Dionysius and Quintilian: Imitation and emulation in Greek and Latin literary criticism

Schippers, A.M.

CHAPTER 3

DIONYSIUS' *ON IMITATION* AND HIS READING LIST OF GREEK LITERATURE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The nuances in Dionysius' mimetic terminology mirror a refined theory of imitation, set out in his rhetorical essays. In these essays, Dionysius shows himself to be particularly interested in providing the greatest literary models for imitation.[1] He quotes extensively from a wide range of classical authors and submits their works to concise critical analyses and methods, such as close reading, rearrangement or *metathesis* (μετάθεσις) and 'comparison' (σύγκρισις) of two or more authors. To arrange his material and thoughts, he identifies different virtues of specific authors and discusses these more or less in depth. In employing such a classifying system of virtues to cast light on the best characteristics for imitation, Dionysius was definitely not alone. The so-called theory of 'virtues of style' (ἀρεταὶ λέξεως) is a traditional one, going back at least to Theophrastus and Demetrius.[2] However, the composition of separate essays on the 'manner of life and style of writing' (προαιρέσεις τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ λόγου) of a few selected authors is, as Dionysius claims, his own invention.[3]

Dionysius also decided to devote a separate treatise to the subject of imitation, in which its nature and methods were not discussed rather incidentally – as part of literary-critical analyses – but in a quite systematic and comprehensive way. His work *On Imitation*, which consists of three books and is dedicated to an unknown Greek called Demetrius, is the fruit of this undertaking. That Demetrius is the addressee of *On Imitation* is revealed by Dionysius in his *Letter to Pompeius*.[4] However, in his treatise *On Thucydides*, Dionysius

[1] In fact, even in Dionysius' historical writings, imitation is a central concept. Imitation is 'the central concept that may be said to encapsulate the intentions of all of Dionysius' works', according to De Jonge & Hunter (2018), 4.

[2] For a brief overview of theories of virtues of style, see section 3.5.2.

[3] Dion. Hal. *Orat*. *Vett*. 4.2. On the preface to *Orat*. *Vett*., see Hidber (1996).

[4] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1. Goold (1961), 188 argues that Demetrius, the author of the treatise *On Style*, is the same Demetrius as the addressee of Dionysius' *On Imitation*. For discussions on the addressee of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, see e.g. Aujac (1992), 163; Fornaro (1997), 163.

makes it clear that we should actually see all orators *in spe* as the intended audience of *On Imitation*.[5]

It is important to realise that Dionysius was writing in Greek to the Greek Demetrius on Greek authors of the classical past. From this Greek perspective, which, judging from the epitome, leaves no room for references to the political and social reality of the Roman world, we should analyse and interpret the treatise *On Imitation* and its aims. However, it is essential not to forget that the Greek Dionysius was also thoroughly Roman.[6] He lived in Rome, wrote the *Roman Antiquities* using both Greek and Roman sources, had many Roman acquaintances among scholars, teachers and pupils, and addressed some of his rhetorical treatises to Romans, like Metilius Rufus (*On Composition*) and Quintus Aelius Tubero (*On Thucydides*). Therefore, Dionysius' claim of offering practically useful recommendations for future rhetoricians in his handbook *On Imitation* strongly involves his own city of Rome in his programme of rhetorical imitation.

Unlike most of Dionysius' works that survived the wear and tear of time, *On Imitation* is only preserved in the form of a few fragments of the first and second book, and an epitome of the second book, which contains a Greek reading list. In this chapter, I present an analysis of the aims, audience, content and form (3.4) and the application of literary virtues (3.6) in *On Imitation*. I do so on the basis of the epitome which, judging from an important section on the historians, can be considered a rather faithful though reduced presentation of Dionysius' views.[7] This analysis, which is accompanied by a brief section on the history of canons (3.5.1) and theories of virtues of style (3.5.2), is preceded by a discussion of the remaining fragments

[5] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.1-2. This passage is also discussed in section 3.4.

[6] For Dionysius' Greek and Roman network, see esp. De Jonge & Hunter (2018), 6-11. For other literature on the network of Greek and Roman intellectuals, see section 1.1, n. 2.

[7] Fortunately, we are able to compare a passage from Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*, in which he quotes an extensive section on the historians Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus from the second book of *On Imitation*, with the epitomised version of *On Imitation*. Deviations turn out to be not very substantial. Cf. Bonner (1939), 39: 'It is possible […] to accept the epitome as representing the gist of Dionysius' remarks on the style of the authors mentioned in it'. Cf. also Aujac (1992), 15: 'Vaille que vaille, l'Épitomé nous livre au moins le plan suivi par Denys dans le livre II'. Cf. also Battisti (1997), 7: 'Pur nella sua frammentarietà, il testo pervenuto offre sufficienti indicazioni per ricostruire una precisa idea del concetto di imitazione letteraria così come viene elaborato da Dionigi […]'. Correspondences between *On Imitation* and *On the Ancient Orators*, especially *On Lysias*, reinforce the supposition that the epitome reflects the tenor of Dionysius' views rather faithfully. On the close parallels between the system of virtues in *On Imitation* and *On Lysias*, see e.g. Bonner (1939), 45.

of *On Imitation* (3.3), including an often overlooked scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.11, 1371b6 which – as I will argue – is very likely to contain a quote from *On Imitation* (3.3.3), and an extensive quote from *On Imitation* in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* (3.3.4-6).

The objective of this chapter is to disclose Dionysius' purposes in *On Imitation* by distilling and reconstructing important mimetic themes and criteria, not only on the basis of what is left of *On Imitation*, but also taking into account other relevant works of his.[8] By analysing this fruitful material, which, as far as I can tell, has not been explored to this extent before, this chapter establishes that Dionysius tries to counterbalance his overt emphasis on poetical magnificence and beauty by insisting also on stylistic virtues which are more effective in Roman rhetorical practice, such as clarity.

Chapter 4, in which Quintilian's Greek and Latin reading lists (included in *Institutio* 10) will be central, forms a diptych together with the present chapter.[9] Both chapters build on the discussion of the use of mimetic terminology in Dionysius and Quintilian in chapter 2. By analysing the reading lists of Dionysius (first century BC) and Quintilian (first century AD), the present and the following chapter shed light on parallels and divergences in Dionysius' and Quintilian's ideas on rhetorical imitation.

Chapter 5 broadens the perspective by analysing the ideas on imitation expressed by Greeks and Romans who lived in the decades between Dionysius and Quintilian. The mimetic ideas of Aelius Theon, Seneca, Longinus, Pliny, Tacitus and Dio reveal that some of these authors tend to emphasise the aesthetic qualities of (often more ancient) literature suited for imitation, while others rather highlight the imitation of (often more recent) literature that is useful for Roman rhetorical practice. As we will see in the present chapter, Dionysius' work, in which both the aesthetic qualities of literature and its usefulness are taken into account, may well have played a steering role in their considerations.

Within the broader perspective of chapter 4 and 5, it will be argued that the parallels and divergences between Dionysius and Quintilian (and other Greek and Roman critics) can be explained by assuming that they drew from a shared discourse and conceptual framework

[8] I.e. the essays *On the Ancient Orators*, *Letter to Pompeius*, *On Dinarchus* and *On Thucydides*.

[9] Hunter (2009), 108 remarks on both reading lists: 'The striking parallelism between the writers considered in the *Epitome* and the judgements passed on them and the similar material in Quintilian 10.1 […] allows some confidence that the task of reconstruction [i.e. of the three books of *On Imitation*, M.S.] is not a hopeless one'. I would like to make the side note that caution is needed when reconstructing Dionysius' views on imitation on the basis of Quintilian's reading list as presented in book 10. There are striking correspondences in their approach of exemplary classical literature, but their preferences also show significant divergences.

of imitation, and adapted elements from this discourse and framework to their own rhetorical agendas. These agendas can be considered to reflect a gradual shift in Roman classicism – from a stage more characterised by a traditional, aesthetic approach of imitation to one more inclined to adhere to rhetorical-practical considerations.[10]

3.2 The Publication of *On Imitation*

From a passage of Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*, we know what each of the three books of *On Imitation* was about:

> Τούτων ὁ μὲν πρῶτος αὐτὴν περιείληφε τὴν περὶ τῆς μιμήσεως ζήτησιν, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος περὶ τοῦ τίνας ἄνδρας μιμεῖσθαι δεῖ ποιητάς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους, ἱστοριογράφους <τε> καὶ ῥήτορας, ὁ δὲ τρίτος περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι μέχρι τοῦδε ἀτελής.[11]
>
> The first of these contains an enquiry into the nature of imitation itself. The second discusses the question of which particular poets and philosophers, historians and orators, should be imitated. The third, on the question of how imitation should be done, is as yet incomplete.

Thus, Dionysius completed books 1 and 2 before or during the writing of his *Letter to Pompeius*, which in turn was a response to Pompeius' objections to Dionysius' treatment of Plato in *On Demosthenes*.[12] It is not certain whether the third book of *On Imitation*, of which nothing is left, was ever published or became just one of the studies which Dionysius did not prepare for publication.[13] His statement in *On Thucydides* that he 'had published his treatise *On Imitation* earlier' is inconclusive, for it does not mention the completion of the third book:

[10] On this gradual shift, see esp. the end of section 4.8.3. This premise builds on De Jonge's ideas on the development of classicism between Dionysius and Dio. See De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.).

[11] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1. On this important passage, which can be considered a remaining fragment of *On Imitation*, see sections 3.3.4-6.

[12] It follows that *On Demosthenes*, just like two of the books of *On Imitation*, must have been completed when Dionysius wrote his *Letter to Pompeius*. Perhaps Dionysius had been working on at least his treatises *On Demosthenes* and *On Imitation* simultaneously.

[13] This is also suggested by Bonner (1939), 37.

