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## **Feminism, philanthropy and patriotism : female associational life in the Ottoman empire**

Os, N.A.N.M. van

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**Author:** Os, Nicolina Anna Norberta Maria van

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## CHAPTER FIVE

# *The Ottoman Economy in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century*

As mentioned in the introductory chapter to this volume, one of the two developments during the Second Constitutional Period in which the actions of the Unionists revealed their ‘national’ tendencies was formed by the efforts to establish a “National Economy” (*Milli İktisat*) from 1914 onwards.<sup>1</sup> Large parts of the public, including women, actively participated in these efforts. Scholars writing on late Ottoman economics have largely ignored the role of women and gender related to this topic. As Anthias and Yuval-Davis have pointed out, however, women may very well be participants in the economic struggles of the (national) community.<sup>2</sup> In studying these economic struggles, therefore, women, and gender, should be included. This part of the book aims exactly at doing this: by including women and their activities it contributes to a more gendered way of writing on the economic history of the Ottoman Empire during the last decades of its existence.

It starts in this chapter with a brief introduction to the economic history of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This introductory chapter is followed by three chapters in which the participation of Ottoman (Muslim) women in the Ottoman economy are described and analyzed. Showing how women got organized in the face of financial and economic threat, the economic activities of Ottoman women are discussed in the context of the construction of citizenship and national identity.

<sup>1</sup> Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists.”

<sup>2</sup> Anthias & Yuval-Davis, “Introduction,” 7.

## The Nineteenth Century: Growing Economic and Financial Ties

During the eighteenth and nineteenth century the economic and financial ties between the Ottoman Empire and the West European countries gradually had tightened or, in other words, the Ottoman Empire got more and more incorporated into a world market system which was dominated by the European powers. The economic and financial ties between the Ottoman Empire and the West European countries were established and reinforced in three different ways.

Firstly, the Ottoman Empire became a partner in the international division of labour, producing raw materials for the industrializing European countries and buying its manufactured goods from them. This development was triggered off when Britain in the 1830s<sup>3</sup> was able to negotiate for terms of trade which were favourable for the industrializing West European countries and got them formalized in the Free Trade Treaties. The British were able to do so, because the Ottoman Empire was desperately in need of support against the increasing threat of Mohammed Ali of Egypt and the growing influence of Russia on the Empire. These treaties weakened the commercial position of the Ottomans: the tariffs on exports and imports, which had been equal until then, were both increased, but the latter much less than the former; moreover, foreign merchants were exempted from the eight per cent tax on trade between the regions within

<sup>3</sup> When this “incorporation” started is a point of discussion. While İnalçık, Keyder and Pamuk argue that it started in the 1830s with the capitulations, Wallerstein and Kasaba argue that the actual start was earlier in the second half of the eighteenth century. According to Frank, however, the Ottoman Empire (or the geographical area which it dominated) had always been part of a trading network stretching from the edges of Europe to the edges of Asia including also Africa. In his view, the above proposed views are all distorted due to Eurocentrism, which leads the above-mentioned scholars to disregard any trading network in which the Europeans did not take part. Halil İnalçık, “When and how British cotton goods invaded the Levant Markets,” in: Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990 [1987], 374-383; Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey; A Study in Capitalist Development*, London: & New York: Verso, 25-48; Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820 - 1913; Trade, Investment and Production*, Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 18-21; Immanuel Wallerstein & Reşat Kasaba, “Incorporation into the world-economy: change in the structure of the Ottoman Empire, 1750 - 1839” in: J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont & P. Dumont (dir.), *Economies et sociétés dans l'Empire ottoman (fin du XVIIIe- début du XIXe siècle)*, Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, 1-5 juillet 1980, Colloques internationaux du CNRS, 601. Paris: Ed. du CNRS, 1983, 335-356. Andre Gunder Frank, *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkely etc: University of California Press, 1998.

