (ΞΕ. Τρίτον τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτήσομαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.)

ΞΕ. Εἶπόν που νυνδὴ λέγων
I said που just now saying
1SG.AOR ΠΟΥ PTCL PTC.PRS.NOM.SG

(ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτ' ἔλεγχον αἰεὶ τε ἀπειρηκῶς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶπες.)

(Stranger: Then I have a third little request to make of you.

Theaetetus: You have only to utter it.)

Stranger: I said a while ago (that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

Theaetetus: Yes, so you did.)

Pl. *Sph.* 242a

Therefore, we may conclude that the strong subjectification that we noted in the *feelings* interpretation of *ergens* does not seem to be present in Ancient Greek for the verbs of saying. However, there are some cases in which *που* is found with other MSPs in Greek, such as verbs of thinking. There are three types of verbs found with modal *που*: ἠγάομαι (3 times), οἶμαι (3 times), and δόκεω (1) time. Only in one example is the verb in the first person and 6 of these 7 examples are also accompanied by *δή* or *ἤ*. In example (13) the main verb is οἶμαι 'I think'. However, the rest of the sentence is a subordinate clause. This raises the question of whether *δήπου* belongs to the main clause or to the subordinate clause. Since *δήπου* normally expresses that the information given is evident and accessible ('of course'), *δήπου* would fit better in the subordinate clause in which it is suggested that all people know something, but the combination of οἶμαι and *δήπου* is hard to interpret.

- (13) Οἶμαι γὰρ δήπου τοῦτό γε πάντα γινώσκειν,
I think for δήπου this all know,
1SG.PRS CONJ δήπου ACC.SG FOC.PTCL ACC.PL INF.PRS,
(ὅτι σοφιστῆ μισθὸς κάλλιστός ἐστιν καὶ μέγιστος, ἦν τῶν μαθητῶν τινες καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ καὶ φρόνιμοι γένωνται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις εὐδοκιμοῦντες)
for I think, δήπου, all men are aware (that a sophist reaps his finest and his largest reward when his pupils prove to be honorable and intelligent and

highly esteemed by their fellow-citizens,)¹²

Isoc. 15.220.1

This lack of connection of the Greek MSPs with the speaker suggests that also in these cases, the mental state predicates do not fulfill the same function as the most frequent MSPs in the case of *ergens*. The connection with the mental space of the speaker, which is found in *ergens*, does not seem to be there for Ancient Greek *που*.

First person verbs

The second characteristic of the interpretation *in someone's feelings or thoughts* of *ergens* was its frequent combination with 1st person pronouns. In 28% (39 out of 139) of all cases of modal *ergens*, *ergens* was found in a clause with a first person pronoun. If we now look at the first person verbs in modal *που*, this is 14% (43 out of 304). In the category of first person verbs, there are cases in which *που* is combined with *δή*, *ἦ* and mental state predicates, but also verbs of saying and action verbs. Therefore, it seems that *που* has less connection with the speaker than Dutch *ergens* for most subcategories of modal *που* we have distinguished. This suggests that it is less likely for *που* to be interpreted as *in someone's feelings or thoughts*.

The copula

Now we will compare the use of the copula in Dutch *ergens* sentences with the Greek *που* sentences. In total, the copula is the main verb in 38 instances of modal *ergens* (24% of 139) and 68 instances of *που* (22% of 304). This seems quite comparable. If we look at the subjective predicative complements, however, 82% (31 out of 38) of the cases of *ergens* have a subjective predicative complement, whereas only 46% (31 out of 68) of the instances of *που* have a subjective predicative complement. Of the subjective complements of *που*, 11 cases are of an epistemic modal type like *it is impossible* (*ἀδύνατον*), or *it is clear* (*δῆλον*). These adjectives are absent from the complements of *ergens*. However, they are in accordance with the frequent use of *δεῖ* and the positive argumentative direction that was found for the translations of *που* in the previous chapter and the frequent presence of verbs of knowing in *που* sentences. The use of these adjectives with *που* also suggests that the speaker is presenting his views as facts, instead of as subjective opinions as is generally the case in *ergens*-clauses.

The somehow interpretation and third person non-subjective verbs

The last group of characteristics of *ergens* which we mentioned above was that of the third person non-subjective verbs. This is a large group for *που*. However, the mere presence of third person non-subjective verbs is not specific enough to draw conclusions. In the case of *ergens*, these characteristics distinguished the *somehow* group from the *feelings* and the *point of view* groups partly by means of the absence of other characteristics. In the case of *που*, however, we have not found a reason to

¹²This translation was slightly modified.

assume these groups of interpretations existed in Greek, which makes this category large and ill-defined.

However, a *somehow* interpretation has been proposed for *που* (Slater, 1969; Scolnicov, 2003; Schwyzer and Debrunner, 1966). This raises the question as to whether an interpretation comparable to the *somehow* interpretation for *ergens* existed in Ancient Greek.

The first question that arises when considering this option, is why the translators do not use this option more frequently if this was an important interpretation. As was already mentioned in passing, the lexicon on Pindar by Slater gives *somehow* as the only interpretation of *που* and also in some commentaries (e.g. Scolnicov, 2003, 81) it is said that *somehow* would be the best interpretation for *που*. However, generally, translators do not choose this type of translation very frequently and if they do, they do not do so for the same passages. This inconsistency may have to do with the compatibility of this form with many contexts. This can be illustrated with example (14) below.

- (14) a. Somehow the cup fell on my shoe instead of on the floor.
 b. A cup fell out of the cupboard straight on the floor, because it somehow had been put on top of another cup in an unstable way.

The Oxford English Dictionary describes *somehow* as *in some manner or by some means not understood or defined; one way or another; somehow*. If we now compare example (14-a) with example (14-b), however, we see that in the latter the manner and cause of the cup's fall is already described. The use of *somehow* in the causal clause makes the interpretation of *somehow* just move one step further to the fact that the person responsible for putting the cup there is not known. If we now add the person by saying *because Ann somehow had put it on top of another cup in an unstable way*, the interpretation moves up another level to the interpretation that it is Ann's motivation is unknown. In other words, the expression *somehow* in English is not restricted to a specific level of interpretation and, because of that, it is compatible with many situations and sentences.

The fact that the English word *somehow* is highly compatible with many situations and sentences implies that it is very hard to prove or disprove whether *που* may have had a comparable use. This also means that if *somehow* is compatible with *που*-clauses, that does not imply that the interpretation of *που* was *somehow*. However, there are some examples in the corpus that really do not seem to be compatible with a *somehow* interpretation, as in example (15) below.

- (15) ὧ φίλοι Ἀργείων ὅς τ' ἔξοχος ὅς τε μεσήεις
 ὅς τε χερείοτερος, ἐπεὶ οὐ πῶ πάντες ὁμοῖοι
 ἄνδρες ἐν πολέμῳ, νῦν ἔπλετο ἔργον ἅπασι
 καὶ δ' αὐτοὶ τόδε που γινώσκετε.
 also and self this που you know
 PTCL CONJ NOM.PL ACC.SG που 2PL.PRS.

Friends, whoso is pre-eminent among the Danaans, whoso holds a middle

place, or whoso is lesser, for in nowise are all men equal in war, now is there a work for all, and this ye know even of yourselves.

Il. 12.272

In example (15), the speaker is making an encouraging speech. This context makes it unlikely that he would add that he does not know by what means his addressees know what he suggests they know, because that would weaken his argument. As we have seen above, *που* is regularly found in this kind of argumentative context. That makes it less likely that in these cases *που* was interpreted as *somehow*. This means that not all cases of modal *που* can be interpreted as *somehow*. In certain groups of cases, like the cases in which *που* is combined with *τις*, it is often possible to interpret *που* as *somehow*, though not always. The generalizing function of locative *που*, which was described above, clearly has some overlap with the *somehow* interpretation. However, as we saw in the previous chapters, in many cases of *που* and *τις* there are locative markers in the context, which makes it less likely that *που* was interpreted as *somehow*. Therefore, we have to conclude that although it is certainly possible for a subset of the instances of *που* to be interpreted as *somehow*, there is a lack of consistent positive evidence for this interpretation.

11.3.2 Comparing modal *που* to modal *ergens*

If we now turn the question around and take the features of *που* as our starting point of the comparison with *ergens*, we see that there are several characteristics of *που* that were not yet discussed. We discussed the occurrence of *που* with conditionals and the indefinite pronoun, which was only partly comparable with *ergens*, as well as verbs of knowing, but the presence of particles and the more general features of *που* contexts have not been discussed yet. We will discuss these two characteristics of *που* now.

The presence of affirmative particles or 'evidently'

One of the clearest collocations of *που* was the particle *δή*, which was present directly next to *που* in up to 40% of the cases in the synchronic prose corpus. As was said above, *δή* is mostly described as meaning 'evidently'. Although there were other descriptions as well, it seems that in the classical period *δήπου* is, just as Denniston says, generally interpreted as 'of course', which fits the description of *δή* well.

We also found particles in the context of *ergens*. The particles that were mostly found in the context of *ergens* were combinations of *ook*, *maar*, *wel*, *toch* 'also, but, focal particle, adversative marker'.¹³ None of these particles have an evidential function, but if we specifically search for markers like *evident* 'evidently' or *natuurlijk* 'of course', we find that of all modal instances of *ergens* in the CGN (139) there are only 7 instances in which, for instance, *natuurlijk* is found in the same sentence as *ergens*, which is about 5%.

¹³ Although *που* is quite frequently found with the focal particle *γε*, there seems to be little resemblance in the use of *γε* with the functions of the Dutch focal particles mentioned here.

If we now take an example of *δήπου*, we see that there is no way that *δήπου* could be translated with modal *ergens* in a sentence like the Greek *δήπου*-sentence in (16).

- (16) (ἃ δὲ βουλόμενοί τινες ἀποτρέπειν τὴν εἰρήνην διαβάλλουσιν, ὡς ἡμεῖς οὐ φιλίας δεόμενοι, ἀλλὰ φοβούμενοι μὴ Ἀνταλκίδας ἔλθῃ ἔχων παρὰ βασιλέως χρήματα, διὰ τοῦθ' ἤκομεν, ἐνθυμήθητε ὡς φλυαροῦσι.)

βασιλεὺς μὲν γὰρ δήπου ἔγραψε πάσας τὰς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι
king ptcl for δήπου wrote all the in the Greek
NOM.SG PTCL PTCL δήπου 3SG.AOR ACC.PL ACC.PL PREP ART.DAT.SG DAT.SG

πόλεις αὐτονόμους εἶναι
states autonomic be
ACC.PL ACC.PL INF.PRS

(Now touching the slanderous allegations of certain people who wish to defeat the peace, to the effect that we have come here, not because we desire friendship, but rather because we fear that Antalcidas may arrive with money from the King, consider how foolishly they are talking.) For the King directed, as you know, that all the cities in Greece were to be independent;

X. HG. 6.3.12

The Dutch translation of this sentence *Want de koning heeft ergens verordonneerd dat alle Griekse steden onafhankelijk moesten zijn* would at best get a locative reading referring to the place in which the decision was written down, but a modal interpretation is not really an option. The reason is that the content of the clause is too factual. There are no possible viewpoints involved. However, forms like 'evidently' are at home in this kind of statements, as well as *που*. This shows that *που* probably had a different function from *ergens* and as we saw in the study above, the main difference may be that *που* is not a viewpoint marker, but manages the expectations of the addressee with respect to the information that is presented.

The same problem is found with the use of ἢ *που*. According to my intuition (I have not been able to find a corpus example) the use of *ergens* in *à fortiori* arguments may not be impossible, but it would be impossible in the context of a defense speech (in which we find most instances in Greek). The reason is that the use of *ergens* would suggest that the speaker himself does not completely believe in his own *a fortiori* argument. In a defense speech one cannot afford to give such an impression, unless one is using strong sarcasm, which is clearly not the case in the Greek contexts. A made up example of an *a fortiori* sentence with *ergens* in Dutch is given in (17).

- (17) ?Als Jan die kans krijgt, zou Piet die ergens zeker moeten krijgen.
If Jan gets that chance, Piet should *ergens* certainly get it.

Another context in which we frequently found modal *που* was in (fatalistic) statements about the gods. Since this kind of statement is also made in other religions it is easy to find comparable sentences in Dutch like *God heeft het zo gewild* 'It was

God's wish'. However, on google I have not been able to find this type of sentences with modal *ergens*. Neither **Ergens heeft God het zo gewild* nor **God heeft het ergens zo gewild* are found on the internet. What does exist is the non-agentive version *Ergens heeft het zo moeten zijn* 'Somehow it had to be this way'. This complies with the idea that the speaker either needs access to the mental space of the subject or is referring to his own mental space to be able to use modal *ergens*.

In tragedy and comedy, we frequently found *που* in incredulous or reluctant questions. It is hard to check this, but I have not been able to find or think of examples of this type of questions with modal *ergens*.

Summarizing we can say that contextual characteristics which did not come up in the comparison of *ergens* with *που*, did not come up because they indicate that there are some fundamental differences between the types of contexts in which *ergens* and *που* are found and the particles with which they are combined.

11.4 *Ergens* and *που* compared

In the previous sections we carefully compared the contextual characteristics of *ergens* and *που*. In this section we will zoom out and discuss why these contextual characteristics may be linked to the interpretations of *ergens* and *που*.

The relationship between the contextual characteristics of locative *ergens* and *που* and their interpretations is relatively clear. Most indicators are part of the same semantic field as locative *ergens* and *που* in that they denote locations or conceptually have a locative complement. This is true for both Dutch and Greek.

However, what is the relationship between mental state predicates, (subjective) copula constructions, first persons, adversative markers, third person action verbs and the interpretations of *ergens*? And what can the contextual properties of modal *που* tell us about the functions of the particle?

Apart from the explicitly metaphorical instances of *ergens*, the clearest connection between the modal interpretation of *ergens* and its contextual characteristics is subjectivity. There is a clear link with the subject, which is exemplified by the use of first person pronouns in combination with subjective verbs like *vinden* 'be of the opinion' as well as subjective predicates. These verbal forms seem to connect *ergens* to the subjective evaluation of the situation described. The use of adversative markers is an indication for a split or contrast, in this case in the person himself (the split-self function of modal *ergens*). The combination with third person action verbs does not fit that picture completely. However, *ergens* may have incorporated its subjectifying function in such a way that if the context does not allow for a locative interpretation or one of the other modal interpretations, *ergens* may subjectify the sentence by itself, indicating that the situation may be seen from a different viewpoint than the speaker has presented. This, however, would only work because locative *ergens* and the other modal options have relatively clear contextual characteristics.

If we now compare the characteristics of *ergens* to those of *που*, we see a different picture. In the context of *που* we often find the results of reasoning and references to knowledge of the world. Both the particles *δή* 'evidently' and *ἤ* *affirmative/inferential*

particle as well as verbs of knowing connect the content of the proposition to factual or accessible information. There is no special connection to the subject or to strictly personal subjective views. The reason for this lack of subjectivity is probably that personal subjective views are not generally presented as accessible information, because they cannot be assumed to be shared. This may be seen from the subjective adjectives that are found in the copula constructions in *που* clauses. These adjectives express in most cases conclusions that are presented as known facts or shared values like *it is impossible, clear, necessary*. If we do find subjective statements they generally refer to a shared set of moral or cultural values e.g. *just* (δικαίον) or statements about the gods, as was already observed by Wackernagel (1885). An example of this last type is given below. This example was also mentioned in section 8.3 above.

- (18) εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἔσσι, θεός που σοὶ τό γ' ἔδωκεν
 if very strong you are, god που you the ptcl has given
 CONJ ADV NOM.SG 2SG.PRS, NOM.SG που DAT.SG ACC.SG PTCL 3SG.AOR
 If you are very strong, it was a god who gave you this gift.¹⁴

Il. 1.178 The information provided in example (18) is commonly held to be true in Greek society and the subjective value of this sentence is only in the choice of the moment of saying it (in a personal row with Achilles, suggesting that he is not more important than others because he is stronger).

As we have seen above, locative and modal readings are not always easy to distinguish. For instance in cases in which a text of a famous author is cited it is often unclear whether the speaker is referring to an indefinite place in the text or whether he is expressing that the other person knows the text, which we may assume was often the case if, for instance, Homer was cited.

In the following example, part of which was already discussed above, the author possibly wanted to disambiguate between a modal and a locative reading by adding *δή* to the first instance of *που* and *ἄλλοθι* to the second. In other examples of this type, like the one in (20), we generally find *που* without any indication whether the speaker wants to refer to some place in a text or is just marking that the text is probably known to the addressee.

- (19) μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα αὐτοῦ· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ δήπου καὶ Ὀμήρω “γάνυται δὲ τ' ἀκούων.” τοῦτο δὲ φράζει ὅτι ἦδεται δέ τ' ἀκούων.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι που
 is and ptcl else somewhere
 3.SG.PRS PTCL PTCL ADV PTCL

“πυκινὰ φρεσὶ μῆδεα εἰδώς.”

This is confirmed by his very name. Homer, you remember, has the words, “He joys to hear;” that is to say, ‘he rejoices to hear;’ and in another place, “harbouring shrewd devices in his heart.”

X. *Smp.* 8.30

¹⁴This translation was slightly modified to adapt it to our new findings.

It may even be that especially in those cases in which the information provided was already known, the speaker could afford not to be very precise about the location, inviting the inference that he knew that the addressee already knew where to find the passage. This might be an explanation of how the inference from an indefinite place to known information came about.

(20) Socrates: Τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαί' ἄττα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν.

Hermogenes: Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

Socrates: Λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος
says που Heracleitus
3SG.PRS που NOM.SG

ὅτι “πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει,” καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῆ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς “δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης.”

EPM. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

(Socrates: I seem to have a vision of Heracleitus saying some ancient words of wisdom as old as the reign of Cronus and Rhea, which Homer said too.

Hermogenes: What do you mean by that?)

Socrates: Heracleitus says, you know(/somewhere EK), (that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream.

Hermogenes: True.)

Pl. Cra. 402a

In example (20), we may interpret που both as a reference to a place in a text of Heracleitus, and as an acknowledgement that Hermogenes probably knows this quote from Heracleitus. If we were to take this one step further, we may even assume that the reason Socrates does not need to specify where Heracleitus says this, is that he knows that the passage is known to Hermogenes, which may have given rise to the inference that που marked the information status instead of the location.

Summarizing, we have seen that the contextual characteristics of *ergens* and που allow us to draw quite a clear picture of the information that is important for the interpretation of these forms. For *ergens* we find, apart from the explicitly metaphorical examples, several indications of subjectivity, such as a connection to the agentive subject of the clause, first person pronouns, mental state predicates expressing personal views and opinions and subjective adjectives, but also indications of a split in the form of adversative markers and focus particles.

The contexts of modal που lack these subjective markers in most cases, but they do link που to interpretations like ‘evidently’ or ‘of course’ (δή που), inferential information (ἦ που) and shared information (verbs of knowing, truisms).

In the case of *ergens* we still find some indications of its probable origin in explicitly metaphorical expressions. In the case of που these indications are harder to find, but what may have contributed to the change from locative to modal is the implication that one can be imprecise if the information is already known.

