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## **Muslim opposition to logic and theology in the light of the works of Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 911/1505)**

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## Introduction

Several works of the Egyptian polymath, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) invite us to take a fresh look at the much debated issues of the origins and status of theology and logic in Islam. As a staunch defender of the prophetic Sunna, al-Suyūṭī discussed these issues at several stages of his intellectual development. The result was a rich documentation of the history of the opposition to theology and logic in Islam, which deserves to be taken into account fully by modern scholars studying these issues.

Modern scholarship on the origin of Islamic theology can be divided into six views, respectively asserting: (1) the Hellenistic influence on the origin of Islamic theology; (2) Islamic theology mainly as the result of an internal development; (3) Christian influence on Islamic theology; (4) Jewish contributions to Islamic theology; (5) Persian features in Islamic theology; and (6) Indian elements in Islamic theology.

In addition to the origin of Islamic theology, modern scholarship also more specifically deals with the opposition to logic and theology. Goldziher, Madkour, Hartmann, al-Nashshār, al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Hallaq, Endress, Van Koningsveld, and Griffel have discussed the Islamic opposition to logic, while Makdisi, Daiber, Pavlin, Abrahamov, Juynboll and al-Hashshash have dealt with the Muslim opposition to theology (*kalām*) and the *mutakallimūn*. The following passages will be devoted to discuss modern views on the origin of Islamic theology (1) and on the Islamic opposition to logic and theology (2). In the third section attention will be paid to al-Suyūṭī's four works on these issues (3). On the basis of these discussions, we shall formulate our research question and explain the composition and the scope of the present study.

### 1. Modern Views on the Origin of Islamic Theology

Discussion on the origin of Islamic Theology occupies an important position in the works of modern scholars. Dealing with the question of how Islamic theology originated and developed, they propose at least six views. Some of them associate the development of Islamic theology with the importation of Greek sciences through the movement of translation, which introduced the Hellenistic tradition into the Islamic world. Some scholars point to the influence of Christianity and Judaism. Some emphasize an internal development independent of foreign influences; while others ascribe its origin to the Indian and Persian intellectual tradition which was introduced into Islam through cultural contact.

#### 1.1. Constant Elements of Hellenistic Influence in Old and Contemporary Views

So far, the origin and the development of Islamic philosophical theology, *kalām* as fostered by Muslim contact with Hellenism, has become the dominant view of modern scholarship. Generally speaking, the conceptions of this idea are founded on several patterns of arguments: (1) terminological; (2) chronological; (3) ontological; and (4) logical/philosophical.

Without a single reference to al-Suyūṭī's SM, works dealing with this issue, like those by Goldziher,<sup>1</sup> Laoust,<sup>2</sup> Watt,<sup>3</sup> Gibb,<sup>4</sup> Von Grunebaum,<sup>5</sup> Fakhry,<sup>6</sup> Madjid,<sup>7</sup> and Van Koningsveld<sup>8</sup> either explicitly or implicitly associate the origin of the theological speculative movement in Islam with the importation of Greek works into the Muslim world. Their approaches in dealing with this topic, aim at, to borrow Cerić's words, 'construing origins and development of Islamic theology in the context of Muslim political and philosophical development,' as reflected in their discussion of the 'historico-political milieu of a particular period,' and 'the introduction of Greek philosophy into the Muslim world in the end of 2<sup>nd</sup> century of Hijra.'<sup>9</sup>

The transmission of Greek philosophy and sciences into the Islamic world through the translation movement in the eighth and ninth century has played a major role in accelerating the Hellenizing process in the Islamic world. The emergence of scholastic theology (*kalām*), Islamic Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism (*falsafā*) in the Islamic world is to be considered, in Madjid's opinion, the direct cultural influence of such a process.<sup>10</sup>

This whole marvellous process of cultural transmission which lead to the emergence of a rationalistic movement in the Islamic world was by no means a matter of coincidence or chance. History tells us about the systematic attempt undertaken by al-Ma'mūn (d. 216/833), who, being fascinated by the practical use of Greek philosophy and sciences, had issued the explicit policy of the state to promote the significance of the adoption of the 'foreign culture'. According to

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<sup>1</sup>Based on the study of Horovitz and Horten, Goldziher underlines that the philosophy of *kalām* should be seen within the context of the Greek philosophical tradition through "the paths of the pre-Aristotelian philosophers of nature, and in particular those of the atomists among them." See Goldziher, I., *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law* (transl. By A. and R. Hamory (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 1110-112.

<sup>2</sup>Laoust, H., *Les Schismes dans l'Islam* (Paris: Paris Payot, 1965)

<sup>3</sup>Watt, M. remarks: "...this was because *kalām*, in addition to using rational arguments, introduced and discussed non-Qur'anic concepts, mostly taken from Greek science and philosophy." See *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), p. 183.

<sup>4</sup>Gibb, Sir. H.A., 'The Influence of Islamic Culture on Medieval Europe', in *Bulletin of the John Ryland's Library*, Manchester, 38 (1955), p. 82-98.

<sup>5</sup>Grunebaum, G.E. Von, 'Islam and Hellenism', in Dunning s. Wilson (ed.), *Islam and Medieval Hellenism: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1976).

<sup>6</sup>Fakhry, Majid, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, New York: Columbia University Press (1983), 2nd ed.

<sup>7</sup>Madjid, Nurcholish, *Ibn Taymiyya in 'Kalam' and 'Falsafa' (A Problem of Reason and Revelation)*, unpub. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1984.

<sup>8</sup>Van Koningsveld, P. S., "Greek Manuscripts in the Early Abbasid Empire: Fiction and Facts about their Origin, Translation and Destruction," in BO, LV no.3/4, Mei-August (1998), p. 345-370.

<sup>9</sup>Cerić identifies several names making use of this approach: Goldziher, Gardet and Anawati, Watt, Laoust, Ahmad Amin and al-Nashshār. See Cerić, Mustafa, *Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abū Manṣūr al-Matūrīdī (d. 333/944)*, (Kualalumpur: ISTAC, 1995), p. 1-4. Here the present author has taken the liberty to add some relevant names unidentified by Cerić.

<sup>10</sup>Madjid, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

Fakhry, al-Ma'mūn himself, the seventh Abbasid Caliph, being influenced by Greek philosophy, composed a number of treatises on theological questions in a speculative spirit. The speculative tendency in his theological thought, Fakhry says, led to the promotion of popular interest in scholastic theology and the support of the cause of the theological party (the Mu'tazilites), which had sought to apply the categories of Greek thought to Muslim dogmas.<sup>11</sup>

As the result of such an explicit policy of the state, the people's interest to learn about the 'new culture' culminated in a great number of Greek treatises and books on philosophy and sciences being translated into Arabic and commentaries upon them being compiled. Al-Ma'mūn and his proponents, who were exemplified in legendary stories about this process by, borrowing Van Koningsveld's term, the 'Ma'mun cycle',<sup>12</sup> represented the Muslims with the inclusive cultural perception that was necessary to find the epistemological assistance of elements derived from other cultures. Thus, they represented the group of Muslims who did not regard their cultural achievements as self-sufficient and therefore needed to learn something from the outside.

This kind of cultural perception paved the way for Muslims to be provided with, according to Von Grunebaum, (a) "rational forms of thought and systematisation," (b) "logical procedures," (c) "methods of generalization and abstraction" and, with (d) "principles of classification."<sup>13</sup>

Such an inclusive attitude of Muslims towards a foreign culture provoked fervent criticism from the side of Muslims 'who regarded their cultural achievements as self-sufficient and those who needed nothing to learn from outside'.<sup>14</sup> These groups of Muslims were represented in the already mentioned legendary stories by the 'Umar cycle', who had a hostile attitude towards 'things foreign'.

History since then witnessed the consecutive disputes between those with an inclusive attitude towards foreign culture and those who regarded Islamic culture as self-sufficient and having nothing to learn from the outside. If the former were represented by the rationalist group of Muslims, the most extreme of which were represented by the Mu'tazilite group, the latter were represented by the traditionalists, the most extreme of which, borrowing Abrahamov's classification, were found among the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*.<sup>15</sup> This dispute culminated in the event of the *miḥna*, the Inquisition by the Caliph al-Ma'mūn. This led to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who did not recognize the createdness of the Koran, a major doctrine of the Mu'tazilite's creed, risking his life.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Fakhry, Majid, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, (New York: Columbia University Press 1983), 2nd ed., p. 10-11.

<sup>12</sup>Van Koningsveld, *op. cit.*, p. 345-370.

<sup>13</sup>Von Grunebaum, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>14</sup>Gibb, *op. cit.*, p. 82-98.

<sup>15</sup>Abrahamov, *op. cit.*, p. ii-x, 1-12.

<sup>16</sup>It is plausible that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal rejected the concept of createdness of the Koran, because, according to Wensinck, he understood the doctrine as 'the very heart of the question of the qualities. We [viz. Wensinck] may suppose, therefore, that his rigorous defence of the eternity of the Koran had its root in the feeling that this dogma followed from the unique nature of the Holy Book, whereas the Mu'tazilite view in his eyes tended to lower the position of the words of Allah.' See Wensinck, A.J., *The Muslim Creed, Its*

Therefore, it is plausible if one concludes that the ‘fruit’ of Hellenism, i.e. scholastic theology (*kalām*), Islamic Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, (*falsafā*) have met with opposition from a great number of Muslims since their inception in the Islamic World in the eighth and ninth century. The inclusion of a number of logical concepts into juridical works, such as the theory of definition (*al-ḥadd*) and syllogism (*al-burhān*), which were included by al-Gazālī in his *al-Mustaṣfā* on legal theory, is an obvious example of an attempt by a Muslim scholar to protect himself from the threat of the traditionalists.<sup>17</sup> The incineration of a great number of books of Muslim philosophers is another discernable example of traditionalists’ fervent opposition to *falsafā*.<sup>18</sup>

Like Islamic Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism (*falsafā*), *kalām*, being considered as a part of the Hellenistic tradition, also became the target of the opposition of a great number of traditionalists. This is reflected *firstly*, in their prohibition of engaging in *kalām*, including the breaking off relations with, and banishment of, the *Mutakallimūn*; and *secondly*, in their refutation of the *Mutakallimūn*’s tenets.<sup>19</sup>

## 1.2. Internal Development

Before delving into a discussion of this view, it is worthwhile to note that the view asserting that Islamic theology was rather the result of an internal development was not introduced explicitly into modern scholarship until 1975, when two German orientalists, Van Ess and Daiber published their works. This is in marked contrast with modern scholars’ assertion of foreign elements in Islamic theology, which had been proposed since the first half of nineteenth century.

The advocates of this view, however, are of the opinion that the development of *kalām* in the Muslim world was not only triggered by an external factor closely associated with the translation movement of Greek writings but also by an internal factor, namely the need for the art of debate in defending their views against their adversaries. This view is shared, for instance, by Amin,<sup>20</sup> Gardet and Anawati.<sup>21</sup>

Amin is of the opinion that the internal factor for the development of *kalām* can be discerned in the fact that some Koranic verses were revealed to encounter various sects and pagans and to refute their religious views. The external factor, he argues on the other hand, is closely related to their being occupied with Greek philosophy in order to construct arguments in defence of

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*Genesis and Historical Development*, (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation 1979), 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 86.

<sup>17</sup>Al-Gazālī’s adoption of Aristotelian logic, which is reflected in the fact that he included it in his work on legal theory, drew fervent criticism from a number of scholars of the traditionalist group, such as Abū Ishāq al-Marginānī (d. 513/1119), al-Qushayrī, al-Ṭurtūshī (d. 520), al-Mazīrī, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ and al-Nawawī. See al-Nashshār, *Manāḥij*, *op. cit.*, p. 143-4.

<sup>18</sup>Several scholars have discussed this topic specifically: J. Sadan in his “Genizah and Genizah-Like Practices in Islamic and Jewish Traditions,” in *BO*, 43 (1986), 36-58, esp. 52-3, and Van Koningsveld, “Greek Manuscripts,” *op. cit.*, p. 351.

<sup>19</sup>Abrahamov, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>20</sup>See his discussion on this topic in Amin, A., *Ḍuḥā ’l-Islām*, *op. cit.*, 3<sup>rd</sup> juz, p. 1-8.

<sup>21</sup>Gardet, L., and G. Anawati, *Introduction a la Théologie Musulmane* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1948).

their views.<sup>22</sup> In other words, the internal factor represents the polemical side, while the external factor shows the apologetical aspect.

Likewise, Gardet and Anawatī argued that the ‘seed’ of rational tendencies had grown up as early as the time of the Companions. Ibn ‘Abbās, Ibn Mas‘ūd and ‘Ikrima, for instance, applied rational methods in interpreting Koranic verses through the process of *ijtihād* or a personal rational elaboration of certain meanings of the Koran. Although the term *kalām* did not yet exist in this period, according to them, this rational tendency played a decisive role in the orientation of *kalām*.<sup>23</sup>

However, the most explicit contention of the indigenous development of *kalām* can only be found in the works of two German orientalists: Joseph van Ess and Hans Daiber. Van Ess shares the view that the *kalām* movement was produced ‘internally’ due to the politico-theological discussion originating from the debate on who was really entitled to succeed the Prophet after he died.<sup>24</sup> This view was also affirmed by Nasution who was of the opinion that the theological movement which arose in Islam originated from political issues.<sup>25</sup>

Van Ess regards the emergence of Islamic theology, *kalām* and speculative sciences as coming from within. The contents of theology in the realm of Islam, Van Ess argues, are not identical with those in Latin or Greek, as ‘knowledge about God,’ but rather named after its style of argumentation: one ‘talks’ (*takallama*) with the adversary by posing questions and reducing his position to ‘meaningless alternatives.’ He develops his view by abolishing the commonly shared conviction that the art of theology is of foreign bearing. This is clearly indicated in his words: “The thesis we want to defend – that Muslim civilization did not slowly develop the art of theology and especially of *kalām*, but rather grew up with it – sounds too radical to be established by these isolated items. We are too accustomed to the idea that the Arabs ‘of the desert,’ masters of poetry and language but uncultivated in all occupations of an urban society, including theology, started their culture as it were from a vacuum and only gradually severed their inherited predilections. We adhere too stubbornly to the conviction

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<sup>22</sup>Amin, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p.1-3.

