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Causes, rationales and dynamics : exploring the strategic security partnership between the European Union and Africa

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Causes, Rationales and Dynamics: Exploring the Strategic Security Partnership Between the European Union and Africa

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Dedicated to my parents (Sabriye and Mürsel)

and my youngest brother (M. Tahir)

ABSTRACT

This study examines a strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security between the EU and Africa. The EU has been strengthening its institutional ties with African organisations since 2000, with security relations with Africa a priority on the EU's agenda following the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America. The study shows the driving forces behind the establishment of the partnership, arguing that the EU's economic interests have played a significant role in its development. In addition, new global threats and challenges, such as immigration issues, climate change, international terrorism, conflicts, and the emerging global actors in Africa have affected the EU's current foreign and security policy towards Africa. Norms and ideas also contribute to the emergence of the notion of strategic security partnership, but to a lesser extent. Drawing on literature, the method of process-tracing, and primary, secondary and tertiary sources, this dissertation opens up previously unexplored aspects of security relations between the two continents. Against the historical background of colonialism and recent moves to continental confederation and globalism, it seeks to determine why the EU has consolidated its institutional relations with African organisations.

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ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ADB	African Development Bank
ADF	African Development Fund
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMISEC	African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APA	Arusha Peace Agreement
APF	African Peace Facility
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
ARTEMIS	EU-led Military Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution
DAEC	Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission
DDDC	Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC	East African Community
EASBRIG	East Africa Standby Brigade
EC	European Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOBRIG	ECOWAS Standby Brigade
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOSAP	ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EDF	European Development Fund
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliment
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERM	Early Response Mechanism
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUSR	EU Special Representative
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FLS	Front Line States
FOMAC	Central Africa Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HSGIC	Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group

ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IMF	Internationa Monetary Fund
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
IR	International Relations
ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
ISPDC	Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MC	Military Committee
MONUC	UN Organisation Mission in the DRC
NASBRIG	North Africa Regional Standby Brigade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSSP	National Security Stabilisation Plan
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACs	Pan-African Congresses
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PT	Process-tracing
RECAMP	Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities
REC	Regional Economic Community
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms

RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RPTC	Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADCBRIG	Southern Africa Standby Brigade
SADR	Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SCM	Southern Common Market
SEA	Single European Act
SEAC	SADC Elections Advisory Council
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPLM/A	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSP	Strategic Security Partnership
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
TEU	Treaty on European Union (Maastricht)
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	Transitional Federal Institutions
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
USA / US	United States of America
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank

WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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CHAPTER ONE
STRATEGIC SECURITY FOR AFRICA AND EUROPE

1.1 RATIONALE, MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

Conflicts, conflict resolution and post-conflict restitution have for some time been major political concerns in Africa, demanding increased attention from the African Union (AU) as well as major external actors, such as the European Union (EU). Prior to the Cairo Summit in 2000, the EU's involvement in Africa was mainly in terms of trade and aid, but at the Summit the notion of a new strategic partnership emerged to shape Africa-EU security relations, to be strengthened by a second Africa-EU summit, held in Lisbon in 2007. Both summits paid much attention to conflicts on the African continent, emphasising their obstruction to peace and stability, and the threat to regional and international security. For the EU, Africa's geographical proximity, the spread of international terrorism following the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America (USA), mass migration,[1] the effects of the recent global recession, as well as current popular uprisings in North Africa, underline the importance of security.

According to the Council of the EU, "Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography, and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all its peoples."[2] These strong historical relations have played a significant role in developing security relations between the two continents, recently reinforced by the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2003 and the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004. For post-colonial Africa's part, the difficult struggle to eradicate regional and local war, bloodshed, genocide and ethnic cleansing, whilst obtaining and/or sustaining peace and security, has been among the greatest challenges its people face. Success so far has been minimal, and much more needs to be done to eradicate the scourges of conflict and war from the continent. The EU's involvement is an important, new and dynamic development, given its increasing importance as an international player and African partner. This development warrants systematic academic analysis and explanation, in particular from the standpoint of African countries themselves, many of which are attempting to develop a more unified continental voice.

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[1] See *European Security Strategy* adopted by Council of the European Union on 12 December 2003.

[2] See the official report published by Council of the European Union (2005), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership.* Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15961/05 (Presse 367).

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to analyse and explain the rationale behind the Africa-EU strategic security partnership (SSP), and assess its real and possible impact on conflict-stricken areas. It will also consider possible directions of change in African politics and development, stability in general, and the possible spill-over to other areas of interaction and cooperation. Against a broader background of increasing influence on, and interference in the African continent from international actors (including China, India, Brazil, Turkey, the USA and others), the dissertation will examine the motives behind the EU's own involvement in Africa, and will explore the insight of this new evolving SSP. The main research question this dissertation will aim to answer is: What are the main driving forces and elements of security cooperation between the EU and Africa? Why does the EU pursue an SSP with Africa?

Closely related sub-questions that also need to be addressed are: What determines the patterns of cooperation between African regional organisations and the EU? How can an SSP be established between unequal actors?

1.2 THEORETICAL APPROACH

As Seale (2004:417-418) underlines, good research does not lie in a specific philosophical or theoretical consideration, but rather in an eclectic blend of theories relevant to the problem being examined. In this dissertation a number of theories provided useful insight into the pursuit of a strategic partnership between different actors, with three in particular, namely *realism*, *liberalism*, and *constructivism* to be discussed in this section. The theoretical framework will be discussed explicitly in chapter two but a short overview of each of these three theories discussed in chapter one.

Jervis (1986:78) points out that international security cooperation in an asymmetrical power relationship is possible because weak actors feel that if they are not cooperating with powerful actors this can bring more challenges for themselves. According to Lipson (1984:12-22), international security cooperation is more difficult than international economic cooperation because security issues are too complicated and there are no tangible rules or norms to resolve them. Great or rising powers cooperate with weak actors in the fields of peace and security in order to protect their own economic interests, thus linking the two fields. The idea of security cooperation lies at the heart of economic considerations (ibid., pp.12-22).

Waltz (1979) argues that:

> … when faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?"

Mistrust among states is a large impediment that blocks international cooperation, and great powers have a tendency to exploit weak states. In addition, the international structure is settled on the premise of "take care of yourself!" (ibid., p. 107). Therefore, according to this reasoning, it is difficult to achieve fair international cooperation in the fields of peace and security between Africa and the EU. Dougherty and Phaltzgraff (2001:505-507) contend that cooperation can emerge as a result of the relationship between a powerful and a weak actor. Hegemonic actors can provide international security by cooperating with weak actors for mutual goals. Cooperation can also arise from mutual interests of actors not based on compulsion or oppression. Critics of realism point out that it overemphasises the role of states in world politics and does not take into account the role of international organisations in maintaining peace, security and stability. Therefore, realism restricts the numbers of international actors (Kauppi & Viotti, 1999:84-85).

Geo-economic and geo-political interests of the global powers have been playing a significant role in cooperating with weak actors. Conflict of interests and struggle for power among actors in the international system will continue to be the order of the day, and international cooperation will thus be undermined by lack of trust between states and non-states actors. Powerful actors will invariably aim to gain more from their strategic partnership when they cooperate with weak actors, and issues related to common threats and common interests are overshadowed by the notion of state interest (Morgenthau, 1967:5-7). According to realism, it would be naive to expect a fair and genuine SSP between the EU and Africa, the rationale of which essentially favours the economic wellbeing of the former over that of the latter.

Burchill (2005:120-121) contends that cooperation between actors can reduce risks concerning conflict or war and increase a broad range of relations between different actors, including economic, security, academic, and technological. International institutions can weaken the concept of self-interest among states and create international cooperation. However, maintaining a true sense of cooperation among different actors is difficult. Particularly, international agreements and procedures made between states or international organisations remain weak. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that cooperation can emerge with or without a hegemonic power (ibid., p.122).

According to Carey and Salmon (1996:33), cooperation is of crucial importance for the development of the modern world. However, implementing international cooperation between actors is very costly and risky. International organisations can promote international peace, security, and prosperity but at the same time they can diminish uncertainty that leads to asymmetrical relations in world politics (ibid., p.33). Neoliberal institutionalism suggests that successful cooperation among actors in a particular field can contribute to other fields, such as the socio-economic and political (Keohane, 1984:6-13). From this point of view, the success of strategic partnership in security matters among Africa and the EU is important for strengthening socio-economic and political structures in Africa. The Africa-EU SSP can reduce insecurity in both continents, if the EU aims to create a genuine partnership with Africa. However, implementing such cooperation between the two continents remains difficult because powerful actors pursue absolute gains while cooperating with weak ones.

Milner (1992:469-70) states that mutual interests and political adjustments are vital for the emergence of international cooperation. Keohane (1984:16,135) emphasises the importance of mutual interests created by economic interdependence as one of the most significant elements in triggering international cooperation. Neoliberals also affirm that international institutions can eradicate all the impediments that inhibit international cooperation. The sharp critiques of liberal theory maintain that liberalism only focuses on the fields of *low politics,* such as financial, social, and environmental issues, and neglects the fields of *high politics,* such as security concerns and the role of states in world politics. The critics of liberal theory also contend that liberalism overemphasises the importance of moral principles (Kegley, 1995:153; 2009:38-9).

By comparison, constructivism emphasises that reconstructing a common identity and culture among actors is very important in paving the way for the establishment of international cooperation, and underlines that social rather than material factors shape world politics (Wendt, 1992:392-95). Whereas neo-realists and neo-liberalists focus on material factors, constructivism focuses on social factors in international politics. Landolt (2007:394) points out that both social and material factors play key roles in shaping international politics and are not divided. According to constructivism, the notion of international cooperation is made by inter-subjective understandings, culture, beliefs, and identities. Wendt holds that the future of international cooperation depends upon "human consciousness." International organisations have beliefs, culture and identities, which before they perform in international politics play a significant role in their decisions and actions. Although international organisations create

peace and security, they can also lead to wars and conflict. More significantly, they are established by "structures of identities and interests" (Wendt, 1992:398-9).

Checkel (1998:325) asserts that constructivism made a momentous contribution to the study of IR with its sociological insight, however, it downplays the importance of material factors by overemphasising the role of social factors. Criticism of constructivism charges it with not explaining the concept of change or answering the questions of why, when, and how changes occur in inter-subjective understandings, identities, beliefs, and cultures. Furthermore, constructivism is not clear about which factors affect identity, beliefs, and shared knowledge (Kegley, 2009:42). The theoretical framework guiding this dissertation will be described in more detail in chapter two and specific hypotheses drawn from it will be derived.

1.3 SECURITY AND EU-AFRICA RELATIONS

Much has been written about the foreign policy of the EU and peace and security in Africa, and on strategic partnership. However, a survey of the literature on the current Africa-EU security partnership reveals little published on it specifically. The available literature in this regard mostly examines peace and security in Africa, not the SSP between Africa and the EU.

1.3.1 The concept of strategic security partnership

Balon (2002:138-141) signifies that to define concepts is always a difficult and challenging task because they do not have precise limits or rules, and attempts to present them as simple definitions are problematic and misleading in academia. The content of the concept of "strategic partnership" is about cooperation of parties within the framework of international organisations, seen by Balon as based on cooperation and equality between partners. Without equality, strategic partnership cannot be actualised, and the basic goal is "to maximise benefits and minimise losses" (ibid., p.141). The question of how two unequal actors will maximise the mutual benefits and resolve challenges while cooperating in the areas of peace and security is problematic. The main challenge behind the Africa-EU SSP is that neither the EU nor Africa made a common definition, thus causing ambiguity among the actors and undermining the development of cooperation. Each actor has its own definition about the current cooperation.

Crossick and Reuter (2007:7-8) stress that internal parameters of a country, such as socio-economic and political developments, NGOs, think tanks, academia, and business, are also vital for shaping strategic partnership. It also requires a clear objective and long-term relationship. Importantly, the aim is not only to serve international actors' common interests,

but also to address issues around international peace, security and prosperity. The concept ought to take into account the internal parameters of Africa, such as socio-economic and political conditions and differences between it and Europe. Baldwin (1997:9-12) states that academic works based on security have neglected the/a conceptual analysis of security, therefore the concept of security faces challenges and it is necessary for security studies to relate to, examine and analyse it in a conceptual way. For Brauch (2005:18), the concept was used in too narrow a perspective during the Cold War, however it has been reinvented since 1990 and is nowadays seen from a wide range of perspectives, including military, political, economic, environmental and social.

Since the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the concept of security has been further redefined. Soko (2007:16) asserts that the character and language of security are blurred and risk has replaced threats. In this respect, "the character and language of security" has been critical to understand the security relations between Africa and the EU. The concept of security should also consider the challenges and threats of the modern world, such as poverty and HIV/AIDS. Security cooperation should not only focus on conflicts and wars in Africa, but also on the root causes of the structural problems of Africa. Luciani (1998:151) explains that security is dominated by economic interests and security issues are linked to economic problems. Peace and security are necessary for development and a broad approach to security and development is crucial for security studies. According to the author, the EU's current security strategy towards Africa does not pay sufficient attention to the balance between security and development.

The current literature on the concept of SSP is limited, and does not link the concept of security to that of strategic partnership or the current changes in Africa and in the world. The existing work is mostly far from assessing the Africa-EU security relations theoretically or critically, so this dissertation will try to address this deficiency.

1.3.2 The Africa-EU strategic security partnership

Olivier (2006:151) assesses the adoption of the Cairo Declaration and the Cairo Plan of Action of 2000 as having replaced the old paradigms with a new one, based on the concept of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, which for Sidiropoulos (2007:2-3), ought to be based on equality, mutual responsibility and mutual accountability. According to the author, the EU needs to change its traditional relationship with Africa, that of a donor-recipient relationship. However, Vasconcelos (2009:10) states that "the responsibility to protect" is the main aim of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU and that the EU's security policy is based on human security. The European Security Strategy

(ESS) was approved by the European Council (EC) in December 2003, and underlines three important strategic goals: addressing threats, establishing security in the EU's neighbourhood and strengthening an international order based on effective multilateralism. However, Gnesotto (2004:52) and Vasconcelos (2009:27) emphasise that the EU needs to redefine its international role and should increase its responsibility in maintaining global security and constructing a better world.

Empirical evidence shows that the EU has a significant economic interest in Africa. In particular, the UK, France, Italy, and Germany have strong economic relations with African countries, with Africa being the largest trading partner for the EU. Research has found that the EU's economic interests in Africa have played an important role in shaping its security relations with Africa. The EU tends to regard foreign and security policies with Africa as secondary to its own economic and political interests. Furthermore, the new actors in Africa, including China, India, Brazil and Turkey, have also increased their economic and political relations and established strategic partnerships with African countries and organisations since 2000. Their active involvement in Africa has changed the EU's economic and political relations with the continent. At the same time, the 9/11 attacks on the US played a significant role in modifying relations between Africa and the EU, which before 2000 had no institutional relationship with Africa beyond aid and trade.

After the 9/11 tragedy the EU dramatically transformed its relations with Africa as it began to consolidate its relations with the continent on an institutional level. This provided significant opportunities for the EU, the first of which is that the EU strengthened its global position in Africa through the Africa-EU SSP, despite the impact of the global economic crisis of 2007. Secondly, the EU has maintained and even increased its economic and political interests in Africa against the new emerging actors on the continent by establishing new strategic partnerships Thirdly, the EU aims to fight with new threats and challenges more effectively by cooperating with African regional and sub-regional organisations. Fourthly, the EU has developed effective mechanisms to spread its own values and norms in the world. Finally, the EU wants more global responsibilities to contribute to global peace and security through strategic partnerships. Empirical data shows that the EU has strengthened its institutional relations with African organisations through its financial means, however strengthening African organisations with donations is not an effective strategy to establish an SSP with Africa. It merely increases the dependency of African countries and organisations on the EU and undermines the development of a true SSP with Africa.

Empirical evidence also demonstrates that the EU made a structural change in its foreign and security policy towards Africa after 2000. Before 2000, the EU mainly used economic aid as a strategic means to develop its economic and political relations with Africa, but after 2000 it decided to take on more global responsibilities and to become actively involved in conflict management, resolution and prevention in Africa. It therefore deployed peacekeeping operations in the conflict areas of Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau and Somalia. It can be said that the EU's foreign and security policy has been transformed from "soft power" to "hard power" in line with its economic, political, global interests and global developments. New threats and challenges, potential EU enlargement, the EU's strong economic and political relations with Africa, the new actors' growing relations with Africa, and the 9/11 tragedy have all had a significant impact on the transformation of the EU's foreign and security policy towards Africa.

1.3.3 Regional organisations and security in Africa

In the view of Marchal (2009:2-4), however, African governments must deal more effectively with security problems, supporting the principle of African solutions to African problems. In particular, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and sub-regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) might create their own security agenda to prevent potential conflicts and wars in Africa. Landsberg (2007:51) argues that the AU should strengthen its political structure and institutions in order to consolidate democratic and sustainable development and to build up an African continental union. He adds that the serious "challenges of the Twenty-First Century" facing Africa include peace, security, governance, democracy and development (ibid., pp.51-52).

Structural problems of Africa and financial and logistical constraints have been damaging the African organisations' security policies, a lack of a unity and solidarity among whose members has been a major problem in evolving a strategic partnership. While Africa is becoming more dependent on the EU, the latter appears to be becoming an increasingly dominant power in this partnership. For Cooper (1994:1545), crises in Africa, that derive from the legacy of colonialism and the use by colonial regimes of power for their own interests, continue to influence Africa's security and future. Chevalier (2006:6-8) cites the example of France, which as an international power has played a considerable role in terms of

security and economics in Africa. It has recently strengthened its military role in order to play a more strategic role on the continent, as well as in the wider international system, such as the EU and the UN. According to Chevalier, like other former colonial powers, it maintains strong diplomatic and strategic ties with Africa and plays an important role in peace and security, but France has been the most significant actor in forging the Africa-EU SSP, the main reason being that France has strong historical relations with Africa, which if lost would bring more challenges and threats to the EU. Conversely, reinforcing them would bring more opportunities for the EU in general, and for France in particular (ibid., pp.6-8).

Literature on the Africa-EU security partnership has not considered the effects of other international actors, such as, China, Brazil, India and Russia. These newly emergent international actors have strengthened their economic and political relations with African states and its regional and sub-regional organisations in recent years, and their involvement in Africa has had a momentous impact on the changing of the EU's strategic policy towards Africa. Therefore, while evaluating security relations between Africa and the EU, it is necessary also to investigate the political and economic effects of other international actors on this partnership.

1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The research strategy adopted in this dissertation is the method of process-tracing (PT), which was developed systematically in George and Bennett's Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (2005). PT is viewed as one of the most significant tools of qualitative analysis by George and Bennett (2005:6), according to whom it investigates "the links between possible causes and observed outcomes" (ibid., p.13). For Collier (2011:2), PT is "the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator." It aims to understand driving forces behind political and social events and in so doing pays special attention to description, which is a fundamental tool of PT. This dissertation systematically examines diagnostic evidence in light of research questions and hypotheses, at the same time paying particular attention to description so as to understand driving motives behind the Africa-EU SSP.

Collier (ibid., p.823) also contends that:

> Process tracing inherently analyses trajectories of change and causation, but the analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not adequately described. Hence, what in a sense is "static" description is a crucial building block in analysing the processes being studied.

Even though the Africa-EU SSP was established in 2000, it is still in progress. Therefore, this dissertation will analyse a dynamic process and "trajectories of change and causation." PT not only observes change or sequence, but also takes a good picture of a specific event in the process. To describe a process, PT portrays key steps behind a social or political phenomenon (ibid., p.824), and will help to understand change behind the strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security between two continents and characterise key steps behind this partnership.

PT is a significant method for testing theories in which a case is addressed in a wide-ranging manner. The method of PT scrutinises histories, archival documents, official documents, interview transcripts, and other sources in order to find evidence for hypotheses (George & Bennett, 2005:6). In this research, it is used to focus on reasons the EU is sustaining an SSP with Africa and the motives behind its establishment. It will examine factors affecting the emergence of the Africa-EU SSP and sequence of events and apply them against the principles of the IR theories, realism, liberalism and constructivism. The relevance of the theories can be interpreted and extrapolations either confirmed as irrelevant or potentially noteworthy.

According to Grinnell and Stothers (1988:219), "a research design is a plan which includes every aspect of a proposed research study from the conceptualisation of the problem right through to the dissemination of the findings." It will also define key concepts, namely "strategic partnership", "international organisation", and "security", prior to applying them to the topic. Understanding of the combined concept, SSP, will therefore provide a theoretical background for the research questions.

Primary, secondary and tertiary sources will be used in this research project to find evidence in support of the hypotheses. Primary sources are formal documents that include key materials of international organisations and governments (McNabb, 2004:475), and include official documents published by the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, the Western European Union, the AU, the IGAD, the SADC, and the ECOWAS. Burnham, Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry (2008:188) state that if the primary documents are inaccessible, the subject is impracticable. Primary sources will provide the firsthand information for the evolvement of the SSP between Africa and the EU. The first categorisation of the evidence in this research project will consist of primary sources.

Secondary and tertiary sources of the study will consist of research papers, books, journal articles, African, and European newspapers, government reports, and MA, MPhil and PhD theses. Pierce (2008:80-1) points out that secondary and tertiary sources provide secondhand information, through analysis, synthesis, interpretations, and evaluation of primary sources. For Burnham et al. (187-8:2008), there is no perfect classification system that accommodates all kinds of documents precisely, however, the approach of the literature review of the study will start by assessing primary sources, followed by secondary and tertiary sources.

1.5 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

This study comprises ten chapters. The chapters will systematically provide evidence for or againsts the hypotheses drawn from the theoretical framework. The current chapter includes the introduction, the description of the research problem, methodology, and it outlines the general structure. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of international cooperation in IR theories and clarification of the concept of strategic partnership. Furthermore, it includes detailed information on methodology and research design. On the basis of theoretical insights, it examines and analyses why the EU pursues cooperation with Africa in the area of peace and security. Chapter 3 explores theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the security concept, and scrutinises the link between notions of security, development, freedom, identity, justice, and governance. In addition, this chapter investigates the relationship between the Africa-EU SSP and security values.

Chapter 4 examines the historical background of the EU's foreign and security policy and objectives. It explores the challenges that undermine it and discusses whether it has enough power to establish a fair and genuine strategic partnership with. Chapter 5 evaluates the impact of colonial powers on security cooperation between Africa and the EU, particularly the interests of the former colonisers, including France, England, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Germany in the Africa-EU security partnership, and how they play an important role in Africa's peace and security. Chapter 6 analyses the EU's foreign and security policy towards Africa. Importantly, it aims to discover the driving forces behind the Africa-EU SSP.

Chapter 7 explores challenges and prospects that influence security in Africa, including the way challenges affecting security in Africa will shape the current SSP between the continents. Chapter 8 scrutinises African regional and sub-regional organisations' security policies and strategies, in particular those of the AU, the IGAD, the SADC, and ECOWAS. It examines the way in which Africa builds a strong regional security framework, and the impediments

that influence the African organisations' security policy. It discusses whether these organisations have sufficient power to work with the EU to build up a strategic partnership. Chapter 9 analyses security cooperation between Africa and the EU and examines a series of socio-political, economic and geo-strategic issues behind it. The final chapter concludes the study by providing a summary and evaluation of the main points raised throughout the study and implications for the Africa-EU partnership in the fields of peace and security. It will also provide recommendations for the future of the Africa-Europe security partnership.

CHAPTER TWO
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUALISATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Recent rapidly rising global issues have led social scientists to seek new paradigms in which to understand and analyse the new challenges that accompany them. There are many contending theories, however, no consensus has been reached between IR theorists as to which are more important or stronger, with each having strong and weak points. In this study, selected theories have been chosen which deal with international security cooperation between states or international organisations, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

In the twenty-first century, international actors have become more interdependent in tackling global challenges and threats, with no state or international organisation able to solve the complicated issues of the new millennium on its own. This situation necessitated strategic partnership among actors across a wide range of issues, and increased the importance of international organisations cooperating in order to resolve global issues more effectively. Furthermore, historical and economic relations between different actors play an important role in developing the concept of strategic partnership, however, whether the weak actors will benefit as much as the more powerful partners from international rapprochement remains questionable. This chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual framework to be used in understanding the research questions more deeply, including clarification of the key concept of strategic partnership. It concludes with a synthesis of the theoretical and conceptual analyses.

2.2 REALISM AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Realism is perhaps the oldest and one of the most influential theories of IR, its roots reaching back to the writings of Thucydides (460-406 BC) and Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), in, respectively, *The Peloponnesian War*, and *The Prince*. Regarded as "timeless wisdom" by IR scholars, many, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, developed it as the dominant IR theory in the post-World War II era and in USA foreign policy during the Cold War. Realist theory is divided into different categories, namely classical realism, liberal realism, neorealism or structural realism and neoclassical realism.

Machiavelli (1532:80) believed that protecting the interests and security of the kingdom was paramount, and that working together with the different kingdoms to maintain peace and security was impossible due to the tendency of human nature to wage wars and engage in conflicts. Furthermore, the "prince" must not govern the kingdom in accordance with moral principles, but must be rational when doing so (ibid., p.100). From a Machiavellian perspective, building cooperation between Africa and the EU is not easy because the EU focuses on its own interests instead of common interests, developing its foreign and security policy in accordance with its political and economic interests rather than moral responsibilities. Thucydides also emphasised that the concepts of power and security were important for a state's survival, expressing that in Melian dialogue:

> …the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. … By conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the security of our empire… (1954:402-403).

Morgenthau, a prominent realist scholar, in *Politics Among Nations* (1967), expanded the borders of realist theory, his most important contribution to which is summarised by four key terms: human nature; power; national interest; and the balance of power. He stresses that wars, conflicts and political instabilities are the result of a strand of human nature that is selfish and has a tendency to dominate a weak actor. A powerful state has a rational foreign policy to minimise potential risks and maximise national interests, but its interests will depend on its power (p.7). In addition, the balance of power is an essential element for maintaining peace and security between states (p.161), and "the realist theory of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power" (p.5). Morgenthau, like Machiavelli, separates politics from moral principles because he looks at the concept of politics rationally, defining international politics as "a struggle for power" and opposing the idea of security partnerships between states or international organisations. He points out that conflict of interests and the struggle for power between states will continue indefinitely.

Neorealism, or structural realism, emerged as a new form of classical realism, developed by Kenneth Waltz in his *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979. Kegley (2009:30) holds that whereas classical realists examine the behaviour of states *at the individual level of analysis*, neorealist theorists examine it *at the global level of analysis*. There is a distinction between classical realism and neorealism, with the latter claiming that wars, conflicts,

insecurity, and aggression are the result of the structure of international systems rather than human nature, and that the latter is no longer enough to explain the structure of the former. In the light of neorealist theory, the emergence of cooperation between Africa and the EU could be seen in terms of changing the structure of international systems. Neorealist scholars define international structure and international relations in terms of anarchy,[3] and believe that states perform in terms of self-help and pursue their national interests due to a lack of international government to provide peace and security.

The lack of a central government engenders more insecurity and violence in the world, as well as a security dilemma among states (Waltz 1979:102,187). Such conditions compel states to arm themselves in order to establish protection from any kind of potential threat. According to Waltz (1979:105), international structure does not allow them to cooperate in the maintenance of international peace and security among states or international organisations because "the state of nature is a state of war." So long as a self-help system that is a result of an anarchic system continues, international cooperation will be impossible (ibid., p.111). Waltz (1979:88-97) defines international political structure around three important principles: (1) ordering principles; (2) the character of the units, and (3) the distribution of capabilities. Structures have a power which affects behaviours of actors, thereby punishing or rewarding them, and they control behaviours of actors within a system "through socialisation of the actors and through competition among them" (p.74). According to Waltz (p.89), structure is the most important feature of international politics, and a bipolar world structure is more stable than a multipolar one (pp.171-2). States' interests and aims are clearer and there is a certainty and calculation of the interests and dangers in the former. He gives as an example the Cold War era, however, states' interests and aims are unclear in a multipolar world structure and they cannot easily define dangers threatening them. Uncertainty and miscalculation are the causes of wars and conflicts.

According to Jervis (1986:61-68), wars are the most important elements exposing the idea of SSP. Meanwhile, they lead to the birth of hegemonic or dominant powers, which in turn increase antagonism and discrepancy in the world. On the other hand, Jervis only sees the emergence of strategic partnership among actors in terms of the possibility of wars and conflicts. In contrast, international structure is changed and the new threats and challenges

[3] Anarchy is defined as a situation in which there is no international government to maintain global peace, security or stability in a neorealist context.

replace wars and conflicts. Jervis (1986:58) asserts that international security cooperation[4] among states or international organisations is problematic under international anarchic order and the security dilemma. The twentieth century became an unsuccessful one in terms of achieving international security cooperation due to the lack of an international government (organisation) or the provision of global peace, security and stability worldwide. More importantly, he (ibid., pp.62-76) highlights factors that have impacted on the notion of the international security cooperation:

(a) Offense-defence balance: Offensive policies of states deter international security cooperation and increase the security dilemma, while defensive policies do not have a direct effect on security cooperation among states or international organisations. A balanced relationship between the two types of policy can facilitate the appearance of international mutual security cooperation; (b) International changes in world politics: States realised that wars are costly and destructive, and history shows that rather than bring about global peace or security they lead to more conflict and destruction. Establishing international security cooperation is seen as an important basis for world peace; (c) Transparency and timely warning: International security cooperation may serve as a watchtower from which to follow what states are doing and how they are behaving, and so help to predict and take measures against potential threats. However, a feeling amongst weaker powers that they are being exploited by the stronger ones can negatively affect the establishment of such cooperation. Another factor creating the notion of the international security cooperation is domestic developments of states.

Gilpin (1981:186-9) exposes a considerable relation between realist theory and hegemony when he states that an asymmetric power relationship brings challenges and opportunities for hegemonic actors within the international political system. Their aims are to increase benefits to themselves by dominating weak actors through economic, political, and military influence. Gilpin (1981:192) explains the ambition of hegemonic or dominant powers as "expand or die", yet they share some responsibilities with weak actors to control the fields of military power in their politics. Domestic developments, such as economic conditions, are also important to hegemonic powers, as the result of the international structure, in particular

[4] For extensive discussions of the notion of international security cooperation, see another of Robert Jervis's articles, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* (30 January 1978).

disequilibrium in the world. It is anathema to global peace and security because by nature its tendency is toward strong countries dominating weak ones and increasing their own gains. The acts of hegemonic powers also cause the emergence of new international political systems in world politics (ibid., p.192). Gilpin stresses that establishing a fair strategic partnership between a dominant and weak actor is impossible, and so long as hegemonic struggle continues in the world, the status quo will persist and even strengthen.

2.2.1 Critiques of Realism

Today, realist theory has still been accepted as one of the most effective by IR theorists, and has been employed for many years by policymakers. For example, the Cold War era and the USA invasion of Iraq in 2003 are the most important examples supporting the principles of realism. However, it has both weaknesses and strengths. Critics contend that the nature of IR has changed and the concepts of power, security and national interest are no longer sufficient to explain world politics, whilst realism does not clarify the structure of international relations, which is changeable and thus dynamic. To understand international structure it is important to explore factors that affect the materialisation of cooperation among international organisations (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 2001:94).

Critics have argued that realism ignores the importance of moral principles, cultures, ideologies and human rights, which are a substantial part of the contemporary world. Moreover, it does not draw attention to the current challenges of the world, such as refugees, poverty, economic disparities and political disquiet (Sutch & Elias, 2007:61). Rather, realism sees states as having to increase their power in order to protect national interests, but it cannot draw the borders of power concretely so the concept becomes vague. At the same time, realism does not seek to explain why a strong actor pursues a partnership with a weak one.

Critics also argued that realism tries to understand the behaviour of states or international organisations within an international anarchic system (Solomon, 2001:45-46), but this raises difficulties because there are many other factors, such as economic and political developments. At the same time, cooperation is not only about peace and security but also about finding an answer to international threats and challenges. Realist scholars have also been criticised for having been Eurocentric, that is putting the interests of Europe ahead of wider global considerations. Realist scholars alleged to believe the principles of American social science (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 2001:96) and do not consider the problems of less developed countries (LDCs).

Critics contend that the realist school of thought ignored studies of conflict resolution and management, conflict transformation and post-conflict reconstruction (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999:86-87), but conflict resolution and management mechanisms of the African organisations and the EU have been significant in developing effective security cooperation. Realist theorists, it was contended, could not unite on international issues and became divided over various ones, such as the USA intervention in Vietnam, nuclear weapons and the USA invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Kegley, 2009:31).

2.3 LIBERALISM AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

As with realist theory, liberalism has a long history, dating back to the writings of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith. Liberalism has also had a profound impact on IR and has been known as the "leader of the opposition." One of the leading IR theories after World War II, liberalism gained more strength with the emergence of the United Nations (UN). In the meantime, Western countries have strengthened their thesis of a "New World Order", with assumptions during the 1990s (Dunne, 2005:186). There are many different types of liberal theory, the most influential ones being economic liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism (often referred to as neoliberalism or liberal institutionalism), idealism, and regime theory.

According to Burchill (2005:112-125), wars and conflicts can be eliminated by democracy, free trade, and collective security, which act as an insurance of international peace and security. In liberal thought, undemocratic states create wars and conflicts to extend their power and interests and remove the possibility of international cooperation among actors. Liberal theory also posits that human nature does not have a tendency to create wars and conflicts, but on the contrary seeks out cooperation and peace between people. Liberalism also supports human rights, equality, freedom of expression, and democracy before the law. If citizens select their own government democratically and freely, strong incentives should occur for international cooperation (ibid., pp.112-125). Democracy not only creates international cooperation, but also contributes to economic, social and political development among states. Significantly, democratic states prioritise democratic solutions rather than military methods in order to resolve their domestic problems, and value moral considerations and the human dimension. Liberalism stresses that national interests should help to increase international cooperation among actors rather than recourse to military power. Mutual responsibility and accountability have also emerged as a result of liberal democracy, and have

become the most important features of international cooperation. Furthermore, domestic factors of states are important in the creation of international cooperation (Burchill, 2001:81).

Dougherty and Phaltzgraff (2001:6,479) assert that political and economic elements play a strategic role in affecting global economic policy and international cooperation. Moreover, there is a strong link between politics and economics, with political actions having a direct impact on economic structure. In other words, political and economic systems of states are behind decisions to play a global role and cooperate with various actors. More importantly, states and international organisations that have economic and political power can trigger international cooperation and shape it easily (Ibid., pp. 6,479).

Neoliberal institutionalism suggests that international relations consist of cooperation and conflict. Contradictory elements are divided from each other, but international organisations can diminish the latter by focusing on the former (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 2001:68). For instance, the basic responsibilities of the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are to eliminate wars and create international cooperation among states and institutions. After World War II, the notion of international cooperation appeared in Europe to make Europe safer and protect it from potential dangers. European states firstly reinforced their political and economic infrastructures, then increased international cooperation among states.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are known as the founders of the neoliberal institutional school of thought, with its three prominent aims being to: (1) strengthen the role of international organisations to address global issues more effectively; (2) create collective security; and (3) reinforce the principles of international law. Neoliberal institutionalists also draw attention to the concept of harmony of interests that focuses on the mutual nature of international cooperation. Harmony of interests contributes to international peace and security, and increases international cooperation in security fields (Genest, 2004:124-128). Former USA President Woodrow Wilson emphasised the importance of collective security in his famous *Fourteen Points* speech on the 8th of January 1918, according to which collective security could be established through international organisations that promoted international peace and international law (ibid., pp.138-141). Kupchan and Kupchan (1995:54-59) argue that collective security has two significant advantages: "providing more effective balancing against aggressors and promoting trust and cooperation among actors."

Figure 1: Conditions of international cooperation of neoliberal institutionalism



Source: Keohane (1989:2-3).

Figure 1 (above), based on Keohane (1989), illustrates the increasing relevance of neoliberal institutional theory against the two important conditions of mutual interests and institutional variation. International cooperation among actors materialises if only mutual interests exist, whilst institutional variation affects the behaviour of states in world politics. If institutional variation is fixed, it cannot shape or affect international politics. In other words, the emergence of cooperation depends on both mutual interests and institutional variation, so any theory of international cooperation should consider the impact of international organisations on world politics.

Cooperation in peace and security may be challenging if it happens between two different actors. The notion of security cooperation not only includes peacekeeping operations but also social, economic and political, even psychological dimensions. According to Nye (2005:44-47), there are three forms of liberal theory: economic, social, and political. Economic relations between states are highly important in preventing wars and identifying mutual interests. For example, increasing economic relations between the USA and Japan prevented wars and created many opportunities between them after World War II. The second strand of liberal school of thought is social relations, the increasing of which can reduce the possibility of wars and create many opportunities. For example, peace, security and stability in Europe emerged as a result of post-war measures towards unification. The last strand of liberal theory is the role of international organisations in keeping peace and security and creating international cooperation in world politics. In particular, the role of international organisations for the maintenance of international peace and security has so far increased in the twenty-first century (ibid., pp.44-47).

Keohane (1984:6-13) asks whether international cooperation is possible without hegemonic or dominant powers, and argues that while hegemonic power can facilitate international

cooperation, it is not a prerequisite for international cooperation or the emergence of cooperation. A hegemonic power must have a strong army to be able to protect its economic interests, because these are related to security concerns. In addition, hegemonic powers keep their gains through international organisations, and therefore create and support them (ibid., pp.6-13).

Figure 2: Harmony, cooperation, and discord



Source: Keohane, (1984:53).

Keohane underlines the importance of the concepts of harmony, cooperation, and discord to explain international cooperation. The concept of cooperation is one that belongs to political science, but the concept of harmony is not a political one. The term "international cooperation" includes negotiations, bargaining, threats, promises, rewards and punishments. Cooperation only emerges when there is a possibility of wars and conflicts, and international cooperation "takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realisation of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination" (ibid., pp.50-3):

> Cooperation must be distinguished from harmony. Cooperation is not automatic, but requires planning and negotiation. It is a highly political process inasmuch as patterns of behaviour must be altered, a process that involves the exercise of influence. And influence is secured not only with the aid of persuasion and prestige but also through the use of

> resources, principally economic resources under conditions of complex interdependence, and military resources when conflicts of interest are very sharp and uses or threats of force are efficacious (Keohane, 1989:11).

