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**Imitating the newcomer. How, when and why established political parties imitate the policy positions and issue attention of new political parties in the electoral and parliamentary arena: the case of the Netherlands**

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## **Chapter 6: When new parties win or when established parties lose?**

*When new political parties influence the election manifestos of established parties*

*“Of course the Union will not obtain a majority in the Tweede Kamer, or even become one of the major parties in the short term, even though there are approximately 3.5 million potential voters of 55 and older. Yet her influence can be large. Every seat won will come at the expense of another party. Because the manifesto will appeal to the Dutch people and it can certainly not be conceived of as extreme, the established parties will, in order to limit the loss of votes, take over points from this programme, and where this is not the case, the Political Union 55+ will let her voice be heard and it will continually draw attention to points from its programme. By forcing change in the positions of the established parties and through its own contributions, the Political Union 55+ will achieve its goals.” Politieke Unie 55+ (1994, 15 translation SO)*

*“The issue of integration was included prominently as first issue in the manifesto, the theme of 'security' as the second. We wanted to show that we had learned lessons from the results of May 15 [2002 in which the LPF won 26 seats and the PvdA lost 22 seats – SO].” Ruud Koole, chair of the PvdA 2001-2005 and 2007 (2010, 213-214)*

### **6.1 Introduction**

Some new parties are frank about their goals. The pensioners' party Union 55+ did not expect to become a major political player. It expected that it could influence politics by influencing the established parties. Its reasoning was that its entry into the political arena would cause parties to lose votes and that established parties would respond to that electoral incentive. The quote from Koole shows that these considerations do play a role when established parties write their manifestos. After the poor election results of the PvdA in 2002, the party leadership decided to send voters a signal by increasing attention to the integration of immigrants and security: the PvdA had learned the lesson from the elections and would no longer neglect the issues that the LPF brought centre stage. This chapter is going to assess whether the case of

the PvdA in 2002 is a single isolated case and whether the U55+ was correct in its assessment of electoral competition: do parties take over policies from the manifestos of new parties? And do electoral incentives play a role?

Previous studies have looked at the effect of new political parties on the positions that established parties take in their election manifestos or the attention that they devote to issues in their election manifestos (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Huijbrechts 2006). These studies found limited effects of new political parties on the programmes of established parties. The difference between the electoral and the parliamentary arena may influence the extent to which and the conditions under which established political parties respond to new political parties: in the electoral arena, parties have a particular incentive to focus on their own issue. Finally, there is a timing issue: it may be the case that established political parties respond to new political parties after they enter parliament. It may also be the case that they do so in the election in which these new parties enter. Therefore, it is prudent to look at both anticipatory and reactive behaviour: to study the behaviour of established political parties in the election in which and after which the new party enters parliament. The main question of this chapter is: when, under what conditions, and to what extent do established political parties imitate the positions that new parties take and the attention that new parties devote to issues?

This chapter finds that new political parties have, under specific conditions, a limited effect on the attention that established political parties devote to issues and the positions that they take on them. The results found here are weaker, less significant and less consistent than the results found in chapter 5. For as far as new political parties do have an effect, this only becomes apparent under specific conditions, which mainly have to do with electoral incentives. Moreover, parties tend to anticipate the entry of new political parties into the parliamentary arena instead of respond to them after they have entered parliament.

## *6.2 Case-by-case analyses*

The following sections will assess the effect of individual new parties on the programmes of individual established parties. The goal of these sections is to assess the extent to which change of the established parties can be attributed to the entry of the new party and to find which factors may play a role. This section shows that the specific features of every case matter greatly in understanding the exact patterns. The

reactions of established parties do not form a uniform pattern, nor can one identify clear consistent patterns between different cases. A secondary concern of these case-by-case analyses is to see whether there is reason to expect anticipatory behaviour from established parties, and to see whether in terms of attention anticipatory behaviour can be identified in each case.<sup>182</sup>

### *6.2.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics*

In 1948 the KNP entered parliament. During the 1948 election campaign the party focused on the Catholic People's Party KVP. There is good reason to expect that the KVP in particular anticipated the entry of the KNP: KNP-founder Welter left the KVP after he was removed from that party's list. The patterns of attention of two parties are shown in figure 6.1: the KVP and the VVD. Most parties followed the pattern of the KVP: this party increased their attention to the issue between 1946 and 1948, but decreased their attention to the colonial affairs in their 1952 election manifesto. The KVP, the party from which the KNP split and which it challenged, did not react markedly different from the other parties. The increased attention to colonial affairs between 1946 and 1948 can best be explained by the developments in Indonesia: the 1948 elections were called in order to ratify a constitutional amendment about Indonesian sovereignty. After the transfer of sovereignty, many parties devoted less attention to colonial affairs. The small increase in the attention of the KVP in the 1948 elections could be interpreted in terms of anticipation, but the constitutional amendment is a more likely explanation. The patterns in attention in parliament could also best be explained by the pattern of decision-making. The attention that the VVD devoted to colonial affairs is different from the other parties. It moves from no attention in 1946 to more than 20% of its election manifesto in 1948. The party caused the fall of the Drees/Van Schaik cabinet over an aspect of colonial policy. The large increase seen in the case of the VVD is more likely the result of the liberals explaining why they let the cabinet fall over New Guinea than a reaction to the KNP. It may be the case that the KNP influenced the positions of established

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<sup>182</sup> The analyses do not look at anticipatory behaviour for positions: analysing anticipatory behaviour for party positions in each of these micro-analyses would be possible, but quite confusing because one would need to represent two patterns in positions because studying anticipation in this way requires a different conceptualisation of the notion of unicity.

Figure 6.1: attention of KVP and VVD to colonial affairs





Figure 6.2: position of KVP and ARP on unique proposals of the KNP



parties. Almost all parties<sup>183</sup> moved from a neutral to a positive or from negative to a neutral position on the unique proposals of the KNP. Two parties are shown in figure 6.2: the ARP, which represents the most common development in position, and the KVP, which showed an extreme development in position. The KVP moved from a generally negative assessment of the KNP programme, to a generally positive one. This development consisted of four changes. This includes an item concerning the Catholic nature of the KVP: while the KVP had downplayed its Catholic identity before the entry of the KNP, it clearly stated its Catholic roots after the entry of the Catholic competitor. Another change concerns the support for emigration to New Guinea and Surinam. This is a minor colonial policy, which the KVP adopted in 1952. The KNP's opposition to the independence of Indonesia is not unique as both the SGP and the ARP also opposed decolonisation. All in all, the KNP has had a clear effect on the positions of the KVP, but less so on the attention it devoted to issues.


#### *6.2.2 PSP: dissenting socialists*

Before the PSP won its first seats in national parliament, the party had gained national attention when it won seats in the 1958 Provincial States elections. The PSP challenged the PvdA and, to a lesser extent, the CPN for accepting the Cold War mentality. Three patterns of attention to defence are shown in figure 6.3. The ARP represents the mean pattern: a small increase, which as was the case for attention in parliament, could be explained by the warming of the Cold War. The PvdA and CPN increased attention to defence markedly.<sup>184</sup> Both parties may have felt the need to react to the entry of a small leftwing socialist, anti-militarist party that shared their historic commitment to socialism and disarmament. These parties may have anticipated the entry of the PSP, by markedly increasing their attention to defence between 1956 and 1959. In figure 6.4, three patterns in position are presented: for the CHU (representing the mean pattern), the PvdA and the CPN. Before the entry of the PSP, most parties disagreed with the party. After its entry, most parties still disagreed with it in general, but many had decreased their level of disagreement, like the CHU. The PvdA, which was challenged by the PSP, moved to disagreeing more with the


<sup>183</sup> The only exceptions are the VVD and the SGP.

<sup>184</sup> The CPN devoted a large portion of its manifestos on defence. This high level may be caused because no official CPN manifestos are available for 1959 and 1963 in the archives of the DNPP or the IISG. Therefore, (shorter) pamphlets were used.

**Figure 6.3: attention of ARP, CPN and PvdA to defense**



**Figure 6.4: position of PvdA, CHU and CPN on unique proposals of the PSP**



PSP. The PvdA's 1963 programme was more supportive of the Dutch military and less supportive of the specific PSP-policies, such as the abolition of conscription. The CPN was the only one to agree more with the party than it disagreed.

The PvdA did anticipate the PSP, by emphasising defence, but it did not take over the PSP's policies. The CPN, however, which shared the socialism and the opposition to nuclear weapons of the PSP, did show consistent signs of increasing agreement and anticipation in attention. In summary, the CPN responded to the entry of the PSP: its policy positions became more similar to the PSP, and it also devoted more attention to the issue of the PSP. For the PvdA, the party that the PSP challenged, the pattern is less clear: it marginally increased attention to defence, but moved to disagree more with the PSP's programme.

### *6.2.3 BP: farmers in protest*

After supporting the farmers' protests in Hollandscheveld, the farmers' party BP won three seats in the 1963 elections. The media attention to the actions of the Free Farmers makes it likely that established parties anticipated the new party. Most parties, like the VVD shown in figure 6.5, decreased their attention to agriculture.<sup>185</sup> This fits the expectation formulated for the parliamentary arena: the decreasing importance of the agricultural sector, combined with Europeanisation of agricultural policies and, to a lesser extent, the corporatist organisation of agricultural policies, caused decreasing political attention to agriculture. The patterns in attention show no sign of anticipation. In contrast to the effects on attention (where no imitation was observed), parties did take over policies of the BP. The parties that show the most marked pattern in attention are VVD and PvdA. Figure 6.6 illustrates how the VVD took over the BP's opposition to high employers' premiums for social insurances and its opposition to government subsidies. The PvdA had supported the corporatist organisation of agriculture, but no longer talked about this issue in 1967. There is no clear effect of the BP on the attention that established parties devoted to agriculture. In contrast, the BP had an effect on the positions that parties took. Agriculture became less important, and (perhaps because of that) parties ceased talking about the corporatist organisation of agriculture.

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<sup>185</sup> The only two parties that increased their attention to agriculture were the PSP and the SGP. In 1959 they both had a short programme. In 1967 they had much longer manifestos. They moved from no to a small number proposals on agriculture.



**Figure 6.5: attention of VVD to agriculture****Figure 6.6: position of PvdA and VVD on unique proposals of the BP**

Figure 6.7: attention of SGP and GPV to moral issues







Figure 6.8: attention of ARP, PSP, VVD, KVP and CDA to moral issues




**Figure 6.9: position of ARP and SGP on unique proposals of the GPV**



**Figure 6.10: position of CDA and GPV on unique proposals of the RKPN**



**Figure 6.11: position of CDA, SGP and GPV on unique proposals of the RPF**



#### 6.2.4 GPV, RKPN and RPF: orthodox dissent

Between 1963 and 1981, three small Christian parties entered parliament: the *Vrijgemaakte* GPV, the Catholic RKPN and the *Gereformeerde* RPF. These three parties shared a common focus on moral issues. Meanwhile, the religious parties from which these new parties split began to moderate. The GPV, RKPN and the RPF are likely to be anticipated by the established parties because they attempted to enter parliament on multiple occasions.

