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## Freedom of expression in a pluralistic world order. Vrijheid van meningsuiting in een pluralistische wereld orde

Awesta, A.G.

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**Author:** Awesta, Ambrogino Ghariv

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## 1. Pluralistic World Order: An Introduction

In this first part of our research, an attempt will be made to expound the scope and content of reciprocal antagonism which has reached its climax in the current process of globalization. For it is this process that has intensified the interaction among civilizations, i.e. cultures and, thereby, pluralized society in general. Thus, globalization has not only had a positive impact on human society but negative consequences as well. This is also why this reciprocity can be drawn along the three waves of globalization – globalism, transformationalism, and skepticism. Henceforth, we will try to expound the scope of the discontent (and its perilous consequences) between worldviews deemed to be fostered by the process of globalization. In other words, through the process of globalization with its enhancement of pluralism, an attempt will be made to grasp the scope and content of the current antagonism that, accordingly, imperils the fundamental right to freedom of expression.

After having explained that the process of globalization has engendered a reciprocal antagonism which is drawn along cultural lines, we will try to conceptualize this animosity which is often described in terms of ‘Orientalism’ versus ‘Occidentalism’. Thus, in order to render the inherency and indisputability of contemporary dichotomous discontent and its perilous consequences obvious, the essence of this civilizational antagonism will be elucidated. This survey will make the inherent nature and the underlying concept of this reciprocal antagonism tangible. Based on this, we will proceed by substantiating this underlying concept in order to understand thoroughly both sides of the antagonistic clashes between ‘Orientalism’ and ‘Occidentalism’.

Upon the theoretical conceptualization of the essential contours and inherent features of this dichotomous antagonism, it is exigent to grasp the actual materialization and continuation of this reciprocal animosity within the current process of globalization which we have pointed out. In this regard, we will make the continued exertion and vivacity of this antagonism tangible and will, subsequently, expound how and through which notions this continuity has taken place and is being upheld in the antagonizing of the West in our globalized era. In so doing, it will become plain that the increase in antagonism is not only fostered by Occidentalism as such, but is rather hastened by Orientalism in its own attitude towards the human dimension.

This comprehension requires, however, a further exposition of globalism, and its demeanor regarding the human dimension, which is conceived as Orientalism *par excellence* and, therefore, antagonized. In coming to such an understanding, ‘the-end-of-history’ thesis of

Francis Fukuyama is taken as our point of departure. A thorough discussion of this will clarify the ineluctability of the human dimension in terms of civilization, as well as the continuity and acceleration of antagonism within the context of an increasingly globalized world. In other words, the unequivocality of this revived concept and its continuity will be enunciated through a comprehensive survey of the aforementioned globalist theory. In so doing, this study will reveal the shortcoming of this theory through a scrutiny of its underlying mechanism, namely, the concept of *thymos*. This will show the necessity for going beyond this theory if we are to grasp the underpinnings of current reciprocal antagonism. Accordingly, for clarifying both the importance and peril of this concept, we will elaborate further on the antagonism towards the West that is being fostered by globalism through its negligence of this very concept.

The menace to fundamental human rights and freedoms (that stems from globalism's disdain of the human dimension and which underpins the current reciprocal antagonism) will be made apparent in the succeeding part of this research. Yet, for the sake of argument, it is important first of all to give further thoughts to the rise in dichotomous antagonism that endangers these rights and freedoms in general and the fundamental right to freedom of expression in particular. Thus, we need to grasp thoroughly that this perilous antagonism does not stop at a mere criticism of the West. For it actually goes so far as to become apologetic about illegitimate discontent that imperils rights such as the fundamental right to freedom of expression.

### **1.1. Globalization and the Essence of Discontent**

Our era is characterized by the disputatious phenomenon of 'globalization' which has challenged human life in all its facets. This means that while globalization has positive, innovative, and dynamic aspects, it also has negative, disruptive, and marginalizing consequences.<sup>30</sup> Despite diverging opinions about the definition, content, scope, and desirability of globalization – indicated as '*globophilia*' and '*globophobia*'<sup>31</sup> – this phenomenon remains a multidimensional process that has affected various realms of human society at the international, regional, and national level. To be more concrete, the process of globalization both informs and disrupts the concept of 'culture' in the broadest sense of the term. And it is also through this concept that globalization is experienced in a most direct

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<sup>30</sup> UN Development Programme, 'Globalization with a Human Face' (1999)

<sup>31</sup> Michael McIvor, *Establishing a Heart Failure Program: The Essential Guide* (3<sup>rd</sup> edn Blackwell Publishing, Malden 2007) 16

way.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the relation between ‘globalization’ and ‘culture’ can be considered reciprocal. This means that it is not only ‘globalization’ that informs the notion of ‘culture’, but also the different cultures that inevitably shape the nature of their interaction with different aspects of globalization and thereby generate diverse responses.<sup>33</sup> It is also in this process of globalization where, as we will discuss later, “the infiltration of popular culture and the encroachment of the global marketplace pose an existential threat to some traditional societies as dire as conquering hordes”.<sup>34</sup>

It has to be noted from the very outset that it is neither our aim to get involved in the unresolved theoretical discourse on the three waves of globalization, nor our goal to rehearse the normative arguments that stem from different disciplines. Instead, we merely adopt a constructive approach in studying the existing contributions to the process of globalization. The purpose of this is to comprehend this process in so far as it concerns its interconnectivity which has had an impact on the human dimension and has generated various responses. Thus, it suffices to grasp the concept of ‘globalization’ in the neutral sense of the word that would encompass the core characteristics of this phenomenon, and which can be deployed as the underlying framework for our comprehension of contemporary tensions. In doing so, various descriptive views stemming from the main actors and documents in the process of globalization will be considered.

One of the main actors that deals, to a certain extent, with globalization’s human dimension is the World Trade Organization.<sup>35</sup> The Director-General of this organization, Pascal Lamy, has defined ‘globalization’ in his speech of 30 January 2006 as “a historical stage of accelerated expansion of market capitalism [...] [which] is a fundamental transformation in societies because of the recent technological revolution which has led to a recombining of the economic and social forces on a new territorial dimension. [...] Globalization has led to the opening, the vanishing of many barriers and walls, and has the potential for expanding freedom, democracy, innovation, social and cultural exchanges while offering outstanding opportunities for dialogue and understanding. [...] [However], globalization has reinforced the strong ones and weakened those that were already weak. It is this double face of globalization that [ought to be addressed in order] to ‘humanize

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<sup>32</sup> Paul Hopper, *Understanding Cultural Globalization* (Polity Press, Cambridge 2007) 2

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid* 3

<sup>34</sup> David P Goldman, *It's Not the End of the World, It's Just the End of You: The Great Extinction of the Nations* (RVP Publishers, New York 2011) 271

<sup>35</sup> For further information concerning, among others, the role of this organization in this age of globalization, reference can be made to: UN Development Programme, ‘Globalization with a Human Face’ (1999)

globalization' [which] is also in line with the millennium development goals [...]"<sup>36</sup> This description makes clear that the process of globalization is multidimensional and interconnected in all its facets with sweeping effect on human life. In other words, globalization is "a powerful, complex and essentially indeterminate and open-ended transformative force or process responsible for massive change within societies and world order".<sup>37</sup> A plain description of this effect on human life is provided by the 1999 UN Human Development Report which asserts that the distinctive features of 'globalization' in the modern era are the "shrinking space, shrinking time and disappearing borders [which] are linking people's lives more deeply, more intensely, more immediately than ever before".<sup>38</sup> This delineation contains two main features of the globalization process.

The first feature is the shrinking of space and time, which is often called the 'time-space convergence'<sup>39</sup>, 'time-space compression'<sup>40</sup> or 'time-space distantiation'.<sup>41</sup> The concept of 'time-space convergence' implies the elimination of distance, that is, from a spatial perspective, a decrease in the distance between places<sup>42</sup> by means of the velocity of transportation technologies, whereas 'time-space compression' indicates<sup>43</sup> the annihilation of space by time "that lies at the core of the capitalist dynamic".<sup>44</sup> This implies that the compression of time and space is the result of the expansion of capitalism across the world. Anthony Giddens, however, goes beyond the technological velocities and the economic dimensions, and calls this feature of globalization the 'time-space distantiation'. By this he means "the processes whereby societies are 'stretched' over shorter or longer spans of time and space"<sup>45</sup>, i.e. "the stretching of social systems across time-space, on the basis of mechanisms of social and system integration".<sup>46</sup> Despite the different contexts and disciplines wherein these phraseologies are applied, one notices that they all have one core aspect in

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<sup>36</sup> Pascal Lamy, 'Humanising Globalization' (Speech at the World Trade Organization in Santiago, 30 January 2006) <[http://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/sppl\\_e/sppl16\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl16_e.htm)> accessed 1 March 2011

<sup>37</sup> Paul Hopper, *Understanding Cultural Globalization* (Polity Press, Cambridge 2007) 8-9

<sup>38</sup> UN Development Programme, 'Globalization with a Human Face' (1999)

<sup>39</sup> Donald G Janelle, 'Central place development in a time-space framework' (1968) 20 *The Professional Geographer*

<sup>40</sup> David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 1989)

<sup>41</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Polity Press, Cambridge 1990)

<sup>42</sup> Ronald John Johnston and others (eds), *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (4<sup>th</sup> edn Blackwell Publishing, Malden 2000) 835

<sup>43</sup> David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 1989)

<sup>44</sup> Peter Droege (ed), *Urban Energy Transition: From Fossil Fuels to Renewable Power* (Elsevier, Oxford 2008) 61

<sup>45</sup> Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: Power, Property and the State* (vol 1 UCP, Berkeley 1981) 90. See also Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Polity Press, Cambridge 1990) 28

<sup>46</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (UCP, Berkeley 1984) 377

common, namely, the shrinking of time and space. And this leads us to the second feature of the globalization process which is the disappearance of borders. This second trait is often called ‘deterritorialization’, which has connected people’s lives more deeply, intensively, and immediately. In other words, the feature of ‘deterritorialization’ contains ‘dislocation’, that is, transcending territorial identities and boundaries and creating new links, i.e. fostering and intensifying ‘interconnectedness’.

Despite the lack of universal consensus on the definition of ‘globalization’, I propose, for the purpose of this study and based on the aforementioned features, the following description. Globalization is a precipitating set of continuous processes involving miscellaneous flows that encompass ever-increasing numbers of the global spaces in a compressed time scale, which result in deterritorialization and lead to aggrandized integration, as well as an intensified and deepened interconnectedness. However, we can see that for a considerable period of time, the aforementioned features of the process of globalization have been applied merely to economic and technological flows across the globe. This means that the flow of human beings, in terms of ‘global migration’, has gained attention as one of the many flows while, at the same time, their modes of life, in terms of ‘culture’, have been neglected. In other words, for a notable period of time, the cultural dimension of globalization has not gained the necessary attention from those involved in the globalization discourse.

In this discourse, globalism, as one of the three waves of the process of globalization, conceives this process merely in terms of ‘modernization’. Hereby, the Western world in general and the United States in particular are considered to be the forerunners of ‘modernization’, i.e. exporters of a global techno-economic consumer culture. This view puts modernization on a par with the homogenization of cultures. However, as we will discuss later, such a narrow view is often conceived as Western capitalist expansionism and imperialism. Therefore, grasping ‘globalization’ merely in these terms entails a narrow understanding of our current globalized world, because the converging and homogenizing effect of techno-economic modernization, which we call the process of modernization, is rather *relative*. This means that the process of modernization does not imply an *absolute* homogenization, i.e. full convergence. What is more, the *relative* homogenizing effect of technological or economical modernity, as will become plain during our inquiry, does not mean that other traits of human life, such as ‘*politics*’ or ‘*culture*’, would necessarily homogenize, too. In other words, the globalization of modernity is considered to be the prerequisite for global connectivity, whereby “contacts between people and their cultures – their ideas, their values, their ways of life – have been growing and deepening in

unprecedented ways [...]”.<sup>47</sup> Yet, this interconnection does not entail the creation of a homogenized ‘global consumer culture’, viz. a *single* ‘universal culture’.

The transformational challenges, that have ensued from the increased plurality and diversity of cultures, have raised the general level of awareness of the parties involved. This has resulted in the second wave of globalization called ‘transformationalism’. The transformationalist wave contends that cultural products flowing around the globe are differently received and used.<sup>48</sup> This means that despite the intensified interactions, cultures do not homogenize but evolve, transform, and hybridize. However, we have to add that cultural interactions can also result in clashes. In the same vein, Menachem Mautner pointed to anthropologists who defined ‘culture’ “[...] as an entity clearly bounded in terms of its contents and internal processes of development, and as widely shared and even agreed to by members of a society. [However], in recent decades, these views of culture have been abandoned and superseded by a new understanding of culture that is to a great extent the reverse of the former one: the culture of every society is viewed as highly fragmented, i.e., as composed of a large number of subcultures whose contents are mastered to varying extents by different members of a society. [...] the contents of every culture are both produced internally and borrowed from other cultures through varying means of contact with them. What all of this means is that people internalize cultural contents whose origins lie in various cultural systems and give meaning to what transpires in their lives by means of mind categories whose origins lie in various cultural systems. Put differently, most people are multicultural beings”.<sup>49</sup> Thus, according to transformationalism, a greater role is given not only to techno-economic modernization, but also “to human agents in both negotiating and contributing to globalizing processes”<sup>50</sup>, viz. the way they perceive ‘modernization’. The determinative and decisive factor in this regard is the human trait ‘culture’ in the broadest sense of the term. Roland Robertson might be considered one of the few scholars who have incorporated the concept of culture, as a global human condition, into the process of globalization. In this context, he has introduced the term ‘glocalization’ which entails that the *global* and *local* are interacting and interpenetrating spheres that inform each other. Thus, in his point of view, “globalization involves the creation and incorporation of locality, processes which themselves largely shape,

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<sup>47</sup> UN Development Programme, ‘Globalization with a Human Face’ (1999)

<sup>48</sup> Ibid

<sup>49</sup> Menachem Mautner, ‘Religion in Politics: Rawls and Habermas on Deliberation and Justification’ (2013) Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers. Working Paper No. 167

<sup>50</sup> Paul Hopper, *Understanding Cultural Globalization* (Polity Press, Cambridge 2007) 8-9

in turn, the compression of the world as a whole”.<sup>51</sup> However, the transformationalist explanation is *partial* in that it does not take the aforementioned discordant dimension of this process into account. Thus, according to the second wave of globalization, cultures have coalesced and fused together, but it should not be forgotten that they also clash with each other. In other words, transformationalism defines this interrelationship as ‘glocalization’, viz. “a hybrid of globalization and localization, [which empowers] local communities through strategic linking of global resources to address local issues for positive social change and to balance changing cultural interests and community needs”.<sup>52</sup> Yet, others go beyond this partial understanding and conceive this interrelationship as a disruptive and disintegrative force, since the *local* also gives rise to various, often traditional, forms of discord and resistance.

This latter perspective is highlighted by the third wave of globalization called ‘skepticism’. According to this wave, the *global* and *local* levels do not always form a syncretic whole or hybridize, but rather differentiate, polarize, fragmentize and collide. This is because modernity, which is normally associated with the Western world, is perceived as the imposition and implosion of Western values on a global scale.<sup>53</sup> And by being thus experienced as a new form of Western imperialism – for which various terminologies such as ‘*Westernization*’, ‘*Americanization*’, and ‘*McDonaldization*’ have been deployed – it is often antagonized and resisted. Therefore, Mautner is right when he observes that despite the assumption that people are multicultural beings, “[...] anthropologists, linguists and cultural researchers are well aware of the difficulties involved in attempts to understand foreign cultures and to ‘translate’ meaning that is prevalent in one culture into the meaning terms extant in another culture without suffering misunderstandings, distortions and losses, as well as the difficulties involved in maintaining intercultural communication. Indeed, there are too many instances in which Western liberals have failed to understand the meaning of cultural practices prevalent in non-liberal groups. It is often the case that liberals attach certain meanings to such practices, while in the groups themselves they bear wholly different meanings”.<sup>54</sup> Thus, globalization does not only homogenize and hybridize cultures, but, as we

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid 97

<sup>52</sup> Patrick Mendis, *Glocalization: The Human Side of Globalization as if the Washington Consensus Mattered* (Lulu Press, Morrisville 2007) 2

<sup>53</sup> E Osei Kwadwo Prempeh, Joseph Mensah, and Senyo B-S K Adjibolosoo (eds), *Globalization and the Human Factor: Critical Insights* (Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire 2004) 73

<sup>54</sup> Menachem Mautner, ‘Religion in Politics: Rawls and Habermas on Deliberation and Justification’ (2013) Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers. Working Paper No. 167. Menachem Mautner, ‘A Dialogue between a Liberal and an Ultra-Orthodox on the Exclusion of Women from Torah Study’ (2013). Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers. Working Paper No. 180

can now observe, it has also disruptive, disintegrative, and marginalizing consequences that are held to be reconfigured along cultural lines.

Based on the foregoing, we can infer that the process of globalization has hastened, if not brought about, pluralism while, at the same time, the human dimension herein has been neglected to the point that it has fostered discontent. In order to understand the menace of this antagonism, it is ineluctable to elaborate on the scope and content of this reciprocal discord, which is often defined as a clash between ‘Orientalism’ and ‘Occidentalism’. In so doing, we have chosen Edward Said’s two landmark works, ‘*Orientalism*’ and ‘*Culture & Imperialism*’, as our point of departure. Subsequently, our study of these two works is supplemented by additional literature.<sup>55</sup>

## **1.2. The Reciprocity of Antagonism: Orientalism v. Occidentalism**

The contemporary menace being aimed at eliminating dissenters as well as undermining and destabilizing the social order seems to be a discord between Orientalism and Occidentalism that is drawn along cultural lines, i.e. constituted on the basis of civilization. This illustrates that this clash is not a new juncture, but in fact an old phenomenon in a new guise. Accordingly, to determine whether the human dimension of the globalization process, i.e. the notion of culture, inevitably fosters the current antagonism, it is important to expound the scope and nature of this discontent in a broader context. In so doing, the aforementioned landmark works of Edward Said, ‘*Orientalism*’ and its sequel ‘*Culture & Imperialism*’, are taken as the point of departure of this inquiry into the inevitability of the notion of culture for contemporary antagonism. This implies that criticisms emanating from various disciplines will not be rehearsed, since the focus will only be on the political dimension of Said’s overall thesis in so far as it is relevant for our inquiry. It suffices to note only that, as we will see below, the core of the critique regarding Said concerns his arbitrary selectiveness which has resulted, among others, in various factual aberrations in his thesis. As to his supposed arbitrary selectiveness, the following main categories can be distinguished.

Firstly, Said restricts his argumentation to the Arab heartland without any (substantial) devotion to, for example, the Turkish, Persian or North African Orientalism.<sup>56</sup> In this context, reference can be made to the critique by Bernard Lewis of Said’s treatment of Orientalism. Lewis contends that Said’s thesis, and all its blind spots, “reveals a disquieting lack of

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<sup>55</sup> Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (Verso, London 2008) 14

<sup>56</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 282

knowledge of what scholars do and what scholarship is about”.<sup>57</sup> Also, the British historian, Robert Irwin, contests Said’s arbitrary selectiveness of the historical facts. He argues that “Orientalism is not a history of Oriental studies, but rather a highly selective polemic on certain aspects of the relationship of knowledge and power”.<sup>58</sup> It is also this relationship that underpins our research, because, as James Clifford suggests, “If Said’s primary aim were to write an intellectual history of Orientalism or a history of Western ideas of the Orient, his narrowing and rather obviously tendentious shaping of the field could [indeed] be taken as a fatal flaw. But his undertaking is conceived otherwise and is openly an oppositional genealogy”.<sup>59</sup> This is why the aim of this inquiry is not to focus on or to rehearse the critique about the *historical* aspects of Said’s work, but, as elaborated below, to take the *political* dimension of his overall thesis as our point of departure in studying the nature and inherency of contemporary antagonism.

