



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Plato's pragmatic project : a reading of Plato's Laws

Bartels, M.L.

Citation

Bartels, M. L. (2014, June 10). *Plato's pragmatic project : a reading of Plato's Laws*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/25982>

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [Leiden University Non-exclusive license](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/25982>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page



Universiteit Leiden



The handle <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/25982> holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Bartels, Myrthe Laura

Title: Plato's pragmatic project : a reading of Plato's Laws

Issue Date: 2014-06-10

CHAPTER TWO

APOLOGY, CRITO, REPUBLIC: THREE PLATONIC TEXTS ON JUSTICE

The present chapter will discuss three Platonic texts that precede *Laws*: *Apology* and *Crito* from Plato's early period, and *Republic* from his middle period.¹ All three texts address questions of justice (τὸ δίκαιον, δικαιοσύνη), but each of them does so in its own way. Despite their differences, they are connected by an underlying theme: exploring the consequences of the existence of an absolute moral norm. *Apology* and *Crito* portray the dilemmas that affect Socrates. Both texts are set in the Athens of 399 B.C.E.—a society which, in Socrates' eyes, fails to live up to the norms of true justice. Conversely, Socrates' way of life is considered inappropriate from the perspective of conventional justice, and *Apology* and *Crito* stage the dramatic lowest ebb—from the perspective of true justice—of that inevitable friction. In *Apology*, Socrates is forced to defend himself before the Athenians at large (section 2.1); in *Crito*, he is faced with the consequences of his failure to convince them (section 2.2).

The third text that will be discussed in this chapter, *Republic*, is of a somewhat different nature (section 2.3). It involves the attempt to construct, in its most persuasive form, a *polis*—called Callipolis—with justice as its defining

¹ For literature on the presumed relative chronology of the Platonic texts, see the references on p. 6, n. 8 above.

characteristic. *Republic* therefore adopts the same belief in an absolute moral norm as *Apology* and *Crito*, but offers a solution to the dilemmas portrayed in the earlier works. In the just society, the problems affecting the just individual in *Apology* (the truth about justice is not convincing) and *Crito* (the just individual has to submit to unjust laws) cannot arise, and Socrates would not have been convicted.

The analyses offered in this chapter serve as a comparative framework for the study of *Laws* in the following ones. Assuming that Plato, and his Socrates, believed in an absolute notion of justice, the present chapter analyzes how this absolute norm takes shape in each of the three communicative settings portrayed. This will provide us with an idea, or set of ideas, about how justice makes its appearance in what may, perhaps somewhat prematurely, be called more prototypical Platonic works. If from there we turn to *Laws* we stand perplexed. For, contrary to what one expects on the basis of Plato's philosophical oeuvre—especially, but not only, the three texts discussed in this chapter—justice (δικαιοσύνη) is not prominent at all in Plato's last work.

The study of absolute justice in its three different contexts is the first step of the argument developed in this thesis. Evidently, each of the three Platonic texts that will be discussed here has attracted considerable scholarly controversy in its own right. Their concise discussion within the scope of this preliminary chapter cannot in any way pretend to do justice to the debate in all its ramifications. The discussion of the primary texts is of limited scope, and necessarily remains somewhat sketchy. Even though I believe that the analysis of *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Republic* in conjunction, as texts revolving around a common dilemma, may offer some new insights, or at least new possibilities for further exploration, the main contribution of this chapter will be to provide us with a suitable foil for the subsequent study of *Laws*.

2.1 *Apology*: Socrates unjustly accused

2.1.1 An isolated Socrates and *Apology*'s philosophical rhetoric

Apology is the only Platonic text that is not a dialectical conversation.² The text reports a sustained defense speech (ἀπολογία) addressed to a mass audience, the court of Athens.³ This setting, the court, forces Socrates to adopt a mode of discourse at variance with his usual, dialectical mode of speech.⁴ Yet although Socrates in his speech formally conforms to the proper way of addressing a court, his speech is a defense speech in a typically Socratic fashion. The argument and attitude displayed by the Socrates of *Apology* are hardly those expected from someone in his position. Normally, the sole purpose of a defense speech is to secure acquittal—a whole genre (forensic oratory) and industry (the professional speech-writers, λογογράφοι) had arisen for the very sake of securing success in lawsuits. Hence the normal procedure would be to try to secure the jury's benevolence and present oneself in the most favourable way possible.⁵

Yet this is not what Socrates does in *Apology*—in fact, Socrates makes clear that winning the multitude's favour might well be his least concern. His care is for something else. *Apology* can be read as what FEAVER & HARE have called an “inverted parody of rhetoric”. First, he claims that in this trial he is not

² With the exception of those *Epistulae* that may be genuine.

³ On the question whether *Apology* is a philosophical work even though not a dialogue, see SLINGS (1994), 36: *Apology* is “a philosophical work, and that implies that it is concerned with the right conduct of life, not only in general, but also with respect to the special activity with which the work is concerned, namely, rhetoric” (cf. Ch. 1 § 2c).

⁴ *Apol.* 17d1-18a3. In *Apol.* 37a5-b2, especially the reference to Socrates' own mode of speech in ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα, “there is some irony present, and perhaps a hint that in a dialectical discussion [Socrates] would have convinced the putative jurors”, STOKES *ad loc.* For the difficulty to persuade his audience: *Apol.* 38a7-8.

⁵ Especially since jurors “were prone to decide a case more on the basis of a general assessment of a person's moral character than on an informed understanding of legal arguments”, SLINGS (1994), 90. “Possible scruples [on the part of the jury] about doing this could be dismissed if the moral offence had been explicitly mentioned in the indictment; in that case a discussion of the defendant's general behaviour could not be considered ‘irrelevant to the case’ (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος)” (SLINGS *ibid.*, 90-91, see also his note *ad* 18a7). Cf. FEAVER & HARE (1981), 210, 212.

the defendant but the accuser; the real person on trial, he suggests, are the Athenians.⁶ Second, Socrates is in fact accusing himself.⁷ He does not attempt to take the sting out of the philosophical activities at which people have taken offence. On the contrary, he confesses to be guilty of the activities that have been the reason for his prosecution. To this it may be added that Socrates' speech is in fact a grand attempt to isolate himself from his fellow Athenians and from their conventional values. Socrates' overt contempt for death as a triviality in the light of his own concern for τὰ μέγιστα emphasizes this dissociation.⁸ Taken together, *Apology's* inversion of the usual arguments of a defense speech—appealing to shared values between city and defendant, the previously impeccable reputation of the defendant, the need to spare the defendant's life—force its audience to recalibrate its moral orientation. Part of *Apology's* purpose is to encourage its audience to adopt a perspective from which these positions (that the Athenians at large stand accused, that conviction and the prospect of death are in fact a triumph, and Socrates' self-accusation) lead to a coherent worldview.

Besides isolating himself from the conventions of his fellow citizens, Socrates in the *exordium* substitutes his own definition of rhetoric, "speaking the truth",⁹ for the conventional definition of being δεινὸς λέγειν ("a formidable

⁶ FEAVER & HARE (1981), 210. *Apology* is an "inverted parody of rhetoric": rhetorical *topoi* are used to effectuate the opposite of what rhetoric aims to do ("success is not winning the case but telling the truth", 205), and to give expression to a "higher authority" (209).

⁷ FEAVER & HARE (1981), 211: "What [Socrates] is doing in this section of the speech [the reply to the unnamed prosecutors] is uncovering the real charge, admitting that he is guilty and claiming the utmost credit for being so." The real accusation he claims to be facing is "just that he is a philosopher. In particular, the real reason for the hatred in which he is held is his habit of consistently exposing powerful figures to the ridicule of the young and rich group that surrounds him. The *Meno* shows the connection between this habit and the trial" (210-211).

⁸ See *Apol.* 30c6-d5.

⁹ τὸν τἀληθὴ λέγοντα, 17b4-5; ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, 17b7-8; ῥήτορος δὲ (ἀρετὴ) τἀληθὴ λέγειν, 18a5-6. See SLINGS (1994), 32-34, 36-40, for an explanation of *Apology's* correspondences with the familiar rhetoric of the orators and its use of rhetorical *topoi* within the context of this agenda of truth-speaking. Since truth cannot be taught but only discovered by insight: "Socratic speech as a rule aims at suggesting rather than at asserting the truth. For truth is discovered by insight (σοφία, φρόνησις), and this cannot be siphoned from one mind into another

speaker").¹⁰ The λόγος he is about to give is the only speech he can give; he simply *cannot* defend himself in a different way.¹¹ Knowing the truth means that one is speaking the truth—the rhetorical counterpart of the Socratic automatism that knowing the good is doing the good.¹² The philosophical rhetoric of *Apology*, although it is a mode of speech determined by different rules than dialectic, and although it has different effects, thus shares with dialectic the concern for, and belief in, truth.¹³

In *Apology* we witness a radical, and, in his overt disdain for conventional norms and values, arrogant, Socrates. He launches a deliberate attempt to create a huge gulf between himself and his fellow Athenians. How does he justify his claim to speak the truth? How does the radical Socrates of *Apology* justify his past activities, and motivate his present indifference? The next two subsections will attempt to offer a reconstruction of the divine mission from Socrates' perspective.

like water from a full vessel into an empty one" (*ibid.*, 33, with ref. to *Symp.* 175d3-7). This is similar to how Socrates represents the procedure of the god of Delphi, who inculcated the truth by suggestions (*ibid.*, 34).

¹⁰ *Apol.* 17b8-c2: the claim that he will speak εἰκῇ and τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασιν therefore does not mean that he will not give a very sophisticated speech and use rhetorical *topoi*, but is part of his claim that he will not distort the truth (*cf.* SLINGS [1994], 37). For the use of rhetorical idiom, *topoi* and structure of *Apology*, see SLINGS (1994), 32, with literature. The correspondences with Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* are especially striking, see FEAVER & HARE (1981), 207-209 and 215 n. 11; also REEVE (1989), 7-8. Socrates' disclaimers have prompted BRICKHOUSE & SMITH (1989) to deny the rhetorical parallels, 48-59.

¹¹ *Cf.* the notion of Socratic παρρησία. On παρρησία in *Apology*, see VAN RAALTE (2004), 296-305: "Although in Plato's *Apology of Socrates* the term *parrhêsia* does not occur, the *Apology* can be seen as one big exercise in Socratic *parrhêsia*" (296); Socrates can simply not hold his tongue.

¹² *Cf.* SLINGS (1994), 325, *ad* 29a3: "Socrates cannot admit to a separation of theory and practice, of convictions and actions. When someone honestly acknowledges the existence of true gods, endowed with perfect insight (*cf.* 23a5-6), he cannot even think of disobeying him." The idea that Socrates has a mission can only take root because the idea of having received the order to remain at one's post has just been mentioned in the context of a military mission. It is in this context that Socrates really speaks of having received an "order" from the god. Parallel to Socrates' current position before the court, the military context also involves a contempt for death.

¹³ *Cf.* SLINGS (1994), 33: "Socratic speech always aims at truth, which is the highest good (...)."

2.1.2 The oracle and ὁ θεός: Socrates' "mission"

Socrates claims that the real charge he faces is that of his "old accusers": he has the "reputation" (ὄνομα) of being "smart" (σοφός) and he reportedly "educated" (παιδεύειν, διδάσκειν) his younger fellow citizens.¹⁴ Socrates' tactic is to refute this charge by explaining the real nature of his σοφία. His explanation at the same time denies the charge that he educated his fellow Athenians (he could not have done so, for he denies to be σοφός in that sense), and *reframes* the activities that underlie his present prosecution: over the years, he has not been educating his fellow citizens but fighting for justice (τὸ δίκαιον). Still, Socrates goes even further than that: not only does he take full responsibility for his offensive activities; he even claims that these activities were commanded by "the god" and that he has been entrusted, solely among his fellow Athenians, with a mission to "serve the god".