> Ἐν τοῖς προεκδοθεῖσι περὶ τῆς μιμήσεως ὑπομνηματισμοῖς ἐπεληλυθὼς οὓς ὑπελάμβανον ἐπιφανεστάτους εἶναι ποιητάς τε καὶ συγγραφεῖς […].[14]
>
> In the published commentaries on imitation, I discussed those poets and prose authors whom I considered to be outstanding.

Although the discussion on the relative order of Dionysius' works continues, the treatise *On Imitation* is generally considered an early work.[15] The main point of disagreement between various scholars is whether the treatise was published before or during the composition of the important essays collected in *On the Ancient Orators*. Bonner (followed by Usher) argues that it is 'extremely unlikely' that Dionysius would have substituted Isaeus with Lycurgus in *On Imitation* after having devoted a special essay to Isaeus, whom he regards as a very important forerunner of Demosthenes in *On Isaeus*.[16] In my opinion, however, Dionysius' inclusion of Lycurgus instead of Isaeus could also have been inspired by the fact that Lycurgus was a more traditional and current choice, and the treatise *On Imitation* more elementary, practical and traditional in character than the essays on the orators. For example, Isaeus is never mentioned by Cicero, and is completely left out of the orators' list in Dio's *Oration* 18.11, in which Lycurgus does get mentioned. We do not know whether Lycurgus and Isaeus were both listed in the lost treatise that may have established the basis for later reading lists: *On the Style of the Ten Orators*, ascribed to Caecilius of Caleacte.[17]

Another argument sustaining the assumption that books 1 and 2 of *On Imitation* were written before *On the Ancient Orators*, is Bonner's observation that Demosthenes' unique character is not well expressed, and that he can hardly be differentiated from the other orators in *On Imitation*, notwithstanding his eminent position in *On the Ancient Orators*. Due to this

[14] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.1. Cf. also the spurious *Ars Rhet*. attributed to Dionysius: 10.6.35-38: τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ἔλεγχον τὸν τοῦ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀκολουθίαν μόνος Δημοσθένης ἐξέφυγεν κατὰ μίμησιν τὴν Πλάτωνος· πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ἐν τῷ περὶ μιμήσεως πειρασόμεθα ('only Demosthenes escaped from this criticism of not knowing the necessary order by imitating Plato: how and in what manner, we will put to the test in the treatise on imitation'); 10.19.10-11: μακρότερος ὁ περὶ μιμήσεως λόγος, ὃν ἀλλαχῇ μεταχειριούμεθα ('the discussion on imitation which we will have elsewhere is more extensive').

[15] E.g. Bonner (1939), 37; Grube (1965), 209; Innes (1989), 267; Aujac (1992), 11-13. For a brief discussion of the relative chronology of the works of Dionysius and a useful list of secondary literature on this subject, see De Jonge (2008), 20-25.

[16] Dion. Hal. *Is*. 1.1. Bonner (1939), 37; Usher (1974), xxv.

[17] We also do not know if this lost treatise preceded Dionysius' *On Imitation*. More on Caecilius of Caleacte in section 3.5.1.

discrepancy, Bonner concludes that the first two books of *On Imitation*, in which Dionysius' views are not yet crystallised, must have been published or composed when Dionysius started working on his essays *On the Ancient Orators*.[18] Bonner may well be right in assuming an early date for *On Imitation* on the basis of a perceived improvement and maturity of Dionysius' critical methods in later works, but we should also allow for the possibility of Dionysius writing a concise manual on imitation suitable for novice learners. For indeed, the intended audience as well as the text genre and text goal must have been decisive for the choices Dionysius made in *On Imitation*, and for the degree of profundity with which he explores his subject.[19]

Aujac on the other hand asserts that Dionysius started composing *On Imitation* after having published the first volume of *On the Ancient Orators* and the provisory version of the first essay of the second volume, *On Demosthenes*.[20] The first volume – consisting of the essays *On Lysias*, *On Isocrates* and *On Isaeus*, in which μίμησις is of central concern – would have urged Dionysius to sharpen his mind on the nature (book 1), the literary objects (book 2) and the methods (book 3) of imitation. Aujac is quite psychologizing in that she is trying to identify the methodological problems Dionysius must have come across while writing his essays *On Lysias*, *On Isoscrates*, *On Isaeus* and *On Demosthenes*.[21] Her assumption is

[18] Bonner (1939), 37, 43. Bonner, who clearly sees an improvement of Dionysius' critical methods over time, is rather negative about *On Imitation*, which is in his eyes an immature work in which Dionysius shows himself to be 'merely a calculator, a mechanical worker dogmatically stating his results for undisputed acceptance by his pupils' (*ibid*., 42). In my opinion, his criticism is rather unfounded, for it is only based on some fragments and an epitome. Grube (1965), 209-210, however, draws the same conclusion as Bonner on the basis of the extant fragment of *On Imitation* in the *Letter to Pompeius*. According to Grube, '[…] this well-known passage undoubtedly shows Dionysius at his worst and weakest'. Instead of assuming that Dionysius developed from a superficial critic in *On Imitation* to a competent one in later works, I would stress the importance of taking the intended audience, text genre and text goal of *On Imitation* into account (more on which in section 3.4). In my opinion, these factors more adequately explain Dionysius' tone and attitude in *On Imitation*. Cf. De Jonge (2017), 650-651, who (following Weaire (2005)) wants to explain differences in tone between Dionysius' remarks on Thucydides in his *Letter to Pompeius* and *On Imitation* on the one hand and *On Thucydides* on the other by focusing on Dionysius' professional situation and intended audience rather than by assuming a significant development in Dionysius' critical thinking.

[19] For a discussion of the aims and audience of *On Imitation*, see section 3.4.

[20] Aujac (1992), 11.

[21] Aujac (1992), 12. For a thorough discussion of *Parisinus gr*. 1741, see e.g. Harlfinger & Reinsch (1970), who argue about its date: 'will man innerhalb des 10. Jhs. eine nähere Eingrenzung wagen, kommen wohl am ehesten die Mitte oder die zweite Hälfte in Frage' (*ibid*., 32).

plausible, but perhaps too speculative. However, for the present chapter it is only important to realise that Dionysius composed *On Imitation* probably early in his writing career, and that he is likely to have been working on different treatises at the same time.

3.3 Remnants of *On Imitation*

The epitome of book 2 is the only rather substantial remnant of *On Imitation*. Together with *inter alia* Dionysius' treatise *On Composition*, it was written on some folios of the manuscript *Parisinus gr*. 1741, dating back to the middle or second part of the tenth century.[22] All copies of the epitome derive from this unique source. Unfortunately, the text of the epitome is preserved in a corrupt and unreliable state, due to a large amount of corrections, restitutions, and conjectures by successive editors.[23] Therefore, due caution is needed when we try to reconstruct Dionysius' views, which, of course, also have been compressed by the epitomator – and perhaps sometimes slightly altered or differently ordered.[24]

We do not know who this epitomator was, nor what his intentions for summarizing the second book may have been. Usener suggests that he belonged to late-antique Neoplatonic circles.[25] Judging from the epitomator's rather straightforward and didactic approach, it seems likely that he aimed at providing students in oratory with a list for easy consultation of Greek authors whom Dionysius (and perhaps also he himself) considered worth reading and imitating.[26] Apart from the epitome of book 2, a few (possible) fragments of book 1 and 2 of *On Imitation* are preserved, which will be discussed in the following sections.

3.3.1 (Possible) Fragments of Book 1

In this section, I examine the textual evidence of book 1 of *On Imitation*. As we have seen in section 2.2.1, Usener-Radermacher accept five remaining fragments representing the first book; of these five fragments, Aujac accepts only fragments II, III and V U-R (= 1, 2 and 3 Aujac = 1, 2 and 3 Battisti), because these are, unlike fragments I and IV U-R, introduced by

[22] Aujac (1992), 23.

[23] *Ibid*. Whereas the text of the epitome of *On Imitation* is corrupt, the content seems to represent Dionysius' ideas rather faithfully. Cf. n. 7.

[24] Hunter (2009), 108 warns against the corruptness of the text.

[25] Usener (1889), 6.

[26] On the didactic tone of the epitome of *On Imitation*, see section 3.4.

an explicit reference to the first book of the treatise.[27] These three fragments are included in Syrianus' commentaries on Hermogenes' *On Issues* (fr. II U-R) and *On Types of Style* (frs. III and V U-R). To give a complete overview of all (possible) remaining textual evidence from *On Imitation*, I will discuss all five passages which are presented by Usener-Radermacher as fragments of *On Imitation*.[28] I adopt the numbering system of the fragments used in their edition, each time arguing whether or not the passage in question should be considered a fragment stemming from *On Imitation*.[29]

Fragment I U-R, which is very Aristotelian in phrasing, lacks a reference to *On Imitation*, and may well not derive from it. The passage provides an interesting definition of rhetoric as an artificial skill pertaining to persuasiveness in politics. It is attributed to Dionysius – sometimes, however, taken to be the grammarian Dionysius Thrax here:[30]

> **Fr. I U-R:** Ῥητορική ἐστι δύναμις τεχνικὴ πιθανοῦ λόγου ἐν πράγματι πολιτικῷ, τέλος ἔχουσα τὸ εὖ λέγειν.[31]
>
> Rhetoric is a technical ability of persuasive discourse in political content, having eloquence as its goal.

Like fragment III U-R (discussed above in section 2.2.1), which contains Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος as presented in *On Imitation*, this passage takes the form of a definition.[32] We can recognize some concepts which easily fit in with Dionysius' ideas on rhetorical imitation, but also with rhetorical theory in general: ability, persuasiveness, political

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[27] See Aujac (1992), 13-14, where she briefly explains her choice. As for the fragments of the first book of *On Imitation*, Battisti (1997) follows Aujac's choice and order.

[28] Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929). The fragments of *On Imitation* have been published by Usener (1889); some years later, they were published as part of Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) (= U-R). In the case of frs. V and VIII, U-R also render the words of Syrianus surrounding the quotes from Dionysius, as does Aujac (3 Aujac and 4 Aujac; 4 Aujac quotes more from Syrianus than VIII U-R). If relevant, I summarise Syrianus' words, but I do not render them as part of the fragments. In this, I follow Battisti (1997).