<sup>23</sup>Gardet and Anawatī, *op. cit.*, p. 46-93.

<sup>24</sup>Van Ess, J., “The Beginning of Islamic Theology,” in *The Cultural Context in Medieval Learning* ed. J.E. Murdoch & E.D. Sylla (Dordrecht/Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975) p. 87-111. Van Ess’ view cannot be separated from his identification of the meaning of *kalām* with a narrow sense and a broad one. The narrow sense, he argues, points to “a technique which the *Mutakallimūn* use for defending their conviction.” Here, thus, “*kalām* is identical with an instrument of argumentation, a methodical tool in real discussion and stylistic device for the expansion of ideas.” The broad significance of *kalām*, according to Van Ess, points to “something like ‘Muslim Theology,’ in contrast to philosophy (*falsafā*) or jurisprudence (*fiqh*).” Van Ess discusses this topic in “Disputationpraxis in der Islamischen Theologie: Eine vorläufige Skizze,” in REI, 44 (1976), p. 23-60; and in “Early Development of Kalām,” in *Studies on the First Century of Islamic Society*, ed. G.H.A. Juynboll (Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), p. 109-123.

<sup>25</sup>Nasution, Harun., *Teologi Islam: Aliran-aliran Sejarah Analisa Perbandingan* (Jakarta: Yayasan Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 1972), 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 1-7.

that literature in Umayyad times was mainly transmitted orally so that it is hard for us to accept readily the possibility of immediate theological production.”<sup>26</sup>

Based on his enormous study of the formation and the development of Islamic theology especially in the second and third centuries A.H, Van Ess argues that each Muslim thinker seems to have developed an approach of his own when dealing with a number of theological issues. This is due to the fact that these two centuries, Van Ess asserts, formed ‘a period of enormous creativity and imagination,’ in which some original approaches were formulated by Muslim theologians themselves to deal with problems of theology. One of the approaches developed by Muslim thinkers was that dealing with the concept of atomism by which Ḍirār ibn ‘Amr, who formulated an atomistic approach to reality, preceded the Mu‘tazilite scholar who first introduced atomism into his system, Abū l-Hudhayl.<sup>27</sup>

Van Ess criticizes the arguments of the scholars who related the development of the concept of atomism to Indian or Greek influence as founded merely on ‘terminological and topological criteria,’ and not on ‘epistemological structures and their underlying axioms.’<sup>28</sup>

The view that *kalām* developed from within is also stressed by Hans Daiber. In his study of Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abbād al-Sulamī,<sup>29</sup> he identifies the development of *kalām* as an “innerislamische Entwicklung.” According to Daiber, theological discussions had thrived in Islam since the beginning, especially in the situation of a coexistence of Muslims, Christians and Jews. This indigenous development, in turn, he maintains, fostered the readiness of Islam to open up to foreign (viz. Greek) influence.<sup>30</sup>

The most recent view affirming this view was proposed by Haleem, who concludes that *kalām* ‘originated completely in the Islamic environment.’ Asserting his argument, Haleem argues that the earliest concept of *kalām* is to be found in the Koran itself, which deals with theological issues supported by rational proofs. He further maintains that the emergence of theological sects was chiefly the result of differences among Muslims in understanding the Koran and the way their views related to the Qur’anic position. However, Haleem does not reject the influence of foreign elements on the later development of Islamic

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<sup>26</sup>Van Ess, *op. cit.*, (1975) p. 90-1; idem, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991-1998), 6 vols.

<sup>27</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>28</sup>See, for instance, his criticism of Peines’ *Beiträge* in Josef van Ess, “60 Years After: Shlomo Pines’s *Beiträge* and Half a Century of Research on Atomism in Islamic Theology,” *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, (Jerusalem, 2002), viii, 2, p. 19-41, esp. 25.

<sup>29</sup>Daiber, Hans, *Das Theologisch-philosophische des Mu‘ammar Ibn ‘Abbad as-Sulamī (gest. 830 n. Chr.)* (Beirut: Orient-Institut der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1975), p. 6-7.

<sup>30</sup>“Ein Nachweis von Fremdeinflüssen wird bei jedem einzelnen Theologen etwas anders aussehen. Ihr Anteil wird wesentlich geringer erscheinen bei einer stärkeren Berücksichtigung der innerislamischen Entwicklung und einer Untersuchung der theologischen Struktur.” Daiber, *op. cit.*, (1975), p. 7.

theology. Yet, this only occurred when the Arabs had mixed with other nations and the Greek texts were translated into Arabic.<sup>31</sup>

### 1.3. Christian Influence

The influence of Christianity on the development of Islamic theology has been dealt with by several Orientalists as early as Von Kremer,<sup>32</sup> whose emphasis on the key role of Christianity for the formation of Islamic theology was followed by a number of scholars: Goldziher,<sup>33</sup> De Boer,<sup>34</sup> MacDonald,<sup>35</sup> Shedd,<sup>36</sup> Becker,<sup>37</sup> Guillaume,<sup>38</sup> Bell,<sup>39</sup> Sweetman,<sup>40</sup> Tritton,<sup>41</sup> Gardet and Anawati,<sup>42</sup> Seale,<sup>43</sup> Allard,<sup>44</sup> Davidson,<sup>45</sup> and Nagel.<sup>46</sup> Before delving into this topic, it should be noted here that most of the works asserting the influence of Christianity on Islamic theology date back to the nineteenth century or the twentieth century in the period before or shortly after the Second World War, seemingly suggesting some bias within the context of the political relation between Muslim countries and the West.

<sup>31</sup>Haleem, M. Abdel, "Early Kalam," in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, S. H. Nasr & O. Leaman (eds.), (London: Routledge, 1996), I, 71-88.

<sup>32</sup>Von Kremer, Alfred, *Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams* (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1868), p. 8, 32-3; idem, *Culturgeschichtliche Streifzüge auf dem Gebiete des Islams* (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1873), p. 2.

<sup>33</sup>'Les théologiens mohamétans reconnaissent eux-mêmes sans difficulté que l'Islam a puisé des enseignements dans le christianisme et qu'il n'a pas dédaigné de lui faire des emprunts sur plusieurs points de doctrine théologique.' See Goldziher, I., "Influences chrétiennes dans la littérature religieuse de l'Islam" (RHR, 1888), XVIII, p. 180. In his *Vorlesungen*, Goldziher, however, associates the origin of the concept of predestination with the concept of pre-Islamic fatalism. See, idem, *Vorlesungen über den Islam* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1910), p. 95.

<sup>34</sup>De Boer, T.J., *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*, (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1901), p. 42-3.

<sup>35</sup>Macdonald, D.B., *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, (London: Routledge, 1903) p. 132.

<sup>36</sup>Shedd, W.A., *Islam and the Oriental Churches* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work, 1904), p. 65, 71.

<sup>37</sup>Becker, C.H., 'Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung', *Islamstudien*, (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1924-1932), I, 432-449.

<sup>38</sup>Guillaume, "Some Remarks on Free Will and Predestination in Islam," *JRAS*, 1924, p. 43-9.

<sup>39</sup>Bell, R., *the Origin of Islam in its Christian Environment*, (London: Macmillan, 1926)

<sup>40</sup>Sweetman, J. W., *Islam and Christian Theology*, (London: Lutterworth, 1945-67).

<sup>41</sup>Tritton in his "Foreign Influences on Muslim Theology" (BSOAS, vol. 10, 4 (1942), p. 837-842, esp. 842) says that 'the lists of [divine] attributes given by John [of Damascus] and Muslim theologians are practically identical...It is notorious that the founder of Islam owed much to other religions; those who built up its theology were equally in their debt'.

<sup>42</sup>Gardet and Anawati, *op. cit.*, p. 5, 26, 31-2, 35-7, 41, 45.

<sup>43</sup>Seale, Morris, *Muslim Theology, a Study of Origins with Reference to the Church Fathers*, (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd, 1964)

<sup>44</sup>Allard, M., *Le problème des attributs divins dans la doctrine d'al-Aṣ'arī et de ses premiers grands disciples* (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1965).

<sup>45</sup>Davidson, Herbert, "John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1969), 357- 91.

<sup>46</sup>Nagel, Tilman, *Geschichte der islamischen Theologie Von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1993), p. 11.



Generally speaking, when discussing the influence of Christianity on Islamic theology, these scholars focus on the five following topics: (1) Christian theologians, as the main link in the intellectual and theological encounter between Christianity and Islam, whose works and ideas influenced some Muslim theologians; (2) Some Islamic theological doctrines, which were claimed to have a parallel with, to be influenced by, or even be borrowings from, Christian theological dogmas; (3) Muslim theologians believed to have adopted Christian theological teachings; (4) Adoption of some celebrated Christian figures into the administration of the Umayyad caliphs and their literary, medical, scientific as well as philosophical relation with some Umayyad Caliphs; (5) Damascus which was formerly the Christian capital, where many Christian monasteries were located and the home of several great Church Fathers, became the capital city of the Umayyad dynasty.

To begin with, when dealing with the influence of Christianity on the development of Islamic theology, most of the modern works focus on the role played by prominent Christian theologians, the chief among whom were John of Damascus (d. 749) and his disciple Theodore Abū Qurra (d. 826). These theologians were regarded as the main link in the Christian influence on Islam.

John of Damascus and his disciple, Theodore Abū Qurra, were always associated by modern scholars to the Christian scholars whose works have influenced the Muslim theologians, especially when discussing the question of *qadar* and the createdness of the Koran, two topics dealt with extensively by John of Damascus and Theodore Abū Qurra.<sup>47</sup>

Modern scholars also discuss certain concepts in Islamic theology believed to have been derived from Christian theological ideas. De Boer, for instance, highlights four theological doctrines: (1) free will, (2) the eternity of the Koran, (3) divine attributes and (4) the relation of God to man and the world.<sup>48</sup> This is confirmed by Becker,<sup>49</sup> Seale,<sup>50</sup> and Wolfson.<sup>51</sup>

Von Kremer and Seale also mention certain Muslim thinkers who were claimed to have made close contact with, and read Christian polemical works: Ma'bad al-Juhani, Jahm ibn Šafwan, Wāsil ibn Aṭā, Ja'd ibn Dirhām, Gaylān al-Dimashqī, Aḥmad ibn Ḥābiṭ, Faḍl Ḥarbī, Aḥmad ibn Mānūs.<sup>52</sup> Von Kremer records three Mu'tazilite scholars who, according to him, had borrowed from Christianity the concept of justice, which is well reflected in the teaching of Aḥmad ibn Ḥābiṭ, Faḍl Ḥarbī and Aḥmad ibn Mānūs, who accepted the incarnation of the divine *logos* in a Messiah, from which concept they

<sup>47</sup>Gardet and Anawati, *op. cit.*, p. 37; cf. MacDonald, *Development*, p. 132.

<sup>48</sup>De Boer, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>49</sup>Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 432-5.

<sup>50</sup>Seale, *op. cit.*, p. 26-7.

<sup>51</sup>Evaluating Christian influences on Islamic theology through seven concepts: (1) the eternity of the Koran, (2) free will, (3) predestination, (4) attributes, (5) atomism, (6) causality, and (7) creation. Reading this work, Wolfson seems to suggest that of these seven issues dealt with in Islamic philosophical theology, the first four (nos. 1, 2, 3, 4) were developed by Muslim thinkers under the influence of Christianity, while the issues of atomism and causality, and the creation of the world derived from Hellenism; Judaism shared free will and predestination with Islam. See Wolfson, H.A., *The Philosophy of Kalam* (London, Massachusetts & Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) p. 304-719.

<sup>52</sup>Von Kremer, *Geschichte*, 32-3.

formulated the pagan doctrine of incarnation. Seale added a number of Muslim scholars who were believed to have adopted certain concepts of Christian dogmas, especially on the predestination and free will. He argued that 'the first to open discussions at Baṣra on free will was Ma'bad al-Juhānī.' Ibn 'Asākir mentions that a Christian convert, Sūsān, was the first who discussed *qadar*. Ma'bad al-Juhānī derived from him and Gaylān from Ma'bad who was executed in 699 in Damascus. The first to play a key role in the development of the Mu'tazila was Jahm ibn Ṣafwān, who was elaborating Greek Christian theology as taught by the Church Fathers in Alexandria.<sup>53</sup>

Christian influence on Islamic theology was also seen from two other perspectives: (1) the Umayyad Caliphs' relation with the Christians in a variety of ways: as administrative advisors (e.g. the family of Maṣṣūrs), as 'admirals' in the newly built Muslim fleet, as poets, such as Akḥṭāl, tutors of the princes such as Cosmas the Sicilian, and artists;<sup>54</sup> (2) the move of the capital city of the Muslim empire by the Umayyad early caliph from Madīna to Damascus, a Christian city and the home of very prominent Christian theologians, such as Clement, Origen, Timothy, John of Damascus, Theodore Abū Qurra, etc.<sup>55</sup>

#### 1.4. Jewish Contributions

The view of Jewish contributions to Islamic theology was proposed explicitly for the first time by Geiger in his provocative work of 1833. We also find this view expressed by Neumark in his *Geschichte* of 1928.<sup>56</sup> In addition to Koranic exegesis and Tradition,<sup>57</sup> modern scholars also identified Jewish influence on Islamic theology. Their discussion on this issue, according to Wolfson, revolves mostly around three problems: (1) Anthropomorphism and anti-anthropomorphism; (2) the eternal or created Koran; (3) the dilemma between predestination and free will.<sup>58</sup>

To begin with, when dealing with this issue, Geiger highlighted certain theological concepts of Islam, which according to him, were borrowings from Judaism, such as the concept of *tawḥīd*, the one-ness of God, reward and punishment, the creation of the Earth and the Heaven in seven days, the concept of resurrection of the bodies in the Hereafter, revelation through the angel Gabriel, the notion of the heavenly book, the merit of certain ascetic practices, etc.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Seale, *op. cit.*, p. 7, 12;

<sup>54</sup>Gardet and Anawati, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Sahas, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>55</sup>Gardet and Anawati, *op. cit.*, p. 35

<sup>56</sup>Neumark, David, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters nach Problemen dargestellt* (Berlin: Reimer, 1907-1928), I, 84, 115.

