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Capitalism, Migration, War and Nationalism in an Aegean Port Town: The Rise and Fall of a Belle Époque in the Ottoman county of Foçateyn

Erol, E.

Citation
Erol, E. (2014, September 9). *Capitalism, Migration, War and Nationalism in an Aegean Port Town: The Rise and Fall of a Belle Époque in the Ottoman county of Foçateyn*. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/28535

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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page

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Author: Erol, Emre
Title: Capitalism, migration, war and nationalism in an Aegean port town: the rise and fall of a Belle Époque in the Ottoman county of Foçateyn
Issue Date: 2014-09-09



Capitalism, Migration, War and Nationalism in an Aegean Port Town: The Rise and Fall of a *Belle Époque* in the Ottoman county of Foçateyn

Emre Erol

Capitalism, Migration, War and Nationalism in an Aegean Port Town: The Rise and Fall of a *Belle Époque* in the Ottoman county of Foçateyn

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker, volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties te verdedigen op dinsdag 9 september 2014 klokke 10:00 uur

door

Emre Erol

Geboren te Izmit

9 september 1984

Promotiecommissie

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Co-promotor:	Prof. dr. Jan Lucassen
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Leiden 2014

To Nihal

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank to my mentors, colleagues, friends, and family who have been with me throughout this journey. Their support was essential in the realization of this dissertation.

The decision to write my Ph.D. dissertation on the history of the county of Foçateyn owes much to my master's thesis supervisor Professor Fikret Adanır, who, like me, has personal connections with Eski Foça. My master's research on the history of the Ottoman Left introduced me to the workers of the Empire, and it was through them that I encountered the world of the Eastern Mediterranean and its port-cities and port-towns. Throughout my journey, I became increasingly interested in the topic of port-town workers within the framework of labor history. Fikret Adanır's encouragement to go beyond the relationship of ports and workers and into the local history of Eski Foça and Yeni Foça further stimulated my own interests, and I am so very grateful to him for his support and inspiration.

I would like to also express my gratitude to my promoter Professor Erik-Jan Zürcher and my co-promoter Professor Jan Lucassen. Their caring guidance and helpful suggestions were essential in developing this dissertation. Our meetings and subsequent discussions were not only very useful to me, but also constituted the most pleasant memories of my doctoral studies. Like most researchers, I encountered challenges during my tenure at Leiden, and I must thank both my promoters for consistently encouraging me and assisting me in new research directions without allowing me to lose my focus. The past five years were truly a period of learning and development for me. I especially would like to thank to Erik-Jan Zürcher for providing me with opportunities that helped me develop my research and teaching skills. His interest, constructive criticism, and expertise kept me on track and expanded my intellectual horizons.

In addition I must thank two institutions that supported my research interests and gave me the financial opportunities to support myself. I was awarded a research fellowship at the International Institute of Social History (IISH) at Amsterdam during my first year of doctoral research (2009-2010). I am grateful to its staff, and my friends and colleagues there who helped me especially during my early days in the Netherlands. After my fellowship year at the IISH, I was employed at various schools and programs at Leiden University. I would like to thank all of my colleagues and staff members at Leiden who believed in my research and shared my passion for teaching and academics. I would specially like to thank the Leiden University Institute of Area Studies (LIAS) for the academic opportunities that it presented to me.

My work and research experience at Leiden University would not have been nearly as enjoyable without the company of Gaye Eksen, Eftychia Mylona, Dr. Tsolin Nalbantian, and Dr. Hans Theunissen. I owe them a heart full of thanks for all the hours that they listened to me, supported me, and cheered me up. What would a doctoral dissertation be without coffee, cookies, and good conversation?

I was lucky to have friends and colleagues who helped me in various ways throughout the research and writing of this dissertation. I am indebted to ProfessorAyhan Aktar, Professor Engin Berber, Gökhan Demirdağ (then Municipal Governor of Foça), Dr. Fuat Dündar, and the late Reha Midilli who showed the courtesy of sharing photographs, ideas, and relevant primary sources with me. I would like to also express my gratitude to Serhan Afacan, Sofia Bouduraki, Stellious Irakleous, Aykut Mustak, and Eftychia Mylona who helped me when I was at times lost amongst the Ottoman and Greek primary material.

My family, especially my sister Ece Erol, was always there to support and encourage me. Ece always offered her helping hand whenever I needed some extra books or archival material from Turkey. My parents, Selcan and Necati, always cared about my progress, fostered my interest, and gave me their full backing. I am indebted to them for all their care and support.

When I look back at this five-year journey I see that I was always able to maintain my enthusiasm, despite various obstacles. I owe this first and foremost to my beloved Nihal who always supported me, believed in me, and cared for me. Our mutual love for anything Aegean shapes this work and impassions future projects. I dedicate this dissertation to her for making my life beautiful in countless ways.

A note on place names:

Names of places are often used in the way they were predominantly used in that particular time in question or how they are used today. In any of these cases, alternative names are often also provided in brackets. The use of one or the other (in Greek or in Ottoman Turkish) is context-bounded and does not show an implied priority.

Introduction

The Irony of the Black Stone of Foça

'The Legend of the Black Stone' (*Karataş Efsanesi*) is a widely known folk tale about Foça. One can hear about the legend from the residents of modern day Eski Foça or from its many visitors who are charmed by the beauty of this Aegean harbour town. Almost all tourist information booklets start with a reference to the legend and some local talents use it as a symbol in their poems. As a child who spent almost all of his summers in Eski Foça, the central town of the modern day district of Foça, I heard and read about that legend countless times. However, it was only in my late twenties that I recognized the irony of that local legend.

According to the legend, a small black stone roams the streets of Eski Foça. It is pushed from one corner to the other by the careless steps of the many visitors of the beautiful town of Eski Foça. Nobody sees the stone because they are busy enjoying the beauties surrounding them. Yet those who step on it know that they did so because of a longing that they feel in their hearts. They fall in love with the charm of Eski Foça and wherever they go, they leave a piece of their hearts wandering in the streets and shores of Eski Foça. Those who leave the town feel a deep longing to go back to Eski Foça and those who stay forget about their 'original homes' and spend the rest of their lives in Eski Foça.

I know that feeling and once I thought that I too had stepped on that little black stone when I was small. If read carefully, one can see that the feeling described in this local legend is nothing but 'homesickness' and for me that is the source of the irony of 'The Legend of the Black Stone'. It is a stone that 'haunts' the hearts of those who set foot on it and makes them feel like 'exiles' longing for home, a place to be, without realizing it. It makes you want to go to a place that is not your 'original home'. The irony is that this town where the stone roams, Eski Foça, really had residents who

longed for it and other new residents who were ‘haunted’ by it without knowing that they were. The real story, however, is more ‘haunting’ than the legendary one.



[**Picture:** Modern day borders of the district of Foça (red) and other districts of the province of Izmir (brown). Foça is the name of a Western Anatolian district in modern day Turkey. Its name is derived from the name of the old Ottoman county of Foçateyn. The administrative borders of Foçateyn and modern day Foça are almost the same.]

Eski Foça, like many other places in Turkey, has been both an origin and a final destination for many refugees who were forced to migrate. The history of the county of Foçateyn (the modern day district of Foça) constitutes one of the many stages of a dramatic transition from empire to nation state. It is a home ‘longed for’ by the generations of its old Ottoman Greek residents who were forced to leave Foça, first in

the spring of 1914 and later in 1922, and it is also a home for the 'charmed' Muslim refugees from the Balkans, the *muhacir*s, and the Muslims who were part of the population exchange after 1923, the *mübadil*s who were resettled there after their flight and expulsion from their 'original homes'. All suffered as the result of nationalism and demographic engineering but they ended up living under the different guises of the Black Stone's charm. Once they set foot in their new home town, those Muslim refugees and subjects of the population exchange 'forgot' about their original homes and embraced Foça. Ottoman Greeks who were forced to leave always longed for the town and wanted to return. One nationalism made people 'forget' and the other one made them 'remember', just like the charm of the legendary stone would do.

So maybe 'The Legend of the Black Stone' is an unconscious manifestation of an 'untold' story, a Freudian slip of sorts. After all, it is the modern day residents of Foça who made up that legend and they are the descendants of their grandparents who settled there as *muhacir*s or *mübadil*s. They grew up listening to stories from their grandparents and some even remembered those days of turmoil from the earlier times in their lives. Early generations struggled to survive. The contemporary people of Foça live amidst the rather intact remains of the old Ottoman town, mostly enjoying their lives there and thriving, but they are also largely amnesic about its history. So 'The Legend of the Black Stone' could be thought of as a literary expression narrated by people who feel but cannot fully comprehend all the things that shaped the reality around them. It offers a poetic explanation for a part of their past and present that is not there.

This thesis does not aspire to test the validity of the above-mentioned claim. Rather, it is an attempt to understand and unravel various elements that played significant roles in the aforementioned process of transition from empire to nation state on a local scale that created exiles and settled other exiles in place of them. The goal is to historicize the real 'haunt' without partisanship or romanticizing. In other words, this is an attempt to write a monograph of the local history of the county of Foçateyn in its most troublesome years in the modern era and connect such a monograph to the rather global histories of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey and from the Age of Empires to the Age of Extremes in general. Beginning roughly in

the 1820s, the county was shaped and reshaped by economic incorporation with global capitalism, state sponsored modernization reforms, growth and migration. It was booming, transformed into a populous, connected and cross-cultural county by the end of the same century. Small communities of Ottoman Armenians, Jews and Europeans lived together with larger groups of Ottoman Greeks and Muslims. But in June of 1914 the county was suddenly transformed into a homogenous community that consisted only of Turks. Foçateyn thus entered a period of transition that essentially lasted until 1922 when imperialisms, nationalisms and warfare were shaping the county.

The county of Foçateyn experienced the simultaneous effects of a multitude of major transformative forces (such as capitalism, state reforms, wars and migration) that in other parts of the Empire were already having a profound impact. For that reason, the history of the county of Foçateyn marks an interesting reference in history in which one can see the effects of market, state, ideologies, power struggles, war, migration and networks all in one place. Of course, those forces were also important in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire in the larger transition from empire to nation-state but it is rather uncommon to see them at play in the history of a single county. That is what makes the real history behind 'The Legend of the Black Stone' so interesting and valuable.

The Enquiry

In this research I try to understand and reveal the historical reasons behind the radical transformation of the county of Foçateyn from a developing, booming, incorporated and cross-cultural entity at the end of the nineteenth century into a veritable ghost town that was a depopulated, destroyed, isolated and demographically homogenized entity at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the context of Foçateyn, the protagonists who started that transformation in 1914 were the Unionists[1] who controlled the Ottoman state at the time. As I worked on the research for this study, I

[1] Unionist is the English translation of *İttihatçı*. It is shortened version used to refer to the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti / Fırkası*).

asked myself two perhaps seemingly naïve and simple questions: Why would a state want such a devastating change for a tax-yielding and developed county like Foçateyn? And, does the history of Foçateyn tell us anything new to help us understand the larger transition from empire to nation state?

The first question came about as the result of my scepticism about what is often taken for granted about Ottoman-Turkish history. My aim is not to legitimize the past. Rather, I sought to understand the relationship between state and society at a particular time in history in a particular geography. There are already some ready answers to this question from a variety of disciplines. The effects of wars, modernity, capitalism, elite networks, nationalisms and geographical peculiarities have all been used to provide answers to such questions. However, the analyses of the same effects are rarely employed together in one study. Moreover, we rarely hear the 'silenced histories' of less global actors, local power holders, workers and minorities in such histories. That is why I asked my first naïve yet probing question about the local history of Foçateyn and through that I seek to discuss the transition from empire to nation state in the local historical context of the county of Foçateyn. I argue that only a reconstruction of the local history of a place where 'Greeks' and 'Turks', Orthodox Christians and Muslims, lived, worked and produced together can help to test the accepted nationalist grand narratives about the 'unavoidable' split between the two groups as it actually took place. Local history thus provides a meaningful context to discuss the question of whether the two groups in that concrete locality had clearly, gradually and unavoidably drifted apart starting in the nineteenth century. Did external (or rather global) forces and actors finally decide what happened locally? Or do we have a more complex picture in which nothing was unavoidable but both the global and the local were at play? I do not take the Ottoman collapse, Ottoman incorporation with capitalist markets, the increasing predominance of nationalisms or any other historical phenomena as forces that inevitably carry history in certain directions. My goal is to ask 'why' without partisanship and bear in mind that why something happens does not excuse it but only helps us understand it.

My second question asks if the history of Foçateyn has the potential to give us a fresh and new perspective for understanding the transition from empire to nation state in the

Ottoman/Turkish context. Much has been written about this transition. We might assume that the history of Foçateyn merely confirms what we already know. However, once I asked that question and delved into material about Foçateyn, I realized that there were new aspects of that transition. My curiosity was rewarded with ample stories and sources that fill in the gaps in our understandings of the late Ottoman Empire. The history of Foçateyn shows why and how the Ottoman demise after the Great War in fact started with the Balkan Wars in 1912 and ended after 1922 with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. This research fills a gap because it does not just look at the rise of nationalisms among the elite or inter-state power plays in explaining the transition as one long chapter. That has already been successfully done. This thesis shows the events that are intricately linked to one another in succession and thus constitute a meaningful, drastic and rapid period of transition from empire to nation state on a local level. The novelty of this approach is in the depiction of the eventful nature of this phase of transition in a local history.

Seminal studies by Fikret Adanır, Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu and Erik Jan Zürcher[2] show that the loss of the Ottoman Balkans, Ottoman Macedonia, and *Rumeli* (Roumelia) is crucial for understanding the Young Turks, and especially the Unionists (members of the Community of Union and Progress, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), the majority of whom hailed from those regions. Those studies discuss the effects of the Macedonian Question and the loss of the Ottoman Balkans on the Ottoman political elite, the Young Turks who shaped the last years of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Republic of Turkey. This study takes such an approach and applies it to the local level. The history of transition in Foçateyn, especially what I call the spring of organized chaos in June 1914, reveals that the loss of the Ottoman Balkans was not only relevant at an elite level but also relevant in the eventful development of history in the Ottoman Empire through nationalist rivalries, migrations and wars.

[2] See: Fikret Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001), Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu* (1890-1918), (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003), Erik Jan Zürcher, 'How Europeans Adopted Anatolia and created Turkey', in *European Review*, Vol.13, No. 3 (2005): 379-394.

This research on the history of transformation in Foçateyn employs two recent and fruitful trends in the historiography of the late Ottoman Empire: micro history and comparative macro models.[3] I simultaneously reveal and discuss the equally important agencies of a variety of local and global actors. The local, in this case the history of Foçateyn and its residents, is emphasized in my research. While I do see a need to give a voice to the 'silenced' agents of history, I disagree with the dichotomy that sees 'we the people' as passive receivers of the policies of 'they the statesmen'. Policies do find willing executioners or dissidents who bargain with the global (historical actors of higher power) and contribute to the ways with which final outcomes of policies are shaped. This bargain between the global and local does not exist in a space of infinite possibilities. Choices are restricted and influenced by discourse, power relations and structures.[4] Established histories of discursive practices, power allocation and economic structures create patterns that limit and influence possibilities. Focusing on the local presents my strong suit in this research, but I also hope that this study will contribute to our understanding of universal human experience and transformation. For that end I employed macro models and world historical references in my interpretations. In doing so, my goal was to connect the story of the local to the story of the global. If such an aim is fulfilled, I would consider it to be an antidote to any forms of essentialism that limit us to regional, cultural or national boundaries and a contribution to the normalization of Ottoman and the Middle Eastern histories.

Chapter Structure

First I attempt to define what was distinct about Foçateyn before the period of transition that started in the spring of 1914. In this way I aim to demonstrate the nature of the transition that started to take place in June of 1914 by providing a contrast with the previous state of affairs. In chapter one, this brings to light the story

[3] For a discussion of these trends see: Erik Jan Zürcher, *Village and Empire: An Essay on Recent Trends in the Historiography of the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, (forthcoming).

[4] This proposed framework was inspired by a work by Sewell. See: William H. Sewell, Jr., *Rethinking Labor History: Toward a Post-Materialist Rhetoric*, CSST Working Paper no 44, CRSO Working Paper no 421, May 1990.

of Eski Foça's emergence as a boomtown, a time when markets acted as a global force at work in the development of the county. I demonstrate that Foçateyn was one of the earliest Ottoman port-towns that became integrated into the world economy. Eski Foça, the center of the county, emerged as a booming and developing entity after the mid-19th century. The history of the development of the salt business in the county provides much insight about the making of a globally-connected economy and shows that the developments in Foçateyn were synchronized with those of incorporated port-towns and port-cities in the eastern Mediterranean.

In the second chapter the second major global force, the state, appears as the main actor in the history of the county of Foçateyn. The amount of knowledge and control that was produced by Ottoman state reforms, including the infrastructure and the new legal framework that emerged after the reforms, appears as the driving force behind the incorporation as well. Ironically, the reforms that were implemented with the aim of increasing central control contributed to the process of incorporation and thus undermined its very purpose. This dichotomous nature of the process of Foçateyn's incorporation is demonstrated through the changes in demography and spatial transformations.

In the third chapter I investigate the meaning of Foçateyn's particular historical trajectory for its residents and for the Ottoman centre. This involves a step outside the discussion of the larger transformative forces like state and market and a subsequent focus on the local. Taking into account the drastic transformations on the horizon in June of 1914, I employ a cautious narrative to avoid retrospective readings. In the 19th century, Foçateyn became a developing cross-cultural entity with a cosmopolitan outlook. Nationalisms loomed in the background but coexistence and increasing interaction was the daily reality. Architectural forms representing middle-class values started to dominate, especially in the boomtown of the county of Eski Foça. Many of Foçateyn's old residents recalled this period as a *Belle Époque*, but this shouldn't be construed as a cosmopolitan heaven, nor as a state of constant contention and conflict. Rather, it was a fragile habitat that was transformed by modernity. It had the potential to formulate coexistence as much as contention. The sustenance of this habitat was dependent on Foçateyn's incorporation into world markets. There were no clear

connections, however, with the transformation that started to take place in June of 1914 and the way Foçateyn emerged as a developing entity. In other words, Foçateyn's history of incorporation and state sponsored modernization did not inevitably lead to its transformation in 1914. There were simply no major or sustained inter-ethnic or inter-communal tensions, no violent attempts by the Ottoman centre to restore its power (which was contested by international markets) but a fragile system of interdependence, development and cross-culturalism. At that point, I take up the pertinent question: Why did such a violent transformation take place?

In 1913, a peculiar brand of ideology and a certain network of young imperial bureaucrats took control of the Ottoman Empire. In my fourth chapter, I propose a framework for understanding and discussing the nature of this change that took place at the Ottoman political centre. I discuss the history of the emergence of the Unionists after the Balkan Wars and argue that it was indeed the Balkan Wars, the experiences of the Unionists with the Macedonian Question, the peculiar form of nationalism that emerged around that time, and the new political and diplomatic realities that created a new Ottoman centre. This new centre of power, the Unionists, identified the very nature of the Ottoman coast, its cross-culturalism and its incorporated structure, as problems that needed urgent attention.

In the fifth chapter I talk about the events of the spring of 1914, which I argue launched the transformation from an imperial county to a national one. This is a monographic attempt to reconstruct the events based on as many sources as possible. I initially present all available details concerning what I refer to as the spring of organized chaos in June of 1914. Then I argue that the Unionists organized the ousting and flight of the Ottoman Greeks of the county of Foçateyn. Through this I hope to provide readers with a chance to make an assessment of my argument through this transparency. The oustings were political in nature and they were reminiscent of the nationalist demographic policies of the era. The spring of organized chaos in Foçateyn constitutes one of the earliest and most well documented cases of the Unionist's demographic operations. This analysis sheds light on the foundations of the Unionists' radical policies of demographic engineering and destruction, which would occur later on. I also argue that June of 1914 in Foçateyn presents a concrete

historical case that links the dynamics of the Macedonian Question to the larger process of the formation of a nation state under the Unionist rule.

The transformation that started in Foçateyn in June of 1914 was only the first chapter in an eight year period of turmoil that left its mark on the history of the county as much as on the history of the Ottoman Empire. In the sixth chapter, the rest of this period of transformation is discussed. The entire period, from the spring of 1914 until the nominal end of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922, is taken up as a single period of extended warfare that affected the county of Foçateyn. That period witnessed increased damage and the creation of more refugees with each chapter of conflict, which built upon one another. A framework that perceives that entire period as a monolithic chapter makes it possible to connect events that national histories often present in vacuums. The spring of organized chaos in 1914 was connected to the Greek invasion of Anatolia in 1919, which in turn was connected to the Turkish re-occupation in 1922. In the end, in 1922, Foçateyn was depopulated, its boomtown (Eski Foça) was largely destroyed and it was no longer incorporated into world markets.

The epilogue provides a brief look at the first years of Foçateyn (now Foça) under the rule of the Republic of Turkey by way of contrast with the state of affairs before 1914. In the epilogue I discuss my conclusions, possible implications of this research and a future research agenda.

About the Sources

This study takes into account a variety of primary sources including the personal photography collections of Felix Sartiaux, Reha Midilli and myself, as well as memoirs, Ottoman state archives (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri*, BOA), the oral historical archives of the Center of Asia Minor Studies (Κέντρο Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών, CAMS here on) and Engin Berber, the British Foreign Office archives (FO), French commercial almanacs, the Ottoman provincial almanac of Aydın and a variety of journals, newspapers, travelogues and ego documents by Ottomans and foreign observers. The aim was to use as many different sources as possible in as

many different languages as possible in order to overcome the problems of methodological nationalism that often causes us to ignore sources outside our own languages. It is an attempt to bridge the gap between the histories of the people of the Empire who are now considered to be distinct subjects by Greek and Turkish historiographies. Such an approach also takes into account the need to simultaneously address both the local and the global actors of change.

In this thesis, none of these materials, whether derived from state archives, ego documents, photographs or deciphered telegrams, are taken at face value. All of them are perceived as being equally context-bounded and subjective in their own right. We should always remember that as historians, we construct narratives and that involves a process of selection. I selected the overlapping parts of these different sources and attempted to present them in a meaningful and critical historical narrative. I present my selections transparently, declare my positions and my reasons for taking them, and leave the final judgement to the reader. When they arise, the disputed aspects of the sources are presented in small discussions in the footnotes.

Two oral history archives are repeatedly used in some parts of this research. The first is the Engin Berber Oral Historical Archive (EBOHA), which is the personal archive of Prof. Dr. Engin Berber who conducted a variety of oral history interviews in Foça in 1995 and in 1997. Between 1994 and 1995, a group of historians consisting of Serhan Ada, Esra Danacıoğlu and Engin Berber started a project for the collection of oral historical material about the period of Greek occupation between 1919 and 1922 and its effects on everyday life in the Izmir (Smyrna) area. At the time, they were enthusiastic about the possibilities that oral history can offer. Later, Pelin Böke, Fahri Dikkaya and Sabri Sürgevil joined the group. Each scholar collected relevant material from different places in and around Izmir by way of conducting individual interviews. These collections were never brought together in one publication because the project ended. Some members of the project published their studies separately.[5] I became

[5] For an example of such a publication and for the information on the projects see: Pelin Böke, *İzmir 1919-1922 Tanıklıklar*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2006), 5-8. For another example of such a publication see: Engin Berber, 'The life in the Anatolian countryside during the Greek occupation: the example of Foça', in

aware of these documents after contacting Mr. Berber. It appears that there was no systematic structure applied in all the separate interviews, but the set on Foçateyn discusses similar issues in a similar manner with the interviewees. I made use of all the cassettes he recorded at the time with the surviving elderly residents of Foçateyn. It should be noted, however, that the interviews were conducted many years after the end of the Ottoman Empire. Also, most of the interviewees were children at the time, and some were barely in their early twenties in the 1910s. There is one interesting fact about almost all of the interviews that should be pointed out. Although the interviewees were mostly asked questions about the troublesome years of 1919-1922, they often talked more about coexistence and daily life. At times, the interviewees were wracked by emotions and made contradictory statements. The collection also provides ample information on topics extending beyond the period of Greek occupation as well. Most of the information presented complies with the information revealed in non-oral sources concerning the history of the period.

The second oral historical sources I often consulted were from the archives of CAMS, which was created in light of the fact that as time went by, there were fewer and fewer Greek refugees from Anatolia who could recall what they experienced. Melpo Logotheti-Merlier (1890-1979), a musicologist who '…set out from mid-1930s to create a repository of information about Anatolia, including a collection of oral testimonies...' established the core of what later became the Center for Asia Minor Studies.[6] The centre collected interviews up until the 1970s. Interviewees were asked about basic information such as details about their villages and their surroundings, approximate population, daily life, education and religion.[7] The information was then recorded textually, and there are no voice recordings for most of the interviews. Interviews with the elderly residents of Foçateyn (those from Eski Foça, Yeni Foça and some villages are categorized under the subfolders ΠΑΛΙΕΣ ΦΩΚΙΕΣ and ΝΕΕΣ

Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean, ed. Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis, (Athens: Alpha Bank Historical Archives, 2010), 125-173.

[6] Nicholas Doumanis, *Before the Nation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12.

[7] For a detailed discussion on the structure of the archive see: Evi Kapoli, 'Archive of oral tradition of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies: Its formation and its contribution to research', *Ateliers du LESC*, 32 (2008), http://ateliers.revues.org/1143 (accessed Oct. 2013).

ΦΩΚΙΕΣ) are hand-written on paper like most of the other interviews in the archive, which results in serious limitations. The real dialogues are inaccessible and the language is standardized by the interviewer. However, the collection is very valuable as it illuminates the blind spots of established historiographies by providing a history from below. The interviewees were also asked about their relations with the local Muslims ('Turks'). This, just like the interviews in EBOHA, gives a valuable insight about the intercommunal and interethnic relations of the period. In the Greek context, just like in the Turkish one, asking questions about this is in itself a political agenda: 'Having lived in Constantinople in her formative years, Merlier had experienced intercommunality first hand, but she also knew that the dominant line in Greece was strictly monocultural. Greek nationalism defined "the Greek" as the civilized opposite of the irredeemably barbarous "Turk", hence the histories of Anatolian coexistence were not only deemed fictions but a cause for shame. It was this threat to historical truth that Merlier's archive was designed to counteract'.[8] Indeed that was why the interviews focused on everyday life. In my research, the overlapping themes and facts in different oral testimonies and oral archives constituted the backbone of my reconstruction.

The vast territories of the Ottoman Empire encompassed settlements that were once important centres of the ancient world, and naturally this attracted the attention of many archaeologists. Once such archaeologist who was commissioned by the French state to undertake excavations in Greece and Ottoman Western Anatolia was Félix Sartiaux (1876-1944), who was also a railroad engineer and a polytechnic. As I will discuss in detail later, he was commissioned to conduct excavations in the county of Foçateyn. According to Sartiaux, the choice of the site was important for two main reasons. Eski Foça (Παλαιά Φώκαια) was a very illustrious centre in the ancient world the residents of which founded the colony of Marseille. Despite this fact, it had not been thoroughly researched even though it was bound up with the history of France. Secondly, back then there had been competition among foreign archaeologists and it was only a matter of time before an Austrian or German company excavated the

[8] Doumanis, *Before the…*, 12.

ruins.[9] Sartiaux arrived in Foçateyn in 1913 and he stayed there until after the spring of June in 1914. He produced maps and photographs of Eski Foça and Yeni Foça, and also wrote his own personal accounts about the region. Later he went back to Eski Foça in 1919 and produced another set of photographs. The work of Sartiaux,[10] who was a philhellene and a pro-Entente figure during and after the Great War, provides extremely valuable information about aspects of daily life in Foçateyn, the events in 1914 and the situation in 1919. For that reason, his accounts are used critically in this research.

The Boomtown

Scrolling through the pages of a contemporary tourist booklet for modern day Foça reveals that it focuses on the remains of its 'once glorious pasts'. Ruins and remains of the ancient Greek, Persian, Genoese and Ottoman periods of rule in the region are frequently mentioned in descriptions of the central town of the Foça district, which is Eski Foça.[11] Ironically, with the exception of some rare and more recently published booklets, the least advertised of these 'glorious pasts' is the Ottoman one, a legacy that one might naturally attribute to modern Turkey. Despite the lack of an appropriate presence in the booklets, many of Ottoman Foça's remains are relatively intact. This may seem surprising given the fact that the entire district of Ottoman Foça was devastated by expulsions, warfare and destruction in the period of turmoil between 1914 and 1922. Two factors explain the relatively high number of remains despite that destruction. First of all, the municipality of Foça has focused on preservation and restoration policies in the last decade and that has helped save the remaining artifacts of the city's Ottoman heritage. Secondly, and more importantly,

[9] Joëlle Dalègre, 'Félix Sartiaux et Phocée, Eski Foça, Παλαιά Φώκια', *Cahiers Balkaniques*, Vol. 40, (2012), 1-11.

[10] His collection of photos, books, articles and correspondence are located in different French archives. His photos were first published in Haris Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée 1913-1920 Le Témoignage de Félix Sartiaux*, (Paris: Éditions Kallimages, 2008). Later, more photos from his collection were published in Haris Yiakoumis et al., *Regards Phocéens de Félix Sartiaux*, (Paris: Éditions Kallimages, 2012).

[11] Eski Foça is also referred to as Phokaia and/or Phocaea in English/Latin, Παλαιά Φώκαια in Modern Greek, Παλαιάσ Φώκαιασ in Classical Greek, Phocée in French, Foglieri in Italian, and Foça-i Atik, Karaca Foça, and Kara Foça in Ottoman documents. Today, in the modern day Turkish Republic, it is known as Eski Foça.

most of the remains of Ottoman Foça are from a period lasting between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the exception of three mosques, a *mescid*, a *hamam*, two castles and a few other buildings. That period was when Foça experienced its biggest economic, demographic and spatial expansion in more than a thousand years. It expanded so much that its remains are still visible after the town's decline.

Unlike the impression one might get from the tourist booklets, in reality Foça only had two 'glorious' periods of growth and expansion in history. In both periods, the town of Eski Foça played a pivotal role in the area's growth as the centre of the county. One period of expansion was in antiquity and the other started around the late 1820s with the start of Foçateyn's incorporation into the world economy.[12] The history of the former was re-discovered when the history of the latter was about to come to an end. Félix Sartiaux was the first person to rediscover the remnants of ancient Foça, Παλαιάσ Φώκαιασ, as a result of his excavations in 1913 and 1920. His early works became a source of inspiration and guidance for later generations and many archaeological excavations inspired by his work have gone on until today. He found numerous remnants of the ancient Phokaian settlement, including sculptures, grotesques, Greek and Roman inscriptions, mosaics and religious sites. His findings

[12] Ottoman historians agree that the Empire was affected by this change and expansion in Europe as early as 1770s. This period of expansion and development of capitalism, and the relative dissolution of protective economic barriers, was mainly a phenomenon that originated in Western Europe. The Ottoman Empire was a peripheral actor in this development and its economy incorporated into the capitalist economy that expanded. The central stage of growth and expansion centered on Britain and France, and the driving forces were the dual revolutions (the French Revolution of 1789 and the Industrial Revolution in Britain) of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The development of capitalism and industry, however, was naturally not limited to Britain. It soon spread to the rest of the world but mainly in the global north. In this period, capitalist economies constantly tried to expand and penetrate into other economies as a result of capitalism's inherent drive for growth. This period was characterized by the expansion of trade and capital flows. The initial stage of capitalist expansion stopped with the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. The pressure of capitalism was felt on the economy of the county of Foçateyn only around the 1820s when capitalist economies resumed growing after the brief period of interruption. For more information on the period see: Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolutions 1789-1848*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1996); Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire 1875-1914*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); Kindleberger, C. P., 'The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe 1820-1875', *The Journal of Economic History*, 1975, 35:1, 20-55.

confirmed that Foça indeed was a regional power in antiquity and it colonized many places on the Black Sea and the Western Mediterranean. One of those colonies was Marseilles in the south of France, the town where Sartiaux is believed to have had the inspiration to come to Foça after witnessing the 25th century celebration of the town's foundation by Phokaians, the ancient residents of Foça, in 1899.[13]

By the time Sartiaux started his first set of excavations in 1913, the county of Foçateyn had been growing rapidly since the last quarter of the 19th century. Its economy was expanding thanks to its incorporation into global capitalism. The county's share of trade in the local economy increased dramatically as opposed to the traditional sectors in the county's economy such as mining and agriculture. Growth attracted migrants and the population of the county increased and new neighbourhoods developed. Foça attracted investors with its lively port-town of Eski Foça and its productive and accessible hinterland. The Ottoman commercial bourgeoisie had started to invest its accumulated capital in promising boomtowns like Eski Foça by the middle of the 19th century. These investments were mostly in real estate and occasionally in business as well. Both the Ottoman state and the Orthodox community were also interested in building charitable structures. The number of schools, shops and attractive seaside stone *yalı*s[14] increased in this period of expansion. Sartiaux walked the streets of this rather cosmopolitan, connected and developing town of Eski Foça during his initial visit. The Foça that he saw was Ottoman Foça, an imperial town at the height of its development. However, Sartiaux's first visit to this imperial boomtown of Eski Foça ended unexpectedly in the spring of 1914 with the start of a chapter of expulsion and violence.

The spring of 1914 constitutes a milestone for the history of Eski Foça and also for history of the county of Foçateyn as a whole, in that it marks the beginning of the transition from empire to nation state. From then onwards, subsequent chapters of

[13] Myriame Morel-Deledalle, 'Félix Sartiaux and Phokaia First Excavations' in *Geçmişten Günümüze Foça: Uluslararası Sempozyum*, (Ankara: Yayımevi A.Ş., 1997), 15-20.

[14] *Yalı* is a Turkish word that is used to describe houses built by the sea. The origin of the word is the Greek word γιαλό, which means shore and/or a house built by the sea just like the Turkish meaning. The wealthy merchants of the town or those of Izmir, the major port city of the province of Aydın, often owned Foça's *yalı*s.

conflict and destruction befell the county of Foçateyn up until the end of the Turkish War of Independence in 1922. Much like the rest of Western Anatolia, Foçateyn faced dramatic events in 1914, 1919 and 1922, the effects of which have lasted until today. These events radically changed the demographic, economic and cultural outlook of the county that Sartiaux first saw. The ousting of Ottoman Greeks in the spring of 1914 that Sartiaux witnessed, the Greek occupation of 1919 and the subsequent Turkish struggle for independence that resulted in the Turkish re-occupation of Foçateyn in 1922 all constitute the local milestones of a more radical change: the transformation from the Ottoman Empire into the Republic of Turkey. The history of that transition is embedded in the history of the global as much as in the history of the local that preceded these periods of crisis.

The emergence of Eski Foça (*Foça-i Atik*[15], Old Foça) as a boomtown and its later demise into a ghost town was at the centre of the narrative of this transition and transformation. This could almost be seen as a natural choice. Eski Foça was the centre of the county, its most populous town and its most developed, transformed and incorporated settlement. There is more photographic, official, oral and statistical information about Eski Foça than any other part of the county of Foçateyn. Of course, information about the other parts of the county is also relevant and important, but there is far less material available about those areas. The political and economic relationship they had with the centre of the county, as well as the constant traffic and interaction of the residents of the county, are also integral parts of the local history of Foçateyn.

Looking at the Past: Path Dependency and Modernist Trajectories

Many historians are interested in the history of the 'long 19th century'[16] because they expect to find the 'seeds of destruction' that they assume played a central role in how

[15] *Eski* and *Atik* both mean old. The former is used in modern Turkish and the latter was used in Ottoman Turkish.

[16] The term 'long 19th century' is a term that was often used by historian Erik Hobsbawm in his works. It was adopted from its earlier use by Fernand Braudel who coined the term the 'long 16th century' and refers to the period between the French Revolution of 1789 and the beginning of the World War I in 1914 as an extended

events unfolded at the dawn of the subsequent century, the age of extremes[17] in which nationalism, the most widespread form of 'extremes', changed the world dramatically. However, this seemingly rational inquiry yields problematic results unless the anachronistic nature of the inquiry is avoided. The pursuit of looking for 'seeds of destruction', given the hindsight of what happened, automatically makes researchers accept the destructive chapters of history as inevitable discontents. A teleological narrative is built where the violence at the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was 'meant to happen' and all evidence is interpreted in light of that assumption. That is why much research builds up arguments in which even the smallest economic conflict or cultural difference is portrayed as an indication of antagonism. Agencies of ordinary people or elites, which are interpreted as harbingers of conflict, are given precedence in such analyses. This is also often due to the underlying primordial assumptions on the nature of national identities which sees all antagonisms as the reflections of national conflicts by simultaneously making two ungrounded assumptions. Firstly, they assume the omnipresence of national identities and in doing so they de-historicize identities. Secondly, they assign a superior role to national identities in people's decision-making processes. It is on this point that I take a different stance.

Reality is complex and multi-faceted. It is a construct of multiple variables that are intricately related with each other, just like a multi-variable mathematical equation. I do not necessarily seek 'seeds of destruction' in the 19th century in the county of Foçateyn. Antagonisms are not necessarily results of national identities nor are they necessarily the basis for 'inevitable' future conflicts. They may or may not have been significant in the way events unfolded. The actions of the actors of history, both global and local, take place within certain constraints. And those constraints, which are formed at the intersection of different historical processes, form paths, or

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century of subsequent and interrelated events. There are various adaptations of this terminology in the history writing of the Ottoman Empire.

[17] 'Age of extremes' is a terminology adopted from the same work by Erik Hobsbawm. In *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century*, *1914-1991*, Hobsbawm discusses the period after World War I in which modern ideologies (capitalism, state communism and nationalism) and warfare radically transformed the globe. Erik Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, (London: Abacus, 1995).

trajectories, that affect the decisions and possible patterns of behaviour of the actors of history.[18] Those restrain outcomes unless the conditions that form them are altered.

This is also true for the transition from empire to nation state in the county of Foçateyn. The intersection of global actors such as states, market and ideologies with the local historical peculiarities of the county of Foçateyn in the long 19th century established a path that determined the positions and the interactions of the actors of the period of crisis and transition in the 20th century. The division between the global and the local is often permeable and they constantly affect and change each other too. This permeable relation was also present in Foçateyn, the local particularities of which along with global actors played roles in the establishment of an historical path. Changes in the social, demographic and economic life of this part of the Ottoman countryside in the 19th century placed it on a 'collision course' with the political centre of the Ottoman Empire in the 20th century precisely because of the historical path that emerged on the Ottoman coast.

The chapters of conflict and destruction that started as early as 1911 with the Italo-Turkish (Tripolitanian) War and continued through the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) lasted until the end of the Turkish nationalist struggle (1922). They engulfed Foçateyn in the form of crises in the spring of 1914. Foçateyn's historical path, however, did not bring about sustained conflicts that gradually developed into crises in and of themselves. It brought an 'alternative path' that the Ottoman centre 'had to' deal with. It was not Foçateyn's own dynamics that caused conflict but it was the Ottoman centre's perception of those dynamics that brought on confrontation. The toll of

[18] This difference of paths and outcomes also means that the same conditions and phenomenon can evolve differently in different places. This is crucial for this thesis since it demonstrates that a certain part of the Ottoman Empire experienced modernity in a different way and that mattered for its history. There were multiple paths to modernity in the Ottoman Empire so there were multiple modernities even within the same political entity. For more information on multiple modernities, path dependency and historical institutionalism see: Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities Part I* and *Part II*, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003); McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Paul A. David, 'Path Dependence – A Foundational Concept For Historical Social Science', *Cliometrica – The Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History*, 1:2, Summer 2007, 91-114.

destruction was much greater in Foçateyn compared to many other places when the period of those successive wars between 1911 and 1922 ended precisely because of the nature of its historical path. Once Foçateyn was drawn into this rather global maelstrom of nationalist and imperialist conflict of competition and survival, the path that was established in the 19th century played crucial roles in the ways events unfolded. This thesis will demonstrate both the emergence of such a historical path in Foçateyn and the role it played in that period of transition. This chapter will deal with the establishment of that historical path and the latter chapters will demonstrate why it was indeed on a 'collision course' and 'had to be dealt with' by the political centre.

A developmental trajectory, in other words a path, was established in Foçateyn as a result of the interaction of various processes. At the heart of these were two major processes: the penetration of European capitalism, which brought about incorporation into world markets, and the Ottoman state's modernization reforms. They contributed to the establishment of a certain modernization trajectory in 'the long 19th' century of Foçateyn. The Balkan Wars put this trajectory on a collision course with another one that was envisaged by the Unionist Young Turks who seized power in the Empire in 1913. The modernist trajectory that affected Foçateyn and many other places in the Empire such as Alexandria, Beirut, Haifa, Izmir (Smyrna) and Thessaloniki[19] was the coastal trajectory of modernity. Understanding the dynamics of that trajectory and understanding why Foçateyn fits such a pattern will reveal why the Unionists found themselves on a collision course with it after the Balkan Wars and how a new Foçateyn was created afterwards.

The Coastal Trajectory

The historical trajectory approach '...suggests that the historical experience is spatially-diverse, temporarily-bounded, and follows a path-depended pattern'.[20] Therefore at a certain moment in history, let's say in the late 19th century of the Ottoman Empire, there were multiple historical experiences arising as the result of

[19] For examples of this see: Cem Emrence, *Remapping the Ottoman Middle East / Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy and the Islamic State*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 35-53.
[20] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 2.

spatial differences within the Empire and all such experiences were manifestations of certain structures or paths that were formed by larger happenings and/or smaller events. Happenings and events constantly transform structures. They are reproduced or reshaped in certain ways in certain directions due to the path-depended nature of the historical experience. To put it simply, 'what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time'.[21] However, no causal structure or pattern is uniform through time. A certain sequence can work differently under different conditions. This is why this research '...investigates the locked-in effects of state-society and global-local relations that become entrenched over time'.[22] It demonstrates a certain set of events, both on the global and on the local level, that put the county of Foçateyn on a certain developmental trajectory which brought about its rise and contributed to its transformation into a battlefield of nationalisms in the following century.

According to Emrence, the Ottoman Middle East was characterized by three major 'imperial paths', three historical trajectories, during the 19th century: the coast, the interior and the frontier. Each trajectory represented distinct paths to modernity. 'The coastal framework represented the port-cities and commercial hinterlands of Western Anatolia and the eastern Mediterranean littoral; the interior path marked the inland experience of Anatolia, Syria and Palestine; and the frontier incorporated the contentious borderland regions of the Eastern Anatolia, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula'.[23] In each distinct zone, 'political coalitions, economic networks, and collective claims sustained the distinct character of Ottoman trajectories. It was the middle classes on the coast, urban Muslim coalitions in the interior, and religious trust networks in the frontier that governed the region'.[24] Each trajectory had certain groups (political coalitions or economic networks) and their collective claims, unique contentious collective action types and history (especially of those who were discontent with the changes), type of political norms and rule (contested rule on the coast, consensual rule on the interior, thin rule on the frontier) and long-term

[21] William H. Sewell Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 100.
[22] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 2.
[23] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 4.
[24] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 6.

outcomes depending on the 'entrenched' and 'locked-in' paths formed in the respective 'imperial path'.[25] The history of the 19th century and the early 20th century in the county of Foçateyn was the history of a coastal trajectory in formation.

The coast was shaped by incorporation into world markets and the modernization reforms undertaken by the Ottoman state. The interaction of these two major and rather global processes with other local dynamics on the coast resulted in the weakening of Ottoman rule and also a simultaneous fast-track spread of modernity. Ottoman rule on the coast was "contested" and this contested nature of rule made the coast an area of inter-state and capitalist rivalry in the 19th and early 20th centuries. On the one hand, the presence of the Ottoman state and its reforming agenda made contracts enforceable and infrastructures more conducive for capitalism. On the other hand, capitalism created new networks, advances and relations that made the coast 'slip away' from effective imperial control.[26] Foreign states took advantage of this power vacuum created by the unique conditions of the coast. The Great Powers used it to expand their imperial power, and the Ottomans, while constantly trying to restore their grip, used the vacuum to halt that expansion by playing rivals against each other; in the meantime, the Kingdom of Greece used it for its irredentist aims. Capitalists, namely foreign investors and the emerging local bourgeoisie, also took advantage of the contestation. Global investors turned inter-state rivalries into opportunities whereas the emerging bourgeoisie used its "locally-embedded character"[27] in Ottoman society to gain a foothold in the global capital flow without being eliminated by larger capital owners. Lastly, places like Izmir, Beirut, Mersin and Eski Foça, major and minor hubs of the Mediterranean trade, also took advantage of the "contested" nature of the coast. They enjoyed the autonomy and wealth brought about by the dependent growth of the 19th century and to some extent they broke away the

[25] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 4-7.
[26] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 6-9.
[27] The term 'locally embedded' refers to the network embeddedness of the Ottoman bourgeoisie. They were familiar with the local networks, credit sources and the geography at large that made them valuable assets for the market. Hometown connections and ethnic and/or communal networks played crucial roles in the way Ottoman bourgeoisie was able to muster resources and facilitate trade. See: Emrence, *Remapping...*, 37.

economic pressure of the Ottoman centres' command economy based on the principles of provisionism, traditionalism and fiscalism.[28]

Class interest became a dominant drive of political contentions on the coast. Port-cities and later port-towns witnessed the emergence of bourgeoisie and proletariat whose interests often collided with each other and with that of the Ottoman bureaucrats who represented the centre. Different agents of political contentions, sometimes also including actors from the interior, found each other to be 'allies' or 'enemies' throughout the ever-changing dynamics of the coast. Although the proportion of the new bourgeoisie and the new proletariat were rather limited in the Ottoman Empire as a whole, their power and influence were much greater on the coast where they were concentrated.[29] Port-cities like Izmir, Thessalonica and Beirut, and port-towns like Eski Foça, where among the places were the influence of the new classes was felt the most.

On the coast, merchants and domestic groups became connected to the global flows and through that they became the vanguards of modernity. Both the Muslim and non-Muslim middle classes were involved with trade on the coast, although the latter were much more numerous and influential. It was the non-Muslim middle classes who '...enjoyed the spoils of foreign trade and European services but had limited political bargains with the Ottoman state'.[30] While Ottoman Christians may have dominated trade on the coast, trade between the port-city and the hinterland was a different matter. Their trade was often dominated by the merchants of the same religion as the majority of the hinterland. In many cases (such as the hinterlands of Izmir and Beirut) this meant Muslims.[31] Being dominant in trade but not being able to deliver their

[28] For a detailed discussion of Ottoman provisionism, traditionalism and fiscalism see the seminal work of Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2000).

[29] Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities in the Ottoman Empire: Some Theoretical and Historical Perspectives', *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, 16:4, Fall 1993, 519-558.

[30] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 7.

[31] According to the Ottoman Directorate of Trade and Agriculture's survey of 1911, only 13% of the officially registered merchants doing business in the capital city of Istanbul consisted of Muslims and foreigners, while the rest were non-Muslims. See: Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities in...', 539.

political demands to the centre due to a limited bargaining capacity played a major role in the way Ottoman Christians positioned themselves *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman state. The coast became the spatial seat of modernity that represented middle-class values and global interactions, and it had a broad public space. Port-cities like Thessaloniki (Selanik), Izmir (Smyrna), Alexandria and Beirut constituted the most well-known examples of cosmopolitan hubs of the coastal trajectory. 'The port-city captured and reflected in concrete form the entire episode of incorporation. Its physical appearance, spatial layout, economic mechanisms, population dynamics, class structure, political aspirations and cultural life could only be understood through the prism of the colonial intercourse'.[32] It was the port-cities that produced the major constituents of the coastal trajectory, and they produced less traditionally oriented, contested, mercantile, versatile and cosmopolitan societies.

Especially towards the end of the 19th century and also in the early years of the 20th century port-towns started to emerge as satellites of port-cities. Around that time, 'Izmir and Beirut merchants transformed nearby commercial centres and invested money in booming towns. Subsequently, places like Jaffa, Haifa, Mersin and Samsun grew from isolated spots into regional port-towns'.[33] Incorporation was spreading and claiming more and more from Ottoman imperial rule. A detail in the history of one of these upstart port-towns, Haifa, is particularly important for understanding the Ottoman centre's perception on incorporation-driven growth. According to Seikaly, "the Ottoman government planned a major harbour for Haifa, the only such initiative in the eastern Mediterranean, as part of its policy to centralize control and limit European encroachment. It was a project aimed at overshadowing Beirut, which was a source of political irritation to Istanbul because of the nationalist activities and pro-European orientations that thrived there. (...) Finally, by building the harbour, the Ottoman government would have a purely Ottoman port'.[34] Haifa, however, outgrew Ottoman authorities' expectations and plans for it, as it was engulfed by incorporation-driven growth. However, the early stages of its emergence were

[32] Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities in...', 520.
[33] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 38-39.
[34] May Seikaly, 'Haifa at the Crossroad: An Outpost of the New World Order'. In Modernity and Culture: From Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C.A. Bayly, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 102.

indicative of the Ottoman rulers' intentions and initiative to struggle against their 'contested' rule on the coast.

Eski Foça was also one such port-town of investment and growth, driven not by the initiative of the state like in the case of Haifa but by the combination of capital investment, state modernization and a fortunate geographical position. The state's determining role in Eski Foça came about not through its emergence as a boomtown as with Haifa but through its demise into a ghost town in the 20th century. In contrast to Haifa, the history of Eski Foça is a history of interrupted growth. Unlike Haifa, which reached '...its zenith in the 1930s under the British Mandate',[35] Eski Foça was a ghost town in the 1930s. Compared to the less promising start of Haifa that had some 162 vessels docked at its harbour in 1850,[36] Eski Foça had 3,069 vessels docked at its harbour in 1893[37] but that figure would ultimately diminish. In short, the history of Eski Foça is the history of a rapid upstart and a rapid demise. From 1884 to 1914, the population of the county of Foçateyn grew more than twofold. Labour migration was the principal source of population growth in Foçateyn, just as was the case in other boomtowns of the 19th century eastern Mediterranean. Throughout this period the Ottoman state, the European capitalists and the merchants of Izmir invested in Foçateyn. The county, and especially its centre Eski Foça, was economically, demographically and spatially transformed.

In the 19th century two major revolutionizing forces, or perhaps it would be more correct to call them processes, contributed to the emergence of a coastal trajectory in the county Foçateyn with Eski Foça as its spatial seat. These were incorporation, which refers to Ottoman integration into the core centres of the world economy, and state sponsored modernization brought about through the reformist agenda of the Ottoman state. These forces, or processes, came into being almost simultaneously and always interacted with one another. These processes brought forth the emergence of new networks, changes in political order, changes in infrastructures and economic systems, and the spatial remaking of the coast. The result was a peculiar imperial path

[35] Seikaly, 'Haifa at...', 97
[36] Seikaly, 'Haifa at...', 97.
[37] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1893 (Hicrî: 1311), 259.

towards modernity: the coastal path. All of these changes had elements that altered power relations, social and economic structures, and discourses. This chapter will refer to those different aspects to the extent that they are related to the county of Foçateyn.

Chapter I

Eski Foça as a Commercial Hub of an Agrarian Empire

In the Ottoman Empire, the privileged geographic positions of port-cities and port-towns turned them into principal hubs of contact with the world capitalist economy as early as the late 18th century. When we look at the histories of those commercial cities and towns, we see that they had been active centres of trade and commerce before that time as well. Those hubs often existed as commercial centres '... prior to capitalist expansion, within agrarian empires. These empires normally sought to establish a closed and compact division of labour within their boundaries, and, therefore, attempted to minimize economic "leaks"'.[38] The port-cities and the port-towns of the agrarian empires often provided for domestic demands and for that their commercial activities were closely monitored and controlled by imperial centres. Looking at these 'pre-capitalist' histories of port-cities and port-towns thus helps clarify why the sovereignties of their respective centres were considered to be 'contested' with the coming of capitalist incorporation. Eski Foça was one such commercial hub of the predominantly agrarian Ottoman Empire and as such attempts were made to minimize 'leaks'. A brief look at the history of the county of Foçateyn and Eski Foça before the period of incorporation will reveal the dramatic nature of the change that occurred afterward.

When Foçateyn came under the control of the Ottomans in 1455, it had long been enjoying the business brought about by the Genoa-Istanbul-Kefe[39] trade route thanks to its prominent alum mines. Foça was under Byzantine rule before 1275, after that date, the Genoese merchant and diplomat Manuelle Zaccaria managed to rule it *de facto* by turning Foça into a Genoese mining outpost. The Zaccaria family controlled the alum mines in the Foça area and the mines were operated by more than 50

[38] Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities...', 519.
[39] Kefe is modern day Feodosiia on the Crimean peninsula.

workers per mine, a number that was very significant for the period.[40] Until the Ottoman conquest in 1455, Foça remained an area of contestation among Byzantines, Genoese and the Turkic Principality of Saruhanoğulları (Sarukhanids).[41] Throughout this time both Eski Foça and Yeni Foça, the two biggest settlements in Foça, maintained their positions. Eski Foça was an exporting port-town and Yeni Foça was a mining colony. The coming of the Ottomans immediately made an impact on the export-oriented production of the county of Foçateyn. By the time Foça came under Ottoman control, an alternative source of alum near the Papal lands of Rome in Tolfa[42] had already weakened the importance of Foça in the medieval trade networks. However, alum production in Foça didn't stop, and the region was still supplying international demand. A decisive change came about with the Ottoman decision to direct alum supply for the demands of the domestic market. The Ottomans fixed the prices and prioritized the domestic market over the international one. This diminished the previous importance of the alum trade for Foça[43] since the demand of the export-oriented trade was more voluminous and the prices had not been fixed. Nonetheless, the Ottoman conquest did not dramatically alter the economic role of the county of Foçateyn as a mining and fishing community with Eski Foça as the centre of commerce.[44] This was because of the Ottoman domestic market's need for the resources that Foçateyn produced and the sustenance of domestic trade through hubs like the port of Eski Foça. However, the very logic of its activities was reshaped within the framework of Ottoman provisionism (the *iaşe* system). In essence, Ottoman provisionism represented a command economy in which prices were fixed by the state. It required that all production first be directed to supply domestic demand

[40] Serap Yılmaz, 'Foça'nın Bölge Tarihindeki Yeri (18. Yüzyıl)'. In *Geçmişten Günümüze Foça: Uluslararası Sempozyum*, (Ankara: Yayımevi A.Ş, 1997), 24.
[41] Foça was a Genoese trade colony by the time of the Ottoman conquest. However it is also understood that it was paying tribute to the Saruhanoğulları principality. For further information about the topic see: Zeki Arıkan, 'XVI. Yüzyılda Foça' . In *Foça Üzerine Yazılar / Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı Anısına*. (İzmir: Ati Matbaa, 1998), 6-7.
[42] Suraiya Faroqhi, 'Alum Production and Alum Trade in the Ottoman Empire (about 1560-1830)', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 71 (1979), 153.
[43] Daniel Goffman, *İzmir ve Levanten Dünya 1550-1650*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), 51.
[44] Arıkan shows through customs registers that in the 16th century Foça was still very active. See: Arıkan, 'XVI. Yüzyılda...', 11.

and that meant the end of export oriented production for the salt, alum and stone mines of medieval Foça.

According to Daniel Goffman, from the last period of the 14th century onwards, after the conquest of the majority of Western Anatolia by Bayezid I (with the exception of Izmir), the volume of trade in the Aegean (meaning the Western Anatolian shores) was almost equally divided among towns like Foça, Selçuk, Balat, Urla, Çeşme and Seferihisar, all of which each had populations of around a few thousand people. This picture changed at the beginning of the 16th century after the conquests of Mehmet II (the Conqueror) that finally brought the entirety of Western Anatolia under Ottoman control. After the Ottoman conquest, most of the ports in Western Anatolia that had been important since the 14th century lost out to Izmir and only few important hubs remained active.[45] Afterwards, Izmir started to grow as the commercial hub of the Ottoman domestic economy. For instance in the mid-16th century, after the Ottoman conquest, commercial contact with Italy, which was maintained through the Genoese rulers of Chios who sent ships to Çeşme, vanished. Ships no longer circulated goods and customs dues declined accordingly.[46] This downward trend in commerce changed towards the end of the 16th century as towns like Foça, Seferihisar, Balat, Izmir, Edremit and Ayezmend (Altınova) appeared as the important ports of the Ottoman era,[47] re-emerging as the commercial hubs of a growing agrarian empire. Although the coming of the Ottomans initially took its toll on the volume of trade, an enlarging empire with a demanding capital city and a demanding domestic market re-established the need for Western Anatolian ports.

Around the 1650s, Eski Foça was one of the three places (along with Izmir and Edremit) that had extensive relations with the Istanbul trade network thanks to its alum, millstone and dried fruit production.[48] The reason for this 'extensive' relation was Istanbul's fundamental needs, and Eski Foça was one of the three major ports on

[45] Goffman, *İzmir ve...*, 2-9.
[46] Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an Urban. Setting 1520-1650*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 114.
[47] Suraiya Faroqhi, *Osmanlıda Kentler ve Kentliler*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), 15-17.
[48] Yılmaz, 'Foça'nın Bölge...', 28.

the Western Anatolian coast that served the capital. Eski Foça port shipped the county of Foçateyn's goods almost exclusively to the imperial capital. Imperial orders stipulated that the needs of Istanbul were a priority and that goods first had to fulfil the capital's demands, which often meant the whole of production. Foçateyn's three major products, alum (and later salt), millstones and dried fruits were very important for the provisionist Ottoman economy.

Alum is a raw material that was used in making medicine, and the paper and dye making industries. Alum production was a major mining activity in the county before Ottoman rule[49] and it was especially centered in Yeni Foça, the second biggest port town of the county of Foçateyn. However, around the 16th century alum mines gave way to salt mines[50] and subsequently rock salt production became the major mining activity in the county. The percentage of salt in trade grew exponentially after the 16th century and peaked at the end of the 19th century. Unlike with alum mining, there were multiple salt mines and methods of production and the extraction was not focused on Yeni Foça. Eski Foça became a better candidate for extraction and transport thanks to its proximity to the salt mines like Çamaltı, and this brought about the loss of prestige that Yeni Foça enjoyed in the medieval period. Under Ottoman rule, Eski Foça gradually became the more dominant and larger of the two towns.

As a pillar of the provisionist (*iaşe*) network, Foçateyn was the supplier of millstones (*seng-i asiyab*) for Istanbul and their purchase from elsewhere was not allowed since millstone production was the only taxable output of the millstone taxable unit (*seng-i asiyab mukata'ası*) in Foçateyn. Millstone production added further importance to the port of Eski Foça after the 18th century when there was an increase in demand for millstones for a number of reasons.[51] Since mills were essential for the processing of grain, millstones were also essential goods for the domestic market. This was even more important in the Ottoman provisionist logic since the constant supply of grain to the masses was vital for avoiding famine and the disorders that ensued when famine

[49] Arıkan, 'XVI. Yüzyılda...', 5.
[50] Goffman, *İzmir ve...*, 58 and Faroqhi, 'Alum Production...', 161.
[51] Suraiya Faroqhi and Randi Deguilhem ed., *Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East: Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 154-156.

became widespread. In the provisionist logic, sustainable bread production was linked to the security of the capital. Therefore bread production in Istanbul was directly linked to both the extraction and the shipment of millstones from Foçateyn.

Dried fruits were the main source of sugar in a world where sugar cane was an expensive rarity. The county of Foçateyn also produced various fruits and supplied them to Ottoman and foreign markets. Its most important good was grapes and the county was particularly famous for its purple grapes. All these goods from Foçateyn were directed to the domestic market unless imperial permission was granted for them to be exported.

After the adaptation to Ottoman provisionism and subsequent focus on demands of the domestic market, port-towns and port-cities reappeared as supporters for Ottoman demand that was almost exclusively directed to Istanbul. This meant that Istanbul determined what was to be shipped where and for how much. In the late 16th century, Eski Foça also became an important transit port in the supply route of the capital's wheat demand, and rice, dried fruits, leather (*sahtiyan*) and beeswax were among the goods that were supplied to the capital through Eski Foça for the domestic market.[52] Despite the gradual adaptation to the system and despite the rigorous Ottoman supervision of trade, Western Anatolian producers and traders sought ways to avoid the central pricing system of Ottoman provisionism. Stocking and hiding goods to drive up market prices, as well as smuggling, piracy and fraud, were among the tactics they devised. Among these methods, which were often used simultaneously, piracy and smuggling of goods became the dominant means of sustaining export activities.

There were two types of pirate activities in the Aegean and they lasted until the end of the Empire in varying degrees. There were pirates who worked through domestic networks and others connected to foreign networks. Domestic piracy drew its labour mostly from those who tried to avoid the repercussions of grain smuggling that they conducted in the regions where pirates were active. They often made small raids and attacked rival towns. Faroqhi argues that despite the fact that those pirates engaged in small skirmishes with rival towns that had communities that had different religious or

[52] Arıkan, 'XVI. Yüzyılda...', 11-12.

communal identities, this was often more of an excuse than a reason. Pirates in the domestic networks relied on the logistic support of their region for water, food and shelter. Their collaborators were often that the people who were supposed to track them down. Domestic pirates' interdependence on local networks made them somewhat less dangerous. In contrast, pirates from other regions were the most dangerous. They enslaved people and pillaged towns and villages on a larger scale because they were alien to the domestic networks. Such pirates even dared to smuggle goods that were most rigorously monitored by the Ottomans, and they played a major role in the smuggling of grain to European ports.[53]

Foçateyn attracted pirates as a result of its position as a commercial hub of an agrarian empire. Eski Foça, the central town of the county, was one of the Ottoman port-towns in the Aegean where both the grasp of Ottoman provisionism and the 'leaks' created by piracy and smuggling was present. The global market tried to get its share from the Ottoman economy but was only able to do so on a limited scale through capitulary agreements. Therefore, both smuggling and piracy were instrumentalized as means to extract more from the Ottoman economy. For instance, between 1565-68 French and Venetian ships secretly entered Eski Foça port in order to smuggle various goods, dried fruits and grains.[54] Thanks to its privileged position on the shore and because of the protective nature of its harbour, Foçateyn became attractive not only to European investors and traders but also to the outlaws who were the mediators of such transactions. That is probably why Eski Foça was also often referred to as *Karaca Foça*, *karaca* meaning 'a nest of pirates'.[55] Piracy sometimes meant trouble for local producers because of the raids but it was also advantageous as long as the pirates or smugglers paid more than Ottoman law would allow. Pirates sold the export goods to European traders, especially in places like Foçateyn where islets and islands close to the mainland provided both shelter and screening from the watchful eye of the Ottoman authorities. Piracy and smuggling remained a reality of the county of

[53] Faroqhi, *Osmanlıda Kentler...*, 122-123.
[54] For various cases of smuggling and piracy in the county of Foçateyn see: Yılmaz, 'Foça'nın Bölge...', 26 and Arıkan, 'XVI. Yüzyılda...', 11-12.
[55] Serap Yılmaz in her article underlines the use of the name *Karaca* to describe Eski Foça by arguing that this use was probably a result of Eski Foça's lack of security, which was caused by pirates. Yılmaz, 'Foça'nın Bölge...', 21.

Foçateyn and of Western Anatolia until the end of the Empire and in the era of incorporation.



[**Picture:** In the famous 16th century (1525) map (*Kitab-ı Bahriye*) of Piri Reis Foça is referred to as '*Karaca' Foça* probably as a result of large pirate presence.
Source: The Walters Art Museum Digital Publication / www. thewalters.org **]**

People from places like Foçateyn responded to the provisionist policies of the Ottoman centre in ways other than piracy as well. Bribing officials whose responsibilities were to oversee commerce and fraud was also a tactic employed by local producers and traders. Daniel Goffman points out that there were many cases in which the Ottoman centre discovered practices conflicting with its economic policies, whereupon it acted to counter them, which invoked a counter response by producers and dealers. Ottoman subjects in the region actively opposed the imposition of a command economy and that struggle became a defining characteristic of the region's relations with the Porte in Istanbul. For instance in 1582 Jews, Christians and the "infidel" foreign wine producers and dealers exhausted the grapes of the Foçateyn region for wine production. As a result, in 1584 it was reported that there were no grapes left for consumption, drying and non-alcoholic beverages (like *Sirke* and *Şıra*) around Yeni Foça and Eski Foça.[56] At the end of the 16th century, the Ottoman centre became aware of this divergence in the course of trade and attempted to take protective measures. As a result, in the winter of 1593-94, each ship that was loaded with grapes, almonds, figs and other fruits destined for Istanbul had to have a guard on board from Eski Foça. Furthermore, castle guards of places like Foçateyn began searching farmlands for secret stocks of goods that were stocked for better price opportunities. Protective as it may sound, that method seems to have failed since the guards cooperated with the smugglers.[57]

The provisionist Ottoman economic structure established a pattern of struggles between 'the capital's orchard'[58] and the Porte in Istanbul. The Ottoman centre constantly tried to oversee and control the supply and prices in the domestic market whereas producers and traders in Western Anatolia,[59] including the county of Foçateyn, constantly tried to avoid the limits of such a command economy. The

[56] Goffman, *İzmir ve...*, 37.
[57] Goffman, *İzmir ve...*, 38 and 41.
[58] This is a term used by Faroqhi to designate agricultural lands like Foçateyn in Western Anatolian that supported Istanbul through the Ottoman network of provisionism. See: Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and...*, 81.
[59] Although my focus is on the county of Foçateyn and thus on Western Anatolia, provisionist policies were applied everywhere in the Empire. The effects of the policy differed from one place to the other.

production and distribution of grapes is one striking example of how that was realized. At a time when cane sugar was scarce and extremely expensive, dried fruits, especially dried grapes, were consumed extensively by all levels of society.[60] However, Western Anatolian producers were not able to make the best of the productive advantage they had with grapes because they provided most of the fruit needed by the capital at fixed prices.

Incorporation into global capitalism came onto the scene in such an environment and that is why local producers and traders easily adapted to the legalization of the 'leaks' that transferred their goods to the European markets. Capitulary arrangements with European states slowly but surely established a pattern in which piracy or smuggling were no longer as necessary since the hold of the Ottoman centre on the Western Anatolian economy was compromised. The Ottoman centre was never in full control but the 18th century witnessed the development of larger and more numerous 'leaks' in the provisionism of the Empire. While Eski Foça and Yeni Foça of the county of Foçateyn had been two important hubs of the Mediterranean trade before the Ottoman conquest, their role initially diminished with Ottoman rule but later Eski Foça became a lively commercial hub of the agrarian Ottoman Empire. Ottoman domestic economy and the demands of the capital were enough to keep agrarian hubs active despite fixed prices. Foçateyn was one such place where the limits of the Ottoman command economy were challenged and 'leaks' formed, making it a likely candidate of growth when incorporation into world markets started to take place.

The Early Stages of Incorporation in the 18th Century

The origins of the formation of a coastal trajectory in the Ottoman Empire can be observed in the mid-eighteenth century when integration into world economy started. Back then, in the 'eventful eighteenth century',[61] the governors of coastal cities and

[60] Faroqhi, *Osmanlıda Kentler...*, 100-102.

[61] Karen Barkey says that the 18th century had been rather neglected and misunderstood in Ottoman historiography and she suggests that the more attention it gets the more its transitional nature between pre-modern and modern political forms is revealed. She describes the 18th century with the term 'eventful century' precisely because she demonstrates that the 18th century was dominated by successive

powerful notables responded to the rising demand for raw materials from the industrial markets of Europe, channelling peasant surplus towards this demand and developing mechanisms to provide protection for long distance trade.[62] It was also around this time that the world was experiencing major developments in seafaring techniques and technologies, and this was accompanied by the rise of insurance companies. In short, trade was becoming easier and safer. These developments later brought the industrialization of shipping[63] that made overseas trade more secure in the late 19th century. So two things happened at the same time: the demand and the number of the types of goods demanded increased, and the means of transport became faster and more secure. This early stage of incorporation was interrupted by the fall of global demand due to various political crises and the Napoleonic Wars. In this initial phase, the effects of incorporation were still minimal. Commercialization was limited and the tax farmers of the Ottoman system were still able to squeeze peasants for surplus, and incorporation was not yet powerful enough to exploit that surplus. No mono-crop hinterlands emerged[64] at this time. The power of the Ottoman centre was not yet 'contested' and the emergence of port-towns had to wait until the first quarter of the 19th century. Nevertheless the 'leaks' in the Ottoman economy grew in this period.

Based on their traditional fiscal and provisionist economic model, the Ottomans had always behaved as 'the most powerful empire in the region, providing "capitulations" – permission to trade - which friendly foreign nations would acquire. They valued the

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formative events that brought about the political empowerment of a variety of social groups that opposed the state and the state's move towards reform in reaction to that. See: Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference / The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 197-225.

[62] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 36.

[63] Industrialization of shipping is a concept coined by maritime historians that refers to the drastic changes that took place in the 19th century. Those changes were related to the volume of goods that were transported and the types of vessels traversing the world. Basically it referred to a transition from wood to steel and from sails to steam in the shipping industry. Downes argues that these changes in shipping triggered further changes in the construction of modern waterfronts, which constituted a part of the Ottoman modernization process. Brant William Downes, *Constructing the Modern Ottoman Waterfront: Salonica and Beirut in the late Nineteenth Century*. (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Stanford University, 2008), 3-5.

[64] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 36-37.

capitulations from a provisionist point of view and they did not seek equal privileges in other economies. The Europeans, in contrast, valued these capitulations as trading licenses and watched one another compete for further dispensation from a capitalist point of view. For the Ottomans, the preferred outcome was moderate commerce, driven by special needs and special regulations'.[65] The Ottomans only realized the negative consequences and true scale of the capitulations and incorporation much later, after they had lost considerable control of their economy and had become dependent in the late 19th century.

Around the mid-18th century, trade hubs on the Western Anatolian coast, including the two Foças, the towns of old and new Foça, had witnessed a dramatic change. Ottoman provisionism, which was never fully realized in the region due to piracy and smuggling, started to lose its dominance in the region's economic activities. An increasing number of capitulary agreements with better privileges (especially after the expansion and renewal of the capitulary privileges by Mahmut I in 1740) allowed France to bypass the protective barriers of the Ottoman Empire. This increased the long dormant export-oriented trade. For instance, total wheat exports of 10,000 tonnes to Marseille from Western Anatolia between the years 1715-19 had increased dramatically and between 1785-89 and it reached to 42,000 tones[66]. Eski Foça was one of the ports that exported wheat to Marseille. The organization of trade around provisionism and the occasional allowances of export 'leaks' through capitulations resulted 'in the growth of two distinct groups, one of merchants that grew to expand the boundaries of trade with Europe, and a second, traders and provisioners who bought grain, sheep and other essentials from local producers at prices set by the state and brought them to Istanbul. Whereas the first group developed a freer, looser relationship to the state and prospered through its commercial acumen and network ties, the other group advanced through the regulation of its trade by the state, which made this trade both more controlled and more protected'.[67] The 18th century stimulated the growth of the first group which relied on the trade with Europe, and

[65] Barkey, *Empire...*, 237.
[66] Yılmaz, 'Foça'nın Bölge...', 27.
[67] Barkey, *Empire...*, 237.

that growth became most visible in the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean and Western Anatolia.

Izmir was the major port-city and a centre of growth in Western Anatolia. It was approximately a day away by land to Foçateyn, and by attracting trade with France, surpassed all the other towns and port-cities of the Empire. Izmir's growth privileged some regions, such as Bursa (for silk) and Ankara (for mohair yarn), and hurt the growth of others like Chios and Kuşadası.[68] Foçateyn was both an important pillar of the Ottoman *iaşe* network and an important minor hub in the global trade networks during the 18th century. Major commercial goods like wheat and olive oil were loaded on ships from ports closer to where they were produced. This was the case for both exports and domestic markets. According to Serap Yılmaz, although Foçateyn appears to have been one such port for certain products, the number of ships loaded in Eski Foça throughout the 18th century is very low compared to other port-towns in Western Anatolia. She argues that this might mean two things: either Foçateyn was not very productive for exports or some of its main exports, which are not too visible in the registers like salt, salted fish or dried fruits, constituted the majority of its commerce in the 18th century and so we cannot asses its full potential.[69] However, as is evident from its demographic growth, Foçateyn did not suffer from Izmir's growth either. Foçateyn, and Eski Foça in particular, were privileged by Izmir's growth and the process of incorporation.

Foçateyn had important mines, famous vineyards and two developed port-towns, and therefore it was both a producer and a transit point for commerce. The county's commercial activities were constantly monitored by the Ottoman centre and its resources were mostly directed to the Ottoman capital in the 18th century. Ottoman provisionism dictated some sort of a command economy where prices were fixed and trade was controlled; however, the people of Foçateyn devised methods to dodge the pressures of Ottoman provisionism in this century as well. After all, European merchants were able to offer more competitive prices compared to the fixed prices of

[68] Barkey, *Empire...*, 239.
[69] See: Yılmaz, 'Foça'nın Bölge...', 30-31. In both cases, the port of Eski Foça still provided for foreign and domestic markets. The role of the former would change in the late 19th century.

the Ottoman centre. In this century, Eski Foça gradually outgrew Yeni Foça as the larger of the two main towns of the county of Foçateyn. Eski Foça became a transit hub for the transfer of many goods that were produced in the fertile hinterland and it also became famous for its own products such as salt, millstones and dried fruits. The 18th century closed with changes brought by capitulary agreements. French merchants, and soon after other European merchants, now demanded goods which were under Ottoman supervision.[70] Salt, wheat and the dried fruit of Foçateyn started to be shipped as export goods in increasing volume as the century came to a close. The increase in exports was minimal, however, and full incorporation had to wait for the 19th century but the closing of the century already saw a change. Foçateyn was not able to free itself from the grasp of the Ottoman centre yet, nor was it fully incorporated into the growing trend of capitalism. This created a struggle between the forces of the market and the Ottoman centre in the 19th century. In the county of Foçateyn, the medium of the struggle between European merchants and the provisionist Ottoman state was piracy.

1820-1870: The Rise of Global Capitalism, Port-Cities and Foçateyn

The early phase of the global growth of capitalism and the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire was interrupted by a series of crises such as the Seven Years' War (1754-1763), the American War of Independence (1775-1783), the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the Napoleonic Wars in Europe (1803-1815). Around the 1820s, global economies resumed growing and the resulting increase in populations and industrial growth called for further demand of raw materials and thus further expansion. In the relative absence of European traders, especially the French in the eastern Mediterranean, Ottoman merchants involved in international trade gained power. For instance Greek and Orthodox Albanian merchants took advantage of the fact that there was an absence of French and Greek merchants who brought grain to

[70] The end of the 18th century created new opportunities for Ottoman merchants. In this century, Ottoman Greeks in Western Anatolia and the Aegean islands were particularly successful in providing for the increasing European demand. See: Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: the Nineteenth Century*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 18-23.

Marseille during the French revolution, and swiftly became 'millionaires'.[71]This early empowerment of local Ottoman agents of trade made them more resilient and autonomous in their relationship with global capitalism.

This second period of incorporation saw the 'meteoric rise' of local capitalist agency in the Empire. This was the period where Ottoman merchants who focused more on trade with Europe started to gain more wealth and became less dependent on the Ottoman state. This process, however, was not equally visible in all parts of the Empire, and was more predominant in the western territories of the Empire (Western Empire which consisted of the southern Balkans, the Aegean islands and littoral, the Marmara basin and Istanbul) and in some parts of the eastern Mediterranean. In other words, based on the framework provided by Emrence, it was only a dominant factor on the coast. 'Occupying an intermediary position in Ottoman-European trade relations, non-Muslim merchants eliminated local Muslim groups from economic competition in long distance trade and enjoyed organizational advantages over Europeans. Two-way connectedness was key to non-Muslim commercial ascendancy on the Ottoman coast as it enabled urban interests to forge economic ties with global actors and the hinterland at the same time. It was against this background that the Greek merchants of Western Anatolia sustained their monopoly over the import trade of the region throughout the century'.[72]

The rise of global capitalism in the early 19th century witnessed the dramatic growth of port-cities as enclaves of incorporation within agrarian empires. The Ottoman Empire was one such agrarian empire where European merchants started to demand more and more from the Ottoman economy. 'In this period, Ottoman export and foreign trade growth rates exceeded global rates. This era was the true heyday of the port-cities'.[73] These port cities were spatial harbingers of modernity and cosmopolitanism. They were not 'alien constructs' placed upon the agrarian empires;

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[71] Traian Stoianovich, 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', *Journal of Economic History*, 20:2 (1960): 234-313, 275. Also: Elena Frangakis-Syrett, 'The Greek mercantile community of Izmir in the first half of the nineteenth century'. In ed. Daniel Panzac, *Les Villes dans l'Empire Ottoman: Activitiés et Sociétés*, Vol. 1, (Paris: CNRS, 1991) 391-416.
[72] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 36-37.
[73] Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities in...', 530.

their existence was not limited to the port-city either. In the Ottoman case, they became unique spaces where different peoples of the Empire and foreigners met and gave shape to the process of incorporation and to the port-city. Their sphere of influence stretched into the hinterlands through webs of commerce and thus they had vital relations with the rest of the Empire as well.[74]

Eski Foça had to wait for the end of the century to become a boomtown that was fully transformed by the incorporation, but it was not stagnant in the early phases of the 19th century. There are two main trends visible in the history of the county of Foçateyn in the 19th century: perseverance of the 'old economic order' and intensification of new, export-oriented economic activities. On the one hand, based on the Ottoman income registers (*temettuat defterleri*) of the county of Foçateyn, we see that the economic structure of the county of Foçateyn had been somewhat resilient to the capitalist incorporation into the world markets. The classical economic structures of the Ottoman Empire more or less persisted and forms like plantation economies did not emerge. A prominent feature of Ottoman provisionism was the small landholding peasantry who represented the most widespread form of the use of land. However, there are strong signs that suggest that those small landholding units, and other bigger farming units that emerged, produced for export-oriented markets. This was in contrast to the classical model of provisionism that tried to extract production primarily for the domestic market. In fact, the county was producing more for international markets than in previous periods. This export-oriented change is visible in various Ottoman bureaucratic registers and the population estimates of William J. Hamilton, the size of export-oriented commercial activities, the numbers of exported goods and the population of Foçateyn, which seems to have grown considerably in the 19th century through the effects of the rise of global capitalism.

The increase in exports is reflected in an imperial edict concerning customs taxes and the frequent number of reported cases of smuggling and piracy, and also in the reports on Foça's salt business which would grow dramatically at the end of the 19th century. Population growth was particularly important in an era where emerging port-cites attracted rural migrants from smaller towns. Instead of losing inhabitants to other

[74] Keyder, Özveren, and Quataert, 'Port-Cities in...', 523-524.

cities like some other towns on the Western Anatolian coast did throughout the course of the 19th century, Foçateyn grew in size. This growth in Foçateyn suggests the existence of pull factors that made the county attractive to migrants. At this point it will be helpful to look in detail at the clues that indicate growth and export-oriented activities.

Ottoman income registers (*temettuat defterleri*) were first issued in the 19th century as a result of larger Ottoman reforms in an era known as the era of the Tanzimat. At first, the registers were experimental in nature. They were systematic but not uniform and they were only applied in some (primarily the more developed/centralized) parts of the Ottoman Empire. They aimed to create more accurate data about the potential tax base and productive capabilities of the population. The principal aim was to increase tax income for the modernisation reforms of the state. In general, the registers do not offer as much information about the non-Muslim sector of the Ottoman population as they do for its Muslim inhabitants. In this regard, the registers of the county of Foçateyn are similar but include more information about non-Muslims. There are four income registers for the county of Foçateyn; two for the two major towns, Eski Foça and Yeni Foça, and two for the various villages within the borders of the county.[75] The *Temettuat* registers of *Foça-i Atik* (Eski Foça / Old Foça) and *Foça-i Cedid* (Yeni Foça / New Foça) include only the Muslim households in their inquiry. The information about the non-Muslim residents in those two registers is only visible when non-Muslims have some joint business, property or income that is related to Muslim households. The other two income registers, those that include the villages and tribes (*aşiret*) of the county, include more information about the non-Muslims of the county.

Four main trends are visible in the income registers of Foçateyn: the perseverance of

[75] The Foçateyn income registers were compiled between 1844-1846 and their names appear as follows in the Ottoman Archives (BOA): *Foçateyn kazası, Foça-i Atik Kalesi'nin bazı mahallerindeki müslümanların temettuat defteri* (Eski Foça), *Foçateyn kazası, Foça-i Cedid Kalesi müslümanlarının temettuat defteri* (Yeni Foça), *Foçateyn kazası, Bozköy, Arab Çiftliği, Giranköy, Tavşan Çayırı vb. karyelerindeki müslüman ve gayri müslim ahalilerinin temettuat defteri* (Villages of Foçateyn), *Foçateyn kazası, Kozbeyli, Ilıpınar ve Şeyh-i Kebir karyeleri temettuat defteri* (Villages of Foçateyn).

small landholding peasantry as the most widespread productive unit, the existence of some large farms (*çiftlik*[76]), a high number of landless sharecroppers in the economy and the existence of a structural difference between the economies of the central towns (Eski Foça and Yeni Foça) and the rest of the county (villages). None of these macro trends alone are enough, however, to prove that the economy of Foçateyn was fully incorporated into the global capitalist economy. There is also insufficient information to prove the existence of an isolated, classical economy. When considered together, these macro trends do show that the economy of the county was undergoing a process of transformation, suggesting the existence of market-oriented (export-oriented) production and occupations as well as the perseverance of some 'classical' economic forms of production for the domestic market. Looking at these trends individually will make this point clearer.

