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Imitating the newcomer. How, when and why established political parties imitate the policy positions and issue attention of new political parties in the electoral and parliamentary arena: the case of the Netherlands

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Chapter 3: Methods

About cases, political arenas and analytical strategies

3.1 Introduction

This research offers three methodological innovations from the existing literature on the effects of new political parties: the cases that are studied, the arenas that are examined and the combination of case-by-case study and statistical analysis. First, this study focuses on all new political parties that entered one political system over an extended period in time. Previous studies of new political parties were either single case studies or they studied one group of new political parties, but limited their research on the basis of either explanatory variables, such as new party size, or on the basis of arbitrary factors, such as party family. Case selection choices will be discussed in the section 3.2.

The second methodological innovation that this study offers, is that in addition to examining the electoral arena, this study also looks at the parliamentary arena. Sound theoretical reasons exist to assume that in different political arenas the effects of new political parties may be different. These were discussed in chapter 2. This chapter will devote special attention to the methods of data collection for party positions and political attention in both the parliamentary and electoral arena. In addition to bringing new insights by examining new political arenas, this study also uses new methods to measure positions and attention.

The final methodological innovation of this study is that it is not limited to either the contextual sensitivity of a case study or the abstractness of statistical analysis. In analysing the effect of new parties this study uses both case-by-case comparisons and statistical analysis. The statistical analysis allows us to control for the possibility of external circumstances by comparing those changes where a new party is present to those changes where no new party is present. This chapter will give an in-depth discussion of the methods of data analysis for the case-by-case and the statistical approaches.

3.2 Case selection

This study builds on two kinds of studies. On the one side, there is a limited number of studies that have tried to find general patterns in the reaction of established parties to new parties on the basis of a large number of cases (Meguid 2005, 2007; Huijbrechts 2006; Van Spanje 2010). These studies examine 'all' new parties in established democracies. On the other side, there is a range of case studies or comparative studies that have identified different effects of new political parties for specific cases (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007). These two different groups of studies pull the orientation of further research into two different directions. The conclusion of the large N-studies is that multiple types of effects on the basis of multiple sources of data need to be studied. A case study is best suited for this kind of research, because the case study provides the best possibility to integrate different types of data (Yin 2009). The different effects that have been uncovered in all the case studies could be put to the test for a larger sample, to test their external validity (Gerring 2007, 197; Yin 2009, 3). This research will combine intensive, context-sensitive study of individual cases in order to find out what effect each new party has had, using a large-N statistical analysis, in order to understand under what conditions which effects will occur.¹⁷

The study will focus on a political system with institutional stability in which a large number of parties enter. The reason that only one country, which is institutionally stable, is selected is to keep the other causes that could influence the programmatic success of new parties constant. In table 3.1 one can see a list of how many new parties entered the parliaments in all European states that have been a democracy since the Second World War. The first two countries on the list combine a higher number of new political parties with considerable institutional instability, making over time comparison of new party effects problematic. Italy tops the list: with 29 new political parties, it has seen most new parties. One explanation for this is the change in the party system after the collapse of DC (*Democrazia Cristiana*/Christian Democracy) and the rise of *Forza Italia* (Go Italy) in the early 1990s. These developments were followed by a major revision of the institutional structure of Italian democracy. These specific events make it difficult to test general theories about new political parties in Italy. The rise of *Forza Italia* may be an

¹⁷ Although this not a study of a large number of countries (or even new political parties), it does study a large number of new/established party pairs.

Table 3.1: number of new parties in parliament since first elections since 1945

Country	New Parties
Germany	3
Austria	3
Sweden	4
Norway	6
Luxembourg	7
Iceland	8
Ireland	11
Finland	11
Denmark	11
France ^a	13
Switzerland	15
United Kingdom ^b	17
Netherlands	19
Belgium ^c	21
Italy ^d	29

^a Excluding parties labelled "diverse left" and "diverse right" by electoral authorities;

^b 13 of which are parties from Northern Ireland;

^c Including the mainstream parties that were split because of the linguistic tensions in the 1960s and 1970s; excluding party cartels;

^d 19 before the disintegration of the party system in 1994 and 10 in the period 1994-2009.

interesting case study of the effects of a new political party. The institutional instability in Italy, however, makes it difficult to compare the effects of say the small communist split-off PD (*Democrazia Proletaria*/Proletarian Democracy), which entered parliament in 1983 to the effects of the anti-corruption party IdV (*Italia dei Valori*/Italy of Values), which entered parliament in 2001. Between 1983 and 2001 the institutional context changed too much to allow for a systematic comparison. Belgium is the second country on the list. Its high number can be explained by country-specific factors as well: due to the split of all established parties between 1960 and 1980 into a French-speaking and a Dutch speaking party, six new parties entered during the period 1960-1980. This was followed by a major decentralisation of the political system. Again the institutional stability prevents systematic comparison. The Netherlands is the third on the list with 19 new parties. Here, the number of new political parties is not the result of a political crisis, but of the open political system. The low electoral threshold is one of the most important features of the openness of the political system. This feature has remained stable during the entire research period. The Netherlands has one of the lowest electoral thresholds in the world (Lowery et al. 2010, forthcoming): it had a *de facto* threshold of 1% before 1956 and after 1956 it had a threshold of 0.67% of the vote. This is the only relevant

change to occur in the electoral system in Netherlands during this period and it is a relatively minor change. Other features that induce the entry of new political parties is the relative ease by which new political parties can register. The registration law has changed marginally over the research period, but not in such a way that it affected the entry of new parties (Lowery et al. forthcoming).

Because of its combination of a high number of new parties with institutional stability, the Dutch party system was selected for this study. The relative weakness of institutional barriers against new parties makes the Netherlands an attractive case to study the effect of new parties: high barriers prevent new parties from entering parliament. This means that parties that perform well electorally and do not enter parliament are not seen as a threat (Norris 2005, 269). But once parties cross the electoral threshold, they immediately form a sizeable parliamentary group. And therefore they form a large threat. Because of the low electoral threshold a considerable number of new parties entered parliament. There are considerable differences in the number of seats these parties had when they entered parliament. Countries with higher electoral thresholds have only had large parties enter their parliaments. This would mean that one cannot test whether the size of the party on entry in parliament influences the effect the party has on the party system.

Another factor that can influence the extent to which new parties can influence the established parties, are the parliamentary rules and procedures. In some countries, like the United Kingdom and France, the government exerts considerable control over the agenda of parliament. In other countries, government control is weaker and MPs have more influence on the parliamentary agenda. The less government control, the more likely new parties are to have an effect on the established parties. In systems with greater government control, the parties in government can prevent new parties from bringing new issues to the parliamentary agenda. In comparative studies of agenda control, the Netherlands quite consistently scores as one of the systems where parliament has most control over its own agenda: the Dutch parliament sets its own agenda, the government does not have tools to pressure parliament to speed up or prioritise its bills and MPs are relatively free in terms of private member bills or amendments (Döring 2001, 1995). The parliamentary rules and procedures are relatively lenient towards new parties.

A final factor is cabinet formation: if cabinet formation is closed to new parties, because of a tradition of one-party government or the existence of pre-

electoral coalitions, new parties are likely to remain marginalised. If cabinet formation is open to unusual coalitions and new parties, it is more likely that established parties might respond to new parties, because they soon can become relevant players in cabinet formation. The Netherlands is characterised by comparatively open procedures of cabinet formation (Mair 1997b).

These factors combined appear to make the Netherlands a likely case for new parties to have a range of effects on established parties. One could say that this makes the Netherlands a “crucial case” to study new parties (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 279). As one is likely to find effects of new parties on established parties in this country, one could argue that it is “a most likely case study” (Gerring 2007, 120). In terms of the external validity of this study, the Netherlands is a likely case. From the perspective of Popper’s (1959) critical rationalism, which emphasises falsification, this kind of case study can be used to disprove the validity of a (deterministic) theory. If a particular relationship does not appear in the system it is likely to occur in, it is likely not to occur in any system (Gerring 2007, 120). This does mean, however, that when one finds that the relationship is proven to hold in this case, it will not necessarily hold for all new political parties. If it proves the theory true, the study says little about the external validity of the theory for less likely cases. Such a characterisation is not without qualification: because of the low electoral threshold, a large number of small flash parties have participated in Dutch elections. These parties gain a small number of seats and often disappear from parliament after one election.¹⁸ It would be easy for established parties to ignore new parties under these conditions, as they are just irrelevant and fleeting phenomena. The Dutch established parties might have developed a kind of immunity to new parties. In a country where a much lower number of new parties enter the political scene, established parties may be more easily shocked by their entry.

This study differs from previous studies about the effect of new political parties in that it looks at all the new parties that have entered the political system instead of a selection of relevant parties. Most studies of new parties have focused on the effect of one particular party or a particular family of parties on the party system. The larger N-studies have selected only ‘relevant’ political parties, in the case of Meguid (2005, 2007) and Huijbregts (2006) on the basis of the criteria used by the

¹⁸ Of the nineteen parties studied, eight gain only one seat and seven do not return in parliament after their first period in parliament.

Table 3.2: new parties in the Tweede Kamer between 1946 and 2006

New Party			Elected	Ideology
Dutch	English	Abb.		
<i>Katholieke Nationale Partij</i>	Catholic National Party	KNP	1948	Rightwing Catholicism
<i>Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij</i>	Pacifist Socialist Party	PSP	1959	Leftwing Socialism
<i>Boerenpartij</i>	Farmers' Party	BP	1963	Conservatism
<i>Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond</i>	Reformed Political League	GPV	1963	Orthodox Protestantism
<i>Democraten '66</i>	Democrats '66	D66	1967	Pragmatism Radical Democracy
<i>Politieke Partij Radicalen</i>	Political Party Radicals	PPR	1971	Progressive Christianity
<i>Democratisch Socialisten '70</i>	Democratic Socialists '70	DS'70	1971	Social-democracy
<i>Nederlandse Middenstandspartij</i>	Dutch Middle Class Party	NMP	1971	Anti-Tax Populism
<i>Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland</i>	Roman Catholic Party Netherlands	RKPN	1972	Orthodox Catholicism
<i>Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie</i>	Reformed Political Federation	RPF	1981	Orthodox Protestantism
<i>Evangelische Volkspartij</i>	Evangelical People's Party	EVP	1982	Progressive Christianity
<i>Centrumpartij</i>	Centre Party	CP	1982	Radical Nationalism
<i>Algemeen Ouderen Verbond</i>	General Elderly League	AOV	1994	Pensioners' Interest
<i>Politieke Unie 55+</i>	Political Union 55+	U55+	1994	Pensioners' Interest
<i>Socialistische Partij</i>	Socialist Party	SP	1994	Socialism
<i>Leefbaar Nederland</i>	Liveable Netherlands	LN	2002	Democratic Populism
<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>	List Pim Fortuyn	LPF	2002	Liberal Nationalism
<i>Partij voor de Dieren</i>	Animals Party	PvdD	2006	Green Politics
<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>	Freedom Party	PVV	2006	Liberal Nationalism

manifesto research group, which only include parties with significant, long-term representation in parliament and/or participation in cabinets into their data set. This means that these studies cannot reveal whether size (or relevance) can explain the effects new that parties have on the party system.

This study focuses on all new political parties to enter the Dutch parliament since 1946. The Second World War formed a major rupture in Dutch politics, especially in terms of the party system - less so in terms of voting behaviour. Many studies of new political parties put the boundary much more recently: in the 1970s for instance (Huijbrechts 2006; Mair 1999). By examining a number of political parties from before 1970, one can also examine the effects of political parties in the much less dynamic political situation of pillarisation and consensus politics (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 39). This does, however, have its drawbacks: political documentation becomes worse if one goes back in time: election manifestos and parliamentary

records are smaller and less informative. Before the Second World War, even less data is available.

