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## **Parliamentary committees in a party-centred context : structure, composition, functioning**

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# Appendices

**Appendix 1: Table A1: Overview of electoral systems for 33 directly elected chambers with strong parliamentary party groups**

Country	Size (length term) - Mode of election
<i>Austria: House of Representatives<sup>LH</sup></i>	150 (3 years) - Preferential voting (Alternative Vote) in 150 single-member districts (SMD)
<i>Australia: Nationalrat<sup>LH</sup></i>	183 (5 years) - PR flexible list regional districts ( <i>Regionalwahlkreise</i> ) in 9 country districts ( <i>Landeswahlkreise</i> ) (size 7-36). Seats allocated in three steps: Regional, country, federal level
<i>Belgium: Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers<sup>LH</sup></i>	150 (4 years) - Open list PR in 11 multi-member constituencies (MMC) (district magnitude 4-24 in 2010)
<i>Canada: House of Commons<sup>LH</sup></i>	308 (4 years) - Simple plurality ('First-Past-the-Post' - FPTP) in 308 SMDs
<i>Croatia: Hrvatski sabor</i>	151 (In 2011. Constitution prescribes minimum of 100 and a maximum of 160 members) (4 years) - PR in MMCs, 5 percent threshold. 10 districts with 14 candidates. One district for the diaspora (max. 12 seats, number depending on turnout) + one district (8 members) for ethnic minorities - 3 Serbian legislators elected in ethnic multi-member district by plurality rule and 5 other minority groups elect 1 legislator each in SMDs (since 2003).
<i>Czech Republic: Poslanecká sněmovna<sup>LH</sup></i>	200 (4 years) - Open-list PR in 14 MMC (magnitude 5-25 in 2010).
<i>Denmark: Folketing</i>	179 (4 years) - 175 from 10 MMCs in three provinces (135 constituency seats + 40 compensatory seats). District magnitude 10 - 21 (outlier Bornholms Storkreds: 2 MPs). 2 MPs from the Faroe Islands and Greenland
<i>Estonia: Riigikogu</i>	101 (4 years) - Open-list PR, 12 MMCs (district magnitude 6-13); MPs elected in three rounds of counting (simple quota, candidate lists of parties receiving more than 5 per cent of the votes nationally, national candidate lists with at least 5 per cent of the national vote)
<i>Finland: Eduskunta</i>	200 (4 years) - Open-list PR in 15 electoral districts (district magnitude 6-34, district Åland 1) (d'Hondt)

<i>France: Assemblée Nationale</i> <sup>LH</sup>	577 (5 years) - Runoff voting system in 577 constituencies (555 in France and 22 overseas). Candidates need to obtain an absolute majority of valid votes and a vote total equal to at least one quarter of the registered electorate to be elected. If no candidate achieves this, a run-off election between candidates polling a number of votes greater than or equal to 12.5 per cent of the electorate is held; in case fewer than two candidates meet this requirement, run-off election only between top two candidates. In 2nd round, candidate obtaining the largest number of votes is elected.
<i>Germany: Bundestag</i> <sup>LH</sup>	598 (4 years) - Mixed-member PR; 299 candidates in SMD (simple majority), 299 elected via party lists in the individual Länder. Surplus mandates (German: <i>Überhangmandate</i> ) are kept (occur when a party wins more constituency seats than it is entitled to according to its share of the second votes - 22 in 2009).
<i>Greece: Vouli ton Ellinon</i>	300 (4 years) - Open-list PR, 288 seats in 56 single- or multi-member constituencies; one MMC (nationwide) for 12 'state deputies'
<i>Hungary: Országház</i>	386 (4 years) - 176 SMDs in two round system; 152 MPs in 20 territorial MMCs via PR (simple electoral quotient), remaining 58 Deputies are chosen from "national lists" of candidates. From 2014: One round system replaces the formerly existing system.
<i>Iceland: Althing</i>	63 (4 years) - PR, 6 MMCs (district magnitude 9 plus 1-2 adjustment seats)
<i>Ireland: (Dáil Éireann)</i> <sup>LH</sup>	166 (5 years) - PR-STV in 43 constituencies (district magnitude 3-5)
<i>Israel: Knesset</i>	120 (4 years) - Closed-list PR in nation-wide district
<i>Italy: Camera dei Deputati</i> <sup>LH</sup>	630 (5 years) - Closed-list PR, 617 members elected in 26 MMCs (outlier Aosta Valley district 1 MP); remaining 12 are elected by Italians living abroad. If below 340 seats, political coalition or party with highest number of votes receives "bonus" seats to meet 340-seat requirement. Remaining seats distributed among the other lists via whole number quotient and highest remainders method
<i>Japan: Shūgiin</i> <sup>LH</sup>	480 (4 years) - Mixed member majoritarian: 300 in SMDs; 180 in 11 MMCs (magnitude 6 - 30)

<i>Latvia: Saeima</i>	100 (5 years) - Open-list PR in 5 MMCs (district magnitude 14-29)
<i>Lithuania: Seimas</i>	141 (4 years) - Mixed: 71 in SMDs, 70 in nationwide MMC using PR
<i>Luxembourg: Chambre des Députés</i>	60 (5 years) - PR in 4 MMCs (district magnitude 7-23) via panachage .
<i>Malta: House of Representatives</i>	69 (5 years) - PR-STV in 13 MMCs (district magnitude 5); remaining 4 seats distributed according to national vote
<i>Netherlands: Tweede Kamer<sup>LH</sup></i>	150 (4 years) - Open-list PR (voorkeurstemmen - 'preference votes') in nation-wide district
<i>New Zealand: House of Representatives</i>	120 (3 years) - Mixed-member proportional; 'electorate vote' for 7 Maori and 63 general electorates (SMDs) (2009 election). 'Party vote' used to represent parties in proportion to the share of votes won (if party wins at least 1 electorate seat, or 5 per cent of all party votes)
<i>Norway: Storting</i>	169 (4 years) - Closed-list PR in 19 MMCs (district magnitude 4-17). 150 elected as constituency representatives + 19 'compensatory seats' (one per constituency) to even out discrepancies between number of votes received and seats in parliament
<i>Poland: Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej<sup>LH</sup></i>	460 (4 years) - Open-list PR in 41 MMCs (district magnitude 7-20) .
<i>Portugal: Assembleia da República</i>	230 (4 years) - Closed-list PR in MMCs. 18 mainland PT (district magnitude 3-47 in 2011), 1 district each for the Azores and Madeira (2 legislators). Portuguese living in Western Europe, and Portuguese living in the rest of the world treated as 1 constituencies each (2 legislators)
<i>Slovakia: Národná rada</i>	150 (4 years) - Semi open-list PR in a nationwide district (party vote and up to 4 preference votes within the same list possible). Preference in allocation of seats if candidate obtains 3 per cent of the party's vote
<i>Slovenia: Državni zbor<sup>LH</sup></i>	90 (4 years) - Open-list PR in 8 electoral districts (district magnitude 11), plus 2 special constituencies representing Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities (simple majority)

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<i>Spain: Congreso de los Diputados</i> <sup>LH</sup>	350 (4 years) - Closed-list PR in 50 MMCs (min. 2 seats per province, the rest allotted according to population (highest Madrid: 36 in 2011); 2 single-member constituencies (North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla).
<i>Sweden: Riksdag</i>	349 (4 years) - Open-list PR in 29 MMCs (district magnitude 2-42): 310 fixed constituency seats + 39 adjustment seats allocated according to party and then according to constituency
<i>Switzerland: Nationalrat</i> <sup>LH</sup>	200 (4 years) - Open-list PR in 20 cantons (district magnitude 2-34), 6 cantons with one MP majority vote , panachage ( <i>panaschieren</i> - indicate preferred candidates of other parties) and cumulate ( <i>kumulieren</i> - list a particular 'double')
<i>United Kingdom: House of Commons</i> <sup>LH</sup>	650 (5 years) - FPTP in 650 SMDs (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland)

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Source: Own data set.



Appendix 2: Table A2: Committee structures overview - Part 1

Country	Number of Committees <sup>213</sup> of the whole House	Size legislative <i>ad hoc</i> / permanent com's (min/max)	Jurisdiction correspondence	Membership restriction (limit)	Rules subcom's (Number)	Same committees in last 2 LPs? <sup>1</sup>
Austria (Nationalrat)	3/0/0/28/3/1/No	n.a. / Not fixed (25/35)	Almost complete correspondence	No	Mandatory for 7 sub-committees. For others neither mandatory, nor prohibited (7)	Yes, with exceptions
Belgium (Chamber of Representatives)	0/0/0/14/13/No	n.a./ Fixed (19/20)	Subject based. Broad coverage	No	Possible with consent of the Conference of Presidents	unknown
Canada (House of Commons)	2/2/0/24/1/2/Yes	Fixed (16/16) / Fixed (12/12)	Almost complete correspondence	No	Possible, not mandatory (3), subcommittees on agenda procedure	No, Nr. committees / jurisdiction changed.
Czech Republic (Chamber of Deputies)	0/0/0/14/11/No	n.a. / Not fixed (18/38)	Subject based. Broad coverage	Yes (2)	Possible, not mandatory (0)	No, number of committees has increased.

<sup>213</sup> *ad hoc* non-leg./ *ad hoc* legis./ Perm. leg./ special./ admin./joint

Denmark (Folketing)	0/0/0/26/7/- No	n.a. / 17/29)	Fixed (to	Almost complete correspondence	Only indep. MPs (2)	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	Yes
Estonia (Riigikogu)	2/0/0/11/3/- No	n.a. / (8/19)	Not fixed	Almost complete correspondence	Yes (1)	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	Yes
Finland (Eduskunta)	0/0/0/16/0/- No	n.a. / Fixed (11/25)	Fixed (11/25)	Almost complete correspondence	No	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (8)	Yes
France (National Assembly)	4/0/0/9/1/1 No	n.a. / Fixed (54/79)	Fixed (54/79)	Subject based. Crude coverage, min. portfolios merged.	Yes (1) <sup>2</sup>	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	No, Nr. committees / jurisdiction changed.
Germany (Bundestag)	2/0/0/20/2/2 No	n.a. / (18/41)	Not fixed	Complete correspondence (plus additional committees).	No	Possible, not mandatory (12)	No, Nr. committees / jurisdiction changed.
Greece (Hellenic Parliament)	0/0/0/10/13/ No	n.a. / Fixed (31/31)	Fixed (31/31)	Subject based, crude coverage. 2-4 minist. portfolios	No	Mandatory for 1 sub-committee. For others possible, not mandatory (4)	Yes, with exceptions
Hungary (National Assembly)	12/0/0/19/1/ No	n.a. / (13/28)	Not fixed	Subject based, crude coverage. 2-4 minist. portfolios	Yes (1)	Yes, mandatory one per committee, other possible (19)	Yes, with exceptions
Iceland (Althing)	0/0/0/8/0/- No	n.a. / Fixed (9/9)	Fixed (9/9)	Almost complete correspondence	Yes (2)	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	Yes
Ireland (Dáil Éireann)	0/0/0/12/3/1 <sup>Yes</sup>	n.a./ (9/21)	Not fixed	Almost complete correspondence, single ministries cross-covered. <sup>3</sup>	No	Possible, not mandatory (11)	No, Nr. committees / jurisdiction changed.

Israel (Knesset)	3/0/0/11/3/-/No	n.a. / (9/17)	Not fixed	Subject based. Crude coverage	No	Possible, mandatory (0)	not Yes
Italy (Chamber of Deputies)	1/0/0/14/4/10/0	n.a. / (43/47)	Not fixed	Almost complete correspondence	Yes (1)	Possible, mandatory (0) <sup>4</sup>	not Yes
Japan (House of Representatives)	10/0/0/14/4/0/0	n.a. / Fixed (30/45)	Fixed	Complete correspondence to all ministries	No	Possible, mandatory (0)	not Yes
Latvia (Saeima)	3/0/0/13/2/-/No	n.a. / (5/20)	Not fixed	Subject based. Crude coverage, portfolios merged	Yes <sup>5</sup>	Possible, mandatory (not more than 2 per committee) (14)	not Yes, with exceptions
Lithuania (Seimas)	11/0/0/15/0/0/No	n.a. / Limited (7/17)	Limited	Almost complete correspondence, single ministries cross-covered.	Yes (1) <sup>6</sup>	Possible, mandatory (0)	not Yes
Luxembourg (Chamber of Deputies)	1/0/0/18/5/-/No	n.a. / Limited (5/13)	Limited	Almost complete correspondence	No	Possible, mandatory (0)	not No, Nr. committees / jurisdiction changed.
Malta (House of Representatives)	3/0/1/6/3/-/Yes	n.a. / Limited (5/9)	Limited	Subject based, crude coverage, portfolios merged	No	Possible, mandatory (0)	not unknown
Netherlands (Tweede Kamer)	5/0/0/13/7/0/No	n.a. / (25/26)	Not fixed	Almost complete correspondence	No	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	No, Nr. committees / jurisdiction changed.

