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Branding the Chilean nation : socio-cultural change, national identity and international image

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CHAPTER 1

Nation-Branding, National Identity and Cultural Change

Introduction

‘We believe we constitute a country but the truth is we are just a landscape’¹ Chilean poet Nicanor Parra wrote, putting in a nutshell a crucial element in the formation of ‘Chileanness’: nature. A crazy geography² that is at the same time a fertile province,³ a continental cornice under constant threat, shaken by periodical cataclysms, located at the end of the Earth and at the southern extreme of all oceans,⁴ *Chilli*, ‘the place where the land tops off’ as the *Aymaras* called this area of the world.⁵ Separated from the rest of the planet by its northern desert, looking at the Southern Pole’s ice, soaked by its western ocean and flanked by an immense cordillera, such a country should be called an island.⁶

Chile has been an isolated piece of land, a self-contemplating country, hardly mentioned in the world press except for its wines, Salvador Allende’s tenure and its aftermath, General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. A sort of laboratory of world ideologies, it has evolved from being an extremely isolated nation to a country that participates fully in the globalized world, although playing a small role. Nevertheless,

¹ Nicanor Parra (1969) *Obra Gruesa*. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, p. 247. All the translations from Spanish into English in this thesis have been done by me.

² B. Subercaseaux Z. (2005) *Chile o una Loca Geografía*. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria.

³ De Ercilla y Zúñiga, Alonso (1964) *La Araucana*. Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, Canto 1, p. 3

⁴ A. Edwards in C. García-Huidobro (2008) *Tics de los Chilenos. Vicios y Virtudes Nacionales Según Nuestros Grandes Cronistas*. Santiago: Catalonia, p. 175.

⁵ H. Pérez de Arce (2006) *Los Chilenos en su Tinto*. Santiago: El Mercurio- Aguilar, p. 19.

⁶ B. Subercaseaux S. (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 59.

granting that the country is scarcely known around the globe, the changes that it has undergone in the period analysed in this dissertation—from 11 September 1973 to 11 March 2010—have been a matter of study and debate among national and foreign scholars, as well as among the political and economic elites.

As explained in the introduction, this thesis aims to study such transformations, assuming, firstly, that the agents of change have been neo-liberalism and a reformed Chilean political Right that recanted its statist views on the economy and society; and secondly, that the Chilean political Left—concomitant to the decline of the world's real socialism and undergoing the experience of exile—shifted its socio-economic stance, accepting the benefits of democracy and economic freedom. As I also pointed out in the presentation of this study, whilst exploring this general frame, I will pay special attention to three specific questions, namely, Chile's identity, the country's social, political and economic transformation, and its image, both in the sense of the Chileans' self-awareness and of how Chile is perceived by others abroad.

In order to explore the factors mentioned above, it is necessary to examine several related concepts, which will be addressed in this chapter. Thus, Section 1.1 will study topics such as nation, national identity and national culture and will then specifically look at some of Latin America's and Chile's identity traits. Afterwards Section 1.2 will consider what it is to be modern and how it is that societies change. For the purposes of this thesis, modernity will be treated from the point of view of socio-economic and political development. In this section I will also revise several historic events that I consider decisive in the country's evolution towards modernity. Finally, Section 1.3 examines the art of branding nations considering that there is a nation-branding process that I call 'classical' when referring to the process of nation-building. There also is a contemporary nation-branding that despite having the same elements as the classical, has a marked commercial angle and relates more to international relations than to building a national state. These ideas are concretely studied in the case of some countries, Chile among them.

Some of the ideas presented above may need further development before moving on to the main points of Chapter 1. A national brand is to be understood as a specific area of a given country's image. In the coming chapters both related concepts, brand and image, will be used when referring to how Chile is perceived by other nations and when referring to its efforts to reflect a positive representation of itself outside its frontiers. The idea of image will also be used when referring to the Chileans' self-perception, which comes to operate in tandem with the existence of a Chilean identity and idiosyncrasy. Image and identity are also connected through nation-branding

given that this process selects historical facts, psychological traits, behavioural trends, and the like—all of which form part of an identity—in order to build a message to be conveyed. Besides, the very fact of selecting aspects of nationality to pass them on to others contributes to Chile's identity-building.

Chile's quest for modernity has implied a cultural transformation that goes hand in hand with the arrival of neo-liberalism in the early 1970s. This has changed mentalities, life styles and has accelerated socio-economic progress. In order to understand these changes it is important first to define the concepts of culture, identity and modernity that will be used throughout this study. Chapter 1 addresses their connotations and selects the following strands: firstly, culture should be understood as a distinct way of life common to a given society and thus present in the lifestyles of its members. Secondly, identity is used in the sense of the manner in which people define themselves through symbolic contacts and associations with others. Thirdly, modernity will be used in its empirical aspect, i.e. tracing specific features which, following the opinion of experts in the field, attest to the development of a modern society. The concept of modernity will also be understood as identified with consumption and the advent of a society that fosters and has the material base to make a consumer culture thrive.

The chapter scans through the opinions of relevant social scientists that have stamped their views on the Chilean character, highlighting the important influence that geography has had in its formation. Finally, Chapter 1 pans along Chile's history, choosing a few historical milestones that show the nation's path towards modernity. They also exemplify how this process has been led by exogenous ideas and forces, even though Chileans have adapted them to their needs.

1.1 National Identity in a Mirror: What We Are and What We Are Not

In this section I shall address several key notions such as nation, national identity and culture. I will also try to show the most common beliefs about what it is to be Latin American and Chilean, in the knowledge that identities are not metaphysical realities; they do not have an immutable essence but are rather a set of historical characteristics, a shared history.⁷ Nationality, culture and identity are concepts loaded with an ample

⁷ 'Sol Serrano y el Apego que Tienen las Nuevas Generaciones a lo Chileno', *El Mercurio*, 29 September, 2007.

array of meanings developed by diverse schools of thought which disagree quite strongly from one another.⁸ After defining these concepts I will revise some of the psychological traits attributed to Latin Americans in general and Chileans in particular.⁹

The idea of a world divided into nations —or nation states as they will also be referred to in this thesis— is fairly new. In fact, the history of humanity has seen the rise and fall of empires, kingdoms and city states just to name some of the planet's many historic forms of political organizations. It is mostly agreed that it was only during the European Enlightenment that the idea of each nation having the right to an independent and sovereign government developed.¹⁰ Thus, that humanity should be naturally divided into nations is a modern political idea.¹¹

Anthony D. Smith defines nations as a portion of human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, common economy and legal rights and duties for all members.¹² This definition is in line with that given by Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, although they do distinguish between what they call the nation's 'parent terms', i.e. state and nation. In their view, the state refers to the political organization that displays sovereignty within geographic borders and in relation to other sovereign entities. On the other hand, nation refers to a population that shares a common culture, language and ethnicity with a strong historical continuity.¹³

In my opinion, these definitions integrate the two main lines of discussion regarding the concept of nation: what Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Karin Liebhart call the political nation by an act of will and the nation defined by culture

⁸ See A.D. Smith (1991), B. Anderson (2006), B. Subercaseaux S. (1999).

⁹ H. Godoy (1976) *El Carácter Chileno: Estudio Preliminar y Selección de Ensayos*. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria and J. Gissi (2002) *Psicología e Identidad Latinoamericana. Sociopsicoanálisis de Cinco Premios Nobel de Literatura*. Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile.

¹⁰ See A.D. Smith (1991), B. Anderson (2006), B. Subercaseaux S. (1999). There are authors —such as Hagen Schulze— who situate the origins of nations towards the end of the Middle Ages and beginning of the Renaissance. See H. Schulze (1996) *States, Nations and Nationalism. The Making of Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 37-38.

¹¹ B. Subercaseaux S. (1999) *Chile o una Loca Historia*. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, p. 48.

¹² A.D. Smith (1991) *National Identity*. Nevada: University of Nevada Press, p. 43.

¹³ I. McLean and A. McMillan (2003) *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 364.

often linguistically demarcated and ethnically based.¹⁴ Nevertheless, these authors do find Smith's definition —and by the same token McLean's and McMillan's— quite 'problematic' as it assumes the existence of a collective group preceding the development of the nation or nation state¹⁵ which, in my view, implies the existence of historical facts that enroot the birth of a nation in real data.

In effect, one of the reasons why I adhere to these definitions is that I ascribe to the idea that the nation, national identities, national values, cultural changes and a nation's self-image as well as its international reputation (including the nation-branding process to be studied in section 1.3) are not absolute artificial constructs but do have a hold in historical realities and on the interaction of those who form the national community. Thus, although recognizing the importance of subjective or artificial human intervention surrounding the features mentioned above, their creation is only part of their whole formative process. I do not believe that a nation is so fixed in an external reality that any change or intervention would mean its destruction, thus denying the possibility of evolution. On the other hand, neither do I believe that a nation is only an imagined construction, a fiction created by intellectual elites that convince a group of people that they belong to a given national community. In my view, the above mentioned definitions of nation —which consider the existence of a group of humans who share a territory, have a common political and legal apparatus as well as certain beliefs as regards their community— escape both from the straitjacket of essentialist conceptions and the detachment from reality of the more constructivist approaches.

If a person asks her/himself who she/he is, that individual is questioning her/his identity. In a similar manner, when hundreds, thousands or millions of people who have never met face to face but have a conscience of community¹⁶ ask themselves who they are, what makes them Mexican and not Paraguayans, they are getting into the deep waters of national identity. Made visible through maps, anthems and flags, football matches and presidents,¹⁷ a nation's identity is quite difficult to define. A traditional approach to the issue considers identity to be a set of more or less fixed

¹⁴ R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart (2009) *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 18. Also see Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁵ R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁶ B. Anderson (2006) *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, p. 6.

¹⁷ S. Radcliffe and S. Westwood (1996) *Remaking the Nation. Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America*. London: Routledge, p. 2.

features linked to a certain territory and kin.¹⁸ Thus, the traditional approach implies an essentialist and immovable conception of identity.¹⁹ In fact, this approach can be quite deterministic and deny change and evolution.²⁰ Besides, it does not consider the heterogeneity of the ways of being and the multiplicity of expressions of social life present in a nation.²¹

A second school of thought —that tends to ascribe to postmodern philosophical principles²² and also has constructivist elements—²³ considers national identity as something that lacks substance,²⁴ an imagined construct,²⁵ generated and reproduced through discourses,²⁶ a sense of belonging based on invention and largely led from above, from elites —mainly intellectuals and historians—²⁷ that somehow ‘educates’ the ‘people’ in what the nation’s identity should be.²⁸

The way that I feel comfortable with when looking into national identities is to a certain extent a middle way between the two schools of thought mentioned above. On the one hand I consider that the concept precedes discourse in the sense that I consider there are several historical features —traditions, languages, shared historic memories, a territory judged to be national— which are vivid and phenomenological testimonies of the existence of non-artificially constructed national traces. On the other hand, I believe that this stance is perfectly compatible with the creation of myths mainly by stressing and selecting historical facts and imagining some aspects of the national community. Thus, a nation’s identity would firstly connect to realities that exist independent from subjectivity. It would also entail the narration of a community which implies an intellectual and symbolic construction²⁹ in which individuals define

¹⁸ Given that the word identity derives from the Latin *idem* —meaning ‘the same’— the fact that the notion of identity implies a certain no-change is not surprising.