The new parties studied are selected on the basis of the criteria proposed: those parties are under study that win seats in the lower house of the Dutch Parliament, the *Tweede Kamer* for the first time, and have not been formed by transformation or a merger in which one or more parties participated that previously held seats in parliament. This means that these cases are selected from all parties that have attempted to enter parliament. Between 1946 and 2006, 165 parties, which had not been represented before, attempted to enter the *Tweede Kamer*. Only 29 of them have been successful in gaining representation. Of these 29, four parties were mergers: PvdA (*Partij van de Arbeid*/Labour Party), CU (*ChristenUnie*/ChristianUnion), GL and CDA (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303).¹⁹ These mergers are excluded on the basis of the definition of a new political party. Almost all merging parties were established parties: on average, a merging party had been in parliament for 44 years before merging. Six parties can be seen as transformations of established parties: KVP (*Katholieke Volkspartij*/Catholic People's Party), PvdV (*Partij van de Vrijheid*/Party of Freedom), KNP (*Katholieke Nationale Partij*/Catholic National Party), CD (*Centrum-Democraten*/Centre Democrats) and VVD.²⁰ The KVP, PvdV and VVD were among "big five" Dutch parties and therefore they were the most established of established parties (Daalder 1965, 172). The KNP is included because of a legal technicality.²¹ The CD is the only problematic case. It was formed when Janmaat, the sole Member of Parliament (MP) for the CP, left his party. Because for parties with parliamentary representation the focus in the definition is on their political representatives and on not their party organisation (see 4.2.1), the CD can best be seen

¹⁹ PvdA was a merger of the SDAP, VDB and CDU (see section 4.3); CDA: CHU, ARP and KVP entered with a common list in 1977 (see section 4.4.7); GL: PSP, PPR, CPN and EVP entered with a common list in 1989 (see section 4.4.7); CU: RPF and GPV entered with a common list in 2002 (see section 4.4.10).

²⁰ KVP entered parliament in 1946 as a transformation of the RKSP (see section 4.3); PvdV entered parliament in 1946 as a transformation of the LSP (see section 4.3); VVD entered parliament in 1948 as a transformation of PvdV (see section 4.3); KNP entered parliament in 1952 as a transformation of Lijst-Welter (see section 4.4.1); CD entered parliament in 1989 as a transformation of CP (see section 4.4.12).

²¹ Because the party was not registered with the Electoral Council the KNP could not run under the name KNP in the 1946 election. Instead it was a nameless list, lead by Welter. In the 1948 election the party did run under the name KNP. Still, the name KNP is used here, because this name was generally used to describe the party.

as a transformation of the CP. This leaves a total of 19 parties. These parties are listed in table 3.2 and are discussed in detail in chapter 4.

3.3 Analytical strategy

This study seeks to determine whether a marked change in attention or in the position of established parties in either the electoral or the parliamentary arena can be attributed to the entry of the new party. To be able to determine whether this is indeed the case, three conditions have to be met: first, there must be a marked difference in the positions or attention between the period before the new party entered the parliamentary arena and the period after it did. Second, alternative explanations for the change must be eliminated. And third, the change must be attributed to the new party.

In order to determine whether all three conditions are met, three different research strategies are used. The first is based on a comparative case study research approach, which analyses case-by-case; the second approach analyses the result of the case studies statistically to assess the significance of the patterns found in the case-by-case analyses. The primary purpose of these two analyses is to assess the extent to which changes in attention of established parties could be attributed to the entry of the new party, whether the change cannot be attributed to alternative explanations, and which factors are at work in every individual case. The third approach, which is only applied for the analysis of attention, compares those changes in attention for established parties, where a new party is present, to those changes in attention where no new party is present. The goal of this expanded statistical analysis is to assess the extent to which the entry of a new party leads to a marked change in attention compared to *all* changes in attention and which, if any, general patterns can be identified.

In the case-by-case analysis, the goal is to ensure that changes in attention and position can be attributed to the entry of a new political party when looking at contextual factors. The goal is to eliminate alternative explanations for changes in attention and position. The logic applied here is one of process tracing or pattern matching (Gerring 2007): the changes in the levels of attention are charted and validity of different explanations for this development are evaluated. The goal of these analyses is three-fold: first, to determine whether the elections in which the new party entered, interrupted the developments in position and attention markedly; second, to

eliminate alternative explanations for the developments. The combined goal here is to determine whether the new party can be identified as the cause of the change in attention and position. The third goal is to determine which of the explanations can best explain differences in the pattern of attention. In other words, the goal is to determine by comparing the patterns in attention whether for instance larger parties react differently than small parties. The strength and significance of these patterns is further tested in a statistical analysis.

In the analysis of attention, the analysis is expanded to include all changes in attention. The goal of this analysis is to assess whether the entry of a new political party has a significant effect on attention. For the analysis of attention, the analysis is taken one level further. In this analysis, *all* changes in attention are studied. That is, the changes are studied in attention in *all* parties' parliamentary activity, in *all* parliamentary periods and on *all* issues. By comparing the developments in the attention that parties devote to the issues new parties own to all other changes, one can see whether the presence of new parties causes significantly different patterns in attention compared to the situation when they were not present. All kinds of changes in attention occur, caused by all kinds of factors inside and outside of established parties. By comparing these natural patterns to those patterns that occur just after the entry of a new party into parliament on the specific issue that it owns, one can control for alternative explanations. One can attribute the changes in attention devoted to a specific issue to the presence of a new party if these changes in attention are *significantly* different from all other changes when this new party is not present. If the developments in the attention to the issue that is owned by the new party are caused by other external factors, then they should not be *significantly* different from the rest of the cases. If external developments cause changes in attention, they do so independently of whether a new party is present or not, and therefore there will be no significant effect of the new party on the attention that established parties devote to issues in those cases. The question is whether new parties caused a significant change in attention, and therefore the focus in the regression analyses is on the levels of significance, and less so on other measures of the explanatory strength of the relationship, such as the R-squared.²²

²² In the case of the r-squared, the variance one can explain by these analyses is small because in only a fraction of the changes in the attention, a new party is present.

This study also does not examine the follow-up effects of new political parties. That is: the entry of a new political party A may cause a change in party B, which in turn elicits change in party C. The approach is temporal: the positions of parties before and after the entry of a new political party are examined. The possibility that the interaction of established parties causes the changes after this point in time which may be attributed to the the new party, because the further one moves from the entry of the new party, the less likely it is that the entry of the new party is the actual cause.

This combination of research strategies allows one to isolate the effects of new political parties. It allows one to assess whether changes in established parties can really be attributed to the new political parties, by separating the effects of new parties from the effects of specific events and determining whether these changes are significantly different from general patterns in attention.

3.4 Data collection and data analysis in the parliamentary arena

Chapter 5 will examine the effects of new political parties on established parties in the parliamentary arena, in terms of attention and positions. The first is operationalised in terms of the issues that parties talk about in parliament and the second in terms of the positions that they take in parliamentary voting. For both position and attention, the reasons for these specific operationalisation and measurement choices are discussed here.

3.4.1 Attention in parliament

There are two research strategies to measure the differences between the issue priorities of parliamentary parties (Louwerse & Otjes 2011): one can look at what parties say or at what parties do. Issues are put on the parliamentary agenda for discussion, but this does not necessarily lead to parliamentary action. MPs have a wide array of actions at their disposal: written questions, motions, amendments and private member bills. MPs are only likely to act when they find government action on the issue lacking or when they want to get media attention. This means that analysing actions to understand issue saliency in parliament has one big drawback (Louwerse 2011, 66): it only measures the actions of dissatisfied MPs. Satisfied MPs who support the government may use their speaking time to praise the government without proposing motions, amendments or bills. A minister can prevent proposals from being tabled or being voted on by making commitments to MPs. Ministers are more likely to

make promises to MPs of the governing coalition than to those of the opposition. Therefore, one would expect government MPs to be far more passive in terms of parliamentary actions than opposition MPs. Looking at action means that one only sees half of parliament, looking at speech means that one sees the whole.

There are two other advantages of examining speech as opposed to motions or other parliamentary actions. First, small parties are limited by the parliamentary rules from tabling motions and amendments. An MP needs the consent of four of his colleagues to propose a motion. While this rule has not been applied rigorously or consistently, it has limited the ability of some small parties to propose motions. Almost all parties that entered parliament with one or two seats have proposed less than 10 motions during their first term in parliament.²³ If one wants to use the parliamentary activity of new parties as an explanatory variable and if many new parties are small, one has to look at parliamentary speech.


Finally, as one can see in figure 3.1, there has been an explosion in the use of motions in the 1970s.²⁴ Before 1967, the number of motions per parliamentary period in the database does not exceed 100. In 1967-1971, the number of motions increases sharply to 384. In the 1977-1981 period, the number of motions exceeds 1000 for the first time. From that moment on, the number of motions per parliamentary period exceeds 1000 (except for parliamentary periods that end early due to snap elections). Between 1982-1986 and 1986-1989 there is a decrease in the number of motions,²⁵ but since then the number has grown during every full parliamentary term. In the period 2006-2009, the number of motions exceeds 2000 for the first time. This poses considerable constraints on which cases one can study: there is little data on the cases before 1967. Parliamentary speech on the other hand stays relatively stable: there is no marked decrease or increase in this.

²³ The only exceptions are the PPR and the PvdD.

²⁴ This marked increase is visible for legislative initiatives as well, but less so for amendments (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 154).

²⁵ This is probably best explained by stricter rules on when motions can be tabled.

Figure 3.1: number of motions proposed each parliamentary period



3.4.2 Talking in the Dutch parliament

One of the major activities of MPs is to speak on issues that are on the agenda.²⁶ Part of the work of MPs takes place in committees and part of it takes place in plenary sessions. The decisions that are made in plenary sessions are prepared in committee. In committees, MPs can engage in a dialogue with the cabinet and they can inform themselves about issues. No substantive decision-making takes place in the committees.²⁷ This means that a plenary meeting must follow every committee meeting that prepares a decision.²⁸

The plenary meetings occur within time constraints: they are held for three days in every week in which the parliament is not in recess. Therefore, the agenda of parliament is tightly controlled. The speaker proposes the agenda to parliament.²⁹ Parliament follows the policy agenda of the government in some cases: it discusses the bills, policy papers or budgets proposed by the government. In some cases, however, laws or policy papers are tabled by the government in response to a request by an MP. MPs can also set the parliamentary agenda themselves: by private member

²⁶ The term 'parliament' itself (from the French 'parlement' which is in turn derived from 'parler' 'to speak') is a sign of this.

²⁷ Reglement van orde van de Tweede Kamer. 2010. Den Haag. p.14.

²⁸ Ibid. 18.

²⁹ Ibid. 20.

bills, which are rare; in the form of parliamentary studies or inquiries, which are rare as well; in the form of interpellations or emergency debates with cabinet members, which are increasing in use; or in the form of an oral question to ministers during the weekly question hour. While any MP has the right to propose a bill or ask oral questions, a parliamentary majority is needed to start a parliamentary study or an inquiry.³⁰

No one can speak unless the speaker has given him or her the right to do so.³¹ The speaker also determines the speaking time. The time is allotted among parliamentary parties, which appoint one spokesperson per debate. In longer debates, parties are allotted speaking time according to the size of the parliamentary party.³² MPs can interrupt other MPs and cabinet members to ask a question, if the speaker allows them to.³³ Parliamentary parties can decide not to participate in a debate; this is often the case in busier periods in parliament, for smaller parliamentary parties and politically less important debates. Within each debate, MPs have considerable leeway to address the issue as they see fit. The Speaker can take away an MP's right to speak, but this only occurs in extreme cases.³⁴ In those cases, the Speaker also has the right to strike the words of that MP from the proceedings (Bootsma & Hoetink 2006).³⁵

In summary, parliamentary parties are constrained by the parliamentary agenda on the one hand, which means that they will focus on the issues that the cabinet, other parliamentary parties or they themselves put on the agenda. On the other hand, parliamentary parties enjoy considerable liberty: they themselves participate in setting the parliamentary agenda; they can decide not to participate in parliamentary discussions and focus on their own policy priorities during their speeches.

