Capitalism, Migration, War and Nationalism in an Aegean Port Town: The Rise and Fall of a Belle Époque in the Ottoman county of Foçateyn

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Introduction

The Irony of the Black Stone of Foça

'The Legend of the Black Stone' (*Karataş Efsanesi*) is a widely known folk tale about Foça. One can hear about the legend from the residents of modern day Eski Foça or from its many visitors who are charmed by the beauty of this Aegean harbour town. Almost all tourist information booklets start with a reference to the legend and some local talents use it as a symbol in their poems. As a child who spent almost all of his summers in Eski Foça, the central town of the modern day district of Foça, I heard and read about that legend countless times. However, it was only in my late twenties that I recognized the irony of that local legend.

According to the legend, a small black stone roams the streets of Eski Foça. It is pushed from one corner to the other by the careless steps of the many visitors of the beautiful town of Eski Foça. Nobody sees the stone because they are busy enjoying the beauties surrounding them. Yet those who step on it know that they did so because of a longing that they feel in their hearts. They fall in love with the charm of Eski Foça and wherever they go, they leave a piece of their hearts wandering in the streets and shores of Eski Foça. Those who leave the town feel a deep longing to go back to Eski Foça and those who stay forget about their 'original homes' and spend the rest of their lives in Eski Foça.

I know that feeling and once I thought that I too had stepped on that little black stone when I was small. If read carefully, one can see that the feeling described in this local legend is nothing but 'homesickness' and for me that is the source of the irony of 'The Legend of the Black Stone'. It is a stone that 'haunts' the hearts of those who set foot on it and makes them feel like 'exiles' longing for home, a place to be, without realizing it. It makes you want to go to a place that is not your 'original home'. The irony is that this town where the stone roams, Eski Foça, really had residents who

longed for it and other new residents who were ‘haunted’ by it without knowing that they were. The real story, however, is more ‘haunting’ than the legendary one.



[**Picture:** Modern day borders of the district of Foça (red) and other districts of the province of Izmir (brown). Foça is the name of a Western Anatolian district in modern day Turkey. Its name is derived from the name of the old Ottoman county of Foçateyn. The administrative borders of Foçateyn and modern day Foça are almost the same.]

Eski Foça, like many other places in Turkey, has been both an origin and a final destination for many refugees who were forced to migrate. The history of the county of Foçateyn (the modern day district of Foça) constitutes one of the many stages of a dramatic transition from empire to nation state. It is a home ‘longed for’ by the generations of its old Ottoman Greek residents who were forced to leave Foça, first in

the spring of 1914 and later in 1922, and it is also a home for the 'charmed' Muslim refugees from the Balkans, the *muhacir*s, and the Muslims who were part of the population exchange after 1923, the *mübadil*s who were resettled there after their flight and expulsion from their 'original homes'. All suffered as the result of nationalism and demographic engineering but they ended up living under the different guises of the Black Stone's charm. Once they set foot in their new home town, those Muslim refugees and subjects of the population exchange 'forgot' about their original homes and embraced Foça. Ottoman Greeks who were forced to leave always longed for the town and wanted to return. One nationalism made people 'forget' and the other one made them 'remember', just like the charm of the legendary stone would do.

So maybe 'The Legend of the Black Stone' is an unconscious manifestation of an 'untold' story, a Freudian slip of sorts. After all, it is the modern day residents of Foça who made up that legend and they are the descendants of their grandparents who settled there as *muhacir*s or *mübadil*s. They grew up listening to stories from their grandparents and some even remembered those days of turmoil from the earlier times in their lives. Early generations struggled to survive. The contemporary people of Foça live amidst the rather intact remains of the old Ottoman town, mostly enjoying their lives there and thriving, but they are also largely amnesic about its history. So 'The Legend of the Black Stone' could be thought of as a literary expression narrated by people who feel but cannot fully comprehend all the things that shaped the reality around them. It offers a poetic explanation for a part of their past and present that is not there.

This thesis does not aspire to test the validity of the above-mentioned claim. Rather, it is an attempt to understand and unravel various elements that played significant roles in the aforementioned process of transition from empire to nation state on a local scale that created exiles and settled other exiles in place of them. The goal is to historicize the real 'haunt' without partisanship or romanticizing. In other words, this is an attempt to write a monograph of the local history of the county of Foçateyn in its most troublesome years in the modern era and connect such a monograph to the rather global histories of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey and from the Age of Empires to the Age of Extremes in general. Beginning roughly in

the 1820s, the county was shaped and reshaped by economic incorporation with global capitalism, state sponsored modernization reforms, growth and migration. It was booming, transformed into a populous, connected and cross-cultural county by the end of the same century. Small communities of Ottoman Armenians, Jews and Europeans lived together with larger groups of Ottoman Greeks and Muslims. But in June of 1914 the county was suddenly transformed into a homogenous community that consisted only of Turks. Foçateyn thus entered a period of transition that essentially lasted until 1922 when imperialisms, nationalisms and warfare were shaping the county.

The county of Foçateyn experienced the simultaneous effects of a multitude of major transformative forces (such as capitalism, state reforms, wars and migration) that in other parts of the Empire were already having a profound impact. For that reason, the history of the county of Foçateyn marks an interesting reference in history in which one can see the effects of market, state, ideologies, power struggles, war, migration and networks all in one place. Of course, those forces were also important in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire in the larger transition from empire to nation-state but it is rather uncommon to see them at play in the history of a single county. That is what makes the real history behind 'The Legend of the Black Stone' so interesting and valuable.

The Enquiry

In this research I try to understand and reveal the historical reasons behind the radical transformation of the county of Foçateyn from a developing, booming, incorporated and cross-cultural entity at the end of the nineteenth century into a veritable ghost town that was a depopulated, destroyed, isolated and demographically homogenized entity at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the context of Foçateyn, the protagonists who started that transformation in 1914 were the Unionists[1] who controlled the Ottoman state at the time. As I worked on the research for this study, I

[1] Unionist is the English translation of *İttihatçı*. It is shortened version used to refer to the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti / Fırkası*).

asked myself two perhaps seemingly naïve and simple questions: Why would a state want such a devastating change for a tax-yielding and developed county like Foçateyn? And, does the history of Foçateyn tell us anything new to help us understand the larger transition from empire to nation state?

