The Locality of Chieftainship: Territory, Authority and Local Politics in Northern Malawi, 1870-1974

Davies, M.E.

CHAPTER 5

Playing the long game: Maintaining credibility and customary control in a changing landscape, 1952-1960

Introduction

Timothy Chawinga knew when to stay silent. The tumultuous period of shifting allegiances, resignations and boycotts by native authorities which took place immediately before the Nyasaland Government was finally subjected to federation with Northern and Southern Rhodesia proved to be one such time; as the political intelligence report for May 1953 simply put it, the usually outspoken chief chose quite uncharacteristically to remain "on the fence".[1] Chawinga had always been opposed to federation, and he made no attempt to hide this fact, however his taking a stance on this particular issue did not mean in any sense that he aligned himself with the Nyasaland African Congress or that he approved of their tactics. Chiefs like Mwase and M'mbelwa who took firm stands to ally with Congress by dramatically resigning their official positions or publicly leading non-cooperation campaigns would later retract their resignations and back out of boycotts, worried about the consequences these activities would have on their authority. Their vacillation on these matters sent confusing messages to both the Government and their people, and it made them prime targets for Congress manipulation on account of their seemingly weak-willed behaviour. Chawinga practiced moderation in dealing with these highly political matters; his only demonstrations of commitment up until 1960 were directed towards the needs of the people of Hewe; a useful tactic in times when the future direction of the nationalist movement was extremely unclear. This chapter will argue that Chawinga was able to ride the wave of political discontent and constitutional change on account of his continued public neutrality throughout the 1950s.

Taking a neutral stance was not a guaranteed ticket to a chief's survival though; it did not work so well as a tactic in places where traditional authority was already being put under considerable pressure from other sources, and fence sitting would see them only lose more ground. As previous chapters have shown, reforms to native administration were putting chiefs' institutionalized powers under threat. This threat was more keenly felt in areas where the experience of labour out-migration had prompted some people to resist traditional authority. Similar tensions were felt in Karonga where the co-operative movement, which had been extremely successful in establishing profitable schemes, enabled local elites to begin to rival the chiefs in terms of economic wealth. In such places leaders were forced to watch their backs. Across the border from Hewe in Chief Muyombe's territory in Northern Rhodesia, the threat to the established order came from younger factions within the chieftaincy itself who saw the advantage of allying themselves with nationalist elements to oust the old guard. The pressures on chiefs and the threats which formed in the local context as well as on account of the national structural reforms varied greatly throughout the Protectorate. Whilst most of them were able to hold the ground throughout the uneven disorder of the 1950s, these often long-standing tensions between the chiefs and their people came to the fore during the State of Emergency which was declared in March 1959, and would last until the middle of June the following year; it

proved a perfect opportunity for unpopular chiefs to be removed and new faces to take their place.

In Hewe, despite increasing Congress pressure Chawinga continued to attend district and provincial meetings and refused to boycott official events. Meanwhile he spent this time also bolstering his traditional role, careful not to neglect the responsibility he had towards his people. There were economic and political threats of some importance but they were not yet organised or strong enough in the local setting to overwhelm his position; he had room to sit tight, and maintain a nonaligned status. Harvests were good, shortages were few, and as the officials noted: when this was the case the breaks were generally put on political activity.[2] In fact, rather than causing his chieftaincy to crumble the opening days of the State of Emergency provided the dramatic stage which Chawinga needed to bravely reassert his commitment to the people of Hewe, some of whom were starting to grumble about his dictatorial style.

When Chawinga did make a political stand, he did so once Hastings Banda had returned to Nyasaland to take over the leadership of Congress from the hesitant T.D.T Banda. Bearing an allegiance to Hastings Banda as an individual – who he had first met in London in 1951 when the chief attended the Festival of Britain and where Banda was practicing as a GP[3] – rather than to the idea of the NAC per se, proved useful for Chawinga. When Banda returned to Nyasaland in July 1958, Hewe was one of the first places he went to hold a rally[4] and he selected the chief to join him in Ghana at the All Africa Peoples Conference in December 1958, and then in London as his chiefly representative during the federal review process in 1960. Interestingly this decision to associate more overtly with the nationalists once Banda returned did not appear to concern the local administration too much. They seemed rather nonchalant about Chawinga's political dealings, probably realising that the ability he had to keep his people in check was too precious an asset to endanger in an atmosphere of great tension across the Northern Province.

Bearing in mind that chapter three has already analysed the structural threats to chieftaincy, this chapter will concentrate on how Chawinga managed to contain the challenges to his leadership whilst chiefs around him struggled to do the same during this eventful period of time (1952-1960); and how he negotiated his way through the myriad political alliances which each promised to protect the future of native authorities in different ways. Two key diplomatic moments sandwich this period, the discussions around federation in 1952-1953 and the arrangements for the 1960 federal review process; in these historical moments many chiefs entered into politics publicly for the first time, officially articulating their loyalties in correspondence, as part of delegations, and in resignations tendered. What becomes clear, however, is that it was not chiefs' interactions with national level politics that would see their future secured, more often than not what happened between chiefs and the local party faithful at these times was far more crucial in determining how their relationship with the future Malawi Congress Party would be shaped. The situation of local politics in Hewe was no exception; it is through this lens of analysis that the shifting fortunes of chiefs such as Chawinga ought to be examined, rather than through the endless changes which took place from 1952 to 1960 at the national level of both the party and the government.

Part one. Chiefs can no longer be kept out of politics

Fractured alliances and shifting agendas

In May 1953 the position which people in the Northern Province took in regard to the Nyasaland African Congress could best be described as "fluid"; a position which reflected the

organisation's own turmoil. A varying degree of opposition to the non-cooperation tactics that elements of Congress had been urging people to participate in as a protest against the dreaded Federation was noted, with most agreeing that the suggestion of a boycott of the Queen's Coronation celebrations in June was in particularly "bad taste".[5] The previous six months had been times of great uncertainty for native authorities, many of whom had tried to avoid taking sides by doing what Chawinga did, attempt to act purely as a figurehead for their people, trying to voice only their people's opinion. This did not stop members of Congress from trying to turn chiefs towards their agenda and they worked on identifying the ones that were more easily persuaded to follow than others. John Hardy Gondwe, Themba Chikulamayembe, was approached as one such susceptible character. In April 1953 he had assured the Provincial Commissioner that he would warn all his people not to have anything to do with Congress, but by June he showed the first signs of rebellion. He is reported to have turned up four hours late to his own meeting and to have insisted that the District Development Committee and Education Committee were to be boycotted, as well as the Coronation celebrations and Provincial Council.[6] Further north, Chief Kyungu in Karonga was reported to have "slipped into the hands of local Congress members", and M'mbelwa to the south was already working at a senior level within the organisation, with his "main motive" appearing to be "self-aggrandisement based on self-government".[7]

There is little evidence to show that local members of Congress set their sights directly on Timothy as a prospective ally in this their earliest non-cooperation campaign. The only source which shows that Chawinga rejected outright a call to boycott official meetings is his response to Chikulamayembe's letter which was an instruction to him to follow in his example; to this "Katumbi tore up the letter and said he would use his own judgement. Later, Katumbi and his councillor the Rev. Amin Msowoya attended the meetings".[8] In the context of the bitter rivalry between the two chiefs this declaration of independence says rather more about local tensions than broader political affiliations.

However, paying heed to local politics and being influenced by the local agricultural and economic situation likely formed a large part of all chiefs decisions in this regard, a dynamic that can be illustrated by the desperate vacillation which many of them displayed when it came to actually seeing through what their grand public statements suggested they would. When the resignation of eight chiefs was reported in the British press on the 12th of June 1953, it seemed as though Congress' plans to capture the chiefs was working. However, the decision to pursue non-cooperation tactics made by Chief Mwase and "his followers" – which included preventing their people from being recruited as labourers to South Africa and distancing themselves from any decisions taken by the Legislative Council[9] - belied the more complex matrix of options and restraints which chiefs faced. The fact that two of these rebellious chiefs retracted their resignations just days later and that at the same time an official chiefs' council passed determined resolutions to continue working with the Government and not to heed Mwase and Congress show that a range of choices, each with their own benefits, presented themselves to native authorities at this time.

After what seemed to have been a successful couple of months of recruitment the interest in Congress from earlier in the year dropped off significantly when good food harvests and a bumper crop of tobacco and cotton dissipated the building tension in April and May 1953. Decisions were also affected by the changing diplomatic situation; when the Secretary of State for Colonies visited, for example, and gave fresh assurance that federation wouldn't mean the loss of land for Africans the mood was also considerably lightened. It should be remembered that the general atmosphere in the country at this time, even just prior to federation, was not

one where angry anti-Government feeling dominated. As one senior official noted after having been away for some time, the "friendly attitude" of Africans towards him surprised him on his return to Nyasaland in June, especially having heard that things were taking a turn for the worst.[10]

For some Africans the question of federation itself had not even been settled, this was especially the case in the north where there was plentiful land and the impact of the Natural Resource Ordinance policies had not been so keenly felt. The African civil servants in Karonga might have been very resistant to the idea of federation but their influence was limited. It was reported that in "the rural areas of Karonga the majority of Africans have no definite opinion about federation, many have no knowledge of it, and others frankly confess that they are not interested; several were surprised to learn that federation was not yet an accomplished fact".[11] There is even evidence in the colonial files that there were some farmers in Nkhata Bay and Mzimba who actively *desired* federation; their correspondence expressed the opinion that it would bring better schools, hospital, transport, food and more money[12] and that those chiefs and Congress members who did not want it were protesting on account of their concern for their own positions rather than the welfare of their people[13]. Whether these examples demonstrate anything more than government propaganda is difficult to know. What is sure is that this was a time when fragile alliances existed within the nationalist organisation, and between Congress and chiefs. Only a very few number of chiefs could be decisively pinned down as being either firm collaborators, or ardent resisters. The emergence of several other organisations professing to speak for "the people" or better represent native authorities is illustrative of this fragile landscape of shifting allegiances.

"Unconstitutional bodies": the Nyasaland African Convention and Supreme Council

Chief Mwase, one of the most high profile of native authority chiefs, was behind several new "unconstitutional" organisations. It is useful to examine his shifting public inconsistency before comparing how Chawinga himself responded to these dramatic events which were reshaping the landscape of politics in Nyasaland. Having worked enthusiastically as a key member within the Nyasaland African Congress throughout the late 1940s, attending the Victoria Falls Conference to discuss federation in 1951 alongside NAC representatives and campaigning with them to make sure few people were persuaded by the plans to federate, by 1952 Mwase was organising the chiefs separately from the NAC and Protectorate Council; with sometimes confusing consequences.

His first rather contradictory display of behaviour was made in a speech against Congress in 1952. In a letter to the Provincial Commissioner of Central Province he openly derided the organisation for their taking freedom of speech away from the people of Nyasaland. He was unhappy about their "recruitment" tactics which included intimidation designed to frighten chiefs into membership and he told the P.C. that the "chiefs and native authorities are ill-advised; that the organisation will soon take over the Government and that the chiefs and native authorities are to be highly respected that they are now".[14] Despite this rather conciliatory letter towards the government just two days later he also resigned from his official position as native authority; it appeared that he was neither pro-Congress nor pro-government. In the context of a NAC riven with internal conflicts he decided to move to higher ground. He imagined that he might be able to do this by leading *chiefs* in protesting against federation in their own way, with their own agenda.

The first opposition party he started "for the good of my country man and woman" was the Nyasaland African Convention.[15] Leading a number of other members of the African

Protectorate Council to also abandon their official positions, he stated that he had begun forming the organisation because the "time has come for chiefs in Nyasaland to take their own line with regard to federation", and to no longer "follow blindly the lead of Congress".[16] Despite Mwase's firm and persuasive statements, just two months later the impetus of this break-away was lost. Lost in its desire to distance itself from Congress – if this was indeed a serious motivation from the start and not a diversion tactic – and lost in its own "independent" campaign against federation.

The chiefs' conference which Mwase had organised to be held on the 15th and 16th of November 1952 in Lilongwe, was said by him to have been a chiefs-only event, but for observers it was clearly "inspired and directed" by Congress and was full of its representatives who were set on influencing the course of events. At this event a National Chiefs Union was formed, with Mwase as president, and one of its first activities was to organise another delegation to the UK in order to present to the Queen a petition against federation signed by 83 chiefs. Early in the following year the Chiefs Union joined with the NAC and the Protectorate Council to form a joint committee which they named the Supreme Council of Action; in this they advocated Congress inspired non-cooperation tactics.[17] Despite his vocal severing of Congress ties Mwase was evidently still working closely with at least some of its more radical leadership. On the basis of his behaviour as it is reported in colonial records it is difficult to pin down where his true allegiance lay; and this was something that the administration would find increasingly irritating.

Chiefs who had no pressing political agendas of their own to pursue had an easier time of it during the months of April and May 1953 when harvests were good and bumper crops of tobacco and cotton were guaranteed to sell well at market[18]; in such a context political agitation was down to a minimum and chiefs could concentrate on their usual administrative duties. Perhaps it was this lack of impetus among chiefs that led Mwase to become involved with the Supreme Council. It consisted of Chiefs Mwase, M'mbelwa, Gomani and seven other native authority chiefs, plus eight representatives of Congress including Willard Gomani, the very active son of Chief Gomani, and J.R.N. Chinyama, the then current President of the NAC.[19] This organisation was essentially the crucible for the campaigns of civil disobedience which became the characteristic tactic of Congress throughout the 1950s. In May 1953 The Supreme Council took the decision to issue orders, which they pinned on trees and buildings, to boycott Government meetings and practice non-participation in all official activities, this controversially included the Queen of England's coronation celebrations. These orders were accompanied by what the Government described as "widespread" intimidation: this consisted of threats that people who did not participate would have their throats cut, their houses burnt, or witchcraft would be used against them. This the Government found difficult to counter, having few channels to spread their own information among the people.[20]

Whilst Mwase led the calls to boycott and perform acts of civil disobedience it was in fact Chief Gomani – encouraged by his son Willard and their close association with the radical minister the Reverend Michael Scott – who became the most famous of all chiefs who participated in these protests. The Natural Resource Ordinance had had a big impact in Ncheu, in which Chief Gomani's chieftaincy was to be found; his was a ready audience who perhaps had not felt the benefit of the good harvests which other areas were experiencing at that time. Working closely with B.W. Matthews Phiri, another member of Congress who was involved with the Supreme Council, and pushed by his son Willard he warned his D.C that should federation come he would personally protest against it by handing back his tax and license books and refusing to undertake his duties. A fierce non-cooperation campaign was fought in Ncheu and Gomani was the first chief to be deposed on account of it.[21] Unrest also took place elsewhere in

the south: in Thyolo, Mulanje, Port Herald, Chikwawa and the Lower Shire; blame was put on the instability of native administration in these areas and on the tensions which the forced labour tenancy system of *Thangata* had fermented.[22] It also forced new fractures between those who believed that violence was needed to overcome federation and those who could not justify the death of Africans in order to attain secession.