The second remark regarding arbitrary selectiveness that needs to be borne in mind concerns the exclusion of the following groups and facts. As Ibn Warraq asserts, “In the view of Edward Said, the Arabs and “Orientals”, by which he seems to mean only Muslims, were always the victims of European imperialism. His hugely influential *Orientalism* does not mention the inconvenient fact that Jews were a significant part of the population of Middle Eastern countries and made great contributions to them, but were chased out or persecuted, especially during moments of intensified Arab nationalism or Muslim fervor. [...] It makes no sense to talk of Israel as a European colony – not to reduce everything to an East-versus-West anti-imperialist struggle, as Said did. [...] Said claimed that the Islamologists were all colluding with imperialists. But he left out any reference to the German Islamologists, since that would have undermined his argument. [...] Said clearly preferred to forget that imperial Germany encouraged Muslims to revolt against the British and the Russians during World War I, and that Arab leaders allied themselves with the Nazis during World War II”.<sup>60</sup> And not only are the German Orientalists excluded but also the Russian Orientalists are left out by Said since including them – as in the case of German Orientalism – would have undermined

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<sup>57</sup> Bernard Lewis, ‘The Question of Orientalism’ *The New York Review of Books* (New York 24 June 1982) 1, 10 <<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1982/jun/24/the-question-of-orientalism/?pagination=false>> accessed 18 July 2012

<sup>58</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 281-282

<sup>59</sup> James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (HUP, Cambridge 1988) 267-268

<sup>60</sup> Ibn Warraq, *Why the West Is Best: A Muslim Apostate’s Defense of Liberal Democracy* (Encounter Books, New York 2011) 143

his thesis. This is why Irwin, by relying on Russian Orientalism, rightly rejects the presumption that Orientalism of the nineteenth century had been Eurocentric.<sup>61</sup>

Furthermore, as Ibn Warraq summarizes and as we will see in the course of our inquiry, “Said attacks not only the entire discipline of Orientalism, which is devoted to the academic study of the Orient and which Said accuses of perpetuating negative racial stereotypes, anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice, and the myth of an unchanging, essential “Orient”, but [as stated before] he also accuses Orientalists as being a group of complicit with imperial power and holds them responsible for creating the distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority, which they achieve by suppressing the voice of the “Oriental” and by their antihuman tendency to make huge, but vague, generalizations about entire populations that in reality consist of millions of individuals”.<sup>62</sup> In this light, two additional comments are in order. Firstly, as regards the Orientalists, it is important to note that “a part of Said’s tactic is to leave out Western writers and scholars who do not conform to his theoretical framework. Since, for Said, all Europeans are a priori racist, he obviously cannot allow himself to quote writers who are not”.<sup>63</sup> And this is why “[...] the generalization which is intended here simply boggles the mind, for it is so obviously contrary to what one knows about numerous intellectuals of the colonial period who never thought of themselves as ever standing *inside* the ‘Western cultural tradition’ ”.<sup>64</sup> Irwin goes a step further and clarifies that “there has [even] been a marked tendency for Orientalists to be anti-imperialists, as their enthusiasm for Arab, or Persian or Turkish culture often went hand in hand with a dislike of seeing those people defeated and dominated by the Italians, Russians, British or French”.<sup>65</sup> Secondly, it has to be noted that Said eloquently deplores the fact that Orientals are never given a voice, “But what is remarkable is that with the exception of Said’s own voice, the only voices we encounter in the book [*Orientalism*] are precisely those of the very Western canonicity which, Said complains, has always silenced the Orient”.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, it is Said himself who denies the Orientals a voice and uses them merely as passive victims for his oppositional ideology.

Thenceforth, despite the factual and historical evasions in Said’s thesis which have already gained enough attention from numerous commentators, the point of concern in our inquiry is the *political* dimension of his thesis that has been neglected thus far. Therefore, the aim of our

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<sup>61</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 158

<sup>62</sup> Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism* (Prometheus Books, New York 2007) 19

<sup>63</sup> Ibid 33

<sup>64</sup> Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (Verso, London 2008) 206

<sup>65</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 204

<sup>66</sup> Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (Verso, London 2008) 172

inquiry below is not to rehearse the existing canon written about Said's thesis from different approaches and disciplines. Instead, the focus will be on the mere political dimension of his thesis. This dimension will be studied only to the extent that it is relevant to our inquiry about the nature and scope of contemporary antagonism that tends to be based on pluralism. In other words, for grasping the danger of the current clashes, it is indispensable to contemplate further on current antagonism being drawn along civilizational lines and, hence, defined in terms of 'Orientalism' and 'Occidentalism'.

### 1.2.1. The Essence of Reciprocal Antagonism

In order to comprehend the essence and inhesion of reciprocal antagonism that is grounded in the notion of culture, it is important to elaborate on the political dimension of Said's thesis which underscores our inquiry below. For a better understanding of this political dimension, it is important to envisage the core notion that underpins his thesis, namely, the notion of 'Orientalism'. In so doing, we will start by expounding the course and nature of this notion according to Said. But before doing so, it is important to bear in mind that "Said never defines Orientalism but rather qualifies and designates it from a variety of distinct and not always compatible standpoints".<sup>67</sup> The essence of his description is tantamount to the following. Said perceives the notion of Orientalism as a discursive mechanism that, as a malefactor, underlies the continuous attitude of the West towards 'the rest', that is, the dichotomy between the East and West. He traces the roots of this attitude back to the colonial and imperial times by arguing that while "[...] direct colonialism has largely ended; imperialism [nevertheless] lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere [in the form of dehumanizing attitudes of cultural hostility<sup>68</sup>] as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices [...]".<sup>69</sup> Subsequently, he is of the view that, after the Second World War, this attitude is inherited by the American Orientalists. This means that, as will be elaborated below, not the *character* of Orientalism but only the *source* of it has changed, and a mere shift in attitude, from *academic* to *instrumental* approach<sup>70</sup>, has taken place. This is apparent in the development of the notion of 'modern Orientalism' which, according to Said, is nothing but the modernization, secularization and laicization of eighteenth-century

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<sup>67</sup> James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (HUP, Cambridge 1988) 259

<sup>68</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 290, 291

<sup>69</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 8

<sup>70</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 246

European culture for Christian supernaturalism.<sup>71</sup> As to the continuity of Orientalism in history, Said notes that “the role of the early Orientalists [...] was to provide their work and the Orient together with *a mise en scene*; later Orientalists, scholarly or imaginative, took firm hold of the scene. Still later, as the scene required management, it became clear that institutions and governments were better at the game of management than individuals. This is the legacy of nineteenth-century Orientalism to which the twentieth century has [thus] become inheritor”.<sup>72</sup> In this context, four secularizing elements of the eighteenth century – expansion, historical confrontation, sympathy, and classification<sup>73</sup> – have formed the basis of ‘modern Orientalism’. As such, Orientalism in the twentieth century has been characterized by the following elements: the use of generalization, binomial opposition, synchronic essentialism, and generalizing narrative descriptions.<sup>74</sup> However, to grasp the notion of ‘modern Orientalism’, we first need to understand the nature of the concept of ‘Orientalism’ itself as expounded by Said.

The essence of Orientalism is the interrelationship between ‘*knowledge*’ and ‘*power*’. Knowledge means the “[...] rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant” and [...] “To have such knowledge of such thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority, that is, power means for ‘us’ to deny autonomy to ‘it’ – the Oriental country – since we know it and it exists, in a sense, *as we know it*”.<sup>75</sup> As Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit assert, this had made Europe – to which much of the rest of the world had been reduced – into the metropolitan center from where the periphery was dominated.<sup>76</sup> The effect of this view has thus been that the Orientals were perceived to be a subjected race dominated by a superior race that knows the Orientals better than themselves, and knows what is good for them. In other words, the Orientals “[...] are useful in the modern world only because the powerful and up-to-date empires have effectively brought them out of the wretchedness of their decline and turned them into rehabilitated residents of productive colonies”.<sup>77</sup> Thus, in Said’s view, this comprises the dichotomy that “there are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the latter must be dominated, which usually means having their lands occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid 120, 122-123

<sup>72</sup> Ibid 197

<sup>73</sup> Ibid 120

<sup>74</sup> Ibid 227-240

<sup>75</sup> Ibid 32

<sup>76</sup> Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (Atlantic Books, London 2005) 22-23

<sup>77</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 35

treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power”.<sup>78</sup> According to him, the discourse on Orientalism insinuates that “[...] the Oriental is *contained* and *represented* by dominating frameworks’, [that is to say] Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’).<sup>79</sup> This was inevitable for the colonizer in terms of establishing his identity against the ‘otherness’ of the colonized according to the *knowledge* of the former, based on which the colonized, consequently, began to define his own identity. In other words, “The creation of the Orient as the ‘other’ is necessary so that the Occident can define itself and strengthen its own identity by invoking such a juxtaposition”.<sup>80</sup> Thus, Orientalism is about constructing ‘the Orient’ that goes beyond the Oriental reality itself and surpasses the Oriental experience. This is the worldliness inherent in ‘Orientalism’ that becomes the doctrine of power, for which, according to Said, Western cultural institutions are responsible. Orientalism is thus seen as the generic term for Western systematic, i.e. particularizing and dividing approach towards the Orient, which has transited from academia to administrative and executive institutionalization, with the aim of (re-)producing authority over it.<sup>81</sup> As James Clifford puts it, “For Said a discourse is [thus] the cultural-political configuration of “the textual attitude”. [...] In certain conditions this textual attitude hardens into a body of rigid cultural definitions that determine what any individual can express about certain reality. This “reality” coalesces as a field of representations produced by the discourse. The conditions for discursive hardening are not clearly defined by Said, but they appear to be related to an ongoing imbalance of power that permits – perhaps obliges – a politically and technologically stringer culture or group to define weaker groups. Thus in Said’s analysis occidental culture through the discourse of Orientalism “suffused” the activity of orientals with “meaning, intelligibility, and reality””.<sup>82</sup>

Thus, according to Said, Orientalism is more than just an idea, for it has a reality and presence in and for the West through the configuration and institutionalization of power that ensure its durability. This means that Orientalism is not a mere *reflection* or *result* of the imperialist tradition, but that Orientalism is *the* tradition<sup>83</sup> which encompasses “[...] a *distribution* of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological,

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid 36

<sup>79</sup> Ibid 40, 43

<sup>80</sup> Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (Routledge, London 2001) 64

<sup>81</sup> Conor McCarthy, *The Cambridge Introduction to Edward Said* (CUP, Cambridge 2010) 84

<sup>82</sup> James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (HUP, Cambridge 1988) 264

<sup>83</sup> Conor McCarthy, *The Cambridge Introduction to Edward Said* (CUP, Cambridge 2010) 73

historical, and philological texts; it is an *elaboration* not only of a basic geographical distinction [...] but also of a whole series of ‘interests’ which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only reacts but also maintains; it *is*, rather than expresses, a certain *will* or *intention* to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different [...] world [...]”.<sup>84</sup> In other words, Orientalism, as the dominating cultural enterprise of imperialism<sup>85</sup> or rather a political doctrine willed over the Orient<sup>86</sup>, is the discursive framework wherein – through the interplay between ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ – the differences between the ‘familiar’ and the ‘strange’ are represented, so that the latter can be dominated. Based on this, knowledge is considered to be a matter of *representation*. And representation is grasped as a process of giving concrete form to ideological concepts and assumptions, that is, making certain signifiers signify signified.<sup>87</sup> More concrete, this suggests that the imperial culture is built on unchallenged assumptions, whereby the cultural production of it has a deep investment in the political character of its society that simultaneously drives and energizes it.<sup>88</sup> Thus, culture and its productions have a deep and complicated investment in as well as an invisible interwovenness with the political character and ideology of a society.<sup>89</sup> This implies that Orientalism is not only a *representation*, but rather a dimension of modern political-intellectual culture<sup>90</sup>, that is to say that Orientalism is both a political and cultural *fact*. The interest of imperialism has been *political*, yet it has been *culture* that created that interest in the Orient. Thence, Orientalism, as a political and cultural fact, exposes culture *as* imperialism.<sup>91</sup> It is in this light that, in Said’s opinion, “continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as that same investment multiplied – indeed, made truly productive – the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture”.<sup>92</sup> This interwovenness has to do with culture operating within civil society, which acknowledges a gradation of political importance in various fields of knowledge<sup>93</sup> that stem from sources of power in political society. Within civil society, some

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<sup>84</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 12

<sup>85</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) xxviii

<sup>86</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 204

<sup>87</sup> Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (Routledge, London 2001) 65

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid* 88

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>90</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 12

<sup>91</sup> Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (Routledge, London 2001) 90

<sup>92</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 6

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid* 10

cultural forms gain hegemony which then gives Orientalism – encompassing Western superiority and non-Western inferiority – its strength and durability. And according to Said, we can better understand “[...] the persistence and the durability of suturing hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that their internal constraints upon writers and thinkers were productive, not unilaterally inhibiting”.<sup>94</sup> Due to this durable productivity, Said contends that “[...] every European in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, and imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric”<sup>95</sup>, antihuman, hegemonic, and anthropocentric – the scope, the institutions and all-pervasive influences which have lasted up to the present.<sup>96</sup> With this in mind, Said considers the West itself to be culpable for the resistance and opposition that it faces. To this end, he insists that from the beginning, “[...] given the discrepancy between European colonial power and that of the colonized societies, there was a kind of historical necessity by which colonial pressure created anticolonial resistance”.<sup>97</sup>

The preceding discussion on the notion of Orientalism shows, thus, the inevitability of the concept of culture (in the broadest sense of the word) within this discursive mechanism for which the West is held liable. Yet, this is only half of the story, for we need to inquire further if we are to gain a thorough understanding of both sides of the current dichotomous antagonism. That being said, it is indispensable to start with the two descriptions of ‘culture’ that Said provides. By reading these two descriptions together, it becomes clear that while culture entails “[...] all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure”<sup>98</sup>, it is nevertheless a concept which as a source of identity includes “[...] a refining and elevating element, [that is] each society’s reservoir of the best that has been known and thought”<sup>99</sup>, in which various political and ideological causes engage one another.<sup>100</sup> Based on the foregoing survey and Said’s second description of culture, it would seem inconsistent to conceive this concept only as the (aesthetic) practices that are autonomous and independent of the other realms of life. This is because, as mentioned already, culture and its products have a deep and complicated investment in, and an invisible interwovenness with, other realms of life such as

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid 14

<sup>95</sup> Ibid 204

<sup>96</sup> Ibid 44

<sup>97</sup> Ibid 45

<sup>98</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) xii

<sup>99</sup> Ibid xiii

<sup>100</sup> Ibid vi

the political and ideological.<sup>101</sup> In confirming the inseparability of culture with other realms of life, and thus the necessity of reading conjunctively the aforementioned descriptions, Said relies on the notion of Orientalism which he conceives as a discourse, i.e. the political configuration of a ‘structure of attitude and reference’ that finds its existence in the cultural product of ‘the novel’.

To put it differently, in reinforcing the interwovenness of the European culture and imperialism, the phraseology of ‘structure of attitude and reference’ is invented. This expression encompasses “[...] the way in which structures of location and geographical reference appear in the cultural language of literature, history, or ethnography [...] across several individual works that are not otherwise connected to one another or to an official ideology of ‘empire’ ”.<sup>102</sup> This phraseology is underpinned by his technique of ‘contrapuntal reading’ that encompasses a ‘reading back’ and ‘rethinking geography’. In other words, “Contrapuntal reading is a technique of theme and variation by which a counterpoint is established between the imperial narrative and the post-colonial perspective, a ‘counter-narrative’ that keeps penetrating beneath the surface of individual texts to elaborate the ubiquitous presence of imperialism in canonical culture”.<sup>103</sup> This implies that while the interest of imperialism has been political, it has been the culture that created that interest. That is, even though this attitude is prevalent in many ways, forms and places, it has been principally the textual attitude – especially the ‘novel’ – which has broadened the domestic imperialist culture, without which territorial acquisition would not have been possible.<sup>104</sup> Conversely, it has been the phenomenon of imperialism that has made it possible for the novel of the nineteenth century to develop. This is, however, not to say that “[...] the novel – or the culture in the broad sense – ‘caused’ imperialism, but that the novel, as a cultural artifact of bourgeois society, and imperialism are unthinkable without each other. Of all the major literary forms, the novel is the most recent, its emergence the most datable, its occurrence the most Western, its normative pattern of social authority the most structured; imperialism and the novel fortified each other to such a degree that it is impossible [...] to read one without in some way dealing with the other”.<sup>105</sup> Thus, the ‘novel’ is seen as an important cultural institution “[...] with a particular capacity for representing society, reproducing its values and

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<sup>101</sup> Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (Routledge, London 2001) 88

<sup>102</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 61

<sup>103</sup> Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (Routledge, London 2001) 93

<sup>104</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 114

<sup>105</sup> Ibid 84

ideas, and displaying its forms of authority”.<sup>106</sup> As regards the notion of ‘authority’, Conor McCarthy pointedly notes that “novelists locate their work in, and derive its authority from, the empirical reality of society [...]. Fictional authority is constructed, firstly, out of authorial authority – the author who gives narrative form to the processes of society; secondly, out of the authority of the narrator [...]; thirdly, out of the authority of the community [...]. But the power of the novel also comes from its appropriation of historical discourse: the novel historicizes the past, and narrativises the society. In so doing, it also differentiates and valorizes social space. Underlying this fictional space lies real political geography”.<sup>107</sup> Thus, the novel mirrors the discourse of Orientalism, as a political and cultural fact that is filtered into the Western consciousness. For that reason, Said contends that what every European could say about the Orient was racist, imperialist, ethnocentric, antihuman, hegemonic, and anthropocentric.<sup>108</sup> Buruma and Margalit share this view, but – unlike Said who argues that no corresponding equivalent of Orientalism is present in the Orient itself<sup>109</sup> – they go a step further by applying this view also to the notion of Occidentalism. In so doing, they argue that “the view of the West in Occidentalism is like the worst aspects of its counterpart, Orientalism, which strips its human targets of their humanity. Some Orientalist prejudices made non-Western people seem less than fully adult human beings; [...]. Occidentalism is at least as reductive; its bigotry simple turns the Orientalist view upside down”.<sup>110</sup>

The preceding elaboration leads us to the conclusion that the concept of culture is not independent and autonomous from other realms of life such as the political domain. To the contrary, this human dimension of globalization is the underlying fundament, which is inevitably interwoven with these realms. This underlines the inherency and inextricability of this concept from dichotomous antagonism, especially now that, as Said warns, “a growing, more and more dangerous rift separates Orient and Occident”.<sup>111</sup> Thus, the importance of this concept for the current antagonism is also elucidated through Said’s thesis about Orientalism or as discussed below, *mutatis mutandis*, applicable to the notion of Occidentalism. Although the roots of this dichotomy can be traced back to the imperial and colonial times, its presence is, more than ever before, tangible in our globalized world which has, coupled with the current pluralism, aggravated the clashes with far-reaching consequences. It is in this context

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<sup>106</sup> Conor McCarthy, *The Cambridge Introduction to Edward Said* (CUP, Cambridge 2010) 114

<sup>107</sup> Ibid 115

<sup>108</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 44, 108, 204

<sup>109</sup> Ibid 204

<sup>110</sup> Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (Atlantic Books, London 2005) 10

<sup>111</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 109

that we need to grasp the manifestation of this reciprocal antagonism in our globalized era, the essence of which has been expounded in this part.

### 1.3. Dichotomous Antagonism within the Process of Globalization

After the theoretical conceptualization of the essential contours and inherent features of the dichotomous antagonism, it is important to examine the actual materialization of this reciprocal discord within the current process of globalization that we have touched on before. The preceding discussion has revealed that the underpinning fundament of the reciprocal clashes between Orientalism and Occidentalism is the unequivocal concept of culture, what we have called the human dimension of the process of globalization. The continuity of this reciprocal antagonism is best seen in Said's reasoning, whereby the West is held liable for the current state of affairs. For he argues that the discourse of Orientalism, being *the* imperial tradition, has laid the fundament for what is now a fully global world.<sup>112</sup> Thus, the notion of globalization has actually become the new word for imperialism<sup>113</sup>, with which this epoch has been marked as 'the rise of the West'.<sup>114</sup> The distinct feature of this century is, hence, the process of globalization which, in Said's point of view, entails "[...] a world tied together as never before by the exigencies of electronic communication, trade, travel, environmental and regional conflicts that can expand with tremendous speed, [wherein] the assertion of identity is by no means a mere ceremonial matter'. [This contains the menace of mobilization of atavistic passions whereby people can be thrown back to] '[...] an earlier imperial time when the West and its opponents championed and even embodied virtues designed not as virtues so to speak but for war'.<sup>115</sup> What is remarkable about Said's view of the process of globalization is that it is a typical example of the skeptical wave of globalization. For according to this wave, as stated above, globalization is to be comprehended in terms of modernity, which is associated with the Western world and, accordingly, perceived as the perilous imposition and implosion of Western values on a global scale.<sup>116</sup> Consequently, this is experienced as Western imperialism which, therefore, is antagonized and resisted. However, it has to be borne in mind that Said does not provide a consistent description of the process of globalization, due to which he jumps from one wave of globalization to another. More

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<sup>112</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 4

<sup>113</sup> Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (Atlantic Books, London 2005) 36

<sup>114</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 6

<sup>115</sup> Ibid 42

<sup>116</sup> E Osei Kwadwo Prempeh, Joseph Mensah, and Senyo B-S K Adjibolosoo (eds), *Globalization and the Human Factor: Critical Insights* (Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire 2004) 73

concretely, depending on the topic at hand, Said switches back and forth from the skeptical paradigm to the transformationalist or globalist paradigm.

