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European Union representation at the United Nations towards more coherence after the Treaty of Lisbon

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Chapter 1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) is known for its solid support for an effective United Nations (UN). “Effective multilateralism” is a fundamental and recurrent theme in various EU documents (e.g., European Council 2003; Commission 2003; European Union 2004). The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), which entered into force on 1 December 2009, reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to multilateral cooperation, especially within the framework of the UN. In order to transform the EU into a more coherent and influential international actor, the ToL introduced a set of institutional innovations affecting the Union’s external representation, including, *inter alia*, the conferral of legal personality to the EU, the creation of the President of the European Council (hereafter the President), the appointment of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

This dissertation examines the coherence of the EU’s external representation in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), within the contexts of two core UN bodies, namely the General Assembly (UNGA) and the Security Council (UNSC). Ensuring coherent EU representation at the UN is vital for the Union to stay relevant in global decision making and to promote its interests on the world stage. In a global environment where the EU faces various challenges, including, *inter alia*, the rise of new powers and the historical changes in the Arab world, either the Union adapts and adjusts its external representation to a more coherent presence, or it is in danger of being sidelined due to the relative decline of its weight (Emerson et al 2011; Balfour and 2013). Taking the principal-agent theory as the point of departure, this study considers the EU and its entire membership collective principals, which have been represented by different agents under different circumstances. The arrangements of the ToL have reformed the delegation structure of the EU’s external representation. They are expected to reduce agency losses, strengthen agent capacities as well as control mechanisms, and thereby infuse greater coherence into EU representation. However, not only the ToL left some agency problems unsolved but has created new inter- and intra-institutional tensions. Overall these defects may have counterproductive effects on coherence. It will

be interesting to see whether the ToL has contributed to increased EU representation coherence within a world organization like the UN.

A mixed approach will be adopted to combine both quantitative and qualitative methods to detect the coherence variation in EU representation before and after Lisbon. At the UNGA, EU representation coherence is measured and evaluated in terms of the voting cohesion of EU member states. At the UNSC, some descriptive statistics are first presented to describe and summarize the voting behaviour of the EU member states sitting on the UNSC. Based on the findings drawing on from these statistics, two cases – the conflicts of Iraq (pre-Lisbon) and Libya (post-Lisbon) – are selected for further investigation. Subsequently, the coherence of the EU's representation during each conflict is examined and then compared to each other to tell whether the EU performed more coherently in the Libya case where the ToL had entered into force.

It will be argued that whereas the ToL offers the opportunity to provide more coherence to EU representation at international organizations, this potential can hardly be fulfilled if the remaining problems and new structural conflicts are left unattended, especially if EU member states are unwilling to overcome their diverging preferences and support common EU positions. Equally important is the need for closer inter- and intra- institutional coordination in order to ensure consistent and complementary representation. It appears that more time is needed for new EU agents, namely the President and the HR – assisted by the EEAS – to develop sophisticated representative capacities and well-functioning relationships with other EU institutions as well as national governments.

This introductory chapter starts with an overview of the status of the EU's presence at the UN and explains why the UNGA and the UNSC are appropriate settings for this research. The second section considers the conceptual and methodological issues in research design. It firstly defines EU representation coherence and distinguishes the fundamental concept of coherence from other prominent themes in the studies in respect to the EU's role or performance in external relations. Then it continues to introduce how EU representation coherence is going to be measured within the two contexts of the UN and the corresponding analytical methods that will be adopted. The third section lays out the structure for the rest of chapters in this dissertation.

