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Imitating the newcomer. How, when and why established political parties imitate the policy positions and issue attention of new political parties in the electoral and parliamentary arena: the case of the Netherlands

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Imitating the newcomer

How, when and why established political parties imitate the policy positions
and issue attention of new political parties in the electoral and parliamentary arena:
the case of the Netherlands

Proefschrift

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"There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women (...)" Margaret Thatcher once stated. Although philosophically, I subscribe to the radical individualism of this statement, I cannot but admit that the practice of social science research refutes this statement thoroughly. The community that helped me write this book consists out of friends and colleagues, anonymous referees and the closest of kin. I want to take this time to thank them all.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	p.5
Table of contents	p.7
Chapter 1: Why care about new political parties?	p.10
1.1 Why care about new political parties?	p.10
1.2 Main claim of this study	p.13
1.3 What this study offers	p.15
1.4 Plan of the study	p.17
Chapter 2: Theorising about new political parties	p.18
2.1 Introduction	p.18
2.2 New political party success	p.20
2.3 Conceptualising new political parties	p.22
2.4 Responding to new political parties	p.24
2.5 Interacting with new political parties	p.27
2.6 Political attention	p.28
2.7 Political positions	p.30
2.8 Hypotheses	p.32
2.8.1 Political arenas	p.32
2.8.2 Relationship between the new and the established party	p.34
2.8.3 Characteristics of the new party	p.37
2.8.4 Characteristics of the established party	p.39
2.8.5 Complications	p.41
2.9 Changing the party system	p.42
2.10 What this study does not claim	p.51
Chapter 3: Methods	p.53
3.1 Introduction	p.53
3.2 Case selection	p.54
3.3 Analytical strategy	p.60
3.4 Data collection and data analysis in the parliamentary arena	p.62
3.4.1 Attention in parliament	p.62
3.4.2 Talking in the Dutch parliament	p.64
3.4.3 Collection and categorisation of parliamentary speech	p.66
3.4.4 Case-by-case analysis of attention in parliament	p.67
3.4.5 Statistical analysis of attention in parliament	p.70
3.4.6 Party positions in parliament	p.73
3.4.7 Voting in the Dutch Parliament	p.74
3.4.8 Collection and categorisation of parliamentary votes	p.77
3.4.9 Models of parliamentary voting	p.78
3.4.10 Analysis of positions in parliament	p.82
3.5 Data collection and data analysis in the electoral arena	p.86
3.5.1 Issue saliency in the electoral arena	p.87
3.5.2 From election manifestos to measures of attention change	p.88
3.5.3 Measuring positions in the electoral arena	p.93
3.5.4 From election manifestos to measures of position change	p.93
3.6 Measuring independent variables	p.100
Chapter 4: Introducing new parties	p.104
4.1 Introduction	p.104
4.2 Three typologies	p.105
4.2.1 Party formation	p.105

4.2.2 Party goals	p.106
4.2.3 Party's issue	p.107
4.3 The parties and party system in 1946: the baseline	p.107
4.4 Nineteen new parties	p.112
4.4.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics	p.112
4.4.2 PSP: dissenting socialists	p.115
4.4.3 BP: farmers in protest	p.117
4.4.4 GPV: dissenting Protestants	p.121
4.4.5 D66: democratic idealists	p.123
4.4.6 DS'70: democratic moderates	p.127
4.4.7 PPR: radicalising radicals	p.129
4.4.8 NMP: small business owners in protest	p.132
4.4.9 RKPN: orthodox Catholics	p.136
4.4.10 RPF: orthodox Protestants	p.138
4.4.11 EVP: progressive Protestants	p.140
4.4.12 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics	p.144
4.4.13 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters	p.146
4.4.14 SP: a leftwing challenger	p.149
4.4.15 LN and LPF: democratic populists & the return of anti-immigration politics	p.151
4.4.16 PVV: the persistence of anti-immigration politics	p.155
4.4.17 PvdD: the hobbyhorse	p.157
4.5 Patterns	p.162
Chapter 5: Reinvigorating or redefining?	p.167
5.1 Introduction	p.167
5.2 Case-by-case analyses	p.168
5.2.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics	p.169
5.2.2 PSP: dissenting socialists	p.171
5.2.3 BP: farmers in protest	p.173
5.2.4 GPV, RKPN and RPF: orthodox dissent	p.175
5.2.5 D66 and DS'70: democratic idealists and moderates	p.180
5.2.6 PPR: radicalising radicals	p.184
5.2.7 NMP: small business owners in protest	p.189
5.2.8 EVP: progressive Protestants	p.191
5.2.9 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics	p.194
5.2.10 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters	p.198
5.2.11 SP: a leftwing challenger	p.204
5.2.12 LN: democratic populists	p.207
5.2.13 LPF and PVV: the return and persistence of anti-immigration politics	p.213
5.2.14 PvdD: the hobbyhorse	p.217
5.3 Analysing the case-by-case results	p.221
5.3.1 Party positions in parliament	p.221
5.3.2 Analysis of attention in parliament	p.226
5.4 Expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliament	p.232
5.5 Conclusion	p.239
Chapter 6: When new parties win or when established parties lose?	p.242
6.1 Introduction	p.242
6.2 Case-by-case analyses	p.243
6.2.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics	p.244
6.2.2 PSP: dissenting socialists	p.246
6.2.3 BP: farmers in protest	p.248

6.2.4 GPV, RKPN and RPF: orthodox dissent	p.252
6.2.5 D66 and DS'70: democratic idealists and moderates	p.254
6.2.6 PPR: radicalising radicals	p.257
6.2.7 NMP: small business owners in protest	p.259
6.2.8 EVP: progressive Protestants	p.261
6.2.9 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics	p.263
6.2.10 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters	p.264
6.2.11 SP: a leftwing challenger	p.266
6.2.12 LN: democratic populists	p.268
6.2.13 PVV and LPF: the return and persistence of anti-immigration politics	p.271
6.2.14 PvdD: the hobbyhorse	p.273
6.3 Analysing the case-by-case results	p.276
6.3.1 Analysis of party positions in the electoral arena	p.276
6.3.2 Analysis of attention in the electoral arena	p.282
6.4 Expanded statistical analysis	p.287
6.4.1 Reaction in terms of attention	p.287
6.4.2 Anticipation in terms of attention	p.292
6.5 Conclusion	p.294
Chapter 7: The invisible people, the left and the right	p.299
7.1 Introduction	p.299
7.2.1 Period 1: 1963-1977	p.301
7.2.2 Period 2: 1977-1986	p.305
7.2.3 Period 3: 1989-1998	p.309
7.2.4 Period 4: 1998-2010	p.311
7.3 Conclusion	p.316
Chapter 8: Why care about new political parties?	p.318
8.1 Why care about new political parties?	p.318
8.2 Comparing Patterns	p.319
8.3 Comparing countries	p.324
8.4 Further research	p.326
Appendix 1: categorization scheme	p.328
Appendix 2: attention in the parliamentary arena	p.329
Appendix 3: party positions in the parliamentary arena	p.331
Appendix 4: attention in the electoral arena	p.338
Appendix 5: party positions in the electoral arena	p.341
Appendix 6: all new parties	p.342
Bibliography	p.348
Dutch summary	p.361
Curriculum Vitae	p.368

Chapter 1: Why care about new political parties?

“That is why the plan was hatched to form the Party for the Animals in 2002. A party that in the first place would act as a 'pacer in the marathon' and remind established parties of the many good intentions in their election manifesto.” - Marianne Thieme, leader of the Party for the Animals (2006, 83 translation SO).

1.1 Why care about new political parties?

New political parties may have a special role in party politics. They may influence the attention that established political parties devote to certain issues and the positions that these parties take on these issues. This idea can be found in both theories of prominent political scientists and the statements of the leaders of actual new political parties. Marianne Thieme, leader of the Dutch PvdD (*Partij voor de Dieren*/Party for the Animals), states that her party was formed specifically to try and change the policies of established parties in parliament, as is evident from the quote above. The party does not seek to implement its policy goals directly but instead hopes that its participation in the parliamentary arena will force established parties to take over its policy priorities. In the 1990's, the founders of the pensioners' party U55+ (*Unie 55+*/Union 55+) shared Thieme's goal of influencing policy indirectly through their influence on the established parties. They stated that they realised they would remain a small party but that they would force established parties to take over their policy positions (Politieke Unie 55+ 1994, 14). The founders of D66 (*Democraten '66*/Democraten '66) had greater ambitions, but these were still put in terms of *influencing* the existing political system: in D66's first election campaign party leader Hans van Mierlo stated that “D66 will disappear when we have helped the existing political system explode” (Van der Land 2003, 36; Rogmans 1991, 54). There is a whole range of effects that founders of new political parties have sought to provoke: from bringing new issues on the political agenda, via forcing established parties to change their positions, to changing the main patterns of the political system.

Off course, founders of new political parties often have greater expectations: on one occasion, Pim Fortuyn, the founder of the eponymous party LPF (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*/List Pim Fortuyn), announced: "I will become the next prime-minister, make

no mistake!"¹ New political parties can influence government policies in two ways: new political parties may use motions, parliamentary initiatives or amendments to steer government policy. If they participate in government, ministers may themselves propose policies that were included in the coalition agreement by the new party. In doing so, parties are able to influence policy directly (Minkenberg 2001, 14; Rydgren 2004; Van den Brink 2006, 153; Hainsworth 2008; Deschouwer 2007).

New parties can also influence government policy indirectly: they may influence the positions that established parties take or change the priority they give to issues. This means that new parties can also have an indirect effect on policy: they influence policy through their effect on established parties. There are good theoretical reasons to examine the indirect effects of new political parties, even though the direct effects of new political parties may also be interesting. Classical studies in political science have proposed that new political parties have a special role to play in politics (Downs 1957; Daalder 1966; Lijphart 1968). Downs, Daalder and Lijphart each recognise the role that new (and often small) parties can play in influencing the positions of established parties. This effect has however not been studied extensively: it is the goal of this thesis to examine these claims.² According to Downs, some political parties may be formed with the explicit goal to "influence already existing parties to change their policies or not to change them" (Downs 1957, 127 emphases removed SO). Daalder and Lijphart have attributed this function to small political parties. According to Daalder (1966, 226) the small political parties in the Dutch system "have served as gadflies, forcing the larger parties not to stray too far from their ideological positions lest they lose votes." Lijphart (1968, 175-176) has used a similar metaphor: the fact that small political parties can easily enter the Dutch parliamentary arena means that they can operate as a pressure valve in the political system: leaders of established parties can use the support for small parties to get an indication of the political dissatisfaction in their constituencies and change their course accordingly. In the Belgian political context scholars often speak of whip

¹ Pels, D. (2009) "Pim Leeft! Zeven jaar na de moord op Pim Fortuyn" *De Groene Amsterdammer* 6/5/2009

² There are also theoretical reasons: As many new political parties disappear from parliament after a few years, remain very small, and are confined to the opposition, focusing only on these direct effects would mean that one neglects many smaller new parties.

parties (*zweeppartijen*): They put established parties under electoral pressure to change their policies (Lucardie 2004; Coffé 2005).

Political parties are, in general, conservative organisations unlikely to change their political positions unless electoral incentives force them to: every vote that the new party gains, is lost by an established party (Janda 1990). So even when these new parties remain small and stay out of government, they can still influence the positions of established parties and therefore their cabinet policies: rather than seeking to implement their own policy positions directly from parliament or government office, new parties may seek to influence the policy positions of established parties in order to see their policy goals realised - albeit indirectly.

New political parties may not only influence established political parties through electoral incentives. In parliament, different mechanisms may play a role (Bardi & Mair 2008). Decision-making in parliament tends to be fixed: the nature of conflict is defined, the lines of conflict are drawn, therefore the majorities are determined and therefore the policy outcomes are set. On the one hand the institutionalised, structured decision-making in parliament may marginalise new political parties. But on the other hand, if new political parties are able to exploit these mechanisms they may have a very strong effect on the patterns of political decision-making. New political parties may form an external shock to the institutionalised decision-making in parliament. They may bring new issues to the agenda, influence the policy positions of established political parties and may even redefine the political conflict. In this way the entry of new political parties may have a marked effect on the way politics is conducted in parliament.

According to Mair (1997a, 1997b), new political parties play a special role in political competition. Mair follows Schattschneider (1960) and proposes that political competition is as much between the established parties on the established lines of conflict, as it is between those parties that have an interest in maintaining the established lines of conflict and those outsiders that have an interest in changing the lines of conflict. The major parties on the left and right compete on the existing left-right dimension. They owe their position to the fact that this conflict exists. New parties have an interest in introducing new lines of conflict and displacing the political conflict. This may, however, also mean that established parties have a particular interest in co-opting new political parties into political alliances. Mair (2001) and following his lead, Bale (2003), propose that the co-optation of new political parties

into political alliances of the left or the right reinforces tendencies towards bipolar cooperation already visible in West-European party systems. In those cases the entry of a new party may actually cause a reduction in the number of lines of conflict.

New political parties may be important forces of change. There is considerable reason to look at the effect of new political parties: some new parties explicitly set out to influence established political parties and established parties may have a good reason to monitor the development of new political parties. New political parties may influence the patterns of electoral competition or patterns of parliamentary cooperation. According to Harmel (1985), there is only a limited number of studies into this subject. Norris (2005, 264) cited the case study of Harmel and Svåsand (1997), as the most systematic study of the effects of new parties. Since then a number of studies of specific cases (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007; Gauja 2010; Slagter & Loewenberg 2009) or on specific party families have been published (Van Spanje 2010; Meguid 2007).³

One may ask the question: why care about political parties at all? At the end of the previous century the idea that political parties had lost their traditional function, had taken root in political science (for an overview of this debate see Koole 2002). Scholars argued that political parties had lost their traditional functions of aggregating public interests and articulating the public's claims. They argued that political parties are relics of the past, not agents of change. The rise of new political parties such as the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn has muted these voices somewhat and has reinvigorated the study of party politics. This study is an attempt to provide an answer to the question whether political parties have lost relevance in the political process, by examining whether new political parties can be agents of political change.

1.2 Main claim of this study

This study will attempt to bring new insight into the study of the reactions of established political parties to new political parties. The main research question of this study is to what extent and under what conditions new political parties influence established political parties and party systems. This study will take a broad look: it will examine reactions of established parties both in terms of attention that established parties devote to certain issues and in terms of the positions that they take on these

³ The only study cited in the literature that looks at new parties in general is Huibregts (2006, cited in Krouwel and Lucardie 2008).

issues. It will examine the reactions of established parties in both the electoral arena and the parliamentary arena. Finally, this study will take a close look at the effects of new parties at the level of both the individual established parties and the party system. This study will look exclusively at the indirect effect of new parties on policy. Their direct effect on government policy through their participation in parliamentary and governmental decision-making may be considerable, but is not the focus of this study.

This study will define new political parties as organisations that have elected representatives in parliament for the first time, except those organisations that were formed as a transformation or a merger of one or more parties that had representatives in parliament.

The study will focus on the reactions of all established parties on all new parties entering parliament in a single country, the Netherlands, since the Second World War. The study will focus on a single country because this way systemic factors that may influence to what extent established parties react to new parties, are kept constant. Because the Netherlands has such an open political system, especially in terms of the electoral system (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008), there is a considerable number of new and established parties to study. The study concerns the effect of nineteen new parties on, on average, nine established parties. This includes "flash parties" like the NMP (*Nederlandse Middenstandspartij*/Dutch Business Party), which was in parliament for little more than a year (Converse & Dupeux 1962), as well as parties that became a vital part of the party system like D66, a party that has been in parliament for over forty years.

The fact that this study focuses on a single country does not mean that its results do not have meaning beyond the borders of that country. The Netherlands has been selected as a likely case to observe the effects of new political parties. With the high number and the great diversity of new political parties, it is likely that if new political parties have an effect on established political parties, one can observe it here. The goal of the study is to test the established theories about new political parties. If one does not find marked reactions of established parties on new parties here, it is unlikely that new parties have a marked effect elsewhere.

The main finding of this study is that, when looking at the effects of new parties on established parties, there is a marked difference between the effect found in the parliamentary arena on the one hand and in the electoral arena on the other hand. While in the parliamentary arena the entry of a new party in general leads to a marked

change in established parties' policy priorities, the effect in the electoral arena is much less clear: while it is possible to identify patterns for individual new parties, it seems impossible to identify patterns in general. On the whole, new parties have more effect on the established parties in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena. The different natures of these two arenas might be a decisive factor here: in the parliamentary arena there is a "party-system agenda" which parties have to follow (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010), while in the electoral arena established parties have an incentive to focus on their own issues and not discuss issues that other parties raise. The effect of new political parties in the parliamentary arena is linked to the activity and nature of these parties. In the electoral arena, however, one finds that - for as far as there are mechanisms behind the weak and unstructured responses - electoral considerations prevail: if established parties lose seats, they are (marginally but significantly) more likely to imitate new political parties.

The effects of new parties on the party system are studied only within parliament, because if new parties are able to influence the interaction between parties it is most likely that one can observe it there. The new political parties that are studied are not associated with the introduction of new lines of conflict, for as far as changes in the dimensionality of party systems can be attributed to the entry of new political parties, new political parties tend to be associated with a reduction of the number of lines of conflict. This can be explained by two mechanisms: these new parties tend to introduce issues on which parties are positioned in a left-right fashion; and because new parties are co-opted into leftwing or rightwing political alliances, they reinforce the existing left-right division.

1.3 What this study offers

As stated in section 1.1, the number of studies on the effect of new political parties in the existing literature is very limited. Compared to the publications at hand, this study is innovative in three respects: first and foremost, most previous studies of the effects of new parties have been single or comparative case studies or they have focused on a particular subset of new parties, such as niche parties or radical rightwing parties (Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010; Gauja 2010; Meguid 2005, 2007; Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007; Van Spanje 2010). Several studies have selected only those new parties that were particularly successful in electoral terms, which makes it impossible to observe the effects of new parties in general: one can

only test whether indeed the size of a new party matters for the response of established parties, which is assumed in many studies, by comparing the effect of new political parties that remained at the electoral margins to the effect of those parties that have become major players themselves. To say something about new political parties in general, one must observe niche parties that focus on new political issues and challenger parties that seek to revive established ideologies.

The second innovative characteristic of this study is that it includes all established parties, whether they are mainstream or not. Many studies of new political parties have neglected certain established parties. They have focused on those two parties that are seen as important system parties, often the main party of the left and the main party of the right (Huijbrechts 2006; Meguid 2005, 2007). However, some new political parties may have an effect outside of those mainstream parties: for instance, this study examines how the Dutch leftwing green party GL (*GroenLinks*/GreenLeft) responded to the entry of the PvdD. It may be interesting to see how this green party responded to the entry of a party that is greener than itself and which claimed that the other established parties, including said green party, had neglected the environment. Moreover, the assumption that many of these studies make, namely that there are only two main parties in every system, does not hold in many Western European party systems (Otjes 2011). With, on average, nine established political parties responding to the entry of each new political party, there is considerable variance in the characteristics of established political parties and in their reactions.

The third innovation that this study makes is that it focuses on both the electoral and the parliamentary arena. Previous studies have almost exclusively focused on the electoral arena (with Gauja (2010) and Slagter and Loewenberg (2009) as exceptions). This study proposes that there is a difference in the way that established parties respond to the entry of a new political party in the parliamentary arena and the electoral arena. As this study will show, the specific characteristics of the different arenas make it much more likely for new parties to influence established parties' policies in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena (Bardi & Mair 2008).

1.4 Plan of the study

The study will set out to show the reactions of established political parties in eight chapters. After this first introductory chapter, the second chapter will introduce a number of theoretical distinctions that will help to understand the nature of new political parties, their effect and the conditions under which they are more or less likely to influence established political parties. Chapter 3, the methodological chapter, will translate these theoretical notions into observable variables. This chapter will also elaborate on the research strategy and case selection. The fourth chapter will introduce the *dramatis personae*: the nineteen new parties that will be the focus of this study. The chapter will put the nineteen individual cases in their historical context and discuss their development. These nineteen parties will be classified in terms of how they were founded, which goals their founders had and what their distinctive issues were. This chapter will be purely descriptive and will serve as a preliminary to the empirical, explanatory chapters.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are three empirical chapters that will examine the effects of the new political parties. Chapter 5 will focus on the effect of new political parties on the positions that political parties take and the attention that they devote to certain issues in parliament. Chapter 6, which examines the electoral arena, will focus primarily on reactions, but will also examine the possibility of anticipation. The choice to study parliament first is informed by methodological concerns: one would expect that the first chance established parties have to respond to the entry of a new political party is in parliament. Established parties can only change their manifestos in reaction to the entry of a new political party in parliament at the end of the new party's first parliamentary period. Therefore, it seems reasonable to study the effect of new parties *within* parliament before studying their effects on the electoral arena and on the party system. Chapter 7 examines the effect of new political parties on the parliamentary party system. The concluding chapter (chapter 8) will evaluate the tenability of the hypotheses, examine the generalisability of the results and consider perspectives for further research.

Chapter 2: Theorising about new political parties

Josh Lyman: *"I gave up everything for this and you are not even in this to win."*

Matthew Santos: *"Maybe we have a different definition of winning."*

- Dialogue from *The West Wing*, episode *Opposition Research* (Misiano 2005)

2.1 Introduction

In a scene in the American political drama *The West Wing*, a presidential candidate, Matthew Santos, and his campaign leader Josh Lyman have a heated discussion. The candidate makes clear that he does not expect to win the election and that he is in the race to put education higher on the political agenda. The campaign manager says: "I gave up everything for this and you are not even in this to win!" The candidate responds: "Maybe we have a different definition of winning." The difference in opinion between Lyman and Santos is not just a difference between two fictional characters in a political drama. In political reality, too, some candidates do not run to get elected, but because they want to put an issue on the political agenda. Some new political parties may be formed in order to change the policies of established political parties, or bring new issues to the agenda, or change the way politics is done instead of winning office and implementing policies directly. In the literature on new political parties, many studies take the perspective of Joshua Lyman, while only a few take the perspective of Matthew Santos.

Major theorists of political science, like Downs (1957), Lijphart (1968), Daalder (1966) and Mair (1997b, 1997a, 2001), have written about the ability of new political parties to influence the policies of established political parties. They use metaphors such as gadflies, thermometers or pressure valves to describe new political parties: their presence prevents established political parties from straying too far from their ideology, and they can point them towards social problems that they have neglected. Their entry into the political system may form an important shock that forces established political parties to reconsider their policies (Harmel & Svåsand 1997). The entry of a new political party may force established parties to change their positions on certain policies or to find solutions for new problems that the new political parties bring to the table. If established parties change their positions sufficiently, this may lead to a change in the party system: new parties may be able to

introduce a new line of conflict into the political arena, upsetting the balance in politics. It is also possible that the entry of a new political party causes the number of dimensions in the political system to decrease because the new party's entry reinforces competition along the left-right dimension. As Janda (1990) hypothesises, established parties are conservative organisations, unlikely to change their policies unless external factors force them to. Therefore, the patterns of interaction, the lines of conflict and thus also the party system is likely to “freeze” (Schattschneider 1960; Lipset & Rokkan 1967). This means that established political parties might be competing with each other on issues that have lost all relevance to voters. By bringing in new issues and influencing political party positions, new political parties may influence the lines of conflict that structure interaction between political parties. New political parties may have an important role in ensuring that the conflicts between established political parties are salient in society.

According to Harmel (1985, 416) and Norris (2005, 264), the ability of new political parties to influence the policies of established political parties has been discussed often. However, there has only been limited systematic research into it. The case study of Harmel and Svåsand (1997) provides “the most systematic evidence” according to Norris (2005, 264). There has been a small number of studies that attempted to contribute to the understanding of the way new political parties influence established political parties in general (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007; Huijbrechts 2006; Harmel & Svåsand 1997). It is the goal of this research to chart more precisely the effect new political parties have on established political parties and the party system. Moreover, this study seeks to determine why some political parties were successful at changing the established political parties and the party systems, whereas others failed.

This chapter will outline a number of theoretical distinctions that may help to understand how established parties respond to new political parties, under what conditions this may happen, and how individual reactions can lead to changes in the party system. This chapter will be divided into four sections. In the first section, the state of the art in the study of new political parties will be discussed. Scholars of new political parties appear to be interested in the ability of new political parties to change party systems, but they have almost exclusively focused on the new parties' ability to win representation. In the second section, the term new political party will be defined. The third section will outline a typology of how established parties can respond to

new political parties. Specific hypotheses will be formulated here about the conditions under which established parties are more or less likely to respond to new political parties. In the fourth and final section, these individual developments will be linked to a notion of party system change.

2.2 New political party success

Since the 1970s, new political parties have been the subject of intensive study in political science. Political scientists began to study why some new political parties were successful, while others failed. Most of these studies focused on explaining the electoral success of new political parties: they took the perspective of Joshua Lyman from the quote above. New parties seek to win elections, occupy public office and implement their policy directly. The idea that new political parties could also be successful in other ways played a major role in explaining the significance of their studies. Ever since Downs (1957, 127), scholars have claimed that new political parties could influence established parties to change their policies. New political parties could not just have electoral success; they could also have programmatic success by influencing the policies of established political parties. This was the goal of Santos in the quote. In this way, new political parties could influence the policies of existing political parties, which could in some cases even lead to changes in the party system.

Since the 1960s, more and more new political parties have entered West European parliaments (Hug 1997, 81). Political science picked up on this trend in the 1970s. Scholars of new parties often use the notions of success and failure. Most of the research has focused on identifying those characteristics of new political parties that explain why some political parties are successful, while others fail. The question rises how one defines success or failure. The success or failure that authors appear to be interested in is the extent to which a new political party changes the party system. One can see this in the title of Hug's (1997) book *Altering party systems* or the title of Tavits (2006) article "Party system change. Testing a model of new party entry".

How one defines success and failure depends on one's definition of the party system. In most studies, success has been defined as obtaining (or maintaining) a (relevant) number of seats in parliament (Hauss & Rayside 1978, 36-39; Harmel 1985, 411-421; Rochon 1985, 432; Hug 1997; Mair 1999, 210; Lucardie 2000, 133-134; Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 288; Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 305). Authors

implicitly define a party system in numerical terms: if the entry of a new political party into parliament changes a two party system into a three party system, the party system has been altered.

A large number of characteristics have been identified that contribute to the electoral success of new political parties. Hug (1997, 44) categorises these in four groups: the presence of untapped issues, on which new political parties can campaign; the requirements for forming a political party, such as a required number of signatures to gain ballot access; the importance of the central government, as this would make running for the national parliament more attractive; and requirements for winning a seat, such as electoral thresholds. Other factors that have been identified relate to the new political parties' organisation and leadership and levels of societal diversity, in religious, ethnic and linguistic terms (Hauss & Rayside 1978; Lucardie 2000; Harmel & Robertson 1985; Lowery et al. forthcoming). Hug's (1997) and Lowery *et aliorum* (forthcoming) longitudinal studies show that the electoral system and the presence of new, untapped issues are the most important factors in determining the new political party's formation and their (initial) electoral performance.

Political parties may define success in another way. Some follow Lyman and seek to win a substantial number of votes, enter political office and become a relevant player in government formation. Many minor new parties, however, may run because they believe that they can influence the positions of the more promising candidates and therefore the positions that these candidates take in office. They may take Santos' perspective. New political parties may have the ability to bring new issues into the political arena (Harmel 1985, 405). They may force established parties to reconsider their political positions (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 313). As Downs (1957, 127) claimed, some new parties may only set out to force established political parties to adopt different stances on particular issues. In this way they may be able to influence the way established political parties interact with each other (Harmel & Robertson 1985, 414). Even when they never gain enough support to be a relevant political party in the terminology of Sartori (1976), new political parties can have a lasting impact on the party system in this way.

2.3 Conceptualising new political parties

There is no standard definition of what a new political party is. How one defines a new party depends on one's research question (Barnea & Rahat 2011; Deschouwer 2007). There are two elements that form the definition of a new political party: 'new' and 'political party'. To start with the latter element: a political party can be defined as “an organization that appoints candidates at general elections to the system’s representative assembly”, as Sjöblom (1968, 12) formulated it. To define 'new', it is necessary to look at the way political parties are formed. Two perspectives are helpful here: Mair’s (1999) and Pedersen’s (1982).

Mair (1999, 216) made a distinction between the origins of political parties in terms of birth, marriage, divorce, and transformation. Parties that are formed by *birth* are new parties that are formed by *homines novi*, people without a background in other political parties. An example of a party formed by birth would be the Flemish green party Agalev (*Anders Gaan Leven*/To Live Differently). Previously apolitical people who were inspired by a green/progressive Catholic social movement founded this party. Parties that are formed by *marriage*, are formed by the merger of two or more existing parties. The Italian PD (Democratic Party/*Partito Democratico*) is an example of such a new party: the social democratic DS (Democrats of the Left/*Democratici di Sinistra*), the social-liberal party *la Margherita* (The Daisy) and several other smaller parties form the PD. Parties that are formed by *divorce* are splits from pre-existing parties. The British SDP (Social democratic Party) that was formed by former Labour ministers is an example of this. *Transformations* are established parties that undergo a significant change (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 279-280) by altering their name, their leadership and sometimes even their official ideology. Examples of recent transformations can be found in Belgium where between 1990 and 2008 every Flemish party in parliament changed its name at least once. These changes in name were often accompanied by the claim that the party had undergone a major transformation.⁴

As Barnea and Rahat (2011, 308 emphases removed SO) argue, "new-ness is a non-dichotomous quality": it is a matter of gradation. Parties that are formed by birth are most new, as they have no connection to any established party. Parties that are

⁴ The PVV was renamed VLD in 1992, the SP was renamed SP.a in 2001, the CVP became CD&V in 2001, AGaLev was renamed Groen! in 2004 and the *Vlaams Blok* became *Vlaams Belang* in 2004.

formed by divorce are less new, because they are related to an established party. Parties that are formed by transformation and marriage are least new: in essence they still are established parties. In order to get a workable definition, it is necessary to draw a line: in this study political parties that are formed by marriage or transformation of established parties are not seen as new but rather as a re-formation of one or more established political parties, formed to maintain their current position within the party system.⁵ Parties formed by divorce may not necessarily be new in the sense that some of their members have been MP in the past, but they are new in the sense that they have formed a new party organisation.

Pedersen (1982) recognises different life phases that a newly formed party goes through. These phases are declaration (the public expression of the intention to form a new party); authorisation (the recognition by the authorities that they are a party); representation (winning the first seats in parliament); and finally relevance (becoming a relevant party in government formation). The point at which a party moves from being a new party to becoming an established party depends on the research question (see Deschouwer 2007). The moment studied here, following Huijbregts (2006, 19) and Rochon (1985, 437 n.6, n.10), is the representation phase.

In summary, this study will define new political parties as organisations that have elected representatives in parliament for the first time, except those organisations that were formed as a transformation or a merger of one or more parties that had representatives in parliament.

⁵ This definition differs from Rahat and Barnea (2011) in two ways: they define a new party as "a party that has a new label and that has no more than half of its top candidates (top candidates or safe districts) originate from a single party" (Rahat and Barnea 2011, 7, emphasis removed SO). In their definition, a merger of three equally sized parties becomes a new party, because not all top candidates originate from a single established party. If all their top candidates originate from established parties is it truly a new party? Moreover, the definition excludes parties formed by divorce. For the purpose of this study, party divorces are interesting because the established party from which the new party was formed, has good reasons to respond to the new party.

Table 2.1: types of reactions of established parties

Reaction	Attention	Position
Imitation ⁶	Imitating policy priorities	Imitating policy positions
Differentiation	Differentiating policy priorities	Taking stand against policy positions

2.4 Responding to new political parties

Established parties can respond in different ways to the entry of new political parties. This study will only examine the reactions to new political parties in terms of party positions and the saliency of issues. It will not look at changes in campaign style, rhetoric or internal party organisation. These organisational, rhetorical and campaign-related changes may be interesting, but the focus here is on the more substantially significant change in party positions. Several distinctions will be outlined that can help to understand the different reactions. These distinctions and reactions are summarised in table 2.1.

The first distinction is the one between imitation and differentiation. In reaction to a new party, an established party can imitate the new party, or they can distinguish themselves from the new party by decreasing similarities. Different authors have also made the distinction between reactions that increase and reactions that decrease similarities. Downs (2001), for instance, divides these reactions into two categories: the first category he calls disengagement. Established political parties seek to distance themselves from the new political party. The second he calls engagement: established political parties address the issues that the new party brings to the table and cooperate with them. Imitation is an example of an engaging reaction (Downs 2001, 27). The same distinction is caught in the division between increasing and decreasing similarity. The established party can imitate different aspects of the new party. It can take over (parts of) the program of the new political party. It can also address the same issues as the new political party; this is the basic difference between saliency and position. This study differentiates between four kinds of reactions: two

⁶ One may question to what extent imitation is the correct term, because it refers to consciously increasing similarity. This study focuses on increasing similarity between political parties. The reasons why they do so are discussed in this theoretical chapter. These theories are all based on conscious, strategic action. Imitation is present where there is increasing similarity and there are theoretical reasons to assume that this action was conscious, exactly as is studied here.

are differentiating, two are imitating reactions; and two are reactions in terms of position and two are reactions in terms of saliency.⁷

Attention imitation: an established political party can devote more attention to the issues that the new political party introduces. It can do so in its election manifesto or in its parliamentary work. This does not necessarily mean that the established political party takes over the specific proposals of the new political party. The established party may emphasise its own proposals concerning the newly introduced issues more than before. For instance, the competition of an animal rights party may force a green party to emphasise its own positions more than before. This strategy seems especially applicable when the new political party is a niche party that prioritises a set of issues that were previously outside of party competition (Meguid 2005, 347-348). By devoting more attention to the issue, the established party may attempt to take over the ownership of the issue from the new party (Meguid 2005, 2007).

Attention differentiation: established political parties can also ignore new parties and their issues (Downs 2001, 26). They remain silent on the issues that the new political party brings to the table (Meguid 2005, 347-349) or, if the issue is already on the agenda, they may actually decrease levels of attention to the issue of the new party (Huijbrechts 2006). This strategy seems especially applicable if the new political party focuses on a particular issue: that is, if the party has a specific single issue, single interest or niche issue that it advocates and that was outside the range of party competition before. By disregarding the issue that the new party raises, the established parties may seek to prevent this issue from becoming the object of party competition. Moreover, the established parties may attempt to deprive the newcomers

⁷ Meguid (2005, 2007) uses this difference between saliency and position to introduce a three-fold classification: accommodative reactions, dismissive reactions and adversarial reactions. Established political parties can deal in different ways with the issues a new political party brings to the table. They can take over the issue that the new party raises, as well as its position. Meguid calls this an accommodative reaction. Established parties can also distinguish themselves from the new party by downplaying the new party's issues. Meguid calls this a dismissive reaction. Or they can distinguish themselves from the new party by taking the opposite position on the issues it brings to the table. Meguid calls this an adversarial reaction. This scheme excludes the possibility that a party keeps a low level of saliency on the issue of the new party, but takes over its specific policy proposals. Huijbregts (2006) has attempted to make a more parsimonious taxonomy by only looking at issue attention only. These taxonomies are not used here because they are either inflexible (for Meguid) or attribute too much change to a new party (for Huijbregts).

of political legitimacy. The established political parties may be hoping that the new political party will wither and fade if they ignore it. This strategy seems particularly applicable in cases where the new political party poses no (electoral) threat to the established political parties (Kitschelt 1995, 256; Huijbrechts 2006). There are some dangers to this strategy: the failure to address the new political party and its issues may actually do little to prevent the defection of voters from the established political parties (Downs 2001, 26).

Position imitation: established political parties may take over the policies that the new political party proposes (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Donovan & Broughton 1999, 267; Downs 2001, 27; Schain 2002, 237-238; Heinisch 2003, 103-109; Bale 2003; Van Spanje 2010; Wilson 1998). For instance, the entry of a green party into the political arena may force a social democratic party to reconsider its position on nuclear energy, or the entry of radical rightwing parties may force established parties to pursue tougher immigration, integration and law and order policies than they otherwise would have done (Wilson 1998, 257).

Position differentiation: established political parties take a stand against the policies of a new political party: the established party moves away from the new party. This strategy seems especially applicable if the new political party takes extreme positions on some issues: for instance, in many countries green or social-liberal parties take a stand against the radical right. They move to more multicultural and cosmopolitan policy position instead.

The idea of policy differentiation has been studied by Meguid (2005, 2007). She identified a political strategy by which established political parties both increase their attention to the new party's issue and emphasise policy differences between themselves and the new party. She called this an adversarial strategy. In this way established political parties legitimise the newcomer by picking a fight with them. Established political parties are likely to pursue this strategy in order to weaken the position of their established competitors. A mainstream rightwing party can lend legitimacy to a green party by focusing more on their pro-growth positions. In this way they force a political conflict with this green party, which then becomes a serious option for those voters who seek a green alternative for the mainstream rightwing party. As the green party is an electoral competitor of the mainstream leftwing party, it is the mainstream rightwing party that benefits here: it is voters of the left who switch parties to the green. This is a way to force a mainstream established political

competitor to lose votes, or, as Meguid (2007, 33) put it: “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Different authors have developed different hypotheses for different arenas and for different types of change (for instance in position or in attention). This study will attempt to extend some of the theories somewhat by applying them to different arenas and to different types of change.

2.5 Interacting with new political parties

In addition to adapting their policy positions or policy priorities, established political parties may actively engage with a new party by cooperating with it, for instance in governing coalitions, or they may actually disengage from it by isolating it politically. Though it is not the subject of this study, this form of political engagement or disengagement may be important in determining to what extent new political parties can influence the patterns of political competition in a political system.

Political cooperation: political cooperation is a way in which established political parties engage with a new political party (Downs 2001, 27). The entry of a new party in parliament can increase the number of potential legislative majorities (Donavan & Broughton 1999, 267), which might influence cooperation both in the legislative arena and in cabinet formation. Cooperation in the legislative arena can occur on an *ad hoc* basis. In some countries, minority cabinets rely on more structured support from the MPs of (relatively) new radical right-wing parties. One example can be found in Denmark where various centre-right minority cabinets since the 1980s have been supported by the radical right (Kitschelt 1995, 157; Hainsworth 2008, 111). In other countries, established political parties and new radical right-wing parties have formed coalition cabinets. Research by De Lange (2008) has shown that especially the ideological similarity between new radical rightwing and centre-rightwing parties opens up the possibility of cabinet formation between them. If a new political party becomes part of a governing majority, it can have an impact on government policy (Minkenberg 2001, 14; Rydgren 2004; Van den Brink 2006, 153; Hainsworth 2008). In the case of radical right-wing parties, governments have adopted tougher legislation on immigration and the integration of immigrants, supported by established parties. Becoming part of a governing majority is not necessarily a success for new political parties, whether in programmatic or electoral terms. If the new political party has an anti-establishment, populist message, this may be difficult to credibly combine with government responsibility in cabinets. Many radical right-wing parties have

performed poorly after a period of government responsibility (Kitschelt 1995, 200; Hainsworth 2008, 115; Heinisch 2003). As will be further discussed in section 2.9, integrating new political parties in political alliances or governing coalitions may limit the new parties' ability to create a new line of conflict, and may actually contribute to a reduction in the number of lines of conflict.

Political isolation: a clear strategy of disengagement is political isolation or containment (Downs 2001). This is the case when political parties make an agreement not to cooperate with the new political party. This may happen in the formation of coalition cabinets or even in the legislature. This strategy is likely to be pursued if the new political party is seen as anti-democratic, for instance if it is a radical right-wing, a radical left-wing party or if it is a political arm of a paramilitary organisation. The most prominent example of a political isolation strategy can be seen in Belgium, where all established political parties have formed a *cordon sanitaire* to keep the radical VB (*Vlaams Blok*/Flemish Bloc) out of power (Hainsworth 2008).

2.6 Political attention

Attention plays a role in different studies of the electoral arena and the parliamentary arena. There are different theories on electoral competition. In one of these theories, the saliency theory of competition, attention plays a major role. This theory was pioneered by Robertson (1976) and extended by Budge (2001). These scholars claimed that parties tend to compete with each other by emphasising different issues. Party positions can best be understood in terms of differences in saliency (Budge 2001, 78-85): parties do not compete by offering different solutions for particular issues, but they compete by emphasising different issues. Some issues belong to the left and some are owned by rightwing parties (Budge 2001, 78, 82). In this view, the left prefers talking about social welfare and the right prefers talking about law and order. A candidate is understood to own an issue when he or she is seen by the electorate to be better able at handling that particular national problem than their opponent (Petrocik 1996, 828). Electoral competition concerns the definition of the conflict: the issue that is salient in the eyes of the voter decides the election (Bélanger & Meguid 2008). In essence, a party seeks to make the elections a referendum about an issue on which voters trust their candidates more than the other parties'. Forcing a candidate to address an issue he or she does not own can be seen as an important step to reframe the elections. In multiparty systems, which issues voters

see as owned by particular parties depends (among other factors) on the communication of the party (Walgrave & De Swert 2007). Walgrave and De Swert (2007, 64-65) find a relationship between the issues that parties emphasise in their manifestos and long-term patterns of issue ownership. New political parties may own issues that lie outside the scope of issue competition. They may be niche parties that focus on new issues such as green parties, anti-immigrant parties or ethno-territorial parties (Meguid 2005, 2007). Established political parties may attempt to halt or prevent the rise of a new party by emphasising the issues that new parties own (Meguid 2005, 2007). As will be described in section 2.9, saliency also plays a role in the work of Schattschneider (1960) and Mair (1997a).

In the study of the parliamentary arena, issue attention plays a major role and new political parties may have a special role in changing it. Attention is an important issue in parliamentary politics (2005, 32). Many real social problems exist and political attention is scarce (Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 34-35; Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 10). The issues that parties decide to focus on are the issues on which political action is taken (Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 37; Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 47). The parliamentary agenda is a particular political construct. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010, 260-261) propose that there is a two-way relationship between attention individual parties devote to issues and the parliamentary agenda.⁸ Parties must engage in the agenda of the party system while at the same time competing over the formulation of the new agenda (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 260). By dominating the party system agenda, some parties may be able to force other parties to focus on the issues that they own (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 273).

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) propose that the parliamentary agenda goes through two phases: long periods of stability on the one hand and sudden changes on the other. In the stable periods, the parliamentary agenda is more or less fixed (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 6). These periods of stability are interrupted by sudden changes: these changes are the result of external influences, such as real world events, media attention or public protests (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 10; Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006; Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006). In addition to these external influences, factors inside parliament may also matter. Elections can cause shifts in attention, because they upset the balance of power between parties (Baumgartner &

⁸ Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) use the term “party system agenda”.

Jones 1993, 22). Changes in the formation of parliamentary committees can even lead to a change in that committee's agenda (Alder 2002, 223). New parties like these other factors may cause a change in the policy agenda. Changes in the parliamentary agenda are often sudden and quick, what Baumgartner and Jones (1993) call a punctuation of the equilibrium. Dutch research has indicated that change is more incremental and less punctuated in the Netherlands than in the United States, because of the consensual nature of Dutch politics (Breeman, Lowery, et al. 2009, 20).

2.7 Political positions

In addition to devoting attention to certain issues, parties also take position on these issues. Different parties may offer different solutions for the same problem. There are two ways in which one can think about political positions: first, one can consider policy positions in an isolated way. Parties may approve or oppose the death penalty, and they may approve or oppose nuclear energy. The entry of a new political party may cause established parties to reconsider their policy priorities and to change position on a certain issue. The entry of a new party may also cause parties to take a position on an issue that they were silent or neutral about before. After the entry of D66 in the *Tweede Kamer* (the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament) for instance, parties had to take position on the question of electoral system reform, on which they had been silent before. This is the most basic way in which one can conceive of party positions: an unstructured set of policy demands, which may to a certain extent resemble a new party's positions. One can also aggregate policy positions into a dimensional structure. Policy dimensions are more than an aggregation of party positions on policy issues that share a thematic basis (pace De Lange 2008). This means that one works under the testable assumption that there is some structure in the party positions on issues. One can put party positions on a dimension. One can then conceive of party positions and parties as rightwing or leftwing, because there is clustering or an order of parties and positions.

Decision making in different arenas can be more or less structured. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 19) parliamentary politics tends to be concentrated on one interpretation of the political conflict. It matters which conflict will become significant (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 19; Schattschneider 1960, 63-64; Green-Pedersen 2007). The significant lines of conflict determine the possible majorities and therefore it fixes the outcomes of political decision-making. By redefining an issue,

one can change the outcomes of political decision-making. Here again, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) propose that policy changes go through phases of stability and sudden change. In the periods of stability, political actors may monopolise the formulation of policy: the median legislator has considerable control over what policies will be pursued (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 4). If the balance of power between the parties is fixed, the definition of the conflict is fixed as well and therefore the outcomes of political decision-making are pre-determined as well (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010). These periods of stability are interrupted by sudden changes: external events, elections and the entry of new political parties. Newcomers and outsiders may explicitly seek to redefine the conflict to their advantage. This view fits the perspective of Schattschneider (1960) and Mair (1997a) who propose that the main conflict of politics is between those parties that have an interest in maintaining the current lines of conflict of politics, and new political parties that seek to redefine the political conflict, by introducing a new line of conflict.⁹ Consider the issue of the welfare state: there are two different ways to frame a conflict. On the one hand, one may understand a conflict in terms of left and right. Leftwing parties favour measures that extend social solidarity while rightwing parties favour measures that are based on individual responsibility (Claassen 2011). One can also redefine the issue in terms of progressive and conservative: between parties that favour welfare state reform and parties that want to maintain the current welfare state. The same issue still dominates the political agenda, but by redefining the issue, new questions are posed and new majorities may be formed. The entry of a new party may also raise the political profile of an issue. The political conflict on that issue can become more polarised. Instead of redefining the conflict, the entry of a new party may reinforce the existing lines of conflict on that issue, which will then become more polarised.

⁹ Baumgartner and Jones (1993) refer to Schattschneider (1960), but only in the context of the contagiousness of the political conflict. For the outcome of political decision-making, it matters which groups are included. Therefore minorities have an interest in expanding the number of participants in a conflict, thus spreading the conflict.

2.8 Hypotheses

The central notion of this study is that the entry of a new party may cause established parties to take more or less similar party positions to the new party or change the focus of their attention. The simplest hypothesis is that the entry of a new political party may in general cause established parties to imitate it:¹⁰

1. New party presence hypothesis: new parties will elicit imitation of their policies (whether conceptualised in terms of attention or position) by the established parties.

Different new parties may influence different established parties in different ways. Specific conditions and characteristics of both the new and the established parties may have an influence on the way established political parties respond to the proposals made by a new party. Here several factors will be discussed that may influence how established political parties respond to the policy proposals of new parties. These factors relate to the characteristics of the new party, the established party, the relationship between these two and the political arena.

2.8.1 Political arenas

In different political arenas, the effect of a new political party entering the political arena may be different. Bardi and Mair (2008) differentiate between two political arenas: the parliamentary arena and the electoral arena. The electoral arena is formed by electoral campaign. The parliamentary arena refers to parliament, where MPs participate in the policy-making process and hold the government accountable. Political parties have different incentives in different arenas and work under different constraints. The goal that parties have in the electoral arena is clear: win as many votes as possible (Bardi & Mair 2008, 158). In the parliamentary arena, however, the goals parties have may be more contingent: for opposition parties the parliamentary

¹⁰ For reasons of parsimony, all these hypotheses are formulated in terms of imitation. Established parties will imitate new parties under certain conditions. While examining this relationship, one also examines the conditions under which established parties are likely to distinguish themselves from new parties: namely when these conditions are not present. Finally, if the relationships are reversed, because established parties are likely to differentiate themselves from new parties under the specified conditions, this will also show in the analyses of these hypotheses: the relationships will go against the expected direction.

arena may only be a platform that they can use to appeal to the electorate, while for coalition parties, parliament may be a place where policy or office goals can be pursued. In the electoral arena, parties may be more responsive to the electorate, while in the parliamentary arena office-seeking incentives can cause moderation (Bardi & Mair 2008, 157).

The characteristics of the different political arenas pull our expectations about the effects of new parties in two different directions. Following Bardi and Mair, one would expect parties to be more responsive to signals from the voters in the electoral arena: here electoral considerations play a major role. Voting for a new party may be a way for voters to express their concerns. Therefore, parties may feel more inclined to respond to new political parties in the electoral arena than in the parliamentary arena. Moreover, it is easier to respond to a new party during an electoral campaign: initiating a new bill takes more work than writing a line in an election manifesto. However, established political parties can more easily ignore new parties during election campaigns than they can in parliament. Political parties will focus on their own issues in the electoral arena in order to frame the elections in terms of issues that are beneficial to them (Budge 2001). This means that they will be inclined to ignore issues of which other parties, including new parties, have ownership.

In the parliamentary arena, similar concerns pull our expectations about the effects of new parties into different directions: in the parliamentary arena, parties are constrained by the parliamentary agenda. At the same time they participate in creating the agenda. As Jones and Baumgartner (2005) have shown, the parliamentary agenda is path-dependent. It is difficult to change the parliamentary agenda. It is not likely to change when a new political party (often with little experience in the parliamentary handiwork) enters the arena. This is, however, only one side of the story, because the parliamentary agenda is a peculiar political construct. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010, 260-261) propose that a two-way relationship exists between the attention that individual parties devote to issues and the parliamentary agenda. Parties must engage in the parliamentary agenda while at the same time competing over the new agenda (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 260). Parties *have* to deal with those issues on the parliamentary agenda. Parliamentary parties are expected by the media and by other parties to have an opinion about issues that are on the agenda (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 261). If a party does not talk about an issue when other parties raise it, it leaves the definition of that issue to other parties. This creates a situation of

dependency that parties will usually try to avoid. It may be possible that, by setting the parliamentary agenda, a new party can force other parties to focus on its issues (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 261).

These mechanisms pull our expectations in different directions. Still one testable expectation needs to be formulated here: the determining factor is the strength of the agenda control by the established parties and the government. In the case studied (the Netherlands), agenda control is relatively weak (Döring 1995, see also section 3.4.1): the agenda is set by parliament. Therefore new parties are likely to have a more marked effect in parliament in the Netherlands than in another country, while for the electoral arena there is no reason to hypothesise a particularly marked effect. Political parties will also be influenced by different incentives in different arenas. It is likely that electoral considerations will play a larger role in the electoral arena than in the parliamentary arena. In the parliamentary arena, control over the parliamentary agenda (exercised through new party activity or government participation) will influence the extent to which established parties will have to deal with those new issues.

2. Political arena hypothesis: a new party will elicit more imitation in established parties' policies in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena.

3. New party activity hypothesis: the more active a new party is on its own issue, the more imitation it will elicit in the attention that established parties devote to that issue.

4. Electoral considerations hypothesis: factors related to the electoral performance of established political parties will have more effect on the imitation by established parties in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary arena.

2.8.2 Relationship between the new and the established party

It may not necessarily be the case that all new parties influence the policies of all established parties. Rather, specific new parties may elicit reactions from specific established parties that they threaten. In the following section, three relationships between new and established parties will be examined: the relationship between

challenged and challenger parties, between ideological proximate new and established parties and between mobiliser new parties and established parties.

An important typology for understanding the goals of new parties is the difference between mobilisers and challengers (Rochon 1985).¹¹ Challengers seek to challenge established political parties “on their own turf” (Rochon 1985, 421); they challenge the legitimacy of a particular established political party by claiming that they have abandoned the ideology or the interest that the party used to stand for (Rochon 1985, 421). In the terminology of this study: they seek to compete with the established political parties on the established lines of conflict. An example could be the new leftwing populist parties such as *Die Linke* (The Left), which attack the social democrats on their weak social agenda and their cooperation with economically conservative parties. Mobilisers seek to mobilise voters on a new issue, emphasising how their new politics differs from the politics of the established political parties (Rochon 1985, 421). An example of such a political party is *Die Grünen* (The Greens), which mobilised voters along new cleavages (Bürklin 1985). Lucardie (2000, 176-177; Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 284) further distinguishes between three types of

¹¹ The distinction is similar to the typology proposed by Daalder (1965), which was elaborated by Lucardie (1986) for the period of depillarisation and by Vossen (2003) for the Interbellum. Daalder recognised six types of parties. Integralist parties, which seek to “adhere as perfectionistically as possible to a particular dogmatic teaching” (Daalder 1965, 192 translation SO). Integralist parties can be found among religious parties and socialist parties. Ecumenical parties, contrariwise, seek to overcome religious and ideological divides (Daalder 195, 192). The next two types come in a pair: special interest parties (Daalder 1965, 193) and socially dissident parties, which represent the labour or the employers’ wing of a particular political family (Daalder 1965, 193). Finally, Daalder (1965, 194) distinguishes between centripetal and centrifugal anti-system parties. These are parties that seek to emphasise national unity and break through all existing divides. It can also occur in a centrifugal fashion, when parties seek revolutionary change of the economic system (Daalder 1965, 194). Vossen (2003, 139-141) only recognises the latter of the two and emphasises that these groups rely on revolutionary means to achieve their goals. Vossen (2003) and Daalder (1965) stress that this characterisation is not exclusive, but that an individual party can be both an integralist party and emphasise the interests of particular groups, for instance. Vossen (2003) adds a personalist party category: with the rise of mass parties and the proportional electoral system, established parties became less open to prominent individuals, who could operate much more freely and independently in the majoritarian electoral system with limited suffrage, and in the elite-parties. They represented a different kind of politics based on trust between voters and parliamentarians, not a defined political program (Vossen 2003, 64-66). Rochon (1985, 424) likewise considers several new parties of the Interbellum period to be “personal vehicles” of their founders.

mobilisers: prolocutors, prophets and purifiers. Prolocutors seek to represent a particular social group that has been neglected by the established political parties, without explicit reference to a political ideology. Prophetic parties seek to mobilise voters on a new political issue with a new political ideology. Purifiers seek to change the political system or the political culture.

Mobilisers are likely to seek to change the attention that established political parties devote to issues, because they mobilise voters on a new issue. By focusing on new issues mobilisers cut through established lines of conflict: therefore, they are likely to influence all parties. On the whole one would expect that mobilisers influence more parties than challengers. Challengers are likely to influence the policy positions or issue attention of the specific established political parties that it challenged. Moreover, the entry of a mobiliser is more likely to result in change in the nature of the political conflict on an issue, than the entry of a challenger would be. The entry of a challenger is more likely to reinforce the existing conflict than the entry of a mobiliser.

In a similar line of argument, one may argue that established parties, which already stand close to a new party on the issue that it raises, might be more likely to respond to a new party than parties that take a different position on the issue. A party may feel challenged by the new party “on its own turf” in this way as well. If a new party enters parliament while it campaigned on the same side of an issue that the established party considers its own, this may be seen by the established party’s leadership as a sign that the party has lost credibility on the issue in the eyes of the voter. Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317), Van Spanje (2010, 567), and Huijbregts (2006, 9), propose that ideologically proximate established parties may respond more to a new party, than ideologically distant parties. Note that Harmel and Svåsand (1997) only examine this hypothesis in the electoral arena, here this hypothesis is examined for both the electoral and the parliamentary arena. Different studies have looked at both ideologically distant and proximate parties and have found reactions from both (Bale 2008; Bale et al. 2010; Van Kersbergen & Krouwel 2008; Van den Brink 2006). There is likely to be more room for improvement in dissimilar parties than in similar parties: if two parties already have similar programs, there are less points they can change to become more similar. As this is most in line with the hypothesis about challengers, this hypothesis will be tested here. One should note, however, that there are good reasons for new parties to try and influence established

political parties on the opposite side of the political spectrum. The entry of a new political party is likely to reinforce the existing political conflict. Meguid (2005, 2007) has taken up this notion: she proposes that, when a new issue is raised, parties that are on opposite sides of the political spectrum may have good reason to raise the political profile of the issue, while at the same time moving away from the established party in terms of positions. By picking a fight with the new party on this issue, the established party may seek to reinforce the ownership of the new party on the issue. The voters of the ideologically opposite new political party are unlikely to switch to the new party, but the voters of ideologically proximate parties are. The underlying reasoning is that “the enemy of the enemy is a friend”: by reacting in an accommodating way to a niche party competing electorally with another mainstream party, an established party can seek to increase its relative electoral position. Moreover, if parties are dissimilar, there is more room for improvement. These different notions are tested in hypothesis 7. The ideological similarity formulation is pursued here, but testing that will also yield information for the possibility that ideological dissimilarity matters.

5. Challenger hypothesis: a challenger new party will elicit more imitation in the policies of the established party that it challenged, than in the policies of other parties.

6. Mobiliser hypothesis: a mobiliser new party will elicit imitation in the policies of more established parties than a challenger new party.

7. Ideological similarity hypothesis: the more similar a new party is to an established party, the more imitation that new party will elicit from that established party.

2.8.3 Characteristics of the new party

There are three characteristics of new parties that may influence the extent to which it is seen as a threat by the established political parties. Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317) claim that parties will only respond to a new party if it “wins enough votes and/or seats to get noticed.” If a new party offers a credible threat to the established parties, they are more likely to imitate it than if it is seen as merely a nuisance. Electoral success of the new party is often used as an explanation for established parties reactions in other studies (Van Spanje 2010, 567; Huijbrechts

2006, 8). One can explain this mechanism in two ways: first, electorally successful new parties may be seen as threats to established parties. Second, it may also be the case that established parties attempt to jump on the "bandwagon" of a successful party (Ceci & Kain 1982; Gray et al. 2010).¹² Harmel and Svåsand (1997) only examine the new party size hypothesis in the electoral arena, here this hypothesis is tested in both the electoral and the parliamentary arena. As stated in paragraph 2.8.1 the hypothesis is that electoral considerations matter more in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary arena.

The extent to which a new political party is seen as a credible threat may depend on its support in the electorate, as Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317) propose, but also on its level of organisation: if the new political party is not organised, the established political parties may be more likely to consider the new competitor a nuisance or a flash party instead of a real threat. It may, finally, also depend on its participation in government. If a new political party participates in government, it is a sign that established parties consider it a relevant political player (Sartori 1976). Government participation may also be related to agenda control, as discussed in section 2.8.1: these new parties have control over the parliamentary agenda by their participation in the governing majority, through the legislative agenda of the cabinet. One should note, however, that the participation of new (radical rightwing) parties in a cabinet is often *preceded* by a growing similarity between the policy positions of the centre-right and the new radical rightwing parties (De Lange 2008; Bale 2003). This relationship reinforces itself: ideological similarity between the new and the established party is likely to be both a cause and result of their political cooperation. What is the case for patterns in attention, is also likely to be the case for the redefinition of the political conflict: new political parties that enter the political arena with a larger number of votes or a stronger party organisation, or those new parties that actually enter government, are more likely to redefine the nature of the political conflict than other new political parties.

¹² Ceci and Kain (1982) and Gray et al. (2010) do not use the notion of the bandwagon in the context of parties imitating each other: Ceci and Kain (1982) look at voters voting for candidates that are doing well in the polls and Gray et al. (2010) look at policy makers imitating successful policies.

8. New party performance hypothesis: the more votes a new party gets in the election, the more imitation it will elicit from established parties.

9. New party organisation hypothesis: the better organised a new party is, the more imitation it will elicit from established parties.

10. New party government hypothesis: a new party that enters government in its first parliamentary period will elicit more imitation from established parties than a new party that does not enter government in its first parliamentary period.

2.8.4 Characteristics of the established party

Some political parties are more “adaptable” than others (Mair 1983, 414): they are more likely to change due to some external shock, in this case a new political party entering the political arena. In explaining why established parties imitate new parties, most authors emphasise the role of electoral considerations. Political parties might take the entry of a new party that focuses on a new issue as an opportunity to expand its own electorate by taking over the issues of a successful new political party. Parties may seek to prevent their electorate from switching parties by responding to the positions their electorate takes on these new issues (Demker 1997; Norris & Lovenduski 2004). Moreover, established parties may seek to re-gain the votes they lost to the new political party by taking over its positions (Harmel & Svåsand 1997). Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317, citing Janda 1990) include this element into their theory as well, hypothesising that “parties are conservative organisations, changing only in response to bad elections”. In times of instability and insecurity, organisations tend to imitate the behaviour of successful examples (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). If a party has lost in the election in which a new party has entered, it is likely to consider this party to be an electoral competitor.¹³ Harmel and Svåsand (1997) only apply this hypothesis in the electoral arena. In this study this hypothesis is also applied in the parliamentary arena. The assumption (discussed in paragraph 2.8.1) is that electoral considerations matter more in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary arena.

¹³ In preliminary research several other specifications of adaptability were tested: such as stability of the internal organisation of the established party, its total electoral result or its participation in government. These factors did not lead to significant results. For reasons of model parsimony, these factors are not tested here.

By taking over the new party's positions, established parties offer the voter of the new political party a better deal: the same policies, but now in the hands of a political party that, because of its experience in the parliamentary and governmental arena, is also able to deliver (Meguid 2005, 349). Thus there can be a relationship between programmatic and electoral success: if a political party is successful in programmatic terms, this may actually undermine its electoral perspectives (Meguid 2005). This may not necessarily be the case: voters may instead stay with the "real thing" instead of some copy made by opportunistic established politicians (Van den Brink 2006, 117). Moreover, if established political parties attempt to deal with the issue that the new political party brings to the agenda but are unable to tackle the issue successfully, the new political party can actually profit from this in electoral terms. By devoting attention to the issue, the established political parties focus media and public attention to the issue and make the issue a legitimate problem in the eyes of the voter (Perlmutter 2002, 213-216; Kitschelt 1995, 272-282). Another problem is that if a new political party enters the political arena, and some political parties choose a strategy of differentiation, other political parties are put in a particularly difficult position: if they differentiate themselves from the new political party, they may lose voters to the new political party, but if they imitate the new political party on its issues, they may lose voters to the political parties that respond in an adversarial way (Kitschelt 1995, 235). This dilemma is particularly clear in Denmark. Here, after the rise of the radical right-wing DF (*Dansk Folkeparti*/Danish People's Party), the social democratic SD (*Socialdemokraterne*/Social democrats) copied the policies of the DF on a number of issues such as immigration. This however did not lead to gains in the following elections: the votes the SD may have won from the radical right were lost again to political parties that voiced opposition against the radical right such as the SF (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*/Socialist People's Party) (Van den Brink 2006, 167). In other European countries the politics of immigration in particular also poses a similar dilemma for both the left and the right (Zaslove 2006).

11. Established party performance hypothesis: the worse an established party performed in the elections in which a new party entered, compared to its performance in the previous election, the more it will imitate that new party.

2.8.5 Complications

These relationships may be complicated by interaction effects, by time effects and by characteristics of the political system. Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317) bring several of these factors together by proposing that “a nearby, established party is likely to change its positions in a new party’s direction only (or at least, most dramatically) when (a) the new party is winning a significant number of votes and/or seats and (b) the established party itself is concurrently experiencing what it considers to be bad elections.” They propose that only when these three factors are present should one see a “dramatic” reaction. This means that one expects an interaction relationship between these variables. Harmel and Svåsand (1997) only examine this hypothesis in the electoral arena. This hypothesis is tested here in both the electoral and the parliamentary arena, with the qualification that it is hypothesised that electoral considerations matter more in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary arena.

Additionally, parties may respond to the (possible) entry of a new party at different points in time. They can react after the entry of a new party into parliament, when it is clear how much support the new party has. But they can also act before a new party enters parliament: anticipating the entry of a new party into the parliamentary arena. If a party is expected to enter parliament, because of opinion polling, it may very well be the case that other parties anticipate its entry in parliament, in the elections in which it enters parliament. This idea of anticipation has not been discussed or theorised extensively. In this context the extent to which a party could be reasonably anticipated becomes an important explanation. In addition to the (anticipated) electoral performance of the new party, the history of the party becomes an important explanation: parties formed by divorce are more likely to be anticipated than parties formed by birth, because the divorce is unlikely to have been a quiet affair. One key complication may be that it becomes difficult to distinguish cause and effect, because they are observed at the same point in time: it may be that in anticipation to the entry of a new party, established parties increase attention to an issue, but also that if established parties increase attention to an issue, new parties may benefit from this.

Finally, Norris (2005, 269) hypothesises that the electoral system plays an important role in influencing the relationship between the share of votes a radical right party has and its effect on the positions of established parties. In a system with proportional representation, where new parties can enter parliament more easily,

established parties are more likely to change their policies. In a country with majoritarian electoral system, where it is difficult for parties to enter parliament, established parties are less likely to see new parties as threats, because they are unlikely to enter parliament. These new parties do not fit the definition of new party used in this chapter, which looks at new parties only when they enter the parliamentary arena. The reasoning of Norris can be explicated: high entry barriers prevent new parties from entering parliament. This means that until they enter parliament, parties, even if they perform well electorally, will not be seen as a threat (Norris 2005, 269). However, once these parties do cross the electoral threshold, they immediately form a sizeable parliamentary group, a real threat.

“The substitution of conflicts is the most devastating kind of political strategy. Alliances are formed and re-formed; fortresses, positions, alignments and combinations are destroyed or abandoned in a tremendous shuffle of forces redeployed to defend new positions or to take new strong points.”

Schattschneider (1960, 74 - emphases removed SO).

2.9 Changing the party system

As Schattschneider described in his *The semi-sovereign people*, the substitution of conflict is the most devastating kind of political strategy. If new political parties are able to change the nature of the political conflict they have a profound effect on the party system. The effect on the party systems appears to be the object of so many studies of new political parties. As discussed in section 2.2, these studies have focused on the electoral performance of new parties and have implicitly worked from a numerical definition of new party. This section will propose to understand a party system in terms of the significant lines of conflict and will propose to understand the effect of a new party from this perspective. Two mechanisms will be discussed which explain how the entry of a new political party may change the significant lines of conflict in a political system. Such a change, as will be argued here, is a form of party system change. Because the link between party system change and change in the political space may not be apparent and the study of (the dimensionality of the) political space is in my view complex and is riddled with empirical problems and theoretical misconceptualisations, these mechanisms require more explanation than the previous hypotheses.

The central notion of this section is that a change in the lines of conflict ought to be understood as a form of party system change. Terms like party system and party system change appear to defy definition (Mair 1997b, 48; Bardi & Mair 2008, 150). There is no consensus between political scientists about what the constitutive elements of a party system are, and the extent to which these elements need to change to qualify as a change of the party system. The typologies developed by Duverger (1954), Blondel (1968) and others still inform the current research on party systems (Bardi & Mair 2008, 150). These all focus on numerical characteristics of party systems (Bardi & Mair 2008, 152): specifically the number of political parties and their relative sizes (Mair 1997b, 202).

Mair (1997b, 6), following Sartori (1976, 42-47) dismisses the strictly numerical approach to party systems. He emphasises that a party system is more than the sum of its parts. What sets a party system apart from a group of individual political parties is the *patterned interactions* between them: a party system is characterised by a structure that determines the behaviour of political parties (Sartori 1976, 131-216; Mair 1997b, 21; Bardi & Mair 2008, 153). Authors have added many different criteria concerning the interaction between parties to their typologies of party systems. Sartori (1976) included criteria that concerned the interaction between government and opposition and electoral competition in his typology of party systems. In his own typology of party systems, Mair (1997b) focused on the difference between open and closed patterns of party competition and government formation. This notion of *patterned interaction* between political parties as the constitutive element of a party system plays a role in another approach to party systems. The spatial approach to party systems sees “party systems mainly through the competitive interaction drives among parties, and parties and voters in ideological space(s)” (Bartolini 1998, 40). Adapting Bartolini’s description of the spatial approach to party systems slightly, one could propose that the spatial approach to party systems sees party systems as the patterned interaction among political parties in a political space structured by a number of significant lines of conflict. The lines of conflict that underlie the patterned interaction between political parties would in this

view constitute a party system. Therefore, a change in those lines of conflict would *constitute* a change in the party system.¹⁴

Given that one can conceive of party system change in terms of change in the lines of conflict that structure political conflict, it may be useful to ask what these lines of conflict actually are. The concept 'significant line of conflict' has two components: the line of conflict and its significance. A line of conflict is a set of patterned differences and similarities in opinion between political parties on a set of issues (Bovens, Pellikaan & Trappenburg 1998, 11). This is also referred to as an issue divide (Deegan-Krause 2007, 539). So for instance, in Western democracies, leftwing parties tend to agree with each other on many political issues and disagree with rightwing parties on those issues.¹⁵ Schattschneider (1960) proposes to see a line of conflict as a line dividing political parties in two groups: for instance those who stand on the left side of that line and those who stand on the right. This conception of a line of conflict works great in a two-party system, but in a system with more than two parties it becomes too restrictive.

A line of conflict is *significant* in the sense that it dominates other lines of conflict (Schattschneider 1960, 64). Two kinds of domination can occur: marginalisation (Schattschneider 1960, 65) and absorption (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007, 283; Mair 2007). Marginalisation means that other issues (related to other lines of conflict) are excluded from the political debate. Marginalisation is an

¹⁴ This is not an odd notion of a party system. The interactive patterns between political parties are often put in spatial terms (Smith 1989). Like the numerical approach to party systems this view goes back to first theorists of party system in the mid 20th century, such as Schattschneider (1960). Even Duverger (1954), who proposed the numerical conception of party systems, describes the patterns of interaction between political parties in the French party systems in spatial terms.

¹⁵ It is conceptually important to distinguish a significant line of conflict from a political disagreement, a position divide and a political cleavage. A *political disagreement* (Bovens, Pellikaan & Trappenburg 1998, 11) is on a lower level than the significant line of conflict. A political disagreement occurs when two groups of parties disagree on a particular policy. Only when the same pattern of differences occurs regularly, can one use the term *line of conflict*. A *position divide* occurs in a different realm than a line of conflict. A position divide is difference in interests and identity between particular social groups. It is a division in the electorate. A *political cleavage* is a fusion of a position divide and a significant line of conflict. When there is both a patterned difference in voting behaviour between social groups with opposing interests and different identities, and a patterned difference in political opinions between the political parties for whom they vote, one can speak of political alignment (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 215; Deegan-Krause 2008, 539).

effect of the significant line of conflict on the *saliency* of other lines of conflict. The dominance of the left-right dimension in Denmark, for instance, has prevented the politicisation of moral issues (Green-Pedersen 2007). Absorption means that other party positions on other issues are “forced” into the significant line of conflict, even though they are not an “intrinsic element” of that line of conflict (Mair 2007, 214). An example of how absorption works can be seen in the materialist/post-materialist divide in the electorate. Inglehart (1984) observed how during the 1980s the post-materialist political divide changed. During the 1980s this divide stood perpendicular to the left-right divide. In the 1990s, post-materialist divide coincided with left-right divide. The post-materialist line of conflict was, according to Inglehart, absorbed into the left-right line of conflict. Absorption is an effect of the significant line of conflict on the positions of parties on other lines of conflict. Although well researched on the electoral level (Mair 2007, 212), this phenomenon has not been studied on the party-level. In summary, a significant line of conflict is a set of patterned differences in opinion between political parties that marginalises or absorbs other lines of conflict in a polity. As long as the issues related to both lines of conflict are salient and the party positions on those issues are perpendicular, there are two lines of conflict.

It is important to differentiate this approach from a model of politics in which one assumes that one dimension, for instance the left-right dimension, matters most. One may then, as De Vries et al. (2011, 2-3) have done, look at how the meaning of this left-right dimension changes over time. De Vries et al. (2011) identify two mechanisms similar to those observed here: issue bundling and issue crowding out. By issue bundling they mean that new issues are integrated into the left-right line of conflict, and by issue crowding out they mean that old issues may be pushed out of the left-right line of conflict. Similarly, this study looks at how new issues are integrated or pushed out of the significant lines of conflict. This study, however, is not based on *a priori* assumptions of the dimensionality of the political space. Whether this is one-, two- or three-dimensional depends on how party positions on salient issues relate to each other.

The significant lines of conflict are an important aspect of a political system. These determine political outcomes (Schattschneider 1960, 60). If a particular line of conflict is significant, a particular group may be part of the majority and in control of the political process. If other lines of conflict become significant, this group may lose its allies and find itself in the minority. The question which line of conflict is

significant in politics determines which groups are in the centre of the political arena and which are forced to stay in the margins. The line of conflict also determines the outcome of political decision making because it determines the majorities and therefore it decides also which policies a polity will pursue.

There are two ways in which a new party is able to influence the established lines of conflict: first its entry may introduce a new, significant line of conflict which replaces one of the existing lines of conflict; and second, its entry may cause a reduction in the number of lines of conflict. Following Schattschneider's lead, Mair proposes that the established parties have a shared interest in maintaining the "frozen" lines of conflict (Mair 1997a, 953, 1997b, 16; Schattschneider 1960, 68). By maintaining the existing lines of conflict, established parties maintain their own position in the party system: by making sure that the voters believe that the election is about either a liberal or a socialist future for the country, they exclude those voices that believe that the future of the country should be religious, green or feminist. New parties may explicitly seek to change the lines of conflict: that is, to introduce a new line of conflict in addition to or instead of the existing lines of conflict and so to displace the existing lines of conflict. This is the essence of what Schattschneider has called the conflict of conflicts (Mair 1997a, 951; Schattschneider 1960, 63).