11.5 Conclusion

The comparison of the contextual characteristics of *ergens* and *που* shows that the two particles may have been comparable in the locative domain, but were probably not very comparable in the modal domain. With respect to the locative interpretation, they seem to be quite alike. This interpretation of both forms seems to be triggered by locative verbs, adverbs and prepositions. Also, the generalizing function of the locative interpretation seems to be shared, although the frequent use in conditional clauses is confined to *που*. The *about/around* interpretation of *που* may have existed only in the Ionian dialect. That is, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that it also existed in the Attic dialect. There is also not enough evidence to assume a temporal interpretation of *ergens* or a *somehow* interpretation for *που*. There are instances in which it would be possible to interpret *που* in this way, but there is no compelling evidence that *που* really had this interpretation.

The comparison between modal *ergens* and modal *που* has shown that although both particles have the same origin and both developed a modal use, this modal use is probably not the same. The Greek particle *που* is less frequently combined with mental state predicates, first person verbs and subjective copula constructions. In other words, *που* seems much less connected to the mental space of the speaker than is the case for modal *ergens*. On the other hand, *ergens* is not frequently found together with adverbs like ‘evidently’ or in (*a fortiori*) arguments, conclusions, factual statements, truisms and (fatalistic) statements about the gods.

Historically, there also seem to be differences. In the older Greek texts we do not find many instances of metaphorically locative uses of *που*. And if we do find them, the type of modal inferences that can be made in the case of *ergens* do not seem to be possible. The lack of metaphorical uses of locative *που* and the differences in the contextual characteristics between modal *ergens* and modal *που* strongly suggest that Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek *που* developed different modal functions from a very comparable starting point.

It seems that a careful study of the contexts of forms like *ergens* and *που* may yield quite a precise picture of which components of the context are important for the interpretation of that form. The contextual characteristics of *ergens* showed, apart from a clearly marked locative use, strong indications that its meaning was related to preferably a first person’s subjective view of the world while it also allowed for different views marked by adversative markers.

The context of *που* showed us that apart from its clearcut locative function, *που* feels at home in generalizing, indefinite contexts with *εἰ* and *τις*, which indicates that it may have had a generalizing function. In addition, known information from all kinds of sources (inference, knowledge of the world, shared moral values) may have played an important role in the use of *που*, as became clear from combinations with the particles *δή* and *ἦ*, as well as verbs of knowing. A recurring feature of *που*-contexts was also, as observed by Sicking, the presence of the particle in truisms, which is a clear contrast with the contexts in which we found *ergens*.

It was suggested that the origin of the development of the locative indefinite

to modal *που* might have been the assumption that an indefinite locative expressed that there was no need to be precise because the addressee already had access to the information. However, there is very little evidence with respect to the development of modal *που*, because this development already took place before the historic period began.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion part III

In this part of the dissertation, I adapted the methods used in the study of *ergens* and the conclusions drawn from that study for use in the study of a dead language. In order to have access to interpretations that were independent from my personal analysis, I used academic translations of the Greek texts in three languages. In addition, I carefully studied the collocations and contextual characteristics of $\pi\upsilon$. On the basis of these two sources of information, I have given a description of $\pi\upsilon$. The first descriptive chapter of this part was based on a synchronic corpus of prose texts from the classical period. This prose corpus was compared to a more diachronic corpus in chapter 10 in order to find out how the various uses of $\pi\upsilon$ may have developed and to test the hypotheses on the use of $\pi\upsilon$ against a corpus on which these hypotheses were not based. In chapter 11, I compared the contextual characteristics and uses of *ergens* and $\pi\upsilon$. Now I will summarize the results from the previous chapters.

12.1 The description of synchronic $\pi\upsilon$

In the chapter on synchronic $\pi\upsilon$, I discussed the contextual characteristics of $\pi\upsilon$ and its implications for the interpretations of the particle. On the basis of the results of the study of *ergens*, I took a corpus linguistic approach to the study of the properties of the context in which $\pi\upsilon$ occurs.

I found evidence for three types of interpretations of $\pi\upsilon$ in the Attic authors.

1. a locative interpretation 'somewhere, anywhere'
2. a generalizing locative interpretation 'some ... somewhere' (i.e. 'the specifics do not matter')
3. a modal interpretation¹

The first interpretation showed clear contextual characteristics like the presence of locative verbs, adverbs and prepositions. The second interpretation is often accompanied by the indefinite pronoun *τις* 'some, someone, something, somehow, εἰ 'if, whether' or, less frequently, by ἢ 'or'.

It was harder to describe the characteristics of the modal use of *που*. Although there was variation in the translations of *που*, the translations of modal *που* shared one characteristic. In most cases, the translations chosen showed a positive argumentative orientation. That is, the translators chose translations which generally aim to evoke conclusions associated with the truth of the statement in the addressee. The most frequent translations were in English: *surely, I presume, of course*, in French: *j'imagine, sans doute, à plus forte raison* and in German: *doch, doch wohl, wohl, sicherlich*. A type of translation that was found in all languages were those presenting the information as accessible to the speaker as in English: *of course, you know, as you know*, French: *bien sûr, tu le sais, vous le savez* and German: *natürlich, wisst ihr wohl, bekanntlich, selbstverständlich*.

The forms that were frequently found in the direct environment of *που* directed us in a comparable direction. Almost 40% of the instances of modal *που* was directly preceded by the particle *δή*, which, according to most descriptions of the particle, is said to mark that the content of the statement is evident. The collocation *δή που* is so frequent, that Denniston even discusses it separately from *που*. He says that this collocation can be rendered best by 'of course'.

Another form which is frequently collocated with *που* is ἤ (23 times out of 304 modal instances of *που*, i.e. 8%). In the prose texts, the combination ἤ *που* is most frequently found in *a fortiori* arguments and preceded by conditional clauses. In tragedy and comedy, the collocation is most frequently found to mark an inference that is drawn from (recently received) new information. The former use may perhaps be seen as a more specific use of the latter.

A last collocation is the adverb *πάντως* 'in all respects, certainly', which is sometimes added to *δή που*, but can also be used with *που* alone. This combination is often found in answers.

A more diverse group of characteristics is found among the predicates. The most frequent predicates with *που* are copula constructions with adjectives like *ἀδύνατον* 'impossible', *δῆλον* 'clear' and *ἀναγκαῖον* 'necessary', verbs of knowing like *οἶδα* and *γινώσκω*, *δεῖ* 'there is need, must' and verbs of saying. Especially the frequent presence of the verbs *οἶδα* and *γινώσκω*, which occurred significantly more often than

¹For the *about/around* interpretation, which is found in Herodotus, there was no convincing evidence neither in the diachronic corpus nor in the synchronic prose corpus.

expected on the basis of chance², drew our attention, because verbs of knowing generally imply that the information presented is an irrefutable fact or a generally shared value or belief.

The types of contexts in which *που* is regularly found are the following. As we already saw above, *που* is found in arguments and inferences and in answers to obvious questions (e.g. *πάντως δήπου*). It is also found in obvious or trivial statements as was described by Sicking (1993, 57-59), in (fatalistic) statements about the gods (Wackernagel, 1885) and in incredulous and reluctant questions, as is noted by Deniston.

What all these types of contexts seem to have in common, is that the speaker implies that the information he provides is accessible to the addressee via reasoning, inference or by shared moral values and knowledge of the world. This suggests that the function of *που* may have been more interactional than the purely epistemic interpretation *I present this statement as true*. The function of *που* may have been to acknowledge that the information provided is, according to the speaker, accessible to the addressee. This would explain its use in argumentation, since if one suggests that the information provided is generally known or inferable, the addressee is less likely to be critical towards that information, because he does not want to deviate from the norm. In answers to trivial questions *που* may have been used to mark that speaker and addressee both know that this was shared information.

If a speaker states something that is already known to the addressee, the inference would be that the speaker thinks that the addressee did not have that information, which in the case of an obvious statement may imply that the speaker thinks the addressee is not very smart. If, for the sake of an argument, the speaker wants to provide that information anyway, he may want to mark that he is aware that the information is not new to the addressee. This can of course also be used rhetorically to suggest that the addressee should know something.

In sentences expressing indignation, the speaker may want to mark that the moral values that cause the indignation are shared between the speaker and the addressee.

This more interactional interpretation of *που* does not change the conclusion that *που* had a positive argumentative orientation, but it would explain much of the use and the contextual characteristics of the particle, such as the collocation with *δή* and *ἦ*, the frequent presence of verbs of knowing and many other characteristics that were discussed. Therefore, in view of the evidence, it seems that the function of modal *που* was to express that the speaker thinks that what he states is true and that this is (or should be) accessible knowledge to the addressee.

12.2 The development of modal *που*

In the section on the development of modal *που*, I studied works from the following authors (fragments excluded): Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and

²Together with *ἐπίσταμαι* they occurred 20 times out of 304 modal instances of *που* (7%).

Aristophanes.

In the earliest texts there were already modal instances of *που*, but not all collocations and constructions were yet in place. The collocation *δή που*, for instance, does not yet seem to be a collocation in Homer and Hesiod. However, in the earliest tragedies *δή που* does seem to already have its collocational value.

It seems that already in the earliest texts there were basically three uses of *που*:

1. the locative use
2. the weak locative use with a generalizing function
3. the modal use with a positive argumentative orientation and the suggestion that the addressee has access to the information provided (by means of reasoning or knowledge of the world)

The modal use may have arisen as an inference on the basis of the larger context, but that cannot really be shown, because the development probably took place before the textual transmission started. The weak locative use seems to have arisen in contexts with other indefinite markers like *τις* and possibly also in *εἰ* ('if, whether')-clauses, which describe generally occurring or repetitive situations and *ἢ...ἢ...* 'either... or' clauses.

The locative use of *που* is generally marked by locative markers like verbs implying a place, locative adverbs and locative prepositions. The weak locative use may also be accompanied by locative markers, but is most frequently found with the indefinite *τις*, the conjunction *εἰ* 'if, whether' and *ἢ...ἢ...* 'either... or' clauses. The modal examples are, especially in later times, accompanied by *δή*, *ἦ* and mental state predicates like verbs of knowing. In later times, they are also frequently found in assertive sentences with the copula. In general, modal *που* is found in sentences which contain information that can either be deduced by inference or which is already accessible to the addressee for other reasons. In poetic texts this can be seen, for example, in its use in fatalistic statements about the gods.

12.3 A comparison of Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek *που*

The comparison of the contextual characteristics of *ergens* and *που* shows that although they seem to have had the same starting point, the modal uses of the two particles may not have been completely comparable. With respect to the locative interpretation, they seem to be quite alike. Both forms seem to be triggered by locative verbs, adverbs and prepositions. Also, the generalizing function of the locative interpretation seems to be shared, although its combination with conditionals is confined to *που*. The *about/around* interpretation may have existed only in the Ionian dialect. That is, there is no compelling evidence that it also existed in the Attic dialect. We also lack compelling evidence for the existence of a temporal interpretation of *που* and for a *somehow* interpretation. There are instances in which it would be possible to interpret *που* in this way, but there is no positive evidence that *που* really had this interpretation.

The comparison between modal *ergens* and modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ has shown that although both particles have the same origin and both developed a modal use, this modal use is probably not the same. The Greek particle $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ is less frequently combined with mental state predicates, first person verbs and subjective copula constructions. In other words, $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ seems much less connected to the mental space of the speaker than is the case for modal *ergens*. On the other hand, *ergens* is not frequently found together with ‘evidently’ or in arguments, factual statements, conclusions, (fatalistic) statements about god(s) and in incredulous questions.

In addition, we do not find many instances of metaphorically locative uses of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$. The lack of metaphorical uses of locative $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ and the differences in the contextual characteristics between modal *ergens* and modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ strongly suggest that Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ developed different modal functions from a highly comparable starting point.

CHAPTER 13

Back to the literature

13.1 Introduction

In section 8.3 above, an overview was given of the literature and descriptions of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. In this section, I will come back to the observations and examples mentioned in the literature and show that many of these observations fit the findings presented above.

As we saw in section 8.3, there are several domains in which modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ may have had a function according to the descriptions in the literature. These domains are repeated below.

1. the epistemic domain of (un)certainly (Denniston, Wakker, Sicking, Wackernagel /Bolling, Schwyzer-Debrunner)
2. the evidential domain (i.e. proof) (Wackernagel)
3. the irony domain (Denniston, Bodin & Mazon)
4. the domain of interpersonal relations between speaker and addressee (Sicking)
5. the accessibility of the content of the proposition for the addressee (obviousness/triviality) (Sicking, Bodin & Mazon)
6. the amount of specification/detail provided (*irgendwie*) (Schwyzer-Debrunner, Sicking, Slater, Italie)

We will now discuss these domains one by one.

13.2 The observations in the secondary literature in the light of the new findings

13.2.1 The epistemic domain

Already in section 8.3, I introduced the distinction between argumentative orientation and argumentative strength (Verhagen, 2005). The main reason we need that distinction is that, as was noted by Sicking (1993), many instances of *που* were not likely only to be connected to the (un)certainty of the speaker about the truth of the proposition. As was discussed in section 9.3.2, the argumentative orientation of *που* also seemed to be relevant (e.g. example (1)).

- (1) Στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο οὗ ἄν τὰ
 round ptcl που is this of which ptcl the
 NOM.SG FOC.PTCL που 3SG.PRS NOM.SG REL.GEN.SG PTCL NOM.PL
 ἔσχατα πανταχῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ.
 extremes everywhere from the middle equally be away from.
 NOM.PL ADV PREP ART.GEN.SG GEN.SG ADV 3SG.PRS.SUBJ.
 Ναί.

English: “The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the center.” “Yes.”

Pl. *Prm.* 137e

It was found that modal *που* seems to have a positive argumentative orientation in general. That is, the speaker is guiding the addressee in the direction of accepting his statement as true. In this respect, I am following Wackernagel (1885), who claimed that *που* was used in sentences which the speaker was convinced were true. There are even examples in which *που*'s argumentative orientation is not only positive, but also its argumentative strength is very high.

Both the argumentative orientation and the argumentative strength may have been a(n) (rhetorical) effect of a more general function of modal *που*. This more general function seems to be to present the content of the *που*-clause as accessible to the addressee, either via reasoning, or because the information has been given previously, or because it is part of the common knowledge and world views of both the speaker and the addressee. This may be used for rhetorical purposes in arguments, since marking information as already accessible makes it very hard for the addressee to question that information.

In LSJ it is said that in some cases *που* is strengthened by epistemic adverbs like ἴσως ‘perhaps’ and τάχα ‘probably, perhaps’. If this is the case, this would of course be a good argument in favor of an epistemic modal (i.e. concerning the truth of the proposition) value for *που*. I will discuss the examples given by LSJ below, but first we will see whether *που* is commonly combined with these adverbs. In all texts up to the classical period, ἴσως and *που* are found in the same clause 5 times of which only 3 times in each other's direct surroundings (i.e. within two words of each other). The combination of τάχα and *που* is even less frequent: They are only found in the same

clause 2 times (example (2) below and Pl. *Phdr.* 256c). This suggests that if *που* was used as a way of strengthening the epistemic interpretation, it was not conventional to do so.

LSJ mention the following examples as instances of strengthening.

- (2) Oidipous: (εἰ χρή τι κάμῃ μὴ συναλλάξαντά πω,
πρέσβεις, σταθμᾶσθαι, τὸν βοτῆρ' ὄρᾱν δοκῶ,
ὄνπερ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν: ἔν τε γὰρ μακρῶ
γῆρα ξυνάδει τῷδε τάνδρῳ σύμμετρος,
ἄλλως τε τοὺς ἄγοντας ὡσπερ οἰκέτας
ἔγνωκ' ἔμαυτοῦ:)

τῇ	δ'	ἐπιστήμη	σύ	μου/	προύχοις	τάχ'
the	but	knowledge	you	me	have and advantage over	probably
DAT.SG	CONJ	DAT.SG	NOM.SG	GEN.SG	2SG.PRS.OPT	ADV

ἄν	που,	τὸν	βοτῆρ'	ἰδῶν	πάρως.
ptcl	που,	the	man	having seen	before.
PTCL	που,	ACC.SG	ACC.SG	PTC.AOR.NOM.SG.	ADV.

Chorus: ἔγνωκα γάρ, σάφ' ἴσθι: Λαΐου γὰρ ἦν
εἶπερ τις ἄλλος πιστὸς ὡς νομεὺς ἀνήρ.

Oidipous: (Elders, if it is right for me, who have never met the man, to guess, I think I see the herdsman we have been looking for for a long time. In his venerable old age he tallies with this stranger's years, and moreover I recognize those who bring him, I think, as servants of mine.) But you may have an advantage in knowledge over me probably *που*, having seen the herdsman before. Chorus: Yes, I know him, be sure. He was in the service of Laius—trustworthy as any shepherd.¹

S. *OT.* 1116

In example (2), Oidipous is talking to the chorus of elderly men from Thebes, the city in which they are and of which Oidipous is the new king. They are waiting for the arrival of the shepherd, who, according to another shepherd, once gave the abandoned child Oidipous to him. This other shepherd already told them that this man had been in the service of the previous king of Thebes, Laius. We find *τάχ' ἄν που* at the end of the clause according to the editor, who has placed a comma after *τάχ' ἄν που*. This position is remarkable since *τάχα* generally has a preference for the first position in the clause (Koier, 2007) and the particle *ἄν* is generally found in the second position after an intonation break (Goldstein, 2010). However, the particle *ἄν* seems to belong with the optative *προύχοις*, which is probably why the editor wanted to keep *τάχ' ἄν που* in the same clause as the verb. Therefore, there are two possible readings, one in which *που* belongs to the participle clause and one in which *που* is interpreted as part of the main clause. If we accept the possibility that *τάχ' ἄν που* belongs to the participle clause, the presence of the verb *ὄράω* 'to see' allows us to interpret *που*

¹The translation of this example was slightly modified.

as locative ‘having seen him somewhere’, but we also may interpret *που* modally as in ‘as we both know you have probably seen the man before’. This paraphrase may sound a bit awkward, but a particle with, as one of its functions, the marking of accessibility in Dutch, *immers*, is also used in combination with markers of epistemic uncertainty as can be seen from the following example.

- (3) Zij krijgen misschien immers straks weer zitting in het kabinet.
They get perhaps *immers* later again a place in the cabinet.
They will, as you know, later, be part of the cabinet again.²

In this Dutch example, *immers* marks that the speaker assumes that the addressee knows how the democracy works (after the elections the parties that are now part of the cabinet may become part of it again), but needs to remind the addressee of this fact in order for his argument to make sense. Whether the party they are talking about really becomes part of the cabinet again is not what is assumed to be shared, only the fact that this may be the case is presented as known information.

If we return to example (2), we see that if we want to keep *τάχ' ἄν που* with the main verb, a modal reading ‘in knowledge you may probably have an advantage over me as you know’ is also fine, since they both know that it is likely that the elderly men know a shepherd who was once a servant of Laius and they also know that Oidipous has not yet been king long enough to know this man. An extra reinforcement of the uncertainty expressed by *τάχα*, as is the interpretation of LSJ, is communicatively not necessary. It cannot be excluded, but this example cannot be seen as a strong argument in favor of an epistemic reading for *που*.

Example (4) is part of a conversation between Electra and an old man. This old man has come up to Electra’s house to tell her that there are fresh offerings at the grave of her father, who was murdered by the current king and her mother. For this reason, it is very dangerous to bring offerings to the grave. There is only one person who would have a strong enough connection to Agamemnon, Electra’s father, to defy this rule: Electra’s brother Orestes, who has grown up abroad because his father’s murderer threatened to kill him as well. With the offerings were locks of hair of the same color as Electra’s hair, which also points in the direction of a family member of Electra. After he has told Electra all this, the old man suggests that it may be that the offerings were made by Orestes.