The patterns of attention to moral issues are presented in figures 6.7 and 6.8. Seven parties are selected: the SGP and GPV, as orthodox Protestant parties. These parties are presented separately in figure 6.7. The GPV is selected to examine its reactions to the entry of the RPF and RKPN. In addition, the ARP, KVP and CDA, parties that were challenged by these new religious parties, and the VVD and PSP, as examples of secular parties, are selected as well. The GPV entered the Dutch parliament in 1963. The most marked change visible before and after this period is for the SGP: a decrease from more than 50% to less than 20%. The reason for this is that the SGP published its first real election manifesto in 1967. Instead of the 1918 manifesto, which was occasionally amended to reflect political changes, the SGP

published a set of concrete demands in 1967. This contained less emphasis on the religious issues than the 1918 manifesto. After the entry in 1967 of the GPV, a new orthodox Protestant party, the SGP published a more concrete election manifesto. The entry of an equally orthodox Protestant party that had a more modern form of political communication, may have contributed to this decision. If one looks at the other developments in attention in figure 6.8, one can see the following: most parties increase their attention for moral issues. Some parties show marginal increases (such as the PSP, the ARP and the VVD), and others more marked increases (for the KVP). The ARP shows signs of anticipation, increasing more sharply in attention before 1963 than after 1963. All in all, four established parties increase attention to moral issues and four decrease attention to moral issues.

Except for the ARP and the SGP, the morally most conservative parties, all parties became more interested in moral issues in this period. The explanation does not lie in the entry of the GPV, however. Figure 6.8 shows what is going on: attention to moral issues peaks in 1971, especially for the VVD and the PSP; the increase in 1967 appears to be only a first step in this development. After 1971, attention to moral issues declines, but it remains on a higher level than before 1971. These developments are most marked for secular parties. This appears to be rather the effect of the developing women's movement than the effect of the GPV, especially given the marked increase in the period after the GPV's first parliamentary period.

The effect of the RKPN is difficult to identify because of this development: 1967 is taken as the before year for the RKPN and 1977 as the after year. For many parties there is a peak in between these years (in 1971), compared to which the change between 1967 and 1977 seems insignificant. The CDA-in-formation, which the RKPN challenged, decreased its attention to the issue. Within the larger pattern however it appears not to be the entry of the RKPN that has influenced patterns of attention, but rather the pattern of politicization of women's issues in early 1970s. The same pattern was found in the study of the RKPN's effect in parliament.

The final party examined here is the RPF: between 1977 and 1982 the SGP, the GPV and the PSP (and the CPN as well) increase their attention to moral issues; the CDA and the VVD (in addition to the PvdA, PPR and D66) decrease their attention. The CDA, the party that the RPF challenged, markedly decreased attention to the issue. After the resolution of the abortion question in 1981 the parties on the margins, the GPV and the SGP (anti-abortion) and the PSP (pro-women's rights)

continued to focus on the question (Outshoorn 1986). Attention to these issues in parliament showed a similar pattern.

Parties disagreed with the GPV in 1959, and on the whole, parties disagreed (slightly) less with the party in 1963. The ARP and SGP's positional reactions to the GPV are presented in figure 6.9. The only exception was the SGP, which moved from a neutral stance to agreement. The fact that the SGP wrote a completely new manifesto in 1967 played a role in this process. The SGP and the ARP were most positive about the GPV program in 1967. These changes did not concern the morally conservative proposals of the GPV, but they concerned issues like land management and housing. One can similarly see marked increases on the religious side for the RKPN as well. The reactions of the CDA and GPV are shown in figure 6.10. Especially the GPV included many of the unique proposals of the RKPN in its manifesto. The GPV and the CDA parties followed the RKPN in explicitly opposing abortion, which they did not do in 1971. The GPV showed similarity to the RKPN on a range of policies from defence spending to tax reduction. The RPF also mainly elicited imitation from religious parties. The reactions of the CDA, SGP and GPV to this party are shown in figure 6.11. The GPV moved from neutrality to agreement with the RPF. The RPF policies to support the traditional conception of the family (restrictions of divorce and limiting the participation of women on the labour market) proved especially controversial: religious parties like the GPV copied these positions, while secular parties explicitly opposed them. Parties that were ideologically close to the RKPN and RPF responded more to them than others.

On the whole, the effects of these new religious parties are mostly limited to the policy positions of the established religious parties, and to a lesser extent to the attention that these religious parties devote to issues.

#### *6.2.5 D66 and DS'70: democratic idealists and moderates*


In 1967 and 1971, two parties entered the Dutch parliament that shared a common focus on government reform. D66 was formed by *homines novi*, who felt that the political system had to be reformed. Before entering into the 1967 election, the group asked voters whether they felt a need for a new party, a public appeal. This Appeal '66 got considerable media attention. DS'70 was formed by a group of prominent PvdA members, who felt that the PvdA had moved too far to the left. Their

departure from the PvdA was well publicised. Therefore, there is good reason to expect that the established parties anticipated DS'70.


Of the ten parties that were in parliament, seven increased their attention to governance between 1967 and 1971. In figure 6.12 one can see two examples: the PvdA and the KVP. The exceptions are among the small parties, such as the SGP, but the CPN and the GPV decreased their attention as well. There were consistent differences between the two groups: parties that agreed more with the positions of D66 tended to react more than parties that did not. Moreover, large systemic parties increased their attention more than the smaller marginal parties. In several of these larger parties there were internal movements that called for political reform, such as the New Left in the PvdA and the Christian Radicals in the KVP, which may also have contributed to their change in attention. Most parties showed a continued increase between 1963 and 1971, indicating that they both anticipated the entry of D66 in 1967 and responded to its entry after it entered. On the whole, D66 has had a marked effect on the attention that parties devoted to issues. After DS'70 entered parliament in 1971, parties tended to devote less attention to governance. Out of the nine parties, three increased their attention to governance, but most parties devoted less attention to it. Like the PvdA, these parties decreased their attention to governance marginally. The SGP and CDA devoted marginally more attention to governance. Part of these increases can actually be attributed to the peak that most parties show in 1971. As most parties increased attention between 1963 and 1971, it is more likely that this peak is an effect of D66, than anticipation of DS70. The patterns found here for the electoral arena is similar to the parliamentary arena.

The positional reactions of three parties to the entry of D66 are shown in figure 6.13. The proposals of D66 were truly unique in the sense that parties did not even oppose them before the entry of the party. In the 1967 elections, one can see that some parties opposed the proposals of D66: the VVD especially, but its reaction is representative of the ARP and CHU as well. The other parties moved to sharply supporting the policies of D66 in 1971. The PvdA showed the most marked increase. The marked increase for the PvdA could in part be attributed to the formation of the New Left in the PvdA, which shared D66's agenda for political reform. For instance, no party discussed electoral system reform before 1967, but almost every party does so in 1971. Most parties opposed it, especially the smaller ones. This explains the disagreement of the SGP, which is representative of the CPN and the GPV as well.

**Figure 6.12: attention of KVP, CDA, SGP and PvdA to governance**



**Figure 6.13: position of PvdA, VVD and SGP on unique proposals of D66**





Parties did not just copy D66's proposals on government reform, on women's emancipation and on education, but on the whole, the program of D66 has been taken over by the established parties in its entire breadth. Especially parties that already agreed with the D66 programme took over elements from the D66 programme.

DS'70 is a different story. It elicited null-reactions from many of the established parties. Therefore it is not presented graphically. The PvdA, the party that the DS'70 challenged did not react visibly to it. There were some reactions from some parties: especially the PSP stood out. While DS'70 represented the side of the social democratic movement that felt that the PvdA had become too radical, the PSP represented the side that felt that the PvdA was not radical enough. Even though the PSP opposed some positions of DS'70 (military-industrial cooperation within NATO, for instance), it moved to agree with DS'70 on a whole range of social issues from orienting education towards the wishes of the youth to housing policy for singles.


While the patterns for DS'70 are erratic and appear to be unrelated to the party's entry, the pattern for D66 can be attributed to D66. In this comparison between D66 and DS'70, it is clear that the first had a more marked effect. For as far as DS'70 had an effect it was on the PSP, but D66 had effect across the board.

#### *6.2.6 PPR: radicalising radicals*

The PPR first won seats in parliament in 1971, but the party had *de facto* operated in parliament since 1968, when the group-Aarden formed a separate parliamentary group. Therefore, there is good reason to expect anticipation. Most parties increased their attention to the environment; most followed the pattern of the CDA that is shown in figure 6.14: a marked increase in attention to the environment. The entry of the PPR coincided with a greening of parties across the entire spectrum. In the parliamentary arena a similar pattern was found for the attention to the environment between 1971 and 1977, which was not attributed to the entry of the PPR, but to increasing environmental policies. The same explanation seems likely to explain these patterns here as well. The effect of the PPR on positions is presented in figure 6.15: most parties, as the CDA in the figure, showed no reaction. Only the progressive partners of the PPR (PSP, D66 and PvdA, the PvdA is shown as an example of them) showed an increase in agreement with the PPR's unique proposals between 1967 and 1977. These parties also agreed with the PPR in 1967, while those

**Figure 6.14: attention of CDA to the environment****Figure 6.15: position of CDA and PvdA on unique proposals of the PPR**

that did not agree reacted less. The copying of policies by progressive partners is likely to be an effect of the coordinated progressive cooperation between these parties. The reactions did not concern the environmental concerns of the PPR, but its leftwing credentials: most reactions concern healthcare insurance or taxes on luxury products. In summary, one cannot attribute the change in attention for the environment to the PPR, while one can attribute the more marginal changes in the positions of the PPR's allies to the PPR.

**Figure 6.16: attention of VVD to economic affairs**

#### 6.2.7 NMP: small business owners in protest

The NMP entered parliament in 1971 and disappeared again in 1972. The established parties did not anticipate the entry of the NMP. To examine the NMP's effect, the attention that established parties devoted to economic affairs is examined. Almost all parties decreased their attention to this issue, as an example the attention of the VVD to this issue is shown in figure 6.16. There is no clear effect of the NMP on the attention that established parties devoted to economic affairs. Looking at party positions, one should note that the NMP had only two unique proposals. The only reaction that is visible is from the BP and it concerns only one policy. This party first disagreed with raising taxes on gasoline, and moved to neutrality on this proposal. All in all, the NMP had almost no effect on established parties, therefore it is not represented graphically.

Figure 6.17: attention of PvdA and CDA to defense






Figure 6.18: position of CDA, PSP and PvdA on unique proposals of the EVP




### 6.2.8 EVP: *progressive Protestants*

The EVP was formed as a split from the CDA. The formation of the EVP followed a long and well-publicised internal debate within the CDA. Therefore, there is good reason to expect that parties anticipated the entry of the EVP. This small leftwing party focused on peace politics. The attention of two parties to defence is shown in figure 6.17. They represent two developments: five parties increased their attention to defence; the PvdA exemplifies these parties. This group includes two parties that favoured the stationing of nuclear weapons (GPV and SGP) and two parties that opposed it (PSP and PPR). The other four parties reduced their attention to defence (this included the D66 and CPN that also opposed the placement of nuclear weapons). The CDA is selected as an example of these. For both groups, one can see a peak in the parties' attention in 1982. This can also be explained by the nuclear arms talks. When comparing 1981 to 1986, one can see a decline for the CDA and an increase for the PvdA. Looking at the positions shown in figure 6.18, one can see reactions across the board: three parties are selected to illustrate this pattern. While most parties (except for the PvdA and the PPR) disagreed with the unique proposals of the EVP before its entry, parties tended to agree with them after its entry. The PSP agreed most with the party. The increase in agreement is mostly on foreign policies: such as debt relief for developing countries. The EVP had a relatively many unique proposals. The increases concern a marginal number of positions: most parties moved from disagreeing with one or two of the more than 84 unique proposals of the EVP to agreeing with some of them. The EVP has not had a strong effect on party positions or on the attention that established parties devoted to defence.