Norway (Storting)	1/0/0/12/3/- No (11/18)	n.a./ (11/18)	Not fixed	Subject- based, broad correspondence	No <sup>7</sup>	Possible, not mandatory (0)	Yes, with exceptions
Poland (Sejm)	0/5/1/20/6/0 No (20/55)	n.a. / (20/55)	Not fixed	Subject- based, broad correspondence	Yes (2)	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (33) <sup>8</sup>	Yes, with exceptions
Portugal (Assembly of the Republic)	4/0/0/12/0/- No (20/23)	n.a. / (20/23)	Not fixed	Subject- based, broad correspondence	Yes (1) <sup>9</sup>	Possible, not mandatory (0)	Yes, with exceptions
Slovakia (National Council)	0/0/0/13/6/- No (11/15)	n.a. / (11/15)	Not fixed	Subject- based, broad correspondence.	No	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	Yes
Slovenia (National Assembly)	2/1/0/14/7/- No (15/21)	19 / (15/21)	Not fixed	Complete correspondence to all ministries	No	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	Yes, with exceptions
Spain (Congress of Deputies)	1/0/0/17/7/5 No (45/45)	n.a. / (45/45)	Not fixed	Almost complete correspondence	No	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	Yes
Sweden (Riksdag)	0/0/0/16/1/- No (17/17)	n.a. / (17/17)	Not fixed	Subject- based, broad correspondence.	No	Neither mandatory, nor prohibited (0)	Yes
Switzerland (National Council)	0/0/0/11/5/1 No (25/25)	n.a. / (25/25)	Not fixed	Subject based, crude portfolios merged coverage.	No	Possible, not mandatory (0)	Yes

United Kingdom (House of Commons)	0/9/0/0/35/9	Yes	16/21 <sup>10</sup> / n.a.	Not applicable w.r.t. committees. <sup>1</sup>	No	Possible for Public Bill and Select Departmental Com's	Yes
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Appendix 2 (continued): Table A3: Committee structures overview - Part 2

	Members assignment via	Selection chairs	Allocation chairs among PPGs	Openness committee meetings
<b>AUT</b>	President, lists of PPGs, formal vote in House	By vote in committee	Proportionally	Private. Open to all government members
<b>BE</b>	House via vote	President of the House, proposal of Conference of Presidents.	Proportionally <sup>1/2</sup>	Always public, exceptions possible
<b>CAN</b>	Party whips submit names to Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, voted on by House	By vote in committee	Mostly majority party	Principally open to the public and the media; 'in camera'-meetings possible
<b>CR</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Proportionally	Always public, exceptions possible
<b>DK</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Proportionally	Ordinary meetings private; exceptions possible
<b>ES</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Mostly government PPGs	Private, open to members of the government, also representatives of state agencies and other persons (if invited); public at request.
<b>FIN</b>	House via vote	By vote in committee	Proportionally divided between six largest PPGs	Private

<b>FR</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Mostly largest majority block party	Private
<b>GER</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Proportionally, negotiations in Council of Elders.	Open to MPs. Otherwise private, exceptionally public. At final stage public debates possible.
<b>GR</b>	Via negotiations in parliamentary body	By vote in committee	Proportionally	Public, exceptions possible
<b>HUN</b>	Formally House, negotiations in ppGs	Speaker of Parliament	Proportionally	Public
<b>IC</b>	Chairmen of PPGs	Compromise between PPGs, otherwise vote in committee.	Mostly government PPGs <sup>13</sup>	Special rules <sup>14</sup>
<b>IE</b>	<i>Ad hoc</i> meeting of party whips <sup>15</sup>	By vote in committee	Mostly government (only TDs)	Public (can be excluded) and other MPs
<b>IS</b>	PPGs	Selecting committee, then formal vote in committee	Proportionally largest PPGs	7 Public, exceptions possible
<b>ITA</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Almost exclusively two largest PPGs	Private, proceedings published as reports
<b>JP</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Exclusively government PPGs.	Always public, exceptions possible
<b>LAT</b>	unknown	By vote in committee	Disproportionally among government PPGs	Public, closed meetings possible
<b>LIT</b>	PPGs and House via vote	Conference of Chairs	Proportionally among government PPGs	Principally public, exceptions possible
<b>LUX</b>	PPGs <sup>16</sup>	By vote in committee	Almost exclusively government PPGs	Principally private

<b>MLT</b>	PPGs	Leader of the House / Government for some committees. Otherwise committee.	Almost exclusively majority party	Public or private
<b>NL</b>	President	By vote in committee	Proportionally among PPGs with 12+ MPs <sup>17</sup>	Principally public, Chamber and committee may decide to make certain parts private.
<b>NOR</b>	House, after proposal of the President.	By vote in committee, negotiations in PPGs	Proportionally	Principally private
<b>POL</b>	House <sup>18</sup>	By vote in committee	Regulated. Proportionally	Public with rare exceptions. Participation possible after approval by the chair. <sup>19</sup>
<b>POR</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Regulated. Proportionally	Public, in camera meetings possible
<b>SLK</b>	House via vote	By House via vote	Proportionally	Public, exceptions possible
<b>SLO</b>	PPGs	unknown	Regulated. Proportionally	Always public, exceptions possible
<b>ESP</b>	PPGs	By vote in committee	Mostly majority party (GP)	Open to Government; Otherwise closed, except media (when not secret)
<b>SW</b>	House via vote	By vote in committee	Proportionally	Principally private, with exceptions
<b>SUI</b>	PPGs	Bureau of the Chamber, proposal by PPGs	Proportionally	Private, usually 3-4 meetings per quarter
<b>UK</b>	PBC: Committee of Selection. SDC: PPG. <sup>20</sup>	PBC, Speaker from Speaker's Panel of senior backbenchers. SDC: Whole house	Equally divided in legislative committees	Public <sup>21</sup>

Appendix 2 (continued): Table A4: Committee structures overview - Part 3

	Allocation bills by	Committee stage	Sim. meetings with plenum	Initiation rights	Split / merge	Right to kill a bill	Minority reports
<b>AUT</b>	President's Conference	After first reading	No	Yes for committee motions	Yes, both	Yes	Yes
<b>BE</b>	Negotiations in Conference of Presidents	Before first reading	No, exception possible	Yes	Yes, both	Yes	No
<b>CAN</b>	Motion by minister	Before OR after second reading (differences in committee power)	Possible	Only if instructed by Minister	Only merge <sup>22</sup>	No	No
<b>CR</b>	Via President/Speaker of the House	Before and after second reading	No	No	No	No	Yes
<b>DK</b>	House	After first reading	Possible <sup>23</sup>	No	No	No	No
<b>ES</b>	Board of Rigikogou	After first reading	No, committee meetings regulated in SO	Yes	Only merge	No	No
<b>FIN</b>	House, proposal of Speaker's Council	After first reading	No	Special rules <sup>24</sup>	No	No	Yes
<b>FR</b>	President of the Assembly	Before first reading	No, only immediate consideration	No for	No	No	No

<b>GER</b>	President, negotiations in Council of Elders	After first reading	Possible	Yes	No	No	Yes
<b>GR</b>	Speaker, with consent of Conference of Presidents	After first reading	Special rules	No	No	No	Yes
<b>HUN</b>	Speaker of the House	Before plenary debate (on necessity of the bill; then during general debate and during debate in detail)	Possible, except when votes are scheduled	Yes	No	No (Only Private Bills)	Yes
<b>IC</b>	Speaker of the House	After first reading	No	Yes	No	Yes <sup>25</sup>	Yes
<b>IE</b>	Government chief whip	After general debate (third stage). Afterwards report and final stage.	Possible	No	No	No	No
<b>IS</b>	Plenary presidency <sup>26</sup> , in case of appeal House Committee	After first reading	No	Special rules <sup>27</sup>	Yes, both	Special rules <sup>28</sup>	No
<b>ITA</b>	President of the Chamber, if PPG / group of MPs disagrees House vote	Always before the reading of the floor <sup>29</sup>	No, except Speaker of the House permits	No	Yes, both	Yes, in legis. capacity	Yes
<b>JP</b>	Committee on Rules and Administration	After first reading	No, except President permits	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
<b>LAT</b>	House	Before first reading, before second reading, before third reading	No	Yes	Yes, both	No	Yes
<b>LIT</b>	House	Before first reading, before consideration, before enactment	No, except with permission (House)	No	No	No	Yes

<b>LUX</b>	Conference of Presidents	Before first reading	No	No	Yes, both <sup>30</sup>	No	No
<b>MLT</b>	Standing Committee on House Business	After second reading.	Possible, except division in House	No	No	No	No
<b>NL</b>	President and First and Second Deputy-President	After first reading	Possible	No	No	No	No
<b>NOR</b>	House, proposal by President (rarely controversial). Matters may be reallocated.	Before first reading	Possible	No	No	No	Yes
<b>POL</b>	Speaker of the House	First reading in committee, 2nd reading in case of amendments by House <sup>31</sup>	Possible	Yes	Only merge <sup>32</sup>	No	Yes
<b>POR</b>	President of the House	After first reading	No, except with permission	No	No	No	No
<b>SLK</b>	House, proposal by Speaker	After first reading	No	Yes	No	No	No
<b>SLO</b>	President of the National Assembly	Before first reading	No	No	No <sup>33</sup>	No	Yes
<b>ESP</b>	Bureau of Congress	After first reading	No	No	No	No	No
<b>SW</b>	Standing Orders matters of committee's jurisdiction, allocation by House vote	After first reading	Possible <sup>34</sup>	Yes	Yes, both <sup>35</sup>	No	Yes
<b>SUI</b>	Bureau of the Chamber, after consultation of committee	Before each reading stage	No	Yes	Yes, both	No <sup>36</sup>	No

<p><b>UK</b></p>	<p>Most bills automatically referred<sup>37</sup></p>	<p>After second debate (containing a debate the main principles of the Bill)</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>
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Appendix 2 (continued): Table A5: Committee structures overview - Part 4

	Redrafting rights	End product committee stage	Control of timetable
<b>AUT</b>	Committees are allowed to rewrite a bill; clause by clause vote on each section, formulation of recommendation for a resolution, writing a final report.	Redrafted bill or original bill with proposed amendments, recommendation for a resolution.	Committee, with right of recall by National Council <sup>38</sup>
<b>BE</b>	Committees can redraft a bill by moving amendments to alter text. Clause by clause vote on each section. Final report with summary.	Redrafted bill ("clean bill")	Committee, with recall by chairman / President of the House
<b>CAN</b>	Committees can redraft a bill by moving amendments to alter text. Special rules depending on committee <sup>39</sup>	Redrafted bill ("clean bill"), resolution recommendations	Committee, with recall by the House.
<b>CR</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Only proposal of amendments (voted on in plenum). Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Original bill with proposed amendments, recommendation for a resolution.	Chairperson, obliged to follow request of Chamber, President or 2/5 of MPs
<b>DK</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Only proposal of amendments (voted on in plenum). Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Original bill with proposed amendments (first vote on amendments), recommendation for a resolution.	Chairperson, no right of recall by plenum
<b>ES</b>	Committees can redraft a bill and prepare new text of draft legislation (contains all the accepted motions to amend and the amendments made by the leading committee itself). Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Redrafted bill ("clean bill"), recommendation for a resolution.	Meetings regulated in parliamentary working schedule, extraordinary sessions possible

<b>FIN</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Only proposal of amendments (voted on in plenum). Final report with recommendation for a resolution and draft provisions.	Original bill with amendments, recommendation for a resolution.	Proposed parliamentary working schedule, extraordinary sessions possible	Meetings regulated in parliamentary working schedule, extraordinary sessions possible
<b>FR</b>	Committees can redraft a bill. Committee debate finishes with a vote on the entire text. Report of the committee concludes with an overall modified text, with the original text or with a rejection of the bill. Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Original bill with amendments or bill drafted by committee.		Committee, no recall of plenum
<b>GER</b>	Committees can redraft a bill; text can be altered by committee members. Proposal and vote on own amendments. Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Redrafted bill ("clean bill") by leading committee, recommendation for a resolution		Chairperson within timetable drawn up by the Council of Elders, right of recall by plenum
<b>GR</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Special rules <sup>40</sup>	Original bill with amendments (if government has adopted them).		Chairperson, no right of recall by plenum
<b>HUN</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Only proposal of amendments (voted on in plenum). Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Original bill with amendments, recommendation for a resolution.		Committee, Speaker may set a deadline
<b>IC</b>	Committees can redraft the bill by including own amendments. Final report (summary).	Original bill with amendments (separately)		Chairperson, no right of recall by plenum
<b>IE</b>	Committees can redraft the bill by including own amendments.	Original bill (with amendments if government has adopted them)		Committee
<b>IS</b>	Committees can redraft a bill by moving amendments to alter text. Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Original bill with amendments (first vote on reservations)		Chairperson

