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Islam and politics in Madura : ulama and other local leaders in search of influence (1990-2010)

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Chapter 5

In the Name of Islam: the Kiai and People's Resistance against Government Plans to 'Modernise' Madura

Introduction

This chapter discusses the government's plans to 'modernise' Madura during the New Order administration and how segments of society responded to these plans. Specifically, it is concerned with two conflicts between the government (at central, provincial, and regency levels) and the powerful Islamic elites together with the people. The first is the Nipah dam incident and the second is the rejection of the *industrialisasi* scheme (to introduce industrialisation and to create industrial estates in Madura) by the *kiai* of Bassra (Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura - The Association of Friendship of Madurese *Pesantren Ulama*).⁷³ Among the questions posed in this chapter are: what is the origin and nature of the Nipah dam incident and the Suramadu Bridge affair? What were the government's efforts in implementing plans to 'modernise' Madura? How did the *kiai* and the people respond to the government's approaches? How were Islamic symbols used in order to convey messages of rejection?

Under the Suharto administration, the lack of state⁷⁴

73 The *industrialisasi* scheme was included in a plan to build the Suramadu Bridge that would connect the islands of Java and Madura and be the country's longest bridge. I will refer to this henceforth as the Suramadu Bridge affair.

74 I follow Pierre James's concept of 'state', which is defined as the government, bureaucracy, and other instruments of the government (1990: 15). Another concept of 'state' is taken from Hans Antlöv (1995: 7): an apparatus embracing

capability to implement its policies was often demonstrated in pressures towards the people. Nevertheless, the inability of the state to govern was not the only factor generating resistance in society. Indeed, there was another significant factor: the structure of the society. The structure of Madurese society affected state capability during the New Order, for instance, as it influenced the state when the state wished to implement its policies. The structure of society in Madura has been dominated by religious facets, which have often generated difficulties for the state in terms of getting the people to comply. The high position of religious leaders in society places them as commanding figures that the people follow. Although according to Pierre James,

[...] the *santri* group has not emerged as a significant threat to the administration due to their dependence upon the government for subsidies and other benefits, and their vulnerability vis-à-vis the peasantry (James, 1990: 20),

in Madura, religious leaders, who compose the main element of the *santri* group, actually posed a constant threat to the government during the Suharto administration. Their strong identification with Islam was applied politically in the form of support for the PPP, and they were seen by the state as a regular menace, especially during elections. This situation is in line with an argument in the previous chapter that in Madura, during the New Order, it would be incorrect to state that most *kiai* served as partners of the government, since most *kiai* remained outside the structure of central power.

The New Order was an era of '*pembangunan*' (development, modernity) and, according to Robert Cribb, it was characterised by unity, uniformity and conformity, contrary to the colonial era, which was characterised by a thoroughgoing fragmentation of society, culture and politics (Cribb, 2010: 70). Although the Old Order administration was also concerned with *pembangunan*, in reality, the Sukarno administration seems to have been more interested in building and presenting a certain independent image of the country to the outside world, as well as being busy coping

the legislative, executive, and judicial arms of central and local governments, including their offices, office holders and resources.

with separatist and Islamic rebels. It was during the Suharto administration that *pembangunan* became a hot subject in the Repelita (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun - the Five Years Development Plan).⁷⁵ According to Hans Antlöv, the New Order built a centralised economy system in which government agencies monitored credits, technological inputs, distribution, and prices. In general, rural development programmes under the New Order were textbook examples of a centralised and top-down modernisation approach (Antlov, 1995: 35). Moreover, if Pancasila represents the political character of the New Order, then *pembangunan* represents the economic character. Opposition to *pembangunan* was seen as being as political as opposition to Pancasila. A massive number of development programmes were implemented in the name of *pembangunan*, not only in the centre of the country (Jakarta), but also in regional areas (Antlöv, 1995: 43).

According to Michael van Langenberg, the New Order was both state and state system. While the state was an entity, an arena, and an idea, the state system was made up of the executive government, military, police, parliament, bureaucracy and courts. Thus, it can be perceived as a network of institutions, through which the rulers of the government attempted to control civil society and manipulate the means of production, distribution and exchange, in pursuance of declared national and community interests (Van Langenberg, 1990: 122). The state was concerned with constructing a continuous local economy. By the late 1960s price stability had been achieved. With economic policy in the hands of a well-qualified group of economic technocrats,⁷⁶ enjoying the full support of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), the international aid consortium chaired by the Netherlands, the Indonesian economy embarked in the late 1960s on a period of unprecedented rapid growth, which was sustained

75 Repelita was a grand design for development created by the New Order administration. In Repelita I (1969-1974), the focus lay primarily on the fulfillment of basic needs and infrastructure with the focal point on agriculture. In Repelita V (1989-1994), the fields of transportation, communication, and education took centre stage.

76 They were Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Sadli, Emil Salim and Subroto who were trained mainly in the US and who were teaching at the University of Indonesia.

for the next three decades. The economic transformation that Indonesia experienced during this period, particularly the rapid industrial growth, transformed Indonesia from an economy highly dependent on agriculture in the mid 1960s, to one in which the manufacturing sector contributed more to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than agriculture, in the mid 1990s.⁷⁷ Moreover, Suharto allowed the military to exercise a more prominent role in Indonesian society. Politics was regulated to prevent social disharmony; civil servants, the military and other components of society were controlled and mobilised through the creation of a government party and managed elections. Western-trained technocrats were brought in to implement ambitious economic *pembangunan* plans favoured by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Meanwhile, international loans and money from oil allowed Indonesia to build a modern infrastructure in the fields of transportation, banking, communications and education, as had been outlined in all Repelita. The expectation was to create a modern industrial and service-based economy. In fact, economic *pembangunan* could be viewed as the main goal of the era and all parts of society were to work towards this objective (Wie, 2002: 196; Wood, 2005: 89).

During the New Order period, the central government targeted Madura as one of the many areas to be *pembangunan*-ised. The process, however, was not smooth. There were several rejections of plans to build mega-projects on the island. Two major cases arose from these rejections. The first was the people and the *kiai*'s rejection of the Nipah (or Nepa) dam and the other was the *kiai*'s refusal to accept the government's plan for *industrialisasi*.

77 Booth suggests that the New Order government saw two distinct phases of 'liberation' of the economy. The first of these occurred between 1967 and 1973. During these years inflation was reduced, the exchange rate unified, and controls on capital flows into and out of the country were removed. Meanwhile, there was much talk in the 1970s and the early 1980s concerning Pancasila economics, which emphasised the role of state enterprises and cooperatives in the economy, the importance of egalitarian social and religious values in tempering the selfish and individualistic aspects of market capitalism, and the need for economic nationalism, and consequently of limiting the role of foreign and Chinese business in the economy. However, the second phase, which took place in the 1980s and early 1990s, saw the progressive liberalisation of both the financial sector and the real economy (Booth, 1986: 329).

The Nipah dam incident was marked by four deaths, while the Suramadu Bridge affair passed without physical violence. Both of these events, however, were characterised by the involvement of *kiai* as the leaders of the people's power.

One of the most obvious aspects that can be highlighted from these rejections is the inability of state officials, especially at regional levels, to cope with the high expectations of the central government. In the Nipah dam incident, the regent of Sampang failed to accommodate the voices of people at the grassroots level who did not want their land and property to be taken away and did not want to be forced to accept the government's plans. In relation to the Suramadu Bridge affair, for much of the 1990s, the central and regional governments did not succeed in convincing the *kiai* of Bassra to approve the *industrialisasi* as had been expected.

Another central aspect underlined by these rejections is the undemocratic approach of the government towards the implementation of its plans. In the Nipah dam incident, the government theoretically saw village inhabitants as those who needed the dam and who needed *pembangunan*. The dam was meant to benefit farmer-dominated villagers, ensuring that farm lands would be well irrigated. For those who did not depend on agriculture, it was meant to create work opportunities in other sectors that would possibly be generated from the dam, such as in the tourism or fishery sectors. Therefore, the government, in this case the Sampang regency administration, believed that all efforts to build the dam would be endorsed by the villagers. In fact, the regional government was unable (or perhaps did not want) to conceive a *pembangunan* plan that would place the villagers as equal partners whose opinions would be taken into consideration. In the Suramadu Bridge affair, the central and regional governments seem to have neglected the power of the religious leaders in society. For some non-state sponsored *kiai*, the *industrialisasi* was seen as a fearsome threat that would possibly diminish their influence and may even deprive *kiai* of their authority; for others, the *industrialisasi* was seen as a deep concern for the Madurese who lacked adequate education to fulfil positions in industry. To show that the *kiai* were influential and to try to maintain their authority, the *kiai* responded to the government's plan by launching a series of

rejections. As we shall see, the government's plans to 'modernise' Madura eventually created resistance among some segments in society and these segments made extensive use of Islamic symbols in resisting the government's plans.

The Nipah dam incident

The origin and nature of the incident

Like other regencies in Madura, Sampang has extensive areas of arid and infertile land that make it difficult to grow rice plants. According to the statistical records for 1971, of the total area of the Sampang regency (1,152.04 km²), only 15,863 hectares or 158.63 km² or 13.76 per cent was harvested areas of wetland paddy (*Jawa Timur dalam Angka tahun 1971*: 84). In 1983, the harvested areas increased to 22,329 hectares or 223.29 km² or 19.38 per cent (*Jawa Timur dalam Angka 1983*: 147), and in 1991, the harvested areas increased to 23,005 hectares or 230.05 km² or 19.96 per cent (*Jawa Timur dalam Angka 1993*: 91). In comparison, of the total area of East Java province (47,922.00 km²), the harvested areas in 1971 were 1,195,818 hectares or 11,958.18 km² or 24.95 per cent (*Jawa Timur dalam Angka 1971*: 84), while in 1983 these figures increased to 1,469,654 hectares or 14,696.54 km² or 30.66 per cent (*Jawa Timur dalam Angka 1983*: 147). In 1991 this reached 1,480,801 hectares (14,808.01 km²) or 30.90 per cent (*Jawa Timur dalam Angka 1993*: 91).

Table 5.1
Harvested (wetland paddy) and total areas of the East Java province and Madura in 1971, 1983, and 1991

Harvested areas	1971, hectare /percentage	1983, hectare /percentage	1991, hectare /percentage	Total area (km ²)
East Java	1,195,818/24.95	1,469,654/30.66	1,480,801/30.90	47,922.00
Bangkalan	29,702/25.94	30,880/26.97	30,199/26.38	1,144.70
Sampang	15,863/13.76	22,329/19.38	23,005/19.96	1,152.04
Pamekasan	9,556/13.03	9,994/13.63	12,166/16.60	732.85
Sumenep	16,971/9.13	17,984/9.68	21,068/11.34	1,857.59

Source: *Jawa Timur dalam Angka 1971, 1983, and 1991*

For the New Order government, these figures showed that Sampang and also other regencies in Madura needed more paddy fields in order to achieve self-sufficiency in rice. Food security—

articulated in the press as self-sufficiency in domestic rice production (*swasembada pangan*)—remains a potent idea in Indonesia, where it has always been a political issue. In 1984, for instance, when Indonesia temporarily achieved *swasembada pangan*, 41 per cent of all planted areas were planted with rice. By contrast, in Malaysia, the total area planted with rice declined from 25 per cent in 1972 to 13 per cent in 1998 (Timmer, 2004: 2, 11).

