Borders in dispute : the construction of state and nation in international diplomacy

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Chapter 6

A Sociological Analysis of Practices in Boundary Politics: Military Officers and Ethnic Division in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The republican boundaries were maintained upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in accordance with the *uti possidetis* principle. The struggle to change these boundaries however continued in several independent republics. This demanded reinforcement of territoriality in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet the outcome of the negotiation process was *de facto* partition along ethnic lines. The 1995 Dayton Agreement ensured the continued international existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand. It *de jure* endorsed the earlier decision to maintain Yugoslavia's republican boundaries, leaving the international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina intact. Yet it codified an internal division of territory between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska on the other hand. The two ethnically organised entities share a central government, with a rotating State Presidency, but each entity has largely autonomous political power. They have their own political structures and even control over foreign affairs and the legitimate use of force rests in the entities rather than with the central government. Hence on the ground, the agreement contrasts the earlier decision and separates the peoples between territories on the basis of their ethnicity.

In this chapter, I analyse how possibilities to define the territorial arrangements for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina were narrowed down to the outcome of internal division of territory between ethnic communities. I argue that it was the outcome of an international negotiation process in which nationalism was legitimised by the military's belief that antagonistic ethnic communities needed to be separated in territorial units for a

defensible peace and order. President Milošević of the Republic of Serbia continued upon dissolution his efforts to change borders through ethnic cleansing and forced migration with the leaders of the Serb community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This contradicted the security map of the professionals of politics in Europe, who had insisted on boundary maintenance in negotiations concerning Yugoslavia's dissolution to discourage aggressive nationalism and prevent state break-ups in nation-states. It thus enabled a different set of actors to gain recognition of their expertise and thus influence in the practice of boundary politics. Military officers rose to power in the negotiations for a violent dispute in which they were professionally trained to operate. They had fundamentally different conceptions of security threats related to territories and populations than the professionals of politics in Europe.

Military professionals in the negotiation process concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina generally shared a *doxa* that the implementation of a peace accord required defensibility and they interpreted the situation on the ground such that this meant a division of territory between the ethnic communities. They considered under the hostilities that the ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were inherently antagonistic and would be inflexible in a process of reconciliation. Hence peace and order for them demanded the communities to be separated in territorial units that they could sustain militarily. Military officers of international forces represented by Colonel Colm Doyle on this basis established the need to accommodate the Bosnian Serb community in territorial separation early in the negotiation process. Quickly following the outbreak of violence at the end of February 1992, they were able to convince international negotiators as their trained representatives on the ground in Sarajevo. Yet many professionals of politics in the United Nations and the European Community remained convinced to reinforce territoriality and civic nationhood. They appointed (former) politicians and civil servants to negotiate in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia who were likely and often proven supporters of this idea. At the initiative of Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek and his German colleague Klaus Kinkel, these negotiators indeed developed a territorial arrangement for integration of peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The military representatives regained influence in the negotiation process with the conflict's escalation. The 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan was rejected under the pressure of officials from the Army of the Republika

Srpska, while the international forces became permanently represented with the appointment of Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting as an adviser to conference chairman Lord Owen in November 1992. The military representatives gained particular authority over the territorial solution to the conflict as map experts informed about the geopolitical strategic realities of war and the intricacies of implementing peace. And although they set out to prevent ethnic balkanisation, they endorsed a representation of the war as ethnic and intractable. Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg as well as the politicians assembled in the Contact Group no longer considered themselves 'formulators' of ideas trying to unite peoples in a single territory; they rather saw their task as mediating stances developed by representatives of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs. Under these circumstances, the military representatives of the international forces justified a *de facto* ethnic division of territory as the only 'feasible' or 'realistic' solution to bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In their effort to separate the warring parties in defensible units, they hence served as a conduit for acceptability of their nationalist agendas.

These findings are in contrast with existing explanations. Groups of negotiators disagreed on the territorial solution, and one needs to consider actors in addition to context in order to find that the different conceptualisations of peace and order correspond to different past experiences and practices. It was indeed the interplay and sequencing between professionals of politics and the military that ensured maintenance of the republican boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina; professionals of politics in Europe defined the international borders before the latter entered to settle disputes by territorial division within these bounds. This contradicts much constructivist and English School theorisation in International Relations literature on norm-driven behaviour towards territorial stability in boundary politics. While Fabry (2010: 205) cites Lord Owen in saying that international diplomacy "stuck unyieldingly to the internal boundaries of the six republics within the former Yugoslavia," a detailed analysis of the negotiations shows that various actors in the negotiation process did not subscribe to the republican boundaries. Particularly the military officers did not share this norm, but also civil servants in the end found their exploration of territorial arrangements not limited by an international norm. In fact, the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina itself is evidence of a contested practice in line with the *uti possidetis* principle in the Yugoslav space.

This also means that the *uti possidetis* principle did not function as a lowest common denominator or 'focal point' for negotiators. Indeed, boundary maintenance did not bring certainty in the Balkans and was not taken as a guiding principle in negotiations concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neoliberal institutionalists like Zacher (2001) and Carter and Goemans (2011: 284) argue that borders that do not follow administrative boundaries are uncertain and thus "likely to greatly slow or even prevent that border from becoming a stable institution". Yet the deliberations for drawing the Inter-Entity Boundary Line reveal the military representatives contrarily considered the existing administrative borders unstable and hence costly to maintain. They thought that these borders were indefensible in Bosnia and Herzegovina because they did not represent the situation on the ground.

This logic is based on belief or *doxa* that sustainable peace requires defensible provisions. The military officers took ethnic separation in the conflict for granted and thus considered the war intractable and in need of defensible territorial divisions. Yet Gagnon (2004: 1-5) finds that this is at odds with evidence from on the ground, where many did not mobilise for their ethnic community while communities remained internally divided. He argues that ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina was fluid in fact, but that political leaders reconceptualised it to demobilise opposition for economic and political liberalisation in the state. Campbell (1999; 2000) similarly finds that the war was not between three fixed ethnic communities. With local forces contesting the nationalist imaginary and all parties to the conflict agreeing to multi-ethnicity with the signing of the 1992 London Principles, the military logic of what was and was not possible was not purely rational (Campbell, 1999: 424). It was based on a contestable representation of reality that was hardly questioned among military officers in the negotiation process and refrained them from comprehensively pursuing alternative territorial arrangements. They believed in codification of the geopolitical strategic realities of ethnic separation to prevent violence in the future.

It was then not the professionals of politics from powerful states who defined outcomes in the negotiation process concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, as realists in International Relations literature presume. Coggins (2011: 449) finds that "Great Powers" determine how and when new states are formed while Castellino and Allen (2003: 112) maintain that "the European powers" ensure territorial sovereignty. Yet particularly army officers shared the security map for an ethnic solution in Bosnia

and Herzegovina, which military representatives of the international forces then 'sold' in the negotiation process. Professionals of politics intervened several times to reinforce territoriality and civic nationhood, but their ideas were rejected because the military had an alternative understanding of their 'national interest' on the basis of a desire not to get (militarily) captured in an escalatory dispute rather than to maintain the international territorial order. Indeed, realists do not account for the fact that success in negotiations depended on implementation, which gave representatives of the warring parties and especially army officials a position of power to determine outcomes. This power rested not in coercion, as realists presume, but depended on relations with representatives of international forces, whose influence in the negotiation process in turn resulted from their authority as informed experts in map-making. Analysis of the negotiations concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates that the military was key in transporting the ethnic solution from the battleground to the negotiation table.

In this chapter, I first analyse how the parameters were set for the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I find that as representatives trained to operate in violent disputes, army officers from international forces introduced accommodation of the Bosnian Serb pursuit of separation early in the negotiation process. They generally considered the hostilities a dispute between ethnic communities that was in need of a defensible territorial arrangement. I then continue by exploring how this security map was mobilised to pave the way for internal division of territory. I trace that it met opposition initially from a number of professionals of politics, which developed in an effort to codify territorial unity and integration in the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan. When this proved unacceptable particularly to General Ratko Mladić from the Army of the Republika Srpska, the conflict had escalated to reestablish the influence of military officers from international forces in the negotiation process. They endorsed the military logic for ethnic separation, gaining particular control over the territorial arrangement. This leads to the conclusion that the acceptance of an internal territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina was fundamentally based in the *doxa* of military officers for pacification through defensibility, which added a layer of military justification to the nationalist agenda that made the unacceptable ethnic solution acceptable in the negotiation process.

