# European Union representation at the United Nations towards more coherence after the Treaty of Lisbon

Jin, X.

# Chapter 5 Quantitative Analysis of EU Voting Behaviour at the UN

The first section of Chapter 5 applies a quantitative method to test whether real-world EU voting behaviour has provided empirical evidence that supports the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4, on the basis of a study of the UNGA roll-call votes. The second section presents a statistical description of the voting patterns of the EU members serving on the UNSC. As clarified in Chapter 1, the meaningfulness of analyzing the roll-call data at this forum might be called into question due to its operational limitations. But it will be demonstrated that a summary of the main features of EU voting behaviour at the UNSC is useful for picking out the "unusual" cases that may be worth an in-depth research in qualitative terms.[80]

## 5.1 Overall Voting Coherence of the EU at the UNGA

### 5.1.1 Data Description and Analytical Model

This part of the research assess EU representation coherence – measured by EU voting cohesion – at the UNGA between 1993 and 2012 (i.e., the 48$^{th}$ and 67$^{th}$ Sessions), and explores whether there is essential variation in its extent after the enforcement of the ToL. The time span is between 1 November 1993 – when the Maastricht Treaty officially created the EU – and 24 December 2012, three years after the ToL's entry into force. The UNGA provides an appropriate research environment because EU representation at this level is fairly well developed and the UNGA roll-call data are relatively well-documented. With these data, it is possible to identify the pattern of EU voting behaviour both over a long period and during a particular interval, e.g., before and after the Lisbon. Accounting for the EU's voting cohesion across different sizes of membership and a wide range of issues areas is also achievable. Furthermore, the statistical approach enables a comparison between the EU and other regional organizations at the UNGA, or even the entire UNGA membership.

The data of this analysis are partially derived from the datasets created by Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009), which contains the votes cast by every member state of the UNGA on all adopted resolutions from 1946 to 2008. This study selects the voting records starting from 1993 in their compilation, but expands data collection to include the votes until 24 December 2012, which were retrieved from the UNBISnet and the

[80] Vote defection from the majority on UNSC resolutions has been rare for EU members. It is of great interest to dig the cause why an EU member chose to vote differently from the others.

ODS. Only votes cast on entire resolutions will be considered in the subsequent analyses.[81] With the data collected from the latest two UNGA sessions, this dissertation contributes to providing updated explanations for the voting behaviour of the EU within this body.

Voting cohesion is computed based on the number of affirmative, negative and abstaining votes. Scholars disagree with how to code abstentions (e.g., van Kampen 2007; Hosli et al. 2010). Some treat abstentions as a softer form of negative votes and code both choices as contributing to a resolution not reaching the required threshold (e.g., Voeten 2000). Others regard abstaining as "half the weight of a complete agreement" (e.g, Lijphart 1963; Luif 2003). A third group of researchers treats the three types of votes as equals, arguing that each vote deviating from the consensus undermines overall voting cohesion (e.g., Hix et al. 2005; Rasch 2008). Based on these coding practices, this research introduces three indices to assess voting cohesion: $C_I$, $C_{II}$ and AI.[82] The difference between $C_I$ and $C_{II}$ lies in the coding of abstentions. For both indices, pro and con votes are respectively coded as 1 and 0, while abstentions are coded 0.5 for $C_I$, and 0 for $C_{II}$. The voting cohesion on resolution *x* in percentage term, is given by

$$\mathrm{C} = |AVx - 0.5| \times 2 \times 100 \qquad (1)$$

where AVx stands for the average vote of a group on resolution *x*.

AI gives equal weight to each vote choice. The voting cohesion indicated by AI in percentage terms, is given by

$$\mathrm{AI} = \frac{\mathrm{MAX\{Y, N, A\}} - 0.5[(\mathrm{Y} + \mathrm{N} + \mathrm{A}) - \mathrm{MAX\{Y, N, A\}}]}{\mathrm{Y} + \mathrm{N} + \mathrm{A}} \times 100 \qquad (2)$$

where Y, N and A respectively stand for the count of each type of votes.

### 5.1.2 Hypotheses Testing and Evaluation

Table 4 displays the average values of EU voting cohesion in each session of the UNGA, measured by $C_I$, $C_{II}$ and AI respectively. The mean of each measurement is reported at the bottom of the table. A much higher

[81] Votes on paragraphs were filtered out since it had been demonstrated that they would make no significant difference to the final results (e.g., Luif 2003; Rasch 2008).
[82] AI denotes the Agreement Index, as applied by Hix et al. (2005) in a study assessing the cohesion of the EP's political groups.

$C_{II,}$ compared to $C_I$, suggests that the Union appears to be more cohesive when abstentions are coded as negative votes. An evaluation of the total 1,419 resolutions using Pearson's correlation reports a coefficient (r) of 0.3 for $C_I$ and $C_{II}$ ($p < 0.01$), 0.3 for $C_I$ and AI ($p < 0.01$), 0.9 for $C_{II}$ and AI ($p < 0.01$), indicating that while the measurements of the three indices are positively correlated with each another, the correlation between $C_{II}$ and AI is stronger.[83] The Bland-Altman analysis demonstrates that $C_{II}$ and AI provide more similar measurements to EU voting cohesion compared to the other two pairs.[84] This outcome is also illustrated by Figure 1: whereas the lines of $C_{II}$ and AI are almost identical, falling between 85 percent and 100 percent, the line of $C_I$ lies alone at the very bottom. Only AI will be applied to the subsequent tests because it treats all three types of votes equally in the calculation.