Birsen Bulmuş, in her study of the *temettuat* registers that include the villages of the county of Foçateyn (Kozbeyli, Gerenköy/Giran, Ilıpınar, Boz and Şeyh Kebir), concludes that the biggest economic activity was farming and that the small wheat-producing, landholding farmers dominated the village economy of the county of Foçateyn.[77] She compares the size of the farms of these small landholding peasants to the classical (pre-capitalist) Ottoman *çift-hane* units[78] and argues that the old economic structures were not altered in the 19th century. She thus argues that the peasant units in Foçateyn were not exactly reminiscent of the old economic units but small landholding peasantry persisted vis-à-vis the challenges presented by incorporation. She also discusses the *çiftlik*s, the large farms, of Foçateyn to see if they acted like agents of global capitalism. She concludes that they did not dominate

[76] *Çiftlik* means farm in Ottoman Turkish.

[77] Birsen Bulmuş, *The Agricultural Structure of the Foça Region in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: An Examination of the Çift-Hane System and the Big Farms in the Light of the Temettü Defters, 1844-45 (H. 1260-61),* (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Bilkent University, 1997), 83.

[78] *Çift-hane* is a term used to describe single-family peasant units (farms, *çiftlik*) in the Ottoman economy. The term is an abbreviation for a peasant household with a pair of oxen to work the land. This terminology is especially used to describe the peasant units in the classical Ottoman land regime. Another terminology for the same landholding small peasants is *reaya çiftlik* (peasant farms). An ideal size *çift-hane* was considered to have two oxen and 50-150 *dönüm* (a *dönüm* is one thousand square meters or a quarter of an acre) of land.

the economy like plantations or monocrop farms elsewhere in incorporated parts of the world did at that time. She argues, based on the predominance of grain (the largest share being wheat) that production on the *çiftlik*s was destined for domestic Ottoman markets.[79]

As a result, Bulmuş argues that the effects of capitalist, or liberal, economic forces were not present in the county of Foçateyn. I would like to argue, however, that this conclusion needs to be revised. Bulmuş's arguments on the perseverance of the small landholding peasantry and the dominance of wheat production in the economy of the county's villages and *çiftlik*s are most convincing and meticulously demonstrated. However, this does not necessarily suggest there was a lack of export-oriented commercial activity. In the preceding argument, the dominant grain production of *çiftlik*s and the perseverance of small landholding peasantry were read as trends suggesting the dominance of Ottoman provisionist ("conservative" in Bulmuş's terminology) economic logic. Wheat was a commodity that the Ottomans tried to strictly control and the existence of small landholding peasantry suggests that capitalist economic forces had not yet created dramatic changes such as the creation of plantation economies or mono-crop farms with landless peasants. However, the income registers tell us nothing about where that wheat ended up or where other commodities (such as grapes and raisins) were shipped. For one thing, as early as the 18th century, to some extent Ottoman wheat became accessible to European traders through capitulary agreements. In addition, piracy and smuggling also existed since incorporation started and they acted as ways to breach protective barriers of Ottoman provisionism.[80] When we consider the economies of the towns of the county and other archival documents about trade, piracy and smuggling, a different picture emerges. There is strong evidence showing that the economy of the county was providing goods for world markets without drastic changes in the local economic structures.

First of all, the biggest of the farms of Foçateyn, the *Baltacı Çiftliği*, belongs to a 'renowned merchant' (*tüccar-ı mu'teber*) called Baltacı Manulaki who resided in the

[79] Bulmuş, *The Agricultural...*, 71-82.
[80] Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

'Foreign' Quarter (*Frenk mahallesi*) of Izmir, the biggest port-city of Western Anatolia. The *çiftlik* almost exclusively produced wheat and was registered as the highest income tax paying unit in the county. The register says that Manulaki had other property outside Foçateyn as well but he was only registered for his farm in the county in this particular register. His farm was almost 8 times larger than the biggest çiftlik in Eski Foça in terms of economic value.[81] This provides a good example of how the new middle classes, such as the Ottoman merchant Baltacı Manulaki, focused on international trade and started to make investments in developing areas (such as the county of Foçateyn in this case) after their initial accumulation of capital in port-cities (such as Izmir in this case). Although there is no way of knowing if this large farm was producing for the domestic or the international markets, it definitely does not match the 'classical' size or economic value of large farms and so it does not fit with the definition of a 'conservative' economic unit.

Secondly, the income register of Eski Foça (Foça-i Atik), the largest town in the county, presents a picture that differs from that of the outlying villages. The most widespread occupation in the centre of the county is *bağban*, the growing of grapes, and the highest amount of tax (almost 60 percent of the *âşar*, the Ottoman agricultural tax) was derived from grape-related commodities. Grain production accounted for a quarter of the tax base and olive related commodities (predominantly olive oil) accounted for approximately 15% of the agricultural tax base. The second most widespread occupation consisted of other sorts of farming and a very close third one consisted of the *esnaf* (various artisans) and craftsmen.[82] The tax derived from the *esnaf*, based on their income, was much higher than that of farmers and the second largest source of tax for the state. A group of occupations, consisting of sailors, camel owners and day-labourers who were involved in the transfer of goods, were quite visible in terms of the taxes they paid based on their income. When considered together, those 'transporters', who were most likely involved in both domestic and international trade, appear as the third largest group in terms of taxes paid. Finally,

[81] *Foçateyn Kazası Temettuat Defteri*, BOA, Register Number: 1940, Baltacı Çiftliği hane :1 no:1.

[82] The most widespread occupation among the *esnaf* (artisans) with a very high income tax in total was *kalafat esnafı*, the caulkers who repaired all sorts of sea vessels.

like the villages of Foçateyn, the economy of Eski Foça was also dominated by landless sharecroppers and an overwhelming majority of them (more than 90%) were Ottoman Greeks.[83] Unfortunately the income registers of Foçateyn, or any other Ottoman income register for that matter, do not list these sharecroppers as separate households (and thus do not have separate data entries). Such households are only half-visible under the entries of the respective households who held the land and paid for the labour of the sharecroppers, so there is no separate entry designating the workforce in the charts below. We understand that these sharecroppers were often farmers at one time of the year and hired themselves out to do wage work at other times of the year. They filled the ranks of seasonal workers of the saltpans, and also worked as fishermen or boatmen.

Grapes, especially purple Foça grapes (*Foça Karası*), sultana grapes and raisins for Foça, were among the generic export commodities of Western Anatolia. Although these commodities were equally valuable for the capital Istanbul, they are often mentioned as the generic export goods of the county of Foçateyn in French commercial almanacs and journals.[84] Another such product was olives and olive oil. So, unlike the grain-dominated (especially wheat) agricultural output of the county's villages, Eski Foça might have been producing more for international markets. Eski Foça presents a very complex economic structure with diverse occupations (such as sailors, camel owners and day-labourers), suggesting it was quite important for trade-related activities. It is plausible to argue that the grain produced by the villages was shipped to the port of Eski Foça and from there they shipped to both domestic and international markets together with grapes, olives and other commodities. However, once more, Eski Foça's income register does not indicate how much of its produce ended up in which markets. Other sources must be examined to determine the destination of the goods produced there.

[83] *Foçateyn Kazası Temettuat Defteri*, BOA, Register Number: 1939.
[84] Raphael C. Cervati, *Annuaire Oriental du Commerce de l'Industrie, de l'Administration et de la Magistrature*, (Paris: Ch. Lorilleux & Cie, 1891), 827.



This chart demonstrates the economic weights of the occupational groups in the town of Eski Foça based on its income register (1844-1846). Weights are calculated based on the total income tax sum registered for each occupation. (*Foçateyn Kazası Temettuat Defteri*, BOA, Register Number: 1939.)

An Ottoman imperial edict, the *hatt-ı hümayûn* of 1827 which stipulates the enactment of additional customs taxes in order to raise money for the newly established modern army, *Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye* (The Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad), provides information on goods exported from the port of Foçateyn. The edict includes two lists consisting of commodities that were shipped from the ports in Foçateyn, Urla, Karaburun, Çeşme and Kuşadası which were overseen by Izmir's administration. One list gives the names of commodities that were exported outside the Empire and the other gives a list of goods that had only recently (after the introduction of some capitulary privileges) been made legal for export. The customs tax rates for individual commodities on the list were based on their current market

price at the time.[85] A close look at the list reveals that almost all the goods produced in Foçateyn according to the *temettuat* register were also listed as export items. Different types of grains (wheat, barley, sesame, chickpea, beans, lentil, horse bean), which were strictly monitored by Ottoman provisionism, made their way onto the lists together with cash crops and raw materials. Cotton, cotton thread, various types of grapes, wool, opium, honey, beeswax, olive oil, soap, copper bullion, used copper, carpets, figs, guns and various plants (*mahmude*, *kitre*, *alacehri*[86]) were listed as export items.[87]



This chart shows the different percentages of the number of taxpayers registered as certain type of workers in Eski Foça (1844-1846). There is only one *Mülazım* and the majority of registered male heads of the Muslim households (62%) were farmers. (*Foçateyn Kazası Temettuat Defteri*, BOA, Register Number: 1939.)

[85] The edict states that the taxes are to be based on the market values of the commodities (*rayiç-i vaktlerine tatbikan*) that make these taxes *ad valorem*. Therefore it is not possible to understand which commodities were in high demand.
[86] *Mahmude* is convolvulus scammonia, *kitre* (or geven) is locoweed, and *alacehri* is speckled buckthorn berry.
[87] For the edict see: BOA, HAT, 541/26728/B, (Hicrî 29/Z /1242).

The imperial edict does not tell us the extent of the export-oriented trade in the county of Foçateyn, so it not possible to be sure about the proportion of exports in relation to domestic trade. However, one thing is clear; the kinds and quantity of goods from Foçateyn increasingly started to make their way into international markets as incorporation intensified. Goods that had been monitored under Ottoman provisionism were now listed as export goods. In addition to that, although many different goods were now included in the international trade, 'leaks' still existed in the Ottoman economy in the form of smuggling and piracy. Therefore the export volume was in fact larger than it appears in the Ottoman archives. These factors suggest that there was pressure from international markets to extract more from the economy. This pressure of growth is evident both in the activities of smuggling and piracy, as well in the population growth.

The return of growth and incorporation after a brief interruption during the Napoleonic Wars in Europe seems to have had a peculiar effect on the county of Foçateyn. Compared to previous periods, Ottoman archival material about the early 19th century Foçateyn includes frequent reports on piracy and smuggling. A series of imperial edicts, *hatt-ı hümayûn*, written between 1822 and 1826 shows how frequent piracy was around Foçateyn and how concerned the Ottoman centre was about this presence. Pirates raided small trade convoys and attacked peasants in and around Foçateyn. Many observers, including the British consulate, reported heavy presences of pirates[88] and noted that the pirates had even threatened Ottoman ships. Guards and watchmen of the Eski Foça castle first noted a major presence (twelve ships and several accompanying lighters and boats) of pirates in 1822. Pirates were moving between the harbours of Foçateyn, Izmir and Chios.[89] Soon after in 1823, a pirate attack on boats carrying goods destined for Istanbul (*der' âliyye*) was reported. The boats were loaded at Midilli (Μυτιλήνη) island and shipped soap and olive oil for the domestic demand. Pirates were reported to have killed the whole crew and the passengers, and then they confiscated the goods.[90] In 1823, pirates sailed between

[88] BOA, HAT, 867/38587, (Hicrî 16/R/1237).
[89] BOA, HAT, 867/38587, (Hicrî 16/R/1237).
[90] BOA, HAT, 872/38768-A, (Hicrî 29/Z/1241).

Foçateyn and Çandarlı bay (located northeast of Eski Foça) and were stationed on Orak Island close to Eski Foça. In the same year, the people of Foçateyn attacked the pirates because of the discontent and insecurity they created. The pirates were defeated and their sizeable loot was seized by the head of the Eski Foça castle guard.[91]

The regular presence of pirates in Foçateyn created a major issue in 1824. A local guardsman fell from his horse onto his weapon out of panic and killed himself when "Ottoman Greek"[92] pirate boats trespassed in front of the castle of Eski Foça. Meanwhile, a group of people who were at the castle of Eski Foça at the time reacted to this event and agitated for people to attack "peaceful and loyal" Ottoman Greek farmers of the county.[93] Some five people headed the angry mob and they killed some Ottoman Greek farmers in Eski Foça, caused damage to their property and looted their belongings. Other Ottoman Greek residents panicked and some fled to surrounding towns. The security forces of the county knew that if they made an open move against the heads of the mob they would escape and become bandits who would further disturb the peasants. Therefore they gathered a small force of soldiers from nearby settlements and went to Foçateyn with the ostensible mission of rooting out the pirates who were living on the islands near Eski Foça and had caused the chain of events in the first place. However, the expedition's true aim was to capture the mob. In the end, the small expedition attacked the pirates and mob leaders at the same time, but some mob leaders managed to escape. The effects of the event lasted until 1826 and the remaining escapees of the angry mob were finally caught and executed. The Ottoman administration facilitated security and compensated the Ottoman Greek farmers for their losses.[94] Ultimately, the authorities were able to defeat the pirates and sustain agricultural production with a single move.

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[91] BOA, HAT, 872/38758-A, (Hicrî 29/Z/1241).
[92] The only document that refers to pirate boats in this event as belonging to the Rum (*rum usatının*), that is the 'Ottoman Greek renegades', is: BOA, HAT, 872/37758, (Hicrî 29/Z/1241). Usually, pirates are described as '*eşkiya*' or '*izbandud*' meaning bandits or pirates and they consist of all kinds of people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
[93] BOA, HAT, 872/37758, (Hicrî 29/Z/1241).
[94] BOA, HAT, 872/38758, (Hicrî 29/Z/1241).

All these events in Foçateyn are manifestations of a dimension of the struggle between market forces and the Ottoman centre. Of course, there are many reasons why piracy existed in the Aegean and not all of these are related to incorporation. However, the presence of pirates and the fact that they stole popular export commodities such as soap, olive oil and grains show us that they acted as 'leaks' in the Ottoman economy. Both the forces of the market and the Ottoman centre tried to control the flow of goods and both tried to extract more from the local economy. In the cases mentioned above, the pirates appear as agents of incorporation.[95] However, it is important to highlight that the line between agents of the market and agents of the Ottoman centre were never very clear and always permeable. Merchants, artisans, bureaucrats, pirates and peasants all became both benefactors and victims of economic competition at different times. This does not deny the fact that competition was there. The existence of intense pirate activity is proof of the world markets' demand to extract more than what the capitulary agreements allowed for.

There is no accurate source for Ottoman demographics in the modern sense of the word before the late 19th century. Those that existed before the late Ottoman population censuses were rather arbitrary estimates and even the late Ottoman censuses were highly problematic and geographically varied in accuracy. So the information we have about the population of the county of Foçateyn is scattered. One early estimate about the population of Foçateyn is from *Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri* (the Financial Register of Anatolian Provinces) dating from 1530.[96] The register does not provide population data but does discuss the number of households in Foçateyn. Based on this register, Foçateyn seems to have had some 1,036 residents in the 16th century.[97] Over the centuries, Foçateyn grew steadily and by the 19th

[95] Another interesting case is that of the cooperation between a certain British merchant Panayot (who might have been an Ottoman Greek with a British passport) and a certain captain who smuggled salt from Foça in 1857. Ottoman officers realized this and they issued penalties for the smugglers. See: BOA, MKT.MHM. 117/52, (Hicrî 1/S/1274), 21 September 1857.

[96] *Defter-i Hâkânî, 166 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri*, (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1995), 38.

[97] The method employed here to make an estimate is based on the method used by Ömer Lütfü Barkan. Barkan multiplies the number of *hane*s (households) with 5 and adds a 10% for towns and a 20% for cities in order to account for non-counted members of the population. For the numbers he presented for the 16th century

century it started to expand rapidly. The earliest 19th century census data about Foçateyn dates from 1835, and is based on the accounts of a British traveller named William J. Hamilton. Hamilton estimated that there were one thousand households (approximately 5,500 people) residing in Eski Foça alone. He noted that around four hundred of those households (approximately 2,200 people) consisted of Ottoman Greeks.[98] Muslims constituted a majority until then.

From then on, throughout the 19th century, the population of Foçateyn rapidly and regularly grew, reaching 11,730 in 1884 and increasing to 16,985 in 1899.[99] Throughout the 19th century, changes in the Muslim population were negligible. On the other hand, the Ottoman Greek population was almost four times that of the Muslims by the end of the century. In 1899, there were 3,597 Muslims and 12,955 Ottoman Greeks residing in the county of Foçateyn.[100] Since we know from the income registers (*temettuat defterleri*) that the majority of sharecroppers were Ottoman Greeks, the growth of their population can be explained by the increase in demand for higher volume production or a need for more free labour in the new fields of the economy. After all, Muslims were predominantly small land holding peasants in Foçateyn. However, most of the peasants on the Aegean islands around Foçateyn were landless. They would travel whenever there was economic pressure for higher agricultural output or demand for workers and day labourers. The growth of export-oriented activities at the port of Eski Foça and the growth of the salt trade in the county were the two principal new economic fields in the late 19th century, and both increased the demand for free labour. These activities were most visible and dominant in the second half of the 1800s, but their emergence began in the early 19th century when the rise of global capitalism started to take hold in the Ottoman economy. A good example of this is reflected in the early documents concerning the emergence of

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Ottoman population see: Cem Behar, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun ve Türkiye'nin Nüfusu 1500-1927*, Vol. II, (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1996), 5.

[98] William John Hamilton, *Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus and Armenia: with some account of their antiquities and geology,* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1842), 59.

[99] These population numbers were derived from the provincial almanacs of Aydın dating from1884 and 1899 respectively. See: *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1884 (Hicrî: 1301), 105-107 and *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1899 (Hicrî: 1317), 214.

[100] For the source see: *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1899 (Hicrî: 1317), 214.

the salt business in Foçateyn.

Salt had been produced in the county ever since it replaced alum production. The earliest record of the salt mines and saltpans (*memlaha*) in Foçateyn in the 19th century suggests that they belonged to an Islamic pious foundation (*vakıf*) named *Sadrazam Hacı Ahmet Paşa Vakfı* until 1831. From then on, the salt mine of Foçateyn, together with others, were brought back under the control of the treasury in order to finance the costs of the new army (*Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye*).[101] After this date, salt mines were under state ownership and were rented by auction to those (*mültezim*) willing to pay its taxes in installments for the right to tax farm. A *reis*, the leader, some *memur*, and the bureaucrats ran the salt mines and seasonal workers worked there. A Muslim *mültezim* owned the right to tax farming and Ottoman Greek leaders (*reis*) ran the mines.[102] This structure was preserved until the Second Constitutional era when salt production was modernized. In 1864 the building of a series of new depots (*anbar*) was commissioned as a result of the increasing demand for salt.[103] As we will see next in the age of imperialisms, the salt business was about to explode. This early growth constituted a pull factor for the county and contributed to its demographic growth by attracting migration.

In conclusion, the rise of global capitalism brought about the changes that caused Eski Foça's emergence as a boomtown after the 1850s. In this period, small landholding peasantry, who were dominated by Muslim residents of the county, existed together with the big farms and a large pool of landless sharecropping workers that was dominated by the Ottoman Greeks of the county. These structures, especially the perseverance of small landholding peasantry and the migration of landless sharecroppers created the basis on which the economic changes of the late 19th century boomtown took place. The economy of the county of Foçateyn provided both for the domestic Ottoman market and for the international markets. And of course both the Ottoman centre and international markets wanted to extract more from the economy of the county. The introduction of capitulary agreements gave European

[101] BOA, C.ML, 91/4122, (Hicrî 2/B/1247). The date is 7 December 1831.
[102] BOA, A.MKT. DV., 156/33, (Hicrî 17/N /1276) and BOA, A.MKT.NZD., 174/91, (Hicrî 22/R /1272), are two good examples of this structure.
[103] BOA, İ.MVL., 504/22803, (Hicrî 26/L/1280). The date is 4 April 1864.

traders the advantage, however, and world markets demanded more and made use of the 'leaks' in the Ottoman economy. Piracy and smuggling, which had already long existed, increased in size and influence. Foça's islands and coves became frequent sanctuaries for pirates. The growth of port-cities such as Izmir did not negatively affect Foçateyn or have an impact on its importance and population. On the contrary, Foçateyn's population grew and its central town Eski Foça gradually became a larger port. Foçateyn also attracted migration with its economic growth. Eski Foça harbour's naturally protected position, its proximity to Izmir, the availability of a landless workforce and the diversity of the county's agricultural output gave it the chance to grow into a major port-town in the region.

The Age of Imperialisms and the rise of Eski Foça as a Boomtown, 1870s-1914

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the world was almost entirely dominated by a few European countries through colonization or various forms of economic or political control. Capitalism and 'Western' ideas reached the furthest corners of the globe. This was also a period of relative peace among the Great Powers, namely the industrialized European states, and that brought ever more industrial growth and spread capitalism. In this period, the American and German economies emerged as competitors to the Britain and France.[104] Competition among these rival capitalisms, that is, imperialist competition, or the age of imperialisms, became a major agent of change in the incorporated areas of the world. This was also true for the coastal areas of the Ottoman Empire where the effects of incorporation were felt the most in this period.

In the Ottoman Empire, however, incorporation was not able to penetrate fully, even in the coastal regions and more so in the interior, but its affects were still dramatic and at times also revolutionizing. Non-Muslim Ottoman merchants played a dual role at this stage. They were both the agents of incorporation and the obstacles before full incorporation. 'The major obstacle that the Europeans faced on the coast was their inability to penetrate to local networks that controlled commodity movements on the

[104] For further reading, see: Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire 1875-1914* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

ground'.[105] The 'locally-embedded character' and the economic diversification of Ottoman merchants allowed them to stay competitive on the coast, and they distributed their risks by investing in various fields. The merchants of the Ottoman Empire, most of whom were non-Muslim Ottomans, its urban bourgeoisie, were the obstacles preventing the full penetration of European merchants. These merchants "...functioned as a usurer group in the hinterland, traded in cash crops for the world economy, and invested in urban manufacturing and real estate. This experience set the Ottoman coastal firms apart from their counterparts in the West, where the economic rationale had been to dominate a global commodity market or an entire domestic economic sector with state support and/or capital accumulation'.[106]

Ottoman merchants' diversified investments transformed port-towns in their proximity, and towns such as Jaffa, Haifa, Mersin, Samsun and Eski Foça grew and became serious alternatives to other port-cities in this period. The emergence of Eski Foça as a boomtown is both related to this kind of merchant investment (in real estate and in the salt trade) and to the increasing demand and volume of export-oriented trade in the port of Eski Foça. In this period, the economy, demography and the spatial structure of Eski Foça changed dramatically. Eski Foça became a busy port-town with ever more investment and growth until its demise in the spring of 1914 right before the outbreak of World War I. The explosion of the salt business, the expansion of the volume of commerce at Eski Foça's port and the real estate investments of merchants from Izmir opened up new fields in the economy of Foçateyn. In the age of imperialisms, more goods made it to international markets from Eski Foça. The expanding economy demanded more labour and so it attracted more migration. The population of Foçateyn increased almost five fold from the 1830s to 1914. Ottoman Foça had a population of 23,180 according to the Ottoman population census of 1914.[107] Today, according to the population census of 2011, modern day district of Foça has some 32,476[108] residents. Almost a hundred years ago when the demographic density was much lower compared to contemporary Turkey,

[105] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 38.
[106] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 38.
[107] See: Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 174.
[108] See: http://www.foca.gov.tr/default_B0.aspx?content=250

Foçateyn in its boom era was nearly as big as the district of Foça in contemporary times.

The growth of Foçateyn had been at the expense of the control of the Ottoman centre. As has been presented in the history of the county so far, as Foçateyn moved from being the hub of an agrarian empire to the incorporated boomtown of a world economy Ottoman financial control weakened. In this way, more and more commodities found their way out of the Ottoman command economy. Foçateyn's growth, or any other port-city's or port-town's growth for that matter, did not necessarily harm the Ottoman economy in all regards but it dissolved the financial grasp of the Ottoman centre and thus undermined its power. Especially since the era of modern reforms in the 19th century, the Ottoman centre constantly sought to increase its consolidation in the peripheries in order to extract more from its human resources and economy. As a result, the centre introduced numerous reforms to centralize its rule. However, at the same time the Ottomans had to wage expensive and major wars in the defence of their shrinking empire. They needed money faster than the reforms would yield in the long run. In order to find the credits they needed, Ottomans had to 'learn to live with' capitalism, rich port-cities and creditors that constituted the 'habitat' in which credit became available. The money was raised in Europe, not on the incorporated Ottoman coast, but the European economies demanded and needed sustenance of incorporation in order to provide credit. In a sense, the Ottomans had to tolerate 'incorporation' in some instances although they realized the dangers of doing so. This is indeed reminiscent of the dilemma that all modern states fell into once they tried to improve their war-making capabilities without having the tax base needed to pull together the funds. Reliance on foreign capital and the ability to borrow became key to the success of war making capabilities and the centre had to make sacrifices.[109] The nineteenth century witnessed phases of loss of Ottoman financial control and the increasing foreign dependency of the Ottoman centre. Subsequent major wars, expensive reforms that yielded slow returns, mismanagement of economic resources and peripheralisation in the world economy (or the world system) led to an ever-growing dependency on debt, imports and

[109] For a detailed discussion of this process see: Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, (Cambridge Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 84-91.

expenses. Finally, the Ottomans declared bankruptcy in 1875 due to their inability to pay their ever-growing debt as the economy deteriorated. They had to allow[110] for the establishment of a body called the *Osmanlı Duyun-u Umumiye-i Osmaniye Varidat-ı Muhassasa İdaresi* (Ottoman Public Debt Administration, OPDA)[111] in 1881 that collected taxes in return for the Ottoman external debt.

The establishment of an OPDA branch in Foçateyn was a milestone for the county, as it represents the considerable loss of Ottoman financial control and power in the age of imperialisms. The establishment of the local OPDA in Eski Foça and its operations and investments transformed the county. In this way, it can be seen that a total of four major events transformed Foçateyn in the age of imperialisms. These were the expansion of (mostly export-oriented) economic activity, the establishment of the OPDA, the change in the county's demography and the changes in its spatial structure.

A Demonstrative Case of Economic Expansion: The Salt Business in Eski Foça

The salt business in Foçateyn exploded in the age of imperialisms. The volume of salt production and the volume of its exports both grew considerably in the second half of the 19th century. Between the 1870s and 1880s, salt was considered the principal export commodity of the county.[112] Many types of marble products and millstones were produced for the domestic market[113] but in particular grains and grapes were exported to a greater extent in this period. Towards the end of the century, around

[110] The OPDA was established as an autonomous institution instead of being put under direct European control, and this, to some extent, was advantageous for the Ottomans. For the process of the establishment of the OPDA see: Murat Birdal, *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 6.
[111] For a seminal work on the OPDA see: Birdal, *The Political....*
[112] In the Aydın provincial almanac of 1876, salt production is presented as the principal economic activity of the county of Foçateyn. The mining of various stones in quarries is second to the salt trade. *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1876 (Hicrî: 1296), 100.
[113] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1876 (Hicrî: 1296), 100.

1895, grapes became the principal export commodity of the county.[114] So growth was visible in a variety of sectors including but not limited to salt. The production and trade of salt had always been a large part of the county's economic activity and as a steady indicator of booming growth, which ended in 1914.

As seen above, the volume of the salt business expanded with the rise of global capitalism. To underline once more, salt mines, saltpans, facilities of production and facilities of storage were all owned by the state and they were rented to tax farmers (*mültezim*) with an auction. Leaders (*reis*) and bureaucrats (*memur*) ran both the saltpans (*memlahal*) and the depots (*anbar*) that stored the salt. Salt was produced seasonally, and this required the short-term employment of unskilled labour. However, the maintenance of saltpans, mills and the transport of salt from the mines or saltpans to depots and from depots to the port of Eski Foça created year-round employment. The tax farmers of the salt business in Foçateyn consisted of both Ottoman Muslims and Ottoman Greeks. The little existing archival data suggests, however, that more and more tax farmers were non-Muslims towards the end of the century[115] and it seems that tax farmers employed local Ottoman Greeks as the leaders (*reis*) of their mines and depots. There seems to have been few problems among these groups except for few cases of disputes over payments and shares. As a whole, the salt business created employment opportunities for many workers, and both Ottoman Muslims and Ottoman Greeks were employed together in different stages of the commodity chain.[116]

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[114] In the Aydın provincial almanacs of 1895 and 1898, grapes are presented as the principal export commodity. See: *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1895 (Hicrî: 1313), 258 and *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1898 (Hicrî: 1316) 226-227.

[115] Berber shows that the Karavokire family rented the largest extraction sites (the Çamaltı and Ada salt pools) in the region at the time. See: Berber, 'Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde Foça Kazası', in *Geçmişten Günümüze Foça: Uluslararası Sempozyum*, (Ankara: Yayımevi A.Ş., 1997) 40.

[116] CAMS (Center of Asia Minor Studies, Athens), Νικόλας Τσάκαλος interview, 25/2/1960, Athens and also EBOHC (Engin Berber Oral Historical Collection), Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31/8/1995 and also EBOHC, Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, Menemen, 4/10/1997. All these testimonies state that the salt business of Foçateyn was mixed and that both Muslims and non-Muslims worked at different levels.

Two types of salt were produced in Foçateyn: sea salt (*deniz tuzu*) and rock salt (*kaya tuzu*). For both types of salt there were four main stages in the commodity chain: extraction, maintenance, transfer and storage. The sea salt was extracted more often and in much greater volume compared to rock salt, and there is little information about the details of the extraction of rock salt from salt mines in the county (especially around Yeni Foça) which was then shipped from the port of Eski Foça.

Sea salt was produced in saltpans built on marshes by the coast. In some parts of the county where there was no direct access to seawater, it was extracted from wells with the help of windmills on the shore (2-3 mills per pool) and directed to pools through ditches. When possible, seawater was channelled into the pools and the water was left to dry from April to August until it became crystalized by the dry north-westerly winds known as *Meltem*. Later the salt slabs were broken up with shovels and loaded into wool sacks. Throughout this process, the ditches and pools were constantly maintained.[117] Once the salt was produced it was carried to Eski Foça port with barges, lighters or camels depending on the location of production, where it was then stored in depots (*anbar*), silos and sometimes also out in the open.

According to Salaheddin bey, the Ottoman Imperial commissioner of the International Exposition of 1867 in Paris, the salt of Foçateyn was the most famous salt in the Ottoman Empire. The salt extraction sites of Çandarlı, Kuşadası, Menemen, Çamaltı, Adatepe (or Ada), Karabaş, Panaya-Thodori, Kozanlı, Söğüt, Kalayhöyük, Şakran, Kazıklı, Karareis and Gülbahçe were all overseen by the administration in Eski Foça. The annual salt production of the county of Foçateyn was approximately 42 million tons and that increased to 56 million tons with the salt production of sites that were administrated in Eski Foça. Salaheddin bey stated that the salt required very little processing and was widely consumed in domestic and international markets. The salt produced at Çamaltı and Adatepe, the two most productive salt extraction sites, was sold on the international market. The salt was loaded onto ships in the port of Eski

[117] CAMS, Τάσος Γιάνναρης interview, 25/9/1964, Athens and CAMS, Θανάσης Παπουτσής interview, 24/2/1960, Athens.

Foça because the shallow waters surrounding the extraction sites made it impossible to bring ships close to shore.[118]

Production sites for salt were spread around the county and sometimes extended beyond its boundaries. As noted above, from the mid-19th century onwards, in addition to Foçateyn's own salt pools (in Çamaltı and Ada[119]) extraction sites such as Ali Ağa, Çandarlı[120] and Kazanlı[121] were administrated as parts of Foçateyn (*mülhakat*) although they lay outside the county. Even when the salt was produced and stored outside Foçateyn, it was also brought to Eski Foça port to be shipped out. For instance Çandarlı and Ali Ağa, two central towns outside the county of Foçateyn which were administered by Foçateyn, had their own salt mines and depots[122] but the salt produced there was transported to the Eski Foça port. In this way, Eski Foça, as the centre of the county of Foçateyn, served as the focal point of the salt business in and around it. Merchants who wanted to buy salt for external markets docked at Eski Foça port and had the salt transferred to their ships with lighters and barges or sometimes by day labourers if the ship was able to dock directly at the wharf. Not all business was international, however, and salt was also sold on the Ottoman domestic market after being brought from Eski Foça to Menemen by camels. Menemen had a train station and from there the salt was distributed to the rest of the Empire along the railroad network, which was rather limited at the time.[123]

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[118] Salaheddin Bey, *La Turquie à l'Exposition universelle de 1867*, (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1867), 72-74.
[119] BOA, MVL, 697/45, (Hicrî 11/L/1281).
[120] BOA, ŞD, 566/5 (Hicrî 10/Ş/1302).
[121] This document suggests that Kazanlı's salt extraction sites were administrated under Foçateyn. See: BOA, MVL, 672/23, (Hicrî 11/Za/1280).
[122] BOA, İ.DH., 792/64315,(Hicrî 18/L/1296).
[123] Berber, 'Mütareke ve Yunan...', 40.

[Picture: Yeni Foça Windmills on the shore. It is likely that these boats were used to deliver the salt and other goods from Yeni Foça. Source**:** Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 168.**]**

The establishment of the OPDA branch after the Ottoman default in 1881 immediately expanded the already growing salt business in Foçateyn. After the bankruptcy, revenues from the salt business were ceded to the OPDA until the debt was liquidated. This meant that the salt business in the county of Foçateyn was under the control of the OPDA, and this had immediate repercussions. Naturally, the OPDA tried to expand the salt trade and increase its revenues, so the OPDA invested in modern infrastructure in order to optimize profits. In this way, the salt trade reached its 'golden age' after the coming of the administration. Initially, in 1885, two additional salt depots (*anbar*) were built in Eski Foça to store the increasing amount

of salt that was produced in the saltpans (*memlaha*)[124] and in 1893, salt from Foçateyn was exported as far as India and Sri Lanka (*Seylan*)[125]. Around the same time, Japan, France and countries around the Black Sea also became export destinations for Foça's salt.[126] Twelve years after the establishment of the OPDA, in 1893 salt from Eski Foça was awarded a medal at the famous Chicago World's Fair, indicating just how important salt was as a good that the Empire exported.[127] In 1898, the OPDA decided to make investments to expedite delivery of the salt from Foçateyn to European markets. First it would be shipped from Eski Foça to Selanik (Thessaloniki), the most developed port-city in the Ottoman Balkans, and from there it would be shipped by train to Europe. Additionally, the OPDA decided to build a depot so the salt could be stored between transfers.[128] As the salt business of Foçateyn constantly expanded under the administration of the OPDA, more and more labourers moved from near and afar to the county to fill the ever-increasing need for a workforce.

[124] BOA, ŞD., 566/17, (Hicrî 10/Ş/1302). The date is 25 May 1885.
[125] BOA, BEO, 209/15657, (Hicrî 12/Za/1310). The date is 28 Mayis 1893.
[126] CAMS, Νικόλας Τσάκαλος interview, 25/2/1960, Athens.
[127] BOA, YA. Hus, 288/55, (Hicrî 10/B /1311).
[128] See: BOA, BEO, 1126 /84432, (Hicrî 28/Z /1315), BOA, ŞD, 374/36 (Hicrî 17/L /1315) and BOA, İ.ML., 26 /1315//Z-18, (Hicrî 18/Z /1315).



[**Picture:** The two large buildings on the visible side of the peninsula are two of the four salt depots in Eski Foça. The other two are located on the opposite side of the peninsula. Two minarets and a church tower can be seen on the same peninsula. The neighbourhood that stretches along the shore in the bottom of the picture is a relatively new Ottoman Greek neighbourhood (1913). Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 6.]

[Picture: A close-up of a salt depot in Eski Foça. Author's collection, Eski Foça 1960s.]

The importance of the salt business is undisputedly evident in the data about the volume of production. According to the Aydın provincial almanacs, the annual production of salt was around 80-90 million kilograms in the year of 1893[129] and this number climbed to 120-130 million kilograms in 1908.[130] The OPDA had an annual profit of around 300,000 lira from the salt business in 1902[131]. According to Berber's research, there were around 52 salt pools under the administration of Foçateyn. He also confirms that the OPDA's annual profit from the business was 300,000 lira and he adds that a single family named Karavokire who paid an annual rent of 4,000 lira rented all of the salt pools from the Ottoman state.[132] It is highly unlikely, however, that a single family ran all of the salt production in the region for a long time. In fact,

[129] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1893 (Hicrî: 1311), 214.
[130] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1908 (Hicrî: 1326), 166.
[131] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1902 (Hicrî: 1320), 166.
[132] Berber, 'Mütareke ve Yunan...', 40. Footnote 84 of Berber's work indicates the amount of money the family is said to have paid for rent.

documents in the Ottoman archives indicate more than one name associated with the production facilities.[133] Thanasis Papoutsis (Θανάσης Παπουτσής), an old resident of Eski Foça, also recalls that the salt mines were in the hands of (Ottoman) Greeks but they were owned by the state (and managed by the OPDA).[134] Ottoman Greeks, however, were not always the only renters of the salt mines. In fact, as it was shown in the discussion of earlier stages of incorporation, there were numerous Muslim renters as well. Nevertheless Berber's example, the Ottoman archives and the oral testimony show that non-Muslims started to become dominant in the salt business towards the end of the 19th century in the age of imperialisms.

The salt business of Foçateyn was critical both for the local economy and the world economy at large. Its status later became a matter of discussion when the Ottoman Empire was on the brink of collapse after World War I in 1920. The Treaty of Sèvres, an imperialist document that aimed to establish zones of influence for the Allied Powers and their satellite states on the territories of the defeated Ottoman Empire, discussed the salt mines of Foçateyn in article 81. According to the article, the salt mines of Phocea (Foçateyn) belonged to the OPDA although the region at large was left under the control of the Greek state. The salt trade in and around Foçateyn was to be immune to any interference by the Greek authorities.[135] The OPDA was given the lion's share of the local economy and the Greek state was only permitted to run the much smaller salt business around Izmir (Smyrna). One of these 'salt marshes [saltpans] of Phocea' that the Treat of Sèvres mentions, which is the saltpans of Çamaltı, is of great importance to the Turkish economy even today. Çamaltı had always been active since the start of the salt business in Foçateyn and it always yielded the highest quality sea salt. Today Çamaltı saltpan is Turkey's first and the world's second biggest sea salt mine with an annual production capacity of 500,000-550,000 tons of salt.[136]

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[133] For instance, a document from 1861 mentions a certain Halil Efendi as the renter (*mültezim*) of the Foçateyn salt mines and Hacı Yorgaki Efendi (an Ottoman Greek) as the leader (*reis*) of the mines. See: BOA, A.MKT.DV., 185/50, (Hicrî 5/N/1277) and BOA, A.MKT.DV., 169/47, (Hicrî 24/S/1277).
[134] CAMS, Θανάσης Παπουτσής interview, 24/2/1960, Athens.
[135] http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260
[136] www.turkiyetuz.com/deniz/camalti.asp

[Picture: Çamaltı Salt Pools. Source: Google Earth, 2013**]**

But salt was not the only commodity of Foçateyn that was in high demand when its economy was expanding. Foçateyn produced three types of grapes and as it is understood from a French booklet about Anatolian commerce, they were considered to be a prime export commodity towards the end of the century[137]. Grape production was important for the Empire as a whole as well. According to the provincial almanacs of the province of Aydın, some 13,383 *dönüm* (app. 36,500,000 square meters) of land was used for grape production in Foçateyn, and these grapes were later exported.[138] One fourth of the all arable land in the county of Foçateyn was used

[137] According to a catalogue of the commercial and industrial professions of Izmir, in the year of 1895 and 1986, purple grapes of various types (small, big, seedless and seeded) were the most important export goods of Eski Foça and Yeni Foça. See: Jacob de Andria, *Indicateur des Professions Commerciales & Industrielles de Smyrne, de l'Anatolie etc.*, (Smyrne: Imprimerie Commerciale Timoni, 1895), 104 and Jacob de Andria, *Indicateur des Professions Commerciales et Industrielles de Smyrne, de l'Anatolie, des Côtes, des Îles etc.*, (Smyrne: Imprimerie Commerciale Timoni, 1896), Chapter 2, 45-46.

[138] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1893 (Hicrî: 1311), 213.

for grape growing in this period[139] and grapes were also used for alcoholic beverage production, the products of which were also exported. In the year of 1892, 333,588 *kıyye* (app. 428,000 kg) of *rakı* and 32,424 *kıyye* (app. 42.000 kg) of wine were produced under the supervision of the local OPDA branch.[140] Needless to say, the age of imperialisms was a period of rapid and voluminous growth in the county of Foçateyn. Eski Foça became the centre of this growth and hence became a boomtown with an ever increasing population and ever changing landscape.

The *Duyun-u Umumiye* (OPDA) and the Salt Business in Eski Foça

The Decree of *Muharrem* issued by Sultan Abdülhamit II after the Ottoman bankruptcy of 1881 '...entrusted to the OPDA the direct administration, receipt, and encashment, by means of agents acting under its authority, of the revenues and other sources ceded to the service of the debt. (...) Under the terms of the decree, the revenues from the salt and tobacco monopolies, the stamps and spirits tax, the fish tax, the silk tithe of certain districts, the Bulgaria tribute, the revenue of Eastern Roumelia and the surplus of the Cyprus revenue were irrevocably ceded to the OPDA, until the debt was liquidated'.[141] The Ottomans were involved in major wars and major reform projects after the establishment of the OPDA, so the government needed money and hence borrowed more. Gradually the OPDA's '...administration of the resources of the Ottoman economy extended far beyond the assignments of the decree. Until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the OPDA functioned as a 'state within the state' controlling around one-third of state revenues.[142]

Eski Foça, was the site of a managerial office of the OPDA thanks to its close proximity to some of the important salt monopolies in the region and its role as an emerging port-town. The OPDA's managerial office supervised salt production at major extraction sites such as Çamaltı, Ali Ağa, Ada and Foça-i Cedid (New Foça).

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[139] According to Berber there were 52,806 *dönüm*s of arable land. Based on this number, areas for growing grapes accounted for the one fourth of all arable lands. See: Berber, 'Mütareke ve Yunan...', 39.
[140] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1894 (Hicrî: 1312), 274.
[141] Birdal, *The Political...* , 6-7.
[142] Birdal, *The Political...* . 7.

The annual income (for the year 1908) of the Public Debt Administration in Foçateyn was estimated to be around 300,000 lira.[143] In contrast, the municipality (*belediye*) of Eski Foça, which was established in 1874, had a very limited budget and a limited number of bureaucrats at its disposal. A total capital of 126,162 lira was commissioned to the treasury of the municipality.[144] Serçe highlights the fact that even at its recorded peak, almanacs state that the annual income of the municipality of Eski Foça (including the income from Foça-i Cedid (Yeni Foça) sub district) was 72,307 liras (in 1896). He states that after 1896, the income of the municipality decreased gradually to the level of 51,732 liras in 1902.[145] Compared to the municipality, the OPDA had greater capital, bureaucratic size and power, and as such was a major force that transformed the county.

By the time the OPDA was established, the Ottoman state had been investing in a thorough reform agenda for almost a century. In the age of imperialisms, the Ottoman countryside had already been affected by the various reforms implemented by the Ottoman state. However, especially in the case of the county of Foçateyn, the forces of the market, which was embodied in the institution of the OPDA after 1881, created more drastic effects. The process of incorporation into world markets changed Foçateyn more than the reforms of the Ottoman state. The OPDA acted as a harbinger of capitalism and thus of modernity as well. The OPDA had invested in the infrastructure of the county of Foçateyn, because it had a stake in the effective collection of taxes and the 'lawful' control of trade. It built a modern quay in Eski Foça, mediated salaries and prices, and fought smuggling.[146] Parts of the economy that previously had not been recorded or supervised, had to be 'reordered' or 'controlled'.

[143] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1908 (Hicrî: 1326), 380.
[144] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1876 (Hicrî: 1296), 98.
[145] Erkan Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti Salname ve İstatistiklerinde Foçateyn Kazası'. In *Foça Üzerine Yazılar / Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı Anısına*. (İzmir: Ati Matbaa, 1998), 18.
[146] For the various policies that were developed by the OPDA to stop smuggling see: Fatmagül Demirel, 'Osmanlı Devleti'nde Tuz Gelirlerinin Düyûn-ı Umûmiye'ye Devredilmesinden Sonra Tuz Kaçakçılığı', in *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, Issue: 1, (2002), 147-157.

The OPDA represented the agenda of the market at large. Its policies put a new social class, the port workers of the county, at odds with the administration. Workers came together to resist the OPDA's policies and this forced the Ottoman state to take sides with one or the other at times. The OPDA also triggered the creation of unexpected alliances that did not necessarily benefit incorporation or the interests of the market at large. For instance, as it will be elaborated later, the native Ottoman Greek salt business leaders (*reis*) and the Muslims who worked for the OPDA cooperated in an economic coalition against a larger merchant through their combined influence in the OPDA. The modernist and capitalist agenda of the OPDA was not necessarily at odds with the Ottoman state either. The OPDA invested in Ottoman infrastructure and employed many Muslims. The success of the Ottoman (and later Turkish) nationalists' statist policies owed a lot to the modern infrastructure and also the 'know-how' created by the OPDA experience.[147] Two sets of incidents demonstrate the dynamics of the OPDA's effects on the history of the county and the position of the Ottoman state vis a vis the OPDA. One set of these is about worker and leader (*reis*) strikes in the salt business for better pay and a change in the attitude of the Ottoman state towards them. The other one is about the formation of a coalition between some of the OPDA officers and the salt business leaders against an Eski Foça salt merchant, and that incident reflects the commercial rivalry that existed in the salt business of Foçateyn.

Workers, Artisans, Leaders (*Reis*) and the OPDA

The expansion of the salt trade lead to the creation of a sizeable amount of jobs in Foçateyn. It is logical to assume that towards the end of the 19th century, the salt business employed at least two thousand workers at a given time and more so during seasons when the workload increased. Investors rented the right to run the saltpans and mines from the state, leaders ran them and workers maintained and mined them. The salt was carried from saltpans and mines to the port of Eski Foça and from the port to the ships by a group of lighters, bargemen, boatmen or camel riders. The people who worked on the pools and mines, and those who worked in the transport

[147] Birdal, *The Political...*, 2.

were sometimes the same people. Both groups consisted of both Muslims and non-Muslims and the latter were also often migrants.

According to the testimony of Mehmet Peker, an old resident of Eski Foça, his father was a captain ("Muammer Kaptan") who ran one of some 32 boats (*kayık* or *mavna*) that carried salt from the Çamaltı salt pools to the Eski Foça salt depots. He recalls that at times Ottoman Greeks and Muslims jointly owned their boats but his family had their own. He also recalls that ten people worked in each boat.[148] Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, another old resident of Eski Foça, says that he used to work in the salt mines in the summer season. He remembered going in groups of 50-60 people together with Ottoman Greeks and noted that Ottoman Greeks and Muslims jointly owned the windmills that were used in the seawater extraction for salt production. He stated that there were no quarrels or conflict among the workers of the salt business.[149] Thanasis Papoutsis' statement confirms the other testimonies about the salt business. He recalled that at least 1000 to 1500 Ottoman Greeks from Foçateyn worked when it was time to collect the salt and said that the salt was loaded on small boats and shipped to Eski Foça.[150] Nikolas Chakalos, another old resident of Foçateyn, stated that he used to work together with Muslims at the salt pools, and that both Muslim and Ottoman Greek members of the male workforce of the salt business knew each other's languages to some extent.[151]

The OPDA tried to optimize the business in order to maximize its revenues. When the OPDA undertook efforts to optimize business in order to maximize its revenues, the first major reaction to the OPDA's policies came from the boatmen (*kayıklar amelesi*) who transferred the salt from the salt pools and mines. The salaries of the boatmen had been reduced a couple of times and it had reached 'a point of insignificance'. They also had problems in receiving their already reduced salaries. They issued their complaints to the OPDA but when they received no answer regarding proper

[148] EBOHC, Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31.8.1995.
[149] EBOHC, Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, Menemen, 4.10.1997. The interview took place in Menemen but the interviewee was born in Yeni Foça in 1323 (1905).
[150] CAMS, Θανάσης Παπουτσής interview, 24/2/1960, Athens.
[151] CAMS, Νικόλας Τσάκαλος interview, 25/2/1960, Athens.

improvements, the boatmen of Eski Foça were among the first to launch a strike (*tâtil-i eşgal*) in the salt business.

Around March of 1898, the boatmen went on strike and stopped all salt transfers. Naturally this was detrimental to the salt trade and the revenues of the OPDA. The boatmen's strike meant the immediate halt of the sale of the salt on domestic and international markets. However, since a large amount of the domestic trade was transported by human labour, the most damage was inflicted on the export-oriented salt trade. Although the OPDA was initially favourable to an increase in the salaries of the boatmen, it also tried to devise ways to bypass the boatmen and maintain operations by itself. The OPDA's local manager hired some boats and used the OPDA's own workers for the transport, showing that the OPDA could maintain the business without abiding by the 'old way of how things worked'. The result was catastrophic. Boatmen on strike attacked the workers of the OPDA and tried to destroy the boats the administration had rented, throwing stones and sticks of dynamite at them. They damaged one boat and many people were injured. The gendarme stepped in and suppressed the revolt, and ultimately the boatmen's strike was put down. Some leaders of the strike were detained.[152]

A correspondence by İhsan, the head of the Eski Foça port (*Foça Liman Reisi*), in 1898 reveals another dimension of the boatmen's strike. According to that correspondence, the people who protested the OPDA's delivery of salt despite the strike, and those who used weapons against the authorities were only the Christians of Eski Foça. The head of the port said that order had been restored and there were only few minor injuries.[153] The telegram was, in fact, a coded message sent from Eski Foça directly to the palace of Sultan Abdülhamit II in Yıldız. The telegram is very brief, however, and does not provide much detail. However, based on later correspondence,[154] we can assume that this was not a Christian-only strike. Nonetheless, it is clear that the OPDA tried to use one group of workers against the

[152] BOA, YA. HUS., 383/26, (Hicrî 06/Za/1315).
[153] BOA, Y.MTV., 175/73, (Hicrî 4 /Za /1315). The date given is 27 March 1898.
[154] BOA, YA. HUS., 383/26, (Hicrî 06/Za/1315). The date is 29 March 1898. (Especially: *Fiş* no: Y-A-HUS-1315-11-6 (piece 1) and *Fiş* no: Y-A-HUS-1315-11-6 (piece 2)).

other by employing some but not others as a strategy to break the strike. Unfortunately, there is no further information about the success of the strike, although it is likely that it failed to achieve any results against the local authorities and the OPDA. The boatmen seem to have resumed their work after some time without any improvements.

Another major wave of strikes came between 1908 and 1909, the first year of which was when the Young Turk Revolution took place. After the revolution, the suspended Ottoman constitution of 1876 was reintroduced and various opposition movements were granted amnesty. Calls for the brotherhood and union of the Empire's various elements, high hopes for the future and the liberal environment of the revolution created a small interval of time where anything seemed possible. A series of worker strikes took place across the Empire during this time period. This was a result of the inflationary pressure on the economy that mounted up to 20% in the first two months after the revolution. According to Karakışla, there were more than a hundred strikes in the first six months of the declaration of *Hürriyet* (freedom) and they were highly motivated by the harsh working conditions and low wages. These strikes were mostly isolated cases, however, and did not have a larger political agenda.[155] The workers and leaders (*reis*) of the salt business in Foçateyn also went on strikes after the Young Turk Revolution, and it was again the boatmen who started the strikes in the winter of 1908. Their terms were accepted by November of 1908 and they were given 3 *kuruş* more per tonne they carried. This time the boatmen were more successful in resisting as a whole and their strike stopped the business for a long while, creating greater losses for the OPDA, and it was their perseverance that underpinned their success.[156]

The boatmen's strike of 1908 was followed by the strike of the leaders (*reis*) of the saltpans and mines. The leaders demanded an increase of 25% for their salaries by arguing that if the boatmen's salaries were increased theirs should increase as well.

[155] Yavuz Selim Karakışla, 'The emergence of the Ottoman industrial working class, 1839-1923', in Donald Quataert and Erik Jan Zürcher (eds) *Workers and working class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish republic 1839-1950*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 19-34.
[156] BOA, DH.MKT., 2684/3, (Hicrî 1326/Za/21), the date is 15 December 1908 and also, BOA, DH.MKT., 2664/80, (Hicrî 1326/L/26), the date is 21 November 1908.

They threatened the OPDA, saying that they would go on strike unless their salaries were raised. The leaders' strike meant further interruptions of the salt trade and the OPDA knew that yet another long strike would be detrimental to business as they feared that salt purchases from foreign salt mines would be necessary in order to replenish their depleting stocks. The OPDA calculated that replacing leaders with OPDA personnel and making investments would be equally burdensome. So in the end they asked the relevant Ottoman ministries to take action with regard to the strike.[157] The correspondence between the heads in the province of Aydın and the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Dahiliye Kalemi*) reveals that in the end the leaders (*reis*) were under threat of being forcefully stripped of their rights to run the saltpans and mines[158] and as a result their strike was broken; the Ottoman state intervened on behalf of the OPDA and maintained the continuity of the salt business.

These two major strikes within ten years (the boatmen's strike of 1898 and workers' and leaders' strikes of 1908-1909) had made it clear that the salt business relied on labour-intensive methods of production and multiple intermediary leaders (*reis*) were costly and introduced new levels of risk. It was surmised that modernizing the production process could decrease dependence on human labour and in return maintain business continuity and competitiveness. Less dependence on large-scale worker employment would also mean less need of leaders (*reis*). In this way, the modernization of salt production would solve two 'problems' (high costs and the danger of strikes) at the same time. Modernization was one of the methods that the OPDA discussed at the leaders' strike of 1909 but it was found to be financially burdensome.[159] The desired change came in 1910, in the period of legal and policy changes initiated by the now restored Unionist government of the Young Turks. The Unionist had a troublesome period after the Revolution of 1908. They had to deal with the exploding demands of various groups after 'the declaration of liberty' *('hürriyetin ilânı'*), the opposition and various major international crises, and in 1909

[157] BOA, DH. MKT., 2841/27, (Hicrî 23/Ca/1327). Date of the particular document in the folder: 27 Mayıs 1325 (9 June 1909).
[158] BOA, DH. MKT., 2841/27, (Hicrî 23/Ca/1327). Date of the particular document in the folder: 27 Mayıs 1325 (9 June 1909) and BOA, DH. MKT., 2830/98, (Hicrî 14/Ca/1327), date of the particular document in the folder: 21 Mayıs 1325 (3 June 1909).
[159] BOA, DH. MKT., 2841/27, (Hicrî 23/Ca/1327).

they lost power as the result of a counter-revolution in the capital. In the same year, however, they recaptured control and initiated a swift agenda of legislation and law-making in order to consolidate their rule, crush the opposition and refashion the Empire along the lines of their revolutionary agenda. According to Zafer Toprak, between 1909 and 1913, the economic policies of the Unionists were liberal and focused on ratifying laws that promoted economic growth by equally encouraging foreign and domestic investments.[160] The Unionist government undertook modernization of the Foçateyn saltpans and mines in this period of liberal policymaking, and modernization greatly improved the production of salt while also increasing profits and competitiveness.

In fact, the modernization of the salt trade was so bold and successful that the journal *Servet-i Fünun* (*The Wealth of Knowledge*) dedicated its pages to this 'story of success'. In the issue dated the 15th of December, 1910, *Servet-i Fünun* published an article (titled 'Foça Tuzlası') about the modernization of the salt business in Foça. It praised the government for its success and gave a detailed account of the improvements. According to the journal, the government aimed to increase the competitiveness of the salt business by bringing it to the level of salt businesses in Europe. It said that before the process of modernization, 100 million tonnes[161] of salt was produced annually, 40% of which was sold on the domestic market and the remainder (60%) was exported. Even before these efforts were undertaken, it was the largest salt business in the Ottoman Mediterranean and people who came to the bay of Izmir by ship could always see the white salt mountains of Foça in the distance. The article goes on to note that the salt trade was conducted by the '*tuzcu esnafı*' (salt artisans) who did their job well but were rather expensive for the company. Since the government wanted to increase its revenues from the salt business that it rented to these '*tuzcu esnafı*', it negotiated with them and took control of the business. In turn, the '*tuzcu esnafı*' relinquished their rental rights in exchange for an 'adequate'

[160] For the different phases of the economic policies and ideas of the Young Turks see: Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Milli İktisat" (1908-1918)*, (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982), 36-68 and 165-210.

[161] This is probably an underestimation. All previous data shows that the annual production was much higher in the county of Foçateyn. However, it is plausible that this article is only talking about the Çamaltı saltpans and not the rest of the production in the county; in that case, the number could be accurate.

reimbursement.[162] In this way, the salt business became a true state monopoly that was still fully administrated and exploited by the OPDA.

Following the buyout of the salt artisans, the government initiated the modernization of the salt mines with the cooperation of an Italian engineer named Mr. Boso. A small power plant was built for electrical motors that replaced the old windmills, making it possible to pump the water more efficiently. *Decovil* (Decauville) rail lines and elevation machines were installed to move salt from one place to another. According to *Servet-i Fünun*, these modernizing developments greatly reduced the necessity for manpower and hence decreased costs. The journal argued that the profits generated after the modernization efforts would be more than enough to pay for the reimbursement of these salt artisans who had relinquished their shares. The Ottoman salt business, it was argued, would now be able to compete with the French, Italian and Spanish and state revenues would increase by thousands of lira.[163]

[162] 'Foça Tuzlası', in *Servet-i Fünun*, Vol. 40, No. 1019, (2 Kanunevvel 1326), 104-105. The date is of the issue is 15 December 1910.
[163] 'Foça Tuzlası', in *Servet-i Fünun*, Vol. 40, No. 1019, (2 Kanunevvel 1326), 104-105. The date is 15 December 1910.

فوچه ملحه‌سنده اداره‌خانه والکتریق فابریقه‌سی [مقاله‌سنه مراجعت بیورلسون]

Usines électriques aux salines de Phocée :

[**Picture:** Foça saltpans managerial office and electrical plant, 1910. Source: 'Foça Tuzlası', in *Servet-i Fünun*, Vol. 40, No. 1019, (2 Kanunevvel 1326), 100.]

فوچه مملحه‌لرندن چام آلتی مملحه‌سی و (ده‌قوویل) خطلری

Lignes Décauville aux salines de Phocée.

[**Picture:** Décauville rail lines on the Çamaltı saltpan of Foçateyn, 1910. Source: 'Foça Tuzlası', in *Servet-i Fünun*, Vol. 40, No. 1019, (2 Kanunevvel 1326), 101.]

فوچه مملحه‌لرنده طوزلرك (ده‌قوویل) واغونلریله نقلی

Une vue des salines de Phocée.

[**Picture:** Salt being loaded and transported with Décauville carts. Foça saltpans, 1910. Here we also see that there are both male and female workers working on the flats. There is no reference to the apparently mixed nature of the labour pool in the archives, and these pictures provide the only evidence for mixed labour practices. Source: 'Foça Tuzlası', in *Servet-i Fünun*, Vol. 40, No. 1019, (2 Kanunevvel 1326), 104.]

« فوچه » مملحه‌لرنده : يیغینلرك یکی اصولده الکتریقله یاپلماسی

Une vue des salines de Phocée (de nos jours).

[**Picture:** Salt being piled with the assistance of new electrical motors. Foça saltpan, 1910. Source: 'Foça Tuzlası', in *Servet-i Fünun*, Vol. 40, No. 1019, (2 Kanunevvel 1326), 104.]

With the modernization of salt production, the merchants who rented the right to run the business and their employees, the leaders (*reis*) and the workers also lost their jobs. Although some workers were still employed in the business, there was far less need for them. The last group to be affected by modernization was the boatmen, and the final chapter of the conflict between the boatmen of Eski Foça and the OPDA took place in the winter of 1912, after modernizing changes had been implemented. According to the report of the Legal Consultancy of the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âli Hukuk Müşavirliği*), shipment of salt in Eski Foça was contracted to a French

entrepreneur, Mr. Tiso, by the OPDA. The contract was issued without the consultancy and approval of the local authorities. Until that point the local boatmen of Eski Foça had been transporting the salt but Mr. Tiso started to use his own facilities and steamships that put the boatmen out of work. The report argued that a state has the right to arrange how transportation is carried out within the boundaries of its own seas and ports and argued that the Ottoman state had the same right and such a right cannot be sold or transferred to others by the will of those who have been granted those rights by the state. The report pressed for a settlement to the dispute by finding a way to employ local boatmen without removing Mr. Tiso. However, in the case of a disagreement between the boatmen and Mr. Tiso, the report urged the OPDA to pay for Mr. Tiso's damages and declared that he would be stripped of his rights by the state.[164] In this case, unlike the leaders' strike of 1909, the Ottoman state intervened on behalf of the boatmen and recognized their right to keep their jobs but the state's position did not benefit the expansion of incorporation and on the contrary, actually limited further penetration of global capital. Before continuing on to present my conclusions about the OPDA's impacts on the history of the county of Foçateyn, I would like to present another event that occurred in the 1900s that reveals yet another aspect of the effects the OPDA had on the region.

[164] BOA, HR.HMŞ.İŞO, 120/54, (Rumî 30/Ha/1330). The folder contains a set of documents with dates ranging from 1912 to 1914.

[**Picture:** Salt being piled by hand. Foça saltpan, 1910. This photograph also depicts female workers but offers no additional information about them. Source: 'Foça Tuzlası', in *Servet-i Fünun*, Vol. 40, No. 1019, (2 Kanunevvel 1326), 105.]

Salt Business Leaders (*Reis*), an OPDA officer and an Eski Foça Merchant

Today, a beautiful stone *yalı* dating from the 19th century stands on Eski Foça's Küçük Deniz (Μικρός Γιαλός) shore. The old *yalı*, which was built in the neighbourhood that expanded during the era of the economic boom, is well preserved and has been restored, and bears witness to Eski Foça's Ottoman past. Its current owners run it as a boutique hotel called Lola 38 and it is little changed from its original condition. Ioannis Fratzeskos, a wealthy merchant of Eski Foça, had the house built in 1891.[165] Nine years later, in 1900, Ioannis Frazeskos' good fortunes

[165] As a result of the Turkish Greek détente in the last decade or so, Greeks and Turks whose ancestors had been removed from their respective homelands through forced migration have started to visit their grandparent's hometowns. One such visit was that of Zacharo Fratzeskou. She visited the house of her grandfather Apostolos Fratzeskos whose father Ioannis Fratzeskos had built the aforementioned house in 1891. She left a letter to the current owners of Lola 38 of the house and I came across that letter in one of my random visits to the house. The letter says that the Fratzeskou family was

turned and he was in danger of losing his wealth and his investments in Foçateyn. His story demonstrates the way in which the OPDA acted as a medium for the establishment of an economic coalition that facilitated the 'transfer' of capital and investment from one group to another. The events reveal how the officers of the OPDA shielded established local members of the salt business of Foçateyn in their unlawful struggle against the apparently 'new comer' Mr. Frazeskos (also *Françesko Oğlu Yani* in the Ottoman correspondence).

As is discussed above, saltpans and salt mines were owned by the Ottoman state and since 1881, their operations and management had been in the hands of the OPDA. The pools and mines were then rented to tax farmers and they employed leaders (*reis* or *rüesa* pl.) who ran the mines and the saltpans. Workers were employed by the leaders, who had certain rights regarding how they ran the mines or pools. According to Mr. Frazeskos, since the establishment of the OPDA there had been some 5 or 6 officially documented sales of rights by the leaders (*reis*) who ran the salt business. The leaders sold their rights, or certain shares of their rights, and then jointly ran the pools or mines with other investors. Mr. Franzeskos himself had purchased a certain amount of shares of the Çamaltı salt pools from a man named Mr. Dimitri, who was from Izmir ('*İzmir ahalisinden çuhacı oğlu Dimitri*'), and he had been investing in the salt pools for the previous fifteen years.[166] Mr. Frazeskos and Mr. Dimitri owned the Çamaltı salt business jointly for the previous fifteen years but Mr. Frazeskos made the investments and did the actual management (*'hakk-ı riyaset'*) because he was experienced and capable whereas Mr. Dimitri was incapable (*'ehliyetsiz'*). Mr. Frazeskos was recognized as the acting manager of the Çamaltı salt business by the OPDA and he had been working in cooperation with the OPDA for the previous fifteen years.[167]

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on good terms with the Muslim residents of Eski Foça and they also had company with some important figures from Izmir. Zacharo Fratzeskou writes that Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Smyrna, who also became godfather to one of the family's children, was among the important visitors. The family is said to have left Eski Foça for good during the population exchange of 1922.

[166] BOA, ŞD., 1409/15, (Hicrî 27/Ca/1327).

[167] BOA, ŞD., 1409/15, (Hicrî 27/Ca/1327).

Mr. Frazeskos claimed that the pools were producing and exporting some 1.5 million *kıyye* of salt per year when he bought his shares and that he had brought the annual production level up to 6 million *kıyye* in 1900. He then related that this was only possible because of his huge industrial investments, repairs and constant maintenance. According to Mr. Frazeskos' claim, despite his lawful and good work, Izmir OPDA officer Mr. Hacı Şefik deprived Mr. Franzeskos of his share, rights and business (annual income) based on the unfounded and false claims made by Mr. Dimitri from Izmir. Without a word of warning, Mr. Hacı Şefik granted full rental rights to Mr. Dimitri without consideration of Mr. Frazeskos' share. According to Mr. Frazeskos, Mr. Hacı Şefik "made-up" an argument and claimed that the sale of shares of the Çamaltı salt pools that took place fifteen years prior were null and void. Mr. Frazeskos stressed that it couldn't be possible because the father of Mr. Dimitri had also obtained his rights to the salt pools in the same manner. Mr. Frazeskos argued that all his transactions were available at the registers of the Ottoman Ministry of Finance.[168]

Mr. Frazeskos' conflict with Mr. Dimitri also affected his shares in another salt pool. He was stripped of his shares there as well on the basis of the same arguments, so he applied to the OPDA's headquarters and the corruption was brought to light. He was given an order that indicated that his rights were to be returned to him unless a court order stated otherwise. However, Mr. Hacı Şefik Beğ of the OPDA office in Izmir declared that the case would be handled by the commission of conflicts *('ihtilaf meclisi'*) in Izmir. The commission decided that that leaders (*'rüesa'*) could not have rights on salt mines other than as acting masters (*'ustabaşı'*) and all the 'self-proclaimed' rights by courts or authorities were declared void. In this way, Frazeskos' earlier victory was denied and he was unable to secure his rights.

There is no information about the result of Mr. Frazeskos' legal struggle. However, the information that we have about Mr. Frazeskos' case nonetheless demonstrates the role of the OPDA as a medium of capitalist penetration in Foçateyn. In Mr. Frazeskos' case, the OPDA acted like a legal justifier of the Izmir port-city merchants' investments in the adjacent boomtown of Eski Foça. Mr. Frazeskos, the

[168] BOA, ŞD., 1409/15, (Hicrî 27/Ca/1327).

town merchant who carried out the actual work and investments for years, struggled to keep his investment from being taken away by an economic coalition based in Izmir.

Final Words about the OPDA in Foçateyn

In conclusion, the OPDA acted as one of the major forces of change in the age of imperialisms in Foçateyn. It acted as an agent of global markets and thus undermined Ottoman economic power in the county. However, it also brought growth and development. The boatmen strikes revealed the limits of the OPDA's penetration into the local economy, and in the case of later strikes, the Ottoman state intervened in favour of the boatmen in order to sustain local order. In the case of the salt business leaders' strike, the Ottoman state intervened in favour of the OPDA and maintained salt exports. As for Mr. Frazeskos the OPDA acted as a medium through which urban interests were bargained vis-à-vis local interests, the global market and the centre. The local merchant Mr. Frazeskos applied to the Sultan's justice to save his investments from the grasp of Izmir city merchants, and in this situation, the OPDA acted against local interests.

Overall the OPDA experience empowered centrifugal processes that were brought about by incorporation into capitalism. The age of imperialism in Foçateyn occurred at a time when the Ottoman state derived the least amount of financial benefit from the county. In other words, the OPDA's economic and political strength dwarfed that of the Ottoman state in Foçateyn. At times, the local agents of this period, who were the workers, leaders and the Ottoman bureaucrats of the OPDA, became an obstacle to the further penetration of capitalism. However, they also benefitted from the prosperity and jobs brought about by incorporation and thus became a part of it. At the same time, the OPDA's investments and management expanded the salt business and established the infrastructure and know-how for the same business in the future. The OPDA also acted as an institution which educated the future bureaucrats of the nationalist re-centralization under the rule of the Unionists and the Kemalists because it employed Muslims. As a result of the establishment of the OPDA, the already growing volume of trade in Foçateyn increased even more, which triggered

demographic and spatial transformations in the county. The effects of these transformations were most visible in Eski Foça, the largest and most central town in the county, and these transformations in themselves acted as forces that affected the way people lived.

Chapter II

Modernizing the Ottoman State

State-sponsored efforts geared towards modernisation in Foçateyn were not a direct reaction to the penetration of capitalism. The Ottomans had been initiating various agendas of reform by the time the economy started to become incorporated into world markets, so in this way, modernisation carried out by the state had begun earlier than modernization by market forces. The Ottomans were aware of the effects of the transformation that was triggered by the market and they responded in a variety of ways. At times growth and modernization brought on by incorporation triggered more control and did not necessarily entail the loss of Ottoman control in incorporated areas. Seen in this way, the Ottoman authorities were not passive actors in the face of the changes caused by incorporation. Despite the oft-repeated passive image of the Ottoman government propagated by Orientalist discourses, we see that there was a balance of power between early modern Europe and the early modern Ottoman Empire. In a recent study, Merlijn Olnon demonstrates this by analysing the development of Izmir, a principal port-city in the Ottoman Empire. He argues 'that there existed a delicate equilibrium during most of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries within which two separate systems – with their own distinct histories, realities, attitudes and policies – continuously and meticulously wrestled each other for influence in all spheres. And that in the end, but only in the end (say from 1850), it became most probable that the West would beat the rest'. [169]

In the long run, incorporation entailed a weakening of Ottoman rule in incorporated areas, and the Ottoman authorities comprehended the full effects of incorporation, European financial pressures and dependency only much later, towards the end of the 19th century. The forces of capitalism, made tangible by the process of incorporation, became one of the centrifugal forces that weakened the centre from the perspective of

[169] Merlijn Olnon, *Brought under the law of the land: The history, demography, and geography of crossculturalism in early modern Izmir, and the Köprülü project of 1678*, (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2013), 229.

the late Ottoman imperial bureaucrats and had to be 'dealt' with. Nevertheless, there were also times when the state made use of the process of incorporation. Ottomans interplayed Great Power imperialisms and the actors of incorporation to the point at which the survival of the Empire was at stake at the end of the age of imperialisms. In short, the dawn of the 20th century witnessed a clash between Great Power imperialisms and the Ottoman Empire. A dimension of this clash could be seen between the forces of the global market and the forces of the state. Incorporated areas such as Foçateyn which had been shaped and transformed by the forces of global markets and the modernizing state now had to be controlled by one or the other. When World War I started, Ottoman rule and incorporation were no longer mutually inclusive in the eyes of the Great Powers or in the eyes of Ottoman nationalists.

The reasons why Ottoman nationalists saw incorporation (and incorporated areas like Foçateyn) as a problem is a question that I will deal in the subsequent sections of this dissertation. Here, I look at the period before the transition that brought on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Republic of Turkey. My aim is to show how the Ottoman agenda of reforms transformed the county of Foçateyn in a manner that parallels the transformation caused by incorporation. In order to do that I will focus solely on the way the Ottoman centre produced knowledge about the county of Foçateyn. In doing so, my aim is to show two things. First, I want to demonstrate that the Ottoman centre's reforms resulted in a better understanding and control of the county of Foçateyn. This will be instrumental in my subsequent discussion of the transition from Empire to nation state. Without such control and bureaucratic know-how, the Ottoman authorities wouldn't have been able to mobilize their resources for the (re)centralization of incorporated areas such as Foçateyn in the face of imperialist challenges. In this way, the presence of the state in the Empire grew with the reforms. That growth required an increase in control and production of knowledge, which demanded a larger bureaucracy and thus more bureaucrats. As a result, the state reproduced and expanded its role as the source of wealth in the society.[170] Employment in modern bureaucracy became an alternative to employment in the new sectors that were opened up by incorporation, and it was non-

[170] For a detailed analysis see: Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Toplum*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 67-116.

Muslims who were the most dominant group in the sectors that emerged. In contrast, Muslims were the most dominant group in the sectors of the expanding state machinery.

Secondly, and perhaps contradictorily, I want to demonstrate that the Ottoman reform agenda also facilitated incorporation and this expanded the reach of the modern Ottoman state apparatus at the same time. Ottoman reforms were not nationalist up until the period of crisis that followed the Balkan Wars. There was no nationalist master plan that was gradually realized by nationalizing incorporated parts of the Ottoman economy. On the contrary, as is also evident in the case of the county of Foçateyn, Ottoman reforms created a secure environment and order that was needed for commerce to take place. The Ottoman centre interplayed with Great Power imperialisms in order to strengthen its own position until that was simply no longer possible. In this way, the Ottoman centre welcomed some aspects of incorporation. The Ottoman bureaucrats overseeing incorporated areas like Foçateyn were not necessarily at odds with the emerging middle-class hegemony and bourgeoisie cosmopolitanism. Some saw it as a model, some had a vested interest in commerce and some worked for institutions of the incorporated economy such as the OPDA. Demonstrating the effects of Ottoman modernization efforts is therefore very important in generating an understanding of how and why the coastal trajectory of incorporated areas later entered a 'collision course' with the Ottoman centre after the Balkan Wars.

The Political System and Reforms: The Big Picture

The long 19th century in the county of Foçateyn, like elsewhere in the Empire, was characterized by the Ottoman state's rediscovery of the Ottoman countryside through modern means of knowledge production. The state was being modernized and its presence was increasing in the realms where it was previously limited or non-existent. The Ottoman authorities kept detailed administrative records especially until the 17th century, and the Porte always tried to keep a careful eye on its subjects, lands and resources to the extent that they were vital to it. However, modernity redefined and reconstructed what was vital and necessary. The 19th century witnessed many drastic

changes in the way the presence of the state became extended. As is commonly stated, knowledge is power.[171] One of the very good examples for testing the validity of this often quoted claim is to see how the growth of the control of modern states over their societies and resources was made possible with their increasing capacity to produce knowledge about those societies and resources. The Ottoman Empire was no exception in this process. Ottoman modernization efforts started in the late 18th century and lasted all the way until the last days of the Ottoman Empire, passing through periods of intervals and crises. The Ottoman bureaucracy and its elites introduced modern ways of accumulating knowledge or they reformed and modernized their predecessors' methods of knowledge accumulation. The intensity of these reforms increased and they diffused into many realms of life especially in the second half of the 19th century. From language to architecture, from dress to furniture and in conceptions of time and space, reforms made their presence felt. Although not with the same strength as it was in the heartlands of the Empire, the effects of modernization efforts soon started to be felt in the remotest corners of the Empire.

[171] The well-known phrase 'Scientia potentia est' is often attributed to Sir Francis Bacon. However, the first written reference to the phrase is in the work of Thomas Hobbes, *De Homine*, published in 1658. For more on the discussion see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientia_potentia_est (Accessed on 22 December 2011)

[Picture: *Hükümet Konağı* (Government Office / Courthouse) of Eski Foça in the Ottoman period. It was first built in 1863 and later it was expanded in 1884. The photograph was taken around early 1900s. Source: *Foça Üzerine Yazılar / Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı Anısına*. (İzmir: Ati Matbaa, 1998), 111.**]**

With modernity, knowing more and thus being able to exert more will over aspects of life or geographies that were previously out of the reach of pre-modern states had become a possibility and furthermore a necessity for the survival of modern states. 'All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects, and in that sense at least, "becomes true"', Foucault argued.[172] In a way, the history of the emergence of nation states is indeed the history of certain knowledge, a dominant form, a *zeitgeist* 'becoming true' through social, demographic and political engineering. The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey is also one such history of an

[172] Michel Foucault. 1977. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Trans. Alan Sheridan), (New York: Random House, 1995). p. 27.

idea becoming truth.[173] Although one might easily argue this to be the case for all forms of states to some extent and/or for other sources of power as well, capacity of nation states to construct 'truth' was a novel phenomenon in the time the concept emerged and stood in contrast to other forms of modern statehood. This capacity to construct 'truth' for the Ottoman Empire and later for the Republic of Turkey was made possible through the centuries-long modern agenda of reform undertaken by the Ottomans. The quote by Foucault continues thus: 'Knowledge, once used to regulate the conduct of others, entails constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice'. Thus, 'there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations'. The very process of modern states' penetration into realms in which they were previously non-existent involves a process of 'correlative constitution' in which the body of knowledge is created out of the interaction of the political centre and the political periphery. That is to say, the process of producing knowledge and constructing 'truth' out of it is a process in which the 'local' is also involved as much as the 'global'.

The extent of pre-modern states' effective rule was limited because of a dearth in the means and tools of warfare, communication and transportation. This is especially noticeable in large agrarian empires like the Ottoman Empire. The political presence of such pre-modern empires over their vast geographies were always limited and their limited presence was heterogeneously spread across their territories. This inability to impose the will of the center equally, universally and directly becomes even more tangible if one examines the presence of such states on the level of everyday life. However, pre-modern imperial entities like the Ottoman Empire were also inevitably driven to enlarge their boundaries to obtain more potentially taxable surplus and spoils of war. This, combined with the limits of pre-modern communication and transport, made them dependent on peripheral actors who would help them rule over their constantly growing lands. The Ottoman state was one such pre-modern empire that ruled over vast geographies through various forms of power sharing mechanisms

[173] I must add that I don't claim this to be a teleological process in which a certain idea imposed itself as truth. It is rather a turbulent and complex struggle of various elements that in the end had created an idea, among many others, as reality.

while still keeping the centre dominant.[174] However, it was forced to enact a transformation into a modern state once its boundaries had begun to shrink. The Ottoman authorities failed to turn some of its conquered territories into loyal, productive territories that would yield high tax returns. In addition, the Empire was under the constant pressure of Russian expansionism that threatened its territories in Europe. The Ottomans lost both income from military expansion and income from peasant surplus from conquered lands when its war machine became inefficient against its rivals' modern armies.[175] Unlike many of its Western European counterparts, Ottoman modernization took place at the expense of its political periphery, which in the Western European case was the motor of that change. The Ottoman state's relations with its periphery before the reforms was already structured around a system in which the centre was dominant. As a result of the inventions of modernity, states were even more capable of inserting their presence into areas where they previously depended on local power holders. Ultimately, the Ottoman periphery would be even more dominated by the centre when considerable parts of its periphery would break away, partly as the result of the forces its centralising reforms set in motion.

Although there had been dramatic changes in the way the Ottoman political centre perceived and managed the Empire, the underlining logic and legitimacy of its rule had remained more or less the same. According to Metin Heper, the Ottoman centuries extending from the 16th to the 19th centuries did not evince a progressive development from a centralized to a quasi-federal polity. On the contrary, throughout the period in question 'two types of relationship existed between the centre and the periphery: power politics and a degenerated form of patron client relationship'.[176]

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[174] According to Zürcher, Ottoman state structure in the 18th century was different in three ways compared to modern nation states. First of all, it was small both in monetary and bureaucratic terms. Secondly, as a result of its small size, most of its relations with its subjects were through various intermediaries. Thirdly, there was no equality before the law. Therefore, unlike a modern state it was impersonal, indirect, limited and arbitrary like other pre-modern state formations. See: Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 29-32.

[175] For a detailed discussion of this process see: William H. MacNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

[176] Metin Herper, 'Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with special reference to the 19th Century', *International Political Science Review*, 1/1, (1980), 81-105.

Although different groups (such as the Sultan's slave bureaucracy or the Turkish aristocratic elites) were able to exert their will on the state at different times, they were only able to legitimize their actions by being at the centre.[177] Furthermore, 'the state was somehow too overwhelming to be dominated long for the benefit of any one ruling group'.[178] One thing had always been dominant in the Ottoman context: the omnipresence of the centre. Neither peripheral forces, nor other actors in society were able to replace this dominance. 'State's supremacy in the Ottoman polity was propped up by the fact that Islam was never an autonomous force or power vis-à-vis the state'.[179] As might be expected from any pre-modern state entity, potentially taxable surplus coming from peasant production was the central source of income for the Ottoman Empire. Therefore it is not surprising to see that the Ottoman's governing ideology, the circle of equity[180] (*Daire-i Adalet*), emphasized the central role of the flock (*reaya,* the peasant population) for the survival of the ruler that in return was necessary for the well-being of society.[181] Therefore 'the center of the Ottoman Empire was never willing to come to terms with the local notables at the expense of the peasants'.[182]

Nor was the Ottoman periphery willing to replace the centre. This was precisely because the legitimacy of a local power holder as opposed to its local rivals rested upon the existence of a legitimizing centre whose power was far too great to be challenged alone. According to Rodric Davison, the Deed of Alliance of 1808 (*Sened-i İttifak*), a peak point of the Ottoman periphery's challenge of the centre, was not an Ottoman *Magna Carta* as many believed it to be. Although it was later referred to as a pluralist reference by the Ottoman reformers later in the same century, they did so only to legitimize their own agenda. Even at the centre's weakest position, the

[177] Herper, 'Center and Periphery...'. 83.
[178] Ibid., 86.
[179] Ibid., 84-85.
[180] Sometimes this concept is also translated as 'circle of justice'.
[181] For the notions of social and political order in the 19th century Ottoman Empire that are relevant for the discussion here see: Maurus Reinkowski, 'The State's Security and the Subjects' Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century)', in Hakan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (eds.) *Legitimizing the Order: the Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 195-212.
[182] Herper, 'Center and Periphery...', 87.

periphery was not interested in replacing the centre; it only wanted to sustain its own autonomy in its locality.[183] Despite reoccurring intervals of de-centralization, the Ottoman political system was centred on the empowerment of the centre and during the period of reforms, there were no exceptions to this. The centre systematically closed the avenues through which local power holders might be able to usurp power to rise up and challenge the centre. Local power holders also knew that their legitimacy over their local rivals was linked to the legitimacy of the centre.