Nevertheless, Said's definition of 'globalization' brings the following essential aspects to the fore, all of which are underpinned by the fundamental concept of 'culture'. The first aspect is that globalization is a precipitating set of continuous processes, which involves miscellaneous flows across global spaces in a compressed timescale. Consequently, this development results in deterritorialization, and leads to aggrandized integration, as well as intensified and deepened interconnectedness. The second significant aspect that Said acknowledges is the inevitability of identity, and by that, the assertion of culture as its source. The third important aspect that ought to be addressed is the mere association of the menace that stems from the assertion of identity with the West and its imperial history. With this narrow understanding, Said fails, wittingly or not, to face the danger ensuing from the assertion of identity by 'others', that is, the assertion of non-Western identities. In focusing on the West, he argues that there are two major Orientalist methods that have delivered the Orient to the West and accomplished the supremacy of Western culture in the twentieth century. First, the delivery took place through the diffusion of modern learning in the broadest sense of the word. Second, the delivery of the East to the West took place by means of the convergence between, what he calls, 'latent Orientalism' and 'manifest Orientalism'.<sup>117</sup> And against this background, two core *factors* have finally made the triumph of Orientalism in our modern world obvious. First, we have the tendencies of the contemporary culture in the Near East that are guided by American and European models. Hereby, the remainder of the Arab and Islamic world is seen as an inferior power in terms of the production of culture.<sup>118</sup> The second factor that confirms the triumph of Orientalism – and inextricable from the first – is Oriental consumption of Western ideological and material products.<sup>119</sup>

Two comments are here called for in order to better understand this consumption. Firstly, Said notes that a modern feature of the ideological component is its claim to being an educational movement that aims to modernize, develop, instruct, and civilize.<sup>120</sup> He is of the view that this is, however, nothing but an attitude of superiority of the West in general and the United States in particular. In this context, the United States is considered to be the symbolic representative of the West. Hereby, he asserts that the American attitude to American greatness, hierarchies of race, and to the perils of other revolutions have remained constant,

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<sup>117</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 221-223

<sup>118</sup> Ibid 323

<sup>119</sup> Ibid 324

<sup>120</sup> Ibid 269

and have obscured and dictated the realities of empirehood.<sup>121</sup> Said continues to contend that apologists for overseas American interests insist on American innocence, doing good, and fighting for freedom.<sup>122</sup> Meanwhile, the United States does not accept any infringements or sustained ideological challenges to what is conceived to be ‘freedom’.<sup>123</sup> Due to this, he considers the West in general and the United States in particular to be imperialistic *par excellence*, by stating for example, as regards the United States, that the American experience “[...] was from the beginning founded upon the idea of ‘an *imperium*- a dominion, state or sovereignty that would expand in population and territory, and increase in strength and power’”.<sup>124</sup> Secondly, concerning the material commodities, Said notes that “granted that American expansionism is principally economic, it is still highly dependent and moves together with, upon, cultural ideas and ideologies about America itself, ceaselessly reiterated in public”<sup>125</sup>, which has “[...] the effect of depoliticizing, reducing, and sometimes even eliminating the integrity of overseas societies that seemed in need of modernization [...]”.<sup>126</sup>

Thence, in this age of globalization, the assertion of identity is by no means a mere ceremonial matter, for it has marked the clashes between Orientalism and Occidentalism. What underpins this reciprocal antagonism is, as already said, the concept of culture, due to which freedom, peace, and security are put into perspective. It is also in this same context that antagonistic utterances such as ‘the rise of the West’, ‘the triumph of Orientalism’, and the linkage between imperialism and culture ought to be understood. Another example that illustrates the undeniability of the concept of culture for the current reciprocal clashes is the presence of Muslim populations in the West. Said acknowledges that there is a considerable and significant Muslim population in the Western countries because of which Islam is no longer on the fringes of the West but at the center of it. Yet, he denies that the notion of culture in general and the culture of this group in particular can be the underlying fundament of the current clashes. The paradox in this, however, is that Said denies the ineluctability of the notion of culture when he deals with ‘others’ and their opposition; while his own thesis is grounded on this notion based on which he antagonizes the West by, for example, arguing that

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<sup>121</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 7

<sup>122</sup> Ibid

<sup>123</sup> Ibid 352

<sup>124</sup> Ibid 7

<sup>125</sup> Ibid 350

<sup>126</sup> Ibid 351

the current threats do stem not from this particular group, but from the hostile memories buried in the collective culture of the West.<sup>127</sup>

Therefore, the ineluctability of the concept of culture in the broadest sense of the term makes Said's opposition to the notion of the 'clash of civilizations' spurious. This notion – coined by Bernard Lewis and later elaborated by Samuel P. Huntington – is severely criticized by Said in his critical article '*The Clash of Ignorance*', in which he argues that "[...] neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagoguery and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization. No, the West is the West, and Islam Islam".<sup>128</sup> This betrays the ambiguity of Said's argument. And this equivocation is embedded in his thesis on Orientalism, based on the notion of culture and, in opposing the West, grounded on this civilizational clash that he, nonetheless, aims to repudiate when uttered by Huntington. Thus, based on the above survey, including Said's own thesis, it can be inferred that the dichotomous antagonism is, indeed, civilizational in nature. However, before continuing, it is important to devote some thoughts to this civilizational antagonism (viz. 'the clash of civilizations' thesis) which we have touched on above in order to explore its underlying cause.

Against all odds, what Said and Huntington have in common – despite differences in their views of the West – is that they are both skeptical about the homogenization and universalization of Western civilization. As Huntington puts it, the idea of a 'universal civilization' "[...] implies in general the cultural coming together of humanity and the increasing acceptance of common values, beliefs, orientations, practices, and institutions by peoples throughout the world".<sup>129</sup> However, he argues that "[...] the assumptions, values, and doctrines currently held by many people in Western civilization and by some people in other civilizations"<sup>130</sup>, at least at the intellectual level, are far from a reflection of one 'universal culture'. Instead, "what is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest".<sup>131</sup> Thus, Huntington is of the view that the concepts developed within Western civilization are not universal and will never take root beyond the boundaries of the Euro-Christian culture. This

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<sup>127</sup> Edward W Said, 'The Clash of Ignorance' *The Nation* (New York 22 October 2001) <<http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=full>> accessed 25 July 2012

<sup>128</sup> Ibid

<sup>129</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 56

<sup>130</sup> Ibid 57

<sup>131</sup> Ibid 184

concur thus with Said's view, according to which Western civilization's ambition, defined in terms of modernization, is nothing but the imposition of Western values on a global scale, which, as Western imperialism, is opposed. In the same vein, Huntington contests the utopian claims of globalists in general and the theory of Francis Fukuyama in particular. In so doing, he argues that the 'soft power'<sup>132</sup> of the West has faded, whereas the relative power of other civilizations has increased and has made them "increasingly immune to Western pressure concerning [among others] human rights and democracy".<sup>133</sup>

It is against the background of this antagonism that Huntington's 'civilizational approach'<sup>134</sup> has to be understood. According to this approach, "[...] the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. [...] the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. [...] Conflict between civilizations will be the last phase in the evolution of conflicts in the modern world".<sup>135</sup> This is attributed to the fact that "people use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity [...]".<sup>136</sup> As Said also acknowledges, the assertion of identity is by no means a mere ceremonial matter anymore. Hence, Huntington defines world politics as a '*multipolar*' and '*multicivilizational*' system, meaning that a civilization-based world order has emerged.<sup>137</sup> Hereby, "[...] local politics [the so-called 'micro-level'] is the politics of ethnicity; [and] global politics [called the 'macro-level'] is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is thus replaced by the clash of civilizations"<sup>138</sup> at the international level. As to the micro-level, Huntington argues that "[...] the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities".<sup>139</sup> While the most pervasive and devastating clashes take place at the micro-level, Huntington's thesis is, nonetheless, mainly if not only, concerned with the

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<sup>132</sup> The idea of 'soft power' entails the ability to get the adherents of other cultures to want what you want through the appeal of your culture and ideology, and by means of the promotion of your political values and institutions that have resulted in material success and influence

<sup>133</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 92, 195. It is important to bear in mind that Huntington considers individualism and the tradition of individual rights and liberties not as universal values, but as the distinct and essential features and qualities of Western civilization

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid* 36

<sup>135</sup> Samuel P Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' (1993) 72 (3) *Foreign Aff* 22, 22

<sup>136</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 21

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid* 20

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid* 28

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid*

macro-level. This is why, unlike Huntington's sole focus on the macro-level, both realms will be comprehensively assayed in our research. It is worth noting that in his focus on the macro-level, Huntington observes that since "[...] international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations, and among non-Western civilizations"<sup>140</sup>, in order to survive, the West should defend itself against the non-Western many<sup>141</sup> by reaffirming the uniqueness of Western civilization and identity.<sup>142</sup> And the prime candidate for doing this, according to him, is the United States.<sup>143</sup> It is precisely this behavior that Said defines as the imperialist superiority of the West in general and the United States in particular. Accordingly, he rejects this attitude and considers it to be highly dependent on consumerism and cultural ideas and ideologies of America and the West.<sup>144</sup> Thus, his antagonism is based on the idea that this attitude depoliticizes, reduces, and eliminates the integrity of overseas societies that seem to be in need of modernization.<sup>145</sup> Yet, as stated before and as will be further clarified in this survey, Said contradicts himself. This is because his own thesis is inextricably entrapped in this reciprocal antagonism, while he himself actually attempts to repudiate its existence. And as our discussion above shows, the vividness of this reciprocal antagonism that underpins globalized world affairs is beyond any reasonable doubt.

The foregoing discussion leads us to the conclusion that reciprocal antagonism, the essence of which is traced back to the colonial and imperial era, has continued to exert cultural influence even in this age of pluralism. The continuity of this dichotomous antagonism is, as already intimated, noticeable in Said's claim that the discourse on Orientalism (as *the* imperial tradition) has laid the groundwork for the current global world. But the question that might arise is *how* this continuity has come to antagonize the West as in the present. A thorough understanding of the continuity of this dichotomous antagonism will thus concern us in the following paragraph.

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<sup>140</sup> Samuel P Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' (1993) 72 (3) *Foreign Aff* 22, 23

<sup>141</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 36

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid* 20-21

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>144</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 350

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid* 351

### 1.3.1. Continuation of Dichotomous Antagonism within a Globalized Era

As we have seen above, dichotomous antagonism, the roots of which are traced back to colonial and imperial times, has continued to exert civilizational influences in the present. The continuity of this antagonism is, as mentioned, clear from the discourse on Orientalism – which is understood as *the* imperial tradition that laid the groundwork for the current global world – against which Occidentalism aims to put up resistance. Thus, the vivacity of this continuity has been made visible in our discussion above. Yet, the question of *how* this continuity has come to antagonize the West in this age of globalization remains.

As previously discussed, in antagonizing the West and holding it liable for the current clashes, appeal is made to the notion of ‘modernization’, which is considered to be the underlying core mission of Western imperialism in our globalized world. However, to grasp the continuity of antagonism in this age and reveal the ineluctable crux that underlies the current clashes, it is imperative to reflect on the assumed linkage between modernization and imperialism. In so doing, Said’s overall thesis remains our point of departure despite his brief and obscure discussion of this issue and the chronological inconsistency about the aforementioned linkage.<sup>146</sup> However, it is worthwhile to note that on this latter linkage, Valerie Kennedy provides a plain summary that we may quote here at length: “Said compares modernism to the ‘ironic disillusion’ in the mainstream nineteenth-century novel and contrasts it with the ‘infection of excitement’ of the colonial experience via late nineteenth-century travel narratives and adventure novels. Specifically, he contrasts the latter with the modernist anxiety [...] and sees the anxiety as having an imperial source”.<sup>147</sup>

Nonetheless, Kennedy refrains from elaborating on this connection by contending that, due to Said’s brief discussion, any judgment must be suspended out of fear of speculation and the inability to provide a convincing demonstration of Said’s ideas. Yet, a thorough reading of Said’s works reveals sufficient continuity in his line of thought, despite the obscurities in his works in general and on this issue in particular. In this context, the prime issue that comes to the fore is the comparison between ‘the interwovenness of modernization and imperialism’ and ‘the entwining of the novel and imperialism’. This comparison is possible because, as Said puts it, “A whole range of people [like Said himself] in the so-called Western or metropolitan world, as well as their counterparts in the Third or formerly colonized world, share a sense that the era of high or classical imperialism [...] has in one way or another

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<sup>146</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 285

<sup>147</sup> Valerie Kennedy, *Edward Said: A Critical Introduction* (Polity Press, Cambridge 2000) 85

continued to exert considerable cultural influence in the present".<sup>148</sup> Thus, it is this continuity that makes, among others, the aforementioned comparison, and by that the comprehension of the interrelationship between modernization and imperialism, possible. The interrelationship between the 'novel' and 'imperialism', as discussed above, entails the 'novel' as a means of reflection by the high culture, thereby broadening the domestic imperialist culture<sup>149</sup> and *vice versa*. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the 'novel' – or rather 'culture' in the broad sense of the term – *caused* imperialism, but that high culture – by means of the 'novel' – and imperialism inevitably fortified each other.<sup>150</sup> Thus, the 'novel' is seen as an important cultural institution that has a particular ability for representing society, reproducing its values and ideas, and displaying its forms of authority.<sup>151</sup> That is why it is perceived to be an institution that perfectly mirrors the discourse of Orientalism as it is filtered into the Western consciousness.

When we analogously draw the same line of thought with the interrelationship between modernization and imperialism, the result will be that, through the 'media' (conceived as a crucial institution), modernization (in terms of global consumerism of Western culture) and imperialism (termed *expansionism* in the current context) have reciprocally fortified each other – which is, however, not to say that by means of the media, modernization has *ipso facto* caused expansionism. Thence, the 'media', as a modernist cultural institution, mirrors the discourse of modern Orientalism as imbedded in the contemporary Western consciousness. In other words, while the novel mirrored the discourse of classical Orientalism in the nineteenth century – which was filtered into the Western consciousness for manufacturing consent – it is the Western media that currently fulfills this task.<sup>152</sup> And while according to Said's understanding of Orientalism, 'others' previously seemed to be in need of culture to become civilized, currently they seem to be in need of modernization in order to become civilized. Thus, modernization, in terms of missionary tendencies to *modernize* 'others', is the same core feature of modern Orientalism just as civilization had previously been the core mission of classical Orientalism that aimed to *civilize* others. Therefore, it is not surprising that the concepts of modern Orientalism and modernization are considered to be dovetailed.<sup>153</sup> Put differently, modernization is considered to be the core feature of modern Orientalism that has delivered the East to the West, and hence the Western expansionism in

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<sup>148</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 6

<sup>149</sup> Ibid 114

<sup>150</sup> Ibid 84

<sup>151</sup> Conor McCarthy, *The Cambridge Introduction to Edward Said* (CUP, Cambridge 2010) 114

<sup>152</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 391-392

<sup>153</sup> Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (Routledge, London 2001) 126

the contemporary world. For that reason, Said sees Orientalism as a racist, imperialist, ethnocentric, and antihuman approach the influences of which are still visible<sup>154</sup> in modern Orientalism. In other words, the contention here is that the era of high or classical imperialism, aimed at civilizing others, has continued to exert considerable cultural influence in the current era, which is being designated as the age of neo-imperialism. The reason for this lies in the assumption that ‘modernization’, as the core feature of ‘modern Orientalism’, is perceived to be the new trait of Western global domination that aims to impose internationally the Western civilizational values.<sup>155</sup> This is, for instance, apparent from Rasheed El-Enany’s exposition of Ahmad Amin’s reasoning. According to this reasoning, antipathy among the Orientals, which has led them to become suspicious of representatives of modern civilization, is, in essence, engendered by the violence of colonial and imperial times.<sup>156</sup>

Thus, the discussion above has brought to light the importance of the notion of ‘modernization’, which is held to be the inextricable crux of the Western civilization that now underlines the clashes of our globalized era. This is because this notion, perceived to be the underlying core mission of Western civilization, is seen as a new form of imperialism. For that reason, the West is antagonized and held liable for the current clashes. In other words, it is believed that through the notion of ‘modernization’ – conceived as the civilizational mission of modern Orientalism – the dichotomous antagonism between Orientalism and Occidentalism has found its way into this age of globalization. Yet, for the sake of argument, it is important to bestow some thought on the nature and extent of this rudiment.

Some scholars have contested the aforementioned *ex parte* view on Western liability by contending that in this way, the notion of ‘the West’ is (ab-)used as a scapegoat for one’s own interests. Yet, the aim of our survey is not to engage in this reciprocal blame-rhetoric and recrimination, since both views contain some nucleus of the truth. However, what is indisputable is that the resistance towards the West stems not only from the demeanor of the antagonists but, as it will become obvious in this research, also from the shortsighted bearing of the Western protagonists. What is more, these proponents are considered to be Orientalists *par excellence* who have paved the way for the antagonists to oppose and resist the Occident. This shortsightedness lies, as discussed before, in globalism’s comprehension of the notion of modernization in terms of ideological, economic and technological advances, without taking

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<sup>154</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 44

<sup>155</sup> E Osei Kwadwo Prempeh, Joseph Mensah, and Senyo B-S K Adjibolosoo (eds), *Globalization and the Human Factor: Critical Insights* (Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire 2004) 73

<sup>156</sup> Rasheed El-Enany, *Arab Representations of the Occident: East-West Encounters in Arabic Fiction. Culture and Civilization in the Middle East* (Routledge, Oxon 2006) 63

the human dimension of the globalization process into consideration. Thus, in this process, the concept of culture in the broadest sense of the term, i.e. civilization<sup>157</sup>, is not, if at all, taken into account. Consequently, this results in the failure to grasp the scope and significance of the perilous antagonism towards the West. As elaborated hereafter, this is made manifest in the reaction of antagonism to the partial bearing of globalism. Therefore, to grasp globalism's flaw, the antagonist approach will be taken as our point of departure with Said's antagonism as its pivotal basis.

The bearing of antagonists in general and Said in particular towards (modern) Orientalism might be said to be grounded in globalism's neglect of the human dimension, i.e. the notion of civilization. For this antagonism encompasses not just the opposition to economic and technological advances, but also to modernization in terms of 'global consumerism of the Western ideological and material products'. This is evident from Said's argument, who contends that "what is crucial about the cultural productions of the West is the subtle way in which the political realities of imperialism are present in them".<sup>158</sup> In the same vein, opposition towards the West is considered to be the result of Orientalism itself because, as he asserts, "Those people [who are] compelled by the system to play subordinate or imprisoning roles within it emerge as conscious antagonists, disrupting it, proposing claims, advancing arguments that dispute the totalitarian compulsions of the world market".<sup>159</sup> In other words, a sense of inferiority and humiliation – held to be caused by Western domination and superiority – is considered to be the inevitable reason for the resistance to Western civilization.<sup>160</sup> Thence, the breeding ground for the contemporary antagonism towards the West, which is defined in terms of global expansionism of civilizational commodities, is to be sought within globalism. In this regard, the major globalist device, which is here opposed from the very outset, is 'the-end-of-history' thesis of Francis Fukuyama which, as elaborated below, heralds the triumph of 'liberal democracy'. Said considers such globalist theories as fallacious Western imagination that entails the completion of the imperialist project, whereby "[...] Westerners have assumed the integrity and the inviolability of their cultural masterpieces [...]. Yet [as regards this imagination, Said is of the view that] [...] it is a radical falsification of culture to strip it of its affiliations with its setting, or to pry it away from the

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<sup>157</sup> It is important to observe that the terms 'culture' and 'civilization', as explained in this research, are interchangeably used, since in all fairness to the consulted theories in which scholars use these notions according to their own subjective preferences, it is impossible to provide a harmonized and/or universalized definition of either term

<sup>158</sup> Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (Routledge, London 2001) 8

<sup>159</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 406

<sup>160</sup> Ibid 45

terrain it contested or – more to the point of an oppositional strand within Western culture – to deny its real influence”.<sup>161</sup> Against the background of this globalist shortsightedness, Said contends that “we are nowhere near ‘the end of history’, but we are still far from free from monopolizing attitudes toward it”.<sup>162</sup> In brief, this globalist theory contends that liberal democracy has a universal significance for all mankind<sup>163</sup> due to which, at the end of this evolutionary process, there will be more democracy than at the beginning.<sup>164</sup> Thus, Fukuyama claimed that “[...] liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of human government’, and as such constituted the ‘end of history’ ”.<sup>165</sup> In other words, as Huntington has meticulously summarized it, according to Fukuyama, “we may be witnessing [...] the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. [...] The war of ideas is at an end. [...] Overall liberal democracy has triumphed. The future will be devoted not to great exhilarating struggles over ideas but rather to resolving mundane economic and technical problems”.<sup>166</sup> Yet, “exactly thirty years after the fall of communism, though, America has lost its self-confidence, the European Community is at risk of disintegration [...]”.<sup>167</sup> Neglecting the concept of civilization within this theory shows the shortcoming of globalism, especially since Fukuyama claims that “the realm of politics remains autonomous from that of culture”.<sup>168</sup> Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the ineluctability of this concept, as we will see later, has, *inter alia*, forced Fukuyama to relativize his thesis. However, Fukuyama’s failure to acknowledge the indispensability of the concept of culture, i.e. civilization in general and the inherency of this concept within the realm of politics in particular, has paved the way for Said to refute this thesis by arguing that it is a radical falsification of culture that strips it of its affiliations, pries it away from the terrain it contests, and denies it real influence.