the Empire, while local traders continued to have to pay these taxes. The *ad valorem* taxation of imports, furthermore, prevented the Ottoman authorities from pursuing an effective import policy. Due to these agreements the Ottoman Empire became a provider of relatively cheap raw materials (especially cotton and foodstuffs) for the industrialized European countries, while the locally handmade textile products could not compete with the machine made European products, whose quality was superior and whose prices were lower. These developments especially affected the local production of both cotton and silk cloth severely.<sup>4</sup> Still, the increased trade also led to a growth of the industrial sector in the Ottoman Empire as well. The production of half products such as silk thread but also high quality and labour intensive end products which were made for the European market, such as lace and tapestries increased. These did not, however, yield as much for the Ottoman economy as they should, since they were partly produced and traded by foreign companies.<sup>5</sup>

The Ottoman adherents of nineteenth-century liberalism approved of this situation, since they believed in the international division of labour. In their view, the Ottoman Empire was destined to be an agricultural producer whose products would be purchased by those who were destined to be industrial producers. As early as the 1880s, however, authors like Namık Kemal and Ahmed Midhat wrote about the dangers of such an international division of labour for the Ottoman Empire and pleaded in favour of a more protective economic policy, a pledge repeated in a less outspoken form in the writings of the latter's pupil, Fatma Aliye Hanım.<sup>6</sup>

Although both the industrial and the agricultural sector thus grew due to the increased trade with Europe, the share of manufacturing in the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Ottoman Empire decreased, while that of agriculture grew. Put differently, while the European countries were industrializing, the Ottoman Empire started to de-industrialize.<sup>7</sup>

Another effect of the increased trade between the 1830s and 1910s was that although both export and import grew, in general over this period the total

<sup>4</sup> Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820 - 1913*, 18-21; 82-129.

<sup>5</sup> M. Şehmuz Güzel, *Kadın, Aşk ve İktidar*, İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1996, 38-42.

<sup>6</sup> Zafer Toprak, *Milli İktisat – Milli Burjuvazi*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995, 27-30; Alihé Hanoum, *Les Musulmanes Contemporaines; Trois Conférences, Traduites de la Langue Turque par Nazimé-Roukie*, Paris & New York: Alphonse Lemerre, 1894, 121-145.

<sup>7</sup> Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms: Manufacturing," in Halil İnalcık & Donald Quataert (eds), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300 - 1914*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 888-933.

amount worth of imports was larger than the amount of exports. Thus a deficit on the trade balance was created. After 1900 this deficit grew even harder reaching about 8.8 million British pounds sterling in 1909 and 13.3 million in 1910 and 1911.<sup>8</sup>

This development led, apart from an actual increase of tax incomes for the state, to a drain on the finances of the country. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire started to lose those areas that were important for cash crop production in the Balkans. Moreover, the colonial expansion of the European countries made the old trade routes through the Ottoman Empire less important.<sup>9</sup>

These all led to a loss of (tax) incomes and eventually to the financial integration of the Ottoman Empire with Europe: the Ottoman Empire had to borrow money from abroad. The lack of money caused by the costs of the wars and of the military and bureaucratic reforms of the nineteenth century forced the Ottoman Empire to knock at the door of the West European financiers, especially when the traditional providers of money, the local bankers in Istanbul, were no longer able nor willing to lend money to the state. The expenditures made for the Crimean War (October 1853 – February 1856) meant that the Ottoman Empire for the first time had to borrow money from Britain and France.

Lending money thus was the second mechanism through which the West European powers succeeded in exerting power over the Ottoman Empire. The first loans, those of 1854 and 1855, were given under relatively favourable conditions. As securities served the incomes from Egypt and the customs revenues from Izmir and Syria. The two loans of 1858 and 1859, which served to stabilize prices in the Ottoman Empire by a reorganization of the financial market, were already less favourable. This time the *octroi*, a local tax on goods moved from one region into another for consumption purposes, and the customs duties of Istanbul served as securities. Other loans followed. With these loans, the amount of money the Ottoman Empire had to pay annually was increasing steeply.