Pellikaan et al. (2007) apply this notion to the effect of the LPF (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*/List Pim Fortuyn) on the Dutch party system in the electoral arena: before the entry of the LPF, the Netherlands was structured by a triangular pattern of competition and cooperation with a religious-secular, individualist-communitarian and a social-economic line of conflict (Pellikaan, Van der Meer & De Lange 2003b). The religious-secular line of conflict had lost its relevance after the legalisation of gay marriage and euthanasia. The LPF replaced the individualist-communitarian dimension by a monocultural-multicultural dimension concerning immigration and integration (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007, 298). Kriesi and Frey (2008, 179) have argued that the entry of the LPF into the Dutch political system caused a "disturbance of the dimensionality of the Dutch political space". In their eyes, the entry of the LPF into the political arena accentuated an on-going transformation of the cultural line of conflict into a line that divides cosmopolitan parties from nationalist parties (Kriesi & Frey 2008, 180). Several other scholars have echoed the idea that new political parties may be able to introduce new lines of conflict. Meguid (2005, 2007), for instance, proposes that when political parties react in an adversarial way to

the issues that a new political party brings to the table, they take position on a new issue dimension that may cut through the established lines of conflict (Meguid 2005, 357). By taking a dismissive strategy, by decreasing attention for the issue that the new party raises, an established political party may attempt to downplay the new issue and its crosscutting line of conflict, which could upset the patterned interaction between political parties.

However, as Mair (2001) has pointed out in a study of *Die Grünen* (The Greens), and as Bale (2003) has elaborated, the entry of a new political party into the political arena may also have another effect. It may upset the balance of power that has fostered a particular constellation of lines of conflict and cause a reduction in the lines of conflict. If a new political party forms a political alliance with a political party that has traditionally been on the losing side of a line of conflict, they may shift the balance in favour of that political party (Mair 2001, 111). By emphasising this line of conflict, the new political alliance finds itself in the majority. Therefore they force other lines of conflicts to the margins of the polity. Instead of multidimensional patterns of competition and cooperation, the pattern is brought down to a one-dimensional conflict. In this way, even parties who seek to introduce a new line of conflict may actually cause a reduction of the lines of conflict. The case of the German *Die Grünen* is especially illustrative: before the 1980s the patterns of cooperation between German political parties was “triangular” (Smith 1989). There were three parliamentary parties in the German *Bundestag*: the social democratic SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*/Social democratic Party of Germany), the Christian-democratic CDU (*Christlich Demokratische Union*/Christian Democratic Union) and the liberal FDP (*Freie Demokratische Partei*/Free Democratic Party). Cabinet cooperation varied between FDP/SPD, SPD/CDU and CDU/FDP. Two lines of conflict played a major role in cabinet: one social-economic line of conflict and one religious line of conflict. A centrist coalition of SPD and CDU, a centre-right coalition of CDU and FDP, or a secular coalition of SPD and FDP were all possible. After *Die Grünen* became a significant political force during the 1990s, the patterns of cooperation changed. Political parties are now structured in two blocks: a cabinet formed by the leftwing block of *Die Grünen* and SPD replaced a cabinet formed by the rightwing block of CDU/FDP in 1998. Although *Die Grünen* had attempted to introduce a new line of conflict concerning the environment into the German political space, their entry into the political arena has actually flattened the political space. This

changed the cabinet formation space from a two-dimensional space into a one-dimensional space. Bale (2003) extended this analysis to radical rightwing parties. He hypothesises that after the entry of the LPF into the Dutch political arena, the pattern of political cooperation flattened: it essentially became one-dimensional. In the Netherlands, as in several other West-European countries, rightwing populist parties were integrated into governing coalitions and/or electoral alliances with political parties of the centre-right. This further reinforced a trend towards a bimodal pattern of political cooperation, already set in motion by the incorporation of green parties into leftwing coalitions (Mair 2001). In those systems where political cooperation was structured by multiple lines of conflict, the co-optation of radical rightwing parties into rightwing alliances has caused a *reduction* of the number of lines of conflict. The significant conflict is now between a bloc of the left and a bloc of the right. The Netherlands is a prime example of this phenomenon, given the formation of a centre-right cabinet of the CDA (*Christen-Democratisch Appel*/Christian Democratic Appeal), the conservative-liberal VVD (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*/People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) and the LPF. The fact that the established parties imitated the issues of the new political parties made cabinet formation easier (Bale 2003, 75).

On the basis of the work of Mair, two different effects of the entry of a new party may be distinguished: sometimes parties are able to introduce their own line of conflict into a political system. Sometimes the entry of a new political party into a political arena can lead to a decrease in the number of lines of conflict. New parties can have a marked effect on the lines of conflict even when their electoral success is limited (as in the case of many green parties) or short-lived (in the case of the LPF). New parties are able to change “the nature of the debate” in a polity (Donavan & Broughton 1999, 267).¹⁶

¹⁶ There appears to be a tension between Bale and Pellikaan, because they come to different claims about the single case that they study. When Pellikaan et al. (2007) applied the Schattschneider-Mair thesis on the Dutch case, this led them to conclude that, due to the participation of the LPF in the Dutch elections, the nature of the significant lines of conflict changed, but the system remained multidimensional. The claim Bale (2003) makes that is also based on Mair's work, is radically different. Due to the participation of the LPF in government, the dimensionality of the Dutch system changed: from a two-dimensional system to a one-dimensional one. The claims of Pellikaan et al. (2007) however are not an outright contradiction of Bale (2003). Bale's claims specifically concern the patterns of cabinet cooperation, while Pellikaan

The question may rise how the systemic and individual level effects of new political parties cohere. In other words, how the claim that new parties can change the lines of conflict relates to the effects new political parties can have on individual established political parties. A line of conflict is a complex political phenomenon, which is the result of both the saliency of issues and the position of parties on those issues. If parties are differently ordered on two different issues and both these issues are salient, there are two lines of conflict. If, however, there is only one salient issue, or all parties are ordered in the same way on all issues, there is only one line of conflict. A change in the lines of conflict therefore is constituted by a change in the significance of issues or the positions of parties on issues.

There are three ways in which the lines of conflict can change: a new line of conflict can be added to the existing ones (Meguid 2005), a new line of conflict can replace one of the current lines of conflict (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007, 117-118; Kriesi & Frey 2008; Poole & Rosenthal 2009), or the number of lines of conflict can decrease (Mair 2001; Bale 2003). A change in the lines of conflict may be the result of a change in the saliency of issues: some issues may become more significant and others may become less significant. If party positions on this new issue are markedly different from their positions on the issues related to the established lines of conflict, a new line of conflict might arise. Contrariwise, if the new issue crowds out an issue on which parties positioned themselves markedly different than on the other issues, including the new one, the number of lines of conflict may decrease. If one wants to attribute a change in the significant lines of conflict to a new party, it must be the issue that this new party brings to the table that becomes more salient. The saliency of issues at the level of the party system is a result of the attention individual parties devote to issues.

focuses on the patterns of electoral competition. It may be that in two different arenas there are different lines of conflict, unless one claims that the lines of conflict that structure interaction in one arena apply to the other arena as well. Pellikaan et al. (2007, 297) actually does claim that his model can explain the patterns of cabinet formation. This contradicts Bale's claim is that the pattern of cabinet formation became more one-dimensional. The configuration of the parties in Pellikaan's *et aliorum* (2007, 296) two-dimensional spatial model for 2002 indicates that there is a significant relationship between the two dimensions, something which can hardly be said for his model of the pre-2002 space (Pellikaan 2003). One could therefore certainly claim that the space after 2002 is less multidimensional than the space before.

A change in the dimensionality of the party system may, however, also be the result of a change of the positions of political parties on some issues. If, because of the entry of a new party, parties change their position on a significant issue so that it is different from the order on other issues, this constitutes the introduction of a new significant line of conflict. If, because of the entry of a new political party, parties change their position on a significant issue so that it is the same as the order on the other issues, this constitutes a reduction of the significant lines of conflict. If both these things happen at the same time, the nature of significant lines of conflict may change, while their number stays the same.

Political cooperation between parties may also influence the number of established lines of conflict. Parties can cooperate in formal political alliances, in parliament or in cabinet. The entry of a new political party will open up the question of how to deal with this new party as established political party. If parties cooperate, they will behave in a similar way, supporting proposals of their allies and opposing proposals because their allies oppose them. If this cooperation takes place on parties that have a similar position on one of the established significant lines of conflict, it may actually focus the political conflict on less lines of conflict. If the cooperation breaks through the established lines of conflict, this may increase the number of lines of conflict.

In summary, a new party may influence the significant lines of conflict by changing the positions of established parties and the attention of parties on their issue. That is, it may change the significance of some lines of conflict (by influencing their saliency) or it may cause some lines of conflict to be absorbed (or ejected) from the existing lines of conflict. On the basis of this account, one can formulate these hypotheses:

12. New line of conflict formation hypothesis: a new line of conflict will come into existence:

- a. if the saliency of the issue that a new party campaigns on increases after its entry into parliament and the party positions on this issue diverge from party positions on the established lines of conflict;
- b. if the positions of parties on the issue that the new party campaigns on, change in such a way that they are different from those on existing significant lines of conflict, and the issue remains significant;

c. if, through cooperation, party positions of some parties that are divided on one of the established lines of conflict, become more similar.

13. Line of conflict disappearance hypothesis: the number of lines of conflict decreases:

- a. if the saliency of the issue that a new party campaigns on increases after its entry into parliament, and the relative positions on this issue are similar to the party positions on one of two dominant lines of conflict;
- b. if the positions of parties on the issue that the new party campaigns on change in such a way that they are similar to the existing lines of conflict and the issue remains significant;
- c. if, through cooperation, party positions of some parties that already held similar positions on the established lines of conflict, become more similar.

2.10 What this study does not claim

The central claim in the previous sections was that new political parties could influence established parties. One needs to differentiate this claim from two other effects on public policy: the direct effect of new political parties on policies through their own activity, and the effect of external events on policy

This study does not claim that new parties can only influence public policy indirectly. Like established political parties, new political parties have a range of tools to influence policy directly: they can use parliamentary initiatives, amendments or motions to influence government policy directly. Moreover, when they participate in government, the cabinet may itself propose policies that the new party favoured. This study looks at the indirect effect of new parties on policy: the effect new parties have on established parties, which may in turn influence public policies. Therefore, this study is not a complete survey of the policy success of new political parties.

The claim of this research is not that only new political parties can influence the established political parties and the party system. Groundbreaking work in the analysis of the agenda of political actors has been done by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). They analysed the change in the agenda of the United States government, especially within Congress. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) relate the changes in the legislative agenda of the United States Congress to objective social problems such as crime levels or levels of environmental pollution. They also show that, while politicians may seek to address these pressing social issues because they want to solve

real social problems, they may also address them because in the subjective view of citizens these issues are important. One important informant about what citizens find important may be found in the media (Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006, 89).

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) stress the role that “policy punctuations” play in maintaining the link between public and political priorities. In this view, periods of stability in the political agendas are interrupted by external events that direct the attention of politicians to social issues. External events can be anything: specific events (think of disasters, such as the Fukushima nuclear meltdown after the 2011 Tsunami in Japan) that get considerable attention from the media (Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006) but also by the formation of social movements (Rohrschneider 1993). Applying this framework to a European context, Walgrave et al. (2006, 1035) see a close link between the (stable) priorities of legislatures and the priorities set by political parties in their manifestos. Changes to these priorities, however, are more difficult to predict on the basis of the manifestos of political parties. Walgrave et al. relate this to smaller and larger external shocks.

One distinction that can be drawn from these studies is the one between antecedent causes and immediate causes. While the objective social problems and the perceptions of citizens of these problems may be important antecedent causes of the agendas of political or parliamentary parties, these can only enter into the political arena through policy punctuations. This study focuses on a particular type of these immediate causes: new political parties. These may serve as external shocks, catalysts bringing the political agenda closer to the priorities of the public. If the public feels that a problem is not addressed in the political arena, it will support a political party that does address that issue.

Chapter 3: Methods

About cases, political arenas and analytical strategies

3.1 Introduction

This research offers three methodological innovations from the existing literature on the effects of new political parties: the cases that are studied, the arenas that are examined and the combination of case-by-case study and statistical analysis. First, this study focuses on all new political parties that entered one political system over an extended period in time. Previous studies of new political parties were either single case studies or they studied one group of new political parties, but limited their research on the basis of either explanatory variables, such as new party size, or on the basis of arbitrary factors, such as party family. Case selection choices will be discussed in the section 3.2.

The second methodological innovation that this study offers, is that in addition to examining the electoral arena, this study also looks at the parliamentary arena. Sound theoretical reasons exist to assume that in different political arenas the effects of new political parties may be different. These were discussed in chapter 2. This chapter will devote special attention to the methods of data collection for party positions and political attention in both the parliamentary and electoral arena. In addition to bringing new insights by examining new political arenas, this study also uses new methods to measure positions and attention.

The final methodological innovation of this study is that it is not limited to either the contextual sensitivity of a case study or the abstractness of statistical analysis. In analysing the effect of new parties this study uses both case-by-case comparisons and statistical analysis. The statistical analysis allows us to control for the possibility of external circumstances by comparing those changes where a new party is present to those changes where no new party is present. This chapter will give an in-depth discussion of the methods of data analysis for the case-by-case and the statistical approaches.

3.2 Case selection

This study builds on two kinds of studies. On the one side, there is a limited number of studies that have tried to find general patterns in the reaction of established parties to new parties on the basis of a large number of cases (Meguid 2005, 2007; Huijbrechts 2006; Van Spanje 2010). These studies examine 'all' new parties in established democracies. On the other side, there is a range of case studies or comparative studies that have identified different effects of new political parties for specific cases (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007). These two different groups of studies pull the orientation of further research into two different directions. The conclusion of the large N-studies is that multiple types of effects on the basis of multiple sources of data need to be studied. A case study is best suited for this kind of research, because the case study provides the best possibility to integrate different types of data (Yin 2009). The different effects that have been uncovered in all the case studies could be put to the test for a larger sample, to test their external validity (Gerring 2007, 197; Yin 2009, 3). This research will combine intensive, context-sensitive study of individual cases in order to find out what effect each new party has had, using a large-N statistical analysis, in order to understand under what conditions which effects will occur.¹⁷

The study will focus on a political system with institutional stability in which a large number of parties enter. The reason that only one country, which is institutionally stable, is selected is to keep the other causes that could influence the programmatic success of new parties constant. In table 3.1 one can see a list of how many new parties entered the parliaments in all European states that have been a democracy since the Second World War. The first two countries on the list combine a higher number of new political parties with considerable institutional instability, making over time comparison of new party effects problematic. Italy tops the list: with 29 new political parties, it has seen most new parties. One explanation for this is the change in the party system after the collapse of DC (*Democrazia Cristiana*/Christian Democracy) and the rise of *Forza Italia* (Go Italy) in the early 1990s. These developments were followed by a major revision of the institutional structure of Italian democracy. These specific events make it difficult to test general theories about new political parties in Italy. The rise of *Forza Italia* may be an

¹⁷ Although this not a study of a large number of countries (or even new political parties), it does study a large number of new/established party pairs.

Table 3.1: number of new parties in parliament since first elections since 1945

Country	New Parties
Germany	3
Austria	3
Sweden	4
Norway	6
Luxembourg	7
Iceland	8
Ireland	11
Finland	11
Denmark	11
France ^a	13
Switzerland	15
United Kingdom ^b	17
Netherlands	19
Belgium ^c	21
Italy ^d	29

^a Excluding parties labelled "diverse left" and "diverse right" by electoral authorities;

^b 13 of which are parties from Northern Ireland;

^c Including the mainstream parties that were split because of the linguistic tensions in the 1960s and 1970s; excluding party cartels;

^d 19 before the disintegration of the party system in 1994 and 10 in the period 1994-2009.

interesting case study of the effects of a new political party. The institutional instability in Italy, however, makes it difficult to compare the effects of say the small communist split-off PD (*Democrazia Proletaria*/Proletarian Democracy), which entered parliament in 1983 to the effects of the anti-corruption party IdV (*Italia dei Valori*/Italy of Values), which entered parliament in 2001. Between 1983 and 2001 the institutional context changed too much to allow for a systematic comparison. Belgium is the second country on the list. Its high number can be explained by country-specific factors as well: due to the split of all established parties between 1960 and 1980 into a French-speaking and a Dutch speaking party, six new parties entered during the period 1960-1980. This was followed by a major decentralisation of the political system. Again the institutional stability prevents systematic comparison. The Netherlands is the third on the list with 19 new parties. Here, the number of new political parties is not the result of a political crisis, but of the open political system. The low electoral threshold is one of the most important features of the openness of the political system. This feature has remained stable during the entire research period. The Netherlands has one of the lowest electoral thresholds in the world (Lowery et al. 2010, forthcoming): it had a *de facto* threshold of 1% before 1956 and after 1956 it had a threshold of 0.67% of the vote. This is the only relevant

change to occur in the electoral system in Netherlands during this period and it is a relatively minor change. Other features that induce the entry of new political parties is the relative ease by which new political parties can register. The registration law has changed marginally over the research period, but not in such a way that it affected the entry of new parties (Lowery et al. forthcoming).

Because of its combination of a high number of new parties with institutional stability, the Dutch party system was selected for this study. The relative weakness of institutional barriers against new parties makes the Netherlands an attractive case to study the effect of new parties: high barriers prevent new parties from entering parliament. This means that parties that perform well electorally and do not enter parliament are not seen as a threat (Norris 2005, 269). But once parties cross the electoral threshold, they immediately form a sizeable parliamentary group. And therefore they form a large threat. Because of the low electoral threshold a considerable number of new parties entered parliament. There are considerable differences in the number of seats these parties had when they entered parliament. Countries with higher electoral thresholds have only had large parties enter their parliaments. This would mean that one cannot test whether the size of the party on entry in parliament influences the effect the party has on the party system.

Another factor that can influence the extent to which new parties can influence the established parties, are the parliamentary rules and procedures. In some countries, like the United Kingdom and France, the government exerts considerable control over the agenda of parliament. In other countries, government control is weaker and MPs have more influence on the parliamentary agenda. The less government control, the more likely new parties are to have an effect on the established parties. In systems with greater government control, the parties in government can prevent new parties from bringing new issues to the parliamentary agenda. In comparative studies of agenda control, the Netherlands quite consistently scores as one of the systems where parliament has most control over its own agenda: the Dutch parliament sets its own agenda, the government does not have tools to pressure parliament to speed up or prioritise its bills and MPs are relatively free in terms of private member bills or amendments (Döring 2001, 1995). The parliamentary rules and procedures are relatively lenient towards new parties.

A final factor is cabinet formation: if cabinet formation is closed to new parties, because of a tradition of one-party government or the existence of pre-

electoral coalitions, new parties are likely to remain marginalised. If cabinet formation is open to unusual coalitions and new parties, it is more likely that established parties might respond to new parties, because they soon can become relevant players in cabinet formation. The Netherlands is characterised by comparatively open procedures of cabinet formation (Mair 1997b).

These factors combined appear to make the Netherlands a likely case for new parties to have a range of effects on established parties. One could say that this makes the Netherlands a “crucial case” to study new parties (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 279). As one is likely to find effects of new parties on established parties in this country, one could argue that it is “a most likely case study” (Gerring 2007, 120). In terms of the external validity of this study, the Netherlands is a likely case. From the perspective of Popper’s (1959) critical rationalism, which emphasises falsification, this kind of case study can be used to disprove the validity of a (deterministic) theory. If a particular relationship does not appear in the system it is likely to occur in, it is likely not to occur in any system (Gerring 2007, 120). This does mean, however, that when one finds that the relationship is proven to hold in this case, it will not necessarily hold for all new political parties. If it proves the theory true, the study says little about the external validity of the theory for less likely cases. Such a characterisation is not without qualification: because of the low electoral threshold, a large number of small flash parties have participated in Dutch elections. These parties gain a small number of seats and often disappear from parliament after one election.¹⁸ It would be easy for established parties to ignore new parties under these conditions, as they are just irrelevant and fleeting phenomena. The Dutch established parties might have developed a kind of immunity to new parties. In a country where a much lower number of new parties enter the political scene, established parties may be more easily shocked by their entry.

This study differs from previous studies about the effect of new political parties in that it looks at all the new parties that have entered the political system instead of a selection of relevant parties. Most studies of new parties have focused on the effect of one particular party or a particular family of parties on the party system. The larger N-studies have selected only ‘relevant’ political parties, in the case of Meguid (2005, 2007) and Huijbregts (2006) on the basis of the criteria used by the

¹⁸ Of the nineteen parties studied, eight gain only one seat and seven do not return in parliament after their first period in parliament.

Table 3.2: new parties in the Tweede Kamer between 1946 and 2006

New Party			Elected	Ideology
Dutch	English	Abb.		
<i>Katholieke Nationale Partij</i>	Catholic National Party	KNP	1948	Rightwing Catholicism
<i>Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij</i>	Pacifist Socialist Party	PSP	1959	Leftwing Socialism
<i>Boerenpartij</i>	Farmers' Party	BP	1963	Conservatism
<i>Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond</i>	Reformed Political League	GPV	1963	Orthodox Protestantism
<i>Democraten '66</i>	Democrats '66	D66	1967	Pragmatism Radical Democracy
<i>Politieke Partij Radicalen</i>	Political Party Radicals	PPR	1971	Progressive Christianity
<i>Democratisch Socialisten '70</i>	Democratic Socialists '70	DS'70	1971	Social-democracy
<i>Nederlandse Middenstandspartij</i>	Dutch Middle Class Party	NMP	1971	Anti-Tax Populism
<i>Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland</i>	Roman Catholic Party Netherlands	RKPN	1972	Orthodox Catholicism
<i>Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie</i>	Reformed Political Federation	RPF	1981	Orthodox Protestantism
<i>Evangelische Volkspartij</i>	Evangelical People's Party	EVP	1982	Progressive Christianity
<i>Centrumpartij</i>	Centre Party	CP	1982	Radical Nationalism
<i>Algemeen Ouderen Verbond</i>	General Elderly League	AOV	1994	Pensioners' Interest
<i>Politieke Unie 55+</i>	Political Union 55+	U55+	1994	Pensioners' Interest
<i>Socialistische Partij</i>	Socialist Party	SP	1994	Socialism
<i>Leefbaar Nederland</i>	Liveable Netherlands	LN	2002	Democratic Populism
<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>	List Pim Fortuyn	LPF	2002	Liberal Nationalism
<i>Partij voor de Dieren</i>	Animals Party	PvdD	2006	Green Politics
<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>	Freedom Party	PVV	2006	Liberal Nationalism

manifesto research group, which only include parties with significant, long-term representation in parliament and/or participation in cabinets into their data set. This means that these studies cannot reveal whether size (or relevance) can explain the effects new that parties have on the party system.

This study focuses on all new political parties to enter the Dutch parliament since 1946. The Second World War formed a major rupture in Dutch politics, especially in terms of the party system - less so in terms of voting behaviour. Many studies of new political parties put the boundary much more recently: in the 1970s for instance (Huijbrechts 2006; Mair 1999). By examining a number of political parties from before 1970, one can also examine the effects of political parties in the much less dynamic political situation of pillarisation and consensus politics (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 39). This does, however, have its drawbacks: political documentation becomes worse if one goes back in time: election manifestos and parliamentary

records are smaller and less informative. Before the Second World War, even less data is available.

The new parties studied are selected on the basis of the criteria proposed: those parties are under study that win seats in the lower house of the Dutch Parliament, the *Tweede Kamer* for the first time, and have not been formed by transformation or a merger in which one or more parties participated that previously held seats in parliament. This means that these cases are selected from all parties that have attempted to enter parliament. Between 1946 and 2006, 165 parties, which had not been represented before, attempted to enter the *Tweede Kamer*. Only 29 of them have been successful in gaining representation. Of these 29, four parties were mergers: PvdA (*Partij van de Arbeid*/Labour Party), CU (*ChristenUnie*/ChristianUnion), GL and CDA (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303).¹⁹ These mergers are excluded on the basis of the definition of a new political party. Almost all merging parties were established parties: on average, a merging party had been in parliament for 44 years before merging. Six parties can be seen as transformations of established parties: KVP (*Katholieke Volkspartij*/Catholic People's Party), PvdV (*Partij van de Vrijheid*/Party of Freedom), KNP (*Katholieke Nationale Partij*/Catholic National Party), CD (*Centrum-Democraten*/Centre Democrats) and VVD.²⁰ The KVP, PvdV and VVD were among "big five" Dutch parties and therefore they were the most established of established parties (Daalder 1965, 172). The KNP is included because of a legal technicality.²¹ The CD is the only problematic case. It was formed when Janmaat, the sole Member of Parliament (MP) for the CP, left his party. Because for parties with parliamentary representation the focus in the definition is on their political representatives and on not their party organisation (see 4.2.1), the CD can best be seen

¹⁹ PvdA was a merger of the SDAP, VDB and CDU (see section 4.3); CDA: CHU, ARP and KVP entered with a common list in 1977 (see section 4.4.7); GL: PSP, PPR, CPN and EVP entered with a common list in 1989 (see section 4.4.7); CU: RPF and GPV entered with a common list in 2002 (see section 4.4.10).

²⁰ KVP entered parliament in 1946 as a transformation of the RKSP (see section 4.3); PvdV entered parliament in 1946 as a transformation of the LSP (see section 4.3); VVD entered parliament in 1948 as a transformation of PvdV (see section 4.3); KNP entered parliament in 1952 as a transformation of Lijst-Welter (see section 4.4.1); CD entered parliament in 1989 as a transformation of CP (see section 4.4.12).

²¹ Because the party was not registered with the Electoral Council the KNP could not run under the name KNP in the 1946 election. Instead it was a nameless list, lead by Welter. In the 1948 election the party did run under the name KNP. Still, the name KNP is used here, because this name was generally used to describe the party.

as a transformation of the CP. This leaves a total of 19 parties. These parties are listed in table 3.2 and are discussed in detail in chapter 4.

3.3 Analytical strategy

This study seeks to determine whether a marked change in attention or in the position of established parties in either the electoral or the parliamentary arena can be attributed to the entry of the new party. To be able to determine whether this is indeed the case, three conditions have to be met: first, there must be a marked difference in the positions or attention between the period before the new party entered the parliamentary arena and the period after it did. Second, alternative explanations for the change must be eliminated. And third, the change must be attributed to the new party.

In order to determine whether all three conditions are met, three different research strategies are used. The first is based on a comparative case study research approach, which analyses case-by-case; the second approach analyses the result of the case studies statistically to assess the significance of the patterns found in the case-by-case analyses. The primary purpose of these two analyses is to assess the extent to which changes in attention of established parties could be attributed to the entry of the new party, whether the change cannot be attributed to alternative explanations, and which factors are at work in every individual case. The third approach, which is only applied for the analysis of attention, compares those changes in attention for established parties, where a new party is present, to those changes in attention where no new party is present. The goal of this expanded statistical analysis is to assess the extent to which the entry of a new party leads to a marked change in attention compared to *all* changes in attention and which, if any, general patterns can be identified.

In the case-by-case analysis, the goal is to ensure that changes in attention and position can be attributed to the entry of a new political party when looking at contextual factors. The goal is to eliminate alternative explanations for changes in attention and position. The logic applied here is one of process tracing or pattern matching (Gerring 2007): the changes in the levels of attention are charted and validity of different explanations for this development are evaluated. The goal of these analyses is three-fold: first, to determine whether the elections in which the new party entered, interrupted the developments in position and attention markedly; second, to

eliminate alternative explanations for the developments. The combined goal here is to determine whether the new party can be identified as the cause of the change in attention and position. The third goal is to determine which of the explanations can best explain differences in the pattern of attention. In other words, the goal is to determine by comparing the patterns in attention whether for instance larger parties react differently than small parties. The strength and significance of these patterns is further tested in a statistical analysis.

In the analysis of attention, the analysis is expanded to include all changes in attention. The goal of this analysis is to assess whether the entry of a new political party has a significant effect on attention. For the analysis of attention, the analysis is taken one level further. In this analysis, *all* changes in attention are studied. That is, the changes are studied in attention in *all* parties' parliamentary activity, in *all* parliamentary periods and on *all* issues. By comparing the developments in the attention that parties devote to the issues new parties own to all other changes, one can see whether the presence of new parties causes significantly different patterns in attention compared to the situation when they were not present. All kinds of changes in attention occur, caused by all kinds of factors inside and outside of established parties. By comparing these natural patterns to those patterns that occur just after the entry of a new party into parliament on the specific issue that it owns, one can control for alternative explanations. One can attribute the changes in attention devoted to a specific issue to the presence of a new party if these changes in attention are *significantly* different from all other changes when this new party is not present. If the developments in the attention to the issue that is owned by the new party are caused by other external factors, then they should not be *significantly* different from the rest of the cases. If external developments cause changes in attention, they do so independently of whether a new party is present or not, and therefore there will be no significant effect of the new party on the attention that established parties devote to issues in those cases. The question is whether new parties caused a significant change in attention, and therefore the focus in the regression analyses is on the levels of significance, and less so on other measures of the explanatory strength of the relationship, such as the R-squared.²²

²² In the case of the r-squared, the variance one can explain by these analyses is small because in only a fraction of the changes in the attention, a new party is present.

This study also does not examine the follow-up effects of new political parties. That is: the entry of a new political party A may cause a change in party B, which in turn elicits change in party C. The approach is temporal: the positions of parties before and after the entry of a new political party are examined. The possibility that the interaction of established parties causes the changes after this point in time which may be attributed to the the new party, because the further one moves from the entry of the new party, the less likely it is that the entry of the new party is the actual cause.

This combination of research strategies allows one to isolate the effects of new political parties. It allows one to assess whether changes in established parties can really be attributed to the new political parties, by separating the effects of new parties from the effects of specific events and determining whether these changes are significantly different from general patterns in attention.

3.4 Data collection and data analysis in the parliamentary arena

Chapter 5 will examine the effects of new political parties on established parties in the parliamentary arena, in terms of attention and positions. The first is operationalised in terms of the issues that parties talk about in parliament and the second in terms of the positions that they take in parliamentary voting. For both position and attention, the reasons for these specific operationalisation and measurement choices are discussed here.

3.4.1 Attention in parliament

There are two research strategies to measure the differences between the issue priorities of parliamentary parties (Louwerse & Otjes 2011): one can look at what parties say or at what parties do. Issues are put on the parliamentary agenda for discussion, but this does not necessarily lead to parliamentary action. MPs have a wide array of actions at their disposal: written questions, motions, amendments and private member bills. MPs are only likely to act when they find government action on the issue lacking or when they want to get media attention. This means that analysing actions to understand issue saliency in parliament has one big drawback (Louwerse 2011, 66): it only measures the actions of dissatisfied MPs. Satisfied MPs who support the government may use their speaking time to praise the government without proposing motions, amendments or bills. A minister can prevent proposals from being tabled or being voted on by making commitments to MPs. Ministers are more likely to

make promises to MPs of the governing coalition than to those of the opposition. Therefore, one would expect government MPs to be far more passive in terms of parliamentary actions than opposition MPs. Looking at action means that one only sees half of parliament, looking at speech means that one sees the whole.

There are two other advantages of examining speech as opposed to motions or other parliamentary actions. First, small parties are limited by the parliamentary rules from tabling motions and amendments. An MP needs the consent of four of his colleagues to propose a motion. While this rule has not been applied rigorously or consistently, it has limited the ability of some small parties to propose motions. Almost all parties that entered parliament with one or two seats have proposed less than 10 motions during their first term in parliament.²³ If one wants to use the parliamentary activity of new parties as an explanatory variable and if many new parties are small, one has to look at parliamentary speech.


Finally, as one can see in figure 3.1, there has been an explosion in the use of motions in the 1970s.²⁴ Before 1967, the number of motions per parliamentary period in the database does not exceed 100. In 1967-1971, the number of motions increases sharply to 384. In the 1977-1981 period, the number of motions exceeds 1000 for the first time. From that moment on, the number of motions per parliamentary period exceeds 1000 (except for parliamentary periods that end early due to snap elections). Between 1982-1986 and 1986-1989 there is a decrease in the number of motions,²⁵ but since then the number has grown during every full parliamentary term. In the period 2006-2009, the number of motions exceeds 2000 for the first time. This poses considerable constraints on which cases one can study: there is little data on the cases before 1967. Parliamentary speech on the other hand stays relatively stable: there is no marked decrease or increase in this.

²³ The only exceptions are the PPR and the PvdD.

²⁴ This marked increase is visible for legislative initiatives as well, but less so for amendments (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 154).

²⁵ This is probably best explained by stricter rules on when motions can be tabled.

Figure 3.1: number of motions proposed each parliamentary period



3.4.2 Talking in the Dutch parliament

One of the major activities of MPs is to speak on issues that are on the agenda.²⁶ Part of the work of MPs takes place in committees and part of it takes place in plenary sessions. The decisions that are made in plenary sessions are prepared in committee. In committees, MPs can engage in a dialogue with the cabinet and they can inform themselves about issues. No substantive decision-making takes place in the committees.²⁷ This means that a plenary meeting must follow every committee meeting that prepares a decision.²⁸

The plenary meetings occur within time constraints: they are held for three days in every week in which the parliament is not in recess. Therefore, the agenda of parliament is tightly controlled. The speaker proposes the agenda to parliament.²⁹ Parliament follows the policy agenda of the government in some cases: it discusses the bills, policy papers or budgets proposed by the government. In some cases, however, laws or policy papers are tabled by the government in response to a request by an MP. MPs can also set the parliamentary agenda themselves: by private member

²⁶ The term 'parliament' itself (from the French 'parlement' which is in turn derived from 'parler' 'to speak') is a sign of this.

²⁷ Reglement van orde van de Tweede Kamer. 2010. Den Haag. p.14.

²⁸ Ibid. 18.

²⁹ Ibid. 20.

bills, which are rare; in the form of parliamentary studies or inquiries, which are rare as well; in the form of interpellations or emergency debates with cabinet members, which are increasing in use; or in the form of an oral question to ministers during the weekly question hour. While any MP has the right to propose a bill or ask oral questions, a parliamentary majority is needed to start a parliamentary study or an inquiry.³⁰

No one can speak unless the speaker has given him or her the right to do so.³¹ The speaker also determines the speaking time. The time is allotted among parliamentary parties, which appoint one spokesperson per debate. In longer debates, parties are allotted speaking time according to the size of the parliamentary party.³² MPs can interrupt other MPs and cabinet members to ask a question, if the speaker allows them to.³³ Parliamentary parties can decide not to participate in a debate; this is often the case in busier periods in parliament, for smaller parliamentary parties and politically less important debates. Within each debate, MPs have considerable leeway to address the issue as they see fit. The Speaker can take away an MP's right to speak, but this only occurs in extreme cases.³⁴ In those cases, the Speaker also has the right to strike the words of that MP from the proceedings (Bootsma & Hoetink 2006).³⁵

In summary, parliamentary parties are constrained by the parliamentary agenda on the one hand, which means that they will focus on the issues that the cabinet, other parliamentary parties or they themselves put on the agenda. On the other hand, parliamentary parties enjoy considerable liberty: they themselves participate in setting the parliamentary agenda; they can decide not to participate in parliamentary discussions and focus on their own policy priorities during their speeches.

³⁰ Ibid. 37-38.

³¹ Ibid. 20-21.

³² Ibid. 21.

³³ Ibid. 21.

³⁴ Ibid. 21-22.

³⁵ Ibid. 22. This includes cases such as personal insults or breaches of confidentiality.

3.4.3 Collection and categorisation of parliamentary speech

The data presented here was collected and categorised by Louwerse (2011). The study uses the digitalised proceedings of the Dutch parliament.³⁶ The texts are categorised into the policy categories of the Comparative Agendas Project (Breeman, Lowery et al. 2009, Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006). The method used here has been developed by Louwerse (2011): the parliamentary speeches are divided into paragraphs. These paragraphs are subsequently assigned to these categories in a two-step process. First, the paragraphs were assigned to categories on the basis of a dictionary of signal words (Louwerse 2011, 80). The basic reasoning is that if a word like ‘refugee’ (vluchteling) is included in a piece of text, one can be reasonably sure that it should be categorised as pertaining to the issue of immigration, especially when words like ‘asylum’ (asiel) are included as well (Louwerse 2011, 80). Each paragraph was assigned to the category in which it had most words, relative to the logged number of words in the word list of each category (Louwerse 2011). For each category, between 20 and 50 words were selected on the basis of a reading of relevant documents: parliamentary debates, election manifestos, parliamentary motions and the categorisation instructions of the Flemish branch of the Comparative Agendas Project (Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006).

Those paragraphs that could not be assigned to a category on the basis of the dictionary approach, because they included no word from the dictionary or an equal number of words from two or more categories, were assigned using an automatic classification algorithm (Louwerse 2011, 214). In these cases a Linear Support Vector Machine was employed: these assign the paragraphs that are not coded to categories based on similarity in word use to paragraphs that were already coded.³⁷ Because of issues with computer processing, the entire period could not be analysed in a single analysis. Therefore, the entire period was cut into shorter periods preceding or

³⁶ The digitalised parliamentary speeches were collected from *parlando* for the period 1995-2010 and from *statengeneraaldigitaal*-websites for the period 1952-1995 (Louwerse 2011, 206). The texts, especially those before 1995, were heavily processed.

³⁷ A Linear Support Vector Machine treats each paragraph as a point in a high-dimensional space, where each word forms a dimension (Louwerse, 2010, 214). For those paragraphs for which the categories are known, the SVM will calculate a hyper-plane, which is best able to separate the different categories (Louwerse, 2010, 214). This can in turn be used to assign the paragraphs to the categories to which they are, in terms of word use, most similar.

following each election.³⁸ The Louwerse approach has shown itself to be quite valid when compared to the results of hand coding (Louwerse 2011, 81). The results of the validity: Louwerse's results have a Krippendorff's Alpha of 0.723 for Dutch-language election manifestos compared to hand coding (Louwerse 2011, 81). The results are similar to the results of Breeman et al. (2009), who also used a computerised technique to process parliamentary documents. This method does not produce perfect correspondence between human and computer coding, but for the purposes of this enterprise the method suffices (Louwerse 2011, 83). The policy issue categorisation scheme of the Dutch Policy Agendas Project was used (Breeman, Lowery, et al. 2009). This scheme was amended in order to better differentiate between the specific appeals of specific new parties. These categories are also used in the other analyses. For the analyses of parliamentary speech a separate category was created for speech concerning procedure. The substantive categories are listed in appendix 1.

3.4.4 Case-by-case analysis of attention in parliament

This data will be analysed in a three-step analysis: in a case-by-case context-sensitive analysis, in a statistical analysis and in an expanded statistical analysis. In chapter 4, the new parties will be linked to specific issues. These issues are selected on the basis of an analysis of the election manifesto of the party and the assessment of scholars in secondary works as to what the unique appeal of the party was.



In the case-by-case analysis, the developments in the attention that established parties devote to the issue of the new party are followed closely. Trend lines are calculated for the period before and after the elections in order to determine whether the elections constitute an interruption in the development of attention. These are made by means of a regression analysis between the year and the level of attention in that year. Examples of patterns in which the elections lead to a marked interruption and do not lead to a marked interruption of the patterns of attention, are shown in figure 3.2 and 3.3. In these figures hypothetical examples of trend lines in attention can be seen. As figure 3.2 shows, the interruption can occur in the form of a difference in the value (pattern A) and in a difference in the slope (pattern B and C) of

³⁸ The periods that were studied were 1952-1959, 1956-1963, 1959-1967, 1967-1977, 1972-1981, 1977-1986, 1982-1989, 1986-1994, 1989-1994, 1994-2002 and 1998-2010. To obtain the figures for section 5.12, a special analysis was made for the period 1963-1977.

the trend lines. Figure 3.3 shows that, even when attention increases (as in pattern E), if the elections do not lead to an interruption in the pattern of attention, one cannot attribute this to the new party, because an autonomous development continued.

The next step is to consider alternative explanations for the patterns that are found. Alternative explanations may be found in two different realms: first, social, economic or international developments may force an issue to the table. An exploding nuclear reactor in Fukushima may force energy policy onto the parliamentary agenda in the Netherlands. To this end (where possible) data on social, economic or international developments are presented that may constitute an explanation to these developments. Second, the legislative cycle may influence when parliament devotes attention to an issue: processes of depoliticisation (advisory committees, moving decision-making to another level, postponing decision-making) may remove an issue from the parliamentary agenda, while processes of politicisation (legislative proposals, government policy papers) may bring an issue to the foreground. In some cases, the budgetary cycle, which concentrates activity on financial matters in the last months of the year may affect the patterns is also evaluated as an alternative explanation.

The third step is to compare different individual patterns of non-reaction and reaction in order to understand these patterns. One of the most striking outcomes of these analyses is that, while there are considerable differences in the way that new political parties influence established parties, when responding to a new party, the reactions of established parties are uniform. All parties show a similar pattern of increasing attention, decreasing attention or stability in attention. Therefore, the attention of all established parties is presented, instead of the attention of individual parties. The focus in the discussions of these individual cases is on whether the change in attention can be understood in terms of a collective response of all established parties to the new party, instead of individual reactions of each established party.

Figure 3.2: response patterns**Figure 3.3: non-response patterns**

3.4.5 Statistical analysis of attention in parliament

Two different statistical analyses are made: one which concerns only the cases of change where a new political party is present and one which concerns all cases of changes. While these analyses are based on different assumptions about attributability, these are based on similar measures.

In the first statistical analysis, only those cases of change are included where a new party is present. In essence, we analyse the results of the case-by-case analyses statistically to see where the patterns found there hold up to statistical scrutiny. In the second, expanded, statistical analysis the cases are expanded to include all changes in attention. These analyses seek to determine the extent to which the presence of a new party matters *significantly* for the issues that established parties devote attention to, compared to all fluctuations of attention. In the analyses presented, *all* changes in attention are studied. That is, the changes are studied in attention in *all* parties' parliamentary activity, in *all* parliamentary periods and on *all* issues. The goal is to determine whether the presence of a new political party leads to a significantly different pattern in attention.

In both analyses the developments in attention will be analysed in a two-parliamentary term-period: in order to see the effect of a party that entered parliament in a particular year (for example 1994), the attention devoted to issues in the period before the new party entered parliament (1989-1994) will be compared to the attention devoted to issues in the period after the new party entered parliament (1994-1998).³⁹ This study employs a measure of relative change in attention. The basic logic is that going to 2 percentage points from 1 percentage point is treated the same as going from 10 percentage points to 20 percentage points: in both cases, attention doubles. In order to avoid divisions by zero, the relative change is calculated in terms of the absolute change in attention divided by the sum of attention in the parliamentary period before and after the entry of a new party. This limits the data between the values -1 and +1.⁴⁰ This method is chosen because of its intuitive appeal.⁴¹

³⁹ For those elections that followed or that were snap elections, the periods were extended in order to avoid outliers. This applies to the elections in 1971, 1972, 1981, 1982, 2002 and 2003.

⁴⁰ This method has clear advantages over other methods of measuring change, such as the Percentage Change Method of Jones and Baumgartner (2005:178-180), which is leptokurtic. This is a logical result of a division by the level of previous attention,

These values will then be analysed in regression analyses. In these analyses, the focus is on determining whether the entry of a new party (under specific conditions) leads to significant change in attention compared to the existing natural changes in attention (when no new party was present). In the expanded statistical analyses, the data set consists of a lot of cases in which no new party is present. Therefore the variables used to evaluate the different explanations in this analysis are highly collinear. Multiple regression is therefore inappropriate. Out of the total of 3045 established party/parliamentary period/issue combinations in the expanded statistical analysis, a new party was present in only 159 cases. Therefore, the strength of the explanations (in terms of the R-squared for instance) is less important than the significance. The key question is not what share of the variance the presence of a new party can explain, because in only 159 of the 3045 established party-year-issue triads a new party is present. The key question is the extent to which the patterns for the cases where new parties are present are *significantly different* from all cases. An example can help to illustrate how the measure of relative change in attention score is calculated. In table 3.3, one can see what percentage of words established parties devoted to the issue of immigration in the parliamentary periods 1998-2002 and 2002-2006. This is the issue owned by the LPF, which entered parliament in the 2002 elections. The absolute change in attention is the difference between the percentages of before and after the entry of the LPF. In 1998-2002, D66 devoted 3.8% of what they said in parliament to immigration. In the period 2002-2006, D66 devoted 4.7% of what they said to this issue: an increase of almost one percentage point. To calculate the relative measure of change in attention score, the absolute change will be divided by the sum of the attention before and after. The relative measure of change in attention score is +0.108 for D66. These developments in the attention devoted to the issue owned by the LPF in the parliamentary period after it

because the data is limited at a 100% decrease in attention. This method limits the data by both the level of attention at $t=-1$ and $t=+1$. Within these boundaries, the data is roughly normally distributed.

⁴¹ Robustness test were run for different operationalisations. For each analysis, four different models were used: a long-term and a short-term model (where the period was and was not extended following snap elections) and a model looking at relative and absolute changes in attention. This leads to four models (long-term absolute, long-term relative, short-term absolute, short-term relative). Where there are deviances between the tests and the models that are presented, this will be noted.

Table 3.3: calculating change in attention scores (example)

Established Party	Attention 1998-2002	Attention 2002-2006	Absolute Change	Relative Change
	%	%		
CDA	3.52	3.13	-0.39	-0.059
CU	2.44	3.10	+1.66	+0.254
D66	3.81	4.73	+0.92	+0.108
GL	3.69	5.27	+1.56	+0.174
PvdA	2.82	4.76	+0.94	+0.143
SGP	2.92	3.81	+0.89	+0.132
SP	2.25	3.61	+1.36	+0.232
VVD	3.47	3.84	+0.47	+0.063

Table 3.4: relationship between change and levels of attention

Variable	Attention in Parliament		Attention in Election Manifestos	
	Absolute Difference	Relative Difference	Absolute Change	Relative Change
Intercept	0.760*** (0.046)	0.082*** (0.005)	2.05*** (0.085)	0.210*** (0.005)
Attention at t=-1	-0.160*** (0.008)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.430*** (0.013)	-0.037*** (0.002)
R-square	0.104	0.071	0.265	0.155
N	3360	3360	2898	2898

entered parliament, will be compared to all developments in the attention to all issues (not included in table 3.3).

When studying developments in attention in this way, there is a problem. Under any specification, there is a negative relationship between the amount of attention a party has devoted to an issue and the change in attention afterwards. As one can see in table 3.4, this relationship is quite robust. Whether one calculates a relationship between the *absolute* change and the previous level of attention, or between the *relative* change and the previous level of attention, this relationship is significant and explains a fair share of the variance. The relationship is present in the data for the electoral and the parliamentary arena. For the absolute change in attention, this may be the result of the fact that the larger the previous level of attention is, the greater the decreases in attention can be: if the previous level of attention is 1% the maximum decrease is 1%, if it is 10% the maximum decrease is 10%. However, a relative measure of change in attention would not have this problem, because the maximum decrease (or increase) is always 1. In contrast to the

pattern in the absolute data, the pattern here appears to be of a substantive nature. It appears to imply that there is a natural maximum to how much attention a party can devote to an issue: the more attention it has already devoted to an issue, the smaller the (relative) change in attention will be. It appears that developments in attention do not continue linearly until 100% is reached. There is a saturation level of attention, beyond which not many parties extend. Only a few outliers extend beyond the level of 30% attention.⁴² This makes the analysis considerably more complicated. There is no way to avoid this phenomenon, because it is a substantive phenomenon. Therefore, all statistical analyses will be constructed as control relationships, using the relationship with this phenomenon as a robustness check.

3.4.6 Party positions in parliament

There are two research strategies available to measure the differences in position in parliament (Louwerse & Otjes 2011): on the one hand one can look at what parties say, and on the other hand one can look at what parties do. The core question here is how parties position themselves on the dominant line of conflict. The two methods available are a word-based approach, which analyses parliamentary speeches, or a vote-based approach, which analyses parliamentary voting. A vote-based strategy is pursued here for three reasons: first, the focus is on the significant line or lines of conflict on an issue. During their parliamentary speeches, any party can address any aspect related to the issue on the agenda. This means that there is considerable variance in the issues that are addressed. It is more likely that party positions conform to the significant line of conflict on that issue, because the motions that are voted on are a non-random sample of all possible motions on that issue. Which motions are voted on, is regulated by parties' strategic considerations.

In a word-based approach, differences in word use may in part be motivated by ideological differences. They may however also be the result of differences in the vernacular of the period or the style, regional background and whether civil servants wrote a speech. All these differences can be picked up in a word-scaling technique (Louwerse 2011, 210-223). A vote-based technique has fewer drawbacks.

⁴² Note that this relationship does not exist in this data set, nor in similar data sets such as the data of the Comparative Manifestos Project: for the absolute data, the relationship is strong and significant (b-value of -0.48 significant at the 0.01-level). For the relative model, the relationship is weaker, but still significant (b-value of -0.04, significant at the 0.01-level). These analyses concern 82,264 cases.

Table 3.5: voting in the Tweede Kamer

Vote Type	Percentage
Motions	56%
Amendments	35%
Laws	9%
Other	0%
N	45,316

Finally, the measurement of party positions in parliament through parliamentary voting is a tried and tested method. The application of these methods to the Dutch parliament goes back to the 1970s (Van Tijn-Koekebakker, Brinkman & Koomen 1971; Wolters 1984; Van der Brug 1997). Since the development of these methods in the United States they have been applied to the Swiss *Nationalrat* (Hug & Schulz 2007), the Danish *Folketing* (Hansen 2008), the Irish *Dáil* (Hansen 2009), the Korean National Assembly (Jun & Hix 2009), the French *Assemblée Nationale* (Rosenthal & Voeten 2004), the British House of Commons (Spirling & McLean 2007), and the European Parliament (Hix 2001; Hix, Noury & Roland 2006).

3.4.7 Voting in the Dutch Parliament

The Dutch parliament votes on a range of different propositions. The major categories are bills, amendments to bills and motions. Parliament can vote on other matters, such as proposals of the speaker or of MPs, the appointment of people to specific posts, citizens' initiatives, articles of bills and recommendations of parliamentary research committees. More than half of the 45,316 votes between 1963 and 2010 are motions. About a third concern amendments and a tenth are bills. The other propositions are only a small share of votes. More precise figures are listed in table 3.5. The problem observed in section 3.4.1 that only a limited number of votes is available for the period before 1977, is (partially) solved by including votes on motions, amendments and laws. The problem of too few votes is not definitively solved in this way, but the extent of these problems is decreased: there are not enough votes before 1963 to analyse the results per issue category.

A motion is the expression of a judgment or wish of parliament, mainly concerning government policy (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 342; Visscher 1994, 98). The political significance of motions differs (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling

2010, 350). In a motion, MPs can express their wishes without having to back these financially (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 350). Some motions are only proposed for political purposes. Small parties or opposition parties can use a motion to make their own views public or force other parties to take position (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 352). The cabinet does not need to implement motions (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 350-351; Visscher 1994, 98). The only motion that cannot be ignored is a motion of no confidence; if such a motion is accepted the minister or the cabinet, as a whole, must resign (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 347). Motions are used to change existing policy. If the *Tweede Kamer* agrees with the cabinet, no need exists to express this with a motion (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 347). A motion need not come to a vote, if a minister takes over the intention of the motion and promises to implement the proposed policies (Visscher 1994, 100). Motions play an important role in the policy making process: motions often ask the cabinet to propose legislation and when proposing a bill, ministers often refer to adopted motions (Visscher 1994, 118-120). MPs make frequent use of motions, because they are not labour-intensive (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 343; compare Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 176). As discussed above MPs need the support of at least four other MPs to propose motions (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 343). Between 1967 and 1985, the number of motions that were proposed increased markedly. This coincided with a revision of parliamentary procedure and increasing responsibilities of government (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 352-353). In light of its increasing use, Bovend'Eert and Kummeling (2010, 353) speak of the devaluation of the motion as a parliamentary instrument. In 1985, the parliament made it more difficult to propose motions. MPs need to use their own speaking time to read motions into the parliamentary proceedings and motions could only be proposed during the second term of parliamentary discussions.

In addition to motions, MPs can vote on bills (Visscher 1994, 80). Unless the constitution requires a larger majority, a simple majority suffices (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 203).⁴³ Both parliament and the cabinet can take the initiative for legislation. Private member bills are rare and cabinet takes almost all the initiatives (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 214). Legal restrictions also exist: MPs cannot propose general spending bills (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 212). Finally, there

⁴³ As is the case for bills that amend the constitution.

are practical restrictions: MPs lack the specialist knowledge needed to write bills, although since 1985 they can get support from the civil service (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 216; Visscher 1994, 83). MPs of the governing coalition can often expect or persuade their own cabinet to propose legislation that they prefer (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 216). When MPs take an initiative, they do so to seek publicity, to break through the division between coalition and opposition or to overcome the passivity of the government (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 216). Sometimes MPs take initiatives for political purposes only, that is: parties use it to express political differences (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 215-216). Parties tend to vote dominantly in favour of bills proposed by the government (Visscher 1994, 391).

Only members of the *Tweede Kamer* have the right of amendment (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 218-219). As with motions, an amendment needs the support of at least four MPs (Visscher 1994, 85). Not all amendments need to come to a vote. Amendments that seek to pervert the goal of a bill are not allowed (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 219). Opposition parties tend to propose more amendments, as they disagree more with the proposed bills (Visscher 1994, 256-257). Moreover, within the coalition, MPs tend to propose amendments on bills proposed by ministers who are not a member of their own party (Visscher 1994, 259).

Until the 1970s, it was common practice for bills to be accepted without a vote and for MPs to ask the speaker to note that they opposed the bill or specific articles of the bill (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 525). Since 1983, it is common practice for MPs to vote by show of hands. Roll calls are rare and decreasing in use. MPs cannot officially abstain, but they can be absent from a vote (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 526). If parliament votes by show of hands, the speaker counts the votes per party unless an MP does not vote in line with his party. Parliamentary parties are expected to be on full strength during a vote (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 526). This means that party unity is high (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011). Effectively, the *Tweede Kamer* has only between nine and ten legislators of which ideal points can be estimated.

Three things are important to note: first, voting on bills tends to be unanimous, but when voting on amendments and motions, considerable differences between parties occur. Second, almost all voting is registered per parliamentary party. This will be the unit of analysis. Third, votes do not concern a random selection of all

proposals. Specific rules restrict specific kinds of proposals to come to a vote. Especially small radical parties will have problems in putting their proposals to a vote; they can still however show their position by voting against proposals of other parties.

3.4.8 Collection and categorisation of parliamentary votes

This study looks at votes on amendments, motions and bills. The votes are collected in different ways. The core of the dataset is formed by votes on motions between 1977 and 2008. These are drawn from PoliDocs, a digitalised database of parliamentary activity (Marx & Schuth 2010). This database includes a refined system of categories, voting results, bibliographic information and co-sponsors with party affiliation. All other votes (motions before 1977 and after 2008, and votes on amendments, articles and bills) are drawn from the Louwerse and Otjes (2011) database. Using a regular expression program, the records of the *Tweede Kamer* were parsed to obtain every instance of a vote and collect the voting results, the co-sponsors and bibliographic information of the votes. Additional information on these votes was obtained manually. Only those motions, amendments and bills for which full bibliographical information and a complete voting result were found are used.

The same categorisation scheme was used here as was used for the parliamentary speeches. The motions from the PoliDocs database are labelled with 2,940 separate keywords. These were assigned by the clerk's office of the *Tweede Kamer*. On the basis of these keywords, each motion has been categorised into 21 substantive categories. A motion was assigned to a category if it had the most keywords in that category (relatively to the total number of key words in that category). There were proposals that had no tags in any category. These were excluded.⁴⁴ For those bills, amendments and motions where no category was available (that is votes before 1977 and after 2010), a two-step procedure was used. First, they were put in the same category as most motions in the same parliamentary dossier. For those dossiers of which no motions with categories were available, the

⁴⁴ This includes all motions and amendments concerning only the budget of a ministry, because these motions, proposed during the parliamentary discussion of the budget, concern (often, but not always) budgetary matters and all the (often multiple) issue area's of the ministry. Because only one ambiguous key word is present, no basis exists for the decision. 305 motions were placed into this category for this reason for the entire period.

motions, amendments and bills were assigned manually on the basis of the subject of their dossier.

3.4.9 Models of parliamentary voting

The voting behaviour of parties can be used to develop spatial representations of voting behaviour. This study employs Optimal Classification (OC). This is a method specifically developed by Poole (2005) to uncover the dimensional structure underlying votes in parliament. It treats each vote as cutting point dividing parties that vote “yea” from parties that vote “nay”. If one does this for a large number of votes, OC groups parties that vote similarly are on one side of a dimension, and parties that vote differently from them are on the other side. For a given number of dimensions, OC gives a spatial representation of voting behaviour. Cutting points become cutting lines or cutting (hyper)planes as dimensionality increases. In essence, OC is similar to Mokken scaling (Niemöller & Van Schuur 1983; Mokken & Lewis 1982).

In chapter 5, the goal will be to analyse single-dimensional models of parliamentary voting on specific issues; multidimensional models will only be used if the single-dimensional models fail to provide useful insights. In chapter 7 however, the goal will be to analyse models of parliamentary voting on all issues in order to assess whether new political parties cause systemic changes. Here, the specific goal is to assess whether the entry of a new political party leads to a change in the dimensionality of the party system. To achieve this, all parliamentary periods between 1963 and 2010 were analysed.⁴⁵

The question of when a particular constellation of parties has a particular number of dimensions depends upon one’s assumptions about dimensionality. For instance, Pellikaan et al. (2007, 296-297) maintain a two-dimensional political space because of the analytical value of the second dimension if one wants to study

⁴⁵ The shorter parliamentary periods (1971-1972, 1981-1982 and 2002-2003) are all included in other parliamentary periods, because too few votes occurred in these periods. They are included in those analyses that can help to understand as many new parties; therefore 1971-1972 is included in 1972-1977, 1981-1982 in 1982-1986 and 2002-2003 in 2003-2006. The only problem that this presented was that it was impossible to estimate the position of both the PVV and LN, because they are now in the same parliamentary period (2002-2006) without once voting on the same issue. This creates a temporal dimension in the voting behaviour, which distorts the analyses. Therefore, no positions of the PVV were measured before it won its first seats in 2006.

electoral competition or government formation. In contrast, most authors like Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and Kriesi and Frey (2008) use a more inductive approach. Their justification of the dimensionality of the political space is based on the goodness of fit of a solution with a particular number of dimensions. That is: the extent to which a solution with a certain number of dimensions fits the data. These researchers emphasise that they “find” solutions with a particular number of dimensions (Kriesi & Frey 2008, 281) or “reveal” particular structures (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009, 327). These authors see the dimensionality of the space as an empirical outcome, and not as a matter of analytical utility. One can, however, not completely rely on statistics to answer this substantive question (Poole 2005, 141).

For a given number of dimensions, Optimal Classification gives a spatial representation of the voting behaviour. The goodness of fit of these models is measured in terms of the Aggregate Proportional Reduction in Error (APRE) (Poole 2005, 129). This is the percentage of correctly classified choices corrected for the fact that votes can be lopsided. The APRE expresses the extent to which the estimate performs better than a random assignment of the parties based on the distribution of the votes. If division in the legislature was 10 versus 90%, one would get a 90% correct rate if one assigned all MPs to the majority side: a random spatial map of legislators would also correctly classify 90% of the choices. Therefore, a non-random placement can only improve the estimate by 10% (Poole 2005, 129). The APRE looks at the improvements given this baseline of random assignment. The APRE has a maximum of 1 and a minimum of 0. If a one-dimensional solution has an APRE of over 0.5, the data can be interpreted in terms of one dimension.

By comparing the levels of fit for different years, one can see whether the *extent to which* the differences between political parties can be represented in a one- or a two-dimensional space, has changed. In this way, the question about the true dimensionality of the space can be shelved. Instead, one can assess whether the political space became more or less easy to model in terms of one dimension after the entry of a new party into the political system. Or, in other words, whether the political space became more or less one-dimensional due to the entry of the new party. For reasons of parsimony, two-dimensional models are presented in chapter 7. To enhance interpretation of the models, the voting behaviour on specific issues is plotted into the models based on all votes. This has been done by means of property fitting (Van der Brug 1997, 60-62). In order to see whether one can attribute the

formation of a new dimension to a new party, the party positions on the issues that the new party owns are included in the representation. If a change in the dimensions can be attributed to the party positions on the new party's issue, they must relate significantly to the model.

Specific problems exist when applying these methods to specific parliaments: institutional features may have an impact on how MPs vote. This is true for United States Congress (Clinton 2007) and the French *Assemblée Nationale* (Rosenthal & Voeten 2004) but also for the *Tweede Kamer*: parliamentary voting in the *Tweede Kamer* is influenced by party unity and the division between opposition and coalition in addition to policy differences. This makes the *Tweede Kamer* more similar to the American Supreme Court (with nine legislators, the justices) than the American House of Representatives (with 435 legislators). This limits the methods one can use in the analyses of parliamentary votes: the most recent insight is that if the number of legislators is small, the results may only be consistent if the measurement of the ideal points is restricted to the ordinal level (Tahk 2010). Optimal Classification is selected because it gives ordinal level estimates of party positions with a minimum of assumptions.

The results of a one-dimensional OC analysis must be interpreted as an ordinal scale.⁴⁶ In order to grasp the strength of the differences, one can look at the number of votes dividing the parties at each cut point. In a two-dimensional analysis one can interpret the party-positions as quasi-interval variables (Peress 2011). In the analysis, each vote is translated into a cutting line, dividing the "yea"-votes from the "nay"-votes. If there are enough votes, the party positions in a two-dimensional space will be brought down to a small area. For measurement purposes the party is then assigned the position in the middle of that area. The extent to which this estimate is correct depends on the number of votes; if there is only a limited number of votes the areas get larger and the assignment of point estimate becomes a less acceptable proxy. Therefore, two-dimensional models can only be used if they are based on a sufficient number of votes: almost all issues have too few votes to confidently estimate party positions in a two-dimensional model. Here one-dimensional solutions

⁴⁶ The scales are ordinal with one change: if two or more parties have the same position, they are assigned the average position between the two parties on each of their sides. If two parties are placed together between the first and the fourth party, they are assigned position 2.5.

Table 3.6: patterns of coalition and opposition support

Group	Coalition proposals	Opposition proposals
Coalition party support	85%	24%
Opposition party support	71%	58%
N	26882	18434

Average percentage of "yea" votes by coalition and opposition parliamentary parties for motions of which the first sponsor was either a member of a coalition party or a member of the opposition party. Data from period 1963-2010.

will be used, unless they are clearly problematic. The two-dimensional solutions should be interpreted with great caution.⁴⁷ As will be seen in chapter 7, estimates become much more reliable if thousands of votes are available.

An analysis needs at least 10 votes to be processed. If the issue linked to a party has less than 10 votes in either the period before or after it entered parliament, the analyses cannot be performed and one must look at a secondary issue. If no other issue has enough votes, one cannot analyse the effect of the party using this method. Because of the low number of parliamentary votes before 1960, only parties that entered parliament after 1963 can be studied. The positional impact of four parties that entered parliament between 1946 and 1963 cannot be studied.⁴⁸

Another problem was identified by Laver (2006, 137). In parliamentary systems like the Netherlands, the division between opposition and coalition parties may dominate policy-based patterns of voting. Hix and Noury (2007) have observed this phenomenon for several parliamentary systems. In the Dutch parliament the voting behaviour of political parties in government and opposition differs in a particular way. In table 3.6, one can see how coalition and opposition parties vote on motions that were introduced by coalition and opposition parties. A party favours a proposal in around three-quarters of votes, independent of who proposed it and

⁴⁷ The recent insights of Tahk (2010) also imply that one needs a large number of votes to obtain consistent results. This study looks at the policy dimensions for specific issues (such as education, agriculture), which causes the number of votes to be limited. This means that the OC solutions may not always be consistent. For one-dimensional solutions, the model with the highest level of APRE is selected. If there are solutions with equal levels of APRE, this is often caused by a few parties that differ marginally in terms of votes; these parties will be assigned a common position. For multidimensional solutions, the results are even less consistent. One should therefore only use multidimensional solutions if it is absolutely necessary. Because these results are inconsistent, the mean position of 1000 analyses is calculated, approximating a bootstrapping procedure.

⁴⁸ These are the GPV, the BP, the KNP and the PSP.

whether that party was part of the coalition or the opposition. One exception exists: coalition parties favour proposals that are proposed by the opposition in only a quarter of the votes. This may be explained by the different considerations that coalition and opposition MPs have when proposing and voting on motions. MPs from coalition parties have two different considerations: on the one hand they wish to see their policies realised; and on the other hand they want the coalition government to continue. Whether the coalition breaks down depends on the coalition partners. A coalition partner will certainly not accept another coalition partner sponsoring motions or favouring a motion that goes against the coalition agreement (Holzhacker 2002, 472). On issues not included in the coalition agreement, parties have more liberty to pursue their own policy goals (Holzhacker 2002, 472). MPs from opposition parties do not need to consider the coalition agreement or the positions of the coalition parties: they can sponsor and favour any proposal they see fit. One may hypothesise that opposition parties will vote against every proposal of the coalition. This is however simply not the case in the Netherlands: if one looks at the voting behaviour of opposition parties on coalition proposals one can see support in over 70% of the votes. In countries like France there is evidence for a coalition-opposition division induced by opposition voting (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004), but this is not the case for the Netherlands. Therefore, in order to obtain estimates of party's positions in parliament without interference from the coalition-opposition division, this study looks at voting on coalition proposals only.

3.4.10 Analysis of positions in parliament

The goal of this study is to analyse the effects of new parties on policy positions. Two methods will be used to analyse this: first, the effect of each new political party will be studied individually and comparatively and second, the effect of all new political parties will be studied in a statistical analysis.

The individual case studies examine the effects of each new political party on the pattern of voting on its own issue.⁴⁹ Three possible outcomes exist: first, parties

⁴⁹ One may wonder to what extent it is useful to analyse the effect of a challenger party on positions on its own issue. A mobiliser introduces a new own issue, while a challenger party takes position on traditional issues thereby challenging established parties on their own turf. The issues that are assigned to challengers tend to be traditional left-right or religious/secular issues. These are issues that established

may not react; second, in response to the entry of a new party, individual parties may shift positions on the issue of the new party, and third, the nature of the line of conflict on that issue may change due to the entry of the new party. The first case (no change) is easy to identify. One needs a criterion to differentiate between the situation where the positions of individual parties change and the nature of the line of conflict changes. Ordinal correlation between the party positions before and after the entry of a new party is employed here. The basic assumption is that, if an ordinal correlation is significant, it is the changes of individual parties on a stable line of conflict. If the correlation is insignificant, two dimensions cannot be compared: the differences are not the result of individual shifts, but of a redefinition of the line of conflict. The ordinal correlation between individual party positions before and after the entry of a new party must be significant. Correlations can work for one-dimensional analyses, but for multidimensional analyses a more complex method is necessary to compare the solutions. Procrustean analysis, which rotates solutions to compare the two-dimensional solutions over time, is employed (Gower & Dijksterhuis 2004). One can evaluate the goodness of fit by looking at the root of the squared errors and by looking at the correlation between the two horizontal and two vertical dimensions.

In the one-dimensional spaces, one can look at shifts of parties over time. These shifts are operationalised as changes in the (ordinal) distance between the new and the established party. To this end, the distance between the new party and the established party is compared before and after the entry of the new party. In order to compare changes in party positions over time one must make a number of assumptions. The OC analyses of parliamentary votes provide party positions relative to each other. That is they order parties from one extreme to another. Two different analyses based on two different data sets will lead to two ordinal orderings, but these are not necessarily on the same scale. One ordering may tap into the economic left-right dimension while another taps into a foreign policy dimensions (pro-European-Euroskeptic, for instance). Moreover even if two orderings tap into the same dimension the positions are not necessarily the same: the second to left position in the 1994-1998 Tweede Kamer is not necessarily identical to the second to left position in the 1998-2002 Dutch parliament. It may be the case that one party retained the same position on some absolute scale and all other parties changed position in the same

parties also consider their own. Therefore here one can see how established parties react when challenged on their own turf.

direction. Therefore it may be the case that an ordering goes from PSP-PPR-PvdA-D66 to PPR-PvdA-D66-PSP. It may be seen, that the PSP moved but 'actually' all the other parties moved. Even if we compare changes over time, it is not necessarily clear if lets the CDA and the SGP switch places in the rank ordering if this is because the CDA changed position and the SGP stayed in the same place or vice versa. Finally, because new parties have no position in the previous parliament one cannot know whether parties moved towards or away from the new party.

Therefore one needs to make four assumptions: first, as said above, if there is a significant correlation between the ordering before and after the entry of a new party, the assumption is that the orderings tap into the same substantive dimension. Second, we assume that largest changes are substantively meaningful changes. In a rank ordering a change of one party will always cause other parties to change: if one party moves one position to the left, another must move one position to the right. Therefore, one can never see the movement of a single party. It becomes difficult to assess which changes are the result of the entry of a new party and which changes are the result of parties making room for other parties that have changed their position.⁵⁰ We work under the assumption that larger changes are the substantively meaningful changes, which require explanation. As the new party had no position before it entered, one needs to assign it a hypothetical position. This is based on its position in the rank ordering after it entered. Because the one-dimensional solutions are ordinal, the only changes that can be observed are changes in the rank ordering of parties over time. This means that one cannot assess systematic changes over time in this way: one cannot see whether party systems become more polarised or move in a particular direction as a whole.

In addition to these analyses of party positions, one also needs to look at systemic changes: as discussed above, the extent to which the change on the new party's issue is systemic will be assessed by means of correlation analyses. In order to measure the reinforcement of conflict, the level of politicisation on the new party's issue is used. One can compare the change in the level of unanimous votes over time.

⁵⁰ The policy dimensions before and after the entry of a new party will be analysed with all parties that were in parliament at the time (including parties that have entered and disappeared). This is the best way to get an insight into the full patterns of competition before and after the entry of a new party, but only those parties are included in the analysis and the graphical representations, which are present in both periods in parliament. The full data is presented in appendix 3.

Table 3.7: calculating change in position scores on governance (example)

Established Party	Position 1963-1967	Position 1967-1971	Change	Absolute Change
BP	1.5	1	-0.5	0.5
SGP	2.5	2	+0.5	0.5
GPV	3	3	0	0
ARP	4	4	0	0
KVP	5	7	+2	2
CHU	6	5	-1	1
VVD	7	6	-1	1
PvdA	8	10	+2	2
CPN	9	8	-1	1
PSP	10	9	-1	1

The less unanimous parliament is over time, the higher the level of politicisation. The level of unanimity in the voting of established parties is used, excluding new parties

The statistical analyses look at the changes in the individual party positions. One should note that, in contrast to the analysis of attention, only those cases are analysed together here that were also discussed in the individual case-by-case analysis. No additional models of parliamentary voting were introduced to compare for attributability. In the analysis of attention the other attention measures are produced as a by-product of the data necessary for the case studies. No additional models were made, because constructing spatial models is complex. Those cases where there was a systemic change (a change in the pattern of voting) have to be excluded: here one cannot measure individual parties changing position over time.

As before, the developments will be analysed in a two-parliamentary term-period. Absolute values will be employed rather than both positive and negative values. All the analyses are based on ordinal positions in one dimension, and therefore for every positive shift there will be an equal negative shift. They would cancel each other out if they were added together: no change would ever be visible. By taking the absolute values this problem is avoided. This does mean that one cannot say anything about the direction of the change in the political positions.

An example may help to illustrate how the change in position is calculated. In table 3.7, one can see the party positions of established parties on governance in the parliamentary periods in the parliamentary periods 1963-1967 and 1967-1971. This is the issue owned by D66, which entered parliament in 1967. The change in position is the absolute difference between the positions in 1963-1967 and 1967-1971. In 1963-1967 KVP took the fifth position from the conservative side between the ARP and the

CHU. In 1967-1971, the party shifted to the seventh position. Two movements to the progressive side: a change of two positions.

3.5 Data collection and data analysis in the electoral arena

Chapter 6 will examine the effects of new political parties on the position that established parties take on issues and the attention that established parties devote to issues in the electoral arena. For both these variables, this study will look at election manifestos of parties, which are still the most authoritative statement of parties' electoral promises (Bara 2006), following Meguid (2005; 2007) and Huibregts (2006). The relationship between election manifestos and electoral campaigns is not simple. What a party says during an election campaign is not necessarily the same as what it says in its election manifesto. The best evidence that is available about election campaigns in the Netherlands (Brants and Van Praag 2007) shows that parties following a party-selling approach. Parties are oriented at selling their own program to the electorate. Public opinion matters in selecting which part of their message will be put on the display (Lees-Marshment, 2001). Parties choose to campaign on those positions from their own program on which they agreed with public and which the public feels strongly about. Public opinion serves as an arbiter, deciding which issues from the party program to focus on during the campaign (Wring, 1996). Therefore election manifestos seem the best sources to assess the positions of political parties. They provide the the most comprehensive collection of party positions on a wide-range of policy issues - far more comprehensive than other expressions used in the election campaigns, such as folders, posters or pamphlets. One can have more doubts about using election manifestos to assess the saliency of issues in the electoral campaign: focus on specific issues is an important part of election campaign. Election manifestos often attempt to be comprehensive and cover all issues. Still there are three good reasons to use election manifestos: first, the division of attention in an election manifesto is a sign of what a party focuses on. An environmentalist party will spend considerably more attention to the environment than other parties. Second, they are the only resource that is available for the entire period (television spots were used much later) and that provides enough data for quantitative analysis. It is not necessarily quantifiable which issues a particular poster addresses. Media data should not be used because it does not reflect what a party focuses on, but what it is forced to react to. Therefore election manifestos are the best

available data to assess the attention devoted to issues by parties in the electoral arena.