In the same vein, Alastair Bonnett considers the contemporary portrayal of the West to be a self-confident attitude, whereby the Western ‘liberal democratic’ blueprint is held to represent

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid 313

<sup>162</sup> Ibid 401

<sup>163</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 343

<sup>164</sup> Ibid

<sup>165</sup> Ibid xi

<sup>166</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 31

<sup>167</sup> David P Goldman, *It’s Not the End of the World, It’s Just the End of You: The Great Extinction of the Nations* (RVP Publishers, New York 2011) 1

<sup>168</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 220

the only viable choice for humanity.<sup>169</sup> In Bonnett's view, this is actually a moderate form of utopianism<sup>170</sup> that contains a hubristic rationalist and universalist vision of the perfect society. Thus, theories that claim the triumph of Western commodities are negligent of the fact that they foster antagonism towards the West, since they are considered to be, *de facto*, a new form of Western imperialism. This is apparent, for instance, in Said's argument that this Western demeanor stems from the "twinning of power and legitimacy, one force obtaining in the world of direct domination, the other in the cultural sphere, [which] is a characteristic of classical imperial hegemony. [And he adds that] where it [only] differs in the American century is the quantum leap in the reach of cultural authority".<sup>171</sup> By applying this more concretely, Said asserts that "[...] modern Orientalism already carried within itself the imprint of the great European fear of Islam [...]".<sup>172</sup> And since the United States is considered to be the inheritor of Orientalism in this century, Said contends that "for decades in America there has been a cultural war against the Arabs and Islam. [...] The very notion that there might be a history, a culture, a society [...] has not held the stage for more than a moment or two, not even during the chorus of voices proclaiming the virtues of 'multiculturalism' ".<sup>173</sup> However, unlike Said's understanding of modern Orientalism as an anti-Arab field that is occupied by Westerners, Irwin points out that one of the salient features of modern Orientalism has been the number of prominent Arabs in it.<sup>174</sup>

Thus, what comes to the fore in our elaboration above is that globalism's neglect of the concept of civilization and the failure to acknowledge its indispensability have paved the way for antagonists to oppose the Western world. This antagonism is also evident from Said's demarcation of his oppositional approach, whereby he focuses on the United States as the symbol of the West. According to this delineated antagonism, apologists for overseas American interests insist on its innocence and defense of freedom<sup>175</sup>, while at the same time the United States does not accept infringements or ideological challenges.<sup>176</sup> In other words, he argues that as in the past but now in a different guise, responsibility towards the world is claimed. As regards 'world responsibility' – which is currently perceived as 'humanitarian imperialism' – Said reckons that this phenomenon "[...] corresponds to the growth in the

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<sup>169</sup> Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History* (Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2004) 123

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid* 140

<sup>171</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 352

<sup>172</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 253-254

<sup>173</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 364

<sup>174</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 245

<sup>175</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 7

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid* 352

United States' global interest after World War Two and to the conception of its enormous power as formulated by the foreign policy and intellectual élite".<sup>177</sup> This shows that the contemporary forms of Occidentalism, as with Buruma and Margalit, are focused on America and specific American globalization policies that are perceived as U.S. imperialism.<sup>178</sup> Thus, it is evident that what underscores such forms of antagonism is the ineluctable concept of culture in the broadest sense of the word, which is wrongly neglected by globalism.

The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that antagonism, the essence and scope of which we have previously explained, has found its way into our age of globalization, and is even fostered by it due to the accelerated pluralism. Currently, this continuance of the dichotomous antagonism between Orientalism and Occidentalism is grounded in the notion of modernization, which is – as the core feature of modern Orientalism – considered to be the civilizational ambition of Western expansionism. This animosity is further hastened by its reciprocity as well as globalism and its perception of the human dimension, which is conceived as Orientalism *par excellence*. Thence, to explain the current acceleration of antagonism, it is necessary to elaborate on the demeanor of globalism towards the human dimension, upon which the globalist thesis of Fukuyama is based.

#### **1.4. Globalism and the Continuation of Dichotomous Antagonism**

As previously observed, reciprocal antagonism has found its continuance in our globalized era. This antagonism is considered to be reciprocal for it is not only fueled by Occidentalism as such, but it is rather hastened by Orientalism with its approach towards the human dimension in the process of globalization. We have seen that the human dimension is the underpinning foundation of the reciprocity between Orientalism and Occidentalism which characterizes the contemporary clashes. This further implies that antagonism is not only unilateral but also reciprocal, i.e. it is fostered by the demeanor of the protagonists of the West as it is mirrored in one of the three waves of globalization called globalism. And so, through a discernment of globalism and its perception of the human dimension, we will try to come to terms with the question as to why, contemporarily, perilous antagonism is not only unilaterally but also reciprocally accelerated. Hence, the survey conducted hereafter will expound the acceleration and continuation of antagonism in this globalized world as well as the ineluctability of the human dimension, i.e. civilization, within the current clashes. In so

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid 345

<sup>178</sup> Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (Atlantic Books, London 2005) 8

doing, the prime example of globalism (the meteoric thesis of Fukuyama that heralds the triumph of liberal democracy) serves as our point of departure to be elucidated from a civilizational angle. In other words, in determining that the concept of civilization is the ineluctable core notion that fuels the contemporary antagonism, we need to scrutinize Fukuyama's globalist thesis from a civilizational angle. For this scrutiny, the main critic of Fukuyama's thesis, the theory of Kenneth Jowitt, provides us with an apt starting point. As to his thesis, Jowitt rejects that the "[...] liberal capitalist civilization is the absolute end of history, the definitively final civilization"<sup>179</sup>; to the contrary, "[...] liberal capitalist democracy will always generate opposing challengers".<sup>180</sup> According to Jowitt, "in coming to grips with the Leninist extinction's global impact we must be ready for chaos in some places, opportunities in others, and for the slim but persistent possibility that new civilizations might emerge".<sup>181</sup> He clarifies this by stating that "[...] in a turbulent, dislocating, traumatic Genesis environment the dissolution of existing boundaries and identities can generate a corresponding potential for the appearance of genuinely *new ways of life*".<sup>182</sup> Thus, liberal capitalist democracy "[...] will regularly witness the rise of both internal and external movements dedicated to destroying or reforming it – movements that in one form or another will stress ideals of group membership, expressive behavior, collective solidarity, and heroic action".<sup>183</sup> This leads then to the emergence of a "[...] worldwide conflict between liberally oriented 'civics' and insular 'ethnics', a conflict that directly calls into question the value and status of liberal democratic individualism even in the West".<sup>184</sup>

While being aware of the emergence of various disruptive movements and acknowledging that "Islam has indeed defeated liberal democracy in many parts of the Islamic world [and still forms] a grave threat to liberal practices even in countries where it has not achieved political power directly"<sup>185</sup>, Fukuyama still believes that, in general, there will not again arise a *major* ideology with universalist aspirations that might fundamentally challenge or replace liberal democracy. Even political Islam, perceived as a disruptive universalist ideology, is assumed to not form a challenge or alternative to democracy in any sense since it does, among others, not attract "many adherents outside the Islamic world".<sup>186</sup> This means that it has, on the level

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<sup>179</sup> Kenneth Jowitt, 'After Leninism: The New World Disorder' (1991) 2 (1) JoD 11, 12

<sup>180</sup> Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (UCP, Berkeley 1992) 263

<sup>181</sup> Kenneth Jowitt, 'After Leninism: The New World Disorder' (1991) 2 (1) JoD 11, 14-15

<sup>182</sup> Ibid 15

<sup>183</sup> Ibid 17

<sup>184</sup> Ibid 20

<sup>185</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 45

<sup>186</sup> Marc F Plattner, *Democracy without Borders? Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland 2008) 31

of ideas, “virtually no appeal outside those areas that were culturally Islamic”<sup>187</sup>, and “[...] outside the Islamic world, [in Fukuyama’s point of view] there appears to be a general consensus that accepts liberal democracy’s claims to be the most rational form of government [...]”.<sup>188</sup> Unlike Fukuyama, Walid Phares tries to come to terms with the reality of this menace by observing that “Islamism [...] is not one ideology clashing with the West, in parallel to other anti-Western ideologies, but in reality is an ideology clashing with all other ideologies, Western, non-Western, and anti-Western alike”.<sup>189</sup> According to him, this is exactly the analytical mistake that is made by the West since “Jihadism is not another ideology competing for the existing world order [...]. Rather, it is an ideology trying to destroy the current order and replace it with another world order altogether”.<sup>190</sup> In the same vein, other commentators argue that “[...] cultural differences in themselves are not bound to produce conflicts; it is the approaches to cultural questions, which are largely determined by ideology and power relations, that matter”.<sup>191</sup> Yet, it remains questionable whether we are still living in this age of ideology wherein Phares tries to fit the Islamic menace since, as Huntington clearly asserts, “September 11 dramatically symbolized the end of the twentieth century of ideology and ideological conflict, and the beginning of a new era in which people define themselves primarily in terms of cultures and religion. The real and potential enemies of the United States now are religiously driven militant Islam [...]”.<sup>192</sup> To put it more broadly, not ideology or economics but ‘culture’ in the broadest sense of the term – including politicized religion, that is, not being privatized within the cocoon of the individual or family, but being set against a liberal and capitalistic society<sup>193</sup> with the aim of refashioning secular politics and culture<sup>194</sup> – is considered to be the fundamental source of conflict in our modern world. In addition, Phares reminds us of the fact that political Islam’s “[...] outreach is vertical across classes and horizontal across nations”.<sup>195</sup> This entails thus that it is in essence a universalist aspiration, “[...] opposed to political pluralism and freedom of religion, the two

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<sup>187</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 46

<sup>188</sup> Ibid 211

<sup>189</sup> Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008) 71

<sup>190</sup> Ibid 15

<sup>191</sup> Jenia Iontcheva, ‘Power Clashes in a Multicultural World’ [1998] *Theory & Event*

<[http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/theory\\_and\\_event/v002/2.1r\\_iontcheva.html](http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/theory_and_event/v002/2.1r_iontcheva.html)> accessed 10 January 2013

<sup>192</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 340

<sup>193</sup> Hans Jansen and Bert Snel (eds), *Eindstrijd: De finale Clash tussen het Liberale Westen en een Traditionele Islam* (Uitgeverij Van Praag, Amsterdam 2009) 180-192

<sup>194</sup> Daniel Philpott, ‘The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations’ [2002] *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 66, 67

<sup>195</sup> Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008) 16

pillars of democratic culture”.<sup>196</sup> Thus, Islamism is against all other viewpoints worldwide<sup>197</sup>, since “under the Islamist paradigm, there is simply no such thing as pluralism, neither political nor ideological. [...] In a manner analogous to Bolshevism, Jihadism rejects the plurality of political parties and doctrines on an existential level, because this concept is in absolute conflict with the doctrinal beliefs of Islamic fundamentalism”.<sup>198</sup>

Nonetheless, Fukuyama contends that it is not Islam as a *religion* but, like any other religion, the *political interpretation* of religion that is at the heart of the problem. However, this is a fictitious confinement of religion to the private sphere since, as Bernard Lewis contends, “From the lifetime of its Founder, and therefore in its sacred scriptures, Islam is associated in the minds and memories of Muslims with the exercise of political and military power”.<sup>199</sup> This line of thought is also discernible from the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in, e.g., the *Refah Party* case whereby, as regards Islamic law, the Court asserts that “[...] Sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in it. [...] [Henceforth] the Court notes that [any attempt towards] the introduction of Sharia [is] difficult to reconcile with the fundamental principles of democracy [...]. [Since] it is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime on Sharia, which clearly diverges from [European Human Rights] Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts. [...]”.<sup>200</sup> The irreconcilability of Islam with the principles of non-discrimination and equality is also apparent from other cases of the Court. For instance, in the *Leyla Sahin*<sup>201</sup> judgment, the Court notes that wearing of a headscarf is not reconcilable with gender equality<sup>202</sup>, and that it undermines the rights acquired by women. As regards the notion of gender equality, it

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<sup>196</sup> Ibid 67. The same line of thought comes to the fore in the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights as is apparent in the case of *Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey* (App nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) ECHR 13 February 2003

<sup>197</sup> Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008) 70

<sup>198</sup> Ibid 68. Similar observations concerning the totalitarian nature of Islamism have been made by other experts in the field. In this regard, particular reference can be made to Afshin Ellian, ‘The Legal Order of Political Religion: A Comparative Study of Political Islam and Political Christendom’ in Geliijn Molier, Afshin Ellian and David Surland (eds), *Terrorism: Ideology, Law and Policy* (Republic of Letters Publishing, Dordrecht 2011) 208-209. For further documented reading, reference can also be made to the following study: Emerson Vermaat, *Nazi’s, Communisten En Islamisten: Opmerkelijke Allianties Tussen Extremisten* (Uitgeverij Aspekt, Soesterberg 2008)

<sup>199</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Phoenix, London 2004) 17

<sup>200</sup> *Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey* (App nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) ECHR 31 July 2001

<sup>201</sup> *Leyla Sahin v Turkey* (App no 44774/98) ECHR 2005-XI

<sup>202</sup> Ibid

is imperative to note that the Court recognizes this notion as one of the underlying and tacit principles of the Human Rights Convention.<sup>203</sup> In addition, the Court asserts in the *Dahlab v. Switzerland* case that “[...] wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which [...] is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It, therefore, appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination [...]”<sup>204</sup> Hence, the aforementioned fictitious confinement of Islam to the mere private sphere and, by that, the disdain for its incompatibility with fundamental rights and democratic principles is not widely shared.

Still, some countries have allowed or even accommodated religion in the name of multiculturalism, notwithstanding that it might imperil the fundamental rights and freedoms, especially of vulnerable groups such as women. A compelling example of this is the United Kingdom where Sharia courts have been set up that apply the Islamic law within the sphere of, among others, family wherein women’s rights and freedoms are at risk.<sup>205</sup> A prime example wherein women’s (human) dignity<sup>206</sup> and physical and mental integrity<sup>207</sup> might be imperiled is the case of marital rape.<sup>208</sup> And that in spite of many attempts to justify the

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<sup>203</sup> *Schuler-Zraggen v Switzerland* (App no 14518/89) (1993) Series A no 263, *Burghartz v Switzerland* (App no 16213/90) Series A no 280-B, *Van Raalte v Netherlands* (App no 20060/92) ECHR 1997-I, *Petrovic v Austria* (App no 20458/92) ECHR 1998-II

<sup>204</sup> *Dahlab v Switzerland* (App no 42393/98) ECHR 2001-V. The same reasoning is present in other cases like in the *Leyla Sahin v Turkey* (App no 44774/98) ECHR 2005-XI

<sup>205</sup> These worries have become apparent from developments in the United Kingdom. For instance, it has been voiced in *The Telegraph* that “calls for a parliamentary inquiry into the scale of Islamic law in the UK are mounting after the body representing solicitors in England and Wales issued formal guidance on making “Sharia compliant” wills. The Law Society was accused of giving its stamp of approval to discriminatory practices after it published advice on writing wills which deny women an equal share and exclude “illegitimate” children or unbelievers” John Bingham, ‘Sharia law in UK: Calls for Parliamentary inquiry’ *The Telegraph* (London 23 March 2014) <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10717575/Sharia-law-in-UK-calls-for-Parliamentary-inquiry.html>> accessed 25 March 2014. With this guidance, “Islamic law is to be effectively enshrined in the British legal system for the first time under guidelines for solicitors on drawing up “Sharia compliant” wills”. John Bingham, ‘Islamic law is adopted by British legal chiefs’ *The Telegraph* (London 22 March 2014) <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10716844/Islamic-law-is-adopted-by-British-legal-chiefs.html>> accessed 25 March 2014

<sup>206</sup> *C.R. v the United Kingdom* (App no 20190/92) (1995) Series A no 335-C

<sup>207</sup> Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Res 1691 ‘Rape of women, including marital rape’ (2 October 2009) CoE Report Doc 12013

<sup>208</sup> Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 defines rape as penetration of the vagina or the anus by the penis without the woman’s consent. The definition of rape was, however, further broadened by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 in order to let it encompass male, spouses, and anal intercourse. This crime is further extended by a sequent Act in 2003 which broadens the scope of the conduct of this crime. However, imperative for this crime is not the manner of penetration but the lack of consent of the victim due to which the victim’s personhood, integrity and autonomy is undermined (*C.R. v the United Kingdom* (App no 20190/92) (1995) Series A no 335-C). It is worth noting that a similar extension of the scope of this crime is present in other domestic legal systems like the Dutch legal system whereby also penetration into the body by means of, e.g., a kiss is qualified as rape (HR 21 April 1998, *NJ* 1998, 781; HR 25 September 2007, *LJN* BA7257); yet the

establishment of such courts. For instance, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Phillips, argues that “[...] there is widespread misunderstanding in this country as to the nature of the Sharia law. Sharia consists of a set of principles governing the way that one should live one’s life in accordance with the will of God. These principles are based on the Qu’ran, as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and interpreted by Islamic scholars. [...] They do not include forced marriage or the repression of women’. [...] [He, however, notes that] “[...] what would be in conflict with the law would be to impose certain sanctions for failure to comply with Sharia principles. Part of the misconception about Sharia law is the belief that Sharia is only about mandating sanctions such as flogging, stoning, the cutting off of hands, or death for those who fail to comply with the law’. [Lord Phillips continues that] “it was not very radical to advocate embracing Sharia law in the context of family disputes [...]. There is

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means and the manner of penetration as such (HR 22 February 1994, *NJ* 1994, 379, HR 27 January 2004, *NJ* 2004, 121) are not decisive but the intention of the perpetrator, the psychological threat (HR 22 March 1988, *NJ* 1988, 785; HR 28 March 1995, *NJ* 1995, 454) and independency (HR 16 November 1999, *NJ* 2000, 125) of the victim are the aspects that underline the absence of consent (HR 16 November 2004, *LJN* AR3040). However, “The wording used for the definition of rape in national jurisdictions may either be specific (describing body parts as in *Persecutor v Furundzija* (Case No. IT-95-17/1-T and IT-95-17/1-A)) or unspecific in nature (without specifying body parts as in *Persecutor v Akayesu* (Case No. ICTR-95-4). [...] The focus now tends to be on the sexual autonomy of the individual, which can be violated [...], having an equally humiliating and traumatic impact on the victim as in ‘traditional rape cases’” in Anne-Marie LM de Brouwer, *Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR* (Intersentia, Belgium 2005) 110. As regards the formal recognition and elucidation of the crime of marital rape, reference can be made to the British case law which has also led to the interference of the European Human Rights Court regarding this crime. Important in this regard is the landmark case *SW v United Kingdom* (App no 20166/92) (1995) Series A no 335-B [which was decided together with *C.R. v the United Kingdom* (App no 20190/92) (1995) Series A no 335-C] whereby the applicant had been convicted of marital rape “[...] following the House of Lords’ decision in *R v R* [1992] AC 599 (HL) to the effect that the marital exemption for rape should be abolished”, see Mike Molan, *Cases & Materials on Criminal Law* (3<sup>rd</sup> edn Cavendish Publishing, Oregon 2005) 37. It is imperative to note that some cast doubts regarding the criminality of non-consented intercourse within the relationship but it is important to bear in mind that, as Lord Chief Justice Lane has plainly formulated in *R v R* [1992] AC 599 (HL), “This is not the creation of a new offence. It is the removal of a [common] law fiction which has become anachronistic and offensive”. In other words, there is no creation of a new offence since one could anticipate on this social change due to the crucial nature of this crime. This development is consistent with the *essence of the offence* and could *reasonably be foreseen*’ see Jaap de Hullu, *Materieel Strafrecht: Over algemene leerstukken van strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid naar Nederlands recht* (3<sup>rd</sup> edn Kluwer, Deventer 2006) 98. Thenceforth, one cannot speak of retrospective criminalization of forced intercourse within marriage. For further elaboration, see Constantin Stefanou and Helen Xanthaki (eds), *Drafting Legislation: A Modern Approach* (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire 2008), Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, *English Legal System* (9<sup>th</sup> edn Pearson Education Limited, Essex 2008), Gary Slapper and David Kelly, *Sourcebook on the English Legal System* (Cavendish Sourcebook Series, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn Cavendish Publishing Limited, London 2011). This discourse has to be approached against the fact that “[...] a definition of a crime consists of both material elements (the *actus reus*) and the mental elements (the *mens rea*), that is, both objective and subjective requirements. [And as regards rape] The *actus reus* designates which sexual acts are included within the boundaries of the crime of rape as well as, most commonly, elements of non-consent or force. The mental components describe the awareness of the perpetrator of non-consensual/forceful sexual acts. These parts are also mentioned with regard to the definition of rape in international law” in Maria Eriksson, *Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States under International Law?* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2011) 90. In addition, “Three issues have to be proven for rape itself. Firstly, that sexual intercourse took place, secondly, that it was without the woman’s consent and thirdly, that the defendant knew that she did not consent or was reckless as to whether or not she consented” in Jalna Hanmer and others (eds), *Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist influences on policy and practice – A reader* (Routledge, London 2000) 60

no reason why principles of Sharia law [...] should not be the basis for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution. It must be recognized, however, that any sanctions for a failure to comply with the agreed terms of the mediation would be drawn from the laws of England and Wales”.<sup>209</sup> This reasoning conveys the impression that verdicts based on Sharia law may not contradict the laws of the state and basic human rights. Yet despite this benighted reasoning, no inquiry has been conducted so far concerning the *empirical* consequences of such Sharia rules and rulings and their impact, e.g. on the legal status of women.<sup>210</sup> This becomes perilous when we bear in mind that the rulings of these courts are, according to the 1996 Arbitration Act, binding and enforceable. Thence, in the United Kingdom, the misrepresentation of *cultural* pluralism as *legal* pluralism<sup>211</sup>, whereby Islamic law is formally institutionalized by means of courts that are allowed to coexist simultaneously with the official legal system of the state<sup>212</sup>, puts fundamental human rights and freedoms in peril.<sup>213</sup> Especially when we take note of the reasoning by the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal – in contrast to the assumption of Lord Phillips according to which only the official legal system of England possesses a monopoly of (legitimate) coercion, and that Sharia rules have to comply with fundamental human rights and the English law – highlighting the fact that although this organization has to operate within the legal framework of England and Wales, it