The decision of people to follow either their chiefs and/or Congress' lead was not really an ideological one for most of the population or indeed for their customary leaders; this remains another aspect of this time. Some people were rather suspicious of their chiefs' motives for wanting independence, and made the suggestion that their chiefs were only fighting for freedom from the colonial regime so as to secure their own future and that they would not think twice about acting against the interests of their people once this was attained. They were convinced that once an African government gave them the space to fill the positions of their entourage with whomsoever they wanted they would immediately select only friends and relatives for the jobs. For this reason freedom from the colonial administration was, for these people, simply not worth fighting for; they were a much tougher crowd for the nationalists to appeal to.[23]

Mwase's resignation in June, along with seven of his compatriots[24] was retracted soon afterward it was submitted. His decision to do so was understood by the administration to be the actions of "a worried man" who was "trying desperately to keep a foot in the Government camp".[25] The message he was sending out to the population, to other chiefs, and to the government was decidedly unclear; behaviour which suggests how difficult it was to be firmly in either one camp or the other:

> *"He campaigned to boycott the celebrations, yet at the last moment he produced an address of loyalty on behalf of the Africans in his area, and also sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, asserting his loyalty to the Queen. On the 19th of June however he took a prominent part in an attempt to prevent Africans from seeing a coronation film".*[26]

Other active members of the Supreme Council also began to get jittery. Strangely Chief M'mbelwa became more co-operative with the Government than he had been for some time, organising a very successful early tax drive in his area in June. The government's interpretation was that he had done this so as to avoid the embarrassment if Congress later pressed for non-collection of tax as a form of non-cooperation.[27] The difficult position of these chiefs was certainly appreciated by the administration but they did not believe that there was any excuse for disloyal behaviour or for "the formation of a quite unconstitutional body such as the Supreme Council and, through this, association with Congress in its call to, and campaign of, civil disobedience".[28] The government had come to the end of its tether with Mwase in particular who they charged in no small measure with "the bloodshed, waste of money, and damage to race relations"[29] which the non-cooperation measures brought about:

> *"He must now realise, and accept, that he will have to stand on one side of the road or the other, and that if he is officially to resume his office he must finally abandon his past policy of vacillation and in sincerity, for Government cannot tolerate it in a Native Authority".*[30]

So too had another group of chiefs come to the end of their appreciation of him. At a meeting of 15 senior chiefs and Native Authorities in the Southern Province, delegates passed firm resolutions not to break any laws made by the Government, and a group of chiefs from Chikwana and Port Herald sent a message to the Provincial Commissioner, "we will not allow

Mwase or Congress to give us orders".[31] One thousand people gathered at N.A. Chikowi's headquarters for an anti-Supreme Council meeting on 24th June, including Chiefs Katunga (of Chikwawa), Ntondeza (of Thyolo), Chitera (of Blantyre), Chimombo (of Thyolo), Kuntembwe (of Chikwawa) and Ngabu (of Chikwawa); most of whom would be later punished by their people for "these acts of treachery".[32]

On the 10th of October, amid these tensions, Mwase decided to withdraw his *third* resignation; this was just another confirmation in the eyes of the administration that he was both "a master of duplicity" and a chief who was easily led.[33] This was not the last that would be heard of Mwase; he went on to play an extremely important role advising the young leadership of the more radical Congress and he saw out the Emergency emerging as more heroic than spineless, however it is difficult to get a sense of what might have happened to him in Banda's Malawi as he died soon after the Emergency in 1962.

Keep on consulting and we'll go on co-operating!

Although he was known to have been a good friend of Chief Mwase, Timothy Chawinga kept a low profile throughout the tumultuous period just prior to federation. His name did not come up as either someone who was obviously loyal to the Government or as someone who signed up to the activities of the Supreme Council. He did make his views on federation very explicit however. At the end of 1952 a special meeting of the African Protectorate Council was held. Chaired by Fox-Strangways the Secretary for African Affairs, it had been called in order to choose and brief representatives to attend the London conference to discuss federation in January 1953. Attending as one of seven delegates from the north Chawinga made his opinion on this matter clear:

> *"If we agree to the suggestion that we send delegates to England it will mean that we are not representing the wishes of our people [who are opposed to Federation] […] we have reached the stage when we feel that there is nothing good in the federation scheme, […] I feel that had there been anything in it to benefit Africans, and had we continued to oppose it as in fact we have done, the scheme would have been dropped long ago simply because we did not want it".*[34]

This is, however, one of the very few public statements from Chawinga. Like most members of the African Protectorate Council he was opposed to the federation in principle and in detail and did not wish to participate in any forum that would be discussing the matter in any seriousness due to the disappointments which had occurred when chiefs had attempted to have their voices heard on previous occasions.[35] Several witnesses confirmed that he did not hold back from expressing his political position amongst his friends, teachers and colleagues in Hewe,[36] but he would never be drawn into a public debate about it. His name is notably absent in all of the political intelligence reports during this time and seems not to appear on lists where chiefs political affiliations were known. He continued to work through the "proper channels", which he knew still gave him the best opportunity of getting the things done he wanted to get done in Hewe, and in giving him chances to have his voice heard the loudest and most effectively. The 1950s were, overwhelmingly, years where he committed himself to his administrative role as native authority and the period of federation was arguably when he was at the height of his powers.[37] As the previous chapter showed he excelled in organising agricultural activities during the federation period, and he wasn't in any hurry to jeopardize the socially and economically important position that he had attained as an honorary game warden. The 1955 Annual report on Native Administration summed up his achievements as follows:

> *"In Rumpi District, Chief Katumbi completed another year of efficient administration in his area. In June he attended the ceremonial parade in Zomba on the occasion of the Queen's birthday, in order to receive from His Excellency the Queen's Medal for Chiefs in silver gilt, which had been awarded to him the previous year. Chief Katumbi was appointed a member of the Provincial Natural Resources Board and was largely responsible for the proposal that the Vwaza Marsh area should become a controlled shooting area. In May, [he was] also responsible for starting a welfare hall building in Katowo".*[38]

In this same year his achievements were even reported in the vernacular newspaper Msimbi; an enthusiastic write-up sent in by the clerk at the Hewe post office, Chakhalira Chilembo about the plentiful harvest in Hewe was deemed a sufficiently important success story to be published.[39] Perhaps being able to maintain a reputation as an efficient and cooperative chief at this time when Congress was thought to have been harassing and intimidating the whole of the countryside was easier than might have previously been thought. The combination of Chawinga's territorial success which had brought him some independence, as the previous chapter explained, and the internal crises which beset the nationalist camp, ensured that the Nyasaland African Congress was not an overwhelming force in Hewe.

The early 1950s were notoriously difficult years for the NAC. The organisation was at a "particularly low ebb", its leadership "lacked unity and seemed to have lost its sense of purpose and direction" especially since the financial scandals and rumours of embezzlement which rocked the executive in the late 1940s created division and distrust.[40] With no strong leadership the campaigns against federation ran along factional lines and chiefs could strategically choose to shift their allegiances as the balance of power altered between the various main stakeholders. In this milieu there was opportunity for chiefs to take a lead of their own, as the example of Mwase showed. With no resolution on how to tackle the future of constitutional reform – which resolutions were enough for the African people and what were acceptable lengths to go to in order to get them – the "nationalist struggle" evidently had assumed a variegated and regionally specifically character. This character would continue even after the party was reinvigorated by the raft of young men who had been educated outside of Nyasaland. Chipembere, Chiume and Chisiza indeed brought a different perspective and a more radical strategy. By the mid-1950s Congress was more organised and determined not to make compromises. In 1957 under the leadership of T.D.T Banda the more moderate positions were no longer tolerated. Achieving anything less than secession and independence was not even contemplated, and Congress undertook this campaign by applying pressure on the government to increase the number of Africans in both the legislature and executive. This was considered by the leadership to be crucial and they worked hard for this change at the national level as they feared if this was not achieved in advance of the Federal Review conference which was to be held in London in July 1960 then an unrepresentative body of men would be left to decide the future of the people of Nyasaland.

However, whilst the organisation had clearly become a lot more focused since 1953, especially in terms of maintaining a strong leader at their helm – this began by getting rid of Chinyama in 1953, then Sangala in 1956, and then eventually T.D.T Banda in 1958 to make way for the return of Dr Banda[41] – "on the ground" the local branches generally remained weak, except in places where tensions created by colonial and federal policy did exist (this is borne out by the extreme reactions that people had towards their chiefs in Southern Province where land was scarcer and agricultural measures since 1949 had taken their toll)[42] or in places where the

more powerful Congress leaders had a specific attachment. As Kalinga points out, "even when Chiume, Bwanausi and others began to organize congress at grass roots level they did so at regular intervals but only in specific areas, usually in or near their homes or places of work".[43] Often the first chair-people of Congress branches in the local setting were the less radical clerks and ministers who had graduated from Livingstonia, most of whom were committed to working through the traditional forums (in Hewe the Reverend Levi Kaleya was the first branch chairperson). In such a situation plenty of chiefs continued to go on working through official forums as they had always done, with little retribution; branch meetings were more often places of sedate discussion about politics than radical interpretations of nationalism. Along with the chiefs they generally found their own less overt ways of resisting the excesses of colonial rule.

Chawinga's attitude was rather: if you keep consulting us chiefs about the matters of local and national importance, then we will keep co-operating with you whoever you are. He knew the benefit of working through official forums, especially because decisions made in small local arenas had the potential to affect change if they continued to be fed into higher levels of policy making. Working within the system did not mean that he did not vocally challenge how he thought it ought to be run, as the minutes of a meeting of the African Protectorate Council in 1952 reveal. At this meeting he was adamant that any legislation which affected African interests and was to be discussed at the Legislative Council should first be submitted to these local forums; if the Government introduces a law without consulting us, he warned, it "will affect the cooperation of the people".[44] This was surely a way of safeguarding his own position as a contributor to the law making processes as much as it was a symbolic stance on behalf of his people. As major changes took place in the local government system he lamented the effects that this would have. When from 1956 Provincial Council resolutions were no longer passed through the African Protectorate Council he flagged up his concern. This process ought to be restored he said because "when Provincial Councils had something to suggest to Government it would carry more weight if it was forwarded through Protectorate Council, as it would show that the four councils were unanimous in their views"; it was his worry that if only the Northern Province African Provincial Council asked for something from Government, "the request would not be treated as well as if it had been submitted by all the Provincial Councils through the Protectorate Council".[45] For understandable reasons Chawinga wanted chiefs to have control over as many of the decision making processes as possible[46] and when there were moves to curb this participation he was very vocal about it.

The local government milieu has been largely ignored as a place where sympathies were won and lost, but this was an important battleground especially as the changes in legislation opened up the system of native administration to political elements. Working through government channels to gain an advantage through grassroots support was a tactic not only pursued by Chawinga; Congress leadership also drew its influence and authority from these arenas. The Local Government (District Council) Ordinance was passed in 1954; granting them the right to sit on the councils as ex-officio members it was designed to bolster the role of chiefs who whilst they lost the power to make rules, retained responsibility for law and order, tax collection and land distribution. Reforms to local government also enabled activists to gain a foothold in the local administration,[47] especially after a revision in the constitution of protectorate and provincial councils which increased the quota for African members saw Congress win all five of the new seats available.[48]

Whilst these shifts in local political representation had the potential to undermine native authorities, Chawinga continued to keep a firm grip on his administration. In 1955 and 1956, for example, he successfully held, on his own initiative, courses for his village headmen "at

which he lectured them about various aspects of Government activities and explained the categories into which village headmen had recently been graded".[49] The question is: *how did he manage to maintain this stance without jeopardizing his authority with his people as happened with many other chiefs?* This thesis continues by arguing that in the period leading up to the Emergency Chawinga maintained both credibility and control on account of three main factors: the nature of his relationship with state officials and Hewe's place in the colonial economy; Chawinga's maintenance and strengthening of tradition in the local setting; and on account of the limited economic threats to his authority. During the period of the Emergency itself the way in which he was able to successfully fulfill the expectations of both his people – customarily – and the state – by helping maintain its sovereignty – was crucial to his survival.

Part two. Maintaining credibility and control in crisis

Before the Emergency: maintaining good relationships and adhering to "custom"

As the previous chapter has explored, the content and technique of colonial policies were experienced differently on account of the personalities of those involved – African and European – the economic context into which they were brought, and the influence of the local political milieu. "Pockets of militarization"[50] might have presented the state, and the scholar, with a particular narrative of decolonization, but this was by no means the common experience. The population's reaction to chiefs' behaviour was based in many different factors; whether or not they were collaborators with the colonial state was generally quite far down the list. As such keeping on the right side of the administration during the years of decolonization did not necessarily condemn native authorities to deposition later on. As more empirical cases of chiefs are drawn up it will surely become clear that their future security could not at all be predicted simply on their choice of whether to follow Congress or follow the Government but rather in relation to the relationships they cultivated and maintained in the local setting.

Another of Chawinga's strengths was that he excelled in using tradition and custom to his advantage. The alienation which traditional councillors felt in Chikulamayembe's area was visceral and damaging; by choosing to consult the Reverend Edward Manda over and above the elders he alienated a potentially powerful body of people .[51] Chawinga, having been advised by another Livingstonia trained minister, the Rev. Isaac Khunga, was warned that he should develop a very diplomatic and inclusive stance when it came to dealing with the elders in his own chieftaincy. Although Khunga died at the end of 1952 his legacy to Chawinga was an important one: he knew the history of the chieftaincy extremely well and he impartially guided the chief through the Chawinga family politics and potentially damaging clan rivalries.[52] The longest serving headman Chembe Mfune, who was also a contemporary of Chawinga's, remembered:

> *"Kamangilira followed the chiefly line and paid great attention to tradition. When people would choose a chief, before he was crowned by the Themba his credentials would be checked by Kamangilira to make sure he was of chiefly line and he would be crowned only after this had been 'proved'. Amongst his own family whenever there was a quarrel he would act the same as with everyone; he played no favouritism amongst the clans".*[53]

Within the royal family itself another key figure who played a large role in guiding Timothy through the minefield of succession and chiefly disputes was the Village Headman Thanila.

People in Hewe remember that he was passed over as a candidate for the Katumbi chieftaincy himself only on account of his limited education which was deemed by the 1930s a prerequisite to rule. This did not appear to sour his relationship with Timothy, however, with whom he worked closely as an adviser. He was seen to be such a stabilizing factor in the area that he was chosen on a number of occasions to act as chief Katumbi for interim periods; for the first time just before Timothy's crowning and then again after the sudden death of a couple of chiefs in more recent times.

What was of some additional help to Chawinga, in contrast to the situation Chiefs Muyombe, Chikulamayembe and Kyungu found themselves in, was the fact that there were many fewer headmen and councillors for Katumbi to manage[54] and at least up until independence he did a good job of keeping everyone of them on-side.[55] His relative youth and flexibility also meant that he did not fall prey to more radical or more conservative elements unlike some of his contemporary native authorities who were more easily co-opted on account of their infirmities or lack of education.[56] There may have been the odd disgruntled individual here and there but no significant party organisation to rival the leadership of Timothy emerged at this time in Hewe, neither did he allow the necessary space to open for new politicized elements to infiltrate the chiefly organization and co-opt disenfranchised traditional elements into their movements, at least not until the late 1960s when these tensions, backed by stronger central party support and resources – as well as the Malawi Young Pioneers – eventually gave Timothy some cause for concern.