The county of Foçateyn was geographically situated in the heartlands of the Empire and can be considered as having existed within the zone of the Ottoman centre's effective rule. However, the more Foçateyn became a part of the process of incorporation the more the Ottoman centre's grasp was undermined. In a sense, it was peripheralised despite being geographically close to the centre. The 19th century Ottoman reforms were able to compensate for this loss of the centre's influence to some extent with the mechanisms and knowledge that it produced. The centrifugal effects of incorporation and Great Power imperialisms were always greater than the centralizing effects of the Ottoman reforms. This is why the Ottoman centre's relationship with the county of Foçateyn resembled its usual relationship with its peripheries. Empowerment of the centre remained top priority and the centre systematically tried to close all avenues that would lead to local empowerment.

Knowing the Periphery: The County of Foçateyn in Aydın's Provincial Almanacs

The reform programs sought to enhance the Ottoman centre's 'grasp' of the periphery. In the following discussion, I offer a glimpse of how the county of Foçateyn was administrated and viewed from the centre after the reforms of the long 19th century based on the administrative materials that were produced. Most of the information about 19th century Foçateyn available today is based upon a collection of modern administrative documents that were introduced by the Ottomans as a part of

[183] Rodric Davison, 'The advent of the principle of representation in the government of the Ottoman Empire', in W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.) *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 95.

their larger agenda of reforms known as the Tanzimat Reforms. One of the modern administrative documents that were produced were called almanacs (*salname*). By the time the Ottoman centre introduced almanacs, it had already undertaken several bold reforms such as the improvement of registers and population censuses in order to accumulate more information about its people, land and resources. Almanacs were initially introduced in 1847, and the first examples were only written for the compilation of information about the bureaucratic bodies of the Empire. However, as their use became apparent, European style provincial almanacs were also introduced in 1866[184] with the aim of accumulating useful information about the Sultan's lands and subjects.

Separate provincial almanacs were written for each provincial unit of the Ottoman Empire. Provincial almanacs included a variety of types of information ranging from population statistics to production, history and geography. They improved in detail and accuracy over the course of the years. However, there were also instances of instability in the Empire that made certain years' almanacs superficial or mere repetitions of previously collected information. Provincial almanacs also include clues about the perceptions of Ottoman bureaucrats regarding their provinces and the self-image of the Ottoman system in general through articles presenting local histories, daily life and trade that were written by local administrators. When the province of Aydın was restructured with Izmir as its centre in 1867, a new printing house was established for the province in the following year. From 1869 onwards, a provincial newspaper was printed and later, in 1879, Aydın province started to produce its provincial almanacs.[185] Most of these texts included information that was seen as being vital for the sustainability of efficient taxation and political control. As an example of this desire to collect more information, the Ottoman provincial almanac of

[184] The earliest almanac in the Ottoman Empire was written in 1847. It was commissioned by the state and it was called the *Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye*. After that, various kinds of almanacs were published regularly until 1912. The earliest provincial almanac was written in 1866 and the last one was written in 1918. There are a total of 527 existing provincial almanacs written for the various parts of the Ottoman Empire in various periods. For more details see: Hasan Duman, *Osmanlı Yıllıkları: Salnameler ve Nevsaller*, (İstanbul: İslâm Konferansı Teşkilâtı, İslam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültürü Araştırma Merkezi (IRCICA), 1982), 12-19.
[185] Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 13.

the province of Aydın (1891) included data on population and properties of the county's villages:

Villages of the County of Foçateyn (1891)	Population	Properties (*Emakin*)	Distance To Eski Foça by land	
			Hours	Minutes
Ulupınar	433	85	3	30
Şeyh Kebir	72	27	2	30
Yeniköy	188	41	3	0
Koca Mehmed(ler)	123	33	2	30
Gerenköy	447	110	3	0
Söğütçük	595	95	1	15
Kozbeğli	524	130	3	30
Çakmaklı	145	75	4	0

[Villages of Foçateyn and their Population (1891). Source: Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 16.]

Among these villages, Kozbeyli and Çakmaklı were administrated under the Foça-i Cedid (Yeni Foça) subdistrict (*nahiyesi*). Given the predominant Greek population of the units of this subdistrict, and based on the information presented before, it is clear that this sub-administrative body included almost exclusively Greek subjects. According to the same almanac (1891), Foçateyn was governed by a county assembly, which was headed by a governor (*kaymakam*). In addition to this body, there were commissions operating at the centre of the county. These were *Muhacirin Komisyonu* (commission of refugees), *Tedarik-i Vesait-i Nakliye-i Askeriye Komisyonu* (commission of military logistics), *Maarif Komisyonu* (commission of education and culture) and *Tahsilat Komisyonu* (commission of revenues).[186] One major commission of the one dedicated to refugees, which confirms that as early as 1891, refugees had started coming to the region probably as a result of the Muslim flight from the Balkans after the Ottoman-Russian war in 1877-78. This shows that Foçateyn was one of the places where *muhacir*s[187] were resettled long before the

[186] Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...',16.

[187] *Muhacir* means refugee in Turkish. The word has been widely and frequently used in the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey because the break-up of the Empire created millions of refugees in and around the Ottoman territories. There are a variety of publications about various *muhacir*s of various periods and geographies. For one valuable book on the *muhacir* experience see: Ali Ezger Özyürek, *Muhacirler: Bitmeyen Göç*, (İstanbul: Laika Yayınları, 2007).

catastrophic forced migrations of the Balkan Wars. However, as is indicated by several population statistics, the presence of these pre-Balkan War *muhacir*s were rather limited. After all, the Muslim population throughout these years was almost stagnant. There is only one reference in the Ottoman archives about the presence of *muhacir*s in the county[188], but the small number of Muslim refugees did not significantly change the demographic structure and their presence was not discussed in any of the oral history testimonies that I examined during my research. Therefore, it can be concluded that their arrival was limited in scale, gradual and peaceful.

The Ottoman county (*kaza*) of Foçateyn[189] was located between Çandarlı bay and the Gulf of Izmir. It was surrounded by Çandarlı in the north, the county of Menemen in the east, Izmir in the south and the Aegean (*Ege*)[190] Sea in the west. Foçateyn consisted of two major towns and several smaller villages. After 1867,[191] Ottoman bureaucratic hierarchies were reorganized as a part of a greater agenda of reform and the county of Foçateyn started to be governed under the municipality (*sancak*) of Izmir which in turn was governed under the province (*vilayet*) of Aydın. It was one of the most prosperous and well developed provinces of the Empire in the 19th century with regards to its agricultural output, trade volume, population and urbanization rate.

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[188] The only reference to muhacirs in the county before the period of Balkan Wars dates from April of 1890. The correspondence talks about the possible settlement of a small group of Circassians in Gerenköy, which is one of the villages of Foçateyn. See: BOA, DH.MKT., 1707/16, (Hicrî 19/B/1307).

[189] This Ottoman name for the county means 'two Foças'. The name refers to the two major towns of the county: Foça-i Atik (Old Foça) and Foça-i Cedid (New Foça). For other names of Foçateyn in Ottoman Turkish see: Tahir Sezen, *Osmanlı Yer Adları: Alfabetik Sırayla*, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2006), 184.

[190] Actually the term Aegean Sea is a contemporary term invented to describe the sea between modern day Turkey and Greece. Historical documents refer to this sea as the Mediterranean since it is a part of it. In the Ottoman almanacs of the 19th century, the Aegean is referred to as the *Adalar Denizi* (sea of islands). For an example see: *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1895 (Hicrî: 1313), 256.

[191] According to Serçe, Foçateyn was administrated under Saruhan municipality (*sancağı*) at least until 1867. The Ottoman state almanac of 1868 referred to Foçateyn as one of the eight counties that were overseen by the Izmir municipality. Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 16.

Aydın province, having most of the shores of the Aegean (*Ege*) within its borders, was also advantageous in terms of logistics. Foçateyn as a county, similar to few others that were located on the Western Anatolian coastline, had enjoyed all of the generic advantages of being a settlement on the shores of Aydın province at times when integration with world markets occurred. However, Foçateyn had more than the usual amount of geographical advantages. Its proximity to a productive hinterland, an abundance of rock and salt mines and the protective nature of its bays and islands didn't go missed by law-abiding citizens and outlaws alike, both from the Empire and beyond. Foça-i Atik (meaning: Old (*Eski*) Foça)[192] was the county's largest town with the highest population. It was also the administrative and economic center for the rest of the county. Foça-i Cedid (meaning: New (*Yeni*) Foça)[193] was the second largest town of the county and was mainly a mining town with sizeable fishing and foresting activities.

The choice of Eski Foça as the administrative center of the county was most likely a direct adaptation of what had existed before the Ottoman rule, since Eski Foça had been a focal point throughout the history from its establishment in Classical Antiquity onwards. Throughout history it has been under the control of various authorities such as Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Genoese and Ottomans. Eski Foça has been a home for many peoples including Armenians, Caucasians, Greeks, Turks, Jews, Kurds and even runaway slaves.[194] This diversity in Foçateyn is a direct result of its location on the shores of the highway of Eurasia, which is the Mediterranean. Availability of better transportation and political stability meant more trade and riches which in return brought prosperity. Compared to a landlocked county, Foçateyn benefited from its location as a hub of the Mediterranean trade networks. The Ottomans were aware of the diversity of Foçateyn, especially in the 19th century, and they compiled relatively detailed statistics about the demography in their almanacs and censuses.

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[192] Eski Foça was also known as Karaca Foça, Fogga or Foggia.

[193] Yeni Foça was also known as Foça-i Cedid, Yenice Foça or Yenice. It was originally established as a Genoese mining colony.

[194] At one point in 1888, a slave ship named *Mahruse* delivered 32 black slaves to Foçateyn although it was forbidden to do so. A man from Bengazi owned the slaves. The captain and the crew fled the scene and state authorities pursued them. See: BOA, DH.MKT., 1480/25, (Hicrî 11/Ca/1305).

[**Picture:** A map of the provincial land routes connecting Foçateyn to Izmir, the center of the province of Aydın. Yellow lines demarcate the coastline. Strait black lines demarcate railroads. Other lines indicate roads of varying quality. Roads indicated by double lines are of better quality than those depicted as dotted lines. Source: *Vilayet Yolları Haritasıdır*, (İstanbul: Dahiliye Nezâreti Umur-i Mahalliye Vilayet Müdüriyeti [Hilal Matbaası], 1329/1913), 13-14[195].]

Other than its two major towns, Foçateyn had various *karye*s (villages) where agriculture and animal husbandry were the dominant occupations. The almanacs also included information about these villages, which were listed as Çakmaklı, Gerenköy, Kozbeyli, Söğütçük, Şeyh Kebir, Ulupınar and Yeni Köy. Although the towns in the county had mixed populations, villages of the county primarily consisted of rather homogenous groups (e.g. Christians or Muslims). Aydın provincial almanacs do not

[195] The full provincial route compilation can be found at: Marmara Üniversitesi Nadir Eserler Koleksiyonu, yer numarası: 912.565 DAH, demirbaş: 03994/F00843.

provide specific information about the village populations but they do describe in detail the demography of the two major towns of Eski and Yeni Foça. Both towns were reported to have mixed populations and Eski Foça was described as having numerous migrant workers.[196] The oral testimony of an old resident of the county of Foçateyn, Thanasis Papoutsis (Θανάσης Παπουτσής), provides additional information about the villages of Foçateyn before 1914. According to Papoutsis, New Foça (Νέες Φώκιες), Söğütçük (Σουβουτζίκια), Gerenköy (Γκερένκιοϊ) and also Kozbeyli (Κούλμπεγλί) consisted primarily of Ottoman Greeks (ελληνικό as he refers to them, meaning Ottoman Greeks) whereas the rest of the villages had "Turks"[197] (meaning Muslims) including a settlement called Koca Memed (Κοτζά Μεμέτ).[198] This state of affairs seems to have persisted under Greek administration between 1919 and 1922 after the Kingdom of Greece invaded Foçateyn. According to the report of the head of internal affairs of Smyrna (Izmir), High Commissioner Skarpetis, in 1921 three of these villages had an exclusively Muslim populace (Şeyh Kebir, Ulupınar, Yeni Köy) and another three were exclusively Greek (Çakmaklı, Gerenköy, Söğütçük). All of the remaining areas (Eski Foça, Yeni Foça and Kozbeyli) reportedly had mixed populations.[199]

[196] According to the provincial almanac of 1891, there were a variety of non-Muslim groups (*nüfus-u muhtelife-i gayri müslime*) in Eski Foça and most of them were from nearby islands. They were referred to as half-native (*"nim yerli add olunmakda"*). See: *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1891 (Hicrî: 1307), 565.

[197] Although Papoutsis refers to them as Turks, it is clear that he meant Muslims. We know from various population registers that Muslims of Foçateyn included a variety of Muslims of Turkish, Kurdish or Caucasian ethnicities. However, one must remember that researchers applied these labels in retrospect.

[198] CAMS, Θανάσης Παπουτσής interview, 24/2/1960, Athens.

[199] Berber, 'Mütareke ve Yunan...', 36.



[Picture: Villages and towns of modern day Foça. The settlements are almost entirely in the same place as during Ottoman times. Source: Google Earth**]**

From the first provincial almanac onwards, Foçateyn was recorded to have had a common (*bidayet*) court and from 1896 onwards it was recorded to have had a commercial (*ticaret*) court.[200] This indicates that the demographic and economic growth combined with the effects of integration into world markets had impacts on the administrative structure of the county especially in the last quarter of the 19th century. As is evident in the almanacs, the bureaucracy of Foçateyn was steadily expanding. Although this development was in line with the general growth of the bureaucracy as a result of the Ottoman reform movement, Foçateyn had an additional reason for growth: It was attracting migration and its economy was growing thanks to incorporation, which was also why it needed additional bureaucratic bodies.

Bureaucratic growth occurred simultaneously with the growth in the economy and the demography of the county but it could be argued that the representative aspect of the bureaucratic growth did not parallel the demographic growth. In other words, the

[200] Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 17.

increased presence of non-Muslim residents (Ottoman Greeks) as compared to Muslim residents of the county was not reflected in the bureaucratic growth. The Muslims staffed state bureaucracy and even the majority of positions in the OPDA. Serçe underlines the fact that despite its predominantly non-Muslim population, all bureaucrats of the county of Foçateyn were 'Muslim and Turkish'. He points to an official correspondence sent from Foçateyn to the province of Aydın that stated that there was an urgent need to appoint Christian representatives to places like Çeşme, Urla and Foçateyn where the majority of the people were non-Muslims.[201] A year after this correspondence, the provincial almanac of 1895 indicates that there was a man by the name of Menulaki Efendi, an Ottoman Greek, who was an associate (*aza*) member of the Yeni Foça sub-district.[202] Although there were increasing numbers of appointed non-Muslim bureaucrats appearing in the almanacs after the correspondence, the majority of the appointed bureaucrats in the county always consisted of Muslims.

Appointed positions, however, were not the only means of participation in decision-making mechanisms for the residents of Foçateyn. After the Tanzimat reforms, non-Muslims of the county could be elected to certain bureaucratic positions. For instance, the head of the municipality of Eski Foça was Mehmed Hilmi Efendi and the municipal assembly consisted of 6 elected members, among whom four were Ottoman Greeks and two were Muslims.[203] The Aydın provincial almanac of 1898 gives a detailed picture of the bureaucratic structure (Picture 15) in which one can see the limited presence of non-Muslim members. There are two important conclusions to be drawn here. First, there was a visible change towards more involvement of non-Muslims. Second, Muslims still dominated the state bureaucracy and the OPDA. Therefore, in contrast to the increasing role of the non-Muslims in the commercial realm (as workers, entrepreneurs or as leaders [*reis*]), and in contrast to their increasing proportion in the county, the bureaucracy of the county was still dominated by Muslims.

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[201] Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 17. The correspondence was written on 30th November 1896.
[202] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1895 (Hicrî: 1313), 256.
[203] Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 17.

Foçateyn Kazası (County of Foçateyn) -1898-				
Memurin-i Kaza (Civil Servants)	**Meclis-i İdare-i Kaza (Administraion Assembly)**	**Mal Kalemi (Property Clerks)**	**Bidayet Mahkemesi (Regular Courts)**	**Ticaret Mahkemesi (Commercial Courts)**
Kaymakam (Governor): Hilmi Bey	Reis (Head): Kaymakam-ı Kaza (Governor of the County)	Mal Müdürü (Fiscal Director): Ahmed Efendi	Reis (Head): Naib Efendi	Reis (Head): Naib Efendi
Mal Müdürü (Fiscal Director): Ahmed Efendi	Aza-i Müntahibe (Elected Members): Mustafa Efendi, İbrahim Bey, Yorgaki Efendi, İstelyanoplu Efendi	Refiki (Associate): Mehmed Vehbi Efendi	Aza (Member): Hafız Nuri Efendi, Yanni Liğoraki Efendi	Aza (Member): -missing-, Dimustin Efendi
Naib (Assignee): Mehmed Arif Efendi		Sandık Emini (Treasurer): Hüsnü Efendi	Başkatib (Chief Clerk): Fethi Efendi	Katib (Clerk): Fethi Efendi
Tahrirat Katibi (Correspondence Clerk): Kemal Efendi	Aza-i Tabiyye (Permament Members): Naib (Assignee), Mal Müdürü (Fiscal Director), Tahrirat Katibi (Correspondence Clerk)		Katib-i Sani (Secondary Clerk): Salih Zehdi Efendi	
			Müstadik(?) Muavini: Halid Efendi	
			Mukavelet Muavini (Contract Clerk): Emin Efendi	
Ticaret ve Ziraat Odası (Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce)	**Evkaf Komisyonu (Commission of Charitable Foundations)**	**Foça-i Cedid Nahiyesi (Subdistrict of Yeni Foça)**	**Meclis-i Nahiye (Assembly of the Subdistrict)**	**Bağzı Memurin (Other Civil Servants)**
Reis (Head): Sadık Bey	Reis (Head): Hoca Hafız Mehmed Efendi	Müdür (Chief Administrator): Ali Rıza Efendi	Reis (Head): Ali Rıza Efendi	Liman Reisi (Harbour Chief): Kol Ağası Raif Efendi
		Tahrirat Katibi (Correspondence Clerk): Hafız Mehmed Efendi		Rüsumat Memuru (Customs Officer): Mehmed Efendi
Azalar (Members): Hüseyin Ağa, İstenyanopli Dimitri Efendi, Andonaki	Azalar (Members): Hafız Nuri Efendi, Mustafa Efendi, Hacı Veli Efendi		Azalar (Members): Alim Ağa, Manolaki, Hafız Mehmed Efendi, İbrahim Bey, Hacı Vasilaki	Aşar Kol Memuru (Tax Officer): Veli Efendi
	Katib (Clerk): Halim Bey			

[A sample of the bureaucratic structure of the county of Foçateyn from the Aydın Provincial Almanac of 1898. Source: *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1898 (Hicrî: 1316), 219-220.]

Overall, Foçateyn's incorporation in the 19th century and the resulting growth were followed by a parallel growth in the state bureaucracy and, by extension, growth in the amounts of knowledge and control. The income registers (*temettuat defterleri*), provincial almanacs (*salnameler*), improved customs registers, population censuses,[204] restructuring of administrative entities, introduction of new bureaucratic bodies and state sponsored building projects (such as telegraph lines, ports and railroad networks) became the tools of the Ottoman centre's increasing influence in the periphery. All of these reforms essentially aimed at the empowerment of the Ottoman state apparatus and they were underpinned by a logic that centred on improving state control which in return would facilitate more effective extraction of surplus (taxes), resources and human capital. However, these seemingly pro-state reforms sometimes led to unintended consequences and undermined the influence of the center, which leads to the second important aspect of the Ottoman modernization: facilitation of incorporation as an unintended consequence.

Growth of Foçateyn as an 'Unintended Consequence' of Ottoman Modernization

Ottoman reforms aimed at the reconstitution of the political centre's dominant position over its peripheries. However, modernizing reforms sometimes created unintended consequences in the way that center-periphery relations were constructed. Reforms and policies that sought the consolidation of political power at the center did not always achieve their ideal goals, sometimes triggering centrifugal forces. This was partly because of the different developmental trajectories of the different parts of the Ottoman Empire. As Emrence demonstrates, the coast, the interior and the frontier zones of the Empire experienced modernity in their own particular ways and thus developed multiple trajectories of development and modernity.[205] As a result of their differing dynamics, a certain modern reform initiated by the center had different effects in other zones. The history of the period of Ottoman reforms is replete with centralization policies that ended up having centrifugal effects which differed from

[204] For more on Ottoman population censuses see: Standford J. Shaw, 'The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 9/3, (1978), 325-338.
[205] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 121-128.

the centralizing intentions that drove them. However, 'if some of the policies of the center eventually benefited the local notables, it was unintentional. The center never doubted its ability to implement legal measures it took. The measures however, were easily distorted. The goals of the center were almost always displaced'.[206] In other words, what might look like an effort to consolidate power had drastic centrifugal effects for both the center and the periphery?

A good example of 'unintended consequences' in the frontier can be observed in the consequences of Mahmud II's efforts to reconsolidate central power between 1812 and 1820. *Ayan*s (local notables) in Anatolia and the Balkans had been able to challenge the central authority of the reigns of Selim III and Mustafa IV. Subsequent to Mustafa IV's reign, Mahmud II undertook several measures to reinstall supremacy of the center. Although the Ottomans' traditional methods of crushing peripheral powers had sought peaceful solutions, open warfare was also an option. Mahmud II's period of reconsolidation saw many small to large-scale campaigns against *ayan*s, the most famous of which was his campaign against Yanyalı Ali Paşa (Ali Paşa of Yannina). Mahmud II's campaigns removed the powerful *ayan*s but failed to fill the resulting power vacuum with representatives of the center. As an unintended consequence, the lack of powerful *ayans* triggered an atmosphere of chaos that contributed to the development of centrifugal forces. For instance, the removal of Ali Paşa of Yannina prompted the Greek revolts, which eventually became a milestone development in the process of the independence of Greece.[207]

Mahmud II's campaigns for power consolidation also had drastic centrifugal consequences in another 'frontier' zone of the Empire: Eastern Anatolia. There, a power vacuum came about because of the struggle of Kurdish tribes with one another for the new leadership after Mahmud II crushed the local *ayans*. This not only disrupted patterns of authority and the economy of the region, but also led to the oppression of Armenian peasants, artisans and merchants in the region whose discontent was never properly addressed by the center. Bruinessen argues that most of the Christian communities in the Kurdish regions of the Empire 'were politically

[206] Herper, 'Center and Periphery...', 97.
[207] Zürcher, *Modernleşen...*, 51-55.

dominated and economically exploited by Kurdish tribal aghas'.[208] However, the level of exploitation acquired a new dimension in the 19th century. Mahmud II's vigorous efforts to centralize power sounded the death-knell for the Kurdish emirates but also saw two Kurdish emirates temporarily rise to unprecedented strength. Initially, Mahmud II's campaigns succeeded in replacing local power holders with appointed officials sent from Istanbul. However, the resulting power vacuum created an atmosphere that brought about inter-tribal rivalry among Kurdish leaders who struggled with each other to acquire dominance.[209] Fierce tribal rivalries which lasted approximately 50 years meant increased exploitation of the peasants, artisans and merchants. This period of centralization and decentralization went hand in hand and was followed by '... an Armenian rebellion in the Sasun area. The revolt was a protest against double taxation: by the government, that had started to collect taxes directly, and by the Kurds, who continued to take their traditional share of the Armenians' crops'. [210] Once more, as in the case of Greek revolts, centralization attempts resulted in the alienation of some Armenian groups and contributed to the way Armenian nationalism was formulated in years to follow.

The history of the growth of the county of Foçateyn in the 19th century constitutes another example of an 'unintended consequence', this time on the coast, where state modernisation and incorporation worked hand in hand. The Ottoman agenda of reform created an enormous need for liquidity in the economy. 'Nineteenth-century dynamics required that such rich sources of taxation be reclaimed and moved from the realm of private tax farming to public tax collection. Between administrative and legal reforms and increasing military needs, the expenditures of the central government skyrocketed by 250% to 300%. Such a development required better tax collection for the central treasury, especially the transformation of indirect to direct taxes as the increasingly efficient state bureaucracy took over the role of tax collection'.[211] The Ottomans needed money to finance their reforms and such funds were primarily available to them through European capital. As a result of this situation, the Ottomans

[208] Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and state: the Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*, (London: Zed Books, 1992), 106-107.
[209] Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh...*, 175-182.
[210] Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh...*, 188-189.
[211] Barkey, *Empire...*, 270.

had to tolerate capitalist penetration to ensure that they maintained access to loans, entailing a situation in which they had to tolerate and at times even facilitate incorporation. Nonetheless, this did not mean that the Ottoman state was completely absent in the commercial realm, nor did it mean that the state fully cooperated with the market. In the 18th century, the Ottoman state 'acted as the protectionist force of the market, restricting the access of foreign traders, but also more often than not interfering in the normal workings of market relations, demanding gifts, bribes, and making policy difficulties that were imitated and enhanced at the local level by government officials'.[212] In Foçateyn, this came about as the Ottomans simply lost their protective and provisionist grasp on the economy, which then brought growth to the county. In turn that growth facilitated a certain autonomy from the center, demographic change and the dominance of a cosmopolitan middle-class hegemony. None of this would have unfolded in that particular way without the Ottoman centre's desperate need for modernization and liquidity.

However, unlike frontier areas like the Peloponnesus or Eastern Anatolia, Foçateyn's location on the coast brought about modernity as the result of two forces: the state and the market. This gave the local population the chance to sustain their existence vis-à-vis centralization. In other words, on the coast a new class emerged that acted as intermediaries between the state and the market by a) facilitating incorporation as merchants and b) also stopping further penetration so they could sustain their intermediary roles. Furthermore, unlike the frontier, the centre's grasp was much stronger in the western territories of the Empire, where Foçateyn was located. This fact assured the greater success of Ottoman reforms along the coast. These effective reforms facilitated, and at times accelerated, Foçateyn's gradual integration into capitalist markets. The centralization reforms of the Ottomans '...cleared the way for global capitalist integration by eliminating political brokers, and Europeans secured the free trade regime by protecting extra-territoriality and commodity movements on the Ottoman coastal space'.[213] According to Keyder, the Tanzimat, as a period of reforms aiming to re-centralize power, can be understood as an attempt to restore the traditional order of the Ottoman society. The founding motivation behind the reforms

[212] Barkey, *Empire...*, 241-242.
[213] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 52.

was to regain the control over the populations in the periphery that had been lost to the *Ayan*s. As such, the primary aim was to allow the center to extract even more taxes from its population. The nineteenth century was characterized by a conflicting situation in which Ottoman bureaucrats tried to modernize their tax collecting methods and keep their tax base of small land-holding peasants in opposition to the forces of European capitalism that granted 'immunities' from the burdens of the Ottoman state and promoted production for the foreign markets.[214]

According to Ilber Ortaylı, ironically the modernizing efforts of the central government destroyed the old *millet* system which constituted the biggest obstacle for the emergence of a bourgeoisie. The Ottoman political hierarchy was divided along religious lines and non-Muslim religious leaders were representatives and the rulers of their respective *millet*s. With the Tanzimat reforms which sought to create a new Ottoman citizenship based on equality and unity, the representative power of the religious leaders was weakened, which drove forward the political empowerment of a non-Muslim bourgeoisie.[215] In addition, as a result of a series of international treaties, the non-Muslim bourgeoisie also became immune to the tax burden, from which fellow Muslim competitors suffered, and therefore they were able to raise considerable capital.[216] This eventually introduced global capitalism into the power equation between the center and periphery. This was yet another example of the unintended centrifugal consequences of the centre's attempts to assert its power.

As Eski Foça moved from being the port-town of an agrarian empire to a boomtown of an incorporated economy, Ottoman control over its economy declined. Foçateyn became the focus of global interests and this paved the way for its relative economic autonomy from the political center in the late 19th century. Like many other port-cities and port-towns on the Western Anatolian coast and in the eastern Mediterranean (like Beirut, Izmir, Mersin or Thessaloniki), the market shaped the history of Foçateyn as a global force. The struggle between the interests of the political center in Istanbul and the interests of the market gave Foçateyn manoeuvring space in its relations with

[214] Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet...*, 32, 39, 41.
[215] İlber Ortaylı, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Millet', in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: İletişm Yayınları, 1983), Vol. 4, 996-1001.
[216] Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet...*, 50.

both, and this was an unintended (or at least undesired) consequence for the Ottoman center.

Not all of the unintended consequences of the Ottoman reforms and policies were undesirable for the Ottoman center, however. In fact, the establishment of the OPDA, an agent of the market, became instrumental and vital in the restoration of the centres' dominant role in the first quarter of the 20th century. As discussed above, in essence the establishment of the OPDA signified a loss of Ottoman economic control in its own territories. However, as Murat Birdal argues, the OPDA was not merely '...an aggressive outpost of Western imperialism or an agent of European powers pursuing hegemony in an Empire on the brink of collapse'.[217] Furthermore, '[t]he institutional reforms initiated by the administration contributed to the development and modernization of state entrepreneurship in the Empire. The backbone of the early republican economy owes much to these reforms'.[218] In short, the OPDA had a modernizing impact on both the Empire and later its successor the Republic of Turkey. A closer look at the bureaucrats of the OPDA office in Eski Foça demonstrates that the majority of its workers were Muslims (see the table below). In the county of Foçateyn, the OPDA became a platform through which economic know-how was transferred to the Ottoman Muslim bureaucrats who staffed the ranks of the administration. Later, in the republican era, many of those Muslims ended up working for the state or in the state-owned salt monopolies, and the salt pools and mines in Foçateyn have always remained operational and their importance has increased over time. The know-how of the salt business that developed in the expansion of Foçateyn proved useful in the continuation and expansion of the business to this day.

[217] Birdal, *The Political...*, 173.
[218] Birdal, *The Political...*, 174.

Foçateyn Kazası Duyun-u Umumiye İdaresi (Public Debt Administration in the County of Foçateyn) -1898-				
Müdür (Administrator): Behçet Bey	Memur (Officer): Nuri Efendi	Nakliye Katibi (Transportation Clerk): Mehmed Efendi	Tahrirat Katibi (Correspondence Clerk) Ata Efendi:	Anbarlar Memuru (Storage Clerk): Miltiyadi Efendi
Baş Katib (Chief Clerk): Esad Bey	İkinci Katib (Secondary Clerk): Halil Efendi	Sandık Emini (Treasurer): Hafız Mehmed Efendi	Tezkere Katibi (License Clerk): İzzet Efendi	Mukayyıd ve Mubsır (Registrar and Controller): Dimistofli Efendi

[Employees of the Foçateyn branch of the OPDA. Source: *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1898 (Hicrî: 1316), 222.**]**

Modernization reforms enabled the center to increase its knowledge about peripheral places like the county of Foçateyn and enabled better control of an empire that was already challenged by incorporation and imperialisms. Throughout the 19th century both the amount of information produced by the center and the presence of the center increased in the county of Foçateyn. While the reforms may have improved extraction of resources, nonetheless their financial burden in general brought on ever more dependence on credits. The Ottoman centre's demand for more outstripped the yield of reforms. A globally-connected economy had to be tolerated because of the Ottoman dependence on Western capital to finance its reforms. So in a sense the reforms caused further incorporation into world markets and thus prompted the further growth of the county of Foçateyn while at the same time weakening Ottoman financial control and thus the centre's grasp. Ironically, these reforms also strengthened the capabilities of the modern Ottoman state apparatus, as seen in the various new forms of information produced about Foçateyn in the century of reform following the Tanzimat era.

This dichotomous nature of the Ottoman reforms is very much evident in the establishment of the OPDA after 1881 and the subsequent growth of the salt business in the county of Foçateyn. The OPDA controlled the most important and greatest yielding salt business in Foçateyn. The salt business expanded under the OPDA's administration and attracted labour and triggered demographic growth as well. Although this meant development for Foçateyn, it also entailed the loss of financial

control for the Ottoman state. As Foçateyn became more incorporated and cosmopolitan, it was financially slipping from the centre's grasp. On the other hand, if it hadn't been for those reforms in the 19th century, the Ottoman state wouldn't have improved its system of taxation, and the Young Turks of the 20th century wouldn't have been able to make assertions and undertake action about the erosion of the centre's authority in the 'contested' regions of the Empire. More knowledge about the region increased the state's capacity to impose its will. The Unionists, who were a branch of the Young Turks, were able to mobilize people and resources for their radical projects thanks to the legacy of the knowledge, infrastructure and bureaucracy that became available through various reform movements and the process of incorporation.

Population Growth in Eski Foça

The growth of the salt business alone would have been enough to attract migration but Foçateyn had even more to offer. The county's various types of grapes were famous and sought after, and exports of grapes also increased in this period along with other commodities such as stones[219] and grains. The combined increase of demand for all these commodities constituted a pull factor for Foçateyn since it required more and more labour. This growth not only entailed the necessity of more production but also required a larger work force in the port where the transfer of goods took place. Foçateyn's goods almost always found their way into markets through the port of Eski Foça, which had two natural harbours: Küçük Deniz (Μικρός Γιαλός) and Büyük Deniz (Μεγάλος Γιαλός). They are both deep and well protected from winds but were not well suited for direct docking. Rocks, seashore houses and lack of proper infrastructure made it impossible for large ships to dock directly. Eski Foça had a modern quay but it was built shortly before the demise of the town as a center of trading. As a result, the expansion of Eski Foça into a boomtown increased the need for lighters, barges and day labourers around the port. So both the growth of demand and thus production for exports, and the growth of the port itself, attracted labour

[219] According to the almanac (*salname*) of 1893, there were some 48 stone quarries in the county of Foçateyn. It appears that they produced mostly for the domestic market. *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1893 (Hicrî: 1311), 214.

migration. Ironically, the increasing need for a larger migrant work force was caused by the resilience of the Ottoman economy against incorporation. The persistence of small land-holding peasantry in Foçateyn prevented local peasants from becoming a part of the growing economy as free labour, and the need for free labour was fulfilled by places elsewhere in the Empire and beyond. In short, lack of labour, abundance of arable land and persistence of small peasantry created a pull factor for migration in Foçateyn as it did elsewhere in the Empire around the same time.[220]



	1880	1884	1887	1891	1893	1894	1895	1896	1898	1899	1902	1908	1914	1917
İslam	0	3642	3133	3762	3847	3529	3564	3575	3578	3597	3621	3617	7427	8384
Yabancı İslam (Foreign İslam)	0	0	129	0	0	0	0	275	275	0	0	0	0	0
Rum (Ottoman Greek)	0	7876	9399	10596	11154	11797	11806	12839	12839	12955	13335	14444	15670	0
Yabancı Rum (Foreign Greeks)	0	0	60	0	0	0	0	0	184	0	0	0	0	0
Ermeni (Armenian)	0	0	26	47	49	47	34	40	40	42	23	0	0	0
Yabancı Ermeni (Foreign Armenian)	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yahudi (Jewish)	0	212	86	97	106	100	100	104	104	104	101	70	83	68
Teba-i Ecnebiye (Foreign Subjects of the Sultan)	0	0	0	0	93	86	84	196	12	12	12	90	0	0
Bulgar (Bulgarian)	0	0	5	46	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yabancı (Foreigner)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	469	507	507	0
Total	6137	11730	12854	14548	15299	15559	15588	17029	17032	16985	17561	18728	23687	8452

[Population Chart of the county of Foçateyn[221]**]**

Migration to Foçateyn had its own peculiar effect. First of all, it was the prime source of demographic growth. Secondly, almost all of the migrants consisted of Ottoman Greeks. As a result, Ottoman Greeks started to become the dominant demographic group. The Muslim majority in the early 19th century was replaced by an Ottoman Greek majority probably as early as the 1860s or 1870s. By 1908, there were four

[220] Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadî Tarihi 1500-1914*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 216-218.

[221] The data in this table was compiled from provincial almanacs, population censuses, Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 19, and the Vital Cuinet estimate from Behar, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun...*, 44. Please also see a larger version in the appendix with two more sets of census data.

times as many Ottoman Greeks as there were Muslims. These new migrants in the county of Foçateyn constituted the majority of the work force of the new economic expansion. They worked in the salt business, on vineyards and on farms; they also became fisherman, lightermen, porters and day labourers. In other words, the new social class of port workers in Eski Foça consisted predominantly of Ottoman Greeks, which should not be seen as mere coincidence. Although there is no concrete data about the details of the migrations of this period, piecemeal data suggests that the Ottoman Greeks who lived on the Aegean islands at the time constituted the largest group of migrants. The Aegean islands of the Ottoman Empire, and all the Mediterranean islands for that matter, always had a chronic problem of unemployment. Ottoman islands like Sakız (Chios) or Midilli (Lesbos) which were close to the county of Foçateyn most likely supported Foçateyn with the free labour it needed, and it was primarily Ottoman Greeks who inhabited the islands.

In his reports on the industrial classes of Turkey in 1869 and 1870, the British Consul Cumberbatch noted that whenever there was a shortage of labour in Izmir (Smyrna) area, demand was filled by migrants from the adjacent Aegean islands. He stated that for instance in Izmir, some 3,000 to 5,000 labourers 'may be reckoned as a floating population, principally from the neighbouring islands'.[222] This seems to have been the case for Foçateyn as well. In fact, we also know from some oral testimonies given by the old residents of Foçateyn that people from the Aegean islands and beyond migrated to Foçateyn through family networks. Marriages often constituted the medium by which brides, grooms or extended families came to Foçateyn. According to the testimony of Thanasis Papoutsis (Θανάσης Παπουτσής), Eski Foça had been attracting migrants 'from all around the world'. People came for work from Midilli (Μυτιληνιοί), Santorini (Σαντορινιοί), Sakız (Χιώτες) and Kithira (Τσιριγώτες). He also recalled that there were 'Bulgarian speaking Macedonians' who went there for work as well. His own father was from Sparta (Σπάρτη) and his mother was a native

[222] *Reports from Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Agents Abroad, Respecting the Condition of the Industrial Classes in Foreign Countries*, (London: Harrison & Sons, 1870), 259 and *Further Reports from Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Agents Abroad Respecting the Condition of the Industrial Classes and the Purchase Power of Money in Foreign Countries*, (London: Harrison & Sons, 1871), 849.

of Eski Foça.[223] Examples from oral testimonies demonstrate that sometimes families or migrants from the Kingdom of Greece also came to Foçateyn for work through family networks. This should not be surprising since the Kingdom of Greece also suffered some economic hardships and unemployment since its establishment in 1832.

All in all, the increasing population and real estate investments of merchants brought about the construction of new neighbourhoods, schools, churches and spaces all around the county. The outlook of the county changed dramatically over a period of 40 to 50 years. Although the demographic growth was economy-driven in nature, as will be discussed later, the loss of the Muslim demographic dominance would ultimately constitute a political problem. Muslims were traditionally and predominantly small landholding peasants and as such were more tied to their land than the non-Muslims of Foçateyn. Muslim males were also conscripted into the military unlike non-Muslims who paid a poll tax instead of serving. Frequent wars throughout the 19th century took an uneven toll on the Muslim population and as a result, when the economy grew through the effects of incorporation, Ottoman Greek free labour from the islands, inland or sometimes even the Kingdom of Greece filled the gap for the required new labour force. Migration rapidly increased the Ottoman Greek population whereas the Muslims population remained stagnant. In a sense, there is an irony here. The resilience of the small land-holding Muslim peasantry, faced with incorporation into world markets, actually decreased the mobility of Muslims. This in return changed the demographic balance in favour of other Ottoman subjects, such as the Ottoman Greeks of Foçateyn, who were able to adapt to the demands of the new economy. After seizing full power in 1913, the Unionists, that is the Committee of Union and Progress, would see the increase of Ottoman Greeks as politically motivated phenomena and as a manifestation of irredentist Greek nationalism.

Spatial Transformation in Eski Foça

The transformation that took place in the incorporated areas of the Ottoman Empire created its own spaces. Modern quays, squares, hotels, summerhouses, apartments,

[223] CAMS, Θανάσης Παπουτσής interview, 24/2/1960, Athens.

theatres, schools, municipality buildings, social clubs, workshops and factories are among the prominent examples of such places. Both the state and the market, in this case the Ottoman state and global capital, made investments that altered spaces on the coast. Although both the reforming Ottoman state and the market invested in the transformation of spaces, the outcome did not represent any one of these forces in particular. Urban, contentious and cosmopolitan spaces emerged under the rule of broadly defined middle-class hegemony but under no single leadership. New economic structures, an emerging middle class, new modern spaces and new mind-sets allowed for the emergence of a new 'way of life'. Spatial transformation was one of the manifestations of this new, bourgeoisie and cosmopolitan 'way of life' on the Ottoman coast. 'The rising economic fortunes of domestic merchants coincided with the burgeoning ideological hegemony of a professional middle class in the port city. Journalists, lawyers, pharmacists, doctors and the literary elite expanded the boundaries of the public sphere on the Ottoman coast and created middle-class networks in Western Anatolia and the eastern Mediterranean'.[224] Communal ties weakened and class politics emerged in the modern port-cities and port-towns of the incorporated Ottoman coast. The space of the middle classes was a cosmopolitan one that came into being as a result of incorporation and the subsequent demographic changes on the coast. It was a space shaped by Western ideas and a relative autonomy from the centre's grasp and its main architect was the non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie of the Ottoman Empire.[225] Growth, which became the main pull factor for migration, resulted in the creation of cosmopolitan spaces. And those cosmopolitan

[224] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 41.

[225] Fatma Müge Göçek's study reveals the segmented nature of middle class formation in the Ottoman Empire where the non-Muslims of the commercial middle class were among the top consumers of Western goods as evident from the inheritance registers of the time. This was a matter of prestige that once was limited to those who were close to the state, officials and their households. It was also a powerful indicator of the exposure to Western norms and ideas that constituted the backbone of middle class values and norms. Göçek argues that these ideas further polarized the commercial element of the bourgeoisie *vis-à-vis* the center. Non-Muslim merchants were able to escape and challenge the Sultan's control. Göçek discusses why it was not the Janissaries, provincial notables, artisans or foreign residents of the Ottoman Empire but the non-Muslims who managed to emerge as the dominant element of the commercial bourgeoisie. She points out the historical peculiarities that made it easier for them to escape the center's grasp. See: Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

spaces entailed the mixing and mingling, or at least the first close encounter, between cultures and groups that had previously been separated in the Empire and rather unfamiliar with one another. Middle-class hegemony was built upon this cosmopolitan social fabric.[226]

The effects of middle class hegemony in the county of Foçateyn are most visible in the age of imperialisms. As discussed above, Foçateyn demographically grew following its economic expansion starting in the mid-19th century, attracting a large number of Ottoman Greeks from the surrounding islands and also some Ottoman Jews, Armenians, Muslims and Europeans. It was a microcosm of the larger port-cities of Izmir and Beirut and the harbour of Eski Foça acted as the center of this microcosm. The buildings and spaces in the emerging neighbourhoods of the Küçük Deniz (Μικρός Γιαλός) area and of the old town center represented the middle-class hegemonic character of the era. Orthodox community schools and churches, Ottoman governmental buildings, pharmacies, coffee houses, rakı and olive oil factories, monasteries, merchant houses and the OPDA's investments all contributed to the emergence of a cosmopolitan and modern space in the county of Foçateyn. Most of the important spatial construction projects in the county took place in the last quarter of the 19th century and they lasted until the demise of Foçateyn's growth in the spring of 1914. Eski Foça thus became the seat of modernity in the county of Foçateyn and the changes in its spaces were most visible there.

[226] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 41-45.

[Picture: The visible northerly expansion of the town in the Sartiaux City Plan, 1913. The peninsula constituted the old historical center and northerly expansion was a result of the increase in the Ottoman Greek population of the town. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 12-13.**]**

According to the provincial almanac of Aydın (1884), Eski Foça had a very large harbour that had no equivalent in the entire *Bahr-i Sefid* (Ottoman Aegean and some parts of the Ottoman Mediterranean) area.[227] Four lighthouses were built in the harbour of Eski Foça in order to ensure safe passage for ships.[228] Between 1894 and 1895, a total of 363 steamships and 2706 sailing ships entered and left the harbour of Eski Foça, and those ships were Ottoman, British, Greek, and Italian, [229] as well as from the Principality of Samos.[230] This was a very high number of ships for the

[227] Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 14.
[228] Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 15.
[229] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1895 (Hicrî: 1313), 260.
[230] A semi-autonomous principality tributary to the Ottoman Empire which was located on the Aegean island of Samos, 1834-1912.

period[231] and it shows the growth of the harbour of Eski Foça. Providing docking for so many vessels was only possible with a modern quay, and the municipality of Eski Foça built a modern quay in Eski Foça in 1893. There is not much information about how it was built but it is quite clear that it was related to the increasing volume of the salt trade. The construction of the quay involved filling in part of the sea, where two salt depots were built.[232] This modern quay became the gateway to Eski Foça and the county of Foçateyn to the world as a conduit for exported and imported goods. Like its counterpart in Izmir,[233] Eski Foça's quay also facilitated easy control of the coastline and helped the state and the OPDA in their struggle against smuggling activities while also creating a modern, mixed public space where the people of the county came together.

Trade ships were not the only visitors to Eski Foça's quay. There was also a ferry connection to Izmir, the closest major port-city. Ferry travel to Izmir entailed greater connectivity with an urban environment in an age where transportation by land was still underdeveloped and slow. The monopoly (*imtiyaz*) of the Hamidiye Company (*Şirke-i Hamidiye*) owned a (*vapur*) steamship and the rights to conduct sea transportation between Eski Foça and Izmir (including places on the coast in between). The ferry visited Eski Foça twice a week and was operated solely by *Şirke-i Hamidiye*.[234] Based on the various oral testimonies that I examined during the course of my research, it is clear that the locals of the county of Foçateyn frequently used the connection to Izmir to go shopping for luxury items as well as for bureaucratic business and family visits.

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[231] In the year 1850, the similar upstart Ottoman port-town of Haifa had some 162 vessels dock at its harbor. See: Seikaly, 'Haifa at...', 97. In an earlier phase of incorporation, in 1840 there were 869 vessels that entered the port of Izmir and 5630 vessels entered the port of İstanbul. See: Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 97.

[232] Müjgan Bahtiyar Karatosun, 'XIX. Yüzyılda Ticaret Faaliyetlerinin Temsili Mekanları: Eski Foça'da Tuz Depoları', *Ege Mimarlık*, 2/65, (2008), 34.

[233] For the effects of modern quay in Izmir see: Sibel Zandi-Sayek, 'Struggles over the Shore: Building the Quay of Izmir, 1867-1875', *City & Society*, 12/1, (2000), 55-78.

[234] Sadık Kurt, 'İzmir Hamidiye Vapur Şirketi (1884-1915)', *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1/1, (1991), 90.

The quay was built at the Büyük Deniz (Μεγάλος Γιαλός) side of the peninsula which lies at the heart of Eski Foça. The peninsula is located between two bays and was referred to as the Camî-i Kebir neighbourhood. It was the old city center where the majority of the Muslims resided in Eski Foça. The peninsula was reshaped throughout the 19th century with a variety of building projects, the majority of which, like the building of the quay, were undertaken by the Ottoman state. A government office (*Hükümet Konağı*) was built around 1863 and it was expanded around 1884.[235] Around that time, the quarantine office of Eski Foça and some shops were constructed as well. The coastline of the peninsula was entirely reshaped by the beginning of the 20th century.

The infrastructural investments and building projects of the OPDA were generally spread across the county in the form of production/extraction site improvements. These investments created job opportunities and so they became additional pull factors for migration to the county. The salt depots (*anbar*) that were built by the OPDA in Eski Foça constituted exceptions to this rule. They were at the center of the county precisely because the port was there. The OPDA commissioned the construction of two large salt depots and the maintenance of existing ones (that had been built by the municipality in the past) at the heart of the harbour of Eski Foça. The depots were built on the peninsula in the area of the Camî-i Kebir neighbourhood. Two of these depots faced the Küçük Deniz (Μικρός Γιαλός) harbour and two faced the Büyük Deniz (Μεγάλος Γιαλός) harbour. These buildings were massive building projects for their time that increased the efficiency of trade in the harbour of Eski Foça. The depots were used mainly for the storage of salt in a secure location to prevent smuggling.[236] The neighbourhood of Camî-i Kebir, the residents of which were predominantly Muslim, was not the only part of Eski Foça that experienced spatial transformations. Neighbourhoods where Ottoman Greeks lived underwent dramatic changes as well as the result of a rapid increase in the population, an increase in the building activities of the Orthodox community and also the real estate investments of merchants.

[235] BOA, MVL., 665/51, (Hicrî 09/Ş /1279) and BOA, DH.MKT., 1344/24, (Hicrî 11/C /1301).
[236] Karatosun, 'XIX. Yüzyılda...', 32-35.

[Picture: Eski Foça Cami-i Kebir (town center) map. The map shows the locations of the salt depots, customs house, government office (*Hükümet Konağı*), coastal batteries (cannons), a munitions depot, *Beş Kapılar* castle, *Dış* (Outer) castle and some houses and shops. BOA, HRT 1930. (Hicrî 20/M/1286). The date is May 1869.**]**

The population of the county of Foçateyn grew relatively quickly over a period of thirty years. There were some 7,876 Ottoman Greeks in the county of Foçateyn in 1884 and that number almost doubled and climbed to 15,670 according to the Ottoman population census of 1914.[237] This rapid growth brought about the emergence of new neighbourhoods all across the county. The two central towns of the county of Foçateyn (Eski Foça and Yeni Foça) were both located by the sea. The old town centres were walled and Eski Foça also had a castle. When these towns expanded, new neighbourhoods were built in the vicinity of the old walled cities and they often were populated solely by Ottoman Greeks. Vangelis Diniakos (Βαγγέλης Ντηνιακός) recalled that Yeni Foça's new neighbourhoods were located outside the old walled center and that "Turks" (meaning Muslims) only lived in the old center while "Greeks" (meaning Ottoman Greeks) lived mostly outside of it. He noted that the houses in the old center tended to be small and built up against one another. Some such houses apparently had adjacent walls with openings through which residents could talk to each other from within their houses. Vangelis also pointed out that the newer houses had their own gardens and had a separate space for animals. Almost all of the houses were built with local stones and none were painted on the outside.[238]

Mehmet Peker, who claims to have had a wealthy grandfather who lived in Eski Foça, stated that they had a large two floor stone house with its own garden in the old town (Cami-i Kebir) of Eski Foça. He also said that another Muslim family had a masonry home surrounded by pine trees in one of the new neighbourhoods of Eski Foça. He stated that most of the other houses were rather small but the houses of the Ottoman Greeks were medium-sized.[239] Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, another old resident of Eski Foça, stated that the Ottoman Greeks used to have better houses than Muslims and that they used imported roof tiles for their houses. He also confirmed that all the houses were made of stone.[240] These accounts suggest that the towns of Foçateyn grew quickly and the new neighbourhoods differed from those of the old city center in

[237] Karpat, *Ottoman Population...*, 174.
[238] CAMS, Βαγγέλης Ντηνιακός interview, 26/3/1964, Athens and CAMS, Βαγγέλης Ντηνιακός interview, 18/4/1964, Athens.
[239] EBOHC, Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31/8/1995.
[240] EBOHC, Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, Menemen, 4/10/1997.

some regards. The new houses were larger, had more space for leisure and areas set aside for animals. The new neighbourhoods tended not to be closed off but most faced the sea and the quay. It appears that there were some mixed neighbourhoods, especially in the old town centres, but most of the new neighbourhoods consisted of primarily Ottoman Greek residents or Muslims. An increase in the number of the county's residents brought with it an increasing demand for schools, public buildings and communal buildings, and this was fulfilled by structures built by the Orthodox residents of the county.

[Picture: The boomtown of Eski Foça in 1912.[241] A careful examination of the number of ships in the picture reveals just how busy the harbour was.**]**

Tanzimat reforms in the 19th century gave non-Muslims the freedom to build their own religious buildings based on the needs of their respective communities. In this way, the reforms opened the way for the construction of numerous churches, hospitals, orphanages and schools. According to Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu, these developments had considerable impact on the building projects of the Orthodox

[241] The photograph is from the author's collection.

millet. 'Villages and small towns near Ürgüp, Kayseri, Niğde, and Aksaray in Cappadocia, around Foça and Selçuk in Western Anatolia, and surrounding Mersin in the south were marked by monumental churches that conveyed the richness of their patrons and demonstrated the new freedoms of religious expression and identity'.[242] These newly constructed spaces became the face of the new Ottoman society, especially in Europe, and they often became icons of oriental fascination in twentieth century post cards.



[242] Filiz Çalışlar Yenişehiroğlu, 'Urban Texture and Architectural Styles after the Tanzimat', in *Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean*, ed. Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis, (Athens: Alpha Bank Historical Archives, 2010), 504.

[Picture: A church plan of the Söğütçük village of the county of Foçateyn. Source: BOA, İ.AZN., 107/1330/N-04. The date is July 1912.**]**

These buildings were also representations of middle-class hegemony along the coastlines. In 1908 there were 11 Orthodox (Ottoman Greek) schools and three Muslim schools in Eski Foça alone.[243] According to the provincial almanacs of Aydın, between 1899 and 1908, there were 24 churches in the county of Foçateyn. According to another provincial statistic in 1918, there were 4 churches and 34 monasteries.[244] It is highly probable that some of the monasteries were registered as churches in the initial accounts. Between 1911 and 1912, permission was given for the construction of three additional churches (in Gerenköy, Söğütçük and Eski Foça Hacı Limanı area).[245] One of those churches was actually built in the village of Söğütçük village in 1912 and a small school was built next to it. Above is a picture of the plan of the church complex.

The construction of spaces in the 19th century was not confined to the building projects of the state and the religious communities. The emerging wealth of classes who succeeded in both international and domestic trade made it possible for them to create their own spaces of leisure and business. Wealthy estates, banks, factories, summerhouses, hotels, coffeehouses, theatres, sports clubs and restaurants started to appear in cities and towns surrounding areas that were engaged in trade. From the early days of the Tanzimat up until the end of the Empire, foreign architects and architects who had been educated in Europe were commissioned to design numerous building projects by the state, local communities, foreign protectors or the bourgeoisie, and this contributed to the creation of architectural pluralism in the Empire. Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu states that eclecticism was the central characteristic of these structures, and a common phenomenon to all countries around the Mediterranean. Shared features included 'the neo-classical style and architectural features with orientalistic forms [that] would be employed within a local eclecticism

[243] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1908 (Hicrî: 1326), 381.
[244] Data is delivered from: Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 20.
[245] See: BOA, ŞD, 82/13, (Hicrî 05/S /1330); BOA, İ.AZN., 107/1330/N-04 (Hicrî 16/N /1330); BOA, İ.AZN., 26/1315/M-12, (Hicrî 21/M /1315) and BOA, İ.AZN., 114/1331/Za-21, (Hicrî 24/Za/1331).

underlined by an Italian touch mixed with the architectural paradigms of the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris'.[246] The representation of spatial projects by the new rich, in other words the emerging middle class, was most visible in Eski Foça. Many houses were built on the seaside in Eski Foça in the last quarter of the 19th century. They were much larger than older homes and were often built by merchants from Eski Foça or Izmir. Some good examples of such houses still stand today.

In the age of imperialisms, the county of Foçateyn was reshaped by construction projects carried out by the Ottoman state, the OPDA, the Orthodox community and the emerging bourgeoisie. Although the traces of these developments are only partially visible today, they still constitute the visually most striking aspects of Foçateyn's past, which is no coincidence. Foçateyn, and Eski Foça in particular, grew rapidly in the age of imperialisms. Schools, telegraph offices, new government buildings, a modern quay, industrial infrastructure, new neighbourhoods, religious buildings, shops and summerhouses for leisure became the spatial representations of the character of the Ottoman coast in Foçateyn.

[246] Yenişehiroğlu, 'Urban Texture...', 509.

[Picture: Eski Foça *yalı*s on the shoreline of the new neighbourhood. *Beş Kapılar* castle, on the shore of the historic peninsula, can be seen on the right. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 120-121. (1913).**]**

[**Picture:** A modern day picture of late 19th century *yalı*s on the shoreline, Eski Foça, 2013. Authors' collection.]

Final Words on Eski Foça the Boomtown

The history of the 19th century in the county of Foçateyn is the history of an emerging path. This path was a path to modernity, a trajectory which was formed by two major forces: the state and the market. Ottoman incorporation into the capitalist world economy brought about the influence of market forces. At the same time, state sponsored modernization through the Ottoman agenda of reform ushered in greater

state influence. The result was a peculiar imperial path to modernity as experienced in Foçateyn as a coastal path. So far this thesis discussed the effects of the forces of the market on the growth of the county of Foçateyn, which was predominantly commerce driven. Also, as it has been noted, 'As far as the Aegean towns were concerned, increasing commercial development encouraged immigration'.[247] Commercial development thus triggered growth in terms of the local demography and the building of spaces. The increase in commercial activity was possible only through a weakening of the provisionist policies of the Empire, and that was a direct result of European penetration into Ottoman markets following a series of events in the late 18th century. The capitulations, which later conflicted with Ottoman provisionism, had already been in place, but subsequent events resulting from Ottoman military defeats prompted the Porte to embark on a constant search for new loans to reform its "sick" war machine. Thanks to the fact that it was an attractive investment market and through successful Ottoman diplomacy, more loans were procured and diplomatic support postponed the destruction of the Ottoman dynasty. However, the cost of taking on more loans resulted in turn in further penetration of European states, which eventually caused the dissolution of the protective economic barriers of the Ottomans.

Eski Foça's emergence as a boomtown in the late 19th century is one of the many examples of economic and demographic booms brought on by capitalist penetration in the incorporated areas of the Ottoman Empire. Starting in the 18th century, Eski Foça began to be transformed from the small port town of an agrarian empire to a boomtown of global markets. As that transformation continued, Foçateyn grew and prospered in terms of development and wealth. It was more connected but also more controlled and regulated. As demonstrated above, on the one hand this growth caused a breakdown of the Ottoman centre's grasp on the economy of the county, and that growth was in turn predicated upon that weakening of control. However, at the same time the growth of the economy and incorporation also depended on the existence of an environment in which the state existed as an enforcer of contracts and of order in general. This was evident in the way the OPDA and the Ottoman bureaucracy sought to manipulate one another in the hope of realizing their own agendas.

[247] Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen...*, 276.

[**Picture:** Hotel Lola 38 on the Eski Foça shoreline, the *yalı* built by Foçateyn salt merchant Ioannis Fratzeskos in 1891.[248]]

Towards the end of the age of imperialisms, in the first decade of the 20th century, Eski Foça became the spatial seat of modernity and middle-class hegemony in the county of Foçateyn. This hegemony represented the demands and future prospects of the people of the incorporated parts of the Ottoman Empire. Like most of the port-towns and port-cities in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean, Eski Foça became a place where bourgeoisie cosmopolitanism started to dominate. Now, one can ask how did the Ottoman elite feel about the emergence of bourgeoisie cosmopolitanism or if that cosmopolitanism was as established and strong as it was promoted in contemporary romantic interpretations of the past? How did the residents of Foçateyn feel about the changes happening around them? What role did nationalisms play? I

[248] Picture obtained from public web domain: http://gezimanya.com/uploads/content/TravelNotes/Userfiles/FOCA/R8_resize.JPG (accessed December 2013).

would like to discuss these before I proceed with the period of transition in Foçateyn that started in June of 1914.

CHAPTER III

Bourgeoisie Cosmopolitanism or Nationalisms?

The peculiar ways in which the market and the state shaped the Ottoman coast as global forces, and the way in which the local agents of change and local structures intermingled with them facilitated the emergence of a distinct 'way of life'. This 'way of life', namely middle-class hegemony, found expression in bourgeoisie cosmopolitanism. Middle-class hegemony on the Ottoman coast was neither the representative of imperial interests nor did it represent the interests of the Ottoman center. The inhabitants of the cosmopolitan and incorporated port-cities and port-towns occupied a distinct position situated between the market and the state. This afforded them a certain amount of autonomy from both of those global forces while also rendering them dependent to a certain extent on both. The intellectuals of those incorporated areas developed their own visions of the future. A trajectory towards modernity emerged that was both distanced from the centralization policies of the center and the imperialist policies of the West. Emrence's analysis encapsulates this succinctly:

> The port-city intellectual possessed a distinct social habitus in late Ottoman society. He was cosmopolitan but local, and pro-reform but neither anti-state nor against community. Ottoman middle classes viewed modernization from a locally-embedded perspective and searched for the 'right balance' between the local and the global. This position was crystal clear in the way western consumption patterns, communal identities, and gender relations were discussed in the Ottoman press. Still as 'rooted cosmopolitans', they did represent a challenge to existing communal hierarchies, the increasing power of the Ottoman state, and the European imperialist project. [249]

Ultimately, incorporation brought about the dissolution of effective imperial control of the Ottoman coast. It brought growth, the emergence of a middle class and global

[249] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 42.

connections while also eroding the boundaries of the 'old ways' and creating modern and mixed spaces. This was the habitus created by incorporation.

'Shaped by free-trade, the coastal path was controlled by non-Muslim merchants whose economic fortunes depended more on the global economy than the Ottoman state. Port-cities amassed enormous economic wealth, which elevated the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie to a leadership position, gave birth to a nascent civil society, and sponsored a discourse of urban autonomy'.[250] Ottoman port-cities, and later port-towns, became economic centres and their wealth and job opportunities became pull factors that attracted migrants from less developed parts of the Empire and beyond. As a result of migration and growth, port-cities and port-towns turned into multi-ethnic and multi-religious environments with '...an expanded public space and a variety of global connections'.[251] These were the spaces where previously unconnected segments of society were brought together.

The ideas of the Ottoman middle classes were compatible with the mind-set of Ottoman reformers as they formulated notions concerning the imperial fatherland and concentric homelands (*vatan*) within the Ottoman universe. Despite their varying formulations, imperial reform and a broad definition of an Ottoman entity remained as a common point of reference until World War I. The middle classes were mostly concerned with the urban question of expanding port-cities and they provided solutions by promoting solidarity through charity. The elites of the incorporated coast dominated city municipalities and they sometimes tested their own reforms through those platforms. But at the same time, expansion of trade from the coast towards the hinterland and class conflict in bourgeoning cities and towns created economic contention along the coasts as well. [252] Such strife was reflected in society as collective actions. 'The Ottoman coast experienced new forms of collective action. There were acts of communal violence in the hinterland, tensions of hegemony in the port-towns, and class struggles in the port-city'.[253] Despite the various challenges and contentions that arose, a strong domestic middle class consolidated the distinct

[250] Ibid., 52.
[251] Ibid., 52.
[252] Ibid., 41-53.
[253] Ibid., 52.

character of the Ottoman coast. From port-city press to merchant houses and from municipal councils to social clubs, it was the perspective of the middle class that counted on the Ottoman coast.[254]

All of the three major aspects of the coastal path (the dissolution of effective imperial control, the emergence of a middle-class hegemony and the emergence of new forms of collective action) can be observed in the history of the county of Foçateyn that this thesis has discussed so far. Eski Foça, the boomtown of the county of Foçateyn, was the central stage in which these aspects were most visible. Eski Foça symbolized the distinctiveness, autonomy and cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman coast, the dissolution of effective imperial control and the emergence of new forms of collective action in the county of Foçateyn.

The *Belle Époque* in the Memories of Foçateyn's Residents

Ottoman Greeks and Muslims have often depicted their lives back in Anatolia as days of harmony and coexistence. People on both sides of the Aegean still recall these memories and convey them orally. In many cases, people with first-hand accounts and the grandchildren of refugees have written popular pieces of literature[255] about the times before the founding of the nation that discuss a cosmopolitan past. This undoubtedly has much to do with the constraints of today's nation states in Turkey and Greece. However, as Doumanis points out, offhand dismissal of such oral sources and literature for reason of its purported 'overtly nostalgic' tone is a hasty approach. In his recent major work *Before the Nation*, Doumanis states, 'the most striking characteristic of Anatolian refugee memory was not the nostalgia for lost homelands but the extremely charitable depiction of former neighbours'.[256] The past was remembered as a *Belle Époque.* Greek refugees would often say that they had gotten on well with the Turks. Doumanis underscores that this indeed was the case until the

[254] Ibid., 41-53.
[255] One internationally known example of such literature inspired by first-hand experiences of people is the book *Birds without Wings* (2004) written by Louis de Bernières. A certain fictional village, Eskibahçe, is described as the center of plot in the novel and it is inspired by Kayaköyü (Λεβισσι), a village located near modern day Fethiye on the southern shores of Turkey.
[256] Doumanis, *Before the*..., 44.

First Balkan War started in 1912 when things were relatively stable and peaceful and Ottoman Greeks and Muslims lived in a cross-cultural reality.[257]

Having investigated the oral testimonies of the old Muslim residents of Foçateyn, I must say that I concur with Doumanis' observation. Muslims of Foçateyn also often remembered the period before the Balkan Wars as a period of peace, growth and coexistence. Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, a native of Foçateyn, was able to recall the names of the *Rum* (Ottoman Greek) doctors and olive oil producers who used to reside in Yeni Foça and he noted that they lived like brothers with them (*'kardeş gibi yaşardık'*)[258]. Mehmet Peker, another native of Foçateyn who was born in 1901, recalled that there were more *Rum* than Muslims when he was a child, and that there used to be a few Armenians and Jews as well. He also stated that the *Rum* and Turks were like brothers (*'Rumlar ile Türkler kardeş gibiydik'*)[259]. It was just as much a *Belle Époque* for many Muslims[260] as it was for the Ottoman Greeks.

The effects of economic incorporation were most visible in the county of Foçateyn around the 1860s. By the turn of the century, Eski Foça was a bourgeoning town that had been dramatically transformed. Its economy was constantly expanding and its products were shipped across the globe. Foçateyn was no longer a mere port-town of an agrarian empire. Thanks to incorporation it broke the restraints of the Ottoman command economy and became a trade hub among the ever-expanding networks of the global economy. The process of incorporation created new jobs and new wealth at the cost of destroying the 'old way of things'. At the same time, however, mechanization and the optimization of operations along the coasts resulted in the loss

[257] For a detailed analysis of the variety of interactions and practices among the cross-cultural communities of the Empire between 1890 and 1912, see: Doumanis, *Before the…*, 61-86.
[258] EBOHC, Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, Menemen, 4.10.1997.
[259] EBOHC, Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31.8.1995.
[260] For an important compilation of a collection of oral historical testimonies of the old residents of Izmir, in which similar notions of nostalgia and coexistence are emphasized by Muslims (from Izmir, as refugees and part of population exchange agreements), see: Pelin Böke, *İzmir 1919-1922 Tanıklıklar*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2006). There is also an emphasis on a *Belle Époque*-like past in the various Muslim testimonies presented in Böke's work that talk about the period before the Balkan Wars and the Great War.

of some jobs. The establishment of the OPDA after 1881 brought more control and sharply limited the informal economy and smuggling. The workers of Eski Foça undertook collective actions in the form of strikes and protests. They bargained and struggled for their rights like many other port workers elsewhere in the Empire. As Eski Foça's population grew, it became more cosmopolitan. Armenians, Europeans, Jews, Muslims and Ottoman Greeks resided in Eski Foça. Throughout Eski Foça's expansion, Ottoman Greeks gradually replaced Muslims as the demographically prominent group of the town. Towards the end of the 19th century almost all of the major traders ("*principaux négociants*" and sellers of raisins, wood, spices, medicine, mastic, wines and products) in Eski Foça and Yeni Foça were Ottoman Greeks.[261] Eski Foça had churches, a Jewish *havra*, monasteries, mosques and *tekke*s (*Sufi* dervish lodges). There were three primary (*ibtidaî*) and three high (*rüşdî*) schools in Eski Foça alone. Half of these belonged to the Muslim community and half belonged to the Orthodox Christian community. The county had hotels, factories, shops, coffee houses, *meyhane*s (establishments serving alcohol), restaurants, pharmacies, shipyards and bakeries.[262]

Eski Foça's emergence as a boomtown reinforced its already central role in the economy and administration of Foçateyn. Oral testimonies from the old residents of Ottoman Foçateyn illustrate that the residents of the county frequently travelled to Eski Foça for weekly shopping and to Izmir for bureaucratic matters and for celebrations and feasts. The various communities of Eski Foça lived separately but together. The major communities, namely the Muslims and the Ottoman Greeks (together with other non-Muslims), had their own neighbourhoods, schools, cemeteries and places of worship. Yet these communities were brought together in the market, the city center and the port. The expansion of Eski Foça eroded the boundaries of the communal quarters (*mahalle* or Greek *μαχαλάς*) and created mixed

[261] See: Jacob de Andria, *Indicateur des Professions Commerciales & Industrielles de Smyrne, de l'Anatolie etc.*, (Smyrne: Imprimerie Commerciale Timoni, 1895), 104 and Jacob de Andria, *Indicateur des Professions Commerciales et Industrielles de Smyrne, de l'Anatolie, des Côtes, des Iles etc.*, (Smyrne: Imprimeri Commerciale Timoni, 1896), Chapter 2, 45 and Raphael C. Cervati, *Annuaire Oriental du Commerce de l'Industrie, de l'Administration et de la Magistrature*, (Paris: Ch. Lorilleux & Cie, 1891), 827.
[262] Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti...', 20.

quarters. The new modern spaces such as the port created public spaces that crossed the boundaries of the communal quarters. Oral testimonies demonstrate that there was more inter-communal interaction in public space when people were younger and when there were feasts of any particular religion. Children with different backgrounds may have played together but when they grew up, they often socialized and married people from their own communities. There were, of course, exceptions to these boundaries. At times Muslims and Ottoman Greeks became good neighbours, jointly owned businesses, sent their children to each other's shops to work, became god fathers, married or worked in the same occupation.[263]

There was no clearly defined communal or ethnic division of labour. However, Muslims were visibly more involved in state (and also the OPDA) bureaucracy and they constituted the majority of the small land-holding peasantry and the (medium and) large farm owners. Non-Muslims of the county, especially the Ottoman Greeks, were most of the time pharmacists, port-workers, day labourers, salt mine leaders, restaurant owners and traders. There were also cases, nonetheless rare, in which they owned large farms. In general, although not exclusively, Muslims were involved in the state and non-Muslims were involved in the new venues of economic activity created by incorporation and modernity. This broad compartmentalization was permeable and had many exceptions. There were cases in which non-Muslims served the state as guards of the castle of Eski Foça[264] and there were shops that were co-owned by Muslims and non-Muslims.[265] Both Muslims and non-Muslims worked in the salt business but the latter were much more numerous and dominated the trade.

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[263] The information presented here on the outlines of everyday life in Foçateyn are a result of the researcher's investigations of the oral testimonies of the EBOHC and CAMS archives, two Greek novels: Αθανάσιος Ε. Καραθανάσης, *Σε λένε Σμύρνη, Φώκαια, Σερέκιοϊ, Μαινεμένη, Σαγγάριο: Στην Ιστορία και τον Χαλασμό*, (Athens: Κυριακίδη Αφοί, 2007), and Παρασκευάς Γ. Συριανόγλου, *Θεμέλια του Πολιτισμού Μας: Λαογραφικά Μικράς Ασίας - Π. & Ν. Φώκαιας*, (Rethymno: Ο Ραδάμανθυς, 1998) and a Turkish novel: Kemal Anadol, *Büyük Ayrılık*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003).

[264] For a document talking about the services of Ottoman non-Muslims in the castle of Yeni Foça see: BOA, HAT, 633/31258, (Hicrî 29/Z /1253). The date is 1838.

[265] EBOHC, Hüseyin Arslan, Kozbeyli, 08/10/1995.

Modernity and capitalism were the two major forces that dissolved the old way of things and old social and economic boundaries in Eski Foça. A look at the history of the town in the 19th and early 20th century gives the impression that as modernity and capitalism transformed the town, the communities became more and more integrated and mixed. Economic and social compartmentalizations did exist but they were rapidly being redefined, changed and merged. It is a valid question to ask if that trend would have disappeared with increased incorporation, urbanization and modernization. At the zenith of its expansion, Eski Foça's seashore neighbourhoods were full of prestigious stone houses mostly owned by merchants. The expanding Orthodox community built new churches[266] and the hegemony of the middle classes was established in the spatial features of the town. In short, Eski Foça was a bourgeoning cosmopolitan boomtown.

A short piece on the history of Foça in the Aydın provincial almanac of 1908 reveals that even the 'official' narrative of the history of the town embraced this cosmopolitan structure. According to the text (*Foça'nın Ahval-i Tarihiyesi*), Foça had first been established at the same location as Ottoman Foça more than a thousand years prior in antiquity. Its people were members of the Ionian civilization and they built famously sturdy ships with which they founded colonies in the Mediterranean, including Marseille. The text delivers a eulogy on the ancient people of Foça for their heroic defence of their town against the invasions of their ancient enemies (such as the Persians). The text states that the Romans, Eastern Romans, Genoese and Saruhan Beğ of the Seljukids ruled Foça until its conquest by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror. It says that Sultan Mehmet II left it under Genoese control in exchange for appropriate taxation and on the condition that the area would remain part of the Ottoman Empire, and hence Foça became Ottoman.[267] The text recognized the history of ancient Foça as a meaningful starting point and made no Islamic or Turkic references to legitimize the Ottoman character of the county. Ottoman protection was presented as an adequate reason to become Ottoman and no nationalist reasoning was

[266] For a detailed investigation of the surviving churches that were built in the 19th century in Foçateyn see: M. Sacit Pekak, '18.-19. Yüzyıllarda Anadolu'da Yaşayan Gayrımüslimlerin İmar Faaliyetleri ve Foça'daki Post-Bizans Kiliseleri', in *Geçmişten Günümüze Foça: Uluslararası Sempozyum*, (Ankara: Yayımevi A.Ş., 1997), 75-90.
[267] *Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın*, 1908 (Hicrî: 1326), 387-388.

presented; in fact, on the contrary, the ancient Greek past of the county was cherished. Although this is not entirely unorthodox for 1908,[268] in less than a decade, with the increasing rise of nationalism, any non-Turkic or non-Islamic references in Ottoman history would be deemed unacceptable. Homogenous references of nationalism would ultimately triumph over the cosmopolitan references of middle-class hegemony. The *Belle Époque* in Foçateyn was a cross-cultural reality based on a fragile cosmopolitanism in which ideas of coexistence were present alongside nationalisms.

Struggle of Nationalisms over Cross-cultural Coastal Space

The first major manifestation of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire was the Greek revolts of 1821-30 and the subsequent founding of the Kingdom of Greece in 1832. Although there had been peasant revolts, discontent and other revolts among the Greeks of the Empire before 1821, this last set of Greek revolts had genuine political demands and a genuine nationalist rhetoric. According to Yusuf Hakan Erdem, the Greek revolts of 1821-1830 shook the Ottoman state system to its foundations because of its demands and success and so they 'brought nationalism home'.[269] Apart from its clear political implications, the Greek revolution brought a new vocabulary (and/or new uses of old concepts) to the attention of the Ottoman rulers such as nation (*vatan*), nationalism (*millet, milliyet*), Hellenic vs Ottoman Greek (*Yunan vs. Rum*) and liberty (*serbesti*). As a result, Ottomans had to redefine their legitimacy and political rhetoric against ideas that were no longer 'distant curiosities of the French Revolution'.[270] The emergence of the Kingdom of Greece as a nation-state triggered

[268] Some Ottoman Greek residents of Foçateyn were also aware of the history of Foçateyn in Antiquity. As a matter of fact, they once wanted to represent the people of Foçateyn in Marseille where the city's ancient Phocean colonizers were commemorated. They saw themselves as the representatives of the ancient Phoceans. See: BOA, BEO, 1361/102057, (Hicrî 20/R/1317). The date is 24 November 1899.

[269] For a discussion of the use of the expression 'Greek War of Independence' and 'Greek Revolts' see: Yusuf Hakan Erdem, 'The Greek Revolt and the End of the Old Ottoman Order', in *The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event*, (İstanbul: Isis, 2011), 258-259.

[270] Yusuf Hakan Erdem, 'Do not think of Greeks as Agricultural Labourers: Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence', *Citizenship and the Nation-state in Greece and Turkey*, Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas (eds.), (London: Routledge, 2005), 81.

the creation of a genuine counter idea among the Ottoman elite in a modern context: the bolstering of Islamic identity. According to Erdem:

> One of the first discernible effects of the first full-fledged nationalist revolt in the Ottoman Empire was to bolster the Islamic establishment. The rulers of the empire once more began to speak the language of the holy war against the infidels. Paradoxically enough, at the end of the crisis, thanks to such momentous changes as the abolition of the janissary army, the disappearance of the – coalition between the Ulema (Islamic learned class) and the janissaries or the establishment of a conscript citizen army, the Ottoman Empire was ready as it never had been to accept modernity together with its nation-state building tools.[271]

The emergence of a Greek nation-state had a profound effect on the new imperial class of Ottoman bureaucrats who had already been in the making since the late 18th century. It was this bureaucratic class that had to formulate a counter idea against the influence of the French Revolution and the nationalism that was brought about by the emergence of the Greek nation. These bureaucrats, whose numbers had been increasing as a result of the reforms targeting centralization and military restructuring that emerged as a response to the Ottoman defeat in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787, launched a phase of hegemonic conceptual reformulations which found expression in the issuance of the 1839 Rescript of the Rose Chamber (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif-î*). After the Rescript, the bureaucracy established a 'living space' for itself and curbed the Sultan's monopoly of power to some extent. They developed the idea of reforms and novel institutions in the Empire as a response to military defeats, modernity and nationalism. Also central to their efforts were centralization policies and European support for political survival while rejuvenating the state apparatus. After 1876, with the introduction of the first Ottoman constitution, they consolidated their position. This period was characterized by a 'thickening of administrative posture' in which a new imperial class of bureaucrats sought to protect the territorial integrity of the challenged empire as a self-assigned mission. The new bureaucratic

[271] Erdem, 'Do not think of Greeks...', 67.

class was multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, and predominantly Muslim.[272] This class formulated Ottomanism as a remedy to nationalisms and Great Power imperialisms. Essentially, Ottomanism was a state nationalism, a French-inspired model which tried to create an overarching identity for the various peoples living in the diverse Ottoman Empire. Ottomanism was at best cautiously received by the non-Muslims of the Empire and, as an ideology; it questions the equal participation non-Muslims in the state apparatus. The leaders of the Kingdom of Greece despised it because it was a project of political centralization that would counter its irredentist aspirations. Therefore, on the Ottoman coast, where imperial rule was contested, rival nationalisms struggled for dominance. An irredentist Greek nationalism (with a Hellenic character) and an imperial Ottoman one (with an emphasis on Islam) struggled over Western Anatolia roughly between the emergence of Greece in 1832 and the empowerment of the Unionists in 1913. Later, after 1913, a Muslim nationalism with a heavy dose of Turkish ethnocentrism replaced the Ottoman form of imperial nationalism.

Middle-class hegemony on the Ottoman coast hinged on a fragile balance that appeased the various demands of the communities with cosmopolitanism and middle-class values. This hegemony acted as a neutralizer of the nationalism of the new Ottoman imperial class and that of the ethnic-religious nationalisms (especially the Greeks). Middle-class hegemony constituted a balancing factor to nationalist demands and secessionism as long as the coast remained integrated, partially autonomous from the centre's grasp, and the middle-classes remained economically dominant as intermediaries. This inevitably tied the coast's fortunes to that of global capitalism and it required decentralization of the Ottoman system. When the Ottoman imperial bureaucratic class matured and undertook a policy of centralization, middle-class hegemony started to crumble. Some elites, both Muslim and non-Muslim, reverted back to nationalism and secessionism whereas some tried to refashion imperial nationalism[273] in order to preserve their privileges. The Balkan Wars and subsequent

[272] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 102-104.
[273] For the discussion of the variety of empire-oriented (such as Helleno-Ottomanism, or a federation of Eastern States) and nation-state oriented formulas used among the Greek Orthodox see: Vangelis Kechriotis, 'Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman-Greeks or just

World War I struck the final blows to middle-class hegemony by ending the reign of global capitalism. The middle-class was also stripped of its economic power base after those conflicts. The transformation of Eski Foça (and Foçateyn at large) from a boomtown into a ghost town began after the Balkan Wars. Nationalism replaced middle-class hegemony and the national economy replaced incorporation in Foçateyn after the spring of 1914. However, nationalisms had been looming in the background long before that.

There is insufficient information to make a sound analysis about the degree of influence that varying nationalisms had on the residents of Foçateyn. There are, however, bits and pieces of information that show how nationalisms loomed in the background of the middle-class hegemony. It is evident from the data in the provincial almanacs that the Ottoman Greek community of Foçateyn had more schools and teachers than its Muslim counterpart, suggesting that rates of literacy were higher among the Orthodox community. This in turn entails greater access to nationalist messages in the modern public space. The oral testimonies of the old Ottoman Greek residents of Foçateyn show that some of the teachers of these schools came from the Kingdom of Greece and they mostly taught Greek history, language and culture. Testimonies suggest that Ottoman Greeks sometimes knew Turkish but only to a limited extent.[274] This seems to have been out of necessity rather than as a part of the educational curriculum. As a result, it is logical to assume that secularist and nationalist tendencies in education boosted Greek nationalist identity through secular teachers from the Kingdom of Greece. In fact, nationalisation of the previous system of communal education was an Empire-wide phenomenon in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[275] However, none of this information reveals anything about the position of the entire Ottoman Greek community of Foçateyn vis-à-vis Ottomanism or Greek nationalism. There is one striking piece of information about nationalisms in

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Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution', *Études Balkaniques* (1/2005): 51-71.