¹⁹ B. Subercaseaux Z. (1999) *op. cit.*, pp. 40-42. Also see J. Larraín (2001) *Identidad Chilena*. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, pp. 181-209.

²⁰ R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart, *op. cit.*, p.11 and 15.

²¹ B. Subercaseaux S. (1999) *op. cit.*, p. 42.

²² J.J. Brunner (1994), *Cartografía de la Modernidad*, Santiago: Dolmen Ediciones.

²³ J. Larraín (2001), *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁴ B. Subercaseaux S. (1999) *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²⁵ B. Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

²⁶ R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

²⁷ B. Subercaseaux S. (1999) *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²⁸ S. Radcliffe and S. Westwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-79.

²⁹ See B. Subercaseaux S. (1999), *op. cit.*, p. 46. and J. Larraín (2001), *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

themselves through the symbolic interaction with others, including linguistic expressions, actions, objects through which individuals communicate and share experiences.³⁰

This view of national identity denies an essentialist static view of history.³¹ On the other hand, it does accept the reality of historical features, languages and so on, which have an existence beyond the subject, taking into account that the acts of individuals contribute to forge that identity.³² Finally, this perception also accepts a more relational view of the identity by which a nation's self-perception is also forged in comparison with others. Thus, Chile's inveterate conception of being the *finis terrae* has been mainly constructed on the perception of existing far away from Europe.³³ Finally, this half-way vision of national identity matches with the elements included in McLean's, McMillan's and Smith's definition of nation, i.e. a portion of human population that shares a historic territory, has common myths and historical memories, has developed a mass public culture, and counts on institutions such as a common economy, and a legal and political system for all members.

A sense of national identity is an important means of positioning individual selves in the world 'through the prism of the collective personality and distinctive culture. It is through a shared, unique culture that we are enabled to know "who we are" in the contemporary world'.³⁴ In fact, culture has a central significance in the discussion of nationality and national identities.³⁵ The term culture is often taken as fine arts, literature, music and intellectual activity in general. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present study it will be considered as a given way of existence, socially shared and present in the lifestyles of common people,³⁶ which contains certain standards of behaviour³⁷ and forms a system of attitudes, values and knowledge transmitted from one generation to the next.³⁸ Despite being different notions, culture and identity are deeply linked given that both imply symbolic constructions through which individuals

³⁰ J. Larraín (2005) *¿América Latina Moderna? Globalización e Identidad*. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, pp. 89-90. Also see B. Subercaseaux S. (1999), *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46 and J. Larraín (2001) *op. cit.*, p. 15.

³¹ J. Larraín (2001), *op. cit.*, p. 15.

³² J. Larraín (2001), *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³³ B. Subercaseaux S. (1999) *op. cit.*, p. 46.

³⁴ A. D. Smith (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁵ R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³⁶ J. Larraín (2005), *op. cit.*, pp. 88 y 90.

³⁷ F. R. Viveló in R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³⁸ R. Inglehart (1997) *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 15.

communicate—in the case of culture—and build a narrative about the self—in the case of identity.³⁹

Continuing with the topic of national identity and culture, I will now examine what is commonly understood to be the traits of Latin America's and Chile's distinctiveness. "America is one and double, paradoxical and harmonious, a land of perpetual strife... America of anguish, of infinite agony, our America, Indian and Spanish, endlessly seeking her self-definition, fighting against herself and others".⁴⁰ As Jaime Eyzaguirre expresses in this piece of poetic prose, the great heterogeneity of the continent's countries and the reality of a changing region does not prevent the existence of a Latin American identity.⁴¹

The majority of Latin American countries share the colonialist language—Portuguese in Brazil, Spanish in almost all the others—the Roman Catholic religion and tradition as well as a Luso-Hispanic administrative system. The fact of having been colonized by European powers left not only a *mestizo* race but also a *mestizo* culture, not totally European and not totally native: this area of the world would be something like a first cousin of the Western world.⁴²

The links with the West—which started five hundred years ago—have been traumatic since the relationship with the European culture—which did intend to replace the indigenous culture—was always asymmetrical: dominion and conquest first, then colonization to end in independence. However, the influence of the Western powers—France, England and the United States—remained pivotal.⁴³ This combination of factors triggered the formation of a low Latin American self-esteem⁴⁴ enforced by the incapacity of the region to reach socio-economic development. These realities have triggered the creation of theories—such as the dependency theory—to explain the continent's inability to overcome poverty. Nevertheless, there is an area in which the region has excelled, and this is literature. As Armando de Ramón, Ricardo Couyoumdjian and Samuel Vial have shown, some of the pioneering efforts to strengthen

³⁹ J. Larraín (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁴⁰ J. Eyzaguirre (1969) *Hispanoamérica del Dolor*. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, p. 26.

⁴¹ J. Gissi. *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

⁴² S. Huntington (1997) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone, p. 46.

⁴³ J. Gissi, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁴⁴ F. Ainsa (1986) *Identidad Cultural de Ibero América en su Narrativa*. Madrid: Gredos, p. 62.

a Hispano American identity were developed by philologists and literati who exerted themselves to maintain Spanish as a common language although independent from Spain's cultural imperialism.⁴⁵ Furthermore, in the twentieth century Latin American literature excelled obtaining six Literature Nobel Prizes.⁴⁶

A final trait to be mentioned here is the relation between race and social class. From the early years of the European conquest a sharp distinction along those lines began to take shape, which although mitigated remains to the present day. In fact, if during the sixteenth century most natives were poor in comparison to Europeans, the same happens today: Latin Americans with stronger native or African roots are comparably still poorer than those who have more European blood.⁴⁷ Thus, as pointed out by Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro, in Chile it is more common to find *Mapuche* or Aymara physical features among Chile's poor than in the upper classes.⁴⁸ It is not surprising that a shared idiosyncratic feature in the region should be the tendency to 'whiten' society, as the fact of having more Western features is normally connected to more wealth and a better social position. Thus, if during the colonial period people sought to obtain the legal status of being Caucasian,⁴⁹ nowadays it is not uncommon that citizens change their surnames so to erase traces of indigenosity that might either be demeaning or hinder social and economic progress.⁵⁰

In his book *Identidad Chilena*, Jorge Larraín addresses several questions about Chile's idiosyncrasy and identity within the Latin American tradition. He touches upon its idiosyncrasy seen through Roman Catholic lenses; Chile's position within the Spanish empire as a place of warfare; the particularly strong imprint of its geography in some aspects of Chileans' personality, as well as the strong pride Chileans feel for what they consider are their politically sound and stable democratic institutions, all aspects that will be further developed in the following chapters. Larraín also tackles the psycho-social version of Chileans' behavioural trends. He cites some early twentieth century

⁴⁵ R. Couyoumdjian; A. de Ramón and S. Vial (1993) *Historia de América*. Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, p. 272.

⁴⁶ Gabriela Mistral in 1945, Miguel Ángel Asturias in 1967, Pablo Neruda in 1971, Gabriel García Márquez in 1982, Octavio Paz in 1990 and Mario Vargas Llosa in 2010.

⁴⁷ J. Gissi, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁴⁸ D. Ribeiro (1972) *Las Américas y la Civilización*. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, p. 42.

⁴⁹ 'Jorge Guzmán: Mestizaje: el Estructural Temor de Devenir el Otro', *La Época*, 31 December 1988.

⁵⁰ 'Cerca de Mil Mapuches Cambiaron sus Apellidos por Temor a Discriminación', *La Tercera*, 27 August 2000.

Chilean intellectuals, such as Alberto Cabrero, who consider that their nationals share racially inherited character traits:

From the Andalusians, the lower classes have inherited a frivolity of judgment, carelessness towards the future as well as fatalism; from the native Indians, the same fatalism, alcoholism, the vice of theft and violence. The high classes have inherited from their Basque ancestors a lack of sentiments and imagination, harshness, severity, suspiciousness, insipidity, and calculating selfishness.⁵¹

Nicolás Palacios who wrote *Raza Chilena* in 1904, also has a racial explanation for Chileanness, albeit a more positive one. Intellectual heir to positivists Herbert Spencer, Darwinism and Gustave Le Bon's social psychology, Palacios describes the *roto Chileno*—as the members of the lower classes are known in the country—as a privileged *mestizo* type, born out of the mix of two outstanding warrior groups: the Goths who came from Spain and the native indomitable Araucanians.⁵²

In more recent times, three Chilean sociologists—Hernán Godoy, Cristián Tolosa and María Elena Montt—completed a thorough compilation of most writings done on the subject of Chile's idiosyncrasy. Firstly, Godoy collected essays written by Chileans and foreigners alike about what he calls 'the Chilean peculiar disposition',⁵³ which he thinks is a consequence of the country's isolating geography and its cloistering effect. Secondly, he states that the staunch resistance from the *Araucano* Indians, which prolonged the frontier war, accounts for the continued presence of military contingents throughout the colonial territory. It also triggered miscegenation with local natives: given that very few European women came with the men, an early *mestizaje* took place. In Godoy's opinion, the synthesis of such factors produced three distinctive features among both high and low class Chileans: an unrestricted obedience towards civilian and religious authorities; a patronizing class relation; and a strong identity and inveterate love for their country.⁵⁴

Some values attached to these factors are keenness for political order, respect for the reign of law, political stability and historic continuity, an impersonal form of

⁵¹ A. Cabrero in J. Larraín, (2001) *Identidad Chilena*. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, pp. 158-159.

⁵² N. Palacios (1918) *Raza Chilena: Libro Escrito por un Chileno y para los Chilenos*. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, pp. 61-88.