<b>ITA</b>	Special rules <sup>41</sup>	Redrafted bill ("clean bill") by leading committee. Otherwise, original bill with amendments (first vote on amendments)	Chairperson, with right of recall by Speaker of the House
<b>JP</b>	Committees can redraft a bill.	Redrafted bill ("clean bill")	Committee on Rules and Administration
<b>LAT</b>	Before first reading: Proposal and consideration of amendments. Preparation of alternative draft law; After first reading: Proposal and consideration of amendments. Preparation of alternative draft law. Final report.	Original bill with proposed amendments	Chairperson
<b>LIT</b>	Committees can redraft the text of a bill, proposal and consideration (publicly called for) of amendments. Final draft of bill containing all proposed amendments (+ assessment).	Redrafted bill ("clean bill") by lead committee (vote on individual articles)	Chairperson
<b>LUX</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Only proposal of amendments (voted on in plenum). Final report with recommendation for a resolution	Original bill with proposed amendments	Committees, no right of recall
<b>MLT</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Only proposal of amendments (voted on in plenum) and new clauses. Final report with recommendation for a resolution	Original bill with proposed amendments (no further discussion of bill)	Committees control their own timetable, right of recall by PPG / group of MPs
<b>NL</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. No amendments can be proposed. During revision of laws (wetgevingsoverleg) committee meetings consist of questions and answers.	Original bill (proposal of motions / amendments only in plenum)	Committee

<b>NOR</b>	Committees can redraft the text of a bill; preparation of new text of draft legislation (contains all the accepted motions to amend and the amendments made by the leading committee itself). Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Redrafted bill ("clean bill") by leading committee, recommendation for a resolution - minority reports.	Chairperson, overrule of Presidium
<b>POL</b>	Committees can redraft the bill by including own amendments. Final report (recommendation of a decision). Can establish subcommittees for particular drafts.	House first considers amendments, then bill as a whole.	Committee, no right to recall by plenum
<b>POR</b>	Committees can redraft the text of a bill, preparation of new text of draft legislation (contains all the accepted motions to amend and the amendments made by the leading committee itself). Final report with recommendation for a resolution.	Redrafted bill ("clean bill"), recommendation for a resolution	Meetings regulated in SO
<b>SLK</b>	Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Consider and recommend amendments (voted on in plenum), final report (recommendation of a decision).	Original bill with proposed amendments	Chairperson, meetings broadly regulated in SO
<b>SLO</b>	Committees can redraft the text of a bill, proposal and vote on own amendments. Clause by clause examination and vote. Extensive power to amend (change, adding, deletion of articles)	"Second" 2nd-reading in plenum: Report of committee: including supplemented draft law (adopted amendments included), separate opinions. No new amendments may be tabled.	Chairperson
<b>ESP</b>	Committees can redraft the text of a bill. Clause by clause examination. Proposal and vote of amendments. Final report.	Redrafted bill ("clean bill"), committee report	Bureau of committee, consultation of Speaker; alteration possible through committee

- SW** Committees can redraft the text of a bill, text can be altered by committee members. Proposal and vote on own amendments. Final report with recommendation for a resolution.
- SUI** Committees can redraft the text of a bill. Proposal and vote on amendments, vote on clauses.
- UK** Committees are not allowed to rewrite a bill. Clause by clause examination, Only proposal of amendments (voted on in plenum).
- Committee report and recommendation for a resolution.
- Committees, with right of recall by majority in Plenum
- Discussion of text proposed by the committee; includes consideration and vote of amendments
- House considers original bill with committee amendments
- Committee, Bureau can set deadlines
- Special rules<sup>42</sup>

Appendix 2 (continued): Table A6: Committee structures overview - Part 5

	Own staff	Nr own staff	Administrative / Research / Document	Rights to compel witnesses? If so, who?	Openness committee hearings	Rights to demand documents from outside
<b>AUT</b>	No own staff	1 per committee	Yes on all	Compel members of the government, invite unrestricted.	Inquiry committees open to media/ public	Yes, unrestricted
	central bureau					
<b>BE</b>	Yes	unknown	Administrative and document preparation.	Compel government	Private, exceptions	Yes, unrestricted
<b>CAN</b>	Yes	Normally 1 clerk and 1 analyst	Yes on all	Compel unrestricted	Public	Yes, unrestricted
<b>CR</b>	Yes	1-2 (secretary + assistant secretary)	Only administrative	Compel cabinet member or director of a central public administration authority	Private, exceptions	Yes from ministries and any director of public administration authorities
<b>DK</b>	Yes	Most 1 clerk and 1-2 secretaries, some clerks <sup>43</sup>	Yes on all	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Public or private	No right to demand documents from outside

<b>ES</b>	Yes	Usually 2-4 advisers or secretaries	Yes on all	Compel government members, invite unrestricted. Committee of investigation compel unrestricted.	Private, exceptions	with	Yes, from government and agencies of the executive power
<b>FIN</b>	Yes	Varies from 2-6	Yes on all	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Private		Yes, from public agencies ministries or
<b>FR</b>	Yes	Varies from 10-40	Yes on all	Committees do not have the right to hear any witnesses	Private and public		No right to demand documents from outside
<b>GER</b>	Yes	Varies from 2-15	Yes on all	Invite member of the Federal Government or external experts	Public		Yes, unrestricted
<b>GR</b>	No staff central bureau	1-2 clerks	Integrate amendments and legal changes	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Public, exceptions	with	Yes, unrestricted
<b>HUN</b>	No staff of Committees	Administrative support via 1-2 staff members per com. + 2 administrative assistants. Exception: EUC (6-8)	Yes on all	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Public, exceptions	with	Yes, unrestricted
<b>IC</b>	Yes	1-2 secretaries per committee.	Yes on all	Compel unrestricted	Private, exceptions	with	Yes, ministries and state institutions

<b>IE</b>	Yes	2 per committee; Total number of staff: 54	Administrative and document preparation <sup>44</sup>	Compel members of the Government or Minister of State; invite unrestricted	Public	Yes, unrestricted
<b>IS</b>	Yes	4-14 per committee	Yes on all	Invite unrestricted but no compel (only the State Audit Committee has that power)	Public, with exceptions	No right to demand documents from outside
<b>ITA</b>	Yes	Up to 11 per committee	Administrative	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Public, with exceptions	Yes, unrestricted
<b>JP</b>	No own staff central bureau	Legislative bureau 82 staff members	Administrative	Compel unrestricted	Public or private	Yes, from certain institutions
<b>LAT</b>	Yes	2-4 per committee	Yes on all	Summon ministers, civil servants and local government members	Public or private	Yes from ministers and ministries
<b>LIT</b>	Yes	Differs, some 4-5, some up to 10-11	Yes on all	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Public or private	Yes, from certain institutions. Committee itself sends draft law out for evaluation

<b>LUX</b>	No own staff central bureau	1-2 administrators and 1-2 assistants	Administrative and document preparation.	Enquiry committees unrestricted; Legislative committees no compel	Private	Yes, unrestricted
<b>MLT</b>	No own staff central bureau	2 per committee	Administrative	Compel unrestricted	Always public	No right to demand documents from outside
<b>NL</b>	No own staff central bureau	Per committee secretaries, at least one clerk	Administrative and document preparation.	Invite Minister, civil servants, external experts	Public, exceptions	Yes, from Ministers
<b>NOR</b>	Yes	1-3 per committee	Administrative and document preparation.	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Private, exceptions	Yes, from government
<b>POL</b>	Yes	1 - 8 mostly 1 secretary and lawyer	Administrative and document preparation.	Permanent committees only but not compel. Investigative committees can compel witnesses.	Public, exceptions	Yes, from ministries and government agencies
<b>POR</b>	Yes	2-5 per committee	Administrative and document preparation.	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Public, exceptions	Yes, unrestricted
<b>SLK</b>	Yes	1-2 per committee	Administrative and document preparation.	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Public, exceptions	No right to demand documents from outside

<b>SLO</b>	Yes	Secretary and clerk (some committees additional advisers)	Yes on all	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Public	Yes, government, state and public institutions	from
<b>ESP</b>	No own staff central bureau	Changing amount of advisers belonging to Chamber available to committees	Yes on all	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Private, exceptions	Yes, government	from
<b>SW</b>	Yes	5 to 10 employees	Yes on all	Compel members, invite unrestricted	Private, occasionally open	Yes, government institutions	from
<b>SUI</b>	Yes	4-10 staff members <sup>45</sup>	Yes on all	Invite unrestricted but not compel	Private	Yes, under certain circumstances <sup>46</sup>	
<b>UK</b>	No own staff central bureau	Scrutiny Unit 14 staff members <sup>47</sup>	Procedural support by Public Bill Office, Experts by Scrutiny Unit <sup>48</sup>	Invite unrestricted but not compel (standard procedure)	Public, exceptions possible	Yes, unrestricted	

## Notes to Appendix 2

<sup>1</sup>With exception was used when not more than 2 committees changed.

<sup>2</sup>Exception European Affairs Committee. MPs can be member of the EUA and another committee.

<sup>3</sup>Complete correspondence when considering select sub-committees.

<sup>4</sup>Additionally, 'Committee of Nine'

<sup>5</sup>Restricted to 2 committees and 2 sub-committees

<sup>6</sup>Exception European Affairs Committee. MPs can be member of the EUA and another committee

<sup>7</sup>Complete correspondence between committee seats and number MPs

<sup>8</sup>Indicates constant subcommittees (podkomisja stala), high number of extraordinary *ad hoc* subcommittees to consider bills (275 as of June 2014).

<sup>9</sup>Additionally, 1 substitute membership. Exceptionally up to 3 in case of small PPGs)

<sup>10</sup>Possible until 50 in Public Bill Committees.

<sup>11</sup>Select departmental committees have direct correspondence.

<sup>12</sup>Proposal of Conference of Presidents

<sup>13</sup>First compromise between PPGs, otherwise vote in committee.

<sup>14</sup>When guests appear before a committee meeting, other than guests who work for the government offices on the responsibility of Ministers, the committee is permitted to open meetings, or a part of the meeting, to the press.

<sup>15</sup>Presentation to the plenary, can be subject of a vote, typically not.

<sup>16</sup>Ratio proposed by Conference of Presidents

<sup>17</sup>An exception is the PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid, Freedom Party)

<sup>18</sup>Proposal by Presidium, approved by Council of Senior Members

<sup>19</sup>Stenographic records available (published), video broadcast live and then archived. Subcommittees in camera.

<sup>20</sup>For PBCs, the Committee of Selection assigns members - largely comprises party whips and essentially ratifies the choices they make regarding their own party. For Select Committees, members are elected from their PPG.

<sup>21</sup>Except for a brief private session in which MPs on the committee discuss the line of questioning witnesses

<sup>22</sup>With special authorisation

<sup>23</sup>Negotiation between PPGs at assignment phase of individual members

<sup>24</sup>Committees have restricted right to initiate legislation, only when matter is closely related to the subject of a government or private members' bill. See for more information also Arter (2002, p.242).

<sup>25</sup>Committee can decide not to deliver a report on a bill, thus not passing it on to the 2nd reading

<sup>26</sup>Comprised of the Speaker and other party representatives

<sup>27</sup>Only certain committees in specified areas

<sup>28</sup>Yes for Private Bills; for all other bills the committee must report on progress after 6 months, plenary has right to take bill back and reassign - can continue and in essence kill the bill.

<sup>29</sup>Concept of reading is different from the Anglo-Saxon distinction

<sup>30</sup>In case of split government usually introduces new bill(s). Also merger of private bills with government bills.

<sup>31</sup>First reading in committee except for most important bills (amendments to Constitution, budget, taxes, elections; decided by the Speaker). Bills may be sent to subcommittees. Amendments may be made during the 1st reading, then reported to the House. Bill also returns to the committee when new amendments are proposed by the Senate.

<sup>32</sup>Only for bills concerning the same law

<sup>33</sup>Possible to discuss several draft laws regulating the same social relations the same time

<sup>34</sup>Committee business must not be part of plenary discussion

<sup>35</sup>Each bill ends with propositions. In case of multiple proposition, each one can be treated in separate decisions. All bills within the same subject are reported in a single report

<sup>36</sup>Only minority statements during plenary debate

<sup>37</sup>Committee's terms of reference restrained by preceding plenary debate (preceding debate is 'second reading'). Some bills are dealt with in plenary (e.g.. bills relating to budget, the constitution, pressing national importance).

<sup>38</sup>Upon proposal by the President or a motion tabled by a Member

<sup>39</sup>*Ad hoc* legislative: Report on bill with or without amendments, no comments or recommendations. Before 2nd reading: clause-by-clause examination, redrafting and report with or without amendments, committees may include recommendations After 2nd reading: same, but no comments or recommendations

<sup>40</sup>Until second reading, committee members may submit amendments in written addressing the Minister - has to explain, if government will adopt these or not. If adopted, integrated in the bill and debated by the Plenum.

<sup>41</sup>committees can redraft the text of a bill, when in legislative and drafting capacity. Advisory capacity: issue opinions (to the committee in reporting capacity); Reporting capacity: proposal of amendments and report; Drafting capacity - votes on individual sections, redrafting; Legislating capacity - debate and approve.

<sup>42</sup>Two-stage process: At end of second reading, government sets 'out date' via programme motion (date at which committee must report). When passed, subcommittee (dominated by government) draws up committee's timetable and also decides on balance oral evidence - scrutiny sessions. This timetable up to a vote, but not the 'out date'.

<sup>43</sup>All committees can draw on the common pool resources of the Folketing

<sup>44</sup>Research advice from different section.

