

Secure Summits

Collaborative Crisis Management Before and During Global Government Conventions

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Introduction

Anytime world leaders meet, the stakes are high: both in terms of policy outcomes as well as in terms of event security. A trip down memory lane takes us from the streets of Genova in 2001, where massive protests resulted in many injured and one death, to the recent 2017 G20 meeting in Hamburg, when the charming old harbor area turned into a downtown battlefield. Summits simultaneously represent inflammable political controversy and potential global agreement. By nature, international summits attract demonstrators and global media attention for their issues and attempts to influence negotiations between political leaders.

The presence of so many heads of government requires the most extreme security measures which makes summits high security events. Meanwhile, the national host tries to organize a successful conference in a comfortable atmosphere, arrange for the complex logistics of delegates, respect protestors' civil rights and limit the consequences of security operations in terms of mobility and restrictions for its own citizens.

Securing summits is a daunting task where things can go dramatically wrong. Violent protests during previous summits in Prague (IMF Annual Meeting, September 2000), Nice (European Council, December 2000), Gothenburg (EU Council, June 2001), Genoa (G8 Summit, July 2001), Copenhagen (UN Climate Summit, December 2009), and Seoul (Nuclear Security Summit 2012) are cases in point. Despite variation in the previous cases regarding local protest cultures and security approaches, these demonstrations all ended in violent clashes between protestors and police, resulting in hundreds of arrests, use of unprecedented force by police units, and millions of euros in damages caused by vandalism and casualties among the protestors.

As such, summits are potential "crises in the making." Yet not all summits become crises. In this chapter, we argue that much can be learned from collaboration in the crisis preparation phase and its effects on the outcome of summits in terms of security. Incident evaluations after Gothenburg, Nice, Genoa, and Prague in the early 2000s hint at a variety of organizational factors that pertain to crisis preparedness. These include a lack of cooperation between the actors involved, a lack of calibrating responsibilities and mandates, blind spots and hubris on behalf of responsible authorities, and limited (inter)national and inter-organizational learning in preparing for high security events (Cf. Hansén and Hagström 2004; SOU 2002, 122; Wallmann 2006; KAMEDO 2001).

Global summits are examples of collaborative crisis management as they are potentially disruptive events that exceed the capacity of any single organization to manage the security situation alone (see introductory chapter). Hitherto studies on security events such as summits have been confined to the domain of policing, from the perspective of "liminal events" (Boersma 2013) or to the domain of sociology with a focus on protest dynamics in

the realm of social movement theory and contentious politics (see, e.g., Tilly and Tarrow 2012). A focus on summits from a crisis management perspective is new, and it can yield important clues on the prevention of and response to violent clashes.

Summits as Crises?

Arranging a secure and smoothly organized summit while respecting civil rights is a balancing act that resembles the many challenges of collaborative crisis management. The authors in the introductory chapter rightly state that crisis collaboration enjoys increasing popularity in scholarly research, but its share in published output is still limited despite its relevance (Kuipers and Welsh 2017). In a context of continuous threats, urgency and conflicting interests, a network (often *ad hoc*) has to provide public safety and reliability of critical infrastructures under conditions of high uncertainty. Summits are latent crises, and as they occur regularly, they seem more comparable than most extreme events. Authorities can prepare and plan better because summits have a lead time. Summits provide an opportunity for learning because the next event is usually scheduled before the current one is over. Summits allow us to study the conditions for collaboration in relation to security outcomes. Even though all the ingredients for a crisis to occur may be present, some summits are carried out calmly whereas others end up in chaos. Public evaluations, intense media scrutiny, and detailed bureaucratic record-keeping on each summit (calm or chaos) provide rich documentation for comparative case studies.

Judging success or failure of governance – in this case collaborative crisis governance – is of course an inherently political act, “because political actors, such as interest groups, politicians, journalists and voters are the main judges” (Bovens, ‘t Hart, and Peters 2001, 10). In this study, we base our review of success and failure in the cases under study on the verdicts of others, such as the previously mentioned actors for each case. Bovens et al. conclude that good government, which comes close to our idea of successful collaborative crisis governance, entails

working one’s way through a complex series of challenges in the most effective and politically sensitive manner possible. When doing so, people in governments would be working with incomplete information . . . and would be attempting to please a public with diverse and often conflicting values. These governments would also be faced with a number of internal governance problems, not the least of which is attempting to coordinate the activities of the numerous organizations working within the public sector.

(2001, 657–58)

Later, Bovens (2010) presents a useful distinction to evaluate success and failure in policymaking: between how a policy came about and what it entails (the locus of the study: process versus outcome), and between success from a political or a programmatic perspective (the focus of the study: legitimacy gained versus goals attained) (Bovens 2010, 584–85).