Internal tensions within chieftaincies created dangerous spaces in which people with radical agendas could enter. Although the national political context was a little different, the ways in which emerging party political elements thread themselves into the Muyombe Chieftainship across the border in Northern Rhodesia – a chieftaincy which had shared much in terms of historical experience with the Katumbi chieftaincy[57] - demonstrates how well Timothy Chawinga held together the different agendas of his people in Hewe. In the kingdom of Uyombe, "where there was widespread dissatisfaction with the chief's policies",[58] the young nationalist leaders were able to exploit it and set up in opposition to Chief Muyombe. They chose not to oppose the chief directly but rather induced his disaffected personal advisors and traditional councillors – key members of the ruling stratum – to join them, co-opting them into these emerging local party structures; as Bond highlights in his detailed ethnography, "the support of these powerful senior men was thought to be necessary to give the movement legitimacy".[59] Essentially the local branch of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) found itself in a position to crystallize the long-standing opposition against the chief and provided "a channel through which popular discontent could be expressed",[60] a discontent which would lead to the creation of a new post of Deputy Chief (taken up by Edwall Muwowo) a position which the party leaders infiltrated and thus became "important figures in the political life of the chiefdom",[61], participating in the structures of traditional legitimacy. Such tactics were not uncommon across the continent during decolonization. In Ghana, Rathbone notes that in a good number of cases "rural Party branches were actually founded by members of embittered, losing factions (of the chiefly clan). Local grievances could now be re-written as elements of a national campaign. Aggrieved factions now used the relatively sophisticated resources of local Party branches to harass their opponents […] In case after case it seems that the formation of rural branches of the CPP (the Congress People's Party) almost always coincided with a long-standing rural struggle for chieftaincy".[62]

Disenfranchised elements of chiefly clans might have benefitted from nationalist support but they also did not want to lose out on achieving the crucially important local

relevance. When the new Deputy Chief Edwall Muwowo introduced the Vinkakanimba ceremony in 1965, it was done so in order to shore up the chieftaincy's position in a landscape of political and social uncertainty. Bond noted that the introduction of this celebration of the arrival of the first royal chief by Muwowo had what he could see were several aims which besides from an attempt to gain popularity, meant he could "emphasize the position of the royal clan as the rightful rulers vis-à-vis the new politicians […] Within the framework of the royal clan it would reinforce the claims of the descendants of Vinkakanimba, and it would bring the residents of the chiefdom to the capital, emphasizing it as the political and, for many, the religious center of the chiefdom".[63] Interestingly this chiefly celebration was known to have been directly inspired by Chawinga's Mulindafwa ceremony which had been first introduced some eleven years earlier in 1954.[64]

Chawinga's constructed "timeless ceremonial tradition"[65] was designed to publicly circulate the narrative of his chieftaincy's historical legitimacy, as well as its continued relevance, and people were invited to attend from neighbouring chieftaincies as well as officials from the government so that its message could resonate beyond the territory itself. Behind the story and the symbol there were a collaboration of chiefs, advisors and councillors who had been re-writing history in order to shape collective memory as a tool to define their place in the polity.[66] The focal point of the celebration and the central symbol of royal sovereignty was the "Mulindafwa Stone"; a symbol immediately picked up on by the Nyasaland Times in which an article was published on the 12th November 1957 which presented the comparison of this stone with that of the Stone of Destiny (or Stone of Scone),[67] used since 1057 at the inauguration of all Scottish monarchs and then from 1296, after being captured by Edward I of England, by all English monarchs.[68] The article went on to describe the provenance of the symbol and how its history was performed at the ceremony; "The legend is that when the chief climbed to the top of Themba Hill to survey his new domain he sat on the stone. It was carried in procession through the main street at the present chief's headquarters during the celebration and was loudly acclaimed when Chief Katumbi held it high for all to see".[69] Staying in control of his future saw Chawinga insisting upon continual reference to the past, and to the importance of tradition as a legitimizing dynamic in his local authority.[70]

The final important aspect which limited the damage to his authority during the lead up to the Emergency was that the local economy in Hewe had not provided much opportunity for the accumulation of substantial wealth; a crucial prerequisite for any potential challenger to Chawinga. Whilst it is certainly true that through various labour migration strategies the number of people who ran small businesses in Hewe did steadily increase in number throughout the 1950s (see tables 1 and 2), in contrast to places in Karonga, for example, where significant gains were being made by individuals involved in domestic cash cropping, individuals in Hewe were however quite unable to economically threaten their chief. The idea that the colonial economy "altered productive activity"[71] in the countryside and thus also affected "the basis" of customary rule is much lauded but cannot be argued as being a universal dynamic (of wealth displacing or transforming customary authority); it is certainly not the case in the Hewe Valley. Furthermore the notion that it also "violated the logic of indirect rule by displacing people from their village economies into the paid labor force […] withdrawing villagers from the moral and physical authority of the customary order" and creating "masterless men",[72] is also perhaps overstated in the literature. Certainly in the case of Hewe, where there is not enough evidence to show that this was the case, this *general* increase in wealth and other dynamics associated with labour migration seemed to have little significant effect on the production of Chawinga's authority.

Timothy's image was more in danger of being dented by particular individuals' rather than from a society wide increase in wealth. One character Abraham "Supply" Munthali, whose activities will be discussed at greater length in the final section of this chapter, was able to accumulate substantial profits from his carpentry business and must have been an annoyance to Chawinga because he was able to demonstrate patterns of patronage, consumption and respectability that sometimes went beyond the chief himself. Given that the performance of prestige was vital for his big man status he monitored such threats carefully. In the event, Munthali had no political ambition or desire to usurp authority from the chief; he did not conform to the patterns of businessmen who were becoming involved in politics elsewhere in the region so was unlikely to have used the Emergency to his advantage.

What did the chiefs do next? Maintaining "order" during the Emergency

Dr Banda returned to Nyasaland in July 1958 to lead the NAC through a long process of diplomatic negotiations with the Governor Robert Armitage and the Secretary of State for Colonies Lennox-Boyd about constitutional change.[73] With nothing resolved after six months the pressure on Banda to deliver something positive to an expectant and agitated population awaiting some change grew. The radical leaders who had called Banda back but had vowed to throw him out should he divert from the strategy of the party grew concerned that he would start to make compromises on their behalf. Furthermore because he rarely divulged any detail about these meetings to the population, who were hanging on Congress promises, they too began to worry that he would leave them in a more difficult situation than before. This was certainly the concern of many chiefs who expressed their fears that their own future constitutional role would not be secured by Banda. The atmosphere in the country began to take a turn for the worse and Armitage warned Lennox-Boyd in October 1958 that something would happen in the country in or before 1960.[74]

In the meantime, these fears about Banda's potential to compromise on constitutional reform were also being picked up on by Youens, the Chief Secretary, and interpreted as a vulnerable point worth pressing.[75] In the event Banda was willing to shift his position on having a majority in the executive council but in January 1959 he told Youens that he was determined to attain a majority in the legislature, a resolve which may have been strengthened by his attendance at the All African People's Conference which was held in Accra in December 1958 and at which the necessity of using violence against the colonial state was discussed; from this time onwards Youens was convinced that Banda in fact *wanted* to go to jail. In Nyasaland non-cooperation reached new heights at the end of 1958 and agricultural orders were widely disobeyed; in order to control the imminent threat to order whilst Banda was away in Ghana new measures were brought in to deal more harshly with the protestors.[76] Banda came back to his country buoyed up by pan-Africanist rhetoric and told his people that they should be ready to be imprisoned, as he was, for the sake of freedom.[77] Whilst Chipembere made threatening speeches warning people that if they sided with Europeans in the times of crises then they would feel the wrath of Congress Banda kept up the public appearance that he was not in favour of violence. The lack of resolution to the constitutional amendments eventually led to an ungovernable situation where a State of Emergency became inevitable.

The political fallout from the Emergency was felt at many levels but especially among the chiefs whose response to the crisis had serious implications for their legitimacy, as well as in relation to the moral authority both Banda and the party gained on account of their high profile participation in the struggle. Banda began his conversion into the father of the nation whilst he was incarcerated in Gweru prison in Southern Rhodesia, and the support for the party from

amongst the grass roots grew exponentially after the Emergency. The Malawi Congress Party was born out of the ashes of the banned and divided Nyasaland African Congress at the end of 1959, whilst the Emergency regulations were still in place. With the help of its active youth league, the support of women and much better organisation at the provincial and district levels, the number of local branches grew from 52 in December 1959, to 77 one month later, reaching an incredible 223 by February 1960 only three months after its inception[78] and something like a quarter of million members.[79] In the light of these changes the outcomes of the conference to discuss the federal constitution, held in London in July 1960, were destined to swing much more in favour of the Africans, at least as far as the Nyasaland delegation was concerned. Before the discussion turns to look a little at the make-up of the delegations who attended the conference, and how chiefs became politically involved in this debate, it is necessary to make some suggestions as to why certain chiefs maintained credibility with their people during the Emergency, and why others did not.

First it is useful to start such a discussion by emphasizing that the government had resolved to deal with native authorities in the Northern Province differently to those in the south and central regions where pro-Congress chiefs could be much more easily deposed. Youens made it clear that action against native authorities in the north ought to be undertaken with extreme caution as here "all chiefs are anti-federation and it would be dangerous to adopt any preventative measures against them";[80] memories of the aftermath of Gomani's arrest in 1953 played on the government's mind and it was assumed that the arrest of any out-spoken chiefs would end in disaster.[81] Chiefs might have all been anti-federation but what has emerged from the few studies that have been done on specific native authorities in the Northern Province is that in the eyes of their people this was less relevant than the way in which they acted during the chaotic and unsettling time of the State of Emergency. Both Kachapila-Mwazizwa and Kalinga have argued that chiefs in Nkhata Bay and Karonga respectively suffered a loss of popular support after the Emergency because they failed to live up to the "customary responsibilities" that their people had for them at this time.[82] It was at this time, when the nominal support of the state failed them, that bubbling crises of local legitimacy came to a head.

Peter Mwakasungula, Chief Kyungu in Old Karonga District, had always worked well "*within the system* as the main spokesman of the people of the northern portion of the Karonga lakeshore"[83] defending his people against certain excesses of colonial rule, however the manner in which he attempted to solve the problematic situation during the Emergency did not resonate well with Ngonde custom and tradition. The expectations the local people had of their leader was to be "their defender and promoter of harmony in the body politic […] The key issue was that during the crisis many of his people no longer perceived him as their champion; in their view, he had encouraged discord, and had failed to lead them at that crucial time".[84] In Hewe, on the contrary, it is remembered that "Kamangilira […] rescued us from [the Colonial government]" during the Emergency. He had explained to his people that they should not fear the whites because "if they did anything we would get rid of them".[85] In Old Karonga local political leaders were quick to pick up on the increasingly conservative acts of Kyungu and emphasised his opposition to decolonization. In doing this they caused major splits in the aristocracy and amongst the headmen.[86] In Hewe there was no significantly well organized younger political elite ready to take advantage of the dilemma which the logic of indirect rule created for their chief at this time, furthermore the disenfranchisement amongst the old elite – a key element bolstering authority amongst *Balowoka* chieftainships like Katumbi – which had been a necessary factor in building the legitimacy of new political cadres in the countryside had not taken place in Hewe as it had done in other areas.

In this context, the popular memories of Chawinga's behaviour during the State of Emergency in Hewe, the heroic scene that was recounted at the very introduction of the thesis, indicate that at this crucial moment he responded to the core of his people's needs. People in Hewe accepted the contradictory behaviour which Timothy displayed; with no one to point out his weakness he was able to hold these tensions, and this seeming paradox, from undermining him. He did this a great deal more successfully than some of his compatriots. "He was partly for the people, partly for the government" said Lyton Karua of Chawinga's actions at this time.[87] Samson Mumba confirmed this contradiction he was able to maintain: "Kamangilira was working with the government but when he came back to his people he was telling them to do bad things to the government".[88] The Government officials on the other hand also had had enough experience of his local authority to believe Timothy when he was able to promise that his area would be returned to calm, so much so that they released him from custody not long after his arrest during the Emergency; when the priority of the colonial officials – who themselves had always had some concerns about the benefits for Nyasaland of federation[89] - was not so much the prevention of secession, but rather the maintenance of order, and the desire to maintain the monopoly over violence within their boundaries. In this regard, Chawinga was the perfect man for the job. The benefits of his maintenance of territorial control extended to the colonial state as he had persuaded his own people not to go with guns to the Boma at Rumphi.[90] He was a useful chief as far as the colonial administration was concerned yet in the local setting he was also a defiant chief with his people's interests at heart.

The rather flamboyant sacrificial image that the 'line in the sand' rumours from the State of Emergency continually reiterate goes beyond the notion that this was a chief doing his duty in the face of grave danger though.[91] It serves as an extremely effective piece of public relations. The rumour presents a definable moment which is easily narrated as proof of leadership qualities; it resonates with other stories of individual heroic defiance in the history of resistance spoken and written throughout the world, not least the representations of Banda's own acts of valor undertaken for the sake of the Nyasaland people. Chawinga gained much from this moment, it was an opportunity to improve his image and regain some much required humility in the face of a growing number of accusations of selfishness. This narrative has had a powerful effect, and the represented actions of this chief have been oft-recounted throughout the Valley as a confirmation not only of this chief's bravery but also his legitimacy.[92]

Practically things did start to change for Chawinga after the Emergency however. For a while he was able to maintain the territorial behaviour which had been enabled by the colonial state as well as by using the techniques for local legitimacy described above; in these ways he kept a lid on discontent, something which his association with Banda helped to contribute towards. However, once colonial state sovereignty was weakened after the 1961 elections, at which the MCP won a landslide victory, new threats emerged, some of which he was able to successfully counter and others which would begin to test his leadership skills more fundamentally. His strong personality politics, which thrived in the setting of indirect rule, eventually fell out of favour with the local branch leadership of the MCP who began to contest his territorial hold on Hewe.

Part three. After the Emergency, new landscapes of discontent

One of Banda's chiefs

As chiefs in the surrounding areas appeared to be losing everything on account of their co-operation with Government, Chawinga seemed more determined to be seen to implement their plans. After the Emergency had been declared Chief Mwenewenya was sent for by the District Commissioner of Karonga. He arrived at the D.C's camp who reported that "his clothes were dirty, his face unshaven and he had been drinking. He took no heart from our visit since he knew we would leave at once and if he identified himself with us he would be condemned by the politicians (…) I wanted him to be encouraged by my visit, by showing our flag. But he knew that the old authority – ours and his – was gone".[93] At the other end of the country in the Lower Shire Chief Tengani was undergoing his own crisis in authority; labelled by Congress as "the quintessential collaborationist chief", his court was eventually boycotted by his people in 1962, "and he was left with no option but to resign".[94] In the midst of this "political strain" and partial boycotting, Timothy Chawinga was still receiving praise, for example on account of his excellent chairmanship of the education committee which he kept running smoothly, reaching "sound decisions" in 1960.[95] Such behaviour seems to suggest that Chawinga was more aligned to the conciliatory attitude of the African members of the Legislative Council than the new radical Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and its new Secretary General Aleke Banda who had assumed the role following the imprisonment of much of the leadership.

As the majority of Africans prepared to boycott the Monckton Commission in January 1960,[96] Chinyama, a former President of the NAC who had himself condemned the non-cooperation riots in 1953 and since 1956 taken up an official position in the Legislative Council, and T.D.T. Banda who after also having been ousted from the leadership of the NAC formed the short-lived Congress Liberation Party (CLP), rather urged them not to, saying that it would be a mistake for people to decide not to give evidence. The rallying cry from the newly formed MCP was that the Commission's terms of reference were simply not wide enough to accommodate the possibility of secession from federation, and furthermore that the continued incarceration of Dr. Hastings Banda following the Emergency put him at a great disadvantage for properly preparing their case for the constitutional review process.

The MCP believed that whilst the State of Emergency was still in place it was "impossible for Africans to consult freely and to know how rank and file thinks";[97] it therefore believed the process should not be supported. Wanting nothing less than self-government it had been their strategy to intimidate witnesses to prevent them giving evidence to the Commission as part of their campaign. They were successful in persuading first the politically inclined, and consequently the bulk of the population to stay away from the Monckton Commission. Chiefs boycotted the consultations en masse either on account of their principled unwillingness to be associated with the colonial government or for the more fearful reaction engendered in response to the intimidation tactics. When questioned by the government about their persuasion towards the commission chiefs like Chikulamayembe feigned ignorance.[98] However, whilst Timothy Chawinga was described as being not "at all anxious to attend" the consultations the District Commissioner did manage to persuade him to discuss meeting some of Glyn-Jones' approved list of Monckton Commissioners[99] along with some of his councillors. His preparedness to hold a meeting with his village headmen was noted by the DC in his ulendo diary entry for 4th March 1960, where he concluded that "the issue is still an open one for them".[100]

Chiefs became masters of negotiation during this tumultuous period; most rejected both the clearly pro-colonial stance of Tengani, but few took up the protesting zeal of Gomani, involving themselves instead, as the examples of Chikulamayembe and Katumbi show, "in a delicate set of manoeuvers through which they attempted to avoid risking the displeasure of the government while […] retaining the support of their subjects".[101] Since many Nyasaland officials had their doubts about the fairness of the conditions under which the Monckton Commission took place, most could forgive chiefs' decisions not to take part in the process, but the reappearance of banned agricultural practices and the targeting of farmers taking part in the Master Farmer scheme or in growing tobacco could not be ignored.[102] Whilst reports show that Chawinga continued to perform his duties with "considerable energy in his area", and he "welcomed most government activities", finding the "time and opportunity" said the D.C. to give "active support to the Agricultural and Veterinary Departments" as well as "the affairs of the District Council and its committees",[103] a concomitant general decrease in co-operation from farmers across the northern region was emphasised. An "extensive opening of visoso gardens" and increase in slash and burn cultivation was reported in Rumphi during 1961,[104] as well as a huge increase in tax defaulters,[105] an indication that people no longer felt threatened by the ramifications of undertaking these outlawed practices.