As explained above, different notions of attributability will be used in different phases of the study. The focus in the study of position is on those changes in those positions of which one can be most certain that they were unique to the new party. The idea is that, if new political parties had any effect, one must be able to observe it here. For electoral attention, the study again compares patterns of change in a three approaches: a context-sensitive case-by-case approach, a statistical analysis of those patterns and an expanded statistical analysis. The last analysis includes all changes in attention, not just those cases where a new party is present.

Special attention will be devoted to the possibility of anticipatory and reactive behaviour. It may be possible that new parties respond to an established party in the election in which it enters parliament and in the first election after it has entered parliament. Therefore this chapter will look at changes in position and attention in both two- and three-election periods. One should note, however, that for both the study of positions and attention, anticipatory behaviour is difficult to attribute to the new party. For the study of positions the notion of uniqueness has to be interpreted in a less strict way so that the chance of false positives is enlarged. For the study of attention, it is difficult to say whether the increased attention to the issue of the new party was a result of its anticipated entry or whether it led to its entry. It may be the case that, by increasing attention to the issue of the new party, established parties created issue space for the new party to exploit. Because cause and effect are observed simultaneously, they cannot be separated. The results of the study of anticipatory behaviour must therefore be interpreted with caution.

3.5.1 Issue saliency in the electoral arena

The standard method to measure party positions in the electoral arena is through the attention that they devote to issues in their election manifestos. The method of the manifesto research group, built on the saliency theory of competition, is often used in this field (Budge et al. 2001). This research distinguishes these effects in a more specific way. One has to distinguish the electoral positions that parties take from the issues that they devote attention to. One could still have employed the standard data set from the manifesto research group: the group has assigned every sentence in every election manifesto of every relevant party in every election since

the Second World War to one of 56 categories ranging from anti-imperialism to Marxist analysis. The categorisation scheme and the parties that are selected pose a problem. The parties selected by the manifesto research group are only the relevant parties in parliament. Parties that are too small and play no role in government formation are neglected. Moreover, the publicly available data set is limited to the period 1946-2003. This has two downsides: first it limits the number of new parties that can be studied. Out of the nineteen new parties in this study, only six are included.⁵¹ The limited number of cases also means that there are considerably fewer parties of which one can examine the reactions: on average 5.5 parties are in the data set, out of 8.9 established parties that are in parliament. Instead of the 169 new party/established party pairs under study here, only 33 of these pairs could be examined with the manifesto research group data. That is better than the two established parties that previous studies have focused on (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Huijbrechts 2006; Meguid 2005, 2007). It is, however, this study's goal to study all established parties.

Another drawback is the coding scheme, which was developed in the 1980s, and which clearly reflects the politics of that period. There are no good categories for new political issues such as immigration, which is the key issue of three new parties studied here. The coding scheme hinges on two ideas: the measurement of positions and the measurement of attention. Therefore, many categories are divided into two: military positive and military negative, for instance. Some issues are, however, only coded from one side: anti-imperialism, for instance. This makes it difficult to measure changes in attention (independent of direction) for every party. The KNP, a pro-colonisation party, can only be linked to increasing attention for anti-imperialism, because there is no pro-imperialism category. The categories seem ill adapted to study political attention independent of position. Therefore, another measure of attention in the electoral arena needs to be developed here.

3.5.2 From election manifestos to measures of attention change

In order to measure changes in attention, the same computer-assisted measure, developed by Louwerse (2011), as discussed above was used. The Louwerse method divides the manifesto text into paragraphs and assigns every paragraph to one of 21

⁵¹ The LPF, LN, SP, D66, DS'70 and PPR. There are some curiosities here: the estimate for the SP in 1994 is based on the 1998 election manifesto.

categories on the basis of a dictionary approach and support vector machine. All election manifestos of all parties in the Dutch parliament between 1946 and 2010 were collected. Most of these are collected and archived by the Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties. Several manifestos were not in its collection. These were collected from secondary sources.⁵²

Levels of attention at different points in time will be compared: for instance, if a party entered parliament in 1963 ($t=0$), the level of attention in the elections before the new party entered ($t=-1$, in this example 1959) will be used as the pre-measure. The pre-measure is a measure of attention before the new party can have had an effect. The post-measure can be dependent on the operationalisation, the election *after* the election in which the new party entered ($t=+1$, in this example 1967), or the election in which it did ($t=0$).

For the case-by-case analyses, the trend lines of the development between $t=-1$, and $t=+1$ are studied to see what, if any, effect the new party had on the attention that established parties devote to issues. In contrast to the study of parliamentary attention, it is a question of seeing change or not. There are no patterns of change that could not be attributed to the entry of the new party, due to the possibility of anticipatory behaviour. The changes in attention are then compared to possible other

⁵² For several specific election manifestos, some problems existed: The SGP did not publish a full election manifesto before 1971. In 1967, they published a 24-point program. Before 1967 they only published a manifesto of principles, which was amended infrequently to keep up with current events. Still, these manifestos reflected the best knowledge of the positions and issue-attention of the party. For the CPN, no election manifestos are in the database of the DNPP (*Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*/Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties) for the period 1959-1963, nor are there full election manifestos in the database of the IISG (*Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis*/International Institute for Social History). Therefore, different sources were employed: in this case several short leaflets that were in the IISG database. Three elections pose particular problems: the ones in 1972, 1982 and 2003. These were snap elections called within a year of the 1971, 1981 and 2002 elections. In 1972, no party published a new election manifesto. Therefore, the 1977 election manifestos are used as the post-measurement. In 1982, most parties published full manifestos, and so therefore these were used. In 2003, most parties published small election pamphlets, in addition to the 2002 election manifestos. Therefore, the 2002 and 2003 election manifestos are used where appropriate as post-measurement. Two new parties pose some problems: for the CP the small 'ten point program' (with 48 individual policy proposals) is used instead of the longer elaboration of the program. For the measurement of position for the LPF, the lists of policy positions at the end of each chapter in Pim Fortuyn's book (2002) were also included.

explanations: social, economic, or international developments may better explain the developments in attention. The final step is to assess which factors from those hypothesised above may be at play here.

Both statistical analyses look at both the possibility of reactive and anticipatory behaviour. Changes are analysed in a three- and a two-election period: in order to see the reactive behaviour in response to a new party that entered parliament in $t=0$, the elections before the entry of a new party into parliament ($t=-1$) will be compared to the election after a new party entered parliament ($t=+1$). In order to see anticipatory behaviour, one can compare the level of attention in $t=-1$ to the level of attention in $t=0$.

This part of the study uses two measures of change in attention: a relative measure of reactive change in electoral attention, and a relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention. These two measures are based on the same logic as the measures presented in the study of parliamentary attention: to measure the relative measure of reactive change in electoral attention, the difference between the levels of attention before and after the new party entered, is divided by the sum of attention in the manifestos before and after the new party entered; and to measure the relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention, the difference between the levels of attention from the election before and in which the new party entered, is divided by the sum of attention in the manifestos from the elections before and in which the new party entered.

As was done for the study of parliamentary attention, two different statistical analyses are run, one including only those changes in attention where a new party is present and one expanded statistical analysis in which *every* change in attention is included. In other words, the changes in attention of *every* established party's manifesto, in *every* election year and on *every* issue were included in order to determine whether a new party focusing on its own issue causes a significant change in attention: one can attribute the changes in attention for a specific issue to the rise of a new party if the changes in attention differ significantly from those changes on other issues.

An example can help to illustrate how the different measures are calculated. Table 3.8 presents the different levels of attention for the issue of immigration, the issue that the LPF owned, in the manifestos of 1998, 2002 and 2003. Looking at the


Table 3.8: attention on migration 1998-2002

Party	1998	2002	2003 ^a	Δ Attention (1998-2003)	Relative Reaction	Δ Attention (1998-2002)	Relative Anticipation
CDA	2,1	4,8	4,5	+2,4	+0,4	+2.7	+0.4
CU	4,4 ^b	3,1	2,2	-2,2	-0,3	-1.3	-0.2
D66	3,3	3,5	4,5	+1,2	+0,2	+0.2	+0.0
GL	3,7	6,9	7,8	+4,1	+0,4	+3.2	+0.3
PvdA	2,5	1,9	2,8	+0,3	+0,1	-0.6	-0.1
SGP	2,1	3,9	3,9	+1,8	+0,3	+1.8	+0.3
SP	6,3	4,5	5,5	-0,8	-0,1	-1.8	-0.2
VVD	2,5	4,2	4,5	+2.0	+0,3	+1.7	+0.3
Average	3,4	4,1	4,5	+1,1	+0,1	+0.7	+0.1

^a In 2003 many parties printed a short pamphlet and maintained their 2002 manifestos. In those cases the value for the 2002 is based on textual analysis of a combination of the 2002 and 2003 manifestos.

^b In 1998 the GPV and the RPF, which merged to form the CU in 2000, competed separately. The figure for 2002 is based on a textual analysis of a combination of the RPF and GPV manifestos.

Figure 3.4: average length of election manifestos



relative measure of reactive change in electoral attention, one finds that most parties increase attention to this issue between 1998 and 2003. On average, the attention increases from 3.4 to 4.5%. The increase of the GL and the CDA are different in absolute terms (+4.1% and +2.4% respectively), but, in terms of the relative change in attention, the increases are exactly the same (+0.4). This is in relative terms, quite a sizeable increase. The relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention is calculated in the same way: most parties increased their attention between 1998 and 2002 as well. One exception is the PvdA: it decreased attention by 0.6% (from 2.5 to 1.9). This is a decrease of 0.1 in terms of the relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention.

There are two factors that complicate the study of election manifestos: the first problem (which was discussed above) is the analysis of parliamentary attention: as seen in section 3.4.5, there is a saturation effect. Second, the length of election manifestos has increased markedly over the years: as one can see in figure 3.4, the average length of election manifestos did not exceed 5,086 words before 1971. After 1981, the average program was 24,030 words long: between 1967 and 1981 the length of the average manifesto has quintupled. A correlation analysis indicates that the relationship between the length of the manifesto and the publication year is significant (0.625 - significant at the 0.01-level). Koole (1992, 332-335) observed a major change in the way election manifestos were produced between 1946 and 1989. He mentions the increase in government responsibilities as one possible explanation for this pattern, and furthermore, the increase also coincided with a democratisation of the process of composing election manifestos (Koole 1992, 332-335). When interpreting results from small election manifestos, one should be cautious. One may observe larger shifts in attention for smaller manifestos, because in smaller manifestos a change of one paragraph has a much larger effect on the share of attention than in larger manifestos. Because manifesto size is related to election year, this pattern has an effect on the estimates for new parties entering parliament earlier, but not on new parties entering later. These shifts might be the result of a less fine-grained measurement. In order to deal with this problem, the length of the two manifestos that are used, weights the cases in subsequent analyses. In this case, the sum of the square roots of the two manifestos is used in order to approximate a standard pattern of error.

3.5.3 *Measuring positions in the electoral arena*

There is a host of methods to measure changes in position. One can look at expert surveys, hand coding and computer assisted analyses of political texts based on different notions of how positions can be understood (Budge et al. 2001; Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Laver & Garry 2000; Slapin 2008; Pellikaan 2004). These measures are all based on a shared notion of political position; they all focus on a notion of political positions in terms of a position in a political space. All party positions on a particular issue can be reduced to a single (or several) line(s) of conflict, and parties move along that dimension.

The goal of the measure that is developed here is to be as sure as possible that the observed change can be attributed to the entry of the new party. To achieve this, one has to look at individual party positions on specific policies and not party positions on issue dimensions. The question should not be “did the PvdA move to the right in response to the entry of the LPF?” but “did the PvdA take over specific policies?”. Many scholars of radical rightwing political parties have looked at these kinds of reactions (Downs 2001, 127; Schain 2002, 237-238; Heinisch 2003, 103-109), but it has not been applied yet to new parties in a more general study.

3.5.4 *From election manifestos to measures of position change*

The study of party positions in election manifestos focuses on changes in the party positions on those proposals that are unique to a new party. This study employs an adaptation of Pellikaan’s (2003; 2004; 2007; extended by Otjes 2008) confrontational method.⁵³ The method is based on hand coding of election manifestos. Two notions play a central role in measuring position change: uniqueness and agreement. The measures that will be presented here are based on programmatic agreement and disagreement between political parties. The central question is “do parties tend to take the same policy positions as the new party or do they oppose the policies of the new party?” For each of the unique policy proposals that a new party makes in their election manifesto, one can determine whether the established parties agree or disagree with it, and whether they changed their opinion

⁵³ Pellikaan measures party positions on a range of issue dimensions by looking at whether particular *pre-conceived* statements appear in the election programme of a particular party, or are directly contradicted. Pellikaan formulates these statements on the basis of an expert assessment of which issues were controversial in the party manifestos and the campaign.

on that proposal over time. One can aggregate these measures to see whether parties move to agree or to disagree with a new party in general.

The measures focus on proposals that are unique to the new political party. This is done in order to ensure that it is possible to attribute the changes in the positions of the established party to the new party. Only those policies are selected for coding that the new party was the sole advocate of before it entered parliament. These are the statements for which one can be most sure that changes in established parties' positions are attributable to the new party. In this way, type-I errors are minimised: a change in an election manifesto of an established party is only attributed to a new party if it is as certain as possible that the specific issue was not in any manifesto of an established party. Due to this cautious approach, however, there may be a large number of type-II errors: statements may be excluded because they may have been based on another manifesto, while actually they were copied from the new party's manifesto.

This measure is different from the measure used in the parliamentary arena, which focuses on the positions of established parties on the policy issue of the new party. The method that is used here allows one to focus on changes on those positions that are truly unique to the new party. Tracing the effect of a new party with such precision is not possible in the parliamentary arena.⁵⁴

The coding process consists of three steps: first, the unitisation of the new party's manifesto into separate proposals. The basic rule of thumb is that if a manifesto consists of bullet points every bullet point is a separate item. If two distinct points are made in the same bullet point, these two are divided into separate statements. If a manifesto does not consist of bullet points the different proposals made in one section are identified as separate items. Earlier research has shown that there can be considerable variance between coders in a unitisation process of election manifestos, indicating that in terms of replicability unitisation may be a key weakness of hand coded research (Mikhaylov, Laver & Benoit 2008), therefore the explicit rules mentioned above were followed.

Next, the manifestos of the old parties from before the first election before the entry of the new party into parliament ($t=-1$) and from the election in which the

⁵⁴ One could study how established parties vote on the proposals of the new party, but if the new party is in opposition, voting patterns on its proposals are structured by the difference between the opposition and the coalition.

new party entered parliament ($t=0$) are coded to identify whether the proposals of the new party are mentioned here; this was done in order to determine whether proposals were unique to the new party. For each of the established parties, three codes are possible per policy proposal of the new party: agreement (+1), neutral (0) or disagreement (-1).

And third, the manifestos of the old parties from the first election after the entry of a new party ($t=+1$) are coded on the unique proposals. This was done to see how established parties responded to the policies of the new party. Again, codes could be agreement (+1), neutral (0) or disagreement (-1). In the coding process, agreement means that a party expresses its support for the same policy or a similar policy. When the PVV proposed a temporary ban on building mosques for five years, any measure that was supposed to limit the building of mosques was scored as a positive statement. The SGP wrote that it would not support policies that promoted the building of mosques and opposed building large-scale mosques. This is counted as a positive code. A negative code is any opposition to a policy or proposing the opposite policy: a number of parties have proposed closing the European Parliament. If any party proposed extending this parliament's powers this was coded positively.

This is a rather 'liberal' interpretation of a party's manifesto, which has two effects: first, this method may overestimate the effect of new political parties. Some changes may be attributed to the new party while they, because of the liberal interpretation, have nothing to do with the new party. Second, a larger number of proposals may be eliminated as non-unique, while they are unique to the new party, because the items were scored in such a liberal fashion. This can have an effect in both directions: on the one hand, this may underestimate the effects of new parties (because they have less unique proposals to be scored on). On the other hand, if there is a change on a unique proposal, its effect will be larger, because the number of unique proposals is smaller.

The analysis will be conducted in three ways: the individual case studies examine the data in-depth, while statistical analyses are used to find general patterns both in terms of anticipation and reaction. The individual case-by-case analyses look at the development of the summed measures of agreement. The goal of these individual case-by-case analyses is to ensure that the observed developments in unique proposals can be attributed to the entry of the new party. Therefore, for each

individual new party, these analyses focus on whether there are consistent patterns in the reactions of the established parties. To achieve this, the measures of agreement will be examined and their development will be traced over time. These measures of agreement are calculated in the following way: the first step is the elimination of non-unique proposals. All proposals made by the new party, which had a positive code at $t=-1$ or $t=0$ in at least one manifesto of an established party are eliminated; the second step is to calculate the measure of agreement per established party for $t=-1$ and $t=+1$. This is the sum of the positive and negative codes divided by the number of unique proposals. In other words, this is the extent to which this established party agreed or disagreed with the unique proposals of the new party. In this measure positive and negative codes cancel each other out: if a party agreed with twenty and disagreed with twenty unique proposals of a new party the value of the measure of agreement is zero, which would have been the same if it agreed and disagreed with no unique proposal.⁵⁵ Since these proposals are unique to the new party, change in this agreement can be attributed to the entry of the new party.

Two measures are used in the statistical analysis: a measure of anticipatory change in electoral position and a measure of reactive change in electoral position. The measure of reactive change in electoral position compares the measures of agreement (calculated above) over time: the measure of reactive change in electoral position-score is the difference between the measures of agreement at $t=-1$ and $t=+1$.

The measure of anticipatory change in electoral position is calculated in a similar way, but with a more 'liberal' notion of uniqueness: the first step is the elimination of non-unique proposals. Only those proposals, which had a positive code at $t=-1$, as opposed to either $t=-1$ or $t=0$, are eliminated; next the average position per established party at $t=0$ is calculated. This is the sum of the positive and negative codes divided by the number of unique proposals. In other words, this is the extent to which this party agreed or disagreed with the unique proposals of the new party. Since these proposals are unique to the new party, this agreement is

⁵⁵ This cancelling out is a feature of the confrontational method (Pelikaan et al. 2003; 2004; 2007), but that is no excuse. Alternative measures which treated negative and positive codes equally did not yield significantly more meaningful results than the measure employed here.

Table 3.9: a fictional example LPF and VVD 1998-2003

#	LPF	VVD		
		1998	2002	2003 ^a
1	Limit migration because of family reunification.	+1	+1	+1
2	Abolish the European Parliament.	-1	-1	-1
3	Re-introduce the municipal police.	-1	0	0
4	Keep police to performance targets.	0	0	+1
5	Scan all containers that enter the Netherlands for drugs.	0	0	0

^a 2003 is the $t=+1$ –year, because the VVD only published a short pamphlet in this year. Therefore, the codes of 2002 and 2003 are taken together for the $t=+1$. Because of the definition of uniqueness, however, every proposal that has a positive code for 2002 is eliminated.

attributed to the entry of the new party. The measure of anticipatory change in electoral position-score is the difference between the average positions at $t=-1$ and $t=0$.

In this case, too, an example may help to illustrate how the coding process works. Table 3.9 lists five policy proposals made by the LPF in its 2002 election manifesto and published in Fortuyn's book *Puinlopen van Acht Jaar Paars* (Fortuyn 2002). These five policy proposals are only a fraction of the 139 proposals made by the LPF in both the manifesto and the book, so this is a reduced example. Table 3.9 also shows the positions of the VVD on the selected policy proposals in its 1998 election manifesto, in its 2002 manifesto and in its 2003 election pamphlet. The particular policy proposals were selected to show the diversity of possible codes and coding configurations. Three kinds of codes are possible: a positive code (+1) indicates that the VVD made a similar proposal as the LPF did in 2002. For instance, the LPF proposed to try and limit immigration from family formation; the VVD did the same in 1998, 2002 and 2003. However, a negative code (-1) might be assigned as well: this would indicate that the VVD made a proposal that ran counter to the LPF's proposal, or that they said that no changes should be made in particular policy fields. The VVD, for example, sought to expand the powers of the European Parliament in both the 1998, 2002 and 2003 manifestos in opposition to the LPF's proposal to abolish it. A neutral code (0) indicates that the VVD said nothing on the subject, or was vague or ambiguous. In 2002 and 2003 for instance, the VVD made no mention of moving the responsibility for the police to the municipal level. In the individual case-by-case analysis, the focus is on the measures of agreement. The first step is to eliminate all proposals that have a positive code for 1998 and

2002. These are not unique to the LPF: the VVD made these proposals itself. In this case that would be only proposal #1. In reality, 80% of the LPF manifesto was eliminated because one or more of the other parties made a similar proposal in 1998 or 2002. The remaining proposals are used to calculate the measures of reactive and anticipatory change. In 1998, the VVD disagreed with the LPF on two issues (-0.5). In 2002, it changed its position on one issue (-0.25), and in 2003 the VVD agreed on one position and disagreed on one: an average position of zero. To calculate the measure of reactive change in electoral position, these scores are then subtracted from each other: this means that the VVD has a value of +0.5. The measure of anticipatory change in electoral position-score uses a similar procedure: one out of five positions is eliminated because it is not unique (#1) and then the difference is calculated between the average position in 1998 (-0.5) and 2002 (-0.25). This is an increase of +0.25.

Finally, one specific problem needs to be examined: the relationship between the number of unique proposals and the extent to which established parties react. In table 3.10, one can see data on the length of election manifestos (in terms of numbers of proposals) and the extent to which new parties' proposals are unique. One can see that election manifestos of new parties are relatively short: on average they contain only 113 proposals. On average, less than 29% of a new party's programme policy proposals were unique (if one includes both $t=-1$ and $t=0$). No party exceeds a level of uniqueness of 54% of the manifesto.⁵⁶ Several outliers exist on the other side of the scale: parties with a limited number of unique proposals. A weak, insignificant relationship exists between the number of unique proposals and the extent to which established parties respond to a new party (Pearson's r of -0.10 - not significant).⁵⁷ Parties that propose a small number of unique proposals can elicit all kinds of reactions: from imitation to differentiation. The more unique proposals a party proposes, the less extreme the reactions become: long programmes elicit less

⁵⁶ This is the uniqueness of the BP.

⁵⁷ Only if one treats imitation and differentiation in the same way (i.e. count any reaction to a new party's policies whether positive or negative equally), can one see a significant relationship (Pearson's r of -0.14 - significant at the 0.1-level). The relationship between the SMOG and this measure which treats imitation and differentiation in the same way is stronger and more significant (Pearson's r of -0.17 - significant at the 0.05-level).

Table 3.10: proposals per new party

New Party	Total	Unique			
		t=-1		t=0 and t=-1	
KNP	37	16	43%	14	38%
PSP	23	14	61%	9	39%
GPV	62	34	54%	31	50%
BP	22	14	64%	12	54%
D66	92	64	70%	31	34%
PPR	78	36	46%	12	15%
DS70	90	44	49%	22	24%
NMP	23	5	22%	2	9%
RKPN	73	-	-	18	25%
RPF	295	143	49%	98	33%
EVP	366	92	25%	84	23%
CP	48	13	27%	12	25%
AOV	141	54	38%	31	22%
SP	117	44	38%	31	27%
U55+	117	31	27%	14	12%
LN	101	19	19%	11	11%
LPF	139	61	43%	33	24%
PvdD	227	127	56%	107	47%
PVV	107	43	40%	29	27%

Total is the total number of proposals; unique gives the number of policy proposals that were unique, when comparing the new party's manifesto to the established parties' manifestos of the election before entry of the new party (t=-1) and the election the new party entered (t=0).

imitation and differentiation. Both a mathematical and a substantive explanation exist for this phenomenon: mathematically, parties with a longer programme have a larger divisor, and therefore the values of the measures of change become lower. Substantively, parties with more unique proposals have a more detailed programme, and the more detailed a party's proposals are, the smaller the chance that another party copies them in their own manifesto. This means that the level of detail of a program may matter. As a proxy for the level of detail the complexity of the language is used (the more complex the language, the more detailed the program): this is measured by the SMOG (McLaughlin 1969).⁵⁸ There is a weak negative relationship between the level of complexity and reactions (-0.06 - not significant). Given the weakness of these relationships, there is no reason to believe that this phenomenon biases the results directly. Still, to err on the side of caution, it may be

⁵⁸ The Simple Measure of Gobbledygook:

$$\text{grade} = 1.0430 \sqrt{30 \times \frac{\text{number of polysyllables}}{\text{number of sentences}}} + 3.1291$$

prudent to see whether relationships found are not the result of parties that have only a limited number of unique proposals. This number of proposals gives a very limited empirical basis for conclusions. For these parties, one may find comparatively high or low scores, which are due to the length of the programme instead of the number of reactions. This problem is addressed by running the analyses with and without these outliers to test the robustness of the relation.⁵⁹

3.6 Measuring independent variables

There are two clusters of independent variables that need to be distinguished: independent variables that serve to examine the formulated hypothesis, and independent variables that serve to examine alternative explanations of development in attention. The latter will be used in case-by-case analyses.

The new party activity hypothesis explains patterns in attention of established parties by the patterns in attention of new parties. For the parliamentary arena, one can look at the percentage of the new party's speech that concerned their own issue, and for the electoral arena, one can look at the percentage of the party's own election manifesto that concerned the party's own issue.

In order to examine the challenger hypothesis and the mobiliser hypothesis, all new parties will be divided into mobilisers and challengers. This will be the subject of chapter 4, where each new party will be classified on the basis of the new parties' histories, with a particular interest in key characteristics of challenger parties, such as orientation towards a particular party in electoral campaigns, similar electoral appeal, and similar political ideology. Moreover, the challenged parties were identified for each challenger in chapter 4 as well.

The ideological proximity hypothesis explains patterns in reactions by reference to the distance between two parties. Different measures will be used in the parliamentary arena and in the electoral arena. In the parliamentary arena, the distance between the new and the established party on the line of conflict on the issue of the new party will be employed.⁶⁰ In the electoral arena, the similarities

⁵⁹ These outliers are the NMP and PSP.

⁶⁰ For some parties, no comparison could be made between the 'before' and the 'after' spatial models. Here, a higher level (systemic) model was used: this is the case for the GPV, BP, KNP, PSP, AOV/U55+, LN and CP. For the RKPN, there was too little information to place DS'70 and the PPR: these are also inferred from systemic

between the entire programme of the new party and the established party, before the entry of the new party, is used: the sum of all positive and negative codes at $t=-1$.

The new party size hypothesis is examined by using the percentage of votes that the new party has obtained in the election in which it entered parliament. This means that for each period party size is treated equally: one may argue that in the 1960s the entry of a party with seven seats was much more significant than in the 1990s: the shift of a few seats was seen as important. However one may also propose that as electoral markets become more volatile parties need to become more responsive. The relative stability of the 1940s required less responsiveness than the instability of the 1990s. Therefore this variable is operationalised in terms of the percentage of votes and not made relative to electoral performance. It is also important to note that both in the anticipatory and the reactive models in the electoral arena, the percentage of the vote of the new party that the new party won in the first election in which it won seats in parliament is used. This is counter-intuitive for the anticipatory analysis, because the temporal order of causality is violated: the election results came *after* the anticipatory behaviour. The assumption here is that the best estimate of anticipated size of the new party is its actual size.⁶¹ Still, when interpreting these results for anticipatory behaviour, caution is warranted.

The new party organisation hypothesis looks at the internal organisation of the new party. Party organisation cannot be measured directly, and therefore a proxy is used. Different proxies are used for the two different arenas. In the parliamentary arena, the level of organisation of the new party is specified by the extent to which a new party has organised their own MPs: the percentage of the new party's MPs that is still a member of the party after four years. This is the stability of the parliamentary party. In the electoral arena, this is measured in terms of the extent to

models. Because there are no votes from before 1952, the data for the KNP is based on a model of the period 1952-1956.

⁶¹ There is a significant correlation between expected, polled party size two months before the election and a new party's share of the votes in the election. One should note, however, that this could only be examined for the four parties for which polling data is available (PVV, PvdD, LPF and LN). This does not mean, however, that these polls correctly predict the size of the new parties. These polls are on average 3% off, but they do predict correctly which parties are larger and which are smaller. The relationship is mainly caused by the fact that the LPF scores considerably better than the other three.

Table 3.11: sociological and economic alternative explanations

New Party	Measure	Notes
BP	Importance of agriculture	Agriculture as percentage of GDP
NMP	Inflation	Inflation of consumer prices
CP	Migration	Non-Dutch migration
SP	Unemployment	Registered unemployment May/June
LPF/PVV	Migration	Non-Western migration
PvdD	Importance of agriculture	Agriculture, forestry and fishery as percentage of GDP
PvdD	Extent of Q-Fever	Number of sheep in agriculture

which new parties have organised their own voters: the member/electorate ratio. This ratio is often used to express in how far parties are able to organise their electorate (Scarrow 2000).⁶² Again, the same measure is used for anticipatory and reactive behaviour and the same interpretative caution is warranted as above. The new party government hypothesis is tested by a simple dichotomous variable: in government or in opposition during the first parliamentary term after the new party entered parliament. This cannot be anticipated before a new party enters parliament, so this variable is not tested for the model examining anticipation.

The established party performance hypothesis requires special attention: established party performance is examined by looking at the percentage of votes an established party lost in the election in which a new party entered, as compared to the votes it had in the previous election: if a party, which has 4 percent of the votes loses 2 percentage points of the votes, it will react in the same way as a party that loses 20 percentage points of its 40 percent of the votes, because both parties lose half of their votes. This reflects the fact that the relative electoral position of an established party determines its reaction. In the statistical analyses, these relationships are examined as an interaction relationship, in the way specified by (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006). The question is: does the presence of a new party significantly influence the general effects of electoral performance? These general effects are recalculated for the analysis of anticipatory behaviour, so that when one looks at the established parties' electoral performance, one looks at their performance in the elections *before* the new party entered.

⁶² The membership data is taken from the DNPP. Note that the DNPP does not have membership figures for the NMP, BP, CP, KNP, and RKPN. Therefore, these parties are excluded from this analysis, leaving only twelve new parties and 101 new-established party pairs. Parties report membership data to the DNPP.

As for the second cluster of variables (the alternative explanations, which will be used in the case-by-case analyses), relevant social and economic indicators will be employed, as well as historical information about international and national political developments. Only the former are real variables in the canonical sense of the word. All of the variables are economic or social statistics obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). They are listed in table 3.11.

Chapter 4: Introducing new parties

“In the beautiful month of May each bird lays an egg and each Dutchman founds his own party.” – Doe Hans, journalist (cited in Vossen 2003, 17 translation SO)

4.1 Introduction

The Dutch political system is known for its openness. The liberal journalist Doe Hans wrote before the Second World War that in May every Dutchman founds his own political party, just like birds lay eggs. While not entirely true, the Netherlands has seen a large number of new parties running in elections: between 1918 and 1940, 125 parties participated in elections, and after 1946, 173 individual parties attempted to enter the Dutch parliament (Kiesraad 2012): from the conservative liberal VVD, one of the big five Dutch political parties, the CDA, which has been in government for more than two decades since its foundation in 1977, to the LPF of the maverick politician Fortuyn and the sectarian IKB (*Internationale Communistenbond*/International Communist League). Not all of these parties will be studied here; this study will focus on nineteen new parties that are selected because they form truly new parties (as defined in section 3.2). A full list of parties that ran in elections since 1946 can be found in appendix 6.

This chapter has three goals: it will introduce each of the new political parties, it will discuss the context of their developments, and it will classify each of the new political parties in terms of three categorisation schemes. These schemes categorise new parties in terms of by whom they are formed, what new parties are formed to accomplish, and on which issues new parties focus. Moreover, this chapter will briefly introduce the Dutch party system and those established parties that already existed in 1946.

Table 4.1: typology of new party formations

Type	Definition	Example
Transformation	A party formed by transformation is a party that has been founded by (nearly) all individuals who had leading, national political offices in one established party.	Groen!
Marriage	A party formed by marriage is a party that has been founded by the merger of at least two established parties.	CU
Divorce	A party formed by divorce is a party that has been founded in either one of two ways: first if it is founded by at least one individual who had a leading, national political office in one established party with parliamentary representation. Or second, if it is founded by an organised group, which took a major role in the internal debate in one established political party.	PVV
Birth	A party formed by birth is a party that does not fit any of the other categories.	LN

4.2 Three typologies

This section will introduce the three categorisation schemes in which new parties will be classified in this chapter.

4.2.1 Party formation

Section 2.3 already gave a definition of what a new political party is and when they would be included in this study. Following Mair (1999), this study distinguishes between parties formed by birth, by divorce, by transformation and by marriage. This study focuses on the effects of political parties in the first period they have MPs in parliament, but only when these new parties are neither a transformation of a party that was already in parliament, nor a merger of parties that were in parliament before. It may prove prudent to provide rigorous definitions of these categories. These definitions are listed in table 4.1. In order to be formed by divorce, transformation, or merger, there must be a link in the personnel of the established party and the new party. This study follows Barnea and Rahat (2011) in operationalising the link between the new and established parties in terms of their personnel. The definition of established party flows naturally from the definition of the new party: any party that has been in parliament for more than one session is an established party. This means that many of the new parties studied here become established parties in later parts of this study. The GPV (*Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond*/Reformed Political League) entered parliament in 1963 and merged into the CU (*ChristenUnie*/ChristianUnion) in 2000. This party is a new party in one part

Table 4.2: Rochon's typology of new party goals operationalised

Characteristic	Challenger	Mobiliser
Political Communication	Oriented at one established political party.	Oriented at no particular party.
Political Ideology	Similar to an ideology one established party has or used to have.	Not similar to an ideology of an established party.
Electoral Appeal	Same social group as one established party used target or targets.	Appeals to no social group or to a social group that is not appealed to by established parties.

of the study, but it becomes one of the established parties in the study of twelve other new parties. Previous studies selected particular established parties for their study (see paragraph 3.2).

4.2.2 Party goals

A second measure that has to be operationalised is the difference between challengers and mobilisers described in section 2.8.2, a distinction drawn from Rochon (1985). This study seeks to systematically integrate, elaborate and further develop this approach by classifying all new Dutch political parties into a single classification scheme. The study attempts to contribute by using more rigid definitions and classification conditions than previous studies. In order to categorise these new parties, table 4.2 offers a scheme with three conditions. The conditions are drawn from Rochon's description of challengers, which he defines as follows: a challenger is a new party that attacks an established party for abandoning the ideology that it used to have, or the interests that it used to represent. The distinction between challenger and mobiliser can be divided into three aspects. The first aspect is the political communication of the new party: is it oriented towards one party (challenger) or not (mobiliser)? The second aspect is the ideology of the new party: is it similar to another party (challenger) or not (mobiliser)? And the third aspect is the electoral appeal of the new party: is it oriented towards the same social group as another party (challenger) or not (mobiliser)? If a party meets two of the three requirements, it should be considered a challenger. Any other party would be a mobiliser party. It is important to note that there is an assumption that in addition to having a new ideology, mobilisers will make new proposals. As seen in paragraph 3.5.4 the extent to which these new parties really offered new proposals should not

be overestimated. In the case-by-case discussion, the classification for every party is discussed, and the scores of all parties on all these characteristics are shown in table 4.2 and discussed in section 4.5.

4.2.3 Party's issue

As this study seeks to determine the effects new parties have on the attention that established parties devote to their issue, it is necessary to assess which new parties have ownership of which issues. Most current research on issue ownership looks at which issues parties are active or competent on in the eyes of the voter (Van der Brug 2004; Walgrave & De Swert 2007). This method cannot be applied here, because such questions were not asked for all new parties included in this study. Even if there is an electoral study available for the year in which the new party entered parliament, these parties are often neglected by electoral researchers, because they only include relevant parties in their studies.

Four measures will be used to triangulate the issues that new parties 'own': the election manifesto of the new party, the motions that it proposed, its parliamentary speeches, and the historical background of the party. The most basic notion is that, if a new party owns an issue, this issue will feature prominently in its election manifesto. Research shows that there is a relationship between the issue a party owns and the main issues in their election manifestos (Walgrave & De Swert 2007). It may, however, be that for strategic reasons, parties talk about different issues in their election manifesto than they actually do in the campaign. So, in order to avoid misassignment, in some cases different issues were selected on basis of their parliamentary work, both in terms of motions and parliamentary speech, and historical descriptions of the party's focus. The precise measurement of these variables is discussed in sections 3.4.3, 3.4.8 and 3.5.2.

4.3 The parties and party system in 1946: the baseline

In the 1946 elections, one can see which parties existed before the entry of new parties into the system. The 1946 elections were the first parliamentary elections after the Second World War. Several parties had been re-founded or reorganised after the war, but the basic pre-war party system and their social organisation in terms of pillars remained. The parties that took part in the 1946

Table 4.3: established parties 1946

Name			Ideology	Seats (1946)
Dutch	English	Abb.		
<i>Anti-Revolutionaire Partij</i>	Anti-Revolutionary Party	ARP	Protestant conservatism	13
<i>Communistische Partij Nederland</i>	Communist Party Netherlands	CPN	Communism	10
<i>Christelijk-Historische Unie</i>	Christian Historical Union	CHU	Protestant conservatism	8
<i>Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij</i>	Reformed Political Party	SGP	Orthodox Protestantism	2
<i>Partij van de Vrijheid</i>	Freedom Party	PvdV	Conservative liberalism	6
<i>Katholieke Volkspartij</i>	Catholic People's Party	KVP	Catholic Christian-democracy	32
<i>Partij van de Arbeid</i>	Labour Party	PvdA	Social-democracy	29

elections are listed in table 4.3. This paragraph offers a brief description of the parties that were established parties in 1946

The ARP (*Anti-Revolutionaire Partij*/Anti-Revolutionary Party) was formed in 1879 (Koole 1995, 172). The ARP's ideology can be described as conservative Protestantism, which combines conservative positions such as support for the monarchy and opposition to decolonisation with a Protestant interpretation of moral issues. It was the first mass party in the Netherlands with a membership base, a manifesto, parliamentary discipline and an extra-parliamentary organisation (Koole 1995, 17). The ARP was also the first party to be part of a network of societal organisations. In the post-war period, all Dutch parties had this kind of societal network, known as "zuilen" or pillars (Koole 1995, 34-35). The ARP-pillar included the *Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland* (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands). The party drew its support from this base (Lijphart 1968, 36). Although the party never received more than 20% of the votes, it had a major influence on Dutch politics, both in pioneering models of societal organisations, such as pillarisation and the mass party model, and in playing a major role in Dutch governments before the Second World War.

The CHU (*Christelijk-Historische Unie*/Christian Historical Union) was formed in 1908 as a merger of several parties which had split away from the ARP or which had formed independently as local support bases of conservative Protestant MPs (Koole 1995, 114; Van Spanning 2001, 115-119). These parties had split from the ARP because of ideological, personal, religious and organisational reasons (Koole 1995, 100, 113). The CHU drew its voters from *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* (Dutch Reformed Church), the main Protestant Church (Lijphart 1968, 36).

Like the ARP, the CHU was a medium-sized party, which participated in most coalition cabinets between 1908 and 1977.

Individuals who were aligned with the *Gereformeerde Gemeenten* (Reformed Congregations), a conservative split from the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* formed the SGP (*Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij*/Reformed Political Party) in 1918. The party was open to orthodox Christians from different churches. The SGP adhered to an orthodox Protestant ideology:⁶³ the right to govern was granted to the Dutch King by God, policy should be based on Biblical commandments, and women and men have different social roles, which should also be reflected in their political rights (Koole 1995, 128-129). The SGP has a small but consistent social base of around 2% of the Dutch population (Koole 1995, 129).

The KVP (*Katholieke Volkspartij*/Catholic People's Party) was formed in 1946. Its founders had been member of the RKSP (*Rooms Katholieke Staatspartij*/Roman Catholic Political Party) before the Second World War (Koole 1995, 165). Catholics form a large religious minority in the Netherlands that had faced formal and social discrimination (Koole 1995, 152). During the late 1800s and the early 1900s, the Catholics began to organise politically. When the Catholic party was re-launched after the Second World War, the founders sought to renew its ideological profile (Koole 1995, 164-166). Still, the party remained a party for Catholic voters (Lijphart 1968, 36; Jong, Van der Kolk & Voerman 2011). In terms of the classification employed above, the move from RKSP to KVP can be understood as a transformation (Lipschits 1982, 44). The ideological profile of the KVP was Christian-democratic, based on Catholic social principles. It supported the formation of a welfare state and corporatist economic management. This was combined with an emphasis on moral and religious issues. After the 1946 elections, the KVP formed a coalition cabinet with the social democrats in order to implement these social-economic reforms.

The PvdV (*Partij van de Vrijheid*/Freedom Party) was formed in 1946. It had personal and organisational ties to the conservative liberal LSP (*Liberale Staatspartij*/Liberal Political Party) that existed before the Second World War (Lipschits 1982, 43). The PvdV had a conservative liberal ideology, emphasising individual liberty and limited government. The conservative liberals were part of a

⁶³ The term orthodox is used here to refer to a bibliocratic political ideology, which holds that government policy should be based on a strict interpretation of scripture.

looser network of neutral organisations. These did not truly constitute a pillar. The electoral support of the liberals fluctuated over time. Its voters belonged to the middle class voters and to latitudinarian currents within the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk*. In 1948, the PvdV had merged with a liberal split from the PvdA to form the VVD (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*/People's Party for Freedom and Democracy). The new formation retained the same ideological orientation and social base (Koole 1995, 292).

The PvdA (*Partij van de Arbeid*/Labour Party) was formed in 1946 as a merger of three parties: the socialist SDAP (*Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij*/Social democratic Workers' Party), the progressive Christian CDU (*Christelijk-Democratische Unie*/Christian-Democratic Union) and the progressive liberal VDB (*Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond*/Freethinking Democratic League), as well as individuals from the Catholic resistance movement *Christofoor* and the CHU (Lipschits 1982, 44). The founders of the PvdA sought to break through the pillarised societal organisation (Koole 1995, 48). The party anticipated an electoral breakthrough in 1946, by uniting progressives from all pillars, but instead, the PvdA won less than its predecessors had done in 1937. The party itself maintained ties with the organisations of the social democratic pillar. It was supported by working class voters from latitudinarian currents within the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* (Koole 1995, 224). Ideologically, the party is social democratic, emphasising the welfare state and government control over economic development. After the 1946 elections, the PvdA became the junior partner in a coalition cabinet with the Christian-democratic KVP.

The CPN (*Communistische Partij Nederland*/Communist Party of the Netherlands) was formed in 1909 as a leftwing split from the main social democratic party SDAP (Koole 1995, 254). It was originally named Social Democratic Party. After the Russian Revolution, it aligned with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and adopted the name Communist Party. During the interwar period the party was small and isolated. During the German occupation, (after initial hesitation) it played a major role in the resistance movement (Koole 1995, 261-262), and after the War, the party was rewarded for this electorally, although it remained politically isolated (Koole 1995, 263; Verrips 1995).

At the level of the party system, three elements must be recognised: first, in terms of electoral competition, the Netherlands of 1946 was a typical case of closed

competition. Each party had its own social base: Catholics voted for the KVP, Protestant voters aligned themselves with the CHU, ARP and SGP, depending on their particular religious persuasion. The secular working class supported the PvdA or the CPN and the secular middle class supported the VVD.

Second, in terms of the patterns of cabinet formation, there had been alternating governments formed by either the religious parties (RKSP, CHU and ARP) or the liberals between 1900 and 1918. As suffrage was extended, the liberal parties needed the support of the social democrats to obtain parliamentary majorities.⁶⁴ After 1918, there was a permanent religious majority. Therefore RKSP, CHU and ARP formed the core of every governing coalition (Koole 1995, 40). During the economic crisis of the 1930s, the cabinet was extended with liberal parties (Koole 1995, 37), and in 1939 on the eve of the Second World War cabinet cooperation also included the social democrats. After the Second World War the pattern of cabinet formation changed: social democratic and Christian-democratic parties formed a coalition cabinet. Those two parties formed the main core of all cabinets between 1946 and 1959; combinations of the ARP, CHU or VVD joined them.

And third, in terms of the dimensionality of the political space, there were two major divisions in Dutch politics: between religious and secular parties, and between parties that favoured government planning and parties that favoured a free market. Both these dimensions concern the extent to which government should interfere with social life: the religious parties favoured a moral state, which intervened into people's personal lives, and the secular parties favoured a neutral state, which did not intervene into the private sphere. The economically leftwing parties supported government intervention in the economy and the economically rightwing parties oppose government intervention in the economy.⁶⁵ The constellation of parties in this space has been characterised as the Dutch triangle (De

⁶⁴ This was also reflected in voting patterns in the two-round electoral system for parliament. At that time the Netherlands had an electoral system akin to the current French system. In the second round, the main divide often was between secular and religious parties (Jong, Van der Kolk and Voerman 2011).

⁶⁵ Both these divisions were related to the terms left and right. In the early twentieth century the terms left and right were tied to the division between secular (left) and religious (right), but by the 1950s, these terms would change their meaning to those who favoured limited government (right) and an interventionist government (left) in economic matters (Koole 1995).

Beus, van Doorn & de Rooy 1993): the PvdA and the CPN were secular and leftwing on both issues. The PvdV was secular and rightwing. The SGP was religious and rightwing. The KVP was a religious party with centrist positions on the economic dimension. The CHU and the ARP were religious parties with traditionally more rightwing positions on economic issues.⁶⁶

4.4 Nineteen new parties

The following sections will sketch the history of several individual new parties and categorise them in the schemes proposed above.

4.4.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics

The KNP (*Katholieke Nationale Partij*/Catholic National Party) was the first new party that entered parliament after the Second World War. It is a classical example of a challenger and a party formed by divorce, in this case from the KVP.

The KNP was formed in 1948 as the list-Welter (Koole 1995, 185). The KNP was founded by Charles Welter, who had been minister of Colonial Affairs two times in 1925 and between 1937 and 1941 for the Catholic RKSP (Tomassen 2003, 51). Until 1946, he had been a senator for the KVP. The issue that split Welter from the KVP was the independence of Indonesia, one of the most important issues in Dutch politics after the Second World War (Tomassen 2003, 51). The KVP supported greater autonomy for Indonesia, under pressure of the PvdA. In the view of Welter, this could not be united with the Dutch constitutional order (Tomassen 2003, 53). In addition to Indonesian independence, Welter was also uneasy about the KVP's cooperation with the PvdA, specifically on economic matters (Koole 1995, 185; Tomassen 2003, 54). Welter led the internal opposition against Indonesian independence within the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 54). His participation in this opposition was a reason for the KVP's national executive committee to remove Welter from the list of candidates for the 1948 elections (Tomassen 2003, 55, 57).

⁶⁶ The CHU and the ARP tended to change over time in their exact ideological relationship to each other. The ARP oscillated between rightwing and leftwing over the course of its post-war existence. It was outside of the first broad coalition cabinets because of its opposition to Indonesian independence, and it moved to the left over the course of the late 1960s, embracing what was called evangelical radicalism. The CHU, characterised by a much less coherent position, tended to move in the opposite direction: from a pragmatic cooperative stance towards the social democrats in the 1950s, to a more conservative position in the 1970s.

Welter and the other members of the internal opposition formed a separate list for those elections. This move had been anticipated by the leadership of the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 58). In the 1948 elections, the KNP won a single seat. KVP leader Romme stated that he did not see the KNP as a major threat (Lipschits 1982, 47). The KNP drew support from the Catholic middle class but also from people with a Dutch-Indian background, including non-Catholics (Tomassen 2003, 64).

The KNP saw itself as a Catholic party and it explicitly agreed with the KVP on moral matters (Tomassen 2003, 62). On other issues, it combined a more conservative and economically liberal outlook (Van Bergen 1996, 45). It was opposed to autonomy or independence of Indonesia and sought to maintain the constitutional order, even after Indonesia had become an independent state (Tomassen 2003, 63). In the election manifesto of the KNP, colonial affairs are a main issue. The party was opposed to extending government intervention on social and economic matters (Tomassen 2003, 63). On matters of economic governance and colonial politics, the KNP saw the PvdA as its main opponent, and the KVP as a “sheep” that was led astray by a “red shepherd” (Tomassen 2003, 63 translation SO). In parliament the KNP pursued the KVP as a “rightwing botfly”, which reinforced the existing conflict between left and right within the KVP (Koole 1995, 186 translation SO). The KNP has also been characterised as “splinter in the flesh of the KVP” (Van Bergen 1996, translation SO). Over time, the KNP focused less on Indonesia (which had become independent) and more on the economic policy of the government (Tomassen 2003, 65). In 1955 the KNP returned to the KVP under pressure from the episcopate (Lipschits 1982, 48; Koole 1995, 186). Welter remained a KVP MP until 1963.

Rochon (1985, 429) considers the KNP a challenger. The KNP considered the KVP to have strayed from the right path because of a “red shepherd”; it adhered to the more rightwing brand of political Catholicism of the RKSP, which the KVP had abandoned after the war, and it appealed specifically to Catholic voters (the base of the KVP). The KNP can be seen as a direct split from the KVP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): its leader had been a minister and senator for the Catholic party and he was a candidate for their party list. Given that the colonial issue was the reason for the KNP to split, and that this is the main issue in their election manifesto, colonial affairs and development cooperation is assigned as the issue owned by the KNP.

Table 4.4: profile of the KNP

Party Profile		KNP
Full name		<i>Katholieke Nationale Partij</i>
English name		Catholic National Party
Founded		1948
First elected		1952
First succesful election result		1 (1.2%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Divorce (from KVP)
Party goal		Challenger (KVP)
Ideology		Rightwing Catholicism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Colonial Affairs (22.5%)
	in parliamentary speech	Colonial Affairs (17.9%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Opposition to decolonization of Indonesia
	assigned	Colonial Affairs
Unique proposals		37.8% (14)
In parliament		1948-1955
Reason dissolution		Merged into KVP

Table 4.5: profile of the PSP

Party Profile		PSP
Full name		<i>Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij</i>
English name		Pacifist-Socialist Party
Founded		1957
First elected		1959
First succesful election result		2 (1.8%)
Membership in year of first MPs		2497
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Challenger (PvdA)
Ideology		Leftwing socialism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Defence (49.4%)
	in parliamentary speech	Defence (17.2%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Opposition to the Cold War
	assigned	Defence
Unique proposals		39.1% (9)
In parliament		1959-1989
Reason dissolution		Merged into GL

4.4.2 PSP: dissenting socialists

The PSP (*Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij*/Pacifist Socialist Party) was the second new party to enter parliament after the Second World War. Like the KNP, it traces its background to events within the international realm, namely the Cold War and Dutch coalition politics.

Individuals from the peace movement formed the PSP in 1957. They were united in their opposition to the use of nuclear weapons and the Cold War mentality (Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 33). Most of them had been involved in a peace movement called The Third Way, which sought a political course between the Soviet Union and the United States (Denekamp et al. 1982, 34-37). Between 1955 and 1957, people from The Third Way organised themselves in a movement of politically homeless individuals (*Daklozenberaad*), which sought to cooperate with the PvdA in order to see a pacifist elected to parliament, but the PvdA refused (Van der Land 1962, 16-18; Koole 1995, 247). After this refusal, they formed their own party. The founding members had different backgrounds: leftwing socialists, dissident communists and pacifist Christians (Van der Land 1962, 89; Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 33; Denekamp et al. 1987). A large number of founders had been a member of the social democratic PvdA and had left the party because of its support for the Dutch military presence in the Dutch Indies in the 1950s (Van der Land 1962, 93).⁶⁷ A sizeable minority of the party's founders had been a member of the pre-War progressive Christian and pacifist CDU, which had merged into the social democratic PvdA (Van der Land 1962, 89). Only a small percentage of the party's founders had a background in the Communist CPN (Van der Land 1962, 89).⁶⁸ Many founders had been active in the SU (*Socialistische Unie*/Socialist Union), a short-lived leftwing-socialist party that existed in the early 1950s (Van der Land 1962, 89; Lipschits 1982, 64). In 1958 the PSP won its first seats in the North Holland Provincial Council, and in 1959 it won two seats in the *Tweede Kamer*. The PSP entered parliament at the cost of the PvdA (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 306).

⁶⁷ The most prominent of them had been Slotemaker-De Bruïne who had been head of the WBS, the PvdA think tank, between 1945 and 1947 (Denekamp et al. 1987).

⁶⁸ In 1967, the PSP was joined by a group of dissident Communists called the "Bruggroep", led by former CPN-parliamentary party chair Gortzak.

The ideology of the PSP contained two elements: pacifism and socialism. Like the Third Way, the PSP sought a third way between the Eastern (communist) and the Western (capitalist) blocs. Within the Dutch left, the division between East and West was reflected politically: the pro-American PvdA and the pro-Russian CPN were divided politically. In its first election manifesto and in its parliamentary speeches the PSP focused on defence. Like the PvdA and the CPN, the PSP had a leftwing economic programme: it was committed to socialisation of the means of production.

After the formation of the PSP, the media wrote about them as a minor nuisance for the PvdA (Van der Land 1962, 53-54). One newspaper wrote: “[w]e do not believe that this split will cost the PvdA many votes” (*de Volkskrant* cited in Van der Land 1962, 54 translation SO). One social democratic author characterised the PSP as a “botfly on the leg of the horse that has to pull socialism forward” (Schurer cited in Van der Land 1962, 60 translation SO). In its early communication, the PSP agitated against both the CPN and the PvdA (Denekamp et al. 1982, 55). The party considered both the CPN and the PvdA militaristic. The success of the PSP in the provincial elections of 1958 took the PvdA by surprise (Denekamp et al. 1982, 57), and after these elections, the PvdA began to warn against the PSP: a vote for the PSP would benefit the VVD or the KVP because the PvdA would become relatively smaller (Denekamp et al. 1982, 61). The early reactions of the CPN appear to have been much more positive: they supported the commitment of PSP against (American) nuclear weapons and sought cooperation between the PSP and CPN in the peace movement, but after the PSP entered parliament, relations became more strained (Denekamp et al. 1982, 64-66).

The PSP would remain in parliament for 30 years. Over time, its pacifism moved to the background and its leftwing socialism took over. During its history, the PSP was characterised by internal instability, conflicts and splits (Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997). Although the party had responded positively to cooperation between the PvdA and other progressive parties in the early stages, it stood isolated from these parties during the 1970s. Over the course of the 1980s, the PSP began to cooperate with the CPN, the EVP and the PPR. These four parties eventually merged to form the leftwing green party GL (*GroenLinks*/GreenLeft) in 1989.

Van der Land (1962, 119) argues that one cannot see the PSP as a divorce from the PvdA, because its members had been politically homeless before forming the PSP, and those who had been a member of the PvdA had been so only for a short time long before the PSP was formed. As the founders included no former MPs or ministers, and as no organised groups from within the PvdA split to join the PSP, it ought to be considered a party formed by birth (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). The question whether the PSP is a challenger or a mobiliser, is more difficult to answer. Rochon (1985, 430) considers it a mobiliser party, even though he claims that the party sought to “revitalise” socialism, the ideology of the PvdA. The PSP adhered to the anti-militarist and socialist ideology of the pre-War SDAP and CDU parties, which had merged to form the PvdA. In its communication, the PSP attacked both the CPN and the PvdA for their militarism. Its support base of leftwing intellectuals, however, was not the support base of these two parties. The PSP shares two of the three characteristics of a challenger (communication and ideology), and therefore, one has to classify the party as such. Because of the early orientation of the PSP-founders towards the PvdA, this party is identified as its challenged party. Given that the defence issue is characteristic of the party’s parliamentary speeches and its election manifestos, and that the party’s anti-Cold War positions distinguished it from the PvdA and the CPN, the party is linked to the defence issue.

4.4.3 BP: *farmers in protest*

The 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of rightwing protest movements, specifically the BP (*Boerenpartij*/Farmers’ Party). In the eyes of Vossen (2005), these movements were part of a process of depillarisation, secularisation and anti-paternalism, as the rise of new leftwing parties such as the PSP had also been: the party is the other face of the sixties.

The BP was formed in 1958 by Hendrik Koekoek (Vossen 2005, 252). He served as party chair and later as chair of the parliamentary party, top candidate in every election and editor of the *Vrije Boer* (Free Farmer), the party’s magazine (Vossen 2005, 250). Koekoek had been a member of the conservative Protestant CHU until 1956, but had not been a prominent member, nor had he ever held political office for the party other than secretary of a local CHU branch (Nooij 1969, 33; Vossen 2005, 251). Since the late 1940s, Koekoek had been organising

resistance against government intervention in the economy: first with his *Bond voor Bedrijfsvrijheid in de Landbouw* (League for Entrepreneurial Freedom in Agriculture), and later with the BP. The party resisted the formation of a corporatist organisation of agriculture that was favoured by the KVP and the PvdA. This corporatist organisation had the power to levy taxes and had limited legislative powers. The first public activity of the BP was participation in the 1958 elections in several municipalities in the province of Gelderland (Nooij 1969, 34).⁶⁹ In 1959, they participated in the national elections unsuccessfully (Nooij 1969, 34-35; Vossen 2005, 252). The party was able to win a seat in the provincial council of Gelderland in 1962 (Nooij 1969, 35). In 1963, several farmers in the hamlet Hollandscheveld refused to pay taxes to the corporatist organisation for agriculture; the resistance degenerated into violent clashes with the police (Nooij 1969, 36; Koole 1995, 337; Vossen 2005, 251-252). Koekoek supported the farmers. This generated considerable attention for Koekoek and the BP. In the 1963 elections, the BP won three seats. Their electoral support was not limited to farmers. They also won a considerable number of votes in Amsterdam for instance (Vossen 2005, 253).⁷⁰

The BP saw itself explicitly as a party of the (economic) right, a position, which had been left open by the parties committed to the free market such as the ARP, the CHU and the VVD (Nooij, 1969:41). It agitated against these parties for abandoning their positions: “[the VVD] has been compromised by years of cooperation with the guild of interventionist quacks, which see the economic straightjacket as the only means to correct the growing resistance of businesses” (Stam 1966, 21 translation SO). In the BP’s view, the Christian parties were controlled by their leftwing labour wings, and the VVD had “collaborated” with these parties in coalition cabinets (Stam cited in Nooij 1969, 41). In the eyes of the BP, the established parties had all become indistinguishable (Faas 1967, 149). The party also stood on the right on issues such as monarchy, the place of religion in politics and foreign affairs (Nooij, 1969:45). In its election manifestos and its parliamentary speeches, the party focused most on agriculture.

⁶⁹ The party ran under the name *Vrije Boeren* (Free Farmers).

⁷⁰ It is important to note that in the elections of 1966 and 1967, the support from urban areas is much greater than in 1963, especially in comparison to the relatively constant support in rural areas (Nooij 1969, 37).

The BP would be in parliament for the following eighteen years. In the late 1960s, the party had become the focal point for individuals and movements to the right of the VVD, the ARP and the CHU (Vossen 2005, 257). The party grew in following elections. This growth coincided with several conflicts. The most prominent concerned the earlier affiliation of a BP senator with a National-Socialist party (Vossen 2005, 261). Koekoek supported the senator, and in response one of the MPs left the parliamentary party in 1966. In the 1970s, support for the BP petered out and the party disappeared from parliament in the 1981 elections.

Given that the BP was not founded by a large section of the members or a prominent politician of an established party, it must be seen as a party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Lucardie (1986, 78-83) considers the BP to be a single interest, anti-system party. Koole (1995, 337-338), however, considers the party to be a protest party rather than a single-issue party. He stresses the comparison with the French *Poujadist* party, which also mobilised protest voters from both the urban and the rural middle class (Koole 1995, 337-338). Mudde (2004, 548) also describes the BP as an early populist party. Rochon (1985, 430) considers the party to be a mobiliser, which appealed primarily to those who opposed “big government”. And indeed, the party did not adhere explicitly to an ideology any other party had before: its conservatism mixed a kind of non-denominational Christianity with economic liberalism. It also agitated against the established parties of the right for abandoning their commitment to the free market. The social group they sought to represent (farmers) were not the social base of these established parties, however. Given the party’s background, electoral orientation and activity, the party is linked to the issue of agriculture.

Table 4.6: profile of BP

Party Profile		BP
Full name		<i>Boerenpartij</i>
English name		Farmers' Party
Founded		1957
First elected		1963
First succesful election result		3 (2.1%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		75%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Mobiliser (protest party)
Ideology		Conservatism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Agriculture (43.6%)
	in parliamentary speech	Agriculture (15.5%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Opposition to organisation of agriculture
	assigned	Agriculture
Unique proposals		54.5% (12)
In parliament		1963-1981
Reason dissolution		Transformed into <i>Rechtse Volkspartij</i>

Table 4.7: profile of the GPV

Party Profile		GPV
Full name		<i>Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond</i>
English name		Reformed Political League
Founded		1948
First elected		1963
First succesful election result		1 (0.7%)
Membership in year of first MPs		7039
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Split (ARP)
Party goal		Challenger (ARP)
Ideology		Orthodox Protestantism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Governance (13.5%)
	in parliamentary speech	Moral issues (26.8%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Moral issues, combined with economic and foreign policy
	assigned	Moral issues
Unique proposals		50% (31)
In parliament		1959-2000
Reason dissolution		Merged into CU

4.4.4 GPV: dissenting Protestants

As discussed above, the Protestant segment of the Dutch political landscape is characterised by splits between different religious groups: the ARP had its support in the *Gereformeerde Kerk*, the CHU in the conservative parts of the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* and the SGP had its support in the smaller orthodox Protestant communities. The GPV (*Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond*/Reformed Political League) was the fourth Protestant party to enter parliament after the Second World War. It, too, had its roots in a specific religious community.

The GPV was an orthodox Protestant party. In 1948, members of the ARP formed the GPV (Koole 1995, 136). The reason for the split was theological (Klei 2010, 12). The GPV was formed by members of the *Gereformeerde Kerken (Vrijgemaakt)* (Liberated Reformed Church) that had split away from the ARP-aligned *Gereformeerde Kerken* in 1944 (Koole 1995, 136). 10% of the members of the *Gereformeerde Kerken* had joined the *Vrijgemaakten* (Harinck 2001, 224). In the following four years, it became clear to the *Vrijgemaakten* that they could not continue to cooperate politically with individuals with whom they had a fundamental religious conflict (Koole 1995, 136-137). On a local level, caucuses had been split on religious grounds (Harinck 2001, 225). In part, the formation of the GPV was the result of a conflict within the *Vrijgemaakte Church*: between those who wanted to continue within the ARP and those who wanted to form a separate party (Klei 2011, 53). The ARP consciously attempted to prevent division, for instance by putting *Vrijgemaakten* on eligible places on the party list (Harinck 2001, 232; Klei 2011, 88). Between 1948 and 1950, the group that split away from the ARP operated as a loose *Voorlopig Verband van Vrije Kiesverenigingen* (Temporary League of Free Electoral Associations) and in 1950 they formed a separate political party (Klei 2010, 13). Several branches of the ARP switched allegiances (Koole 1995, 137). GPV local parties did not allow anyone to become a member if they were not a member of the *Vrijgemaakte Church* (Koole 1995, 138). The GPV was closely tied to the *Vrijgemaakte Church* and the *Vrijgemaakte pillar* (Klei 2010, 22-23). The GPV participated in the elections of 1952, 1956 and 1959 without winning a seat.⁷¹ The party had provincial councillors in Groningen since 1950. In 1959, they missed out

⁷¹ Already in 1948 *Vrijgemaakte* former ARP-voters believed that they had cost the ARP a seat by abstaining from voting (Klei 2011, 51).

on a seat in the *Tweede Kamer* by only twenty votes (Klei 2010, 14). Before the GPV entered parliament, however, the ARP had attempted to consciously ignore the party (Klei 2011, 64). The ARP spoke negatively of what it considered to be “an irrelevant, sectarian, small party” (Koole 1995, 137 translation SO). The GPV legitimated its own existence by referring to what it perceived as the aberrant course of the ARP (Klei 2011, 93). In one of its first election manifestos, the party wrote “the GPV does not seek to navigate a new course, but rightfully pretends to continue the old line of the ARP.” (Enschede Program of the GPV cited in Klei 2011, 94 translation SO). In 1963, the GPV won a seat in parliament. From then on the party provided one or two MPs. In parliament the GPV MPs were highly respected for their contributions to parliamentary debates. They were considered the “conscience” of the *Tweede Kamer* (Klei 2011, 119).

The GPV was an orthodox Protestant party. It was based on a specific interpretation of the Bible and the doctrines of Dutch Calvinism. The party combined conservatism on moral issues with conservative stances on the role of the government in the economy. The party also took conservative positions on foreign affairs: it was anti-communist and it opposed European integration. The GPV was opposed to the quick dissolution of both colonial relations and the apartheid regime in South Africa (Klei 2010, 26-27). For this party, however, its religious convictions were more important than any other issue. This is evident if one looks at the party’s election manifesto: moral issues are dominant.

The GPV would remain in parliament for the following 39 years. During the 1960s, a group of ARP-members petitioned to join the party because they felt the ARP drifted from its conservative positions. The GPV was internally divided over their support; in the end the GPV rebuked them because they were not members of the *Vrijgemaakte* Church (Klei 2011). This group became one of the components of the RPF (see section 4.4.10). Over the course of the 1990s, the GPV modified its position on non-*Vrijgemaakten* joining the party. This allowed for closer cooperation with the other orthodox Christian parties, especially the RPF. The two parties merged in 2000 to form the CU (*ChristenUnie*/ChristianUnion).

It is clear that the GPV was formed by divorce, as the party was formed by an organised group of *Vrijgemaakte* members in the ARP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). In terms of its goals it is much more difficult to characterise the party. Rochon considers them to be a mobilising party (Rochon 1985, 430), because they

mobilised voters on a new religious cleavage. Although some prominent GPV-politicians had attempted to broaden the base of the party, the GPV oriented itself in electoral terms to *Vrijgemaakten*. The ARP, however, considered the *Vrijgemaakten* part of its social base. As Daalder (1965) and Lucardie (1986) recognise, the GPV did adhere to a perfected version of the ideology of the ARP. At the moment of the GPV's foundation or the GPV's entry into parliament, the ARP had not drifted that far from this position yet, as it would in the course of the 1960s. On the basis of these characteristics, one has to characterise the GPV as a challenger of the ARP. Given its religious background and prevalence of moral themes in its election manifesto, the party is linked to moral issues.

4.4.5 D66: democratic idealists

During the 1960s, the pillars, which had organised Dutch social life, began to weaken. The party system continued to reflect the pillarised society. A group of *homines novi* formed a new political party, D66 (*Democraten '66*/Democrats '66)⁷², to try and radically reform the Dutch political system. Soon however, they themselves became part of that very same party system.

D66 was formed in 1966. The initiative for the party lay with Hans Gruijters, who had been a municipal councillor for the VVD in Amsterdam (Van der Land 2003, 21; Koole 1995, 311). He had left the VVD over a conflict with the conservative wing of the party concerning the royal wedding of Princess Beatrix, the heir-apparent, and Claus von Amsberg, which Gruijters had refused to attend (Van der Land 2003, 21). After he left the party he was approached by different individuals about the formation of a new party (Van der Land 2003, 22-23). Gruijters organised a series of meetings with several of them. The group had a mixed background.⁷³ A major concern they shared was the functioning of democracy (Van der Land 2003, 23). The group explicitly sought to prevent becoming a Group-Gruijters, a local split from the VVD, and therefore Gruijters soon handed over leadership to Hans van Mierlo (Van der Land 2003, 24-26).

⁷² The party was founded with the acronym D'66. D66 will be used consistently, which is the formal spelling since the 1980s.

⁷³ Out of the 44 participants, 25 were member of a political party: sixteen were members of the VVD, seven had been members of the PvdA, one had been a member of the PSP and one had been a member of the CHU (Godschalk 1970). Nineteen did not have a background in an established political party.

In 1966, the group formed the initiative-committee D66 with the intention to form a political party (Van der Land 2003, 25). The reasoning behind this move was that the group had to become a threat for the established parties in order to realise its policy goals (Van der Land 2003, 25). The committee drafted an appeal to the Dutch people, and because the appeal got considerable response both from the population and the media (Van der Land 2003, 29), the committee formed a new party in 1966 in order to participate in the 1967 elections (Van der Land 2003, 30). In the electoral campaign of 1967, the party emphasised government reform, because that was – according to market researchers – the unique selling point of the party (Van der Land 2003, 27). In the 1967 elections, D66 won seven seats, which was unprecedented for a new party (Van der Land 2003, 37; Koole 1995, 313). Electorally, D66 drew its support from all over the political landscape (Van der Land 2003, 38-39).

The party combined two political perspectives: on the one hand, the party presented itself as a pragmatic party unburdened by traditional ideology, and on the other hand, it presented itself as an ardent proponent of government reform (Koole 1995, 309-310; Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 67). Its message of government reform was far-reaching: the party sought “to blow up the existing parties” (Van der Land 2003, 36 translation SO). It advocated institutional reforms including the direct election of the prime minister and reform of the electoral system (Van der Land 2003, 33; Koole 1995, 312). All these reforms were oriented at the creation of a two party system, which would eliminate the need for a formation process, which was not transparent enough in the eyes of the D66 founders. There is a discrepancy between the party’s profile (which focuses on government reform) and the text of the party’s appeal to the electorate and the first election manifesto (which focuses on foreign policy). This was in many ways a marketing ploy: when the first appeal was printed, the government reform issues were printed on the front, while the other policies were printed on the back “in very small print” (Van der Land 2003, 27 translation SO). Also, in its parliamentary motions, D66 did not focus on government reform; instead it was most active on economic issues. This can be explained by the fact that government reform is a question of long-term constitutional amendments instead of motions. Over time, D66 developed programmatically in a progressive liberal direction (Lucardie 1993).

After 1967, D66 began to set steps towards the formation of a two-bloc political system. Like D66, the PvdA sought the creation of a two-bloc system, and it

proposed reforms similar to those of D66 (Van der Land 2003, 47-48). In the 1971 elections, D66 and PvdA together with the KVP-Radicals (see 4.4.7) formed a Progressive Agreement (*Progressief Akkoord*) committed to the formation of a progressive party, which could win a majority in parliamentary elections (Van der Land 2003, 74-78). After the 1972 elections, the alliance won a plurality in parliament and formed a progressive cabinet with ministers from the KVP and the ARP. In the following years, D66 went through a series of dramatic electoral ups and downs, governed in five different cabinets and continues to exist until today.

The position of D66 as a party formed by birth is somewhat problematic (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303) as a larger number of founders had backgrounds in different parties. But because none of them played a role on the national stage, their backgrounds were mixed and they were joined by so many independents, D66 ought to be seen as a party formed by birth. The party saw itself as a pragmatic party without an ideology, but with a clear commitment to government reform. It did not attack a single party, but rather moved against all parties. It drew its support from all parties. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider D66 a mobiliser, and specifically a purifier: it advocates new politics, which it combines with a pragmatic attitude on other issues. This is in line with Rochon's (1985, 431) classification of D66. Given this classification and its parliamentary speech, D66 is linked to the issue of governance.

Table 4.8: profile of D66

Party Profile		D'66
Full name		<i>Democraten '66</i>
English name		Democrats '66
Founded		1966
First elected		1967
First succesful election result		7 (4.5%)
Membership in year of first MPs		3700
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Mobiliser (purifier)
Ideology		Radical democracy Pragmatism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Foreign Affairs (14.2%)
	in parliamentary speech	Governance (14.0%)
	in motions	Economic Affairs (16.7%)
	in literature	Government reform
	assigned	Governance
Unique proposals		33.7% (31)
In parliament		1967-now
Reason dissolution		Still in parliament

Table 4.9: profile of DS'70

Party Profile		DS'70
Full name		<i>Democratisch Socialisten '70</i>
English name		Democratic Socialist '70
Founded		1970
First elected		1971
First succesful election result		8 (5.3%)
Membership in year of first MPs		3000
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Merger of divorced groups
Party goal		Challenger (PvdA)
Ideology		Social-democracy
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Governance (17.6%)
	in parliamentary speech	Economic Affairs (16.9%)
	in motions	Economic Affairs (20.2%)
	in literature	Foreign policy, economic issues
	assigned	Governance
Unique proposals		24.4% (22)
In parliament		1970-1981
Reason dissolution		Party death

4.4.6 DS'70: democratic moderates

The question of political cooperation was a key question for many parties in the late 1960s. It led to a division in the PvdA in the form of DS'70 (*Democratisch Socialisten '70*/Democratic Socialists '70).