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<sup>209</sup> Speech by Lord Phillips, Lord Chief Justice, *Equality before the Law*, East London Muslim Centre (3<sup>rd</sup> July 2008) “The speech was organized by Pro Bono in the LMC and the London Muslim Centre”

<sup>210</sup> It is worthwhile to note that “[...] the consequences of violence directed against women are difficult to ascertain because the crimes are often invisible and there is very little data on the subject. However, it is very clear that fear is perhaps the greatest consequence. Fear of violence prevents many women from living independent lives. Fear curtails their movement, so that women in many parts of the world do not venture out alone. Fear requires that they dress in a manner that is “un-provocative” so that no-one can say that “they asked for it” if they are violently assaulted. Fear of violence requires that they seek out male protection to prevent violence being directed at them. This protection can result in a situation of vulnerability and dependence which is not conducive to women’s empowerment” in UN Economic and Social Council, Preliminary Report, para.73 <<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/75ccfd797b0712d08025670b005c9a7d?Opendocument>> accessed 10 December 2012

<sup>211</sup> Kirsten Hastrup (ed), *Human Rights on Common Grounds: The Quest for Universality* (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001) 139

<sup>212</sup> Steve Doughty, ‘Britain has 85 sharia courts: The astonishing spread of the Islamic justice behind closed doors’ *Mail Online* (London 29 June 2009) <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1196165/Britain-85-sharia-courts-The-astonishing-spread-Islamic-justice-closed-doors.html>> accessed 10 December 2012

<sup>213</sup> This has even forced Francis Fukuyama to falter relatively his universalistic thesis in the face of these developments and to acknowledge that the “contemporary Muslim communities are [indeed] making demands for group rights [exemptions] that simply cannot be squared with liberal principles of individual equality’ [...] ‘These demands include special exemptions from the family law that applies to everyone else in the society, the right to exclude non-Muslims from certain types of public events, or the right to challenge free speech in the name of religious offence (as with the Danish cartoons incident), [...] ‘In some more extreme cases, Muslim communities have even expressed ambitions to challenge the secular character of the political order as a whole. These types of group rights clearly intrude on the rights of other individuals in the society and push cultural autonomy well beyond the private sphere”. Francis Fukuyama, ‘A question of identity’ *The Australian* (Sydney 3 February 2007) <<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/a-question-of-identity/story-e6frg6n6-111112933880>> accessed 3 January 2013

does not prevent or impede the same tribunal from ensuring that all determinations reached by it are in accordance with one of the recognized schools of Islamic Sacred Law.<sup>214</sup> This becomes precarious when we take into account that Islamic law is considered to be “[...] superior and dominant over English law in the Muslim mind and in the eyes of the Muslim community”.<sup>215</sup> This fact is independent of the question whether the official legal system recognizes this reality<sup>216</sup>, let alone the inability<sup>217</sup> of this system to prevent Islamic practices that are inconsistent with both the English law<sup>218</sup> and fundamental human rights and freedoms. Especially when we take note of the fact that unlike Christianity<sup>219</sup>, the Western distinction between church and state (that is, secularism) is alien to Islam.<sup>220</sup> This is apparent, for instance, from the reasoning of the reviver of the Islamic theocracy in the modern times, Ruhollah Khomeyni, who, by rehearsing the Islamic history, asserts that “in his days, the prophet, [...], was not content with explaining and conveying the laws. He also implemented them. God’s prophet, [...], was the executor of the law. He punished, cut off the thief’s hand, lashed and stoned and ruled justly. A successor is needed for such acts. A successor is not the conveyor of laws and not a legislator. A successor is [thus] needed for implementation”<sup>221</sup> of a static, immutable and infallible body of (divinely inspired) law.<sup>222</sup> In other words, “The idea that any group of persons, any kind of activities, any part of human life is in any sense outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to Muslim thought. There is, for instance, no distinction between canon law and civil law, between the law of the church and the law of the state, crucial in Christian history. There is only a single law, the shari’a, accepted by Muslims as of divine origin and regulating all aspects of human life: civil, commercial, criminal, constitutional, as well as manners more specifically concerned with religion in the limited, Christian sense of that word”.<sup>223</sup> It is thus an analytical error to downplay or neglect the role and challenge of religion in general and Islam in particular within the contemporary

<sup>214</sup> Muslim Arbitration Tribunal <<http://www.matribunal.com/>> accessed 10 December 2012

<sup>215</sup> Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’ [2007] Syd LR 375

<sup>216</sup> Ihsan Yalmiz, ‘The Challenge of Post-Modern Legality and Muslim Legal Pluralism in England’ [2002] Journal of Ethics and Migration Studies 343

<sup>217</sup> Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’ [2007] Syd LR 375, 44

<sup>218</sup> Ibid 23

<sup>219</sup> Jacob Neusner (ed), *Religious Foundations of Western Civilization: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (Abingdon Press, Nashville 2006)

<sup>220</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to al Qaeda* (UCP, Berkeley 2008) 47

<sup>221</sup> Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, *Islamic Government: Governance of Jurisprudence* (UPPH, Hawaii 2005) 7

<sup>222</sup> It might be contested that the interpretation of this body of law is fallible and changeable – based on which Islam deems to be erroneously bifurcated into distinct realms – but it is imperative to bear in mind that this does, nevertheless, not diminish the sanctity and stability of the legal content of Sharia due to which any artificial bifurcation is and remains a fallacy

<sup>223</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Harper Perennial, New York 2003) 100

civilizational collisions, especially when religion is institutionalized and accommodated by the state. The inseparability of the public and private realm within Islam is discernible from the reasoning of Khomeyni who asserts that it is the task of his followers to “familiarize the people with the truth of Islam so that the young generation may not think that the men of religion in mosques of Qum and al-Najaf believe in the separation of church from state [...]. The colonialists have spread [...] the need to separate church from the state and have deluded people into believing that the ulema of Islam are not qualified to interfere in the political and social affairs. [...] In the prophet’s time, was the church separated from the state? Were there at the time theologians and politicians? At the time of the caliphs and the time of ‘Ali, [...], was the state separated from the church? Was there an agency for the church and another for the state? The colonialists and their lackeys have made these statements to isolate religion from the affairs of life and society and to tacitly keep the ulema of Islam away from the people and drive people away from the ulema because the ulema struggle for the liberation and independence of the Moslems”.<sup>224</sup> And thus, in the point of view of Islamists like Khomeyni, “The solution is [and has always been] the same for all these – to remove the alien and pagan laws and customs imposed by foreign imperialists and native reformers, and restore the only true law, the all-embracing law of God”.<sup>225</sup>

The foregoing inquiry leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the aforementioned fictitious confinement of religion in general and Islam in particular to the private sphere is a contemptuous comprehension of the importance of the human dimension in terms of civilization, thus blurring the perilous reality of contemporary antagonism which has unprecedented and unforeseeable consequences for, among others, the dignity and integrity of the human person. The discussion above shows the unilateral and independent nature of antagonism towards the West. Yet, this antagonism is considered to be reciprocal for it is not only embedded in Occidentalism, but is rather fostered by Orientalism. In other words, some commentators are of the view that the current antagonism is not only unilateral but also reciprocal in nature. Therefore, they seek the source of the current clashes not only within the Oriental civilization, which is often traditional in nature, but also within the sphere of modernity which, as explained above, is conceived as *the* mission of the Occidental civilization. Thence, while some scholars, like Fukuyama, contend that “[...] the contemporary challenge that the world faces in the form of radical Islamism or Jihadism is

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<sup>224</sup> Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, *Islamic Government: Governance of Jurisprudence* (UPPH, Hawaii 2005) 8

<sup>225</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Harper Perennial, New York 2003) 105

much more political than religious, cultural, or civilizational [...]”<sup>226</sup>, that is, it neither stems from Islam as a religion<sup>227</sup> nor is it “[...] the reassertion of some traditional Islamic cultural practice, [they, nevertheless, acknowledge that it takes place within] the context of modern identity politics”<sup>228</sup>, meaning that our time is characterized by a global identity crisis.<sup>229</sup> Thus, irrespective of whether one calls this challenge a *Muslim* resistance to democratization, or, as Fukuyama asserts, resistance stemming from the *Arab political culture*, it, nonetheless, “[...] emerges [as he also acknowledges] precisely when traditional cultural identities are disrupted by modernization and a pluralistic democratic order that creates a disjuncture between one’s inner self and external social practice”.<sup>230</sup> It is in this same context wherein Huntington asserts that due to globalized modernization, “Subnational cultural and regional identities are taking precedence over broader national identities. People identify with those who are most like themselves and with whom they share a perceived common ethnicity, religion, traditions, and myth of common descent and common history. In the United States [as in Europe] this fragmentation of identity manifested itself in the rise of multiculturalism and racial, ethnic, and gender consciousness”.<sup>231</sup> It is worth noting that “this narrowing of identities, however, has been paralleled by a broadening of identity as people [due to globalization as we have elaborated above] increasingly interact with other people of very different cultures and civilizations and at the same time are able through modern means of communication to identify with people geographically distant but with similar language, religion, or culture. The emergence of a broader supranational identity has been most obvious in Europe [among the Muslim population], and its emergence there reinforced the simultaneous narrowing of identities”.<sup>232</sup>

Although one may argue that the source of the current antagonism is political rather than religious or cultural in nature, it is, nonetheless, unassailable that it is not only unilateral but also reciprocal in essence. For it is the result of an interaction between two phenomena – tradition (of the Oriental culture) and modernity (of the Occidental culture) – within the context of civilization. This means that Muslims are actually entrapped between two worlds. On the one hand, the Western civilization characterized by the notion of modernity, and on

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<sup>226</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 348

<sup>227</sup> Ibid 347

<sup>228</sup> Ibid 348

<sup>229</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 12

<sup>230</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 348

<sup>231</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 13

<sup>232</sup> Ibid 14

the other, the Islamic civilization characterized by ideology and tradition.<sup>233</sup> As we have previously inferred, this latter signals that it is an analytical error to bifurcate or classify religion into realms, for “religion is both “ideology”, an articulated vision of how the world should be, and “culture”, a template for understanding the world, oneself, and their relations. If we think of culture as having cognitive, moral, and emotive components [...], religion is clearly implicated in all those dimensions, both as a force for change as well as for stasis”.<sup>234</sup> However, it is worth remarking that, as Corwin Smidt puts it, unfortunately, in the process of globalization, “Little attention, as yet, has been devoted to the unique role that religion may play in building social capital<sup>235</sup>. [...] Different religious doctrines may affect the ways in which people may view human nature generally, the extent to which such believers choose to relate to those outside their religious community, and the priorities given to political life generally and personal political agendas specifically”.<sup>236</sup> It is in this light that we need to be attentive to the fact that “over the past decades, there has been increased discussion within religious communities that they may be engaged in a cultural war”.<sup>237</sup> Huntington is then right when he asserts that “the twenty-first century [...] is dawning as a century of religion. Virtually everywhere, apart from Western Europe, people are turning to religion for comfort, guidance, solace, and identity”.<sup>238</sup> Therefore, religion has to be understood in this broad and comprehensive sense that represents an alternative means for reintegration with the capacity to challenge the modern culture, which tends to divide the objective material and subjective aesthetic harmony of the human wholeness.<sup>239</sup> The term ‘culture’ encompasses “[...] a heritage from which a society draws its strength. [It] is a resource which enables any given individual, community or society to survive and cope with the demands of social life. [...] For any given society, culture, through its shared and distinctive values, beliefs, forms of knowledge, symbols and language, expressiveness, and customs, charts life courses for its

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<sup>233</sup> Tony Blankley, *The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?* (Regnery Publishing, Washington 2005) 183

<sup>234</sup> Rhys H Williams, ‘The Language of God in the City of Man: Religious Discourse and Public Politics in America’ in Corwin Smidt (ed), *Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good* (Baylor University Press, Waco 2003) 182

<sup>235</sup> The notion of ‘social capital’ is taken at face value and entails, for the sake of this inquiry, merely “[...] the set of norms, networks, and organizations through which people gain access to power and resources, and through which decision making and policy formulations occur”, and which makes them able to cooperate at both the horizontal and vertical level, see Christiaan Grootaert, ‘Social capital: The missing link?’ in Paul Dekker and Eric M Uslaner, *Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life* (Routledge, Oxon 2001) 10-11

<sup>236</sup> Corwin Smidt (ed), *Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good* (Baylor University Press, Waco 2003) 2

<sup>237</sup> Ibid 12-13

<sup>238</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 15

<sup>239</sup> Amr G E Sabet, *Islam and the Politics: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (Pluto Press, London 2008) 34

members. [...] Culture encompasses the symbolic, the non-material aspects as well as the material objects that society produces in order to guarantee individual and group survival”.<sup>240</sup> Thus, the concepts of religion and culture – the two indispensable components for the formation of ‘civilization’ – are interwoven in such a way that they influence each other reciprocally at various levels, since “[...] culture is concerned with the meaning and significance of human activities and relations<sup>241</sup>, [which] is also a matter of central concern to religion<sup>242</sup>, [due to which] the two tend to be closely connected”<sup>243</sup> and can be defined within the broader notion of civilization. Against this background, we can infer that religious culture fulfills a vital role for the construction of a subjective, objective, and institutional worldview that underpins the social experience of the collectivity about, for instance, norms, beliefs, traditions, and charismatic leaders.<sup>244</sup> This is why religion is an unequivocal phenomenon that has underpinned the destinies of civilizations.<sup>245</sup> And in the case of Islam, “In the Muslims’ own perception, Islam itself was indeed conterminous with civilization, and beyond its borders there was only barbarians and infidels”.<sup>246</sup> Consequently, Islam is not only concerned with religious matters that are confined to the private realm, but it is an identity and loyalty that tends to transcend all others.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> E Osei Kwadwo Prempeh, Joseph Mensah, and Senyo B-S K Adjibolosoo (eds), *Globalization and the Human Factor: Critical Insights* (Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire 2004) 67

<sup>241</sup> “For its part, culture influences how a religion is interpreted, its rituals conducted, the place assigned to it in the life of society, and so forth [...]” in Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 2006) 147

<sup>242</sup> “Religion shapes a culture’s system of beliefs and practices [...]” in Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 2006) 147. But it also provides culture with fundamental and existential worldviews. For an elaborated discussion on this latter from a sociological angle, see Matthias Koenig and Paul de Guchteneire (eds), *Democracy and Human Rights in Multicultural Societies* (Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire 2007) 255

<sup>243</sup> Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 2006) 146

<sup>244</sup> Amr G E Sabet, *Islam and the Politics: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (Pluto Press, London 2008) 41

<sup>245</sup> Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008) xiii

<sup>246</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Harper Perennial, New York 2003) 3. For further information, see the distinction between ‘*Dar al-Islam*’ and ‘*Dar al-Harb*’ in Stephen C Neff, *War and the Law of Nations: A General History* (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 39-46. However, it is worthwhile to observe that some commentators, like Bassam Tibi, contest this dichotomous worldview by arguing that “today, the Islamic civilizational model of an *umma*-based community of *dar al-Islam* vs the rest of the world no longer reflects any reality in the contemporary world. It can be safely stated that this model of *umma*-unity never reflected any unity in classical Islamic history, as well. Nonetheless, the scriptural doctrine has never engaged in any revising of this binary worldview”. Despite this hypothetical contention, Tibi is forced to accept the current reality by asserting that “twisted in this inherited tradition contemporary Islamic worldview continues its own constructed dichotomy. Even though it is not in line with reality [as Tibi keeps denying, he nevertheless is forced to acknowledge that], the binary worldview remains dominant. [...] The Islamic Weltanschauung represent the cultural commitment of many religio-political groups in this period of re-politicization of Islam” in Bassam Tibi, *Islam in Global Politics: Conflicts and Cross-Civilizational Bridging* (Routledge, Oxon 2012) 40-41

<sup>247</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Phoenix, London 2004) 15

Thence, as discussed above, the reciprocity of current antagonism lies in the fact that the notion of modernity is conflated and equated with Western civilization, against which the Islamic civilizational discourse<sup>248</sup> is on a collision course. This means the West is antagonized and resisted through an appeal to the process of modernization. In this regard, in exploring and explaining the crux of this civilizational clash, the following two dimensions of the process need to be elaborated: the *historical* and *psychological* angle. As regards the first dimension, the historical angle<sup>249</sup>, attention is primarily drawn to the fact that “[...] Islamic culture has not collapsed in the face of modernity, as other cultures have. Instead, it has gotten stronger and reacted powerfully to the intruding world, and revolutionary leaders like bin Laden have infected this vigorous and angry culture with dangerous pathologies, including Islamist terror and jihad”<sup>250</sup>, because “Muslim peoples, like everyone else in the world, are shaped by their history, but unlike some others, they are keenly aware of it”.<sup>251</sup> Bernard Lewis, as the forerunner of this historical school, asserts that “[...] much of the anger in the Islamic world is directed against the Westerner, seen as the ancient and immemorial enemy of Islam since the first clashes between the Muslim caliphs and the Christian emperors, and against the Westernizer, seen as a tool or accomplice of the West and as a traitor to his own faith and people”.<sup>252</sup> With this historical animosity in mind, Lewis moves to the nineteenth century as the starting point of modernity and contends that “the cumulative effect of reform and modernization [in the Middle East was], paradoxically, not to increase freedom but to reinforce autocracy”.<sup>253</sup> And above all, “[...] during the past three centuries, the Islamic world has lost its dominance and its leadership, and has fallen behind both the modern West and the rapidly modernizing Orient. This widening gap [subsequently] poses increasingly acute problems, both practical and emotional, for which the rulers, thinkers [like Edward Said], and rebels of Islam have not yet found effective answers”<sup>254</sup>, and thus use the West as a scapegoat for their misfortune. More concrete, “For those nowadays known as Islamists or fundamentalists, the failures and shortcomings of the modern Islamic lands afflicted them

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<sup>248</sup> For the historiography of civilizational discourse and Islam, see Peter J Katzenstein (ed), *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and pluralist perspectives* (Routledge, Oxon 2009) 160

<sup>249</sup> It is worth noting that this reasoning is also applied within the international politics as we see, for instance, in the speech of Benjamin Netanyahu on 27 September 2012 at the UN.

<<http://www.algemeiner.com/2012/09/27/full-transcript-prime-minister-netanyahu-speech-to-united-nations-general-assembly-2012-video/>> accessed 4 January 2013

<sup>250</sup> Tony Blankley, *The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?* (Regnery Publishing, Washington 2005) 183

<sup>251</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Phoenix, London 2004) xviii

<sup>252</sup> Ibid 113

<sup>253</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Harper Perennial, New York 2003) 53-54

<sup>254</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Phoenix, London 2004) 4

because they adopted alien notions and practices. They fell away from authentic Islam, and thus lost their former greatness”.<sup>255</sup> As regards the adoption of alien notions and practices, reference can be made, for instance, to “[...] the emancipation of women by modernizing rulers [which] was one of the main grievances of the radical fundamentalists, and the reversal of this trend is [thus] in the forefront of their agenda”<sup>256</sup>, something they attempt to realize through, among others, the application and enforcement of Islamic law, as we have seen in our example above.

Hence, reciprocal antagonism is considered to have started and grown since the decolonization process whereby, in abandoning traditional beliefs, the now independent countries recognized the inherent relativism that underpinned all societies, systems of belief, and cultural practices.<sup>257</sup> Against this background, in our modern world, as Said rightly contends, “between the extremes of discontented, challenging urban mobs and the floods of semi-forgotten, uncared-for people, the world’s secular and religious authorities have sought new, or renewed, modes of governance. None has seemed so easily available, so conveniently attractive as appeals to tradition, national or religious identity, patriotism. And because these appeals are amplified and disseminated by a perfected media system addressing mass cultures, they have been strikingly, not to say frighteningly effective”.<sup>258</sup> It is in this context then that the concept of culture ought to be comprehended as a means that can palliate the ravages of a modern, aggressive, mercantile, culturally impoverished, and brutalizing (urban) existence.<sup>259</sup> The drawback of this is that, as Said emphasizes, “in time, culture comes to be associated, often aggressively, with the nation or the state; this differentiates ‘us’ from ‘them’ [...]. Culture in this sense is a source of identity, and a rather combative one at that, as we see in recent ‘returns’ to culture and tradition”.<sup>260</sup> However, he employs this only when criticizing Orientalism, while currently this menace is more discernible from Occidentalism. For the invocation of tradition for palliating the ravages of modernity is the main cause of the current clashes, especially when it is accommodated and fostered by the states themselves through the enactment of multicultural measures, for example.