<sup>57</sup>See the discussion on this issue by modern scholars: Munk, S., *Melanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, (Paris: Franck, 1859); Speyer, Heinrich, *Die Biblischen Erzählungen im Qoran* (Gräfenhainichen: Druck von C. Schulze & Co. GMBH, 1931); Torrey, Ch. C., *The Jewish Foundation of Islam* (New York, 1933); Katsh, Abraham I., *Judaism in Islam* (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1954).

<sup>58</sup>Wolfson, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

<sup>59</sup>Geiger, Abraham, *Was hat Mohammad aus dem Judenthum aufgenommen?* (Leipzig: Verlag von M.W.Kaufmann, 1833, reprinted in 1902), esp. 61-83.

According to Schreiner, the Mu‘tazilites owed their two principle doctrines to Judaism, i.e. the concept of the unity of God and that of His Justice. He argued ‘Hingegen lassen sich die Hauptpunkte der mu‘tazilitischen Anschauungen in der voraufgegangenen jüdischen Literatur nachweisen und es gibt bestimmte Daten bei arabischen Geschichtschreibern, welche die Lehren der Mu‘taziliten auf das Judenthum zurückführen. Die Hauptpunkte der Lehre der Mu‘taziliten bezogen sich auf die Einheit und Gerechtigkeit Gottes.<sup>60</sup> Schreiner rejects the view that the concept of anthropomorphism, as commonly discussed among the Mu‘tazilites, was of Jewish origin.<sup>61</sup> He maintained that anthropomorphism was generally avoided in Judaism (notwithstanding a number of drastic instances in the Babylonian Talmud), as is witnessed by numerous written Jewish sources, from the *Tikkūnē sōfērīm*<sup>62</sup> until the latest targums.<sup>63</sup>

Neumark asserted the influence of Judaism on two important doctrines of Islamic theology which were treated philosophically by Muslim theologians: (1) the eternity of the Koran; and (2) predestination. For the first doctrine, he says that the controversy in Islamic theology over whether the Koran was created or not arose under the influence of the controversy in Judaism over the eternity or the createdness of the Torah. Like Schreiner, Neumark also argued that the introduction of the concept of free will which led the controversy among Muslim theologians took place under the influence of Judaism.<sup>64</sup>

### 1.5. Persian Features

The advocates of Persian influence on Islamic theology highlighted the cultural contact between Islam and the Persian people after the Arab conquest in the first half of the seventh century.

<sup>60</sup>Schreiner, M., “Der Kalām in der jüdischen Literatur,” *Bericht über die Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums in Berlin* 13 (1895), p. 3.

<sup>61</sup>According to Schreiner, Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī’s *Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā* recorded the biography of Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Jibril al-Kullābī who held debate against Ibn Taymiyya: “*thumma afāda al-mudda‘ī wa asnada anna hādhihi al-maqāla ma’ḥūdhah min talāmidhat al-yahūd wa ‘l-mushrikīn wa ḍalāl al-sābi‘īn qāla fainna awwala man hafidha anhu hādhih al-maqālat al-ja’d ibn dirhām wa aḥadhaha anḥ jahm ibn ṣafwān wa aḥarahā fanusibat maqālat al-jahmiyya ilayh qāla wa ‘l-jahm aḥadhahā an abbād ibn sam‘ān wa aḥadhahā abbād min tālūt ibn uḥt labīd ibn a’šām wa aḥadhahā tālūt min labīd al-yahūd al-ladhī saḥira al-nabīy ṣalla allāh ‘alayh wa sallam qāla wa kāna al-ja’d hadhih fima yuqālu min ahl harrān fayuqālu lah ayyuha al-mudda‘ī inna hādhih al-maqāla ma’ḥudha min talāmidhat al-yahūd qad ḥālafāt al-ḍarūra fi dhālika fā innah mā yuḥfā ‘an jamī‘ al-ḥawāṣ wa kathīr min al-‘awwām an al-yahūd mujassima mushabbihā fakayfā yakūn didd al-tajāsīm wa ‘l-tashbīh ma’ḥūdhān ‘anhum. Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 4, n.2.*

<sup>62</sup>According to Zipor, *Tikkūnē sōfērīm* literally means ‘corrections of scribes.’ This term is used to signify the ‘eighteen’ biblical phrases ‘the root of which go back to tannaitic authorities, where, according to the tradition found in Masoretic notations, the biblical text has been ‘improved’ because of the reverence for God. See Zipor, Moshe A., “Some Notes on the Origin of the Tradition of the Eighteen Tikkūnē Sōfērīm,” in *Vetus Testamentum* XLIV, 1 (1994), p. 77-102.

<sup>63</sup>Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 3. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. J. Kromph, of Leiden University, for his explanation of the concept of *Tikkūnē sōfērīm* and his translation of Schreiner text on this issue.

<sup>64</sup>Neumark, David, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters nach Problemen dargestellt* (Berlin: Reimer, 1907-1928), I, 84, 115; Wolfson, *op. cit.*, p. 69-70.

According to Stepaniants, the Persian imprints on Islamic theology can be seen chiefly in the concepts of dualism and eschatology, concepts which also had a profound influence on Judaism and Christianity.<sup>65</sup> When explaining the influence of Zoroastrianism on Islamic theology, Jackson mentions several narrative accounts from Muslim heresiographers quoting the Prophet as having condemned the Qadarites for their free will doctrine, calling them the Magians of this people. Another account he mentions was recorded by al-Isfarā'inī, who reported that 'the Prophet applied the name of Magians to the upholders of free will, rightly enough. For the Magians ascribe a part of the things decreed to the Will of God, and another part of it to that of the Devil; and if you are to believe them, the decrees of God come to pass at one time, and at another time those of the Devil.'<sup>66</sup>

Those narratives, Jackson argued, reflect the view prevailing among the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> century Muslims, representing their association of the Qadarites with the Zoroastrians. Further Jackson cites statements from a Persian mystical work of the thirteenth century denouncing free will believers as Magians (fire worshippers) and 'Jabars', names referring to the Zoroastrians.<sup>67</sup>

However, he admitted that the main link of the association with zoroastrianism of Qadarites by the opponents of the free will doctrine was Ma'bad al-Juhani (d. 699), who learned the doctrine of *qadar* from Abu Yūnus Snsūyh or Sinbūya, a man of Persian origin called al-Aswārī.<sup>68</sup> According to Jackson, the attribute of al-Aswārī was referring to the party called asāwirat, 'who had come from Fārs in Persia and settled in Basra after having lived in Syria.'<sup>69</sup>

While dismissing direct Indian influence on Islamic cosmological theories due to a lack of reliable historical data, Haq asserts the role of Persian dualism in the formation of certain fundamental cosmological and theological doctrines of *kalām*, such as the concept of atomism, God's creation *ex nihilo*, His justice and attributes, the relation between reason and revelation, etc. In his opinion, this Persian influence was made possible through an early contact between the *Mutakallimūn* and the Manichaean dualists of Persia. This contact, in turn, led to the emergence of many polemical *kalām* writings against dualist ideas, as can be obviously read in *Kitāb al-Agānī* of Abu 'l-Faraj al-Isfahānī (d. 357/957), who reported that several disciples of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) held debates with those who were accused of disseminating Manicheism. This contact, according to Haq, was also well recorded by a great number of Muslim theologians such as 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), al-Māturīdī (d. 331/942), Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 385/995) and al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1145). In addition, accounts on the

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<sup>65</sup>Stepaniants, M., "The Encounter of Zoroastrianism with Islam," in *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 52, n. 1 (2002), p. 161-2.

<sup>66</sup>Jackson, A.V. W., *Zoroastrian Studies*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), 235-6.

<sup>67</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, 237.

<sup>68</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 238-9; Mackensen, Ruth S., "Supplementary Notes to 'Arabic Books and Libraries in the Umayyad Period'" in *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, vol. 56, no. 2 (April, 1939), p. 149-57, esp. 150.

<sup>69</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

Arabic translations of Manichaean tracts, including the books of Mānī himself, were made by many other Muslim historians and bibliographers.<sup>70</sup>

### 1.6. Indian Elements

The marks of Indian influence on the origin and the development of *kalām* have been hinted at for the first time by Schmölders, who argued that several Mu'tazilite leaders were well versed in a number of Indian works, especially those composed by the sect of the Summanites, which he ascribes to a certain social group of the Chārvākas in India. The Mu'tazilite leaders were also exposed, Schmölders adds, to works of another Indian sect, beside that of the Summanites.<sup>71</sup> The conjecture on the Indian influence in 1842 made by Schmölders, who was still unsure of the origin of the sect of the Summanites,<sup>72</sup> had been left vague but in 1910 Horten explicitly confirmed that the Summanite sect originated in India. His argument was based on his study of a report by Ibn al-Murtaḍā, who recorded that 'Jahm and Mu'ammār held a debate with Summanites in India and also that another debate was held in India between a Summanite and a Muslim'.<sup>73</sup>

The introduction of the idea of Indian influence on Islamic theology into modern scholarship by Schmölders had significant influence on later studies on this issue. In 1895, Mabilieu in his study of the history of atomism, one of the central issues in Islamic theology, asserted that atomism did not originate from the Greek concept of atomism, but had come from India.<sup>74</sup> Forty-one years later (in 1936), Pines, following Horten, confirmed Mabilieu's study on the Indian origin of atomism. Pines argued that the concept of atomism in *kalām* contains features that cannot be found in Greek atomism.<sup>75</sup> These features, Pines maintains, lie in Indian atomism, especially in relation to the view that atoms have no extension.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>70</sup>Haq, Syed Nomanul, "the Indian and Persian Background," in Nasr, *op. cit.*, I, p. 56-70.

<sup>71</sup>Augustus Schmölders, *Essai sur les Ecoles philosophiques chez les Arabes, et notamment sur la doctrine d'Al Gazzali* (Paris: Typographie de Firmin Didot Frères, 1842), 112-5;

Wolfson, *op. cit.*, p. 66-7.

<sup>72</sup>"On dit que la secte des Somanites derive de l'Inde, et, bien qu'il ne soit pas aisé de prouver quant à présent la vérité de cette assertion, je ne crois pourtant pas qu'on puisse la révoquer en doute..." See Schmölders, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>73</sup>Horten, Max, "Der Skeptizismus der Sumanija nach der Darstellung des Razi, 1209", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, xxiv (1910), 141-66, esp.142-3, 144, n.6;idem, "Indische Gedanken in der islamischen Philosophie," *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie* (1910),vol. 34, p. 310; idem, *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam* (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1912); Wolfson, *op. cit.*, p. 69-70.

<sup>74</sup>Mabilieu, Léopold, *Histoire de la philosophie atomistique* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1895), 328; Wolfson, *op. cit.*, p. 69-70.

<sup>75</sup>The conclusion by Pines that the concept of atomism derives from Indian philosophy is diametrically opposed to that of Pretzl who maintained that the early concept of atomism in Islam stemmed from the Greek concept of atomism. See Pretzl, Otto, "Die frühislamische Atomenlehre: Ein Beiträge zur Frage über die Beziehungen der frühislamische Theologie zur griechischen Philosophie," *Der Islam*, 19 (1931), p. 117.

<sup>76</sup>Pines, S., *Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomenlehre* (Berlin: 1936), p. 102.

Despite the refutation of this view by Massignon in 1910, who remarked that the Indian influence on *kalām* was only based on ‘similarities and isolated coincidents,’<sup>77</sup> and by Haq in 1996, who questioned such influence due to the lack of reliable historical data,<sup>78</sup> this theory is still upheld by some scholars, even up to this time. Referring to Herman Jacobi’s article on ‘Atomic Theory (Indian),’<sup>79</sup> and Keith’s on ‘Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon,’<sup>80</sup> Macdonald argued in 1928 that some aspects of *kalām* atomism reveal elements of a theory developed by the Indian Buddhist sect of Sautrāntikas, which flourished in the first and second century B.C. According to MacDonald, this Buddhist school formulated a doctrine of time atomism, signifying that time is not ‘infinitely divisible but rather consisted ultimately of discrete atomic moments which cannot be further divided.’<sup>81</sup>

According to several modern scholars, the Indian influence on Islamic theology can also be seen in the concept of *ma‘nā*. According to Horten, as quoted by Wolfson, Mu‘ammar’s theory of *ma‘nā* was formulated under the influence of the Vaiśeṣika category of inherence in Indian philosophy.<sup>82</sup> Horten’s opinion on this issue was confirmed by Nader, who argued that ‘Indian influence in other branches of knowledge is certain so it is not surprising to find it in philosophy, even if indigested.’<sup>83</sup>

In addition to the theory of *ma‘nā*, Islamic theology was said to owe also to India the concept of reincarnation, which was developed by Ibn Ḥā’it (d. 870), Ḥadathī (d. 870) and Ibn Ayyūb (d. 870) out of the concept of *kumūn* (concealment), under the influence of India. According to this theory, all the living beings had been created perfectly. The good among them were angels; the bad were devils; while those sitting in the middle were sinners, who, through their atonement, followed a series of existences, firstly as animals, then as humans, subsequently as prophets, and finally becoming angels. This chain forms the long development of the souls from the state of concealment.<sup>84</sup>

In 1997, a favourable view asserting this element was expressed by Madjid Fakhry, who argued that the influence of Indians on Islam was not limited to their astronomical and medical ideas, but also included some of their theological contentions. This becomes clear, he argued, from al-Bīrūnī’s (d. 1048) *Taḥqīq mā li ‘l-Hind min Ma‘qūla* (the Truth about the Beliefs of the Indians). According to

<sup>77</sup>Massignon’s critical remark is as follows: ‘De similitudes et coïncidences isolées... à l’énonciation d’emprunts formels, - il y a loin ! l’esquisse de preuve ébauchée au sujet d’une polémique isolée avec les Somanīyah et à propos de Naẓẓām semble peu convaincante’. See Massignon, L., “Les systèmes philosophiques des motakallimūn en Islam selon Horten”, *Der Islam*, vol. 3, (1912), p. 404-9, esp. p. 408; Wolfson, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

<sup>78</sup>Haq, *op. cit.*, p. 52-70.