³⁰ Ibid. 37-38.

³¹ Ibid. 20-21.

³² Ibid. 21.

³³ Ibid. 21.

³⁴ Ibid. 21-22.

³⁵ Ibid. 22. This includes cases such as personal insults or breaches of confidentiality.

3.4.3 Collection and categorisation of parliamentary speech

The data presented here was collected and categorised by Louwerse (2011). The study uses the digitalised proceedings of the Dutch parliament.³⁶ The texts are categorised into the policy categories of the Comparative Agendas Project (Breeman, Lowery et al. 2009, Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006). The method used here has been developed by Louwerse (2011): the parliamentary speeches are divided into paragraphs. These paragraphs are subsequently assigned to these categories in a two-step process. First, the paragraphs were assigned to categories on the basis of a dictionary of signal words (Louwerse 2011, 80). The basic reasoning is that if a word like ‘refugee’ (vluchteling) is included in a piece of text, one can be reasonably sure that it should be categorised as pertaining to the issue of immigration, especially when words like ‘asylum’ (asiel) are included as well (Louwerse 2011, 80). Each paragraph was assigned to the category in which it had most words, relative to the logged number of words in the word list of each category (Louwerse 2011). For each category, between 20 and 50 words were selected on the basis of a reading of relevant documents: parliamentary debates, election manifestos, parliamentary motions and the categorisation instructions of the Flemish branch of the Comparative Agendas Project (Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006).

Those paragraphs that could not be assigned to a category on the basis of the dictionary approach, because they included no word from the dictionary or an equal number of words from two or more categories, were assigned using an automatic classification algorithm (Louwerse 2011, 214). In these cases a Linear Support Vector Machine was employed: these assign the paragraphs that are not coded to categories based on similarity in word use to paragraphs that were already coded.³⁷ Because of issues with computer processing, the entire period could not be analysed in a single analysis. Therefore, the entire period was cut into shorter periods preceding or

³⁶ The digitalised parliamentary speeches were collected from *parlando* for the period 1995-2010 and from *statengeneraaldigitaal*-websites for the period 1952-1995 (Louwerse 2011, 206). The texts, especially those before 1995, were heavily processed.

³⁷ A Linear Support Vector Machine treats each paragraph as a point in a high-dimensional space, where each word forms a dimension (Louwerse, 2010, 214). For those paragraphs for which the categories are known, the SVM will calculate a hyper-plane, which is best able to separate the different categories (Louwerse, 2010, 214). This can in turn be used to assign the paragraphs to the categories to which they are, in terms of word use, most similar.

following each election.³⁸ The Louwerse approach has shown itself to be quite valid when compared to the results of hand coding (Louwerse 2011, 81). The results of the validity: Louwerse's results have a Krippendorff's Alpha of 0.723 for Dutch-language election manifestos compared to hand coding (Louwerse 2011, 81). The results are similar to the results of Breeman et al. (2009), who also used a computerised technique to process parliamentary documents. This method does not produce perfect correspondence between human and computer coding, but for the purposes of this enterprise the method suffices (Louwerse 2011, 83). The policy issue categorisation scheme of the Dutch Policy Agendas Project was used (Breeman, Lowery, et al. 2009). This scheme was amended in order to better differentiate between the specific appeals of specific new parties. These categories are also used in the other analyses. For the analyses of parliamentary speech a separate category was created for speech concerning procedure. The substantive categories are listed in appendix 1.

3.4.4 Case-by-case analysis of attention in parliament

This data will be analysed in a three-step analysis: in a case-by-case context-sensitive analysis, in a statistical analysis and in an expanded statistical analysis. In chapter 4, the new parties will be linked to specific issues. These issues are selected on the basis of an analysis of the election manifesto of the party and the assessment of scholars in secondary works as to what the unique appeal of the party was.

In the case-by-case analysis, the developments in the attention that established parties devote to the issue of the new party are followed closely. Trend lines are calculated for the period before and after the elections in order to determine whether the elections constitute an interruption in the development of attention. These are made by means of a regression analysis between the year and the level of attention in that year. Examples of patterns in which the elections lead to a marked interruption and do not lead to a marked interruption of the patterns of attention, are shown in figure 3.2 and 3.3. In these figures hypothetical examples of trend lines in attention can be seen. As figure 3.2 shows, the interruption can occur in the form of a difference in the value (pattern A) and in a difference in the slope (pattern B and C) of

³⁸ The periods that were studied were 1952-1959, 1956-1963, 1959-1967, 1967-1977, 1972-1981, 1977-1986, 1982-1989, 1986-1994, 1989-1994, 1994-2002 and 1998-2010. To obtain the figures for section 5.12, a special analysis was made for the period 1963-1977.

the trend lines. Figure 3.3 shows that, even when attention increases (as in pattern E), if the elections do not lead to an interruption in the pattern of attention, one cannot attribute this to the new party, because an autonomous development continued.

The next step is to consider alternative explanations for the patterns that are found. Alternative explanations may be found in two different realms: first, social, economic or international developments may force an issue to the table. An exploding nuclear reactor in Fukushima may force energy policy onto the parliamentary agenda in the Netherlands. To this end (where possible) data on social, economic or international developments are presented that may constitute an explanation to these developments. Second, the legislative cycle may influence when parliament devotes attention to an issue: processes of depoliticisation (advisory committees, moving decision-making to another level, postponing decision-making) may remove an issue from the parliamentary agenda, while processes of politicisation (legislative proposals, government policy papers) may bring an issue to the foreground. In some cases, the budgetary cycle, which concentrates activity on financial matters in the last months of the year may affect the patterns is also evaluated as an alternative explanation.

The third step is to compare different individual patterns of non-reaction and reaction in order to understand these patterns. One of the most striking outcomes of these analyses is that, while there are considerable differences in the way that new political parties influence established parties, when responding to a new party, the reactions of established parties are uniform. All parties show a similar pattern of increasing attention, decreasing attention or stability in attention. Therefore, the attention of all established parties is presented, instead of the attention of individual parties. The focus in the discussions of these individual cases is on whether the change in attention can be understood in terms of a collective response of all established parties to the new party, instead of individual reactions of each established party.

Figure 3.2: response patterns





Figure 3.3: non-response patterns



3.4.5 Statistical analysis of attention in parliament

Two different statistical analyses are made: one which concerns only the cases of change where a new political party is present and one which concerns all cases of changes. While these analyses are based on different assumptions about attributability, these are based on similar measures.

In the first statistical analysis, only those cases of change are included where a new party is present. In essence, we analyse the results of the case-by-case analyses statistically to see where the patterns found there hold up to statistical scrutiny. In the second, expanded, statistical analysis the cases are expanded to include all changes in attention. These analyses seek to determine the extent to which the presence of a new party matters *significantly* for the issues that established parties devote attention to, compared to all fluctuations of attention. In the analyses presented, *all* changes in attention are studied. That is, the changes are studied in attention in *all* parties' parliamentary activity, in *all* parliamentary periods and on *all* issues. The goal is to determine whether the presence of a new political party leads to a significantly different pattern in attention.

In both analyses the developments in attention will be analysed in a two-parliamentary term-period: in order to see the effect of a party that entered parliament in a particular year (for example 1994), the attention devoted to issues in the period before the new party entered parliament (1989-1994) will be compared to the attention devoted to issues in the period after the new party entered parliament (1994-1998).³⁹ This study employs a measure of relative change in attention. The basic logic is that going to 2 percentage points from 1 percentage point is treated the same as going from 10 percentage points to 20 percentage points: in both cases, attention doubles. In order to avoid divisions by zero, the relative change is calculated in terms of the absolute change in attention divided by the sum of attention in the parliamentary period before and after the entry of a new party. This limits the data between the values -1 and +1.⁴⁰ This method is chosen because of its intuitive appeal.⁴¹

³⁹ For those elections that followed or that were snap elections, the periods were extended in order to avoid outliers. This applies to the elections in 1971, 1972, 1981, 1982, 2002 and 2003.

⁴⁰ This method has clear advantages over other methods of measuring change, such as the Percentage Change Method of Jones and Baumgartner (2005:178-180), which is leptokurtic. This is a logical result of a division by the level of previous attention,

These values will then be analysed in regression analyses. In these analyses, the focus is on determining whether the entry of a new party (under specific conditions) leads to significant change in attention compared to the existing natural changes in attention (when no new party was present). In the expanded statistical analyses, the data set consists of a lot of cases in which no new party is present. Therefore the variables used to evaluate the different explanations in this analysis are highly collinear. Multiple regression is therefore inappropriate. Out of the total of 3045 established party/parliamentary period/issue combinations in the expanded statistical analysis, a new party was present in only 159 cases. Therefore, the strength of the explanations (in terms of the R-squared for instance) is less important than the significance. The key question is not what share of the variance the presence of a new party can explain, because in only 159 of the 3045 established party-year-issue triads a new party is present. The key question is the extent to which the patterns for the cases where new parties are present are *significantly different* from all cases. An example can help to illustrate how the measure of relative change in attention score is calculated. In table 3.3, one can see what percentage of words established parties devoted to the issue of immigration in the parliamentary periods 1998-2002 and 2002-2006. This is the issue owned by the LPF, which entered parliament in the 2002 elections. The absolute change in attention is the difference between the percentages of before and after the entry of the LPF. In 1998-2002, D66 devoted 3.8% of what they said in parliament to immigration. In the period 2002-2006, D66 devoted 4.7% of what they said to this issue: an increase of almost one percentage point. To calculate the relative measure of change in attention score, the absolute change will be divided by the sum of the attention before and after. The relative measure of change in attention score is +0.108 for D66. These developments in the attention devoted to the issue owned by the LPF in the parliamentary period after it

because the data is limited at a 100% decrease in attention. This method limits the data by both the level of attention at $t=-1$ and $t=+1$. Within these boundaries, the data is roughly normally distributed.

⁴¹ Robustness test were run for different operationalisations. For each analysis, four different models were used: a long-term and a short-term model (where the period was and was not extended following snap elections) and a model looking at relative and absolute changes in attention. This leads to four models (long-term absolute, long-term relative, short-term absolute, short-term relative). Where there are deviances between the tests and the models that are presented, this will be noted.

Table 3.3: calculating change in attention scores (example)

Established Party	Attention 1998-2002	Attention 2002-2006	Absolute Change	Relative Change
	%	%		
CDA	3.52	3.13	-0.39	-0.059
CU	2.44	3.10	+1.66	+0.254
D66	3.81	4.73	+0.92	+0.108
GL	3.69	5.27	+1.56	+0.174
PvdA	2.82	4.76	+0.94	+0.143
SGP	2.92	3.81	+0.89	+0.132
SP	2.25	3.61	+1.36	+0.232
VVD	3.47	3.84	+0.47	+0.063

Table 3.4: relationship between change and levels of attention

Variable	Attention in Parliament		Attention in Election Manifestos	
	Absolute Difference	Relative Difference	Absolute Change	Relative Change
Intercept	0.760*** (0.046)	0.082*** (0.005)	2.05*** (0.085)	0.210*** (0.005)
Attention at t=-1	-0.160*** (0.008)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.430*** (0.013)	-0.037*** (0.002)
R-square	0.104	0.071	0.265	0.155
N	3360	3360	2898	2898

entered parliament, will be compared to all developments in the attention to all issues (not included in table 3.3).