Military officers in international forces and a threat to order

The military's logic for territorial division

The first republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gained recognition of their independence in December 1991. As chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia that had hosted international negotiations for boundary maintenance on dissolution of the federation, Lord Carrington then asked conference coordinator José Cutileiro two months later to lead a first round of negotiations in Bosnia and Herzegovina on future constitutional arrangements involving the Muslim, Serb and Croat parties that formed the coalition government (Cutileiro, 1992). José Cutileiro had been tasked coordinator of the negotiation process since Minister of Foreign Affairs João de Deus Pinheiro took over the seat of EC President in January 1992. But when he arrived with Lord Carrington to begin talks on 13-14 February 1992 at Villa Konak in Sarajevo, military officers were already present in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the European Community Monitor Mission to foreground the need to accommodate the Bosnian Serb community in its desire to create a separate territorial entity (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2012).

The EC Monitor Mission had been established with the 1991 Brioni Agreement to observe and report on the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army from the republic of Slovenia. President Slobodan Milošević of the Republic of Serbia however continued after dissolution of the Yugoslav federation his struggle to change the republican borders in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He wished to accommodate unification of the Serb nationals, which incited violent strategies to cleanse certain areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, political leaders of the Bosnian Serb community started to organise in autonomous oblasts – that is, areas which they had declared autonomous as part of the 'Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina' or 'Republika Srpska' – months before international recognition of the republican borders in April 1992. "[The current] borders do not really exist. We should follow ethnic principles in establishing new borders," said Radovan Karadžić, President of the Republika Srpska and close political ally of President Milošević, illustrating the nationalist intentions of territorial separation (Harden, 1991: A08).

International forces were then also sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a military officer trying to carry out the mandate, head of the EC Monitor Mission Colonel Colm Doyle considered hostilities inspired by the Bosnian

Serb "determination to take control over territory that suited the purpose to adjoin the Republic of Serbia".[89] He believed under this violence that ethnicities would be inflexible in a process of reconciliation. "There is a lot of ethnic violence," he reported in *Associated Press* on 14 January 1992. "A great many people here are armed" (Rosenblum, 1992). Three months later, a few days before the international recognition of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he told journalists from *The Hamilton Spectator* that "[t]he ethnic divisions are so wide now that the implementation may be impossible because these people want to fight" ('World Digest', 1992). Colm Doyle thus followed intelligence reporting in characterising tensions as grounded in ethnic solidarities and hatreds, rather than a reality of fluid alliances (NIOD, 2002: 48). Viewing the situation from the battlefield, he thought that relations between groups were inevitably mutually exclusive and segregated in the state Bosnia and Herzegovina.[90]

This representation of order in Bosnia and Herzegovina was grounded in his background as a military officer. Colonel Doyle had experience in a Foreign Service mission with the 11th infantry Group of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus. Ten years later, he served in Lebanon with the United Nations Interim Force after which he was a military observer with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East monitoring the separation of armies behind the 'Green Line' drawn in the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Colm Doyle considered particularly the latter experience of "considerable benefit" to work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this experience in enforcing territorial separation between warring factions, he was likely to endorse a division in the violent circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, he considered that if the Bosnian Serb community was not accommodated with a separate entity after people had been displaced, "[t]here would be war, period".[91] "The situation is very dangerous," he explained to reporters of *The Irish Times* (Hegarty, 1992); the Bosnian Serbs would continue a policy of ethnic cleansing to join the Republic of Serbia.[92]

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[89] Interview with Colm Doyle

[90] Interview with Colm Doyle

[91] Interview with Colm Doyle

[92] Interview with Colm Doyle

Within his EC Monitor Mission army troops, this association of a territorial separation with defensibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina was widespread. Officers regularly expressed the need to separate armed forces to ensure the safety of the local citizens and soldiers as well as their own troops (Vulliamy, 1992: 1). Also among military officers in the United Nations peacekeeping forces, there was a felt need for territorial division between ethnic communities to establish peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Representative General John MacKenzie for example said in August 1992 in the *Kitchener-Waterloo Record* that the most promising solution was the "cantonisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines," which would give regional governments a high level of autonomy. "My personal opinion is that there will be borders and I hope pretty bloody soon," he said ("Partition of Bosnia", 1992). Experiencing its violence on the ground, the international officers were hence inclined to repeat the idea of the warring army commanders that the conflict was intractable and in need of a resolution that recognised a physical separation of the ethnic communities for order.

A response for integration from professionals of politics

The military's acceptance of ethnic separation in the conflict met opposition among the (former) politicians and civil servants that assembled to negotiate in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia. Former consul-general in Paris José Tadeu Soares, who had joined José Cutileiro as the Portuguese secretary of the EC-sponsored talks, objected that "[w]hat existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not ethnic division at all".[93] Conference coordinator José Cutileiro similarly saw no differences between the communities, which had lived intermixed in the past.[94] They rather considered the dispute an outcome of power politics, just like their colleague civil servants had done when they chaired negotiations before the dissolution of Yugoslavia. José Tadeu Soares thus upheld the alternative territorial arrangement of a 'Swiss-like' confederation with many cantons of which none was ethnically delimited.[95] As a civil servant with twenty years of experience in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving amongst others in East Berlin and Paris, he believed in statehood defined by unity and

[93] Interview with José Tadeu Soares

[94] Interview with José Cutileiro

[95] Interview with José Tadeu Soares

civic nationhood. He found that particularly with his experience at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, he could "grasp the problems [of aggressive nationalism and territorial disintegration they] faced at the time".[96]

Chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia and retired Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom Lord Carrington similarly expressed desire to avoid disintegration into ethnically defined territorial units. He said in his speech on 26 August 1992 that cantons could not be "geographical entities, in the sense of consisting of only one nationality" nor "distinct self-contained blocks". Just like José Cutileiro in his position as special adviser to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs João de Deus Pinheiro, Lord Carrington had as chairman of the conference been at the forefront of the decision to maintain the republican borders upon Yugoslavia's dissolution and subscribed to this effort to curtail irredentism. He had worked to enforce territoriality rather than ethnic division, just like during his period as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom in the 1980s when he oversaw the transition from white-led Rhodesia to majority-led Zimbabwe. This indicates that particularly military officers did not share a norm or 'focal point' that prescribed territorial stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor did the team of negotiators from the European Community cohere around a common understanding of their stakes in the negotiation process. In contrast with the (former) politicians and civil servants in the negotiation process, the military officers in fact associated division of territory with order as a codification of the geopolitical strategic realities of ethnic separation in the war.

The military's influence in early negotiations

The outbreak of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of February 1992 then challenged the political representatives' expectation of order. They had considered integration in shared territory possible upon the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in line with the *uti possidetis* principle. José Tadeu Soares says about the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: "It was strange to us. […] It is like today you cannot think of people fighting in Britain". His colleague civil servant Henry Wynaendts confirms that in the earlier negotiations under chairmanship

[96] Interview with José Tadeu Soares

of Lord Carrington, the main challenge had been dealing with the war between the republics of Croatia and Serbia. The professionals of politics in Europe had insisted that boundary maintenance would calm nationalist tensions down, eliminating irredentist motives for conflict, while minority issues could be dealt with by means of a law mirroring the agreement on the Alto Adige between Italy and Austria.[97] German Director-General of Political Affairs Jürgen Chrobog captures this when he says that at the time, he thought that "the fragility [of Bosnia and Herzegovina], we had stalled in the past".

The fighting leading up to the referendum on independence then offered an opportunity for representatives of the military to influence conceptions of reality in the negotiation process. Rather than through coercion, this influence derived from the military's position as their permanent representatives who were professionally trained to operate in violent disputes. Lord Carrington remained chairman of Christie's Auction House throughout his term as chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, and he shuttled with the other international negotiators in-and-out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Colonel Colm Doyle, as head of the EC Monitor Mission and then Lord Carrington's personal envoy, became for them an important source of information when violence erupted. Being constrained by the war, they relied on him for briefings on the political and military situation. "I remember coming to Sarajevo and being informed that a huge number of the population had been expelled from the region," José Tadeu Soares recounts. These briefings generally followed the military's shared beliefs. "I was able to tell [the negotiators] that the Muslims were worried in areas where the Serbs were a majority and that the Serbs were trying to move out of places where the Muslims were a majority," Colm Doyle says. He notes his effort to instil in them that populations were moving and that the Bosnian Serbs would not halt until territories were cleansed.[98] And he felt that "overall, […] there was little doubt on that".[99]

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[97] Interview with Henry Wynaendts; Legal adviser Andrey Liakhov supports that in deliberations for the Arbitration Commission, "we paid little attention to Bosnia and Herzegovina" and focused on tensions between the republics of Croatia and Serbia and Croatia instead. "We did not expect a conflict there," he says.