The European financiers started to worry about the reliability of the Ottomans and demanded further financial reforms and more control over the

<sup>8</sup> İnalcık, "When and how British cotton goods invaded the Levant Markets," 374-383; Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism*, 23-27. For figures on trade between 1830 and 1913 see Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme 1820 - 1913*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1994<sup>2</sup> [1984], 234-235.

<sup>9</sup> Wallerstein & Kasaba, "Incorporation into the World-Economy," 335-356.

Empire's finances. The loans to finance these reforms were granted under much less favourable conditions. In March 1876 the Ottoman government was no longer able to repay the debts or even the interests on them. The Empire was formally bankrupt. In that same year Abdülaziz and his successor were both dethroned and Serbia and Herzegovina declared war. A year later, the Ottoman Empire lost a short war with Russia. The war had been financed by local financiers through short term loans, which the Ottomans could not pay back either. To regain the trust of the much needed local and foreign financiers, the Minister of Finance reached an agreement with the local investors in November 1879. The incomes generated from the taxes on stamps, spirits, and fishing, the silk tithe, and salt and tobacco monopolies were used to pay off the local debts. The foreign investors, meanwhile, felt at a disadvantage since they did not receive anything and feared they would never be able to regain their loans. They demanded to get a share of the incomes. The agreement of 1879 was cancelled and in 1881 the Public Debt Administration (PDA), an institution staffed by Europeans, was founded to replace the local administration founded in 1879.<sup>10</sup> It also obtained the rights to collect the taxes formerly acquitted to the local creditors, including, for example, the silk tithe. By 1903 the PDA effectively administered one quarter of the state's revenues diverting these incomes to paying off the debt at an accelerating pace.<sup>11</sup> The Ottomans were left with hardly any money to invest in the development of a local industry or other productive activities. For capital investment, therefore, the Ottomans had to turn to foreigners again. The PDA was ready to act as a direct intermediary between the Ottoman government and those potential foreign investors.<sup>12</sup>

The PDA, thus, was instrumental in the third way to further European domination: direct investment. Apart from investment through loans to the

<sup>10</sup> Edhem Eldem, "Ottoman Financial Integration with Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Public Debt," *European Review*, XIII, 3, 2005, 431-445; Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism*, 56-62; Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1929, 27-46; Emine Kıray, *Osmanlı'da Ekonomik Yapı ve Dış Borçlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993, 205-221.

<sup>11</sup> Moreover, between 1882 - 1924 the PDA absorbed 20-24% of the total expenditures of the Ottoman government. Engin Deniz Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II (1876 - 1909): Origins and Solutions." [Unpublished PhD-Thesis, Princeton: Princeton University, Dept of Near Eastern Studies, 1976], 180-184.

<sup>12</sup> Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*, 108-120; Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II," 184-185.

Ottoman government, foreigners also invested directly in the Empire. The most interesting investment projects for them were railroads and ports, both investments directed by the requirements of trade: the railroads and ports connected the producers of manufactured goods with their supplier of raw materials and with their market. Important early investors in these fields were the Germans and the French, while the Americans only got interested in investments in the Ottoman Empire after 1908.<sup>13</sup>

The growing influence of the European powers over the Ottoman economy had an important effect on the relations between the different ethnic groups and their place within the economic structure of the society. The European traders and financiers had always preferred to deal with their co-religionists instead of with Muslims. The intermediaries between the European traders with their trade houses in the main cities of the Ottoman Empire and the producers of the goods in the Ottoman hinterland, therefore, were generally coming from the non-Muslim minorities.