1.1 An Overview of the EU's Presence at the United Nations

The EU and the UN share similar core values, notably the maintenance of international peace and security, the protection of fundamental human rights, the pursuit of sustainable development and the seeking of multinational solutions to global problems. In parallel with the implementation of the CFSP, the EU has grown into an important partner to the UN. It is virtually visible in almost all major UN bodies, agencies, programmes and conferences. The Union is party to more than fifty international UN agreements and conventions as the only non-state participant. It has also been a full participant at certain UN summits, such as the Rio and Kyoto summits on climate change. Outstandingly, the EU is the largest financial contributor to UN activities. Until the end of 2012, together EU member states provided over 36 percent of the funding for UN peacekeeping operations, nearly 35 percent of the UN regular budget and about one-half of all UN member state contributions to UN funds and programmes (United Nations 2013). The EU owns the capability to assist UN missions and carry out UN resolutions. It has undertaken to establish a rapid reaction force as part of its common defence system, which will certainly infuse more inputs to EU-UN cooperation. The Union has delegations in the UN based in New York, Geneva and other locations all over the world. Communications between the officials of the two organizations occur on a regular basis as daily working contacts grow. The European Parliament (EP), which is conventionally conceived less active in participating the UN's work, now sends Members of the EP (MEPs) to attend major UN meetings more frequently than it used to do (Rasch 2008).

All EU countries are members of the UNGA.¹ Together they represent more than one eighth of the entire UN membership. The Union can count on over 30 votes since candidate countries, potential candidate countries and members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and European Economic Area (EEA) frequently align themselves with EU statements (European Union 2004).² Only sovereign states can become members of the UN. But it does not prevent the EU from having a collective presence in this organization. In 1974, the then European Community (hereafter the Community) was granted by the UNGA

¹ Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013 and became the 28th EU member. But it is not included in the empirical analyses in this dissertation due to the limits of the data.

² Current EFTA members include Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. The EEA contains 28 EU members (including Croatia) and three members of the EFTA. Switzerland is the only EFTA member not participating in the EEA.

an observer status, which has been promoted to a higher level through UNGA Resolution 65/276 in May 2011. EU representation at the UNSC is not as inclusive as it is at the UNGA. Only Britain and France (also known as the P2) are permanently represented while other EU states get elected on a rather random basis. Usually there are three to five member states (including the P2) sitting at the UNSC every year.³ The EU has no regular collective presence at this body. Most of the time, the Union relies on those member states sitting on the UNSC, particular the P2, for representation. Occasionally other EU states or EU officials are invited in light of the provisional rules of procedure of the UNSC. Prior to the ToL, the responsibility of EU external representation was mainly assumed by the EU member state holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (hereafter the Council). This representation system applied to the UNGA as well. But the Presidency state could only address the UNSC on behalf of the Union when it happened to be an elected or permanent member or when it was invited. The ToL created two new leaderships, namely the President and the HR, to replace the role of the Presidency in representing the EU in the CFSP field. It's implications on the structure and coherence of EU representation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 from a principal-agent perspective.

The UNGA and the UNSC offer ideal empirical grounds to examine the ToL's effects on EU representation, as out of the five principal UN organs these two are most relevant to the CFSP.⁴ Both the EU and its member states – to varying degrees – participate in the work of the UNGA. Discussions at this level cover a broad range of issues, making it possible to conduct a comprehensive assessment of EU representation coherence. Albeit UNGA decisions are nonbinding, they are *de facto* influential, as many international norms are rooted in specific resolutions of the Assembly (Petersen 2006). Moreover, UNGA voting records are readily accessible and relatively well-documented, allowing coherence to be quantitatively measured in terms of voting cohesion. The UNSC is the core organ that deals with global issues of “high politics” with respect to international peace and security. While UNGA resolutions are only recommendatory to governments, the decisions of the UNSC are legally binding on all UN member states.

³ The EU had Germany and Portugal sitting on the UNSC as non-permanent members in 2012. They were replaced by Luxemburg starting from January 2013.

⁴ There used to be six principal organs of the UN, including the UNGA, the UNSC, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice and the Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council has suspended operations since 1994.

Since the end of the Cold War, it has regained its relevance in world affairs, especially in the authorization of the use of force (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004; Ronzitti 2012). Therefore, the coherence of EU representation at the UNSC is equally crucial to the functioning of the CFSP.