**Figure 1: EU Voting Cohesion in the UNGA (48th – 67th Session)**




[83] Notice that a strong correlation does not automatically imply that the two indices are measuring the same quantity.
[84] The points of these two measurements in the plot of identity fall closer to the line y = x compared to the other two pairs. In the Bland-Altman plot, most of the points are located between the 95 % limits lines, which indicate the range of agreement.

**Table 4: EU Voting Cohesion (48th – 65th Session)**

| UNGA Session (year) | $C_I$ | $C_{II}$ | AI | Cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 48 (1993/1994) | 65.0 | 90.5 | 88.1 | 65 |
| 49 (1994/1995)* | 74.8 | 90.0 | 89.3 | 68 |
| 50 (1995/1996) | 76.6 | 90.9 | 91.0 | 70 |
| 51 (1996/1997) | 78.2 | 94.2 | 92.3 | 76 |
| 52 (1997/1998) | 75.0 | 95.4 | 93.5 | 69 |
| 53 (1998/1999) | 81.7 | 95.2 | 94.8 | 61 |
| 54 (1999/2000) | 75.7 | 95.4 | 93.8 | 69 |
| 55 (2000/2001) | 79.5 | 94.2 | 93.6 | 67 |
| 56 (2001/2002) | 77.7 | 94.6 | 93.7 | 67 |
| 57 (2002/2003) | 77.1 | 92.3 | 91.1 | 73 |
| 58 (2003/2004)* | 73.9 | 91.5 | 90.4 | 76 |
| 59 (2004/2005) | 79.4 | 93.3 | 93.4 | 71 |
| 60 (2005/2006) | 78.6 | 94.5 | 94.4 | 75 |
| 61 (2006/2007)* | 76.7 | 96.1 | 96.1 | 84 |
| 62 (2007/2008) | 81.2 | 94.3 | 94.6 | 78 |
| 63 (2008/2009) | 78.4 | 94.4 | 95.0 | 72 |
| 64 (2009/2010)** | 75.2 | 94.6 | 92.9 | 68 |
| 65 (2010/2011) | 78.3 | 93.4 | 92.1 | 73 |
| 66 (2011/2012) | 79.9 | 96.6 | 95.6 | 62 |
| 67 (24/12/2012) | 76.4 | 90.3 | 91.6 | 68 |
| **Mean** | 77.0 | 93.6 | 92.9 | 71 |

*Marks the UNGA sessions during which EU enlargements took place.
**Marks the UNGA session during which the ToL entered into force.

Figure 2 compares the ratio of abstentions of the EU with that of the entire UNGA membership. It appears that EU countries have cast abstentions more frequently as a milder way to express disagreement. The share of abstentions of the EU is on average 9 percent higher than that of the global level. The rightmost vertical dotted line indicates the 64th Session when the ToL started to take effect, while the other three lines on the left respectively mark off the UNGA sessions during which the three waves of EU enlargements took place.[85] For the EU, the proportion of abstaining votes ranges from 16.5 percent to 34 percent, whereas the number is constantly below 17 percent for the UNGA as a whole. The two descending lines illustrate that the ratios of abstentions for both the EU and the UNGA have been decreasing since the 48th Session. The range of decline for the EU is almost 14 percent, which is much larger compared to the UNGA's 6 percent. The

[85] The meanings of the lines equally apply to Figure 3 and Figure 5.

percentage of abstentions for the Union dropped to a lower level after each enlargement. Meanwhile, EU voting cohesion increased by a small amount, except for the 2007 enlargement, after which cohesion decreased by 1.5 percent. This could be a reflection of the Union's 20 years of efforts to cultivate the CFSP and avoid deviations in voting at the UNGA. A decline in the ratio of EU abstentions also occurred immediately after the ToL's entry into force, while voting cohesion dropped by 1 percent. But it appears that no apparent linear relationship between EU voting cohesion and the percentage of EU abstentions can be claimed.[86]

**Figure 2: Ratios of Abstentions of the EU and the UN (48th-67th Session)**




$H_1$ hypothesizes that EU voting cohesion has been increasing over time. The upper line in Figure 3 shows the cohesion pattern of the EU across UNGA sessions. The level of EU voting cohesion appears to be fluctuant. Since the 50th Session EU cohesion has been above the level of 90.0 percent. But it suffered a

[86] A preliminary correlation analysis discovered that the two variables are negatively correlated. But the linear correlation was largely due to the extreme value (34 percent) of the percentage of EU abstentions in the 48th Session. Without this value, this is no apparent linear relationship between the percentage of EU abstentions and EU voting cohesion.