After the Napoleonic wars these intermediaries had taken over the work of their European counterparts within the Ottoman Empire. The European, or Levantine, trade houses had gradually disappeared, while the non-Muslim Ottomans had taken over their role. This led to the creation of an almost exclusively non-Muslim, Ottoman stratum of merchants while the position of the non-Muslim minorities in the field of financing and banking was also strengthened. This development was especially visible in the larger port cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Thessalonica. Moreover, with the advance of industrialization - as limited as it was - they also proved to be the forerunners and became the first industrial entrepreneurs.<sup>14</sup> Thus the top-layer of Ottoman society in the nineteenth century existed of two main, distinct groups: on the one hand the non-Muslim Ottomans which had become rich through their commercial activities, but who hardly had any political power; on the other hand, the Muslim Ottomans who held a position in the top of the imperial bureaucracy or the military and belonged to a sort of Ottoman "aristocracy."<sup>15</sup> Typically, an Ottoman Muslim mother wanting her son to gain a respectable

<sup>13</sup> Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, 42-47; Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*, 124-133; Charles Morawitz, *Les Finances de la Turquie*, Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, 1902, 371-418. See also John A. DeNovo, "A Railroad for Turkey: the Chester project 1908 - 1918," *Business History Review*, 33, 1959, 300-329.

<sup>14</sup> Quataert, "The Age of Reforms: Manufacturing," 837-841.

<sup>15</sup> Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire; Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.



position in society would aspire a military career or one in the fast growing bureaucracy for him,<sup>16</sup> while she would reject the alternative of manufacturing or trade.

Another effect of the economic developments, directly influencing the life of individuals and their families, were the shifts taking place in manufacturing. Due to the import of cheap and high quality goods some branches were almost completely destroyed. In other branches such as for example those producing half-products, on the other hand, there was a substantial growth. Also completely new branches were developed, such as the cigarette industry.<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, it became easier for individuals to purchase European goods, the symbol of modernity. In the Ottoman press of those days, therefore, we find advertisements for European consumer goods, which were sold in the shops in Pera owned in majority by non-Muslims.<sup>18</sup> The import of these goods was further facilitated by the improved means of communication and transportation, which were developed mainly by foreign investors especially during the last decades of the nineteenth century such as the telegraph, postal services, railroads, harbour facilities, and ships.<sup>19</sup> Thus, European consumer goods came into reach of an ever increasing group of people in the Ottoman cities and towns, while it also became easier for the Ottomans to travel abroad and purchase their goods there. The goods the Ottomans were especially attracted by were the “products” from France, the country which for many of them was the center of enlightenment and modernity.

<sup>16</sup> See e.g. how in an article in a woman's periodical of 1914 a Muslim mother in a fictitious conversation answers the question what she thinks about the future of her children: “We will make my Mehmet officer, my Osman will be a judge like his late grandfather, and my Hüseyin will be taken to his father's own office and become a scribe,” Ebüzzeriya Sami, “Kısm-ı içtimai: bizde kadın zihniyeti,” *Kadınlık*, 1, 8 Mart 1330 (21 March 1914), 3-4, quotation 3.

<sup>17</sup> Quataert, “The Age of Reforms: Manufacturing,” 888-933.

<sup>18</sup> Alan Duben & Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880 - 1940*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 202-203; Behzat Üsdiken, “Bonmarşeler” in: *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1994, II, 297-298.

<sup>19</sup> Quataert, “The Age of Reforms: Manufacturing,” 798-823.



Figure 7 On this picture from *Harper's Weekly* of 16 September 1876 two (imagined) Ottoman women are shown: one woman in traditional garb is smoking the traditional pipe; the other woman is smoking a cigarette to complete her modern outfit. "Turkish Harem Life – The New Style and the Old," *Harper's Weekly*, 16 September 1876, 765.

Thus many European artefacts found their way into the homes of the Ottomans. Changes took place in the interiors of the Ottoman homes and in (men and women's) outfits. European artefacts and fashion found their way to the lower levels of society over two different routes: on the one hand from the imperial palaces, through the homes of the high-level civil and military servants to the lower-level servants. On the other hand, via the houses and families of the non-Muslim inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, who, through commercial contacts, were able to increase their familiarity with these European products more easily than their Muslim compatriots.<sup>20</sup> Thus, knives, forks, individual plates, chairs and bedsteads gradually entered the interiors of the houses of Ottoman officials and started to be used instead of the traditionally used spoons, communal bowls, *divans* and makeshift beds.