[29] Aujac's motivation for rejecting some fragments that were accepted by Usener-Radermacher is often very brief; I will reconsider the rejected fragments carefully.

[30] This fragment is attributed to Dionysius Thrax by the commentator Doxopater in his *Prolegomena in Aphthonii Progymnasmata*, 14.106.22-23 (*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Rabe 1931).

[31] This passage can also be found in *Epitome Artis Rhetoricae* 3.611.4-6 (*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Walz 1834) (without the explicitation that Dionysius is Dionysius Thrax).

[32] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti.

oratory, and eloquence or beauty of speech.

Rhetoric is characterised as a 'technical ability' (δύναμις τεχνική) – δύναμις also being the word used by Aristotle in his definition of rhetoric.[33] The term frequently occurs in Dionysius' works, as in other rhetorical treatises. In all its ambiguity, δύναμις evokes different domains which are closely intertwined: rhetorical ability, stylistic force and political reign (to which rhetoric is explicitly confined in this fragment – cf. ἐν πράγματι πολιτικῷ).[34] The notion of δύναμις returns in fragment V U-R, which is introduced by a reference to Dionysius' *On Imitation*.[35]

It is this fragment V U-R which provides us with a weighty argument for rejecting fragment I U-R as deriving from *On Imitation*. Whereas δύναμις denotes a technical ability in fragment I U-R, it occurs in a non-technical sense in fragment V U-R, i.e. as a reference to 'talent', the most important part of which is said to be located in 'nature' (φύσις). This may, of course, imply that the word δύναμις is not intrinsically connected with either art or nature, but derives its specific meaning from the context. However, the fact remains that in Dionysius' works the notion of δύναμις is preponderantly used to denote a power of natural origin. Since δύναμις τεχνική is probably an unusual and self-contradictory expression for Dionysius – and its Aristotelian resonances are suspiciously strong –, fragment I U-R may well be a conflation of different, Aristotelian-inspired sources, or a free adaptation of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric.[36]

There are other arguments for assuming a Peripatetic origin of the fragment. The words πιθανοῦ λόγου ('persuasive discourse') may also be considered an echo of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as an 'ability […] to see the available means of persuasion' (δύναμις […] τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν).[37] Of course, the idea of persuasiveness plays an important role in Dionysius' thinking; as one of the virtues of style, 'persuasiveness' (πειθώ) is closely intertwined with such important stylistic qualifications as 'vigour' (ἰσχύς) and 'strength' (ῥώμη), which are richly represented in his treatise *On Imitation.*[38] The notion of

[33] Arist. *Rh*. 1.2, 1355b25-26. On the (ambiguity of the) term δύναμις in Aristotle, see Haskins (2013).

[34] For δύναμις meaning 'ability', see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 5.1. For δύναμις as a reference to the stylistic virtue of 'power', see e.g. *Lys*. 20.2. For δύναμις denoting 'political reign', see e.g. *Isoc*. 6.1.

[35] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti.

[36] We might consider the possibility that Dionysius adds the word τεχνική exactly because he conceives of δύναμις as a power of natural origin. However, I think he would have avoided the notion of δύναμις.

[37] Arist. *Rh*. 1.2, 1355b25-26.

[38] More on the literary virtue of πειθώ in n. 217.

persuasiveness is also at the core of an often overlooked scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.11, 1371b6, which is attributed to a 'Dionysius' and may well be regarded as a remnant of *On Imitation*, as I will argue in section 3.3.3. However, the insistence on rhetorical persuasiveness is so common in ancient rhetorical criticism that it offers insufficient proof for attributing fragment I U-R to Dionysius.

Finally, also the idea of rhetoric 'having eloquence as its goal' (τέλος ἔχουσα τὸ εὖ λέγειν) seems to be inspired by Aristotle's classification of discourse according to its specific 'goal' (τέλος) throughout his *Rhetoric*. The idea of eloquence leading to a 'goal' is for instance expressed in Dionysius' proclamation in *On Imitation* that Lysias' oratory reaches its 'goal' (σκοπός).[39] That 'speaking well' or 'eloquence' (τὸ εὖ λέγειν) is the ultimate goal of all imitative efforts by rhetoricians, becomes clear from Dionysius' introduction to his treatise *On Thucydides*, in which he explains that he wrote *On Imitation* 'in order that those who intend to write and speak well should have sound and approved standards' (ἵνα τοῖς προαιρουμένοις γράφειν τε καὶ λέγειν εὖ καλοὶ καὶ δεδοκιμασμένοι κανόνες ὦσιν).[40] However, this idea is also too common to allow for an attribution of fragment I U-R to Dionysius. Therefore, we should reject the fragment as a whole.

Fragment II U-R is included in a passage in which Syrianus discusses 'the divine Plato' (τῷ θείῳ Πλάτωνι). He explicitly attributes the quote to the first book of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*. It says that excellence in public discourse, art and science can only be achieved by a 'clever nature' (φύσις δεξιά), 'careful study' (μάθησις ἀκριβής) and 'laborious exercise' (ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος), i.e. by faculties belonging to nature, art and training:

> **Fr. II U-R:** Τρία ταῦτα τὴν ἀρίστην ἡμῖν ἔν τε τοῖς πολιτικοῖς λόγοις ἕξιν καὶ ἐν πάσῃ τέχνῃ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ χορηγήσει· φύσις δεξιά, μάθησις ἀκριβής, ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος· ἅ περ καὶ τὸν Παιανιέα τοιοῦτον ἀπειργάσατο.[41]
>
> The following three elements will in our opinion be principal in attaining eminence in political oratory, every art and branch of science: a clever nature, careful study and

[39] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.1.

[40] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.2. For the combination εὖ λέγειν in Dionysius, see also *Dem*. 51.5; *Dem*. 51.7; *Comp*. 1.5; *Comp*. 3.10.

[41] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *Status* [133, 4], p. 4, 19 – p. 5, 5. For a brief discussion of this fragment, cf. Walker (2005), 138-139. The fragment is briefly referred to in section 2.2.1.

> laborious exercise – things which also formed the man of [the deme of, M.S.] Paiania [i.e. Demosthenes, M.S.] as he is now.

The insistence on nature, study and exercise is in line with the ideas on the creation and reception of literary texts that Dionysius articulates elsewhere.[42] The notion of φύσις δεξιά points to the inventive, natural ability or talent with which a rhetorician should be endowed in order to create texts, whereas μάθησις ἀκριβής comprises his cognitive capacity to critically examine and receive literary theories.[43] The ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος, then, pertains to the need of

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[42] The notion of φύσις (as opposed to τέχνη) plays a crucial role in Dionysius' discussions on style, syntax and word order. Cf. De Jonge (2008), 251 ff. On φύσις with regard to an orator's natural ability or talent, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 34.2, 34.7. The word μάθησις is rare in Dionysius' works. On μάθησις and πολυμαθεία, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.5 (the moral attached to the introductory story of Zeuxis); cf. also Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 4.3, where he insists on the special attention one should pay to the 'wide learning' (πολυμαθεία) displayed by Aristotle. On the notion of ἄσκησις, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Dem*. 52.1; *Comp*. 25.37. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.2, in which Dionysius states that rhetoricians *in spe* should have beautiful and approved 'standards' (κανόνες) by which to carry out 'their exercises' (τὰς […] γυμνασίας) (see also section 3.4). Also instructive on ἄσκησις is Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 11.4, where training of irrational sense is central: τοῦτο κἀγὼ τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τίς ἡ παρ' αὐτῷ χάρις ἐστὶ βουλομένοις μαθεῖν ὑποθείμην ἂν ἐπιτηδεύειν, χρόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ μακρᾷ τριβῇ καὶ ἀλόγῳ πάθει τὴν ἄλογον συνασκεῖν αἴσθησιν ('I would advise those readers of Lysias who wish to learn the nature of his grace to do the same: to train the irrational sensibility over a long period of time, by diligent practice, and irrational experience'.

[43] That 'invention' (εὕρεσις) for the most part depends on φύσις is clear from e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 34.2: ἐν ᾧ πρώτην μὲν ἔχει μοῖραν ἡ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τε καὶ νοημάτων εὕρεσις, δευτέραν δὲ ἡ τῶν εὑρεθέντων χρῆσις· ἐκείνη μὲν <ἐν> τῇ φύσει μᾶλλον ἔχουσα τὴν ἰσχύν, αὕτη δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ('in the treatment of this [i.e. content and style of Thucydides' speeches, M.S.] the first place is occupied by the invention of arguments and ideas, the second by the deployment of this material, the former depending more upon native talent, the latter more upon art'). The notion of φύσις cannot only pertain to the process of creating a text, but also to the reception of texts by means of irrational criteria. For the reception or judgement of works of art, which can be based on rational criteria (related to τέχνη) and irrational criteria (related to φύσις), see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 27.1: τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ τούτῳ τῷ γένει τῆς λέξεως ἄγεται, καὶ οὔτε τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον, ᾧ πεφύκαμεν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ἡδέων ἢ ἀνιαρῶν, ἀλλοτριοῦται πρὸς αὐτὸ, οὔτε τὸ λογικόν, ἐφ' οὗ διαγιγνώσκεται τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ καλόν ('observing that this style of writing [i.e. a Thucydidean passage full of sublime eloquence, beauty of language and rhetorical brilliance, M.S.] appeals to all minds alike, since it offends neither our irrational aesthetic faculty, which is our natural instrument for distinguishing the pleasant from the distasteful, nor our reason, which enables us to judge individual technical beauty'. For a discussion of Dionysius' concept of the rational and irrational perception of literature, cf. e.g. Schenkeveld (1975); Goudriaan (1989), 142-154, 230-240, 466-468; De Jonge (2008), 379-384 (esp. 384) (discussion of '*metathesis*'); Hunter (2018), 46 ff. For irrational perception esp. in relation to Lysias' virtue of 'grace' (χάρις), see Viidebaum (2018), esp. 117 ff.

