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## **Causes, rationales and dynamics : exploring the strategic security partnership between the European Union and Africa**

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# **CHAPTER FIVE**

## **THE FORMER EUROPEAN COLONIAL POWERS’ SECURITY POLICIES TOWARDS AFRICA**

### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

Since the colonial period, Africa has played a strategic role in world politics, the second largest continent comprising 55 countries with a collective population of over one billion. It provides raw materials for the former colonial powers and therefore plays an important role in their economic development. At the same time, it is one of the most significant continents in the world in terms of natural resources and strategic position. Europe has strong historical, economic, and political relations with Africa, and throughout the history of colonialism, the former European colonial powers have developed various economic and political relations. Economic and political interests of the former colonial powers have thus necessitated revision of the Africa-EU SSP. Realist theory emphasises that security relations between global actors and weak actors are strongly related to global actors’ economic interests. This chapter deals with the former European colonial powers’ security policies towards Africa and discusses how both realist and liberalist predictions have been applicable in the former colonial powers’ security policies in Africa.

### **5.2 FRANCE’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

France has “special” economic and political relations with Francophone African countries, dating back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and retains its military bases in Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Djibouti, and the Central African Republic. France’s security policy towards Africa has changed according to its economic, political and strategic interests. It has been linked with the concepts of change and continuity. For instance, during the apartheid regime, the French government strengthened its economic and political relations with South Africa and opposed the UN’s embargos of the pariah state, even encouraging Francophone African countries to increase their economic and political relations with it.

Additionally, France’s international power and position has also shaped its security policy towards Africa, seeing it become a member of the Group of Eight (G8) and one of the largest economic powers in the world. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and at the same time has been playing a significant role in European integration. Significantly, it is a nuclear power and a member of various security organisations, for instance NATO and the

OSCE (Renou, 2002:5-8). Approximately 240,000 French citizens live in different countries of Africa, where French companies operate, such as *Total*, *Areva*, *Accor*, *Bolloré*, *Bouygues*, and *Elf Aquitaine*. In turn, Africa provides raw materials, such as uranium, natural gas and oil to France, which is still highly dependent on these for its technological industries. France also has special agreements with many African countries in the fields of defence and military power. France is the largest trading partner for the African countries within the EU members<sup>8</sup>. When France's exports to Africa in 2007 were 30,393 million dollars, its exports to Africa in 2008 increased to 36,878 million dollars. As shown in Table 3, France's economic relations have significantly grown each year.

**Table 3: France's overall trade with Africa (2006-2008) (in million dollars)**

	Exports			Imports		
	2006	2007	2008	2006	2007	2008
France	26,344	30,393	36,878	24,763	28,198	38,354
Africa excl. South Africa	24,240	28,177	34,482	23,767	26,957	36,945
Sub-Saharan Africa	11,341	13,184	15,278	9,195	11,443	15,640
Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa	9,237	10,968	12,882	8,199	10,202	14,231
South Africa	2,104	2,216	2,396	996	1,241	1,409

Source: Adapted from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009.

Nevertheless, the global economic crisis of 2007 has had a negative impact on the growth of France's economic relations with Africa, with both exports and imports falling. France's exports to Africa in 2009 were €17.163 million and its imports to Africa were €14.312 million.<sup>9</sup> France's economic relations have relatively started to increase in 2010, with its exports to Africa increasing to €19.516 million and imports to €16.452 million. France was also the largest of the EU's exporters to Africa, with €20 billion in 2010.<sup>10</sup>

According to Hansen (2008:1) and Martin (1995:9-14), the main aims of France's security policy towards Africa are to protect French economic and political interests and citizens and provide intelligence for the French government. The Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the collapse of the authoritarian regime in the DRC, formerly Zaire, in 1997 weakened France's security policy towards Africa (Renou, 2002:11-3). New developments in Africa forced

<sup>8</sup> See the detailed report for France's economic relations with Africa published by EUROSTAT, Revival of EU 27 trade in goods with Africa, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pg. 1.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 1-2.

French policymakers to re-define security policy in Africa, particularly after the Cold War. The bipolar international system in world politics and spread of communism in Francophone African countries had been the main threat for the French interests during this era, leading France to increase its social, economic, and political relations with former colonial states in Africa against the threat of the Soviet Union.