<sup>79</sup>Jacobi, H., “Atomic Theory (Indian)” in J. Hastings (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1908-27), vol. 2, p. 199-202.

<sup>80</sup>Keith, A. B., *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon* (London: Clarendon Press, 1923).

<sup>81</sup>MacDonald, D. B. “Continuous Re-creation and Atomic Time in Moslem Scholastic Theology,” *The Muslim World*, v. 18 (1928), 6-28.

<sup>82</sup>Horten, M., “Die Modus-Theorie des Abū Ḥāshchim,” *ZDMG*, (1909), vol. 63, p. 303.

<sup>83</sup>Nader, A.N., *Le système philosophique des Mutazila (Premiers penseurs de l’Islam)* (Beyrouth: l’Institut de Lettres Orientales, 1956), p. 208-210.

<sup>84</sup>Horten, M., “Die Lehre vom Kumūn bei Naẓẓām († 845),” *ZDMG*, (1909), vol. 63, p. 780.

Fakhry, in this work al-Bīrūnī referred to a writer of the ninth century, Abu ‘l-‘Abbās al-Iranshahrī, who was well-acquainted with Indian religious doctrines.<sup>85</sup>

It is al-Iranshahrī, Fakhry maintains, who influenced the great philosopher-physician Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 925), especially in the latter’s concepts of space and time and the atomic composition of bodies. He further argued that even some aspects of Indian atomism appear to have been at the basis of the atomism of *kalām*, one of the cornerstones of Islamic theology.<sup>86</sup>

In 2002, Van Ess evaluated Pines’ *Beiträge*, which asserted the Indian elements of Islamic atomism.<sup>87</sup> Van Ess objected to Pines’ conclusion, which was merely based on ‘terminological and topological criteria,’ and not on ‘epistemological structures and their underlying axioms.’<sup>88</sup> According to Van Ess, the concept of atomism did not develop from India and Greece and neither was it Qur’anic. It developed rather from the creative internal discourse of the second and third centuries, in which each Muslim theologian ‘seems to have experimented with an approach of his own.’<sup>89</sup> The first Muslim thinker who had something of an atomistic approach to reality, according to Van Ess, was Ḍirār ibn ‘Amr, the predecessor of the scholar who first introduced atomism into his system, Abū ‘l-Hudhayl.<sup>90</sup>

## 2. Modern Views on Islamic Opposition to Logic and Theology

In marked contrast to the abundance of modern literature on the history of theology and logic in Islam, we can only find a few works dealing with the history of the Muslim opposition to logic and theology. Usually, these works mainly focus either on the opposition to logic or on the opposition to theology. In the following passages, I will deal chronologically with the views of modern scholars who discuss the opposition to logic and theology respectively.

### 2.1. Modern Views on the Islamic Opposition to Logic

#### 2.1.1. Goldziher (1916)

Goldziher was the first of the modern writers to draw our attention to the Muslim opposition to logic.<sup>91</sup> He underlines that logic was already condemned by a scholar as early as Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq, the seventh *imām* of the Shi‘ite *Ithnā*

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<sup>85</sup>Fakhry, Majid, *A Short Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 1997), p. 10.

<sup>86</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>87</sup>Van Ess, *op. cit.*, (2002) p. 19-41.

<sup>88</sup>Van Ess, *op. cit.*, (2002) p. 25.

<sup>89</sup>Van Ess, *op. cit.*, (2002) p. 28.

<sup>90</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>91</sup>Goldziher, I., “Die Stellung der alten Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften,” written in Berlin in 1916. This article is found in *Gesammelte Schriften* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1970) vol. V, p. 357-400. For this discussion, I rely on an English translation of Goldziher’s article by Merlin L. Swartz, “The Attitude of Orthodox Islam toward the ‘Ancient Sciences’” in *Studies on Islam* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 185-215.

'*Ashariyya* (d.148/764), to whom the following words are ascribed: "People will occupy themselves with logic until they even question the belief in God. If you hear something of that kind, say: 'there is no god except the unique One; there is nothing like unto Him.'" <sup>92</sup> According to Goldziher, al-Ṣādiq was hostile to logic because he understood that Aristotle's method of proof on 'the validity of religious doctrines' would result in grave evil. <sup>93</sup>

He then enumerated a number of scholars of various denominations, who opposed "the sciences of the ancients" in general or logic in particular: The Shafi'ite al-Mawardī (d. 450/1059), Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā (d. 790/1389), the Sūfī al-Suhrawardī (d. 584/1190), <sup>94</sup> the Shafi'ite al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), the Shi'ite Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbaḥtī (d. c. 310/922), the Shafi'ite Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ al-Sahrazūrī (d. 643/1246), the Shafi'ite Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370), the Hanbalite Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329) and the Shafi'ite Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 909/1505). <sup>95</sup> According to Goldziher, antagonism to the study of logic increased after al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111). <sup>96</sup>

The sources on which Goldziher relied are: *Uṣūl al-Kāfī* by al-Kulaynī (d. 329/940), *Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Umam* by Ibn Sa'īd (d. 683/1286), *al-Kāmil fī 'l-Ta'rīḥ* by Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233), *Mu'jam al-Buldān* by Yāqūt al-Hamawī (d. 624/1229), *al-Futūḥat al-Makkiyya* by Ibn al-'Arabī, *Wafayāt al-A'yān* by Ibn Ḥallikān, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyya* and *Mu'id al-Ni'am wa Mubīd al-Niqam* by Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Mufasssīrīn* by al-Suyūṭī and *Nayl al-Ibtihāj* by Aḥmad Bābā al-Sūdānī.

However, Goldziher's argument on this issue is challenged by el-Rouayheb, <sup>97</sup> who examines Goldziher's argument, confirmed by Makdisi, <sup>98</sup> that opposition to logic was already manifest in the 2<sup>nd</sup>/8<sup>th</sup> century and increased in intensity in the 7<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup>/14<sup>th</sup> centuries, when al-Shahrazūrī and Ibn Taymiyya composed works in which they censured it. El-Rouayheb rejects Makdisi's suggestion that opposition to logic was facilitated by the establishment of *madrasas* that were opposed to Greek learning. El-Rouayheb also questions

<sup>92</sup>Goldziher, *op. cit.*, (1981) p. 198.

<sup>93</sup>Goldziher, *op. cit.*, (1981) p. 199.

<sup>94</sup>Madkour seems to have based his view on the fact that al-Suhrawardī had composed *Kashf al-Faḍā'ih al-Yūnaniyya* to condemn Greek philosophy. This view is also confirmed by Goldziher, *op. cit.*, (1981) p. 188 and 'Alī Ḥusayn al-Jābirī (see *al-Fikr al-Salafī 'ind al-Shi'a al-Ithnā 'Ashariyya Dirāsa Taḥlīliyya li Mawqif al-Fikr al-Salafī fī 'l-Islām 'Umūman wa 'Ind al-Ithnā 'Ashariyya 'alā Wajh al-Ḥuṣūṣ min Mantīq wa Falsafat al-Yūnān* (Beirut: Manshūrāt 'Uwaidāt, 1977), p. 127. n. 1). In contrast, Hartmann argues that this work was composed by al-Suhrawardī as politico-religious propaganda in favour of the Abbasid Caliph, al-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh against "ärgste Staatsfeinde geltenden Philosophen" and against the Muslims who were occupied by the philosophy. However H. Ritter, according to Hartmann, suggests that this work was composed to serve al-Nāṣir's propaganda against the Isma'ilites. See Hartmann, Angelika, *an-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh (1180-1225): Politik, Religion, Kultur in der späten 'Abbāsidenzeit* (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), p. 250-4.

<sup>95</sup>Goldziher, *op. cit.*, (1981) p. 201-8.

<sup>96</sup>Goldziher, *op. cit.*, (1981) p. 204.

<sup>97</sup>Khaled el-Rouayheb, 'Sunnī Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500-1800,' ILS 11, 2 (2004), 213-32.

<sup>98</sup>Goldziher, *op. cit.*, (1981), p.198, 201-8; Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 282-3.



Goldziher's suggestion that hostility to logic was found predominantly among Sunni scholars, 'at least between the endorsement of the discipline by Abū Ḥāmid al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111) and the rise of the Salafiyya in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.'<sup>99</sup>

El-Rouayheb bases his argument on discussions concerning the status of logic by Sunni scholars in the period between 1500 and 1800. He argues that 'hostility to logic was a minority position in scholarly circles throughout this period.' Since 'many of the scholars of this period regularly invoked earlier authorities in support of their position,' el-Rouayheb argues, Goldziher's suggestion that hostility to logic was a predominant view amongst Sunni scholarship, especially between the 12<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries, is no longer tenable.<sup>100</sup>

### 2.1.2. Madkour (1974)

As far as the opposition to logic is concerned, Madkour<sup>101</sup> suggested that logic, i.e. the logic of Aristotle, was subjected to the objections of scholars of various backgrounds. Two grand savants, Madkour argues, one a mystic and the other a traditionist, al-Suhrawardī<sup>102</sup> (d. 584/1190) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329), can be considered as fervent critics of logic who aimed at deconstructing its foundation. Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d.148/764) is also referred to by Madkour as having opposed theological speculation based on logic. Al-Shāfi'ī (d. 203/820), Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 641/1245) and his disciple al-Nawawī (d. 674/1277) are highlighted as having an unfavourable attitude toward logic as well.<sup>103</sup> At last, Madkour asserts the influence of the great Shi'ite thinker of the tenth century, Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbaḥtī (d. ca.310/922) on Ibn Taymiyya in the latter's aim of demolishing the principles of Aristotelian logic.<sup>104</sup> In discussing the opposition to logic of certain scholars, Madkour frequently refers to *Ṣawn al-Manṭiq* by al-Suyūṭī (4 times) and *Manāḥij al-Baḥth* by 'Alī Shāmi al-Nashshār, the editor of *Ṣawn al-Manṭiq* (twice), *A'yān al-Shi'a* by al-Āmilī (once), *al-Radd 'ala 'l-Manṭiqiyyīn* by Ibn Taymiyya (8 times) and *Fatāwā Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ* (once).

### 2.1.3. Hartmann (1975)

In her discussion of "the Measures against any occupation with Greek Philosophy," Hartmann shows how the 34<sup>th</sup> Abbasid caliph, who was generally

<sup>99</sup>On this issue, see my article, "A Statistical Potrait of the Resistance to Logic by Sunni Muslim Scholars Based on the Works of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (849-909/1448-1505)," ILS 15 (2008), 250-267, esp. 252-3; El-Rouayheb, *op. cit.*, esp. p. 213-6; Goldziher, *op. cit.*, (1981), p. 198-9.

<sup>100</sup>Ali, *op. cit.*, (2008), p. 253; El-Rouayheb, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

<sup>101</sup>Madkour, I., "La Logique d'Aristote chez les Motakallimīn," in Mohaghegh, Mahdi and T. Izutsu, *Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language* (Tehran: The Tehran University Press, 1974) p. 29-46.

<sup>102</sup>Madkour underlines the fact that al-Suhrawardī critically remarked that Aristotle's theory on definition is difficult to apply, because it is based on the essence and quiddity which belong to the metaphysical notions. See Madkour, *op. cit.*, p. 42. *Rashf al-Naṣā'ih al-Imāniyya wa Kashf al-Faḍā'ih al-Yūnāniyya* was edited and published in Cairo in 2004 by Dr. Aisha al-Manna'i.

<sup>103</sup>Madkour, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>104</sup>Madkour, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

known as *mujtahid* and *muḥaddith*, al-Nāṣir li 'l-Dīn Allāh (d. 623/1225), took at least three measures against Greek philosophy by (1) exterminating philosophical literature; (2) burning libraries housing Hellenistic works; and (3) denouncing the prominent figures claimed to be occupied by Greek learning.<sup>105</sup> Al-Nāṣir issued an order to burn libraries which housed works of Ibn Sīnā. Due to their collections of Hellenistic works, according to Hartmann, a private library of Rukn al-Dīn ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb ibn 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilī, a nephew of a prominent Ḥanbalite scholar, 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilī, was burnt. The works believed to be preserved in the library, according to Hartmann, were those of Ibn Sīnā, i.e., *Kitāb al-Shifā'*, *Kitāb al-Najāt*, the Encyclopaedia of the Iḥwān al-Ṣafā',<sup>106</sup> works on philosophy, logic, astronomy, treatises on *nīranjīyāt* (trick and talisman)<sup>107</sup> as well as guides for worshipping the stars.<sup>108</sup>

Several notable scholars during al-Nāṣir's rule, according to Hartmann, also lost their professorial chair in the state-funded institution of learning, due to their covert occupation with philosophy. Hartmann mentions the *Faqīh* al-Mūjir (d. 595/1198), who was forced to leave the Niẓāmiyya college and Baghdad for Damascus and Ḥurāsān.<sup>109</sup> Another prominent scholar who lost his official position, according to Hartmann, was al-Faḥr Gulām ibn al-Munā, known as Ibn al-Māshiṭa (d. 610/1213), who was intensively occupied with Greek learning. According to Hartmann, Ibn Māshiṭa in his work, *Nawāmis al-Anbiyā'*, claimed that the prophets were men knowledgeable of Greek philosophy.<sup>110</sup>

Hartmann also dealt with the hostile attitude of Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar al-Suhrawardī al-Shāfi'ī (w. 632/1234), the chief judge appointed by al-Nāṣir himself. Al-Suhrawardī's unfavourable attitude toward logic was well known for his condemnation of the pantheist Ibn 'arabī, who established an epistemological relation between the doctrine of *taṣawwuf* and some elements derived from Greek philosophy. Besides, al-Suhrawardī (d. 632/1234) was said to have composed a polemical work against Greek sciences and philosophy, *Rashfu 'l-Naṣā'iḥ al-Īmāniyya wa Kashfu 'l-Faḍā'iḥ al-Yūnāniyya*, in order to refute apologetico-dialectical arguments of theology and *falsafa* along with their Greek sources.<sup>111</sup> Under the commission of al-Nāṣir, Hartmann says, al-Suhrawardī even sunk volumes of Ibn Sīnā's works.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>105</sup>See Hartmann, *op. cit.*, (1975), p. 256-62; this topic has also been dealt with by Ali, Mufti, "Aristotelianisme dalam Kaca Mata Para Tokoh Abad Tengah Penentang Logika," *Alqalam*, IAIN Sultan Maulana Hasanudin, Serang Banten, XXIV, 3 (September-Desember, 2007), p. 318-339.