1.2 Conceptual and Methodological Considerations

It is necessary to first clarify some key concepts in order to answer the research question whether EU representation has become more coherent after the ToL's implementation. However, not only the ToL left the term "representation of the Union" undefined, studies regarding the EU's role in international organizations (IOs) also often take this concept for granted (e.g., Frieden 2004; Mahieu et al. 2005; Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Rasch 2008; Niemann and Huigens 2011). This dissertation defines "EU representation" by its functionality. It refers to the institutional set-up that performs the function of representing the Union and its member states through legitimate representatives toward third parties in the international arena (see also Gstöhl 2012). Drawing on, and to some extent deviating from existing literature on coherence in EU foreign policy or external relations (e.g., Missiroli 2001; Gauttier 2004; Hillion 2008; Thomas 2012), coherent EU representation is conceptualized as the Union's capacity to coordinate EU member states' divergent policy preferences, allowing common positions to be formulated, and articulated by its representatives consistently and coherently toward the outside world.⁵

This conceptualization implies that the search for coherence requires on one hand coordination to attain internal harmony and on the other hand articulation to provide declaratory diplomacy with consistent contents (Gauttier 2004: 25). Both elements are indispensable to coherent EU representation. Coordination means the set of elaborate mechanisms through which the EU and its member states exchange information, make concessions and find a common ground on foreign affairs (Jordan and Schout 2006; Marchesi 2008; Degrand-Guillaud 2009). It is the necessary process for reaching coherence, especially when EU member states' preferences are not initially congruent. With the absence of a common approach hardly can the Union

⁵ The terms of "coherence" and "consistency" are often used interchangeably in academic discussions (e.g., Christansen 2001; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Gaspers 2010). Some legal scholars and political scientists have underlined the necessity to distinguish one notion from the other (e.g., Gauttier 2004; Nuttall 2005; Hillion 2008): whereas "consistency" refers to compatibility and the absence of contradictions, "coherence" emphasizes complementarity and synergy; whereas "consistency" is an either-or concept, "coherence" is a matter of degree in the sense that an entity can be more or less coherent, but can only be consistent or inconsistent. This dissertation considers "consistency" a minimum requirement of "coherence", meaning that coherent EU representation should be non-contradictory at least.

project any sensible external representation. But EU representation coherence can be fully achieved only when the agreed policy as a result of coordination is consistently and coherently declared by EU and national representatives.

Considering the nature of the EU as a multi-level governance system (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Smith 2004), this research adopts a distinction between horizontal and vertical coherence that have been identified in the relevant studies (e.g., Christansen 2001; Gauthier 2004; Nuttall 2005; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Hillion 2008; Gaspers 2010; Marangoni 2012). Horizontal coherence relates to the coherence between and within EU institutions.⁶ Vertical coherence includes the coherence between EU member states and the EU and the inter-state coherence among EU member states.⁷ The acquirement of horizontal coherence requires different EU institutions and different branches within these institutions to be able to represent the Union in a coordinated, consistent and unified manner (Helwig et al. 2013). The pursuit of vertical coherence means that EU member states need to aggregate their policy preferences through institutionalised coordination mechanisms and their representatives can present complementary or at least non-contradictory national positions to those of the Union (Portela 2012).

Coherence is closely related to another prominent theme when the EU's international performance is concerned, i.e., actorness, a concept broadly understood as "the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system" (Sjøstedt 1977). This definition alone does not provide methods to operationalize actorness. Subsequent studies, however, have emerged to assess actors applying different series of variables.⁸ As for the relationship between actorness and coherence, the latter is often used either as a near-synonym (e.g., Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007; Thomas 2012) or a key criterion for

⁶ Some scholars, e.g., Guttier (2004), Nuttall (2005), Gaspers (2010) and Hillion (2008), think that horizontal coherence includes the coherence of policies across pillars. Since the ToL has abolished the pillar structure, it makes more sense to focus on inter- and intra-institutional coherence. "Institutional coherence" was seen as a sub-category of horizontal coherence in Nuttall's ternary categorisation, but was treated as a separate category because of its specialisation in the field of external relations.