After the Cold War, the concept of security has appeared to change, and now includes the new threats, mentioned above. Particularly, conflicts and wars in Africa began to threaten regional stability and especially France's economic interests after the 1990s, as democratic movements emerged. A new political rivalry between France and the USA arose in Africa after the end of the Cold war. Wary of what it perceived as imperial ambitions of the USA, France saw these new developments in Africa as a threat to its economic and political interests (*ibid.*, pp.11-3).

Financial aid programmes are also seen as a momentous component of France's security policy towards Africa, for instance strengthening the authoritarian regime of President Paul Biye in Cameroon in 1992 with a pledge of 436 million dollars of aid. After the 1990s, France also started to support the concepts of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, due to its changing interests in Africa and in the world (Martin, 1995:6-17; Ogunmola, 2009: 234-8; Renou, 2002:13-7; Touati, 2007:9-12). In recent years, France has claimed that the UN Security Council should include one African country to reflect and support the continent's interests precisely. However, its support for Africa at the UN Security Council remains somewhat rhetorical.

The emergence of the regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa also affected France's security policy. For example, France was opposed to the establishment of the ECOWAS (Renou, 2002:19-22) created by the Treaty of Lagos, in 1975, the aims of which were to reinforce economic relations amongst the members, to create an economic integration in western Africa and to create a common security system. At the same time, it included a peacekeeping force, and in 1995 ECOWAS played a critical role in stopping the Liberian civil war. France established its own security institution, known as the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programme in 1998. RECAMP included Francophone African countries, the USA, the UK, Belgium, and five Anglophone countries. This provides evidence against hypothesis 3, which is "the EU encourages to reinforce regional organisations on the African continent through the Africa-EU SSP." France's economic and political relations with Africa have influenced its institutional relations with the continent. Meanwhile, the establishment of the RECAMP also shows that France is pursuing its own

individual security policy in Africa, and one that is undermining the development of the EU CFSP. This also strengthens hypothesis 2.

Furthermore, the current economic crises also influenced France's security strategy in Africa, causing France to close down two military bases in Central Africa (Mehler, 2008:28-33). France also plays a large role in the international organisations, including in the UN and the EU, to keep its strategic influence in Africa. For example, it took a leading role in the EU peacekeeping force, which is the Artemis Operation, in the DRC in 2003, and has made a major contribution to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Since the post-independence era in Africa, France has institutionalised its relations with African states, and has organised Franco-African summits since 1973, in order to strengthen its social, economic, and political relations with Africa. The 25th took place in Nice between the 31<sup>st</sup> of May and the 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2010, in which France underlined that establishing a strategic partnership based on equality, solidarity and mutual respect was necessary for combating the common threats facing both continents and enhancing their interests. Importantly, France agreed to strengthen Africa's security system through regional and sub-regional organisations, and in so doing pledged €300 million between 2010 and 2012 to African states and organisations. It also agreed to train 12,000 African troops to reinforce African peacekeeping operations in that time. Meanwhile, the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, in his opening speech, argued that the spread of liberal concepts, such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law was essential for the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in Africa. It seems that France is changing its relations with Africa according to global developments and its political and economic interests, supporting hypothesis 3. It can be said that the evidence for this hypothesis is somewhat mixed.

According to assumptions of realism, making a true strategic partnership between France and Africa is problematic because France is aiming to increase its economic interests and security concerns while cooperating with Africa. Liberal views stress that cooperation between Africa and France is essential to fight against the new global threats and challenges. Liberal values can reduce the possibility of uncertainty, therefore, spreading liberal principles in Africa is crucial for removing the possibility of conflict and wars. Conflicts and wars have also threatened France's economic interests on the African continent. After 2000, France began to play a more active role in African politics and supported liberal principles, starting to put more pressure on its former colonial African states to show respect for liberal ideals. There are three important factors affecting France's new foreign and security policy towards Africa. First,

conflicts and wars directly damage France's economic and political interests in Africa. Second, the new emerging actors such as India, Brazil, China and Turkey have begun to establish new strategic partnerships and increase their economic and political relations with African states and organisations. Third, dictatorial regimes have begun to lose their power in African states over the last decade.