Socrates traces the origin of his mission, *i.e.* his life of elenctic examination of his fellow citizens, to a Delphic oracle. He even refers to the god as his "witness" (μαρτύς), as if the Delphic god himself were giving testimony in his favour.¹⁵ The Pythia reportedly answered the question whether anyone was "wiser" (σοφώτερος) than Socrates in the negative. Knowing that he knows nothing about τὰ μέγιστα¹⁶ and that therefore the oracle cannot be correct, Socrates sets out on a quest for someone who *is* σοφός.¹⁷ This quest

¹⁴ *Apol.* 19a8-20c3. *Apology* 26b2-6 "reflects Plato's treatment of the corruption of the young as *de facto* the main charge", SLINGS (1994), 90, n. 35. Cf. also *ibid.*, 51: "(...) by acting as he does, Socrates is guilty not of breaking the law but of going beyond the normal bounds within which a reasonable and well-behaved citizen would keep himself". Cf. TAYLOR (1954), 90: Socrates was condemned "on what was really a charge of *incivisme*, disloyalty to the spirit of Athenian life", which appeared more vulnerable to threat in the tense political climate at the time of the charge (89-115).

¹⁵ *Apol.* 20e6-8: τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν ἐν τοῖς Δελφοῖς.

¹⁶ The ἐπιστήμων or ἐπιστάτης knows the human and political virtue, ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη τε καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή, which enables him to *make others* καλὸς καὶ γαθός, *Apol.* 20a5-b5.

¹⁷ Some commentators have found Socrates' doubts about the god's veracity worrying, either because in their eyes these doubts would make him guilty of impiety after all, or because they consider disbelief hard to reconcile with Socrates' later recognition of the god's authority and obedience. Therefore, there exists some controversy about the exact meaning of the phrase ἐλέγξων

among politicians, poets and craftsmen leads to the conclusion that all, even the craftsmen, who on their part do know many fine things that he does not (πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους), are liable to the same error (ἀμάρτημα, πλημμέλεια): they believe that they possess a σοφία which they in fact do not have. From these disillusioning encounters Socrates infers that there must be two kinds of σοφία: on the one hand, ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία, that is, *not* being ignorant of one's own ignorance about τὰ μέγιστα; on the other hand, a higher, divine σοφία, knowledge about what is truly good.¹⁸ Ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία is thus an informed awareness of the existence of truth and divine σοφία, yet without possessing knowledge of τὰ μέγιστα oneself. By thus casting both the accusation and the oracle in terms of σοφία,¹⁹ Socrates can at the same time

τὸ μαντεῖον (*Apol.* 21c1); does it mean disprove, or merely interpret? For “disprove” or “refute” is argued by BURNET *ad* 21b8 (“tries to prove the god a liar”); HACKFORTH (1933), 88-104; TAYLOR (1954), 80; RYLE (1966), 17; WEST (1979), 106; NEHAMAS (1986), 305; TELOH (1986), 111. Others, emphasizing the oracle's habitual answering in riddles, have argued for an ‘interpretative’ reading: GUTHRIE (1971), 86-88 (“What [Socrates] set out to refute was the obvious meaning of the oracle, its words taken at their face value, in order to discover the answer to its riddle”, 87); REEVE (1989), 21-23 (“Hence his strategy of refutation is interpretative only”, 23, *contra* WEST [1979]); BRICKHOUSE & SMITH (1989), 96 (“[...] Socrates’ attempt to refute the apparent meaning of the oracle only reinforces the view that he sees piety as requiring that he always make ‘the god’s business’ his first priority”, *contra* NEHAMAS); STOKES (1997), 117; MCPHERRAN (2002), 129 (“attempting to refute (ἐλέγξων), to show *false*, the *apparent meaning* of the oracular pronouncement taken at face value, not (...) the oracle of the god”, *italics in original*).

¹⁸ The outcome of *Apology* shows us the *social* implications of recognizing one's own ignorance about τὰ μέγιστα: it spares innocent lives.

¹⁹ Xenophon in his *Apologia Socratis*, 14, reports the oracle in a different version: Χαίρεφῶντος γὰρ ποτε ἐπερωτῶντος ἐν Δελφοῖς περὶ ἐμοῦ πολλῶν παρόντων ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μῆτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μῆτε δικαιοτέρων μῆτε σωφρονέστερον, “Once, when Chaerephon asked in Delphi about me in the presence of many, Apollo responded that no human being was more free, more just, or more moderate than I” (transl. BARTLETT). The difference between Plato's version and Xenophon's has fuelled a discussion about the oracle's historical form. Diogenes Laertius (II.37-38) supports Plato's version. SLINGS (1994) thinks (*contra* BURNET *ad* 21a5) “[i]t is reasonable to assume that § 14 of the Xenophontic *Apology* is a correction of the Platonic formulation” (76). Yet, in § 16 Socrates asks the jury, echoing Chaerephon's question to the oracle, who they know that is more σώφρων, ἐλευθεριώτερος, δικαιοτέρος, and includes σοφός. It therefore seems equally reasonable that Plato singled out σοφία for his own purposes, simply omitting the other virtues. For literature on the issue: MCPHERRAN (2002), 122-123, n. 25; BRICKHOUSE & SMITH (1989), 89, n. 71. A list of ancient sources on the oracle is given in FONTENROSE (1978), 245; see also MCPHERRAN (2002), 115, n. 5. For the reconstructed historical date of the oracle, see REEVE (1989), 21, and the literature in n. 21 *ibid*.

claim that he indeed is σοφός (which explains his ὄνομα) in a way that no-one else is, and at the same time maintain his claim that he has not been educating anyone.

Realizing that he was the only one who had ἀνθρωπίνῃ σοφία, Socrates felt that he had received a command to enlighten others about their own ignorance as well. This he sees as “searching in accordance with the god”, and “the service to the god”.²⁰ From his perspective, it is a task that has been *imposed upon* him by a higher norm over which he has no control and in which he has only limited insight. Truth, because it is *the Truth*, entails commitment and requires to be made known. The person who learns the Truth feels that it should be made known. An issue which has attracted quite some scholarly attention, is how Socrates could have concluded on the basis of the oracle as he reports it in *Apology* that he had a mission, and moreover, that this is what it consists in. Yet considerations of modern deductive logic are not the kind of worries of someone who *believes* (or at least presents himself as believing) that his activities have been divinely commanded.²¹ Here it is important that we

²⁰ *Apol.* 22a4: ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν; 23b4-7: ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιώων ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν καὶ τῶν ἀσπῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἶμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός; 23c1: τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν; 28e4-29a4: τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος (...) δεινὸν τὰν εἴη, (...) ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ; 29d3-4: πείσομαι μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν; 30a5 κελεύει ὁ θεός; furthermore 30e3-31a1 (Socrates has been placed by the god on the cumbrous horse of the *polis*), and 33c4-7: προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ὧπέρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν.

²¹ Many interpreters have considered Socrates' interpretation of the oracle debatable. This ignores the fact that *from Socrates' perspective*, his mission is not his personal (and hence contestable) interpretation of the oracle, but what the oracle, truly and objectively, *meant*. No claim to having received a divine command would survive the scrutiny of logical consistency. In terms of strict logic, Socrates' elenctic activities can of course in no way be deduced from the oracle. Some commentators have—naturally, in vain—tried to reconstrue how Socrates could have concluded from the wording of the oracle that he had a mission, see e.g. BRICKHOUSE & SMITH (1983), KRAUT (1984), 270-274, BRICKHOUSE & SMITH (1989), 88, n. 67; REEVE (1989), 22-28; STOKES (1992), especially 29-42; MCPHERRAN (2002); DOYLE (2004). An overview of the discussion and literature is given by BRICKHOUSE & SMITH (1983), 657-658 nn. 1-4; also by MCPHERRAN (2002), 118-120, nn. 11 and 12. In (2002) MCPHERRAN readdressed the problem of “how exactly Socrates derived from the Pythia's report a command to do philosophy” (120) by providing an analysis along logical lines. He argues that Socrates had a pious commitment to philosophy prior to the oracle, which is the reason why

accept Socrates' claims; from his point of view, *this* is what the oracle means. It means that the god is truly wise (τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει (...) τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι) and that his life's assignment is to "assist the god" (βοηθῶν τῷ θεῷ, 23b7).²² The god thereby becomes the ultimate authority for Socrates' announcement to speak the truth. His claim in the *exordium* that his λόγος will be the whole truth (πᾶσα ἀλήθεια) now appears not to be his own λόγος, but the λόγος of the god.²³ It may be worth noting that he never makes explicit who this god is. The natural inference, that is left to his audience to draw, is that ὁ θεός is "the god of Delphi" (τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, 20e8); for that is the only god identified.

The oracle narrative underpins the claim that Socrates' loyalty rests with a different party than the Athenians, and that there exist interests other than those which they recognize, even though, at the same time, his mission ultimately serves the interest of the *polis*. It is from the perspective of his belief in a divine assignment that Socrates' conviction feels to him like a triumph: if the jury will prohibit him to perform the service of the god, death is, under the given circumstances, the best prospect.

"he is being used by the god as a paradigm" (139); cf. DOYLE (2004) for a similar reading of Socrates being used by the god as paradigm. Others have argued that Socrates had already started to examine people prior to the oracle, and in fact had (also) more rational motivations; see in particular VLASTOS (1991), chapter 4, and cf. NUSSBAUM's (1985) ironical reading of the *daimonion*. SLINGS (1994), 80-81, is concerned with the historical origins of Socrates' philosophical activity and argues that, although Plato's literary narrative "creates the impression" that the oracle is its starting point, Plato "never asserts" that it was (81, italics in original). MCPHERRAN (1996) addresses worries about how "Socrates' acceptance of extrarational indicators" can be reconciled with his "profound respect for rational justification" (quotations from [2002], 119). SLINGS (1994) rightly notes that the effect of is cumulative: "Socrates corroborates divine instructions or suggestions with motivations based on his own reasoning" (186, see also 81-82, 153, 197). That Socrates juxtaposes reason and divinity should not surprise us: for association of reason to the divine, we may compare numerous instances in the Platonic corpus, e.g. *Resp.* 500d1-2, 518d11-e2, 590d1-4. Compare also the end of *Crito*, where, after the speech of Laws, instead of ὁ θεός we would have expected ὁ λόγος.

²² *Apol.* 23a5-7.

²³ *Apol.* 20e5-6: οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω.

2.1.3 Socrates' *daimonion*

Socrates' private conduct is yet another inversion of conventions, this time of what would logically be expected from an Athenian citizen. On the one hand, Socrates tests the individual convictions of his fellow citizens (thus making himself in their eyes guilty of πολυπραγμοσύνη); on the other hand, he does not engage in political affairs (which is incompatible with the Athenian ideal of active citizenship).²⁴ It is in the context of his aloofness from politics that Socrates introduces another deity: his divine sign. He describes this divine sign as "something divine and supernatural" (θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον) which arose in his childhood (ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον). He goes on to speak about it as "a kind of voice" (φωνή τις γιγνομένη),²⁵ which, when it occurs, always dissuades him from what he is about to do but never induces him to something (ἢ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε).²⁶ Socrates never knows in advance when it will occur, it simply keeps him from doing what he is about to do. It is this divine sign that has opposed Socrates' engaging in politics (ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν). We hear why it was a good thing that it did so, *Apol.* 31e1-32a3:

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλω πλήθει
οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ

²⁴ *Apol.* 31c4-7. Cf. SLINGS (1994), 151, for the idea of refraining from πολυπραγμοσύνη, drawing on Pericles' Funeral Oration.