The first question came about as the result of my scepticism about what is often taken for granted about Ottoman-Turkish history. My aim is not to legitimize the past. Rather, I sought to understand the relationship between state and society at a particular time in history in a particular geography. There are already some ready answers to this question from a variety of disciplines. The effects of wars, modernity, capitalism, elite networks, nationalisms and geographical peculiarities have all been used to provide answers to such questions. However, the analyses of the same effects are rarely employed together in one study. Moreover, we rarely hear the 'silenced histories' of less global actors, local power holders, workers and minorities in such histories. That is why I asked my first naïve yet probing question about the local history of Foçateyn and through that I seek to discuss the transition from empire to nation state in the local historical context of the county of Foçateyn. I argue that only a reconstruction of the local history of a place where 'Greeks' and 'Turks', Orthodox Christians and Muslims, lived, worked and produced together can help to test the accepted nationalist grand narratives about the 'unavoidable' split between the two groups as it actually took place. Local history thus provides a meaningful context to discuss the question of whether the two groups in that concrete locality had clearly, gradually and unavoidably drifted apart starting in the nineteenth century. Did external (or rather global) forces and actors finally decide what happened locally? Or do we have a more complex picture in which nothing was unavoidable but both the global and the local were at play? I do not take the Ottoman collapse, Ottoman incorporation with capitalist markets, the increasing predominance of nationalisms or any other historical phenomena as forces that inevitably carry history in certain directions. My goal is to ask 'why' without partisanship and bear in mind that why something happens does not excuse it but only helps us understand it.

My second question asks if the history of Foçateyn has the potential to give us a fresh and new perspective for understanding the transition from empire to nation state in the

Ottoman/Turkish context. Much has been written about this transition. We might assume that the history of Foçateyn merely confirms what we already know. However, once I asked that question and delved into material about Foçateyn, I realized that there were new aspects of that transition. My curiosity was rewarded with ample stories and sources that fill in the gaps in our understandings of the late Ottoman Empire. The history of Foçateyn shows why and how the Ottoman demise after the Great War in fact started with the Balkan Wars in 1912 and ended after 1922 with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. This research fills a gap because it does not just look at the rise of nationalisms among the elite or inter-state power plays in explaining the transition as one long chapter. That has already been successfully done. This thesis shows the events that are intricately linked to one another in succession and thus constitute a meaningful, drastic and rapid period of transition from empire to nation state on a local level. The novelty of this approach is in the depiction of the eventful nature of this phase of transition in a local history.

Seminal studies by Fikret Adanır, Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu and Erik Jan Zürcher[2] show that the loss of the Ottoman Balkans, Ottoman Macedonia, and *Rumeli* (Roumelia) is crucial for understanding the Young Turks, and especially the Unionists (members of the Community of Union and Progress, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), the majority of whom hailed from those regions. Those studies discuss the effects of the Macedonian Question and the loss of the Ottoman Balkans on the Ottoman political elite, the Young Turks who shaped the last years of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Republic of Turkey. This study takes such an approach and applies it to the local level. The history of transition in Foçateyn, especially what I call the spring of organized chaos in June 1914, reveals that the loss of the Ottoman Balkans was not only relevant at an elite level but also relevant in the eventful development of history in the Ottoman Empire through nationalist rivalries, migrations and wars.

[2] See: Fikret Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001), Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu* (1890-1918), (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003), Erik Jan Zürcher, 'How Europeans Adopted Anatolia and created Turkey', in *European Review*, Vol.13, No. 3 (2005): 379-394.

This research on the history of transformation in Foçateyn employs two recent and fruitful trends in the historiography of the late Ottoman Empire: micro history and comparative macro models.[3] I simultaneously reveal and discuss the equally important agencies of a variety of local and global actors. The local, in this case the history of Foçateyn and its residents, is emphasized in my research. While I do see a need to give a voice to the 'silenced' agents of history, I disagree with the dichotomy that sees 'we the people' as passive receivers of the policies of 'they the statesmen'. Policies do find willing executioners or dissidents who bargain with the global (historical actors of higher power) and contribute to the ways with which final outcomes of policies are shaped. This bargain between the global and local does not exist in a space of infinite possibilities. Choices are restricted and influenced by discourse, power relations and structures.[4] Established histories of discursive practices, power allocation and economic structures create patterns that limit and influence possibilities. Focusing on the local presents my strong suit in this research, but I also hope that this study will contribute to our understanding of universal human experience and transformation. For that end I employed macro models and world historical references in my interpretations. In doing so, my goal was to connect the story of the local to the story of the global. If such an aim is fulfilled, I would consider it to be an antidote to any forms of essentialism that limit us to regional, cultural or national boundaries and a contribution to the normalization of Ottoman and the Middle Eastern histories.

Chapter Structure

First I attempt to define what was distinct about Foçateyn before the period of transition that started in the spring of 1914. In this way I aim to demonstrate the nature of the transition that started to take place in June of 1914 by providing a contrast with the previous state of affairs. In chapter one, this brings to light the story

[3] For a discussion of these trends see: Erik Jan Zürcher, *Village and Empire: An Essay on Recent Trends in the Historiography of the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, (forthcoming).

[4] This proposed framework was inspired by a work by Sewell. See: William H. Sewell, Jr., *Rethinking Labor History: Toward a Post-Materialist Rhetoric*, CSST Working Paper no 44, CRSO Working Paper no 421, May 1990.

of Eski Foça's emergence as a boomtown, a time when markets acted as a global force at work in the development of the county. I demonstrate that Foçateyn was one of the earliest Ottoman port-towns that became integrated into the world economy. Eski Foça, the center of the county, emerged as a booming and developing entity after the mid-19th century. The history of the development of the salt business in the county provides much insight about the making of a globally-connected economy and shows that the developments in Foçateyn were synchronized with those of incorporated port-towns and port-cities in the eastern Mediterranean.