The Banyuates sub-district in the Sampang regency, with an area of 141.23 km² or 11 per cent of the total area of the Sampang regency, was seen by the central government as a potential location for the introduction of an irrigation system by building a new dam. The idea was based partly on the fact that the Nipah River, 21.77 km in length and flowing primarily through the sub-district, could be the main source of the dam. In addition, the rainfall in the sub-district was relatively high for Sampang.⁷⁸ The fact that the area was also dry and un-irrigated prompted the government to transform the area with plans to build a dam. The idea was to flood the areas surrounding eight villages in the sub-district, namely the villages of Planggaran Barat, Planggaran Timur, Tolang, Nagasareh, Lar-Lar, Tapa'an, Montor and Tebanah. Only one of these villages, Nagasareh, would be completely inundated. After the site was flooded and the dam was constructed, it was expected that the farmers in the area would change their cropping pattern (the selection of crops to be made depending on the soil and the source of water) so that eventually they would benefit from the dam.⁷⁹ It was also expected that the dam would become a tourist attraction that would benefit many people in the surrounding area.

78 In 2009, the average monthly rainfall was 100 mm/month, slightly higher than other sub-districts such as Torjun whose average monthly rainfall was 60 mm/month, or Omben whose average monthly rainfall was 80 mm/month, but slightly lower than Kedundung or Tambelangan whose average monthly rainfall was 110 mm/month (*Kabupaten Sampang dalam Angka 2010*: 3).

79 Many irrigation development plans throughout the world have been conventionally based on cropping pattern selection and aimed at maximising the revenue from irrigation activities. In reality, however, several complexities make the cropping pattern selection a more complicated problem (Tsakiris & Spiliotis, 2006: 57).

According to the 1993 plan, the government aimed to build a number of dams in East Java province. Some of these dams were already under construction, while some projects were not yet implemented.

Table 5.2
List of dams under construction and awaiting construction in 1993 in three river areas (*wilayah sungai*) in the East Java province

A. Wilayah Sungai Bengawan Solo	Size
1. Gongseng dam(Bojonegoro)	13 million m ³
2. Kerjo dam (Bojonegoro)	11 million m ³
3. Cawah dam (Bojonegoro)	13 million m ³
4. Nglambangan dam (Bojonegoro)	12 million m ³
5. Belah dam (Bojonegoro)	11 million m ³
6. Jipang dam (Cepu)*	560 million m ³
7. Bugel dam (Tuban)	14 million m ³
8. Tawun dam (Bojonegoro)	32 million m ³
9. Lamong dam (Lamongan)	13 million m ³
10. Sangiran dam (Ngawi)	15 million m ³
Sub-total:	694 million m ³
B. Wilayah Sungai Brantas	Size
1. Wonorejo dam (Tulungagung)	120 million m ³
2. Sejawe dam (Tulungagung)	1 million m ³
3. Tugu dam	40 million m ³
4. Bagong dam (Trenggalek)	9 million m ³
5. Kampak dam (Trenggalek)	19 million m ³
6. Beng dam (Jombang)	100 million m ³
Sub-total:	289 million m ³
C. Wilayah Madura	Size
1. Blega dam	70 million m ³
2. Samiran dam	60 million m ³
3. Nipah dam	2.5 million m ³
Sub-total:	132.5 million m ³
Total:	1,115.5 million m ³

*the location is in the Central Java province, but the benefits are also felt in the East Java province

Source: DPU Pengairan Daerah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur, 1993 (quoted in Hardiyanto, 1995: 5).

The plan to build the Nipah dam had been on the table since

the fiscal year of 1981/1982. Indeed, it was implemented from that fiscal year until the fiscal year of 1985/1986 with funds from the Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (APBN - Budget Revenue and Expenditure) through the project Pembangunan Jaringan Irigasi Sedang Kecil Jawa Timur (Small Medium Irrigation Development in East Java). The project was halted due to lack of funds and was scheduled to restart in the fiscal year of 1986/1987 (Hardiyanto, 1995: 10). In 1982, the government started the process of acquiring land with a total area of 53 hectares. This land acquisition, however, was postponed since the government decided to reschedule the project in 1984 (*Kompas*, 17 October 1993). In the end, no further action was executed until a decade later and the fiscal year of 1993/1994.

In the fiscal year of 1993/1994 the Nipah irrigation development project was scheduled to recommence. The proposal came from Dinas Pekerjaan Umum Pengairan Daerah Jawa Timur (DPUPD Jawa Timur - the East Java Public Works Office of Irrigation Areas), the East Java provincial government, and the Sampang regency government. The proposal was approved by the Minister of Public Works (Menteri Pekerjaan Umum) and was drawn up by Surat Pembantu Gubernur Wilayah VI (the Decree of Regional Governor Assistant VI) in Pamekasan No. 092/3134/440.11/1989 dated 10 May 1989 (Hardiyanto, 1995: 10).

According to the 1991 annual report and the special report related to the 25 September 1993 incident (the incident will be described in the following paragraphs), both issued by DPUPD, the Nipah project planned to irrigate an area of 1,150 hectares under the following conditions: the conversion of an area of 225 hectares of semi-technical irrigation land in Montor village into a technical irrigation area; and the conversion of a rain-fed agriculture area of 925 hectares into a technical irrigation area (Hardiyanto, 1995: 10). Moreover, according to an official from DPUPD of Pamekasan, with a total volume of 2.5 million m³, the dam was expected to function as a research centre for aquaculture (*Surabaya Post*, 28 September 1993).

In order to build the dam, the government needed to acquire land, and that included people's property, such as houses, mosques and burial grounds. The land acquisition issues turned out to be a

major problem. The government did not publicly explain the plan to the residents, and despite the fact that the land belonged to the people, the villagers were not invited to discuss the land acquisition process. The land acquisition began with a measurement of the land instead of a discussion of the plan with the land owners. The land measurements caused unrest among the villagers, and they felt that they were not given adequate information regarding the plans.

According to the statistical records for 1992, the population of Banyuates was 60,837 people or 8.65 per cent of the total population of Sampang.⁸⁰ The total number of households within the eight villages was 11,424, while the types of work undertaken by the inhabitants were farming (87.63 per cent) and trading (8.16 per cent) (Hardiyanto, 1995: 13). For the farmers, their land was not only a source of income, but also a sacred possession. There were graveyards and *langgar* (small mosque) on their lands. These places were regarded as sacred, and together with their houses and their paddy fields they constituted a connected family property. Khudori, who was considered the ringleader of the people's protests, revealed that his property was inherited land and that he had no desire to sell it: 'If I sold it, how would I visit (*ziarah*) the graves of my parents?' (*Tempo*, 16 October 1993). Moreover, Musa, the father of Nindin (one of the victims who died in the incident), stated that he had two hectares of land and that he did not want to sell: 'The land was inherited from my parents. I was afraid to get *kualat* (being cursed and struck down by calamity) if I sold it; what's more, it was my only property' (*Kompas*, 17 October 1993).

In the process of land acquisition, on 5 April 1993 the head of DPUPD asked permission from the regent of Sampang to conduct a land acquisition amounting to an area of approximately 120 hectares in Banyuates. The proposal was approved by the regent on 30 April 1993 through letter No. 593.82/914/442.11/1993. This letter stated that the regent approved the DPUPD's plan to acquire the land to build the Nipah dam in the villages of Nagasareh, Montor, and Tapaan. This letter was also confirmed by the Regional Governor Assistant in Pamekasan through letter

80 In 2009 the inhabitants were 73,234 people or 8.47 per cent of the Sampang population (*Kabupaten Sampang dalam Angka*, 2010: 55).

No. 593.82.349/440.15/93 dated 19 May 1993 and addressed to the head of DPUPD (Hardiyanto, 1995: 23). Meanwhile, on the same day as the approval letter, 30 April 1993, the regent also issued a decree (Surat Keputusan - SK) No. 71/1993, to form a land acquisition committee for the Nipah dam. The committee was led by the regent, with some officials from the regency office and the sub-district head (*camat*) of Banyuates and other members including the *klebun* of Montor, Tapaan, and Nagasareh (Hardiyanto, 1995: 23-24).

A couple of weeks later, on 19 May 1993, the regent issued SK No. 89/1993 establishing the Tim Pembantu Pelaksana Pembebasan Tanah (the land acquisition supporting team) for the Nipah dam project. In the letter, we find the beginnings of the involvement of local security forces in the process of land acquisition. It is stated in the letter that Aliwafa, the sector police chief (Kapolsek) of Banyuates and Sudjak, the military rayon commander (Danramil) of Banyuates were members of the support team along with other officials from the regency office (Hardiyanto, 1995: 25-26).

The measuring of the land by the officials of the Badan Pertanahan Nasional (BPN - the National Land Board) started on 5 July 1993 in the villages of Nagasareh and Tapaan and ended on 31 July 1993. On 2 August 1993, around 35 landowners came to the local parliament of Sampang to ask about the measuring process. They also demanded that the regency parliament clarify the plans to build the dam. However, they did not receive a clear answer. The local government saw the visit as a protest. As a result, the measuring was suspended for eight days. On 10 August 1993, the measuring continued and once again the villagers showed signs of disagreement with the process. Around six landowners approached the measuring team and requested that it be stopped (Hardiyanto, 1995: 27).

On 25 August 1993, around 32 landowners went to the regency parliament once again. They complained about the unrest being caused by the measuring. Reports by the fact-finding team of Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH - Legal Aid Organisation) Surabaya indicated that landowners were restless and uneasy because village officials were forcing them to give their approval (to give *cap jempol*, literally a thumb mark) to the measuring. The

landowners discovered that this thumb mark was being used as a sign of approval of the measuring, whereas they were initially told that the thumb mark would be a sign that their land would not be measured. As a result, the following day, four landowners, Khudhori, Makruf, Masruki, and Mar'i were ordered to come to Koramil (the military rayon command) Banyuates. They were taken to Kodim (the military district command) Sampang and stayed there for two days. They were accused of: 1) being the masterminds behind the rejection of the Nipah dam; 2) being ringleaders in terms of organising other villagers to come to the local parliament; 3) leading the way in the rejection of the measuring process; and 4) influencing people to not sell their land. Furthermore, the four men were forced to accept the land prices set by the government and were forced to influence fellow landowners to sell their land. The measuring then continued on 27 August 1993; this time in the villages of Planggaran Barat and Planggaran Timur (Hardiyanto, 1995: 27-28). The arrest of these four landowners was actually part of a rather common pattern in many places in Indonesia. As Lucas has indicated, the 'mysterious' arrests of activists or people labelled as activists who tried to organise resistance and change the security forces' perception of its own role in land acquisition disputes, also happened in Plumpang, north Jakarta and Tubanan, north Surabaya (Lucas, 1997: 255).

During the measuring on 8 September 1993, officials from the BPN, accompanied by the *klebun* of Planggaran Barat, two police officers from Polsek (the sector police in the sub-district) Banyuates and a soldier of Koramil Banyuates were intercepted by around one hundred villagers. Asdin, the *klebun*, armed with a machete, threatened the villagers not to disrupt the measuring. The villagers demanded that the measuring be stopped and, after a heated debate, this is indeed what happened (Hardiyanto, 1995: 28).