²⁵ *Apol.* 31c7-d3. The *daimonion* is referred to in other Platonic texts as well (*Phdr.* 242b8-9; *Tht.* 151a4), but always to explain Socrates' personal motivation, never in order to advance the dialectical argument. In *Phdr.* 242c1-3, Socrates reports that, when he was just about to cross the river, his habitual divine sign happened to him: τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, which ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν. Here, as in *Apology*, he describes it as a voice: τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἢ με οὐκ ἔα ἀπιδίναμι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσομαι, ὥς δὴ τι ἡμαρτήκοτα εἰς τὸ θεῖον, "I thought I heard a voice coming from this very spot, forbidding me to leave until I made atonement for some offense against the gods" (transl. NEHAMAS & WOODRUFF in COOPER, CW). In *Tht.* 151a2-5 the sign sometimes prevents Socrates to associate with those who have, after previous association with him, left his company sooner than they ought to have, and have returned to wicked company (πονηρὰν συνουσίαν), yet now wish to renew their association with him: οὐς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσι δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συνουσίας καὶ θαυμάστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνέειναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἔα (...).

²⁶ *Apol.* 31d4-5; also 31d6 and 31e3; cf. ἀποτρέπει, 31d1-2.

παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι
μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον
σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

It is impossible for any man to be spared if he truly opposes you or any other democratic majority, and prevents many unjust and illegal things from occurring in his city. He who intends to truly fight for what is just, if he is to be spared even for a little time, must of necessity live a private rather than a public life. (Transl. ALLEN, adapted)

Here the looming conflict between society and true justice becomes apparent. The idea of justice (τὸ δίκαιον), for which he has been fighting, sets him apart from the rest of society.²⁷ Once more Socrates emphasizes that he speaks the truth (λέγοντι τᾷληθῇ, 31e1): anyone who is a champion of justice like himself will be forced to oppose the mass on many occasions, if he wants to prevent “many unjust and illegal things” (πολλὰ ἄδिका καὶ παράνομα, 31e4).²⁸ The mass eliminates whosoever dares to oppose its wishes.²⁹ To avoid these risks, which would certainly have led to a premature death, his alternative campaign for justice is to practise dialectics.

We further hear that Socrates' *daimonion* (this time called ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου) has always been rather frequent (πάννυ πυκνή) and obstructed him especially in quite trivial matters (καὶ πάννυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς).³⁰ But in this matter, it did not: it has not obstructed him when he left his house in the morning, nor when he appeared before the court, nor has it opposed him in some part of his speech, on the brink of a particular statement he was about to

²⁷ *Apol.* 19a6, 35c2-4; cf. *Crit.* 47c9-11, d4-5, 47e6-48a1, a7-10, b8-9, c6-d5.

²⁸ Some commentators have denied that the *daimonion* is a moral force: BURNET *ad* 40a5; TAYLOR (1954), 46 (“It had nothing to do with right and wrong, and is never appealed to, in any of the accounts of it, on points of moral conduct, but amounts to a sort of ‘uncanny’ *flair* for bad luck”); SLINGS (1994), 154 (see for more references n. 7 *ibid.*); STOKES (1997), 8. Such evaluations seem hard to comprehend in the light of statements of the kind that the *daimonion* withheld Socrates when on the verge of doing something wrong (εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν, 40a6).

²⁹ SLINGS (1994) concludes from Socrates' addition of παράνομα (*i.e.* Athenian law) to ἄδिका that the δῆμος “was intolerant of any restriction on its freedom to act as it pleased, even of self-imposed restrictions” (157); see the references in SLINGS *ibid.*, n. 12. The readiness to recall even its own decrees implicitly emphasizes the fickleness of the δῆμος.

³⁰ *Apol.* 40a4-5. Cf. 40b1: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, “the sign of the god”.

make.³¹ This implies a discrepancy between what may *seem* important (but what in fact is not—one's life), and what, from a conventional perspective, may seem trivial, but in fact is not.

On comparison, the oracle and the *daimonion* serve the same rhetorical purpose: they act formally as the authorities to which Socrates attributes his unconventional—just—mode of life. The *daimonion* and oracle point in the same direction, but do not have the same amount of precision. Nor are their effects on the audience identical. Whereas the *daimonion* is an internal and somewhat indeterminate moral intuition on an *ad hoc* basis, the oracle is an external authority and a response to a concrete case. The oracle and θεός represent a less ambiguous and contestable source of authority than the *daimonion*: they give Socrates' critical behaviour an aura of inevitability. Moreover, the fact that Socrates was charged with a failure to honour the gods may contribute to the piquancy of Socrates' appeal to the oracle and ó θεός. To the Athenian audience, an appeal to the *daimonion* would probably have been less effective to justify his conduct than referring to the more conventional authority of the oracle of Delphi, which moreover can be *proved* right by critical examination.³² The oracle/θεός justifies the elenctic examinations, and his conduct towards his fellow citizens. The *daimonion* is a (φωνή) μαντική, a voice of divine

³¹ *Apol.* 40a8-b3: ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν. In this context, ἀνέβαινον is not to be interpreted, with ALLEN (1984), as “when I came up here to the courtroom”, but as “I appeared (before the court)” see SLINGS (1994) *ad loc.*

³² I do not see how SLINGS (1994), 154 can conclude: “the ‘sign’ has nothing to do (...) with the mission which is entrusted to Socrates by the god”. MCPHERRAN (1991) distinguishes between “elenctic testing” and “extrarational signification” and takes Xenophon as an hypothesis for a reconciliation between these two “sources of conviction” (348): “Xenophon (...) suggests that Socrates thought that these were two distinct avenues of inquiry, each appropriate to somewhat disparate subject matters (*Mem.* 1.1.6-9)”. The *daimonion* is a species of *mantikê*: “reasonable prediction lies beyond the power of human reason” (354), MCPHERRAN refers to *Apol.* 31d and *Xen. Mem.* 1.1.6-9, 4.3.12: “how or why it is that the result of his obedience will be good-producing is, like many future events, opaque to reasoned calculation” (356). See for literature on the *daimonion* *ibid.*, n. 22, 353-354.

inspiration, not an articulate proposition: this explains why, in contrast to the oracle, Socrates does not subject the *daimonion* to an elenctic procedure.

The accumulation of signs—of the god (ὕπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ), from oracles (ἐκ μαντείων³³), from dreams (ἐξ ἐνυπνίων), and especially their explicit presentation as specific instances of the more general category of divine communication³⁴ (the way in which θεία μοῖρα may communicate its will to a human being³⁵)—is a token of Socrates' belief in his divine mission. To someone thus convinced, the *exact* form in which the divine communication manifests itself, is of secondary importance.

2.1.4 Conclusion

In this section, we have analyzed how the Socrates of *Apology* in a forensic context presents his loyalty to a norm different from the conventional one. The circumstances force him to adopt a mode of speech unlike his habitual one. His

³³ SCHANZ *ad loc.* attributes the accumulation of divine signals to the strength of Socrates' conviction "von seinem Beruf", but considers the plural μαντείων a rhetorical exaggeration: "Rhetorisch übertreibend sagt Sokrates, dass alle nur denkbaren Arten der Offenbarung ihm seinen Beruf vorgezeichnet haben." STOKES *ad loc.* supposes that Plato "is here piling fiction on fiction in the interests of rhetorical force".

³⁴ *Apol.* 33c6-7: καὶ παντὶ τρώπῳ ᾧπέρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτιον προσέταξε πράττειν. Some interpreters have considered Socrates' appeals to divinity examples of Socratic irony, e.g. NUSSBAUM (1985); VLASTOS (1991), ch. 4; more recently LEIBOWITZ (2010). But this is of course what Socrates *fears* that the jury will think when he motivates why it is not option to live a quiet life by saying that he will in that case "disobey the god" (τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν, 37e6). As SLINGS (1994) explains, this is the view of those who think that Socrates spoke about the oracle ὡς εἰρωνευόμενος (*Apol.* 38a1): "the jurors will not accept this motivation and think it a mere pretext: as they see it, Socrates had made this choice [make philosophy his calling] because it suited him, and he should not now try to avoid his responsibility by invoking a divine command" (197). But, as I argue here, Socrates' reference to ὁ θεός serves the opposite goal: to claim full responsibility for his philosophical activities.

³⁵ STOKES *ad loc.* notes that a "divine dispensation, θεία μοῖρα, does not normally give orders; orders come from a god (...[ref. to 33c5]); (...) Pl. sometimes uses the phrase 'divine dispensation' to denote the means whereby poets and prophets arrive at the truths they utter without knowledge." In the *Meno*, the course of the argument points to the conclusion that virtue does not come to one by nature or teaching, but by divine dispensation, without insight, *Men.* 99e5-100a1: ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνεται; cf. *Men.* 100b2-4. The phrase θεία μοῖρα supports Socrates' impression that his mission was imposed upon him by an agency beyond his control. On θεία μοῖρα see also chapter six, p. 226.

interpretation of rhetoric as “truthful speech” aligns it with dialectic’s hypothesis that there exists a moral truth. The goal of this true rhetoric is, in contrast to the usual forensic oratory, completely detached from his own person. His own speech effectively isolates him from his fellow Athenians and their misdirected concerns. The Athenian court and citizens are not those to whom he is answerable, even though his philosophical ἔλεγχος has ultimately been in the service of the city. He is only answerable to “the god” in whose service he has tried, as well as he could given the circumstances, to live his life. This higher cause has been imposed upon him via several divine channels. Whereas the god is presented as the origin of his conduct, the *daimonion* is its legitimation in terms of Socrates’ own intuition: it has shown him the only way open to him to fight for justice in the context of a society with a radically different moral orientation than his own.

In *Crito*, the circumstances are very different. Socrates is not forced to isolate himself. *Crito* is the second Platonic text on justice to which we will now turn. The Socrates we encounter there is a convicted Socrates, who has, in one sense, triumphed (because he has secured for himself what he saw as the only justified option under the circumstances, namely death); yet, in a different way, it is also a Socrates who has failed, since in the end he was unable to convince his fellow citizens of the truth. *Crito* portrays a Socrates who has to face the practical consequence of his failure to unmask the political system as unjust.

2.2 *Crito*: Socrates unjustly convicted

2.2.1 Introduction: the relation between *Apology* and *Crito*

The Socrates of *Crito* displays a very different attitude towards the Athenian court and laws than the Socrates of *Apology*. Whereas the latter announced that he would disobey the court were its verdict that he should terminate his

philosophical activities, the former submits to the court's verdict. Moreover, instead of asserting that his loyalty lies elsewhere, in *Crito* he impersonates a speech by the Athenian laws insisting on his obligation to remain loyal to the Athenian city and its laws, and respect their integrity. His obedience to the very same court and society which he defied in *Apology* raises problems of consistency: how can one explain Socrates' apparent change of attitude and his adherence to different authorities?³⁶ Why does Plato have him impersonate *the Athenian laws* as the authority to which Socrates owes obedience—why does Plato not, for instance, have Socrates attribute his refusal to escape to the *daimonion*, in which case the inconsistency would have been avoided?