sharp drop and hit the bottom at the 58th Session.[87] Then the cohesion continued to grow until the 65th Session.[88] After a return to 95.0 percent, the voting cohesion again fell to an even lower point in the 67th Session.[89] An OLS regression using UNGA sessions as the independent variable and EU cohesion measured by AI as the dependent variable reveals the existence of a significant positive linear relationship ($b = 0.18$, $SE = 0.08$, $t\,(1417) = 2.37$, $p < 0.01$, $r = 0.06$). For each UNGA session, EU voting cohesion increases by 0.2 percent on average. In other words, for another decade, EU cohesion, on average, is likely to increase by 2 percent. But the fact that the effect size is small indicates that increasing EU representation coherence through institutional reforms and socialization is a slow process.[90]

$H_2$ assumes that EU voting cohesion would change after the ToL's adoption. Contrary to the more general expectation that the ToL will bring more coherence to the EU, Figure 3 shows that the degree of EU voting cohesion actually experienced a small decline after the ToL was enforced. The cohesion reaches an even higher level (above 95 percent) following a rebound in the 66th Session. Then it decreases again, by 4 percent. An independent *t*-test (Test 1) is conducted to compare EU cohesion levels between two groups using the 64th Session during which the ToL started to take effect as the cut point. The first group (Pre-ToL) includes 309 resolutions adopted between the 60thand 63rd sessions while the second group (Post-ToL) is comprised of 278 resolutions that were passed during the 64th-67th Session. The means of the two groups are calculated as 95.0 percent ($SE = 0.71$) and 93.1 percent ($SE = 0.78$) respectively. The mean difference in EU voting cohesion of the two groups is about 2 percent ($M_{Pre\text{-}ToL} - M_{Post\text{-}ToL}$). It appears that there was a small decrease in EU voting cohesion after the ToL was adopted. But the difference is not statistically or substantively significant ($t\,(517) = 1.62$, $p = 0.11$, $r = 0.07$). A second test (Test 2) is performed using 1 December 2009 – the date when the ToL officially entered into force – as the cut point to categorize the resolutions between 1 January 2007 and 24 December 2012 into two groups. 156 cases are classified into the

[87] The resolutions that contributed to the lower level of EU voting cohesion during the 58th Session include, *inter alia*, A/RES/58/50, A/RES/58/51, A/RES/58/198, and A/RES/58/245, among which three are related to nuclear weapons or armed conflict while one was about economic measures against developing countries.

[88] The relatively low voting cohesion in the 65th Session was mainly caused by the split votes of EU member states over five resolutions: A/RES/65/55, A/RES/65/71, A/RES/65/119, A/RES/65/219 and A/RES/65/240, among which two are related to nuclear weapons, one is relevant to human rights issues and the other concerns decolonization.

[89] The low voting coherence in the 67th Session was mainly caused by the split votes of the EU over five resolutions (A/RES/67/19, A/RES/67/36, A/RES/67/46, A/RES/67/56 and A/RES/67/171), among which two are related to nuclear weapons, one related to human rights, one concerning Palestine.

[90] Cohen (1988) suggested that $r = 0.1$, $r = 0.3$ and $r = 0.5$ represent small, medium and large effects, respectively.

first group (Pre-ToL), while 275 cases fall into the second group (Post-ToL). Again, EU voting cohesion decreased by 1.2 percent ($M_{Pre\text{-}ToL} - M_{Post\text{-}ToL}$) after the ToL's implementation. But the statistics are not significant and the size of effect is small ($t$ (429) = 0.79, $p$ = 0.43, $r$ = 0.04), making it difficult to tell the overall influence of the ToL.

**Figure 3: Voting Cohesion of the EU and the UNGA as a Whole (48th-67th Session)**




If we look at Figure 4, in which the ink dots represent the mean cohesion difference ($M_{Pre\text{-}ToL} - M_{Post\text{-}ToL}$) of the two groups respectively in the two tests. The error bars demonstrate the confidence intervals of these mean differences. It can be seen that both dots are located on the right side of 0. It means that in the two samples EU voting cohesion of the pre-Lisbon period is consistently higher than that of the post-Lisbon period. This may reveal a somewhat problematic trend. But it would be arbitrary to jump to the conclusion that the ToL has negative effects on EU representation coherence. Suffice it to say that the ToL has not made the EU a more coherent actor at the UNGA yet. A possible cause could be the remaining agency problems and new institutional tensions that were discussed in Chapter 4. The institutional adaption of the ToL may

really "bite" in the years to come when EU members can act in concert at this forum, allowing EU representatives to take the floor and when these representatives can truly stand as fully-fledged agents that can represent the Union consistently and coherently.

**Figure 4: Confidence Intervals of Cohesion Difference Pre and Post-Lisbon**




$H_3$ stipulates that the EU performs more coherently in general than the UNGA as a whole and this "superiority" will not be affected by the ToL. This assumption is likely to be supported as in Figure 3 the line marking EU voting cohesion is obviously higher than that of the global level. An independent *t*-test later confirms that the voting cohesion of EU member states, on average, is about 20 percent greater than that of the entire UNGA membership between 1993 and 2012 ($t$ (2442) = 25.67, $p < 0.01$, $r = 0.46$). The effect size is large, meaning that as well as being statistically significant, this effect of membership represents a substantive finding. A second test comparing the voting cohesion means of the EU and the entire UNGA membership after the date when the ToL took effect shows that the former remains to be about 20 percent higher than the latter ($t$ (492) = 12.19, $p < 0.01$, $r = 0.48$). Again, this finding is both statistically and substantively significant.