[274] CAMS, Βαγγέλης Ντηνιακός, 11/03/1964, Athens; CAMS, Βαγγέλης Ντηνιακός, 26/03/1964, Athens and CAMS, Πέπα Δέσποινα, 20/03/1959, Athens.

[275] For discussion of this educational phenomenon and its various effects on different Ottoman *millet*s see: Selçuk Akşin Somel, 'Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period', in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, Elisabeth Özdalga (ed.), (London: Routledge Press, 2005), 254-273.

those times and that can be traced to the votive letter of an Ottoman Greek from Foçateyn written in 1887.

Ottoman Greeks in Foçateyn had a tradition of making sacrifices and votives when they laid the first stone of a house that they were building. Dimitros Papadopoulos (*Δημήτριος Παπαδόπουλος*) of Gerenköy (*Κερένκιόϊ*) abided by this tradition and placed a votive letter inside the first stone at his new house in Eski Foça. This letter recently came to light when the house was renovated by its current owners. It was written in May 27th of 1887 and included a set of prayers from Orthodox Christian holy texts and poetic lines. The voice of the author is present only at the beginning and end of the letter:

> Today is the 27th of May, Wednesday. Now is the time when the owner of this house, Dimitios Papadopoulos of Gerenköy, lays the first stone of this home. Blessed be the heart of the man who places his soul around the world. (...) This was written on the 27th of May 1887 under the reign of Sultan Hamit and of George I, the king of the Greeks and the successor of Constantin, and the one that the Christian nation might desire for liberation from the Turkish yoke and tyranny. May those who will get to see the cross on the dome of Agia Sofia in Constantinople be blessed...[276]

It would seem that a religiously inspired form of Greek nationalism inspired some residents in the county of Foçateyn. The author sees the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II as tyranny and yearns for its replacement. However, it should be pointed out that this was a widespread perception about Hamidian rule for many subjects of the Empire, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Abdülhamit was even referred as the Red Sultan (because of his bloody repression of discontent) who abolished the constitution and was depicted as ruling with an iron fist in the British press. For Papadopoulos, the solution lies in the triumph of a Christian nation that would replace Ottoman rule in Istanbul. Like many others in his time, who were influenced by the various forms of

[276] I was able to access the letter through a contemporary resident of Eski Foça, Prof. Dr. Fikret Adanır. For a sample page of the original letter see the appendix.

Orthodox and Greek nationalisms, Papadopoulos aspires to see Agia Sofia as a church under the reign of a Christian ruler.

In another instance, in June 1913 in the midst of the Second Balkan War, Izmir's *Kuva-yi Mürettebe Kumandanı* (Commander of Forces) sent a report to the Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa calling his attention to a charity founded by Ottoman Greeks in Foçateyn. According to the report, all the income of that particular cinema that opened in Foça was donated to the Greek navy.[277] This proved to be fatally damaging for Ottoman nationalists' perceptions of the minorities in the Empire after the end of the Balkan Wars. As I will discuss later, because of the stories about such charities and the aid dedicated to the Greek nationalist cause, all Ottoman Greeks started to be otherized and perceived as potential agents of Hellenism in Western Anatolia.

Making assertions about the effect of nationalisms on the Muslims of Foçateyn is equally difficult. Muslims were less educated compared to the Ottoman Greeks of the county of Foçateyn and most importantly they were much less 'aware' of the ethnocentric Turkish national identity. Muslim interviewees of the oral testimonies use 'Turk' and 'Muslim' interchangeably. The use of Muslim identity as a label only becomes particularly tangible at times when they talk about *muhacir*s (who were the Muslim refugees of the lost Ottoman territories). They refer to *muhacir*s as Muslims or with names derived from their original hometowns (*Giritli, Limnili, Boşnak, Midillili*, and so on) instead of referring to them as Turks. This is not surprising since Turkism started to become dominant only after the Balkan Wars and a secular Turkish nationalism became dominant only after the mid-1920s. It was only after the mid-1920s that people were considered to be Turks as we think of it today. The interviews of the EBOHA archive were held in in the late 1990s when a secular Turkish identity was the dominant reference and so the interviewees used Muslim and Turk interchangeably. However, despite the later influence of the Turkish nationalism of the Kemalist era in the interviews, Muslim nationalism does appear to predominate as a communal identity before the Balkan Wars. Most importantly, the transition from

[277] BOA. A.DVN, 803/96, (31 Mayıs 1329). Citation taken from: Ahmet Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı Rumları: Göç ve Tehçir (1912-1918)*, (İstanbul: Bayrak Yayımcılık, 2011), 36.

ordinary Ottomans to nationally conscious Muslims or Turks is very much evident in the interviews. As a matter of fact, the testimony of one of Eski Foça's old residents presents a very good individual example of the construction of a national self.

Ferit Oğuz Bayır, a resident of Eski Foça from early 1920s onward, said that he learned that he was a Turk thanks to the modern teachers school (*Dar-ül Muallimin*) of Istanbul. When he started the teachers school, World War I had just started and his family had recently fled from Edirne as *muhacir*s after its loss in 1913 during the First Balkan War. He recalled that most of the schoolbooks at the teachers school were translations from contemporary French books and he praised the 'revolutionary' policies of the Unionist Ottoman government of the period. He said that his 'most enlightened' days as a candidate teacher were a result of dialogues with the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths), a Turkish nationalist circle. He remembered being heavily influenced by the ideas of prominent nationalists like Ahmet Ağaoğlu and he said that he felt like 'the doors of a new world' had opened in front of him. He recalled that the young candidate teachers learned that they were Turks as a result of the history books promoted by those Turkists from the Turkish Hearths. He remembered giving public speeches to spread his ideas and being encouraged by members of the CUP. However, he added that 'he was more Turkist than the CUP'.[278] Bayır's testimony also reveals and confirms that Turkish nationalism was a novelty of the Second Constitutional period and it only became dominant later. This indicates that the period before the Balkan Wars in Foçateyn was a time when nationalisms were still under construction.

Values of middle-class hegemony on the coast existed in Foçateyn side by side with emerging nationalisms looming in the background. The summer houses by the sea of wealthy merchants, a new quay, a flourishing Orthodox merchant middle-class with

[278] Ferit Oğuz Bayır was born in 1899 in Simav, which is located in Western Anatolia and was administrated under the province of Hüdâvendigar (similar to modern day Bursa). Coming from a migrant family, he spent his early years in Edirne and witnessed its siege in the Balkan Wars. He was educated in one of the modern teachers' schools (*Dar-ül Muallimin*) of Abdülhamit II. Later he became a prominent figure in the Republic of Turkey as a co-founder of the *Köy Enstitüleri*. He went to Eski Foça in February of 1923 as one of the first modern teachers of the Republic of Turkey. EBOHC, Ferit Oğuz Bayır, Eski Foça, 1995-1997.

its churches and schools and the increasing but limited Christian presence among the local Muslim ruling elite reflected a powerful middle-class character in Foçateyn. However, both the power and reach of middle-class hegemony in Foçateyn was limited. The situation was a smaller and less successful reflection of the larger port-cities like Izmir where middle-class hegemony truly ruled the day. Modernity eroded communal barriers as a kind of co-existence was being formed but both the Muslims and the non-Muslims of the county also showed signs of awareness of national identities. However, none of the communities undertook organized political action to support ethnic/religious (Greek and Turkish or Orthodox and Muslim) or imperial (Ottoman) nationalisms. On the contrary, Foçateyn's growth and the emergence of Eski Foça as a rather cosmopolitan boomtown seems to have brought previously more isolated communities into closer contact, exposing them to each other's segmented lives. Oral testimonies of both the Muslim and the non-Muslim residents of Foçateyn reveal a certain level of social and economic contact and cooperation. Ottoman Greeks of the county owned shops together with Muslims, they attended each other's funerals and they celebrated each other's holy days. Nationalisms, like other modern ideologies, constituted just some of the political projects among many. Their domination of the Ottoman political stage in the age of extremes was a result of a series of wars and conflicts that were to engulf Foçateyn in the spring of 1914. Before that, as I demonstrated here, coexistence was as likely as the separation of the peoples of the county of Foçateyn, if not more. Communal boundaries were not necessarily causes of conflict in Foçateyn. As Doumanis points out, '...conflicts are not really about cultural difference, or certainly they do not begin as such, and it is telling that the victims of the violence of the last days of the Ottoman Empire [whom the residents of Foçateyn were a part of] were firmly of this view'.[279]

Conclusion

Foçateyn was slowly incorporated into the world capitalist economy beginning in the 18th century and Eski Foça emerged as a boomtown especially towards the end of the 19th century. Although greater incorporation resulted in larger holes in the Ottoman economy, it also meant the availability of finances and at times also know-how and

[279] Doumanis, *Before the*..., 8.

technology for the centralist modernization reforms of the Empire. Thanks to these reforms, the Ottoman state secured greater control over the incorporated areas of the Empire such as the county of Foçateyn, but it was always 'one step behind'. In essence the more the county of Foçateyn became integrated the more it slipped away from effective Ottoman imperial control. In the end, from the establishment of the OPDA in 1881 to the Great War in 1914, a large part of the county's production was directed towards external European markets and the Ottoman center did not benefit from its income.

Merchants who were involved in the export-oriented trade made use of the capitulary agreements and thus paid much little tax. The non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie increasingly took on a dominant role in export-oriented trade. Since the 18th century they had been entering in the service and protection (*beratlı*) of a foreign power that accumulated large amounts of capital and privileges outside the Sultan's control.[280] Towards the end of the century, we see such capital being invested in Foçateyn in the story of Mr. Franzeskos. The centre's tax income was syphoned by European creditors who were represented by the OPDA. This was seen in Foçateyn as well. The largest share of the county's economy, the salt business, was under the control of the OPDA and the Ottoman center had little effect on this even though the salt business was a state monopoly.

From a local point of view, Foçateyn developed economically and demographically and became cosmopolitan through integration with the world markets. It experienced the transformative powers of modernity both through the penetration of capitalism and the agenda of reform of the Ottoman state. This allowed the county to take full advantage of investments made by the market and by the state. Previous economic hierarchies and a dominant small peasantry persisted at least until the mid-19th century but new economic actors had altered the economic hierarchies by the second half of the same century. Trade and industrial mining came to the forefront of the county's economy with Eski Foça's emergence as a boomtown in the age of imperialisms. Incorporation brought growth and that in turn attracted migration. Muslims had constituted a large part of Foçateyn's population before incorporation,

[280] Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie...*, 93.

but soon the Ottoman Greeks became demographically dominant as a result of migration triggered by economic pull factors. Nonetheless, Muslims remained as the dominant group in politics and the service of the state.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Greeks of Foçateyn were employed in all sectors of the economy as workers, day labourers, share-cropping peasants, salt business leaders (*reis*), artisans, merchants, craftsmen teachers, pharmacists and as restaurant owners. Muslims mostly remained as small landholding peasants, craftsmen, day labourers and civil servants. Their roles in other sectors remained marginal and they did not figure as merchants in the export-oriented trade. Market-oriented changes opened new venues of social mobility mostly for the Christians of the county whereas state oriented changes opened up venues of mobility for the Muslims. Capitalism and state reforms tended to obscure the communal borders and created a sense of cohesion among communal groups. A particular form of life and a path to modernity, the coastal path, was established in Foçateyn. The middle-class hegemony of the larger port-cities of the Ottoman coast also became a powerful norm in Foçateyn and appeased nationalisms that loomed in the background.

The period between the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and the beginning of the Balkan Wars in 1912 constituted a period in which the hegemony of the middle classes started to crumble in port-cities and also in port-towns like Eski Foça where it also had become a powerful norm. Middle-class hegemony and its cosmopolitan outlook failed to establish a lasting umbrella identity that could pull together the disparate constituents of the Ottoman state. This was perhaps due to its short life span and fragility in the face of imperialisms and the powers of a centralizing state. It appeared that this hegemony would partially be restored in 1920s with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the face of colonization but it lost out finally and fully by 1922 after the success of the Turkish War of Independence. The forces that drove Foçateyn's growth, a cosmopolitan social and economic order and the relative autonomy from the control of the imperial center, all disappeared during the transition from the Balkan Wars to the end of war in 1922.

The end of the *Belle Époque* came with the age of extremes. This period brought the refashioning of the world order under the influence of powerful ideologies. This was a temporary end of the reign of global capitalism and a beginning of the reconsolidation of the Ottoman centre's control in the form of a nation-state project. 'In less than a decade, the bright future of the port-city faded from the horizon and was replaced by a nightmare scenario in which cosmopolitan peace was sacrificed for the greater good of political irredentism, nation-state building, and colonial greed'.[281] Challenges presented to the Ottoman rule in its 'longest century', the 19th century, shaped the ways in which Ottoman rules formulated resistance and survival. 'War, trade, and taxation were the major macrohistorical factors that impinged on the networks of state–society relations, forcing them into new, more formal and less flexible patterns with separation and closure, and finally leading to violent nationalizing state action. How the Ottoman state responded to the challenges of war, trade, and taxation shaped the forms of centralization, as well as the discourse about the future of the empire'.[282]

The emergence of a coastal trajectory of modernity constituted one of the 'challenges' that affected the centralization response of the Ottoman state in an age of extremes. Incorporation was tolerated at times by the Ottoman center for borrowing, currying diplomatic support or simply because they were not able to stop it. However, it was always a 'necessary evil' at best that the center had to deal with in order to re-consolidate its imperial control over its incorporated territories. The Unionists, the last 'reformers' of the Empire, saw this as a means of achieving their ideal state and society precisely because they thought that the survival of the Empire rested upon its ability to reconsolidate and centralize its power. For the Unionists, places like Foçateyn had to be 're-centralized' before they became 'lost causes' like Ottoman Europe which was almost entirely lost after the Balkan Wars. They realized the Ottoman state's control was fading on the coast and believed that middle-class hegemony was incompatible with the centralized nation-state they envisaged. The Unionists thought that a collision between the Ottoman state and rivals to its rule (Great Power imperialisms and the rival nationalism of the Kingdom of Greece) would be inevitable unless those territories were reconsolidated by the center.

[281] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 106.
[282] Barkey, *Empire...*, 265.

But had the Young Turks, or more specifically the Unionists, always thought like this? Far from it. Just like the earlier reformers known as the Young Ottomans or the pre-Unionist Young Turks, the Unionists' responses were also shaped by the challenges they confronted. The Unionists, a particular generation and clique of the Young Turks, became what they were through exposure to nationalisms in the Balkans, incorporation, state sponsored modernity and the loss of their homelands. These formative experiences contributed to the emergence of a nation-state model that conflicted with the model of the Ottoman coast in the period of transition from 1911 to 1922. However, not all Ottoman reform, including some of the Unionists', were displeased with what the coast represented. The coast represented cosmopolitanism, middle-class values, economic development, progress, collective action and modernity. The Unionists accepted and promoted some elements of the coastal trajectory if they considered them useful for a centralized nation-state project. If not, they saw them as potential threats to the survival of the imperial state. They tried to create a nation-state with its own loyal bourgeoisie, industry, modern army and docile citizens. Anything cosmopolitan or 'connected' was perceived to be a threat. In a sense, the Unionists despised the coast but they also strove to become what it represented: a modern and industrious entity. But why did this cosmopolitanism, that was compatible with Ottomanism or incorporation, that was compatible with the liberal economic growth polices between 1909 and 1913, become a problem? Why did the Unionists not consider Foçateyn to be an ideal 'Ottoman' town that was cosmopolitan and growing? The answers to these questions can be found in the transition of Eski Foça from a boomtown to a ghost town from 1914 to 1922.

The subsequent chapter aims to demonstrate the ways in which the Unionists were 'transformed' and thus 'collided' with what the county of Foçateyn represented: an incorporated and cross-cultural county with a cosmopolitan outlook. Once the strains of extended warfare from the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 to the Turkish War of Independence (1922) relaxed, the reasons for the tragedies that occurred in this period began to be questioned. However, with the hindsight of destruction at hand, what was seen as being the reasons underlying demographic engineering or warfare were often repetitions of the previous 'perceived threats' that served for the legitimization of

those conflicts and destruction in the first place. As the next chapter will discuss, the coastal modernist trajectory of the county of Foçateyn, its cosmopolitan outlook, integration into the world economy and its predominantly Christian demography made it appear like a ‘lost cause’ that had to be re-conquered and re-consolidated by the Unionists, who represented the political center after 1913.

CHAPTER IV

Beginning of the Transition and the Transformation: On the Road to the Spring of Organized Chaos

On the 31st of August in 1913, the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âli*) approved the request of Félix Sartiaux, a philhellene French archaeologist, for archaeological explorations around the province of Aydın and in the county of Foçateyn for a six month period.[283] Following this approval, Sartiaux and his team started their explorations that same year[284] and later excavations[285] in the central town of the county of Foçateyn, Eski Foça. Mr. Sartiaux and his team, consisting of Mrs. Carlier, Dandria and Manciet,[286] stayed in the county of Foçateyn from 1913 to June 1914. Their work came to a close with a milestone event for the county of Foçateyn: the Spring of Organized Chaos. They witnessed the horrors that befell the residents of the county in its boomtown Eski Foça. Their coincidental presence resulted in testimonies and photographs that open a window onto a phenomenon that engulfed the region around them at the time. Their work was interrupted, just as the relatively peaceful and prosperous life in the

[283] For the first approval of his request for exploratory drilling (*sondaj ameliyatı*) granted by the Sublime Port, see: BOA, BEO., 4209/315604, (Hicrî, 28/N /1331).

[284] Their initial explorations (*sondaj ameliyatı*) lasted 5 weeks between September 1913 and October 1913. Following his initial findings, Sartiaux wrote a report and presented it on the 6th of January in 1914 to *l'académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* in Paris. It is therefore clear that he left Foçateyn after his initial explorations and came back later to resume detailed excavations in the county sometime around the spring of 1914. For the original report he presented, see: Félix Sartiaux, *Note sur l'exploration de l'Ancienne Phocée, en septembre-octobre 1913*, (Paris, 1914). For a Turkish translation see: Félix Sartiaux, *Eski Foça / Foça Tarihi'ne Bir Bakış*, (İzmir: Ege Turizm Cemiyeti Yayınları, No: 6, 1952).

[285] Later, Sartiaux's permission for exploration drilling was changed to a permission for excavation (*hafriyat*) and it was also extended for a year on the 17th of May, 1914. See: BOA, İ..MMS., 183 / 1332/C-07, (Hicrî 21/C /1332), and BOA, BEO., 4285/321315 (Hicrî 22/C /1332).

[286] The Ottoman Ministry of Education of the time (*Maarif Nezareti*) also mentioned a certain Mösyö Harnpo from France who had also conducted exploration drillings in the county of Foçateyn in August of 1913. He may well have been a member of Mr. Sartiaux's team. For the document about his drilling, see: BOA, İ.MF., 21 / 1331/N-1, (Hicrî 27/N /1331).

boomtown in which they worked. Sartiaux and his team thus witnessed Eski Foça's (and thus the county of Foçateyn's) transition from a boomtown to a ghost town.

Later, Félix Sartiaux came back once more to resume his work in Eski Foça in 1919 following the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia. In fact, he came back to Eski Foça on a ship that had transported some of the Ottoman Greeks ousted in 1914 and an important figure, George Horton, American consul of Izmir (Smyrna) whose account of the fire of Izmir in 1922 became a frequent reference. Mr. Sartiaux's second visit lasted until the winter of 1920 when he completed his excavations. The eyewitness accounts and the photographs of Félix Sartiaux and his team (especially Mr. Manciet's) constitute one of the most important primary sources of this period of turmoil.

By the time Sartiaux had started his archaeological work in September 1913, Ottoman Anatolia was on the verge of becoming the next battlefield of rival nationalisms and imperialisms after the Balkans. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, neither the previous century nor the twenty years before the Second Constitutional revolution could foretell the traumatic period that was to befall the county of Foçateyn. In fact, Foçateyn was a developing county with a growing population and economy. When the salt from Ottoman Eski Foça was displayed at the famous Chicago World's Fair in 1893 and was awarded a medal[287] as an important export good, Eski Foça was already a burgeoning town. The county, together with settlements such as Yeni Foça (Νέες Φώκιες), Gerenköy (Γκερένκιοϊ), Kozbeyli (Κούζμπεγλί) and Ulupınar, was producing important goods for both the internal and the external markets. Located on the Western Anatolian shore, Foçateyn belonged to the central regions of the traditional 'core empire'. However in the early twentieth century this positive outlook was going to change dramatically. The events of the spring of 1914 (right before the World War I) in the county of Foçateyn were only a chapter of bigger transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, from 'core empire' to a borderland and from a bourgeoning trade hub to a fishing county of a few thousand in the early Republic.

[287] BOA,YA. Hus, 288/55, 10/B /1311.

In 1914, just before the advent of 'organized chaos', which resulted in the forced migration and killing of Ottoman Greeks, the county had a population of approximately 23,000[288] the majority of whom were Ottoman Greeks. This included many Greeks (Ottoman or otherwise) who had migrated from the islands in the Aegean and beyond for job opportunities[289] especially starting in the mid-19th century. Muslims, whether Kurdish, Turkish or otherwise, had long been residents of the county along with non-Muslims such as Greeks, Armenians and Jews. Native populations, together with the almost omnipresent migrants (which were limited until the nineteenth century to small numbers of voluntary immigrants) constituted a cosmopolitan society that reached its apex in the pre-World War I context. On a given

[288] This number is derived from the number of all the residents of the county of Foçateyn in 1914. Since seasonal migration was a widespread phenomenon in the Western Anatolian region it is not possible to give exact numbers for the settlements in the county. In summer, most of the residents in the county seasonally migrated to Eski Foça which was the largest settlement in the county.

[289] As was discussed in the previous chapter, the county of Foçateyn was one of the many centers that attracted migration on the Western Anatolian coast. Although it is not possible to know the exact number of these migrants who came to the county of Foçateyn starting in the 1850s, it is highly likely that there were less of them than native Ottoman Greeks. They mostly consisted of Ottoman citizens of the Aegean islands who migrated for better job opportunities. For a discussion of this migratory pattern see the previous chapter and Reşat Kasaba, 'Migrant Labor in Ottoman Agriculture', Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak eds., *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, pp. 113-121. In addition, most of the old Foçateyn resident interviewees in CAMS (Center of Asia Minor Institute, Athens) oral history documents (under subfolders ΠΑΛΙΕΣ ΦΩΚΙΕΣ and ΝΕΕΣ ΦΩΚΙΕΣ) stated that either one or both of their parents were from the Kingdom of Greece (or likely held such a passport). They also stated that their parents were often islanders who previously resided on one of the Aegean islands. Therefore, even for Foçateyn Greeks themselves, the boundaries of identity were not well defined. According to Kitromilides, most of the Greek-speaking populations concentrated on the Western Anatolian coast in the 19th century were a product of migration from the Aegean islands and continental Greece (See: Paschalis M. Kitromilides, 'Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1990, 26:1, 4.) There are no sources, however, referring to the number of non-Ottoman Greeks in the county. Nonetheless, even if we had such numbers, it is also known that with the introduction of universal conscription by the Young Turks in 1909, many Ottoman Greeks changed their nationality or left the Empire in order to dodge conscription. (See: Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye Tarihi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 155.) This contributed to the blurring of the already 'vague' boundary between the Greeks of Greece and the Greeks of the Empire.

day, one would have heard around eight languages[290] in the harbour of Eski Foça. However, by the early Republican period Eski Foça was practically a deserted ghost town that was demographically engineered into a 'homogenous' national community. Less than one third of its population remained. Devastated by constant warfare, migrations, banditry and state violence, Foçateyn lost its human resources, infrastructure and economic know-how.

[**Picture**: Photograph showing Félix Sartiaux and some locals working for him in Eski Foça in 1913. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée, 113.*]

Félix Sartiaux and his team witnessed crucial parts of this period of transition in the county of Foçateyn: the early days of the post-Balkan War period, the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks from the county in the spring of 1914 and some of the period of Greek occupation of the county of Foçateyn between 1919 and 1920. This chapter aims to elaborate on the milestone of the transition in the county, which is the Spring

[290] Throughout my research I came across to a few accounts referring to different languages that the residents of Foçateyn used to speak. These languages were Arabic, Armenian, French, Greek, Ladino, Italian, Kurdish and Ottoman.

of Organized Chaos that occurred in June 1914. The discussion of 1919 and 1920 will be dealt with in the subsequent sections of the thesis. Following two introductory detailed discussions of the relevant events preceding the spring of 1914, the chapter goes on to discuss the ousting of Ottoman Greeks in the Spring of Organized Chaos. In doing so it draws upon various primary sources about these periods including but not limited to the eyewitness accounts of Félix Sartiaux and his team. The aim of the first two parts is to provide the background that will permit a discussion of the agency of the elites and others in the Spring of Organized Chaos in order to show the "realities" of the actors of June 1914. The third part aims to reconstruct the events of the spring of 1914 and as a whole, these three parts will be as descriptive as possible leaving the conclusion of the chapter for the conceptualization and interpretation of the material discussed.

The Beginning of the End: Balkan Wars 1912-1913

As the previous chapter of this thesis discussed, the effects of a series of changes in the 19th century would constitute the elements or compounds of a complex chemical reaction about to take place and come into being as the transformation from the Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic, and the Balkan Wars and the domination of nationalist ideologies would constitute the final catalysts for this change. The popular reach of nationalist discourses and the effects of the Balkan Wars were determined by the context of the last century of the Empire. The effects of the Balkan Wars and the subsequent domination of nationalist discourses as catalysts are only meaningful in terms of the social realities that preceded them. That is why this thesis builds its final analysis of the events of the 1914, both on the particular realities of the county of Foçateyn and on the rather global dynamics in existence. Although many different forces affected the history of the county of Foçateyn, such as modernization and incorporation, the Balkan Wars and the ensuing events brought about the biggest transformation in the county.

The effects of the Balkan Wars on the 'organized chaos' of June 1914 in Foçateyn can be grouped under two headings. First is the dominance of hardliners and nationalists in the Ottoman Empire which came about as the result of the unexpected Unionist

(the CUP) return to power. Later the Unionists would go on to be the architects of the Spring of Organized Chaos. The second issue was the creation of a new zone of conflict in the Aegean in which rival nationalisms, Greek and Ottoman, clashed. The Balkan Wars disturbed the international status quo and failed to establish a lasting peace in the region and between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire and thus set into motion a struggle for dominance over the Aegean and Western Anatolia. This rivalry, 'the National Question of Izmir' as the Unionists perceived it, revolved around the disputed future of some Aegean islands following the Balkan Wars and the imminence of a new war between the Ottomans and Greece. Finally, in the Ottoman context, this nationalist rivalry further eroded the state-society relations between the political center and some of its non-Muslim citizenry while also straining inter-communal and inter-ethnic relations among various groups.

Seen in this way, the Balkan Wars initiated the creation of an agitated public space, the authoritarian rule of a nationalist and radicalized party and the inter-state rivalry that brought the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece to brink of war. At a time when the Balkan Wars ushered in the legitimization of the nation-state as an international norm, the medium of conflict and rivalry became nationalism. Foçateyn was one such battlefield of rival nationalisms. In a sense, the Balkan Wars marked the beginning of a process that precipitated the demise of the empire and initiated its transformation into a nation-state. At this point, I will try to address the details of these processes in order to show their imprint on the events of June of 1914 in the county of Foçateyn.

The Italian victory in the Ottoman-Italian war in Tripolitania (*Trablusgarp*) in October 1912 was followed by a coup against the Young Turks in power. The CUP, which had been central in politics since the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, was removed from power. Ensuing domestic instability and a power vacuum gave Balkan states the opportunity that they longed for. Through a process of negotiation under Russian mediation, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia united their forces against the Ottoman Empire under the rather loose alliance of the Balkan League. When war broke out in October 1912, the Ottomans found themselves in a difficult position. They were ill-prepared and under-equipped. They had a large population that

was their only advantage against the Balkan allies but they had political and logistical difficulties in mustering forces. The Ottoman population was approximately 26 million, but only just over 6.1 million of those lived in the European territory of the Empire, and of those only 2.3 million were Muslim, the remainder being Christians and Jews, and the conscription of non-Muslims had only begun in 1909; in addition, there were doubts about whether they would remain loyal to the Empire if armed.[291] The rather underdeveloped transport network, especially in Anatolia, meant that the only reliable way for a massive transfer of troops to the Balkans was by sea, but that was challenged by the presence of the Greek fleet in the Aegean Sea.[292] The Ottomans were also still engaging in a protracted war with the Italians in Tripolitania (and then in the Dodecanese islands of the Aegean), which had dominated the Ottoman military effort for over a year and would last until 15 October 1912, a few days after the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans. Therefore the Ottomans were unable to significantly reinforce their positions in the Balkans as relations with the Balkan states deteriorated over the course of the year.[293]

Although the Young Turks had been working hard to reform the Ottoman army after coming to power in 1908, the reach of these reforms was still problematic by the beginning of the Balkan Wars. This was especially true for the army reserves (*redif*) which was undergoing major organizational and drafting reforms. The Ottoman reserves had previously been a self-standing branch of the Ottoman army with its own barracks, units, organization and officers. In 1910, the reserves (*redif*) and the home guard (*müstahfiz*) were incorporated into the standing army, known as the *nizam*. Although announced formally before the Balkan Wars, this 'three pillars under one roof' structure was for all purposes created during the war in 1913. After the reforms,

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[291] For an in depth discussion of this topic see: Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayri Müslimlerinin Askerlik Serüvenleri*, (İstanbul: Simurg, 2000).

[292] According to Hall, the 'Ottoman fleet consisted of six armored ships, two armored cruisers, eleven torpedo destroyers, thirty torpedo ships, and nineteen other transportation and antiquated vessels. Its two modern vessels were the 3,800-ton light cruiser *Hamidiye* (1903), which had two 6-inch and four 4.7-inch guns, and the 9,250-ton armored cruiser *Mecidiye* (1904), which had two 15-cm guns and eight 12-cm guns apiece. Together they were probably a match for the *Georgios Averov*, but not separately'. See: Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 / Prelude to the First World War*, (London and New York: Routledge: 2000), 19.

[293] Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913...*, 18-19.

redif became representative of the Ottoman population as an almost proportionate mix of Muslims and non-Muslims in society. The reforms in the structure of the army proceeded hand in hand with the introduction of the Ottoman centre's long anticipated announcement of universal conscription, which in 1909 became especially problematic for the non-Muslims of the Empire who were traditionally used to paying a tax in lieu of military service. Among the non-Muslims, Ottoman Greeks in particular showed a great deal of discontent for the reform. In 1909, all provinces received the orders about the lottery that was going to be used for the conscription. Although there was little resistance in places like Selanik (Thessalonica), many Ottoman Greeks in the region of the Aegean Islands resisted enrolment. They even threatened to apply for Greek citizenship if the pressures persisted.[294] A contemporary observer, British Military attaché Colonel Surtees, penned a letter in 1909 stating:

> It is evident that the desire of the Greek clerical and educated party is to be a nation within a nation. The Greeks are to remain Greeks, are to speak Greek, associate only with Greeks, and be led by Greeks, when they would be prepared to serve in the Ottoman army, almost, one would say, as allies! Not a very reassuring prospect for stability of the Ottoman Empire [...] The Armenian is much more capable of living in harmony with the Turks than is the Greek. Mixed regiments of Turks and Armenians will get along with a minimum of friction. They would, of course, require their priests and the recognition of certain fetes and holidays. But they put forward no absurd demand for separate regiments as do the Greeks.[295]

All this discontent among some non-Muslim Ottoman conscripts played a devastating role when war broke out. Almost a quarter of the whole mobilized army consisted of Christians in a war fought against Christians. In the first days of the war, many districts in the Balkans were unable to conscript local Ottoman Christians into their

[294] Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayri Müslimlerinin...*, 141-148.
[295] British Military attaché Colonel Surtees to Lowther, Constantinople, September 25 1909, No.7, PRO, FO371/776/23991. Original quotation taken from: Fikret Adanır, 'Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912/13', in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, Norman Naimark and Fatma Müge Göçek, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 117.

respective *redif* corps, delaying mobilization efforts. Furthermore, some Christian settlements also refused to support the army logistically with their carts and wagons.[296] When the war started to take a downward turn for the Ottomans, the reserves (*redif*) were observed to have played a major role in the defeatism and panic that spread in the Ottoman Army since the regular troops fought well.[297] Low morale, lack of discipline and desertion was a problem among all troops of the *redif,* both Muslim and non-Muslim. The conscription, the mobilization and the use of the mobilized *redif* had been problematic everywhere in the Empire.[298] Christians among *redif* troops were also deserting in large numbers and sometimes changed sides as well. Although the Ottoman High Command knew that there were many reasons behind the defeat, they also knew that some of those reasons were caused by non-Muslim soldiers. Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks were not willing to fight against what they perceived to be their co-nationals although they also did not want to lose their privileged status in Ottoman society.[299]

When the first Balkan War was over, the Ottomans had lost all of their European territories and the Bulgarians were just a few kilometres outside the capital, Istanbul. The capital was vulnerable. The victors of the Balkan Wars, however, failed to agree on the spoils of war after the first Balkan War. Despite the efforts of the Ottoman government (under Kıbrıslı Memet Kâmil Paşa) to minimize the losses through negotiation, there was no incentive for an timley assault on the part of the government. However, many nationalists and especially the major opposition to the government, the Community of Union and Progress's [*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (CUP or Unionists)], wanted war. In the end, the Ottomans were able to hold onto a small amount of territory in Europe as a result of the Second Balkan War and the CUP's military coup, which replaced the pro-negotiation government with one that was pro-war. After the Second Balkan War Istanbul was more defendable but nearly all of Ottoman Europe was lost. The old capital Edirne was taken back but the situation of the Aegean islands was still uncertain. Hundreds of thousands of Muslim

[296] Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayri Müslimlerinin...*, 162-163.
[297] Adanır, 'Non-Muslims..., 112.
[298] Mehmet Beşikçi, 'Balkan Harbi'nde Osmanlı Seferberliği ve Redif Teşkilatının İflası', in *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 110, (Bahar 2012), 27-43.
[299] Adanır, 'Non-Muslim...', 122-124.

refugees flooded the Empire with stories of horror and destruction at the hands of the Christians. The Ottomans were shocked by the speed of the defeat and the amount of territory lost sometimes even without resistance. This was a difficult lesson; the age of nation-states was upon them and the mentality of the preservation of the status quo, which was introduced in the Congress of Berlin (1878) hosted by Otto von Bismarck, was null and void. The Ottomans witnessed the fulfilment and the international recognition of the nationalist aspirations of Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Serbia that had previously been halted in the congress. They learned that the nation-state and nationalism had become the diplomatic norm, a *zeitgeist* of the era. The period of war between 1912-13 also marked the end of Ottomanism as a political project. The validity of the Young Turk policies of liberal democracy, parliamentarianism and free markets were shaken to their foundations. New aspirations for solidarity, nationalism and national economy were swiftly replacing the old policies.[300]

Immediately after the war, a few key issues in the defeat stood out as major traumas for the Ottomans: low morale and poor discipline of troops (especially among the reserves), lack of experienced officer corps, the incompetence of the Ottoman Minister of War Hüseyin Nazım Paşa,[301] the naval superiority of the Kingdom of Greece and the failure of the arrival of the Anatolian reserve troops due to the hindrances caused by the non-Muslim railroad employees of the railway. Among these reasons, especially the nationalist Ottoman press related almost all but one to the 'backstabbers' – that is, the non-Muslim members of the Ottoman society. Non-Muslims were portrayed as soldiers who fled the battlefield or betrayed the Ottoman army. Ottoman Greeks were particularly criticized for their voluntary contributions to the purchase of *Georgios Averov* (*Γεώργιος Αβέρωφ*), the battleship that almost singlehandedly secured the Aegean for the Kingdom of Greece.

[300] Adanır, 'Non-Muslims...', 124.

[301] Most of the veteran officers did not make it back in time for the Balkan Wars. They were busy fighting in Tripolitania or elsewhere. This contributed to the lack of the experience of war among officers. In addition, the newly appointed Minister of War, Nazım Paşa, was uninformed about the war plans for Ottoman Europe that were prepared by the previous minister of war. See: Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*..., 19-20. This incompetence played a very crucial role in the Ottoman defeats of the First Balkan War. Had the Ottomans withdrawn their Western Army into Albania in order to establish a 'fortress Albania', as was indicated by the war plans, they would have had certain advantages. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*..., 67.

Stories of heroism and the sacrifices of non-Muslim Ottoman troops and officers who fought well[302] were less visible compared to the news of treachery and misconduct. These massive traumas of war for the Ottomans took their toll and mechanisms of otherization stopped many from seeing the intricacies and details of the situation. The contribution of Ottoman non-Muslims' to the defeat is undeniable; true, it is significant, but also exaggerated. In addition, how it was portrayed in the nationalist press did not contribute to a solution but created more problems. The post-war years under Unionist single party rule witnessed discussions and the application of various remedies to correct these perceived weaknesses. The Unionists made most of their decisions within this polarized environment. Most of the policies of the Unionist ended up being a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they tried to remedy the weaknesses of the Empire and on the other hand, they inflicted harm on the Christians of the Empire while doing so, sometimes as a consequence rather than an aim and sometimes as both. As a result, this radicalized Christians even more and legitimized the transfer of resentment against Christians. Earlier examples of this can be seen in the activities of the *Donanma Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Fleet Association)[303] and the

[302] Many non-Muslims of the Ottoman army fought loyally in the Balkan Wars as well. As a matter of fact, some non-Muslims, such as Anatolian Armenians and Jews, were perceived as being trustworthy. For some examples of the non-Muslim Ottomans' positive contributions to the war effort see: Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayri Müslimlerinin...*, 165, 166-167.

[303] The full name of the association is *Donanma-i Osmâni Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti.* It was established in July 1909 and its establishment was basically a reaction to two events that demonstrated the weakness of the Ottoman navy: the Cretan crisis of 1908 and the Ottoman naval parade on the 4th of July 1909 for the first anniversary of the Revolution of 1908. After 1913, its name was changed to the *Donanma Cemiyeti*. Many nationalist intellectuals also wrote in the *Donanma* journal that was published by the association after 1914. A considerable number of articles praised the Greek navy's strength and urged readers and the association to achieve that same strength. The perception of a 'Greek threat', however, was always present in the journal. More than half of the money the association raised for the fleet consisted of donations that included many non-Muslim Ottoman contributors. (see: Emre Sunu, *The Great War and the Visual Mobilization of the Ottoman Public Sphere: The Case of "Donanma" Journal*, (Unpublished MA thesis, Sabancı University, 2007)). However, as the World War approached, the donations '...took on the form of a veiled tax, because – even if not for all citizens, than at least for all members of the public sector, traders and craftsmen - the minimal amounts they were obliged to allot from their wages or incomes were determined' (see: Piotr Nykiel, 'Osmanlı Donanma Cemiyeti – The Association for the Ottoman Navy', on

development of the Boycott Movements[304] slightly before the Balkan Wars, during wartime and in its aftermath.

http://www.navyingallipoli.com/englishtexts.html, 2011). Although the association made use of Ottomanism in its propaganda up until the Balkan Wars, it used Islam and much later Turkism as well for a very limited period. According to Shaw, the association was a private organization only on paper and in fact it was the Ministry of Interior who was responsible for its founding and activities (see: Stanford Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, Volume I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2006), 587). Later, in World War I, both the journal and the association became principal sources of Ottoman War propaganda.

[304] Although Boycott Movements started as a political and popular reaction against foreign states, they took on a new anti-Greek (*Hellenic or Yunani*) dimension in 1910 with the Cretan Crisis and an almost total anti-Christian dimension after the Balkan Wars. This shift started between 1910 and 1911, and the boycotts evolved into political and popular movements aiming at the economic empowerment of Ottoman Muslims at the expense of the Ottoman Christians under the influence of the principles of the *Milli İktisat* (National Economy). After 1910 these movements increasingly injected Muslim vs. non-Muslim rivalry into society. See: Çetinkaya, 'Muslim Merchants and Working Class in Action: Nationalism, Social Mobilisation and Boycott Movement in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914', (Unpublished PhD diss., Leiden University, 2010), 113-127.



[**Picture:** The Ottoman Empire and Kingdom of Greece after the Balkan Wars, 1914.[305] The map does not show the Aegean islands left in control of the Kingdom of Greece by the Great Powers on February 14th 1914.]

[305] Source: 'Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars', 1914. Quoted in:

Although the relationship between the Ottoman center and its non-Muslim subjects had been somewhat problematic especially in the last century of the Empire,[306] the Balkan Wars marked the beginning of a new era in which both the center and its non-Muslim subjects, but especially the former, started to doubt the possibility of coexistence under an imperial structure. This was not only because of the experience of war or the success of sectarianisms, in addition to the notion of nation-states as legitimate polities in the Balkans; this was also because of the changes that the war had brought to Ottoman society. The unexpected comeback of the Unionists, the transfer of sectarianism and nationalist rivalry to the Western Anatolian coast, the predominance of the idea of a national economy, the polarization of the public sphere and the power of nationalist discourses all contributed to the establishment of separate trajectories of the Ottoman center and its subjects in the western parts of the Empire. The upcoming conflict, World War I, would spread these notions throughout the Empire.

Repercussions of the Balkan Wars: Turmoil, the Unexpected Unionist Comeback and the Domination of Nationalism

The end of the Balkan Wars marked the beginning of a new period for the contested regions of the Empire. The Ottoman defeats confirmed the weakness of the Ottoman military capabilities on the seas and on land and thus heated up the debate on the fate of the Empire, which was the Eastern Question. As the previous chapter discussed, the sovereignty of the Empire had long been challenged by forces and processes such as integration with the world markets, the development of secessionist nationalisms,

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http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dosya:Balkan_Wars_Boundaries.jpg (accessed November 2013).

[306] According to Barkey, the long eighteenth century (1695-1808) '...set the empire on a trajectory of transformation from empire to multiple nation states'. The imperial compact was slowly taken apart and peripheral social actors gained relative autonomy from the center. The subsequent 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed several attempts at centralization and national unification by the Ottoman center which often created problems with the peripheral social actors and groups, among which were the non-Muslims of the Empire. That is why the previously tolerant imperial structure evolved into a more centralist and thus acquired a more conflict-driven nature. See: Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference / The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 264-266, 277-289.

modernization and imperialisms. Nevertheless, the Ottoman center was able to reconsolidate some of its lost sovereignty through wars, reforms and diplomatic manoeuvring. Especially after the last major reform movement of the Young Turk Revolution (Second Constitutional period of 1908), many Ottomans, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, nourished great hopes for the restoration and renovation of the Ottoman order. In fact, the early years of the Second Constitutional Period witnessed great activism in public spaces and the presentation of many long ignored political demands.[307] Still in the early 20th century it would have been farfetched to imagine the total loss of the Ottoman presence in the Balkans, which were the heartland of the Empire and of the Young Turk revolution.

However, subsequent political crises such as the annexations of the (already autonomous) province of *Şarki Rumeli* by Bulgaria and the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in October 1908, the declaration of Crete's enosis (union) with the Kingdom of Greece also in October, the Albanian insurrections between 1909 and 1912[308], the Counter-Revolution of 1909 (Incident of 31st of March 1325 in the *Rumi* calendar), the Adana incident of 1909 resulting in the massacre of some 20,000 Armenians[309] and the Italian invasion of Tripolitania in 1911 rapidly turned the climate of the 'revolutionary brotherhood' of the Young Turk constitutional revolution of 1908 into a period of turmoil and uncertainty.

[307] However, it should be noted that not all activism was non-violent and democratic. Although numerous instances of ethnic violence occurred over the course of the 19th century, clashes, struggles, hostilities and strife became one of the fundamental features of the Second Constitutional Period. See: Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 172-191.
[308] 1910 in Kosovo, 1911 Southern borders of Karadağ, 1912 Kosovo again.
[309] Taner Akçam, *İnsan hakları ve Ermeni sorunu: İttihat ve Terakki'den Kurtuluş Savaşı'na*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1999), 122.

[Picture: Ottoman *Alem* newspaper depicting the struggle of *İttihad ve Terakki* (the CUP) and *Fırka-i Ahrar* (the Liberal Union), and the various troubles of the Empire after the constitutional revolution. The Ottoman caption says: 'Recent signboard of our Constitutional regime' ('*Meşrutiyetimizin son levhası*') and the French one says, 'Unify us! Unify us!' ('Unissons-nous! Unissons-nous!') Source: Palmira Brummet, *Image & Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 138-139, Figure 5.11. The original is in: *Alem*, 6: 8–9, 5 Mart 1324 / 18 March 1909.**]**

The Balkan Wars erupted following this period of successive political and diplomatic crises during the Constitutional Era. The provinces of the "core empire" in Ottoman Macedonia[310] had been lost and the losses of others such as the provinces of Aydın and Hüdavendigar, and even the capital Istanbul (and Çatalca as its sub-province) had become imminent possibilities. The provinces in the Ottoman Balkans had been the principle zones where the sovereignty of the Ottoman center in Istanbul was challenged the most throughout the 19th century. Izmir, the center of the province of Aydın, was no different in terms of the challenges presented to the Ottoman center in the previous century. Therefore the loss of the Ottoman Balkans was not only a shock but also a premonition of possible losses to follow. The Balkan Wars constituted the last chapter of the successive crises after the Constitutional Revolution. It was also one of the major phases of warfare in a period of almost omnipresent warfare between 1911 and 1923[311] from which arose an environment of 'blood feuds' of rival nationalisms.

The turmoil and trauma caused by the Balkan Wars were both a concern and an opportunity for the CUP. The committee longed to dominate the political realm and had wanted to implement its reform and centralization policies since the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 but was never able to seize full power. According to Feroz Ahmad, the CUP constantly struggled for political power in the first five years of the constitutional government and the Unionist victory in the end was far from predetermined. He argues that the CUP might have well been eliminated from

[310] Macedonia was not an Ottoman administrative unit and the Great Powers introduced it into the diplomatic language much later. The area described as Macedonia consisted of the Ottoman provinces (*vilayet*) of Selanik, Kosovo (Kosova), and Manastır. They are also known as the *Vilâyat-ı Selâse*, meaning 'the three provinces'.

[311] According to Gingeras, this period of omnipresent warfare (from the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 to the end of the Turkish War of Independence in 1923 with the treaty of Lausanne) is as important as the Battle of Malazgirt (Manzikert) in 1071, which is traditionally regarded as the battle that marked the coming of the central Asian populations (and predominantly Turks) into Anatolia, as a turning point in the history of the region. After this period, neither Anatolia nor the Middle East or the Balkans would ever be the same. Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 167.

the political scene if it had not been for the catastrophe of the first Balkan war.[312] The first major challenge to the Unionists after 1908 came on the 31st of March 1325 (13th of April 1909)[313], in the form of the Counter-Revolution. The timely intervention of the *Hareket Ordusu*, a section of the Ottoman Army mobilized by the Unionists, permitted them to survive. The members of the *Hareket Ordusu* were among the soldiers stationed in the Ottoman Balkans and they were led by Mahmut Şevket Paşa, whose influence grew much more than all the other actors, including the CUP, when he repressed these events in the capital and became the head of the three largest and most important armies (and later Minister of War) in the Empire. After the Counter-Revolution, martial law was decreed in Istanbul until July 1912 and the army was above the law in all matters. Additionally, the CUP was left free to make constitutional changes as long as it did not intervene in the matters of the army.[314]

After the Counter-Revolution attempt against the Unionists on 31st of March (13th of April 1909), the army initially established itself as a powerhouse under Mahmut Şevket Paşa's control whose aim was to make the army immune to the influence of the CUP and its rivals. However, on closer examination, one might see that this immunity was never fully established since many young officers in the army were members of the CUP and some also in parliament.[315] In fact, the CUP and its rivals struggled for the control and/or the support of the army and this struggle remained unresolved. Starting in 1910, the opposition tried to counter the rising power of the CUP by gaining influence in the army. Some members of the opposition were persuaded to take up non-parliamentarian means of resisting the CUP following the

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[312] Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge Press, 1993), 37.

[313] The anti-Unionists events of 31st of March 1909, also known as the Counter Revolution of 1909, were a major trauma for the Unionists. At the beginning of 1909, anti-Unionist social actors such as the *Ahrar Fırkası* in the opposition and the conservative sections of Ottoman society increased their criticism of the CUP. On the night of the 30th of March in 1325, an insurgence against the CUP started in the capital and successfully seized control of the city. Rebels declared their demands under the leadership of a *Nakşibendi* sheikh Derviş Vahdeti. Although the events got out of control when the insurgence started, it was probably the Liberal opposition of the *Ahrar Fırkası* that originally instigated the insurgence. See: Zürcher, *Modernleşen...*, 151-154.

[314] Zürcher, *Modernleşen...*, 154-159.

[315] Actually this was against the Ottoman constitution but it was tolerated.

infamous elections of spring 1912 (also known as the *Sopalı Seçim,* 'Big Stick Elections'), as a result of which the CUP dominated parliament despite the much disputed election results. Subsequently, Miralay Sadık[316] and his friends called upon the newly established government to resign and declared that they would launch an armed struggle against the dominance of the CUP through a group in the army referred to as the *Halaskar Zabitan* (saviour officers). In this way, the opposition proved to be quite problematic for the CUP. By mid-1912, *Sadrazam* Mahmud Said Paşa, who was supported by the CUP, resigned together with Mahmud Şevket Paşa who had been tolerating the activities of the CUP. Furthermore, a new cabinet (*Büyük Kabine*) was established and it was very much in line with the ideas of the well-known opposition figure Miralay Sadık. The CUP lost its power base and just before the Balkan Wars, a Unionist purge forced many members of the CUP to flee the country or go underground.[317] It was around this time that Enver and Talât had probably already decided to force the government out of power.[318]

When the CUP installed its dictatorship on the 23rd of January in 1913 with a successful coup d'état, the Kingdom of Bulgaria had already reached the Midye-Enez line[319] and the threat of further losses was imminent for the Ottomans. The First Balkan War was concluded for the Ottomans with the treaty of London on the 30th of May in 1913 and the Ottoman Balkans were lost entirely. Ensuing negotiations failed to create a new status quo in the Balkans and the conflicting claims of the Balkan states on the spoils of war brought on the Second Balkan War almost sixteen days after the treaty of London. As soon as the Second Balkan War started, the leadership of the CUP pressured the government and the chief of staff to recapture Edirne.

[316] Miralay Sadık Bey or Miralay Sadık (Colonel Sadık) was a senior officer in the Ottoman Army who protected the Young Turks and the members of the CUP in its early periods. He was the head of the Manastır branch of the Committee of Union and Progress between 1907 and 1908. He played a critical role in the Second Constitutional Revolution. Later he had disagreements with leading Unionists and he became a fierce member of the opposition Hürriyet ve İtilaf party and the Halaskar Zabitan group. Zürcher, *Modernleşen...*, 544.
[317] Zürcher, *Modernleşen...,* 156-159.
[318] Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics 1908–1914*, (Oxford: Clarendon1969), 120.
[319] Midye and Enez were two port cities, one on the Black Sea and one on the Aegean. The Midye-Enez line was a straight line passing between these two cities. It was intended to cut across Ottoman Thrace as a border.

Despite their hesitation and urgings of caution, Enver Paşa, one of the prominent leaders of CUP, wanted to seize the opportunity presented by the Balkan states' rivalries with each other. After a successful coup d'état attempt on the 23rd of January, Enver and some senior officers took the initiative and launched an attack on Edirne. The security of Istanbul, the significance of the loss of the old capital Edirne and the atrocities to which Muslims were subjected by the Bulgarian authorities were put forward as reasons for the offensive against Bulgaria. Edirne was finally recaptured on the 22nd of July in 1913 when the Bulgarian army was busy fighting on other battlefronts of the Balkan Wars and Bulgaria was forced to sign the peace agreement of Constantinople that restored Edirne to the Ottoman Empire.

In the end, the domestic political instability that lasted since the declaration of the constitution in 1908 ended in favour of the CUP. The Balkan Wars and the recapturing of Edirne gave the CUP the circumstances, legitimacy and power it required to introduce the political agenda of its ruling core.[320] Since the community (consisting of that ruling core) dominated the party itself, crucial political decisions about the fate of the Empire were in the hands of a group of Unionists. Furthermore, after 1913, members of the CUP were appointed to many key bureaucratic positions.

The loss of the Balkan Wars and the resulting chaos and trauma signified the beginning of a new period in which what was once called the 'heartlands of the Empire' were either lost within weeks or became border areas competed over by various nationalisms and imperialisms. Following these developments, reconsolidation of the contested Ottoman sovereignty and the restoration of the power of the Ottoman center became matters of survival for the Empire. More importantly, the tool of this reconsolidation was nationalism, which became the dominant political language on all sides of the conflicts in and around the Ottoman Empire. The political diversity (or maybe cacophony) of the period between the Young Turk revolution of

[320] The Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) was the core group behind the rather visible and larger body of the Party of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası*) and even among the CUP, the influence of the core ruling cadre, namely the members of the *merkez-i umûmi*, were much greater. They were the ones formulating policy and making decisions. Even after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, most members of the CUP and all members of the *merkez-i umûmi* kept their memberships secret for some time.

1908 and the First Balkan War in 1912 was lost together with the mutual trust of competing political groups. In a way, politics was brutalized and sheer survival by all means necessary became the norm for the policies of states in the region with one other exception: gaining Great Power support. This however, did not contradict the use of all means necessary since '...Great Power diplomacy was a fixed game: the Great Powers were the House, and you could not beat it by playing by the rules'.[321]

Repercussions of the Balkan Wars: A new Zone of Conflict with the Transfer of the "Eastern Question" From Macedonia to the Province of Aydın

By the time the Balkan Wars had ended, nationalist ideology and nationalist rivalry had already made its way onto the shores of Ottoman Anatolia. However, 1913 signified the year in which nationalism became the only legitimate political field shaping the destiny of Thrace, Marmara and the Western Anatolian regions of the Empire.[322] In fact, 1913 signified the year in which the "Aegean Question" became the new pending chapter of the "Eastern Question" after the end of "Macedonian Question" with the loss of Ottoman Europe. A disturbed status quo in the Balkans and the Aegean (*Adalar Denizi*) created unresolved issues right after the peace treaties of the Balkan wars and this immediately affected everyday life in the province of Aydın. The three effects of the wars created a post-war environment of uncertainty and conflict within which nationalisms flourished. The loss of the Aegean Islands and the resulting dilemma of security between the Ottomans and the Kingdom of Greece, the mutual loss of trust between the leaders of the Orthodox *millet* and the Ottoman center during the war and finally, the flow of *muhacir*s from lost territories all contributed to the transfer of the "Eastern Question" from the Balkans to the Aegean, both on a political and popular level.

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[321] Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 / The Ottoman Empire and the First World War*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9.

[322] Although the main concern of this thesis is to discuss the developments in the province of Aydın, it should be underlined that the period of the post-Balkan wars disturbed the status quo of the entire western part of the Empire bordering the Kingdom of Greece. These regions included Thrace, Marmara and Aydın. And among these, Thrace was also a battlefield in the Balkan Wars.

Disturbed Status Quo in the Aegean, Outstanding Issues and the Security Dilemma

The Treaty of London in 1913 failed to establish a status quo that would appease the demands of the participants of the Balkan Wars. One of the central discussions at the meetings revolved around the fate of the Aegean Islands. Following much debate, it was agreed that the Aegean Islands be ceded directly to the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire would abandon all claims to Crete.[323] Although the war had ended in 1913, the situation of three strategically (and also symbolically) important Aegean Islands [Lesvos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam)] remained uncertain until the 14th of February in 1914. Their situation was closely related to the other border issues in Albania and the withdrawal of the Kingdom of Greece from the region of Epirus. The Ottomans did not want to lose the islands and they even considered offering some of the Dodecanese islands to Greece in exchange for some in the Aegean. It is understood from the correspondences of the period that the Great Powers were deeply concerned about a possible war between the Greeks and the Turks if the Ottomans succeeded in buying dreadnoughts that would beat down the Greeks' naval superiority.[324] For that reason, the period until that time witnessed a diplomatic struggle of Ottomans and Greeks for the fate of the islands.

When the islands were granted to the Kingdom of Greece[325] on the condition that they would not be used as military bases,[326] the Ottomans became deeply disappointed and concerned. The loss of the islands during the wars, together with the Great Powers' decision to award disputed islands to Greece, resulted in the loss of Thasos (Taşoz),

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[323] Anderson, Frank Maloy and Amos Shartle Hershey. *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa 1870-1914*, Prepared for the National Board for Historical Service, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 429-431.

[324] For detailed documentation of the various diplomatic correspondences of the Great Powers regarding the Aegean disputes see: Bilal N. Şimşir, *Ege Sorunu Belgeler Cilt II (1913-1914)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basım Evi, 1989). For the particular suggestion about the Dodecanese islands, see Bilal N. Şimşir, *Ege...*, 447, 499,504.

[325] It should be noted that as a part of the same decision process, İmroz, Bozcaada and Meis were left to the Ottomans due to their fundamental importance in the defense of the straits.

[326] Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkilabı Tarihi*, Vol. 2, Part 3, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1991), 247-248.

Samothrace (Samandra / Semadirek), Lemnos (Limni), Lesvos (Midilli), Chios (Sakız), Samos (Sisam) and Icaria. Among those, Lesvos, Chios and Samos created security concerns for the Ottomans due to their proximity to Anatolia. The main concern was the threat to the security of the Asian shores due to possible aggression of Greek irredentism.[327] The Unionists knew the importance of the islands and they were not willing to accept the rule of the Kingdom of Greece.[328] According to a memorandum dating from 1914 issued by the Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires in Constantinople, H. D. Beaumont, there was concern about anti-Greek sentiment among the Ottomans:

> Rightly or wrongly, educated Turks were convinced that the cession to Greece of the Islands of Mytilene, Soio [meaning Chios] and Samos would ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Turkish possessions in Asia. The Turkish Press accused Europe of committing a great injustice and of forgetting her assurances that she would assist Turkey to consolidate her position in Asia. The provision that Greece should pledge herself not to fortify these Islands or use them as naval bases was regarded as of no value. Will Europe, asked the Press, guarantee that Greece will not use these Islands as centres of agitation from which bands of comitajis will be let loose upon Asia Minor to turn it into a second Macedonia?[329]

Mr. Beaumont's assessment of the situation was quite accurate. Many newspapers voiced concerns about the future of the province of Aydın. In fact, they already started to give reports about Bulgarian and Greek "comitajis" who allegedly crossed the border and started to terrorize people and disturb the peace and order.[330] In April

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[327] It will be useful to point out that, initially, it was agreed that the Great Powers were to have the control over the fate of the Aegean Islands. Later, their rule was granted to the Kingdom of Greece. Even this was enough of a concern for the Ottomans due to the proximity of the islands to the mainland. In addition, according to Anderson and Hershey, Greece still had outstanding issues and wished to expand its territories after the peace treaties of the Balkan Wars. See: Maloy and Hershey, *Handbook for...*, 440.

[328] Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996), 60.

[329] FO 195/2458, p537 21.7.1914.

[330] Banditry was already present in the province of Aydın before the Balkan Wars. However, state-sponsored use of bandit groups for political purposes became much

1914, soon after the loss of the islands, the newspapers *Tasvir-i Efkar*, *Ahenk* and *Tanin* published several articles about the activities of Greece in the province of Aydın. All warned the readership about the reported activities of Greek bandits in Edremit and Karaburun (both just across from the islands). They also discussed the negative effects of such banditry on the railroad network of the region and general security as well.[331] These were indeed very 'Macedonian' stories. Anyone keeping up with events would have known that in Macedonia, bandits (comitajis or chettes) had been used as means to undermine the legitimacy of Ottoman rule in the Balkans by spreading nationalism or by disturbing order and presenting Ottoman rule as inadequate in the eyes of the Great Powers.[332] 'To use brigands for "national causes", turning a number of enterprising marauders from despised outlaws to "national" figures was something that the Greeks, like all Balkan nations, frequently availed themselves of, whenever irredentism reached a boiling point and a supply of seasoned men of arms was needed to spark off revolutions in Thessaly or Macedonia'.[333] Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Ottomans all used bandits as a means to oppress and terrorize people to support their causes. The Ottomans were now concerned that such a 'boiling point' would be reached in the province of Aydın as well. The use of such methods also sometimes occurred due to a lack of clear information flow between the Ottoman Empire and the newly emerging nation-states. States, not being sure of others' intentions, suspected retaliation or irredentist expansionism and wanted to strike before they were struck.

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more widespread with the Balkan Wars. When the wars were concluded, the frequency of reports concerning the presence of bandits in the region increased enormously.

[331] See: 'Yunanlılar Müslüman Fabrikalarını mı Yakıyor?', *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 3 April 1914, No. 1037, 3; 'Edremid'te Yunan Kundağı?', *Tanin*, 3 April 1914, No: 1895, 1; 'Yunanlıların Kaçakçılığı', *Ahenk*, 15 April 1914, No: 5401, 2; 'Adaların Karşısında Karaburun Havalisi', *Tanin*, 9 April 1914, No: 1901, 3; 'Anadolu Sevahili', *Tanin*, 10 April 1914, No: 1902, 3. I would like to thank Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu whose work brought these articles to my attention. For Kerimoğlu's work see: Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu, *İttihat Terakki ve Rumlar 1908-1914*, (İstanbul: Libra Yayınevi, 2009), 364-365.

[332] For a discussion of this pattern and a detailed analysis of the popular Macedonian uprisings between 1880 and 1902 see: Fikret Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001), 108-149.

[333] Dimitris Livanios, 'Conquering the souls: nationalism and Greek guerilla warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904-1908', in *Journal of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 23, (1999), 210.

However widespread they were, these aggressions still required legitimacy or total secrecy. After all, subsequent violence had the potential to result in a war that the Great Powers wanted to avoid, and no state wanted to be the prime aggressor. States tried their best to show that they were mere 'victims' and 'had to resort to drastic measures' in the defence of their security. That is precisely why it is quite difficult to test the credibility of primary source references on bandit activities. In reality, states like the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire often simultaneously employed methods of asymmetric warfare against each other and immediately tried to prove that they were not the initial aggressors. This security dilemma, in which the intentions of the other state was not clear due to a lack of information or mixed signals of intentions, created an atmosphere of mutual mistrust not only among states but also among and within their populations.

Mutual Loss of Trust within Ottoman Society

Understanding the role of elites and citizens alike in the events of the Spring of Organized Chaos in the county of Foçateyn requires an understanding of how those people and elites perceived each other. In addition, as stated before, it is also important to understand the inter-ethnic and inter-communal relations in the Empire after the Balkan Wars in order to show that the period of war facilitated the shift of the Macedonian Question to other parts of the Empire. After the Balkan Wars, the already problematic relationship between the leaders of the Orthodox millet and the Ottoman elites further eroded. Political incentives for coexistence and dialogue were discarded and nationalism became the norm. In addition to the disruption of the status quo and the resulting transfer of inter-state nationalist/imperialist rivalries to the shores of the Aegean, the very experience of the Balkan Wars itself eroded mutual trust in Ottoman society. This erosion of trust occurred both within society and between the states and their subjects. The former, the erosion of trust among the Ottomans, was not universally applicable to all parts of the Empire but it was rather limited to the war zones of the Balkan Wars and its adjacent territories.

On an elite level, the relationship between the Ottoman center and the leaders of the *millet*s had been problematic since the first major nationalist blow to the Ottoman imperial system in 1821 which led to the establishment of a small but independent Greek state. By the Second Constitutional Revolution in 1908, that small state had considerably expanded its territories, encroaching on the lands of the Ottoman Empire, despite major defeats by the Ottomans such as during the Thirty Day's war (Greco-Turkish war of 1897). From the mid-19th century onwards, the Ottomans were alarmed by Greek nationalism and irredentism, fearing the collapse of their imperial system if other *millet*s followed the Greek example.

By the time the world expected a major battle to break out in the Balkans due to the heated Macedonian Question that brought about Greek, Serbian, Albanian and Bulgarian forms of nationalism, Russian imperialism and Ottoman interests were at a crossroads; the people of the Empire took to the streets in 1908, with the hope that a revolution would change it all. Even at the height of hopes and revolutionary fraternity in 1908, opposing voices were weak and fewer in number among the Ottoman Greeks compared to the others.[334] According to Şükrü Ilıcak, this was because Greeks from the Kingdom of Greece had determined the fate of the Ottoman Greeks. In his article, Ilıcak argues that the Organosis Konstantinoupoleos (Οργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως / Society of Constantinople), an underground organization that was established in 1908 and operated until its administrators left Istanbul in 1914, dominated various positions of leadership and influenced policy making within the Orthodox *millet*. The Society of Constantinople was a major force in the propagation of the Greek nationalist agenda among the prominent leaders of the Ottoman Greeks and eventually the Patriarchate, which had resisted nationalism until the Patriarchal crisis of 1910.[335] The Greek 'national cause' became the dominant

[334] Şükrü Ilıcak, 'Osmanlı Rumlarının Bilinmeyen "Hürriyet" Hikayeleri', in *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in İlanının 100üncü Yılı*, ed. Bahattin Öztuncay, (İstanbul: Sadberk Hanım Müzesi, 2008). 18-23.

[335] Although it is not possible to neatly divide the complex camps within the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate into pro-nationalist and anti-nationalist, the Patriarchal crisis of 1910 ended the reign of Joachim III and thus the rather anti-nationalist camp within the Patriarchate. For further details see: Fujinami Nobuyoshi, 'The Patriarchal Crisis of 1910 and the Constitutional Logic: Ottoman Greeks' Dual Role in the Second Constitutional Politics', in *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 27, (2009): 1-30.

policy among the Ottoman Greek elite. In the government after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, sixteen out of the twenty-four Greek-Orthodox parliamentary deputies were members of the Greek Political League (Ελληνικός Πολιτικός Σύνδεσμος), 'an alter ego of the Society of Constantinople' that was directed by one of the two founders of the Society: Souliotis-Nicolaidis. The rest of the deputies were friendlier towards the CUP and supported them on many issues.[336] But there were greater numbers of Ottoman Greeks who advocated (or felt sympathetic to) the 'national cause'.

Although it is clear that the 'national cause' became dominant among elites of the Ottoman Greek, what that entailed is still open to discussion. Federative structures, the separation of nations over ethnic lines or even the amalgamation of the people of the East in an Ottoman/Hellenic empire were among the ideas circulated among Greeks. According to Vangelis Kechriotis, two main figures (founders) of the Society of Constantinople, Ion Dragoumis and Athanasios Souliotis-Nicolaidis, and some other prominent intellectuals of the Greek Orthodox community, adhered to 'overlapping national discourses' that included a variety of ideas from two major political trends among Greeks. The 'nation state oriented' position advocated a nation-state solution in modern terms whereas the 'empire oriented' formula proposed non-nation state solutions for what it saw as the antagonism among ethnicities.[337]

In an age where there were no polls and public opinion statistics, understanding the political ideas of the masses is not as easy as understanding that of the elites. That is why one should not jump to conclusions and think that the 'national cause' was dominant among the numerous and diverse Ottoman Greeks of the Empire. Greek educational institutions, the Patriarchate and the Society of Constantinople was still limited in terms of how broadly it could disseminate notions of nationalism across the vast, peasant-based Empire. Today, thanks to the abundance of ego-documents from

[336] Vangelis Kechriotis, 'Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman-Greeks or just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution', *Études Balkaniques* (1/2005): 54-55.
[337] For a discussion of these different trends see: Vangelis Kechriotis, 'Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman-Greeks or just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution', *Études Balkaniques* (1/2005): 54-55.

both sides of the Aegean, we know that many Ottoman Greeks and Balkan Muslims stayed in their 'ancestral lands' even in spite of many subsequent instances of demographic engineering and the wars that broke out between 1911 and 1923. Some took on 'Turkish' or 'Greek' identities to survive, while others preserved their identities. Such individuals did not submit to any of the 'national causes' and often expressed that they felt alien to such political aspirations.

Nonetheless, for many Greeks the Ottoman Empire became a 'necessary evil' after the Ottoman victory over the Kingdom of Greece in 1897. This perception was further strengthened by the emergence of Bulgarian nationalism as a rival to Greek nationalism within the Empire and in the Balkans. Developments in the early days of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, however, changed this perception of the Ottoman Empire. According to Şükrü Ilıcak, the 'burning down of the bridges' between the CUP and the Ottoman Greek elite was also due to the political imprudence of the CUP. The untimely and demanding centralization reforms of the Unionists turned rival Bulgarian and Greek nationalists in the Empire into allies against the Ottoman center,[338] creating the situation before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars.

During the war, the province of Aydın, like other places in close proximity to war zones, was affected by the tensions of the war. The Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople feared that its flock might become 'expandable assets' or 'collateral damage', whereas at the same time the Ottoman center thought that the Ottoman Greeks and the Patriarchate might become 'backstabbers' or 'a fifth column'. On the 11th of June in 1912, the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a telegram to the province of Aydın asking about the reliability of a complaint issued by the Orthodox Patriarchate. It was asked if Cretan *muhacirs* had attacked native Ottoman Greeks in the county of Foçateyn and caused harm to their animals and damaged their property. The telegram pressed for an investigation and the resettlement of the attackers if they

[338] Şükrü Ilıcak, 'Osmanlı Rumlarının Bilinmeyen "Hürriyet" Hikayeleri', in *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in İlanının 100üncü Yılı*, ed. Bahattin Öztuncay, (İstanbul: Sadberk Hanım Müzesi, 2008). 18-23.

were found guilty.[339] Six days later, on 17th of June 1912, a reply was sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs stating that there were no Cretan *muhacirs* in the county and no such attack had ever taken place. The Patriarchate was asked to be specific and open about where and when such events had supposedly taken place.[340]

In conclusion, although it is not possible to know if such an attack ever truly occurred, it is certain that the Orthodox Patriarchate felt threatened by the influx of Balkan Muslims to the Greek-dominated regions of the Empire. The Ottoman government shared the Patriarchate's perception of the threat, but in an inverse manner. At the height of the First Balkan War, the authorities in the province of Aydın decided to declare martial law. Three telegraphs in November 1912 summarize the Ottoman administration's reasoning for imposing martial law and its perception by the Non-Muslim sectors of the population. All of the telegraphs urged the granting of powers to the Ministry of War (*Harbiye Nezareti*) to introduce martial law and to set up a military court since the Ottoman reverses in the war had been celebrated by many non-Muslims which was triggering hatred between the Ottoman *millets,* which in return affected the security in the province. In addition, and more importantly, these telegraphs stated that the supporters of the Greek cause were highly likely to stash away guns, ammunition and explosives in their houses, schools and churches, invoking the case of the Balkans where that had occurred and had influenced the outcome of the war.[341] In short, war was creating quite fertile ground for nationalist agitation.

On a popular level, the Balkan Wars had profound effects on the inter-ethnic and inter-communal relations as well. They increased the differences among Muslims and the Orthodox *millet* (especially the Greeks and the Bulgarians). The former was perceived as a victim who was suffering at the hands of the latter. A good example of this loss of mutual trust among people and the subsequent increase in inter-ethnic and inter-communal tensions can be observed in the post-Balkan War migrations in Thrace. When the Second Balkan war resulted with the retaking of Edirne on the 23rd

[339] BOA, DH. H., 13/59, (Hicrî 25/C/1330), 1.
[340] BOA, DH. H., 13/59, (Hicrî 25/C/1330), 2.
[341] BOA, İ.MMS., 156/1330-Z-2, (Hicrî 2/Z/1330), 2 ,4, 5.

of June in 1913, most of the Muslims who fled to Anatolia and the capital from Thrace and Marmara were sent back to their original places of residence. There were around 200,000 of them and they were all negatively affected by the experience of the war that resulted in the destruction of their properties and livelihoods.[342] In addition, some non-Muslim Ottomans who had collaborated with the invading forces were still causing trouble in the region during and after the war. Many Muslims held personal grudges against those non-Muslims who had inflicted harm upon them during the war[343]. In a short time, non-Muslim Ottomans, in particular Greek and Bulgarian Ottomans, were all perceived as being 'backstabbers' and homogenized as the enemy. There is evidence suggesting that the Ottoman authorities tried to put a halt to subsequent conflicts but with very limited success. Events escalated especially after the Ottoman reclamation of lost territories. News of misconduct on the part of officials and on the part of the Muslim population started to spread. The government introduced martial law in the region and established commissions that were tasked with visiting individual villages to ensure the restoration of security and order.[344] The process of establishing order was quite problematic and caused numerous discussions between the Armenian and the Orthodox Patriarchates and the Ottoman center. All sides were always uncertain of the other's intentions and roles in the development of events. Finally, when order was more or less established by September of 1913, tensions would be re-ignited in 1914.

The Coming of the *Muhacirs*

The disturbances of the status quo in the Aegean facilitated the establishment of a hostile diplomatic environment in which a war between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece seemed imminent. That in turn transformed 'national minorities' on both sides of the Aegean into potential collaborators and backstabbers in the eyes of nationalists. The Ottoman and Greek elites were well aware of this situation because of the 'lessons learned' from the 'Macedonian Question' and the Balkan Wars. The possibility of war was drawn upon as an excuse for demographic

[342] Ahmet Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı Rumları: Göç ve Tehçir (1912-1918)*, (İstanbul: Bayrak Yayımcılık, 2011), 67-68.
[343] For specific examples of such cases see: Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 68-69.
[344] Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 70-79.

homogenization. The mutual loss of trust in the Ottoman Empire facilitated the establishment of a vicious cycle in society within which political problems were worsening instead of being solved. Political demands, complaints and the protests of 'national minorities', which in this case were the Ottoman Greeks and Bulgarians in Western Anatolia, were seen as proof of their 'treachery' and hence acted upon by the Unionists with further centralization and pressure. On the other hand, at the same time all the policies of the Unionists, and the support of the nationalist masses and media for them, were seen by the 'national minorities' as proof of the destructive and nationalist intentions of the Unionists (or the Ottoman administration in general), regardless of whether or not that was the case.

The last issue that facilitated the transfer of the 'Eastern Question' from Macedonia to Western Anatolia, and therefore the province of Aydın, was the influx of *muhacir*s. The mass flight of Muslims from the lost territories of Ottoman Europe occured at the intersection of the effects discussed above: a disturbed status quo and the loss of mutual trust. Muslim refugees from the Balkans, or *muhacir*s as they were referred to in the Ottoman Empire, were both a major problem and a 'potential solution' for some problems the Empire faced. The logistics of the resettlement of the *muhacir*s, creating housing and employment for them, and reducing the negative effects of their influx (such as the spreading of diseases or the social discontent that the refugees could create due to the limited capacities of the fragile Ottoman economy) carried the potential to further burden the rest of the Ottoman population as it required substantial finances and effort. However, at the same time, the *muhacir*s were also valuable demographic assets for the Unionists as loyal Muslims who would constitute the 'human resource' of their demographic policies. In addition, they were also political assets. Their suffering at the hands of the nation-states in the Balkans served as legitimization for the homogenization policies of the CUP in the international arena. Whenever the CUP was criticized for the pressures it applied on the Christians of the Empire after the Balkan Wars, the issue of the *muhacir*s was raised in their defence. The coming of the *muhacir*s had domestic political implications as well. The suffering of the *muhacir*s was used for nationalist agitation and their resentment sometimes made them fervent supporters of the nationalist cause. In a nutshell, they constituted the medium through which the conflict in Macedonia was transferred into Western

Anatolia and thus also to the county of Foçateyn. The refugee problem acted both as a disrupter of the status quo and a reason for the further erosion of mutual trust within Ottoman society.

Muhacir is a term that was originally used to describe the followers of the Muslim prophet Muhammed in his migration from Mecca to Medina. However, a new usage of the term arose which was divorced from this religious connotation and in contemporary Turkish it means 'migrant'. The explanation for this new usage lies in the mass waves of migration of Muslims from Europe, voluntary or forced, who left their homes and came to the Ottoman Empire. These masses of Muslims were perceived as being people who had to leave their ancestral lands for the sanctuary of a Muslim state. The issue of the migration of the Balkan Muslims (*muhacirs*) was a central problem in the Ottoman Empire before, during and after the Balkan Wars.[345] Muslim emigration included both flight and expulsion, and the boundaries between the two cannot always be clearly distinguished. The Ottomans' losses of military conflicts in the Balkans are known to have caused repeated waves of Muslim migration since the mid-18th century. The first major wave of Muslim expulsion and flight came after the Ottoman defeat against Tsarist Russia in the war of 1877-1878 (which is also known as the *93 Harbi* in Turkish). In total, some 1,500,000 Muslim civilians were displaced (1 million in war and more than half a million after the war) and another 200,000-300,000 Muslims were killed. The resulting treaty of Berlin in 1878 'had grave implications for religious and ethnic populations, who had suddenly become minorities and had to fear expulsions resulting from segregationist practices. Massive refugee convoys formed everywhere with the emigrants hoping to escape the vengeance of conquerors belonging to other religions or nationalities'.[346]

[345] For the various waves of refugee migration from lost Ottoman territories see: Ahmet Akgündüz, 'Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960: Types, numbers and ethno-religious dimensions', in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 24, Issue 1 (1998): 103.

[346] Berna Pekesen, 'Expulsion and Emigration of Muslims from the Balkans', *European History Online (EGO)*, published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (EIG), Mainz 2012-03-07. http://www.ieg-ego.eu/pekesenb-2011-en [2013-01-04].

In the period after the treaty of Berlin in 1878, battles against the Ottomans were usually followed by attacks on Muslim civilians, who were considered to be collaborators of the 'oppressors'. There was no general pattern of expulsion. Destruction of villages, destruction of cultural and religious institutions, direct attacks, or 'voluntary' migration out of fear of certain expulsion were common.[347] The flight and expulsion of Muslims was becoming an increasingly large problem in the 19th century. The Ottoman state repeatedly tried to count, understand, control and plan the flow of refugees. The Ottoman bureaucracy dealing with the refugees was never fully in control nor efficient, but it grew larger and more competent with each major refugee crisis. The first commission for *muhacir*s in the Ottoman Empire was established as early as 1860 following the Crimean War between the Ottomans and Russia. This initial *Muhacirin Komisyonu* (Commission for Refugees) was followed by the *Muhacirin İdaresi* (Administration of Refugees) in 1875, the *İdare-i Umumiyye-i Muhacirin Komisyonu* (Commission for the Administration of All Refugees) in 1878, the *Muhacirin Komisyon-ı Alisi* (The Grand Commission of Refugees) in 1897, the *Trablusgarb ve Bingazi Mültecilerine Mahsus Komisyon* (Special Commission for the Refugees of Tripolitania and Bengazi) in 1911 and lastly the *İskan-ı Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyeti* (Directorate of the Settlement of Refugees and Tribes) on the 13th of May in 1913. With each successive institution or temporary commission, the bureaucratic body dealing with the *muhacir*s was becoming politically more important as a major tool for managing the demographic resources of the Empire.

The last and the largest of these bureaucratic bodies, the *İskan-ı Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyeti* (henceforth IAMM), was established by the CUP after its seizure of power through a coup. Its major aim was to solve the problems of the massive refugee influx of the Balkan Wars. However, at the party congress of 1913, Ziya Gökalp convinced the CUP members to use the directorate for the research and settlement of non-sedentary elements in the Empire too. In the end, the directorate was tasked to supervise the resettlement of the refugees and the non-sedentary tribes of the Empire.

[347] Berna Pekesen, 'Expulsion and Emigration of Muslims from the Balkans', *European History Online (EGO)*, published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (EIG), Mainz 2012-03-07. http://www.ieg-ego.eu/pekesenb-2011-en [2013-01-04].

The CUP saw the refugees and the tribes as the two principal resources or their demographic goals. The CUP aimed to use the *muhacir*s in order to counter the claims of having a majority that the Greek and Bulgarian nationalists asserted they had in the western parts of the Empire. At the same time, the CUP aimed to use tribes to discount similar claims made by Armenians and Kurds in the Eastern parts of the Empire.[348] The CUP then made further changes to the directorate and increased its powers on the 14th of March in 1916 under the pressure of World War I. After that date it was referred to as the *Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi* (The General Directorate of Refugees and Tribes, henceforth AMMU) and its powers were increased yet again. The AMMU had the power to displace whole settlements in the Empire. Many *muhacir*s lived in poor conditions on the outskirts of larger cities despite the growing bureaucracy responsible for their well-being and the fact that they were seen as valuable political assets by the CUP. Sickness, uncertainty, poverty and social marginalization haunted the majority of the refugees. A resourceful few managed to cope with their new lives whereas the majority were deprived of their former standards of living. Those who went to rural areas often had problems with Muslim and/or non-Muslim locals and some formed gangs and committed robberies as a means of staking out a livelihood.[349]

The flight and expulsion of Muslims during and after the Balkan Wars constituted the most important phase of refugee migration from the lost Ottoman territories in terms of impact. It also represented the peak of violence and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans as a whole. The Balkan Wars caused the displacement of some 410,000 Muslims from the Balkans[350] and among those, only approximately 297,737[351] made it safely to the Ottoman territories between 1912 and 1915. In the end, only a mere 38 percent of the Muslim population living in the Balkans region in the year 1911 remained in 1923.