persevering in repetitive writing practices which will imbue the rhetorician *in spe* with empirical skill. This triad of nature, art and training as (possible) prerequisites for attaining eminence in speech is a common one, also put forward by e.g. Cicero and Quintilian.[44]

Fragment II U-R calls into mind the remarkable distinction Dionysius makes between artificial and natural imitation in his essay *On Dinarchus* (a passage discussed in section 2.2.2).[45] Judging from Dionysius' words, natural imitation is obtained by 'familiarity' (συντροφία) – closely related to the 'clever nature' (φύσις δεξιά) in fragment II U-R – and 'intensive learning' (κατήχησις), which can be assimilated to the requirement of 'careful study' (μάθησις ἀκριβής) in fragment II U-R. By contrast, artificial imitation, which is said to be 'related' (προσεχής) to natural imitation, is based on the precepts of art and therefore always gives the impression of contrivance and unnaturalness. Here we observe that the concept of τέχνη in Dionysius' ideas on imitation can be ambiguous: on the one hand, it forms a crucial component of the imitative practice of a rhetorician, whereas on the other, it may effectuate a soulless copy of the original without any trace of spontaneous charm and freshness. Consequently, artistic skill within the process of imitation should always be balanced with natural talent and a profound affiliation with literary models.[46]

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[44] Cicero considers the triad of *ars-natura-exercitatio* e.g. in *Inv. rhet.* 1.2, and also brings in 'study' (*studium*) and 'gift of nature' (*facultas ab natura profecta*). Cf. Cic. *Brut.* 25. Quintilian discusses *ars* and *natura* in 2.19; in 3.5.1, he mentions *natura*, *ars* and *exercitatio*, and notices that some people also add *imitatio*.

[45] On this passage, see also Wiater (2011), 285.

[46] I do not agree with Whitmarsh (2001), who argues that Dionysius presents μίμησις as an 'artificial concoction' (*ibid*., 71) and 'an artificial elaboration upon nature' (*ibid*., 73), and who plays down the status of *natura* in Dionysius' notion of μίμησις by posing that 'the celebration of nature's limited role in the education of the rhetorician can be discerned in the very project of *On mimesis*' (*ibid*., 72). Whitmarsh draws this conclusion mainly on the ground that both the programmatic narratives of the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis 'exemplify the artificiality of education through literary μίμησις' (*ibid*., 73). Thus, we may infer that he does not reckon a 'clever nature' (φύσις δεξιά, *Imit.* fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti) among Dionysius' main concerns. This is contrary to the view of Untersteiner (1971), who argues that Dionysius was a staunch exponent of an irrational approach of literature both in its creation and evaluation. What seems to lay behind these conceptions is the persistent dichotomistic view of some scholars (among them Pavano (1936)) that ancient literary criticism was guided either by a rational and *ars*-related approach, or by an irrational and *natura*-related approach. Goudriaan (1989), 467 and De Jonge (2008), 255, n. 16 have rightly noticed (with references to relevant text passages) that Dionysius' works do not support this supposition, since they explicitly state that nature and art work together. E.g. in *Lys.* 11.5, Dionysius refuses to declare whether art or nature is the source of Lysias' charm. This suggests that the boundaries between artistic skill and natural talent are blurred, and that specific virtues of style may well be caused by a 'mix' of both, as Dionysius assumes (*ad loc.*). Cf. the interesting observations of Halliwell

Fragment III U-R contains a definition of 'imitation' (μίμησις) as opposed to 'emulation' (ζῆλος) formulated by Dionysius in his first book of *On Imitation*:

> **Fr. III U-R:** Μίμησίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια διὰ τῶν θεωρημάτων ἐκματτομένη τὸ παράδειγμα. Ζῆλος δέ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς πρὸς θαῦμα τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἶναι καλοῦ κινουμένη.[47]
>
> Imitation is an activity that moulds the model in accordance with the rules of art. Emulation is an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful.

Since these definitions of imitation and emulation were discussed at length in section 2.2.1, I will confine myself to some remarks on the connections between this fragment and the other ones.

Like fragment II U-R, this fragment, with its rather puzzling syntax and its vague Aristotelian resonance (cf. ἐνέργεια), suggests a complementary relationship between artistic skill – based on knowledge of 'theoretical rules' (θεωρήματα) – and natural abilities – related to a movement of the soul.[48] This complementary relationship between art and nature is crucial in Dionysius' mimetic theory, as we have already seen. Fragment V U-R (discussed below) will also focus on the role played by nature, as is true for fragment X U-R (discussed below), which is about the 'hidden artfulness' of Lysias' natural style.[49] The close thematic correspondences between these fragments (which are all provided with a reference to Dionysius' *On Imitation*) make it plausible that they at least reflect the gist of *On Imitation* and should be considered rather reliable remains of this treatise.

Fragment IV U-R (not accepted by Aujac and Battisti) originates from a rather obscure, anonymous source: *The Life of Epiphanius*. It contains the name of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but it is not a foregone conclusion that it derives from his work *On Imitation*:

(2002), who argues that 'nature and artistry form an intricate partnership in Dionysius' argument: a general human instinct for μίμησις becomes the basis of a highly artificial, self-conscious manipulation of language […]' (*ibid*., 294).

[47] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [265, 15], p. 3, 15-21.

[48] On the Aristotelian resonances of fragment III U-R, see section 2.2.1.

[49] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti. Fr. X U-R = 6a Aujac = 7 Battisti.

Fr. IV U-R: Ἔλεγεν γὰρ Διονύσιος ὁ Ἁλικαρνασσεύς, ὅτι πρόσωπα προσώποις ἀλλήλως θεωρούμενα ἢ καλλιστεύειν δύνανται ἢ ***. Κακοὶ καλοῖς συμφυρέντες ἐν ἑνὶ ξύλῳ τανυσθήσονται.[50] Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἕνα χιτῶνα φορῶν ἀνάξαντον τὸ σῶμα διαφυλάξει. Ἡ γὰρ πλείστη συντυχία πλείστους λόγους παρέχει· ὅπου δὲ πλεῖστοι λόγοι, πολυπειρία πραγμάτων διαφόρων.[51]

For Dionysius of Halicarnassus said that some characters, compared to others, are either able to be the most beautiful or ***. Ugly characters mixed with beautiful ones will be strained on one bow. For none of the people will keep his body combed again wearing only one chiton. For a great spontaneous mixture will provide the greatest amount of words: an abundance of different matters is where the greatest amount of words is.

The fragment as a whole is quite confusing and should probably be understood metaphorically. Two things stand out. In the first place, there is great emphasis on the idea of comparison (cf. πρόσωπα προσώποις ἀλλήλως θεωρούμενα, συμφυρέντες, συντυχία). Secondly, the language of variety is very prominent.

The insistence on comparison can be understood in different ways. It may be suggested that an aesthetic judgement can only be based on comparison and contrast (that means, things can only be designated as 'beautiful' in comparison with other things which are more or less beautiful, or not beautiful at all). Seen in this way, ἀλλήλως should probably be interpreted as παραλλήλως ('next to each other (in a contrastive way)'), and as such points to a judgement based on and made possible by dissimilarity between things which are placed together. In this interpretation, the fact that ugly characters mixed with beautiful ones 'will be strained on one bow' (ἐν ἑνὶ ξύλω τανυσθήσονται) would mean that beauty and ugliness ideally occur alternately in a text. As I understand it, this mixture of things of different nature results in a certain tension (cf. τανυσθήσονται).

Another way of interpreting the insistence on comparison and contrast is to assume that something is beautiful only in the context of other beautiful things – that means, beauty

[50] U-R (1904-1929) (app. crit.) note that ἢ κακοὶ is attested, but suggest to read καλοὶ κακοῖς.

[51] Cf. Epiph. *Opera Omnia* 336e (ed. Petavius 1622) / t I, 25, 20 (Dindorf 1859-1862) (*non vidi*). Epiphanius (ca. 310-403 AD) was a saint from Constantia. Aujac (1992), 14 rejects this passage as a fragment from Dionysius' *On Imitation* because of its deviating content: 'son lien avec le traité qui nous occupe [i.e. *On Imitation*, M.S.] est loin d'être évident'.

exists by virtue of cumulation. Seen in this way, ἀλλήλως (or παραλλήλως) would mean that something beautiful can only be seen 'in conjunction with' things alike (i.e. other beautiful things), because they reinforce each other. Following this interpretation, ξύλον probably designates something negative: not a bow, but a tool for punishment or torture (option also given by LSJ). That ugly characters mixed with beautiful ones 'will be strained on one gallow' (ἐν ἑνὶ ξύλω τανυσθήσονται) would mean that both the beautiful and the ugly ones will perish, because of their juxtaposition.

In the last two sentences of this obscure fragment, the insistence seems to be on 'variety'. I suppose we should understand ἀνάξαντον as derived from ἀναξαίνω ('comb again' or 'card' – a verb e.g. used with respect to textile/wool), not from ἀναξαίνω ('tear open'). The combing possibly refers to a refreshment or cleaning of the surface of the body, i.e. the chiton. Then we read that 'wearing only one chiton, none of the people will keep his body combed again' (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἕνα χιτῶνα φορῶν ἀνάξαντον τὸ σῶμα διαφυλάξει), possibly meaning that when you have got only one jacket, you cannot clean it. The last sentence of this fragment transposes this rather enigmatic message to the field of rhetoric, arguing that a 'great spontaneous mixture' (πλείστη συντυχία) will provide the 'greatest amount of words' (πλείστους λόγους), just like wearing different chitons allows someone to display a great variety of colours, materials and cuts.[52] Thus, this passage seems to make a plea for pragmatic and stylistic 'variety' and 'change' (ποικιλία, μεταβολή), which play a crucial role in Dionysius' works.[53]

This interpretation is plausible when we realise that the image of a coat used to refer to a rhetorical style can also be found in other (Latin) sources, e.g. in Quintilian.[54] However, his use of this image serves a different purpose; instead of recommending stylistic ποικιλία, Quintilian warns for colourfulness that defeats its goal. In his discussion of the usefulness of historiography for the future rhetorician, Quintilian claims that historical works are very different from political speeches in that they are e.g. full of 'brilliance' (cf. *nitor*, 10.1.33) and not equipped for rhetorical battles, which need the 'arms of soldiers' (cf. *militum lacertis*, *ibid*.) rather than the 'muscles of athletes' (cf. *athletarum toris*, *ibid*.). As an example of a rhetorician whose ornamental speeches are too spectacular and ineffective, Quintilian nominates Demetrius of Phalerum, whose famous 'coat of many colours' (cf. *versicolorem*

[52] The comparison goes wrong because someone cannot wear different chitons at the same time, whereas 'the greatest amount of words' is likely to be displayed in one text.