⁵³ H. Godoy, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

⁵⁴ H. Godoy, *op. cit.*, p. 508.

government—quite different from the Latin American tendency towards *caudillismo*,⁵⁵ relative lack of corruption within the public sphere, pacific coexistence within society and openness towards dialogue.⁵⁶ To these ‘social’ features, the author adds ‘personal’ psychological dispositions, such as serenity in the face of adversity, sobriety, order, great patriotism and hospitality. Nevertheless, not all is virtue: some national vices are envy, servile character, insecurity of self, pessimism and lack of imagination.⁵⁷

Also interesting to mention are Cristián Tolosa’s and María Elena Montt’s findings after an accurate study of 57 works on the Chilean self, several of which coincide with Godoy’s conclusions: love for order, sobriety and moderation; sociability, warm-heartedness and hospitality; great personal insecurity and dependence on others’ opinion.⁵⁸

It is interesting to highlight that, against Godoy’s idea that personal characteristics should not be passed on to social entities, several well renowned historians and sociologists from diverse ideological backgrounds, do coincide with many of Cabrero’s, Tolosa’s and Montt’s findings. Along these lines, historian Gonzalo Vial asserts that geography has left a very important imprint in Chile’s peculiar disposition. Firstly, it made of Chile a segregated piece of land. A consequence of this would be a passion for travelling to overcome the isolating tyranny of oceans, deserts, mountains and ice. It is also apparent in its keenness towards foreigners. Another personality trait which stems from the geographical factor would be love for unity—given that more than 4.000 kilometres separate nationals from Arica to those from Punta Arenas—and order. In particular connection with geography, Vial upholds the view that frequent and strong earthquakes in Chile have nurtured a love for order and stability as opposed to the chaos, death toll and suffering resulting from their violence.⁵⁹

In Cristián Gazmuri’s opinion, Chile’s geographic location definitely has had an effect on the national mind. Positioned in a north south vertical line, until 100 years ago Chile was like a real island, especially during winter: locked up between a rough ocean

⁵⁵ See A. Knight (2005) *Revolución, Democracia y Populismo en América Latina*. Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario.

⁵⁶ H. Godoy, *op. cit.*, p. 509.

⁵⁷ M. E. Montt and C. Tolosa (1984) *Análisis e Interpretación Psicosocial de los Ensayos sobre el Carácter Chileno (1950-1983)*. Santiago: Editorial Universidad Católica, pp. 125-127.

⁵⁸ H. Godoy, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

⁵⁹ G. Vial in A. Soto, (ed.) (2003) *Chile en el Siglo XX. Camino al Bicentenario*, Santiago: Universidad de los Andes, pp. 50-51.

and harsh coastline to the west, and the Andes to the east —almost insurmountable during winter; the *Despoblado de Atacama* to the north and Cape Horn at the southern end, bathed by the most ferocious sea in the world, ‘arriving in Valparaíso was to reach the other side of the planet. Coming to Chile was a total adventure’.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the geographical conditions created a mind frame of periphery, always curious about foreigners —especially if coming from powerful nations— and eager to show off.

In addition, the geological harshness has generated a fatalistic character, always unhappy or unsatisfied with what it has.⁶¹ Several Chilean literati have similar opinions on this regard. Thus, Benjamín Subercaseaux said that Chileans have a ‘depressive psyche’⁶² and are quite incapable of having fun in fairs and merry-go-rounds.⁶³ Also Isabel Allende considers that Chileans are sombre and serious ‘which contrasts with the exuberant temperament so common in the rest of Latin America’.⁶⁴ Stoicism facing catastrophe in this ‘happy replica of Eden’⁶⁵ and tremendous attachment and fondness for the land,⁶⁶ would be two other Chilean characteristics that stem from the national geography. In my view, these two aspects, together with warm heartedness, have combined in the forging of another trait: solidarity. In fact, living in a catastrophe-prone land has forced the people to unite in the common purpose of survival and reconstruction, and has helped them to develop the capacity for working together to overcome adversity.

‘That Chileans are Latin Americans is a self-evident truth for everyone except for Chileans themselves’.⁶⁷ This statement can be constantly confirmed. It is just one of the many contradictions of the complex Chilean psyche; it is present in daily life, it turns up in the press and in casual conversation. ‘It makes me sick when we compare

⁶⁰ ‘Cristián Gazmuri: Lejanía, Aislamiento, Pobreza y Guerra. La Mentalidad Histórica del Chileno’, *El Mercurio*, 22 April 2006.

⁶¹ C. Laborde in S. Montecino (2003) *Revisitando Chile. Identidades, Mitos e Historia*, Santiago: Comisión Bicentenario, pp. 92-93.

⁶² B. Subercaseaux Z. (1939) ‘Apuntes para una Psicología del Chileno’ in *Chile, o Una Contribución a la Realidad*. Santiago: Editorial Zig-Zag, p. 70.

⁶³ B. Subercaseaux Z. in C. García-Huidobro, p. 96.

⁶⁴ I. Allende (2004) *My Invented Country. A Memoire*. New York: Perennial, p. 81.

⁶⁵ ‘Cristián Gazmuri: Lejanía, Aislamiento, Pobreza y Guerra. La Mentalidad Histórica del Chileno’, *El Mercurio*, 22 April 2006, *op. cit.*

⁶⁶ Eliodoro Matte L. (President of Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones, one of the biggest companies in Chile), interviewed on 25 May 2006 and ‘Cristián Gazmuri: Lejanía, Aislamiento, Pobreza y Guerra. La Mentalidad Histórica del Chileno’, *El Mercurio*, 22 April 2006, *op. cit.*

⁶⁷ A. Pizarro in S. Montecino, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

ourselves with Latin America'⁶⁸ reads the title of an interview with Cristián Larroulet, then head of an important right wing political think-tank, who became a minister in Sebastián Piñera's government. These feelings are not exclusive to Rightists: many *Concertacionistas*, i.e. members of the centre-left coalition that ruled Chile from 1990 to 2010, believe the same. Thus, Jorge Rodríguez Grossi, former minister of Economy during the administration of Ricardo Lagos, started off his opening speech during the official launching of Chile's country branding campaign, with the following story: 'A few days ago I was at Paris airport. I started flipping through a magazine and found an article about our country which read "What is Chile doing in South America?" So, what should we do about it....'⁶⁹ That French magazine is not the only publication that feels that way towards Chile. *The Economist* frequently compares Chile with its continental partners: 'Look at Chile. Alone among its neighbours, Chile has achieved sustained high growth';⁷⁰ 'The exception (in infrastructure), as so often, is Chile';⁷¹ and this heading: 'Trouble with the neighbours. Can Chile stay different?'⁷² These publications do not help Chileans to feel Latin American, at least not the elite readers of this British weekly.

Chile's Latin American bonds are uncomfortable, a topic that will be addressed mainly in Chapter 4. Firstly, after almost 200 years of independent life, Chile still has important border problems with Peru and Bolivia, which affect sensitive economic issues. Such may be the case of the fishing industry which would see the best Chilean fishing areas taken away if Peru obtains the sea zone that it claims.⁷³ Secondly, many Chileans perceive that the Latino nations are underdeveloped, have troublesome political systems —not to mention the considerable amount of dictatorships they accumulate—, and they do not follow European behavioural standards.⁷⁴ Chile is simply different, and this assumption has a strong hold in all social strata. Closely linked to this contradictory stance is the deep-rooted desire to 'whiten' the racial Chilean ancestors — i.e. denying *mestizaje*— intending to further highlight the European

⁶⁸ 'Cristián Larroulet Evalúa la Era Lagos y Analiza lo que Viene: 'Me Enferma que nos Comparemos con A. Latina'', *El Mercurio*, 19 February 2006.

⁶⁹ Jorge Rodríguez Grossi, speech delivered on 25 April 2006.

⁷⁰ 'All Good Things Must Slow Down', *The Economist*, 5 March 1988.

⁷¹ 'Stop! Government Obstacles Ahead', *The Economist*, 15 June 2006.

⁷² 'Trouble with the Neighbours. Can Chile Stay Different?', *The Economist*, 18 July 2002.

⁷³ Sergio Lecaros M., (President Duncan Fox S.A. holding, one of the biggest companies in Chile), interviewed on 11 December 2006. Duncan Fox owns some of the largest fishing companies in Chile (e.g. Pesquera Coloso and Pesquera San José).

⁷⁴ A. Pizarro in S. Montecino, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

background, searching for upward social mobility and refuting the most likely origin of blood mixture: rape.⁷⁵ Interestingly, as was mentioned at the beginning of section 1.1, the desire of being white is very common to all Latin American nations. Besides *mestizaje* and the desire to appear as more European, Chileans also share other traits with their fellow Latinos: a common religion and language and also a pervasive diffident and timid attitude mainly when facing developed nations.⁷⁶ They also share with the region a strong longing for development, which I equate with modernity, as will be seen in section 1.2.

1.2 Modernization and Cultural Change

As happens with concepts like nation, culture and identity, the idea of modernity also suffers from semantic fuzziness and is used to name a wide array of issues both in lay language and in the social sciences. Besides, each society that has undergone a modernization process has done so in diverse circumstances and following different ideological guidelines, a fact that adds to the multiplicity of interpretations of the term. In section 1.2 I refer to three important schools of thought that deal with what it is and what it takes to be modern, namely, modernization, world-system and dependency approaches. Then in the same section I try to explore briefly some of the country's main historical milestones in its search for modernity.

A topic addressed by diverse academic disciplines —from sociology to history passing through philosophy, to name but a few— it seems there is not one single description of modernity that embraces it as a unique and coherent whole,⁷⁷ and there is definitely no agreement on what modernity is. Neither is there an agreement as regards its starting point. It is the opinion of Eugenio Tironi that the notion of modernization is normally applied to the formation processes of European and North American societies from the sixteenth century onwards,⁷⁸ although other authors are of

⁷⁵ P. Morandé in S. Montecino, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁷⁶ J. Gissi, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–49.

⁷⁷ J. J. Brunner (2005) Modernidad: Centro y Periferia. Claves de Lectura in http://mt.educarchile.cl/mt/jjbrunner/archives/2005/08/modernidad_cent.html

⁷⁸ E. Tironi (2005) *El Sueño Chileno. Comunidad, Familia y Nación en el Bicentenario*. Santiago: Taurus, p. 163.

the opinion that it began closer to the eighteenth century, during the Enlightenment.⁷⁹ What generates consensus is that modernity was triggered by, and also hastened a rise of secularism and rationality, industrial development and a strong belief in the unstoppable progress of humanity.⁸⁰ This last aspect proved to be wrong. What is more, the past century with its concentration camps and death squads, its two world wars and its threat of nuclear annihilation —put into practice in Hiroshima and Nagasaki— certainly shattered that optimism.⁸¹

The twentieth century saw the rise of several and antagonistic individual philosophers and schools of thought on what modernity is and should be. Thus, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno wrote in 1972 —with the still vivid memory of Hitler and Stalin— that the logic behind the rationality preached by the Enlightenment obeyed to one of dominion and oppression.⁸² Jürgen Habermas kept supporting the project of modernity —albeit with a strong degree of uncertainty— mainly because the material development it helped to create enhanced the chances of survival in terms of a rise in life expectancy and also allowed for higher levels of subjective well-being.⁸³

As for the social scientists gathered around specific schools of thought, such as the modernization, world-system and dependency perspectives, they offer different diagnoses of why poor countries have reached advanced levels of modernity. Yet, they coincide in one aspect: they more or less equate modernity with economic and social development. Thus, modernity would be something desirable given that it would imply, for example, a development of each nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), higher incomes for each individual with its consequent improvement in living conditions and

⁷⁹ M.A. Garretón (2000) *La Sociedad en que Vivi(re)mos, Introducción Sociológica al Cambio de Siglo*. Santiago: LOM, p. 205 and C. Welzel and R. Inglehart (2005) *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 16.