[98] Interview with Colm Doyle

[99] Interview with Colm Doyle

As such, the armed officers established the need to accommodate the Bosnian Serb community among the (former) politicians and civil servants in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia. Acting independently of their principals in a broad mandate to "promote dialogue" and to reach "a constitutional solution which must take into consideration the legitimate concerns of all peoples involved within the inviolable frontiers of [Bosnia and Herzegovina]" (Trifunovska, 1994: 514-515), José Cutileiro indeed believed after a while that coexistence could not be restored in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He deemed it an "illusion"[100] that it would remerge after peoples had been separated. His colleague José Tadeu Soares was also convinced that the violence made codification of the ethnic separation in territories necessary for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[101] "New arrangements were needed because Bosnian Serbs did not wish to belong to an independent Bosnia," José Cutileiro wrote in *The New York Times* in August 1992 (Cutileiro, 1992). Not the professionals of politics but representatives of armed forces hence developed the idea of a territorial division between communities in the negotiation process. After violence had erupted to separate peoples by displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they 'sold' the need to codify this geopolitical strategic reality to international negotiators in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, who then slipped, shifting policy away from their principals' desired outcome of integration.

On 22 February 1992, conference coordinator José Cutileiro indeed reported to journalists from *Reuters News* that representatives of the Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat communities considered "internal arrangements based on 'several national constituent units to be defined'" while agreeing to recognise the republican border (Pontes, 1992). The 'Statement of Principles for a New Constitutional Arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina' that was presented on 18 March 1992 then codified that the state would be "composed on three constituent units, based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria" (Ramcharan, 1997: 24). The negotiators hence established a possibility for the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb communities to be given self-determination, albeit without complete sovereignty. The statement did not offer a final map, but it contained that territory would be divided along ethnic lines. The territory of each unit would be decided

[100] Interview with José Cutileiro

[101] Interview with José Tadeu Soares

with "a map based on the national absolute or relative majority in each municipality" (Ramcharan, 1997: 26). A map recording the 1991 census figures and depicted the ethnic structure of each municipality would thus be the basis for the territorial division.

So after violence broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nationalist vision of an internal territorial division along ethnic lines was introduced and legitimised among international negotiators by representatives of the military personnel on the ground. The armed forces at war were fighting to homogenise communities in the declared autonomous oblasts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Army officers generally interpreted this violence as intractable for its basis in ethnic solidarities and hatreds. Sharing the belief that peace and order required defensibility of the provisions of a peace accord, the international military officers were then inclined to support territorial codification of the physical separation between the ethnic communities. The members of his negotiation team initially objected to endorsement of the territorial division. As civil servants and (former) politicians under the auspices of the European Community, they upheld reinforcement of statehood characterised by political unity and civic bonds. Yet the violence increased the influence of military officers as negotiators' trained representatives on the ground in Sarajevo, who then established acceptance of territorial separation in the negotiation process.

Professionals of politics and their attempt to reinforce territoriality

A territorial alternative in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

As negotiations developed for territorial separation in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, professionals of politics intervened in the negotiation process to secure integration of peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In disregard of continuing efforts to negotiate under the leadership of Lord Carrington, British Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the European Council of Foreign Affairs Douglas Hurd announced on 25 July an international conference under United Nations aegis (NIOD, 2002: 435). In line with the earlier efforts by professionals of politics in Europe to regulate the disintegrative process in the Yugoslav federation, where they invested significantly to uphold the republican boundaries, Douglas Hurd hence created an opportunity for professionals of politics to reinforce statehood defined by political unity detached from nationalist sentiments

of territorial adjustment. They structured the negotiation process towards a territorial solution based on integration of peoples for it to be rejected under the pressure of military officers from the Army of the Republika Srpska.

With the founding of a wider conference on Yugoslavia, Douglas Hurd accepted the proposal by French President François Mitterrand at the Group of Seven (G7) Conference in Munich two weeks earlier. Since Douglas Hurd became EC President of Foreign Affairs in July 1992, he had experienced the lacking communication between himself and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. A row in which the latter expressed that he "was not just going to be steamrolled by the British" led Douglas Hurd to attempt improving relations with an enlargement of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (NIOD, 2002: 435). In this light, he set out to develop a set of principles for negotiation under the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. He requested adherence to international law, suggesting that borders could be changed upon mutual agreement, which British director of Political Affairs Leonard Appleyard communicated to his colleagues in the European Community (NIOD, 2002: 436).[102]

Yet the same set of professionals of politics who had enforced boundary maintenance upon the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation now invested to establish a stricter adherence to the republican boundaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek particularly asserted that peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be based on a division into ethnic areas. He had set boundary stability as a precondition for negotiation in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia in 1991 and wanted the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to endorse this. His preference for territoriality can be found for example in his statement at the opening of the conference in London on 26 August 1992,[103] in which he expressed that discussions on borders and minority

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[102] Marrack Goulding, the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations in charge of peacekeeping who attended the opening of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in London with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his memoirs *Peacemonger* (2002) writes that most of the drafting was done by staff from the host country rather than the United Nations.

[103] The opening session assembled 34 representatives of states and international organisations including the United Nations and the European Community, as well as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

rights "lose credibility and become counter-productive when certain parties use them as a cover in order to continue their policy of creeping expansionism" (Ramcharan, 1997: 146). Van den Broek could count for support on his German colleague Klaus Kinkel, whose predecessor had sided with him in his earlier efforts as EC President of Foreign Affairs in Yugoslavia. Klaus Kinkel said at the opening session in London: "The international community will never accept the acquisition of territory though force and terror" (Crossette, 1992).

These professionals of politics managed to import their stances in the negotiation process. The 'Statement of Principles' in the end denoted thirteen principles to guide development of a peace proposal that included not only respect for the integrity of state borders, but also non-recognition of all advantages gained by force (Owen, 2013).[104] The political leaders of all parties to the conflict Alijah Izetbegović, Radovan Karadžić and Mate Boban signed for agreement with the 1992 London Principles. This indicates that there was at this stage an opening for unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In contrast with the military's representation of reality earlier in the negotiation process, alternatives to territorial separation of communities were in practice possible. Representation of the war as intractable and belief in the codification of the geopolitical strategic realities for defensibility had refrained the military representatives of the international forces from comprehensively pursuing these alternatives, but they were foregrounded by professionals of politics in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Indeed, boundary changes were treated "very delicately" in the conference, with international negotiators trying to explore agreement between the Yugoslavs.[105] Spokesman Frederic Eckhard recounts that the explicit aim was integration of peoples, or to "stitch this new country back together," in refutation of any ethnic separation.

A configuration for territoriality and civic nationhood

The conference was designed "to hold all the Yugoslav parties to the commitments made at the London session" (Secretary-General, 1992:

[104] The 'Statement on Bosnia' contained in support that "[t]he negotiations will need to cover […] a genuine and lasting end to the conflict throughout the Republic, and return of territory taken by force" (Owen, 2013).

[105] Interviews with Graham Messervy-Whiting and Lord Owen

1552). International negotiators were thus to establish an arrangement for integration of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs peoples in a single Bosnia and Herzegovina. The professionals of politics then invested significantly in the social constitution of the conference to minimise the risk of agency losses and hence ensure implementation of their mandate, mirroring the practices they had used to regulate the disintegrative process of the Yugoslav federation in the EC Conference in 1991. First of all, politicians remained in charge by assigning coordination of the conference to the President of the European Council John Major and the Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Daily supervision was then delegated to two chairmen who were in frequent contact with these politicians and a Steering Committee made up of representatives of the European Community, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the United Nations Security Council, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, neighbouring states, and Lord Carrington. The professionals of politics thus adopted key positions of control in the negotiation process.

