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Imitating the newcomer. How, when and why established political parties imitate the policy positions and issue attention of new political parties in the electoral and parliamentary arena: the case of the Netherlands

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Chapter 5: Reinvigorating or redefining?

How new parties influence issue politics in parliament

“I am content with the intentions [of the animal-friendly established parties], I don’t want to create a conflict between us and them, but the fact remains that, for them, animal welfare is a side dish on their political menu. That should come to an end once and for all. And that will happen when a serious competitor is represented in parliament and reminds them every day of their moral duties to their voters and to animals.” - Marianne Thieme, leader of the PvdD (2006, 113 translation SO)

5.1 Introduction

Thieme is clear about the role of her party, the PvdD: established parties have ignored animal welfare, the issue that the PvdD owns, for far too long. Thieme does not disagree with the intentions that established parties wrote in their election manifestos, but rather, she laments that they do not put their promises into practice in the *Tweede Kamer*. She hopes to influence the attention that established parties devote to issues by participating in parliament. Harmel (1985:405) has proposed that new political parties may have a special role in bringing new issues into the political arena. Even when they never gain enough support to be a relevant political party (in the sense used by Sartori (1976)) or when their support lasts only a single election, new political parties could have a lasting impact on the party system in this way.

The focus in this chapter is on the parliamentary arena. Political decision-making in parliaments tends to be fixed: the nature of the conflict has been defined, the lines of conflict have been drawn, the possible majorities have been determined, and, therefore, the policy outcomes are predictable. Only an external shock will be able to change this situation. Elections may provide an external shock because they can change the possible majorities, but also because they allow new actors to enter the political arena. New political parties will attempt to put new issues on the agenda, influence the policy positions of established parties, redefine the political conflict, create new majorities and therefore upset the existing balance of powers. The entry of a new political party may have an effect on the way politics is done in parliament. Just like PvdD, mobilising new parties may specifically seek to change

the saliency of an issue or redefine the nature of competition on this issue. Challenger parties may seek to bring new life to the existing lines of conflict that established parties let bleed to death. The goal of this chapter is to determine to what extent and under what conditions new parties are able to influence the attention that established parties devote to issues in parliament. Moreover, this chapter will seek to analyse how new parties influence the positions of established parties on issues, and the extent to which they are able to introduce new lines of conflict on specific issues. This chapter will also examine whether new parties are able to reinvigorate the conflict on particular issues in parliament.

The results indicate that the effects of new parties on attention will be more marked when the new parties focus on their own issue, when new parties are larger and when new parties are better organised. This chapter also finds that mobiliser and challenger new parties influence the positions that parties take on issues differently: mobilisers are associated with a redefinition of significant lines of conflict, while challengers are associated with increasing political conflict and party politicisation on the issue.

5.2 Case-by-case analyses

The following sections will present the developments in the attention that parties devote to the issues owned by all new parties. The goal of these discussions is to assess the extent to which the patterns in attention can be attributed to the entry of the new party and to uncover mechanisms that may underlie these developments. The focus, here, will lie on the question *to what extent* and less on the question *under what conditions*. The reason for this is that this chapter finds that there may be considerable differences in the way new parties influence the attention that established parties devote to issues, but established parties react in a uniform way to new parties; in most cases, all parties show a similar pattern of increasing attention, decreasing attention or stability in attention. This has two implications: first and foremost, the explanation of differences in the developments must be attributed to characteristics of new parties and not to characteristics of established parties or the link between the new and established party. And second, the focus of these case-by-case analyses will lie on alternative explanations for the patterns in attention and position that were found.

5.2.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics

The KNP split from the KVP, because of the KVP position in the debate about Indonesian independence. Therefore, in order to understand the patterns of reaction for the KNP, one must examine the history of the decolonisation of Indonesia. British forces liberated the Dutch-Indies from Japanese control (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 2010, 229-230). In 1945, Indonesian republicans declared the independence of Indonesia. The Dutch did not accept Indonesian independence, and the British handed over control over Indonesia to the Dutch (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 2010, 229-230). This led to an agreement between the Indonesian republicans and the Dutch, the Cheribon Agreement of November 1946 (Keylor 2003, 246). This agreement proclaimed a sovereign Indonesian state with a Dutch-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown. This required a change in the constitution. The Dutch government and the Indonesian republicans disagreed about the implementation of the agreement. The Dutch sent two so-called police missions to regain control over Indonesia (in 1947), but they failed to gain control over the islands. The Dutch actions led to an international response: the United Nations and the United States did not support the Dutch attempt to retain control over Indonesia. The United States suspended the Marshall plan. Under international pressure, the Dutch negotiated a new agreement with the Indonesian nationalists: the same basic agreement as in 1946 was reached in 1949 (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 2010, 229-230). The agreement did not offer a solution for Papua New Guinea, a region that remained under Dutch control. New Guinea would remain a political issue: in 1951 the Dutch cabinet fell over New Guinea policy. As can be seen in figure 5.1, attention to colonial affairs steadily declined over the period 1946-1952. The attention was high before 1948 and declined afterwards. The military actions and the negotiations had put the issue on the agenda in the period 1946-1948. Indonesian independence moved the issue from the agenda in the period 1948-1952.

The presence of the KNP did not increase attention to the issue of colonial affairs. There is one exception, however: the KVP (figure 5.2) did not decrease its attention to colonial affairs after 1948. Instead, there is a (marginal) increase in this party's attention to the issue. The presence of the KNP, a challenger of the KVP, may have caused it to retain focus on the colonial affairs. All in all, there is no proof that the KNP caused a systemic increase in attention to its issue, but it is likely that it caused a markedly different pattern in attention for the party it was oriented towards.

Figure 5.1: parliamentary attention to colonial affairs



Figure 5.2: parliamentary attention of the KVP to colonial affairs



5.2.2 PSP: dissenting socialists

The PSP, a leftwing socialist party with ties to the nuclear disarmament movement, entered parliament in one of the hotter periods of the Cold War. One cannot observe the effect of the PSP without reference to the international events that surrounded the party's entry. In the period before the entry of the PSP, there had been considerable turmoil on both sides of the Iron Curtain: on the Eastern side the Hungarian Revolution was violently put down by an intervention of the Soviet military (Keylor 2003, 71-72), and on the Western side, the French and the British had been involved in a coordinated attack on Egypt in order to take control of the Suez Canal (Keylor 2003, 156). After 1959, the Cold War began to become even warmer with conflict growing about the American presence in Berlin and the plan to create a Soviet Russian military presence in Cuba (Keylor 2003, 91, 107).

Given these international developments, one can expect attention for defence to increase over time. The question thus becomes whether the entry of the PSP led to an identifiable interruption in this development. Figure 5.3 shows the developments in attention that established parties devote to defence in the period 1956-1963. In general, parties increase attention to defence between 1956 and 1963. The entry of the PSP does not seem to have caused a marked interruption of this pattern. It seems to be the case here that the development in attention to defence is caused by external circumstances. One party, the CPN, forms a clear exception. This is shown in figure 5.4. The election year 1959 interrupted the increasing pattern of attention of the CPN for defence. The PSP and the CPN shared a socialist ideology, which was historically committed to disarmament. While the CPN was opposed to the Western nuclear weapon capacity, it was more tolerant of nuclear weapons on the Eastern side of the Cold War divide. The CPN had lost a considerable number of votes in the election in which the PSP entered parliament. It seems reasonable therefore to conclude that this change was a reaction to the entry of the PSP.

Figure 5.3: parliamentary attention to defense 1956-1963





Figure 5.4: parliamentary attention of the CPN to defense



5.2.3 BP: farmers in protest

The BP campaigned against the corporatist organisation of agriculture. Over the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, agriculture politics in the Netherlands was depoliticised: decision-making power was moved to the corporatist Farming Board (*Landbouwschap*) or to the European level. Meanwhile, the importance of the agricultural sector in the Dutch economy declined, as can be seen in figure 5.5. The European Economic Community was founded in 1957 and, over a ten-year period, agricultural policies in Europe were harmonised and decision-making was moved to the European level (Krajenbrink 2005, 103). By 1962, the Common Agriculture Policy, which set agricultural price policies, had begun to take shape (Dinan 2004, 95-96). Disagreements about price policy that had characterised discussions about agriculture until the early sixties disappeared from the Dutch parliament, because the issue fell under European jurisdiction now (Krajenbrink 2005, 144-145).

At the national level, decision-making was moved to the Farming Board. The legislation to create this body passed through parliament in 1954 (Krajenbrink 2005, 103). This body was given the power to introduce legally binding rules on agricultural matters and farmers were legally required to pay a levy to the body (Krajenbrink 2005, 109). The body consisted of representatives of farmers' organisation and farm labour unions. The organisation began to function in 1955 (Krajenbrink 2005, 110-115). The agricultural community had not welcomed the Farming Board with open arms: farmers had resisted paying the obligatory levy (Krajenbrink 2005, 115-116). Free Farmers (*Vrije Boeren*), the group around BP-leader Koekoek, organised opposition against the Farming Board. The Farming Board took far-reaching measures against farmers who refused to pay their levies: it laid claim on their property and auctioned it off, something the Free Farmers attempted to prevent (Krajenbrink 2005, 163-164). In the province of Drenthe, the conflict between the Free Farmers and the Farming Board escalated (Krajenbrink 2005, 165): in order to get their levies the Farming Board laid claim to three farms in the hamlet of Hollandscheveld and evicted their inhabitants (Krajenbrink 2005, 167). This led to violent clashes between the police and the Free Farmers in March 1963. After the events of Hollandscheveld, the Farming Board reorganised and reoriented itself towards a smaller set of tasks (Krajenbrink 2005, 181, 199).

Figure 5.5: economic importance agriculture 1959-1967




Figure 5.6: parliamentary attention to agriculture 1959-1967



The BP did not have a marked effect on the attention that parties devoted to agriculture. Almost all parties follow the pattern presented in figure 5.6: levels of attention to agriculture decrease before 1961, in 1962 and 1963 attention sharply rises, and afterwards, that attention declines again. On the one hand, one may explain the pattern by referring to economic and political developments: the decreasing importance of the agricultural sector, increasing delegation of decision-making concerning agriculture to the European level and the corporatist agricultural bodies. In this perspective, the declining attention after 1963 can be explained, but the increasing attention just before 1963 is more problematic. This increase may be explained by the discussion of the Europeanisation of agricultural policies. On the other hand, one may explain these developments by referring to the dismissive strategy proposed by Meguid (2007): in reaction to the entry of a new populist party, established parties reduced their attention to the issue that the party owned, in order to reduce the saliency of the issue and therefore the electoral appeal of the party. Given that the BP was the political representative of a social movement that had clashed with the police, declining attention is not illogical. The most balanced explanation may combine these two approaches: for almost every party, the election year 1963 is a peak in a continued development of decline of the attention to agricultural policies. It is likely that the events of Hollandscheveld had temporarily turned the attention of established politicians to agriculture. But after that year the attention continued to decline. In this sense the activities of the Free Farmers have been much more successful in bringing their issues to the table (and in changing the actual policies of the Farming Board) than their political arm, the BP, ever was.

5.2.4 GPV, RKPN and RPF: orthodox dissent

Between 1963 and 1981, three parties entered the Dutch Parliament that focused on moral matters: the GPV in 1963, the RKPN in 1972 and the RPF in 1981. In order to understand the patterns in attention to moral issues, it is important to understand the patterns of depoliticisation and politicisation of the abortion issue. Before 1962, the abortion issue was in a pre-political phase. Between 1962 and 1967, an extra-parliamentary debate on abortion began to develop (Outshoorn 1986, 100-133). Between 1967 and 1977, three attempts were made to change the existing legislation on abortion: the KVP-ministers of Health and Justice made the first

attempt in the Biesheuvel cabinet. This bill was abandoned when this cabinet fell in 1972 (Outshoorn 1986, 165). During the formation of the Den Uyl cabinet, the parties decided that the initiative on abortion would be left to parliament instead of to the government. This meant that, during most of the 1972-1977 parliamentary term, MPs prepared a bill that would only come to a vote at the end of the term (Outshoorn 1986, 200). In 1976, two initiatives were debated in parliament: one by VVD and PvdA and one by KVP and ARP. The *Tweede Kamer* accepted the VVD/PvdA bill and the KVP/ARP bill was put on hold indefinitely (Outshoorn 1986, 230). The *Eerste Kamer* did not approve of the VVD/PvdA bill (Outshoorn 1986, 233), though. After the 1977 elections the Christian-democratic CDA and the secular VVD agreed in their coalition agreement that government had until 1979 to formulate its own proposals on abortion. If the coalition parties could not reach an agreement, the initiative would return to the *Tweede Kamer* where the secular parties had a majority (Outshoorn 1986, 246). In 1980, the cabinet came with a proposal that was narrowly carried by both houses (Outshoorn, 1986, 262, 269). The coalition parties called for the necessary additional policies to implement the legislation in 1982, and the government finalised its policies over the course of 1983 (Outshoorn 1986, 280-281, 286).

If one looks at the graph of parliamentary attention to moral matters in figure 5.7, one can clearly distinguish between three periods: relatively high levels of attention between 1959 and 1967, then a sharp decline in attention in the 1967 elections, and after that, the attention that most parties devoted to moral matters was on a lower level but erupted in a few spikes, especially in 1971, 1977 and 1983.

Zooming in on the period 1959-1967, one can see the following: while attention to moral issues increased before 1963, it decreased again after 1963. Two parties form a clear exception: the ARP (shown in figure 5.8) and the CHU, which went through a similar development. These two Protestant parties may have felt challenged by the entry of the GPV. They devoted a similar level of attention to moral issues before and after the entry of the GPV.

Table 5.1: party positions on moral issues 1967-1986

Position	1967-1972	1972-1977	1977-1981	1981-1986
1	GPV	GPV	SGP	GPV
2	SGP	SGP	GPV	SGP
3	BP	BP	CDA	CDA
4	ARP	CHU		
5	CHU	ARP		
6	KVP	KVP	VVD	D66
7	VVD	VVD	D66	PPR
8	D66	D66	PvdA	VVD
9	PSP	PvdA	PPR	PSP
10	PvdA	CPN	PSP	CPN
11	CPN	PSP	CPN	PvdA

Figure 5.7: parliamentary attention to moral issues




Figure 5.8: parliamentary attention of the ARP to moral issues



In the period 1967-1977, attention was at a much lower level.¹³³ All parties increased the levels of attention to moral issues before the 1972 elections. After the 1972 elections the attention decreased, only to culminate in a shared outlier in 1976 for almost all parties. This fits the pattern Outshoorn described: rising political attention to the issue between 1967 and 1972, but because the initiative was moved to parliament, it was removed from parliamentary decision-making until 1976 when the attention to moral issues peaked (Outshoorn 1986, 200).