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[348] Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi / İttihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendisliği (1913-1918)*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 178-179.
[349] For a good read on the conditions and the stories of the Muslim refugees see: Ali Ezger Özyürek, *Muhacirler, Bitmeyen Göç*, (İstanbul: Laika Yayıncılık, 2007).
[350] Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1995), 184, 339.
[351] Yusuf Oğuzoğlu, 'Balkanlardaki Türk Varlığının Tarih İçindeki Gelişmesi', in *Balkanlardaki Türk Kültürünün Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını*, (Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002), 18.

The rest had been expelled, fled, died while fleeing or were killed.[352] In the province of Aydın some 104,879 *muhacir*s were settled within its boundaries. Although some refugees from past wars were already living there,[353] the effects of refugee migration became much more drastic in the province of Aydın only after the First Balkan War in 1912. The Ottoman losses in the Balkan Wars were swift and so was the influx of *muhacir*s immediately after 1912. They were deprived of their properties and forced to leave quickly *en masse*. The flight of thousands of Muslims lasted until the end of the Second Balkan War and beyond. In addition, as many international observers observed, the nature of the Balkan Wars was also different than previous European wars.[354] Civilians on all sides were targeted throughout the war, either forced to migrate or destroyed in the creation of 'ideal' homogeneous nation-states. For the victors, the Balkan Wars paved the way for the forceful displacement and destruction of Muslims from the entirety of the Balkans and it was not only those who lived in the post-Berlin Congress territories of the Ottoman Europe who were forced out. Muslims who had been taking refuge in the remaining Ottoman territories in the Balkans or those who stayed within the borders of the new Balkan states were also forced out.

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[352] Berna Pekesen, 'Expulsion and Emigration of Muslims from the Balkans', *European History Online (EGO)*, published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (EIG), Mainz 2012-03-07. http://www.ieg-ego.eu/pekesenb-2011-en [2013-01-04].

[353] Right before the Balkan Wars, on the 22nd of February 1912, an article titled 'İzmir'den: İzmir ve Türkler' was published in the journal *Türk Yurdu* about İzmir. In this article, westernized, modern and developed parts of the city where mostly Christians lived were compared and contrasted with the parts where Muslims lived. The neighbourhood of the Cretan, Tatar, Tripolitanian *muhacir*s (refugees) was described as the least developed, dirty and almost like a village. These were indeed the refugees who had fled from the recently lost Ottoman territories. See: 'İzmir'den: İzmir ve Türkler', in *Türk Yurdu*, 9 February 1327, Vol. I, No: 7, 209-211.

[354] According to Richard C. Hall, the Balkan Wars introduced a new chapter in European warfare: targeting civilians and operations of ethnic cleansing. 'The purpose of many of the atrocities inflicted upon the civilian populations in the Balkans was to achieve a homogenous national state. Deliberate terror created by arson, looting, murder, and rape was intended as a spur to move populations out of a particular piece of territory'. See: Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*..., 136-137.

[Picture: *Muhacir*s marching in Istanbul (1912). Source: Wikimedia Commons[355]]

The Balkan Wars presented an opportunity for demographic engineering that many Balkan nationalists longed for. All of that contributed to the enormous proportion of Muslim refugees that flooded the Empire, first in Thrace and later in the province of Aydın. Since the Aegean Sea was under the blockade of the navy of the Kingdom of Greece until the end of the Balkan Wars, many *muhacir*s made their way into the Empire in large groups overland which is why they initially ended up in the western-most borderlands of the Empire: Thrace. However, coming in the hundreds of thousands, these *muhacir*s were too much for any single Ottoman province to handle. For that reason, throughout the Balkan Wars and afterwards as well, especially between 1913 and 1914, these Muslim refugees also dispersed into other parts of the Empire. One such principle area for *muhacir* resettlement was the province of Aydın.

[355] The original photograph is by Frederick Moore and it was published in the National Geographic of 1912. It had a caption stating 'Muhajirs from Balkans in Turkey during the First Balkan War'. See: http://tr.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dosya:Muhajir.jpg&filetimestamp=20091116161816 (accessed January 2013).

Some *muhacirs* went to Aydın by means of their own religious or family networks. Most of the muhacirs were sent to certain parts of the Empire by the Ottoman government, and the province of Aydın was one such principal destination. The refugees who went to Aydın largely came after the war had ended or in its very last stages. Therefore, the effects of the refugees in Aydın were visible slightly later than in Thrace. In Thrace, the arrival of the *muhacir*s caused inter-ethnic and inter-communal tensions as early as the end of the First Balkan War.

The mass arrival of *muhacir*s was a major socio-economic source of instability for the Ottoman Empire. First of all, they transferred their resentment against Christians to regions which hadn't directly been affected by the war. Most had been deprived of their properties, suffered from violence, forced out of their ancestral lands and lost loved ones.[356] Their experiences and stories soon affected their fellow co-religionists. Their mass exodus from the Balkans was not only a matter that deeply polarized the social order; they also caused great economic stress in the Ottoman Empire. There were simply not enough jobs or housing for the massive amount of the refugees, and social strain increased. In July of 1914, Talât Paşa was delivering an anecdote in a parliamentarian discussion about a tragic event indicative of *muhacir*s' frustrations. According to the *mutasarrıf* of Çanakkale, a refugee baker from Toyran rushed into a baker's shop, forcing out the owner, and started baking bread. When he was asked what he was doing, he argued that he had been kicked out of his shop the same way.[357]

The effect of the resettlement of *muhacir*s is critical to the history of Foçateyn. Judging from the unnatural increase of its Muslim population from 1908 to 1914 (from 3,617 to 7,427), Foçateyn was indeed one of the destinations for the

[356] For an observer's account of the atrocities conducted by the Greek army and the Greeks against their Muslims neighbours also see: Aram Adonyan, *Balkan Savaşı*, trans: Zaven Biberyan (İstanbul: Aras Yayınları, 1999), 371 and 389; and The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Division of Intercourse and Education, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, Publication No. 4, (Carnegie Endowment: Washington, D. C.: 1914).
[357] *Meclis-i Mebushan Zabit Ceridesi* (MMZC), İnikad: 26, Celse: 2, 23 June 1330 (6 July 1914), 612.

resettlement of Balkan Muslims.[358] The exact timing of their arrival was also critical. If the *muhacir*s arrived prior to the mass migration of Ottoman Greeks from the county of Foçateyn in June of 1914, it could be assumed that a similar bout of inter-ethnic and inter-communal violence had led to their departure. As I will discuss in detail later, such incidents happened in places like Edirne in Thrace. However, if they arrived after the exodus of the Ottoman Greeks of Foçateyn, such a possibility would be ruled out.

The Ottoman state archives are silent about the mass resettlement of *muhacir*s before 1914 in Foçateyn. The first visible information about the refugees in Foçateyn before the Balkan Wars is from a newspaper article dating from the 26th of October in 1889. According to the article, '...there was much reclaimed land found at the frontiers of the *kaza* borders of Menemen and Foça, as a result of the changing river bed of Gediz and the founding of two villages as the result of the incoming Circassian immigrants (...) the lands of which were assigned by the Council of Provincial Administration (*Vilayet İdare Meclisi*)'[359] The court registers *(şer'iyye sicilleri*) of the county of Foçateyn between 1899 and 1906 are also silent about the presence of *muhacir*s. In fact, there is only one case of a land dispute recorded between an Ottoman Greek and a *muhacir* between these dates in the county.[360]

None of the oral historical documents referred to in this chapter mention a sizeable arrival of Muslim refugees in Foçateyn before the winter of 1914. In the winter of 1914, Nicos Vrutanis (Νίκος Βρουτάνης) and Georgeos Savvas (Γιώργος Σάββας) from Çakmaklı village talked about the presence of a limited number of thieves of possible refugee background in the county.[361] In his personal memoir, Reha Midilli,

[358] For the numbers see: Erkan Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti Salname ve İstatistiklerinde Foçateyn Kazası'. In *Foça Üzerine Yazılar / Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı Anısına*. (İzmir: Ati Matbaa, 1998) and also Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914 Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (London, 1985), 174.
[359] *Hizmet*, no. 292, October 26th 1889. Source: Nilgün Kiper, 'Resettlement of Immigrants and Planning in Izmir During the Hamidian Period', (Unpublished PhD diss., İzmir Yüksek Teknoloji University, 2006), 146.
[360] Fatma Gamze Kocabıyık, '112 Numaralı Foça Şer'iyye Sicili'nin Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi', (Unpublished MA thesis, Afyon Kocatepe University, 2009), 74.
[361] CAMS, Βρουτάνης and Σάββας interview, 22/4/1964, Athens.

an influential local figure in contemporary Foça whose family were *muhacir*s from Midilli, claimed that there were some families who migrated from Midilli to Foçateyn as a result of increasing Greek nationalist pressure, murders and being driven from the island, events that started with the Balkan Wars. His own father's family left the island in 1913, settled in Izmir initially and later settled in the village of Bağarası near Foça in 1915.[362] This suggests that there was a very limited number of *muhacir*s from places adjacent to Foçateyn and they either weren't there before 1915 or very few in number. All of this is confirmed by the lack of a drastic change in the Muslim population of the county until 1914. There are no sources indicating a substantial *muhacir* presence that would account for the increase in the census of 1914.

Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the first major wave of *muhacir*s arriving in the county of Foçateyn happened after the 30th of June in 1914,[363] a date provided by eyewitness Felix Sartiaux. There is no other data, or any other clues that conflict with this date as the first major date of arrival. The *Muhacir*s arrived in one large group only after the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks in June of 1914. This, as I will demonstrate later in my discussion of the Spring of Organized Chaos of June 1914, makes the case of Foçateyn different from the flight and oustings in Thrace. Those who arrived in Foçateyn were Muslim refugees of the Balkan Wars, most of whom came from Macedonia.

The Ottoman population census of 1914 was conducted in the year 1330 (of the *Rumi* calendar) and was not based on a new survey. It was issued on the 14th of March 1914 and possibly ended sometime before the end of that calendar year on the 28th of February in 1915. The census was actually a modified version of the 1905-1906 census, and existing birth rate and death rate figures were used to modify numbers in places where such statistics were available. Estimates were made when such statistics did not exist.[364] This poses a peculiar problem for determining the number of

[362] Vural Yiğit, *Midilli'den Çıktık Yola*, (İstanbul: Ege Basım, 2013), 64-70; 99-97.
[363] This date is provided by Félix Sartiaux. See: Félix Sartiaux, 'Le Sac de Phocée et L'Expulsion Des Grecs Ottomans D'Asie-Mineure en Juin 1914', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1914, 654 - 686.
[364] Musa Şaşmaz, 'The Ottoman Censuses and the Registration Systems in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', *OTAM*, Vol: 6, (1995), 289-305.

*muhacir*s in the county of Foçateyn. The census estimated that there were 7,427 Muslims in Foçateyn, which was more than twice the number recorded in the census of 1908 which provided the latest data about Foçateyn before 1914. But this figure is simply too high regardless of whether Foçateyn's census was an estimate or a modification based on birth and death rates. And that raises the question: Why was the Muslim population modified / estimated to be so high? Was the census modification/estimate made after the arrival of the *muhacir*s or before? If the latter was the case, then did the Ottoman administration decide to settle *muhacir*s in Foçateyn as early as March of 1914? Unfortunately, we don't have the means to answers these questions accurately. The same census of 1914 indicated that there were 15,670 Ottoman Greeks whereas the census of 1917 indicated that there were none. Therefore, one might assume that if this modification/estimate was recorded after the expulsion of the Ottoman Greeks, it would have registered their population as zero. Could this be a sign that the 1914 census was recorded before the exodus of the Ottoman Greeks and thus foresaw that event? One can only make guesses based on the present data. However, there are clues that suggest the possibility that such a decision was made a month prior to the events of June 1914.

According to a telegram sent by the Minister of Interior, Talât Paşa, to the province of Aydın on the 20th of May in 1914, it was impossible for *muhacir*s to go back to their homes despite ongoing talks with the Kingdom of Greece about their possible return. Talât Paşa stated that their return would mean their destruction even if there was an agreement and he noted that such an option would yield no benefits.[365] One day later, on the 21st of May, Talât Paşa sent yet another telegram to the province of Aydın. His statements confirm that by May of 1914 refugees were still arriving and were being sent to Ottoman Greek villages (*Rum köylerine*), moving from the coast toward the interior, until an agreement on a possible population exchange could be settled with the Kingdom of Greece. According to Talât Paşa, although a consensus had been reached to accept the offer of the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos on the exchange of the populations of Macedonian Muslims with the Ottoman Greeks of the province of Aydın, such a procedure would take a long time. In the meantime, refugees continued to arrive and needed to be settled. He then indicated that a mutual decision had been

[365] BOA, DH-ŞFR, 41/35, (Hicrî, 24/C /1332).

agreed upon between him and the Grand Vizier on the settlement of the *muhacir*s in Ottoman Greek villages with the necessary security measures to be provided by the gendarmerie.[366] Almost a month from the date of the telegram, one of the villages where refugees would end up would be the largest town of the county of Foçateyn: Eski Foça. However, as will be discussed later, the transition would prove to be quite violent, far from the secure and smooth process described in the telegram.

It is important to underline once more that there had been a small number of Muslim refugees in the county of Foçateyn before 1914. However, the major wave of *muhacir*s, which more than doubled the population of the Muslims in the county, came only after the events of June 1914. Therefore, unlike many places in Thrace, like Edirne where refugees had been arriving since the early days of the First Balkan War and causing inter-ethnic or inter-communal tensions, the refugee phenomena took longer to reach Foçateyn and, as we will see its arrival produced different dynamics. In short, the Muslim influx did not coincide with the end of the Balkan Wars. Muslims continued to flee from the Balkan League states. In fact, the fate of the refugees, which is obviously linked to that of the Ottoman Christians who were fleeing the Empire or had been driven out, had acquired so much political importance that it is possible to argue that the peace treaties regarding the Balkans failed to create a sustainable status quo precisely because they did not solve the issue of refugees. For the refugees on all sides, it was as if the war hadn't come to an end.

At the end of the Balkan Wars, the Kingdom of Greece had enlarged its territories and homogenized its population through the flight, expulsion and killing of Muslims. On the other hand, the Ottomans had lost sizeable territories and those that remained were not as homogenous as those of the Balkan nation-states like Bulgaria and Greece. From the perspective of the nationalist Unionists, this situation had to be dealt with. The argument went that if the Balkans had been homogenized, so should the Ottoman territories. It is for this reason that the end of the Balkan Wars witnessed the start of a period of 'demographic wars' in which the victors and the defeated tried to get rid of their 'internal enemies'. These 'demographic wars' carried the seeds of serious diplomatic crises and forebodings of new wars to come.

[366] BOA, DH-ŞFR, 41/37, (Hicrî, 25/C /1332).

To sum up, the Ottoman and the Greek political elites were convinced that another war was imminent between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece. Both states tried to take precautions that ultimately exacerbated diplomatic tensions in an environment in which the status quo had already been destabilized. On the Ottoman side, the leaders and the bureaucracy of the Orthodox *millet* in the Empire had been much less involved and supportive of the continuation of the Ottoman system since the Second Constitutional Revolution in 1908. By the time the Balkan Wars came to a close, the majority of the Ottoman Greek elite was swayed by nationalism and thus made the 'nightmares' of the Ottoman center a reality. The Balkan Wars destroyed the last hopes of political compromise and dialogue between the leaders of the Orthodox *millet* and the Ottoman elite (especially the CUP, which dominated the political sphere after the war). The possibility of a constitutional Ottoman citizenship, a Union of the Elements (*İttihad-ı Anasır*), was an empty concept for the elites. For both the Ottoman Christians and the center, the intentions of the 'other' and 'always' run contrary to the respective other. Finally, with the massive influx of *muhacir*s, the experiences of nationalist rivalry and violence in conflict-ridden Macedonia and the resentment stirred up by the Balkan Wars were literally transferred to Western Anatolia and especially to areas such as Thrace and the shores of the Aegean and Marmara.

So far I have provided the historical background of the time period preceding the events of the spring of 1914 in Foçateyn. I would like now to look at how the Unionists, who had seized power toward the end of the Balkan Wars (in 1913), made use of this rather agitated social and political environment to further their own nationalist causes. This is significant for this research because it demonstrates both the role that this unstable environment played and the nationalist policies of the Ottoman elite that unfolded in the events in Foçateyn. For good reasons, the Balkan Wars served as sufficient conviction for the CUP that nationalism was the only way to 'survive'. Their experience of economic incorporation and penetration by Europe and its negative effects drove them closer to nationalist economic policies. The Unionists had adopted liberal 'laissez faire, laissez passer' policies in the beginning, but the Balkan Wars made them realize that critiques of the liberal economy were right about

the dangers of such policies. Simply put, the cosmopolitan and individual model proved to be unfruitful. As Unionist ideologue Ziya Gökalp argued, the time had come for a communal and a national economy, not an individual one (‘*fert yok, cemiyet var*’).[367] In their minds, the building of a ‘national’ and ‘mutual’ economy, economic consciousness and a loyal bourgeoisie were fundamental necessities for the survival of the Empire. They believed that only a loyal bourgeoisie, communal economy and full control over resources would yield the necessary output in the struggle for survival against the increasing dominance of the West.[368]

The Unionists used the economic and the political discontent that was rife among the Muslims of the Empire as a means of mobilizing them in the nationalist cause. The utilization of the idea of a national economy (*Milli İktisat*) through Unionist involvement in the boycott movements and the use of the press to spread nationalist ideas and causes constitute two of the three major pillars of policy of the Unionists after the Balkan Wars. These policies helped the CUP make use of the polarized state of affairs to further their causes by channelling the discontent of the disenfranchised Muslims of the Empire. The third pillar of their policy was demographic engineering. This policy was applied hand in hand with economic nationalism and the spread of nationalism through the press. At this point, I will discuss the first two policies and then move on to examine the demographic policy within the framework of the formulation of the ‘National Question of Izmir’ and the agenda that the Unionists developed in that regard.

[367] Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de Milli İktisat 1908-1918*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012), 95-96.
[368] For a detailed discussion of a variety of topics on the national economy discussed by a variety of Ottoman intellectuals of the time see: Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de Milli İktisat 1908-1918*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012), 95-124.

The Unionist's Utilization of the Post-War Climate: The Idea of a *Milli İktisat* and the Boycott Movements

The arrival of the *muhacir*s was not the only issue that polarized the relationship between inter-communal and inter-ethnic groups. Subsequent waves of boycott movements between 1913 and 1914 swiftly grew and took on the form of an anti-Christian movement following the Balkan Wars. The first boycott movement in the Empire, which started on the 8th of October in 1908, urged citizens to shun Austrian goods; this movement arose in reaction to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Although that initial boycott arose through the spontaneous reactions of Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims alike, it was later understood that the CUP had in fact been behind the scenes, orchestrating its momentum and fanning the flames.[369] Although the Unionists repeatedly claimed that they were not involved in the boycott, they closely monitored events and tried to control them because they feared uncontrolled developments.[370] In a way, the CUP utilized the movement for its own political agenda. This initial boycott served as an experiment which demonstrated that mass movements had the potential to be powerful weapons wielded against imperialism and that they were useful albeit dangerous political tools for nationalists. The boycott of 1908 served as an important development for the emergence of demand for a *milli iktisat*[371] (national economy) and bolstered popularization of the idea.[372]

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[369] Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları 2001, 135).

[370] Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *1908 Osmanlı Boykotu Bir Toplumsal Hareketin Analizi*, (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2004), 291.

[371] The *Milli İktisat* was an economic agenda that became popular among the Young Turks after the Second Constitutional period. Although it started as economic patriotism in the face of the challenges presented to the Ottoman economic system by capitalist penetration and wars, it soon evolved into a fundamental pillar of Muslim and later Turkish nationalisms. In its later stages, it became a Muslim and later Turkish centered idea of economic development. The idea had tremendous influence on the policies of the Unionists and later Kemalists as well. It also had powerful appeal for the Muslim middle classes and workers and also found supporters among the elites. It basically foresaw the creation of a native and loyal bourgeoisie, the definitions of which were open to interpretation, that could support the development of a domestic industry. The *Milli İktisat* focused on the capitulations, dominance of foreign imports, under-development of war-making industries, infrastructure,

The second major wave of boycotts came in 1910, but this time they targeted 'internal enemies'. Cretan unification (Ένωσις) had been a heated issue since the 1908 revolution and a boycott against Greece was launched as a means of expressing discontent. Following the intensification of political turmoil in Crete in 1910, mass meetings paved the way for a boycott in May of 1910. Venizelos' subsequent election to the Greek parliament and failed Ottomans attempts to assuage political problems in Crete increased the vehemence of the public's reaction against these events. By May of 1911, the CUP had either initiated numerous boycott movements and the government and CUP had attempted to control those movements that instilled fear among elites.[373] It is thus clear that some boycotts developed spontaneously while others were the result of conscious planning. Public pleas for boycotts against Greece were sent to the government and the public demanded that the state take action to solve the issue of Crete. News spread around the Empire that masses of people were gathering in public spaces or mosque courtyards in such places as Manastır, Üsküp, Selanik, Drama, Serez, Kavala, Edirne, Beirut, Sidon, Haifa, and Damascus. And not only Muslims rose up, but some non-Muslims as well. Although the Ottoman Greek press and foreign observers were convinced that the Ottoman government was behind the events, the government itself was also trying to keep control of the situation. In particular, there was concern about mobs that were whipped into frenzies that resulted in attacks against Greeks. Another issue was the voluntary enlistment initiative that listed names of voluntary fighters for the defense of Cretan Muslims, as this had the potential to incite the populace to inter-communal or inter-ethnic violence.[374]

One such enlisting initiative also took place in the county of Foçateyn. On the 5th of June in 1910, the *İttihad* newspaper published a copy of a telegram that had been sent by the people of Eski Foça ('*Foça-i Atik Ahalasi tarafından'*) to the Grand Vizier (*'Sadaret-i Uzmaya'*). The telegram stated that as it had been previously declared, 'the people of Foçateyn do not consent to the recent bloody games played by a small

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agricultural production and the lack of the credit raising capacities of national institutions.

[372] Çetinkaya, *1908 Osmanlı...*, 134.

[373] Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 89-90.

[374] Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 90-94.

group of people in Crete which is rightfully our land', and they requested the delivery of the measures 'suitable to the glory of our community'. The telegram went on to say that 'the reactions and enthusiasm of the people have reached an uncontrollable degree since the acts of aggression still continue on the island'. For that reason, it was argued that voluntary enlisting had commenced and hundreds of people submitted their names to be martyrs for the homeland. It was stated that the people were ready to sacrifice themselves and a plea was made for the government to take swift action.[375]

The final stage of the boycott movements between 1913 and 1914 coincided with the troublesome period following the Balkan Wars. The major difference in this particular wave of boycotts was its explicit target: the Ottoman Greeks. These boycotts not only protested the conceived role of the Ottoman Greeks (and other Christians) in the Balkan Wars, but also sought to fulfil the fundamental goal of the *Milli İktisat* (national economy): the creation/empowerment of a Muslim bourgeoisie. In addition, these boycotts also differed in that the 'political groupings and gangs were much more visible than the groups of merchants and port workers'[376] who played the dominant role of agency in previous boycotts. In short, the role of nationalists and the CUP was far more dominant and visible. Nonetheless, just as with previous boycotts, but to an even greater extent, the public took on an active role. There was a flurry of pamphlets and newspaper articles both in Istanbul and in the provinces. Many civil society organizations and clubs were opened to support the cause of the boycotts and the national economy. At one point, even an open letter of criticism was sent to the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople by boycotters because the Patriarchate had spoken out against the boycotts.[377] At this point it should be emphasized that this period of mass mobilization also coincided with the period of time when the ousting of Ottoman Christians (especially Ottoman Greeks) had reached its peak on the Western Anatolian coast. According to Çetinkaya, in its final stage 'the boycotting started to resemble banditry and became entirely different from the "Fez tearing feasts"'[378] of earlier boycotts.

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[375] See the appendix for the transliteration of the full text. 'Foça-i Atik'ten Çekilen Telgraf Sureti', in *İttihad*, 23 Mayıs 1326 (5 June 1910).
[376] Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 185.
[377] Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 152-159.
[378] Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 200.

After 1910 the boycott movements evolved into 'the economic aspect of the process of elimination of the non-Muslims from the Ottoman Empire'[379] from the rather Ottomanist 'native economy' logic of the early boycotts in 1908 as a result of many other dynamics such as diplomacy, war, high politics and political ideas. It must be stressed that Muslim merchants (particularly in Asia Minor) and the working class, the backers of the boycotts, supported the movements for their own interests. They established organizations, institutions and voluntary associations, and also created publications and made contributions to the movement. Some even made fortunes as a result. However, it must also be stressed that the interests and reactions of those classes were utilized by the CUP which 'attempted to enhance the status of Muslims and Turks in the economy through the mobilization of the public opinion[380]' for its own political agenda.

Rise of Nationalism in the Public Sphere and the Polarization of the Press

In addition to the direct transfer of the experiences of the wars through *muhacir*s, the new modern public sphere, which had been developing in the Ottoman Empire since the era of the Tanzimat,[381] constituted an additional realm and echoing effect for the transfer of the horrors of the war and the resulting resentment against Christians. But the modern public sphere should not simply be construed as a mere medium of transfer. It is also a medium within which people's opinions are shaped, reshaped or constructed. It is a realm in which mutual interactions between social classes, individuals, people, groups and state are constantly (re)shaping imagined realities about life. It is a realm in which state policies are influenced and the state influences people through mass politics. It is also a realm in which hegemonies and counter-hegemonies take shape. In the Ottoman Empire, the public sphere after the Balkan Wars had become a realm which facilitated both the transfer of experiences of the war and the state's and elites' use of those experiences through mass politics to influence

[379] Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 200.
[380] Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 202.
[381] Cengiz Kırlı, 'Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire', in *Public, Islam and the Common Good*, ed. Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 75-99.

public opinion. The result was a polarized civil society, warping the nature of the relationships between social and political actors in the society, and thus contributed to the predominance of nationalist discourses after the Balkan Wars. In addition, this general polarization led to particular results for the province of Aydın: the creation of a 'National Question of Izmir'[382] and the generation of anti-Greek sentiment through mass politics.

Although traces of some anti-Christian (and anti-Greek) feelings in the Ottoman press can be seen in columns discussing events like the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897, the Young Turk reforms related to education and churches, the introduction of universal conscription, the Cretan question and the wave of boycott movements between 1909 and 1911, the breaking point in the radicalization and nationalization of the discourse employed in the Ottoman press against Christians came with the formulation of the 'National Question of Izmir' and the spread of predominantly anti-Greek feelings in the Ottoman press between 1913 and 1914 following the Balkan Wars. Throughout the period of wars and especially afterward, the public sphere, including but not limited to the press, became a principal realm in which rival nationalisms fought, new policies were formulated and the masses were 'enlightened.[383] The province of Aydın was the region that had the highest numbers of Muslim migrants from the territories

[382] The 'National Question of Izmir' is a term that I translated from a phrase that I encountered often in the Ottoman nationalist literature of the period following the Balkan Wars. It is basically used to define discussions surrounding the topic of the fate of Izmir and Western Anatolia (especially the province of Aydın) after the Balkan Wars. When these discussions are put into context together with the discussions of irredentist Greek nationalism's policies of expansion in Asia Minor, it is clear that the two nationalisms were on a crash course right after the Balkan Wars. A good example of such discussions in the nationalist literature can be seen in: Celâl Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım / Milli Mücadeleye Giriş*. Vol. 5, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967), 1578. Bayar quotes Eşref Kuşçubaşı's phrase '*Milli Dikkat İzmir'e Çevriliyor*'.

[383] For instance, in the year 1914, one of the pro-Unionist newspapers *İkdam* alone published numerous articles discussing the issues of the Aegean Islands after the war, supporters of Greek nationalism, Greek propaganda and Greek bandits. The central theme of these columns was fear of the invasion of Asia Minor following the Balkan defeats, and non-Muslims were feared to be a 'fifth column' in the face of a possible invasion. The Ottoman elite galvanized the sentiments of Muslims through the use of this perception of threats. See: Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 150-152.

lost in the Balkan Wars.[384] Therefore, the effect of these *muhacir*s, who transferred their experiences and stories of inter-communal/inter-ethnic violence and who also became political assets for nationalist propaganda, was felt the most in the province of Aydın. The memorandum of British diplomat Mr. Beaumont is again very revealing in terms of the instrumentalisation of the Balkan tragedies by the nationalist press:

> *Circumstantial, if unreliable, accounts of the ill treatment, by the Hellenes, of Moslems in Macedonia and the Islands were daily published in these* [referring to *Tanin*, *Tasfir-i Efkar* and *Köylü*] *newspapers. Incidents, in which Ottoman Greeks were stated to be involved and which frequently had never occurred, were reported and commented upon at length.*[385]

Izmir, the provincial seat of Aydın, was one of the largest cities of the Empire. It was an urbanized and cosmopolitan trade hub connected to the rest of the world. There was an active press scene and a lively public space, and those became the principal agents of the creation, sharing and transfer of nationalist discourses. Although there are many examples of such polarized discussions both in the local newspapers of the province of Aydın (such as *Köylü*) or elsewhere (such as *Tanin*, *İkdam*, and *Akenk*),[386] one particular journal, *Türk Yurdu*, is especially important for developing an understanding of the creation of the 'National Question of Izmir' among nationalists in the Empire.

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[384] Murat Bardakçı, *Talât Paşa'nın Evrak-ı Metrûkesi*, (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2008), 41. Also, for Talât Paşa's hand-drawn map of Muslim refugee settlements density, see the appendix.

[385] FO 195/2458, p537-538 21.07.1914.

[386] The history of the Ottoman press, and especially printing houses that published in Greek during and after the Balkan Wars, is an understudied topic. While recognizing that this field demands further research, I limit myself in this study solely to the demonstration of polarisation. One good example of this can be seen in an article in the newspaper *Ahenk* on the 8th of October in 1912 (25th of September 1328) that criticized Ottoman newspapers published in Greek because of the degrading tone of the language they employed when talking about the Balkan War. *Ahenk* defined newspapers that critiqued the Ottoman government as traitors and called for reason and fairness. For the original reference and more examples see: Zeki Arıkan, 'Balkan Savaşı ve Kamuoyu' in *Dördüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri*, (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basım Evi, 1989), 168-187.

The Formation of the National Question of Izmir

A group of nationalist intellectuals associated with the journal *Türk Yurdu*[387] embarked on a journey to Izmir in June of 1913[388] in order to make observations about the city and to meet enthusiasts of Turkish nationalism in the region. This was actually the first[389] of a series of journeys that various nationalist groups and later members of the CUP made to Western Anatolia after the start of the Balkan Wars in 1912. Following the traumatic loss of territories that were considered to be truly Ottoman in character, such as Selanik (Thessaloniki), and after the loss of areas where Muslims were a majority in the Balkans, many Ottomans, but especially nationalists, started to fear the same destiny for the province of Aydın. And that was how the National Question of Izmir, or the struggle for the 'removal of the fake label of Hellenism'[390] from Izmir in Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver)'s words, was formulated. The nationalists thought that they had to combat nationalism with nationalism before

[387] The journal *Türk Yurdu* was a successor to a previous journal called *Genç Kalemler*. *Genç Kalemler* was established in Selanik (Thessaloniki) and is considered to be among the earliest intellectual enterprises that contributed to the formation of Muslim/Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. Its end came with the loss of the Balkans and with that the city of Selanik. According to Arai, despite the fact that there was a similar group of intellectuals who had a particular interest in nationalism and had established *Genç Kalemler*, the majority of contributors to *Türk Yurdu* and its successor *İslam Mecmuası*, were refugees and non-Ottoman Muslims, most of whom were from territories lost to the Russians and some from recently lost Balkans. Thus the ideological layout of its nationalism was much more Turkist than Islamist. All of these journals also had some sort of an organic connection to the CUP since most of their contributors were important members of the CUP such as Doctor Nazım, Nesimî Sarım, Ömer Seyfettin and Ziya Gökalp. *Türk Yurdu* was dominated by *muhacir*s both in terms of the amount of contributions they made to the journal and by the fact that the leading figure was Yusuf Akçura, an émigré from Russia. For a detailed discussion of these journals and the role of the refugee elite, see: Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 24-68.

[388] When they embarked upon their journey, the Second Balkan War was still going on and Félix Sartiaux was about to start his first excavations in the county of Foçateyn.

[389] Although it is highly likely that other groups or associations might have embarked on similar journeys, this one seems to be the first of its kind (predominantly concerned with the level of national consciousness in Izmir) that I came across during my research. Of course, subsequent research could turn up evidence to the contrary.

[390] Cemal Kutay, *Etniki Eterya'dan Günümüze Ege'nin Türk Kalma Savaşı*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1980), 194.

it was too late. The 'Izmir Journey' of the *Türk Yurdu* journal is the earliest example of such a political agenda and consciousness.

This initial journey undertaken by this group of nationalists in 1913 targeted the assessment of people's awareness of their Turkishness. The underlying logic was a romantic and a primordialist one: Turks had forgotten their national selves and it was the duty of the journal and thus intellectuals to awaken them from their slumber of forgetfulness. They perceived their journey to Izmir to be a mission (the first one in Anatolia after the journal's establishment) of reconnaissance and support that aimed to assess how aware people were of their national selves and if possible, to enhance their consciousness through activities, conferences and cultural events. After all, such an assessment was perceived to be vital considering the recent Ottoman defeat in what they saw as a war of nationalisms. In this line of thinking, what had brought about the loss of the Ottoman Balkans was now engulfing the province of Aydın. The nationalists of *Türk Yurdu* thought that the Ottoman defeat in the Balkans was partly due to the lack of a powerful national identity, which, had it existed, would have put a halt to sectarianisms.

In response to an invitation from their fellow Turkish nationalists in Izmir, Ahmed Agayef (later Ağaoğlu), Hamdullah Subhi, Köprülü Zade Mehmed Fuad, Ali Canib (Yöntem) and Aka Gündüz (also Enis Avni), who were associated with the journal *Türk Yurdu*, embarked on a journey by ship from Istanbul on the 5th of July in 1913. On their way, they passed the island of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and as they were passing a lighthouse on a stone outcropping, they saw a Greek flag. The writer described that moment with great agony, since it was the first time he had 'seen the flag of our enemies [Greeks]' on a piece of land that 'had borne the red and crescent flag for over four, five hundred years'. The writer then dwelled on thoughts of the Balkans and mourned their loss. He stated that he had doubts that 'if we, who ran away like women after tossing down our guns in the Balkans, were the descendants of those heroic Turks who conquered these lands'. He imagined how he would feel when he would see Midilli (Mytilene or Lesbos) and felt like he had been 'wounded in the

depths of [his] soul'.[391] A day later, their ship anchored outside the harbour of Midilli and lighters bearing Greek flags approached them. They looked at the castle of Midilli in the background, right by the harbour with a Greek flag on top, and they felt 'the weight of their ships huge iron anchor going deep into the depths of the sea as if it was sinking deep in their hearts'. There was an obvious fear that Izmir, 'the city whose lights outstripped those in Istanbul', might well share the same destiny.[392]

[391] 'İzmir Seyahati', in *Türk Yurdu*, 3 July 1329, Vol: IV, No: 9, 730-731.
[392] 'İzmir Seyahati', in *Türk Yurdu*, 3 July 1329, Vol: IV, No: 9, 730-733.

[Picture: A Populist Pamphlet. Source: Kutay, *Etniki...,* 206-207.[393]**]**

[393] Pamphlets were an essential part of mass politics in the Second Constitutional era. This nationalist propaganda pamphlet is particularly interesting since it reflects the Ottoman nationalists' perception of the role of Greek nationalists, Greeks and

The journey taken by *Türk Yurdu*'s writers to Izmir turned out to be a major self-proclaimed success. They were well pleased and even surprised by the level of attention they received and the kind reception with which they were welcomed, and they approved of the amount of hard work they saw and the high level of consciousness among their fellow Turkists in the city. On their arrival in Izmir, they were welcomed by the head of the municipality, Evliyazade Refik, commissioner Talât bey, board members of the *Türk Ocağı*[394] (Turkish Hearth) and *Milli Kütüphane* (National Library), representatives from *Sultani* and *İttihad ve Terakki* (CUP) schools, writers from the newspapers *Anadolu*, *Ahenk* and *Köylü*, and lastly representatives of the governor, Nazım Paşa, and the commanding officer of the army of the region, İsmail Fazıl Paşa.[395] According to Kazım Nami (Duru),[396] the writer of the Izmir

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Ottoman Greeks in what they perceived as the 'national question of Izmir'. For the Unionists, another Balkan/Macedonian tragedy was imminent in Western Anatolia after they lost the Balkan Wars. They feared that their beloved Izmir would share the same destiny with that of Selanik (Thessaloniki). The main idea behind the cartoon was to demonstrate to the masses how the money spent on Ottoman Greek enterprises contributed to the suffering of Muslims at the hands of the Greek army and to warn them about the possibility of the same Balkan disaster happening in Izmir since the cartoons described the unloading of ammunition in front of a famous hotel on the cosmopolitan Izmir coastline (Square 6 says '*İzmir Rıhtım Oteli*'). The original of the pamphlet is presented in the cited work of Kutay where he wrote his own judgment about it; in addition to that he also wrote the captions that had been used to define the parts of the cartoon. The captions said: '1) *Köylümüz hükümete aşâr borcunu öderken* (While our villagers pay their debt), 2) *Maaş dağıtımı* (Salary distribution), 3) *Aylık alınca ne yaparız?* (What do we do with our salaries?) 4) *Verdiğimiz paralar nereye gidiyor?* (Where does the money we spend go?) 5) *Neler ısmarlıyorlar?* (What do they buy with it?) 6) *Paralarımız cephane oluyor* (Our money is becoming ammunition), 7) *Dönüp dolaşıp bizi vuruyorlar* (It all comes back and they [our enemies/Greeks] strike us), 8) *Neticede çırıl-çıplak hicret...* (The result is becoming bare naked refugees...)'.

[394] *Türk Ocağı* or *Türk Derneği* was established in March 1912, in the middle of the Balkan Wars and it was, according to Arai, 'the most influential nationalist organization in the Young Turk era, and even in the Republic....' It was established through the initiative of Military Medical School (*Askerî Tıbbiye*) students and it became yet another elite network whose members included many refugees and members of other circles such as the *Türk Yurdu* as well. See: Arai, *Turkish Nationalism...*, 71-82.

[395] 'İzmir Seyahati', in *Türk Yurdu*, 3 July 1329, Vol: IV, No: 9, 732-733.

[396] At this point it is important to underline that both Nami and the others who joined the Izmir journey were also members of the *Genç Kalemler* in Selanik (Thessaloniki)

journey series, that was the first occasion in which a Turkish delegation had been invited to promote Turkishness (*Türklük namına*) 'in the land of the Turk'. He described it as an opportunity to revive the loss of national consciousness among people, almost as an opportunity to kiss a sleeping beauty.

Later, the *Türk Yurdu* delegation travelled to the girls and boys schools of the CUP, the offices of some prominent nationalist journals and lastly the movie theatre called the *Osmanlı Sineması* which had been established by young Turkist enthusiasts to raise money for the province of Aydın's map-making enterprise. They spent the rest of their visit organizing a few conferences and cultural events based around the performances of Turkish songs, dances and poems. Nami's account reported that the topics discussed included Turkish folklore, tales about Turkish ancestors in the region (especially in Manisa), Turkish arts, the differences and similarities between Ottomanism, Turkism and Islamism, and the situation of the Turkish educational institutions. They also discussed the activities of the Turkish youth and lastly education and the social roles of Turkish women in the promotion of national consciousness.[397] He wrote the last of his reports on the 20th of January 1914 when discussions about the future of the Izmir area were heating up.

Hamdullah Suphi, the head of the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths), was much more dramatic in discussing his experience in Izmir. Although he was pleased with the reception they received and the effect of the activities they held during the journey, Suphi was disappointed with the low level of awareness, cultural backwardness, and economic underdevelopment that he saw among the people he considered to be Turks:

> Since our principles and ideology tell us the necessities required to be the real masters of a land, our strengths and weaknesses [in this region] were truly revealed to us. It was impossible not to feel sad at the result. However, this

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between 1910 and 1912. Therefore, it is evident that their interest in the future of Izmir was also linked to their feelings and ideas about the recent loss of the city.

[397] For all the accounts related to the Izmir journey see: 'İzmir Seyahati', in *Türk Yurdu*, 3 July 1329, Vol: IV, No: 9, 730-735, 'İzmir Seyahati 2', in *Türk Yurdu*, 3 Teşrinievvel 1329, Vol: V, No: 2, 900-906, 'İzmir Seyahati 3', *Türk Yurdu*, 28 Teşrinisani 1329, Vol: V, No: 6, 1032-1036 and 'İzmir Mektupları 4', *Türk Yurdu*, 7 Kanunusani 1329, Vol: V, No: 9, 1130-1136.

> sadness was new for us, and being able to feel it signified the beginning of the road to its cure.[398]

Suphi also said that the journey made him realize the importance of economic issues since they witnessed a very visible disparity between Turks and others. According to him, 'non-Turks *(Türk'den gayrı olan*) held to an open and excessive policy of abuse'. For that reason, upon their return to Istanbul they wanted to warn the heads of the relevant ministries. However, according to him, they had to visit Cavid Bey, the minister of finance, since the other responsible ministers were an Ottoman Greek, Aristidi Efendi (the minister of forestry and mines) and an Armenian (the minister of commerce and agriculture, name not mentioned). Cavid Bey mentioned that he knew about the problems in Izmir but replied that this was a matter of education and development and thus required the work of people in that field.[399]

Yusuf Akçura, the founding member of *Türk Yurdu*, a Russian *muhacir* and a Turkist himself, was also invited to Izmir but he was unable to go since he was in Damascus (Şam) at that time. However, on his way back to Istanbul, he also visited Izmir and later he also published his impressions as part of the Izmir Journey series. Akçura 'sadly confesses' to his readers that he was displeased with what he saw in Izmir. According to him, Turkishness and culture were stronger and more pristine in the inner parts of the Aegean region compared to the coastal areas. The closer you went to the coastal areas, he argued, the Ottoman Greek (*Rum*) and foreign influence and pressure became increasingly tangible. For Akçura, those deep influences were not only economic, but more 'terribly' they were cultural (*harsî*). He stated that when the impressions of the others who had travelled Izmir and its surroundings were compiled in the journal, one mutual conclusion was achieved: as long as the existing system that is firmly established and unfortunately considered to be natural persists, the day will come when Turkishness (*Türklük*) will be nothing but an idea.[400] Ironically, in reality that which was nothing but a thought, Turkishness, was about to be constructed as a reality.

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[398] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 196.
[399] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 196.
[400] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 193.

All the members of the journal who wrote about the journey mutually agreed on the dangers engulfing the province of Aydın. Their diagnoses and suggested treatments were almost identical. The Turks of Izmir were economically and culturally in a weaker position, and they 'lacked national consciousness'. The 'real Turkish' character of the region, they admonished, would become a matter of dreams if nationalism was not promoted and spread. It might seem that their perceptions shouldn't be surprising given the circumstances of the era and their ideology. However, what they suggested was also related to their personal narratives. Some of the correspondents of the Izmir Journey, such as Agayef and Akçura, were émigrés themselves and others, such as Ali Canib, Nami Duru and Aka Gündüz, had recently been *muhacir*s[401]. *Türk Yurdu* was the successor journal of *Genç Kalemler*[402] which had been published in Thessaloniki between 1910 and 1912. Ali Canib was its founding member and Kazım Nami Duru and Aka Gündüz were important writers of the journal. The driving force that had brought all of them to the new journal *Türk Yurdu* that had been established in Istanbul and the underlying reason for their journey to Izmir were one and the same: defeat in the Balkan Wars.

Peace agreements that failed to establish a status quo, unresolved demographic and border conflicts between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottomans, a mutual loss of trust between the Ottoman center and Ottoman Greeks, the transfer of the horrors of war and resentment to the province of Aydın, and the polarization of the public resulted in the creation of extremely fertile grounds for nationalist agitation. Neither the CUP nor Greek nationalists, both of whom dominated positions of power in their

[401] Eight of the thirty-five contributors of the journal *Türk Yurdu* were Russian-born migrants and many other were (or had recently become) *muhacir*s from the Balkans. Although smaller in number, these Russian *muhacir*s gave shape to the dominant Turkic discourse of the journal unlike its predecessor *Genç Kalemler* or its successor *İslam Mecmuası*, which were both more Islamic in their nationalist discourse. For a detailed discussion see: Arai, *Turkish Nationalism...*, 48-70.

[402] *Genç Kalemler* is considered to be a very important journal in the genesis of Turkish nationalism. Ali Canib Yöntem, Ömer Seyfettin and Ziya Gökalp constituted its core group and they were instrumental in the formation of Turkism and the *Yeni Lisan* (New Language) movements. Selanik (Thessaloniki) was the headquarters of the movement and the loss of the city in the Balkan Wars resulted in the establishment of offspring movements in Anatolia and Istanbul.

respective countries, wanted to miss the opportunity to use this fertile ground for nationalist propaganda. An overview of the newspapers of the era and the activities of nationalist groups, like those carried out by *Türk Yurdu*, reveals the radicalized nature of Ottoman perceptions of ethnic and communal groups. A closer look, however, reveals that various nationalist discourses (influenced by Turkism, Ottomanism or Islamism) found their real life manifestations through a popular Muslim nationalism fighting against the sectarian actions of Christian nationalisms. In the end, however, actions would be more telling than discussions in newspapers. It was not the columns in the journal of *Türk Yurdu* but people's actions that brought nationalist ideas to life. When the real-life manifestations of all these nationalist discussions are elaborated, it becomes clear that popular Muslim nationalism was set into motion by a complex body of actors in Ottoman society, including but not limited to the CUP. The unfolding of events in the county of Foçateyn in the spring of 1914 is but one such manifestation of that drive.

Formulation of the Unionist Agenda for the National Question of Izmir

Following the assassination of Grand Vizier Mahmud Şevket Paşa by a sympathizer of the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf* party, Said Halim Paşa, another renowned Unionist, became the new Grand Vizier on the 11th of June in 1913, a position he held until February of 1917. Following this assassination, the CUP, which had already established single party rule by that time, launched a political purge against the liberal opposition. Death penalties and the Sinop Exiles[403] followed trials of the assassination. Subsequently, three key figures of the central committee were appointed to key positions: Talât became the minister of internal affairs, Enver was promoted twice and became a Paşa and the minister of war, and Cemal was also promoted to the position of a Paşa (and Minister of Public Works in February 1914 and later Minister of the Navy in March

[403] Although the CUP seized the power with a successful coup on the 23rd of January in 1913, it still had to legitimize its intervention and appease the reactions of the opposition. This was probably why they did not install their own government immediately after. Instead they appointed a pro-Unionist Grand Vizier, Mahmud Şevket Paşa. However, after his assassination within months on the 11th of June in 1913, the CUP took power more tightly and launched its dictatorial rule. The exile of some 250 opposition figures after the assassination, the so-called Sinop Exiles, was a part of the CUP's policy to tighten and strengthen its hold on power.

1914). Although this period is often referred to as the 'Triumvirate' of the three *Paşa*s (Enver, Cemal and Talât), that is not a reflection of the reality. According to Erik-Jan Zürcher, the term is an over-simplification, creating an illusion of absolute authority. Although all three Paşas wielded great power, they still had rivals and their power rested upon the successful power brokerage of Talât Paşa with the independent yet powerful local representatives of the CUP. There was a ruling core of about fifty people in the CUP, each of whom belonged to different cliques, and it was through Talât's skill that he managed to balance them and establish his sphere of influence.[404] The influence of the CUP was almost absolute in creating policies between 1913 and 1918, and appointing Unionists to key positions in 1913 was the means to achieve that.

A flood of Unionists and their *fedaî* entourage into the Western Anatolian coast followed the CUP's seizure of power in 1913. These Unionists, in positions of power and 'on the field', gave the CUP the ability to formulate strategies of survival and competition in the face of the challenges they faced following the Balkan Wars. With the Unionists in the region, the coasts of Ottoman Anatolia effectively became the next battlefield of rival nationalisms. In addition to Celâl Bayar, who was appointed by the central committee[405] of the CUP, there were also members of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, who were appointed by Enver Paşa, the minister of war, to oversee the coastal regions.[406] Today we have two[407] surviving accounts of those inspections in the region (the Western Anatolian coastline) and the account of Celâl Bayar. The surviving inspection reports were made by Dr. Mehmed Reşid (Şahingiray) and Kuşçubaşızade (or Kuşçubaşı) Eşref (Sencer). They both aimed to make assessments about the situation of the Ottoman Greeks, government bureaucrats and the logistical

[404] Zürcher, *Modernleşen...*, 169.
[405] According to Cemal Kutay, Mahmut Celâl Bayar (from the CUP), the head of the 4th Army Petrev (Demirhan) Paşa and the Chief of Staff of the same army (*Kurmay Başkanı*) Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez) Paşa were appointed in the region to orchestrate the ousting operations. Cited in: Nurdoğan Taçalan, *Ege'de Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlarken*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2007), 79-80.
[406] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 201.
[407] It is known that many Unionists played active roles in this period in the province of Aydın. However, my research only turned up the accounts of Kuşçubaşı and Şahingiray in terms of their task to survey the region. Nevertheless, it's possible that there are others as well.

structure of the region. It is clear that they were commissioned with the possibility of warfare with the Kingdom of Greece in mind. In addition, it is clear that both reports also sought to fulfil a nationalistic policy: determining possible courses of action to solve what they perceived to be the National Question of Izmir.

On the 29th of July in 1913, almost a month after the Izmir Journey undertaken by the members of *Türk Yurdu* and a week after the retaking of Edirne, Dr. Mehmed Reşid (Şahingiray)[408] embarked on a tour to inspect some of the counties of Balıkesir (the provincial capital of the province of Hüdavendigar). Later, he published a compilation of his notes from this inspection (titled *Karesi Mutasarrıflığı Tahrirât Kalemi*) in his memoirs. During his inspections, Şahingiray visited Havran, Edremid, Akçay, Ilıca, Burhaniye, Ayvalık, Yunda (Cunda) and Gömeç. His inspection notes were brief but fully detailed. In terms of logistics, he made suggestions for the development of transport and communication for almost every place he visited. However, more importantly, he wrote detailed reports on the situation of the local Ottoman Greeks. When Şahingiray first arrived in Edremit, he complained about the Ottoman Greeks who 'kept their identities and culture intact'. Commerce was also 'unfortunately' under the control of the Ottoman Greeks, and he wrote that the members of the CUP of Edremit were spoiled and over-confident, so he suggested that an intervention be made because they were meddling in matters of the government. Furthermore, he emphasized that national and commercial feelings against the Greeks were awakening in the town. He suggested that the committee utilise those sentiments by stoking them and keeping a close watch over them. However, he said, the major of Edremid was

[408] Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray was born in the Russian-administered Caucasus in 1873. According to Kieser, '...he can be seen as typical representative of the İttihadist generation with a middle-class background and Western style education, while at the same time a distrustful, proud and radical nationalist'. He served in a variety of governorship positions in areas such as İstanköy, Hums, Kozan, Lazistan (Rize) and also Karesi (province of Balıkesir). The last position he held between the 8th of July 1913 and 23rd of July 1914. That is the time when he embarked on an inspection tour of Western Anatolia. Later, he also served as the governor of the province of Diyarbakır in 1915 and he was one of the culprits of the Armenian mass murders in the region. See: Hans-Lukas Kieser, 'From "Patriotism" to Mass Murder: Dr Mehmed Reşid (1873-1919)', in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, Norman Naimark and Fatma Müge Göçek, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 126-149.

very close to the *Metropolid* of the town and was hence unfit for the task.[409] On his travels down the coast, he stopped by Ilıca and urged the government to take action against nomadic Ulahs from the Thessaly region of Greece, because they were constantly on the move and he feared that they would cause security problems.[410]

When Şahingiray arrived in Ayvalık, a prominent town on the Aegean coast that is just across from the island of Midilli, he was greatly disappointed and described the town as 'unfortunately Greek' ('*Ayvalık ma'tteessüf bir Yunan kasabasıdır'*). He reported that Ayvalık had numerous olive orchards, was wealthy, well-built and beautiful 'but consisted almost solely of Ottoman Greeks' (*'fakat ahâli umumiyle Rum'*). He noticed that almost all the buildings that belonged to the Ottoman state except that of the *Adliye* (Courthouse) were in ruins, and in contrast, the buildings that belonged to the *Medropolid* were incredibly 'glorious and splendid'. The major was from Yanya (Ioannina) and was 'a clever man'. However, according to Şahingiray, it was unclear just how 'Ottoman' he was (*râbıta-i Osmâniye'nin derecesi tain olunmaz*). In addition, he complained that the major's mother tongue was Greek and he was on good terms with the Greeks. Later, Şahingiray voiced concern that most of the town was pro-Greek and he warned that action needed to be taken. He suggested changing the municipal borders and including some Muslim villages in the county and settling wealthy, able Muslim merchants and peasants in the town.[411] Şahingiray then crossed over to the island of Yunda (Cunda) from Ayvalık, where he made comments similar to what he had said about Ayvalık. Again he suggested that 'wealthy and able Muslim' *muhacir*s should be settled there to exert control over the Ottoman Greeks (*muhacirlere tevzii ma'kul. Bu sayede tüccâr ve zeytuncu ve oldukça zengin ahâli-i İslâmiyenin iskânı Rumluğu tarassuda yarar*).[412] It is likely that Şahingiray's report contributed significantly to the focusing of attention on the province of Aydın and the coastal regions.

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[409] Nejdet Bilgi, *Dr. Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray, Hayatı ve Hâtıraları*, (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1997), 65-66.
[410] Bilgi, *Dr. Mehmed Reşid...,* 68.
[411] Bilgi, *Dr. Mehmed Reşid...,* 68-69.
[412] Bilgi, *Dr. Mehmed Reşid...,* 69-70.

On the 2nd of October in 1913, Rahmi Bey,[413] a prominent Unionist, was appointed as the governor-general (*Vali*) of the province of Aydın. Although the core group of the CUP hoped to gain much in terms of wielding influence in the region with this appointment, Rahmi Bey proved unsuitable for the drastic measures they wanted to implement. A series of events occurred from October of 1913 to April 1914 which led to the appointment of someone else who would carry out the CUP's drastic measures. Following Rahmi Bey's appointment, Eşref Kuşçubaşı arrived back in the province of Aydın, where he and his Circassian family were residing and had local connections. Although he successfully served in the establishment of *Batı Trakya Hükümeti* (Government of Western Thrace) after the Balkan Wars, both Eşref's mission and the activities of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* were terminated, much to his chagrin, under the orders of Enver Paşa.[414] Later, Enver Paşa would re-activate his *fedaî*s and the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* would yet again enter service.[415] It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that this clandestine organization never had a rigid structure and always embodied a variety of fractions, ideological motivations and designs. This elasticity persisted even after *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*'s reorganisation as the Ottoman secret service

[413] Rahmi (Arslan) Bey (of the Evrenos family) was a Macedonian *muhacir* himself who was born in Thessaloniki in 1873. He was one of the ten founding members of the *Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti* in 1906. This organization later evolved into the CUP, where he played a prominent role. He served as a bureaucrat (*mutasarrıf*) in Selanik (Thessaloniki) before it was lost during the Balkan Wars. It was also known that he had been unable to sell his vast property in Selanik (Thessaloniki). As a result of this, he proposed an exchange of his land with a property owned by a wealthy Ottoman Greek in Manisa but failed due to complications raised by the Kingdom of Greece. It was later rumoured that Rahmi Bey had confiscated property worth up to 200,000 francs. Rahmi Bey was also known to have his own Cretan *fedaî* entourage and he was known to have played significant roles in the nationalization of the economy and the resulting anti-Greek policies in the region. For a short discussion about him see: Fuat Dündar, *Modern...,* 200-202. In addition, Rahmi Bey was also known to have resisted some of the pre-war (Great War) nationalist policies of the Unionists. He is thought to have ruled Izmir (Smyrna) as though it were an autonomous entity throughout the Great War and saw the war as harmful. See: Evangelia Achladi, 'Savaştan Yunan İdaresine: Kozmopolit Smyrna'nın Sonu' in *İzmir 1830-1930 Unutulmuş bir Kent Mi?* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 218-219.

[414] It is highly likely that Enver wanted the establishment of the republic as a bargaining chip. However, he must have cancelled the plan since negotiations with Greece were at a stalemate.

[415] See: Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1570 for the account in which Bayar talks about this period, and see also Cemal Kutay, *1913'de Garbi Trakya'da ilk Türk Cumhuriyeti*, (Tarih Yayınları, 1962), 146 and the book *Lozan ve Batı Trakya*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi Neşriyatı, 1967).

during the Great War. This is well demonstrated by the nature and conduct of its operations at the time.[416]

Although we do not know when exactly the organization was activated the second time, we know that Eşref Kuşçubaşı was very active in the province of Aydın in the fall and the winter of 1913. Eşref, together with others, was considered to be the mastermind behind the Boycott Movement and Turkification policies. Furthermore, in one of his dispatches in February of 1914, the British consul-general of Smyrna reported that Eşref Kuşçubaşı and Emin Efendi (the former gendarmerie officer of Serez and the new head of the gendarmerie in Manisa) had implemented anti-Albanian policies in the province of Aydın. The consul emphasised that the expulsion of Albanians increased after their arrival.[417]

Although little evidence remains, in my opinion what lead to the discrediting of Rahmi Bey among the core Unionists might have been his performance in the Boycott Movement of 1914. We know that January and February of 1914 witnessed many boycotts, picketing and even attacks on people who bought goods from shops owned by Greeks (or Christians). The CUP organized most of these events and there was a tremendous increase in anti-Greek and anti-Christian sentiment. All those events put Rahmi Bey in a difficult position since he was often accused of being the person behind all those events in a region where the policies of the CUP affected the majority for which Rahmi Bey was accountable. If he had been more dedicated to the cause of the core Unionists, he wouldn't have been considered a problem when the CUP's policies against the Ottoman Greeks took a more radical turn in the March 1914. This suggests that he tried to balance the demands of the CUP with the demands of Izmir.

The province of Aydın was not the only region that the nationalists were concerned about. The southern Marmara, where the battle lines of the Balkan Wars were just a few kilometres across the sea, constituted another region that concerned the Unionists. For them, just as with the province of Aydın, the shores of the southern Marmara had

[416] Touraj Atabaki, 'Doğu'ya Doğru: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın İran, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Faaliyetleri', *Kebikeç*, No: 24, (2007), 31-48.
[417] Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 165. Footnote 655.

to be secured. The same line of reasoning was established for both regions. 'The same lethal admixture that had contributed to the fall of the Ottoman Balkans could be found in (...)' those regions that were both critical for the Empire and non-Muslim communities were prominent in those regions. 'Their economic primacy, backed by the West, mirrored that of the Christians in pre-war Macedonia'.[418] The entirety of the remaining parts of the Western Empire thus became contested zones of nationalisms and the national question of Izmir lay at the heart of the state's concerns. While Unionist appointments, the presence of nationalist *fedaî*s like Eşref Kuşçubaşı in the region and the boycotts launched with the aim of radicalizing the climate of the province of Aydın, on a parallel level diplomatic initiatives were being carried out that might have solved the National Question of Izmir from a nationalist perspective.

Population Exchange as a "Remedy"?

International dynamics were constantly changing while the CUP was trying to establish an absolute power base in the Empire and in the province of Aydın. In this respect, March of 1914 was an extremely critical month in which many developments, which were fundamentally important for the future of the province of Aydın, occurred one after the other. Most importantly, on the 14th of February in 1914, the Great Powers decided to hand over control of the Aegean islands of Midilli, Sakız and Samos to the Kingdom of Greece. The Ottomans hadn't anticipated that move, and as it was discussed previously, the status quo in the Aegean was greatly disturbed. Subsequently came the Boycott Movement of February 1914 that resulted in widespread disturbances in trade networks and by March of the same year had garnered serious international attention. In the same month (late March or beginning of April), Themistoklis Sofoulis, an ex-Ottoman who was a revolutionary from Samos and had been sentenced to death, was appointed governor-general of the Macedonian province of the Kingdom of Greece. Subsequently, some Ottoman newspapers started to voice calls for revenge in response to the increasing amount of news reports concerning violence committed against Muslims in Macedonia.[419] Around the same

[418] Gingeras, *Sorrowful...,* 39.
[419] In an issue dating from the 27th of March 1914, *Tanin*, a pro-Unionist newspaper, wrote that Greek violence against Muslims should be considered a debt that would

time, news of Ottoman Greeks being terrorized in Thrace reached the capital. Bandits were reportedly shooting around villages, killing shepherds, starting fires and damaging property.[420] In addition to all this, the number of Ottoman Greeks from Thrace who had been on the run since the end of the Balkan Wars was increasing. On the 23rd of March, the Kingdom of Greece issued a memorandum (*muhtıra*) stating that Muslims fleeing Greece were forced to do so by external forces and that Greece had been treating them fairly and equally. However, it was stressed that the Boycott Movement and migration in Thrace were carried out against the will of Ottoman Greeks.[421] That was the mirror opposite of what the Unionists claimed for the Ottoman Greeks and of course it did not reflect the truth.[422]

Following the turmoil of March, Galip Kemali Bey (Söylemezoğlu),[423] Athens' ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, gave an official letter to Venizelos that suggested a Greek-Muslim (*Makedonya İslamları ve Aydın Rumları arasında*) population exchange for a second time on the 18th of May.[424] Initially, the Kingdom of Greece

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soon be repaid. '*Bu facialar dikkatle kaydolunmakta, bu muameleler hep Yunanlılar hesabına zimmet geçirilmektedir. Ve unutulmamalıdır ki her zimmetin bir de zaman-ı tahsili vardır*'. Source: Kerimoğlu, *İttihat...,* 370. For the original see: 'Niçin Hicret Ediyorlar?', *Tanin*, 27 Mart 1914, no: 1888, 1. In a sense this article was a foretelling of the violence that was to befall the Ottoman Christians.

[420] Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 126.

[421] Kerimoğlu, *İttihat...,* 379, footnote, 1219.

[422] 'The British Consul in Thessaloniki presents successfully the way that the propaganda of the Balkan States towards the minorities works: "*each Balkan people is, within its own borders, persecuting the adherents of its neighbors, and each is endeavoring to obtain its own justification before the world, the sympathy of Europe for itself and European condemnation of its neighbours, by loudly calling attention to its neighbours acts and by concealing its own*"'. This was something that the Young Turks learned the hard way and applied as well. For a critical assessment of the policies of the Venizelos administration regarding the Muslims of Greece, its *modus vivendi* and the atrocities conducted, as well as the quotation see: Glavinas Ioannis, 'The Perception of Muslim Minority in Greece in Greek and Bulgarian policy and strategy (1912-1923)', *Études Balkaniques*, 4 (2005): 157-174.

[423] Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu had been an important figure in the negotiations with the Balkan states during and after the Balkan Wars. For his memoirs on his services to the Ottoman state see: Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, (İstanbul: Şaka Matbaası, 1949) and Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde 30 Sene*, (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1955).

[424] According to newspaper *Tanin*, the first suggestion of a population exchange between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire was delivered by a representative of Venizelos, the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, in negotiations

maintained its stance which had been communicated via the ultimatum of March. However, on the 23rd of May, the Kingdom of Greece issued a verbal dictum stating her position and demands in the case of a population exchange. By the time these demands were listed, the flight of Ottoman Greeks had been continuing in Thrace and it spread to the Marmara and Western Anatolian regions. In addition, the number of fleeing Greeks was also increasing. Although there was chaos and uncertainty about the reasons, it was clear that the number of fleeing Christians increased exponentially starting at the beginning of 1914. Venizelos must have feared appearing unable to protect the existence of the Hellenism in Asia Minor, which was a fundamental aspect of his political program. On the other hand, the arrival of the Greeks from Asia Minor was a major domestic concern for Greece, which had limited financial resources at its disposal. And after all, the majority of the Muslims within the new borders of the Kingdom of Greece had already been forced out in the Balkan Wars. Therefore, the incentive for a population exchange was not as powerful for the Venizelos administration as it was for the CUP.

Venizelos demanded that the Greeks of Eastern Thrace and the province of Aydın be simultaneously exchanged with the Muslims of Macedonia and Epirus following their declaration of the will to migrate. He also demanded that there should be a commission that would work on the exchange of properties. The center of these commissions were to be located in Thessaloniki and Izmir, respectively. The commissions were also to discuss the property issues of Muslims and Greeks who had previously migrated and independent foreign referees were to oversee the proceedings.[425] In June of 1914, the CUP responded to these demands with their own. No consensus was achieved, however, and Ottoman Greeks continued to flee. The

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for the Athens Agreement (1913). (See: 'Siyaset, İslam ve Rum Mübadelesi', in *Tanin*, 13 Haziran 1330 (26/6/1914). However, such an agreement was never made although the Ottomans looked favourably upon such a move. According to Efiloğlu, this was primarily due to the irredentist ambitions of the Venizelos administration that wanted to keep Asian Greeks where they were as long as the Muslims fled Macedonia. See: Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...*, 218.

[425] Yannis G. Mourelos, 'The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey', in *Balkan Studies*, Vol: XXVI, No: 2, (1985), 394.

Kingdom of Greece prepared for war and issued another ultimatum on the 12th of June in 1914.

The Unionists sought to avoid war and implemented measures to stop the flight of the Ottoman Greeks.[426] It was only around late spring that the two parties finally agreed to start working towards an exchange. The first meeting took place in Izmir on the 11th of July in 1914, but the two sides failed to reach an agreement, as issues revolving around the Aegean islands, which the Ottomans had recently lost, resulted in a deadlock. In August the talks were postponed due to the outbreak of World War I, and the exchange was brought back to the agenda only after the Greco-Turkish war ended in 1922. For this study, it is an extremely important point that these population exchange talks progressed hand in hand with the flight of Ottoman Christians.

The aggressive ultimatum of the Kingdom of Greece on June 1914 was not surprising since the ousting and flight of Ottoman Greeks had already started on a small scale by that time and had been increasing since the beginning of 1914. In addition, the last wave of boycotts in the Empire made life unbearable for many Ottoman Greeks, whose existence in Asia Minor had become a political asset for irredentist Greek nationalism. By the end of the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman public rallied for another war because many issues remained unresolved, so the Ottomans tried their best from September of 1913 to August of 1914 to garner Great Power support.[427] However, the Kingdom of Greece managed to curry more favour and in addition it still enjoyed supremacy in naval power. For that reason, the Kingdom of Greece even considered blockading Izmir before Ottoman dreadnaughts would arrived in late July 1914 so they could have the upper hand in the case of an outbreak of war.[428] According to E.P. Demidov, 'the chief Russian diplomat in Athens, the Greek government was playing an obvious game: it was trumping up charges of Ottoman misconduct in order to create an international uproar that would prevent the scheduled

[426] Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 222.
[427] Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, 42.
[428] Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, 43. In the telegram sent from the British Consulate General of Istanbul Sir L. Mallet to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Sir E. Grey on the 21st of May 1914, Sir Mallet, who recently visited Athens, argued that the Greeks were planning to attack Ottoman Dreadnaught "Sultan Osman" before it reached Turkey or they were planning to provoke war. See: Şimşir, *Ege...*, 490.

delivery of the two powerful dreadnoughts'.[429] Greece acted like an aggressive protector for Ottoman Greeks and this appeared to be a confirmation of their fears for the Unionists. They tried to formulate their 'pre-emptive' measures without losing the Great Power support they desired and without provoking an untimely war in which the Greeks would have the naval upper hand.

Population Exchange or Not: Cleansing of the Borders

Talât Paşa immediately embarked on a visit to Edirne to ease pressures resulting from the news of misconduct against the Orthodox population of Thrace.[430] His visit was timely and prevented a possible war with the Kingdom of Greece. On the other hand, the ousting and flight of Christians continued. Many were forced to sign documents declaring that they were abandoning their lands and property. At the same time, pro-Unionist newspapers like *Tanin* were publishing tens of articles stressing that it was the Balkan Muslims who had truly suffered at the hands of the Christians.[431] The message was clear: the flight of the Christians was portrayed as a 'rightful reaction of the people'. Unionists and the pro-Unionist press tried to portray the events merely as spontaneous reactions. This also served the purposes of the Unionists since they wanted to discredit any claims of the responsibility of the Ottoman government, fearing that such a claim would invite intervention by the Great Powers.

All attempts to stop an untimely war were crucial for the CUP because they had two weaknesses yet to be rectified before they would be ready for combat. In the Balkan Wars, the Ottomans had been shown to be inferior in naval strength and they thought, as was evident in Şahingiray's report, that their coastal borders were populated by traitors and backstabbers who would cause another 'Balkan tragedy' in the Aegean. For the Unionists, March 1914 was a clear sign that they urgently needed to correct those weaknesses since war was closer than they thought. The curing of the first weakness was a simpler matter: the Ottomans had to acquire battleships that would subvert the dominance of the Greek navy in the Aegean. The CUP managed to raise

[429] Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, 49.
[430] Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, 48, footnote 27.
[431] Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, 48.

enough money to purchase two battleships through the voluntary and forced contributions of Ottomans citizens.[432] It was not just a matter of time and the Ottomans would become the superior naval power. However, correcting the latter problem, the securing of borders, was a much more delicate matter that required trustworthy and dedicated Unionists and secrecy.

The CUP's most crucial appointment for the province of Aydın came in April 1913, right after the above-mentioned political crises of the long month of March. The CUP found its urgently-needed Unionist to supervise the solving of the national question of Izmir, which was also the problem of security of the borders. According to Cemal Kutay, within the hierarchy of the committee the *Kâtib-i Mesul* (secretary in charge) was actually a higher authority than the governor-general of a particular province. The *Kâtib-i Mesul* of a particular province was responsible for keeping political authority in line with Unionist principles and was considered to be a mediator for collaboration between the civilian and military authorities. Since Enver Paşa knew that these secretaries were of prime importance for the accurate execution of his decisions, he asked for the suggestions of the heads of the regional armies. In addition, Enver Paşa had a new reason to be sure about the trustworthiness of the power of execution in the province of Aydın. A member of the German commission for the reform of the army, *levazım müşaviri* (logistics advisor) Adolf Buchardi, convinced Enver Paşa to disregard Istanbul as the logistical center of the army and base it somewhere in the Aegean with Izmir as its operational center because it had a developed railroad network.[433] This contributed to the urgency of the appointment of a liaison commissioner for Aydın.

The head of the fourth army, Cafer Tayyar Paşa responded to Enver's letter on the 27th of April in 1914 and urged Enver to appoint someone trustworthy and more powerful than Rahmi Bey to be the liaison commissioner of the province of Aydın if the 'planned services to the province were to be delivered'.[434] He clearly defined

[432] As discussed previously, both voluntary and involuntary contributions were collected for the battleships. See my previous discussions of the *Donanma Cemiyeti*.
[433] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 197.
[434] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 197. The relevant part of Cafer Tayyar Paşa's letter is as follows: '*Merkez-i Umumî vâkıa geçen senenin müntehasında İzmir'e sabır Selânik mebusu ve*

Rahmi Bey as being an obstacle. Talat Paşa found the necessary candidate who had the power to balance Rahmi Bey's rather independent rule in İzmir[435] and the demands of Enver and thus those of the CUP as well. The candidate was the 29 year-old, *Kâtib-i Mesul* of Bursa, Mahmud Celâl (Bayar). He was given responsibility of the region encompassing Aydın, Manisa, Balıkesir, Muğla and their counties, one of which was Foçateyn. Bayar's appointment, together with the appointments of Petrev Paşa and Cafer Tayyar Paşa, both trusted by Enver, into leading positions in the regional army created the control they needed for the decision-making mechanisms of the region for the CUP.

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sizin de tanıdığınız Rahmi Beyi vali olarak göndermişse de tasavvur ettiğimiz hizmetlerin ifası için fırka katib-i mes'ullüpüne arza çalıştığım evsafta bir zatın gönderilmesi zarûridir.'

[435] Kutay gives an anecdote about Rahmi Bey and Cemal Paşa in which the former acted as the superior of the latter during one of Cemal Paşa's visit to Izmir. This was considered to be an important sign of Rahmi's untrustworthiness. See: Kutay, *Etniki...*, 199.

[**Picture:** Young Celâl Bayar at the age of 22 in uniform when he joined the voluntary corps of the Action Army (*Haraket Ordusu*) from Bursa. The text on his cap is unclear but it probably says 'Liberty or death' (*Ya hürriyet ya mevt*)[436]. See: Cemal Kutay, *Tarih Sohbetleri*, Vol.1, (İstanbul: Halk Matbaası, 1966), 63.]

[436] The famous quotation "Give me liberty, or give me death!" that is often attributed to Patrick Henry from a speech he made to the Virginia Convention in 1775 is likely

Celâl Bayar's impressions on his arrival in Izmir differed little from those of his Unionist peers. He was disappointed with the condition of the Turks, whom he identified as the sole and true owners of the land. He was saddened to realize that even those like him (the Unionists) called the city "*Gavur İzmir*" (Infidel Izmir).[437] He was also disappointed to see that foreigners dominated almost every economic field. 'We Turks were left working low-level jobs (*ayak hizmetleri*)'.[438] Apparently, he was unpleasantly surprised as a revolutionary *(bir inklâpçı olarak*) to find himself on ships, trains and in hotels of companies that belonged to foreigners in the cosmopolitan environment of Izmir. He said that he 'felt like a foreigner in his own land'[439] and stated that as he started his duty as the top figure in the government with power at his disposal, he still felt the fresh scars of the bitter lessons drawn from the Balkan Wars.[440]

The CUP had full control in the province of Aydın after the appointment of Celâl Bayar in late April of 1914. Nevertheless, it still had to formulate a delicate plan that would avoid war with the Kingdom of Greece, which had nearly erupted in March of 1914, while still implementing their policies without any compromises. A series of meetings were held at the *Harbiye Nezareti* (ministry of war), the headquarters of the CUP and at Talât Paşa's house starting in May and lasting through August of 1914.[441] It would appear that more than one meeting was held that focused on coordinating and updating the rather delicate policies of homogenization and nationalization during these four months. Sometime between March and June, but most probably in March,[442] another prominent Unionist and also one of the core members of the

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to be the source of inspiratipon for this phrase on Bayar's cap. This was a well-known constitutionalist slogan and a similar version was also used by the Armenian revolutionaries of the time.

[437] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 200.

[438] Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1553.

[439] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 200.

[440] Kutay, *Etniki...*, 200. '*Balkan Harbi faciaları içinde aldığımız derslerin izlerini ruhumda ve kafamda taptaze hissederek İzmir'de, iktidar kudreti'nin bir numaralı adamı olarak işe başlıyorum*'.

[441] Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1573. Here, Bayar quotes Kuşçubaşı's work.

[442] Eşfer Kuşçubaşı was in the province of Aydın since the *Bâb-ı Âli* coup of the CUP in 1913. However, he does not specify time of his activities after this point in his own

Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, the *fedaî* Eşref Kuşçubaşı (Sencer),[443] embarked on a journey to inspect the coastal regions and their hinterlands from Istanbul to all the way down to Milas. Talât Paşa appointed him to carry out this task after the first of the May-August meetings. Eşref Kuşçubaşı travelled under cover and reported his findings in the format of a report to a limited number of the core members of the CUP.[444] It seems that this report was one of the last in a series of attempts by the CUP to establish a policy that would solve the national question of Izmir. Kuşçubaşı's impressions during the inspection and his later duties, drawn from this report, reflect

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fragmented account. Therefore we can only guess the time interval within which he went to Istanbul in order to join the series of meetings at the *Harbiye Nezareti* (Ministry of War), the headquarters of the CUP and Talât Paşa's house that led him to be appointed to carry out an inspection in Western Anatolia. His name is mentioned in British Foreign Office documents dating from February of 1914. In one of his dispatches the British Consul-General of Smyrna reported on the anti-Albanian policies of Eşref Kuşçubaşı and Emin Efendi (the former gendarmerie officer of Serez and the new head of the gendarmerie in Manisa) in the province of Aydın. The consul emphasized that the expulsion of Albanians increased after their arrival. (See: Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, 165). Therefore, it is clear that Eşref was active at least since February 1914. In addition, according to Dündar, it was most likely that the first of these meetings in Istanbul was held right after the Greek battleship *Averof* arrived in the Aegean in March of 1914, which made it clear that it was impossible to take back the Aegean islands from the Kingdom of Greece. (See Dündar, *Modern...*, 198).

[443] Eşref (Sencer) Kuşçubaşı was born in Istanbul in 1873. His family was Circassian and they hailed from the Caucasus. After graduating from the military academy, he was first posted to Macedonia. After starting to work for the CUP in 1907, he established the Izmir branch of the CUP in 1908 together with 12 other comitajis (*komitacı*) including Çerkez Reşid (the brother of Çerkez Ethem). Although Kuşçubaşı's life after World War I has been relatively well studied, his crucial roles in the events preceding 1914 such as the Tripolitanian War, the Second Balkan War and the ousting of Christians in the entirety of the Western Anatolia are much understudied. Most likely the major reason for this is a lack of relevant primary source materials, and the chronology of Kuşçubaşı's life before 1914 is fragmentary. However, it is known that he returned to his farm in Izmir in 1913 when his service in Western Thrace was over. My research used two groups of primary sources in the reconstruction of his time before 1914. The first group consists of various references to when he went to Izmir and the province of Aydın and what he did there, and these are mentioned in foreign consulate reports that were concerned about the political implications of his activities. The second group consists of the ego documents of Eşref Kuşçubaşı that are referred to in the ego document of Celâl Bayar and various books on Cemal Kutay. For an academic study based on an interview with Kuşçubaşı, which does not delve into the details of his life before World War I but is otherwise fairly detailed, see: Philip Hendrick Stoddard, 'The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa', (Unpublished Phd diss., Princeton University, 1963).

[444] Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1576.

one of the most critical historical periods not only in the county of Foçateyn but also the entire Western Anatolian coast.

On his return, he reported to the *Başkumandan Vekaleti* (acting head of the army).[445] In this report, he described what he identified as vital problems and he suggested solutions.[446] He stated that the *Rum* (Ottoman Greeks) were concentrated in certain areas on the coast all the way down to Milas. According to Kuşçubaşı, these regions were under the influence of three army divisions administered by the Kingdom of Greece (*Yunan Kolordusu*) from the islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos. *Rum* youth who had reached the age of military service were sent to these islands and were trained for insurgency and warfare. He also reported that the Izmir-Kasaba and Aydın railway lines were completely staffed by *Rum*. He was definitely sure (*suret-i kat'iyede*) that the *Rum* kiosk owners at every railroad station were spies for their respective regions. His report also stated that the *Rum* dominated economic life and the farms of the Turkish peasants were being confiscated as a result of the unfair debts imposed on them by *Rum* commercial networks. For that reason, Kuşçubaşı believed that it was not possible to expect loyal service from the railroad network in times of need.[447]

Like many of his nationalist contemporaries elsewhere, Kuşçubaşı was also interested in numbers and statistics. In his report he included rough numbers indicating areas heavily populated by Ottoman Greek on the coast.[448] He argued that 320,000 *Rum*

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[445] It should be noted that although Enver Paşa was referred to as the 'acting head of the army' he was the head of the army in practice. The head of the army (*Başkumandan*) by title was the Sultan but in practice Enver was the acting head of the army who fulfilled the duties of the position.

[446] What we have today is a summary of this report presented in two different sources, Celâl Bayar's *Ben'de Yazdım* and Cemal Kutay, *Tarih Sohbetleri*, Vol.1, (İstanbul: Halk Matbaası, 1966), 58-114. Unfortunately, both accounts seem to lack the parts that might have described the resulting operations based on the report. This part of my research forced me to double check these sources and use them together.

[447] Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1575-1576.

Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1576. His rough table includes the following: '*Ayvalık körfez mıntıkasında 120.000, Çanakkale (dahil) mıntıkasında 90.000, Nefs-i İzmir'de 190.000, Urla yarım adası ile İzmir'in Güneybatı'sında Çeşme'ye kadar 130.000, Aydın havalisinde 80.000, Akhisar, Manisa, Alaşehir, Uşak ve havalisinde 150.000 Rum teksif etmişti*'. Bayar also confirms these numbers in his memoir.

consisted of migrants from the Kingdom of Greece who were purposely sent to the coast with fake identification papers.[449] He concluded that in Izmir the nationalization movement would be far more complicated and harder to apply than in Istanbul. This was primarily because of the presence of international observers such as the consulates.[450] In Kuşçubaşı's own terminology, there was a lot of 'national attention' (*Milli dikkat*) on Izmir because it was understood that Ottoman neutrality would be impossible if war broke out. And for him, the immediate task at hand was the 'cleansing of internal tumours' (*İlk iş dahilî tümörlerin temizlenmesi davası*)[451]. Ultimately, the *Bâb-ı Âli* coup d'état gave the Committee the opportunity to implement its policies without opposition. It was not only able to dominate the Ottoman Parliament but also able to carry out its various political projects outside Parliament. In effect, it was a state within a state. That was how the 'cleansing of the internal tumours' became more intensive and organized, spreading to the entire Aegean cost.