- (4) (κάθαύμασ', ὧ παῖ, τίς ποτ' ἀνθρώπων ἔτλη
πρὸς τύμβον ἐλθεῖν: οὐ γὰρ Ἀργείων γέ τις.)

ἀλλ' ἦλθ' ἴσως που σὸς κασίγνητος λάθρα,
but came perhaps που your brother secretly,
CONJ 3SG.AOR ADV ΠΟΥ POSS.NOM.SG NOM.SG ADV,

(μολὼν δ' ἔθαύμασ' ἄθλιον τύμβον πατρός.)
(And I wondered, child, who ever dared come to the the tomb; for it was no

²<http://www.goeievraag.nl/vraag/bestaat-fractie-tweede-kamer-kamerleden.85133>

Argive at least.) But perhaps your brother has somehow come secretly (and on his return has done honor to his father's wretched grave.)

E. *El.* 518

Example (4) is comparable to example (3) in that a possibility is presented as a known option to both speaker and addressee. In this case, it would communicatively be possible to strengthen ἴσως, for instance because the old man expects Electra will be skeptical and not inclined to believe this really is the case. However, there is little evidence that this is really the case and the interpretation 'but perhaps -as we both know- your brother has come secretly' is also possible. Therefore, this example in itself is not a reason to think που has an epistemic function.

From this discussion we can conclude the following. First, the examples of strengthening of the epistemic value of που mentioned in LSJ are exceptional, since they do not occur very frequently. Second, these examples do not need to be interpreted as cases of strengthening and therefore I don't consider them to be counterexamples to the view that was presented in this dissertation. The generally positive argumentative orientation of που together with collocations like δή, ἤ, πάντως and verbs of knowing, as well as the observation that has been made by several authors that που is frequently found in truisms are in my view strong indications that the main function of που is not in the epistemic domain.

13.2.2 The evidential domain

Wackernagel (1885) introduces the evidential domain in the discussion about the characteristics of modal που. His main observation is that, in Homer, που is frequently used in sentences in which the speaker has no proof that his statement is true. As Wackernagel observes, this is often the case in statements about the gods. Most of these sentences state something about the gods that is generally assumed in Greek religion as in (5).

- (5) εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἔσσι, θεός που σοὶ τό γ' ἔδωκεν
 if very strong you are, god που you the ptcl has given
 CONJ ADV NOM.SG 2SG.PRS, NOM.SG που DAT.SG ACC.SG PTCL 3SG.AOR
 If you are very strong, it was a god που who gave you this gift.³

Il. 1.178

As I have argued elaborately in section 9.3.3 and elsewhere, the main function of που seems to be that the information provided in the που-clause is already accessible to the addressee, either because he already knows it, because it is general knowledge of the world as it was seen in Greek society or because the addressee may arrive at a certain conclusion on the basis of the information that is presented. This means that που is generally found in statements for which no proof is needed or that function as arguments for a certain view themselves. Therefore, Wackernagel's observation fits this description very well. However, this lack of proof may not be a key property

³This translation was slightly modified to adapt it to our new findings.

of *που*-sentences, so much as an effect of the type of sentences in which a marker of accessibility is used.

13.2.3 The domain of irony

Although *που* certainly may occur in sentences which have an ironic nuance, this is not the case for *που*-sentences in general. Therefore, we may ask whether the ironic interpretation depends on the presence of *που* and if so, what interaction between *που* and the context makes it ironic, since *που* is not claimed to be a marker of irony. Generally, irony occurs if a form is used in a situation in which it is for some reason not considered appropriate or in accordance with Gricean maxims such as truthfulness (Walde and Erler, 2011). This means that to say that a form is used ironically, one needs to be very certain about what would constitute the ‘normal’ use of a form.

Denniston gives the following descriptions of ironic *που*:

‘From *που* meaning ‘somewhere’ is developed the sense ‘I suppose’, ‘I think’, the particle conveying a feeling of uncertainty in the speaker. Hence, further, *που* is used ironically, with assumed diffidence, by a speaker who is quite sure of his ground.’

In his description of *δήπου* he adds this:

‘strictly speaking, the certainty of *δή* is toned down by the doubtfulness of *που*. But often the doubt is only assumed, *μετ’ εἰρωνείας* (not always ‘ironically’ in the modern sense of the word), ‘presumably’, ‘I believe’, ‘I imagine’ being virtually equivalent to ‘of course’

It seems that the ironic use of *που* is mainly characterized by the use of the uncertainty marker *που* in situations in which for some reason uncertainty is not appropriate. This may be because the speaker is quite sure.

However, as was argued above, there are good reasons to think that the main function of *που* was not to express uncertainty. This implies that the use of *που* in situations in which uncertainty would not be appropriate need not be seen as ironical anymore. This does not mean that the context can’t be ironic, but that need not be linked to the use of *που*. I agree with Verdenius (1956) that the available material does not give us reason to think that there is some special ironic use of *που*. However, there are good reasons to think that modal *που* feels at home in sentences with a positive argumentative orientation as was argued in section 9.3. I will now discuss an example that is mentioned as an instance of ironic *που*.

In example (6), Klytaimnestra is explaining why she has a very mixed feeling about the message she just received that her son Orestes is dead. On the one hand, a mother is never glad that her child is dead, on the other hand this means that Orestes can’t revenge his father, whom she murdered together with her new partner.

- (6) (οὔτοι μάτην γε: πῶς γὰρ ἂν μάτην λέγοις,
εἴ μοι θανόντος πίστ' ἔχων τεκμήρια
προσῆλθες, ὅστις τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς γεγώς,
μαστῶν ἀποστάς καὶ τροφῆς ἐμῆς, φυγὰς
ἀπεξενοῦτο καὶ μ', ἐπεὶ τῆσδε χθονὸς
ἐξῆλθεν, οὐκέτ' εἶδεν, ἐγκαλῶν δέ μοι
φόνους πατρώους δεῖν' ἐπηπείλει τελεῖν;
ὥστ' οὔτε νυκτὸς ὕπνον οὔτ' ἐξ ἡμέρας
ἐμὲ στεγάζειν ἠδύν, ἀλλ' ὁ προστατῶν
χρόνος διῆγέ μ' αἰὲν ὡς θανουμένην.
νῦν δ'—ἡμέρα γὰρ τῆδ' ἀπήλλαγμαὶ φόβου
πρὸς τῆσδ' ἐκείνου θ': ἦδε γὰρ μείζων βλάβη
ξύνοικος ἦν μοι, τοῦμόν ἐκπίνουσ' αἰὲν
ψυχῆς ἄκρατον αἶμα—

νῦν δ' ἔκηλά που/ τῶν τῆσδ' ἀπειλῶν οὔνεχ'
now but without anxiety που the of her threats because of
ADV CONN ADV ΠΟΥ GEN.PL GEN.SG GEN.PL POST

ἡμερεύσομεν.
we will pass our days
1PL.FUT

(No, not in vain; how can you say “in vain” when you have brought me sure proofs of his death? He sprang from my own life, yet deserting my breast and my nurture he became a fugitive, completely alien from me. And me, once he left this land, he saw no more; but, charging me with the murder of his father, he made terrible threats, so that neither by night nor by day could sweet sleep cover me, but the imminent moment made me live always as if I were about to die. Now, however, since today I am rid of terror of him and of this girl—that greater plague who shared my home while consuming undiluted my life-blood—) now for all her threats που, I shall pass my days in peace.

S. El. 786

In reality, Orestes is not dead, but this message is part of his plan to murder his mother, in which he will succeed. Therefore, we may call this statement tragic irony, but that is not due to the presence of που, since the tragic irony would also be present without the use of που in this sentence. Since Klytaimnestra's addressee is (because of her explanation) fully aware of the implications of the death of Orestes, Klytaimnestra presents deducible information in her last sentence: since the threat that made her life unpeaceful has disappeared, the news of Orestes' death has made it possible to have a peaceful life.

13.2.4 The accessibility of the content of the proposition for the addressee (obviousness/triviality)

One of Sicking's observations is that *που* frequently occurs in obvious or trivial statements, an example of which we already saw in example (4). In my view, this is a very important observation, because the examples of this use have several characteristics that are present in many other examples of modal *που* as well. First, obvious and trivial statements contain information that is generally known or deducible information and second, it is very clear that the speaker does not doubt the content of his statement and that these sentences have a positive argumentative orientation (i.e. the speaker wants the addressee to believe that what he says is true). These characteristics are found in many instances of *που* and together with the collocational evidence they form an important indication for the functions that *που* may have had.

In the following example, Socrates has been asking the same type of obvious questions for a while, which is shown by the use of *πάντως δή που*. At some point he states that a just man does what is just. This is almost tautological and can thus be marked as known or at least deducible information. It had to be said anyway to be marked explicitly as part of the common ground so as to function as the basis for Socrates' following syllogistic argument. The function of *που* is to show that Socrates knows that he is stating something that is obvious and that it is already part of the common ground. However, by using *που* he also marks that he is deliberately bringing it to the foreground.

- (7) ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός; καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκῶς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;
 ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκῶς δίκαιος;
 ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δή που.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.
 the and just just things does
 NOM.SG CONN NOM.SG ACC.PL.N PTCL 3.SG.PRS

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

Socrates: Then he who has learnt medicine is a medical man, and so on with the rest on the same principle; anyone who has learnt a certain art has the qualification acquired by his particular knowledge?

Gorgias: Certainly.

Socrates: And so, on this principle, he who has learnt what is just is just?

Gorgias: Certainly, obviously.

Socrates: And the just man *που* does what is just.

Gorgias: Yes.

13.2.5 The domain of interpersonal relations between speaker and addressee

As I said above, I agree with Sicking (1993) that interpersonal relations may have played a role in the use of modal *που*. However, as I have argued in section 9.3.3, the interpersonal functions of modal *που* may not have been so much in the area of the social relation between speaker and addressee but more in the area of expectation management. These two areas are of course closely related, but not completely the same. If a speaker plans to violate Grice's maxim of quantity, as is the case if he says something of which he presumes the addressee to be aware, he may mark this to cancel the implications from such a violation (i.e. that the addressee is stupid). Sicking (1993, 59) described cases like this as introducing in a casual way what is obvious or even trivial so as to avoid any impression of smugness or pedantry. He says that this is done by means of a particle that expresses that the statement is just a surmise so that disputing it need not impair the basis for an understanding between the partners in the conversation. The observation that these sentences do not seem appropriate without *που* is completely in line with the argument made above. However, the explanation of why the use of *που* cancels these implications is somewhat different. If a speaker presents something that is obvious or trivial as a surmise, this may even worsen the implicatures, because it suggests that the addressee could be stupid enough to be unfamiliar with basic facts or commonly shared knowledge. If we take example (8) below again as an example, we see that adding a particle that implies that the speaker is surmising would generally make the insult even worse, because it suggests that the speaker thinks it necessary to hedge this type of statement, presumably because he thinks the addressee may not be familiar with it. However, if *που* is taken to be a marker of accessibility, the implications are completely cancelled and do not play a role anymore, which is in line with the observation made above that *που*-clauses are generally not questioned and receive (strongly) positive answers.

- (8) Στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο οὗ ἄν τὰ
 round ptcl που is this of which ptcl the
 NOM.SG FOC.PTCL που 3SG.PRS NOM.SG REL.GEN.SG PTCL NOM.PL

ἔσχατα πανταχῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ.
 extremes everywhere from the middle equally be away from.
 NOM.PL ADV PREP ART.GEN.SG GEN.SG ADV 3SG.PRS.SUBJ.

Ναί.

English: "The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the center." "Yes."

13.2.6 The amount of specification/detail provided

There are several authors who mention the following descriptions and translations ‘irgendwie’, *acknowledgement of the lack of further specification* and ‘somehow’, although these translations and interpretations do not seem to have become part of the *communis opinio* on $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. These interpretations do not belong to one of the previous groups, but they do seem to have one thing in common, which we may call indefiniteness, vagueness or a generalizing function. In section 10.2.4, this category was discussed elaborately and it was argued that there is a clearly delimited group of instances of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ (in conditional clauses, with the indefinite pronoun $\tau\iota\varsigma$ and in the poetic texts in *either...or...* sentences) that seem to have what will be called a generalizing (locative) function. That is, in many cases a locative interpretation is possible, although the main function of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in these cases seems to be to signal that it is not important where something happened. In a few cases this seems to be extended to a general marking of a lack of specification, which can be seen from the fact that the place in which it happened is specified in the direct context, although if this was not the case they would be perfect examples of a locative use.

Almost all instances of generalizing (locative) $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ may be linked to specific contexts (a.o. conditional clauses, the use of $\tau\iota\varsigma$) and although they cannot always be interpreted as locative, they do not seem to be connected to the modal uses of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. This means that we may see this group as a third category, although most examples are in the classical period (still) clearly related to locative $\pi\omicron\upsilon$.

13.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that the description of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ as a marker of accessibility (either because the content of the $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ -clause is (generally) known, or because it is deducible from what is known) with a positive argumentative orientation allowed us to explain and connect many of the observations on $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ that have been made in the secondary literature on the particle. This way, the methods that were used have contributed to a more coherent view on the particle and its characteristics.

Part IV

Summary, conclusion and further research

CHAPTER 14

Summary

14.1 Introduction and research questions

Many words in language are poly-interpretable. For instance the word *table* can be used to refer to a piece of furniture, but also to a page in a book as in a *table of contents*. For native speakers the disambiguation of these different uses is rarely a problem. However, when studying a dead language we do not have access to native speaker interpretations. For this reason, we need to rely more on (linguistic) contextual features. This raises the question of how native speakers interpret poly-interpretable words and whether there are mechanisms involved that may help us to interpret poly-interpretable words in dead languages.

In the introduction, two examples were presented in which the translations of Ancient Greek *που* differed greatly between modern translators (examples (1) and (2)). In example (1), we see the collocation *δήπου* in a clause about a phrase in the epics of Homer, which were well known to many Greeks. We found that in the classical period the collocation *δήπου* was used with the interpretation ‘of course’ in sentences of which the content is accessible to the addressee. Therefore, this example fits larger patterns in the Greek language and we may conclude that it is likely that the Greeks would have interpreted this *δήπου* example as expressing that the content of the clause is evident and accessible to the addressee.

- (1) ἔστι μὲν γὰρ δήπου καὶ Ὀμήρῳ
is ptcl for δήπου ptcl in Homer
3SG.PRS PTCL PTCL δήπου PTCL DAT.SG
(γάνυται δὲ τ’ ἀκούων.)

English: Homer, you remember, has the words, (“He joys to hear”);

French: On lit en effet, vous le savez, dans Homère:

German: Denn es steht irgendwo bei Homer.

X. Smp. 8.30.3¹

Example (2) is an example of the 20-30% of the instances in which not the direct linguistic context, but the social context determines the interpretation of *που*. In this example *που* is found next to *τι*, which is often an indication for a generalizing (locative) function. However, this use is mainly found in repeatable situations or in the description of unspecified situations that may occur in the future. In this case, we do find *που* with (adverbial) *τι*, but this situation is very specific, since the addressees have recently experienced it. In addition, the phrase *ὡσπερ ἴστε* ‘as you know’ in the line before already points in the direction that the speaker is suggesting that they are all aware of the reasons for the defeat. This suggests that *που* may also mark that the speaker presents this reason as accessible to the addressees. Therefore, we may conclude that since in this case the social context of *που* does not fulfill the normal requirements for a generalizing interpretation and since there is reason to think of an interpretation like *as you are aware*, this last interpretation seems to comply best with the uses of *που* found in this study.

- (2) (τῆ τε γὰρ παρασκευῆ ἐνδεῆς ἐγένετο, ὡσπερ ἴστε, καὶ οὐχὶ ἐς ναυμαχίαν μάλλον ἢ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐπλέομεν· ζυνέβη δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ὀλίγα ἐναντιωθῆναι.)

καί	πού	τι	καὶ	ἡ	ἀπειρία	πρῶτον	ναυμαχοῦντας	
and	που	somehow	also	the	inexperience	first	fighting on sea	
CONJ	ΠΟΥ	ADV		PTCL	NOM.SG	NOM.SG	ADV	PTC.PRS.ACC.PL

ἔσφηλεν.
cause to fall.
3SG.AOR.

English1: (Preparation for it, as you know, there was little enough; and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were largely against us;) and perhaps also inexperience had something to do with our failure in our first naval action.

English2: (For our preparation was deficient, as you know, and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations on land; and it happened, furthermore, that not a few of the chances of war were against us) and doubtless also our inexperience had something to do with our failure at our first sea-fight.

French: (Les préparatifs, vous le savez, ont alors laissé à désirer, et nous étions moins en mer pour un combat que pour un campagne; à cela s’est ajoutée l’intervention du hasard, qui, à bien des égards, a été contre nous,) et, dans une certaine mesure, l’inexpérience, en ce premier combat naval, a contribué à l’échec.

¹Transl. English: Todd (1922), French: Ollier (1961), German: Bux (1956)

German: (Sie war mangelhaft vorbereitet, wie ihr wißt, da wir gar nicht zur Seeschlacht ausführen, sondern zu einem Feldzug; dazu kam eine Reihe von Zufällen, die gegen uns waren,) und etwas trug wohl auch die mangelnde Erfahrung bei zu diesem Mißerfolg unserer ersten Seeschlacht.

Th.2.87.2²

These examples show that by means of the study of the recurrent contextual patterns of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, we can argue in a more objective way that certain interpretations are more likely to have been used by speakers of Greek than others. The arguments for these conclusions will be summarized below.

In this dissertation, there were two main questions. On the one hand there was the more general question of what contextual cues people use to interpret poly-inter-pretable words, which was studied for Dutch *ergens* ‘somewhere/anywhere, modal particle, at some point (in time), about/around’ and tested for Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ ‘somewhere/ anywhere, modal particle’. On the other hand, there was the question of how we could use the results of the study of *ergens* to make an empirically well founded description of a comparable form (i.c. $\pi\omicron\upsilon$) in a dead language.

Another question, which could not be answered completely due to a lack of data, concerns the role of the (linguistic) context in the development of a new meaning. We wanted to know whether the same original meaning and a development in the same direction as in the case of *ergens* and $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ imply the same type of development in two different languages.

In the introduction we posed the following research questions:

1. How do people use the context to disambiguate poly-interpretable forms and can we use this information to make an empirically well founded description of a poly-interpretable form in a dead language?
 - (a) What is the role of the context in the disambiguation and development of the poly-interpretable Dutch form *ergens* ‘somewhere/anywhere, modal particle, at some point (in time), about/around’?
 - (b) What is (are) the function(s) of Dutch *ergens* and how did these functions develop?
 - (c) What can we learn from the study of *ergens* for the interpretation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, a poly-interpretable form in a dead language which also has a locative and a modal function?
 - (d) What are the functions of Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ ‘somewhere/anywhere, modal particle about/around’, how did these functions develop and are they comparable to Dutch *ergens*?

These questions were investigated in the following ways. For *ergens*, we used three different sources of information: 1. three surveys, 2. a synchronic corpus study, and 3. a diachronic corpus study. The three surveys were conducted with around

²Trans.: English1: Crawley (1910), English2: (Loeb translation, instead of Perseus translation) Forster Smith (1919), French: Romilly et al. (1953), German: Landmann (1960).