In the period 1977-1986, one can see a clear peak in attention in the second half of 1982, the last year in which abortion was debated extensively in parliament. This is an outlier, however, because it only concerns the period in 1982 after the September elections. The attention that established parties devoted to moral issues is relatively stable. The parliamentary discussions on the abortion bill in 1980 did not cause a clear peak in attention. The abortion question was settled, and after 1984 the political focus in terms of moral issues moved to euthanasia (Green-Pedersen 2007, 280-281).¹³⁴

All in all, none of the three religious new parties appears to have forced increased attention to moral issues. The GPV's entry was followed by stable levels of attention by the other Protestant parties and declining levels of attention by most other parties. The pattern of attention to moral issues after 1967 followed the cycle that the abortion legislation followed: increased attention to the issue between 1967 and 1971. The attention increased between 1967-1972 as the abortion issue became more polarised. Attention to moral issues peaked in 1971, when the cabinet proposal was discussed. As the issue was depoliticised, the attention for moral issues was low between 1972 and 1976, and peaked due to the discussion of the (failed) parliamentary initiatives. Attention marginally increased with the 1980 discussion of the new government bill. After 1983, when the implementation of the law was

¹³³ The figures presented here are based on different analyses for the periods 1959-1967, 1967-1977 and 1977-1986. Therefore, the level differences between these years should be interpreted with the utmost care, because they may also be artifacts of the different analyses.

¹³⁴ Two parties defy this general pattern, the PSP and the CPN. For them, attention to moral issues is high and continues on a high level after 1981. This can be explained by referring to their developing feminist orientation. In these parties, a generation of feminists took over the helm from economically oriented socialists and communists. These developments appear to be independent from the entry of the RPF.

discussed, moral issues were removed from the parliamentary agenda. None of the three religious parties appears to have been able to put moral issues on the agenda.

The next step is to examine voting behaviour. As is explained in paragraph 3.4.9, insufficient parliamentary votes are available to analyse the impact of the GPV on party positions, but sufficient votes are available to examine the effect of the RKPN and RPF on party positions. Voting on religious issues is clearly one-dimensional in each of the four periods. Party positions, as shown in table 5.1, tend to follow the division between religious and secular parties.¹³⁵ On the extreme one can find the SGP, the GPV, orthodox Christian parties, joined by the morally conservative agrarian party BP. The next bloc of parties is formed by the ARP, the CHU and the KVP, or, after 1977, the CDA. Then one can find the liberal VVD, and the parties of the left: D66, PSP, PvdA and CPN. The differences between these secular parties are marginal. The main division is between the orthodox Protestant parties and the others. The correlation between party positions on the dimension over time is significant. The level of unanimous parliamentary votes increases after the entry of the RKPN from 2% to 7%; it declines marginally after the entry of the RPF from 7% to 6%. The RKPN, not included in the figure, has the most conservative position of all parties in the period 1972-1977. In the period 1981-1986, the RPF takes the shared most conservative position.¹³⁶

Between 1967 and 1977, there is only one marked change: the PSP moves sharply to the most progressive position, and therefore the PvdA and CPN move to a more conservative position. Between 1977 and 1986, there are two major changes: the VVD moves sharply to the progressive side. It passes D66 (which becomes the most conservative of the secular parties) and the PPR. The PvdA makes a similar move to the progressive side of the spectrum: it moves to the most extreme position,

¹³⁵ Given that the number of votes is small, three solutions have equal levels of fit. These solutions differ in the order of the SGP, GPV and BP. Each is the most extreme party in one of the solutions. Therefore, these three parties are taken together and are assigned a single position.

¹³⁶ Three additional parties entered parliament between 1968 and 1972: the PPR (1968), DS'70 (1970) and the NMP (1971). One can only determine positions for new parties for the period after 1972, because they did not participate in enough votes in the period before 1972. DS'70 has a moderate position between the VVD and the KVP. The PPR is placed on the extreme among the most progressive parties. Between 1981 and 1982, two additional parties entered parliament: the CP is the most secular party and the EVP is positioned between the more conservative of the secular parties.

passing by the PPR, PSP and CPN. The sharp move of the PSP in the opposite direction of the RKPN and the move of the PvdA and the VVD to the opposite side of the RPF could be understood as adversarial moves. The most striking result in this analysis is the stability in the position of the CDA and the KVP. These parties did not change position after two more conservative Christian parties entered parliament. Moreover, the division between very conservative, moderately conservative, moderately progressive and very progressive parties remains intact between 1967 and 1986. The RKPN and RPF joined the SGP and the GPV on the very conservative side. Instead of changing the line of conflict on moral issues, the RKPN and RPF have been integrated into them. Both reinforced some of the conflict, as is evident by the movements to the progressive side of the PSP, PvdA and the VVD.

5.2.5 D66 and DS'70: democratic idealists and moderates

Between 1967 and 1977, the Dutch party system changed: five new parties entered parliament and three of the traditional big five established parties lost a considerable share of the votes and merged. Two of these new parties focused specifically on the Dutch political system. The first one was D66, which advocated a radical revision of the Dutch political system, and the second one was DS'70, which opposed such changes.¹³⁷ D66 entered parliament in 1967 and DS'70 in 1971, and therefore, three periods will be examined: 1963-1967 (before the entry of D66), 1967-1971 (after the entry of D66 but before the entry of DS'70) and 1971-1977 (after the entry of DS'70).

After the 1967 elections a government advisory committee was set up: the Cals/Donner committee. The formation of the depoliticised committee can be understood as response of the established parties to the entry of D66. The committee consisted of representatives from the major political parties, including D66 co-founder Gruijters (Cals et al. 1971). The committee worked on advice concerning the political system, the constitutional order and the electoral system. In 1971, they presented their final report, which included proposals to change the constitution,

¹³⁷ DS'70 is linked to governance, although hesitantly: this is the issue that united to two factions within the party but is not the defining issue of either of them. Other choices might have been made: the focus of the social democratic faction and its own parliamentary party was on fiscal policies. Therefore, one may also have examined macro-economy and tax policies, but this is done extensively in section 4.4.7 when the effect of the NMP is examined.

reform the electoral system, and change the role of the prime minister (Cals et al. 1971). On many issues, such as the referendum, the government formation process and the electoral system, the committee was divided (Cals et al. 1968, 1969, 1971). Its proposals to reformulate constitutional rights were much less controversial (Cals et al. 1971). It is not surprising that, as most proposals did not have the support of the entire committee, the proposals also faced a divided parliament and divided government coalitions (Wielenga 2010, 258). Smaller reforms were implemented while the committee was working on its report (such as the lowering of the voting age). The only major result of the committee's activities was the 1983 constitutional revision, which mainly implemented the less controversial proposals on constitutional rights.

In order to understand the effects of both the entry of D66 and DS'70, and of the depoliticised process of decision-making in the Cals/Donner committee on the attention that established parties devoted to governance, one can look at figure 5.9:¹³⁸ the 1967 elections lead to a clear interruption in the development in the attention to the issue. Between 1967 and 1971, attention devoted to governance increased sharply: from less than 10% to more than 20%. There is a small decline after the 1967 election, probably due to the depoliticization. Even though decision-making was depoliticised, attention to the issue increased markedly. It appears that, after the entry of D66, the established parties increased attention to this issue, even though decision-making was depoliticised.¹³⁹

In 1971, the moderate DS'70 entered parliament and the Cals/Donner committee presented the final report. One would expect a greater increase in attention after the depoliticised process of advice writing had ended and the more politicised process of lawmaking could start, and after the entry of yet another party that focuses on governance. This is not the case, however: after 1971, the attention to governance decreased sharply. One can explain the pattern in attention by the lack of political consensus within the committee-Cals/Donner and in parliament concerning their

¹³⁸ The data used here are based on different data than those that were used for the macro-level analyses. The figures are based on data from the period 1963-1977. The analyses are based on data for the period 1963-1971 and the period 1967-1977. These two data sets correlate significantly (Pearson's r of 0.997 significant at the 0.01-level).

¹³⁹ The only exception to this pattern is the PSP. This party shared D66's orientation towards the democratisation movement. Therefore, it may not have needed the impetus of the entry of D66 to orient itself towards democratic reform.

Figure 5.9: parliamentary attention to governance 1963-1971




Table 5.2: party positions on governance 1963-1977

Position	1963-1967	1967-1971	1971-1977
1	BP	BP	BP
2	SGP	SGP	SGP
3	GPV	GPV	GPV
4	ARP	ARP	VVD
5	KVP	CHU	CHU
6	CHU	VVD	KVP
7	VVD	KVP	ARP
8	PvdA	CPN	PvdA
9	CPN	PSP	PSP
10	PSP	PvdA	CPN

proposals. The committee did not formulate a broadly supported agenda of government reform, but rather showed the political divisions on the issue. Given the lack of consensus on the issue and the fact that most proposals would require a two-third majority, it was not politically opportune to be active on the issue. In this sense, DS'70 got what it wanted: no major reforms of the Dutch constitutional order were implemented.

The next step is analysing the effects of these parties on party positions. Party positioning on governance can be integrated into a one-dimensional model in all three periods. The party positions are shown in table 5.2. In each of these periods, one can see a division between the SGP, GPV and BP, conservative parties that tended to

oppose government reform; the parties of the centre-right (CHU, KVP, ARP and VVD), and the parties of the left (PvdA, CPN, PSP), which tended to favour government reform. The party positions on three dimensions correlate. Voting on government reform became more polarised in this period: the percentage of unanimous votes dropped from 12% to 7%.

D66, which entered parliament in 1967, took a position among the leftwing parties, but it is not the most extreme party on the issue. DS'70, which was formed during this parliamentary term, also took positions between the KVP and the parties on the left. In the period 1971-1977, these patterns remained with limited differences: D66 moved to the extreme position on governance. The position of DS'70 poses some questions: it was a party that defended the existing parliamentary system, but it did not position itself between the conservative parties such as the SGP and the GPV. Instead, it took a position between the Christian-democratic and leftwing parties. This position may reflect the moderate views DS'70 had: it did not oppose all reform, but only radical reform.¹⁴⁰

Between 1963-1967 and 1967-1971, one can observe two marked movements: on the one hand, the KVP moved to a more reformist position, relative to the CHU and the VVD. The PvdA moved to the extreme on the reformist side of the dimension, beyond the PSP, CPN (and D66). The movements of the KVP and the PvdA are considerable. Between 1967-1971 and 1971-1977, one can observe three movements: the ARP made a marked shift towards a more reformist position. It leapt over the CHU and the KVP, and instead of the least progressive of the three Christian-democratic parties, it became the most progressive of the three. Second, the VVD, which had a centrist position, took a more conservative position on the issue. It now came close to the position of the GPV. Finally, the PvdA made a marked move to the centre switching positions with the CPN and skipping over the PSP. The main division in the period 1971-1977 is between DS'70 and the PPR. 45% of the votes divide the Progressive Agreement parties (with PSP and CPN) from the rest. This coincided with the participation of D66 in the Progressive Agreement of PvdA, PPR and D66, which embraced government reform: instead of following a division between religious and secular parties in the period 1963-1967 (with the VVD taking a centrist position), the division on government reform now appears to follow the

¹⁴⁰ Two other parties entered parliament during this period: the PPR took a centre-left position, and the RKPN took a clear conservative position close to the GPV.

division between the traditional economic left and the right, with the Christian-democrats in the centre and the VVD further away from the PvdA. The shifting positions may indicate a shift in the nature of the line of conflict: from secular-religious to left-right.

If the two patterns are combined, the following pattern emerges: between 1963 and 1967, there was little attention to governance and the issue was incorporated in the religious-secular pattern. After the entry of D66 in 1967, the issue received more attention, voting became less unanimous and the KVP and the PvdA moved to a more progressive position. After the entry of DS'70 in 1971, the issue received less attention and voting on the issue was incorporated in the left-right dimension. The increasing politicisation of the issue can certainly be ascribed to the entry of D66. The same goes for its incorporation in the left-right pattern: by joining the Progressive Agreement and making government reform a core issue of the alliance, the issue became part of the left-right pattern.

5.2.6 PPR: radicalising radicals

Over the course of the 1970s, the PPR became a greener party (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008). During the same period, environmental issues became much more important, societally: the political effect of this was the formation of a ministry of Public Health and the Environment was founded in the 1971 cabinet formation. The first real environmental bill from this ministry came in the Den Uyl cabinet.¹⁴¹ The cabinet created the legal tools for environmental policies: the 1976 General Law on the Environment (*Wet Algemene Bepalingen Milieuhygiene*) is the most prominent example (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst 1977, 103). The question of this section is whether the pattern in attention can be explained by the formation of the ministry or by the entry of the PPR.

The entry of the PPR and the creation of the ministry of Public Health and the Environment closely followed each other and can both be expected to have led to increased attention for environmental issues. Therefore, a more precise prediction about the expected pattern is necessary. If the increase in attention was caused by the PPR, one would expect the PPR to lead the development in attention. Contrariwise,

¹⁴¹ Due to the short period in which this cabinet was in office (it fell in 1972), no environmental policy was proposed during the period 1971-1972.

Figure 5.10: parliamentary attention of the PPR to the environment




Figure 5.11: parliamentary attention to the environment




Table 5.3: party positions on the environmental issues 1967-1977

Position	1967-1971	1971-1977
1	BP	BP
2	SGP	SGP
3	KVP	GPV
4	VVD	VVD
5	CHU	CHU
6	GPV	ARP
7	ARP	KVP
8	D66	D66
9	PvdA	PvdA
10	CPN	PSP
11	PSP	CPN

if the increase in attention was caused by external circumstance, one would expect the PPR to follow the pattern of attention of the other established parties. And this would be a pattern of continual increase, as the ministry began to produce bills.

In figure 5.10, one can see the level of attention that the PPR devoted to the environment: low levels of attention to environmental issues before 1972, and then an increase in attention over the period 1972-1977. Looking at the development of attention of established parties to the environment (in figure 5.11), one can see a similar pattern: before the 1971 elections, attention to the environment increases, and after the 1971 elections, the level of increase is much more marked.¹⁴² The pattern of attention makes the formation of the ministry a much more likely cause than the entry of the PPR. If one can draw any conclusion about the relationship between the entry of the PPR into the political system and the attention to the environment, it has to be that both the PPR and the other parties became greener, more oriented towards the environment, over the period 1972-1977.