According to Lamy (2005:213), the contents of mutual interests have been expanded. Since the end of the Cold War era, new security challenges have emerged and, as a result, security threats have become more complex and so have necessitated international cooperation. While mutual interests are playing a strategic role in cooperation between Africa and the EU, the question of "who gains more from mutual interests (interdependence) or international cooperation?" remains problematic. In addition, mutual interests have increased the realisation of interdependence among various actors. Waltz (1970:220-23) states that the concept of interdependence means mutual respect and mutual dependence. States that are greatly interdependent on each other have intensive relations in political, economic and social fields. Furthermore, these states reduce inequalities between themselves but there are many issues and a high possibility of conflicts between them. According to Waltz (1970:206), the concept of interdependence marginalised international politics. Nye (2005:198), however, expresses that "interdependence" refers to situations in which actors or events in different parts of a system affect each other. According to Nye (2005:197-8), "interdependence" is a "fuzzy term", and ambiguous in that:

> We are all in the same boat together, therefore we must cooperate, therefore follow me but the boat we are all in may be heading for one person's port but not another's, or that one person is doing all the rowing while another steers or has a free ride.

Figure 3 (below) depicts the distribution of power as a pyramid. According to Nye (*Korea Times*, 14 September 2009), at the top, states that are superpowers in the military fields remain and are generally unipolar. For example, the USA remains a global military superpower. In the middle there are no unipolar, bipolar systems or hegemonic powers, only multipolar ones, for example, the USA, the EU, Japan, and China, which remain economic powers.

Figure 3: The distribution of power in different areas



Source: Adapted from Nye (*Korea Times,* 14 September 2009).

At the base are many complex global threats and challenges, such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation of WMD, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, poverty, climate change and conflicts. In this category, no state or international organisation can resolve these common problems on its own. Therefore, powerful states or organisations need to strengthen international cooperation through international organisations if they are to address these challenges and accomplish their goals. To this end, powerful actors should reinforce weak organisations worldwide in order to manage international problems collectively. Thus, power is distributed by powerful states to non-state international, regional or sub-regional actors in world politics. Nor is there a hegemonic power, unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar system in this category, because of these complex issues.

2.3.1 Critiques of Liberalism

Even though liberalism made a unique contribution to IR theories, like realist theory it has its weaknesses. For example, there are both internal and external reasons in the appearance of security cooperation between Africa and the EU. Critics of neoliberal institutionalist theory argue that it does not take into account external pressures for international cooperation, and that it overemphasises harmony of interests. Liberalism also ignores human nature, which has a tendency to wage wars and conflicts. For example, the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Iraq war in 2003, conflicts between India and Pakistan (Genest, 2004:128-30) were the result of "human nature." In particular, liberalism does not pay attention to the strategic partnership on security matters between Africa and the EU.

Critics argue that neoliberal institutionalist theory overemphasises international cooperation among actors (Baurmann, 1996:140-1), and imply that collective security is problematic. The international community cannot play an effective role in maintaining peace, security and prosperity in world politics. For instance, the UN failed to prevent wars and conflicts in Rwanda, DRC, Somalia, Sudan, and Burundi (Genest, 2004:130-132). The critics of liberalism contend that it could not detect the borders of its concepts, with for instance those of democracy, equality, natural rights, justice and law appearing vague (Sandel, 1984:28). The realist critique of neoliberal institutional theory argues that its scholars misinterpret the realist assumption, particularly international anarchy, and do not see the real problems that hamper international cooperation among actors. Even though liberalism has been criticised, it does offer a unique insight into the issues of international cooperation and remains one of the most influential theories of IR.

2.4 CONSTRUCTIVISM AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Constructivism has become one of the leading IR theories since the end of the Cold War era, as the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union increased scholarly attention to it (Kegley, 2009:39-49). Constructivism traces its origins to the scholarship of the Italian scholar Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), according to whom, "the natural world is made by God, but the historical world is made by Man." Whereas human beings can create peace, security, and international cooperation for its development, they can also make wars and conflicts that aggravate the world. Constructivism is also inspired by sociology and philosophy, for example, Anthony Giddens, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber, indicating the interdisciplinary nature of the approach. Alexander Wendt particularly seeks an answer to the question of "how IR theories can be constructed" (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004:52), asserting that "constructivism is not a theory of international politics. It clarifies the differences and relative virtues" of other IR theories (Wendt, 1999:6,193). According to Wendt:

> Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for inter-national political theory; (2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics (Wendt, 1994:385).

Meanwhile, for Steele (2007:25), constructivism is "a loose paradigm of related interpretations which share certain assumptions with realists and liberals." Nevertheless, constructivism profoundly diverges from the paradigms of realism and liberalism. According to neorealism and neoliberalism, "power" and "national interests" come first and are the most

important elements in IR. Thus, they are materialist theories in IR, even in neoliberal institutionalism (Wendt, 1999:92).

Material factors are shaped by human consciousness and identities play a significant role in constructing interests and actions of international organisations: "Identities are the basis of interests" (Wendt, 1992:396-8). Threats and challenges are socially constructed, not given. In this respect, international cooperation can be affected by ideas and interests. Constructivism especially explores the ontological and epistemological features of realist and liberalist theories. It is not an anti-realist or anti-liberalist theory, nor is it either pessimistic or optimistic about international cooperation among actors. It only claims that understanding of international politics depends upon inter-subjective knowledge and interpretations of social and material factors (Adler, 2005:92).

Price and Reus-Smit (1998:1791-2) assess constructivism holistically. Constructivist theory examines three crucial ontological features with regard to the social world and its effects on international politics. The first is that material elements get their meanings from human activities. Without human beings, material elements do not make sense. The second is that identity has a power to affect world politics. For example, there are ideational elements behind international sanction policies of states or international organisations. The question of "why some states and the UN imposed sanctions on South Africa during the apartheid regime" can be understood by exploring the importance of identities of states or international organisations. The third feature is that states' agencies and social structures are bound together, with normative or ideational elements exploring the meaning of identity. Constructivism tends to link subject and object and knowledge and power in international politics.

According to Kratochwil (1989:5-6), interpretation of the social world and norms is very important in helping understand world politics and resolve global issues effectively. For example, building a common language and a shared knowledge is vital for a successful strategic partnership. In addition, the success of international cooperation depends upon the emergence or creation of a common identity between actors, but this is not easy for actors because according to international organisations, doing so for cooperation will restrict their sovereignty (Wendt, 1992:417; 1994:385). Sovereignty is one of the most important features of international organisations wishing to establish a common identity. International organisations that are not sovereign cannot increase their interests and play an active role in international cooperation (Wendt, 1994:388).

Since 1957, Europe has taken historical steps to create a common European identity, through the establishment of organisations such as the EU, NATO, and the OSCE. This also gives strength to the EU as an international actor in world politics. Unlike the EU, Africa has struggled to establish an African identity, despite many attempts. Most importantly, the establishment of NEPAD, the AU, and active roles played by sub-regional organisations in resolving the problems facing the continent are evidence of a strong hope or desire to do so.

2.4.1 Critiques of Constructivism

The neorealist critiques of constructivism contend that constructivism did not understand anarchy very well, therefore it could not analyse it properly. International norms cannot reduce uncertainty in international politics or create international cooperation under an international anarchic order. At the same time, social interactions cannot help to bring together actors to make up cooperation in such a system (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007:172-3). Constructivists overstate the role of identities. Though beliefs, cultures, and historical ties are of great importance in the emergence of cooperation among the two different actors in the case of the EU and Africa, political and economic factors are also crucial. Constructivists fail to balance a sensitive relationship between social elements and material elements but, despite the critiques of constructivism, it has provided a unique insight into the understandings of the theories of IR and can be used to explain the SSP between Africa and the EU. Table 1 (below) provides a summary of the view of IR theories and their different approaches regarding international cooperation.

Table 1: A summary of realist, liberal, and constructivist theories on international cooperation

Characteristics	Realism	Liberalism	Constructivism
Major concern	Increase power and security	Create international political and economic cooperation	Social elements can shape world politics
Main actors	States	States, international organisations and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)	Social groups and individuals
Approach to international cooperation	A pessimistic outlook and difficulty to create international cooperation under anarchy, to protect states' interests by increasing military capabilities	An optimistic outlook and possibility to create international cooperation among actors by spreading liberal ideas in the world	An agnostic outlook, but shared knowledge and common identities can make a positive contribution to international cooperation
Basic concepts	Power, security dilemma, balance of power, anarchy, national interests, self-help system, relative gains	International organisation, global security, interdependence, international regimes, human rights, free markets, harmony of interests, liberal institutionalism, absolute gains	Shared knowledge, identity, interest, ideas, images, inter-subjective understanding

Source: Own compilation

According to the realist approach, making a genuine strategic partnership between Africa and the EU in the fields of peace and security is difficult because the EU focuses on its own security concerns and economic interests while cooperating with African organisations. However, according to the liberalist tradition, international cooperation is possible between Africa and the EU. The Africa-EU SSP can also strengthen economic and social infrastructures of African states. In addition, establishing a strategic partnership among Africa and the EU is necessary to fight against global threats and challenges such as international terrorism and immigration issues. The Constructivist view points out that historical relations, norms, identities, and ideas can have a positive impact on development of the SSP between

Africa and the EU. The EU's historical relations are important in building up an international collaboration in the areas of peace and security with African organisations.

2.5 UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS: THE CASE OF THE SSP

Concepts have an essential role to play in shaping peoples' thoughts, and are an instrument that gives direction to thinking, analysing and understanding. Vital for interpreting ideas or notions, they also play a critical role in making sense of the discipline of IR. Without conceptualising ideas or notions, it is very difficult to understand or analyse what is happening in world politics. For example, an understanding of the concepts of security and diplomacy is crucial to comprehending the Cold War era. In this section, the concepts of "strategic partnership" and "international organisation" as understood in this dissertation will therefore be clarified.

2.5.1 The concept of strategic partnership

Today, the use of the term "strategic partnership" is not usually employed consciously or carefully. Even though it has been frequently used by international organisations such as the UN, the EU and NATO, it has not yet been clearly defined. Meanwhile, the clarification of the concept of strategy is vital to understanding it. According to Clausewitz (1943:117-118), strategy is "the use of engagements to attain the object of the war. Strategy maps out the plan of the war", and includes "politics and statesmanship." There are two important elements that have disclosed strategy: material forces, which have physical, mathematical, geographical and statistical elements; and moral and mental forces, which include a leader's intellectual capacity and strength of character. The latter, moral and mental forces, are the last step of strategy and are more significant and complicated than the former, material forces. A successful strategy requires a clear objective and a strong mind. If a strategy does not take into consideration moral and mental factors in a war or operation, then, Clausewitz argues, defeat will be inevitable. These factors also constitute the theory of the art of war, with all elements serving as pre-conditions for strategy and relating to each other at all times (Clausewitz 1943:124-125). Particularly, grand strategy is a noteworthy term for states and international organisations, which is a system in which actors manage their material and moral resources effectively and strategically (Hart, 1967:333-6).

In the African context, the concept of "strategy" has changed, expanding greatly since the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the AU in 2002. In particular, the AU and sub-regional organisations have played significant roles

in attempting to bring peace, security, and stability to parts of Africa. Today, strategy has broad and differing meanings in different parts of Africa, for instance as cooperation among states in the fields of security, health, economy, education, and technology. It also involves international cooperation with actors beyond the continent, and comprehensive and effective planning for resolving the problems facing African states. However, working to undermine the idealism are structural problems in Africa, such as corruption, poverty, HIV/AIDS, and underdevelopment.

In the European perspective, strategy is more aligned with development and it was based on an understanding that peace would depend upon mutual trading and economic partnership. Moreover, changes in social, economic, and political life in the EU have expanded its borders and the solid relationship between strategy and security was consolidated in 2003, with the approval of the European Security Strategy (ESS).

As the UK has perpetuated tensions within the EU regarding its willingness to cede sovereignty on a wide range of competencies, including currency and defence, so differences exist within the AU, notably a wish by the late Kaddafi of Libya to develop a "United States of Africa", and less grandiose aims by South Africa. Despite the differences in emphasis between and within the AU and the EU, however, or perhaps related to them, there is a strong relationship between the two continents, based not least on economic and historical ties. The legacy of colonialism cannot be ignored, and when the EU makes a strategy for Africa it invariably takes into consideration its complex historical background. In the twenty-first century, states and international organisations have thus changed their diplomacy and strategy according to new developments in the world. Particularly, the first Europe-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000, the adoption of the "EU Strategy for Africa" in 2005, and the second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon in 2007, have significantly impacted on strategy. The developing relationship between Africa and the EU since 2000 has changed the content of the term "strategy", and invested it with a new dynamic.

Broadly, the term "strategic partnership" can be defined as an intensive relationship in a wide range of cooperation between actors to attain common goals with mutual respect and trust. Generally, it has many dimensions, which include security, politics, economics, energy, and technology. Whereas a strategic partnership focuses on many things, it can only deal with a particular field. Importantly, one that dwells on a particular area, such as security issues or economic issues, can be more effective and successful (Grevi, 2008:161).

The components making up strategic partnership among actors are geo-strategic positions of states, common interests and willingness, as well as mutual respect, accountability and trust. International common instruments such as supervisory, legislative, and judicial authority should be established for affecting a strategic partnership. Drawing on these premises, the recognition of sovereignty of states, institutionalisation of the common instruments and a smooth coordination and communication with common instruments are therefore vital (Balon, 2002:139-145; Grevi, 2008:158). According to a report published by the Strategic Partnership Study Group in 2002, the core principles of the notion of strategic partnership are: (1) Development of strong social and economic strategies; (2) Leaving behind of ideological views and biases; (3) Creation of a common vision between actors; (4) Knowledgeable, effective and strong leaders and (5) Reinforcement of "civil dialogue" (2002: II-IV).

Whereas "knowledgeable, effective and strong leaders" make powerful pronouncements on their peoples' interests, uneducated, ineffective and weak leaders may be quiescent in working for the interests of the global powers. So, the concept of strategic partnership in the area of peace and security between Africa and the EU remains problematic. The other and important conceptual problem about this partnership is that while the EU deals with this partnership according to its economic and political interests, Africa cannot make a clear definition of this partnership that undermines the international role of Africa in world politics. Both African and the EU leaders need to define it in terms of mutual interests and purposes, and mutual respect.

It is worth noting that bilateral and multilateral relations between actors are key features in the emergence of strategic partnership. While multilateralism requires three or more actors to tackle common issues effectively, bilateralism needs only two. After World War II, whereas multilateralism became a very important strategy in developing strategic partnerships between actors in international relations, unilateralism lost its significance. In particular, the emergence of international organisations such as the UN, the EU, the AU and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) strengthened a multilateral international structure on the world stage, ostensibly designed to address global challenges and threats confronting the world. However, the multilateral international system has also given rise to conflicts of interest amongst the great powers which, despite their strength, have had to consider diplomatic means to establish and strengthen relationships between each other (Grevi, 2008:150).

Today, global threats and challenges are becoming increasingly complicated. A multipolar world has replaced a bi-polar one, with terrorism, transnational organised crime, climate

change, illegal migration, and a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the leading challenges in the twenty-first century. In particular, an SSP has become the most critical matter between Africa and the EU in recent years, due to conflicts that have damaged Africa's socio-economic and political developments, and affected and economic interests of the EU. According to the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa (2005:2), the EU is still highly dependent on Africa's natural resources and it is its largest trading partner. For instance, the EU imports 85 percent of its vegetables, fruit and cotton from the continent (Commission of the European Communities, 2006:5).

The term "strategic security partnership" has a narrower meaning than the term "strategic partnership." Whereas the latter includes social, economic, political, diplomatic, and military dimensions, the former focuses on peace and security, and it has become a sensitive concept in recent years in international affairs. It can be described as cooperation in the fields of peace and security to sustain and promote peace, security and stability among actors. Political dialogue, equality, justice, mutual confidence, mutual accountability, solidarity, common interests and responsibilities, interdependence, and ownership are at the core of the term "strategic security partnership." To develop a common strategic culture is a prerequisite for the success of an SSP between Africa and the EU. Even though both actors have recently taken common steps to reinforce it, a common strategic culture has not yet matured, and it remains a vulnerable and critical partnership because of the fragility of many African governments and the history of colonialism.

2.5.2 The concept of international organisation and the SSP

Today, even though international organisations have played a very important role in maintaining peace, security, and stability in the world, they have become more complex. It has been claimed they "make the impossible possible by doing what governments can not or will not" (Karns and Mingst, 2004:230), whilst for Archer (2001:33) they act "as a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or nongovernmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership." According to Claude (1971:4), an international organisation is "a process; international organisations are a representative aspect of the phase of that process which has been reached at a given time." Significantly, the number of international organisations increased after the Second World War.

From a historical viewpoint, the notion of international organisation dates back to Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (1795), in which he argues for the establishment of a common constitution by which states would share as an effective international mechanism for preventing wars (McCloughry, 1957:7-16). The "League of Nations" that followed World War I could be seen as an initial step in this direction, and was in some ways a precursor to the United Nations, aiming at international peace and security. Smaller societies had emerged to fight against slavery in the United States, England, and France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and these had paved the way for larger international organisations in the following centuries (Karns & Mingst, 2004:224). One of these, the Concert of Europe, was established by the powerful European states, Austria, Prussia, the Russian Empire and the United Kingdom, in 1815 to solve common problems of great powers following the Napoeonic Wars, and to promote the idea of international organisations. Furthermore, Russia organised important international conferences to prevent wars and maintain international peace, security, and stability between 1899 and 1907, known as the "Hague System." It also advanced the development of the notion of international organisations (Claude, 1971:24-30).

Three other important developments in history contributed to the birth of international organisations. First, increasing global relations among states engendered some issues regarding trade controversies in the nineteenth century. This situation particularly pushed the states to establish a common association in order to discuss and resolve their common problems. Second, with the establishment of international postal communication in the nineteenth century, before the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 1878, some disagreements regarding postal delivery rates among member states had emerged. Subsequently, the member states of the international postal communication attempted to resolve their common problems by creating a common mechanism. Third, commercial relations among powerful states increased interdependence in world politics in the nineteenth century. Therefore, powerful states tended to establish international institutions to protect their common interests within one legitimised entity. Trade relations among states particularly played a significant role in the reinforcement of the notion of international organisations. More importantly, powerful states' roles in the nineteenth century had a great impact on the creation of international organisations (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:2-4).

Historical events in the twentieth century saw a marked development and institutionalisation of international organisations in world politics, particularly the First and Second World Wars. Karns and Mingst (2004:224-30) also point to four important factors: (1) the effects of

globalisation and interdependence; (2) international conferences held under the auspices of the UN and the role of non-state actors; (3) technological developments; and (4) the end of the Cold war and spread of liberal values across the world. President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" in 1918 provided early inspiration for the establishment of international organisations, emphasising their importance in maintaining international peace, security and stability, and resolving international disputes. Woodrow Wilson is known as the father of the League of Nations, set up in 1919 (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:16-18), although the USA did not become a member for reasons of international self-interest and balance.

Political and economic developments, particularly integration movements in Europe in the 1960s, had a major influence on the emergence of regional and sub-regional organisations on different continents, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, and ECOWAS in 1975 (ibid., pp.213-5). According to Mazzeo (1984:240-1), international organisations have four critical functions:
(1) to protect local traditions, cultures, and values; (2) to protect local peoples' interests from global dangers; (3) to promote their own peoples' living standards and socio-economic and political cooperation among people; and (4) to form a bridge between different regions and continents.

The behaviour of member states of regional and sub-regional organisations is an important factor in making them strong and fructuous actors in their regions (ibid., pp.240-1), with three elements having a significant impact on their development: ideology, technology, and nationalism. The first two of these played an important role in maturing cooperation amongst developed countries, whereas the third had a more influential impact on Africa and developing countries (ibid., p.3). This dichotomy again poses the question as to whether regional and sub-regional organisations can make a difference to peoples' lives and sustain peace, security and stability.

In an African context, the notion of regional and sub-regional organisations can be said to date back to Jamaican-born journalist and political agitator Marcus Garvey's weekly newspaper, *Negro World*, his founding of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), and poems written in the1920s, including:

> "Hail! United States of Africa-free! Motherland most bright, divinely fair! State in perfect sisterhood united. Born of truth, mighty thou shalt ever be."

The writings of Garvey (1889-1948) provided inspiration for much of the Harlem Renaissance and "Back to Africa" movement that encouraged African Americans to return to Africa, particularly Liberia. It also created the idea of Pan-Africanism, and in this respect the idea of the establishments of the Pan-African organisations, such as, OAU, and ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and currently the AU. (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:215-6). The notion of regional and sub-regional organisations was also institutionalised in Africa during the nineteenth century, based on racial struggle and turning to independent struggle during the twentieth century. The role of the Pan-African Congresses (PACs) had a significant effect on materialising the idea of regional organisations, as the participants emphasised the importance of political and economic cooperation among the African states. On the other hand, financial and political constraints have weakened African regional and sub-regional organisations in tackling Africa's structural problems (Karns & Mingst, 2004:200-4).

International organisations have three important features: (1) independence of member states; (2) equal rights of member states and rules; and (3) presence of a legitimised structure. Independence of member states is a prerequisite for international legitimation, for without it hegemonic or imperialist powers can emerge and use the international organisation for their own global interests. Likewise, the principle of equality of member states and rules in international organisations is important in resolving member states' common issues effectively (Archer, 2001:36-7; Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond, 2004:2-4; McLean, 2000:161-2).

There are significant aims amongst international organisations to increase cooperation and tackle global challenges and threats in the twenty-first century, therefore, they are of great strategic importance in world politics. Particularly, states place much importance on joining them so as to protect their own interests and legitimise their policies in international affairs (McLean, 2000:187-8). International organisations largely emerged to resolve the complicated issues of contemporary world politics (Claude, 1971:6), on the other hand, the critical question remains as to whether the sovereignty of member states is weakened by joining them (Claude, 1971:5; McLean, 2000:187-8). According to McLean (2000:187), they restrict the behaviours of states and therefore sovereignty. The next section will designate the hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework.

2.6 HYPOTHESES

As Silverman (1997:46) points out, hypotheses have a theoretical background, but require conceptual clarity and appropriate research and data collection to be tested. This dissertation

provides a theoretical and conceptual framework for a deeper understanding of the research questions, testing the hypotheses and providing clarity of the concept of strategic partnership on the basis of empirical insights.

Realist theory holds that international politics is a struggle for power and actors behave in terms of power and national interests on the international scene. In an anarchic system, international cooperation is not easy. The question of who will gain more from international cooperation is a dilemma. In addition, human nature has a tendency to engage in conflicts, instabilities, and insecurity. The more powerful concentrate on their own security and interests at the expense of the weaker or of common interests. In view of realism, the SSP between Africa and the EU is related to a struggle for power. The partnership will deepen an asymmetrical power relationship between the two continents. In a liberal approach, however, values can increase international cooperation among actors.

Neoliberal institutionalism contends that international organisations can promote international peace, security, and stability, and at the same time reduce uncertainty and inequality among actors. This theoretical framework reveals that economic interdependence between Africa and the EU has played a significant role in establishing an SSP. The concept of international security has changed in the twenty-first century and many complex global threats have appeared that threaten the interests of powerful actors on the world stage. This includes international terrorism, conflicts, climate change, and migration. No state or international organisation can solve global threats and challenges. Therefore, making strategic partnership between Africa and the EU has been necessary to effectively combat global threats and challenges. From a constructivist viewpoint, ideas, beliefs, cultures and common identities can also play a significant role in shaping international affairs. Historical ties have affected the development of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.

Understanding and interpreting concepts correctly is crucial for identifying issues in IR. In this respect, this chapter has analysed the critical concepts of "strategy" and "strategic partnership." These pave the way for a better understanding of the meaning of SSP between Africa and the EU. The concept of strategy has profound military, social, economic, diplomatic, political, technological as well as psychological connotations. The aims of strategy are to increase the interests of the states and to tackle the issues effectively. The most critical point for the notion of strategy is a relationship between national and global strategy, with the success of the latter depending on the strengths of the former. Weak and ineffective national strategies cannot serve the interests of their countries, and powerful strategies can use weak

strategies for their global interests. The second important point for the concept of strategy is that states and international organisations have to take into account the components of a strategy holistically, these being willingness, power, physical, economic, diplomatic, and psychological features of actors.

When a continental actor develops a strategy in order to serve its interests and become a powerful global actor, it should first consider the features of internal parameters of its constituent countries, otherwise strategies can engender marginal results. Actors should not devise their strategies under global pressure, as they would not then serve the interests of states. On the contrary, they would benefit the global powers. In this respect, African leaders need to deal carefully with the components of the concept of strategy to be able to clarify their own concepts. Trust, solidarity, mutual responsibility, and mutual interests are the key features of the concept of strategic partnership. In the contemporary world, the best strategic partnership is the modern partnership model that deals with the question of "how we can equally and fairly intensify our relationship and common interests" (Eisler, 1994:33-34). The aims of the concept of strategic partnership are to increase living conditions of people by accomplishing defined aims and removing inequalities between the countries.

The concept of strategic partnership has a more profound and comprehensive connotation than concepts of strategy and partnership. The notion of strategic partnership includes social, economic, political, and military dimensions. Especially, internal parameters of actors such as economic and political factors play a significant role in shaping the notion of strategic partnership. Most importantly, the SSP not only considers security issues, but also socio-economic and political problems. Security cooperation between Africa and the EU requires a multidimensional approach that considers all the elements that influence the concept of strategic partnership. On the basis of the theoretical framework and the concepts discussed, this dissertation formulates the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Mutual interests lead to the emergence of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.

Hypothesis 2: The lack of cohesion and discrepancy between the EU members damages the development of the Africa-EU SSP.

Hypothesis 3: The EU encourages to reinforce regional organisations on the African continent through the Africa-EU SSP.

Hypothesis 4: The EU aims to spread its norms and values in Africa through the SSP.

Hypothesis 5: The EU aims to protect its material interests against the new emerging global actors in Africa, such as China, India and Brazil and increase its international power in world politics by creating an Africa-EU SSP.

Hypothesis 6: Power imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the SSP.

Hypothesis 7: The lack of a common African identity and African internal challenges undermine the success of the SSP.

Hypothesis 8: The Africa-EU SSP makes African organisations more dependent on the EU.

Hypothesis 9: Globalisation has induced incentives for the Africa-EU SSP.

These hypotheses will be tested in the following chapters. Chapter 3 examines the concept of security and its implications for IR.

CHAPTER THREE
PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter established part of the theoretical framework for the research, around the concept of strategic partnership, particularly employing relevant theories of International Relations (IR), namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Whilst it sought theoretical perspectives on the question of why the EU pursues an SSP with Africa, this chapter completes the framework by exploring the concept of security and the interactions between it and its values, notably freedom, identity, justice, good governance, and development. The concept of security is somewhat ambivalent and has changed over time, particularly as understood by international actors. While the EU has certain approaches towards the concept of security, Africa has others. It is therefore necessary to develop a concept of security that supports and reflects the interests of both in order to establish fair security cooperation. Moreover, the relationship between security and the preservation of traditional values has been a critical one for the twenty-first century. A balance must be struck between peacekeeping and peacemaking on one hand, and freedom, justice, good governance, development and identities on the other.

3.2 CONCEPTUALISING SECURITY

Security plays a very *dynamic*, *sensitive*, and *profound* role in IR, having changed and expanded throughout history. It has been easily influenced by technological, scientific, social, economic, and political developments, and now has social, economic, political, and military dimensions. As two different international actors, the EU and Africa have their own approaches to security, with each looking to safeguard its own political, economic and historical interests.

The concept of security is a Western, mostly American, one that arose in the post-World War II era (Azar & Moon, 1988:1). Traditionally, it rests on the realist school of IR, which accepts that a system that reaches out internationally necessarily involves a wider struggle for power. Azar and Moon stressed that at the end of the previous century the international environment was becoming more complicated, therefore the concept of security had to include economic, technological, intelligence, diplomatic, military and other forms of security. It naturally engenders many complex and hard questions, and hence it is widely contested, with no

universally accepted definition (Buzan, 1991:15-16). As Schultze (1973:429-30) states, "the concept of security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimly perceive." The diversity of perspectives in the following definitions substantiates this:

- "The concept of security goes beyond military considerations. It embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights" (African Leadership Forum, 1991:23).
- "An instrumental value that enables peoples some opportunity to choose how to live. It is a means by which individuals and collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas about being human" (Booth, 2005:23).
- "Security is primarily about the fate of human collectivities" (Buzan, 1991:19).
- "Part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries" (Trager & Simonie, 1973:36).
- "Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur" (Bellany 1981:102).
- "The ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruptions from outside; and to control its borders" (Brown, 1983:4).
- "Security–insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities-*both internal and external*-that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes" (Ayoob, 1995:9).

The concept of security has been significantly broadened since the end of the Cold War and the bipolar international system that sustained it. The very restrictive connotation had then included a nuclear threat and international economic crises, such as that in the 1970s

(Mathews, 1989:162). Today, the content of the concept of security has been dramatically transformed from the military to non-military connotations, including international terrorism, transnational organised crime, illegal migration, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug trafficking, conflicts that threaten regional and international peace and security, and global epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. Buzan (1991:140) states that international threats of today have *diffuse, uncertain,* and *unorthodox* features. Non-military threats cannot be easily predicted or prevented "objectively." They can threaten the security of any states at any time or place. Hence, global threats and issues of today have been accepted as unpredictable and subjective by the international community. Wolfers (1962:147) describes the concept of security as an "ambiguous symbol", while Rothschild (1995:55) places it into four categories:

> In the first, the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals. In the second, it is extended from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere… In the third operation, it is extended horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question… the concept of security is extended, therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or 'human' security. In a fourth operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security… is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organisations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market.

Non-military threats have been mostly ignored by IR scholars, despite being more important than military ones (Ullman, 1995:19). Peoples' and states' needs, interests, and concerns have changed over time, as has the concept of security, but of most importance is whether actors can respond to the new threats and issues effectively. Walt (1991:213) points out that non-military threats that weaken the security of states and individuals have been the most dangerous security issues of today. Nevertheless, for Hough (2004:2), there have been both non-military and military threats to the security of states and individuals. Hence, while policymakers and IR scholars pay more attention to the former, they should not ignore the importance of the latter. They are both important.

International actors realised that no single actor could tackle complicated security issues of the twenty-first century on its own, therefore, establishing strategic partnership between different actors has been necessary to resolve effectively the new global threats and challenges. According to the ESS, the EU must cooperate with international organisations to increase its own security and international security. On the other hand, the concept of security varies from

state to state and from continent to continent. In this respect, Africa faces greater security challenges than the EU, through such issues as poverty, HIV/AIDS and malaria, corruption, the legacy of colonialism, refugees, fragile socio-economic and political structures, and conflicts. Since the first EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000, security cooperation between the two continents has intensified. In particular, the EU has spent a large sum of money on strengthening this cooperation with Africa.

Buzan (1991:19) and Baldwin (1997:13) have argued for the concept of security to be examined at three levels. Firstly, the individual level is related to protecting security of individuals; secondly, the national (state) level is related to strengthening social and political solidarity within the state; and thirdly, the international level is about sovereignty of the state. Conflicts, economic and political crises threaten the future of the concept of security in Africa. At the same time, the future of the concept of security in Africa depends on Africa's own capacity to implement or maintain it.

The concept of security has been used in a very narrow way in Africa, including in relation to military threats. The concept needs to take on "human security", that is, it should focus on how the living standards of people can be improved. The EU's concept of security towards Africa focuses on good governance, human rights, freedom of the media, social and economic development, and democratisation. In addition, the concepts of dialogue, sanctions, and financial aid have been very important components of the EU's concept of security to resolve security issues in Africa. However, it is debateable whether the EU's concept of security towards Africa has made a difference to peoples' lives in Africa to date.

There is then a marked difference between the EU's concept of security and Africa's. For Ayoob (1995:6-8), Europe regards it as "protection from external threats of the EU's vital interests and core values." Importantly, it has the three prominent components: "its external orientation, its strong links with systemic security, and the correspondence of state security with alliance security." Azar and Moon (1988:8-12) also argue that the concept has three critical dimensions: security environment, hardware, and software. Security environment is vital for eliminating external threats, hardware is related to military power of a state, while, by contrast, security software concentrates on political legitimacy, integration among the states, and reinforcing policy capacity of the states. The security issue does not look like the other issues, but is instead very complicated, risky, and costly. Thus, there is a need to balance the concept of security and its other critical dimensions, such as development, justice, and identity.

3.3 SECURITY AND ITS ELEMENTS AND VALUES

This section scrutinises the importance of security and its values. Security plays a key role in the development of states, as without it there cannot be freedom, justice, good governance, or development. Also, without security, societies cannot keep their values, language, culture, and religions. In the current age, maintaining peace and security has been the most important objective of states and international organisations. On the other hand, it has been difficult for states because it has been related to a wide range of policies, including socio-economic and political developments, both domestic and international. At the same time, establishing a balance between security and its values has been a necessary condition for socio-economic and political progress. Furthermore, the question of how much attention the Africa-EU SSP pays to the interactions between security and its values will be investigated.

3.3.1 Security and freedom

Sustaining security and widening freedoms have ostensibly been the most substantial objectives of the states in the twenty–first century. The notion that "*there cannot be freedom without security*" has been significant in reinforcing the relationship between the two concepts, both of which are considered essential for development. The balance between the two is vital for establishing strong security cooperation between Africa and the EU, as well as the maintenance of international peace and prosperity in the world, but understanding of it varies from country to country. For instance, while the USA and Israel interpret the balance between these values in accordance with terrorism (Donohue, 2008:59-60), it has a different meaning both in the EU and Africa. From the EU perspective, the balance is related to protecting fundamental rights, fighting many kinds of discrimination, removing physical borders between the EU member states, and tackling terrorism, crime and corruption. Importantly, the aim in achieving such a balance is to increase the power of "democracy" in the EU countries. At the same time, it has changed in accordance with global changes and the strategic interests of the EU (Hix, 2005:346-7, 359). From an African perspective, seeking a balance is mostly associated with preventing conflicts, and tackling structural problems and crises, such as wars, corruption, poverty and HIV/AIDS.

Both the EU and Africa have different approaches towards balancing security and freedom, which many states have adopted in terms of terrorism since the 9\11 attacks on the USA. Taking aggressive measures to prevent terrorist attacks is the foremost approach, however, in doing so, many individual rights have been restricted and freedom interpreted according to often ad hoc security issues. The second, seemingly conflicting approach is to expand and

protect individual rights. In this way, the states take measures against terrorist attacks by increasing their own citizens' individual rights (Donohue, 2008:60). According to Goold (2007:45-7), the 9/11 attacks on the USA and the 7 July 2005 attacks on the UK respectively have increased the gap between security and freedom in the world. Particularly, the individual rights of the minority groups living in the USA, the UK and in the West have been highly constricted. In exacerbating fears and mistrust between people, it has immeasurably damaged the delicate balance between security and freedom.

Ferge (1996:14) argues that while it is difficult to establish a balance between security and freedom in underdeveloped societies, it is easier to create it in developed societies. An example of this dichotomy occurred when the USA failed to find a balance between security and freedom during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (*Christian Science Monitor*, 3 June 2004). Despite a wide range of supposed justifications offered up for the illegal invasion of a sovereign state, the USA could bring neither security nor freedom to the Iraqi people, in many cases widening the imbalance and creating new security threats to the USA itself and to the Middle East. The security of the USA and freedom of Iraqi people are not related, with both countries having different social, economic, and political structures (ibid., 3 June 2004).

According to a report (3:1994) published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), freedom has three important categories. The first is *freedom from want*; the second is *freedom from fear*; and the third is *freedom to live in peace and dignity*. With some overlapping and ambivalence of conceptual definition, the principle of freedom from fear in large part refers to the prevention of conflicts, wars, crime and what some call "terrorism",[5] the principle of freedom from want refers to social, economic and political freedom and rights of individuals; and the principle of freedom to live in peace and dignity refers to protecting and strengthening fundamental rights. Both security and freedom are thus invariably bound together. While security is increased by states, freedom should not be restricted. They are supposed to exist together in a peace, thus, security cooperation among Africa and the EU ought to focus on the balance between freedom and security for making it an effective partnership.

[5] Desmond Tutu (*New Black Magazine*) famously alluded to one man's terrorist being another man's freedom fighter. The highly problematic term is understood here to refer to the killing of civilians by militant groups or individuals whose political and/or religious views, insofar as they are clearly articulated or permitted to be, do not conform to those of the respective hegemonic powers against whom they are waging bloody conflict.

3.3.2 Security and identity

Identities, whether in terms of religion, region, language or values, can play either a negative or positive role on security development (Lerche & Said, 1970:210-11). It is important to consider the security-identity nexus when trying to grasp the EU-Africa SSP. While the same identities may play a positive role in sustaining peace and security, different identities may play a negative role. It is known that the EU and Africa have different and complex identities, not least in terms of region, language, ethnic structure and cultural features. It is thus essential to determine how the EU should take into consideration African identity when it builds security cooperation.

The relationship between security and identity is complex and there can be an asymmetrical power relationship between various identities (Pettman, 2005:168;174). Pettman (2005:171) states that identity can contribute to the enhancement of peace and security, but for Wiberg (1993:107) security and identity issues affect each other negatively. Just as the Cold War era cannot be understood without understanding the identities of the two superpowers and their conflicting identities (Fierke, 2007:80), so the impact of that ideological struggle on African identity in world politics needs to be taken cognisance of. After World War II, Western European states attempted to establish a "common identity" in order to prevent conflicts and wars and to develop social, economic and political relations.

However, the end of the Cold War brought only a brief respite in European conflict. While the Western countries had largely subsumed centuries of strife in the successive federalising agencies of the EU and its forerunner institutions, the Bosnian War (1992-95) saw identities playing a destructive rather than constructive role in the Balkans. When coupled with the notion of "national sovereignty", identities have two aims, namely, to keep peace and security or to destroy the others (Fierke, 2007:82-3). As the EU continues to negotiate its way through a complex melange of historically formed identities, any constructive role it has in establishing a genuine security cooperation with Africa must also take heed of that continent's own patchwork of identities.