With the increased purchase of European goods a dualism was developed in material culture. A dualism which was expressed in the terms *allafranga* versus *allaturka*. *Allafranga* symbolized the modern, Europeanised way of life; *allaturka* represented the life-style of the past generations. The two of them, however, were often not completely separated. The traditional and Ottoman Muslim was not always replaced by but coexisted with the European and modern. Thus, it was not unusual for Ottoman houses to have one room furnished and decorated in the European way and others in the Ottoman way. In the same way, Ottoman Muslim women would be dressed like Europeans indoors and wearing a traditional, Ottoman garb when going outside.<sup>21</sup>

Thus the European powers not only were able to increase their influence on a macro-level, the politics and economics of the Ottoman Empire, but also on a micro-level. European products entered the houses of the Ottomans and contributed even further to the acquaintance of Ottomans with European culture. Even those who did not enter the European oriented schools, did not read French or another European language were not able to escape this influence. During the Second Constitutional Period, the urge to diminish European influence was, however, increasingly felt.

<sup>20</sup> Nancy Micklewright, "Late-nineteenth-century Ottoman Wedding Costumes as Indicators of Social Change," *Muqarnas*, VI, 1990, 161-174, 161.

<sup>21</sup> Duben & Behar, *Istanbul Households*, 202-210.

## Economic and Financial Policies during the Second Constitutional Period

After the revolution of July 1908 one of the aims of the Young Turks became to decrease the economic hold of the European powers over the Ottoman Empire. An important part of the leverages for economic domination of the European powers were the immense debts the Ottoman Empire had accumulated. In the days and months immediately following the Young Turk revolution, therefore, the Young Turk government made its first efforts to fill the Treasury again, or at least diminish the payments made from it. Corrupt officials from the *ancien régime* were forced to return unjustly appropriated capital and goods. The highly overstaffed government offices were streamlined and salaries cut back.<sup>22</sup>

One of the persons playing an important role in the determination of Ottoman economic policy in the period following the Young Turk revolution until the end of the Second Constitutional Period was Mehmed Cavid, who was the spokesman for those who held nineteenth-century liberal, economic views.<sup>23</sup> He and his followers advocated free trade and free enterprise and were hostile to protectionist tendencies. In order to stimulate free trade Cavid Bey encouraged the development of the infrastructure and foreign trade and investment. Moreover, by reorganizing the control on tax revenues and the resulting raise of government income by 25%, he hoped to inspire the European powers with confidence in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>24</sup> This confidence should have led to more foreign investments and a modification and eventual abolishment of the capitulations through which the European powers still held a firm grip on the Empire's economy. However, this economic liberalism did not work out the way the CUP had hoped for. Foreign investors were not interested, the European powers were not willing to give up their privileges and the principle of free trade led to a negative result of the import-export balance, since the Ottoman Empire continued to export mainly cheap raw materials, while the Europe countries

<sup>22</sup> Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, 138-151. These measures created a lot of resentment. This resentment caused several strikes and it is not unlikely that many former civil servants participated in the counter-revolution of April 1909 out of disenchantment with the new government, which had caused them to lose their jobs. See also Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London, etc.: I.B. Tauris, 1993, 102-103.

<sup>23</sup> He was also one of the founders of the *Ulum-ı İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye Mecmuası*. Deniz Karaman, *Câvid Bey ve Ulûm-ı İktisâdiye ve İçtimâiye Mecmûası*, Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001.