**Figure 6.19: attention of PSP, SGP and PvdA to immigration**



**Figure 6.20: position of PvdA and SGP on unique proposals of the CP**



### *6.2.9 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics*

The CP entered the Dutch parliament 1981. Its entry was not widely expected: rather, many parties were shocked by the entry of an anti-immigration party in parliament. The attention of three parties to immigration is shown in figure 6.19. Three parties decreased the attention that they devoted to immigration after the entry of the new party, as the PvdA in the figure, and five increased their attention, as the PSP and SGP in the figure. In addition to the SGP and the PSP, the GPV, PPR and D66 increased their attention to immigration. These included parties with more conservative positions on immigration (GPV, SGP) and parties with progressive stances on immigration (PSP, D66 and PPR). As far as there is any pattern, it appears that parties that lost votes in the 1982 election reacted more to the entry of the CP. It may also be the case that the small parties of the left such as the PSP and the PPR may have increased their attention after the entry of the CP in order to emphasise its opposition to the CP: these leftwing parties were opposed to what they perceived as the CP's racism. The increase in attention clearly followed the entry of the CP: there is no sign of anticipation. In the parliamentary arena, parties also increased their attention to migration in reaction to the entry of the CP. In figure 6.20 one can see the patterns in position for two parties. One should note that the CP's unique proposals did not concern its anti-immigration positions: its manifesto was relatively soft on immigration. It favoured remigration (as did the CDA, RPF and GPV), opposed voting rights for migrants (as did the VVD) and action against illegal immigrants (as did the VVD and the GPV). Most parties moved to disagree less with the CP. The movement of many parties concerned special housing policies for migrants. No party moved to agree with the CP that Dutch people should not be discriminated against in housing policies, but some parties, like the PvdA, no longer explicitly supported special housing policies for migrants. Parties that lost votes in the 1982 election tended to react more. The effect of the CP is concentrated on smaller, ideologically more extreme parties: the smaller parties of the left and the right had increased their attention to immigration in their election manifestos. The party's effect on party positions is marginal. Therefore the effect of this party is not presented graphically.


### *6.2.10 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters*

The size of the electoral support of the AOV in the 1994 election was unexpected, but both the AOV and the U55+ had tested their support by entering in the 1994 municipal election. The entry of these two elderly parties therefore could have been anticipated by the established parties. After the entry of the AOV and the U55+, almost all parties increased their attention to healthcare. The developments in attention of three parties are shown in figure 6.21: the CDA increased its attention by half a percentage point, and the PvdA by six percentage points. GL (and the RPF) decreased their attention to health. The AOV and U55+ had a consistent effect: after the entry of these two pensioners' parties most parties increased their attention to healthcare. This defies the patterns in the parliamentary arena, where declining attention to the issue after the 1994 elections was observed. In these different arenas, different mechanism may play a role: established parties may have sought to appeal to the electoral niche that the AOV left before imploding, by writing about healthcare in their election manifestos. Most parties increased their attention to the issue after the entry of the AOV and U55+ into parliament, showing no signs of anticipation.


When one examines positions, one has to distinguish between the U55+ and the AOV, which had different unique proposals. The U55+ had only 14 unique proposals. Only the PvdA and D66 change their view on any of these issues; both parties agree with the U55+ that society should increase its respect for manual labour. One would have to conclude that parties did not react markedly to the limited number of unique proposals of the U55+ in their election manifestos. Therefore the effect of this party is not presented graphically. Turning to the AOV, presented in figure 6.22, one can observe more variance. Two parties are shown as an example: the CDA and the RPF. Most parties like the RPF started out disagreeing with some elements of the party's unique proposals. In addition to the VVD and the GPV, the CDA and the RPF moved to agree with the AOV more than that they disagreed. That is, most parties on the (centre-)right, which tended to agree with the whole AOV programme already before 1994. They agreed with the AOV that reducing government spending and extending the tax base for the government pension premium was necessary.

The pensioners' parties did have an effect on the established parties in the electoral arena. Almost all parties increased their attention to healthcare after the entry of the AOV and U55+, and especially parties on the right (which already tended to agree with the AOV) took over their policy positions. The U55+, whose ambitions

**Figure 6.21: attention of PvdA, CDA and GL to healthcare**



**Figure 6.22: position of CDA and RPF on unique proposals of the AOV**





were cited in the introduction, has had a marginal effect on the established parties, perhaps because it only had one seat in parliament but mainly because its positions were so moderate that they were not unique.

#### *6.2.11 SP: a leftwing challenger*

The SP had tried to enter parliament five times before winning a seat in 1994. The party had already won representation in municipal and provincial councils. One can expect that parties anticipated the entry of the party. The SP is a radical leftwing party that focused on a range of social-economic issues. The party's effect on attention to labour issues is examined, as a prime example of its economically leftwing appeal. Its 31 unique proposals cover a range of issues from foreign policy to health and labour. Two exemplary patterns in attention are shown in figure 6.23. The VVD is one of only two parties that increased their attention to labour. The other one is the SGP. The other parties decreased their attention to the issue, though most did so only marginally. The PvdA, the party that the SP challenged, also shown in figure 6.23, showed no special reaction to this newcomer. The VVD stood on the other side of the electoral spectrum, far from the SP. The only explanation, related to the SP, for the VVD to increase their attention is that by picking a fight with the SP these parties may have wanted to increase the legitimacy of the SP in order to let it siphon votes away from the PvdA. On the whole, however, the SP did not influence attention to labour issues, neither in terms of anticipation, nor reaction. These marginal developments cannot, however, be explained by economic circumstances. The rising unemployment led to higher levels of attention to the labour market after 1994.



In order to study the SP's effect on party positions, the VVD and the PvdA are selected as examples and shown in figure 6.24. The first thing that is noted is that all parties dominantly disagree with the SP; even the PvdA (but also the GL) disagree with more than one of the SP's unique proposals. The SP's opposition to the free market, alternative medicine, European integration, the UN Security Council and environmental taxes were especially contentious. Most shifts came from parties becoming silent on one of these (and other) extremist positions. Parties that tended to disagree with the SP (such as the PvdA) showed the most reactions. These results, however, should be interpreted with some caution, because, on the whole, they do not concern parties agreeing more with the programme of the SP, but they concern parties

**Figure 6.23: attention of PvdA and VVD to labour****Figure 6.24: position of VVD and PvdA on unique proposals of the SP**


explicitly dropping opposition to some of the policies of the SP. On the whole, the effect of the SP on the established parties has been limited. Only a few established parties increased their attention to labour, selected as the distinctive social economic issue of the SP. In terms of positions, parties dominantly disagreed with the unique proposals of the SP, whether before or after its entry. Parties that lost votes in the 1994 elections tended to take over more positions than parties that did not.

#### *6.2.12 LN: democratic populists*


There were good reasons for the established parties to have anticipated the entry of LN: the party was already formed in 1999, as joint venture of members of several prominent local parties, whose entry into the Hilversum and Utrecht city council was well-publicised. The developments in attention of two exemplary parties are shown in figure 6.25: the PvdA and D66. Most parties like the PvdA marginally decreased their attention to governance. D66 (in addition to VVD and SGP) showed an increase in attention. The effect of D66 may be seen as a response to the entry of LN: D66 was itself created as a government reform party. LN advocated many policies that D66 had endorsed previously: elected mayors, referendums and electoral reform. While D66 did not speak out on these issues before the entry of the LN, it became more outspoken about these issues in 2003. It may have responded to the entry of this kindred party by re-emphasising their own solutions. The marginally declining levels of attention to governance reflected the parliamentary agenda, where attention to the issue also declined. There are no signs of anticipation. The programme of LN showed similarities to the manifesto of D66, which, like LN, was a centrist party with a historic focus on government reform. Out of the 100 proposals in the LN programme, only 11 are unique. Parties only changed their opinion on a single proposal: the LN proposal to make car taxes dependent on gasoline use. Parties moved from disagreeing with this proposal to becoming neutral on it. On the whole, LN did not influence the attention that established parties devoted to issues or the positions that they held on them. Therefore the effect of this party is not presented graphically.

**Figure 6.25: attention of PvdA and D66 to governance****Figure 6.26: attention of PvdA, VVD, GL and CDA to immigration**

**Figure 6.27: position of GL, D66 and VVD  
on unique proposals of the LPF**



**Figure 6.28: position of SP, D66 and VVD  
on unique proposals of the PVV**



### 6.2.13 PVV and LPF: the return and persistence of anti-immigration politics

As Koole (2010) testified above, some established parties felt the need to show the electorate that they had learned a lesson from the election results of 2002. Since fall of 2001 first LN and then LPF had performed well in the polls, therefore established parties may have anticipated the LPF's entry. The PVV first entered in the 2006 elections, but had already been in parliament in 2004. There were, therefore, good reasons for parties to have anticipated the entry of the PVV in 2006.

In order to examine the effect of the LPF on immigration, the 2002 and the 2003 election manifestos will be examined. The data are presented in figure 6.26. Most parties increased their attention to immigration between 1998 and 2003: GL more than doubled its attention to the issue. Most parties that increased their attention to immigration did so in 2002, which is a sign of anticipation. The increase occurred within a political context: the events of 9/11 may also, in part, have increased attention for immigration and integration issues. In the Netherlands, the LPF was the catalyst for this development. In 2006, the LPF disappeared from the scene and it was succeeded as the parliamentary anti-immigration party by the PVV. The PvdA, VVD and GL (in addition to SGP and CU) increased their attention to immigration between 2003 and 2010. There are less signs of anticipation here: the VVD, for instance, markedly decreased its attention in 2006, only to increase it markedly in 2010 after the PVV entered parliament. The VVD devoted little attention to immigration in its 2006 election manifesto. In this election the PVV won nine seats, while the VVD performed poorly. The VVD may have attributed this loss to its lack of attention to migration. Moreover the VVD faced competition from Trots (*Trots op Nederland*/Proud of the Netherlands) a party formed by its former #2 and former minister of immigration Rita Verdonk in the 2010 election. This party however did not obtain parliamentary representation. The fact that almost all parties increased their attention to immigration after the entry of the LPF corroborates the notion of an 'LPF-effect' on attention to immigration. Although less strong, a similar pattern was identified for the parliamentary arena. The increase in the attention that parties, especially the VVD, devoted to immigration after the entry of the PVV also corroborates the notion that there was a 'PVV-effect' on the attention that parties devoted to immigration. As seen in chapter 5, the increasing attention to immigration after 2002 cannot be explained by the levels of immigration.