<sup>45</sup>Staff is shared with corresponding committee of upper house.

<sup>46</sup>Possible if the plenum formally sets up a legislative investigation against the government or administration.

<sup>47</sup>Comprises lawyers, accountants, economist and statisticians, as well as clerks and small team of administrative staff

<sup>48</sup>The procedural aspects of the bill (amendment of the bill and its progress through parliament) largely dealt with by the Public Bill Office. Additional support from Scrutiny Unit, a specialist section of the Committee Office which is otherwise responsible for providing help to select committees. SU staff is largely responsible for evidence gathering phase (receiving and processing written submissions, formally inviting witnesses, etc).

### Appendix 3: Question list interviews

1. Part: Formal allocation:
  - a. At the beginning of the legislative period, how is the assignment of members to committees coordinated? Does your party use personal talks, survey among members, etc.?
  - b. When did you first think about the “best” committee for you?
  - c. When do preparations begin? Is a possible committee choice already point of discussion at the drafting of the list of candidates for the constituencies?
  - d. In case of reshuffling of members of parliament, e.g. after a by-election, how are the new TDs assigned to committees?
  - e. How are situations solved if too many / too few legislators want to serve on a committee?
2. Part: Criteria in the assignment process
  - a. Earlier research in other countries has highlighted the importance of several factors:
    1. Corresponding knowledge through former education and occupation
    - 2 Knowledge acquired through membership in societal groups
    3. Parliamentary experience and loyalty with regard to highly sought after committeesHow well do these factors explain the process in your PPG?
  - b. Apart from these aforementioned criteria which other factors explain, in your view, the assignment process in your PPG in [your parliament]?
3. Part: Relationship between members in committees and the PPG
  - a. Do MPs in committees possess relatively high autonomy in their actions or are positions first communicated to the other members of the PPG before they are presented in the committee?
  - b. What is the relationship between committee members of a the same PPG?
  - c. How are positions developed? Are, within the group of MPs from your party, particular MPs decisive for the position?
  - d. Do differences exist across committees?

## Appendix 4: List of respondents per country

### Dáil Éireann:

Anne Ferris (Labour)  
 Caoimhghín Ó Caoláin (Sinn Féin)  
 Charlie McConalogue (Fianna Fáil)  
 David Stanton (Fine Gael)  
 Eamonn Maloney (Labour)  
 Emmet Stagg (Labour)  
 Eoghan Murphy (Fine Gael)  
 Finian McGrath (Independent)  
 John Halligan (Independent)  
 John O'Mahony (Fine Gael)  
 Marcella Corcoran Kennedy (Fine Gael)  
 Maureen O'Sullivan (Independent)  
 Niall Collins (Labour)  
 Pádraig MacLochlainn (Sinn Féin)  
 Pat Breen (Fine Gael)  
 Pat Rabbitte (Labour)  
 Regina Doherty (Fine Gael)  
 Robert Dowds (Labour)  
 Ruairi Quinn (Labour)  
 Sean Fleming (Fianna Fáil)  
 Seán Ó Fearghaíl (Fianna Fáil)  
 Thomas Pringle (Independent)  
 Additionally:  
 Art O'Leary  
 Mark O'Doherty (Special Advisor to Chief Whip)

### Bundestag:

Alexander Ulrich (Die Linke)  
 Alois Karl (CDU/CSU)  
 André Hahn, Dr. (Die Linke)  
 Anette Hübingler (CDU/CSU)  
 Birgit Wöllert (Die Linke)  
 Christina Kampmann (SPD)  
 Christoph Bergner, Dr. (CDU/CSU)  
 Cornelia Möhring (Die Linke)  
 Dirk Fischer (CDU/CSU)  
 Eberhard Gienger (CDU/CSU)  
 Egon Jüttner, Prof. Dr. (CDU/CSU)  
 Ernst Dieter Rossmann, Dr. (SPD)  
 Gerold Reichenbach (SPD)  
 Gustav Herzog (SPD)

Jörg Hellmuth (SPD)  
Jörn Wunderlich (Die Linke)  
Johann Saathoff (SPD)  
Josef Göppel (CDU/CSU)  
Katharina Dröge (Grüne)  
Kersten Steinke (Die Linke)  
Klaus Barthel (SPD)  
Kordula Schulz-Asche (Grüne)  
Manfred Zöllmer (SPD)  
Marcus Weinberg (CDU/CSU)  
Markus Kurth (Grüne)  
Martin Burkert (SPD)  
Martin Gerster (SPD)  
Matthias Gastel (Grüne)  
Matthias Lietz (CDU/CSU)  
Matthias Zimmer, Prof. Dr. (CDU/CSU)  
Monika Lazar (Grüne)  
Nicole Maisch (Grüne)  
Niema Movassat (Die Linke)  
Patricia Lips (CDU/CSU)  
Ralf Kapschack (SPD)  
Ralph Lenkert (Die Linke)  
Sigrid Hupach (Die Linke)  
Simone Raatz, Dr. (SPD)  
Stefan Liebich (Die Linke)  
Stefan Rebmann (SPD)  
Stephan Kühn (Grüne)  
Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU)  
Stephan Stracke (CDU/CSU)  
Sven Schulz (SPD)  
Thomas Dörflinger (CDU/CSU)  
Tom Koenigs (Grüne)  
Ute Finckh-Krämer, Dr. (SPD)  
Waldemar Westermayer (CDU/CSU)  
Waltraud Wolff (SPD)  
Willi Brase (SPD)

**Tweede Kamer:**

Anne-Wil Lucas (VVD)  
Attje Kuiken (PvdA)  
Bart de Liefde (VVD)  
Bas van 't Wout (VVD)  
Brigitte van der Burg (VVD)

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Duco Hoogland (PvdA)  
Erik Ziengs (VVD)  
Foort van Oosten (VVD)  
Harm Beertema (PVV)  
Henk Leenders (PvdA)  
Henk Nijboer (PvdA)  
Han ten Broeke (VVD)  
Henk van Gerven (SP)  
Jan Vos (PvdA)  
Jeroen Recourt (PvdA)  
Joost Taverne (VVD)  
Lea Bouwmeester (PvdA)  
Loes Ypma (PvdA)  
Lutz Jacobi (PvdA)  
Manon Fokke (PvdA)  
Marit Maij (PvdA)  
Mark Harbers (VVD)  
Michel Rog (CDA)  
Michiel Van Veen (VVD)  
Michiel van Nispen (SP)  
Mohammed Mohandis (PvdA)  
Raymond Knops (CDA)  
Ronald Vuijk (VVD)  
Additionally:  
Sjoerd Kuiper (ambtelijk secretaris PvdA)

Appendix 5: Table A7: Bivariate models of predictor variables with committee autonomy

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Majority seat share	0.001 (0.003)								
Personal vote		-0.005 (0.007)							
(log)Connection to districts			0.010 (0.016)						
Corporatism				0.044** (0.021)					
(log)Size					0.006 (0.030)				
Average number of bills per plenary session						0.009*** (0.003)		0.129** (0.054)	
Ratio of coalition governments									0.034*** (0.011)
Ideol. distance government parties									0.043 (0.076)
Frequency minority governments									0.564*** (0.031)
Constant	0.527*** (0.140)	0.599*** (0.034)	0.556*** (0.040)	0.509*** (0.037)	0.545*** (0.161)	0.530*** (0.024)	0.481*** (0.044)	0.480*** (0.037)	
Observations	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.022	0.013	0.140	0.001	0.241	0.170	0.248	0.011
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.031	-0.013	-0.022	0.109	-0.034	0.214	0.141	0.221	-0.024
Residual Std. Error	0.112	0.111	0.112	0.105	0.113	0.098	0.103	0.098	0.112
F-Statistic (df = 28)	0.130	0.640	0.378	4.551**	0.041	8.899***	5.743**	9.240***	0.317

Note: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Own data set.

Appendix 6: Table A8: Correlation coefficients between all possible pairs of independent variables

	Majority seat share	Reliance on 'personal vote'	(log)Connection to districts	Corporatism	(log)Size	Average number of bills per plenary session	Ratio of coalition gov's	Ideology distance gov. parties
Majority seat share	0.08							
Reliance on 'personal votes'	-0.19	-0.34						
(log)Connection to districts	-0.02	-0.48**	0.27					
Corporatism	-0.12	0.30	-0.35	-0.10				
(log)Size	-0.15	0.07	0.25	0.28	-0.01			
Average number of bills plenary per session						-0.29	0.14	
Ratio of coalition gov's	0.36	-0.19	0.33	0.33	-0.29	0.33	0.73***	
Ideology distance gov. parties	0.26	-0.15	0.40*	0.28	-0.15	0.33	0.73***	
Frequency minority governments	-0.71***	-0.12	0.09	0.22	0.12	0.19	-0.20	-0.08

Source: Own data set. \*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01.

## Appendix 7: Addressing the issue of ‘overfitting’: Subset selection and shrinkage models

To address the problem of too many variables, too few cases with a more appropriate statistical model, several solutions have been proposed. Hastie et al. (2009) distinguish two major approaches, which were both used in this study. A first is applying forward or backward stepwise selection of variables. Forward stepwise selection basically means that the model starts with the intercept, and then “sequentially adds into the model the predictor that most improves the fit” (Hastie et al., 2009, p. 58) in order to find the best subset selection. Vice versa, backward-stepwise elimination starts with the full model, and “sequentially deletes the predictor that has the least impact on the fit. The candidate for dropping is the variable with the smallest Z-score” (Hastie et al., 2009, p. 59). Pursuing this strategy<sup>214</sup> on all variables leaves the following streamlined “final model”:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Committeea} \text{autonomy}_t &= \alpha + \beta_1 * (\log) \text{Connection.to.districts} \\ &+ \beta_2 * \text{level.of.corporatism} \\ &+ \beta_3 * \text{average.number.of.bills.per.year} \\ &+ \beta_4 * \text{ideological.distance.government.PPGs} \\ &+ \beta_5 * (\log) \text{years.since.democrac.ic.transition} + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

Looking at the variables which improve the model fit most gives additional support for the initial results of the OLS regression. Next to the variables which measure the connection to districts and the years since democratic transition the three main variables of the ‘keeping tabs’ and informational theory remain in the subset. Although the application of these techniques is straightforward, a drawback is that they do not reduce the prediction error of the full model. Additionally, there is no guarantee that the subsets obtained from stepwise procedures contain the “best” subset as the process is discrete - variables are either kept or discarded in the model (Tibshirani, 1996). Another possibility to deal with the problem of overfitted models and to find the best subset is to rely on shrinkage methods (Hastie et al., 2009). Shrinkage methods are generally preferred to selection methods when dealing with overfitting (see also Babyak, 2004). Examples of shrinkage techniques are ridge regression and lasso regression.<sup>215</sup> Both impose a particular form of penalty on the parameters to constrain the coefficient estimates and help therefore to prevent certain sources of overfitting. Ridge regression and lasso regression *shrink* the coefficient estimates towards zero (for a more detailed discussion, see Hastie et al., 2009, p. 69ff). For example, lasso, developed by Tibshirani (1996), penalizes the model if the sum of the norms of the slopes gets too high. As, in terms of performance,

<sup>214</sup> The analysis was conducted using the MASS package in R.

<sup>215</sup> The lasso technique stands for ‘least absolute shrinkage and selection operator’.

“neither ridge regression nor the lasso will universally dominate the other” (James et al., 2013, p. 223). As the interpretation of ridge regression models is less straightforward, as it does not set any coefficients to zero (Tibshirani, 1996, p. 267), lasso regression was chosen.

The lasso model was estimated using the `glmnet` package in R. All variables which test the theoretical framework, as well as the control variables, were inserted. The results<sup>216</sup> further support the impression that the variables that ‘matter most’ are those which refer to the informational and partisan theory. For the analysis the minimum value of  $\lambda$ <sup>217</sup> obtained from the `glmnet` model was used. This gives minimum mean cross-validated error (Hastie & Qian, 2014). Only the variables referring to the average number of bills per plenary session (informational perspective) and one of the ‘keeping tabs’ variables (ideological distance between coalition partners) remain in the model. Additionally, the level of corporatism which is a test of the distributive rationale ‘survives’. It is not surprising that the second variable of the ‘keeping tabs’ perspective was thrown out. In case two predictors are highly correlated, lasso usually only selects one of them.

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<sup>216</sup> The R output and plots are available from the author.

<sup>217</sup> The tuning parameter  $\lambda$  controls the strength of the penalty for cross-validation and is decisive for choosing the final selection of variables.