<sup>24</sup> Karaman, *Câvid Bey ve Ulûm-ı İktisâdiye ve İçtimâiye Mecmûası*, 14-49.

continued to return their expensive end products to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>25</sup> The deteriorating economic situation of the Ottoman Empire smoothed the way for those in favour of a more nationalist economic policy. Although some of them had been publishing their nationalist economic views for years, it lasted until 1913 before they gained more influence and a policy of *Milli İktisat* in imitation of the German nineteenth-century industrialization policy started to be followed. This *Milli İktisat* entailed a more state controlled economy: it aimed at the development of a national economy and the forming of a national, that is Ottoman Muslim, elite of commercial and industrial entrepreneurs.<sup>26</sup>

In December 1913 a ‘Provisional Law on the Stimulation of Industry’ was promulgated.<sup>27</sup> The financial position of the Ottoman Empire due to which it could not afford to give credits to potential industrialists and the impossibility to protect a nascent industry against foreign competitors due to international agreements and the capitulations, however, proved to be major impediments to the development of a national industry. The outbreak of the First World War constituted a turning point: it gave the Ottoman government ample reason to one-sidedly lift the limitations set by international agreements and to abolish the capitulations, the age-old privileges granted by the Ottoman sultans allowing non-Ottomans (foreigners) to establish more or less sovereign trading communities within the Ottoman Empire.<sup>28</sup> With a two-article (provisional) law promulgated in October 1914 the old rules and regulations were declared null and void.<sup>29</sup> With another law in December of that year, the nationals of foreign countries and their companies were no longer subject to the rules and regulations of their

<sup>25</sup> Şevket Pamuk, “19. yy’da Osmanlı dış ticareti” in: *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985, III, 653-665, tables at 658-659.

<sup>26</sup> Toprak, *Milli İktisat - Milli Burjuvazi*, 1-9; Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de “Milli İktisat” (1908 - 1918)*, Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982, 23-25; 104-113; Zafer Toprak, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İktisadî Düşünce” in: *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985, III, 635-640; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 127-129.

<sup>27</sup> “Teşvik-i sanayi kanun-u muvakkat,” *Düstür*, II, 6, 1 Kanunuevvel 1329 (14 December 1913), 108-114.

<sup>28</sup> Toprak, *Türkiye’de Milli İktisat (1908 - 1918)*, 70-73. The first privileges had been granted by the Ottomans to the Venetians and Genovese even before the conquest of Constantinople. Later these originally one-sidedly granted privileges became embedded in bilateral agreements with reciprocal rights. Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, 127; Feroz Ahmad, “Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations, 1800 - 1914,” *Journal of Islamic Studies*, X, 1, 2000, 1-20.

<sup>29</sup> “Kavanin-i mevcude uhu-u atıkaya müstenid ahkâmın lağvı hakkında kanun-u muvakkat,” *Düstür*, II, 6, 2 Teşrinievvel 1330 (15 October 1914), 1336.

own country, but falling under the Ottoman (fiscal) jurisdiction.<sup>30</sup> From that moment on foreign entrepreneurs had to pay the same taxes and dues as Ottoman entrepreneurs which eliminated their competitive advantages.

The establishment of Ottoman Muslim enterprises was further facilitated by the elimination of a large part of the internal competition of non-Muslim Ottomans through the redistribution of the goods of migrated and deported Greeks and Armenians to Turkish and Muslim immigrants. Ottoman government policy combined with the arousing of Ottoman Muslim public opinion proved to be instrumental in this.

During the period 1910 - 1914 two subsequent boycott periods<sup>31</sup> had severely undermined the economic power of the Ottoman Greeks. The first boycott of 1910 - 1911, the result of the crises around Crete, was actually directed against Greece, but also effected the relation between the Ottoman Muslims and the local Greeks (*Rum*). The second boycott of 1913 - 1914 was directed against the Ottoman Greeks (*Rum*) who were accused of supporting the Greeks of Greece against the Ottomans during the Balkan Wars.<sup>32</sup>

After the Balkan Wars had ended, however, Greece continued to threaten the Ottoman Empire regarding the islands under the coast of the Ottoman Empire. Due to the disputes over these islands, the Ottoman Government, and especially the Ministry of War, continued to regard the Ottoman Greeks on the west coast as a strategic liability. It therefore decided to eliminate the non-Muslim population in these areas. To prevent the foreign powers from reproaching the Ottoman Government and from intervening on behalf of the Christian population, it disguised its aims: while the Ottoman government formally tried to prevent the harassment of the Christians and the subsequent large scale migration, that same Ottoman government seems to have been the motor behind the terror activities of the Special Organizations directed against the

<sup>30</sup> "Ecnebi anonim ve sermayesi eshama münkasım şirketler ile ecnebi sigorta şirketleri hakkında kanun-u muvakkat," *Düstür*, II, 7, 30 Teşrinisani 1330 (15 December 1914), 142-148.