100 native speakers of Dutch to test the participants' interpretations of *ergens* in the same sentences with three different types of contexts: 1. the (minimally modified) original context based on corpus material, 2. a minimal context consisting of a two word window on both sides and 3. a manipulated context. (Each participant filled in only one of the three surveys.)

Second, a corpus study was conducted in three corpora from the second half of the 20th century. It was investigated whether native speaker interpretations of *ergens* correlated with contextual characteristics of *ergens* and whether these contextual characteristics were in line with the results from the questionnaires.

Third, the historical development of *ergens* was studied in a diachronic corpus.

To answer the questions on Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, three corpora were used: 1. a corpus of synchronic prose from the later part of the classical period, 2. a corpus of epics from around 700 BC and a corpus of tragedy and comedy (i.e. poetry) from the early classical period. In these corpus studies, two types of information were used: 1. the collocational characteristics of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ and 2. scholarly translations into *English*, *French* and *German*. Translations in three different languages were used to minimize the influence of the goal language as well as to avoid circularities in the analysis.

In addition, we studied the historical development of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ using the three corpora above.

The approaches used to answer the questions above were based on several theoretical assumptions. These assumptions were discussed in section 1.3 to 1.5. These sections will now be summarized.

14.2 The assumptions underlying this dissertation

14.2.1 Contextual knowledge in language use

In the theoretical introduction I argued for the following two assumptions:

1. Words are normally not interpreted in isolation. Thus the 'meaning' of a word may consist of knowledge of the language user about the linguistic and social contexts in which a form is regularly used and which effects it generally has on the addressee. The choice of a particular interpretation by the addressee may be triggered by similarity of the situation to some known situations in which a form has been used together with an estimation of the communicative goals of the speaker.
2. Elaborating on the previous assumption, I assume that speakers do not use words, but generalized (cf. Verhagen, 2010) regularities (like constructions and other contextual patterns) as their basic building blocks which help them together with their expectations and the situational context, to decide on the choice for, or the interpretation of a form.

The arguments for these two assumptions were based on three domains: 1. The influence of the social context and expectations of the addressee on interpretation, 2.

The connection that is found in studies in grammaticalization and semantic change between a new use of a form and a particular context and 3. The fact that there are units larger than a word which carry meaning and which a speaker needs to know in order to comply with the conventions of the language. I will briefly summarize the line of argumentation here.

The situational context of an utterance may have an important influence on the interpretation of a word. While camping, for instance, a stone or a bunch of clothes may be called a *chair*, even though the only connection between a more prototypical chair and stones or clothes is that one can sit on them. However, the full knowledge of the normal uses of the word *chair* is needed in order to arrive at the right interpretation in the context. This is an indication of the importance of the situational context in language use. However, pragmatic mechanisms cannot account for many other things. For instance, the use of introductory politeness questions like in English *How are you?* is not inferable from the phrase itself. A non-native speaker needs to learn how to use these phrases, even though he may know the meaning of the individual words.

These two examples show that on the one hand expectations and situational context play an important role in interpretation, but on the other hand a speaker needs a more extensive knowledge of his language than the meaning of words and phrases alone to be able to speak it correctly.

Language change, which in the end is the outcome of language use over time, also provides us with indications that the context plays an important role in interpretation. Research into semantic change even suggests that speakers may assign meanings to a form-in-context rather than to a form on its own. New meanings of a form are often not extended to all contexts in which that form is used. The older use may persist. This suggests that speakers link the new use not just to the form itself, but also to a particular context. This way they are able to distinguish the new use from the older, persisting use. Since languages and thus meanings change continually, this means that we may expect that such connections between meaning and a form-in-context will also be present for at least a part of the words at every synchronic stage of a language. This implies that for a language user it may not always be a word that carries a certain meaning, but that it may be a word-plus-context-type that is the meaning bearing unit.

That this is synchronically indeed the case is shown by the presence of all kinds of fixed and less fixed idioms and idiomatic constructions in language. An example of a fixed idiom is *kick the bucket* 'to die', a more flexible idiom is *X gives Y the creeps* and an almost completely flexible pattern that speakers need to know anyway is *X gives Y Z* as in *Mary gave him a book*. A theory that tries to account for all these idiomatic features of language is *construction grammar*, which was therefore used in this dissertation.

If we take all these observations together, we find that the situational context may play an important role in interpretation as well as the speaker's knowledge of the conventions of the use of forms in certain types of context. Therefore, it may well be that a language user does not have a lexicon in which he may look up the meaning of each form in an utterance, but an extensive knowledge of the common contexts in

which that form is used and the interpretations which these contexts usually evoke. This would mean that in order to give a usage based account of the meaning of a form, we may need to investigate the contextual patterns in which this form is used and which interpretation each of these patterns may receive.

14.2.2 From theory to practice

It may seem counterintuitive to describe the use of a form if one has just argued that it may not be forms themselves that carry meaning. However, as a researcher, a systematic way to gain insight into the contextual patterns in language is to focus on a particular form and see in which constructions it fulfills a function. This is a methodological choice which does not imply that it works that way for speakers.

In order to gain more insight into the use of modal particles in a dead language like the particle $\pi\omicron\nu$ ‘somewhere/anywhere, *modal particle*’ in Ancient Greek, we investigated which features of the context Dutch speakers use to interpret a comparable poly-interpretable form: *ergens* ‘somewhere/anywhere’, *modal particle*, at some point in time, about/around’. It was assumed that the basic mechanisms for the disambiguation of comparable forms would be the same in different languages. For this reason it seemed that we could learn something from studying the way speakers use the context for the disambiguation and interpretation of poly-interpretable forms. From the study of *ergens*, it became clear that speakers often only need the direct linguistic context (i.e. a two-word window on both sides) to decide on the specific interpretation of *ergens*. This suggests that there are some clear patterns in the linguistic context which are known to the language users and which may guide them towards an interpretation.

A corpus study confirmed this conclusion and made clear that the contextual characteristics also give some clear indications as to what the various uses of *ergens* are.

This knowledge was used to study Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\nu$. Instead of native speaker intuitions we used the translations of modern scholars in English, French and German. Trends in these translations were compared to collocational characteristics and situational and social context. Together, these three types of information allowed us to give an empirically well founded account of the various uses of $\pi\omicron\nu$ in Ancient Greek and the knowledge speakers of Greek may have had of the uses of the particle.

Now I will summarize the results of the studies of *ergens*.

14.3 What is the role of the context in the disambiguation and development of the poly-interpretable Dutch form *ergens*?

In the chapter on the surveys on *ergens*, we asked the following subquestions:

1. Are speakers as a group consistent in their interpretations?
2. How much context do speakers need to be consistent in an interpretation?
3. What linguistic cues guide the choice of an interpretation?
4. Can we influence the interpretation of a speaker by manipulating the context?

The results and the answers to these questions will be summarized in the following subsections.

14.3.1 Are speakers as a group consistent in their interpretations?

The first question of whether speakers as a group are consistent in their interpretations of *ergens*, requires a twofold answer. On the one hand we have the choice between modal and non-modal categories, on the other hand we have the choices within these two large groups. Participants chose very consistently between a non-modal and a modal interpretation of *ergens*. In that respect, they were very consistent. However, there was more variation within both domains, and especially within the modal domain, than between the domains. Generally, however, we can say that in most cases participants had a clear preference for one interpretation, since in 70% of the cases more than 50% chose one interpretation out of nine options. Therefore, it seems that in general participants preferred one interpretation over others, although there were cases in which a second option also had a high score.

14.3.2 How much context do speakers need to be consistent in an interpretation?

The second question was how much context speakers need to interpret *ergens* consistently. From the comparison of survey 1 and 2 (i.e. with the original context and with a minimal context) we can conclude that in most cases a two-word window on both sides was enough to retain the original interpretation of *ergens*. Only in a few cases did contextual characteristics outside this window play an important role in the interpretation, since the interpretations of the sentences with only the two-word window on both sides did not differ significantly from the interpretations of the complete sentences. A likely explanation is that speakers are guided by the presence of triggers in the direct environment of *ergens*. What triggers were found will be discussed below.

14.3.3 What linguistic cues guide the choice of an interpretation?

The third question was what linguistic cues guide the choice of an interpretation. To answer this question, we will use the results both from the surveys and from the corpus study. The non-modal interpretations all had quite predictable triggers, such as locative verbs, prepositions and adverbs for the locative interpretation, temporal markers for the temporal interpretation, scalar adverbs, scalar constructions and numbers for the scalar interpretation and numbers, scalar adpositions, scalar constructions and expressions of vagueness for *about/around* interpretations.

For the modal interpretations, the survey with the two-word window on each side showed that it is probably the presence of first person pronouns, other particles and specific constructional knowledge (e.g. word order in combination with certain lexical items) that triggered the interpretation *in someone's feelings or thoughts*. The corpus study confirmed the observation that first person pronouns were very frequent with the addition of subjective predicates and, more specifically, the frequent use of the verb *vinden* 'to be of the opinion'. It was shown that by means of these characteristics we could account for 86% of the instances of *ergens* in the category *in someone's feelings or thoughts*.

The category *from a certain point of view* seemed to be characterized by impersonal constructions in the surveys. This was also confirmed in the corpus study with the addition of the presence of copula constructions with subjective predicates, variants of the phrase *aan de andere kant* 'on the other hand' and some (combinations of) other contrastive markers like *ook, wel, maar, toch* 'also, focus particle, but, focus particle' and the *ergens is dat*-construction. These characteristics could account for 68% of the instances in this category.

The *somehow* category seemed to be categorized by a lack of personal pronouns in the surveys. In the corpus study, we found that within this category, there seemed to be a much larger number of third person verbs and non-subjective predicates and also a frequent use of the verb *kloppen* 'to be right, correct'. In this category, the characteristics mentioned could account for 88% of the cases.

All in all, both the surveys and the corpus study showed that speakers probably use their knowledge of the patterns in the direct context as described above for *ergens* to disambiguate a poly-interpretable form. Only in a relatively small number of instances did the larger context play an important role.

The conclusion that the direct context plays an important role in interpretation raised the question how people decide on an interpretation if there are little or no contextual cues available. It may be that in these cases people choose the most concrete interpretation of a form, which is still commonly used. However, this last explanation could not be tested without interference from the frequency of locative *ergens*, because the most concrete interpretation (the locative interpretation) is in the case of *ergens* also the most frequent interpretation. What we found, however, was that if the context left room for doubt in interpretation, people tended to choose one of the modal interpretations rather than a locative interpretation. The same phenomenon was observed in cases in which a locative metaphor was employed. Speakers tended to choose the metaphorical interpretation (i.e. the modal interpretation) rather than

the locative interpretation on which the metaphor was based (i.e. somewhere inside me was interpreted as *in someone's feelings or thoughts* rather than as *at some place*). This suggests that speakers prefer the more subjective interpretation if both interpretations seem possible. It was suggested that this phenomenon, which is in line with the Gricean maxim of quantity as phrased by Traugott and Dasher (2002, 19) 'say no more than you must and mean more thereby', might explain the historical tendency of subjectification.

14.3.4 Can we influence the interpretation of a speaker by manipulating the context?

The fourth and last question we tried to answer by means of the experimental approach was whether we could influence the interpretation of the sentences by changing just a few of the contextual features. This seemed to be possible except when a change in interpretation was blocked by the overall context or by constructional conventions that encompassed a large part of the sentence.

The answers to the four subquestions all seem to indicate that speakers may use the regularities in the linguistic context to interpret a poly-interpretable form. However, this cannot be seen as a completely automatic link between form and function, because there may be conflicting contextual evidence such as higher order triggers or blocking contexts. However, contextual characteristics are generally a good indicator of which interpretation will be chosen.

14.4 What is (are) the function(s) of modal *ergens* and how did these functions develop?

14.4.1 *Ergens*: a mental space builder and viewpoint marker

The next question was: how do the contextual characteristics of *ergens* relate to its functions and what exactly are the functions of *ergens*? What we found was that one of the effects of *ergens* is that it sets up a mental space. That is, the mind is perceived as a spatial environment³ in which one can be in various places (viewpoints). Generally, the mental space which is created by the use of *ergens* is linked to the speaker, but it may also be the mental space of a story character or some sort of shared mental space of the speaker and the addressee.

The viewpoints taken in this mental space may be used in several ways. By means of *ergens* it may be suggested that the speaker (or the person to whom the mental space belongs) could imagine taking other viewpoints as well. This is the case, for instance, in example (3), in which the speaker suggests that she was aware that this story was a little different from the completely fictional stories her mother had told her. In these cases, *ergens* is often accompanied by first person pronouns and

³The term *mental space* within Mental Space Theory is not coincidentally based on this metaphor. This is a very frequently used metaphor in many areas of language (e.g. Lakoff, 1996).

32014.4. What is (are) the function(s) of modal *ergens* and how did these functions develop?

subjective markers which are connected to mental states. Generally, these examples get the interpretation *in someone's feelings or thoughts*.

- (3) Maar toch, toch had ik vroeger ergens óók altijd geloofd dat
But still, still had I when I was a child ERGENS also always believed that
mijn moeders verhaal maar een verzinsel was, een
my mother's story only a figment of her imagination was, a
sprookje zoals alle andere die ze me had verteld, alleen zonder
fairy-tale like all others that she me had told, only without
“zij leefden nog lang en gelukkig”.
‘they lived ever after long and happily’.

But still, when I was a child I had *ergens* also believed that my mother's story was only a figment of her imagination, a fairy-tale like all the other ones she had told me, only without ‘and they lived happily ever after’.

From Dorrestein (2003)

Ergens is also used to contrast two specific viewpoints as in example (4). In these cases the speaker may take the viewpoint that is introduced by *ergens*, as is the case in split self constructions (cf. Lakoff, 1996). In split self constructions, as in (4), the speaker splits herself in two and each part takes its own viewpoint. The goal is to show her indecisiveness. However, the speaker may also use a construction which suggests that there are several possible viewpoints without committing himself to one of them. This option is often accompanied by contrastive markers and subjective impersonal constructions. Generally, this use results in a *from someone's point of view* interpretation.

- (4) ja als je toch speciaal ja een kind wil hebben en zo. ja ja. dan
Yes if you PTCL especially PTCL a child want have and so. Yes, yes then
ja ergens vind 'k 't wel mooi. Maar ergens ja 't is
PTCL ERGENS am of the opinion I it PTCL beautiful. But ERGENS PTCL it is
uh d... ja. 't is een stap achteruit vind ik uh...
ehm d... PTCL it is a step backwards am of the opinion I ehm...
If you especially want a child and all that. Yes *ergens* I think that is beautiful.
But *ergens* it is.. It is a step backwards, I think, ehm...

From CGN comp-a/nl/fn000968.

A third way of using the mental space builder *ergens* is by stressing the indefiniteness of the location in the mental space. This way the speaker expresses that the

reason for or background of the proposition is unclear as in example (5). Since this is only implicitly connected to the subjective evaluation of the speaker, this use is mainly found with third person non-subjective predicates. These cases are generally interpreted as *somehow*.

- (5) D'r zitten d'r zat op 't IVBO met een goed verstand. Maar ze
 there sit there enough at the IVBO with a good mind. But they
 krijgen ergens de kans niet. Willen ook niet hoor.
 get ERGENS the chance not. Want also not PTCL

There are a enough smart children at the IVBO, but they *ergens* don't get the chance. They don't want that either.

From: CGN comp-b/nl/fn000130.

14.4.2 The development of modal *ergens*

The last question with respect to *ergens* was how this locative indefinite adverb has developed its modal use. A historical corpus study showed that the *in someone's feelings or thoughts*-category and the *from someone's point of view*-category probably arose via the explicit metaphor *somewhere in my mind*. In the 19th century at the latest this metaphor did not need the explicit expression of a metaphorical location anymore. From that time onwards it could also be used without reference to a metaphorical place.

The *somehow* interpretation may have developed through *invited inferencing* (Traugott and Dasher, 2002). This probably worked as follows: If something occurs in a place which is not known or important, it may be inferred that other aspects of that event, such as the reason it happens, may also not be known or important. This inference subsequently became the main function of *ergens* in some types of contexts.

Apart from the *somehow* interpretation, a comparable inference may be at the basis of the Flemish construction *ergens iets* 'somewhere something', which does not always seem to refer to a place, but seems express that the specifics do not matter. This use was already found in Flanders in the 17th century.

14.5 What are the functions of Ancient Greek $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, how did these functions develop and are they comparable to Dutch *ergens*?

To apply the same techniques to $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ as we did to *ergens*, we needed to adjust the methods to a dead language. What we wanted to know was whether there were recurring contextual characteristics which could tell us something about the interpretation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. In the case of *ergens* we started out with native speaker intuitions,

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which we do not have for *που*. To make up for this, we made an inventory of the translations of *που* made by prominent scholars in three languages: English, French and German. These translations provided us with cues with respect to the interpretations of modern expert readers, the best and the most objective interpretational information to which we have access.

These two sources of evidence, linguistic and social contextual evidence and the evidence from the translations were combined to try to find out what the function(s) of *που* may have been. Clear patterns in the linguistic and social context of *που* were found. In addition, there were tendencies in the translations across languages and translators, even though the translations of an individual passage sometimes differed greatly.

In the classical period, we found some clear patterns in the linguistic context of *που*. The following list of collocations accounts for 71% of the instances of *που* in the prose corpus⁴:

- *δή* ‘evidently’
- *ἤ* *affirmative particle*
- *εἰ* *conditional*
- *τις* ‘some, someone, something, somehow’
- *γάρ* ‘for, because’
- *πάντως*
- ‘certainly, in all respects’
- verbs of knowing (*οἶδα*, *γινώσκω*, *ἐπίσταμαι*)
- verbs of saying (*λέγω*, *φημί*)
- locative adverbs
- locative prepositions
- locative verbs.

This list of collocations covered 70% in the tragedy and comedy corpus. In section 9.5 we saw that more than one collocate of *που* may be found in the same sentence within both the locative and the modal categories. However, there is very little overlap between the collocations related to the modal interpretations of *που* and those related to the locative interpretation. This is again an indication that for speakers the connection between the two uses may have been lost. In addition, it suggests

⁴This corpus consisted of the following works: Plato: *Cratylus*, *Hipparchus*, *Sophist*, *Symposium*, *Parmenides*; Xenophon (430-354 BC) dialogic works: *Symposium*, *Apology*, *Hiero*, *Economics*, *Memorabilia*; Thucydides (430-399 BC): *Historiae*; Xenophon (430-354 BC) historiographical works: *Anabasis*, *Hellenica*; Lysias (458-380 BC): all works except fragments; Isocrates (436-338 BC): all works except fragments.

that there may have not been a connection anymore between the locative and modal uses of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ for Greek speakers.

In epics, tragedy and comedy, we found one pattern that did not occur in the prose corpus. We found $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in $\eta\grave{\dots}\eta\grave{\dots}$ 'either... or' sentences 5 times (3%), which was also a collocation in the epics.

The next step was to look at the translations of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in the three languages in order to find out whether there were patterns in the kind of interpretations $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ may get according to translators and whether these patterns could be linked to linguistic and social properties of the contexts of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. Generally, the locative interpretation of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ was not a problem, although there was a relatively large group of examples in which the translators did not agree whether $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ was to be interpreted as modal or as locative. A hypothetical construction network of locative $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ is presented in figure 14.1. In this network, we see that the locative uses of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ share many characteristics with the generalizing (locative) uses of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, although this last interpretation seems to be confined to a number of specific linguistic contextual environments.

For modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ it was found that the most frequently used translations of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ (both with and without $\delta\eta$ 'evidently' and $\eta\grave{\dots}$ *affirmative particle*) had a positive argumentative orientation (Verhagen, 2006). The most frequent translations were: *surely, sans doute, wohl*. That is, the addressee was expected to agree with the proposition made in the $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ -clause.

For the most frequent collocates of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, $\delta\eta$ 'evidently' and $\eta\grave{\dots}$ *affirmative particle*, it was found that in the case of $\delta\eta$ the translations contained more phrases expressing that the information presented was evident and in the translations of $\eta\grave{\dots}$ we found more comparative expressions, although in both cases the most frequent translations were the same or comparable to the cases of modal $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ without $\delta\eta$ and $\eta\grave{\dots}$.

Another pattern that was clearly present in the translations of mainly the prose corpus was the use of expressions that suggested that the information was already accessible to the addressee. Examples include the following translations: *you know, as you know, as everybody knows, of course, tu le sais, vous le savez, bien sûr, wisst ihr wohl, bekanntlich, selbstverständlich, natürlich*.

The last type of information I used was the patterns in the types of social contexts in which $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ was used. As was noted by Sicking (1993, 57-59), $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ is frequently used in obvious or trivial statements. Bodin and Mazon (1919 [1902], 359) noticed the same for $\delta\eta\pi\omicron\upsilon$ in Aristophanes and called this type of sentence *truisme* 'truism', a term I have adopted. As was noted by Wackernagel (1885), in the epics and tragedy and comedy, $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ is frequently found in contexts that express a (fatalistic) statement about the gods as in *for such was the wish of Zeus and the other gods*. This seems, for members of Greek society, a type of truism as well.

Other patterns in the social context were the following: $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ was regularly used in *a fortiori* arguments (generally this use is characterized by [conditional clause] $\eta\grave{\dots}\pi\omicron\upsilon\dots$) and also in inferences from (newly received) information, which seemed to be linked to $\eta\grave{\dots}\pi\omicron\upsilon$ without a conditional clause. In general, $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ was frequently found in arguments. This use in arguments often correlates with the presence of $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ in the $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ clause. In tragedy and comedy, $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ occurred in incredulous questions as

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


Figure 14.1: A hypothetical construction network for locative *που* and generalizing locative *που* incorporating the patterns found in the social and linguistic context.

was noted by Denniston. A last type of context was the use of οὐ γὰρ (δή)που to present some line of reasoning or idea as completely ridiculous. This use was frequently found in the orators. A general feature of δήπου contexts was that the information presented was both evident and (presented as) shared by others.

On the basis of these three types of evidence: the translations, the collocations and the types of social contexts, I proposed three larger groups of uses of που that may have been, but were not necessarily connected for speakers.


1. a locative indefinite use (characterized by locative markers, see the construction network in figure 14.1)⁵
2. a generalizing (locative) use (i.e. the exact details of (the location of) an event are not known or not important) (characterized by the presence of εἰ, τις, ἦ...ἦ..., and sometimes the conjunction μή, see the construction network in figure 14.1)
3. a modal use expressing that the speaker presents his proposition as already accessible to the addressee, either because it is a repetition of information mentioned earlier, or because it is part of the knowledge of the world of the people in that community or because it can be inferred from information that is known to the addressee (characterized by δή, ἦ, (οὐ) γάρ, πάντως and verbs of knowing, see the construction network in figure 14.2)

These construction networks raise the question of how που developed all these uses. However, the development of modal που clearly happened before our earliest texts, which makes it hard to say anything about it. What we can say, though, is that the collocation δή που developed only after Homer, although ἦ που already had a modal interpretation at that time. The development from locative που to modal που may have had to do with the implication that one does not need to be specific about something like the location if the speaker expects the information to be already accessible to the addressee, but this remains speculation.

⁵The interpretation of που with numbers as 'about/around' which is mentioned by LSJ was not unequivocally present in any of the corpora used. Only in Herodotus (and late Ionic authors) have I been able to find clear examples. The expression μάλιστα που 'about/around' is also only found in Herodotus and late Ionic authors. This suggests that this use of που may have been confined to Ionic. Since Herodotus was not part of the corpus studied in this dissertation, I did not add this interpretation to my overview of the uses of που.

14.5. What are the functions of Ancient Greek πῶν, how did these functions develop and are they comparable to Dutch ergens?

Figure 14.2: A hypothetical construction network for modal πῶν incorporating the patterns found in the social and linguistic context.



14.6 A comparison between Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek ΠΟΥ

The comparison between *ergens* and πού showed that their locative uses were comparable, both in types of interpretations and in their contextual features. The same was true of some of their other non-modal uses, but the modal uses of the two forms are probably quite different.

With respect to the locative interpretation, we can say the following. Both locative πού and locative *ergens* seem to be triggered by locative verbs, adverbs and prepositions. Also, the generalizing function of the locative interpretation seems to be shared, although the combination with conditionals is confined to πού. The *about/around* interpretation may have existed only in the Ionian dialect. That is, there is no compelling evidence that it also existed in the Attic dialect. The temporal interpretation of *ergens* and the *somehow* interpretation may have been present in Greek, but there is no unequivocal evidence that they were. That is, there are instances in which it would be possible to interpret πού in this way, but there are no examples in which any other interpretation would really be impossible.

The comparison between modal *ergens* and modal πού has shown that although both particles have the same origin and both developed a modal use, this modal use is probably not the same. The Greek particle πού is less frequently combined with mental state predicates, first person verbs and subjective copula constructions. In other words, πού seems much less connected to the mental space of the speaker than is the case for modal *ergens*. On the other hand, *ergens* is not frequently found together with words like *evident* ‘evidently’ or in arguments, factual statements, conclusions, (fatalistic) statements about the gods and in incredulous questions.

The modal use of *ergens* is connected to subjective views that are also presented as such because they are placed within the mental space of the speaker. Modal πού, however, is often found in truisms and frequently combined with verbs of knowing, which are also factual in nature. Also, there are often strongly positive answers to πού-clauses, which is impossible for modal *ergens* because of its subjective nature. This shows that modal πού did not have the same function as modal *ergens*.

In addition, we do not find many instances of metaphorically locative uses of πού. The lack of metaphorical uses of locative πού and the differences in the contextual characteristics between modal *ergens* and modal πού strongly suggest that Dutch *ergens* and Ancient Greek πού developed different modal functions from a very comparable starting point.

14.7 Back to the literature

In section 13 it was discussed how the new findings on πού fit the older descriptions of the particle. We found that the various descriptions of πού touched upon several domains:

1. the epistemic domain of (un)certainly (Denniston, Stephens, Wakker, Sicking, Wackernagel/Bolling, Schwyzer-Debrunner)
2. the evidential domain (i.e. proof) (Wackernagel)
3. the irony domain (Denniston, Bodin & Mazon)
4. the domain of interpersonal relations between speaker and addressee (Sicking, Bodin & Mazon)
5. the accessibility of the content of the proposition for the addressee (obviousness/ triviality) (Sicking, Bodin & Mazon)
6. the amount of specification/detail provided (*irgendwie*) (Schwyzer-Debrunner, Sicking, Slater, Italie, Scolnicov)

Many of the things found in this study had been observed before, although the observations were not always connected to each other. For instance, Wackernagel's observation that the speaker has no proof for the statements made in $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ -clauses can be explained by Sicking's observation that $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ -clauses often contain obvious or trivial statements. These types of statements usually contain generally accepted views, which do not need to be proven in normal conversation.

Sicking also observed that $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ seemed to make the speaker less arrogant in utterances in which the speaker makes obvious and trivial statements. This effect may be explained as follows. If a speaker makes a statement, this generally implies that he thinks the addressee does not have that information. However, if the information presented is so obvious or trivial that everyone knows it, the implication of such a statement is that the speaker thinks that the addressee is stupid. In other words, the speaker violates Grice's maxim of quantity (i.e. he gives more information than is required). One way to avoid such an implication is for the speaker to mark that he is aware that the information is already known to the addressee. This seems to be the function of $\pi\omicron\upsilon$. By using $\pi\omicron\upsilon$, the speaker shows this awareness that the information he provides is accessible to the addressee, which blocks the implication that he thinks the addressee is stupid and signals that he has another reason to state something obvious. One reason may be that he wants to bring the information to the foreground in order to refer to it later in his argument, which is frequently the case in Plato.

This shows that an important part of the observations made in the literature fit the picture that arose from the study above and seem to become a coherent whole when we look at them from this perspective.

Conclusion, theoretical implications and further research

15.1 Conclusion and theoretical implications

In this dissertation, a study of *ergens* and $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ showed that it is very likely that speakers interpret poly-interpretable forms by means of a detailed knowledge of the contextual patterns with which certain interpretations of a form are associated. In an experimental setup, it was found that, generally, a two word window on both sides of *ergens* was enough for speakers to interpret *ergens* in the same way as they did when 9-15 words of context on both sides were provided. This implies that meaning may be connected not so much to one word, but to the word in a specific context, which is known to the language users.

However, in a minority of the cases, the larger context (i.e. more than a few words around *ergens*) played an important role in its interpretation. This suggests that although contextual and constructional information is an important factor in interpretation, it not the only factor. Expectations on the basis of the larger context may sometimes also have a strong influence on interpretation.

The patterns in both the direct linguistic context and the situational contexts of *ergens* and $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ allowed us to draw quite a clear picture of what the functions of these forms may be. By means of a careful study of the patterns in the linguistic and situational contexts in which *ergens* was used, I was able to describe *ergens*, apart from its non-modal uses, as a mental space builder which expresses that there is more than one subjective viewpoint. These viewpoints may be implicit, as in the interpretation *in someone's feelings or thoughts*, or explicit, as in the case of many instances of the *from some point of view*- interpretation.

As was shown by the study of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$, the relation between the linguistic and con-

textual patterns of a poly-interpretable form and its interpretation may be used to find out more about the use of forms in dead languages that are hard to interpret. By using both translations in three different languages as well as the linguistic and situational contextual characteristics of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$, it was possible to describe modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ as a marker that manages the expectations of the addressee by expressing that the speaker is aware that the content of the $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ -clause is accessible information for the addressee.

This description of modal $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ was used to connect and explain many observations that have been made in the literature on $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$.

On the basis of the surveys on *ergens*, it was suggested that in case of ambiguity speakers tend to prefer a more subjective, modal or metaphorical interpretation over the original concrete interpretation. However, if there is no context at all they seem to prefer the most concrete interpretation, which, in the case of *ergens* also happened to be the most frequent interpretation. The question as to whether people choose the most concrete interpretation when deprived of all context or the most frequent interpretation remains open.

This brings us to questions for further research.

15.2 Further research

With respect to the theoretical points made in this dissertation, it is a child of its time. This is clear from the fact that during the five years I worked on it, many of the theoretical ideas which are put forward here were independently put on the agenda by other scholars (e.g. Bergs and Diewald, 2009a; Bybee, 2010; Taylor, 2012). What this dissertation has to offer is, therefore, for the largest part the testing of the theories against linguistic data, thereby stumbling upon the inevitable complexities of actual human language use both in dead and living languages. This means that although in many respects the results of this dissertation confirm the theoretical expectations, it also shows that there are still many problems to be solved. I will indicate a few directions in which further research may expand the work that was done here.

In the discussion of the use of triggers for interpretation, we distinguished between higher order triggers and lower order triggers. This distinction was purely descriptive. However, this raises the question of what makes one trigger more important than another and how people know that.

One of the most difficult problems is how to account for those cases which seem to comply only partly with the most commonly found regularities. Both in the cases of *ergens* and of $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ we found examples which seemed to be connected to some larger group, but also deviated from it in the sense that they did not comply with the normal characteristics of that group. It may be that this is just a symptom of language change in progress, but if language users know which patterns are found in their language as well as seemed to be the case in the *ergens* surveys, one would not expect this to be 20-30% of the instances in a corpus. One solution is that I just overlooked some patterns, possibly also as a result of a restricted corpus. However, the question remains how, in the end, people combine all the types of information they have into an utterance

and why they (on purpose or by accident) sometimes deviate from the most common way to express things. More psycholinguistic research may shed more light on this issue.

A last point is the question as to which extent the methods used in this dissertation will work for other forms and other word types, both in Dutch, Ancient Greek and in other languages. One of the questions that was already mentioned in the introduction is whether the type of linguistic and situational information used may differ between more content related words and function words. If the type of word studied matters, it may be useful when studying a dead language to study a comparable form in a living language also. This way it may become clear what kind of contextual characteristics do or do not play a role.

APPENDIX A

The surveys

A.1 Survey 1: *Ergens* in slightly modified contexts from corpora

Welkom!

Met deze vragenlijst willen wij onderzoeken wat het woord *ergens* in verschillende zinnen betekent. De zinnen waarin u het woord *ergens* te zien krijgt, zijn in het dagelijks leven door mensen uitgesproken of opgeschreven. Dit betekent dat sommige voorbeelden typisch gesproken taal bevatten. De bedoeling van deze vragenlijst is om erachter te komen wat *ergens* betekent. Woordenboeken zijn hier niet altijd geschikt voor, want betekenissen kunnen per persoon verschillen. Daarom willen wij u vragen om tijdens het invullen van deze vragenlijst af te gaan op uw eigen eerste indruk. Wij zijn op zoek naar informatie over het gevoel van zoveel mogelijk mensen en uw eerste indruk is dus precies wat we willen horen. Denk er vooral niet teveel (en zeker ook niet te lang) over na. Deze vragenlijst neemt ongeveer 15 tot 20 minuten in beslag. Elke vraag bestaat uit een stukje tekst met daarin het woord *ergens*. Vervolgens krijgt u de keus uit de volgende mogelijkheden, die steeds in verschillende volgorde onder de vraag staan. Lees dus elke keer de antwoorden goed door. Van elk van de mogelijke antwoorden zullen we hieronder een voorbeeld geven.

- a) Op een of andere plaats
- b) Op een of ander moment
- c) Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)

- d) Op een of andere manier
- e) Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, naar iets toe
- f) In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- g) Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- h) Ongeveer
- i) Anders, namelijk:

Nu zullen we van elk van deze opties een voorbeeld geven:

- a) De eerste optie is: op een of andere plaats. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
gebruik is: voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ik heb mijn sleutels ergens neergelegd, maar ik weet niet meer waar."
- b) De tweede optie is: op een of ander moment. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"We gaan ergens in juli op vakantie."
- c) De derde optie is: op een of ander punt (op een schaal). Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"In een zak appels zitten ergens tussen de twaalf en vijftien appels."
- d) De vierde optie is: op een of andere manier. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"We moeten dat ergens toch voor elkaar zien te krijgen."
- e) De vijfde optie is: over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets of naar iets toe
- f) Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ernst verbaasde zich ergens over."
In dit zinnetje kun je ergens over vervangen door over iets. In ons voorbeeld kun je bijvoorbeeld ook zeggen: Ernst verbaasde zich over iets. Dit is vaak ook mogelijk in zinnen met ergens in, ergens mee, ergens aan, ergens voor of ergens naartoe.
- g) De zesde optie is: 'in (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten' Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ergens denk ik dat dat niet klopt."
- h) De zevende optie is: 'Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt'. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
Ergens is dat wel fijn, maar aan de andere kant hoeft het echt niet áltijd.
- i) De achtste optie is: ongeveer. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is: "Dat was op mijn zestiende ergens."

- j) De laatste optie is om zelf uw interpretatie in te vullen, als u echt niet overweg kunt met de opties hierboven.

U kunt deze uitleg nalezen door op de link helemaal onderaan elke pagina te klikken.

Vragen vooraf

We beginnen met een aantal vragen over u zelf. Deze gegevens blijven volledig anoniem en zijn niet aan uw persoon te koppelen.

1. * Wat is uw geboortjaar?
2. * Wat is uw geslacht?
 Man Vrouw
3. * In welke gemeente woont u?
4. * Wat is uw moedertaal?
5. * Welke taal/talen werden tijdens uw jeugd thuis gesproken?
6. * Wat zijn de moedertalen van uw ouders/verzorgers?
7. * Waar heeft u tot uw twaalfde gewoond?
8. * Welk van de volgende typen taal werden er in uw jeugd in uw omgeving gesproken? (Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.)
 Standaard Nederlands (ABN)
 Standaard Nederlands met een regionaal accent
 Streektaal
 Dialect
 Een buitenlandse taal

Als u b-e heeft aangekruist: Welk(e) streektaal/dialect/buitenlandse taal is/zijn dat?

9. * In welke provincie(s) van Nederland heeft u minstens vier jaar gewoond? (Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)
 Groningen
 Friesland
 Drenthe
 Overijssel
 Gelderland
 Utrecht
 Flevoland

- Noord-Holland
 - Zuid-Holland
 - Zeeland
 - Noord-Brabant
 - Limburg
10. * Heeft u meer dan een jaar buiten Nederland gewoond? Zo ja, waar en hoe lang heeft u daar ongeveer gewoond?
- Nee
 - Ja (vul hieronder in welk land u heeft gewoond en hoe lang u daar gewoond heeft.)
11. * Wat is de hoogste opleiding die u genoten heeft?
- Basisschool
 - Vmbo (vroeger: LBO)
 - Havo
 - Vwo (vroeger: HBS, gymnasium)
 - Mbo
 - Hbo
 - Universiteit
 - Anders, namelijk:
12. * Heeft u op hoger onderwijs niveau een taal of taalwetenschap gestudeerd?
- Ja
 - Nee

Vragenlijst ergens

1. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ik vind het belangrijk dat ik met leuke mensen wegga. Om nou met z'n vieren ergens in Frankrijk te zitten, daar heb ik niet zo veel zin in."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment

- Op een of andere plaats
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
2. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. Spreker 1: "Door zijn concentratiestoornis is hij zo weer weg met zijn gedachten als ie ergens mee bezig is." Spreker 2: "Maar kan ie wel goed leren lezen en zo?"
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
3. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Dat wás vroeger. Als je 'n man hebt ga je toch ergens niet alleen zitten. Dan denken ze dat je sjans zit te zoeken."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten Anders, namelijk:
4. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Zij kan niet fulltime werken. En huishouden is in principe een fulltime baan ergens. Zeker in haar tempo omdat zij last heeft van reuma."
- Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere plaats

- Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Anders, namelijk:
5. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Het zou natuurlijk ideaal zijn een school zonder huiswerk. Maar het werk moet ergens gebeuren in de lessen of in andere uren, tussenuren, huiswerkuren of zo."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment Anders, namelijk:
6. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Mijn vrienden zeggen: "dat je dat volhoudt" en "ik zou dat nooit kunnen." Ergens is dat natuurlijk ook wel lekker om te horen, aan de andere kant ook niet."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Anders, namelijk:
7. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Enkele gevallen, zei minister Van Boxtel, en daarmee bedoelt ie ergens tussen de vijf en de tien gevallen van illegaal namaken."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt

- Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
8. * Wat betekent het eerste ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "De regisseur heeft de actie overgeplaatst, zoals u waarschijnlijk al heeft gezien, naar ergens (1) in de negentiende eeuw alsof het zich nooit ergens anders heeft afgespeeld."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Anders, namelijk:
9. * Wat betekent het tweede ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "De regisseur heeft de actie overgeplaatst, zoals u waarschijnlijk al heeft gezien, naar ergens in de negentiende eeuw alsof het zich nooit ergens (2) anders heeft afgespeeld."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
10. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Stenen voorwerpen uit een periode die men het mesolithicum noemt. Dat is ergens ja pff laten we zeggen zesduizend, vijfduizend voor Christus."