[53] See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 19.

[54] See e.g. Cic. *Brut*. 274; Tac. *Dial*. *de Orat*. 26. I owe the latter reference to Peterson (1891), 38.

vestem, *ibid*.) was not apt for the 'dust of the forum' (cf. *forensem pulverem*, *ibid*.).[55] This flamboyant coat alludes to Demetrius' adorned style which was of little use in the political arena.[56]

That being said, we return to the enigmatic fragment IV U-R, which is likely to contain a recommendation of stylistic 'variety' (ποικιλία) and alternation. Does it suggest an alternation between beautiful and ugly things which are juxtaposed, or between beautiful things and other beautiful things, which enhance and reinforce each other? The fragment is too obscure to allow for a solution; we can only speculate as to what would fit Dionysius' rhetorical ideas most. There are several passages in Dionysius' work in which the juxtaposition of words, characters and events of *different* nature and appearance comes to the fore. One example is Dionysius' story on Zeuxis selecting beautiful and less beautiful parts of his female models (*Imit*. 1.4); another is a passage from his treatise *On Composition*, in which he analyses Homer's juxtaposition of words of unattractive sounds and euphonious words in his catalogue of ships.[57] Because no style consists entirely of the finest words, this juxtaposition of beautiful and less beautiful words is, according to Dionysius, inevitable, and can result in a beautiful composition. On the basis of such passages, we might infer that fragment IV U-R as a whole touches upon Dionysius' discussion of the commendable alternation of a wide variety of words, characters and events of differing beauty.

The introduction to fragment V U-R makes explicit reference to the last part of the first book of Dionysius' *On Imitation*. In this fragment, 'power' or 'talent' (δύναμις) is discussed as being opposed to 'deliberate choice' or 'intention' (προαίρεσις, i.e. the choice of how to apply one's talent). The fragment makes it clear that since 'talent' (δύναμις) should be seen as a phenomenon to a great extent depending on 'nature' (φύσις) – and thus, by

[55] Quintilian also mentions Demetrius of Phalerum in his reading list (10.1.80).

[56] Cf. Peterson (1891), *ad loc*., who observes that '*vestis* is more than a metaphor here: Demetrius was as foppish in dress as he was in his style'. For the clothing metaphor, cf. also Quint. 8 *proem*. 20: *similiter illa translucida et versicolor quorundam elocutio res ipsas effeminat quae illo verborum habitu vestiantur* ('in the same way, the translucent and many-coloured style of some speakers emasculates subjects which are clothed in this kind of verbal dress').

[57] Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 16:19: ἅπας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατάλογος αὐτῶν τοιοῦτος καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα, ἐν οἷς ἀναγκασθεὶς ὀνόματα λαμβάνειν οὐ καλὰ τὴν φύσιν ἑτέροις αὐτὰ κοσμεῖ καλοῖς καὶ λύει τὴν ἐκείνων δυσχέρειαν τῇ τούτων εὐμορφίᾳ ('the whole of his [i.e. Homer's, M.S.] list is of the same character, as are many other passages in which, being forced to handle words which are not naturally beautiful, he places them in a setting of beautiful ones, counteracting their ungainly effect by the shapeliness of the others'. Cf. also *Comp*. 18.2, where Dionysius discusses the juxtaposition of words with a beautiful and mean rhythm. More on this in De Jonge (2008), 77-84.

implication, for a minor part also on 'art' (τέχνη) – we cannot control it as we wish.[58] By contrast, 'intention' (προαίρεσις) is a matter fully in our 'control' (ἐξουσία):

> **Fr. V U-R:** Τῆς μὲν δυνάμεως τὴν κυριωτάτην εἶναι μοῖραν ἐν τῇ φύσει, ἣν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν οἵαν ἀξιοῦμεν ἔχειν· τῆς δὲ προαιρέσεως οὐδὲν μέρος ἐστὶν οὗ μὴ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν.[59]
>
> Of talent, the most important part lies in nature, of which it is not in our control to have it as we wish. But of intention, there is not a single part which is not in our control.

The opposition between δύναμις and προαίρεσις in fragment V U-R seems to correspond to the message in fragment II U-R, which shows that, in order to achieve literary perfection, the endowment with a 'clever nature' (φύσις δεξιά), significantly mentioned first, should be accompanied by the accomplishment of 'careful study' (μάθησις ἀκριβής) and 'laborious exercise' (ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος). The notion of δύναμις seems to be equivalent in value to φύσις δεξιά; προαίρεσις in turn can be seen as the fruit of μάθησις ἀκριβής and ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος. In Dionysius' works, the notion of προαίρεσις is more often contrasted with natural talent, for instance in the *Letter to Pompeius*, where Dionysius argues that 'Xenophon and Philistus […] did not resemble one another either in their nature or in the intentions they adopted' (Ξενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Φίλιστος […] οὔτε φύσεις ὁμοίας εἶχον οὔτε προαιρέσεις).[60]

As we have seen, of the five fragments which are said to represent the first book of *On Imitation*, fragment I U-R is of a different nature than the other ones. It contains a statement on the subject of rhetoric in general, not on imitation. Moreover, its Aristotelian resonances are suspiciously strong. On this basis, the fragment may be regarded as spurious.

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[58] For the term δύναμις used with reference to a faculty which may have been acquired through the mixture of nature and art, cf. also Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 11.5 (in this case: Lysias' 'grace' (χάρις)).

[59] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [265, 25], p. 5, 24 – p. 6, 5.

[60] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 4.1. The opposition between δύναμις and προαίρεσις is also a rather common one, e.g. occuring in Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 5.6, where Dionysius criticises Philistus' uniformity: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μεγέθεσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν συνεξισῶν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ ψοφοδεεῖς καὶ τοὺς <κρατίστους> δημηγοροῦντας καταλείπων τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς προαιρέσεις ὁμοίους ἅπαντας ποιεῖ ('he does not even make his speeches measure up to the stature of his speakers, but makes his popular orators so crowd-shy that they all alike abandon their faculties and their principles'). For other passages in which δύναμις and προαίρεσις are juxtaposed, see Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 12.8, 20.2; *Is*. 2.1; *Dem*. 2.3, 16.1, 41.1; *Thuc*. 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.1, 16.4, 24.12.

Fragment IV U-R remains problematic. It seems to emphasise the importance of pragmatic and stylistic mixture and variety, which are important topics in Dionysius' treatises. Although this fragment may be attributed to another Dionysius than 'our' Dionysius, we do well to allow for the possibility that it derives from *On Imitation*.

Fragments II and V U-R bear witness to a rather coherent view on the very important roles of natural talent on the one hand and active, technical effort on the other in the imitative process of composing a text. Finally, fragment III U-R clearly defines and contrasts the notions of imitation and emulation, also by alluding to the concepts of φύσις and τέχνη. Therefore, these fragments, which are thematically interconnected and provided with a reference to Dionysius' *On Imitation*, are likely to be genuine remains of the treatise's first book.

3.3.2 (Possible) Fragments of Book 2

In addition to the epitome, a few fragments and a long quote in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* are preserved of the second book of *On Imitation*.[61] In their edition of *On Imitation*, Usener-Radermacher included what they consider to be a fragment (VI[a]) in which there seems to be a reference to Dionysius' introductory story on the painter Zeuxis.[62] The passage is found in the Byzantine grammarian and philologist Maximus Planudes, who may have adapted it from Dionysius' *On Imitation*. Whether Planudes is quoting or paraphrasing from his source, remains unclear. Neither can we establish whether his source was the original of *On Imitation*, the epitome or another text, but what we can observe is that his rendition of the story of a 'certain painter' corresponds to the Zeuxis story in *On Imitation*'s epitome, although only in broad outline:

> **Fr. VI[a] U-R:** Ὅτι ζωγράφος τις κάλλος ἄριστον γράψαι βουλόμενος τὰς κατὰ τὴν χώραν καλὰς γυναῖκας συνήθροισε, καὶ ἀφ' ἑκάστης τὸ τῶν μελῶν μιμούμενος κάλλιστον, τῆς μὲν ὀφθαλμούς, τῆς δὲ ῥῖνα, τῆς δὲ ὀφρύας καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλης ἄλλο (οὐδὲ

[61] In this section, I will not discuss Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. XI U-R. This fragment is adopted from *Ars Rhet*., falsely attributed to Dionysius. I quote this fragment in n. 14 (first quote). I will also pay no further attention to Dionysius' own reference (ὁ δὲ τρίτος περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι) to book 3 of *On Imitation*, presented as a fragment in the editions of Usener-Radermacher and Aujac. This is a borrowing from Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1.

[62] In the edition of U-R, the text of the epitome is listed as fr. VI, whereas the fragment under discussion is numbered 'VI[a]'. This fragment VI[a] is not accepted by Aujac (1992) and Battisti (1997).