DS'70 was founded in 1970 by former members of the PvdA (Koole 1995, 242). The founders of DS'70 felt uneasy with the course the PvdA had pursued since 1966. In 1966 *Nieuw Links* (New Left), a new generation of social democrats manifested itself within the party. The group advocated reform of the PvdA's internal organisation, a new strategy of polarisation and a new political agenda consisting of social, political and economic reform, leftwing economic policies, an anti-NATO foreign policy (Boivin et al. 1977, 34). Between 1966 and 1969, they gradually took over the leadership of the PvdA (Bosscher 1994, 225).

DS'70 was formed by three groups: a group of PvdA municipal councillors, an organised centrist faction within the PvdA, and group-Goedhart, which consisted of three PvdA MPs (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 118-120; Koole 1995, 242). The group of municipal councillors split from the PvdA over the formation of a local Progressive Agreement. The first such conflict was in Eindhoven: the local party meeting favoured the formation of a local Progressive Agreement, while the councillors did not (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 112). Therefore, these councillors formed their own party in the local council. The break in Eindhoven was followed in several other municipal councils (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 114). This group of councillors was joined by members of the *Democratisch Appel* (Democratic Appeal), who had unsuccessfully attempted to steer the course of the PvdA towards the centre. Their main concern was the new foreign policy of the PvdA, which in their view failed to grasp the distinction between democracies and dictatorships (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 104-105). The third constituent group was the group-Goedhart, a split from the PvdA parliamentary party (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 115). They left the PvdA parliamentary party in 1970 over the PvdA's position on the war in Indochina (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 116).

Basically, DS'70 adhered to the ideology that the PvdA adhered to in the 1950s (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 74-75). The party was committed to a social order that was characterised by solidarity with the weak and an economic system in which production and distribution were controlled by the community (Voerman 1991, 95). DS'70's economic policies were centrist: it adhered to fiscal conservatism and

opposed nationalisation. Moreover, it was opposed to communism at home as well as abroad (Lipschits 1982, 70; Voerman 1991, 104-108; Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 128-129; Lucardie 1991, 117). These two orientations were reflected in the party: it had two tendencies, a centrist tendency focusing on responsible social economic policies and an anti-communist tendency focusing on foreign policy. These two tendencies did not agree programmatically, which is why the party has been characterised as “a case of political schizophrenia” (Voerman 1991, translation SO). This makes it difficult to relate the party to a single issue. The most dominant issue in its manifesto (governance) was not one of the issues owned by one of these two tendencies. In its parliamentary activity (both motions and speeches), the issue of one of the tendencies (economic affairs) is dominant. Both the centrist and the rightwing tendency of the party were united in their commitment to (parliamentary) democracy: according to the anti-communist tendency, foreign cooperation should be oriented towards democracies, even if these are free market countries, and not towards dictatorships, even if they are socialist (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 104-105). Likewise, the social democratic tendency favoured parliamentary democracy over a socialist economy at home (Lucardie 1991, 114; De Vos 1976, 227). Thus governance was selected as the core issue of DS'70.

In the 1971 election campaign, DS'70 oriented itself against the PvdA (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 119). Drees junior, son of a former PvdA prime minister, was chosen as its leader. In the 1971 elections, DS'70 won eight seats. The leadership of DS'70 saw its electoral success as the vindication of their view that the PvdA had drifted too far from the views of its traditional electoral base (Koole 1995, 243).⁷⁴ In 1971, DS'70 joined a centre-right cabinet with the VVD, CHU, ARP and KVP. Within a year, however, the cabinet fell due to a difference of opinion between the DS'70 ministers and the rest of the cabinet about budget cuts (Koole 1995, 244). DS'70 continued to exist until 1981, but it declined with every election.

DS'70 is a split from the PvdA in organisational terms (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): it was formed by the organised internal opposition within the PvdA and by people within the PvdA parliamentary party. Rochon (1985, 429) considers the party to be a challenger of the PvdA: DS'70 believed the PvdA had drifted too far from its original positions and no longer represented the interests of its

⁷⁴ In reality, the electoral support of DS'70 was drawn from the VVD, D66 and PvdA (Koole 1995, 243).

traditional electorate. The party took the positions that the PvdA took in the 1950s. Moreover, they agitated against the PvdA in their first election campaign. DS'70 is linked to governance because this issue (the largest in its election manifesto) links both the social democratic and anti-communist tendency.

4.4.7 PPR: radicalising radicals

In the 1960s and 1970s, cooperation between political parties was a major issue. This can be seen in the formation of a Progressive Agreement around the PvdA, as seen in section 4.4.5 and 4.4.6, but also in the formation of the CDA (*Christen Democratisch Appel*/Christian Democratic Appeal), a merger of the three major religious parties: the KVP, the ARP and the CHU. Within the KVP, cooperation with other parties was a contested issue. It divided the party between those who preferred a progressive alliance and those who preferred Christian-democratic cooperation. Those who favoured progressive to Christian-democratic cooperation founded the PPR (*Politieke Partij Radicalen*/Political Party Radicals).

The PPR was formed in 1968 as a split from the KVP (Koole 1995, 178). They had operated within the KVP before the split as the KVP-Radicals (*KVP-Radicalen*). The key issue between the KVP-Radicals and the rest of the party concerned cooperation: the KVP-Radicals preferred progressive cooperation to Christian-democratic cooperation. The majority of the KVP preferred centrist Christian democratic cooperation. The KVP-Radicals favoured the formation of a progressive concentration, which would consist of a progressive Christian-democratic party, the PvdA, D66 and the PSP (Tomassen 2003, 97-103). These KVP-Radicals included members from the trade unionist wing of the party, former ministers and even a former prime minister (Koole 1995, 178; Tomassen 2003, 95; Van der Steen 2004, 434-440). The KVP-Radicals kept close contacts with like-minded members of the ARP, so-called ARP-Radicals (*ARP-Radicalen*): a working group of Christian Radicals (*Christen-Radicalen*) was formed by members of the KVP, the ARP and the CHU (Tomassen 2003, 94; Waltmans 1983, 14; Klaassen 2000, 23). After the 1967 elections, the KVP formed a cabinet with the centre-right VVD and CHU, without the PvdA. The KVP-Radicals attempted to change the course of their own party internally (Waltmans 1983, 18). When in 1968 the KVP leadership committed itself explicitly to centrist Christian-democratic cooperation in a televised interview, several of the KVP-Radicals left the party. This group included four MPs, three of

whom would form a separate parliamentary party (Koole 1995, 178-179; Tomassen 2003, 115). They were joined by several members of provincial councils and municipal councils (Waltmans 1983, 23; Klaassen 2000, 25; Tomassen 2003, 199). Many prominent KVP-Radicals (including former Prime Minister Cals) remained within the KVP (Lipschits 1982, 52). In 1968, the *KVP-Radicalen* who had split away from the KVP formed a new party, the PPR. 79% of the founders were Catholic and 40% had been a member of the KVP (Waltmans 1983, 30). Although many founders had been affiliated with political Catholicism before forming the PPR, the party was not explicitly religious and was open to non-Christians (Waltmans 1983, 27; Koole 1995, 179; Tomassen 2003, 120). The PPR explicitly sought to cooperate with the other progressive parties, PvdA, D66 and PSP. In 1971, they were joined by a group of ARP-Radicals (Waltmans 1983, 33). In its early campaigns, the PPR explicitly sought conflict with the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 120). The party oriented itself towards religious voters who doubted the radicalism of the Christian parties (Waltmans 1983, 35; Van Egdom 1991, 8). The PPR participated in the Progressive Agreement, an alliance of PvdA and D66 (Van Egdom 1991, 12). Under the leadership of Bas De Gaay-Fortman (a former ARP-Radical), the party did particularly well in the 1972 elections (Klaassen 2000, 84). Between 1973 and 1977, the PPR became part of the Den Uyl cabinet (Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 34). After 1977, electoral decline set in (De Gaay-Fortman & Van Egdom 1988, 14). The PPR began to cooperate with other small leftwing parties and merged to form the leftwing green party GL in 1989.

The KVP-Radicals had a progressive Christian vision, which interpreted Christianity as a commitment to “peace, justice, harmony, and happiness” (Tomassen 2003, 104). The PPR, however, did not have a Christian identity, as it was a secular leftwing progressive party. Over time, the PPR radicalised (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 72-73); it became more and more influenced by new politics ideas such as environmental protection, women’s rights, government reform and Third World development (Koole 1995, 180; Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 34-35). The party’s diffuse focus is reflected in their behaviour: in their first election manifesto, labour was the most prominent issue, its parliamentary speech focused on governance and its motions on defence. These, however, do not form the unique appeal or the core issue of the party. The party's unique appeal was in its emphasis on new politics issues: development cooperation, the environment, government reform and women's

Table 4.10: profile of the PPR

Party Profile		PPR
Full name		<i>Politieke Partij Radicalen</i>
English name		Political Party Radicals
Founded		1968
First elected		1971
First succesful election result		2 (1.8%)
Membership in year of first MPs		4284
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Divorce (KVP)
Party goal		Challenger (KVP/CDA)
Ideology		Progressive Christianity
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Labour (20.6%)
	in parliamentary speech	Governance (12.2%)
	in motions	Defence (14.5%)
	in literature	New politics issues (e.g. environment)
	assigned	Environment
Unique proposals		15.4% (12)
In parliament		1968-1989
Reason dissolution		Merged into GL

liberation. Of these four issues, the environment is the most often linked to the PPR. So the PPR is linked to the issue of the environment, but it is with some hesitation, because the party became greener after its foundation.

The PPR was formed by a divorce from the KVP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): it was formed as a split within the KVP parliamentary party. Rochon (1985, 431) considers the PPR to be a mobilising party for this new combination of Christian politics with redistribution and environmentalism. If one looks more precisely, however, the PPR meets two out of three requirements to be a challenger party. It oriented itself primarily against the KVP in its early campaigns. In the early years it oriented itself primarily to (a segment of) the Christian electorate. It did not represent an ideology the KVP ever had, but an ideology that the KVP-Radicals wanted the KVP to pursue. The PPR does not appear to fit well into the mobiliser category: it did not advocate a particular interest or focus exclusively on government reform (as a purifier would). Only in later years did the PPR begin to advocate a prophetic, green ideology. Therefore, it is categorised as a challenger of the KVP. For the purpose of some analyses however it is necessary to see the PPR as a challenger of the CDA, which was formed in 1977.

Table 4.11: profile of the NMP

Party Profile		NMP
Full name		<i>Nederlandse Middenstandspartij</i>
English name		New Business Party
Founded		1970
First elected		1971
First succesful election result		2 (1.5%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		50%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Mobiliser (protest party)
Ideology		Anti-tax populism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Economic affairs (29.0%)
	in parliamentary speech	Enterprise (20.2%)
	in motions	Housing Enterprise Defence (33.3%)
	in literature	Economic issues (e.g. taxes)
	assigned	Economic affairs
Unique proposals		8.7% (2)
In parliament		1971-1972
Reason dissolution		Party death (?)

4.4.8 NMP: small business owners in protest⁷⁵

Relatively little is known about the NMP (*Nieuwe Middenstandspartij*/New Business Party). This small anti-tax, pro-business party was in parliament for less than two years and fell apart due to internal strife.

The NMP was founded in 1970. The formation of the new party was announced in an advertisement in several newspapers.⁷⁶ The advertisements of the NMP appealed explicitly to the “self-employed, businessmen and entrepreneurs” and their financial, economic and business interests.⁷⁷ The established political parties had

⁷⁵ As there are no historical accounts of the NMP, the account provided here is based on newspaper reports. Three newspapers were selected for the description of the NMP. *Het Nieuwsblad voor het Noorden*, the *Leeuwarder Courant* and the *Zierikzeesche Courant*. These were selected on the basis of digital availability and because in Zeeland and Friesland (where these newspapers were based), the NMP won considerably more votes than in the rest of the Netherlands: 2.1% in Friesland and 2.7% in Zeeland compared to 1.5% nationally.

⁷⁶ "Nederlandse Middenstandspartij opgericht". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 17/9/1970.

⁷⁷ "Ingezonden mededeling". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 13/10/1970. Translation SO.

in the eyes of the NMP founders, neglected the interests of this group.⁷⁸ These advertisements did not attack specific established parties, but they attacked the parties of the government and the opposition in general.⁷⁹ The founders of the NMP were businessmen.⁸⁰ Ab Te Pas (managing director of a wholesale trading company in paintings) led the party list.

The NMP was considered a marginal party.⁸¹ And yet, during their campaign, the NMP announced that based on the number of self-employed people in the Netherlands, the party should be able to obtain at least 16 seats in parliament, and that it could potentially win between 20 and 25.⁸² When the NMP won only two seats, the top candidate Te Pas said he was pleased, although he had expected a better result.⁸³ Journalists explained the support for the NMP by the popular discontentment with the policies of the centre-right cabinet.⁸⁴

After the elections, internal conflict began to develop. The first conflict focused on a group around Te Pas, the party's top candidate and Jacques De Jong, the party's third candidate on the list. Issues were the composition of the party's parliamentary party and the composition of the party's executive board.⁸⁵ Under pressure of the party's advisory council, the party's second candidate decided not to take his seat in parliament, but left the position to De Jong.⁸⁶ De Jong was also elected chair of the party's executive board.⁸⁷ The party executive then attempted to cut ties with their MP Te Pas⁸⁸ and demanded that he handed over the position of parliamentary party chair to De Jong,⁸⁹ which Te Pas refused.⁹⁰ By August 1971, the

⁷⁸ "'Middenstanders". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 6/8/1971.

⁷⁹ "Ingezonden mededeling". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 13/10/1970.

⁸⁰ "Weekbladen van week tot week". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 24/9/1970.

⁸¹ "Nederland viel van zijn geloof". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 29/4/1971.

⁸² "Middenstandspartij rekent op minstens zestien zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

⁸³ "Premier De Jong: 'Verheugend dat zovelen zijn opgekomen'". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

⁸⁴ "Dus toch Willem II". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

⁸⁵ "Scheuring bedreigt Middenstandspartij". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 11/5/1971.

⁸⁶ "Spoeding Kamerdebat over monetaire situatie". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 12/5/1971.

⁸⁷ "A. te Pas treedt af als voorzitter van Middenstandspartij". *Zierikzeesche Nieuwsbode*, 19/5/1971.

⁸⁸ "Middenstandspartij wil van Kamerlid Te Pas af". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 30/7/1971.

⁸⁹ "Daverende ruzie in Middenstandspartij". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 30/7/1971.

two-man NMP parliamentary party had formally been split into two one-man parties.⁹¹ In September 1971 the party organisation had formally split into two:⁹² the NMP (led by Te Pas) and the DMP (*Democratische Middenstandspartij*/Democratic Business Party, led by De Jong). The two organisations then became involved in a legal conflict.⁹³ Conflicts would continue within the NMP, led by Te Pas.⁹⁴ Both parties would participate in the Dutch General election of 1972 without winning parliamentary representation (Lucardie 2004, 203).

The NMP was opposed to government intervention in the economy (Lucardie 2004, 202). Its short programme focused on taxation (Koole 1995, 340): the party advocated a fair distribution of burdens, especially for small businessmen (Lucardie 2004, 202). The most characteristic issue of the NMP's manifesto is economic affairs. In the eyes of the NMP, the social democrats had oriented the government towards the interests of the working class, neglecting the interests of small business owners and shopkeepers.⁹⁵ Additionally, the NMP favoured more liberal policies in the media, specifically a legal status for radio pirate station Veronica,⁹⁶ while at the same time they were advocating judicial action against the counterculture movement.⁹⁷ In parliamentary debates, the party focused more on enterprise. The party proposed only three motions, one of which also concerned enterprise. The second issue in its parliamentary speeches is economic affairs.

⁹⁰ "Te Pas blijft fractievoorzitter Middenstandspartij". *Zierikzeesche Nieuwsbode* 3/8/1971.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² "Bom is gebarsten bij Middenstandspartij: bestuur in opstand". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 7/9/1971.

⁹³ "Kamerlid De Jong dient klacht wegens smaad in tegen NMP'ers". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 2/11/1971, "Tweede Kamerlid de Jong wint geding tegen Te Pas". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 30/11/1971.

⁹⁴ "Ruzie tussen voormannen Middenstandspartij". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 18/10/1972, "Middenstandspartij verliest 't geding". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 7 November, 1972.

⁹⁵ "Middenstandspartij rekt op minstens zestien zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971, "Middenstandspartij rekt op 28 April 20-25 zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 14/4/1971.

⁹⁶ "Nieuwe Mini-partijtjes staan vooral aan rechterzijde". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 22/3/1971.

⁹⁷ "Middenstandspartij rekt op 28 April 20-25 zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 14/4/1971.

Before the 1971 elections, the party held a meeting with the newly formed DS'70 party, which also advocated cutting government expenditures.⁹⁸ Later on, the NMP castigated DS'70 for its lack of fiscal conservatism.⁹⁹ The NMP was oriented towards cooperation with those parties that sought to revitalise the Dutch economy: these were centre-right parties including DS'70.¹⁰⁰ Koekoek of the BP saw considerable programmatic similarities between his own party and the NMP;¹⁰¹ the relationship between the NMP-leader Te Pas and BP-leader Koekoek were amiable.¹⁰²

Given the limited academic literature on the party, it is difficult to classify it in terms of the different classificatory schemes. According to the information available, the founders of the NMP did not have a position within any established party. Therefore, it can be considered a new party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Rochon (1985, 430) considers the NMP to be a challenger of the VVD, because of its programmatic similarity to that party. Tromp (1989, 86) considers the NMP a *Poujadist* party in line with the BP. The ideological similarities between the VVD and the NMP are the only reason to consider the NMP a challenger of the VVD. In the available information on the campaign, there is no sign that the NMP oriented itself towards the VVD in its rhetoric or towards VVD voters. Like the BP, the NMP agitated against the growing influence of the government on the economy. It also oriented itself explicitly towards defending the position of small business owners. Therefore, one can best consider the party a mobiliser of small business owners. The party's core issue is economic affairs.

⁹⁸ "DS'70 praatte met Middenstandspartij". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 16/3/1971.

⁹⁹ "Middenstandspartij rekent op minstens zestien zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

¹⁰⁰ "Dus toch Willem II". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

¹⁰¹ "Drees: kabinet-De Jong maakte beleidsfouten". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 13/5/1971.

¹⁰² "Hans Wiegel, de PvdA en D'66 en het ondergeschoven kind". 1971. *Leeuwarder Courant*.

4.4.9 RKPN: orthodox Catholics

As described in section 4.4.7, in 1968 part of a leftwing faction of the KVP left the party to form the PPR. They believed that Christian-democratic cooperation pulled the party too far to the right. Within the Catholic community, there were also those who thought that this Christian-democratic cooperation would pull the KVP too far to the left. These people formed the RKPN (*Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland*/Roman Catholic Party Netherlands).

After 1968, the KVP developed in the direction of a non-denominational party with moderate positions on social and moral issues, especially abortion (Koole 1995, 186; Tomassen 2003, 124-126). The conservative wing of the Catholic community, including the episcopate, disagreed (Tomassen 2003, 128-129). One of these reactions took the form of a new political party, the NRP (*Nieuwe Roomse Partij*/New Roman Party), which was founded in 1971 by a former KVP-member (Tomassen 2003, 130-131). The NRP failed to obtain parliamentary representation in the 1971 elections (Tomassen 2003, 132). Consequently, several members of the NRP formed a separate party, the RKPN. Klaas Beuker, who had been a member of the KVP until 1969 and who had been second candidate on the NRP list, led the new party (Tomassen 2003, 134). The RKPN (and the NRP) participated in the 1972 elections, in which the RKPN won a single seat (Tomassen 2003, 135). The ideology of the RKPN was based on a strict interpretation of the Bible and Papal dogma (Tomassen 2003, 137). The party believed that Dutch society was undergoing moral decay, and tolerant policies towards abortion were seen as a prime example of this (Tomassen 2003, 137-138). In its election manifesto, abortion and other moral issues played a dominant role. These issues were also reflected in the party's activity in parliament: the RKPN proposed four motions, three of which concerned moral issues. In parliamentary debates, however, the party focused more on education.

The RKPN received little attention from the media or from the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 145), and in parliament the RKPN was not taken seriously by the major parties (Koole 1995, 186; Tomassen 2003, 139). In 1977 the RKPN did not win a single seat in parliament and it has not participated in new elections since then.

The RKPN was formed as a split, but not as a split from a parliamentary party. The party was formed as a split from an extra-parliamentary party (pace Lipschits 1982, 53; pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303); one of its founders

Table 4.12: profile of the RKPN

Party Profile		RKPN
Full name		<i>Rooms-Katholieke Partij Nederland</i>
English name		Roman Catholic Party Netherlands
Founded		1972
First elected		1972
First succesful election result		1 (0.9%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Extraparliamentary divorce
Party goal		Challenger (KVP)
Ideology		Orthodox Catholicism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Moral issues (23.1%)
	in parliamentary speech	Education (25.7%)
	in motions	Moral issues (75.0%)
	in literature	Opposition to abortion
	assigned	Moral issues
Unique proposals		24.7% (18)
In parliament		1972-1977
Reason dissolution		Party Death

had been a prominent member of the extra-parliamentary NRP. The RKPN was formed as a challenger party of the KVP: it sought to represent the former Catholic ideology of the KVP and attacked the KVP for abandoning its positions (Tomassen 2003, 148). The party adhered to a perfectionist version of political Catholicism and appealed specifically to conservative Catholics (Lucardie 1986). Rochon (1985, 430) indeed considers the RKPN a challenger of the KVP. Because KVP, ARP and CHU proposed a combined CDA manifesto in 1977, one has to consider the party a challenger of the CDA at least when studying parties in the electoral arena. The RKPN is linked to the moral issues category.

Table 4.13: profile of the RPF

Party Profile		RPF
Full name		<i>Reformatorische Politieke Federatie</i>
English name		Political Reformed Federation
Founded		1975
First elected		1981
First succesful election result		2 (1.3%)
Membership in year of first MPs		7000
Stability of the parliamentary party		50%
Formation history		Merger of divorced groups
Party goal		Challenger (CDA)
Ideology		Orthodox Protestantism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Moral issues (24.1%)
	in parliamentary speech	Governance (11.8%)
	in motions	Foreign Affairs (30.0%)
	in literature	Moral issues, combined with economic and foreign policy
	assigned	Moral Issues
Unique proposals		33.2% (98)
In parliament		1981-2000
Reason dissolution		Merged into CU

4.4.10 RPF: orthodox Protestants

Like the RKPN, which challenged the KVP for being too moderate, the RPF (*Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie*/Reformed Political Federation) split away from the ARP because they found the ARP had become too moderate. As the ARP oriented itself towards cooperation with the KVP and inclined more towards the left, some of its rightwing elements no longer felt at home in the party.

Four different groups formed the RPF in 1975: the NEV (*Nationaal Evangelisch Verband*/National Evangelical League), the Conversation Group (*Gespreksgroep*), the ARJC (*Anti-Revolutionair Jongerencontact*/Anti-Revolutionary Youth Contact), and the RPC (*Reformatorisch Politiek Contact*/Reformed Political Contact). The NEV was formed in 1966 by members of the ARP, who were not aligned with the *Vrijgemaakte* churches, but still felt closer to the parliamentary actions of the GPV than to the ARP, which had moved to the left during the 1960s (Koole 1995, 139; Van Mulligen 2010, 32). The NEV sought cooperation with the GPV, but it was rebuked because the NEV-members did not belong to the Church that the GPV was linked to (see section 4.4.4) (Van Mulligen

2010, 32-33).¹⁰³ The Conversation Group was founded in 1972 by prominent, conservative members of the ARP (Van Mulligen, 2010:33), and the ARJC was founded in 1975 by young ARP-members who did not feel at home in ARJOS (*Nationale Organisatie van Anti-Revolutionaire Jongerenstudieclubs*/National Organisation of Anti-Revolutionary Youth Study Clubs), the youth organisation of the ARP (Koole 1995, 142). The RPC was a loose organisation of independent conservative Protestant local parties in the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel (Van Mulligen 2010, 33). The four groups shared three ideas: the ARP had drifted too far to the left, the ARP should not merge with the KVP, and politics should be based on Biblical principles. In 1975, these groups formed the RPF (Lipschits 1982, 59). The RPF emphasised the importance of cooperation with the other orthodox Protestant parties GPV and SGP. These parties reacted in a reserved fashion (Koole 1995, 138). The RPF shared an orthodox Protestant outlook with these parties: an emphasis on moral issues combined with a commitment to limited government intervention in the economy and opposition to European integration (Van Mulligen 2010, 35-36). Like the GPV, the RPF focused on moral issues in its election manifesto, but in its parliamentary activity its issue-specific concerns about domestic and foreign policies shines through.

In the 1977 elections, the RPF appeared to seek GPV-voters, and in particular those who left the *Vrijgemaakte* Church due to a religious split. The RPF put a former GPV-municipal councillor at the top of their list (Van Mulligen 2010, 36). The RPF missed the *de facto* electoral threshold by a few thousand votes, but the GPV did lose one of its seats (Van Mulligen 2010, 36). The GPV saw the RPF as an electoral competitor and attempted to combat the RPF, before cooperating with it (Klei 2011, 189-191). In 1981, the RPF did enter parliament (Koole 1995, 143). In 1985 one of the two RPF MPs, Aad Wagenaar, split to form AR'85, which was electorally unsuccessful. The RPF remained in parliament for 19 years. In 2000, the RPF formed a new, broader orthodox Protestant party together with the GPV, the CU.

The RPF can be seen as a divorce from the ARP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Although no prominent ARP politicians were involved, several organised internal oppositional groups such as the ARJC and the *Gespreksgroep*

¹⁰³ They were joined by a religious group that split from the *Vrijgemaakte* Church and the GPV (Van Mulligen 2010, 32).

were involved. Rochon (1985, 430) considers the early RPF to be a challenger of the GPV, which later developed into a mobiliser because of its commitment to unite the existing orthodox Protestant parties. If one looks more precisely, it appears that the RPF can better be seen as a challenger of the CDA: as the ARP leaned too far to the left and towards the Catholic KVP, a new group emerged seeking to revive the old ARP with its conservative Protestant orientation. This appealed to Protestant voters. There are, however, two complicating factors: first, the ARP ceased to exist in 1980 (Koole 1995, 187), and it is up for discussion whether the RPF can be seen as a challenger of the *newly* formed CDA, which had yet to define its position and electoral base. Second, the RPF also competed with the GPV: it offered the GPV electorate a party, which had the potential to become a bigger political player, because it was less limited in its electoral appeal, and it offered those who split from the *Vrijgemaakte* Church an orthodox Protestant party open to their ideals. One cannot see the RPF as a challenger of the GPV because they did not claim that the GPV had drifted from its original positions or appealed to its exclusively *Vrijgemaakte* electoral base. Therefore, taking these two factors into account, the RPF can best be considered a challenger of the CDA. Given the party's religious background and the focus in its election manifesto on moral issues, the party is linked to this category.

4.4.11 EVP: progressive Protestants

The EVP (*Evangelische Volkspartij*/Evangelical People's Party) shares many similarities with several of the parties in this chapter: like the RPF it was formed as a split from the ARP, and like the PPR it was formed by the leftwing tendency of a Christian-democratic party. The main difference between the two is that the founders of the EVP began to consider the formation of a new party *after* the ARP had merged with the CHU and the KVP to form the CDA in 1977.

The EVP was formed in 1981. Its roots lie within the leftwing tendency within the ARP, the *ARP-Radicalen* (ARP-Radicals) (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 150-151). Like the KVP-Radicals, this group read Scripture in a progressive way. Of all the religious parties, the ARP was most open to leftwing politics, and therefore, the ARP-Radicals had (mostly) remained within the ARP. Over the 1970s, however, the ARP oriented itself more and more towards Christian-democratic cooperation. After the CDA was formed, the ARP-Radicals became

increasingly uneasy with its centrist course. This led to the formation of two groups, which later merged to form the EVP. The first of the two groups was the EPV (*Evangelische Progressieve Partij*/Evangelical Progressive Party) (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 152; De Bas 1999, 42). It had split from the CDA because of the formation of the Van Agt cabinet of liberals and Christian-democrats. The EPV consisted of former members of the ARP, which had favoured the leftwing course the party had pursued during the 1970s (Koole 1995, 150; De Bas 1999, 52-53). The second group was called *Niet Bij Brood Alleen* (Not By Bread Alone), which had operated within the CDA since 1978 (De Bas 1999, 68-69). This group was called after the first election manifesto of the CDA, which emphasised that material happiness was not enough. The group felt that the CDA did not live up to its manifesto (De Bas 1999, 74). They belonged to the left wing of the party and, again, most of them had their roots in the ARP (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 152). They had formed an unofficial opposition within the CDA, hoping to push the CDA into a leftwing direction. The group included CDA MPs and former ARP MPs, such as Bob Goudzwaard, who had authored the CDA election manifesto (De Bas 1999, 73). In 1981, a part of the *Niet Bij Brood Alleen*-group merged with the EPV to form the EVP (Koole 1995, 150; De Bas 1999, 96-97). At the foundation congress, several former CDA MPs were present (De Bas 1999, 97).

The party adhered to a radical, leftwing interpretation of Scripture. Its political programme is explicitly based on religious principles. Its most important issue was nuclear disarmament: the party was motivated by the Biblical message of peace. Its commitment to these foreign policy and defence issues is also reflected in its parliamentary activity and election manifesto: it spoke mostly about foreign affairs in parliament, and in its election manifesto, defence was the dominant issue.

In the 1981 parliamentary elections the party failed to obtain representation, and it also failed to win its own seats in the 1982 municipal and provincial elections.¹⁰⁴ In 1982, there were mass protests against the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands, an issue on which the CDA was divided. The EVP opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons. In 1982 the EVP managed to secure a single seat in the Dutch parliament (Koole 1995, 149; De Bas 1999, 117). Their motto in the election was “Christian, therefore progressive” (De Bas 1999, 116

¹⁰⁴ Electoral research shows that the party was able to decrease the vote share of the CDA (Nieboer and Lucardie 1992, 156).

translation SO). The party saw itself as the “conscience” of the CDA (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 155), but the CDA explicitly ignored the EVP (De Bas 1999, 281-285). Relationship with the orthodox Christian parties in the Dutch parliament were hostile (De Bas 1999, 297), and so instead, the party cooperated with the PvdA, D66, the PPR and the PSP (De Bas 1999, 295). After disappearing from parliament in 1986, the EVP merged with three small, secular leftwing parties to form the leftwing green party GL in 1989 (De Bas 1999, 149).

The EVP was a party formed by divorce (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): *Niet Bij Brood Alleen*, out of which the EVP was formed, played a major role in the internal discussions in the CDA. The EVP was a challenger party: it believed it acted as the conscience of the CDA; its founders believed that the CDA did not live up to its own, progressive, election manifesto and that the EVP did. Additionally, the EVP was oriented explicitly at (progressive) Christian voters. De Bas (1999, 103) and Rochon (1985, 430) also consider the party to be a challenger. But while De Bas sees it as a challenger of the CDA, Rochon considers the PPR to be the challenged party. The relationship with the PPR posited by Rochon is less plausible than the one proposed by De Bas, because the EVP never stated that the PPR abandoned its ideology. Given its pacifist policies and the focus in its manifesto on defence, the EVP is linked to the issue defence.

Table 4.14: profile of the EVP

Party Profile		EVP
Full name		<i>Evangelische Volkspartij</i>
English name		Evangelical People's Party
Founded		1981
First elected		1982
First succesful election result		1 (0.8%)
Membership in year of first MPs		1790
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Merger of divorced groups
Party goal		Challenger (CDA)
Ideology		Progressive Christianity
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Defence (11.5%)
	in parliamentary speech	Foreign Affairs (19.2%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Opposition to nuclear weapons
	assigned	Defence
Unique proposals		23.0% (84)
In Parliament		1982-1986
Reason Dissolution		Merged into GL

Table 4.15: profile of the CP

Party Profile		CP
Full name		<i>Centrumpartij</i>
English name		Centre Party
Founded		1980
First elected		1982
First succesful election result		1 (0.7%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		0%
Formation history		Extraparliamentary divorce
Party goal		Mobiliser (prophet)
Ideology		Radical nationalism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Education (17.9%)
	in parliamentary speech	Migration (17.5%)
	in motions	Justice (100%)
	in literature	Opposition to immigration
	assigned	Migration
Unique proposals		25.0% (12)
In parliament		1982-1986
Reason dissolution		Transformed into CD

4.4.12 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics

The CP (*Centrumpartij*/Centre Party) was the first anti-immigrant party to enter the Dutch parliament. It became politically isolated because of its anti-immigration policies, and it drifted to the political extremes and fell victim to internal struggles.¹⁰⁵

The CP was formed in 1980. It was formed by Henry Brookman, who had previously been involved with the far right NVU (*Nederlandse Volksunie*/Dutch People's Union) (Koole 1995, 331). Brookman had founded another party just before forming the CP, the NCP (*Nationale Centrumpartij*/National Centre Party) but after some of that party's members had been involved in racist violence, he abandoned it to form the CP (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 35; Koole 1995, 331). After the formation, the leadership of the party was taken over by Hans Janmaat, who had been a member of the KVP and active for DS'70 before joining the CP (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 20-21; Lucardie 1998, 19). After unsuccessfully participating in the 1981 elections, the CP won a single seat in the elections of 1982 (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 43). The CP drew most of its support from traditional working class neighbourhoods and a plurality of CP-voters had voted for the PvdA before 1982 (Brants & Hogendoorn 1983, 40).

In the social and political responses to the CP, one can see political isolation, direct social action and judicial persecution.¹⁰⁶ Whenever Janmaat spoke in parliament, many MPs would leave the room (Van Holsteyn 1998, 51-52). In municipal councils, CP councillors also faced political isolation. Whether CP councillors should be greeted with a handshake was a serious political issue in other parliamentary parties (Witte 1998, 130; Schikhof 1998, 145). CP local councillors found it impossible to find sufficient co-sponsors for motions and amendments (Van Riel & Van Holsteyn 1998, 71). The media also consciously sought to ignore the CP (Brants & Hogendoorn 1983, 39). The party also faced direct action from anti-fascist protestors. Direct action took many forms, but it was most extreme in 1986: violent anti-racism protestors interrupted a reconciliation meeting of former CP members.

¹⁰⁵ One of the problematic elements in the relationship between the CP, the press and established politics (and academic research), were its alleged ties to pre-War fascism, a characterisation that was difficult to substantiate (Brants & Hogendoorn 1988, 131-132).

¹⁰⁶ Most of the research has oriented itself towards the CD, and to a lesser extent to the CP. The following section assumes that these patterns also occur for the CP.

Their actions caused the hotel where the meeting was held to catch fire and one CP member lost a leg (Lucardie 1998, 24).

The CP was considered a far right party (Koole 1995, 332). In its 1982 election manifesto, one can see some anti-immigration and nationalist policies, but not the anti-system, racist and far right rhetoric that characterised its campaigns (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 35-36; Lucardie 1998, 26). The issue that got most attention in the election manifesto is education and culture. The party's parliamentary speech, however, focused on immigration. The only motion that the CP proposed was on justice. In written texts, the CP would use more moderate language and focus on other issues than they did in their direct electoral appeal to voters (Mudde 1995). The CP had good reason to be cautious: Janmaat has been persecuted for making racist statements (Schikhof 1998, 147). In parliament, Janmaat had less reason to worry, because he could not be prosecuted for what he said there.

In 1984, Janmaat came into conflict with the extra-parliamentary party organisation (Lucardie 1998, 21): an ideological dispute between Janmaat and the party cadre escalated into a conflict between the parliamentary party and the extra-parliamentary party organisation about who should decide the party's course. Janmaat left the party, but held on to his seat in parliament (Koole 1995, 332). In 1984, Janmaat founded the CD (*Centrumdemocraten*/Centre Democrats). In the 1986 elections, both the CP and the CD entered: the CP won three times as many votes as the CD, but neither party won a seat. Later that year, the CP was declared bankrupt and it was re-launched under the name CP'86 (Koole 1995, 332). The CD would go on to win seats in the 1989 and 1994 parliamentary elections.

Like the RKPN, the CP is a split but not from a parliamentary party: its founder Brookman had founded the NCP, but abandoned that party to form the CP. The CP sought to mobilise voters on a new far right ideology: the party did not attack a particular party for abandoning its ideology. It did, however, appeal particularly to working class voters, the traditional base of the PvdA. Combining these three arguments, one can consider the party as a mobiliser and specifically as a prophet. This categorisation is in line with Rochon (1985, 431). Given that the party's opposition to immigration was the party's unique appeal, the party has been linked to immigration. The CD can be considered both a split from the CP (Janmaat left the

CP) and a transformation of the CP (the sole MP and face of the party left the CP). Therefore, the CD is not included in this study as a separate new party.¹⁰⁷

4.4.13 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters

The AOV (*Algemeen Ouderen Verbond*/General Pensioners' League) and U55+ (*Politieke Unie 55+*/Political Union 55+) are similar parties: with similar programmes they entered in the same election and they both won seats. After the elections, they started to cooperate, and in 1998 they entered as a common list. Therefore they can best be discussed side-by-side.

From 1971 onwards, one or more pensioners' parties entered in the elections occasionally, albeit unsuccessfully. In 1989, two parties did: PvO (*Partij voor Ouderen*/Pensioners' Party) and BC (*Bejaarden Centraal*/Seniors Central). In 1992, members of these parties were brought together in order to form a new pensioners' party, U55+. After testing their appeal in the 1994 municipal election, the party decided to compete in the 1994 parliamentary elections (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 69).¹⁰⁸ At the same time, another party was formed: the AOV was founded in December 1993 (Van Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996, 132), six months before the 1994 election. The founder had sought the support of several prominent wealthy industrialists in order to finance the new party. Anton Philips, former managing director of the electronic company Philips, was the first to support the party financially. The party selected the Eindhoven municipal elections as the testing ground for the party.¹⁰⁹ It won 14% of the vote and became part of the municipal governing coalition. After this success, two provincial councillors left the Christian-democratic CDA and joined the AOV (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 27). The party decided to go national and to compete in the 1994 parliamentary elections (Kreulen 1995, 15).

The differences between the two pensioners' parties were marginal. According to the secretary of the U55+, the U55+ was mainly supported by pensioners who depended on a state pension, while the pensioners of the AOV also had a private pension (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 12). The election

¹⁰⁷ This goes against the classification of Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) who characterise the CD as a party formed by divorce.

¹⁰⁸ The U55+ won seats in Waddinxveen (in South Holland) and Hengelo (in Overijssel).

¹⁰⁹ Eindhoven (in North Brabant) is the fifth city of the Netherlands.

manifestos of both parties have similar emphases: healthcare played a major role in both their manifestos. The same is true for the parliamentary speech of both parties. In addition to healthcare, both parties also emphasised issues such as immigration and crime. The major difference in their manifestos is that the AOV wanted to finance the financial demands caused by the aging of the population by increasing labour market participation, while the U55+ wanted to solve this problem by reducing excessive government spending.

In the 1994 elections, pensioners' issues played a major role. Due to economic circumstances the governing coalition of CDA and PvdA had to consider cuts on healthcare and social security. The social democratic minister of healthcare sought to reduce the budget for nursing homes, pensioners' associations and healthcare coverage for pensioners. She was forced to back down after major resistance from pensioners' organisations, which organised mass protests against the cuts (Van Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996, 133-134). In 1994 the CDA, the senior partner in the coalition government, proposed to freeze all government income grants, including government pensions. The proposal also faced public resistance. The party soon retracted this proposal. The welfare state was one of the two major issues in newspaper reporting of the election campaign (Flight & Felix 1995, 103).

The 1994 elections saw a large number of seats changing owners: the CDA lost 36% of its votes and the PvdA lost 24%. The AOV and U55+ both won seats in parliament: the AOV six and the U55+ one. After the elections the AOV was riddled by internal problems. At the same time the U55+ sought to cooperate with the AOV. Between 1994 and 1998, the conflicts in the AOV spiralled out of control. By 1998 there were five different parliamentary groups in parliament, which had split from the AOV.¹¹⁰ Polling indicated that the AOV was unable to win any seats on its own after 1995 (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 27). Therefore, first the AOV and later one of its successor groups entered into talks with the U55+ about cooperation between and possibly a merger of the two pensioners' parties. The conflicts within the AOV stalled this process for a while, but the AOV and U55+ formed a common list for the

¹¹⁰ The MP Hendriks, which was expelled in 1994 (see Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 1995, 28); a group of three MPs, which had been expelled from the AOV, led by former top candidate Nijpels (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 1996, 27); the MP Van Wingerden was still aligned with the national executive of the AOV; the MP Verkerk who had split from Van Wingerden in 1998; and the senator Batenburg, who had split from the AOV as well (De Boer et al. 1999, 26).

Table 4.16: profiles of the AOV and U55+

Party Profile		AOV	U55+
Full name		<i>Algemeen Ouderenverbond</i>	<i>Politieke Unie 55+</i>
English name		General Pensioners' League	Political Union 55+
Founded		1993	1992
First elected		1994	1994
First succesful election result		6 (3.6%)	1 (0.9%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>	<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		33.3%	100%
Formation history		Birth	Extraparliamentary merger
Party goal		Mobiliser (prolocutor)	Mobiliser (prolocutor)
Ideology		Pensioners' interest	Pensioners' interest
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Healthcare (13.7%)	Healthcare (58.0%)
	in parliamentary speech	Healthcare (21.8%)	Healthcare (27.6%)
	in motions	Economic Affairs (29.2%)	Healthcare Labour Transport (33.3%)
	in literature	Pensioners' issues	Pensioners' issues
	assigned	Healthcare	Healthcare
Unique proposals		35.5% (50)	12.0% (14)
In parliament		1994-1998	1994-1998
Reason dissolution		Merged into AOV/U55+	Merged into AOV/U55+

1998 parliamentary election (De Boer et al. 1999). In 1998 two other pensioners' parties, related to the AOV, entered the election. None of these parties won a seat.¹¹¹

U55+ was formed as a merger, but not of two parliamentary parties (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): it was formed by two small extra-parliamentary pensioners' parties. The AOV, in contrast, was a truly new initiative, a party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Both parties were mobilisers: they did not orient themselves towards any party specifically. They did not represent a group that was the traditional social base of a party. Nor did they adhere to an ideology of an established party. Rather, they emphasised traditional economic issues, with a particular mix of leftwing and rightwing positions, oriented at defending the interests of one particular group: pensioners. This categorization is in line with Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287). Both parties are linked to the category healthcare.

¹¹¹ The AOV/U55+, *Senioren 2000* (*Seniors 2000*, formed by the group Nijpels) and the NSOV (*Nieuw Solidair Ouderenverbond*/New Social Pensioners' League), formed by AOV founder Batenburg.

Table 4.17: profile of the SP

Party Profile		SP
Full name		<i>Socialistische Partij</i>
English name		Socialist Party
Founded		1971
First elected		1994
First succesful election result		2 (1.3%)
Membership in year of first MPs		15978
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Extraparliamentary divorce
Party goal		Challenger (PvdA)
Ideology		Socialism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Foreign Affairs (11.6%)
	in parliamentary speech	Housing (11.3%)
	in motions	Healthcare (21.4%)
	in literature	Economic issues, Health, Education
	assigned	Labour
Unique proposals		24.5% (31)
In parliament		1994-now
Reason dissolution		Still in parliament

4.4.14 SP: a leftwing challenger

The SP (*Socialistische Partij*/Socialist Party) was formed as part of the small Dutch Maoist movement, which had split away from the CPN. Over time it developed a different profile as a leftwing protest party. 23 years after its foundation the SP entered parliament.

The SP was formed in 1971 under the name KPN (*Kommunistische Partij Nederland-Marxistisch/Leninistisch*/Communist Party Netherlands-Marxist/Leninist), a Maoist splinter party (Koole 1995, 270). The KPN was split from the KEN (*Kommunistische Eenheidsbeweging Nederland-Marxistisch/Leninistisch*/Communist Unity Movement Netherlands-Marxist/Leninist), which in turn was a split from the CPN, the main communist party in the Netherlands (Beekers 2005, 22). The leader of the KPN, Daan Monjé, had also had a leading role in the KEN (Beekers 2005, 49). In 1972 the party renamed itself Socialist Party¹¹². In its early years, the SP followed a Maoist strategy: party members were expected to integrate into the masses and learn from them what it was that the people wanted (Voerman 1988, 133-134).

¹¹² Since 1972 the party called itself *Socialistiese Partij*; since 1993 *Socialistische Partij*.

Since 1977, the SP participated in parliamentary elections. On the municipal level, it was particularly successful in North Brabant (one of the southern provinces of the Netherlands), especially in the city of Oss, where it has had seats in the municipal council since 1974 (Slager 2001, 138). On the national level, the party entered in all elections between 1977 and 1989 but without electoral success. The party adapted, abandoning its Maoist strategy and Marxist ideology (Voerman 1988; Van der Steen 1995). It took “populist” positions on issues like women’s emancipation and the integration of minorities. It voiced opposition to feminism and the multicultural positions of the small parties of the left and the social democrats (Koole 1995, 271). By 1994, the party had reinvented itself as a leftwing protest party: the party entered the election with the slogan “Vote Against, Vote SP” (Kagie 2004, 79 translation SO). The party focused on a broad range of issues including social-economic policy, healthcare, education and income distribution. In the analysis of the manifesto, foreign policy was identified as the dominant issue and labour issues are a close second. The 1994 elections were preceded by major conflicts about social affairs cuts: in addition to the conflicts with pensioners’ organisations, the cabinet also came into conflict with the labour unions about disability pension, which in turn led to conflicts within the PvdA (Lucardie, Nieboer & Noomen 1992, 47; Van der Zwan 2008, 227-228). In these elections the SP won two seats. Koole (1995, 271) explains the rise of the SP with the conflicts within the PvdA.¹¹³ In parliament, the SP’s two MPs soon became an important voice of opposition. The party focused on housing in its parliamentary speech and on healthcare in its motions. They targeted their critique on the social democrats, which had adopted a third way-ideology; therefore Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the SP as a challenger of the PvdA. Social democratic Prime Minister Wim Kok characterised the party as a “jamming station”, which SP-leader Jan Marijnissen took as a compliment (De Boer et al. 1999, 78 translation SO). Over time, the SP would grow considerably, doubling its vote share in 1998 and 2002 and more than doubling it in 2006.

The SP was a split from the KEN, which was a split from the CPN. At the time, however, the KEN was not in parliament, which makes this yet another example of an

¹¹³ Koole also points to the disappearance of the CPN: a segment of working class voters was no longer represented. As the CPN disappeared from parliament in 1986 due to a lack of electoral support and the SP entered in 1994, this argument seems a bit strange.

extra-parliamentary split (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). The SP clearly operated as a challenger party, adhering to a stricter interpretation of socialism than the PvdA and seeking to represent the traditional working class electorate of the PvdA. On the basis of its history, one may consider the SP to be a challenger of the CPN. However, given that the CPN had disappeared from parliament in 1986 and that the SP positioned itself as a competitor of the PvdA rather than of the CPN, one has to consider it a challenger of the PvdA. Labour is selected as the SP's issue, as this is characteristic of its economic focus.

4.4.15 LN and LPF: democratic populists & the return of anti-immigration politics

In 2002, two new political parties entered the Dutch political arena: LN (*Leefbaar Nederland/Liveable Netherlands*), a typical case of a purifier party, oriented at government reform but pragmatic on other issues, and the LPF (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn/List Pim Fortuyn*), an anti-immigration party. The histories of the two parties are closely linked and they will therefore be discussed in one section.

LN was formed in 1999 as “the outgrowth of a motley collection of local protest parties” (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 23). Its founders were Jan Nagel, a former senator for the PvdA, who led the local party *Leefbaar Hilversum* (Liveable Hilversum), and Henk Westbroek, who led the local party *Leefbaar Utrecht* (Liveable Utrecht) (Lucardie, Noomen & Voerman 2003, 21). These were two of a growing number of independent local political parties. Most of them voiced opposition against technocratic urban renewal projects (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 75). LN favoured government reform, and combined this with a mix of rightwing and leftwing positions on other issues (Lucardie 2004, 21; Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 209): the party wanted to bring politics closer to the voters and rejected technocratic politics (Lucardie 2008b, 154). In its election manifesto, governance was the largest issue.

None of the founders of the party wanted to lead the party in the upcoming election, and therefore, they decided to hold an election for the leadership. The most prominent candidate was Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn was known as a columnist of the centre-right weekly *Elsevier* in which he criticised the cabinet of PvdA, VVD and D66 for the way it managed the public sector and for the way it dealt with the growing immigrant, Islamic, population (Lucardie, Noomen & Voerman 2003, 22; Lucardie 2004, 209). Fortuyn had undergone several ideological transformations as

well: from a Marxist beginning, via a neo-liberal phase to a communitarian period (Pels 2003). The other candidates for the party's list included many people who had been involved with other established parties (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 94).¹¹⁴ The party was not formed by *homines novi* who had no background in other parties, but instead, it united individuals from the entire political spectrum. Fortuyn was endorsed by the party board and was elected by a wide margin as top candidate on the party's list (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 23).

Since the 1990s, Fortuyn had strongly emphasised the importance of culture. He had denounced the lack of national consciousness of Dutch politicians (Pels 2003, 200), and he combined his communitarian and nationalist beliefs with a commitment to liberal values (Akkerman 2005). In Fortuyn's view, the fact that many immigrants did not accept these liberal values was a threat to these values. Fortuyn's outspoken positions on immigration led to a break between him and LN. The final issue was an interview in which Fortuyn proposed to eliminate the prohibition of discrimination from the Dutch constitution (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 97; Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 23). A former VVD member and prominent public prosecutor, Fred Teeven, replaced Fortuyn on the LN list (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 98). In February 2002, Fortuyn formed his own party: the LPF. The party was founded with support of several businessmen (Lucardie 2004, 213). In a matter of months a new party was created. The list of candidates consisted of a large number of people without much political experience. The most experienced people were a CDA MP and a prominent parliamentary journalist who had been a passive VVD member (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 103). As a (first) election manifesto, the party used Fortuyn's book, which combined policy proposals with autobiographical elements (Fortuyn 2002). The book combined populism with liberal, nationalist and communitarian elements. The book was followed by a shorter election manifesto. In both the book and the election manifesto, immigration was the main issue. Fortuyn dominated the following general election campaign, especially after the strong performance of the Fortuyn-led *Leefbaar Rotterdam* (Liveable Rotterdam), in the municipal elections in Rotterdam. He criticised all parties for neglecting the growth of government bureaucracy and the integration of immigrants into Dutch society

¹¹⁴ Out of the 353 candidates, 62 had a VVD-background, 21 in the PvdA, 21 in the CDA, 18 in D66, 6 in the SP and 5 in the GL. The most experienced were a former KVP-minister and a senator representing provincial parties (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 2004).

(Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 74-75). Nine days before the election, Fortuyn was shot by an animal rights activist (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 23).

Andeweg and Irwin (2005, 17) claimed that, “[g]iven the extraordinary circumstances, the (electoral, SO) results came as no surprise, although they were without precedent.” The governing parties PvdA, VVD and D66 lost heavily. The LPF made the most “impressive début” (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 24) a new party had ever made in the Netherlands: from 0% to 17% of the vote. LN obtained less than 2% in parliament (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 99). A cabinet was formed by the CDA, the LPF and the VVD. The cabinet was short-lived, however: by the autumn of 2002, the cabinet had fallen due to internal struggles within the LPF, a party that was left without its leader (Lucardie 2008a, 163). In the short period in which it was in parliament, the LPF saw three MPs leave its ranks. In the following elections, the LPF lost eighteen of its 26 seats, and LN lost both its seats. In the following three years the LPF disintegrated: by 2006 the eight men parliamentary party had divided into three parliamentary parties and there had been four changes in the leadership of the LPF parliamentary party. In the 2006 elections, three parties participated that were led by (former) members of the LPF.¹¹⁵ None of them were able to win a seat in parliament. During the period 2002-2006, the LPF focused on justice in its parliamentary speeches, but it proposed most motions on agriculture.¹¹⁶

LN was as a party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): contrary to other parties formed by birth many of its members were involved in other parties from the entire political spectrum. Therefore it cannot be considered a party formed as a split from any of the established parties. The LPF was a party formed by divorce, but again, not from a parliamentary party (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): the top candidate of the LN left the party to form his own party. Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the LN as a mobiliser (and specifically a purifier): LN did not adhere to an ideology that another party abandoned, nor did it target a segment of the electorate a party no longer represented.

¹¹⁵ These were Fortuyn (*Lijst Vijf Fortuyn*/List Five Fortuyn), the legal successor of the LPF, PvdN (*Partij voor Nederland*/Party for the Netherlands), led by former LPF-minister Hilbrand Nawijn and the *EénNL* formed by former LPF-MP Joost Eerdmans and former Rotterdam alderman Marco Pastors for *Leefbaar Rotterdam*.

¹¹⁶ These differences between programme and parliamentary activity can be explained by individual MPs in these poorly organised parties: one of the most experienced LPF MPs was Van den Brink, a former farmers’ leader. The LN, under the leadership of former public prosecutor Teeven, focused on justice, in its parliamentary speeches and motions.

Table 4.18: profiles of the LN and LPF

Party Profile		LN	LPF
Full name		<i>Leefbaar Nederland</i>	<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>
English name		Liveable Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn
Founded		1999	2002
First elected		2002	2002
First succesful election result		2 (1.6%)	26 (17.0%)
Membership in year of first MPs		1237	4100
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%	62.5%
Formation history		Birth	Extraparliamentary divorce
Party goal		Mobiliser (prophet)	Mobiliser (prophet)
Ideology		Democratic Populism	Liberal Nationalism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Governance (17.6%)	Migration (19.2%)
	in parliamentary speech	Justice (32.5%)	Justice (12.7%)
	in motions	Justice (60%)	Agriculture (11.0%)
	in literature	Government reform	Opposition to immigration
	assigned	Governance	Migration
Unique proposals		10.9% (11)	23.7% (33)
In parliament		2002-2003	2002-2006
Reason dissolution		Party death	Party death

It sought to represent the entire population and advocate government reform, as a purifier. Given that LN was a purifier that focused on government reform, governance is the party's core issue. Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) consider the LPF a purifier (a subcategory of mobiliser), but acknowledge that in many ways the party is a personalist party, which also has elements of a prophet. Closer analysis however implies that the party can best be thought of as a prophet, another kind of mobiliser. The party introduced a new ideology of the LPF, which mixes elements of nationalism and liberalism. The categorisation of purifier also does not fit because the most important issue of the LPF was not government reform but rather immigration.

Table 4.19: profile of the PVV

Party Profile		PVV
Full name		<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>
English name		Party for Freedom
Founded		2004
First elected		2006
First succesful election result		9 (5.9%)
Membership in year of first MPs		1
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Divorce
Party goal		Mobiliser (prophet)
Ideology		Liberal nationalism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Justice (22.1%)
	in parliamentary speech	Justice (14.1%)
	in motions	Justice (14.8%)
	in literature	Islamisation
	assigned	Migration
Unique proposals		27.1% (29)
In parliament		2004-now
Reason dissolution		Still in parliament

4.4.16 PVV: the persistence of anti-immigration politics

As we saw in paragraph 4.4.16, over the course of the 2003-2006 parliamentary term, the LPF completely collapsed. At the same time, Geert Wilders broke away from the VVD parliamentary party and formed a new party, the PVV (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*/Freedom Party). In the 2006 elections, the PVV replaced the LPF as the most rightwing party in the Dutch parliament.

In 2004, Wilders left the VVD parliamentary party (Hippe et al. 2005, 101). Wilders had been an MP for the VVD since 1998. After the 2002 elections, he became an important voice in the debate about integration and immigration, and especially the place of Islam in the Netherlands and the European Union. Meanwhile, Wilders and the VVD grew apart. The final breaking point was the possible entry of Turkey into the European Union, which the VVD favoured but Wilders opposed. Wilders continued as an independent MP. He rebuked offers from the LPF to cooperate with them (Hippe et al. 2005, 102), and in 2006, he formally founded the PVV. The name explicitly referred to the name of the PvdV, one of the parties that merged into the VVD. In Wilders' view, the VVD had abandoned the classical liberal

course by espousing a social liberal course (Lucardie et al. 2008, 61). The PVV did not only scald the VVD for abandoning its course: the party also presents itself as the true heir of social democracy (Bosma 2010, 38-55). In the 2006 elections, the PVV won nine seats. The party's list consisted of individuals who did not have extensive political experience. One MP had been a member of the Rotterdam city council for *Leefbaar Rotterdam* and another had been a member of the North Holland provincial council for the LPF. The PVV has a limited party organisation: formally, there is only a *Vereniging Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Association Party for Freedom) of which Wilders and his *Stichting Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Foundation Party for Freedom) are the only members. In the 2010 general elections, the PVV nearly tripled its electoral support and it entered in an agreement with the CDA and VVD to support their cabinet without supplying ministers.

The PVV's manifesto advocated a more restrictive immigration policy, law and order policies, lower taxes, and more direct democracy, and it opposed further European integration (Lucardie et al. 2008, 62-63; Lucardie 2009, 177-178). The programme specifically advocated policies against the Islamisation of the Dutch culture, such as specific legislation against Islamic schools, headscarves and the building of mosques. Wilders agitated against the Dutch Left, which in his view was far too appeasing towards the growing totalitarian threat of political Islam (Vossen 2010, 9-10). According to Vossen (2010), this combined critique of both the Dutch leftwing establishment and the growth of Islam has similarities to Fortuyn. There is considerably discussion about how to characterise the ideology of the PVV (Lucardie 2009, 176-177). Pels (2005, 90, 2011, 43-44) considers the party to be committed to a kind of liberal nationalism: it seeks to defend the liberal Dutch culture against external threats such as Islam. On similar grounds, Lucardie (2009, 181) describes the party's ideology as liberal nationalism as well. From the scholarly literature, it is clear that the dominant issue of the PVV is immigration, because of the party's opposition to the Islamisation of Dutch society. In its election manifesto, its parliamentary speeches and its motions, however, the PVV focuses on justice. In the eyes of the PVV there is a relationship between the two issues: its anti-crime measures are specifically oriented at fighting what they call "street terror" in which they link Islamic extremism to security (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2010, 9).

Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the PVV as a challenger of the VVD and a party split from the VVD. While the latter is certainly the case, the former

is less certain. One has to consider three elements: the political communication of the PVV, its electoral strategy and its political programme. The electoral appeal of the PVV is much broader than the VVD-electorate, and their ideology is far more radical, especially in its opposition to the Islamisation of Dutch culture and the political establishment than the VVD ever was. In this sense, the PVV is more of a challenger of the LPF, which had collapsed, than of the VVD. Therefore, one cannot consider the PVV to be a challenger of the VVD, but rather a mobiliser in the tradition of the LPF. Thus, the PVV is linked to the issue of immigration.

4.4.17 PvdD: the hobbyhorse

The PvdD (*Partij voor de Dieren*/Party for the Animals) was the first animal rights party to win representation in a national parliament.¹¹⁷ The party defends the interest of a particular group. This group, however, is not a group that could vote for the party, like farmers, pensioners or small businessmen, but it is a group that cannot vote: animals.

The PvdD was formed by birth, founded by members of the animal welfare movement (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 287). It was founded on October 28, 2002. The founders were the chair, the director and a policy advisor of the animal rights NGO *Bont voor Dieren*.¹¹⁸ They were concerned about the policies of the first Balkenende cabinet concerning animal rights, environment and agriculture (Lucardie 2008b, 159). The founders were particularly worried about that cabinet's plans to delay and reverse legislation on animal rights. In the eyes of the activists, this legislation was an indirect consequence of their own efforts as lobbyists and activists (Thieme 2006, 29).¹¹⁹ They decided that, in that case, they should go into politics to ensure that animal rights received the attention it deserved (Schaafsma 2006, 21). The stigmatisation that animal rights activist felt after the murder of Fortuyn by an animal rights activist and their timid reactions to the plans of the centre-right cabinet were additional reasons to enter into politics (Meeuwissen 2011, 19). Niko Koffeman, an

¹¹⁷ Misérus, M. "Wereldprimeur in het Haagse parlement; dierenpartij in de landelijke politiek heeft geen voorbeelden elders". *Volkskrant* 24 November, 2006.

¹¹⁸ "Bont voor Dieren" literally means Fur for Animals, but it also sounds like League for Animals in Dutch. Jungmann, B. "Politieke dieren houden voeling met de wortels". *De Volkskrant*, 30/9/2006.

¹¹⁹ De Bruijn, E. "Zetels voor dieren: hoe zit dat nou?" *NRC Handelsblad*, 19/12/2002.

independent campaign advisor to the Socialist Party, had already developed the idea for an animal rights party back in 1992 (Meeuwissen 2011, 18).¹²⁰

The PvdD participated in the 2003 elections. In the parliamentary elections, the party obtained 0.5% of the votes. A year later, the party participated in the elections for the European Parliament. Eight Dutch authors, TV personalities and opinion makers endorsed the party by accepting a position on the party's list.¹²¹ The party won 3.2% of the vote, half a percent short for a seat. In 2006, the party again took part in the national elections, and again, several Dutch celebrities endorsed the party.¹²² The party won two seats in the *Tweede Kamer*. In the parliamentary elections of 2010, the party retained its two seats and in the provincial elections of 2011, it lost one of its eight seats in provincial councils.

The programme of the PvdD focuses on animal welfare. The party aims to be the voice of the weaker and voiceless sections of society, particularly animals (Lucardie 2004, 208; Meeuwissen 2011, 21). Most of the PvdD attention is given to the position of animals in industrial agriculture, but there is also attention to the position of wild animals and circus animals. The environment features prominently in the programme, besides animal rights. The party argues that it transcends the traditional division between left and right and instead aims for a society based on sustainability and compassion.¹²³ Therefore, "the Party for the Animals is not a single-issue party. We dare to believe in and work towards a sustainable society. A society that aims at a more comfortable life for current and future generations" (Thieme 2006, 11 translation SO).

Thieme and Koffeman give different reasons why specifically an animal rights party was established. Thieme, who was involved in the foundation of the party, demonstrates a great commitment to the welfare of animals. In her opinion, the other existing parties are actually single-interest parties because they focus solely on

¹²⁰ Banning, C. "Via Sla! en Nútopia in de Eerste Kamer; Niko Koffeman wordt de eerste senator voor de Partij voor de Dieren en neemt afscheid van de SP". Ibid., 29/5/2007. Kruijt, M. "'Stem tegen, stem SP' kiest voor de dieren. Interview Niko Koffeman". *De Volkskrant*, 15/3/2007, Ter Horst, G. "Partij wil dieren terug op Haagse agenda". *Agrarisch Dagblad*, 3/12/2003.

¹²¹ "Rudy Kousbroek lijstduwer Partij voor de Dieren". *NRC Handelsblad*, 8/3/2004. "Onderste Dieren". *Het Financieele Dagblad*, 10/2/2004.

¹²² Jungmann, B. "Politieke dieren houden voeling met de wortels". *De Volkskrant*, 30/9/2006.

¹²³ De Waard, M. "Profiteren van onbehagen burgers". *NRC Handelsblad*, 9/6/2004.

the financial interests of humans and neglect many other interests, particularly the interests of animals (Thieme 2006, 30).¹²⁴ She tries to raise the profile of animal rights by acting as a pacer in the marathon, which forces the other runners (the other parties) to run faster for animal rights. In the eyes of Thieme, animal welfare is "a side dish on the political menu" of the established parties (Thieme 2006, 113). Even when there was an animal-friendly majority in the *Tweede Kamer* between 1998 and 2002, the parties did too little for animal welfare, according to Thieme (2006, 80). The "hot breath" of the PvdD should force the other parties to put animal rights higher on the political agenda (Thieme 2006, 83). Thieme wants to remind the existing parties of the "good intentions in their own programmes" (Thieme 2006, 74) and wants to be their animal-friendly conscience (Thieme 2006, 70).

Koffeman explains the strategy of the party in a different way. He fathered of the idea of an animal rights party, but he became involved with the party only after it was formed. In his view, journalists are not interested in yet another party with a broad programme oriented at welfare and sustainability. By zooming in on the specific issue of animal rights, the party draws journalists' attention. By doing so, the party can bring its message to the public: even the choice for the name 'Party for the Animals' was strategic in nature, according to Koffeman. The party could also have been called 'Party for the Environment' or 'Party for Animals and Children', but according to Koffeman that makes no lasting impression. By zooming in on the animal issue, the PvdD shows the true magnitude of the environmental problems and attracts media attention.¹²⁵

These arguments are partly contradictory: in the story of Koffeman, the PvdD has a broad green and leftwing programme and it *uses* animal rights to attract attention. In Thieme's story, the party focuses on animal rights in order to realise policy change, albeit indirectly. The question arises whether animals have intrinsic value for the party or whether they are an instrument. In the parliamentary work of

¹²⁴ Van Heese, R. & I. Weel. "'Wij zijn Partij voor de Duurzaamheid" PvdD-fractievoorzitter Thieme wil verder kijken dan de belangen van de Westerse mens". *Trouw*, 21/3/2009.

¹²⁵ Van Os, P. "Dierenmanieren; portret Partij voor de Dieren". *NRC Handelsblad* 17/4/2010, "'Wij worden gedomineerd" Partij voor de Dieren-senator Niko Koffeman gruwet van CDA "Beschaving zou los moeten staan van welvaart"'. *De Telegraaf*, 2/7/2007 "'Wij worden groter dan GroenLinks'". *De Pers*, 31/3/2008. Translations SO

the party, the focus of the party on agriculture and animal rights remains. This is an indication of the MP's intrinsic motivation.

The relationship between the PvdD and the other existing parties, particularly the GL, influences how the goal of the PvdD must be understood: is this small green party a challenger of the larger green party GL or does the party seek to create a new line of conflict that transcends the existing dimensions? In the eyes of the PvdD, all existing parties focus too much on the interests of human beings and neglect the interests of animals, although some parties are more successful in transcending the interests of their own species than others (Thieme 2006, 56-57). The Christian parties, and particularly the CDA, emphasise environmental stewardship, but according to Thieme, they have continually bowed to agricultural interests. They are, according to Thieme, the main opponents of the PvdD.¹²⁶ GL, together with the SP, PvdA and D66 belong to the "animal-friendly majority" (Thieme 2006, 79-80), the parties that are better able to transcend their own species' interest. These parties did not devote enough attention to animal welfare in the eyes of Thieme (2006 113). The GL, PvdA and D66 are the parties that belong to the left in traditional socio-economic terms, but animal welfare, according to Thieme (2006), transcends the existing left-right pattern. On issues other than the environment and agriculture, the PvdD takes similar positions as the other leftwing parties.¹²⁷

The relationship between the animal-friendly parties and the PvdD is complex. Thieme claims that the main conflict is not between the PvdD and the animal friendly parties (Thieme 2006, 113). The proponents of animal welfare within, for instance the GL, are unable to make the issue a priority of the party (Thieme 2006, 84). The absence of vegetarians in the GL parliamentary party between 2006 and 2010 was symptomatic for the lack of attention to animal welfare in that party, according to Thieme and Koffeman.¹²⁸ During several campaigns, the PvdD focused on the GL: in 2005, Thieme wrote that GL's support for the "animal-unfriendly

¹²⁶ Eerst belachelijk dan crimineel en dan win je"; lijsttrekker Thieme ziet andere politici de 'grote leugen' van haar dierenpartij nu annexeren". NRC Handelsblad, 17/4/2010.

¹²⁷ Lucardie, P. "Links voor dieren én mensen". *Trouw*, 5/12/2006.

¹²⁸ Van Os, P. "'Eerst belachelijk dan crimineel en dan win je"; lijsttrekker Thieme ziet andere politici de 'grote leugen' van haar dierenpartij nu annexeren". NRC Handelsblad, 17/4/2010, "'Wij worden groter dan GroenLinks'". *De Pers*, 31/3/2008.

European Constitution" was bad for its credibility on the animal rights issue.¹²⁹ When several local GL councillors spoke out in favour of an industrial scale stable, Thieme, together with the author Kees Van Kooten, wrote: "how fast can a party that once called itself progressive forget its ideals when it begins to bear governmental responsibility."¹³⁰

In an electoral sense, the PvdD does not focus on the constituency of a particular party. When Thieme (2006, 33) speaks about the electoral potential of the PvdD, she refers to the number of vegetarians. Also, she appeals explicitly to voters by asking them to voice their dissatisfaction about the treatment of animals and express their sympathy for animals, independent of the question of who gets into power (Thieme 2006, 115). For what is known about the party's electoral support, the party performs well in constituencies with highly educated voters (which tend to vote GL and D66) and constituencies with lower educated voters (which tend to vote SP and PVV) (De Voogd 2011).

Authors have categorised the PvdD a prolocutor, a subcategory of the mobiliser party (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 287; Schaafsma 2006, 5). If one looks at the three aspects of a mobiliser party discussed above, a more complex picture emerges: in the campaign strategy, one can see that the party focused on both the CDA, as the representative of traditional farm interests, and on the GL and the other animal friendly parties that have neglected the issue. This makes the PvdD difficult to place. The programme of the PvdD shows the same ambiguity. This programme differs significantly from the programmes of the existing parties in its special focus on animal welfare. The PvdD, however, says that it is more than a single-issue party: it looks at all political issues from the perspective of sustainability and compassion. This is reflected in positions that are similar to the ones of GL and the SP. The central claim of challenging parties, namely that a particular party no longer represents the ideology that it once did, is not consistently and continually made by the PvdD. The PvdD also does not focus on the electorate of the GL: indeed, by insisting that the animal welfare issue transcends the traditional lines of conflict, it appeals to animal lovers in all social groups. All in all, the party's profile leans somewhat to the

¹²⁹ Thieme, M. "GroenLinks en het welzijn van dieren". *NRC Handelsblad*, 1/3/2005.

¹³⁰ Van Kooten, K. & M. Thieme. "Nieuw! Pluk van de Varkensflat". *Trouw*, 11 November, 2006. Translation SO

Table 4.20: profile of the PvdD

Party Profile		PvdD
Full name		<i>Partij voor de Dieren</i>
English name		Party for the Animals
Founded		2003
First elected		2006
First succesful election result		2 (1.8%)
Membership in year of first MPs		6370
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Mobiliser (prophet)
Ideology		Green Politics
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Agriculture (68.5%)
	in parliamentary speech	Agriculture (36.2%)
	in motions	Agriculture (68.0%)
	in literature	Animal Rights
	assigned	Agriculture
Unique proposals		47.1% (107)
In parliament		2006-now
Reason dissolution		Still in parliament

mobiliser. If one follows that profile, it can best be understood as a prophetic party trying to express a new ideology of animal welfare, sustainability and compassion, which transcends the traditional pattern between left and right. Because animals, the group that the PvdD wants to represent, do not have voting rights, the party cannot be characterised as a prolocutor. This categorisation follows Meeuwissen (2011, 65-66).

4.5 Patterns

Three categorisation schemes were employed here: one looked at the history of the new party; the second looked at its goal, and the third at its unique issue. The first scheme differentiated between parties formed by birth or divorce. The greatest drawback of this scheme is that it does not take into account whether the predecessors of a new party - the parties that merged, or the party from which it split - are parliamentary or extra-parliamentary. Here the point where a party moves from old to new is identified as the point where it enters parliament after competing in an election under its own banner for the first time. Therefore, it matters whether the predecessor parties had successfully participated in parliamentary elections before. The definition

Table 4.21: new parties classified as challenger or mobiliser

Party	According to Literature	Campaign	Ideology	Electorate	Sum	Verdict
KNP	Challenger	+	+	+	3	Challenger
PSP	Mobiliser	+	+	-	2	Challenger
BP	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
GPV	Mobiliser	-	+	+	2	Challenger
D66	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
PPR	Mobiliser	+	-	+	2	Challenger
DS'70	Challenger	+	+	+	3	Challenger
NMP	Challenger	-	+	-	1	Mobiliser
RKPN	Challenger	+	+	+	3	Challenger
RPF	Challenger	-	+	+	2	Challenger
EVP	Challenger	+	+	+	3	Challenger
CP	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
AOV	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
U55+	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
SP	Challenger	-	+	+	2	Challenger
LN	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
LPF	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
PvdD	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
PVV	Challenger	+	-	-	1	Mobiliser

employed here assumes that the new party split from a party with parliamentary representation. Four parties were formed as splits from extra-parliamentary parties (the SP, the CP, the RKPN and the LPF), however, and one was formed as a merger of two extra-parliamentary parties (U55+). While these parties are formally formed by divorce or marriage, this is a kind of embryonic divorce or marriage (if one continues with Mair's typology). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, these parties ought to be considered as parties formed by birth.

The second classification divided challengers from mobilisers. This typology was operationalised into a classificatory scheme with three criteria. It is clear that some parties fit better into this scheme than others. In table 4.21 one can see whether the particular characteristics of challenger parties were or were not present in each case. Twelve of the nineteen cases fit perfectly into this categorisation. Four of these are challengers and eight of these are mobilisers. Seven cases fit less well into this categorisation: five of these, PSP, GPV, PPR, RPF and SP, are imperfect challengers, which miss one characteristics of a challenger party. Two of these, the PVV and the NMP, meet one characteristic of a challenger but are still considered mobiliser.