⁸⁰ D. Harvey (1990) *The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell, p. 13; M. A. Garretón, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-206 and C. Welzel and R. Inglehart (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁸¹ D. Harvey (1990) *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁸² M. Horkheimer and Th. W. Adorno (2002) *Dialect of Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

⁸³ J. Habermas (1990) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

a rise in literacy rates.⁸⁴ In short, they imply the achievement of socio-economic and technical standards, in the range of those of Europe and the United States.⁸⁵

The strongly evolutionary modernization theory, mainly developed in the 1950s in a post-war United States, sought to launch third world countries into development by encouraging them to copy American values even to the point of transforming each nation's culture, which was considered a hindrance to development.⁸⁶ The 1960s saw the rise of the dependency school, which opposed the modernization school. In fact, this theory established that the lack of development of poor nations, most of them former European and American colonies, was due precisely to exploitative and imposed economic relationships with the colonizer nations.⁸⁷ The following decade saw the rise of the world-system perspective which, based on the dependency theory and the French *Annales* School, analyses the world historical economic system, distinguishing concentric poles of development: the core, the semi periphery and the periphery, the first of which would contain the developed world.⁸⁸

Alvin Y. So convincingly argues that the three schools have been able to adapt and reinvent themselves by accepting the criticism of their detractors. He even postulates their convergence from the 1980s onwards so that they all have something interesting to say about the process of modernization in the current world. For the purposes of this dissertation, the approach to modernity that, in my opinion, best interprets Chile's process in the period under study—from 1973 to 2010, i.e. from the beginning of the military dictatorship until the end of the Concertación era—is the modernization theory, albeit in its adapted version as explained by So.⁸⁹ According to this theory, it was possible to carry out modernizing processes by applying American ways of development. As we will see mainly in Chapters 3 and subsequently in Chapters 4 and 5, one of the main agents of the modernization course undergone in Chile stems from American academia—the University of Chicago. At its Economics Faculty several Chilean economists were imbued in the principles of neo-liberalism as conceived by

⁸⁴ F. Larraín B. (2004) *Macroeconomía en la Práctica*. Ciudad de México: Pearson, p. 6.

⁸⁵ G. van der Ree (2007) *Contesting Modernities. Projects of Modernization in Chile, 1964-2006*. Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, p. 1.

⁸⁶ C. Welzel and R. Inglehart (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁸⁷ B. Keen and K. Haynes (2004) *A History of Latin America*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, pp. 13-18.

⁸⁸ A. Y. So (1990) *Social Change and Development. Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, pp. 169-260.

⁸⁹ A. Y. So, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-87.

that school and went back to their country eager to have the chance to apply them. Interestingly, this economic model —laden with modernization and developmental principles— was adapted to Chile’s needs and ways, thus fulfilling what So claims in his book: the modernization theory accepted that local traditions and culture did not necessarily hinder development.⁹⁰

The debate over modernity in Chile has normally followed a practical and empirical rather than a theoretical angle. In 1990 José Joaquín Brunner suggested that publications on modernization in this country usually concentrated on specific experiences of modernity, aiming at the elaboration of policy guidelines for the achievement of such forms of modernity.⁹¹ In the same vein, Gerard van der Ree states that this tendency is due to two characteristic of Chilean intellectuals: firstly, they perceive modernity —under its different interpretations— as achievable, thus conducting the debate on practical rather than philosophical or theoretical terms. Secondly, Chilean intellectuals often participate actively in national politics. Consequently it is not surprising that their work should be policy-oriented.⁹² These facts made me choose to approach the study of Chile’s changes towards modernization in an empirical way rather than concentrating on theoretical debates, as will be seen mainly in Chapter 5.

An important aspect that still needs to be addressed before revising some of the main historic facts in Chile’s modernization process is change. In section 1.1 I ventured into the topic of the existence of national identities. In this section I have explored some aspect of what it means to be modern. What remains to be studied is how a given nation can achieve modernity —which, for the purposes of this thesis I have equated with socio-political and economic development— without totally transforming its inherited identity. Four authors that have dealt with this issue are Louise S. Spindler, who works from an anthropological perspective, David Harvey, whose work is based on Marxist premises, and Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel whose works partly adhere to the modernization school. Harvey situates postmodern societies within the logic of advanced capitalism, thus explaining social change as a consequence of economic matters.⁹³ As for Inglehart and Welzel, they also believe that transformation in the economic bases of a society brings about change. In fact,

⁹⁰ A. Y. So, *op.cit.*, p. 61.

⁹¹ J. J. Brunner (1996) ‘Tradicionalismo y Modernidad en la Cultura Latinoamericana’, *Escritos, Revista del Centro de Ciencias del Lenguaje* (13-14). Santiago: FLACSO, p. 304.

⁹² G. van der Ree (2007), *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

⁹³ See D. Harvey (1990).

economic development, cultural and political modifications go together in coherent and, to some extent, predictable patterns. Thus, in post-industrial societies—or societies that are evolving towards that state—when survival issues are solved (people are well fed, they have access to health care and education, etc.), an array of new values on political, religious, social and sexual terms sets in. Thus, socio-economic development brings about cultural changes that make individual autonomy, gender equality, and democracy increasingly likely.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, their view of modernizing change is neither linear nor deterministic nor Western-centred. Furthermore, Inglehart states that although modernization was once concentrated in the West, today the process is global and not necessarily Western as Asian nations have taken the lead in many aspects.⁹⁵ Also, local cultures, traditions and religiosity do not always disappear.⁹⁶ Spindler would agree with Inglehart and Welzel in that the transformation of some societies is not deterministic but discretionary as some groups resist change and others do seek it.⁹⁷ Besides, change would not be a copy-paste process but rather comes about by adaptation and synthesis.⁹⁸ As will be seen in Chapters 3 to 5, these theories of change match the case of Chile's transformation from 1973 onwards.

It is important to establish some characteristics of Chile's path towards modernity. Firstly, the country has been led by foreign powers in its quest for modernity. During the nineteenth century the influence came from Europe⁹⁹ and towards the Bicentennial it came from the United States.¹⁰⁰ Even the first modernity-related event—independence—was not an endogenous movement but was triggered from the outside by the Napoleonic wars. Secondly, Chile has tended to imitate and adapt to its idiosyncrasy the institutions and ideas of developed powers,¹⁰¹ most notably, during the period dealt with by this thesis, from 1973 to 2010.

In what remains of section 1.2 I will briefly refer to three historical periods that I consider important in Chile's formation as a nation and its pursuit of socio-economic development: its independence from Spain; the celebration of its first century as an

⁹⁴ C. Welzel and R. Inglehart (2005), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁵ R. Inglehart, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁹⁶ C. Welzel and R. Inglehart (2005), *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

⁹⁷ L. S. Spindler (1977) *Culture Change and Modernization. Mini-models and Case Studies*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, pp.148-161.

⁹⁸ L. S. Spindler, pp. 143-156.

⁹⁹ J. Eyzaguirre (1969), *op. cit.*, pp. 18-24.

¹⁰⁰ J. Gissi, *op. cit.*, p. 41 and E. Tironi (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁰¹ J. Larraín (2005), *op. cit.*, pp. 24-34.

independent republic (1910),¹⁰² and the political and social tensions that characterized those years; and the last decades of the twentieth century, as Chile was approaching the Bicentennial of the beginning of the struggle to break away from the Spanish empire. These events highlight how foreign ideas and events have influenced Chile's evolution and how this nation has been able to adapt to those impacts more or less successfully.

The Chilean independence from the Spanish Empire was of utmost importance in forging Chile's identity. Naturally, this was accompanied by anti-Spanish-civilization feelings and a search for new cultural icons to emulate. Thus, at the same time as there emerged ever increasing criticism of everything directly related to the Spanish conquest and colonial settlement in America,¹⁰³ the Anglo-Saxon and French societies rose steeply as cultural models.¹⁰⁴ In any case, it was clear that the path towards the much desired modernity was going to be Europe-led, even if in the end it was the child of both Chilean input and Europe's contribution.¹⁰⁵ The influence was not only cultural. In fact, the economic ties with Great Britain during the nineteenth century and the United States from 1900-1920 onwards were obviously important for Chile's economic performance and also had a cultural impact.¹⁰⁶

Much was achieved during the first hundred years of independent life and the Centennial celebrations were partly meant to show Chile's development. What had started as an embryo nation state had matured into a full scale one. It had faced five wars —and won them all— expanded its commercial activity and built a stable political system in contrast to most of Latin America. The first governments created what would become Chile's nation-branding historical 'sign-posts', such as the red, white and blue flag, which was firstly flown in 1818 at the independence ceremonies. The national anthem's lyrics date from 1819 —although they were changed a few years later— and its music was composed in 1820. The final version of Chile's coat of arms was ready by 1834, except for its motto —'by right or by might'— which was added

¹⁰² The commemoration refers specifically to the formation of the First National Government Junta which intended the preservation of Chile for the Spanish monarch Ferdinand VII. 18 September 1810 became Chile's national holiday and has remained as such since 1811.

¹⁰³ J. Eyzaguirre (1969), *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁰⁴ J. Eyzaguirre (1957) *Ideario y Ruta de la Emancipación Chilena*. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, pp. 126-130 and S. Collier and W. Sater (2004) *A History of Chile. 1808-2002*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 40.

¹⁰⁵ J. Larraín (2001), *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

¹⁰⁶ M. Aylwin, C. Bascuñán, S. Correa, C. Gazmuri, S. Serrano and M. Tagle (2005) *Chile en el Siglo XX*. Santiago: Editorial Planeta, pp. 47-48.

in 1910. Even a new word was coined: the former ‘Spaniards from Chile’ or *criollos* started calling themselves ‘Chileans’ upon an 1818 edict.¹⁰⁷

For the Centennial, once the wars against Spain and its neighbours had been fought and won, awareness of being Chilean, part of a territory and of a people, was quite fixed. By then a colonial past, geography, the aforementioned wars, independence from Spain, the construction of a republican state etc., were the bases on which the notion of being Chilean was built. And it was also the root from where the idea of being exceptional shoots.¹⁰⁸ In spite of what had been accomplished, still much had to be done. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the Centennial of the independence was approaching, a feeling of malaise set in throughout society. The first ten years of the twentieth century were marked by acute symptoms of social unrest: the so-called ‘social question’,¹⁰⁹ i.e. the plight of the poor who were living in overcrowded shelters, suffered from all sorts of diseases—especially smallpox—and whose women went into prostitution, started to be strongly heard.¹¹⁰ It is not that these social issues appeared only by the turn of the century. Already in the 1870s the enormous gap existing between the rich and poor attracted a considerable amount of attention and it was obvious during the Centennial celebrations when the glamorous merriments struck a sharp contrast with the misery of the poor. What made the social question more pressing was that the workers from the nitrate fields, far away in the north of the country, and the poor from the urban centres, were not willing to wait any longer for their situation to improve, especially in view of the great fortunes that a small group of foreigners and Chileans were amassing: this had never been seen before in traditionally poor and austere Chile.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ The decree was approved by Bernardo O’Higgins (3 June 1818) and was published some weeks later. It states that “as we do not depend on Spain we should not call ourselves Spanish but Chilean”. See this information at <http://www.auroradechile.cl/newtenberg/681/article-2537.html>

¹⁰⁸ J. Ferandois (2005) *Mundo y Fin de Mundo. Chile en la Política Mundial 1900-2000*. Santiago: Editorial Universidad Católica de Chile, p. 43.