They also assigned the task of negotiation to proven supporters of their shared beliefs against division in ethnically homogeneous territories, in line with logics of interaction between principals and agents theorised by for example Hawkins et al. (2006). Co-chairmen Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance had professional experience in common with the politicians and they had shown committed to oppose the creation of nation-states in past assignments. Lord Owen had served as British Foreign Secretary between 1977 and 1979, when he worked with then-US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to endorse an Anglo-American plan for the transition from white-led Rhodesia to majority-led Zimbabwe upon independence. Cyrus Vance had as Deputy Secretary of Defence been at the centre of the escalating Vietnam conflict, and he helped negotiate the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty by which the United States returned control of the canal zone to Panama and the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty that meant the Israelis withdrew armed forces from the annexed Sinai peninsula before representing the UN Secretary-General on fact-finding missions to South Africa and the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. They had hence both worked to avoid expansionism and return territory instead. As such, they were likely candidates to support the professionals of politics in reinforcing territoriality in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Convening for the first time on 3 September 1992 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva,[106] the co-chairmen brought their own personal staff that had demonstrated reluctance to accommodate nationalism with territorial changes in past assignments. Cyrus Vance brought senior civil servant Herbert Okun and aide from his own law firm in New York Peter Beshar. Herbert Okun was a Soviet specialist that had spent much of his diplomatic career confronting the politics of the Cold War in amongst others East Germany and at the United Nations when the Berlin Wall fell. He told journalist David Binder from *The New York Times* in 1993 that he became a diplomat to enforce the strategy of containment for resistance to Soviet expansionism recommended by George F. Kennan in 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' in Foreign Affairs in 1947 (Binder, 1993). Lord Owen's staff initially comprised the senior British civil servant and former ambassador in Belgrade Peter Hall and David Ludlow, a private secretary supplied by the Foreign Office. As British Ambassador to Yugoslavia between 1989 and 1991, Sir Peter Hall had represented policy of containment and unwillingness to accept boundary changes in Europe (Simms, 2003: 11-12). He had objected to President Milošević's irredentism. "He was a man addicted to power and that was the route he took," he later explained to Jimmy Jamieson for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme. Hence the negotiators as well as their coordinators from the United Nations and the European Community were likely and often proven supporters of the ideas expressed by the professionals of politics in London.

The international negotiators indeed subscribed to territoriality and civic nationhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina . Chairman Lord Owen holds that he aimed at integration; it was his intention to unite peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[107] Just days before the presentation of the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, he confirmed in *Reuters News* that the principles agreed in London "still hold, will hold, and will apply" (Naughton, 1992). In accordance with the mandate formulated by Ministers of Foreign Affairs Hans van den

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[106] In Geneva, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia had a small secretariat run by executive director Bertrand Ramcharan, a United Nations official who had previously worked as a Director in the United Nations Political Department, focusing on conflicts in Africa (Ahrens, 2007: 58).

[107] Interview with Lord Owen; Lord Owen in a meeting with Sir Peter Inge, Chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence in London on 24 November 1992 confirmed: "Rolling back ethnic cleansing might not be a bad long-term aim. The parties did end up living together after WWII" (Owen, 2013: 138).

Broek and Klaus Kinkel, he hence wished to avoid the territorial separation endorsed in negotiations earlier by military representatives. Just like their colleagues who had invested in boundary maintenance upon dissolution in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, many (former) politicians and civil servants who led negotiations between the Yugoslavs in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia associated boundary changes with irredentism. They shared the belief in territorial adjustment as a threat to international peace and order that professionals of politics in London had coordinated on. "President Milošević of the Republic of Serbia had a plan to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina," Lord Owen says, which made the conflict a "war on aggression" that could not be awarded with territorial adjustment. Lord Owen's envoy in Sarajevo Jeremy Brade similarly viewed changes in territorial distribution in light of President Milošević's desire to create a Greater Serbia. Speeches were "inflammatory and nationalist," he held, so he aimed to uphold the principle of territoriality in response.[108]

A structure of negotiations to discourage territorial division

The international negotiators then regulated deliberations with the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb representatives on this basis. They generally took instructions from the principal professionals of politics in the European Community and the United Nations; they understood their task not as facilitating ideas brought to the table by representatives of different parties to the conflict, but as assisting the Yugoslavs in devising an agreement by making substantive suggestions on the basis of the 1992 London Principles. Chairman Lord Owen captures this when he describes his role as "try[ing] a position," hence preparing a plan for conflict resolution, and "hav[ing] to adjust it and modify it" after learning what the different parties' representatives would accept. His envoy in Sarajevo Jeremy Brade confirms that the negotiators were committed to a role as 'formulators' of a territorial solution. "They were always attempting to act in good faith, which meant upholding the principles," he says. Indeed, under the lead of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, the negotiators took considerable time to devise a plan before presenting it to the Yugoslavs.

In line with this directive approach, head of the Working Group of Bosnia and Herzegovina Martti Ahtisaari gave the Yugoslav delegation heads a

[108] Interview with Jeremy Brade

'Checklist of London Principles in Relation to the Future Constitution of BH' and reminded them that they were meant to negotiate an agreement on the basis of these principles when he started negotiations in the second half of September 1992 (Ramcharan, 2011: 54).[109] He requested legal expert Paul Szasz to brief each delegation on human rights (Ramcharan, 2011: 56). Martti Ahtisaari and Paul Szasz had cooperated on drafting the constitution for independent Namibia just three years earlier. As head and legal adviser in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, they had structured statehood where many suffered from "racial discrimination and the practice and ideology of apartheid," as article 23 of the Namibian constitution reads. In this line, Paul Szasz argued in a memorandum 'Problems in Basing Institutions on National or Ethnic Status' that constitutional provisions related to ethnic groupings were "against the entire trend of international human rights developments of the past several decades (e.g., in particular, the firm rejection of apartheid)" and could be the pretext for resorting to ethnic cleansing (Ramcharan, 2011: 55-56). As such, he supported Ahtisaari in a quest to ensure that the parties' contributions met the principles of territoriality and civic nationhood.

Ahtisaari then developed the guiding principles further in the negotiations for a future constitution. He presented a paper to the co-chairmen on 4 October 1992 in which he argued that "[a] centralised federal state but with significant functions (especially in fields of education and culture) carried by 4-10 'regions' whose boundaries would take into account ethnic and other considerations" was the "apparent position of ICFY". He embraced integration, but found that a centralised state was strongly opposed within the Bosnian Croat and Serb delegations. Martti Ahtisaari thus argued in his paper for a compromise where regions would not be autonomous or homogeneous enough to secede. He subsequently distributed among the delegations a questionnaire on the responsibilities of a central government and 'constituent units' that led him to conclude that "each of the parties desired a state in which the central powers would be minimised and those of the regional units maximised" (Owen, 2013:

[109] The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia additionally incorporated the working groups on ethnic and national communities and minorities, succession issues and economic issues from the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, which remained chaired by Geert Ahrens, Henry Darwin (who was succeeded by Jorgen Bojer after his passing in September 1992) and Jean-François Durieux respectively, and comprised the working groups on humanitarian issues and confidence and security-building and verification measures under Sadako Ogata and Vicente Berasategui (Ramcharan, 1997: 1210).

85). Yet he did not concede on the ethnic basis of territorial separation. He discussed with the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs on 28/29 October a final plan to create seven to ten provinces taking into account ethnic as well as geographic, historical, communication and other features in order not to acquiesce in already accomplished ethnic cleansing.

Political representatives of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats Haris Silajdžić and Mate Boban accepted the general outline of the proposal for a division of territory into ethnically mixed provinces; only the head of the Bosnian Serb delegation Nikola Koljević insisted on the three ethnic areas enforced by the military representatives. Officials of the Army of the Republika Srpska indeed proved particularly unwilling to compromise on territorial control in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They tied stability to the liberation of the Bosnian Serbs in an area that they could defend. "In Bosnia and Herzegovina, protection of the Serbs was a key issue," Colonel Duško Četković says. And in a meeting with NATO Permanent Representatives on 4 December 1992, Lord Owen described his colleague General Ratko Mladić as "not joking when he talked about Greater Serbia"; "I did not believe that anyone would stop him" to secure an area for the Bosnian Serbs, Owen (2013: 157) said. These military officials insisted on the creation of an ethnically pure area in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the deputy commander forces, General Milan Gvero told journalist John Burns from *The New York Times* in May 1993: "We say everybody has to live on his own territory, Muslims on Muslim territory, Serbs on Serbian" (Burns, 1993), while Duško Četković describes motivation to preserve the Serb identity that the army had fought to defend after "over a million Serbs [had been] brutally murdered, cleansed" during the Second World War.[110]

The military's rejection of a territorial alternative

Military officers did not have a place at the negotiation table in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Just like chairman Lord Carrington in the earlier negotiations concerning Yugoslavia, chairman Cyrus Vance insisted on restricting attendance to heads of delegation Haris Silajdžić, Mate Boban and Nikola Koljević plus one (Owen, 2013: 85). Yet representatives of the military proved decisive in the rejection

[110] Interview with Duško Četković

of territorial unity and integration as a solution. In the co-chairmen's final efforts to convince the Bosnian Serbs to sign the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, President Krajišnik of the Republika Srpska conditioned signing on ratification by the Bosnian Serb Assembly. Lord Owen proved contemptuous in his dismissal of these representatives. In line with his earlier efforts to restrict participation in the negotiation process to political leaders, he assumed others to have little authority to shape outcomes. "I am telling you," he said to the journalists who assembled to report on development in negotiations, "and believe me I have been in politics a long time, I know that Milošević is on board and that is what counts" (Silber and Little, 1995: 314). But as soon as the debate in the Bosnian Serb Assembly began, his optimism proved misguided.