The second dimension of modernity from which the reciprocity of current antagonism towards the West ought to be approached is the psychological angle. As mentioned, the

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<sup>255</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Harper Perennial, New York 2003) 156-157

<sup>256</sup> Ibid 73

<sup>257</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 394-395

<sup>258</sup> Ibid 396

<sup>259</sup> Ibid xiii

<sup>260</sup> Ibid xiii-xiv

antagonizing reactions emanating from the Islamic civilizational discourse is, by some commentators, considered to have been caused by the disruptive nature of modernity that currently underlies both pluralistic Western democracies and a rapidly transforming world. It is also in this context that modernization is conceived as the imposition of Western values on ‘others’, thereby undermining traditional values and ways of life and hence the resistance to such imposition.<sup>261</sup> And this is considered to be the challenge that also Islam in the broadest sense of the term has been facing with regard “[...] to its identity structure from a rapidly transforming world and a concomitantly changing order of values. The resulting imbalances and confusion that have afflicted Muslims in effectively all their social, political, economic, strategic, and religious domains, have imposed on them soul-searching question of existential significance”.<sup>262</sup> To put it differently, it is believed that “modernity [...] has failed to achieve the multi-dimensional fulfillment required by human society. Its alluring promise of a better life has masked a dwindling concern with human self-realization through spiritual as well as material development. The internal dimension of the human essence has been externalized, and this has induced an unprecedented chaotic and conflicting relationship between body and spirit”.<sup>263</sup> This tends to be caused by the process of modernity, which entails that one can become modern only when the substantive traditional values and manners are cast away, that is, to be free from the encumbrances of anything traditional.<sup>264</sup> Thus, the current clashes inevitably occur when the two constitutive human dimensions (the ‘mental structures’, that is, identity, and ‘objective material conditions’, that is, structural reality) dialectically collide. Due to this, “[...] a sense of crisis develops which is detrimental to [all social, political, economic, strategic, and religious realms of] a culture or a civilization’s strength of character, equanimity, and consistency”.<sup>265</sup> It is in this light that current world affairs can be defined as “[...] a universal conflict between two camps: the forces accepting and promoting a future with multiple types of democracies, and those heading back toward the past, armed with extreme religious injunctions. [...] The energies of the two outlooks have been unleashed against each other [...] culturally, politically, and increasingly militarily”<sup>266</sup>, since “modernity exchanged the calm tyranny of traditional society for the anomie of the atomized individual, who was free, that is, free to wander alone in the universe and ask for an indication of his

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<sup>261</sup> Amr G E Sabet, *Islam and the Politics: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (Pluto Press, London 2008) 29

<sup>262</sup> Ibid 3

<sup>263</sup> Ibid 31

<sup>264</sup> Ibid 29

<sup>265</sup> Ibid 3

<sup>266</sup> Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008) xviii

signification from an unhearing and indifferent cosmos”.<sup>267</sup> Especially when it is borne in mind that in an epoch which is characterized by secularism and the decline of ideologies and loyalties, worldviews that are traditional in nature provide a solid basis for the palliation of psychological emptiness. This is because they offer, among others, “an emotionally familiar basis of group identity, solidarity, and exclusion; an acceptable basis of legitimacy and authority; an immediately intelligible formulation of principles for both a critique of the present and a program for the future”.<sup>268</sup>

Thus, the process of modernization seems to have paved the way for antagonists who, in order to oppose this process, make an appeal to tradition, i.e. culture in the broadest sense of the term. Accordingly, Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King are right in asserting that the “[...] ‘indigenization perspective’ falls into the very trap of cultural globalization against which it wants to stand up: the claim of cultural and scientific authenticity in local traditions is in itself a production of modernity. To reject modernity and to search for alternatives in tradition already presupposes participation in a knowledge of modern culture”.<sup>269</sup> However, others, like Mona Abaza and Georg Stauth, extensively argue that opposition in general and fundamentalism in particular do “[...] not appear as a reaction against too much modernization and secularization [...]”. ‘Rather it is a reaction against an incomplete and false transposition of religious language into the language of ‘modernity’ ’.<sup>270</sup> In the same vein, Alastair Bonnett argues that Oriental spirituality, i.e. indigenization perspective, is, due to its participation in the knowledge of modern culture, a form of reflexive modernization in that it entails a freedom of mind and not a slavery to materialism. The reflexivity of it entails a self-examining approach to the problem of modernity which is associated with the West. In addition, he asserts that Occidentalists’ “[...] attitude towards the West represents an ‘othering’ of internal problems. It is a process of purification of the nation that sanctions and demands strict protection and self-discipline as well as the perpetuation of an image of the West as a spatially displaced ‘folk-devil’ ”.<sup>271</sup>

It is worth noting that this antagonizing discourse is more vivid at the national level within pluralistic Western societies, where violent resentments are deemed to have occurred more tensely because of the breakdown of singular cultures. This breakdown entails, among others,

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<sup>267</sup> David P Goldman, *It's Not the End of the World, It's Just the End of You: The Great Extinction of the Nations* (RVP Publishers, New York 2011) 4

<sup>268</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Phoenix, London 2004) 19

<sup>269</sup> Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King (eds), *Globalization, Knowledge and Society* (SAGE Publications, London 1990) 219

<sup>270</sup> Ibid 216

<sup>271</sup> Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History* (Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2004)

the loss of old certainties of village life, the tightly knit clan relations, and the subservience to feudal or religious traditions.<sup>272</sup> It is in this context that, as noted before, the concept of culture is considered to be a crucial means of palliating the ravages of a modern, aggressive, mercantile, culturally impoverished, and brutalizing Western (urbanized) existence. This is why “commitment to traditional values [...] reflects a defensive posture which aims at rejuvenating the spirit of internal cohesion and self-identification against the disintegrative effects brought in by patterns of modern life”.<sup>273</sup> This rejuvenation is achieved by ‘othering’ the West in order to give shape and force to cultural revival. This ‘othering’ encompasses a negative image of the West for which various terms have been employed. Examples of these terminologies, as we also saw in the course of our inquiry, are spatially displaced folk-devil, aggressive, mercantile, culturally impoverished, imperialistic, racist, ethnocentric, undemocratic, and antihuman. All these notions have the core aspect of the ‘soullessness’ of Western civilization (that is, the vacuum of modernization) in common. This antagonistic ‘othering’ of the West is clearly spelled out in Said’s line of thought in which he merely associates the menace of identifying with the West and its colonial and imperial times. While, at the same time, he fails to come to terms with the reciprocal nature of this antagonism, viz. the peril emanating from the assertion of identity by ‘others’ and their perception of the West, as we have previously observed.

Hence, the resisting indigenization is aimed at facing the fundamental dilemma of the process of modernity by means of and through a reliance on the concept of culture in the broadest sense of the word, i.e. civilization. More concrete, the dilemma of modernization in this age of globalization concerns, as elaborated hitherto, the mental vacuum created by the neglect of the internal dimension of the human essence, that is, the spiritual constituent. Consequently, to palliate this vacuum, modernization is resisted through an appeal to and by means of civilization. In other words, “Traditional peoples fight to the death, even in the knowledge that one day they must lose their existential fight for existence”. [...] ‘The explanation for self-destructive behavior on a grand scale is that the spiritual death ensuing from the dissolution of traditional society provokes greater fear than does the fear of physical death’.<sup>274</sup> And since modernization is conflated with the West, “any fundamental proposed resolution to problems of modernity [...] can only be violently anti-modern, anti-secular, anti-

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<sup>272</sup> Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (Atlantic Books, London 2005) 26, 31

<sup>273</sup> Amr G E Sabet, *Islam and the Politics: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (Pluto Press, London 2008) 157

<sup>274</sup> David P Goldman, *It's Not the End of the World, It's Just the End of You: The Great Extinction of the Nations* (RVP Publishers, New York 2011) 272

democratic, and therefore anti-Western. [...] This is expected to provoke a violent discourse [which we, however, are already witnessing in the Western world] between modernists and their opponents regarding the morally and ethically determinate and causal foundations of human, social and political organization”.<sup>275</sup>

The inquiry above leads us thus to the inevitable conclusion that the current devastating antagonism is based on more than just an ideology or a mere political interpretation of religion<sup>276</sup> that aims to destroy or replace the contemporary order.<sup>277</sup> Religion is not merely ‘ideology’ but also ‘culture’<sup>278</sup> which, as a social capital<sup>279</sup>, underlies the civilization of society.<sup>280</sup> This also means that the confinement of it to the private realm is a minimization and neglect of its relevance to the destinies of civilizations as well as contemporary antagonism and its perilous clashes. What is more, this civilizational antagonism is, as we have noted above, not only unilateral in nature but also, and for the most part, reciprocal in character. In other words, a negation of the importance of the concept of religion within the dichotomous antagonism or a bifurcation of it into artificial realms is a fallacy. For this concept is the underlying fundament of the notion of civilization, especially in the formation and mediation of identity in the process of modernization which has undermined traditional dogmas and, by that fact, created a psychological vacuum. As a result, we witness resistance emanating from this resurging concept which Jowitt describes as ‘the appearance of new civilizations’.<sup>281</sup> Also, this latter remains dubious for it raises the question of whether we are witnessing the *appearance* of *new* civilizations or are we merely dealing with the *resurgence* of *traditional* civilizations along which Huntington draws the lines of his ‘clash-of-civilizations’ thesis. Either way, it is beyond doubt that – in contrast to Fukuyama’s claim that “[...] the future will be devoted not to great exhilarating struggles over ideas but rather to resolving mundane economic and technical problems”<sup>282</sup> – the challenge that the world is now facing can only be apprehended from a civilizational prism, i.e. if we do not overlook let

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<sup>275</sup> Amr G E Sabet, *Islam and the Politics: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (Pluto Press, London 2008) 32

<sup>276</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 348

<sup>277</sup> Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008) 15

<sup>278</sup> Rhys H Williams, ‘The Language of God in the City of Man: Religious Discourse and Public Politics in America’ in Corwin Smidt (ed), *Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good* (Baylor University Press, Waco 2003) 182

<sup>279</sup> Christiaan Grootaert, ‘Social capital: The missing link?’ in Paul Dekker and Eric M Uslaner, *Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life* (Routledge, Oxon 2001) 10-11

<sup>280</sup> Corwin Smidt (ed), *Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good* (Baylor University Press, Waco 2003) 2

<sup>281</sup> Kenneth Jowitt, ‘After Leninism: The New World Disorder’ (1991) 2 (1) *JoD* 11, 14-15

<sup>282</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 31

alone ignore the concept of civilization. Especially when we bear in mind that the contemporary animosity towards the West “[...] goes beyond the level of hostility to specific interests or actions or policies or even countries, and becomes a rejection of Western civilization as such, not so much for what it does as for what it is, and for the principles and values that it practices and professes. These are indeed seen as innately evil, and those who promote or accept them are seen as the ‘enemies of God’ ”.<sup>283</sup> This is why even the United States is not opposed as being a country, but as the exemplification and embodiment of Western civilization. Thus, it is undeniable that the Western identity in general and the “American identity [in particular has begun] a new phase with the new century. [Their] salience and substance in this phase are being shaped by [the West’s and particularly] America’s new vulnerability to external attack and by a new turn to religion, a Great Awakening [especially] in America that parallels the resurgence of religion in most of the world”.<sup>284</sup>

The indispensability of the notion of civilization for apprehending the acceleration and continuity of the dichotomous antagonism in this age of globalization also becomes evident once we elucidate the mechanism that underlies Fukuyama’s globalist thesis. However, it is important to bear in mind that while Fukuyama is aware of the grave menace being posed to liberal democracy<sup>285</sup>, yet he fails to explain why liberal democracy has no appeal within the Islamic world.<sup>286</sup> Similarly, Jowitt does not explain why the dissolution of existing boundaries and identities can generate a corresponding potential for the appearance of genuinely new ways of life<sup>287</sup> that would pave the way for internal and external movements that stress the ideals of group membership, expressive behavior, collective solidarity, and heroic action<sup>288</sup> in order to destroy or reform liberal capitalist democracy. The following inquiry into the underlying mechanism of Fukuyama’s theory will provide us with answers to these questions. Hence, the following survey will explain the resurgence of antagonizing movements and alternative ways of life that imperil liberal democracy and, with that, the fundamental rights and freedoms within the Western world. Thus, this scrutiny should reveal the deficit of Fukuyama’s globalist thesis and, by that, the necessity to go beyond it if we are to comprehend reciprocal antagonism and the discontent that we are confronted with in our

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<sup>283</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Phoenix, London 2004) 22

<sup>284</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 336

<sup>285</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 45

<sup>286</sup> Ibid 211

<sup>287</sup> Kenneth Jowitt, ‘After Leninism: The New World Disorder’ (1991) 2 (1) JoD 11, 15

<sup>288</sup> Ibid 17

globalized era. To put it simply, as elaborated hitherto, globalism neglects the notion of civilization in order to foster and universalize its relative political theory that consequently gives rise to alternative ways of life with perilous consequences. Therefore, the following inquiry into the underlying mechanism of Fukuyama's globalist thesis will shed further light on the indispensable role of the notion of civilization in the understanding of dichotomous antagonism in this age of globalization wherein pluralism is, more than ever before, being accelerated.

#### **1.4.1. The Globalist Mechanism and Dichotomous Antagonism**

As previously noted, globalism's neglect of the human dimension of the process of globalization, that is, the concept of civilization, bypasses the current global antagonism and the perilous clashes thereof. This has, as discussed before, provided the second wave of globalization – skepticism – with the necessary breeding ground to oppose this deficit which has fostered the current global clashes. However, this failure requires a thorough analysis before the roots of the existential threats and clashes emanating from dichotomous antagonism become apparent. In so doing, the underlying mechanism of Fukuyama's thesis is scrutinized, which will shed light on the indispensability of the human dimension of the globalization process – the notion of civilization – for comprehending the current reciprocal antagonism. Therefore, Fukuyama's book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, is taken as our point of departure and, for a better understanding, supplemented with other relevant literature.

The fundamental mechanism that underpins his triumphalist thesis is the Platonic notion of *thymos*. By adopting a Hegelian approach, Fukuyama defines this concept as '*the desire for recognition*' which is the seat of 'values'<sup>289</sup> consisting of two constituents: *isothymia* and *megalothymia*. *Thymos* entails, according to him, "[...] the side of man that deliberately seeks out struggle and sacrifice, which tries to prove that the self is something better and higher than a fearful, needy, instinctual, physically determined animal [...]"<sup>290</sup> This is why Fukuyama, by criticizing the Hobbes-Locke tradition for banishing and constraining the desire for recognition from politics for the sake of physical security and material accumulation<sup>291</sup>, conceives *thymos* to be "[...] an innately political virtue necessary for the survival of any political community, because it is the basis on which private man is drawn out from the

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<sup>289</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 213

<sup>290</sup> Ibid 304

<sup>291</sup> Ibid 188-189

selfish life of desire and made to look toward the common good'. [...] 'Construction of a just political order therefore requires both the cultivation and the taming of a *thymos*'.<sup>292</sup>

The concept of *isothymia* entails the desire to be recognized as equal to others, whereas the concept of *megalothymia* contains the desire to be recognized as superior.<sup>293</sup> This latter concept is conceived to be the benign and dark side of *thymos*, i.e. highly problematic for political life, since it entails the desire to dominate as we could see with imperialism. This is why Fukuyama is of the view that *thymos*, even in its most humble manifestation, is just the starting point for human conflicts and, thus, capable of fanaticism, obsession, and animosity. For there is no guarantee that self-esteem would be confined to the bounds of 'moral self' which is, above all, not developed to the same level in all human beings. Therefore, there is no reason to contend that all human beings would evaluate themselves as each other's equals.<sup>294</sup> In this regard, *thymos* ought to be tamed by using *megalothymia* to counteract ambition<sup>295</sup> so as to prevent the emergence of tyranny. This can only take place in the democratic constitutional process, that is, a stage for the expression of *thymos* where men can seek recognition for their own views. Accordingly, he observes that the dialectical contradiction between these two concepts – *megalothymia* and *isothymia* – is best resolved and balanced out in the '*universal and homogenous state*', i.e. liberal democracy that rests on the twin pillars of economics and recognition.<sup>296</sup> This form of political organization is considered to be *universal* for it grants recognition to its citizens, not because they are members of certain ethnic, racial, or national groups but because they are human beings.<sup>297</sup> This recognition is also *rational* in as far as the state's authority does not stem from an ancient tradition or religious faith, but from the citizens' explicit consent to the conditions by which they cohabit. And it is also *homogeneous* due to its creation of a classless society in which the distinction between master and slave is erased.<sup>298</sup> However, despite his eulogy of this utopian form of political organization and the alleged general consensus about its superiority, he admits that liberal democracy is yet to be globally accepted, as is the case in the Islamic world. This is also apparent from the reasoning of those who follow Fukuyama's line of thought. For instance, Amartya Sen defends the universality of liberal democracy by arguing that "[...] while democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed uniformly accepted, in

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<sup>292</sup> Ibid 183

<sup>293</sup> Ibid 182

<sup>294</sup> Ibid 182, 214

<sup>295</sup> Ibid 187-188

<sup>296</sup> Ibid 204

<sup>297</sup> M C Lemon, *Philosophy of History: A Guide for Students* (Routledge, Oxon 2003) 404

<sup>298</sup> Ibid 404

the general climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right”.<sup>299</sup> In other words, Sen contends that the “[...] recognition of democracy as a universally relevant system, which moves in the direction of its acceptance as a universal value<sup>300</sup>, is a major revolution in thinking, and one of the main contributions of the twentieth century”.<sup>301</sup> Michael Goodhart also adheres to this understanding of the universality of the concept of democracy, and observes that “[...] calling democracy a universal value, then, does not imply that it is actually accepted by all, nor does it imply that people ‘must’ find it acceptable, reasonable, nonrejectable, the subject of an overlapping consensus, or otherwise ‘valid’ in any sense. The universality of democracy as a value does not concern its grounding”.<sup>302</sup>

Despite a lack of empirical grounding, these commentators believe in the universality of liberal democracy, for it is considered to be, albeit in theory, the only mode of governance that, as Fukuyama puts it, is ‘completely satisfying to man’.<sup>303</sup> This conviction is based on the conciliatory nature of liberal democracy between the *satisfaction of desire*<sup>304</sup> and “[...] the pursuit of *rational recognition*, i.e., recognition on a universal basis in which the dignity of each person as a free and autonomous human being is recognized by all”.<sup>305</sup> The former component is designated through economics, which is considered to be vital in the formation of prerequisites that make autonomous choice probable. But if this economic homogenization would be undermined, the future of the process of democratization would become uncertain. It is also noteworthy that Fukuyama holds the view that, at the end, there is no economic rationale for democracy, which means that the choice for this mode of governance is autonomous and based on recognition instead of desire. While Fukuyama rejects “any *necessary* connection between capitalist economics and liberal-democratic politics”<sup>306</sup> he, nonetheless, considers economics to be a distinct, yet interwoven, feature that makes an autonomous choice for liberal democracy possible. He continues to argue that what has replaced *megalothymia* in our contemporary world is, firstly, a desiring part of the soul which

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<sup>299</sup> Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’ (1999) 10 (3) JoD 3, 5

<sup>300</sup> According to Amartya Sen, the universality of any value is not dependent on the consent of all, but on the general view whereby this form of governance is generally conceived as a valuable concept, Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’ (1999) 10 (3) JoD 12

<sup>301</sup> Ibid

<sup>302</sup> Michael Goodhart, *Democracy as Human Rights: Freedom and Equality in the Age of Globalization* (Routledge, New York 2005) 138

<sup>303</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 206

<sup>304</sup> Ibid 301

<sup>305</sup> Ibid 200

<sup>306</sup> M C Lemon, *Philosophy of History: A Guide for Students* (Routledge, Oxon 2003) 396

manifests itself as an *economization* of life, and, secondly, an all-pervasive *isothymia*.<sup>307</sup> In other words, while modern liberalism has sought to banish *thymos* from the political life, we, nevertheless, witness the continued existence of *megalothymia* which is divulged in the *economization* of life and the transmutation of the desire for recognition in the form of *isothymia*<sup>308</sup> which, as the rational form of recognition, has to overcome the irrational desire for recognition.