It is important to note that France is playing the greatest role in developing security cooperation between Africa and the EU. For example, it took a leading role in establishing the APF in 2004 to cement African organisations' security structures. Moreover, France played a leading role in an EU peacekeeping operation in Africa in 2003, named Artemis Operation in the DRC. France's increasing involvement in peace and security also confirms hypothesis 3. Based on the above, it can be said that France's economic and political relations with Africa have been one of the most important factors in evolving the Africa-EU SSP. While the EU set up an SSP with Africa, France is reinforcing its international position and also protecting its increasing economic interests. In particular, its economic relations have been increased with Africa, as shown in Table 3 (above).

Even though France's security policy towards Africa has changed since 2000, due to its changing economic and international interests in Africa and in the world, it still does not take into consideration internal challenges of Africa, nor focus on resolving the continent's structural, economic or political problems. However, these threats of the new millennium have led French policymakers to recognise that security cooperation with Africa is the best way to protect France's economic and political interests.

### **5.3 THE UK'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

Like France, the UK has strong economic, political, and historical ties with Africa, in particular with Anglophone African countries. The presence of a "Ministry for Africa" in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is evidence of Britain's maintenance of robust historical and economic relations with the continent. Whilst France colonised 20 African countries in the region of West and Central Africa, the UK colonised a similar number in the region of West and sub-Saharan Africa. The UK does not have permanent military bases in Africa, however it has special military cooperation agreements with some strategic African countries, especially South Africa.

There are many private British and government companies operating in over ten African countries, the largest being *British Petroleum, Marconi, Lonrho, ICI, British Petroleum,*

*Unilever*, and banks, such as *Barclays* and *Standard Chartered*. In addition, Britain<sup>11</sup> has special economic, political and historical relations with South Africa, and the total rate of its exports and imports running at over 40 percent, making it one of the most important commercial partners for the UK in Africa and in the world (Ero, 2001:66). Africa has been a significant trade market for it, particularly South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Angola, Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia. Debt-relief and financial aid programmes are also among the most important strategies of British foreign policy to maintain the strength of its historical relations with Africa.

It can be argued that the British security policy towards Africa has widened and deepened since 2000, but also that it has remained contradictory. The Blair government continued to sell weapons to Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and the Ivory Coast (Porteous, 2005:295-6), and increased its military cooperation with the government of South Africa. Importantly, Britain has been actively involved in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone since 2000. The reasons for Britain's military involvement in this country are to protect the British economic interests and citizens and to protect the government of Sierra Leone (Ero, 2001:56-7).

The British government (2001:13-5) published a report entitled *The Causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa* in March 2001, analysing and focusing on security challenges in Africa. The report significantly made a link between the British security policy towards Africa and dynamics affecting security on the continent. According to the report, conflicts and wars in Africa have causes that are "root", "secondary", and "tertiary."

The root causes are: (a) a wide gap between the rich and the poor, or inequalities between different groups or people; (b) the lack of strong political structures of the states that have caused conflicts and led to the emergence of corruption, ethnic conflicts, and weak political and civil institutions; (c) economic crises that have aggravated violence; (d) the legacy of colonialism that has a profound impact on conflicts; and (e) struggles for natural resources that have led to violence. The secondary causes are: (a) unemployment, lack of education and population pressure; (b) the abuse of ethnicity; and (c) availability of arms. The tertiary causes of conflicts are: (a) regional and interlocking conflicts; (b) the conflict cycle; (c) lack of guarantors for peace-making and peacekeeping; and (d) misplaced humanitarian assistance.

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<sup>11</sup> See the detailed report for the UK's economic relations with Africa published by EUROSTAT, Revival of EU 27 trade in goods with Africa, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010.



Meanwhile, the report (2001:22) states that the British security policy for Africa should focus on: (a) small arms and light weapon control; (b) encouraging investments and strengthening economic structure in conflict areas in Africa; (c) preventing the abuse of natural resources; (d) supporting development; (e) supporting security sector reform programmes; and (f) supporting the concept of African ownership through African regional and sub-regional organisations, and playing a more proactive role in international organisations for the interests of Africa. The importance of the report lay in its widening of the concept of security, particularly the British security policy towards Africa. It linked the British security policy towards Africa with social, economic, political, environmental, and physiological elements.