The present section will investigate how Socrates motivates his conduct in *Crito* and present a fresh reading of the Laws' speech in its dramatic, dialogical context. Since inconsistency is not to be expected of Socrates in the light of what we hear about him both in *Crito* and elsewhere (where he is repeatedly made to emphasize consistency in one's attitude between words and deeds, and between one's deeds as a characteristic of the virtuous person), and since we have every reason to expect that Plato envisaged to present Socrates' attitude to his conviction as consistent, a reading that makes the figure of Socrates in both texts mutually consistent is preferable.

The first aspect that is worth noting is that the composition and communicative setting of *Crito* are more complex than those of *Apology*: *Crito* is a dialogue between Socrates and his friend Crito, in which Socrates impersonates the Athenian laws in a speech that is designed to persuade Crito.

³⁶ There is an enormous amount of literature on this issue. One explanation put forward distinguishes between the Athenian court on the one hand and the laws on the other, and argues that Socrates' profession of disobedience in *Apology* concerns only the former. See e.g. KRAUT (1984), OBER (2005), 406. *Cri.* 50b2-5 and b7-8, however, do not warrant such a distinction, as the Laws (and therefore Socrates) explicitly put the δίκαι on equal footing with the laws. A similar explanation is SLINGS (1994), arguing that Socrates in *Apology* merely refuses to agree to a proposed compromise that is not "provided for by the law nor suggested by a legal authority acting within the limits of its competence" and does "not question the state's authority, whether manifested in the provisions of the law or the injunctions of a magistrate" (158).

In *Crito*, Socrates engages in dialectic as his usual mode of speech. The fact that Socrates does not appeal to his *daimonion* here may be understood as prompted by the change in setting: Crito does not have access to Socrates' personal divine voice, and at the same time, it is in *Crito* not Socrates' purpose to isolate himself from his audience. Within this dialectical framework, the authority of the *daimonion* cannot be accounted for. After the speech of the Laws, Socrates, in his own person, adds that the sound (αὐτή ἢ ἡχή) of these *logoi* "buzzes" (βομβεῖ) in his ears and makes it impossible for him to hear anything else—he is just as unable to ignore the arguments marshalled by the Laws as his *daimonion* in *Apology*.³⁷ Instead of to his *daimonion*, Socrates, within this setting, appeals to the Laws of Athens as authority. How does he motivate that appeal?

First, we should be clear about the setting of *Crito* and its differences from the setting of *Apology*. As in *Phaedo*, Socrates in *Crito* is engaged in a discussion with people who wish him well. In *Phaedo* he converses with a group of intimates, in *Crito* with his elderly friend Crito, who in fact speaks on behalf of all of his φίλοι. It is therefore a friendly rather than a hostile audience that Socrates addresses in *Crito*. As good φίλοι ought, at least according to public expectations,³⁸ Socrates' friends have repeatedly urged Socrates to accept their offer to help him escape from prison. His refusal to accept this offer compromises their good reputation, since people who do not know what happened will assume that his friends have failed to live up to the expectations of good φίλοι, and have valued the money needed to bribe the guards more than their friend; no sensible person will actually believe that Socrates himself was unwilling to flee, and that he ignored the actual arrangements that were made to smuggle him out of prison and the repeated injunctions of his friends.³⁹

³⁷ *Cri.* 54d2-6.

³⁸ On the popular moral creed of "helping friends, harming enemies" in classical Athens, see VAN BERKEL [diss. Leiden 2012], 13, nn. 69, 71, 73, with literature; DOVER (1974), 180.

³⁹ *Cri.* 44b9-c5; 45d8-46a2.

The speech of the Laws impersonated in the conversation with Crito may therefore be read as an apology for Socrates' *friends*. Socrates has to explain to his friends in the person of Crito that to save him does not, contrary to popular morality, constitute helping a friend.

2.2.2 The speech of the Laws

It is at a critical point in the dialogue that Socrates brings in the Laws as speakers: when Crito is unable to answer his friend when Socrates applies the outcome of the discussion so far to his present dilemma.⁴⁰ The Laws' speech consists, essentially, of two arguments. The first is the importance of refraining from doing injustice (μὴ ἀδικεῖν), including doing injustice by way of requiting injustice (μὴ ἀνταδικεῖν).⁴¹ The second argument is rooted in the dialectical notion of "agreement" (ὁμολογία).⁴² Both arguments are anticipated in the first, dialogic half of *Crito*. In the first part of the dialogue, Crito has given his assent (as he often has in the past⁴³) to the proposition δεῖ μὴ ἀδικεῖν (including μὴ ἀνταδικεῖν),⁴⁴ and to the proposition that it is just to meet one's commitments (or, conversely, that dishonouring one's commitments is ἀδικεῖν).⁴⁵ Since in *Crito* it is Crito who has to be persuaded (this is the immediate rhetorical

⁴⁰ *Cri.* 49e9-50a3: Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν δίκαιοις οὐσιν ἢ οὐ; "See what follows from this: if we leave here without having convinced the city, are we harming those whom we should least do harm to? And are we sticking to a just agreement, or not?" (transl. GRUBE, adapted).

⁴¹ *Cri.* 50a8-51c5.

⁴² *Cri.* 51c6-54b2.

⁴³ *Cri.* 49a6-7.

⁴⁴ *Cri.* 49a4-e4.

⁴⁵ *Cri.* 49e5-7. Some interpreters have found a notion of justice in the speech of the Laws not subscribed to by Socrates. SCHOFIELD (2007), 157 sees a parallel between the argument of the Laws in *Crito* and Socrates' argument in *Republic* to make the philosophers go back into the cave: both concern "how to *persuade* the individual to do something required by the good of the city. In each case the considerations put forward in favor are drawn not from the deeper resources of Socratic or Platonic philosophy but from more popular discourse" (158); cf. "[t]he laws [in *Crito*] appeal for the most part to Simonidean justice" (157).

purpose of the Laws' speech),⁴⁶ it is understandable that the Laws' arguments are in line with the outcome of the first half of *Crito*, and therefore with the central dogma of Socratic philosophy.

The strategy of the Laws (and hence of Socrates to his friend Crito) is to present themselves as Socrates' φίλοι par excellence—friends to whom he owes a previous, greater loyalty than to his human friends: they have given him life, an upbringing, an education.⁴⁷ The Laws appeal to φιλία on the macro-level, to the interest of the *polis* and τὸ κοινόν: what is at stake is not the obligation between friends to guarantee each other's preservation (σωτηρία), but to preserve and contribute to the σωτηρία of society, which is, for every citizen, one's greatest friend.⁴⁸ The Laws refer to the harmful consequences for themselves, and thus to the common interest, and the fatherland (πατρίς⁴⁹): to disobey the δίκη of the jury will be tantamount to overturning the entire *polis*.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ *Cri.* 48e3-5.

⁴⁷ *Cri.* 50d1-e4. He owes to the Laws his γένεσις (50d1-5); his τροφή and παιδεία (50d5-e1). The Laws conclude: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένον τε καὶ ἐξετράφη καὶ ἐπαιδεύθη, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὥς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; For one's parents as one's φίλοι par excellence, see VAN BERKEL [diss. Leiden 2012], 108-110; in *Leg.* 717b4-c6, children must pay back to their parents the "first and greatest debts" (τὰ πρῶτά τε καὶ μέγιστα ὀφειλήματα) they owe them for the years of care (ἐπιμελεία) and pain (ώδιναι παλαιαί) parents have suffered for their sake.

⁴⁸ The analogy between court and war substantiates the Laws' claim that one single act of disobedience would destroy them. The functional comparison between war (πόλεμος) and the courtroom (δικαστήριον) makes sense from the Laws' perspective. A courtroom is for laws what a battlefield is for the fatherland: a situation in which its preservation is at stake. For laws, becoming ἄκυροι equals death. This analogy is often read in the context of the debate whether or not the Laws allow for disobedience or not, e.g., EMLYN-JONES *ad* 51a7-c3 (p. 80), and KRAUT (1984), 21. Such a reading obscures its function, witness EMLYN-JONES' remark (*loc. cit.*) that "Plato here allows Socrates to slide over obvious differences between obeying military orders on campaign and obeying the decision of a court".

⁴⁹ The fatherland (ἡ πατρίς) here seems to be an emotionally grounded representation of the common interest (τὸ κοινόν) in terms of patriotism.

⁵⁰ *Cri.* 50b1-4: ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἣ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μὴδὲν ἰσχύωσιν ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται; Some interpreters consider this an exaggeration. KRAUT's distinction between "vital and peripheral laws" ([1984], 124; cf. 141-142) seems to spring from such an assumption, but misses the point; from the Laws' perspective, any act of disobedience would be tantamount to destruction (this is the rationale of the comparison between the court and war, see note 48 above), at least for his part (τὸ σὸν μέρος).

The references to Socrates *ὁμολογία* to obey them are part and parcel of their self-presentation as his friends.⁵¹ Socrates thus pledges loyalty to *φιλία* as a principle, instead of to *φιλία* as the bond between individuals. He declares his loyalty to an interest greater than his own life, the city as a whole. The city as a whole was of course also in *Apology* the interest his mission ultimately served. By appealing to the strong belief that one must refrain from committing injustice, he can both maintain that his conviction was unjust and legitimize his refusal to accept his friends' offer.

The famous "convince or obey" (*ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύη*, 51b3-4; 52a2-3) argument of the *Laws* is part of the argument from *φιλία*. The *Laws* offer Socrates two alternatives: "both in war and in court and in all situations to do what the city and the fatherland command, or to persuade her [*πόλις* or *πατρίς*] wherein the just lies by nature" (*ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε*).⁵² Persuading the Athenian court of what is just is of course precisely what Socrates had attempted to do in *Apology* (*τὸ δίκαιον* would for example have been to give him the rewards of an Olympic victor), but unsuccessfully so.⁵³ *Apology*

⁵¹ Drawing on the notion of "agreement", *ὁμολογία*, the *Laws* claim that Socrates' famous refusal to leave Athens is a token of his loyalty to them: he approved of the laws and of the way they regulate society (a *ὁμολογία* "in deed" (*ἔργῳ*) to abide by them, *ὡμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείσεσθαι*, 51e6). *Cri.* 51d1-53a7. Especially 51e1-4: *ὅς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τὰλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φάμεν τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιῆσειν ταῦτα, (...).* "But we say that whoever of you stays here, seeing how we administer justice and how we govern the state in other respects, has thereby entered into an agreement with us to do what we command; (...)" (transl. FOWLER). Had he found the laws not to his liking, he has had ample opportunity (*ἐξουσία*) to move to any other city of his choice, *Cri.* 51c9-e1. It is especially interesting that the *Laws* here are made to mention Crete and Sparta—the island of Cleinias and city of Megillus in the *Laws* respectively—as those cities Socrates always was saying had good laws (*ἃς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι*), *Cri.* 52e5-53a1.

⁵² *Cri.* 51b8-c1: *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε.* Cf. 51c1 and 51e7-52a3.