When studying developments in attention in this way, there is a problem. Under any specification, there is a negative relationship between the amount of attention a party has devoted to an issue and the change in attention afterwards. As one can see in table 3.4, this relationship is quite robust. Whether one calculates a relationship between the *absolute* change and the previous level of attention, or between the *relative* change and the previous level of attention, this relationship is significant and explains a fair share of the variance. The relationship is present in the data for the electoral and the parliamentary arena. For the absolute change in attention, this may be the result of the fact that the larger the previous level of attention is, the greater the decreases in attention can be: if the previous level of attention is 1% the maximum decrease is 1%, if it is 10% the maximum decrease is 10%. However, a relative measure of change in attention would not have this problem, because the maximum decrease (or increase) is always 1. In contrast to the

pattern in the absolute data, the pattern here appears to be of a substantive nature. It appears to imply that there is a natural maximum to how much attention a party can devote to an issue: the more attention it has already devoted to an issue, the smaller the (relative) change in attention will be. It appears that developments in attention do not continue linearly until 100% is reached. There is a saturation level of attention, beyond which not many parties extend. Only a few outliers extend beyond the level of 30% attention.⁴² This makes the analysis considerably more complicated. There is no way to avoid this phenomenon, because it is a substantive phenomenon. Therefore, all statistical analyses will be constructed as control relationships, using the relationship with this phenomenon as a robustness check.

3.4.6 Party positions in parliament

There are two research strategies available to measure the differences in position in parliament (Louwerse & Otjes 2011): on the one hand one can look at what parties say, and on the other hand one can look at what parties do. The core question here is how parties position themselves on the dominant line of conflict. The two methods available are a word-based approach, which analyses parliamentary speeches, or a vote-based approach, which analyses parliamentary voting. A vote-based strategy is pursued here for three reasons: first, the focus is on the significant line or lines of conflict on an issue. During their parliamentary speeches, any party can address any aspect related to the issue on the agenda. This means that there is considerable variance in the issues that are addressed. It is more likely that party positions conform to the significant line of conflict on that issue, because the motions that are voted on are a non-random sample of all possible motions on that issue. Which motions are voted on, is regulated by parties' strategic considerations.

In a word-based approach, differences in word use may in part be motivated by ideological differences. They may however also be the result of differences in the vernacular of the period or the style, regional background and whether civil servants wrote a speech. All these differences can be picked up in a word-scaling technique (Louwerse 2011, 210-223). A vote-based technique has fewer drawbacks.

⁴² Note that this relationship does not exist in this data set, nor in similar data sets such as the data of the Comparative Manifestos Project: for the absolute data, the relationship is strong and significant (b-value of -0.48 significant at the 0.01-level). For the relative model, the relationship is weaker, but still significant (b-value of -0.04, significant at the 0.01-level). These analyses concern 82,264 cases.

Table 3.5: voting in the Tweede Kamer

Vote Type	Percentage
Motions	56%
Amendments	35%
Laws	9%
Other	0%
N	45,316

Finally, the measurement of party positions in parliament through parliamentary voting is a tried and tested method. The application of these methods to the Dutch parliament goes back to the 1970s (Van Tijn-Koekebakker, Brinkman & Koomen 1971; Wolters 1984; Van der Brug 1997). Since the development of these methods in the United States they have been applied to the Swiss *Nationalrat* (Hug & Schulz 2007), the Danish *Folketing* (Hansen 2008), the Irish *Dáil* (Hansen 2009), the Korean National Assembly (Jun & Hix 2009), the French *Assemblée Nationale* (Rosenthal & Voeten 2004), the British House of Commons (Spirling & McLean 2007), and the European Parliament (Hix 2001; Hix, Noury & Roland 2006).

3.4.7 Voting in the Dutch Parliament

The Dutch parliament votes on a range of different propositions. The major categories are bills, amendments to bills and motions. Parliament can vote on other matters, such as proposals of the speaker or of MPs, the appointment of people to specific posts, citizens' initiatives, articles of bills and recommendations of parliamentary research committees. More than half of the 45,316 votes between 1963 and 2010 are motions. About a third concern amendments and a tenth are bills. The other propositions are only a small share of votes. More precise figures are listed in table 3.5. The problem observed in section 3.4.1 that only a limited number of votes is available for the period before 1977, is (partially) solved by including votes on motions, amendments and laws. The problem of too few votes is not definitively solved in this way, but the extent of these problems is decreased: there are not enough votes before 1963 to analyse the results per issue category.

A motion is the expression of a judgment or wish of parliament, mainly concerning government policy (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 342; Visscher 1994, 98). The political significance of motions differs (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling

2010, 350). In a motion, MPs can express their wishes without having to back these financially (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 350). Some motions are only proposed for political purposes. Small parties or opposition parties can use a motion to make their own views public or force other parties to take position (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 352). The cabinet does not need to implement motions (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 350-351; Visscher 1994, 98). The only motion that cannot be ignored is a motion of no confidence; if such a motion is accepted the minister or the cabinet, as a whole, must resign (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 347). Motions are used to change existing policy. If the *Tweede Kamer* agrees with the cabinet, no need exists to express this with a motion (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 347). A motion need not come to a vote, if a minister takes over the intention of the motion and promises to implement the proposed policies (Visscher 1994, 100). Motions play an important role in the policy making process: motions often ask the cabinet to propose legislation and when proposing a bill, ministers often refer to adopted motions (Visscher 1994, 118-120). MPs make frequent use of motions, because they are not labour-intensive (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 343; compare Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 176). As discussed above MPs need the support of at least four other MPs to propose motions (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 343). Between 1967 and 1985, the number of motions that were proposed increased markedly. This coincided with a revision of parliamentary procedure and increasing responsibilities of government (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 352-353). In light of its increasing use, Bovend'Eert and Kummeling (2010, 353) speak of the devaluation of the motion as a parliamentary instrument. In 1985, the parliament made it more difficult to propose motions. MPs need to use their own speaking time to read motions into the parliamentary proceedings and motions could only be proposed during the second term of parliamentary discussions.

In addition to motions, MPs can vote on bills (Visscher 1994, 80). Unless the constitution requires a larger majority, a simple majority suffices (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 203).⁴³ Both parliament and the cabinet can take the initiative for legislation. Private member bills are rare and cabinet takes almost all the initiatives (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 214). Legal restrictions also exist: MPs cannot propose general spending bills (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 212). Finally, there

⁴³ As is the case for bills that amend the constitution.

are practical restrictions: MPs lack the specialist knowledge needed to write bills, although since 1985 they can get support from the civil service (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 216; Visscher 1994, 83). MPs of the governing coalition can often expect or persuade their own cabinet to propose legislation that they prefer (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 216). When MPs take an initiative, they do so to seek publicity, to break through the division between coalition and opposition or to overcome the passivity of the government (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 216). Sometimes MPs take initiatives for political purposes only, that is: parties use it to express political differences (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 215-216). Parties tend to vote dominantly in favour of bills proposed by the government (Visscher 1994, 391).

Only members of the *Tweede Kamer* have the right of amendment (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 218-219). As with motions, an amendment needs the support of at least four MPs (Visscher 1994, 85). Not all amendments need to come to a vote. Amendments that seek to pervert the goal of a bill are not allowed (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 219). Opposition parties tend to propose more amendments, as they disagree more with the proposed bills (Visscher 1994, 256-257). Moreover, within the coalition, MPs tend to propose amendments on bills proposed by ministers who are not a member of their own party (Visscher 1994, 259).

Until the 1970s, it was common practice for bills to be accepted without a vote and for MPs to ask the speaker to note that they opposed the bill or specific articles of the bill (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 525). Since 1983, it is common practice for MPs to vote by show of hands. Roll calls are rare and decreasing in use. MPs cannot officially abstain, but they can be absent from a vote (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 526). If parliament votes by show of hands, the speaker counts the votes per party unless an MP does not vote in line with his party. Parliamentary parties are expected to be on full strength during a vote (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 526). This means that party unity is high (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011). Effectively, the *Tweede Kamer* has only between nine and ten legislators of which ideal points can be estimated.

Three things are important to note: first, voting on bills tends to be unanimous, but when voting on amendments and motions, considerable differences between parties occur. Second, almost all voting is registered per parliamentary party. This will be the unit of analysis. Third, votes do not concern a random selection of all

proposals. Specific rules restrict specific kinds of proposals to come to a vote. Especially small radical parties will have problems in putting their proposals to a vote; they can still however show their position by voting against proposals of other parties.

3.4.8 Collection and categorisation of parliamentary votes

This study looks at votes on amendments, motions and bills. The votes are collected in different ways. The core of the dataset is formed by votes on motions between 1977 and 2008. These are drawn from PoliDocs, a digitalised database of parliamentary activity (Marx & Schuth 2010). This database includes a refined system of categories, voting results, bibliographic information and co-sponsors with party affiliation. All other votes (motions before 1977 and after 2008, and votes on amendments, articles and bills) are drawn from the Louwerse and Otjes (2011) database. Using a regular expression program, the records of the *Tweede Kamer* were parsed to obtain every instance of a vote and collect the voting results, the co-sponsors and bibliographic information of the votes. Additional information on these votes was obtained manually. Only those motions, amendments and bills for which full bibliographical information and a complete voting result were found are used.

The same categorisation scheme was used here as was used for the parliamentary speeches. The motions from the PoliDocs database are labelled with 2,940 separate keywords. These were assigned by the clerk's office of the *Tweede Kamer*. On the basis of these keywords, each motion has been categorised into 21 substantive categories. A motion was assigned to a category if it had the most keywords in that category (relatively to the total number of key words in that category). There were proposals that had no tags in any category. These were excluded.⁴⁴ For those bills, amendments and motions where no category was available (that is votes before 1977 and after 2010), a two-step procedure was used. First, they were put in the same category as most motions in the same parliamentary dossier. For those dossiers of which no motions with categories were available, the

⁴⁴ This includes all motions and amendments concerning only the budget of a ministry, because these motions, proposed during the parliamentary discussion of the budget, concern (often, but not always) budgetary matters and all the (often multiple) issue area's of the ministry. Because only one ambiguous key word is present, no basis exists for the decision. 305 motions were placed into this category for this reason for the entire period.

motions, amendments and bills were assigned manually on the basis of the subject of their dossier.

3.4.9 Models of parliamentary voting

The voting behaviour of parties can be used to develop spatial representations of voting behaviour. This study employs Optimal Classification (OC). This is a method specifically developed by Poole (2005) to uncover the dimensional structure underlying votes in parliament. It treats each vote as cutting point dividing parties that vote “yea” from parties that vote “nay”. If one does this for a large number of votes, OC groups parties that vote similarly are on one side of a dimension, and parties that vote differently from them are on the other side. For a given number of dimensions, OC gives a spatial representation of voting behaviour. Cutting points become cutting lines or cutting (hyper)planes as dimensionality increases. In essence, OC is similar to Mokken scaling (Niemöller & Van Schuur 1983; Mokken & Lewis 1982).