Attacks on the London transport system on the 7<sup>th</sup> of July 2005 strengthened a notion formulated after the 9\11 attacks on the USA that international terrorism was the greatest and most unpredictable threat to Britain's national interests. A post-9/11 and 7/7 assumption of neoliberal approach arose, based on interdependence between actors in combating a perceived common threat to the West and the rest of the world. The concept of strategic partnership became a strategic priority for the foreign affairs of Britain, which began to play a more proactive role in international organisations, including the EU, the UN, WB, and the IMF, in order to eradicate the roots of international terrorism. Attention focused on so-called "failed states", conflicts, regional instabilities and organised crime in the world, in particular in Africa. Hence, the British security policy for Africa was defined in terms of international terrorism by British policymakers. Furthermore, the UK increased its relations with African regional and sub-regional organisations, especially with the AU, and sought solutions with them against international terrorist attacks. This is also providing evidence for hypothesis 3. The challenges of the twenty-first century have threatened Britain's economic and political interests in Africa. The SSP between Africa and the EU became crucial for protecting Britain's economic interests in Africa, in particular, and the EU's interests, in general. At the same time, the Africa-EU SSP has become a significant tool for the UK to combat international terrorism more effectively.

#### **5.4 GERMANY'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

Even though Germany hosted the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, which regulated European colonialism in Africa, it did not pursue an active foreign policy towards Africa until the end of the Cold War. Germany had not colonised as much land as had France and Britain, and its colonial states only included South West Africa (now Namibia), German East Africa (now divided as Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi), Togo, and Cameroon. During the colonial period

its policy was similar to that of other colonial powers in Africa. After the First World War, Germany lost its all colonies in Africa, but unlike the French and British security policies towards Africa it could not maintain its economic and political relations with African states after the First World War, due to domestic developments in Germany, such as unification between East and West Germany. Nor did Germany have as strong political and economic interests in Africa as France or the UK. While the concept of continuity applies to French and British security policies for Africa, it is not applicable to the German one. As Golaszinski (2007:6) points out, Germany did not develop a consistent African strategy towards Africa, leaving its security policy for Africa inactive.

Mair (1998:21) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union and unification of Germany in 1989 had a significant impact on the German security policy towards Africa, however Germany's political relations with African countries remained limited, in proportion to its economic interests. For example, the total of Germany's imports and exports to the Sub-Saharan African countries was less than 2 percent in the 1990s, and has not changed substantially since. Germany's exports and imports have been predominantly with South Africa and Nigeria, while the first priority of the German security policy for Africa had been to protect its own citizens in its old colonial African states. During the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Germany did not play a proactive role in preventing it, and generally played a passive role in maintaining peace, security and stability in conflicts and wars in the Great Lakes Region. It can be said that German involvement in conflict prevention, resolution, and management was limited, and that political relations with African organisations were not solid (ibid., p.32).

After the 1990s, Germany developed a wider security policy towards Africa, seeing the new threats after the end of the Cold War as including organised crime, money laundering, drug smuggling and conflicts (Hofmeier, 2002:59-62; Mair, 1998: 23-5). Importantly, the new security policy of Germany paid more attention to conflicts and wars in Africa, and underlined that conflicts can lead to the emergence of different kinds of challenges for the interests of Germany and Europe, including mass emigration into Europe (ibid., pp. 59-62; ibid., pp. 23-5). Another significant changing security perception of Germany towards Africa was that if inequalities between North and South widened too far, a new Cold War could emerge, giving rise to new international problems (ibid., pp. 59-62; ibid., pp. 23-5). Meanwhile, Germany has become one of the EU's largest donors to African countries.