γὰρ ἦν ἁπάσας καλὰ φέρειν τὰ πάντα), κάλλιστον εἶδος ἀπηκριβώσατο. Ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτο λαβεῖν ἐκ τοῦ Ὁμήρου. Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὑπογράφων τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ὄμματα (μὲν φησί) καὶ κεφαλὴν ἴκελος Διὶ <τερπικεραύνῳ>, Ἄρεϊ δὲ ζώνην, στέρνον δὲ Ποσειδάωνι.[63]

A painter who wanted to depict the utmost beauty, gathered the beautiful women from the region, and while he was imitating of each of them their most beautiful part – the eyes from this one, the nose from another one, the eyebrows from yet another one and from each of them something different – (for it was not possible that they all were beautiful in all parts), he carefully worked out the most beautiful form. He seems to have been adopting this from Homer. For the latter says in describing Agamemnon that with respect to his eyes and face he was like Zeus hurling the thunderbolt, with respect to his waist like Ares, and with respect to his breast like Poseidon.[64]

Deviations from the epitome's Zeuxis story occur in the omission of the name of the story's protagonist, but also in the more detailed description of the physical objects of imitation (specific facial parts). Although it is striking that nothing is said either on the city of Croton (Zeuxis' working place), or on Helen (his object of painting) and the virginal status of the selected Crotonian women, we may have enough reason to assume that Planudes indeed had a version of *On Imitation* at his disposal, if only because of the remarkable parallels in the choice of words between the epitome's Zeuxis story and Planudes' rendition of a remarkably similar narrative.[65] The associative reference to Homer seems to be Planudes' own addition.

[63] Cf. 'Intorno ai Collectanea di Massimo Planude', in *Rivista di filologia* 2.157c47 (ed. Piccolomini 1874) (*non vidi*).

[64] The reference is to Hom. *Il*. 2.477-479.

[65] I.e. συνήθροισε ('he gathered') vs. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4: ἠθροίσθη ('were collected') (note, however, that ἠθροίσθη is used not for assembling the maidens, but for assembling their most beautiful features in one single picture of a body). Other comparable expressions are: κάλλος ἄριστον ('utmost beauty') vs. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4: τέλειον [καλὸν] εἶδος ('a perfect [beautiful] form'); ἀφ' ἑκάστης τὸ τῶν μελῶν μιμούμενος κάλλιστον ('imitating of each of them their most beautiful part') vs. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4: ὃ δ' ἦν ἄξιον παρ' ἑκάστῃ γραφῆς […] κἀκ πολλῶν μερῶν συλλογῆς ('what was worth paining in each of them […] and from the compilation of many parts'); οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἁπάσας καλὰ φέρειν τὰ πάντα ('for it was not possible that they all were beautiful in all parts') vs. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4: οὐκ ἐπειδήπερ ἦσαν ἅπασαι καλαί ('not that they were all beautiful').

Fragment VII U-R encompasses the extensive quote from *On Imitation* in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*. As it is of great interest, it will be discussed separately in sections 3.3.4-6.[66]

Fragment VIII U-R can be found in Syrianus' commentary on Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*. In the introduction to this fragment, Dionysius is said to have proclaimed that a discourse which should be labelled 'poetical' is characterised 'by figurative, metaphorical and dithyrambic composition' (τροπικῇ τε καὶ μεταφορικῇ καὶ διθυραμβώδει συνθήκῃ), and that Gorgias' political speeches bear witness to this.

Syrianus' reference to Dionysius' criticism of Gorgias is triggered by Hermogenes' discussion of different types of style. In the introduction to his treatise, Hermogenes indicates that he will discuss these types of style on themselves before analysing the style of an author who pre-eminently combines all the types – whom he considers to be the orator Demosthenes. A demonstration of i.a. the 'individual features' (τά […] μέρη καθ' ἕκαστον) of this author and the 'general character' (τὸ ὅλον εἶδος) of his work will serve as an account of every individual type of style.[67] Moreover, it will clarify how these types can be combined and 'how, as a result of these combinations, the style can be poetical or unpoetical' (καὶ πῶς μιγνυμένων τῶν αὐτῶν τοτὲ μὲν ποιητικός, τοτὲ δὲ οὐ ποιητικός).[68] In his comment on this passage in Hermogenes, Syrianus refers to Dionysius as follows:

> **Fr. VIII U-R:** Πρῶτος γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, *ὥς φησι Διονύσιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ μιμήσεως δευτέρῳ*, τὴν ποιητικὴν καὶ διθυραμβώδη λέξιν εἰς τοὺς πολιτικοὺς εἰσήνεγκε λόγους.[69]
>
> He [i.e. Gorgias, M.S.] was, as Dionysius argues in the second book of *On Imitation*, the first to introduce a poetical and dithyrambic vocabulary in political speeches.

Syrianus adds that poetical discourse shares in a 'beautiful rhythm and a continual harmony' (εὐρυθμίας μὲν καὶ ἁρμονίας ὁμαλῆς) caused by the 'meticulous composition of periods and clauses' (περιόδων καὶ κώλων ἀπηκριβωμένην σύνθεσιν), and is 'far away from rivalling with the dithyrambic and poetical composition such as the style of Isocrates is' (τὴν δέ γε διθυραμβώδη καὶ ποιητικὴν συνθήκην ἥκιστα ζηλώσαντα, οἵα τίς ἐστιν ἡ Ἰσοκράτους

[66] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. VII U-R = 7 Aujac = 5 Battisti.

[67] Hermog. *Id*. 1.1.48-49.

[68] Hermog. *Id*. 1.1.52-53.

[69] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. VIII U-R = 4 Aujac = 4 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [266, 31], p. 10, 9-20. On the views of Gorgias, Dionysius and Longinus on poetical speech, see e.g. De Jonge (2008), 332-340.

φράσις). After having mentioned Isocrates, Syrianus quotes Dionysius again, this time referring to his treatise *On Isocrates*, in which Dionysius expresses his distaste for the orator's use of rhythms which are 'not far removed from those of verse' (οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντι τοῦ ποιητικοῦ μέτρου).[70]

From Syrianus' (introduction to the) quote from the second book of *On Imitation*, it becomes clear that Dionysius was of the opinion that 1) dithyrambic elements are inherent to poetical discourse, and 2) Gorgias introduced poetical and dithyrambic vocabulary in political speeches.[71] There are several passages in which Dionysius pays attention to the (unsuccessful) incorporation of dithyrambic discourse by prose writers. Especially for Gorgias' grand prose style, which heavily leans against poetical discourse, Dionysius expresses his contempt by using the term 'dithyramb' (διθύραμβος).[72] We find this word also in his deprecatory characterisations of the grand styles of Thucydides and Plato.[73]

It is striking that Gorgias is mentioned in this (and the following) fragment, whereas he is entirely omitted in the epitome of the second book.[74] From the existence of these two fragments, it follows that Dionysius may have mentioned more and/or other authors than those recorded by the epitomator.

In the quite extensive fragment IX U-R of book 2, Dionysius elaborates on his idea that Gorgias transferred poetical expression to political speeches to distinguish himself from ordinary people. Gorgias is contrasted with Lysias, who did the opposite: his style was, according to Dionysius, clear and common for all people, in accordance with his belief that current and simple language would be best suited for persuading the layman:

> **Fr. IX U-R:** Γοργίας μὲν τὴν ποιητικὴν ἑρμηνείαν μετήνεγκεν εἰς λόγους πολιτικούς, οὐκ ἀξιῶν ὅμοιον τὸν ῥήτορα τοῖς ἰδιώταις εἶναι. Λυσίας δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐποίησε· τὴν γὰρ φανερὰν ἅπασι καὶ τετριμμένην λέξιν ἐζήλωσεν ἔγγιστα νομίζων εἶναι τοῦ πεῖσαι τὸν ἰδιώτην τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ὀνομασίας καὶ ἀφελές· ἥκιστα γὰρ ἄν τις εὕροι τὸν Λυσίαν

[70] Dion. Hal. *Isoc*. 2.5.

[71] From this latter statement it follows that dithyrambic vocabulary can be distinguished from poetical discourse, though it also forms an intrinsic part of it.

[72] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 3.4 The dithyramb is a choral song of relatively free harmony and form, performed in honour of Dionysus.

[73] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 29.4 (on Thucydides); *Dem*. 6.4 (on Plato); *Dem*. 7.4 (on Plato); *Dem*. 29.4 (on Plato). More on Dionysius' characterisation of the styles of Gorgias, Thucydides and Plato as 'dithyrambic' in De Jonge (2008), 354.

[74] Aujac (1992), 21 also observes this.

τροπικῇ καὶ μεταφορικῇ λέξει κεχρημένον· σεμνὰ δὲ καὶ περιττὰ καὶ μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα ποιεῖ τοῖς κοινοτάτοις ὀνόμασι χρώμενος καὶ ποιητικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος κατασκευῆς.[75]

Gorgias transferred poetical expression to political speech, for he did not consider it right for the rhetorician to be equal to laymen. By contrast, Lysias did the opposite: he aspired to a style clear to all and used constantly by all, believing that a current and simple vocabulary comes closest to persuading the laymen. Indeed, one could least of all find Lysias using figurative and metaphorical speech: he makes his subject matter seem solemn and extravagant and grand by applying the commonest words and not adhering to poetical ornamentation.

From other works of Dionysius, it becomes clear that he preferred the approach of Lysias to that of Gorgias.[76] In his essay *On Lysias,* but also in the epitome of book 2 of *On Imitation,* Dionysius highly recommends Lysias' purity, common language and clarity.[77] In the discussion of fragment VIII U-R above, I already touched upon Dionysius' aversion to Gorgias' 'dithyrambic' prose style. In *On Lysias,* Gorgias is introduced as a deterrent example of an orator who, when trying to add 'colour' (κόσμος) to his speeches, chooses to resort 'to poetical expression' (εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν), 'using a lot of metaphors, exaggerations and other forms of figurative language' (μεταφοραῖς τε πολλαῖς χρώμενοι καὶ ὑπερβολαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τροπικαῖς ἰδέαις).[78] By contrast, Lysias succesfully 'makes his subject matter seem solemn, extravagant and grand by applying the commonest words and not adhering to poetical ornamentation' (καὶ σεμνὰ καὶ περιττὰ καὶ μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα ποιεῖ τοῖς κοινοτάτοις χρώμενος ὀνόμασι καὶ ποιητικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος κατασκευῆς).[79]

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[75] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [266, 31], p. 11, 19 - p. 12, 3.