<sup>31</sup> Immediately after 1908 another boycott had taken place which had been directed against Austria-Hungary because it had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and against Bulgaria, because it had declared independency. For an extensive discussion of this boycott which was used as a "political weapon" against foreign states see Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, "Muslim Merchants and Working-Class in Action: Nationalism, Social Mobilization and Boycott Movement in the Ottoman Empire 1908 - 1914," [Unpublished PhD-Thesis, Leiden: Leiden University, 2010], 47-107.

<sup>32</sup> Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu, *İttihat-Terakki ve Rumlar 1908 - 1914*, İstanbul: Libra kitapçılık, 2009, 309-319.

Christian population of the coastal areas of West Anatolia.<sup>33</sup> The emigration of Ottoman Greeks was facilitated and to some extent legitimated, when the Greek and Ottoman governments decided to co-operate in the exchange of large groups of their populations in the “small exchange” of 1914.<sup>34</sup> The protests of the foreign powers forced the Ottoman government to call a halt to the forced migrations involved in this exchange, but with the outbreak of the First World War they were resumed. The goods of the Greeks who left, died or were killed were confiscated and partly redistributed to Muslim immigrants. So were the goods and properties of the Armenians, whose large scale deportations from April 1915 onwards further decreased the potential internal competition.<sup>35</sup>

Whatever non-Muslim entrepreneurs were left in the Ottoman Empire, were moreover, disproportionally affected by the measures taken against the hoarding of and speculation with goods during the First World War, while Muslim entrepreneurs, and especially those close to the CUP, were able to benefit from them.

The popular press proved to be instrumental in both creating public awareness and in calling upon that public to take action. During both boycotts, the popular press published numerous calls of both the editors but also the public to participate in them. Both boycotts found a large public response. Similarly, the need for a national economy was widely discussed in the Ottoman

<sup>33</sup> Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*, New York, New York: Henri Holt and Company, 2006, 102-108. In Kerimoğlu the official policy followed is described in detail. Gertrude Bell noted in her diary however that the local authorities followed a “[p]olicy of intolerant pinpricks against the Greeks, seemingly in the hope that they will be forced to leave and the Turks step into their place as merchants,” while also other sources mentioned by Akçam testify to the terror campaigns of the Special Organization. Kerimoğlu, *İttihat-Terakki ve Rumlar 1908 - 1914*, 372-432; Diary of Gertrude Bell, 12 May 1914 at <http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/diaries.php> (accessed 9 August 2010). An article in *New York Times* refers to “hundred and eighty thousand [Greeks] who last year were driven out of their homes in Thrace and the vilayet of Smyrna” and “a still greater number [of Greeks], since Turkey became involved in the war, [who] have been and are still being dragged from their villages throughout Thrace and Asia Minor,” “Turks are Evicting Native Christians,” *New York Times*, July 12, 1915. See also “Treatment of Greeks in Turkey,” *Christian Science Monitor*, January 4, 1918, 3; *Persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey since the Beginning of the European War: Translated from Official Greek Documents* by Carroll N. Brown & Theodore P. Ion, New York: American-Hellenic Society & Oxford University Press American Branch, 1918; *Persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey, 1914 - 1918*. Constantinople: Greek Patriarchate, 1919. [the last two accessed through [www.archive.org](http://www.archive.org)]

<sup>34</sup> This “small exchange” as compared to the large exchange which took place in the 1920s is relatively unknown and hardly referred to in works on the period.