⁵³ In *Apology* he attributes his failure to convince to a lack of time: had the law given him more time for his defense, he would surely have convinced them, see p. 47, n. 4 above. The implication seems to be that, had he been given the opportunity to engage with members of the jury in a dialectical conversation, he would have persuaded them. But under Athenian law this is not possible. This is yet another problem for the just individual, who may have to be forced to defend himself under circumstances that force him to adopt a less than ideal defence strategy. *Apology* is, by implication, the best he could do in his situation.

therefore embodies the stage of *πείθειν*. The “convince or obey” principle in retrospect incorporates the *ἀπολογία* of which *Apology* presents itself as the reflection: if one cannot convince one’s society of what is truly just, one has no other option than to abide by that society’s sentence. Having done what he could to persuade the Athenians, his failure to unmask the political system as incorrect commits him to submission to the laws—at least insofar as the laws and court do not demand something of him that he considers to be an act of injustice.⁵⁴ In a non-ideal society, being compelled to submit to unjust laws is simply the risk that the just individual faces.⁵⁵

That Socrates, as related by the Laws, claims that he has to obey the laws does not mean that the Laws themselves are just—as in his case, it is possible that the laws treat one unjustly. Yet *obeying* the (human) laws here *is* just. Whereas in *Apology* Socrates was led by an absolute authority, in *Crito* he submits to an authority he strictly disputes. Obeying the laws is what is just in the absence of being able to appeal to the authority invested in a true notion of justice. To be sure, Socrates does not explicitly state why one ought to obey the laws, now that he has failed to persuade politics into a better course. He

⁵⁴ Any reading of *Crito* ought to accommodate the fact that Socrates himself presents the Laws as authoritative and is persuaded. WHITE (1996) argues that neither the Laws nor dialectic has authority (see in *Crito*; the only authority is, paradoxically, the recognition that “our own desires for certainty in argument, for authority in the laws—or in reason, or in persuasion—are self-misleading” (127). There is only the situation of the text of *Crito* itself, as “a set of pieces that do not fit together” (125) that “offers us a mode of thought that is inherently inconclusive and puzzling” (127). This reading seems hard to reconcile with the persuasive purpose of the Laws’ speech.

⁵⁵ At the end of their speech, the Laws themselves claim that Socrates has in fact not been treated unjustly by them, but by human agents, *i.e.* the plaintiffs and judges: *Cri.* 54b8-c1: ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικοῦμενος ἄπει, ἐὰν ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων. That Socrates at this point in the speech holds the Athenians rather than the laws themselves responsible for his conviction is in line with the Laws’ ‘self’-presentation as Socrates’ φίλοι. The Laws suggest that they were *applied* in an unjust way. At *Cri.* 54b4-5, the Laws urge Socrates to obey him, “so that when you have come to Hades you will have all these things to say in your defense to those that govern over there” (ἵνα εἰς Αἴδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἀρχουσιν). Here again, in the Underworld the truth is convincing (recall τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικάστας in the Underworld, *Apol.* 41a2). The Laws’ reference to the laws in the Underworld (οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Αἴδου νόμοι, 54c5-6) implies that these laws represent a different justice than the Laws themselves. The Underworld-scenario therefore confirms that submitting to the verdict falls in with the broader (large-scale) justice scenario. In that final tribunal, he will be acquitted.

presents himself as being under a moral obligation of the kind that a child has to his parents, and someone who has made an agreement to that agreement. He feels morally compelled to submit to the laws as long as he has not convincingly unmasked the political system as unjust. This sense of moral obligation he frames in terms of $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$, in order to meet Crito's bidding. The Laws' arguments are a reaction to Crito's arguments in the sphere of $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (that Socrates' choice compromises their reputation as $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{o}\iota$). This is his way of defending himself *vis à vis* his friends, thereby indicating that his primary social attachments are not a matter of personal relationships, but of general principles. In *Apology*, by contrast, Socrates emphasized that he had no choice but to act as he did; he had a divine mission. *Crito* stages a different problem that confronts the truly just individual in a non-ideal society. If one has not been able to persuade society of true justice, one has to submit to the laws, even though they may be unjust.⁵⁶ In this argumentative strategy, the notion of true justice remains out of sight.

2.2.3 Conclusion

The speech of the Laws is, as we have seen, embedded in a conversation between Socrates and his friend Crito. As this is a conversation between friends, Socrates is addressing someone who wishes him well; it is not a speech addressed to enemies. The speech of the Laws can thus be read as an apology for Socrates' friends, in reaction to Crito's arguments in the sphere of $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$. In this speech, Socrates explains to his $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{o}\iota$ represented by Crito why freeing him from prison and helping him escape (as friends would do), would not actually

⁵⁶ On *Crito*'s arguments for legal obligation, see e.g. WOOZLEY (1979), especially 5, 23-26, 76-110; KRAUT (1984); WHITE (1996); BROWN (2006). On the issue whether the Socrates of *Crito* allows for disobedience, see KRAUT (1984), 60-65, 73-76, 125-126, 146. He thinks that "persuade or obey" means that "one may disobey, as long as one persuades" (60). Yet there is only one case in which Socrates admits that one must disobey the laws: if they force one to do something one believes to be unjust, like ceasing to philosophize. On civil disobedience in antiquity, DAUBE (1972).

help him. It is not so that he does not share their concerns—there is a greater interest at stake. Socrates has the Laws introduce the idea of solidarity and *φιλία* in a more principled sense: not the preservation of the individual, and the bonds between individuals, but the preservation of society, and the loyalty of the individual to the community as a whole. He appeals to a large-scale *φιλία* on the level of the *πόλις*.⁵⁷ Both the Socrates of *Apology* and the Socrates of *Crito* ultimately act in the interest of the city. The discrepancy between Socrates' allegiance to different authorities in *Apology* and *Crito* is therefore to be explained by the difference in their communicative setting.

The dilemma cast in the principle “convince or obey” also points to its solution: creating a *polis* with truly just laws. In such a society, one will never be forced to subject to unjust laws. At the same time, to not obey the laws is acting unjustly, because the laws are just. The dilemmas that the just individual faces in *Apology* and *Crito* could not arise in the ideally just society. This ideal society is the just *polis* of *Republic*, to which we will now turn.

2.3 *Republic: the just polis*

2.3.1 Introduction: the solution to the dilemma

Republic does not address problems that the just individual in a non-ideal society has to face. Instead, it pitches Socrates' ideal of “the true city”, or “the just city” (ἡ ἀληθινή πόλις,⁵⁸ ἡ δίκαια πόλις⁵⁹), Callipolis, against other

⁵⁷ Socrates' arguments here may reflect a notion of citizenship that is a precursor of Aristotle's notion of πολιτική φιλία.

⁵⁸ *Resp.* 372e6.

⁵⁹ *Resp.* 434c7-10: χρηματιστικοῦ, ἐπικουρικοῦ, φυλακικοῦ γένους οἰκιοπραγία, ἐκάστου τούτων τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττοντος ἐν πόλει, τοῦναντίον ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὴν πόλιν δικάϊαν παρέχοι; “For the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes each to do its own work in the city, is the opposite. That's justice, isn't it, and makes the city just?” *Resp.* 435b4-7: ἀλλὰ μέντοι πόλις γε ἔδοξεν εἶναι δικάϊα ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ τριττὰ γένη φύσεων ἐνόντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἐπραττεν, σῶφρων δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα πάθη

‘ideals’, most importantly that of Thrasymachus. In terms of my analysis, there is more overlap between *Republic* and *Apology* than between *Republic* and *Crito*. In both *Republic* and *Apology* we encounter individuals through whom we acquire an idea about a higher notion of justice—the philosopher-kings and Socrates respectively—whereas in *Crito*, that notion of justice largely remains out of sight. In *Apology*, the account we hear is from Socrates himself; in *Republic*, the philosopher-king is a hypothesis within a dialectical framework: this is what the moral expert would look like within the context of the most convincing account of a just society. The present section will be concerned with the question of what *Republic* reveals about the absolute norm lying beyond the human domain.

2.3.2 *Republic’s* analytical toolbox: ζῶον, ἰατρικὴ τέχνη

One of the notions that has a strong bearing on the conceptual framework of *Republic* is that of ζῶον (“living being”, “animal”, or, in more technical philosophical discourse, “organic whole”). The just *polis* as a class society is likened to a ζῶον in order to illustrate and elucidate some of its fundamental characteristics. In order to understand the implications of this representation of the just *polis*, and to be able to compare its representation to the society depicted in the *Laws*, we shall first turn to a brief analysis of the term ζῶον as an analytic, technical term.

The usual renderings, “living being” or “animal”, do not convey the conceptual significance of ζῶον as a technical notion in philosophical discourse. As a technical, analytic term, ζῶον is the third element in the triad ἔν–ὄλον–ζῶον, each of which denotes a different form of unity, with increasing complexity. What determines this most complex notion of unity is not so much

τε καὶ ἐξείς. “But a city was thought to be just when each of the three natural classes within it did its own work, and it was thought to be moderate, courageous, and wise because of certain other conditions and states of theirs” (both translations GRUBE, rev. REEVE in COOPER, CW).

the idea of completeness (unity in the sense that no part is missing, which is already expressed by the term ὅλον⁶⁰), but the internal and functional *order* of its parts: an organic whole stands or falls with the functional order of *all* of its constituent parts. From the analogy of the just *polis* to ζῶον follows that the just *polis* is a unity in all three senses: it is (1) one (μία πόλις);⁶¹ it is (2) a complete whole (ὅλη πόλις); and it is (3) an *organic* whole, *i.e.*, a whole in which all parts have their natural function (ζῶον).⁶² The unity of the just *polis* is therefore a unity with an internal hierarchy (τάξις referring to the order in its respect of being a (vertical) hierarchy, κόσμος to its being self-contained as a whole).⁶³ It is not a unity because its individual citizens have more or less uniform ways of life (this aspect also plays a role, but only within the class of the φύλακες⁶⁴), but it is a unity due to the internal order of its classes.⁶⁵

It is this notion of the correct cooperation of the parts in the just *polis* that is presented as the essence of justice (δικαιοσύνη). In this organic, just whole, every part (and person) is δίκαιος: being just consists in performing one's own

⁶⁰ In Arist. *Met.* 1023b26-27 we find the following definition of ὅλον: ὅλον λέγεται οὐ τε μηθὲν ἄπρεσι μέρος ἐξ ὧν λέγεται ὅλον φύσει, "We call a whole (...) that from which is absent none of the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole" (transl. BARNES); cf. 1016b12-16: a whole (ὅλον) is called "one" in virtue of the unity of its substance (ἡ οὐσία μία).

⁶¹ Callipolis as μία πόλις, *e.g.*: 422d8, 423c4, d5-6, 462a9-b2.

⁶² The triad ἐν—ὅλον—ζῶον, notions of unity that are logically in line with one another with increasing complexity, is Stoic. A ζῶον is a unity of such a kind that what can be predicated of the whole can also be predicated of each of its constituent parts. This is of course precisely what is the case with the virtue of justice in *Republic*: the whole is δίκαιον, and so is each of the classes. For ζῶον as an organic whole, of which the parts must fit both each other and the whole: Pl. *Phdr.* 264c2-5, with YUNIS (2011) *ad loc.*: "(...) the parts that must be properly disposed are not formal elements such as introduction, narrative, and conclusion, which [Socrates] disparages (266d7-c4, 267d2-4), but the steps of the argument that move the listener from his initial position to the position which the speaker ultimately wants him to hold."

⁶³ κόσμος: *Resp.* 443d4, 506a9 (*polis*) and 500c4 (soul); τάξις is mostly used in the sphere of the individual, to refer to the order of his soul parts: 462c12, 618b3.

⁶⁴ *Resp.* 451d4ff., 461e5, 462b4, c11.