In the second chapter the second major global force, the state, appears as the main actor in the history of the county of Foçateyn. The amount of knowledge and control that was produced by Ottoman state reforms, including the infrastructure and the new legal framework that emerged after the reforms, appears as the driving force behind the incorporation as well. Ironically, the reforms that were implemented with the aim of increasing central control contributed to the process of incorporation and thus undermined its very purpose. This dichotomous nature of the process of Foçateyn's incorporation is demonstrated through the changes in demography and spatial transformations.

In the third chapter I investigate the meaning of Foçateyn's particular historical trajectory for its residents and for the Ottoman centre. This involves a step outside the discussion of the larger transformative forces like state and market and a subsequent focus on the local. Taking into account the drastic transformations on the horizon in June of 1914, I employ a cautious narrative to avoid retrospective readings. In the 19th century, Foçateyn became a developing cross-cultural entity with a cosmopolitan outlook. Nationalisms loomed in the background but coexistence and increasing interaction was the daily reality. Architectural forms representing middle-class values started to dominate, especially in the boomtown of the county of Eski Foça. Many of Foçateyn's old residents recalled this period as a *Belle Époque*, but this shouldn't be construed as a cosmopolitan heaven, nor as a state of constant contention and conflict. Rather, it was a fragile habitat that was transformed by modernity. It had the potential to formulate coexistence as much as contention. The sustenance of this habitat was dependent on Foçateyn's incorporation into world markets. There were no clear

connections, however, with the transformation that started to take place in June of 1914 and the way Foçateyn emerged as a developing entity. In other words, Foçateyn's history of incorporation and state sponsored modernization did not inevitably lead to its transformation in 1914. There were simply no major or sustained inter-ethnic or inter-communal tensions, no violent attempts by the Ottoman centre to restore its power (which was contested by international markets) but a fragile system of interdependence, development and cross-culturalism. At that point, I take up the pertinent question: Why did such a violent transformation take place?

In 1913, a peculiar brand of ideology and a certain network of young imperial bureaucrats took control of the Ottoman Empire. In my fourth chapter, I propose a framework for understanding and discussing the nature of this change that took place at the Ottoman political centre. I discuss the history of the emergence of the Unionists after the Balkan Wars and argue that it was indeed the Balkan Wars, the experiences of the Unionists with the Macedonian Question, the peculiar form of nationalism that emerged around that time, and the new political and diplomatic realities that created a new Ottoman centre. This new centre of power, the Unionists, identified the very nature of the Ottoman coast, its cross-culturalism and its incorporated structure, as problems that needed urgent attention.

In the fifth chapter I talk about the events of the spring of 1914, which I argue launched the transformation from an imperial county to a national one. This is a monographic attempt to reconstruct the events based on as many sources as possible. I initially present all available details concerning what I refer to as the spring of organized chaos in June of 1914. Then I argue that the Unionists organized the ousting and flight of the Ottoman Greeks of the county of Foçateyn. Through this I hope to provide readers with a chance to make an assessment of my argument through this transparency. The oustings were political in nature and they were reminiscent of the nationalist demographic policies of the era. The spring of organized chaos in Foçateyn constitutes one of the earliest and most well documented cases of the Unionist's demographic operations. This analysis sheds light on the foundations of the Unionists' radical policies of demographic engineering and destruction, which would occur later on. I also argue that June of 1914 in Foçateyn presents a concrete

historical case that links the dynamics of the Macedonian Question to the larger process of the formation of a nation state under the Unionist rule.

The transformation that started in Foçateyn in June of 1914 was only the first chapter in an eight year period of turmoil that left its mark on the history of the county as much as on the history of the Ottoman Empire. In the sixth chapter, the rest of this period of transformation is discussed. The entire period, from the spring of 1914 until the nominal end of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922, is taken up as a single period of extended warfare that affected the county of Foçateyn. That period witnessed increased damage and the creation of more refugees with each chapter of conflict, which built upon one another. A framework that perceives that entire period as a monolithic chapter makes it possible to connect events that national histories often present in vacuums. The spring of organized chaos in 1914 was connected to the Greek invasion of Anatolia in 1919, which in turn was connected to the Turkish re-occupation in 1922. In the end, in 1922, Foçateyn was depopulated, its boomtown (Eski Foça) was largely destroyed and it was no longer incorporated into world markets.

The epilogue provides a brief look at the first years of Foçateyn (now Foça) under the rule of the Republic of Turkey by way of contrast with the state of affairs before 1914. In the epilogue I discuss my conclusions, possible implications of this research and a future research agenda.

About the Sources

This study takes into account a variety of primary sources including the personal photography collections of Felix Sartiaux, Reha Midilli and myself, as well as memoirs, Ottoman state archives (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri*, BOA), the oral historical archives of the Center of Asia Minor Studies (Κέντρο Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών, CAMS here on) and Engin Berber, the British Foreign Office archives (FO), French commercial almanacs, the Ottoman provincial almanac of Aydın and a variety of journals, newspapers, travelogues and ego documents by Ottomans and foreign observers. The aim was to use as many different sources as possible in as

many different languages as possible in order to overcome the problems of methodological nationalism that often causes us to ignore sources outside our own languages. It is an attempt to bridge the gap between the histories of the people of the Empire who are now considered to be distinct subjects by Greek and Turkish historiographies. Such an approach also takes into account the need to simultaneously address both the local and the global actors of change.

In this thesis, none of these materials, whether derived from state archives, ego documents, photographs or deciphered telegrams, are taken at face value. All of them are perceived as being equally context-bounded and subjective in their own right. We should always remember that as historians, we construct narratives and that involves a process of selection. I selected the overlapping parts of these different sources and attempted to present them in a meaningful and critical historical narrative. I present my selections transparently, declare my positions and my reasons for taking them, and leave the final judgement to the reader. When they arise, the disputed aspects of the sources are presented in small discussions in the footnotes.