In fact, the cleansing of 'tumours' was not only a political agenda but also a diplomatic tool. At the beginning of spring, in a correspondence in May 1914, Cemal Paşa, one of the most influential unionists and the Minister of the Navy, told Sir L. Mallet, the British Consulate General of Istanbul, that if 'the Greeks declare war now, the fleet was ready to meet them without the new ships, and he was confident of victory. If they were defeated they lost nothing but what had already been lost, namely the islands. It must be remembered, moreover, that they had a weapon in their hands which they meant to use, which would soon bring the Greek Government to reason in the expulsion of all Greeks from the Empire, which they would proceed to

[449] See: Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1576. Although what he argued was not unlikely given the irredentist ambitions of the Kingdom of Greece, it is highly likely that he considered any migrant from the Kingdom of Greece to be a potential threat although many such migrants came not for ideological reasons but for better job opportunities. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, many migrants came to Western Anatolia (from elsewhere in the Empire and from the newly established Kingdom of Greece) in the late 19th century simply because it had the fastest growing economy in the region at the time. In addition, he does not present any proof for the validity of his claim. Yet, it is also important to remember that proving such a claim would not have been easy given the bureaucratic capabilities of the Empire.

[450] Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1576-1577.

[451] Bayar, *Ben de...,* 1578.

carry out if necessary'. Cemal Paşa was clearly threatening Venizelos' regime with the destruction of the source of legitimacy of Greek expansionism: Hellenism in Asia Minor. In this way, Greek nationalist expansionism was being threatened by the diplomatic realism of the Unionists and the fates of thousands were hence to be sealed. Although the role and direct involvement of the CUP can be argued to be somehow vague, less visible and debated[452] before the spring of 1914, the time period from late winter[453] to the spring of 1914 marked the beginning of a period in which the role and involvement of the CUP became most dominant and visible. It seems highly likely that the Unionists decided to do something about western Anatolia after the Great Powers decided to grant important Aegean islands to Greeks after the 14th of February 1914 at the latest.[454] When the ousting was launched in the county of Foçateyn in the spring of 1914, it was in its most intense and destructive stage.

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[452] According to Efiloğlu, in 1913 the CUP did its best to control the flight of Christians in Thrace and the resulting conflict and violence. He points to the fact that the region had been a war zone and argues that the events were spontaneous conflicts rather than planned. He does not see Unionist or state involvement in the process of the flight of the Ottoman Christians in that region at that time. According to Efiloğlu, even the bureaucratic correspondence that is often cited to show Unionist involvement urged the reallocation of Ottoman Greeks by pointing out new settlements in the hinterlands of the respective provinces rather than driving Ottoman Greeks out of the Empire. Although some of his arguments have merit, Efiloğlu always considers Ottoman bureaucratic correspondences at face value and does not question possible motives, and his manner of interpreting certain documents is also problematic. Nevertheless, it is clear that the nature of the events and Unionist involvement in Thrace in 1913 is different from the events and the Unionist involvement in Thrace and Western Anatolia in 1914. For Efiloğlu's articles see: Ahmet Efiloğlu, 'Fuat Dündar'ın, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kaybolan "Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi"', in *Belleten*, Vol. LXXIV, No: 270, Ankara: Ağustos 2010 and Ahmet Efiloğlu, 'Fuat Dündar'ın "Tehcire Gereken ve Hak Ettiği Anlamı Veren Kitabı": Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi', in *Yücel Dağlı Anısına*, ed. Evangelia Balta et al. (İstanbul: Turkuaz Yayınları, 2010) 177-201.

[453] According to Efiloğlu, despite the fact that misconduct and violence took place in Thrace between July and August of 1913, when the Ottomans were reoccupying Edirne there was only a limited number of recorded cases of crime in Western Anatolia. Based on his research on the *Vukuat Cetvelleri*, he claims that from July 1913 to May 1914, there were only a few cases of conflict between native Ottoman Greeks and *muhacir*s in the region. (See: Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 121-122). This suggests that the events in the province of Aydın started to escalate in the spring of 1914.

[454] See the chronology in the appendix which shows how the Unionists and the Greek administration of the time started to act upon the new status quo in the Aegean Sea as soon as it was declared. The Unionist fact-finding mission carried out by Kuşçubaşı,

the new wave of boycotts in the Ottoman Empire, the appointment of a nationalist figure in Greece's newly acquired territories and an attempt for a population exchange all took place after February. This makes it clear that February 14th was indeed a turning point and March of 1914 witnessed a sharp spike in tensions between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece.

CHAPTER V

The Spring of Organized Chaos in the County of Foçateyn, June 1914

When we look back at the history of the early twentieth century in the county of Foçateyn, we can not see a gradual pattern of conflict that would have inevitably led to the events that occurred between 1914 and 1922. Before the twentieth century, there is simply no evidence of an established pattern of inter-ethnic or inter-communal conflict in any of the historical sources about Foçateyn that I examined during my research. However, there were some particular cases of inter-communal conflict that reflected the insecurities and social change of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[455] In the end, such instances were resolved by the state with finesse and they did not constitute a basis for long lasting social tensions. Actually, despite the fact that it was adjacent to Izmir and had a developed internationally connected town like Eski Foça, the county of Foçateyn seems to have been influenced very little by the ongoing nationalist struggles until the Balkan Wars. It was only after the Balkan Wars that it was quickly engulfed by the dramatic changes taking place in the province of Aydın. And unlike the events in Thrace, the ignition of events in the county of Foçateyn was anything but spontaneous. It is for that reason that the spring of 1914 came as a shock to the residents of Foçateyn, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

According to Nicos Vrutanis (Νίκος Βρουτάνης) and Georgeos Savvas (Γιώργος Σάββας), residents of Çakmaklı (Τσακμακλί),[456] the expulsion of the Greeks from the

[455] In 1823, the county of Foçateyn was reported to be under constant threat of piracy. On one occasion, pirates took refuge on the island of Orak just across from the harbor of Eski Foça. Their presence caused panic and subsequently a small group of Muslims who accused local Greek farmers of collaborating with the pirates attacked some Greek farmers in the county, killing some of them and causing damage to their properties. The government stepped in and cleverly resolved the unrest by simultaneously capturing the pirates and those who were responsible for attacking peasants. For details on the matter see: BOA, HAT 872/38758-A, (1823) and BOA, HAT 872/38758 (1826).

[456] Çakmaklı was a Greek village 4 kilometres (map distance) northwest of the Turkish village of Kozbeyli. Modern day Çakmaklı is located in the county of Aliağa, which is next to Foçateyn.

county of Foçateyn started as early as the first days of winter of 1914. In their interview,[457] they stated that in the winter of 1914 the mayor of the village, Mr. Kourela (Κουρέλα), received an envelope.[458] Kourela was told that he should open the envelope when he was told to do so or else he would be killed. According to these accounts, the mayor of Çakmaklı was quite strong-headed and opened the letter anyway. He told the villagers that the letter contained the orders to 'burn and plunder'. Vrutanis and Savvas recalled that the mayor tried to spread the word but nobody took him seriously.[459] They stated that after some time (probably early spring and afterwards), 'Turks' started beating their shepherds and capturing their sheep herds. Later 'Turkish women' started to steal their belongings and were 'searching for money'. Although they didn't clearly state who those attackers might be, it is logical to assume that it was either chettes,[460] *muhacir* groups (judging from the accounts of women looking for money and sheep being seized) or both. After all, inter-communal

[457] CAMS, Βρουτάνης and Σάββας interview, 22/4/1964, Athens.

[458] The arrival of this envelope is worth discussing. The ousting of Ottoman Greeks in 1914 centered on a project intended to frighten the native population in order to avoid diplomatic pressure. Therefore it is logical to assume that the letter which was sent to Çakmaklı was intentionally 'misdirected' to Greeks instead of Muslims. However, there is the argument that such a move could incur the intervention of the Kingdom of Greece. Mehmet Yılmaz argues that the Kingdom of Greece sent some soldiers to Western Anatolia in the spring of 1914 who wore *chette* (bandit) clothes and tried to frighten the Ottoman Greeks. He claims that the Kingdom of Greece did this in order to Hellenize Macedonia by encouraging the local population to migrate there. (See: Mehmet Yılmaz, 'Balkan Savaşlarından Sonra Türkiye'den Yunanistan'a Rum Göçleri', in *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no: 10, (2001): 19, 20. Although this would not have been farfetched given the nationalist spirit of the era, his sources are not convincing. In order to support his claims he refers to an archive document (BOA, DH-ŞFR, 41/85, [01-B-1332]) that does not mention anything about a possible intervention on behalf of the Kingdom of Greece.

[459] This is noteworthy because by the time the Çakmaklı Greeks heard about a possible assault and ousting operation, both the Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece were probably aware of the news of similar operations in the Balkan Wars. Therefore one might have expected them to take such threats more seriously. One possibility is that small rural communities, such as the residents of Çakmaklı, were disconnected from the rest of the Empire and therefore hadn't heard such stories, or perhaps they never thought that the effects of the Balkan wars would reach their region.

[460] 'Chetes' or 'chettes', in Turkish *çete*, is a common term used for bandits. These groups often consisted of outlaws, draft dodgers, refugees and migrants who, with a few exceptions, were always male. Although they often eluded state authorities by roaming the mountains, they were also used as irregular forces in service of the state to which they owed allegiance at the time.

tensions between the native population and *muhacir* groups had become common in the era following the Balkan Wars.[461] However, until that time native Muslims rarely had conflicts with their Greek neighbours in the region. Vrutanis and Savvas stated that after those events, 'they understood that persecution was on its way'. When the spring of 1914 came, news of such violence had escalated and Ottoman Greeks began fleeing. Although some left for the island of Partheni (Παρθένι), many escaped to Eski Foça. Meanwhile, by the end of the spring, areas around Foçateyn (such as Seyrek)[462] had witnessed similar events as well. Especially in predominantly Ottoman Greek settlements that were further inland such as Kozbeyli, Gerenköy and Söğütçük (Σουβουτζίκια), large groups of Greeks headed towards coastal areas and bigger towns in the face of similar threats. There was talk of a Turkish 'horde' surrounding Greek settlements, and as a result, most Greeks ended up in the center of the county, Eski Foça.[463]

On the 11th of June in 1914 at around 6:30 in the evening, a member of Félix Sartiaux's excavation team, Charles Manciet, witnessed the influx of ousted and fleeing Ottoman Greeks. That evening he was working on an excavation near the road from Eski Foça to Menemen. He was surprised when he saw a long convoy of people carrying their belongings, and he found out that they were Ottoman Greeks fleeing from Gerenköy[464] and seeking refuge in Eski Foça.[465] This is particularly important because on the day that Manciet saw the Ottoman Greek refugees, the ousting had not

[461] This was primarily because of the Balkan Wars which uprooted thousands of Muslims and Christians. The war affected both migrant and native Muslims. However, the traumas suffered by the former were much greater. News of inter-communal and inter-ethnic tensions dominated the post-Balkan War era especially in the border provinces of the Empire.

[462] For more on the events that occurred in Seyrek, see the foreign reporters' commentaries mentioned in Dündar's article: Fuat Dündar, '1914'te Rumlar'ın sürülmesi, Yabancı inceleme heyeti gözlemleri ve Seyrek köyünün foto hikayesi', in *Toplumsal Tarih*, 189 (2010), 82-86.

[463] Haris Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée 1913-1920 Le Témoignage de Félix Sartiaux*, (Paris: Éditions Kallimages, 2008), 184. Originally from Félix Sartiaux, *Le sac de Phocée et l'expulsion des Grecs ottomans d'Asie Mineure*, (Paris: Typographie Philippe Renouard, Juin 1914).

[464] Also referred to as Σερεκιοι or Γκερένγκιοϊ, which was a predominantly Greek village in the hills of Foçateyn.

[465] The original of this account, which was written by Charles Manciet on the 18th of June in 1914, can be found in: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 185-191.

yet begun in Eski Foça. The group that Manciet saw probably included Vrutanis and Savvas too. Considering the accounts of Vrutanis and Savvas, it also becomes clear that Eski Foça had become a refuge not only for Ottoman Greeks from Gerenköy but for all Ottoman Greeks in the county and outlying areas. The decision to go to Eski Foça was logical because it was the center of the county and hence would have offered security and shelter. In addition, it had a busy harbour, which meant that they would have the means to escape to the nearest Aegean islands. This partly explains why the violence was relatively intense in Eski Foça compared to the rest of the Western Anatolian coast, which experienced similar events. Since Eski Foça was the last place to be cleansed of Ottoman Greeks in the county of Foçateyn, many others (like Nicos Vrutanis and Georgeos Savvas) took refuge in the town (and to a lesser extent in Yeni Foça) until they were surrounded, which later made it impossible for them to escape. There were simply not enough vessels to carry them to the closest safe haven, which was the islands of the Aegean (Midilli/Λέσβος or Sakız/Χίος). Even to reach the islets of Partheni and Orak at the very least they needed small boats, and that would prove to be a problem when the situation worsened. However, the relative density of refugees or the lack of vessels are not in themselves enough to explain the violence that occurred in Eski Foça.

According to Manciet, the next morning (the 12th of June, 1914) bore witness to widespread panic because people thought that the chettes, which they had been running from, were about to come to Eski Foça as well. In the accounts of Vrutanis and Savvas,[466] which corroborate Manciet's account, it was noted that the Greeks who had fled Çakmaklı initially took refuge in a Greek school in Eski Foça. Rumour had it that later that night Turks would come and slaughter them, and several families took shelter in a strongly-built house. This account again corroborates that of Manciet. According to the French archaeologist, people initially locked themselves in their houses but later, around noon, approximately 1,000 people fled on fishing boats and sailing ships to Midilli. Manciet and Félix Sartiaux were surprised to see people fleeing without their belongings even before 'the enemy' had arrived. Subsequently, Sartiaux, Carlier, Dandria and Manciet all went to the governor (the *kaymakam* of Foçateyn, Fehrit Ali Bey) and insisted that protection be provided to ensure the safety

[466] CAMS, Βρουτάνης and Σάββας interview, 22/4/1964, Athens.

of their lives and property. Four Gendarmes were assigned to them and they used their houses, where they put a French flag at the entrance, as sanctuaries for up to 800 to 900 Christians. The same night, at around 8:00, Manciet heard gunshots which he incorrectly presumed had been fired by an 'army' that was marching silently over the mountains surrounding Eski Foça. He recalled hearing shots fired from two different directions and assumed that there were 'two armies' encircling Foça on both sides. Those were two bandit groups.

Sartiaux claimed that the gunshots and the gradual approach of the bandit and chette hordes had to have been pre-organized.[467] Judging by the way the chettes approached the town, he argued that their goal was to instill panic among the Greeks so that they would flee of their own accord. However, not all Ottoman Greeks were willing to leave and others simply didn't have the means, and more violence was imminent. Of course it was quite natural that the local Ottoman Greeks did not want to leave their lands, belongings and beloved towns, they must have been quite shocked by the events that were occurring. Manciet claimed that those two armies started to plunder the city during the night and that by morning (the 13th of June, 1914) the gunshots were drawing closer. When they eventually left their houses, he recalled seeing 'the most disgraceful acts ever imaginable'.[468]

[467] Sartiaux referred to a pamphlet as proof for his argument, which he claimed he had gotten from a prominent Turkish friend of his as proof of the organized nature of the events. He claimed that the pamphlet had been sent out before the ousting took place and that it began with the phrase '*Çete reisleri ve Karakol Zabitleri'ne*' ('to Chete leaders and the Gendarmes'). The only copy of this pamphlet is included in Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 182. However, it is not a pamphlet for bandits. It is a copy of the well-known Ottoman call for mobilization for the Great War. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent footnotes.

[468] Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 185-191.



[**Picture:** Armed chette members proudly marching with their loot and some fleeing Ottoman Greeks on the quay (right) and also in front of F. Sartiaux's house (left). 13th of June 1914. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 200-201.**]**

[Picture: A pillaged house. Gun shells can be seen lying on the ground. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 225.**]**

Manciet stated that on the morning of the 13th of June, chettes on foot and on horseback and armed with rifles (*γκράδες* in the account of Vrutanis and Savvas account and *fusil gras* in Manciet's account) occupied Eski Foça. Christians rushed to the shoreline but there were no ships left for them to board. Since they had no means of fleeing, it seems that many people either tried to defend themselves in their homes or crowded onto the small piers in the hope that a ship would approach. This made matters worse because the plunder-seeking chettes then had to force those who stayed behind out of their homes. The bandits, bound by no military codes of conduct and responsibility, did whatever they pleased and the local gendarmerie did not intervene. In addition, the crowds of people on the piers had panicked and a number of people drowned after falling in the water. Manciet described one particularly violent scene in

which the house of a Christian was attacked by the chettes who wanted to loot it and when the owner tried to defend his house and family at the entrance, he and later his wife were killed by the chettes. According to Manciet, fortunately there were two steamships just outside the harbour and the Frenchmen convinced the captains to allow the fleeing Christians on board. Around noon, Manciet and his fellows, who were horrified by the plundering and killings, threatened the gendarmeries, who until then had stood idly by, to take action and assist in the escape of the Christians. They managed to convince them and the gendarmes allowed safe passage to those who were still trying to reach the shore and the steam ships. This seems to be the reason why Ottoman Greeks in the photograph with the armed chette memebers are waving their hands towards the sea. They must be calling the ships or boats from the safe corridor established in front of the French flagged house. Manciet recalled seeing camels ascending the mountains on the roads leading out from Eski Foça when the situation had begun to calm down and he said they were laden with the plunder taken from the town. This further suggests that no measures whatsoever were taken to stop further abuses even after the gendarmes had been persuaded to help.

[**Picture:** *Rum* of Eski Foça fleeing in boats (12th or 13th of June 1914). Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 209.]

Félix Sartiaux also wrote an account of the events.[469] Although there are many similarities with Manciet's account, Sartiaux presents more details about how the chettes were gathered and the resistance of the Greeks. According to Sartiaux, armed chettes of approximately 150 men started to attack the town of Sulucak where local Greeks tried to defend themselves and sent their wives and children to an island. Nearby, the chettes had succeeded in their attack and proceeded to attack the villages of Sukuyu, Yeniköy and Hoca (Koca) Mehmed. According to Sartiaux, more

[469] There are two almost identical sources of his account: his own book [Félix Sartiaux, *Le sac de Phocée et l'expulsion des Grecs ottomans d'Asie Mineure*, (Paris: Typographie Philippe Renouard, Juin 1914)] and his report to the British authorities who were also in the region at the time FO (Foreign Office) 195/2458, 542-543.

Muslims joined the chettes with each attack. He claimed that salt mine workers (*hammal*) from Benghazi, other hooligan Muslims and gendarmeries wearing peasant clothes were among those who joined the mob. Sartiaux indicated that their final destination was Eski Foça where they plundered the town and killed as many as 50 Christians, some of whose names Sartiaux recorded. He also stated that the doctor of the governorship, Saim Bey from Ulupınar along with Cafer Ağa and his son, were the leading participants in the pillage.[470] Sartiaux's report to the British and his subsequent book that was published in 1914 present a picture that underlines the organized nature of the events. In his book, Sartiaux includes a photograph of a pamphlet which he claimed was sent to the chette leaders and officers of the *karakol* (security forces). He stated that the document was sent to him by a wealthy Turkish friend of his (Karabina Zade Ali) and that it proved the cooperation of regular and irregular troops in the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks.[471] However, the pamphlet he mentioned does not seem to support what he argued and seems to be unconnected to the events that took place.

[470] FO 195/2458, 542-543.

[471] Unfortunately it is impossible to read all of the Ottoman script on the pamphlet since the photograph is too blurry. However, the words '*asker*' and '*seferberlik*' are legible, and the first two lines seem to be printed and the third line is hand written. None of the words, however, correspond to the terms *karakol*, *çete* or *zabit*. The pamphlet is identical with the well-known Ottoman pamphlet of the call for mobilization of the Great War. So in the end, the document cannot be taken as proof of the organized nature of the events. For the exact copy of the original document see: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 183 and the picture on the following page. Please see the appendix for the comparison between the original call for mobilization and the photograph cited by Yiakoumis Later Sartiaux also claimed that the events were carefully prepared in early July during the visit of the governor of Izmir (Rahmi Bey) and various other meetings held by local Muslim leaders. See: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 188. Fuat Dündar, in his major work *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*, includes another document signed by a certain 'Kara bin Zade', who is highly likely the same person that Félix Sartiaux mentioned. This document is dated 10th of June, 1914 and consists of a hand-written order addressing '*Çete reisleriyle karakol zabıtalarına...*' ('To the bandit chiefs and municipal gendarmerie'). The document warns them not to bring harm to a certain Ottoman Greek who was involved in the construction of a road in Urla. See: Dündar, *Modern...*, 482.



[**Picture:** The pamphlet mentioned by F. Sartiaux. See the relevant footnote for a discussion of the picture. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 182.]

The story presented in the accounts of Manciet and Sartiaux can be further completed with the accounts of Turkish and Ottoman Greek eyewitnesses. According to Vrutanis and Savvas, many of the Ottoman Greek families who had taken refuge in a thick-walled house ran away from the windows in the back of this house when the chettes tried to break through from the door (on the 13th of June). Ultimately the Greek

families escaped to the mountains where they stayed for seven days. They stated that a ship named *Pinios* (Πηνειός) came to get them, as those who had fled in swift boats had alerted the residents of Midilli that there were still Greeks in the town. Geogre Savvas also stated that the people who left for the islet Partheni (Παρθένι) had no water and even resorted to drinking seawater. He also noted that two Ottoman Greeks who returned to their homes thinking that the violence was over were killed by chettes. In the end, the surviving Ottoman Greeks were also taken to Midilli.

Although Manciet and Sartiaux's accounts provide valuable insights, they fail to describe the situation of the local Muslim residents of Foçateyn at the time. When assessed critically, oral historical accounts of the Muslim residents[472] of the county of Foçateyn confirm most parts of the other accounts but also reveal a complex picture. Mehmet Peker[473] stated that he watched the events of 1914 from his house, located in the center of Eski Foça. He said, 'out of the blue, coming from Menemen these chettes approached Eski Foça. They wanted to steal the belongings of the Greek residents of the town, without killing them'. At that point he stopped speaking and burst into tears. He said that the members of the chettes were not from the region and he cursed them as 'rats' who 'looted, stole and burned Greek property'. He noted that the Ottoman Greeks had taken shelter in the Greek school, and said that they ('those thieves') burned those beautiful Greek buildings and even his own high school building. Since the salt business was over at the time (due to the seasonal nature of the business), there were not many large ships left in the harbour so most of the Ottoman Greeks left in small fishing boats. Since he was primarily around his house, which was located in the mainly Muslim neighbourhood, Mehmet Peker said that he saw

[472] There is no written material left by the Muslim population of the county of Foçateyn about the events of 1914. This is probably due to the fact that most of the residents of the county of Foçateyn were illiterate. However this paper will use oral historical documents that were collected by Prof. Dr. Engin Berber who conducted several interviews about the history of the county in the early Republican period. His interviews are especially detailed and accurate about the period after the Greek occupation (1919). However his interviewees also present valuable insights about early the period of early 1900s. Interviews include rather limited and emotionally loaded memories about the events of 1914. References to this collection will be cited as EBOHC (Engin Berber Oral Historical Collection).

[473] Mehmet Peker was born in Bağarası in 1317 (1901) and he was a local resident for his entire life. EBOHC, Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31.8.1995.

members of the chettes mostly shooting into the air but not killing anyone. He also stated that once his Greek neighbours left, everybody, locals and refugees alike, started looting. People went into Greek houses and especially shops in order to loot coffee, sugar and so on. He stated that later, Greek houses were occupied by *muhacirs* [Muslim refugees] from Yanya (Ιωάννινα). Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan,[474] who remembered the days of pillage and violence with much shame and sorrow, stated that once the Greeks were almost all gone 'There was so much looting… Everybody took what was left from the Greeks, including their food, carpets, furniture…' When elaborated altogether, these accounts indicate that despite the fact that the local Muslims were either bystanders or in some cases even offered resistance,[475] there were also many opportunists, especially on the last day of the events, when it was thought that the Greeks would never return. Eyewitness accounts suggest that native Muslims were not members of the chettes and were considered outsiders.

Months after the events occurred, Felix Sartiaux published an article on the plunder of Foça in the influential French journal *Revue des Deux Mondes* on the 1st of November 1914. The Great War, which had just started in the autumn of 1914 after the events in Foça, heavily influenced his article and he made comments that were clearly influenced by war propaganda. In the first three pages of his article he made the comment that Turks and Germans are no better than barbarians. Clearly, his position is biased and pro-Entente. Later in the article he discusses the events that occurred in detail and provides some additional details that were not previously present in his earlier reports. These details can be grouped in two categories, those that emphasize the organized nature of the events and those that discuss the gradual calming down after the looting ended.

Sartiaux stated that all was peaceful on May 26th when Sartiaux was in Eski Foça. He first saw the convoy of people fleeing on the 11th of June and by the next day, Eski Foça was full of panicked Greeks. The new information he presents concerns the account of a certain friend ('the richest Greek in Foça', whom he referred to in his

[474] Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan was born in Yeni Foça in 1323 (1905) and was a local resident for his entire life. EBOHC, Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, Menemen, 4.10.1997.
[475] EBOHC, Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, Menemen, 4.10.1997.

previous reports in less detail) which is about the days that preceded the events. Sartiaux claimed that he received this information on the 12th of June. He stated that this friend of his heard about a secret meeting that took place on the 10th of June at the house of a certain *mülazım* (lieutenant) in the company of the old *müftü* (Muslim legal expert), *kaymakam* (governor), some *müdür*s (managers) of the tobacco monopoly, the gendarmerie commander of Menemen and some Muslim notables. Two Turks among the participants betrayed the secrecy of the meeting and told this particular friend of Sartiaux about the details. Sartiaux claimed that the meeting was the direct cause of the events and he also implied that the Unionist governor general of Izmir, Rahmi Bey, had orchestrated them.

Sartiaux said that as a result of the looting, some 1,250 houses were left empty and most of the shops and pharmacies were pillaged. He noted that he was surprised to see that despite all the looting and chaos, the houses of the Ottoman Greeks were undamaged. He then claimed that this was probably because of the organized nature of the events, since large numbers of Muslim *muhacir*s from Macedonia, who were waiting to be resettled in Izmir at the time, were destined to fill these houses. He recalled the calming of events towards the end of the day on the 13th of June, noting that a group of auxiliary troops from Smyrna arrived at a time (on the 13th of June after 7:00 in the evening) when there was already nothing left to protect. Sartiaux said that the entire intensified period of chaos lasted slightly more than twenty-four hours and within that time, all of the Ottoman Greeks were gone. We know from other accounts that some still remained in hiding for a few more days but the town itself and nearby settlements were emptied, just as he claimed. Unlike in his other accounts, however, he made the claim that the small number of Jews who lived in Foça were spared. He stated that their houses were marked with pieces of white cloth to ensure that they weren't looted. Sartiaux then went on to claim that the entire plan was a Jewish and masonic conspiracy all along and he suggested that there was possible involvement of masonic figures from among the Unionists.[476] It is quite likely that

[476] Félix Sartiaux, 'Le Sac de Phocée et L'Expulsion Des Grecs Ottomans D'Asie-Mineure en Juin 1914', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1914, 654 - 686. Despite Sartiaux's claims of a Jewish conspiracy, it is known that the Ottoman Jews also suffered from the hardships of the boycott movement and the ousting. For a record of this see: FO 1915/2458, pg: 521.

this statement was a result of the rampant anti-Semitism of his times and the war propaganda. There is no information confirming (or even mentioning) the sparing of Jewish houses by means of marking in any of the accounts that I examined during my research.

Sartiaux left Eski Foça on the 14th of June and returned on the 20th of the same month. In the meantime, he visited Izmir and then travelled up and down the coast of Foçateyn (between the 18th and 20th of June) to survey the damage in other settlements. When he returned to Eski Foça, he heard about Talât Paşa's visit (which will be discussed) to Foçateyn on the 16th of June. He noted that not a single Ottoman Greek was left and most of the Ottoman Greek houses had been taken over by local notables and functionaries, and the doors of the empty houses were sealed with a wax and a piece of string. He argued that this was done in preparation for the commission of Europeans that went to places like Foçateyn that had been affected by the mass emigration of Ottoman Greeks at the time. Finally, he left again for Izmir on the 28th of June and claimed that he saw *muhacir*s boarding ships in the port of Izmir upon his arrival. He said he was told that some of them were heading to Foçateyn and claimed that the Muslim refugees from the Balkans were settled in the houses of the Ottoman Greeks in Foça from the 30th of June onwards.[477]

Sartiaux perceived the events on the Western Anatolian seaboard as a new chapter of the inter-communal violence that started in Edirne after the Balkan Wars. He stated that the tragedies of Menemen and Foça were visible to international observers because of their proximity to Izmir but that the tragedy was much graver than what people thought. Sartiaux theorized that there were four main reasons underlying the events. He argued that there was a pan-Islamist policy that tried to concentrate the Muslim population by means of immigration and that the effects of the Balkan Wars quickened this approach. He also said that there was a need for a simple solution to settle *muhacir*s, and lastly he claimed that there were strategic and military considerations that had arisen after the Ottoman loss of Aegean islands during the Balkan Wars. Sartiaux stated that the islands were considered to be strong Hellenic

[477] Félix Sartiaux, 'Le Sac de Phocée et L'Expulsion Des Grecs Ottomans D'Asie-Mineure en Juin 1914', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1914, 678, 677, 681.

centers that the Ottoman authorities saw as being dangerously close to the Anatolian mainland. Lastly he argued that from the point of view of the Turks, this was a 'successful' and rapid operation.[478]

Another set of eyewitness accounts, again written much later, suggest that there was considerable participation by local Muslims. The Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople published a booklet in the midst of the turbulent political climate of 1919 when Istanbul was occupied and when the Kingdom of Greece landed its armies in Izmir. As I will discuss later, this was a climate in which Greece went to great lengths to legitimize its occupation of Anatolia. The title of the booklet is *Persecution of Greeks in Turkey 1914 – 1918* and it is a Greek propaganda account that included detailed information about the misdeeds inflicted on Greeks. The booklet includes a chapter concerning the events in the county of Foçateyn purportedly based on numerous witness accounts, most of which have already been discussed here. Based on the eyewitness accounts of Mr. Laurence (a professor at the American College), Mr. Sartiaux, Mr. Carlier, Mr. and Mrs. de Andria (director of the Ottoman Public Debt), Edward Whittal (a merchant in Smyrna), Mr. I. Belhomme, Mr. Vedova and Mr. Manciet the claim is put forward that many prominent local Muslims participated in the pillage and atrocities. According to the booklet, the mayor of the town, Hasan Bey, the director of the salt works of Foçateyn, Ali Bey, the administrator of the tobacco monopoly, İbrahim Efendi, and a *müezzin* (Muslim religious figure who leads the call to prayer) all participated in murderous acts and pillage.[479] However, the booklet does not present new evidence of mass participation by local Muslims. Rather, it refers to the account of Manciet for the rest of the events in order to make its point. Nevertheless, as was discussed above, Manciet's account does not suggest mass participation by locals.

[478] Félix Sartiaux, 'Le Sac de Phocée et L'Expulsion Des Grecs Ottomans D'Asie-Mineure en Juin 1914', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1914, 682 - 686.
[479] Greek Patriarchate, *Persecution of Greeks in Turkey 1914-1918*, (Constantinople: 1919), 71.

[**Picture:** Another picture from the town of Eski Foça taken during the flight of the local Greeks from the county on the 13th June 1914. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 214-215.**]**

When the 13th of June was over, those who didn't have the means to obtain a vessel and those who were too old to flee became the target of the organized chaos. Manciet noted that most of the wounded were people older than 60, sometimes even 90 years old, and that they had been wounded when they were defending their property. According to Manciet's eyewitness account, the nature of the atrocities took a crucial turn around the 17th of June. He claimed that soldiers were sent from Izmir to re-establish order but the soldiers ended up plundering the town themselves. Manciet stated that the atrocities he witnessed were of an organized nature that aimed at encircling the Christian peasant populations (*reaya*)[480] of the region. According to him, the murder and plunder continued until the 18th of June when he finally read in the official newspaper (*resmi gazete*) that order had been restored and there was no remaining danger for the local Christians. The account of Vrutanis and Savvas noted that this was the time when a second ship had come to rescue them. In other words, by the time order was restored, all of the Ottoman Greeks had already left. This date is also significant because it was two days after the minister of the interior, Talât Paşa, had visited the county to supposedly restore order[481].

[480] Although this term means 'peasant' and although it is also used for Muslim peasants, the writer of the accounts misuses this term to refer to the Greek residents of the county.
[481] BOA, DH. ŞFR, 430/85, (4/H/1330), 2-3.

Around the same time that these events were unfolding in Foçateyn, between mid-June and July of 1914[482] Talât Paşa was already touring the Western Anatolian coast (between Bursa and Izmir, starting on the 8th of June) in order to 'establish order' and ease diplomatic pressures in response to the news of atrocities coming from all over the region. And clearly the county of Foçateyn was one such places.[483] Talât also facilitated the participation of foreign observers during his journey in order to boost Ottoman diplomatic credibility. His purported aim was to discourage Ottoman Greeks from the so-called 'self-motivated' migrations that had already resulted in the flight of many Ottoman Greeks in the region of Thrace. It is also important to recall that around the same time Venizelos was also on a similar visit[484] to the parts of the recently enlarged Kingdom of Greece that had Muslim inhabitants and were also experiencing similar problems. Like Venizelos,[485] Talât was also trying to prove to

[482] The timing of Talât Paşa's visit is crucial for another reason. It is highly likely that Talât decided on his next step based on a diplomatic principle of reciprocity (what the Unionists referred to as '*mukabele-i bi'l-misl'*) with his Greek counterpart Venizelos. In the post-Balkan War era, the international community closely monitored both the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire for abuses against their minorities. For the Unionists and for Venizelos, the plight of the Balkan Muslims was considered to be reciprocal for the plight of Ottoman Greeks. Furthermore, being away from the capital, Istanbul, also helped Talât Paşa dodge the diplomatic pressure resulting from news about the attacks.

[483] According to a booklet published by the Greek Patriarchate, Talât Paşa visited Eski Foça in order to draft his plan for the destruction of the Ottoman Greeks on the 23rd of May in 1914. According to same source, Eski Foça was surrounded on the 31st of May 1914 by hordes of armed Turks. First of all, it should be noted that both dates are incorrect. Secondly, the only account about the details of Talât Paşa's visit is his own account (which is presented in this study) that contradicts the claims in the Patriarchate's booklet. Talât Paşa claimed that he visited the town on the 16th of June when the events were already in their final stages. This, in my opinion, is neither proof that he did not organize the events, nor that he did. The development of events suggests that both sources are misleading in some aspects. See: Greek Patriarchate, *Persecution of Greek in Turkey 1914-1918*, (Constantinople: 1919), 71-73.

[484] On the 19th of May in 1914, almost a month after Talât Paşa's visit to Thrace and almost three weeks before his visit to Western Anatolia, Venizelos also embarked on a tour to Serres (Serez), Drama, Naousa and Veroia (Karaferye). His visit was by no means pleasant. Although his concerns differed from those addressed by Talât, Venizelos was also there to address local discontent and demands and to prove the competence of Greek rule in the newly conquered territory. See: Basil C. Gounaris, 'Doing Business in Macedonia: Greek Problems in British Perspective (1912-1921)', in *European Review of History*, 5/2 (1998), 172.

[485] For a discussion of similar policies carried out by the Kingdom of Greece in the same period see: Glavinas Ioannis, 'The Perception of Muslim Minority in Greece in

the Great Powers that it was not his country which had initiated a possible '*casus belli*',[486] an issue the importance of which I will discuss later. It is crucial to emphasize that as he travelled from Balıkesir to Manisa, which included visits to Ayvalık, Balya, Bergama, Burhaniye, Dikili and Foça, atrocities against the Ottoman Greeks were still taking place all around him. He was quite careful to give the impression that the Ottoman government was doing its best to establish order.[487] In fact, he was indeed issuing and executing orders to restore security[488] but they were obviously too late since Ottoman Greeks had left by the time they were implemented. If his intent had truly been to restore order, he would have implemented additional measures in the Aegean long before, when Ottoman Greeks started fleeing from Thrace immediately after the Second Balkan War. Later when he was asked if there were any murders or loss of life during the process of mass migrations, he answered that only Foça and two villages of Menemen witnessed such atrocities and he added that the guilty parties were being severely punished[489]. Evidence of this punishment and of Talât's perception of the events in Foçateyn is from a coded telegram that he sent from the governorship of Izmir to the Ministry of Internal Affairs at 4:30 in the afternoon on the 17th of June in 1914 (4th of June 1330).

The account of the events provided by Talât Paşa in his telegram is as follows:

> *Yesterday morning* [16th of June]*, we went to* [Eski] *Foça together with Vali Bey* [governor-general of Izmir, Rahmi Bey]. *Events with serious repercussions*

Greek and Bulgarian Policy and Strategy (1912-1923)', *Études Balkaniques*, 4 (2005): 157-174.

[486] Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, 42-57.

[487] He publicly condemned the violence and even suspended the governors of Foçateyn, Ayvalık and Biga. See: Azlolan Memurlar. *Ahenk* newspaper, 17 June 1914, No: 5453, pg: 2. The governor (*kaymakam*) of the county of Foçateyn, Ferit Ali Bey (Ferid Bey), was removed from office together with the governor general of the county of Biga on the 22nd of June 1914. See: BOA., BEO., 4293/321973, (Hicrî: 12/B/1332). This was carried out due to his 'failure' in maintaining security. However, the same Ferit bey was re-appointed as a *kaymakam* in the county of Karamürsel, yet another area with sizeable amount of Christian Ottomans in the Marmara region, on the 9th of January in 1915. BOA., İ.DH., 1512/1333/S-31, (Hicrî: 22/S/1333).

[488] For the measures taken by the CUP government see: Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 201-204.

[489] Diran Kelekyan, 'Seyahat Etrafında Dahiliye Nazır-ı Muhteremiyle Mülakat', in *Sabah*, 29 June 1914, No: 8902, 1.

occurred there. A group, consisting of 500 people from some villages and settlements around the region, had entered the mountains above Foça. They intended to loot the city and at that moment the Christian residents panicked and swiftly tried to seek refuge in a Greek ship that was in the harbor. The Kaymakam [the governor of Foçateyn] *failed to show the courage to send his 20 gendarmeries to stop this group because it was so large. These people, together as a group, entered the town and they started looting and there is not a single home, shop or establishment left untouched. All was looted. Subsequently, all the Greeks migrated. A second group was left behind and among them 9 people died. Two of these people died as they rushed to board the ship and it is understood that they drowned in panic. The governor of the county* [kaymakam] *will be removed from his position because he failed to order his gendarmeries to take action. This request is hereby written to the ministry. As of yesterday and today, it appears that order has been restored in the county. Declarations have been issued to the villages to let people know that those who attempt to disturb the internal and external security of the state will be punished with the death penalty. I would like to state that if the situation calms down by Friday, I would be able to travel to Çanakkale by ship*.[490]

Based on the chronology of the text, Talât Paşa must have been in Foça at the same time as Manciet and the rest of Sartiaux's excavation team. Manciet claimed that he had been able to convince the *kaymakam* to send in the gendarmeries, but Talât did not seem to be aware of that. Neither Talât nor Manciet seemed to be aware of each other's presence in the same town. This would be surprising given Talât's cautiousness with diplomatic pressure. It could be the case that he did not make a public appearance, and in any case it is quite likely that he held a closed meeting when he was there and issued orders regarding security measures.

In the beginning of the telegram, Talât claimed that the people of the surrounding villages had entered the mountains of Eski Foça, but he does not refer to them as

[490] BOA, DH.ŞFR, 430/85, (4/H/1330). It is interesting to note that although it does not say so in the telegraph, the dossier in which this telegram is located is titled 'the attack of the Cretan *muhacir*s on Ottoman Greeks'. See the appendix for the transliteration.

chettes.[491] This is a critical problem with Talât Paşa's telegram. First of all, the photographic evidence and eyewitness accounts (Muslim, Ottoman Greek and French) suggest that this group (even if it did not only consist of chettes) predominantly consisted of armed chette members who were later allowed to leave with their loot. In the photographs of Félix Sartiaux's excavation team, it is clear that there are people with rifles, horses and clothing typical for bandits in that era. However, Talât does not mention the chette members and the gunshots, rape, murders and injuries that resulted from their encounters with civilians.[492]

Talât Paşa's account gives the impression that what had occurred was spurred on by inter-ethnic or inter-communal tensions among neighbouring communities. In short, he depicts the event as a projection of Muslim resentment.[493] His interpretation of the events is inflected by a tone typical of his approach that refers to the whole period of the flight of Ottoman Greeks as an unfortunate indirect consequence of the Balkan Wars and the expulsion of the Balkan Muslims. However, if the people from neighbouring villages had gathered to loot Eski Foça, that would have been noted in the local Greek and Muslim accounts. Ottoman Greeks who, by the 16th of June, had been on the run from their own settlements that were around Eski Foça do not talk about the attackers being from the local area (neighboring villages).[494] Nevertheless, as in the case of the account of Vrutanis and Savvas, the claim is made that Turks attacked their shepherds and some Turkish women tried to steal their property long

[491] He referred to them as '*civar ve bazı kura ahalisi*'.
[492] However, both Manciet and the booklet published by the Patriarchate of Constantinople (1919) claim that Talât visited Eski Foça and he played an active role in the planning of the events. Even if that was not the case, Talât must have had more intelligence about what transpired.
[493] This interpretation of Talât is especially emphasized when he was talking about the incidents as a whole, including Foça, in a parliamentarian session. See the 'The Aftermath' section of this chapter for details on that matter.
[494] This is important since we know from oral testimonies that Eski Foça and Yeni Foça were two centers of the county in which (especially in Eski Foça) residents of other villages gathered on certain days of the week for bazaars, shopping and religious ceremonies. Therefore, both Muslims and Christians must have had a certain level of familiarity with their fellow county people. In none of the oral testimonies are the attackers referred to as 'other villagers'. On the contrary, they are referred to as 'strangers' or 'chettes'.

before the ousting started.[495] Sartiaux's account discussed above also mentions that there was limited participation by some non-chette member locals but he also states that the *muhacir*s came only after the 30th of June. This rules out the possibility of a conflict between *muhacir*s and the Ottoman Greek population of Foçateyn. In addition, Muslim eyewitnesses also do not remember those 'thieves and rats' as local people. They would have known them if they had been from other Muslim villages since Eski Foça was the center of Foçateyn and as such was traversed by local residents. In other words, if they had been from surrounding villages, someone would have taken note of that fact. On the contrary they refer to them as 'strangers' and 'chettes'. The conclusion that can be drawn from these accounts is this: the group that initiated the violence was clearly comprised of people other than local Muslims who joined the pillage (or supposedly masterminded it, according to Sartiaux). The initiators of the violence and ousting were armed bandits not from the county.

As discussed previously, when international pressure had increased and war with Greece seemed imminent, Talât Paşa facilitated a tour for international observers in the regions of conflict. The account of one of these observers, his Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires in Constantinople, H. D. Beaumont, also sheds light on the events that transpired in Foçateyn. After joining another group of observers[496] on the 24th of June 1914 in Menemen, Mr. Beaumont visited Eski Foça and Yeni Foça on the 28th of June. He made the following comments about the state of affairs:

> *We found that both towns had been sacked. Elaborate measures, which we subsequently learned had been carried out under the direction of Hadjim Bey Police Mudir of Smyrna, had been taken to deceive us as to what had occurred. Some doors had been repainted, the marks of axes on others had been covered over with strips of tin, and a clumsy attempt had been made to remove the traces of the desecration of the churches. The cathedral church of St. Irene, which we examined carefully, had clearly been looted. The exodus of the Greek population of Old and New Phocea had taken place on June 12 and 13, as the*

[495] CAMS, Βρουτάνης and Σάββας interview, 22/4/1964, Athens.
[496] Consisting of M. Ledoulx (French), M. Toukholka (Russian), M. Chabert (Italian), M. Schoenberg (German), and M. Coglievina (Austrian). FO 195/2458, 520.

result of an attack by armed bands of Moslems from neighboring villages. The inhabitants do not appear to have offered any resistance.[497]

Although Mr. Beaumont clearly states that armed local Muslims from the neighbouring settlements were involved, we should keep in mind that he was there after the attacks and order had been restored. And based on other witness accounts, it is known that although the Muslim residents of the county joined in the pillage only in the end, they restrained themselves when the initial violence and attacks were taking place. In addition, Mr. Beaumont was already travelling from Bursa down to Foçateyn and he had seen cases where local Muslims had truly attacked local Greeks.[498] However, in contrast to Mr. Beaumont's remark, the majority of the evidence suggests that this was not the case in Foçateyn.

Mr. Beaumont's full report on what he described as the 'anti-Greek movement' which consisted of his personal impressions, the impressions of several other international observers, and his correspondences with Rahmi Bey and Dr. Nazım, summarizes the situation quite accurately. According to Beaumont, when the media had been fuelling Muslim reactions against non-Muslims for months, 'the most "Committee" Government that Turkey has yet had seemed to regard the anti-Greek Press campaign, if not with favour, at least with benevolent indifference'. He strongly believed that the suggestion concerning the expulsion of the Greeks by German officers in the service of the government, at least on the strategic grounds, removed the last hesitations of the government. 'However this may be, there can be no reasonable doubt that the expulsion of the Greek element was approved, even if not officially ordered, by the Central Government. Without violence and bloodshed, the Greeks were to be intimidated into leaving the country'.[499] According to him, 'The Greeks had, however, to be eliminated from certain districts and as the "Nation" did not appear disposed to undertake the task of its own motion, the Committee of Union and Progress had to

[497] FO 195/2458, 523. For the complete account see the appendix.
[498] He reported one such case in Başköy where 'The bandits which attacked the village consisted mainly of Moslems of the district, many of whom they [Greeks] recognised. They were all races, Circassian and Gipsy in particular'. FO 195/2458, 516-517
[499] (FO 195/2458, 538). 21 July 1914.

take the "Nation" in hand'.[500]. He went on to say, 'When the news of what had taken place during the first two weeks of June became generally known and war with Greece seemed to be imminent, the authorities performed a volte-face'. Those who assisted in the plunder were then ordered to escort the villagers.[501]

Mr. Beaumont was not alone in talking about possible German influence on the Unionist decision to deport populations. In fact this was an often repeated and at times exaggerated argument. American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire between 1913-1916, Henry Morgenthau, in his *Secrets of the Bosphorus* claims that Germany saw Greeks of Asia Minor as '…a barrier to Pan-German aspirations.' He also sees deportation as '…the peculiar German method which German publicists have advocated for dealing with populations that stand in Germany's way.' He states that Turkey '…acting under Germany's prompting…' begun using the same method to her Greek subjects in Asia Minor. Morgenthau refers to a private dialog between him and the German Admiral Guido von Usedom, who had been stationed in Çanakkale (Dardanelles) during its bombardment by the allies in the Great War, as a proof of German influence on the Unionists decision to adopt a policy of deportation. According to Morgenthau, Usedom told him that '… it was the Germans "who urgently made the suggestion that the Greeks be moved from the sea-shore." The German motive, Admiral Usedom said, was purely military.' Morgenthau is also doubtful weather or not the Unionists '…realized that they were playing the German game…' It appears that the spring of organized chaos in 1914 in Foçateyn left an impression also on Morgenthau. He talks about Phocaea (Foçateyn) as one of the '...occasional massacres...' in Western Anatolia that were a result of Turkish officials pouncing upon the Greeks to transfer them to Greek islands in the Aegean[502]. Turkish (or more accurately Ottoman) officials did not transfer Ottoman Greeks. They were forced to flee or ousted by bandits.

I find Mr. Beaumont's approach more reasonable and neutral. Although there is no hard evidence other than the aforementioned ego documents, Germany seems to have

[500] (FO 195/2458, 539). 21 July 1914.
[501] (FO 195/2458, 540). 21 July 1914.
[502] Henry Morgenthau, *Secrets of the Bosphorus*, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1918), 31.

been influential on the Unionists' deportation decisions. The degree of this influence does not seem to be possible to understand for contemporary historians. Unionists were perfectly capable of formulating these policies without German influence and the history of their radicalization clearly explains why they desired such policies on their own account. However, having a Great Power like German on their side clearly removed any hesitations that they might have had. Another contemporary observer, Arnold J. Toynbee, states that Turks use German involvement as a point in defending their policies. This line of thinking is still dominant among contemporary defenders of old Unionist policies. Turks' defence, he states, '…is accepted rather too readily by British, French, and American non-official residents in Turkey…' Orientalism plays an important role in the readiness to accept predominant German role, as Turks are perceived incapable of undertaking such schemes alone. Toynbee states that the deportation plans are '… attributed to General Liman von Sanders, and though it is not usually assumed that he foresaw the consequences, it is argued that he who wills the end wills the means. I have so far discovered no evidence for this allegation, which seems to rest on nothing more than the unconvincing presumption that the Turks could not have devised and executed such measures on their own account.'[503]

In light of the evidence provided so far, I strongly believe that what happened in June of 1914 in Foçateyn was an outcome of the combination of the political will (for demographic engineering) of a very limited group (the CUP), whose plans were carried out by clandestine groups, and a series of unpredictable events. It was organized yet the extent to which the events unfolded seems to have been "too noisy" for the Unionists. Unlike other parts of the Empire such as Thrace, which was a battlefield during the Balkan Wars, Foçateyn did not witness spontaneous conflicts between inter-ethnic or inter-communal groups. Therefore, significant tensions had not arisen between local Greeks and Muslims. In addition, by June of 1914 there were few *muhacir*s in the county and there are no accounts that suggest there was any major tension between them and native Greeks. During my research I only came across one case of tension between *muhacir*s and native Greeks: the cases of robbery and theft in the winter of 1914 that was mentioned by Vrutanis and Savvas' oral testimonies. If we employ Mr. Beaumont's terminology, the events of June 1914

[503] Toynbee, *The Western Question*…, 144.

required a force to take matters into hand since the 'nation' did not appear disposed to undertake the task on its own. For that reason I prefer to refer to the events as 'organized' yet 'chaotic'. When the spring of 1914 was over, Foçateyn had become a county of just 8,452[504] residents (from 23,180[505] in 1914) and there were no Christians left. Throughout the spring of 1914, thousands[506] of Christians were forced to leave along the shores of Foçateyn. In the following days, their houses were filled by *muhacir*s who contributed to the major increase in the Muslim population of the county in the troublesome days of World War I.

[504] This number is taken from the 1917 population census. Erkan Serçe, 'Aydın Vilayeti Salname ve İstatistiklerinde Foçateyn Kazası', in *Foça Üzerine Yazılar / Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı Anısına*. (İzmir: Ati Matbaa, 1998).

[505] Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914 Demographic and Social Characteristics*. (London: 1985), 174.

[506] According to British sources (FO 195/2458, 552) some 13,000 to 18,030 Ottoman Greeks left Foçateyn in 1914 (For Dündar's compilation of the numbers presented in the same source, see: Dündar, *Modern...*, 213-214). Although the first number is slightly less than the total number of Ottoman Greeks that were counted in the county in the 1914 Ottoman official census (15,670, Karpat, *Ottoman...,* 174), there were no Ottoman Greeks left in the end. And while the second number may be slightly higher than the original native population, the number presented by the British might still be accurate given the chaotic nature of the events. Greeks who did not reside in of Foçateyn fled into the county seeking refuge or opportunities of escape. Therefore, the people from the surrounding settlements of Foçateyn might have been included in the number presented by the British.

The Aftermath

According to the investigation undertaken by his Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, H. D. Beaumont, the total number of Ottoman Greeks that fled the Empire was as follows:

Date of Emigration	Locality of Origin	Number
May 28 to June 9	District of Cheshmeh (*Çeşme*)	45,000
About June 4	District of Adramid (*Edremit*)	15,000
do.	District of Burhanieh and Kemer (*Burhanıye ve Kemer*)	7,000
About June 5	District of Balikesser (*Balıkesir*)	5,000
June 7 to 10	District of Bergama and Dikeli (*Bergama ve Dikili*)	18,000
June 11-12	District of Phocea (*Foçateyn*)	13,000
June 12 to 16	District of Karaburun	14,000
	TOTAL:	117.000

[A table by British Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, H. D. Beaumont depicting the number of the Ottoman Greek flight. Source: FO 195/2458, 552.]

The numbers presented by the British observer were a bit underestimated compared to the numbers presented by one of the most influential Unionists: Talât Paşa. According to the numbers presented in the *Kara Kaplı Defter* (*Black Book*)[507] of Talât Paşa, some 163,975 native Ottoman Greeks (from provinces of Edirne and Aydın and the

[507] This terminology is barrowed from the work of Murat Bardakçı. See: Bardakçı, *Talât...*, 28-29.

*Sancak*s of Çatalca, Karesi and Kal'a-i Sultaniye) escaped or migrated to the Kingdom of Greece.[508] Although he does not specify a time period for those figures, it is possible that he meant from 1913 to the beginning of World War I in 1914. It is reasonable to think like that since he wrote his notes sometime between late 1916 and early 1917, the numbers he indicated are close to other estimates given in other sources for the Ottoman Greek emigration in 1914. One striking feature of Talât's *Black Book* is its structure. The book starts with an in-depth presentation of statistical data about *muhacir*s and the various financial burdens that the Ottomans had to deal with in times of war. Then it presents detailed data about the relocation of Christians (Greeks and Armenians). The very structure of the book complies with Talât's (and Unionists') often-encountered logic of *mukabele-i bi'l-misl* (reciprocity). For instance, he mentions the arrival of some 339,074 Muslim refugees from the Balkans between 1329 and 1331 (1914-1916) and their detailed ratios in provinces before he writes about the number of emigrant Christians.[509] It seems as though he calculated them as a response from one to the other.

The period following the Balkan Wars until the Ottomans entered World War I witnessed a series of emigrations that altered the demographic structure of what remained of the western Empire. Although there were still Ottoman Christians left after this period, they were mostly concentrated in rather urban areas such Izmir or in the hinterland. Many places, like the county of Foçateyn, were completely de-Christianized, and news of atrocities and misdeeds poured into the capital and abroad.

[508] Bardakçı, *Talât...*, 79. See the appendix for Talât's statistic.
[509] Bardakçı, *Talât...*, 41.

T.C. BAŞBAKANLIK OSMANLI ARŞİVİ DAİRE BAŞKANLIĞI (BOA) ©

[**Picture:** A Comparative Population Statistic of the Province of Aydın in 1917. Red indicates Muslims; blue indicates (Ottoman) Greeks. Foçateyn (Phocéa) is listed on the bottom right as having an exclusively Muslim population. Source: BOA, HRT 503 BOA]

On the 18th of June 1330 (1st July 1914), a group of Ottoman Greek members of the Ottoman Parliament,[510] headed by Emmanuelidi Efendi, the M.P. of Aydın, made a motion to hold a session following Talât Paşa's return from the province of Aydın. The Ottoman Greek members of Parliament wanted to know what had caused the flight and what measures had been taken. Their request was fulfilled on the 6th of July in 1914. Talât Paşa sought clarification of the demands and concerns of the parliamentarians and Emmanuelidi was given the task of elaborating on the questionnaire that was presented to Parliament. The resulting speech given by Emmanuelidi and the subsequent response of Talât Paşa[511] present a valuable opportunity for a better understanding of the perceptions of the Ottoman Greeks and Unionists.

Emmanuelidi started his speech by stating that their purpose was not to blame anyone but draw attention to and address the tragic events that would be considered as acts of great dishonour and shame in the history of the mankind. He stated that those who thought of the events as insignificant had not seen or heard about the disgraceful acts that befell the residents of Izmir and especially Foça, which was in ruins. He stressed that it was the duty of the Parliament to discuss those matters that affected the citizens of the country who are protected by law. He stressed that they brought those issues to the floor not because they mattered for the Ottoman Greeks but because they mattered for the Ottomans as a whole. After all, he said, his job was to defend Ottoman interests.

Emmanuelidi addressed the Boycott Movements and he argued that despite them he would be pleased to see progress in a certain element of the Ottoman society, for example Turks, and he stated that he disagreed that it had to be at the expense of another element in the same society. He argued that economic progress was only possible with the application of a free market (*teşebbüs-ü şahsiyi serbest bırakmakla*)

[510] This group of parliamentarians consisted of: M.P. of Istanbul Viktor, M.P. of Izmir Simonaki Simonoğlu, M.P. of Izmir Vangel, M.P. of Gelibolu Dimitraki Fitu, M.P. of Trabzon Yorgi, M.P. of Aydın Emanuelidi, M.P. of Istanbul Haralambidi and M.P of Karesi Savapulos. See: MMZC, İnikad: 26, Celse: 2, 23 Haziran 1330 (6 July 1914), 606.

[511] See: MMZC, İnikad: 26, Celse: 2, 23 Haziran 1330 (6 July 1914).

and he added that the current situation of Turks being encouraged to shop from Turks was not a formula for progress but for disaster. He urged the government to take measures to stop the propaganda that prevented people from shopping wherever they want. His speech was interrupted several times and he was urged to come to a conclusion. He responded that the discussion of the flight of some 150,000 citizens of this country was worthy of a long discussion.

Emmanuelidi implied that the cause of the flight of the Ottoman Greeks was the propaganda of the idea of the *Milli İktisat* and he argued that if it had been stopped in the beginning, matters wouldn't have reached the point they had. He stated that some *sopacılar* (gangs) had appeared and forced some Muslims and non-Muslims alike to engage in economic activities as they saw fit. He argued that those gangs who wanted to wage a war of the economy were not punished in such a country, where martial law was practiced, precisely because there was another agenda behind their actions. He claimed that what started as an economic pursuit turned into a political one and initiated the mass flight out of the country. He also emphasized that there was a tendency to see those actions as reciprocal acts (*mukabele bilmisil*) in response to the suffering of the Balkan Muslims. He added that there were people who regarded all Ottoman Greeks as Greek nationalists (*Yunan kafalı*) and that there were no solution to the present problems.

At one point, Emmanuelidi asked why the Muslim refugees were not directed to the less populous areas of the Empire but instead to the areas that were dominated by Ottoman Greek inhabitants. In his question he was referring to the entire period stretching from 1912 to 1914. He was clearly trying to criticize the settling of *muhacir*s in areas where their resentment against Christians caused problems. After all, this was what Talât Paşa presented to the outside world as the main reason behind the 'flight' of the Ottoman Greeks. As I discussed above, Talât Paşa's way of seeing things was not entirely wrong but not entirely true either. And in addition, it was definitely not the case in the county of Foçateyn. Emmanuelidi's speech was interrupted again and he was asked to address the rumours about Ottoman Greeks fleeing as a result of propaganda by the Kingdom of Greece. He replied that although there might have been some Greeks writing letters that urged their relatives in the

Empire to migrate, those would not account for the flight of some 150,000 Ottoman Greeks.[512]

Talât Paşa, Minister of Internal Affairs at the time, addressed Emmanuelidi's questions and comments. Initially, Talât Paşa highlighted the atrocities conducted by the Balkan nations against Muslims and he stressed that these atrocities, just like what Emmanuelidi claimed for the flight of Christians, were a disgrace in the history of mankind. He argued that once *muhacir*s flooded those (Western Anatolian) parts of the country, it was impossible to stop conflicts and rivalry. Talât Paşa argued that there was no other options but to place those *muhacir*s in populated areas (initially in Muslim and later in Christian settlements as well), since to do otherwise and establish new settlements for them, like Emmanuelidi suggested, would put a substantial burden on the state budget (which was already shrinking and under the pressure of wars). If, Talât said, they were to send those *muhacir*s to the less inhabited parts of the Empire 'between Üsküdar and Basra', like Emmanuelidi suggested, they would have perished in the desert.[513]

In Talât Paşa's reasoning, the Boycott Movements were also a result of the *muhacir* propaganda and he claimed that the government took numerous measures to stop them but to no avail. Furthermore, he underlined that the initial stages of the flight of the Christians had started in Edirne which had been under Bulgarian control for some time. This period and the collaboration of some Christians with the invaders, he argued, was the principal reason behind the Muslim retaliation that started the flight. Talât Paşa also stated that he visited places where news of misconduct and violence had arisen and he took all necessary measures to stop the flight of Christians. One such place, he said, was the town of Foça (meaning Eski Foça). He stated, confirming Emmanuelidi's claims, that some houses had been looted and some people were killed in Foça. He added that he visited Foça and ordered the removal of the district governor of the county (*kaymakam*) due to his inability to handle the situation.[514] He

[512] MMZC, İnikad: 26, Celse: 2, 23 Haziran 1330 (6 July 1914), 606-611.
[513] MMZC, İnikad: 26, Celse: 2, 23 Haziran 1330 (6 July 1914), 611.
[514] The governor general (*kaymakam*) of the county of Foçateyn, Ferit Ali Bey (Ferid Bey) was removed from his office together with the governor general of the county of Biga on the 22nd of June 1914. See: BOA., BEO., 4293/321973, (Hicrî: 12/B/1332)

said that nearly a hundred people had already been punished by the *Divan-ı Harp* (Wartime Court) for the events that transpired in Foça alone. He also said that the inspections were still underway and more measures were to come.[515] Lastly, he said that the return of the Christians was a matter that would now be discussed between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, implying that a population exchange was soon to take place.

When considered as a whole, the entire speech of Talât Paşa was clearly nothing but a reflection of the often-encountered logic of reciprocity. His speech implied that whatever happened to Ottoman Christians happened as a result of the flight and expulsion of the Balkan Muslims, which according to him was the result of the unjust Balkan Wars. For him, the scale of the trauma of Muslims' expulsion and flight was so immense that the government was simply unable to stop social tensions. The implication is that the way the Balkan Wars ended and the hardships of the subsequent diplomatic environment played significant roles in the way the question of *muhacir* migrations was dealt with. In line with the spirit of the era, those Muslim migrants became an asset as a means of legitimizing the 'national borders' through wars of population statistics of rival nationalisms. Although the suffering and the resentment of the *muhacir*s were a reality, it is also evident that they became an asset for the nationalist cause of the Unionists.

Most of the Ottoman Greeks in Western Anatolia were already gone by the time the Ottomans entered World War I. However, more was to befall the residents of the county of Foçateyn, including the old and new towns of Foça. The Balkan Wars were just one chapter in the protracted period of warfare for the Ottoman Empire that started in 1911. This period of warfare ultimately brought about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. By the time Anatolia and the Aegean found peace again in 1923 with the treaty of Lausanne, the nation-state had become the ultimate political norm in

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This was ostensibly due to his failure to protect the citizens of the county of Foçateyn. However, the same Ferit bey was re-employed as a *kaymakam* in the county of Karamürsel, yet another area with sizeable amount of Christian Ottomans in the Marmara region, on the 9th of January 1915, BOA., İ.DH., 1512/1333/S-31, (Hicrî: 22/S/1333).

[515] MMZC, İnikad: 26, Celse: 2, 23 Haziran 1330 (6 July 1914), 611-613.

the region and in the world. Lausanne recognized demographic engineering as a tool of peace-making and millions were 'legally' displaced after the peace accord. And by that time, the county of Foçateyn, just like many others, was a town in ruins inhabited by the ghosts of the Empire.

Conclusions

In the end realist war diplomacy, nationalist elites, and the nationalist mobilization of the resentments of migrant groups and social antagonisms, all of which were the result of many complex historical developments, initiated this catastrophic prelude of violence in Foçateyn, and it foretold the demographic policies of the Unionists during the Great War. In a sense, the unresolved political issues of the Balkan Wars and nationalist rivalry spread inter-ethnic and inter-communal violence from the Balkans to the Aegean. Anastesis Varistopoulos, a native of Foça whose town was attacked by bandits in the spring of organized chaos, '… gave the impression that the harmonious nature of intercommunal relations might have continued had it not been for the First Balkan War. It was only with the war did we see each other as enemies. The cause was the Balkan War… Before 1912 they'd come to our weddings and baptisms. We did koumparies [spiritual relatives]… [but] after 1912, such things no longer happened. We were at daggers [sta maheria]. The Turks no longer trusted us'.[516]

This Pandora's Box was opened in a region contested by rival nationalisms, transformed by modernity and challenged by economic incorporation. Although the nationalists had to 'lead the nation' or 'awaken' it first, they found sleeping beauties awaiting them among the Ottoman Greeks and Muslims alike. Some segments of Ottoman society enthusiastically took up the nationalists' causes because they saw them as an answer to the challenges brought upon them by multiple actors and forces. People became the agents of change, just as they were affected by it. And that is why this period of crisis was not a purely elite project masterminded in retrospect. It was a combination of the nationalist political will that constantly redefined itself, popular support that leapt in and out of nationalist causes, and unforeseen twists. The case of

[516] Doumanis, *Before the*…, 152.

the county of Foçateyn is a demonstrative case and is helpful in trying to draw conclusions.

Unionists' Organized Chaos: A Double Reality

Just like the Boycott Movement, the ousting and flight of the Ottoman Greeks after the Balkan Wars also included elements of spontaneity and the involvement of the CUP, often simultaneously. And again, just like the Boycott Movement, the flight and the ousting of Christians evolved into something more directed and less spontaneous from 1913 to 1914, and from Thrace down to the Western Anatolian coast. When it reached the county of Foçateyn in the spring of 1914, it was not the local populace or ordinary *muhacir*s who attacked and ousted Ottoman Greeks but bandits who were not stopped by present security forces for days. The photographic and oral historical evidence leaves little room for doubt regarding the nature of the events that occurred. I should make it clear that I am not arguing that all migratory movements of Christians after the Balkan Wars were related to the CUP or to its underground organization, the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*. However, I do make the claim that there is considerable evidence that suggests there was major involvement on the part of the CUP and its *fedai*s[517] in most of these flights and there is a definite involvement, the degree of which cannot be fully reconstructed, in the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks of Foçateyn. Nonetheless, due to the nature of the events and the background of the era, peculiarities created unforeseen results as well. Since the Unionists sponsored unofficial operations in secrecy, the control and conduct of such operations were also compromised. It is for those reasons that the flight of Christians was organized, and yet chaotic.

[517] Another good example of such involvement in the ousting of Ottoman Christians in Western Anatolia can be found in the life story of Dramalı Rıza Bey, a *muhacir* and a *fedai* from Drama. He was born in Ottoman Drama in 1890 and he became one of the earliest members of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* towards the end of the Balkan Wars. He and his bandits were actively involved in ousting operations in Bergama, Manisa, Dikili and Menemen. See: 'Dramalı Rıza Bey ve Kuzey Batı Anadolu Kuva-yı Milliye Mücadelesindeki Hizmetleri', *Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi Dergisi*, No: 57, Vol: XIX (2003). http://atam.gov.tr/dramali-riza-bey-ve-kuzey-bati-anadolu-kuva-yi-milliye-mucadelesindeki-hizmetleri/

This study on the county of Foçateyn demonstrates the double reality in the way these migrations and flights were perceived, reacted to and acted upon by the CUP. As has been shown above, neither Talât's accounts of the events nor any Ottoman bureaucratic correspondence describe the events in the county of Foçateyn as they are depicted in the other textual and photographic sources presented in this research. On the other hand, there are ample sources, mostly bureaucratic correspondence, which would make it seem that the CUP government had done its best to stop these migrations, violence and flights (at least in general, but not in Foçateyn as previously discussed). In contrast, there are also sources, the majority of which consist of ego documents of members of the CUP, which openly (and proudly) talk about the direct involvement of the CUP as well.[518] The existence of this double reality is what brings me to this conclusion: Despite the fact that an interpretation of the existing pool of primary sources would easily, and not always wrongly, lead one to assume the direct involvement of the CUP in the flight of Christians as a whole between 1912-1914, one should always work case by case with the benefit of doubt. Otherwise, it is far too easy to lapse into the mistake of not seeing the influence of other forces such as war, refugee resentment, various social antagonisms or ideology. After all, not all anti-Christian feelings and acts were results of the actions of the CUP but it used them for its own purposes, and that is what I have attempted to demonstrate here.

I am also convinced that the very existence of this double reality served a parallel role in the political convictions of Unionists: brutal realism. A review of the chronology presented earlier in this chapter reveals that the timing of the major ousting and boycotts always coincided with moments when the relationship with the Kingdom of Greece had deteriorated. It also shows, however, that these periods were also followed by times when Talât embarked on journeys to assuage local tensions and problems. In

[518] For instance, the Unionist Halil Menteşe openly states in his memoirs that Talât, who coordinated the cleansing of the 'disloyal elements' with Rahmi Bey and Mahmut Celâl (Bayar) in the province of Aydın, pointed out that *muhacir* groups were the cause of violence against Christians whereas the CUP was the mastermind behind the ousting. According to Menteşe, Talât aimed at easing diplomatic pressures in this way and the government appeared to control the situation although the party (the CUP) was behind it. See: Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları*, (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), 165-166. See the appendix for the part of the memoir where Menteşe clearly speaks of the involvement of the CUP.

addition, throughout this process, up until the beginning of World War I and beyond, the CUP always tried to initiate a peaceful population exchange as well. This brings me to the conclusion that once the CUP decided to demographically engineer an ideal nation state, they tried to achieve this aim by all means possible, both secret and open, peaceful and violent, but without causing untimely war, and that is why they sustained a double reality in their discourse.[519] In a sense, the flight and the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks gave them a *de facto* population exchange, the one that they thought they desperately needed but failed to achieve by diplomacy after the Balkan Wars. In fact, Talât Paşa refers so often to the sufferings of the *muhacir*s whenever the issue of misconduct against the Christians comes up that it seems as though he saw this '*de-facto* exchange' as a reciprocal (*mukabele-i bi'l-misl* in their terminology) policy against the flight of Balkan Muslims for which the CUP did not have a chance to retaliate because the Balkan Wars were lost.

Catalysts of Destruction: War and Migration

Wars played crucial roles in the ways that they altered power relations, locally and globally, and in the way they affected the perception of legitimate violence in Ottoman society. Nationalisms were fuelled through various wars with Russia (but most importantly the 'War of '93', i.e. 1878), nationalist uprisings (such as Illinden uprising of the 2nd of August, 1903), the Balkan Wars and World War I. These wars, when considered altogether, make one thing clear: the last century of the Empire witnessed almost omnipresent warfare and almost all those wars were driven by

[519] A good example of this can be seen in the examples of Talât Paşa's correspondence about the flight of Ottoman Greeks. On the 21st of May in 1914, Talât Paşa wrote to the province of Aydın that, as it was decided together with the Grand Vizier, the Muslim refugees (*muhacir*) were to be settled (*misafir edilmesi*) in the Ottoman Greek villages starting from the coast as long as the Muslim flight from Macedonia lasted. He also ordered the implementation of 'necessary precautions' to avoid violence. (See the appendix for the transliteration of the original text, BOA. DH.ŞFR 41/37, 8th of May 1330). On the 6th of June 1914, two days before he embarked on a journey to 'stop' the flight, Talât Paşa ordered the governor-general of the province of Aydın, Rahmi Bey, to allow Ottoman Greeks who wanted to migrate to leave. (See: BOA. DH.ŞFR, 41/175, 24 Mayıs 1330 [6 June 1914]). In this way, he was arranging what he portrayed as a spontaneous event behind the scenes with his coded telegrams, but he was also being cautious not to cause violence probably due to the diplomatic commitments of the Ottomans.

nationalist motivations. In short, in various ways those wars affected both the elites and the ordinary people. If four words were to be chosen to define the effects of war, they would be: resentment, injustice, insecurity and migration.

Starting with the loss of the Crimea in 1770 and intensifying after the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878, successive waves of forced displacement and destruction haunted Muslims and non-Muslims in the process of the transformation from an Empire to nation states. Between 1770 and 1923, approximately 6.9 million people, not taking into account deaths, were subjected to atrocities, driven out of their ancestral lands and deprived of their properties within and outside the Ottoman geography and its proximity.[520] In fact, almost all the communities in the former Ottoman lands were so agitated by their experience of atrocities and forced displacement, or by stories of them told down the generations, that nationalist intellectuals were able to easily mobilize people's resentment against each other for their own ends. For all sides in this nationalist 'blood feud', atrocities carried out by the 'other' were emphasized whereas atrocities against the 'other' were silenced, forgotten or legitimized.

Muslims from the former Balkan provinces of the Empire, and especially the majority of the members of the Young Turks (and more of the members of the CUP) who ruled the empire, had first-hand experience of inter-communal and inter-ethnic violence when they were cast from their homelands and assaulted by paramilitary groups and bandits. The experience of violence at the hands of Christians was very much alive in their memories and that in turn was transferred from one generation to the next as feelings of resentment for generations to come even after they took refuge in Ottoman lands.[521] As a result of this state of almost constant warfare, insecurity prevailed in almost all of the Ottoman countryside and in former Ottoman lands, becoming a matter of everyday life. Outlaws, draft dodgers, and former soldiers often dominated

[520] For a visual representation of this tremendous century of migration and for the approximate number of people that suffered forced migration see: McCarthy, Justin. *Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire / An Annotated Map*. Turkish Coalition of America, 2010. See: http://www.turkishcoalition.org/files/grants/Forced_Displacement.pdf, l.

[521] See: Erik Jan Zürcher, 'How Europeans Adopted Anatolia and Created Turkey', in *European Review*, Vol.13, No. 3 (2005): 379-394.

the ranks of bandits and chettes. States, either the Ottoman state or the newly established Balkan states, failed to provide or consciously avoided providing security for the minorities within their borders. They seized the opportunity to use this lack of security to further their own radical nationalist projects. Injustice often became a norm in that logic of blood feuds in which one 'national' community's violence legitimized others' violent response in a vicious cycle. Nation-states used each other's respective nationals ('the enemies within') for diplomatic and political leverage. The spring of 1914 in the county of Foçateyn is an example of this.

Subscribing to Nationalist Causes I: The Refugee Elites

In the Ottoman Empire, a secret society, which later evolved into a political party, played the central role in the unfolding of the events that surrounded the collapse of the Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. This was the Committee of Union and Progress. Although the idea of nationalism existed before the Young Turks and before the CUP, the CUP's gradual evolution into a predominantly nationalist and more ethnocentric party[522] with a revolutionary agenda and its hold on power present crucial turning points. Forged with the military experience of fighting against nationalist guerrilla groups and secret societies throughout the years in which the Ottomans lost the Balkans, these mostly Balkan migrant men, who formed the majority of the CUP,[523] created their own organization and its paramilitary wing based on the idea that they had learned the hard way in the years of Balkan defeats. Once established,[524] the CUP used its underground paramilitary groups[525], whether or

[522] Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building / From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 213-236.
[523] See Zürcher, *The Young...*, (2010), 95-110.
[524] *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (Special Organization) was officially created under the *Harbiye Nezareti* (Ministry Of War) on 5 August 1914. However, groups existed and operated under that name before that date often under the direct orders of the CUP's leading figures like Enver and Talât.
[525] There is no clear evidence that clearly reveals the nature and the structure of the groups that were associated with the CUP. However it is clear that the CUP, most of whose members were experienced in fighting against guerilla warfare, created their own groups to fight for their causes. Powerful CUP leaders like Enver and Talât might have had their own clandestine groups that gradually evolved into what became known as the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*. The existence of such groups and the way they were

not it was in power, for example to grasp parliamentary power, crush political resistance and realize their nationalist projects. In a sense, the era of the Macedonian Question and its final resolution forged the ideologies of most of the Unionists and later even the Kemalists.[526] What these elites learned was simple; all means were justified for political ends. Politics was merely a method of seizing power and so were guerrilla warfare and political assassinations.[527] These elites, who identified their interests with that of their state, did their best to preserve and develop the power of the Ottoman polity at a time when the will for, and consensus on, the destruction of the 'sick man of Europe' was taking shape.

The minds of the members of the CUP, like many of their contemporaries elsewhere in Europe, were preoccupied with positivist ideas of a future society.[528] CUP members, most of whom were military officers, thought that the 'sickness' of the Ottoman Empire could be diagnosed with tools of science. The cure for the Ottoman ailment lay in the creation of a Prussian-inspired 'Nation in Arms' through the construction of a politically and militarily sustainable Ottoman-Muslim motherland that was to be developed by a national economy. Intellectuals in the late Ottoman Empire, more specifically Young Turks and members of the CUP, were not always nationalists. But once they became so, ideas of liberalism, socialism, Islamism, Westernization, Ottomanism and Turkism were simultaneously used to strengthen the position of Ottoman Muslims. 'The Unionist politicians, therefore, felt free to use any

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organized are only partially visible in various documents. For a detailed discussion of the topic see: Cemil Koçak, '"'Ey Târihçi, Belgen Kadar Konuş!': Belgesel Bir Teşkilâtı Mahsusa Öyküsü', in *Târih ve Toplum (Yeni Yaklaşımlar)*, Issue: 3, (Spring 2006), 171-214.

[526] Adanır, *Makedonya...*, V. In his pioneering research, Fikret Adanır critically engages with the literature discussing the formation of Macedonian nationalisms and he argues that the policies of the Young Turks and Kemalists can only be understood in their entirety through comprehension of the Macedonian Question. See: Fikret Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001).

[527] For the members of the CUP, politics had become brutalized and the ends justified the means. For a discussion of the development of this political culture among Young Turks, see: George Gawrych, 'The culture and politics of violence in Turkish society, 1903-1914'. In: *Middle Eastern Studies* XXII/3 (1986), 307-330.

[528] For a discussion of the idea of positivism among Young Turks see: Şükrü Hanioğlu, 'Blueprints for a future society: the late Ottoman materialists on science, religion and art' in: Elisabeth Özdalga (ed.), *Late Ottoman society. The intellectual legacy*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 28-89.

and all of these ideologies as they saw fit to accomplish their ultimate goal of establishing a strong, modern and unified state'.[529] Wars intensified this process and when elites brought forth their nationalist ideas, they found both supporters and resistance among the Ottoman population.

The CUP was not always what it became after the *Bâb-ı Âli* coup. However, once the coup was over and the party had eliminated all opposition, it became a party that acted like a state within a state. Understanding the events that stretch from 1913 to 1922[530] requires keeping this dilemma in mind. On the one hand, there was the Sultan and the Ottoman parliament. On the other hand, there was a party that was not democratically successful in elections but still in power. Furthermore, this party [Party of Union and Progress (PUP)] was just the public face of the committee (CUP) that ruled it behind the scenes. Some institutions and people throughout the vast Ottoman geography were loyal to one group whereas some were loyal to the other. This divided nature of Ottoman elites almost disappeared when the CUP installed its dictatorship after the 23rd of January in 1913, which enabled it to make radical decisions for the Empire. For the members of the CUP, and especially for the infamous Triumvirate,[531] if an organ in the body of society was irreparably sick, the only means of healing the body was to eliminate that organ. For the CUP this 'irreparable' part of Ottoman society consisted of disloyal elements that were often, but not limited to, non-Muslims.[532]

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[529] Zürcher, *The Young...*, (2010), 231.

[530] The CUP's physical, human and discursive means were not diminished when the Ottoman Empire was defeated in WWI. On the contrary, through processes of negotiation and competition, they were merged with the Turkish nationalist struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Therefore, it can be argued that, despite the prominent figures of the Young Turk movement having changed from 1912 to 1922, a certain network of people with common ideological convictions ruled the country from the Balkan Wars to the first democratic election in Turkey in 1950. For further reading on the relationship between the CUP and the Kemalist national movement see: Erik Jan Zürcher, *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010).

[531] Three leading figures of the CUP consisting of İsmail Enver Paşa (minister of war), Ahmet Cemal Paşa (minister of navy) and Mehmed Talât Paşa (minister of interior, Grand Vizier).

[532] CUP was also concerned about the loyalties and identities of its Muslim subjects. Its policy was very much in line with the traditional Ottoman logic in which regional homogeneities were to be avoided. This policy is not visible in all of the documents of

When the CUP diagnosed the sickness of their state and decided on the 'cure', there was already popular support for nationalism among various segments of Ottoman society. The Ottomans, especially some non-Muslim groups such as Armenians, Greeks, Albanians and Bulgarians, were already supporting nationalism before their Muslim counterparts. For Muslims, as demonstrated in this chapter, the spread of nationalism owes much to the traumatic effects of the wars the Empire fought. Nevertheless it would be misleading to argue that elites such as the Unionists or war alone brought about the rise of nationalist agendas among Ottoman Muslims in a top-down manner. As was the case with their non-Muslim and European counterparts, the Young Turks found 'sleeping beauties'[533] ready to be woken up[534] and war came upon a society that was already bifurcated.[535] For many, the nationalist project presented an opportunity for social mobility and they served as 'public projects'[536] for certain groups in society. Although they may differ in the details, one such political and popular 'project' was the ousting of Ottoman Greeks from the 'borderlands', and that included the county of Foçateyn. But who constituted the human resources behind the

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the CUP. For a detailed study on the topic see: Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan politikası (1913-1918)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 2008.

[533] The term 'sleeping beauty' here refers to the common nationalist perspective of a primordial idea of the nation in which the Hellenes or the Turks are out there waiting to be made aware of their 'real' selves.

[534] There were many cases in which people seized opportunities that were presented by the nationalist projects of their respective 'national' elites. A good example of one such situation can be seen in the Ottoman boycott movement where Muslim merchants used the opportunity of boycotting their non-Muslim competitors for the sake of the 'national' interests that helped their own personal interests. For a detailed discussion see: Çetinkaya, *Muslim...*, (2010).

[535] According to Göçek, the Ottoman reforms in the 19th century created a bifurcated society of patronage, service and economy. She argues that this was how Ottoman Muslims became anchored in the bureaucracy and military through government education and recruitment, and how, simultaneously, the Ottoman Christians became anchored in commerce through a parallel system of patronage by the West through business contacts, citizenship and foreign representatives. See: Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 44-116.

[536] I think there is a striking similarity between how workers tried to improve their living conditions through public projects like strikes and how nationalist projects also served as such public projects for various groups such as workers, artisans and merchants in the Ottoman Empire. For the concept of private and public projects see: Marcel van der Linden and Jan Lucassen, *Prolegomena for a Global Labour History*, (Amsterdam: International Institute on Social History, 2009), 13-16.

projects of the CUP in this particular project? Which parts of society expressed their support?