This disturbance on 8 September annoyed the regent who ordered a briefing (*penyuluhan*) be held among the villagers.⁸¹ On 20 September 1993, the regent along with a number of members of the DPRD II (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah - the regency

⁸¹ It is a common rhetoric that many village meetings during the New Order, which were actually monologist in nature, were called briefings or *instruksi* (instructions).

parliament) Sampang and a group of officials of the sub-district of Banyuates (Muspika) conducted a briefing in Planggaran Timur village hall. A local *ulama*, *Kiai* Jauhari was also spotted at this briefing. The regent was angry because the measuring process was not going smoothly. He threatened that anyone who obstructed the Nipah dam project would be shot (Hardiyanto, 1995: 30-31; Elsam, 1996: 5). Makruf, a villager who would later be suspected of being a provocateur, voiced his disapproval of the project. He was supported by the majority of villagers who eventually left the hall as a sign of protest (Elsam, 1996: 5). He and other villagers said that they did not want to sell their land because there were a number of mosques and graves of their ancestors there (*Surabaya Post*, 22 September 1993). According to *Kiai* Moh Ismail Muzakki, one of the vice chairmen of the regency's parliament, on 20 September 1993, in a meeting with residents of Banyuates in Planggaran Timur village, Bagus Hinayana, the regent of Sampang, intimidated villagers who disagreed with the plan to build a dam in their area by threatening to shoot anyone who rejected the plan (*Jawa Pos*, 19 October 1993).

On 23 September 1993, the regent held a coordination meeting (*rakor*) with the regency parliament head, the police chief of Sampang (Kapolres), the commander of Kodim Sampang (Dandim), BPN, and other officials. One of the outcomes of this *rakor* was the replacement of police officers (Polres Sampang) in the measuring process with the armed forces (Kodim 0828) (Hardiyanto, 1995: 31). According to *Tempo* magazine, which obtained its information from an anonymous source, in a meeting on 15 September 1993 with Muspida (a group of officials of the Sampang regency), the regent asked the Dandim to provide security for the measuring. The anonymous source claims that: 'since the regent is more senior [his military rank was colonel] than the Dandim, of course the request is approved by the Dandim. In ABRI [the Indonesian Armed Forces], a request from a senior is an order' (*Tempo*, 23 October 1993). On 24 September 1993, one day before the Nipah dam incident, officials from BPN and around 20 security officers from Polres Sampang and Kodim 0828 conducted the measuring in Planggaran Timur village. No incident took place on that day.

To conclude, it seems that the government consistently

attempted to measure the land despite a number of protests from landowners. Lucas reveals that this kind of situation has been common in the period since the late 1980s, when land disputes involving the authorities and landowners became a major source of local and national tension in Indonesia. The disputes were usually concerned with compensation offered for the land at rates well below market value (Lucas, 1997: 230). The low prices of the land were caused by, among other things, landholders' failure to register their lands, because of both the costs and the bureaucratic procedures involved. Therefore, the only proof of ownership or cultivation rights is the length of time they had been cultivating the land and their payment of all financial obligations (Lucas, 1992: 84).

The shooting

After 24 September passed without incident, the officials of BPN and the Social and Politics Office (Kantor Sosial Politik) of Sampang and around 20 security officers, recommenced measuring on 25 September. Unlike the day before, this time hundreds of villagers had gathered on the site where officials were attempting to measure the land and protested against the process. There are several different versions of the incident reported in the media. One of the reports mentions that the villagers were armed with sharp weapons and tried to attack the officials. They forced the officials back until the distance between them was only five metres, and then, following a number of warning shots, which were ignored by the protesters, the security forces fired on the villagers. As a result, three villagers, Mutirah, Nindin, and Simuki, died on the spot, and one, Muhammad, died in a hospital a couple of days later (30 September 1993) (*Surya*, 26 September 1993; *Tempo*, 16 October 1993).

The findings of LBH Surabaya reveal another story. According to this organisation, the villagers of Planggaran Timur, Lar-Lar, Tolang, Nagasareh, Tapaan, Montor, and Planggaran Barat, came to the site to ask why their property was being measured while the question of whether they were willing to sell their property or not, and whether the prices being offered were appropriate had not been resolved. Moreover, according to this

version of the story, the villagers were not carrying any weapons and were shot from a distance of 125 metres, rather than five metres (Hardiyanto, 1995: 36). It is also said that village officials, such as Asdin, the *klebun*, wore headbands of yellow coconut leaves and weeds (*janur kuning* and *ilalang*) (Hardiyanto, 1995: 36; *Tempo*, 16 October 1993). Despite its prevalent use in wedding ceremonies in Java and Madura, for some people *janur kuning* is a symbol of *tolak bala* (to avoid calamities). Therefore, the use of *janur kuning* by the village officials was a sign that they were expecting or hoping that calamities could be avoided. According to *Tempo*, there were rumours that *calo tanah* (land brokers) were aware of the signs (such as the *janur kuning* and *ilalang* headbands worn by the village officials) that on 25 September, during the measuring process, there would be a bloody incident in which people would be killed (*Tempo*, 16 October 1993).

After the incident, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (Menko Polkam), Susilo Sudarman, stated that the guilty parties would be prosecuted (*Surya*, 29 September 1993). Meanwhile, twenty *kiai* from Sampang issued a statement demanding that the perpetrators be charged in accordance with the applicable laws. Similar statements were issued by *kiai* from Pamekasan and Sumenep. The statement from the *kiai* of Sampang was directed against the regent with a number of copies sent to several civil and military officials of East Java province as well as to the central government (Hardiyanto, 1995: 45). One day after the statement from the *kiai*, Pangdam V/Brawijaya (the commander of the military provincial command) Major General Haris Sudarno asserted that there would be an investigation into the shooting. The investigation was to be carried out by Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Keamanan dan Stabilitas Nasional - Body for the Coordination of National Security and Stability) of East Java (Hardiyanto, 1995: 45).

Consequently, the soldiers who had shot the four people were brought to court and punished. Furthermore, Dandim 0828 Sampang, Lieutenant Colonel (Artillery) Sugeng Wiyono and Kapolres Sampang, Lieutenant Colonel (Police) Siswinarto, were dismissed from their posts (*Suara Karya* and *Jayakarta*, 16 October 1993).

Kiai in power

One of the most active *kiai* in the protest was *Kiai* Alawy Muhammad. After the incident, *Kiai* Alawy, together with Sampang residents, demanded justice. Vice President Try Sutrisno asked *Kiai* Alawy to calm the fiery situation in Sampang. Meanwhile, other *kiai* also responded to the incident. *Kiai* from the NU of East Java, represented by its board members, *Kiai* Imron Hamzah and *Kiai* Hasyim Muzadi, stated that: 'the NU of East Java deeply regrets the three persons shooting incident. The NU of East Java is very concerned. The suspects in the Nipah incident must be thoroughly investigated under applicable laws, taken the public interest into account'. The NU of East Java also urged the *nahdliyin* (the NU followers) to perform *shalat ghaib* (a funeral prayer performed when the corpse is not in the same location as those performing the prayer) and *tahlilan* (a prayer performed on six consecutive nights to facilitate a deceased person entering paradise) for the victims. Moreover, Ikatan Keluarga Madura (Ikama - Association of the Madurese) via its advisor *Kiai* Amin Imron also stated its concern about the incident (*Jawa Pos*, 30 September 1993; *Surya*, 31 September 1993).

The Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan (FPP - the United Development Fraction) of DPRD II Sampang issued a statement deploring the shooting incident and urging for the authorities and individuals involved in the incident to be thoroughly investigated. It also insisted that all activities in the fields be stopped, given the fact that Sampang's citizens were now gripped by fear, it called for a stop on the arresting of citizens in the area (Hardiyanto, 1995: 47-48).

Meanwhile, on Saturday, 2 October 1993 twenty *ulama* from Sampang who had signed a statement of concern and regret over the Nipah incident were invited by Muspida Sampang to an event titled 'Pertemuan Ulama-Umaro Sampang' (the meeting of *ulama-umaro* (the government) of Sampang). However, only one of the twenty invited *ulama* attended, *Kiai* Busyiri Nawawi, the *kiai* of *Pesantren Asy-Syirojijah* Sampang. Among others present at the meeting were Dandim 0828, the vice Kapolres, the chairman of the municipal court, the chairman of the municipal parliament, and a number of other officials (*Surya*, 3 October 1993; *Surabaya*

Post, 3 October 1993).

In the meantime, *Kiai* Alawy, one of the *ulama* who had signed the statement, stated that he did not have to attend the meeting because the regent, Bagus Hinayana, had not apologised, and had instead persisted in blaming the citizens for being ‘puppeteers’ of the incident and the on-going protests to reject the dam. *Kiai* Alawy claimed that he did not know about the government’s plan to build the dam: ‘I have never been asked to consult about the plan, Mister Bagus [Hinayana] has only been here once, at the opening of Penataran P4 (the Upgrading of the Guidance to the Perception and Practice of Pancasila) some time ago’. Another *ulama*, *Kiai* Marzuki Djufri, the chairman of the education foundation Al Jufri, Blumbungan, Pamekasan, supported *Kiai* Alawy’s statement, saying that ‘the eruption of the incident is proof that the role of *ulama* and public figures is not taken into consideration’ (*Jawa Pos*, 4 October 1993; *Surya*, 4 October 1993).

The statements of a number of *ulama* were later taken into consideration by the authorities. Around seventeen *ulama*, led by *Kiai* Alawy, were invited to meet with the governor of East Java.⁸² In the meeting with the *ulama*, the governor was accompanied by the chairman of the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia - the Council of Indonesian *Ulama*) of East Java, *Kiai* Misbach. According to *Kiai* Alawy, the main purpose of the meeting was to deliver ten points of concern from the Madurese *ulama* on the incident. These points included the handling of the incident. The *ulama* voiced their concern that to deal with the incident, peace must first be created in the villages surrounding the dam, people’s lives must be put back to normal, people’s trust had to be restored in the government’s

82 The *ulama* of Sampang were *Kiai* Abdul Mohaimin of *Pesantren* Dharut Tauhed, *Kiai* Faisol Basuni of *Pesantren* Darus Salam, *Kiai* Hamiduddin of *Pesantren* Prajan, *Kiai* Saifuddin of *Pesantren* Nanggor Sempal, and *Kiai* Dhoviersyah of *Pesantren* Dasussalam Torjun. From Sumenep, there were *Kiai* Taufiqurrachman of *Pesantren* Mathlaul Ulum, *Kiai* M. Musyhab of *Pesantren* Tegal, and *Kiai* Tijani Jauhari of *Pesantren* Al Amien. From Pamekasan *Kiai* Moch Maimun of *Pesantren* Madukawan, *Kiai* Maduqi of *Pesantren* Cendana, and *Kiai* Moch Sobri of *Pesantren* Banyuanyar were present. From Bangkalan *Kiai* Kholil A.G. of *Pesantren* Syaichona Kholil, *Kiai* Nuruddin Rahman of *Pesantren* Mamba’ul Hikam, *Kiai* Syafik Rafi’i of *Pesantren* Asyasyafi’iyah, *Kiai* Abdullah Cholil of *Pesantren* Bustanil Arifin, and *Kiai* Machfud Sidik of *Pesantren* Nurul Taufik were invited.

plan, and mutual suspicion between the various parties must be eliminated. The governor was said to have appreciated the initiative of the *ulama* to convey their ten points: '[...] well done, they were willing to help and cooperate with us to calm the community around the site' (Hardiyanto, 1995: 55; *Jawa Pos*, 6 October 1993; *Surya*, 6 October 1993).