$H_4$ assumes that EU voting cohesion is reduced at the early stage of a post-enlargement era. But it will rebound to its previous or an even higher level afterwards. The overall effect of enlargements on EU voting cohesion should be positive. As shown in Figure 3, only the 2004 enlargement fitted the description of $H_4$.

The development of EU voting cohesion around the 2007 enlargement appeared to be the very opposite of our hypothesis. As for the 1995 enlargement, EU voting cohesion did not experience any decline but continued to increase until the 53rd Session. Take the 1995 enlargement as an example: the resolutions during the 49th-50th Session are classified into two groups using the date 1 January 1995 as the cut point.[91] 67 and 71 cases fall in the two groups respectively. The independent *t*-test results indicate that the voting cohesion increased about 2 percent after the enlargement ($t$ (136) = 0.61, $p$ = 0.55, $r$ = 0.05). The test regarding the 2004 enlargement (the 58th-59th Session) reveals that post-enlargement cohesion was about 3.6 percent higher than the cohesion prior to the enlargement ($t$ (142) = 1.30, $p$ = 0.19, $r$ = 0.11). The third test with respect to the 2007 enlargement (the 61st-62nd Session) has produced a similar result, with post-enlargement cohesion 1 percent higher than that of pre-enlargement period ($t$ (160) = 0.61, $p$ = 0.54, $r$ = 0.05). It appears that EU voting cohesion was somewhat increased after each round of enlargement. Consistent as they are, none of these findings are statistically or substantively significant. It is safe to suggest that EU enlargements did not at any rate reduce EU cohesion, although there is no conclusive evidence of a positive relationship between EU voting cohesion and enlargements.

The reason why EU voting cohesion did not decrease after the enlargements could be that those new EU member states had started to vote coherently with the EU majority at the pre-accession stage. Any European country can apply for EU membership if it meets the so-called "Copenhagen criteria" and has the ability to apply the body of EU laws and rules, also known as the *acquis communautaire*.[92] Applicants typically sign association agreements with the Union to get prepared for candidacies and eventual memberships. A special process, the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) exists to deal with the countries of the Western Balkans (Cohen 2008). The Council, based on the Commission's opinion, decides whether to open accession negotiations. Once the negotiations are concluded, a draft treaty of accession needs to be approved by EU institutions, including the Council, the Commission, and the EP. Then it must be signed and

[91] Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the EU on 1 January 1995.
[92] The "Copenhagen criteria" requires that the candidate country seeking EU membership need to achieve "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union" (Presidency resolutions, Copenhagen European Council, 1993).

ratified by the candidate country as well as all EU member states.[93] The process from application to accession (e.g., the 2004 enlargement) can take more than a decade.[94] After years of preparations to meet the requirements for EU membership, national preferences of the applicant countries might have converged with those of existing EU members. In other words, the socialization process and institutional adaption had been initiated prior to the formal accession and continued to affect the preferences of the new entrants in the context of their growing participation in EU foreign policy-making.

**Table 5: Keywords for Issue Area Classification**

| | Issue Area | Selected Keywords | Main Committee | Cases (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | International security | Nuclear, proliferation, disarmament | First Committee | 466 (33%) |
| 2. | Middle East | Israel, Palestine, Palestinian, Lebanon, Syria, Middle East Jerusalem. | None[95] | 397 (28 %) |
| 3. | Human Rights | Human rights, cultural | Third Committee | 326 (23 %) |
| 4. | Decolonization | Decolonization, colonial, coercion, Cuba | Fourth Committee | 152 (11 %) |
| 5. | Other issues | Climate, economic, development, environment law. | Second Committee Fifth Committee Six Committee | 78 (5 %) |

$H_5$ suggests that EU voting cohesion varies across different issue areas. All 1,419 UNGA resolutions are classified into five issue areas. It is primarily carried out by identifying the Main Committee involved.[96] The categorized resolutions are further distinguished by preset keywords shown in Table 5 (which also lays out the number and proportion of resolutions in each category). Plenary resolutions without the involvement of a particular Main Committee were classified by their contents. For the contents having multifaceted dimensions, the UN Yearbook was consulted. As a result, resolutions regarding issues like nuclear weapons, proliferation and disarmament, the reports of the IAEA, the security situations of states, or cooperation between the UN and the OSCE, fall into the category "International Security". The category "Middle East"

[93] For a detailed introduction of EU enlargement process, see Nicolaides (1999); Ott and Inglis (2002).
[94] For some countries, notably Sweden, Finland, and Austria, it took only a couple of years. For others, it may take two decades or even longer. Turkey, for example, applied for full EU membership in the 1987 and has yet to conclude accession negotiations, which were opened in 2005. See an analysis of the way in which time-rules and time-horizons structured and mobilized EU enlargement process in Avery (2009).
[95] See footnote 24.
[96] In practice, 81 percent of the resolutions in the data of this dissertation are based on a report submitted by a Main Committee.