⁶⁵ The idea that a *polis* consists of classes is an everyday given and therefore much easier to accept than the idea that the soul has parts. The interlocutors aim to discover δικαιοσύνη by searching for it in an entity that possesses it on larger scale, on the level of the πόλις, *Resp.* 368c5-369a4; cf. *Resp.* 441d4-5. It is therefore *via* the *polis* that the parts of the soul are introduced.

social function (*suum cuique*, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν⁶⁶). τὰ αὐτοῦ is determined, and imposed upon the individual, by what the whole is by nature. Part and whole are mutually dependent upon each other. Each part depends on the whole for its identity; conversely, the whole can only function (be a whole) if each part performs its proper function. The notion of ζῶον thus implies a *norm* for the internal organization: this is how a constitution *ought* to be, since only this constitution is just; this normative aspect is inherent in the notion of ζῶον.⁶⁷

The τέχνη that produces the ζῶον, *i.e.* the *polis* in its natural condition, is medicine (ἡ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη). For it is distinctive about medicine that the status of its ἔργον, when it concerns the functioning of a ζῶον, is the optimal condition (τὸ βέλτιστον):⁶⁸ “health” (ὕγεια). In *Republic*, medicine is the *analogon* for the kind of activities that will establish justice in a *polis* (corresponding to health in a σῶμα). This objectively best condition is, by definition, the *natural* condition. Analogously, the product of the political expertise is δικαιοσύνη, the objectively best condition for the *polis*.⁶⁹ The analogy of medicine is part of the same picture as the ζῶον: it is the condition that is best *by nature* (φύσει), given the nature of the body and its parts.

Medicine invests the responsibility for, and knowledge of, the natural condition in an authority (a doctor).⁷⁰ Subjective perception (feeling well) is, according to the system of *Republic*, and particularly according to the analogy that associates rule with ἰατρική, declared subservient to the εὐδαιμονία of the whole. To the extent that ἡδονή features in this discussion, it is a true ἡδονή,

⁶⁶ *Resp.* 433a8; cf. 434a1: ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πράξις.

⁶⁷ This notion of justice is developed on the scale of the *polis* and subsequently propelled back on the individual, creating a kind of boomerang-effect: *Resp.* 591e1, τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν (about the soul).

⁶⁸ Dependent on the context, τὸ βέλτιστον can be understood in different ways: epistemologically (ἡ ἀληθινὴ πόλις, τὸ ἀληθέστατον, 484c7), ethically (ἡ δίκαια πόλις); or in terms of utility (τὸ σύμφερον).

⁶⁹ *Resp.* 444d3-10 ὕγεια for the body is what δικαιοσύνη is for the soul; cf. 444d12-e1: Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὕγεια τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἰσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια. Cf. 591b3-4: τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν.

⁷⁰ Cf. *Prot.* 322c6-7: one expert (δημιουργός), for example a doctor, suffices for many laymen.

the pleasure deriving from the activity designated as just.⁷¹ But Plato is careful to design his system so that the real interest of each of the three classes coincides with its social function. The analogy of *ιατρική* does raise the question what this implies about how far the expert ruler may go in imposing the good upon society. *Ιατρική*, at least in principle, leaves open the possibility of harsh measures, defensible in terms of the absolute good.⁷²

This brings us to another important implication of the medical analogy. The *ζῶον*-analogy implies that the just *polis* is a *polis* in its most natural condition, that is, a *healthy* city. One might have expected that medicine is not the most obvious candidate to serve as an analogy for political expertise in *Republic*. Medicine is, intuitively at least, concerned with administering remedies. Notably in *Gorgias*, *ιατρική* is on a par with “corrective” *δικαιοσύνη*,⁷³ while the regulative *τέχναι* are *γυμναστική* (for the body) and *νομοθετική* (!) for the soul.⁷⁴ Yet in *Republic* these more intuitive, everyday connotations give way to medicine’s inextricable association with health (*ὑγίεια*). Medicine becomes *regulative*: it establishes and maintains the naturally good condition of the *polis* (for instance by the eugenic mechanisms that serve

⁷¹ *Resp.* 419a1-421c6; 586d4-587a6 (with ADAM *ad* 586d).

⁷² Cf. chapter one, p. 31, and chapter five, p. 181. On the question of whether *Republic* warrants the use of violence, KLOSKO (2006), 187-191, 205.

⁷³ In the analogical scheme of the *Gorgias*, *δικαιοσύνη* is a “Fremdkörper”, and *δικαστική* would have been the more regular variant (*δικαστική* is in fact the reading of manuscript F), VAN RAALTE (1991), 315, n. 40. VAN RAALTE *ibid.* argues that *δικαστική* is disqualified because of its association with (imperfect) Athenian jurisdiction (cf. DODDS *ad loc.*, 228), and because *δικαιοσύνη* is precisely what Socrates’ wants to substitute for *ῥητορική* as the counterpart of *ιατρική*.

⁷⁴ *Gorg.* 463e5-466a3, with DODDS’ note *ad loc.*, 226-227. The *Gorgias* makes *γυμναστική* the regulative, *ιατρική* the corrective *τέχνη* for the human body. DODDS *ad loc.* explains that the reason why medicine is corrective may be prompted by the fact that the historical Gorgias “claimed that rhetoric was to the mind what medicine was to the body (*Hel.* 14)”, and *ῥητορική* is the spurious *τέχνη* used to evade punishment, *i.e.* is the ‘τέχνη’ for a soul that has fallen ill. It seems a reasonable supposition that Plato did not use the analogy of *γυμναστική* in *Republic* because *γυμναστική* would have brought us in the domain of *training*, with suggestions that virtue can be attained by exercise, in a gradual process, taught, etc. Training would however have brought us in the sphere of the *Laws*: *γυμναστική*, practiced in the Spartan and Cretan *syssitia* (see chapter three, section 3.2.3, and especially p. 108, p. 113), presents the good condition as something that can be brought about, rather than, absolutely, as the natural condition that is a given. That is why in Callipolis even bodily quality (eugenetics) becomes the product of *φάρμακα*, not *γυμναστική* (see note 75 below).

to keep the classes pure).⁷⁵ This regulative understanding of *ιατρική*, as opposed to its corrective interpretation in *Gorgias*, is derived from its *analogon* in the political domain, the *ἄρχειν* of a city. A clear indication of medicine's regulative interpretation in *Republic* is the conspicuous omission of punitive mechanisms from Callipolis. In terms of the *ζῶον*-analogy, this is perfectly understandable: in a just *polis*, *paideia* does not fail. Hence in the best condition (health), there is no need for punishment.

2.3.3 The *εὐδαιμονία* of the whole *polis* as the natural norm

The *ζῶον* as an analogy for society raises the question of the relation between the whole and its parts. To frame a class society as an organic whole has an important implication: the interest of the whole takes precedence over, and determines, the interest of its constituent parts.⁷⁶ In the case of a (real) *ζῶον*—an animal—of which the parts lack independent existence, that is evident.⁷⁷ But in the case of a society consisting of individuals, one may think that this analogy can have disturbing consequences. The *εὐδαιμονία* of each class is determined by the *εὐδαιμονία* of the whole.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ The term *φάρμακα* does not signify “remedies”, but “drugs”, i.e., means to *bring* a certain condition *about*. The herd of citizens must be of top-quality (τὸ ποιμνιον ὅτι ἀκρότατον εἶναι, *Resp.* 459e1): which requires many drugs (φαρμάκοις πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι, namely the artificial ways of setting up marriages and procreation of the elite), and an even more courageous doctor than if no drugs would have been necessary (ἀνδρειοτέρου δεῖ τοῦ ἱατροῦ), *Resp.* 459c3-7.

⁷⁶ See on the primitive “city of pigs” in *Resp.* 369b4-372e7, 373b1-2: TAYLOR (1999), 289-290 (the philosophic legislator’s “aim in setting up the ideal city is continuous with the aim of the creators of the primitive city, viz. the maximization of *eudaimonia* for the citizens”, 290); further HEMMENWAY (1999); MCKEEN (2004). It is called ἡ ἀληθινὴ πόλις (372e6), ἡ ὑγιεινὴ [πόλις] (373b1-2).

⁷⁷ Another problematic consequence (from our modern perspective) is that conceiving of the *polis* as a *ζῶον* prevents the individual as such from coming into focus. Individuals are only considered in terms of their class, and as such are interchangeable; *Republic* does not imply that there exist relevant differences among the members of each class. Cf. TAYLOR (1999), 288.

⁷⁸ Cf. NEU (1971), 248: “The state’s interest is the individual’s interest—but his *real* one.” Therefore Plato does not, as ANNAS contends, “undeniably subordinate individual interests to the common good” ([1981], 179). TAYLOR (1999) surprisingly argues (with VLASTOS [1977]) that of the three kinds of totalitarianism (282-283), Callipolis is a totalitarian community of the “paternalistic” kind (see especially 295-296) instead of in the second sense (“an organic social unity”, 283). His conclusory statement that “at least in intention [Plato] subordinates the perfectly organized state to the happy

Plato does not shy away from recognizing and addressing directly the problematic nature of this aspect of the just *polis*. Indeed, he has Socrates' interlocutors twice make explicit reservations about precisely this aspect of the just society: the (lack of) εὐδαιμονία of the three classes on their own. The interventions of the interlocutors force the figure of Socrates to offer a justification of the social order that is thereby represented as going even beyond his original intentions. It is in the context of these interruptions, if anywhere in *Republic*, that we may get a glimpse of the kind of norm that determines why this particular social order constitutes *the* just society.

The guards and producers

Doubts about the kind of life that the well-being of the whole imposes are raised for the first time at the beginning of Book IV, where the ways of life of guards and producers are discussed at greater length. Adeimantus asks what Socrates would have to say in his defence in case someone objected to his description of the guards' way of life that this would not make these men particularly happy;⁷⁹ they are in truth the rulers of the city, but do not derive any good from it.⁸⁰ Socrates replies that in establishing their state, they did not aim to make one of its classes happy on their own, but the *polis* as a whole (ὅλη ἡ πόλις, 420b7-8). For their governing principle in founding their *polis* was that

community" (296) *de facto* subordinates justice to εὐδαιμονία and hence defies *Republic's* thesis that the perfectly organized *polis* is the only εὐδαιμών community. POPPER (2006), 81-83, on these *Republic*-passages as evidence of "political holism". See KAMTEKAR (2001) for an attempt to reconcile Socrates' definition of social justice as doing one's own (one's social duty) with the idea that justice is concerned with the allocation or distribution of benefits via what she calls Plato's "happiness principle".

⁷⁹ *Resp.* 419a1-4: Καὶ ὁ Αδείμαντος ὑπολαβὼν, Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπολογήσῃ, ἐάν τις σε φῇ μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαιμόνας ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ τὰτα δι' ἑαυτοῦς, ὧν ἔστι μὲν ἡ πόλις τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οἱ δὲ μὴδὲν ἀπολαύουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῆς πόλεως, (...); "And Adeimantus interrupted: How would you defend yourself, Socrates, he said, if someone told you that you aren't making these men very happy and that it's their own fault? The city really belongs to them, yet they derive no good from it" (transl. GRUBE, rev. REEVE in COOPER, CW).

⁸⁰ ADAM *ad loc.*: "Adimantus' objection is the dying echo of the view already advocated by Thrasymachus, that a ruler should rule for his own profit" (at 342c7-9, 343b1-d1).

justice was most likely to be found in such a state (ὥθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὐρεῖν δικαιοσύνην, 420b8-9).⁸¹ This is why Callipolis is the just *polis* in its most appealing form.