- Op een of andere plaats
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere manier
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Anders, namelijk:

11. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Steven knikte. Daar heb ik ook al aan gedacht. Maar ergens heb ik het gevoel dat er meer achter steekt."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere plaats Anders, namelijk:

12. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Carola vroeg of ze Anais even terug mocht geven aan Isabelle, want ze moest ergens naartoe, maar dat kon niet volgens Isabelle. Belachelijk, het is haar eigen kind!"

- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Ongeveer
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Anders, namelijk:

13. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ze misten haar. Baba Balook voelde zich vreemd, ietwat lusteloos, maar ergens ook opgewekt en dan weer huilerig. Zijn maag was op slot en grendel."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment Anders, namelijk:
14. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Dat heb ik opgedaan in het ziekenhuis zelf. En eigenlijk zijn zij daar dan ergens verantwoordelijk voor. Daarom zeggen ze niet wat er aan de hand is."
- Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Anders, namelijk:
15. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Volgend jaar geef ik nog maar één klas les en dat vind ik toch ergens wel jammer. Hoewel ik regelmatig door de druk vergeet om les te geven."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt Anders, namelijk:

16. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "In bijna alle talen bestaan woorden voor die emoties. Dat duidt toch ergens aan dat inderdaad die verschillende soorten emoties dus ook universeel zijn."
- Ongeveer
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
17. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Andrew zou me om half zes opwachten en dan zouden we ergens gaan eten en daarna zouden we gezellig naar een theater."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment Anders, namelijk:
18. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. Spreker 1: Wanneer heeft ze toen ook alweer haar rijbewijs gehaald? Weet je dat nog? Spreker 2: Ergens in 't najaar. Spreker 1: Oktober of zo hè? Spreker 2: Ja, oktober, november, dacht ik ook.
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe

- Op een of ander moment
- Ongeveer
- Anders, namelijk:

19. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. Spreker 1: Hoeveel kilometer is dat dan? Spreker 2: Ongeveer tweehonderd, dus ongeveer honderd vijftig, tweehonderd daar ergens tussenin, als je er naartoe vaart dan ben je een dag onderweg.

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of andere manier
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:

20. * Wat betekent het eerste ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Maar hebben jullie niks meegemaakt vandaag? Ik bedoel, we moeten 't toch wel ergens (1) over kunnen hebben wat echt ergens over gaat toch of niet?"

- Op een of andere plaats
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of ander moment
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Anders, namelijk:

21. * Wat betekent het tweede ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Maar hebben jullie niks meegemaakt vandaag? Ik bedoel, we moeten 't toch wel ergens over kunnen hebben wat echt ergens (2) over gaat toch of niet?"

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander moment

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer Anders, namelijk:
22. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. Spreker 1: Daarvòòr steunen ze je wel maar daarna niet meer. Spreker 2: Daar zit ergens wel weer wat in. Ze kunnen aan de andere kant ook bezig blijven.
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
23. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. Spreker 1: Eerst het behang en dan dat hoekje afmaken. Spreker 2: Nou dan zijn we ergens rond twee drie uur wel klaar, denk ik. Spreker 1: We zijn wel eerder klaar hoor.
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
24. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ik heb het vermoeden, maar dat is op basis van landschappelijke argumenten, dat ze ergens tussen de dertienduizend en achtduizend jaar oud zijn."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of ander moment
- Anders, namelijk:

25. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ik zag dat ze goed verzorgd haar had. Geen grijs haartje, begrijp je wel. Ergens in de veertig dacht ik. Maar ze gedroeg zich nog steeds als een verwend kind."

- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:

26. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ik ZAT in de beta van 21 (zoiets) januari, of 9 januari, daar ergens. Maar kun je dan ook meedoen met die van 9 februari ofzo?"

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

27. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Na Multatuli, in achttien, nee, in negentien twintig dertig daar ergens vestigde de journalist Jan Greshof zich ook in Brussel."

- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten Anders, namelijk:

28. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "De Pueblo-indianen gebruikten bakstenen om hun dorpen en stadjes te bouwen. Ergens tussen twaalfhonderd en veertienhonderd na Christus kwamen de Navaho de streek binnen."

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander moment
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Anders, namelijk:

29. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ik ben ook onderdeel van de ronde nieuwelingen. Ik speel orgel vanaf mijn tiende ergens, ik heb tot mijn achttiende veel les gehad, hoewel met twee - drie jaar onderbreking."

- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere manier
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten

- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer Anders, namelijk:
30. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "De vraag is: wat probeert een religie te zijn? Want de geschiedenis van Israël is ergens een beschrijving van 't volk dat zichzelf moed inpraatte om zelfstandig te blijven."
- Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Anders, namelijk:
31. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Hoe nu die elementen eruit komen, is een kwestie van je persoonlijkheid toch ergens, dat kun je niet wegdrukken. En die persoonlijkheid die heb je zelf."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
32. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Zaterdag is er weer een demonstratie en dan gaat ze naar 't eindpunt om toch ergens, ja, mee te tellen. Kijk d'r vallen onderweg weer mensen af."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere manier

- Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
33. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Na veertien dagen ben ik nog eens om dat ontslagbewijs gaan vragen, want ergens zat het me toch dwars. maar ik heb het nooit gekregen."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats Anders, namelijk:
34. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Huldigde ook Hitler niet de zienswijze, dat ook leugens wel ergens worden geloofd? Of wat zij zeggen wààr is, doet er dus niet toe."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Anders, namelijk:
35. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ik kon al liegen voordat ik kon praten. Maar toch had ik vroeger ergens óók altijd geloofd dat mijn moeders verhaal maar een verzinsel was."
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander moment Anders, namelijk:
36. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ik bewonder mensen wel die de moed hebben om dat te doen. Ik zou dat ergens wel willen, maar ja we maken keuzes in het leven hè?"
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Anders, namelijk:
37. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Krakau vond 'k eigenlijk ook heel erg mooi. Warschau viel ergens tegen omdat 't nagebouwd is, maar aan de andere kant was 't leuk om te zien."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten Anders, namelijk:
38. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Want we wouden even naar een museum en ik dacht als we toch ergens heen gaan, dan kunnen we gelijk even bij papa langs."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe

- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Anders, namelijk:
39. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. Spreker 1: En wanneer vertrekt ie naar Roemenië? Spreker 2: Ik weet het niet. Ergens in juli. Spreker 1: was 't niet de zesde of zo? Spreker 2: Ik weet het niet.
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats Anders, namelijk:
40. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "De minister heeft aangegeven dat hij wel degelijk met een visie gaat komen. Ergens in het voorjaar van 2010, het vroege voorjaar, zei hij er nog bij."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Anders, namelijk:
41. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ik realiseerde me ineens dat ik het mes niet zomaar ergens neer kon leggen. De grijpgrage handjes van mijn dochttertje kennende voorzag ik on-aangename gevolgen."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of andere plaats
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt Anders, namelijk:

42. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Het zal wel in het Guinness Book of Records komen. Lopen we toch nog ergens in voorop, want dat voetballen wordt bij ons nooit meer iets."

- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander moment
- Anders, namelijk:

43. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Dan ga ik me netjes aankleden. Het is heel wat gemakkelijker ergens over te praten dan er over te schrijven, daar kunnen we het over eens zijn."

- Op een of andere plaats
- Ongeveer
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:

44. Heeft u nog opmerkingen, suggesties of kritiek op deze vragenlijst?

Dit is het einde van deze vragenlijst. Heel hartelijk dank voor het invullen.

A.2 Survey 2: *Ergens* in a two word window

Welkom!

Met deze vragenlijst willen wij onderzoeken wat het woord *ergens* in verschillende zinnen betekent. De zinnen waarin u het woord *ergens* te zien krijgt, zijn in het dagelijks leven door mensen uitgesproken of opgeschreven. Dit betekent dat sommige voorbeelden typisch gesproken taal bevatten. De bedoeling van deze vragenlijst is om erachter te komen wat *ergens* betekent. Woordenboeken zijn hier niet altijd geschikt voor, want betekenissen kunnen per persoon verschillen. Daarom willen wij u vragen om tijdens het invullen van deze vragenlijst af te gaan op uw eigen eerste indruk. Wij zijn op zoek naar informatie over het gevoel van zoveel mogelijk sprekers van het Nederlands en uw eerste indruk is dus precies wat we willen horen. Denk er vooral niet teveel (en zeker ook niet te lang) over na. Elke vraag bestaat uit het woord *ergens* met een paar woorden er omheen. Van u willen wij graag weten hoe u *ergens* in deze context interpreteert. Daarna kunt u zeggen hoe zeker u van uw interpretatie bent. U krijgt de keus uit de volgende mogelijkheden, die steeds in verschillende volgorde onder de vraag staan. Lees dus elke keer de antwoorden goed door. Van elk van de mogelijke antwoorden zullen we hieronder een voorbeeld geven.

- a) Op een of andere plaats
- b) Op een of ander moment
- c) Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- d) Op een of andere manier
- e) Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, naar iets toe
- f) In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- g) Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- h) Ongeveer
- i) Anders, namelijk:

Nu zullen we van elk van deze opties een voorbeeld geven:

- a) De eerste optie is: op een of andere plaats. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ik heb mijn sleutels ergens neergelegd, maar ik weet niet meer waar."
- b) De tweede optie is: op een of ander moment. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"We gaan ergens in juli op vakantie."
- c) De derde optie is: op een of ander punt (op een schaal). Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"In een zak appels zitten ergens tussen de twaalf en vijftien appels."

- d) De vierde optie is: op een of andere manier. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is: "We moeten dat ergens toch voor elkaar zien te krijgen."
- e) De vijfde optie is: over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets of naar iets to
- d) Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ernst verbaasde zich ergens over."
In dit zinnetje kun je ergens over vervangen door over iets. In ons voorbeeld kun je bijvoorbeeld ook zeggen:
Ernst verbaasde zich over iets.
Dit is vaak ook mogelijk in zinnen met ergens in, ergens mee, ergens aan, ergens voor of ergens naartoe.
- e) De zesde optie is: in (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ergens denk ik dat dat niet klopt."
- f) De zevende optie is: Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is: Ergens is dat wel fijn, maar aan de andere kant hoeft het echt niet áltijd.
- g) De achtste optie is: ongeveer. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is: "Dat was op mijn zestiende ergens."
- h) De laatste optie is om zelf uw interpretatie in te vullen, als u echt niet overweg kunt met de opties hierboven.

U kunt deze uitleg nalezen door op de link helemaal onderaan elke pagina te klikken.

Vragen vooraf

We beginnen met een aantal vragen over u zelf. Deze gegevens blijven volledig anoniem en zijn niet aan uw persoon te koppelen.

1. * Wat is uw geboortjaar?
2. * Wat is uw geslacht?
 Man
 Vrouw
3. * In welke gemeente woont u?
4. * Wat is uw moedertaal?
5. * Welke taal/talen werden tijdens uw jeugd thuis gesproken? 6. Wat zijn de moedertalen van uw ouders/verzorgers? *
6. * Waar heeft u tot uw twaalfde gewoond?

7. * Welk van de volgende typen taal werden er in uw jeugd in uw omgeving gesproken? (Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.)

- Standaard Nederlands (ABN)
- Standaard Nederlands met een regionaal accent
- Streektaal
- Dialect
- Een buitenlandse taal

Als u b-e heeft aangekruist: Welk(e) streektaal/dialect/buitenlandse taal is/zijn dat?

8. * In welke provincie(s) van Nederland heeft u minstens vier jaar gewoond? (Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)

- Groningen
- Friesland
- Drenthe
- Overijssel
- Gelderland
- Utrecht
- Flevoland
- Noord-Holland
- Zuid-Holland
- Zeeland
- Noord-Brabant
- Limburg

9. * Heeft u meer dan een jaar buiten Nederland gewoond? Zo ja, waar en hoe lang heeft u daar ongeveer gewoond?

- Nee
- Ja (vul hieronder in welk land u heeft gewoond en hoe lang u daar gewoond heeft.)

10. * Wat is de hoogste opleiding die u genoten heeft?

- Basisschool
- Vmbo (vroeger: LBO)
- Havo
- Vwo (vroeger: HBS, gymnasium)

- Mbo
- Hbo
- Universiteit
- Anders, namelijk:

11. * Heeft u op hoger onderwijs niveau een taal of taalwetenschap gestudeerd?

- Ja
- Nee

Vragenlijst ergens

1. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. " ...z'n vieren ergens in Frankrijk..."

- Op een of andere plaats
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere manier
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of ander moment Anders, namelijk:

2. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?

- Heel zeker
- Zeker
- Neutraal
- Onzeker
- Heel onzeker

3. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. ...als ie ergens mee bezig...

- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

4. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
5. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "... je toch ergens niet alleen..."
- Op een of andere plaats
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal) Anders, namelijk:
6. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
7. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...fulltime baan ergens. "
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Anders, namelijk:
8. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
9. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...werk moet ergens gebeuren in..."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe

- Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal) Anders, namelijk:
10. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
11. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ergens is dat..."
- Op een of andere plaats
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Anders, namelijk:
12. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
13. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "... bedoelt ie ergens tussen de..."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats Anders, namelijk:
14. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
15. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...gezien, naar ergens in de ..."

- Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Anders, namelijk:
16. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
17. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...zich nooit ergens anders heeft..."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt Anders, namelijk:
18. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
19. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Dat is ergens ja pff..."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten

- Anders, namelijk:
20. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
21. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Maar ergens heb ik..."
- Op een of andere plaats
 In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 Op een of andere manier
 Ongeveer
 Op een of ander moment
 Op een of ander punt (op een schaal) Anders, namelijk:
22. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
23. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...ze moest ergens naartoe."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 Ongeveer
 Op een of andere manier
 Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 Op een of andere plaats
 Op een of ander moment
 Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 Anders, namelijk:
24. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
25. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...lusteloos, maar ergens ook opgewekt..."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 Ongeveer
 Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe

- Op een of andere manier
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal) Anders, namelijk:
26. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
27. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...daar dan ergens verantwoordelijk voor."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
28. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
29. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...ik toch ergens wel jammer."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment Anders, namelijk:
30. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker

31. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...duidt toch ergens aan dat..."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Anders, namelijk:
32. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
33. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...zouden we ergens gaan eten..."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats Anders, namelijk:
34. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
35. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ergens in 't najaar."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere plaats

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Anders, namelijk:
36. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker
 - Zeker
 - Neutraal
 - Onzeker
 - Heel onzeker
37. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...tweehonderd daar ergens tussenin, als..."
- Op een of andere plaats
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal) Anders, namelijk:
38. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker
 - Zeker
 - Neutraal
 - Onzeker
 - Heel onzeker
39. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...toch wel ergens over kunnen..."
- Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Anders, namelijk:
40. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker
 - Zeker
 - Neutraal
 - Onzeker
 - Heel onzeker
41. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...wat echt ergens over gaat..."
- Op een of andere plaats

- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal) Anders, namelijk:
42. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
43. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Daar zit ergens wel weer..."
- Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander moment
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
44. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
45. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...zijn we ergens rond twee..."
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment Anders, namelijk:

46. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
47. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...dat ze ergens tussen de..."
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Anders, namelijk:
48. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
49. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ergens in de..."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
50. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
51. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...januari, daar ergens."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt

- Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Anders, namelijk:
52. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
53. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...dertig daar ergens vestigde de..."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten Anders, namelijk:
54. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
55. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ergens tussen twaalfhonderd..."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Anders, namelijk:
56. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker

57. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...mijn tiende ergens, ik heb..."
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Ongeveer
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
58. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
59. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...Israël is ergens een beschrijving..."
- Op een of andere plaats
 - Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Anders, namelijk:
60. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
61. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...persoonlijkheid toch ergens, dat kun..."
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere plaats Anders, namelijk:
62. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
63. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...om toch ergens, ja, mee..."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
64. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
65. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...vragen, want ergens zat het..."
- Op een of andere plaats
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of ander moment Anders, namelijk:
66. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
67. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...leugens wel ergens worden geloofd..."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Anders, namelijk:
68. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
69. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...ik vroeger ergens óók altijd..."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt Anders, namelijk:
70. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
71. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...zou dat ergens wel willen..."
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Ongeveer
 - Anders, namelijk:

72. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
73. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...Warschau viel ergens tegen omdat..."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of ander moment
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
74. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
75. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...we toch ergens heen gaan..."
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Ongeveer
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
76. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
 Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
77. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ergens in juli."
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Ongeveer
 - Op een of andere manier

- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere plaats Anders, namelijk:
78. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
79. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "Ergens in het..."
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Ongeveer
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Anders, namelijk:
80. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
81. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...niet zomaar ergens neer kon..."
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 - Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 - Ongeveer
 - In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 - Op een of andere manier
 - Op een of ander moment
 - Op een of andere plaats
 - Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:
82. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?
- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker
83. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...toch nog ergens in voorop..."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

84. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?

- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker

85. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden. "...wat gemakkelijker ergens over te..."

- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

86. * Hoe zeker bent u van uw vorige antwoord?

- Heel zeker Zeker Neutraal Onzeker Heel onzeker

87. Heeft u nog opmerkingen, suggesties of kritiek op deze vragenlijst?

Dit is het einde van deze vragenlijst. Heel hartelijk dank voor het invullen.

A.3 Survey 3: *Ergens* in modified contexts

Welkom!

Met deze vragenlijst willen wij onderzoeken wat het woord *ergens* in verschillende zinnen betekent. De zinnen waarin u het woord *ergens* te zien krijgt, zijn in het dagelijks leven door mensen uitgesproken of opgeschreven. Dit betekent dat sommige voorbeelden typisch gesproken taal bevatten. De bedoeling van deze vragenlijst is om erachter te komen wat *ergens* betekent. Woordenboeken zijn hier niet altijd geschikt voor, want betekenissen kunnen per persoon verschillen. Daarom willen wij u vragen om tijdens het invullen van deze vragenlijst af te gaan op uw eigen eerste indruk. Wij zijn op zoek naar informatie over het gevoel van zoveel mogelijk sprekers van het Nederlands en uw eerste indruk is dus precies wat we willen horen. Denk er vooral niet teveel (en zeker ook niet te lang) over na. Deze vragenlijst neemt ongeveer 15 tot 20 minuten in beslag. Elke vraag bestaat uit een stukje tekst met daarin het woord *ergens*. Vervolgens krijgt u de keus uit de volgende mogelijkheden, die steeds in verschillende volgorde onder de vraag staan. Lees dus elke keer de antwoorden goed door. Van elk van de mogelijke antwoorden zullen we hieronder een voorbeeld geven.

- a) Op een of andere plaats
- b) Op een of ander moment
- c) Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- d) Op een of andere manier
- e) Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, naar iets toe
- f) In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- g) Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- h) Ongeveer
- i) Anders, namelijk:

Nu zullen we van elk van deze opties een voorbeeld geven:

- a) De eerste optie is: op een of andere plaats. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ik heb mijn sleutels ergens neergelegd, maar ik weet niet meer waar."
- b) De tweede optie is: op een of ander moment. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"We gaan ergens in juli op vakantie."
- c) De derde optie is: op een of ander punt (op een schaal). Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"In een zak appels zitten ergens tussen de twaalf en vijftien appels."