includes all resolutions that are relevant to the Middle East.[97] The category "Human Rights" encompasses issues related to human rights and social development, including the resolutions regarding the restitution of cultural property. The category "Decolonization" contains the cases dealing with decolonization and self-determination. Resolutions concerning economic or political coercion against developing countries, e.g., the embargo imposed by the US against Cuba, are also classified into this category. The remaining resolutions that do not belong to any of these five groups are labelled as "Other Issues".[98]

**Figure 5: EU Voting Cohesion across Issue Areas at the UNGA (48th-67th Session)**




Figure 5 captures EU voting cohesion across issue areas over UNGA sessions. EU cohesion ranks the highest on "Middle East" issues in the diagram.[99] In the past 20 years, the Union's voting cohesion on issues of this domain has been consistently above 90 percent. In fact, as early as 1980 by the Venice Declaration,

[97] Resolutions that are marked as "Middle East" issues will no longer be categorized into other issue areas.
[98] Resolutions falling into this category are excluded from the analysis testing $H_5$ since their share is small and their topics are not as relevant as the resolutions of the other four categories.
[99] It is consistent with the findings of some earlier studies, e.g., Luif (2003); Rasch (2008); Hosli et al. (2010).

the then nine member states of the Community had decided to coordinate their policies on Middle East affairs, especially on the Arab-Israeli conflict (Luif 2003: 27). The lower voting cohesiveness starting from the 58th Session – during which the 2004 enlargement took place – was mainly caused by the deviating votes of Cyprus and Malta.[100] The category "Human Rights" has the second highest voting cohesion. EU voting cohesion has been equal to or greater than 90 percent until it experienced a considerable decrease (over 10 percent) in the 64th Session.[101] Afterwards, EU cohesion increased again and reached 94.2 percent in the 67th Session. EU voting cohesion on issues regarding "International Security" has been fluctuating between 85 percent and 95 percent in the past two decades, whereas the category "Decolonization" shows the least voting cohesiveness and the largest extent of fluctuation between 65 percent in the 48th Session and full consensus in the 51st Session.

The results of one-way ANOVA analysis suggest that there is a medium significant effect of issue areas on the degree of EU voting cohesion ($F$ (3, 481) = 47.89, $p < 0.01$, $r = 0.28$).[102] Games-Howell *post hoc* test further discovers that EU voting cohesion on "Middle East" issues is significantly the highest ($M = 98.25$, $SE = 7.54$), whereas the cohesion among "Decolonization" issues is the lowest ($M = 83.66$, $SE = 21.85$).[103] The analysis fails to detect any significant difference in voting cohesions between the categories "International Security" and "Human Rights". An independent $t$-test later finds that the voting cohesion on "Human Rights" issues is about 3 percent significantly higher than that of "International Security" issues, although the size of effect is small ($t$ (790) = 2.52, $p < 0.05$, $r = 0.1$). The relatively lower cohesiveness in the latter category may contribute to the reduction of overall EU voting cohesion, since it accounts for the largest share of the resolutions analyzed in this research.

$H_5$ also assumes that the EU's voting cohesion in traditionally contested areas, i.e., "International Security" and "Decolonization", should be promoted after the ToL took effect. As shown in Figure 5, EU

[100] There were two three-way splits of the EU in the 64th and the 67th Session respectively. The split votes on UNGA Resolution A/RES/64/21 regarded the endorsement of the Goldstone Report on the Gaza conflict. The split of EU member states over Resolution A/RES/67/19 on upgrading Palestine to non-member observer state status in the UN was mainly between support (14 voted in favour) and abstention (12 abstained). Only the Czech Republic joined the US and Israel and voted against it.

[101] This sharp decrease was mainly caused by the EU's split votes over three UNGA resolutions: A/RES/64/148 (the implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action), A/RES/64/172 (the human right to development) and A/RES/64/292 (the right to water and sanitation).

[102] The Welch $F$ is reported because the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated.

[103] Games-Howell test is used because sample sizes are very different and the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated.

voting cohesion of both categories dropped to a lower level in the wake of the ToL's implementation. It quickly returned to the previous level but decreased again in the 67th Session. Independent *t*-tests are conducted to compare the EU's voting cohesion of the two issue areas between the period of the 60th-63rd Session and the period of the 64th-67th Session. According to the statistics, it seems that EU cohesion in both categories slightly decreased after the ToL entered into force, although the differences are not considered significant. On issues concerning "International Security", such as disarmament in general or nuclear weapons in particular, EU member states' opinions tend to differ. As permanent members of the UNSC and nuclear powers, France and the UK prefer holding onto their nuclear prominence and have often aligned themselves with the US, whereas non-nuclear member states, especially Austria, Sweden and Ireland, are devoted to building a nuclear-free world (see also Luif 2003; Young and Rees 2005).[104] In addition, the EU member states of NATO sometimes disagree with the non-aligned states, and within NATO, France played a special role after it had withdrawn from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 (Fassbender 2004: 862). As a result, two-way or even three-way split votes of EU member states prove to be unavoidable within this issue area.[105] When it comes to "Decolonization" issues, France and Britain, as former colonial powers, tend to distance themselves from the EU majority (see also Wouters 2001). But recent UNGA sessions have witnessed a gradual convergence among EU member states since more and more frequently Britain is the only EU member that votes against such resolutions.[106] Anyhow, the second part of $H_5$ is not supported by the empirical evidence.