In this study on summits, we say that the cooperation and coordination of network partners during a summit fails when either the collaborative network falls apart (process failure) or when the network collaboration produces predominantly unintended or negative results or consequences (outcome failure). Failure in terms of summit security from a programmatic perspective would be breaches to security of political executives. Failure in terms of legitimacy include civil unrest, violation of rights, eruptions of violence leading

Table 3.1 Assessment of success of G20 and NSS

	<i>Programmatic perspective</i>	<i>Legitimacy perspective</i>
Process	Both +	G20: +/-; NSS: ++
Outcome	Both ++	G20: --; NSS: ++

Source: Table Created by Authors

to damage and casualties in public space, use of force toward citizens by law and order authorities, and decline of trust in public authorities and their work. A combination of these would constitute a local, national or international crisis depending on the levels of governance involved and on the severity of the incident(s).

Each case can be evaluated as success or failure regarding the locus and focus introduced by Bovens (2010). We will compare a summit that could be characterized as a violent, disruptive event (G20 Toronto in 2010) to a case of similar threat, size, and scope that occurred relatively calmly (NSS The Hague in 2014). Although both summits had successful outcomes from a programmatic security perspective (all heads of state participated unhindered and returned home unharmed), they were not equally successful in terms of legitimacy.

Why is it that some collaborative networks result in failed outcomes during high profile security events whereas others do not? What we will probe into is whether the collaborative process was smooth or rugged (programmatic success/failure) and whether it was inclusive and responsive or not (legitimacy success/failure). As we will outline later, collaboration in preparation of summits brings together a set of actors similar to those cooperating in crisis and disaster response. The fault lines that impede cooperation and coordination are also similar, and variation in the cases along these fault lines can help to explain the different outcomes.

Cooperation and Collaboration in Crisis: Focus on Fault Lines

“Decades of research on the subject have demonstrated that effective cooperation under crisis conditions is unlikely to emerge by itself” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2012, 183). The scale and scope of the threat or damage, the fact that crises respect no territorial or functional boundaries, and above all the different types of actors involved are among the key challenges that crises pose (Bynander and Nohrstedt, this volume). Summit actors come from within and from outside government organizations, bringing different perspectives, interests and resources to the table. Many of these actors are new to the safety and security field. And yet they need to collaborate to produce an effective response to the crisis or threat at hand (Boin and ‘t Hart 2012). In these networks, cooperation is most likely involuntary and defined by political responsibility (Moynihan 2012). Among the involuntary networks, Kenis and Provan (2009) distinguish between the ones led by a hierarchically superior actor (the “lead organization network”) and the ones coordinated by a “network administrative organization.”

Cooperation between actors in a collaborative crisis network has vertical and horizontal dimensions (Moynihan 2012). Vertical relationships pertain to hierarchy between network partners: central agencies and line or niche departments, national and local or regional authorities, and chief executives with their strategic staffs as well as operational commanders and their units. Horizontal relations exist between actors that are interdependent but have no authority (formal or de facto) over each other.

Cooperation between public authorities and private actors (such as NGOs, business firms, interest groups) come to mind but also relationships between actors at an equal level of authority (such as two regional police units or two ministries are horizontal). A Network Administrative Organization (NAO) could be helpful here (Kenis and Provan 2009).

While relating to each other along the horizontal and vertical dimensions, the actors in the network can also be fitted neatly into Dynes' boxes of established, extending, expanding, and emerging organizations in the crisis and security field (see Dynes 1970, in the introductory chapter for explanation of each category). Though Dynes originally discerned between organizations responding to disasters, the typology applies well to security networks preparing for summits. Established organizations (type I) are the routine security partners such as police and counterterrorism units. Extending organizations are those (public) organizations involved in hosting and accommodating the summit, the "type II bureaucracies" that Boin and 't Hart (2012) routinely refer to. Expanding organizations (type III) would be existing private organizations with some interest or involvement in the summit operation, organization or outcome (firms, NGOs, and interest groups). Finally, emerging organizations (type IV) are *ad hoc* groups of demonstrators, protesters, residents or other citizens that react to the summit in some newly organized form.

Boin and 't Hart (2012) identify several collaboration fault lines. We regroup them here into three categories. First, fault lines seem to occur when **cultures clash** (between different organizational styles such as type I command and control type organizations versus type II confederations of diplomats). Second, fault lines also occur when crises cross functional boundaries and tasks are not covered, and when **problem frames are set too narrow** (creating discussions between type I and II organizations on who assumes responsibility for what, or disputes between insiders – type I and II – versus outsiders – type III and IV). Third, fault lines prevail when **single perspectives rule** (short-term not long-term, national focus with disregard for local interests, and strategic considerations versus operational demands) and when actors of different types do not find common ground during the collaboration process.