¹⁰⁹ M. Aylwin, C. Bascañán, S. Correa, C. Gazmuri, S. Serrano and M. Tagle, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-77.

¹¹⁰ P. Valdivieso (2005) *La Historia de Chile, la Política Social y el Cristianismo. Dignidad Humana y Justicia*. Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica. This book contains a novel study on socio-political Chilean history from 1880 to 1920 as influenced by European Catholicism on the so-called social question. As for a definition of the concept see pp. 23-38.

¹¹¹ ‘Cristián Gazmuri: Lejanía, Aislamiento, Pobreza y Guerra. La Mentalidad Histórica del Chileno’, *El Mercurio*, 22 April 2006, *op. cit.*

A new working class was beginning to get organized in Chile, although it had already been doing so for decades in Europe. In fact, some of the labour movements in Europe date from the industrial revolution. Although associated with specific historical national particularities, it is necessary to remember the strong proletarian conscience and the consequent social upheaval and violence that arose in Germany, Russia and Spain—to name but a few places—in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In Chile, the number of mutual associations kept growing and by 1910 there were more than 400.¹¹² In addition, metalworkers, railway labourers, printers, etc., organized themselves in labour unions. Along with them came strikes and protests.¹¹³ In May 1903 the Pacific Steam Navigation Company stevedores went on strike and were severely repressed by the navy and army. Casualties numbered about one hundred. Two years later it was the turn of the city of Santiago. This time the protesters were complaining about the price of meat. The crowd went out of control, looting started and general violence broke up. Order was restored by army officials armed with rifles. There were approximately 200 casualties among the workers. In 1906, railway workers went on strike in Antofagasta and many of them were killed by marines. However, the worst tragedy was still to come: it took place in Iquique in 1907 where thousands of nitrate workers and their families went on a general protest demonstration, concentrated in the Santa Maria school. The local military commander ordered an attack with machine guns: the death toll was the highest of all the strikes that had taken place until that date.¹¹⁴

Discontent had also reached the emerging middle class. From colonial times to the early years of the republic, the middle class was almost non-existent and was mainly made up by pauperized descendants of the conquistadores, a few *mestizos*, artisans and few others. Nevertheless, with the arrival of European migrants, the growth of cities and of the state apparatus, the middle class began to emerge and form a class consciousness, giving rise to political aspirations and denouncing—often through its fledgling *intelligentsia*—what this class considered as unacceptable political and social

¹¹² S. Collier and W. Sater, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

¹¹³ Chilean historians often cite the rebellion of Chañarcillo miners in 1834 as a starting point in the history of the country's labour movement. It is possible that there may have been events prior to that year. Nevertheless, these were spontaneous and unconnected actions whereas it was from the 1980s onwards that worker's strikes started becoming more like a national labour movement. For further information see B. Loveman (2001) *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 168.

¹¹⁴ For more information on the labour movements see M. Aylwin, C. Bascuñán, S. Correa, C. Gazmuri, S. Serrano and M. Tagle, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-77 and B. Loveman, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-173.

differences.¹¹⁵ A golden example of this was the book *Sinceridad: Chile Intimo en 1910*, which appeared in 1910, the year of the Centennial. Written by a school teacher under the name of Dr Valdés Cange, the book is a diatribe against the ruling oligarchy and the triumphal war-driven Chile of the nineteenth century. 'We have come to believe that Chile is destined to be a grand military state'¹¹⁶ cries the book, adding that the present social construction had managed to widen the already considerable gap that divided the upper from the lower classes. It bitterly criticizes the Parliamentary regime then in power: with the arrival of independence from Spain, 'we used to have a parody of democracy given that the people did not elect their representatives; but at least these were imposed by an enlightened and responsible authority, which normally chose our leaders from among the best'.¹¹⁷

Those were the words of an intellectual born to the middle class, but his feelings were shared by aristocrats such as Alberto Edwards.¹¹⁸ They are evidence that social discontent was quite widespread throughout society. Thus, it is not surprising that the Centennial commemoration was an uneasy one, even amidst fireworks, parades, gala nights and horse races. To make matters worse, the President of the Republic, Pedro Montt, died shortly before the September celebrations. His interim successor, Vice-President Elías Fernández, suffered the same fate. It was only the third-in-line to power, second Vice-president Emiliano Figueroa Larraín, that presided the official festivities.

'If the Parliamentary period had been the *Belle Époque* of the upper class, the years after the 1930s were when the Chilean middle class came into its own'.¹¹⁹ Not that the aristocracy was left out of the political or the socio-economic game, but it was forced to coexist with an up-and-coming middle class that was holding the Radical governments. As for the working class, its employment conditions improved considerably through the so-called social laws and access to social security. Their living conditions, however, did not progress much either in the towns or countryside. Part of this lack of improvement was due to the vertiginous increase of city dwellers mostly caused by country-town migration. Accordingly, in the span of 20 years, Santiago's population

¹¹⁵ M. Aylwin, C. Bascuñán, S. Correa, C. Gazmuri, S. Serrano and M. Tagle, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-64.

¹¹⁶ Dr. Valdés Cange, in M. Góngora (1986) *Ensayo Histórico sobre la Noción de Estado en Chile en los Siglos XIX y XX*. Chile: Editorial Universitaria, pp. 96-97.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ A. Edwards (1928) *La Fronda Aristocrática en Chile*. Santiago: Imprenta Nacional.

¹¹⁹ S. Collier and W. Sater, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

rose from about 500 thousand to more than 2 million by the 1960s.¹²⁰ The lack of opportunities in the mining industry in the far north and in the countryside forced thousands to move away from the *haciendas* and also from the small patches of land privately owned by some *campesinos*.¹²¹ As the capital was unable to take the pressure of such population increase —neither in terms of housing facilities nor in employment opportunities— the newcomers set up shantytowns mostly around the cities, forming poverty belts. They lacked basic services such as electricity, drinking water and proper medical care. They became city dwellers in search of an urban ‘El Dorado’ and were only able to obtain money through street-vending or getting hold of casual jobs.¹²²

The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed several attempts at national modernization through the implementation of radical reforms of Chile’s structures: it was what Mario Góngora called Chile’s ‘global planning era’¹²³ of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Gerard van der Ree completes Góngora’s vision adding that rather than experiencing alternating periods of expansion and crisis, Chile’s trajectory to modernity —specifically during Frei Montalva’s, Salvador Allende’s and Augusto Pinochet’s governments— has behaved more in the shape of interfering waves.¹²⁴ Thus, the three presidential administrations mentioned above respond to three modernization projects, each of which interacts with the following one, thus contributing to give the next period an original Chilean imprint.¹²⁵ Although each of these presidential periods involved well defined groups of people who held the political power, all of Chilean society participated in the events. In fact, all three of them left a deep mark in the nation’s consciousness, contributing to the modernization of Chile’s historically varying identity, as will be studied in the next chapter.

¹²⁰ M. Góngora (1986) *op. cit.*, p. 243. By 1930, 50.6 percent of Chileans lived in the countryside; by 1940, 47.6 percent; in 1952, 39.8 percent and in 1970, 24 percent only.

¹²¹ S. Collier and W. Sater, *op. cit.*, p. 290-295.

¹²² P. Valdivieso, *op. cit.* Chapter 3 of the book contains a thorough recount of each individual social problem —such as lack of houses, addiction and disease— their impact on society and what was done about it.

¹²³ M. Góngora (1986) *op. cit.*, p. 246.

¹²⁴ G. van der Ree (2007), *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

¹²⁵ Van der Ree specifies a fourth modernizing wave, that of the Concertación era. Although I obviously admit substantial differences with the previous ‘wave’ —Pinochet’s dictatorship— for the purposes of this thesis I study both periods more along the line of continuity of the application of the neo-liberal system which was, in my view, one —if not the main— agent responsible for Chile’s transformation from 1973 onwards.

As mentioned before, the first of the global planning attempts occurred during the 1960s and was externally propelled by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC or ECLAC) and by American President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Although President Jorge Alessandri accepted the latter, it was during Eduardo Frei's mandate that the influence of both ECLAC and America was heavily felt. Alessandri's and Frei's main driving ideas were the need to nationalize the mining companies and the implementation of an agrarian reform.

The second stage of the global planning era was led by Salvador Allende and his Unidad Popular government. While Frei's attempts were externally driven by American ideas, the Unidad Popular was linked to international Marxism in the midst of the Cold War. Allende's government accelerated and radicalized the nationalization of the copper industry and the agrarian reform. In a year and a half, the Unidad Popular had expropriated more land than Frei during his presidential period.¹²⁶ In 1970, 4,093.4 thousand hectares were expropriated; in 1971 expropriations amounted to 2,025.8 thousand hectares.¹²⁷ It is evident that the blow to the aristocratic landowners was to prove fatal for them.¹²⁸

The third stage of the global planning epoch arrived escorted by tanks. When the military seized power in 1973 the Generals knew little about economics. They had to stabilize and reactivate a badly dislocated economy and needed advice, and there was a team of economists eager to give it.¹²⁹ When the 'Chicago Boys', as these economists were later nicknamed, were entrusted with the economic administration of the state, laissez-faire was officially enthroned. At this point it seems important to explain that in this thesis the terms liberalism, neo-liberalism and laissez-faire will be used indistinctively as they all stem from the same root, i.e. classic liberalism.¹³⁰ Thus all these terms come to identify an economic organization that supports free market positions,

¹²⁶ From 1965 to 1970, 3,408,788.3 hectares were expropriated, corresponding to a total of 1,319 farms. It was during 1969 that more of them were expropriated, exactly 314 farms. For further information, see B. Loveman., *op. cit.*, p. 243.

¹²⁷ M. Góngora (1986), *op. cit.*, pp. 255-256.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ S. Collier, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-365.