It is worth mentioning that EU voting cohesion in the category "Human Rights" in the post-Lisbon era, appears to be about 7 percent lower than that of the pre-Lisbon era ($t$ (84) = 2.36, $p < 0.05$, $r = 0.25$). This finding may raise some concerns in the sense that not only the ToL fails to improve EU cohesion in the traditionally contested areas but may also contribute to lower coherence in the areas where EU member states have exhibited highly coherent voting behaviour.

[104] Austria is a nuclear-free zone and the country favours an anti-nuclear policy. Both Sweden and Ireland are members of the New Agenda Coalition, which seeks to facilitate nuclear disarmament.
[105] For instance, the decrease in EU voting cohesion during the 65th and 67th Session was mainly resulted by the Union's three-way splits on these resolutions concerning nuclear weapons: A/RES/65/49, A/RES/65/55, A/RES/65/71, A/RES/65/76 A/RES/67/31, A/RES/67/33, A/RES/67/36, A/RES/67/46 and A/RES/67/56, among which France and the UK voted against six out of nine. Only France voted against A/RES/67/33.
[106] For example, Britain is the only EU member that voted against UNGA resolution A/RES/65/119.

$H_6$ proposes that the EU has a higher voting cohesion than other regional organizations at the UNGA during the periods both before and after Lisbon. One-way ANOVA analysis is applied to compare the EU with the League of Arab States (Arab League),[107] the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),[108] the AU,[109] the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),[110] the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),[111] and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[112] These organizations are chosen because their integration degrees are somewhat comparable to that of the EU in economic, institutional or political terms and because they represent diversity in terms of both geographical location and group size.

It turns out that the levels of voting cohesion are significantly different across regional organizations ($F$ (6, 4404) = 82.17, $p < 0.01$, $r = 0.29$).[113] The effect of membership on voting cohesion is a substantive finding and represents a medium effect size. Planned contrasts are used so that it is possible to explore whether the size of membership mitigates voting cohesion at the same time. Contrast 1 compares the block of ASEAN, CIS, CARICOM and ECOWAS (membership size < 20) with the block of Arab League, the EU and the AU (membership size > 20). The results show that the voting cohesion of the second block of regional organizations is significantly higher than that of the first block ($t$ (8770) = 8.46, $p$ <0.01, $r = 0.1$). Contrast 2 compares the block containing ASEAN and CIS (membership size = 10) with the block containing CARICOM and ECOWAS (membership size = 15). Again, the test tells us that the voting cohesion of the block with a larger membership is significantly higher than the block with a smaller membership ($t$ (4537) = 17.01, $p$ <0.01, $r = 0.24$). Contrast 3 reveals that ASEAN is significantly more coherent than CIS ($t$ (2496) = 17.80, $p$ <0.01, $r = 0.34$). Contrast 4 compares CARICOM and ECOWAS but

[107] The Arab League currently encompasses 22 member states. Palestine is not included in this analysis since it is not a UN member. Comoros is considered in the analysis after 20 November 1993 when it became a member of the Arab League.
[108] The ASEAN has 10 members, of which Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia obtained membership on 28 July 1995, 23 July 1997 and 30 April 1999, respectively. These three countries are analyzed only after their dates of accession.
[109] The AU, as the successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was founded in 2002 and currently has 54 member states. Within our observation period, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has not become a UN member, and thus is not included into the analysis. South Africa became a member of the OAU on 23 May 1994 and is taken into account in the analysis since this date. South Sudan joined the UN on 14 July 2011 and the AU on 27 July 2011 and is only considered an AU member since that date.
[110] The CARICOM has 15 full members. Montserrat is not a UN member and is not considered in the analysis. Suriname and Haiti joined the community respectively on 4 July 1995 and 2 July 2002. They are calculated as CARICOM members only after their dates of accession.
[111] The CIS originally had 10 member states. Turkmenistan changed its status to associate member on 26 August 2005. Therefore, it is no longer considered a member in the analysis from this date onwards. Georgia withdrew from the CIS on 17 August 2009 and is since then no longer taken as a member state in the analysis.
[112] ECOWAS currently has 15 member states. Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS on 1 January 2002 and therefore, is not considered in the analysis from this date onwards.
[113] Again, the Welch $F$ is reported here.

fails to find any significant difference in voting cohesion between the two organizations. Contrast 5 compares the block of Arab League and the EU (membership size < 30) with the AU. The statistics show that the voting cohesion of the two smaller organizations is significantly higher than that of the AU, but the effect size is rather small ($t$ (2783) = 4.29, $p$ <0.01, $r$ = 0.08). Contrast 6 finds that there is no significant difference in voting cohesion between the EU and the AU.