What we expect to see in the cases is that the composition of the network, the cooperation between the actors, and the content of the joint planning and operations reflect how the collaborative network has dealt with the previously mentioned fault lines that are likely to occur between different types of organizations. The prevalence of fault lines in the cases is related to the outcome (violent or peaceful summit) in our analysis and discussion.

Research Design

This study is a structured, focused comparison of two cases (George and Benett 2005). Our cases focus on the middle zone between long-term collaborations in managing public policy and the *ad hoc* prevention and management of crises. Organizing an international summit usually takes one to two years of preparation and involves threats, uncertainty, and high stakes regarding security matters. An international summit sometimes materializes into a public order crisis and sometimes not. Our cases involve the wide spectrum of security related actors and representatives from sectors affected by security measures. These actors participate in a network, and they each bring their own organizational values and interests, which may be implicit and inherently conflicting (Owen et al. 2016). Moynihan points out that involuntary participation in public service networks (such as the collaborative security networks in our study) may increase

each participant organization's concerns about extra-network reputation and organizational values, as opposed to reciprocity norms that usually bind voluntary networks (Moynihan 2012, 568, 573).

We do not study the diplomatic outcome of the selected cases (i.e., the treaty content), nor did we study operational and tactical decisions during the summits. We selected two summits: one summit that – in spite of intense network cooperation – was perceived as a security drama, a civil rights nightmare, and a logistical standstill, and another summit that in terms of civil rights, logistics, and security, ran smoothly (in the eyes of media and the respondents, according to the formal evaluations). This allows us to probe into the collaborative practices in preparation of these summits to see what influenced the difference in outcome in terms of public order and security.

Of course, collaborating authorities responsible for security operations during international summits do not fully impact the security threats they face. Anti-establishment groups may or may not decide autonomously (uninfluenced by considerations regarding security measures) to demonstrate during a summit, and the intensity and size of their demonstration and ultimately rioting efforts may vary. Part of the explanation may also be anticipation: rioters decide not to mobilize because of expected police presence and security barriers. While the advanced announcement of such measures could be seen as part of successful preparation and communication by the summit's host, we cannot control for the autonomous decisions made by rogue individuals or groups.

We compare the two cases in a qualitative case study design to examine whether collaboration in the governing networks responsible for security and logistics before and during the summits reveal striking differences that may relate to the diverging case outcomes. We look into what fault lines were present in the cases, and the ways these collaborative networks dealt with these fault lines can be connected to the overall outcomes of the cases.

The outcomes of collaboration in the security management of a summit are compared on dimensions such as security, public order, civil rights, and mobility. It is important to consider all these dimensions because they are inherently conflicting. Security and public order are much easier to guarantee if constitutional rights can be disregarded (for instance when all protests and demonstrators are banned from the wider area surrounding the summit), and if all local mobility can be optimally restricted. Vice-versa, if both citizen rights and their mobility have to be respected, the risks that demonstrators or even terrorists can disturb a summit are much higher.

Data Collection

Data for the study was collected in two steps. First, a content-analysis of all relevant (public) evaluations from official government sources, media sources (through Lexis-Nexis searches) and independent inquiries were coded in NVivo to get an idea of the key characteristics of both cases in terms of the policy process and the policy outcomes of the summits in terms of (1) security, (2) public order, (3) constitutional rights, (4) mobility, and (5) resources.¹ The second step included semi-structured interviews with key respondents of both cases. In the interviews, we asked respondents about the relations between key stakeholders in the preparation phase, the prior relationships between key stakeholders, the formal structure of the summit preparation organization, the timeline, and the perceived successes and failures in the collaboration process. The 26 interviewees were identified either by their names appearing in the key

documents used for the content analysis or by snowball sampling (see list of respondents in Appendix I). All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded by both authors independently using NVivo.

Description of the Cases: NSS the Hague Versus G20 Toronto

The G20 Toronto Summit in June 2010 was the fourth in a line of G20 meetings addressing global finance and economic issues. Its theme “Recovery and New Beginnings” referred to the aim to overcome the ongoing economic worldwide recession. The G20 Toronto Summit was combined with a G8 Summit held immediately prior in nearby rural Huntsville. Together, the summits represented the largest and most expensive security operation in Canadian history. Both summits were criticized for being many times more costly than similar events in the UK and in Japan (Chase 2010).