The many of anti-immigration proposals of the LPF were not unique and therefore not included in the analysis: 1998 the SP already supported preventing ethnic segregation of schools and neighbourhoods, and the VVD already wanted to limit migration for the purpose of family formation. Most policies of the LPF are not unique in the strictest sense because the VVD and the SGP included similar proposals in their 2002 manifestos. This is likely to be a form of anticipation, but in this analysis of positional reactions, it means that these issues are not included in the analysis. As shown in figure 6.27, parties tended to disagree with the unique proposals of the LPF. Three parties are selected as examples: the GL, the VVD and D66. Between 1998 and 2003, however, parties became more positive about the policies of the LPF. The two exceptions were the GL and the CDA. The parties that reacted most to the entry of the LPF were those that tended to agree with the LPF, such as the VVD. They mostly agreed with the LPF's market-based economic policies. These parties moved in a range of issues. The VVD moved to agree on several anti-immigration measures, but also on reducing police bureaucracy and making the police accountable for their results.

Parties responded differently to the entry of the PVV (as shown in figure 6.28): the VVD and the SP are shown as examples. These parties disagreed with the PVV programme in 2003, but by 2010 these two parties, together with the SGP, had moved to agree more with the party in general. The SP is a peculiar case: it was not outspoken on the unique proposals of the PVV in 2003 or 2010. In 2010 it agreed with one of them (limiting labour immigration from Eastern Europe) and was neutral on the other ones. For the VVD, this pattern can be understood by reference to the fact that the PVV split from the VVD, and the PVV programme and the VVD programme of 2003 were very similar. Most changes concerned the law and order policies of the PVV: the VVD, for instance, joined the PVV in calling for less community service as punishment for crime. The PVV elicited adversarial movements: for instance by D66, as shown in figure 6.28. D66 opposed the PVV explicitly on one in four of its unique proposals. This included PVV proposals to limit labour immigration from Eastern Europe and to ban the burqa. For as far as there is a pattern, parties that were already similar to the PVV move to agree more with it.

The entry of the LPF has led to increasing attention to immigration, and many parties imitated the LPF's positions. The PVV's effect is concentrated in the VVD, from which the PVV split in 2004. The VVD lost considerably in the 2006 elections,

and VVD and PVV shared a large part of their programme. As discussed in section 4.2.16, good reasons exist not to consider the PVV a challenger of the VVD, but the VVD clearly felt challenged by the PVV.

#### 6.2.14 PvdD: the hobbyhorse

The PvdD entered in the 2003 elections, but was unsuccessful. In 2006 it re-entered and won two seats. Established parties may have anticipated the entry of this animal rights party. When one looks at attention to this issue, the following pattern emerges: all parties devoted *less* attention to agriculture after the entry of the PvdD. Some parties devoted marginally less attention to agriculture (such as the GL in figure 6.29), other parties drastically decreased their attention to the issue (such as the SP). The SP won votes in the elections in which the PvdD entered, while almost all the other parties lost votes. It appears that the SP may have felt that they could afford to markedly decrease attention to agriculture, while other parties felt that they could not. As seen in chapter 5, the declining political attention to agriculture can be explained by its declining economic importance. The GL programme was the only one that showed signs of anticipation: markedly increasing attention to agriculture between 2003 and 2006.<sup>186</sup> When examining positions, the patterns become clearer. Most parties took over at least one position of the PvdD. The most marked movements can be seen for GL (shown in figure 6.30). This party took over five positions from the PvdD: from a ban on the use of animals in circuses to a ban on *foie gras*. The GL may have felt challenged by the PvdD: the two parties shared a similar programme and GL lost votes in the 2006 elections. Other scholars have also noticed this party's move to more animal-friendly programmes after 2006 (Lucardie & Pennings 2010). All in all, the PvdD appears to have had no effect on the issue that parties talk about, but it has definitely had an effect on the explicit positions that parties take, especially the GL, the other green-left party in parliament.

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<sup>186</sup> In a more qualitative analysis of attention to animal rights, Meeuwissen (2011, 40) emphasises that parties appear to have anticipated the entry of the PvdD in 2006, because they increased their attention to animal rights between 2003 and 2006.



**Figure 6.29: attention of GL and SP to agriculture****Figure 6.30: position of D66 and GL on unique proposals of the PvdD**

Table 6.1: challengers' effects on electoral positions

| Party | KNP         | PSP          | GPV      | PPR      | DS'70    | RKPN        | RPF         | EVP         | SP          |
|-------|-------------|--------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ARP   | 0.07        | 0.22         | <b>0</b> |          |          |             |             |             |             |
| CHU   | 0.07        | 0.33         | -0.04    |          |          |             |             |             |             |
| KVP   | <b>0.21</b> | 0.22         | -0.01    |          |          |             |             |             |             |
| SGP   | 0           | 0            | 0.05     | 0        | 0        | 0.06        | 0.02        | 0.05        | 0           |
| PvdA  | 0.07        | <b>-0.22</b> | 0.07     | 0.08     | <b>0</b> | 0           | -0.01       | 0.05        | <b>0.06</b> |
| VVD   | 0           | -0.11        | 0        | -0.08    | 0        | 0.11        | -0.02       | 0.08        | 0           |
| CPN   | 0.07        | 0.11         | 0        | 0        | 0        | -0.06       | -0.04       |             |             |
| PSP   |             |              | 0.08     | 0.14     | 0.06     | 0.01        | 0.08        |             |             |
| BP    |             |              |          | 0        | -0.05    | 0           |             |             |             |
| GPV   |             |              |          | 0        | 0        | 0.39        | 0.02        | 0.05        | -0.03       |
| D66   |             |              |          | 0.17     | 0.05     | 0.11        | -0.02       | 0.05        | -0.16       |
| CDA   |             |              |          | <b>0</b> | 0.05     | <b>0.11</b> | <b>0.01</b> | <b>0.05</b> | 0.06        |
| DS'70 |             |              |          |          |          | 0.06        | 0.01        |             |             |
| PPR   |             |              |          |          |          | 0           | 0.01        | 0.02        |             |
| RPF   |             |              |          |          |          | 0           | 0.01        | 0.05        | 0.03        |
| GL    |             |              |          |          |          |             |             |             | -0.10       |
| Hypo. | Yes         | Opp.         | No       | No       | No       | No          | No          | No          | Tied        |

Challenged parties in **bold**

Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction

No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction

Note that the sets of parties differs between this table and table 5.14

Table 6.2: mobilisers' effects on electoral positions

| Party | BP   | D66   | NMP | CP   | AOV  | U55+  | LPF   | LN    | PVV  | PvdD  |
|-------|------|-------|-----|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| ARP   | 0.08 | 0.13  |     |      |      |       |       |       |      |       |
| CHU   | 0    | 0.06  |     |      |      |       |       |       |      |       |
| KVP   | 0    | 0.1   |     |      |      |       |       |       |      |       |
| SGP   | 0    | -0.03 | 0   | 0.08 | 0    | 0     | -0.03 | 0     | 0    | 0.11  |
| PvdA  | 0.08 | 0.16  | 0   | 0.08 | 0    | 0.07  | 0.03  | 0     | 0    | 0.04  |
| VVD   | 0.08 | 0.06  | 0   | 0    | 0.04 | 0     | 0.06  | 0     | 0    | 0.11  |
| CPN   | 0.08 | -0.03 | 0   |      |      |       |       |       |      |       |
| PSP   | 0    | 0.13  | 0   | 0    |      |       |       |       |      |       |
| BP    |      | 0.1   | 0.5 |      |      |       |       |       |      |       |
| GPV   |      | -0.03 | 0   | 0    | 0.04 | 0     |       |       |      |       |
| D66   |      | -0.03 | 0   | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.07  | 0.12  | 0     | 0.04 | -0.11 |
| CDA   |      |       | 0   | 0    | 0.08 | -0.07 | -0.03 | 0.09  | 0.01 | 0.11  |
| PPR   |      |       |     | 0.08 |      |       |       |       |      |       |
| RPF   |      |       |     | 0    | 0.12 | 0     |       |       |      |       |
| GL    |      |       |     |      | 0    | 0     | -0.03 | -0.09 | 0.05 | 0.04  |
| SP    |      |       |     |      |      |       | 0.06  | -0.09 | 0.02 | 0.11  |
| CU    |      |       |     |      |      |       | 0.09  | 0     | 0.01 | -0.14 |

Note that the sets of parties differs between this table and table 5.15

### *6.3 Analysing the case-by-case results*

The previous sections examined the effects of nineteen new parties individually; this section will compare and contrast those results.

#### *6.3.1 Analysis of party positions in the electoral arena*

The parties that elicit the most imitation in terms of position are the PSP, the RKPN, KNP, NMP and D66 (in that order). However, the high average reaction to the PSP, the RKPN, the KNP and the NMP can be explained by the effect these parties had on a single party<sup>187</sup> or the limited number of unique proposals.<sup>188</sup> D66 has had the most consistent effect on the electoral positions of established parties.

In table 6.1 the different reactions in electoral positions for the nine challenger parties are shown. This allows us to see whether challenged parties consistently react more to the entry of a new party than other parties. Out of the nine challenged parties, six do not show the most marked reaction. Two show the strongest increase in similarity (KVP to KNP; PvdA to SP, but this score is tied with the CDA) and one shows the strongest decrease (PvdA to PSP). This shows that all in all challengers do not consistently elicit marked reactions from the challenged parties. As one can see in table 6.3, this is also supported statistically: the average reaction of a challenged party is slightly weaker than the reaction of an unchallenged party.

Mobilisers may elicit imitation from more established parties, because they challenge all parties instead of just one. These reactions are shown in table 6.2. In no case can one see a consistent increase (or decrease) in similarity for all parties. As one can see in table 6.3 the average reaction does not differ statistically between mobilisers and challengers. Several mobilisers suffered (contrary to what one would expect for a mobiliser) from programmes that were not innovative: consider the NMP, BP, the CP or LN. All these parties made fewer than 15 unique proposals. Almost no reaction could be observed on those few proposals.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> The GPV for the RKPN, the KVP for the KNP and the BP for the NMP

<sup>188</sup> For the PSP and the NMP

<sup>189</sup> One can question to what extent these parties are truly mobilisers, because established parties already devoted much attention to their issue. In the mobiliser-challenger dichotomy however they do not necessarily fit in the challenger category.