This increase in attention also influences the analysis of positions. In order to allow for a comparison of party positions over time, one must have a sufficient

¹⁴² There are to exceptions: the PSP and KVP increased their attention to the environment before 1971, and then the attention stabilised. Both parties shared strong similarities with the PPR: the PPR had split away from the KVP and both parties shared an orientation to Catholic votes, the PSP and the PPR shared a new politics orientation. After the PPR, a green party, entered parliament, these parties stabilised their attention for the environment. For both parties the PPR was a competitor, and both parties lost a considerable number of votes in 1971, the elections in which the PPR entered. It is difficult to understand this stability in terms of strategic reaction.

empirical basis. Therefore, a range of issues related to the environment politics is examined, namely environment, land management, energy and transport.¹⁴³ The first thing that catches the eye when looking at the two distributions of parties in table 5.3 is that parties converged in the period 1967-1971. In this period, both the BP and the SGP are assigned the same position as well as the CHU, KVP and the VVD. In the period 1971-1977, all parties are assigned a separate position. This is clearly the effect of the increasing absolute number of non-unanimous votes on the issue (allowing for a more precise division of parties). This number explodes from 13 to 157. This increase itself may be a sign of increasing politicisation of the issue. Party positions on the issue appear to roughly follow the left-right division, with the parties of the right and centre right on the one side and the leftwing parties on the other. In the period 1971-1977, the main distinction is between the parties of the right and centre right and parties of the left. The correlation between party positions on this dimension over time is significant. The PPR takes a relatively environmentalist position, as the most environmentalist party of the Progressive Agreement parties.¹⁴⁴ Two marked changes can be observed here. The VVD, KVP and CHU had the same position in 1967-1971, but they now differ in position. The VVD moves to the least environmentalist position of these three. It is followed by the CHU and then the KVP, which has also leapt over the ARP. The KVP is now the most environmentalist of the Christian-democratic parties. The second movement involves the GPV: while this party voted similarly to the ARP in the period 1967-1971, it moved to a less environmentalist position in the period 1971-1977, close to the SGP and the VVD. The pattern that can be established for this period is clear: the concentration of political parties on the environmental issues decreased over time.

In summary, it appears not to be the case that the entry of the PPR has put environmental issues on the agenda. Rather, the party and its environment became more environmentalist during the 1970s. The increasing attention for environmental issues was coupled by an increasing differentiation of established parties' positions on the issue.

¹⁴³ Transport can be understood in environmental terms during this period because of the oil shortage and the first protests against the dominance of cars.

¹⁴⁴ DS'70 takes a centrist position on the issue, while the RKPN joins the small parties of the right.

Figure 5.12: inflation



Figure 5.13: parliamentary attention to economic affairs



Table 5.4: party positions on economic affairs 1967-1977

Position	1963-1967	1967-1971
1	BP	VVD
2	VVD	BP
3	ARP	SGP
4	SGP	GPV
5	CHU	CHU
6	KVP	KVP
7	GPV	ARP
8	PvdA	CPN
9	D66	PvdA
10	CPN	D66
11	PSP	PSP

5.2.7 NMP: small business owners in protest

The NMP entered the Dutch parliament in a period of growing economic difficulty. As can be seen in figure 5.12, between 1967 and 1971 the inflation level increased from 3.1% to 7.6%. The increase occurred in a period of rising unemployment (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 212). The NMP emphasised fiscal responsibility: the party proposed radical reduction of government interference in the Dutch economy, and a lowering of the tax level.¹⁴⁵ The electoral success of the NMP was short-lived: it disappeared from parliament in the snap-elections of 1972. These elections were called after the fall of the centre-right Biesheuvel cabinet, which fell on disagreements on how to combat the economic crisis.¹⁴⁶

The development in attention to economic affairs that is presented in figure 5.13 shows a clear pattern: before the 1971 elections it is declining, the period just before the 1971 election forms a dip. The 1971 election causes an increase in attention for most parties, but after that, the attention declines again. The 1971 elections in which the NMP entered parliament have interrupted a general pattern of declining attention for economic affairs for almost all parties. Between the pre-election 1971 period and the pre-election 1972 period, attention for economic affairs increases sharply for all parties. The entry of the NMP appears to be followed by an increase in attention to economic affairs. However, the peculiar development of the attention for economic affairs can also be explained by the policy cycle. In September

¹⁴⁵ DS'70, which entered parliament in 1971, emphasised fiscal responsibility as well.

¹⁴⁶ A centre-left cabinet was formed after the 1972 elections (in which the NMP disappeared from the political scene). This cabinet did not take drastic budgetary steps after the discovery of large natural gas deposits in the North of the Netherlands.

the cabinet proposes the budget, which is then discussed in parliament before the Christmas recess. This means that in the months before the 1971 election (held in April), fewer economic issues would be discussed than after the elections, because the budget is discussed after April. Without this outlier there is no marked change in the attention for economic affairs.

Voting on economic affairs roughly follows the left-right division as can be seen in table 5.4: the BP, the VVD and NMP on the right hand side, the centre-right position of the Christian-democrats and orthodox Christians, and the leftwing position of the social democratic, socialist and communist parties. The correlation between party positions in the two periods is significant. The percentage of unanimous votes decreases during this period from 11% before the entry of the NMP to 5% in the period 1971-1977. The NMP takes the position furthest on the right.¹⁴⁷

The established parties move considerably. Only the PSP maintained its position relative to the other established parties. The pattern that one can see in the data is that the major parties tend to move to the left (PvdA, D66, CHU, KVP, ARP), while the smaller parties (CPN, SGP, GPV) move to the right. The major established parties appear to show adversarial reactions to the entry of a new fiscally responsible party. The only party that defies this pattern is the VVD, which actually moved to the right. The pattern may not necessarily be the result of the entry of the NMP. The leftwing shift of the ARP and KVP on economic issues, in particular, may be the result of an autonomous shift of these parties to the left, which was also observed for their voting on government reform issues.

The entry of the NMP does not seem to be a good explanation of the development in the parties' attention for and their positions on economic affairs between 1967 and 1977. Rather, it appears that the budgetary cycle has caused attention to sharply increase after the entry of the NMP into parliament, and that the

¹⁴⁷ Three other parties entered parliament during this period: the PPR and DS'70, which split from their mother parties during the period 1967-1971, the NMP in 1971 and RKPN in 1972. During the entire period, DS'70 took a position between the parties of the left and the parties of the centre right. Even though this party emphasised fiscal responsibility, it did not vote with the other parties that emphasised fiscal responsibility such as the NMP, the VVD, and the smaller Christian parties. Instead, the party took a centrist position. The PPR started with a similar position as DS'70 in 1967-1971, but it sharply moved to the left in the period 1971-1977. The RKPN took a position on the right with the orthodox Christians.

leftwing courses of the ARP and KVP moved them to the left. The NMP appears not to have influenced the saliency of tax issues or parties' positions on them.

5.2.8 EVP: progressive Protestants

In 1982, on the waves of the protest movement against the stationing of nuclear weapons, the Christian-pacifist EVP entered parliament. The effect of the EVP cannot be evaluated without reference to the international events of the late 1970s. In response to the Soviet decision to renew its intermediate range nuclear missiles in 1977, NATO also decided to place a new generation of intermediate range missiles in several Western European countries, including the Netherlands, unless the Soviet Union would agree to eliminate its new intermediate range missiles (Keylor 2003, 143). This so-called Double Track Decision posed a major problem to the first Van Agt cabinet, which relied on a small majority in the Dutch parliament (Wielenga 2010, 312). The senior coalition partner, the CDA, had many dissenting MPs within its own ranks who opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands (Van Diepen 2004, 121). The peace movement and especially the Inter-Church Peace Council (*Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad*) began to organise public opposition to stationing. The Dutch parliament adopted a motion not to place nuclear weapons in the Netherlands in the lead-up to the NATO decision (Van Diepen 2004, 131). Many CDA dissidents supported the motion. In its double track decision, NATO allowed the Dutch government to postpone the stationing of nuclear weapons for two years (Van Diepen 2004, 131-132). After a long parliamentary debate, parliament rejected a second motion, which was meant to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands ever again. The CDA dissidents had made a *volte-face* because they did not want to force a cabinet crisis (Van Diepen 2004, 136). The short-lived second Van Agt cabinet, which was formed after the 1981 elections, had made an agreement to disagree about nuclear weapons and decided to postpone stationing even longer (Van Diepen 2004, 155-156). Meanwhile, public attention to the issue grew: in 1981, 1983 and 1985 major protests were organised against the stationing of nuclear weapons. The 1981 and 1983 protests were large public protests: in 1981, 400,000 Dutch people attended (Van Diepen 2004, 188-189), and the 1983 protest was attended by 500,000 Dutch people (Van Diepen 2004, 203). In 1985, a petition was organised against the decision to place nuclear weapons (Van Diepen 2004, 320). The cabinet was not swayed by the protests and prepared the stationing of nuclear

Figure 5.14: parliamentary attention to defense 1977-1986



Table 5.5: party positions on defence 1977-1986

Position	1977-1982	1982-1986
1	SGP	VVD
2	GPV	GPV
3	VVD	SGP
4	CDA	CDA
5	D66	PvdA
6	PvdA	D66
7	PPR	PPR
8	CPN	CPN
9	PSP	PSP

weapons (Van Diepen 2004, 183). In 1984, the cabinet presented a compromise: the decision to accept American missiles was postponed for one year. The decision would be tied to the development in Soviet missiles, shifting the responsibility to the Soviet Union (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 231). The Soviets increased their missiles and in 1985 the government signed the treaty to accept the missiles (Van Diepen 2004, 316). The decision was ratified by parliament in 1985 (Van Diepen 2004, 330). By then, international events had caught up with the Dutch political decision-making: the weapons were never placed because of weapon control talks between the Soviet Union and the United States.

As can be seen in figure 5.14, attention for defence peaks in 1979, the year of the NATO double-track decision; after that, attention increases only marginally. There is no sign of a major increase in attention after the entry of the EVP, certainly in comparison to the peak in attention in 1979. One cannot point to the entry of the EVP as an external shock in the attention for defence. While the social debates about defence policy were heated and prominent, the issue was kept from the parliamentary agenda because the government first postponed the decision-making and then controlled the debates by making small steps over the course of the 1980s. Because of a government strategy of postponement and incrementalism, the activities of the nuclear disarmament movement in the Netherlands, such as the 1985 petition, the 1981 and 1983 demonstrations and the entry of the EVP into parliament in 1982, could not influence the agenda.

A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the EVP's impact on other parties' positions. The voting pattern follows the division between left and right, as can be seen in table 5.5. The anti-communist orthodox Protestant parties and the VVD are furthest to the right, followed by the CDA, then the more moderate leftwing parties PvdA and D66 and finally the PSP, PPR and CPN; these are the leftwing parties that opposed the pro-American defence policy of the Netherlands. The EVP joined the left. The EVP is not the most extreme party; rather, it stands closer to the centre than to CPN, PPR and PSP. The correlation between party positions on the two dimensions is significant. The level of unanimity *increases* during the period studied: from 6% to 10%. The increase in unanimity may be explained by the fact that several hot issues, in particular the presence of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil, had cooled because of the cabinet's incremental strategy.¹⁴⁸ There is only one marked change: on the anti-communist side of the dimension, the SGP and the VVD change position, leapfrogging over the GPV. The VVD takes the most extreme position in the period 1982-1986. The difference in terms of the number of votes between the VVD and SGP was small. The EVP entered the political arena on an issue that was already politicised. Instead of changing the patterns of competition, the party joined one of the sides.

The EVP is another example of a party that entered parliament as the result of the politicisation of an issue, instead of its entry resulting in the politicisation of its

¹⁴⁸ During the period studied, two additional parties entered parliament: the RPF and the CP. They are placed on the anti-communist side of the spectrum.

issue. The EVP entered parliament on the back of social protests against the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands, an issue that was politicised especially by the NATO decision in 1979. A government strategy of postponement and incremental decision-making further prevented politicisation of the defence issue when the EVP was in parliament.

5.2.9 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics

The CP was the first anti-immigration party to enter the Dutch parliament. It wanted to limit migration, advocated re-migration and sought to fight what it perceived as discrimination of native Dutch people. Since the Second World War, two groups of people migrated to the Netherlands: one group from Dutch colonies, and another group of migrant workers from the Mediterranean (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 229). The possibility of political independence of Surinam led to an increase in immigration to the Netherlands after 1970 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 251-254). Immigration levels from Surinam peaked in 1975, the year of the independence, and continued to be high until 1980, when it became more difficult for people from Surinam to migrate to the Netherlands (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 254-255; Lucassen and Lucassen 2011, 75). High unemployment on the Dutch Antilles led to high levels of immigration to the Netherlands in the period 1973-1982 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 261). Additionally, the Netherlands also opened its borders to labour immigration from the Mediterranean. Between 1964 and 1974, the Dutch government pursued an official policy of recruitment of migrant workers (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 267-268). In 1974, the recruitment of migrant workers ended, but, due to family reunion, immigration continued (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 272). Migration from Morocco peaked in 1979 (Lucassen & Lucassen 1974, 66). Until the late 1970s, the government had worked under the assumption that migrants would return to their own country, and so no integration policy was pursued (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 289). In the late 1970s, the government began to recognise that the migrant workers would stay permanently: in 1981 the government published a concept-government policy paper on minority policy and in 1983 a definitive policy paper followed (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 290). In figure 5.15, one can see that levels of immigration increased until 1980 and fluctuated around a much lower level of immigration afterwards.

Figure 5.15: immigration levels 1977-1986




Figure 5.16: parliamentary attention to immigration 1977-1986



Table 5.6: party positions on immigration 1977-1986

Position	1977-1982	1982-1986
1	SGP	VVD
2	GPV	SGP
3	VVD	GPV
4	CPN	PvdA
5	CDA	CPN
6	D66	D66
7	PSP	PSP
8	PPR	PPR
9	PvdA	CDA

Immigration became an issue of political contestation, during the 1980s, which it had not been before. As can be seen in figure 5.16, attention follows a pattern of breaking the silence: low, stagnant or declining levels of the attention for immigration before the entry of the 1982 elections, which turn into markedly increasing levels of attention after the elections. This pattern can be observed for most parties.¹⁴⁹ For many parties, the 1982 elections interrupt the pattern in attention: low and stable levels of attention for immigration are turned to increasing or higher levels of attention. The CP entered parliament in this election, which may have caused the rise in attention. One can eliminate several other explanations, such as the actual immigration levels: while actual immigration levels rose, attention was stable, and when the immigration levels stabilised, political attention for immigration rose.¹⁵⁰ The government policy paper on immigration may be another explanation. The concept-government policy paper was already published in 1981 and the final version was published in 1983. A marked difference exists in the parliamentary attention for the issue between 1981 and 1983. An important difference here appears to be the presence of the CP.