- d) De vierde optie is: op een of andere manier. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"We moeten dat ergens toch voor elkaar zien te krijgen."
De vijfde optie is: over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets of naar iets toe.
Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ernst verbaasde zich ergens over."
In dit zinnetje kun je ergens over vervangen door over iets. In ons voorbeeld kun je bijvoorbeeld ook zeggen: Ernst verbaasde zich over iets. Dit is vaak ook mogelijk in zinnen met ergens in, ergens mee, ergens aan, ergens voor of ergens naartoe.
- e) De zesde optie is: in (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Ergens denk ik dat dat niet klopt."
- f) De zevende optie is: Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
Ergens is dat wel fijn, maar aan de andere kant hoeft het echt niet áltijd.
- g) De achtste optie is: ongeveer. Een voorbeeld van dit gebruik is:
"Dat was op mijn zestiende ergens."
- h) De laatste optie is om zelf uw interpretatie in te vullen, als u echt niet overweg kunt met de opties hierboven.

U kunt deze uitleg nalezen door op de link helemaal onderaan elke pagina te klikken. We beginnen met een aantal vragen over u zelf. Deze gegevens blijven volledig anoniem en zijn niet aan uw persoon te koppelen.

1. * Wat is uw geboortjaar?
2. * Wat is uw geslacht?
 Man
 Vrouw
3. * In welke gemeente woont u?
4. * Wat is uw moedertaal?
5. * Welke taal/talen werden tijdens uw jeugd thuis gesproken?
6. * Wat zijn de moedertalen van uw ouders/verzorgers?
7. Waar heeft u tot uw twaalfde gewoond?
8. * Welk van de volgende typen taal werden er in uw jeugd in uw omgeving gesproken? (Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.)

- Standaard Nederlands (ABN)
- Standaard Nederlands met een regionaal accent
- Streektaal
- Dialect
- Een buitenlandse taal

Als u b-e heeft aangekruist: Welk(e) streektaal/dialect/buitenlandse taal is/zijn dat?

9. * In welke provincie(s) van Nederland heeft u minstens vier jaar gewoond? (Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)
- Groningen
 - Friesland
 - Drenthe
 - Overijssel
 - Gelderland
 - Utrecht
 - Flevoland
 - Noord-Holland
 - Zuid-Holland
 - Zeeland
 - Noord-Brabant
 - Limburg
10. * Heeft u meer dan een jaar buiten Nederland gewoond? Zo ja, waar en hoe lang heeft u daar ongeveer gewoond?
- Nee
 - Ja (vul hieronder in welk land u heeft gewoond en hoe lang u daar gewoond heeft.)
11. * Wat is de hoogste opleiding die u genoten heeft?
- Basisschool
 - Vmbo (vroeger: LBO)
 - Havo
 - Vwo (vroeger: HBS, gymnasium)
 - Mbo
 - Hbo

- Universiteit
- Anders, namelijk:

12. * Heeft u op hoger onderwijs niveau een taal of taalwetenschap gestudeerd?

- Ja
- Nee

Vragenlijst ergens

1. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Ik vind het belangrijk dat ik met leuke mensen wegga. Om nou met z'n vieren ergens in januari in Frankrijk te zitten, daar heb ik niet zo veel zin in."

- Ongeveer
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Anders, namelijk:

2. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

Spreker 1: "Door zijn concentratiestoornis is hij zo weer weg met zijn gedachten als ie ergens iets interessanter ziet."

Spreker 2: "Maar kan ie wel goed leren lezen en zo?"

- Op een of andere plaats
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander moment
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere manier
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:

3. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Dat wás vroeger. Als je 'n man hebt ga je toch ergens op een andere manier met mannen om. Anders denken ze dat je sjans zit te zoeken."

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of andere plaats
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Anders, namelijk:

4. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Zij kan niet fulltime werken. En voor haar is huishouden in principe vergelijkbaar met een fulltime baan ergens. Zeker in haar tempo omdat zij last heeft van reuma."

- Ongeveer
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere manier
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten Anders, namelijk:

5. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Het zou natuurlijk ideaal zijn een school zonder huiswerk. Maar het werk moet ergens gebeuren op school of thuis."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe

- Op een of andere manier
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

6. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Mijn vrienden zeggen: "dat je dat volhoudt" en "ik zou dat nooit kunnen."
Ergens heb ik zelfs wel eens te horen gekregen dat iemand liever werkloos zou zijn dan voor de klas te gaan staan."

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of andere manier
- Ongeveer
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten Anders, namelijk:

7. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Enkele gevallen, zei minister Van Boxtel, en daarmee zegt ie ergens dat er tussen de vijf en de tien gevallen van illegaal namaken zijn."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of andere manier
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Anders, namelijk:

8. * Wat betekent het eerste ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"De regisseur heeft de actie overgeplaatst, zoals u waarschijnlijk al heeft gezien, naar ergens (1) in Italië in de negentiende eeuw alsof het zich nooit ergens anders heeft afgespeeld."

- Op een of andere plaats
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere manier
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt Anders, namelijk:

9. * Wat betekent het tweede ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"De regisseur heeft de actie overgeplaatst, zoals u waarschijnlijk al heeft gezien, naar ergens in Italië in de negentiende eeuw alsof het zich nooit ergens (2) anders heeft afgespeeld."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

10. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Stenen voorwerpen uit een periode die men het mesolithicum noemt. Dat is ergens in ja pff laten we zeggen zesduizend, vijfduizend voor Christus."

- Op een of andere plaats
- Ongeveer
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe Anders, namelijk:

11. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Steven knikte. Daar heb ik ook al aan gedacht. Maar ergens heb ik gelezen dat er meer achter steekt."

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of ander moment
- Anders, namelijk:

12. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Carola vroeg of ze Anais even terug mocht geven aan Isabelle, want ze moest haar oma ergens mee helpen, maar dat kon niet volgens Isabelle Belachelijk, het is haar eigen kind!"

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

13. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Ze misten haar. Baba Baloek voelde zich vreemd, ietwat lusteloos, maar ergens zou hij wel een oplossing vinden. Zijn maag was op slot en grendel."

- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of andere manier

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Anders, namelijk:

14. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

”Dat heb ik opgedaan in het ziekenhuis zelf. En eigenlijk zijn zij daar dan ergens in de fout gegaan. Daarom zeggen ze niet wat er aan de hand is.”

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Anders, namelijk:

15. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

”Volgend jaar geef ik nog maar één klas les en ergens in de komende jaren zal ik er wel helemaal mee moeten stoppen. Dat vind ik toch wel jammer. Hoewel ik regelmatig door de druk vergeet om les te geven.”

- Op een of andere plaats
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander moment
- Anders, namelijk:

16. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"In bijna alle talen bestaan woorden voor die emoties. Dat duidt toch aan dat ergens in onze genen die verschillende soorten emoties zitten."

- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of ander moment
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Anders, namelijk:

17. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Andrew zou me om half zes opwachten en dan zouden we ergens tussen zes en zeven gaan eten en daarna zouden we gezellig naar een theater."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Anders, namelijk:

18. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

Spreker 1: Waar heeft ze toen ook alweer haar rijbewijs gehaald? Weet je dat nog? Spreker 2: Ergens in 't Gooi. Spreker 1: Bussum of zo hè Spreker 2: ja, Bussum of Naarden dacht ik ook.

- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe

- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere plaats
- Ongeveer
- Anders, namelijk:

19. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

Spreker 1: Hoeveel kilometer is dat dan? Spreker 2: Ongeveer tweehonderd, dus ongeveer honderd vijftig, tweehonderd daar ergens, als je er naartoe vaart dan ben je een dag onderweg.

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

20. * Wat betekent het eerste ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Maar hebben jullie niks meegemaakt vandaag? Ik bedoel, we moeten toch wel ergens (1) een onderwerp kunnen vinden wat echt ergens over gaat toch of niet?"

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Anders, namelijk:

21. * Wat betekent het tweede ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Maar hebben jullie niks meegemaakt vandaag? Ik bedoel, we moeten 't toch wel ergens een onderwerp kunnen vinden wat echt ergens (2) over gaat toch of niet?"

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of andere plaats
- Ongeveer
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Anders, namelijk:

22. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

Spreker 1: Daarvòòr steunen ze je wel maar daarna niet meer. Spreker 2: Daar zit ergens wel een probleem. Ze kunnen aan de andere kant ook bezig blijven.

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

23. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

Spreker 1: Eerst het behang en dan dat hoekje afmaken. Spreker 2: Nou dan zijn we ergens toch wel goed bezig, denk ik. Spreker 1: We zijn wel eerder begonnen hoor.

- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander moment
- Anders, namelijk:

24. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Ik heb het vermoeden, maar dat is op basis van landschappelijke argumenten, dat ze ergens op de hei leefden en tussen de dertienduizend en achtduizend jaar oud zijn."

- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

25. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Ik zag dat ze goed verzorgd haar had. Geen grijs haartje, begrijp je wel. Ergens een sterke vrouw dacht ik. Maar ze gedroeg zich nog steeds als een verwend kind."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe

Anders, namelijk:

26. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Ik ZAT in een team van 21 (zoiets) man, of 15 man, daar ergens. Maar kun je dan ook meedoen met die van 50 deelnemers ofzo? "

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 Op een of andere manier
 Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 Ongeveer
 Op een of ander moment
 Op een of andere plaats
 Anders, namelijk:

27. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"In Halle, nee, in Vilvoorde daar ergens vestigde de journalist Jan Greshof zich."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
 Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
 Op een of andere manier
 Op een of andere plaats
 Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
 Ongeveer
 Op een of ander moment
 Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
 Anders, namelijk:

28. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"De Pueblo-indianen gebruikten bakstenen om hun dorpen en stadjes te bouwen. Ergens vanuit het noorden kwamen de Navaho de streek binnen."

- Op een of andere plaats
 Ongeveer
 In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten

- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Anders, namelijk:

29. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Ik ben ook onderdeel van de ronde nieuwelingen. Ik speel orgel vanaf mijn tiende ergens op een kerkorgel, ik heb tot mijn achttiende veel les gehad, hoewel met twee - drie jaar onderbreking."

- Op een of andere plaats
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Anders, namelijk:

30. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"De vraag is: wat probeert een religie te zijn? Want de geschiedenis van Israël is ergens beschreven als 't volk dat zichzelf moed inpraatte om zelfstandig te blijven."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander moment
- Anders, namelijk:

31. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Hoe nu die elementen eruit komen, is een kwestie van je persoonlijkheid die toch ergens in je zit, dat kun je niet wegdrukken. En die persoonlijkheid die heb je zelf."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

32. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Zaterdag is er weer een demonstratie en dan gaat ze naar 't eindpunt om toch ergens, ja, aan mee te doen. Kijk d'r vallen onderweg weer mensen af."

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere plaats
- Ongeveer
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Anders, namelijk:

33. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Na veertien dagen ben ik nog eens om dat ontslagbewijs gaan vragen, want ergens bij een instantie vroegen ze erom, maar ik heb het nooit gekregen."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe

- Op een of andere manier
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander moment
- Anders, namelijk:

34. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

”Huldigde ook Hitler niet de zienswijze, dat ook leugens wel ergens in mensen hun achterhoofd blijven hangen? Of wat zij zeggen wààr is, doet er dus niet toe.”

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Anders, namelijk:

35. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

”Ik kon al liegen voordat ik kon praten. Maar toch had ik vroeger ergens van binnen óók altijd geloofd dat mijn moeders verhaal maar een verzinsel was.”

- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Anders, namelijk:

36. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Ik bewonder mensen wel die de moed hebben om dat te doen. Ik zou dat ergens in de komende jaren wel willen maar ja we maken keuzes in het leven hè?"

- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of ander moment
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of andere manier
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Anders, namelijk:

37. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Krakau vond 'k eigenlijk ook heel erg mooi. Ons bezoek aan Warschau viel ergens tussen kerst en oud en nieuw en viel, doordat alles dicht was, een beetje tegen. "

- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Anders, namelijk:

38. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Want we wouden even naar een museum en ik dacht als we toch ergens bezig zijn, dan kunnen we gelijk even bij papa langs."

- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt

- Ongeveer
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Anders, namelijk:

39. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

Spreker 1: En waar vertrekt ie naartoe? Spreker 2: Ik weet het niet. Ergens in het oostblok. Spreker 1: was 't niet Roemenië of zo? Spreker 2: Ik weet het niet.

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere plaats
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Anders, namelijk:

40. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"De minister heeft aangegeven dat hij wel degelijk met een visie gaat komen. Ergens in de voorjaarsnota van 2010 en die komt in het vroege voorjaar, zei hij er nog bij."

- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Op een of andere manier
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander moment
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Anders, namelijk:

41. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Ik realiseerde me ineens dat ik het ergens een risico vond. De grijpgrage handjes van mijn dochtertje kennende voorzag ik onaangename gevolgen."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander moment
- Ongeveer
- Anders, namelijk:

42. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Het zal wel in het Guinness Book of Records komen. Lopen we toch nog ergens het hardst, want dat voetballen wordt bij ons nooit meer iets."

- Op een of andere plaats
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt
- Ongeveer
- Op een of andere manier
- Op een of ander moment
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Anders, namelijk:

43. * Wat betekent ergens in dit voorbeeld? Kies een van de volgende mogelijkheden.

"Dan ga ik me netjes aankleden. Het is heel wat gemakkelijker ergens om te praten dan om te schrijven, daar kunnen we het over eens zijn."

- In (een deel van) iemands eigen gevoelens of gedachten
- Ongeveer
- Op een of ander moment
- Vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt

- Op een of andere manier
- Over iets, in iets, met iets, aan iets, voor iets, naar iets toe
- Op een of ander punt (op een schaal)
- Op een of andere plaats
- Anders, namelijk:

44. Heeft u nog opmerkingen, suggesties of kritiek op deze vragenlijst?

Dit is het einde van deze vragenlijst. Heel hartelijk dank voor het invullen.

APPENDIX B

The statistics of survey 1

On the next page there is an overview of the results of the test results for each individual sentence in survey 1. The other test results were provided within the chapter itself, as they consisted of only one or few test statistics. The one sentence that was not significant is discussed in section 3.4.4 example (24).

Chi-square	60.500 ^a	45.500 ^a	65.533 ^b	29.556 ^a	83.444 ^b	8.444 ^a	18.500 ^a	92.714 ^b	18.600 ^a	22.167 ^a	34.000 ^a	31.778 ^a	19.533 ^a	47.611 ^a
df	2	5	4	4	4	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	4
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.038	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Chi-square	27.133 ^a	36.500 ^a	32.111 ^b	40.667 ^a	30.444 ^a	60.500 ^a	59.533 ^b	45.944 ^a	33.444 ^a	30.444 ^a	33.333 ^a	21.556 ^a	14.444 ^a	21.67 ^a
df	4	2	1	2	3	2	3	4	4	3	5	3	3	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.338
Chi-square	50.667 ^a	23.778 ^a	12.667 ^a	100.111 ^b	25.556 ^a	19.222 ^a	46.778 ^a	20.944 ^a	16.222 ^a	28.667 ^a	28.167 ^a	40.667 ^a	32.111 ^b	81.000 ^b
df	3	3	3	6	3	6	4	4	3	3	2	2	1	5
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000	.005	.000	.000	.004	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Figure B.1: The statistical results of a χ^2 test for all sentences of survey 1. Only sentence 28 does not show a significant result.

APPENDIX C

By-products of this dissertation

In order to get and keep an overview of the large amounts of data that were used in this dissertation, I made several databases and four computer programs. However, both the databases and the code are too space consuming to include in this appendix, but they are available from the author on request. They include the following databases and programs:

1. Databases on *ergens*
 - (a) The raw results of the surveys, including demographical information on the participants
 - (b) Summaries and calculations of the statistics of the surveys
 - (c) A table with all passages containing *ergens* in the three corpora (i.e. CGN, Eindhoven corpus, corpus of novels) and the way they were interpreted as well as some collocational information
 - (d) A table with statistical information on the corpora
2. Databases on $\pi\upsilon$
 - (a) Two databases with the collocational information, comments on $\pi\upsilon$ from some commentaries and the translations of $\pi\upsilon$ in English, French and German. One for the synchronic prose corpus, the other one for the diachronic corpus
 - (b) The results of the statistical tests on the collocations of $\pi\upsilon$.
3. Four computer programs (written in Python and without interface)

- (a) A program that converts TLG citations to LSJ citations
- (b) A program that reads .xls files with LSJ formatted citations and returns a file with the requested Greek passages and their Perseus translations (based on the data provided by the Perseus hopper)
- (c) A very rudimentary and not completely reliable program (due to the rich morphology of Greek) to find the collocations of a form. This needs to be adapted to be usable for other forms than πού or to other collocational definitions
- (d) A program which puts GREP results from the CGN in an excel sheet

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Het interpreteren van partikels in dode en levende talen: Een constructie-grammatica benadering van de semantiek van Nederlands *ergens* en Grieks *pou*

Dezelfde woorden kunnen in verschillende contexten heel andere dingen betekenen. Zo heeft het woord *tafel* in voorbeeld (1-a) een totaal andere betekenis dan in (1-b).

- (1) a. Ik heb het kopje net op tafel gezet.
b. Ik heb net de tafel van drie opgezegd.

In onze moedertaal vinden wij het heel vanzelfsprekend dat we geen moeite hebben met dit soort dubbelzinnigheden. De context zorgt er immers voor dat we wel weten wat er bedoeld wordt. Dat we een uitdrukking als *de tafel van [getal]* moeten kennen om hem te begrijpen, wordt duidelijk wanneer we ons proberen voor te stellen dat een buitenlander die redelijk goed Nederlands spreekt, maar de uitdrukking *tafel van [getal]* niet kent, in de tram een kind zin (1-b) hoort zeggen. De buitenlander zal in eerste instantie aan het object *tafel* denken, maar waarschijnlijk toch concluderen dat hij zich niets voor kan stellen bij dat object in combinatie met het werkwoord *opzeggen*. Op basis van het feit dat het kind het over school heeft, zal hij waarschijnlijk concluderen dat het over iets op school moet gaan, maar waarover precies, dat zal iemand hem waarschijnlijk moeten uitleggen.

Een vergelijkbaar probleem hebben wij als we proberen oud-Grieks te lezen. Van veel woorden weten we wel redelijk wat ze betekenen, maar vooral woordjes die niet zo'n concrete betekenis hebben (partikels), zoals bijvoorbeeld het Nederlandse *toch*, *wel*, *eigenlijk* zijn moeilijk te interpreteren in een taal die op dit moment niet meer gesproken wordt. Ook kan het voor ons lastig zijn om te weten welke betekenis we

moeten kiezen als woorden meerdere betekenissen kunnen hebben, zoals in het volgende voorbeeld.

- (2) ἔστι μὲν γὰρ δὴ που καὶ Ὅμηρῳ
 is ptcl want ptcl που ptcl in Homerus
 3SG.PRS PTCL PTCL δὴπου PTCL DAT.SG
 (γάνυται δὲ τ' ἀκούων.)
 Want er staat, zoals je je herinnert, zelfs in Homerus: (Hij verheugt zich om te horen.)
 Want er staat, zoals je weet, zelfs in Homerus: ...
 Want er staat zelfs ergens in Homerus: ...

X. Smp. 8.30.3

In voorbeeld (2) zien we dat het partikel που op verschillende manieren geïnterpreteerd kan worden. De gegeven vertalingen zijn vertaald uit wetenschappelijke vertalingen in het Engels, Frans en Duits. Deze vertalingen laten zien dat zelfs specialisten in het Grieks het niet altijd eens zijn of in een bepaald geval που als 'ergens' geïnterpreteerd moet worden (de originele betekenis) of een nieuwere betekenis heeft die niets met een plaats te maken heeft (zoals je je herinnert, zoals je weet).