It is important to note that keeping identity is vital for developing independent policies. The question of who defines African identity is essential if the rationale behind the partnership is to be grasped. As Enloe and Zalewski (1995: 282-287) argued, "Identity determines how you are treated, what is expected of you, and what you expect of yourself." Security issues also reflect complex identities of the societies. Importantly, identities ask this question "what do we perceive of as threats to us?" (ibid., pp.282-287). For the EU, meanwhile, it would be a

challenging task to establish an SSP with Africa without considering some form of shared African identity.

3.3.3 Security and justice

There is a strong link between security and justice, for without the former there cannot be the latter. Both are necessary for social, economic, and political stability. An effective and fair judicial system in a country is imperative for sustaining peace and security. While insecurity destroys the economic and political structure of a country, it also damages the development of a fair judicial system (Department for International Development, 2009:75). Importantly, the SSP between Africa and the EU is not only about keeping international peace and security in Africa and in Europe, but also about promoting democracy, human rights, and justice. In Africa, conflicts or wars are often accompanied by torture, detention, arbitrary arrests, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. All these are threats or challenges to fundamental human rights on the continent, hence, security cooperation between Africa and the EU should take into consideration the complementary connection between security and justice.

Today there are still many African countries that have unstable social, economic and political structures that threaten fundamental human rights. Creating an effective and fair judicial system in Africa is indispensable for maintaining peace and security and for establishing genuine strategic partnership with the EU. It is worth noting that states that have a fair justice system can easily and more effectively sustain peace and security as well as contribute to international security. Bassiouni (1996:12) argues that justice plays a key role in attaining peace and security. When people go to work or school they must believe that both security and justice systems are working effectively.

Without security and justice, other services cannot be provided adequately, less so other services, because these are closely connected to socio-economic and political mechanisms of a state. Therefore, building a balance between security and justice is a challenging task in fragile countries. In addition, corruption, mismanagement and poverty weaken development of the relationship between security and justice in Africa. Particularly, as stated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2007:15), reinforcing the principle of accountability is fundamental for providing effective security and justice services. In addition, good governance contributes to the development of security and justice services. States that do not have a good governance system cannot provide effective security or judicial

services to their citizens. Besides, roles of civil society are critical in improving security and justice services.

In Africa, many states lack capacity-building in terms of delivering good security and judicial services to their citizens, which overshadows the establishment of a balance between security and justice. It is also necessary to emphasise that security and judicial systems cannot be enhanced by outside donations alone, but rather African countries should first mobilise their own resources in this direction. The Africa-EU SSP ought to consider geo-political and geo-economic conditions of the African states to build a good balance between security and justice. The questions of "who actually provides justice and security, and for whom justice and security are being provided" are critical to establishing a complementary relationship between security and justice (OECD, 2007:6).

3.3.4 Security and governance

Security and good governance are essential for social, economic, and political stability. Building a strong relationship between security and governance has been one of the most important preconditions for establishing a genuine strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. Attention to the link between security and governance has dramatically increased in world politics in recent years. International actors such as the UN, the EU, and AU pay a great deal of attention to the significance between these two critical values so as to preserve international peace, security and stability. In particular, good governance plays a key role in maintaining peace and security in conflict-affected countries. Generally, the notion of good governance has been mostly connected with democratisation. In this respect, the principles of transparency, accountability, the rule of law, and the active participation of the citizens in politics are accepted as a core of good governance (Hussein, 2005:28).

Nkiwane (2003:53) emphasises that states that have a good governance system can maintain peace and security more effectively than those that do not. Each African state has a different character in terms of governance and security. Developing a governance system in accordance with the country's political, social and economic features is highly important to contribute to peace and security in conflict-affected countries. Whether international pressures to strengthen a balance between security and governance in African countries can be an asset is questionable. Recent and current crises in some African states, such as Somalia, Sudan, the DRC, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, have also been closely related to the lack of a strong link between security and governance.

There are three main factors affecting the balance between security and governance in Africa. First, the role of international actors, the legacies of colonialism, and the leadership of African statesmen. During the Cold War era, the bipolar international system shaped world politics, including Africa's international affairs and the security and governance of African states. Domestic challenges of African states, such as poverty, corruption, and mismanagement, also weaken the relationship between security and governance. Therefore, establishing a good balance between these two important values has been affected by world politics as well as internal political developments in Africa (Sawyer, 2004:94-95). Importantly, a strong leadership under the umbrella of the AU would play a key role in enhancing the security and governance nexus in the African countries and helping in bringing about the emergence of true security cooperation with the EU.

Regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa have recently paid attention to the significance of this balance by establishing in 2003, within the AU, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), one of the important objectives of which was to prevent potential conflicts or wars by strengthening the governance system in African states.

3.3.5 Security and development

The interactions between security and development have changed over time. Duffield (2001:35-42) asserts that the relationship between security and development was politicised and marginalised during the Cold War era. The superpowers, then the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or 'Soviet Union'), used aid policy to strengthen their strategic positions with their alliances. Moreover, limited actors were engaged in affecting security and development, but today different actors are involved in the development-security nexus, including NGOs, universities, think-tanks, private and government organisations, and military institutions. Hence, the relationship between security and development has become more important in recent years. The content of the notions of security and development is also very important for the development-security nexus. In the past, the two concepts had very specific and narrow meanings, but today their meanings go beyond military operations and economic progress. Therefore, the relationship between security and development touches upon economic, social, military and political progress (ibid., pp.35-42).

The security-development nexus has been connected with hard policies and soft policies of the states. While the former focus on reinforcing the military strength of a state, the latter pay attention to the welfare and security of the citizens. Importantly, militarised countries tend to prefer hard policies to balance security and development, while, on the other hand,

democratised countries tend to use soft policies (ibid., pp.10-3). In addition, fragile countries do not have a clear policy to strengthen a balance between security and development, and states that enjoy a good balance between security and development can play an active role in resolving international issues. A good balance between security and development can have a positive impact on domestic as well as international developments. The question of whether the SSP between Africa and the EU will take into account a balanced relationship between security and development remains controversial. The balance ought rather to focus on the welfare and security of the citizens of both Africa and the EU for making this partnership an effective global initiative.

According to Deger and West (1987:2-16), the roles of international actors influence the development between security and development in LDCs. Furthermore, inequalities and injustice between North and South have also shaped the link between security and development in the world. The former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (*Mail & Guardian*, 7 October 2004) declared that "we know that poverty and instability lead to weak states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals…", a point made by Simpson (2006:1-3) in underlining that poverty, fragile or failed states, and violent conflicts threaten the security of the North. At the same time, they destabilise the balance between security and development. It can be said that poverty and mismanagement in Africa weaken security and development. Hence, the SSP should be supported with structural reforms by the African leaders, such as radical social, economic and political adjustments.

3.4 SYNOPSIS

This chapter has provided an overview of approaches to "security" and explained the interactions between security and its elements and values, namely freedom, identity, justice, governance, and development. It argued that constructing a common security concept is necessary for creating a common future and building an SSP between the two continents. The challenge is how Africa and the EU, with their different political and economic features, will establish a common security concept for strategic partnership. There is no universally accepted definition of security, rather it is still viewed as an ambivalent concept. Furthermore, it has a very dynamic meaning within the field of IR, having changed over time. Importantly, concepts also mirror the features of their own time. For example, security was mostly related to the bipolar system during the Cold War era, with a narrow meaning that included a nuclear threat and the security of the state.

With the end of the Cold War era, the international system has changed. A multilateral global system has replaced the bipolar system and new international security threats and challenges have emerged in world politics. The 9\11 attacks and increasing globalisation have also broadened the concept of security. The new, unclear, non-military, and unpredictable security threats, such as international terrorism, climate change, drug trafficking, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), environmental disasters and global pandemics like HIV/AIDS have emerged. In other words, the security threats and challenges of the twenty-first century have been changed. Compared with the Cold War era, when there was a mutually defined and clear security threat, this new complexity has affected the future of security in international affairs and made it very problematic and complex. Today, the concept of security has social, economic, political, diplomatic, technological and environmental dimensions, which this chapter concludes that the Africa-EU SSP should take into consideration.

It is clear that traditional solutions to the security challenges of Africa did not bring any lasting peace and security. On the contrary, they escalated the violent conflicts and wars on the continent of Africa. Trying to understand Africa's security issues with the EU's security concept may be regarded as a waste of time and energy. Africa needs to create its own security concept to find a comprehensive solution to its security threats and challenges. Without creating a concept that reflects Africa's security issues, Africa neither becomes successful in resolving its domestic security challenges nor maintaining the SSP with the EU effectively. In addition, it is important to note that success of the SSP of Africa depends on its successes in resolving its own domestic socio-economic and political challenges. If *status quo* continues in Africa, the EU is likely to strengthen its economic and political interests under the newly evolving SSP.

The Africa-EU strategic partnership on security matters should not only consider security, but also the other matters that affect the security issues. There is a strong link between security and its values, namely freedom, identity, justice, governance, and development. Without security, there cannot be development, justice, freedom or democratic governance. It could be said that if there is a secure environment in a state, the other components of the state could exist peacefully and work effectively. At the same time, it is compulsory to balance between security and its values so as to establish a fair SSP among Africa and the EU. However, the question of how this partnership will construct a balance between security and its values remains unclear.

According to realism, actors do not trust each other whilst setting up a cooperation. Each defines its partnership in terms of its own security concerns and economic benefits, nor is there a possibility to create a fair cooperation between a strong actor and a weak actor because the EU has a tendency to use Africa while building a partnerhip. The realist view expresses that the concept of security has a narrow meaning and concentrates on the "security of state." However, a liberalist approach sees the concept of security as focussing on "human security." Furthermore, it points out that it is likely to make a genuine cooperation between Africa and the EU because both actors are confronted by common challenges and threats. So, both actors need to cooperate in order to combat common challenges. At the same time, collaboration among Africa and the EU in a wide range of activities, can also contribute to peace and security. Common threats such as conflicts, wars, international terrorism, and climate change damage not only economic and political interests of Africa but also the interests of the EU members. Since 2000, the EU has begun to develop new security policies towards Africa. Establishing strategic partnerships in different areas with different actors has beeen an important foreign and security policy for the EU, to contribute to global peace and security and to keep its political and economic interests. For example, the EU created the APF in 2004, under the leadership of the AU, so as to reinforce conflict prevention, management, and resolution capacities of the African organisations. It funded €740 million for this facility. In addition, the EU allocated €100 million in 2007 to strengthen the APSA. Particularly, the APF has been playing a significant role in consolidating the African organisations' peace and security mechanisms and creating an SSP with Africa. Also, the EU has contributed to sustaining peace and security in Darfur/Sudan, the Great Lakes Region/DRC, and CAR, as well as in Western Africa. The EU has also conducted 10 peacekeeping operations in conflict areas in Africa since 2003. This supports hypothesis 1, that "mutual interests lead to the emergence of security cooperation between Africa and the EU."

Constructivism states that common identities, values and norms are an asset for making strategic partnership between different actors. However, it is difficult to establish a cooperation among the states that have different identities and values. According to constructivism, having different identities and values is a disadvantage for the establishmet of cooperation in the areas of peace and security between Africa and the EU. For instance, different identities in Europe conflicted with each other and played a negative role in keeping peace and security during the Bosnian War (1992-1995).

Chapter 4 examines the historical background of the EU's foreign and security policy and objectives.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU has undergone regular development. In particular, the new challenges of the twenty-first century have forced the members of the EU to speak with one voice on international issues and to resolve them effectively. However, different types of challenge have been affecting the development of the CFSP, which remains one of the EU's most controversial political spheres. This chapter examines the CFSP of the EU and its objectives. The historical dynamics of the CFSP play a major role in developing the notion of security cooperation, so it is first necessary to understand the background.

4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The end of World War II had an extensive impact on global history. With millions killed, it caused profound geopolitical and geostrategic changes in global affairs. For instance, the USA and USSR emerged as two superpowers, while new international organisations emerged, such as the UN, the WB, the IMF and the WTO. In Europe, the most significant political changes related to the unification endeavours of a divided western Europe, that through various metamorphoses ultimately led to the creation of the European Union (EU), with its own foreign and security policy. Meanwhile, in the military dimension, *North Atlantic Treaty,* signed in April 1949 by the USA, Canada, and western European countries, had formalised the USA's role in maintaining peace and security in Europe (Smith, 2009:29).

The domestic dynamics of Europe had a great impact on the creation of the EU's foreign and security policy. Most importantly, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's historical proposal, which saw the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in May 1950, became a turning point. The ostensible goal was to end disputes between France and Germany over the contentious mineral resources of Alsace Lorrain, and create peace and prosperity on the continent. Archer (2000:162) states that the ECSC can be viewed as a "peace project", and through its expansion to the Common Market and European Community, has continued to develop its economic and political dimensions. While conflicts and wars

aggravated Africa's economic, social and political stability after World War II, Europe made significant efforts to change its history.

Figure 4: Current map of the European Union

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html

Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the subject of sovereignty within member states has been the greatest obstacle to developing the CFSP. Against the threat of communism, the USA wanted to rearm West Germany in 1950, but France rejected this, proposing instead to establish a European army under the European Defence Community (EDC). In May 1952, a treaty was signed to set up the EDC, however it did not come into force because the French Parliament did not ratify it, due to debates over sovereignty. Likewise, French president Charles de Gaulle's endeavour, named *The Fouchet Plan* (1961), to strengthen the political unity of Europe, was a failure because of perceptions also regarding national sovereignty held by the member states (Hoffman, 2000:190).

Part of the sovereignty debate relates to historical traditions that serve as barriers to greater integration. Many critics upheld NATO as sufficient defence against aggressors, particularly

before the end of the Cold War, while as Gnesotto (2003:1) points out, the EU does not have a clear CFSP because some of the member states have special economic, political and military relations with neighbouring countries, and their former colonies. In the case of the UK there is also a "special relationship" with the US, as well as economic and political ties with members of the Commonwealth. Traditionally, France, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Germany have deep interests with former African colonies, and hence wish to preserve relations with them, independently and strongly, rather than creating collective policies towards Africa under the competencies of the EU.

The complexity of relations between the European institutions, especially between the CFSP, the WEU and NATO, has been one of the greatest challenges to developing the CFSP. These two factors have also undermined the international role of the EU (Hurd, 1994:428; White, 2004:13-15). In December 1969, the Heads of State and Government of the EC convened for the "Summit of the Hague," which brought considerable and concrete achievements, especially in the areas of economy, enlargement and foreign policy. Since 1957, this had been viewed as the most historic European summit, reinforcing political cooperation within the member states (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:153-4), and establishing foreign policy cooperation among member states. In October 1970, the foreign ministers proposed to develop "European Political Cooperation (EPC)" in the *Luxembourg Report*, and to increase cooperation on foreign policy, leading to the creation of the EPC. Essentially, the EPC is known as a predecessor of the CFSP of the EU (Leonard, 2005:259), and it brought a more comprehensive and systematic approach towards the CFSP, which aimed to speak with one voice on foreign and security affairs. It also gave due consideration to all aspects of security, not only political and economic, whilst emphasising for the first time that creating a common defence policy among the members was important.

In spite of its weaknesses, the EPC was to play a noteworthy role in shaping the notion of the EC/EU's foreign policy until 1992 and the Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Salmon, 1992:233-36). It was developed and expanded in the *Copenhagen Report* in July 1973 and the *London Report* in October 1981, emphasising that political cooperation should "become a central element in the foreign policies of all member states" (1981:61-2). The EPC was formalised in the *Single European Act* (SEA) in February 1986, which amended the EC/EU treaties in the most effective and comprehensive reform since 1957. The strategic significance lay in the establishment of a European Common Market, and the facilitation of speaking with one voice on international issues among the

members. Title III of the SEA constructed a framework for the EPC, stating that closer political cooperation was necessary for the Community's security. To this end, "political and economic aspects of security" were to be considered, in particular technological and industrial developments, as vital for securing a European identity.

The SEA was a prominent step in strengthening the notion of cooperation between the EU members. According to liberalism, increasing strategic partnership among the actors in a wide range of activities can remove the possibility of wars and conflicts and reinforce peace and security. This can also play a remarkable role in developing social, economic, and political development. However, without cooperation, conflicts and wars can emerge and threaten political and economic stability. The SEA shows that liberalism has predictions applicable to European integration.

According to Regelsberger (1993:271-72), EPC was a first and concrete step in establishing a common foreign and security policy among the EC/EU members. However, when member states wished to pursue their own national foreign policies, this undermined the mechanism of the EPC. Importantly, defence and security fields were excluded from discussion in the EPC, with some members insisting on discussing them in EPC and others proposing to do so through NATO or the WEU. These differences weakened the capacity and effectiveness of the EPC (Smith, 2009:32). Prior to 1990, members could not deal with Africa's peace and security. Hence, before 1990 the notion of an SSP with Africa was largely determined by commercial and historical interests.

The end of the Cold War provided opportunities for radical change in global history, with challenges to many traditional concepts. Particularly, it brought major changes in Europe's foreign and security perceptions. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar international system, and the end of the threat of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, all had a profound impact on internal and external historical developments, forcing European leaders to re-examine and rethink policy. The paradigm shift was from a perceived threat of communism to the new above-mentioned threats. Despite these issued having existed during the Cold War, they were now brought to the forefront of discourse in order to preserve the confrontational polemic upon which capitalism and nationalism thrives (Denitch, 1990:17).

When European leaders came together to sign the TEU at Maastricht in February 1992, it was to extend and strengthen the Community. It brought substantial structural changes for the

Community, such as the creation of the European Union and a basis for a single currency. Significantly, the Treaty established the three important pillars of the EU, namely: the European Community (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Title V of the Provision on a CFSP in the TEU at Maastricht established five objectives: (a) To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; (b) To strengthen the security of the Union and its member states in all ways; (c) To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; (d) To promote international co-operation; and (e) To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Maastricht Treaty (TEU) paved the way for establishing the notion of the SSP with the objectives of the CFSP, which were "to preserve peace and strengthen international security and to promote international cooperation" (Title V of the TEU). On the other hand, the national foreign policies of the members towards NATO and the WEU have continued to weaken the CFSP and the Union. Particularly, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo) demonstrated that the CFSP of the Union was very weak and the USA and NATO were still influential actors in European security.

Furthermore, the conflicts showed that the EU was not ready for genuine security cooperation with Africa, and there was a long and hard journey to create it. If the project of the EU attained success, its content might be going beyond this. Even though the Treaty dealt with preserving international peace and security, it did not facilitate active involvement in sustaining international peace and security in the world, largely because of the regional conflicts in Europe and the various national foreign policies of the members. The historical developments indicated that the birth of the notion of security cooperation is related to internal and external developments in Europe and in the world.

Its international role was also criticised for being passive during the 1994 outbreak of genocide in Rwanda. The deficiencies of the CFSP in post-conflict Yugoslavia and Rwanda compromised its international role and raised harsh criticism. While some scholars stated that the EU was a soft or civilian power, some argued that it could not be a military power at all, and would continue to remain a normative power unless it creates a solid military power aside from NATO. Kjeldsen (2007:51) wrote that while the EU was an effective and strong international actor in "low politics", it was not an effective actor in "high politics." According

to Manners (2002:253), the EU had played a major role in establishing its norms in the world, such as democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and respect for human rights, and therefore should be regarded as a "normative power." According to Kjeldsen and Manners, the EU is a soft power in world politics, however, it is not an influential global actor on global security concerns. Democracy, human rights, free trade and the rule of law can reinforce the notion of strategic partnership and contribute to international peace and security. Furthermore, universal norms and values can bring solution to global challenges.

According to Jones (2001:430), the EU is an "economic giant but it is a political pygmy." McCormick (2008: 13-22) also points out that the international position of the EU had not been clearly defined. Common to these writers, the question is begged as to what kind of international organisation the EU is, in terms of world affairs. In concluding that the EU was the largest donor to the developing countries in the world, Warleigh-Lack (2009:84-5) found its development policy questionable. Development policy, he argues, reflected its self-interests and aims to preserve its trade interests with African states. In addition, it did not aim to establish SSP with Africa in order to make a difference to Africa's economic or political life, but rather it used its economic power to sustain its historical interests on the continent. However, according to Pirozzi (2009:19-21), the EU not only supports peace and security in Africa, but also strengthens democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. For instance, the EU has authorised 10 peacekeeping operations in order to sustain peace and security in the conflict areas of Africa since 2003.

In June 1992, the Ministerial Council of the WEU had adopted the *Petersberg Declaration* in order to strengthen Europe's security structure. According to the Declaration, the WEU would actively be involved in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management tasks, including peace-making. Specifically, it placed a great deal of attention on reinforcing Europe's defence system and NATO rather than maintaining international peace and security beyond Europe. It can be argued that the EU did not develop the precedent of a strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security, in particular with Africa outlined in the *Petersberg Declaration*. Alternatively, it could be viewed as a notable step in establishing peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks.

The reappearance of war in Europe revealed that the EU needed to make substantial revisions to the CFSP. The 15 members of the EU signed the *Treaty of Amsterdam* in October 1997, making large changes to consolidate the EU as well as the architecture of the CFSP. Importantly, the Treaty created the institution of a "High Representative for the CFSP" and

the "Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit" (PPEWU). The former Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, was appointed as a first High Representative in October 1999, a position he held until December 2009, when succeeded by Catherine Ashton who combines this function with Vice-Presidency of the European Commission.

Despite the weaknesses of the CFSP, the desire to strengthen it has continued greatly. Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac, held a Franco-British Summit in St. Malo in December 1998, in which they agreed in the *St. Malo Declaration* to draw attention to the solidarity among the member states of the EU and the establishment of a common security policy. According to the Declaration (1998:1), "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises." This was a strategic step for the Union, intensifying the capacity of the CFSP. Particularly, the three important points mentioned by France and Britain were solidarity among members, creating a military force for the Union, and a common security policy. Even though the Franco-British Summit in 1998 focused on preventing peace and security in Europe, it made little contribution to the development of the notion of a strategic security partnership with the expression of "in order to respond to international crises."

The post-Kosovo War in 1999 revealed that the CFSP would not work effectively without a military component, and that the USA would continue to remain the strongest element in European security. In addition, the success of the CFSP would require greater political unification among the member states on international issues. Gordon (1997:131) saw the elements that impaired the power of the CFSP and gave the following recommendations:

> France needs to claim a greater role for Europe as political cover to come back into the Alliance; Germany needs to show progress toward European political unification to reassure its elites and to convince its public to accept monetary union; Britain wants to show a strong role for the WEU to forestall calls to give the EU a defence role; and the U.S. administration needs to be able to claim to Congress and the public that the Europeans are now prepared to shoulder more of the defence burden of transatlantic defence.

Title V of the CFSP of the Treaty of Amsterdam added the expression of "external borders" concerning international security. According to the related objective of the CFSP (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997:7), the EU should "preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; including those on external borders." According to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997:7), the expression of "external

borders" has three critical meanings. First, the CFSP must be a more effective player in keeping peace and security. Second, it should begin to engage in conflicts and wars outside Europe. Third, the EU should develop pro-active foreign diplomacy to prevent conflicts or wars on the continent of Europe. Inserting such an expression into the Treaty of Amsterdam was historic in leading to the creation of the notion of a strategic partnership in the fields of peace and security.

The European Council Summit held in Cologne in June 1999 underlined the significance of the St. Malo Declaration, and agreed that the EU should implement the "Petersberg tasks." Significantly, the Cologne European Council established the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to strengthen the CFSP of the Union, in particular in the fields of civilian and military capacities of the EU. It also stressed that international security issues could only be resolved with closer cooperation between the countries. It gave expression to a "strategic partnership" with the Western Balkans, Russia, Japan, and the Middle East, and may therefore be viewed as a major step to reinforcing the notion of security cooperation. The Cologne meeting of the European Council proved that there was a strong link between a culture of common security strategy among the members and the emergence of a notion of an SSP. The determined desire to set up a common security strategy within the EU pushed for development of its strategic partnership with different actors.

The European Council met again in Helsinki in December 1999, making some critical decisions to develop the CFSP. To this end it agreed that the "EU must be able to deploy within 60 days by 2003 and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks." Second, it established new political and military structures in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (MC), and the Military Staff (MS). The Helsinki European Council's strategic decisions about the EU's military capabilities became a turning point in European history. Mainly, it stressed that if NATO did not want to engage in international conflicts or wars, the EU would have to play a leading role in maintaining international peace and security in areas of conflict around the world. In its establishment of an autonomous mechanism for effective involvement in international crises, and to develop the notion of a strategic partnership independently without using NATO assets, "Helsinki" thus became a significant milestone.

The EU entered the millennium facing challenges and responsibilities. The borders of the CFSP of the Union in the twenty-first century have started to change dramatically. Particularly, the 9\11 attacks on the USA, terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, and

London in July 2005, have had a great impact on the changing of security perceptions in the EU. When the concept of security only included military threats during the Cold war era, it contained non-military threats after 2000, such as international terrorism, transnational organised crime, illegal migration, climate change, and drug trafficking. At the same time, balance between security and its values has been more important for maintaining peace and security. European leaders placed much attention on the concepts of "diplomacy" and "multilateralism", and realised that the mechanisms of diplomacy and multilateralism must be strengthened to prevent or remove new threats. According to liberalism, international cooperation between different actors is necessary to increase democratic values and to fight against new challenges. Without international collaboration, states are not able to resolve new threats. In this regard, the EU has made significant efforts to foster its strategic partnership with Africa in the areas of peace and security since 2000, the year of the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo. The EU committed itself to strengthening security cooperation with Africa at this summit. To this end, the EU established an APF in 2004 in collaboration with the AU in order to reinforce strategic partnership with African regional organisations.

Realism stresses that building a true cooperation between different actors is not easy because actors have different security concerns and economic interests. When the USA made a decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the European countries split into different views. Whilst France, Germany, Belgium, and Austria opposed the invasion, Britain, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and several Eastern European countries supported it. Likewise, some EU members played active roles in opposing the Libyan War of 2011. The US-led invasion and the Libyan War of 2011 again showed that the CFSP of the Union lacked a common security and foreign vision among members. The EU's pursuit of different national policies on international issues have damaged both the CFSP and the reinforcement of strategic partnership on security matters with Africa.

In 2002 and 2003, the Constitutional Treaty brought changes to the CFSP to enable it to speak with one strong voice on the international stage. One of the most notable changes under the Constitutional Treaty is the establishment of the "Union Minister for Foreign Affairs." Furthermore, the enlargement of the EU has created new challenges and opportunities. On the 1st of May 2004, the EU accepted 10 countries as new members, namely the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Malta, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Poland. In addition, Romania and Bulgaria were accepted as members on the 1st of January 2007. The EU currently has 27 member states, with Turkey, Croatia, Iceland and Macedonia awaiting

membership. The adoption of the new countries was a milestone in the history of Europe, adding to its strength as regional and global actor. On the other hand, it also brought more international responsibilities to the EU to sustain international peace and security.

The ESS has developed the concept of security widely, and the EU has started to play a leading role in maintaining peace and security in conflict regions around the world since 2003, particularly in Africa. For example, it has taken strategic steps to keep international peace and security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eastern Chad and the North-East of the Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, and Sudan. Furthermore, it has strengthened regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa. Since the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the EU has particularly attached importance to strengthening regional organisations in Africa. It can be said that the perceptions of liberalim are playing a strategic role in developing relations between the EU and African organisations. Liberalist views point out that cooperation between different actors can reduce the possibility of uncertainty and increase economic and political cooperation. In doing so, the EU has strengthened the APSA to fight against global threats and challanges. It supported the AU Mission in Sudan\Darfur (AMIS II) in 2005-2006 and allocated €300 million for AMIS II. The EU also established the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004 within the framework of the AU to cooperate with African organisations in the fields of peace and security more effectively and sent €740 million to the regional organisations in Africa through the APF. Table 2 gives an overview of the evolution of the CFSP of the EU and important historical events that shaped the notion of a strategic security partnership.

Table 2: The evolution of the CFSP of the EU

Historical event	Year	Significance
Treaty of Brussels	1948	To set up a mutual defence mechanism to stop the spread of communism in Europe between Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, France and the UK.
North Atlantic Treaty	1949	To provide peace and security of Europe. It was a strategic step to develop the notion of an SSP between the United States and Europe.
European Defence Community	1952	An unsuccessful attempt to establish a common European military power among the founding members of the EC.
Treaty of Rome	1957	To establish the EC and create a peaceful continent. The notion of strategic partnership emerged in Europe with this treaty.
Summit of The Hague	1969	An important step in strengthening political cooperation within the EC. Hence, it paved for the establishment of the notion of SSP in Europe.
Luxembourg Report	1970	To set up European political cooperation among the members. It was a significant attempt to institutionalise European cooperation as well the notion of an SSP.
Single European Act	1986	The European Political Cooperation was formed. It made a substantial contribution to the development of the notion of a strategic partnership.
Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU)	1992	To bring fundamental changes to the Community and establish the CFSP. It was a historical moment to reinforce the notion of an SSP among the members.
Petersberg Declaration	1992	To reinforce Europe's defence mechanism and NATO.
Treaty of Amsterdam	1997	To create the institution of a "High Representative for the CFSP" and intensify the notion of an SSP among the members.
Franco-British Summit	1998	To strengthen a common European security policy. It developed the notion of an SSP among the members.
Cologne European Council	1999	To set up the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and to strengthen the CFSP of the Union.
Helsinki European Council	1999	To establish a common European army within the EU. It widened the borders of the notion of an SSP.
Constitutional Treaty	2002, 2003	To create the "Union Minister for Foreign Affairs" to speak with one voice on international issues.
Treaty of Lisbon	2007	To establish the post of "High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy." It conceptualised the notion of an SSP and the notion became a global concept of the EU.

Source: Own compilation

In December 2007, the *Treaty of Lisbon* renamed the new established function as a "High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy". In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified by all the members of the EU and it came into force on the 1st of December 2009. Most importantly, the EU appointed its first president of the European Council (EC) to increase the EU's international role under the *Treaty of Lisbon*. In spite of efforts by the EU to consolidate the CFSP, the South Ossetia War in the Caucasus in August 2008, between Russia and Georgia, proved that the EU still had deficiencies to anticipate and prevent wars and conflicts in the neighbouring countries of the EU. The CFSP exposed weaknesses in the EU strategic security field that had persisted throughout its development.

4.3 THE EU'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OBJECTIVES

The EU's foreign and security policy objectives have been playing essential roles in deveping the EU CFSP. There are six important EU foreign and security policy objectives, namely: (1) increasing regional cooperation; (2) developing effective multilateralism; (3) countering terrorism; (4) preserving international peace and security; (5) promoting democracy and good governance; and (6) promoting human rights.

4.3.1 Increasing regional cooperation

Enhancing regional cooperation among the member states of the EU has been the most consequential foreign and security policy goal of the EU since its establishment. After World War II, the founding members made a historic decision to establish the EC under the *Treaty of Rome* in 1957. According to the European leaders, the best way to prevent wars and conflicts and create prosperity in Europe was to strengthen regional cooperation. Smith (2009:76) defines regional cooperation in Europe as "all efforts on the part of (usually) neighbouring countries to address issues of common interests." To this end the EU has been regarded as the most successful regional cooperation project, especially in economic and political fields in the world (Acharya & Johnston, 2007:245; McCormick, 2008:12; Smith, 2004:165), despite disagreements between the members on some foreign and security policy spheres.

According to liberalism, human nature does not have a tendency to make war or conflict and international cooperation among the nations can bring many opportunities for the development of countries. At the same time, strengthening regional cooperation is a prerequisite for the maintenance of international security. Consequently, the EU has made history by increasing regional cooperation among the EU members and, therefore, many regions or continents

including Africa and Asia have been inspired by the EU. Since 2000, the EU has also made efforts to consolidate regional cooperation in Africa through African organisations, including the AU, the IGAD, and the ECOWAS. It can be said that the Africa-EU SSP has an aim of increasing regional cooperation on the continent of Africa.

Particularly, the EU has been using its economic power to reinforce regional cooperation in Africa. For instance, the EU has earmarked €740 million for consolidating regional organisations of Africa since 2004. In addition, in 2007, the European Commission donated €10 million to strengthen the IGAD (IGAD, 2007:7). The EU allocated €258 million to support the ECOWAS's economic and integration activities in the region between 2002 and 2007 and also donated €116[6] million to reinforce the capacity building of SADC and its regional and economic integration efforts. However, it is not clear whether or not the EU will increase regional cooperation in Africa thereby making donations to regional organisations of Africa.

Regional cooperation in Europe began under an economic project and its borders have gradually broadened from economic cooperation to foreign and security policy cooperation. It has also many benefits for the member states, as well as the candidate countries, encouraging them to improve their democratic systems and create economic opportunities (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:195). Significantly, it brought together France and Germany, traditional enemies and the cause of over a century of warfare. The consequent *entente* became a valuable example for former adversaries embracing peace, security, and prosperity. Strategically, the USA supported a strong regional cooperation project of the EU, since in some respects a strong and united Western Europe was in the USA's interest, in particular against the threat of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the USA has been watchful of any growing European economic strength that might threaten USA hegemony. The same may also apply to military growth.

The EU's regional cooperation project has also protected aspects of the EU's common history, culture and values, including those that have spread over the colonies, such as democracy, good governance, human rights and individual freedoms (ibid., p.195). According to Smith (2009:80-2), the regional cooperation project in Europe has two essential planks, namely

[6]See the Communiqué EU-SADC Double Troika Ministerial Meeting, 11 November 2008, Doc. 15597/08 (Presse 326), Brussels, Belgium.

"self-interest" and "altruism." The concept of self-interest refers to strengthening the EU's international role and its economic interests in the world. From this point of view, the EU has attempted to create a strong strategic partnership among its members and prosperity in Europe. It was perhaps beyond its scope to establish a strategic partnership with the rest of the world, or to contribute to international peace, security and prosperity unless this coincided with its own economic interests.

Altruism has led many regions in the world to be inspired by the EU's regional cooperation project. The regional cooperation project brings the countries together and opens many opportunities that push them to develop. Most importantly, increasing regional cooperation helps to prevent wars and conflicts (ibid., pp.80-82). According to the 2003 ESS, wars and conflicts threaten the EU's peace and security as well as international security, so that the EU should promote the strengthening of regional cooperation in the world, particularly regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa.

4.3.2 Developing an effective multilateral diplomacy

One of the most prominent foreign and security policy objectives of the EU, multilateral diplomacy, is defined by Kegley and Wittkopf (2004:477) as "a cooperative strategy of working with allies or with collective problem-solving institutions to face threats from another actor or global problem." The EU committed itself to reinforce its multilateral diplomacy in order to play a more active role on the world scene in the 2003 ESS, the significance of which was to conceptualise multilateralism as an "international order based on effective multilateralism." The goals were to enhance "international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based institutional order" (European Council, 2003:9). According to the 2003 ESS, "the EU's security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The EU is committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter." The strategy underlines that "key institutions in the international system" such as the UN, WTO, IMF and the WB, were notable for the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, it stressed that regional organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the AU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Southern Common Market (SCM), were also of importance in developing international law and resolving the common threats effectively.

The end of the Cold War era that shaped international relations brought significant changes to world history, particularly in the replacement of a bipolar system by a multipolar one, and the

emergence of multilateral diplomacy. This became a strategic means to resolving international issues effectively, notably the new threats and challenges, making the UN the most effective global actor in preserving international peace and security and reinforcing its multilateral diplomacy on the international stage. As a prominent part of the multilateral system of the EU, it has also attempted to increase its relations with important global actors, such as the USA, Russia, China, India, and Brazil, as well as the Islamic world. In particular, "the transatlantic relationship" remains the most prominent strategic relationship for the EU. However, the deep division between the "Europeanists" and the "Atlanticists" within the EU member states on foreign and security policies has sometimes undermined its pro-active foreign policy, especially over the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (ibid., p.312), and even during the Libyan War of 2011. On the other hand, a strengthening of strategic partnership with Russia has been connected to the former superpower's nuclear and energy power resources, as with China, the fastest growing trading actor in the world. The EU's strong historical relations with Africa compel the EU to strengthen its multilateral diplomacy with the African organisations.

4.3.3 Countering terrorism

Terrorism has been one of the major post Cold War challenges to the EU, because it threatens political, economic and social infrastructures, and is "more diverse, less visible and less predictable" than communism, and is viewed as a "growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe" (European Council, 2003:3). A problematic concept, the Council of the European Union (2002:1) clarified terrorism as:

> seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

In the ESS, "terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected with electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties." In addition, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime are seen as a substantial component of terrorism. Since the 9\11 attacks on the USA, the EU has intensively cooperated with the USA and the UN, as well as the other important global actors, in countering terrorism.

4.3.4 Preserving international peace and security

According to the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (TEU), one of the most prominent foreign and security policy objectives of the EU was "to preserve peace and strengthen international security", after which it developed its CFSP in order to play a more active role in keeping international peace and security in the world. The 2003 ESS highlights that "the EU should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world." To this end, the EU actively started to involve in international peacekeeping operations, for instance deploying forces in Afghanistan, East Timor, Kosovo, Georgia, Iraq, Guinea-Bissau and the DRC. At the same time, the EU appointed Special Representatives (EUSRs) to conflict areas such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Great Lakes. Regional conflicts undermine political, economic and social infrastructures of the states and threaten the EU's interests directly and indirectly. In addition, conflicts can create insecurity, injustice and poverty. Therefore, international peace and security are a precondition for political, economic and social development.

Dealing with international peace and security has been complicated for the EU and international organisations, and hence a multilateral framework has increasingly been considered imperative. The EU has been working with the USA, the UN, and other organisations and actors on peace and security initiatives, including in Africa, and in so doing has consolidated African regional and sub-regional organisations, including the establishment of an *African Peace Facility* with €740 million in 2004 through the AU. It has contributed to maintaining peace and security in Darfur/Sudan, the Great Lakes Region/DRC, and CAR, as well as in western Africa.

4.3.5 Promoting democracy and good governance

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty (TEU) stated that "developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law" were objectives of the CFSP of the EU. Firstly, promoting democracy and good governance would protect human rights; secondly, democratic systems would not become enemies with each other. Conflicts and international terrorism were the result of a lack of democracy and good governance. Thirdly, promoting democracy and good governance was essential for political, social and economic development, as well as the interests of the EU (Smith, 2009:151-3). However, the concepts of democracy and good governance remain ambiguous and contentious, thus affecting the policies of the EU and Africa towards democracy and good governance.

Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008:224-5) state that promoting democracy and good governance was not only important for the CFSP but also vital for the EU's identity. As a normative power, the EU pays a great deal of attention to spreading democracy and good governance in the world, however it does not have a consistent policy towards these concepts and its policy varies from region to region. For example, while the EU has various foreign policy towards China, it has a different policy for Iran and Palestine (ibid., pp.224-5). Even though Hamas won the democratic elections in Palestine in 2006, the EU did not recognise it as a democratically elected government.

It has been argued that the EU's economic, political, and strategic interests in the world have shaped the EU's democracy and good governance policy worldwide. The EU has also made an effort to strengthen democracy and good governance in developing countries, for instance through the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, where democracy and good governance were underscored as essential elements for sustainable development in both the EU and Africa. On the other hand, the question of whether the EU would promote democracy and good governance in developing countries, with its financial aid policy, remains controversial.

4.3.6 Promoting human rights

Promoting human rights is regarded not only as a strategic priority for the EU, but also as a moral responsibility. Respect for human rights is also viewed as a key to keeping security and stability. The EU has a wide range of tools to promote human rights across the world, such as promotion of democracy and good governance, diplomatic and economic sanctions, bilateral and multilateral dialogues, and financial aid, even peacekeeping and peacemaking assistance. The EU set up guidelines on human rights in 2007, in particular on capital punishment, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, human rights dialogues, child soldiers and armed conflict, and human rights defenders (Council of the European Union, 2007: 33). Importantly, following the end of the Cold War, the EU started to promote human rights as a strategic means for European integration, as well as for increasing economic cooperation in the global arena. However, it has been argued that the EU lacks a common vision for the promotion of human rights and partically develops its human rights policies according to its economic and strategic interests (Gropas, 1999:10, 23-4).

For instance, whilst the EU has a human rights policy towards Russia, it has a different strategy towards China and Africa. For instance, the EU imports 50 percent of its gas and 30 percent of its oil from Russia (Monaghan, 2006:1). The EU is heavily dependent on Russia's natural resources, therefore, this affects the EU foreign and security policy towards Russia

(Balfour, 2008:2: Smith, 2009:130). The EU's inconsistent human rights policy in the world also undermines its international credibility and damages the evolution of security cooperation with Africa. Though the protection of human rights is one of the most important CFSP objectives, the EU's human rights diplomacy remains somewhat limited and ineffective worldwide. For example, massive violations in the Balkans, Rwanda, Zaire, Nigeria, Burma and East Timor showed the EU's lack of power to prevent them.

4.4 EVALUATION

The end of the Cold War had a major impact on the fundamental concepts of security, power, and strategic partnership. At the same time, it brought many structural changes in the world, for instance the replacement of a bipolar international system by a multipolar one. Importantly, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet Union had a great impact on the foreign and security policy of the EU. European leaders began to take strategic steps to reinforce their common foreign and security policy, signing the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1992, and thus bringing many changes to the EU, especially the creation of the CFSP. It can be said that the Treaty was the first and most significant strategic step in establishing the CFSP and the notion of an SSP.

However, some obstacles, such as different national policies of the member states within the EU, sovereignty of member states, and disagreements between the various European institutions, including the CFSP, the WEU, and the NATO, have jeopardised the effectiveness of the CFSP of the EU. Therefore, developing a common foreign and security policy has always been the most difficult political field on the EU's agenda. Meanwhile, this situation has had a negative impact on the progress of the notion of a strategic partnership with different continents. Hence, the EU could not develop a proactive foreign and security policy, unanimously, to stop the wars in former Yugoslavia or genocide in Rwanda. After the conflicts and the wars in former Yugoslavia, the European leaders declared that without securing Europe first, the EU would not contribute to world peace.

Furthermore, the EU's foreign and security policy objectives have been playing key roles in developing the Africa-EU SSP. Promoting human rights, democracy and good governance are amongst the most important objectives of the EU's foreign and security policy. Liberal theory contends that promoting fundamental rights and freedoms can consolidate the notion of SSP and reinforce world peace and security. However, disregarding them can lead to political and economic instabilities and wars. Since 2000, many new developments have emerged in global politics, encouraging the CFSP of the EU to speak with one voice on international relations,

and look for solutions to the accompanying new threats. The ESS in 2003 was a significant strategic step in advancing security cooperation with different continents, as it underlined the necessity to build up institutional relations with different regional and sub-regional organisations, and so prevent conflicts and wars. For instance, the EU deployed its first civilian and military peacekeeping operations in Africa in 2003. In addition, it has made extensive institutional agreements with African regional and sub-regional organisations. In this regard, the establishment of an African Peace Facility is an important example of the birth of security cooperation with Africa. In particular, the EU strengthens its security cooperation in Africa through African organisations, such as the AU, the IGAD and the ECOWAS. The predictions of liberalism have been playing significant roles in shaping the EU's policy towards the SSP. EU policymakers believe that making the African organisations strong and effective can boost peace, security and stability and increase economic and political cooperation between the two continents. So, the SSP also aims to increase institutional relations between Africa and the EU.

However, the EU's controversial foreign and security policy implications have also undermined the effectiveness of the CFSP and the reinforcement of strategic partnership. Establishing a strong SSP with Africa is not an easy task, requiring more consistent EU foreign and security policy objectives, and a more united CFSP. In spite of some structural challenges, however, the EU has taken determined steps to make a solid partnership in the fields of peace and security with Africa, the future of which will partically depend on the strategic steps of the EU. If the EU shapes its strategic partnership with Africa in accord with its political and economic interests, it would weaken its global power and not sustain peace and security in Africa. Rather, it would contribute further to dividing Africa.

According to liberalism, increasing international cooperation between different actors can contribute to peace and security and spread over universal values, such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Reinforcing cooperation can also increase interdependence among the actors. The Africa-EU SSP has two important aims, the first of which is to maintain peace and security in Africa, the second to spread liberal values in Africa. Liberalism stresses that cooperation can be easy among the states that share the same values, however, it can be difficult among the states that do not have the same values. Therefore, spreading universal values in Africa is one of the most important aims for the EU to increase strategic partnership in a wide range of activities, such as economy and security.

Regarding Hypothesis 4: "the EU aims to spread its norms and values in Africa through the SSP", following the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the EU boosted its strategic partnership with African organisations in the areas of peace and security to spread over the principles of liberalism in Africa and to fight against global threats and challenges more effectively. According to the ESS adopted by the EU members in 2003, conflicts and wars have occurred as a result of lack of rule of law, human rights and democracy. The EU should disseminate its norms, values and ideas in order to sustain global peace and security through the establishment of strategic partnerships with different actors across a wide range of fields. The ESS underlines that the EU should strengthen its institutional relations with African organisations by creating different strategic partnership models. To this end, the EU established the APF through the AU to launch a security cooperation with African organisations in 2004 and allocated €740 million for it. One of the most important aims of the APF is to spread the European values and norms on the continent of Africa and to strengthen African organisations. This provides evidence for hypothesis 4. Making African organisations strong and effective is in the interest not only of the continent of Africa, but also of the EU. Liberal views point out that regional organisations can also increase social, economic, and political cooperation, however, while ineffective regional organisations can fail to fulfil their purposes, strong and effective ones can make difference in changing their society. In 2005-2006, the EU donated €300 to strengthen the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur, and supported the AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur politically.

The main idea behind the creation of the EC in the 1950s was to build peace and security by establishing a strategic partnership among the members of the community in economic areas. The establishment of strategic partnerships with different states has become a significant strategy for the EU since the EC was created, designed to promote its norms and values throughout the continent of Europe. To this end, the EU has deployed 10 peacekeeping operations since 2003 in conflict areas throughout Africa and supported African organisations' peace and security mechanisms both politically and financially. For instance, the EU has supported the AU peacekeeping operation in Sudan during the conflict. Significantly, a constructive pattern of AU-EU collaboration on peace and security appeared during the Darfur conflict. The EU members' interests, security concerns, and integration movement played a significant role in creating this pattern of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.

Nevertheless, the EU lacks a consistent foreign and security policy in the world. In particular, its economic and political interests have shaped its foreign and security policy towards different actors. While the EU has a certain foreign policy with Russia, it has a different policy with Africa due to its various economic and political interests. For example, the EU imports 50 percent of its gas and 30 percent of its oil from Russia (Monaghan, 2006:1), which is affecting the EU's relations with Russia. Likewise, some EU members have strong political and economic interests with North Africa. For instance, some of the EU members sold weapons to the value of €343.7 million to Libya in 2009,[7] the most important members being France, Italy, the UK, and Germany. The EU's contradictory security policy in the world weakens its international credibility and development of security cooperation with Africa.

Hypothesis 2 is "the lack of cohesion and discrepancy between the EU members damages the development of the Africa-EU SSP." For instance, while France has different interests in its former colonial countries in Africa, the UK has also different ones. This undermines the success of security partnership between Africa and the EU. It should be noted that while France plays a leading role in the EU peacekeeping operations in Africa, the other members remain passive and ineffective because of their different geo-economic and geo-political interests. The Libyan War of 2011 revealed that disagreement between the members of the EU remained the most significant issue. The South Ossetia War in the Caucasus in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia provided evidence that the EU members did not have sufficient capacity to develop effective security mechanisms to anticipate and prevent wars or conflicts in its neigbouring regions. Furthermore, the EU members could not develop a common security strategy when the USA invaded Iraq in 2003. While some EU members, such as France and Germany, resisted the USA-led invasion of Iraq, some, including Britain, Italy and Denmark, supported it. These examples demonstrate that the EU members lack common foreign and security policies when faced with global issues. This provides evidence for hypothesis 2.

Divergence between the EU members and its different institutions has had a negative impact on evolving the Africa-EU SSP. At the same time, the lack of unity and solidarity between the EU members on foreign and security policies undermines the development of the EU CFSP

[7] See the *Official Journal of the European Union*, twelfth annual report according to article 8 (2) of Council common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (2011/C 9/01), 13.1.2011, C 9/1, pp. 160-162.

and its global power. For example, the Bosnian war (1992-1995) showed that the EU did not have enough capacity to sustain peace and security in conflict areas. Likewise, its passive role during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrated that the EU was not ready to be a global power. Making a consistent CFSP among the EU members is a prerequisite for making long-term and successful strategic partnership models with Africa. This also confirms hypothesis 2.

Chapter 5 will assess the impact of colonial powers on the Africa-Europe SSP. Mainly, it investigates the interests of the former colonisers including France, England, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Belgium in security cooperation between Africa and the EU. This chapter also examines the importance of their role in Africa's peace and security.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE FORMER EUROPEAN COLONIAL POWERS' SECURITY POLICIES TOWARDS AFRICA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the colonial period, Africa has played a strategic role in world politics, the second largest continent comprising 55 countries with a collective population of over one billion. It provides raw materials for the former colonial powers and therefore plays an important role in their economic development. At the same time, it is one of the most significant continents in the world in terms of natural resources and strategic position. Europe has strong historical, economic, and political relations with Africa, and throughout the history of colonialism, the former European colonial powers have developed various economic and political relations. Economic and political interests of the former colonial powers have thus necessitated revision of the Africa-EU SSP. Realist theory emphasises that security relations between global actors and weak actors are strongly related to global actors' economic interests. This chapter deals with the former European colonial powers' security policies towards Africa and discusses how both realist and liberalist predictions have been applicable in the former colonial powers' security policies in Africa.

5.2 FRANCE'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

France has "special" economic and political relations with Francophone African countries, dating back to the 19th century, and retains its military bases in Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Djibouti, and the Central African Republic. France's security policy towards Africa has changed according to its economic, political and strategic interests. It has been linked with the concepts of change and continuity. For instance, during the apartheid regime, the French government strengthened its economic and political relations with South Africa and opposed the UN's embargos of the pariah state, even encouraging Francophone African countries to increase their economic and political relations with it.

Additionally, France's international power and position has also shaped its security policy towards Africa, seeing it become a member of the Group of Eight (G8) and one of the largest economic powers in the world. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and at the same time has been playing a significant role in European integration. Significantly, it is a nuclear power and a member of various security organisations, for instance NATO and the

OSCE (Renou, 2002:5-8). Approximately 240,000 French citizens live in different countries of Africa, where French companies operate, such as *Total*, *Areva*, *Accor*, *Bolloré*, *Bouygues*, and *Elf Aquitaine*. In turn, Africa provides raw materials, such as uranium, natural gas and oil to France, which is still highly dependent on these for its technological industries. France also has special agreements with many African countries in the fields of defence and military power. France is the largest trading partner for the African countries within the EU members[8]. When France's exports to Africa in 2007 were 30,393 million dollars, its exports to Africa in 2008 increased to 36,878 million dollars. As shown in Table 3, France's economic relations have significantly grown each year.

Table 3: France's overall trade with Africa (2006-2008) (in million dollars)

	Exports			Imports		
	2006	2007	2008	2006	2007	2008
France	26,344	30,393	36,878	24,763	28,198	38,354
Africa excl. South Africa	24,240	28,177	34,482	23,767	26,957	36,945
Sub-Saharan Africa	11,341	13,184	15,278	9,195	11,443	15,640
Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa	9,237	10,968	12,882	8,199	10,202	14,231
South Africa	2,104	2,216	2,396	996	1,241	1,409

Source: Adapted from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009.

Nevertheless, the global economic crisis of 2007 has had a negative impact on the growth of France's economic relations with Africa, with both exports and imports falling. France's exports to Africa in 2009 were €17.163 million and its imports to Africa were €14.312 million.[9] France's economic relations have relatively started to increase in 2010, with its exports to Africa increasing to €19.516 million and imports to €16.452 million. France was also the largest of the EU's exporters to Africa, with €20 billion in 2010.[10]

According to Hansen (2008:1) and Martin (1995:9-14), the main aims of France's security policy towards Africa are to protect French economic and political interests and citizens and provide intelligence for the French government. The Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the collapse of the authoritarian regime in the DRC, formerly Zaire, in 1997 weakened France's security policy towards Africa (Renou, 2002:11-3). New developments in Africa forced

[8] See the detailed report for France's economic relations with Africa published by EUROSTAT, Revival of EU 27 trade in goods with Africa, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010.
[9] Ibid., pg. 1.
[10] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

French policymakers to re-define security policy in Africa, particularly after the Cold War. The bipolar international system in world politics and spread of communism in Francophone African countries had been the main threat for the French interests during this era, leading France to increase its social, economic, and political relations with former colonial states in Africa against the threat of the Soviet Union.

After the Cold War, the concept of security has appeared to change, and now includes the new threats, mentioned above. Particularly, conflicts and wars in Africa began to threaten regional stability and especially France's economic interests after the 1990s, as democratic movements emerged. A new political rivalry between France and the USA arose in Africa after the end of the Cold war. Wary of what it perceived as imperial ambitions of the USA, France saw these new developments in Africa as a threat to its economic and political interests (ibid., pp.11-3).

Financial aid programmes are also seen as a momentous component of France's security policy towards Africa, for instance strengthening the authoritarian regime of President Paul Biye in Cameron in 1992 with a pledge of 436 million dollars of aid. After the 1990s, France also started to support the concepts of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, due to its changing interests in Africa and in the world (Martin, 1995:6-17; Ogunmola, 2009: 234-8; Renou, 2002:13-7; Touati, 2007:9-12). In recent years, France has claimed that the UN Security Council should include one African country to reflect and support the continent's interests precisely. However, its support for Africa at the UN Security Council remains somewhat rhetorical.

The emergence of the regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa also affected France's security policy. For example, France was opposed to the establishment of the ECOWAS (Renou, 2002:19-22) created by the Treaty of Lagos, in 1975, the aims of which were to reinforce economic relations amongst the members, to create an economic integration in western Africa and to create a common security system. At the same time, it included a peacekeeping force, and in 1995 ECOWAS played a critical role in stopping the Liberian civil war. France established its own security institution, known as the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programme in 1998. RECAMP included Francophone African countries, the USA, the UK, Belgium, and five Anglophone countries. This provides evidence against hypothesis 3, which is "the EU encourages to reinforce regional organisations on the African continent through the Africa-EU SSP." France's economic and political relations with Africa have influenced its institutional relations with the continent. Meanwhile, the establishment of the RECAMP also shows that France is pursing its own

individual security policy in Africa, and one that is undermining the development of the EU CFSP. This also strengthens hypothesis 2.

Furthermore, the current economic crises also influenced France's security strategy in Africa, causing France to close down two military bases in Central Africa (Mehler, 2008:28-33). France also plays a large role in the international organisations, including in the UN and the EU, to keep its strategic influence in Africa. For example, it took a leading role in the EU peacekeeping force, which is the Artemis Operation, in the DRC in 2003, and has made a major contribution to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Since the post-independence era in Africa, France has institutionalised its relations with African states, and has organised Franco-African summits since 1973, in order to strengthen its social, economic, and political relations with Africa. The 25th took place in Nice between the 31st of May and the 1st of June 2010, in which France underlined that establishing a strategic partnership based on equality, solidarity and mutual respect was necessary for combating the common threats facing both continents and enhancing their interests. Importantly, France agreed to strengthen Africa's security system through regional and sub-regional organisations, and in so doing pledged €300 million between 2010 and 2012 to African states and organisations. It also agreed to train 12,000 African troops to reinforce African peacekeeping operations in that time. Meanwhile, the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, in his opening speech, argued that the spread of liberal concepts, such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law was essential for the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in Africa. It seems that France is changing its relations with Africa according to global developments and its political and economic interests, supporting hypothesis 3. It can be said that the evidence for this hypothesis is somewhat mixed.

According to assumptions of realism, making a true strategic partnership between France and Africa is problematic because France is aiming to increase its economic interests and security concerns while cooperating with Africa. Liberal views stress that cooperation between Africa and France is essential to fight against the new global threats and challenges. Liberal values can reduce the possibility of uncertainty, therefore, spreading liberal principles in Africa is crucial for removing the possibility of conflict and wars. Conflicts and wars have also threatened France's economic interests on the African continent. After 2000, France began to play a more active role in African politics and supported liberal principles, starting to put more pressure on its former colonial African states to show respect for liberal ideals. There are three important factors affecting France's new foreign and security policy towards Africa. First,

conflicts and wars directly damage France's economic and political interests in Africa. Second, the new emerging actors such as India, Brazil, China and Turkey have begun to establish new strategic partnerships and increase their economic and political relations with African states and organisations. Third, dictatorial regimes have begun to lose their power in African states over the last decade.

It is important to note that France is playing the greatest role in developing security cooperation between Africa and the EU. For example, it took a leading role in establishing the APF in 2004 to cement African organisations' security structures. Moreover, France played a leading role in an EU peacekeeping operation in Africa in 2003, named Artemis Operation in the DRC. France's increasing involvement in peace and security also confirms hypothesis 3. Based on the above, it can be said that France's economic and political relations with Africa have been one of the most important factors in evolving the Africa-EU SSP. While the EU set up an SSP with Africa, France is reinforcing its international position and also protecting its increasing economic interests. In particular, its economic relations have been increased with Africa, as shown in Table 3 (above).

Even though France's security policy towards Africa has changed since 2000, due to its changing economic and international interests in Africa and in the world, it still does not take into consideration internal challenges of Africa, nor focus on resolving the continent's structural, economic or political problems. However, these threats of the new millennium have led French policymakers to recognise that security cooperation with Africa is the best way to protect France's economic and political interests.

5.3 THE UK'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Like France, the UK has strong economic, political, and historical ties with Africa, in particular with Anglophone African countries. The presence of a "Ministry for Africa" in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is evidence of Britain's maintenance of robust historical and economic relations with the continent. Whilst France colonised 20 African countries in the region of West and Central Africa, the UK colonised a similar number in the region of West and sub-Saharan Africa. The UK does not have permanent military bases in Africa, however it has special military cooperation agreements with some strategic African countries, especially South Africa.

There are many private British and government companies operating in over ten African countries, the largest being *British Petroleum, Marconi, Lonrho, ICI, British Petroleum,*

Unilever, and banks, such as *Barclays* and *Standard Chartered*. In addition, Britain[11] has special economic, political and historical relations with South Africa, and the total rate of its exports and imports running at over 40 percent, making it one of the most important commercial partners for the UK in Africa and in the world (Ero, 2001:66). Africa has been a significant trade market for it, particularly South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Angola, Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia. Debt-relief and financial aid programmes are also among the most important strategies of British foreign policy to maintain the strength of its historical relations with Africa.

It can be argued that the British security policy towards Africa has widened and deepened since 2000, but also that it has remained contradictory. The Blair government continued to sell weapons to Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and the Ivory Coast (Porteous, 2005:295-6), and increased its military cooperation with the government of South Africa. Importantly, Britain has been actively involved in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone since 2000. The reasons for Britain's military involvement in this country are to protect the British economic interests and citizens and to protect the government of Sierra Leone (Ero, 2001:56-7).

The British government (2001:13-5) published a report entitled *The Causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa* in March 2001, analysing and focusing on security challenges in Africa. The report significantly made a link between the British security policy towards Africa and dynamics affecting security on the continent. According to the report, conflicts and wars in Africa have causes that are "root", "secondary", and "tertiary."

The root causes are: (a) a wide gap between the rich and the poor, or inequalities between different groups or people; (b) the lack of strong political structures of the states that have caused conflicts and led to the emergence of corruption, ethnic conflicts, and weak political and civil institutions; (c) economic crises that have aggravated violence; (d) the legacy of colonialism that has a profound impact on conflicts; and (e) struggles for natural resources that have led to violence. The secondary causes are: (a) unemployment, lack of education and population pressure; (b) the abuse of ethnicity; and (c) availability of arms. The tertiary causes of conflicts are: (a) regional and interlocking conflicts; (b) the conflict cycle; (c) lack of guarantors for peace-making and peacekeeping; and (d) misplaced humanitarian assistance.

[11] See the detailed report for the UK's economic relations with Africa published by EUROSTAT, Revival of EU 27 trade in goods with Africa, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010.

Meanwhile, the report (2001:22) states that the British security policy for Africa should focus on: (a) small arms and light weapon control; (b) encouraging investments and strengthening economic structure in conflict areas in Africa; (c) preventing the abuse of natural resources; (d) supporting development; (e) supporting security sector reform programmes; and (f) supporting the concept of African ownership through African regional and sub-regional organisations, and playing a more proactive role in international organisations for the interests of Africa. The importance of the report lay in its widening of the concept of security, particularly the British security policy towards Africa. It linked the British security policy towards Africa with social, economic, political, environmental, and physiological elements.

Attacks on the London transport system on the 7th of July 2005 strengthened a notion formulated after the 9\11 attacks on the USA that international terrorism was the greatest and most unpredictable threat to Britain's national interests. A post-9/11 and 7/7 assumption of neoliberal approach arose, based on interdependence between actors in combating a perceived common threat to the West and the rest of the world. The concept of strategic partnership became a strategic priority for the foreign affairs of Britain, which began to play a more proactive role in international organisations, including the EU, the UN, WB, and the IMF, in order to eradicate the roots of international terrorism. Attention focused on so-called "failed states", conflicts, regional instabilities and organised crime in the world, in particular in Africa. Hence, the British security policy for Africa was defined in terms of international terrorism by British policymakers. Furthermore, the UK increased its relations with African regional and sub-regional organisations, especially with the AU, and sought solutions with them against international terrorist attacks. This is also providing evidence for hypothesis 3. The challenges of the twenty-first century have threatened Britain's economic and political interests in Africa. The SSP between Africa and the EU became crucial for protecting Britain's economic interests in Africa, in particular, and the EU's interests, in general. At the same time, the Africa-EU SSP has become a significant tool for the UK to combat international terrorism more effectively.

5.4 GERMANY'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Even though Germany hosted the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, which regulated European colonialism in Africa, it did not pursue an active foreign policy towards Africa until the end of the Cold War. Germany had not colonised as much land as had France and Britain, and its colonial states only included South West Africa (now Namibia), German East Africa (now divided as Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi), Togo, and Cameroon. During the colonial period

its policy was similar to that of other colonial powers in Africa. After the First World War, Germany lost its all colonies in Africa, but unlike the French and British security policies towards Africa it could not maintain its economic and political relations with African states after the First World War, due to domestic developments in Germany, such as unification between East and West Germany. Nor did Germany have as strong political and economic interests in Africa as France or the UK. While the concept of continuity applies to French and British security policies for Africa, it is not applicable to the German one. As Golaszinski (2007:6) points out, Germany did not develop a consistent African strategy towards Africa, leaving its security policy for Africa inactive.

Mair (1998:21) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union and unification of Germany in 1989 had a significant impact on the German security policy towards Africa, however Germany's political relations with African countries remained limited, in proportion to its economic interests. For example, the total of Germany's imports and exports to the Sub-Saharan African countries was less than 2 percent in the 1990s, and has not changed substantially since. Germany's exports and imports have been predominantly with South Africa and Nigeria, while the first priority of the German security policy for Africa had been to protect its own citizens in its old colonial African states. During the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Germany did not play a proactive role in preventing it, and generally played a passive role in maintaining peace, security and stability in conflicts and wars in the Great Lakes Region. It can be said that German involvement in conflict prevention, resolution, and management was limited, and that political relations with African organisations were not solid (ibid., p.32).

After the 1990s, Germany developed a wider security policy towards Africa, seeing the new threats after the end of the Cold War as including organised crime, money laundering, drug smuggling and conflicts (Hofmeier, 2002:59-62; Mair, 1998: 23-5). Importantly, the new security policy of Germany paid more attention to conflicts and wars in Africa, and underlined that conflicts can lead to the emergence of different kinds of challenges for the interests of Germany and Europe, including mass emigration into Europe (ibid., pp. 59-62; ibid., pp. 23-5). Another significant changing security perception of Germany towards Africa was that if inequalities between North and South widened too far, a new Cold War could emerge, giving rise to new international problems (ibid., pp. 59-62; ibid., pp. 23-5). Meanwhile, Germany has become one of the EU's largest donors to African countries.

Golaszinski (2007:9) states that after 9\11, the thesis "without security no development, without development no security" became the first priority of the German foreign and security policy towards Africa. Germany has supported the concept of African ownership, seeing the establishment of the AU, NEPAD, and the APRM as strategic steps in sustaining peace, security, and stability in conflict areas. Since 2000, the German security policy towards Africa has widened, with it taking conceptual and practical leads, particularly against the above-mentioned threats of the twenty-first century. The 2007 German G8 Presidency was a very important event for developing its relations with Africa, initiating a Peace and Security Programme (PSP) in Africa, the aims of which were to address the roots of conflicts in Africa, to strengthen African capacity-building, and to support Africa's peace and security structure. It contributed almost €30 million to this programme and to a G8 Africa programme of 2008. Germany has actively begun to engage in crisis management in Africa in recent years. For example, it participated in a EUFOR mission to provide peace and stability in the DRC in 2006, in peace operations in Liberia and Western Sahara, and on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, as well as supporting the Darfur peace process. It was also involved in the EU mission to maintain peace and security on the coast of Somalia. Meanwhile, it has started to play an active role in preventing conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. This supports hypothesis 3. After the EU members adopted the ESS in 2003, members of the EU increased their security cooperation with African organisations. According to the ESS, the EU should strengthen its strategic partnerships with different actors, including African organisations, in order to disseminate its norms and values, sustain global peace and security, and keep its interests. It has been argued that there is mixed motivation behind the creation of the Africa-EU SSP.

Germany's economic interest has recently increased relatively in Africa, as for example it became the largest exporter of conventional weapons to African states between 2003 and 2006, with an amount of $900 million. Meanwhile, its total trade reached €33 billion in 2008. Exporting energy supplies to African states has been one of the most substantial commercial activities of Germany in recent years (Cargill, 2010:33), to which end, Angolan President Eduardo Dos Santos made an official visit in 2009. It can be said that security interests of Germany in Africa have changed and widened. According to German policymakers, conflicts in Africa have been seen as the most dangerous threat to Germany's economic interests. Regional stability in Africa has been linked with economic interests of Germany. Despite Germany not playing a dynamic political role in Africa, its involvement has improved

streadily. In this regard, developing security cooperation with Africa has been vital for the pursuit of Germany's changing international interests.

5.5 ITALY'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Italy's historical relations with Africa date back to the 19th century, when Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Libya were its colonies, all of which were lost after World War II. It particularly had special relations with East Africa, one of the strategic regions in Africa and the world. Since the colonial era, and throughout the Cold War, international actors, including the USA, USSR, Britain, and France, played an active role in keeping their geo-economic and geo-political interests in the region. The strategic significance of East Africa can be summarised as (a) a key region for the Middle East; and (b) a strategic gateway for the Red Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean (Commission of the European Communities, 2006:5). Conflicts and wars have been a fate of this region since the post-independence era, with political and military tensions between the states. The border wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and conflicts in Somalia have been chronic, and have threatened the regional stability of Africa and international security. The legacy of colonialism has damaged political and economic stabilities in East Africa, particularly the artificial borders it created. For instance, Sudan and Ethiopia have claimed that part of Eritrea belongs to them, threatening further confrontation in the region. While the countries spend a large amount of money on weapons from industrialised countries, they have ignored other challenges.

Italy's security policy towards Africa has been premised on its own political and economic interests, particularly in East Africa. It has changed dramatically in accord with historical events, such as the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 events, and the 2007 economic crisis. Having been marginalised by Italy during the colonial period (Novati, 2008:2), in the post-independence era the military regimes took over the governments and aggravated social, economic, and political stability (ibid., p.4). During the Cold War, the bipolar international structure exacerbated regional stability in the Horn (Negash, Papa & Taddia, 2003:14). Italy's foreign and security policy for East Africa has begun to change since the end of the Cold War, following the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the area, and it has developed a different security policy towards Africa in accord with the changing global politics.

The Italian government has recognised that conflicts and wars have begun to threaten the historical interests of Italy, so Italy should play a leading role in preventing them as well as

those in other regions of Africa. Italy views this region as a "natural area of its own influence" (Novati, 2008:15-7), while trade relations with Africa have increased, to the point where it is the fourth largest commercial partner on the continent (Cargill, 2010:33).

When the new threats in North Africa emerged in 2011, Italy was overly concerned because of its significant geo-economic and geo-political interests[12] in the region. At the same time, Italy has faced serious emigration problems and threats of international terrorism surrounding conflicts occurred in this region. Italy's role in starting the Libyan War of 2011, with the coalition powers, was therefore significant. Italy played a pivotal role in maintaining peace, security, and stability in Africa during the 2009 G8 Italian Presidency, but its increasing involvement in Africa's peace and security in recent years has not gone beyond its pragmatic approach.

5.6 PORTUGAL'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Portugal is the oldest former colonial power and has been present in Africa for almost 500 years. It was the first European power to colonise territories in Africa and also the last European colonial power to relinquish formal control over them. Its colonial possessions in Africa, namely Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, played a momentous role in developing the Portuguese economy, providing raw materials and a protected market for Portugal. Portugal's strong historical and economic ties with its former colonies in Africa have continued, and it is worth mentioning that when Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in 1975, bloody civil wars erupted there. The Angolan civil war of 1975 to 2002 was one of the longest and the most destructive of the Cold War, claiming the lives of 500,000 civilians and displacing four million. The civil war in Mozambique also lasted a long time, from 1977 to 1992, with almost 900,000 civilians being killed and five million people being displaced (Leitenberg, 2006:77).

Angola has been the most strategic country for Portugal since colonisation, leaving many Portuguese private companies in this country, including *Portugal Telecom*, *Mota-Engil*, *Caixa Geral de Depósitos* (CGD), *Santander Totta*, *Banco Português de Investimento* (BPI), *Banco Espírito Santo* (BES), *Millennium BCP*, and *Galp Energia*. Almost 70,000 Portuguese citizens work in Angola, which is becoming the largest trading partner after the EU (Gorjao &

[12] http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/eu-arms-exports-libya#data. See also the *Official Journal of the European Union*, twelfth annual report according to article 8 (2) of Council common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (2011/C 9/01), 13.1.2011, C 9/1, pg. 160-161.

Seabra, 2010:4). At the same time, Angola is an important country in terms of producing oil in Africa and in the world, being the eighth largest oil exporting country in the world and a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 2007 (Government of Angola, 2001:11-2). Despite also being one of the world's largest diamond producing countries, its social, economic, and political infrastructures, as with other African colonies of Portugal, remain vulnerable. Particularly, poverty is still the greatest problem of Mozambique and Angola, in spite of the natural richness of these countries. As with the other former European colonial powers, the Portuguese security policy in Africa has been related to protecting and increasing its own political and economic interests, rather than those of the African people (Coelho, 2002:129).

The Portuguese security policy for Africa has widened since 2000, with two historic EU-Africa summits held during the Portuguese presidencies of the Council of EU. The Portuguese security policy for Africa has included international terrorism, the principle of democracy, mass migration, conflicts, peace-building, and conflict prevention, management, and resolution. A "Joint EU-Africa Strategy" was accepted by the EU and Africa at the second Africa-EU Summit held in Portugal in 2007. This followed the first EU-Africa summit, in 2000, which was a turning point for changing relations between Africa and EU, underlining that establishing a fair strategic partnership between Africa and the EU was necessary to develop social, economic, and political relations. It also highlighted that developing relations between African regional and sub-regional organisations and the EU was essential for sustaining peace, security, and stability in Africa. The second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon in 2007 also broadened its security policy towards Africa. Especially, it paid much attention to the root causes of the conflicts and acknowledged that Africa's future was closely linked to that of the EU, particularly in matters of security. Such a belief would be promoted through seeing the EU becoming more actively engaged in maintaining peace and security in Africa.

Portugal sees that it can play a more effective role through the EU, the UN, the WB, and the IMF in sustaining peace and security in conflict areas in Africa, more so than it could on its own. In this spirit, Portugal and Angola have begun to support each other at the international organisations, including the UN and the EU, in the fields of the maintenance of international peace and security. For instance, Portugal supported the Angolan candidacy to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the 2003-2004 session. Likewise, Angola declared that it would support the Portuguese candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during 2011-2012. Portugal's security policy for Africa is based on

pragmatism, but while the notion of an SSP between Africa and the EU has emerged during the Portuguese presidencies of the Council of the EU, it has not led to a genuine strategic partnership with Africa.

5.7 BELGIUM'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Belgium had three colonial countries in Africa, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (formerly the Republic of Zaire), the Republic of Rwanda, and Burundi. The "scramble for Africa" was led by Belgian King Leopold II, in a policy towards Africa that was racially punitive and brutal. Millions of people were killed in the DRC during the colonial period, leaving the Belgian colony with many challenges in its colonies, including political instabilities and racism. As with other colonial powers in Africa, Belgium also marginalised its colonies and artificially delineated many ethnic groups. After relinquishing all its colonies in Africa in 1962, the Kingdom of Belgium retained strong economic and political relations with the old colonies in Africa. In particular, Belgium has had a special relationship with the DRC, one of the world's richest countries in terms of natural resources.

The root causes of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 go back to the brutal and racial policies of the Kingdom of Belgium, with Belgium dividing Rwanda into the two main ethnic groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus. Whereas the Tutsis had a privileged social and economic position, the Hutus lived in poor conditions in the country. Significantly, the Tutsis had protected the interests of the Kingdom of Belgium in the country during the colonial period. When the Rwandan genocide erupted in 1994, and nearly one million people were killed, the government of Belgium played no role in stopping it. Ethnic conflicts and political instabilities have remained the greatest challenges to the former colonies of Belgium in Africa and have continued to threaten the future of the DRC and Rwanda to this day. On the other hand, Belgium has changed elements of its foreign and security policy towards Africa since 2003, supporting peacekeeping operations of African regional and sub-regional organisations.

5.8 EVALUATION

The concept of security in the twenty-first century has been transformed, and the new century has brought both opportunities and challenges. Whereas the nuclear threat was the main challenge for the world during the Cold War, today the content of security includes a number of new threats. Meanwhile, the 9/11 attacks on the USA had an impact on the former colonial powers' security policies for Africa. International terrorism became a major concern for the EU, leading it to increase its strategic relations with Africa's regional and sub-regional

organisations so as to eliminate the roots of international terrorism. The new threats and challenges increased the significance of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, so the former colonial powers adjusted their security policies towards Africa after 2000 and built up collaboration with Africa in the fields of peace and security.

Gradual EU integration in foreign affairs and security may have increasingly forced EU member states to be driven less by their own immediate interests (e.g., economic ones) and more by adaption of a collective perspective that explicitly takes other motivations into account (such as crisis prevention and human rights). It seems that external factors, such as the increasingly shared perspeption of a global terrorist threat, may have further enhanced the drive for the EU to act towards Africa and, with this, another rationale has been "superimposed" on the individual policies of EU states towards Africa.

According to the realist approach, international politics are defined in terms of interests. Global actors tend to increase their own economic and political interests while developing cooperation. This chapter found that economic and political interests of the former European colonial countries have influenced security relations with Africa, the EU being its largest trading partner. Liberalism and constructivism also have predictions to apply for the Africa-EU SSP. According to the liberal approach, a strategic partnership among the actors is crucial to combating the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century. In addition, cooperation between the actors can bring opportunities to increase economic and political relations. Importantly, a strategic partnership can be made easily with the states that share the same political culture.

After 2000, the new global developments affected the former colonial powers' security policies towards Africa. In particular, conflicts and wars, international terrorism and immigration issues have threatened the EU members' economic and political interests on the African continent. The former Europan colonial powers began to support liberal values and put more pressure on African states to transform their political systems after 2000. In this regard, the Africa-EU SSP has been a strategic tool to foster cooperation between the two continents and to increase the EU's global power. According to constructivism, norms, historical relations and common identities can have a positive impact on developing relations between different actors. Deep historical relations between Africa and the former European colonial countries have led to the emergence of different cooperation fields, such as security partnership between the two continents.

This chapter has found evidence for and against hypotheses 2 and 3. It has been argued that the former European colonial powers have mixed aims from the establishment of the Africa-EU SSP. Importantly, economic and political interests of the former European colonial countries in Africa has been playing a significant role in emerging security cooperation between Africa and the EU. However, new threats and challenges, such as international terrorism, immigration issues, drug trafficking, and conflicts and wars have forced the former EU colonial countries to initiate such cooperation with Africa. The EU's enlargement has also had an impact on the emergence of Africa-EU SSP.

Chapter 6 will evaluate the EU's foreign and security policy towards Africa, and examine domestic and international factors influencing the EU's foreign and security policy towards Africa. In addition, it will highlight the driving forces affecting the Africa-EU SSP.