It is difficult to characterise party positions on immigration before and even after the entry of the CP. These positions are shown in table 5.6. In both periods, one dimension suffices to show the voting patterns. In the period 1977-1982, a limited

¹⁴⁹ The CDA and the CPN show signs of autonomous, independent increasing attention to immigration. For both parties, the 1982 elections caused an interruption of the increasing attention, but the growth of attention continued afterwards. Only the SGP shows a decline in attention to immigration after the 1981 elections.

¹⁵⁰ It may be the case that instead of immigration, integration of migrants was the problem. There is a five-year period between the peak in migration and the peak in attention to migration. The question is however why a five-year period would be crucial.

number of votes were held on the issue. The first position on the dimension is shared by the GPV and SGP, then comes a shared position of VVD and CPN, then the CDA, then D66, a shared position of PSP and PPR and then the PvdA. The voting appears to follow the left-right divide, although the CPN is placed on the right hand side.¹⁵¹ After the entry of the CP into parliament, the VVD is the most extreme of the established parties, followed by the SGP, the GPV, then one can find the PvdA, the CPN, D66, the PSP, the PPR and the CDA. Positions appear to follow a rough left-right pattern. Now the CDA is among the leftwing parties. During the 1980s, the CDA did indeed favour a multicultural approach to integration (Lucassen & Lucassen 2011, p.96). The CP is placed furthest right in the period 1982-1986.¹⁵² In its voting behaviour the CP stood isolated from the other parties.¹⁵³ After 1982, the dominant pattern in the voting pattern is between the CP and the other parties. The correlation between party positions before and after the entry of the CP is not significant. Given the differences between party positions before and after the entry of the CP, the shifts of individual parties over time cannot be identified, and neither can the dimensions be considered to be the same substantive dimension. Party positions shifted between the periods but not in a way that can be interpreted meaningfully because of the low number of votes. There is no sign of politicisation of the issue in terms of voting: the level of unanimous voting decreases only slightly during this period.¹⁵⁴

The entry of the CP has interrupted the low, stable and stagnating levels of attention accompanied by a consensual approach to the issue. It has caused established parties to devote more attention to immigration and to politicise the issue.

¹⁵¹ The position of the CPN is unexpected because, especially in this period, it emphasised anti-discrimination and appealed to migrant communities.

¹⁵² In this period two other new parties entered parliament: the RPF and the EVP. The RPF is placed between the GPV and the SGP and the EVP between D66 and PSP. This reinforces the idea that division between the other parties is between the left (including the CDA) and the right (including the orthodox Christian parties).

¹⁵³ 18 votes (38% of the votes under study) separate the CP from the VVD. A large share of the votes in which the CP stands alone from the other parties concerns the naturalisation of individuals, which, until 1985, was done by law, and as such had to pass through parliament. In parliament, CP MP Janmaat devoted considerable attention to the naturalisation process (Van Holsteyn 1997). He was one of the first MPs to seriously scrutinise the naturalisation process. The CP was not the first to vote against such a naturalisation bill. Already in 1978, the BP voted against such a bill.

¹⁵⁴ It decreases from 17% to 15%. Note that this looks at the voting behaviour of the established parties, excluding the votes of the CP. With the voting behaviour of the CP, the level of unanimity falls back from 17 to 3%.

Established parties were united in their negative response to the CP. After the entry of the CP, criticism of immigration was seen as support for the extreme right. The political left began to treat immigrants with more consideration (Tinnemans 1995). Some observers propose that it was after the entry of the CP that the PvdA became more supportive of multiculturalism (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011, 94). The political and social developments diverge: before the entry of the CP, levels of immigration were high and increasing, political attention however was low and stable. After the CP entered, political attention to immigration was rising, while immigration levels were stabilising at a level lower than before. It may be the case that the opposition to immigration grew as immigration increased during the 1970s, which may have sowed the seeds for support for the CP. Even though immigration levels had already dropped by 1982, the issue became politically salient because of the entry of the CP. In this sense, the CP may have been the link between the societal saliency of immigration and its political saliency.

5.2.10 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters

The AOV and the U55+ were both founded shortly before the 1994 elections (Van Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996; Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1995, 27, 69). The issue of social security began to play a prominent role on the public agenda because economic circumstances had forced the governing parties to consider controversial budget cuts on social security, pensions and health care, this included an ill-fated proposal of the CDA to freeze the government pensions, which was retracted quickly (Flight & Felix 1995, 103).

When one looks at the developments in the attention for healthcare in figure 5.17, one thing stands out: in the first months of 1994 (before the 1994 elections) attention to healthcare peaks. After 1994, attention is much more stable and shows a slight increase. Only the CD, GL and the CDA increase their attention to the issue after 1994.¹⁵⁵ This effect is marginal compared to the increases in attention before the entry of the AOV and U55+. There is a clear pattern in the data: attention to pensioners' affairs peaks *before* the entry of the U55+ and AOV. The AOV and U55+

¹⁵⁵ The CDA and GL may have attempted to profit from the pensioners' issues that the AOV and U55+ brought to the table. Both parties lost votes in the 1994 elections. Only the CD is a real exception to this trend: this party peaks in attention to healthcare after the 1994 election: this interrupts a pattern of decline over the entire period.

probably profited electorally from the increased saliency of pensioners' affairs in the run-up to the 1994 election, which is also reflected in the parliamentary attention to this issue. After the 1994 election politics as usual returned.

Voting on pensioners' affairs and healthcare combined is on the border between being scaled best in one or two dimensions. As is evident from table 5.7, the single dimensional models are not comparable. Between 1989 and 1994 the order of the parties on the dimension is VVD, CD, SGP, GPV RPF, CDA, PvdA, D66 and GL. This follows the division between left and right. Between 1994 and 1998, the order of the parties is different: at the extreme end one can find CD, CDA and GL, followed by the SGP and RPF on one position, followed by the GPV, PvdA, D66 and the VVD. The two orderings are different and do not correlate. The U55+ is placed between the CD and CDA, and the AOV stands between the GL and the shared position of the SGP and GPV.¹⁵⁶ The main pattern divides the coalition parties from the other parties. This provides no answer to the question how this pattern changes.

One can further examine this change by modelling voting in a two-dimensional model. This fits for the data in the period 1989-1994 in terms of stress. It is shown in figure 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20: in the lower left hand corner one can find the leftwing opposition parties (D66 and GL). In the upper right hand corner the coalition parties at the time (CDA and PvdA) are located, together with the small Christian parties (GPV, SGP and RPF). On the right side, the VVD is in the lower corner and the CD is in the upper corner. The horizontal dimension divides leftwing parties (PvdA, D66 and GL) from the parties on the right (CD and the VVD) with the Christian parties in the centre. The second dimension is more difficult to grasp: it appears to separate more secular and religious parties, with the PvdA standing close to the religious parties. In the period 1994-1998, the voting also best fits a two-dimensional model. One dimension separates the CD from the other parties and on the other moves from VVD, via D66, PvdA, AOV, SP and the small Christian parties, to the GL, the CDA and the U55+. If one rotates the two solutions onto each other, one thing becomes apparent: in both models there appear to be two patterns. One divides between the CD and the other parties, and the other divides among the other parties. This second pattern in both cases comes close to the single dimension from the one-dimensional model.

¹⁵⁶ The SP stands close to the GL.

Figure 5.17: parliamentary attention to healthcare



Table 5.7: party positions on health 1989-1998

Position	1989-1994	1994-1998	1998-2002
1	VVD	CD	*
2	CD	CDA	VVD
3	SGP	GL	D66
4	GPV	SGP	CDA
5	RPF	RPF	SGP
6	CDA	GPV	CU
7	PvdA	PvdA	PvdA
8	D66	D66	GL
9	GL	VVD	SP

Figure 5.18: model of voting on healthcare 1989-1994




Figure 5.19: model of voting on healthcare 1994-1998





Figure 5.20: procrustean analysis of voting on healthcare 1989-1998



In this sense, the change in both the one and the two-dimensional model is similar. Given the division between the CD and the rest of the parties on the horizontal dimension in figure 5.20, most of the variance between the other parties is concentrated on the vertical dimension. This vertical dimension roughly coincides with the one-dimensional solution. Differences exist between the two one-dimensional solutions. One cannot compare the changes of the party positions in terms of changes of position. Rather, there appears to be a change in the dominant dimension of the issue of healthcare. Instead of the socio-economic left-right division between conservative liberals on the right, Christian-democrats in the centre and social democrats on the left, the dominant division appears to be between the CDA, U55+ and GL on the one side, the AOV, the PvdA, the SP and the small Christian parties in the centre and D66 and VVD on the other extreme. The division may be between those who seek to reform the healthcare system and those who seek to maintain it. The entry of the pensioners' parties may have caused this new division to come to life.

The pattern, however, opens up another possibility: on one side of the new dimension one can find the parties that formed the cabinet, and on the other side one can find the parties that formed the opposition. It may be possible that this new pattern is merely the effect of the formation of a government that cuts through the traditional left-right divide. One can examine this question in two ways: first, one may want to compare the pattern found here for healthcare to other issues and other time periods. If one finds that the pattern is not found for other issues and one finds that in the next parliamentary period (when PvdA, VVD and D66 formed the cabinet, but the pensioners' parties were not in parliament) the pattern is different, the pattern found may be more reasonably related to the specificities of this issue (specifically the entry of the pensioners' parties), rather than to the formation of new cabinet. A useful issue to examine may be labour and social affairs, because like healthcare this issue concerns the protection of weaker members of society, insurance against major risks and the material needs of citizens. Labour and social affairs are analysed in section 5.2.11. A striking stability is found in the pattern of party positions between 1989-1994 and 1994-1998. In both cases the left-right pattern was dominant. This appears to falsify the notion that the change in the pattern for healthcare is caused by a change in cabinets. The next step would be to look at voting in the following parliamentary period (1998-2002). For this purpose, this period has also been included in figures 5.19 and 5.20. In this period, PvdA, VVD and D66 also formed the cabinet. If one finds the persistence of a pattern that separates the PvdA, VVD and D66 from the CDA and the GL, one may find reason to attribute the pattern found in the period 1994-1998 to the formation of the PvdA, VVD and D66 cabinet rather than to the participation of the U55+ and AOV in the parliamentary arena. The data is on the border between a one and a two-dimensional solution. In the one-dimensional model of voting behaviour, one can observe the following pattern: the VVD is the furthest party on the right, followed by D66, the CDA, the SGP, the CU, the GL and the SP. Certainly the dominant pattern in this model is not between government and opposition parties, but rather between the socio-economic left and the right, as was also observed for all votes concerning pensioners' affairs and healthcare in the period 1989-1994.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ The two-dimensional solution shows two dimensions: one between socio-economic left and right, and one between religious and secular parties. The PvdA, VVD and D66 stand close to each other on the second dimension.

In both these comparative analyses the peculiar voting patterns on healthcare in the period 1994-1998 appear to be specific to voting on that issue in that period, rather than a phenomenon that is caused by a division of government and opposition. These patterns, however, do not appear to be related to the political priorities of elderly parties in a consistent way: the AOV and the U55+ vote very differently.

If one compares the results of the two analyses of voting and attention, one particular finding stands out: the CDA, GL and CD are the only parties to respond to the U55+ and AOV; they show a change in terms of saliency and they also sit closely together on the new healthcare dimension. The CDA and GL both lost in the 1994 elections, in which the CD won seats (but not as many as was polled). It appears that these three parties may have attempted to take over some of the momentum of the pensioners' parties.

5.2.11 SP: a leftwing challenger

In addition to the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+, another party entered parliament in the 1994 elections: the Socialist Party. The SP opposed the cuts on social spending proposed and implemented by the CDA/PvdA cabinet. The leftwing party opposed the centrist course of the PvdA across the line but particularly on healthcare, labour market and social policies. As an example of this, the labour issue is selected.¹⁵⁸ To understand the effects of the SP, two things need to be taken into consideration: the political events during the Lubbers cabinet (discussed in section 5.2.10) and the actual economic circumstances. Figure 5.21 shows the levels of unemployment in the Netherlands. As one can see this follows a zigzag pattern of decreasing unemployment in the period 1989-1992, followed by an increase in unemployment in the period 1992-1994. After that, unemployment decreased again.

The patterns in the attention that established parties devote to this issue, shown in figure 5.22, are similar: for all parties the pattern follows a zigzag pattern. Attention to labour issues declined before the 1994 election. It peaked after the 1994 election but then declined again. One may propose that the entry of the SP interrupted the decreasing levels of attention to labour market policies, and that this effect was only short term, given the subsequent decline. The levels of attention for labour market issues also show a clear similarity to the actual levels of unemployment. This pattern

¹⁵⁸ This includes the labour market, labour market reintegration, and disability and unemployment insurance.

Figure 5.21: unemployment



Figure 5.22: parliamentary attention to labour



Table 5.8: party positions on labour and social affairs 1989-1998

Position	1989-1994	1994-1998
1	CD	CD
2	VVD	VVD
3	SGP	CDA
4	RPF	SGP
5	GPV	GPV
6	CDA	RPF
7	D66	PvdA
8	PvdA	D66
9	GL	GL

does not only explain the rise in attention between 1993 and 1995, but also the decline in attention before 1994 and the decline in attention after 1994. A significant correlation exists between the levels of attention for labour market affairs and unemployment (Pearson's r is 0.84 – significant at the 0.01-level). Given this correlation, the entry of the SP has to be dismissed as a likely explanation for the increase in attention to labour policies. During the entire period the level of unemployment appears to be a better explanation for the level of attention for labour market policies than the entry of the SP. While the entry of the SP could explain the change in the level of attention before and after the 1994 election, the level of unemployment can also explain the developments before and after the 1994 election.

Table 5.8 presents voting in parliament on labour and social affairs.¹⁵⁹ The Centre-Democrats stand furthest to the right; followed by the VVD, then the Christian-democratic CDA and the smaller orthodox Christian parties, at the furthest left on the dimension one can find D66, the PvdA and the GL. The party positions correlate significantly over time. The SP takes a position on the far left.¹⁶⁰ Party positions on labour and social affairs remain remarkably stable over time. Only two parties change position over time: between 1989 and 1994, the CDA was the most

¹⁵⁹ In both cases the level of error is slightly lower than the threshold for a one-dimensional interpretation. However, given the strong consistency in the voting patterns over time and their confirmation of pre-established dimensions, a one-dimensional solution is used. The second dimension in both cases separate more religious from more secular parties, and this is not related to the positions of the SP.