Two oral history archives are repeatedly used in some parts of this research. The first is the Engin Berber Oral Historical Archive (EBOHA), which is the personal archive of Prof. Dr. Engin Berber who conducted a variety of oral history interviews in Foça in 1995 and in 1997. Between 1994 and 1995, a group of historians consisting of Serhan Ada, Esra Danacıoğlu and Engin Berber started a project for the collection of oral historical material about the period of Greek occupation between 1919 and 1922 and its effects on everyday life in the Izmir (Smyrna) area. At the time, they were enthusiastic about the possibilities that oral history can offer. Later, Pelin Böke, Fahri Dikkaya and Sabri Sürgevil joined the group. Each scholar collected relevant material from different places in and around Izmir by way of conducting individual interviews. These collections were never brought together in one publication because the project ended. Some members of the project published their studies separately.[5] I became

[5] For an example of such a publication and for the information on the projects see: Pelin Böke, *İzmir 1919-1922 Tanıklıklar*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2006), 5-8. For another example of such a publication see: Engin Berber, 'The life in the Anatolian countryside during the Greek occupation: the example of Foça', in

aware of these documents after contacting Mr. Berber. It appears that there was no systematic structure applied in all the separate interviews, but the set on Foçateyn discusses similar issues in a similar manner with the interviewees. I made use of all the cassettes he recorded at the time with the surviving elderly residents of Foçateyn. It should be noted, however, that the interviews were conducted many years after the end of the Ottoman Empire. Also, most of the interviewees were children at the time, and some were barely in their early twenties in the 1910s. There is one interesting fact about almost all of the interviews that should be pointed out. Although the interviewees were mostly asked questions about the troublesome years of 1919-1922, they often talked more about coexistence and daily life. At times, the interviewees were wracked by emotions and made contradictory statements. The collection also provides ample information on topics extending beyond the period of Greek occupation as well. Most of the information presented complies with the information revealed in non-oral sources concerning the history of the period.

The second oral historical sources I often consulted were from the archives of CAMS, which was created in light of the fact that as time went by, there were fewer and fewer Greek refugees from Anatolia who could recall what they experienced. Melpo Logotheti-Merlier (1890-1979), a musicologist who '…set out from mid-1930s to create a repository of information about Anatolia, including a collection of oral testimonies...' established the core of what later became the Center for Asia Minor Studies.[6] The centre collected interviews up until the 1970s. Interviewees were asked about basic information such as details about their villages and their surroundings, approximate population, daily life, education and religion.[7] The information was then recorded textually, and there are no voice recordings for most of the interviews. Interviews with the elderly residents of Foçateyn (those from Eski Foça, Yeni Foça and some villages are categorized under the subfolders ΠΑΛΙΕΣ ΦΩΚΙΕΣ and ΝΕΕΣ

Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean, ed. Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis, (Athens: Alpha Bank Historical Archives, 2010), 125-173.

[6] Nicholas Doumanis, *Before the Nation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12.

[7] For a detailed discussion on the structure of the archive see: Evi Kapoli, 'Archive of oral tradition of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies: Its formation and its contribution to research', *Ateliers du LESC*, 32 (2008), http://ateliers.revues.org/1143 (accessed Oct. 2013).

ΦΩΚΙΕΣ) are hand-written on paper like most of the other interviews in the archive, which results in serious limitations. The real dialogues are inaccessible and the language is standardized by the interviewer. However, the collection is very valuable as it illuminates the blind spots of established historiographies by providing a history from below. The interviewees were also asked about their relations with the local Muslims ('Turks'). This, just like the interviews in EBOHA, gives a valuable insight about the intercommunal and interethnic relations of the period. In the Greek context, just like in the Turkish one, asking questions about this is in itself a political agenda: 'Having lived in Constantinople in her formative years, Merlier had experienced intercommunality first hand, but she also knew that the dominant line in Greece was strictly monocultural. Greek nationalism defined "the Greek" as the civilized opposite of the irredeemably barbarous "Turk", hence the histories of Anatolian coexistence were not only deemed fictions but a cause for shame. It was this threat to historical truth that Merlier's archive was designed to counteract'.[8] Indeed that was why the interviews focused on everyday life. In my research, the overlapping themes and facts in different oral testimonies and oral archives constituted the backbone of my reconstruction.

The vast territories of the Ottoman Empire encompassed settlements that were once important centres of the ancient world, and naturally this attracted the attention of many archaeologists. Once such archaeologist who was commissioned by the French state to undertake excavations in Greece and Ottoman Western Anatolia was Félix Sartiaux (1876-1944), who was also a railroad engineer and a polytechnic. As I will discuss in detail later, he was commissioned to conduct excavations in the county of Foçateyn. According to Sartiaux, the choice of the site was important for two main reasons. Eski Foça (Παλαιά Φώκαια) was a very illustrious centre in the ancient world the residents of which founded the colony of Marseille. Despite this fact, it had not been thoroughly researched even though it was bound up with the history of France. Secondly, back then there had been competition among foreign archaeologists and it was only a matter of time before an Austrian or German company excavated the

[8] Doumanis, *Before the…*, 12.

ruins.[9] Sartiaux arrived in Foçateyn in 1913 and he stayed there until after the spring of June in 1914. He produced maps and photographs of Eski Foça and Yeni Foça, and also wrote his own personal accounts about the region. Later he went back to Eski Foça in 1919 and produced another set of photographs. The work of Sartiaux,[10] who was a philhellene and a pro-Entente figure during and after the Great War, provides extremely valuable information about aspects of daily life in Foçateyn, the events in 1914 and the situation in 1919. For that reason, his accounts are used critically in this research.