⁷ Gaspers (2010) differentiated between vertical and interstate coherence. Such a distinction is not made in the present study because the coherence among EU member states will be inevitably touched upon in order to tell whether their national policies are in line with the EU's. Marangoni (2012) identified "external coherence" as another dimension of coherence. It is related to the extent to which outsiders perceive the EU as coherent. For the sake of parsimony, this dissertation adopts the two-dimensional classification, namely horizontal and vertical coherence.

⁸ For different approaches that measure actorness, see Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Brattberg and Rhinard 2013.

the former (e.g., Carbone 2013; Groen and Niemann 2013). This research adopts the idea that a higher degree of coherence contributes to a higher degree of actorness.

Ginsberg (1999) pointed to the phenomenon that scholars were moving beyond establishing the existence of the EU to assessing the Union's effectiveness as an important international actor. Many researchers have, implicitly or explicitly, used "goal achievement" as the benchmark determining effectiveness (e.g., Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Jørgensen et al. 2011; Delaere and Van Schaik 2012; Niemann and Bretherton 2013). Therefore, effectiveness of EU representation is seen as the extent to which the EU reaches the objectives defined by its common positions and manages to influence world affairs in accordance with its preferred outcomes.

EU policy-makers (e.g., Solana 2009) tend to posit a positive relationship between coherence and effectiveness. It is rather natural to expect greater effectiveness coming out of increased coherence since the Union appears to be stronger when all EU members jointly support a common position, which is expressed by a pooled representation. But empirical evidence suggests that their connection may not be straightforward. Groen and Niemann (2013) argue that whether coherence translates into effectiveness depends on the "opportunity structure", the external context that enables or constrains the EU e.g., the involvement of other important actors. Other scholars find that increased coherence may reduce effectiveness: the diverse national preferences of EU member states can result in agreements based on the lowest common denominator, which are non-constraining and inflexible; the lengthy coordination may prevent the Union from responding to sudden crises in a timely fashion; a highly united Union may raise political pressure from other actors that have opposite interests (Gst 2012; Thomas 2012; Carbone 2013). Therefore, coherence does not necessarily lead to effectiveness. Instead, it can be seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for the realization of effectiveness, that is to say, a coherent EU may not be successive in achieving its goals, but a divided Union with its member states pursuing conflicting agendas can rarely be effective.

It is difficult to measure a concept as complicated as EU representation coherence in general terms. This study operationalizes the EU's coherence at the UNGA as the voting cohesion of EU member states, which

is quantitatively calculable by UNGA roll call data. The data for the statistical analyses contain all the recorded resolutions of the UNGA between 1993 and 2012. They were partially extracted from Voeten and Merdzanovic's (2009) data and partially retrieved by the author from the UN Bibliographic Information Centre (UNBISnet) and the Official Document System of the United Nations (ODS).⁹ Voting pattern analysis based on roll call votes has been commonly practiced by scholars in examining decision making within the UN (e.g., Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2000; Luif 2003; Smith 2006; Rasch 2008; Dreher and Jensen 2009; Hosli et al. 2010). This method is not unchallenged. Some scholars (e.g., Carrubba et al. 2008; Hug 2012) have pointed out the pitfalls of roll call votes: first, roll call votes only provide a partial picture of policy making since they are only applied to a relatively small fraction of UNGA decisions;¹⁰ second, recorded votes may provide lopsided inferences because they are often used on more contested issues; third, an analysis of roll call votes may overestimate the actual degree of group cohesion since they can be used as an instrument to "show off" cohesiveness; fourth, roll call votes are limited in revealing true policy preferences because their application can be strategic, e.g., a state may choose to vote against its own preference on an issue in exchange for a deal on more important ones.