[76] As a critic, Dionysius was not really interested in designating one particular composition type and style as superior to another in the process of literary imitation, because he expected his students to imitate all styles in a creative and eclectic way. He nevertheless expressed his preference for the 'well-blended' middle style, e.g. in *Comp*. 24. What Dionysius did care about was excellence in one of the three styles he distinguished: the grand, the plain (of which Lysias was the role model) and the middle, which he himself considered most worth pursuing.

[77] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 2.1, 3.8-9, 4.1; Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.1.

[78] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 3.3.

[79] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 3.2. Note that this is the same sentence as the final sentence of Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti, except for the reversal of the order of χρώμενος ὀνόμασι.

As for fragment X U-R, Syrianus states that it comes from the second book of *On Imitation*, but its message can, in a slightly different form, also be found in *On Lysias* 8.5. Like the former fragment, the quote casts light on the subject of poetical discourse. This time, however, Dionysius is not concerned with its presence, but with its absence in prose. Syrianus declares that for Dionysius, 'unpoetical' is 'what seems to be not artful' (τὸ δοκοῦν ἀνεπιτήδευτον εἶναι), and he critically notes that Dionysius would have done better completely to avoid the term 'unpoetical' in favour of 'not artful'. The following is, according to Syrianus, what Dionysius had to say about the seemingly loose and not artful style of Lysias:

> **Fr. X U-R:** Δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀποίητός τις εἶναι καὶ ἀτεχνίτευτος ὁ τῆς ἑρμηνείας αὐτοῦ [τοῦ Λυσίου] χαρακτήρ, καὶ πολλοῖς ἂν καὶ τῶν φιλολόγων παράσχοι δόξαν, ὅτι ἀνεπιτηδεύτως καὶ οὐ κατὰ τέχνην, αὐτομάτως δέ πως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε σύγκειται. Ἔστι δὲ παντὸς ἔργου μᾶλλον τεχνικοῦ κατεσκευασμένος· πεποίηται γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀποίητον καὶ δέδεται τὸ λελυμένον, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ δοκεῖν δεινῶς κατεσκευάσθαι τὸ δεινὸν ἔχει.[80]
>
> His [Lysias'] type of style seems to be an unpoetical and artless one, and he may give many people, even among philologists, the impression that he is composing unartfully and without competence, but rather accidentally and casually. But his style is more artificially constructed than whatever technical work: for the unpoetical element of his work is the fruit of effort and its loose character is strongly tied, and even in the respect in which it does not seem to be skilfully constructed, it possesses skill.

The last line of this fragment is quoted a second time in Syrianus' commentary on Hermogenes' *On Types of Style* (fr. 6b Aujac), though in a slightly different form.[81]

The fragment, along with many passages in the treatise *On Lysias*, clearly shows that a casual style such as Lysias' often creates the impression that the author lacks the ability to compose his work in a solid way and in accordance with the rules of the art. Looseness of style, however, certainly does not always indicate a lack of talent, according to Dionysius. In

[80] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. X U-R = 6a Aujac = 7 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [266, 31], p. 12, 7-15.

[81] Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [394, 24], p. 87, 19-21.

the case of Lysias, it is established by great virtuosity which completely obscures itself.[82] This concealment of craftsmanship requires even more artistic competence than the overt display of it.

The four fragments of the second book of *On Imitation* discussed above show that Dionysius did not intend to provide his readers with a mere enumeration of classical authors, devoid of any theoretical consideration. Yet, this is the impression we get from him in the epitome, in which his views on imitation seem to be rather simplistic and unfounded. Judging from the remaining fragments, however, we can conclude that Dionysius also elaborated on subjects like art and nature, the poetical element in prose, and on stylistic nonchalance as a mask of great artistic skill – themes which are also prominent in the rest of his works.

3.3.3 An Overlooked Fragment?

In his commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1.11, 1371b6), Spengel points to the existence of a scholion in the margin of codex A, containing a reference to 'Dionysius':[83]

> Καὶ ὁ Διονύσιός φησιν ὅτι τὰ πιθανὰ κρείττονά εἰσι τῶν ἀληθῶν ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ μιμήματα τῶν πρωτοτύπων, οἷον βοῦν μὲν ἰδεῖν τίκτουσαν οὐ θαυμαστόν, τὴν δὲ ποιηθεῖσαν τῷ Φειδίᾳ βοῦν τίκτουσαν ἰδεῖν θαυμαστόν.
>
> Also Dionysius says that what is convincing is more powerful than what is true, and that imitations are more powerful than their models: for example, seeing a cow bearing is not miraculous, whereas seeing that the cow made by Phidias is bearing is.

In *Rhetoric* 1.11, 1371b, Aristotle discusses the pleasure of learning and admiration, and all things connected, such as good works of imitation which are pleasant even if the object of imitation is not.[84] Observing these imitations excites pleasure which arises from the recognition of 'likeness' (συλλογισμός) between model and imitation – which is an act of learning. Aristotle adds that the same may be said from sudden changes and escapes from danger, which induce 'wonder' (θαῦμα).

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[82] There are many comparable comments of Dionysius concerning Lysias' (hidden) skill in the treatise *On Lysias*. See e.g. *Lys*. 8.4 ff., but also 17.1, where Lysias is called 'the most skilful' (δεξιώτατον) of all orators in composing introductions.

[83] Spengel (1867), 166.

[84] I touched upon this passage in section 2.2.4, n. 80.

Spengel doubts whether the quote in the scholion to this passage is to be attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He claims that the author of this scholion could hardly have used other works of Dionysius than those known to us, and that in Dionysius' treatises which have stood the test of time, ideas are expressed which are not compatible with the message of the scholion. Spengel must have thought of Dionysius' discussion of both 'persuasiveness' and 'truthfulness' as (equally) important literary virtues, as well as those passages reflecting the idea which is at the heart of Dionysius' theory of imitation: that of the (preliminary) supremacy of models over imitations (e.g. *On Dinarchus* 7.5-7).[85]

The interesting scholion is rescued from oblivion by Radermacher, who admits that the idea of convincing things being superior to true things and imitations being superior to their models cannot be reconciled with Dionysius' surviving works.[86] However, Radermacher thinks it is 'well thinkable' ('wohl denkbar') that Dionysius has emphasised the *possibility* of the superiority of τὰ πιθανά and τὰ μιμήματα to truth and models, suggesting that in the scholion the word 'sometimes' (ἐνίοτε) has disappeared after φησὶν ὅτι.[87] He supposes that the reference in the scholion may be to a fragment of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*. I agree with this hypothesis, accepting one of Radermacher's two arguments and proposing other arguments to make a reference to a fragment of Dionysius' *On Imitation* in the Aristotle-scholion more plausible.

Supporting his suggestion that *On Imitation* is the original source of the quote, Radermacher points to fragment I U-R, which contains the definition of rhetoric as δύναμις τεχνικὴ πιθανοῦ λόγου ('technical ability of persuasive discourse'). As I have argued above, it is plausible that this definition is a conflation of different, Aristotelian-inspired sources, or a free adaptation of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric. Therefore, unlike Radermacher, I do not

[85] For the importance of both persuasiveness and truthfulness, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Din*. 7.2, where Dionysius is concerned with establishing whether texts should be attributed to Lysias or to Dinarchus: ἐὰν δὲ μήτε <τὸ> χάριεν ὅμοιον εὑρίσκῃ μήτε τὸ πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀκριβὲς μήτε <τὸ> τῆς ἀληθείας ἁπτόμενον, ἐν τοῖς Δεινάρχου λόγοις αὐτοὺς ἐάτω ('but if he [i.e. the man who tries to attribute texts to Lysias or Dinarchus, M.S.] finds no such qualities of grace or persuasiveness or precision of language or close adherence to reality, let him leave them [i.e. the texts he examines, M.S.] among the speeches of Dinarchus'). In Dion. Hal. *Din*. 7.6, Dionysius endows original models with 'a certain spontaneous grace and freshness' (αὐτοφυής τις ἐπιτρέχει χάρις καὶ ὥρα), whereas imitations run the risk of being contrived and unnatural. See section 2.2.2.

[86] Radermacher (1940), 78-80.

[87] Radermacher (1940), 79: 'man könnte dem geforderten Sinne geradezu durch Einschub von ἐνίοτε hinter φησὶν ὅτι aufhelfen'.

consider this fragment an argument for maintaining that Dionysius in the scholion is 'our' Dionysius.

To announce *On Imitation* as the possible object of reference in the Aristotle-scholion, Radermacher also brings in the Zeuxis story at the beginning of the epitome of the second book of *On Imitation*, which is centered around the idea that reality can be sublimated in artistic imitations – that means, that imitations should ideally surpass their objects through skilful selection and arrangement. This is in line with the statement in the scholion that 'imitations are [or – following Radermacher's plausible suggestion – 'are sometimes', M.S.] more powerful than their models' and the proclamation that Phidias' representation of a bearing cow is 'marvelous' (θαυμαστόν), in contrast to the real-life scene of a bearing cow.[88] In my opinion, the Zeuxis story offers Radermacher a valid argument for reconsidering the Aristotle-scholion as a probable remnant of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, which simply must have been overlooked by Usener, his forerunner Rössler and by Rabe, who edited the scholia to Aristotle.[89] There are, however, more reasons to suppose that it stems from Dionysius' *On Imitation*, as I will show.