The Hague’s Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014 was the largest security operation the Netherlands ever hosted. This NSS 2014 was the third in a row, preceded by Nuclear Security Summits in Washington DC (2010) and Seoul (2012). Though the aim of the summits was to improve global nuclear safety, the prior summit in South Korea had sparked off violent protests. The NSS in The Hague was combined with a G7 summit that took place on the same premises the same week.

The cases are highly comparable in the sense that they both took place in the post-9/11 era, they were preceded by similar summits in other countries that instigated violent demonstrations, they were organized in a densely populated city center and they put similar demands on policing capacity. The summits were similar in terms of political controversy and terrorist threat. Neither of the host countries had experienced violent protests during previous summits. Both summits were hosted in metropolitan areas and preceded by a G7/G8 summit back to back to the larger summit. At both events, over 20,000 security officers were deployed during the operations, parts of the city centers (where the summits were held) were entirely sealed off with fences, and the summits paralyzed regional logistics for three consecutive days.

The Netherlands scores much higher than Canada in studies on protest demonstrations and activism, with self-reported activism among respondents scoring 32% in the Netherlands (ranking 3rd, which is comparable to Sweden: ranking 2nd with 35%) against 19% in Canada (ranking 14th), which is more comparable to South Korean scores (14%, ranking 18th) (Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005, 199).

Yet, the Toronto Summit attracted 9,000 protesters and resulted in over 600 reported incidents and more than 1,000 arrests, whereas The Hague Summit occurred rather peacefully. The protests in downtown Toronto addressed generic issues as globalization, capitalism, and gay rights and further escalated during the summit itself. What started off as peaceful demonstrations, led to increasing protests and the use of *black bloc* tactics once the summit officially started (The Star 26 June 2010). Shops and businesses in downtown Toronto were vandalized. Security was subsequently tightened, which further escalated the aggression exerted against the police officers near the temporary detention facility where 500 protesters were being detained. In total, more than 1100 people were arrested during the week of the summit. Riot police and protesters clashed, and tear gas and plastic bullets were used to push back the protesters (The Globe 28 June 2010). After the Toronto Summit, at least nine formal investigations into police operations were conducted. The costs of the G8-G20 security amounted up to 930M Canadian dollars all together (Office of the Parliamentary Budget Office 2010).

Table 3.2 Characteristics of the high security events

	G20	NSS
Theme	Economic recovery after the global recession	Increase Global Nuclear Security
Dates	26–27 June 2010	24–25 March 2014
Occurrence	Fourth edition	Third edition
Back-to-back event	Combined with G8	Combined with G7
Key stakeholders in planning and operation of security	Toronto Police Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Peel Regional Police, Ontario Provincial Police, Canadian Forces, Summit Management Office	Project team Security and Safety, 17 members from different security domains and different public and private organizations, including but are not limited to: National Coordinator for Terrorism and Security, National Police, Municipality The Hague, Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Prorail (train network), Border Police (KMAR), hotels, etc.
Security staff employed	+/- 20,000	+/- 21,000
Number of delegations	36	58
Security zones	Inner and outer zones. Inner zone: 3–4 km ²	Five security rings: first and second up to 250m range around the conference center
High security measures in inner security zone	3m high fences, Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD), mobility restrictions through Regulation 233/10, Public Works Protection Act, Stop and Search	“Ring of steel”: high fences, police control, CCTV systems

Source: Table Created by Authors

Table 3.3 Outcomes in terms of experienced unrest

	G20	NSS
Number of protesters	9000	+/- 800
Number of reported incidents	600	7
Number of arrests	1100	75
Number of injured security personnel	75	19

Source: Table Created by Authors

Toronto G20: Violence Met With Violence

When the Harper administration announced in June 2008 that the next G8 summit would be held on June 25 and 26, 2010, in Huntsville, Ontario, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) assumed general responsibility for the security of the event. They started planning for the event with Chief Superintendent Alphonse MacNeil in the lead. The Peel Regional Police (PRP, Toronto airport jurisdiction), the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP, jurisdiction travel routes of delegation) and the Canadian Forces (CF, general patrolling) all became members of the G8 steering committee and the Integrated Security Unit (ISU). The Toronto Police Service (TPS) was also part of the ISU, responsible for the media center of the G8 in Toronto. Huntsville, three hours north of Toronto, is a small town; thus, planning for the event progressed relatively smoothly between the security partners.