For a short time after the Emergency, when a freer political atmosphere meant rules and orders were much less strictly enforced in the courts, there was more room to demonstrate dissatisfaction with native authorities.[106] Chawinga did not escape this time unscathed, in Hewe he too became the target of criticism. Yet, the accusations leveled at Timothy were oriented around more local matters; his possible involvement in corrupt activities, in particular an alleged embezzlement of funds which had been supposedly contributed to the Native Treasury for the clearing of the airfield at Chiteshe,[107] and his manoeuvering to exploit the game in the Valley whilst denying others the opportunity to manage pest control by owning firearms.[108] He jealously guarded his position and was keen for no one to excel above him in economic or social standing, "he only gave chances to himself to kill game and he wanted to possess everything".[109] His pursuit of objectives with a single-mind might have given rise to his famous praise name but it did not make him popular with everyone; something that emerged for the first time at this juncture.

Some tried their luck in bringing him down after the Emergency. During an ulendo to Hewe in February 1960 the D.C. was met by a villager Benedicto Lonje who openly criticised Timothy with no holds barred, bizarrely attacking him over matters that the government had already concluded that he was extremely competent in. His "enthusiasm for agriculture is very limited" Lonje complained, he called him "backward" and bitterly accused him of holding back others. He railed against the fact that Hewe was now a place "where the chief is more than his people, and must be treated accordingly",[110] something that was no doubt much nearer the mark. Others complained that he didn't grant them their gun licenses, or that he was monopolising the businesses operating at the trading centre, whilst increasingly his judicial decisions were contested by Hewe people who took their cases to the D.C.[111]

These points of contention became much more present in the discussion of his leadership from this time onwards; a notable change from an earlier colonial period where his chieftainship received little internal criticism, at least as far as can be gathered from the colonial records. In the case of Chawinga, the challenges were neither concerned about his cooperation with Congress, nor were they sufficient to affect his local standing at this time, especially since his association with Banda brought him timely relief from these decidedly gentle pressures. From the point of view of the administration his close co-operation with the MCP did not go

unnoticed but, perhaps surprisingly, it is presented by them as neither contradictory nor worrying. His local campaigning was largely ignored by the D.C, one example of which occurred after his ulendo to Mwachibanda at which point he writes that he left Chawinga to "hold a political meeting in a church [...] I only hope I didn't turn a blind eye too obviously".[112] The tone describing his political activities becomes almost congratulatory: on top of all his official work he also managed to "visit England twice as a member of Dr. Banda's political team".[113] His contribution to the sovereignty of the state's monopoly of force surely has to have been one of the main reasons for his continued popularity with the administration.

He may have been a hesitant contributor to the discussions about Nyasaland's future as far as the Monckton Commission was concerned, but when he was chosen by Banda to join him in London as an MCP representative Chawinga could not have been a more willing participant in the process around constitutional reform. It is difficult to know how the relationship between Banda and Chawinga developed in-between 1958 and 1960 but clearly the new leader thought a great deal of the chief. The decision to take chiefs to participate in the Federal Constitutional Review came after long months of native authorities who were concerned that their future position would be in "jeopardy unless they have opportunity to make representations to [the Secretary of State for the Colonies]".[114] It was a confronting process; chiefs still maintained such a wide variety of positions that the choice of which ones would attend necessarily lifted the lid on the box that tried to "keep chiefs out of politics"[115] and directly pit them against one another as official and party representatives. At first it was hoped that putting together an official delegation was the solution which would avoid the chiefs having to obviously take sides. In doing this chiefs acting as advisers or members of party delegations of the United Federal Party (UFP), the Malawi Congress Party and the Congress Liberation Party would be excluded. Chiefs should speak their opinion, agreed the Secretary of State for Colonies but they should do so "in their own right as chiefs, rather than in the capacity of advisers to myself, yourself, or anyone else".[116] In the event, the creation of an "official" delegation only brought the divisions more starkly to a head. Each party argued that their interests could never be adequately represented in such a group and decided that they would each take their "own" chiefs as advisers, something which prompted the Government to have to do the same. The Secretary of State was desperately keen, however, for everything to be done to avoid them appearing as "government" chiefs, as opposed to "Malawi" or "U.F.P" chiefs.[117] However it grew increasingly impossible to maintain the façade that chiefs were apolitical, especially as they themselves wished to be involved in the conference. In this situation they could not safely be denied their role in the discussions;[118] once they started laying their cards on the table it could be quickly seen that they could not be neatly slotted into having either pro- or anti- government positions.

The concern then of those in the leadership of the MCP, namely Orton Chirwa, was that any official delegation might nominally represent the interests of each party but it would not do so in a way which reflected reality; it would be too weighted in favour of the UFP he said and given that "we represent the great majority of the population, we are entitled to the largest delegation".[119] After meeting Banda privately in London before the conference the Secretary of State did eventually manage to persuade him to add an MCP chief on to the official delegation, but whilst it was expected that he would add it from one of the nominated three chiefs which the party was bringing as their advisers,[120] as the others had done, a new member of the team was selected; "on the directions of Dr. Banda, the party has nominated Chief Katumbi of Rumpi as representative for official chiefs delegation".[121] They could do nothing to change his mind on this matter and Chawinga arrived in London, at Government expense, on the 22nd July ready to take part in the conference as one of Banda's chiefs.[122] The selection of Chawinga to undertake

this task is telling not only of his ability to effectively represent party views but also on his diplomatic skill, which was a great asset when having to work alongside other chiefs with differing views, as would be the case with the official delegation.

The personal backing of Chawinga by Banda in this instance guaranteed that his immediate future was secure however in the end it would be in the context of local politics not national acclaim, where his authority would eventually be put in jeopardy. The events around the State of Emergency had created a platform not only for him but for other nationalist heroes to emerge, even if on the very smallest of scales. The local branches of the Malawi Congress Party bristled with ambition, and the politically minded members of the Hewe branch were no exception. People like Jim Ngwira and Jato Kawonga, who had been extremely active in galvanizing the people in their area before the Emergency and who were eventually arrested themselves on the 3rd of March, became notable if diplomatic critics of Chawinga's approach.

Political people in Hewe

Jim Ngwira posed no substantial threat to Chawinga's chiefly authority in the closing years of colonialism but he would eventually become the biggest thorn in the chief's side. Born in 1920, by his teenage years Ngwira had taught himself to repair bicycles and build rudimentary shotguns which he sold to people in the area so that they could control pests in their gardens and hunt game when they needed to. His services were in such great demand that he was asked by the then chief Dukamayere to set up a stall offering his bicycle repair skills in the new trading centre which had built up at Chiteshe.[123] His social and economic position dramatically improved throughout the next couple of decades and once he became a Master Farmer in the mid-1950s his advantages were secured. Under this scheme he was one of the few farmers in Hewe to greatly benefit from the change in policy by the agricultural department to "concentrate on the more progressive elements of the population and not to dissipate its energies on trying to convert the more conservative villagers".[124]

Ngwira explains that he was selected for the scheme because "whenever there was a meeting or a course on agriculture to remind farmers, I was there." His participation increased and before long, by 1956, he was receiving bonuses "of 38 pounds, and a plough".[125] He went to Mbawa training college "to learn about livestock for two weeks […] I learned quickly and the government made us role models for the people". Through this scheme not only did he grow in stature, by 1958 he had accumulated six pairs of oxen for farming in 1958 and was given the opportunity to raise cattle, pigs and goats for milk production and meat on 58 acres of land. Unsurprisingly the benefits to him and his family were significant:

> *"I educated the children; all seven children have secondary school education. I had no problems paying fees, I even sent some daughters to a private primary; we assist girls so they can school safely. I had lots of cattle. After selling a cow I could deposit money to the account of each of the children and the children could learn without any problems. The eldest child went up to university. This house that you see, I paid the builder who built this house a cow. Even though I have worked for the court for 35 years this house I built because of the cattle before I started working. To enable my four sons to marry, it is down to these cattle. When the daughters are getting married I provide a cow for the wedding and those they get married to just wonder".*[126]

The Master Farmers not only received special benefits, they interacted one-on-one with government officials and could by-pass the chiefs on certain matters. This position not only enabled him to establish significant farming activities it brought the motivated and self-made man local respect and extra prominence in the community (as well as the inevitable jealousy). It

was his vocal and active participation in the political battles for independence though which secured his future opportunities as the death knell was rung on colonial rule. Through his activism and eventual arrest by the colonial authorities he gathered the necessary credentials for his future role in the MCP organizational structure.

Having been the MCP District Chairman Ngwira says that he was elected, under the new constitution, to become court magistrate for Hewe in January 1963. He attended a short course which he did well on, so much so that he was sent to college to learn "legal English". By 1967 he took on appeal court duties and became chairman of the District Appeal Court in addition to his day-to-day duties in Hewe he would manage any appeals in the wider district. By assuming the judicial function that had long been in the hands of native authorities his presence was greatly resented by the chief. It is said that Ngwira had a few run-ins with Chawinga in the latter years of his chieftaincy[127] and in relation to Timothy's leadership, though diplomatic, Ngwira did not speak with the same enthusiasm or unreflective praise as most other people did about their former chief; mysteriously he commented that "[Kamangilira] could do some evil things but I wasn't counting".[128] In answer to questions about Chawinga's reaction to this loss of responsibility he avoided answering directly but tellingly his response shows where he knew the power was beginning to lie: "there was no chance for anyone to accept or refuse these things. The law says that an appointment can be revoked any time and you cannot make any appeal […] and this is what happened to the chiefs. The chiefs were very angry but they had no chance because there was nowhere to go instead they were against court proceedings".[129]

Ngwira's story shows that it was possible to navigate an independent path in rural areas where chiefs had reigned supreme. It was not his economic standing that threatened Timothy's position, at least not during the colonial period, his success in creating his own spaces of empowerment through his commercial mindedness – gun making, bicycle repairs and especially farming – meant that he was simply less subjected to the same structures of control as others; he chose not to interact with customary authorities and on account of his economic position this was possible. He had regular correspondence with government officials, this was especially easy for him in his role as Master Farmer in the colonial period, and Magistrate during Independence. Few individuals managed to negotiate themselves into an independent position in Hewe as successfully as Ngwira had done.

Another character who was on less than amicable terms with Timothy during the years of early independence was a youth leader from the local NAC branch, Elias Jato Kawonga. Largely on account of his activities during the nationalist campaigns, and in particular his 11 month imprisonment along with Ngwira at Kanjedza during the Emergency in 1959-1960, Kawonga would also eventually take up a prominent role in the local MCP organisation on Independence. Having been organizing secretary for the Hewe branch of the Nyasaland African Congress during the 1950s he was given the position as court clerk in 1963 – again serving alongside Ngwira - up until his retirement in 1996:

> *"I was arrested in 1959 and put in Kanjedza for eleven months. I refused to go back into teaching when I returned as I wanted to know why I had been arrested. So I continued politics with Chiume until Independence – I was an area organising chairman. Then in 1963 I was chosen to be a court clerk – until 1996 I was a clerk".*[130]

The performances of these people in the build up to the State of Emergency protests, and their direct punishment by the colonial government, gave them a significant footing in the nationalist organisation; they were local heroes honoured for their participation in the

campaign for freedom and the incarceration this led to. In a report on discussions between Hastings Banda and the Chief Secretary, the Governor Glyn Jones pondered that Banda's imprisonment "was a necessary stage in his progress towards leadership of his people in a free Nyasaland";[131] similarly the harsh conditions that Kawonga and Ngwira endured in Kanjedza elevated them for a time into political heroes in Hewe.

"These local leaders met secretly in the bush, only a few knew about what was going on the rest were drunkards", remembers Lyton Karua.[132] Kawonga himself, one of those local leaders, also recalls that those who were "politically minded" in Hewe were relatively few, and those who got involved with the Nyasaland African Congress at an organizational level were fewer still; as a result the reputation that they had as 'political activists' in the area was prominent. "Very old people and those who were not educated […] did not know politics, they were only staying and eating", says Kawonga, "we the party leaders, Chamang'anga, Ngwira, Chafwakali - went around villages telling people that you have to show that you are not happy with colonial rule".[133]

Chawinga managed to see out the colonial years as a popular figure in Hewe, but for Ngwira and Kawonga this was a period in which their loyalty to the MCP was cemented. Not much is known at present about how these characters worked together with the chief in the run up to the Emergency, and whether their agenda's were in fact the same, but whilst they might all have desired independence once this had been attained it was there their co-operation ended. The ascent of characters in Hewe such as Ngwira and Kawonga reflect how much the Nyasaland African Congress had changed by the middle of the 1950s. Gone was the influence of the educated ministers and clerks of the 1940s who believed that the politics of tradition was the most effective way of carving out political space in the local setting, and they were overtaken by young people who had not left Hewe either for work or education but had been captured by a new radical politics as represented by Chiume, Chipembere and Chisiza.

The ongoing transformation which took place in the relationships between Chawinga and the local NAC branch members will be considered to some extent in the next chapter. However it should be noted that figures at the district level such as Mikeka Mkandawire, from Bolero, need to be looked at closer if a more complete understanding of the challenges to Chawinga's authority is to be reached. A leading light in Congress during the 1950s, Mkandawire went on to become the first MP for Rumphi before being later deposed by Banda during the cabinet crisis. His activities in Hewe and those of his presidentially-endorsed replacement Daniel Mkandawire present notable gaps in this history; deeper insights into their influence would add a great deal to our current understanding of Chawinga's management of Hewe at this late colonial stage.

Despite the increasing influence of these overtly political characters, the role of the educated elements in the village did not lose its importance and characters such as John Mwangonde and Levi Kaleya,[134] the teachers at the school in Katowo, played an important role in Hewe for both the chieftaincy and the nationalist struggle, propagating the message and giving intellectual support. Mwangonde had an impressive reputation in the region having risen to become one of the first African headmasters in Nyasaland and the reputation of the primary school in Hewe, which he had been brought in by Chief Dukamayere to run, had been an influential factor in the local politics of the chieftaincy and the importance of the area in the early colonial period. He had, therefore, a longstanding association with the Katumbi chieftaincy.

Mwangonde's friendship with Chawinga was an important source of information, guidance and support; in some ways he was Timothy's right-hand man. Mwangonde was a

regular visitor to Chawinga's home, as Chawinga was at his. The teacher had a library of books, regularly received the newspapers and news from abroad, and was one of the only people to have a saucepan radio in the early 1950s; as a result his home become a place where people gathered to listen to the BBC and where many discussions about the future of the Protectorate took place. The school was the destination for many other African teachers in the 1950s[135] and as a result there was a keen atmosphere of debate in which the work of the Nyasaland African Congress, the problems of Federation and the trouble with the agricultural conservation rules were discussed by teachers and students alike.

Aside from his professional duties Mwangonde became directly involved in the preservation of the chieftaincy and the administration of the native authority. Along with Levi Kaleya, who would later become the first M.P from Hewe, Mwangonde assisted with the gathering of information for the Livingstonia publication *Midauko*, a history of the area. And on a less high profile set of historical questions the teachers were said to have helped in the preparation of the Mulindafwa narrative, the central part of the annual ceremony which Timothy inaugurated in 1954 and which would cement his authority firmly in 'official' history. He often drafted letters to the government from Chawinga and even became a court assessor. Like his father before him, who had helped mediate disputes in Nkamanga for Chikulamayembe, he played a central role in mediating the border discussions between Katumbi and Chikulamayembe. He petitioned the Government on Timothy's behalf and on any matter of importance the chief requested Mwangonde's help, "they worked together a lot".[136] Mwangonde understood the difficult position that Chawinga found himself as the contradictions of indirect rule became harder to manage, and having also been the beneficiary of significant assistance from the mission at Livingstonia and the Colonial administration he was sympathetic.