Fukuyama is also cognizant of the fact that *megalothymia* has not completely disappeared from human life, and that the satisfaction of desire through material abundance and mere rational recognition is not sufficient for the survival of liberal democracy. For he argues that if ‘man’ is merely defined in terms of desire for recognition and material abundance, at the end of history, when these goals are achieved, he will cease to exist. This is because there will be no significant causes anymore to struggle and fight for.<sup>309</sup> This way of life, denoted by Fukuyama as ‘the life of rational consumption’, which we have designated as ‘the mass consumerist culture’, will become boring because human beings want to have ideals for which they can devote their lives.<sup>310</sup> With this reality in mind, he suggests that “[...] liberal democracies should take care to inculcate in their citizens ‘a certain irrational thymotic pride in their political system and way of life, rather than relying for stability on their capacity to deliver economic prosperity and equal rights’”.<sup>311</sup> In other words, he insists that *megalothymia* “[...] must continue to have a place in a vibrant liberal democratic state, albeit in a tamed form that does not lead to violence. However, there is no good reason to believe, as he does, that liberalism will be able to tame these megalithymotic impulses”.<sup>312</sup> He is thus forced “to give scope to *megalothymia* within liberal democracy”<sup>313</sup>, especially because of the current reappearance of *megalothymia* on an unprecedented scale. Hereby, he admits that thymotic individuals have been seeking other forms of contentless activities that can give them recognition. This is because the traditional forms of struggle are no longer possible, while material prosperity has made such struggles within the economic realm superfluous.<sup>314</sup> We can discern this, for instance, in today’s democratic societies where people “[...] are not content to merely congratulate themselves on their broadmindedness, but who would like to

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<sup>307</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 190

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid* 190

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid* 310

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid* 314

<sup>311</sup> M C Lemon, *Philosophy of History: A Guide for Students* (Routledge, Oxon 2003) 404

<sup>312</sup> Mark D Gismondi, *Ethics, Liberalism and Realism in International Relations* (Routledge, Oxon 2008) 99

<sup>313</sup> Shadia B Drury, *Alexandre Kojève: The Roots of Postmodern Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 1994)

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<sup>314</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 319, 332

‘live within a horizon’. That is, [as he acknowledges,] they want to choose a belief and commitment to ‘values’ deeper than mere liberalism itself, [such as traditional values] offered by [e.g.] traditional religions”.<sup>315</sup> Thus, it is questionable whether liberal democracy is even *in theory* universal, and whether this theory is vital and vigorous enough to compete with (traditional) civilizations encompassing both ‘culture’ and ‘religion’. Because of the impossibility of unleashing *megalothymia* by means of satisfaction of desire through material abundance and mere rational recognition, it results, *de facto*, in an even greater reappearance and resurgence of *megalothymian* horizons, i.e. traditional ways of life. This shows, in fact, the impotence and deficit of the universalist thesis of liberal democracy in coping with such contradiction.<sup>316</sup> Thus, liberal democracy is not completely satisfactory to man, since, as Huntington argues, people are not likely to find in political principles the deep emotional content and meaning provided, for example, by kith and kin, blood and belonging, culture and nationality.<sup>317</sup> These ties do not need to have factual bases for satisfying the deep human need for belonging to a meaningful community. Hence, the presumption that we are all liberal democratic believers in the American Creed – containing liberty, equality, democracy, civil rights, nondiscrimination, and the rule of law – which is, *mutatis mutandis*, held to be self-evident in other Western European democracies, is unlikely to satisfy that need.<sup>318</sup>

Fukuyama is, thus, aware of the impossibility for liberal democracy to solve the problem of *megalothymia*. He even considers the reappearance of *megalothymia*, in the form of alternative ways of life, as a barrier and challenge to democracy, yet not serious enough to constitute an existential threat to it. In other words, as regards the notion of ‘culture’ in its broadest sense, Fukuyama acknowledges that “[...] the form of resistance to the transformation of certain traditional values to those of democracy [culture] constitutes an obstacle to democratization”<sup>319</sup>, but he does not consider it capable enough to undermine this process. And it is, *inter alia*, in this same context that he considers religion as one of the forms of cultural obstacles to democracy.<sup>320</sup> Yet, it is worth noting that it is “Samuel Huntington [who] did the world [finally] an enormous service by changing the subject from comparative social system to civilizations based on religion”.<sup>321</sup> Moreover, besides the

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<sup>315</sup> Ibid 307

<sup>316</sup> Ibid 314

<sup>317</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 339

<sup>318</sup> Ibid

<sup>319</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 215

<sup>320</sup> Ibid 216

<sup>321</sup> David P Goldman, *It’s Not the End of the World, It’s Just the End of You: The Great Extinction of the Nations* (RVP Publishers, New York 2011) 347

dissolution of existing identities and boundaries, there is the inadequacy of liberal democracy itself to not only leave man's *megalothymian* longings unsatisfied, but even to disunite the objective material and subjective aesthetic harmony that is so vital to human fulfillment and wholeness.<sup>322</sup> This forms the main reason for the (re-)appearance of genuinely (new) ways of life<sup>323</sup>, i.e. civilizations that led to the rise of – often antidemocratic – *megalothymian* movements, since unlike liberal democracy the traditional civilizations provide man with alternatives for the fulfillment of his *megalothymian* longings. An example of such an alternative which is fostered by the *megalothymian* deficit of liberal democracy concerns the recurrence of the Islamic way of life that manifests itself in various movements. For it presents alternatives for bridging the gap between the objective material and subjective aesthetic harmony in man. Thus, 'man' in 'liberal democracy' is merely reduced to a self-interested rational consumer, whereby not his *megalothymian* longings but only his needs for rational recognition and satisfaction of desire are fulfilled. And that in spite of the fact that he has a deeper spiritual essence, which is "intrinsically equipped with the necessary qualifications to see beyond his self-interest, and is therefore responsible, guided by revelation, for creating structures reflective of this understanding".<sup>324</sup>

Another, more practical, reason why alternative ways of life manifest themselves in *megalothymian* movements is because "[...] private associational life is much more immediately satisfying than mere citizenship in a large modern democracy [since] recognition by the state is necessarily impersonal; community life, by contrast, involves a much more individual sort of recognition from people who share one's interests, and often one's values, religion, ethnicity, and the like".<sup>325</sup> This implies that "[...] in contrast to liberal societies, communities sharing 'languages of good and evil' are more likely to be bound together by a strong glue than those based merely on shared self-interest".<sup>326</sup> It is why Fukuyama acknowledges that life in contemporary liberal democracies, in which various civilizations meet, "[...] is one in which cultural or group identities are being continually asserted, reasserted, and sometimes invented out of whole cloth. This is an area in which the original theories of modern liberalism do not provide us with much useful guidance. [...] In modern liberal societies, individuals organize themselves into cultural groups that assert group rights

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<sup>322</sup> Amr G E Sabet, *Islam and the Politics: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (Pluto Press, London 2008) 34

<sup>323</sup> Kenneth Jowitt, 'After Leninism: The New World Disorder' (1991) 2 (1) JoD 11, 15

<sup>324</sup> Amr G E Sabet, *Islam and the Politics: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (Pluto Press, London 2008) 166

<sup>325</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 323

<sup>326</sup> Ibid 325

against the state and limit the choice of individuals within those groups”.<sup>327</sup> As such, he argues that “[...] democracy is not likely to emerge in a country where the nationalism or ethnicity of its constituent groups is so highly developed that they do not share a sense of nation or accept one another’s rights. A strong sense of national unity is necessary prior to the emergence of stable democracy”.<sup>328</sup> Thence, we can state that the resurgence of *megalothymian* movements constitutes an obstacle to the creation of a stable democracy.

Therefore, although Fukuyama contends that the realm of politics is autonomous from that of culture, he is, nonetheless, forced to admit that, due to the aforementioned theoretical deficit, “liberal democracies [...] are not self-sufficient: the community life on which they depend must ultimately come from a source different from liberalism itself”.<sup>329</sup> To put it differently, “rational recognition is not self-sustaining, but must rely on pre-modern, non-universal forms of recognition to function properly [meaning that] stable democracy requires a sometimes irrational culture [...]”.<sup>330</sup> Thus, the fact that liberal democracy is not self-sufficient and self-sustaining puts the claim to universality of liberal democracy into perspective and makes the incorporation of a *thymotic* pride within it ineluctable. This is why, as noted above, he argues that for a proper functioning of democracy an irrational *thymotic* pride has to be developed<sup>331</sup>, which he denotes as the ‘democratic’ or ‘civic culture’. In other words, he himself employs the notion of *megalothymia* for solving the deficit of democracy regarding the satisfaction of spiritual longings, enfranchisement of various groups within society, and the defense of democracy against civilizations with an excess of *megalothymia*.<sup>332</sup> By incorporating *megalothymia* in his thesis in order to develop an irrational culture, he uses the theory of George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.<sup>333</sup> According to this philosopher, “[...] the ultimate crucible of citizenship [...] is the willingness to die for one’s country: [thence] the state would have to require military service and continue to fight wars.’ [Fukuyama adopts this option of waging war for incorporating *megalothymia* within his thesis which he, accordingly, substantiates by contending that] ‘a liberal democracy that could fight a short and decisive war every generation or so to defend its own liberty and independence would be far healthier and more satisfied than one that experienced nothing but continuous

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<sup>327</sup> Ibid 344-345

<sup>328</sup> Ibid 216

<sup>329</sup> Ibid 220, 326

<sup>330</sup> Ibid 334

<sup>331</sup> Ibid 215

<sup>332</sup> Ibid 326, 219, 324-325

<sup>333</sup> Allen W Wood (ed), *Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (CUP, Cambridge 1991)

peace”.<sup>334</sup> Thus, for the satisfaction of citizens’ spiritual longings, we need to incorporate ideals that are not always rational, especially for the newly enfranchised groups, since the liberal principles alone are found inadequate for protecting liberal democratic societies.<sup>335</sup>

Accordingly, Huntington points out that civilizational diversity challenges our belief in the universal relevance of Western culture which, with the current civilizational clashes, suffers from the following three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous.<sup>336</sup> In addition, he argues that civilizational diversity, i.e. “multiculturalism at home, threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. Both deny the uniqueness of Western culture”.<sup>337</sup> Thus, Huntington does not conceive Western civilization as universal, but only as something unique within this current multicivilizational world. Subsequently, the survival of this unique civilization depends on American reaffirmation of their Western identity and Westerners’ acceptance of the uniqueness of their civilization. Therefore, “the principal responsibility of Western leaders [...] is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West, which is beyond their declining power, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization”.<sup>338</sup> In order to defend this uniqueness, Huntington also incorporates the *megalothymian* factor within his theory. In so doing, in the case of America – as the forerunner of Western civilization – he proposes a nationalism based on religion as the alternative to cosmopolitanism and imperialism.<sup>339</sup> In the same vein, but in a different mode, others argue that “[...] there are more grounds on which to oppose the Islamists than simply a religious “clash of civilizations”. While religion is probably the most powerful force in determining a culture’s strength, it is not the only one. Love for country, loyalty to a homeland and a way of life, even hatred of other ways, are also powerful cultural forces around which to rally”.<sup>340</sup> But Huntington seems to put the emphasis more on religion when he argues that “in a world in which religion shapes the allegiances, the alliances, and the antagonisms of people on every

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<sup>334</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 329

<sup>335</sup> Ibid 219, 324-325

<sup>336</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 310

<sup>337</sup> Ibid 318

<sup>338</sup> Ibid 311

<sup>339</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 364-365

<sup>340</sup> Tony Blankley, *The West’s Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?* (Regnery Publishing, Washington 2005) 194

continent, it should not be surprising if Americans again turn to religion to find their national identity and their national purpose”.<sup>341</sup>

Others plead also for the incorporation of similar *megalothymian* ideals, by warning that “[...] countries that have abandoned nationalism, religion, and ideology in favor of the milquetoast administration of daily affairs – for example, the Europeans – suffer from the most dreadful psychic symptom of all”<sup>342</sup> as regards their identity. This leads to the question whether Europe has turned irredeemably secular and, if it has, then, whether a secular Europe can rally around any sustainable value for which it is willing to fight and die in order to survive.<sup>343</sup> The menace of this becomes particularly dire when we take note of “the absence of a native secularism in Islam, and the widespread Muslim rejection of an imported secularism inspired by Christian example, [which] may [accordingly] be attributed to certain profound differences of belief and experience in the two religious cultures”.<sup>344</sup> Especially when due allowance is made for the fact that “a whole series of Islamic radical and militant movements, loosely and inaccurately designated as “fundamentalist,” share the objective of undoing the secularizing reforms of the last century, abolishing the imported codes of law and the social customs that came with them, and returning to the Holy Law of Islam and an Islamic political order”.<sup>345</sup> In this regard, we can argue that, “broadly speaking, Muslim fundamentalists are those who feel that the troubles of the Muslim world at the present time are the result of not insufficient modernization but of excessive modernization, which they see as a betrayal of authentic Islamic values. For them the remedy is a return to true Islam, including the abolition of all the laws and other social borrowings from the West and the restoration of the Islamic Holy Law, the shari’a, as the effective law of the land”.<sup>346</sup> Thus, we can assert that this “[...] ‘indigenisation perspective’ falls into the very trap of cultural globalisation against which it wants to stand up: the claim for cultural and scientific authenticity in local traditions is in itself a production of modernity. To reject modernity and to search for alternatives in traditions already presupposes participation in a knowledge of modern culture”.<sup>347</sup> This shows

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<sup>341</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 365-366

<sup>342</sup> David P Goldman, *It's Not the End of the World, It's Just the End of You: The Great Extinction of the Nations* (RVP Publishers, New York 2011) 14

<sup>343</sup> Tony Blankley, *The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?* (Regnery Publishing, Washington 2005) 190

<sup>344</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Harper Perennial, New York 2003) 100

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid* 106

<sup>346</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Phoenix, London 2004) 115

<sup>347</sup> Mona Abaza and George Stauth, ‘Occidental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic Fundamentalism: A Critique’ (1988) 3 *Int Sociol* 343, 353

the reciprocity of the current antagonism. Cognizant of this, Huntington and those who follow him champion the uniqueness of Western civilization in a milieu of cooperation and understanding within a multicivilizational world order.<sup>348</sup> On the other hand, Fukuyama advocates war which he considers legitimate for universalizing liberal democracy and for keeping it healthy. This conveys the impression that this ideology and its triumph are used as *jus victoriae*. And so, based on Samuel von Pufendorf, we can describe the solution of Fukuyama as an attempt to make business out of war for personal interests, and as the promotion if not imposition of one's own ideals and ideologies, e.g. by waging war in the name of peace (*si vis pacem para bellum*). Besides, it is questionable whether this bellicose solution indemnifies the *megalothymian* deficit of liberal democracy, and whether it can compete with alternative civilizations with an excess of *megalothymia*. This belligerent solution rather fuels the *megalothymia* of other civilizations that consequently resist the Western concepts, which, as noted above, are conceived as a new form of imperialism.

Thus, we can infer that liberal democracy is not self-sufficient and self-sustaining, that is, not satisfactory to man, since it does not accommodate and conciliate the ineluctable *megalothymian* demand of society. Also, the solutions provided for bridging this *megalothymian* gap are not viable enough to compete with civilizations that have an established, if not excessive, *megalothymia*. Most perilous in this is a naive faith in the universality of liberal democracy, for the frailty and tenuousness of this globalizing political theory lies in its denial and negligence of the concept of civilization. This means that the notion of *megalothymia* is not taken into account within the framework of 'liberal democracy' and, because of that, it fails to elaborate on the demeanor of this latter towards excessively *megalothymian* civilizations. The preclusion of the concept of civilization, and by that the neglect of the inevitable concept of *megalothymia*, becomes even lethal for this universalizing thesis, once we make due allowance for its resurgence, which is fostered by globalization. However, this has also not escaped Fukuyama's attention – as the main advocate of the universality thesis of liberal democracy – and has even forced him to relativize his thesis by asserting, for instance, that “[...] the problem of jihadist terrorism will not be solved by bringing modernization and democracy to the Middle East. Modernization and democracy are good things in their own right, but in the Muslim world they are likely to increase, not

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<sup>348</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 321

dampen, the terror problem in the short run”.<sup>349</sup> In other words, the *megalothymian* dilemma has, in fact, forced Fukuyama to face the significance of the notion of civilization and to relativize his globalist theory. Thus, while he argues that irrational forms of recognition are replaced by rational ones in the universal and homogeneous state<sup>350</sup>, he, nevertheless, admits that there is on a sub-political level, that is, on the level of cultural identities, a resistance to homogenization<sup>351</sup> and competition between different cultures.<sup>352</sup> Hence, he relativizes his *Pax Democratica* thesis and acknowledges, as regards the notion of ‘culture’ in the broadest sense of the term, that “[...] at the end of the modernization process, nobody wants cultural uniformity; in fact, issues of cultural identity come back with a vengeance”<sup>353</sup>, since, at the sub-political level, local cultures have also taken on renewed vigor and significance in the form of political movements in order to promote local culture and local identity. In the post-Cold War world, as the rise of fundamentalist movements suggests, culture in the broadest sense of the word, i.e. civilization, has often replaced ideology in politics.<sup>354</sup>

This is why Fukuyama has been subsequently forced to acknowledge that “Samuel Huntington is correct when he says that we will never live in a world in which we have cultural uniformity, the global culture of what he calls ‘Davos Man’ ”.<sup>355</sup> Thus, as we elaborated above, Fukuyama, in agreeing with Huntington, has been compelled to concede that “[...] culture remains an irreducible component of human societies, and that you cannot understand development and politics without a reference to cultural values”.<sup>356</sup> Hence, given the aforementioned deficits and shortcomings, his theory of political globalization, that is, universalization of liberal democracy, cannot be said to be universally accepted as a normative value – as empirically confirmed by resistance from traditional *megalothymian* civilizations. This means that his globalist thesis, which in fact obliterates the concept of civilization and, by that, cultural diversity<sup>357</sup>, does not lead to a global political monoculturalism as long as the concept of civilization is not taken into account. Especially when one has regard for the fact that globalization has rather the potential to foster cultures in

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<sup>349</sup> Francis Fukuyama, ‘A question of identity’ *The Australian* (Sydney 3 February 2007) <<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/a-question-of-identity/story-e6frg6n6-111112933880>> accessed 3 January 2013

<sup>350</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 259

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid* 244

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid* 234

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid* 344

<sup>354</sup> UN Development Programme, ‘Globalization with a Human Face’ (1999)

<sup>355</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, New York 2006) 344

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid* 344

<sup>357</sup> E Osei Kwadwo Prempeh, Joseph Mensah, and Senyo B-S K Adjibolosoo (eds), *Globalization and the Human Factor: Critical Insights* (Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire 2004) 84

the broadest sense of the term, i.e. civilization, which have to become rigid in order to protect themselves from external influences. This can, however, imperil the universal appeal of various fundamental concepts, such as fundamental human rights that transcend both concepts of ‘politics’ and ‘culture’. Thus, “one world culture is a euphemism for westernization of people’s way of life on a global scale”<sup>358</sup> which, as some observe, is “eroding cultural authenticity in order to encourage similar aspirations and greater uniformity of lifestyles”<sup>359</sup>, i.e. the homogenization of cultures.

The conclusion that we can draw from the preceding discussion is that globalism’s disdain for the notion of civilization is rightly opposed by the skeptics, since the neglect of this notion has created the ground for cultures to resurge and resist the imposition of globalism’s civilizational concepts. On the one hand, the attempt to universalize the Western political civilization erodes other civilizations, and fosters polarization and antagonism due to its neglect of the concept of civilization and the proposed bellicose solution to indemnify the *megalothymian* deficit for defending itself against civilizations with an excess of *megalothymia*. On the other hand, the universalization of Western notions and, by that, the disregard for the relevance of other civilizations lead to a dichotomous antagonism which relativizes and imperils essential concepts such as fundamental human rights and freedoms. In sum, globalism’s disdain for the notion of civilization has hastened the emergence of antagonism, which endangers fundamental human rights and freedoms by repudiating and opposing them along with the rejection of globalism’s universal claims to its relative concepts.<sup>360</sup> Although the menace of this neglect for fundamental rights and freedoms has been briefly discussed, for the sake of better understanding the perilous challenges the world is currently facing, it is imperative to make due allowance, in the next paragraph, for the rise of antagonism towards the West which is fostered, if not brought about, by globalism. It is thus exigent to note that this perilous antagonism does not stop at a mere opposition and criticism of the West but, as we will see below, goes so far as to become apologetic of illegitimate oppositions that, in essence, aim to annihilate and intimidate the West as well as to undermine fundamental rights and freedoms in general and the fundamental right to freedom of expression in particular.

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<sup>358</sup> Ibid 69

<sup>359</sup> Paul Hopper, *Understanding Cultural Globalization* (Polity Press, Cambridge 2007) 88

<sup>360</sup> In this regard, reference can be made to the doubt raised by Paul Cliteur as to “whether democratic values are ripe for export” in Paul Cliteur, *The Secular Outlook: In Defense of Moral and Political Secularism* (Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex 2010) 131

## 1.5. The Fundamental Menace of Antagonism

The concept of civilization, as the underpinning tenet of dichotomous antagonism (that is, the clashes between Orientalism and Occidentalism), cannot be trivialized and neglected, for, as we have seen before, it is much too ingrained within globalized world affairs. Especially when we are cognizant of the fact that the neglect of this human dimension of the process of globalization is used as a means for opposing the West, which goes further than just criticism. Therefore, it is important to elucidate the aforementioned disdain which has fueled the current antagonism that does not stop at a mere skeptical critique of the West, but poses an existential threat to fundamental rights and freedoms.