The "decisive speaker" in the Bosnian Serb Assembly was General Ratko Mladić, correspondent for *Financial Times* Laura Silber and *BBC* journalist Allan Little find (Silber and Little: 1995: 316). He showed a map of the geopolitical strategic realities on the ground and used a transparency of the territorial arrangement in the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan to illustrate how much conquered territory would be isolated or returned to the Bosnian Muslims. This would leave the Serb population in these territories vulnerable to future violence. The General's strictly military logic carried weight among the political representatives gathered in the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Momir Bulatović found (Silber and Little, 1995: 316). Indeed, a majority of fifty-one representatives out of sixty-five who cast a vote decided to organise a referendum on the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan – a referendum in which ninety-six per cent of the voters said 'no'.

Political representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were more generally susceptible to a military representation of reality. They tended to distrust politicians from the Republic of Serbia or Croatia to negotiate, considering that they would outbid desires for territorial separation in a political manoeuvre, but they acknowledge the military's contribution to their negotiation strategies. While politicians like the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladislav Jovanović hold that military representatives had no influence on their negotiation strategies, members of the Bosnian Serb delegation aimed to facilitate the army in its potentials. Maksim Stanišić captures this when he says that they meant to "never sacrifice army units in a negotiation".[111] Negotiator for the Bosnian Croats Vitomir Miles

[111] United Nations Chief Political Officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina Phillip Corwin (1999:

Raguž confirms that it was their main responsibility to take their military's assessment into account. Negotiations were for him not guided by "knowledge and skill, or fairness" but determined by "the rule of applied power," which implied for him that "the party with most military strength can dictate the terms". Unlike politicians from the neighbouring republics, these representatives agreed with their army officers that autonomy would have little meaning without territorial demarcation,[112] and they were unwilling to compromise on territory for a political deal.

The peace settlement demanding their agreement, the military hence had a position of power in the negotiation process. In fact, exactly the army officials controlled the strategic means to upset a settlement that they considered unfair in terms of the territorial distribution. They had a different understanding of their national interest in the negotiations, yet their influence tends to be disregarded in realist theories of International Relations literature. Scholars such as Coggins (2011) emphasise the role of "Great Powers" represented by professionals of politics rather than local actors, let alone military officers. But in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, professionals of politics representing the most powerful institutions of the European Community and the United Nations proved unable to impose statehood defined by political unity and civic bonds. Not even allied politicians from the Republic of Serbia were able to convince political representatives of the Bosnian Serbs to accept the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan. President Slobodan Milošević of the Republic of Serbia had signed the settlement. Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladislav Jovanović then called the Bosnian Serb insistence on an ethnic solution "unfortunate," while it led Chris Spirou, a confidant of President Milošević, to describe them as "zealots". Still they refused to sign it as their military rather than their political allies influenced their stances.

So military officers from the Army of the Republika Srpska notably pressed to discard territorial unity in the negotiation process. When officers from the international forces had introduced and legitimised the demand for territorial division between ethnic communities in negotiations, professionals of politics intervened to pursue the alternative. At the initiative of EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek and Klaus

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89) confirms in his memoirs that with regard to the Bosnian Serb delegation, "everyone knew who was in charge: the military. […] General Ratko Mladić gave the orders".

[112] Interview with Maksim Stanišić

Kinkel, politicians assembled at the opening session of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia foregrounded integration in shared territory. They gained agreement by the political representatives of all parties to the conflict and structured negotiations towards implementation of this agreement. In line with practices in boundary politics concerning the dissolution of Yugoslavia, they maintained both direct and indirect control in the conference, delegating the task of negotiation to a team of (former) politicians and civil servants who shared their rejection of ethnic separation for association with irredentism and disruption of international order. Yet the territorial arrangement the international negotiators then developed proved unacceptable for army officers under the lead of General Ratko Mladić, who the chairmen had excluded from the negotiation process. They informed rejection of the draft peace agreement by the Bosnian Serbs for creation of an ethnically pure territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Military officers in international forces and their reinforcement through negotiations

Military advisers in the negotiation process

The escalation of the conflict offered an opportunity for the military officers from international forces to regain influence in the negotiation process. The structure of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia set up by professionals of politics in London had not included representation of the military. But in October 1992, when fierce fighting had broken out with the Bosnian Croats who until then had sided with the Bosnian Muslims, chairman Lord Owen suggested to have in-house military advice in a meeting with the British Chiefs of the Defence and General Staff. "There was an on-going battle," Lord Owen clarifies. "A breakdown of structures. A breakdown of trust. A breakdown of the whole society – It was a terrible mess".[113] He hence brought representatives of the international armed forces back into the negotiation process. He gave military officers permanent representation on the team and they only gained strength of position with progression of the war, being able to establish among negotiators the need to delimit ethnic separation territorially to end the war.

[113] Interview with Lord Owen

Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting became the military adviser to Lord Owen in November of 1992. He had served intelligence and counter-intelligence duties in amongst others Germany, Libya and Cyprus, after which he was appointed the plans staff officer in Northern Ireland responsible for the armed forces estate. He then became the Briefing Officer for NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe General John Galvin during the ending of the Cold War and the extending of military contacts to the former Warsaw Pact countries before entering the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. So just like Colonel Colm Doyle, Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting had experience defending boundaries of separation between warring communities. And he shared his perception that the ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were irreconcilable under the hostilities. In line with the representation of the conflict foregrounded by nationalists, Graham Messervy-Whiting considered that ethnicity was "a factor we had to take into account"[114]. He saw his task as identifying where armies were fighting and what their longer-term territorial aims were (Messervy-Whiting, 1993: 30). Accommodating these aims in the distribution of particular areas and villages among the ethnic communities, he thought, was essential for pacification of the situation (Messervy-Whiting, 1993: 31).

The military gained particular authority in developing the territorial arrangement for conflict resolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The volatile situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina foregrounded among negotiators concerns about the implementation of the peace accord, on which army officers are experts in charge. They were on the ground and professionally trained to operate in violent disputes, so they knew the geography of the war zone and understood how it related to military strategy. Their representatives controlled information on the locations and movements of army units, particularly because officers on the battlefield tended not to communicate directly with the negotiators (Corwin, 1999: 42-43). As the liaison between the various troops and forces in international diplomacy, Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting then knew what international services were likely to be made available and what they could achieve to implement a plan. He was hence in a unique position to inform international negotiators on the practical challenges in enforcing certain territorial solutions; as the chairman's military adviser, Graham Messervy-Whiting made it known what he considered possible in terms of moving the various warring armies to a particular situation and what he thought

[114] Interview with Graham Messervy-Whiting

the armies were capable of violating. He captures this when he declares that his role was to "inject into the decision-making process what the art of the practical would be". He accounts his ability to give 'realistic' advice about the sustainability of ideas for a territorial solution.

Authority over the territorial arrangement additionally developed from his military training in reading geographic maps. In a team of international negotiators where some were "incurably map-dyslectic" while he instructed others, Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting was educated in the identification and analysis of geopolitical strategic elements on maps for drawing a defensible boundaries (Messervy-Whiting, 1993: 33). A boundary, he thought, needed to take into account geographic and economic elements on land such as ports, rivers, factories, mines, mineral resources, and railways.[115] In this situation, the military adviser notes that he was left in charge of producing maps for territorial arrangements. Exactly these maps were instrumental in justifying the territorial separation of ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Campbell (1999) finds. They created an image that confirmed the divisibility of territory along ethnic lines while excluding alternatives for a territorial arrangement. So it was the position in the negotiation process as map experts informed about the geopolitical strategic realities of war and the intricacies of implementing peace that gave the military influence among international negotiators, in contrast with assumptions about coercion in realist theories in International Relations.