<sup>106</sup>The Epistles of the Iḥwān al-Ṣafā', according to Rescher, comprises 52 treatises which deal with mathematics, natural sciences, metaphysics, mysticism, astrology, magic, etc. See Rescher, Nicholas, *The Development of Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 146.

<sup>107</sup>Hartmann refers to this term as "trick und talismane." For elaborate discussion on this term, see Ullmann, Manfred, *Die Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften im Islam* (Köln & Leiden: E.J Brill, 1972), hal. 360;

<sup>108</sup>Hartmann, *op. cit.*, (1975), p. 256.

<sup>109</sup>Hartmann, *op. cit.*, (1975), p. 260-1.

<sup>110</sup>Hartmann, *op. cit.*, (1975), p. 262.

<sup>111</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>112</sup>Hartmann, *op. cit.*, (1975), p. 255,

According to Hartmann, the hostility toward things ‘Greek’ did not stop at the period of al-Nāṣir but continued under the rule of the Caliph al-Mustanjid (d. 884/1479) who also issued an order to burn Ibn Sīnā’s works and the Epistles of the Iḥwān al-Ṣafā.<sup>113</sup>

#### 2.1.4. Al-Nashshār (1978)

A discussion of how Greek logic, i. e. Aristotelian logic, was rejected by Muslims can be found in al-Nashshār’s *Manāḥij*.<sup>114</sup> Al-Nashshār started his discussion with the problem whether Greek logic and philosophy were ‘made to enter’ (*idhāl*) or ‘entered themselves’ (*duḥūl*) into the Islamic world. Based on his own view that the inner structure of Islamic culture had no need whatsoever of Greek logic and philosophy, he maintained that Greek logic and philosophy were ‘made to enter’ into the Islamic world,<sup>115</sup> where one finds that the *mutakallimūn* and the jurists of the first generation did not accept Aristotelian logic, which was also opposed by the traditionalists.

Rejecting the idea that the legal theories of the usulists were influenced by Aristotelian logic, al-Nashshār suggests that the principle of the *uṣūl*<sup>116</sup> was based on *al-qiyās al-lugawī*, whose most important authorities were al-Ḥalīl and Sibawayhi.<sup>117</sup> In formulating his legal theory, al-Shāfi‘ī, for instance, did not get any benefit from Aristotelian logic. He says, this was because of his conviction that Aristotelian logic was based on the particular characteristics of the Greek language, which, according to him, were totally different from those of Arabic.<sup>118</sup>

Al-Nashshār also interestingly discussed how logic was opposed not only by the Traditionalists, but also by the “Rationalist” group of Muslims, i.e. the *mutakallimūn*. The hostile attitude of the traditionalists towards logic was represented by the fact that when al-Gazālī adopted Aristotelian logic in his legal theory, he was criticized severely by a number of prominent figures, such as Abū Ishāq al-Marjīnānī, Abū al-Wafā’ b. ‘Uqayl (d. 513/1119), al-Qushayrī, al-Ṭurtūshī (d. 520/1127), al-Māziri, Ibn al-Ṣalāh (d. 643/1246) and al-Nawawī (d. 631/1234).<sup>119</sup> The rejection of the *mutakallimūn* of Aristotelian logic was reflected by their conviction that it contained certain metaphysical premises, which were substantially against the teaching of the Koran, and certain physical premises, which could not be accepted whatsoever by the Muslims.<sup>120</sup>

<sup>113</sup>Hartmann, *op. cit.*, (1975), p. 256.

<sup>114</sup>See al-Nashshār, ‘Alī Sāmī, *Manāḥij al-Baḥth ‘Inda Mufakkirī al-Islām* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1978), 4th ed. p. 143-4.

<sup>115</sup>“*Intiqāl al-falsafa wa ‘l-manṭiq al-yūnānī ila ‘l-‘alam al-islāmī intiqāl idhāl...*” Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p.16.

<sup>116</sup>Al-Nashshār identifies *al-uṣūl* as having two significances; a narrow and a broad one: The narrow significance refers to “*manhaj al-baḥth ‘ind al-faqīh aw huwa manṭiq masā’ilih*,” while the broad one is “*qānūn ‘āṣim lidhihn al-faqīh min al-ḥaṭa’ fī ‘l-istidlāl ‘ala ‘l-aḥkām*.” Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>117</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

<sup>118</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

<sup>119</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 143-4.

<sup>120</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

### 2.1.5. Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī (1979)<sup>121</sup>

When discussing 'the introduction of logic into Muslim world,' al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī lists the proponents and the opponents of Aristotelian logic. Referring to al-Suyūṭī's *Ṣawn al-Manṭiq* and his *fatwā*, Ibn Qayyim's *Miftāḥ Dār al-Sa'āda*, and Abū al-Najā' al-Fāriḍ's *Kasr al-Manṭiq*, al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī further mentions some scholars who opposed Aristotelian logic: Abū Sa'īd al-Sirāfi al-Naḥwī, al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-Ṭayyib, al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, al-Jubbā'ī and his son, Abū al-Ma'ālī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Anṣārī, al-Bāqillānī, Abū l-'Abbās al-Nāshī, al-Nawbaḥṭī, Abū Sa'īd Abū 'l-Ḥayr al-Mīhanī (d. 440/1048), Ibn Taymiyya, Sirāj al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, al-Suyūṭī and Abū al-Najā' al-Fāriḍ.<sup>122</sup>

As far as the opposition to logic by each of the scholars mentioned above is concerned, referring to Ibn Taymiyya's *al-Radd*, al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, first of all, discussed al-Nawbaḥṭī's criticism of *shakl al-qiyās* (form of analogy). According to al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, al-Nawbaḥṭī's criticism of Aristotelian logic was recorded in his no longer extant work, *al-Radd 'alā Ahl al-Manṭiq*, some of whose topics were preserved by Ibn Taymiyya's *al-Radd*.<sup>123</sup> Referring to al-Tawḥīdī's *al-Imtā'*, he further discussed the debate between al-Sirāfi and Mattā b. Yūnus.<sup>124</sup> He then recorded the logical dispute between Ibn Sīnā, the philosopher, and Abū Sa'īd Abū 'l-Ḥayr al-Mīhanī, the Ṣūfī, who criticized Ibn Sīnā's use of rational sciences for finding the truths.<sup>125</sup> Criticizing the epistemological foundation of logic, al-Mīhanī, according to al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī argued: *inna 'l-burhān al-'aqlī la 'tibāra lah li annah yuthbit buṭlānah min tariq al-burhān al-'aqlī wa hādha al-shakl min al-istidlāl laysa min mafād al-burhān bal huwa šura wāḍiḥa min al-mugālaṭa* (rational demonstration is nothing, since its invalidity is confirmed by way of rational demonstration. This kind of deduction is not a result of (proper) demonstration but represents clearly its confusion).<sup>126</sup>

According to al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, al-Fāriḍ's opposition to logic, as discussed in *Kasr al-Manṭiq*, lies in the concept of analogy which 'neither gives us any new knowledge nor unravels the complexity or reveals a secret from its covert form.'<sup>127</sup> Ibn Taymiyya's systematical criticism of logic was discussed comprehensively by al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī as well.<sup>128</sup> Finally, al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī's discussion of the opposition to logic ended up with his account of Ibn Ḥaldūn's criticism toward logic asserting: *al-manṭiq aw al-'aql fi 'l-'ulūm al-ilahiyya lā yufidu shay'an wa la 'sti'māla lah fi majālīhā* (logic or reason made use of in religious sciences does not bear any benefit nor is there any need to use it in the scope of their study).<sup>129</sup>

<sup>121</sup>I would like to express my gratitude to Samir Kaddouri, Rabat, who drew my attention to a work of Muṣṭafā al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *al-Mufakkirūn al-Muslimūn fī Muwājahat al-Manṭiq al-Yūnānī Naqd 'ulamā' al-Muslimīn li Manṭiq Aristū wa Muwāzanatih bi Manṭiq al-Falāsifa al-Garbiyyīn*, (Beyrut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 11410/1990), originally published in Persian in 1399/1979.

<sup>122</sup> Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 19-20.

<sup>123</sup> Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 32-33.

<sup>124</sup> Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 37-70.

<sup>125</sup> Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 71-80.

<sup>126</sup> Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>127</sup> *anna 'l-qiyās lā yu 'tinā āyat ma 'rifa jadīda wa lā yaḥillu mushkilan wa lā yakshif al-sirra 'an amr ḥafiyy...* Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 81-8.

<sup>128</sup> Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 89-116.

<sup>129</sup> Al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 117-125.

#### 2.1.6. Hallaq (1993)

The opposition of a particular historical figure, i.e. Ibn Taymiyya, against logic is the central issue in Hallaq's introduction of his translation of al-Suyūṭī's *Jahd al-Qarīḥa fī Tajrīd al-Naṣīḥa* (the Exertion of Effort in Divesting the *Naṣīḥa*).<sup>130</sup> Hallaq argues that Ibn Taymiyya fought against everything that directly or indirectly derived from what was termed the "ancient sciences" (*ulūm al-awā'il*), especially Aristotelian logic. Ibn Taymiyya criticized logic because, Hallaq maintains, 'it brought under its wings not only Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Ibn Sīnā and the rest of the Arabic philosophers, but also the pantheistic Sufis, the Shī'is, and the speculative theologians (*ahl al-kalām*).'<sup>131</sup> Ibn Taymiyya's unrelenting attack against the philosophers, i. e. logicians, Hallaq says, was, however, double edged. On the one hand, by refuting philosophical logic, he advanced his critique of the metaphysical doctrines of *falsafa*, and, on the other, by undermining logic in general and the realist theories of essences and universals in particulars, he sought to shake the dogmatic foundation of mystical pantheism.<sup>132</sup> Hallaq interestingly maintains that despite Ibn Taymiyya's intense disapproval of Greek logic, he insisted on the proposition that the categorical syllogism was formally impeccable.

Determining what was Ibn Taymiyya's real attitude towards logic, Hallaq conclusively states that for Ibn Taymiyya the challenge facing the logicians lies not in an investigation of forms, figures, and moods but rather in arriving at the truth and certainty of propositions. The truth and certainty of propositions, as it is stated by Hallaq in his concluding passages, could not be established by simple human minds but should be based on revealed knowledge, which is conveyed to mankind by the prophets.<sup>133</sup>

Hallaq also mentions that a number of scholars of various theological denominations have written treatises to refute either entirely or partially formal logic and to condemn the logicians. He says that the Mu'tazilite poet and thinker Abu 'l-'Abbās al-Nāshī' al-Akbar, known as Ibn al-Shirshīr (d. 293/905), was the first who refuted logic. The Shī'ī thinker Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbaḥṭī (d. ca. 310/922), the author of *Kitāb al-Arā' wa 'l-Diyānāt* and *al-Radd 'alā Ahl al-Manṭiq*, which is no longer extant, was another scholar mentioned by Hallaq as a fervent opponent to logic. The grammarian Abū Sa'īd al-Sirāfī (d. 368/979) was cited as the one who launched an attack against the philosopher-logician Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940). Besides, he suggests that the Ash'arite theologian Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, in his treatise *al-Daqā'iq*, is said to have argued against the philosophers' logic. At last, Hallaq indicates the unfavourable attitude of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245) with his well-known *fatwā*, and that of the unknown Abū al-Najā al-Farīd (?) in one of his treatises.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>130</sup>Hallaq, W.B., *Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. xi-lvi.

<sup>131</sup>Hallaq, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.

<sup>132</sup>Hallaq, *op. cit.*, p. xxiv.