Two days later, a larger meeting was held in the Grahadi building (a state building built by the Dutch in 1795) in Surabaya. Among the participants were: *Kiai* Alawy, the chairman of the MUI of East Java, and a number of Madurese *ulama*. Representing the authorities were the governor of East Java; Pangdam V/Brawijaya; Kapolda (the commander of provincial police) of East Java; the chairman of the East Java office of the council for the prosecution (Kejaksaan Tinggi Jawa Timur); the Danrem (the commander of the military resort command) 084 Bhaskara Jaya; the regional governor assistants of East Java; regents and mayors of East Java municipalities; the chief of the Social Politics Office; all Dandim under the command of East Java Kodam; the chairman of the provincial parliament of East Java; and Mohammad Noer, a Madurese public figure (*Jawa Pos*, 8 October 1993; Hardiyanto, 1995: 55).

The incident generated concern from a number of quarters, including from other *ulama* in other places. From Rembang, Central Java, around forty *ulama* expressed these concerns in a letter to President Suharto. This eight-page letter was sent with copies to: the vice president; the chairmen of the DPR/MPR; the Pangab (the highest military commander); Menko Polkam; the central board of the NU; the central board of the MUI; the board of the provincial parliament; the NU of Central Java; the MUI of Central Java; DPRD II Rembang; the NU of Rembang; the NU of Lasem; the NU of East Java; and the NU of Sampang (*Suara Merdeka*, 13 October 1993).

Meanwhile, the incident was also discussed in a Bassra meeting in *Pesantren Raudlatul Muta'allimin*, Bangkalan on 17 October 1993. Around 75 *ulama* were present to hear an explanation from *Kiai* Jauhari of Banyuates (*Surabaya Post*, 18 October 1993). Following the incident, there was also a plan by a number of *ulama* to conduct a *tahlilan akbar* (grand *tahlilan*) to commemorate

forty days since the death of the victims. However, this plan was abandoned due to security reasons following a recommendation from Pangdam V/Brawijaya. As an alternative, *Kiai* Busyiri Nawawi recommended that a *tahlil* be performed in every mosque, *langgar*, and home (*Jawa Pos*, 22 October 1993).

In an interview with the *Surabaya Post*, *Kiai* Alawy asserted that the plan to build the Nipah dam was not crystal clear for the people surrounding the site. He added that the villagers did not completely understand the benefits of the dam and that they only knew that their land was being measured, so it was easy to see how the misunderstanding had surfaced. He urged the officials measuring the land to have direct meetings with the villagers and demanded that the villagers be provided with clear explanations about the benefits of the dam, the prices of their land and, finally, why the land should be measured. He also mentioned that the incident happened because the government had not approached the *ulama* and other public figures about this matter adequately. He lamented that the government did not invite the *ulama* to discuss the plan prior to the measuring (*Surabaya Post*, 4 October 1993). The important role *Kiai* Alawy played was approved by the governor of Lemhanas (the National Resilience Institute), Major General R. Hartono, who publicly voiced his unhappiness about the plan that had not involved the *ulama*, including *Kiai* Alawy (*Jawa Pos*, 4 October 1993).

A youth wing organisation of the NU, GP Ansor also attempted to speak out about the incident. The chairman of GP Ansor of East Java, Choirul Anam, stated that the organisation had sent an investigation team of seven people. The team issued a 'three-versions' report based on data collected from the site: the version according to the villagers, the version put forward by the municipal government, and the police's version (*Memorandum*, 5 October 1993).

It is interesting to observe that the role of the *klebun* is absent from these versions. Even though the *klebun* position was formally acknowledged by the villagers, during and prior to the incident, the *klebun* of the eight villages were seen as aligned to the government, and not on the side of the people. *Klebun* were perceived as not having the right and authority to be involved in the land affairs

of the landowners. *Klebun* were seen as ‘individuals above the village’, even though they lived in the neighbourhood. Moreover, in the Nipah incident, *klebun* were thought to have favoured the interests of the ‘*orang kota*’ (townsmen), such as the *camat* (head of sub-district) or the regent, instead of their own people. This became clear when some *klebun* (Montor, Tapaan, and Nagasareh villages) became members of the land acquisition committee. Therefore, the fact that the measuring team arrived accompanied by the *klebun*, made no difference and the landowners still refused to approve the process (Hardiyanto, 1995: 4). After the incident, the villagers turned to other leaders who they expected would be able to solve the problems. During this time, the *ulama* showed their influence and became involved for two reasons. Firstly, they became involved because the people called on them to help solve the problems, and secondly—and this is actually more important—it was because the *ulama* felt the need to involve themselves in the conflict. They believed that their capacity as leaders of the people would be preserved if they were seen to be on the villager’s side, supporting the people, and criticising the government.

Land acquisition and the problems of ‘provocateurs’

Freshwater is a much-contested resource. Industry, households, and farmers make competing demands on available water resources, using them diversely for, among other things, transport, a source of drinking water, and a key resource for agriculture and fish farming. The 1990s saw governments worldwide experimenting with market-mimicking devices for water management (Braadbaart, 2007: 297). The incident over land acquisition in Sampang was actually part of a series of wider land disputes in Indonesia. During the New Order, land dispossession was guarded under the strict control of the bureaucracy and the military, justified by utilitarian ideas of development and public purposes (Fauzi & Bachriadi, 2006: 3-4). According to Lucas, during the early 1990s, an enormous increase in land disputes was caused by the rapid expansion of foreign and domestic private investment. The government had to facilitate the acquisition of land by investors for the building of factories and public projects such as housing, dams, roads, and urban renewal schemes. The help given to private investment was part of the

government's industrialisation programme. Other public projects that generated land disputes arising from land acquisition include urban redevelopment, agricultural estates, reforestation, new plantations, and land for military use (Lucas, 1997: 231-232). Prior to the Nipah incident, the most infamous land dispute regarding a public project and involving thousands of families is perhaps the Kedung Ombo dam dispute in Central Java in the 1980s.

In almost all land dispute cases, bureaucracy plays a pivotal role in the administration of land acquisition as well as in the settling of disputes. It is the bureaucracy of various ministries at the village, regency, and provincial levels that has the responsibility to implement government laws and regulations regarding land, from the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 (which sets the legal framework for all land regulations) to Keppres/Keputusan Presiden (the Presidential Decree) No. 55/1993, which covers the implementation of land acquisition, definitions and interpretations of public interest (Lucas, 1997: 232).

In the Nipah dam incident, which cost the lives of several villagers, there was a common attitude among the civil and military authorities, which was asserted in various statements, that the incident was masterminded (*didalangi*) by third parties (*pihak ketiga*) or outsiders (*orang luar*). The governor insisted that the incident happened because there were third parties encouraging landowners to reject the dam. Pangdam V/Brawijaya even accused three villagers of being ringleaders in opposing the measuring team and the security forces (Hardiyanto, 1995: 46). The regent suspected 'outsiders' of being the actors behind the protests: 'I suppose that the protests were driven by outsiders, not by the local people, but I do not know who drove it' (*Kompas*, 28 September 1993). According to the special report of the DPUPD, the protesters, including the three dead victims, were mostly not the landowners, and that the protests from 2 August 1993 to 25 September 1993 were masterminded by Makruf of Lar-lar, Khudhori of Talang, and Siseh of Talang (Hardiyanto, 1995: 50).

One year after the incident, a team from Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional Yogyakarta (Centre for Research of History and Traditional Values Yogyakarta) under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism investigated the incident and visited the site.

According to their report, officials returned to the site to install markers on the acquired land. They were accompanied by security forces and measured the land in the villages of Lar-lar, Talang, and Nagasareh. These activities were said to have generated anxiety amongst the villagers who still hoped, indeed, expected, that the incident would be settled (Nurhajarini et al, 2005: 99). Moreover, the report also stated that a number of people benefited from the project, including a number of *klebun*, such as the *klebun* of Montor, who is said to have provided lodging for the construction workers and to have supplied building material (Nurhajarini et al, 2005: 108-109).

The trial of four security personnel

On 8 April 1996, the trial of four people from the security forces in Mahkamah Militer (Court Martial) III-12 Surabaya—three from the army and one from the police—began. The defendants were: Letda Inf. (Second lieutenant infantry) Sudjak, Danramil Banyuates 0828/09; Serka (Sergeant first class) M. Said Riyadi of Kodim 0828 Sampang; Serda (Lower-ranking sergeant) Bambang Edy Cahyono of Polres Sampang; and Pratu (First private) Siswanto of Kodim 0828 (Elsam, 1996: 1).

Table 5.3
Verdict of Mahkamah Militer III-12 Surabaya in the Nipah dam incident

Names of defendants	Demanded	Sentence
Letda Sudjak	2 years 4 months imprisonment and discharged from duty	The same
Serka M. Said Riyadi	2 years 4 months imprisonment and discharged from duty	2 years 2 months and discharged from duty
Praka Siswanto	2 years imprisonment and discharged from duty	1 year 7 months 20 days and discharged from duty

Serda Bambang	2 years imprisonment	2 years and discharged from duty
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Source: Elsam, 1996: 40.

What about the regent?

In the midst of the pressure from the *ulama* and the general public to investigate the incident thoroughly, the Minister of Home Affairs, as the regent's ultimate superior, appeared hesitant. Up until 15 October 1993, the minister was still waiting for the report from the governor (the official report of Bakorstanas of East Java), which was necessary before any punishment could be imposed. He said that punishments could vary from being discharged of duties, demotions, or cuts in salary. Four days earlier, the governor also stressed that he would punish the regent over the incident. To that end, the governor formed a special team to evaluate the regent's involvement in the incident. The team was composed of the Deputy Governor of the People's Welfare section, the Itwilprop (provincial inspectorate) of East Java, and the first assistant of the Sekwilda (provincial secretary). The team was to operate based on the report of Bakorstanas of East Java and the opinion of DPRD Sampang (Hardiyanto, 1995: 53).

Prior to 15 October 1993, the regent released a statement that he would take full responsibility for what happened in the incident (*Suara Merdeka*, 13 October 1993). This did not prevent the governor from asserting that he would bear the ultimate responsibility for the incident: 'It is not fair to blame others in the incident. This is completely my responsibility as the governor of East Java; do not blame the regent of Sampang Bagus Hinayana in this case because he was only the executor [of the project] in the *daerah* (region, here it means in Sampang)' (*Merdeka*, 15 October 1993; *Tempo*, 23 October 1993; Hardiyanto 1995: 53). Two days previously, the governor had stated that he would punish the regent: 'but what kind of sanctions, we shall see later, as we are still waiting for the results of the investigation by Bakorstanas of East Java, so that I shall be able to find out about his mistakes and how far he was involved. Certainly, Bagus as the regent made some mistakes in the incident that took four lives' (*Suara Merdeka*, 13 October 1993).