Golaszinski (2007:9) states that after 9\11, the thesis “without security no development, without development no security” became the first priority of the German foreign and security policy towards Africa. Germany has supported the concept of African ownership, seeing the establishment of the AU, NEPAD, and the APRM as strategic steps in sustaining peace, security, and stability in conflict areas. Since 2000, the German security policy towards Africa has widened, with it taking conceptual and practical leads, particularly against the above-mentioned threats of the twenty-first century. The 2007 German G8 Presidency was a very important event for developing its relations with Africa, initiating a Peace and Security Programme (PSP) in Africa, the aims of which were to address the roots of conflicts in Africa, to strengthen African capacity-building, and to support Africa’s peace and security structure. It contributed almost €30 million to this programme and to a G8 Africa programme of 2008. Germany has actively begun to engage in crisis management in Africa in recent years. For example, it participated in a EUFOR mission to provide peace and stability in the DRC in 2006, in peace operations in Liberia and Western Sahara, and on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, as well as supporting the Darfur peace process. It was also involved in the EU mission to maintain peace and security on the coast of Somalia. Meanwhile, it has started to play an active role in preventing conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. This supports hypothesis 3. After the EU members adopted the ESS in 2003, members of the EU increased their security cooperation with African organisations. According to the ESS, the EU should strengthen its strategic partnerships with different actors, including African organisations, in order to disseminate its norms and values, sustain global peace and security, and keep its interests. It has been argued that there is mixed motivation behind the creation of the Africa-EU SSP.

Germany’s economic interest has recently increased relatively in Africa, as for example it became the largest exporter of conventional weapons to African states between 2003 and 2006, with an amount of \$900 million. Meanwhile, its total trade reached €33 billion in 2008. Exporting energy supplies to African states has been one of the most substantial commercial activities of Germany in recent years (Cargill, 2010:33), to which end, Angolan President Eduardo Dos Santos made an official visit in 2009. It can be said that security interests of Germany in Africa have changed and widened. According to German policymakers, conflicts in Africa have been seen as the most dangerous threat to Germany’s economic interests. Regional stability in Africa has been linked with economic interests of Germany. Despite Germany not playing a dynamic political role in Africa, its involvement has improved

steadily. In this regard, developing security cooperation with Africa has been vital for the pursuit of Germany's changing international interests.

## **5.5 ITALY'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

Italy's historical relations with Africa date back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Libya were its colonies, all of which were lost after World War II. It particularly had special relations with East Africa, one of the strategic regions in Africa and the world. Since the colonial era, and throughout the Cold War, international actors, including the USA, USSR, Britain, and France, played an active role in keeping their geo-economic and geo-political interests in the region. The strategic significance of East Africa can be summarised as (a) a key region for the Middle East; and (b) a strategic gateway for the Red Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean (Commission of the European Communities, 2006:5). Conflicts and wars have been a fate of this region since the post-independence era, with political and military tensions between the states. The border wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and conflicts in Somalia have been chronic, and have threatened the regional stability of Africa and international security. The legacy of colonialism has damaged political and economic stabilities in East Africa, particularly the artificial borders it created. For instance, Sudan and Ethiopia have claimed that part of Eritrea belongs to them, threatening further confrontation in the region. While the countries spend a large amount of money on weapons from industrialised countries, they have ignored other challenges.

Italy's security policy towards Africa has been premised on its own political and economic interests, particularly in East Africa. It has changed dramatically in accord with historical events, such as the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 events, and the 2007 economic crisis. Having been marginalised by Italy during the colonial period (Novati, 2008:2), in the post-independence era the military regimes took over the governments and aggravated social, economic, and political stability (*ibid.*, p.4). During the Cold War, the bipolar international structure exacerbated regional stability in the Horn (Negash, Papa & Taddia, 2003:14). Italy's foreign and security policy for East Africa has begun to change since the end of the Cold War, following the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the area, and it has developed a different security policy towards Africa in accord with the changing global politics.

The Italian government has recognised that conflicts and wars have begun to threaten the historical interests of Italy, so Italy should play a leading role in preventing them as well as

those in other regions of Africa. Italy views this region as a “natural area of its own influence” (Novati, 2008:15-7), while trade relations with Africa have increased, to the point where it is the fourth largest commercial partner on the continent (Cargill, 2010:33).

When the new threats in North Africa emerged in 2011, Italy was overly concerned because of its significant geo-economic and geo-political interests<sup>12</sup> in the region. At the same time, Italy has faced serious emigration problems and threats of international terrorism surrounding conflicts occurred in this region. Italy’s role in starting the Libyan War of 2011, with the coalition powers, was therefore significant. Italy played a pivotal role in maintaining peace, security, and stability in Africa during the 2009 G8 Italian Presidency, but its increasing involvement in Africa’s peace and security in recent years has not gone beyond its pragmatic approach.