In December 2009, the Harper administration announced that the G8 summit would be held back-to-back with a G20 summit on June 26 and June 27, 2010. In February, they announced the venue: the Metro Toronto Convention Centre (MTCC) in the midst of the downtown financial district. This news changed everything (interview 19). Although the TPS was already part of the steering committee, they suddenly became a lead agency because the city of Toronto became the primary event location. Confusion reigned on the role of TPS, RCMP and the other partners but no formal changes were made regarding the overall responsibility for the security of the event. The prime minister's office had overall responsibility for hosting the G20. They set up a Summit Management Office (SMO), responsible for the organization of the G20 Summit and for the coordination of the federal agencies. The RCMP, as the lead law enforcement agency at the federal level, was responsible for the overall security of both the G8 and G20 Summits. Information from the prime minister's office was sent to the RCMP and then down to the other partners. This was problematic for the network because information was not shared easily among security partners. Furthermore, the fact that the summits were held back to back hindered the mobilization and deployment of staff needed in both Huntsville and Toronto.

The Harper administration's late announcement of the G20 Summit and the additional venue left the federal, provincial, and city authorities with only four months to plan for the G20. As a result, planning was rushed, information was inadequate, and time for training and preparing operational staff was limited. In terms of security within the city of Toronto, RCMP was responsible for the security of all political leaders and diplomats and took over the jurisdiction of downtown Toronto.² The overarching goal of the RCMP was to organize a safe and secure summit for the Internationally Protected Persons (IPP's). The RCMP closed off the summit's security zones (3–4 square miles) for the public by putting up 10-foot high fences. This severely disrupted city life in Toronto. Businesses were temporarily closed or moved, public transport was disrupted, and major thoroughfares were closed (OIPRD 2012).

The Toronto Police Service controlled the outer zones. In these zones, public order issues unfolded resulting in violent protests and riots starting on June 26. The TPS officers in these zones received support from the OPP and RCMP officers who operated under the command of the TPS. The riots escalated to a point that the TPS chief commanders decided to “take back the streets.” The use of force by both police and protestors further escalated, leading to a vicious circle of “violence to be met with violence” (OIPRD 2012). Over the course of the summit, more than 1,100 people were arrested and detained in the temporary Prisoner Processing Center. Several independent inquiries reported that these detentions resulted in severe human rights violations.

Media reports paid little attention to the content of the summit. Instead, they reported on the high security fences, massive police presence, large groups of demonstrators, protesters employing *black bloc* tactics, vandalism, and excessive violence between police and protestors. Yet most police respondents assert that, given the scope of the security operation, the number of jurisdictions involved, and the short notice, policing was carried out very well.

The Hague NSS: Dignified, Secure, and Peaceful

When the Netherlands agreed in 2012 to U.S. President Barack Obama’s request to host the third global Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, The Hague won the bid of the hosting city. The Hague, a city of half a million inhabitants, is the Dutch government residence. It likes to promote itself as a city of peace because several important international institutions are located in the city. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as the primary responsible government department) would organize the event in close cooperation with the city (also as its contractor) and with local and national security partners. From the start, the overarching goal of organizing the NSS was to host a “dignified, secure and peaceful” summit.

The summit, unprecedented in scope to the Dutch organizers, would bring 58 heads of state, their delegations, and the world press to the Netherlands for a three-day high security, high profile event in the heart of the densely populated country. The Netherlands is a decentralized state; thus, mayors have ultimate authority over public order and safety in their jurisdiction. Accommodating and transporting delegations from and to the World Economic Forum in The Hague would include crossing the jurisdictions of 20 different mayors/municipalities, two provinces, and four police districts. Security operations would involve the deployment of 13,000 police and 8,000 military officers. The impact on mobility, logistics, and business continuity was unparalleled.

A Ministerial Committee including the PM (chair), and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Security and Justice, Economic Affairs, Defence, and Infrastructure plus the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security and the Mayor of The Hague would be the ultimate decision unit at the highest strategic level. One level below, responsibility was divided between two committees at the Directorate-General level (one for content/diplomacy and one for security of the event). Two levels below, three project groups (Sherpa team, NSS project team and the Security Project Group – PGV) formed the administrative backbone of the event organization, coordinating the work at the operational level. At all levels, diplomacy and security formed the pillars of the event organization.

The summit was successful in the eyes of the organizers and well received by the Dutch press and international media. No major incidents occurred, and demonstrations were exercised peacefully and calmly. The Dutch government concluded that its goals were met as the summit could be characterized as dignified, secure, and peaceful.

Analysis

We will highlight the most striking differences in our analysis of fault lines and conditions that seemed to relate to the differences in outcomes between the two events.