Following the hesitation of the higher authorities, such as the Ministry of Home Affairs and the governor, to dismiss the regent, residents of Sampang demanded justice by protesting in front of the regent's office on 9 September 1993. They did not have simply one demand. They also called for the abolishment of the SDSB (state-sponsored lottery) and for the Bahari movie theatre to be closed down because it was undermining people's morality (*Surabaya Post*, 9 November 1993; *Jawa Pos*, 10 November 1993). A number of *santri* who claimed to be representatives of *Pesantren* Tanwirul Islam and Darul Ulum also came to the DPRD II Sampang in order to request that parliament dismiss the regent (*Surya*, 16 November 1993).

The protests were not only voiced by those who were against the regent. Twelve *kiai* from Omben, led by *Kiai* Asyari Munir, came to the DPRD II Sampang to give their support to the regent. They asked the DPRD not to dismiss Bagus Hinayana and, in fact, requested that parliament let him keep his position until the end of his tenure. However, they also requested that the SDSB in Sampang be abolished (*Surya*, 16 November 1993).⁸³ It seems that there was a political agreement between the regent and his supporters that would allow the regent to retain his position as long as the SDSB was abolished. It is also possible that these *kiai*, in order not to appear to be direct supporters of the regent, raised the issue of abolishing the SDSB so that their disagreement with the SDSB indicated their support for Islamic law.

Meanwhile, in an interview with *Surya*, *Kiai* Alawy stated that the regent must be punished: 'Not only has he to be sanctioned in the form of dismissal from his position,' he said, 'but he also has to be brought to court'. He also condemned the twelve *kiai* who gave support to the regent, saying that those who supported the regent could not claim to be *kiai*. He suggested that those who supported the regent were driven by contractor companies; if they did not support the regent, he reasoned, they would not get governmental projects. The same opinion was also voiced by the FPP (the United Development Fraction) of DPRD II Sampang who demanded that the regent resign from his position (*Surya*, 18

83 Among the *kiai* were *Kiai* Asyari Munir of *Pesantren* Nurul Hidayah, *Kiai* Junaidi, *Kiai* Sobir Mawardi, *Kiai* Farisi A.S., *Kiai* Ali Wafa, and *Kiai* Mukit.

November 1993).

Nevertheless, on 17 November the DPRD confirmed that the regent would remain in his position until the end of his tenure in 1995. This decision was made for several reasons, such as the fact that the regent was still needed to rule the regency and that during his tenure he had achieved much for the regency. The FPP, who had voiced their disagreement with other fractions in the parliament, ultimately had to agree with the decision. However, they made sure that their opinions on the regent would be inserted into the statement that would be sent to the governor (*Surabaya Post*, 18 November 1993). Subsequently, there were no further attempts to bring the regent to court or to dismiss him from his position for the remainder of his tenure.

The Suramadu Bridge affair

The origin and nature of the project

According to Harold Crouch, authoritarian regimes exercise substantial control over society. One of the main characteristics of such regimes is their capacity to maintain themselves in power through direct repression in which, more often than not, the army and police play major roles. In addition, there is another significant way in which authoritarian regimes dominate society; that is to say, the development of political methods to maintain control. Such political methods range from formulating national ideologies to justify rule, to holding elections to provide the regime with legitimacy. Despite the regimes' claims that the political institutions of authoritarian regimes permit the people to participate in the decision-making process, such pseudo-democratic characteristics typically administer the people in well-designed ways that reinforce the regimes. Indications of pseudo-democratic characteristics include the victory of the government party in all elections, which results in parliament being dominated by the regime, and situations when mass organisations serve to control rather than represent. According to this description, the New Order administration in Indonesia was a typically authoritarian regime. Crouch also reminds us that domination is not always complete where the repressive machinery of the regime does not always operate efficiently. Moreover, the extent of domination also

depends on the degree of unity and cohesion in the governing elite. When the elite is divided, rival factions may have interests in turning ideologies, institutions, and organisations, which are originally intended to facilitate state control, into means for mobilising political support (Crouch, 1990: 115-116).

During the New Order, political methods were also used to manipulate government projects. Foreign and domestic private investment rapidly entered Indonesia in the name of *pembangunan*. Many government projects, such as high-rise buildings, roads, and bridges were financed by such investments in which the government facilitated the investors as part of the industrialisation programmes. Frequently, in order to implement a project, another project had to be executed by the government in order to meet all the requirements by the investors. It could also be the case that the government felt it necessary to execute another related project in order to accelerate development or regain capital. Meanwhile, if there was any disagreement about such projects from society or oppositional parties, the authoritarian New Order administration responded with manipulative methods.

The plan to build the Suramadu Bridge, which would connect the islands of Java and Madura, was characterised not only by such manipulative methods and the pseudo-democratic characteristics of the New Order administration, but also by a division among the Madurese religious elite where the use of ideologies, institutions, and organisations was prevalent. At the same time, both the government and the religious elite targeted the people to gain support.

At the end of 1990, through the Keppres No. 55/1990, dated 14 December 1990, the government stated that it would build the Suramadu Bridge. The government also asserted that the development of the bridge would go hand in hand with the establishment of industrial estates on the island, especially in Bangkalan. In other words, both plans were arranged in one policy package. According to the governor of East Java, Soelarso (r. 1988-1993), in the future all industrial activities would have to be concentrated in one area in order to avoid the annexation of fertile agricultural land. In order to do this, the development of the Madura region was seen as an alternative option to the

development of other industrial areas in East Java, alongside the existing industrial estates such as in Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Gresik, and Pasuruan (*Surabaya Post*, 4 December 1991).

The idea to build a bridge had, apparently, been there long before the government issued the decree. In the 1960s, Professor Sedyatmo, a notable engineer, raised the idea of bridging the islands of Java and Sumatra and Java and Bali.⁸⁴ He named these bridges after Ontoseno (Antasena), a mythical figure in the Javanese version of the Mahabharata epic (Effendi & Aksan, 2009: 235). The idea then developed into a plan to build a bridge connecting Java and Madura since this was more practical in terms of implementation.⁸⁵ Another early idea concerning the bridge is said to have come from R.P. Mohammad Noer, known as Pak Noer (b. 1918, d. 2010). Noer claimed that the idea came to him when he served as *patih* (deputy regent) of Bangkalan between 1950 and 1959 (Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 46, 53, 179). The idea became stronger during his tenure as the governor of East Java between 1971 and 1976. He claimed that he never officially stated his idea when he held the governor position, because he feared that people would accuse him of giving preference to his home island, Madura.⁸⁶ A third idea about the bridge seems to have arisen during the Sukarno presidency. The initial plan was to build the bridge between Kebomas, Gresik (Java) and Kamal, Bangkalan (Madura). Due to the left-wing officers coup (G30S/PKI) in 1965, the plan was not implemented (Subaharianto et al, 2004: 103). In 1965, a blueprint of the Sumatra-Java bridge was formulated by Sedyatmo at ITB Bandung. The blueprint was seen by Suharto in June 1986, two years after Sedyatmo passed

84 Prof. R.M. Sedyatmo was born in Karanganyar in 1909 and died in Jakarta in 1984. He was an engineer trained at Technische Hogeschool (now ITB - Bandung Technological Institute). The toll road that connects Jakarta with the Soekarno-Hatta international airport is named after the engineer (Effendi & Aksan, 2009).

85 Connecting Java and Sumatra by bridge is naturally very difficult in an island group of such volcanic activity. Krakatoa (*Krakatau* in Indonesian) lies in the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra. Connecting Java and Bali has not been seen as urgent since direct flights to Denpasar from major cities in Java have existed for years.

86 There have been recent discussions that the name of the bridge should be changed to the Mohammad Noer Bridge (*Tempo*, 17 April 2010; *Surabaya Post*, 19 April 2010).

away (Effendi & Aksan, 2009: 239).

The idea to include the establishment of industrial estates was determined mainly by economic reasons. The development of the bridge was estimated to have cost around Rp. 500,000,000,000 (roughly US\$ 300,000,000) or Rp. 1,000,000,000,000 including the establishment of industrial areas (Muthmainnah, 1998: 54; Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 181; *Surabaya Post*, 2 August 1991). As is the case in other investments, investors expect a quick return on their capital. However, depending on the bridge to deliver immediate profit was not considered an appropriate or suitable option. There had to be a way that investors would be attracted to investing in the bridge based on economic calculations. *Daerah* (or regions, that range from provincial to municipal regions) were forced to find creative ways of attracting investors by *pusat* (the centre-Jakarta). Therefore, in the ambitious plan to build the bridge, the government believed that industrial estates had to be established along with the development of the bridge as a way for investors would be able to obtain a quick profit. This seems to be a common centralisation policy of the Guided Democracy (1959-1966) and the New Order administration in which regional governments had neither influence over central government policies, nor the power to control their own affairs. Local politics and power constellations reflected the interests of central government, rather than those of regional governments (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003: 2).

Two years after Sedyatmo passed away, his wife, Sumarpeni Sedyatmo, wrote a letter to one of the personal assistants of President Suharto, Ario Darmoko, about the blueprint for a project called the Trinusa Bima Sakti Bridge. Based on the basic concepts outlined by Sedyatmo, in July 1986 Suharto assigned Menteri Negara Riset dan Teknologi (Menristek)/Kepala Badan Penerapan dan Pengkajian Teknologi - BPPT (the State Minister of Research and Technology/Chairman of Body of the Application and Assessment of Technology), B.J. Habibie, to conduct research on the feasibility of building the Java-Sumatra, Java-Bali, and Java-Madura bridges. This project, which was initially named the Trinusa Bima Sakti Bridge, was later officially named the Trinusa Bima Sakti and *Penyebrangan Utama* (hereafter Trinusa), based on the earlier name given by Sedyatmo. The Japan Indonesia Science

and Technology Forum (JIF), a cooperation forum comprising of Japanese private companies and BPPT, supported the research project between 1986 and 1989 by conducting a number of preliminary studies on the feasibility of building the bridges. Based on these studies, the most feasible plan seemed to be to build a bridge that would connect Java and Madura. On 9 January 1989, a committee, led by Wardiman Djojonegoro, an official at the BPPT, was established to implement the Trinusa project (Effendi & Aksan, 2009: 239-241).

Mohammad Noer saw many opportunities in the Trinusa project. He was aware that local people should be involved in the project, and that such a plan would end Madura's relative isolation from Java. On 3 May 1989, Noer established P.T. (Perseroan Terbatas - Inc or Ltd) Dhipa Madura Pradana (DMP), a private company that would be part of the consortium charged with building the Suramadu Bridge. Summa Group, a large conglomerate group, was also part of P.T. DMP and Noer became the director president. P.T. DMP was given a significant role in surveying the location, executing land acquisition, and financing the mega project. Based on the decree of Menristek/Kepala BPPT No. 283/M/BPPT/VI/1991 dated 5 June 1991, P.T. DMP was appointed as the project organiser for the Suramadu Bridge. Noer became the project coordinator of the industrial and housing areas until he was replaced by the governor of East Java, Basofi Sudirman (r. 1993-1998) on 14 March 1995 (Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 182; Muthmainnah, 1998: 69).