The Boomtown

Scrolling through the pages of a contemporary tourist booklet for modern day Foça reveals that it focuses on the remains of its 'once glorious pasts'. Ruins and remains of the ancient Greek, Persian, Genoese and Ottoman periods of rule in the region are frequently mentioned in descriptions of the central town of the Foça district, which is Eski Foça.[11] Ironically, with the exception of some rare and more recently published booklets, the least advertised of these 'glorious pasts' is the Ottoman one, a legacy that one might naturally attribute to modern Turkey. Despite the lack of an appropriate presence in the booklets, many of Ottoman Foça's remains are relatively intact. This may seem surprising given the fact that the entire district of Ottoman Foça was devastated by expulsions, warfare and destruction in the period of turmoil between 1914 and 1922. Two factors explain the relatively high number of remains despite that destruction. First of all, the municipality of Foça has focused on preservation and restoration policies in the last decade and that has helped save the remaining artifacts of the city's Ottoman heritage. Secondly, and more importantly,

[9] Joëlle Dalègre, 'Félix Sartiaux et Phocée, Eski Foça, Παλαιά Φώκια', *Cahiers Balkaniques*, Vol. 40, (2012), 1-11.

[10] His collection of photos, books, articles and correspondence are located in different French archives. His photos were first published in Haris Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée 1913-1920 Le Témoignage de Félix Sartiaux*, (Paris: Éditions Kallimages, 2008). Later, more photos from his collection were published in Haris Yiakoumis et al., *Regards Phocéens de Félix Sartiaux*, (Paris: Éditions Kallimages, 2012).

[11] Eski Foça is also referred to as Phokaia and/or Phocaea in English/Latin, Παλαιά Φώκαια in Modern Greek, Παλαιάσ Φώκαιασ in Classical Greek, Phocée in French, Foglieri in Italian, and Foça-i Atik, Karaca Foça, and Kara Foça in Ottoman documents. Today, in the modern day Turkish Republic, it is known as Eski Foça.

most of the remains of Ottoman Foça are from a period lasting between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the exception of three mosques, a *mescid*, a *hamam*, two castles and a few other buildings. That period was when Foça experienced its biggest economic, demographic and spatial expansion in more than a thousand years. It expanded so much that its remains are still visible after the town's decline.

Unlike the impression one might get from the tourist booklets, in reality Foça only had two 'glorious' periods of growth and expansion in history. In both periods, the town of Eski Foça played a pivotal role in the area's growth as the centre of the county. One period of expansion was in antiquity and the other started around the late 1820s with the start of Foçateyn's incorporation into the world economy.[12] The history of the former was re-discovered when the history of the latter was about to come to an end. Félix Sartiaux was the first person to rediscover the remnants of ancient Foça, Παλαιάσ Φώκαιασ, as a result of his excavations in 1913 and 1920. His early works became a source of inspiration and guidance for later generations and many archaeological excavations inspired by his work have gone on until today. He found numerous remnants of the ancient Phokaian settlement, including sculptures, grotesques, Greek and Roman inscriptions, mosaics and religious sites. His findings

[12] Ottoman historians agree that the Empire was affected by this change and expansion in Europe as early as 1770s. This period of expansion and development of capitalism, and the relative dissolution of protective economic barriers, was mainly a phenomenon that originated in Western Europe. The Ottoman Empire was a peripheral actor in this development and its economy incorporated into the capitalist economy that expanded. The central stage of growth and expansion centered on Britain and France, and the driving forces were the dual revolutions (the French Revolution of 1789 and the Industrial Revolution in Britain) of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The development of capitalism and industry, however, was naturally not limited to Britain. It soon spread to the rest of the world but mainly in the global north. In this period, capitalist economies constantly tried to expand and penetrate into other economies as a result of capitalism's inherent drive for growth. This period was characterized by the expansion of trade and capital flows. The initial stage of capitalist expansion stopped with the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. The pressure of capitalism was felt on the economy of the county of Foçateyn only around the 1820s when capitalist economies resumed growing after the brief period of interruption. For more information on the period see: Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolutions 1789-1848*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1996); Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire 1875-1914*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); Kindleberger, C. P., 'The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe 1820-1875', *The Journal of Economic History*, 1975, 35:1, 20-55.

confirmed that Foça indeed was a regional power in antiquity and it colonized many places on the Black Sea and the Western Mediterranean. One of those colonies was Marseilles in the south of France, the town where Sartiaux is believed to have had the inspiration to come to Foça after witnessing the 25th century celebration of the town's foundation by Phokaians, the ancient residents of Foça, in 1899.[13]

By the time Sartiaux started his first set of excavations in 1913, the county of Foçateyn had been growing rapidly since the last quarter of the 19th century. Its economy was expanding thanks to its incorporation into global capitalism. The county's share of trade in the local economy increased dramatically as opposed to the traditional sectors in the county's economy such as mining and agriculture. Growth attracted migrants and the population of the county increased and new neighbourhoods developed. Foça attracted investors with its lively port-town of Eski Foça and its productive and accessible hinterland. The Ottoman commercial bourgeoisie had started to invest its accumulated capital in promising boomtowns like Eski Foça by the middle of the 19th century. These investments were mostly in real estate and occasionally in business as well. Both the Ottoman state and the Orthodox community were also interested in building charitable structures. The number of schools, shops and attractive seaside stone *yalı*s[14] increased in this period of expansion. Sartiaux walked the streets of this rather cosmopolitan, connected and developing town of Eski Foça during his initial visit. The Foça that he saw was Ottoman Foça, an imperial town at the height of its development. However, Sartiaux's first visit to this imperial boomtown of Eski Foça ended unexpectedly in the spring of 1914 with the start of a chapter of expulsion and violence.

The spring of 1914 constitutes a milestone for the history of Eski Foça and also for history of the county of Foçateyn as a whole, in that it marks the beginning of the transition from empire to nation state. From then onwards, subsequent chapters of

[13] Myriame Morel-Deledalle, 'Félix Sartiaux and Phokaia First Excavations' in *Geçmişten Günümüze Foça: Uluslararası Sempozyum*, (Ankara: Yayımevi A.Ş., 1997), 15-20.