A conclusion can be drawn from the planned comparisons: membership size alone does not determine voting cohesion. According to the principal-agent theory, all things being equal, a larger group tends to have higher preference heterogeneity and thus lower coherence. But contrast 1 and 2 have revealed that regional organizations with larger size of membership manage to exhibit higher degree of coherence at the UNGA. Contrast 3 demonstrates that two organizations having exactly the same size of membership can have different degrees of voting cohesion. These findings do not have to be contradictory to the assumption of the principal-agent theory since the condition "all things being equal" is not met in these contrasts. For the first two contrasts, the CIS contributes a great deal to the lower cohesiveness in the smaller blocks. Established in December 1991, the CIS was seen more a vehicle for managing the inter-state relations after the Soviet Union's disassembly than an institution for closer regional cooperation (Dragneva 2004: 280). Because of limited and selective formalization of its institutions, policy-making within the CIS mainly relies on traditional diplomacy and power mechanisms (Aslund et al. 1999). Plus the problems of preference heterogeneity, mutual mistrust and poor commitments among its member states, the CIS has been relatively disappointing in terms of both economic and political integration. Therefore, the degree of integration and the "maturity" of institutional structure may have stronger influence on the coherence of an organization.

The results of Games-Howell *post hoc* test are displayed in Table 6. Combining the findings of planned contrast, this ANOVA analysis uncovers that the CIS is the least coherent organization ($M$ = 78.4, all $p$-values < 0.05) and the AU has been voting less coherently ($M$ = 91.17) than the Arab League, CARICOM and ECOWAS (all $p$-values < 0.05). However, there is no statistical evidence suggesting that the Arab League, ASEAN, the AU, CARICOM, ECOWAS and the EU vote significantly different from each other at the UNGA. Multiple independent $t$-tests that compare the EU with the remaining five organizations show

that the voting cohesion of the EU ($M$ = 92.9) is significantly higher than that of the AU, but it is lower than the voting cohesion of the Arab League and CARICOM, although the effect sizes for all three tests are rather small. Neither of the two organizations is perceived to feature higher level of integration than the Union. A possible explanation could be that these organizations are less concerned about some subjects in UNGA discussions than EU member states are (see also Rasch 2008). To sum it up, the EU's voting cohesion is only found to be higher than that of the AU and the CIS. $H_6$ is thus only partially supported. It demonstrates that the ToL so far has not made the EU the most coherent actor at the UNGA in terms of voting cohesion.

**Table 6: Multiple Comparisons of Voting Cohesion of Regional Organizations**

| Membership | | Mean Difference | Std. Error | Membership | | Mean Difference | Std. Error |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arab League | ASEAN | 1.25349 | .62290 | AU | CARICOM | -2.92887* | .58863 |
| | AU | 2.82283* | .61122 | | CIS | 12.77083* | .79678 |
| | CARICOM | -.10604 | .58257 | | ECOWAS | -2.53250* | .58658 |
| | CIS | 15.59366* | .79231 | | EU | -1.72736 | .60988 |
| | ECOWAS | .29033 | .58050 | CARICOM | CIS | 15.69970* | .77502 |
| | EU | 1.09547 | .60403 | | ECOWAS | .39637 | .55666 |
| ASEAN | AU | 1.56934 | .62857 | | EU | 1.20151 | .58117 |
| | CARICOM | -1.35953 | .60075 | CIS | ECOWAS | -15.30333* | .77346 |
| | CIS | 14.34017* | .80577 | | EU | -14.49819* | .79128 |
| | ECOWAS | -.96316 | .59874 | ECOWAS | EU | .80514 | .57909 |
| | EU | -.15802 | .62159 | | | | |

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

## 5.2 EU Voting Behaviour at the UNSC: Descriptive Statistics

Voting behaviour to a certain degree serves as an indicator of a country's policy preferences. Analyzing the voting pattern of EU member states in a long-term period at the UNGA is commonly accepted by EU researchers as one reliable quantitative approach to steadily investigate the quality of EU decision-making in this UN organ. Following the same logic, one would look at the voting behaviour of the EU member states sitting in the UNSC in order to comprehend EU representation coherence in this body. However, unlike in the UNGA it is rather questionable to apply a similar approach in the UNSC. It is firstly because there are numerous informal consultations or closed meetings that either have inaccessible records or no record at all

(Malone 2012). Although the annual data of adopted UNSC resolutions are available in the UNBISnet and the ODS, the meaningfulness to apply this method is questionable due to the unique decision making and voting procedures at the UNSC.

During the period 1993-2012, the UNSC adopted 1,286 resolutions, of which 1,264 (about 98.3 percent) were subject to a vote and 22 were adopted by consensus with no vote casting.[114] Among these resolutions, 1,168 were adopted unanimously with 15 votes in favour (about 92.4 percent), 11 were adopted with some members against the draft resolution and 82 had members abstaining. It will not be difficult to predict that the voting cohesion of the UNSC stays at a quite high level. As expected, the average voting cohesion (measured by AI) of the UNSC is 98.7 percent.

One explanation to the high frequency of unanimity and voting cohesion is that the UNSC – in order to refrain from its paralysis in the early days – has established a practice not to allow the matters that are too contested to come to a vote (Franda 2006). When a certain proposal is subject to a vote before a formal session of the UNSC, intense negotiations have been conducted and compromises have been made during informal consultations so that the concerning parties are able to agree at least not to cast negative votes. This tendency is also reflected by the fact that the use of the veto has largely dropped since the 1990s. Before its collapse, the Soviet Union used to be the most frequent exerciser of the veto. Starting from the mid-1990s, the US has been leading in the use of the veto. The last time France and the UK used their veto power was in 1989 in a joint veto with the US on the situation of Panama (Okhovat 2011: 13). But France has threatened to apply its veto power on several occasions, e.g., in the Iraq crisis. It prevented a second resolution drafted by the US and its European adherents from granting mandate for a military attack on Iraq. The case of Iraq will be explored in more detail later on in Chapter 6.