CHAPTER SIX
THE EU'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine the EU's security policy towards Africa and evaluate this in the light of the hypotheses. Other global actors in Africa, such as the USA, China, India, Brazil, and Turkey, have consolidated their political and economic relations with both African states and organisations. For instance, the USA imports 22 percent of oil from Africa, compared to 17 percent from the Middle East (Cargill, 2010:20). However, the new changing global structure in Africa has influenced the EU's foreign and security policy in Africa. At the same time, the new challenges, for example international terrorism and immigration, also affected the EU's foreign and security policy in Africa. This chapter will particularly examine which factors impinge on the development of the Africa-EU SSP.

6.2 THE EU'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

During the first Africa-EU Summit, the *Cairo Declaration* and the *Cairo Plan of Action* were accepted by both African and European leaders, and a wide range of issues were handled. In the *Cairo Plan of Action*, the EU's new security policy towards Africa focused on (a) peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution; (b) post-conflict assistance and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; (c) terrorism; (d) small arms and light weapons; (e) landmines; (f) proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (g) conflicts in Africa. The Summit played a significant role in changing the EU's foreign and security policy for Africa, and it was the first time the EU, *inter alia*, had dealt with security issues facing Africa. More importantly, it paved the way for the establishment of security cooperation between the continents.

In addition, there are other foremost historical events that influence the EU's security policy towards Africa, namely the Cotonou Agreement and the European Security Strategy. As noted above, the Cotonou Agreement was signed between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries) in June 2000, in Cotonou, Benin, and contributed to the birth of SSP between Africa and the EU. Though the Agreement mainly focused on poverty reduction, economic and trade cooperation, and integration of the ACP countries into the global economy, its approach did not constitute an entirely comprehensive security policy

towards the ACP countries. It did have a limited security scope, for instance referring to peace-building policies of the EU, conflict prevention and resolution.

In 2005 a revised Cotonou Agreement dealt with international cooperation against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), followed in 2010 by another revision that brought a different perspective to the EU's security policy towards the ACP countries, underlining the interdependence between security and development. However, for all its revisions, the Agreement developed a global security policy rather than one specific to Africa. Its most important feature was that the EU linked the security concept with international economic and trade cooperation within the ACP countries. Especially, the EU's limited security strategies towards the ACP countries demonstrate that the prevention of conflicts and wars, and sustaining peace and security in the ACP countries, have become important political concerns on the EU's agenda in the new millennium.

In the history of the CFSP of the EU, 2003 was momentous in the progress of the CFSP, as the European Council adopted its first common "*European Security Strategy*" in December, in Brussels, under the responsibilities of the EU's High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana. The title of the ESS was "*A Secure Europe in a Better World*", and identified the key threats facing the EU, defined its strategic goals, and established its political implications towards Europe. The ESS highlighted that:

> Europe still faces security threats and challenges… Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible… In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law (European Council, the European Security Strategy, 2006:1-9).

The EU acknowledges itself as a global actor, however in so doing it has some global responsibilities, the most essential of which is to play a proactive role in maintaining international peace, security, and stability. According to the ESS, the key threats facing the EU were terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. The ESS clearly states that "no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own", and refers to "the internal and external aspects of security", both of which are strongly related to each other and not divided. In this context, the EU's security policy towards Africa has occurred as an external aspect of security, and it has started to

change with the ESS, namely clarified security issues, the new global threats facing the EU, and the new security strategies.

The strategic objectives of the EU were drawn up by the ESS to consolidate security with its neighbouring countries to establish an effective multilateral system. One of the most indispensable new security policies of the ESS was that the EU should strengthen its relations with international and regional organisations in order to play a more dynamic role in the maintenance of international peace, security, and stability. The ESS provides the momentum for the establishment of strategic partnership with Africa in the areas of peace and security, intended to: (a) strengthen its relations with African regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa; (b) deal with poverty reduction, the lack of good governance, and the root causes of the conflicts and wars in Africa; and (c) use economic, social, diplomatic and political instruments to effectively sustain peace and security in Africa.

However, the EU failed to draw up a tangible security concept with the ESS, nor is it clear how a vague security concept of the EU will make a contribution to international peace and security, in particular that of Africa. It can be said that the EU does not have a strategic security culture, as evident in the divisions that occurred during the USA invasion of Iraq in 2003 among member states, and even in the Libyan War of 2011, which weakened the CFSP. This was a reminder of how it had failed to end the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s. Though the adoption of the ESS by the European Council was a milestone in creating a common security culture among the members of the EU, it is questionable whether the ESS has the power to make an effective security policy for the EU towards Africa.

The EU divided Africa into three categories, so as to make its security policies more effective: (1) the Maghreb countries, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004; (2) the countries in East Africa, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and Uganda through the Strategy for the Horn of Africa in 2006; and (3) special bilateral relations with South Africa through the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership in 2007.

The emergence of the ENP was notable in building up a new security approach and an SSP towards the Maghreb countries. It was established in 2004 and consisted of 27 EU member states, and 16 EU neighbouring countries, including the Maghreb countries. The fundamental objective was to strengthen socio-economic and political relations with neighbouring countries. Essentially, the ENP underlines the three important concepts relating to the EU's relations with its neighbours, namely security, stability, and prosperity. It is also one of the

crucial foreign policy instruments of the EU within the CFSP. The ENP built up two important security policies towards the Maghreb countries, namely to reinforce cooperation among its countries to effectively combat the new security threats and challenges, and achieve more political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management. This also highlights the consolidation of EU civil and military capabilities in playing an effective role in the countries of Maghreb and other neighbouring countries of the EU.

According to liberal theory, conflicts and wars can damage political and economic stability and spreading norms and values can reinforce political and economic infrastructure. The EU aims to strengthen economic and political relations with North Africa and to spread its norms and values through the ENP. Significantly, the EU imports 14 percent of its oil and 20 percent of its natural gas from North Africa.[13] Therefore, the EU is highly dependent on natural resources of the North African countries and the concept of economic interdependence plays a significant role in developing the EU's security policy towards North Africa. Some of the EU members had significant relations with the ousted leader Libya Muammer Gaddafi, for example, France, Italy, the UK, and Germany, which sold weapons to the value of €343.7 million to Libya in 2009.[14]

Making the ENP strong in North Africa is in the interest of the EU, but a weak ENP cannot protect the EU's economic interests. The EU's political relations with North Africa have increased since terrorist attacks on New York, Madrid and London. At the same time, immigration has been one of the greatest issues of the EU in relations with North Africa. Spreading the principles of liberalism and defining its security policy for North Africa in light of "terrorism and immigration" do not make the EU a safe continent. On the contrary, this aggravates the EU's identity problem and makes its security strategy and partnership with North Africa complicate.

The EU strategy for Africa was adopted by the European Commission in Brussels, in October 2005, entitled "*EU Strategy for Africa: towards a Europe-African pact to accelerate Africa's development*", the first time the 25 EU member states had accepted a common strategy regarding Africa. The strategy identified the EU's comprehensive security policy objectives,

[13] See the report published by SECURE and OME, *the EU and North African Oil and Gas Suppliers*, Cairo, 19 October 2010.

[14] See the *Official Journal of the European Union*, twelfth annual report according to article 8 (2) of Council common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (2011/C 9/01), 13.1.2011, C 9/1, pp. 160-162.

namely to (a) "develop a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention", (b) "cooperate in addressing common security threats", (c) "support African peace-support operations", (d) "disarm to break the conflict cycle", (e) "sustain peace in post-conflict situations", and (f) "tackle conflict resources." The EU's proposal to establish a strategic partnership with Africa in *the EU Strategy for Africa* became the most significant moment in creating the notion of the Africa-EU strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security.

Peace and security have been the most crucial matters in the 2005 EU strategy for Africa, inspired by a speech from former General Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan, in which he said: "we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development…" (UN, 2005:6). The EU paid more attention to the relations between security and development in the new EU strategy for Africa. The EU mentioned that the world had changed, and with it the EU's interests, and the pace of globalisation. The EU's common interests have played a major role in creating its new strategy for Africa, as well as security cooperation.

2005 turned out to be an important year for the EU to cement its social, economic, and political relations with Africa, as it followed the October strategy, with another in December. Under the banner "year of Africa", the European Council adopting a strategic plan in Brussels entitled "*the EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership."* Importantly, this strategy outlined the official frameworks of the EU's security policy towards Africa. Nonetheless, it was a short-term strategy, timetabled from 2005 and 2015, with attention paid to reinforcing ties with African regional and sub-regional organisations, in particular with the AU. It also asserted that consolidating relations with the African regional and sub-regional organisations would play the greatest role in reinforcing the Africa-EU SSP. This supports hypothesis 3.

With regard to the EU's policy towards East Africa, the EU has a strong historical and economic relationship with the countries in East Africa, especially with its geo-strategic location in Africa and in the world. According to the Commission of the European Communities (2006:5):

> … a prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region is in the interests of the countries and peoples of both the Horn of Africa and the EU. However, an uncontrolled, politically neglected, economically marginalised and environmentally damaged Horn has the potential to undermine the region's and the EU's broad stability and development policy objectives and to pose a threat to European Union security.

Thus, the EU adopted a regional strategy towards East Africa in Brussels in 2006, entitled "*Strategy for Africa: an EU regional political partnership for peace, security and*

development in the Horn of Africa." Even though making a security policy for East Africa is a challenging task for the EU, for complex reasons that include conflicts and wars in the region, it has been necessary. Consequently, it has developed a special political relationship with the sub-regional organisation in East Africa, which is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Conflicts and wars damage the EU's economic interests in East Africa. Liberal approach contends that international cooperation between the different actors is necessary to prevent conflicts or wars and strengthen political and economic development. However, the realist view rejects the assumptions of the liberal theory, and agrees that the global actors only concentrate on their own economic interests and security. The realist scholars believe that "the realist theory of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power" (Morgenthau, 1967:5). Conflict of interests in East Africa has weakened the development of an SSP between African organisations and the EU. Also, cooperation between the EU and the IGAD is not working effectively for complex reasons. Accordingly, realism has been playing a predominant role in the EU's security polices towards East Africa and the conflict of interests has weakened the development of the Africa-EU SSP in East Africa. While a strong SSP in East Africa can increase the EU's economic and political interests, a failed SSP can lead to the emergence of new threats and challenges for the EU's economic and political interests.

The EU's relations with South Africa are also of great importance for the improvement of security policy towards Africa. South Africa has an influential role at regional and international levels in sustaining international peace, security, and stability and has played significant roles in the establishment of the AU and NEPAD. A non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during the period 2007-2008, it again became a candidate for the non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council between 2011 and 2012. Meanwhile, it is a member of the group of the G20, is the largest trading partner in Africa and one of the most important trading partners for the EU in the world. According to liberal thought this will increase peace and security. Both the EU and South Africa have developed a common security perception, including countering international terrorism, stemming the proliferation of WMD, fighting organised crime, and taking measures to reduce drugs and human trafficking. Though the EU's main relations with South Africa are based on economic cooperation, in particular through the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement

(TDCA) signed in 1994 and effective in 2004, cooperation between the EU and South Africa in the fields of peace and security has increased in recent years.

The EU member states changed their security policies towards South Africa in line with their changing economic and global interests after the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, since when the EU has increased political dialogue with South Africa and opened the way for a strategic partnership. On the 17th of October 2006, the Council of the EU adopted the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, underscoring the main objective as being to promote liberty, peace, security and stability in Africa and in the world (Council of the European Union, 2007a:2). The process of the EU-South Africa strategic partnership is a significant asset for the development of the EU's security policy towards Africa, and has significantly consolidated the Africa-EU SSP.

The most remarkable step for establishing strategic partnership in the fields of peace and security was the second Africa-EU Summit, held in Lisbon, Portugal in December 2007. Although this historic summit was supposed to have been held in 2003, there was a delay due to the emergence of a deep political crisis between the European leaders regarding the invitation of Zimbabwe's president Mugabe. After the Cairo Summit in 2000, the African and European leaders decided that the Africa-EU Summits would be organised every three years. Seen as playing a role in reinforcing social, economic, and political relations between the two continents, they have helped the EU develop new policies and strategies towards Africa in a changing world. The *Lisbon Declaration* and the *Joint EU-Africa Strategy and Action Plan* were adopted by the Heads of State and Government of Africa and the EU at the second Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon. Disagreement between the EU members concerning the invitation of Zimbabwe's president Mugabe to the next summit led to a postponement of the second Africa-EU Summit, proving that discrepancy among the EU members weakens the development of the Africa-EU strategic partnership on peace and security. This provides evidence for hypothesis 2.

The new Africa-EU Strategic Partnership consists of four main areas, which are (a) peace and security; (b) governance and human rights; (c) trade and regional integration, and (d) key development issues (Council of the European Union, 2007b:5). Setting up the partnership has been the priority among the other partnerships at the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan. Both sets of leaders at the second Summit agreed that sustaining peace and security were essential for good governance, development of human rights, trade, and regional and global integration.

Security cooperation between the two continents was institutionalised with the second Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007 and strategic concepts were born, including civil society, African ownership, mutual responsibility and accountability, mutual confidence, equality, justice, human security, non-discrimination, and solidarity. Both sides claimed that the new strategic concepts would play key roles, in particular in the fields of security. However, the new values or concepts that emerged at the second Africa-EU Summit in 2007 were not effective politically in making a difference to Africa's peace and security.

In particular, the joint Africa-EU Strategy underscored the common security challenges facing Africa and the EU, and the concept of interdependence. The core of the EU's security policy towards Africa lay in the global security threats and challenges, rather than Africa's structural problems. According to liberal perspective, collaboration between the actors is essential to fight the new threats and challenges effectively and increase economic interdependence among the actors. At the second Africa-EU Summit, 2007, the African and the EU leaders particularly paid more attention to the common security challenges and the significance of economic interdependence. The joint Africa-EU Strategy underlines that:

> While today's global environment has opened up new opportunities to enhance international peace and security, it has also come with new security challenges, which in a world of increasing interdependence and close links between the internal and external aspects of security, only can be addressed through concerted international action, including in a UN context. Issues relating to transnational organised crime, international terrorism, mercenary activities, and human and drugs trafficking, as well as the illicit trade in natural resources, which are a major factor in triggering and spreading conflicts and undermining state structures, are of particular concern (Council of the European Union, 2007b:7).

The third Africa-EU Summit was held in Tripoli, Libya in November, 2010, the aim of which was to strengthen strategic partnership between the two continents, however it did not bring a new approach regarding the EU's new security policy towards Africa. Historic summits between Africa and the EU should be held in stable and democratic African countries rather than unstable and undemocratic countries. Undemocratic regimes in Africa would not contribute to the development of a fair and genuine strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. Rather, they can only focus on their own political interests instead of African peoples' interests while holding international summits between the two continents.

Libya has been one of the most substantial members of OPEC since 1962, producing around 1.7 million barrels of oil per day[15], which account for 3.9 percent of OPEC members' output. Europe receives more than 85 percent of Libya's oil, with Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the UK among the main importers.[16] In 2009, Libya was the primary African country exporting to the EU.[17] The Africa-EU summits play an important role in evolving the notion of security cooperation. The EU has actively involved in peace and security in Africa since 2003. The 9/11 attacks on the USA and the ESS adopted by the European Council in 2003 had a significant impact on the development of the EU's foreign and security policy towards Africa. According to the ESS, the EU should create new strategic partnerships with African states and organisations so as to spread its norms and values and play a more dynamic role in keeping peace and security. This is because conflicts, wars, terrorism, state failure and organised crime damage the EU's economic interests in Africa, directly or indirectly. The EU has deployed 10 peacekeeping operations in the different parts of Africa since 2003, as shown inTable 4.

[15] See, the Monthly Oil Market Report of Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, January 2011, pg, 39.
[16] See, Facts on Libya: oil and gas published by International Energy Agency (IEA), 21 February 2011, p. 1.
[17] See, the report published by the EU, EU-Africa Summit Revival of EU 27 trade in goods with Africa in the first nine months of 2010, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010, p. 4.

Table 4: The EU civilian and military operations in Africa

Operation	Country	Year	Cost
EU military mission (Operation Artemis)	DRC	2003	€7 million
EU Support to the AU Mission (AMIS II)	Sudan\Darfur	2005-2006	€300 million
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa)	DRC	2005-2007	€4.3 million
EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform (EUSEC RD Congo)	DRC	2005-present	€1.6 million
EU military operation European Union Force) (EUFOR RD Congo)	DRC	2006	€23 million
EU military operation (EU NAVFOR Atlanta)	Somalia	2008-present	€8.3 million
EU Security Sector Reform Mission (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)	Guinea-Bissau	2008-2010	€5.6 million
EU Military Bridging Operation (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)	Chad and the CAR	2008-2009	€299 million
EU Police Mission (EUPOL RD CONGO)	DRC	2007-present	€5 million
EU military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)	Somalia	2010-present	€7 million

Siradag, 2009:129-130.

The EU allocated €300 million for the AU missions in Sudan in 2005 and 2006. Even though the EU did not authorise a peacekeeping operation in Sudan, its financial and political support played a critical role in strengthening the AU peacekeeping operation in Sudan. The EU's largest peacekeeping operation in Africa has been deployed in Chad and the CAR in 2008 and 2009 (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), for which it earmarked €299 million. Importantly, the EU deployed its own peacekeeping operation for the firtst time in Africa named "EU military mission (Operation Artemis) in the DRC." The EU Security Sector Reform Mission contributed to sustaining peace and security in Guinea-Bissau in 2008-9. Four of the EU peacekeeping operations are still running on the continent of Africa, two in Somalia, the others in the DRC. This appears to support the claim that the Africa-EU SSP is not only driven by its own economic and material interests, but also by a wish to create and maintain peace and security.

6.3 INTERNAL FACTORS SHAPING THE EU'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Internal factors that form the EU's security policy towards Africa are political, economic and historical.

6.3.1 Political factors

Political developments in Europe have had a significant impact on the advance of the EU's external relations. Since the establishment of its forerunner in 1957, remarkable events in Europe have occurred and played consequential roles in changing its foreign and security policy. One of the most important political moments in its history was the Treaty of European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht in 1993, which created the EU. The CFSP was also created, intended to allow the Union to speak with one voice on international affairs. The most fundamental principles of the Treaty were "to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter", and "to promote international cooperation." The TEU was a strategic step in creating the EU's global policies and increasing its international role.

The European Security Strategy highlighted that "Europe should be ready to share the responsibility for global security and in building a better world". In this context, its common security strategy provided impetus to developing a global vision for the EU, in particular in the fields of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Since 2003, the EU has begun to take more responsibility for Africa, for instance deploying its first peacekeeping operation in the DRC in 2003, without support from NATO. It also amplified its political engagement in African regional and sub-regional organisations. As a result, changing political dynamics in Europe have had a momentous impact on the birth of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.

6.3.2 Economic factors

As discussed in Chapter 5, in more detail, each former European power has different economic interests with African countries, in particular the United Kingdom and France. Since the post-independence era, the EU has continued to pursue its economic interests in Africa through diplomatic means, such as bilateral agreements, conventions and summits. Since the signing of the first Yaoundé Convention in 1963, between the African states and the EC\EU, the EU's economic interests have been the priority in Africa, which is its largest

trading. The 2005 EU Strategy for Africa (2005:2) stated that the EU was still highly dependent on Africa's natural resources, for instance importing 85 percent of its vegetables, fruits, and cotton from the continent, making it the largest trading partner for Africa (Commission of the European Communities, 2006:5).

The EU applied great pressure to African countries to sign the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), to create a free trade area (FTA) between the EU and the ACP group of states, during the third Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli in 2010. This was in spite of the structural problems of many African countries remaining unsolved, and was symptomatic of the EU's contradictory policy towards Africa. The EPAs reflected the EU's inclusive economic interests with the African countries, and their pressure to sign them shows that economic relations between Africa and the EU remain critical to the EU's agenda. The notion of economic interdependence is of critical importance in improving the EU's relations with Africa. Liberalism posits that economic interdependence can increase prosperity among the states. However, the question of who gains more from this remains doubtful. Even though a new chapter was opened between Africa and the EU with the first historic Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000, economic relations have been the most substantial item on the EU's agenda. Realism claims that though the global actors cooperate with weak actors, they focus on their own economic interests. As a result, the predictions of realism are applicable to shaping the EU's relations with Africa, in particular economic. Table 5 (below) shows that the EU has increased its trade volume since 2006 with Africa. While the EU's exports to Africa in 2006 were 115,149 million dollars, they increased to 175,120 million dollars in 2008. However, the global economic crisis of 2007 has affected the EU's economic relations with Africa, for example, its exports and imports to Africa dropping in 2009. While the EU's imports to Africa decreased by 33 percent in 2009 its exports also fell by 10 percent.[18]

[18] See the report for the EU's economic relations with Africa published by EUROSTAT, Africa-EU: economic indicators, trade and investment, EUROSTAT Statistics in Focus, 59/2010, p. 1.

Table 5: European Union's overall trade with Africa (2006-2008) (in million dollars)

	Exports			Imports		
	2006	2007	2008	2006	2007	2008
EU (27)	115,149	140,908	175,120	158,828	178,083	231,681
Africa excl. South Africa	90,137	112,822	145,224	135,213	149,378	198,807
Sub-Saharan Africa	62,490	75,444	89,579	67,198	79,074	100,766
Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa	37,478	47,358	59,683	43,583	50,369	67,892
South Africa	25,012	28,086	29,896	23,615	28,705	32,874

Source: Adapted from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009

6.3.3 Historical factors

As mentioned in Chapter 5, in more detail, historical factors play a significant role in developing social, economic, and political relations between different countries or regions. The assumptions of constructivism are meaningful in this regard, holding that historical relations, ideas, images and shared knowledge can play pivotal roles in preserving international peace, security, and stability. However, the main challenge in improving social, economic, and political relations between Africa and the EU is its past. The EU does not have a positive image in Africa due to the brutal colonial history of some of its key members. Therefore, its history in Africa creates a physiological barrier to the development of a wide range of opportunities for both sides, especially the establishment of a genuine strategic partnership. Nor have the EU's economic interests in Africa primarily served the interests of Africa's people.

The EU has begun to play a proactive role in keeping peace and security in Africa since 2000, in particular through the AU, NEPAD and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Internal and external factors have affected the development of the EU's security policy towards Africa. For instance, international terrorism, immigration, organised crime, drug trafficking, conflicts and wars forced the EU members to take on more global responsibilites to fight against these threats and challenges. Particularly, conflicts and wars damage the EU's economic and political interests in conflict areas. Political developments in Europe have also had an impact on it, such as gradual EU integration in foreign affairs and security, which provided energy to strengthen the EU's security policy and to speak with one voice on international issues. It should be underlined that the adoption of the ESS by the European Council in 2003 was also important in presenting an influencial EU's security policy to

international observers. According to the ESS, the EU should strengthen its institutional ties with African organisations in order to keep peace and security and to spread its norms and values. To this end, the EU established the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004 to sustain peace, security, and stability in the conflict zones of Africa, and deployed peacekeeping forces in the DRC, Chad and the Central African Republic. This supports hypotheses 3 and 4. The EU's initiatives were also related to its strong historical ties with Africa, encapsulating the significance of developing social, economic, and political relations between Africa and the EU, and playing an important role in creating the notion of strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security.

6.4 EXTERNAL FACTORS SHAPING THE EU'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

External factors that impinge on the EU's security policy towards Africa consist of the new emerging global actors in Africa; their role; the emergence of a new political climate in Africa; the 9\11 terrorist attacks on the USA; and globalisation.

6.4.1 The new emerging global actors in Africa

The new actors have actively strengthened their economic and political relations with both African governments and African organisations, such as with the AU, NEPAD, and the IGAD. Firstly, Africa is of great strategic importance to China's economic interests, with the latter importing 26 percent of its oil from Africa, with whom its total trade reached $72 billion in 2007, and $100 billion in 2008 (Alden & Alves, 2009:3-4). Though China's total trade with Africa decreased to $91.07 billion in 2009, because of the global economic crisis, it remained Africa's largest trading partner in 2009. In 2010, China's total trade with Africa reached $114.81 billion.[19]

India has also increased its commercial ties with the African states. Whereas India's total trade with Africa was $25 billion in 2006-7, it was almost $45 billion in 2010 (Voll, 2010:7). Brazil's trading relations with Africa have also boomed significantly in recent years, the trade volume reaching $26 billion in 2008. While its imports from Africa increased to 39 percent in 2007-8, its exports only increased to 18 percent in the same period (Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, 2010:1). While Turkey's total trade with Africa was $16 billion in 2008, it reached $30 billion in 2010. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its political and economic relations with Africa since 2005, opening 15 new embassies in 2010, to reach the current total

[19] http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/23/content_1771603_3.htm (Accessed 23 October 2011).

of 27 (Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit, 2008:1-3). Turkey also announced 2005 as a "year of Africa" and set up a strategic partnership with the continent of Africa.

Political instabilities in Turkey influence the development of the country's foreign and security policy towards Africa. For example, even though Turkey adopted its first policy towards Africa in 1998, entitled the "African Opening Action Plan of 1998", the plan could not be implemented successfully because a coalition government, which destabilised economic and political growth in the country, was in power at that time. Since the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power in 2002, it has established new strategic partnerships with African states and organisations to make contributions to international peace and security and to increase economic relations with Africa. It can be said that political stability in Turkey has played a key role in developing economic and political relations with different regions and continents.

The appearance of the new global actors in Africa, especially China, India, Brazil, and Turkey, has had an extensive impact on the global powers' foreign and security policies towards Africa. The new actors' engagement in Africa has particularly impinged on three important areas: (1) political relations between African states and the global actors; (2) economic relations between African states and the global actors; and (3) relations between the African regional organisations and the global actors.

According to realism, the global actors aim to increase their own economic interests and their hegemonic power in the world politics. The roles of the new global actors in Africa have had a great impact on the changing of the EU's security policy. In particular, their increasing economic relations with the African states have affected the EU's traditional foreign policy in Africa substantially. The EU attached more value to the principles of liberalism with the changing political atmosphere on the African continent. In particular, the concept of strategic partnership became more important to the EU's foreign policy in Africa. As a result of the new conjectural structure, the EU has started to reinforce its institutional relations with the African organisations after 2000, including the AU, the ECOWAS, the IGAD, and the SADC.

Hypothesis 5: "The EU aims to protect its material interests against the new emerging global actors in Africa, such as China, India and Brazil and increase its international power in world politics by creating an Africa-EU SSP." The EU seems to have created different strategic partnership models to consolidate its economic, political, and historical relations with the continent of Africa against the continent's new emerging global actors. In this case, strategic partnership in the fields of peace and security was established between the two continents in

2007. This strengthens hypothesis 5. The EU established an SSP not only to increase its global power but also to keep its interests, to create new strategic partners, and to sustain peace and security. Therefore, there are different motivations behind the Africa-EU SSP, albeit economic and political interests have been the most important factors and elements driving it.

6.4.2 The role of the global actors in Africa

The role of the global actors, in particular the USA, Russia and Japan, has affected political and economic developments in Africa and in the world. These three countries have strong historical, economic, and political relations with the countries of Africa, therefore, they play a vigorous role in reinforcing the African regional organisations and security fields. For example, the USA established "the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM or AFRICOM)" in October 2007, with the aim of strengthening security cooperation between itself and Africa, and to address together the new challenges and opportunities (Ploch, 2010:16). Most importantly, the USA imports 22 percent of its oil from Africa, and it has been estimated to reach up to 26 percent by 2015 (Cargill, 2010:20). According to a report published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), conflicts and wars have threatened global security and US strategic interests, therefore it should play an active role in keeping peace, security, and stability in the conflict areas.

Likewise, Russia has recently consolidated its political and economic relations with Africa. In June 2009, the Russian president, Dimity Medvedev, made an historic visit to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia, and Angola, during which political and economic relations were strengthened. Particularly, Russia's high technological power plays a significant role in relations with the African countries, in, for example, an important agreement with the Angolan National System of Satellite Communications and Broadcasting (ANGOSAT). The most important Russian companies operating in Africa are *Gazprom, Lukoil, Rusal, Sintez, Alrosa, Renkova, Rosatom*. In addition, Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, plays a pivotal role in the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Japan, meanwhile, as a member of the G8 group also has solid ties with Africa, firstly keeping its political relations in order to get their support for a non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Secondly, it hosts the Africa-Japan Forum every five years and has opened new embassies in recent years in Africa, including Botswana and Mali. Thirdly, it is greatly dependent on outside raw materials, including oil, gas, and metals, of which it sees Africa as a significant source (Cargill, 29:2010). The creation of the SSP not only consolidated the EU's

institutional relations with the African organisations, but it is likely also to have enhanced its global power amongst the global actors.

6.4.3 The emergence of a new political climate in Africa

According to structural realism, self-help and lack of international government cause conflicts and wars, therefore each state needs to arm and strengthen its military power in such a chaotic atmosphere. As noted above, with the end of the Cold War, the bipolar international system collapsed, to be replaced by a multipolar global system. In particular, the significance of multilateral diplomacy in world politics increased. After the Cold War, the principles of liberalism became fashionable not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, including Africa. Many African countries changed their political systems and transformed to democracy from their authoritarian regimes. Hypothesis 4: "The EU aims to spread its norms and values in Africa through the SSP." It can be said that one of the aims of the Africa-EU SSP is to enhance universal norms and values in Africa, because the lack of good governance and democracy threatens political and economic stability and the EU's interests in Africa. This supports hypothesis 4.

Since 1990, integration movements have increased among the African nations, and more importantly, democratic movements have spread over the continent. After 2000, many African states were transformed from an authoritarian system to a multiparty system. In addition, the concepts of democracy, human rights, rule of law, civil society, and transparency have become popular in recent years in Africa. Significantly, the appearance of the new regional organisations in Africa, such as the AU and NEPAD, has brought hope to Africa that it can resolve its structural problems. The significance of the concept of ownership, solidarity, and regional integration has also increased under the new regional organisations in Africa. With the birth of the AU and NEPAD, the African leaders have begun to play more dynamic roles in resolving their common threats and challenges and creating new opportunities. For instance, the AU deployed peacekeeping operations in Burundi 2003, in Sudan 2004, and in Somalia in 2005. Meanwhile, it has also reinforced its political relations with international organisations and global institutions and powers, such as with the UN, the WB, the USA and the EU. The new changing political climate in Africa has also influenced the global actors' traditional foreign and security policies towards the continent. The EU has developed its relations with the AU and the RECs, and the new political developments on the continent of Africa have had a remarkable impact on the emergence of the Africa-EU SSP.

6.4.4 The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States

Countering international terrorism has been one of the most important matters for the international organisations and states since 2000. In particular, the 9\11 attacks on the USA provided Bush and his corporate interests with an opportunity to heighten and capitalise on increased security concerns in the world. The terrorist attack was a significant moment for world history, changing some traditional security approaches of the global powers. New dimensions of the concept of security have appeared and international organisations have become vital to remove the roots of international terrorism. While poverty, injustice, inequality, and discrimination have incited terrorism, so the concept of security has come to include economic, social, political, environmental, diplomatic, psychological, and military dimensions.

On the 11th of March 2004, international terrorists attacked Madrid, Spain, then on the 7th of July 2005, London was bombed. The UN Security Council (2001:3) highlighted that without international cooperation, international terrorism could not be removed. At the same time, international organisations and global powers, including the UN, the EU, the AU, Japan, Canada and the USA, paid more attention to conflicts and wars in Africa. They reported that these had created many security challenges and threats for world security, such as international terrorism, drug and human being trafficking, political, economic instabilities, immigration and poverty. These threats and challenges threaten not only Africa's security but also international security.

One of the most important reasons behind the birth of the Africa-EU SSP appears to be fighting against international terrorism and the removal of its root causes. International terrorism is one of the most substantial complex global challenges of the new millennium, both unpredictable and incapable of being defeated by one country alone. Therefore, international cooperation appears to be necessary for international organisations and states wishing to combat it. In particular, working with weak states and organisations has become crucial, also because undeveloped countries have potential to create many security problems for themselves and for the world. Hypothesis 1 is "mutual interests lead to the emergence of security cooperation between Africa and the EU." The 9/11 attacks on the USA paved the way for the establishment of the Africa-EU SSP. International terrorism damages economic and political development of both African states and EU members. The idea of combating international terrorism played a significant role in the emerging SSP with Africa, thus confirming hypothesis 1. Meanwhile, hypothesis 6 states: "Power imbalance makes

cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the SSP." New threats and challenges of the twenty-first century, such as international terrorism, necessitated an SSP between African organisations and the EU, despite a power imbalance between the two actors. This provides evidence against hypothesis 6.

6.4.5 Globalisation

While globalisation provides many opportunities, such as social, economic and technological advances among states, it also creates many threats and challenges for the world. According to Karacasulu (2006:2), globalisation is an "integration of economic, social, and cultural relations across borders", while for Keohane and Nye (2000:105) it is a "type of interdependence." A recent example of the substantial new challenges facing the globalised world was the global economic crisis of 2007. Even though it started in the USA, it affected the entire world in a short time, and has had a profound economic impact on the world economic system, especially in Europe. For instance, Greece, Spain, the UK, Italy, and Portugal were among the European countries most affected by the global economic crisis of 2007, which, combined with indiscipline in their economic systems, contributed to serious recession in some. Hypothesis 9 in this study is "globalisation has induced incentives for EU-Africa cooperation / the SSP." The emergence of security cooperation between Africa and the EU is a crucial strategy in fighting the new global threats and challenges, and creating new opportunities for cooperation between the two continents. This strengthens hypothesis 9. It should be underlined that social, economic, political and technological developments affect the states easily and quickly in a globalised world.

6.5 EVALUATION

Realist thought stresses that creating a genuine international cooperation is difficult because global actors tend to increase their strategic importance while cooperating with weak actors in world politics. Global actors also focus on their own security concerns and economic interests. According to liberal views, actors can benefit equally from international cooperation. However, realism claims that actors do not benefit equally from a strategic partnership because global actors uses weak ones for the sake of their own economic and political interests. In this study, hypothesis 5 is "the EU aims to protect its material interests against the new emerging global actors in Africa, such as China, India and Brazil and increase its international power in world politics by creating an Africa-EU SSP." This is partially confirmed by evidence presented above.

China is the fastest growing economy in the world, and has been making deep inroads into African markets, as well as reinforcing economic and political engagement in African countries and organisations. Other actors have also strengthened their political and economic relations with Africa, as this chapter explored. This can be a jeopardy for the interests of the EU on the continent of Africa, with its deep historical and economic ties. Africa is a key trading partner for the EU. There are internal and external factors that influence the EU's security policy. As an external factor, new global challenges damage the interests of the EU in Africa, but strengthen the notion of international cooperation. The Africa-EU strategic partnership on security matters can also be seen as a strategy to make clearer the threats facing the EU. It is a strategic investment for the future of the EU, and a project for predicting the future prospects, threats, and opportunities. The current strategic position of the EU may lead to the emergence of the establishment of security cooperation between Africa and the EU, but a strong political will is necessary for creating a strong strategic partnership between the two.

As an important global actor, the EU has also deployed 10 peacekeeping operations in Africa since 2003, four of which are still operating in Africa. Especially, the EU peacekeeping operations on the African continent demonstrated that the EU remains an important strategic actor, despite the new emerging global actors in Africa. At the same time, conflicts, wars, political and economic instability can weaken economic interests. In addition, international cooperation is necessary for combating international terrorism, immigration issues and climate change. Hypothesis 1 is "mutual interests lead to the emergence of security cooperation between Africa and the EU." Fighting against international terrorism, immigration problems, and drug trafficking has become the most important security concern for the EU members in recent years. This chapter argues that the EU has also attempted to create a strategic partnership with Africa in the fields of peace and security because, without cooperation with weak actors, it is impossible to remove new global threats. In this sense, hypothesis 1 is largely confirmed.

This chapter discussed four important factors influencing the creation of Africa-EU SSP. The first and the most important is that the EU has significant economic and political relations with Africa, so it develops influential strategies to keep its interests. The second is that the EU aims to tackle unpredictable challenges more effectively. The third is that the EU wishes to play a more active role in maintaining international peace and security. The fourth is that the enlargement of the EU has forced it to increase its global responsibility. Importantly, external

threats, such as international terrorism, immigration issues, conflicts and wars, and political developments in Europe, have shaped the pattern of cooperation between Africa and the EU on peace and security. Security cooperation between the AU and the EU during the Darfur conflict is an example of this pattern of cooperation between the two global actors.

The next chapter will investigate challenges and prospects influencing security in Africa. It will discuss how challenges affecting security in Africa will shape the current SSP between the continents.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS AFFECTING SECURITY IN AFRICA

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter critically analyses internal and external factors influencing security in Africa, the understanding of which is vital for answering the question of how Africa will play a pivotal role in establishing a successful SSP with the EU. Social, economic, and political factors have been affecting peace and security. In particular, internal problems not only weaken socio-economic and political stability, but also undermine the international power of the continent. In this sense, there is link between internal and external developments. Whereas an actor facing internal challenges cannot contribute to world peace and security, another actor that solved its internal problems can play a leading role in the maintenance of international security.

7.2 THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Europe has deep historical relations with Africa, with social, economic and political interests dating back to the 15th century. The colonisation of Africa created a complex relationship between the two continents, the legacy of which has continued to have a profound impact upon Africa's social, economic and political fabrics, in particular security. The systematic colonisation of Africa started with the Berlin conference in 1884-5, in which the UK, France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and Spain emerged as major European colonial powers (Gedlu, 2007:298-302), but which for Africa were "traumatic changes" in its history (Mohammed, 1985:69-73). The importance of this conference was that the European colonial powers together made an official plan to divide Africa and started on a journey to colonise it. The main character of the European colonisation in Africa was based on the exploitation of African national resources and manpower (Gedlu, 2007:302). Horvath (1972:46) depicts colonialism as "a form of domination and exploitation - the control by individuals or groups over the territory and/or behaviour of other individuals or groups."

Colonial states established their own social, economic and political systems to gain social, economic, and political hegemony over Africa. The colonial powers divided Africa without regard for ethnic territories or groups, and created artificial states, boundaries and ethnic divisions to strengthen their self-centred colonial policies (Boahen, 1996:310; Throup,

1995:238). According to Throup[20] (1995:242), the most destructive colonial legacy was the creation of the artificial African states (Rodney, 1995:297-8). Ethnic conflicts remain one of the most dangerous threats for socio-economic and political developments in Africa, with many states affected by them, including Somalia, Sudan, the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. Stopping ethnic divisions and strengthening social, economic and political unity within the states is a prerequisite for building up genuine security cooperation between Africa and the EU.