[14] *Yalı* is a Turkish word that is used to describe houses built by the sea. The origin of the word is the Greek word γιαλό, which means shore and/or a house built by the sea just like the Turkish meaning. The wealthy merchants of the town or those of Izmir, the major port city of the province of Aydın, often owned Foça's *yalı*s.

conflict and destruction befell the county of Foçateyn up until the end of the Turkish War of Independence in 1922. Much like the rest of Western Anatolia, Foçateyn faced dramatic events in 1914, 1919 and 1922, the effects of which have lasted until today. These events radically changed the demographic, economic and cultural outlook of the county that Sartiaux first saw. The ousting of Ottoman Greeks in the spring of 1914 that Sartiaux witnessed, the Greek occupation of 1919 and the subsequent Turkish struggle for independence that resulted in the Turkish re-occupation of Foçateyn in 1922 all constitute the local milestones of a more radical change: the transformation from the Ottoman Empire into the Republic of Turkey. The history of that transition is embedded in the history of the global as much as in the history of the local that preceded these periods of crisis.

The emergence of Eski Foça (*Foça-i Atik*[15], Old Foça) as a boomtown and its later demise into a ghost town was at the centre of the narrative of this transition and transformation. This could almost be seen as a natural choice. Eski Foça was the centre of the county, its most populous town and its most developed, transformed and incorporated settlement. There is more photographic, official, oral and statistical information about Eski Foça than any other part of the county of Foçateyn. Of course, information about the other parts of the county is also relevant and important, but there is far less material available about those areas. The political and economic relationship they had with the centre of the county, as well as the constant traffic and interaction of the residents of the county, are also integral parts of the local history of Foçateyn.

Looking at the Past: Path Dependency and Modernist Trajectories

Many historians are interested in the history of the 'long 19th century'[16] because they expect to find the 'seeds of destruction' that they assume played a central role in how

[15] *Eski* and *Atik* both mean old. The former is used in modern Turkish and the latter was used in Ottoman Turkish.

[16] The term 'long 19th century' is a term that was often used by historian Erik Hobsbawm in his works. It was adopted from its earlier use by Fernand Braudel who coined the term the 'long 16th century' and refers to the period between the French Revolution of 1789 and the beginning of the World War I in 1914 as an extended

events unfolded at the dawn of the subsequent century, the age of extremes[17] in which nationalism, the most widespread form of 'extremes', changed the world dramatically. However, this seemingly rational inquiry yields problematic results unless the anachronistic nature of the inquiry is avoided. The pursuit of looking for 'seeds of destruction', given the hindsight of what happened, automatically makes researchers accept the destructive chapters of history as inevitable discontents. A teleological narrative is built where the violence at the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was 'meant to happen' and all evidence is interpreted in light of that assumption. That is why much research builds up arguments in which even the smallest economic conflict or cultural difference is portrayed as an indication of antagonism. Agencies of ordinary people or elites, which are interpreted as harbingers of conflict, are given precedence in such analyses. This is also often due to the underlying primordial assumptions on the nature of national identities which sees all antagonisms as the reflections of national conflicts by simultaneously making two ungrounded assumptions. Firstly, they assume the omnipresence of national identities and in doing so they de-historicize identities. Secondly, they assign a superior role to national identities in people's decision-making processes. It is on this point that I take a different stance.

Reality is complex and multi-faceted. It is a construct of multiple variables that are intricately related with each other, just like a multi-variable mathematical equation. I do not necessarily seek 'seeds of destruction' in the 19th century in the county of Foçateyn. Antagonisms are not necessarily results of national identities nor are they necessarily the basis for 'inevitable' future conflicts. They may or may not have been significant in the way events unfolded. The actions of the actors of history, both global and local, take place within certain constraints. And those constraints, which are formed at the intersection of different historical processes, form paths, or

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century of subsequent and interrelated events. There are various adaptations of this terminology in the history writing of the Ottoman Empire.

[17] 'Age of extremes' is a terminology adopted from the same work by Erik Hobsbawm. In *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century*, *1914-1991*, Hobsbawm discusses the period after World War I in which modern ideologies (capitalism, state communism and nationalism) and warfare radically transformed the globe. Erik Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, (London: Abacus, 1995).

trajectories, that affect the decisions and possible patterns of behaviour of the actors of history.[18] Those restrain outcomes unless the conditions that form them are altered.

This is also true for the transition from empire to nation state in the county of Foçateyn. The intersection of global actors such as states, market and ideologies with the local historical peculiarities of the county of Foçateyn in the long 19th century established a path that determined the positions and the interactions of the actors of the period of crisis and transition in the 20th century. The division between the global and the local is often permeable and they constantly affect and change each other too. This permeable relation was also present in Foçateyn, the local particularities of which along with global actors played roles in the establishment of an historical path. Changes in the social, demographic and economic life of this part of the Ottoman countryside in the 19th century placed it on a 'collision course' with the political centre of the Ottoman Empire in the 20th century precisely because of the historical path that emerged on the Ottoman coast.

The chapters of conflict and destruction that started as early as 1911 with the Italo-Turkish (Tripolitanian) War and continued through the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) lasted until the end of the Turkish nationalist struggle (1922). They engulfed Foçateyn in the form of crises in the spring of 1914. Foçateyn's historical path, however, did not bring about sustained conflicts that gradually developed into crises in and of themselves. It brought an 'alternative path' that the Ottoman centre 'had to' deal with. It was not Foçateyn's own dynamics that caused conflict but it was the Ottoman centre's perception of those dynamics that brought on confrontation. The toll of

[18] This difference of paths and outcomes also means that the same conditions and phenomenon can evolve differently in different places. This is crucial for this thesis since it demonstrates that a certain part of the Ottoman Empire experienced modernity in a different way and that mattered for its history. There were multiple paths to modernity in the Ottoman Empire so there were multiple modernities even within the same political entity. For more information on multiple modernities, path dependency and historical institutionalism see: Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities Part I* and *Part II*, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003); McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Paul A. David, 'Path Dependence – A Foundational Concept For Historical Social Science', *Cliometrica – The Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History*, 1:2, Summer 2007, 91-114.

destruction was much greater in Foçateyn compared to many other places when the period of those successive wars between 1911 and 1922 ended precisely because of the nature of its historical path. Once Foçateyn was drawn into this rather global maelstrom of nationalist and imperialist conflict of competition and survival, the path that was established in the 19th century played crucial roles in the ways events unfolded. This thesis will demonstrate both the emergence of such a historical path in Foçateyn and the role it played in that period of transition. This chapter will deal with the establishment of that historical path and the latter chapters will demonstrate why it was indeed on a 'collision course' and 'had to be dealt with' by the political centre.