¹⁶⁰ Three other parties entered parliament during this period: the socialist SP and the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+. The AOV and U55+ take a position in the political centre, between D66 and the RPF.

leftwing of the Christian parties, but it moved to the most rightwing position between 1994 and 1998. The move of the CDA can be interpreted as an adversarial move, which has also been observed in the other cases: larger parties seem to move further to the flanks after the entry of a new party. The RPF finally moves to the most leftwing position of the Christian parties. It skips over the position of the GPV. The level of unanimity remains remarkably stable over time: 15%. Like many other new parties, the SP appears not to have influenced the basic structure of competition, and instead, it joined one of the sides of the conflict.

Given all of these results, one has to conclude that the SP did not influence the attention that parties devoted to issues or the positions that they took on issues during the new party's first period in parliament.

5.2.12 LN: democratic populists

In 1999, members of local protest parties founded the Liveable Netherlands. The party agreed on a platform of government reform. Both in the period before and in the period after LN was in parliament, several consitutional reforms were discussed in parliament. An overview of these is presented in table 5.9. Between 1998 and 2002 the reform party D66, the conservative liberal VVD and social democratic PvdA formed a cabinet. The cabinet proposed a set of government reforms: some of these were accepted by parliament, but some were voted down. Several proposals required a second reading. After the 2003 elections,¹⁶¹ several government reforms were discussed for the second time; some because they required a second reading, and some because they were proposed again by the D66-minister for government reform. Almost all major proposals were voted down, all others were withdrawn. The minister for government reform stepped down; a new D66-minister took over his portfolio and asked several committees to advise him on the issue of government reform. These committees presented their reports just before the 2006 elections, but none of the reports were followed up with any political action.

¹⁶¹ In the short parliamentary period between 2002 and 2003 no major democratic reforms were discussed.

Table 5.9: government reforms discussed in the Tweede Kamer 1998-2006

Year	Reform	Notes
1999	Bill on Corrective Referendum	Constitutional amendment (second reading) Voted down by <i>Eerste Kamer</i>
2001	Bill on Temporary Referendum	
1999	Advise of the Elzinga Committee	Major advice on local democracy
2001	Bill on Municipal Government	
2002	Bill on Elected Mayor	Constitutional amendment (first reading)
2004	Bill on Corrective Referendum	Constitutional amendment (first reading)
2004	Bill on Temporary Referendum	Reintroduction by opposition parties
2004	Bill on Elected Mayor	Constitutional amendment (second reading)
2005	Bill on Change of the Electoral System	Did not come to a final vote
2005	Bill on Referendum on the European Constitution	
2006	Advice of the Citizens Forum on Electoral Change	Major advice on electoral change
2006	Advice of the National Convention	Major advice on government reform

The overview in table 5.9 shows that issues on government reforms were discussed before and after the entry of LN into the parliamentary arena, and so it may have been the case that the entry of LN gave a special impetus to these discussions. In figure 5.22, one can see the developments in attention that established parties devoted to government reform. Attention increased before 2002 and decreased after the entry of LN. Even though more bills on government reform were proposed after 2002, this did not lead to more parliamentary activity. Many proposals on government reform that were discussed in the period 2003-2004 were not particularly new: they were bills that were reintroduced or that came up for a second reading. Therefore, the parliamentary discussions may have been less intensive.

The voting patterns on government reform between 1998 and 2002 and 2002 and 2006 are difficult to compare and understand. In both periods the voting pattern is on the border between one- and two-dimensional. The one-dimensional representations of voting behaviour, shown in table 5.10, are not comparable. When modelling the voting in the period 1998-2002 in terms of one dimension, the following pattern occurs: the models separate the religious parties (CU, SGP and CDA) from the coalition parties (VVD, PvdA and D66). In the centre, one can find the parties of the leftwing opposition (SP and GL). The largest difference is between the coalition parties and the rest. The pattern appears to follow the division between secular and religious parties, where the secular parties in the *Tweede Kamer* and in

Figure 5.23: parliamentary attention to governance 1998-2006




Table 5.10: party positions on governance 1998-2006

Position	1998-2002	2002-2006
1	SGP	VVD
2	CU	CDA
3	CDA	CU
4	SP	SGP
5	GL	PvdA
6	D66	GL
7	PvdA	D66
8	VVD	SP

particular those in the coalition tend to favour government reform, and the religious parties tend to be more conservative. The coalition parties stand closely together on one extreme of the dimension. In the period 2002-2006, a different pattern can be observed in the voting behaviour: the SP and the LPF are on the far end of the spectrum, followed by D66 and the GL. In the centre, one can find the PvdA, followed by the CDA, the SGP, the CU and the VVD. The largest difference is between the VVD and the other parties, the smallest difference is that between the CU and SGP. The level of unanimous voting decreases over time: from 26% in the period 1998-2002, to 20% in the period 2002-2006. The ordering of parties for the period 1998-2002 and 2002-2006 correlates only weakly, and therefore, it is impossible to compare the party positions over time.

Perhaps, a two-dimensional solution provides more insight. However, as discussed above, two-dimensional solutions with such a low number of votes are unstable. In terms of the reduction of errors, both models can comfortably be modelled in terms of two dimensions. The models are shown in figure 5.22, 5.23 and 5.24. The model for the period 1998-2002 shows the following structure: there appears to be a division between government and opposition parties, and between parties that are progressive and conservative on the government reform issue. In the upper right hand corner one can find the CU and the SGP, which are conservative opposition parties that tend to oppose government reform. In the upper left hand corner, the coalition parties VVD, PvdA and D66 can be found. These parties agreed on an agenda of government reform. In the lower half of the figure, one can find CDA, SP and GL.

In the model of voting on governance between 2002 and 2006, as shown in figure 4.29, one can also observe two divides: the first divide is between CU, SGP, CDA and VVD that tend to oppose government reform on the one side, and the PvdA, GL, D66 and SP that tend to favour government reform on the other side. It is difficult to explain the variance on the second dimension: this includes both government and opposition parties and parties that tend to favour government reform (SP, LPF, D66), as well as parties that tend to be more conservative (CDA and VVD). One can use Procrustean Analysis to superimpose the one model on the other. If one does so, an interesting pattern emerges. Political parties move considerably, but most of these movements occur on the vertical dimension. The correlation between party positions on the horizontal dimension is significant, while the correlation on the vertical dimension is not.

The following may be the case: party positions on governance can best be modelled in terms of two dimensions in both periods. One dimension stays the same in both periods: this is the government reform dimension with the SGP and CU on the one side, and D66 and the SP on the other. Shifts along this dimension may be understood in terms of changes in position. On the vertical dimension, party positions change considerably. It is, however, difficult to interpret party positions on this dimension without referring to government formation: while in the period 1998-2002 the VVD, the PvdA and D66 stand together, the PvdA has shifted away in the period

Figure 5.24: model of voting on governance 1998-2002




Figure 5.25: model of voting on governance 2002-2006





Figure 5.26: procrustean analysis of voting on governance 1998-2006



2002-2006, while the CDA and the VVD take a rather similar position in this period.¹⁶²

¹⁶² Because voting on democratic reform includes several changes of the constitution, several votes are held in both periods. Constitutional changes are voted on two times. For two issues, multiple votes have taken place: for the constitutional change of the legislative procedure to allow for referenda and the deconstitutionalisation of the appointment of the mayor and the Queen's commissioner. Both issues were priority reforms of LN (and D66). In the vote on the elected mayor, the following pattern emerges: in 1998 the CDA, the CU and the SGP voted against the deconstitutionalisation of the appointment. When the issue returned to parliament in 2004, the CDA had made volte-face. The LPF also voted in favour. Only the CU and the SGP retained their opposition against the reform. In both the 1998-2002 and the 2003-2006 coalition agreements, the cabinet had committed itself to the elected mayor. While the support for the directly elected mayor expanded over time, the support for the referendum decreased. In 1999, the same majority that had favoured the elected mayor also voted in favour of the referendum. In 2004 the VVD voted against the referendum, while the LPF voted in favour. While the referendum had

In both these discussions, LN does not play a role at all: the party emphasised an issue that had already seen parliamentary and government activity before it entered parliament. After LN entered parliament and disappeared from it again, the D66 minister of government reform proposed a set of reforms, the majority of which had already been discussed in the previous parliamentary period. The entry of LN did not reinvigorate the parliamentary debate on government reform or consistently influence party positions on the issue.

5.2.13 LPF and PVV: the return and persistence of anti-immigration politics

The LPF and PVV are two parties that focused on immigration. Over the course of the 1990s, a new group of migrants came to the Netherlands. After migrants from (former) Dutch colonies and migrant workers from the Mediterranean, refugees came to the Netherlands from conflict areas such as the Western Balkan and Iraq (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 328). The number of asylum seekers more than doubled between 1992 and 1998 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 328). Between 1998 and 2010 the levels of immigration into the Netherlands fluctuated, as can be seen in figure 5.27: while rising marginally in the period 1998 and 2001, the level of non-Western immigration sharply dropped in the period 2001-2005. After 2005, immigration levels increased again. Before 2002, immigration was the subject of political debate: in 2000, a new, more restrictive bill on aliens was accepted by parliament (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 316). In the period 2002-2006, the cabinet focused on more restrictive legislation on integration, while strictly applying the 2000 bill on aliens (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 316-318).¹⁶³ After the 2006 parliamentary elections, parliament did not debate major changes in legislation, except for a general pardon that was accepted for asylum-seekers that had lived in the Netherlands for longer than five years (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 318).

been agreed upon by the parties in the coalition agreement, the Second Balkenende government had deferred judgment to the *Tweede Kamer*. From this it becomes clear that the CDA and the VVD did not move unambiguously to more democratisation. Instead, the positions on democratic reform cannot be separated from the position of D66 in coalition politics. While D66 had been able to get the support of PvdA and the VVD for the elected mayor and the referendum in the 1998 coalition talks, it had been able to win the CDA and VVD for the elected mayor, but not for the referendum in 2003.

¹⁶³ The law on aliens was also made slightly more restrictive.

The development in the attention for immigration is presented in figure 5.28: between 1998 and 2002 the attention that most parties devoted to immigration was low. After the 2002 elections, the attention to immigration increased. The entry of the LPF may have caused a reversion in the attention for immigration with most parties. The 2006 election reverses the trend: in the months after the 2006 elections, established parties devoted considerable attention to immigration. This is the period in which the new leftwing majority voted in favour of the general pardon for asylum-seekers. The attention to immigration dropped after this peak, and the base level is now lower than in the period 2002-2006.¹⁶⁴ Established parties did not devote more attention to integration and immigration in response to rising levels of immigration: between 1998 and 2001, the levels of immigration were high, while the levels of attention for immigration were low; between 2001 and 2005 the level of immigration decreased drastically, while the level of attention for immigration increased. After 2006, the attention to immigration decreased, while the actual level of immigration increased. The incongruence between political attention to immigration and actual levels of immigration in the Netherlands since 2000 has also been observed by Lucassen and Lucassen (2011, 39). It may be that the rising levels of attention for immigration can be understood in strategic terms: that the entry of the LPF caused a change in the attention that established parties devoted to immigration. For most parties, a marked change in attention after the 2002 elections is visible. After the entry of the LPF, established parties may have followed its successful example and devoted more attention to immigration, in order to regain lost votes.

The entry of the PVV did not cause an increase in attention: even with the extreme outlier after the 2006 elections, established parties devote less attention to immigration after the entry of the PVV. Established parties may not have been impressed by their nine seats (only one more than the LPF's eight in the 2003 election) and reduced their attention to immigration. The low levels of attention for immigration after 2006 can also be understood because no new policy or legislation was needed: legislation that was intended to restrict the level of asylum requests and

¹⁶⁴ Only the CDA defies this pattern: it devotes less attention to immigration after the entry of the LPF in 2002, and, in the period before and after the election, the attention is relatively stable. The pattern in attention of the CDA to immigration may imply that there is a relationship between electoral performance and attention to the LPF's issue: it performed particularly well in the 2002 and 2003 elections and therefore could (marginally) reduce its attention for immigration.

Figure 5.27: immigration levels 1998-2009




Figure 5.28: parliamentary attention to immigration 1998-2010




Table 5.11: party positions on immigration 1998-2010

Position	1998-2002	2002-2006	2006-2010
1	VVD	VVD	VVD
2	CDA	CDA	CDA
3	SGP	SGP	SGP
4	CU	CU	CU
5	D66	D66	PvdA
6	PvdA	PvdA	SP
7	SP	SP	GL
8	GL	GL	D66

make the civic integration process stricter had been accepted. No new legislation was needed after 2006.

Voting on immigration can be modelled in terms of one dimension during the entire period. Party positions on the dimension, as shown in table 5.11, follow the traditional division between the social-economic left and right. Of the established parties, the VVD is furthest to the right, followed by the CDA, the SGP and the CU. The traditional parties of the left can be found D66, PvdA, SP and GL. The LPF, which was the most conservative party on immigration during the election campaign (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007), is placed between the CDA and the SGP. The VVD is the most extreme party on immigration in the period 1998-2006. This may be a result of the fact that the LPF was leaderless and increasingly divided in the period 2002-2006. But the PVV, too, is more moderate on immigration than the VVD. The differences between the PVV and the VVD are minimal, however. In the period 2006-2010, the PVV is the most extreme party on immigration. In this period most votes (23%) divide the PVV from the other parties. Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the party positions are identical. For the periods 2002-2006 and 2006-2010, the correlation is significant. Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the level of unanimous voting increases slightly, while it falls sharply in the period 2006-2010: the LPF put the issue of immigration on the political agenda, the PVV subsequently polarised the issue.¹⁶⁵

Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the relative positioning of established parties does not change. The parties retain their position relative to each other: rather

¹⁶⁵ LN participated in too few votes to be included in the study. The PvdD joins the progressive parties on the left.

than introduce a new line of conflict, the immigration issue remained part of the traditional social-economic division. Rather than changing the lines of conflict, the LPF became incorporated into the right, as is evident from its participation in the first Balkenende cabinet (Bale 2003). While the leaderless, internally divided LPF parliamentary party was easily incorporated into the existing system, the entry of the PVV did lead to a change of party positions: a change occurred on the leftwing side of the political spectrum. D66 moved from the most conservative of the parties of the left, it became the most progressive on the issue of immigration. The PvdA, the SP and the GL all moved to a slightly more conservative position. This is a clear example of an adversarial move of D66 against the PVV: D66 chose to oppose the PVV. As a conservative competitor entered the parliament, D66 became more progressive.