In chapter 5, the goal will be to analyse single-dimensional models of parliamentary voting on specific issues; multidimensional models will only be used if the single-dimensional models fail to provide useful insights. In chapter 7 however, the goal will be to analyse models of parliamentary voting on all issues in order to assess whether new political parties cause systemic changes. Here, the specific goal is to assess whether the entry of a new political party leads to a change in the dimensionality of the party system. To achieve this, all parliamentary periods between 1963 and 2010 were analysed.⁴⁵

The question of when a particular constellation of parties has a particular number of dimensions depends upon one’s assumptions about dimensionality. For instance, Pellikaan et al. (2007, 296-297) maintain a two-dimensional political space because of the analytical value of the second dimension if one wants to study

⁴⁵ The shorter parliamentary periods (1971-1972, 1981-1982 and 2002-2003) are all included in other parliamentary periods, because too few votes occurred in these periods. They are included in those analyses that can help to understand as many new parties; therefore 1971-1972 is included in 1972-1977, 1981-1982 in 1982-1986 and 2002-2003 in 2003-2006. The only problem that this presented was that it was impossible to estimate the position of both the PVV and LN, because they are now in the same parliamentary period (2002-2006) without once voting on the same issue. This creates a temporal dimension in the voting behaviour, which distorts the analyses. Therefore, no positions of the PVV were measured before it won its first seats in 2006.

electoral competition or government formation. In contrast, most authors like Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and Kriesi and Frey (2008) use a more inductive approach. Their justification of the dimensionality of the political space is based on the goodness of fit of a solution with a particular number of dimensions. That is: the extent to which a solution with a certain number of dimensions fits the data. These researchers emphasise that they “find” solutions with a particular number of dimensions (Kriesi & Frey 2008, 281) or “reveal” particular structures (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009, 327). These authors see the dimensionality of the space as an empirical outcome, and not as a matter of analytical utility. One can, however, not completely rely on statistics to answer this substantive question (Poole 2005, 141).

For a given number of dimensions, Optimal Classification gives a spatial representation of the voting behaviour. The goodness of fit of these models is measured in terms of the Aggregate Proportional Reduction in Error (APRE) (Poole 2005, 129). This is the percentage of correctly classified choices corrected for the fact that votes can be lopsided. The APRE expresses the extent to which the estimate performs better than a random assignment of the parties based on the distribution of the votes. If division in the legislature was 10 versus 90%, one would get a 90% correct rate if one assigned all MPs to the majority side: a random spatial map of legislators would also correctly classify 90% of the choices. Therefore, a non-random placement can only improve the estimate by 10% (Poole 2005, 129). The APRE looks at the improvements given this baseline of random assignment. The APRE has a maximum of 1 and a minimum of 0. If a one-dimensional solution has an APRE of over 0.5, the data can be interpreted in terms of one dimension.

By comparing the levels of fit for different years, one can see whether the *extent to which* the differences between political parties can be represented in a one- or a two-dimensional space, has changed. In this way, the question about the true dimensionality of the space can be shelved. Instead, one can assess whether the political space became more or less easy to model in terms of one dimension after the entry of a new party into the political system. Or, in other words, whether the political space became more or less one-dimensional due to the entry of the new party. For reasons of parsimony, two-dimensional models are presented in chapter 7. To enhance interpretation of the models, the voting behaviour on specific issues is plotted into the models based on all votes. This has been done by means of property fitting (Van der Brug 1997, 60-62). In order to see whether one can attribute the

formation of a new dimension to a new party, the party positions on the issues that the new party owns are included in the representation. If a change in the dimensions can be attributed to the party positions on the new party's issue, they must relate significantly to the model.

Specific problems exist when applying these methods to specific parliaments: institutional features may have an impact on how MPs vote. This is true for United States Congress (Clinton 2007) and the French *Assemblée Nationale* (Rosenthal & Voeten 2004) but also for the *Tweede Kamer*: parliamentary voting in the *Tweede Kamer* is influenced by party unity and the division between opposition and coalition in addition to policy differences. This makes the *Tweede Kamer* more similar to the American Supreme Court (with nine legislators, the justices) than the American House of Representatives (with 435 legislators). This limits the methods one can use in the analyses of parliamentary votes: the most recent insight is that if the number of legislators is small, the results may only be consistent if the measurement of the ideal points is restricted to the ordinal level (Tahk 2010). Optimal Classification is selected because it gives ordinal level estimates of party positions with a minimum of assumptions.

The results of a one-dimensional OC analysis must be interpreted as an ordinal scale.⁴⁶ In order to grasp the strength of the differences, one can look at the number of votes dividing the parties at each cut point. In a two-dimensional analysis one can interpret the party-positions as quasi-interval variables (Peress 2011). In the analysis, each vote is translated into a cutting line, dividing the "yea"-votes from the "nay"-votes. If there are enough votes, the party positions in a two-dimensional space will be brought down to a small area. For measurement purposes the party is then assigned the position in the middle of that area. The extent to which this estimate is correct depends on the number of votes; if there is only a limited number of votes the areas get larger and the assignment of point estimate becomes a less acceptable proxy. Therefore, two-dimensional models can only be used if they are based on a sufficient number of votes: almost all issues have too few votes to confidently estimate party positions in a two-dimensional model. Here one-dimensional solutions

⁴⁶ The scales are ordinal with one change: if two or more parties have the same position, they are assigned the average position between the two parties on each of their sides. If two parties are placed together between the first and the fourth party, they are assigned position 2.5.

Table 3.6: patterns of coalition and opposition support

Group	Coalition proposals	Opposition proposals
Coalition party support	85%	24%
Opposition party support	71%	58%
N	26882	18434

Average percentage of "yea" votes by coalition and opposition parliamentary parties for motions of which the first sponsor was either a member of a coalition party or a member of the opposition party. Data from period 1963-2010.

will be used, unless they are clearly problematic. The two-dimensional solutions should be interpreted with great caution.⁴⁷ As will be seen in chapter 7, estimates become much more reliable if thousands of votes are available.

An analysis needs at least 10 votes to be processed. If the issue linked to a party has less than 10 votes in either the period before or after it entered parliament, the analyses cannot be performed and one must look at a secondary issue. If no other issue has enough votes, one cannot analyse the effect of the party using this method. Because of the low number of parliamentary votes before 1960, only parties that entered parliament after 1963 can be studied. The positional impact of four parties that entered parliament between 1946 and 1963 cannot be studied.⁴⁸

Another problem was identified by Laver (2006, 137). In parliamentary systems like the Netherlands, the division between opposition and coalition parties may dominate policy-based patterns of voting. Hix and Noury (2007) have observed this phenomenon for several parliamentary systems. In the Dutch parliament the voting behaviour of political parties in government and opposition differs in a particular way. In table 3.6, one can see how coalition and opposition parties vote on motions that were introduced by coalition and opposition parties. A party favours a proposal in around three-quarters of votes, independent of who proposed it and

⁴⁷ The recent insights of Tahk (2010) also imply that one needs a large number of votes to obtain consistent results. This study looks at the policy dimensions for specific issues (such as education, agriculture), which causes the number of votes to be limited. This means that the OC solutions may not always be consistent. For one-dimensional solutions, the model with the highest level of APRE is selected. If there are solutions with equal levels of APRE, this is often caused by a few parties that differ marginally in terms of votes; these parties will be assigned a common position. For multidimensional solutions, the results are even less consistent. One should therefore only use multidimensional solutions if it is absolutely necessary. Because these results are inconsistent, the mean position of 1000 analyses is calculated, approximating a bootstrapping procedure.

⁴⁸ These are the GPV, the BP, the KNP and the PSP.

whether that party was part of the coalition or the opposition. One exception exists: coalition parties favour proposals that are proposed by the opposition in only a quarter of the votes. This may be explained by the different considerations that coalition and opposition MPs have when proposing and voting on motions. MPs from coalition parties have two different considerations: on the one hand they wish to see their policies realised; and on the other hand they want the coalition government to continue. Whether the coalition breaks down depends on the coalition partners. A coalition partner will certainly not accept another coalition partner sponsoring motions or favouring a motion that goes against the coalition agreement (Holzhacker 2002, 472). On issues not included in the coalition agreement, parties have more liberty to pursue their own policy goals (Holzhacker 2002, 472). MPs from opposition parties do not need to consider the coalition agreement or the positions of the coalition parties: they can sponsor and favour any proposal they see fit. One may hypothesise that opposition parties will vote against every proposal of the coalition. This is however simply not the case in the Netherlands: if one looks at the voting behaviour of opposition parties on coalition proposals one can see support in over 70% of the votes. In countries like France there is evidence for a coalition-opposition division induced by opposition voting (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004), but this is not the case for the Netherlands. Therefore, in order to obtain estimates of party's positions in parliament without interference from the coalition-opposition division, this study looks at voting on coalition proposals only.

3.4.10 Analysis of positions in parliament

The goal of this study is to analyse the effects of new parties on policy positions. Two methods will be used to analyse this: first, the effect of each new political party will be studied individually and comparatively and second, the effect of all new political parties will be studied in a statistical analysis.

The individual case studies examine the effects of each new political party on the pattern of voting on its own issue.⁴⁹ Three possible outcomes exist: first, parties

⁴⁹ One may wonder to what extent it is useful to analyse the effect of a challenger party on positions on its own issue. A mobiliser introduces a new own issue, while a challenger party takes position on traditional issues thereby challenging established parties on their own turf. The issues that are assigned to challengers tend to be traditional left-right or religious/secular issues. These are issues that established

may not react; second, in response to the entry of a new party, individual parties may shift positions on the issue of the new party, and third, the nature of the line of conflict on that issue may change due to the entry of the new party. The first case (no change) is easy to identify. One needs a criterion to differentiate between the situation where the positions of individual parties change and the nature of the line of conflict changes. Ordinal correlation between the party positions before and after the entry of a new party is employed here. The basic assumption is that, if an ordinal correlation is significant, it is the changes of individual parties on a stable line of conflict. If the correlation is insignificant, two dimensions cannot be compared: the differences are not the result of individual shifts, but of a redefinition of the line of conflict. The ordinal correlation between individual party positions before and after the entry of a new party must be significant. Correlations can work for one-dimensional analyses, but for multidimensional analyses a more complex method is necessary to compare the solutions. Procrustean analysis, which rotates solutions to compare the two-dimensional solutions over time, is employed (Gower & Dijksterhuis 2004). One can evaluate the goodness of fit by looking at the root of the squared errors and by looking at the correlation between the two horizontal and two vertical dimensions.

In the one-dimensional spaces, one can look at shifts of parties over time. These shifts are operationalised as changes in the (ordinal) distance between the new and the established party. To this end, the distance between the new party and the established party is compared before and after the entry of the new party. In order to compare changes in party positions over time one must make a number of assumptions. The OC analyses of parliamentary votes provide party positions relative to each other. That is they order parties from one extreme to another. Two different analyses based on two different data sets will lead to two ordinal orderings, but these are not necessarily on the same scale. One ordering may tap into the economic left-right dimension while another taps into a foreign policy dimensions (pro-European-Euroskeptic, for instance). Moreover even if two orderings tap into the same dimension the positions are not necessarily the same: the second to left position in the 1994-1998 Tweede Kamer is not necessarily identical to the second to left position in the 1998-2002 Dutch parliament. It may be the case that one party retained the same position on some absolute scale and all other parties changed position in the same

parties also consider their own. Therefore here one can see how established parties react when challenged on their own turf.

direction. Therefore it may be the case that an ordering goes from PSP-PPR-PvdA-D66 to PPR-PvdA-D66-PSP. It may be seen, that the PSP moved but 'actually' all the other parties moved. Even if we compare changes over time, it is not necessarily clear if lets the CDA and the SGP switch places in the rank ordering if this is because the CDA changed position and the SGP stayed in the same place or vice versa. Finally, because new parties have no position in the previous parliament one cannot know whether parties moved towards or away from the new party.

Therefore one needs to make four assumptions: first, as said above, if there is a significant correlation between the ordering before and after the entry of a new party, the assumption is that the orderings tap into the same substantive dimension. Second, we assume that largest changes are substantively meaningful changes. In a rank ordering a change of one party will always cause other parties to change: if one party moves one position to the left, another must move one position to the right. Therefore, one can never see the movement of a single party. It becomes difficult to assess which changes are the result of the entry of a new party and which changes are the result of parties making room for other parties that have changed their position.⁵⁰ We work under the assumption that larger changes are the substantively meaningful changes, which require explanation. As the new party had no position before it entered, one needs to assign it a hypothetical position. This is based on its position in the rank ordering after it entered. Because the one-dimensional solutions are ordinal, the only changes that can be observed are changes in the rank ordering of parties over time. This means that one cannot assess systematic changes over time in this way: one cannot see whether party systems become more polarised or move in a particular direction as a whole.