A military justification for territorial division

To learn what the 'art of the possible' was for a territorial arrangement, Graham Messervy-Whiting exchanged views primarily with commanders of the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb armies. They shared his understanding of geography, he found. They could read maps and subscribed to the idea that a sustainable settlement required due consideration of the lines of confrontation and the military balance on the ground.[116] "We could talk the same language," Messervy-Whiting says. In contrast, he found many of the political representatives of the warring parties lacked experience with geographic maps. Such maps had been treated as military secrets in the communist era, when they were closely controlled by the Yugoslav National

[115] Interview with Graham Messervy-Whiting

[116] Interview with Graham Messervy-Whiting

Army, so many political leaders considered them misrepresentations; they brought out sociological maps instead that showed population distribution within administrative boundaries (Messervy-Whiting, 1993: 33). The local army commanders' power in negotiations then developed from their relations with representatives of the international forces, who could insert their views in the draft territorial arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

But the army officials on the sides of the conflicting parties were generally intransigent interlocutors. Their aim was to liberate and defend their peoples. "It was necessary to preserve the [Bosnian Serb] population," Colonel Duško Četković from the Army of the Republika Srpska says. "The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina had the right to defend their homeland," Deputy Commander of the Headquarters of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina General Jovan Divjak maintained on the other side of the battlefield. They both considered the war intractable and divisive, occurring between communities that would be separated in future relations because they could not live together peacefully, and considered their armies capable of military defeat. This made them generally reluctant to compromise in political settlement. Commander in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina Selmo Cikotić captures this when he said: "There was no reason for our attitude to be changed; quite the opposite, the situation on the ground developed in our favour". The armies rather fought to maintain and, if possible, increase the territory that they occupied in order to safeguard their communities. "It was not in their mind-set to give up territories," deputy to the President of the Committee for the Relations with the United Nations Amir Hadžiomeragić says in confirmation of the military's intransigence in negotiations. "They had spent much energy and lives to control it".

This informed Graham Messervy-Whiting to consider an internal territorial division "a necessary step" for pacification in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[117] Just like military representatives of international forces in earlier negotiation, he took for granted ethnic separation in the conflict and interpreted the situation such that the Bosnian Serbs needed to be accommodated in their desire for a territorial entity. He believed that the settlement needed to be defensible for the safety of locals and the international troops, in accordance with the military's shared conception of peace and order, and justified the territorial codification of ethnic

[117] Interview with Graham Messervy-Whiting

separation as the strategically 'feasible' or 'realistic' solution on this basis. Viewing the situation from perspectives on the battlefield, he thought that peace without recognition of the territorial advancements of the Army of the Republika Srpska would be unsustainable. This army, he held, was with the support of the Serbian army capable of overthrowing such an unsatisfying settlement. "The Bosnian Serbs, without a doubt, were the most powerful from a military point of view because they were *de facto* the remnants of the Yugoslav National Army," Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting says. This meant that they had heavy weapons and professional army officers, while the Bosnian Muslims "were starting from an almost zero baseline".[118] He thus deemed maintenance of existing boundaries costly. As a military officer, he rather associated peace with the territorial delimitation of geopolitical strategic realities. He sought to establish a boundary that separated ethnic communities so that particularly the Bosnian Serb armed forces would find limited reason to upset the arrangement.

So following the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which was "not heavily influenced by implementation factors" according to Lord Owen's military adviser, the 1993 Union of Three Republics Plan returned to the ethnic solution introduced in the 1992 Statement of Principles of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia. Drafted under the co-chairmanship of Lord Owen and Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg, who had replaced Cyrus Vance on 1 May 1993 as representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the 1993 Union of Three Republics Plan presented a territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three units that was explicitly ethnic in nature. Article 1 reads: "The Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of three constituent republics and encompasses three constituent peoples: the Muslims, Serbs and Croats, as well as a group of other peoples" (Trifunovska, 1994: 1032). These constituent republics, which are referred to as the 'Muslim', 'Croat' and 'Serb' majority republics, could not withdraw from the union in violation of the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[118] Interview with Graham Messervy-Whiting

Rejection of territorial alternatives in negotiations

The departure from the principle of territoriality was a source of disillusionment for many professionals of politics in Europe. Notably objections came from the Dutch and German Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who had at the opening session of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in London insisted on endorsement of peace based on integration. In a letter to his Belgian colleague on 29 July 1993, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Pieter Kooijmans opposed the 1993 Union of Three Republics Plan saying that he was "concerned that the negotiations in Geneva could lead to a settlement, which would in many respects be at odds with the basic principles subscribed to in London and Copenhagen" (Both, 2000: 162). "It is the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina that worries us," his spokesman said in *Reuters News* a month later, that is, "whether a Muslim state can survive and whether the Muslims will accept it voluntarily" ('Dutch to Voice Doubts', 1993). A week later, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel made it known to his colleagues in the European Community that he shared Kooijmans' reservations about the negotiations.[119] He held that peace should not impose a territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Bosnian Muslims, who he characterised as the main victims of the conflict, and he expressed concerns about whether the plan for a Union of Three Republics could produce a fair and equitable outcome on the basis of the London principles ('Kinkel Skeptisch Zu Bosnien-Friedensplan', 1993).

Co-chairmen Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg discarded the politicians' claim for integration in shared territory. In visits to Frankfurt and The Hague on 25 August, they said that they were pursuing the best possible settlement under the constraints of the war and needed full support from the European Community Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Lord Owen argued that the plan for ethnic separation had emerged in negotiations where he and Thorvald Stoltenberg had been forced to accept what was on offer, thence discursively positioning their political principals at distance in an asymmetry of knowledge and 'grasp' of the situation (Williams, 1993). He specialised to the point where he felt no longer bound and acted independently of his mandate. The London principles had "died with the ditching of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan," Lord Owen asserted,

[119] ABZ, DEU/ 05238 Memorandum, Chef DEU, 12/08/1993

confirming slippage from his principals' preferred outcome.[120]

In the circumstances of uncertainty about outcomes, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg were influenced by context and negotiators with different social backgrounds; they accepted the representation of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as intractable that had been foregrounded by their military adviser. Lord Owen no longer categorised tensions as irredentism, which could not be awarded with territorial adjustments, but found that "as the war developed, the ethnic element became stronger". Both he and Thorvald Stoltenberg hence believed in the need to accommodate the Bosnian Serbs in their quest for territory.[121] Lord Owen was convinced that forcing back territorial gains would prolong the conflict and increasingly considered it an "illusion, and hence bad policy" to insist on population resettlement for integration in shared territory (Owen, 2013: 262).[122] Co-chairman Thorvald Stoltenberg, who was as the representative of the Secretary-General also head of the United Nations military forces, says: "territorial separation was necessary for future peace".

Professionals of politics hence proved unable to enforce territoriality in the negotiation process. Military officers rather established among members of the international negotiation team that the peoples were separated on the ground, and that it was necessary under the circumstances of violence to codify this geopolitical strategic reality. Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Pieter Kooijmans warned the co-chairmen of the conference for the military's influence in the negotiation process. He believed that their emphasis on 'realism' and 'negotiability' led the 1993 Union of Three Republics Plan to be determined largely by the military superiority of the Bosnian Serbs at the cost of the principles laid down in London.[123] But the negotiators moved around their mandate. They did notably not find a norm on boundary maintenance in international diplomacy that limited their exploration of this territorial arrangement. They accepted that the republican borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not represent the *de facto* situation and that sustainable peace and order therefore required an alternative allocation of territory.

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[120] ABZ, DEU/ 05239 ICFY/Briefing Lord Owen, 20/01/1994

[121] Interviews with Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg

[122] ABZ, DEU/ 05239 ICFY/Briefing Lord Owen, 20/01/1994

[123] ABZ, DEU/ 05238 Memorandum, Chef DEU, 24/08/1993

Acceptance of territorial division in negotiations

The continued intensification of the fighting only strengthened the position of the military officials in the negotiation process. Acceptance of the ethnic division of territory increased with the number of military representatives. By the end of 1993, Vigleik Eide, a retired Norwegian general and former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee who was assisted by a Finnish colonel and major, reported from Zagreb and an UNPROFOR liaison team in Geneva included Finnish Major Pasi Karonen and his French colleague as assistants to Australian brigadier John Wilson. So when the Contact Group was established to intervene after President Alijah Izetbegović of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had rejected the 1993 Union of Three Republics Plan, its members according to British representative David Manning agreed without much discussion that peace required an arrangement that recognised areas for the different ethnic communities.

The Contact Group was composed of the directors general of political affairs from the United States, the Russian Federation, France, the United Kingdom and Germany and their representatives Charles Redman, Vitaly Churkin, Jacques-Alain de Sedouy, David Manning and Michael Steiner. These professionals of politics came to accept the ethnic solution upon their engagement in the negotiation process. While German Director-General of Political Affairs Jürgen Chrobog had objected to recognition of the *fait accompli* of ethnic cleansing still in November 1992, he and his British colleague Pauline Neville-Jones hold that their efforts in the Contact Group were aimed at identifying areas for ethnic communities to live separated (NIOD, 2002: 479). "We had to accept facts on the ground otherwise we would not have stopped the war," Jürgen Chrobog says, echoing the military's shared association of territorial division with the codification of the geopolitical strategic realities of ethnic separation. David Manning strikingly distances himself from the division that the members of the Contact Group as such endorsed by calling it a "rather old-fashioned sort of solution". This indicates his disappointment with the negotiators' inability under the constraints of the war to attain the ideal of in statehood defined by unity and civic nationhood.