The most striking thing about the data is the difference between the effects of the LPF and the PVV: the LPF has had a consistent effect on the attention that all parties devote to immigration. It did not influence the party positions on the issue.¹⁶⁶ After the PVV replaced the LPF, the parliamentary attention to the issue decreases, but there is a change in party positions and the level of unanimous voting. It appears that the politicisation of the immigration issue went through two stages: after 2002 all parties agreed that something had to be done after the public expression of discontent with immigration policies. Attention and unanimous voting on the issue *increased*. After 2006 this was then transformed into an increasing *political* difference on the issue: after the process of consensual law making, the parties politicised the issue.

5.2.14 PvdD: *the hobbyhorse*

The PvdD has said that since it has started to take part in parliamentary decision-making, every day is "World Animal Day".¹⁶⁷ The party was active on its own subject in parliament.¹⁶⁸ In order to deal with the high number of questions from the PvdD, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food appointed additional civil servants.¹⁶⁹ Marianne Thieme, the chair of the PvdD parliamentary party, concludes

¹⁶⁶ This does not exclude the possibility of systemic shift to the right.

¹⁶⁷ Misérus, M. "Dierenliefde bindt links en rechts; diervriendelijk blok in de Tweede Kamer laat zich in moties duidelijk horen". *De Volkskrant* 13/12/2006.

¹⁶⁸ Stokmans, D. "Dierenpartij maakt zich over mensen geen zorgen. Nieuwe partijen in Tweede Kamer schenken vooral aandacht aan 'hun' onderwerpen". *NRC Handelsblad*, 26/1/2007.

¹⁶⁹ Douwes, D. "Vragen Partij voor de Dieren dagtaak". *De Volkskrant*, 30/10/2007.

all of her contributions to the plenary debate with the words "And I am also of the opinion that industrial agriculture must be ended", echoing Cato the Elder (translation SO).¹⁷⁰ The special focus of the PvdD has sometimes led to visible irritation of other MPs. When the PvdD attempted to propose sixty motions during the discussion of the agriculture budget, D66 MP Boris van der Ham announced loudly that he was going home, because, according to him, this was meaningless.¹⁷¹

It may be possible that not the entry of the PvdD, but the developments in the agricultural sector influenced the attention for agriculture. Over time the share of the GDP constituted by agricultural activities steadily fell from 2.6% to 2.4%, as can be seen in figure 5.29. One major animal disease in the Netherlands broke out in the period: Q-fever. Between 2003 and 2009, this affected the number of sheep: the growth in the number of sheep stagnated after 2006 and the number of sheep declined after 2007, as can be seen in figure 5.30. During the period 2006-2010, there were also two policy initiatives on agriculture: a government policy paper on animal welfare was sent to parliament in the end of 2007 and the discussions were brought to close during the beginning of 2008. Moreover, the environmental organisation Environmental Defence (*MilieuDefensie*), the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth, brought the environmental impact of livestock to the table by means of the citizens' initiative. The initiative was discussed in parliament in 2007.

When looking at the attention that established parties devote to agriculture (shown in figure 5.31), one can see that the 2006 elections interrupted the development: the levels of attention were low and stagnant, before the 2006 elections. After the 2006 elections, the level of attention for agriculture increased sharply, and afterwards, the growth stagnated. Outliers cause the decrease in the trend lines.¹⁷² These patterns clearly do not conform to the actual developments in agriculture. The economic activity declined before 2006 and stabilised afterwards, while in terms of attention the period before 2006 is stable and the period after shows an increase. The events of 2007 and 2008 (Q-fever, the two major policy proposals) amplified a trend

¹⁷⁰ Middendorp, P. "Cato". *De Pers*, 26/10/2009.

¹⁷¹ "Record aan moties PvdD". *De Telegraaf* 5/2/2008.

¹⁷² Two parties defy this trend. The VVD shows a less pronounced but similar pattern: for this party attention was low and declining before the 2006 elections. After this the level of attention increased, but it does not exceed the level of attention before the entry of these elections. The SGP appears not to have been affected by the entry of the 2006 elections: for this party, attention for agriculture increased constantly in the period 2003-2010.

Figure 5.29: economic importance agriculture 2003-2010




Figure 5.30: number of sheep




Figure 5.31: parliamentary attention to agriculture 1998-2010




Table 5.12: party positions on agriculture 2003-2010

Position	2003-2006	2006-2010
1	VVD	VVD
2	CDA	CDA
3	SGP	SGP
4	CU	CU
5	D66	PvdA
6	PvdA	D66
7	GL	GL
8	SP	SP

towards more attention for agriculture that already started at the end of 2006. For most parties, the 2006 elections interrupted the stable levels of attention and increased attention.

Voting on agriculture can be modelled in terms of one dimension in both periods. The distribution of parties, as shown in table 5.12, follows the division between left and right. Furthest to the right, one can find the VVD, the CDA, then the small Christian parties SGP and CU, followed by the traditional parties of the left (D66, PvdA, SP and GL). Voting on agriculture in both periods correlates significantly. The level of unanimous voting drops sharply from 19% to 3%. The PvdD joined the parties on the left and became the most extreme party on agriculture.¹⁷³ Two clear movements are visible: on the one side the CDA and the SGP, which held the same position between 2003 and 2006, and which now hold two separate positions next to each other. Still, only 4% of the votes on agriculture divide the two parties. The second change is a switch in positions of the PvdA and D66. D66 takes the more environmentalist position, while the PvdA moves to the other side. All in all, the PvdD did affect the attention to agricultural issues: this sharply increased after the 2006 elections. The PvdD did not influence party positions and instead joined the existing left-right dimension on the extreme left.

¹⁷³ The PVV started as a separate party in 2004. In the period 2004-2006, the party took a moderate position on the less environmentalist side of the CU. In the period 2006-2010, the party took the least environmentalist position on the spectrum.

5.3 Analysing the case-by-case results

In the previous sections, the effects of individual new parties on the attention that established parties devote to issues and the positions that they take on these issues were studied. These will now be compared and analysed statistically.

5.3.1 Party positions in parliament

The most remarkable outcome of the case-by-case analysis of party positions is that for three cases (CP, AOV/U55+ and LN) changes in party positions before and after the entry of the new party could not be understood as changes on a stable dimension because the nature of the conflict on the issue changed. These cases were analysed in detail, and inconclusive results were found each time. For immigration, the issue of the CP, the difference between the two periods may be a consequence of the low number of votes. This led to poor results in both cases. Because of the divided position of the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+ on the issue, one cannot attribute the change in position of established parties on healthcare to them directly. If one models the changes in the voting patterns for governance, the issue of LN in two dimensions, it becomes clear that the line of conflict between pro- and anti-reform parties has remained stable, and that any change in position is caused by a changing government composition. In none of the cases can the changes be easily attributed to the entry of the new parties. However, in each of these elections, more than one new party entered parliament: the lines of conflict on the issues of these second new parties (the EVP, SP and the LPF) remained stable.

The CP, AOV, U55+ and LN may have played some role in the perturbation of the political space. One thing stands out about these cases: they are all mobilisers. The pattern found fits the formulated hypothesis: mobiliser parties are associated with a change in dimensionality.¹⁷⁴ In table 5.13 one can see that for the remaining parties there is no difference in the size of the changes between mobilisers and challengers. There is a significant difference, however, between mobilisers and challengers in the levels of unanimity in voting on their issue, as can be seen in table 5.13. On average

¹⁷⁴ Moreover, two of these three parties were internally unstable. LN was also internally unstable, but not in terms of its parliamentary party. Again, internal instability is not sufficient condition for change in the lines of conflict on an issue. The internally unstable parties such LPF, NMP and RPF are associated with stability in the lines of conflict. Here the relationship may be reversed: the instability of voting patterns on the issue resulted in instability within the party.

Table 5.13: Comparing mean effects on parliamentary positions

Characteristic	Change in party positions				Change in unanimity	
	μ	σ	N	ϵ	μ	ϵ
Challenged	0.067	0.096	5	0.058	-	-
Unchallenged	0.089	0.082	33			
Mobiliser	0.066	0.086	69	0.116	-0.08	0.645**
Challenger	0.087	0.095	38		0.01	
Government	0.064	0.099	30	0.099	0.03	0.437
Opposition	0.084	0.088	67		-0.04	

μ : average value

σ : standard deviation

N: number of cases

ϵ : eta

there is a small decrease in the level of unanimity. While for challengers there is a small increase in unanimity, the entry of mobiliser is associated with a marked decrease in unanimity. This difference between challengers and mobilisers is significant.

Seven of the eleven cases in which individual party positions could be compared, saw large movements of one or more large established parties *away* from the centre (D66, the NMP, the PPR, DS'70, the RPF, the EVP and the SP).¹⁷⁵ Five of these seven parties are challengers: 83% of challengers are associated with large parties making large movements to the extremes, while only 25% of mobilisers have this effect. These results are summarised in table 5.14. Only in one case did the challenged party react most (KVP to PPR). In three cases the value for the challenged party is zero, meaning that there was no reaction. For the other challengers, a party on the opposite side of the political spectrum moved away from the new party. While the challenged party tended to ignore its challenger, the other established parties have moved to the extreme, augmenting the problem for the challenged party.¹⁷⁶ All in all, the average reaction from challenged parties is not significantly different from those

¹⁷⁵ This may be a result of measurement uncertainty: the four cases where this does not occur are the RKNP, LPF, PVV and PvdD. This is not the case, however: if one looks at the combined number of votes in both the pre and the post-analysis, the top-six of number votes is the LPF (immigration, 1998-2006), the SP (labour and social affairs 1989-1998), the PVV (immigration 2002-2010), the PPR (a bloc of environmental issues 1967-1977), LN (governance 1998-2006) and NMP (economic affairs 1967-1977). Four are associated with changes in positions and two are not.

¹⁷⁶ Marked accommodative reactions are found after the entry of PPR (from the KVP), D66 (from the KVP) and the NMP (from the VVD) and marked adversarial

Table 5.14: challengers' effects on parliamentary positions

Party	PPR	DS'70	RKPN	RPF	EVP	SP
ARP	-0.08	0.25	-0.09			
CHU	-0.08	0	0.14			
KVP	0.25	-0.08	0			
SGP	0.04	0	0	-0.11	0.18	0.1
PvdA	0	0.17	0.09	-0.33	-0.09	-0.1
VVD	0	-0.17	0	-0.22	-0.18	0
CPN	0	-0.33	-0.09	0.11	0	
PSP	0	0	-0.18	0.11	0	
BP	-0.04	0	-0.13			
GPV	-0.25	0	0.09	0.11	0	0
D66	0	0	0	0.11	0.09	0.1
CDA				0	0	-0.3
DS'70			0			
PPR			0	0.22	0	
RPF						0.2
GL						0
CD						0
Hypo.	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

Challenged parties in **bold**

Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction

No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction

Table 5.15: mobilisers' effects on parliamentary positions

Party	D66	NMP	CP	AOV/U55+	LPF	LN	PVV	PvdD
ARP	0	-0.33						
CHU	-0.09	-0.04						
KVP	0.18	0.04						
SGP	0.05	0.04	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0	0.06
PvdA	0.18	-0.08	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0.13	-0.11
VVD	-0.09	0.08	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0	0
CPN	-0.09	0.17	n/a					
PSP	-0.09	0	n/a					
BP	-0.05	-0.08						
GPV	0	0.21	n/a	n/a				
D66		-0.08	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	-0.38	+0.11
CDA			n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0	0.06
PPR		n/a	n/a					
RPF			n/a	n/a				
GL				n/a	0	n/a	0.13	0
CD					0	n/a		
SP					0	n/a	0.13	0
CU					0	n/a	0	

reactions after the entry of the NMP (from the PvdA and the ARP), the EVP (from the VVD), the RPF (from the VVD and the CDA), and the SP (for the CDA).

of unchallenged parties, as can be seen in table 5.13.¹⁷⁷

The new party government hypothesis proposes that new parties that enter government will have a larger impact on the positions of established parties, than new parties that remain in opposition. In table 5.13 one can see that governing new parties are associated with less change in party positions than opposition parties. This difference is not significant. Governing new parties do have a larger impact on the levels of unanimity, than new parties in opposition. This difference, however, is not significant, either.

If one looks at the overall correlation in table 5.16, there is a significant negative relationship between the size of the new party and the reactions of established parties: larger parties elicit less reaction. The entry of the largest party that is studied here, LPF, was not followed by any change in the relative party positions. Without the LPF the relationship becomes insignificant, changes sign and becomes much weaker: both smaller parties such as the RPF and larger parties such as DS'70 elicit marked reactions.

Table 5.17 provides an overview of the results concerning the new party organisation hypothesis. Here one can see that both poorly organised parties such as the RPF and well-organised parties such as DS'70 elicit marked reactions. The overall relationship implies that weakly organised parties elicit more reactions than well-organised parties. This relationship is not significant and goes in against the stated expectation: parties like the NMP and the RPF, which fell apart, are accompanied by larger parties that moved to the flanks of the political spectrum. All in all, the hypothesis that better organised parties elicit more reactions has to be rejected.

In table 5.18 different correlation results are presented concerning the distance between the new and the established party and the size of established party responses. The image is mixed: for some new parties the parties that are furthest away respond most (in the case of DS'70 this relationship is significant). For other parties, it is the parties that are closest by respond most. The overall pattern is that the further two

Table 5.16: new party size and parliamentary positions

¹⁷⁷ One should note that the measure that is used in the statistical analysis looks at the absolute value of the changes, because for every change a (set of) equally large change(s) in the other direction occurs. Therefore, one cannot take the direction of the movement into account.

Party	New party size	Average change in position	Standard deviation	N
LPF	17	0	0	8
PVV	5.89	0.093	0.129	8
DS'70	5.33	0.106	0.118	11
D66	4.48	0.064	0.058	10
PPR	1.84	0.068	0.095	11
PvdD	1.83	0.042	0.049	8
NMP	1.51	0.114	0.093	11
SP	1.32	0.089	0.105	9
RPF	1.25	0.148	0.096	9
RKPN	0.92	0.063	0.066	13
EVP	0.83	0.061	0.079	9
Correlation			-0.208**	107

Table 5.17: new party organisation and parliamentary positions

Party	New party organisation	Average change in position	Standard deviation	N
PVV	1	0.094	0.129	8
DS'70	1	0.106	0.118	11
D66	1	0.064	0.058	10
PPR	1	0.068	0.096	11
PvdD	1	0.042	0.049	8
SP	1	0.089	0.105	9
RKPN	1	0.063	0.066	13
EVP	1	0.061	0.079	9
LPF	0.625	0	0	8
NMP	0.5	0.113	0.093	11
RPF	0.5	0.148	0.096	9
Correlation			-0.136	107

Table 5.18: party distance and parliamentary positions

Party	Correlation	N
DS'70	-0.55*	11
NMP	-0.257	11
D66	-0.227	10
SP	-0.173	9
PvdD	0	8
PPR	0.257	11
RPF	0.264	9
RKPN	0.301	13
EVP	0.417	9
PVV	0.507	8
Overall	0.165*	107

Table 5.19: established party performance and parliamentary positions

Party	Correlation	N
PvdD	-0.521	8
SP	-0.325	9
D66	-0.308	10
RPF	-0.263	9
PVV	-0.113	8
EVP	0.109	9
RKPN	0.123	13
PPR	0.22	11
DS'70	0.318	11
NMP	0.37	11
Overall	0.070	107

parties are apart, the more the established party will react.¹⁷⁸ This goes against the formulated expectation, but it can be understood in terms of Meguid's (2005) notion that established parties will polarise the issue on which their competitor is challenged.