He goes on to liken their project of founding a just *polis* to a painter who is painting a statue of a man (ἀνδριᾶς, see 420c5ff.). The objection voiced by Adeimantus would be like charging him with not using the most beautiful colour for the most beautiful part of the body, the eyes.⁸² Against that charge they could reasonably defend themselves by saying that, had they used purple for the eyes instead of black, the eyes would not appear as eyes (μηδὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς φαίνεσθαι, 420d3-4). It is only by assigning to each part what is appropriate to it that the whole becomes beautiful (εἰ τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ποιοῦμεν, 420d4-5).⁸³ Thus, what is καλόν is what is appropriate, and what is appropriate is the *natural* condition. Eyes ought to be black (not purple) because they are eyes, and they are eyes because they are *that* particular part of a man. Similarly (the thought runs), the social role of each class is determined by what each part *is*, which in turn is determined by the whole of which the part is a part. This explains why the whole *polis* cannot be made εὐδαίμων simply by leaving it up to each class to decide what will make them most happy, not hampered by other considerations: in that case, the guards would be anything but guards, the farmer would not be a farmer, nor the potter a potter.⁸⁴ The identity of the *polis* as a whole (what a *polis* truly is) is

⁸¹ *Resp.* 420b5-9: οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαίμων, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις. ὥθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὐρεῖν δικαιοσύνην (...). POPPER (2006) has claimed on the basis of this passage (ch. 5, n. 35, p. 264) that the *polis* of *Republic* is of the extreme totalitarian kind (the first kind of three kinds of totalitarian states in TAYLOR (1999), where the interest of the state is distinct from the individuals who compose it). See for another refutation of POPPER's claim TAYLOR (1999), 284-289.

⁸² *Resp.* 420c5-d5.

⁸³ This is why it is misleading to call the just *polis* "ideal": it is the natural and therefore best condition of a *polis*; only from the perspective of *Apology* and *Crito* could Callipolis be said to be "ideal".

⁸⁴ *Resp.* 420e1-421a3: καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκασε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξι προσάπτειν, ἢ ἐκείνους πάν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται ἡ φύλακας. ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ξυστίδας ἀμφιέσαντες καὶ χρυσὸν περιθέντες πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐργάζεσθαι κελεύειν τὴν

what determines the roles of its parts. In the analogy, this is the form of the statue (what the statue is or represents), which determines which colours the painter has to use. The norm is the model for the colour painter: it is the man himself.

The philosophers

The relation between the εὐδαιμονία of one class and the εὐδαιμονία of the whole is subjected to critical scrutiny a second time in Book VII. At this point, the class of the philosophers has been separated from the rest of the guards. At the end of the cave simile, the poignant demand that the philosophers descend back into the cave prompts Glaucon to raise (again) the question whether they (*i.e.*, the interlocutors) will not be treating them unjustly by giving them a life that is worse than possible (ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χειρόν ζῆν, δυνατόν αὐτοῖς ὃν ἀμείνον; 519d8-9).⁸⁵ Socrates replies, 519e1-520a4:

γῆν, καὶ τοὺς κεραμέας κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους, τὸν τροχὸν παραθεμένους, ὅσον ἂν ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοιοῦτῳ τρόπῳ μακαρίους ποιεῖν, ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονῇ. ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς μὴ οὕτω νουθετεῖ· ὥς, ἂν σοι πειθώμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἔσται οὔτε ὁ κεραμεὺς κεραμεὺς οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἔχων σχῆμα ἐξ ὧν πόλις γίγνεται. "Similarly, you mustn't force us to give our guardians the kind of happiness that would make them something other than guardians. We know how to clothe the farmers in purple robes, festoon them with gold jewelry, and tell them to work the land whenever they please. We know how to settle our potters on couches by the fire, feasting and passing the wine around, with their wheel beside them for whenever they want to make pots. And we can make all the others happy in the same way, so that the whole city is happy. Don't urge us to do this, however, for if we do, a farmer wouldn't be a farmer, nor a potter a potter, and none of the others would keep to the patterns of work that give rise to a city" (transl. GRUBE, rev. REEVE in COOPER, CW)

⁸⁵ This worry has been shared by some modern commentators, either because they consider ruling contrary to the philosophers' own interest (so ANNAS [1981], 267-269), or because they think Plato fails to justify why the philosophers themselves consider it in their interest to rule (so ADKINS [1960], 290-292; SCHOFIELD [2007], 152). ANNAS' way out (and cf. SEDLEY [2007], 277 n. 32 for commentators holding similar views), that the Good is an "impersonal Good", and that the philosophers learn to conceive of their "personal loss" of happiness ([1981], 268) in an impersonal way misinterprets the fact that the philosophers have an evident interest in ruling: the absence of "punishment" for not ruling (ζημία ἐὰν μὴ ἀρχῇ, 347a5, cf. b6-c3 in Book I), the "punishment" being rule by an inferior. SEDLEY (2007) has shown that Book I "showcases" (272) the developments

Ἐπελάθου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι νόμῳ οὐ τοῦτο μέλει, ὅπως ἐν τι γένος ἐν πόλει διαφερόντως εὖ πράξει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι, συναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθοῖ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις τῆς ὠφελίας ἣν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ ὦσιν ὠφελεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφιῇ τρέπεσθαι ὅπῃ ἕκαστος βούλεται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καταχρῆται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν σύνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως.

"You are forgetting again that it isn't the law's concern to make any one class in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion and by making them share with each other the benefits that each class can confer on the community. The law produces such people in the city, not in order to allow them to turn in whatever direction they want, but to make use of them to bind the city together." (Transl. GRUBE, rev. REEVE in COOPER, CW)

This is the same kind objection as the one raised at the beginning of Book IV, to which Socrates refers in his answer (ἐπελάθου, πάλιν, 519e1). Here, in answering to the objection raised in the case of the philosophers, his strategy is a different one. Indeed, the objection in this case can rest on firmer ground. For, in the case of the guards and producers, Socrates' claim was that the life he described for them was truly the most εὐδαίμων life possible, even though one may have assumed otherwise (and Adeimantus voices this reasonable objection). But in the case of the philosophers, Socrates has in fact himself admitted (and this is corroborated by the purport of the cave simile) that the life of pure philosophy (θεωρία) is more εὐδαίμων for the philosophers than ruling

and terminology of compulsion common in the later Books; see also LYCOS (1987), 110: "Socrates is not, of course, arguing that the only thing which motivates practitioners of a craft is to benefit the 'object' of their craft. He is concerned to establish whether, and how, the knowledge which constitutes a craft introduces the idea of an interest that is specific to the craft. The question is whether any such 'knowledge-interest' can be a self-interest." Moreover, any worries about the absence of a positive reward for the philosophers (such as χρήματα or τιμή) should be alleviated by the Socratic-Platonic consideration that it is typical of the ἀγαθός *not* to be paid for the exercise of his πολιτικὴ τέχνη, something which demarcates him from the sophist, see, e.g., *Gorg.* 520c2-e10; for sophists receiving wages: *Gorg.* 519c5-d4; *Prot.* 328b1-c2, 349a2-4; *Soph.* 219-223; *Meno* 90d3-95e.

the city. In other words, for them, there is a life possible that is more εὐδαίμων than the life demanded by the εὐδαιμονία of the whole *polis*.⁸⁶

In answering this objection Socrates does not put forward another analogy, but appeals to “law” (νόμος).⁸⁷ Law “attends to” (μέλει) the εὐδαιμονία of the city as a whole, not to that of one of its classes.⁸⁸ The terminology employed here (μέλει) is reminiscent of that used in the context of τέχνη.⁸⁹ The focus on the *polis* as a whole, of course, does not imply that the individual classes are not εὐδαίμων. The philosophers are here emphatically viewed as part of the *polis*, as a class submitted to this law.⁹⁰ Νόμος therefore

⁸⁶ Cf. ADKINS (1960), 291: “To philosophize is an absolute good. The philosophers would be more *eudaimon* if they remained aloof from politics: accordingly, Plato can offer no real reason why they should go back. Admittedly the city would be better governed, and hence more *eudaimon*, if they went back; but Plato cannot explain why, if one’s own *eudaimonia* is the end of life, one should prefer the city’s—or anyone else’s—*eudaimonia* to one’s own.” ADKINS here ignores (*ibid.*, 290-291) Socrates’ first answer in *Resp.* 519e1-520a4 and jumps straight to Socrates’ second response, in 520b5-c1. He raises the question (*ibid.*, 291-292) why Plato did not assert that the life combining ruling and philosophy was most *eudaimon*. There are two considerations of interest. The first is an important aspect upon which the system hinges: “Plato presents this as an advantage of his system: since the philosophers have a better life to return to ‘outside the cave’ of the affairs of this world, they will not be tempted to set any value on political power as an end in itself, and hence will be just and disinterested rulers” (290). The second consideration has to do with Plato’s background: “Such an assertion would of course be a solution; but to suppose that it is a solution open to Plato is to forget the nature of the movement of which both Thrasymachus and Plato form a part. It is an intellectual, not a moral, movement, and the intellect must always take precedence” (292). It may be worth adding that the conception of the philosopher as moral expert (practitioner of a τέχνη) does not allow for such a strict separation between the two activities, cf. chapter one, p. 30. Cf. SILVERMAN (2010): “the Aristotelian separation of theoretical reason from practical reason and the flight interpretation seems totally belied by what philosophers actually do in the *Republic*”.

⁸⁷ Cf. *Resp.* 590e1-591a3: Δηλοῖ δέ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος ὅτι τοιοῦτον βούλεται, πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει σύμμαχος ὢν, (...). τοιοῦτον refers back to the imposition of rule by a divine and sensible element (from ὡς ἄμεινον ὄν παντὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, 590d3-4).

⁸⁸ In *Resp.* 420bb6-8, e6-7, 421b7-8 (εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντες), 519e3, and 576d9-e1, the well-being of one of its classes is opposed to the well-being of the whole.

⁸⁹ Cf. *Resp.* 345d1-3: τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου ἄλλου τοῦ μέλει ἢ ἐφ’ ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ. “Shepherding is concerned only to provide what is best for that which it is set over” (transl. GRUBE, rev. REEVE).

⁹⁰ This νόμος is therefore *not* on a par with the *polis*-internal νόμοι that govern the life of the class of the guards, mentioned in e.g. *Resp.* 380c5-6 (on poets); 453d1, 456c2, 457b8, c8, 465a1, 471b9-10 (on family life), 534d8-10 (on the place of dialectic in the philosophers’ education) and by implication the laws that will be laid down by the final authority in the city, the philosophers. On these, see LANE (2013), 110-112; ROSSETTI (2013), 356. More often than νόμος the term τύπος is used: LANE (2013), 109; on the τύποι περὶ θεολογίας, BORDT (2003), especially 70-73.

introduces a perspective on the *polis* from the outside. The philosopher is in a sense outside the *polis* (as depicted in the cave simile); yet as the ruler, he is also part of it. This νόμος emphatically views the philosopher in his capacity as *part* of the whole.

Conceptualizing the just society's order as imposed upon it by νόμος, however, does beg the question what sort of law this is, and who made it—it is a question that this passage poses, yet *Republic* as such does not provide an explicit answer to it.⁹¹ Within the system of *Republic*, its analogy of the just *polis* to ζῶον, justice to υἡγία, and ruling to ιατρική, the most reasonable hypothesis would be to think of this as a 'law of nature' (νόμος τῆς φύσεως), since it is nature that determines the constitution of a ζῶον.⁹² Recalling the analogy of the statue discussed above, the nature of the statue (what a man really *is*) determines what colours are appropriate for each part. The νόμος can thus be seen as a law inherent in what a *polis* is by nature: that law, like the man that serves as a model for the statue, determines the function (or, in the case of the statue, the colour) of the parts. Δικαιοσύνη designates the internal structure of the best society; νόμος represents this as necessitated by a higher norm. The

⁹¹ This is *not* a law made by the interlocutors-as-founders of Callipolis, *contra* LANE (2013), 111 (and 113), and SEDLEY (2007), 280, n. 37. They suggest that the fact that the philosophers are required to rule by "law" is because in the context of Book VII the interlocutors call themselves legislators, say that "we" shall compel the philosophers to rule. For the role of lawgivers and laws in *Republic*, see ANNAS (2010); LANE (2013), with further references p. 105, n. 4. For the interlocutors as lawgivers, see *ibid.*, 109, 110-111, and their relation to the philosopher-rulers *ibid.*, 112-113.