Problem Framing: Narrow Versus Broad

For the Toronto G20 Summit, several police respondents said their overarching goal was “to get the heads of state in and out of the summit safely,” which illustrates the perfect isolation of security planning in the Canadian case (interview 22). This isolation stands in stark contrast to the integrated perspective on goals of the Dutch NSS summit organization. From the start, security was but one goal of the entire network responsible for the NSS planning and operations. Security concerns in The Hague (represented by the type I organizations in the network) had to find a constant balance with the desired peaceful, undisturbed, dignified and festive character of the event (represented by type II organizations such as the Foreign Office which was in charge of hosting the Summit) as well as with the people of the city (and their local interests represented by businesses, interest groups, and residents through type III and IV organizations included in the network). Because of this compound aim, societal actors joined the decision-making tables at all governance levels. They brought in different views on how to deal with demonstrations, how to groom public opinion, and how to minimize security restrictions that hindered city life and business continuity. Their interests were constantly weighing into the security planning. The Dutch actors had experience with this inclusive approach from prior events and their constitutional setup of local autonomy ensured that local demands for a festive and peaceful event were taken into serious consideration.

Though it is unlikely that the exclusion of other interests than security in the Canadian ISU's planning efforts inspired demonstrators and violent protestors, there was clearly a “them” (summit/security, type I organizations) against “us” (demonstrators/media/spectators – type IV) atmosphere in the city. Imposed restrictions, incurred costs, and the use of law enforcement related to the summit were critically received by the press. However, the rogue nature of the protestors and the violence they displayed in the city center led 81% of the Torontonians who participated in a poll to agree that the police had done a good job during the summit (Chase 2010). Nevertheless, the escalation of violence between the police and the protestors probably did not favorably influence the public evaluations of the organization of the G20 Summit.

It seems that the integrated approach in The Hague empowered a diversity of interests. The compound motto ensured that interests that played a minor role in the Toronto G20 planning (citizen mobility and public appreciation for the event) weighed in heavily in the NSS preparations.

Single Perspectives Rule: Planners Versus Operators

The inclusive, integrated network for preparing the NSS at the strategic and tactical level in the Netherlands was mirrored by a similar network at the operational level. According to respondents, the liaisons present in both networks ensured the operability of decisions taken, regular information flows, and reality checks between the levels. Yet six months before the NSS was scheduled to take place, the PGV at the strategic level started to lose grip on the numerous expert groups created to work on specific issues. Each issue had been translated into a specific expert group which undermined the integrated approach

and the number of groups had proliferated. The PGV seized the opportunity to escalate the most pressing issues to the strategic level and reduce the number (45–50) of the expert groups considerably, to regain oversight and reduce overlap. Respondents saw the lead time (1.5 years) up to the event both as a benefit and a disadvantage: it allowed both for the proliferation of network segments and for the time to “tame the beast we created” (interview 11). In any case, sufficient time existed to carefully calibrate strategic and operational plans, practices and responses before and during the event.

Such time was lacking in the Toronto case, in the four months after the Harper administration selected the MTCC venue as the G20 location. In the G8/G20 preparations phase, an operational network that mirrored the collaborative network of strategic planners (all type I organizations, but at different hierarchical levels) existed on paper but not in practice. Much of the ISU information to the operational forces was directed top down to the chiefs of the operational services and in fact given only a few days prior to the event to the officers involved in the operation. Confusion reigned about the exact plans, strategies, and security operations, as operators were not included in the planning dialogue. As one of the lead planners of the G20 recalled in an interview: “I should have ensured that the deputy chief and chiefs of the [operational] services were involved [and] understood the plans. I did not do that.” In the end, the chief was able to say

I didn't know. I learned my lesson there, and if I ever do this again, I would definitely make sure that we were on the same page. Responsibility and accountability were on paper, but that didn't matter. Nobody took that to the chief of police to check if he understood.

(interview 19)

System architecture between planners and operators in the G20 case clearly differed from the situation in The Hague, as operational actors were not involved in the G20 security planning, hindering collaborative governance and ultimately unsettling operations during the G20 Summit.

Culture Clashes: Inward Looking Versus Outreaching

In both Toronto and The Hague, the local police contacted anticipated demonstrators prior to the summit to explain the restrictions, demonstration routes, locations, and so on. In order to be able to anticipate potential demonstrations and constantly update their threat assessments, the Dutch police used international intelligence networks to stop potential protestors “from getting on the bus in Italy” instead of just waiting for their arrival in a more reactive way. In the Toronto case, the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) consisted mainly of key stakeholders of the ISU: the Canadian Intelligence Service (CSIS), border agencies, Transport Canada, and the Canadian Forces (type I and type II organizations). Although official inquiries indicated that “collection and dissemination of intelligence through one central theme supported the partners in working together,” they found that “varying protocols and procedures for sharing and classifying information made information sharing difficult” (RCMP 2014, 10).