In this regard, and as noted in our elaboration of Said's thoughts, the current image of the West in general and the United States in particular is traced back to an era called 'classical imperialism'. What is more, this image is conceived to be underpinned by Orientalism with a civilizational mission at the heart. Heretofore, we also noted that Said is of the view that this attitude has continued to exert considerable influence in modern Orientalism that, respectively, undergirds modern imperialism. According to him, there is, however, a major difference between these two periods. Whereas previously the supremacy of Western civilization was acclaimed, since the twentieth-century the concept of civilization is used to convey an ironic sense of how vulnerable the West is.<sup>361</sup> In his view, this irony is, for instance, discernible from the Western rhetoric concerning terrorism in its generality.<sup>362</sup> It is also in this context that, according to him, "[...] the American mainstream media use the rhetoric of terrorism to disparage anything that does not meet the approval of the American government".<sup>363</sup> And as regards the content of news coverage, he contends that "the fear and terror induced by the overscale images of 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism' – call them the figures of an international or transnational imaginary made up of foreign devils – hasten the individual's subordination to the dominant norms of the moment.' [...] 'Thus to oppose the abnormality and extremism embedded in terrorism and fundamentalism [...] is also to uphold the moderation, rationality, executive centrality of a vaguely designed 'Western' [...] ethos'; [...] 'this dynamic imbues 'us' with a righteous anger and defensiveness in which 'others' are finally seen as enemies, bent on destroying our civilization and way of life".<sup>364</sup> It seems, however, that Said downplays, if not underestimates, the magnitude of terrorism when he, in

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<sup>361</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 229

<sup>362</sup> Reference can, for instance, be made to: Edward W Said, *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination 1969-1994* (Chatto and Windus, London 1994) 257

<sup>363</sup> Valerie Kennedy, *Edward Said: A Critical Introduction* (Polity Press, Cambridge 2000) 57

<sup>364</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 376

his animadversion of Huntington, argues that “the carefully planned and horrendous, pathologically motivated suicide attack and mass slaughter by a small group of deranged militants has been turned into proof of Huntington’s thesis”.<sup>365</sup> As we can see, antagonism does not stop at a mere criticism of the West and global consumerism of Western cultural products. For it goes so far as to underestimate the magnitude of terrorism and to label the vulnerability of the West and phenomena such as terrorism as mere ironic imaginations of Western imperialism. The paradoxical irony of this is that Said, as noted above, reproaches the West for upholding the vaguely designed Western ethos, while he himself is entrapped in this prejudiced rhetoric underpinned by his apparent animosity towards the West. In other words, as we have observed heretofore, “Said’s discourse analysis does not itself escape the all-inclusive “Occidentalism” he specifically rejects as an alternative to Orientalism”.<sup>366</sup> In the same vein, Shireen T. Hunter, who follows Said in this line of thought, albeit implicitly, repudiates the existence of any dichotomous antagonism and asserts that the conflict between the West and Islam is not civilizational, but rather a matter of power, that is, “[...] specific Western policies coupled with the overall disequilibrium in power relationships between the West and the Islamic world are more responsible for the anti-Western dimensions of the Islamists’ thinking and behavior than is mere civilizational incompatibility”.<sup>367</sup> Yet, what is striking is Said’s contention that the American world, representing the West, and the Arab world are two distinct worlds. And what distinguishes one from the other is, firstly, the lack of contact between the Western nations and their Eastern counterparts, and, secondly, the barrier of language and religion that differentiates them.<sup>368</sup>

However, although Said is cognizant of this, he, nonetheless, seems to trivialize the magnitude of the aforementioned perilous outrages, and considers the menace emanating from the Islamic worldview to be negligible, and a product of inflated Western imagination. To reinforce this, he adds that “[...] into this vicious cycle feed a few groups like bin Laden’s and the people he commands, whether they are in Saudi Arabia or Yemen or anywhere else. [But] They’re magnified and blown up to insensate proportions that have nothing to do with their real power and the real threat they represent. This focus obscures the enormous damage done by the United States, whether militarily, environmentally, or economically, on a world scale,

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<sup>365</sup> Edward W Said, ‘The Clash of Ignorance’ *The Nation* (New York 4 October 2001)  
<<http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=full>> accessed 25 July 2012

<sup>366</sup> James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (HUP, Cambridge 1988) 271

<sup>367</sup> Shireen T Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Westport 1998) 19, 115

<sup>368</sup> David Barsamian, *Culture and Resistance: Conversations with Edward W. Said* (Pluto Press, London 2003)

which far dwarfs anything that terrorism might do”.<sup>369</sup> What is more, “Uncountable are the editorials in every American and European newspaper and magazine of note adding to vocabulary of gigantism and apocalypse, each use of which is plainly designed not to edify but to inflame the reader’s indignant passion as a member of the “West”, and what we need to do”.<sup>370</sup> Thus, while Said has never condoned terrorism, he, nevertheless, minimizes, if not underestimates, the devastating magnitude of it by antagonizing and upbraiding the West for the aforementioned contingencies, and blaming it for the demonization of the perpetrators. And again, in order to condone the Islamic reaction to the West, he considers the West itself to be the cause of this antagonism by asserting that Muslims “[...] in their idioms and from within their own threatened localities, attack the West, or Americanization, or imperialism, with little more attention to detail, critical differentiation, discrimination, and distinction than has been lavished on them by the West”.<sup>371</sup> This ought to be understood in the same way as the Orientalist feature that Said elaborates, according to which, the knowledge of the Orientalist about the Oriental is what paves the way for the creation of the identity of the former but which, subsequently, becomes the breeding ground for the latter to establish respectively *his* identity according to that same imposed Orientalist knowledge.

Thus, his thesis does not only hold the West amenable for the antagonizing reactions, but it even upbraids the West for the imposition of an identity on the ‘other’, whereas, in his own deductive and constructivist<sup>372</sup> theory, “the Orient is never seen as an actor, an agent with free will or designs or ideas of its own”.<sup>373</sup> In addition, two paradoxical issues are discernible from Said’s line of thought. First, while he opposes the dichotomy of East and West by perceiving it as a Western imperialistic and ignorant creation<sup>374</sup> that has no objective existence<sup>375</sup>, he himself deploys this dichotomy. He does this by arguing that the Western and Arab world are two distinct worlds. And what distinguishes them is, firstly, the lack of contact between the Western nations and their Eastern counterparts, and, secondly, the barrier of language and religion that differentiates them from one another.<sup>376</sup> Second, Said attempts to convey the

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<sup>369</sup> David Barsamian, ‘They call all resistance “terrorism” ’ [2001], Issue 19, *International Socialist Review*

<sup>370</sup> Edward W Said, ‘The Clash of Ignorance’ *The Nation* (New York 4 October 2001) <<http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=full>> accessed 25 July 2012

<sup>371</sup> Edward W Said, *Culture & Imperialism* (Vintage, London 1994) 376

<sup>372</sup> James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (HUP, Cambridge 1988) 257

<sup>373</sup> Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism* (Prometheus Books, New York 2007) 28, 246

<sup>374</sup> Edward W Said, ‘The Clash of Ignorance’ *The Nation* (New York 4 October 2001) <<http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=full>> accessed 25 July 2012

<sup>375</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 288

<sup>376</sup> David Barsamian, *Culture and Resistance: Conversations with Edward W. Said* (Pluto Press, London 2003)

impression that the notion of terrorism is a fictitious Western invention<sup>377</sup> in order to create this dichotomy. This is, however, a flagrant trivialization of the very existence of terrorism, and an egregious blurring of the devastations – both in human and material terms – that this phenomenon brings about. And while Peter Berkowitz places it in a broader perspective in order “[...] to demonstrate that the Orient and the West are ‘supreme fictions’, Said cavalierly effaces the vital distinction between terrorist attacks on civilians and wars by liberal democracies against terrorist organizations and ruthless dictators: The suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of September 11 and their aftermath in the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq”.<sup>378</sup>

The elaboration above leads us, thus far, to the inevitable conclusion that Said’s *ex parte* bearing is paradoxically entrapped in a prejudiced horizon as regards the West. And it goes even so far as to almost condone phenomena such as terrorism, despite his own assertion that a ‘rhetoric of blame’ undermines the potential for social change. Accordingly, Mona Abaza and Georg Stauth are right in criticizing Said’s concept of knowledge-power interplay, and in conceiving it as “[...] a reductionist Foucaultian discourse on epistemes of cultural classification of the Other, [for] his paradigm of knowledge/power and attempts at better and deeper understanding of the Other, and thus of doing less injustice to the local, indigenous people, brings about a false framework of indigenous culture and religion which denies a long history of productive cultural exchange”.<sup>379</sup> It also leads to ‘Orientalism in reverse’, i.e. ‘going native’, which is manifested by an apologetic attitude towards Islamic fundamentalism<sup>380</sup> that fails, above all, to put historical facts into perspective or to mention them all unselectively.<sup>381</sup> The menace of Said’s *ex parte* antagonism becomes also tangible once we take into consideration the way he endeavors to explain the cause of the extraneous Western representation of ‘others’. According to him, the imperialistic Western representation of the Orient and Islam, as briefly touched upon above, is explainable against the background

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<sup>377</sup> For instance, Said asserts that “terrorism has become a sort of screen created since the end of the Cold War by policymakers in Washington, as well as a whole group of people, like Samuel Huntington and Steven Emerson, who have their ticket in that pursuit. It is fabricated to keep the population afraid and insecure, and to justify what the United States wishes to do globally. [...] the whole history of terrorism has a pedigree in the policies of imperialists”. David Barsamian, ‘They call all resistance “terrorism”’ [2001], Issue 19, *International Socialist Review*

<sup>378</sup> <<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5664>> accessed 8 March 2012

<sup>379</sup> Mona Abaza and George Stauth, ‘Occidental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic Fundamentalism: A Critique’ (1988) 3 *Int Sociol* 343, 344

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.* Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King (eds), *Globalization, Knowledge and Society* (SAGE Publications, London 1990) 210

<sup>381</sup> Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (Routledge, London 2001) 80

of the fact that “if the mind must suddenly deal with what it takes to be a radically new form of life [...] the response on the whole is conservative and defensive”.<sup>382</sup> Additionally, he asserts that in general, “[...] all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into units of knowledge’. [...] ‘It is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist the assault on it of untreated strangeness; therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these other cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be’.<sup>383</sup> Said applies this reasoning, which actually makes the reciprocity of antagonism evident merely to Occidentals by stating that “[...] the Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something into something else: he does this for himself, for the sake of his culture [...]”<sup>384</sup> which deems to have led to misrepresentations of the Orient and Islam in the West. What is, thus, lopsided in this is the fact that Said wittingly fails to acknowledge and apply the same reasoning concerning the human mind and culture to the representation of the West by ‘others’. The aim of this is to hold the West amenable and to depict these others as the victims, whereas this same reasoning concerning the human mind and culture is, *mutatis mutandis*, applicable to the perception of the West by ‘others’. This is relevant as regards the aforementioned causative root of antagonism, which is said to be embedded in the Western agency. However, as stated above, one of the inconsistencies of his thesis is the fact that “at several points in his book, Said contends that the Orient had no objective existence. In other places he seems to imply that it did exist, but that the Orientalists systematically misrepresented [and misinterpreted<sup>385</sup>] it”<sup>386</sup>, while in other instances he himself depicts the East and West along linguistic and religious lines as two distinct worlds<sup>387</sup> by deliberately omitting the Orientals for representing themselves. And as Irwin rightly points out, “if indeed the Orient did not exist, it should not be possible to misrepresent it”.<sup>388</sup> But “for Said, however, they seem to exist [yet] only when Orientalists write about them. Surely that is a truly “Orientalist” position, by Said’s own pejorative definition. Orientals could not be autonomous individuals or moral subjects with their own desires, in charge of their destiny, but only passive subjects or helpless victims of Western conspiracies. Said could not

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<sup>382</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 59

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid* 67

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>385</sup> For instance, Said contends that international luminaries have pontificated about Islam’s troubles in Edward W Said, ‘The Clash of Ignorance’ *The Nation* (New York 4 October 2001)

<<http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=full>> accessed 25 July 2012

<sup>386</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 288

<sup>387</sup> David Barsamian, *Culture and Resistance: Conversations with Edward W. Said* (Pluto Press, London 2003)

<sup>388</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 291

acknowledge that they were actively and politically engaged with the world, for it would destroy the main thrust of his argument”.<sup>389</sup> What is more, he does not only consider the West itself as the cause of antagonism, and is not only silent about perceptions regarding the Occident held by Occidentalists, but he rebuts even an autonomous existence of a corresponding equivalent of Orientalism in the Orient.<sup>390</sup> And whenever he sporadically touches upon the phenomenon of ‘Occidentalism’, as noted above, he blames the Orientalist for making the Oriental into the Occidental cultural figure he would become. For he argues that the Orientalist, by emphasizing the difference between Eastern ancient tradition and Western modernity<sup>391</sup>, maintains even the prejudices against and the inherent fear of Islam<sup>392</sup> and menace of *jihād*<sup>393</sup>; not a fear of “[...] destruction of Western civilization but rather the destruction of barriers that kept East and West from each other”.<sup>394</sup>

Thence, in his apologetic trivialization<sup>395</sup>, Said argues that “[...] Western society did not face a significant threat from terrorists of an Islamic fundamentalist persuasion. The real danger in the encounter between the East and West arose from Western misrepresentation of Islam”.<sup>396</sup> Thus, as far as he does not deny the very existence of the concept of Occidentalism, he considers it to be the antithetical byproduct of Orientalism itself, and this is why Buruma and Margalit, who share Said’s view that Occidentalism is a Western invention, are also erring by contending that “[...] Occidentalism, like capitalism, Marxism, and many other modern isms, was born in Europe, before it was transferred to other parts of the world”.<sup>397</sup> However, this perception that the first Occidentalists were Europeans<sup>398</sup> is not shared by everyone and is even contested by others like Alastair Bonnett who argues that “[...] the West is not merely a Western creation but something that many people around the world have long been imagining and stereotyping, employing and deploying’ [and hence] ‘[...] far from being merely a response to Western images of ‘self’ and ‘other’, it has often exhibited novel and influential ways of defining the West [and thus contrary to Said and those who share his view]

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<sup>389</sup> Ibn Warraq, *Why the West Is Best: A Muslim Apostate’s Defense of Liberal Democracy* (Encounter Books, New York 2011) 143-144

<sup>390</sup> Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, London 2003) 50, 204

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid* 269

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid* 253-254

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid* 287

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid* 263

<sup>395</sup> Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (Verso, London 2008) 198

<sup>396</sup> Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism & Its Discontents* (Overlook Press, Woodstock 2006) 306

<sup>397</sup> Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (Atlantic Books, London 2005) 6

<sup>398</sup> *Ibid* 22

it was the non-West that invented the West”.<sup>399</sup> Even with regard to radical Islamism, which Bonnett perceives to have come into being in the context of Western dominance, he, nevertheless, argues that we ought to comprehend this phenomenon in its own terms, since its relationship to the West has been one that ‘others’ the West in order to give shape and force to Islamic revival and to suppress the political and religious traditions of Islamic societies.<sup>400</sup> However, a further discussion of this ongoing question as to whether antagonism is caused by the West itself concerns an altercation which is yet to be settled. Therefore, any further engagement in this agitation is falling prey to this vicious circle that reaches beyond the scope of this research. More important is recognizing the undeniability of this civilizational clash which has occurred as a consequence of the dichotomous antagonism that has been fostered by pluralism of this age of globalization.

Hence, the foregoing has clarified that disregard for the concept of civilization by globalism in apprehending the current civilizational antagonism can result in existential menaces with unprecedented repercussions that, based on that same neglected concept, not only contain criticism towards the West, but go so far as to condone the animosities and outrages. This is why, in antagonizing the West and rendering it culpable of any opposition to it, Said tends to conceive the operation of ideology in others’ narratives and conceptions of truth except in his own<sup>401</sup>, which means thus that he himself is entrapped in the ideological dichotomy of Orientalism and Occidentalism<sup>402</sup>, that is, the East-West paradox from which the force of his entire ontological and epistemological polemic ensues.<sup>403</sup> This implies that “the reverse side of his ‘Orientalism’ is [inevitably] an ‘Occidentalism’ whereby his analysis of ‘the West’ follows precisely the same Enlightenment malpractices which he criticizes in the latter’s approaches to ‘the East’. He represents European culture in ways which essentialize, objectify, demean, de-rationalize, and de-historicize it”.<sup>404</sup> What is more, as we saw already, “[...] the kind of essentializing procedure which Said associates exclusively with ‘the West’ is by no means a trait of the European alone; any number of Muslims routinely draw epistemological and ontological distinctions between East and West, the Islamicate and Christendom, and when [for instance] Ayatollah Khomeini did it he hardly did so from an

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<sup>399</sup> Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History* (Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2004) 1-2

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid* 151

<sup>401</sup> Valerie Kennedy, *Edward Said: A Critical Introduction* (Polity Press, Cambridge 2000) 78

<sup>402</sup> James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (HUP, Cambridge 1988) 271

<sup>403</sup> Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (Verso, London 2008) 182. Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism* (Prometheus Books, New York 2007) 32

<sup>404</sup> Robin W Winks (ed), *Oxford History of the British Empire: Historiography* (OUP, Oxford 1999) 197

Orientalist position”.<sup>405</sup> This is why some scholars have soundly argued that “Said’s work, with its strident anti-Westernism, has made the goal of modernization of Middle Eastern societies that much more difficult. His work, wherein all the ills of Middle Eastern societies are blamed on the wicked West, has rendered much-needed self-criticism by Muslims, Arab, and non-Arab alike, nearly impossible”.<sup>406</sup>

The preceding discourse leads us to the conclusion that the aforementioned dichotomous antagonism does not stop at a mere criticism of the West but, as has become evident, it goes so far as to condone perilous discontent that, in essence, aims to annihilate and intimidate the West and, subsequently, to undermine the fundamental rights and freedoms in general and the fundamental right to freedom of expression in particular. As to this perilous aim, Paul Cliteur rightly observes that one can distinguish two phases regarding the limitation of this fundamental right. Before 1989, the only constraints of this right stemmed from the legislations of the nation-state. After this period, violent networks and individuals also confine this fundamental right.<sup>407</sup> Examples of this include the Rushdie affair<sup>408</sup>, the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, death threats at the address of Dutch politician, Geert Wilders, and when this failed, his continued persecution through the Dutch criminal law.<sup>409</sup> The underlying aim of such actions is not only the restriction of the freedom of expression of the person in question but – through an attack on the person – to create a sense of fear that leads, in general, to appeasement and self-censorship<sup>410</sup>, i.e. curtailment of the freedom of expression. In this regard, it is worth noting that due to globalization, and thus “thanks to [among others] the rapid development of the media, and especially of television, the more recent forms of terrorism are aimed not at specific and limited enemy objectives but at world opinion. Their primary purpose is not to defeat or even to weaken the enemy militarily but to gain publicity and to inspire fear – a psychological victory”.<sup>411</sup> This sense of fear has thus resulted in the fact that “[...] many liberals in the West, from government officials to academics and journalists, have failed to stand up for our fundamental liberties

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<sup>405</sup> Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (Verso, London 2008) 183-184

<sup>406</sup> Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism* (Prometheus Books, New York 2007) 54

<sup>407</sup> Paul Cliteur, ‘Van Rushdie tot Jones: over geweld en uitingsvrijheid’ in Afshin Ellian, Gelijn Molier and Tom Zwart (eds), *Mag ik dit zeggen? Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting* (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag 2011) 67-87

<sup>408</sup> Daniel Pipes, *The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West* (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick 2003)

<sup>409</sup> This was done through the so-called “Article 12 Sv-procedure”, that is, Article 12 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure

<sup>410</sup> Paul Cliteur, ‘Godslastering en zelfcensuur na de moord op Theo van Gogh’ (2004) *NJB* 45, 2328-2335

<sup>411</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Phoenix, London 2004) 125

[...] but instead have engaged in appeasement and self-censorship”.<sup>412</sup> In addition, the sense of guilt that runs through Western liberalism can produce a corrosive self-hatred which is destructive for the West. This is why it can be argued that we need to ascertain our Western values and confirm their superiority in order to preserve our culture<sup>413</sup>, that is, we need to (re-)affirm the uniqueness of Western civilization.<sup>414</sup>

In other words, the fear of violence creates two types of reactions from within the West and among Occidentals, leading to the suspension of fundamental rights in general and the freedom of expression in particular. There is, namely, an unconditional expression of solidarity with those who are offended, and a sweeping disqualification of those who exercise their freedom of expression.<sup>415</sup> And the influence of theories, like “the influence of Said, has [firstly] resulted in the deliberate obfuscation or ignoring of the evidence, where the empirical data are forced into the Procrustean bed prepared by historians afraid of seeming to endorse anything smacking of racism, colonialism, and imperialism”<sup>416</sup>, since the “Post-World War II Western intellectuals and leftists [have been] consumed by guilt for the West’s colonial past and continuing colonialist present, and they wholeheartedly [have embraced] any theory or ideology that voiced or at least seemed to voice the putatively thwarted aspirations of the peoples of the third world”.<sup>417</sup> Thus, at the heart of the Western response is, among others, a political correctness but also a psychological negation, as will be seen in the course of this survey, of the nature and magnitude of the radical Islamist menace.<sup>418</sup> And so, it can be inferred that our contemporary epoch, which is underpinned by the process of globalization with its pluralism, has not only had positive sides, but also unforeseeable negative impacts on human life that are not always recognized. It is then also the undeniable presence of this human dimension which is mainly underplayed while, at the same time, it has actually been the main source of antagonism that has fostered, if not brought about, civilizational clashes. As it has been elaborated in the course of our inquiry, this has especially imperiled the

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<sup>412</sup> Ibn Warraq, *Why the West Is Best: A Muslim Apostate’s Defense of Liberal Democracy* (Encounter Books, New York 2011) 185

<sup>413</sup> Ibn Warraq, *Why the West Is Best: A Muslim Apostate’s Defense of Liberal Democracy* (Encounter Books, New York 2011) 202, 203

<sup>414</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, London 2002) 20-21

<sup>415</sup> Paul Cliteur, ‘Van Rushdie tot Jones: over geweld en uitingsvrijheid’ in Afshin Ellian, Gelijn Molier and Tom Zwart (eds), *Mag ik dit zeggen? Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting* (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag 2011) 67-87

<sup>416</sup> Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism* (Prometheus Books, New York 2007) 168

<sup>417</sup> Ibid 246

<sup>418</sup> Tony Blankley, *The West’s Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?* (Regnery Publishing, Washington 2005) xii

fundamental rights and freedoms in general and the fundamental right to freedom of expression in particular. Accordingly, this confining menace posed to the fundamental right to freedom of expression underpins the following part of our research. More concrete, in the second part of our study, an attempt will be made to assess, from a legal perspective, this limiting impact of antagonism that emanates from this accelerated pluralism as far as this fundamental right is concerned. But before doing so, an attempt will be made to explain why exactly this fundamental right is at risk of being confined, which we subsequently aim to scrutinize.