Overall, this study agrees with the studies of Rochon (1985) and Krouwel and Lucardie (2008) in almost three quarters of the cases.¹³¹

Finally, each party was linked to an issue: from agriculture to defence. Some issues are used by more than one party: only nine issue categories are used for nineteen parties. The most prominent issues are governance, immigration, and moral issues. Three new parties prioritise each of these three issues. Three issues are prioritised by two parties (defence, agriculture, healthcare). Two issues are prioritised by one party (the economic issues economic affairs and labour). Most issues lie outside of the socio-economic line of conflict and are more cultural (immigration, moral issues) or political (defence, governance) in nature. The classification fits poorly in six cases, because there is a discrepancy between the most emphasised issue in the manifesto and the distinctive issue according to the literature. Post-materialist parties D66 and PPR emphasised economic issues more than their distinctive post-materialist concerns for the environment and governance. While in absolute terms D66 and the PPR focused more on economic issues, compared to the established parties these two parties were distinctive for their focus on post-materialist issues. For the CP one can see a clear difference between the formal documents (such as election manifestos) and their activity in parliament. The SP has a diffuse economic issue focus instead of a focus on one economic issue; therefore, foreign policy (a relatively large issue category) is slightly larger than economic issues such as labour. The PVV, however, is a different case: as could be seen for the PVV, but also for LN and LPF, these populist parties tend to be active on justice instead of on governance or immigration.¹³² DS'70 is the most difficult case. This party focused most on governance in its election manifesto. This is not, however, an issue that was,

¹³¹ Two cases offer an additional complication: the NMP and the BP. These parties are clearly not challengers, because they do not focus on a particular party, but they are not really mobilisers either: they do not seek to introduce a new issue or a new division into politics. Rather, they operate on economic issues and on the classical left-right dimension. Therefore one could identify a fourth category of the mobilisers, namely the protest parties. These parties seek to mobilise protest votes *along* the existing dimensions, challenging not just one party on the right or the left, but all parties on one of these dimensions.

¹³² Note, however, that when analysing the patterns in attention and position, the patterns found for immigration and governance for these periods could better be explained by the presence of these new parties than the patterns on the issue of justice.

Table 4.22: new parties classified

Category	Divorce	Birth	Sum
Challenger	6	3	9
Mobiliser	1	9	10
Sum	7	12	19

according to the literature, a defining issue of either of DS'70's tendencies (the foreign policy-oriented anti-communists, or the economically oriented social democrats). It is still selected as the distinctive issue of the DS'70 because it was the issue that united its two tendencies.

Over time, several trends can be seen in the categorisation: a major change is that new parties before 1982 were mainly challengers of established parties, whereas after 1982 the new parties tended to be mobilisers. There is a significant correlation between the year in which a party entered parliament and whether it was a challenger or not (Pearson's r is -0.52 – significant at the 0.05-level). This may be a result of depillarisation: the established parties did not just lose control over the voters, but they also became less important for the foundation of new parties. The major established parties lost their dominant role in politics. A similar development can be seen in the electoral support of new parties: there is a weak correlation between the support of a new party on its first entry and the year of its foundation (Pearson's r is 0.34). This is a sign of the same development: over time, the established parties lost control over their voters and elections became more volatile, providing better opportunities for new parties. There is a weak negative relationship between the year of entry and whether a party was formed by divorce or not (Pearson's r is -0.25). Over time, new parties were formed more independently from the established parties. Another pattern, which is shown in table 4.22, is that challenger parties tend to be formed by divorce: all parties formed by divorce were challengers, and only three parties formed by birth were challengers. It seems obvious that new parties, which break away from established parties claim that the established party no longer represents the ideology a party stood for, instead of advocating new issues or representing underrepresented interests. Of the nine parties formed in order to challenge an established party, three challenged the PvdA, which followed the oscillation between the left and the centre that the PvdA made over time. Six challenger parties were oriented explicitly towards one of the Christian-democratic parties. Four of these were formed in the wake of the formation of the Christian-

democratic Appeal (CDA), in which the ideologically homogenous Christian parties merged into one non-denominational centrist party.

This is also reflected in their issue orientation: out of the nine challenger parties, three focus on moral issues; these are all challengers of a Christian-democratic party. As one would expect, mobilisers have tended to focus on issues outside of traditional social-economic competition: out of the ten mobiliser parties, three focus on immigration, two on government reform and two on pensioners' issues. Three parties focus on economic issues: agriculture (BP and PvdD) and economic affairs (NMP). Of these three, the PvdD brings their distinctive animal rights approach to agriculture.

Chapter 5: Reinvigorating or redefining?

How new parties influence issue politics in parliament

“I am content with the intentions [of the animal-friendly established parties], I don’t want to create a conflict between us and them, but the fact remains that, for them, animal welfare is a side dish on their political menu. That should come to an end once and for all. And that will happen when a serious competitor is represented in parliament and reminds them every day of their moral duties to their voters and to animals.” - Marianne Thieme, leader of the PvdD (2006, 113 translation SO)

5.1 Introduction

Thieme is clear about the role of her party, the PvdD: established parties have ignored animal welfare, the issue that the PvdD owns, for far too long. Thieme does not disagree with the intentions that established parties wrote in their election manifestos, but rather, she laments that they do not put their promises into practice in the *Tweede Kamer*. She hopes to influence the attention that established parties devote to issues by participating in parliament. Harmel (1985:405) has proposed that new political parties may have a special role in bringing new issues into the political arena. Even when they never gain enough support to be a relevant political party (in the sense used by Sartori (1976)) or when their support lasts only a single election, new political parties could have a lasting impact on the party system in this way.

The focus in this chapter is on the parliamentary arena. Political decision-making in parliaments tends to be fixed: the nature of the conflict has been defined, the lines of conflict have been drawn, the possible majorities have been determined, and, therefore, the policy outcomes are predictable. Only an external shock will be able to change this situation. Elections may provide an external shock because they can change the possible majorities, but also because they allow new actors to enter the political arena. New political parties will attempt to put new issues on the agenda, influence the policy positions of established parties, redefine the political conflict, create new majorities and therefore upset the existing balance of powers. The entry of a new political party may have an effect on the way politics is done in parliament. Just like PvdD, mobilising new parties may specifically seek to change

the saliency of an issue or redefine the nature of competition on this issue. Challenger parties may seek to bring new life to the existing lines of conflict that established parties let bleed to death. The goal of this chapter is to determine to what extent and under what conditions new parties are able to influence the attention that established parties devote to issues in parliament. Moreover, this chapter will seek to analyse how new parties influence the positions of established parties on issues, and the extent to which they are able to introduce new lines of conflict on specific issues. This chapter will also examine whether new parties are able to reinvigorate the conflict on particular issues in parliament.

The results indicate that the effects of new parties on attention will be more marked when the new parties focus on their own issue, when new parties are larger and when new parties are better organised. This chapter also finds that mobiliser and challenger new parties influence the positions that parties take on issues differently: mobilisers are associated with a redefinition of significant lines of conflict, while challengers are associated with increasing political conflict and party politicisation on the issue.

5.2 Case-by-case analyses

The following sections will present the developments in the attention that parties devote to the issues owned by all new parties. The goal of these discussions is to assess the extent to which the patterns in attention can be attributed to the entry of the new party and to uncover mechanisms that may underlie these developments. The focus, here, will lie on the question *to what extent* and less on the question *under what conditions*. The reason for this is that this chapter finds that there may be considerable differences in the way new parties influence the attention that established parties devote to issues, but established parties react in a uniform way to new parties; in most cases, all parties show a similar pattern of increasing attention, decreasing attention or stability in attention. This has two implications: first and foremost, the explanation of differences in the developments must be attributed to characteristics of new parties and not to characteristics of established parties or the link between the new and established party. And second, the focus of these case-by-case analyses will lie on alternative explanations for the patterns in attention and position that were found.

5.2.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics

The KNP split from the KVP, because of the KVP position in the debate about Indonesian independence. Therefore, in order to understand the patterns of reaction for the KNP, one must examine the history of the decolonisation of Indonesia. British forces liberated the Dutch-Indies from Japanese control (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 2010, 229-230). In 1945, Indonesian republicans declared the independence of Indonesia. The Dutch did not accept Indonesian independence, and the British handed over control over Indonesia to the Dutch (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 2010, 229-230). This led to an agreement between the Indonesian republicans and the Dutch, the Cheribon Agreement of November 1946 (Keylor 2003, 246). This agreement proclaimed a sovereign Indonesian state with a Dutch-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown. This required a change in the constitution. The Dutch government and the Indonesian republicans disagreed about the implementation of the agreement. The Dutch sent two so-called police missions to regain control over Indonesia (in 1947), but they failed to gain control over the islands. The Dutch actions led to an international response: the United Nations and the United States did not support the Dutch attempt to retain control over Indonesia. The United States suspended the Marshall plan. Under international pressure, the Dutch negotiated a new agreement with the Indonesian nationalists: the same basic agreement as in 1946 was reached in 1949 (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 2010, 229-230). The agreement did not offer a solution for Papua New Guinea, a region that remained under Dutch control. New Guinea would remain a political issue: in 1951 the Dutch cabinet fell over New Guinea policy. As can be seen in figure 5.1, attention to colonial affairs steadily declined over the period 1946-1952. The attention was high before 1948 and declined afterwards. The military actions and the negotiations had put the issue on the agenda in the period 1946-1948. Indonesian independence moved the issue from the agenda in the period 1948-1952.



The presence of the KNP did not increase attention to the issue of colonial affairs. There is one exception, however: the KVP (figure 5.2) did not decrease its attention to colonial affairs after 1948. Instead, there is a (marginal) increase in this party's attention to the issue. The presence of the KNP, a challenger of the KVP, may have caused it to retain focus on the colonial affairs. All in all, there is no proof that the KNP caused a systemic increase in attention to its issue, but it is likely that it caused a markedly different pattern in attention for the party it was oriented towards.

Figure 5.1: parliamentary attention to colonial affairs**Figure 5.2: parliamentary attention of the KVP to colonial affairs**

5.2.2 PSP: dissenting socialists

The PSP, a leftwing socialist party with ties to the nuclear disarmament movement, entered parliament in one of the hotter periods of the Cold War. One cannot observe the effect of the PSP without reference to the international events that surrounded the party's entry. In the period before the entry of the PSP, there had been considerable turmoil on both sides of the Iron Curtain: on the Eastern side the Hungarian Revolution was violently put down by an intervention of the Soviet military (Keylor 2003, 71-72), and on the Western side, the French and the British had been involved in a coordinated attack on Egypt in order to take control of the Suez Canal (Keylor 2003, 156). After 1959, the Cold War began to become even warmer with conflict growing about the American presence in Berlin and the plan to create a Soviet Russian military presence in Cuba (Keylor 2003, 91, 107).

Given these international developments, one can expect attention for defence to increase over time. The question thus becomes whether the entry of the PSP led to an identifiable interruption in this development. Figure 5.3 shows the developments in attention that established parties devote to defence in the period 1956-1963. In general, parties increase attention to defence between 1956 and 1963. The entry of the PSP does not seem to have caused a marked interruption of this pattern. It seems to be the case here that the development in attention to defence is caused by external circumstances. One party, the CPN, forms a clear exception. This is shown in figure 5.4. The election year 1959 interrupted the increasing pattern of attention of the CPN for defence. The PSP and the CPN shared a socialist ideology, which was historically committed to disarmament. While the CPN was opposed to the Western nuclear weapon capacity, it was more tolerant of nuclear weapons on the Eastern side of the Cold War divide. The CPN had lost a considerable number of votes in the election in which the PSP entered parliament. It seems reasonable therefore to conclude that this change was a reaction to the entry of the PSP.

Figure 5.3: parliamentary attention to defense 1956-1963**Figure 5.4: parliamentary attention of the CPN to defense**

5.2.3 BP: farmers in protest

The BP campaigned against the corporatist organisation of agriculture. Over the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, agriculture politics in the Netherlands was depoliticised: decision-making power was moved to the corporatist Farming Board (*Landbouwschap*) or to the European level. Meanwhile, the importance of the agricultural sector in the Dutch economy declined, as can be seen in figure 5.5. The European Economic Community was founded in 1957 and, over a ten-year period, agricultural policies in Europe were harmonised and decision-making was moved to the European level (Krajenbrink 2005, 103). By 1962, the Common Agriculture Policy, which set agricultural price policies, had begun to take shape (Dinan 2004, 95-96). Disagreements about price policy that had characterised discussions about agriculture until the early sixties disappeared from the Dutch parliament, because the issue fell under European jurisdiction now (Krajenbrink 2005, 144-145).

At the national level, decision-making was moved to the Farming Board. The legislation to create this body passed through parliament in 1954 (Krajenbrink 2005, 103). This body was given the power to introduce legally binding rules on agricultural matters and farmers were legally required to pay a levy to the body (Krajenbrink 2005, 109). The body consisted of representatives of farmers' organisation and farm labour unions. The organisation began to function in 1955 (Krajenbrink 2005, 110-115). The agricultural community had not welcomed the Farming Board with open arms: farmers had resisted paying the obligatory levy (Krajenbrink 2005, 115-116). Free Farmers (*Vrije Boeren*), the group around BP-leader Koekoek, organised opposition against the Farming Board. The Farming Board took far-reaching measures against farmers who refused to pay their levies: it laid claim on their property and auctioned it off, something the Free Farmers attempted to prevent (Krajenbrink 2005, 163-164). In the province of Drenthe, the conflict between the Free Farmers and the Farming Board escalated (Krajenbrink 2005, 165): in order to get their levies the Farming Board laid claim to three farms in the hamlet of Hollandscheveld and evicted their inhabitants (Krajenbrink 2005, 167). This led to violent clashes between the police and the Free Farmers in March 1963. After the events of Hollandscheveld, the Farming Board reorganised and reoriented itself towards a smaller set of tasks (Krajenbrink 2005, 181, 199).

Figure 5.5: economic importance agriculture 1959-1967




Figure 5.6: parliamentary attention to agriculture 1959-1967



The BP did not have a marked effect on the attention that parties devoted to agriculture. Almost all parties follow the pattern presented in figure 5.6: levels of attention to agriculture decrease before 1961, in 1962 and 1963 attention sharply rises, and afterwards, that attention declines again. On the one hand, one may explain the pattern by referring to economic and political developments: the decreasing importance of the agricultural sector, increasing delegation of decision-making concerning agriculture to the European level and the corporatist agricultural bodies. In this perspective, the declining attention after 1963 can be explained, but the increasing attention just before 1963 is more problematic. This increase may be explained by the discussion of the Europeanisation of agricultural policies. On the other hand, one may explain these developments by referring to the dismissive strategy proposed by Meguid (2007): in reaction to the entry of a new populist party, established parties reduced their attention to the issue that the party owned, in order to reduce the saliency of the issue and therefore the electoral appeal of the party. Given that the BP was the political representative of a social movement that had clashed with the police, declining attention is not illogical. The most balanced explanation may combine these two approaches: for almost every party, the election year 1963 is a peak in a continued development of decline of the attention to agricultural policies. It is likely that the events of Hollandscheveld had temporarily turned the attention of established politicians to agriculture. But after that year the attention continued to decline. In this sense the activities of the Free Farmers have been much more successful in bringing their issues to the table (and in changing the actual policies of the Farming Board) than their political arm, the BP, ever was.

5.2.4 GPV, RKPN and RPF: orthodox dissent

Between 1963 and 1981, three parties entered the Dutch Parliament that focused on moral matters: the GPV in 1963, the RKPN in 1972 and the RPF in 1981. In order to understand the patterns in attention to moral issues, it is important to understand the patterns of depoliticisation and politicisation of the abortion issue. Before 1962, the abortion issue was in a pre-political phase. Between 1962 and 1967, an extra-parliamentary debate on abortion began to develop (Outshoorn 1986, 100-133). Between 1967 and 1977, three attempts were made to change the existing legislation on abortion: the KVP-ministers of Health and Justice made the first

attempt in the Biesheuvel cabinet. This bill was abandoned when this cabinet fell in 1972 (Outshoorn 1986, 165). During the formation of the Den Uyl cabinet, the parties decided that the initiative on abortion would be left to parliament instead of to the government. This meant that, during most of the 1972-1977 parliamentary term, MPs prepared a bill that would only come to a vote at the end of the term (Outshoorn 1986, 200). In 1976, two initiatives were debated in parliament: one by VVD and PvdA and one by KVP and ARP. The *Tweede Kamer* accepted the VVD/PvdA bill and the KVP/ARP bill was put on hold indefinitely (Outshoorn 1986, 230). The *Eerste Kamer* did not approve of the VVD/PvdA bill (Outshoorn 1986, 233), though. After the 1977 elections the Christian-democratic CDA and the secular VVD agreed in their coalition agreement that government had until 1979 to formulate its own proposals on abortion. If the coalition parties could not reach an agreement, the initiative would return to the *Tweede Kamer* where the secular parties had a majority (Outshoorn 1986, 246). In 1980, the cabinet came with a proposal that was narrowly carried by both houses (Outshoorn, 1986, 262, 269). The coalition parties called for the necessary additional policies to implement the legislation in 1982, and the government finalised its policies over the course of 1983 (Outshoorn 1986, 280-281, 286).

If one looks at the graph of parliamentary attention to moral matters in figure 5.7, one can clearly distinguish between three periods: relatively high levels of attention between 1959 and 1967, then a sharp decline in attention in the 1967 elections, and after that, the attention that most parties devoted to moral matters was on a lower level but erupted in a few spikes, especially in 1971, 1977 and 1983.

Zooming in on the period 1959-1967, one can see the following: while attention to moral issues increased before 1963, it decreased again after 1963. Two parties form a clear exception: the ARP (shown in figure 5.8) and the CHU, which went through a similar development. These two Protestant parties may have felt challenged by the entry of the GPV. They devoted a similar level of attention to moral issues before and after the entry of the GPV.

Table 5.1: party positions on moral issues 1967-1986

Position	1967-1972	1972-1977	1977-1981	1981-1986
1	GPV	GPV	SGP	GPV
2	SGP	SGP	GPV	SGP
3	BP	BP	CDA	CDA
4	ARP	CHU		
5	CHU	ARP		
6	KVP	KVP	VVD	D66
7	VVD	VVD	D66	PPR
8	D66	D66	PvdA	VVD
9	PSP	PvdA	PPR	PSP
10	PvdA	CPN	PSP	CPN
11	CPN	PSP	CPN	PvdA

Figure 5.7: parliamentary attention to moral issues




Figure 5.8: parliamentary attention of the ARP to moral issues



In the period 1967-1977, attention was at a much lower level.¹³³ All parties increased the levels of attention to moral issues before the 1972 elections. After the 1972 elections the attention decreased, only to culminate in a shared outlier in 1976 for almost all parties. This fits the pattern Outshoorn described: rising political attention to the issue between 1967 and 1972, but because the initiative was moved to parliament, it was removed from parliamentary decision-making until 1976 when the attention to moral issues peaked (Outshoorn 1986, 200).

In the period 1977-1986, one can see a clear peak in attention in the second half of 1982, the last year in which abortion was debated extensively in parliament. This is an outlier, however, because it only concerns the period in 1982 after the September elections. The attention that established parties devoted to moral issues is relatively stable. The parliamentary discussions on the abortion bill in 1980 did not cause a clear peak in attention. The abortion question was settled, and after 1984 the political focus in terms of moral issues moved to euthanasia (Green-Pedersen 2007, 280-281).¹³⁴

All in all, none of the three religious new parties appears to have forced increased attention to moral issues. The GPV's entry was followed by stable levels of attention by the other Protestant parties and declining levels of attention by most other parties. The pattern of attention to moral issues after 1967 followed the cycle that the abortion legislation followed: increased attention to the issue between 1967 and 1971. The attention increased between 1967-1972 as the abortion issue became more polarised. Attention to moral issues peaked in 1971, when the cabinet proposal was discussed. As the issue was depoliticised, the attention for moral issues was low between 1972 and 1976, and peaked due to the discussion of the (failed) parliamentary initiatives. Attention marginally increased with the 1980 discussion of the new government bill. After 1983, when the implementation of the law was

¹³³ The figures presented here are based on different analyses for the periods 1959-1967, 1967-1977 and 1977-1986. Therefore, the level differences between these years should be interpreted with the utmost care, because they may also be artifacts of the different analyses.

¹³⁴ Two parties defy this general pattern, the PSP and the CPN. For them, attention to moral issues is high and continues on a high level after 1981. This can be explained by referring to their developing feminist orientation. In these parties, a generation of feminists took over the helm from economically oriented socialists and communists. These developments appear to be independent from the entry of the RPF.

discussed, moral issues were removed from the parliamentary agenda. None of the three religious parties appears to have been able to put moral issues on the agenda.

The next step is to examine voting behaviour. As is explained in paragraph 3.4.9, insufficient parliamentary votes are available to analyse the impact of the GPV on party positions, but sufficient votes are available to examine the effect of the RKPN and RPF on party positions. Voting on religious issues is clearly one-dimensional in each of the four periods. Party positions, as shown in table 5.1, tend to follow the division between religious and secular parties.¹³⁵ On the extreme one can find the SGP, the GPV, orthodox Christian parties, joined by the morally conservative agrarian party BP. The next bloc of parties is formed by the ARP, the CHU and the KVP, or, after 1977, the CDA. Then one can find the liberal VVD, and the parties of the left: D66, PSP, PvdA and CPN. The differences between these secular parties are marginal. The main division is between the orthodox Protestant parties and the others. The correlation between party positions on the dimension over time is significant. The level of unanimous parliamentary votes increases after the entry of the RKPN from 2% to 7%; it declines marginally after the entry of the RPF from 7% to 6%. The RKPN, not included in the figure, has the most conservative position of all parties in the period 1972-1977. In the period 1981-1986, the RPF takes the shared most conservative position.¹³⁶

Between 1967 and 1977, there is only one marked change: the PSP moves sharply to the most progressive position, and therefore the PvdA and CPN move to a more conservative position. Between 1977 and 1986, there are two major changes: the VVD moves sharply to the progressive side. It passes D66 (which becomes the most conservative of the secular parties) and the PPR. The PvdA makes a similar move to the progressive side of the spectrum: it moves to the most extreme position,

¹³⁵ Given that the number of votes is small, three solutions have equal levels of fit. These solutions differ in the order of the SGP, GPV and BP. Each is the most extreme party in one of the solutions. Therefore, these three parties are taken together and are assigned a single position.

¹³⁶ Three additional parties entered parliament between 1968 and 1972: the PPR (1968), DS'70 (1970) and the NMP (1971). One can only determine positions for new parties for the period after 1972, because they did not participate in enough votes in the period before 1972. DS'70 has a moderate position between the VVD and the KVP. The PPR is placed on the extreme among the most progressive parties. Between 1981 and 1982, two additional parties entered parliament: the CP is the most secular party and the EVP is positioned between the more conservative of the secular parties.

passing by the PPR, PSP and CPN. The sharp move of the PSP in the opposite direction of the RKPN and the move of the PvdA and the VVD to the opposite side of the RPF could be understood as adversarial moves. The most striking result in this analysis is the stability in the position of the CDA and the KVP. These parties did not change position after two more conservative Christian parties entered parliament. Moreover, the division between very conservative, moderately conservative, moderately progressive and very progressive parties remains intact between 1967 and 1986. The RKPN and RPF joined the SGP and the GPV on the very conservative side. Instead of changing the line of conflict on moral issues, the RKPN and RPF have been integrated into them. Both reinforced some of the conflict, as is evident by the movements to the progressive side of the PSP, PvdA and the VVD.

5.2.5 D66 and DS'70: democratic idealists and moderates

Between 1967 and 1977, the Dutch party system changed: five new parties entered parliament and three of the traditional big five established parties lost a considerable share of the votes and merged. Two of these new parties focused specifically on the Dutch political system. The first one was D66, which advocated a radical revision of the Dutch political system, and the second one was DS'70, which opposed such changes.¹³⁷ D66 entered parliament in 1967 and DS'70 in 1971, and therefore, three periods will be examined: 1963-1967 (before the entry of D66), 1967-1971 (after the entry of D66 but before the entry of DS'70) and 1971-1977 (after the entry of DS'70).

After the 1967 elections a government advisory committee was set up: the Cals/Donner committee. The formation of the depoliticised committee can be understood as response of the established parties to the entry of D66. The committee consisted of representatives from the major political parties, including D66 co-founder Gruijters (Cals et al. 1971). The committee worked on advice concerning the political system, the constitutional order and the electoral system. In 1971, they presented their final report, which included proposals to change the constitution,

¹³⁷ DS'70 is linked to governance, although hesitantly: this is the issue that united to two factions within the party but is not the defining issue of either of them. Other choices might have been made: the focus of the social democratic faction and its own parliamentary party was on fiscal policies. Therefore, one may also have examined macro-economy and tax policies, but this is done extensively in section 4.4.7 when the effect of the NMP is examined.


reform the electoral system, and change the role of the prime minister (Cals et al. 1971). On many issues, such as the referendum, the government formation process and the electoral system, the committee was divided (Cals et al. 1968, 1969, 1971). Its proposals to reformulate constitutional rights were much less controversial (Cals et al. 1971). It is not surprising that, as most proposals did not have the support of the entire committee, the proposals also faced a divided parliament and divided government coalitions (Wielenga 2010, 258). Smaller reforms were implemented while the committee was working on its report (such as the lowering of the voting age). The only major result of the committee's activities was the 1983 constitutional revision, which mainly implemented the less controversial proposals on constitutional rights.

In order to understand the effects of both the entry of D66 and DS'70, and of the depoliticised process of decision-making in the Cals/Donner committee on the attention that established parties devoted to governance, one can look at figure 5.9:¹³⁸ the 1967 elections lead to a clear interruption in the development in the attention to the issue. Between 1967 and 1971, attention devoted to governance increased sharply: from less than 10% to more than 20%. There is a small decline after the 1967 election, probably due to the depoliticization. Even though decision-making was depoliticised, attention to the issue increased markedly. It appears that, after the entry of D66, the established parties increased attention to this issue, even though decision-making was depoliticised.¹³⁹

In 1971, the moderate DS'70 entered parliament and the Cals/Donner committee presented the final report. One would expect a greater increase in attention after the depoliticised process of advice writing had ended and the more politicised process of lawmaking could start, and after the entry of yet another party that focuses on governance. This is not the case, however: after 1971, the attention to governance decreased sharply. One can explain the pattern in attention by the lack of political consensus within the committee-Cals/Donner and in parliament concerning their

¹³⁸ The data used here are based on different data than those that were used for the macro-level analyses. The figures are based on data from the period 1963-1977. The analyses are based on data for the period 1963-1971 and the period 1967-1977. These two data sets correlate significantly (Pearson's r of 0.997 significant at the 0.01-level).

¹³⁹ The only exception to this pattern is the PSP. This party shared D66's orientation towards the democratisation movement. Therefore, it may not have needed the impetus of the entry of D66 to orient itself towards democratic reform.

Figure 5.9: parliamentary attention to governance 1963-1971*Table 5.2: party positions on governance 1963-1977*

Position	1963-1967	1967-1971	1971-1977
1	BP	BP	BP
2	SGP	SGP	SGP
3	GPV	GPV	GPV
4	ARP	ARP	VVD
5	KVP	CHU	CHU
6	CHU	VVD	KVP
7	VVD	KVP	ARP
8	PvdA	CPN	PvdA
9	CPN	PSP	PSP
10	PSP	PvdA	CPN

proposals. The committee did not formulate a broadly supported agenda of government reform, but rather showed the political divisions on the issue. Given the lack of consensus on the issue and the fact that most proposals would require a two-third majority, it was not politically opportune to be active on the issue. In this sense, DS'70 got what it wanted: no major reforms of the Dutch constitutional order were implemented.

The next step is analysing the effects of these parties on party positions. Party positioning on governance can be integrated into a one-dimensional model in all three periods. The party positions are shown in table 5.2. In each of these periods, one can see a division between the SGP, GPV and BP, conservative parties that tended to

oppose government reform; the parties of the centre-right (CHU, KVP, ARP and VVD), and the parties of the left (PvdA, CPN, PSP), which tended to favour government reform. The party positions on three dimensions correlate. Voting on government reform became more polarised in this period: the percentage of unanimous votes dropped from 12% to 7%.

D66, which entered parliament in 1967, took a position among the leftwing parties, but it is not the most extreme party on the issue. DS'70, which was formed during this parliamentary term, also took positions between the KVP and the parties on the left. In the period 1971-1977, these patterns remained with limited differences: D66 moved to the extreme position on governance. The position of DS'70 poses some questions: it was a party that defended the existing parliamentary system, but it did not position itself between the conservative parties such as the SGP and the GPV. Instead, it took a position between the Christian-democratic and leftwing parties. This position may reflect the moderate views DS'70 had: it did not oppose all reform, but only radical reform.¹⁴⁰

Between 1963-1967 and 1967-1971, one can observe two marked movements: on the one hand, the KVP moved to a more reformist position, relative to the CHU and the VVD. The PvdA moved to the extreme on the reformist side of the dimension, beyond the PSP, CPN (and D66). The movements of the KVP and the PvdA are considerable. Between 1967-1971 and 1971-1977, one can observe three movements: the ARP made a marked shift towards a more reformist position. It leapt over the CHU and the KVP, and instead of the least progressive of the three Christian-democratic parties, it became the most progressive of the three. Second, the VVD, which had a centrist position, took a more conservative position on the issue. It now came close to the position of the GPV. Finally, the PvdA made a marked move to the centre switching positions with the CPN and skipping over the PSP. The main division in the period 1971-1977 is between DS'70 and the PPR. 45% of the votes divide the Progressive Agreement parties (with PSP and CPN) from the rest. This coincided with the participation of D66 in the Progressive Agreement of PvdA, PPR and D66, which embraced government reform: instead of following a division between religious and secular parties in the period 1963-1967 (with the VVD taking a centrist position), the division on government reform now appears to follow the

¹⁴⁰ Two other parties entered parliament during this period: the PPR took a centre-left position, and the RKPN took a clear conservative position close to the GPV.

division between the traditional economic left and the right, with the Christian-democrats in the centre and the VVD further away from the PvdA. The shifting positions may indicate a shift in the nature of the line of conflict: from secular-religious to left-right.

If the two patterns are combined, the following pattern emerges: between 1963 and 1967, there was little attention to governance and the issue was incorporated in the religious-secular pattern. After the entry of D66 in 1967, the issue received more attention, voting became less unanimous and the KVP and the PvdA moved to a more progressive position. After the entry of DS'70 in 1971, the issue received less attention and voting on the issue was incorporated in the left-right dimension. The increasing politicisation of the issue can certainly be ascribed to the entry of D66. The same goes for its incorporation in the left-right pattern: by joining the Progressive Agreement and making government reform a core issue of the alliance, the issue became part of the left-right pattern.

5.2.6 PPR: radicalising radicals

Over the course of the 1970s, the PPR became a greener party (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008). During the same period, environmental issues became much more important, societally: the political effect of this was the formation of a ministry of Public Health and the Environment was founded in the 1971 cabinet formation. The first real environmental bill from this ministry came in the Den Uyl cabinet.¹⁴¹ The cabinet created the legal tools for environmental policies: the 1976 General Law on the Environment (*Wet Algemene Bepalingen Milieuhygiene*) is the most prominent example (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst 1977, 103). The question of this section is whether the pattern in attention can be explained by the formation of the ministry or by the entry of the PPR.

The entry of the PPR and the creation of the ministry of Public Health and the Environment closely followed each other and can both be expected to have led to increased attention for environmental issues. Therefore, a more precise prediction about the expected pattern is necessary. If the increase in attention was caused by the PPR, one would expect the PPR to lead the development in attention. Contrariwise,

¹⁴¹ Due to the short period in which this cabinet was in office (it fell in 1972), no environmental policy was proposed during the period 1971-1972.


Figure 5.10: parliamentary attention of the PPR to the environment**Figure 5.11: parliamentary attention to the environment**

Table 5.3: party positions on the environmental issues 1967-1977

Position	1967-1971	1971-1977
1	BP	BP
2	SGP	SGP
3	KVP	GPV
4	VVD	VVD
5	CHU	CHU
6	GPV	ARP
7	ARP	KVP
8	D66	D66
9	PvdA	PvdA
10	CPN	PSP
11	PSP	CPN

if the increase in attention was caused by external circumstance, one would expect the PPR to follow the pattern of attention of the other established parties. And this would be a pattern of continual increase, as the ministry began to produce bills.

In figure 5.10, one can see the level of attention that the PPR devoted to the environment: low levels of attention to environmental issues before 1972, and then an increase in attention over the period 1972-1977. Looking at the development of attention of established parties to the environment (in figure 5.11), one can see a similar pattern: before the 1971 elections, attention to the environment increases, and after the 1971 elections, the level of increase is much more marked.¹⁴² The pattern of attention makes the formation of the ministry a much more likely cause than the entry of the PPR. If one can draw any conclusion about the relationship between the entry of the PPR into the political system and the attention to the environment, it has to be that both the PPR and the other parties became greener, more oriented towards the environment, over the period 1972-1977.

This increase in attention also influences the analysis of positions. In order to allow for a comparison of party positions over time, one must have a sufficient

¹⁴² There are to exceptions: the PSP and KVP increased their attention to the environment before 1971, and then the attention stabilised. Both parties shared strong similarities with the PPR: the PPR had split away from the KVP and both parties shared an orientation to Catholic votes, the PSP and the PPR shared a new politics orientation. After the PPR, a green party, entered parliament, these parties stabilised their attention for the environment. For both parties the PPR was a competitor, and both parties lost a considerable number of votes in 1971, the elections in which the PPR entered. It is difficult to understand this stability in terms of strategic reaction.

empirical basis. Therefore, a range of issues related to the environment politics is examined, namely environment, land management, energy and transport.¹⁴³ The first thing that catches the eye when looking at the two distributions of parties in table 5.3 is that parties converged in the period 1967-1971. In this period, both the BP and the SGP are assigned the same position as well as the CHU, KVP and the VVD. In the period 1971-1977, all parties are assigned a separate position. This is clearly the effect of the increasing absolute number of non-unanimous votes on the issue (allowing for a more precise division of parties). This number explodes from 13 to 157. This increase itself may be a sign of increasing politicisation of the issue. Party positions on the issue appear to roughly follow the left-right division, with the parties of the right and centre right on the one side and the leftwing parties on the other. In the period 1971-1977, the main distinction is between the parties of the right and centre right and parties of the left. The correlation between party positions on this dimension over time is significant. The PPR takes a relatively environmentalist position, as the most environmentalist party of the Progressive Agreement parties.¹⁴⁴ Two marked changes can be observed here. The VVD, KVP and CHU had the same position in 1967-1971, but they now differ in position. The VVD moves to the least environmentalist position of these three. It is followed by the CHU and then the KVP, which has also leapt over the ARP. The KVP is now the most environmentalist of the Christian-democratic parties. The second movement involves the GPV: while this party voted similarly to the ARP in the period 1967-1971, it moved to a less environmentalist position in the period 1971-1977, close to the SGP and the VVD. The pattern that can be established for this period is clear: the concentration of political parties on the environmental issues decreased over time.

In summary, it appears not to be the case that the entry of the PPR has put environmental issues on the agenda. Rather, the party and its environment became more environmentalist during the 1970s. The increasing attention for environmental issues was coupled by an increasing differentiation of established parties' positions on the issue.

¹⁴³ Transport can be understood in environmental terms during this period because of the oil shortage and the first protests against the dominance of cars.

¹⁴⁴ DS'70 takes a centrist position on the issue, while the RKPN joins the small parties of the right.

Figure 5.12: inflation**Figure 5.13: parliamentary attention to economic affairs**

Table 5.4: party positions on economic affairs 1967-1977

Position	1963-1967	1967-1971
1	BP	VVD
2	VVD	BP
3	ARP	SGP
4	SGP	GPV
5	CHU	CHU
6	KVP	KVP
7	GPV	ARP
8	PvdA	CPN
9	D66	PvdA
10	CPN	D66
11	PSP	PSP

5.2.7 NMP: small business owners in protest

The NMP entered the Dutch parliament in a period of growing economic difficulty. As can be seen in figure 5.12, between 1967 and 1971 the inflation level increased from 3.1% to 7.6%. The increase occurred in a period of rising unemployment (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 212). The NMP emphasised fiscal responsibility: the party proposed radical reduction of government interference in the Dutch economy, and a lowering of the tax level.¹⁴⁵ The electoral success of the NMP was short-lived: it disappeared from parliament in the snap-elections of 1972. These elections were called after the fall of the centre-right Biesheuvel cabinet, which fell on disagreements on how to combat the economic crisis.¹⁴⁶

The development in attention to economic affairs that is presented in figure 5.13 shows a clear pattern: before the 1971 elections it is declining, the period just before the 1971 election forms a dip. The 1971 election causes an increase in attention for most parties, but after that, the attention declines again. The 1971 elections in which the NMP entered parliament have interrupted a general pattern of declining attention for economic affairs for almost all parties. Between the pre-election 1971 period and the pre-election 1972 period, attention for economic affairs increases sharply for all parties. The entry of the NMP appears to be followed by an increase in attention to economic affairs. However, the peculiar development of the attention for economic affairs can also be explained by the policy cycle. In September

¹⁴⁵ DS'70, which entered parliament in 1971, emphasised fiscal responsibility as well.

¹⁴⁶ A centre-left cabinet was formed after the 1972 elections (in which the NMP disappeared from the political scene). This cabinet did not take drastic budgetary steps after the discovery of large natural gas deposits in the North of the Netherlands.

the cabinet proposes the budget, which is then discussed in parliament before the Christmas recess. This means that in the months before the 1971 election (held in April), fewer economic issues would be discussed than after the elections, because the budget is discussed after April. Without this outlier there is no marked change in the attention for economic affairs.

Voting on economic affairs roughly follows the left-right division as can be seen in table 5.4: the BP, the VVD and NMP on the right hand side, the centre-right position of the Christian-democrats and orthodox Christians, and the leftwing position of the social democratic, socialist and communist parties. The correlation between party positions in the two periods is significant. The percentage of unanimous votes decreases during this period from 11% before the entry of the NMP to 5% in the period 1971-1977. The NMP takes the position furthest on the right.¹⁴⁷

The established parties move considerably. Only the PSP maintained its position relative to the other established parties. The pattern that one can see in the data is that the major parties tend to move to the left (PvdA, D66, CHU, KVP, ARP), while the smaller parties (CPN, SGP, GPV) move to the right. The major established parties appear to show adversarial reactions to the entry of a new fiscally responsible party. The only party that defies this pattern is the VVD, which actually moved to the right. The pattern may not necessarily be the result of the entry of the NMP. The leftwing shift of the ARP and KVP on economic issues, in particular, may be the result of an autonomous shift of these parties to the left, which was also observed for their voting on government reform issues.

The entry of the NMP does not seem to be a good explanation of the development in the parties' attention for and their positions on economic affairs between 1967 and 1977. Rather, it appears that the budgetary cycle has caused attention to sharply increase after the entry of the NMP into parliament, and that the

¹⁴⁷ Three other parties entered parliament during this period: the PPR and DS'70, which split from their mother parties during the period 1967-1971, the NMP in 1971 and RKPN in 1972. During the entire period, DS'70 took a position between the parties of the left and the parties of the centre right. Even though this party emphasised fiscal responsibility, it did not vote with the other parties that emphasised fiscal responsibility such as the NMP, the VVD, and the smaller Christian parties. Instead, the party took a centrist position. The PPR started with a similar position as DS'70 in 1967-1971, but it sharply moved to the left in the period 1971-1977. The RKPN took a position on the right with the orthodox Christians.

leftwing courses of the ARP and KVP moved them to the left. The NMP appears not to have influenced the saliency of tax issues or parties' positions on them.

5.2.8 EVP: progressive Protestants

In 1982, on the waves of the protest movement against the stationing of nuclear weapons, the Christian-pacifist EVP entered parliament. The effect of the EVP cannot be evaluated without reference to the international events of the late 1970s. In response to the Soviet decision to renew its intermediate range nuclear missiles in 1977, NATO also decided to place a new generation of intermediate range missiles in several Western European countries, including the Netherlands, unless the Soviet Union would agree to eliminate its new intermediate range missiles (Keylor 2003, 143). This so-called Double Track Decision posed a major problem to the first Van Agt cabinet, which relied on a small majority in the Dutch parliament (Wielenga 2010, 312). The senior coalition partner, the CDA, had many dissenting MPs within its own ranks who opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands (Van Diepen 2004, 121). The peace movement and especially the Inter-Church Peace Council (*Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad*) began to organise public opposition to stationing. The Dutch parliament adopted a motion not to place nuclear weapons in the Netherlands in the lead-up to the NATO decision (Van Diepen 2004, 131). Many CDA dissidents supported the motion. In its double track decision, NATO allowed the Dutch government to postpone the stationing of nuclear weapons for two years (Van Diepen 2004, 131-132). After a long parliamentary debate, parliament rejected a second motion, which was meant to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands ever again. The CDA dissidents had made a *volte-face* because they did not want to force a cabinet crisis (Van Diepen 2004, 136). The short-lived second Van Agt cabinet, which was formed after the 1981 elections, had made an agreement to disagree about nuclear weapons and decided to postpone stationing even longer (Van Diepen 2004, 155-156). Meanwhile, public attention to the issue grew: in 1981, 1983 and 1985 major protests were organised against the stationing of nuclear weapons. The 1981 and 1983 protests were large public protests: in 1981, 400,000 Dutch people attended (Van Diepen 2004, 188-189), and the 1983 protest was attended by 500,000 Dutch people (Van Diepen 2004, 203). In 1985, a petition was organised against the decision to place nuclear weapons (Van Diepen 2004, 320). The cabinet was not swayed by the protests and prepared the stationing of nuclear

Figure 5.14: parliamentary attention to defense 1977-1986



Table 5.5: party positions on defence 1977-1986

Position	1977-1982	1982-1986
1	SGP	VVD
2	GPV	GPV
3	VVD	SGP
4	CDA	CDA
5	D66	PvdA
6	PvdA	D66
7	PPR	PPR
8	CPN	CPN
9	PSP	PSP

weapons (Van Diepen 2004, 183). In 1984, the cabinet presented a compromise: the decision to accept American missiles was postponed for one year. The decision would be tied to the development in Soviet missiles, shifting the responsibility to the Soviet Union (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 231). The Soviets increased their missiles and in 1985 the government signed the treaty to accept the missiles (Van Diepen 2004, 316). The decision was ratified by parliament in 1985 (Van Diepen 2004, 330). By then, international events had caught up with the Dutch political decision-making: the weapons were never placed because of weapon control talks between the Soviet Union and the United States.

As can be seen in figure 5.14, attention for defence peaks in 1979, the year of the NATO double-track decision; after that, attention increases only marginally. There is no sign of a major increase in attention after the entry of the EVP, certainly in comparison to the peak in attention in 1979. One cannot point to the entry of the EVP as an external shock in the attention for defence. While the social debates about defence policy were heated and prominent, the issue was kept from the parliamentary agenda because the government first postponed the decision-making and then controlled the debates by making small steps over the course of the 1980s. Because of a government strategy of postponement and incrementalism, the activities of the nuclear disarmament movement in the Netherlands, such as the 1985 petition, the 1981 and 1983 demonstrations and the entry of the EVP into parliament in 1982, could not influence the agenda.

A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the EVP's impact on other parties' positions. The voting pattern follows the division between left and right, as can be seen in table 5.5. The anti-communist orthodox Protestant parties and the VVD are furthest to the right, followed by the CDA, then the more moderate leftwing parties PvdA and D66 and finally the PSP, PPR and CPN; these are the leftwing parties that opposed the pro-American defence policy of the Netherlands. The EVP joined the left. The EVP is not the most extreme party; rather, it stands closer to the centre than to CPN, PPR and PSP. The correlation between party positions on the two dimensions is significant. The level of unanimity *increases* during the period studied: from 6% to 10%. The increase in unanimity may be explained by the fact that several hot issues, in particular the presence of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil, had cooled because of the cabinet's incremental strategy.¹⁴⁸ There is only one marked change: on the anti-communist side of the dimension, the SGP and the VVD change position, leapfrogging over the GPV. The VVD takes the most extreme position in the period 1982-1986. The difference in terms of the number of votes between the VVD and SGP was small. The EVP entered the political arena on an issue that was already politicised. Instead of changing the patterns of competition, the party joined one of the sides.

The EVP is another example of a party that entered parliament as the result of the politicisation of an issue, instead of its entry resulting in the politicisation of its

¹⁴⁸ During the period studied, two additional parties entered parliament: the RPF and the CP. They are placed on the anti-communist side of the spectrum.

issue. The EVP entered parliament on the back of social protests against the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands, an issue that was politicised especially by the NATO decision in 1979. A government strategy of postponement and incremental decision-making further prevented politicisation of the defence issue when the EVP was in parliament.

5.2.9 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics

The CP was the first anti-immigration party to enter the Dutch parliament. It wanted to limit migration, advocated re-migration and sought to fight what it perceived as discrimination of native Dutch people. Since the Second World War, two groups of people migrated to the Netherlands: one group from Dutch colonies, and another group of migrant workers from the Mediterranean (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 229). The possibility of political independence of Surinam led to an increase in immigration to the Netherlands after 1970 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 251-254). Immigration levels from Surinam peaked in 1975, the year of the independence, and continued to be high until 1980, when it became more difficult for people from Surinam to migrate to the Netherlands (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 254-255; Lucassen and Lucassen 2011, 75). High unemployment on the Dutch Antilles led to high levels of immigration to the Netherlands in the period 1973-1982 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 261). Additionally, the Netherlands also opened its borders to labour immigration from the Mediterranean. Between 1964 and 1974, the Dutch government pursued an official policy of recruitment of migrant workers (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 267-268). In 1974, the recruitment of migrant workers ended, but, due to family reunion, immigration continued (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 272). Migration from Morocco peaked in 1979 (Lucassen & Lucassen 1974, 66). Until the late 1970s, the government had worked under the assumption that migrants would return to their own country, and so no integration policy was pursued (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 289). In the late 1970s, the government began to recognise that the migrant workers would stay permanently: in 1981 the government published a concept-government policy paper on minority policy and in 1983 a definitive policy paper followed (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 290). In figure 5.15, one can see that levels of immigration increased until 1980 and fluctuated around a much lower level of immigration afterwards.

Figure 5.15: immigration levels 1977-1986




Figure 5.16: parliamentary attention to immigration 1977-1986



Table 5.6: party positions on immigration 1977-1986

Position	1977-1982	1982-1986
1	SGP	VVD
2	GPV	SGP
3	VVD	GPV
4	CPN	PvdA
5	CDA	CPN
6	D66	D66
7	PSP	PSP
8	PPR	PPR
9	PvdA	CDA

Immigration became an issue of political contestation, during the 1980s, which it had not been before. As can be seen in figure 5.16, attention follows a pattern of breaking the silence: low, stagnant or declining levels of the attention for immigration before the entry of the 1982 elections, which turn into markedly increasing levels of attention after the elections. This pattern can be observed for most parties.¹⁴⁹ For many parties, the 1982 elections interrupt the pattern in attention: low and stable levels of attention for immigration are turned to increasing or higher levels of attention. The CP entered parliament in this election, which may have caused the rise in attention. One can eliminate several other explanations, such as the actual immigration levels: while actual immigration levels rose, attention was stable, and when the immigration levels stabilised, political attention for immigration rose.¹⁵⁰ The government policy paper on immigration may be another explanation. The concept-government policy paper was already published in 1981 and the final version was published in 1983. A marked difference exists in the parliamentary attention for the issue between 1981 and 1983. An important difference here appears to be the presence of the CP.

It is difficult to characterise party positions on immigration before and even after the entry of the CP. These positions are shown in table 5.6. In both periods, one dimension suffices to show the voting patterns. In the period 1977-1982, a limited

¹⁴⁹ The CDA and the CPN show signs of autonomous, independent increasing attention to immigration. For both parties, the 1982 elections caused an interruption of the increasing attention, but the growth of attention continued afterwards. Only the SGP shows a decline in attention to immigration after the 1981 elections.

¹⁵⁰ It may be the case that instead of immigration, integration of migrants was the problem. There is a five-year period between the peak in migration and the peak in attention to migration. The question is however why a five-year period would be crucial.

number of votes were held on the issue. The first position on the dimension is shared by the GPV and SGP, then comes a shared position of VVD and CPN, then the CDA, then D66, a shared position of PSP and PPR and then the PvdA. The voting appears to follow the left-right divide, although the CPN is placed on the right hand side.¹⁵¹ After the entry of the CP into parliament, the VVD is the most extreme of the established parties, followed by the SGP, the GPV, then one can find the PvdA, the CPN, D66, the PSP, the PPR and the CDA. Positions appear to follow a rough left-right pattern. Now the CDA is among the leftwing parties. During the 1980s, the CDA did indeed favour a multicultural approach to integration (Lucassen & Lucassen 2011, p.96). The CP is placed furthest right in the period 1982-1986.¹⁵² In its voting behaviour the CP stood isolated from the other parties.¹⁵³ After 1982, the dominant pattern in the voting pattern is between the CP and the other parties. The correlation between party positions before and after the entry of the CP is not significant. Given the differences between party positions before and after the entry of the CP, the shifts of individual parties over time cannot be identified, and neither can the dimensions be considered to be the same substantive dimension. Party positions shifted between the periods but not in a way that can be interpreted meaningfully because of the low number of votes. There is no sign of politicisation of the issue in terms of voting: the level of unanimous voting decreases only slightly during this period.¹⁵⁴

The entry of the CP has interrupted the low, stable and stagnating levels of attention accompanied by a consensual approach to the issue. It has caused established parties to devote more attention to immigration and to politicise the issue.

¹⁵¹ The position of the CPN is unexpected because, especially in this period, it emphasised anti-discrimination and appealed to migrant communities.

¹⁵² In this period two other new parties entered parliament: the RPF and the EVP. The RPF is placed between the GPV and the SGP and the EVP between D66 and PSP. This reinforces the idea that division is between the other parties is between the left (including the CDA) and the right (including the orthodox Christian parties).

¹⁵³ 18 votes (38% of the votes under study) separate the CP from the VVD. A large share of the votes in which the CP stands alone from the other parties concerns the naturalisation of individuals, which, until 1985, was done by law, and as such had to pass through parliament. In parliament, CP MP Janmaat devoted considerable attention to the naturalisation process (Van Holsteyn 1997). He was one of the first MPs to seriously scrutinise the naturalisation process. The CP was not the first to vote against such a naturalisation bill. Already in 1978, the BP voted against such a bill.

¹⁵⁴ It decreases from 17% to 15%. Note that this looks at the voting behaviour of the established parties, excluding the votes of the CP. With the voting behaviour of the CP, the level of unanimity falls back from 17 to 3%.

Established parties were united in their negative response to the CP. After the entry of the CP, criticism of immigration was seen as support for the extreme right. The political left began to treat immigrants with more consideration (Tinnemans 1995). Some observers propose that it was after the entry of the CP that the PvdA became more supportive of multiculturalism (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011, 94). The political and social developments diverge: before the entry of the CP, levels of immigration were high and increasing, political attention however was low and stable. After the CP entered, political attention to immigration was rising, while immigration levels were stabilising at a level lower than before. It may be the case that the opposition to immigration grew as immigration increased during the 1970s, which may have sowed the seeds for support for the CP. Even though immigration levels had already dropped by 1982, the issue became politically salient because of the entry of the CP. In this sense, the CP may have been the link between the societal saliency of immigration and its political saliency.

5.2.10 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters

The AOV and the U55+ were both founded shortly before the 1994 elections (Van Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996; Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1995, 27, 69). The issue of social security began to play a prominent role on the public agenda because economic circumstances had forced the governing parties to consider controversial budget cuts on social security, pensions and health care, this included an ill-fated proposal of the CDA to freeze the government pensions, which was retracted quickly (Flight & Felix 1995, 103).

When one looks at the developments in the attention for healthcare in figure 5.17, one thing stands out: in the first months of 1994 (before the 1994 elections) attention to healthcare peaks. After 1994, attention is much more stable and shows a slight increase. Only the CD, GL and the CDA increase their attention to the issue after 1994.¹⁵⁵ This effect is marginal compared to the increases in attention before the entry of the AOV and U55+. There is a clear pattern in the data: attention to pensioners' affairs peaks *before* the entry of the U55+ and AOV. The AOV and U55+

¹⁵⁵ The CDA and GL may have attempted to profit from the pensioners' issues that the AOV and U55+ brought to the table. Both parties lost votes in the 1994 elections. Only the CD is a real exception to this trend: this party peaks in attention to healthcare after the 1994 election: this interrupts a pattern of decline over the entire period.

probably profited electorally from the increased saliency of pensioners' affairs in the run-up to the 1994 election, which is also reflected in the parliamentary attention to this issue. After the 1994 election politics as usual returned.

Voting on pensioners' affairs and healthcare combined is on the border between being scaled best in one or two dimensions. As is evident from table 5.7, the single dimensional models are not comparable. Between 1989 and 1994 the order of the parties on the dimension is VVD, CD, SGP, GPV RPF, CDA, PvdA, D66 and GL. This follows the division between left and right. Between 1994 and 1998, the order of the parties is different: at the extreme end one can find CD, CDA and GL, followed by the SGP and RPF on one position, followed by the GPV, PvdA, D66 and the VVD. The two orderings are different and do not correlate. The U55+ is placed between the CD and CDA, and the AOV stands between the GL and the shared position of the SGP and GPV.¹⁵⁶ The main pattern divides the coalition parties from the other parties. This provides no answer to the question how this pattern changes.

One can further examine this change by modelling voting in a two-dimensional model. This fits for the data in the period 1989-1994 in terms of stress. It is shown in figure 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20: in the lower left hand corner one can find the leftwing opposition parties (D66 and GL). In the upper right hand corner the coalition parties at the time (CDA and PvdA) are located, together with the small Christian parties (GPV, SGP and RPF). On the right side, the VVD is in the lower corner and the CD is in the upper corner. The horizontal dimension divides leftwing parties (PvdA, D66 and GL) from the parties on the right (CD and the VVD) with the Christian parties in the centre. The second dimension is more difficult to grasp: it appears to separate more secular and religious parties, with the PvdA standing close to the religious parties. In the period 1994-1998, the voting also best fits a two-dimensional model. One dimension separates the CD from the other parties and on the other moves from VVD, via D66, PvdA, AOV, SP and the small Christian parties, to the GL, the CDA and the U55+. If one rotates the two solutions onto each other, one thing becomes apparent: in both models there appear to be two patterns. One divides between the CD and the other parties, and the other divides among the other parties. This second pattern in both cases comes close to the single dimension from the one-dimensional model.

¹⁵⁶ The SP stands close to the GL.

Figure 5.17: parliamentary attention to healthcare



Table 5.7: party positions on health 1989-1998

Position	1989-1994	1994-1998	1998-2002
1	VVD	CD	*
2	CD	CDA	VVD
3	SGP	GL	D66
4	GPV	SGP	CDA
5	RPF	RPF	SGP
6	CDA	GPV	CU
7	PvdA	PvdA	PvdA
8	D66	D66	GL
9	GL	VVD	SP




Figure 5.18: model of voting on healthcare 1989-1994**Figure 5.19: model of voting on healthcare 1994-1998**

Figure 5.20: procrustean analysis of voting on healthcare 1989-1998

In this sense, the change in both the one and the two-dimensional model is similar. Given the division between the CD and the rest of the parties on the horizontal dimension in figure 5.20, most of the variance between the other parties is concentrated on the vertical dimension. This vertical dimension roughly coincides with the one-dimensional solution. Differences exist between the two one-dimensional solutions. One cannot compare the changes of the party positions in terms of changes of position. Rather, there appears to be a change in the dominant dimension of the issue of healthcare. Instead of the socio-economic left-right division between conservative liberals on the right, Christian-democrats in the centre and social democrats on the left, the dominant division appears to be between the CDA, U55+ and GL on the one side, the AOV, the PvdA, the SP and the small Christian parties in the centre and D66 and VVD on the other extreme. The division may be between those who seek to reform the healthcare system and those who seek to maintain it. The entry of the pensioners' parties may have caused this new division to come to life.

The pattern, however, opens up another possibility: on one side of the new dimension one can find the parties that formed the cabinet, and on the other side one can find the parties that formed the opposition. It may be possible that this new pattern is merely the effect of the formation of a government that cuts through the traditional left-right divide. One can examine this question in two ways: first, one may want to compare the pattern found here for healthcare to other issues and other time periods. If one finds that the pattern is not found for other issues and one finds that in the next parliamentary period (when PvdA, VVD and D66 formed the cabinet, but the pensioners' parties were not in parliament) the pattern is different, the pattern found may be more reasonably related to the specificities of this issue (specifically the entry of the pensioners' parties), rather than to the formation of new cabinet. A useful issue to examine may be labour and social affairs, because like healthcare this issue concerns the protection of weaker members of society, insurance against major risks and the material needs of citizens. Labour and social affairs are analysed in section 5.2.11. A striking stability is found in the pattern of party positions between 1989-1994 and 1994-1998. In both cases the left-right pattern was dominant. This appears to falsify the notion that the change in the pattern for healthcare is caused by a change in cabinets. The next step would be to look at voting in the following parliamentary period (1998-2002). For this purpose, this period has also been included in figures 5.19 and 5.20. In this period, PvdA, VVD and D66 also formed the cabinet. If one finds the persistence of a pattern that separates the PvdA, VVD and D66 from the CDA and the GL, one may find reason to attribute the pattern found in the period 1994-1998 to the formation of the PvdA, VVD and D66 cabinet rather than to the participation of the U55+ and AOV in the parliamentary arena. The data is on the border between a one and a two-dimensional solution. In the one-dimensional model of voting behaviour, one can observe the following pattern: the VVD is the furthest party on the right, followed by D66, the CDA, the SGP, the CU, the GL and the SP. Certainly the dominant pattern in this model is not between government and opposition parties, but rather between the socio-economic left and the right, as was also observed for all votes concerning pensioners' affairs and healthcare in the period 1989-1994.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ The two-dimensional solution shows two dimensions: one between socio-economic left and right, and one between religious and secular parties. The PvdA, VVD and D66 stand close to each other on the second dimension.

In both these comparative analyses the peculiar voting patterns on healthcare in the period 1994-1998 appear to be specific to voting on that issue in that period, rather than a phenomenon that is caused by a division of government and opposition. These patterns, however, do not appear to be related to the political priorities of elderly parties in a consistent way: the AOV and the U55+ vote very differently.

If one compares the results of the two analyses of voting and attention, one particular finding stands out: the CDA, GL and CD are the only parties to respond to the U55+ and AOV; they show a change in terms of saliency and they also sit closely together on the new healthcare dimension. The CDA and GL both lost in the 1994 elections, in which the CD won seats (but not as many as was polled). It appears that these three parties may have attempted to take over some of the momentum of the pensioners' parties.

5.2.11 SP: a leftwing challenger

In addition to the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+, another party entered parliament in the 1994 elections: the Socialist Party. The SP opposed the cuts on social spending proposed and implemented by the CDA/PvdA cabinet. The leftwing party opposed the centrist course of the PvdA across the line but particularly on healthcare, labour market and social policies. As an example of this, the labour issue is selected.¹⁵⁸ To understand the effects of the SP, two things need to be taken into consideration: the political events during the Lubbers cabinet (discussed in section 5.2.10) and the actual economic circumstances. Figure 5.21 shows the levels of unemployment in the Netherlands. As one can see this follows a zigzag pattern of decreasing unemployment in the period 1989-1992, followed by an increase in unemployment in the period 1992-1994. After that, unemployment decreased again.

The patterns in the attention that established parties devote to this issue, shown in figure 5.22, are similar: for all parties the pattern follows a zigzag pattern. Attention to labour issues declined before the 1994 election. It peaked after the 1994 election but then declined again. One may propose that the entry of the SP interrupted the decreasing levels of attention to labour market policies, and that this effect was only short term, given the subsequent decline. The levels of attention for labour market issues also show a clear similarity to the actual levels of unemployment. This pattern

¹⁵⁸ This includes the labour market, labour market reintegration, and disability and unemployment insurance.

Figure 5.21: unemployment



Figure 5.22: parliamentary attention to labour




Table 5.8: party positions on labour and social affairs 1989-1998

Position	1989-1994	1994-1998
1	CD	CD
2	VVD	VVD
3	SGP	CDA
4	RPF	SGP
5	GPV	GPV
6	CDA	RPF
7	D66	PvdA
8	PvdA	D66
9	GL	GL

does not only explain the rise in attention between 1993 and 1995, but also the decline in attention before 1994 and the decline in attention after 1994. A significant correlation exists between the levels of attention for labour market affairs and unemployment (Pearson's r is 0.84 – significant at the 0.01-level). Given this correlation, the entry of the SP has to be dismissed as a likely explanation for the increase in attention to labour policies. During the entire period the level of unemployment appears to be a better explanation for the level of attention for labour market policies than the entry of the SP. While the entry of the SP could explain the change in the level of attention before and after the 1994 election, the level of unemployment can also explain the developments before and after the 1994 election.

Table 5.8 presents voting in parliament on labour and social affairs.¹⁵⁹ The Centre-Democrats stand furthest to the right; followed by the VVD, then the Christian-democratic CDA and the smaller orthodox Christian parties, at the furthest left on the dimension one can find D66, the PvdA and the GL. The party positions correlate significantly over time. The SP takes a position on the far left.¹⁶⁰ Party positions on labour and social affairs remain remarkably stable over time. Only two parties change position over time: between 1989 and 1994, the CDA was the most

¹⁵⁹ In both cases the level of error is slightly lower than the threshold for a one-dimensional interpretation. However, given the strong consistency in the voting patterns over time and their confirmation of pre-established dimensions, a one-dimensional solution is used. The second dimension in both cases separate more religious from more secular parties, and this is not related to the positions of the SP.

¹⁶⁰ Three other parties entered parliament during this period: the socialist SP and the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+. The AOV and U55+ take a position in the political centre, between D66 and the RPF.

leftwing of the Christian parties, but it moved to the most rightwing position between 1994 and 1998. The move of the CDA can be interpreted as an adversarial move, which has also been observed in the other cases: larger parties seem to move further to the flanks after the entry of a new party. The RPF finally moves to the most leftwing position of the Christian parties. It skips over the position of the GPV. The level of unanimity remains remarkably stable over time: 15%. Like many other new parties, the SP appears not to have influenced the basic structure of competition, and instead, it joined one of the sides of the conflict.

Given all of these results, one has to conclude that the SP did not influence the attention that parties devoted to issues or the positions that they took on issues during the new party's first period in parliament.

5.2.12 LN: democratic populists

In 1999, members of local protest parties founded the Liveable Netherlands. The party agreed on a platform of government reform. Both in the period before and in the period after LN was in parliament, several consitutional reforms were discussed in parliament. An overview of these is presented in table 5.9. Between 1998 and 2002 the reform party D66, the conservative liberal VVD and social democratic PvdA formed a cabinet. The cabinet proposed a set of government reforms: some of these were accepted by parliament, but some were voted down. Several proposals required a second reading. After the 2003 elections,¹⁶¹ several government reforms were discussed for the second time; some because they required a second reading, and some because they were proposed again by the D66-minister for government reform. Almost all major proposals were voted down, all others were withdrawn. The minister for government reform stepped down; a new D66-minister took over his portfolio and asked several committees to advise him on the issue of government reform. These committees presented their reports just before the 2006 elections, but none of the reports were followed up with any political action.

¹⁶¹ In the short parliamentary period between 2002 and 2003 no major democratic reforms were discussed.

Table 5.9: government reforms discussed in the Tweede Kamer 1998-2006

Year	Reform	Notes
1999	Bill on Corrective Referendum	Constitutional amendment (second reading) Voted down by <i>Eerste Kamer</i>
2001	Bill on Temporary Referendum	
1999	Advise of the Elzinga Committee	Major advice on local democracy
2001	Bill on Municipal Government	
2002	Bill on Elected Mayor	Constitutional amendment (first reading)
2004	Bill on Corrective Referendum	Constitutional amendment (first reading)
2004	Bill on Temporary Referendum	Reintroduction by opposition parties
2004	Bill on Elected Mayor	Constitutional amendment (second reading)
2005	Bill on Change of the Electoral System	Did not come to a final vote
2005	Bill on Referendum on the European Constitution	
2006	Advice of the Citizens Forum on Electoral Change	Major advice on electoral change
2006	Advice of the National Convention	Major advice on government reform

The overview in table 5.9 shows that issues on government reforms were discussed before and after the entry of LN into the parliamentary arena, and so it may have been the case that the entry of LN gave a special impetus to these discussions. In figure 5.22, one can see the developments in attention that established parties devoted to government reform. Attention increased before 2002 and decreased after the entry of LN. Even though more bills on government reform were proposed after 2002, this did not lead to more parliamentary activity. Many proposals on government reform that were discussed in the period 2003-2004 were not particularly new: they were bills that were reintroduced or that came up for a second reading. Therefore, the parliamentary discussions may have been less intensive.

The voting patterns on government reform between 1998 and 2002 and 2002 and 2006 are difficult to compare and understand. In both periods the voting pattern is on the border between one- and two-dimensional. The one-dimensional representations of voting behaviour, shown in table 5.10, are not comparable. When modelling the voting in the period 1998-2002 in terms of one dimension, the following pattern occurs: the models separate the religious parties (CU, SGP and CDA) from the coalition parties (VVD, PvdA and D66). In the centre, one can find the parties of the leftwing opposition (SP and GL). The largest difference is between the coalition parties and the rest. The pattern appears to follow the division between secular and religious parties, where the secular parties in the *Tweede Kamer* and in

Figure 5.23: parliamentary attention to governance 1998-2006




Table 5.10: party positions on governance 1998-2006

Position	1998-2002	2002-2006
1	SGP	VVD
2	CU	CDA
3	CDA	CU
4	SP	SGP
5	GL	PvdA
6	D66	GL
7	PvdA	D66
8	VVD	SP

particular those in the coalition tend to favour government reform, and the religious parties tend to be more conservative. The coalition parties stand closely together on one extreme of the dimension. In the period 2002-2006, a different pattern can be observed in the voting behaviour: the SP and the LPF are on the far end of the spectrum, followed by D66 and the GL. In the centre, one can find the PvdA, followed by the CDA, the SGP, the CU and the VVD. The largest difference is between the VVD and the other parties, the smallest difference is that between the CU and SGP. The level of unanimous voting decreases over time: from 26% in the period 1998-2002, to 20% in the period 2002-2006. The ordering of parties for the period 1998-2002 and 2002-2006 correlates only weakly, and therefore, it is impossible to compare the party positions over time.

Perhaps, a two-dimensional solution provides more insight. However, as discussed above, two-dimensional solutions with such a low number of votes are unstable. In terms of the reduction of errors, both models can comfortably be modelled in terms of two dimensions. The models are shown in figure 5.22, 5.23 and 5.24. The model for the period 1998-2002 shows the following structure: there appears to be a division between government and opposition parties, and between parties that are progressive and conservative on the government reform issue. In the upper right hand corner one can find the CU and the SGP, which are conservative opposition parties that tend to oppose government reform. In the upper left hand corner, the coalition parties VVD, PvdA and D66 can be found. These parties agreed on an agenda of government reform. In the lower half of the figure, one can find CDA, SP and GL.

In the model of voting on governance between 2002 and 2006, as shown in figure 4.29, one can also observe two divides: the first divide is between CU, SGP, CDA and VVD that tend to oppose government reform on the one side, and the PvdA, GL, D66 and SP that tend to favour government reform on the other side. It is difficult to explain the variance on the second dimension: this includes both government and opposition parties and parties that tend to favour government reform (SP, LPF, D66), as well as parties that tend to be more conservative (CDA and VVD). One can use Procrustean Analysis to superimpose the one model on the other. If one does so, an interesting pattern emerges. Political parties move considerably, but most of these movements occur on the vertical dimension. The correlation between party positions on the horizontal dimension is significant, while the correlation on the vertical dimension is not.

The following may be the case: party positions on governance can best be modelled in terms of two dimensions in both periods. One dimension stays the same in both periods: this is the government reform dimension with the SGP and CU on the one side, and D66 and the SP on the other. Shifts along this dimension may be understood in terms of changes in position. On the vertical dimension, party positions change considerably. It is, however, difficult to interpret party positions on this dimension without referring to government formation: while in the period 1998-2002 the VVD, the PvdA and D66 stand together, the PvdA has shifted away in the period




Figure 5.24: model of voting on governance 1998-2002**Figure 5.25: model of voting on governance 2002-2006**

Figure 5.26: procrustean analysis of voting on governance 1998-2006

2002-2006, while the CDA and the VVD take a rather similar position in this period.¹⁶²

¹⁶² Because voting on democratic reform includes several changes of the constitution, several votes are held in both periods. Constitutional changes are voted on two times. For two issues, multiple votes have taken place: for the constitutional change of the legislative procedure to allow for referenda and the deconstitutionalisation of the appointment of the mayor and the Queen's commissioner. Both issues were priority reforms of LN (and D66). In the vote on the elected mayor, the following pattern emerges: in 1998 the CDA, the CU and the SGP voted against the deconstitutionalisation of the appointment. When the issue returned to parliament in 2004, the CDA had made volte-face. The LPF also voted in favour. Only the CU and the SGP retained their opposition against the reform. In both the 1998-2002 and the 2003-2006 coalition agreements, the cabinet had committed itself to the elected mayor. While the support for the directly elected mayor expanded over time, the support for the referendum decreased. In 1999, the same majority that had favoured the elected mayor also voted in favour of the referendum. In 2004 the VVD voted against the referendum, while the LPF voted in favour. While the referendum had

In both these discussions, LN does not play a role at all: the party emphasised an issue that had already seen parliamentary and government activity before it entered parliament. After LN entered parliament and disappeared from it again, the D66 minister of government reform proposed a set of reforms, the majority of which had already been discussed in the previous parliamentary period. The entry of LN did not reinvigorate the parliamentary debate on government reform or consistently influence party positions on the issue.

5.2.13 LPF and PVV: the return and persistence of anti-immigration politics

The LPF and PVV are two parties that focused on immigration. Over the course of the 1990s, a new group of migrants came to the Netherlands. After migrants from (former) Dutch colonies and migrant workers from the Mediterranean, refugees came to the Netherlands from conflict areas such as the Western Balkan and Iraq (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 328). The number of asylum seekers more than doubled between 1992 and 1998 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 328). Between 1998 and 2010 the levels of immigration into the Netherlands fluctuated, as can be seen in figure 5.27: while rising marginally in the period 1998 and 2001, the level of non-Western immigration sharply dropped in the period 2001-2005. After 2005, immigration levels increased again. Before 2002, immigration was the subject of political debate: in 2000, a new, more restrictive bill on aliens was accepted by parliament (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 316). In the period 2002-2006, the cabinet focused on more restrictive legislation on integration, while strictly applying the 2000 bill on aliens (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 316-318).¹⁶³ After the 2006 parliamentary elections, parliament did not debate major changes in legislation, except for a general pardon that was accepted for asylum-seekers that had lived in the Netherlands for longer than five years (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 318).

been agreed upon by the parties in the coalition agreement, the Second Balkenende government had deferred judgment to the *Tweede Kamer*. From this it becomes clear that the CDA and the VVD did not move unambiguously to more democratisation. Instead, the positions on democratic reform cannot be separated from the position of D66 in coalition politics. While D66 had been able to get the support of PvdA and the VVD for the elected mayor and the referendum in the 1998 coalition talks, it had been able to win the CDA and VVD for the elected mayor, but not for the referendum in 2003.

¹⁶³ The law on aliens was also made slightly more restrictive.

The development in the attention for immigration is presented in figure 5.28: between 1998 and 2002 the attention that most parties devoted to immigration was low. After the 2002 elections, the attention to immigration increased. The entry of the LPF may have caused a reversion in the attention for immigration with most parties. The 2006 election reverses the trend: in the months after the 2006 elections, established parties devoted considerable attention to immigration. This is the period in which the new leftwing majority voted in favour of the general pardon for asylum-seekers. The attention to immigration dropped after this peak, and the base level is now lower than in the period 2002-2006.¹⁶⁴ Established parties did not devote more attention to integration and immigration in response to rising levels of immigration: between 1998 and 2001, the levels of immigration were high, while the levels of attention for immigration were low; between 2001 and 2005 the level of immigration decreased drastically, while the level of attention for immigration increased. After 2006, the attention to immigration decreased, while the actual level of immigration increased. The incongruence between political attention to immigration and actual levels of immigration in the Netherlands since 2000 has also been observed by Lucassen and Lucassen (2011, 39). It may be that the rising levels of attention for immigration can be understood in strategic terms: that the entry of the LPF caused a change in the attention that established parties devoted to immigration. For most parties, a marked change in attention after the 2002 elections is visible. After the entry of the LPF, established parties may have followed its successful example and devoted more attention to immigration, in order to regain lost votes.