<sup>35</sup> Akçam, *A Shameful Act*.

Turkish press. A large number of authors called upon the Ottoman Muslim public to become active in business and trade and not to leave these branches of the economy to non-Muslims.

Since women's periodicals formed an intrinsic part of that popular press from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards and since women constituted a considerable part of the public that was addressed, women also actively participated in the discussions. Most of the women (and men) writing in the periodicals used as source for the following chapters were the daughters, sisters, and wives of the men belonging to the existing state elites and the new bureaucratic and military sectors which had been created by the reforms made during the nineteenth century. These were the people who, according to Lapidus, were "to govern the economic as well as the political and cultural responses of their societies to European intervention."<sup>36</sup>

From the late nineteenth century onwards, therefore, the Ottoman Muslim women and men writing in the women's periodicals of the time, who were keenly aware of the economic situation of the Ottoman Empire, eagerly discussed in what ways they could contribute to turning the tide. Frierson rightfully points out that in the women's press of the Hamidian era

women's (...) economic life as both producers and consumers were ceaselessly debated by the editors, writers, and readers, [while w]omen were also encouraged to learn skills that could turn them into economically productive members of society.<sup>37</sup>

The Ottoman Turkish popular press, thus, provides us with ample information on the ideas regarding the participation of women in the economic struggle and on their actual activities. The available materials show us that, for the Ottoman Muslim female urban elite, the economic struggle was not only a nationalist struggle, but that simultaneously a gender struggle was being fought; literate urban Ottoman Muslim women, as individuals and organized in women's organizations, tried to carve out a space for themselves within the nascent nationalist economy.

<sup>36</sup> Ira Lapidus, "Introduction: Modernity and the Transformation of Muslim Societies," in: idem, *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 551-570, quotation 555.

<sup>37</sup> Frierson, "Gender, Consumption and Patriotism," 107-108.



Chapter Six in this part on Ottoman women and the economy, shows how the Bursa silk industry indeed changed due to the accelerating incorporation of the Ottoman economy into, especially, the European economic realm and how this also had consequences for women in this region. Women belonging to the lower strata of urban and rural Bursa became an important source of labour when the silk reeling industry expanded due to the industrialisation of silk cloth production in France. However, the same international, economic relationships and the international competition it entailed, not only created work for these women, but also gave the factory owners the arguments to decline the demands for better working conditions which had led the women working in the silk reeling industry to undertake collective action by striking.

The other two chapters deal with the agency of Ottoman Muslim women of the urban elite in the efforts to improve the economic situation of the Ottoman Empire as a whole and its Muslim population, more specifically. In Chapter Seven the role of Ottoman Muslim women as consumers is discussed. The idea that women through their spending on goods could cause harm to not only the family economy, but also the national economy was reversed: by spending the money more carefully women could contribute to the uplifting of the economy. The chapter evolves around the discussion of creating a national dress, *kıyafet-i milliye* or *milli kıyafet*. The creation of such a dress proved to be pivotal to the perception of Ottoman women regarding their agency in establishing a progressive and civilized nation-state between the Young Turk Revolution and the beginning of the First World War. The chapter also touches upon the change in ideas on what the “nationality” of the new Ottoman nation-state after the revolution should be.

In Chapter Eight, the discussions amongst Ottoman Muslim women of the urban elite on their role in the possible reshuffling of the division of labour existing at several levels and the initiatives taken to generate such a reshuffle are discussed. The introduction of Ottoman Muslim women into white collar jobs and their activities as potential proprietors/investors/shareholders (at distance), and as proprietors/managers, actively involved in the production process as supervisor of the working process and employer, as individuals and collectively, are elaborated upon. This chapter shows how Ottoman Muslim women as consumers were aware of the different communities they belonged to and how they consciously used their multiple identities within these communities, as women, as Ottomans and as Ottoman Muslims to carve out a space for themselves in the economic public space.