Hug (2012) pointed out in his recent findings on roll call votes that the "systematic difference" between decisions adopted by recorded votes and other decisions of the UNGA had become trivial starting from the 1970s. The observations of the present study start from 1993, meaning that the biases – although inevitable – shall be small. Hug also found that the majority of recorded votes had occurred on resolutions dealing with the issues falling into the CFSP field. This could be problematic for a research that expects to draw general inferences across EU policy areas. This dissertation, however, focuses on EU representation coherence in the CFSP domain and therefore will be less skewed. Researchers often lack information of non-recorded resolutions and non-voted decisions. Even if such data were available, it would be beyond this study's scope

⁹ The data starting from 1993 until 2008 were partially obtained from Voeten and Merdzanovic's (2009) datasets. Votes on paragraphs of resolutions, votes cast by non-UN members and absences were filtered out. The author rechecked Voeten and Merdzanovic's (2009) data and corrected some discrepancies and filled in some missing values. The data between 2009 and 2012 were manually retrieved by the author from the UN sources. The author has noticed that Voeten and his colleague Anton Strezhnev have extended their data collection to cover the resolutions adopted between 2009 and 2012, but decided to use her own data collection anyway for the sake of consistency. Voeten and Strezhnev's datasets can be found in the website: <http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/12379>.

¹⁰ Decisions made in closed sessions or by presidential statements are often not subject to roll call votes.

to analyze all those decisions, as Hug himself admitted that tailor-made estimators and techniques to better inferences were yet immature. Besides, the potential inferential problems listed above apply consistently for both the pre- and post-Lisbon period in this research. In a word, it is considered that roll call votes – in a way – indicate the national policy preferences of individual EU member states on particular issues. An analysis of voting cohesion can thus demonstrate the degree of preference homogeneity or heterogeneity among EU member states, and more importantly, the extent to which they are willing to coordinate national policies to vote coherently at the UNGA, which are of great relevance to the concept of coherence.¹¹

As Yin (2009) pointed out, a shortcoming of quantitative measurements is that they may be unable to equally describe every aspect of the dependent variable(s). Voting cohesion is directly related to the inter-state dimension of vertical coherence since it measures the cohesiveness of the voting behaviour among EU member states at the UNGA. It also concerns the coherence between the EU and EU states in a relatively straightforward fashion because the agreement reached by member states to vote coherently on a particular resolution is a result of coordination, during which an EU common position is formulated. When national delegations to the UN decide to synchronize their votes, they also act in line with the EU. Horizontal coherence, however, is indirectly manifested by voting cohesion. If a higher degree of voting cohesion is considered an outcome of improved coordination among EU member states, it can also be seen as an indicator of greater inter- and intra institutional coherence, since EU institutions, notably the HR and the EEAS, are established to ensure and organize the Union's internal coordination. Regarding the two elements of representation coherence, voting cohesion appears to be more directly linked to articulation. High cohesion often implies an agreed common approach, which shall be delivered by EU representatives at the UNGA. The essence of the coordination process, however, cannot be uncovered since voting cohesion merely reflects the outcome of political decision-making. It can be demonstrated in an indirect way in the sense that closer coordination tends to produce more cohesive voting behaviour.

Annual roll-call data of adopted UNSC resolutions are also retrievable from the UNBISnet, but the meaningfulness of applying a similar approach as in the UNGA is questionable. Due to the unique culture of

¹¹ Casting identical votes does not necessarily suggest that the voters have identical interests towards a certain resolution, but it means that they manage to synchronize their voting choices regardless of their national policy differences.