The colonial powers did not develop the notion of democracy or sustainable democratic institutions in order to increase the interests of African people during the colonial period, and as a result the legacy is one of a complex string of social, economic, and political variations that emerged in the post-independence era (Thomson, 2000:13-14). From a theoretical point of view, neo-liberal institutional theory holds that setting up democratic institutions is indispensable for establishing a strong strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, but while the EU has a strong democratic structure, Africa does not. The neo-liberal institutional view may not be applicable to the SSP between Africa and the EU. Colonialism made Africa's political structure weak and fragile, and the EU's colonial history has thus been the greatest barrier to achieving genuine cooperation in the fields of peace and security with Africa. This supports hypothesis 7, i.e. "the lack of a common African identity and African internal challenges undermine the success of the SSP."

From a different point of view, the apartheid regime is also seen as a different form of colonialism (Moleah, 1993: XI). Appearing in South Africa in 1948, until it ended in 1994, it provided for the minority, the whites, who made up less than 17 percent of the population. Concentrated social, economic, and political power was vested in the white minority, while the majority black population lived in very poor conditions. As Landsberg (2004:19) emphasises, the regime deliberately created deep inequality between white and black, and did little to alleviate poverty, both of which conditions are still felt intensively today. The rate of unemployment in the country is still high and poverty remains the greatest issue. "Xenophobic" attacks threatened social and economic development, in particular in May of 2008, in which 62 people were killed (*Mail & Guardian*, 31 May 2008). The ostensible motives were given as resentment against an influx of black African migrants who were undercutting wages, though this cannot be seen as isolated from the unemployment, poverty

[20] See his detailed article, the *colonial legacy*, in the book of *Conflict in Africa*, 1995, Tauris Academic Studies, pp.237-274.

and inequalities between white and black created during apartheid. The legacy of colonialism in Africa is still fresh, and this includes elements of apartheid.

It is most likely that the impact of colonialism in Africa will continue as long as the European countries preserve their own pragmatic policies, which in turn will undoubtedly undermine the development of the notion of SSP between the continents, but the EU also seems to increase its commitment to create peace and peace. Building peace and security in Africa necessitates social, economic, and political stability. Meanwhile, building security cooperation between Africa and the EU also obliges social, economic and political stability. The challenge for Africa, with its legacy of colonialism, manifests itself in poor security, and negative socio-economic and political development.

7.3 POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Over the last decade, African leaders have taken substantial political steps in sustaining peace and security. For instance, remarkable political and strategic moments for the development of Africa include the creation of the AU and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD); democratic transitions in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe; the birth and the reinforcement of the concept of African ownership; and active multi-dimensional foreign policies of the regional and sub-regional organisations with the international community. However, many challenges continue to threaten the future and security of Africa, including poverty, corruption, infectious epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, conflicts, terrorist attacks, poor infrastructure, high unemployment rates, wide gaps between rich and poor and events in North Africa. Political conditions in Africa are still delicate and directly influence security. Understanding the political dilemma in Africa is indeed challenging because there are many factors that affect development, including leadership, the impact of colonialism and the Cold War era, and the interests of international actors.

Tordoff (2002:40-1) and Falola (2003:XXVIII) point out that the colonial legacy still has a negative impact on political development, in particular the increased interdependence between Africa and Europe. The concept of interdependence in this case refers to unequal relations and gains between the two continents, with benefits to Europe at the expense of Africa. Many African leaders continue to be dependent on their countries' former colonial powers, thus inhibiting the birth and development of independent African-centred policies. Arbitrary states and boundaries created social and economic problems, but most importantly, long-term political challenges for Africa. For example, the colonial system shattered political stability in Somalia, where five different sovereign states emerged, including British Somaliland, Italian

Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopia and Kenya. Likewise, Burkina Faso was divided into 21 ethnic groups during the colonial period and Tanzania was divided to more than 200 ethnic groupings. In particular, the colonial legacy left two destructive inheritances for African politics, the first of which was ethnic and political division, the second irredentism (ibid., p.13), described by Thomson (2000:13) as "the desire to unite under one flag a community that is currently divided." For example, Somalia waged a war with Ethiopia to control the province of Ogaden in the 1970s, resulting in many deaths and political crises that devastated the country (ibid., pp.12-13).

Geo-economic and political interests of the international actors, such as China, India, Brazil, the former European colonial powers, and the USA, have played a significant role in Africa's politics, particularly in the geo-strategic and geo-economic arena during the Cold War. The ideological struggle between nuclear superpowers, the USA and USSR, between 1945 and 1989-91, polarised the world between communism and capitalism, and deepened the political divisions in Africa, which are "still profound and mixed" (Nwauwa, 2003:18), following intra and inter-state wars that devastated the political stability. During the Cold War era, 6.5 million African people died from conflicts and wars, including those between Ethiopia and Somalia, and others in Eritrea, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia and South Africa's destabilising policy towards Mozambique, Angola and, Namibia. The Cold War marginalised Africa's politics and weakened its political institutions (ibid., pp.18-9).

Both the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War aggravated the political stability and security Africa. The dictators in Africa have undermined not only political stability but also socio-economic stability, leaving the people they are supposed to have lead in extreme poverty and suffering. Superpowers developed strategies according to their own economic and political interests, and thus indirectly strengthened the dictatorship system. For example, France supported a dictatorial political system in Gabon; the USA reinforced and supported dictators in Zaire (now the DRC); and the USSR and China supported a dictatorial structure in Ethiopia, Burundi and Angola (Falola, 2003:XXVIII-XXIX). At the same time, arms and drug trafficking increased, further weakening the political stability (Falola, 2003:XXVIII; Nwauwa, 2003:16).

Military coups d'état in Africa are also amongst the greatest obstacles for maintaining political stability and security. It is important to note that domestic and international factors have played a tactical role in emerging military coups in Africa, with 71 between 1952 and 1990. Thomson (2000:123) defines a military coup d'état as a "sudden illegal displacement of

government in which members of the security forces play a prominent role", of which 60 percent of African states have been affected. Even though the period of the Cold War ended in 1990s, important actors within the EU, such as France, the UK, and Italy have pursued their traditional foreign and security policy towards Africa. For instance, they reinforced the ousted Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and sold weapons to him[21]. The dictators and military coups in Africa also prevent the emergence of democratically elected leaders and render security cooperation with the EU more difficult.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, there have been signs of optimism. The former president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki's reference in 1998 in Johannesburg to an "African renaissance" drew a great deal of attention to the leadership problem in Africa, with emphasis on the leadership problem behind the challenges of Africa, such as conflicts, wars and corruption. It was seen as necessary that Africa create its own leaders, who would only work for the interests of African people. The establishment of the AU in 2002 was another historic moment for socio-economic and political development of Africa, as it has strengthened the notion of African ownership as well as leadership. The establishment of the AU called on the continent to unite the divided states and resolve issues under an effective leadership. However, the new developments in North Africa at the beginning of 2011 damaged the signs of optimism and the evolution of SSP between Africa and the EU. Both Egypt and Libya had been the most influential states in the AU, and were giving significant financial assistance to it. This partially confirms hypothesis 7.

[21] See the *Official Journal of the European Union*, twelfth annual report according to article 8 (2) of Council common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (2011/C 9/01), 13.1.2011, C 9/1, pp.160-162.

Figure 5: Current map of Africa

Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/africa.pdf

Ong'ayo (2008:6-7) and Salih (2001:1) regard as problematic whether or not African states will succeed in transforming from a dictatorial political structure to a democratic structure under Western pressure. During the democratic transitions in Africa, violence has erupted and weakened the political stability, including that of Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. It is indeed a challenging task to bring Western democracy into African states without considering indigenous features. This political situation has also undermined the birth and the reinforcement of the concept of SSP. Making true strategic partnership with a powerful actor may require a united political structure, without which it cannot be genuine SSPs stemming

from a fragile political structure can be vulnerable and dependent on the powerful actor. While the powerful actor gains more, the weak one gains less because of complicated political fragmentation.

7.4 SOCIAL CHALLENGES

The social structure of many African states is still vulnerable, with poverty, HIV\AIDS and malaria, unemployment, corruption, illiteracy, refugees, and poor infrastructure seen as the greatest obstacles to sustainable development. This section will examine the social problems in Africa and discuss how they would affect security and the concept of SSP.

Though African states, regional and sub-regional organisations, such as the AU, the SADC, the ECOWAS and the IGAD and the international community, including the EU, the G8, and the UN have made efforts to eradicate poverty in Africa, levels are still higher than on other continents. The majorities of African people live in extreme poverty, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. While the proportion of poverty dramatically falls in the other continents, it remains constant in Africa. For example, the poverty rate has been reduced from 80 percent to 20 percent in East Asia in the last 25 years, but has remained chronic at 50 percent in sub-Saharan Africa over the same period (UN, 2008:1). Since the 1990s, the poverty rate has increased in Africa, with 34 of the 54 states categorised by the UN as the least developed countries (LDCs). More than 250 million African people live on less than $1 a day, which is not enough to cover their basic needs, including clean drinking water, food, health services, housing and clothing. Meanwhile, life expectancy is below 40 and more than two million children die of malnutrition every year (UNECA, 2005:5; 2006:2; WB, 2001:3).

Table 6: Population living on less than 1.25 dollars in a day in the world (1990-2015) (in percent)

Region or country	1990	2005	2015
Sub-Saharan Africa	57.6	50.9	37.1
Middle East and North Africa	4.3	3.6	2.5
East Asia and the Pacific	54.7	16.8	6.8
China	60.2	15.9	6.1
India	51.3	41.6	25.4
South Asia	51.7	40.3	23.8
Latin America and the Caribbean	11.3	8.2	5.0
Europe and Central Asia	2.0	3.7	2.2
Total	41.7	25.2	15.5

Source: World Bank, 2008:47.

According to Table 6, the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 in a day remained high in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2005. When the rate of poverty was 2.0 percent in Europe and Central Asia in 1990, it was 57.6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa in the same year. Even though the rate of poverty was 60.2 percent in China in 1990, it was reduced to 15.9 percent in 2005, expected to be decreased to 6.1 percent until 2015, as the table shows. However, poverty remains the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa and it is not expected to be reduced too much until 2015. In addition, India also reduced the rate of poverty significantly since 1990, to 25.4 percent from 51.3 percent.

Poverty also leads to the emergence of other social problems in Africa, including education and health, unemployment, and corruption. The education infrastructure is very poor, with the majority of children still having no access to schools and teachers having low salaries. In 2001, more than 40 million children in Africa could not enrol at primary schools and in 2002 more than 60 percent of the African population did not know how to read or write. The illiteracy rate is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, compared to the other regions, with the illiteracy rate amongst African girls and women persistently high. The literacy rate was below 40 percent in Benin, Burkina Faso, the Niger, Senegal, and Mali in 2002. West African states have also been facing education problems since 1990. More than 65 million West African people remain illiterate, 40 percent of whom are women and girls (UNESCO, 2005:1-2). Even though education is one of the most important fundamental rights for people, African people cannot receive education. Thus, the majority of the African population cannot play dynamic roles in developing their own societies or contribute to the development of strategic partnership with the EU. While many NGOs and think tanks in European countries contribute to this partnership, few contribute to it, a situation that weakens the Africa-EU SSP. This partially confirms hypothesis 7, which is "the lack of a common African identity and African internal challenges undermine the success of security cooperation between Africa and the EU."

Furthermore, the health parastatals in Africa have been deteriorating with infectious pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, measles, tuberculosis, and diarrhoea killing many African civilians each year. Globally, an estimated 33.3 million people currently carry the HIV/AIDS pandemic, one of the most destructive conditions in history. An estimated 22.5 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa carry the condition, of whom 1.3 million died between 2001 and 2009. Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland are among the countries with the highest rates of HIV/AIDS, which slows down population growth and

reduces life expectancy, with women and girls the most affected groups (UNAIDS, 2010: 7; 20).

Armed conflicts have also devastated the health infrastructure in many African states. For instance, 45 percent of Ethiopians do not have access to health services due to the armed conflicts, poor management, and poverty (Ojukutu-Macauley, 2003:108-9; 120-9). The unemployment rate in Africa is also among the highest in the world, with 56 percent of sub-Saharan Africans unable to afford to support their families. Despite the high mortality rate, the population in Africa is expected to rise from 793 million in 2001 to 1.37 billion in 2025, with governments unable to create jobs for so many people. This situation aggravates the unemployment rate as well as social development in Africa (UNECA, 2005:57-8).

The conflicts and wars in post-independence Africa have also increased the refugee problem, which is one of the most essential social challenges to social development on the continent. According to a report published by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2010:7; 21-2), there are more than 2 million refugees in Africa, the second largest number in the global total of 8.8 million. Furthermore, of the 15.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world, 6.4 million are in Africa, also the largest number of any continent. During the armed conflict in the DRC in 2009, some 2.1 million people were displaced, with more than 144,000 having to flee the country. Likewise, 132,000 civilians had to flee their country in Somalia in 2009 due to the armed conflicts (ibid., pp.6-8). Refugees are usually in poor living conditions, with health, education and food problems chief among others. Women and girls are again the worst affected groups (UNHCR & World Food Programme, 2003:1-2).

The notion of civil society is crucial for social, economic, and political developments. Civil society organisations in a country, such as NGOs, the media, think tanks, and academia, provide alternative solutions to social, economic, and political problems. Moreover, civil society contributes to the development of the notions of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, and it promotes accountability and transparency in a country. However, the concept of civil society varies from state to state or from continent to continent. Internal factors, both economic and political, play major roles in reinforcing the concept of civil society, but the notion of civil society in Africa is different from that in Europe, where it plays critical roles in developing social, economic and political institutions. Political and economic problems, as well as ethnic divisions, weaken the concept of civil society in Africa.

Civil society institutions in a country also make a critical contribution to peace and security, however many African governments tend to control civil society institutions. Therefore, these

cannot work effectively for Africa's social, economic, and political developments. Even though the African regional and sub-regional organisations, including the AU, the ECOWAS, the SADC and the IGAD, have been actively playing important roles in developing the notion of civil society in recent years, they do not have effective capacities to resolve Africa's problems (UNESCO, 2009:31-3). Edwards (2009:5) writes that if there were strong civil society institutions in Kenya, conflicts would not have taken place during the 2008 election period. The lack of strong civil society in Africa also undermines the development of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.

Maintaining peace and security necessitates social stability, but social problems, such as education, health, poverty, refugees and the lack of social society, lead to the emergence of security problems. The challenge is how a continent such as Africa, that faces social problems, will contribute to world peace and security and become a strong and equal partner or continent in establishing a fair and genuine SSP with the EU.

7.5 ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Economic developments play key roles in sustaining peace and security, which is difficult without economic stability. Internal and external determinants of Africa, including poverty, political crises, conflicts and wars, the international actors' economic interests, high unemployment rates, and poor infrastructures have been affecting economic growth and developments. Although the Regional Economic Communities of Africa (RECs), such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), have been playing noteworthy roles in developing economic cooperation throughout the African states over the last decade, economic developments remain very slow.

According to a report published by the UNECA (2006a:2), 34 of the 54 African states are viewed as LDCs, while another economic report published by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (2006b:31) notes that achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa is indeed a difficult task, due to its complex economic and political structures. In 2005, only ten African countries saw higher than seven percent of economic growth, namely Angola (19.1%), Burkina Faso (7.5%), the Republic of the Congo (7.7%), Equatorial Guinea (9.3%), Ethiopia (8.9%), Liberia (8%), Libya (8.5%), Mozambique (7.5%), Sierra Leone (7.3%), and Sudan (8%) (ibid., p.31). According to the 2010 MDGs Report, poverty and unemployment

rates have been very high in Africa, therefore the continent's fragile economic structure continues to threaten political and economic stability in many countries and in turn, may make the future of security cooperation between Africa and the EU more difficult. Table 7 (below) shows real GDP growth in Africa between 2005 and 2010.

Table 7: Real GDP growth in Africa (in percent)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Africa	5.9	5.9	6.0	4.9	1.6	4.3
Central Africa	5.0	2.6	5.6	4.5	0.9	3.8
East Africa	7.4	6.8	7.5	6.4	3.9	5.3
North Africa	6.0	5.9	5.3	4.7	3.5	4.1
Southern Africa	6.0	6.6	6.7	4.6	-1.6	4.1
West Africa	5.1	5.3	5.9	5.3	2.4	4.7

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and African Union, 2010:135.

As the table shows, real GDP growth has been slow in Africa since 2005. While GDP growth was 6.0 percent in Southern Africa in 2005, it decreased to 4.1 percent in 2010. East Africa saw 7.5 percent of real GDP growth in 2007. While GDP growth was 6.0 percent in Southern Africa in 2005, there was recession with -1.6 percent in 2009, but economic growth of 4.1 percent again in 2010. Since 2007, real GDP growth in Africa has decreased. The global economic crisis of 2007 also affected economic growth in Africa, with it slowing down signficantly but 2010 shows an increasing trend again in terms of growth.

While many African leaders enthusiastically emphasise that enhancing transparency and accountability and creating good governance are preconditions for economic development, economic growth in Africa is still lagging behind other continents. For instance, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in East Asia has increased 800 percent since the 1960s, but has not changed substantially in Sub-Saharan Africa in that time. Economic stagnation has also exacerbated levels of poverty. With Africa accommodating 10 percent of the global population, it also contains 30 percent of the poor. Since the 1980s, the number of Africans in poverty has increased, and is estimated to reach 400 million by 2015. Economic problems also deepen inequalities between rich and poor (Madavo, 2005:1-2), causing the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, to describe Africa as a "champion of the negative indicators" in the world.

Though the continent is rich in terms of natural and human reserves, it has been regarded as the poorest in the world. Hence, the notion of political stability and economic stability is

farfetched in the African context and the relationship between the two has to be based on parity, and without the former the latter would not take place. It has been said that one of the greatest problems concerning economic development in Africa is the absence of effective political institutions. Meanwhile, corruption, nepotism, rent-seeking, and other opportunistic unethical attitudes are the barriers of economic development. Conflicts and wars have also destabilised economies, as well as some 139 military coups in Africa since the independence era (Fosu, 2007:211).

Economic crises and huge external debt burdens have debilitated economic development of African states. External debts of Africa have relatively increased, rising from $158 billion in 1985 to $230 billion in 1989 (Dibua, 2003:509), $286 billion in 2008, and $300 billion in 2009 (UNECA and AU, 2010:101). The 2007 global economic crisis also hit Africa, causing economic growth of Africa to decrease from six percent in 2007 to 4.9 percent in 2008, and 1,6 percent in 2009. At the same time, the 2007 global economic crisis has affected a wide range of business sectors, such as textiles, tourism, mining, and the manufacturing sector. Also, many people lost their jobs in this period as economic crises and the external debt burdens in Africa led to an increase in unemployment, poverty, inflation and other chronic problems (ADB and ADF, 2009:4-14).

International financial institutions (IFIs), such as the IMF and the WB, as well as industrialised countries, have been giving loans to African states since the independence era. However, debt policies of the IFIs and industrialised countries have not been an effective way of developing Africa's economy. On the contrary, external debt burdens only increase dependency on West and the IFIs (Dibua, 2003:510). Foreign aid policies only reflect geo-strategic and economic interests of the donor countries (Solimano, 2005:49). More importantly, African countries cannot be represented fairly in the IFIs, hence, the IFIs are not likely to reflect the economic interests of African people precisely. For example, while Western powers' voting rights were 67.5 percent in the IMF in 1984, those of the 43 African states were only 5.2 percent (Dibua, 2003:510). According to Boaduo (2008:94-7) and Dibua (2003:512-5;528), the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have brought no substantial changes but rather have increased Africa's dependency on the capitalist system.

Economic stability is fundamental for preserving peace and security, however many African states are characterised by inefficient economic structures. Moreover, their economic problems have also weakened regional and sub-regional organisations' peacekeeping roles. For example, even though the AU, IGAD, and ECOWAS have played active roles in keeping

peace and security in conflict regions of Africa in recent years, economic constraints of these organisations have undermined their peacekeeping operations. The future of Africa's economy is at great risk from conflicts, corruption, education and health problems. Furthermore, economic instability impacts on foreign policy of countries and international organisations. States and international organisations that do not have economic power cannot play proactive or constructive roles in maintaining international peace, security, and stability. Without economic development, effective security cooperation with the EU is much more challenging. This supports hypothesis 7.

7.6 EVALUATION

The focal point of this chapter was an analysis of the internal and external factors affecting security in Africa, including social, economic and political developments. Whilst a strong actor with well-built internal dynamics can play a more proactive role in creating a strategic partnership and benefit from it, the weak actor that suffers from its internal problems plays a less proactive role and is likely to benefit less. This chapter predicts that if Africa cannot resolve its internal problems it will have to play a passive role, not only in this SSP but also in the new strategic partnerships with different actors in the future. Internal problems of Africa are indeed complex, in particular with the legacy of colonialism still affecting the continent's social, economic, and political life but combined with structural problems. This chapter found that Africa faces profound social, economic and political problems, and its internal challenges damage the development of the Africa-EU SSP. This strengthens hypothesis 7.

The argument presented in this chapter advocates Africa's re-investment in improving peoples' life standards by mobilising its own energy. In so doing, the leadership plays a strategic role in making a difference in internal dynamics. Over the last decade, historical changes have occurred, including the creation of the AU and NEPAD, as the notion of African ownership has grown as democratic movements struggled to emerge. More importantly, proactive roles of the AU in sustaining peace, security and stability in conflict areas promise to bring fundamental political change to the continent. This chapter also found that the EU's colonial relations with Africa necessitate cooperation in the fields of peace and security, however, its violent history inhibits the emergence of true cooperation between the two continents. Africa's structural problems make the African organisations dependent and weak actors in world politics. This chapter also found that African organisations cannot play an influential role in shaping the Africa-EU SSP.

According to realism, while strong actors benefit more from international cooperation, weak ones benefit less. Weak actors face many challenges, including social, economic and political, so they do not have enough power to benefit equally from a strategic partnership. However, weak actors need to cooperate with global ones because if they do not cooperate with global actors they feel unsecure. Hypothesis 6 is "power imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the SSP." This chapter explored social, economic and political challenges affecting security in Africa, which make the Africa-EU SSP difficult. While the EU plays a more active role in developing the Africa-EU SSP by using its economic power, Africa plays a less active role due to the mentioned challenges.

The next chapter elaborates upon African regional and sub-regional organisations' security strategies, in particular those of the AU, the IGAD, the SADC, and the ECOWAS. It also examines the way in which Africa is attempting to build a strong regional security framework.

CHAPTER EIGHT
AFRICAN REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS' SECURITY POLICIES

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine peace and security policies and strategies of the AU, IGAD, ECOWAS, and SADC. Upholding peace and security has been the first priority for the African organisations following independence. The leaders have recognised that Africa's security can only be maintained by Africans, not outside actors. In doing so, the African leaders have made efforts to create their own peace and security mechanisms through the regional and sub-regional organisations. In particular, the philosophical principle "without peace and security there is no sustainable social and economic development" plays a major role in developing the African organisations' peace and security policies.

The establishment of the AU, NEPAD, and the African sub-regional organisations' efforts to preserve peace and security led to the re-emergence of the concept of African ownership,[22] which now plays a strategic role in developing their peace and security policies. The history of the concept of African ownership goes back to the Pan-Africanist movements[23]. According to Esmenjaud and Franke (2009:3), there are two kinds of "African ownership", one negative the other positive. While the concept of negative African ownership is controlled by external actors and concentrates on the interests of the external actors, the other is controlled by Africans and focuses on the interests of the African people. The concept of African ownership has been evolving since 2000, but has done so with the financial and political support of external actors. Integration movements among the African nations play a significant role in evolving and developing the concept of African ownership. In particular, the emergence of the

[22] Boughton and Mourmouras (2002:3) define ownership as "a willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of policies, by officials in a borrowing country who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the program is achievable and is in the country's own interest."

[23] The notion of regional and sub-regional organisations was institutionalised in Africa during the nineteenth century, based on racial struggle and turning to independent struggle during the twentieth century. The role of the Pan-African Congresses (PACs) had a significant effect on materialising the idea of regional organisations and the notion of African ownership, as the participants emphasised the importance of political and economic cooperation among the African states. The PACs were held on different dates and in various countries, in the USA, France, and England, in 1919, 1921, 1923, 1927, and 1945. The idea of Pan-Africanism particularly was formalised in the fifth meeting of the PAC held in England, in 1945. This movement has played an historical role in the formation of the notion of Pan-Africanism, the notion of regional organisations in Africa as well as the notion of the African ownership (Geiss, 1968:3-8).

new African organisations, including the AU and NEPAD, has had a positive impact on the development of this concept. Creating an independent concept of African ownership is necessary to make African organisations' peace and security policies effective. This chapter will explore the challenges facing the African organisations' peace and security policies, and create a link between them and African-EU SSP.

8.2 THE AU'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Africa's first continental organisation was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established on the 25th of May 1963 by 32 African countries in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU had two essential aims, namely to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states and to eradicate all forms of colonialism from the continent (Article 2 of the OAU Charter). Even though the OAU failed to resolve Africa's social, economic, and political problems, it did play a pivotal role in the decolonisation process of the African states. It did not succeed in preventing conflicts or wars in Africa during its 39 year history, and could not develop an effective security policy towards Africa. However, it contributed to the emergence of the notion of unity and solidarity among the African nations.

Established on the 9th of July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, as a successor to the OAU, the African Union (AU) was intergovernmental and the most important regional organisation on the continent, comprising 53 African states. Only Morocco is not a member, having already withdrawn from the OAU, on the 12th of November 1984, following OAU recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (Western Sahara) as an independent state in February 1982 (Wellens, 1990:48).

The first chair of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, explained the significance of this historical transformation at the 40th Anniversary Celebrations of the OAU in Durban, South Africa on the 25th of May 2003:

> New challenges confront us today, brought about by world-wide phenomena such as globalisation and shaped by our desire to see a prosperous, healthy, stable, unified and peaceful continent, fully living up to its promise and potential. We need to harness and use our meagre resources at hand especially our natural, cultural and human resources. We suffer hardships in our Continent, most notably, poverty and conflict. We need to address these challenges with dedication and commitment, and recognise that these hardships extend beyond the original, political mandate of the OAU. For this reason we have transformed the Organization of African Unity into the African Union in order to deal with the socio-economic development of the continent in tandem with the need to build political stability.

Whereas the OAU objectives were too narrow, the AU objectives were more comprehensive, in particular to: (1) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; (2) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; (3) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; and (4) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance (Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union).

Since 1960, more than 20 civil wars have broken out in Africa, and most African states have been involved in conflicts or wars, with consequent damage to social, economic, and political infrastructures, and an estimated 14 million deaths (Leitenberg, 2006:77-79). While preserving peace and security has been the most fundamental objective of the Constitutive Act of the AU, decolonising the African states became the most ambitious aim of the OAU Charter. During the OAU\AU Summit in Durban in 2002, the African leaders underlined that social, economic and political developments were prerequisites for sustaining peace and security, encapsulated by Mbeki's pronouncement that there can be no sustainable development without peace, without security and without stability.

It was of significance to Africa in terms of the emergence of a new political climate, with three important strategic institutions being founded, namely the AU, NEPAD, and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The idea that social, economic, and political challenges have caused conflicts and wars spread over the continent and became a common view among the African leaders in the new century. In this spirit, NEPAD was built at the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001, as a socio-economic programme of the AU. The fundamental aims of NEPAD were:

> … to eradicate poverty; place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development; halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process; accelerate the empowerment of women; and fully integrate Africa into the global economy (NEPAD Secretariat, 2003:1-9).

The second body, the APRM, was created within NEPAD at the sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of NEPAD in Abuja, Nigeria in 2003, the main aim being to help African governments improve their government system. The members of the AU can voluntarily become members of the APRM, which has 29 members (NEPAD Secretariat, 2003:9). Whereas the new regional organisation of Africa addresses Africa's social, economic, and political problems, it also makes efforts to reinforce its security policy. In doing so, the AU adopted the "*Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and*

Security Council of the African Union" at the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, in Durban, South Africa on the 9th of July 2002. The Protocol came into effect on 26 December 2003, charting a course for the AU's security policy towards Africa, and is the most prominent security strategy for the AU. The creation of the AU, NEPAD and APRM shows that African nations can develop a common African identity and play a more active role in solving their own problems. This provides evidence against hypothesis 7.

The Peace and Security Council of the AU (PSC) was officially established on the 25th of May 2004, and is described in the Protocol as "a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa" (Protocol of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 2). It claims that the AU as a regional power has a primary responsibility for keeping peace, security, and stability in Africa, significantly emphasising that these are preconditions for sustainable social, economic, and political developments. Its three essential principles related to the AU's security policy are, firstly, to increase cooperation with the international and African sub-regional organisations; secondly to strengthen relations with the African states and their security policies; and thirdly, to increase the dignity of the continent at both regional and global levels, by preventing conflicts and wars in Africa (Protocol of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 3).

The Protocol built three important strategic instruments to strengthen the AU's security policy. A "Panel of the Wise" was established as an advisory mechanism to the AU in the fields of conflict prevention, and a "Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)" objective to facilitate, anticipate, and prevent conflicts. However, the third, an "African Standby Force (ASF)," is the most significant security mechanism in the Protocol, created as a peacekeeping force of the AU and composed of civilian and military missions. In addition, developing a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) has been a prominent aim since the establishment of the AU. To achieve this, the AU adopted the Solemn Declaration in February 2004, in Sirte, Libya, a momentous step in creating a CADSP. The Declaration emphasised that building a common defence and security identity was necessary to retain peace, security, and stability in Africa, and is regarded as one of the most noteworthy components of the AU's security policy.

The AU as a new organisation has begun to play a central role in preserving peace and security in the conflict zones of Africa since its creation. It has deployed three major peacekeeping operations since 2002, which are the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the

African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMIB was deployed in April 2003 in a mission that ended in June 2004, the main aims of which were to monitor the Ceasefire Agreement and to reinforce the peace process in Burundi (Siradag, 2009:70). AMIS ran from July 2004 to December 2007, with the main objectives being to monitor and verify the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and maintain peace and security in Darfur (ibid., p.46). AMISOM was mandated in February 2007, and was still running, Its main aims are to sustain peace and security and to improve the humanitarian condition in Somalia (ibid., p.76). The AU also authorised a peacekeeping mission in the Comoros in March 2006 to observe and keep peace and security during the electoral period. The AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) completed its mission in June 2006 (ibid., pp.80-2). Furthermore, the AU has strengthened its relations with international organisations, including the UN, the EU, the WB, the IMF, and the RECs in Africa in the field of security. Even if there are internal challenges, institutionalisation within Africa may help overcome some of them and also facilitate cooperation with other actors, such as the EU. The creation of new security mechanisms, such as the the PSC and CADSP, demonstrated that the African nations can establish their own common security identity and reinforce cooperation with other actors despite internal challenges. AU civilian and military operations in Africa (see Table 8, below) are evidence that institutionalisation efforts in Africa have forced African leaders to take more responsibility in maintaining peace and security. This does not confirm hypothesis 7, which is "the lack of a common African identity and African internal challenges undermine the development of the Africa-EU SSP."

Africa has strengthened its security structure since the last decade and taken independent initiatives for the sake of Africa's peace and security. At the same time, Africa has increased its security cooperation with international actors, in particular with the EU. For instance, security cooperation between Africa and the EU during the Darfur conflict proved that different actors can create a strategic security partnership. This also refutes hypothesis 6, which is "power imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the SSP."

Table 8: AU civilian and military operations in Africa

Operation	Country	Year	Cost
African Union Mission (AMIB)	Burundi	2003-2004	$134 million
African Union Mission (AMIS)	Sudan	2004-2007	$466 million
African Union Mission(AMISOM)	Somalia	2005-2008	$622 million
The African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	2006	$12 million

Source: Siradag, 2009:130.

Though the AU has made some structural reforms and great efforts in a short time to reinforce its security policy, as a young regional organisation it faces serious challenges. Firstly, the lack of political union within the member states of the AU remains the greatest challenge for developing the CADSP of the AU. Each African country traditionally has different economic and political policy, importantly with different colonial relationships with the former colonial powers. The second challenge for the AU's security policy consists of financial and logistical constraints, which are common to AU's peacekeeping operations in Africa. In particular, outside donations and assistance from different international organisations and developed countries have played a critical role in the implications of the AU's security policy. The third challenge is the lack of the AU capacity building. The AU established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which consists of the ASF, the Panel of Wise, and the CEWS. However, the AU lacks an effective leadership, conflict-management and resolution policy and sufficient military and civilian structures. The AU itself also described this challenge as a 'chronic shortage of capacity' at a meeting on the 14th of May 2007. Meanwhile, the AU failed to keep peace and security in North Africa in the beginning of 2011. Although Africa has taken independent initiatives to sustain peace and security in conflict areas, the lack of unity and solidarity among the African nations and Africa's internal challenges weaken the development of a common African security identity and its security cooperation with international actors. This confirms hypothesis 7.

At the Fourth Joint Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Finance of the AU held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2011, the President of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, said that Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa provide 15 percent of the AU's budget each year. Some 77 percent have been provided by the global actors, mainly the EU. Libya was the largest financial supporter of the AU from among its members. Following the start of the Libyan War of 2011, the AU's financial power has weakened seriously. Ping warned that if the AU members would not support the Union, it would not carry out its mission

independently. In this study, hypothesis 8 is "the Africa-EU SSP makes African organisations more dependent on the EU." During the conflict in Sudan, the EU provided significant financial assistance to the AU peacekeeping operation in Sudan (AMIS). Had the EU and other global actors not supported the AMIS, the AU could not have deployed a large peacekeeping mission in Sudan. African organisations' financial and logistical constraints render Africa more dependent on outside actors, which confirms hypothesis 8. Meanwhile, hypothesis 6 is that "power imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the SSP." The EU's financial and political support to African organisations are playing an important role in strengthening an SSP with Africa. This also supports hypothesis 6. Mixed evidence is found for hypothesis 6. While African internal challenges make security cooperation with Africa more difficult, new threats and challenges necessiate cooperation on peace and security between Africa and the EU.

The AU's efforts in peace and security in Africa have contributed to the development of the Africa-EU SSP; however the AU's structural problems have damaged it. Developing an effective common security policy within the member states of the AU is necessary for playing a more active role in this strategic partnership. Without it, this partnership would not work effectively. Furthermore, fair security cooperation between the AU and the EU depends on the AU's political will and capacity. If the AU cannot resolve its structural problems, this partnership cannot reflect the interests of the African people and it would remain unfair. Africa's internal problems also damage the development of an SSP with the EU, which also confirms hypothesis 6.

8.3 THE IGAD'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS EAST AFRICA

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional organisation in East Africa, established on the 21st of March 1996 as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) created in January 1986 by six Eastern African countries. Its head office is located in the city of Djibouti in the Republic of Djibouti, and it currently has seven members, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Uganda. The IGADD's aims were to combat famine, drought, economic issues, and ecological degradation in East Africa (IGAD Charter, 1996:2). Its objectives were widened in 1996 to include social, economic, political developments in East Africa. Since the establishment of the IGAD, creating an effective security policy among the member states has been its primary aim.

The IGAD's main objectives are to retain peace, security, and stability and toaccomplish prosperity and regional integration among the member states. The IGAD's security policy towards East Africa is stated in Article 18A of the IGAD Charter: (1) To act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress; (2) To take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability; (3) To establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and (4) To deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organisations.

The Peace and Security Division is the most important means of the IGAD sustaining peace and security in the region. It consists of Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CPMR), political affairs, and humanitarian affairs. It also organises the programmes of the IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT). One of the greatest challenges IGAD faces is its capacity building, so, the heads of state and governments of the IGAD adopted a protocol in Khartoum, Sudan on the 9th of January 2002, regarding the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the IGAD's Peace and Security Division. In particular, CEWARN aims at reinforcing the IGAD member states' capacity building in the fields of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. It is the key component of the IGAD's Peace and Security Division (Article 5 of the Protocol of the CEWARN).

The AU ASF is divided into five groups to coordinate its peace and security activities effectively in Africa, namely the North Africa Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), Central Africa Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (FOMAC), Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), and ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG). IGAD coordinates the programme of EASBRIG and works closely with the AU in the areas of peace and security (Alghali & Mbaye, 2008:34-5), as well as with the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), which was established with the Nairobi Declaration on the 15th of March 2000. RECSA's main function is to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and East Africa (Nairobi Declaration, 2000:1-3).

Since the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, IGAD has been playing a key role in facilitating and observing the Sudan peace process. Furthermore, it

contributed to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with two peacekeeping battalions from Uganda and Kenya. In Somalia, it has played vital roles in reinforcing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and assisted the TFG to prepare the National Security Stabilisation Plan (NSSP). In addition, it has made efforts to lift the UN arms embargo against the TFG, to make it a more active and more effective political instrument in the country. In January, IGAD was authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, named IGASOM. However, it could not implement it in 2006, but rather the AU Peace and Security Council authorised a peacekeeping mission, AMISOM, in April 2007 (IGAD, 2007:45-6).

A series of internal and external factors have contributed to the deterioration of IGAD's capacity. There is not such strong coordination between the members, because while some are actively engaged in IGAD's programmes and activities, others are not. For instance, Kenya and Uganda have recently developed their relations with the East African Community (EAC), originally established in 1967 and revived in July 2000 (Institute for Security Studies, 2003:19-21). It currently has five members, namely Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. IGAD is also greatly dependent on outside donations and assistance, and regularly organises a Donor's Forum. Since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, the country has not had an effective central government. Likewise, Sudan has faced complicated internal problems for a long time, with border disagreements between Ethiopia and Eritrea continuing. All these political and economic challenges in the region have threatened IGAD's effectiveness and reduced its power.

Healy (2009:15) points out that IGAD does not have an effective security policy towards East Africa, and moreover it still uses traditional political mechanisms to stop the conflicts in the region, which are respect for "the sovereign equality of all Member States and non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States" (Article 6A of IGAD Charter). Importantly, international actors, including the USA, France, Britain, China and Italy have become strongly engaged in political developments in East Africa. International actors' involvement has made East Africa complex and weakened the IGAD's security policy. The making of an effective security policy toward East Africa might be possible with strong political determination of the member states of the IGAD rather than engagement by international organisations or other outside powers.