The politicians and civil servants on the Contact Group more generally dissociate from the ethnic separation codified in the 1994 Contact Group Plan by denying a role as 'formulators' in the drafting process. They considered themselves mediators of stances developed by representatives of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs. "We were trying to find out

what might work, where the difficulties lay, […] and see whether there were ways forward," British representative David Manning says. For him, "[t]he whole point of the Contact Group was to make contact, that is, to find out what people felt and then to come back and report". So just like Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg half a year earlier, they identified themselves as 'facilitators' of dialogue between the conflicting parties. Lord Owen had insisted on not attaching his name to the peace process, unlike in earlier negotiations for integration in the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan.[124] United States representative Charles Redman then reported in May 1994 that the members of the Contact Group were "*not* prepared to define a map" and impose it on the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[125] His colleagues Pauline Neville-Jones and Jürgen Chrobog confirm that they came in without images of a settlement. They considered the representatives of the warring parties responsible for formulating it.[126] These professionals of politics as such distance themselves from the outcome they authorised, which contrasts integration in shared territory.

A combined politico-military intervention in negotiations

When negotiations finally came to the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton on 1 November 1995, "[t]he centre of gravity was getting an agreement," the Political Deputy to Special Envoy of the European Union to the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt says. At the initiative of United States National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who spent more time with President Clinton than any other senior foreign policy official by virtue of his job, President Clinton had agreed to a major American intervention in the negotiation process (Chollet, 2005: 19). This intervention brought military officers to the front in the negotiation process. In a combined politico-military mission, representatives of the international forces became equal members in the international negotiation team after (former) politicians and civil servants had composed the Contact Group. Anthony Lake had indeed in late June asked his senior adviser on European affairs Alexander Vershbow to develop an 'endgame' strategy paper for levelling the military playing field, which he combined with Robert Frasure's earlier

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[124] ABZ, DEU/ 05239 ICFY/Briefing Lord Owen, 20/01/1994

[125] ABZ, DEU/ARA/05240 Former Yugoslavia, 16/05/1994

[126] A report on the Contact Group meeting in Geneva of 13 May 1994 confirms that enforcement of a territorial solution was "not an option" (ABZ, DEU/ARA/05240 Bosnia, 17/05/1994).

proposal for diplomacy with the political leaders of the warring parties (Chollet, 2005: 20; 26-27).[127]

Support for this politico-military intervention in the negotiation process increased after July 1995, when the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina escalated. Bosnian Serb army units then overran two of the United Nations safe areas, Zepa and Srebrenica, and the Croats commenced offensives in the Krajina and in western Slavonia regions of the Republic of Croatia in order to reverse Serb territorial gains from the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia. "This is an extremely escalatory step," United Nations spokesman Alexander Ivanko said in the *Los Angeles Times* when Croatian forces attacked to lift the siege of Bihać on the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina. "We have an attack across an international border. We have basically three warring factions taking part in this attack …[and] might see more factions drawn in," which could mean an escalation of the war to draw in Croatian forces that had pledged to support the Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs (Wilkinson, 1995). US President Clinton then brought the negotiation process to the United States. He agreed to the mission, saying: "We must commit to a unified Bosnia. And if we cannot get that at the bargaining table, we have to help the Bosnians on the battlefield" (Chollet, 2005: 40).

The negotiations were shaped under the lead of politicians and civil servants. The chairman was US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Ambassador to Germany Richard Holbrooke, who had in 1993 already volunteered to be a special envoy. Richard Holbrooke had proven to support integration in shared territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Just like his colleagues earlier in the negotiation process, and in line with US President Clinton's expressed commitment, he had objected to the creation of nation-states in *Foreign Affairs* in April/May 1995. "Local conflicts, internal political and economic instability, and the return of historical grievances [are] the greatest threat to peace in Europe," he wrote. With "democracy, stability, and free-market economies," states are vulnerable to the "most dangerous [problems of] territorial and ethnic disputes" (Holbrooke, 1995). Indeed, Richard Holbrooke describes in his

[127] Robert Frasure was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and the United States representative to the Contact Group since July 1994. He had in this position proposed "one more roll of the diplomatic dice," aiming to negotiate with President Milošević of the Republic of Serbia as the negotiator for the Bosnian Serbs in return for sanctions relief (Chollet, 2005: 22).

memoirs *To End a War* that his goal for the negotiations in Dayton was to gain agreement for a multi-ethnic state. "We would not legitimise Serb aggression or encourage Croat annexation," he writes in objection to a division of territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the three ethnic communities (Holbrooke, 1999: 232-233).

Yet representatives of the military gained authority in the development of the territorial arrangement. Principal US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who had objected to Richard Holbrooke's assignment as head of the mission, set the conditions for negotiation. He did not share the politicians' understanding of their interest to maintain the international territorial order, as realists would argue, but considered it their national interest not to get (militarily) trapped in a dispute that could easily escalate into another war (Chollet, 2005: 20). He instructed the agent negotiators that Bosnia and Herzegovina "would be composed of two highly autonomous entities (one majority-Serb and another majority-Muslim/Croat)" on the basis of the 51-49 territorial division endorsed by the members of the Contact Group (Chollet, 2005: 42-43). His talking points had been drafted by Alexander Vershbow, the Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council who had proven to accommodate ethnicities in his dealing with Soviet Union affairs between 1988 and 1991 (Meyer, 2014: 6; Friedman, 1992: 1). An emphasis on separation of ethnic communities also underlay Alexander Vershbow's 'endgame' strategy paper in 1995. "[W]e will need to have a heart-to-heart discussion with the [Bosnian Muslims] aimed at eliciting greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs' right to secede from the Union after an initial period," it reads.

The military's influence in the final negotiations

The military representatives then advanced the instructions on territorial division in the negotiations. James Pardew from the US Department of Defence, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by Executive Assistant Daniel Gerstein, and the Director of European Affairs at the US National Security Council Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick were members of the inter-agency negotiation team headed by Richard Holbrooke. These trained and experienced military officers, United Nations Chief Political Officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina Phillip Corwin confirms, had in negotiations a primary allegiance to military commanders. "Once a soldier, always a soldier," he writes in

his memoirs (Corwin, 1999: 55). They indeed followed the military representing the war as intractable for its origins in ethnic differences. Daniel Gerstein describes how he considered that "it was not possible to bring these peoples together and to make them want to live together". Just like the representatives of international armed forces in earlier rounds of negotiations, they did hence not deem reconciliation in shared territory possible. They shared the belief that the ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were and would have to remain separated in territorial units to ensure defensibility and thus peace. "That was just the nature of the ties," Donald Kerrick says.

The representation of the conflict as intractable was widespread in the United States military. The idea that age-old ethnic tensions underlay the war, and that the war reflected the violent history of the region, can be found for example in public statements by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and in studies by analysts like Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College William Johnsen. Johnsen found that "substantial time – perhaps decades or generations" was necessary for integration in the Balkans (Johnsen, 1995: 63). He thus found maintenance of the existing borders in Bosnia and Herzegovina inconceivable; "the price would be considerable," he claimed (Johnsen, 1995: 63; 72). The military representatives on the negotiation team supported the essence of this policy brief. They considered the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina the result of ancient hatreds between ethnic communities, unlike the professionals of politics that had pursued integration. The (former) politicians and civil servants chaired by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance had associated violence with power politics by the Yugoslav political leaders, while Donald Kerrick says: "They have long memories in this area". James Pardew also found that "the resentment in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extreme". "I do not think that you can go in and expect to change cultures," Daniel Gerstein says capturing the same representation of the conflict, which had been foregrounded by nationalists in the war.[128]

Seeing the situation thence from perspectives on the battlefield, the military representatives were inclined to reason that peace and order required a

[128] The book *Balkan Ghosts* (1993) by Robert Kaplan may have been a factor in the evaluation of the situation. Daniel Gerstein at least read it in preparation for the negotiations. Scholars of the region like Noel Malcolm (1993) criticised the book for overemphasising violence and ignoring traditions of coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

territorial delimitation of ethnic separation. Just like Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, they intended to assess the positioning and capabilities of the various armed forces in order to codify their lines of confrontation in a way that discourages the use of further violence. With great reluctance in the principal US Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy significant ground forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina for enforcement,[129] this meant that the agents needed to appease particularly the militarily capable in their demands. Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick says: "There had to be an agreement that [the Bosnian Serbs] could accept, which meant accepting a republic as part of the larger country". The Bosnian Serbs had to be accommodated in order to get them to the negotiation table, James Pardew confirms in support of his Department of Defence's written contribution to the 'endgame' strategy in July 1995 (Chollet, 2005: 39). As military officers, they thus considered enforcement of existing boundaries costly, in contrast with what neoliberal institutionalist scholars like Carter and Goemans (2011) find. They thought that this required deployment of considerable ground forces to establish a military balance; they instead sought to freeze the conflict and ensure defensibility with a standoff zone that outreached the max-effective range of a standard gun of attack.[130]