⁹² The likening of the parts of the just soul to a ἁρμονία points to the same conclusion, *Resp.* 443d3-e2: (...) καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἓνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμουςμένον, (...), "(...) [the just man] harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high, low, an middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious" (transl. GRUBE, rev. REEVE in COOPER, CW). These are the "immovable notes" (WEST [1992], 162, also 219-222): if the intervals are altered, the ἁρμονία will no longer be a ἁρμονία: the proportions between the three notes designated as ὄροι determined by nature (irrespective of the pitch of the system as a whole, and the genus, which is determined by the shifts in position of the notes inside the tetrachord). Νεάτη and ὑπάτη form the boundaries of an octave (2:1). The note μέση lies between these two boundary notes, the interval between νεάτη and μέση being a fifth (3:2), the interval between ὑπάτη and μέση being a fourth (4:3).

particular νόμος mentioned in this passage is thus co-extensive with δικαιοσύνη.

Philosophy without ruling is excluded by the conditions of the system: because the rule of philosophy is the necessary precondition for realizing τὸ βέλτιστον. Ruling is in the philosopher's interest, because the philosopher cannot exist outside Callipolis.⁹³ The fact that the philosophers are several times said to be "compelled" to rule,⁹⁴ indicates that this is conceptualized as a norm that is imposed upon them from the outside.

2.3.4 The philosopher-kings: inside and outside the *polis*

The ζῶον-analogy makes the well-being of the *polis* as a whole the cardinal interest. That this may seem to compromise the interest of the classes taken individually ignores that the true interest of the classes is simply and solely realized in the just *polis*. We have already seen in the previous section that, when this point explicitly enters the discussion, *Republic* refers to the idea of a *natural* norm for the good of a *polis*. But the question remains, of course, how this claim to the natural good of a *polis* is justified: why are we to believe that this is the natural form for a human society? The philosopher-king has a double occupation: he contemplates the Ideas (θεωρία) and he has a social role: to rule the *polis* (ἄρχειν).⁹⁵ As its rulers, they are part of the whole, and as

⁹³ This is anticipated in Book I, where the ruler, if he rules, receives as a reward "absence of punishment" (οὐ ζημία). The "punishment" for not ruling is to be ruled by inferior rulers, which *de facto* means that neither the philosopher nor Callipolis could exist. Therefore, ἀνάγκη and ζημία are juxtaposed.

⁹⁴ Which some scholars have assumed means that ruling is not in the philosophers' own interest. See e.g. ADKINS (1960), 290; WHITE (1986); BROWN (2000); SEDLEY (2007), 272-281.

⁹⁵ By taking turns: *Resp.* 540a9-b5: (...) καὶ πόλιν καὶ ιδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἐκάστους, τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἦκη, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, (...). Cf. 520d7-9: the philosophers will ἐν μέρει descend back into the cave. According to Aristotle, this alternation (τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος, τάξις) of rulers results in law, *Pol.* 1287a14-18. I do not think that *Republic* endorses such a fundamental distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom as we find in Aristotle. Nor is there sufficient evidence for a "flight interpretation" (the extreme idea that the philosophers eschew the ruling part of their task, as

philosophers, they can see from the outside, as it were, the whole of which they themselves are part. The double role of the philosophers puts them in an ambiguous position: from the internal perspective, they are the ἄρχοντες of the *polis*; from the external perspective, they are at the same time ἀρχόμενοι. Callipolis as an operational constitution thus contains a circularity, since the ἐπιστήμων is at the same time the *external* legitimation for the ἔργον and *part* of the ἔργον itself.⁹⁶ That they have knowledge of this norm does not mean that they are not subject to it; it merely means that they understand *why* their social function is necessary.⁹⁷ The just *polis* stands or falls with their government of it. The philosopher-king outside the *polis* resembles a painter, who “looks at” (ἀποβλέπει) τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα and paints a just *polis* on a clean *pinax*.⁹⁸ The natural condition of the *polis* (*i.e.*, the just *polis*) is claimed to be an imitation of its model (παράδειγμα).⁹⁹ The philosopher differs from other lawgivers because he works on a *tabula rasa*.¹⁰⁰

defended by, *e.g.*, KRAUT [2003]). See on these issues, and a comparison with Aristotle, SILVERMAN (2010).

⁹⁶ The same concern is addressed in Book I: the introduction of the additional μισθαρχητική or μισθητική τέχνη, the τέχνη of producing wages (*Resp.* 346b1ff.), when the notion of the ruler’s self-interest has been discarded already in the discussion with Thrasymachus, shows that it is not entirely unproblematic whether or how the δημιουργός benefits from his τέχνη himself, and can thus be seen to anticipate the famous reservation of *Resp.* 519d8-9. Likewise, the substitution of τὸ σύμφερον for τὸ βέλτιστον or τὸ ἀγαθόν as the object of the τέχνη in Book I raises the question *whose* benefit it is and makes it possible to construct the notion of a common interest.

⁹⁷ Cf. ἀνάγκη as that which motivates the philosophers to rule: *Resp.* 347c1-d6, 519e4, 520e1-3, 521b7, 539e4, 540a4-b5. See SEDLEY (2007), 276-281.

⁹⁸ This is a *polis* in which, in contrast to the Athens of *Crito*, the laws are based on τὸ φύσει δίκαιον, cf. ἡ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, and Socrates by implication would not have been convicted. These laws are not the product of human agreement, but made after the image of metaphysical, absolute standards.

⁹⁹ *Resp.* 500d11-501c4; cf. 472c4-d10: the παράδειγμα is the good *polis* in speech that the interlocutors are founding (οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς ... παράδειγμα ἐποιούμεεν λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως; 472d9-10), not a Form (see BURNYEAT (1999), 298, in disagreement with the commentators in note 5 *ibid.*). Here the παράδειγμα is the ἔργον, not the model. It is compared to the most beautiful possible human being, but it is still a human being: again, there is a pre-conceived notion operative of what a *polis* truly is.

¹⁰⁰ The designers of the *polis* who use a divine *paradeigma* “take a *polis* and the characters of human beings like a *pinax*” (λάβοντες ... ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἦθη ἀνθρώπων): first they clean it, which is not easy to do (πρῶτον μὲν καθαράν ποιήσιν ἂν, ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον), 501a2-7. A possible purification is proposed in 540e4-541a7: sending all citizens over the age of ten to the

where a divine *paradeigma* (τὸ θεῖον παράδειγμα, 500e2; τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον, 501b2) exists, there is no need to draw on existing laws or customs, or to adopt a more dynamic, cooperative procedure of lawgiving. The Good is an object of knowledge, but, it seems, not a matter of discussion. The philosophers are not represented as talking about the Good, but as looking at it. The Good (τὸ καλόν) exists *a priori*: it is there to be known by every philosopher.¹⁰¹ The painter-analogy portrays the philosopher as standing outside, instead of being part of, the whole.

Republic explains the σοφία of the philosopher-king (what *Apology* called divine σοφία) in psychological terms: the dominance of the λογιστικόν over the soul as a whole. He has a “divine ruling principle” (ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, 592d1) within himself. Little is said about how he comes to be qualified, or where his qualification comes from. His qualification can be discussed in virtue of the city-soul-analogy. Whereas the qualifications of the philosopher-class are explicitly stipulated in the context of the description of their education (*i.e.* the philosophers qualified in the context of the city), what qualifies the individual philosopher is that the parts of his soul are in the correct order; in terms of the myth of the metals, he has the right kind of soul. In Callipolis it is by and large a matter of genetic reproduction: in most cases, couples will produce children of the same soul-type as they are themselves. It is, however, possible that a silver child will be born from golden parents, or *vice versa*, or, more general, that a couple from one class will beget a soul that

countryside (εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς), and taking the children “out of the characters of today” (ἐκτὸς τῶν νῦν ἡθῶν) to raise them in the ways of life and laws stipulated by the philosophers (ἐν τοῖς σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις), *i.e.* those which the interlocutors have expounded. *Contra* MORROW (1960), 580 and ANNAS (2010), 72, there is a fundamental difference in the original position between the project of *Republic* and *Laws*. Cf. chapter four, p. 136.

¹⁰¹ The combination of a noun (τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ καλόν) in conjunction with αὐτό is a characteristic way of referring to the absolute Good, see *Resp.* 507a3: τὸν τόκον καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; 532b1: αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστον ἀγαθόν; 534c4: αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν; 540a8-9: τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. Sometimes simply τὸ ἀγαθόν: 509b7. Also: 517c1: ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα; 526e1: τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν.

belongs to another class.¹⁰² In such cases, the rulers have to transfer the soul of the child to its appropriate class.¹⁰³ This implies that, in the ideal city, soul quality is not exclusively a matter of the type of soul of the parents.

2.3.5 Conclusion

In this section we have examined *Republic*, the last of the three Platonic texts on justice discussed. *Republic* differs from *Apology* and *Crito* in outlining a truly just *polis*. We have attempted to get a clearer view of what it is that determines the identity of the just *polis* and what is claimed to be the qualification of the moral expert in this setting. In the first subsection, we looked at the implications of *Republic's* strategy to analogize the just *polis* to a ζῶον, justice (δικαιοσύνη) to its internal best condition (ὕγεια), and the rule of this whole to the ἰατρικὴ τέχνη. In the second subsection, we have focused on the most fundamental objection to this system, and examined Socrates' argument in justification of that system. It appeared that in the final instance, all that can be said is that the objectively good status of the just *polis* is natural objectivity, grounded in nature, φύσις. This of course agrees with the *polis's* representation as a ζῶον. In the third subsection, we have investigated how this natural norm is imparted in the best society. The philosopher-king knows the interest of the whole in virtue of his knowledge of the Good. He therefore imposes this on society, and, as part of that society, upon himself. The just city is therefore a closed system: the philosophers know the good of the whole of which they themselves are part. Finally, *Republic* makes ἀρετή clearly dependent upon the natural quality of one's soul; this is yet another way in which it appeals to φύσις.

¹⁰² *Resp.* 415b1-3: ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθεῖν ἂν ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ ἀργυροῦ χρυσοῦν ἐκγονον καὶ τὰλλα πάντα οὕτως ἐξ ἀλλήλων.

¹⁰³ *Resp.* 415a7-c7.

2.4 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, we have examined three Platonic texts on justice. Each of these three texts portrays individuals who are loyal to a higher principle that is imposed upon them from the outside. We have explored how the notion of a norm beyond the human domain takes shape in each of these texts, and how its shaping is influenced by the respective communicative situations.

Apology portrays how Socrates motivates his conduct before the hostile audience of his jury by appealing to divine authority. *Crito*, by contrast, is a discussion in a much more friendly setting. Socrates defends his refusal to save himself when he has the chance before the friend who offers him this opportunity by stressing his prevailing loyalty to the community of which they are both part. That he pledges allegiance to different authorities in *Apology* and *Crito* is the direct consequence of the different communicative settings and rhetorical purposes of the two speeches: the apology to his enemies and to his friends. *Republic*, finally, develops a hypothesis of the just *polis* in its most persuasive form, and a vignette of the moral expert in this setting. The absolute norm outside the human domain that determines what justice is, is a *natural* norm, φύσις. The system of *Republic* is internally sustainable because it makes the individual(s) who possesses knowledge of the norm themselves the rulers of the *polis* upon which, as a whole, this natural law is imposed.