The entry of the PVV did not cause an increase in attention: even with the extreme outlier after the 2006 elections, established parties devote less attention to immigration after the entry of the PVV. Established parties may not have been impressed by their nine seats (only one more than the LPF's eight in the 2003 election) and reduced their attention to immigration. The low levels of attention for immigration after 2006 can also be understood because no new policy or legislation was needed: legislation that was intended to restrict the level of asylum requests and

¹⁶⁴ Only the CDA defies this pattern: it devotes less attention to immigration after the entry of the LPF in 2002, and, in the period before and after the election, the attention is relatively stable. The pattern in attention of the CDA to immigration may imply that there is a relationship between electoral performance and attention to the LPF's issue: it performed particularly well in the 2002 and 2003 elections and therefore could (marginally) reduce its attention for immigration.



Figure 5.27: immigration levels 1998-2009**Figure 5.28: parliamentary attention to immigration 1998-2010**

Table 5.11: party positions on immigration 1998-2010

Position	1998-2002	2002-2006	2006-2010
1	VVD	VVD	VVD
2	CDA	CDA	CDA
3	SGP	SGP	SGP
4	CU	CU	CU
5	D66	D66	PvdA
6	PvdA	PvdA	SP
7	SP	SP	GL
8	GL	GL	D66

make the civic integration process stricter had been accepted. No new legislation was needed after 2006.

Voting on immigration can be modelled in terms of one dimension during the entire period. Party positions on the dimension, as shown in table 5.11, follow the traditional division between the social-economic left and right. Of the established parties, the VVD is furthest to the right, followed by the CDA, the SGP and the CU. The traditional parties of the left can be found D66, PvdA, SP and GL. The LPF, which was the most conservative party on immigration during the election campaign (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007), is placed between the CDA and the SGP. The VVD is the most extreme party on immigration in the period 1998-2006. This may be a result of the fact that the LPF was leaderless and increasingly divided in the period 2002-2006. But the PVV, too, is more moderate on immigration than the VVD. The differences between the PVV and the VVD are minimal, however. In the period 2006-2010, the PVV is the most extreme party on immigration. In this period most votes (23%) divide the PVV from the other parties. Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the party positions are identical. For the periods 2002-2006 and 2006-2010, the correlation is significant. Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the level of unanimous voting increases slightly, while it falls sharply in the period 2006-2010: the LPF put the issue of immigration on the political agenda, the PVV subsequently polarised the issue.¹⁶⁵

Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the relative positioning of established parties does not change. The parties retain their position relative to each other: rather

¹⁶⁵ LN participated in too few votes to be included in the study. The PvdD joins the progressive parties on the left.

than introduce a new line of conflict, the immigration issue remained part of the traditional social-economic division. Rather than changing the lines of conflict, the LPF became incorporated into the right, as is evident from its participation in the first Balkenende cabinet (Bale 2003). While the leaderless, internally divided LPF parliamentary party was easily incorporated into the existing system, the entry of the PVV did lead to a change of party positions: a change occurred on the leftwing side of the political spectrum. D66 moved from the most conservative of the parties of the left, it became the most progressive on the issue of immigration. The PvdA, the SP and the GL all moved to a slightly more conservative position. This is a clear example of an adversarial move of D66 against the PVV: D66 chose to oppose the PVV. As a conservative competitor entered the parliament, D66 became more progressive.

The most striking thing about the data is the difference between the effects of the LPF and the PVV: the LPF has had a consistent effect on the attention that all parties devote to immigration. It did not influence the party positions on the issue.¹⁶⁶ After the PVV replaced the LPF, the parliamentary attention to the issue decreases, but there is a change in party positions and the level of unanimous voting. It appears that the politicisation of the immigration issue went through two stages: after 2002 all parties agreed that something had to be done after the public expression of discontent with immigration policies. Attention and unanimous voting on the issue *increased*. After 2006 this was then transformed into an increasing *political* difference on the issue: after the process of consensual law making, the parties politicised the issue.

5.2.14 PvdD: the hobbyhorse

The PvdD has said that since it has started to take part in parliamentary decision-making, every day is "World Animal Day".¹⁶⁷ The party was active on its own subject in parliament.¹⁶⁸ In order to deal with the high number of questions from the PvdD, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food appointed additional civil servants.¹⁶⁹ Marianne Thieme, the chair of the PvdD parliamentary party, concludes

¹⁶⁶ This does not exclude the possibility of systemic shift to the right.

¹⁶⁷ Misérus, M. "Dierenliefde bindt links en rechts; diervriendelijk blok in de Tweede Kamer laat zich in moties duidelijk horen". *De Volkskrant* 13/12/2006.

¹⁶⁸ Stokmans, D. "Dierenpartij maakt zich over mensen geen zorgen. Nieuwe partijen in Tweede Kamer schenken vooral aandacht aan 'hun' onderwerpen". *NRC Handelsblad*, 26/1/2007.

¹⁶⁹ Douwes, D. "Vragen Partij voor de Dieren dagtaak". *De Volkskrant*, 30/10/2007.

all of her contributions to the plenary debate with the words "And I am also of the opinion that industrial agriculture must be ended", echoing Cato the Elder (translation SO).¹⁷⁰ The special focus of the PvdD has sometimes led to visible irritation of other MPs. When the PvdD attempted to propose sixty motions during the discussion of the agriculture budget, D66 MP Boris van der Ham announced loudly that he was going home, because, according to him, this was meaningless.¹⁷¹

It may be possible that not the entry of the PvdD, but the developments in the agricultural sector influenced the attention for agriculture. Over time the share of the GDP constituted by agricultural activities steadily fell from 2.6% to 2.4%, as can be seen in figure 5.29. One major animal disease in the Netherlands broke out in the period: Q-fever. Between 2003 and 2009, this affected the number of sheep: the growth in the number of sheep stagnated after 2006 and the number of sheep declined after 2007, as can be seen in figure 5.30. During the period 2006-2010, there were also two policy initiatives on agriculture: a government policy paper on animal welfare was sent to parliament in the end of 2007 and the discussions were brought to close during the beginning of 2008. Moreover, the environmental organisation Environmental Defence (*MilieuDefensie*), the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth, brought the environmental impact of livestock to the table by means of the citizens' initiative. The initiative was discussed in parliament in 2007.

When looking at the attention that established parties devote to agriculture (shown in figure 5.31), one can see that the 2006 elections interrupted the development: the levels of attention were low and stagnant, before the 2006 elections. After the 2006 elections, the level of attention for agriculture increased sharply, and afterwards, the growth stagnated. Outliers cause the decrease in the trend lines.¹⁷² These patterns clearly do not conform to the actual developments in agriculture. The economic activity declined before 2006 and stabilised afterwards, while in terms of attention the period before 2006 is stable and the period after shows an increase. The events of 2007 and 2008 (Q-fever, the two major policy proposals) amplified a trend

¹⁷⁰ Middendorp, P. "Cato". *De Pers*, 26/10/2009.

¹⁷¹ "Record aan moties PvdD". *De Telegraaf* 5/2/2008.

¹⁷² Two parties defy this trend. The VVD shows a less pronounced but similar pattern: for this party attention was low and declining before the 2006 elections. After this the level of attention increased, but it does not exceed the level of attention before the entry of these elections. The SGP appears not to have been affected by the entry of the 2006 elections: for this party, attention for agriculture increased constantly in the period 2003-2010.

Figure 5.29: economic importance agriculture 2003-2010




Figure 5.30: number of sheep




Figure 5.31: parliamentary attention to agriculture 1998-2010




Table 5.12: party positions on agriculture 2003-2010

Position	2003-2006	2006-2010
1	VVD	VVD
2	CDA	CDA
3	SGP	SGP
4	CU	CU
5	D66	PvdA
6	PvdA	D66
7	GL	GL
8	SP	SP

towards more attention for agriculture that already started at the end of 2006. For most parties, the 2006 elections interrupted the stable levels of attention and increased attention.

Voting on agriculture can be modelled in terms of one dimension in both periods. The distribution of parties, as shown in table 5.12, follows the division between left and right. Furthest to the right, one can find the VVD, the CDA, then the small Christian parties SGP and CU, followed by the traditional parties of the left (D66, PvdA, SP and GL). Voting on agriculture in both periods correlates significantly. The level of unanimous voting drops sharply from 19% to 3%. The PvdD joined the parties on the left and became the most extreme party on agriculture.¹⁷³ Two clear movements are visible: on the one side the CDA and the SGP, which held the same position between 2003 and 2006, and which now hold two separate positions next to each other. Still, only 4% of the votes on agriculture divide the two parties. The second change is a switch in positions of the PvdA and D66. D66 takes the more environmentalist position, while the PvdA moves to the other side. All in all, the PvdD did affect the attention to agricultural issues: this sharply increased after the 2006 elections. The PvdD did not influence party positions and instead joined the existing left-right dimension on the extreme left.

¹⁷³ The PVV started as a separate party in 2004. In the period 2004-2006, the party took a moderate position on the less environmentalist side of the CU. In the period 2006-2010, the party took the least environmentalist position on the spectrum.

5.3 Analysing the case-by-case results

In the previous sections, the effects of individual new parties on the attention that established parties devote to issues and the positions that they take on these issues were studied. These will now be compared and analysed statistically.

5.3.1 Party positions in parliament

The most remarkable outcome of the case-by-case analysis of party positions is that for three cases (CP, AOV/U55+ and LN) changes in party positions before and after the entry of the new party could not be understood as changes on a stable dimension because the nature of the conflict on the issue changed. These cases were analysed in detail, and inconclusive results were found each time. For immigration, the issue of the CP, the difference between the two periods may be a consequence of the low number of votes. This led to poor results in both cases. Because of the divided position of the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+ on the issue, one cannot attribute the change in position of established parties on healthcare to them directly. If one models the changes in the voting patterns for governance, the issue of LN in two dimensions, it becomes clear that the line of conflict between pro- and anti-reform parties has remained stable, and that any change in position is caused by a changing government composition. In none of the cases can the changes be easily attributed to the entry of the new parties. However, in each of these elections, more than one new party entered parliament: the lines of conflict on the issues of these second new parties (the EVP, SP and the LPF) remained stable.

The CP, AOV, U55+ and LN may have played some role in the perturbation of the political space. One thing stands out about these cases: they are all mobilisers. The pattern found fits the formulated hypothesis: mobiliser parties are associated with a change in dimensionality.¹⁷⁴ In table 5.13 one can see that for the remaining parties there is no difference in the size of the changes between mobilisers and challengers. There is a significant difference, however, between mobilisers and challengers in the levels of unanimity in voting on their issue, as can be seen in table 5.13. On average

¹⁷⁴ Moreover, two of these three parties were internally unstable. LN was also internally unstable, but not in terms of its parliamentary party. Again, internal instability is not sufficient condition for change in the lines of conflict on an issue. The internally unstable parties such LPF, NMP and RPF are associated with stability in the lines of conflict. Here the relationship may be reversed: the instability of voting patterns on the issue resulted in instability within the party.

Table 5.13: Comparing mean effects on parliamentary positions

Characteristic	Change in party positions				Change in unanimity	
	μ	σ	N	ϵ	μ	ϵ
Challenged	0.067	0.096	5	0.058	-	-
Unchallenged	0.089	0.082	33			
Mobiliser	0.066	0.086	69	0.116	-0.08	0.645**
Challenger	0.087	0.095	38		0.01	
Government	0.064	0.099	30	0.099	0.03	0.437
Opposition	0.084	0.088	67		-0.04	

μ : average value

σ : standard deviation

N: number of cases

ϵ : eta

there is a small decrease in the level of unanimity. While for challengers there is a small increase in unanimity, the entry of mobiliser is associated with a marked decrease in unanimity. This difference between challengers and mobilisers is significant.

Seven of the eleven cases in which individual party positions could be compared, saw large movements of one or more large established parties *away* from the centre (D66, the NMP, the PPR, DS'70, the RPF, the EVP and the SP).¹⁷⁵ Five of these seven parties are challengers: 83% of challengers are associated with large parties making large movements to the extremes, while only 25% of mobilisers have this effect. These results are summarised in table 5.14. Only in one case did the challenged party react most (KVP to PPR). In three cases the value for the challenged party is zero, meaning that there was no reaction. For the other challengers, a party on the opposite side of the political spectrum moved away from the new party. While the challenged party tended to ignore its challenger, the other established parties have moved to the extreme, augmenting the problem for the challenged party.¹⁷⁶ All in all, the average reaction from challenged parties is not significantly different from those

¹⁷⁵ This may be a result of measurement uncertainty: the four cases where this does not occur are the RKPN, LPF, PVV and PvdD. This is not the case, however: if one looks at the combined number of votes in both the pre and the post-analysis, the top-six of number votes is the LPF (immigration, 1998-2006), the SP (labour and social affairs 1989-1998), the PVV (immigration 2002-2010), the PPR (a bloc of environmental issues 1967-1977), LN (governance 1998-2006) and NMP (economic affairs 1967-1977). Four are associated with changes in positions and two are not.

¹⁷⁶ Marked accommodative reactions are found after the entry of PPR (from the KVP), D66 (from the KVP) and the NMP (from the VVD) and marked adversarial

Table 5.14: challengers' effects on parliamentary positions

Party	PPR	DS'70	RKPN	RPF	EVP	SP
ARP	-0.08	0.25	-0.09			
CHU	-0.08	0	0.14			
KVP	0.25	-0.08	0			
SGP	0.04	0	0	-0.11	0.18	0.1
PvdA	0	0.17	0.09	-0.33	-0.09	-0.1
VVD	0	-0.17	0	-0.22	-0.18	0
CPN	0	-0.33	-0.09	0.11	0	
PSP	0	0	-0.18	0.11	0	
BP	-0.04	0	-0.13			
GPV	-0.25	0	0.09	0.11	0	0
D66	0	0	0	0.11	0.09	0.1
CDA				0	0	-0.3
DS'70			0			
PPR			0	0.22	0	
RPF						0.2
GL						0
CD						0
Hypo.	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

Challenged parties in **bold**

Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction

No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction

Table 5.15: mobilisers' effects on parliamentary positions

Party	D66	NMP	CP	AOV/U55+	LPF	LN	PVV	PvdD
ARP	0	-0.33						
CHU	-0.09	-0.04						
KVP	0.18	0.04						
SGP	0.05	0.04	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0	0.06
PvdA	0.18	-0.08	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0.13	-0.11
VVD	-0.09	0.08	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0	0
CPN	-0.09	0.17	n/a					
PSP	-0.09	0	n/a					
BP	-0.05	-0.08						
GPV	0	0.21	n/a	n/a				
D66		-0.08	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	-0.38	+0.11
CDA			n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0	0.06
PPR		n/a	n/a					
RPF			n/a	n/a				
GL				n/a	0	n/a	0.13	0
CD					0	n/a		
SP					0	n/a	0.13	0
CU					0	n/a	0	

reactions after the entry of the NMP (from the PvdA and the ARP), the EVP (from the VVD), the RPF (from the VVD and the CDA), and the SP (for the CDA).

of unchallenged parties, as can be seen in table 5.13.¹⁷⁷

The new party government hypothesis proposes that new parties that enter government will have a larger impact on the positions of established parties, than new parties that remain in opposition. In table 5.13 one can see that governing new parties are associated with less change in party positions than opposition parties. This difference is not significant. Governing new parties do have a larger impact on the levels of unanimity, than new parties in opposition. This difference, however, is not significant, either.

If one looks at the overall correlation in table 5.16, there is a significant negative relationship between the size of the new party and the reactions of established parties: larger parties elicit less reaction. The entry of the largest party that is studied here, LPF, was not followed by any change in the relative party positions. Without the LPF the relationship becomes insignificant, changes sign and becomes much weaker: both smaller parties such as the RPF and larger parties such as DS'70 elicit marked reactions.

Table 5.17 provides an overview of the results concerning the new party organisation hypothesis. Here one can see that both poorly organised parties such as the RPF and well-organised parties such as DS'70 elicit marked reactions. The overall relationship implies that weakly organised parties elicit more reactions than well-organised parties. This relationship is not significant and goes in against the stated expectation: parties like the NMP and the RPF, which fell apart, are accompanied by larger parties that moved to the flanks of the political spectrum. All in all, the hypothesis that better organised parties elicit more reactions has to be rejected.

In table 5.18 different correlation results are presented concerning the distance between the new and the established party and the size of established party responses. The image is mixed: for some new parties the parties that are furthest away respond most (in the case of DS'70 this relationship is significant). For other parties, it is the parties that are closest by respond most. The overall pattern is that the further two

Table 5.16: new party size and parliamentary positions

¹⁷⁷ One should note that the measure that is used in the statistical analysis looks at the absolute value of the changes, because for every change a (set of) equally large change(s) in the other direction occurs. Therefore, one cannot take the direction of the movement into account.

Party	New party size	Average change in position	Standard deviation	N
LPF	17	0	0	8
PVV	5.89	0.093	0.129	8
DS'70	5.33	0.106	0.118	11
D66	4.48	0.064	0.058	10
PPR	1.84	0.068	0.095	11
PvdD	1.83	0.042	0.049	8
NMP	1.51	0.114	0.093	11
SP	1.32	0.089	0.105	9
RPF	1.25	0.148	0.096	9
RKPN	0.92	0.063	0.066	13
EVP	0.83	0.061	0.079	9
Correlation	-0.208**			107

Table 5.17: new party organisation and parliamentary positions

Party	New party organisation	Average change in position	Standard deviation	N
PVV	1	0.094	0.129	8
DS'70	1	0.106	0.118	11
D66	1	0.064	0.058	10
PPR	1	0.068	0.096	11
PvdD	1	0.042	0.049	8
SP	1	0.089	0.105	9
RKPN	1	0.063	0.066	13
EVP	1	0.061	0.079	9
LPF	0.625	0	0	8
NMP	0.5	0.113	0.093	11
RPF	0.5	0.148	0.096	9
Correlation	-0.136			107

Table 5.18: party distance and parliamentary positions

Party	Correlation	N
DS'70	-0.55*	11
NMP	-0.257	11
D66	-0.227	10
SP	-0.173	9
PvdD	0	8
PPR	0.257	11
RPF	0.264	9
RKPN	0.301	13
EVP	0.417	9
PVV	0.507	8
Overall	0.165*	107

Table 5.19: established party performance and parliamentary positions

Party	Correlation	N
PvdD	-0.521	8
SP	-0.325	9
D66	-0.308	10
RPF	-0.263	9
PVV	-0.113	8
EVP	0.109	9
RKPN	0.123	13
PPR	0.22	11
DS'70	0.318	11
NMP	0.37	11
Overall	0.070	107

parties are apart, the more the established party will react.¹⁷⁸ This goes against the formulated expectation, but it can be understood in terms of Meguid's (2005) notion that established parties will polarise the issue on which their competitor is challenged.

The analysis for the established party performance hypothesis is summarised in table 5.19. One can see that it is evenly split: five new parties elicit more marked reactions from parties that performed well in the elections and five new parties elicit more marked reactions from parties that performed poorly in the elections. Overall, the relationship is weak and insignificant. This does fit the expectation formulated above that electoral reasoning does not play a strong role in the parliamentary arena.

On the whole, one can draw two conclusions from these analyses of the effect of new parties on parliamentary party positions. Mobiliser parties and challenger parties have different roles to play: mobilisers emphasise previously unpolarised issues, which leads to increasing levels of non-unanimous voting and, in some cases, the redefinition of the lines of conflict. Challengers emphasise issues that are already polarised and take positions that are on the extreme of the existing dimensions. These parties reinforce the existing lines of conflict, as large parties move sharply to the extremes. Parties that are far away from the new party tend to move more than parties that stand close to the new party. As before this can be understood in the context Meguid's theory (2005) that the enemy of one's enemy is one's friend.

5.3.2 Analysis of attention in parliament

The patterns in the attention that established party devote to the issue of the new party, are remarkably uniform. It does not appear to be the case that some parties react more to the entry of particular new political parties than others; instead, established political parties react in the same way, because the parliamentary agenda limits the ability of parties to pursue their own priorities. The question then is *why* some new parties were able to put an issue on the agenda while other parties were not.

For nine cases, the KNP, BP, EVP, RKPN, EVP, LN, DS'70, AOV, U55+ and PVV, generally declining levels of attention were found. This could be explained by external circumstances. In most cases processes of politicisation and depoliticisation explained these patterns. The KNP was formed in opposition to Indonesian

¹⁷⁸ One should note that in the multivariate analysis, this relationship is not significant.

independence, which was realised anyway. Agricultural issues had been moved from the parliamentary agenda before the BP entered parliament. In many cases the new political parties contested a decision-making process that had already been set in motion: the RPF and the RKPN entered parliament after the first attempts to liberalise the abortion law had already been made. The EVP could hardly contest the stationing of nuclear weapons because the decision to place these weapons were made in small steps by a cautious government. LN and DS'70 entered parliament after decision-making on their issue, governance, had already been initiated and the first initiatives had already faltered. The attention of established parties to healthcare, the issue that the AOV and U55+ focused on, peaked before these two parties entered parliament. The entry of the PVV was followed by a decrease in attention to immigration, because migration policies were revised before its entry. All these cases open up another possibility: that the entry of a new party does not lead to a change in the parliamentary agenda, but rather that a change in the parliamentary agenda facilitates the entry of a new party (Lowery et al. forthcoming). These parties entered parliament after their issue had been put on the parliamentary agenda and controversial decisions had already been made. Their formation and electoral success may be a result of this politicisation.

The entry of the PSP, NMP, PPR and SP is followed by an increase in attention to their issues, but external events form a better explanation: the budget cycle (for the NMP), the Cold War (for the PSP), the first government environmental policy (for the PPR) and economic circumstances (for the SP) explain the patterns in attention better. This leaves four parties that may have had a clear effect: D66, CP, LPF and PvdD. The patterns of attention to their issues cannot be explained by referring to external circumstances: for instance, after D66 entered parliament, a depoliticised committee on government reform was set up, still the parliamentary activity on government reform increased. All four parties are mobilisers. These parties were indeed successful in introducing a new issue to the parliamentary agenda, as a mobiliser seeks to do. The PvdD and the CP are small new parties, they devote a more than the average share of parliamentary speech to their own issue; D66 and the LPF are large, they devote less than the average share of parliamentary speech to their issue. It may be the case that D66 and the LPF changed the parliamentary agenda because their size, while the PvdD and the CP because of the focus on their issue.

In table 5.20, the effects of mobilisers are summarised. The question is whether mobilisers have a consistent effect on all parties. For six cases (D66, CP, AOV/U55+, LPF, PVV and PvdD) this appears to be the case. For the PVV a dismissive reaction is observed for every party. One should note that this includes the D66, CP, LPF and PvdD, for which no other explanation except for the presence of the new party can explain the patterns in attention. These individual cases lend credence to the idea that indeed mobilisers tend to elicit consistent reactions from their environment. In table 5.22, one can see, however, that both in terms of the average reaction and the standard deviation of the reaction, there is no marked difference between mobilisers and challengers. In the multivariate analyses this relationship is significant. This means that if we control for other effects mobilisers elicit more reactions than challengers. One explanation for the weakness of this relationship may be that for those mobilisers for which fewer reactions were observed, established parties already devoted considerable attention to the issues that the new party attempted to put on the parliamentary agenda. The attention to the issue could not increase markedly, because it was already considerable.¹⁷⁹

In table 5.21, the effects of challengers are summarised. This allows one to see whether challengers have a more marked impact on the party that they challenge than on other parties. The results here are mixed. Only for three parties do challenged parties actually respond most (ARP to GPV, KVP to RKPN and CDA to EVP). The CDA shows a strong dismissive reaction to the EVP. For the other six parties the challenged party shows no special reaction. In table 5.22 one can see that challenged parties do respond more than unchallenged parties. This difference is not significant.

The new party government hypothesis is also examined in table 5.22. It shows that new parties in government have more effect on attention than new parties that remain in opposition. As seen above, however, there are major issues with attributing patterns of attention to DS'70 and the PPR, two of the three new parties that entered government. This leaves the LPF, which was in government for less than half a year. For substantive reasons, it seems unlikely that their government participation *per se* is a good explanatory factor.

¹⁷⁹ One can question to what extent these parties are truly mobilisers, because established parties already devoted considerable attention to their issue. In the mobiliser-challenger dichotomy however they do not necessarily fit in the challenger category.

Table 5.20: mobilisers' effects on parliamentary attention

Party	BP	D66	NMP	CP	AOV/U55+	LPF	LN	PVV	PvdD
ARP	-0.15	0.09	-0.05						
CHU	-0.09	0.02	0.01						
KVP	-0.13	0.06	-0.03						
SGP	0.07	-0.03	0.07	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.00	-0.21	0.15
PvdA	-0.00	0.15	-0.12	0.16	0.10	0.14	-0.04	-0.12	0.18
VVD	-0.04	0.17	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	-0.08	-0.02	0.06
CPN	-0.23	0.02	-0.07	0.47					
PSP	0.24	0.10	-0.13	0.26					
BP		0.13	-0.08						
GPV		-0.04	0.10	-0.12	0.07				
D66			-0.18	0.16	0.11	0.11	-0.02	-0.37	0.20
CDA				0.12	0.01	-0.06	-0.01	-0.06	0.28
PPR				0.31					
RPF				0.01	-0.06				
GL					0.11	0.17	0.01	-0.22	0.25
CD					0.04				
SP						0.23	-0.07	-0.22	0.26
CU						0.25	0.03	-0.21	0.20
Hypo.	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Opp.	Yes

Yes: General pattern of increasing attention (no more than two deviations)

No: No consistent pattern

Opp.: General pattern of decreasing attention

Table 5.21: challengers' effects on parliamentary attention

Party	KNP	PSP	GPV	PPR	DS'70	RKPN	RPF	EVP	SP
ARP	-0.17	0.15	0.09	0.32	0.03	0.03			
CHU	-0.16	-0.16	0.01	0.24	0.01	-0.08			
KVP	0.04	0.11	-0.00	0.27	0.06	0.19			
SGP	0.11	0.00	0.02	-0.12	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06	0.02
PvdA	-0.11	0.16	-0.02	0.25	-0.04	0.05	-0.03	0.02	-0.02
VVD	-0.33	0.07	0.01	0.23	-0.02	-0.21	-0.06	0.03	-0.04
CPN	-0.14	0.25	0.05	0.39	-0.06	-0.04	0.00	-0.21	
PSP				0.09	-0.10	-0.09	0.31	-0.12	
BP				0.04	-0.12				
GPV				0.06	-0.07	-0.23	-0.26	-0.25	0.06
D66				0.52	-0.03	-0.06	0.16	-0.13	0.05
CDA							0.00	-0.01	0.03
DS'70						-0.02			
PPR							-0.14	0.12	-0.03
RPF								-0.10	
GL									0.12
Hypo.	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Opp.	No

Challenged parties in **bold**

Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction

No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction

Opp.: Challenged party showed most marked reaction in the opposite direction

Table 5.22: comparing mean effects on parliamentary positions

Characteristic	Change in party positions			
	μ	σ	N	ϵ
Challenged	0.076	0.107	9	0.152
Unchallenged	0.003	0.131	76	
Mobiliser	0.038	0.148	79	0.088
Challenger	0.009	0.130	85	
Government	0.101	0.159	30	0.253***
Opposition	0.006	0.129	132	

μ : average value

σ : standard deviation

N: number of cases

ϵ : eta

The new party attention hypothesis proposed that the extent to which new parties devoted attention to their own issue, mattered for the reactions of established parties. Table 5.23 shows that both parties that focused on their own issue like the PvdD, and parties that neglected their own issue like the PPR elicit marked reactions from established parties. While two of the four parties for which one could attribute change in attention devote considerable attention to their own issue, the overall relationship between change in attention and attention that a new party devotes to its issue is weak and not significant, it is however in the expected direction.

The new party size hypothesis proposed that larger new parties would elicit more reactions from established parties, than smaller new parties. This hypothesis is examined in table 5.24. Both the largest and the smallest new party (LPF and the CP) elicit marked reactions from the established parties. Above it has been observed that two of the four parties for which change could be attributed to their entry were larger. The overall correlation between size and change in attention is, however, weak and insignificant, but in the expected direction.

The new party organisation hypothesis proposes that better organised new parties would elicit more reactions from established parties, than weakly organised new parties. Table 5.25 delves further into this relationship. The evidence shows that both among poorly organised new parties, such as the NMP and the LPF and well organised new parties such as DS'70 and the PvdD, one can find cases of marked and negligible reactions. The overall correlation is weak and insignificant, but in the expected direction.

Table 5.23: new party attention and parliamentary attention

Party	New party attention	Average change in attention	Standard deviation	N
PvdD	36.2	0.197	0.068	8
AOV/U55+	24.1	0.062	0.059	9
KNP	17.9	-0.111	0.146	7
NMP	17.7	-0.04	0.09	11
CP	17.5	0.149	0.167	9
PSP	17.2	0.084	0.132	7
RKPN	16.1	-0.054	0.111	13
LN	16	-0.023	0.038	8
BP	15.5	-0.042	0.145	8
D66	14	0.081	0.077	10
EVP	13.1	-0.087	0.095	10
PVV	12.2	-0.179	0.112	8
DS'70	12.1	-0.028	0.056	11
SP	11.1	0.023	0.050	9
RPF	8.7	0.027	0.159	9
GPV	7.9	0.03	0.041	8
LPF	5.6	0.131	0.099	8
PPR	3.4	0.208	0.179	11
Correlation			0.029	164

Table 5.24: new party size and parliamentary attention

Party	New party size	Average change in attention	Standard deviation	N
LPF	17	0.131	0.099	8
PVV	5.89	-0.179	0.112	8
DS'70	5.33	-0.028	0.056	11
AOV/U55+	4.5	0.062	0.059	9
D66	4.48	0.081	0.077	10
BP	2.13	-0.042	0.145	8
PSP	1.84	0.208	0.179	7
PPR	1.84	0.084	0.132	11
PvdD	1.83	0.197	0.068	8
LN	1.61	-0.023	0.038	8
NMP	1.51	-0.04	0.09	11
SP	1.32	0.023	0.050	9
KNP	1.26	-0.111	0.146	7
RPF	1.25	0.027	0.159	9
RKPN	0.92	-0.054	0.111	13
EVP	0.83	-0.087	0.095	10
GPV	0.74	0.03	0.041	8
CP	0.69	0.149	0.167	9
Correlation			0.091	164

The results for the party distance hypothesis are mixed: new parties elicit both marked reactions from parties far away from them (such as the RKPN) as parties close to them (such as the PPR). As can be seen in table 5.26, the latter group is in the majority. Over all, the relationship is not significant.

The party performance hypothesis is examined in table 5.27, here one can see that for eight new parties, parties that perform poorly in the elections react more than parties that perform well. For ten parties, the relationship is reversed. Given this balance in the examined cases, the relationship is weak and not significant. This null-result sustains the idea that electoral incentives do not play a major role in the reactions of established parties in the parliamentary arena.

The case-by-case analyses and the regression analyses are not entirely consistent. They both identify mobiliser new parties as more effective in changing the issues that established parties devote attention to. While the case-by-case analysis also identified specific patterns for party size and party activity, these have not reappeared in the regression analysis. Finally, the regression analysis clearly points to the participation of new parties in government as an important explanatory factor. There are, however, substantive reasons to dismiss this explanation. In order to further scrutinise these relationships, these effects are examined in an extended statistical setting.

5.4 Expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliament

The previous analyses of patterns of attention unanimously pointed to one explanation: mobilisers elicit more reactions than challengers. For two explanations the results were mixed: the case-by-case analysis showed that new parties that are larger and new parties that focus on their own issue elicit more reactions in terms of positions from established parties than smaller new parties and new parties that did not focus on their own issue. The regression analysis, however, did not support these patterns. It is the goal of this section to scrutinise the same phenomenon with an expanded set of cases, using a different notion of attributability. In this way, one can consistently test the hypotheses about the conditions under which new parties influence established parties. In this expanded statistical analysis, *all* changes on *all* issues in *all* periods are analysed. The central question is whether, compared to all the developments in attention, the presence of a new party leads to a significant change in attention. One can test the results of the case-by-case analyses in a more robust

Table 5.25: new party organisation and parliamentary attention

Party	New party organisation	Average change in attention	Standard deviation	N
CP	1	0.149	0.167	9
D66	1	0.081	0.077	10
DS'70	1	-0.028	0.056	11
EVP	1	-0.087	0.095	10
GPV	1	0.03	0.041	8
KNP	1	-0.111	0.146	7
LN	1	-0.023	0.038	8
PPR	1	0.208	0.179	11
PSP	1	0.084	0.132	7
PvdD	1	0.197	0.068	8
PVV	1	-0.179	0.112	8
RKPN	1	-0.054	0.111	13
SP	1	0.023	0.050	9
BP	0.67	-0.042	0.145	8
LPF	0.625	0.131	0.099	8
NMP	0.5	-0.04	0.09	11
RPF	0.5	0.027	0.159	9
AOV/U55+	0.429	0.062	0.059	9
Overall Correlation	0.001			164

Table 5.26: party distance and parliamentary attention

Party	Correlation	N
RKPN	0.747	11
RPF	0.568	8
LPF	0.52	8
SP	-0.200	9
EVP	-0.204	9
DS'70	-0.314	11
D66	-0.393	10
NMP	-0.468	11
PVV	-0.55	8
PvdD	-0.61	8
PPR	-0.636**	11
Correlation	-0.131	105

Table 5.27: established party performance

Party	Correlation	N
PSP	-0.47	7
RKPN	-0.434	13
PVV	-0.275	8
AOV/U55+	-0.284	9
CP	-0.266	9
KNP	-0.15	7
LPF	-0.084	8
SP	-0.021	9
D66	0.037	10
LN	0.038	8
PPR	0.277	11
NMP	0.288	11
EVP	0.293	10
DS'70	0.334	11
PvdD	0.37	8
GPV	0.563	8
BP	0.581	8
RPF	0.857***	9
Correlation	0.026	164

fashion. The analyses will be tested in several bivariate analyses and analyses with control variables. Due to the highly collinear nature of the data, each hypothesis must be tested independently from the others; if they were combined in a single analysis the collinearity would prevent any relationship from manifesting itself.¹⁸⁰

The first hypothesis tested is the new party presence hypothesis. In general, the presence of a new party leads to significantly more increases in attention (as can be seen in model 1 in table 5.28). In all the ups and downs in attention to issues between 1946 and 2010, the presence of a new party makes a significant difference: if a new party is present, parliamentary attention on the issue that the new party owns increases significantly more than when no new party is present. Therefore, one can consider the first hypothesis corroborated.

The next factor examined is the activity of a new party on its own issue (model 2). The underlying reasoning is that if the new party is particularly active on its own issue, it will be an important force in defining the nature of the conflict on that issue. In order to retain control over the definition of the issue, established parties must respond by also raising their attention to the issue. A positive, significant relationship exists: the more attention a new party devotes to its own issue, the more established parties react. This implies that the more new parties talk about their own issue, the more established parties will talk about that issue as well.¹⁸¹ This relationship was not significant in the statistical analyses presented above. This means that the conclusions here are only conditional: only if one compares the change in attention for new parties to all change in attention, does new party attention matter.

In model 3, one can see that the presence of a challenged party leads to an increase in the attention of the established party, but this increase is not significant. This echoes results of the case-by-case analysis: only the PSP and KNP elicited significantly more reactions from the parties they challenged, but other challenger

¹⁸⁰ In a multivariate analysis with all variables, only the new party government variable is consistently significant. There are validity issues with this variable, however.

¹⁸¹ Note that this - as all relationships discussed here - is not a relation between the levels of parliamentary activity of the new and established party, where it would be obvious that there may be similar levels of attention between parties. Rather, this is a relationship between the level of activity of the new party and the relative increase in attention of the established party.

Table 5.28: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (1)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.081*** (0.005)	0.082*** (0.006)	0.083*** (0.006)	0.082*** (0.006)	0.082*** (0.005)
Previous Attention	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)
New Party Presence	0.031** (0.015)	-	-	-	-
New Party Attention	-	0.019** (0.001)	-	-	-
Challenged	-	-	0.064 (0.061)	-	-
Mobiliser	-	-	-	0.052** (0.021)	-
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	0.034 (0.032)
R-Squared	0.073	0.073	0.072	0.073	0.072

n=3336

Table 5.29: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (2)

Variable	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Intercept	0.082*** (0.005)	0.082*** (0.005)	0.082*** (0.006)	0.082*** (0.006)	0.083*** (0.006)
Previous Attention	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)
New Party Presence	-	-	-	0.030** (0.014)	0.071* (0.040)
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	-0.114 (0.073)
New Party Size	0.006** (0.003)	-	-	-	0.003 (0.004)
New Party Organisation	-	0.033** (0.016)	-	-	-
New Party Gov't	-	-	0.122*** (0.032)	-	-
Est. Party Perform	-	-	-	0.051*** (0.017)	0.051*** (0.017)
Interaction Term	-	-	-	-0.059 (0.077)	0.000 (0.088)
R-Squared	0.073	0.073	0.075	0.075	0.075

n=3336

parties tend to be ignored by the parties that they challenged. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected.

The analysis does support the mobiliser new party hypothesis. In model 4, the presence of a mobiliser new party leads to significantly more reactions in terms of increasing levels of attention. These results echo the results of the case-by-case analysis, which shows that mobilisers are associated with consistently more marked, attributable reactions than challengers. When a new party does not focus on a single party but on all parties, they elicit more reactions than when it does focus on a single party. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis has to be accepted.

The party distance hypothesis is examined in model 5. The central notion here is that parties that stand closer to a new party react more to the new party than parties that stand far away from it. The insignificant relationship is positive; this indicates that parties that are far away from the new party react more. All in all, the parties that stand close to the new party do not increase their levels of attention more significantly than others. This echoes results of the case-by-case analysis, which show that new parties tend to elicit results from all parties, instead of from some. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected.

Model 6 concerns the new party size hypothesis (in table 5.29). The central idea is that larger new parties elicit significantly more reactions than smaller new parties. The basic reasoning for the first of these factors is that if a new party makes a big entry, it is more likely to be noticed than parties that make a more modest entry. There is a significant, positive relationship between the size of the new party and the reactions of established parties: larger new parties elicit more reactions from the established parties than parties that are smaller. The same pattern was found in the case-by-case analyses: D66 and the LPF tended to elicit markedly more attributable reactions from established parties than others. Therefore, this hypothesis is corroborated.

As for the new party organisation hypothesis, the results in model 7 imply that well organised new parties pose a more serious threat than poorly organised new parties. There is a significant positive relationship between the level of organisation and the strength of the reactions: better organised new parties elicit more reactions from the established parties. This variable is not significant in every robustness test.


The central notion for the new party government hypothesis, examined in model 8, is that new parties that enter government elicit significantly more reactions

from established parties. However, as seen in the case-by-case analysis: two of the new parties that were in government (the PPR and the LPF) were associated with markedly more changes in attention. The LPF was in government for only a short period, and it was difficult to attribute the change in attention for environmental issues to the entry of the PPR. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected, not on the basis of the statistical evidence but on the basis of contextual information.

Given the case-by-case analyses, good reasons exist not to expect significant relationships between the reactions of individual established parties and their characteristics: the patterns in the development of attention were similar for most established parties. There is a significant relationship between the performance of the established party and the attention that it devotes to issues in general: if a party performed well in the elections, it will broaden its activities afterwards; if it performed poorly it will focus its activities. In figure 5.32, one can see the difference between the relationship with and without the presence of new parties incorporated. One can see that parties that win elections diffuse their issue orientation: there is a positive relationship. Parties increase attention to issues when they win elections. The interaction term pulls the relationship in a negative direction: if a new party is present, the parties do not increase attention when they are winning. Parties increase attention to this issue that the new party will own when they lose. One should note, however, that this relationship is not significant.

These insignificant results are reflected in the multivariate analysis set up to scrutinise the expectation of Harmel and Svåsand (1997) that three factors have to be present at the same time: an established party will only respond when a new party enters that stands close to it, and that performs well, and only when the established party has lost. The interaction model shows three significant relations, but these are not related to the Harmel and Svåsand thesis: in this model, as in model 9, the variables for new party presence, previous attention and established party performance have significant effects. This sustains the interpretation that, in general, the presence of a new party that focuses on an issue matters for the attention that established parties devote to that issue, but it says nothing about the conditions under which this is more or less likely.

Figure 5.32: marginal effect of new party presence
on effect of electoral performance on change in attention



These results indicate that the characteristics of established parties do not matter for their reactions: the characteristics of new parties are important to understand established party reactions. The underlying mechanism has been identified in the case-by-case analysis: if new parties are able to set the parliamentary agenda, they are able to influence the attention that all parties devote to issues. As the parliamentary agenda constraints political parties, their reactions will be relatively uniform. This means that if a new party is able to put a new issue on the parliamentary agenda, it will be difficult for established parties to ignore it. New parties may exert more control over the parliamentary agenda when they focus on their own issue, are larger and are better organised. Moreover, new parties may form a threat to established parties when they are larger and better organised. What appears to be important is the ability of the new party (through its own activity, cohesiveness and size) to set the parliamentary agenda and therefore to influence the definition of the political conflict. These results are quite positive about the ability of new parties to change their environment: given the restrictive nature of the parliamentary agenda, once a new party is able to put an issue on the agenda established parties must follow suit.

Table 5.30: summary of chapter 5

Hypothesis	Factor	Individual Attention	Individual Position	Systemic
1	New Party Presence	+	n/a	n/a
3	New Party Attention	+	n/a	n/a
5	Challenged	0	0	+
6	Mobiliser	+	0	+
7	Ideological Proximity	0	-	n/a
8	New Party Size	+	- ^a	0
9	New Party Organisation	+	-	0
10	New Party in Government	+ ^a	0	0
11	Est. Party Performance	0	0	n/a

+: in expected direction

0: no consistently significant relationship

-: in opposite direction than expected

^a: statistically significant, but not substantively meaningful

5.5 Conclusion

Three conclusions can be drawn here: first about the role of new political parties, second about the factors that were identified, and third about the nature of the parliamentary arena. The research shows that new political parties matter in the parliamentary arena. The analyses show that new parties can influence the attention that established parties devote to issues in parliament. The presence of new political parties itself matters for the attention that established parties devote to issues. Moreover, it is the characteristics of new political parties that influence the responses of established parties in terms of attention. New political parties are also associated with changing positions and patterns in parliamentary voting. On the whole, the entry of new political parties can have an effect on politics in the parliamentary arena. New political parties can bring new issues to the table, they can polarise unpolarised issues, or intensify political conflict on that issue. The role of new political parties is not so much in redefining pre-existing political conflicts, but in bringing new issues to the political agenda and polarising non-politicised issues. In this sense, new political parties are not agents of political change, but instead they are forces that are associated with re-entrenchment and reinforcement of the existing lines of conflict.

Table 5.30 provides a summary of the hypotheses that were falsified and corroborated by the results. On the whole, the mobiliser-challenger dichotomy is useful to explain patterns: mobilisers, which mobilise voters from all social groups on previously non-politicised issues, are associated with change in the attention that more established parties devote to issues, than challengers. Mobilisers bring new issues to

the political agenda that established parties pick up. This is not just visible in the increasing levels of attention, but also because mobilisers (as opposed to challengers) are associated with increasing levels of politicisation. Moreover, four new parties, all mobilisers, are associated with a change in the pattern underlying the voting behaviour: the anti-immigrant CP, the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+ and the government reform party LN. These parties are associated with a perturbation of the lines of conflict, but not one that is easily interpreted in terms of being in favour or against the positions that the new party proposes. In each of these cases it was difficult to interpret the political landscape after their entry into the parliamentary arena. These parties upset the political space, but not in a clear or consistent way. Challengers take on one established party on its own issue. They are associated with another pattern: here one can see established parties on the other side of the political spectrum showing adversarial reactions to the entry of the new party. In the strategic perspective of Meguid (2007), established parties on the opposite side of the spectrum have a particular interest in invigorating the political conflict between a challenger of one's electoral competitor: by moving in the opposite direction, one reinforces the challengers' ownership of the issue. In this way they aggravate the problem of the challenged party. This evidence shows the usefulness of the challenger-mobiliser distinction and shows that these kinds of parties have different roles to play in the political competition.

Most corroborated hypotheses concern characteristics of the new party: the central idea is that better organised or larger new parties and new parties that are in government or that devote attention to their own issue, elicit significantly more imitating reactions than smaller, poorly organised parties that remain in opposition and devote little attention to their own issue. The case-by-case analyses and the extended statistical analysis showed that new party attention matters. The new party organisation and new party size hypothesis were also supported by the data. While the results for new parties in government may be statistically significant, the case-by-case analyses indicate that it is not likely to be the governing parties that put the issue on the agenda. Two mechanisms may be at work here: new parties that are more cohesive and larger may be seen as threats to the established political parties, while smaller, less cohesive new parties. Second, new political parties that focus on their own issue and that are in government may be able to set the political agenda and force other parties to address their issues. The final factor examined is the established party

performance: there is no sign that parties that perform poorly in the elections, react more to new parties, than parties that perform well in those elections. This is reinforced by the case-by-case analyses, which show that parties tend to react in a uniform way to the entry of a new political party.

The results indicate that the nature of the parliamentary arena has an effect on the way new parties can influence established political parties. The parliamentary agenda is a particular political construct. On the one hand, political parties through their own policy initiatives and their scrutiny of government activities set the agenda. The issues that parties decide to focus on are the issues that parliament focuses on. On the other hand, the parliamentary agenda limits the issues that parties discuss. The institutional nature of the parliamentary agenda means that parties will address those issues that are on the parliamentary agenda. By setting the parliamentary agenda, new political parties can influence the parliamentary activities of other parties. Because the interaction between political parties in the parliamentary arena is structured through the parliamentary agenda and one-dimensional voting patterns, new political parties can have an effect, especially on the level of attention that established parties devote to issues and the level of politicisation of issues.

The results indicated that the attention that new parties devote to issues matters for the reactions of established parties: by tearing itself loose from the parliamentary agenda, a new parties is able to dominate it. New parties that only follow the parliamentary agenda will never be able to set it. By its own activity on its own issue, a new party can control the definition of the political conflict. Established parties will not leave the definition of the political conflict to other parties, and therefore, they must increase their own activity in order to retain control over the definition of the political conflict. The case-by-case analysis showed one unexpected result, but it is not counterintuitive. Many new parties did not influence the parliamentary agenda. Their entry followed a marked change in the parliamentary agenda, rather than that their entry changed the parliamentary agenda. Legislative activities, economic developments or social events brought their issues to the parliamentary agenda. This may have led to opposition in the electorate, which in turn leads to the entry of a new party. Some new parties lead the political agenda, while others follow it.

Chapter 6: When new parties win or when established parties lose?

When new political parties influence the election manifestos of established parties

“Of course the Union will not obtain a majority in the Tweede Kamer, or even become one of the major parties in the short term, even though there are approximately 3.5 million potential voters of 55 and older. Yet her influence can be large. Every seat won will come at the expense of another party. Because the manifesto will appeal to the Dutch people and it can certainly not be conceived of as extreme, the established parties will, in order to limit the loss of votes, take over points from this programme, and where this is not the case, the Political Union 55+ will let her voice be heard and it will continually draw attention to points from its programme. By forcing change in the positions of the established parties and through its own contributions, the Political Union 55+ will achieve its goals.” Politieke Unie 55+ (1994, 15 translation SO)

“The issue of integration was included prominently as first issue in the manifesto, the theme of 'security' as the second. We wanted to show that we had learned lessons from the results of May 15 [2002 in which the LPF won 26 seats and the PvdA lost 22 seats – SO].” Ruud Koole, chair of the PvdA 2001-2005 and 2007 (2010, 213-214)

6.1 Introduction

Some new parties are frank about their goals. The pensioners' party Union 55+ did not expect to become a major political player. It expected that it could influence politics by influencing the established parties. Its reasoning was that its entry into the political arena would cause parties to lose votes and that established parties would respond to that electoral incentive. The quote from Koole shows that these considerations do play a role when established parties write their manifestos. After the poor election results of the PvdA in 2002, the party leadership decided to send voters a signal by increasing attention to the integration of immigrants and security: the PvdA had learned the lesson from the elections and would no longer neglect the issues that the LPF brought centre stage. This chapter is going to assess whether the case of

the PvdA in 2002 is a single isolated case and whether the U55+ was correct in its assessment of electoral competition: do parties take over policies from the manifestos of new parties? And do electoral incentives play a role?

Previous studies have looked at the effect of new political parties on the positions that established parties take in their election manifestos or the attention that they devote to issues in their election manifestos (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Huijbrechts 2006). These studies found limited effects of new political parties on the programmes of established parties. The difference between the electoral and the parliamentary arena may influence the extent to which and the conditions under which established political parties respond to new political parties: in the electoral arena, parties have a particular incentive to focus on their own issue. Finally, there is a timing issue: it may be the case that established political parties respond to new political parties after they enter parliament. It may also be the case that they do so in the election in which these new parties enter. Therefore, it is prudent to look at both anticipatory and reactive behaviour: to study the behaviour of established political parties in the election in which and after which the new party enters parliament. The main question of this chapter is: when, under what conditions, and to what extent do established political parties imitate the positions that new parties take and the attention that new parties devote to issues?

This chapter finds that new political parties have, under specific conditions, a limited effect on the attention that established political parties devote to issues and the positions that they take on them. The results found here are weaker, less significant and less consistent than the results found in chapter 5. For as far as new political parties do have an effect, this only becomes apparent under specific conditions, which mainly have to do with electoral incentives. Moreover, parties tend to anticipate the entry of new political parties into the parliamentary arena instead of respond to them after they have entered parliament.

6.2 Case-by-case analyses

The following sections will assess the effect of individual new parties on the programmes of individual established parties. The goal of these sections is to assess the extent to which change of the established parties can be attributed to the entry of the new party and to find which factors may play a role. This section shows that the specific features of every case matter greatly in understanding the exact patterns. The

reactions of established parties do not form a uniform pattern, nor can one identify clear consistent patterns between different cases. A secondary concern of these case-by-case analyses is to see whether there is reason to expect anticipatory behaviour from established parties, and to see whether in terms of attention anticipatory behaviour can be identified in each case.¹⁸²

6.2.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics

In 1948 the KNP entered parliament. During the 1948 election campaign the party focused on the Catholic People's Party KVP. There is good reason to expect that the KVP in particular anticipated the entry of the KNP: KNP-founder Welter left the KVP after he was removed from that party's list. The patterns of attention of two parties are shown in figure 6.1: the KVP and the VVD. Most parties followed the pattern of the KVP: this party increased their attention to the issue between 1946 and 1948, but decreased their attention to the colonial affairs in their 1952 election manifesto. The KVP, the party from which the KNP split and which it challenged, did not react markedly different from the other parties. The increased attention to colonial affairs between 1946 and 1948 can best be explained by the developments in Indonesia: the 1948 elections were called in order to ratify a constitutional amendment about Indonesian sovereignty. After the transfer of sovereignty, many parties devoted less attention to colonial affairs. The small increase in the attention of the KVP in the 1948 elections could be interpreted in terms of anticipation, but the constitutional amendment is a more likely explanation. The patterns in attention in parliament could also best be explained by the pattern of decision-making. The attention that the VVD devoted to colonial affairs is different from the other parties. It moves from no attention in 1946 to more than 20% of its election manifesto in 1948. The party caused the fall of the Drees/Van Schaik cabinet over an aspect of colonial policy. The large increase seen in the case of the VVD is more likely the result of the liberals explaining why they let the cabinet fall over New Guinea than a reaction to the KNP. It may be the case that the KNP influenced the positions of established

¹⁸² The analyses do not look at anticipatory behaviour for positions: analysing anticipatory behaviour for party positions in each of these micro-analyses would be possible, but quite confusing because one would need to represent two patterns in positions because studying anticipation in this way requires a different conceptualisation of the notion of unicity.

Figure 6.1: attention of KVP and VVD to colonial affairs





Figure 6.2: position of KVP and ARP on unique proposals of the KNP



parties. Almost all parties¹⁸³ moved from a neutral to a positive or from negative to a neutral position on the unique proposals of the KNP. Two parties are shown in figure 6.2: the ARP, which represents the most common development in position, and the KVP, which showed an extreme development in position. The KVP moved from a generally negative assessment of the KNP programme, to a generally positive one. This development consisted of four changes. This includes an item concerning the Catholic nature of the KVP: while the KVP had downplayed its Catholic identity before the entry of the KNP, it clearly stated its Catholic roots after the entry of the Catholic competitor. Another change concerns the support for emigration to New Guinea and Surinam. This is a minor colonial policy, which the KVP adopted in 1952. The KNP's opposition to the independence of Indonesia is not unique as both the SGP and the ARP also opposed decolonisation. All in all, the KNP has had a clear effect on the positions of the KVP, but less so on the attention it devoted to issues.

6.2.2 PSP: dissenting socialists

Before the PSP won its first seats in national parliament, the party had gained national attention when it won seats in the 1958 Provincial States elections. The PSP challenged the PvdA and, to a lesser extent, the CPN for accepting the Cold War mentality. Three patterns of attention to defence are shown in figure 6.3. The ARP represents the mean pattern: a small increase, which as was the case for attention in parliament, could be explained by the warming of the Cold War. The PvdA and CPN increased attention to defence markedly.¹⁸⁴ Both parties may have felt the need to react to the entry of a small leftwing socialist, anti-militarist party that shared their historic commitment to socialism and disarmament. These parties may have anticipated the entry of the PSP, by markedly increasing their attention to defence between 1956 and 1959. In figure 6.4, three patterns in position are presented: for the CHU (representing the mean pattern), the PvdA and the CPN. Before the entry of the PSP, most parties disagreed with the party. After its entry, most parties still disagreed with it in general, but many had decreased their level of disagreement, like the CHU. The PvdA, which was challenged by the PSP, moved to disagreeing more with the

¹⁸³ The only exceptions are the VVD and the SGP.

¹⁸⁴ The CPN devoted a large portion of its manifestos on defence. This high level may be caused because no official CPN manifestos are available for 1959 and 1963 in the archives of the DNPP or the IISG. Therefore, (shorter) pamphlets were used.

Figure 6.3: attention of ARP, CPN and PvdA to defense





Figure 6.4: position of PvdA, CHU and CPN on unique proposals of the PSP



PSP. The PvdA's 1963 programme was more supportive of the Dutch military and less supportive of the specific PSP-policies, such as the abolition of conscription. The CPN was the only one to agree more with the party than it disagreed.

The PvdA did anticipate the PSP, by emphasising defence, but it did not take over the PSP's policies. The CPN, however, which shared the socialism and the opposition to nuclear weapons of the PSP, did show consistent signs of increasing agreement and anticipation in attention. In summary, the CPN responded to the entry of the PSP: its policy positions became more similar to the PSP, and it also devoted more attention to the issue of the PSP. For the PvdA, the party that the PSP challenged, the pattern is less clear: it marginally increased attention to defence, but moved to disagree more with the PSP's programme.

6.2.3 BP: farmers in protest

After supporting the farmers' protests in Hollandscheveld, the farmers' party BP won three seats in the 1963 elections. The media attention to the actions of the Free Farmers makes it likely that established parties anticipated the new party. Most parties, like the VVD shown in figure 6.5, decreased their attention to agriculture.¹⁸⁵ This fits the expectation formulated for the parliamentary arena: the decreasing importance of the agricultural sector, combined with Europeanisation of agricultural policies and, to a lesser extent, the corporatist organisation of agricultural policies, caused decreasing political attention to agriculture. The patterns in attention show no sign of anticipation. In contrast to the effects on attention (where no imitation was observed), parties did take over policies of the BP. The parties that show the most marked pattern in attention are VVD and PvdA. Figure 6.6 illustrates how the VVD took over the BP's opposition to high employers' premiums for social insurances and its opposition to government subsidies. The PvdA had supported the corporatist organisation of agriculture, but no longer talked about this issue in 1967. There is no clear effect of the BP on the attention that established parties devoted to agriculture. In contrast, the BP had an effect on the positions that parties took. Agriculture became less important, and (perhaps because of that) parties ceased talking about the corporatist organisation of agriculture.

¹⁸⁵ The only two parties that increased their attention to agriculture were the PSP and the SGP. In 1959 they both had a short programme. In 1967 they had much longer manifestos. They moved from no to a small number proposals on agriculture.



Figure 6.5: attention of VVD to agriculture**Figure 6.6: position of PvdA and VVD on unique proposals of the BP**

Figure 6.7: attention of SGP and GPV to moral issues




Figure 6.8: attention of ARP, PSP, VVD, KVP and CDA to moral issues




Figure 6.9: position of ARP and SGP on unique proposals of the GPV




Figure 6.10: position of CDA and GPV on unique proposals of the RKPN





Figure 6.11: position of CDA, SGP and GPV on unique proposals of the RPF



6.2.4 GPV, RKPN and RPF: orthodox dissent

Between 1963 and 1981, three small Christian parties entered parliament: the *Vrijgemaakte* GPV, the Catholic RKPN and the *Gereformeerde* RPF. These three parties shared a common focus on moral issues. Meanwhile, the religious parties from which these new parties split began to moderate. The GPV, RKPN and the RPF are likely to be anticipated by the established parties because they attempted to enter parliament on multiple occasions.

The patterns of attention to moral issues are presented in figures 6.7 and 6.8. Seven parties are selected: the SGP and GPV, as orthodox Protestant parties. These parties are presented separately in figure 6.7. The GPV is selected to examine its reactions to the entry of the RPF and RKPN. In addition, the ARP, KVP and CDA, parties that were challenged by these new religious parties, and the VVD and PSP, as examples of secular parties, are selected as well. The GPV entered the Dutch parliament in 1963. The most marked change visible before and after this period is for the SGP: a decrease from more than 50% to less than 20%. The reason for this is that the SGP published its first real election manifesto in 1967. Instead of the 1918 manifesto, which was occasionally amended to reflect political changes, the SGP

published a set of concrete demands in 1967. This contained less emphasis on the religious issues than the 1918 manifesto. After the entry in 1967 of the GPV, a new orthodox Protestant party, the SGP published a more concrete election manifesto. The entry of an equally orthodox Protestant party that had a more modern form of political communication, may have contributed to this decision. If one looks at the other developments in attention in figure 6.8, one can see the following: most parties increase their attention for moral issues. Some parties show marginal increases (such as the PSP, the ARP and the VVD), and others more marked increases (for the KVP). The ARP shows signs of anticipation, increasing more sharply in attention before 1963 than after 1963. All in all, four established parties increase attention to moral issues and four decrease attention to moral issues.

Except for the ARP and the SGP, the morally most conservative parties, all parties became more interested in moral issues in this period. The explanation does not lie in the entry of the GPV, however. Figure 6.8 shows what is going on: attention to moral issues peaks in 1971, especially for the VVD and the PSP; the increase in 1967 appears to be only a first step in this development. After 1971, attention to moral issues declines, but it remains on a higher level than before 1971. These developments are most marked for secular parties. This appears to be rather the effect of the developing women's movement than the effect of the GPV, especially given the marked increase in the period after the GPV's first parliamentary period.

The effect of the RKPN is difficult to identify because of this development: 1967 is taken as the before year for the RKPN and 1977 as the after year. For many parties there is a peak in between these years (in 1971), compared to which the change between 1967 and 1977 seems insignificant. The CDA-in-formation, which the RKPN challenged, decreased its attention to the issue. Within the larger pattern however it appears not to be the entry of the RKPN that has influenced patterns of attention, but rather the pattern of politicization of women's issues in early 1970s. The same pattern was found in the study of the RKPN's effect in parliament.

The final party examined here is the RPF: between 1977 and 1982 the SGP, the GPV and the PSP (and the CPN as well) increase their attention to moral issues; the CDA and the VVD (in addition to the PvdA, PPR and D66) decrease their attention. The CDA, the party that the RPF challenged, markedly decreased attention to the issue. After the resolution of the abortion question in 1981 the parties on the margins, the GPV and the SGP (anti-abortion) and the PSP (pro-women's rights)

continued to focus on the question (Outshoorn 1986). Attention to these issues in parliament showed a similar pattern.

Parties disagreed with the GPV in 1959, and on the whole, parties disagreed (slightly) less with the party in 1963. The ARP and SGP's positional reactions to the GPV are presented in figure 6.9. The only exception was the SGP, which moved from a neutral stance to agreement. The fact that the SGP wrote a completely new manifesto in 1967 played a role in this process. The SGP and the ARP were most positive about the GPV program in 1967. These changes did not concern the morally conservative proposals of the GPV, but they concerned issues like land management and housing. One can similarly see marked increases on the religious side for the RKPN as well. The reactions of the CDA and GPV are shown in figure 6.10. Especially the GPV included many of the unique proposals of the RKPN in its manifesto. The GPV and the CDA parties followed the RKPN in explicitly opposing abortion, which they did not do in 1971. The GPV showed similarity to the RKPN on a range of policies from defence spending to tax reduction. The RPF also mainly elicited imitation from religious parties. The reactions of the CDA, SGP and GPV to this party are shown in figure 6.11. The GPV moved from neutrality to agreement with the RPF. The RPF policies to support the traditional conception of the family (restrictions of divorce and limiting the participation of women on the labour market) proved especially controversial: religious parties like the GPV copied these positions, while secular parties explicitly opposed them. Parties that were ideologically close to the RKPN and RPF responded more to them than others.

On the whole, the effects of these new religious parties are mostly limited to the policy positions of the established religious parties, and to a lesser extent to the attention that these religious parties devote to issues.

6.2.5 D66 and DS'70: democratic idealists and moderates

In 1967 and 1971, two parties entered the Dutch parliament that shared a common focus on government reform. D66 was formed by *homines novi*, who felt that the political system had to be reformed. Before entering into the 1967 election, the group asked voters whether they felt a need for a new party, a public appeal. This Appeal '66 got considerable media attention. DS'70 was formed by a group of prominent PvdA members, who felt that the PvdA had moved too far to the left. Their

departure from the PvdA was well publicised. Therefore, there is good reason to expect that the established parties anticipated DS'70.

Of the ten parties that were in parliament, seven increased their attention to governance between 1967 and 1971. In figure 6.12 one can see two examples: the PvdA and the KVP. The exceptions are among the small parties, such as the SGP, but the CPN and the GPV decreased their attention as well. There were consistent differences between the two groups: parties that agreed more with the positions of D66 tended to react more than parties that did not. Moreover, large systemic parties increased their attention more than the smaller marginal parties. In several of these larger parties there were internal movements that called for political reform, such as the New Left in the PvdA and the Christian Radicals in the KVP, which may also have contributed to their change in attention. Most parties showed a continued increase between 1963 and 1971, indicating that they both anticipated the entry of D66 in 1967 and responded to its entry after it entered. On the whole, D66 has had a marked effect on the attention that parties devoted to issues. After DS'70 entered parliament in 1971, parties tended to devote less attention to governance. Out of the nine parties, three increased their attention to governance, but most parties devoted less attention to it. Like the PvdA, these parties decreased their attention to governance marginally. The SGP and CDA devoted marginally more attention to governance. Part of these increases can actually be attributed to the peak that most parties show in 1971. As most parties increased attention between 1963 and 1971, it is more likely that this peak is an effect of D66, than anticipation of DS70. The patterns found here for the electoral arena is similar to the parliamentary arena.

The positional reactions of three parties to the entry of D66 are shown in figure 6.13. The proposals of D66 were truly unique in the sense that parties did not even oppose them before the entry of the party. In the 1967 elections, one can see that some parties opposed the proposals of D66: the VVD especially, but its reaction is representative of the ARP and CHU as well. The other parties moved to sharply supporting the policies of D66 in 1971. The PvdA showed the most marked increase. The marked increase for the PvdA could in part be attributed to the formation of the New Left in the PvdA, which shared D66's agenda for political reform. For instance, no party discussed electoral system reform before 1967, but almost every party does so in 1971. Most parties opposed it, especially the smaller ones. This explains the disagreement of the SGP, which is representative of the CPN and the GPV as well.

Figure 6.12: attention of KVP, CDA, SGP and PvdA to governance





Figure 6.13: position of PvdA, VVD and SGP on unique proposals of D66





Parties did not just copy D66's proposals on government reform, on women's emancipation and on education, but on the whole, the program of D66 has been taken over by the established parties in its entire breadth. Especially parties that already agreed with the D66 programme took over elements from the D66 programme.

DS'70 is a different story. It elicited null-reactions from many of the established parties. Therefore it is not presented graphically. The PvdA, the party that the DS'70 challenged did not react visibly to it. There were some reactions from some parties: especially the PSP stood out. While DS'70 represented the side of the social democratic movement that felt that the PvdA had become too radical, the PSP represented the side that felt that the PvdA was not radical enough. Even though the PSP opposed some positions of DS'70 (military-industrial cooperation within NATO, for instance), it moved to agree with DS'70 on a whole range of social issues from orienting education towards the wishes of the youth to housing policy for singles.


While the patterns for DS'70 are erratic and appear to be unrelated to the party's entry, the pattern for D66 can be attributed to D66. In this comparison between D66 and DS'70, it is clear that the first had a more marked effect. For as far as DS'70 had an effect it was on the PSP, but D66 had effect across the board.

6.2.6 PPR: radicalising radicals

The PPR first won seats in parliament in 1971, but the party had *de facto* operated in parliament since 1968, when the group-Aarden formed a separate parliamentary group. Therefore, there is good reason to expect anticipation. Most parties increased their attention to the environment; most followed the pattern of the CDA that is shown in figure 6.14: a marked increase in attention to the environment. The entry of the PPR coincided with a greening of parties across the entire spectrum. In the parliamentary arena a similar pattern was found for the attention to the environment between 1971 and 1977, which was not attributed to the entry of the PPR, but to increasing environmental policies. The same explanation seems likely to explain these patterns here as well. The effect of the PPR on positions is presented in figure 6.15: most parties, as the CDA in the figure, showed no reaction. Only the progressive partners of the PPR (PSP, D66 and PvdA, the PvdA is shown as an example of them) showed an increase in agreement with the PPR's unique proposals between 1967 and 1977. These parties also agreed with the PPR in 1967, while those

Figure 6.14: attention of CDA to the environment**Figure 6.15: position of CDA and PvdA on unique proposals of the PPR**

that did not agree reacted less. The copying of policies by progressive partners is likely to be an effect of the coordinated progressive cooperation between these parties. The reactions did not concern the environmental concerns of the PPR, but its leftwing credentials: most reactions concern healthcare insurance or taxes on luxury products. In summary, one cannot attribute the change in attention for the environment to the PPR, while one can attribute the more marginal changes in the positions of the PPR's allies to the PPR.

Figure 6.16: attention of VVD to economic affairs

6.2.7 NMP: small business owners in protest

The NMP entered parliament in 1971 and disappeared again in 1972. The established parties did not anticipate the entry of the NMP. To examine the NMP's effect, the attention that established parties devoted to economic affairs is examined. Almost all parties decreased their attention to this issue, as an example the attention of the VVD to this issue is shown in figure 6.16. There is no clear effect of the NMP on the attention that established parties devoted to economic affairs. Looking at party positions, one should note that the NMP had only two unique proposals. The only reaction that is visible is from the BP and it concerns only one policy. This party first disagreed with raising taxes on gasoline, and moved to neutrality on this proposal. All in all, the NMP had almost no effect on established parties, therefore it is not represented graphically.

Figure 6.17: attention of PvdA and CDA to defense





Figure 6.18: position of CDA, PSP and PvdA on unique proposals of the EVP



6.2.8 EVP: *progressive Protestants*

The EVP was formed as a split from the CDA. The formation of the EVP followed a long and well-publicised internal debate within the CDA. Therefore, there is good reason to expect that parties anticipated the entry of the EVP. This small leftwing party focused on peace politics. The attention of two parties to defence is shown in figure 6.17. They represent two developments: five parties increased their attention to defence; the PvdA exemplifies these parties. This group includes two parties that favoured the stationing of nuclear weapons (GPV and SGP) and two parties that opposed it (PSP and PPR). The other four parties reduced their attention to defence (this included the D66 and CPN that also opposed the placement of nuclear weapons). The CDA is selected as an example of these. For both groups, one can see a peak in the parties' attention in 1982. This can also be explained by the nuclear arms talks. When comparing 1981 to 1986, one can see a decline for the CDA and an increase for the PvdA. Looking at the positions shown in figure 6.18, one can see reactions across the board: three parties are selected to illustrate this pattern. While most parties (except for the PvdA and the PPR) disagreed with the unique proposals of the EVP before its entry, parties tended to agree with them after its entry. The PSP agreed most with the party. The increase in agreement is mostly on foreign policies: such as debt relief for developing countries. The EVP had a relatively many unique proposals. The increases concern a marginal number of positions: most parties moved from disagreeing with one or two of the more than 84 unique proposals of the EVP to agreeing with some of them. The EVP has not had a strong effect on party positions or on the attention that established parties devoted to defence.

Figure 6.19: attention of PSP, SGP and PvdA to immigration





Figure 6.20: position of PvdA and SGP on unique proposals of the CP



6.2.9 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics

The CP entered the Dutch parliament 1981. Its entry was not widely expected: rather, many parties were shocked by the entry of an anti-immigration party in parliament. The attention of three parties to immigration is shown in figure 6.19. Three parties decreased the attention that they devoted to immigration after the entry of the new party, as the PvdA in the figure, and five increased their attention, as the PSP and SGP in the figure. In addition to the SGP and the PSP, the GPV, PPR and D66 increased their attention to immigration. These included parties with more conservative positions on immigration (GPV, SGP) and parties with progressive stances on immigration (PSP, D66 and PPR). As far as there is any pattern, it appears that parties that lost votes in the 1982 election reacted more to the entry of the CP. It may also be the case that the small parties of the left such as the PSP and the PPR may have increased their attention after the entry of the CP in order to emphasise its opposition to the CP: these leftwing parties were opposed to what they perceived as the CP's racism. The increase in attention clearly followed the entry of the CP: there is no sign of anticipation. In the parliamentary arena, parties also increased their attention to migration in reaction to the entry of the CP. In figure 6.20 one can see the patterns in position for two parties. One should note that the CP's unique proposals did not concern its anti-immigration positions: its manifesto was relatively soft on immigration. It favoured remigration (as did the CDA, RPF and GPV), opposed voting rights for migrants (as did the VVD) and action against illegal immigrants (as did the VVD and the GPV). Most parties moved to disagree less with the CP. The movement of many parties concerned special housing policies for migrants. No party moved to agree with the CP that Dutch people should not be discriminated against in housing policies, but some parties, like the PvdA, no longer explicitly supported special housing policies for migrants. Parties that lost votes in the 1982 election tended to react more. The effect of the CP is concentrated on smaller, ideologically more extreme parties: the smaller parties of the left and the right had increased their attention to immigration in their election manifestos. The party's effect on party positions is marginal. Therefore the effect of this party is not presented graphically.

6.2.10 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters

The size of the electoral support of the AOV in the 1994 election was unexpected, but both the AOV and the U55+ had tested their support by entering in the 1994 municipal election. The entry of these two elderly parties therefore could have been anticipated by the established parties. After the entry of the AOV and the U55+, almost all parties increased their attention to healthcare. The developments in attention of three parties are shown in figure 6.21: the CDA increased its attention by half a percentage point, and the PvdA by six percentage points. GL (and the RPF) decreased their attention to health. The AOV and U55+ had a consistent effect: after the entry of these two pensioners' parties most parties increased their attention to healthcare. This defies the patterns in the parliamentary arena, where declining attention to the issue after the 1994 elections was observed. In these different arenas, different mechanism may play a role: established parties may have sought to appeal to the electoral niche that the AOV left before imploding, by writing about healthcare in their election manifestos. Most parties increased their attention to the issue after the entry of the AOV and U55+ into parliament, showing no signs of anticipation.

When one examines positions, one has to distinguish between the U55+ and the AOV, which had different unique proposals. The U55+ had only 14 unique proposals. Only the PvdA and D66 change their view on any of these issues; both parties agree with the U55+ that society should increase its respect for manual labour. One would have to conclude that parties did not react markedly to the limited number of unique proposals of the U55+ in their election manifestos. Therefore the effect of this party is not presented graphically. Turning to the AOV, presented in figure 6.22, one can observe more variance. Two parties are shown as an example: the CDA and the RPF. Most parties like the RPF started out disagreeing with some elements of the party's unique proposals. In addition to the VVD and the GPV, the CDA and the RPF moved to agree with the AOV more than that they disagreed. That is, most parties on the (centre-)right, which tended to agree with the whole AOV programme already before 1994. They agreed with the AOV that reducing government spending and extending the tax base for the government pension premium was necessary.

The pensioners' parties did have an effect on the established parties in the electoral arena. Almost all parties increased their attention to healthcare after the entry of the AOV and U55+, and especially parties on the right (which already tended to agree with the AOV) took over their policy positions. The U55+, whose ambitions

Figure 6.21: attention of PvdA, CDA and GL to healthcare





Figure 6.22: position of CDA and RPF on unique proposals of the AOV





were cited in the introduction, has had a marginal effect on the established parties, perhaps because it only had one seat in parliament but mainly because its positions were so moderate that they were not unique.