<sup>133</sup>Hallaq, *op. cit.* p. xxxix

<sup>134</sup>See Hallaq, *op. cit.*, p. xlii-xlv. In spite of the fact that Hallaq does not mention any individual treatise which al-Farīd wrote against logic, it may be mentioned here that it

### 2.1.7. Endress (1987)

As has been mentioned elsewhere,<sup>135</sup> Goldziher associates the alleged decline of Muslim civilization with Muslim resistance to the ‘Greek sciences,’ one of which was, of course, logic; Makdisi equates the resistance to logic with the emergence of *madrasas*. Similarly, Endress, according to Brentjes, attributes the decline of Muslim civilization after the 13<sup>th</sup> century to four factors which implicitly reflect a resistance to logic: (1) the dichotomy between the ancient ‘rational’ sciences and religious and legal sciences; (2) the marginal position of the ancient sciences in the Muslim world; (3) ‘the rejection of innovation as a positive value for Muslim society and the insistence on social practice based on authoritative learning,’ and (4) the replacement of philosophy by ‘the canon of religious duties as the ideal of salvation.’<sup>136</sup>

In her discussion of the relation between power and the *madrasa vis a vis* orthodoxy and ‘the ancient sciences,’<sup>137</sup> Brentjes challenges Endress’ thesis in the spirit of Goldziher and Makdisi by claiming that the negative and hostile attitudes toward philosophy and logic ‘did not dominate the intellectual atmosphere from the 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century onwards.’<sup>138</sup> Referring to Chamberlain, Brentjes also rejects the *madrasas* as ‘the core institution of Muslim legal education which possessed a formalized curriculum and excluded the ancient sciences and rational theology’.<sup>139</sup>

### 2.1.8. Van Koningsveld (1998)

Van Koningsveld proposes a new interpretation of the dream of al-Ma’mūn and of the stories of the importation of Greek books from Byzantium. The interpretation of this dream and stories by Muslim historians, biographers, and jurists give birth to two Muslim literatures showing two tendencies representing their opposite attitude toward Greek sciences: (1) the ‘Ma’mūn cycle,’ representing a favourable attitude to Greek sciences, and (2) the ‘Umar cycle,’ showing hostility to Greek sciences.<sup>140</sup>

The opposition to logic, Van Koningsveld suggests, is reflected in certain aspects by the hostile attitudes of religious scholars of early Islam to Greek

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probably points to *Kasr al-Manṭiq*, which has been studied by Z. A. Baqir (a lecturer at Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta Indonesia) in his M.A. thesis, *The Problem of Definition in Islamic Logic: A Study of Abū al-Najā al-Farīd’s Kasr al-Manṭiq in Comparison with Ibn Taimiyyah’s Kitāb al-Radd ‘ala ‘l-Manṭiqiyyīn* (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1998), 89 pp.

<sup>135</sup>See p. 15-6; Read also my discussion in ILS, *op. cit.*, 252-3; Brentjes, *op. cit.*, p. 3-4.

<sup>136</sup>Endress, G., “Die wissenschaftliche Literatur,” in *Grunriß der Arabischen Philologie*, ed. H. Gätje, (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1987), vol. 2, 8, p. 400-473.

<sup>137</sup>Brentjes, Sonja, “*Orthodoxy*,” *Ancient Sciences, Power, and the Madrasa (“college”) in Ayyubid and early Mamluk Damascus* (International Workshop Experience and Knowledge Structures in Arabic and Latin Sciences Organized by Muhammad Abattouy and Paul Weinig, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science Berlin, December 16-17, 1996), 3; Ali, *op. cit.*, (2008), p. 252

<sup>138</sup>Brentjes, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>139</sup>Brentjes, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>140</sup>Van Koningsveld, *op. cit.*, p. 355-366.

sciences in general and to philosophy and logic in particular.<sup>141</sup> Though indirect, their opposition to logic can be associated, he suggests, with their exhortation of the destruction of the “ancient books” which contain the “ancient sciences”, among which are logic and philosophy. In sum, he says that the unfavourable attitude of some of the early authorities in Islam toward logic was closely connected to their opposition to things Greek, which was specifically reflected by their “suspicion and overt enmity” toward the “Books of the Infidels” (the Books of the Greeks).<sup>142</sup>

Relying on, among others, *Iḥtilāf al-Fuqahā*’ by al-Ṭabarī and *al-Mi’yār al-Mu’rib wa ’l-Jāmi’ al-Mugrib* by al-Wansharīsī, several early leading scholars are listed by Van Koningsveld to have opposed the “Books of the Infidels”: Al-Awzā’ī (d. 159/774), Mālik b. Anas (d. 178/795) and al-Shāfi’ī (d. 203/820).<sup>143</sup> Referring to *Ṭabaqāt al-Umam* by Ṣā’id al-Andalusī, Van Koningsveld also deals with al-Manṣūr b. Abī ‘Āmir’s (d. 392/1002) incineration of the books of philosophy and logic.<sup>144</sup>

### 2.1.9. Griffel (2000)

Griffel’s discussion of the opposition to logic focuses on the notorious *fatwā* of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d.643/1245), who maintained that being occupied with learning and teaching logic is not allowed by the Law-giver, by the Companions, the Followers and by the leading scholars qualified to undertake *ijtihād*. Griffel understands the issuance of this *fatwā* from the context of the Muslim opposition to the influence of Greek philosophy on the works of Muslim scholars. Griffel further argues that this *fatwā* not only forms evidence of the existence of the study of philosophy in the first half of 8<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> century, but also constitutes the peak of the opposition to the philosophers, which had already been undertaken by al-Gazālī with his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* more than one hundred-fifty years earlier.<sup>145</sup>

Interestingly, Griffel also proposes another *fatwā* of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ as illustrative of his unfavourable attitude toward logic in particular and Greek philosophy in general. Referring to al-Qal‘ajī’s second edition of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s *fatwā*, Griffel records the *fatwā* as follows: “Es ist die Pflicht des Herrschers, die Muslime vor dem Übel dieser Peripatetiker zu beschützen, sie aus den Medresen zu entfernen und zu verbannen und die Beschäftigung mit ihrer Disziplin zu bestrafen. Um den Brand, den diese Leute legen, zu löschen und die Überreste der Philosophie und der Philosophen zu vertilgen, soll der Herrscher alle, die öffentlich ihr Bekenntnis zu den Glaubensüberzeugungen der Philosophen kundtun, unter das Schwert tun oder sie dazu auffordern, zum Islam überzutreten. (...) Wer diese Pflicht zu erfüllen anstrebt, der muß jene, die von den Leuten der Philosophie in den Medresen als Lehrer tätig sind und über Philosophie schreiben und sie rezitieren, ihres Amtes entheben, sie dann einsperren und ihnen seinen Standpunkt aufzwingen. Für den Fall, daß jemand behauptet, er glaube nicht an ihr Bekenntnis, und dabei der Lüge überführt wird, so ist der (beste) Weg, ein Übel auszureißen, indem man es seiner Wurzel ausreißt

<sup>141</sup>Van Koningsveld, *op. cit.*, p. 345-370.

<sup>142</sup>Van Koningsveld, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

<sup>143</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>144</sup>Van Koningsveld, *op. cit.*, p. 354-5.

<sup>145</sup>Griffel, *op. cit.*, p. 354-8.

und die Wiedereinstellung eines solchen als Lehrer gehört zu den größten Vergehen.”<sup>146</sup>

According to Griffel, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s adamant criticism of logic is well reflected in his *fatwā*, which prohibits people from using philosophical terms, such *al-ḥadd* (definition) and *al-burhān* (demonstration). Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ even condemned, Griffel maintains, those who read a work of Aristotelian bearing, like *Kitāb al-Shifā’* of Ibn Sīnā. Muslim scholars (‘*ulamā*’) and Sufis will lose their authority as soon as they read Ibn Sīnā’s works.<sup>147</sup>

## 2.2. Modern Views on the Islamic Opposition to (Philosophical) Theology

### 2.2.1. Makdisi (1962, 1971, 1986, 1990)

A penetrating analysis of how “philosophical theology” was opposed by the Traditionalists was given by Makdisi in several of his works. In his opinion, the opposition against theology was embodied by a form of scholastic movement, “a movement of schools, guild schools of legal science,” which was prepared by the efforts of two leaders, al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 203/820) and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 245/855), whose influence against *kalām* and philosophy remained throughout Muslim history. This movement was brought into existence, he states, by the movement of juridical theology against the theology of *kalām*, in which *al-Risāla* was composed by al-Shāfi‘ī as its religious manifesto.<sup>148</sup> Like al-Shāfi‘ī, the first champion of the traditionalists whose “career signaled the first triumph over rationalism and whose life was imbued with a deep sense of submission to the Koran, the Word of God, the *ḥadīth* and the deeds of the Prophet,” Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal with his resistance against the Great Inquisition signaled the second defeat of Rationalism.<sup>149</sup>

The traditionalist triumph over Rationalism does not end up with Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, it continues through two other landmarks, the defection of al-Ash‘arī (d. ca. 324/935) from Mu‘tazilism to Hanbalism and the promulgation of the Traditionalist creed<sup>150</sup> by the Caliph al-Qādir (381-422/991-1031).<sup>151</sup> The rise of legal studies and institutions such as Mosque-Inn (*masjid-ḥān*) college and Madrasa, in which they were taught and in which *kalām* and philosophy were not admitted as part of the curriculum,<sup>152</sup> is associated by Makdisi with the effort by the Traditionalists in their respective “guilds of law,” the rise of which was the effect of the rise of such institutions, to preserve their dominance over the Rationalists.

<sup>146</sup>Griffel, *op. cit.*, p. 356-7.

<sup>147</sup>Griffel, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

<sup>148</sup>Makdisi, G., *The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West: With Special Reference to Scholasticism* (Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. 3.

<sup>149</sup>Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 5.

<sup>150</sup>The contents of this creed, according to Makdisi, was directed against the anthropomorphists, the Karramiya, the Shi‘a, the Ash‘ariyya and the Mu‘tazila. *The Rise*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>151</sup>Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 5-8.

<sup>152</sup>Makdisi, G. “Law and Traditionalism in the Institutions of Learning of Medieval Islam” in *Theology and Law in Islam*, ed. G.E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), p. 75-89.



Although, with the passage of time, Makdisi suggests, the Traditionalist institutions were not immune to Rationalist infiltration, as is illustrated by the fact that the Ash'arite movement, in search of a home, infiltrated into the Shafi'ite school like the Mu'tazilite did into the Hanafite,<sup>153</sup> the Traditionalists had succeeded in their attempt to exclude the Rationalists from their institutions.<sup>154</sup>

The defeat of the Mu'tazilites in the political arena, on the other hand, forced them to make use of *uṣūl al-fiqh* as an intellectual vehicle to maintain the rational influence with which they had introduced some of the problems of philosophical theology and legal philosophy. The character of *uṣūl al-fiqh* changed from purely traditionalist, in the sense that al-Shāfi'ī does not treat a single problem of *kalām*, to rationalist, in the sense that it deals with philosophico-theological problems. *Uṣūl al-fiqh*, which was founded by al-Shāfi'ī in opposition to *kalām*, acquired authors whom al-Shāfi'ī himself had previously called 'the Partisans of Words', *Mutakallimūn*.<sup>155</sup> The intellectual effort of the Rationalist camp, Makdisi suggests, gained their success. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that many eminent scholars of Shafi'ite or Hanbalite juridical denomination have dealt with the inroads made by other sciences into the field of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.<sup>156</sup>

The result of such infiltration brought about the phenomenon by which a Sunni Muslim, a member of a Rationalist movement, could also become a member of a Sunni guild of law. Setting examples, Makdisi then enumerates a number of scholars knowledgeable of the 'foreign sciences', such as the Shafi'ite al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111) with the Ash'arite theological tendency with his introduction of logic into *uṣūl al-fiqh*, Sayf al-Dīn al-Amīdī (d. 631/1233), who was sacked from his chair of law of the 'Azīziyya Madrasa for teaching philosophy and philosophical theology, and Ibn 'Aqīl whose *al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* was receptive to a Rationalist instrument of methodology, dialectics.<sup>157</sup>

Examining his *Rise*, his five articles and one book-chapter, which I can only mention briefly here,<sup>158</sup> Makdisi can be said to have discussed the opposition of a number of personalities to *kalām*: such as Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karajī (d. 532/1138), Abū Shāma al-Dimashqī al-Shāfi'ī (d. 665/1268), Abū Sulaymān al-Ḥaṭṭābī al-Bustī (d. 388/999), al-Sam'ānī (d. 562/1166), Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 406/1016), Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083)<sup>159</sup> and his Hanbalite colleague, the Sharīf Abū Ja'far

<sup>153</sup>Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 42.

<sup>154</sup>Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 26.

<sup>155</sup>Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 4-5.

<sup>156</sup> Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 4.

<sup>157</sup> Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 42-3.

<sup>158</sup>Makdisi, G., "The Non-Ash'arite Shafi'ism of Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī", in REI (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1986) LIV, p. 239-257; "Ashari and the Asharites in Islamic Religious History" in SI (G-P. Maisonneuve -Larose Paris XVII & XVIII, 1962), p. 37-80 & 19- 39; "The Juridical Theology of Shafi'i Origins and Significance of Uṣūl al-Fiqh" in SI, LIX, 1984, p. 5-48; "Law and Traditionalism in the Institutions of Learning of Medieval Islam" in *Theology and Law in Islam*, ed. G.E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), p. 75-89; "Hanbalite Islam," in Swartz, *op. cit.*, p. 216-274.

<sup>159</sup>Makdisi identifies him with the author of *Ṭabaqāt* who "indicated the transmission of authoritative knowledge from the Prophet himself, as the first mufti-jurisconsult, across the generations, down to his day, to drive home the idea that *ḥadīth* and law – not *kalām*

(d. 470/1077), the Hanbalite Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200),<sup>160</sup> Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329), al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348)<sup>161</sup> who listed Abu 'l-Ḥasan al-Ḥammāmī (d. 417/1026), 'Abd al-Ganī Sa'īd (d. 409/1018), Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 412/1021), Abū 'Amr b. Darrāj (d. 421/1030), Ibn al-Bawwāb (d. 413/1022), the Sultan Maḥmūd b. Sabuktakin (d. 421/1030), and the Hanbalite Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350).

Besides, Makdisi exhaustively discusses the hostile attitude toward *kalām* of the “celebrated doctor of the Hanbalite theologico-juridical school”, Muwaffaq al-Dīn b. Qudāma.<sup>162</sup> In the introduction of his translation, *Ibn Qudāma's Censure of Speculative Theology*, Makdisi says that Ibn Qudāma in this work not only specifically condemns Ibn 'Aqīl, but also censures those who indulge in speculative theology, i.e. those who apply allegorical interpretation of the revealed text with regard to the divine attributes.<sup>163</sup> Ibn Qudāma, Makdisi reiterates, opposes all manner of speculation in matters of religious belief because such speculation is unorthodox.<sup>164</sup>

According to Ibn Qudāma, Makdisi says, speculative theology (*kalām*) was prohibited not only because of the fact that the pious ancestors did not practise it, but also for its inherent danger, i.e. that speculative theology leads to the use of allegorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*) whose principal evil is that it leads to the practice of stripping God of the attributes which He attributed to Himself and of those which He did not.<sup>165</sup>

Representing the Traditionalists i.e. in defence of the Hanbalite school against the accusation of anthropomorphism, Ibn Qudāma, Makdisi argues, advocates the unreserved acceptance of the Koranic expressions and the traditions on the divine attribute as they stand and as they were handed down from the Prophet without attempting any interpretation. A rationale of Ibn Qudāma's advocating this principle is that only God knows their intended meaning. This principle is what distinguishes, according to Ibn Qudāma, the pious believers, the followers of the pious ancestors, from the error-laden partisans of allegorical interpretation, the speculative theologians.<sup>166</sup>

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and *falsafā* – have their origin in the teaching of the Prophet.” Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 6-7.