When the casting of negative votes becomes rare, abstentions and non-participation may bear another layer of meaning. Abstentions in the UNSC can be classified into three categories: obligatory abstention, voluntary abstention and other abstentions. Obligation abstention refers to Article 27(3) of the UN Charter which prescribes that "in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a

[114] Own calculation based on the data of Security Council Resolutions between 8 January 1993 and 20 December 2012, collected by the author from UNBISnet.

dispute shall abstain from voting". The third category includes those cases in which a member is considered directly concerned with the matter under consideration has abstained from voting or has been recorded as not participating in the vote, even though itself has not contended that the matter is a dispute. Voluntary abstention means that a permanent member of the UNSC may voluntarily choose to abstain from voting due to its "strong negative" attitude toward a particular draft resolution (Gross 1951). It chooses to abstain because casting a negative vote may constitute a veto, which makes the adoption of a resolution impossible. Likewise, nonparticipation can be resulted by a negative attitude either against the way the issue under consideration is dealt with rather than simply due to lack of instructions from the capital. It is not always self-evident whether a country chose to abstain or not to participate a particular voting based on which ground. Without in-depth exploring the background of the matter under consideration and the foreign policy of the state, it is difficult to be precise about the genuine motive behind a certain voting choice.

As for the EU, there were three to five EU member states serving on the UNSC each year, including the two permanent members, the UK and France, during the period of our investigation. Of all 1,264 voted resolutions, the entire group of EU members sitting in the UNSC have cast affirmative votes in 1,258 resolutions (about 99.5 percent). Only in six resolutions have EU member states cast abstentions, among which France abstained five times while Germany three times.[115] Of all six resolutions, three centred around the situation in Iraq: UNSC Resolution 1134, Resolution 1284 and Resolution 1958.[116] In each case France stood as the only EU member that abstained. The first two resolutions related to the disarmament of Iraq. Resolution 1134 requested Iraq's cooperation with UN weapons inspection teams and threatened to impose travel bans on Iraqi officials in the event of non-compliance. France abstained because it had been trying to convince the international community to lift the sanctions on Iraq after the First Gulf War (Styan 2006). Resolution 1284 created a new weapons inspection team, lifted some restrictions in the "oil-for-food" trade, and promised to suspend all remaining sanctions as long as Iraq made significant progress on disarmament. France abstained this time along with Russia because it worried about its fair share of the "oil-for-food" deal

[115] These resolutions include UNSC Resolutions 1134, 1284, 1487, 1497, 1958 and 1973.
[116] Resolution 1134 was adopted on 23 October 1997 by 10 votes to none against and 5 abstentions from China, Egypt, France, Kenya and Russia. Resolution 1284 was passed on 17 December 1999 by 11 affirmative votes with four abstentions from China, France, Malaysia and Russia. Resolution 1958 was adopted on 15 December 2010 with 14 votes in favour and one abstention cast by France.

that was worth about $17 billion per year (Read 2003). Two out of the six deviation cases took place in the aftermath of the ToL's adoption. France who wanted additional financial guarantees abstained on Resolution 1958, which terminated the residual activities of the "oil-for-food" Programme and ended some major sanctions on Iraq. Germany's abstention on Resolution 1973 that formulated the legal basis for the military intervention in the Libyan civil war resulted in the most serious split of the EU since Iraq.[117] Given that departure from unanimity is rare in the UNSC, topics surrounding the situations of Iraq and Libya are considered as unusual cases that have provoked curiosity in further inquiry. A second astonishing finding is that Germany and France, the two countries that are considered as the core engine driving EU integration forward, have contributed to EU splits at the UNSC in recent years. But without a close-range exploration of the particular cases, it is impossible to understand the causal mechanism behind their decisions to vote differently from the majority of EU members.

Like the roll-call data of UNGA voting records, the compiled voting data of UNSC resolutions only represents the decisions adopted with recorded votes but not the decisions made in closed sessions nor the decisions made though presidential statements. It only presents the final outcome of policy-making but cannot reveal the entire coordination process before the final decision or the complex motives of EU member states that drive for a particular voting choice in a resolution. Merely taking the analysis of voting behaviour as the only option of the EU's presence within the UN would overlook other alternatives, e.g. an in-depth case study that can elaborately explore EU representation and coordination over UNSC matters. Although the data of our collection are unable to uncover the matters that were even more disputed and never came to a vote in the UNSC due to a promising veto (e.g., during the Iraq crisis, a draft resolution proposed by the US, Spain and the UK was eventually abandoned because a French and Russian veto was almost certain), they were able to uncover the unusual events and provide an enlightening guidance for case selection.

[117] Resolution 1973 was adopted on 17 March 2011 with 10 votes in favour and 5 abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia. Resolution 1497 was adopted on 1 August 2003 concerning the situation in Liberia.