## Appendix 8: Analysed specialised committees in Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland per legislative period

### Bundestag

#### *12th legislative period (1990-1994)*

1. Arbeit und Sozialordnung
2. Auswärtiger Ausschuss
3. Bildung und Wissenschaft
4. EG-Ausschuss
5. Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten
6. Familie und Senioren
7. Finanzausschuss
8. Forschung, Technologie und Technikfolgenabschätzung
9. Frauen und Jugend
10. Fremdenverkehr
11. Gesundheit
12. Haushalt
13. Innenausschuss
14. Petitionsausschuss
15. Post und Telekommunikation
16. Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau
17. Rechtsausschuss
18. Sportausschuss
19. Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
20. Verkehr
21. Verteidigungsausschuss
22. Wirtschaft
23. Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit

#### *13th legislative period (1994-1998)*

1. Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union
2. Arbeit und Sozialordnung
3. Auswärtiger Ausschuss
4. Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung, Technologie und Technikfolgenabschätzung
5. Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten
6. Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend
7. Finanzausschuss
8. Fremdenverkehr und Tourismus
9. Gesundheit
10. Haushaltsausschuss
11. Innenausschuss
12. Petitionsausschuss
13. Post und Telekommunikation
14. Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau
15. Rechtsausschuss

16. Sportausschuss
17. Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
18. Verkehr
19. Verteidigungsausschuss
20. Wirtschaft
21. Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung

*14th legislative period (1998-2002)*

1. Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union
2. Arbeit und Sozialordnung
3. Auswärtiger Ausschuss
4. Bildung, Forschung und Technikfolgenabschätzung
5. Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (after 15.03.2001  
Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft)
6. Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend
7. Finanzausschuss
8. Gesundheit
9. Haushaltsausschuss
10. Innenausschuss
11. Kultur und Medien
12. Menschenrechte und humanitäre Hilfe
13. Petitionsausschuss
14. Rechtsausschuss
15. Sportausschuss
16. Tourismus
17. Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
18. Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung
19. Verteidigungsausschuss
20. Wirtschaft und Technologie
21. Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung

*15th legislative period (2002-2005)*

1. Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union
2. Auswärtiger Ausschuss
3. Bildung, Forschung und Technikfolgenabschätzung
4. Finanzausschuss
5. Frauen, Familie, Senioren und Jugend
6. Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherheit
7. Haushaltsausschuss
8. Innenausschuss
9. Kultur und Medien
10. Menschenrechte und Humanitäre Hilfe
11. Natur, Umweltschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
12. Petitionsausschuss
13. Rechtsausschuss
14. Sportausschuss

15. Tourismus
16. Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft
17. Verkehr, Bau- und Wohnungswesen
18. Verteidigungsausschuss
19. Wirtschaft und Arbeit
20. Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung

*16th legislative period (2005-2009) and 17th legislative period (2009-2013)*

1. Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union
2. Arbeit und Soziales
3. Auswärtiger Ausschuss
4. Bildung, Forschung und Technikfolgenabschätzung
5. Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz
6. Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend
7. Finanzausschuss
8. Gesundheit
9. Haushalt
10. Innenausschuss
11. Kultur und Medien
12. Menschenrechte und Humanitäre Hilfe
13. Petitionsausschuss
14. Rechtsausschuss
15. Sportausschuss
16. Tourismus
17. Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
18. Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung
19. Verteidigungsausschuss
20. Wirtschaft und Technologie
21. Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung

*18th legislative period (since 2013)*

1. Arbeit und Soziales
2. Auswärtiger Ausschuss
3. Bildung, Forschung und Technikfolgenabschätzung
4. Digitale Agenda
5. Ernährung und Landwirtschaft
6. Europäische Union
7. Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend
8. Finanzausschuss
9. Gesundheit
10. Hauptausschuss
11. Haushalt
12. Innenausschuss
13. Kultur und Medien
14. Menschenrechte und Humanitäre Hilfe
15. Petitionsausschuss

16. Recht und Verbraucherschutz
17. Sportausschuss
18. Tourismus
19. Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit
20. Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur
21. Verteidigungsausschuss
22. Wirtschaft und Energie
23. Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung

Excluded:

Housekeeping committees, e.g. Scrutiny of Elections (Wahlprüfungsausschuss)  
 Scrutiny of Elections, Immunity and the Rules of Procedure (Wahlprüfung, Immunität und Geschäftsordnung)  
 Rechnungsprüfungsausschuss (all legislative periods)  
 Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Ausschuss)  
 Mediation (Vermittlungsausschuss)  
 Inquiry committees Untersuchungs- Ausschüsse  
 Treuhandanstalt (Privatisation Agency)  
 Angelegenheiten der Neuen Länder  
 General Committee (Hauptausschuss)<sup>218</sup>

### **Tweede Kamer**

*Tweede Kamer 1994, 1998 and 2002*

1. Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (V)<sup>219</sup>
2. Buitenlandse Zaken (V)
3. Defensie (V)
4. Economische Zaken (V)
5. Europese Zaken (A)
6. Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (V)
7. Financiën (V)
8. Justitie (V)
9. Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (V)
10. Nederlands-Antilliaanse en Arubaanse Zaken (V)
11. Rijksuitgaven (V)
12. Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (V)
13. Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (V)
14. Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer (V)
15. Verkeer en Waterstaat (V)

*Tweede Kamer 2003*

1. Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (V)

<sup>218</sup> The establishment of an interim General Committee was a novum in the 18th Bundestag. The creation of regular, jurisdictional committees was delayed due to particularly difficult government formation until January 2014. However, it only met once and its political impact was minor.

<sup>219</sup> V = Vaste commissie, A = Algemene commissie.

2. Buitenlandse Zaken (V)
3. Defensie (V)
4. Economische Zaken (V)
5. Europese Zaken (V)
6. Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (V)
7. Financiën (V)
8. Integratiebeleid (A)
9. Justitie (V)
10. Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (V)
11. Nederlands-Antilliaanse en Arubaanse Zaken (V)
12. Rijksuitgaven (V)
13. Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (V)
14. Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (V)
15. Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer (V)
16. Verkeer en Waterstaat (V)

#### *Tweede Kamer 2006*

1. Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (V)
2. Buitenlandse Zaken (V)
3. Defensie (V)
4. Economische Zaken (V)
5. Europese Zaken (V)
6. Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (V)
7. Financiën (V)
8. Justitie (V)
9. Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (V)
10. Nederlands-Antilliaanse en Arubaanse Zaken (V)
11. Rijksuitgaven (V)
12. Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (V)
13. Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (V)
14. Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer (V)
15. Verkeer en Waterstaat (V)
16. Integratiebeleid (A)
17. Wonen, Wijken en Integratie (A) (2007-2010)
18. Jeugd en Gezin (A) (2007-2010)

#### *Tweede Kamer 2010*

1. Binnenlandse Zaken (V)
2. Koninkrijksrelaties (V)
3. Buitenlandse Zaken (V)
4. Defensie (V)
5. Economische Zaken (V)
6. Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (V)
7. Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie
8. Europese Zaken (V)
9. Financiën (V)

10. Justitie (V)
11. Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (V)
12. Rijksuitgaven (V)
13. Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (V)
14. Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (V)
15. Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer (V)
16. Verkeer en Waterstaat (V)
17. Infrastructuur en Milieu (V)
18. Jeugdzorg (A)
19. Immigratie en Asiel (A)

*Tweede Kamer 2012*

1. Binnenlandse Zaken (V)
2. Koninkrijksrelaties (V)
3. Buitenlandse Zaken (V)
4. Defensie (V)
5. Economische Zaken (V)
6. Europese Zaken (V)
7. Financiën (V)
8. Veiligheid en Justitie (V)
9. Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (V)
10. Rijksuitgaven (V)
11. Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (V)
12. Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (V)
13. Infrastructuur en Milieu (V)
14. Wonen en Rijksdienst (A)
15. Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (A)

Not in analysis: Commissie voor het Onderzoek van de Geloofsbrieven;  
Commissie voor de Werkwijze;

Petitions (Commissie Verzoekschriften en Burgerinitiatieven - data only available for 2005 to 2012;

Inquiry committees (parlementaire enquêtecommissies);

Temporary committees (tijdelijke commissies);

Housekeeping committees;

**Dáil Éireann**

*27th Dáil 14 December 1992 - 15 May 1997*

1. Committee on Procedure and Privileges (11 March 1993)
2. Public Accounts (11 March 1993)
3. Irish Language (28 April 1993)
4. Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies (28 April 1993)
5. Women's Rights (28 April 1993)
6. Legislation and Security (28 April 1993)
7. Enterprise and Economic Strategy (28 April 1993)

8. Finance and General Affairs (28 April 1993)
9. Social Affairs (28 April 1993)
10. Foreign Affairs (29 April 1993)

*27th Dáil 14 December 1992 - 15 May 1997*

1. Women's Rights (9 March 1995)
2. Public Accounts (10 March 1995)
3. Committee on Procedure and Privileges (26 January 1995)
4. Irish Language (10 March 1995)
5. Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies (10 March 1995)
6. Finance and General Affairs (10 March 1995)
7. Social Affairs (10 March 1995)
8. Legislation and Security (10 March 1995)
9. Enterprise and Economic Strategy (10 March 1995)
10. Foreign Affairs (10 March 1995)
11. European Affairs (10 March 1995)
12. Family (10 March 1995)
13. Small Business and Services (10 March 1995)
14. Sustainable Development (10 March 1995)

*28th Dáil 26 June 1997 - 25 April 2002*

1. Committee on Procedure and Privileges
2. Public Accounts
3. European Affairs
4. Heritage and the Irish Language
5. Justice, Equality and Women's Rights
6. Family, Community and Social Affairs
7. Agriculture, Food and the Marine
8. Environment and Local Government
9. Finance and the Public Service
10. Public Enterprise and Transport
11. Health and Children
12. Education and Science
13. Enterprise and Small Business
14. Tourism, Sport and Recreation
15. Foreign Affairs

*29th Dáil 6 June 2002 - 29 April 2007*

1. Committee on Procedure and Privileges
2. European Affairs
3. Agriculture and Food
4. Arts, Sport, Tourism, Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
5. Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
6. Education and Science
7. Enterprise and Small Business
8. Environment and Local Government
9. Finance and the Public Service

10. Foreign Affairs
11. Health and Children
12. Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights
13. Social and Family Affairs
14. Transport
15. Public Accounts
16. Constitution

*30th Dáil 14 June 2007 - 1 February 2011*

1. Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
2. Climate Change and Energy Security
3. Communications, Energy and Natural Resources
4. Constitution
5. Constitutional Amendment on Children
6. Economic Regulatory Affairs
7. Education and Skills
8. Enterprise, Trade and Innovation
9. Environment, Heritage and Local Government
10. European Affairs
11. European Scrutiny
12. Finance and the Public Service
13. Foreign Affairs
14. Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement
15. Health and Children
16. Justice, Defence and Women's Rights
17. Social Protection
18. Tourism, Culture, Sport, Community, Equality and Gaeltacht Affairs
19. Transport

*31st Dáil: 9 March 2011<sup>220</sup>*

1. Public Accounts
2. Communications, Natural Resources and Agriculture
3. European Union Affairs
4. Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform
5. Foreign Affairs and Trade
6. Health and Children
7. Investigations, Oversight and Petitions
8. Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation
9. Justice, Defence and Equality
10. Environment, Transport, Culture and the Gaeltacht
11. Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement

Not in analysis:

Housekeeping committees, e.g. Committee on Members' Interests of Dáil

<sup>220</sup> Some committees were restructured in the course of the legislative period. This analysis focused on the committees established at the beginning of the legislative period.

Éireann

Ad hoc committees, e.g. All-Party Committee on the Strategic Management Initiative

## Appendix 9: Figure A1: Example committee membership list German MPs

MdB-Stamm Ausschussmitgliedschaften der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages Seite 130  
der 17. Wahlperiode

### Frankenhauser, Herbert

#### 12. Wahlperiode

12.WP/17.AUS	Ausschuß für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit	om	
12.WP/19.AUS	Ausschuß für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau	om	
12.WP/22.AUS	Ausschuß für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit	sm	

#### 13. Wahlperiode

13.WP/08.AUS	Haushaltsausschuß	om	27.02.97
13.WP/16.AUS	Ausschuß für Umwelt, Naturschutz u. Reaktorsicherheit	om	14.12.94 13.03.97
13.WP/16.AUS	Ausschuß für Umwelt, Naturschutz u. Reaktorsicherheit	sm	13.03.97
13.WP/18.AUS	Ausschuß für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau	om	14.12.94 13.03.97
13.WP/18.AUS	Ausschuß für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau	sm	13.03.97
13.WP/20.AUS	Ausschuß für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung	sm	14.12.94

#### 14. Wahlperiode

14.Wp/08.AUS	Haushaltsausschuss	om	11.11.98
14.Wp/20.AUS	Ausschuss für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung	sm	11.11.98

#### 15. Wahlperiode

15.Wp/08.AUS	Haushaltsausschuss	om	06.11.02
15.Wp/18.AUS	Ausschuss für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung	sm	06.11.02

#### 16. Wahlperiode

16.Wp/03.AUS	Auswärtiger Ausschuss	sm	30.11.05
16.Wp/08.AUS	Haushaltsausschuss	om	30.11.05
16.Wp/08.AUS	Haushaltsausschuss	sv	30.11.05
16.Wp/19.AUS	Ausschuss für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung	sm	30.11.05

#### 17. Wahlperiode

03.AUS	Auswärtiger Ausschuss	sm	16.11.09
08.AUS	Haushaltsausschuss	om	16.11.09
08.AUS	Haushaltsausschuss	sv	24.11.09

Stand: 16. April 2013

Source: Print version obtained from parliamentary archive Deutscher Bundestag.