Their relationship, however, was not without its tensions. In allowing Mwangonde to contribute all these things to his leadership the chief also put himself in a position of indebtedness, a position he hated to be in. As one of the few people in Hewe who had the resources buy the most prestigious luxury items he also represented a threat to Chawinga's economic prestige and his own attempts at aggrandizement did not always appear so special in comparison[137]. As a person who selected people to go and further their studies Mwangonde gained prestige by paying and investing in education, an increasingly valuable display of largesse. He also benefited when these educated people returned and were happy to return the favour to their teacher, it was help that was never forgotten. Unlike Timothy his manner meant that he was much more approachable "he spoke a lot […] and told many jokes", and he knew how to look after himself so as to avoid the inevitable jealousy that such a position in society provoked; "of course people spoke a lot of things, but ufwiti can only get you if you are careless, drink and eat anywhere. But he was clever and knew what to do".[138] Mwangonde was in a much freer position than Timothy and although his civil servant status meant he could not be openly pro-Congress he was able to lend his support to the political activities of the nationalists in Hewe, among the key members his brother Donald.[139] But whilst Mwangonde was clearly a person who had influence like the previously mentioned Abraham Munthali, he was not in a position, or in possession of the desire, to wrench any political authority from Timothy; in that Chawinga was secure for the time being.

Competing with a respectable and wealthy man

"The African who believes that Jesus is preparing for him a glorious mansion in Heaven will endeavour to build for himself a decent house on earth", a young missionary is quoted by John Iliffe as having said in 1858.[140] As Iliffe has highlighted, all across the continent this need to

demonstrate respectability was achieved by Africans through a variety of moral and material achievements which taken together could be seen as a "cultural package" which "displayed their distinction".[141] One of the few characters in Hewe, beside Chawinga, to achieve this level of distinctiveness was Abraham Munthali.

Munthali had been selected in around 1935 to go to Livingstonia Mission by John Mwangonde, in order that he should "learn shop". His training to become a carpenter lasted five years and would set him up to become an extremely successful businessman in the district. Equipped by his teachers at Livingstonia with not only the knowledge but the material tools of his new trade, and a loan to establish his first workshop, once he had established his own woodlot Munthali quickly became a truly independent entrepreneur.

Starting out with a bicycle, the first thing he bought after leaving the mission, his business grew from its initial small scale operation, "at first we just made chairs for 3/9p and people from the village were buying them",[142] he recalled. As men returned from the mines and farms with some small disposable income Munthali began to regularly benefit as many spent their money on ordering these chairs and eventually tables, cupboards and benches too. His own growing wealth reflected a more general increase in the consumption of 'luxury' household items that some years before would have been impossible to find in people's homes. With such items in mind men went back to South Africa and Northern Rhodesia to earn more money, and as they gathered it some were even in a position to buy the increasingly sought after European style doors and bed frames from his store. The carpenter provided the first wooden coffins to the people of Hewe, and they quickly became the most popular item, something that has remained the same to this day.

"Supply" quickly gained an excellent reputation in the wider region for his fair prices and craftsmanship of such goods and with Hewe's position so close to isolated communities in Northern Rhodesian he is said to have captured the market across the border too. People came from Muyombe and Malambo to buy products from his shop and would then sell these original items on in their own stores at higher prices.[143] He won contracts for the building of new school blocks, the welfare hall and renovations to the maternity ward which saw his business grow beyond carpentry to construction, and in this he also cornered the market with his greater access to resources, transport, and investment capital.[144]

By establishing several shops and eventually providing training for a number of young men from the area he was by the end of the 1950s probably the wealthiest person in Hewe, aside from perhaps Timothy Chawinga himself, and local respect for this disciplined, self-made man was significant; his prominent position was reflected in the fact that his was the first house by some years to have a full iron sheet covered roof, the materials for which he had purchased in Mbeya, Tanganyika, in 1953 at "10 Kwacha per sheet".[145] Other mission trained craftsmen from the area such as Joseph Munthali's father left the village setting to practice their trade elsewhere, in Northern Rhodesia or South Africa.[146] Munthali, however, remained local with his production and distribution; and with no one else around to compete with his experience, the decision to remain in Hewe proved a most lucrative choice. Efrida Mhango, the woman whom Abraham had married whilst undergoing his training at Livingstonia in 1938, remembered distinctly the feeling her family had on account of her husband's business: "we were on top of the world".[147] Without any conscious attempt to do so, his "cultural package" of respectability inadvertently undermined Chawinga.

In addition to his carpentry business the shop he had established, which stocked many sought after goods, meant that it was Munthali's name that became synonymous with prosperity; "People called us rich because everyone bought clothes from our store"[148], Efrida

recalls. However, staying 'local' came with its own difficulties. Jealousy was a difficult aspect of life to manage and caused many problems for Munthali's family who were regularly the targets of witchcraft, theft and other threatening behaviour. And the jealousy did not only come from the poor relatives and neighbours, one of the people who began to get distressed by his accumulation of wealth was Timothy Chawinga. Reflecting upon the chief's reaction to the Munthali's newly iron-roofed properties Efrida Mhango remembers that he had not been too happy about it. "My husband told Chief Zolokere and Kamangilira" about his new purchase and whilst "Zolokere said he had done a good thing, because he was developing the area, Kamangilira kept silent […] he didn't even really know about iron sheets at that time";[149] within months he too ordered up iron sheets for his own roof from Abraham, who had been charged to collect these prestige goods from Tanganyika on his behalf. Whoever was able to was "investing almost as heavily in cement and corrugated iron as in education", it was deemed that important.[150]

Timothy still purchased items from Munthali, increasing the carpenter's own fortune as he did so but he also had to ensure that he was able to distinguish himself from his population through the display of new goods; European furniture, for example, that "only a square house could accommodate".[151] Munthali remembers the chief purchasing many items which "no-one else in Hewe could have done".[152] Yet, he also felt that the carpenter was beginning to undermine his own prestige and efforts at patronage. As *msambazgi* (a wealthy man) he, like Timothy, was socially obliged to pay school fees for relatives, buy necessities for neighbours and help various other people in the area when they were in difficulty "munthu uyu walela wanthu", *this person assisted many others*, it was said by several community members.[153] There is no denying that belief and investment in education formed a part of the modern Christian man's package; and "educational benevolence" was greatly admired.[154] Iliffe's example of a Ugandan chief, Kibedi Zirabamuzale, who "reportedly paid the school fees for ninety-eight young people who reached university",[155] was not an unusual display of largesse during this period in African history; both Munthali and Chawinga were capable and obliged to contribute to their community in such ways.

Interestingly, Munthali started using fertilizer on his crops well before anyone else, including Chawinga. People had been skeptical at first, saying that they didn't want to use chemicals on their garden, but after they had seen how his maize grew with this novel input it was to his example they looked. His wealth had given him the opportunity to take risks, and enabled him to set an example in agriculture as well as in business, something Timothy had always striven to do. Furthermore the colonial officials also worked with him, using his office as a place to discuss local affairs and land disputes in the area whilst they were on ulendo.

With the profits from his carpentry business, grocery and maize mill Abraham even attempted to register himself eligible to vote for the 1961 constitutional elections.[156] 20 out of the 28 seats for the Legislative Council were decided by the predominantly African lower roll electorate at these elections; "the nature of the franchise strongly favoured people with education, money or status. On the lower roll over 10,000 chiefs, headmen and councillors were enfranchised as a consequence of their position. Others were required to be literate in one of a number of languages, to have a minimum income, or to possess a certain amount of property".[157] In the end the government was not convinced by his claims of having an income over £700 per year, the requirement for the franchise, so he was denied the opportunity.[158] There is not enough evidence to suggest why he was not believed, or whether he had earned such an amount. What is known is that in this same year he had been able to purchase a new car in Blantyre for £400 and had built bridges for his car to pass by within Hewe, organising and

paying for the local labour himself in order for him to be able to drive all the way to his front door. He was a man of significant standing yet he never seriously threatened Chawinga's authority, primarily this was because he did not have the political ambition that the 'new men' Bond describes in Muyombe did or like those that threatened the Kyungu chieftaincy in Karonga.

One reason why Abraham Munthali was not so grave a threat to the authority of Timothy was due to his Christian faith; his major objective being not the attainment of power in this world but the attainment of salvation in another. The message of the Gospel, which he had taken authentically onboard during his time at the C.C.A.P Mission at Livingstonia, underpinned his living and working life;[159] his example represented everything the missionaries had wanted their graduates to be and his financial successes marked him out as the perfect illustration of what a dedicated Christian work ethic could achieve. His ex-teachers regularly came to visit him, especially as they prepared to go on leave or as they departed from the colony for good, in order to encourage him in "this work that is not easy" and to spur him on to "have courage" in his material and spiritual labours. They warned him of the many others who had received the same opportunities but who had fallen under the influence of alcohol once they returned to the village, squandering their chances in the process. "Be brave with your shop, they told me, you will encounter many problems! Remember to remain with our teaching".[160]

Monopolising major profits

Aside from the example of Munthali, a particularly successful individual, the opportunities to make money within Hewe were limited to the running of small stores, maize mills and some cash-cropping. The general level of wealth in Hewe may have risen significantly throughout the colonial period – mainly on account of money from labour migration which was used to invest in small businesses – but the growth was relatively even and, as table (i) in the appendix clearly demonstrates, the only significant earners at the close of the colonial period were Munthali and Timothy Chawinga. Besides these no-one made more than £120 in the year from their business and 19 out of the 36 stores in Hewe made less than £61 in the year in question, 1962. Even the impact of the co-operative movement in Hewe was limited and no individual gained a lot in personal status through these initiatives, as the table shows the combined efforts of the co-operative did no better than the most successful individual. In Rumphi, and in particular at the Chikulamayembe's headquarters in Bolero and in the Rumphi Boma itself, there were many more businesses; coffee co-operatives, maize mills and hotels, as well as the ubiquitous and ever-expanding selection of stores whose fortunes ebbed and flowed over time.[161] Some commoners were able to establish two or three maize mills and were able to stump up the significant amount of tax which was required to run such businesses. In Rumphi aside from L & B Coy of the Bookers Group (Kandodo) and the Africa Lakes Corporation (Mandala stores) who had made over £600 in 1962, there were the Asian traders A.L.H Osman and the Geloo Brothers who made between £300 to £600 in their stores.[162]

In 1962 only three maize mills existed in Hewe. Two of them were positioned in the busy area of Chisimuka and only one was constructed in the more central Katowo trading centre; this one was owned by the chief himself and it made double the profits of those in Chisimuka. Aside from his extremely lucrative hunting exploits this was Chawinga's main income generating activity and he was keen to protect its advantageous position near to the road and main stores. More mills may have been introduced throughout the 1960s but as far as Timothy Chawinga was concerned he fought to protect the monopoly he had on grinding maize in his area right up until his deposition in 1974. One case was discovered from May 1973 which

highlights this protectiveness; just a few hundred metres from Chawinga's maize mill Joffrey Kachari had set up his own near to Kabrufu school. No sooner had it been erected then it was ordered by the Themba to be moved away from the area of the trading centre:

> *"Chief Katumbi stopped him from grinding he sent a messenger to tell Kachari to go down to sub-Chief Zolokere. But Kachari refused and is still refusing. I also agree with Kachari because he has got buildings and a garden of cassava and potatoes around his grinding mill. People with all vge headmen around the grinding about 1 sqr mile like the machine not to move and go down Zolokere. I agree with them because people at sub-chief Zolokere are near by Kabulufu T center and they also appeal to Chief Katumbi not to worry Mr. Kachari because of refusing to come to Zolokere. They say that Kabulufu is near why for Chief Katumbi to worry? Please would you settle the matter"?*[163]

Timothy's son disputes the fact that his father had been this monopolistic in his business activities, saying that he also liked people in his area to be rich and powerful[164] but the evidence suggests very much otherwise. Whilst this behaviour may have been viable in his position as Native Authority in the setting of indirect rule, it quickly became untenable as his base from which he could produce authority weakened.

VH/place	**Number of stores**		**Number of maize mills**		**Other business**	
	> £61	< £61	> £61	< £61	> £61	< £61
V.H Makanga	3					
V.H Makula/Kaduku		2				
V.H Kasalika/Katowo	7	3	1			
V.H Mikule/Katowo						1 (hotel)
V.H Chipofya/Katowo	3					
V.H Kampuzunga/Katowo	1					
V.H Thanila/Katowo		1				
V.H Zolokere/Katowo		2				
V.H Mgungu/Katowo		1				
V.H Mwachibanda/ Chisimuka	3	5	2		1 (carpentry shop)	
V.H Chembe/Chisimuka		2				
V.H Mteweta/ Chisimuka		3				

Table 1: Distribution of stores in Hewe 1962[165]

Name of taxable person	Ward and Place of Business		Type of business	Net earnings for previous year (1962)	Amount of tax payable
Hewe Co-operative Society	Katowo	Kasalika	Store	£200-£300	£7: -: -
Abraham Munthali	Katowo	Mwachibanda	Store and carpentry shop	£200-£300	£7: -: -
Themba Katumbi (Timothy Chawinga)	Katowo	Kasalika	Grinding mill	£120-£200	£4: 10: -
Simon S. Luhanga	Katowo	Makanga	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Clement Mfune	Katowo	Makanga	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Brown J. Mhango	Katowo	Makanga	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Gibson Mtambo	Katowo	Chipofya	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
J. M. Nundwe	Katowo	Chipofya	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Jackson B. Mfune	Katowo	Kasalika	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Tenson Chisi	Katowo	Kasalika	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Rodwell D. Chavura	Katowo	Kasalika	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
C. N. Kalea	Katowo	Kasalika	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
B. W. T. Mvula	Katowo	Kasalika	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Lighton Harawa	Katowo	Kasalika	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
John Nundwe	Katowo	Chipofya	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Sandress Mkandawire	Katowo	Kampuzunga	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Stephen Mfune	Katowo	Mwachibanda	Store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
K. W. Mkandawire	Katowo	Mwachibanda	Maize mill and store	£61-£120	£2: 10: -
Lennard Chilambo	Katowo	Mwachibanda	Maize mill	£61-£120	£2: 10: -

Table 2: Hewe residents with taxable businesses in 1962[166]

Spiritual authority and chieftaincy in the context of British Central Africa

Highlighting the interpretation of chiefs' actions during the Emergency as representing some kind of customary failure to protect their people opens up the need for another discussion about the possibility of regaining a position in the local context through custom. When the promise of Independence forced a renewed attempt to find authority and support at the local rather than national level, there were questions raised throughout much of the Protectorate about the spiritual authority of customary leaders. The emergence of the witchdoctor *Nchimi* Chikanga,[167] who began practicing his divinations from his home village Thete, in the Northern Province of Nyasaland, spoke to these vulnerable places of chiefly authority; Timothy's own response to such a witch-finding movement as Chikanga's, and to the issue of witchcraft in general, is worth noting. Maintaining a powerful spiritual authority, whether it was drawn from customary narratives or mission values, was fundamental. Unlike many chiefs in surrounding territories his refusal to allow Chikanga to come and practice in his area encourages a re-examination of these movements from the perspective of different chiefly authorities.