Bij gebrek aan sprekers van het Grieks die ons uit kunnen leggen wat de juiste betekenis is, zijn we aangewezen op de context van een woord om te weten te komen wat de betekenis van dit woord was. Dat is echter makkelijker gezegd dan gedaan, omdat het voor abstracte betekenissen erg moeilijk is om doorslaggevende redenen te vinden waarom een bepaalde interpretatie wel mogelijk is en een andere echt niet.

Maar hoe weten moedertaalsprekers dit dan? De verwachting was dat moedertaalsprekers, omdat ze heel veel ervaring hebben met gebruikgevallen in context, op basis van die ervaring weten wat er meestal wel en niet bedoeld wordt in bepaalde contexten. Nieuwe taaluitingen kunnen ze dan vergelijken met de gebruikswijzen die ze goed kennen. Dat zou betekenen dat er toch bepaalde herkenbare en terugkerende patronen in taalgebruik moeten zitten. Die patronen zouden ons mogelijk ook kunnen helpen om in het Grieks meer te weten te komen over woorden met meerdere (abstracte) betekenissen.

Het Griekse που kan zowel een plaats uitdrukken als een abstractere betekenis hebben. Daarin lijkt het woord wel een beetje op het Nederlandse *ergens*, zoals in de volgende voorbeelden.

- (3) a. Ergens in dit dorp moeten we links afslaan.
 b. Ergens denk ik dat hij wel gelijk heeft.

De interpretatie van *ergens*

Om te onderzoeken of mensen daadwerkelijk zoveel van de contexten weten waarin dergelijke woorden voorkomen, heb ik ruim honderd moedertaalsprekers van het Nederlands gevraagd een vragenlijst over *ergens* in te vullen. Er waren drie versies van de vragenlijst: een met *ergens*-zinnen zoals ze daadwerkelijk uitgesproken zijn

door mensen die met elkaar aan het praten waren, een met dezelfde zinnen, maar dan met maar twee woorden context voor en na *ergens* en een met een door mij aangepaste context. Die laatste context was zo aangepast dat met zo min mogelijk verandering *ergens* waarschijnlijk toch een andere interpretatie zou krijgen.

Uit die drie vragenlijsten is gebleken dat sprekers een heel duidelijke voorkeur hebben voor een bepaalde betekenis, maar dat die voorkeur het duidelijkst is tussen de gevallen van *ergens* die 'op een of andere plaats' betekenen en die 'in iemands gevoelens of gedachten' betekenen. De andere betekenissen van *ergens* (op een of ander moment, voor iets, aan iets, bij iets etc., op een punt op een schaal, vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt, op een of andere manier) zijn soms minder duidelijk voor de respondenten, al zijn er voor elke betekenis gevallen waarover bijna alle proefpersonen het eens zijn.

Als we nu de interpretaties van de originele zinnen vergelijken met de zinnen met maar heel weinig context, dan valt op dat de interpretaties van moedertaalsprekers niet zo heel vaak veranderen als er minder context is. Ook de vraag hoe zeker ze zijn van hun interpretatie beantwoorden ze vaak met dat ze behoorlijk zeker zijn van hun zaak. Daarnaast verandert de hoeveelheid variatie in de antwoorden van de proefpersonen nauwelijks in vergelijking met de originele zinnen.

Als we nu kijken naar de overgebleven woorden in de context van de tweede vragenlijst, dan zien we dat in veel gevallen de woorden direct voor of na *ergens* al een heel duidelijke aanwijzing geven hoe *ergens* waarschijnlijk geïnterpreteerd moet worden. Vaak staan er in die twee woorden voor en na *ergens* andere plaatsbepalingen, tijdsbepalingen, voorzetsels, voorzetsels die een schaal uitdrukken of heel subjectieve uitdrukkingen zoals *vind ik*. Daarnaast hebben we nog een groep woorden die met die woordvolgorde eigenlijk maar op een heel beperkt aantal manieren in een zin kunnen fungeren. Bijvoorbeeld *Ergens is het* wordt bijna altijd gevolgd door een subjectief bijvoegelijk naamwoord (bijvoorbeeld *goed*), al zou het theoretisch ook mogelijk zijn om te zeggen 'ergens is het kind gevallen'. Dit laatste blijkt echter in echte teksten nauwelijks voor te komen.

We kunnen hieruit concluderen dat de interpretatie van *ergens* dus heel vaak bepaald wordt door de woorden die er vlak omheen staan. Dit suggereert dat er duidelijke patronen te vinden zouden moeten zijn in de directe context van *ergens*. Die patronen zouden dan gelinkt moeten zijn aan interpretaties. Of dit ook echt zo is, is onderzocht met behulp van een groot aantal teksten (een corpus), waarin ik alle gevallen van *ergens* bekeken heb. Om te zorgen dat mijn interpretaties niet beïnvloed werden door de patronen die ik al gezien had, ben ik het onderzoek naar *ergens* begonnen met aan al alle gevallen van *ergens* in mijn corpus een interpretatie toe te kennen. Vervolgens heb ik gekeken of die interpretaties overeen kwamen met frequente patronen in de directe context van *ergens*. Uit deze vergelijking bleek dat een groot deel van de verschillen in interpretaties inderdaad direct aan een bepaalde soort context verbonden kan worden. Met een paar toevoegingen zijn die contexten heel vergelijkbaar met de patronen die we ook al gezien hadden in de resultaten van de vragenlijsten. Voor de minder concrete betekenissen zoals *in iemands gevoelens of gedachten, vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt en op een of andere manier* zijn er ook

duidelijke patronen te onderscheiden.

Zo komen in gevallen van *ergens* die als *in iemands gevoelens of gedachten* geïnterpreteerd worden heel veel persoonlijk voornaamwoorden in de eerste persoon (ik, mij) voor, net als subjectieve werkwoorden en werkwoorden die een mentale staat aanduiden (voelen, het gevoel hebben, vinden). De gevallen van *ergens* met een interpretatie *vanuit een bepaald gezichtspunt* daarentegen, komen het meest voor in onpersoonlijke constructies met een subjectief bijvoeglijk naamwoord (bijvoorbeeld *Ergens is dat wel een goed idee*). Ook komt het in deze groep veel vaker voor dat er een tegenstelling volgt of voorafgaat aan de *ergens*-zin. Gevallen waarin *ergens* geïnterpreteerd wordt als *op een of andere manier* verschillen van de twee voorgaande gevallen hierin dat ze meestal geen subjectieve elementen bevatten en ook geen tegenstellingen. Ze wijken hierin ook af van de concretere gevallen in dat ze geen plaats, tijd of andere concrete interpretaties toelaten.

Als we het gebruik van het abstractere *ergens* wat gedetailleerder bestuderen, dan zien we dat de kenmerken die we hierboven genoemd hebben een duidelijke relatie hebben met de functies die *ergens* kan vervullen in conversatie. Als we bijvoorbeeld *ergens* met *misschien* vergelijken zoals in voorbeeld (4-a) en (4-b) dan zien we duidelijke verschillen.

- (4) a. Misschien zat het hem niet lekker¹
 b. Ergens zat het hem niet lekker wat er gebeurd was.²

In (4-a) zegt *misschien* dat de spreker niet zeker weet of het waar is dat het een ander persoon niet lekker zat. Dit is een beschrijving van wat volgens de spreker een ander persoon mogelijk dacht in het verleden. In voorbeeld (5-b) daarentegen worden we door een verteller als het ware in de denkwereld (mental space) van een personage gearachuteerd. Het personage denkt: “Ergens zit het me niet lekker wat er gebeurd is” maar omdat we dit te weten komen via een verteller staat de zin in de verleden tijd en in de derde persoon.

De reden dat dit wel gebeurt in het zinnetje met *ergens* en niet in het zinnetje met *misschien* is dat *ergens*, als het niet met de concrete betekenis *op een of andere plaats* gebruikt wordt, altijd betrekking moet hebben op de gevoelens of gedachten van een persoon. Normaal gesproken hebben mensen alleen directe toegang tot hun eigen gevoelens en gedachten. Gaat zo’n *ergens*-zin toch over een ander persoon dan de spreker zelf, dan moet dat dus wel een alwetende verteller zijn.

Deze eigenschap van *ergens* verklaart waarom *ergens* zo vaak voor komt in zinnen met een eerste persoon en in subjectieve constructies. Als een spreker *ergens* gebruikt, verplaatst hij de focus van de aandacht van de inhoud van wat hij zegt naar het feit dat die inhoud zich in zijn gevoelens of gedachten bevindt.

Een spreker kan dan ook heel verschillende redenen hebben om *ergens* te gebruiken. Hij kan bijvoorbeeld willen laten zien dat er verschillende gezichtspunten ten opzichte van een onderwerp mogelijk zijn, maar ook dat hij niet bereid is om te

¹http://forum.girlscene.nl/forum.php/Schrijfsels/Verhaal_ik_had_je_lief/list_messages/142572/4?visitorId=71b8536e78b8205d998603138c75ff3c.

²<http://www.bloempje.nl/index.php?itemid=1246>.

beargumenteren wat hij zegt, omdat dit nu eenmaal zijn eigen, persoonlijke visie is.

Dan rest ons de vraag wat de relatie(s) tussen al die verschillende betekenissen en gebruiken van *ergens* is (zijn). Onderzoek van een corpus van historische teksten wijst uit dat *ergens* waarschijnlijk op verschillende manieren nieuwe betekenissen gekregen heeft. Daar spelen metaforen een belangrijke rol in. In deze samenvatting zal ik de ontwikkeling van het gebruik van *ergens* als plaatsbepaling naar de meer abstracte betekenissen schetsen.

Mensen hebben de gewoonte om voortdurend impliciet en expliciet vergelijkingen te maken. Zo worden standpunten (letterlijk: plaatsen waar je staat) vaak vergeleken met plaatsen in een ruimte. Uitdrukkingen als *daar staat tegenover* of *vanuit zijn gezichtspunt* laten dat ook al zien. Het Nederlandse woord *ergens* werd al vroeg (op zijn minst vanaf de 17e eeuw) voor dit doeleinde gebruikt, zoals in het volgende voorbeeld.

- (5) (Wat sullen wy hier dan van Chymon segghen?) Voorwaer anders niet dan dat de hooghe Hemelsche crachten, die in zijn edel herte ghestordt waren, door eenrehande nijdich ongheluck vast ghebonden ende besloten moesten zijn gheweest erghens binnen een cleyn hoecxken van sijn herte:³

Op een bepaald moment moet het zo algemeen zijn geweest om *ergens* zo te gebruiken dat mensen *ergens* ook gingen gebruiken voor een plaats in hun gevoelens of gedachten zonder dat ze expliciet aangaven dat zij een metaforische plaats in hun gevoelens of gedachten bedoelden. Uit oude teksten blijkt dat dit waarschijnlijk al gebeurde in de 19e eeuw.

Bij dit soort historisch onderzoek moeten we altijd voorzichtig zijn met zeggen wanneer een bepaald gebruik opkwam, want hoe verder we teruggaan in de tijd, hoe minder teksten we hebben en ook hoe eenzijdiger de teksten die we hebben worden. Zo komt *ergens* in het metaforische gebruik in het huidige Nederlands vooral in informele taal voor, maar informele taal wordt minder vaak opgeschreven en zeker minder goed bewaard. Daarom kunnen we uit de afwezigheid van een bepaald gebruik in onze bronnen niet zomaar concluderen dat dat gebruik niet bestond.

In het algemeen kunnen we zeggen dat het onderzoek naar *ergens* heeft laten zien dat de contextuele eigenschappen van *ergens* een sterk verband vertonen met de interpretaties die sprekers kiezen. Dit betekent dat een systematische studie van de contextuele eigenschappen van een vergelijkbaar woord ons mogelijk ook zou kunnen helpen in de interpretatie van een dode taal zoals het Grieks.

De interpretatie van $\pi\upsilon$

Om meer te weten te komen over de interpretatie van het Griekse $\pi\upsilon$ is een corpus van teksten bestudeerd op een manier die vergelijkbaar is met de studie van *ergens*.

De interpretaties zijn losgekoppeld van de analyse van de context door vertalingen te gebruiken in drie talen: Engels, Frans en Duits. De regelmatig terugkerende

³D.V. Coornhert, *Vijftigh lustighe historien oft nieuwigheden* Joannis Boccatij. Broer Jansz, Amsterdam z.j. [ca. 1644]

vertalingen in die talen werden vervolgens gekoppeld aan de patronen die te vinden waren in de context van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$.

Uit deze studie bleek dat de context van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ de volgende eigenschappen bezit.

1. Net als in het geval van *ergens* komen de plaatsgerelateerde gebruikswijzen van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ voornamelijk voor met andere plaatsbepalingen.
2. Ook komt $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ veel voor in zinnen met *als* waarin een situatie geschetst wordt die vaker voorkomt of waarin het er niet toe doet wie de precieze personen zijn.
3. De abstractere gebruiken van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ worden vaak gecombineerd met andere partikels zoals $\delta\acute{\eta}$ 'evident', $\grave{\eta}$ 'zeker' en $\gamma\acute{\alpha\rho}$ 'want'.
4. De frequentste werkwoorden in zinnen met de abstractere betekenissen van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ waren *weten*, *zeggen* en het koppelwerkwoord *zijn* met niet-subjectieve (bijvoeglijke) naamwoorden.
5. De zinnen waarin het abstractere $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ voorkomt, bevatten vaak voor de toehoorder al bekende of beredeneerbare informatie, zoals definities van woorden, godsdienstige algemeenheden en dergelijke.

De vertalingen van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ lieten ook interessante dingen zien. De frequentst gebruikte vertalingen waren bijvoorbeeld allemaal woorden die suggereren dat de spreker gelooft dat het waar is wat hij zegt en ook wil dat de toehoorder hem gelooft. Een andere grote groep vertalingen leek daar nog aan toe te voegen dat de spreker denkt dat de toehoorder die informatie eigenlijk al wel had.

De reden waarom dit interessant is, is dat in een van de meest gezaghebbende werken over partikels wordt gezegd dat $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ onzekerheid uitdrukt. De bovenstaande resultaten lijken niet in die richting te wijzen, ondanks dat de vertalers zich ongetwijfeld bewust waren van wat dit standaardwerk over partikels over $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ zegt.

Er zijn wel oudere beschrijvingen van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ die wel meer in deze richting wezen, maar daar is in de commentaren op de teksten relatief weinig aandacht voor.

Op basis van de eigenschappen van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ die hierboven beschreven zijn en het zorgvuldig bekijken van de gebruikswijzen van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ heb ik de functie van $\pi\upsilon\upsilon$ in contexten die wijzen op een abstracter gebruik van het partikel beschreven als een markeerder van al bekende of toegankelijke informatie voor de toehoorder.

Een dergelijke markeerder kan voor allerlei doeleinden gebruikt worden. Zo kan het als een belediging opgevat worden als je iemand iets vertelt wat iedereen al weet. Als je bijvoorbeeld tegen iemand zegt "Een bal is rond" dan loop je de kans dat hij geïrriteerd reageert. Maar als je iemand iets aan het uitleggen bent, kun je zonder problemen zeggen "Zoals je weet is een bal rond" of "Een bal is immers rond".

Een ander gebruik dat veel voorkomt is in argumenten. Als je iets presenteert als (algemeen) bekende informatie, dan wordt het voor de toehoorder veel moeilijker om te zeggen dat het niet waar is.

Deze conclusies zijn gebaseerd op een corpus van prozateksten uit de klassieke periode (480-323 v.Chr.). Dit roept de vraag op of deze conclusies ook gelden voor

eerdere teksten en voor poëzie. Uit onderzoek van vroege epische teksten van Homerus en Hesiodus (8e en 7e eeuw) en latere tragedies en komedies (begin van de klassieke periode) blijkt dat er zeker dingen veranderd zijn tussen de vroegste periode en de klassieke tijd, maar dat in het algemeen de conclusies hierboven ook voor die periodes en genres gelden.

Een vergelijking van *ergens* en $\pi\omicron\upsilon$

Hoewel *ergens* en $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ veel op elkaar leken van een afstand (ze hebben dezelfde bronbetekenis op een of andere plaats en ze hebben allebei een abstractere betekenis gekregen) is uit de preciezer studies van de beide woorden een heel ander beeld opgerezen. De contexten van de beide woorden als ze als plaatsbepaling fungeren lijken inderdaad veel op elkaar, maar de contextuele eigenschappen van de abstractere gebruiken verschillen erg van elkaar. Zo komt *ergens* met een abstractere betekenis vaak voor in subjectieve contexten en met eerste personen, terwijl de abstracte interpretaties van $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ vooral gevonden worden in als feitelijk gepresenteerde contexten. Dit laat zien dat twee woorden in verschillende talen die ongeveer hetzelfde betekenen en beide een abstractere betekenis krijgen, zich niet noodzakelijk op dezelfde manier ontwikkelen.

Conclusie

Dit onderzoek heeft laten zien dat er een duidelijke relatie bestaat tussen de contextuele kenmerken van een woord en de interpretatie ervan. Dit doet vermoeden dat het dus niet zozeer woorden zijn die een bepaalde betekenis hebben, maar woorden-in-context. Ook hebben moedertaalsprekers maar een klein aantal woorden in de context nodig om een woord dat meer dan een betekenis kan hebben consistent te interpreteren. Deze informatie over de manier waarop moedertaalsprekers bepalen welke interpretatie een woord krijgt, kan een bijdrage leveren aan de interpretatie van vergelijkbare woorden in dode talen.

Curriculum vitae

Elizabeth Koier werd geboren op 4 mei 1982. In 2001 deed zij eindexamen gymnasium aan het Sint Ignatiusgymnasium in Amsterdam. In het daaropvolgende jaar behaalde zij twee propaedeuses: Italiaanse taal en cultuur aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam en Oudheidkunde (Griekse variant) aan de Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. In september 2002 begon zij, naast het vervolgen van de bachelor oudheidkunde, met de bovenbouwstudie Vergelijkende Taalwetenschap van het Indo-Europees aan de Universiteit Leiden. In 2004 sloot zij haar bachelor Oudheidkunde (Griekse variant) af en werd zij toegelaten tot een researchmaster Linguistics aan de Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. In 2007 sloot zij deze master af en werd haar onderzoeksvorstel voor een promotietraject in de taalwetenschap aan het Leiden University Center for Linguistics geaccepteerd.

Als onderdeel van haar 0.8 fte aanstelling als promovenda aan de universiteit Leiden, gaf Elizabeth van begin 2009 tot juli 2010 colleges taaltraining en Griekse accentuering aan eerstejaarsstudenten Griekse en Latijnse taal en cultuur. Op vrijwillige basis was zij daarnaast bestuurslid en later ook voorzitter van het Promovendi Netwerk Nederland. In 2010 behaalde zij alsnog haar mastertitel in de vergelijkende taalwetenschap. In het kader van haar promotietraject verbleef zij het academisch jaar 2010-2011 aan de University of California in Berkeley.

Dit proefschrift, dat binnen de daarvoor gestelde tijd afgerond is, is de afsluiting van het promotietraject aan de universiteit Leiden. Na het voltooien van haar proefschrift heeft Elizabeth een baan geaccepteerd als onderzoeker op de afdeling science system assessment van het Rathenau Instituut te Den Haag.