## Appendix 10: Figure A2: Example committee membership list Dutch MPs (see *samenstelling* for the committee lists)

### Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal

# 2

Vergaderjaar 1998–1999

21 501-20

Europese Raad

Nr. 81

**VERSLAG VAN EEN ALGEMEEN OVERLEG**  
Vastgesteld 30 maart 1999

De algemene commissie voor Europese Zaken<sup>1</sup> en de vaste commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken<sup>2</sup> hebben op 18 maart 1999 overleg gevoerd met minister-president Kok en minister Van Aartsen van Buitenlandse Zaken over:

- de agenda van de Algemene Raad van 22 en 23 maart 1999 (BuZa 195/99);
- het verslag van de informele bijeenkomst van regeringsleiders en staatshoofden van 26 februari 1999 te Bonn (21 501-20, nr. 71);
- de agenda van de speciale Europese Raad van 24 en 25 maart 1999 te Berlijn (BuZa DIE/208/99).

Van het gevoerde overleg brengen de commissies bijgaand beknopt verslag uit.

**Verslag van de informele bijeenkomst van regeringsleiders en staatshoofden van 26 februari 1999 te Bonn**

**Agenda van de speciale Europese Raad van 24 en 25 maart 1999 te Berlijn**

*Wagen en opmerkingen uit de commissies*

De heer **Van den Akker** (CDA) sprak zijn zorgen uit over de bestuurlijke crisis in Europa. Met het aftreden van bondskanselier Kohl is de basis van stabiliteit weggevalven. De ontwikkelingen in Duitsland sindsdien dragen niet bij aan het vertrouwen in Europa. Datzelfde geldt voor de aanhoudende berichten over fraude, vriendjespolitiek en wanbeleid. De waarde van de euro loopt terug en rond Agenda 2000 wordt met veto's gedreigd.

M. B. Vos (GroenLinks), Dijkema (PvdA), Van den Doel (VVD), Koenders (PvdA), De Boer (PvdA), voorzitter, Van der Knaap (CDA), Rose van Doorn (CDA), Karim (GroenLinks), Timmermans (PvdA) en Wilders (VVD).  
Pfr. Iedere: Dijkstal (VVD), Balkstein (VVD), De Graaf (D66), Van 't Riet (D66), Rouvoet (RPF), Belinfante (PvdA), Duivesteyn (PvdA), Patijn (VVD), Visser-van Doorn (CDA), Zijlstra (PvdA) Eurlings (CDA), Chertob (VVD), De Haan (CDA), Schiltens-de Nier (D66), Van Rommel (SP), Harrewijn (GroenLinks), Bussemaker (PvdA), Remak (VVD), Albayrak (PvdA), Van Oven (PvdA), Van den Akker (CDA), Leers (CDA), Vindrik (GroenLinks), Feenstra (PvdA) en Balemans (VVD).

<sup>1</sup> Samenstelling:  
Leden: Weisglas (VVD), Schiltens-de Nier (D66), Van Middelkoop (GPF), Voorhoeye (VVD), Nolte-Drostse (VVD), Hessing (VVD), Hoekema (D66), Marijnissen (SP), Verhagen (CDA), Rouvoet (RPF), Van Oven (PvdA), ondervoorzitter, De Haan (CDA), Koenders (PvdA), Patijn (VVD), voorzitter, Van den Akker (CDA), Rose van Doorn (CDA), Karim (GroenLinks), Bussemaker (PvdA), Timmermans (PvdA), Vindrik (GroenLinks), Bos (PvdA), Weekers (VVD), Albayrak (PvdA), Eurlings (CDA) en Van Dok-van Weele (PvdA).

Pfr. Iedere: Blauwe (VVD), Ditsch (D66), Van den Berg (SGP), Ongi (VVD), Klein Molekamp (VVD), Remak (VVD), Ter Veer (D66), Van Bommel (SP), Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven (CDA), De Graaf (D66), Valk (PvdA), Van der Knaap (CDA), Verbaug (VVD), Balkende (CDA), Mosterd (CDA), M.B. Vos (GroenLinks), Feenstra (PvdA), Zijlstra (PvdA), Harrewijn (GroenLinks), Crouw (PvdA), Geluk (VVD), Visser van Doorn (CDA) en Gortzak (PvdA).

<sup>2</sup> Samenstelling:  
Leden: Blauwe (VVD), Weisglas (VVD), Van den Berg (SGP), Ter Veer (D66), Van Middelkoop (GPF), Apetobou (PvdA), Van Gijzel (PvdA), Voorhoeye (VVD), Hilten (CDA), Valk (PvdA), Verhagen (CDA), ondervoorzitter, Hessing (VVD), Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven (CDA), Hoekema (D66), Marijnissen (SP),

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S2N 0011 7371  
Sdu Uitgevers  
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Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1998–1999, 21 501-20, nr. 81

Source: Obtained via [www.officielebekendmakingen.nl](http://www.officielebekendmakingen.nl).

## Appendix 11: Extended discussion on the (non)-suitability of roll-call votes and surveys to infer ideological positions of legislators

### Inferring ideological positions by analyzing roll call voting behaviour

Analysing roll call voting behaviour is the most straightforward and frequently used way to measure the programmatic positions of legislators. Roll call votes indicate the voting behaviour of every legislator and are a common procedure because of the availability of the data. Especially in the U.S. such models have been often used to analyse and predict voting behaviour via spatial models. Spatial models are analytically interesting because they can be used to predict the outcome of legislative votes once the positions of the alternatives have been defined (Poole & Rosenthal, 1991). Several methods of fitting spatial voting models to binary roll call number exist (see for the IDEAL method Snyder & Heckman, 1997; Clinton et al., 2004).<sup>221</sup>

Arguably the most common procedure is Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score (Poole & Rosenthal, 1985, 1991).<sup>222</sup> NOMINATE models calculate ideal points of legislators in an abstract policy space. This is done by aggregating past roll call votes to calculate preference-based scores for each legislator (referred to ideal points).<sup>223</sup> The ideal points can be plotted on a spatial map representing ideological polarisation according to partisan affiliation (Poole, 2004). Such geometric representations of legislative voting have commonly been used in analyses of the United States Congress they have also been applied in more recent studies of the European Parliament's committees (Yordanova, 2009).<sup>224</sup>

However, the reliance on legislative voting is not well suited for every type of legislature. The usefulness of spatial models depends on the extent to which legislators pursue their own preferences as much as possible and express these unrestricted via voting.<sup>225</sup> The European Parliament as a particular case can be

<sup>221</sup> Developed in the 1980s, several computing methods are available, the original D-NOMINATE method, W-NOMINATE, and most recently DW-NOMINATE. The first and the latter differ mostly in the algorithm which is used. The most recent version adds the possibility to allow for distinct (salience) weights between dimensions (for more details see Poole, 2004).

<sup>222</sup> See also Clinton and Jackman (2009) for a comparison between the IDEAL method and NOMINATE

<sup>223</sup> Roll call votes have two possible outcomes - voting in favour (Yea) and voting against (Nay). Therefore each legislator's utility function consists of two dimensions. First, the deterministic component which measures the distance between the legislator and a roll call outcome in the basic space and second, a stochastic component that represents the idiosyncratic component of utility (Poole & Rosenthal, 2000).

<sup>224</sup> Yordanova applies "an ex-post measure of observed loyalty after the committee assignments as a proxy of expected loyalty, under the assumption that PPG leaders had reasons to form such expectations" (Yordanova, 2009, p. 267) to maintain the full sample of MEPs. Her measure of group loyalty is defined as "the frequency of voting with the group majority, which is reflected in the absolute distance between a legislator's score and the median of his or her party group on the first NOMINATE dimension" (Yordanova, 2009, p. 267). The technique is used in the study under the assumption that "party groups evaluate their members not on the basis of their true preferences but rather on their expected or manifested behaviour" (Yordanova, 2009, p. 268).

<sup>225</sup> Research has indicated that the choice for a roll call votes can be driven by the PPG leaderships' intention to monitor and discipline members (Carruba et al., 2008) or show unity in situations in which other PPGs are divided (Stecker, 2010). In any case, it boosts the observed unity of the

analysed this way, but national legislatures of countries with a parliamentary system of governance are a different story because of the presence of strong PPG organisations and the particular voting behaviour of legislators. Relying on an aggregated score of several roll call votes can thus be misleading.

Research has shown that legislators of national legislatures reveal high level of voting cohesion. Sieberer (2006) finds average PPG unity of 97 per cent in his cases in a comparative study of PPG unity in the 1990s with Finland being a comparatively 'extreme' outlier with only 88.63 per cent voting cohesion. In the other countries, PPG unity in roll call votes varies between 94.75 per cent (New Zealand) and 99.83 per cent in Denmark. Such high levels of PPG unity can be achieved via different pathways (see for a more extended discussion Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011; van Vonno et al., 2014).<sup>226</sup> A commonly associated mechanism is the use of sanctions by threatening to take away parliamentary privileges. The role of whips deserves particular mentioning.<sup>227</sup> Their roles, ways and means are diverse. The primary function of whips is the organisation of votes to ensure unified voting behaviour on the floor of the house in important votes. 'Whipping' therefore constitutes what Krehbiel defines as 'significant' PPG behaviour, i.e. inducing behaviour that is consistent with known PPG policy objectives but that is contrary to personal preferences (Krehbiel, 1993, p. 240). Godbout and Høyland (2011, p. 370) argue that achieving PPG unity via this mechanism is "probably the best example of a mechanism capable of significantly altering the measurement of ideal points in a given legislative assembly". Because the preferences are altered "we cannot always assume that lawmakers vote sincerely for the alternative that is closest to their own ideal point" Godbout and Høyland (2011, p. 367) when faced with the choice between diverging alternatives. Whatever the underlying mechanisms are for not following one's true preference, high levels of PPG unity violate a fundamental assumption of spatial models, namely that ideal points via roll call votes reflect the sincere position of a legislator.

In all three cases, high levels of voting unity are visible. In the post-1994 era the Tweede Kamer has voted on 29.451 motions, bills and amendments (numbers based on Parliamentary Vote Data Set (Louwerse et al., 2013; Otjes, 2012; van

respective PPG (Stecker, 2015, see for a more extensive discussion).

<sup>226</sup> In general, legislators of the same PPG usually share similar policy preferences due to self-selection or as the result of the nomination procedure of parties (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011). This generally high level of ideological homogeneity is reflected in similar voting behaviour. Second, legislators may decide to vote against their preference based on a 'logic of appropriateness' (see J. P. Olson, 2006). Such behaviour occurs when actors follow rules which they see as rightful or expected and to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role that they have. In such a case legislators realise the importance of being loyal on grounds of duty. A third mechanism is inter-group division of labour and occurs when legislators take cues from policy experts of a PPG and thus follow the tacit strategy of "if you don't interfere in my policy domain, I won't interfere with yours" (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011, p. 657, see also ; van Vonno et al., 2014).

<sup>227</sup> Whips are legislators who are appointed by the PPG leadership to organise parliamentary business and function as a linkage between PPG leadership and backbenchers. They are traditionally associated with parliaments of the Westminster tradition (see for a historical discussion Gladstone, 1927) but can be found in every legislature.

Vonno, 2016). The vast majority was voted on by raising hands. Only 249 votes were actual roll call votes.<sup>228</sup> Decisive for the usefulness of roll call votes as means for loyalty is the variation of legislators' votes. For the purpose of showing the amount of dissent a simple Rice score (Rice, 1925) can be calculated.<sup>229</sup> Rice scores for all roll call votes between May 1994 and September 2012 were obtained from van Vonno (2016). Of all individual PPG roll calls almost 98 per cent were unanimous. This is an extremely high score and means that almost no variation exists. The non-variation prohibits the calculation of ideal points of legislators and an application in this analysis.

The same problems are encountered in the Bundestag and the Dáil. Table A9 contains Rice scores for German PPGs on a subset of roll call votes (all 2013 votes).

Table A9: Rice scores roll call votes Bundestag 17th legislative period (2013 votes, n = 37)

Party	CDU/ CSU	SPD	FDP	THE LEFT	GREENS	Total
RICE score	0.99	0.95	0.97	1.0	0.96	0.97
Minimum	0.91	0.33	0.82	0.97	0.27	

Source: Own calculation; Roll call data obtained from Roll call archive of Bundestag <http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/plenum/abstimmung/liste/2013/index.html> (access on 7th of May 2014).

The high unity of the governing coalition (CDU/CSU and FDP) is only trumped by The Left (Die Linke) which did not vote coherently in two instances. The data indicates several breaches of PPG unity for some PPGs. However, even the 'outliers' in this regard, the SPD and the Green Party, have relatively high Rice scores.<sup>230</sup> Data compiled by S. Martin (2014b) using the daily coverage of parliamentary proceedings in *The Irish Times* indicates only 15 breaches of PPG voting unity in the Dáil between 1980 and 2010.<sup>231</sup>

High levels of voting unity hinder the application of spatial models. Figure A3 illustrates the problem via a short model calculation of all Dáil divisions

<sup>228</sup> In the Tweede Kamer general three types of votes are possible, votes via raising hands, via roll call (*hoofdelijke stemming*) or in written (*schriftelijke stemming*). As in other parliaments when voting via hand sign the Speaker assumes that all legislators of a PPG, including those who are not present at the meeting vote united.