Diplomats from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (type II) proactively contacted organized protestors (type III and IV) to convince them of the benefits of the NSS in terms of world peace. After all, the Nuclear Security Summit aimed to reduce the risk of criminal and terrorist use of nuclear materials worldwide. Who could be against that? This informal marketing campaign on the NSS may have contributed to the less fierce anti-nuclear energy protests than for instance during the Seoul NSS of 2012. In Toronto, the

Community Relations Group (CRG) of the joint police organizations (all type I) reached out to both the citizens affected by the G20 Summit and to potential protesters (type IV and III respectively) to facilitate peaceful and lawful protests. However, “For the most part, there was little positive interaction between the CRG and the more militant activists” (TPS 2011, 55; interview 18). The protestors criticized the CRG for being solely concerned about obtaining intelligence (RCMP 2012).

Demonstrators and security actors by nature have a prehistory of conflict rather than cooperation, so collaborative actors need to take positive steps to remediate low levels of trust. Though the TPS did extensive fieldwork to inform demonstrators, this was not necessarily perceived as a trust-building exercise by the protesters, and the resulting protests do not indicate any positive effects of prior bilateral communication (Ontario Ombudsman 2010). By contrast, the Dutch diplomatic approach to activists, not by the security actors in the networks but by their colleagues from the Foreign Office to positively communicate and find agreement and support for the ultimate goals of the summit seemed to pay off in increasing mutual trust.

Both Culture Clash and Single Perspective: Mono Versus Multidisciplinary

The network in the Toronto case seemed to mainly facilitate cooperation among the police forces (all type I). Toronto police respondents characterized their cooperation as smooth, in spite of a mild historical animosity between the federal RCMP and the local TPS. In the Toronto case, elected officials representing the city, the Ontario government or the Harper administration did not assume a strong mediating role within the network of stakeholders. The homogeneity of their network (police organizations only) led to a widely shared agreement on their mission (providing security to G20 delegations). Most respondents agreed that, given the challenges, they successfully pulled off the task at hand.

In the NSS case, cooperation at the strategic level (PGV) involved the greatest possible variety of network partners, including the city (type II), cabinet departments (type II), business representatives (type III), emergency services (type I), special police forces (type I), intelligence agencies (type II), neighborhood communities (type IV), and the military (type I/II). The Chairperson of the PGV was the Deputy DG of the National Coordinator of Counterterrorism and Security in the Netherlands, a Directorate-General that by definition always plays a moderating and coordinating role among a diversity of network partners in all its regular activities. This background may have contributed to her coordinating approach and skills, allowing her to become the “honest broker” in the NSS preparations network.

The NSS network in The Hague faced an intense conflict about the integration of command centers, six months before the NSS began. The local police demanded to include the local emergency services in the operational command center *on site* (i.e., inside the secured zone). The special police forces (such as intervention squads and police intelligence groups part of the national police) in that command center, opposed vehemently against the presence of civilian actors. The special police forces argued that their information could not be shared in the presence of non-police actors. The local police escalated this issue because they valued the presence of their highly trusted local emergency counterparts for an integrated operational approach. In the end, the PGV at the strategic level intervened and included the relevant non-security actors in the command center on site. According to the local respondents, the issue harmed the overall reputation of the police in the eyes of other emergency response organizations, but the resulting integrated command center worked well before and during the summit.

Table 3.4 Overview of main findings

Fault line	G20	NSS
Culture clash	Inclusive toward protestors (managed by type I organizations – security focus) Mainly type I organizations (inward looking). Constrained information sharing through protocols and procedures	Inclusive toward protestors (managed by type II organizations – content focus) Outward looking. Ability to use international information sharing and cooperation networks (EU wide)
Problem framing	“Us versus them” framing (type I versus type IV organizations). Narrow goal-setting (safe and secure)	Collective, inclusive decision making (all types of organizations). Broad goal-setting (festive, safe, peaceful)
Single perspectives	Short-term preparation seen as disadvantage Hierarchical “tension” (RCMP lead in TPS area). Clear strategic/operational division	Long-term preparation seen as both advantage and disadvantage Dispersed “tensions”: who is doing what? (losing oversight). Integrated/mirrored strategic/operational organization

Source: Table Created by Authors

Conclusions: Stay on the Slack Line

Though we cannot conclude that the observed differences of how fault lines prevailed in the cases causally relate to security outcomes of the two summits, the contrasts are insightful. The absence of scholarly research into such differences and the recurrence of summits make this exploration a valuable effort. Our cases confirm the importance of collaborative efforts between organization types to deal with crises or threats that ignore functional boundaries. Such collaborative efforts require an inclusive approach to security. Not surprisingly, taking on board societal actors (type III and IV in Dynes’s typology) is imperative to meet societal security challenges.