¹³⁰ Some scholars —Ángel Soto among them— make a difference between the terms 'liberalism' and 'neo-liberalism' stressing that the latter has a pejorative connotation —that of being a dehumanizing ideology— when used by Left wing sectors. Ángel Soto (Director of the think-tank *Instituto Democracia y Mercado*) interviewed on 18 June 2008.

such as free market economy and globalized free-trade. It also stresses the need to avoid state intervention, foster private initiative and entrepreneurial spirit. The liberalism introduced in Chile has the profile of the Chicago School of Economics, which has been one of the main actors responsible for the revamping and popularization of its principles around the world in the last decades.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section and as will be further analyzed in Chapters 3 and 5, neo-liberalism 'installed' consumerism and a consumer society as an identifying feature of modernity.

This consumerist means of experiencing modernity is not only a cultural and ideological phenomenon, but is based on real material and structural changes which have taken place in society. In fact, the strengthening of a widespread consumerist ethos among the population has been intimately related to the neo-liberal economic policies applied by the military government since 1975. These policies deeply transformed the structure of Chilean society and economy stimulating the massive importation of consumer goods.¹³¹

Although there are some intellectuals who will not give any credit to the Pinochet years in terms of Chile's economic development,¹³² it is vastly accepted that the liberal economic planning drove the country into a new phase of solid growth. So much so that when the Concertación gained power in 1990, the general neo-liberal framework—although reformed—was maintained. However, Góngora did not include the 20 years of Concertación administrations for obvious reasons:¹³³ they are more than a mere continuation of the military dictatorship in relation to economic matters.

That money does not give happiness is a cliché that proves quite wrong in Chile. Although most Chileans say that their main source of happiness stems from their family ties, the second factor that weighs more in their felicity is money.¹³⁴ This is not surprising if the levels of consumption prevailing in Chile are taken into account. This is true to such extent that it can be said that the country 'owes' Pinochet an economic

¹³¹ P. Silva in D. Hojman (1995) *NeoLiberalism with a Human Face? The Politics and Economics of the Chilean Model*. Liverpool: University of Liverpool, p. 119.

¹³² P. Politzer (2006) *Chile: ¿De Qué Estamos Hablando? Retrato de una Transformación Asombrosa*. Santiago: Sudamericana, p. 312.

¹³³ Mario Góngora died in 1986.

¹³⁴ 'La Felicidad, Aquí y Ahora', *Revista Capital*, N° 180 (19-31 May 2006).

and state system that, besides contributing to overcome a pervasive poverty, installed consumerism as a new national identity code.¹³⁵

In Roberto Méndez's opinion, in a 20 year time span —from 1985 to 2005— Chile 'hit the nail on the head' and this triggered a tremendous economic and social transformation. Its landmarks have been an important reduction of poverty levels, a considerable influx of people onto the middle class, the cultural assimilation of market economy among the general population, a new entrepreneurial outlook involving the shaping of companies with a global rather than just a local or national scope, and lastly, the appearance of new values such as the pursuit of wealth.¹³⁶ As sociologist Fernando Villegas puts it, "long gone are the years in which it could be said —with a gist of truth— that Chileans...were austere".¹³⁷ In keeping with the onset of the neo-liberal frame, Chile started launching nation-branding campaigns to improve its international reputation and gain space in the world markets. Interestingly, as will be studied in section 1.3, nation-branding is not only a facet of liberalism but an attitude quite spontaneous to nations in order to enhance their own identity and improve their dealings with other countries.

1.3 Nation-branding: Just a Question of Marketing?

Pre-Columbian natives arrived in Chile "pushed by migrations that displace people and force them to move beyond. Only that this time it was not possible to go any further: they had reached the frontiers of the Earth".¹³⁸ A thin sash of land, 4,329 kilometres long,¹³⁹ 180 kilometres wide on average,¹⁴⁰ almost drowning in the Pacific Ocean, shoved into it by the Andes, Chile's population amounts to roughly 15 million people.¹⁴¹ Chile's identity is quite connected to geography, its isolation and distance

¹³⁵ J. Larraín (2001), *op. cit.*, pp. 246-248.

¹³⁶ 'R. Méndez: Cómo Son los Nuevos Chilenos', *El Mercurio*, 14 May 2005.

¹³⁷ F. Villegas (2005) *El Chile que No Queremos*. Santiago: Editorial Suramericana, p. 147.

¹³⁸ B. Subercaseaux Z. (2005) *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹³⁹ The 4,329 Km corresponds to the continental length of the territory, not including the Antarctic territory. If included, Chile's length adds up to 8,000 Km.

¹⁴⁰ The maximum width of the territory —468 Km— is located close to the Magellan Strait, specifically from Punta Dungenes to Islotes Evangelistas (52°21'S). The narrowest area of the country is located close to Illapel (31°37'S) between Punta Amolanas and Paso de la Casa Piedra.

¹⁴¹ The 2002 census establishes an exact total of 15,116,435 million people.

http://www.ine.cl/cd2002/cuadros/1/C1_00000.pdf

from other nations being very much part of the country's mentality.¹⁴² Such seclusion has slowly relaxed with the passing of time and the development of technologies that facilitate international communications and travelling. Nevertheless, I suggest that it was during Pinochet's government that Chile was forced to get in closer contact with the rest of world. Partly, the political isolation that the country had to endure due to the military dictatorship and also the world globalizing trend that developed simultaneously alongside the military regime, triggered the need to go out and tell world citizens that Chile existed. Although these specific topics will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, section 1.3 will study a particular area of these efforts to get into deeper contact with the rest of the planet, i.e. nation-branding.

Chile is not the only state on earth trying to show-off worldwide and selling its attributes on the open market. Nevertheless, although it has taken some important steps towards making itself known in territories beyond its frontiers, other countries have definitely taken the lead. France, Mexico, Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia have built coherent and holistic communicational policies, which have been put into uninterrupted practice for a considerable period of time. Their governments—or rather, several of their governments regardless of ideological stance—have for extended periods of time hired the services of communication experts, branding specialists and professional designers to develop a relevant, realistic and distinctive message to pass on to its nationals and foreigners alike.

It is undeniable that nation-branding has a commercial aspect. This fact makes some academics reject it as they cannot come to terms with the fact that a nation—with all the historical weight that this notion has—may be launched as a 'product' into the global market. Although these apprehensions are understandable, it is not less real that nation-branding is very related to nation-building and foreign policy in an age where global commerce permeates many aspects of a nation's existence. Furthermore, I believe that within the current globalizing cultural trends, nation-branding forces individual countries to re-think what they are and thus aids them not to lose or waste their unique culture. Although I have found no written evidence by any of the experts in the field, I am under the impression that nation-branding should be understood as an effect of globalization that depends on whether globalization itself is accepted or rejected. Taking Chile as an example, on the one hand globalization has pushed

¹⁴² V. Valjalo (2009) *Hacia una Imagen de Chile por los Chilenos. Estudio Metafórico*.
<http://www.imagenpais.cl/frmviewnoticia.aspx?idArticulo=193>

it to deepen its contacts with the globe and, on the other, it has forced it to protect its national uniqueness, nation-branding providing an opportunity to reflect on what Chile has become towards the Bicentennial.

According to Hill & Knowlton's General Manager for South America, 12 per cent of those who answered a survey on Chile's image conducted by this company among Americans said that they thought that this country produces coffee.¹⁴³ This answer, besides being a mistake, may even be considered as offensive by Chileans who do not regard themselves as tropical coffee and samba producers.¹⁴⁴ Juan Capello, the aforementioned Manager from Hill & Knowlton, added that not everything was discouraging as regards Chile's image in the United States. In fact, within an elite group of Americans, Chile is highly regarded for its banking and financial system as well as for its commercial activity and politically sound and stable democratic institutions. Following Capello's information, it can also be said that Chile is quite well known among a wider range of American citizens, which comprises a few million consumers of Chilean wine, fruit or other products. Finally, there is a vast number of Americans who cannot tell Colombia from Bolivia or Chile. And this is not a bad thing, because for many other Americans the name of the country, Chile, sounds just like that of the spicy vegetable and not a nation state, at least not one to be taken seriously.¹⁴⁵

In general terms it can be said that Chile lacks a specific image projection overseas, at least beyond South America's boundaries. Most of those who are able to locate Chile within Latin America just think of it as a mix of Brazilian and Mexican hats, poverty-stricken *favelas*, fiestas and tropical dances. It would certainly be more accurate

¹⁴³ 'Juan Capello: La Imagen de Chile No Ha Avanzado', *El Mercurio*, 8 April 2006.

¹⁴⁴ An example of how disagreeable it is for Chileans to be considered tropical and underdeveloped came about when a James Bond film was shot in Chile in 2008. The movie aroused much public anger as it used Chile's landscape to create a fiction dictatorial and third world nation. A humorous press article commented on the fact that the film did not mention Chile as the location where the movie was filmed: "menos mal. El honor nacional está a salvo, el futuro es luminoso. Bananeros, jamás". 'El Mapa Bond', *La Tercera*, 25 March, 2008.

¹⁴⁵ It is not that American citizens are especially renowned for being knowledgeable in world geography —by the same token, they do not identify where the Netherlands is located. Nevertheless, as Juan Gabriel Valdés S. concluded, 'it is important that a little old American, who lives in Miami and dyes her hair green should know about Chile because she buys our products'. Juan Gabriel Valdés S., (Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 1999 to March 2000. Executive Director *Fundación Imagen de Chile*) interviewed on 10 December 2008.

to say that Chile virtually has no image at all: it is like an empty box.¹⁴⁶ Although this is not very encouraging news, there is no denying that it is much better to have no international reputation at all rather than to have a bad reputation. However, the box must be filled-up with positive and truthful data, with different communicational strategies being designed for each sector of the world's community.¹⁴⁷

This country image-building process is commonly known as nation-branding. In most cases, it implies applying strategic marketing to promote a given nation for commercial reasons, mainly to encourage direct foreign investment and promote tourism as well as support exports. Although economic aims are pivotal to most nation-branding projects, they neither are —nor should they be— the only guiding purpose. In fact, nation-branding differs from commercial branding in that it also aims at creating internal pride and backing diverse enterprises that a nation may undertake. Whilst most national branding programs are aimed at foreigners —as to improve a countries' image in the eyes of the rest of the world— it is equally important to create programmes that target the nation's own people, because a state is perceived through its citizens. In fact, it is their temper, looks, history and endeavours that lie at the core of a national image.¹⁴⁸

As has become apparent, nation-branding is a complex exercise involving a conjunction of disciplines and practices, mainly coming from the social sciences and commercial marketing. Besides, several concepts used within the field of study of contemporary nation-branding are made up by inter twinning terms with ambiguous or equivocal meanings. Thus, for the purpose of studying what nation-branding is, I selected some aspects of what was defined as a nation in section 1.1, which specifically relate to the issue of nation-branding. Thus, nation is considered mainly as referring to a sovereign entity¹⁴⁹ with a communality of sense of belonging to a specific territory and people,¹⁵⁰ sharing myths and historical memories, a mass public culture.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ 'La Mayoría de los Estadounidenses No Saben Dónde Queda Chile', *El Mercurio*, 2 November 2006.