The analysis for the established party performance hypothesis is summarised in table 5.19. One can see that it is evenly split: five new parties elicit more marked reactions from parties that performed well in the elections and five new parties elicit more marked reactions from parties that performed poorly in the elections. Overall, the relationship is weak and insignificant. This does fit the expectation formulated above that electoral reasoning does not play a strong role in the parliamentary arena.

On the whole, one can draw two conclusions from these analyses of the effect of new parties on parliamentary party positions. Mobiliser parties and challenger parties have different roles to play: mobilisers emphasise previously unpolarised issues, which leads to increasing levels of non-unanimous voting and, in some cases, the redefinition of the lines of conflict. Challengers emphasise issues that are already polarised and take positions that are on the extreme of the existing dimensions. These parties reinforce the existing lines of conflict, as large parties move sharply to the extremes. Parties that are far away from the new party tend to move more than parties that stand close to the new party. As before this can be understood in the context Meguid's theory (2005) that the enemy of one's enemy is one's friend.

5.3.2 *Analysis of attention in parliament*

The patterns in the attention that established party devote to the issue of the new party, are remarkably uniform. It does not appear to be the case that some parties react more to the entry of particular new political parties than others; instead, established political parties react in the same way, because the parliamentary agenda limits the ability of parties to pursue their own priorities. The question then is *why* some new parties were able to put an issue on the agenda while other parties were not.

For nine cases, the KNP, BP, EVP, RKPN, EVP, LN, DS'70, AOV, U55+ and PVV, generally declining levels of attention were found. This could be explained by external circumstances. In most cases processes of politicisation and depoliticisation explained these patterns. The KNP was formed in opposition to Indonesian

¹⁷⁸ One should note that in the multivariate analysis, this relationship is not significant.

independence, which was realised anyway. Agricultural issues had been moved from the parliamentary agenda before the BP entered parliament. In many cases the new political parties contested a decision-making process that had already been set in motion: the RPF and the RKPn entered parliament after the first attempts to liberalise the abortion law had already been made. The EVP could hardly contest the stationing of nuclear weapons because the decision to place these weapons were made in small steps by a cautious government. LN and DS'70 entered parliament after decision-making on their issue, governance, had already been initiated and the first initiatives had already faltered. The attention of established parties to healthcare, the issue that the AOV and U55+ focused on, peaked before these two parties entered parliament. The entry of the PVV was followed by a decrease in attention to immigration, because migration policies were revised before its entry. All these cases open up another possibility: that the entry of a new party does not lead to a change in the parliamentary agenda, but rather that a change in the parliamentary agenda facilitates the entry of a new party (Lowery et al. forthcoming). These parties entered parliament after their issue had been put on the parliamentary agenda and controversial decisions had already been made. Their formation and electoral success may be a result of this politicisation.

The entry of the PSP, NMP, PPR and SP is followed by an increase in attention to their issues, but external events form a better explanation: the budget cycle (for the NMP), the Cold War (for the PSP), the first government environmental policy (for the PPR) and economic circumstances (for the SP) explain the patterns in attention better. This leaves four parties that may have had a clear effect: D66, CP, LPF and PvdD. The patterns of attention to their issues cannot be explained by referring to external circumstances: for instance, after D66 entered parliament, a depoliticised committee on government reform was set up, still the parliamentary activity on government reform increased. All four parties are mobilisers. These parties were indeed successful in introducing a new issue to the parliamentary agenda, as a mobiliser seeks to do. The PvdD and the CP are small new parties, they devote a more than the average share of parliamentary speech to their own issue; D66 and the LPF are large, they devote less than the average share of parliamentary speech to their issue. It may be the case that D66 and the LPF changed the parliamentary agenda because their size, while the PvdD and the CP because of the focus on their issue.

In table 5.20, the effects of mobilisers are summarised. The question is whether mobilisers have a consistent effect on all parties. For six cases (D66, CP, AOV/U55+, LPF, PVV and PvdD) this appears to be the case. For the PVV a dismissive reaction is observed for every party. One should note that this includes the D66, CP, LPF and PvdD, for which no other explanation except for the presence of the new party can explain the patterns in attention. These individual cases lend credence to the idea that indeed mobilisers tend to elicit consistent reactions from their environment. In table 5.22, one can see, however, that both in terms of the average reaction and the standard deviation of the reaction, there is no marked difference between mobilisers and challengers. In the multivariate analyses this relationship is significant. This means that if we control for other effects mobilisers elicit more reactions than challengers. One explanation for the weakness of this relationship may be that for those mobilisers for which fewer reactions were observed, established parties already devoted considerable attention to the issues that the new party attempted to put on the parliamentary agenda. The attention to the issue could not increase markedly, because it was already considerable.¹⁷⁹

In table 5.21, the effects of challengers are summarised. This allows one to see whether challengers have a more marked impact on the party that they challenge than on other parties. The results here are mixed. Only for three parties do challenged parties actually respond most (ARP to GPV, KVP to RKPN and CDA to EVP). The CDA shows a strong dismissive reaction to the EVP. For the other six parties the challenged party shows no special reaction. In table 5.22 one can see that challenged parties do respond more than unchallenged parties. This difference is not significant.

The new party government hypothesis is also examined in table 5.22. It shows that new parties in government have more effect on attention than new parties that remain in opposition. As seen above, however, there are major issues with attributing patterns of attention to DS'70 and the PPR, two of the three new parties that entered government. This leaves the LPF, which was in government for less than half a year. For substantive reasons, it seems unlikely that their government participation *per se* is a good explanatory factor.

¹⁷⁹ One can question to what extent these parties are truly mobilisers, because established parties already devoted considerable attention to their issue. In the mobiliser-challenger dichotomy however they do not necessarily fit in the challenger category.

Table 5.20: mobilisers' effects on parliamentary attention

Party	BP	D66	NMP	CP	AOV/U55+	LPF	LN	PVV	PvdD
ARP	-0.15	0.09	-0.05						
CHU	-0.09	0.02	0.01						
KVP	-0.13	0.06	-0.03						
SGP	0.07	-0.03	0.07	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.00	-0.21	0.15
PvdA	-0.00	0.15	-0.12	0.16	0.10	0.14	-0.04	-0.12	0.18
VVD	-0.04	0.17	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	-0.08	-0.02	0.06
CPN	-0.23	0.02	-0.07	0.47					
PSP	0.24	0.10	-0.13	0.26					
BP		0.13	-0.08						
GPV		-0.04	0.10	-0.12	0.07				
D66			-0.18	0.16	0.11	0.11	-0.02	-0.37	0.20
CDA				0.12	0.01	-0.06	-0.01	-0.06	0.28
PPR				0.31					
RPF				0.01	-0.06				
GL					0.11	0.17	0.01	-0.22	0.25
CD					0.04				
SP						0.23	-0.07	-0.22	0.26
CU						0.25	0.03	-0.21	0.20
Hypo.	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Opp.	Yes

Yes: General pattern of increasing attention (no more than two deviations)

No: No consistent pattern

Opp.: General pattern of decreasing attention

Table 5.21: challengers' effects on parliamentary attention

Party	KNP	PSP	GPV	PPR	DS'70	RKPN	RPF	EVP	SP
ARP	-0.17	0.15	0.09	0.32	0.03	0.03			
CHU	-0.16	-0.16	0.01	0.24	0.01	-0.08			
KVP	0.04	0.11	-0.00	0.27	0.06	0.19			
SGP	0.11	0.00	0.02	-0.12	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06	0.02
PvdA	-0.11	0.16	-0.02	0.25	-0.04	0.05	-0.03	0.02	-0.02
VVD	-0.33	0.07	0.01	0.23	-0.02	-0.21	-0.06	0.03	-0.04
CPN	-0.14	0.25	0.05	0.39	-0.06	-0.04	0.00	-0.21	
PSP				0.09	-0.10	-0.09	0.31	-0.12	
BP				0.04	-0.12				
GPV				0.06	-0.07	-0.23	-0.26	-0.25	0.06
D66				0.52	-0.03	-0.06	0.16	-0.13	0.05
CDA							0.00	-0.01	0.03
DS'70						-0.02			
PPR							-0.14	0.12	-0.03
RPF								-0.10	
GL									0.12
Hypo.	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Opp.	No

Challenged parties in **bold**

Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction

No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction

Opp.: Challenged party showed most marked reaction in the opposite direction

Table 5.22: comparing mean effects on parliamentary positions

Characteristic	Change in party positions			
	μ	σ	N	ϵ
Challenged	0.076	0.107	9	0.152
Unchallenged	0.003	0.131	76	
Mobiliser	0.038	0.148	79	0.088
Challenger	0.009	0.130	85	
Government	0.101	0.159	30	0.253***
Opposition	0.006	0.129	132	

μ : average value

σ : standard deviation

N: number of cases

ϵ : eta

The new party attention hypothesis proposed that the extent to which new parties devoted attention to their own issue, mattered for the reactions of established parties. Table 5.23 shows that both parties that focused on their own issue like the PvdD, and parties that neglected their own issue like the PPR elicit marked reactions from established parties. While two of the four parties for which one could attribute change in attention devote considerable attention to their own issue, the overall relationship between change in attention and attention that a new party devotes to its issue is weak and not significant, it is however in the expected direction.

The new party size hypothesis proposed that larger new parties would elicit more reactions from established parties, than smaller new parties. This hypothesis is examined in table 5.24. Both the largest and the smallest new party (LPF and the CP) elicit marked reactions from the established parties. Above it has been observed that two of the four parties for which change could be attributed to their entry were larger. The overall correlation between size and change in attention is, however, weak and insignificant, but in the expected direction.

The new party organisation hypothesis proposes that better organised new parties would elicit more reactions from established parties, than weakly organised new parties. Table 5.25 delves further into this relationship. The evidence shows that both among poorly organised new parties, such as the NMP and the LPF and well organised new parties such as DS'70 and the PvdD, one can find cases of marked and negligible reactions. The overall correlation is weak and insignificant, but in the expected direction.

Table 5.23: new party attention and parliamentary attention

Party	New party attention	Average change in attention	Standard deviation	N
PvdD	36.2	0.197	0.068	8
AOV/U55+	24.1	0.062	0.059	9
KNP	17.9	-0.111	0.146	7
NMP	17.7	-0.04	0.09	11
CP	17.5	0.149	0.167	9
PSP	17.2	0.084	0.132	7
RKPN	16.1	-0.054	0.111	13
LN	16	-0.023	0.038	8
BP	15.5	-0.042	0.145	8
D66	14	0.081	0.077	10
EVP	13.1	-0.087	0.095	10
PVV	12.2	-0.179	0.112	8
DS'70	12.1	-0.028	0.056	11
SP	11.1	0.023	0.050	9
RPF	8.7	0.027	0.159	9
GPV	7.9	0.03	0.041	8
LPF	5.6	0.131	0.099	8
PPR	3.4	0.208	0.179	11
Correlation			0.029	164

Table 5.24: new party size and parliamentary attention

Party	New party size	Average change in attention	Standard deviation	N
LPF	17	0.131	0.099	8
PVV	5.89	-0.179	0.112	8
DS'70	5.33	-0.028	0.056	11
AOV/U55+	4.5	0.062	0.059	9
D66	4.48	0.081	0.077	10
BP	2.13	-0.042	0.145	8
PSP	1.84	0.208	0.179	7
PPR	1.84	0.084	0.132	11
PvdD	1.83	0.197	0.068	8
LN	1.61	-0.023	0.038	8
NMP	1.51	-0.04	0.09	11
SP	1.32	0.023	0.050	9
KNP	1.26	-0.111	0.146	7
RPF	1.25	0.027	0.159	9
RKPN	0.92	-0.054	0.111	13
EVP	0.83	-0.087	0.095	10
GPV	0.74	0.03	0.041	8
CP	0.69	0.149	0.167	9
Correlation			0.091	164

The results for the party distance hypothesis are mixed: new parties elicit both marked reactions from parties far away from them (such as the RKPN) as parties close to them (such as the PPR). As can be seen in table 5.26, the latter group is in the majority. Over all, the relationship is not significant.

The party performance hypothesis is examined in table 5.27, here one can see that for eight new parties, parties that perform poorly in the elections react more than parties that perform well. For ten parties, the relationship is reversed. Given this balance in the examined cases, the relationship is weak and not significant. This null-result sustains the idea that electoral incentives do not play a major role in the reactions of established parties in the parliamentary arena.

The case-by-case analyses and the regression analyses are not entirely consistent. They both identify mobiliser new parties as more effective in changing the issues that established parties devote attention to. While the case-by-case analysis also identified specific patterns for party size and party activity, these have not reappeared in the regression analysis. Finally, the regression analysis clearly points to the participation of new parties in government as an important explanatory factor. There are, however, substantive reasons to dismiss this explanation. In order to further scrutinise these relationships, these effects are examined in an extended statistical setting.