## **5.6 PORTUGAL’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

Portugal is the oldest former colonial power and has been present in Africa for almost 500 years. It was the first European power to colonise territories in Africa and also the last European colonial power to relinquish formal control over them. Its colonial possessions in Africa, namely Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, played a momentous role in developing the Portuguese economy, providing raw materials and a protected market for Portugal. Portugal’s strong historical and economic ties with its former colonies in Africa have continued, and it is worth mentioning that when Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in 1975, bloody civil wars erupted there. The Angolan civil war of 1975 to 2002 was one of the longest and the most destructive of the Cold War, claiming the lives of 500,000 civilians and displacing four million. The civil war in Mozambique also lasted a long time, from 1977 to 1992, with almost 900,000 civilians being killed and five million people being displaced (Leitenberg, 2006:77).

Angola has been the most strategic country for Portugal since colonisation, leaving many Portuguese private companies in this country, including *Portugal Telecom*, *Mota-Engil*, *Caixa Geral de Depósitos* (CGD), *Santander Totta*, *Banco Português de Investimento* (BPI), *Banco Espírito Santo* (BES), *Millennium BCP*, and *Galp Energia*. Almost 70,000 Portuguese citizens work in Angola, which is becoming the largest trading partner after the EU (Gorjao &

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/eu-arms-exports-libya#data>. See also the *Official Journal of the European Union*, twelfth annual report according to article 8 (2) of Council common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (2011/C 9/01), 13.1.2011, C 9/1, pg. 160-161.

Seabra, 2010:4). At the same time, Angola is an important country in terms of producing oil in Africa and in the world, being the eighth largest oil exporting country in the world and a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 2007 (Government of Angola, 2001:11-2). Despite also being one of the world's largest diamond producing countries, its social, economic, and political infrastructures, as with other African colonies of Portugal, remain vulnerable. Particularly, poverty is still the greatest problem of Mozambique and Angola, in spite of the natural richness of these countries. As with the other former European colonial powers, the Portuguese security policy in Africa has been related to protecting and increasing its own political and economic interests, rather than those of the African people (Coelho, 2002:129).

The Portuguese security policy for Africa has widened since 2000, with two historic EU-Africa summits held during the Portuguese presidencies of the Council of EU. The Portuguese security policy for Africa has included international terrorism, the principle of democracy, mass migration, conflicts, peace-building, and conflict prevention, management, and resolution. A "Joint EU-Africa Strategy" was accepted by the EU and Africa at the second Africa-EU Summit held in Portugal in 2007. This followed the first EU-Africa summit, in 2000, which was a turning point for changing relations between Africa and EU, underlining that establishing a fair strategic partnership between Africa and the EU was necessary to develop social, economic, and political relations. It also highlighted that developing relations between African regional and sub-regional organisations and the EU was essential for sustaining peace, security, and stability in Africa. The second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon in 2007 also broadened its security policy towards Africa. Especially, it paid much attention to the root causes of the conflicts and acknowledged that Africa's future was closely linked to that of the EU, particularly in matters of security. Such a belief would be promoted through seeing the EU becoming more actively engaged in maintaining peace and security in Africa.

Portugal sees that it can play a more effective role through the EU, the UN, the WB, and the IMF in sustaining peace and security in conflict areas in Africa, more so than it could on its own. In this spirit, Portugal and Angola have begun to support each other at the international organisations, including the UN and the EU, in the fields of the maintenance of international peace and security. For instance, Portugal supported the Angolan candidacy to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the 2003-2004 session. Likewise, Angola declared that it would support the Portuguese candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during 2011-2012. Portugal's security policy for Africa is based on

pragmatism, but while the notion of an SSP between Africa and the EU has emerged during the Portuguese presidencies of the Council of the EU, it has not led to a genuine strategic partnership with Africa.