<sup>160</sup>The role of Ibn al-Jawzī becomes clear from the fact that he transmitted in his *al-Muntaẓam* the promulgation of the traditionalist creed by al-Qādir, which condemned deviations from Traditionalist teaching on the authority of his teacher of *ḥadīth*, the Shafi'ite Abu 'l-Faḍl b. al-Nāṣir (d. 550/1155), who had learned it from the Hanbalite Abu 'l-Ḥusayn b. al-Farra' (d. 526/1133). Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 8.

<sup>161</sup>Al-Dhahabī's list preserved in his biographical work is identified here by Makdisi as conveying the same Traditionalist message as the Creed promulgated by Al-Qādir, i.e. condemning the Rationalists. Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1990), p. 8.

<sup>162</sup>According to Makdisi, Ibn Qudāma does not censure theology as the knowledge of God, but rather that particular type of theology which Ibn Qudāma describes as theorizing without sufficient evidence. See *Ibn Qudāma's Censure of Speculative Theology: An Edition and Translation of Ibn Qudāma's Taḥrīm al-Nazar fī Kutub Ahl al-Kalām* (London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1962), p. ix.

<sup>163</sup>Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1962), p. lvi.

<sup>164</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>165</sup>Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1962), p. lvii.

<sup>166</sup>Makdisi, *op. cit.*, (1962), p. lviii.

### 2.2.2. Daiber (1981)

The position of Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223) regarding heresy and the heretics became clearer when Ibn Qudāma's Creed (*'Aqīda al-Imām al-Maqdisī*) was edited and given a succinct commentary by Daiber, who discussed very comprehensively not only the sources to which Ibn Qudāma referred but also how his Creed would become an important reference for his disciples as well as scholars of later generations, who opposed all rationalistic tendencies.<sup>167</sup> According to Hans Daiber, this text 'turns out to be a typical product of the Ḥanbalite school', and appears to depend on the writings of Ibn Ḥanbal.<sup>168</sup>

According to Daiber, the sources to which Ibn Qudāma referred in his Creed were the Creed of Ibn Baṭṭa al-'Ukbarī, (d. 387/997) *al-Sharḥ wa 'l-Ibāna 'an Uṣūl al-Sunna wa 'l-Diyāna*, and *I'tiqād Ahl al-Sunna* of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Ibn Qudāma also shares his theological ideas with the Creeds (*'aqā'id*) of some Ḥanbalites of the 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century, like Abū 'Alī al-Hāshimī and al-Barbahārī.<sup>169</sup> Daiber also deals with several scholars who referred to Ibn Qudāma in their staunch criticism of the theologians with rationalistic tendencies. In his opinion, the historian al-Ṭabarī's *Ṣariḥ al-Sunna* and Abū Bakr Al-Ājurri's *Kitāb al-Sharī'a* record articles of faith which can also be found in the Creed of Ibn Qudāma and can be traced back to common Ḥanbalite sources.<sup>170</sup>

Because of his unfavourable attitude toward the Ash'arite school of his time, according to Daiber, Ibn Qudāma, when defining *īmān*, avoids to use *taṣdīq*, a term commonly used by the Ash'arites. For his staunch criticism of the scholars who made use of the rationalistic methods of the Mu'tazilites, such as Ibn 'Aqīl (d. 513/1119), Ibn Qudāma, Daiber argues, composed *Tahrīm al-Nazar fī Kutub Ahl al-Kalām*. Ibn Qudāma's opposition to *kalām* also inspired his disciple, Abū Shāma, to compose a work against heresy, *Kitāb al-Bā'ith 'alā Inkār al-Bida' wa 'l-Hawādith*.<sup>171</sup>

### 2.2.3. Pavlin (1996)

Pavlin also draws our attention to the history of the Muslim opposition to speculative theology.<sup>172</sup> He identifies the theologians as those who were engaged in disputes on theological controversies, such as the nature of God and His attributes. Their theological disputes are closely connected to their attempt to interpret allegorically certain obscure verses concerning the Attributes of God. In this light, speculative theology, Pavlin suggests, had already become subjected to the attack by its opponents as early as the Companions of the Prophet who

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<sup>167</sup>Daiber, Hans, "The Creed (*'Aqīda*) of the Ḥanbalite Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī A Newly Discovered Text," *Studia Arabica and Islamica, Festschrift for Iḥsān 'Abbās on his Sixtieth Birthday*, Wadād al-Qādī (ed.), (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1981), p. 105-125.

<sup>168</sup>Daiber, *op. cit.*, (1981), p. 107.

<sup>169</sup>Daiber, *op. cit.*, (1981), p. 106-7.

<sup>170</sup>Daiber, *op. cit.*, (1981), p. 107.

<sup>171</sup>Daiber, *op. cit.*, (1981), p. 107-8.

<sup>172</sup>Pavlin, J., "Sunnī Kalām and Theological Controversies," in *History of Islamic Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1996), ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, vol. I, p. 105-118.

maintained a belief in the clarity of the Koranic verses, shunning allegorical interpretation. Following this principle, individuals such as Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795), Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 245/855), al-Buḥārī (d. 256/870), and Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī (d. 620/1223) are listed by Pavlin as those who had an intense hatred of speculative theology.<sup>173</sup>

#### 2.2.4. Abrahamov (1998)

The opposition to theology and the theologians is extensively and systematically dealt with by Abrahamov in his study which focuses on the trend and direction of the dispute between the “Rationalists” i.e., the heralds of speculative reasoning and logical reasoning in matters of faith, and the Traditionalist i.e., the heralds of the tradition.<sup>174</sup> Abrahamov presents several identifications of the Traditionalists, viz. (1) those who avoided the dispute between philosophy and tradition, whereas they put forward arguments in the dispute between speculative theology and tradition; (2) those who usually do not practice theological speculation in their works or those who minimize the use of speculative arguments; (3) those who maintain that the first foundation of traditionalism is strict adherence to the teachings of the Koran, the Sunna and the consensus mainly of the first generations of scholars; (4) when disputing with the “Rationalists”, the Traditionalists, such as Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, sometimes combine traditional and rational proof in their arguments; (5) the Traditionalists sometimes make use of the technical terms of their adversaries to prove that the latter contradict their own arguments. Abrahamov argues convincingly that Traditionalism is not a monopoly of the Hanbalite scholars, but can also be found among the adherents of the Shafi‘ite, the Malikite and the Hanafite schools. Those who employ reason in their arguments, like Ibn Taymiyya, are referred to by Abrahamov as the *Mutakallimū Ahl al-Ḥadīth* (the speculative theologians of the people of Tradition).<sup>175</sup>

According to Abrahamov, the issue against which the Traditionalists launched their criticism is the use of rational arguments by the “Rationalists” as reflected in their use of independent rational interpretation (*tafsīr bi ‘l-ra’y*), and the use of analogical reasoning (*qiyās*) in deducing law from the Koran and the Sunna. Their hostile attitude toward the rationalists, Abrahamov argues, is reflected in two forms: (1) Their prohibition of engaging in theological dispute, including breaking off relations with the *mutakallimūn*, (2) the refutation of the “Rationalists” tenets.<sup>176</sup>

#### 2.2.5. Juynboll (1998)

Objections<sup>177</sup> against theology can also be found in Juynboll’s *Sunna*,<sup>178</sup> his *Excursus*,<sup>179</sup> and his review of Van Ess’ *Theologie und Gesellschaft*.<sup>180</sup> Although

<sup>173</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>174</sup>Abrahamov, B., *Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 8.

<sup>175</sup>Abrahamov, *op. cit.*, p. 1-11.

<sup>176</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>177</sup>Here, I was confronted with G.H.A. Juynboll’s personal suggestion that he prefers to use the term ‘objection’ rather than the term ‘opposition.’ I am indebted to him, who, at

the whole passage is mainly concerned with a discussion of the development of the term *sunna* from the *Jāhiliyya* until the third century of Islam, Juynboll's discussion of the objection to theology can be found in his description of certain historical personalities, figuring in his writing, when discussing the appellative *Sunna*, *Ahl al-Sunna* as well as *Ṣāḥib (Aṣḥāb) al-Sunna*. The motive of their opposition to *ahl al-bida'* is illustrated by their arguments against their opponents among whom are theologians (*Mutakallimūn*).<sup>181</sup>

### 2.2.7. Al-Hashshash (2000)

Finally, the discussion of more than two centuries of opposition to theology by Muslim scholars ranging from Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 245/855) till al-Harawī (d. 481/1089) was dealt with by al-Hashshash in his discussion of "*Die Ḥanbaliten in der Zeit zwischen der Miḥna Ibn Ḥanbals und der Miḥna des al-Anṣārī*."<sup>182</sup> Based on his study of *Dhamm al-Kalām* by al-Harawī (d. 481/1089), al-Hashshash underlines the Hanbalites' struggle against theology. According to al-Hashshash, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal constitutes a key figure in the opposition to the theologians. His fervent attitude against theology caused him and his followers, during more than two centuries and in various regions of the Islamic world, to be repressed by the ruling authorities. Such repression was not only felt by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and his contemporary followers, upon whom al-Ma'mūn (198-218/813-833) had afflicted the *miḥna* (the "Inquisition"), but also by the Hanbalites of later generations, including al-Harawī himself.

## 3. Al-Suyūṭī's Position

### 3.1. Al-Suyūṭī's View on the Origin of Islamic Theology

As far as the position of al-Suyūṭī is concerned, it can be said here that his view is strikingly parallel with the view of certain modern scholars who asserted that the development of *kalām* is not only due to an external factor, i.e. the translation movement of Greek writings, but also to an internal one, i.e. the need of an art of debate for religious argumentation.

In his SM, al-Suyūṭī discusses a number of topics regarding the origin and the foundation of logic, its introduction into the religious community of Islam,

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times, has guided me through the jungle of the orientalists' collection in the 'magna' University Library of the Leiden University.

<sup>178</sup>EI<sup>2</sup>, vol.IX, p. 878-81.

<sup>179</sup>"An Excursus on the the *Ahl al-Sunna* in Connection with Van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. IV" in *Der Islam* Band 75 Heft 2 (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), p. 318-329.

<sup>180</sup>Juynboll, G.H.A., "Josef van Ess' *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam*. Berlin/New York 1991, 1992 (Walter de Gruyter) Band I, II, III in *Der Islam* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), Band 71, p. 363-371.

<sup>181</sup>Juynboll, *op. cit.*, (1997), p. 880; idem, *op. cit.*, (1998), p. 320-1.

<sup>182</sup>Al-Hashshah, Mohammad, *Zwischen Tradition und Aufbruch, Die Ablehnung und Verleumdung der spekulativen Theologie – Dhamm al-Kalām wa Ahlih - in der Frühzeit des Islam: Ursachen und Folgen* (Inaugural Dissertation at Rheinischen-Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität at Bonn: 2000), p. 237-302.

and scholars who connected the works on *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *uṣūl al-dīn* to logic, as well as its diffusion among later scholars.<sup>183</sup> Al-Suyūṭī gives weight to the importation of the books of Greekdom and the translation movement through the mediation of al-Ma'mūn's explicit policy in favour of foreign sciences. In dealing with the origin of logic and that of Islamic theology *vis a vis* Greek influence, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have distinguished two different orientations between logic and theology. Logic was first made use of by Muslims after their cultural and intellectual contact with Hellenism. Logical speculation, according to al-Suyūṭī, was closely associated with the translation movement, as mentioned briefly above, whereas the origin of *kalām* arose out of the need for an art of debate on religious issues which had been practiced since the time of the Prophet and the Companions.

However, in dealing with *kalām*, al-Suyūṭī's view can be said to come close to that of Van Ess and Daiber, mentioned earlier. Al-Suyūṭī provides a lot of data concerning disputes of early Muslims on matters pertaining to the Islamic creed. These disputes had been practiced by the Muslims long before the importation of Greek books and the translation movement. Referring to al-Harawī, al-Buḥārī, al-Lālakā'i, al-Ājurī and al-Sam'ānī, al-Suyūṭī holds the view that the opposition to *kalām*, *jadal*, *naẓar* and *marā'* had already started with the Prophet, who said that "the perishing of those before us happened because of their frequent questions (posed to) and their arguments with their prophets," and who prayed: "O God, I ask your protection against knowledge which has no significance..." According to al-Suyūṭī, the opposition to *kalām* was also performed by the Companions. 'Umar b. al-Ḥaṭṭāb, for instance, lashed Ṣabīḡ because of a question posed by him concerning a variant reading of the Koran till the blood run from his back. Likewise, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib warned people that at the end of time there would be a people whose speech and arguments were not known by the adherents of Islam. They would be inviting the people to adhere to their message. If one meets them, one is to kill them. When he was encountered with a question of *kalām*, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib even prepared himself for fighting.

However, al-Suyūṭī argues that logic and *kalām* have intricate relations, which implies that logic, to a certain extent, can be identified with *kalām* and *vice-versa*. The intricate relation between them is clearly indicated, for instance, when he speaks of the (legal) reasons (*'ilal*) why they were both prohibited. According to al-Suyūṭī, these reasons are: *First*, the Pious Ancestors were not concerned with them; *secondly*, they lead to dissension and error.