6.2.11 SP: a leftwing challenger

The SP had tried to enter parliament five times before winning a seat in 1994. The party had already won representation in municipal and provincial councils. One can expect that parties anticipated the entry of the party. The SP is a radical leftwing party that focused on a range of social-economic issues. The party's effect on attention to labour issues is examined, as a prime example of its economically leftwing appeal. Its 31 unique proposals cover a range of issues from foreign policy to health and labour. Two exemplary patterns in attention are shown in figure 6.23. The VVD is one of only two parties that increased their attention to labour. The other one is the SGP. The other parties decreased their attention to the issue, though most did so only marginally. The PvdA, the party that the SP challenged, also shown in figure 6.23, showed no special reaction to this newcomer. The VVD stood on the other side of the electoral spectrum, far from the SP. The only explanation, related to the SP, for the VVD to increase their attention is that by picking a fight with the SP these parties may have wanted to increase the legitimacy of the SP in order to let it siphon votes away from the PvdA. On the whole, however, the SP did not influence attention to labour issues, neither in terms of anticipation, nor reaction. These marginal developments cannot, however, be explained by economic circumstances. The rising unemployment led to higher levels of attention to the labour market after 1994.

In order to study the SP's effect on party positions, the VVD and the PvdA are selected as examples and shown in figure 6.24. The first thing that is noted is that all parties dominantly disagree with the SP; even the PvdA (but also the GL) disagree with more than one of the SP's unique proposals. The SP's opposition to the free market, alternative medicine, European integration, the UN Security Council and environmental taxes were especially contentious. Most shifts came from parties becoming silent on one of these (and other) extremist positions. Parties that tended to disagree with the SP (such as the PvdA) showed the most reactions. These results, however, should be interpreted with some caution, because, on the whole, they do not concern parties agreeing more with the programme of the SP, but they concern parties

Figure 6.23: attention of PvdA and VVD to labour**Figure 6.24: position of VVD and PvdA on unique proposals of the SP**

explicitly dropping opposition to some of the policies of the SP. On the whole, the effect of the SP on the established parties has been limited. Only a few established parties increased their attention to labour, selected as the distinctive social economic issue of the SP. In terms of positions, parties dominantly disagreed with the unique proposals of the SP, whether before or after its entry. Parties that lost votes in the 1994 elections tended to take over more positions than parties that did not.

6.2.12 LN: democratic populists

There were good reasons for the established parties to have anticipated the entry of LN: the party was already formed in 1999, as joint venture of members of several prominent local parties, whose entry into the Hilversum and Utrecht city council was well-publicised. The developments in attention of two exemplary parties are shown in figure 6.25: the PvdA and D66. Most parties like the PvdA marginally decreased their attention to governance. D66 (in addition to VVD and SGP) showed an increase in attention. The effect of D66 may be seen as a response to the entry of LN: D66 was itself created as a government reform party. LN advocated many policies that D66 had endorsed previously: elected mayors, referendums and electoral reform. While D66 did not speak out on these issues before the entry of the LN, it became more outspoken about these issues in 2003. It may have responded to the entry of this kindred party by re-emphasising their own solutions. The marginally declining levels of attention to governance reflected the parliamentary agenda, where attention to the issue also declined. There are no signs of anticipation. The programme of LN showed similarities to the manifesto of D66, which, like LN, was a centrist party with a historic focus on government reform. Out of the 100 proposals in the LN programme, only 11 are unique. Parties only changed their opinion on a single proposal: the LN proposal to make car taxes dependent on gasoline use. Parties moved from disagreeing with this proposal to becoming neutral on it. On the whole, LN did not influence the attention that established parties devoted to issues or the positions that they held on them. Therefore the effect of this party is not presented graphically.



Figure 6.25: attention of PvdA and D66 to governance**Figure 6.26: attention of PvdA, VVD, GL and CDA to immigration**

**Figure 6.27: position of GL, D66 and VVD
on unique proposals of the LPF**





**Figure 6.28: position of SP, D66 and VVD
on unique proposals of the PVV**



6.2.13 PVV and LPF: the return and persistence of anti-immigration politics

As Koole (2010) testified above, some established parties felt the need to show the electorate that they had learned a lesson from the election results of 2002. Since fall of 2001 first LN and then LPF had performed well in the polls, therefore established parties may have anticipated the LPF's entry. The PVV first entered in the 2006 elections, but had already been in parliament in 2004. There were, therefore, good reasons for parties to have anticipated the entry of the PVV in 2006.

In order to examine the effect of the LPF on immigration, the 2002 and the 2003 election manifestos will be examined. The data are presented in figure 6.26. Most parties increased their attention to immigration between 1998 and 2003: GL more than doubled its attention to the issue. Most parties that increased their attention to immigration did so in 2002, which is a sign of anticipation. The increase occurred within a political context: the events of 9/11 may also, in part, have increased attention for immigration and integration issues. In the Netherlands, the LPF was the catalyst for this development. In 2006, the LPF disappeared from the scene and it was succeeded as the parliamentary anti-immigration party by the PVV. The PvdA, VVD and GL (in addition to SGP and CU) increased their attention to immigration between 2003 and 2010. There are less signs of anticipation here: the VVD, for instance, markedly decreased its attention in 2006, only to increase it markedly in 2010 after the PVV entered parliament. The VVD devoted little attention to immigration in its 2006 election manifesto. In this election the PVV won nine seats, while the VVD performed poorly. The VVD may have attributed this loss to its lack of attention to migration. Moreover the VVD faced competition from Trots (*Trots op Nederland*/Proud of the Netherlands) a party formed by its former #2 and former minister of immigration Rita Verdonk in the 2010 election. This party however did not obtain parliamentary representation. The fact that almost all parties increased their attention to immigration after the entry of the LPF corroborates the notion of an 'LPF-effect' on attention to immigration. Although less strong, a similar pattern was identified for the parliamentary arena. The increase in the attention that parties, especially the VVD, devoted to immigration after the entry of the PVV also corroborates the notion that there was a 'PVV-effect' on the attention that parties devoted to immigration. As seen in chapter 5, the increasing attention to immigration after 2002 cannot be explained by the levels of immigration.

The many of anti-immigration proposals of the LPF were not unique and therefore not included in the analysis: 1998 the SP already supported preventing ethnic segregation of schools and neighbourhoods, and the VVD already wanted to limit migration for the purpose of family formation. Most policies of the LPF are not unique in the strictest sense because the VVD and the SGP included similar proposals in their 2002 manifestos. This is likely to be a form of anticipation, but in this analysis of positional reactions, it means that these issues are not included in the analysis. As shown in figure 6.27, parties tended to disagree with the unique proposals of the LPF. Three parties are selected as examples: the GL, the VVD and D66. Between 1998 and 2003, however, parties became more positive about the policies of the LPF. The two exceptions were the GL and the CDA. The parties that reacted most to the entry of the LPF were those that tended to agree with the LPF, such as the VVD. They mostly agreed with the LPF's market-based economic policies. These parties moved in a range of issues. The VVD moved to agree on several anti-immigration measures, but also on reducing police bureaucracy and making the police accountable for their results.

Parties responded differently to the entry of the PVV (as shown in figure 6.28): the VVD and the SP are shown as examples. These parties disagreed with the PVV programme in 2003, but by 2010 these two parties, together with the SGP, had moved to agree more with the party in general. The SP is a peculiar case: it was not outspoken on the unique proposals of the PVV in 2003 or 2010. In 2010 it agreed with one of them (limiting labour immigration from Eastern Europe) and was neutral on the other ones. For the VVD, this pattern can be understood by reference to the fact that the PVV split from the VVD, and the PVV programme and the VVD programme of 2003 were very similar. Most changes concerned the law and order policies of the PVV: the VVD, for instance, joined the PVV in calling for less community service as punishment for crime. The PVV elicited adversarial movements: for instance by D66, as shown in figure 6.28. D66 opposed the PVV explicitly on one in four of its unique proposals. This included PVV proposals to limit labour immigration from Eastern Europe and to ban the burqa. For as far as there is a pattern, parties that were already similar to the PVV move to agree more with it.

The entry of the LPF has led to increasing attention to immigration, and many parties imitated the LPF's positions. The PVV's effect is concentrated in the VVD, from which the PVV split in 2004. The VVD lost considerably in the 2006 elections,

and VVD and PVV shared a large part of their programme. As discussed in section 4.2.16, good reasons exist not to consider the PVV a challenger of the VVD, but the VVD clearly felt challenged by the PVV.

6.2.14 PvdD: the hobbyhorse

The PvdD entered in the 2003 elections, but was unsuccessful. In 2006 it re-entered and won two seats. Established parties may have anticipated the entry of this animal rights party. When one looks at attention to this issue, the following pattern emerges: all parties devoted *less* attention to agriculture after the entry of the PvdD. Some parties devoted marginally less attention to agriculture (such as the GL in figure 6.29), other parties drastically decreased their attention to the issue (such as the SP). The SP won votes in the elections in which the PvdD entered, while almost all the other parties lost votes. It appears that the SP may have felt that they could afford to markedly decrease attention to agriculture, while other parties felt that they could not. As seen in chapter 5, the declining political attention to agriculture can be explained by its declining economic importance. The GL programme was the only one that showed signs of anticipation: markedly increasing attention to agriculture between 2003 and 2006.¹⁸⁶ When examining positions, the patterns become clearer. Most parties took over at least one position of the PvdD. The most marked movements can be seen for GL (shown in figure 6.30). This party took over five positions from the PvdD: from a ban on the use of animals in circuses to a ban on *foie gras*. The GL may have felt challenged by the PvdD: the two parties shared a similar programme and GL lost votes in the 2006 elections. Other scholars have also noticed this party's move to more animal-friendly programmes after 2006 (Lucardie & Pennings 2010). All in all, the PvdD appears to have had no effect on the issue that parties talk about, but it has definitely had an effect on the explicit positions that parties take, especially the GL, the other green-left party in parliament.

¹⁸⁶ In a more qualitative analysis of attention to animal rights, Meeuwissen (2011, 40) emphasises that parties appear to have anticipated the entry of the PvdD in 2006, because they increased their attention to animal rights between 2003 and 2006.



Figure 6.29: attention of GL and SP to agriculture**Figure 6.30: position of D66 and GL on unique proposals of the PvdD**

Table 6.1: challengers' effects on electoral positions

Party	KNP	PSP	GPV	PPR	DS'70	RKPN	RPF	EVP	SP
ARP	0.07	0.22	0						
CHU	0.07	0.33	-0.04						
KVP	0.21	0.22	-0.01						
SGP	0	0	0.05	0	0	0.06	0.02	0.05	0
PvdA	0.07	-0.22	0.07	0.08	0	0	-0.01	0.05	0.06
VVD	0	-0.11	0	-0.08	0	0.11	-0.02	0.08	0
CPN	0.07	0.11	0	0	0	-0.06	-0.04		
PSP			0.08	0.14	0.06	0.01	0.08		
BP				0	-0.05	0			
GPV				0	0	0.39	0.02	0.05	-0.03
D66				0.17	0.05	0.11	-0.02	0.05	-0.16
CDA				0	0.05	0.11	0.01	0.05	0.06
DS'70						0.06	0.01		
PPR						0	0.01	0.02	
RPF						0	0.01	0.05	0.03
GL									-0.10
Hypo.	Yes	Opp.	No	No	No	No	No	No	Tied

Challenged parties in **bold**

Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction

No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction

Note that the sets of parties differs between this table and table 5.14

Table 6.2: mobilisers' effects on electoral positions

Party	BP	D66	NMP	CP	AOV	U55+	LPF	LN	PVV	PvdD
ARP	0.08	0.13								
CHU	0	0.06								
KVP	0	0.1								
SGP	0	-0.03	0	0.08	0	0	-0.03	0	0	0.11
PvdA	0.08	0.16	0	0.08	0	0.07	0.03	0	0	0.04
VVD	0.08	0.06	0	0	0.04	0	0.06	0	0	0.11
CPN	0.08	-0.03	0							
PSP	0	0.13	0	0						
BP		0.1	0.5							
GPV		-0.03	0	0	0.04	0				
D66		-0.03	0	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.12	0	0.04	-0.11
CDA			0	0	0.08	-0.07	-0.03	0.09	0.01	0.11
PPR				0.08						
RPF				0	0.12	0				
GL					0	0	-0.03	-0.09	0.05	0.04
SP							0.06	-0.09	0.02	0.11
CU							0.09	0	0.01	-0.14

Note that the sets of parties differs between this table and table 5.15

6.3 Analysing the case-by-case results

The previous sections examined the effects of nineteen new parties individually; this section will compare and contrast those results.

6.3.1 Analysis of party positions in the electoral arena

The parties that elicit the most imitation in terms of position are the PSP, the RKPN, KNP, NMP and D66 (in that order). However, the high average reaction to the PSP, the RKPN, the KNP and the NMP can be explained by the effect these parties had on a single party¹⁸⁷ or the limited number of unique proposals.¹⁸⁸ D66 has had the most consistent effect on the electoral positions of established parties.

In table 6.1 the different reactions in electoral positions for the nine challenger parties are shown. This allows us to see whether challenged parties consistently react more to the entry of a new party than other parties. Out of the nine challenged parties, six do not show the most marked reaction. Two show the strongest increase in similarity (KVP to KNP; PvdA to SP, but this score is tied with the CDA) and one shows the strongest decrease (PvdA to PSP). This shows that all in all challengers do not consistently elicit marked reactions from the challenged parties. As one can see in table 6.3, this is also supported statistically: the average reaction of a challenged party is slightly weaker than the reaction of an unchallenged party.

Mobilisers may elicit imitation from more established parties, because they challenge all parties instead of just one. These reactions are shown in table 6.2. In no case can one see a consistent increase (or decrease) in similarity for all parties. As one can see in table 6.3 the average reaction does not differ statistically between mobilisers and challengers. Several mobilisers suffered (contrary to what one would expect for a mobiliser) from programmes that were not innovative: consider the NMP, BP, the CP or LN. All these parties made fewer than 15 unique proposals. Almost no reaction could be observed on those few proposals.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ The GPV for the RKPN, the KVP for the KNP and the BP for the NMP

¹⁸⁸ For the PSP and the NMP

¹⁸⁹ One can question to what extent these parties are truly mobilisers, because established parties already devoted much attention to their issue. In the mobiliser-challenger dichotomy however they do not necessarily fit in the challenger category.

Table 6.3: comparing effects on electoral position

Characteristic	μ	σ	N	ϵ
Challenged	0.024	0.115	9	0.042
Unchallenged	0.036	0.087	68	
Mobiliser	0.031	0.076	88	0.023
Challenger	0.035	0.090	77	
Government	0.034	0.086	26	0.029
Opposition	0.027	0.060	135	

μ : average value

σ : standard deviation

N: number of cases

ϵ : eta

Table 6.4: new party size and electoral positions

Party	New party size	μ	σ	N
LPF	17	0.034	0.141	8
PVV	5.89	0.034	0.177	8
DS'70	5.33	0.021	0.173	9
D66	4.48	0.049	0.127	10
AOV	3.63	0.040	0.043	8
BP	2.13	0.040	0.107	8
PPR	1.84	0.028	0.167	9
PSP	1.84	0.079	0.122	7
PvdD	1.83	0.016	0.177	8
LN	1.61	-0.011	0.141	8
NMP	1.51	0.056	0.167	9
SP	1.32	-0.018	0.089	8
KNP	1.26	0.070	0.189	7
RPF	1.25	-0.002	0.145	9
RKPN	0.92	0.076	0.727	11
U55+	0.87	0.009	0.089	8
EVP	0.83	0.049	0.263	9
GPV	0.74	0.010	0.107	8
CP	0.69	0.036	0.251	9
Correlation			0.008	161

Table 6.5: new party organisation and electoral positions

Party	New party organisation	μ	σ	N
GPV	15.2	0.019	0.107	8
SP	13.45	-0.018	0.089	8
RPF	5.54	-0.002	0.145	9
PvdD	3.54	0.016	0.177	8
PPR	3.45	0.028	0.167	9
U55+	3.37	0.009	0.089	8
PSP	1.8	0.079	0.122	7
EVP	1.51	0.049	0.263	9
D66	1.2	0.049	0.127	10
DS'70	0.89	0.021	0.173	9
LN	0.81	-0.011	0.141	8
AOV	0.58	0.049	0.043	8
LPF	0.25	0.034	0.141	8
PVV	0	0.034	0.177	8
Correlation	-0.176*			117

For the new party government hypothesis, the question is whether new parties in government elicit more reaction than new parties in opposition. This is the case for positions in the electoral arena, but the difference, as can be seen in table 6.3 is not statistically significant. Opposition parties, like the RKPN, elicited, on average, more reactions in terms of position from established parties than the LPF did, although the latter was in government.

One can examine the average reactions to the new parties ordered by size in table 6.4, here one can see that both the largest new party (LPF) and the smallest new party (CP) elicit similar increases in agreement (around +0.035). The overall correlation is in the expected direction but weak and not significant. It does not appear to be the case that larger new parties elicit more reactions.

In order to test the new party organisation hypothesis, the new parties are ordered by the extent to which they organised their electorate in table 6.5. One can see here that well organised new parties elicit more negative reactions than less well organised new parties. New parties that tend to be well organised elicit less imitation (GPV) and more differentiation (SP and RPF), than other parties. This relationship is based on three parties (RPF, GPV and SP), which are well organised but elicit weak and negative reactions. These three parties tried to enter parliament several times but

were unsuccessful before.¹⁹⁰ All three participated in municipal and provincial elections before entering parliament. All are challenger parties formed by a divorce. Instead of being unexpectedly successful well-organised new entries, these parties appear to be well-established parties before entering parliament, and their modest support did not lead to reactions from the established parties.¹⁹¹

An analysis of the new party proximity hypothesis is presented in table 6.6. Here one can see the correlation between the distance between the new and the established party and the extent to which the established party reacted. The central notion here is that parties that are closer to the new party respond more to the new parties than parties that are further away from it. For some cases there is a marked reaction for parties that already were closer to the new party (RPF, LPF, D66), but the overall relationship is that parties that are further away react more. This relationship is not significant, however. This indicates that, as far as there is a difference between parties, parties that are further away from the new party respond more.¹⁹²

Finally, one can see the analyses of the effect of the performance of the established party in table 6.7. Even though, there are a number of cases where the established parties that won the most votes, reacted most, the overall trend indicates that, significantly, established parties that lost votes react most. It seems to be the case that parties that have lost votes in the election in which the new party entered, increase their similarity to the election manifesto of the new party. The relationship is, however, not significant if the analysis is replicated without the NMP and the PSP, outliers in terms of the number of unique proposals.

¹⁹⁰ One unsuccessful try for the RPF, four for the GPV and five for the SP. In the election before entering parliament, they all won a significant amount of the votes.

¹⁹¹ These results are not replicated in the multivariate analysis, because this variable has a lot of missing values.

¹⁹² The best explanation for this may be that, even though a common measurement of party similarity for all parties was used (based on the codes of all items unique and non-unique), the similarity of new parties will cluster around three levels: some new parties have programmes with which established parties in general disagree (such as the SP), which means that on average established parties will have a negative score in terms of similarity. Some new parties (such as LN) may have a programme that has a lot of similarities with the programmes of established parties, and therefore established parties will have positive scores. Some new parties (such as the PvdD) will have long programmes with a lot of detailed points; therefore parties will in general score neutral. Given that in addition to patterns within parties there are also patterns between parties, this general pattern may cancel out the relationships found in the case-by-case analysis.

Table 6.6: party distance and electoral positions

Party	Correlation	N
PSP	-0.624	7
SP	-0.502	8
CP	-0.496	9
EVP	-0.439	9
BP	-0.341	8
U55+	-0.341	8
KNP	-0.214	7
GPV	0.014	8
PvdD	0.034	8
NMP	0.082	9
PVV	0.098	8
LN	0.166	8
AOV	0.385	8
RKPN	0.467	11
DS'70	0.469	9
PPR	0.564	9
RPF	0.586*	9
LPF	0.678*	8
D66	0.800***	10
Overall	-0.079	161

Table 6.7: established party performance and electoral positions

Party	Correlation	N
NMP	-0.771**	9
CP	-0.553	9
D66	-0.548	10
BP	-0.533	8
SP	-0.48	8
LPF	-0.457	8
KNP	-0.286	7
RKPN	-0.252	11
PSP	-0.216	7
PvdD	-0.192	8
RPF	-0.179	9
LN	-0.093	8
GPV	-0.087	8
DS'70	-0.006	9
PVV	0.11	8
PPR	0.144	9
EVP	0.198	9
U55+	0.408	8
AOV	0.414	8
Overall	-0.201**	161

Table 6.8: correlation coefficients anticipation

Variable	Correlation	N
Challenged	0.024	150
Mobiliser	0.115	150
Party distance	0.245***	150
New party size	0.152*	150
New party organisation	-0.247***	117
Established party performance	0.158*	150

Only one relationship is consistently significant: well-organised new parties elicit significantly weaker reactions from established parties, than parties that are less well organised. This goes against the hypothesised relationship. As discussed above in detail: the underlying pattern here may be that these parties are not really new. The most well-organised new parties had already participated in elections before.

One explanation for the weakness of the patterns found above is that this part of the study examined the wrong kind of behaviour: instead of reacting to new parties, established parties may have anticipated new parties. Therefore, the following section will look at the anticipation of new parties by established parties. A range of factors

now show significant relationships: party distance, new party size, new party organisation, established party performance, established party leadership change and established party size all show significant relationships. Most of these relationships are in the expected direction. One should note, however, that, in analysing anticipation, it is necessary to relax the notion of uniqueness: in order to measure anticipation only those policies were eliminated as non-unique that were held by established parties in the elections *before* the entry of new party and not in the elections *before and in which* the new party entered. It is not strange that with such a relaxed notion of uniqueness more reactions by established parties are found, because there is more variance to 'lash onto'. However, because of the relaxed notion of uniqueness used here, one cannot be sure that the changes found can actually be attributed to the new party. They could also be attributed to external circumstances. In statistical terms: the chance of type-I errors increases. Table 6.8 provides an overview.

The single most important outcome is that new parties that will become larger are anticipated more. This relationship is significant and in the expected direction. As before, new parties that are better organised elicit less anticipation. Again the same explanation can be given: the well-organised parties (SP, RPF and GPV) were ignored by established parties because their entry was not unexpected; they had already participated in elections before. One should note that one cannot study these factors without neglecting the temporal order of causality: a new party's size and its level of organisation, in which party size is a factor, are only known *after* that new party has entered parliament. What is explained now precedes the cause. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between pre-election polls and new party size. Established parties that lost votes in the elections before the new party entered show more anticipation than established parties that are performing well. This effect is significant and goes in the expected direction. The same is true for the ideological distance between new and established party. These two relationship are not significant in the multivariate analysis (presented in appendix 5), however.

Several conclusions stand out in the interpretation of these results of anticipatory behaviour: when new parties are expected to be larger, when new and established parties have similar programmes, and when established parties are losing votes, there is more anticipatory behaviour than if these characteristics are not present.

On the whole, this analysis of changes in party positions points to one factor: the performance of the established party explains the positional reactions of

established parties to new parties in almost every analysis. Established parties will respond to new parties when they have lost votes in the last elections (whether in the election in which the new party entered, or the election before the new party entered). Losing elections may be the only way in which the conservative organisations that parties often are, are forced to respond to their surroundings.

6.3.2 Analysis of attention in the electoral arena

The PPR, KNP, D66 and RKPN elicited the most marked reactions in terms of attention from the established parties. In the case of the PPR, RKPN and the KNP, external circumstances can better explain the patterns in attention than the presence of these new parties: therefore, again D66 appears to be the prime example of a new party that is successfully changing the policies of established parties.

In table 6.9 one can compare the changes in attention for the challenger party. Here one can compare the patterns elicited by different challengers. Only three of the nine challengers elicit the most marked reactions from the parties that they challenge. Two of these challenged parties actually decrease attention to the issue of the challenger party (KVP to RKPN, CDA to EVP). Only the PvdA imitates the issue attention of the PSP. Challenger parties do not elicit more marked reactions from the parties that they challenge. In table 6.11 one can see that unchallenged parties react more than challenged parties (but not significantly).

The mobiliser hypothesis poses that mobiliser new parties will elicit reactions from more established parties, than challengers. In table 6.10 one can see that for no new mobiliser party, established parties consistently increase their attention to issues. The only party for which any consistent pattern can be seen, is the PvdD, which actually elicits consistently decreasing attention. In table 6.11 one can see that there is a statistically significant difference between challengers and mobilisers, where mobilisers elicit *less* reactions than challengers. This relationship, however, does not hold in the robustness checks presented in appendix 4.

Table 6.11 also gives an insight into the government-opposition hypothesis. There is a positive significant relationship between whether a new party was in government or not, and whether it elicited reactions from the established parties. The LPF and the PPR, in particular, elicit reactions from established parties. This relationship, however, is not significant in the multivariate analysis presented in appendix 4.

Table 6.9: challengers' effects on electoral attention

Party	KNP	PSP	GPV	PPR	DS'70	RKPN	RPF	EVP	SP
ARP	0.12	0.14	0.1						
CHU	1	-0.06	-0.17						
KVP	0.38	0.55	0.44						
SGP	0	0	-0.53	1	0.05	-0.14	0.05	0.16	0.19
PvdA	-0.04	0.6	0	0	-0.03	1	-0.02	0.43	-0.07
VVD	1	-0.4	0.55	0.86	-0.12	0.3	-0.79	-0.13	0.29
CPN	0.17	0.31	0	1	-0.69	0	1		
PSP			1	0.41	-0.21	0.24	0.46	0.05	
BP				1	0.33	1			
GPV				0.31	-0.38	0.24	0.03	0.3	-0.04
D66				0.25	-0.08	-0.04	-0.47	-0.25	-0.15
CDA				0.37	0.17	-0.15	-0.39	-0.37	-0.05
PPR							-0.04	0.2	
RPF								-0.29	-0.14
GL									-0.01
Hypo.	No	Yes	No	No	No	Opp.	No	Opp.	No

Challenged parties in **bold**

Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction

No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction

Table 6.10: mobilisers' effects on electoral attention

Party	BP	D66	NMP	CP	AOV/U55+	LPF	LN	PVV	PvdD
ARP	-0.27	0.38							
CHU	0	1							
KVP	0	1							
SGP	1	-0.34	0.28	0.75	-0.01	0.51	-1	-0.39	-0.12
PvdA	-0.86	1	-0.67	-0.21	0.42	0.05	-0.08	-0.38	0.14
VVD	-0.18	0.19	-0.13	-0.09	0.09	0.29	0.08	-0.16	0.39
CPN	-1	-0.43	-1						
PSP		0.13	-0.01	0.53					
BP		0.15	-0.17						
GPV		-0.09	-0.73	0.03	0.15				
D66			-0.5	0.25	0.16	0.16	0.47	-0.21	-0.42
CDA			-0.13	0.11	0.03	0.36	-0.17	-0.07	-0.25
PPR				0.13					
RPF				-0.46	-0.12				
GL					-0.15				
SP						-0.33	-0.04	-0.25	0.52
CU						0.35	-0.29	-0.05	0.02
Hypo.	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Op..

Yes: Change in the nature of the lines of conflict on this issue

No: Changes in party positions

Table 6.12 examines the new party attention hypothesis. Here one can see that the party that devoted most attention to its own issue (the PvdD) elicits a marked decrease in attention, while the PPR, which devoted least attention to its issue actually elicits one of the largest increases in attention. All in all, there is a significant, negative relationship between the attention a new party devotes to its issue and the reactions of established parties. The expectation that was formulated was quite complex: without stated conditions, one would expect when new parties devote a lot of attention to their issue, established parties increase attention. One would also expect that this party attention variable was crucial in the parliamentary arena but not in the electoral arena. This expectation is corroborated by the data.

In table 6.13 the data for the new party size hypothesis is shown. Here one can see that new party size does not matter for the reactions of established parties: the largest new party (LPF) elicits less reaction than the second to smallest new party (GPV). Overall there is a weak, negative, insignificant relationship.

Table 6.14 provides a test for the new party organisation hypothesis. One can see here that most well organised organisation (GPV) elicits almost as much reaction as the least well organised party (LPF). The overall relationship is weak, insignificant and positive.

Table 6.15 summarises the analyses of the party distance hypothesis. The data shows that for some parties the parties that were furthest away reacted most (such as the PPR), while for other parties, (such as D66 and LN) the parties that were closest already reacted most, and even significantly so. The overall relationship is weak, insignificant and goes in against the expected relationship.

In table 6.16 the analyses of the party performance hypothesis are summarised. Here one can see that for most parties the parties that lost most, react most. For five parties, the reversed is true. The overall relationship, however, goes in the expected direction and is significant. As expected, established parties that lose seats respond significantly more than established parties that win seats. This is the only hypothesis that is supported by the data: the more a party loses in the elections in which the new party enters, the more it focuses on the issue that the new party raises.

Table 6.11: comparing effects on electoral attention

Characteristic	μ	σ	N	ϵ
Challenged	0.048	0.346	9	0.095
Unchallenged	0.172	0.435	66	
Mobiliser	-0.006	0.442	76	0.186**
Challenger	0.157	0.426	75	
Government	0.214	0.428	26	0.144*
Opposition	0.047	0.439	125	

μ : average value

σ : standard deviation

N: number of cases

ϵ : eta

Table 6.12: new party attention and electoral attention

Party	New party attention	μ	σ	N
PvdD	68.5	-0.246	0.154	8
PSP	49.4	0.164	0.356	7
BP	43.7	-0.038	0.739	8
NMP	29	-0.34	0.408	9
GPV	26.8	0.173	0.473	8
RPF	24.1	-0.019	0.527	9
RKPN	23.1	0.272	0.445	9
KNP	22.5	0.375	0.448	7
AOV/U55	21.5	0.07	0.181	8
LPF	19.2	0.166	0.273	8
DS'70	17.6	-0.107	0.301	9
LN	17.6	-0.147	0.412	8
PVV	13.3	0.021	0.318	8
EVP	11.5	0.012	0.284	9
D66	11.3	0.299	0.541	10
SP	9.8	0.004	0.158	8
CP	8	0.114	0.368	9
PPR	6.6	0.578	0.388	9
Correlation	-0.210***			151

Table 6.13: new party size and electoral attention

Party	New party size	μ	σ	N
LPF	17	0.166	0.273	8
PVV	5.89	0.021	0.318	8
DS'70	5.33	-0.107	0.301	9
AOV/U55	4.5	0.07	0.181	8
D66	4.48	0.299	0.541	10
BP	2.13	-0.038	0.739	8
PSP	1.84	0.164	0.356	7
PPR	1.84	0.578	0.388	9
PvdD	1.83	-0.246	0.154	8
LN	1.61	-0.147	0.412	8
NMP	1.51	-0.34	0.408	9
SP	1.32	0.004	0.158	8
KNP	1.26	0.375	0.448	7
RPF	1.25	-0.019	0.527	9
RKPN	0.92	0.272	0.445	9
EVP	0.83	0.012	0.284	9
GPV	0.74	0.173	0.473	8
CP	0.69	0.114	0.368	9
Correlation	-0.033			151

Table 6.14: new party organisation and electoral attention

Party	New party organisation	μ	σ	N
GPV	15.2	0.173	0.473	8
SP	13.45	0.004	0.158	8
RPF	5.54	-0.019	0.527	9
PvdD	3.54	-0.246	0.154	8
PPR	3.45	0.578	0.388	9
PSP	1.8	0.164	0.356	7
EVP	1.51	0.012	0.284	9
D66	1.2	0.299	0.541	10
DS'70	0.89	-0.107	0.301	9
LN	0.81	-0.147	0.412	8
LPF	0.25	0.166	0.273	8
PVV	0	0.021	0.318	8
Correlation	0.013			101

Table 6.15: party distance and electoral attention

Party	Correlation	N
PPR	-0.528	9
GPV	-0.469	8
RKPN	-0.451	9
SP	-0.388	8
BP	-0.214	8
AOV/U55	-0.147	8
RPF	-0.105	9
LPF	0.125	8
CP	0.164	9
PSP	0.171	7
EVP	0.218	9
DS'70	0.222	9
PVV	0.223	8
NMP	0.291	9
PvdD	0.546	8
KNP	0.639	7
D66	0.653**	10
LN	0.802**	8
Correlation	-0.008	151

Table 6.16: established party performance

Party	Correlation	N
RPF	-0.7**	9
SP	-0.586	8
DS'70	-0.519	9
RKPN	-0.496	9
PSP	-0.482	8
PvdD	-0.426	8
NMP	-0.413	9
D66	-0.397	10
EVP	-0.373	9
PPR	-0.346	9
LN	-0.282	8
AOV/U55	-0.2	8
LPF	-0.151	8
PVV	0.204	8
GPV	0.412	7
CP	0.44	9
BP	0.527	8
KNP	0.619	7
Correlation	-0.185**	151

6.4 Expanded statistical analysis

In the next step all developments in attention on all issues will be compared to those developments when new parties were present.

6.4.1 Reaction in terms of attention

The short summary of the analysis of attention to issues in terms of reaction, is that all hypotheses are rejected, except for a hypothesis that explicitly stated that in the electoral arena there would be no relationship. None of the characteristics of new parties have a significant effect on the reactions of established parties. Different specifications are used here, but under none of them any discernable effect is visible. In table 6.17, one can see that the presence of a new party leads to an increase in attention on its issue. There is no general effect of new political parties: the presence of a new party does not lead to significantly more change on its issue than when no new party is present. This echoes the results of the case-by-case analysis where this study did not observe a consistent effect in the hypothesised direction.

Table 6.17: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (1)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.210*** (0.010)	0.212*** (0.010)	0.211*** (0.010)	0.212*** (0.010)	0.214*** (0.010)
Previous Attention	-0.036*** (0.002)	-0.037*** (0.002)	-0.037*** (0.002)	-0.037*** (0.002)	-0.035*** (0.001)
New Party Presence	0.015 (0.030)	-	-	-	-
New Party Attention	-	-0.001 (0.001)	-	-	-
Challenged	-	-	-0.077 (0.137)	-	-
Mobiliser	-	-	-	-0.046 (0.041)	-
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	0.010 (0.126)
R-Squared	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.156

n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by the sum of the square roots of manifesto length.

Table 6.18: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (2)

Variable	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Intercept	0.210*** (0.010)	0.209*** (0.010)	0.210*** (0.010)	0.208*** (0.010)	0.201*** (0.010)
Previous Attention	-0.037*** (0.002)	-0.037*** (0.002)	-0.037*** (0.002)	-0.037*** (0.002)	-0.037*** (0.002)
New Party Presence	-	-	-	0.018 (0.031)	-0.004 (0.047)
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	0.045 (0.169)
New Party Size	0.005 (0.006)	-	-	-	0.005 (0.008)
New Party Organisation	-	0.005 (0.006)	-	-	-
New Party Government	-	-	0.058 (0.075)	-	-
Est. Party Performance	-	-	-	0.085** (0.040)	0.087** (0.040)
Interaction Term	-	-	-	-0.213 (0.158)	-0.210 (0.157)
R-Squared	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.156	0.157


n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by the sum of the square roots of manifesto length.

It is also not the case that under specific conditions new parties may have an effect. The first of these hypotheses analyses is the new party activity hypothesis. The expectation was that this mechanism mattered more in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena. These results are presented in model 2 of table 6.17. New parties that focused more on their own issue elicit *fewer reactions*, but this relationship is not significant. As the result *was* significant in the study of the parliamentary arena, this negative result actually corroborates one of the expectations.

The relationship between new and established party was operationalised in terms of the relationship between challenged parties and challengers, between mobilisers and all parties and party distance. No significant relationship was found. Moreover, the relationship was in the opposite direction in each case: there is more change in attention when parties are not challenged or when mobilisers are not present. The sign for the party distance variable was unstable: under different specifications, close-by or distant parties tend to react more. These relationships are insignificant. These results echo the case-by-case analysis, which showed that those parties that were not challenged reacted more than challenged parties in many cases.

The results for new party characteristics are presented in models 5 (in table 6.17), 6 and 7 (in table 6.18). Again, no significant relationship was found: larger, better-organised or governing new parties do not elicit more change in attention than in those cases without new parties. The relationship for new party size is in the correct direction (larger new parties elicit more reactions), but it is not significant. Better-organised new parties elicit more reactions. This is not significant. Government parties elicit more reaction than when they stay in opposition, but significantly.

The performance of the established party has an insignificant effect on the reactions of that party. The relationship is specified as an interaction relationship, which can best be presented graphically. In figure 6.31 one can see the marginal effect of the performance of the established party, both when new parties are present and when they are not. On the whole, the performance of the established party has a significant positive effect on the changes in attention. After winning elections, parties, marginally but significantly, devote more attention to more issues. The presence of a new party has a negative effect on the attention of established parties: this means that when parties lose the elections and a new party is present, they will increase attention to the issue of the new party. As one can see this effect has considerable uncertainty. This means that one cannot distinguish it from a null-effect.



The final analysis tests the notion proposed by Harmel and Svåsand (1997) that three factors have to be present to see marked reactions from established parties: ideological proximity, a larger new party and a poorly performing established party. Concerns about multi-collinearity must be silenced to see whether this relationship is present. In model 10 one can see that pooling these variables does not lead to significant results, either. The results are similar to the bivariate analyses.

The results of these different analyses indicate that there is no factor that is consistently and significantly related to the reactions of established parties: the electoral performance of the established party comes closest, but even this effect is not significant. This stands in contrast to the case-by-case analyses in which significant relationships were found. There are four ways to read these results: first, the presence of a new party in general or under specific specifications does not matter for the reactions of established parties in terms of attention compared to all the shifts in attention that occur. In the electoral arena, new parties do not matter. There is a second possibility: under specific conditions, established parties react differently to new parties. In the case-by-case analysis, contradictory results were found. Sometimes, for instance, challenged parties respond to their challenger, but sometimes challengers ignore the challenging party. These mixed results mean that it is impossible to analyse everything in a one-size-fits-all model. Third, these null-results

Table 6.19: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (1)

Variable	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Intercept	0.146*** (0.008)	0.134*** (0.008)	0.145*** (0.008)	0.148*** (0.008)	0.145*** (0.009)
Previous Attention	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.026*** (0.001)	-0.026*** (0.001)	-0.026*** (0.001)
New Party Presence	0.005 (0.027)	-	-	-	-
New Party Attention	-	-0.001 (0.001)	-	-	-
Challenged	-	-	0.019 (0.121)	-	-
Mobiliser	-	-	-	-0.075** (0.037)	-
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	0.106 (0.175)
R-Squared	0.099	0.093	0.099	0.100	0.098

n=4011; all analyses by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos

Table 6.20: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (2)

Variable	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Intercept	0.145*** (0.009)	0.133*** (0.008)	0.132*** (0.008)	0.145*** (0.009)	0.145*** (0.009)
Previous Attention	-0.026 (0.001)	-0.023*** (0.001)	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.026*** (0.001)	-0.026*** (0.001)
New Party Presence	-	-	-	0.018 (0.028)	0.004 (0.047)
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	-0.112 (0.237)
Divorce	0.075* (0.045)	-	-	-	-
New Party Size	-	0.004 (0.006)	-	-	0.003 (0.007)
New Party Organisation	-	-	0.004 (0.005)	-	-
Est. Party Performance	-	-	-	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)
Interaction Term	-	-	-	-0.300** (0.125)	-0.311** (0.125)
R-Squared	0.100	0.092	0.091	0.100	0.102

n=4011, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=3967); all analyses by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos


could also be explained by a missing variable that could explain these patterns but is not included in these analyses. There is, however, a fourth possibility, and that is that this study has been looking for new party effects in the wrong place. Perhaps new parties do not influence established parties after they have entered parliament, but in the election *in which* they enter parliament.

6.4.2 Anticipation in terms of attention

This section examines the possibility of anticipatory behaviour. The relative measure of anticipatory change in attention looks at the increase in attention to the issue of the new party in the election in which the new party entered. One should note that, when studying anticipatory behaviour, a major caveat should be taken into account: in these analyses the entry of the new party occurs in the same election as the anticipatory behaviour. This makes it difficult to distinguish cause and effect: does the entry of the new party cause the increase in attention or is the entry of the party actually the result of the increased attention to its issue?

The results are presented in detail in table 6.19 and 6.20. These results mainly echo the results of the previous analysis for post-entry reactions. Many relationships are not significant. In order to avoid repeating the insignificant results from the previous paragraphs, only the substantive changes will be addressed here. The only interesting significant result concerns the performance of the established party: this now has a significant effect. One should note that this concerns the relationship between the established party's performance in the elections before the new party entered: parties that lost in the election before the new party entered are more likely to show anticipatory behaviour. A graphical representation is presented in figure 6.32. The established party performance variable is also incorporated in the Harmel and Svåsand model (model 20). This model echoes the previous results: established party performance is the only variable that has a significant effect.

The other significant result concerns the mobiliser hypothesis: the relationship is negative and significant. This indicates that parties decrease attention to the issue that a mobiliser focuses on in the election in which it enters. One can explain this in two ways: first, this may be a sign that mobilisers focus on issues that, in the election in which they enter, were outside the realm of political competition. Second, established parties may anticipate the entry of challengers, because these tend to be



formed by divorce. One can examine this relationship further by looking at the relationship between the formation history of the new party and the reactions of established parties. There is indeed a significant difference between party reactions to parties formed by divorce and birth: parties formed by divorce elicit more anticipation (model 16).

If operationalised in terms of anticipation, new parties in general do not have an effect on established parties. There are only two conditions under which they do: parties that are mobilisers tend to be anticipated less than parties that are formed as challenger. New parties are anticipated more by an established party that has lost more in the previous election. Parties that have lost the previous election, are more sensitive to their environment than established parties that did not lose votes: parties are conservative organisations, unlikely to respond to their environments unless external factors force them to (Janda 1990).

Table 6.21: summary of chapter 6

Hypothesis		Attention		Position	
		Reaction	Anticipation	Reaction	Anticipation
1	New Party Presence	0	0	n/a	n/a
3	New Party Attention	0 ^a	0 ^a	n/a	n/a
5	Challenged	0	0	0	0
6	Mobiliser	0	-	0	0
7	Ideological Proximity	0	0	0	+
8	New Party Size	0	0	0	+
9	New Party Organisation	0	0	-	-
10	New Party in Government	0	n/a	0	n/a
11	Established Party Performance	0	+	+	0

+: in expected direction;

0: no consistently significant relationship;

-: in opposite direction than expected;

^a: null relationship expected;

^b: statistically significant, but not meaningful.

6.5 Conclusion

The main findings of this chapter are summarised in table 6.21. Four conclusions will be drawn here on the basis of these results: first, about the extent to which established parties change their programmes in relation to the entry of new parties into the electoral arena; second, when established parties do so; third, about the conditions under which they do so; and, fourth, about the nature of the electoral arena.

First, no evidence was found in this analysis that the presence of new parties *per se* matters for the attention that established parties devote to issues in their election manifesto. While one cannot say the same for the positions that established parties take on issues because the research method was different, the evidence does not point to more reactions of established parties to new parties here, either. The case-by-case analyses showed that there were some meaningful patterns in the reactions of some established parties to some new parties, but these patterns were not consistent between cases. There is, however, clear evidence that specific new parties elicited reactions from the established parties; for instance, D66 elicited marked changes in the attention all established parties devoted to issues and the positions that they took on them. More than any other party, D66 brought a new issue to the political agenda and forced every party to address its proposals, especially those that concerned government reform.

The expanded statistical analyses showed that, even under specific conditions, significant patterns could not be identified. This study echoes the results of the study of Huijbregts (2006), who, likewise, found only weak effects of the presence of new parties on the election manifestos of established parties. The conclusion would have to be that, on the whole, there is no evidence that new parties consistently and significantly influence the positions that established parties take in the election manifesto or the attention that they devote to issues. The difference between this study and those studies that find more marked results for specific new parties (e.g. Harmel and Svåsand 1997, Van Spanje 2010) can be explained in two ways: first, by examining all new parties in one system this study also took into account a lot of cases in which change was unlikely and also did not occur. By focusing on less likely cases of changes the established theories are tested more robustly. However, another major source of divergence may be the alternative measure of policy positions employed here compared to other studies: on aggregated policy dimensions parties may shift more, by examining the specific proposals of new parties, one can be sure that the change can be attributed to the new party.

In general, established parties anticipate new parties more than that they react to them. Both for position and attention, more significant and meaningful relationships were identified for anticipatory behaviour than for reactive behaviour. It appears to be the case that, when writing election manifestos, established parties do not attempt to win the last battle, but that (under specific conditions) they are quite conscious of the battle they are going to fight. This may mean that parties anticipate the entry of new parties and write their election manifestos in order to pre-empt the entry of new parties, but it may also mean that both the new and the established parties pick up on the same social problems.

When one looks at the conditions under which established parties react to or anticipate the entry of new political parties, the results are mixed. There are three ways in which new and established parties could be linked: the challenger-challenged relationship, the mobiliser-challenger distinction, and ideological distance. Challenged parties do consistently react to their challengers. While in some cases the challenged established party reacted most (KVP to KNP in positions), in others it showed the least (PvdA to PSP in positions). These patterns indicate that one can understand the reactions for each particular case, but that if one is interested in general patterns, the evidence is much weaker.

In general, there is no evidence that mobilisers elicit reactions from more established parties than challengers: instead, it was found that in one case, anticipatory behaviour in terms of attention, mobilisers in general elicit *less* anticipation from established parties than challengers. The distance between the new and established party only has a significant effect when studying anticipation of new parties in terms of positions. All in all, there is limited evidence that the relationship between new parties and established parties matters for the extent to which established parties change their manifestos when a new party enters the electoral arena.

It may also be the case that new party characteristics matter: the underlying reasoning is that if new parties form a serious threat, established parties must respond to them. The evidence shows that new party size matters significantly in one of the expanded statistical analyses: new parties that are (expected to be) larger are anticipated more by established parties than new parties that are (expected to be) smaller. Three parties that are particularly well organised elicit fewer reactions in terms of position: these are the GPV, the RPF and SP; all parties that attempted to enter parliament on one or more previous occasions before succeeding. In that sense, they are not really new parties from which established parties will copy positions. There is no evidence that the government participation of a new party matters for the reactions of established parties. Finally, in accordance with the formulated expectation, the attention a new party devotes to its own issue has no significant effect on the reactions of established parties in the electoral arena. On the whole, the evidence that the characteristics of the new parties matter for the reactions they elicit is weak as well.

Finally, the electoral performance of the established party may explain when established parties will react to new parties. The underlying notion is that parties that have a reason to fear the new party will change their manifestos more than those parties that have no reason to fear the new party or parties that already have a comfortable position. Here the most consistent evidence was found. In the case-by-case, statistical and expanded statistical analyses of reactive and anticipatory behaviour, this factor was most often the most significant explanation for new party behaviour. When one looks at established party organisation, there is one significant relationship that indicates that the more unstable an established party is the more it will anticipate new parties. All in all, the evidence shows that the short-term

performance of the established party in terms of electoral performance matters for the reactive and anticipatory behaviour of established parties.

On the whole, this study finds that new parties do not matter for the positions established parties take in their election manifestos or the attention that they devote to issues. If they do, the performance of the established party appears to matter more than the performance of the new party or the relationship between them.

One can understand these results in two ways. First, there may be institutional reasons for established parties to be less responsive to new parties in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary arena. In the parliamentary arena and in the electoral arena, parties work under different constraints and have different incentives (Bardi & Mair 2008, 158). The constraint that parties have in the parliamentary arena is that they have to address the issues that are on the parliamentary agenda constrains parties. In the electoral arena, parties are not bound by a common agenda. This means that new parties cannot influence established parties by influencing the party system agenda. Competition in the electoral arena is much less structured. In this unstructured electoral competition, parties also have different incentives: in the theory of Budge (2001) and in the theory of Schattschneider (1960) and Mair (1997a), parties have a particular interest in focusing on their own issues in the electoral arena. According to the saliency theory of competition, parties benefit if they talk about their own issues in the electoral arena, and according to the Schattschneider-Mair thesis, the established parties will try to focus electoral competition on the issues that they are connected to. This means that, in the electoral arena, parties have little incentive to talk about the issues that new parties raise. In their electoral manifestos, parties can talk about the issues that *they* think are important, and this is perhaps one of their few opportunities to do so, while in the media or in parliament the agenda is set by others as well. Therefore, it is not counterintuitive that parties in the electoral arena are not responsive to new parties. Parties stay focused on their own issues and do not try to address the issues other parties own. If this strategy is successful, parties will not change it and stay focused on their own issue. Only when forced by electoral considerations will they change strategies and address those issues that new parties brought to the agenda. And this is indeed the case: the significant relationships were mostly related to electoral performance. When established parties performed poorly in the elections, they would focus more on those issues that new parties raise, and they would be more anticipatory if they expected new parties to do well.

Second, the lack of responsiveness may be a result of the chosen methodology. In this chapter electoral arena was examined by looking at election manifestos. One may doubt to what extent these election manifestos provide a good insight into the behaviour of parties in the elections. Election manifestos are static documents written a number of months before the elections. They cannot provide an insight into how parties respond to competitors during the election campaign. Indeed, they provide an insight to what a party wants to say independent of its competitors. They are the only appropriate source of data, because only they provide an overview of 'all' the positions of the established parties and only they show how much attention parties devote to a range issues, while flyers or posters often concern only one topic (if they are topical at all), and the subjects of media appearances are set by journalists and not by politicians. Three things are important to note in this context: first, election manifestos are important input for the campaign message of a party. What a party says during the election is a reflection of the manifestos. These two may not be identical, but during the campaign a party will not take positions that are outside of the election manifesto. Second, in the case-by-case analysis some effects of specific new parties were identified. If election manifestos are poor measures of party priorities then these changes are very noteworthy. Third, the analysis of anticipation did identify a number of significant patterns. Under specific conditions established parties anticipate the entry of new political parties and incorporate these new party's issues into their election manifestos. This shows that election manifestos are not written outside of the political context. It may not necessarily be the case that election manifestos are static documents that are written too far before the elections to reflect party behaviour in the elections. It may be that election manifestos are written in their contemporary political context and that measuring new parties effects after they entered, is far too late.

Chapter 7: The invisible people, the left and the right

How new parties change the parliamentary party systems

"We oppose the existing parties[,] that maintain the existing ideological lines of conflict, which provide citizens with no political clarity; that are not occupied with working towards their precious ideals, but with guarding their own positions; that are a part of a new class of rulers, which operates according to the principle of favouritism; (...)" – Leefbaar Nederland (2003, 212 translation SO)

"The real essence of a party system may be seen not in the competition between the principal protagonists, be they Labour and Conservative, Christian Democrat and Social democrat, or whatever, but rather in the competition between those who wish to maintain that principal dimension of competition, on the one hand, and on the other hand, those who— 'the invisible people' — are trying to establish a wholly different dimension" - Mair (1997b, 16)

7.1 Introduction

There is an interesting parallel in the claim of the government reform populist party Liveable Netherlands and of political scientist Peter Mair. In the introductory paragraph of its election manifesto, Liveable Netherlands voices its opposition to the established parties. In its view they maintain the existing lines of conflict, even though they do not provide the voter with any clarity. Moreover, they are preoccupied with protecting their own interests and form a new class of rulers that excludes outsiders. This is the classical rhetoric of a populist party: established parties disenfranchise voters by and they form an impenetrable political class (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008). Mair (1997a, 1997b) takes the argument a level further: using the work of Schattschneider (1960) as a basis, he argues that the fact that the established political parties maintain the existing lines of conflict, is the mechanism that keeps them in power and new political parties out of power. In his eyes the competition between the established parties along the existing lines of conflict is only part of the story. By maintaining the existing lines of conflict, established parties maintain their own

position in the party system: by making sure that the voters believe that the election is about either a liberal or a socialist future for the country, they exclude those voices that believe that the future of the country should be religious, green or feminist. Mair (2001) has also argued that the entry of some new political parties may reinforce the existing lines of conflict. If these new parties are co-opted into political alliances of the left or the right, the entry of a new political party may actually reinforce the existing pattern between left and right. Mair (2001) has shown that the entry of *Die Grünen* reinforced the left-right pattern in Germany, while Bale (2003) has shown that similar patterns may occur when extreme right parties were co-opted into political alliances of the centre-right. By joining the rightwing or the leftwing political alliance, the entry of new political parties may actually reduce the number of lines of conflict because they focus the political conflict on the left-right dimension, making other dimensions (such as the religious-secular dimension) irrelevant.

This chapter seeks to find out which of the two theses of Mair (1997a, 1997b, 2001) holds in general: are new political parties able to introduce new lines of conflict? Or does their entry actually focus politics on a single left-right dimension? A change in the existing lines of conflict may be among the effects that new political parties can have on the party system (Schattschneider 1960) and, as argued in chapter 2, it can be conceived of as a form of party system change. This chapter will examine the interaction between political parties at the systemic level. It will examine the effect of each of the new parties on parliamentary party system. The parliamentary arena is selected because this is the most likely place to observe effects of new political parties. As shown in chapter 5, new political parties had a significant effect on the attention that established political parties devote to issues and on the positions that they take on these issues in the parliamentary arena. The effects of new political parties on established parties in the electoral arena (chapter 6) were far less marked or structured. This study focuses on the period 1963-2010, because for this period sufficient voting data is available. These will be analysed in four periods: 1963-1977, 1977-1986, 1989-1998 and 1998-2010. Between 1963 and 2006, six parties entered the Dutch parliament that according to the analyses presented in chapter 5, elicited such considerable reactions in terms of either party positions or attention in parliament that their entry may in turn have led to a change in the interaction between established parties in parliament. These parties are D66 (both attention to and positions on governance), the CP (both attention to and positions on immigration),

AOV and U55+ (positions on healthcare), LN (positions on governance) and the LPF (attention to immigration). These parties are of special interest here. Each of these parties are mobilisers. It seems reasonable that mobilisers are related to changes in the structure of party competition: mobilisers seek to introduce new lines of conflict, while challengers seek to reinforce the existing lines of conflict.

This chapter shows that, for as far as one can attribute changes in the lines of conflict to the entry of new political parties, new political parties are mostly associated with *reducing* the number of lines of conflict and not with increasing them. New political parties are not able to introduce new lines of conflict; rather, their co-optation into political alliances of the left or the right leads to a reduction of the number of lines of conflict and focuses political conflict on the left-right distinction.

7.2.1 Period 1: 1963-1977

Between 1967 and 1972, five new parties entered parliament: D66, DS'70, the PPR, the NMP and the RKPN. As can be seen above, the entry of D66 led to a marked and attributable change in the levels of parliamentary attention to governance and the positions of parties on this issue. The entry of DS'70, the NMP and the RKPN did not lead to significant change in attention. The entry of the PPR was followed by a marked increase in attention to the environment, but not in a way that can be attributed to the entry of the PPR.

The parliamentary period 1963-1967 is the period before the entry of any of these parties. A spatial model of voting behaviour in this period is presented in figure 7.1. In the figure one can see three blocs: in the leftwing half of the figure, the PvdA, the PSP and the CPN are located. In the rightwing half there are two clusters: the SGP and the BP in the lower right half, and the other parties (ARP, KVP, CHU, GPV and VVD) in the upper right half. The first dimension appears to be a left-right dimension, dividing the leftwing parties (PSP, CPN and PvdA) from the parties of the right. The parties of the right are divided on the vertical dimension in particular. Interpreting the vertical dimension is difficult: it divides the Christian-democratic KVP and ARP from the farmers' party BP and the orthodox-Protestant SGP. It does not divide religious parties from secular parties (as the secular VVD is placed closer to conservative Protestant ARP than the orthodox Protestant SGP).

In 1967, D66 entered parliament, and it raised political attention to governance. Over the course of the 1967-1971 parliamentary term two new political

Figure 7.1: model of voting 1963-1967






Figure 7.2: model of voting 1967-1971



parties were formed: the Group-Goedhart broke away from the PvdA, and the Group-Aarden broke away from the KVP. The Group-Goedhart would later on evolve into DS'70 and the Group-Aarden into the PPR. The model for the after-period is comparatively more one-dimensional, and it now falls just above the basic level for one-dimensionality. The basic structure of party positions, presented in figure 7.2, is similar to the period 1963-1967: the only parties that made a marked shift were the GPV, the VVD and the SGP. The SGP and GPV moved to the centre of the vertical dimension, and the VVD took a position close to the three Christian-democratic parties. The horizontal dimension is still related to the left-right division. As said before, it is difficult to understand the vertical dimension. One can plot the four dimensions developed in sections 5.2.4 to 5.2.6 into this model (for the environment (in a broad sense), governance, moral issues and economic affairs). They relate to the horizontal dimension. The relationship between the moral issues dimension and the general voting patterns is markedly weaker than for the other issues.

It appears that the entry of D66 (and the formation of the PPR and DS'70) coincided with a decrease in the dimensionality of the system. It raised attention to the issue of governance and party positions on this issue began to follow the left-right division more. This, combined with cooperation between the progressive parties (PvdA, D66 and PPR), led to a decrease in the dimensionality of the party system. This is not counter-intuitive as during this period polarisation started in the Dutch parliament. This does mean, however, that the entry of D66 is not associated with the creation of a new line of conflict in the Dutch *Tweede Kamer*. Instead, the interaction between political parties became more one-dimensional, because of an increasing dominance of left-right voting on the issue of governance, an issue that became more important, and because of the cooperation between the progressive parties.

In the period 1971-1977, voting, as presented in figure 7.3, became even more one-dimensional than before: the APRE of a one-dimensional model moves up almost one-tenth (on a scale from zero to one). The patterns in voting behaviour are similar to the previous period: the horizontal division still follows a left-right structure. It divides the CPN, PSP, PPR, PvdA and CPN from the other parties. DS'70 stands in the centre of the political space. On its right are the parties of the right and centre-right: the Christian-democratic parties in one cluster, close to the orthodox-Christian

Figure 7.3: model of voting 1971-1977

GPV and the SGP. The VVD and the BP are in the lower half of the figure. Although in general voting behaviour was more one-dimensional than before, voting on specific issues was more diverse than in the period 1967-1971. Governance and the Environment follow the horizontal division. On economic issues, the VVD, BP and NMP take a more rightwing position than the Christian-democratic parties. On moral issues, the Christian-democratic parties (ARP, KVP, CHU) and their orthodox Christian counterparts (RKPN, GPV and SGP) stand further away from the leftwing parties. It appears that in this analysis the vertical dimension in part reflects the division between religious and secular parties, with all the religious parties concentrated in the upper-rightwing parties. On the whole, the strength of the left-right division on the horizontal dimension, combined with the fact that the model can better be scaled in terms of one-dimension than before, appears to imply that the entry of the NMP, RKPN, PPR or DS'70 has not led to the creation of a new political division, either. Instead, the pattern set in the 1967-1971 parliamentary period continues: the increased importance of issues on which voting follows the left-right



dimension combined with the formation of a leftwing bloc reinforced the existing left-right division.

All in all, the entry of D66, DS'70, PPR, NMP or RKPN has not led to the creation of a new division between political parties, but instead, during this period voting became more one-dimensional because of the formation of political alliances between progressive parties and between Christian-democratic parties. This clearly conforms to the theoretical expectation of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003): the formation of a political alliance, in this case between the progressive parties, has reinforced the existing left-right division. Instead of creating a new environmental dimension or a governance dimension, the co-optation of the PPR and the D66 into the Progressive Agreement with the PvdA strengthened the left-right division. This was combined with increasing importance of those issues (governance, the environment) on which parties are divided between left and right.

7.2.2 Period 2: 1977-1986

In 1982 the CP entered the Dutch parliament. The CP was a mobiliser focusing on immigration. As seen in chapter 5, its entry was accompanied by an increase in attention to immigration and unstable voting patterns on this issue. In this period the small Christian EVP and RPF parties also entered. These are both splits from the ARP (or the Anti-Revolutionary tendency within the CDA) one orienting itself towards the left and one towards the religious right. Is it possible that the entry of these parties influenced the pattern of interaction between political parties?

Voting in the period 1977-1981 was similar to voting in the period 1971-1977. These results are presented in figure 7.4. Even a one-dimensional model scores quite well in terms of the APRE. On the left hand side one finds the PSP, CPN, D66, PPR and PvdA. In the centre of this dimension one finds DS'70, and to its right one can find the CDA, the VVD and the smaller parties of the right (RPF, GPV, SGP and BP). Voting patterns on religion and defence, issue that were owned by the RPF and EVP respectively (the latter is typically associated with the economic left-right dimension), are both related to the horizontal dimension, although the relationship for moral issues is considerably weaker than the relationship for defence. Voting on immigration does not cohere with the model for voting on all issues. For as far as the dimension relates to the model, it separates parties in the upper-left corner from parties in the lower-right corner. The clearest pattern on the vertical dimension (of which the importance

Figure 7.4: model of voting 1977-1981**Figure 7.5: model of voting 1981-1986**

should not be over-interpreted because a one-dimensional model fits quite well) is that the religious parties are all located in the upper-right corner.

The model for the period 1981-1986 is presented in figure 7.5. The entry of the RPF and the EVP has reinvigorated the moral issues and the defence dimension, while the entry of the CP upset voting patterns on immigration. It may be possible that this has influenced the basic structure of interaction between political parties.

Compared to 1977-1981, the voting patterns show change and continuity. One can see four clear clusters: the small parties of the left (PSP, PPR, EVP and CPN) are in the upper-leftwing corner; in the lower leftwing corner one can see the PvdA and D66, the main parties of the centre left; the secular rightwing parties CP and VVD are situated in the lower rightwing corner; and the Christian parties (CDA, GPV, SGP and RPF) are all in the upper-rightwing corner. The party positions on the vertical dimension are similar to the period 1977-1981 and can easily be interpreted in terms of the left-right division. If one looks at the correlation, the party positions on the vertical dimension are different from the period 1977-1981. This is, however, almost exclusively caused by the movement of the PPR away from PvdA towards the PSP. The small leftwing parties are now clearly distinguishable from the larger parties of the moderate left. These small leftwing parties take a position opposite from the VVD, and the mainstream leftwing parties take a position opposite from the CDA. One can understand part of this pattern in terms of a change that occurred in the PPR: in the early 1980s it decided to cooperate with the small left parties instead of cooperating with the PvdA (Waltmans 1983). The similarity in the voting patterns between the small left parties may be a result of this decision. On the whole, the extent to which voting behaviour can be modelled in terms of one dimension has decreased. Party positions on the vertical dimension changed markedly and voting on this dimension matters more than before. To aid interpretation, one can run property fitting models for the three issue-dimensions analysed: voting on defence and immigration divides the small leftwing parties in the upper left corner from the secular rightwing parties in the lower right corner. Voting on immigration, however, coheres only weakly with voting on all issues. Voting on moral matters divides the PvdA and D66 from the Christian parties. The religious dimension correlates more with the vertical dimension than the defence and immigration dimensions do, but on the whole, however, its relationship with the entire model is markedly weaker than before. The left-right division measured in this case by the defence dimension structures party positions.

Figure 7.6: model of voting 1989-1994





Figure 7.7: model of voting 1994-1998



Between 1977 and 1986 the pattern in voting behaviour changed, but not drastically: the vertical dimension remained as important in structuring party positions before and after 1981, but several parties shifted position. Especially on the left there was a marked division between the small parties of the left (PPR, EVP, CPN and PSP) and the larger parties of the left (D66 and PvdA). The change in dimensionality of the system cannot be attributed to the entry of the CP into the political system: it was not its issue that is most related to the changing vertical dimension.

7.2.3 Period 3: 1989-1998

In 1994 three parties entered parliament: the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+ and the socialist party SP. All opposed the cuts in the welfare state that the centre-left coalition of CDA and PvdA proposed. After the 1994 elections PvdA, VVD and D66 formed a coalition. This was the first coalition in the Netherlands since 1918 that was formed without the Christian-democrats, the traditional pivotal player in Dutch politics because of its centrist position on the economic dimension between the conservative liberal VVD and the social democratic PvdA. The coalition parties shared a commitment to liberal policies on gay rights and euthanasia. One may expect that the parliamentary space became more two-dimensional, because the second, religious-secular dimension played a large role in the formation of the cabinet. As seen in chapter 5, the entry of the AOV and U55+ upset voting patterns on healthcare.

Between 1989 and 1994 the models of voting were clearly two-dimensional. The voting patterns are represented in figure 7.6. Here, one can see roughly three clusters of parties: the secular parties of the left (PvdA, GL and D66) are in the lower leftwing corner. The secular parties of the right (VVD and CD) are in the lower rightwing corner. The religious parties (GPV, RPF, SGP and CDA) are in the upper half of the figure in the centre. This pattern is clearly reminiscent of the traditional division in Dutch politics with a left-right and religious-secular divide. Voting on labour relates to the horizontal dimension of the model, as does voting on healthcare, but this is much weaker.

There is no rupture in the voting patterns in 1994, as presented in figure 7.7. The SP has joined the system on the left; the U55+ and the AOV take a place in the centre. PvdA and the CDA have moved away from the centre. More than any model analysed here, a one-dimensional solution does not fit the data. Voting during this period is clearly two-dimensional. One can hardly attribute this to the entry of the

Figure 7.8: model of voting 1998-2002





Figure 7.9: model of voting 2002-2006



pensioners' parties, however. After 1994 voting on healthcare does not conform to the political space at all. The AOV and U55+ take a position in the centre and voting on their issue relates weakly with the entire model. These parties were not able to force a new line of conflict into existence.

All in all, the 1994 elections did not upset the patterns of parliamentary voting behaviour: the entry of the U55+ and AOV and the remarkable patterns in voting behaviour on healthcare did not upset the party system. The entry of the SP or the formation of the cabinet of PvdA, VVD and D66 has not upset voting patterns, either.

7.2.4 Period 4: 1998-2010

In 2002 both the LPF and LN entered parliament. The entry of the LPF was associated with a marked increase in attention to immigration; the entry of LN was associated with instability of the voting patterns on governance, which was the issue of LN. The LPF was immediately co-opted into a centre-right cabinet formed by CDA and VVD. It may be possible that the entry of LPF and LN influenced the interaction between political parties. The events surrounding the entry of the LPF has been characterised as “party system change” (Pellikaan et al. 2007), a “revolt of the citizens” (Couwenberg 2004) and “a punctuation of the equilibrium of Dutch politics” (De Vries & Van der Lubbe 2004).

The voting patterns in the period 1998-2002 (in figure 7.8) are extremely similar to the voting patterns in the period 1994-1998. There are three clusters of parties. The VVD stands in the lower rightwing corner. The secular leftwing parties (GL, PvdA, D66 and SP) all stand in the lower leftwing corner. The Christian-democratic parties (SGP, CDA and CU) all stand in the upper rightwing corner. It appears to be the case that the vertical dimension divides religious from secular parties and that the horizontal dimension divides the left from the right. Voting patterns on immigration relate to the horizontal dimension. These are typical left-right issues. Governance divides religious from secular parties, with the PvdA, VVD and D66 favouring government reform and the CU and the SGP opposing it.

After the 2002 elections voting patterns remained remarkably stable. The results are presented in figure 7.9. The most marked change is that one can model voting behaviour more easily in terms of one dimension after the entry of the LPF than before. The second dimension has less meaning than in the period 1998-2002. Positions on the horizontal dimension are similar in both models: the basic structure

remains intact: a difference between parties of the left, with the SP and GL more to the left and PvdA and D66 more in the centre. There also is a division between religious parties (CU, SGP and CDA concentrated in the upper rightwing corner) and secular rightwing parties (VVD, joined in 2002 by LN and LPF). Most voting patterns studied (agriculture and immigration) are related to the horizontal dimension. Party positions on immigration, which, as Kriesi and Frey (2008) have observed, stand perpendicular to social-economic issues among voters, coincide with party positions on economic matters for political parties. This reinforces similar findings about the relationship between party positioning on this issue by Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009). The governance dimension weakly conforms to the vertical dimension. Given the position of religious parties on this dimension, one should interpret it in terms of a classical division between religious and secular parties. Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the importance of the vertical dimension has decreased. Two developments have contributed to this: first the increased importance of immigration on the parliamentary agenda. On these issues voting is clearly one-dimensional and conforms to the horizontal, left-right dimension. Moreover, the political cooperation between the LPF, CDA and the VVD added to the reduction of the dimensionality of the party system, as Bale has observed (2003).

One may question the extent to which the LPF was successfully co-opted into a rightwing governing bloc. After the fall of the CDA/VVD/LPF-cabinet, a coalition cabinet was formed of D66, CDA and VVD. The LPF was left in opposition. The rightwing bloc had splintered. If one looks at voting patterns in general, however, one can see that in parliament the CDA and VVD also often relied on the LPF to obtain a parliamentary majority. The second Balkenende cabinet was a special majority cabinet: it could rely on both the LPF and D66 to get a majority for its policies. The SGP voted with the CDA and VVD most often, followed by the LPF, D66 and the CU. Even though D66 was in government, the LPF had a voting record that was more similar to that of the CDA and VVD than to that of D66. It may be interesting to delve further into these patterns. In table 7.1 one can see the percentage of votes in which D66 and LPF voted the same as VVD and CDA.¹⁹³ D66 and the LPF are roughly in balance if one looks at all the votes. Both parties voted the same as CDA and VVD in

¹⁹³ That is when they voted the same, which is the case in 86% of the votes. It is important to note that this concerns all votes, not just those selected to remove the interference of the coalition/opposition division.

Table 7.1: all votes 2003-2006



		D66		
All votes ^a		Like CDA and VVD	Unlike CDA and VVD	Total
LPF	Like CDA and VVD	64%	15%	79%
	Unlike CDA and VVD	15%	6%	21%
	Total	78%	22%	100%
Economic issues ^b				
LPF	Like CDA and VVD	68%	9%	76%
	Unlike CDA and VVD	18%	6%	24%
	Total	86%	14%	100%
Cultural issues ^c				
LPF	Like CDA and VVD	62%	21%	83%
	Unlike CDA and VVD	12%	5%	17%
	Total	74%	26%	10%

^a N=5162^b N=1344; Economic Affairs, Labour, Social Affairs, Enterprise, Science^c N=718; Justice and Immigration

around 80% of the cases. In 64% of the votes, both voted the same as the VVD and CDA. In 6% of the votes they both voted against the CDA and VVD. In 15% of the cases the LPF voted the same as CDA and VVD, but D66 did not, and vice versa. However, there are striking patterns. D66 tended to agree with CDA and VVD on cases where there is a political disagreement between CDA and VVD and their junior social-economic issues. In these cases, D66 voted the same as CDA and VVD more often than the LPF: 85% compared to 75%. The same is true for votes on healthcare and education. On other issues, such as the immigration and justice, one can see that the LPF tended to vote like the CDA and VVD more than D66 did. The LPF voted like CDA and VVD in 83% of the votes; the support of D66 is only 74%. In those partner D66, the LPF jumped in.¹⁹⁴ The same pattern can be observed for the environment and foreign affairs. Even though the LPF was in opposition, its political cooperation with the CDA and the VVD continued in parliament.

After 2006, when the PVV won its first seats in the election, there is a marked change. This is presented in figure 7.10. Again the model can be represented in terms of one dimension. The first thing that stands out in the model is that most parties are clustered along a diagonal. The ordering goes from SP to VVD. The positions of these

¹⁹⁴ Perhaps the most famous example is the motion of no confidence proposed by Femke Halsema at the end of the parliamentary debate about the nationality of Ayaan Hirshi Ali. The motion was narrowly rejected because the LPF MPs voted against the motion of no confidence, while D66, a coalition party, favoured the motion. D66 withdrew from the cabinet, which continued as a caretaker minority cabinet.

Figure 7.10: model of voting 2006-2010**Figure 7.11: model of voting 2010-2011**

parties follow the left-right dimension. This is reflected by the fact that party positions on the horizontal dimension are similar to party positions before 2006, and by the fact that party positions on agriculture and immigration all correlate with the horizontal dimension. One party defies this pattern: the PVV. It takes a rightwing stance on the horizontal dimension, but it is in the lower half of the figure. The position of the PVV also explains the low correlation of the immigration dimensions with the entire model: it is the most extreme party on these dimensions, but on the horizontal dimension it takes a position similar to the VVD. The vertical dimension captures the difference between the PVV and the VVD. The PVV is the only party studied that has been able to create a pattern between itself and the rest of the parties that has influenced the entire model. While all other parties are integrated into the left-right pattern, the PVV has created its own dimension, which is perpendicular on the left-right dimension. This dimension is the result of the fact that the PVV often voted against the proposals of the government. As one can see in the model, the PVV sometimes joined the opposition parties PvdD and SP in their opposition to government proposals. All in all, the PVV is the only party in this study that can be linked to the formation of a new line of conflict in parliament. However, given that one can comfortably model the party positions in terms of one dimension, the importance of this second dimension should not be overestimated.

Moreover, this pro-system-anti-system dimension that the PVV forced, is not a durable phenomenon. In figure 7.11 one can see a preliminary analysis of the voting patterns in the Dutch parliament between June 2010 elections and the start of the 2011 summer recess. Given the low number of votes the results should be interpreted cautiously. Two things stand out: first, more than in the period 2006-2010, party positions can confidently be modelled in terms of one dimension in the period 2010-2011. Only in the polarised period 1971-1977 voting patterns were as one-dimensional as in the period 2010-2011. Second, the structure is similar to the structure in the previous period. There are some shifts of individual parties (especially the VVD and the CDA stand close together), but on the whole the correlations on both dimensions are significant. The second dimension, although less important than before, is more pronounced in the period 2010-2011. For as far as there is a second dimension in Dutch politics, it is caused by similar voting patterns between the SP, the PvdD and the PVV. The decreasing dimensionality of this space should be understood in the first place as a sign of the strength of the left-right dimension, since

the PVV supported the rightwing coalition cabinet of VVD and CDA. These preliminary figures show that again a new party was co-opted successfully into the alliance of the centre-right.