Subscribing to Nationalist Causes II: The Muslim Middle Class, Workers and Refugees

In his work on the Boycott Movements, Çetinkaya comes to the conclusion that just like the Unionist elites, the Muslim middle classes and workers also had agency and played major roles in the ways that the boycotts unfolded.[537] After all, they had their own individual, economic and/or ideological convictions for subscribing to the nationalist cause. In the case of the flight and ousting of Christians after the Balkan Wars, which went hand in hand with the boycotts, there is one more specific layer in the Ottoman society that can be added to the list presented by Çetinkaya: the Muslim refugees, or *muhacir*s as they were often called. Just like the port workers or Muslim merchants in the boycott example, *muhacir*s took up the nationalist cause often because they had personal stakes in those projects. Whether it was resentment against Christians, at the hands of whom they had suffered, or simply because they needed to survive in the new environment of uncertainty and poverty, many *muhacir*s subscribed to a Muslim nationalist cause.

The CUP instrumentalized the resentment of *muhacir*s in order to instill fear among Christians through resettlement of *muhacir*s, chettes or threats. They used the same guerrilla tactics that they had learned the hard way in the Balkans and ethnically cleansed the borders of the 'enemies within'. Therefore the way native Muslims acted and perceived events sometimes differed from that of *muhacir*s. When we look at the case of the county of Foçateyn, we see this difference at work. In the organized chaos of the spring of 1914, the Muslims of Foçateyn were often bystanders yet some of them, natives and *muhacir*s alike, joined the looting on the last day of the events in Eski Foça. Nevertheless, there was a difference in the way that the events were perceived. A tragic account about a later phase of violence in 1922 summarizes the situation. When Ferit Oğuz Bayır, a *muhacir*, ex-guerrilla, prisoner of war and nationalist teacher himself, was asked about the events of 1922 (the last chapter of the

[537] Çetinkaya, *Muslim*..., 186-203.

forced migration when some of the Greeks who came back in 1919 during the Greek occupation of Anatolia were drowned and killed by Turkish nationalist forces), he says that the Greeks deserved to die because of the atrocities they had committed against Turks.[538] Although it was chettes who carried out the attacks in 1914, it is clear that there was a difference between the way native Muslims and Muslims who were refugees from the Balkans perceived it. In short, the accounts of those who were not from the region, like refugees, were radically different from those who belonged to local networks.[539] This was primarily due to the fact that the refugees were subjected to the same kind of violence in the Balkans and that they were outsiders to the local networks.

[538] Ferit Oğuz Bayır was born in 1899 in Simav. He spent his early years in Edirne and his family became *muhacir*s during the Balkan Wars. He was educated in one of the modern teachers' schools (*Dar-ül Muallimin*) of Abdülhamit II and he stated that he learned that he was a Turk from his teachers who wrote books about Turkism. Later he became a prominent figure in the Republic of Turkey as a co-founder of the *Köy Enstitüleri*. His story is also discussed in a later chapter of this thesis. EBOHC, Ferit Oğuz Bayır interview, Eski Foça, 1995-1997.

[539] As Reşat Kasaba argues, this pattern is also visible in the way violence was perceived and practiced during the Greco-Turkish war. Those who did not belong to local networks constituted the majority of the manpower of the nationalist wars that brought destruction to Western Anatolia. Many of the soldiers on both sides left destruction in their wake when they retreated or advanced. Reşat Kasaba, *Greek and Turkish Nationalism in Formation: Western Anatolia 1919-1922*, (Italy: European University Institute, 2002), 9.

CHAPTER VI

Extended Warfare and the End of the *Belle Époque*

The Ottoman Empire engaged in a series of successive wars that started with the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 (Tripolitanian War, 1911-1912) and ended in 1923 with the Lausanne Peace treaty. This was a period of almost omnipresent warfare that witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Republic of Turkey as a modern state from the remnants of the Empire. In a sense it was the last great Ottoman war, and a painful process of nation making. The effects of this extended period of warfare between 1911 and 1923 were first felt in the county of Foçateyn after the spring of organized chaos in June of 1914. The spring of organized chaos, which was discussed in the previous chapter, marked the local beginning of the transition for Foçateyn. This was a transition from peace to perpetual warfare, from empire to nation-state and from a fragile cosmopolitanism to nationalisms. The ousting of the Christians in June 1914, which was a direct consequence of the Balkan Wars, was only the beginning for Foçateyn, although the county was not affected by the early stages of the Great War. The effects of the war only became tangible after 1916 with a series of allied bombing operations. Later, the Kingdom of Greece invaded Western Anatolia in 1919 and the re-taking of the county by Turkish nationalist forces in 1922 followed this. Each of these periods constituted subsequent phases of violence and destruction that followed the spring of organized chaos. Once this period of transition and war was over, Foçateyn's so-called *Belle Époque*, its cross-cultural reality and its expansion, was over as well. It was no longer a bourgeoning county with a growing boomtown and a cosmopolitan demography. Foçateyn was depopulated, structurally devastated and its boomtown Eski Foça was turned into a ghost town.

The *Belle Époque* in Foçateyn, its cosmopolitanism, dominance of middle-class values and its wealth, were fragile and depended on the sustenance of growing world capitalism. Incorporation into the world economy was the major driving force behind the growth of Foçateyn into a more populous and developed county, but that was not

the only driving force. As I demonstrated in Chapter One, Foçateyn's expansion was also a result of the modernist reforms of the Ottoman center, and the growing Ottoman state apparatus also triggered development and growth in the county. These reforms essentially lagged behind the pace of the changes brought about by incorporation and they were designed as remedies to reconsolidate the central power that was challenged by incorporation in the first place. The fragility of the *Belle Époque* and the values it represented was a result of the delicate balance that it had to maintain between the agents behind these distinct forces of change: the market and the state. The balance between these two forces relied on the agility and fragile existence of the emerging Ottoman middle-class in the incorporated parts of the Empire. This middle-class consisted predominantly of Ottoman Christians who had been accumulating capital and acted as a buffer in the face of further capitalist penetration, supporting reform for 'order and progress'[540] and demanding more political participation.

The organized chaos of 1914 in Foçateyn marked the local beginning of the period of transition that brought an end to this balance and thus to the *Belle Époque.* Ousting the Ottoman Christians and destroying their businesses were the obvious reasons why the balance was shattered after 1914. Replacement of the fragile cosmopolitanism and middle-class values with ethno/religious nationalisms, an emerging distrust of economic liberalism and being engulfed by an extended period of warfare and its effects on trade, demography and diplomacy constituted the other important reasons. In the earlier phase of this period of extended warfare, strongholds of incorporation, and middle-class hegemony and cosmopolitanism, as embodied by Izmir, remained relatively safe and unaffected by the disruption of the balance compared to places like Foçateyn. The international focus on Izmir provided a temporary shield. However, once Izmir was also engulfed by warfare and transition at a later stage in 1922, it was equally devastated, destroyed and changed beyond recognition.

[540] Vangelis Kechriotis, 'Civilisation and Order: Middle class morality among the Greek Orthodox in Smyrna/Izmir at the end of the Ottoman Empire', (Accessed: Nov. 2013), https://www.academia.edu/4123234/Civilization_and_Order_Middle-class_morality_among_the_Greek-Orthodox_in_Smyrna_Izmir_at_the_end_of_the_Ottoman_Empire

The major agents of change who represented the reconsolidation of state power and centralization after 1913 were the Unionists who seized full power in the same year with a coup. The Unionists decided to reconsolidate central authority at all costs vis-à-vis further capitalist penetration, imperialism and rival nationalisms through a nationalist framework during the period of extended warfare that threatened the very existence of the last non-colonized Muslim state. As I argued before in the previous chapter, it was a combination of their political will and design, and the peculiar post-Balkan Wars circumstances (the spread of the Macedonian Question into Western Anatolia) that brought the spring of organized chaos to Foçateyn. As we will see in this chapter, once the battle lines between a nationalist consolidation of central power and an imperialist and rival nationalist counter-scenarios were drawn, each successive stage of conflict brought increasing amounts of violence and destruction. As war became increasingly prevalent between 1914 and 1922,inter-communal relations became more and more strained in Foçateyn and violence became more widespread. And as warfare continued, more people were uprooted and displaced. The 'enemy' was increasingly stigmatized and dehumanized after each pahse of violence, and Greeks and Muslims fought each other in desperation and resentment at the western end of the Empire. In a sense, war-making during this period of extended warfare violently homogenized demographics[541] and even physical space for the contemporary nation-states of the post-Ottoman geography. The nationalisms that loomed in the background of the fragile cosmopolitanism of the *Belle Époque* became the dominant discourses. Formulas of coexistence diminished before they had the

[541] Hakan Yavuz argues that in the case of the Ottoman Empire, war replaced industrialization (or urbanization and others) as a catalyst of homogenization. War laid the foundations of national identities in the Ottoman context as opposed to the way identities were first homogenized by other forces such as the expansion of capitalism, industrialization or urbanization in Western Europe according to the modernist paradigm. Although war was very central to the emergence of national identities and although the Unionists utilized it as discussed here, I see it as only one of the many factors that affected the emergence of national identities in the Ottoman Empire, not the only one. The incorporation, urbanization and the emergence of a public space all contributed to the emergence of national identities in the Ottoman Empire as well. For Yavuz's discussion see: Hakan Yavuz, 'Warfare and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars as a Catalyst of Homogenization', in *War and Nationalism: the Balkan wars, 1912-1913, and their sociopolitical implications*, ed. Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2013), 31-84.

time to mature. In short, war turned hypothetical 'national enemies' and 'national borders' into real ones.

The Great War, the Unionists and the Ottoman Greeks

The Ottomans were forced to defend themselves against the Balkan alliance before the Tripolitanian War of 1911 with Italy had ended. In addition, the Ottoman army had been under major reorganization and redeployment since 1910. It entered the Balkan Wars in '…a condition of professional unreadiness'.[542] The changing tactical dynamics of the twentieth century greatly favoured entrenched troops supported by machine guns and artillery. This would have been an advantage for the Ottomans if they had not opted for offensive encirclement operations, and as a result, Ottoman offensives were unsuccessful and they resulted in heavy losses for the army. The Ottomans also divided their capabilities by focusing on both the Balkan and Thracian strategic centers of conflict. As a result, the Balkan alliance was able to isolate smaller Ottoman forces, beat them at their own offence and break the connections between the eastern and western theatres of war. The Ottoman flanks were exposed and the defeat was heavy and swift.[543] Lengthy peace talks in July 1913, at the end of the two subsequent Balkan Wars, only succeeded in establishing a fragile status quo. These talks left the involved parties with many future uncertainties. The Ottoman public was deeply affected by the wars, and many expressed resentment and made calls for revenge.[544]

Boycotts, inter-communal violence, banditry and forced migration became often-encountered phenomena after the Balkan Wars in Western Anatolia. The failure to establish a new status quo after the Balkan Wars turned places like Foçateyn that had recently became border zones into potential war zones. Chettes, boycotts, forced migration and massacres were often considered to be 'Macedonian stories' before the

[542] Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913*, (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 332.
[543] Erickson, *Defeat...*, 331-332.
[544] For a seminal work on the Ottoman war propaganda see: Erol Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey during World War I*, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 24-72.

Balkan Wars. After 1914, such 'stories' started to spread in Western Anatolia as well. All of these circumstances damaged the already strained relationship between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire. A Greco-Ottoman war was widely anticipated and national borders seemed but temporary. Many feared that such a war would drag the Great Powers in as well and create an unprecedented world war.

The spring of organized chaos took place in Foçateyn following the months when the Aegean islands were placed under the control of the Kingdom of Greece as a result of the post-Balkan War peace talks. Similar instances of forced migration took place in other parts of the Western Anatolian coast as well. Çeşme, Seyrek,[545] Edremit, Burhaniye, Kemer, Kınık, Balıkesir, Bergama, Karaburun, Menemen, Ödemiş, Uluabad, Eskice and towns and villages on or near the Kasaba-Aydın Railways, around Bursa and around Ayvalık (but not the towns themselves)[546] all experienced instances of the ousting of Ottoman Christians (mainly Orthodox), similar to what happened in Foçateyn. An estimated total of some 160,000[547] Ottoman Greeks were

[545] For a detailed discussion of the events in Seyrek and some photographs of the commission that visited Seyrek after the ousting see: Fuat Dündar, '1914'te Rumların Sürülmesi, Yabancı Heyetin Gözlemleri ve Seyrek Köyünün Foto Hikâyesi', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 189 (2010), 82-86.

[546] This is not an exhaustive list of the names of the places that were affected by the ousting operations and boycott movements of 1914. More on the names of the places can be found in: FO 195/2458, pgs: 513-536, *Report on tour in the Brusa and Smyrna districts (June 20 to July 11, 1914)*

[547] There is no consensus on the number of Ottoman Greeks that emigrated as a result of the ousting operations and boycott movement. This is understandable given the nature of the events and all of the different estimations amount to a substantial size. Zürcher estimates the number of ousted Ottoman Greeks could have been as high as 200,000. See: Erik Jan Zürcher, 'Greek and Turkish refugees and deportees 1912-1924', http://www.transanatolie.com/english/turkey/turks/ottomans/ejz18.pdf (accessed in December 2013). Kerimoğlu in his book *İttihat-Terakki ve Rumlar 1908-1914* discusses the different sources of numbers provided. We see numbers as high as 200,000 from the area of Izmir alone in contrast with a low of 98,552. See: Kerimoğlu, *İttihat...*, 473-474. Engin Berber argues that according to the official numbers of the Greek Ministry of Social Help of the time (*Yunanistan Sosyal Yardımlar Bakanlığı*), some 98,552 Ottoman Greeks were forced to leave the Empire. According to the same statistical data, 8,817 of these were from Yeni Foça and 9,250 were from Eski Foça. See: Engin Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar: İzmir 1918-1922*, (Ankara: Ayraç Yayınevi, 1997), 58. In his own personal notes (*Black Book*) Talât Paşa provides a detailed table about the number of the Ottoman Greeks that fled (*firar*) and migrated to Greece, citing a figure of 163,975. See: Bardakçı, *Talât...*, 79. In the Foreign Office archives, British observers gave an estimated total of 136,000 as the

forced to leave their country and homes right before the Great War had even begun. All these instances of ousting shared common features and unlike the earlier chapters of the Christian flight and ousting in Thrace,[548] the Western Anatolian examples of flight and ousting were more organized than spontaneous. Amidst these troubled times and forced migration, on the 12th of June in 1914, the Kingdom of Greece delivered an ultimatum to the Ottomans and warned them about the drastic consequences that would occur if they didn't put a halt to the bandit activities that were being used to terrorize Ottoman Greeks. The Ottomans responded with an ultimatum on the 18th of June. According to the Ottoman envoy to Athens, Galip Kemali Bey, the language of the ultimatum was appeasing and the Ottomans offered to resume negotiations for a possible population exchange with Greece on the 20th of June 1914.[549] War was still more likely than ever.

The ousting operations carried out in Western Anatolia were outside the war zones of the Balkan Wars. This was important because there were real cases of spontaneous inter-communal or inter-ethnic tensions in the war zones of the Balkan Wars such as in Edirne. Many Ottoman Christians had to flee, were attacked or forced out (within the same province, outside the province or outside the Empire) in Thrace (all of which was affected by the war) at different times until the Great War.[550] Nationalist agitation, propaganda and the Unionists most certainly played roles in those war zone tensions and oustings as well, but the tensions seem to have been more related to the direct experience of war and violence among the communities that lived through it.

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number of Ottoman Greeks who emigrated from the district of Smyrna (Izmir). See: FO 195/2458, pg: 552. I employ the number provided by Talât Paşa assuming that his calculations would be most accurate. This number only became available to researchers since 2008 and that is one of the reasons why many researchers were not aware of it.

[548] Dündar points out that the security concerns of the Unionists, bandit involvement and being attacked by *muhacir*s while fleeing were common characteristics in the oustings of some 20,000 Ottoman Greeks in the first three months of 1914 and another 30,000 as of June 1914. He also emphasizes that the costs for resettling *muhacir*s were taken from the charity funds of the Ottoman Navy Society (*Donanma Cemiyeti*). See: Dündar, *Modern...,* 194-196.

[549] Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hatıraları Atina Sefareti (1913-1916)*, (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınları, 2007), 118-121.

[550] Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 67-69.

Ousting and flight in the Marmara region, which is located between Thrace and Western Anatolia, was very similar to the situation along the coast of the Aegean. Marmara was close to the regions affected by war but it was outside them just like Western Anatolia. Gingeras's description of the situation on the shores of Marmara after 1913 shows the striking similarity of developments between the shores of Marmara and the Aegean:

> From the collection of imperial directives, anecdotes, and studies available to us, we can infer a general line of reasoning encased within the CUP's approach to South Marmara after 1913. The same lethal mixture that had contributed to the fall of the Ottoman Balkans could be found in this region so dreadfully close to the capital. Rum [Ottoman Greek] and Armenian communities riddled the South Marmara's landscape. Their economic primacy, backed by the West, mirrored that of Christians in pre-war Macedonia. Added to the dormant threat of Christian sedition was the influx of tens of thousands of Albanians into the towns and villages of the region. Although the vast majority of these newcomers were undoubtedly Muslims (and therefore potentially dependable citizens), the state could not readily count upon their loyalty and their domestic tranquillity. If the integrity of Istanbul's control over the South Marmara was to be maintained, a new, quite radical approach towards these three polities had to be engendered. By 1914, the CUP implemented a two-track solution to deal with the dangers posed by the presence of such large numbers of Armenians, Greeks, and Albanians: economic prohibition and forced relocation.

The instances of ousting and flight of Ottoman Christians on the shores of Marmara in places such as Mudanya, Bandırma and Çanakkale were similar to the Spring of Organized Chaos in Foçateyn. 'Bands of Muslims, some of them residents of the neighbouring villages, menaced and robbed their [Ottoman Christian] settlements, in some instances murdering and raping innocent civilians. (...) Although Athens may have had a hand in compelling emigrants to seek better fortunes in Greece, the CUP, as one British observer put it, appeared intent upon "driving the Greeks" out of the

region'.[551] Seen in this way, a pattern becomes visible. The Thracian phases of flight and ousting must be seen in a different light than the cases of flight and ousting on the shores of the Marmara and Western Anatolia. The latter cases seem to have been the results of the CUP's economic and demographic policies whereas the former seems to have been more spontaneous and related to the discontent stirred up by the Balkan Wars. Although we still need more case by case research on the issue, it seems like the more we move from north to south on the western frontline and seaboard of the Ottoman Empire in 1913-1914, the more organized and the less spontaneous the oustings and flights become.

The Unionists perceived the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks as a 'precaution' and also as an act of 'revenge' for the Muslim refugees from the Balkans. Most of the places where the Ottoman Greeks were ousted neighboured the newly acquired islands of the Kingdom of Greece after the Balkan Wars and/or were predominantly populated by Ottoman Greeks. In the eyes of the Unionists, such areas were potential sites of Greek irredentism and aggression. The Unionists feared that the fate of Macedonia would be repeated in Western Anatolia where they saw an economically, demographically and culturally dominant 'fifth column'. As was demonstrated previously, what the Unionists saw in Foçateyn, or in any other Western Anatolian settlement for that matter, was the cosmopolitan and integrated existence of a middle class hegemony. Such a cosmopolitan and internationally connected entity was incompatible with the content of the Unionists' centralist and nationalist policies after the Balkan Wars. As a result, the Unionists initiated or, at times, directed popular discontent, by means of boycotts and also brigandage in order to re-centralize and nationalize political control over the Western Anatolian coast. Their policies of economic nationalism in the form of boycotts and their policies of demographic engineering in the form of forceful displacement, ousting and violence dominated the short period of 'peace' after the Balkan Wars in the west of the Empire. In a sense, the chaos, atrocities and instability between 1913 and 1914 maintained 'the state of warfare' in Western Anatolia after the Balkan Wars.

[551] Gingeras, *Sorrowful...,* 40.

A war between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire had the potential to erupt into a larger European war by disturbing the balance of power. The Great Powers were aware that the rapid deterioration of the relationship between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire had the potential to erupt in war. In the meantime, Greece was worried about the increasing number of refugees from Anatolia and the Ottomans were worried about possible hostilities directed towards them from the Aegean islands. According to Fuat Dündar, Germany tried to be a mediator between the two parties in order to avoid a confrontation that would drag all the Great Powers into a larger conflict.[552] The preliminary agreement on a population exchange between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire was also an outcome of this general policy of appeasement by the diplomatic community that aimed to avoid a larger crisis and war.

A war between Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire was avoided but a larger global conflict arrived before long in 1914. World War I, or the Great War as it was called back then, erupted in July of 1914. This was only shortly after the ousting of Ottoman Christians in Western Anatolia. The Great War brought even more misery to both the Christians and the Muslims of the Empire and to the county of Foçateyn. The future of the Ottoman Empire, that is, the Eastern Question, played a significant role in the eruption of the Great War.[553] The Ottomans had been trying to avoid yet another period of diplomatic isolation in a war that would bring catastrophic consequences like those they had faced in the Balkan Wars. They had been unsuccessfully seeking alliances with England, France and even Russia, as the Ottoman authorities believed that it would be impossible to remain neutral. In the end, the Unionists found their way out of this diplomatic isolation by siding with the Germans with the hope that they wouldn't be engaged in extensive warfare.

[552] Dündar, *Modern...,* 228-229. Germany's efforts to avoid a larger conflict failed with the beginning of the Great War.

[553] Richard Hall describes the Balkan Wars as the first stage of the Great War and sees a direct relation between the two. See: Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 / Prelude to the First World War*, (London and New York: Routledge: 2000), 132-135. Jeremy Salt also points out the unstable nature of the Treaty of Bucharest that failed to satisfy the demands of the various parties at the end of the Balkan Wars. There was no stable peace and a new war was imminent. Jeremy Salt, *The Unmaking of the Middle East: A history of the Western disorder in Arab Lands*, (California: University of California Press, 2008), 54.

Wagenheim and Said Halim signed a secret treaty of alliance on the 2nd of August in 1914, and initially few Ottomans in the government knew about the decision.[554] The Ottoman cabinet was divided about the issue of alliance and they were kept in the dark until much later when the Ottomans were officially engaged in war.

As was seen with the spring of organized chaos in Foçateyn, the Unionists had already adopted a brutally realist approach after the Balkan Wars. The Unionists were extremely radicalized by a series of events that shook the Empire: the outbreak of the Great War, the blow of major defeats at the hands of the Russians, Armenian uprisings in the eastern provinces, military fiascos on the Caucasus front as in the case of Sarıkamış, an invasion by the Allied forces on the western front, Arab rebellions and a failure to hold the Middle East, the immense economic and social pressures of a global conflict, and the activities of some Ottoman subjects who supported the Allies .[555] The Ottomans were fighting a war of survival and the prospects appeared grimmer than during the Balkan Wars. This brought more misery to the Ottoman Greeks whose situation had already been a major concern for the Unionists since the end of the Balkan Wars. Coexistence proved impossible to maintain by the end of Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 that followed the Great War.

Although the Unionists always feared that the Ottoman Greeks might support the Allies on the western front, they did not undertake radical measures against the Ottoman Greeks in the early stages of the Great War, and Germany managed to calm

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[554] Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908-1918*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 107-109.

[555] Discussing causality in the radicalization of the Unionists and the changes occurring in the Ottoman imperial framework shows how intricate the dynamics behind the late Ottoman violence and dissolution were. This approach also helps to dispel the idea that what happened to the Empire was inevitable or predetermined. In a seminal article Ronald Suny criticizes teleological readings of history in discussions of the Armenian Genocide and proposes a causal story. Suny states that Young Turk ideology was an unstable mix that aimed at the survival of the Empire in the face of perceived threats rather than being a rigid and stable nationalist agenda that had always produced policies aiming for a certain goal. See: Ronald Suny, 'The holocaust before the holocaust: reflections on the Armenian genocide', in Hans Lukas Kieser and Dominic Schaller (ed.), *The Armenian genocide and the Shoah*, (Zürich: Chronos, 2003), 83-100.

hostilities between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire. In addition, from a Unionist point of view, most of the Ottoman Greeks on the Western Anatolian seaboard were already gone when the Great War started. According to Dündar, the coming of the Great War and the alliance with Germany turned the remaining Ottoman Greeks from potential threats into potential assets in the eyes of the Unionists. Outright forced migration was not possible after the alliance was formed because of Germany's diplomatic efforts. Fuat Dündar argues that the Ottoman Greeks were then perceived as assets in a war against potential Greek aggression.[556] This point of view is disputable but one thing was sure: soon enough the Unionist deportations and relocations started again. The Unionists decided to cleanse the immediate western seaboard of the Empire of the remaining Ottoman Greeks by moving them to the interior areas of their respective provinces. It is estimated that 100,000 Ottoman Greeks were deported to the interior (of the country or their respective provinces) from north-western Anatolia alone. These forced relocations often occurred within the borders of the same province. Gingeras points out that three months after the allied landing, the Ottoman Greeks of Çanakkale and Gelibolu were transferred on a large-scale 'an hour from the coast line'.[557]

There were exceptions and exemptions in the relocation of Ottoman Christians throughout the Great War, but in the end large numbers of Christian communities were drastically affected by the relocations.[558] In addition, during the Ottoman mobilization for the Great War in 1914, Ottoman Greek males were conscripted to infamous labour battalions without weapons, where they were to serve the Ottoman army in places far from their provinces and under harsh conditions.[559] It is also feasible that the Unionists did not feel the urgency or necessity of undertaking radical measures in the early stages of the Great War because of the ousting operations and

[556] Dündar argues that getting German support entailed a change in the Unionist policy towards the Ottoman Greeks in that they became assets to be used (in labour battalions and as diplomatic bargains with Greece) rather than problems to be eliminated. See: Dündar, *Modern...,* 229-230.
[557] See: Gingeras, *Sorrowful...,* 43.
[558] For a short discussion of these exemptions see: Gingeras, *Sorrowful...,* 45-46.
[559] Erik Jan Zürcher, 'Ottoman Labour Battalions in World War I', in Hans Lukas Kieser and Dominic Schaller (ed.), *The Armenian genocide and the Shoah*, (Zürich: Chronos, 2003), 187-195.

flight of the Ottoman Greeks in 1914 before the Great War broke out. Had the Great War not erupted, the population exchange planned between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire could have succeeded but most of the Ottoman Greeks were already gone from the western seaboard by the end of the summer of 1914. Some places on the Western Anatolian coast, like the county of Foçateyn, literally had no Ottoman Greek population left.[560] The Unionists did not perceive the small number of remaining Ottoman Greeks as being an urgent problem so long as the Kingdom of Greece remained neutral.

The Kingdom of Greece was domestically divided over foreign policy at the beginning of the Great War. The political struggle between the supporters of Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and the supporters of King Constantine I, also known as the National Schism, made Greece's position ambiguous. The source of the crisis ran deeper than mere disagreements over foreign policy and in the end it was a disagreement between a pro-Allied, energetic, nationalist, and irredentist Prime Minister and a cautious, pro-German King.[561] The Germans hoped at least for neutrality and found supporters in the pro-German camp around King Constantine I. King Constantine I dismissed Venizelos in the hope of avoiding the war and this resulted in a division of the country into pro-Allied and pro-Central Powers camp, ultimately leading to a situation reminiscent of civil war. The victory of the Venizelist camp, which was located in Thessaloniki in 1916, and the subsequent exile of King Constantine I in June of 1917 changed Greece's stance in the Great War. In the same month Greece declared war on the Central Powers and joined the Triple Entente.

Venizelos' victory over the king was a turning point in the treatment of Ottoman Greeks. The Ottomans had closely observed the power struggle in Greece and took action as soon as they saw that the pro-war camp of Venizelos acted against the political isolation imposed upon them. The Unionists changed their settlement policy

[560] The Ottoman population census of 1917 indicated that there were no Ottoman Greeks (*Rum*) in Foçateyn.
[561] Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85-89.

regarding Western Anatolian Greeks in 1916[562] after Venizelos launched a rebellion in Thessaloniki against the government in Athens. In September of the same year, the Unionist government issued an order for the resettlement of the Ottoman Greeks of Edirne, İzmit, Balıkesir, Çatalca and Çanakkale away from the Western Anatolian seaboard. Most of these Ottoman Greeks seem to have ended up in the internal parts of their respective provinces while a smaller number seem to have been moved to the Anatolian interior.[563] The eyewitness account of Arnold J. Toynbee, who toured Marmara and the Western Anatolian coast (from Istanbul to Ephesus) in 1921, stated that the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 confirmed that pattern. Toynbee's reflections on the issue accurately encapsulate the nature and the extent of the deportations:

> In the spring of 1916 the Ottoman military authorities started deportations, first partial and then wholesale, of the Greek population along the Aegean and Marmara littoral. This may partly have been a political counter-demonstration to the establishment of Mr. Venizelos's revolutionary pro-Entente Government at Salonika, but the hostile occupation of the three neighbouring Greek islands by the naval forces of the Entente Powers themselves was probably the main cause. These deportations (in contrast to the previous deportation of the Armenians) bear marks of having been a genuine measure of military precaution. While in 1914 there were sporadic outrages [he refers to the ousting and flight of Ottoman Christians in 1914, including the case of Foçateyn] in the interior too, the deportations of 1916-18 appear to have been

[562] When Greece joined the war, the Unionists took extra measures regarding Ottoman Greeks. The Unionists hastily resumed the demographic relocation policy and expanded it to new parts of the Empire. As of the 4th of September in 1916, orders for relocation ('*dahile sevk*') were issued in Aydın, Edirne, İzmit, Balıkesir, Çanakkale, Menteşe and Hüdavendigar. See Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 298-299. For a chart showing relocation the numbers as of the 10th of November 1917, also see: Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 307.

[563] Fuat Dündar points out that the Unionists undertook large-scale relocations of the Ottoman Greeks into the interior parts of the Empire after the victory of the Venizelists in Thessaloniki. Dündar, *Modern...,* 241. Ahmet Efiloğlu states that these relocations were mostly limited to the borders of the province in which the Ottoman Greeks lived. See: Ahmet Efiloğlu, 'Fuat Dündar'ın "Tehcire Gereken ve Hak Ettiği Anlamı Veren Kitabı": Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi', in *Yücel Dağlı Anısına*, ed. Evangelia Balta et al. (İstanbul: Turkuaz Yayınları, 2010) 180-191.

> practically confined to places within range of hostile naval operations. They were carried out with great brutality. At Aivali [Ayvalık], for instance, which had survived [the wave of ousting and flight] in 1914, all inhabitants between the ages of twelve and eighty (that is, in effect, the entire population) were transported great distances – the former French vice-consul, M. Sapaunjoghlu, a gentleman of advanced age, as far as Kaisaria [Kayseri]. But his case was apparently exceptional. The majority of the Aivaliots seem to have been transported only as far as Balykesry [Balıkesir], and to have remained there till the end of the [Great] War; and though they suffered great hardships and were shamelessly fleeced by the Turkish peasants from whom they were forced to hire transport, they were not massacred on the road, or driven on and on till they dropped, or marooned in deadly swamps and deserts, like the still more unfortunate Armenians.[564]

The number of relocated Ottoman Greeks, the distances they had to cover and the hardships they had to endure varied but it was observed that relocations generally increased over the course of the Great War as the war took a downturn for the Ottomans.

Almost 100,000[565] Ottoman Greeks were relocated during the Great War. Unlike Ottoman Armenians, most of the Ottoman Greeks made it back safely to their original settlements after the Great War. However, more trouble awaited them. More warfare was yet to come with the Greek invasion in 1919 which further exacerbated the

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[564] Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A study in the contact of civilisations*, (London, Bombay & Sydney: Constable and Company, 1922), 142-143.

[565] According to Talât Paşa's own account, 93,088 Ottoman Greeks from the provinces of Istanbul, Edirne, Hüdavendigar, Çatalca and Kal'a-i Sultaniye were relocated ('*Ahvâl-i harbiye hasebiyle dâhile nakl olunan Rumlar'*). See: Bardakçı, *Talât...*, 79. Talât Paşa's account does not include Aydın province, a principal province where Ottoman Greeks lived, in its wartime relocation chart. This might be because Aydın province was already mostly devoid of its Ottoman Greeks after the oustings of 1914 and because Izmir was at the center of international attention. Ryan Gingeras estimates this number to be around 100,000 by looking at different sources including some secondary literature and primary sources. See: Gingeras, *Sorrowful...,* 43.

already tattered relationship between the Muslims and Christians of the Empire.[566] Foçateyn was unaffected by these developments precisely because there were no Ottoman Greeks left in the county after 1914. From a Unionist point of view, Foçateyn had been secured before the war and did not pose any immediate danger even in the face of a possible invasion. As a result, the Unionists' demographic projects had no impact on Foçateyn during the Great War.

The period of extended warfare in Foçateyn can be divided into three stages from a local historical point of view: pre-Greek invasion period (the Great War), the Greek occupation period and the period at the very end of the Turkish War of Independence (Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922). Foçateyn had its share of physical and demographic destruction even though it was not among the major battlefields of the Great War and was under the Unionists' radar for immediate security concerns. The center of the county, Eski Foça, was bombed several times during the Great War, resulting in extensive damage. The demography of Foçateyn was not affected by the wartime deportation policies of the Unionists, although it was affected twice in the later stages of the war. It was first affected as a result of the Greek invasion and later when the Turkish army repulsed the Greek invaders, and that conflict itself can be seen as an extension of World War I.

Foçateyn during the Great War before the Greek Invasion: The Allied Bombings

The period between the beginning of the Great War and the Greek invasion in 1919 constitutes the period in which Foçateyn suffered the most damage. Eski Foça, the center of the county, was the central theatre of this destruction. Allied planes and ships bombarded Eski Foça several times between 1916[567] and 1918 because of its

[566] The Armenian and the Ottoman Greek communities of the Marmara region who went back to their houses after the Great War faced more problems and their relationship with the Muslim communities became more strained as the war continued until 1922. See: Gingeras, *Sorrowful...,* 52-54.

[567] There is only one piece of information about an offensive naval engagement that may have occurred around Foça on the 30th of October in 1914. The document in question mentions an unsuccessful attack by a French cruiser ship around Eski Foça. It is not clear if any damage was caused. See: BOA, HR.SYS., 2108/4, (Miladî: 30/10/1914). It is also not clear if Eski Foça was targeted in the bombing runs of 1915

strategic position. Bombing operations were not novelties of the Great War but the extent to which they were used, increased use of heavier than air vehicles (planes instead of zeppelins) and the extensive civilian damage they caused were new, however. The information about the bombing operations that affected Eski Foça is fragmentary which makes it difficult to provide details about the exact number of the bombing raids and the reasons behind the timing of each operation. Nevertheless, the damage they caused is well documented and it is evident that they took place more than once in order to weaken Ottoman resolve and war capacities.

The main reason behind the Entente's bombing operations was the Gallipoli (Çanakkale) Campaign of 1915. The Entente wanted to strike a decisive blow to the Ottomans by breaking through the straits and capturing the Ottoman capital. This was also an attempt to bolster the Russian war effort, which had been held back by the Ottoman closure of the Straits. Allied bombings targeted numerous settlements on the coastline and in the interior of the Western Anatolian seaboard including the shores of the Straits and the Marmara Sea[568] in the north. The Entente's bombing operations, which took place between 1915 and 1918,[569] targeted forts, defensive positions, shore batteries, railroads, bridges and also civilian structures in strategic places. Aerial bombardments seem to have been undertaken by Entente units that were stationed in Thessaloniki,[570] on the Greek island Mytilene (Midilli) and the Ottoman island of Kösten (Uzunada), which was located just at the entrance to the gulf of Izmir and was

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around the Gulf of Izmir. It is highly likely that Eski Foça was bombed at that time but there is no official Ottoman document describing Foça as one of the targets of the bombing runs. The earliest such official record of damage in Eski Foça is dated 1916.

[568] Gingeras states that the Great War '…came calling [to the Marmara region] in February 1915 with the Royal Navy's first attack upon the Dardanelles'. This is quite similar to Foçateyn, where the first impact of the war was also the bombing operations of the Entente just as was the case on the shores of Marmara. Gingeras, *Sorrowful...,* 41.

[569] 'Bombs Fall in Smyrna/British Airman Attacks City, Causing Seventy Casualties', *The New York Times*, June 28, 1915. 'Dropped Bombs on Smyrna/French Airman's Missiles Effective-Turkish Garrison 35,000', *The New York Times*, April 25, 1915.

[570] 'Drop Bombs on Turk Guns/Seven French Aeroplanes Visit Smyrna in 24-Hour Flight', *The New York Times*, March 4, 1916 and 'Air Bombs on Smyrna/Remarkable French Exploit', *The Argus*, 6 March 1916.

occupied by the British in 1915.[571] According to Otto Liman von Sanders, the German general who commanded the 5th Ottoman Army stationed along the west coast, the headquarters of which were in Badırma at the time, the British used Kösten Island as an artillery depot and airport base. There were warships protecting the island from the Ottomans and there was constant traffic between Kösten and Mytilini. The Gulf of Izmir was thus effectively blockaded by the Entente. The British bombarded Izmir's fortresses and there was talk of a possible offensive against Izmir in the spring of 1915.[572] Other sources confirm that Izmir and strategic positions on the nearby coastline were bombed as early as March 1915.[573]

This first wave of attacks came as the Entente fleet moved towards the Straits to the north of the Gulf of Izmir. It is plausible that the two forts of Eski Foça were among the '...forts at the entrance to the Gulf of Smyrna'[574] that were bombarded by the Entente war ships and planes. Several bombing runs followed in March, April and June in 1915 in which Izmir and nearby strategic positions were targeted a couple of times.

In March of 1916, the Ottomans attempted to break the blockade to the Gulf of Izmir by attempting to capture the Kösten Island. According to Otto Liman von Sanders, who led the operation, the task was more difficult than it initially appeared. The operation had to be conducted in secrecy and that was almost impossible due to the presence of the Entente fleet around the island and the Greeks and the citizens of the Entente states in Izmir, who, according to Sanders, roamed freely in the region and made it difficult to conceal operations. The Ottomans finally managed to position their artillery for the attack on Kösten Island, despite the odds against them. The barrage started on the 6th of May 1916 and ended in victory on the 4th of June in 1916. Liman von Sanders was pleasantly surprised by the success of the Ottoman troops.

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[571] Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı...,* 236-237 and Sabri Sürgevil, 'Çanakkale Savaşı ve İzmir', *Askeri Tarih Bülteni*, 15/28, (February 1990), 94.
[572] Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, (Berlin: Scherl, 1920), 150-151.
[573] "Operations Against Smyrna / Forts Blown Up", *The Ballarat Courier*, 15 March 1915.
[574] 'Smyrna Forts Bombarded/Hydroplanes Drop Bombs', *The Leader (Melbourne)*, 10 April 1915 and 'Shell Forts Near Smyrna/British again Bombard Defenses at the Entrance to the Gulf', *The New York Times*, 7 April 1915.

The British retreated from the island and drew a new line of defence at the very entrance of the Gulf of Izmir where Karaburun and Eski Foça (Deve Boynu point) lay.[575] As a result of this change in the front lines in the naval theatre, a second wave of bombing runs on and around Izmir took place in May, June and July of 1916.[576] According to British sources, 'Defence posts near Smyrna' and 'Smyrna Encampments' were targeted in this wave as well.[577] It is quite likely that along with Karaburun Eski Foça was one of the targets of this wave of bombings. In one instance, in May of 1916, a civilian quarter in Smyrna was also targeted and the bombs caused the death of three people and injured three women and a child.[578] All of these bombings took place months after the Ottoman victory of January 1916 in the Gallipoli (Çanakkale) Campaign and it is possible that they were an attempt to dissuade the Ottomans from attempting a counter-offensive.

[575] Sanders, *Fünf Jahre*…, 152-153.
[576] 'Aeroplanes Drop 100 Bombs on Smyrna', *New Zealand Herald*, 7 July 1916.
[577] 'Smyrna Shelled', *The Leader (Orange)*, 19 June 1916.
[578] 'Turkish Front/Bombs on Symrna', *The Advertiser*, 29 May 1916.



[**Picture:** Kösten Island Operation Map. Once the Ottoman forces reclaimed the island, the new line of defense was drawn at the entrance of the Gulf of Izmir where Karaburun and Eski Foça's castles became the prime targets of the Entente. The dotted line indicates the route taken by the Turkish boats that managed to bypass the route of the Entente naval patrol which is indicated by dashes. Source: Otto Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre*…, 149.]

The first official Ottoman record of damage in the county of Foçateyn dates from the 16th of September in 1916 (*3 Eylül 1332*). The damage chart identifies the cause of the damage as a bombardment carried out by two British airplanes and indicates there was 14,000 liras in damage. Later, another less detailed message mentioned that damage had been inflicted in Foçateyn as a result of Entente bombing in January 1918 (*5 Kanunsani 1334*). Lastly, on the 13th of February in 1919 (*12 Cemaziyelevvel 1337*), the Ottomans compiled a chart showing all of the wartime damage in the province of Aydın which indicates that the Entente bombing runs of the Great War targeted Çeşme, Foçateyn, Seferihisar, Manisa, Karaburun, Söke, Urla, Birgi and Kuşadası in the province of Aydın. The county of Foçateyn suffered damage amounting 44,200 Ottoman liras, 26,700 of which was on civilian structures, 15,000

on a lighthouse and 2,500 on properties left behind (*emval-i metruke*) by Ottoman Greeks in 1914. Urla, another coastal settlement close to Izmir, suffered devastating damage worth 6,351,400 liras. The total damages in the province amounted to 9,414,126 lira in total damage on the province[579].

Such figures may mean little to us today. Fortunately, there is more evidence about the wartime damage in Eski Foça that provides a clearer picture of the extent of the destruction that was caused. The source of this evidence is Felix Sartiaux's photograph collection, which has been discussed in previous chapters. Sartiaux's work was interrupted in 1914 with the coming of the spring of organized chaos and he was forced to leave, but he resumed his work in 1919 following the Greek invasion of Eski Foça, during which time he took photographs of the area. Some of these show the extensive damage that was caused in the *Cami-i Kebir* neighbourhood of Eski Foça.

Cami-i Kebir was the old town center. The government office (*Hükümet Konağı*), two mosques (*Kayalar Cami* and *Fatih Cami*), a church (*Αγία Ειρηνη*), the customs office and four large salt depots were located there. The neighbourhood was situated on a peninsula and *Beş Kapılar* (Five Doors) castle was situated on the outer end that faced the entrance to the port. There were cannons situated on top of the castle walls and it was the point of defence for the port of Eski Foça. The neighbourhood was predominantly Muslim but there had been an Ottoman Greek area prior to 1914, which was situated around the church where the peninsula joined the mainland. The Entente's bombing operations affected both the Ottoman Greek and the Muslim areas of the neighbourhood, but the damage was much more extensive in the latter. As the pictures indicate, most of the houses were heavily damaged and it is likely that they were targeted because of their proximity to the castle.

[579] BOA. DH.İVM, E112/79, (1337 Ca. 12).

[**Picture:** Houses damaged by Entente bombing runs in the *Cami-i Kebir* neighbourhood of the port-town Eski Foça, 1920. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 286-287]

Mehmet Peker, who was a fourteen-year-old resident of Eski Foça at the time, recalled that his family had left Eski Foça as soon as the Great War started. Schools were closed down with the outbreak of war and Eski Foça was crowded with refugees from Ioannina (*Yanyalılar*) who had arrived to take up residence in the houses of the Ottoman Greeks. Peker recalled hearing that soon after Eski Foça was shelled twice, the town was evacuated and only soldiers remained. Most of the houses and shops

were empty.[580] The demographic change of 1914 was followed by the physical devastation of the Great War between 1915 and 1918. In 1919, the end of the Great War left little of Eski Foça's *Belle Époque* intact. The lively port and the burgeoning town center were shrouded in silence. Local Muslims and refugees in Foçateyn had been unable to properly repair the damage caused as the result of the spring of organized chaos because of the subsequent Great War, which not only frightened people away from the center of Foçateyn but also resulted in damage to the city which was largely empty because the local Muslims and refugees deserted Eski Foça for the most part because of the bombings. Misfortunes and destruction followed for three more years after 1919 until that period of extended warfare came to an end for the Ottomans. The next chapter of turmoil after 1919 was the Greek invasion of Anatolia.

[**Picture:** Picture of the extensive damage in the *Cami-i Kebir* neighbourhood, Eski Foça, 1920. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 282-283.]

[580] EBOHC, Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31.8.1995.

The Greek Invasion of Anatolia

In November of 1918, Venizelos sent a long memorandum to the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George. Venizelos explained with much confidence his plan for the creation of a threefold settlement in 'Asiatic Turkey'. He took for granted the detachment of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia from the Ottoman Empire and basically argued for the creation of a Greek Asia Minor, an independent state of Constantinople and Eastern Thrace and an independent Armenia. In this plan, the Turks were to have their own zone as well, and Greeks and Turks were going to be encouraged to engage in mutual and voluntary intermigration. 'His aim was to abolish the causes of friction in Asiatic Turkey, and to create a strong, defensible Greek zone which would not be subverted from within'.[581] Venizelos' Greek nationalist design was the mirror opposite of the Unionists' Muslim nationalist strategy. His claims were published as a booklet in English and French in December of 1918 and again in 1919 (*Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919: A Memorandum Dealing with the Rights of Greece*), after which he presented his arguments to the Council of Ten on the 3rd and 4th of February in 1919.[582]

In his formal statement to the Council of Ten, Venizelos tried to justify his Greek designs on Anatolia based on ethnographic statistics, history, culture and strategic necessities. His arguments were largely criticized and stirred up debate among the representatives of the Entente.

Two arguments he raised in his formal statement are particularly significant for this research. First of all, in an attempt to legitimize Greek control over almost all of the islands in the eastern Mediterranean (including all of the Aegean islands that remained under Turkish control after 1914 and the Dodecanese islands which were under Italian control, but not including the island of Cyprus) and Western Anatolia, he argued that the majority of the inhabitants were Greek, although this was not the case everywhere (especially on the Anatolian mainland). Venizelos, however, presented a

[581] Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1998), 71.
[582] Smith, *Ionian*…, 72.

higher Greek population on the mainland by including the Greek populations on the islands in his calculations. He argued that such a method was logical since '...these islands were from the economic and geographical point of view a part of mainland Turkey...."[583] The Young Turks had made the same argument for the legitimization of Ottoman rule over the islands after the Balkan Wars. Both parties disregarded the demands the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the islands had and focused on their own strategic calculations. Venizelos used the proximity of the islands as a means to legitimize his irredentist claims, as the Unionists anticipated. Both nationalist camps, the Unionists and the Greek nationalists, understood the political 'value' of the demographic argument for political legitimacy. But the nationalist competition was a zero-sum-game with only one 'majority' winning at the expense of the other.

Secondly, Venizelos raised the issue of the Unionists' demographic policies between 1914 and 1918 as proof that the Ottomans were uncivilized and incapable of self-rule. He stated in his formal declaration:

> In the course of the World War, 700,000 Armenians and 300,000 Greeks have been exterminated. How can the Peace Congress send these unhappy peoples back under the Turkish yoke, renewing the derisive promises of new reforms in their interest? We must not, furthermore, forget that between 1914 and 1918, four hundred and fifty thousand Greeks have been expelled by the Turkish Government and have had to take temporary refuge in Greece; that several other hundreds of thousands have been deported from the coast to the interior, where the greater part of them have died, The mere reinstating of the survivors in their homes and on their confiscated lands presupposes necessarily the abolition of Turkish sovereignty.[584]

Venizelos viewed the same people, the Ottoman Greeks, who had become victims once as 'demographic problems' in the hands of the Unionists, as 'demographic assets' for the legitimization of Greek designs. Abolition of Ottoman rule was framed

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[583] Smith, *Ionian*…, 73.

[584] Eleutherios Venizelos, *Greece before the Peace Congress of 1919 / A memorandum Dealing with the Rights of Greece*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1919), 23-24.

as a necessity for the return and the well-being of the Ottoman Greek refugees. They were described as the demographic legitimation of the Megali Idea, together with the native Christians of Anatolia, who had not become refugees. Both groups were put in danger for a risky and unrealistic irredentist Greek nationalist project in a predominantly Muslim land. The Muslims' prospects were not bright in Venizelos's vision either. He '...pictured an Asia Minor divided into Turkish, Greek and Armenian sections in which the population would eventually be homogenous. He had groped for a similar solution in 1914. His aim was to abolish the causes of friction in Asiatic Turkey, and to create a strong, defensible Greek zone which would not be subverted from within'.[585] Venizelos would have been a perfect Unionist if he had been a Muslim nationalist instead of a Greek one. In fact, his vision of Anatolia was the same as that of the Unionists: a homogenous and defensible zone that would be secure from the 'dangers from within'.

Greece was granted a seat in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 based on its contributions to the war effort and as a result of Venizelos's agile and adventurous statesmanship. America and France did not support the Greek plans wholeheartedly and the Italians opposed them from the start. However, in the end, Greeks were given the 'green light' for a plan that was ambitious and risky. This was the doing of two men, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Lloyd George, and the Prime Minister of Greece, Venizelos.[586] The Entente's peace talks were not negotiated with the defeated countries but solely among the Entente powers, and there were conflicting designs and promises that needed to be sorted out. This took time and by the end of the negotiations the Entente forces had largely been demobilized and thus lacked the means to enforce their decisions. 'The Greeks, led by their Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, exploited this situation; they offered to act as the strong arm of the Entente and to force the Turkish resistance movement in Anatolia to accept the peace terms. The result was a bloody war that ended with a complete Greek defeat in 1922'.[587]

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[585] Smith, *Ionian*…, 71.
[586] Smith, *Ionian*…, 76-85.
[587] Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey a Modern History*, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 136.

The Greek invasion of Anatolia was legitimized as an operation to keep peace and order while preventing massacres that the Ottoman administration was supposedly unable to prevent.[588] Supported by Britain, in May of 1919 Greece embarked on a mission to establish and maintain order. Greece's so-called mission to maintain order was in fact a disguise for its irredentist policies. "If the object were really to keep the peace and prevent massacres, then the occupation should have been genuinely and not nominally interallied. As it was, both Venizelos and the allied politicians and military advisers in Paris had insisted, each for his own reason, that the Greeks should have a free hand on 15 May'.[589]

Two parties were eager to highlight the fact that the Greek operation was an invasion in disguise for the sake of their own respective interests. One of these parties was the nationalist resistance movement in Anatolia, which was still embryonic and fragmented. These Nationalists were the remnants of the Unionist networks that had gone underground in the capital but remained active in the provinces after the Ottoman defeat in the Great War.[590] The old Unionist structure was decapitated but the network was intact. For them, naturally, it was crucial to remove Greece's mask and prove to the international community that the sole intention of the Greek administration was to repeat what they had done in Macedonia, namely create a homogeneous nation-state by driving out Muslims. They were bitterly disappointed and angry about the fact that the defeated Ottoman government in Istanbul remained silent in the face of a Greek invasion. The nationalists were equally disillusioned with the application of the principle of self-determination by the victors of the Great War which gave little recognition to the Muslim majority of Anatolia after the Great War. They felt as though the Muslims were being left to their own fate, which indeed was the case. This in essence was particular to post-Great War peace treaties; little or no

[588] A good example of this war propaganda can be found in: *Greek Patriarchate, Persecution of Greek in Turkey 1914-1918*, (Constantinople: 1919). For a brief discussion of such propaganda material that attempted to legitimize Greek war claims see: Kerimoğlu, *İttihat...,* 475.
[589] Smith, *Ionian*…, 91.
[590] Erik Jan Zürcher, *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010).

attention was given to the realities of the defeated states and their people[591] and negotiations were conducted only among the victors.[592] Citizens were punished together with the governments that dragged them into the Great War and this undermined the validity of the peace treaties in the eyes of the defeated, which in this case were the Ottoman Muslims.

An overview of the leaders of the nationalist resistance movement in Anatolia reveals that some of the important Unionists, such Ali Çetinkaya, Kazım Özalp and Hüseyin Rauf, who were active before and throughout the Great War, were also equally important and active in the resistance. Celâl Bayar is a particularly relevant example. As discussed earlier, Bayar was appointed as *Kâtib-i Mesul* (secretary in charge) of a region encompassing Aydın, Manisa, Balıkesir, Muğla and their respective counties and as such he had played an active role in the ousting operations of 1914 that he perceived as a 'success'.[593] A prominent figure such as Bayar, who was involved in the homogenisation of the Western seaboard of the Empire, came to the forefront again in the face of the Greek invasion. In fact, at the beginning of 1919, Bayar, together with important Unionists like Talât Paşa, Dr. Nazım and Rahmi Bey, was interrogated for his involvement in the ousting operations of 1914. He left Izmir on the 18th of February in 1919 but remained active in the resistance with an undercover name: Galip Hoca. He went on to be a major architect of the resistance movement in Western Anatolia.[594] In the end, the Greek and Muslim-Turkish nationalists who had fought one another before were now wrestling over Western Anatolia under the pretext of a Greek irredentist expansion.

The other party that was interested in undermining the irredentist ambitions of Greece was the Italians. 'Unlike the Great Powers, Italy had staked out colonialist claims in Asia Minor which directly conflicted with those of the Greeks. It was this direct clash of Greek and Italian ambitions and interest which made the support of the Big

[591] For a discussion of the dynamics behind the post-World War I peace treaties see: Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*…, 31-32.
[592] Zürcher, *Turkey a Modern*..., 136.
[593] Bayar, *Ben de*..., 1579.
[594] For a brief but detailed summary of Bayar's role in the nationalist resistance movement see: Emel Akal, *Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 228-232.

Three[595] statesmen so important to Venizelos'.[596] In fact, rapid expansion of the Italian sphere of influence after the Great War was one of the reasons why the British and the French gave a green light to the Greek invasion of Anatolia. In short, Greece was used as a buffer against Italian expansion. The Italians were kept in the dark about the Greek invasion until it was too late and this, together with their own expansionist ambitions, placed them in a hostile position in terms of the Greek designs on Anatolia.

It turned out to be quite easy for both the nationalist resistance in Anatolia and the Italians to undermine the legitimacy of the Greek invasion of Anatolia. Incompetence and the brutality of the Greek invasion proved self-destructive. The Greek invasion started with a catastrophic failure on the first day and problems, disorder and violence continued to varying degrees until the very end of the war in 1922, fundamentally contradicting the *raison d'être* of the invasion.

On the 15th of May in 1919, the first Greek troops set foot in Izmir. Chaos and violence broke out within hours. The incidents started with a shot that was fired on the Greek 1/38 Evzone Regiment while it was marching to take control of the city. There was no official resistance and nobody knew where the shot came from. As a matter of fact, both the Ottoman soldiers stationed in the city and the Ottoman administration complied with the orders of the Entente.[597] However, Greek troops fired multiple shots, most likely assuming that they were faced with resistance. Chaos ensued, and both Greek soldiers and some local Greeks attacked the Ottoman troops (who surrendered), and also attacked Muslim and Jewish civilians. Killing, looting and the destruction of possessions followed the attacks. Before long, killing and looting spread to the villages around Izmir as well. On the first day alone, some 300

[595] The original use of the term was Big Four. It included the powerful statesmen of Britain (David Lloyd George, Prime Minister), Italy (Vittorio Orlando, Prime Minister), France (George Clemenceau, Prime Minister) and the United States (Woodrow Wilson, President). Venizelos tried to gain the support of all but the Italian representative.

[596] Smith, *Ionian*…, 68.

[597] The Ottoman commander of the 17th Army Corps, Ali Nadir Paşa, who was in Izmir, was informed about the invasion and ordered not to do anything ('*mütareke ahkamına riayet ediniz*') by the Ottoman Ministry of War. He obeyed the order and as a result there was no resistance. See: Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 213.

to 400 Muslims and some 100 Greeks had been killed.[598] The final picture was more dramatic. Numerous telegrams and letters of protests were sent to the American Commission in Turkey, and some prominent Turks even sent appeals to President Wilson himself. The American Commission was asked '...that President Wilson and the American Peace Commission at Paris personally see to it that Allied officers be detailed to accompany the Greek forces on the Smyrna front to observe their conduct and to make sure that Greek "brigands" with the Greek Army (presumably Greek irregulars operating with the army) be sent to the rear' as a result of protests.[599] The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry, which was established immediately after the events, emphasized that it was quite difficult to accurately tally the casualties. The picture of the first day of the events was much clearer than what would ensue as attacks grew more widespread.[600] A reasonable estimate is that thousands of Muslims and hundreds of Greeks were affected as a result of what transpired. The events clearly reflected a hostile invasion against the local Muslims and the already strained inter-communal and inter-ethnic relations were severely strained.

Such events continued, triggering a major reaction among the Muslims of the collapsed Empire. The injustices of the invasion built up momentum for the nationalist resistance in Anatolia which spread throughout war-weary Anatolia. As a result, a war-like environment persisted in Anatolia even after the Great War had come to close. The whole debacle was a major blow to the legitimacy of the Greek plan. As a matter of fact, Greece was depicted as being incompetent and the 'peace keeping' operation was deprived of its legitimacy by the report of the Inter-Allied

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[598] For varying accounts of the events see: Smith, *Ionian*…, 89-90; Toynbee, *The Western Question*…, 396-400 and *Documents of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjoining Territories*, (Constantinople: 1919). Bilge Umar argues that the Inter Allied Commission report is still biased and incomplete, despite its many criticisms of the Greek occupation. She argues that persecution of Muslim civilians is toned down in the report. See: Bilge Umar sf 30-31. A comparative look at the different sources suggests that the violence against Muslims is indeed toned down in the report but it is still quite accurate and not partisan.

[599] Laurence Evans, *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 174-175.

[600] *Documents of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjoining Territories*, (Constantinople: 1919). Document 3, no: 16, pg 8. Online version: http://www.aegeancrisis.org/GreekOccupation.pdf see pages: 29-52.

Commission of Inquiry. It became clear that Greece was simply causing more trouble that it sought to resolve.[601] Despite this fact, the Greek invasion continued unabated regardless of the negative result of the inquiry.

An inter-allied contingent consisting of British, French and Greek forces invaded Foçateyn on the 14th of May in 1919. It appears that the British and the French forces initially controlled the county, and this was a result of the attempt to portray the invasion as an inter-allied effort. Soon enough, on the 15th of May in 1919, Greek forces took full control of Foçateyn.[602] No resistance was observed in Foçateyn and it seems that Foçateyn was not affected by the initial days of violence. Chaos, however, lasted for some time after the landing. A variety of the oral historical testimonies that I consulted during my research offered little insight into the occupation of the county. There is only a vague reference to a certain landing of the British and Greek troops on *İngiliz Burnu* (British Cape) just across from the Küçük Deniz port. There is some agreement that the British were stationed there for a while, hence the name of the cape.

The conflict between the design and reality defined the period of the Greek invasion in Anatolia between 1919 and 1922. On the one hand, Venizelos sought to create a homogenous Greek nation-state on a non-homogeneous and predominantly Muslim polity in Anatolia. He legitimized this plan under the false pretences that the region was predominantly Greek and that Greece could provide law and order (and civilization) to the Christians and Muslims of politically unstable Anatolia. International pressure required that the Christians and Muslims of Western Anatolia be treated equally; after all, that was what the Greeks were supposed to offer in place

[601] Greek nationalist historiography blames the misconduct and violence on the fact that there wasn't a Greek governor at the moment of the invasion. This would not have been possible, however, since appointing a Greek administrator to an internationally recognized sovereign Ottoman province was simply out of the question. If that had been possible somehow, it would still have created the impression of a direct invasion that Greece had tried to conceal since the beginning.

[602] See: http://atam.gov.tr/turk-istiklal-mucahedesi-konferanslari/?s=foça (Accessed Nov. 2013) and http://atam.gov.tr/izmirin-isgali-uzerine/?s=foça. (Accessed Nov. 2013). Some sources and individuals mention the 23rd of May as the day when the Greek army entered Foçateyn. This was probably actually a later stage when the existing Greek occupation forces were reinforced with auxiliaries.

of the Ottomans, who had failed in that same pursuit. However, the tenets of Hellenic nationalism stipulated that the newly acquired territories would gradually become homogenous Greek strongholds. Such were the inner workings of the plan, and the self-contradictions quickly became clear.

On the other hand, there was the reality on the ground that did not correspond to the design. Greek rule was clearly hostile towards Muslims although the appointment of Stergiadis,[603] who allegedly had sympathy for the Muslim population, as a high commissioner was a sincere (but unsuccessful) move to mitigate the anti-Muslim image and practices of Greek rule. In addition, some Greeks of the occupied territories expected that the regime would be a pro-Greek regime, but were unprepared for equal treatment with Muslims.[604] For that reason, Greeks often resented Stergiadis's attempts at impartial rule and labelled him a 'Turkophile'.[605] Lastly, the future of the hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees from the Balkans, the *muhacir*s, who had been settled in Western Anatolia in place of Ottoman Christians were never given a consideration. Ottoman Greeks who had been ousted or fled came back to Anatolia together with Greeks who wished to live in the newly acquired territories. *Muhacir*s watched the invasion with much alarm as they became refugees yet again after 1919. Some were being driven from their lands for a second time by the same Greek state that had ousted them from the Balkans.

[603] Stergiadis was presented as a visionary, known for his impartiality and knowledgeable of Islamic law and Muslims. However, his administration discriminated against Muslims. Toynbee says that it was not only the fanaticism of his inferiors that brought about anti-Turkish actions under his administration. Stergiadis himself was said to be prejudiced against educated Turks and closed down their major educational institutions. See: Toynbee, *The Western Question*…, 171.

[604] The Greeks of Izmir complained that they were not being allowed enough influence in the decision-making process and that Greeks from Athens dominated the administration. Even an important nationalist figure like the Greek Orthodox metropolitan bishop of Smyrna (Izmir), Chrysostomos Kalafatis, was demoted to the rank of a regular clergyman. Achladi, '*Savaştan Yunan İdaresine…*', 225.

[605] Achladi, '*Savaştan Yunan İdaresine…*', 221-222.

Life in the County of Foçateyn during the Greek Invasion

Felix Sartiaux, who left Eski Foça on the 14th of June in 1914[606] following the spring of organized chaos, came back sometime between late summer and fall of 1919. Sartiaux returned on a ship named *Arcadia* which had sailed from Athens (Piraeus)[607] and on board was George Horton,[608] the American Consul General in Izmir at the time, and some[609] of the Ottoman Greek refugees who had left Foçateyn in the spring of organized chaos. The presence of the Greek refugees was a result of the policy priorities of the Greek High Commissioner Stergiadis and Venizelos.[610] The resettlement of the Ottoman Greek refugees, who had left and been forced out of their homes between 1914 and 1918, was a critical issue for Greece. It was thought that resettlement would provide relief from the economic burden of the refugees in Greece, mark a step forward towards normalization of Anatolian peace and order, and provide backing to legitimize Greek demographic claims in the occupied territories. A commission established by Stergiadis facilitated the return of the Ottoman Greeks and made the necessary preparations.[611] Official permission for the return of the Greek refugees was delivered in stages by October of 1919. The Allied High Commissioners

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[606] Sartiaux cancelled his archaeological work and left Eski Foça on the 14th of June. He toured again the coastline of the county of Foçateyn one last time on the 18th of June before leaving the Ottoman Empire. See: Félix Sartiaux, 'Le Sac de Phocée et L'Expulsion Des Grecs Ottomans D'Asie-Mineure en Juin 1914', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1914, 670.

[607] Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 320.

[608] Although we do not know for certain why George Horton was on board the ship to Eski Foça, it is plausible to think that he was there as the representative of the Allied commission that oversaw the repatriation process. He was a philhellene and a controversial diplomat. He talked about Foçateyn (Phokaia) in his book *The Blight of Asia* (See: George Horton, *The Blight of Asia*, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1926), Chapter VI: Massacre of Phocea and it is highly likely that his impressions were based on the eye witness account of Félix Sartiaux and his visit to Eski Foça in 1919.

[609] Ottoman Greeks returned to Foçateyn in rounds. Nicos Vrutanis recalled that his family and those who moved to the village of Καλλονή in Mytilini like them moved back to Foçateyn after 1920 when a ship came to take them back. CAMS, Βρουτάνης and Σάββας interview, 22/4/1964, Athens.

[610] Victoria Solomonidis, 'Greece in Asia Minor: The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin, 1919-1922', (PhD diss., King's College, University of London, 1984), 161. And Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 227.

[611] See: http://atam.gov.tr/kurtulustan-sonra-izmirde-yunan-isgal-donemine-tepkiler/?s=foça (Accessed Nov. 2013).

tried to prevent the relocation and presented a collective note to the Greek representatives and asked for certain limitations and conditions in the repatriation process.[612] In essence, the Allied Commissioners, and the Ottomans who pressured them, tried to avoid resettlement of large refugee groups that would create tensions. This was probably because they saw that the repatriation of the Ottoman Greeks would create new tensions with the embittered *muhacir*s who had been settled in their place.

[612] Solomonidis, 'Greece in Asia Minor', 164 and Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 318. For instance Ottoman Greek refugees who did not have proper paper work were initially not allowed to move back in their old houses. However, that did not stop some from forcibly evicting Muslim refugees from Macedonia who had been settled in their place.

[**Picture:** From left to right: Félix Sartiaux, the captain of the ship and George Horton entering Büyük Deniz, Eski Foça, 1919. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 255.]

Although the resettlement of the Ottoman Greek refugees clearly benefited Greece, their resettlement created new refugees and thus failed to create order and peace. This eventually turned out to be counter-productive for the Greek administration. Resettlement of the Christian victims of the Unionist demographic policies without any consideration for the fate of the *muhacir*s, the victims of the Balkan nationalisms' demographic policies, soon became a countrywide problem in the Ottoman Empire.

Two major victims of the Unionist relocation policies in the Great War, the Armenians and Greeks, were '...confronted with the issue of their abandoned property and possessions. For some, there was simply no home to which to return. British and American sources claim that between 28 and 34 per cent of the Armenian homes in İzmit had been left uninhabitable. Similar numbers were seen in Adapazarı'.[613] So, not only had others occupied the houses of the Ottoman Greek refugees but some of those houses were destroyed as well. This issue, the resettlement problem, was important in Foçateyn as well. The physical state of the houses in Foçateyn was less severe compared to those in İzmit or Adapazarı in the Marmara region. Abandoned properties of Ottoman Greeks in Eski Foça and Yeni Foça, the *emval-i metruke*, were partially damaged in the spring of organized chaos in 1914. The properties in Eski Foça were damaged slightly more as a result of the Entente's bombing runs during the Great War. It is clear from Sartiaux's pictures from the 1920s that the majority of the Ottoman Greek houses in Eski Foça and Yeni Foça were intact by the time of the Ottoman Greek refugees' return. In some cases, the Muslim neighbours of the Ottoman Greek refugees looked after the houses for their old neighbours, but in most other cases Muslim refugees from the Balkans, *muhacir*s, occupied them. In either case, these houses were relatively well preserved because they were either looked after or lived in. However, the damage that was caused by the organized chaos in the churches and shops was still visible. Most of the possessions that had been looted or damaged had not been replaced or repaired. In addition, there were only around 3,000 *muhacir*s that were settled in Foçateyn after 1914 and the number of Ottoman Greeks who had left was much greater (around 7,000), and as a result, the majority of the houses and property had been left unattended. Furthermore, the central part of Eski Foça was now largely destroyed after the allied bombings and repairs needed to be made.

The lively port and the burgeoning town were markedly changed by the time of the repatriation of the Ottoman Greek refugees. The old prospects of the county were gone, damage was widespread and the roads and villages were not secure. The Greek invasion had merely added more instability and insecurity to this picture, as reflected by the fact that the immediate violence in Izmir in May of 1919 following the Greek

[613] Gingeras, *Sorrowful...,* 53.

invasion caused a spike in tensions in the Western Anatolian countryside. This did not engulf Foçateyn (probably because there were no Greeks in Foçateyn at the time) but problems of security and instability increased in later stages of the invasion. There were frequent cases of robbery, humiliation and some cases of murder of Muslims in the county of Foçateyn between 1919 and 1922.

According to Engin Berber, the Greek High Commission, as the Greek administration was known, ruled the occupied territories as 'a colonial apparatus like its name suggests'. Greeks were appointed to important bureaucratic positions without much consideration for representative legitimacy and merit. Many Muslim bureaucrats were removed from their positions including governors in the countryside who were replaced with Greeks.[614] In short, the decision-making mechanisms were 'Hellenized'. Without delay a certain Mr. Nikolaos Valasopulos was appointed as the governor of Eski Foça on behalf of the Greek administration.[615] All counties, including the county of Foçateyn, had to obtain the permission of the Greek administration for all decisions.[616] Izmir and the nearby-occupied territories were governed by Greece on behalf of the Allies until the treaty of Sèvres was signed. The official currency was the Ottoman lira, Greek and Turkish were the official languages and the international status was ambiguous. The Greek administration had to appease the Muslims and others, especially the Levantines, Jews and Europeans of Izmir, who were discontent with the Greek occupation, and such a move was crucial for the legitimization of the occupation.[617]

The signing of the Treaty of Sèvres on the 10th of August in 1920 further complicated matters as it left the occupied territories under Ottoman control while also recognizing 'rights of sovereignty to a local parliament' on the one hand while recognition of the exercise of 'rights of sovereignty' was transferred to the Greek government.[618] Section IV, articles 65 to 83 of the Treaty of Sèvres deal with the situation of what is described as 'Smyrna and the adjacent territory'. The area in question extended up to

[614] Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 280-305, 306.
[615] Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 307.
[616] Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 313.
[617] Achladi, '*Savaştan Yunan İdaresine*...', 221-222, 224.
[618] http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_Treaty_of_Sèvres (accessed Nov. 2013).

Edremit in the north and to Kuşadası (also Scalanova) in the east of the Western Anatolian seaboard. In the interior it extended up to Kasaba and Akhisar. The people of the occupied territories were to be given a chance to conduct a plebiscite under the supervision of the League of Nations after five years on whether they wished to join Greece or remain under Ottoman rule. None of that came to pass because the Anatolian nationalist struggle defeated the Greek forces in 1922. However, a Greek administration with an ambiguous status remained in power until that time.

Three immediate problems emerged for the Greek administration in Foçateyn after the invasion: the situation of the property now in use by *muhacir*s (the resettlement problem), the necessity of large-scale repairs[619] and the problem of maintaining order and security. The first problem seems to have been solved by itself in the county of Foçateyn. The violent start of the Greek occupation, the ensuing violence, and later the resettlement of the Ottoman Greek refugees caused the exodus of the *muhacir*s who had been settled in Foçateyn. Eski Foça had been mostly deserted throughout the Great War as the local residents escaped to inland settlements after the bombing runs and stayed there for varying periods of time until the end of the war. Some, but not all, returned to Eski Foça after the end of the conflict. It was clear that *muhacir*s in the county, especially those who returned to Eski Foça but also groups in other settlements, were frightened by the Greek invasion and fled. The Ottoman Greek refugees and Greek soldiers later ousted those who remained.[620] Pressure and violence committed against *muhacir*s increased as Greek refugees arrived in Anatolia. On the 11th of February in 1920, *muhacir*s who were settled in the village of Gerenköy in Foçateyn were pressured to leave and threatened by Greek refugees who arrived from

[619] Solomonidis points out that the Greek administration in Izmir conducted surveys to estimate the damage in the parts of Western Anatolia under Greek control. The surveys indicated that there was considerable damage and it was decided that extensive repairs should be undertaken in order to facilitate normalization of life for the returning Ottoman Greek refugees. See: Solomonidis, 'Greece in Asia Minor', 165.

[620] BOA, DH.ŞFR., 631/43, (Rumî: 21/Temmuz/1335), 21st July 1919. The tag title of the document is as follows: 'Yunan işgalinin Seydiköy, Urla, Cumaovası, Torbalı, Görece ve Foça taraflarına kadar tevsi edildiğine, Rum ahalisinin ve çetelerin Müslümanlar üzerine tasallut eylediklerine ve muhacir Müslümanların Amerikan ve İngiliz cemiyet-i hayriyesi tarafından iaşe olunmakta olduklarına dair'.

Thessalonica.[621] Hüseyin Arslan recalled that *muhacir*s were expelled from their homes by the Ottoman Greek refugees who had originally owned the houses.[622] The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry also recognized this issue in 1919. In their report, they recognized that the settlement of the Ottoman Greek refugees in Pergamon (Begama) and Phocea (Foçateyn) '...has been facilitated by the exodus of the Turkish population from these areas'.[623] Toynbee, when speaking about various forms of misconduct and violence in this period, noted that '...the repatriation of the Greeks...' resulted in some of the worst violence in the county of Foçateyn:

> At Phokiés, not only expropriation but murder and violence were suffered, at the hands of the repatriated Greeks, by the Turkish element. In a place so near the centre of government, such excesses ought not to have occurred. The result was that from May 1919 onwards, even before systematic atrocities began, there was a vast emigration of Turks from occupied territories. By the spring of 1921, the Ottoman Ministry of Refugees at Constantinople estimated the numbers at something between 200,000 and 325,000, and there is no danger of exaggeration in at least equating them with those of the repatriated Greeks.[624]

By 1921, almost all of the *muhacir*s who had been settled in Foçateyn after the organized chaos of 1914 were gone. The Skarpetis population census of 1,921 (a census carried out by the Greek administration) indicates that of the 8,384 Muslims who had been living in the county of Foçateyn in 1917, only 3,765[625] remained. This was slightly fewer than the number of native Muslims in Foçateyn before the coming of the Muslim refugees.[626] The *muhacir*s of Foçateyn were on the run; we do not

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[621] *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Balkanlar'da ve Anadolu'da Yunan Mezâlimi – Anadolu'da Yunan Mezâlimi*, Vol. II, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1996), 87.
[622] EBOHC, Hüseyin Arslan, Kozbeyli, 08/10/1995.
[623] *Documents of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjoining Territories*, (Constantinople: 1919), Document: 3 no: 47.
[624] Toynbee, *The Western Question*…, 169.
[625] Skarpetis' figure is cited in: Berber, 'Mütareke ve Yunan...'.
[626] Ottoman population census of 1914 was a projection and the census before that, the census of 1908, indicated that the total number of Muslims in the county of Foçateyn was 3,617. This was slightly higher than the number of Muslims who remained in the county in 1921.

know exactly when and where the *muhacir*s were ousted and when they fled. It is plausible that they fled in small numbers in the immediate aftermath of the Greek invasion and they were ousted and fled in large numbers following the coming of the Ottoman Greek refugees. There is no data about where the Muslim refugees of Foçateyn ended up. It is likely that they fled to areas that were not occupied by Greece. Also, there is no data about casualties. Most likely, the refugees continued to flee as the Greek army pushed into Anatolia between 1919 and 1922.



[**Picture:** There is very little documentation left from the period of the Greek invasion of the county of Foçateyn. This particular official document reflects the peculiar legal situation of the Greek administration. The text is about a disagreement between some villagers from Eski Foça on the issue of the repair of their houses. The documents bears the Ottoman Sultan's seal as the recognized sovereign but it was administered and signed by the Greek High Commission.[627]]

[627] This document is from the authors' private collection. I would like to express my gratitude to the Municipality of Foça for providing me with a copy of this document



[Population statistics of the towns and villages of Foçateyn under Greek Administration, 1921. Source: Berber, 'Mütareke ve Yunan....']

and others that they collected over time for the establishment of a local history museum in Eski Foça.

The second problem, the issue of repairs that needed to be done, seems to have been solved to a certain degree in Foçateyn. Foçateyn was not restored to its former glory of the 1910s, but some of the damage was repaired. The Greek administration provided credit for the reconstruction and repair of a number of places including Foçateyn. There were 1,838 people who used these funds in Eski Foça alone.[628] A few pictures from Felix Sartiaux's visit to Eski Foça show the progress of reconstruction.

[**Picture:** Eski Foça's main shopping street was one of the earliest to be repaired. This picture shows the situation after the reconstruction. Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 278.]

[628] Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 327.

The last problem faced by the Greek administration was the maintenance of order and security. In the case of Foçateyn, the major victims of the resettlement issue were the *muhacir*s whereas the major victims of the problem of the maintenance of order and security were those Muslims who did not flee. A lack of security, humiliation and violence became everyday realities for the Muslims of Foçateyn. Apparently both the Muslims and the Greeks under the rule of the Greek administration were also increasingly called upon for the Greek war effort in Anatolia. Ottoman Greek refugees were forcibly conscripted and Muslims were asked to contribute their animals, ox-carts and produce. All of this, and the damage that was caused during the occupation, resulted in a 'further impoverishment of the country'.[629] Ports like the one in Eski Foça stagnated and foodstuffs in the interior of Western Anatolia couldn't be transported as a result of the ongoing struggle between the Anatolian resistance movement and the Greek occupation.[630] The Western Anatolian seaboard was cut off from its productive hinterland by war just as had been foreseen by the Americans in the discussions surrounding the legitimacy of the Greek invasion at the Paris Peace Conference.[631]

Fahriye Ürgüp from the village of Ilıpınar in Foçateyn recalled the days of the Greek occupation based on his encounter with the Greek gendarmerie. He said that he didn't remember seeing regular army troops but he recalled that the Greek gendarmerie used to regularly visit their village two times a week, meet with the *muhtar* (village head), carry out occasional searches for guns and attend and check on weddings. He recalled one case in which an Ottoman soldier who returned from duty was publicly beaten and humiliated by the Greek gendarmerie in front of a coffee house in the center of his village. He said that the Greek gendarmerie knew Turkish and sometimes bought food from the villagers.[632] Ayşe Melahat Foçalı recalled the stories told by her grandfather Ahmed Efendi and her father Fahrettin (Karacalı), both of whom experienced the Greek occupation. Ahmed Efendi lived in Eski Foça at that time and he was well-respected. An Ottoman Greek friend of his warned him that violence

[629] Toynbee, *The Western Question*…, 169-170.
[630] Toynbee, *The Western Question*…, 170.
[631] Smith, *Ionian*…, 75.
[632] EBOHC, Fahriye Ürgüp, Ilıpınar, 31/8/1995.

could erupt when the Greek army arrived and urged him to move before the occupation. Ahmed Efendi, like many others at that time, moved to Ilıpınar, a village in the interior of the county. The Greeks had begun treating them more negatively (*'bize kötü bakmaya başlamışlar*') after the occupation. Fahrettin, Ahmed's son, had a quarrel with his Ottoman Greek friend over whether Venizelos or Mustafa Kemal was the greatest leader of all. They fell out because of that quarrel and never spoke again.[633]

Mehmet Peker from Eski Foça, who moved to the village of Bağarası in the interior of the county of Foçateyn during the Great War, had painfully clear memories of the occupation. He stated that they saw Greek soldiers in Bağarası sometime after having heard that the Greeks landed in Izmir and a small fight broke out between the Greek troops and the Muslims and in the end, some people were beaten by the soldiers. He said that some people who had houses in Eski Foça sold them and moved to Bağarası, perhaps because they were afraid of the Greeks who had returned to Eski Foça. Clearly, some people no longer believed that coexistence was a viable and safe option. Peker mentioned that their old Ottoman Greek sharecroppers who left in 1914 had returned and they worked together again after 1919. He stated that the gendarmerie mostly consisted of native Greeks of Foçateyn, but his memories about violence are fragmentary, filled with emotion and contradictory. He said that the Greeks did not kill anyone (*'Yunanlılar hiç kimseyi öldürmediler*') and respected Muslim cemeteries and mosques. However, he also said that he remembered being slapped in the face by the Greek gendarmerie for 'disturbing' a Greek girl and then significantly he began telling the brutal story of a murder which he claimed he'd never told anyone before. He said that an Ottoman Greek bandit (*'serseri bir kişi, bir Rum*') beheaded his stepmother for unknown reasons and was never brought to justice.[634]

Hüseyin Arslan from the village of Kozbeyli in Foçateyn said that the Ottoman Greek refugees ousted the *muhacir*s and took back their houses. He also said that the Greek gendarmerie used to search houses for cached weapons. In his memories, the

[633] Author's interview, Ayşe Melahat Foçalı, Eski Foça, 2/8/2010.
[634] EBOHC, Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31.8.1995.

relationship between the Muslims and the Greeks of the county changed after the occupation. He said that there were [Ottoman] Greeks who could do whatever they pleased without fear of repercussions. A recurring theme for him was the fact that the Greeks and Muslims were not treated equally. One particular instance in Arslan's interview is especially telling. He mentioned a certain Ottoman Greek who had joined the Greek war effort in Anatolia and suffered defeat at the hands of Mustafa Kemal's forces and returned to Foçateyn after being wounded. Upon his return he would curse the Turks because of his experience in the war and caused numerous problems. At one point, he kidnapped the son of a wealthy Muslim from Yeni Foça and demanded a ransom and in the end, apparently got what he wanted. Later this Ottoman Greek wanted to kill a particular Turk, a man by the name of Haydar, who had quarrelled with him and who happened to be the next door neighbour of Hüseyin Arslan's family. After going to Haydar's house and not finding him there, he went to Hüseyin Arslan's house.

> 'When Yuhan [Ιωάννης] couldn't find him, he came to our house and knocked on the door. My uncle, who knew Greek, went and spoke to him. Yuhan had a gun and cartridges. He went upstairs. He said 'I can't find him. You are Turks as well, so give me some money'.