On 20 November 1990 in Tokyo, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between P.T. DMP and a Japanese consortium, consisting of the Mitsubishi Corporation, C. Itoh & Company (now known as Itochu Corporation), the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan,⁸⁷ and the Shimizu Company. The agreement was intended to implement further research on the feasibility of the project, and it was expected that the project would commence in 1992 (Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 182). After Summa Bank, a major company within the Summa Group, collapsed in 1992, due to highly concentrated intra-group lending, the Indonesian

⁸⁷ Nationalised in 1998, in 2000 the bank was purchased by a group led by US-based Rippelwood Holdings and was renamed Shinsei Bank.

government expected that a new consortium would be established. Habibie explained there would only be three groups in this new consortium: the BPIS (Badan Pengelola Industri Strategis - the Strategic Industries Management Board), the provincial and municipal government, and national private companies (*Jawa Pos*, 3 July 1992). In order to get national private companies involved in financing the project, the governor of East Java, Soelarso, asked Bimantara Group, a business emporium belonging to Bambang Trihatmojo (a son of President Suharto), to be included in the consortium. Bimantara, however, turned down this invitation (*Surya*, 17 July 1992).

An agreement between P.T. DMP and The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECEP), an implementing agency for loan aid furnished by the Japanese government, was made in 1992 when another Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 18 December 1992. This time the agreement was about the financing of the project. After this, the financing would be the responsibility of the OECEP (80 per cent), a Japanese consortium (10 per cent), and an Indonesian consortium (10 per cent), consisting of P.T. DMP, P.T. PAL, P.T. Barata, P.T. Boma Bisma Indra, P.T. Krakatau Steel, P.T. SIER (Surabaya Industrial Estate Rungkut), P.T. Jasa Marga, and Bukaka Group (Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 183; Muthmainnah, 1998: 54).

The governor of East Java supported the plan because the bridge and the industrial areas were predicted to accelerate the development of Madura as well as being a perfect solution to the problem of limited space for industrial estates in Surabaya. Madura was seen as the ideal plan because the fertile agricultural areas in the south of Surabaya would not be disturbed.

Although the development of the bridge was arranged in one package with the establishment of industrial estates, the governor Basofi Sudirman and ex-governor Soelarso expected the bridge to be built first, because in order to build the industrial estates the bridge was required to be fully functional. This was because the only transport system at the time, a number of ferries, could not support the creation of the industrial estates (*Surabaya Post*, 17 February 1994; *Bisnis Indonesia*, 17 February 1994). The industrial estates were to be divided into two parts. In the south,

approximately 15,000 hectares of land would be used for electronic industries in the sub-districts of Labang, Kamal, Socah, Burneh, and Tragah. In the north, heavy industries would cover around 8,000 hectares of land in the Tanjung Bumi sub-district (Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 182).

The start of the project was postponed a couple of times. After it was realised that the project could not be inaugurated in 1992, it was expected that the plan would start in March 1994. In 1994, however, in a meeting between Menristek, Kasospol (Kepala Staf Sosial Politik - Chief of Social and Politics of the Indonesian Armed Forces) Lieutenant General R. Hartono, the governor of East Java, and Madurese public figures, it was decided that the project would begin in April 1995 (*Surya*, 24 September 1994). When the Asian financial crises occurred in 1997, governmental projects worth, in total, around Rp. 135,000,000,000,000 (roughly US\$ 67,500,000,000) were postponed or re-scheduled under Keppres No. 39/1997 on the suspension/reconsideration of governmental projects by BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik Negara - state-owned enterprises) and private sectors attached to BUMN. The Suramadu Bridge project was included in these postponements (Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 183; Muthmainnah, 1998: 107; *Memorandum*, 17 September 1997; *Karya Darma*, 17 September 1997; *Surabaya Post*, 17 September 1997). Before the financial crises hit the Indonesian economy, the delays were thought to be part of the business strategy of the OECF, which demanded assurance from the Indonesian government in case loan repayments be hampered, so that the agency could maximise possible benefits and minimise risk (Siahaan & Purnomo, 1997: 183; Muthmainnah, 1998: 104).

The rejection of Bassra and the opinions of non-Bassra ulama

From the beginning of the plan, a number of *ulama* in the group of Bassra objected to the idea of combining the bridge with the establishment of industrial estates. They wanted the bridge to be built, but thought that the plan to establish industrial estates, which later became known among them as *industrialisasi*, should not be implemented for various reasons. Bassra's opinions became a point of argument among the decision-makers at the national as well as regional level. Through Habibie, the central government

attempted to influence the *ulama* and get them to change their opinion. Such attempts included holding national seminars to which Bassra members were invited, making visits to industrial areas in Surabaya and Batam, and inviting Bassra to P.T. IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara - Nusantara Aircraft Industry). State officials from the central government (Jakarta), such as the Pangab and Minister of Religious Affairs, visited Madura frequently to hold talks with the *ulama*. Objections also came from a number of *ulama* who lived in the area surrounding where the bridge would be built. In a meeting with members of the regency parliament, around fifty *kiai* of several *pesantren* in Sukolilo Barat village, Labang sub-district, Bangkalan, requested that the government keep the educational institutions in the area. In the village, there were around seventeen educational institutions, such as *Pesantren Al-Ittihad Yasi* and *Pesantren K.H. Ishak*. According to the RUTRK (Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Kota - urban spatial planning) of Labang, all educational institutions were to be demolished should *industrialisasi* be introduced (*Surabaya Post*, 10 December 1991).

Meanwhile, on 31 August 1991, IMABA (Ikatan Mahasiswa Bangkalan - the Bangkalanese Student Association) held a seminar entitled 'Persepsi Masyarakat tentang Industrialisasi di Madura' (People's Perceptions of *Industrialisasi* in Madura) in the Bangkalan town hall. *Kiai Kholil A.G.* was one of the speakers (Moesa, 1999: 118). In the following year, on 13 and 14 January, IMABA held another seminar 'Menyongsong Industrialisasi di Madura' (Welcoming *Industrialisasi* in Madura) in Bank Jatim, Surabaya. On 14 and 15 December 1993 Bassra held a seminar entitled 'Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Madura Memasuki Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Tahap II (PJPT II)' (The Development and Construction of Madura in Entering the Second Period of Long-Term Development) (Moesa, 1999: 119).

The attempts by top-level officials to encourage Bassra to support the plan were not completely successful. On 18 August 1994, Bassra sent 'Sembilan Pokok Pikiran Bassra' (the Nine Opinions of Bassra), regarding the *industrialisasi* plan, to Habibie and related government officials, such as the Pangab, the governor of East Java, Pangdam V/Brawijaya, the Regional Governor Assistant in Madura, all regents in Madura, the DPRD I (the

provincial parliament) East Java and the DPRD II of all regencies in Madura. Bassra had high expectations that the government would implement policies that would benefit the Madurese. The fundamental issues were:

1. The development and improvement of Madura on a bigger scale is essential and urgent.
2. Developments and improvements have to be in line with Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara 1993 (GBHN - Broad Guidelines of State Policy).
3. In order to achieve developments and improvements, there are several elements that need to be considered:
 - A. Developments and improvements have to be compatible with Islamic, Indonesian and human rights values.
 - B. Developments and improvements have to accommodate aspirations of the Madurese in order to be constructive for the Madurese.
 - C. Developments and improvements have to actively involve society, particularly the *ulama*, from the outset.
 - D. Developments and improvements have to be implemented gradually.
 - E. Human resources have to be organised as early as possible and must involve *pesantren* in Madura.
 - F. Equal cooperation between the *ulama*, the government, and entrepreneurs should be promoted in order to ensure fruitful outcomes.
4. In order to help development, the Madurese *ulama* are willing:
 - A. To enhance the integration of the people and the role of *ulama* with the intention that development is not against Islamic values.
 - B. To maintain Islamic values, observe the outcomes of the development, and anticipate its negative effects as early as possible.
5. The expected economic growth in Madura has to be compatible with people-oriented economy.
6. In order to accelerate the developments and the improvements, infrastructure must be built quickly.
7. The development of agri-business, agro-industry and home industries supported by *pesantren* cooperatives is the main

- option for development and the improvement of Madura.
8. In order to solve the problem of lack of water in Madura, the building of dams is not the only solution. Reforestation and greening are more positive alternatives.
 9. The development and the improvement of the tourism industry in Madura should not be incompatible with Islamic Madurese norms (Muthmainnah, 1998: 122-125; Moesa, 1999: 123).

This list was taken by the government as a rejection of the bridge plan. The government responded by threatening to cancel the establishment of industrial estates in Madura and to move them to Gelangban (regencies of Gresik, Lamongan, and Tuban). Meanwhile, the regent of Lamongan, R. Mohammad Faried, was expecting that *industrialisasi* would be introduced to his regency (*Karya Darma*, 30 August 1994).

The government, via Menristek, insisted that the project to put the plans together in one policy package was not open to negotiation. The two plans would fail if the government could not obtain sufficient land for the project: 'if *industrialisasi* failed, [building] the bridge would automatically fail. We do not want to only build the bridge, then it would be used by a limited number of people for getting about, it is useless' (*Surabaya Post*, 4 September 1994).

Meanwhile, the non-Bassra *ulama*—generally those who occupied government or governmental-related positions—had a different opinion regarding the gigantic project. The chairman of MUI Bangkalan, *Kiai* Luthfi Madani, believed that having the bridge and the industrial estates in one package was a fair plan, because the government believed that no investor would build the bridge if they did not get a return on their investments as quickly as possible. He also stated that the realisation of the bridge was the most urgent part of the plan (Muthmainnah, 1998: 138; *Karya Darma*, 7 September 1994). On another occasion, *Kiai* Luthfi also stated that the social function of the bridge should not be denied by those with business interests (*Karya Darma*, 22 August 1994).

In the opinion of the non-Bassra *ulama*, globalisation was an unstoppable phenomenon and would, inevitably, come to Madura. As it could not be prevented, it should, instead, be anticipated. The way to do so was to educate the people morally in preparation

for this globalisation. *Kiai* Luthfi's opinion was also shared by *Kiai* Mahfudz Hadi, the FKP (Fraksi Karya Pembangunan - the Golkar fraction in the DPRD II) chairman of DPRD Bangkalan (Muthmainnah, 1998: 139). To support the non-Bassra *ulama*, the ex-governor Soelarso stated that, in principle, the Madurese were relatively flexible. When the *ulama* acknowledged crucial points related to socio-religious issues, the people would eventually follow their leaders. Nevertheless, this was not a completely stable relationship: if the *ulama* were seen to be misleading, these people would be disappointed, and the *ulama* would no longer be able to rally support for *industrialisasi* (Surya, 14 September 1994). According to *Kiai* Nuruddin, the then spokesperson and secretary of Bassra, 'the state *ulama*' (those who are regarded by the Bassra *ulama* as *ulama* who serve the government's interests) attacked Bassra for their negative attitude towards *industrialisasi* by asking: 'Is Madura going to be reforested? Do we want to be forest men?' (*Apakah Madura mau dihutankan? Apakah kita mau menjadi orang hutan?*) (Interview with *Kiai* Nuruddin on 1 December 2009).