Meanwhile, this inclusive approach can generate its own fault lines when the number of actors increases so much that a proliferation of different expert groups takes place, each embracing a single-perspective specialization. A network administrative organization that bears the responsibility to safeguard the sustainability and coherence of the network may be required to smoothen cooperation between the partners (Kenis and Provan 2009). The Dutch case study revealed the vital importance of a coordinating actor that served as an “honest broker” between the different interests involved (cf. Kuipers and Swinkels 2018).

Another finding is that smooth network cooperation can be deceptive when the network only involves the same type of organizations. When these organizations are horizontally related, such as different police organizations in the Canadian case (all type I), network collaboration can still require much effort because of disputes on tasks and responsibilities. Hierarchy within the network can help to make collaboration succeed in terms of reconciling actors involved in a single mission, as it did in Toronto (with the RCMP taking the lead in securing world leaders at all cost). The process of collaboration could even be characterized as a programmatic success (Bovens 2010). Yet, collaboration will still likely fail to cover societal interests and thus get harmed in the long run (resulting in process failure in terms of legitimacy). Including “strangers” (from a security perspective) may generate severe culture clashes within the network in the short run but may prove beneficial

to the relations with other “outsiders,” such as the protestors who were appeased by the diplomats in the Dutch case.

Practitioners must try to move from fault lines to slack lines. Slack lines find their origin in climbing. They are dynamic lines between two anchor points on which people can train their balance. Moving from one edge to the other is a delicate, balancing act that requires cooperation of many different muscles in the body. Due to the wobbly line that moves with you as you go, long-term training to stay on the line is essential in order to cross from one point for another. As we have outlined in this chapter, preparing for secure summits can lead to dramatic outcomes when organizations fall off slack lines into fault lines. The lessons from both cases concerning problem framing, culture clashes, and single perspective rules challenge practitioners to train, prepare, and practice the balancing act from event planning and preparation to secure summit operations.

The findings of this study can guide further research on securing high profile security events through collaboration in governance networks. Collaborative networks in security and crisis management deserve more scholarly attention than they currently receive (Kuipers and Welsh 2017, 280). High profile security events will always be there, and in recent years, global summits are on the rise (Bradford, Linn, and Martin 2008). When demonstrators may become more mobile and militant against authorities in a polarized world, authorities responsible for public order cannot afford to ignore these lessons for collaborative governance in security settings.

Notes

1. Data available upon request.
2. Within the controlled access and restricted access zone.

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Appendix I

List of Respondents

	<i>Position/role</i>	<i>Date</i>
1	World Forum, The Hague, event manager	19 August 2015
2	The Hague Police – strategic leadership 1	10 August 2015
3	The Hague Police – strategic leadership 2	04 November 2015
4	The Hague Police – operational leadership	24 September 2015
5	National Police – strategic leadership	01 December 2015
6	Ministry of Foreign Affairs – operational leadership	07 October 2015
7	Ministry of Foreign Affairs – strategic leadership	24 September 2015
8	Ministry of Security and Justice – staff project group security (PGV)	26 August 2015
9	Ministry of Security and Justice – strategic leadership Crisis Management Unit	07 September 2015
10	Ministry of Security and Justice – strategic leadership project group security (PGV)	09 September 2015
11	Ministry of Security and Justice – strategic leadership project group security (PGV)	31 August 2015
12	Ministry of Security and Justice – staff project group security (PGV) – logistics	10 August 2015
13	Ministry of Security and Justice – staff project group security (PGV) – security heads of state	26 August 2015
14	Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation – staff project group security (PGV)	15 September 2015
15	The Hague City – City manager	02 September 2015
16	The Hague City – NSS project leadership	23 July 2015
17	The Hague City – strategic leadership security	17 August 2015
18	Toronto Police Service – communications manager	20 August 2015
19	Toronto Police Service – strategic leadership, project leader	19 August 2015
20	Office of the Independent Police Review – lead researcher	25 August 2015
21	Royal Canadian Mounted Police – strategic leadership 1, project leader	29 August 2015
22	Royal Canadian Mounted Police – strategic leadership 2	26 August 2015
23	Peel Regional Police – strategic leadership	24 August 2015
24	Metro Toronto Convention Centre – event managers (2)	20 August 2015
25	Toronto Emergency Services – operational leadership	25 August 2015
26	Ontario Provincial Police Association – strategic leadership	19 August 2015