*Table 6.3: comparing effects on electoral position*

| Characteristic | $\mu$ | $\sigma$ | N   | $\epsilon$ |
|----------------|-------|----------|-----|------------|
| Challenged     | 0.024 | 0.115    | 9   | 0.042      |
| Unchallenged   | 0.036 | 0.087    | 68  |            |
| Mobiliser      | 0.031 | 0.076    | 88  | 0.023      |
| Challenger     | 0.035 | 0.090    | 77  |            |
| Government     | 0.034 | 0.086    | 26  | 0.029      |
| Opposition     | 0.027 | 0.060    | 135 |            |

$\mu$ : average value

$\sigma$ : standard deviation

N: number of cases

$\epsilon$ : eta

*Table 6.4: new party size and electoral positions*

| Party       | New party size | $\mu$  | $\sigma$ | N   |
|-------------|----------------|--------|----------|-----|
| LPF         | 17             | 0.034  | 0.141    | 8   |
| PVV         | 5.89           | 0.034  | 0.177    | 8   |
| DS'70       | 5.33           | 0.021  | 0.173    | 9   |
| D66         | 4.48           | 0.049  | 0.127    | 10  |
| AOV         | 3.63           | 0.040  | 0.043    | 8   |
| BP          | 2.13           | 0.040  | 0.107    | 8   |
| PPR         | 1.84           | 0.028  | 0.167    | 9   |
| PSP         | 1.84           | 0.079  | 0.122    | 7   |
| PvdD        | 1.83           | 0.016  | 0.177    | 8   |
| LN          | 1.61           | -0.011 | 0.141    | 8   |
| NMP         | 1.51           | 0.056  | 0.167    | 9   |
| SP          | 1.32           | -0.018 | 0.089    | 8   |
| KNP         | 1.26           | 0.070  | 0.189    | 7   |
| RPF         | 1.25           | -0.002 | 0.145    | 9   |
| RKPN        | 0.92           | 0.076  | 0.727    | 11  |
| U55+        | 0.87           | 0.009  | 0.089    | 8   |
| EVP         | 0.83           | 0.049  | 0.263    | 9   |
| GPV         | 0.74           | 0.010  | 0.107    | 8   |
| CP          | 0.69           | 0.036  | 0.251    | 9   |
| Correlation |                |        | 0.008    | 161 |

*Table 6.5: new party organisation and electoral positions*

| <b>Party</b> | <b>New party organisation</b> | <b><math>\mu</math></b> | <b><math>\sigma</math></b> | <b>N</b> |
|--------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|----------|
| GPV          | 15.2                          | 0.019                   | 0.107                      | 8        |
| SP           | 13.45                         | -0.018                  | 0.089                      | 8        |
| RPF          | 5.54                          | -0.002                  | 0.145                      | 9        |
| PvdD         | 3.54                          | 0.016                   | 0.177                      | 8        |
| PPR          | 3.45                          | 0.028                   | 0.167                      | 9        |
| U55+         | 3.37                          | 0.009                   | 0.089                      | 8        |
| PSP          | 1.8                           | 0.079                   | 0.122                      | 7        |
| EVP          | 1.51                          | 0.049                   | 0.263                      | 9        |
| D66          | 1.2                           | 0.049                   | 0.127                      | 10       |
| DS'70        | 0.89                          | 0.021                   | 0.173                      | 9        |
| LN           | 0.81                          | -0.011                  | 0.141                      | 8        |
| AOV          | 0.58                          | 0.049                   | 0.043                      | 8        |
| LPF          | 0.25                          | 0.034                   | 0.141                      | 8        |
| PVV          | 0                             | 0.034                   | 0.177                      | 8        |
| Correlation  | -0.176*                       |                         |                            | 117      |

For the new party government hypothesis, the question is whether new parties in government elicit more reaction than new parties in opposition. This is the case for positions in the electoral arena, but the difference, as can be seen in table 6.3 is not statistically significant. Opposition parties, like the RKPN, elicited, on average, more reactions in terms of position from established parties than the LPF did, although the latter was in government.

One can examine the average reactions to the new parties ordered by size in table 6.4, here one can see that both the largest new party (LPF) and the smallest new party (CP) elicit similar increases in agreement (around +0.035). The overall correlation is in the expected direction but weak and not significant. It does not appear to be the case that larger new parties elicit more reactions.

In order to test the new party organisation hypothesis, the new parties are ordered by the extent to which they organised their electorate in table 6.5. One can see here that well organised new parties elicit more negative reactions than less well organised new parties. New parties that tend to be well organised elicit less imitation (GPV) and more differentiation (SP and RPF), than other parties. This relationship is based on three parties (RPF, GPV and SP), which are well organised but elicit weak and negative reactions. These three parties tried to enter parliament several times but

were unsuccessful before.<sup>190</sup> All three participated in municipal and provincial elections before entering parliament. All are challenger parties formed by a divorce. Instead of being unexpectedly successful well-organised new entries, these parties appear to be well-established parties before entering parliament, and their modest support did not lead to reactions from the established parties.<sup>191</sup>

An analysis of the new party proximity hypothesis is presented in table 6.6. Here one can see the correlation between the distance between the new and the established party and the extent to which the established party reacted. The central notion here is that parties that are closer to the new party respond more to the new parties than parties that are further away from it. For some cases there is a marked reaction for parties that already were closer to the new party (RPF, LPF, D66), but the overall relationship is that parties that are further away react more. This relationship is not significant, however. This indicates that, as far as there is a difference between parties, parties that are further away from the new party respond more.<sup>192</sup>

Finally, one can see the analyses of the effect of the performance of the established party in table 6.7. Even though, there are a number of cases where the established parties that won the most votes, reacted most, the overall trend indicates that, significantly, established parties that lost votes react most. It seems to be the case that parties that have lost votes in the election in which the new party entered, increase their similarity to the election manifesto of the new party. The relationship is, however, not significant if the analysis is replicated without the NMP and the PSP, outliers in terms of the number of unique proposals.

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<sup>190</sup> One unsuccessful try for the RPF, four for the GPV and five for the SP. In the election before entering parliament, they all won a significant amount of the votes.

<sup>191</sup> These results are not replicated in the multivariate analysis, because this variable has a lot of missing values.

<sup>192</sup> The best explanation for this may be that, even though a common measurement of party similarity for all parties was used (based on the codes of all items unique and non-unique), the similarity of new parties will cluster around three levels: some new parties have programmes with which established parties in general disagree (such as the SP), which means that on average established parties will have a negative score in terms of similarity. Some new parties (such as LN) may have a programme that has a lot of similarities with the programmes of established parties, and therefore established parties will have positive scores. Some new parties (such as the PvdD) will have long programmes with a lot of detailed points; therefore parties will in general score neutral. Given that in addition to patterns within parties there are also patterns between parties, this general pattern may cancel out the relationships found in the case-by-case analysis.

*Table 6.6: party distance and electoral positions*

| Party   | Correlation | N   |
|---------|-------------|-----|
| PSP     | -0.624      | 7   |
| SP      | -0.502      | 8   |
| CP      | -0.496      | 9   |
| EVP     | -0.439      | 9   |
| BP      | -0.341      | 8   |
| U55+    | -0.341      | 8   |
| KNP     | -0.214      | 7   |
| GPV     | 0.014       | 8   |
| PvdD    | 0.034       | 8   |
| NMP     | 0.082       | 9   |
| PVV     | 0.098       | 8   |
| LN      | 0.166       | 8   |
| AOV     | 0.385       | 8   |
| RKPN    | 0.467       | 11  |
| DS'70   | 0.469       | 9   |
| PPR     | 0.564       | 9   |
| RPF     | 0.586*      | 9   |
| LPF     | 0.678*      | 8   |
| D66     | 0.800***    | 10  |
| Overall | -0.079      | 161 |

*Table 6.7: established party performance and electoral positions*

| Party   | Correlation | N   |
|---------|-------------|-----|
| NMP     | -0.771**    | 9   |
| CP      | -0.553      | 9   |
| D66     | -0.548      | 10  |
| BP      | -0.533      | 8   |
| SP      | -0.48       | 8   |
| LPF     | -0.457      | 8   |
| KNP     | -0.286      | 7   |
| RKPN    | -0.252      | 11  |
| PSP     | -0.216      | 7   |
| PvdD    | -0.192      | 8   |
| RPF     | -0.179      | 9   |
| LN      | -0.093      | 8   |
| GPV     | -0.087      | 8   |
| DS'70   | -0.006      | 9   |
| PVV     | 0.11        | 8   |
| PPR     | 0.144       | 9   |
| EVP     | 0.198       | 9   |
| U55+    | 0.408       | 8   |
| AOV     | 0.414       | 8   |
| Overall | -0.201**    | 161 |

*Table 6.8: correlation coefficients anticipation*

| Variable                      | Correlation | N   |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----|
| Challenged                    | 0.024       | 150 |
| Mobiliser                     | 0.115       | 150 |
| Party distance                | 0.245***    | 150 |
| New party size                | 0.152*      | 150 |
| New party organisation        | -0.247***   | 117 |
| Established party performance | 0.158*      | 150 |

Only one relationship is consistently significant: well-organised new parties elicit significantly weaker reactions from established parties, than parties that are less well organised. This goes against the hypothesised relationship. As discussed above in detail: the underlying pattern here may be that these parties are not really new. The most well-organised new parties had already participated in elections before.

One explanation for the weakness of the patterns found above is that this part of the study examined the wrong kind of behaviour: instead of reacting to new parties, established parties may have anticipated new parties. Therefore, the following section will look at the anticipation of new parties by established parties. A range of factors

now show significant relationships: party distance, new party size, new party organisation, established party performance, established party leadership change and established party size all show significant relationships. Most of these relationships are in the expected direction. One should note, however, that, in analysing anticipation, it is necessary to relax the notion of uniqueness: in order to measure anticipation only those policies were eliminated as non-unique that were held by established parties in the elections *before* the entry of new party and not in the elections *before and in which* the new party entered. It is not strange that with such a relaxed notion of uniqueness more reactions by established parties are found, because there is more variance to 'lash onto'. However, because of the relaxed notion of uniqueness used here, one cannot be sure that the changes found can actually be attributed to the new party. They could also be attributed to external circumstances. In statistical terms: the chance of type-I errors increases. Table 6.8 provides an overview.

The single most important outcome is that new parties that will become larger are anticipated more. This relationship is significant and in the expected direction. As before, new parties that are better organised elicit less anticipation. Again the same explanation can be given: the well-organised parties (SP, RPF and GPV) were ignored by established parties because their entry was not unexpected; they had already participated in elections before. One should note that one cannot study these factors without neglecting the temporal order of causality: a new party's size and its level of organisation, in which party size is a factor, are only known *after* that new party has entered parliament. What is explained now precedes the cause. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between pre-election polls and new party size. Established parties that lost votes in the elections before the new party entered show more anticipation than established parties that are performing well. This effect is significant and goes in the expected direction. The same is true for the ideological distance between new and established party. These two relationship are not significant in the multivariate analysis (presented in appendix 5), however.

Several conclusions stand out in the interpretation of these results of anticipatory behaviour: when new parties are expected to be larger, when new and established parties have similar programmes, and when established parties are losing votes, there is more anticipatory behaviour than if these characteristics are not present.

On the whole, this analysis of changes in party positions points to one factor: the performance of the established party explains the positional reactions of

established parties to new parties in almost every analysis. Established parties will respond to new parties when they have lost votes in the last elections (whether in the election in which the new party entered, or the election before the new party entered). Losing elections may be the only way in which the conservative organisations that parties often are, are forced to respond to their surroundings.

### *6.3.2 Analysis of attention in the electoral arena*

The PPR, KNP, D66 and RKPN elicited the most marked reactions in terms of attention from the established parties. In the case of the PPR, RKPN and the KNP, external circumstances can better explain the patterns in attention than the presence of these new parties: therefore, again D66 appears to be the prime example of a new party that is successfully changing the policies of established parties.