Yuhan threatened to kill Arslan's family if they failed to come up with the gold and money he demanded. Arslan family gave him what they had and asked for more from the neighbours, whereupon the bandit Yuhan left the house. He raided three other houses the same night and escaped. Later he was killed during a dispute that broke out when and another bandit were sharing their loot.[635] Arslan recalled that as being his worst experience during the occupation, which was a period marked by humiliation and a lack of security.

Taking all of these accounts into consideration, a clear picture emerges about Foçateyn under the Greek administration. First of all, as seen elsewhere, the *muhacir*s mostly fled or they were ousted with the arrival of the Greek administration. Life

[635] For a discussion of the increasing common banditry in Western Anatolia under the Greek administration see: Berber, *Sancılı Yıllar*…, 98-101.

under the Greek administration was occasionally marred by violence and often humiliating and unjust treatment for the remaining native Muslims of Foçateyn, who observed that the Greek administration was partial to the Greeks. As early as June 1919, *Sebil-ül Reşad*, a Muslim newspaper, published an article stating that it would not be surprising if the same Greece which had violated *Rumeli* (Roumeli) Muslims' right to exist would oust the Muslims of Izmir with violence and pressure. It called on the Ottoman government to take action so that Izmir wouldn't suffer the same fate as the Balkans.[636]

Finally, as seen in Hüseyin Arslan's case, a Greek who'd lived through the war was more violent in his relationships with the Muslims of Foçateyn. War and defeat took its toll on that particular Greek just like it had for many others in that era. The radicalizing effect of war can be observed in Arslan's story in the same way that it affected the Muslim refugees from the Balkans. The 'other' was easily dehumanized and considered expendable in the struggle for survival. The radicalizing effect of war increased as the conflicts continued between 1911 and 1922. By the time the war was drawing to a close, Greeks and Muslims mostly considered each other (or at least claimed to do so) as enemies.

The Nationalist Resistance and the County of Foçateyn

The injustices and atrocities caused by the Greek invasion fuelled nationalist sentiment and support for what later evolved into the Anatolian nationalist struggle. The Nationalist Resistance Movement (*Milli Mücadele Hareketi*)[637] gathered pockets of resistance into one common struggle in 1920.[638] Battles were fought mainly against the Greek army on the Western Front and the Armenian forces on the Eastern and Southern Fronts. In the end, the victory of the Nationalist Resistance Movement annulled the treaty of Sèvres and gave rise in Anatolia to a Turkish nation-state. It

[636] 'İzmir'den Hicret', *Sebi-ül Reşad*, 13 June 1919, 45-46.
[637] The nationalist movement, Anatolian resistance, the nationalist resistance movement, and the national resistance are all used interchangeably to refer to the Nationalist Resistance (*Milli Mücadele*) between 1919 and 1922.
[638] The Unionists established the required networks and structures for a possible post-war resistance in the case of a defeat in the Great War. See: Zürcher, *Turkey a Modern*…, 134-136.

could be argued that in the long run, the Ottomans won by doing what their rivals done: found a sovereign nation-state. Major policies were regularly developed which targeted the founding of a nation-state after the Unionists seized power in 1913. Most of these policies were brutally realist and had dire consequences for the people of Anatolia, such as the ousting of Ottoman Greeks in the spring of organized chaos in Foçateyn. These policies constantly evolved and became radicalized in relation to external pressures and designs to partition the Empire. In a sense, 1922 marked the victory of the nationalist plan of the Anatolian resistance over the others. This victorious nationalism had yet to take full shape and direction under Kemalist hegemony. In the words of the renowned Turkish nationalist and female writer Halide Edip, this victory and its hardships were the 'Turkish Ordeal', a trial by fire of the Turkish nation.

The local history of the county of Foçateyn in this period falls outside that context in some aspects. In Foçateyn, there were no major movements of resistance and voluntary participation in the nationalist resistance in Anatolia was limited to the years from 1919 to 1922. This is primarily because Foçateyn was quite distant from the battlefronts, and also it was under Greek occupation and in close proximity to Izmir, which was a kind of a safe haven due to the fact that it was under the international observation throughout the war years. For those reasons, Foçateyn's Muslims were relatively detached from the nationalist resistance in Anatolia. There were volunteers and some had been in the army before the Greek invasion of Anatolia, but no clear figures exist regarding their numbers. Mehmet Peker recalled that he knew just one person who joined the nationalist resistance in Anatolia and returned to Foçateyn as an officer after the war. Peker said that so few people went because no efforts were made to organize and encourage potential recruits, and also because they heard about it so late.[639] Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan recalled that during the war years, they hoped that Turks would come and liberate them. He said that he heard about Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism when Turkish troops arrived to Manisa (in 1922).[640] Fahriye Ürgüp said he recalled seeing the name of Mustafa Kemal in the newspapers that arrived from Izmir immediately following the Greek invasion in

[639] EBOHC, Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31.8.1995.
[640] EBOHC, Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, Menemen, 4.10.1997.

1919. This however, is highly unlikely because Mustafa Kemal was largely unknown to the public at the time. Fahriye Ürgüp said that they used to pray for liberation from the Greek occupation, but nobody from the village of Ilıpınar joined the nationalist resistance.[641]

Despite the county's relative detachment from the war, the end of the period of extended warfare in Foçateyn was as violent as in the rest of Anatolia. Foçateyn was not on the Greek army's path of retreat and that most likely saved it from the kind of major destruction and violence that befell places like Kasaba, Manisa, Alaşehir, Salihli and Menemen[642] in Western Anatolia. Those cities and towns were mostly burned and destroyed by the Greek army as it retreated and there were numerous cases of robbing, looting, rape and murder of Muslim civilians, many of whom were burned alive in their houses. Feelings of anger and resentment against the destruction caused by the retreating Greek army grew with each step the nationalist resistance took towards Izmir, and those feelings had an impact on the residents of Foçateyn.

The reinstatement of Turkish control over Foçateyn by the Turkish forces, now angrier and more resentful of the Greeks, brought more tragedy. Eski Foça was recaptured on the 11th of September in 1922 and by that time some of the Greeks of Foçateyn had already departed. Turkish control had been reinstated in Izmir on the 9th of September. News of the Turkish victory caused panic among many residents of the recaptured settlements, in particular the Greeks, and many fled. This was the final stage of at least ten years of war and radicalization of the relations between the Christian and Muslim communities in the Empire. This was the end of the period of extended warfare in the county of Foçateyn that started in 1914 with the organized chaos. Muslims and Christians had all been perpetrators and victims at one time or another in this tragedy by the time the forces of the nationalist resistance recaptured Foçateyn. That was why news of the Greek defeat stirred fears of possible retribution among both the Greeks and Muslims. Greeks feared Muslim resentment and persecution whereas Muslims feared persecution from Greek forces as they retreated.

[641] EBOHC, Fahriye Ürgüp, Ilıpınar, 31/8/1995.
[642] Standford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923: a Documentary Study*, Volume IV, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), 1710-1717.

Each side feared what the other might do during those final moments of chaos,[643] and the stage was set with the arrival of the Turkish forces. The Muslims of Foçateyn welcomed them with celebrations whereas the Greeks, who were still there on the 11th of September looked on with angst, distress and panic. Soon enough, all of the Greeks of Foçateyn were ousted or fled once again with the coming of the Turkish forces and some were killed in the process.

Most of what we know about the process of the reinstatement of Turkish control is fragmentary. Nonetheless, the oral testimonies collected by Engin Berber and the oral historical testimonies at the Center of Asia Minor[644] offer a narrow window onto those days. They all present a human tragedy, a common suffering shared by many of the inhabitants of the collapsing Empire at the time. Nikolas Chakalos, who was born in Eski Foça in 1888, recalled persecutions, being under pressure and finally being forced to flee to Mytilene in 1922.[645] Georgeos Chichiras, who was also from Eski Foça, stated that he was ousted in 1914 and then returned in 1919 together with other Ottoman Greek refugees. He recalled leaving Eski Foça for the last time in 1922 during the catastrophe (*'με την καταστροφή'*)[646]. Thanasis Papuchis, who was born in Eski Foça in 1896, stated that he was ousted in 1914 and returned in 1919. In 1921, he joined the Greek army voluntarily and went as far as Afyon Karahisar and Sarı Gazi, where he was wounded. In 1922, he asked that his sisters be taken to Mytilene and he

[643] This mutual fear of persecution in the last moments before the reinstatement of Turkish control is most accurately conveyed in a novel of Kemal Anadol that was inspired by eyewitness accounts of the period. Anadol shows that some neighbours were concerned for one another, whereas others celebrated the coming of the Turkish forces and desired retribution. The situation was little more than pure chaos and panic. Most of Foça's residents, Muslim and Christian alike, were war weary and wanted nothing more than an end to the conflicts. See: Kemal Anadol, *Büyük Ayrılık*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003), 546-556.

[644] When compared, the oral testimonies from the Center of Asia Minor studies portray a less violent process of reinstatement of Turkish control. Muslims' oral testimonies portray violent stories that are not found in those of the Greeks of Foçateyn. This could be because some of the Greeks in the stories of the Muslim witnesses did not live to tell their story and because the testimonies from the Center of Asia Minor studies did not focus on narratives of violence. For a discussion on the political agenda of the collections in the Center of Asia Minor studies see: Doumanis, *Before the…*, 11-14.

[645] CAMS, Νικόλας Τσάκαλος, 25/2/1960.

[646] CAMS, Γιώργος Τζίτζιρας, 4/6/1964.

went on to Piraeus, Athens.[647] Sofia Giannari, who was born in Eski Foça in 1898, said she forced to leave in 1914 and yet again in 1922. She said that she went back to Eski Foça in 1920 and got married but within two years they were forced to hastily flee the town.[648]

Fahriye Ürgüp from the village of Ilıpınar stated that the Turkish cavalry marched the local Greeks to Eski Foça and that some children who had become orphans stayed behind.[649] Mehmet Peker noted that some Greeks had already started to evacuate their villages as early as the 9th of September. He said that word had been spreading that the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal were coming to Eski Foça, and when he went to see what was happening at night together with his friends, they were arrested by the gendarmerie but soon released. The next morning, on the 10th of September, he said that Eski Foça was full of Greeks who were trying to flee and panic had spread when news arrived that the Turkish forces were near. Many Greeks fled, and those who remained were marched outside Eski Foça (towards Izmir) in four separate groups. He said there were rumours that some of the Greeks died on the way.[650] Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan stated that there was panic among the Greeks when they heard that the Turks were coming. In their rush, the Greeks had to leave behind their belongings and many fled to nearby islands and islets in small boats. Kalkan recalled that a Greek who had killed a Muslim woman during the days of the Greek occupation was killed by the woman's son when the Turkish forces arrived. He also said that irregulars (*başıbozuk*) killed some Greeks during the Turkish re-conquest of the county and that Greeks who remained were of the poorest classes, along with some who hid in their houses. The consequences were grim; he said that some of those who stayed behind or hid suffered at the hands of Turkish troops who bayoneted and drowned them. An event described by Kalkan shows the tragedies suffered by the war weary population of Anatolia, for whom nationalist rivalry had become a 'blood-feud':

> *When a Turkish soldier caught hold of a Greek and called him a 'dog', my* nine [grandmother] *asked him, 'Oh son, why are you doing this?' The Turk*

[647] CAMS, Θανάσης Παπουτσής, 24/2/1960.
[648] CAMS, Σοφία Γιάνναρη, 23/9/1964.
[649] EBOHC, Fahriye Ürgüp, Ilıpınar, 31/8/1995.
[650] EBOHC, Mehmet Peker, Eski Foça, 31/8/1995.

responded, 'Oh mother, do you know what they've done? They killed our pregnant women in Manisa, ripped their bellies apart, bayoneted their children and played with them!' They didn't do anything like that in Foça, but they say they did it in other places.[651]

This otherization, dehumanization of the other, and homogenization of all Greeks as one entity and labelling of them as enemies resulted in a situation in which some Greeks in Foçateyn became targets of 'legitimate violence' in the eyes of the nationalists. Such instances were not peculiar to Foçateyn. In fact, this type of stigmatization had long been the rule, at least since the last phase of the Macedonian Question in the Balkans and the Balkan Wars in Western Anatolia. The degree of 'legitimate violence' that the nationalists mobilized intensified as the war dragged on and tensions rose.

The oral testimony given by Ferit Oğuz Bayır also presents a typical example of the otherization and dehumanization of the Ottoman Greeks (and Greeks) that was witnessed by Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan. Bayır's perception of the misfortunes that befell the Greeks lacks compassion in comparison to the perceptions of the other testimonies presented here. When Bayır was asked about how the Muslims of Foçateyn were treated under the Greek administration, he responded by telling the story of his wife's older sister Hatice. Hatice had lived in Bağarası, a village in Foçateyn, where she was murdered leaving her one year old baby an orphan. The Greek army tried to persuade the family not to talk about the murder (of a Muslim by a Greek). They were afraid that if word spread there would be a public outcry and they wanted to prevent a larger disaster. However, Bayır added, justice was never served, and he added that there were numerous similar incidents. He stated:

> Everyone knows that the punishment for these deeds was delivered in and around the harbor of [Eski] Foça when the Greeks who tried to escape [in 1922] by boats or other means were prevented from doing so![652]

[651] EBOHC, Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan, Menemen, 4.10.1997.
[652] EBOHC, Ferit Oğuz Bayır interview, Eski Foça, 1995-1997.

Two details from Bayır's biography provide possible explanations for this lack of compassion and dehumanisation. The first was his self-proclaimed transformation after being exposed to Turkish nationalism, and the second was his personal experience of victimization by the Greeks when he was a prisoner of war. Ferit Oğuz Bayır was born in 1899 in the Bayır village of Simav, which is located in Western Anatolia and administrated under the province of Hüdâvendigar. In 1905, his family moved to Edirne because his father had been appointed there. He spent his early years in Edirne and he recalled the destruction and hardships brought about in Edirne during the Balkan Wars. Ultimately he and his family became refugees and moved to Istanbul as *muhacir*s. When he talked about those days, he said, 'The enmities and realities of those days are still alive within us'. He was enrolled in one of the modern teachers' schools (*Dar-ül Muallimin*) of Abdülhamit II in Istanbul where he said he learned that 'he was a Turk' from his teachers who wrote about Turkism. Through these influences he discovered the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearts), where he claimed to have been 'enlightened'. He considered himself 'more Turkist then the CUP'.[653] He went to Eski Foça in 1923 as a teacher of the new Republic of Turkey and there he married a Muslim woman from Midilli. Therefore, unlike most of the native Muslims of Foçateyn, Bayır was educated and had been exposed to nationalist ideas, and he wasn't from the region. He was more conscious about his national identity and its 'enemies'. He was also alien to the local networks and thus more distanced. However, I believe that the second detail from his biography is more important in explaining his lack of compassion.

Ferit Oğuz Bayır spent three years of his life between 1920 and 1923 as a bandit and a soldier. He had direct experience of war and violence at the hands of the national 'other'. He joined the army of the Anatolian resistance on the 1st of June in 1920. Soon after, he joined the voluntary guerrilla force that was led by Çolak Sabri, a national hero of the times. He was one of the 43 bandits who crossed into Bulgaria, and together with other bandit groups, they undertook operations in Western Thrace. They took refuge in Bulgaria after being chased by the Greek army. He remained as a

[653] EBOHC, Ferit Oğuz Bayır, Eski Foça, 1995-1997 and Mustafa Aydoğan and Zeliha Kanalıcı, *Ferit Oğuz Bayır'a Saygı*, (Ankara: Köy Enstitüleri ve Çağdaş Eğitim Vakfı, 2003).

prisoner in Bulgaria until February 1920. The Greek army captured him while he was being sent back to the Ottoman Empire by ship, and he became a prisoner of war in Greece. He was released from prison on the 15th of July in 1921. He was subjected to forced labour, harsh treatment, torture and humiliation throughout his imprisonment in Greek ships and in Athens. Following his return, Bayır was re-conscripted into the Anatolian resistance from the 28th of July in 1921 to the 17th of December in 1921 and then was sent to Konya where he served in the army until 1923.[654] All of his experiences turned ideological enmities into a reality. When the war was over, he became one of the very first teachers of the new republic in Eski Foça.

If we look at the reasons and the ways in which the Unionists decided to undertake an ousting operation in 1914, the details of which were discussed in the previous chapters, we see that Bayır's individual story is not that exceptional for the period. Exposure to nationalist ideas, experiencing violence and forced migration as refugees or in war, and finally being alien to local networks in the place where one ends up all contribute to what Gawrych has called the 'brutalization of politics,'[655] or radicalization. The period of extended warfare in the county of Foçateyn between 1914 and 1922 radicalized the relationship between Muslims and Christians in the county to the point that coexistence was thought to be hardly feasible, if desirable. This stood in stark contrast to the period that preceded 1914 when these communities coexisted and the county developed. The fate of a variety of possibilities of coexistence that were formulated in the cross-cultural reality of the so-called *Belle Époque* was officially sealed with the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. After the war, Greece and Turkey agreed on a mutual and permanent population exchange. Greeks and Muslims who had already been refugees since the 18th of October in 1912, together with the remaining Muslims and Greeks, with the exception of the Greeks of the prefecture Istanbul and the Muslims of Western Thrace, were subjected to the exchange.[656] Almost eleven years of continuous war and violence *de facto* brought the most sought after norm of nationality: a homogeneous society. Inclusion of the older

[654] Aydoğan and Kanalıcı, *Ferit Oğuz*…, 3-14.
[655] Gawrych, "The culture…"
[656] Onur Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek exchange of populations, 1922-1934*, (New York & London: Routledge, 2006), 113-122.

refugees from 1912 onwards was merely an official seal stamped on the existing reality. Following the end of the last war in 1922, Eski Foça, Foçateyn's bourgeoning boomtown, was nothing but a ghost town and the Empire to which it belonged had been divided into several nation-states.

Epilogue

The Ghost Town

Soon after the reinstatement of Turkish control, Foçateyn again became a destination for Muslims from the old imperial territories that now lay outside the Ottoman Empire. It was also again a home left behind for the Ottoman Greeks who had to leave after the Turkish reoccupation. This last major wave of population displacement in Foçateyn after the war was a result of the Greco-Turkish population exchange of May 1, 1923. This exchange made the departure of the Ottoman Greeks (at the end of the war) in 1922 permanent and it also displaced new waves of Muslims from Greece who continued living in the Greek territories after the Balkan Wars. The *Rum* of Anatolia were now *Mikrasiates* (Οι Μικρασιάτες πρόσφυγες, the little Asia refugees) of Greece after the exchange. This time they became permanent refugees in Greece who were culturally distinct, economically challenged and politically significant. Their arrival and their struggle to settle and survive constitute one of the most important pillars of modern Greek history, and a now detached part of the history of Foçateyn. After all, the Ottoman Greeks of Foçateyn were an important part of the county's history and now, after 1922, this important part of the county's history, the history of most of its former residents, became a story of struggle for survival and rejuvenation. The Greeks of Foçateyn found refuge in the Kingdom of Greece after 1922 and they established a new Old Phokaia (*Παλαιά Φώκαια Αττικής*, between 1922 and 1925) in Attica, south of Athens, and a new New Phokaia (*Νέα Φώκαια Χαλκιδικής,* in 1922) in Chalkidiki, south of Thessaloniki. Greek refugees from Foçateyn founded new towns in the image of their lost homelands, in places that resembled Foçateyn, and just like many other Greek refugees from Anatolia, they named it after their old hometowns. In fact, some refugees who arrived in Pireaus (Athens) sought out places where they could utilize their skills in the salt business. This played an important role in the establishment of new Old Phokaia in Attica. The

municipalities and residents of these settlements in Greece still commemorate their refugee past today.[657]

The final wave of population displacement caused by the Turkish re-conquest brought the third major influx in Foçateyn after the coming of the *muhacir*s in 1914 and the repatriation of Ottoman Greeks in 1919-1920. It also brought about the third largest exodus after the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks in 1914 and Muslims in 1919. This time it was the *mübadil*s, the Muslims of Greece, who were officially exchanged with the Greeks of Anatolia in 1923, who were resettled in Foçateyn. The Ottoman Greeks who left their homes in 1914 and came back after the Greek occupation were forced to leave yet again.

Both the Greek and the Ottoman representatives had been discussing the idea of a population exchange since the Balkan Wars. The design and the details of the exchange that were to be discussed in Lausanne were drafted by a Norwegian humanist, diplomat, scientist and explorer, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, under the auspices of the League of Nations. In 1922, he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for similar involvements in the resolution of post-Great War conflicts. In the postscript of the forum of the exchange, the question 'whose idea was this' was answered clearly: 'This plan was not, as some have said, suggested by Dr. Nansen. It was both a Greek and Turkish proposition. Nor is it a new plan foisted upon the world, but one which was discussed years ago (referring to the 1914 Agreement), both in Turkey and in Greece'.[658] Both Greece and Turkey were firmly committed to the idea of a compulsory population exchange of their respective minorities when they showed up in Lausanne after the Armistice of Mudanya in 1922. Despite their different aims and concerns, both Greece and Turkey arrived at the same conclusion and agreed to ratify

[657] For examples see: http://www.palaiaphokaia.gr/content.asp?section=56 (Accessed 20th of February 2014) and http://www.halkidiki.gov.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=984&Itemid=193 (Accessed 20th of February 2014).

[658] See the discussions in the previous sections of this thesis for the earlier stages of the idea of a population exchange. For the quotation see: Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement…*, 84. For the discussion of Venizelos' approach and policies regarding the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks and the possibility of exchange see: John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*, (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 74-75.

a compulsory exchange after an intricate process of negotiations. From the Turkish point of view, the population exchange '...made the infamous Eastern Question, which aimed at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire from within, obsolete. Once military victory was achieved, the Turkish military leadership adopted a determined position so as to define national sovereignty in a manner that was essentially against foreign intervention of any kind'.[659] A norm that had dominated the political stage in the Ottoman Empire with the consolidation of the Unionist rule in 1913, in which a homogeneous nation-state model is the legitimate form of existence, came to its logical conclusion with the new diplomatic order that was established after the end of the extended period of war. Like many of its predecessors among the Balkan nation states, the Ottomans 'achieved' the demographic homogeneity that they saw as necessary by utilizing war.[660] The Treaty of Lausanne was the international recognition of this 'legitimate nationhood' based on demography. Approximately two million people were uprooted as a result of the agreement of a compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey not counting the uprooted of the Balkan Wars. Slightly more than half a million of them were Muslims and the rest were Greeks.[661]

According to the first general census of the young Republic of Turkey, the population of Foçateyn consisted of 8,818 Muslims in 1927. This was a sharp increase from the 3,765 Muslims of the Skarpetis census of 1921 under the Greek administration. The census of 1927 does not tell us the cause of the increase but it is logical to assume that they consisted of returning *muhacir*s and exchanged *mübadil*s of Foçateyn. The latter were likely to be more numerous. The population of the center of the county, Eski Foça, was recorded as 3,827 in this same census of 1927.[662] When we compare these figures with the estimate of the Ottoman census of 1914, which was the last statistical data before the spring of organized chaos in 1914, we see a sharp decrease in the overall population. A county of 23, 687 people in 1914 had become a county of just

[659] Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement*…, 82-83.
[660] Utilization of war was not the only source of homogenization but perhaps the most important one. The Unionists tried to standardize language and alphabet. They also attempted to control religious life and economy as means to construct a national identity.
[661] Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement*…, 91-92.
[662] *Türkiye Nüfusu / 28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1927*, (Türk Ocakları Merkez Heyeti Matbaası, 1928), 16.

8,818 people in 1927. So although the number of Muslims increased (from 7,427 in 1914 to 8,384 in 1917), the overall population decreased dramatically.

The transformation of the county was not solely limited to demography. It was physically and economically transformed as well. The cross-cultural reality of the *Belle Époque*, its cosmopolitan outlook and its incorporated economy now contrasted with the presence of the state as the only dominant actor, a homogenized demography and a disconnected economy in the mid-1930s in the young Republic of Turkey. The physical transformation was most visible in Eski Foça, the boomtown of the county. The next two pictures make this very clear.

[**Picture:** A comparison of the boom town of 1913 and the ghost town of the mid-1930s, Eski Foça, *Cami-i Kebir*, Old town peninsula. The first picture (1913) is from: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée,* 82-83; the second one (mid-1930s) belongs to the author's collection. The date for the second photograph is an estimate.]

Eski Foça was physically destroyed to varying degrees in 1914 and between 1915 and 1918. Its population changed dramatically and most of the economic know-how was lost at the end of this transformation. The burgeoning port that once exported salt all the way to Japan and Sri Lanka was now mostly silent. The large salt depots had become empty storage spaces and stables. Eski Foça was no longer incorporated into the world economy and the commercially active Aegean Sea, which was mostly a single commercial zone before the Balkan Wars, was now divided into two by the Greco-Turkish national border. Port towns like Eski Foça were cut off from their connection to the islands in the Aegean that had traditionally been a source of labour and commerce. The Republic of Turkey focused on the revitalization of the devastated country through a policy of self-sufficiency. Reconstruction projects

started in the county of Foçateyn as early as 1924.[663] Understandably, the Kemalists, the latest offshoot of the Young Turks, were not willing to borrow from the same countries that they fought against in the Great War and in the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922. This meant that they had to rely on their own limited sources for healing the wounds of the war years. As a result, the damage in Foçateyn remained unrepaired for most of the early Republican period. However, one still has to ask and try to explain why the contrast was so stark between the economic prospects of the county before and after this period of transition. After all, one would have expected the Muslim refugees to eventually pick up where the Ottoman Greeks left off and resume trading. However, the Muslim peasants who replaced the Greeks often did not have the relevant know-how because they came from different regions. Muslim refugees adopted their new environment over time and production slowly resumed. However, the absence of non-Muslim merchants proved much harder to remedy. The necessary connections and skills required to export the Empire's products abroad had been lost, and the economic policies of the new Turkish nation state caused isolation and shifts in the economic role of the county.

It can be argued that the young Republic of Turkey was undecided in its economic policies until the 1930s. It remained nationalist and anti-cosmopolitan, but was not always against foreign investment. Kemalists, arguably naively, expected to attract a limited amount of foreign investment despite their economic nationalism. This was not entirely unrealistic but they failed to attract the desired amount of investments in the end and this failure left the central state as the principal investor in the economy and development across the country. And this brought about the predominance of the role of the state in an economy where such a presence had already been increasing since the Unionist shift from economic liberalism to nationalism before the Great War.

In the winter of 1923, Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the new Republic of Turkey, embarked on a thirty-five day visit to Western Anatolia. *Türkiye İzmir İktisad*

[663] Kemal Arı, '1923 Türk-Rum Mübadele Antlaşması Sonrasında İzmir'de "Emvâl-i Metruke" ve "Mübadil Göçmenler"', *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, No: 18, (June 1990).

Kongresi (Turkey Izmir Economy Congress) of 17th of February - 4th of March 1923 constituted the most important event of that visit. The congress sought to encourage discussions of the new country's economic policies and the establishment of a network with the Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie. The new regime, dominated by Kemalists, was also influenced by the same idea that the Unionists had tried to impose: economic nationalism (*Milli İktisad*). This was essentially a form of state capitalism that aimed to create a loyal native bourgeoisie who would support the industrial base and market economy that a powerful state needed in order to survive among the already industrialized capitalist nation-states of the West. It also aimed for the nationalisation of monopolies and strategic resources that had been exploited by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (the OPDA) or owned by foreign capital in order to consolidate state control over the economic resources and relations of production. These meant an increased state presence, more control and a less connected economy. However, the country lacked the necessary capital and some foreign investments had to be attracted as well. Despite the fact that the Turkish government wanted to be self-sufficient, the fledgling country was still depended on foreign expertise and know-how. The Kemalists could not afford to achieve their aims solely with the resources at hand. They opposed the Capitulations and foreign privileges in the economy, but they wanted to give an investment friendly outlook at the first economic congress in Izmir, as it was seen as being necessary to launch the economy.

An approach that balanced state sponsored capitalism with a limited tolerance for foreign capital was adopted in the beginning. There was still a sizeable number of foreign companies operating in the Republic of Turkey by 1928, however, despite the nationalist economic policies.[664] The aim of the state was to abolish (or buy) monopolies and hand them over to a Turkish middle class who would then develop them over the course of time. But lack of capital, lack of know-how and the economic depression of 1929 soon dispelled the hopes of the Kemalists. The already ambiguous 'foreign investment friendly' outlook was abandoned. Statism (*devletçilik*), an import substitution industrialization approach designed to protect the national economy was implemented, meaning almost full economic involvement of the state in planning, and

[664] See: *1927 – 1928 Devlet Salnamesi*, Tabhane-i Amire: İstanbul.

this progressively became the dominant economic policy after 1930. This caused further increases in the already increased state presence in the economy and delivered a fatal blow to the once globally-connected parts of the country like Foçateyn.

The Republic followed a system reminiscent of the old Ottoman state monopolies. In the past, the Ottoman state owned monopolies and after the establishment of the OPDA in 1881, the right to run these monopolies was transferred to the OPDA and the state remained the owner. Companies like the Régie tobacco company, or sometimes individual entrepreneurs, ran the monopolies on behalf of the OPDA. In essence, they ran on non-state capital. The government of the Republic bought back the rights for most of these old monopolies and also created new ones. They were then turned into *inhisal* (or *tekel*), that is state monopolies administered by the government in Ankara. In some cases, the old Ottoman monopolies which had foreign ownership rights were allowed to exist. This was partly out of necessity and partly due to the ideological ambiguities of the young nationalist regime. Following the statist policy turn after the Great Depression of 1929, all foreign investment in monopolies except the match monopoly (*kibrit inhisarı*) was withdrawn from Turkey and as a result the state became the sole administrator of the monopolies.

A salt monopoly (*inhisar*) was established on the 1st of June in 1927 in Ankara, the new capital of the Republic of Turkey. It was responsible for the production, sale and export of all types of salt in Turkey. The Çamaltı salt marshes and the rock salt mines around Foçateyn constituted the most important production base in the Republic. Salt prices were fixed by the state, and this had negative consequences for the salt business.[665] Unfortunately, there is not much information on the volume of the salt business between 1923 and 1930. A comparative glance at the performance of the salt, alcohol and tobacco monopolies (the three most important) in the fiscal year 1910-1911 and 1935-1936 gives a rough picture. According to Refii Şükrü Suvla's comparison, the adjusted revenues of the same monopolies in the fiscal year of 1935-1936 were almost three times higher compared to the last peaceful fiscal year of the Ottoman Empire in 1910-1911. But Suvla makes two main adjustments in his

[665] Sinan Demirbilek, 'Tek Parti Döneminde İnhisarlar (1923-1946)', *ÇTTAD*, XII/24, (Fall 2012), 203-232.

comparisons. He first adjusts the currency unit of the 1910-1911 data (Turkish Gold Lira) to the 1935-36 data (Turkish Lira of 1935-1936). Later he makes an adjustment on the now decreased size of the Turkish state. He then attempts to calculate the effect of the shrunken size of the state and thus the lost income by adjusting the 1910-1911 data to the population of 1935-36. If we accept this method, despite its shortcomings, it becomes obvious that the net income (income before costs) from the salt monopoly decreased from 6,920,298 Turkish Lira in 1910-1911 to 5,380,533 Turkish Liras in the 1935-1936 fiscal year. In contrast, income from tobacco and alcohol skyrocketed.[666] In fact, the most important salt production sites, such as Çamaltı, were still within the territories of the Republic of Turkey. This means that Suvla's size adjustment does not work for salt. In the past, salt was primarily exported, and the most important sites of extraction and production were still a part of Turkey. The revenues would have stayed the same and wouldn't have been affected by the change in the population if the salt exports remained the same. In addition, the monopolistic profits were used by the new Turkish state to generate profit for industrialisation programmes and the purchase of foreign companies. So, a relatively high income does not necessarily mean increased production. The increase can simply be a result of an increase in taxes alone or an increase both in taxes and production. Therefore, the real scale of the decrease in the salt business must have been much greater and that must be a result of the decrease in the volume of exports.

The decrease in the importance of the port of Eski Foça's role in the salt business and trade in general was sharper than the decrease in the volume of the salt business. In other words, Eski Foça was shrinking economically more quickly than the salt trade. This was due to the changes in technology that allowed for the transfer of salt directly from the Çamaltı marshes to markets and a decrease in the volume of salt exports. But also, and more importantly, the gradual establishment of statism after the Great Depression of 1929 caused the decline of economic prospects for Foça. As a matter of fact, between 1941 and 1946, salt was not listed among the thirteen principal exports of Turkey. Goods which made up less than 0.1% in the share of exports in that

[666] Refii Şükrü Suvla, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tütün, Tuz ve İçki İnhisarları Varidatı', *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası*, Vol. 3, (1937), 490-495.

interval such as raw cotton and olive oil showed up at the end of this list but salt was not there.[667] Another exemplary measure towards a more restrained and controlled economy was the new administration's decision to impose strict restrictions on the mobility of foreigners and non-Muslims around the Bay of Izmir (including all of Foçateyn) in 1927. Although there were exceptions, foreigners and non-Muslims were prohibited from travelling to or from the ports in a demarcated zone around the Bay of Izmir.[668] It is quite likely that this was not only a measure to control trade but it was also issued in order to stop smuggling, which was likely to increase with the return of the state monopoly. This constitutes a very good example of the stark contrast between the connectedness of the pre-1914 period and the isolation of the early Republican period. The port of Eski Foça, which once exported its salt all over the world, was also within the range of this restricted zone and it too was isolated. Mobility was under strict state control.

[667] Max Weston Thornburg, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949), 280.

[668] This map was brought to my attention by the staff of the *Ottoman History Podcast* web blog. I would like to thank them for their help. The map is from the *Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivleri* (BCA). The tag number of the map and the associated correspondences are: BCA, 030-10-00-00-99-639-22: 1, 2 and 3.



[**Picture:** Map of the zone of restriction around the Gulf of Izmir, 1927.]

Eski Foça had been attracting mostly Ottoman Greek and Greek migrants in the region especially after the second half of the 19th century. Its economic prospects and expansion constituted the main reason for this draw which lasted until the organized chaos of the spring 1914 when the pull factors started to disappear. By the time Eski Foça had been transformed into a ghost town in the mid-1920s, those factors had disappeared altogether. The salt was still there and the young Turkish Republic was extracting it. However, it was consumed on the domestic market rather than

internationally, as it had been in the ‘classical Ottoman’ past. As a result, the volume of business decreased and in a way, the old Ottoman system of monopoly was restored. The Turkish state became the main actor in the business and salt was consumed on the domestic market just as it would have been under the principles of Ottoman provisionism.

The Nationalist Movement brought Eski Foça under the full control of the central state like many other parts of the Empire that were once incorporated and contested. But the costs were high. War had brought destruction on all sides. The story of the period of extended warfare in this thesis was limited to the history of Foçateyn, but in reality all phases and geographies of this period are connected to one another. This was a nationalist and an imperialist competition of a larger scale where particular nationalists appeared as the perpetrators in one theatre and others in another one. National historiographies remained silent about their own violent acts and underlined the atrocities of the other for years to come after the ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’. The same militias, bandits, bureaucrats and military men who unleashed unspeakable violence and crimes against humanity were considered to be ‘national heroes’ on one side of the border and perpetrators of mass murder on the other side.

In Greece, the defeat of the Greek army is remembered as a ‘catastrophe’. The defeat in the war and the eventual disappearance of the Greek communities from their homelands in Asia Minor constitute major traumas. After 1922, refugees from Asia Minor caused major political problems in Greece. Refugees faced numerous hardships and a certain degree of alienation. At times they were considered ‘lesser Greeks’ compared to native Greeks which led to fault lines in the Greek national identity. The losses of the war and migration are often remembered and commemorated as ‘national’ rather than humanitarian tragedies. Traumas are echoed and remembered as fundamental aspects of the Greek national identity. Turkish nationalism’s relationship with the same traumas is the opposite of the Greek one. The human costs and violence of war were silenced or forgotten. In a sense, victory erased the trauma of the Balkan Wars and the Great War. Turks ‘had to’ start with a clean slate. Refugees often became harbingers of this enthusiasm for the new nation and a new future. Remembering the traumas was much less important for Turkish nationalism.

Christians or Muslims, Greeks or Turks, had been agitated, used and pushed against each other throughout this period. Some used violence as an opportunity, while others initiated it. Some showed compassion in the darkest of times and some never felt resentment. The people of Foçateyn, who made its history, became both victims and perpetrators in the same period.

By Way of Conclusion

I wanted to overcome two obstacles that, in my opinion, stand before our fuller understanding of Ottoman history: the limits of national historiography and the limits of history from above. We need to take into account what now appears as incompatible 'national' histories (by Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Turks or Jews) of the same historical entity: the Ottoman Empire. I think bringing together these 'seemingly unrelated' histories under meaningful narratives of 'common histories' is a challenge facing us young scholars. The other obstacle, namely relying too much on what states tell us, is somewhat in the process of being overcome. We now know more 'silenced' histories. The period of transformation that took place in Foçateyn between the spring of organized chaos in 1914 and the end of the extended warfare in 1922 is one such history the silence of which is broken in this study. Here, I put the local history of Foçateyn, the agency and perspectives of its people together with larger processes and actors such as global capitalism and modernity.

I used as many sources and opinions as possible from 'the incompatible' national historiographies only to narrate a meaningful history of what I would define as a genuine human story that is essentially universal. This was not an attempt to legitimize one historiography over another. This was an attempt to understand how incorporation into the world economy and the changing nature of states and ideologies affected the people of the Ottoman Empire during its collapse by weaving the role of their agency into the narrative. Ideas and conditions may restrain us, but it is not capitalisms, modernities or nationalisms that do things; rather, it is the capitalists, modernists and nationalists. That is why I focused on individuals and networks together with discourses and the structures within which they move. Now, at

the end of my research, I still see there is much to be done for the fulfillment of these ideals. I can only hope this work can be considered a humble beginning.

A Nationalist Re-consolidation of Central Power

The period of crisis that started in the Ottoman Empire as early as 1911 with the Tripolitanian War lasted until the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. There was almost omnipresent war for eleven years between 1911 and 1922. The period witnessed the single most violent transformation in the entire Middle East. Nevertheless, it is not a unique process if one looks at the history of the world. The Ottomans, as well as other forms of imperial structures like Austria-Hungary, Russia, China, India or Japan, all faced the challenge of the reformulation of state-society relationships the moment they started to be challenged by the new forms of state and economy that originated in Western Europe. 'In the nineteenth century, empire faded away in the face of a plurality of forms, some imperial, some national, and some more hybrid, leaving the empire looking like a modern failed state, with "imperial" authoritarian forms of government coexisting with policies of nationalizing, while the reality on the ground was one of indomitable diversity'.[669]

When the period of extended warfare came to a conclusion in the twentieth century, the Ottoman imperial state was replaced by a new nation-state by combating, engineering, constructing and even murdering the above-mentioned "indomitable diversity" on the ground. The Ottoman state emerged as a smaller, devastated, exploited but more centralized and consolidated structure in the face of the challenges presented by Western domination, capitalism and modernity. When we consider the continuities between the Ottoman Empire and the new Turkish nation state, it makes sense to perceive this transition as a chapter of the Ottoman political center's re-consolidation of power in reaction to the historical challenges that empowered peripheral actors vis-à-vis the center. Many peoples of the Empire, its many structures, economic spheres and modern trajectories were dominated and rearranged by the center.

[669] Barkey, *Empire...*, 265.

This distinct period of the center's reconsolidation of power was first initiated by a certain group of Young Turks: the Unionists. Attempts to reconsolidate the power of the center had been on the main agenda of the imperial elite at least since the 18th century with certain interruptions. There had been many attempts at restoration since Selim III including those that occurred in the eras of Mahmud II, the Tanzimat reforms and Abdülhamit II. They were successful in some ways and unsuccessful in others. What distinguishes them from the Unionist period was the fact that they still embraced an imperial framework for reconsolidation. The ruling elite's (the Unionists) composition after 1913[670] and their perception on the limited nature of the available political options to save the Empire were different from these (sometimes overlapping) previous periods of reconsolidation. The Unionists pushed for a particular trajectory of modernity after 1913 that became the dominant force of change in the Ottoman and later Turkish restoration and resistance: a Muslim nation state.[671] The imperial framework was abandoned for a national one. The history of Foçateyn demonstrates how that transition from empire to nation state transpired on the ground. Later the Unionists were followed to some extent by the Kemalists, the founders of modern Turkey, who were also often old Unionists and Young Turks of the same generation.[672] Attempts to consolidate the power of a nation-state and to build a nation lasted to some degree at least until 1950, when the Kemalists were no longer in full power.

The Ottoman Empire, like other empires, was not a monolithic whole. This is why different parts of the Empire were affected by different socio-economic realities and historical processes. Each such principal region (like Foçateyn with its particular history and coastal trajectory) had its own trajectory of regional development and thus

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[670] Erik Jan Zürcher, 'How Europeans Adopted Anatolia and created Turkey', in *European Review*, Vol.13, No. 3 (2005): 379-394.

[671] For a discussion of the Muslim character of this Young Turk nation state project see: Zürcher, *The Young...*, 213-236.

[672] The Unionists developed policies to construct a new nation-state that was intended to have a predominantly Muslim population and be marked by strong Turkish ethnocentrism. The Muslim character of the project remained dominant at least until the end of the Turkish War of Independence in 1922. Later it started to take a shift towards a more Turkist and secular character by the mid-1920s following Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's consolidation of power. Both the Unionist and the Kemalists strove for a powerful, modern and central state and survival despite this difference.

its own future prospects. According to Emrence, there were three distinctive regions in the last century of the Empire: the cosmopolitan coast, the Muslim interior and the autonomous frontiers. They '...rose to the Ottoman scene in an interactive manner, and clashed over resources, values and the nature of the state at the turn of the twentieth century. With the Second Constitutional Revolution, imperial options seemed clear: a cosmopolitan empire with a strong record of non-Muslim rights and global connections, a Muslim state that marries Islam with state modernity and gives more representation to Arabs, or a weak Ottoman political framework that leaves local autonomy untouched'.[673] None of these alone came to be realized. The Unionists struggled for a Muslim nation-state that wedded Islam with state modernity but emphasized a Turkish ethnocentrism over an imperial one. Later, the Kemalists maintained the statist and modernist framework but introduced secularism. The role of Islam was interchanged with the role of Turkish ethnocentrism in which the latter became dominant.

The Unionist reconsolidation of power meant the subduing and redefining of all these multiple trajectories. Reconsolidation of the center's power meant the subjection of the peripheral actors and disappearance of their autonomies together with the systems and relations that made such autonomies possible. This placed places like Foçateyn on a collision course with the Unionist designs after 1913. When the period of extended warfare was nominally over in 1922, none of the primary processes that sustained the distinct character of a cosmopolitan coastal path in Foçateyn remained. The center's grasp was successfully reconsolidated. 'Without its cosmopolitan cover and global markets, the coast took a nationalist turn'.[674] Now there was a new modernist trajectory on what used to be the Ottoman coast.

I propose that the new nation state model, which the Kemalists adopted after consolidating power in the mid-1920s, the statist, modernist and Turkish ethnocentric model, was in fact based on the old coastal trajectory but now took 'a nationalist turn'. It did not have cosmopolitan values but aspired to the bourgeoisie culture of the coast. It was reform-minded, modernist and pro-change but it idealized a classless,

[673] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 126.
[674] Emrence, *Remapping...*, 124.

conservative, moderationist and corporatist social order. It wanted to be capitalist but aimed at a strong state, a docile middle class and a homogenous society. Being reform-minded but seeking a perfect balance between the modern and traditional were all reminiscent of the middle class values of the incorporated eastern Mediterranean with one important exception: a strong distaste and distrust of the very middle classes that created these values in the places where these Young Turk imperial bureaucrats like the Unionists and Kemalists grew up. Of course this study did not provide proof or discussions about this argument and such enquiry remains to be answered in future research.

The history of Foçateyn simultaneously showed two aspects of this Unionist reconsolidation: its genesis and its praxis. The reasons behind the Unionists' decision to oust the Ottoman Greeks in Foçateyn were historicised and the details of that demographic engineering operation were dissected. In chapters four and five, it became clear that 'how it happened?' was actually related to 'why it happened?' The spring of organized chaos in Foçateyn is the best-documented Unionist demographic engineering project between the Balkan Wars and the Great War. Through it we see that actually the Macedonian Question that was supposedly 'solved' after the Balkan Wars was indeed not solved at all. It merely changed its name and geography. It was now the National Question of Izmir and its geography was Western Anatolia. The spring of organized chaos reveals that the praxis of the Unionists' Muslim nationalism, its manifestation in Foçateyn, was a Unionist reaction to the National Question of Izmir.

The ways in which the Ottoman Greeks in Western Anatolia were ousted and fled before the Great War are reminiscent of the ways with which the Balkan nationalists homogenized their societies. Foçateyn provides a very good case in point. In this research it became clear that the demographic policies are not only similar but the Unionists, the decision makers of the time, connected them to the ousting and flight of Muslims from the lost Ottoman territories in the Balkans. I think this directs us to the genesis of the Unionists' post-1913 project of reconsolidation. The Unionists' formative experiences in Macedonia, their exposure to minority nationalisms in the Balkans, the coming of the Balkan Wars, the fact that most of the Unionists became

refugees and victims of nationalism themselves and the similarities between the guerrilla (*chette, komitacı, haydut, bandit*) tactics employed in Foçateyn and the Balkans all indicate that the Macedonian Question was not 'solved' after the Balkan Wars but was rather transferred to Ottoman Anatolia.

If the arguments raised here are sound, this has two larger implications for our agenda of research concerning the history of the late Ottoman Empire. The first is a comparative issue. Are there any other examples of an imperial center reconsolidating its eroded power at the expense of the varying trajectories within its imperial framework? Do imperial centers choose what is best for their own survival? Is there a pattern? Are there parallels with that in post-colonial histories? The second issue is about perspective. If the earlier demographic policies of the Unionists are related to their formative years and the Macedonian Question, are their later demographic policies also related? Are there parallels between the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks and the mass murder of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915? Can we see the whole Ottoman cataclysm as one history? Is Foçateyn an intermediary step in the radicalization of the Unionist demographic policies in 1915?

The various reasons, causal frameworks, incentives, experiences and provocations that have been discussed and proposed in this work explain but do not excuse the treatment of refugees, be they Muslim or Christian, and victims of wars, exile, expulsion and mass murder. The Ottoman Empire was ravaged by continuous warfare and eventually torn to pieces. The cost of that transition is an immense human tragedy, one that is hardly matched in scale in the modern era perhaps with the exception of the tragedies brought about by the Second World War. Today millions of people, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Kurds and Turks and others, live lives that are shaped by that transition from empire to nation-state. But few such people are aware of the tragedies that shape them. It is often the case that people remember past tragedies selectively and they are amnesic about the fact that the perpetrators and victims are often the same people. Most of us simply dwell unaware amidst the ruins of the past but are affected nonetheless. In Foça, people speak of 'the legend of the Black Stone', an ironic tale of longing for an explanation. This is the result of an urge to fill in the gaps of our unspoken pasts. This is an urge to remember. Other stories

and legends are told elsewhere because remembering is resistance. Remembering is saying no.

Appendix

Item 1: A sample page of the letter of Dimitros Papadopoulos (*Δημήτριος Παπαδόπουλος*) written on May 27th in 1887. The letter was found in the foundation of an old Ottoman Greek house in Eski Foça. Below is the last page of the letter.



Item 2: Transliterated version of the following article: 'Foça-i Atik'ten Çekilen Telgraf Sureti', in *İttihad*, 23 Mayıs 1326 (5 June 1910).

Foça-i Atik'den çekilen telgraf sureti

(Makam-ı Sadaret-uzmaya)

Mülk-i sarihamız olan Girit'deki hakimiyet-i Osmaniyemizi bir şerzime-i kalilenin eyadi-i hun-rizanesinde baziçe olmasına katiyen razı olmadığımızı evvelce akd etdiğimiz mitingde dinimizle, namusumuzla tebid etmiş ve meselenin şan-ı milli ve hükümranimize muvafık bir suretde hallini istirham eylemişdik. Tecavüzün henüz ber-devam olmasından galeyan ve heyecan-ı ahali gayr-i kabil-i teskin bir raddeye geldi. Gönüllü defteri açılarak her gün yüzlerce ahali vatan fedaiyesi yazılıyor. Namus-u millet namına feda-i can için harekete amade ve kabineye zahirdirler. Meselenin sürʿat-i mümküne ile halliyle tecavüzata nihayet verilmesini istirham ederler.

Fi 23 Mayıs Sene 326 Foça-i Atik Ahalisi tarafından

Item 3: Transliteration of Talât Paşa's coded telegram (BOA, DH.ŞFR, 430/85, 4/H/1330) about the June events in Eski Foça. Undechiphered codes are kept as they appear in the original document.

Dahiliye Müsteşarlığına

Dün sabah vali beğ-efendi ile birlikde Foçaya gidildi Foçada cereyan itmiş olan vekayi 11173 (cidden) 24861 (şayan) 95168 (tesirdir) 77247 beş yüz kişiye karib civar ve bazı kura ahalisi Foçanın üzerindeki dağlara gelerek 25155 (şehri) 55577 55853 (yağma) 89861 (itmek) 89691 (isterler) 79682 o sırada Hristiyan ahali duçar-ı hak ve heyecan olarak limanda bulunan Yunan vapuruna ilticaya müsaraat eylediler. Kaymakam köylülerin adunın çoklığını nazar-ı dikkat alarak şehre duhullerini men içün mevcud olan yirmi jandarmaya silah istimali için emr virmek cesaretini gösteremediğinden bu ahali grubla beraber şehre girerek 55853 (yağmaya) 78654 91255 (başlarlar) 79682 25155 (şehrde) 77956 55853 (yağma) 66668 (idilmeyerek) 79254 16649 33476 92862 (bir dükkan) 17538 92862 (bir hane) 14879 34919 77335 (kalmamışdır) 79653 77247 o sırada Rumlar kâmilen hicret itmişler yalnız sona kalan bir kafileden 88872 (otuz) 17544 (değil) 27969 (dokuz) 37821 (kişi) 47551 (maktul) 89448 79653 (olmuşdır) 77247 bunlardan ikisinin vapura giderek isticalden denize düşerek magruken vefat itdikleri anlaşıldı kaymakam-ı kaza jandarmalara silah istimali emrini virmediğinden dolayı azl idilerek diğerinin intihab-ü arz müsteşarlığa yazılmışdır dün ve bugün vilayetin her tarafında hal-i tabii avdet itmiş gibidir hükumet tarafından köylere beyannameler tevzi idilerek bunda devletin emniyet-i dahiliye ve hariciyesini ihlale cüret idenlerin idam idileceği halka anlatılmışdır Cumaya kadar ahval tamamiyle kesb-i sükun iderse o gün deniz tarikiyle çanakkaleye hareket[e] memur oldığı arz ve bu babda dahi emr-i fahimanelerine intizar iderim fi 4 Haziran sene 33.
Dahiliye Nazırı Talât

Tebeyyüz idilüb takdim idilmişdir

Item 4: A hand-drawn map by Talât Paşa showing the density of *muhacir*s (Muslim refugees) in the Ottoman provinces. Taken from: Murat Bardakçı, *Talât Paşa'nın Evrak-ı Metrûkesi*, (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2008), 46-47.



Item 5: A chronology of the relevant events mentioned in the dissertation.

Date	**Event(s)**
1908, July 24	Young Turk Revolution and the Re-introduction of Constitutional Monarchy
1908, October 5	Annexation of *Vilayet-i Şark-i Rumeli* by Bulgaria
1908, October 6	Annexation of (*Bosna Hersek*) Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary
1908, October 8	First Boycott Movement against Austria, ended on 26th of February 1909
1908, October - November	Cretan nationalists' self-declared Enosis (Union) with the K.o. Greece
1909-1910	Start of a wave of a series of Albanian insurrections followed by major uprisings in April, June, July 1910
1909-1911	Second Boycott Movement against the K.o. Greece and Greek nationalists
1909, April 13	The Incident of the 31st of March (31 March 1325)
1909, April 23-24	3rd Army stationed in Selanik (*Hareket Ordusu*) entered Istanbul and suppressed the Incident of the 31st of March
1909, April 27	Abdülhamit II was dethroned and sent to exile in Selanik (Thessaloniki). Mehmet V Reşad, a relatively passive Sultan was enthroned
1910, 12 June	Residents of the county of Foçateyn sent a telegram to the *İttihad* newspaper stating their protest to the situation in Crete and a list of volunteer conscripts for the 'defense of fellow Muslims in Crete'
1911, September 29	The beginning of the Italo-Turkish war in Tripolitania

1911, Late September-October	Third Boycott Movement against Italy
1912, October 8	Beginning of the First Balkan War
1912, Following Balkan War	Fourth Boycott Movement against the Balkan states but especially the K.o. Greece
1912, October 15	Ouchy Treaty with Italy and the end of the Italo-Turkish War
1912, December 20	Recognition of Albania as an independent state, Albanian revolts.
1912, February	The parliamentary elections known as the '*Sopalı Seçimler*', overwhelming victory of the CUP
1912, Winter, Following the Elections	Establishment of the '*Halaskar Zabitan*' (Saviour Officers) in the Ottoman army in order to overthrow the Unionists in power. Unionist power start to decrease.
1912, August 5	The abolishment of the 4th *Meclis-i Mebusan* (the Unionist government) by Sadrazam Ahmet Muhtar Paşa
1913, August	French archaeologist Félix Sartiaux's arrival in the county of Foçateyn and the subsequent approval of his permission for research by the Sublime Porte
1913, January 23	*Bâb-ı Âli* Coup d'etat, Unionists come back to power
1913, January	Parliamentarian Elections after the coup and the establishment of Unionist dominance in the 5th *Meclis-i Mebusan*
1913, September 19 (or October 2)	Rahmi Bey was appointed the governor-general of the province of Aydın
1913, Late April-Early May	Celal Bayar's appointment as the CUP's liaison commissioner for the province of Aydın
1913, June 16	Beginning of the Second Balkan War (until 1913, July 18)
1913, June 24	Izmir journey of the prominent writers of the journal of *Türk Yurdu*
1913, July 22	Re-taking of Edirne in the Second Balkan War

1913, July 29	Dr. Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray starts his journey in the Karesi (Balıkesir) area
1913, August	Dr. Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray's travels end and his report
1913, September 29	Ottoman-Bulgarian Convention of Population Exchange, first of its kind
1914, February 14th	Great Powers decided to leave Midilli, Sakız and Sisam to the K.o. Greece
1914, February (Following the loss of the Aegean Islands)	The Fifth Boycott Movement against the K.o. Greece, Ottoman Greeks and other Ottoman Christians
1914, March	Eşref Sencer Kuşçubaşı is commissioned to conduct a tour of the Western Anatolian coastline
1914, March	Sofulis (ex-Ottoman death penalty convict, Sisam revolutionary) becomes the head of Macedonian province and violence against the Muslim minority starts to increase
1914, March 23	K.o. Greece issues an ultimatum (*Muhtıra*) protesting the boycott and the emigration of Ottoman Greeks
1914, Late January-March	Ottoman Greeks start to flee in Thrace
1914, March 27	*Tanin* (a pro-Unionist newspaper) publishes an article saying that the Greek violence against Muslims is going to be repaid soon
1914, May	The Ottoman Ambassador in Athens, Galip Kemali Bey, presents an official letter to Venizelos for a Greek-Muslim population exchange
1914, Mid- April	The Ottoman Minister of the Interior, Talât Paşa, embarks on an inspection in Thrace
1914, May 19	Venizelos embarks on an inspection to troubled parts of Western Thrace in the K.o. Greece
1914, May 23	The K.o. Greece gives a verbal dictum stating her position and demands in the case of a population exchange with the Ottoman Empire
1914, June 8	Ottoman Minister of the Interior Talât Paşa embarks on an inspection on the Western Anatolian coast

1914, June 10	According to the testimony of a Menemen area local, Karabinazade Ali, the roads were under the control of gangs and bandits.
1914, June 12	The K.o. Greece issues a war-provoking ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire, urging a guarantee of security for the Ottoman Greeks
1914, June 11-18	Ousting that started in the county of Foçateyn reaches a violent peak between the 12th and 13th. Eski Foça is ransacked by bandits. Plundering and some violence last until the declaration of the restoration of order on the 18th
1914, June 18	The Ottomans respond with an ultimatum to the K.o. Greece
1914, June 20-July 11	An international commission tours Western Anatolia for an investigation of the reasons of the Christian flight
1914, June 24	The international commission arrives at Eski Foça
1914, June 20	Galip Kemali Bey sends a telegraph to Venizelos in order to go back to negotiations for a population exchange that had been disrupted by ultimatums and the possibility of war
1914, July 1	An Ottoman parliamentarian session takes places discussing the mass flight of the Ottoman Greeks
1914, July 11	First meeting of the Ottoman-Greek population exchange commission in Izmir
1914, July 13	Said Halim Pasha writes a confidential note to War Minister Enver Pasha about the imminence of a European war
1914, July 28	World War I breaks out
1914, August 2	Ottoman-German alliance pact signed by İTC without Sultan's approval

Item 6: The complete version of the FO 195/2458, 523.



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5,000 Greeks, we found that, although houses had been plundered, the 3 churches were intact. Like Cheshmeh, the town presented a deserted appearance, not more than a third of the houses being occupied by Moslem refugees. The exodus from Katopanaya had preceded that of Cheshmeh by a day. The Greek population at the time of our visit consisted of 5 or 6 old men and women. Many of the Moslem refugees whom we questioned stated that they came from Prishtina.

On June 28 we visited the towns of Old and New Phocea, proceeding there on board the ''Issa Reiss''. We found that both towns had been sacked. Elaborate measures, which we subsequently learned had been carried out under the direction of Hadjim Bey Police Mudir of Smyrna, had been taken to deceive us as to what had occurred. Some doors had been repainted, the marks of axes on others had been covered over with strips of tin, and a clumsy attempt had been made to remove the traces of the desecration of the churches. The cathedral church of St. Irene, which we examined carefully, had clearly been looted. The exodus of the Greek population of Old and New Phocea had taken place on June I2 and I3, as the result of an attack by armed bands of Moslems from neighbouring villages. The inhabitants do not appear to have offered any resistance. A French archaeologist, M. Felix Sartiaux, of the French Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, was at Old Phocea with several other Frenchmen when the town was attacked. His account and that of M. Manciet, one of his companions, may be regarded as reliable. A number of Greeks were killed, and other excesses were committed. Shukri Bey informed us that Ghiridli Ferid Effendi, Kaimakam of Phocea, Mehmed Effendi, local Commandant of Gendarmerie, Talaat Bey, Commandant of Gendarmerie at Menemen, and a certain Jaafer Effendi, had been arrested and sent

before

Item 7: A hand drawn table by Talât Paşa showing the number of Ottoman Greeks that 'fled' to the Kingdom of Greece. Source: Murat Bardakçı, *Talât Paşa'nın Evrak-ı Metrûkesi*, (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2008), 78-79.

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YUNANİSTAN'A FİRAR VE HİCRET EDEN RUMLAR'IN MİKDARI

Esâmî-i vilâyât ve elviye	Firar eden nüfus aded	Terkeyledikleri Emlâk adedi	Kıymeti	Arazi	Kıymeti
Edirne Vilâyeti	50.004	9.319	34.324.087	429.724	0
Aydın Vilâyeti	80.766	17.630	36.400.000	449.292	89.615.521
Çatalca Sancağı	6.461	1.158	0	20.507	0
Karesi Sancağı	15.506	4.065	20.526.425	82.173	231.160.895
Kal'a-i Sultaniye Sancağı	11.238	0	0	0	0
YEKÛN	163.975	32.172	91.250.512	981.696	320.776.416

BULGARİSTAN'A HİCRET EDEN BULGARLAR

Esâmî-i vilâyât	Nüfusu
Edirne Vilâyeti	46.510
Çatalca Sancağı	4.508
Karesi "	5.903
Kal'a-i Sultaniye "	11.238
YEKÛN	58.039

AHVÂL-İ HARBİYE HASEBİYLE DÂHİLE NAKLOLUNAN RUMLAR

İstanbul Vilâyeti	4.166
Edirne Vilâyeti	58.955
Çatalca Sancağı	986
Hüdavendigâr Vilâyeti	13.558
Kal'a-i Sultaniye	15.423
YEKÛN	93.088

Item 8: An excerpt from Menteşe's memoir. Taken from: Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları*, (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları,1986), 165-166.

leketin dahilî emniyetini ihlâl eder bir hareket vuku bulursa örfî idare ilân ederiz, divanıharb kurulur, kanun müsaade ederse mücrimler idama mahkûm edilir ve asılırlar. Şimdi sen söyle, Meclis gelir mukaveleyi feshederse ne kadar tazminat istersin, bu iş böyle biter» demekliğim üzerine Weyl, «Vakit verin, düşüneyim» dedi. Talât «Dedim ya, vakit yok, ya şimdi ya hiç.»

Weyl biraz düşündükten sonra 300.000 lira istedi. 150.000 liraya sulh olduk. Mukaveleler imza edildi 1.600.000 lira alındı. Ertesi günü Orduya hareket emri verildi. Enver de (Enver Paşa) süvari müfrezesinin başında yıldırım süratile Edirne'ye bir baskın hareketile girdi. Şehri harap olmadan Bulgarlardan kurtardı.

Heyet-i Vükelâ odasına girerken Talât: «Halil Bey bugün de karar veremezsek Enver yarın kendi başına orduyu alıp yürüyecektir, biz de burada ağzımızı açıp bakakalacağız» demişti. Enver, Talât'ı mütemadiyen sıkıştırıyordu.

Brezilya Hükûmeti Zırhlı Satmak İstiyor

Brezilya Hükûmeti İngiltere'de inşası biten zırhlısını satmak için teklifte bulunmuştu. Averof'u Yunanlılara kaptırdığımızın acısı, yüreğimizde idi. O günkü şeraite göre para bulmak da çok müşküldü. Fransız Perrier Bankası geminin bedeli olan iki buçuk milyon lirayı ikraza muvafakat etmişti. Fakat şerait çok ağırdı. Maliye Nâzırı Menemenlizade Rifat Bey mukaveleyi imzada tereddüd gösteriyordu. Talât mukaveleleri hazırlatmış, Heyet-i Vükelâ odasının yanındaki odaya bankanın representanını da getirmiş, Heyet-i Vükelâ içtima halinde idi. Rifat Bey'e hitaben:

«Beyim adam geldi» dedi.

Rifat Bey: «Canım Talât Bey nasıl imza edeyim bu mukaveleyi?» der demez, Talât heyecanla kalktı, Rifat Bey merhumun zayıf vücudunu kuvvetli pazularının arasına aldı, büyük bir heyecanla «Beyim Adaları alacağız, santim düşünecek zamanda değiliz.»

Kolları arasında okşıyarak, sakallarını öperek Rifat Bey'i götürdü, mukaveleyi imza ettirdi, ertesi günü paralar Londra sefirimize gönderildi. O ne heyecanlı bir insandı Yarabbi!

Talât Bey Hıyanetleri Görülen Unsurlardan Memleketi Temizlemeyi Ön Safa Almıştı

Edirne istirdad edilmiş (geri alınmış), Hakkı Paşa Londra'da Cavid Bey de Fransa'da başladıkları müzakereleri muvaffakıyetle bitirmişlerdi. Dahil ve hariçte hükûmetin mevkii kuvvetlenmişti. Talât Bey, Balkan Harbi'ndeki hıyanetleri tebarüz eden anâsır-

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dan memleketi temizlemeyi ön safa almıştı. İstanbul Muahedesile Edirne, Kırkkilise ve civarındaki Bulgarlar, Bulgaristan'a sevkedilmişlerdi. Sıra Trakya'daki Rumlara gelmişti. Fakat bu çok ihtiyat isteyen bir işti. Zira yeni bir harbi doğurabilirdi. Alınan tedbir şu oldu: Valiler ve diğer memurin resmen işe müdahale eder görünmeyecek, Cemiyet'in teşkilâtı işi idare edecek Bir vak'a ihdas edilmeyerek, yalnız Rumlar ürkütülecek, bu talimat dahilinde hareket başladı. Balkan Harbi'ndeki hıyanetlerinin tepkisile maneviyatı bozulmuş olan Rum halkı gitmek üzere ayaklandı. 100.000'e yakın Rum, kimsenin burnu kanamaksızın Yunanistan'a çekilip gittiler. Bundan sonra aynı tarzda İzmir civarında teşebbüs ele alındı. Urla ve Çeşme'de hicret başladı. Bergama, Dikili ve Menemen Rumları da ayaklandılar. Bu defa Venizelos protestoda bulundu. Harp tedarikatı başladı. Babıâli bu işte hükûmetin bir müdahalesi olmadığı, Balkan Harbi'nin tepkisi olarak halkın maneviyatının bozulduğu ve kendi arzularile hicret etmekte olduklarını ileri sürerek mahallinde Dahiliye Nâzırile birlikte tetkikat yapmak üzere birer murahhas tâyin edilmesi için süferaya notalar gönderildi. Sefirler, Babıâli'nin teklifini kabul ettiler. Baştercümanlarını Dahiliye Nâzırı'nın maiyetinde bera-yı tetkik İzmir'e gitmek üzere murahhas tâyin ettiler. Vaziyeti mahallinde gördüler. Kimsenin burnu kanamamış, Dahiliye Nâzır'ı ile İzmir Valisi halkı durdurmak için çabaladıkları halde halk durmuyor ve vagonların üzerine ve aralarına atlıyor ve gidiyor. Hâl ve vaziyeti sefirler hükûmetlerine, onlar da sefirleri vasıtasile Yunan Hükûmeti'ne bildirdiler. Harp önlendi. İzmir civarından da 200.000'e yakın Rum Yunanistan'a gitti.

Trakya'da Rumların tehciri devam ederken Edirne Valisi Hacı Âdil Bey teftiş esnasında suikasde uğramış, yedi yaşındaki yavrusu kucağında vurulup şehid olmuştu. Bir baba için ne büyük bir acı! Fakat Hacı Âdil Bey bu felâketin altında ezilmemiş, coşkun vatanperverliğinin manevî kudretile vazifesi başında dimdik durmuş, işin sonunu getirmişti. Onlar ne metin, ne vatanperver, ne fedakâr insanlardı. İzmir Valisi Rahmi Bey, İttihad-Terakki Cemiyeti Kâtib-i Mesulü de Celâl Bayar'dı.

Item 9: Transliteration of Talât Paşa's coded telegram (BOA. DH.ŞFR 41/37) of 8th of May 1330.

Aydın Vilayetine (Şifre)

7 Mayıs 1330

Venizelosun teklifi üzerine Makedonyadaki ahali-i İslamiye ile Aydın vilayetindeki Rumların mütekabilen mübadele ve hicretlerinin kabulü esas itibariyle kararlaşdırılmış ise de bu karar bir komisyon teşkili suretiyle ileride icra edilebilir. Komisyonun teşkkülüyle karar-ı mezkurun infazı uzun bir zamana mütevakkıf bulunmasına binaen pey der pey vurutetmekde olan Makedonya muhacirin-i İslamiyesinin sadrazam Paşahazretleriyle bilmüzakere kararlaşdırıldığı üzere sahilden başlayarak dahile doğru Rum köylerine müsafir edilmesi ve Makedonyadan muhacirin-i İslamiye vurut ettikçe bu suret-i muamelenin devam–i tatbiki zaruri bulunduğu ve fakat esna-yı iskanda ve mütakiben bu köylere jandarma kuvveti ikame veya seyyar olarak istihdamı suretiyle muhalif-i asayiş vekayi hudusuna meydan bırakılmaması.

8 Mayıs 1330
Nazır: Talât

Item 10: List of the names of the Turkish and Greek interviewees used in this research

Ayşe Melahat Foçalı

Fahriye Ürgüp

Ferit Oğuz Bayır

Georgeos Savvas (Γιώργος Σάββας)

Hüseyin Arslan

Mehmet Peker

Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan

Nicos Vrutanis (Νίκος Βρουτάνης)

Nikolas Chakalos (Νικόλας Τσάκαλος)

Pepa Despina (Πέπα Δέσποινα)

Sofia Giannari (Σοφία Γιάνναρη)

Tasos Giannaris (Τάσος Γιάνναρης)

Tasos Giannaris (Τάσος Γιάνναρης)

Thanaris Papuchis (Θανάσης Παπουτσής)

Vangelis Diniakos (Βαγγέλης Ντηνιακός)

Yorgos Chichiras (Γιώργος Τζίτζιρας)

Item 11: A comparative table of the population statistics of the county of Foçateyn. The years 1921 and 1927 only provide numbers for Muslims (described as Turks) and Ottoman Greeks (described as Greeks). The year 1880 only provides an estimate of the total population.



	1880	1884	1887	1891	1893	1894	1895	1896	1898	1899	1902	1908	1914	1917	1921	1927
İslam	0	3642	3133	3762	3847	3529	3564	3575	3578	3597	3621	3617	7427	8384	3765	8818
Yabancı İslam (Foreign İslam)	0	0	129	0	0	0	0	275	275	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rum (Ottoman Greek)	0	7876	9399	10596	11154	11797	11806	12839	12839	12955	13335	14444	15670	0	13550	0
Yabancı Rum (Foreign Greeks)	0	0	60	0	0	0	0	0	184	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ermeni (Armenian)	0	0	26	47	49	47	34	40	40	42	23	0	0	0	0	0
Yabancı Ermeni (Foreign Armenian)	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yahudi (Jewish)	0	212	86	97	106	100	100	104	104	104	101	70	83	68	0	0
Teba-i Ecnebiye (Foreign Subjects of the Sultan)	0	0	0	0	93	86	84	196	12	12	12	90	0	0	0	0
Bulgar (Bulgarian)	0	0	5	46	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yabancı (Foreigner)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	469	507	507	0	0	0
Total	6137	11730	12854	14548	15299	15559	15588	17029	17032	16985	17561	18728	23687	8452	17315	8818

Item 12: Details of Eski Foça's *Temettuat* (Income) register. Produced from: *Foçateyn Kazası Temettuat Defteri* (1844-1846), BOA, Register Number: 1939.

Larger Occupational Groups	Name of occupation	Total income tax from an occupation group in Ottoman *Kuruş*	Number of registered individuals	Average income of the occupation in Ottoman *Kuruş*
Alîl-i Vücud (Sick and Needy)	Alîl-i Vücud (Sick and Needy)	2433	5	486,6
Farmers	Bağban (Grape Farmer)	122092	194	629,3402062
	Eshab-ı Çiftligan (Large Farm Owner)	38130	5	7626
	Erbab-ı Ziraat (Farmer)	38540	79	487,8481013
Sailors and Caravaneers	Balıkçı Taifesi (Fishermen)	4856	7	693,7142857
	Gemici Taifesi (Sailors)	16106	25	644,24
	Kalyon Reisi (Galleon Captain)	2628	2	1314
	Kayıkçı (Boatman)	782	1	782
	Sefine Kabudanı (Ship Captain)	11653	5	2330,6
	Sefine Taifesi (Ship Crew)	2590	4	647,5
	Deveci (Caravaneer)	7889	9	876,5555556
Artisans	Bakkal Esnafı (Shopkeepers)	600	1	600
	Berber Esnafı (Barber)	1867	2	933,5
	Çoban (Shepherd)	485	1	485
	Değirmenci Esnafı (Windmill Artisan)	3675	4	918,75
	Eskici (Secondhand Dealer)	2256	3	752
	Gündelikçi (Cleaners)	1770	2	885
	Hammal Taifesi (Porters)	685	1	685
	Helvaci Esnafı (Helva Artisans)	3262	2	1631
	Hizmetkar Taifesi (Servants)	6734	13	518
	İmam	4334	4	1083,5
	Kahveci Esnafı (Coffee Atrisans)	4121	5	824,2
	Kalafat Esnafı (Caulker)	18876	17	1110,352941
	Kalaycı (Tinsmith)	807	1	807
	Kasab (Buthcher)	7995	8	999,375
	Memur (Civil Servant)	5463	4	1365,75
	Nalband (Farrier)	1738	2	869
	Seherci	2805	2	1402,5
	Tamirci (Repairman)	1200	2	600
	Yazıcı (Clerk)	920	1	920
Irgat Taifesi (Day Laborers)	Irgat Taifesi (Day Laborers)	11912	23	517,9130435
Mülazım (Lieutenant)	Mülazım (Lieutenant)	15146	1	15146
Topçu Neferi (Cannoneer)	Topçu Neferi (Cannoneer)	2687	11	244,2727273
		778,1098655	446	
		Total income tax	Total number of registered individuals	

Item 13: Ottoman call to arms pamphlet. This pamphlet is clearly identical to the pamphlet used by Yiakoumis as discussed in footnote 471. Last part of the pamphlet was hand written in order to fill the exact date of mobilization upon recieveing order. Originals versions of this pamphlet can still be found in various museums in Turkey. For an example see: http://www.jandarma.gov.tr/jandmuze/?BY=03

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Photographs:

Photographs used in this research are either from the above-listed archives, from the private collection of the author or from the publications of *Éditions Kallimages*. Each individual photograph has a relevant footnote designating its source. Please consult the references of the relevant *Éditions Kallimages* publications for the source of the original photographs.

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Curriculum Vitae

Emre Erol was born in 1984 in Izmit (Turkey). He graduated from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabancı University (Istanbul) in 2007 with honors. Subsequently he enrolled to the M.A. program of History at the same university with full scholarship. He completed his thesis titled *Reproaching Hüseyin (İştirakçi) Hilmi: An Ottoman Socialist in Early 20th Century* and received his M.A. degree in 2009 from the History program in Sabancı University. He is expected to defend his doctoral dissertation on the 9th of September 2014 at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. He has been teaching a variety of courses at the University of Leiden since 2009, in the Middle East program, in the program of International Studies in 2013 and at the International Honours College of Leiden University since fall 2013. He is currently affiliated with the Leiden University Institute of Area Studies (LIAS) / Middle East department. His main areas of interest are the late Ottoman history, modern Turkish history, migration and capitalism in the Eastern Mediterranean, comparative Area Studies and nationalisms.

Samenvatting

Allereerst tracht ik vast te stellen wat kenmerkend is aan Foçateyn gedurende de overgangsperiode die begint vanaf de lente van 1914. Door de tegenstelling met de voorgaande gang van zaken in beeld te brengen, wil ik de aard van deze overgang die vanaf juni 1914 begint laten zien. In hoofdstuk 1 brengt dit het verhaal van de opkomst van Eski Foça als een explosief groeiende stad over het voetlicht, op een moment waarop de markten als een mondiale kracht ook hun weerklank vinden in de ontwikkeling van het district. Ik toon aan dat Foçateyn een van de eerste Osmaanse havensteden was die wordt geïntegreerd in de wereldeconomie. Halverwege de negentiende eeuw kwam Eski Foça, het centrum van het district, op als een groeiend en zichzelf ontwikkelende entiteit. De geschiedenis van de ontwikkeling van de zouthandel in het district biedt veel inzicht in de aard van de integratie in de wereldmarkt en laat zien dat de ontwikkelingen in Foçateyn synchroon liepen met die in de wereldmarkt geïntegreerde havenplaatsen en havensteden in het Oostelijke Middellandse Zeegebied.

In het tweede hoofdstuk verschijnt de staat, de tweede grote mondiale kracht, als de belangrijkste speler in de geschiedenis van het district Foçateyn. De hoeveelheid kennis en controle die door middel van de Osmaanse staatkundige hervormingen werd geproduceerd, met inbegrip van infrastructuur en het nieuwe juridische raamwerk die opkwamen na de hervormingen, is eveneens een drijvende kracht in het proces van integratie. Ironisch genoeg droegen de hervormingen, die werden geïmplementeerd om het centrale gezag te versterken, bij aan het proces van integratie en schoten aldus aan hun doel voorbij. Deze tegenstrijdige aard van de integratie van Foçateyn vindt uiting in demografische mutaties en ruimtelijke veranderingen.

In het derde hoofdstuk onderzoek ik de betekenis van de specifieke historische ontwikkeling van Foçateyn, zowel voor de inwoners als het Osmaanse machtscentrum. Dit behelst een stap buiten de discussie van grotere veranderende krachten zoals de staat en de markt en een focus op lokale dimensies. Met aandacht voor de drastische veranderingen die aan de horizon van juni 1914 liggen, gebruik ik

een voorzichtige beschrijving om retrospectieve interpretaties te voorkomen. Foçateyn werd een interculturele entiteit met een kosmopolitisch karakter. Verschillende vormen van nationalisme doemden op aan de horizon, maar coëxistentie en toenemende interactie waren de dagelijkse realiteit. Vormen in architectuur die de waarden van de middenklasse vertegenwoordigden, begonnen te overheersen, vooral in de explosief groeiende stad van het district, Eski Foça. Veel oudere inwoners van Foçateyn memoreren deze periode als een *Belle Époque*, maar deze dient niet te worden geconstrueerd als een kosmopolitische utopie, noch als een staat van voortdurende twist en conflict. Ze was veeleer een fragiele habitat die door moderniteit werd getransformeerd. Ze had het potentieel om net zo veel co-existentie als conflict voort te brengen. Het voortbestaan van deze habitat was afhankelijk van de integratie van Foçateyn in de wereldmarkt. Er waren geen duidelijke relaties met de transformatie die vanaf juni 1914 begon plaats te vinden en de wijze waarop Foçateyn opkomt als een entiteit in ontwikkeling. De geschiedenis van integratie en door de staat geleide modernisering in Foçateyn leidde met andere woorden niet noodzakelijkerwijs tot de transformatie in 1914. Er waren simpelweg geen grote of langdurige interetnische of intercommunautaire spanningen, geen gewelddadige pogingen van het Osmaanse centrum om de macht (die door de markten werd betwist) te herstellen, maar een kwetsbaar systeem van onderlinge afhankelijkheid, ontwikkeling en interculturalisme. Hier stel ik de toepasselijke vraag: waarom vond een dergelijke gewelddadige transformatie dan plaats?

In 1913 greep een specifiek netwerk van jonge, imperiale bureaucraten de macht en kreeg een eigenaardige ideologische tak de overhand in het Osmaanse Rijk. In mijn vierde hoofdstuk presenteer ik een raamwerk om de aard van de transformatie die in het Osmaanse centrum plaatsvond te begrijpen en bediscussiëren. Ik bespreek de geschiedenis van de opkomst van de Unionisten na de Balkanoorlogen en stel dat het inderdaad de Balkanoorlogen, de ervaringen van de Unionisten met de Macedonische Kwestie, de karakteristieke vorm van nationalisme die rond die tijd opkwam en de nieuwe politieke en diplomatieke realiteiten die een Osmaans centrum lieten ontstaan. De Unonisten, als nieuw centraal machtsblok, constateerden dat de aard van de Osmaanse kust, het multiculturalisme en de geïntegreerde structuur problemen waren die urgent aandacht behoefden.

In het vijfde hoofdstuk bespreek ik de gebeurtenissen van de lente van 1914, die de transformatie van een imperiaal district naar een nationaal district op gang brachten. Dit is een monografische poging om de gebeurtenissen te reconstrueren op basis van zo veel mogelijk bronnen. Allereerst presenteer ik alle aanwezige details gerelateerd aan wat ik de lente van georganiseerde chaos in juni 1914 noem. Vervolgens betoog ik dat de Unionisten de verdrijving en vlucht van de Osmaanse Grieken uit het district Foçateyn organiseerden. Hiermee hoop ik de lezer transparantie te bieden om zo een beoordeling te maken van mijn argumentatie. De motivatie achter de verdrijvingen was politiek van aard en doet denken aan het nationalistische demografische beleid van deze periode. De lente van georganiseerde chaos in Foçateyn biedt een van de vroegste en meest uitvoerig gedocumenteerde voorbeelden van de demografische campagnes die door de Unionisten werden uitgevoerd. Deze analyse werpt licht op de grondbeginselen van het radicale beleid van demografische constructie en vernietiging, dat later zou plaatshebben. Ik betoog ook dat de maand juni van 1914 in Foçateyn een concrete historische casus biedt die de dynamiek van de Macedonische Kwestie verbindt met het grotere proces van vorming van de natie-staat tijdens het bewind van de Unionisten.

De transformatie die vanaf juni 1914 plaatsvond in Foçateyn was slechts het eerste hoofdstuk in een periode van acht jaar onrust die een litteken heeft achtergelaten in de geschiedenis van zowel Foçateyn als het Osmaanse Rijk. In het zesde hoofdstuk wordt de resterende periode van deze transformatie besproken. De hele periode, vanaf de lente van 1914 tot het formele einde van de Grieks-Turkse oorlog in 1922, wordt beschouwd als een voortdurende periode van oorlog die het district Foçateyn heef beïnvloed. Tijdens deze periode vond er een toename van oorlogsschade plaats en groeide het aantal vluchtelingen met ieder nieuw hoofdstuk van conflict. Een raamwerk dat deze hele periode als een monolithisch hoofdstuk beziet, maakt het mogelijk om gebeurtenissen die in nationale geschiedenissen worden behandeld in een vacuüm. De lente van georganiseerde chaos in 1914 was verbonden met de Griekse invasie in Anatolië in 1919 die weer is verbonden met de herovering van Anatolië door de Turken in 1922. Uiteindelijk raakte Foçateyn in 1922 ontvolkt en

werd de explosief groeiende stad (Eski Foça) grotendeels verwoest en was het niet langer onderdeel van de wereldmarkt.

De epiloog biedt een kort overzicht van de eerste jaren van Foçateyn (tegenwoordig Foça) ten tijde van de Republiek Turkije bij wijze van contrast met de stand van zaken voor 1914. In de epiloog bespreek ik mijn conclusies, mogelijke implicaties van dit onderzoek en een toekomstige onderzoeksagenda.