A developmental trajectory, in other words a path, was established in Foçateyn as a result of the interaction of various processes. At the heart of these were two major processes: the penetration of European capitalism, which brought about incorporation into world markets, and the Ottoman state's modernization reforms. They contributed to the establishment of a certain modernization trajectory in 'the long 19th' century of Foçateyn. The Balkan Wars put this trajectory on a collision course with another one that was envisaged by the Unionist Young Turks who seized power in the Empire in 1913. The modernist trajectory that affected Foçateyn and many other places in the Empire such as Alexandria, Beirut, Haifa, Izmir (Smyrna) and Thessaloniki[19] was the coastal trajectory of modernity. Understanding the dynamics of that trajectory and understanding why Foçateyn fits such a pattern will reveal why the Unionists found themselves on a collision course with it after the Balkan Wars and how a new Foçateyn was created afterwards.

The Coastal Trajectory

The historical trajectory approach '...suggests that the historical experience is spatially-diverse, temporarily-bounded, and follows a path-depended pattern'.[20] Therefore at a certain moment in history, let's say in the late 19th century of the Ottoman Empire, there were multiple historical experiences arising as the result of

[19] For examples of this see: Cem Emrence, *Remapping the Ottoman Middle East / Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy and the Islamic State*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 35-53.
[20] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 2.

spatial differences within the Empire and all such experiences were manifestations of certain structures or paths that were formed by larger happenings and/or smaller events. Happenings and events constantly transform structures. They are reproduced or reshaped in certain ways in certain directions due to the path-depended nature of the historical experience. To put it simply, 'what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time'.[21] However, no causal structure or pattern is uniform through time. A certain sequence can work differently under different conditions. This is why this research '...investigates the locked-in effects of state-society and global-local relations that become entrenched over time'.[22] It demonstrates a certain set of events, both on the global and on the local level, that put the county of Foçateyn on a certain developmental trajectory which brought about its rise and contributed to its transformation into a battlefield of nationalisms in the following century.

According to Emrence, the Ottoman Middle East was characterized by three major 'imperial paths', three historical trajectories, during the 19th century: the coast, the interior and the frontier. Each trajectory represented distinct paths to modernity. 'The coastal framework represented the port-cities and commercial hinterlands of Western Anatolia and the eastern Mediterranean littoral; the interior path marked the inland experience of Anatolia, Syria and Palestine; and the frontier incorporated the contentious borderland regions of the Eastern Anatolia, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula'.[23] In each distinct zone, 'political coalitions, economic networks, and collective claims sustained the distinct character of Ottoman trajectories. It was the middle classes on the coast, urban Muslim coalitions in the interior, and religious trust networks in the frontier that governed the region'.[24] Each trajectory had certain groups (political coalitions or economic networks) and their collective claims, unique contentious collective action types and history (especially of those who were discontent with the changes), type of political norms and rule (contested rule on the coast, consensual rule on the interior, thin rule on the frontier) and long-term

[21] William H. Sewell Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 100.
[22] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 2.
[23] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 4.
[24] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 6.

outcomes depending on the 'entrenched' and 'locked-in' paths formed in the respective 'imperial path'.[25] The history of the 19th century and the early 20th century in the county of Foçateyn was the history of a coastal trajectory in formation.

The coast was shaped by incorporation into world markets and the modernization reforms undertaken by the Ottoman state. The interaction of these two major and rather global processes with other local dynamics on the coast resulted in the weakening of Ottoman rule and also a simultaneous fast-track spread of modernity. Ottoman rule on the coast was "contested" and this contested nature of rule made the coast an area of inter-state and capitalist rivalry in the 19th and early 20th centuries. On the one hand, the presence of the Ottoman state and its reforming agenda made contracts enforceable and infrastructures more conducive for capitalism. On the other hand, capitalism created new networks, advances and relations that made the coast 'slip away' from effective imperial control.[26] Foreign states took advantage of this power vacuum created by the unique conditions of the coast. The Great Powers used it to expand their imperial power, and the Ottomans, while constantly trying to restore their grip, used the vacuum to halt that expansion by playing rivals against each other; in the meantime, the Kingdom of Greece used it for its irredentist aims. Capitalists, namely foreign investors and the emerging local bourgeoisie, also took advantage of the contestation. Global investors turned inter-state rivalries into opportunities whereas the emerging bourgeoisie used its "locally-embedded character"[27] in Ottoman society to gain a foothold in the global capital flow without being eliminated by larger capital owners. Lastly, places like Izmir, Beirut, Mersin and Eski Foça, major and minor hubs of the Mediterranean trade, also took advantage of the "contested" nature of the coast. They enjoyed the autonomy and wealth brought about by the dependent growth of the 19th century and to some extent they broke away the

[25] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 4-7.
[26] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 6-9.
[27] The term 'locally embedded' refers to the network embeddedness of the Ottoman bourgeoisie. They were familiar with the local networks, credit sources and the geography at large that made them valuable assets for the market. Hometown connections and ethnic and/or communal networks played crucial roles in the way Ottoman bourgeoisie was able to muster resources and facilitate trade. See: Emrence, *Remapping...*, 37.

economic pressure of the Ottoman centres' command economy based on the principles of provisionism, traditionalism and fiscalism.[28]

Class interest became a dominant drive of political contentions on the coast. Port-cities and later port-towns witnessed the emergence of bourgeoisie and proletariat whose interests often collided with each other and with that of the Ottoman bureaucrats who represented the centre. Different agents of political contentions, sometimes also including actors from the interior, found each other to be 'allies' or 'enemies' throughout the ever-changing dynamics of the coast. Although the proportion of the new bourgeoisie and the new proletariat were rather limited in the Ottoman Empire as a whole, their power and influence were much greater on the coast where they were concentrated.[29] Port-cities like Izmir, Thessalonica and Beirut, and port-towns like Eski Foça, where among the places were the influence of the new classes was felt the most.