Their shared association of territorial separation with defensibility refrained the army officers from comprehensively pursuing alternative territorial arrangements in the final rounds of negotiations. They took the ethnic separation in the conflict for granted and did not question that the peace accord thus needed to codify this separation in territorial units that armies could defend upon agreement. Yet several civil servants deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina challenged the military representation of the Army of the Republika Srpska as a threat. "What I saw was an army of thugs and often drugs," United States Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith accounts. Having the benefit of permanent representation over shuttle diplomacy by the military representatives in the negotiation process, he and United Nations Chief Political Officer Phillip Corwin were convinced after visiting the frontlines that the army's ability to counter attacks and hence to undermine a peace settlement was hugely overestimated (Corwin, 1999:

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[129] Lieutenant General Wesley Clark writes in his memoirs *Waging Modern* War that he "sensed a lot of truth in what Holbrooke was saying" when Richard Holbrooke asked him during the negotiations if he understood "that there are members of the Joint Chiefs who want our effort to fail" (Clark, 2002: 65).

[130] Interview with Daniel Gerstein

127).[131] At the same time, United States Special Envoy for the Bosnian Federation Daniel Serwer argues, the military representatives failed to acknowledge that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was "a military force that had been shaped by the war. [It] was a serious military force".

On the basis of their shared conception of peace and order, however, military officers James Pardew, Donald Kerrick and Daniel Gerstein unequivocally rejected support for the Bosnian Muslims in efforts to recover lost territory in the context of the ongoing violence. Daniel Serwer describes in his memoirs being treated as a "threat to [the] broader enterprise" (Serwer, 1999: 570). After objecting to the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an award for strategies of ethnic cleansing, he describes that both he and his colleague Peter Galbraith were excluded from the negotiation process. Territorial division of ethnic communities is "a centuries old program" that is more commonly applied than trying to "solve ethnic issues through law," James Pardew says, as such exemplifying that his rejection of integration was based on strong beliefs about peaceful territorial change rather than pure rational choice. "The other million voices out there," he finds, "were not in the game, so to speak".

The military representatives were then able to insert the territorial division into the settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. United States Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith illustrates the extent of their influence when he says that "they certainly played a big role in the instructions". As representatives of the international forces on the ground who were trained to operate in violent disputes, they delivered their reflections on the situation and its prospects, making it known to the negotiation team members what the minimum conditions were for a territorial arrangement to be sustainable. Particularly Lieutenant General Wesley Clark and his Executive Assistant Daniel Gerstein, who were educated in analysis of geopolitical strategic elements on maps, then drew the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. "Military representatives are good at that kind of stuff," US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Walter Slocombe explains. "They know what a defensible line is". They developed it in a small group

[131] In his memoirs *Dubious Mandate*, Phillip Corwin describes that "[t]he common perception of [the Army of the Republika Srpska] as a ruthless and effective military machine, much like the Nazis of World War II, was hardly accurate. Ruthless, yes, but efficient and well-trained, not necessarily" (Corwin, 1999: 202).

composed of mainly military officers.[132] Daniel Gerstein recounts: "There were probably no more than ten people in the room when we drew the border".

Indeed, their team member representing the US Department of State Christopher Hill acknowledges that the territorial arrangement was under the circumstances of war a 'military matter' and "the militaries understood each other". "We all knew the destructive power of weapons and ammunition," military attaché to the Bosnian Muslim delegation at Dayton Selmo Cikotić confirms. Christopher Hill then mirrors practices by Lord Own and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who discursively positioned their political principals at distance after interaction with context and negotiators with different social backgrounds. He declares that he found his colleagues in the US Department of State in Washington had strong views that were "ideology-driven" and "out of proportion to their actual knowledge," establishing an asymmetry of knowledge and 'grasp' of the situation. His ideas for the territorial settlement developed in the negotiation process, he holds, attesting to a decreasing orientation on instructions from his professional field. He even used his autonomy to influence decisions by his principals; his knowledge of what was going on in the negotiation process strengthened his position "as someone who knew what [he] was talking about," he sensed.

When the 1995 Dayton Accords were concluded, they hence codified an ethnic division of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not professionals of politics from the European Community or the United States but military officers shaped this outcome of the international negotiation process; after territorial unity had been rejected under the lead of military officer from the Army of the Republika Srpska General Ratko Mladić, the escalation of the conflict provided the military representatives of the international forces with an opportunity to establish the need to codify the geopolitical strategic reality of ethnic separation in the negotiation process. First General-Major Graham Messervy-Whiting and then James Pardew from the US Department of Defence and Lieutenants General Donald Kerrick and Wesley Clark mastered development of the territorial solution as map experts informed about the geopolitical strategic realities of war and their implications for implementation of peace. They relied on commanders of the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb armies to learn what the 'art of the possible' and justified codification of their

[132] Interview with Daniel Gerstein

divisions on the basis of the military's shared conception of peace and order, although this was against the interests of many (former) politicians and civil servants who intervened to reinforce integration. It was through the military justification of defensibility that the ethnic was ultimately accepted as an outcome.

Conclusion

The division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in ethnic areas was hence the outcome of a negotiation process in which nationalism was legitimised by a need to create defensible territorial units for antagonistic communities separated in war. After armies had started to homogenise areas in contrast with the security map of the professionals of politics in Europe, who had insisted that boundary maintenance would discourage such irredentism upon Yugoslavia's dissolution, military officers gained influence to shape outcomes in negotiations. They developed authority as professionals trained to operate in violent disputes. In the context of the violence, the military representatives of the international forces then endorsed a representation of the war as intractable, being based in ancient ethnic hatreds, and they established among negotiators the need to accommodate geopolitical strategic realities of ethnic separation to prevent crises in the future. As such, they added a layer of military justification to what was essentially a nationalist outcome. With this acceptable justification for an essentially unacceptable outcome, they defined in the negotiation process that a *de facto* division of territory between the ethnic communities was the only 'feasible' or 'realistic' territorial arrangement for peace and order in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Professionals of politics intervened regularly in the negotiation process to pursue territorial alternatives for integration. After they had insisted on boundary maintenance upon the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, they sought to avoid a division of territory along ethnic lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet military officers were strengthened in their position by the escalation of violence and they rejected the alternatives. In fact, representation of the war as intractable and a *doxa* on the defensibility of a peace accord refrained the military representatives from comprehensively pursuing them, and they established support among the international negotiators in interaction with their political principals. Viewing the situation from the battlefield, they tended to believe as trained and

experienced military officers that integration was costly in implementation where the existing borders did not represent the situation on the ground.

The military representatives did hence not subscribe to existing boundaries as 'focal points' in the negotiations concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Carter and Goemans (2011) note, and they did not regard a universal norm on boundary maintenance, as many constructivists and English School theorists argue. They rather shaped negotiations towards acceptance of ethnic division of territory. Under the constraints of an ongoing war, the outcome foregrounded by army officials fighting on the ground thus prevailed over the alternatives desired by professionals of politics. Their power developed not from tacit or explicit coercion, as for example Krasner (1999) argues, but from relations with representatives of international forces. Commanders in the conflict, who were in a powerful position to undermine peace, shared assumptions with colleagues among the international negotiators, who could insert their logic into the territorial arrangement when drafting instructions and maps for negotiation. These military representatives did not share an understanding of their national interest with the professionals of politics, as realists assume. They emphasised the risk of conflict re-escalation rather than the disruption of the international territorial order.

In order to understand how outcomes are constructed in the practice of boundary politics, it is hence important to understand where power to interpret reality lies – that is, it is necessary to consider who takes control of the negotiation process and how they are influenced by their different backgrounds. It was the interplay and sequencing between professionals of politics and the military that shaped outcomes in the Yugoslav space. Professionals of politics in Europe assumed authority to pressure boundary maintenance upon dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in order to discourage the aggressive nationalism that threatened international order. When violence escalated in Bosnia and Herzegovina in contrast with this understanding of peaceful territorial change, the military entered the negotiation process to settle disputes within these confines. They sought to codify the geopolitical strategic realities of war and as such, legitimised an internal division of territory along ethnic lines. So it was not the strength of a principle like *uti possidetis* or even the quality of existing boundaries that ensured that the borders of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were left intact; specific agents with particular backgrounds managed to structure the process for these practices in boundary politics in line with their conceptions of security threats related to territories and populations.