In table 6.9 one can compare the changes in attention for the challenger party. Here one can compare the patterns elicited by different challengers. Only three of the nine challengers elicit the most marked reactions from the parties that they challenge. Two of these challenged parties actually decrease attention to the issue of the challenger party (KVP to RKPN, CDA to EVP). Only the PvdA imitates the issue attention of the PSP. Challenger parties do not elicit more marked reactions from the parties that they challenge. In table 6.11 one can see that unchallenged parties react more than challenged parties (but not significantly).

The mobiliser hypothesis poses that mobiliser new parties will elicit reactions from more established parties, than challengers. In table 6.10 one can see that for no new mobiliser party, established parties consistently increase their attention to issues. The only party for which any consistent pattern can be seen, is the PvdD, which actually elicits consistently decreasing attention. In table 6.11 one can see that there is a statistically significant difference between challengers and mobilisers, where mobilisers elicit *less* reactions than challengers. This relationship, however, does not hold in the robustness checks presented in appendix 4.

Table 6.11 also gives an insight into the government-opposition hypothesis. There is a positive significant relationship between whether a new party was in government or not, and whether it elicited reactions from the established parties. The LPF and the PPR, in particular, elicit reactions from established parties. This relationship, however, is not significant in the multivariate analysis presented in appendix 4.

Table 6.9: challengers' effects on electoral attention

| Party | KNP         | PSP        | GPV        | PPR         | DS'70        | RKPN         | RPF          | EVP          | SP           |
|-------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| ARP   | 0.12        | 0.14       | <b>0.1</b> |             |              |              |              |              |              |
| CHU   | 1           | -0.06      | -0.17      |             |              |              |              |              |              |
| KVP   | <b>0.38</b> | 0.55       | 0.44       |             |              |              |              |              |              |
| SGP   | 0           | 0          | -0.53      | 1           | 0.05         | -0.14        | 0.05         | 0.16         | 0.19         |
| PvdA  | -0.04       | <b>0.6</b> | 0          | 0           | <b>-0.03</b> | 1            | -0.02        | 0.43         | <b>-0.07</b> |
| VVD   | 1           | -0.4       | 0.55       | 0.86        | -0.12        | 0.3          | -0.79        | -0.13        | 0.29         |
| CPN   | 0.17        | 0.31       | 0          | 1           | -0.69        | 0            | 1            |              |              |
| PSP   |             |            | 1          | 0.41        | -0.21        | 0.24         | 0.46         | 0.05         |              |
| BP    |             |            |            | 1           | 0.33         | 1            |              |              |              |
| GPV   |             |            |            | 0.31        | -0.38        | 0.24         | 0.03         | 0.3          | -0.04        |
| D66   |             |            |            | 0.25        | -0.08        | -0.04        | -0.47        | -0.25        | -0.15        |
| CDA   |             |            |            | <b>0.37</b> | 0.17         | <b>-0.15</b> | <b>-0.39</b> | <b>-0.37</b> | -0.05        |
| PPR   |             |            |            |             |              |              | -0.04        | 0.2          |              |
| RPF   |             |            |            |             |              |              |              | -0.29        | -0.14        |
| GL    |             |            |            |             |              |              |              |              | -0.01        |
| Hypo. | No          | Yes        | No         | No          | No           | Opp.         | No           | Opp.         | No           |

Challenged parties in **bold**

Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction

No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction

Table 6.10: mobilisers' effects on electoral attention

| Party | BP    | D66   | NMP   | CP    | AOV/U55+ | LPF   | LN    | PVV   | PvdD  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ARP   | -0.27 | 0.38  |       |       |          |       |       |       |       |
| CHU   | 0     | 1     |       |       |          |       |       |       |       |
| KVP   | 0     | 1     |       |       |          |       |       |       |       |
| SGP   | 1     | -0.34 | 0.28  | 0.75  | -0.01    | 0.51  | -1    | -0.39 | -0.12 |
| PvdA  | -0.86 | 1     | -0.67 | -0.21 | 0.42     | 0.05  | -0.08 | -0.38 | 0.14  |
| VVD   | -0.18 | 0.19  | -0.13 | -0.09 | 0.09     | 0.29  | 0.08  | -0.16 | 0.39  |
| CPN   | -1    | -0.43 | -1    |       |          |       |       |       |       |
| PSP   |       | 0.13  | -0.01 | 0.53  |          |       |       |       |       |
| BP    |       | 0.15  | -0.17 |       |          |       |       |       |       |
| GPV   |       | -0.09 | -0.73 | 0.03  | 0.15     |       |       |       |       |
| D66   |       |       | -0.5  | 0.25  | 0.16     | 0.16  | 0.47  | -0.21 | -0.42 |
| CDA   |       |       | -0.13 | 0.11  | 0.03     | 0.36  | -0.17 | -0.07 | -0.25 |
| PPR   |       |       |       | 0.13  |          |       |       |       |       |
| RPF   |       |       |       | -0.46 | -0.12    |       |       |       |       |
| GL    |       |       |       |       | -0.15    |       |       |       |       |
| SP    |       |       |       |       |          | -0.33 | -0.04 | -0.25 | 0.52  |
| CU    |       |       |       |       |          | 0.35  | -0.29 | -0.05 | 0.02  |
| Hypo. | No    | No    | No    | No    | No       | No    | No    | No    | Op..  |

Yes: Change in the nature of the lines of conflict on this issue

No: Changes in party positions

Table 6.12 examines the new party attention hypothesis. Here one can see that the party that devoted most attention to its own issue (the PvdD) elicits a marked decrease in attention, while the PPR, which devoted least attention to its issue actually elicits one of the largest increases in attention. All in all, there is a significant, negative relationship between the attention a new party devotes to its issue and the reactions of established parties. The expectation that was formulated was quite complex: without stated conditions, one would expect when new parties devote a lot of attention to their issue, established parties increase attention. One would also expect that this party attention variable was crucial in the parliamentary arena but not in the electoral arena. This expectation is corroborated by the data.

In table 6.13 the data for the new party size hypothesis is shown. Here one can see that new party size does not matter for the reactions of established parties: the largest new party (LPF) elicits less reaction than the second to smallest new party (GPV). Overall there is a weak, negative, insignificant relationship.

Table 6.14 provides a test for the new party organisation hypothesis. One can see here that most well organised organisation (GPV) elicits almost as much reaction as the least well organised party (LPF). The overall relationship is weak, insignificant and positive.

Table 6.15 summarises the analyses of the party distance hypothesis. The data shows that for some parties the parties that were furthest away reacted most (such as the PPR), while for other parties, (such as D66 and LN) the parties that were closest already reacted most, and even significantly so. The overall relationship is weak, insignificant and goes in against the expected relationship.

In table 6.16 the analyses of the party performance hypothesis are summarised. Here one can see that for most parties the parties that lost most, react most. For five parties, the reversed is true. The overall relationship, however, goes in the expected direction and is significant. As expected, established parties that lose seats respond significantly more than established parties that win seats. This is the only hypothesis that is supported by the data: the more a party loses in the elections in which the new party enters, the more it focuses on the issue that the new party raises.

*Table 6.11: comparing effects on electoral attention*

| Characteristic | $\mu$  | $\sigma$ | N   | $\epsilon$ |
|----------------|--------|----------|-----|------------|
| Challenged     | 0.048  | 0.346    | 9   | 0.095      |
| Unchallenged   | 0.172  | 0.435    | 66  |            |
| Mobiliser      | -0.006 | 0.442    | 76  | 0.186**    |
| Challenger     | 0.157  | 0.426    | 75  |            |
| Government     | 0.214  | 0.428    | 26  | 0.144*     |
| Opposition     | 0.047  | 0.439    | 125 |            |

$\mu$ : average value

$\sigma$ : standard deviation

N: number of cases

$\epsilon$ : eta

*Table 6.12: new party attention and electoral attention*

| Party       | New party attention | $\mu$  | $\sigma$ | N   |
|-------------|---------------------|--------|----------|-----|
| PvdD        | 68.5                | -0.246 | 0.154    | 8   |
| PSP         | 49.4                | 0.164  | 0.356    | 7   |
| BP          | 43.7                | -0.038 | 0.739    | 8   |
| NMP         | 29                  | -0.34  | 0.408    | 9   |
| GPV         | 26.8                | 0.173  | 0.473    | 8   |
| RPF         | 24.1                | -0.019 | 0.527    | 9   |
| RKPN        | 23.1                | 0.272  | 0.445    | 9   |
| KNP         | 22.5                | 0.375  | 0.448    | 7   |
| AOV/U55     | 21.5                | 0.07   | 0.181    | 8   |
| LPF         | 19.2                | 0.166  | 0.273    | 8   |
| DS'70       | 17.6                | -0.107 | 0.301    | 9   |
| LN          | 17.6                | -0.147 | 0.412    | 8   |
| PVV         | 13.3                | 0.021  | 0.318    | 8   |
| EVP         | 11.5                | 0.012  | 0.284    | 9   |
| D66         | 11.3                | 0.299  | 0.541    | 10  |
| SP          | 9.8                 | 0.004  | 0.158    | 8   |
| CP          | 8                   | 0.114  | 0.368    | 9   |
| PPR         | 6.6                 | 0.578  | 0.388    | 9   |
| Correlation | -0.210***           |        |          | 151 |

*Table 6.13: new party size and electoral attention*

| Party       | New party size | $\mu$  | $\sigma$ | N   |
|-------------|----------------|--------|----------|-----|
| LPF         | 17             | 0.166  | 0.273    | 8   |
| PVV         | 5.89           | 0.021  | 0.318    | 8   |
| DS'70       | 5.33           | -0.107 | 0.301    | 9   |
| AOV/U55     | 4.5            | 0.07   | 0.181    | 8   |
| D66         | 4.48           | 0.299  | 0.541    | 10  |
| BP          | 2.13           | -0.038 | 0.739    | 8   |
| PSP         | 1.84           | 0.164  | 0.356    | 7   |
| PPR         | 1.84           | 0.578  | 0.388    | 9   |
| PvdD        | 1.83           | -0.246 | 0.154    | 8   |
| LN          | 1.61           | -0.147 | 0.412    | 8   |
| NMP         | 1.51           | -0.34  | 0.408    | 9   |
| SP          | 1.32           | 0.004  | 0.158    | 8   |
| KNP         | 1.26           | 0.375  | 0.448    | 7   |
| RPF         | 1.25           | -0.019 | 0.527    | 9   |
| RKPN        | 0.92           | 0.272  | 0.445    | 9   |
| EVP         | 0.83           | 0.012  | 0.284    | 9   |
| GPV         | 0.74           | 0.173  | 0.473    | 8   |
| CP          | 0.69           | 0.114  | 0.368    | 9   |
| Correlation | -0.033         |        |          | 151 |

*Table 6.14: new party organisation and electoral attention*

| Party       | New party organisation | $\mu$  | $\sigma$ | N   |
|-------------|------------------------|--------|----------|-----|
| GPV         | 15.2                   | 0.173  | 0.473    | 8   |
| SP          | 13.45                  | 0.004  | 0.158    | 8   |
| RPF         | 5.54                   | -0.019 | 0.527    | 9   |
| PvdD        | 3.54                   | -0.246 | 0.154    | 8   |
| PPR         | 3.45                   | 0.578  | 0.388    | 9   |
| PSP         | 1.8                    | 0.164  | 0.356    | 7   |
| EVP         | 1.51                   | 0.012  | 0.284    | 9   |
| D66         | 1.2                    | 0.299  | 0.541    | 10  |
| DS'70       | 0.89                   | -0.107 | 0.301    | 9   |
| LN          | 0.81                   | -0.147 | 0.412    | 8   |
| LPF         | 0.25                   | 0.166  | 0.273    | 8   |
| PVV         | 0                      | 0.021  | 0.318    | 8   |
| Correlation | 0.013                  |        |          | 101 |