In addition to these analyses of party positions, one also needs to look at systemic changes: as discussed above, the extent to which the change on the new party's issue is systemic will be assessed by means of correlation analyses. In order to measure the reinforcement of conflict, the level of politicisation on the new party's issue is used. One can compare the change in the level of unanimous votes over time.

⁵⁰ The policy dimensions before and after the entry of a new party will be analysed with all parties that were in parliament at the time (including parties that have entered and disappeared). This is the best way to get an insight into the full patterns of competition before and after the entry of a new party, but only those parties are included in the analysis and the graphical representations, which are present in both periods in parliament. The full data is presented in appendix 3.

Table 3.7: calculating change in position scores on governance (example)

Established Party	Position 1963-1967	Position 1967-1971	Change	Absolute Change
BP	1.5	1	-0.5	0.5
SGP	2.5	2	+0.5	0.5
GPV	3	3	0	0
ARP	4	4	0	0
KVP	5	7	+2	2
CHU	6	5	-1	1
VVD	7	6	-1	1
PvdA	8	10	+2	2
CPN	9	8	-1	1
PSP	10	9	-1	1

The less unanimous parliament is over time, the higher the level of politicisation. The level of unanimity in the voting of established parties is used, excluding new parties

The statistical analyses look at the changes in the individual party positions. One should note that, in contrast to the analysis of attention, only those cases are analysed together here that were also discussed in the individual case-by-case analysis. No additional models of parliamentary voting were introduced to compare for attributability. In the analysis of attention the other attention measures are produced as a by-product of the data necessary for the case studies. No additional models were made, because constructing spatial models is complex. Those cases where there was a systemic change (a change in the pattern of voting) have to be excluded: here one cannot measure individual parties changing position over time.

As before, the developments will be analysed in a two-parliamentary term-period. Absolute values will be employed rather than both positive and negative values. All the analyses are based on ordinal positions in one dimension, and therefore for every positive shift there will be an equal negative shift. They would cancel each other out if they were added together: no change would ever be visible. By taking the absolute values this problem is avoided. This does mean that one cannot say anything about the direction of the change in the political positions.

An example may help to illustrate how the change in position is calculated. In table 3.7, one can see the party positions of established parties on governance in the parliamentary periods in the parliamentary periods 1963-1967 and 1967-1971. This is the issue owned by D66, which entered parliament in 1967. The change in position is the absolute difference between the positions in 1963-1967 and 1967-1971. In 1963-1967 KVP took the fifth position from the conservative side between the ARP and the

CHU. In 1967-1971, the party shifted to the seventh position. Two movements to the progressive side: a change of two positions.

3.5 Data collection and data analysis in the electoral arena

Chapter 6 will examine the effects of new political parties on the position that established parties take on issues and the attention that established parties devote to issues in the electoral arena. For both these variables, this study will look at election manifestos of parties, which are still the most authoritative statement of parties' electoral promises (Bara 2006), following Meguid (2005; 2007) and Huibregts (2006). The relationship between election manifestos and electoral campaigns is not simple. What a party says during an election campaign is not necessarily the same as what it says in its election manifesto. The best evidence that is available about election campaigns in the Netherlands (Brants and Van Praag 2007) shows that parties following a party-selling approach. Parties are oriented at selling their own program to the electorate. Public opinion matters in selecting which part of their message will be put on the display (Lees-Marshment, 2001). Parties choose to campaign on those positions from their own program on which they agreed with public and which the public feels strongly about. Public opinion serves as an arbiter, deciding which issues from the party program to focus on during the campaign (Wring, 1996). Therefore election manifestos seem the best sources to assess the positions of political parties. They provide the the most comprehensive collection of party positions on a wide-range of policy issues - far more comprehensive than other expressions used in the election campaigns, such as folders, posters or pamphlets. One can have more doubts about using election manifestos to assess the saliency of issues in the electoral campaign: focus on specific issues is an important part of election campaign. Election manifestos often attempt to be comprehensive and cover all issues. Still there are three good reasons to use election manifestos: first, the division of attention in an election manifesto is a sign of what a party focuses on. An environmentalist party will spend considerably more attention to the environment than other parties. Second, they are the only resource that is available for the entire period (television spots were used much later) and that provides enough data for quantitative analysis. It is not necessarily quantifiable which issues a particular poster addresses. Media data should not be used because it does not reflect what a party focuses on, but what it is forced to react to. Therefore election manifestos are the best

available data to assess the attention devoted to issues by parties in the electoral arena.

As explained above, different notions of attributability will be used in different phases of the study. The focus in the study of position is on those changes in those positions of which one can be most certain that they were unique to the new party. The idea is that, if new political parties had any effect, one must be able to observe it here. For electoral attention, the study again compares patterns of change in a three approaches: a context-sensitive case-by-case approach, a statistical analysis of those patterns and an expanded statistical analysis. The last analysis includes all changes in attention, not just those cases where a new party is present.

Special attention will be devoted to the possibility of anticipatory and reactive behaviour. It may be possible that new parties respond to an established party in the election in which it enters parliament and in the first election after it has entered parliament. Therefore this chapter will look at changes in position and attention in both two- and three-election periods. One should note, however, that for both the study of positions and attention, anticipatory behaviour is difficult to attribute to the new party. For the study of positions the notion of uniqueness has to be interpreted in a less strict way so that the chance of false positives is enlarged. For the study of attention, it is difficult to say whether the increased attention to the issue of the new party was a result of its anticipated entry or whether it led to its entry. It may be the case that, by increasing attention to the issue of the new party, established parties created issue space for the new party to exploit. Because cause and effect are observed simultaneously, they cannot be separated. The results of the study of anticipatory behaviour must therefore be interpreted with caution.

3.5.1 Issue saliency in the electoral arena

The standard method to measure party positions in the electoral arena is through the attention that they devote to issues in their election manifestos. The method of the manifesto research group, built on the saliency theory of competition, is often used in this field (Budge et al. 2001). This research distinguishes these effects in a more specific way. One has to distinguish the electoral positions that parties take from the issues that they devote attention to. One could still have employed the standard data set from the manifesto research group: the group has assigned every sentence in every election manifesto of every relevant party in every election since

the Second World War to one of 56 categories ranging from anti-imperialism to Marxist analysis. The categorisation scheme and the parties that are selected pose a problem. The parties selected by the manifesto research group are only the relevant parties in parliament. Parties that are too small and play no role in government formation are neglected. Moreover, the publicly available data set is limited to the period 1946-2003. This has two downsides: first it limits the number of new parties that can be studied. Out of the nineteen new parties in this study, only six are included.⁵¹ The limited number of cases also means that there are considerably fewer parties of which one can examine the reactions: on average 5.5 parties are in the data set, out of 8.9 established parties that are in parliament. Instead of the 169 new party/established party pairs under study here, only 33 of these pairs could be examined with the manifesto research group data. That is better than the two established parties that previous studies have focused on (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Huijbrechts 2006; Meguid 2005, 2007). It is, however, this study's goal to study all established parties.

Another drawback is the coding scheme, which was developed in the 1980s, and which clearly reflects the politics of that period. There are no good categories for new political issues such as immigration, which is the key issue of three new parties studied here. The coding scheme hinges on two ideas: the measurement of positions and the measurement of attention. Therefore, many categories are divided into two: military positive and military negative, for instance. Some issues are, however, only coded from one side: anti-imperialism, for instance. This makes it difficult to measure changes in attention (independent of direction) for every party. The KNP, a pro-colonisation party, can only be linked to increasing attention for anti-imperialism, because there is no pro-imperialism category. The categories seem ill adapted to study political attention independent of position. Therefore, another measure of attention in the electoral arena needs to be developed here.

3.5.2 From election manifestos to measures of attention change

In order to measure changes in attention, the same computer-assisted measure, developed by Louwerse (2011), as discussed above was used. The Louwerse method divides the manifesto text into paragraphs and assigns every paragraph to one of 21

⁵¹ The LPF, LN, SP, D66, DS'70 and PPR. There are some curiosities here: the estimate for the SP in 1994 is based on the 1998 election manifesto.

categories on the basis of a dictionary approach and support vector machine. All election manifestos of all parties in the Dutch parliament between 1946 and 2010 were collected. Most of these are collected and archived by the Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties. Several manifestos were not in its collection. These were collected from secondary sources.⁵²

Levels of attention at different points in time will be compared: for instance, if a party entered parliament in 1963 ($t=0$), the level of attention in the elections before the new party entered ($t=-1$, in this example 1959) will be used as the pre-measure. The pre-measure is a measure of attention before the new party can have had an effect. The post-measure can be dependent on the operationalisation, the election *after* the election in which the new party entered ($t=+1$, in this example 1967), or the election in which it did ($t=0$).

For the case-by-case analyses, the trend lines of the development between $t=-1$, and $t=+1$ are studied to see what, if any, effect the new party had on the attention that established parties devote to issues. In contrast to the study of parliamentary attention, it is a question of seeing change or not. There are no patterns of change that could not be attributed to the entry of the new party, due to the possibility of anticipatory behaviour. The changes in attention are then compared to possible other

⁵² For several specific election manifestos, some problems existed: The SGP did not publish a full election manifesto before 1971. In 1967, they published a 24-point program. Before 1967 they only published a manifesto of principles, which was amended infrequently to keep up with current events. Still, these manifestos reflected the best knowledge of the positions and issue-attention of the party. For the CPN, no election manifestos are in the database of the DNPP (*Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*/Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties) for the period 1959-1963, nor are there full election manifestos in the database of the IISG (*Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis*/International Institute for Social History). Therefore, different sources were employed: in this case several short leaflets that were in the IISG database. Three elections pose particular problems: the ones in 1972, 1982 and 2003. These were snap elections called within a year of the 1971, 1981 and 2002 elections. In 1972, no party published a new election manifesto. Therefore, the 1977 election manifestos are used as the post-measurement. In 1982, most parties published full manifestos, and so therefore these were used. In 2003, most parties published small election pamphlets, in addition to the 2002 election manifestos. Therefore, the 2002 and 2003 election manifestos are used where appropriate as post-measurement. Two new parties pose some problems: for the CP the small 'ten point program' (with 48 individual policy proposals) is used instead of the longer elaboration of the program. For the measurement of position for the LPF, the lists of policy positions at the end of each chapter in Pim Fortuyn's book (2002) were also included.

explanations: social, economic, or international developments may better explain the developments in attention. The final step is to assess which factors from those hypothesised above may be at play here.

Both statistical analyses look at both the possibility of reactive and anticipatory behaviour. Changes are analysed in a three- and a two-election period: in order to see the reactive behaviour in response to a new party that entered parliament in $t=0$, the elections before the entry of a new party into parliament ($t=-1$) will be compared to the election after a new party entered parliament ($t=+1$). In order to see anticipatory behaviour, one can compare the level of attention in $t=-1$ to the level of attention in $t=0$.

This part of the study uses two measures of change in attention: a relative measure of reactive change in electoral attention, and a relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention. These two measures are based on the same logic as the measures presented in the study of parliamentary attention: to measure the relative measure of reactive change in electoral attention, the difference between the levels of attention before and after the new party entered, is divided by the sum of attention in the manifestos before and after the new party entered; and to measure the relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention, the difference between the levels of attention from the election before and in which the new party entered, is divided by the sum of attention in the manifestos from the elections before and in which the new party entered.

As was done for the study of parliamentary attention, two different statistical analyses are run, one including only those changes in attention where a new party is present and one expanded statistical analysis in which *every* change in attention is included. In other words, the changes in attention of *every* established party's manifesto, in *every* election year and on *every* issue were included in order to determine whether a new party focusing on its own issue causes a significant change in attention: one can attribute the changes in attention for a specific issue to the rise of a new party if the changes in attention differ significantly from those changes on other issues.