<sup>229</sup> The variation of votes can be calculated via several indexes (see for a discussion Carey, 2007). The Rice score reflects the percentage of the vote majority on a roll call within a group in relation to those voting otherwise. It ranges from zero (equal numbers voting aye and nay) to one (all members vote coherent).

<sup>230</sup> The low value of the SPD stems from a roll call vote on matters 17/10994 und 17/12474 in which only three MPs from the SPD participated via yes and no votes while all others abstained. When excluding these outliers, the score of the SPD would be 0.71. The value of the Greens stems from a vote in which 12 MPs voted in favour while 21 voted against.

<sup>231</sup> On eight occasions an individual legislator voted against the PPG line; on seven occasions individual members abstained from a vote deliberately

between March 2011 and April 2014 ( $n=572$ ).<sup>232</sup> Legislators with similar voting patterns are closer to each other while those with different voting behaviour are further removed. For illustrative purposes the Dáil data is compared to an example of ideal points for the U.S. Senate and U.S. House in the 113th Congress. A simple plotting of the calculated ideal points of legislators indicates the practicality for analysing Members of Congress. In both chambers of the U.S. Congress two clear “camps” are visible but the individual legislators are considerably spread across the two dimensions to allow for a meaningful interpretation. This within-PPG variation can be utilised for measuring relative closeness to the PPG mean. Looking at the plot of Dáil divisions, two things can be noted. First, legislators of the same PPGs are very closely located. There is almost no variation for legislators from Fianna Fail, Sinn Féin and Fine Gael despite the fact that a considerable amount of divisions ( $n=524$ ) was analysed. This is because all legislators of these PPGs usually vote for or against a proposal collectively.


With regard to the government PPGs (Fine Gael and Labour Party, upper right corner) some variation is visible. There is, however, a straightforward explanation for the ‘outliers’ in the lower part of the plot. Looking more closely at the outlying Fine Gael legislators all of these are TDs who have ‘lost the whip’ but are still listed in the Dáil divisions as members of the PPG.<sup>233</sup> Their numerous dissenting votes since then led to the outlying score. Relying on roll call votes to measure loyalty therefore has little promise to uncover a meaningful variation in the studied legislatures<sup>234</sup>

<sup>232</sup> The voting patterns in divisions are available online and were obtained from the parliamentary website.

<sup>233</sup> PPGs in the Oireachtas have usually reacted with severe consequences towards TDs who do not toe the line. All of these TDs lost the membership of their Oireachtas Committees and their offices in Leinster House (McEnroe, 2013). The government legislators losing whip in Irish Dáil between March 2011 and May 2014 were Denis Naughten, Lucinda Creighton, Terence Flanagan, Peter Mathews, Billy Timmins, Brian Walsh (all FG) who opposed the 2011 budget’s downgrade of Roscommon County Hospital; Thomas P. Broughan (L) who voted against the renewal of the Blanket Bank Guarantee in November 2011; Colm Keaveney (L) and Patrick Nulty (L) who voted against Budget cuts (2012); Róisín Shortall (L) due to policy differences (Source: TheJournal.ie Online Archive).


<sup>234</sup> So far the absent votes have not been taken into consideration. Rice scores do not take them into consideration and they are also excluded from the analysis of NOMINATE scores. Some authors have suggested that abstaining from voting can be interpreted as means to express dissent with an issue. Contrary to voting against the PPG line being absent is less costly for the PPG and has a less damaging effect. In this sense being absent is not neutral but can be seen as ‘calculated responses to formal rules that punish defection’ from the PPG line (Rosas & Shomer, 2008, p. 576). Contrary to breaches, absenteeism occurs frequently in legislatures. In Congress, it has been linked to close votes (Poole & Rosenthal, 2000). However, a conceptual problem arises when trying to distinguish between strategic absenteeism and being absent simply because the legislator is not present due to other, unrelated factors like simple scheduling problems. As an example, some legislatures allow committee meetings to be scheduled during plenary sessions. There is no way to distinguish these two based on roll call data. If one would count all absent MPs as voting against the line one would overestimate PPG breaches.

Figure A3: Comparison W-NOMINATE scores 113th Congress (U.S. House of Representatives / Senate) and Dáil Divisions (between March 2011 - April 2014 (n = 524)



(a) U.S. House of Representatives

(b) U.S. Senate



(c) Dáil Divisions

Source: Scores calculated using the *wnominate* package in R (Poole et al., 2011); House of Representatives top row left-hand side, Senate left-hand side. Data from Database 113th Congress Roll Call Votes, (Lewis & Poole, 2014), access date: 1st of May 2014); Dáil Divisions Data obtained from Dáil website, accessed 14th of April 2014.

The meaning of the dimensions themselves is subject to interpretation. Poole and Rosenthal (1991, 2000) argue that in the U.S. the first dimension refers to the traditional conflict along the left-right ideological spectrum. The second dimension contains any remaining votes that cannot be explained by this first dimension. These relate to dominant cross-cutting, differing issues in the legislature and vary from e.g. slavery to civil rights. The issue represented by the second dimension needs to be extracted from the constituent votes.

### Measuring ideological distance between individual legislators with survey data

An alternative to measuring the ideological distance between individual legislators and the PPG mean would be to rely on *survey data*. Surveys have frequently been used and are a “critical method to garner information about political institutions and behaviour” (Fisher & Herrick, 2013). In surveys, a wide variety of questions can be used such as self-placement on several policy dimensions which could be employed to measure the ideological distance

between legislators. Ciftci et al. (2008) use a survey on members of the Turkish parliament to calculate the ideological distance between a member of parliament and the majority parliamentary party group median.

Relying on own surveys was also not a feasible option in this project. Surveys on elites (such as legislators) usually suffer from low response rates (Fisher & Herrick, 2013). The reasons are manifold. MPs receive such requests frequently and subsequently refuse to participate. Additionally, as the information is considered sensitive, legislators may be unwilling to indicate their response. For the purpose of this study, data on all legislators are needed, not just a sample. Additionally, prior legislative periods would require a separate survey. In the context of this study two brief surveys were conducted in the first months of the elections in Germany and the Netherlands in 2012 and 2013. Several respondents indicated a categorical unwillingness to fill out a survey. This problem is not solved either by relying on already conducted surveys who have gathered such data. As an example, the PartiRep survey, a comparative international survey among members of national parliaments contains several questions applicable to the issue of loyalty and adherence to a PPG, but suffers from similar problems (Deschouwer & Depauw, 2014, p. 10). Across countries, response rates in this study are on average around 26 per cent.<sup>235</sup> Low response levels would leave a large part of the members out of the analysis. It is vital to not compromise the number of analysed legislators. Complete data are needed in order to analyse the PPG as a whole. An additional concern relates to privacy and data protection issues. Without knowing who individual survey respondents are it is impossible to relate the data in the survey to the committee assignment data.

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<sup>235</sup> Certain countries score relatively high (Netherlands 43 per cent). However, of e.g. Ireland (22.5 per cent).

## Appendix 12: Table A10: Number of analysed legislative speeches per country

Country	Plenary sessions	No analysed speeches and questions <sup>236</sup>
<b>Bundestag</b>		
12th (1990-1994)	243	46028
13th (1994-1998)	247	44559
14th (1998-2002)	253	40885
15th (2002-2005)	187	31619
16th (2002-2005)	233	44353
17th (2005-2009)	253	60809
18th (2009-May 2015)	107	20721
<b>Dáil Éireann</b>		
27th (1992-1997)	435	191843
28th (1997-2002)	422	226100
29th (2002-2007)	555	296515
30th (2007-2011)	348	245980
31st (2011-March 2015)	503	297769
<b>Tweede Kamer</b>		
1995-1998	291	140620
1998-2002	301	157121
2002-2003	97	25979
2003-2006	387	153738
2006-2010	378	155742
2010-2012)	232	86432
2012- March 2015	281	151020


Source: Own data set. For Germany the data set also includes speeches which were placed on record (*zu Protokoll gegebene Reden*) as well as all 'Explanations of vote' (Erklärungen nach Paragraph 31 GO).<sup>237</sup> The plenary minutes of the Tweede Kamer were obtained from the publications of the parliament listed on [www.officielebekendmakingen.nl](http://www.officielebekendmakingen.nl).<sup>238</sup> In the Dáil, the data contains all speeches, questions asked during Question Time on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays and also all written questions addressed to ministers for written reply. During question time, each TD is allowed to ask the Minister only two questions. There is no limit to the number of written questions. TDs frequently use written questions. In 2010, Ministers answered over 35000 written questions. With regard to the legislative periods which were still 'on-going' during the research, the end point was fixed at mid-2015. The last analysed plenary session in the Tweede Kamer was the one which took place on 24th March 2015 (66th), in the Dáil 31st of March 2015. In the Bundestag it was the 107th plenary session end of May 2015. The Tweede Kamer and the Dáil were analysed in April and May. This allowed for the inclusion of April and May in the Bundestag which was analysed as last parliament.

<sup>236</sup> Includes written speeches and statements as well as written and oral questions.


<sup>237</sup> According to Paragraph 31 Rules of Procedure, the Bundestag allows its members after the conclusion of a debate to make an oral statement on the final vote which may also be submitted as a short written statement and is included in the minutes of plenary proceedings. As these are highly likely sources of information for the expression of discontent and reservations these need to be included. As it is common for MPs to give an explanation in groups the statements were manually copied in order to assign these to every MP who supported them.

<sup>238</sup> The data is available from January 1995 onwards.

**Appendix 13: Figure A4: Visualisation Wordscores for (a) PPGs and (b) Committees (30th Dáil)**




(a)




(b)

**Appendix 14: Figure A5: Visualisation Wordscores for (a) PPGs and (b) Committees (Tweede Kamer 2010-2012)**



(a)

**Appendix 15: Figure A6: Visualisation Wordscores for (a) PPGs and (b) Committees (17th Bundestag)**



(a)

## Appendix 16: Table A11: High importance committees Dáil

27th Dáil	applies to
Public Accounts Committee	all PPGs
Finance and General Affairs	all PPGs
Legislation and Security	all PPGs
Social Affairs	all PPGs
Enterprise and Economic Strategy	all PPGs
27th Dáil	(after mid-term reform of committee system)
Public Accounts Committee	all PPGs
Enterprise and Economic Strategy	all PPGs
Finance and General Affairs	all PPGs
Legislation and Security	all PPGs
Small Business and Services	all PPGs
Social Affairs	all PPGs
28th Dáil	
Public Accounts Committee	all PPGs
Enterprise and Small Business	all PPGs
Finance and the Public Service	all PPGs
Health and Children	all PPGs
Justice, Equality and Women's Rights	all PPGs
Public Enterprise and Transport	all PPGs
29th Dáil	
Public Accounts Committee	all PPGs
Enterprise and Small Business	all PPGs
Finance and the Public Service	all PPGs
Health and Children	all PPGs
Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights	all PPGs
Social and Family Affairs	all PPGs
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources	Green Party
30th Dáil	
Public Accounts Committee	all PPGs
Economic Regulatory Affairs	all PPGs
Enterprise, Trade and Innovation	all PPGs
Finance and the Public Service	all PPGs
Justice, Defence and Women's Rights	all PPGs
Select Committee on Social Protection	all PPGs
Communications, Energy and Natural Resources	Green Party
Environment, Heritage and Local Government	Green Party
30th Dáil	
Public Accounts Committee	all PPGs
Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform	all PPGs
Jobs, Social Protection and Education	all PPGs
Justice, Defence and Equality	all PPGs

Source: Own depiction.

## Appendix 17: Table A12: High importance committees Bundestag

12th Bundestag until 14th Bundestag	applies to
Innenausschuss	all PPGs
Rechtsausschuss	all PPGs
Finanzausschuss	all PPGs
Haushalt	all PPGs
Wirtschaft	all PPGs
Arbeit und Sozialordnung	all PPGs
Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit	Green Party
<b>15th Bundestag</b>	
Innenausschuss	all PPGs
Rechtsausschuss	all PPGs
Finanzausschuss	all PPGs
Haushalt	all PPGs
Wirtschaft und Arbeit	all PPGs
Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung	SPD, CDU/CSU, Green Party
Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit	Green Party
<b>16th Bundestag and 17th Bundestag</b>	
Innenausschuss	all PPGs
Rechtsausschuss	all PPGs
Finanzausschuss	all PPGs
Haushalt	all PPGs
Wirtschaft und Technologie	all PPGs
Arbeit und Sozialordnung	all PPGs
Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit	Green Party
<b>18th Bundestag</b>	
Innenausschuss	all PPGs
Recht und Verbraucherschutz	all PPGs
Finanzausschuss	all PPGs
Haushalt	all PPGs
Wirtschaft und Energie	all PPGs
Arbeit und Sozialordnung	all PPGs
Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit	Green Party

Source: Own depiction.