*Table 6.15: party distance and electoral attention*

| Party       | Correlation | N   |
|-------------|-------------|-----|
| PPR         | -0.528      | 9   |
| GPV         | -0.469      | 8   |
| RKPN        | -0.451      | 9   |
| SP          | -0.388      | 8   |
| BP          | -0.214      | 8   |
| AOV/U55     | -0.147      | 8   |
| RPF         | -0.105      | 9   |
| LPF         | 0.125       | 8   |
| CP          | 0.164       | 9   |
| PSP         | 0.171       | 7   |
| EVP         | 0.218       | 9   |
| DS'70       | 0.222       | 9   |
| PVV         | 0.223       | 8   |
| NMP         | 0.291       | 9   |
| PvdD        | 0.546       | 8   |
| KNP         | 0.639       | 7   |
| D66         | 0.653**     | 10  |
| LN          | 0.802**     | 8   |
| Correlation | -0.008      | 151 |

*Table 6.16: established party performance*

| Party       | Correlation | N   |
|-------------|-------------|-----|
| RPF         | -0.7**      | 9   |
| SP          | -0.586      | 8   |
| DS'70       | -0.519      | 9   |
| RKPN        | -0.496      | 9   |
| PSP         | -0.482      | 8   |
| PvdD        | -0.426      | 8   |
| NMP         | -0.413      | 9   |
| D66         | -0.397      | 10  |
| EVP         | -0.373      | 9   |
| PPR         | -0.346      | 9   |
| LN          | -0.282      | 8   |
| AOV/U55     | -0.2        | 8   |
| LPF         | -0.151      | 8   |
| PVV         | 0.204       | 8   |
| GPV         | 0.412       | 7   |
| CP          | 0.44        | 9   |
| BP          | 0.527       | 8   |
| KNP         | 0.619       | 7   |
| Correlation | -0.185**    | 151 |

#### *6.4 Expanded statistical analysis*

In the next step all developments in attention on all issues will be compared to those developments when new parties were present.

##### *6.4.1 Reaction in terms of attention*

The short summary of the analysis of attention to issues in terms of reaction, is that all hypotheses are rejected, except for a hypothesis that explicitly stated that in the electoral arena there would be no relationship. None of the characteristics of new parties have a significant effect on the reactions of established parties. Different specifications are used here, but under none of them any discernable effect is visible. In table 6.17, one can see that the presence of a new party leads to an increase in attention on its issue. There is no general effect of new political parties: the presence of a new party does not lead to significantly more change on its issue than when no new party is present. This echoes the results of the case-by-case analysis where this study did not observe a consistent effect in the hypothesised direction.

*Table 6.17: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (1)*

| Variable            | Model 1              | Model 2              | Model 3              | Model 4              | Model 5              |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Intercept           | 0.210***<br>(0.010)  | 0.212***<br>(0.010)  | 0.211***<br>(0.010)  | 0.212***<br>(0.010)  | 0.214***<br>(0.010)  |
| Previous Attention  | -0.036***<br>(0.002) | -0.037***<br>(0.002) | -0.037***<br>(0.002) | -0.037***<br>(0.002) | -0.035***<br>(0.001) |
| New Party Presence  | 0.015<br>(0.030)     | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    |
| New Party Attention | -                    | -0.001<br>(0.001)    | -                    | -                    | -                    |
| Challenged          | -                    | -                    | -0.077<br>(0.137)    | -                    | -                    |
| Mobiliser           | -                    | -                    | -                    | -0.046<br>(0.041)    | -                    |
| Party Distance      | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    | 0.010<br>(0.126)     |
| R-Squared           | 0.155                | 0.155                | 0.155                | 0.155                | 0.156                |

n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by the sum of the square roots of manifesto length.

*Table 6.18: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (2)*

| Variable               | Model 6              | Model 7              | Model 8              | Model 9              | Model 10             |
|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Intercept              | 0.210***<br>(0.010)  | 0.209***<br>(0.010)  | 0.210***<br>(0.010)  | 0.208***<br>(0.010)  | 0.201***<br>(0.010)  |
| Previous Attention     | -0.037***<br>(0.002) | -0.037***<br>(0.002) | -0.037***<br>(0.002) | -0.037***<br>(0.002) | -0.037***<br>(0.002) |
| New Party Presence     | -                    | -                    | -                    | 0.018<br>(0.031)     | -0.004<br>(0.047)    |
| Party Distance         | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    | 0.045<br>(0.169)     |
| New Party Size         | 0.005<br>(0.006)     | -                    | -                    | -                    | 0.005<br>(0.008)     |
| New Party Organisation | -                    | 0.005<br>(0.006)     | -                    | -                    | -                    |
| New Party Government   | -                    | -                    | 0.058<br>(0.075)     | -                    | -                    |
| Est. Party Performance | -                    | -                    | -                    | 0.085**<br>(0.040)   | 0.087**<br>(0.040)   |
| Interaction Term       | -                    | -                    | -                    | -0.213<br>(0.158)    | -0.210<br>(0.157)    |
| R-Squared              | 0.155                | 0.155                | 0.155                | 0.156                | 0.157                |


n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by the sum of the square roots of manifesto length.

It is also not the case that under specific conditions new parties may have an effect. The first of these hypotheses analyses is the new party activity hypothesis. The expectation was that this mechanism mattered more in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena. These results are presented in model 2 of table 6.17. New parties that focused more on their own issue elicit *fewer reactions*, but this relationship is not significant. As the result *was* significant in the study of the parliamentary arena, this negative result actually corroborates one of the expectations.

The relationship between new and established party was operationalised in terms of the relationship between challenged parties and challengers, between mobilisers and all parties and party distance. No significant relationship was found. Moreover, the relationship was in the opposite direction in each case: there is more change in attention when parties are not challenged or when mobilisers are not present. The sign for the party distance variable was unstable: under different specifications, close-by or distant parties tend to react more. These relationships are insignificant. These results echo the case-by-case analysis, which showed that those parties that were not challenged reacted more than challenged parties in many cases.

The results for new party characteristics are presented in models 5 (in table 6.17), 6 and 7 (in table 6.18). Again, no significant relationship was found: larger, better-organised or governing new parties do not elicit more change in attention than in those cases without new parties. The relationship for new party size is in the correct direction (larger new parties elicit more reactions), but it is not significant. Better-organised new parties elicit more reactions. This is not significant. Government parties elicit more reaction than when they stay in opposition, but significantly.

The performance of the established party has an insignificant effect on the reactions of that party. The relationship is specified as an interaction relationship, which can best be presented graphically. In figure 6.31 one can see the marginal effect of the performance of the established party, both when new parties are present and when they are not. On the whole, the performance of the established party has a significant positive effect on the changes in attention. After winning elections, parties, marginally but significantly, devote more attention to more issues. The presence of a new party has a negative effect on the attention of established parties: this means that when parties lose the elections and a new party is present, they will increase attention to the issue of the new party. As one can see this effect has considerable uncertainty. This means that one cannot distinguish it from a null-effect.



The final analysis tests the notion proposed by Harmel and Svåsand (1997) that three factors have to be present to see marked reactions from established parties: ideological proximity, a larger new party and a poorly performing established party. Concerns about multi-collinearity must be silenced to see whether this relationship is present. In model 10 one can see that pooling these variables does not lead to significant results, either. The results are similar to the bivariate analyses.

The results of these different analyses indicate that there is no factor that is consistently and significantly related to the reactions of established parties: the electoral performance of the established party comes closest, but even this effect is not significant. This stands in contrast to the case-by-case analyses in which significant relationships were found. There are four ways to read these results: first, the presence of a new party in general or under specific specifications does not matter for the reactions of established parties in terms of attention compared to all the shifts in attention that occur. In the electoral arena, new parties do not matter. There is a second possibility: under specific conditions, established parties react differently to new parties. In the case-by-case analysis, contradictory results were found. Sometimes, for instance, challenged parties respond to their challenger, but sometimes challengers ignore the challenging party. These mixed results mean that it is impossible to analyse everything in a one-size-fits-all model. Third, these null-results

*Table 6.19: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (1)*

| Variable            | Model 11             | Model 12             | Model 13             | Model 14             | Model 15             |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Intercept           | 0.146***<br>(0.008)  | 0.134***<br>(0.008)  | 0.145***<br>(0.008)  | 0.148***<br>(0.008)  | 0.145***<br>(0.009)  |
| Previous Attention  | -0.025***<br>(0.001) | -0.022***<br>(0.001) | -0.026***<br>(0.001) | -0.026***<br>(0.001) | -0.026***<br>(0.001) |
| New Party Presence  | 0.005<br>(0.027)     | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    |
| New Party Attention | -                    | -0.001<br>(0.001)    | -                    | -                    | -                    |
| Challenged          | -                    | -                    | 0.019<br>(0.121)     | -                    | -                    |
| Mobiliser           | -                    | -                    | -                    | -0.075**<br>(0.037)  | -                    |
| Party Distance      | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    | 0.106<br>(0.175)     |
| R-Squared           | 0.099                | 0.093                | 0.099                | 0.100                | 0.098                |

n=4011; all analyses by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos

*Table 6.20: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (2)*

| Variable               | Model 16            | Model 17             | Model 18             | Model 19             | Model 20             |
|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Intercept              | 0.145***<br>(0.009) | 0.133***<br>(0.008)  | 0.132***<br>(0.008)  | 0.145***<br>(0.009)  | 0.145***<br>(0.009)  |
| Previous Attention     | -0.026<br>(0.001)   | -0.023***<br>(0.001) | -0.022***<br>(0.001) | -0.026***<br>(0.001) | -0.026***<br>(0.001) |
| New Party Presence     | -                   | -                    | -                    | 0.018<br>(0.028)     | 0.004<br>(0.047)     |
| Party Distance         | -                   | -                    | -                    | -                    | -0.112<br>(0.237)    |
| Divorce                | 0.075*<br>(0.045)   | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    |
| New Party Size         | -                   | 0.004<br>(0.006)     | -                    | -                    | 0.003<br>(0.007)     |
| New Party Organisation | -                   | -                    | 0.004<br>(0.005)     | -                    | -                    |
| Est. Party Performance | -                   | -                    | -                    | 0.026<br>(0.030)     | 0.026<br>(0.030)     |
| Interaction Term       | -                   | -                    | -                    | -0.300**<br>(0.125)  | -0.311**<br>(0.125)  |
| R-Squared              | 0.100               | 0.092                | 0.091                | 0.100                | 0.102                |

n=4011, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=3967); all analyses by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos


could also be explained by a missing variable that could explain these patterns but is not included in these analyses. There is, however, a fourth possibility, and that is that this study has been looking for new party effects in the wrong place. Perhaps new parties do not influence established parties after they have entered parliament, but in the election *in which* they enter parliament.