¹⁴⁷ J. Hildreth (2009) ¿De Dónde Eres? Más que una Simple Pregunta' <http://www.imagenpais.cl/frmviewnoticia.aspx?idArticulo=197>

¹⁴⁸ R. Pool in S. Radcliffe; S. Westwood (1996) *Remaking the Nation. Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America*. London: Routledge, p. 16.

¹⁴⁹ I. McLean and A. McMillan, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

¹⁵⁰ Trends: Can a Nation Be Branded? <http://logolounge.com/articles/default.asp?Archive=True&ArticleID=73>

¹⁵¹ A. D. Smith (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 43.

The formation of a country needs a process of nation-building, a concept that will be used throughout this study. It specifically refers to the process of structuring a national identity and achieving the unification of its people within the state —using the power of the state— so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. The nation-building process may use propaganda, major infrastructure development, etc. to encourage social harmony and economic growth.¹⁵² Nation-building needs nation-branding for the promotion of its good reputation within the country—with the purpose of state-building, as described above— and towards other nations, aiming at fostering good political relations with them. Throughout Chapters 1 and 2 some examples of early nation-branding will appear. Although several of the nation-branding experts —especially Ollins— mention those branding episodes and match them or equate them with contemporary branding of countries and places, the former normally do not have the commercial edge of the latter. They can be understood partly as a nation-building effort and partly as a nation-branding process in a more classical angle.

Other key concepts that need to be defined are brand and nation-branding. The former will be regarded as the way in which an organization communicates, differentiates and symbolizes itself to all of its audience.¹⁵³ It specifically refers to a set of signs, including a name and design, which together embody figurative information derived from certain products, companies, services, etc. A brand has an image, i.e. an emblematic construct which exists within the minds of people encompassing all the information and expectations associated with a product.

A brand means to be known, to be valued and loved, with a personal identity (...) it is substance plus feeling, reality and images, truth and imagination, facts and impressions as sensible result of an influence exerted from without. And a good job done in this regard assures that such ideas remain in the minds of people.¹⁵⁴

Secondly, nation-branding implies the way a country is perceived by a given audience. A nation brand carries a delivery promise of several qualities, values and characteristics

¹⁵² CIC/IPA, 'Concepts and Dilemmas of State-Building in Fragile Situations', OECD-DAC, Paris, 2008 in <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf> and A. Whaites (2008) *State in Development: Understanding State-Building*, DFID. London. <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/State-in-Development-Wkg-Paper.pdf>

¹⁵³ S. Anholt (2005) *Brand New Justice. How Branding Places and Products can Help the Developing World*. London: Elsevier, p. 12.

¹⁵⁴ J. Hildreth (2009) *¿De Dónde Eres? Más que una Simple Pregunta*, *op. cit.*

that have been attributed to that country. Within its realms, reputation, image and national identity are also core concepts. They all imply the existence of an image that should be a truthful reflection of a country's reality.¹⁵⁵

Although branding and marketing are closely related, the terms need to be set apart. Branding is the result of marketing consistency. A successful brand encapsulates an expectation, based on a record of characteristics which reflect loosely one or more aspirational values. Whereas these characteristics may include beliefs and idiosyncrasies, these need to be expressed consistently. If branding is introverted, focusing on the nature of the brand, marketing is extroverted and is related to the way in which branding is achieved.¹⁵⁶ Marketing asks the 'how' question, whilst branding relates to the 'what'—the product—question: a brand is the manifestation of a set of aspirational values that are the result of distinct marketing strategies.¹⁵⁷ As we shall see, nation-branding does not aim only at marketing a given country with commercial purposes. In fact, it is practised by most countries and I consider it a form of soft power in the sense that it helps those successful national brands to obtain what they seek by attraction rather than by coercion, force or payment. Thus, they make other states and individuals want what they want,¹⁵⁸ i.e. their nation and its produce, culture, art, etc., not imposing them violently. As will be seen in Chapter 6, this aspect proved to be quite true in the case of the 33 pitmen trapped in a mine in northern Chile.

Research on state branding is not new. Since the 1960s several studies have been carried out on the so-called 'country of origin effect': the effect of the national image on products. Later on, during the 1990s Philip Kotler dealt with the topic in some of his books: *The Marketing of Nations*¹⁵⁹ (which actually has more to do with economic development and government policy than marketing), *Marketing Places in Europe*,¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ S. Anholt (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁵⁶ J. van der Westhuizen, Beyond Mandelmania? Imaging, Branding and Marketing South Africa, p. 4. <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000875/docs/BeyondMandelmaniaImagingBranding&MarketingSA.pdf>,

¹⁵⁷ J. van der Westhuizen, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁵⁸ J. Nye (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Cambridge MA: Perseus Books Group, p. 31.

¹⁵⁹ P. Kotler, S. Jatusripitak and S. Maesincee (1997) *The Marketing of Nations. A Strategic Approach to Building National Wealth*. New York: Free Press.

¹⁶⁰ P. Kotler, C. Asplund, I. Rein and D. Haider (1993) *Marketing Places in Europe. Attracting Investments, Industries, Residents and Visitors to European Cities, Communities, Regions and Nations*. New York: Free Press.

*Marketing Asian Places*¹⁶¹ and finally *Marketing for Hospitality and Tourism*.¹⁶² Eugene Jaffe and Israel Nebenzahl wrote *National Image and Competitive Advantage*,¹⁶³ a book that constitutes an important contribution to state branding studies. Besides reviewing the theoretical underpinning of country image for products, they provide a useful insight on how it can be managed by countries, industries and firms. They state that the perception of a country's image partly determines the brand's marketability, as a form of export or as a place to establish a subsidiary.

Simon Anholt is usually identified as both the inventor and populariser of the concept of nation-branding.¹⁶⁴ He is one of the leading international marketing thinkers and has devoted several of his writings to the country branding issue. Anholt used this term in a paper entitled 'Nation Brands of the Twenty-first Century', which appeared in the July 1998 issue of *Journal of Brand Management*.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, it was a piece of writing which came out in *Foreign Affairs* that attracted the most attention and prompted further discussion on the topic by scholars, people from the marketing industry and the world of consultants. The article was authored by Peter van Ham who wrote about 'state-branding' in his article 'The Rise of the Brand State', which appeared in September 2001.¹⁶⁶

Nowadays most countries try to promote their individual personalities, culture, history and values, by projecting what may be an idealized but immediately recognizable

¹⁶¹ P. Kotler, M. Hamlin, I. Rein and D. Haider (2002) *Marketing Asian Places. Attracting Investment, Industry, and Tourism to Cities, States and Nations*. Singapore: John Wiley and Sons.

¹⁶² P. Kotler, J. Bowen and J. Makens (2006) *Marketing for Hospitality and Tourism* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

¹⁶³ E. Jaffe and I. Nebenzahl (2001) *National Image and Competitive Advantage*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.

¹⁶⁴ Anholt was also the first to publish a world index on nation-branding. Afterwards, several global or world indexes have appeared. They measure the global perception of a country in spheres such as its people's behaviour, its governance, exports, tourism, etc. Some of the best known surveys are: Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index.

http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/nbi_index/index.en.html

Global Peace Index <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/results/rankings/2008/>

The Happy Planet Index <http://www.happyplanetindex.org/>

Country Brand Index FutureBrand <http://www.countrybrandindex.com/country-brand-rankings/>

World Economic Forum, Tourism Competitiveness Index.

<http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm>

¹⁶⁵ S. Anholt (1998) 'Nation Brands of the Twenty First Century' in *Journal of Brand Management* 5(6)

July: 395-406.

¹⁶⁶ P. van Ham (2001) 'The Rise of the Brand State', *Foreign Affairs* 80(5).

idea of their selves. Not that we face a new art: as nations have always competed for power and prestige, branding —although not called that way— has been an integral element in that competition. Wally Olins, one of the world experts in country-branding, holds that the necessity of competing in the world markets has somehow pushed nations to adopt the marketing and branding techniques used with so much success by many global companies. He adds that up to a point, there is an identification process, a symbiosis, between commercial brands and the identities of nations. ‘For many people, Sony is Japan and Japan is Sony. Germany is cool, unemotional engineering efficiency like Mercedes Benz. Italy is stylish like Max Mara’.¹⁶⁷

Both corporate brands and country brands feed on each other rendering it evident that nation-branding has an important commercial and marketing edge. Although it is true that Anholt and Olins write about the non-commercial side of a nation’s brand image —as will be seen later in this section— both match the process of state branding with that of multinational corporation branding. They both create strategic systems or operational models to facilitate the implementation of their branding plans. Thus, Olins suggests a seven-step diagram for governments that want to launch a national branding campaign¹⁶⁸ and Anholt presents his national brand hexagon with a national branding tactical model.¹⁶⁹ Both models could be applied to a country and to an economic corporation.

Nation-branding is a contentious political notion, aiming at measuring, building and managing a country’s reputation to foster better conditions for tourism, trade, foreign investment and also political relations with other states. First world countries spend large amounts of money to praise their virtues and values. Many less pivotal nations in the international arena —such as Chile— have come to understand that promoting themselves is absolutely vital if they want to have a say and be able to have a competitive edge in the global world. In the case of Chile, ‘it is indispensable to increase its prestige in the global society in order to augment the value of all its exchanges, from art to culture passing through tourism and exports of goods’.¹⁷⁰ The problem for states such as Paraguay, Chile or Sri Lanka is that, outside a very small

¹⁶⁷ W. Olins (1999) *Trading Identities. Why Countries and Companies are Taking on Each Others’ Role*, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, p. 13.

¹⁶⁸ W. Olins (1999), *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

¹⁶⁹ S. Anholt (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 118.

¹⁷⁰ J. G. Valdés Soublette (2009) ‘La Asignatura Pendiente de Chile’.
<http://www.imagenpais.cl/frmviewnoticia.aspx?idArticulo=234>

perimeter, no one knows of their existence nor cares for them at all. The opposite is true of famous nations, such as sunny and fun Spain¹⁷¹ or rich and multi-layered cultured Italy,¹⁷² which get caught in strait-jacket stereotypes. At least they profit from these stereotypes as far as tourism is concerned.

Although state branding obviously has a commercial edge, it also deals with many other aspects of a nation's existence. In fact, it is closely associated with the process of nation-building itself and the interpretation of a country's history. Furthermore, whatever the marketing techniques can help to sell, the 'product' itself stems directly from the nation's reality and identity. Thus, fields of study such as history, political science or sociology should deal with the development of a national brand, but they seldom do so. In fact, 'branding places is an emotive subject. Somehow, when the fiendish tricks of marketing are applied to something as sacred as the nation-state, all hell breaks loose. Insults are heaped on the heads of brands, marketers and policy-makers alike — "spin", "gloss" and "lies" are the most commonly heard terms'.¹⁷³ Obviously the marriage between social sciences and marketing is not an easy one.