IGAD, as a regional actor, has critical duties for the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in East Africa, and for reinforcing the Africa-EU SSP. It has strengthened its political

and economic relations with international organisations, such as with the UN and the EU, and so far has taken important responsibilities to facilitate the peace processes in Somalia and Sudan. However, it failed to bring lasting peace and security to the region. IGAD's ineffective security policy contributes neither to security in East Africa nor to the development of strategic partnership in security matters between Africa and the EU. Mixed evidence for hypothesis 7 was found throughout the dissertation. While IGAD also contributes to the development of a common African security, its internal problems weaken the enlargement of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.

8.4 THE ECOWAS'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS WEST AFRICA

The leaders of the fifteen[24] West African countries signed the *Treaty of Lagos* in Nigeria on the 28th of May 1975 to establish the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organisation in West Africa and one of the most prominent pillars of the Regional Economic Communities[25] (RECs) in Africa, with headquarters in the city of Abuja, Nigeria. The notion of a West African Community goes back to the Liberian President William Tubman, who made a proposal to the West African countries to create a community in order to increase economic integration in 1964, which however failed. The establishment of ECOWAS was an historic event in the development of West Africa and the continent as a whole, the main purpose being to achieve economic integration in order to set up an economic union in West Africa (Article 2 of the ECOWAS Treaty). The leaders of the West African countries recognised that without economic integration in the region, political and social improvements would not exist, so, the notion of economic partnership emerged as a precondition in West Africa for raising the living standards of African people.

Article 58 of the *Treaty of ECOWAS* contains strategies and policies regarding peace and security in West Africa: (1) Member states undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region; and (2) in pursuit of these objectives, member states undertake to cooperate with the community in

[24] When ECOWAS was created in 1975, it only had 15 members. Cape Verde became a sixteenth member of the organization in 1976. However, Mauritania left the organization in 2002. The current ECOWAS' members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

[25] It consists of seven sub-regional organisations in Africa, which are Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts.

Economic and political infrastructures in many Western African countries remain fragile. Even though promoting economic integration has been the first priority of the ECOWAS at the first years of its establishment, preserving peace and security in the region has been a more important concern in the long run. ECOWAS's objectives have widened to include social and political developments, according to the new challenges emerging in the sub-region and in Africa. With the outbreak of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the principle of "without peace and security, there is no sustainable social, economic, and political stability" has become more popular in West Africa. Therefore, the ECOWAS leaders have begun to pay more attention to sustaining peace and security in the region since the 1990s, and in so doing have taken serious steps to strengthen the appropriate mechanisms.

A *Protocol*[26] *relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security* was adopted by the ECOWAS members on the 10th of December 1999 in Lome, Togo. It established two important peace and security mechanisms: ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which is a civilian and military force of the organisation, and a Sub-Regional Peace and Security Observation System (ECOWAS Early Warning System). The 1999 Protocol aimed to "strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines among the members" (Article 3, d). ECOWAS also adopted the *ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other related materials* in Abuja, Nigeria on the 26th of June 2006, the main objective of which was "to prevent and combat the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS" (Article 2 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons).

The outbreak of the conflicts and wars in Liberia in 1989, in Sierra Leone in 1991, in Guinea Bissau in 1998 and Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, undermined the ECOWAS's security policy and led to the emergence of the ECOWAS's new and more active conflict prevention strategies. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) adopted on the 1st of January 2008 in

[26] This Protocol replaced *Protocol on Non-Aggression* signed in 1978 and *Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence* signed 1981, both defined the concept of security from a narrow perspective and approached conflicts and wars according to the period of the Cold War. However, the 1999 Protocol was written in accordance with the new millennium. For instance, it deals with conflict prevention, management, and resolution strategies and polices and defines the concept of security from a broader perspective.

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso is the most important strategic plan regarding the ECOWAS's security policy towards West Africa. Essentially, ECOWAS's security paradigm has shifted from "state security" to a "human security"[27] through the ECPF (Section II, 4 of the ECPF). The primary responsibility of the ECPF is to 'strengthen human security[28] in the region' (Section II, 5 of the ECPF).

ECPF particularly encourages strengthening cooperation with African and international organisations, and global actors in the areas of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. It also coordinates the ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG). It is worth noting that the ECPF provides an impetus for the establishment of a consistent and effective security policy towards the sub-region. In addition, it conceptualised the ECOWAS's conflict prevention, management, and resolution strategies and policies. Significantly, it creates a link between security and democracy and good governance. The ECPF stresses that promoting democracy and good governance in West African countries will help to maintain peace, security, and stability in the sub-region (Section VIII, 52 of the ECPF).

ECOWAS deployed peacekeeping operations in Liberia in 1990 and 2003, in Sierra Leone in 1997, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) in 2002, and the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia in 2003 (ECOMIL). Its peacekeeping experiences and strategies in West Africa became a worthy asset for the AU and the RECs. However, ECOWAS has also faced some challenges that damage the evolution of security cooperation between Africa and, for example, the EU. It has failed to implement its strategic plan regarding conflict prevention, management, and resolution. First, the lack of a strong coordination between the members within ECOWAS remains the greatest challenge and weakens its security policy towards the region. Second, nor does ECOWAS pay attention to civil societies, therefore there is still not enough cooperation between ECOWAS and them in the areas of conflict prevention. Third, ECOWAS does not have a strong relationship with external actors in the fields of peace and security. Fourth, ECOWAS still does not have an effective conflict prevention mechanism to predict potential conflicts and wars. Fifth, it lacks capacity building and human capacity. In

[27] It is defined in the ECPF as "the creation of conditions to eliminate pervasive threats to people's and individual rights, livelihoods, safety and life; the protection of human and democratic rights and the promotion of human development to ensure freedom from fear and freedom from want" (Section II,7 of the ECPF).

[28] ECOWAS developed three important systematic methods to guard and strengthen human security in West Africa through the ECPF. The first is "the Responsibility to prevent," which allows for taking actions to prevent intra and inter state conflicts and wars, and to remove the root causes of conflicts. The second is "the Responsibility to react," which allows taking for actions to stop humanitarian disasters. The third one is "the Responsibility to rebuild," which allows for taking action in post-conflict reconstruction, such as rehabilitation, recovery, and reconciliation after conflicts, wars, or natural disasters (Section VII,41 of the ECPF).

particular, when it deploys a peacekeeping operation in a conflict area, its financial and logistical constraints undermine its power. Sixth, the rivalry between Anglophone and Francophone countries in West Africa have continued and diminished ECOWAS's effectiveness in the areas of conflict prevention (Section II, 2-3 of the ECPF). This partially confirms hypothesis 7.

ECOWAS's new security paradigm, which is a transformation from the state security to human security, has brought a new perspective to Africa's peace and security. Its new strategy also underlined that traditional security policies of the African organisations failed to achieve peace and security. Moreover, it underscored that peace and security can only be sustained by Africans, not outside actors. A new security paradigm of ECOWAS emerged as a necessary circumstance to effectively maintain peace and security in West Africa, and appeared as an independent security policy of ECOWAS rather than external pressures. It is difficult to say that ECOWAS can contribute to the development of strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security between Africa and the EU, because of its serious political and financial challenges.

8.5 THE SADC'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA

The history of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) lies in the 1970s. On the 1st of April 1980, the Front Line States (FLS) group[29] organised a conference entitled "the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)" in Lusaka in Zambia and adopted the Lusaka Declaration, which aimed at increasing economic cooperation among the FLS group members in Southern Africa and getting rid of the economic dependence on apartheid South Africa (Bowen, 1990:29-31). The FLS group was dissolved when the black majority of South Africa won the first democratic election in 1994. The fifteen Southern African countries signed the Declaration and Treaty of SADC at the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Windhoek, Namibia, on the 17th of August, 1992. Then, SADCC was transformed into SADC with the Declaration and Treat of SADC in 1992. Currently having 14 members[30] and a head office located in Gaborone, Botswana, it is an inter-governmental

[29] The FLS group was established in 1970 to struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa and to achieve liberation movements in the Southern African region. The FLS' members were Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia. Zimbabwe joined the group in 1980 after it gained its independence from Britain (Bowen, 1990:29-31).

[30] The current members of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADC suspended the membership of Madagascar in 2009 due to the emergence of a military coup in this country.

organisation. Schoeman (2002:6) states that the new transformation from SADCC into SADC emerged as a result of the end of the Cold War and demise of apartheid in South Africa.

The main objectives of SADC are to "achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration" (Chapter 3, Article 5 of the SADC Treaty and Declaration). The most important protocol of the SADC regarding its peace and security policy is *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation* adopted in Blantyre, Malawi, on 14th August, 2001. The Protocol institutionalises SADC's peace and security policies and strategies. Significantly, it established the Organ[31] on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, the main objectives of which are to: (1) protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, interstate conflict and aggression; (2) promote political co-operation among state parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions; (3) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; (4) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of state parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the Organisation of African Unity and United Nations respectively; (5) observe, and encourage state parties to implement UN, AU and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states; and (6) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations (Article 2 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation).

Schoeman (2002:6) points out that whereas SADCC approached the definition of security from only a military perspective, SADC approaches it also from societal, economic, environmental, and psychological perspectives. The 2001 Protocol created two important mechanisms within the Organ, namely to conduct SADC's political and security programmes, which are the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) (Article 3 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation). ISDSC is the most substantial mechanism within the Organ to conduct the SADC's peace and security programmes. In April 2002, SADC reinforced its peace and security institute with the adoption of the *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ*

[31] According to the Protocol (2001:2), "the Organ constitutes an appropriate institutional framework by which Member States could co-ordinate policies and activities in the area of politics, defence and security."

on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO), which provides strategies regarding SADC's peace and security policies and explores the challenges that weaken the SADC peace and security efforts. Besides, SIPO (2002:37) emphasises that structural problems, such as poverty, HIV\AIDS, corruption and crime, weaken the SADC peace and security mechanism and cause social, economic and political instability in the sub-region.

On the 26th of August 2003, SADC signed the *SADC Mutual Pact* in Dar es Salam, Tanzania, which provides strategies to create collective self-defence[32] among the SADC members, and complements the 2001 Protocol of SADC. The Pact stresses that developing the notion of collective self-defence among the members is indispensable to sustain peace, security, and stability in the region (Article 4 of the SADC Mutual Pact). Meanwhile, SADC became a part of the AU Standby Force by establishing the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIC) on the 17th of August 2007, in Lusaka, Zambia. This comprises civilian, military, and police ingredients, but the most significant feature is that it enables deployment of a peacekeeping operation in a conflict area in the region of Southern Africa for the sake of peace, security, and stability (Article 4 of the SADCBRIC). In 1995, SADC set up a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare, Zimbabwe, in order to strengthen its peacekeeping capacity. SADC deployed two peacekeeping operations in 1998 in the DRC and Lesotho. Only small numbers of the SADC members were involved in the peacekeeping operations in both countries. Since 1998, SADC has not authorised any peacekeeping operations. The poor coordination among the members of SADC during the two peacekeeping operations weakened its security policy.

Critics argue that SADC's peace and security policies and strategies are too vague and ambitious, and that SADC makes them without taking into consideration its financial or human capacity (Derblom & Hull, 2009:32). Political issues in Zimbabwe and in the DRC, and the emergence of a military coup in Madagascar in March 2009, damaged regional stability. It is important to underline that SADC prefers to use its soft power to resolve peace and security challenges facing Southern Africa rather than its hard power. SADC called upon the international community to lift the sanctions against Zimbabwe and urged that placing economic sanctions against Zimbabwe would aggravate the political crisis and increase suffering in the country. Schalkwyk (2005:38-9) argues that SADC failed to develop an effective security policy towards Southern Africa. The ideological camps between the

[32] It is described in the SADC Mutual Pact as "the measures undertaken collectively by the State Parties to ensure peace, stability and security in the Region."

members of the SADC and unclear security concepts of the Organ have made SADC peace and security policy ineffective. SADC needs to create a holistic approach regarding its peace and security policy. More importantly, it should focus on the concept of human security rather than that of state security.

SADC, as an important regional actor, plays a strategic role in mitigating political crises in the region and developing the Africa-EU SSP. Especially, its soft power increases the importance of the concept of pro-active diplomacy and active leadership of SADC. Developing the notion of soft power diplomacy through SADC can also be an asset for the progress of security cooperation between Africa and the EU. However, it requires human and logistical capacity.

Even though the African organisations have several structural challenges that weaken strategic partnership among the African countries, they have taken significant steps to create a collective security system for the whole continent. Importantly, the African organisations' efforts have enhanced the notion of strategic partnership. These developments seem to provide support for neoliberal institutional predictions, according to which, cooperation can reinforce political and economic stability and contribute to peace and security. However, the main problem behind the establishment of a collective security framework in Africa is that economic and political relations among the African states are not strong and therefore the concept of economic interdependence cannot play a dynamic role in consolidating the continental security framework. It can be said that the assumptions of the neoliberal institutionalist theory do not really seem to be supported when focusing on African organisations.

8.6 EVALUATION

The AU and the RECs have taken significant steps to sustain peace and security in the conflict areas of Africa. In particular, the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 brought new hope for the whole continent to keep peace, security, and stability. The African organisations' efforts led to the re-birth of the concept of African ownership, and strengthened the principle of African solutions to African problems. However, the concept needs to be strengthened by a strong political will. Increasing inclusive relations between the African states is necessary to raise the standards of the African people and maintain peace and security. Implementing a peace and security policy is a challenging task for the African organisations, because there are many challenges that damage it, such as internal and external factors, including poverty, unemployment, disasters, and mismanagement, the ideological divisions between the states

and the external actors' economic and political interests in Africa. In this case, hypothesis 7 is also supported.

This chapter has argued that the African organisations' weak security policies and strategies cannot contribute to the development of strategic partnership with the EU in the areas of peace and security. Nor can such security policies create independent security concepts or concentrate on the interests of the African people. Whereas the African organisations' effective security policies contribute to the emergence of genuine cooperation with the EU, their weak security policies undermine its development. The establishment of the AU in 2002 consolidated the concept of strategic partnership; however, African organisations' fragile security policies seem not to correspond fully with the predictions of neoliberal institutionalism. Strengthening political, social, and economic relations between the African nations is necessary to create economic interdependence among the African nations.

Constructivism stresses that establishing a common identity among nations can foster cooperation in a wide range activities. Each African state has different interests with different actors, for instance, while Francophone African countries have different economic and political interests, Anglophone African countries also have different ones. Having different foreign and security policy within the framework of African organisations weakens the emergence of strong regional organisations on the continent of Africa. This chapter discovered that the lack of unity and solidariy within the African organisations damages the development of African-EU SSP. This provides some support for hypothesis 7. The next chapter scrutinises security cooperation between Africa and the EU, and explores a series of socio-political, economic and geo-strategic issues behind it.

CHAPTER NINE
THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIP AND ITS CHALLENGES

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Having analysed the African regional and sub-regional organisations, namely the AU, IGAD, ECOWAS, and SADC and their security policies, this chapter investigates strategic partnerships between these African organisations and the EU in the area of peace and security. Understanding the concepts of mutual accountability and mutual responsibility is vital to developing security cooperation between Africa and the EU, the meanings of both of which are very close. The concept of accountability was clarified at the UN Millennium Summit of September 2000 and the Monterrey Conference of March 2002; and the concept of international cooperation between different actors was developed during the Johannesburg, Rome, and Paris Summits of 2002, 2003 and 2005 respectively. According to the UN Millennium Declaration:[33]

> We have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world's people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs.

The Paris Summit of 2005 modified the concept of mutual accountability, since regarded as an aid relationship between donor and recipient countries and the monitoring of reciprocal commitments.[34] With their deep historical, economic, and political relationships, both these concepts have been crucial for the EU in strengthening its security relations with the continent of Africa.

9.2 A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AFRICA-EU SSP

According to Brüne, Betz and Kühne (1994:26), the roots of the EU's current strategic partnership with Africa lie in the colonial period, which started with the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. Europe's association with Africa is based on special economic, cultural and historical ties, but the first cooperative links between the continents began at the start of the twentieth century, and involved "commodity-money relations" (Maslennikov, 1983:13-21). Prior to that, the relationship had been one of colonial subservience. During the colonial

[33] See the original document United Nations Millennium Declaration, (A/55/l.2), 18 September 2000.
[34] See the original document Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, February 28-March 2, 2005.

period, cooperative activities had served the interests of capitalist countries who exploited the natural resources and people of Africa. Even following the end of the slave trade, and the later collapse of colonialism, any cooperation between African and European countries was not primarily aimed at improving the social and economic life of Africa's people. On the contrary, it increased insecurity and the gap between rich and poor between the two continents.

However, it was only with the Treaty of Rome (1957) that there was a discernible shift towards a strategic partnership between Europe and Africa, leading to the establishment of the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). Only following this did the content of strategic partnership between Africa and Europe begin to change significantly from hegemonic relations to institutionalised relations in the post-independence era. Since the establishment of the EC in 1957, a set of strategic conventions and summits have been signed and organised by Africa and the EU, in order to strengthen socio-economic, political, military, historical and technologic relations and to establish a solid strategic partnership between the two continents. Table 9 shows the historical phases which paved the way for the establishment of a strategic partnership between Africa and the EU.

Table 9: Evolution of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU

Year	Event	Aim	No of countries from Europe	No of countries from Africa
1957	The establishment of the European Economic Community	To enable social, economic, and political solidarity among the members of the EEC	6	–
1963	The signing of the first Yaoundé Convention between the EEC and AASM	Trade and financial aid	6	18
1969	The second Yaoundé Convention between the EEC and AASM	Trade and financial aid	6	18
1975	The signing of the Georgetown Agreement between the EEC and ACP countries	To establish ACP group and expedite cooperation between the EEC and ACP countries	9	37
1975	The signing of the first Lomé Convention between the EEC and ACP countries	Trade and aid agreements	9	37

1979	The second Lomé Convention between the EEC and ACP countries	The expansion of trade and aid agreements	9	43
1984	The third Lomé Convention between the EEC and ACP countries	The expansion of trade and aid agreements	10	44
1990	The fourth Lomé Convention between the EEC and ACP countries	The expansion of trade and aid agreements as well as different subjects such as issues of human rights and democracy	12	45
1995	The revision of the fourth Lomé Convention between the EEC and ACP countries	Substantial economic and political changes	15	48
2000	The Cairo summit between the EU and African countries	Addressing social, economic, and political challenges	15	52
2000	The signing of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries	To promote social, economic and political development and security	15	47
2005	The revision of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries	To promote social, economic and political development and security	25	47
2005	The adoption of the EU strategy for Africa	To back Africa's development	25	–
2007	The Lisbon summit between the EU and African countries	To increase relations in a wide range of cooperation	27	53

Source: Own compilation

While the Yaoundé I, II Conventions and Lomé I, II, III Conventions only focused on trade and aid agreements, the Lomé IV Convention had a broader scope, including the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Likewise, the Cotonou Agreement ushered in a set of original innovations and approaches to the notion of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. For example, in 2000 it firstly referred to the concepts of peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution, civil society and good governance, as well as, also for the first time, the term "strategic partnership" itself. It has subsequently become a common term, including 13 usages in the "Joint Africa-Europe Strategy" adopted by the EU and Africa in Lisbon in 2007. Thus, it can be seen that the use of the terms "strategy", "partnership", and "strategic partnership" have gradually increased in usage through

conventions and summits. The AU adopted the "Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU" in 2002, which underlined that strengthening strategic partnership in the fields of peace and security with international organisations was vital for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, as well as in the world. Likewise, the adoption of ESS by the European Council in 2003 was also an important step in increasing an SSP with Africa, as well as with other global actors.

Security cooperation between Africa and the EU includes a comprehensive strategy that relates to political and economic challenges. Even though security cooperation is the most critical field in the strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, it is the most difficult area to accomplish due to security issues being related to complicated economic and political challenges, as well as policies that are a legacy of colonial states in Africa.

9.3 BETWEEN THE AU AND THE EU

Since the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo, in April 2000, security cooperation between the two has increased considerably. The AU's involvement in peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, and Comoros showed that the concept of African ownership has evolved and the principle of African solutions to African problems has been implemented seriously by the Africans themselves. The AU has played a significant role in implementing strategic partnership in the fields of peace and security with the EU since 2000. Importantly, the AU has been the most important regional actor in Africa for the EU to strengthen security relations between the two continents. The EU has consolidated its security cooperation with the AU in four categories: (1) To strengthen the AU peace and security capacity; (2) To support the AU-led peacekeeping operations; (3) To reinforce diplomatic relations with the AU; and (4) To strengthen the AU's capacity building.

Backing up the AU peace and security mechanism and making it a strong regional actor have been a priority of the EU as it seeks to establish a strong SSP with Africa. The EU and the AU became engaged in promoting peace, security, and stability in Burundi when the European Commission allocated €25 million for the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), deployed in 2003. Both actors made an intensive effort to bring together the groups in the country, signing the Arusha Peace Accord (APA) between the Government of Burundi and the National Forces of Liberation on the 7th of September 2006. In addition, the EU and the AU organised a regional summit in Dar-es-Salaam to find a comprehensive solution to the conflict in Burundi in 2002 (Siradag, 2009:72).

The Maputo Summit held by the AU in Mozambique in 2003 was a cornerstone in the developing notion of the AU-EU SSP, as the AU heads of state and governments called upon the EU to establish a common peace and security mechanism in order to effectively keep peace and security in Africa. Following the Summit, the African Peace Facility (APF)[35], as a financial instrument of the EU, was established under the authority of the AU in 2004[36]. The APF had three important aims, the first of which was to strengthen the concept of African ownership and to support peacekeeping operations in Africa through the AU and the sub-regional organisations. The second aim was to cement solidarity among the African nations and increase dialogue between Africa and Europe. The third and most important aim was to maintain economic, social, and political development in Africa (European Commission, 2004:5). This provides support for hypotheses 3 and 4. European integration seems to help reinforce cooperation with Africa, whilst strengthening and disseminating values and actions linked to peace and security.

In 2007, the AU and the EU extended the level of the APF[37] to include conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Since the creation of the APF in 2004, the EU has earmarked €739.8 million[38] to the APF through the European Development Fund (EDF), one of the main objectives of which was to reinforce capacity building of the AU and RECs. The EU has played a critical role in reinforcing the APSA through the APF, which allocated €100 million to strengthen it.[39]

In addition, the APF contributed to developing the doctrine of the ASF and planning its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for AU peacekeeping operation deployments. The creation of the APF under the authority of the AU in 2004 reinforced the AU's strategic role in the fields of peace and security in Africa. The EU allocated €15 million to the AU and its RECs for the Early Response Mechanism (ERM)[40], which aimed to make strategic plans for Peace Support Operations (PSO). On the 29th of February 2008, the Council of the European

[35] The APF is created in accordance with the Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement signed between the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries) and the EU in 2000.
[36] See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union, assembly/AU/dec.21 (II), 10-12 July 2003, Maputo.
[37] See Annual report, the African Peace Facility, 2009, Brussels, European Commission.
[38] The EU distributed €250 million in 2004, €50 million in 2006, €139.2 million in 2007, and €300.6 million in 2008 for the African Peace Facility, see annual report, the African Peace Facility, 2009, Brussels, European Commission, pp.12-13.
[39] The EU earmarked €100 million for the APSA through the ninth EDF between 2000 and 2007 and tenth EDF between 2008 and 2013, see annual report, the African Peace Facility, 2009, Brussels, European Commission, p.14.
[40] The EU allocated €100 million for the ERM through the tenth EDF between 2008 and 2011, see annual report, the African Peace Facility, 2009, Brussels, European Commission, p.14.

Union appointed General Pierr-Micher Joana[41] as a Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities. He is playing a key role in beefing up the AU's peacekeeping capacity and sub-regional organisations' peacekeeping capacities[42]. The Council of the EU adopted an "Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa[43]" in Brussels on the 16th of November 2004, a key strategic document for the EU in outlining the borders of the Africa-EU security cooperation. It stated that:

> … the EU shall support, over the long term, the enhancement of African peace support operations capabilities, at regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels as well as the capacity of the African States to contribute to regional integration, peace, security and development.

The APF has contributed to the reinforcement of the AU peacekeeping operations, including AU Missions in Sudan (AMIS), in Somalia (AMISOM), and for support to the elections in the Comoros (AMISEC). The facility allocated €600 million to support the African-led peacekeeping operations. In turn, the AU deployed AMIS in May 2004 (known as AMIS I), but it had a narrow mandate and only 465 personnel. Its objectives were only to observe the implementation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) signed between the rebel groups and the Sudanese government on the 8th of April 2004. On the 20th of October 2004, the AU called upon the international community to build up AMIS. At the request of the AU, the EU adopted an "EU civilian-military supporting action to the AU Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS II)"[44] on the 18th of June 2005. It included a wide range of support for AMIS, including financial, equipment, military, technical support, police officers and political advisors.

During the Darfur conflict, security relations between the AU and the EU peaked and made a significant contribution to developing strategic partnership between Africa and the EU in the fields of peace and security. The causes of the Darfur conflict were complicated, having erupted in the western region of Sudan in February 2003 it was halted in May 2006, when the foremost rebel group, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Government of Sudan reached a comprehensive agreement. On the 9th of January 2011, Southern Sudan held a referendum to determine whether the region would become a separate state. On the 7th of

[41] See the decision of Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, appoints General Pierr-Micher Joana as a Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities, S091/08, Brussels, 29 February 2008.
[42] General Pierr-Micher Joana has pursued his mission since March 2008.
[43] See the details about Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa, 10538/4/04 REV 4, Brussels, 16 November 2004.
[44] See the details of Darfur-Consolidated EU package II, AMIS II/00 (initial), Brussels, 1 July 2005.

February 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission[45] published the final referendum results, according to which people with 98.83 percent of the total vote in the Southern region of the Sudan decided to separate from the Government of the country. A new state was officially established as "Southern Sudan" on the 9th of July 2011.

Even if the conflict had ended, the political atmosphere remains fragile and complex in the Sudan. The APF earmarked €303 million to the AMIS, and the AU spent €348 million on the implementation of the AMIS. €303 million was used mostly for logistic and military needs of AMIS, training programmes, media support, and planning. South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda, Zambia, Senegal, and Gambia sent staff to the AMIS, with a total of 7,500 peacekeepers joining the operation. The main objectives of the AMIS operation were to: (1) Maintain peace and security in Sudan; (2) Observe implementation of the peace agreements made between the rebel groups and the government of Sudan; (3) Protect civilians in Darfur; (4) Provide a security environment for humanitarian operations in Darfur; and (5) Sustain political stability in Sudan. On the 31st of December 2007, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) replaced AMIS.

Meanwhile, the EU fortified its political and diplomatic cooperation with the AU during the Darfur conflict. Both actors worked together for the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) signed by the rebel groups and the government on the 8th of April 2004. Moreover, the EU and the AU joined in the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and Joint Commission with other international actors. The EU and the AU played a key role for the Abuja peace talks, which led to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, between the rebel groups and the government, which started in Abuja, Nigeria on the 23rd of August 2004. When the Abuja peace talks stopped on the 10th of June 2005, the EU and the AU together put much effort into restarting it, and played an active role in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 between the groups, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudanese government. At the same time, the EU appointed Pekka Haavisto as EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan to consolidate diplomatic cooperation with the AU and to facilitate the peace agreements in Sudan on the 18th of July 2005. Torben Brylle replaced Pekka Haavisto as second EUSR for Sudan in May 2007. The AU also appointed Salim Ahmed Salim in May 2005 as the AU Special Envoy and Chief Mediator for the Inter-Sudanese Political Talks on Darfur, a position he held until May 2006. This shows

[45] See Southern Sudan referendum final results report, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, 7 February 2011, p.2.

that both Africa and the EU have increased and strengthened security cooperation. This does not support hypothesis 6.

Rosalind Marsden was appointed as third EUSR for Sudan on the 11th of August 2010[46], and worked closely with the AU in preparing the referendum in Sudan. More importantly, the European Council and the Commission appointed Koen Vervaeke[47] as a EUSR to the AU in Addis Ababa and Head of Delegation of the European Commission to the AU on the 6th of December 2007. The EUSR to the AU plays a crucial role in strengthening the Africa-EU SSP. Meanwhile, the AU appointed Mahamat Saleh Annadif as a Permanent Representative of the AU to the EU in May 2006. Both Vervaeke and Annadif have worked closely to reinforce African ownership and the EU-AU strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security. Moreover, the EU worked together with the AU in the implementation of the Preparatory Committee for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC)[48] process and the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission (DAEC). DDDC and DAEC are mechanisms established by the AU to implement and reinforce the peace agreements made between the rebel groups and the GoS. Political and diplomatic cooperation between the AU and the EU during the conflict of Sudan strengthened the notion of security cooperation.

The AU PSC authorised the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on the 19th of January 2007, the main objectives of which were to brace the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), to provide security for humanitarian aid in the country, and sustain peace, security, and stability. The current conflict in Somalia began in 1991 and has destabilised political, economic and social development, with more than 300,000 civilians having died since 1990. Only Burundi and Uganda sent staff for AMISOM, with a total of 5,150 peacekeepers joining the operation. The EU worked with the AU for the implementation of AMISOM, with the APF earmarking €95.5 million to reinforce it. It is still completing its mission in the country. Also, the Stability for Instrument[49] allocated €4.75 million to AMISOM. The European Commission adopted the "Somalia Special Support Programme[50] (2008-2013)" on the 30th of October 2007 and assigned €215.4 million for this programme,

[46] See *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 211/42, Council Decision 2010/450/CFSP of 11 August 2010 appointing the European Union Special Representative for Sudan.
[47] See *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 211/23, Council Decision 2010/441/CFSP of 11 August 2010 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative to the African Union.
[48] See the African Union, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Launches PrepCom of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, Press Release, 10 November 2006.
[49] It was established as a financial instrument of the European Commission to address global challenges on the 15th of November 2006. The instrument replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM).
[50] See Commission of the European Communities, a decision on the allocation of resources to Somalia from the Tenth European Development Fund, COM (2008) 574 final, Brussels, 25 September 2008.

which included supporting governance, education, development, agriculture, and hospitals. The EU and the AU together made efforts for the implementation of the Djibouti Peace Process signed in 2008 between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), and played an active role in holding a presidential election in Somalia on the 30th of January of 2009. The EU also supports the efforts of IGAD.

In spring 2006, the AU PSC deployed the AU Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC), the essential tasks of which were to observe the elections in the country, to provide peace and security during the elections, and to protect civilians. A total of 500 personnel joined AMISEC, from South Africa, Egypt, the DRC, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Madagascar, and Mauritius. It operated until the 9th of June 2006, with the APF allocating €8.5 millions. The EU financial support to AMISEC played a sizeable role in implementing its mandates in the Comoros.

With regard to challenges behind security cooperation between Africa and the EU, the EU authorised its first peacekeeping operation in Africa in the DRC in 2003, named ARTEMIS, and is currently conducting two civilian and two military operations[51] in Africa. The EU also authorised its military operation in 2007 in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) without cooperating with the AU or its RECs. While the EU cooperated with the AU to support African-led peacekeeping operations, such as in Darfur and Somalia, it did not collaborate with the AU in the DRC, Chad and the CAR, nor Guinea Bissau.

It is worth noting that the EU has not cooperated actively with the AU in the areas of peace and security regarding current events in North Africa. These examples indicate to critics that the EU does have a contradictory security cooperation policy with the AU in the areas of peace and security, which undermines its global credibility. Creating a coherent foreign and security policy is an essential condition for strengthening the AU-EU SSP.

It seems that the APF also has some strong elements. For example, it does not include North Africa or South Africa, and excludes military and arms expenditures[52] of the AU. It can be argued that the assessment of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU in the fields of peace and security is mixed. The AU has similar challenges in developing security

[51] The EU's current peacekeeping operations in Africa are the European Union's Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin since 2008, European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces **(**EUTM Somalia) since 2010, EU Police Mission for the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo) since 2007, and EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (EUSEC RD Congo) since 2005.

[52] See Decision 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resourcesfrom the long-term development envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa.

cooperation, as does the EU, such as Francophone and Anglophone African countries having different economic and political relations with their former colonies, which impedes the development of a common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). In the meantime, many African countries face poverty and other structural, economic, social, and political problems, which undermine this cooperation between the equal and strong.

The lack of coordination between the AU and its RECs is another important issue for the implementation of the AU-EU SSP, because the roles and successes of RECs of the AU in the fields of peace and security are an asset for the AU's leadership and conflict prevention, management, and resolution capacity. According to Pirozzi (2009:17), the EU and the AU should develop "longer-term capacity building options in order to make the African peace and security architecture more independent and self-sustainable."

9.4 BETWEEN THE IGAD AND THE EU

The EU has paid attention to international terrorist attacks after 9/11 and begun to focus on the root causes of international terrorism. Since 2008, the EU has deployed two important peacekeeping operations in Somalia, namely EU military operation (EU NAVFOR Somalia) and European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia). It can be noted that the states live in an interdependent world today, when no country or actor can resolve global challenges on its own. In this regard, the EU's cooperation with the IGAD has been crucial in the areas of peace and security. The EU fortifies the IGAD peace and security capacity, supports the IGAD's efforts in increasing regional integration in the region, and enhances its diplomatic relations with the IGAD.

The first IGAD-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting took place in Kampala, Uganda on 23 October 2003. During the third IGAD-EU Troika meeting[53] in Brussels, on 1 April 2009, the Council of the European Union stressed that making the IGAD a strong regional actor was in the interest not only of the region but also of the EU. The EU supports the IGAD CPMR programmes, namely ICPAT and CEWARN. In 2007, the European Commission donated €10 million to strengthen the IGAD peace and security capacity (IGAD, 2007:7). According to the European Commission, the EU financial and diplomatic support to the IGAD contributes to developing the concept of African ownership in Eastern Africa.

Both actors have worked closely to implement the Djibouti peace process to stop the civil war in Somalia and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan. The IGAD has been

[53] See the details of the EU-IGAD Ministerial Troika meeting, Brussels, 31 March 2009, 8328/09 (Presse 74).

involved in implementing the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the First Action Plan of the Joint Strategy accepted by African and the European leaders in Lisbon in 2007. The IGAD's involvement in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy provides an impetus for the reinforcement of the Africa-EU SSP. In 2009, the European Commission funded €1 million to build up the IGAD's institutional capacity (IGAD, 2009:4). The EU also supports the IGAD regional integration efforts. On the 15th of March 2010, the EU funded €15 million to support the IGAD's regional economic integration efforts (IGAD, 2010:1). The IGAD established an IGAD Liaison Office in Juba, Sudan and appointed an IGAD–EU liaison officer in 2010. The Office plays an important role in developing political relations between the IGAD and the EU and the implementation of the CPA in Sudan. The EU is involved in the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) to reinforce the IGAD. The IPF provides three important partnership levels between the IGAD and the EU, namely ministerial, ambassadorial, and technical. The first IPF was held in Rome, Italy in January 1998.

The lack of coordination among the IGAD members weakens the IGAD's effectiveness as well as the development of the IGAD-EU security partnership. The IGAD and the EU security cooperation in the eastern region of Africa has been inadequate and ineffective in resolving the region's security issues. Structural problems, such as poverty, disasters, civil and border conflicts damage the future of the IGAD-EU security cooperation. Importantly, the lack of a strong cooperation between the IGAD and the EU also undermines the current security partnership between Africa and the EU. This provides some support for hypotheses 6 and 7. Western Africa is the most important part of the continent of Africa in terms of its geo-strategic importance. Therefore, international actors have their own interests, which destabilise political and economic stability in this region. This breaks the evolution of a strong Africa-EU SSP under the IGAD-EU security cooperation. Meanwhile, the financial constraints and insufficient capacity of the IGAD have also decreased the effectiveness of the IGAD-EU security cooperation, especially due to its financial problems.

9.5 BETWEEN THE ECOWAS AND THE EU

ECOWAS has authorised four peacekeeping operations, namely in Liberia in 1990 and 2003, in Sierra Leone in 1997, and Ivory Coast in 2002. ECOWAS is viewed as a strategic partner for the EU, whose economic power plays a significant role in developing security cooperation with the body. The EU provided €2,365 million to the ECOWAS to strengthen its capacity-

building between 2002 and 2007.[54] According to the EU, ECOWAS's economic and regional integration efforts contribute to peace and security and increase welfare among the members. Therefore, the EU allocated €258 million to support the ECOWAS's economic and integration activities in the region between 2002 and 2007.

In 2003, the EU underwrote €50 million to reinforce the ECOWAS's peacekeeping mission in Liberia, called ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). During the Ivorian conflict, the EU donated €500 million to support the ECOWAS's conflict prevention, management, and resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, the EU donated €5.5 million to the ECOWAS to back up its conflict prevention mechanism between 2006 and 2010. ECOWAS established the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) in June 2006 to combat the proliferation of small arms in West Africa. The EU has supported ECOSAP and provided €1,450,000 million for it. In April 2007, a Joint Declaration on Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)[55] was adopted by the ECOWAS and the EU in Luxembourg. The Declaration plays an important role in fighting against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa.

Since 2000, the EU has organised ministerial Troika meetings with the ECOWAS. During the 17th EU-ECOWAS Troika meeting on 15 June 2010, both sides developed common strategies to improve security in West Africa. The EU acknowledged that the EU would support and finance the ECPF. According to the Council of the EU, the ECOWAS should be a central actor and become more actively involved in peace and security in the region. Meanwhile, the ECOWAS joined the 2nd and the 3rd Africa-EU Summits in 2007 in Lisbon and in 2010 in Libya. The ECOWAS's role in building up the Africa-EU SSP was of great importance. The EU and the ECOWAS worked closely in observing elections in West African countries, such as in Guinea, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2010. Both actors emphasised that implementing successful elections in the countries was essential for improving social, economic and political conditions.

[54] The EU has supported the ECOWAS and provided money it through the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) of the EU.

[55] See the document ECOWAS-EU Joint Declaration on Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Ministerial Troika Meeting, Doc. 8834/07 (Presse 93), Luxembourg, 24 April 2007, Council of the European Union.

The ECOWAS does not have effective coordination among its members. Likewise, the lack of a political unity within the EU has also undermined the security cooperation between the EU and the ECOWAS. When the UK deployed a peacekeeping mission in Liberia in 2003, France authorised its own peacekeeping operation in Ivory Coast in 2002, and even in April 2011, because of its significant political and economic interests in these countries. France and the UK's peacekeeping policies in West Africa reflect their geo-economic and geo-political interests. The EU support to the ECOWAS's economic and regional integration endeavour is also problematic. Without taking into considering the internal factors of the region, the EU's financial support will not strengthen the ECOWAS's integration efforts. On the contrary, it undermines the region's economic and political stability.