If we compare the two groups of *kiai*, we may assume that the Bassra *kiai* focused more on morality, while the non-Bassra *kiai* were concerned more with economic factors. According to Muthmainnah, a different view on the difference between the two groups is that before they voiced their concerns, the *ulama* of Bassra observed the situation and conditions in other industrial estates, such as Batam, while the non-Bassra *ulama* were fully convinced that the government would create a prosperous society by implementing *industrialisasi* (Muthmainnah, 1998: 140). It seems, however, that Bassra *ulama* did not base their opinions solely on their visit to Batam. Even before the trip, they disagreed with *industrialisasi* because of the possibility of losing some of their influence. It might also be true that some *kiai* were really concerned with the people; in particular, some *kiai* were concerned that the Madurese were not ready to accept *industrialisasi* since they lacked adequate education to compete with outsiders in gaining employment in industry. On the other hand, the support of the non-Bassra *ulama* towards *industrialisasi* was not only because they believed that it would bring prosperity to the people, but also because they were convinced that they would benefit politically and economically

from the project. As governmental agents, they also believed that they should support the government's plans. Clearly, both Bassra and non-Bassra *ulama* were aware that various possibilities and opportunities could be used to amplify their interests. For instance, it is important to note that the opinions of Bassra actually varied over time. On one occasion they might strongly reject *industrialisasi*, while on another occasion, they might be relatively accepting of it. In one instance, they stated that they did not reject *industrialisasi*. They would accept it if it would be established gradually so that the people would be able to adjust to the change (*Merdeka*, 14 September 1994). Another time, *Kiai* Nuruddin, told journalists that 'massive *industrialisasi* to turn Madura into an industrial area equipped with hotels and bars could materially improve people's well-being, but if they were morally corrupt, it would be useless. Therefore, the industry should be integrated with moral development through a gradual process' (*Merdeka*, 14 September 1994). *Kiai* Badrus Soleh of *Pesantren* Darul Aitam, Kwanyar in Bangkalan, as well as being the fraction chairman of the PPP in the DPRD II and a member of Bassra, stressed the social function of the bridge. He said that it should be able to bridge the gap between the presently less developed Madura with the more developed Madura in the future (*Karya Darma*, 22 August 1994). *Kiai* Nuruddin feared that the Madurese would no longer be religious if industrialisation became a reality. He commented that industrial estates should be compatible with Islamic values. In other words, there should be mosques in factories and that the workers should be provided with sufficient time during work to pray (Interview on 1 December 2009). *Kiai* Alawy expected *pesantren* to have a vital role in bridging the government's interests on the island and people's expectations about the future of Madura, in initiatives such as running cooperatives (*Surabaya Post*, 26 February 1994). The chairman of Bassra, *Kiai* Kholil A.G., argued that the bridge was vital as a means of transportation connecting Java and Madura (*Surya*, 25 September 1994). A similar statement was released by *Kiai* Mahfudz Siddiq, another prominent member of Bassra's board. He pointed out that the bridge would be a tool to open up Madura as well as improve the connection between Java and Madura (*Surya*, 25 September 1994). *Kiai* Nuruddin stated that the

Madurese did not reject *industrialisasi*. What they actually expected was that the government should not neglect the Madurese when it developed Madura (*Memorandum*, 17 September 1997).

As has been revealed on a number of occasions, such as seminars, hearings, and interviews with newspapers, Bassra's rejection of *industrialisasi* can be classified into a number of reasons. Firstly, the plan to establish industrial estates on the island was seen to lack adequate preparation, especially considering the fact that many Madurese were not sufficiently educated. Some *kiai* were concerned with the lack of education of Madurese people and their ability to compete with outsiders in the manufacturing industry should *industrialisasi* be implemented. Secondly, there were concerns about the negative impacts of *industrialisasi*. Some *kiai* were concerned that outsiders who came to Madura would introduce 'un-Islamic' cultures. Thirdly, all the plans and ideas came directly from the central government, while neglecting opinions from the people and the Madurese religious figures. Fourthly, some *kiai* were sincerely concerned with the fate of the Madurese in the rapid *pembangunan* era. Finally, some *kiai* also feared that when the *industrialisasi* plan was realised, the *ulama* might not be able to maintain their religious authority. The reasoning behind this last point was that if the *ulama* lost their control in society, they would naturally find themselves in a difficult situation. For instance, Bassra *ulama* would no longer have large followings; consequently, the association would no longer be a major oppositional power to the government and the state-sponsored *ulama*. Moreover, the *ulama* would no longer be frequently visited since the people might become more conscious, and would no longer feel it necessary to seek guidance from the *ulama*.

The opposition of Bassra to *industrialisasi* was seen by the New Order government as a main obstacle to the integration of a regional society in the Indonesian social, political and economic system. For the *ulama*, it was seen as an attempt to reduce the socio-political influence of the religious leaders in society. Thus, the process from the first rejection to the consensus between Bassra and the central government did not take an easy road. Eventually, however, construction of the bridge, under the new Keppres No. 79/2003 that replaced the Keppres No. 55/1990, started on 20 August 2003

and the bridge was officially opened to the public on 10 June 2009. After the project was postponed due to the financial crises, and after the new post-Suharto government introduced a more decentralised and democratic administration, the Bassra *ulama* gradually changed their attitude. The shift was caused, primarily, by the separation of the establishment of the industrial estates from the plan to build the bridge. In other words, the establishment of industrial estates was not a compulsory requirement to build the bridge. Secondly, since *industrialisasi* was not compulsory, concerns over its negative impacts gradually diminished. Thirdly, the decentralisation policy of the new administration in the reformation era created a situation in which the voices of the people and *ulama* were listened to. This, in turn, created an environment in which the region was able to see the benefits of the bridge more clearly.

Industrialising Madura

In principle, according to James, the New Order administration was dependent upon the production of capital in Indonesia in order to ensure that the administration had sufficient funds for the continuation of its rule. These funds were distributed to supporters through patronage or bribery, or used for the maintenance of an effective security apparatus to repress dissenters (James, 1990: 20). According to Robison (1986), the concept of an authoritarian-bureaucratic capitalism was born in which the state figured prominently. The New Order government obviously tried to make *industrialisasi* a reality. While some officials, such as Habibie, tried to directly implement *industrialisasi* the hard way, other individuals, such as Pak Noer, tried to persuade the *ulama* and the people to accept *industrialisasi* in a more nuanced way. In a seminar held at BPD Jatim on 13 and 14 January 1992, Noer and Soelarso, in front of Rahardi Ramelan of BPPT, Muspida of East Java, and other officials, argued that *industrialisasi* should be adjusted to the readiness of the Madurese, and that the situation of *kekeluargaan* (literally kinship or familiness, here it means friendship-good relations) should be kept (*Surabaya Post*, 13 January 1992).

In order to persuade the *ulama* to accept the project, Noer regularly visited a number of *pesantren*, not only in Madura, but

also in Java. In Probolinggo, for instance, in a visit that is usually called '*silaturahmi*' (good relationship/friendship), Noer visited *Kiai* Wahid Zaini of *Pesantren* Nurul Jadidi, Paiton and *Kiai* Badri Madsuqi of *Pesantren* Badridduja, Kraksaan. In the two *pesantren*, Noer asked *kiai* and the *pesantren* world in East Java to support the bridge plan. In order to win sympathy for the cause, he promised to build workshop centres that would be used to train local people to be able to work in the new industrial areas. He also assured the public that there would be mosques and Islamic educational institutions in such areas (*Surabaya Post*, 7 February 1992).

Noer suggested his ideas on the creation of workshop centres to the Minister of Manpower, Cosmas Batubara. The idea was sparked by East Java receiving foreign aid to establish an industrial training centre. Having found out about the news, Noer suggested that the centre should be built in Bangkalan, because the regency would soon become a new industrial area in East Java (*Surabaya Post*, 21 February 1992). In order to attract supporters among the public, Noer stated that he would resign as the project coordinator should the project have detrimental effects on the local people. As he did in Probolinggo, he visited a number of *ulama* in Bangkalan. He restated this pledge to resign in a visit to prominent *ulama* in Bangkalan, such as *Kiai* Abdullah Schal, *Kiai* Kholil A.G., and *Kiai* Machfud Siddiq. In the meeting, he also raised his concerns about the prices of the land in the surrounding areas of the bridge, which had been steadily rising. He believed that the asking prices of the landowners, of around Rp. 100,000 (roughly US\$ 60) per square metre, were too high. He suggested that the appropriate price of the land was between Rp. 5,000 and Rp. 10,000 (roughly US\$3 and US\$6) per square metre (*Surabaya Post*, 20 January 1994). Noer also argued that the asking price of Rp. 25,000 per square metre by Bassra was not reasonable because the landowners only demanded Rp. 4,000 per square metre (*Memorandum*, 26 September 1994). A couple of years earlier, he had argued that people should have had shares in the project. The shares would be obtained through selling land. Therefore, in order to prevent land speculators from taking possession of the land, Noer urged the *ulama* to stop the speculators' activities in the surrounding areas (*Surabaya Post*, 7 February 1992).

In the early phase, after the issuance of Keppres No. 55/1990, it was not clear who would conduct the land acquisition. It was not clearly stated in the Keppres which parties would be in charge of the land acquisition. For example, there was nothing stated in SK Menristek No. 283/M/BPPT/1991 about the appointment of a project executor for the Surabaya-Madura Bridge and the development of industrial areas and housing zone (Penunjukkan Pelaksana Proyek Jembatan Surabaya-Madura dan Pengembangan Kawasan Industri dan Kawasan Perumahan). Equally, the SK Gubernur KDH Tk I Jawa Timur No. 39/1991 did not outline measures for the supervisory team of the development of the Surabaya-Madura Bridge (Tim Pengawas Pembangunan Jembatan Surabaya-Madura) (Muthmainnah, 1998: 92). The provision on land supply was actually regulated in the Deregulasi Oktober 1993 (the October 1993 Deregulation),⁸⁸ which mandated the provincial government of East Java and the regency government of Bangkalan to handle the land acquisition. In order to expedite the supply of the land, the governor formed Panitia Pembebasan Tanah untuk Negara (P2TUN - State Committee for Land Acquisition) (Muthmainnah, 1998: 93).

In reality, the acquisition was also executed by BPPT and P.T. DMP. BPPT acquired land for the area at the foot of the bridge in the *kampung* (hamlet) of Sekar Bungoh, Sukolilo Barat village, at the price of Rp. 7,000 per square metre. Meanwhile, P.T. DMP executed the acquisition in Pangpong village for the construction of a toll road Kamal-Tanjung Bumi at prices between Rp. 3,000 and Rp. 4,000.00 per square metre. The price depended on the quality of the land and the availability of the land certificate. If the land was fertile and certified, then the prices would be higher. What we can observe from the acquisition is that there was no precise provision on the procedure or on the parties in charge of the acquisition

88 The deregulation was issued on 23 October 1993 to cut off a high-cost economy. One of the significant aspects of the deregulation, which it expected would accelerate the growth of the Indonesian economy, was the ease of acquiring land using the business licensing process, particularly from the BPN and Dinas Tata Kota (the city planning department in regency level). Before deregulation, investors had to request the business licence for the village at the governor's office. Now it was adequate to request the licence via the regency BPN.