Nevertheless, the profile of nation-branding has been rising from being a 'recondite academic curiosity'¹⁷⁴ to a respectable matter of research. In fact, it has increasingly called the attention of a range of audiences, including politicians, destination stakeholders, students and academics. Moreover, the construction of a country image is also related to a country's international relations 'which pertain to the innermost core of what shapes a national identity of a state or society, as much as cultural, economic or demographic factors do'.¹⁷⁵ Chile's case is an example. Thus, the 1836-1839 war fought against Peru and Bolivia reinforced a sense of Chileanness.¹⁷⁶ By the same token, it was towards the Centennial, once most international wars had been settled,

¹⁷¹ A. Pedreño (2007) La Imagen de España en el Exterior. Instituto de Economía Internacional in: <http://blog.diarioinformacion.com/tecnologia/2007/04/08/la-imagen-de-espana-en-el-exterior/>

¹⁷² International Cultural Cooperation, 19 February 2010 in <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/italy.php?aid=241>

¹⁷³ S. Anholt (2005) *Brand New Justice. How Branding Places and Products can Help the Developing World*. London: Elsevier, pp. 12-13.

¹⁷⁴ N. Morgan; A. Pritchard; R. Pride (eds.) (2004) *Destination-branding. Creating the Unique Destination Proposition*. London: Elsevier, p. 28.

¹⁷⁵ J. Fermandois, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁷⁶ S. Collier (2003) *Chile: the Making of a Republic, 1830-1865. Politics and Ideas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 41.

that consciousness was further fixed.¹⁷⁷ A key aspect of feeling Chilean was the self-image of exceptionality, a topic that constituted an important platform for Chile's foreign policy and international relations.¹⁷⁸ Almost 200 years later, having already celebrated the Bicentennial, the same exceptionality idea is present in the way Chile deals with other states at foreign policy level and when promoting Chile as a brand.

Although using what many people might consider shockingly commercial language, given that a country is not a company and it would not be ethical to apply publicity techniques to it,¹⁷⁹ nation-branding can also be considered as an angle of a country's international relations policy. Even further, showing the market oriented competitive edge of a nation relates more to developmental national strategies rather than to straight publicity.¹⁸⁰ The latter is not only a state affair but it necessarily involves private and independent actors such as companies and national citizens who through their contact with foreign people help to promote a nation's good name, a nation's main asset in terms of promotion being their own citizens.¹⁸¹

As mentioned above, nation-branding has a strong historical nation-building aspect. As will be demonstrated in this paragraph, it deals with groups of people who feel they belong to a specific territory and people, shared myths, historical memories and a mass public culture.¹⁸² It is precisely working over what structures a national identity—and thus helps to build a nation—that good nation-branding is developed. Olins equates nation-branding to national identity development. He explains that building and remodelling national features is not new, it has always happened throughout history for the sake of diverse political purposes. Far from being a shallow concept, a bad substitute for substantial policy making, 'the creation and establishment of identities has long been a central preoccupation of nations and regimes, often very influential in fixing their legitimacy and hold on power'.¹⁸³ In his opinion, while no nation has

¹⁷⁷ J. Fernandois, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁷⁸ M. Colacrai and M. E. Lorenzini (2005) 'La Política Exterior de Chile: ¿Excepcionalidad o Continuidad? Una Lectura Combinada de Fuerzas Profundas y Tendencias' in *Confines* 1(2): 45-63. Also see F. Fernandois, *op. cit.* p. 43.

¹⁷⁹ Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt: Imagen País y la Ética de la Publicidad', *La Tercera*, 3 April 2010.

¹⁸⁰ Juan Gabriel Valdés S., (Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 1999 to March 2000. Executive Director *Fundación Imagen de Chile*) interviewed 10 December 2008.

¹⁸¹ N. Morgan; A. Pritchard; R. Pride, *op. cit.* p. 10.

¹⁸² A.D. Smith (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁸³ W. Olins (1999), *op. cit.*, p. 7.

been immune to reviving and reinterpreting traditions, aimed at the development of a nation's uniqueness, France has specialized in it.

And where France led, others followed. Nation-building on a truly significant scale dates from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Cultural propagandists, from academics, linguists and historians to musicians and painters, deliberately and consciously invented or revived patriotic traditions (...) The use of myth and history contributes to both national independence and national aggrandizement.¹⁸⁴

The French First Republic changed the flag from the *Fleur de Lys* ensign to the three-coloured flag and introduced *La Marseillaise* as the new national anthem. The Third Republic developed a tradition of admiration of republicanism which was shown through parades, processions and celebration of the Bastille Day which was invented in 1880, almost 100 years after the event had taken place.¹⁸⁵ As for Chile, as was mentioned in section 1.2, national feelings were also reinforced by annual patriotic rituals, by the use of the country's coins and the visible or audible signs of nationality: the flag, the national anthem and the coat of arms.¹⁸⁶

Besides and associated with these signs that make the nation visible,¹⁸⁷ states select historical facts to fit the nation's contemporary demands. Thus, Austria's one-thousandth anniversary of its toponym —first mentioned in a document dated 1 November 996— was greatly celebrated to enhance the sense of nationhood even though a specific feeling of Austrian nationality developed only during the nineteenth century.¹⁸⁸ During the 1980s, the Inca empire gained an increasingly favourable image in Peruvian textbooks in order to stress on the minds of Peruvians the heroic struggle of the national earlier period.¹⁸⁹ In Ecuador, history classes stress the importance of the kingdom of Quito, avoiding to link the country with its Inca past which would tie them too closely to their southern rival, Peru.¹⁹⁰ Finally, during France's Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle

¹⁸⁴ W. Olins (1999), *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ S. Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

¹⁸⁷ S. Radcliffe and S. Westwood, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁸⁸ R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹⁸⁹ G. Portocarrero and P. Oliart (1989) *El Perú desde la Escuela*. Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario.

¹⁹⁰ S. Radcliffe and S. Westwood, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

resurrected elements of both the Monarchical and Republican traditions in order to secure democracy.¹⁹¹

In the same vein as Olins, Anholt also has a non-purely commercial approach to the process of state-branding. Firstly, he stresses that a country is not a product, and while ‘there is huge potential in the enlightened, imaginative and responsible application of product marketing techniques to places, it is certainly not the case that countries may be dealt with as if they were soap powder¹⁹² to be sold in a supermarket. Secondly, he stresses the fact that it is fundamental to acknowledge the value of national culture in itself and as a prime element in the process of enriching a country’s brand image. He adds that ‘culture uniquely provides this extra dimension because, in the face of the consumer’s suspicion of commercial messages, culture is self-evidently ‘not for sale’.¹⁹³

Along a similar line of argumentation Jannis van der Westhuizen explains how nation-branding and policy making are tightly knit thus being a complex art.

Clearly, nation-branding is a far more vicarious, complex and unpredictable branding process, quite simply because ‘selling’ a country —especially in the developing world— is subject to a multiplicity of unpredictable events, perceptions and outcomes. Unlike a product or service, country-branding is an inherently political course of action given the extent to which various stakeholders, civil society, business, labour, consumers and the like, react to the marketing process (...) To assess the development of a brand in this context, is to inherently evaluate the impact that perceptions of foreign policy decisions have in either reinforcing or undermining other marketing strategies.¹⁹⁴

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have explored several key issues that will be touched upon in the following ones. It firstly addressed notions such as nation, national identity and culture. Having concluded that identities are not immutable essences but rather a set of historical characteristics and shared history, the chapter moved on to studying specific

¹⁹¹ W. Olins (1999), *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁹² S. Anholt (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹⁹³ S. Anholt (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 136.

¹⁹⁴ J. van der Westhuizen, *op. cit.*, p.4.

features of Latin America's and Chile's distinctive traits. Although sharing quite a few features —such as the language, religion, the discomfort of being a *mestizo* continent in opposition to the so much admired and hated Western world— Chileans do not feel totally Latin American. In fact, their culture of order, their early achieved political stability as well as the relatively sombre character of Chileans if compared with the temperament of most Latinos, are aspects that set that nation apart from the rest of the region. On the other hand, despite the engraved belief that Chileans have of the exceptional character of their country, its belonging to Hispanic America is undeniable. The identity traits just mentioned —including the self-image of exceptionality— are mainly derived from Chile's harsh geography and colonial past marked by war and isolation. As for the notions of culture, nation and national identity, I suggested that they are best defined when admitting their connection with historical facts rather than viewing them as purely intellectual/rational creations. The trio of concepts should also imply an interaction of the community that originates the strong beliefs in national myths, the construction of symbols, the nation's identity traits and its unique culture.

In this chapter I also tried to clarify the concept of modernity, which has become loaded with so many meanings that it is in danger of denoting everything and nothing. After mentioning three relevant schools of thought on this issue —specifically modernization, world system and dependency theories— chapter 1 continues to tackle the topic of modernization and change. It refers to the case of Chile, mentioning three events —secession from Spain and the celebrations of the Independence Centennial and Bicentennial— which constitute milestones in the country's path towards modernity, equalled to socio-economic and political development. Moreover, Chapter 1 concludes that —at least in the aforementioned schools of thought— modernity equates with socio-economic development that brings about political transformation as occurred in European and North American states. This fact matches the debate about modernity in Chile, which is pragmatic and policy-oriented, modernity being understood as an achievable and desirable socio-economic development.

Finally, I analyzed the contentious topic of nation-branding. Related to multiple disciplines of the social sciences, it is also linked to commercial marketing and acts in tandem with nation-building, i.e. the process of structuring a country's identity. The country-branding efforts undergone by several nations with success, have generated discontent among those who consider that the nation is being treated as a product. Nation-branding is a multifaceted skill connected to what I call classical nation-branding referring to the forging of national identities through nation-building. The term also applies to the current efforts of nations to continue fostering a national identity in a

global world that may endanger local cultures. Thus, globalization has pushed states to deepen their contacts with the globe and at the same time, has forced them to protect their national uniqueness through several means, one of them being nation-branding.

Consistent with Chapter 1, in the following chapter I will present a few nation-branding efforts—in the classic sense— developed by some of the very first Spanish conquistadores and Chilean creoles. In the same way, the next chapter highlights several historical happenings which contributed to develop a national and an international reputation or image, firstly that of Chile *Flandes Indiano* and secondly, that of Chile as an exceptional country. Traits that were mentioned in chapter 1 will be addressed in further depth in the coming section thus developing the idea of the existence of a Chilean identity which has evolved associated with its approach to modernity. Chapter 2 will specifically study Chile's geographic isolation and its impact on the national character, the nation-building process in tandem with the culture of order and endeavour and democratic rule in the nation's self-image.