Lighton "Chikanga" Chuma was born in Rumphi District in 1934, at the age of 19 it was said that he had died from witchcraft only to be resurrected soon afterwards equipped with the divination skills required in order to "rid the world of sorcery".[168] His headquarters was not 100

miles from Themba Katumbi's own chiefly base and the most intense part of the spirit-medium's career in Nyasaland spanned the Federal period (1953-64) with his powers at their height during the uncertain years after the Emergency and just before independence, 1959-1963.[169] At this time regular bus services were known to have transported people from all over the country straight to his headquarters for "treatment"; and not only from Nyasaland, people came to him from Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Zaire, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, "even the Masai of Kenya came here", he remembered.[170] Headmen and chiefs wrote to the Nchimi for a variety of reasons including to see if a death in their village was caused by witchcraft, to cleanse a village where many people were dying, to help discover the culprits in cases of theft, to discover who had bewitched a person, and to prepare medicine for victims of sorcery.[171]

Of course Chikanga's activities were not without precedent in Central Africa. Similar "witch crazes" had occurred at various times which often coincided with major health crises, cultural shifts and/or economic change.[172] The rise of Chikanga, as well as that of Alice Lenshina and her semi-religious cult the Lumpa Church in Northern Rhodesia,[173] could more likely be related to the dramatic *political* change that was underway in the closing years of colonial control in British Central Africa, and with the renewed feeling of insecurity around customary authority that this brought.[174] Commonly a proliferation of witchcraft accusation has accompanied the liberation of African nations, periods of civil unrest or civil war and at other times of extreme spiritual and/or social uncertainty which were most often characterized by the collapse, or gradual disintegration, of institutions.*[175]*

The crisis in customary authority which was at its height in British Central Africa in the 1930s was reflected in the spread of the *bamucapi,* arguably the most famous witch-cleansing campaign of the colonial period,[176] it was a movement which dominated district commissioners thoughts and village processes of justice. The activities of *bamucapi* forced a rethinking of the Witchcraft Ordinance which had been created a decade or so earlier in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland territories. It questioned the practicalities of this law which had "removed the offense of witchcraft from the purview of the law altogether", turning witchcraft "from the status of a crime to the status of a superstitious belief that merely generated recognised crimes".[177] By doing this some colonial officers came to a realisation that now these portents of "social disorder", being neither chargeable by customary leaders in colonial courts[178] nor controllable by them through the more traditional application of poison ordeal, would make a mockery of these leaders local authority, the very basis of indirect rule; the colonial regime had "chosen chiefs and headmen as executors of colonial order; it was up to them to control social evil in their own terms and up to the local administrations to support them",[179] but without the wherewithal to punish such threats they were left a little bereft of authority.

Bamucapi had operated effectively for a time in this "new world of colonial space", existing "outside the powers of chiefs and traditional diviners, as new cultural bricoleurs and entrepreneurs"[180]. Fields demonstrates that there was also a fair amount of "enthusiasm" amongst chiefs and headmen to the *bamucapi*; this is a crucial point.[181] The loss of control over the spiritual well being of their communities added to a more fundamental loss of "resources" which had been guaranteeing the authority of customary leaders. Fields analyses these spiritual "crises" in the same terms as she looks at the loss of customary control of labour, or marriage and divorce proceedings: it formed a part of a wider erosion of customary standing which undercut the moral and political influence of chiefs and headmen who were trying to implement indirect rule.[182] Chiefs had enthusiasm for these witch-cleansers because, if Fields' argument is

to be followed, if they did not welcome these external arbiters of justice into their territory their own place in the political order would be under threat.

Whilst this particular movement was eventually suppressed by the British and petered out by 1935, the contested spaces of customary power remained vulnerable to further economic and political 'shocks'. Chikanga's campaign, much like the slightly earlier "modern anti-witchcraft" movement of Bwanali-Mpulumutsi (1947-1949) behaved quite differently to the more commercially minded *bamucapi*[183] and with their use of Christian symbol and ritual, emphasis on divine inspiration and back-to-God philosophy they evoked more of a religious revivalism.[184] However there were similarities; Behringer describes the mode or organisation of these campaigns "as supra-national movements" which "served the purpose of exonerating the village elders from their legal responsibility, imposed by the colonial – and post-colonial – justice administration.[185] As with *bamucapi* there was much pressure on chiefs, and much benefit to be gained from, allowing Chikanga in to their villages to cleanse them.

Witch-cleansing and authority in Northern Nyasaland

Chikanga was not welcome in Hewe. This is perhaps all the more surprising for the fact that the paramount chief of the Mzimba Ngoni, M'mbelwa Inkosi ya maKosi, Katumbi's powerful southern neighbour, was more than happy to invite the diviner into his territory to perform a general cleansing in 1959 when he "ordered that all the people under his jurisdiction in Mzimba district should be searched".[186] Chikulamayembe was known to also have "considerable belief in Mr Chikanga",[187] and he admitted to the D.C in 1960 that he had told everyone in his area to attend Chikanga who was "a good man".[188] Despite the fact that the DC had warned him against such threatening orders and that "nobody who told people their houses would be burned down if they did not attend could be a chief",[189] he continued to lean heavily on the diviner's judgments and there is evidence that he deposed village headmen on the basis of his divinations.[190] As McCracken has put it a large percentage of the population in the northern part of Nyasaland "were at least as much caught up in Chikanga's crusade for spiritual cleansing as they were in the struggle for political independence".[191]

Chikanga's activities were not initially popular with the Nyasaland administration who envisaged that he would break villages with his witchcraft accusations.[192] However, by the early 1960s he was no longer so sidelined by them, whilst they abhorred forced trial by Chikanga district commissioners did not mind people going to see him out of their own volition and he was also sometimes even allowed to be called in to investigate criminal activities within his local district council[193]. Such was his reputation that the district commissioner in Rumphi began to receive calls – sometimes from people in other countries – asking for the Nyasaland government to send Chikanga to hastily proceed to see them; "The services of Nchimi Chikanga are now much in demand and the boma has frequently to advise callers that it is not his agent",[194] the DC reported in August 1963.

To understand Timothy's less than enthusiastic response to Chikanga, and for that matter witch-doctoring of other kinds, it is worth remembering one of the most significant sources of his authority was based in his management of spiritual landscapes within Hewe. Timothy trod a very careful line; on the one hand he was a "morally upstanding" Christian, this was very much part of his public – or at least 'official' – persona, on the other it was "well-known" that he had his own extremely powerful protective medicine; these two *sources* of his authority both required his rejection of Chikanga's activities. He was, in fact, consistent to both when he refused Chikanga to cleanse villages in Hewe.[195] The language of the Katumbi chieftainship, and its political highs and lows, is consistently associated with witchcraft. The

narrative of struggle against enemies within and external to the chieftainship has been a strong one and having the ability to overcome material and spiritual enemies is still a fundamental attribute for successful leadership in Hewe. Chapter three described how Timothy's rise was accounted for locally on account of his spiritual strength which is a key motif in the narrative of his chieftaincy. But whilst his predecessor Dukamayere had been happy to advise people to go to the witchdoctor to garner the source of their personal and economic problems, Kamangilira was more likely to order the witchdoctors out of the village; he "didn't want to hear anything about witchcraft cases, he believed witchdoctors bring in lots of confusion", said Dambazuka Nundwe.[196] Whilst Samson Mumba reflected that he had heard Chawinga was involved with such things himself, but he did not accept it from others, "today it is worse", he said "people freely accuse one another all the time".[197]

Perhaps it was easier for him to manage the local landscape of witchcraft, and the insecurity it suggested, in the relatively small area of Hewe than it would have been for Chikulamayembe and M'mbelwa. In any case it is not easy to garner whether or not this control lead to less occurrences and accusations of witchcraft in Hewe, people certainly suggest that with Timothy as chief a definite lid was kept on these "malevolent" forces. He was less tolerant of the way people talk of it and freely accused others of it. Once, in order to demonstrate to his people that witchdoctors had no authority in his area, he arranged that a performance of 'witch finding' be undermined publicly. Chawinga had been handed some cloth which had been dropped by a woman from Chisimuka who had purchase it at the trading centre in Chiteshe, near the chief's own home. He predicted that the woman, not imagining that the cloth could have just been innocently picked up, would immediately cry that this was a case of witchcraft and seek out the witchdoctor – at this time it was likely to have been a man called Mung'anja Munthali – in order to get some knowledge as to whom had stolen it from her. Knowing that this man would say that it had been stolen by magic and that he would look for medicine to bring it back the Themba called for a big meeting, asking all village heads to come with one person, he also called the woman who cried witchcraft and the person who had found the scarf on the road.[198] At this meeting he is said to have exposed the lies of the witchdoctor and demonstrated that such people were not to be trusted with such things.

It should not be underestimated how significant such a demonstration of authority would have been. The causes of most non-medical troubles were referred to witchdoctors or *nchimi* like Chikanga in this part of Nyasaland. The reason being that because "lost or stolen personal effects may be used by a *fwiti* to fabricate *nyanga* capable of ensorcering their erstwhile owner", a suitably qualified person was needed to deal with the spiritual threat which such a theft posed.[199] Since it often cost more for people to travel to see famous *nchimi* than the value of the item stolen it is evident that the concern for people was not the good itself "but over its possible use by a sorcerer".[200]

As well as dealing with these accusations in his own way, Chawinga would also refer cases of witchcraft to the police, in accordance with the anti-witchcraft legislation.[201] Whether such practices demonstrate his show of keeping the colonial authorities on side by occasionally sending them appropriate cases, or indeed was one of his ways of showing that he had no tolerance for such practices, it is clear that he would have rather sent for the police than Chikanga. Yet this was not the whole story, privately he was said to have indulged in his own magic practices which ensured his own protection in the short term. As well as the widespread rumours about the medicine he had got from Zambia, or Tanzania, which ensured that nobody could kill him, some heard that he had a "maginet", some kind of crystal ball through which he could see when witches would visit his house, and also that he was friends with powerful people

who could bewitch those who were looking to take his life.[202] He understood that "access to spiritual power" ensured his "social effectivity"; furthermore, he was aware that this very same spiritual power had the ability to "place limits on the hegemonic power of the state".[203] It had the potential to assist his ambitions vis a vis the government and with his people. Ironically, however, dabbling in these very same activities might indeed have contributed to his downfall.[204]

The religious foundations of chiefly authority

The customary responsibility of chiefs to deal with uncertainty was not only expressed in terms of witchcraft. Fields' contention that the growing power of missionary institutions within the territories of chiefs affected customary authority detrimentally is also interesting to consider. She writes how by "displacing the religious foundations of African rulers' legitimacy", mission activity violated the logic of indirect rule as keeping the colonial peace.[205] However, in the case of Timothy Chawinga, the influence of converts such as Munthali and the work of Mission teachers and church leaders within his area – in the arena of spiritual authority in any case – had the effect of actually being quite useful to him. The aspects of custom that the C.C.A.P. wished to influence: marriage, the consumption of alcohol, praying to ancestors, were not at odds with Timothy's own public agenda as chief whose commitment to an ordered disciplined population who took responsibility for their families and eschewed idleness was celebrated.

As has been discussed in previous chapters his authority did not rest so fundamentally on "customary foundations" but on a more territorially based, historically determined, economic monopoly, which was dynamic though it drew upon traditional motifs. The "religious foundations" for legitimacy had never customarily been in the hands of Katumbi. The role of rainmaker had enabled the chieftaincy to distance its ritual authority from possible weaknesses created by colonial and mission values. Though the rainmaker, and the rainmaking family was crucially connected to Katumbi in terms of both kinship and political ritual, the foundational underpinnings of legitimacy in the land was out-sourced and thus the chieftaincy itself was less affected by ritual disruptions to it. It existed in another landscape, so whilst the rainmaker could be criticised for the lack of rain during crises and other "natural disasters", Katumbi himself could get away with limited culpability for the loss of order, and even for its ritual restoration.[206]

Timothy managed to convert mission authority by co-opting it as his own, taking a position as church elder within the C.C.A.P. and maintaining the dominance of this one particular church within the area. The Watchtower Movement didn't get much of a foothold in Hewe, and Timothy famously clashed with the Catholic Church when there were plans to build a large station in Hewe; in both instances he played the tune of the colonial administration for his own benefit. His ability to be adaptable ensured the mission did not undermine his authority. It was only after the people in Kabrufu complained bitterly that his refusal would also put pay to a primary school being planned in the early 1960s by the Catholic missionaries, and that more opportunities for paid labour in this area would be lost on account of this, that he finally conceded to have a small presence of Catholics in the area, which he nevertheless continued to monitor carefully, and certainly not allowing their activities to expand beyond his control or for a full-blown mission station to be established.[207] The result of this tension saw much distrust and competiveness between the pupils of the Catholic and C.C.A.P. schools and a tense relationship between the chieftaincy and the areas in which the Catholics had a following.[208]

Conclusion

As the introduction to the thesis made clear and chapters three and four have illustrated, Chawinga policed the boundaries of his political space meticulously, and was able to do so largely unhindered during the colonial period. The mediation of his territorial ambition became less and less viable, however, after the State of Emergency as his opportunities to accumulate personal wealth decreased and the growing politicisation of his area brought more attention to it. Increasingly Timothy retreated into tradition convinced that claims to historical legitimacy would bolster the position of chiefs, at least from the point of view that local people would be encouraged to stay loyal. In addition to 'tradition' Chawinga leaned more strongly upon the narratives and rumours of his spiritually significant sources of power. With his judicial power dwindling, his access to wealth production and his territorial independence curbed, these spiritual and traditional aspects of his authority became increasingly important in enabling Chawinga to keep the bubbling threats in the local context at bay. Those individuals, who perceived that they had been wronged by the chief in the latter part of the colonial period, and the ambitions of the local party faithful, were given increasing opportunities to make their voices heard. These elements which had been irritating to Chawinga before began to become thoroughly undermining as he entered the last decade of his rule from 1963 to 1973. As the spatial emphasis of the post-colonial state's administrative and economic designs altered, his chieftaincy no longer occupied a space which lay outside of state interest, in fact by the late 1960s Hewe was anything but peripheral to the eye of the one-party government of Hastings Kamuzu Banda. The techniques which had been successful in establishing and maintaining his authority throughout the 1940s and 1950s were decreasing in effectiveness as a new landscape of power and politics was being shaped.

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[1] PRO, CO 1015/464: *Monthly Political Intelligence Reports, Nyasaland 1951-1953*, May 1953
[2] *Ibid.,* April 1953: In reference to the Protectorate as a whole, the report suggests that "with the biggest tobacco crop in memory, and a bumper cotton crop likely, political affairs tend to find little place in the average peasant's mind".
[3] "In the late 1940s and early 1950s [...] Kamuzu was a successful London family doctor, with a concern for his homeland" (A. Ross, *Colonialism to Cabinet Crisis: A Political History of Malawi,* (Zomba, 2009), 129). At this stage Banda was not explicitly political but was interested in Nyasaland's progress and would support people there with school fees and other educational assistance. This was the man as Chawinga would have met him in 1951.
[4] Informal email communication with Dickson Mzumara, 27 March 2011
[5] PRO, CO 1015/464, May 1953
[6] *Ibid*., June 1953
[7] *Ibid*., April 1953
[8] *Ibid*., June 1953
[9] PRO, CO 1015/86: *Federation, Subversive Activities of Africans, 1952-1953*. Extract from the Manchester Guardian, 12 June 1953.
[10] PRO, CO 1015/464, June 1953
[11] *Ibid*., April 1953
[12] *Ibid*., September 1952. Laxon Z. Chunga of Zakeyo Chunga village, Mzimba, wrote to the Provincial Commissioner of Northern Province on 26 August 1952: "To federate the two Rhodesias to Nyasaland will mean a greater change of life. Why should Nyasaland stand along while there is amongst the wisest people of the World a need to unit (sic) the whole World into a single Government. [...] We want better schools, better hospitals, better transport, better foods and better money [...] I am not afraid to speak this to my fellow Africans".
[13] PRO, CO 1015/464, September 1952. The complaints of Lawlen Laban of Usisya were published under the title "Poor Man Favours Federation" in the newspaper "The African Weekly", dated the 23 July 1952:

"I challenge the leaders of the Nyasaland African Congress who say that they are fighting for their country when in fact they are fighting for good jobs for themselves. They fear that if federation comes white people will take their nice jobs. [...] I support federation because I am a poor man who realises that if more White will be more jobs and people come to Nyasaland their wages for Africans (sic). The people in the Congress are working for their names and not for their fellowmen".