9.6 BETWEEN THE SADC AND THE EU

The official relationship between SADC and the EU began with the first SADC-EU Ministerial Conference in Berlin in September 1994. Every two years, SADC and the EU organise a ministerial meeting to consolidate economic and political relations. At the first SADC-EU conference, the EU stressed that consolidating the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and good governance in Southern African countries is necessary for keeping peace, security, and stability. In 1994, both parties agreed to cooperate in combatting international crime, including money laundering, drug and women trafficking, and the proliferation of WMD. The EU associated political and economic instabilities in the region with the principles of democracy at the first SADC-EU conference. Even though the conflicts continued in the DRC and Angola, the EU did not develop its cooperation with SADC in the areas of peace and security during this conference, in particular conflict prevention policies towards the DRC and Angola. The EU has mainly developed its political and economic relations with SADC rather than its security relations since 1994.

In 1995, SADC became involved in conflict prevention in the DRC and deployed a peacekeeping mission to this country. The EU provided financial assistance to SADC to facilitate the ceasefire process for this country. In November 2006, SADC and the EU established a "SADC Elections Advisory Council (SEAC)" to observe elections, to reinforce democracy and good governance in Southern African countries. In addition, there is a significant difference between the SADC and the EU on the issue of Zimbabwe. For instance, SADC rejected receipt of EU financial support to observe the elections in Zimbabwe in 2008, claiming donations from the former colonial powers would not help to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe. The EU and SADC could not develop a common effective security policy

towards Zimbabwe. Whereas the EU insisted that sanctions would help to resolve the political crisis in the country, SADC argued that USA and EU sanctions were causing political instability in the country and therefore should be lifted.

Importantly, the EU's economic power is also playing a substantial role in developing comprehensive relations with SADC. On the 11th of November 2008, the SADC-EU Troika Ministerial Meeting took place in Brussels. The EU allocated €116 million[56] to reinforce the capacity building of SADC and its regional and economic integration efforts. SADC had two important strategic plans to increase regional integration among the members, namely the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). The EU has especially supported its strategic plans and provided financial assistance for the implementation of the plans. According to the Council of the EU, regional and economic integration efforts can bring peace and security in the region, thus, the EU allocated €135 million to SADC to increase regional and economic integration programmes of SADC at the SADC-EU Troika Ministerial Meeting in the Kingdom of Lesotho on the 17th of November 2006.

However, there is not such a strong relationship between SADC and the EU in the areas of peace and security. SADC is also highly dependent on the international community's donations and the lack of strong coordination among its members impairs its security policy towards the region. Ineffective capacity of the SADC also undermines its international role, in particular cooperation with the EU. SADC's role in the fields of peace and security is critical to developing the Africa-EU SSP, and it plays a worthwhile role in implementing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). As a result, SADC and the EU did not create strong security cooperation on the issues of Zimbabwe, therefore, SADC-EU cooperation failed to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe. Ineffective cooperation between SADC and the EU partically damages the evolution of security cooperation between Africa and the EU. This provides support for hypothesis 7.

9.7 EVALUATION

With the adoption of the ESS in December 2003, the EU consolidated its security relations with the African organisations. The EU has a special partnership with the AU in the areas of

[56]See the Communiqué EU-SADC Double Troika Ministerial Meeting, 11 November 2008, Doc. 15597/08 (Presse 326), Brussels, Belgium.

peace and security among the African organisations. The OAU's transformation into the AU in 2002 provided the drive to changing security relations between Africa and the EU. The EU has especially strengthened the AU's security capacity, such as the establishment of the APF within the AU in 2004 and the reinforcement of the APSA. Furthermore, the EU has also increased its diplomatic relations with the AU in recent years. According to the Council of the EU, the AU is the most important regional organisation in Africa, making it a strong regional organisation in Africa of great significance to the interests of both Africa and the EU. The security relations between the EU and the AU peaked during the Darfur conflict, with the EU mostly providing financial assistance and diplomatic support to the AU during the conflict in Sudan.

At the same time, the EU has increased its security relations with the sub-regional organisations in Africa. It can be underlined that it has generally used its soft power to consolidate its security relations with the African organisations. This chapter showed that the EU's financial assistance to the African organisations plays a major role in reinforcing the concept of the Africa-EU SSP. In addition, the EU's cooperation and dialogue with the IGAD, the ECOWAS, and SADC in the areas of peace and security have also contributed to the development of security cooperation between the two continents.

This chapter found that the African organisations are working as dependent actors on outside powers because of financial and logistical problems. According to realism, when a global actor cooperates with a weak actor, it only concentrates on its own security concerns and economic interests. At the same time, the global actor cooperates with the weak ones to fights against the new threats and challenges effectively. Liberalism points out that strategic partnership among different actors can provide peace and securıty and increase economic, social and political interactions.

Hypothesis 3 in this study is "the EU strengthens regional organisations on the African continent through the Africa-EU SSP." The EU established the APF to reinforce African organisations through the AU in 2004 and allocateed €740 million for this facility. Moreover, the European Commission provided €10 million to strengthen the IGAD in 2007 (IGAD, 2007:7). The EU assigned €258 million to consolidate the ECOWAS between 2002 and 2007 and also made a €116 million donation to strengthen capacity building of SADC. This supports hypothesis 3. However, whether or not the EU's soft power will be enough to strengthen regional organisations in Africa is not clear. Consolidationg security frameworks of African organisations with the EU's donations is not a long-term solution to make them

effective actors in Africa because financial dependency can weaken the effectiveness of African organisations. This strengthens hypothesis 6.

It is important to underline that the EU adopted its first security strategy in 2003, entitled "European Security Strategy". It posits that wars, conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, state failure, and organised crime damage the EU's peace and security, as well as international security, therefore the EU should make greater efforts to promote the strengthening of regional cooperation in the world, especially regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa. To this end, the EU deployed its first peacekeeping operation in Africa, named "Artemis Operation," in 2003 to the DRC so as to maintain peace and security. In addition, the European Commission provided €25 million to strengthen the AU peacekeeping operation in Burundi in 2003 (European Commission, 2004:3). Importantly, the EU's support to the AU during the Darfur crisis demonstrated that the EU aims to support regional organisations in Africa by reinforcing an SSP with African organisations. This supports hypothesis 3. At the same time, security concerns, such as conflicts and wars, international terrorism, immigration issues, the EU's members' interests and the EU's enlargement create a pattern of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.

Fostering African organisations by increasing unity and solidarity among African countries and enhancing political relations between the EU and African organisations on the basis of mutual interests can make African organisations more effective actors in Africa and in the world. Realist views also contend that different levels between the different actors can damage the emergence of a genuine strategic partnership. While a global actor is fostering its cooperation with a weak actor, global actors' strategic positions can make a weak actor more dependent on itself, and that has a negative impact on emerging of a true strategic partnership. Hypothesis 8 is "the Africa-EU SSP makes African organisations more dependent on the EU." This chapter showed that the EU's financial aid to the African organisations make them more dependent actors on global powers but on the other hand, helps to strengthen African organisations' peace and security mechanisms. This provides evidence for hypothesis 8.

CONCLUSION

The introductory chapter of this dissertation outlined the general structure of the study, including the introduction and the main topics to be addressed. The main research questions this dissertation aimed to answer were: What are the main driving forces and elements of security cooperation between the EU and Africa? And Why does the EU pursue an SSP with Africa? The sub-questions addressed were: What determines the patterns of cooperation between African regional organisations and the EU? And How can an SSP be established between unequal actors?

Chapter Two examined the theoretical framework of international cooperation in IR theories and the concepts of strategic partnership and international organisation. On the basis of the theoretical framework, Chapter 2 formulated the related hypotheses. The concept of an SSP between Africa and the EU is a relatively new phenomenon, dating from the first Summit between the two groups held in Cairo in 2000. The elements creating the concept of strategic partnership are geo-strategic, geo-economic and geo-political interests, and mutual responsibility. At the same time, internal and external dynamics, such as socio-economic and political development, global economic crises, international terrorist attacks, and institutions, NGOs, think tanks, academia and business also influence it.

Complex interdependence has been affecting security relations between Africa and the EU as new challenges of the modern world have threatened economic interests and security of the global actors. Moreover, realist views stress that global powers have a propensity to increase their economic and political interests while cooperating with weak actors, however, liberal theorists of IR contend that strategic partnership among different actors can reduce the possibility of uncertainty and increase economic, social and political relations. At the same time, actors can fight against new global threats and challenges more efficiently by reinforcing international cooperation in a wide range of activities. According to constructivism, common identity and culture, historical relations and shared knowledge can also contribute to creating strategic partnership between different actors. Chapter 2 discussed the significant role played by economic and political interests in creating an SSP between Africa and the EU. At the same time, there are also other important elements influencing the establishment of a strategic partnership on peace and security between different actors, such as international terrorism, conflicts and wars, and immigration issues. This chapter also argued that colonial relations between Africa and Europe have forced EU members to increase their security cooperation,

albeit to a lesser extent. It found a mixture of motivations behind the creation of an SSP between Africa and the EU.

Chapter Three focused on the security concept and its related elements and values, a concept so complicated as to include social, economic, political, and military dimensions. This chapter revealed that the concept of security cooperation should include not only the traditional security dimension, but also socio-economic, political, technological and physiological dimensions. This chapter discussed that the EU and African organisations have gradually widened the concept of "security", including aspects such as poverty reduction, economic development, education and other elements as strategic aims. According to liberalism, cooperation between different actors is necessary to increse mutual interests. Hypothesis 1 in the study is "mutual interests lead to the emergence of security cooperation between Africa and the EU." Conflicts and wars damage not only Africa's economic and social interests, but also the EU's economic and political interests. The EU established the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004 with the AU to foster security cooperation between the two continents. Importantly, the EU has deployed 10 peacekeeping operations in Africa since 2003 to maintain peace and security on the African continent. One of the most important aims of the APF is to sustain peace, security and stability in Africa. In particular, the 9/11 attacks on the USA forced the EU to strengthen its security cooperation with African organisations. At the same time, new threats and challenges, including immigration issues, drug trafficking, state failure, organised crime and proliferation of WMD forced EU members to develop a more effective security strategy towards Africa to combat these problems. In this sense, hypothesis 1 is largely confirmed.

Chapter Four scrutinised the historical background of the EU's foreign and security policy and its foreign and security policy objectives. The CFSP\ESDP has played a significant role in developing the EU's security policy inside and outside the EU. Until the end of the Cold War, the CFSP of the EU did not contribute to international peace and security because of the domestic developments in Europe. The end of the Cold War changed the international framework as a multipolar international structure replaced the bipolar international system. According to liberal approaches, international cooperation among different actors is possible and can contribute to peace and security. At the same time, cooperation can increase common interests among the nations. After the Cold War, the significance of international organisations also increased. Internal dynamics in the European countries have played a major role in the expansion of the SSP between Africa and the EU. In particular, integration

movements in Europe have had an impact on the development of the Africa-EU SSP. For instance, the admission of ten new European countries into the EU in 2004 provided a forceful momentum to increase the EU's global power in world affairs. Since 2004, the EU has begun to take more global responsibilities in sustaining international peace and security, and strengthening its institutional ties with different regional and sub-regional organisations, such as security cooperation with African organisations.

The new international system also brought substantial changes to Europe, in particular its security concept. In 1992, the EU established the CFSP with the adoption of the TEU at Maastricht, which also created the notion of security cooperation. However, developing the CFSP of the EU has been one of the most controversial areas of the EU. In particular, different national policies within the EU and discrepancies between the different institutions, including the WEU, NATO, and the CFSP, have impeded the evolution of the CFSP of the EU. This situation undermines the effectiveness of the CFSP outside the EU, and these challenges have also damaged the evolution of a strategic partnership with Africa. Making cooperation among different actors in a particular area is a challenging task. Hypothesis 2 is "the lack of cohesion and discrepancy between the EU members damages the development of the Africa-EU SSP." The USA-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the South Ossetia War in the Caucasus in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia, and the Libyan War of 2011 proved that the divergence among the EU members has continued to undermine its global strategies, including the SSP with Africa. These examples provide evidence for hypothesis 2.

France and the UK have played the most important roles in the EU peacekeeping operations in Africa while the other members of the EU remain so passive. More importantly, huge economic and political interests of France and the UK in Africa are among the major factors influencing the Africa-EU SSP, however, this damages the creation of a strong security partnership between the two continents. The EU needs to develop a common African strategy. Without creating a common strategy with regard to Africa, the Africa-EU SSP cannot work effectively. To this end, the EU should strengthen its CFSP in order to create strong strategic partnerships with African organisations. Meanwhile, the adoption of the ESS by the EU members in December 2003 was a turning point for making the CFSP influential and consistent. The ESS provided energy for the EU members to play a more active role in maintaining international peace and security. Even though the EU has made efforts to make the CFSP effective, different national policies of the EU members, in particular the national

interests in Africa of France, the UK, Italy and Germany, have undermined the development of the Africa-EU SSP. This also largely supports hypothesis 2.

This chapter also examined the EU's foreign and security policy objectives and drew attention to the EU foreign and security policy objectives. In this study, hypothesis 3 is "the EU encourages reinforcing regional organisations on the African continent through the Africa-EU SSP." After the EU adopted the ESS in 2003, it started to play a more active role in keeping international peace and security. According to the ESS, the EU as a global actor should take more global responsibilities to sustain international peace and security in conflict areas and reinforce its institutional relations with different actors. Furthermore, the ESS emphasises that new threats and challenges, as mentioned above, damage the EU's economic and political interests, therefore, the EU should increase its security cooperation with Africa. To this end, the EU has provided financial assistance to foster African organisations. For instance, the EU set up the APF to strengthen African regional and sub-regional organisations' peace and security mechanisms through the AU in 2004 and earmarked €740 million for this facility. Furthermore, the European Commission donated €10 million to reinforce the IGAD in 2007 (IGAD, 2007:7).

In addition, the EU assigned €258 million to consolidate the ECOWAS between 2002 and 2007 and also made a €116[57] million donation to fortify the capacity building of SADC and its regional and economic integration efforts. The European Commission granted €25 million to the AU to reinforce its peacekeeping operation in Burundi in 2003 (European Commission, 2004:3). The EU authorised its first peacekeeping operation to the DRC in 2003, in order to sustain peace, security and stability. It can be said that the EU's financial and political support to the AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur during the conflict played a key role in fortifying the AU's security structure. These developments support hypothesis 3.

This chapter argued that the Africa-EU SSP aims not only to stop conflicts and wars in the conflict areas in Africa, but also aims to spread norms and values in the African countries. One of the most important objectives of the CFSP of the EU is to promote democracy, human rights and good governance. According to liberalism, setting up cooperation is easier among

[57]See the Communiqué EU-SADC Double Troika Ministerial Meeting, 11 November 2008, Doc. 15597/08 (Presse 326), Brussels, Belgium.

democratic countries, however, the lack of democracy, the rule of law and human rights can prevent the emergence of a fair strategic partnership between different actors.

Hypothesis 4 is "the EU aims to spread its norms and values in Africa through the SSP." After the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the EU started to put more pressure on African governments to put into practice principles of liberalism and democracy. According to the ESS, the EU should make a contribution to global peace and security by disseminating its own norms and values, which requires it to establish new strategic partnerships with different global actors. To this end, the EU has alredy established the APF through the AU, in 2004 and provided significant financial, diplomatic, military and civilian assistance to the AU peacekeeping operation in Sudan (AMIS II) in 2005. The EU's support of the AU during the Darfur conflict played an important role in empowering its peacekeeping operation and emerging security cooperation between the EU and Africa (Siradag, 2012, 136-139). It is important to note that the APF became a significant tool for the EU to spread its norms and values throughout Africa, which largely confirms hypothesis 4.

This chapter has argued that the EU does not have a consistent foreign and security policy in the world. In particular, its economic and political interests shape its foreign and security policy or its strategic partnership policies. For instance, the EU imports 50 percent of its gas and 30 percent of its oil from Russia (Monaghan, 2006:1). Economic and political relations between the EU and Russia influence the EU's foreign and security policies. For example, when the war started between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the EU could not develop an effective foreign and security policy to prevent it. Likewise, some of the EU members, such as Italy, Germany, the UK, and France had strong economic and political relations with the ousted Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, selling weapons to the value of €343.7 million to Libya in 2009, The EU's contradictory foreign and security policies in the world damage its international power and the development of an SSP with Africa.

Chapter Five dealt with the former European colonial powers' security policies towards Africa and their impact on security cooperation among Africa and the EU. The European colonial powers, in particular France and the UK, have a strong economic and political interest in their former colonial countries in Africa. Their historical relationship with Africa has influenced the birth of the notion of an SSP. The colonial legacy in Africa is still undermining the development of security relations between the two continents. According to constructivism, ideas, identities, shared knowledge, and historical relations can make a contribution to the concept of strategic partnership. In particular, economic interests have

been playing significant roles in developing the Africa-EU SSP and the former colonial powers' policies towards Africa. Meanwhile, new challenges of the twenty-first century provide the impetus for the former European colonial powers to make security cooperation with the African organisations. This also revealed that EU members have not only aimed to keep their economic interests through the SSP with Africa but have also fought against new threats and challenges.

Some members of the EU play a more active role in establishing an SSP with Africa. For instance, France allocated €300 million between 2010 and 2012 in order to foster African states' and organisations' security capacities during the 25th France-Africa summit in Nice in 2010. Also, France set up its own security mechanism in 1998, known as the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programme. RECAMP consisted of Francophone African countries, the USA, the UK, Belgium, and five Anglophone countries. Its main aim being to enhance African organisations' and states' peace and security capacities by creating a strategic partnership with Africa. RECAMP has been a strategic means for France in strengthening African organisations in the areas of peace and security. This supports hypothesis 3. On the other hand, France was opposed to the creation of the ECOWAS in 1975, which aimed to sustain peace and security and increase economic cooperation among the members in the Western part of Africa. France's geo-economic and geo-political interests have shaped its security relations with Africa. This does not support hypothesis 3. Germany also donated €30 million to African states and African organisations to strengthen Africa's peace and security structure at the 2007 German G8 Presidency. At the same time, Germany joined a EUFOR mission in the DRC in 2006 and provided financial, political and logistical support for it. This also provides evidence for hypothesis 3. In light of these developments, political and economic interests influence EU members' foreign and security policies towards Africa. This shows that important countries within the framework of the EU have developed individual strategies towards Africa that are damaging the unity and solidarity between the EU members and the current strategic partnership on peace and security between the two different continents. This supports hypothesis 2.

Realism claims that the EU does not have an aim to establish an SSP with Africa, because the members of the EU have different interests in Africa and block its creation. However, liberalism points out that the world has changed and multilateralism has been significant in diplomacy to fight the global challenges and increase common interests. So, some of the most important aims of the SSP are to combat the new threats and challenges. This also supports

hypothesis 1. Moreover, realist views stress that global powers have a propensity to increase their global power on the international arena while cooperating with weak ones.

Chapter Six analysed the EU's security policy towards Africa and driving forces behind it. The first Africa-EU Summit, held in Cairo in 2000, played a significant role in the emergence of the new paradigms between the two continents, including the notion of the strategic partnership. The second significant step was the *EU Strategy for Africa* adopted by the European Council in December 2005. For the first time the EU proposed to Africa that they establish a strategic partnership in the fields of peace and security. Moreover, the EU declared 2005 as a "year of Africa." The other substantial pace to conceptualise the Africa-EU security cooperation was the second Africa-EU Summit, held in Lisbon 2007. This particularly brought together the European and African leaders and provided a momentum to change the security relations between the two continents. It is worth noting that this security partnership was intended to be a long-term relationship, forged in the most difficult partnership area. The third Africa-EU Summit, held in Libya in 2010, did not bring a new approach to Africa's security, but merely repeated the old strategies.

This chapter revealed internal and external dynamics behind the current security cooperation. Internal dynamics of this partnership are political, economic and historical. The new developments in the EU, such as enlargement and the economic crisis of 2007, have had a foremost impact on this partnership. Furthermore, the political and economic interests of the former European colonial powers impacted on the creation of this partnership. External factors have also contributed to the progress of the Africa-EU SSP, including the emerging the new global actors in Africa, the 9\11 terrorist attacks on the USA, and globalisation. Globalisation forced the EU to strengthen an SSP with Africa to combat new threats and challenges and to provide new opportunites. This supports hypothesis 9. The new emerging powers, such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey have increased their political and economic relations with Africa in recent years. For instance, China's total trade with Africa increased from $91.07 billion in 2009 to $114.81 billion in 2010. Similarly, India's total trade with Africa increased from $25 billion in 2006-7 to $45 billion in 2010, and Turkey's total trade with Africa increased from $16 billion in 2008 to $30 billion in 2010. This largely supports hypothesis 5.

According to the realist approach, states see each other as rivals and threats, so they increase their own material interests and security while cooperating. The EU is the largest trading partner for Africa and has a significant economic and political interest on the continent. This

largely supports hypothesis 5. This chapter indicated that there are two important main driving forces and elements of security cooperation between Africa and the EU, namely serving the EU's economic and political interests in Africa and combating the new challenges and threats more effectively. There has been a strong relationship between the EU's economic interests and its security policy towards Africa, and one of the main reasons behind the emergence of the Africa-EU SSP towards Africa has been its economic interests. Meanwhile, the other external factors have also provided a strong force behind its creation. The EU members' interests in Africa, security concerns and the EU enlargement have shaped a pattern of security cooperation between the two.

Since 2003, the EU has begun to consolidate its strategic cooperation with African organisations in the areas of peace and security. Significantly, the EU deployed its first peacekeeping operation in Africa in the DRC in 2003, in order to maintain peace, security and stability. The EU's cooperation with African organisations in the fields of peace and security peaked during the Darfur conflict. The EU established an APF in 2004 within the framework of the AU to foster security capacities of regional organisations in Africa. When the AU deployed its peacekeeping mission in Darfur in 2004, the APF played a substantial role in reinforcing the AU's security structure and beginning a strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security between the two continents. Particularly, the creation of the APF is likely to enhance the global role of the EU in Africa against the new actors. This provides evidence for hypothesis 5.

Chapter Seven explored internal and external factors that affect security in Africa, concluding that internal factors in Africa, such as historical, social, political and economic problems, weaken the development of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. According to realism, global actors gain more from strategic partnership because global actors' economic and political power dominates cooperation with weak actors. Hypothesis 6 is "power imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the SSP." African organisations have made efforts to increase security cooperation with the EU. In particular, the 9/11 attacks forced both African organisations and the EU to strengthen their security cooperation. The establishment of the APF and the EU peacekeeping operations in Africa show that security cooperation can be created between different actors. Furthermore, security cooperation between the AU and the EU during the Darfur conflict provides evidence against hypothesis 6. However, African organisations face financial, logistical and political constraints. The lack of unity and solidarity between the members of African organisations

undermines the development of a common African strategy. For example, the AU had huge financial, political and logistical restraints when it deployed peacekeeping operations in Sudan and Burundi, known as AMIS and AMIB respectively. Mixed evidence was found for hypothesis 6 throughout this dissertation, since global developments make cooperation among various actors possible and necessary. However, different economic and political levels between Africa and the EU render a strategic partnership on peace and security more difficult.

Africa faces political, economic and social problems. African internal challenges damage security cooperation between Africa and the EU, which provides support for hypothesis 7. The EU should cooperate more with African organisations in the fields of peace and security, and assume more global responsibilities in peace and security activities to strengthen its strategic partnerships with Africa. However, using its soft power to enhance an SSP with African organisations is not a strategic way for the EU. Rather, the EU should focus on the roots of conflicts and wars. The EU's financial support for Africa is not solving structural problems of Africa, such as poverty, unemployment, and AIDS/HIV, nor is its financial assistance bringing lasting peace and security. Also, the EU needs to reduce divergence between the members in order to develop a more consistent foreign and security policy towards Africa. Creating a common African strategy is necessary for making the EU a more active and effective global actor in Africa.

African organisations lack a common African strategy due to the lack of unity and solidarity between African states. For example, when the AU authorised a peacekeeping operation in Burundi in 2003, only three countries, namely South Africa, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, provided troops. The poor coordination between African states and African organisations damages the effectiveness of the Africa-EU SSP, which supports hypothesis 7. African organisations should make their own common African strategy in order to play a more active role in the Africa-EU SSP. Effective coordination between the members of African organisations is essential for making Africa's peace and security activities more successful. Mechanisms should thus be reinforced by African states, rather than by outside powers. Good coordination between the members of African organisations can increase the success of the Africa-EU SSP. At the same time, increasing economic and political cooperation between African nations is needed to establish strong strategic partnerships with different actors. Without boosting cooperation among African nations, Africa's cooperation with global actors cannot work effectively. Mixed evidence was found for hypothesis 7 in the dissertation. While structural problems of Africa weaken the development of the Africa-EU SSP, the

establishment of the AU and NEPAD has reinforced its strategic partnership with the EU on peace and security.

Chapter Eight examined security policies of the AU, the IGAD, the ECOWAS, and SADC. These African organisations have been playing an important role in sustaining peace and security on the continent of Africa, as African leaders have recognised that "without peace and security there is no sustainable social and economic development." Therefore, the African organisations have developed their own security strategies since they were established. Their efforts for peace and security in Africa have strengthened the concept of African ownership, which this chapter indicated cannot play a dynamic role in keeping peace and security and instead has been shaped by the external powers, including the EU, the UN, G8, and other global actors. This also highlights that structural problems of the African organisations have weakened their security policies, as well as their security cooperation with the EU, including their financial and logistical constraints, and the lack of unity and solidarity within the African organisations' members. This provides evidence for hypotheses 6 and 7.

Chapter Nine analysed the Africa-EU SSP and explored the main challenges behind it. The concepts of mutual accountability and mutual responsibility have been meaningful in developing the Africa-EU security cooperation. Before 2000, the EU was mainly involved in Africa in terms of aid and economic relations, however, the new developments in world politics created new strategic partnerships across a wide range of areas between the different actors. At the same time, the security relations between the EU and other important African organisations, namely, the IGAD, the ECOWAS, and SADC contribute to the development of this strategic partnership, but not greatly. Realism states that building up true cooperation between different actors is not possible because economic and political differences between actors can damage the emergence of a genuine strategic partnership. At the same time, unequal cooperation can make weak actors more dependent on strong ones. Hypothesis 8 is "the Africa-EU SSP makes African organisations more dependent on the EU." The APF was established with the financial support of the EU in 2004, at a time when the EU was reinforcing the APSA with its financial assistance to enhance African organisations' peace and security mechanisms. Importantly, the AU strengthened its peacekeeping operation in Sudan in 2006 with the financial support of the EU, but the EU's economic assistance to African organisations is making African organisations more dependent on the EU. It seems that African organisations would not take action to sustain peace and security in conflict areas if the EU and other global actors did not provide financial support. This supports hypothesis

8. African organisations should find their own way of strengthening their own peace and security structure. For example, coordination between the members of the African organisations should be increased. The EU's financial contributions to crisis prevention and management efforts in Africa have strengthened African regional organisations, but, by necessity, have also made them more dependent on outside support. African organisations first need to increase economic and political cooperation between African nations to reduce dependency of Africa on outside powers.

There are mixed motivations behind the establishment of the Africa-EU SSP. First, some of the EU members aim to protect their economic and political relations with Africa through the Africa-EU SSP. Second, conflicts and wars threaten political and economic stability in Africa and damage the EU's political and economic interests. Therefore, the EU wishes to play a more active role in sustaining peace and security in Africa through this partnership. Furthermore, the EU members consider that international cooperation is necessary for combating new threats and challenges. It can be said that the Africa-EU SSP also endeavours to fight against international terrorism, immigration issues and the proliferation of WMD. The third motivation is that the growth of the EU, with 10 new European states joining the union in 2004, has forced the EU to increase its global responsibility. The fourth motivation is historical relations between the two continents. In particular, some of the EU members take steps to foster their historical relations with Africa linked with their own interests. It has been argued that though historical ties do not have a great impact on the creation of security cooperation, the significance of historical relations should not be ignored in this partnership. The assumptions of realim, liberalism and constructivism apply to the Africa-EU SSP but the predictions of realism and liberalism are more applicable to this security cooperation. The EU's policy towards Africa is driven by somewhat contradictory rationales, characterized by dependence on natural resources and trade with Africa on the one hand and a genuine interest to maintain peace and stability on the continent on the other.

African organisations need to increase their security relations with the EU in order to strengthen their peace and security structures. In particular, conflicts and wars have forced African organisations to cooperate with the EU in the fields of peace and security. An SSP between Africa and the EU can be possible, however, security cooperation should focus on the root causes of conflicts and wars, not only financial support for African organisations' security mechanisms. Both actors need to create a system that decreases Africa's dependency on global actors. For example, the members of the AU should create a common funding system to

support African peacekeeping operations without receiving financial assistance from outside powers. In particular, the members of the AU should increase cooperation with each other in a wide range of activities. Weak and ineffective African organisations will have to remain passive in world politics and cannot play a constructive role in solving their security problems.

Empirical evidence as presented in this dissertation has shown that the EU has shifted its foreign and security policy towards Africa since 2000. Before 2000, the EU used its "soft power" to bolster its economic and political relations with African countries, but after 2000 it began to employ its "hard power" to enhance security cooperation. Clearly, new threats and challenges, potential EU enlargement, the EU's strong economic and political relations with Africa, and the 9/11 tragedy have all played a significant role in transforming the EU's foreign and security policy towards Africa. As important evidence of its changing foreign and security policy in Africa, the EU has deployed peacekeeping operations in the DRC, Chad, the CAR, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia.

However, as this dissertation has demonstrated, the EU's military or security capacity is not enough to sustain lasting peace and security in the conflict areas of Africa. The EU failed to preserve peace and security in the Balkans in the 1990s during the war. At the same time, the EU could not play an active role in stopping war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Importantly, the disagreement between the members of the EU on the foreign policies of its member states damages the development of a strong strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. Though the EU has played an important role in maintaining peace and security in Africa since 2003, its security activities in the conflict areas remain limited and ineffective. The evidence shows that the EU's first military operation in the DRC in 2003, called "Artemis Military Operations" was limited and ineffective in creating lasting peace, security and stability in the country.

Empirical evidence provided in this dissertation demonstrates that African organisations do not have effective security mechanisms to sustain peace and security. In particular, the discrepancy between the members of the African organisations has undermined the effectiveness of African organisations. Furthermore, most of the African states face economic, social and political difficulties which undermine the evolution of a strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security with the EU. African organisations would not deploy a peacekeeping operation in a conflict area if the global actors would not support it, because of their economic and political challenges. For instance, the AU would not have authorised a peacekeeping operation in Sudan/Darfur in 2004 without the EU's financial and political

support. Research presented in this dissertation has also revealed that international powers can use their financial support as a strategic tool to keep or shape their economic and political interests. The EU aims to secure its own security and increase its economic and political interests through the SSP with Africa. It can be said that the SSP between Africa and the EU was born as a result of conjunctional developments.

After the 9/11 attacks on the US, the EU began to increase its institutional relations with African organisations. The EU's relations with Africa had been based mainly on aid and economic relations before 2000. Strengthening its relations with African organisations at the institutional level has offered significant opportunities for the EU. Firstly, the EU began to increase its global power in Africa through the SSP. Secondly, it took a strategic step to keep its economic and political interests in Africa against the new emerging actors' increasing economic and political relations with Africa by establishing an SSP. Thirdly, it set up its new security mechanisms in cooperation with African organisations so as to fight the new threats and challenges more effectively.

Countering international terrorism, migration problems, climate change, failed states, conflicts, wars, and the proliferation of WMD has become the most important policy for the EU since 2000. To do so the EU has decided to increase its cooperation with African organisations in the areas of peace and security at the institutional level and to strengthen their security mechanisms. As this dissertation has shown, establishing an SSP with African organisations has become the most important strategy for the EU to battle against these challenges. The EU has also developed new international mechanisms in cooperation with African organisations to spread its own values and norms in the world. Finally, the EU wishes to take on more global responsibilities to contribute to global peace and security through the establishment of strategic partnerships.

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SAMENVATTING

Sinds Afrikaanse staten hun afhankelijkheid verkregen, bedreigen conflicten en oorlogen de veiligheid van het Afrikaanse continent. Om dit probleem op te lossen proberen verscheidene Afrikaanse organisaties vredes- en veiligheidstructuren te versterken en de vrede, veiligheid en stabiliteit in conflictgebieden te bewaren. De effectiviteit van deze Afrikaanse organisaties wordt echter geminimaliseerd door een gebrek aan effectieve veiligheidsmechanismen tezamen met financieel en logistieke beperkingen en het gebrek aan eenheid en solidariteit tussen Afrikaanse naties. De aanslagen op 11 september op de VS hadden een belangrijke invloed op de versterking van veiligheidsbetrekkingen tussen de Europese Unie (EU) en Afrika als bolwerk tegen internationaal terrorisme en andere gevaren. Na deze aanvallen begonnen internationale actoren met het ontwikkelen van nieuwe beleidsvormen om hun "strategic security partnership" (SSP) met Afrika te versterken. Binnen de context van de SSP ontwikkelde de EU een strategisch samenwerkingsbetrekking met Afrikaanse organisaties op het gebied van vrede en veiligheid.

Sinds 2000 zorgen interne en externe ontwikkelingen ervoor dat Afrikaanse leiders geforceerd worden een actievere rol te spelen in het behoud van vrede en veiligheid en de verbetering van veiligheidsbetrekkingen met de EU. Nog belangrijker voor de ontwikkeling van de betrekkingen tussen Afrika en internationale actoren, met name die van de EU, was de oprichting van de Afrikaanse Unie (AU) in 2002 en de New Partnership for African's Development (NEPAD) in 2001. De EU en de AU hebben gemeenschappelijk veiligheidsbeleid ontwikkeld om conflicten en oorlogen te voorkomen en vrede en veiligheid te behouden. In deze studie is de methode van "process-tracing" (PT) gebruikt om de volgende onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden:

1. Wat zijn de belangrijkste mechanismen en elementen voor de samenwerking op veiligheidsgebied tussen Afrika en de EU?
2. Waarom streeft de EU naar een SSP met Afrika?
3. Wat bepaald het samenwerkingsverband tussen Afrikaanse regionale organisaties en de EU?
4. Hoe kan een SSP tussen deze ongelijke actoren worden vastgelegd?

Economische en politieke belangen hebben een belangrijke rol gespeeld in de vorming van het concept: strategische coöperatie. Volgens het realisme is het moeizaam een strategische coöperatie tussen twee ongelijke actoren te vormen, aangezien de kans bestaat dat de sterkere partij de zwakkere zal proberen uit te buiten. Hoewel er een samenwerking is tussen internationale actoren, richt elke actor zich op eigen economische en politieke belangen. Deze studie betoogd dat door de substantiële economische en politieke belangen van de EU in Afrika, de EU wordt gedwongen om de veiligheidsbetrekkingen met Afrikaanse organisaties te versterken. Na de implementatie van de eerste veiligheidsstrategie in 2003, genaamd de European Security Strategy (ESS), heeft de EU besloten om z'n institutionele banden met Afrikaanse organisaties te versterken om haar belangen op het wereldtoneel te behouden en bij te dragen aan wereldvrede en veiligheid. Na de implementatie van de ESS was het versterken van de veiligheidsbetrekkingen met Afrika een prioriteit voor de EU. Volgens deze studie blijken internationaal terrorisme, drugshandel, mislukte staten, conflicten en oorlogen de belangrijkste factoren te zijn voor de vorming van veiligheidsbetrekkingen tussen de twee actoren.

Aanhangers van het liberalisme stellen dat samenwerking tussen verschillende actoren mogelijk is en dat dit noodzakelijk is om gevaren en uitdagingen effectiever te bestrijden in toenemende sociale, economische en politieke ontwikkelingen. Bovendien kunnen strategische samenwerkingsverbanden ook de afhankelijkheid tussen verschillende actoren versterken waardoor mogelijke conflicten en oorlogen worden voorkomen. In dit verband heeft de EU haar veiligheidsbetrekkingen met Afrikaanse organisaties versterkt en steunde hun financieel en op politiek gebied. Vervolgens heeft deze studie ook onderzocht hoe de EU de SSP met Afrika heeft gevormd om haar normen en waarden te verspreiden, om haar belangen in de wereld te behouden, om de Afrikaanse regionale organisaties te versterken en om een bijdrage te leveren aan wereldvrede en veiligheid.

Het begrijpen van de onderliggende oorzaken van conflicten en oorlogen is van essentieel belang bij het vaststellen van een sterke SSP tussen de twee continenten. Echter, verscheidene factoren ondermijnen de veiligheid in Afrika, waaronder de belangen van internationale actoren, de erfenis van het kolonialisme, gebrek aan cohesie tussen Afrikaanse naties en corruptie. Het gebrek aan eenheid en solidariteit tussen Afrikaanse organisaties verzwakt hun onderlinge vredes- en veiligheidsstrategieën en hun veiligheidsrelaties met internationale actoren. Verbetering van veiligheidsbetrekkingen tussen Afrikaanse landen is noodzakelijk om een sterkere SSP met de EU te kunnen bewerkstelligen. Afrikaanse organisaties zullen

zelfstandig hun eigen veiligheidsbetrekkingen moeten ontwikkelen waarbij economische en politieke belangen de samenwerkingsbetrekkingen zullen bepalen tussen Afrika en de EU. Nieuwe bedreigingen en uitdagingen, waaronder de huidige Eurocrisis en mogelijke uitbreiding van de Europese Unie, zullen veiligheidsbetrekkingen tussen Europa en Afrika blijven beïnvloeden. Uit deze studie blijkt dat het gebrek aan een gemeenschappelijk Europees buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid, Europa's mondiale macht en veiligheidsbetrekking met Afrika ondermijnt. Hoewel de oprichting van een SSP tussen Afrika en de EU mogelijk is, wordt het bemoeilijkt door de interne problemen van Afrika. Verschillende motieven drijven de SSP tussen Afrika en de EU aan en uit deze studie blijkt dat de EU haar financiële macht heeft gebruikt om haar veiligheidsbetrekkingen met Afrika te vormen. Dit brengt het gevaar met zich mee dat Afrikaanse organisaties afhankelijk blijven van buitenlandse machten.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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