An example can help to illustrate how the different measures are calculated. Table 3.8 presents the different levels of attention for the issue of immigration, the issue that the LPF owned, in the manifestos of 1998, 2002 and 2003. Looking at the


Table 3.8: attention on migration 1998-2002

Party	1998	2002	2003 ^a	Δ Attention (1998-2003)	Relative Reaction	Δ Attention (1998-2002)	Relative Anticipation
CDA	2,1	4,8	4,5	+2,4	+0,4	+2.7	+0.4
CU	4,4 ^b	3,1	2,2	-2,2	-0,3	-1.3	-0.2
D66	3,3	3,5	4,5	+1,2	+0,2	+0.2	+0.0
GL	3,7	6,9	7,8	+4,1	+0,4	+3.2	+0.3
PvdA	2,5	1,9	2,8	+0,3	+0,1	-0.6	-0.1
SGP	2,1	3,9	3,9	+1,8	+0,3	+1.8	+0.3
SP	6,3	4,5	5,5	-0,8	-0,1	-1.8	-0.2
VVD	2,5	4,2	4,5	+2.0	+0,3	+1.7	+0.3
Average	3,4	4,1	4,5	+1,1	+0,1	+0.7	+0.1

^a In 2003 many parties printed a short pamphlet and maintained their 2002 manifestos. In those cases the value for the 2002 is based on textual analysis of a combination of the 2002 and 2003 manifestos.

^b In 1998 the GPV and the RPF, which merged to form the CU in 2000, competed separately. The figure for 2002 is based on a textual analysis of a combination of the RPF and GPV manifestos.

Figure 3.4: average length of election manifestos



relative measure of reactive change in electoral attention, one finds that most parties increase attention to this issue between 1998 and 2003. On average, the attention increases from 3.4 to 4.5%. The increase of the GL and the CDA are different in absolute terms (+4.1% and +2.4% respectively), but, in terms of the relative change in attention, the increases are exactly the same (+0.4). This is in relative terms, quite a sizeable increase. The relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention is calculated in the same way: most parties increased their attention between 1998 and 2002 as well. One exception is the PvdA: it decreased attention by 0.6% (from 2.5 to 1.9). This is a decrease of 0.1 in terms of the relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention.

There are two factors that complicate the study of election manifestos: the first problem (which was discussed above) is the analysis of parliamentary attention: as seen in section 3.4.5, there is a saturation effect. Second, the length of election manifestos has increased markedly over the years: as one can see in figure 3.4, the average length of election manifestos did not exceed 5,086 words before 1971. After 1981, the average program was 24,030 words long: between 1967 and 1981 the length of the average manifesto has quintupled. A correlation analysis indicates that the relationship between the length of the manifesto and the publication year is significant (0.625 - significant at the 0.01-level). Koole (1992, 332-335) observed a major change in the way election manifestos were produced between 1946 and 1989. He mentions the increase in government responsibilities as one possible explanation for this pattern, and furthermore, the increase also coincided with a democratisation of the process of composing election manifestos (Koole 1992, 332-335). When interpreting results from small election manifestos, one should be cautious. One may observe larger shifts in attention for smaller manifestos, because in smaller manifestos a change of one paragraph has a much larger effect on the share of attention than in larger manifestos. Because manifesto size is related to election year, this pattern has an effect on the estimates for new parties entering parliament earlier, but not on new parties entering later. These shifts might be the result of a less fine-grained measurement. In order to deal with this problem, the length of the two manifestos that are used, weights the cases in subsequent analyses. In this case, the sum of the square roots of the two manifestos is used in order to approximate a standard pattern of error.

3.5.3 *Measuring positions in the electoral arena*

There is a host of methods to measure changes in position. One can look at expert surveys, hand coding and computer assisted analyses of political texts based on different notions of how positions can be understood (Budge et al. 2001; Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Laver & Garry 2000; Slapin 2008; Pellikaan 2004). These measures are all based on a shared notion of political position; they all focus on a notion of political positions in terms of a position in a political space. All party positions on a particular issue can be reduced to a single (or several) line(s) of conflict, and parties move along that dimension.

The goal of the measure that is developed here is to be as sure as possible that the observed change can be attributed to the entry of the new party. To achieve this, one has to look at individual party positions on specific policies and not party positions on issue dimensions. The question should not be “did the PvdA move to the right in response to the entry of the LPF?” but “did the PvdA take over specific policies?”. Many scholars of radical rightwing political parties have looked at these kinds of reactions (Downs 2001, 127; Schain 2002, 237-238; Heinisch 2003, 103-109), but it has not been applied yet to new parties in a more general study.

3.5.4 *From election manifestos to measures of position change*

The study of party positions in election manifestos focuses on changes in the party positions on those proposals that are unique to a new party. This study employs an adaptation of Pellikaan’s (2003; 2004; 2007; extended by Otjes 2008) confrontational method.⁵³ The method is based on hand coding of election manifestos. Two notions play a central role in measuring position change: uniqueness and agreement. The measures that will be presented here are based on programmatic agreement and disagreement between political parties. The central question is “do parties tend to take the same policy positions as the new party or do they oppose the policies of the new party?” For each of the unique policy proposals that a new party makes in their election manifesto, one can determine whether the established parties agree or disagree with it, and whether they changed their opinion

⁵³ Pellikaan measures party positions on a range of issue dimensions by looking at whether particular *pre-conceived* statements appear in the election programme of a particular party, or are directly contradicted. Pellikaan formulates these statements on the basis of an expert assessment of which issues were controversial in the party manifestos and the campaign.

on that proposal over time. One can aggregate these measures to see whether parties move to agree or to disagree with a new party in general.

The measures focus on proposals that are unique to the new political party. This is done in order to ensure that it is possible to attribute the changes in the positions of the established party to the new party. Only those policies are selected for coding that the new party was the sole advocate of before it entered parliament. These are the statements for which one can be most sure that changes in established parties' positions are attributable to the new party. In this way, type-I errors are minimised: a change in an election manifesto of an established party is only attributed to a new party if it is as certain as possible that the specific issue was not in any manifesto of an established party. Due to this cautious approach, however, there may be a large number of type-II errors: statements may be excluded because they may have been based on another manifesto, while actually they were copied from the new party's manifesto.

This measure is different from the measure used in the parliamentary arena, which focuses on the positions of established parties on the policy issue of the new party. The method that is used here allows one to focus on changes on those positions that are truly unique to the new party. Tracing the effect of a new party with such precision is not possible in the parliamentary arena.⁵⁴

The coding process consists of three steps: first, the unitisation of the new party's manifesto into separate proposals. The basic rule of thumb is that if a manifesto consists of bullet points every bullet point is a separate item. If two distinct points are made in the same bullet point, these two are divided into separate statements. If a manifesto does not consist of bullet points the different proposals made in one section are identified as separate items. Earlier research has shown that there can be considerable variance between coders in a unitisation process of election manifestos, indicating that in terms of replicability unitisation may be a key weakness of hand coded research (Mikhaylov, Laver & Benoit 2008), therefore the explicit rules mentioned above were followed.

Next, the manifestos of the old parties from before the first election before the entry of the new party into parliament ($t=-1$) and from the election in which the

⁵⁴ One could study how established parties vote on the proposals of the new party, but if the new party is in opposition, voting patterns on its proposals are structured by the difference between the opposition and the coalition.

new party entered parliament ($t=0$) are coded to identify whether the proposals of the new party are mentioned here; this was done in order to determine whether proposals were unique to the new party. For each of the established parties, three codes are possible per policy proposal of the new party: agreement (+1), neutral (0) or disagreement (-1).

And third, the manifestos of the old parties from the first election after the entry of a new party ($t=+1$) are coded on the unique proposals. This was done to see how established parties responded to the policies of the new party. Again, codes could be agreement (+1), neutral (0) or disagreement (-1). In the coding process, agreement means that a party expresses its support for the same policy or a similar policy. When the PVV proposed a temporary ban on building mosques for five years, any measure that was supposed to limit the building of mosques was scored as a positive statement. The SGP wrote that it would not support policies that promoted the building of mosques and opposed building large-scale mosques. This is counted as a positive code. A negative code is any opposition to a policy or proposing the opposite policy: a number of parties have proposed closing the European Parliament. If any party proposed extending this parliament's powers this was coded positively.

This is a rather 'liberal' interpretation of a party's manifesto, which has two effects: first, this method may overestimate the effect of new political parties. Some changes may be attributed to the new party while they, because of the liberal interpretation, have nothing to do with the new party. Second, a larger number of proposals may be eliminated as non-unique, while they are unique to the new party, because the items were scored in such a liberal fashion. This can have an effect in both directions: on the one hand, this may underestimate the effects of new parties (because they have less unique proposals to be scored on). On the other hand, if there is a change on a unique proposal, its effect will be larger, because the number of unique proposals is smaller.

The analysis will be conducted in three ways: the individual case studies examine the data in-depth, while statistical analyses are used to find general patterns both in terms of anticipation and reaction. The individual case-by-case analyses look at the development of the summed measures of agreement. The goal of these individual case-by-case analyses is to ensure that the observed developments in unique proposals can be attributed to the entry of the new party. Therefore, for each

individual new party, these analyses focus on whether there are consistent patterns in the reactions of the established parties. To achieve this, the measures of agreement will be examined and their development will be traced over time. These measures of agreement are calculated in the following way: the first step is the elimination of non-unique proposals. All proposals made by the new party, which had a positive code at $t=-1$ or $t=0$ in at least one manifesto of an established party are eliminated; the second step is to calculate the measure of agreement per established party for $t=-1$ and $t=+1$. This is the sum of the positive and negative codes divided by the number of unique proposals. In other words, this is the extent to which this established party agreed or disagreed with the unique proposals of the new party. In this measure positive and negative codes cancel each other out: if a party agreed with twenty and disagreed with twenty unique proposals of a new party the value of the measure of agreement is zero, which would have been the same if it agreed and disagreed with no unique proposal.⁵⁵ Since these proposals are unique to the new party, change in this agreement can be attributed to the entry of the new party.

Two measures are used in the statistical analysis: a measure of anticipatory change in electoral position and a measure of reactive change in electoral position. The measure of reactive change in electoral position compares the measures of agreement (calculated above) over time: the measure of reactive change in electoral position-score is the difference between the measures of agreement at $t=-1$ and $t=+1$.

The measure of anticipatory change in electoral position is calculated in a similar way, but with a more 'liberal' notion of uniqueness: the first step is the elimination of non-unique proposals. Only those proposals, which had a positive code at $t=-1$, as opposed to either $t=-1$ or $t=0$, are eliminated; next the average position per established party at $t=0$ is calculated. This is the sum of the positive and negative codes divided by the number of unique proposals. In other words, this is the extent to which this party agreed or disagreed with the unique proposals of the new party. Since these proposals are unique to the new party, this agreement is

⁵⁵ This cancelling out is a feature of the confrontational method (Pellikaan et al. 2003; 2004; 2007), but that is no excuse. Alternative measures which treated negative and positive codes equally did not yield significantly more meaningful results than the measure employed here.

Table 3.9: a fictional example LPF and VVD 1998-2003

#	LPF	VVD		
		1998	2002	2003 ^a
1	Limit migration because of family reunification.	+1	+1	+1
2	Abolish the European Parliament.	-1	-1	-1
3	Re-introduce the municipal police.	-1	0	0
4	Keep police to performance targets.	0	0	+1
5	Scan all containers that enter the Netherlands for drugs.	0	0	0

^a 2003 is the $t=+1$ –year, because the VVD only published a short pamphlet in this year. Therefore, the codes of 2002 and 2003 are taken together for the $t=+1$. Because of the definition of uniqueness, however, every proposal that has a positive code for 2002 is eliminated.

attributed to the entry of the new party. The measure of anticipatory change in electoral position-score is the difference between the average positions at $t=-1$ and $t=0$.