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter took particular interest in several parties when studying the changing patterns of interaction between political parties. These parties were D66, CP, AOV, U55+, LN and LPF. Two of these can be clearly linked to changes in the patterns of interaction: the LPF and D66. The saliency of their issues increased, and voting patterns on their issues conformed to the horizontal left-right dimension. The interaction between political parties became more one-dimensional after their entry into the parliamentary arena, as the value of adding a second dimension to the model decreased after 1967 and after 2002. On the whole, the developments seem to reinforce the perspective of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003): after the entry of these parties into parliament, the dominant pattern in parliamentary voting was that between the leftwing and the rightwing bloc. D66 was co-opted into a leftwing bloc and the LPF into a rightwing bloc. One can also place other parties into this picture: in 1971 the PPR was co-opted into the leftwing bloc as well, and like the LPF, DS'70 entered a rightwing cabinet and maintained a position on the rightwing side of parliament afterwards.

Given that these parties were not able to create a new line of conflict, one has to dismiss the idea that new parties and especially mobilisers are able to introduce new lines of conflict in parliament. Instead, the study shows the strength of the existing left-right dimension in incorporating new parties and absorbing new issues into it, even when they are not an intrinsic part of it. In addition to D66 and LPF, special attention was devoted to CP, AOV, U55+ and LN. Their entries into parliament coincided with a marked change in party positions on their issues. As seen in chapter 5, the party positions on immigration were unstable after the entry of the CP, the party positions on healthcare changed markedly after the entry of AOV and U55+, and after 2002 there was a marked change in party positions on governance. But instead of changing the pattern of voting patterns in general, all that these changes in issue dimensions resulted in was that these issue dimensions no longer related with the general voting patterns.

One party is related to a change in the general voting patterns: the PVV. It is

the only one of the parties studied here that influenced the patterns of voting behaviour almost exclusively through its own behaviour. After the PVV entered parliament, two lines of conflict structured voting in the parliamentary arena: a left-right line of conflict, in which the PVV is on the far right, and a line of conflict, which basically pitted the PVV against the established parties. This dimension existed primarily because the PVV voted against many proposals of the government, sometimes together with parties of the leftwing opposition (SP and PvdD). But the support of the PVV for the rightwing government coalition of CDA and VVD further reinforced the left-right dimension. It made the party system more one-dimensional and weakened the relevance of this dimension.

As the Netherlands and the specific cases under special scrutiny were selected as a likely case, some conclusions can be drawn about new parties in general: it is unlikely that many other new parties introduce new significant lines of conflict in parliament, which completely upset parliamentary interaction between established political parties. It seems more likely that, if new parties are successfully co-opted into a political alliance of the right or left, new issues will be integrated into the existing left-right dimension, and that if this is not the case these new dimensions will be weak.

The fact that Dutch political parties are so effective in diffusing the threat that new political parties form to the party system actually reinforces the centrality of the conflict that Mair (1997b, 1997a) described. In the conflict between those who have an interest in maintaining the established lines of conflict and those who have an interest in creating a new line of conflict, the former have consistently won.

Chapter 8: Why care about new political parties?

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. In fact it is the only thing that ever has." – Source unknown, widely but without verification, attributed to Margaret Mead (Keyes 2006)

8.1 Why care about new political parties?

This study has examined the effect of new political parties on established political parties. New political parties are formed as small groups of citizens seeking to change society. As seen in this study, many new political parties sought to change the positions of established parties, and the attention that established parties devote to issues or the party system. This is of course not the goal of a new party: the goal is to change society, by changing the priorities of the government, by changing the party positions and policy priorities of the established parties. The effect of new parties examined here is indirect.

The extent to which new political parties could play this role depends upon the specific features of the political arena: the study found marked differences between the parliamentary and the electoral arena. Even when new political parties remain small, as long as they were focused, they could put new issues on the parliamentary agenda. Especially when established political parties lost votes in the election in which the new party entered, these established parties were inclined to change their positions in the electoral arena. Moreover, when new parties were able to change the attention that established political parties devote to issues, and when they were co-opted into political alliances of established political parties they influenced the interaction between established political parties. Especially the findings in the parliamentary arena pointed to the ability of new political parties to shape the activities of other political parties and the party system. This provides corroboration for the thesis that is often attributed to Margaret Mead, "that a group of thoughtful, committed citizens" can cause significant social change. While one cannot say on the basis of this study that it is the *only* thing that ever has, the small groups of citizens that formed new parties such as the PvdD, D66, the LPF and the PVV have influenced the way politics is done in the Netherlands. There is good reason to care about new political parties. They form an important impetus of political change.

The central finding of this study is that there is a fundamental difference between the parliamentary and the electoral arena. In these different arenas, parties have different incentives and work under different constraints. This means that the extent to which and the conditions under which they react to the entry of new political parties differs: in the parliamentary arena decision-making is structured by the party system agenda, which constrains the issues new parties can address. If new political parties are able to influence this agenda, however, the established political parties must follow. In the electoral arena, parties can focus on the issues that they think are important. This means that they can ignore new political parties, unless electoral considerations force them to do otherwise. In the parliamentary arena, established political parties react more to new political parties than in the electoral arena. The conditions under which parties change in the parliamentary arena and in the electoral arena differ. In the parliamentary arena, the characteristics of the new parties matter; in the electoral arena, for as far as there is a consistent pattern, the electoral performance of the established party matters. The central conclusion of this research would have to be that new political parties matter, but that their effect is mediated by the characteristics of the electoral and the parliamentary arena.

8.2 Comparing patterns

In chapter 2 several hypotheses were formulated. These have been tested extensively in the empirical chapters. The results are briefly summarised in table 8.1. Several larger patterns have not been discussed in-depth: these concern especially the differences between the parliamentary and the electoral arena proposed in the political arena hypothesis, the new party activity hypothesis and the electoral considerations hypothesis. The extent to which new political parties influence established political parties and the conditions under which they do so, differs between the electoral arena and in the parliamentary arena. The political arena hypothesis concerned the difference between the parliamentary and the electoral arena with regard to how new political parties influence established parties. In these different arenas, party positioning is structured by different constraints and is subject to different incentives (Bardi & Mair 2008). While decision-making in the parliamentary arena is structured by a parliamentary agenda that constrains what parties can talk about, parties are free in the electoral arena to focus on the issues that they think will benefit them electorally. On the basis of the saliency theory of party competition (Budge 2001),

Table 8.1: patterns per hypothesis

#	Hypothesis	Attention		Position	
		Electoral Arena	Parliamentary Arena	Electoral Arena	Parliamentary Arena
1	Presence	0	+	n/a	n/a
2	Arena	+		n/a	n/a
3	New party activity	0 ^b	+	n/a	n/a
4	Electoral considerations	+		n/a	n/a
5	Challenged	0	0	0	0
6	Mobiliser	- ^c	+	0	0
7	Distance	0	0	+ ^c	-
8	New party size	0	+	+ ^c	- ^a
9	New party organisation	0	+	-	-
10	New party in government	0	+ ^a	0	0
11	Established party performance	+ ^c	0	+	0

+: in expected direction;

0: no consistently significant relationship;

-: in opposite direction than expected;

^a: statistically significant, but not substantively meaningful;

^b: corroborated that there was no relations;

^c: relationship only present for anticipatory behaviour.

one would expect that parties would focus on their own issue in their election manifestos. By focusing on the issues that voters trust these parties on, established parties seek to make the election a referendum on their own issue. Parties have no interest in talking about the issues that new parties bring to the agenda in their election manifestos. They may be still forced, however, to address these issues in other fora during the election campaign. On the basis of the notion of a parliamentary or party system agenda, one would expect that parties devote attention to the issues that other parties put on the agenda in parliament (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010). Parties are expected by other parties and the media to join in all the parliamentary discussions. Moreover they have an interest in joining every discussion, because otherwise they leave the definition of the conflict to another party. This structured nature of parliamentary decision-making gives an advantage to new parties if they are able to exploit it. In general, new parties have more effect in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena. In the parliamentary arena the presence of a new party has a significant effect on the attention that established parties devote to issues, while this

is not the case in the electoral arena. This corroborates the political arena hypothesis (hypothesis 2 in table 8.1).

One may question to what extent election manifestos are a good measure for the attention that parties spend on issues and the position that they take on issues in the electoral arena. Election manifestos are written before the elections and serve as one of the inputs for the election campaign. They are however the only collection of party positions for the elections and the only texts on basis of which one can reasonably assess party priorities without the interference of other actors such as the media. They do however have a static quality. They do not capture the dynamic of the electoral campaign, where parties react to each others expressions during the campaign. In part, this may explain the lack of reaction by established parties to new parties in the election: as stated, election manifestos are the only document in which parties can express their views without the interference of the media, other parties and parliamentary officers. The evidence for anticipatory behaviour, however, shows that election manifestos can show marked responses to new political parties.

In addition to this effect on the extent to which new political parties influence the attention that established political parties devote to issues, one would also expect that the conditions under which new political parties have an effect differ from arena to arena. The new party activity hypothesis proposed concerns the effects of a new party's attention to its own issue on the attention that established parties would devote to that issue. One would expect this effect to be different in the electoral and in the parliamentary arena. The structured nature of parliamentary decision-making means that if a new party is able to set an issue on the agenda through its own activity, it forces other parties to engage in that issue. In the electoral arena, a new party's focus on its own issue should not have a marked effect on the attention that established parties devote to that issue. This is indeed the case, supporting the new party hypothesis (numbered 3). This pattern can be illustrated by the example of the PvdD: a party that focused on animal rights both in the parliamentary and the electoral arena. Through its activity in the parliamentary arena, it focused the attention of the entire parliament on agriculture. In contrast: its own focus on agriculture in its election manifesto did not elicit such reactions in the election manifestos of other parties. This means that new parties that refuse to follow the parliamentary agenda are actually able to set it. If one wants to set the parliamentary agenda, one must not follow it. This does not hold in the electoral arena.

Moreover, the electoral considerations hypothesis posited that electoral incentives play a different role in the electoral and the parliamentary arena. One would therefore expect that the electoral performance of an established party does matter for its reactions to new political parties in the electoral arena, while it does not in the parliamentary arena. This is indeed the case: the electoral performance of the established party was one of the few factors consistently influencing the different reactions of established parties to new parties in the electoral arena. In contrast, the electoral performance of the established party had no significant effect in the parliamentary arena. Electoral incentives do not play a role in the parliamentary arena, but the evidence suggests that they do play some role in the electoral arena. As hypothesised in the electoral considerations hypothesis (number 4), the electoral and the parliamentary arena differ in both the extent to which established political parties react to new political parties and in the conditions under which they do so.

In addition to these general hypotheses about the parliamentary and the electoral arena, and about new party attention and established party electoral performance, several hypotheses were posited about the conditions under which established political parties would react to new political parties independent of the arena. These concerned the relationship between the new and the established party, the characteristics of the new party, and the characteristics of the established party. While these results were discussed extensively in the empirical chapters, it may be useful to briefly summarise the results here and relate them to the bigger picture.

The basic notion behind the challenger hypothesis (number 5) is that, if parties feel challenged by a new party, they will respond to it and otherwise they will ignore it. In the different analyses of specific parties' reactions, in some cases imitation from challenged parties was observed, but sometimes they reacted less than all other parties. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected in every analysis. New parties may also feel challenged when a new party enters that shares a similar programme. This is the basic notion behind the ideological similarity hypothesis (number 7). This relationship only holds for the positional anticipatory behaviour of established parties in the electoral arena, but in parliament it is the parties at the other side of the political spectrum that show most reactions. This can be explained by the notion that Meguid (2005, 2007) proposed: established parties at the opposite side of the political spectrum can benefit electorally from engaging with a new party that challenges another party. The opposite of a challenger is a mobiliser: a party that focuses on a

new issue, which seeks to address an unaddressed constituency and that does not focus on a particular party. The mobiliser hypothesis (number 6) holds that these parties should elicit imitation from more parties than challengers. In general, mobilisers do elicit more imitation in terms of reactions in the parliamentary arena. When studying anticipatory behaviour in the electoral arena, however, the opposite pattern was found: the often unknown mobilisers elicited less anticipatory behaviour than other parties. This means that, indeed, these parties mobilised on issues that were not addressed by established parties.

One may also hypothesise that the size (number 8), level of organisation (number 9), and the government participation of new parties (number 10) matter for the reactions that they elicit. The main finding here is that in parliament parties that are larger, that are better organised and that are in government, elicit more effect of established political parties. This corroborates the idea that in the parliamentary arena, new political parties themselves are able to set the agenda. In addition to their own activity, the coherence and strength of a new party may strengthen its ability to effectively set the agenda. The effect of government participation may be statistically significant, but the case-by-case shows that is not substantially meaningful. In the electoral arena, new party size does matter for the extent to which they are anticipated by established parties in terms of position (number 11). This fits the assumption that electoral incentives play a role here. In contrast to the hypotheses, the organisation of new political parties has a negative effect on the reactions of established political parties in terms of positions, in both the electoral and the parliamentary arena. This indicates that several poorly organised parties were able to elicit more reactions.

The evidence points to a structural difference between the electoral and the parliamentary arena. As expected, in the parliamentary arena the presence of a new political party matters significantly for the attention that established political parties devote to issues. This effect is not present in the electoral arena. Due to the structured nature of parliamentary decision-making, new parties have a significant effect there. Moreover, as expected, the factors that matter in the parliamentary arena are characteristics of the new party (its attention to its own issue, its type, its size, its organisation), while in the electoral arena, for as far as one is able to discern meaningful, significant patterns, these are related to electoral considerations (most prominently the electoral performance of the established party).

8.3 Comparing countries

This study started with explicit expectations. Basing themselves on theories about political parties, authors have ascribed a special role to new political parties. According to Mair (1997b, 1997a), the real competition in the party system is between those who benefit from the established lines of conflict and those who want to introduce new lines of conflict. Daalder (1966) and Lijphart (1968) believed that new parties served as important sources of information about the dissatisfaction of the electorate for established political parties. In the view of Harmel and Svåsand (1997), the entry of new political parties could wake established parties up from their conservative, self-sufficing slumber. This was further reinforced by the claims that new parties made: they would change the way politics is done, they would show established parties what the real priorities were, and they would force established parties to change their positions.

The results of this study are more cautious, however, and therefore echo to some extent the conclusions of Huijbregts (2006). Specific new political parties have had an effect on established parties. On the whole, however, the effect of new political parties is limited: it is constrained by the political arena, as new parties elicit more reactions in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena; it is constrained by electoral considerations informing parties in the electoral arena and by mechanisms of agenda-control in the parliamentary arena; it is constrained in the electoral arena by timing with parties imitating more in anticipation than in reaction; and finally it is constrained because new parties tend to be co-opted into pre-existing alliances of the left and the right.

The question arises what these conclusions mean beyond the borders of the Dutch case. The Netherlands was selected as a most likely case. If new political parties would have an effect in any political system it would be here. The positive results found here do not mean that these mechanisms and patterns are likely to occur in other cases. In relatively closed systems there may still be mechanisms that ensure that established parties do not have to engage with new political parties. More important than the positive findings are the negative findings. The effect of new political parties was much more limited in the electoral than in the parliamentary arena. That means that it is unlikely that in other countries other parties will react to new parties in the electoral arena. Every new party that was studied was actually able to enter parliament, even if it won only two-thirds of a percent of the vote. And even

this electoral incentive did not cause established parties to react to new parties in general. Contrariwise, one may expect that new political parties in other countries are unable to create new lines of conflict in other parliaments, which completely upset parliamentary interaction between established political parties. It seems more likely that these new lines of conflict will remain weak and subjugated to the established lines of conflict.

There are two important caveats however. One may contest the extent to which the Netherlands is actually a most likely case. There are clear individual examples of new political parties that have led to more marked effect than the effects observed here: for instance in the Italian 1994 elections, when *Forza Italia* replaced DC (*Democrazia Christiana*/Christian Democracy) as the dominant party in Italian politics. Its entry influenced the Italian party system at a more fundamental level than any Dutch political party studied here. These are only individual cases: they say nothing about the effect of for example the PD (*Democrazia Proletaria*/Proletarian Democracy).

A more important problem has to do with the nature of the Dutch political system. It is well established that the Dutch political system is open to new political parties both in terms of the electoral system and the process of government formation (Mair 1997b). The openness of the electoral system (combined with the structured nature of decision-making in parliament) may actually benefit the ability of new political parties to influence the attention that established parties devote to issues in the parliamentary arena. The openness of the government formation procedures may benefit new political parties in terms of getting into office, but it constrains their ability to change the patterns of interaction in the parliamentary arena and therefore to upset the party system. As seen in the case of the LPF and D66, and to lesser extent for the PPR, PVV and DS'70, these threats to the stability of the party system were co-opted into alliances of the right and left. This hindered their ability to change the lines of conflict and instead reinforced the existing lines of conflict. In a system with more closed patterns of government formation, where new parties are left out, they may actually be able to create a new line of conflict, perhaps partially informed by the division between those who are in power and those who are outside of power. By co-opting new political parties into alliances of the left and right, Dutch political parties effectively diffuse these new conflicts and maintain the existing left-right dimension. This means that in terms of the systemic effect, the Netherlands may actually not be a

most likely case, and that if new parties get into parliament in other systems, they may potentially influence the party system more. Therefore, the Netherlands does not convincingly disprove the Schattschneider-Mair thesis, but it does provide considerably corroboration for the Mair-Bale thesis.

8.4 Further research

When considering avenues for further research, one needs to distinguish two different types of follow-up research: one can follow this research in a theoretical way and in a methodological way. First, this study found effects of new political parties on the attention that parties devoted to issues, but it also found that the consistent incorporation of new political parties into the existing left-right division influences their ability to change the established lines of conflict. As shown in section 8.3 the positive findings are not an end point. The Netherlands was selected as a most likely case. Whether in other countries, with more closed political systems, new parties have similar effects, is an open question. And even the negative findings are -to some extent- open for further examination. If the open process of government formation in the Netherlands may actually limit the ability of new political parties to create new lines of conflict, one should examine cases where new parties are more likely to have an effect to effectively disprove this hypothesis. The methods and hypotheses devised here can be extended to other cases, to examine the extent to which and the conditions under which new political parties in other systems influence established political parties.

A second finding that merits elaboration is the fact that some new parties follow and other new parties lead the political agenda. In the study of the attention in the parliamentary arena, the results showed some parties are able to set the parliamentary agenda after their entry, while others actually enter the parliamentary arena *after* there has been considerable attention to their own issue. A similar pattern was found in the electoral arena: on the whole, no evidence was found that established parties markedly change their election manifestos after the entry of new political parties. Instead, considerable evidence was found for the possibility of anticipatory behaviour. This evidence may however also indicate that new parties actually *enter* parliament because established parties devote attention to them: that the increased attention is actually not the effect of the entry of the new party but its cause. Lowery et al. (forthcoming) similarly found that the attention that established parties devote to

issues may actually benefit new political parties. Follow-up research is necessary to determine more precisely why some new parties are able to set the political agenda and others follow it.

There is a last reason for follow-up research. This research has shown that for studying the effects of new political parties, the strength of the political agenda or the patterned interaction between political parties, the parliamentary arena is more important than the electoral arena. The day-to-day politics in parliament may be much more informative of how established political parties master changes in their environment or are led by them. The focus of scholars of party politics on the short period of interaction between political parties in the elections, and related to that, the idea that in their election manifestos parties lay down their actual policy positions, is a weak point in the study of party politics. As Bardi and Mair (2008) have rightfully pointed out, the parliamentary and the electoral arena influence party strategies in those arenas, because these have their own mechanisms, incentives and constraints. The parliamentary arena should be regarded as just as important for the study of party politics as the electoral arena. Moreover, the structured nature of the parliamentary arena, the clear position-taking of parties in their parliamentary votes, and the host of instruments that parties have at their disposal, mean that from a methodological point of view, the parliamentary arena is an extremely rich source of data, which due to the internet and computer technology, has become more easily available to political scientists. Too little has been done to exploit the richness of this data to understand what politicians actually do. This study examined only the tip of the iceberg of what is actually possible. If further research takes anything from this study, it should be a greater interest of scholars of party politics to actual behaviour in the parliamentary arena.

Appendix 1: categorization scheme

One can see the categories used in this study in table 9.1. This categorization scheme is based on the categories of the Comparative Agendas Project. Several categories are adapted in order to link these categories better to specific new parties and to streamline voting patterns on these issues. The key changes are that a colonial affairs category has been separated out of the foreign affairs and governance category and that moral issue category has been created from parts of the healthcare, agriculture, justice and science categories. Pensioners' affairs have been moved from social affairs to healthcare. Animals have been moved from the environment to agriculture. Immigration has been removed from the labour category and combined with the civil rights category to form an immigration category.

Table 9.1: issue categories

#	Issue (long name)	Issue (short hand)	Comments
1	Macro-Economy and Taxation	Economic Affairs	
2	Integration and Immigration	Immigration	Immigration added
3	Healthcare and Pensioners' Affairs	Healthcare	Pensioners' affairs added Moral issues removed
4	Agriculture and Animals	Agriculture	Animals added Moral issues removed
5	Labour	Labour	Immigration removed
6	Education and Culture	Education	
7	Environment	Environment	Animals removed
8	Energy	Energy	
9	Transport	Transport	
10	Justice, Courts and Crime	Justice	Moral issues removed
11	Social Affairs	Social Affairs	Pensioners' affairs and moral issues removed
12	Community development, Housing and Urban Planning	Housing	
13	Enterprises, Banks and Internal Trade	Enterprise	
14	Defence	Defence	
15	Science, Technology and Communication	Science	Moral issues removed
16	Foreign Trade	Trade	
17	Foreign Affairs	Foreign Affairs	Development cooperation removed
18	Democracy and Governance	Governance	Colonial Affairs removed
19	Land, Nature and Water Management	Land Management	
20	Moral issues	Moral Issues	New Category
21	Colonial Relations and Development Cooperation	Colonial Affairs	New Category

Appendix 2: attention in the parliamentary arena

Additional regression models are included, which serve as robust checks of the results presented in chapter 5 in table 10.1 to 10.3.

Table 10.1: multivariate regressions for attention in parliament

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Dependent Variable	Change in parliamentary attention	Change in parliamentary attention
Intercept	-0.0445 (0.0768)	-0.065 (0.061)
New Party Activity	0.0032 (0.0025)	0.0028 (0.0020)
Challenged	0.0676 (0.0615)	0.0831* (0.0493)
Mobiliser	0.0745 (0.0466)	0.0731** (0.0311)
Party Distance	0.000 (0.0584)	-
New Party Size	-0.0094 (0.0057)	-0.0091* (0.0046)
New Party Organisation	-0.0402 (0.07366)	0.0016 (0.0571)
New Party in Government	0.2091*** (0.0466)	0.1897*** (0.0412)
Established Party Performance	0.00120* (0.0007)	0.0007 (0.0006)
R-Squared	0.200	0.145
N	105	165

Table 10.2: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (robustness check, 1)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
New Party Presence	0.014 (0.015)	-	-	-
New Party Attention	-	0.001 (0.001)	-	-
Challenged	-	-	0.065 (0.063)	-
Mobiliser	-	-	-	0.028 (0.021)
R-Squared	0.000	0.003	0.001	0.000

n=3336

Table 10.3: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (robustness check, 2)

Variable	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Intercept	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
New Party Presence	-	-	-	0.014 (0.015)
New Party Size	0.004 (0.003)	-	-	-
New Party Organisation	-	0.015 (0.016)	-	-
New Party Government	-	-	0.111*** (0.033)	-
Est. Party Performance	-	-	-	0.049*** (0.017)
Interaction Term	-	-	-	-0.025 (0.080)
R-Squared	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.003

n=3336

Appendix 3: party positions in the parliamentary arena

One and two-dimensional models of party positions were studied in chapter 5 and 7. This appendix provides overview of all position data used in chapter 4 (table 11.1 and 11.2). Moreover it provides the diagnostic statistics of these votes: for the models in chapter 5, the number of votes, the Aggregate Proportional Reduction in Error and the Percentage of Correctly Classified Choices (which express the extent to which votes can be modelled correctly under a set number of dimensions), the percentage of non-unanimous votes, and the correlation between single-dimensional models of voting before and after the entry of the new party. These are presented in table 11.3 to 11.13. An additional regression model is included in table 11.14. This serves as a robust check of the results presented in the chapter. The APRE for the models of parliamentary voting included in chapter 7 are presented in table 11.15. These tables also provide the sum of squares of the procrustean analyses and the correlations on the first and second dimensions of these superimposed models. Table 11.16 present the b-values and the R-squared values for the property fitting analyses for each of the single dimensional models.

Table 11.1: full party positions (1)

[illegible]

Table 11.2: full party positions (2)

Issue	Immigration		Health		Social Affairs/ Labour		Immigration			Governance		Agriculture	
Period	'77-81	'82	'89	'94	'89	'94	'98	'02-3	'06	'98	'02-3	'03	'06
SGP	1.5	5	3	7.5	3	4	3	5	4	1	6	3.5	4
VVD	3.5	2	1	12	2	2	1	1	2	8	9	2	2
CPN	3.5	7											
PSP	7.5	10											
GPV	1.5	3	4	9	5	5							
PvdA	9	6	7	10	8	9	6	8	6	7	5	8	6
D66	6	8	8	11	7	10	5	7	10	6	7	7	7
PPR	7.5	11											
CDA	5	12	6	3	6	3	2	3	3	3	3	3.5	3
RPF		4	5	7.5	4	6							
CP/CD		1	2	1	1	1							
EVP		9											
GL			9	4	9	12	8	10	9	5	4	9	8
SP				5		11	7	8	7	4	1	10	9
U55+				2		8							
AOV				6		7							
CU							4	6	5	2	7	6	5
LPF							4			2	1		
PVV							2	1			5	1	
PvdD									8				10

Table 11.3: diagnostic statistics concerning moral issues 1967-1977

Statistic	1967-1981	1971-1977	1977-1981	1981-1986
N	20	38	39	56
PCCC	0.92	0.90	0.93	0.89
APRE	0.70	0.57	0.69	0.49
% Unanimous	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.06
Correlation	0.94***		0.82***	

Table 11.4: diagnostic statistics concerning governance 1963-1977

Statistic	1963-1967	1967-1971	1971-1977
N	15	46	82
PCCC	0.90	0.91	0.92
APRE	0.65	0.58	0.70
% Unanimous	0.12	0.09	0.07
Correlation	0.92***		0.87***

Table 11.5: diagnostic statistics concerning the environment 1967-1977

Statistic	1967-1971	1971-1977
N	13	157
PCCC	0.94	0.91
APRE	0.80	0.60
% Unanimous	0.027	0.09
Correlation	0.90***	

Table 11.6: diagnostic statistics concerning economic affairs 1967-1977

Statistic	1967-1971	1971-1977
N	53	106
PCCC	0.94	0.92
APRE	0.64	0.64
% Unanimous	0.11	0.05
Correlation	0.85***	

Table 11.7: diagnostic statistics concerning defence 1977-1986

Statistics	1977-1982	1982-1986
N	34	39
PCCC	0.95	0.96
APRE	0.80	0.84
% Unanimous	0.06	0.10
Correlation	0.92***	

Table 11.8: diagnostic statistics concerning immigration 1977-1986

Statistic	1977-1982	1982-1986
N	13	48
PCCC	0.98	0.95
APRE	0.86	0.76
% Unanimous	0.17	0.15
Correlation	0.56	

Table 11.9: diagnostic statistics concerning health 1989-1998

Statistic	1989-1994	1994-1998	1998-2002
N	59	77	98
PCCC 1D	0.90	0.93	0.90
APRE 1D	0.49	0.55	0.53
Mean PCCC 2D	0.96	0.96	n/a
Mean APRE 2D	0.85	0.80	n/a
% Unanimous	0.24	0.20	n/a
Correlation 1D	-0.03		n/a
Correlation 2D D1	0.55		n/a
Correlation 2D D2	0.73**		n/a
Root of Squared Error	1.31		n/a

Table 11.10: diagnostic statistics concerning labour and social affairs 1989-1994

Statistic	1989-1994	1994-1998
N	91	117
PCCC	0.90	0.90
APRE	0.52	0.52
% Unanimous	0.15	0.15
Correlation	0.87***	

Table 11.11: diagnostic statistics concerning governance 1998-2006

Statistic	1998-2002	2002-2006
N	98	64
PCCC 1D	0.90	0.90
APRE 1D	0.63	0.57
Mean PCCC 2D	0.96	0.96
Mean APRE 2D	0.86	0.85
% Unanimous	0.26	0.20
Correlation 1D	0.02	
Correlation 2D D1	0.92***	
Correlation 2D D2	0.43	
Root of Squared Error	1.58	

Table 11.12: diagnostic statistics concerning immigration 1998-201

Statistic	1998-2002	2002-2006	2006-2010
N	95	116	80
PCCC	0.91	0.93	0.94
APRE	0.62	0.76	0.75
% Unanimous	0.13	0.15	0.05
Correlation	1***		0.86***

Table 11.13: diagnostic statistics concerning agriculture 2003-2010

Statistic	2003-2006	2006-2010
N	44	93
PCCC	0.95	0.93
APRE	0.83	0.77
% Unanimous	0.19	0.03
Correlation	0.97***	

Table 11.14: multivariate regression for position in parliament

Variable	Result
Dependent Variable	Change in parliamentary position
Intercept	0.144*** (0.047)
Challenged	-0.021 (0.038)
Mobiliser	0.0012 (0.024)
Party Distance	0.042 (0.025)
New Party Size	-0.007** (0.003)
New Party Organisation	-0.079* (0.045)
New Party in Government	0.028 (0.027)
Established Party Performance	0.000 (0.000)
R-Squared	0.116
N	114

Table 11.15: comparing two-dimensional models

Period	APRE ^a		Votes ^b	Procrustean Analysis		
	1D	2D		Sum of Squares ^c	Correlation ^d	
					D1	D2
1963-1967	0.544	0.877	128	-	-	-
1967-1971	0.574	0.812	394	0.430	0.944***	0.902***
1971-1977	0.653	0.819	1218	1.045	0.966***	0.700***
1977-1981	0.594	0.838	1180	0.944	0.968***	0.745
1981-1986	0.594	0.808	2005	1.142	0.985***	0.068
1986-1989	0.596	0.846	626	0.337	0.970***	0.959***
1989-1994	0.507	0.853	1324	0.763	0.914***	0.914***
1994-1998	0.441	0.722	1569	0.344	0.956***	0.946***
1998-2002	0.566	0.867	1395	0.134	0.970***	0.984***
2002-2006	0.617	0.848	1563	0.192	0.989***	0.967***
2006-2010	0.592	0.833	1627	2.406	0.958***	0.406
2010-2011	0.650	0.845	279	0.492	0.938***	0.894***

^a Measure of Error for One-Dimensional and Two-Dimensional Model;

^b Number of Votes;

^c Sum of Squared distances between solution in period 1 and period 2;

^d Correlation between vertical and horizontal dimension for period 1 and period 2.

Table 11.16: comparing voting on issues and systems

Period	Issue	B ₁	B ₂	R-Squared
1963-1967	Governance	-7.600 (2.625)	2.642 (1.420)	0.641
1967-1971	Governance	-14.875 (1.797)	3.164 (1.068)	0.883
1967-1971	Environment (broad)	-11.979 (1.797)	1.614 (1.066)	0.850
1967-1971	Economic Affairs	-15.009 (2.221)	0.2991 (1.320)	0.820
1967-1971	Moral issues	-11.340 (2.277)	1.592 (1.351)	0.760
1971-1977	Governance	-7.6973 (0.8858)	0.6937 (1.009)	0.873
1971-1977	Environment (broad)	-7.8583 (0.749)	0.3412 (0.8535)	0.850
1971-1977	Economic Affairs	-7.956 (1.057)	3.660 (1.094)	0.846
1971-1977	Moral issues	-7.480 (0.823)	-1.962 (0.9379)	0.890
1977-1981	Migration	-2.582 (0.790)	-2.590 (1.494)	0.727
1977-1981	Defence	-4.592 (0.524)	0.596 (0.804)	0.907
1977-1981	Moral issues	-4.441 (0.664)	0.6515 (1.019)	0.850
1981-1986	Migration	-3.584 (1.367)	2.430 (1.724)	0.502
1981-1986	Defence	-5.230 (0.519)	2.293 (0.655)	0.928
1981-1986	Moral issues	-3.315 (1.031)	-4.036 (1.554)	0.735
1989-1994	Health	-4.811 (1.689)	-0.436 (1.248)	0.741
1989-1994	Labour and Social Affairs	-5.142 (0.880)	-0.623 (0.940)	0.853
1994-1998	Health	-1.977 (2.508)	-2.725 (2.866)	0.140
1994-1998	Labour and Social Affairs	-7.408 (1.071)	-1.418 (1.224)	0.844
1998-2002	Migration	-4.768 (0.2615)	-0.625 (0.2755)	0.985
1998-2002	Governance	0.304 (0.796)	-4.733 (0.838)	0.865
2002-2006	Migration	4.755 (0.756)	0.068 (0.720)	0.872
2002-2006	Governance	-1.671 (1.727)	1.729 (1.644)	0.227
2002-2006	Agriculture	5.697 (0.405)	0.050 (0.385)	0.901
2006-2010	Migration	-5.242 (1.081)	-1.441 (1.576)	0.777
2006-2010	Agriculture	-5.508 (0.698)	-2.489 (1.018)	0.907

Appendix 4: attention in the electoral arena

In table 12.1 to 12.5 additional regression models are included, which serve as robust checks of the results presented in the chapter.

Table 12.1: multivariate regressions for attention in the electoral arena

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Dependent Variable	Reactive Change in Electoral Attention	Reactive Change in Electoral Attention
Intercept	0.280*** (0.088)	0.248* (0.125)
New Party Attention	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.003)
Challenged	-0.116 (0.172)	-0.054 (0.178)
Mobiliser	-0.136 (0.091)	0.092 (0.136)
Party Distance	-0.091 (0.305)	-0.625 (0.387)
New Party Size	0.006 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.016)
New Party Organisation	-	0.005 (0.011)
New Party Government	0.022 (0.133)	0.152 (0.149)
Established Party Performance	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)
R-Squared	0.114	0.201
N	151	93

Table 12.2: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (robustness check, 1)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.036*** (0.008)	0.038*** (0.007)	0.036*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.036*** (0.007)
New Party Presence	0.004 (0.034)	-	-	-	-
New Party Attention	-	-0.002 (0.001)	-	-	-
Challenged	-	-	-0.137 (0.148)	-	-
Mobiliser	-	-	-	-0.041 (0.044)	-
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	-0.005 (0.150)
R-Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos

Table 12.3: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (robustness check, 2)

Variable	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Intercept	0.035*** (0.003)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.008)
New Party Presence	-	-	-	0.007 (0.033)
New Party Size	0.001 (0.007)	-	-	-
New Party Organisation	-	0.081 (0.081)	-	-
New Party Government	-	-	0.058 (0.075)	-
Est. Party Performance	-	-	-	0.088** (0.043)
Interaction Term	-	-	-	-0.273 (0.171)
R-Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002

n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos

Table 12.4: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (robustness check, 1)

Variable	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
Intercept	0.022*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.006)
New Party Presence	-0.001 (0.028)	-	-	-	-
New Party Attention	-	-0.002 (0.001)	-	-	-
Challenged	-	-	-0.022 (0.128)	-	-
Mobiliser	-	-	-	-0.077** (0.038)	-
Party Distance	-	-	-	-	-0.013 (0.184)
R-Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000

n=4011, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=3967); all analyses by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos

Table 12.5: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (robustness check, 2)

Variable	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
Intercept	0.021*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.006)
New Party Presence	-	-	-	0.006 (0.029)
Divorce	0.061 (0.047)	-	-	-
New Party Size	-	0.003 (0.006)	-	-
New Party Organisation	-	-	-0.000 (0.006)	-
Est. Party Performance	-	-	-	0.028 (0.032)
Interaction Term	-	-	-	-0.326** (0.131)
R-Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002

n=4011, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=3967); all analyses by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos

Appendix 5: party positions in the electoral arena

An additional regression model is presented in table 13.1. This serves as a robustness check of the results presented in the chapter.

Table 13.1: multivariate regressions for position in the electoral arena

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Dependent Variable	Reactive Change in Electoral Position	Anticipatory Change in Electoral Position
Intercept	0.040*** (0.012)	0.293*** (0.075)
Challenged	-0.005 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.177)
Mobiliser	-0.011 (0.016)	0.035 (0.088)
Party Distance	-0.054 (0.057)	0.544 (0.350)
New Party Size	0.001 (0.003)	0.028** (0.012)
New Party Government	-0.027 (0.026)	-
Established Party Performance	-0.087** (0.034)	-0.010 (0.010)
R-Squared	0.060	0.064
N	161	161

Appendix 6: all new parties

Table 14.1 provides an overview of all parties that ran in elections for the *Tweede Kamer* between 1946 and 2010. Out of this list the new parties that are studied are selected. This list includes the party name in Dutch and English, the year in which the party first ran in elections, the election result, the inclusion and the reasons for (not) including the party.

Table 14.1: all parties that ran in *Tweede Kamer* elections 1946-2010

#	Party Name		First Election		Inclusion	
	Dutch	English	Year	Seats	Incl.	Reason
1	<i>Katholieke Volkspartij</i>	Catholic People's Party	1946	32	no	transformation
2	<i>Lijst-Bellamy</i>	List-Bellamy	1946	0	no	no representation
3	<i>Lijst-Lopez</i>	List-Lopez	1946	0	no	no representation
4	<i>Protestantse Unie</i>	Protestant Union	1946	0	no	no representation
5	<i>Partij van de Arbeid</i>	Labour Party	1946	29	no	merger
6	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>	Freedom Party	1946	6	no	transformation
7	<i>Lijst-Welter</i>	List-Welter	1948	2	yes	
8	<i>Middenstandspartij</i>	Small Business Party	1948	0	no	no representation
9	<i>Onafhankelijke Nationale Groep</i>	Independent National Group	1948	0	no	no representation
10	<i>Oud Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij</i>	Former Social-Democratic Workers' Party	1948	0	no	no representation
11	<i>Revolutionaire Communistische Partij</i>	Revolutionary Communist Party	1948	0	no	no representation
12	<i>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</i>	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	1948	0	no	transformation
13	<i>Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond</i>	Reformed Political League	1952	1 (1963)	yes	
14	<i>Jong Conservatief Verbond</i>	Young Conservative League	1952	0	no	no representation
15	<i>Katholiek Nationale Partij</i>	Catholic National Party	1952	2	no	transformation
16	<i>Partij voor Recht en Vrijheid</i>	Party for Justice and Liberty	1952	0	no	no representation
17	<i>Socialistische Unie</i>	Socialist Union	1952	0	no	no representation
18	<i>Nationale Oppositie Unie</i>	National Opposition Union	1956	0	no	no representation
19	<i>Nationale Unie</i>	National Union	1956	0	no	no representation
20	<i>BP/BMP</i>		1959	0	no	no representation
21	<i>Lijst-Wagenaar</i>	List-Wagenaar	1959	0	no	no representation
22	<i>Protestants-Christelijke Nationale Unie</i>	Protestant-Christian National Union	1959	0	no	no representation
23	<i>Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij</i>	Pacifist-Socialist Party	1959	2	yes	
24	<i>Boerenpartij</i>	Farmers Party	1963	3	yes	

Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010

#	Party Name		First Election		Inclusion	
	Dutch	English	Year	Seats	Incl.	Reason
25	<i>Christelijk Nationale Volkspartij</i>	Christian National People's Party	1963	0	no	no representation
26	<i>Lijst-Grol</i>	List-Grol	1963	0	no	no representation
27	<i>Liberale Staatspartij</i>	Liberal State Party	1963	0	no	no representation
28	<i>Nieuwe Democratische Partij</i>	New Democratic Party	1963	0	no	no representation
29	<i>Partij Economisch Appel</i>	Party Economic Appeal	1963	0	no	no representation
30	<i>Partij voor Volksreferendum</i>	Party for a Popular Referendum	1963	0	no	no representation
31	<i>Veilig Verkeer/100.000 woningen</i>	Safe Traffic/100.000 houses	1963	0	no	no representation
32	<i>Alarm</i>	Alarm	1967	0	no	no representation
33	<i>Christen-Democratische Unie</i>	Christian Democratic Union	1967	0	no	no representation
34	<i>Democraten '66</i>	Democrats 66	1967	7	yes	
35	<i>Landsbelangen</i>	National Interests	1967	0	no	no representation
36	<i>Lijst-Germeaux</i>	List-Germeaux	1967	0	no	no representation
37	<i>Lijst-Rodermond</i>	List-Rodermond	1967	0	no	no representation
38	<i>Lijst-Voogd</i>	List-Voogd	1967	0	no	no representation
39	<i>Liberale Volkspartij</i>	Liberal People's Party	1967	0	no	no representation
40	<i>Noodraad</i>	Emergency Council	1967	0	no	no representation
41	<i>Nederlandse Werknemerspartij</i>	Dutch Employees Council	1967	0	no	no representation
42	<i>Partij van het Recht</i>	Justice Party	1967	0	no	no representation
43	<i>Partij voor Ongehuwden</i>	Party for the Unmarried	1967	0	no	no representation
44	<i>Algemene Bejaardenpartij Nederland</i>	General Elderly Party Netherlands	1971	0	no	no representation
45	<i>Bejaarden en Arbeiderspartij</i>	Elderly and Workers' Party	1971	0	no	no representation
46	<i>Bejaardenpartij 65+</i>	Elderly Party 65+	1971	0	no	no representation
47	<i>Bejaardenpartij Algemeen Belang</i>	Elderly Party General Interest	1971	0	no	no representation
48	<i>Binding Rechts</i>	Binding Rightwing	1971	0	no	no representation
49	<i>Democraten 2000, Partij voor de Gewone Man</i>	Democrats 2000, Party for the Common Man	1971	0	no	no representation
50	<i>Democratisch Socialisten 1970</i>	Democratic Socialists 1970	1971	8	yes	
51	<i>Kabouters</i>	Leprechaun	1971	0	no	no representation
52	<i>Lijst-Van Velsen</i>	List-Van Velzen	1971	0	no	no representation
53	<i>Landelijke Part voor Bejaarden</i>	National Elderly Party	1971	0	no	no representation
54	<i>Nederlands Appel</i>	Dutch Appeal	1971	0	no	no representation
55	<i>Nieuwe Midden Partij</i>	New Centre Party	1971	2	yes	
56	<i>Nieuwe Roomse Partij</i>	New Roman Party	1971	0	no	no representation
57	<i>Politieke Partij Radicals</i>	Political Party Radicals	1971	0	no	no representation

Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010

#	Party Name		First Election		Inclusion	
	Dutch	English	Year	Seats	Incl.	Reason
58	<i>Positief Social-Democraten</i>	Positive Social-Democrats	1971	0	no	no representation
59	<i>Stichting Gedupeerde Groepen 18-65+</i>	Foundation for Disadvantaged Groups 18-65+	1971	0	no	no representation
60	<i>Anti-Woningnood Actie</i>	Anti Housing Shortage Action	1972	0	no	no representation
61	<i>Democratische Middenstandspartij</i>	Democratic Small Business Party	1972	0	no	no representation
62	<i>Lijst-Stam</i>	List-Stam	1972	0	no	no representation
63	<i>Rooms-Katholieke Partij Nederland</i>	Roman-Catholic Party Netherlands	1972	1	yes	
64	<i>Christen-Democratisch Appel</i>	Christian Democratic Appeal	1977	49	no	merger
65	<i>Democratisch Actiecentrum</i>	Democratic Action Centre	1977	0	no	no representation
66	<i>Europese Conservatieve Unie</i>	European Conservative Union	1977	0	no	no representation
67	<i>Federatie Bejaardenpartijen Nederland</i>	Federation Elderly Parties the Netherlands	1977	0	no	no representation
68	<i>Kommunistische Eenheidspartij Nederland</i>	Communist Unity Party Netherlands	1977	0	no	no representation
69	<i>Lijst-Griek</i>	List-Griek	1977	0	no	no representation
70	<i>Lijst-Jusia</i>	List-Jusia	1977	0	no	no representation
71	<i>Nederlandse Volksunie</i>	Dutch People's Union	1977	0	no	no representation
72	<i>Partij voor de Belastingbetalers</i>	Tax Payers' Party	1977	0	no	no representation
73	<i>Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie</i>	Reformed Political Federation	1977	2 (1981)	yes	
74	<i>Socialistische Partij</i>	Socialist Party	1977	2 (1994)	yes	
75	<i>Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur</i>	League against Bureaucratic Arbitrariness	1977	0	no	no representation
76	<i>Centrumpartij</i>	Centre Party	1981	1	yes	
77	<i>Evangelische Volkspartij</i>	Evangelical People's Party	1981	1	yes	
78	<i>God met Ons</i>	God with Us	1981	0	no	no representation
79	<i>International Kommunistenbond</i>	International Communist League	1981	0	no	no representation
80	<i>Kleine Partij</i>	Small Party	1981	0	no	no representation
81	<i>Leefbaar Nederland</i>	Liveable Netherlands	1981	0	no	no representation
82	<i>Nederlandse Evolutiepartij</i>	Dutch Evolution Party	1981	0	no	no representation
83	<i>Partij Likwidatie van Nederland</i>	Party for the Liquidation of the Netherlands	1981	0	no	no representation

Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010

#	Party Name		First Election		Inclusion	
	Dutch	English	Year	Seats	Incl.	Reason
84	<i>Partij voor Rijksgenoten</i>	Party for Kingdom inhabitants	1981	0	no	no representation
85	<i>Realisten '81</i>	Realists 81	1981	0	no	no representation
86	<i>Rechtse Volkspartij</i>	Rightwing People's Party	1981	0	no	no representation
87	<i>Save Our Souls</i>	Save Our Souls	1981	0	no	no representation
88	<i>Vredespartij</i>	Peace Party	1981	0	no	no representation
89	<i>Wereld Welzijn Bewustwording</i>	World Wellbeing Consciousness	1981	0	no	no representation
90	<i>Behoud Milieu Werk Maatschappij</i>	Keep Environment Work Society	1982	0	no	no representation
91	<i>Anti-Revolutionairen '85</i>	Anti-Revolutionaries '85	1986	0	no	no representation
92	<i>Centrum-Democraten</i>	Centre Democrats	1986	1 (1989)	no	transformation
93	<i>Federatieve Groenen</i>	Federated Greens	1986	0	no	no representation
94	<i>Humanistische Partij</i>	Humanist Party	1986	0	no	no representation
95	<i>Lijst-Brummer</i>	List-Brummer	1986	0	no	no representation
96	<i>Lijst-Wissink</i>	List-Wissink	1986	0	no	no representation
97	<i>Loesje</i>		1986	0	no	no representation
98	<i>Partij Algemeen Belang</i>	Party for the General Interest	1986	0	no	no representation
99	<i>Partij van Ambtenaren en Trendvolgers</i>	Party for Civil Servants and Trends Followers	1986	0	no	no representation
100	<i>Partij Geluk voor Iedereen</i>	Party for Happiness for Everyone	1986	0	no	no representation
101	<i>Partij voor de Middengroepen</i>	Party for Centre Groups	1986	0	no	no representation
102	<i>Socialistische Arbeiderspartij</i>	Socialist Workers' Party	1986	0	no	no representation
103	<i>Verbond Communisten Nederland</i>	League of Communists Netherlands	1986	0	no	no representation
104	<i>Anti-Werkeloosheidspartij</i>	Anti-Unemployment Party	1989	0	no	no representation
105	<i>Bejaarden Centraal</i>	Elderly Central	1989	0	no	no representation
106	<i>De Groenen</i>	The Greens	1989	0	no	no representation
107	<i>Grote Alliance Partij</i>	Large Alliance Party	1989	0	no	no representation
108	<i>GroenLinks</i>	GreenLeft	1989	6	no	merger
109	<i>Milieu Defensie Partij 2000+</i>	Environment Defense Party 2000+	1989	0	no	no representation
110	<i>Partij Democratisch-Socialisten</i>	Party Democratic Socialists	1989	0	no	no representation
111	<i>Politieke Partij voor Ouderen</i>	Political Party for the Elderly	1989	0	no	no representation
112	<i>Realisten Nederland</i>	Realists the Netherlands	1989	0	no	no representation
113	<i>Staatskundige Federatie</i>	Political Federation	1989	0	no	no representation
114	<i>Socialistische Minderheden Partij</i>	Socialist Minorities Party	1989	0	no	no representation

Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010

#	Party Name		First Election		Inclusion	
	Dutch	English	Year	Seats	Incl.	Reason
115	<i>Vooruitstrevende Minderhedenpartij</i>	Progressive Minorities Party	1989	0	no	no representation
116	<i>Vrouwenpartij</i>	Vrouwenpartij	1989	0	no	no representation
117	<i>Algemene Democratische Partij</i>	General Democratic Party	1994	0	no	no representation
118	<i>Algemeen Ouderenverbond</i>	General Pensioners' League	1994	6	yes	
119	<i>Centrumpartij '86</i>	Centre Party 86	1994	0	no	no representation
120	<i>De Nieuwe Partij</i>	The New Party	1994	0	no	no representation
121	<i>Libertarische Partij</i>	Libertarian Party	1994	0	no	no representation
122	<i>Nieuwe Communistische Partij Nederland</i>	New Communist Party Netherlands	1994	0	no	no representation
123	<i>Partij Democratisch Appel</i>	Party Democratic Appeal	1994	0	no	no representation
124	<i>Partij voor Milieu en Recht</i>	Party for the environment and Justice	1994	0	no	no representation
125	<i>Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij '92</i>	Pacifist-Socialist Party '92	1994	0	no	no representation
126	<i>Solidair '93</i>	Social '93	1994	0	no	no representation
127	<i>Socialistische Arbeiderspartij - Rebel</i>	Socialist Workers' Party - Rebel	1994	0	no	no representation
128	<i>Solidariteit Boerenpartij</i>	Solidarity Farmers' Party	1994	0	no	no representation
129	<i>Unie 55+</i>	Union 55+	1994	1	yes	
130	<i>Vrije Indische Partij</i>	Free Indian Party	1994	0	no	no representation
131	<i>Algemeen Ouderenverbond/Unie 55+</i>	General Pensioners' League/Union 55+	1998	0	no	no representation
132	<i>Idealisten/Jij</i>	Idealists & You	1998	0	no	no representation
133	<i>Het Kiezers Collectief</i>	The Electors' Collective	1998	0	no	no representation
134	<i>Katholieke Politieke Partij</i>	Catholic Political Party	1998	0	no	no representation
135	<i>Nederland Mobiel</i>	Netherlands Mobile	1998	0	no	no representation
136	<i>Nieuw Solidair Ouderen Verbond</i>	New Social Elderly League	1998	0	no	no representation
137	<i>Senioren 2000</i>	Seniors 2000	1998	0	no	no representation
138	<i>Natuurwetpartij</i>	Natural Law Party	1998	0	no	no representation
139	<i>ChristenUnie</i>	ChristianUnion	2002	4	no	merger
140	<i>Duurzaam Nederland</i>	Sustainable Netherlands	2002	0	no	no representation
141	<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>	List Pim Fortuyn	2002	26	yes	
142	<i>Partij van de Toekomst</i>	Party of the Future	2002	0	no	no representation
143	<i>Vrije Indische Partij/Ouderenunie</i>	Free Indian Party/Elderly Union	2002	0	no	no representation
144	<i>Verenigde Senioren Partij</i>	United Seniors Party	2002	0	no	no representation
145	<i>Republikeinse Volkspartij</i>	Republican People's Party	2002	0	no	no representation
146	<i>Leefbaar Nederland</i>	Liveable Netherlands	2002	2	yes	
147	<i>Alliantie Vernieuwing en Democratie</i>	Alliance Renewal and Democracy	2003	0	no	no representation

Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010

#	Party Name		First Election		Inclusion	
	Dutch	English	Year	Seats	Incl.	Reason
148	<i>De Conservatieven.nl</i>	The Conservatives.nl	2003	0	no	no representation
149	<i>Lijst-Ratelband</i>	List-Ratelband	2003	0	no	no representation
150	<i>Lijst-Veldhoen</i>	List-Veldhoen	2003	0	no	no representation
151	<i>Partij voor de Dieren</i>	Party for the Animals	2003	2 (2006)	yes	
152	<i>Ad Bos Collectief</i>	Ad Bos Collective	2006	0	no	no representation
153	<i>Continue Direct Democratie Partij</i>	Continuous Direct Democracy Party	2006	0	no	no representation
154	<i>Een NL</i>	One Netherlands	2006	0	no	no representation
155	<i>Groen Vrij Internet Partij</i>	Green Free Internet Party	2006	0	no	no representation
156	<i>Liberaal-Democratische Partij</i>	Liberal Democratic Party	2006	0	no	no representation
157	<i>Lijst 14</i>	List 14	2006	0	no	no representation
158	<i>Lijst 21</i>	List 21	2006	0	no	no representation
159	<i>Liefde, Respect en Vrijheid - Het Zeteltje</i>	Love, Respect, Freedom - the Small Seat	2006	0	no	no representation
160	<i>Lijst Vijf Fortuyn</i>	List Five Fortuyn	2006	0	no	no representation
161	<i>Nederland Transparant</i>	Netherlands Transparent	2006	0	no	no representation
162	<i>Partij voor Nederland</i>	Party for the Netherlands	2006	0	no	no representation
163	<i>Tamara's Open Partij</i>	Tamara's Open Party	2006	0	no	no representation
164	<i>Solide Multiculturele Partij</i>	Solid Multicultural Party	2006	0	no	no representation
165	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>	Freedom Party	2006	9	yes	
166	<i>Trots op Nederland</i>	Proud of the Netherlands	2010	0	no	no representation
167	<i>Partij voor Mens en Spirit</i>	Party for Human and Spirit	2010	0	no	no representation
168	<i>Piratenpartij</i>	Pirate Party	2010	0	no	no representation
169	<i>Lijst 17</i>	List 17	2010	0	no	no representation
170	<i>Nieuw Nederland</i>	New Netherlands	2010	0	no	no representation
171	<i>Partij Eén</i>	Party One	2010	0	no	no representation
172	<i>Heel NL</i>	Whole NL	2010	0	no	no representation
173	<i>Lijst 19</i>	List 19	2010	0	no	no representation

Source: Kiesraad (2011)

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Nederlandstalige samenvatting

De Nieuwkomer Nadoen.

Hoe, wanneer en waarom gevestigde politieke partijen de politieke posities en de aandacht voor thema's van nieuwe partijen over nemen in de electorale en de parlementaire arena: de casus van Nederland

Nieuwe politieke partijen hebben mogelijk een bijzondere rol in de politiek. Ze zouden invloed kunnen hebben op hoeveel aandacht bestaande politieke partijen besteden aan thema's en de posities die ze innemen op thema's. Sommige nieuwe partijen, zoals de dierenwelzijnspartij Partij voor de Dieren en de ouderenpartij Unie 55+ stelden dit doel expliciet voor zichzelf: ze gaven in interviews en programma's aan dat ze niet verwachten dat ze meteen een grote kiezersschare zullen krijgen, maar dat ze door hun aanwezigheid bestaande partijen willen dwingen om meer aandacht te besteden aan hun thema's of hun standpunten over te nemen. Andere partijen tonen grotere ambities. Zo wilde D66 het bestaande politieke stelsel opblazen. Nieuwe partijen kunnen op allerlei manieren indirect invloed uitoefenen op de bestaande partijen en het partijensysteem. Ze kunnen nieuwe onderwerpen op de agenda zetten, bestaande partijen dwingen om hun posities te veranderen, of de structuur van het partijensysteem veranderen. Dit onderzoek richt zich op deze indirecte effecten van nieuwe partijen.

Natuurlijk zijn er ook partijen die nog grotere verwachtingen hebben. Pim Fortuyn, de leider van de Lijst Pim Fortuyn zei ooit: "Ik word de volgende premier. Let maar op!"¹⁹⁵ Door toe te treden tot de regering kunnen nieuwe partijen direct invloed uitoefenen op beleid. Er zijn echter goede redenen van uit de politicologische theorie om een onderzoek te richten op het indirecte effect van nieuwe politieke partijen. Een aantal voornamelijk politicologen, zoals Downs, Daalder, Lijphart en Mair hebben voorgesteld dat nieuwe politieke partijen indirect effect kunnen hebben op het partijensysteem. Downs, bijvoorbeeld, stelde dat nieuwe partijen gevormd kunnen worden met het expliciete doel om de bestaande partijen te dwingen hun posities aan te passen. Hun hypothesen zijn echter nooit uitgebreid onderzocht. Dat is het doel van dit onderzoek.

¹⁹⁵ Pels, D. (2009) Mei 6 "Pim Leeft! Zeven jaar na de moord op Pim Fortuyn" *De Groene Amsterdammer*

Politieke partijen zijn conservatieve organisaties, die niet snel geneigd zijn om hun politieke posities te veranderen, behalve als ze zich daartoe voelen gedwongen vanuit electorale overwegingen. Iedere zetel die een nieuwe partij wint, is afkomstig van een bestaande partij. Dus zelfs als nieuwe partijen kleine oppositiepartijen blijven, kunnen ze invloed uit oefenen op de beleidsposities van bestaande partijen, en daarmee op het overheidsbeleid. Zo kunnen nieuwe partij invloedrijke actoren zijn - zij het indirect door hun invloed op bestaande partijen.

Maar nieuwe partijen kunnen niet alleen invloed uitoefenen door stemmen te winnen van bestaande partijen. In het parlement kunnen andere mechanismen een rol spelen. De besluitvorming in het parlement volgt vaak vaste paden: de aard van het politieke conflict staat vast, de conflictslijnen zijn getrokken, daarom staan de meerderheden ook al vast en dus ook de uitkomsten van besluitvorming. De geïnstitutionaliseerde, gestructureerde besluitvorming in het parlement kan nieuwe politieke partijen marginaliseren. Het is echter ook mogelijk dat nieuwe partijen deze mechanisme uitbuiten en een grote invloed kunnen hebben op besluitvorming. Nieuwe politieke partijen kunnen een externe schok zijn die de geïnstitutionaliseerde parlementaire besluitvorming ontregelen. Zo kunnen ze nieuwe onderwerpen op de parlementaire agenda zetten en de aard van het politieke conflict veranderen.

Volgens Mair hebben nieuwe partijen een bijzondere rol in politieke competitie. Mair dat de politieke competitie tussen nieuwe en bestaande partijen even belangrijk is als de competitie tussen bestaande partijen. Bestaande partijen hebben er belang bij om de bestaande conflictslijnen in stand te houden: de bestaande linkse en rechtse partijen ontlenen hun posities in het partijenstelsel en hun legitimiteit aan deze conflictslijn. Nieuwe partijen hebben er belang bij om nieuwe conflictslijnen te introduceren en daarmee het politieke conflict te herdefiniëren. Dit betekent echter ook dat bestaande partijen er een bijzonder belang bij hebben om nieuwe partijen op te nemen in politieke bondgenootschappen. Mair en Bale stellen dat de coöptatie van nieuwe partijen in linkse of rechtse politieke allianties de bestaande links-rechts-dimensie versterken. Hierdoor zou het aantal dimensies in het politieke systeem zelfs kunnen verminderen.

Nieuwe politieke partijen kunnen dus politieke verandering teweeg brengen. Het onderzoek in dit veld is beperkt, zo stelde Harmel. Sindsdien zijn er een aantal studies naar het effect van nieuwe partijen geweest. Norris noemt de *case-study* van Harmel and Svåsand het meest systematische onderzoek. Er zijn een aantal studies

gepubliceerd daarna maar deze richten zich op specifieke nieuwe partijen of specifieke partijfamilies.¹⁹⁶ Dit onderzoek is uniek omdat het zich richt op alle nieuwe partijen, die een parlement binnen treden.

Dit onderzoek probeert een antwoord te geven op de vraag in welke mate en onder welke voorwaarden nieuwe partijen invloed uitoefenen op bestaande partijen en partijsystemen. Dit onderzoek kijkt naar alle reacties van bestaande partijen, zowel in termen van aandacht voor onderwerpen als de positie op die onderwerpen. Het richt zich zowel op de parlementaire arena, als op de electorale arena. Ten slotte, kijkt het zowel naar het effect van nieuwe partijen op bestaande partijen en op het partijenstelsel.

Dit onderzoek richt zich op de reacties van alle bestaande partijen op alle nieuwe partijen in één land, Nederland, sinds 1946. De reden om een enkel land te onderzoeken is dat op deze manier eigenschappen van het politieke stelsel die invloed kunnen hebben op de mate nieuwe partijen invloed kunnen hebben op bestaande partijen, constant worden gehouden. Omdat Nederland zo'n open politieke systeem heeft, zeker in termen van het kiesstelsel is er een groot aantal nieuwe en bestaande partijen om te onderzoeken. Nieuwe partijen zijn in dit onderzoek gedefinieerd als organisaties die verkozen vertegenwoordigers in het parlement hebben voor de eerste keer en niet gevormd zijn als een transformatie van een bestaande partij of als een fusie van twee bestaande partijen. Dit onderzoek richt zich op de invloed van negentien nieuwe partijen op gemiddeld negen bestaande partijen. Deze nieuwe partijen staat in tabel 15.1. De uitkomsten van dit onderzoek hebben ook betekenis buiten de grenzen van Nederland. Nederland is geselecteerd als een meest waarschijnlijke casus om effecten te zien van nieuwe partijen. Met het grote aantal en zeer diverse aanbod van nieuwe partijen is het waarschijnlijk dat als nieuwe partijen invloed hebben op bestaande partijen, men dat hier kan zien. Als er geen effect van nieuwe partijen wordt waargenomen in Nederland, dan is het onwaarschijnlijk dat dit buiten Nederland wel gevonden kan worden.

¹⁹⁶ Er is mij maar een onderzoek bekend dat naar nieuwe partijen in het algemeen kijkt. Het onderzoek van Huibregts (2006).

Tabel 15.1: nieuwe partijen in de Tweede Kamer sinds 1946

Naam	Afk.	Verkozen	Ideologie
Katholieke Nationale Partij	KNP	1948	Rechts-Katholicisme
Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij	PSP	1959	Links-Socialisme
Boerenpartij	BP	1963	Conservatisme
Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond	GPV	1963	Orthodox Protestantisme
Democraten '66	D66	1967	Pragmatisme Radicale Democratie
Politieke Partij Radicalen	PPR	1971	Progressief Christendom
Democratisch Socialisten '70	DS'70	1971	Sociaal-democratie
Nederlandse Middenstandspartij	NMP	1971	Anti-belastingpopulisme
Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland	RKPN	1972	Orthodox Catholicisme
Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie	RPF	1981	Orthodox Protestantisme
Evangelische Volkspartij	EVP	1982	Progressief Christendom
Centrumpartij	CP	1982	Radicaal Nationalisme
Algemeen Ouderen Verbond	AOV	1994	Ouderenbelangen
Politieke Unie 55+	U55+	1994	Ouderenbelangen
Socialistische Partij	SP	1994	Socialisme
Leefbaar Nederland	LN	2002	Democratisch Populisme
Lijst Pim Fortuyn	LPF	2002	Liberaal Nationalisme
Partij voor de Dieren	PvdD	2006	Groene politiek
Partij voor de Vrijheid	PVV	2006	Liberaal Nationalisme

De belangrijkste uitkomst van dit onderzoek is dat er een groot verschil is tussen de parlementaire en de electorale arena. Terwijl in de parlementaire arena de binnenkomst van een nieuwe partij over het algemeen leidt tot een reactie van de bestaande partijen, is dit minder duidelijk voor de electorale arena. Waar het gaat om aandacht voor onderwerpen kan er een directe vergelijking gemaakt worden tussen beide arena's. In de parlementaire arena leidt de aanwezigheid van een nieuwe partij tot een verandering van de aandacht voor het onderwerp van die partij. In de electorale arena gaat dit niet op: er kan wel voor sommige nieuwe partijen een effect gevonden worden voor sommige bestaande partijen. Het verschil in de reacties tussen deze twee arena's heeft te maken met de aard van deze twee arena's. In de parlementaire arena is er een parlementaire agenda waar bestaande partijen zich aan moeten houden, terwijl in de electorale arena bestaande partijen er belang bij hebben om zich te richten op hun eigen onderwerpen.

De aard van de politieke arena heeft effect op de manier waarop bestaande partijen reageren op nieuwe partijen. De parlementaire agenda is een bijzonder politiek construct: aan de ene kant, geven politieke partijen zelf vorm aan de parlementaire agenda door hun eigen initiatieven. Aan de andere kant beperkt de

parlementaire agenda waar nieuwe partijen over kunnen spreken. Door de parlementaire agenda te veranderen, kunnen nieuwe partijen de activiteiten van individuele partijen beïnvloeden. Door bijvoorbeeld zelf actief te zijn op het eigen onderwerp, kunnen nieuwe partijen de definitie van het politieke conflict beïnvloeden. Om controle te houden over de definitie van het conflict op dat onderwerp, moeten bestaande partijen zelf actief worden op dat onderwerpen. Door zich zelf los te maken van de parlementaire agenda kunnen nieuwe partijen de parlementaire agenda beïnvloeden.

In de parlementaire arena hebben de eigenschappen van nieuwe partijen een effect hebben op de reacties van bestaande partijen: sterker georganiseerde nieuwe partijen, nieuwe partij die meer zetels hebben gehaald en nieuwe partijen die meer aandacht besteden aan hun eigen onderwerpen, veroorzaken meer reacties dan nieuwe partijen die slechter zijn georganiseerd, kleiner zijn en minder aandacht besteden aan hun eigen onderwerpen. Ook kan er een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen mobiliserende en uitdagende nieuwe partijen. Mobiliserende nieuwe partijen proberen een nieuw onderwerp op de agenda te brengen, terwijl uitdagende nieuwe partijen een bestaande partij uitdagen op zijn eigen onderwerp. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat mobiliserende nieuwe partijen inderdaad nieuwe onderwerpen op de agenda zetten: er is meer aandacht voor die onderwerpen en er wordt vaker verdeeld overgestemd over deze onderwerpen. Voor uitdagende partijen is er geen verandering in aandacht zichtbaar. Noch is het zo dat de partijen die ze uitdagen van positie veranderen. Wel is het zo dat grote partijen aan de overkant van het politieke spectrum een extremere positie innemen. Dit kan begrepen worden vanuit het strategisch perspectief van Meguid: deze grote partijen proberen de uitgedaagde partij in het nauw te brengen door het conflict aan te gaan met diens uitdager.

Waar het gaat om de posities van bestaande partijen op vraagstukken, zien we dat de binnenkomst een nieuwe partij in de parlementaire arena samenhangt met de polarisatie van eerder nog niet-gepolariseerde vraagstukken en het versterken van het politieke conflict op dat onderwerp. Nieuwe partijen creëren geen nieuwe conflicten, maar brengen nieuw leven in bestaande conflicten.

Er is geen bewijs dat de aanwezigheid van nieuwe partijen per se ertoe doet voor de aandacht die nieuwe partijen besteden aan onderwerpen in hun verkiezingsprogramma's na hun binnenkomst. Voor zo ver we betekenisvolle patronen vinden, lijken bestaande partijen nieuwe partijen sterker te anticiperen, dan dat ze op

nieuwe partijen reageren na hun binnenkomst. Zowel voor aandacht als voor posities geldt dat er meer betekenisvolle relaties gevonden zijn voor anticiperend gedrag dan voor reactief gedrag. Bij het schrijven van verkiezingsprogramma's zijn nieuwe partijen niet zo zeer bezig met het winnen van de laatste slag, maar -onder specifieke voorwaarden- zijn nieuwe partijen zeer bewust van het conflict dat ze die verkiezingen aan zullen gaan. Bestaande politieke partijen zijn conservatieve organisaties die alleen op hun omgeving reageren als ze verkiezingen hebben verloren: Als bestaande partijen de verkiezingen hebben verloren hebben ze een reden om op hun omgeving te reageren. Het meest consistente patroon dat is gevonden in de electorale arena is dat nieuwe partijen het sterkst reageren en anticiperen op nieuwe partijen, als ze de voorgaande verkiezingen hebben verloren. Dit geldt zowel voor aandacht als voor positie.

Het effect van nieuwe partijen op het partijsysteem is onderzocht in het parlement, waar op het niveau van de individuele partij de sterkste reacties zijn waargenomen. Als nieuwe partijen effect zouden hebben op de conflictslijnen dan is het hier. Voor zo ver als veranderingen van conflictslijnen teruggebracht kunnen worden naar nieuwe partijen, duidt de data erop dat nieuwe partijen geassocieerd worden met het verminderen van de dimensionaliteit van partijsystemen. Dit is in tegenstelling met de verwachtingen die op basis van het werk van Mair, Schattschneider en Pellikaan et al. geformuleerd zijn. Dit kan verklaard worden door twee mechanismen: op de onderwerpen die nieuwe partijen introduceren, volgen partijposities de links-rechts-dimensie; en omdat nieuwe partijen worden gecoöpteerd in linkse of rechtse bondgenootschappen wordt de links-rechts-dimensie versterkt. Dit laatste is eerder voorgesteld door Mair en Bale: de integratie van nieuwe partijen in linkse en rechtse allianties versterkt de bimodale competitie. Dat de bestaande politieke partijen zo succesvol zijn geweest in het uitschakelen van nieuwe politieke partijen, versterkt het belang van het conflict dat Mair heeft beschreven: in het conflict tussen zij die een belang hebben bij het in stand houden van de bestaande conflictslijn, en zij die de bestaande conflictslijn willen vervangen door een nieuwe conflictslijn, heeft de eerste groep vrij consistent gewonnen.

Dit onderzoek toetst de bestaande theorieën over het effect van nieuwe partijen en de ambities die nieuwe partijen zelf hebben uitgesproken in een enkele casus. De uitkomsten van het onderzoek moeten daarom voorzichtig geïnterpreteerd worden: specifieke nieuwe partijen hebben effect op specifieke bestaande partijen.

Over het algemeen, is het effect van nieuwe partijen afhankelijk van de politieke arena. Het is de vraag of de resultaten van dit onderzoek relevantie hebben buiten de grenzen van de Nederlandse casus. Nederland is geselecteerd als een meest waarschijnlijk casus. Als nieuwe partijen effect hebben, dan is het hier. Positieve resultaten betekenen niet dat de mechanismen en patronen die gevonden zijn noodzakelijkerwijs in andere landen voorkomen. In meer gesloten systemen, kunnen er nog steeds mechanismen zijn die ervoor zorgen dat bestaande partijen geen rekening hoeven te houden met nieuwe partijen. De negatieve resultaten van dit onderzoek zijn daarom des te betekenisvoller: als zelfs in Nederland, met een open kiestelsel de aanwezigheid van nieuwe partijen in de electorale arena niet leidt tot reacties van bestaande partijen, is het niet waarschijnlijk dat dit in andere landen wel zo is. Noch is het waarschijnlijk dat de binnenkomst van nieuwe partijen in deze systemen zal leiden tot nieuwe conflictslijnen. Ook hier zullen de nieuwe conflictslijnen zwak blijven of geïntegreerd worden in de bestaande links-rechts-tegenstelling. Het is de vraag of Nederland een meest waarschijnlijke casus is: door de openheid van het politieke systeem kunnen bestaande partijen geïmmuniseerd zijn voor nieuwe partijen. Terwijl in andere systemen de binnenkomst van een nieuwe partij een schok voor het systeem is, hoort het in Nederland bij een verkiezing dat in de marge van het systeem een nieuwe partij ontstaat. Bestaande partijen kijken daar niet meer van op. Alleen als nieuwe partijen door hun eigen activiteit de parlementaire agenda beïnvloeden, dan moeten bestaande partijen wel reageren. Daarnaast kan de openheid van de kabinetsformatie, waar een aantal nieuwe partijen al snel bij betrokken raakten, het vermogen van nieuwe partijen om in het parlement nieuwe conflictslijnen te introduceren ernstig belemmeren. Dit onderzoek in dit ene land vormt geen finale ontkrachting van de Schattschneider-Mair thesis, maar het vormt wel een ondersteuning van de Mair-Bale thesis.

Curriculum Vitae

Simon Otjes (Schagen, 5 November 1984) graduated from the Murmellius Gymnasium in Alkmaar in 2003. He obtained a bachelor's degree in both political science and philosophy of the social sciences in 2006. In 2008, he obtained a research master's degree in political science *cum laude*, specialising in party politics. In the same year, he also obtained a master's degree in philosophy of the social sciences, specialising in liberal political theory. During his studies, he worked as a teaching and research assistant at the Institute of Political Science. Between 2008 and 2011 he was a PhD-researcher at this institute.

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