## Appendix 18: Table A13: High importance committees Tweede Kamer

Tweede Kamer 1994, 1998, 2002, 200 and 2006		applies to
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties		all PPGs
Economische Zaken		all PPGs
Financiën		all PPGs
Justitie		VVD, LPF (2002), PVV (2006)
Verkeer en Waterstaat		VVD
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid		PvdA
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport		PvdA
Tweede Kamer 2010		
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (later Binnenlandse Zaken)		all PPGs
Economische Zaken (later Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie)		all PPGs
Financiën		all PPGs
Justitie		VVD, PVV
Verkeer en Waterstaat		VVD
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid		PvdA
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport		PvdA
Tweede Kamer 2012		
Binnenlandse Zaken		all PPGs
Economische Zaken		all PPGs
Financiën		all PPGs
Veiligheid en Justitie		VVD, PVV
Infrastructuur en Milieu		VVD
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid		PvdA
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport		PvdA

Source: Own depiction.

**Appendix 19: Table A14: Descriptive statistics Bundestag**

	Prior education	Prior occupation	External interests	Committee experience	Ideological distance	Number LPs
12th Bundestag (n = 632 legislators)						
nbr.val	632	632	632	632	632	632
nbr.null	36	53	351	336	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.01	1
max	1	1	0	1	28.87	10
sum	596	579	281	269	2189.09	1715
13th Bundestag (n = 636 legislators)						
nbr.val	636	636	636	636	636	636
nbr.null	18	37	370	256	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.00	1
max	1	1	1	1	68.06	9
sum	618	599	266	380	2929.13	1670
14th Bundestag (n = 654 legislators)						
nbr.val	654	654	654	654	654	654
nbr.null	26	52	336	247	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.01	1
max	1	1	1	1	46.39	9
sum	628	602	318	407	2384.11	1798
15th Bundestag (n = 576 legislators)						
nbr.val	576	576	576	576	576	576
nbr.null	22	47	268	212	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.01	1
max	1	1	1	1	43.61	9
sum	554	529	308	464	2501.99	1558

Source: Own data set. nbr.val = number of cases in variable; nbr.null = number of 0's (zeros) in variable; nbr.na = missing values; min = minimum value; max = maximum value; sum = sum of all values.

## Appendix 19: Table A14: Descriptive statistics Bundestag - part 2

	Prior education	Prior occupation	External interests	Committee experience	Ideological distance	Number LPs
16th Bundestag (n = 581 legislators)						
nbr.val	581	581	581	581	581	581
nbr.null	20	45	211	215	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.01	1
max	1	1	1	1	45.87	10
sum	561	536	370	366	1613.04	1648
17th Bundestag (n = 597 legislators)						
nbr.val	597	597	597	597	597	597
nbr.null	23	49	220	262	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.00	1
max	1	1	1	1	34.69	10
sum	574	548	377	335	837.9	1617
18th Bundestag (n = 575 legislators)						
nbr.val	575	575	575	575	575	575
nbr.null	22	41	220	254	0.00	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0.00	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.01	1
max	1	1	1	1	57.42	11
sum	553	534	355	321	2387.47	1450

Source: Own data set. nbr.val = number of cases in variable; nbr.null = number of 0's (zeros) in variable; nbr.na = missing values; min = minimum value; max = maximum value; sum = sum of all values.

**Appendix 20: Table A16: Descriptive statistics Dáil Éireann**

	Prior education	Prior occupation	External interests	Committee experience	Ideological distance	Number LPs
27th Dáil (n = 124 legislators)						
nbr.val	124	124	124	124	124	124
nbr.null	43	2	124	78	1	29
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0	0
max	1	1	0	1	47	10
sum	81	122	0	46	1111	368
27th Dáil (post reform) (n = 127 legislators)						
nbr.val	127	127	127	127	127	127
nbr.null	45	2	127	94	2	30
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0	0
max	1	1	0	1	49	14
sum	82	125	0	33	1178	402
28th Dáil (n = 133 legislators)						
nbr.val	133	133	133	133	133	133
nbr.null	40	2	110	79	5	35
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0	0
max	1	1	1	1	33	10
sum	93	131	23	44	719	367

Source: Own data set. nbr.val = number of cases in variable; nbr.null = number of 0's (zeros) in variable; nbr.na = missing values; min = minimum value; max = maximum value; sum = sum of all values.

## Appendix 20 (continued): Table A16: Descriptive statistics Dáil Éireann - part 2

	Prior education	Prior occupation	External interests	Committee experience	Ideological distance	Number LPs
29th Dáil (n = 132 legislators)						
nbr.val	132	132	132	132	132	132
nbr.null	41	4	123	64	2	37
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0	0
max	1	1	1	1	22.82	10
sum	91	128	9	9	655.31	312
30th Dáil (n = 140 legislators)						
nbr.val	140	140	140	140	140	140
nbr.null	48	5	132	60	1	40
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0	0
max	1	1	1	5	13	9
sum	92	135	8	80	366	338
31st Dáil (n = 119 legislators)						
nbr.val	119	119	119	119	119	119
nbr.null	37	9	112	82	3	68
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0	0
max	1	1	1	1	13	9
sum	82	110	7	37	394	120

Source: Own data set. nbr.val = number of cases in variable; nbr.null = number of 0's (zeros) in variable; nbr.na = missing values; min = minimum value; max = maximum value; sum = sum of all values.

**Appendix 21: Table A18: Descriptive statistics Tweede Kamer**

	Prior education	Prior occupation	External interests	Committee experience	Ideological distance	Number LPs
Tweede Kamer '94 - '98 (n = 169 legislators)						
nbr.val	169	169	169	0	169	169
nbr.null	29	10	84	0	2	87
nbr.na	0	0	0	169	0	0
min	0	0	0	NA	0	0
max	1	1	1	NA	24	7
sum	140	159	85	NA	565	212
Tweede Kamer '98 - '02 (n = 178 legislators)						
nbr.val	178	178	178	178	178	178
nbr.null	28	9	96	85	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.01	1
max	1	1	1	1	23.59	9
sum	150	169	82	93	454.98	381
Tweede Kamer '02 - '03 (n = 160 legislators)						
nbr.val	160	160	160	160	160	160
nbr.null	29	8	104	84	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.00	1
max	1	1	1	1	23.88	9
sum	131	152	56	76	471.76	343
Tweede Kamer '03 - '06 (n = 183 legislators)						
nbr.val	183	183	183	183	183	183
nbr.null	25	4	123	68	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.02	1
max	1	1	1	1	31.16	10
sum	158	179	60	95	979.16	458

Source: Own data set. nbr.val = number of cases in variable; nbr.null = number of 0's (zeros) in variable; nbr.na = missing values; min = minimum value; max = maximum value; sum = sum of all values. Data for variable 'committee experience' only available since 1994.

**Appendix 21 (continued): Table A18: Descriptive statistics Tweede Kamer - part 2**

	Prior education	Prior occupation	External interests	Committee experience	Ideological distance	Number LPs
Tweede Kamer '06 - '10 (n = 172 legislators)						
nbr.val	172	172	172	172	172	172
nbr.null	23	10	116	83	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.00	1
max	1	1	1	1	28.94	9
sum	149	162	56	89	727.38	395
Tweede Kamer '10 - '12 (n = 164 legislators)						
nbr.val	164	164	164	164	164	164
nbr.null	23	8	107	73	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.035	1
max	1	1	1	1	26.938	7
sum	141	156	57	91	428.313	369
Tweede Kamer since '12 (n = 149 legislators)						
nbr.val	149	149	149	149	149	149
nbr.null	25	5	124	61	0	0
nbr.na	0	0	0	0	0	0
min	0	0	0	0	0.04	1
max	1	1	1	1	16.07	8
sum	124	144	25	88	347.40	336

Source: Own data set. nbr.val = number of cases in variable; nbr.null = number of 0's (zeros) in variable; nbr.na = missing values; min = minimum value; max = maximum value; sum = sum of all values. Data for variable 'committee experience' only available since 1994.

**Appendix 22: Table A20: Model summaries multiple-membership multilevel model of committee assignments in the Tweede Kamer 1994 - 2012 (full members including transfers) including variable 'place on candidate list'**

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Committee membership (full members including transfers)							
		Tweede Kamer '94 - '98		Tweede Kamer '98 - '02		Tweede Kamer '02 - '03		Tweede Kamer '03 - '06	
		Model 1	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	
Prior education	0.415* (0.212)	0.389*** (0.143)	0.358** (0.149)	0.445*** (0.155)	0.374** (0.161)	0.553*** (0.129)	0.478*** (0.139)		
Prior occupation	0.629*** (0.195)	0.985*** (0.122)	0.902*** (0.128)	0.613*** (0.136)	0.462*** (0.141)	0.584*** (0.118)	0.502*** (0.127)		
External interest	0.165 (0.308)	0.457** (0.198)	0.372* (0.210)	0.347 (0.248)	0.106 (0.264)	0.528** (0.224)	0.318 (0.249)		
Committee experience			1.565*** (0.132)		1.583*** (0.168)		2.161*** (0.135)		
High imp. com's	1.631*** (0.508)	0.209 (0.316)	0.100 (0.340)	0.259 (0.453)	0.420 (0.476)	0.445 (0.338)	0.561 (0.368)		
Ideol. distance	0.006 (0.026)	-0.066*** (0.024)	-0.053** (0.026)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)		
NumberLPs	0.062 (0.061)	-0.004 (0.046)	-0.168*** (0.056)	0.072* (0.039)	0.036 (0.041)	0.022 (0.041)	-0.087* (0.048)		
Place on party list	0.006 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.0004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)		
Ideol. distance * HICs	-0.028 (0.047)	0.064* (0.036)	0.066* (0.038)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.026 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.025)		
Number LPs * HICs	-0.203* (0.108)	-0.051 (0.089)	-0.024 (0.101)	-0.119 (0.091)	-0.157 (0.096)	-0.128 (0.084)	-0.175* (0.097)		
Place on party list * HICs	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.009)		
Constant	-3.570*** (0.322)	-1.784*** (0.162)	-1.881*** (0.174)	-1.839*** (0.208)	-1.982*** (0.225)	-1.758*** (0.172)	-1.872*** (0.189)		
<i>Random effects:</i>									
Individual legislators	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Committees	(0.708)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.454)	(0.513)	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Observations	2535	2670	2670	2400	2400	2928	2928		
Log Likelihood	-579.207	-1128.461	-1058.473	-1093.726	-1051.197	-1284.170	-1157.144		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1.184.413	2.282.923	2.144.946	2.213.452	2.130.393	2.594.340	2.342.287		
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	1.260.307	2.359.490	2.227.404	2.288.634	2.211.358	2.672.107	2.426.036		

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Own data set.

**Appendix 22 (continued): Table A20: Model summaries multiple-membership multilevel model of committee assignments in the Tweede Kamer 1994 - 2012 (full members including transfers) including variable 'place on candidate list' - part 2**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Committee membership (full members including transfers)					
	Tweede Kamer '06 - '10		Tweede Kamer '10 - '12		Tweede Kamer '12 -	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Prior education	0.975*** (0.129)	0.887*** (0.140)	0.706*** (0.131)	0.558*** (0.142)	0.530*** (0.145)	0.437*** (0.148)
Prior occupation	0.510*** (0.124)	0.456*** (0.133)	0.467*** (0.123)	0.314** (0.133)	0.569*** (0.132)	0.488*** (0.138)
External interest	0.495** (0.243)	0.343 (0.272)	0.376* (0.212)	0.403* (0.231)	0.715** (0.339)	0.513 (0.363)
Committee experience		2.183*** (0.155)		2.494*** (0.148)		1.897*** (0.156)
High imp. com's	0.070 (0.312)	0.113 (0.326)	0.264 (0.348)	0.269 (0.385)	0.118 (0.424)	0.211 (0.424)
Ideol. distance	0.014 (0.013)	0.016 (0.015)	-0.060** (0.024)	-0.056** (0.025)	-0.062* (0.036)	-0.059 (0.039)
NumberLPs	-0.008 (0.040)	-0.166*** (0.049)	-0.042 (0.047)	-0.231*** (0.054)	0.045 (0.052)	-0.035 (0.060)
Place on party list	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.007)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)
Ideol. distance * HICs	-0.026 (0.028)	-0.030 (0.029)	-0.057 (0.052)	-0.071 (0.056)	0.104* (0.062)	0.124* (0.063)
Number LPs * HICs	0.014 (0.079)	0.013 (0.087)	-0.035 (0.088)	0.002 (0.101)	-0.136 (0.113)	-0.169 (0.125)
Place on list * HICs	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.0002 (0.011)	0.0003 (0.011)
Constant	-1.696*** (0.162)	-1.653*** (0.180)	-1.396*** (0.191)	-1.488*** (0.205)	-1.924*** (0.216)	-2.122*** (0.225)
<i>Random effects:</i>						
Individual legislators	(0.182)	(0.326)	(0.351)	(0.339)	(0.277)	(0.333)
Committees	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.171)	(0.217)	(0.228)	(0.001)
Observations	2916	2916	3116	3116	2533	2533
Log Likelihood	-1273.518	-1169.552	-1337.556	-1181.787	-1034.120	-961.583
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2.573.035	2.367.103	2.701.112	2.391.573	2.094.240	1951.166
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	2.650.749	2.450.795	2.779.688	2.476.193	2.170.123	2032.886

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Own data set.