Al-Suyūṭī seems to have seen that speculative and rational argumentation (*naẓar*, *marā'*, *jidāl*, *kalām*, etc), which had already been practiced since the time of the Prophet, were provided with a sophisticated method borrowed from Greek culture, when the Muslims encountered the Sciences of the Ancients. This is clearly reflected in his remarks: "...that the Sciences of the Ancients had reached the Muslims in the first century when they had conquered the lands of the non-Arabs. But they had not spread among them widely and had not become generally known among them since the ancestors had prohibited [us] from being engrossed in them. However, [the Greek sciences] became popular in al-Barmakī's period, while their spread increased in the period of al-Ma'mūn because of the

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<sup>183</sup>For an elaborate discussion of this issue see Chapter 3, p. 88-90.

innovations he stimulated and the occupation with the sciences of the Ancients as well as the extinguishing of the Sunna he promoted.”<sup>184</sup>

The fate that befell this ‘indigenous’ art of debate through this cultural encounter is clearly indicated by al-Suyūṭī, who includes *‘ilm al-kalām* as one of the sciences of the ancients, “whose origin was found among the materialist philosophers.”<sup>185</sup> Saying this, al-Suyūṭī seems to give the impression that the rudimentary practice of *takallama* needed to be refined through the adoption of a foreign sophisticated science, viz. the *‘ilm al-kalām* (discursive theology). He purposely used the term *‘ilm al-kalām*, which implies such a development, was referred to by Gardet and Anawati as that of ‘la période de fermentation.’

### 3.2. Al-Suyūṭī’s Contributions to the Study of the Islamic Opposition to Logic and Theology

Our understanding of the Muslim opposition to logic and theology may be furthered by the study of the four works on these subjects written by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī. These works are, in the historical order of their composition:

#### 3.2.1. *Al-Qawl al-Mushriq fī Tahṛīm al-Ishtigāl bi ‘Ilm al-Manṭiq*

Of the four works against logic by al-Suyūṭī, QM can be said to have been composed first, i.e. in 867 or 868/1465 or 1466. This is clearly indicated in the introduction of SM, which states: “Long ago, in the year 867 or 868 [H] I composed a book on the prohibition of being occupied with the art of logic, which I named “*al-Qawl al-Mushriq*” into which I included the statements of the learned men of Islam to condemn and prohibit it.”<sup>186</sup>

In this work al-Suyūṭī discusses either explicitly or incidentally the opposition of more than 40 leading scholars of various law schools to logic by referring to more than 28 works which deal either explicitly or incidentally with the same issue.

Despite the fact that Brockelmann has given adequate reference to it in his celebrated *Geschichte*,<sup>187</sup> it may be said here that not a single reference to QM has been made by modern scholars. This is presumably due to the fact that QM has not been published yet in a printed edition.

#### 3.2.2. *Jahd al-Qarīha fī Tajrīd al-Naṣīḥa*

As can be clearly read in the introduction of SM, al-Suyūṭī abridged Ibn Taymiyya’s *Naṣīḥat Ahl al-Īmān fī ‘l-Radd ‘alā Manṭiq al-Yūnān* in 888, after QM and before SM. The scope of this work comprises al-Suyūṭī’s discussion of IT’s attempt to unravel the main theses on which the logicians founded their logic: (1) *Al-taṣawwur lā yunālu illā bi ‘l-ḥadd* (no concept can be formed except by means of definition); (2) *Al-ḥadd mufīd taṣawwur al-ashyā’* (definition leads to the conception of things), (3) *Al-taṣdīq lā yunālu illā bi ‘l-qiyās* (judgement cannot be

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<sup>184</sup>SM, *op. cit.*, p. 44-5.

<sup>185</sup>“*wa lihādḥā dhammā ‘ulamā’ al-salaf al-naẓar fī ‘ilm al-awā’il: fa-inna ‘ilm al-kalām mawlūd min ‘ilm al-ḥukamā’ al-dahriyya...*” SM, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>186</sup>See al-Suyūṭī’s introduction of SM, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>187</sup>GAL, II, 189.

formed except by means of analogy), and (4) *Al-burhān yufīd al-‘ilm bi ‘l-taṣdīqāt* (demonstration leads to certain knowledge of judgements).<sup>188</sup>

First of all, it should be noted that this work has been translated and introduced by Hallaq, in his *Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians*. This work has also been referred to by modern scholars for more than one purpose. Al-Nashshār in his *Manāhij*, for instance, exhaustively refers to JQ when dealing with Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion against logic,<sup>189</sup> and with the attitude of the jurists (*fuqahā*) toward logic.<sup>190</sup> Likewise, al-Jābirī relies on JQ when discussing the attitude of the Ithna ‘Ashariyya Shi‘ites toward Greek philosophy and logic.<sup>191</sup> Al-Zayn and Abū Zahra also make use of it when dealing with Ibn Taymiyya’s logic and intellectual method<sup>192</sup> and with the biography of Ibn Taymiyya.<sup>193</sup>

### 3.2.3.. *Ṣawn al-Manṭiq wa ‘l-Kalām ‘an Fannay al-Manṭiq wa ‘l-Kalām*

SM was the third work which al-Suyūṭī composed in order to deal with the opposition to logic and theology. Like JQ, this work was composed in 888 when some of al-Suyūṭī’s contemporaries rejected his claim for *ijtihād*, since he allegedly lacked the knowledge of logic which was claimed to be one of its prerequisites. This work revolves around the history and origin of logic, its introduction into the Muslim world, the reaction of leading Muslim scholars against it, its connection to theology and the reaction of Muslim scholars against theology and the refutation against one who introduced logic into grammar.

Like JQ, SM has also been referred to by modern scholars, for more than one purpose. Regarding SM as the most complete encyclopaedia dealing with the criticism of Greek logic,<sup>194</sup> al-Nashshār in his *Manāhij* relied on it when dealing with (1) the history of the introduction of Aristotelian logic to the Muslim world,<sup>195</sup> (2) the attitude of the Uṣūlists, i.e. the scholars of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, and the theologians (*mutakallimūn*) toward Aristotelian logic,<sup>196</sup> and (3) the attitude of the jurists (*fuqahā*) toward logic.<sup>197</sup> Likewise, SM has been frequently referred to by al-Jābirī in his discussion of the attitude of the Ithna ‘Ashariyya Shi‘ites

<sup>188</sup>In the translation of these logical principles, I rely fully on Hallaq’s translation of JQ in his, *Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians*, translation with an introduction and notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 3-174.

<sup>189</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p.83, 91, 139, 150-8, 165, 168-179 .

<sup>190</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

<sup>191</sup>Al-Jābirī’s reference to SM can be found in his work, *op. cit.*, in p. 52, 58, 84, 90, 93, 96, 119, 121, 123; to JQ in p. 101, 123, 131-2, 140, 142.

<sup>192</sup>Al-Zayn refers to SM when dealing with the Muslim attitude toward logic in p. 32, 36-7 and to JQ when representing IT’s logic in p. 38, 44, 48-53, 55, 70, 87, 86-9, 91-2, 103, 149, 164-5. See al-Zayn, Muḥammad Ḥusnī, *Manṭiq Ibn Taymiyya wa Manhajuh al-Fikrī* (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1979).

<sup>193</sup>Abū Zahra refers to JQ in his discussion of the intellectual biography of Ibn Taymiyya in his *Ibn Taymiyya: Ḥayātuh wa ‘Aṣruh; Arā’uh wa Fiqhuh* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1953), p. 250.

<sup>194</sup>“*wa hādha ‘l-kitāb yu‘tabar awṣa‘ mawsū‘at fīmā na‘lam fī mawḍū‘ naqd al-manṭiq al-yūnānī.*” See al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

<sup>195</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>196</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 69, 70, .

<sup>197</sup>Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 147.



toward Greek philosophy and logic,<sup>198</sup> and by Abrahamov especially when discussing the attitude of the partisans of Tradition toward the partisans of Reason,<sup>199</sup> as well as by Fodah in his critical survey of the early Muslim opponents of logic.<sup>200</sup> The first five printed-pages of SM in which al-Suyūṭī discusses his motive for composing SM have also incidentally been referred to by Sartain in her study of al-Suyūṭī's biography,<sup>201</sup> by Van Ess,<sup>202</sup> by Hallaq in the introduction to his annotated translation of Ibn Taymiyya's *Naṣīḥa*,<sup>203</sup> and by Geoffroy, when dealing with al-Suyūṭī's condemnation of Hellenistic logic.<sup>204</sup> Along the same line, SM was also consulted by Madkour when discussing Aristotle's logic among the *Mutakallimūn* and its influence on the Arab world,<sup>205</sup> and by al-Rouayheb when dealing with the Sunnī Muslim Scholars' attitude towards Logic.<sup>206</sup>

### 3.2.4. Al-Suyūṭī's *Fatwā*

The *fatwā* was the fourth work composed to prohibit logic. That this work was composed after JQ and SM is clearly indicated in a passage which says that he abridged IT's *Naṣīḥa*, i.e. JQ, and composed a volume to condemn logic, i.e. SM. Like any other *fatwā*, this *fatwā* starts with a question on the issue of logic, and is then followed by al-Suyūṭī's prohibition in reference to 43 scholars whom he claims to have prohibited logic.

As far as the fact whether this work has been referred to by modern scholars is concerned, it should be said that only Brunschwig relies on it when he discusses the attitude of Ibn Ḥazm, al-Gazālī and Ibn Taymiyya toward Greek logic.<sup>207</sup>

## 4. The Scope of the Present work

<sup>198</sup>Al-Jābirī's reference to SM can be found in his work, *op. cit.*, in p. 52, 58, 84, 90, 93, 96, 119, 121, 123; to JQ in p. 101, 123, 131-2, 140, 142.

<sup>199</sup>Abrahamov's extensive reference to SM can be found in his *Islamic Theology*, *op. cit.*, p. 23, 65, 69, 73-4, 77, 80-1, 83, 84-5, 91.

<sup>200</sup>Fodah even devotes one chapter to an examination of al-Suyūṭī's attitude toward logic and *kalām* and an analysis of several sources on which al-Suyūṭī relies in his discussion in SM. See Fodah, Saeed, *Tad'īm al-Mantiq: Jawla Naqdiyya ma'a 'l-Mu'aridīn li 'Ilm al-Mantiq mina 'l-Mutaqaddimīn* (Amman: Dār al-Rāzī, 2002), esp. p. 114-181.

<sup>201</sup>Sartain, *op. cit.*, p. 69; see also her note, no. 144.

<sup>202</sup>Van Ess, J., "Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," in G.E. von Grunebaum (ed.) *Theology and Law in Islam* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), p. 50; See also his note no. 150.

<sup>203</sup>Hallaq, *op. cit.*, p. xlix; see also his note no. 180.

<sup>204</sup>Geoffroy, E., "al-Suyūṭī," EI<sup>2</sup>, IX, 915.

<sup>205</sup>"Il y en a qui sous-estiment aujourd'hui le rôle joué par la logique d'Aristote dans le monde arabe ou qui le nient complètement. C'est sans doute sous l'influence d'un certain traité d'al-Suyūṭī publié dernièrement et auquel nous avons fait mention auparavant..." Madkour, I., "La Logique d'Aristote chez les Motakallimīn," in Parviz Morewedge (ed.) *Islamic Philosophical Theology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), p.59, 63-4, 66-7.

<sup>206</sup>Al-Rouayheb, *op. cit.* p. 213-32.

<sup>207</sup>Brunschwig, Robert, "Los teólogos juristas del Islam en pro o en contra de la lógica griega: Ibn Hazm, al-Gazali, Ibn Taymiyya," in *Al-Andalus*, 35: 1 (1970), p. 176.

The purpose of the present work is to deal with the following research-question:

What can we learn from al-Suyūṭī's four works against logic and theology about the history of Islamic thought concerning the condemnation of logic and theology, in addition to the light shed on this subject by modern scholars quoted earlier?

In dealing with this research-question, I will discuss in the first chapter al-Suyūṭī's earliest contribution to the history of the opposition to logic, entitled *al-Qawl al-Mushriq fī Taḥrīm al-Ishtigāl bi 'Ilm al-Manṭiq*, written by him when he was still a student of 18 years old. I will deal with the manuscripts and the edition of QM (1.1), the date and purpose of its composition (1.2), as well as with an analysis of its contents (1.3). In my conclusion, I shall evaluate this work as a source for the history of Muslim opposition to logic (1.4).

In chapter two, I will discuss al-Suyūṭī's abridgement of IT's *Naṣīḥa*, entitled, *Jahd al-Qarīḥa fī Tajrīd al-Naṣīḥa*, a work composed when his knowledge of logic was doubted by some of his contemporaries. I will deal with the date (2.1) and purpose of his abridgement (2.2). I will also assess the contribution made by al-Suyūṭī in rendering IT's *Naṣīḥa* more comprehensible. Elements of IT's religious viewpoints against logic and theology in JQ will also be discussed (2.3). Some pages are devoted to deal with the question how al-Suyūṭī selected IT's viewpoints against logic in his JQ (2.4). In the conclusion, I shall analyse the rationale of al-Suyūṭī's selection of IT's arguments in it (2.5).

Chapter three will discuss al-Suyūṭī's work that was composed twenty years after QM, when his call for *ijtihād* was refused by some of his contemporaries who doubted his ability to comply with an alleged precondition for *ijtihād*, i.e., the knowledge of logic. I will deal, first of all, with the manuscript and the edition of SM (3.1), with the date (3.2) and the purpose of the composition of this work, i.e. *Ṣawn al-Manṭiq* (3.3). An analysis will also be given of the content of this work (3.4). In my conclusion, I shall again evaluate this work as a source for the history of Muslim opposition to logic and theology (3.5).

In chapter four, I will discuss al-Suyūṭī's *Fatwā* against logic. In so doing, first of all, I will deal with its manuscript (4.1). I will give an analysis of the content of this *fatwā* (4.2) and evaluate this sources on which al-Suyūṭī relies when issuing this *fatwā* (4.3).

In the conclusion, I will try to answer the research-question formulated above by synthesizing the last paragraphs of each of the four chapters of this study.