## **5.7 BELGIUM'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

Belgium had three colonial countries in Africa, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (formerly the Republic of Zaire), the Republic of Rwanda, and Burundi. The “scramble for Africa” was led by Belgian King Leopold II, in a policy towards Africa that was racially punitive and brutal. Millions of people were killed in the DRC during the colonial period, leaving the Belgian colony with many challenges in its colonies, including political instabilities and racism. As with other colonial powers in Africa, Belgium also marginalised its colonies and artificially delineated many ethnic groups. After relinquishing all its colonies in Africa in 1962, the Kingdom of Belgium retained strong economic and political relations with the old colonies in Africa. In particular, Belgium has had a special relationship with the DRC, one of the world's richest countries in terms of natural resources.

The root causes of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 go back to the brutal and racial policies of the Kingdom of Belgium, with Belgium dividing Rwanda into the two main ethnic groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus. Whereas the Tutsis had a privileged social and economic position, the Hutus lived in poor conditions in the country. Significantly, the Tutsis had protected the interests of the Kingdom of Belgium in the country during the colonial period. When the Rwandan genocide erupted in 1994, and nearly one million people were killed, the government of Belgium played no role in stopping it. Ethnic conflicts and political instabilities have remained the greatest challenges to the former colonies of Belgium in Africa and have continued to threaten the future of the DRC and Rwanda to this day. On the other hand, Belgium has changed elements of its foreign and security policy towards Africa since 2003, supporting peacekeeping operations of African regional and sub-regional organisations.

## **5.8 EVALUATION**

The concept of security in the twenty-first century has been transformed, and the new century has brought both opportunities and challenges. Whereas the nuclear threat was the main challenge for the world during the Cold War, today the content of security includes a number of new threats. Meanwhile, the 9/11 attacks on the USA had an impact on the former colonial powers' security policies for Africa. International terrorism became a major concern for the EU, leading it to increase its strategic relations with Africa's regional and sub-regional

organisations so as to eliminate the roots of international terrorism. The new threats and challenges increased the significance of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, so the former colonial powers adjusted their security policies towards Africa after 2000 and built up collaboration with Africa in the fields of peace and security.

Gradual EU integration in foreign affairs and security may have increasingly forced EU member states to be driven less by their own immediate interests (e.g., economic ones) and more by adaption of a collective perspective that explicitly takes other motivations into account (such as crisis prevention and human rights). It seems that external factors, such as the increasingly shared perception of a global terrorist threat, may have further enhanced the drive for the EU to act towards Africa and, with this, another rationale has been “superimposed” on the individual policies of EU states towards Africa.

According to the realist approach, international politics are defined in terms of interests. Global actors tend to increase their own economic and political interests while developing cooperation. This chapter found that economic and political interests of the former European colonial countries have influenced security relations with Africa, the EU being its largest trading partner. Liberalism and constructivism also have predictions to apply for the Africa-EU SSP. According to the liberal approach, a strategic partnership among the actors is crucial to combating the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century. In addition, cooperation between the actors can bring opportunities to increase economic and political relations. Importantly, a strategic partnership can be made easily with the states that share the same political culture.

After 2000, the new global developments affected the former colonial powers’ security policies towards Africa. In particular, conflicts and wars, international terrorism and immigration issues have threatened the EU members’ economic and political interests on the African continent. The former European colonial powers began to support liberal values and put more pressure on African states to transform their political systems after 2000. In this regard, the Africa-EU SSP has been a strategic tool to foster cooperation between the two continents and to increase the EU’s global power. According to constructivism, norms, historical relations and common identities can have a positive impact on developing relations between different actors. Deep historical relations between Africa and the former European colonial countries have led to the emergence of different cooperation fields, such as security partnership between the two continents.



This chapter has found evidence for and against hypotheses 2 and 3. It has been argued that the former European colonial powers have mixed aims from the establishment of the Africa-EU SSP. Importantly, economic and political interests of the former European colonial countries in Africa has been playing a significant role in emerging security cooperation between Africa and the EU. However, new threats and challenges, such as international terrorism, immigration issues, drug trafficking, and conflicts and wars have forced the former EU colonial countries to initiate such cooperation with Africa. The EU's enlargement has also had an impact on the emergence of Africa-EU SSP.

Chapter 6 will evaluate the EU's foreign and security policy towards Africa, and examine domestic and international factors influencing the EU's foreign and security policy towards Africa. In addition, it will highlight the driving forces affecting the Africa-EU SSP.