(Muthmainnah 1998: 93). As the *Surabaya Post* reported, a number of landowners were forced to give up their land for the bridge. They were concerned that if they stayed at their asking price of Rp. 90,000 to Rp. 100,000 per square metre, their property rights would be taken over by the government. Instead, they accepted Rp. 7,000 per square metre (*Surabaya Post*, 18 February 1994). There were at least two possibilities that made the landowners anxious: firstly, that the government would not recognise their property rights; and secondly, that the government would take over their property rights. However, there was no indication from the government in respect of either of these two possibilities. It seems that some landowners were looking to make the most of the situation, even without knowing exactly the price of their land.

Although the plan to establish industrial estates in Madura became the main issue for Bassra, in the beginning there were no precise details regarding the establishment of such areas. Even though Article 9 of the Presidential Decree stated that ‘in order to obtain economic value, the development of the Surabaya-Madura Bridge should be followed by industry development at both ends of the bridge by the project organisers’, initially it was never made clear whether the establishment would be conducted before the development of the bridge, at the same time or after (Muthmainnah, 1998: 73).

The government seems to have applied a ‘wait and see’ policy, especially when dealing with financial issues. After the financial support was thought to be adequate, Habibie stressed that the industrial estates would come in one package with the bridge. He stated that it was a compulsory demand from the Japanese side, and that the Japanese had made it clear they would not assist the project if the bridge was not accompanied by industrial estates (*Surya*, 8 February 1994). Bassra responded to this by calling for the development of the bridge to be prioritised, or at least for adequate and exact plans about the industrial estates to be clearly arranged before both plans were simultaneously implemented (*Surya*, 17 February 1994).

The idea of implementing industrial estates was actually rather vague, not only for the Madurese *ulama*, but also for the decision-makers. A number of attempts to introduce the concept

were executed. Some initiatives came from Bassra. One of these attempts was to hold a seminar on 14 and 15 December 1993. A number of state officials, including the Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Syadzali, and the governor, Basofi Sudirman, were present at the seminar (Muthmainnah, 1998: 82).

From this meeting, Bassra *ulama* issued statements that urged the government to involve them in the project. They also asked the government to take them to other industrial areas in Indonesia to conduct *studi banding* (comparative research). Habibie responded to the request by attending a national dialogue held by Bassra on 7 January 1994 in *Pesantren* Banyuanyar, Pamekasan. He expressed his perceptions of *industrialisasi*. He said that if Madura was industrialised, it would be greater in many aspects than Batam because Madura was bigger in size and population. In his speech, Habibie tried to alleviate the concerns of the *ulama* about the negative impacts of *industrialisasi*. Furthermore, he disagreed that the Madurese should be given priority in *industrialisasi* because all Indonesians had the same right and opportunity to participate in *industrialisasi*. Therefore, if the Madurese were not prepared to compete in the job market, other Indonesians would fill the positions: 'We cannot say that if we establish industrial areas in West Java, only West Javanese can work there. It is not right, nor in [*industrialisasi*] in Batam that it is only for Riaunese, and [*industrialisasi*] in Madura it is not only for Madurese. It is not right' (Memorandum, 8 September 1994). It is said that a number of Bassra *ulama* were offended by these statements. According to Muthmainnah, *Kiai* Nuruddin was resentful of Habibie's words, such as 'Madura does not belong to the Madurese, but to the Indonesians' or 'I do not develop Madura, but the country'. *Kiai* Nuruddin understood it as a sign that the Madurese would be neglected in their own home island, and he was concerned that other people would exploit Madura (Muthmainnah, 1998: 83-84).

As promised by Habibie, the Bassra *ulama* were taken to the industrial estates in Batam and IPTN in Bandung from 31 January to 4 February. The *ulama* asked to be taken to Aceh too, for they believed that Aceh shared similar religious sentiments to Madura. However, Habibie refused, as he believed that visiting Aceh had nothing to do with the purpose of the tour (Muthmainnah, 1998:

84-85).

In September 1994, Habibie discussed the Suramadu project again with Bassra. After a fruitless meeting, he sent a letter, via *Kiai Amin Imron*, demanding that Bassra approve *industrialisasi* by signing a letter of approval. After the *ulama* discussed the letter during an internal meeting at the residence of *Kiai Kholil A.G.*, they decided not to sign it, because they were waiting for the government to respond to their nine opinions first (Muthmainnah, 1998: 87-88; Moesa, 1999: 124). In response, *Kiai Kholil A.G.* stated that Bassra could not simply be asked to approve *industrialisasi*. Moreover, he also revealed that in order to reach an agreement, all members of Bassra had to discuss the issue at length: 'The demand of Mr Habibie that Bassra has to approve the *industrialisasi* plan is unilateral. If he responds to the nine opinions, then we can talk about something else. We are still waiting for Mr. Habibie's response' (*Surabaya Post*, 27 September 1994). On another occasion, Noer voiced his opinion about the reasons behind Bassra's rejection, and stressed that only the DPRD (I and II) had the right to voice people's aspirations. Therefore, he argued that it was only the DPRD, not Bassra, who had the right to voice the people's opinions on the Suramadu project. He believed that Bassra did not represent the people (*Surabaya Post*, 9 September 1994). Moreover, in early 1995, Noer and the regent of Bangkalan had a meeting without inviting the *ulama* to discuss land acquisition. After finding out, the *ulama* held their own meeting to discuss the 'secret' meeting. The *ulama* denounced the government for not responding to their opinions and pushing ahead with land acquisition (Muthmainnah, 1998: 89).

The fate of the bridge was discussed again on 14 March 1995 in a meeting of several ministers. The meeting strengthened the plan to have the development of the bridge and the establishment of industrial estates in one package. After the meeting, Habibie issued a statement that there had been no disputes between the Bassra *ulama* and the government, and that both sides were concerned about the people's interests and welfare.

Conclusion

If we look at the situation at the end of the twentieth

century more globally, it is not surprising to see that the rapid and sustained development in Indonesia was also found in other third world countries in Asia and Latin America. What is more interesting to note is that the efforts to create development in all these places were typically state-led or state-designed in top-down policies. In New Order Indonesia, development was associated with rapid industrial transformation and efforts to narrow the large gap between the middle class and workers, peasants, and other city dwellers. The main positive aspect learnt from the New Order experience is that an open trade and investment regime and efficient supply-side investments were beneficial for Indonesia. This can be seen from Indonesia's thirty years of rapid growth and the rapid improvement in living standards (Hill & Narjoko, 2010: 63). The role of authoritarian governments, such as the New Order administration, was very important as they functioned as strong and active economic actors and consequently became vigorous in intervening in all aspects of development. In the Nipah dam incident and the Suramadu Bridge affair, however, state intervention ignored people's rights and disregarded the *kiai's* authority.

The rejections of the Nipah dam and *industrialisasi* occurred in the last years of the Suharto administration. In the Repelita VI (which began in 1994 and ended suddenly when the Suharto administration collapsed in 1998), *tinggal landas* (literally, 'take-off') was a term to denote the stages of *pembangunan* that would supposedly be achieved by the end of the Repelita year in 1999. However, the discourse on *tinggal landas* had surfaced in the previous Repelita IV and Repelita V. The government intensified *pembangunan* in Repelita IV and Repelita V as an effort to prepare for the *tinggal landas* era in Repelita VI. Nevertheless, the economic element of the development policies of the New Order seem to have neglected the un-readiness of social, political, and cultural aspects of *pembangunan*. If we observe the strategy of the national economy development, especially in Repelita IV and Repelita V, it seems that the priority of the development policies was to achieve fast economic growth as preparation for entering the *tinggal landas* era.

The landowners at the Nipah dam site, together with a number

of *kiai*, led by *Kiai Alawy*, protested against the unjust process of land acquisition and the shooting incident that took four lives. The Bassra *ulama* rejected the introduction of industrialisation and the establishment of industrial estates in Madura. However, the rejections are not best identified as a refusal of *pembangunan*. Principally, while general elections were regarded as an important means to legitimate the administration politically (Antlöv, 2004: 114), *pembangunan* was seen by the New Order administration as an important way to legitimate the administration economically. The rejections were not directed against the dam or the bridge, which symbolised the unremitting efforts of the government to develop the country. Indeed, the *kiai* and the people realised that the dam and the bridge were essential in the process of *pembangunan* for Madurese society. Both constructions were eventually accomplished (or almost accomplished in the case of the Nipah dam) after the government tried a few different policies. Therefore, the rejections are best described as the dissatisfaction of segments of society towards the undemocratic and authoritarian policies of *pembangunan*.

With these rejections, segments of society, especially the *kiai*, maximised the use of cultural and Islamic symbols. In the Nipah dam incident, issues such as the drowning of mosques, sacred graveyards, and inherited lands were prevalent. The people assumed that their inherited lands were crucial for their life, as it was widely believed that those who sold the lands would experience misfortune. Nevertheless, the inappropriate prices of the lands were actually the decisive factors which drove people to protest against the land acquisitions. *Kiai Alawy* and other *kiai* who demanded justice for the Nipah dam incident acted in the name of the public and of Islam. Their involvement was actually demanded by the public since the people had great expectations of their leaders. On the other hand, they were also requested by the government to help solve the incident. The government realised that it was easier to ask the *kiai* to pacify the heated situation than to cope with the tense circumstances without involving local leaders. Here we see the importance of the *kiai* as brokers, and the alignment of these *kiai* with the people made their influence more powerful.

In the Suramadu Bridge affair, issues such as demoralisation

and incompatibility with Islam became the main arguments of Bassra *kiai* when voicing their concerns over *industrialisasi*. The *kiai* believed that *industrialisasi* would cause more disadvantages than benefits. One notion was the un-readiness of the Madurese to accept *industrialisasi* since they lacked adequate education to fulfil positions in the manufacturing industry. Here we see the *kiai* attempting to speak for the people. Another important notion was the fear of negative side effects of *industrialisasi* that would bring immorality to Madura, such as the introduction of modern cultures that would destroy the local cultures and worse, the emergence of whorehouses such as those in Batam. As part of the rejection of the plans, the Bassra *kiai* held seminars and invited officials to discuss the issue, conducted *studi banding*, and formulated opinions to represent their thoughts.

It is now very clear that Madurese *ulama*, particularly those who were not affiliated with the state, were very much aware and conscious of contemporary socio-political circumstances. Most Madurese *kiai* were not partners of the state and they remained outside the state system. However, they were aware that their influence in society was great and, thus, they attempted to maintain their authority and prevent it from being usurped by the state. We can conclude, therefore, all rejections witnessed in the Nipah dam incident or the Suramadu Bridge affair were not solely meant to guard Islamic principles, but perhaps also because the plans might have a direct impact on their authority, not only in terms of religious authority, but also social, political, economic, and cultural authority. In order to protect themselves, they used their religious authority extensively to convey their messages; indeed, this was their main weapon and the people did not expect anything less.