decision making and voting procedures at the UNSC, over 90 percent of resolutions in the period of 1993-2012 have been adopted unanimously with 15 votes in favour.¹² It is difficult to identify an EU voting pattern in general or its developments led by the ToL and the policy preferences of individual EU states, not to mention the fact that the majority of the discussions regarding sensitive topics are held in the caucusing sessions or informal meetings that leave no records (Biscop and Missiroli 2008). Calculating the voting cohesion of the EU member states serving on the UNSC does not make as much sense as in the context of the UNGA. A high degree of voting cohesion or even full consensus is not tantamount to a high degree of coherence of the Union because the EU members in the UNSC and the members that are not may hold opposite positions. Furthermore, a veto threat might have led to the eventual withdrawal of an elaborately prepared draft. As it never came to a vote, a draft like this would not be recorded in the roll-call data.¹³ Taking quantitative analysis as the only option thus risks overlooking important information (Lieberman 2005).

But descriptive statistics of EU voting behaviour help exposing “unusual” cases that are worth further investigation. The rarity of abstentions and negative votes at the UNSC implies that their occurrences may signify deeper disagreement with a particular resolution.¹⁴ It is feasible to get a rough idea about the preference orientation of the EU state(s) that abstained and the preference distance among the EU member states within the UNSC on this particular issue. But identifying EU member states’ positions and the motivations behind requires close-range examinations so that assessing the degree of their preference homogeneity and the extent to which they are in line with the Union is made possible. Inter- and intra-institutional coherence obviously cannot be assessed by the descriptive statistics. Within-case studies are necessary to reveal the coordination mechanisms and articulation coherence at both horizontal and vertical levels. Focusing on separate cases alone does not facilitate the detection of the variations of EU

¹² The author’s own calculation based on the data of UNSC Resolutions collected from UNBISnet between 8 January 1993 and 20 December 2012.

¹³ An example is the resolution draft co-sponsored by the UK, Spain and the US, calling for the authorization of the use of force against Iraq, was eventually abandoned due to the veto threats from France and Russia.

¹⁴ The resolutions voted against by at least one UNSC member account for less than one percent of all the UNSC resolutions analyzed in this research (1,264 in total). None of the EU members sitting on the UNSC voted against any resolution during the period under investigation. The resolutions from which at least UNSC member abstained account for about 9 percent of the total resolutions. EU member states cast abstentions on six resolutions, among which three resolutions concerned the situations in Iraq. Germany’s abstention from Resolution 1973 concerning Libya resulted in the most serious split of the EU since the Iraq war.

coherence under different circumstances. Cross-case comparisons shall be conducted as a follow-up if one wants to explore, e.g., the extent to which the new delegation structure created by the ToL has made a difference in EU representation coherence. By all accounts, a mixed analytical strategy is needed.

Guided by the research question and the descriptive statistics of EU voting behaviour at the UNSC, EU representation coherence will be studied in two cases: the 2002-2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libya crisis. These two cases are selected based on a “most similar” design. They are considered to have many parallels but occurred respectively before and after the adoption of the ToL. If EU representation coherence is found to have increased during the Libya conflict, the ToL may possibly be responsible for the improvement. Case selection will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

EU representation is qualified to be coherent if it scores high on both horizontal and vertical coherence. Measuring the degree of horizontal coherence requires evidence of the role of EU institutions in external representation and how they coordinated with each other during the two conflicts. Vertical coherence should be assessed by the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity between EU member states’ policy preferences, the extent to which they coordinated their national policies to reach common approaches, and the extent to which the EU member states serving on the UNSC concerted and shared information. Meanwhile, the capacities of EU institutions in organising (and perhaps facilitating) the coordination will be evaluated. It also demands an examination of whether the statements between EU institutions and national representatives are complementary or non-contradictory at least. Increase in representation coherence will be determined by comparing both horizontal and vertical coherence across the two cases. EU representation coherence is considered improved if, at the horizontal level, the Union’s collective presence at the UNSC is upgraded, EU delegation structure is streamlined, and the role of EU institutions in representing the EU at this body is strengthened. Vertical coherence increase requires observations of converging policy preferences among EU member states on UNSC matters, greater concertation of the EU member states sitting on this council, closer contacts and improved information exchange between these states and other EU members as well as EU institutions, last but not least, more willingness of national delegations to represent the Union’s common interests.