[14] PRO, CO 1015/86, G.S. Mwase to P.C. Central Province, 2 September 1952

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] PRO, CO 1015/464, September 1952

[17] Kuwali, 'The role of chiefs', 9

[18] PRO, CO 1015/464, May 1953

[19] J. R. N. Chinyama had played a very active role alongside G. S. Mwase in setting up Native Associations in the Central Province of Nyasaland in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1950 he was elected President of the NAC a position he remained in until 1953 when the direction of congress moved towards a more radical approach which he was not able to agree with. After condemning the anti-federation rioting he felt forced to resign. He remained in politics, elected as one of the African members of the Legislative Council in 1956, but after the MCP were victorious in the elections of 1961 he disappeared from the political scene. For more on the rise and fall of individuals who formed the leadership of Congress during the early 1950s see J. Power, 'Building relevance: the Blantyre Congress, 1953 to 1956' in *The Journal of Southern African Studies,* 28:1 (2002); J. Power, *Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi: Building Kwacha* (Rochester NY, 2010); O. J. M. Kalinga, 'Resistance, politics of protest, and mass nationalism in Colonial Malawi, 1950-1960', in *Cahiers d'Études Africaines,* 36:143 (1996), 443-454; J. M. McCracken, 'Democracy and nationalism in historical perspective: the case of Malawi' in *African Affairs,* 97:387 (1998), 231-249

[20] PRO, CO 1015/464, May 1953

[21] For more on this episode see Ross, *Colonialism*, 73-74; R. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (Harvard, 1965), 259

[22] Kalinga, 'Resistance' 448

[23] PRO, CO 1015/464, March 1953

[24] Mwase and Kaluluma resigned on 8 June and Kapeni of Blantyre on 10 June. Msamala and Kumtumanji resigned too, though these two withdrew their resignations. Malemia and Mlumbe of Zomba threatened to resign but did not go through with it. (PRO, CO 1015/86, 17 June 1953).

[25] PRO, CO 1015/464, June 1953

[26] *Ibid*.

[27] *Ibid*.

[28] PRO, CO 1015/86, Chief Secretary to PC Central Province, 29 September 1953

[29] *Ibid*.,

[30] *Ibid*.,

[31] *Ibid*., Governor Colby to Secretary of State for Colonies, 17 June 1953

[32] Kuwali, 'The role of chiefs', 9

[33] PRO, CO 1015/86, Fox-Strangways to Marnham, 19 October 1953.

[34] PRO, CO 1015/250, Minutes of the 15th Meeting, held at Zomba, 4 December 1952.

[35] At an earlier conference in Salisbury the delegation of chiefs was labeled as silly by Welensky, and when a previous White Paper on Federation had been discussed in London in April 1952 the African representatives (Mposa, Muwamba, Kumbikano, and Gondwe) decided to boycott the conference as they had been denied a separate meeting with the Secretary of State beforehand. Now Congress was suspicious of getting involved with any official discussions, the conclusions of which they considered to have been already reached. See PRO, CO 1015/250, Minutes of the 15th Meeting, held at Zomba, 4 December 1952.

[36] Personal email communication with Dickson Mzumara, 27 March 2011

[37] Discussion with Joseph Munthali, Nguwoyang'ombe Village, 29 January 2009.

[38] PRO, CO 626/32: *Annual Report on Native Administration*, 1955

[39] Msimbi, 11 August 1955

[40] Kalinga, 'Resistance' 445

[41] See Power, 'Building Relevance' 49

[42] During disturbances in Port Herald, Mulanje, Chikwawa and Lower Tshiri, "chiefs, perceived to be supporters of government and the new federal dispensation, became the main targets of violence. This was also the case in Chiradzulu where the roads leading to Chief Kadewele's court were blocked, and police force was used before the traditional rulers could be freed" (Kalinga, 'Resistance' 448)

[43] Kalinga, 'Resistance' 447

[44] PRO, CO 1015/250, Minutes of the 14th Meeting, 25-27 August 1952

[45] MNA, NN 4/1/11: *Northern Province Annual Report, 1959-1960*, Local Government Section
[46] He had been very critical of the Government after hearing a rumour that a bill which was introduced to limit the ability of people to raise funds from the public was being passed in order to specifically prevent Congress from raising money. Deeply suspicious of their motives he challenged the viability of their cover excuse for this, that the bill was intended to apply to all races, not only Africans, by pointing out that when it had been introduced as a district specific set of rules it had in fact applied to no other races, and why was this. See PRO, CO1015/250, 14th Meeting 25-27 August 1952.
[47] Kalinga, 'Resistance' 450
[48] Kuwali, 'The role of chiefs', 12-13
[49] MNA, NN 4/2/2, August 1956
[50] O.J.M. Kalinga, 'The 1959 Nyasaland state of emergency in old Karonga District', in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36:4 (2010), 743-763. Kalinga explains that in areas such as Kaporo and Misuku there was heavy violence during the Emergency. The reasons for this he puts down to the fact that they were areas where pockets of economic empowerment had grown up. Whilst the NAC was not very influential in Karonga the impact of the co-operative movement had the effect of politicising a cadre of people. Many of the trained teachers were from these areas (Rubadiri, Nyasulu, Orton Chirwa), as were the clerks who were employed in the health sector and postal service. When these sectors were federalised much discontent was fermented in Karonga in particular.
[51] MNA, NN 4/1/6: *Provincial Annual Report, Northern Province, 1945*: "The dominating personality in Chikulamayembe Council is Rev. Edward Manda. One is forced to conclude that Chikulamayembe is much less intelligent than he appears. Lacks ability and driving force, no tact with subordinate chiefs". See also MNA, NNM 1/14/8, Chikulamayembe's tendency for expressing his opinion and having conflicts with his sub-chiefs is mentioned in the notes and instructions given to the new assistant DC at Nchenachena when he assumes the position in 1947. Questions should be asked whether or not this had the effect of giving Congress, and in particular the MCP later on, a foothold in traditional politics as had happened across the border in Chief Muyombe's area?
[52] Personal email communication with Dickson Mzumara: "During his stay at Livingstonia and during his time as a chief up to 1952 Timothy had been receiving advice from Rev. Isaac Khunga". See also the emphasis of the article published in 'Msimbi', 11 February 1953 which reported what a greatly respected man he was. The article explains that at his funeral in Hewe over 500 people came, including seven white missionaries who travelled from Livingstonia to attend. He had been an influential character in the area, and the eulogy given by Timothy Chawinga expressed his high regard for the man: "We really knew that this man was an intercessor/advocate for many things here, working together with the Mission and Government […] he didn't use his intelligence to become a more important person, rather he used it to help".
[53] Interview MD with SGVH Chembe, Austin Mfune
[54] Interview MD with Acting SGVH Thanila, Godwin Chawinga, Thanila Village, 16 January 2009. He claimed that during this time chiefs were greatly respected on account of their being very small in number. Nowadays, he said, there are ten headmen in Thanila alone, in the past there was only one: Thanila himself.
[55] One of the more difficult relationships Chawinga had to deal with was with the Councillor Zolokere. This became increasingly problematic in the post-colonial period and Chawinga is said to have tempered the tensions by arranging for him to be given sub-Traditional Authority status. Ultimately this also came with benefits to himself both in terms of the financial reward and the prestigious image which having a sub-TA gave him. He was able to honour difficult chiefs with ritual roles and included many of them at his Mulindafwa ceremony proceedings. He consulted them about the history of the area, if only for show. He was fully aware of the benefits of playing the "tradition" card when it came to keeping headmen on side.
[56] During the 1950s Timothy was of a different generation to his neighbouring chiefs. The Chikulamayembe had been chief since the early 1930s, Muyombe from 1928 (to 1965); Kyungu assumed his position in 1926 (and reigned also until 1965). The vision of an independent nation had loomed on the horizon the whole time he had been chief so he was more adaptable having the language to speak to both old and new generations. Chawinga spanned both eras, and whilst it is difficult to know what would have happened in the MCP era to many of the old chiefs, as many of them died in early 1960s, it is unlikely that they would have been so adaptable.
[57] The two chieftaincies were structurally similar. There were several royal clans and a rotating hereditary system, education had played an important role in the selection of chiefs, and both had developed long standing relationships with the Livingstonia Mission.

[58] G. Bond, *The Politics of Change in a Zambian Community* (Chicago, 1976), 91-92. "Punyira, who had become increasingly conservative, had done little for the development of schools and medical facilities. In addition he had alienated his "traditional" advisers and other important headmen by not consulting them. As the head of the Native Administration court he had given arbitrary and, at times, partial decisions which estranged many of his subjects. In 1960, he also alienated those of his personal advisers who were traders and shop owners by giving permission to an Asian to open a shop in Muyombe; he withdrew it only in the face of vehement protest. Thus, it was not difficult for the new leaders to persuade many of the chief's advisors to support the founding of a UNIP branch in Muyombe".
[59] *Ibid*., 91
[60] *Ibid*., 109
[61] *Ibid*., 93
[62] R. Rathbone, 'Kwame Nkrumah and the chiefs: the fate of 'natural rulers' under nationalist governments', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6:10 (2000), 45-63
[63] Bond, *The Politics,* 144
[64] See Msimbi, 7 October 1954; Interview MD with Edwall Muwowo, Chief Muyombe, Muyombe trading centre, 8 September 2009
[65] D. M. Gordon, 'The cultural politics of a traditional ceremony: mutomboko and the performance of history on the Luapula (Zambia)' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 46:1 (2004), 63-83, 64
[66] *Ibid*.
[67] The Nyasaland Times, Tuesday November 12, 1957: "Stone of Katowo"
[68] Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stone_of_Scone, 2 August 2011
[69] Nyasaland Times, "Stone of Katowo"
[70] When Chawinga visited the United Kingdom in 1951 for the Festival of Britain he was not only exposed to the high modernist visions of Britain's future in exhibitions, architecture and design, amidst all these experiences he observed the importance of the Royal Family in Britain. He was already aware of this in Nyasaland because, as Cannadine points out in reference to the Empire more generally, the cult of the Royal Family was embedded in the colonial landscape (D. Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British saw their empire* (Oxford, 2002). He was said to have been freshly inspired to create his own celebration by the coronation celebrations of the Queen of England in 1953, see interview MD with Kawonga, 29 January 2009.
[71] Fields, *Revival*, 64
[72] *Ibid*.
[73] The reasons for Banda's return to Nyasaland are discussed in more detail in Power, *Political Culture,* 123-135.
[74] C. Baker, *State of Emergency: Crisis in Central Africa, Nyasaland, 1959-1960,* (London and New York, 1997), 5-6
[75] *Ibid*.*,* 10
[76] Baker, *State of Emergency,* 9
[77] *Ibid*., 9
[78] Power, *Political Culture,* 146
[79] Baker, *State of Emergency,* 203
[80] Youens, Chief Secretary speaking at an Intelligence meeting 7 Oct 1959 quoted in Baker, *State of Emergency*
[81] Kuwali, 'The role of chiefs', 14
[82] Papers discussed at the 50th Anniversary of the State of Emergency in Malawi conference held at Chancellor College, Zomba, 27-28 July 2009: H. Kachapila-Mazizwa, 'Operation Jambo; Chiwaliwali Village and the 1959 Nyasaland State of Emergency'; O.J.M. Kalinga, 'The State of Emergency in the Old Karonga District'.
[83] Kalinga, 'The 1959 State of Emergency', 762, my emphasis.
[84] *Ibid*.
[85] Interview MD with Karua
[86]One example of this was the tension between headman Katolola and Mwakasungula. When Mwakasungula tried to calm the situation by saying all the good things that the Europeans had brought the headman's response was angry; "our people have died" he said, "and I am surprised that you think we should continue to die".
[87] Interview MD with Karua
[88] Interview MD with Samson Mumba
[89] Informal discussion with Cosmo Haskard, Bantry Bay, 5 November 2009

[90] Interview MD with Julius Zgambe, 4 February 2009. Zgambe said that Kamangilira did take part in this unrest but he advised Chikulamayembe not to go with guns otherwise they would all be finished. He said that Kamangilira took all the guns and the people went to the office to fight without them; Interview MD with Austin Mfune, SGVH Chembe: Chembe said that the organisers of the protests wanted us to go to Rumpi but Kamangilira refused saying that they had guns so we should not go and fight.
[91] The historical facts reveal that Federal soldiers were not simply shooting people for resisting arrest or non-cooperation in general, although events at Nkhata Bay might contest such a picture, it is widely believed in the main the soldiers fired on people only when protests were violent and overwhelming.
[92] Interview MD with Dambazuka Nundwe, Dambazuka Village, 28 August 2009: Kamangilira was very brave, during the state of emergency he saved lots of people by volunteering himself in the front line.
[93] Harvey, "10 years of Freedom"
[94] Power, *Political Culture,* 103. The most detailed analysis of Molen Tengani's chieftainship can be found in Elias Mandala's *Work and Control in a Peasant Economy: A History of the Lower Tchiri Valley in Malawi, 1859-1960* (Madison, 1990)
[95] MNA, NN 4/1/13: *Provincial Annual Report, Northern Province, 1960*, Local Government Section
[96] Realising that changes would need to be made to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland if it was to survive the implications of the Emergency disturbances, and knowing that the nationalist force was growing ever stronger, the Monckton Commission was set up and charged with gathering information for a review into the constitutional future of Federation. The findings were to be presented at the Federal Review Conference planned for later in that same year, 1960; a meeting which Katumbi attended as a chiefly representative.
[97] PRO, CO 1015/1723: *Proposed Boycott of Monckton Commission*, Aleke Banda, Secretary General MCP to all members and branches, n.d. circular No 2, 1959
[98] MNA, Transmittal Files. 3-12-4F (Box 9564), Diary entry, 9th February, Chikulamayembe said that he "had not heard" of Monckton.
[99] The Monckton Commission was not entirely well received even by the colonial administration in Nyasaland. Jones "Approved List" included "Monckton, Hartley Shawcross, Elspeth Huxley, Aidan Crawley, Arden Clarke, John Moffat, Menzies and the Canadian". See, MNA: Transmittal Files. 3-12-4F (Box 9564) *Ulendo West Rumpi*
[100] MNA: Transmittal Files. 3-12-4F (Box 9564), diary notes 4th March 1960
[101] McCracken, *A Political History,* 229
[102] MNA, NN 4/1/13, *Provincial Annual Report, Northern Province, 1960*, Local Government Section. Antagonism towards Master Farmers receiving government subsidies accompanied the boycott, as well as towards growers of Turkish tobacco, who were labeled 'federal' because the crop was purchased by a firm with headquarters in Salisbury. As a part of the more general disruption people protested by refusing to dip cattle and inoculate dogs against rabies.
[103] *Ibid.*
[104] MNA, NN 4/1/11, *Northern Province Annual Report, 1959-60*
[105] MNA, Transmittal Files. 3-12-4F (Box 9564), diary notes 9 February 1960
[106] MNA, NN 4/1/11: *Northern Province Annual Report, 1959-60*. The general policy of the agricultural department has been to concentrate on progressive elements, and not to dissipate energies on converting others, as a consequence "few people were prosecuted for offences against the natural resources legislation".
[107] Interview MD with Jakob Chawinga, P.G.V.H. Chikunguweya, Chikunguweya village, 15 January 2009. Chikunguweya mentioned that some say he embezzled the money which was intended for the airport but there is no evidence of this. Some say that he bought his car with the money but there is no proof; Interview MD with Efron Zgambo, G.V.H. Nthawathawa, Nthawathawa village, 15 January 2009. Whilst Zgambo said that he had done nothing bad a neighbour interjected that he had dispensed with the money given to him by a white man to build the airport. Interview MD with Austin Mfune, S.G.V.H. Chembe: Chembe also said that he received money for the airport that should have been used as labour costs to clear the land. He said that everyone speculated that he used the money to buy his Landrover. In fact it is likely that Chawinga was given a loan to buy the car, but it is nevertheless interesting to hear how people interpreted his possession of these new prestige items.
[108] Interview MD with Kawonga and Joseph Munthali, 29 January 2009; MNA, transmittal files 2.2.4F, (25390) *District Monthly Reports Rumphi, 1966-1975*
[109] Interview MD with Kawonga and Munthali
[110] MNA, transmittal files 3-12-4F (9564), 11th February 1960, complaint lodged by Benedicto Lonje with Assistant District Commissioner