In this case, too, an example may help to illustrate how the coding process works. Table 3.9 lists five policy proposals made by the LPF in its 2002 election manifesto and published in Fortuyn's book *Puinlopen van Acht Jaar Paars* (Fortuyn 2002). These five policy proposals are only a fraction of the 139 proposals made by the LPF in both the manifesto and the book, so this is a reduced example. Table 3.9 also shows the positions of the VVD on the selected policy proposals in its 1998 election manifesto, in its 2002 manifesto and in its 2003 election pamphlet. The particular policy proposals were selected to show the diversity of possible codes and coding configurations. Three kinds of codes are possible: a positive code (+1) indicates that the VVD made a similar proposal as the LPF did in 2002. For instance, the LPF proposed to try and limit immigration from family formation; the VVD did the same in 1998, 2002 and 2003. However, a negative code (-1) might be assigned as well: this would indicate that the VVD made a proposal that ran counter to the LPF's proposal, or that they said that no changes should be made in particular policy fields. The VVD, for example, sought to expand the powers of the European Parliament in both the 1998, 2002 and 2003 manifestos in opposition to the LPF's proposal to abolish it. A neutral code (0) indicates that the VVD said nothing on the subject, or was vague or ambiguous. In 2002 and 2003 for instance, the VVD made no mention of moving the responsibility for the police to the municipal level. In the individual case-by-case analysis, the focus is on the measures of agreement. The first step is to eliminate all proposals that have a positive code for 1998 and

2002. These are not unique to the LPF: the VVD made these proposals itself. In this case that would be only proposal #1. In reality, 80% of the LPF manifesto was eliminated because one or more of the other parties made a similar proposal in 1998 or 2002. The remaining proposals are used to calculate the measures of reactive and anticipatory change. In 1998, the VVD disagreed with the LPF on two issues (-0.5). In 2002, it changed its position on one issue (-0.25), and in 2003 the VVD agreed on one position and disagreed on one: an average position of zero. To calculate the measure of reactive change in electoral position, these scores are then subtracted from each other: this means that the VVD has a value of +0.5. The measure of anticipatory change in electoral position-score uses a similar procedure: one out of five positions is eliminated because it is not unique (#1) and then the difference is calculated between the average position in 1998 (-0.5) and 2002 (-0.25). This is an increase of +0.25.

Finally, one specific problem needs to be examined: the relationship between the number of unique proposals and the extent to which established parties react. In table 3.10, one can see data on the length of election manifestos (in terms of numbers of proposals) and the extent to which new parties' proposals are unique. One can see that election manifestos of new parties are relatively short: on average they contain only 113 proposals. On average, less than 29% of a new party's programme policy proposals were unique (if one includes both $t=-1$ and $t=0$). No party exceeds a level of uniqueness of 54% of the manifesto.⁵⁶ Several outliers exist on the other side of the scale: parties with a limited number of unique proposals. A weak, insignificant relationship exists between the number of unique proposals and the extent to which established parties respond to a new party (Pearson's r of -0.10 - not significant).⁵⁷ Parties that propose a small number of unique proposals can elicit all kinds of reactions: from imitation to differentiation. The more unique proposals a party proposes, the less extreme the reactions become: long programmes elicit less

⁵⁶ This is the uniqueness of the BP.

⁵⁷ Only if one treats imitation and differentiation in the same way (i.e. count any reaction to a new party's policies whether positive or negative equally), can one see a significant relationship (Pearson's r of -0.14 - significant at the 0.1-level). The relationship between the SMOG and this measure which treats imitation and differentiation in the same way is stronger and more significant (Pearson's r of -0.17 - significant at the 0.05-level).

Table 3.10: proposals per new party

New Party	Total	Unique			
		t=-1		t=0 and t=-1	
KNP	37	16	43%	14	38%
PSP	23	14	61%	9	39%
GPV	62	34	54%	31	50%
BP	22	14	64%	12	54%
D66	92	64	70%	31	34%
PPR	78	36	46%	12	15%
DS70	90	44	49%	22	24%
NMP	23	5	22%	2	9%
RKPN	73	-	-	18	25%
RPF	295	143	49%	98	33%
EVP	366	92	25%	84	23%
CP	48	13	27%	12	25%
AOV	141	54	38%	31	22%
SP	117	44	38%	31	27%
U55+	117	31	27%	14	12%
LN	101	19	19%	11	11%
LPF	139	61	43%	33	24%
PvdD	227	127	56%	107	47%
PVV	107	43	40%	29	27%

Total is the total number of proposals; unique gives the number of policy proposals that were unique, when comparing the new party's manifesto to the established parties' manifestos of the election before entry of the new party (t=-1) and the election the new party entered (t=0).

imitation and differentiation. Both a mathematical and a substantive explanation exist for this phenomenon: mathematically, parties with a longer programme have a larger divisor, and therefore the values of the measures of change become lower. Substantively, parties with more unique proposals have a more detailed programme, and the more detailed a party's proposals are, the smaller the chance that another party copies them in their own manifesto. This means that the level of detail of a program may matter. As a proxy for the level of detail the complexity of the language is used (the more complex the language, the more detailed the program): this is measured by the SMOG (McLaughlin 1969).⁵⁸ There is a weak negative relationship between the level of complexity and reactions (-0.06 - not significant). Given the weakness of these relationships, there is no reason to believe that this phenomenon biases the results directly. Still, to err on the side of caution, it may be

⁵⁸ The Simple Measure of Gobbledygook:

$$\text{grade} = 1.0430 \sqrt{30 \times \frac{\text{number of polysyllables}}{\text{number of sentences}}} + 3.1291$$

prudent to see whether relationships found are not the result of parties that have only a limited number of unique proposals. This number of proposals gives a very limited empirical basis for conclusions. For these parties, one may find comparatively high or low scores, which are due to the length of the programme instead of the number of reactions. This problem is addressed by running the analyses with and without these outliers to test the robustness of the relation.⁵⁹

3.6 Measuring independent variables

There are two clusters of independent variables that need to be distinguished: independent variables that serve to examine the formulated hypothesis, and independent variables that serve to examine alternative explanations of development in attention. The latter will be used in case-by-case analyses.

The new party activity hypothesis explains patterns in attention of established parties by the patterns in attention of new parties. For the parliamentary arena, one can look at the percentage of the new party's speech that concerned their own issue, and for the electoral arena, one can look at the percentage of the party's own election manifesto that concerned the party's own issue.

In order to examine the challenger hypothesis and the mobiliser hypothesis, all new parties will be divided into mobilisers and challengers. This will be the subject of chapter 4, where each new party will be classified on the basis of the new parties' histories, with a particular interest in key characteristics of challenger parties, such as orientation towards a particular party in electoral campaigns, similar electoral appeal, and similar political ideology. Moreover, the challenged parties were identified for each challenger in chapter 4 as well.

The ideological proximity hypothesis explains patterns in reactions by reference to the distance between two parties. Different measures will be used in the parliamentary arena and in the electoral arena. In the parliamentary arena, the distance between the new and the established party on the line of conflict on the issue of the new party will be employed.⁶⁰ In the electoral arena, the similarities

⁵⁹ These outliers are the NMP and PSP.

⁶⁰ For some parties, no comparison could be made between the 'before' and the 'after' spatial models. Here, a higher level (systemic) model was used: this is the case for the GPV, BP, KNP, PSP, AOV/U55+, LN and CP. For the RKPN, there was too little information to place DS'70 and the PPR: these are also inferred from systemic

between the entire programme of the new party and the established party, before the entry of the new party, is used: the sum of all positive and negative codes at $t=-1$.

The new party size hypothesis is examined by using the percentage of votes that the new party has obtained in the election in which it entered parliament. This means that for each period party size is treated equally: one may argue that in the 1960s the entry of a party with seven seats was much more significant than in the 1990s: the shift of a few seats was seen as important. However one may also propose that as electoral markets become more volatile parties need to become more responsive. The relative stability of the 1940s required less responsiveness than the instability of the 1990s. Therefore this variable is operationalised in terms of the percentage of votes and not made relative to electoral performance. It is also important to note that both in the anticipatory and the reactive models in the electoral arena, the percentage of the vote of the new party that the new party won in the first election in which it won seats in parliament is used. This is counter-intuitive for the anticipatory analysis, because the temporal order of causality is violated: the election results came *after* the anticipatory behaviour. The assumption here is that the best estimate of anticipated size of the new party is its actual size.⁶¹ Still, when interpreting these results for anticipatory behaviour, caution is warranted.

The new party organisation hypothesis looks at the internal organisation of the new party. Party organisation cannot be measured directly, and therefore a proxy is used. Different proxies are used for the two different arenas. In the parliamentary arena, the level of organisation of the new party is specified by the extent to which a new party has organised their own MPs: the percentage of the new party's MPs that is still a member of the party after four years. This is the stability of the parliamentary party. In the electoral arena, this is measured in terms of the extent to

models. Because there are no votes from before 1952, the data for the KNP is based on a model of the period 1952-1956.

⁶¹ There is a significant correlation between expected, polled party size two months before the election and a new party's share of the votes in the election. One should note, however, that this could only be examined for the four parties for which polling data is available (PVV, PvdD, LPF and LN). This does not mean, however, that these polls correctly predict the size of the new parties. These polls are on average 3% off, but they do predict correctly which parties are larger and which are smaller. The relationship is mainly caused by the fact that the LPF scores considerably better than the other three.

Table 3.11: sociological and economic alternative explanations

New Party	Measure	Notes
BP	Importance of agriculture	Agriculture as percentage of GDP
NMP	Inflation	Inflation of consumer prices
CP	Migration	Non-Dutch migration
SP	Unemployment	Registered unemployment May/June
LPF/PVV	Migration	Non-Western migration
PvdD	Importance of agriculture	Agriculture, forestry and fishery as percentage of GDP
PvdD	Extent of Q-Fever	Number of sheep in agriculture

which new parties have organised their own voters: the member/electorate ratio. This ratio is often used to express in how far parties are able to organise their electorate (Scarrow 2000).⁶² Again, the same measure is used for anticipatory and reactive behaviour and the same interpretative caution is warranted as above. The new party government hypothesis is tested by a simple dichotomous variable: in government or in opposition during the first parliamentary term after the new party entered parliament. This cannot be anticipated before a new party enters parliament, so this variable is not tested for the model examining anticipation.

The established party performance hypothesis requires special attention: established party performance is examined by looking at the percentage of votes an established party lost in the election in which a new party entered, as compared to the votes it had in the previous election: if a party, which has 4 percent of the votes loses 2 percentage points of the votes, it will react in the same way as a party that loses 20 percentage points of its 40 percent of the votes, because both parties lose half of their votes. This reflects the fact that the relative electoral position of an established party determines its reaction. In the statistical analyses, these relationships are examined as an interaction relationship, in the way specified by (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006). The question is: does the presence of a new party significantly influence the general effects of electoral performance? These general effects are recalculated for the analysis of anticipatory behaviour, so that when one looks at the established parties' electoral performance, one looks at their performance in the elections *before* the new party entered.

⁶² The membership data is taken from the DNPP. Note that the DNPP does not have membership figures for the NMP, BP, CP, KNP, and RKPN. Therefore, these parties are excluded from this analysis, leaving only twelve new parties and 101 new-established party pairs. Parties report membership data to the DNPP.

As for the second cluster of variables (the alternative explanations, which will be used in the case-by-case analyses), relevant social and economic indicators will be employed, as well as historical information about international and national political developments. Only the former are real variables in the canonical sense of the word. All of the variables are economic or social statistics obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). They are listed in table 3.11.