Lastly, it needs to be clarified that the mixed analytical approach is not equally applied to the context of the UNGA. It is because EU voting cohesion at this platform varies across a wide range. Neither low cohesion nor full consensus is rare. It is not as easy to identify outstanding cases as in the context of the UNSC within a considerable amount of data. The advantage of a mixed method that statistical analysis provides guidance to case selection is less obvious regarding the UNGA.

1.3 Structure of the Dissertation

The remaining chapters of the dissertation are organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the existing bodies of literature with reference to the EU's representation in the international system, notably at the UNGA and the UNSC, and explains how this dissertation contributes to the relevant fields of studies.

Chapter 3 first lays out the fundamental assumptions of the principal-agent theory and argues that this theoretical mode bears promising power in explaining the complexity and variety in the EU's external representation. Within this framework, the situations of EU representation in multilateral organizations are theorized into different types of delegation relationships, in which the EU and its member states are considered collective principals, while the actors that play the role of agents and the delegation structures are conditioned by the division of EU competences and the status of EU in particular international institutions. This section develops the typologies of EU competences and EU status models, and then specifies the agents and delegation structures under different (combinations of) circumstances within selected IOs. The final section of Chapter 3 places the principal-agent theory in a broader theoretical framework of new institutionalism. It compares the principal-agent theory with historical and sociological institutionalisms, and indicates that an extended and adapted model of the principal-agent theory that absorbs the strengths of the other two approaches of new institutionalism will serve as the theoretical foundation for this dissertation.

Chapter 4 is divided into two sections, which respectively draw a panorama for the evolution of EU representation at the UNGA and the UNSC from an adapted principal-agent point of view. Following a brief introduction of the institutional structures the UNGA, the first section takes a look back at the "problematic" delegation relationship of the EU's external representation at this forum in the pre-Lisbon era. Then it

describes the reformed representation structure of the Union established by the ToL and points out the remaining agency problems. Based on the post-Lisbon developments in EU representation, and drawing on the insights of the extended principal-agent theory outlined in Chapter 3, six hypotheses regarding the coherence of EU representation – measured by the voting cohesion of EU member states at the UNGA – are proposed to be tested using a quantitative method in Chapter 5. The second section briefly describes the *sui generis* institutional structure of the UNSC and examines the horizontal coherence of EU representation within this context in the pre- and post-Lisbon eras. It also examines the vertical representation coherence by looking at the implications of the ToL on the Union’s coordination and concertation mechanisms on UN matters. It is proposed that the innovations of the ToL – although limited – would contribute to an increase in the Union’s representation coherence at the UNSC. The final section touches upon the inevitable question about the reform of the UNSC and explores the EU dimension in the ongoing debate.

Chapter 5 tests the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4 on EU representation coherence at the UNGA, with systematic statistical analyses of the voting behaviour of EU member states. This chapter also presents the descriptive statistics of voting in the UNSC, which not only demonstrate the unique decision-making methods within this body but also identify both general and unusual patterns of EU voting behaviour.

Guided by the descriptive statistics in the previous chapter, Chapter 6 assesses EU representation coherence in two case studies, i.e., the 2002-2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libya crisis, which are divided by the entry into force of the ToL. In each case, EU representation coherence is examined at both horizontal and vertical levels. In order to uncover the variation in coherence after the implementation of the ToL, a follow-up cross-case comparison is conducted.

The conclusionary chapter, Chapter 7, is split into three sections: the first section summarizes and revisits the central empirical findings of this dissertation; the second section makes some recommendations concerning EU representation coherence based on the lessons that are learned; the final section points out the main contributions and remaining limitations of the present study, and prospects the directions for future research.