[111] Manuel Mfuni, Nickson Mfuni, Fighton Mfuni took a case to appeal in early 1960 (MNA, transmittal files, 3-12-4F (9564), *Native Authority Court Matters,* DC Rumphi to Chief Katumbi, 4 February 1960). Chawinga responded to their accusation of his refusal to review their case; "If they say I refused this appeal that is a lie".
[112] MNA, Transmittal files, 3-12-4F, box 9564, 6th March 1960
[113] MNA, NN 4/1/13, 1960
[114] PRO, CO 1015/2376: *1960 Conference on Nyasaland Constitution*, Governor Robert Armitage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 July 1960
[115] *Ibid.*
[116] *Ibid.,* 12 July 1960
[117] *Ibid.*, 14 July 1960
[118] *Ibid.*, 12 July 1960
[119] *Ibid.*, 18 July 1960
[120] The MCP brought three "chiefs" as advisers: Kabunduli of Nkhata Bay; Kuntaja of Blantyre and the officially deposed Mr Willard Gomani of Ncheu.
[121] PRO, CO 1015/2376, Armitage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 July 1960
[122] The government sent Chiefs Chinde (Mzimba), Masula (Lilongwe), and Makanjira (Fort Johnston); the MCP selected Chiefs Kuntaja (Blantyre) and Kabunduli (Nkhata Bay), as well as Willard Gomani from Ncheu; and the UFP chiefs were: Somba (Blantyre), Chikumbu (Mlanje), Chakumbira (Ncheu); the CLP representatives were Y.M.L. Chirwa, Wellington Phiri and G.C. Namangwiyo.
[123] Interview MD with Jim Ngwira, Thiti Farm, Chivwalankwende Village, 20 January 2009
[124] MNA, NN 4/1/11: *Annual Report Northern Province 1959*, Land Use
[125] Interview MD with Jim Ngwira, 20 January 2009;
[126] *Ibid.*
[127] Interview MD with Roosevelt Mwangonde. Mwangonde remembers that Ngwira and Kamangilira were not on the best of terms and that they had a conflict about something.
[128] Interview MD with Jim Ngwira, 20 January 2009; he made it clear that he thought that Chawinga was not the only one doing good things in the area, he was keen to declare that there were many others like him.
[129] *Ibid.*
[130] Interview MD with Kawonga, 29 January 2009
[131] "Report on discussions between Banda and Chief Secretary Youens", Glyn Jones to Monson, March 1960, quoted in McCracken, *A Political History,* 364
[132] Interview MD with Karua
[133] Interview MD with Kawonga, 29 January 2009
[134] Much more information on both needs to be known.
[135] Orson Mkandawire for example whose autobiography (Mkandawire, Face to Face with My Life, 2004) provides interesting descriptions of this work and the wider world that he, and others like him, was connected to.
[136] Interview MD with John Mwangonde, Katowo Trading Centre, 24 September 2009
[137] He had been the first person to buy something from the carpenter Abraham Munthali when he set up his shop in 1939; a bed and chair that it was said had gone for 10 shillings, this was a fact confirmed by John Mwangonde in an interview.
[138] Interview MD with John Mwangonde
[139] Jato Kawonga recalls that he along with Levi Kaleya, and John's brother Donald Mwangonde, also a teacher, were some of the leading anti-Federal campaigners.
[140] J. Iliffe, *Honour in African History,* (Cambridge, 2005), 252
[141] *Ibid.*
[142] Interview MD with Abraham Munthali, Kawulumira Village, 22 September 2009
[143] Interview MD with Efrida Nyamhango, Kawulumira Village, 22 September 2009
[144] Abraham Munthali recalls that he "won a tender for building school blocks at Chisimuka and thought that some of the young men can come and learn carpentry so I invited some to come and mold bricks and Kamuzu sent us some iron sheets" (Interview MD with Munthali).
[145] Interview MD with Efrida Nyamhango
[146] Discussion MD with Joseph Munthali, 29 January 2009.
[147] Interview MD with Efrida Nyamhango
[148] *Ibid.*
[149] *Ibid.*

[150] J. Iliffe, *Honour in African History,* (Cambridge, 2005), 252
[151] *Ibid.*
[152] Interview MD with Abraham Munthali
[153] Interview MD with Efrida Nyamhango
[154] J. Iliffe, *Honour in African History,* (Cambridge, 2005), 253
[155] *Ibid.*
[156] MNA, 17.15.4F (41265): *Hewe (I) Rejected 1961*
[157] McCracken, *A Political History,*378
[158] MNA, 17.15.4F (41265)*, Hewe (I) Rejected 1961*
[159] Confused by the apparent contradiction of the teachings he had received at the mission and the command that was made of him to be conscripted into the army, Munthali objected to being drafted saying that he had been taught not to kill. It was only on account of the goods and services his carpentry shop promised to provide that he was spared the fate of many of his contemporaries (see Interview MD with Abraham Munthali)
[160] *Ibid.*
[161] The trading licences listed in archival files produce just a snapshot of the type and number of stores in Rumphi. Licenses were revoked or people simply had to close their stores on account of not being able to pay the fees for trading. Less successful stores came and went, licences were granted and revoked continually. If it was located less than 200 yards from the road then a £10 licence had to be sought. If more than this only £3 would be paid for a general licence. One trader, James Zgambo, complained about the way in which the Boma levied fees; "I thought you will come and measure the distance from my store to the road. Does the Boma think that everybody who is in the District is on the main road? […] I am far from the main road. The distance where my business place is, is probably twice 200 yards. I now realize that without that the Boma does not want people to do business. Without sending the people to come and measure the distance, I shall not pay the £8. According to your letters received I should like to let you know that you should come and close the store this year, and not next year" (MNA, 3-12-4F (9564): James Zgambo to Government Agent Rumpi, 10th November 1963). Yakobe Chawinga of Chikunguweya ceased trading on the 3rd April 1964; Elton Sinyiza of Ntawatawa Village ceased trading 13th April 1964; and Patrick Zgambo of Ntawathawa had a store "near the Main road to Fort Hill" but "because of the £10: -: - licence he has moved his store from the Main road which is now three quarters of a mile and he wants to pay for his £3: -: - licence" (MNA, 3-12-4F (9564): *Licences: Trading Licences 1963-64)*.
[162] MNA, (NA 1/3/38, DC Rumphi 1952-89), 3.12.4F (9564), *Tax Rural Ass Board Minutes 1963-64*
[163] MNA, (NA 1/3/38 DC Rumphi 1952-89): 17.15.2R (41258), letter from C.J Muwowo (Cllr Vwaza Ward) to DC Rumpi, 28/5/73 complaining about Katumbi. It is not clear from the archive what happened next in the dispute but with Chawinga's arrest coming only a few months later the outcome becomes rather irrelevant in terms of observing how it affected his future authority.
[164] Interview MD with Norman Chawinga
[165] Based on figures found in source: MNA, NA 1/3/38 DC Rumphi 1952-89: 3.12.4F (9564), *Tax Rural Ass Board Minutes 1963-64*
[166] *Ibid.*
[167] *Nchimi* translates as 'diviner'
[168] W. Behringer, *Witches and Witch-Hunts: A Global History* (Cambridge and New York, 2004); B. Soko and G. Kubik, *Nchimi chikanga: The battle against witchcraft in Malawi. Vol. 10*. (Blantyre, 2002), 45-48 and 207
[169] His popularity and influence was significant enough for Hastings Banda to summon Chikanga soon after Independence in 1964, in order to restrict his activities. His work encouraged much cross border movement which Banda was keen to stem.
[170] Soko and Kubik, *Nchimi Chikanga,* 50
[171] A. P. Wendroff, "'Trouble-Shooters and Trouble-Makers": Witchfinding and Traditional Malawian Medicine", Unpublished PhD thesis, City University of New York, 1985, 106
[172] Behringer uses Apter's description of the Atinga Cult in Yoruba society in his control of female traders to show that, contrary to traditional anthropologists assumptions about the provenance of collective witch cleansings, sometimes it was used as "language to reinterpret economic control" (Behringer, *Witches and Witchhunts,* 207-8)
[173] See A. Roberts, *The Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina*, (Lusaka, 1972)
[174] Chikanga is quoted in Soko and Kubik (2002; 50) as saying, "many thousands of people came to Thete Village and the climax was during the years 1959-1964. Although this was also the peak of political

activities in the country against Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this did not disturb my work in any way".

[175] The Kabenga-Benga Movement in Congo, for example, spread in early 1950s and reached its height in October 1958 just before independence; in the Portuguese colony of Angola "guerilla fighters, from 1961 onwards, aided the local population in killing witches and practically served as an anti-witchcraft movement"; in Zimbabwe "witch-hunts reached a zenith during the war of liberation, partly due to the collapse of traditional as well as modern institutions, partly because of the importance of spirit-mediums during the guerilla war". Behringer argues that witch-hunting in Zimbabwe became an act of liberation in itself. (Behringer, *Witches and Witch-Hunts*, 209)

[176] The *bamucapi* were first given scholarly attention in 1935 by Audrey Richards whilst she was working amongst the Bemba in North-Eastern Rhodesia. She observed that this anti-witchcraft revival, which had in fact been underway since around 1930, saw men "who dressed in European clothing" go in to villages to which they had been called and, by using small mirrors which could catch the reflection of the spirit of a person, they could find those responsible for witchcraft (P.J. Stewart and A. Strathern, *Witchcraft, Sorcery, Rumors and Gossip* (Cambridge, 2004) 60-61). On discovery, the guilty party would be made to drink the *mucapi* liquid, a red solution the soapy appearance of which is said to have given rise to the name of the movement since the Nyanja for washing clothes is *Kuchapa,* after which they were unable to go back to practicing their craft as if they did it would mean certain, and horrible, death (M. G. Marwick; 'Another modern anti-witchcraft movement in East Central Africa', in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 20: 2 (1950), 100-112

[177] Fields, *Revival and Rebellion,* 76

[178] Stewart and Strathern, *Witchcraft, Sorcery,* 62

[179] Fields, *Revival and Rebellion,* 78

[180] Stewart and Strathern, *Witchcraft, Sorcery,* 62.

[181] At first – and in the final instance - the colonial administration on the other hand treated these "medicine men" as much a part of the witchcraft-complex as the local ng'anga and, in 1933 in both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, the *bamucapi* were prosecuted in large numbers under the Witchcraft Ordinance. However, by the next year, after some debate at a Provincial Commissioner's conference, many officials in Nyasaland changed their mind about the impact such men were having; for a period of time it was decided that as long as they didn't interfere with "public order and good government", they were better left off alone (Fields, *Revival and Rebellion,* 84).

[182] *Ibid.,* 67

[183] The Mucapi movement was more easily able to be controlled by the Europeans and as such the subsequent movements adapted their behaviour and practices to avoid being the subject of similar control. Mucapi had made patients drink medicine, evoking in the colonial mind the poison ordeal which had already been suppressed. Furthermore they made direct accusations of witchcraft conflicting "with the requirements of European Administrations whose concern to keep the peace had made them declare accusations of witchcraft illegal". They also sold medicines and charms, making them open to prosecution (Marwick, 'Another modern anti-witchcraft movement', 111)

[184] Marwick; 'Another modern anti-witchcraft movement', 101

[185] Behringer, *Witches and Witchcraft,* 208

[186] Soko and Kubik, *Nchimi Chikanga,* 51

[187] MNA, transmittal files 9-16-5R (52343), Government Agent Rumpi to Office of the PM: Re Themba Chikulamayembe's Dismissal of GVH Kawazamawe, 2 March 1964

[188] MNA, transmittal files 3-12-4F. (9564), Notes from a meeting between the DC and Themba Chikulamayembe at Bolero, 9th February 1960

[189] *Ibid.*

[190] In 1964, after having developed a serious illness the Themba sought out Chikanga's advice as to whom had bewitched him into this state and it was reported, by the D.C., that "the Witch Finder, […] told the family of the Themba that the Themba's sickness is due to the making of two Village Headmen in one village". His divinations were heeded and at a Chiefs Council meeting the matter was discussed at some length: "Nchimi Chikanga has said that this illness has been caused by Kawazamawe […] I therefore depose him from GV Headmanship because he refuses to come to my call" (MNA, transmittal files 9-16-5R (52343), Chikulamayembe Chiefs Council, Bolero on 22 February 1964)

[191] McCracken, *A Political History,* 126

[192] Soko and Kubik, *Nchimi Chikanga,* 40

[193] MNA, NN 4/2/19, *Rumphi District Report 1956-63,* August 1962. Chikanga was called in to investigate a missing £50 from the councils safe.

[194] *Ibid.*, August 1963
[195] This is not an unusual case. Take for example Jonas Savimbi's leadership in Namibia; support for him should be looked at in light of the notion that a ruler's power was based on control of secular *and* spiritual forces. Behringer points out that "whereas supporters of Savimbi stressed his attempts at eradicating witchcraft, his opponents saw him as a witch himself" (Behringer, 210).
[196] Interview MD with Dambazuka Nundwe; he had a policy whereby you could not keep accusing people of being *fwiti*, if you were caught doing this then you would be called into his office, in this way *ufwiti* was reduced during his time
[197] Interview MD with Samson Mumba
[198] Interview MD with Norman Chawinga
[199] Wendroff, 'Trouble shooters', 100
[200] *Ibid.*
[201] MNA, (NA 1/3/38 DC Rumphi 1952-89) transmittal files 3.12.4F (9564), *Court Matters 1953-62,* Katumbi to Officer in Charge Rumpi Police Station, 14 October 1959. He sends a letter to the Officer in charge at Rumpi police station dated the 6 October 1959 asking for assistance: "I can see that the case is a threat to witchcraft. Will you go over it and if you think it is worthy for me to try such a case, please inform me". In another incident in the same file reported a couple of years later on the 3 July 1961, Chief Katumbi writes to the police again: "Will you send a Constable to investigate a case caused by Village Headman Chipofya who used Muabvi […] According to Witchcraft Ordinance Cap.8 of 1933, Section 7, I report this matter to you for your action".
[202] Interview with anonymous informant, 29 January 2009
[203] Berry, *Chiefs Know their Boundaries,* xxv
[204] He lost peoples trust and as one anonymous informant suggests, "people were afraid and many believed that he was using charms and that they could not confront such a powerful person. If you rely very much on practicing magic you don't care about anything and only think about yourself".
[205] Fields, *Revival and Rebellion,* 73.
[206] A more detailed history on the rainmaking institution, the clan histories surrounding it and the relationship which it was to have with the Katumbi Chieftainship needs to be further expanded
[207] Unfortunately there was no archival evidence discussing this issue though many people confirm this story. Several interviewees brought up the fact that Timothy Chawinga refused at first to have a catholic school in Hewe, at Kabrufu. Perhaps because he feared they would grab all the land and he would lose control over it. Of course Chawinga was a member of the Livingstonia Mission's Church of Scotland church and this might have had something to do with it, however the people in Kabrufu wanted a school there and were not happy with his decision. See Interviews MD with Samson Mumba; Efron Zgambo; and various informal discussions with people in Kabrufu area. This tension between the Catholic mission and Timothy Chawinga was also confirmed by one of his right hand men at the time Austin Mfune when interviewed on 29 January 2009. Whilst a school was eventually built and a church established on the proviso that ownership of the land remained in the hands of the government, it is known that he flatly refused for a Catholic mission station to be built.
[208] Interview MD with Austin Mfune, SGVH Chembe; Interview MD with Benson Chimsewu, GVH Mzelemeka, Kaduku Village, 14 May 2009.