On the coast, merchants and domestic groups became connected to the global flows and through that they became the vanguards of modernity. Both the Muslim and non-Muslim middle classes were involved with trade on the coast, although the latter were much more numerous and influential. It was the non-Muslim middle classes who '...enjoyed the spoils of foreign trade and European services but had limited political bargains with the Ottoman state'.[30] While Ottoman Christians may have dominated trade on the coast, trade between the port-city and the hinterland was a different matter. Their trade was often dominated by the merchants of the same religion as the majority of the hinterland. In many cases (such as the hinterlands of Izmir and Beirut) this meant Muslims.[31] Being dominant in trade but not being able to deliver their

[28] For a detailed discussion of Ottoman provisionism, traditionalism and fiscalism see the seminal work of Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2000).

[29] Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities in the Ottoman Empire: Some Theoretical and Historical Perspectives', *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, 16:4, Fall 1993, 519-558.

[30] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 7.

[31] According to the Ottoman Directorate of Trade and Agriculture's survey of 1911, only 13% of the officially registered merchants doing business in the capital city of Istanbul consisted of Muslims and foreigners, while the rest were non-Muslims. See: Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities in...', 539.

political demands to the centre due to a limited bargaining capacity played a major role in the way Ottoman Christians positioned themselves *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman state. The coast became the spatial seat of modernity that represented middle-class values and global interactions, and it had a broad public space. Port-cities like Thessaloniki (Selanik), Izmir (Smyrna), Alexandria and Beirut constituted the most well-known examples of cosmopolitan hubs of the coastal trajectory. 'The port-city captured and reflected in concrete form the entire episode of incorporation. Its physical appearance, spatial layout, economic mechanisms, population dynamics, class structure, political aspirations and cultural life could only be understood through the prism of the colonial intercourse'.[32] It was the port-cities that produced the major constituents of the coastal trajectory, and they produced less traditionally oriented, contested, mercantile, versatile and cosmopolitan societies.

Especially towards the end of the 19th century and also in the early years of the 20th century port-towns started to emerge as satellites of port-cities. Around that time, 'Izmir and Beirut merchants transformed nearby commercial centres and invested money in booming towns. Subsequently, places like Jaffa, Haifa, Mersin and Samsun grew from isolated spots into regional port-towns'.[33] Incorporation was spreading and claiming more and more from Ottoman imperial rule. A detail in the history of one of these upstart port-towns, Haifa, is particularly important for understanding the Ottoman centre's perception on incorporation-driven growth. According to Seikaly, "the Ottoman government planned a major harbour for Haifa, the only such initiative in the eastern Mediterranean, as part of its policy to centralize control and limit European encroachment. It was a project aimed at overshadowing Beirut, which was a source of political irritation to Istanbul because of the nationalist activities and pro-European orientations that thrived there. (...) Finally, by building the harbour, the Ottoman government would have a purely Ottoman port'.[34] Haifa, however, outgrew Ottoman authorities' expectations and plans for it, as it was engulfed by incorporation-driven growth. However, the early stages of its emergence were

[32] Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities in...', 520.
[33] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 38-39.
[34] May Seikaly, 'Haifa at the Crossroad: An Outpost of the New World Order'. In Modernity and Culture: From Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C.A. Bayly, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 102.

indicative of the Ottoman rulers' intentions and initiative to struggle against their 'contested' rule on the coast.

Eski Foça was also one such port-town of investment and growth, driven not by the initiative of the state like in the case of Haifa but by the combination of capital investment, state modernization and a fortunate geographical position. The state's determining role in Eski Foça came about not through its emergence as a boomtown as with Haifa but through its demise into a ghost town in the 20th century. In contrast to Haifa, the history of Eski Foça is a history of interrupted growth. Unlike Haifa, which reached '...its zenith in the 1930s under the British Mandate',[35] Eski Foça was a ghost town in the 1930s. Compared to the less promising start of Haifa that had some 162 vessels docked at its harbour in 1850,[36] Eski Foça had 3,069 vessels docked at its harbour in 1893[37] but that figure would ultimately diminish. In short, the history of Eski Foça is the history of a rapid upstart and a rapid demise. From 1884 to 1914, the population of the county of Foçateyn grew more than twofold. Labour migration was the principal source of population growth in Foçateyn, just as was the case in other boomtowns of the 19th century eastern Mediterranean. Throughout this period the Ottoman state, the European capitalists and the merchants of Izmir invested in Foçateyn. The county, and especially its centre Eski Foça, was economically, demographically and spatially transformed.

In the 19th century two major revolutionizing forces, or perhaps it would be more correct to call them processes, contributed to the emergence of a coastal trajectory in the county Foçateyn with Eski Foça as its spatial seat. These were incorporation, which refers to Ottoman integration into the core centres of the world economy, and state sponsored modernization brought about through the reformist agenda of the Ottoman state. These forces, or processes, came into being almost simultaneously and always interacted with one another. These processes brought forth the emergence of new networks, changes in political order, changes in infrastructures and economic systems, and the spatial remaking of the coast. The result was a peculiar imperial path

[35] Seikaly, 'Haifa at...', 97
[36] Seikaly, 'Haifa at...', 97.
[37] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1893 (Hicrî: 1311), 259.

towards modernity: the coastal path. All of these changes had elements that altered power relations, social and economic structures, and discourses. This chapter will refer to those different aspects to the extent that they are related to the county of Foçateyn.