5.4 Expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliament

The previous analyses of patterns of attention unanimously pointed to one explanation: mobilisers elicit more reactions than challengers. For two explanations the results were mixed: the case-by-case analysis showed that new parties that are larger and new parties that focus on their own issue elicit more reactions in terms of positions from established parties than smaller new parties and new parties that did not focus on their own issue. The regression analysis, however, did not support these patterns. It is the goal of this section to scrutinise the same phenomenon with an expanded set of cases, using a different notion of attributability. In this way, one can consistently test the hypotheses about the conditions under which new parties influence established parties. In this expanded statistical analysis, *all* changes on *all* issues in *all* periods are analysed. The central question is whether, compared to all the developments in attention, the presence of a new party leads to a significant change in attention. One can test the results of the case-by-case analyses in a more robust

Table 5.25: new party organisation and parliamentary attention

Party	New party organisation	Average change in attention	Standard deviation	N
CP	1	0.149	0.167	9
D66	1	0.081	0.077	10
DS'70	1	-0.028	0.056	11
EVP	1	-0.087	0.095	10
GPV	1	0.03	0.041	8
KNP	1	-0.111	0.146	7
LN	1	-0.023	0.038	8
PPR	1	0.208	0.179	11
PSP	1	0.084	0.132	7
PvdD	1	0.197	0.068	8
PVV	1	-0.179	0.112	8
RKPN	1	-0.054	0.111	13
SP	1	0.023	0.050	9
BP	0.67	-0.042	0.145	8
LPF	0.625	0.131	0.099	8
NMP	0.5	-0.04	0.09	11
RPF	0.5	0.027	0.159	9
AOV/U55+	0.429	0.062	0.059	9
Overall Correlation			0.001	164

Table 5.26: party distance and parliamentary attention

Party	Correlation	N
RKPN	0.747	11
RPF	0.568	8
LPF	0.52	8
SP	-0.200	9
EVP	-0.204	9
DS'70	-0.314	11
D66	-0.393	10
NMP	-0.468	11
PVV	-0.55	8
PvdD	-0.61	8
PPR	-0.636**	11
Correlation	-0.131	105

Table 5.27: established party performance

Party	Correlation	N
PSP	-0.47	7
RKPN	-0.434	13
PVV	-0.275	8
AOV/U55+	-0.284	9
CP	-0.266	9
KNP	-0.15	7
LPF	-0.084	8
SP	-0.021	9
D66	0.037	10
LN	0.038	8
PPR	0.277	11
NMP	0.288	11
EVP	0.293	10
DS'70	0.334	11
PvdD	0.37	8
GPV	0.563	8
BP	0.581	8
RPF	0.857***	9
Correlation	0.026	164

fashion. The analyses will be tested in several bivariate analyses and analyses with control variables. Due to the highly collinear nature of the data, each hypothesis must be tested independently from the others; if they were combined in a single analysis the collinearity would prevent any relationship from manifesting itself.¹⁸⁰

The first hypothesis tested is the new party presence hypothesis. In general, the presence of a new party leads to significantly more increases in attention (as can be seen in model 1 in table 5.28). In all the ups and downs in attention to issues between 1946 and 2010, the presence of a new party makes a significant difference: if a new party is present, parliamentary attention on the issue that the new party owns increases significantly more than when no new party is present. Therefore, one can consider the first hypothesis corroborated.

The next factor examined is the activity of a new party on its own issue (model 2). The underlying reasoning is that if the new party is particularly active on its own issue, it will be an important force in defining the nature of the conflict on that issue. In order to retain control over the definition of the issue, established parties must respond by also raising their attention to the issue. A positive, significant relationship exists: the more attention a new party devotes to its own issue, the more established parties react. This implies that the more new parties talk about their own issue, the more established parties will talk about that issue as well.¹⁸¹ This relationship was not significant in the statistical analyses presented above. This means that the conclusions here are only conditional: only if one compares the change in attention for new parties to all change in attention, does new party attention matter.

In model 3, one can see that the presence of a challenged party leads to an increase in the attention of the established party, but this increase is not significant. This echoes results of the case-by-case analysis: only the PSP and KNP elicited significantly more reactions from the parties they challenged, but other challenger

¹⁸⁰ In a multivariate analysis with all variables, only the new party government variable is consistently significant. There are validity issues with this variable, however.

¹⁸¹ Note that this - as all relationships discussed here - is not a relation between the levels of parliamentary activity of the new and established party, where it would be obvious that there may be similar levels of attention between parties. Rather, this is a relationship between the level of activity of the new party and the relative increase in attention of the established party.

Table 5.28: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (1)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.081*** (0.005)	0.082*** (0.006)	0.083*** (0.006)	0.082*** (0.006)	0.082*** (0.005)
Previous Attention	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)
New Party Presence	0.031** (0.015)	-	-	-	-
New Party Attention	-	0.019** (0.001)	-	-	-
Challenged	-	-	0.064 (0.061)	-	-
Mobiliser	-	-	-	0.052** (0.021)	-
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	0.034 (0.032)
R-Squared	0.073	0.073	0.072	0.073	0.072

n=3336

Table 5.29: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (2)

Variable	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Intercept	0.082*** (0.005)	0.082*** (0.005)	0.082*** (0.006)	0.082*** (0.006)	0.083*** (0.006)
Previous Attention	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)
New Party Presence	-	-	-	0.030** (0.014)	0.071* (0.040)
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	-0.114 (0.073)
New Party Size	0.006** (0.003)	-	-	-	0.003 (0.004)
New Party Organisation	-	0.033** (0.016)	-	-	-
New Party Gov't	-	-	0.122*** (0.032)	-	-
Est. Party Perform	-	-	-	0.051*** (0.017)	0.051*** (0.017)
Interaction Term	-	-	-	-0.059 (0.077)	0.000 (0.088)
R-Squared	0.073	0.073	0.075	0.075	0.075

n=3336

parties tend to be ignored by the parties that they challenged. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected.

The analysis does support the mobiliser new party hypothesis. In model 4, the presence of a mobiliser new party leads to significantly more reactions in terms of increasing levels of attention. These results echo the results of the case-by-case analysis, which shows that mobilisers are associated with consistently more marked, attributable reactions than challengers. When a new party does not focus on a single party but on all parties, they elicit more reactions than when it does focus on a single party. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis has to be accepted.

The party distance hypothesis is examined in model 5. The central notion here is that parties that stand closer to a new party react more to the new party than parties that stand far away from it. The insignificant relationship is positive; this indicates that parties that are far away from the new party react more. All in all, the parties that stand close to the new party do not increase their levels of attention more significantly than others. This echoes results of the case-by-case analysis, which show that new parties tend to elicit results from all parties, instead of from some. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected.

Model 6 concerns the new party size hypothesis (in table 5.29). The central idea is that larger new parties elicit significantly more reactions than smaller new parties. The basic reasoning for the first of these factors is that if a new party makes a big entry, it is more likely to be noticed than parties that make a more modest entry. There is a significant, positive relationship between the size of the new party and the reactions of established parties: larger new parties elicit more reactions from the established parties than parties that are smaller. The same pattern was found in the case-by-case analyses: D66 and the LPF tended to elicit markedly more attributable reactions from established parties than others. Therefore, this hypothesis is corroborated.

As for the new party organisation hypothesis, the results in model 7 imply that well organised new parties pose a more serious threat than poorly organised new parties. There is a significant positive relationship between the level of organisation and the strength of the reactions: better organised new parties elicit more reactions from the established parties. This variable is not significant in every robustness test.


The central notion for the new party government hypothesis, examined in model 8, is that new parties that enter government elicit significantly more reactions

from established parties. However, as seen in the case-by-case analysis: two of the new parties that were in government (the PPR and the LPF) were associated with markedly more changes in attention. The LPF was in government for only a short period, and it was difficult to attribute the change in attention for environmental issues to the entry of the PPR. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected, not on the basis of the statistical evidence but on the basis of contextual information.

Given the case-by-case analyses, good reasons exist not to expect significant relationships between the reactions of individual established parties and their characteristics: the patterns in the development of attention were similar for most established parties. There is a significant relationship between the performance of the established party and the attention that it devotes to issues in general: if a party performed well in the elections, it will broaden its activities afterwards; if it performed poorly it will focus its activities. In figure 5.32, one can see the difference between the relationship with and without the presence of new parties incorporated. One can see that parties that win elections diffuse their issue orientation: there is a positive relationship. Parties increase attention to issues when they win elections. The interaction term pulls the relationship in a negative direction: if a new party is present, the parties do not increase attention when they are winning. Parties increase attention to this issue that the new party will own when they lose. One should note, however, that this relationship is not significant.

These insignificant results are reflected in the multivariate analysis set up to scrutinise the expectation of Harmel and Svåsand (1997) that three factors have to be present at the same time: an established party will only respond when a new party enters that stands close to it, and that performs well, and only when the established party has lost. The interaction model shows three significant relations, but these are not related to the Harmel and Svåsand thesis: in this model, as in model 9, the variables for new party presence, previous attention and established party performance have significant effects. This sustains the interpretation that, in general, the presence of a new party that focuses on an issue matters for the attention that established parties devote to that issue, but it says nothing about the conditions under which this is more or less likely.

Figure 5.32: marginal effect of new party presence on effect of electoral performance on change in attention



These results indicate that the characteristics of established parties do not matter for their reactions: the characteristics of new parties are important to understand established party reactions. The underlying mechanism has been identified in the case-by-case analysis: if new parties are able to set the parliamentary agenda, they are able to influence the attention that all parties devote to issues. As the parliamentary agenda constraints political parties, their reactions will be relatively uniform. This means that if a new party is able to put a new issue on the parliamentary agenda, it will be difficult for established parties to ignore it. New parties may exert more control over the parliamentary agenda when they focus on their own issue, are larger and are better organised. Moreover, new parties may form a threat to established parties when they are larger and better organised. What appears to be important is the ability of the new party (through its own activity, cohesiveness and size) to set the parliamentary agenda and therefore to influence the definition of the political conflict. These results are quite positive about the ability of new parties to change their environment: given the restrictive nature of the parliamentary agenda, once a new party is able to put an issue on the agenda established parties must follow suit.

Table 5.30: summary of chapter 5

Hypothesis	Factor	Individual Attention	Individual Position	Systemic
1	New Party Presence	+	n/a	n/a
3	New Party Attention	+	n/a	n/a
5	Challenged	0	0	+
6	Mobiliser	+	0	+
7	Ideological Proximity	0	-	n/a
8	New Party Size	+	- ^a	0
9	New Party Organisation	+	-	0
10	New Party in Government	+ ^a	0	0
11	Est. Party Performance	0	0	n/a

+ : in expected direction

0 : no consistently significant relationship

- : in opposite direction than expected

^a : statistically significant, but not substantively meaningful

5.5 Conclusion

Three conclusions can be drawn here: first about the role of new political parties, second about the factors that were identified, and third about the nature of the parliamentary arena. The research shows that new political parties matter in the parliamentary arena. The analyses show that new parties can influence the attention that established parties devote to issues in parliament. The presence of new political parties itself matters for the attention that established parties devote to issues. Moreover, it is the characteristics of new political parties that influence the responses of established parties in terms of attention. New political parties are also associated with changing positions and patterns in parliamentary voting. On the whole, the entry of new political parties can have an effect on politics in the parliamentary arena. New political parties can bring new issues to the table, they can polarise unpolarised issues, or intensify political conflict on that issue. The role of new political parties is not so much in redefining pre-existing political conflicts, but in bringing new issues to the political agenda and polarising non-politicised issues. In this sense, new political parties are not agents of political change, but instead they are forces that are associated with re-entrenchment and reinforcement of the existing lines of conflict.

Table 5.30 provides a summary of the hypotheses that were falsified and corroborated by the results. On the whole, the mobiliser-challenger dichotomy is useful to explain patterns: mobilisers, which mobilise voters from all social groups on previously non-politicised issues, are associated with change in the attention that more established parties devote to issues, than challengers. Mobilisers bring new issues to

the political agenda that established parties pick up. This is not just visible in the increasing levels of attention, but also because mobilisers (as opposed to challengers) are associated with increasing levels of politicisation. Moreover, four new parties, all mobilisers, are associated with a change in the pattern underlying the voting behaviour: the anti-immigrant CP, the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+ and the government reform party LN. These parties are associated with a perturbation of the lines of conflict, but not one that is easily interpreted in terms of being in favour or against the positions that the new party proposes. In each of these cases it was difficult to interpret the political landscape after their entry into the parliamentary arena. These parties upset the political space, but not in a clear or consistent way. Challengers take on one established party on its own issue. They are associated with another pattern: here one can see established parties on the other side of the political spectrum showing adversarial reactions to the entry of the new party. In the strategic perspective of Meguid (2007), established parties on the opposite side of the spectrum have a particular interest in invigorating the political conflict between a challenger of one's electoral competitor: by moving in the opposite direction, one reinforces the challengers' ownership of the issue. In this way they aggravate the problem of the challenged party. This evidence shows the usefulness of the challenger-mobiliser distinction and shows that these kinds of parties have different roles to play in the political competition.

Most corroborated hypotheses concern characteristics of the new party: the central idea is that better organised or larger new parties and new parties that are in government or that devote attention to their own issue, elicit significantly more imitating reactions than smaller, poorly organised parties that remain in opposition and devote little attention to their own issue. The case-by-case analyses and the extended statistical analysis showed that new party attention matters. The new party organisation and new party size hypothesis were also supported by the data. While the results for new parties in government may be statistically significant, the case-by-case analyses indicate that it is not likely to be the governing parties that put the issue on the agenda. Two mechanisms may be at work here: new parties that are more cohesive and larger may be seen as threats to the established political parties, while smaller, less cohesive new parties. Second, new political parties that focus on their own issue and that are in government may be able to set the political agenda and force other parties to address their issues. The final factor examined is the established party

performance: there is no sign that parties that perform poorly in the elections, react more to new parties, than parties that perform well in those elections. This is reinforced by the case-by-case analyses, which show that parties tend to react in a uniform way to the entry of a new political party.

The results indicate that the nature of the parliamentary arena has an effect on the way new parties can influence established political parties. The parliamentary agenda is a particular political construct. On the one hand, political parties through their own policy initiatives and their scrutiny of government activities set the agenda. The issues that parties decide to focus on are the issues that parliament focuses on. On the other hand, the parliamentary agenda limits the issues that parties discuss. The institutional nature of the parliamentary agenda means that parties will address those issues that are on the parliamentary agenda. By setting the parliamentary agenda, new political parties can influence the parliamentary activities of other parties. Because the interaction between political parties in the parliamentary arena is structured through the parliamentary agenda and one-dimensional voting patterns, new political parties can have an effect, especially on the level of attention that established parties devote to issues and the level of politicisation of issues.

The results indicated that the attention that new parties devote to issues matters for the reactions of established parties: by tearing itself loose from the parliamentary agenda, a new party is able to dominate it. New parties that only follow the parliamentary agenda will never be able to set it. By its own activity on its own issue, a new party can control the definition of the political conflict. Established parties will not leave the definition of the political conflict to other parties, and therefore, they must increase their own activity in order to retain control over the definition of the political conflict. The case-by-case analysis showed one unexpected result, but it is not counterintuitive. Many new parties did not influence the parliamentary agenda. Their entry followed a marked change in the parliamentary agenda, rather than that their entry changed the parliamentary agenda. Legislative activities, economic developments or social events brought their issues to the parliamentary agenda. This may have led to opposition in the electorate, which in turn leads to the entry of a new party. Some new parties lead the political agenda, while others follow it.