#### *6.4.2 Anticipation in terms of attention*

This section examines the possibility of anticipatory behaviour. The relative measure of anticipatory change in attention looks at the increase in attention to the issue of the new party in the election in which the new party entered. One should note that, when studying anticipatory behaviour, a major caveat should be taken into account: in these analyses the entry of the new party occurs in the same election as the anticipatory behaviour. This makes it difficult to distinguish cause and effect: does the entry of the new party cause the increase in attention or is the entry of the party actually the result of the increased attention to its issue?

The results are presented in detail in table 6.19 and 6.20. These results mainly echo the results of the previous analysis for post-entry reactions. Many relationships are not significant. In order to avoid repeating the insignificant results from the previous paragraphs, only the substantive changes will be addressed here. The only interesting significant result concerns the performance of the established party: this now has a significant effect. One should note that this concerns the relationship between the established party's performance in the elections before the new party entered: parties that lost in the election before the new party entered are more likely to show anticipatory behaviour. A graphical representation is presented in figure 6.32. The established party performance variable is also incorporated in the Harmel and Svåsand model (model 20). This model echoes the previous results: established party performance is the only variable that has a significant effect.

The other significant result concerns the mobiliser hypothesis: the relationship is negative and significant. This indicates that parties decrease attention to the issue that a mobiliser focuses on in the election in which it enters. One can explain this in two ways: first, this may be a sign that mobilisers focus on issues that, in the election in which they enter, were outside the realm of political competition. Second, established parties may anticipate the entry of challengers, because these tend to be



formed by divorce. One can examine this relationship further by looking at the relationship between the formation history of the new party and the reactions of established parties. There is indeed a significant difference between party reactions to parties formed by divorce and birth: parties formed by divorce elicit more anticipation (model 16).

If operationalised in terms of anticipation, new parties in general do not have an effect on established parties. There are only two conditions under which they do: parties that are mobilisers tend to be anticipated less than parties that are formed as challenger. New parties are anticipated more by an established party that has lost more in the previous election. Parties that have lost the previous election, are more sensitive to their environment than established parties that did not lose votes: parties are conservative organisations, unlikely to respond to their environments unless external factors force them to (Janda 1990).

Table 6.21: summary of chapter 6

| Hypothesis |                               | Attention      |                | Position |              |
|------------|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------|--------------|
|            |                               | Reaction       | Anticipation   | Reaction | Anticipation |
| 1          | New Party Presence            | 0              | 0              | n/a      | n/a          |
| 3          | New Party Attention           | 0 <sup>a</sup> | 0 <sup>a</sup> | n/a      | n/a          |
| 5          | Challenged                    | 0              | 0              | 0        | 0            |
| 6          | Mobiliser                     | 0              | -              | 0        | 0            |
| 7          | Ideological Proximity         | 0              | 0              | 0        | +            |
| 8          | New Party Size                | 0              | 0              | 0        | +            |
| 9          | New Party Organisation        | 0              | 0              | -        | -            |
| 10         | New Party in Government       | 0              | n/a            | 0        | n/a          |
| 11         | Established Party Performance | 0              | +              | +        | 0            |

+: in expected direction;

0: no consistently significant relationship;

-: in opposite direction than expected;

<sup>a</sup>: null relationship expected;

<sup>b</sup>: statistically significant, but not meaningful.

### 6.5 Conclusion

The main findings of this chapter are summarised in table 6.21. Four conclusions will be drawn here on the basis of these results: first, about the extent to which established parties change their programmes in relation to the entry of new parties into the electoral arena; second, when established parties do so; third, about the conditions under which they do so; and, fourth, about the nature of the electoral arena.

First, no evidence was found in this analysis that the presence of new parties *per se* matters for the attention that established parties devote to issues in their election manifesto. While one cannot say the same for the positions that established parties take on issues because the research method was different, the evidence does not point to more reactions of established parties to new parties here, either. The case-by-case analyses showed that there were some meaningful patterns in the reactions of some established parties to some new parties, but these patterns were not consistent between cases. There is, however, clear evidence that specific new parties elicited reactions from the established parties; for instance, D66 elicited marked changes in the attention all established parties devoted to issues and the positions that they took on them. More than any other party, D66 brought a new issue to the political agenda and forced every party to address its proposals, especially those that concerned government reform.

The expanded statistical analyses showed that, even under specific conditions, significant patterns could not be identified. This study echoes the results of the study of Huijbregts (2006), who, likewise, found only weak effects of the presence of new parties on the election manifestos of established parties. The conclusion would have to be that, on the whole, there is no evidence that new parties consistently and significantly influence the positions that established parties take in the election manifesto or the attention that they devote to issues. The difference between this study and those studies that find more marked results for specific new parties (e.g. Harmel and Svåsand 1997, Van Spanje 2010) can be explained in two ways: first, by examining all new parties in one system this study also took into account a lot of cases in which change was unlikely and also did not occur. By focusing on less likely cases of changes the established theories are tested more robustly. However, another major source of divergence may be the alternative measure of policy positions employed here compared to other studies: on aggregated policy dimensions parties may shift more, by examining the specific proposals of new parties, one can be sure that the change can be attributed to the new party.

In general, established parties anticipate new parties more than that they react to them. Both for position and attention, more significant and meaningful relationships were identified for anticipatory behaviour than for reactive behaviour. It appears to be the case that, when writing election manifestos, established parties do not attempt to win the last battle, but that (under specific conditions) they are quite conscious of the battle they are going to fight. This may mean that parties anticipate the entry of new parties and write their election manifestos in order to pre-empt the entry of new parties, but it may also mean that both the new and the established parties pick up on the same social problems.

When one looks at the conditions under which established parties react to or anticipate the entry of new political parties, the results are mixed. There are three ways in which new and established parties could be linked: the challenger-challenged relationship, the mobiliser-challenger distinction, and ideological distance. Challenged parties do consistently react to their challengers. While in some cases the challenged established party reacted most (KVP to KNP in positions), in others it showed the least (PvdA to PSP in positions). These patterns indicate that one can understand the reactions for each particular case, but that if one is interested in general patterns, the evidence is much weaker.

In general, there is no evidence that mobilisers elicit reactions from more established parties than challengers: instead, it was found that in one case, anticipatory behaviour in terms of attention, mobilisers in general elicit *less* anticipation from established parties than challengers. The distance between the new and established party only has a significant effect when studying anticipation of new parties in terms of positions. All in all, there is limited evidence that the relationship between new parties and established parties matters for the extent to which established parties change their manifestos when a new party enters the electoral arena.

It may also be the case that new party characteristics matter: the underlying reasoning is that if new parties form a serious threat, established parties must respond to them. The evidence shows that new party size matters significantly in one of the expanded statistical analyses: new parties that are (expected to be) larger are anticipated more by established parties than new parties that are (expected to be) smaller. Three parties that are particularly well organised elicit fewer reactions in terms of position: these are the GPV, the RPF and SP; all parties that attempted to enter parliament on one or more previous occasions before succeeding. In that sense, they are not really new parties from which established parties will copy positions. There is no evidence that the government participation of a new party matters for the reactions of established parties. Finally, in accordance with the formulated expectation, the attention a new party devotes to its own issue has no significant effect on the reactions of established parties in the electoral arena. On the whole, the evidence that the characteristics of the new parties matter for the reactions they elicit is weak as well.

Finally, the electoral performance of the established party may explain when established parties will react to new parties. The underlying notion is that parties that have a reason to fear the new party will change their manifestos more than those parties that have no reason to fear the new party or parties that already have a comfortable position. Here the most consistent evidence was found. In the case-by-case, statistical and expanded statistical analyses of reactive and anticipatory behaviour, this factor was most often the most significant explanation for new party behaviour. When one looks at established party organisation, there is one significant relationship that indicates that the more unstable an established party is the more it will anticipate new parties. All in all, the evidence shows that the short-term

performance of the established party in terms of electoral performance matters for the reactive and anticipatory behaviour of established parties.

On the whole, this study finds that new parties do not matter for the positions established parties take in their election manifestos or the attention that they devote to issues. If they do, the performance of the established party appears to matter more than the performance of the new party or the relationship between them.

One can understand these results in two ways. First, there may be institutional reasons for established parties to be less responsive to new parties in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary arena. In the parliamentary arena and in the electoral arena, parties work under different constraints and have different incentives (Bardi & Mair 2008, 158). The constraint that parties have in the parliamentary arena is that they have to address the issues that are on the parliamentary agenda constrains parties. In the electoral arena, parties are not bound by a common agenda. This means that new parties cannot influence established parties by influencing the party system agenda. Competition in the electoral arena is much less structured. In this unstructured electoral competition, parties also have different incentives: in the theory of Budge (2001) and in the theory of Schattschneider (1960) and Mair (1997a), parties have a particular interest in focusing on their own issues in the electoral arena. According to the saliency theory of competition, parties benefit if they talk about their own issues in the electoral arena, and according to the Schattschneider-Mair thesis, the established parties will try to focus electoral competition on the issues that they are connected to. This means that, in the electoral arena, parties have little incentive to talk about the issues that new parties raise. In their electoral manifestos, parties can talk about the issues that *they* think are important, and this is perhaps one of their few opportunities to do so, while in the media or in parliament the agenda is set by others as well. Therefore, it is not counterintuitive that parties in the electoral arena are not responsive to new parties. Parties stay focused on their own issues and do not try to address the issues other parties own. If this strategy is successful, parties will not change it and stay focused on their own issue. Only when forced by electoral considerations will they change strategies and address those issues that new parties brought to the agenda. And this is indeed the case: the significant relationships were mostly related to electoral performance. When established parties performed poorly in the elections, they would focus more on those issues that new parties raise, and they would be more anticipatory if they expected new parties to do well.

Second, the lack of responsiveness may be a result of the chosen methodology. In this chapter electoral arena was examined by looking at election manifestos. One may doubt to what extent these election manifestos provide a good insight into the behaviour of parties in the elections. Election manifestos are static documents written a number of months before the elections. They cannot provide an insight into how parties respond to competitors during the election campaign. Indeed, they provide an insight to what a party wants to say independent of its competitors. They are the only appropriate source of data, because only they provide an overview of 'all' the positions of the established parties and only they show how much attention parties devote to a range issues, while flyers or posters often concern only one topic (if they are topical at all), and the subjects of media appearances are set by journalists and not by politicians. Three things are important to note in this context: first, election manifestos are important input for the campaign message of a party. What a party says during the election is a reflection of the manifestos. These two may not be identical, but during the campaign a party will not take positions that are outside of the election manifesto. Second, in the case-by-case analysis some effects of specific new parties were identified. If election manifestos are poor measures of party priorities then these changes are very noteworthy. Third, the analysis of anticipation did identify a number of significant patterns. Under specific conditions established parties anticipate the entry of new political parties and incorporate these new party's issues into their election manifestos. This shows that election manifestos are not written outside of the political context. It may not necessarily be the case that election manifestos are static documents that are written too far before the elections to reflect party behaviour in the elections. It may be that election manifestos are written in their contemporary political context and that measuring new parties effects after they entered, is far too late.