Seeing that Dionysius for reasons of clarity and illustration often refers to art and architecture, and the epitome of *On Imitation* mentions the painter Zeuxis, the reference to the artist Phidias, one of the greatest Athenian sculptors from the fifth century BC and a prominent figure in Dionysius' works, should come as no surprise. Therefore, in my opinion, Radermacher's suggestion that the scholion's illustrative sentence (οἷον βοῦν μὲν ἰδεῖν τίκτουσαν etc.) is an addition of the scholiast, is an unconvincing attempt to solve the problem that we do not know of a sculpted cow made by Phidias. In fact, it is quite possible that he made one, just as his contemporary Myron is known to have made a cow of bronze. Radermacher's proposition that the second-century AD sculptor Phidias, 'son of Phidias', is meant instead of the fifth-century BC Athenian sculptor is, to my taste, an improbable argument for holding a scholiast, and not Dionysius, responsible for the remarkable οἷον βοῦν-sentence.[90]

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[88] Radermacher (1940), 79 notes that the example (οἷον βοῦν μὲν ἰδεῖν τίκτουσαν etc.) may well be an addition of the scholiast.

[89] *Ibid*. The scholion is not mentioned in editions of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, except for the edition of Battisti (1997), 28-29, n. 74, who excludes the fragment because of scarcity of evidence ('data la scarsità di evidenza').

[90] The names of the second-century AD Phidias and his brother Ammonius occur on a basalt statue (159 AD) of a crouching monkey, discovered in the great Serapeum in Rome.

The scholion also contains other elements which frequently occur in the works of Dionysius. The virtue of stylistic 'persuasiveness' is proclaimed everywhere in his works; in the epitome of *On Imitation*, Herodotus is said to be superior to Thucydides i.a. 'in persuasion' (πειθοῖ).[91] The criterion of 'truthfulness' appears four times in the epitome, and is scattered throughout Dionysius' other treatises.[92] Quite rare is the word μίμημα; it is attested once in the epitome of *On Imitation*, once in *On Thucydides* and once in *On Composition*.[93] The word πρωτότυπον could be a hapax in Dionysius' works; we do find its equivalent ἀρχέτυπον. Finally, the image of a cow is absent in Dionysius' treatises, but 'conception' and 'birth' (cf. τίκτουσαν), 'observation' (cf. ἰδεῖν) and 'marvel' (cf. θαυμαστόν) are crucial concepts in the epitome's introductory stories of the ugly farmer (whose wife observes beautiful pictures and brings forth beautiful children) and the painter Zeuxis (who closely observes his female models).[94] The emotion of 'marvel' (θαῦμα) is even intrinsically connected with the activity of ζῆλος in fragment III U-R of *On Imitation*.[95]

On the basis of these observations, it must be considered plausible that the scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.11, 1371b6 discovered by Spengel refers to a lost passage in Dionysius' *On Imitation*, in which Dionysius touches upon important mimetic theoretical concepts (persuasion, truth, and the interconnection between literary model and imitation) in an appealing and highly illustrative way.

3.3.4 A QUOTE IN THE *LETTER TO POMPEIUS*

That Dionysius' work *On Imitation* was less schematic than we may conclude from the epitome, is suggested not only by the fragments preserved by Syrianus, but also by an important fragment cited by Dionysius himself in his *Letter to Pompeius*. When comparing the fragment with the passage in the epitome, we can conclude that the epitomator has presented the views of Dionysius rather faithfully, though in a strongly condensed form.[96]

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[91] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3.

[92] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.1; 2.12; 5.1; 5.3. *Imit*. 3.8 discusses Philistus' usefulness 'for real debates' (πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθεῖς ἀγῶνας).

[93] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.5; *Thuc*. 42.5; *Comp*. 16.3.

[94] See section 1.1-3.

[95] See the discussion of this fragment in section 2.2.1; 3.3.1.

[96] Aujac (1992), 18-20 is not very positive about the epitomator's work, but she does admit that the epitomised section on style properly reflects the tenor in the quote from the *Letter to Pompeius*: 'sur le style en revanche, l'Épitomé fournit un résumé assez fidèle de ce qu'avait dit Denys […]'.

The *Letter to Pompeius* is Dionysius' response to Cn. Pompeius Geminus, who received copies from Dionysius' works from Zeno, a friend of both of them, who is otherwise unknown to us.[97] Most scholars assume that Pompeius was Greek, but it is also suggested that he was Roman.[98] The character and 'nationality' of the addressee is a matter of great importance, as recent articles of Weaire and De Jonge have shown regarding Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* and *On Thucydides*.[99] As De Jonge observes, in the *Letter to Pompeius* (which quotes a passage from *On Imitation*), Dionysius criticises Thucydides rather frankly for his anti-Athenian attitude (*Pomp*. 3.15), whereas in *On Thucydides* 8.1, the attentive reader notices that Dionysius expresses the same criticism in a more implicit and concealed way.

De Jonge, following Weaire, suggests that this discrepancy can be explained by taking into account Dionysius' professional situation and his intended audience rather than by assuming a significant development in Dionysius' critical thinking. The treatise *On Thucydides* was addressed to the Roman Aelius Tubero, one of the passionate admirers of Thucydides in Rome, who was obviously discontented with Dionysius' explicit rejection of Thucydides' anti-Athenian bias in *On Imitation*.[100] The recipient of *On Imitation*, however, was, as we have seen, the otherwise unknown Greek Demetrius, who probably did not take offence at such criticism.

We cannot determine Pompeius' 'nationality', but what we do know is that he objected to the critical judgements Dionysius passed on Plato in *On Demosthenes*.[101] This treatise contains a famous comparison between Plato and Demosthenes, in which Dionysius shows how Plato (just like Isocrates) in his application of the middle style falls short in comparison with Demosthenes' superior stylistic qualities.

After having received an objection from Pompeius to his critical assessments of Plato, Dionysius – insisting on the fact that he too is an admirer of Plato – defends his σύγκρισις between Plato and Demosthenes by arguing that he intended to do justice to Demosthenes as

[97] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 1.1. Cf. Rhys Roberts (1900), 439-440, who observes that nothing is known about Pompeius and Zeno. For scholarly discussions of Dion. Hal. *Pomp*., see e.g. Heath (1989b); Fornaro (1997), esp. 162 ff.; Wiater (2011), 132-154.

[98] Hidber (1996), 7, n. 50.

[99] Weaire (2005); De Jonge (2017).

[100] We know from e.g. Cic. *Orat*. 30-32 that Thucydides was very popular in Rome.

[101] Pompeius stands at the beginning of a tradition in which Dionysius is sharply criticised for his harsh attitude towards Plato.

the greatest of all literators, not as one of the best. The comparative method, so Dionysius, is the only truthful tool of analysis to determine whose style is the most excellent of all.

Dionysius' defence of his critical comparative method covers the first two chapters of the *Letter to Pompeius*; the remainder is an extensive quote from a passage in his treatise *On Imitation*, in which he discusses the historians whom he judges most suitable for imitation: Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus – who are discussed pairwise in comparison – and finally Theopompus. By quoting this passage, Dionysius meets Pompeius' request to learn his opinion of Herodotus and Xenophon.[102] The quote is preceded by a general description of the content of book 1, 2 and 3 of *On Imitation*.

Dionysius' discussion on the historians is split into two parts concerning 'subject matter' (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) and 'style' (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος). The epitomator seems to have been only interested in Dionysius' discussion on style, for he reduces the section on the πραγματικὸς τόπος of the historians to no more than one sentence, in which Herodotus is declared superior to Thucydides in this respect.[103]

In the section on the λεκτικὸς τόπος, the epitomator allows himself some liberties concerning the construction of sentences, the choice of words and, less frequently, the presentation of ideas. The majority of these deviations, however, may have occurred due to condensation of the material and different emphasis – which in turn may be caused by the genre of the epitome, the personal preferences of the epitomator and his intended audience.[104]

Although it may be considered sufficient to explain the discrepancies between the epitome of the second book of *On Imitation* and the extant fragment in the *Letter to Pompeius* by pointing to these influential factors of genre, personal preference and audience, much effort has been made to provide other solutions.

Usener, partly followed by Heath, tries to explain the points of difference by assuming that the *Letter to Pompeius* was drawn from an early draft of *On Imitation*, whereas the epitomator had the final version at his disposal, which contained additional material that is not

[102] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1.

[103] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.1.

[104] It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all correspondences between the epitome of *On Imitation* and the relevant section in the *Letter to Pompeius* in detail. Weaire (2002) partly deals with this subject, as well as Aujac (1992), 18-20. For a short discussion on the intended audience and the aim of the treatise *On Imitation*, see section 3.4.

included in the *Letter*.[105] Sacks on the other hand argues that the differences between the epitome and the *Letter* (and especially the additions in the *Letter*) are so substantial that the passage on the historians in the *Letter* must reflect an entire reconsideration of Dionysius' views on the ancient historians.[106] Finally, Costil states that the discrepancies between both sources (and particularly the apparent additions in the epitome) are established by lacunae in our text of the *Letter* – thus dismissing the idea of separate versions of *On Imitation*.[107]

As Weaire has shown – and in my opinion in a convincing way –, all of these explanations are more or less deficient, because they do not (or not sufficiently) account for the editorial procedure of omission and addition of the epitomator.[108] The additions, according to Weaire, are so minor – Costil, Sacks and Heath discuss only three examples – that they could be as easily attributed to the epitomator as the omissions.[109] Dionysius indeed seems to present to Pompeius an extract from a work in progress, but, according to Weaire, 'there is nothing in Dionysius' words that suggests that *Imit*. 2 was in need of further revision', as Usener claims in sustaining his idea that the fragment included in the *Letter* was based on a draft.[110]

Sacks' view that in his *Letter* Dionysius presents a revised version of the section on the historians in *On Imitation* is, as Weaire rightly argues, at variance with Dionysius' opening words that he literally, not periphrastically or partially, quotes from this work (τάδε

[105] Usener (1889), 8; Heath (1989a). As Weaire (2002),353 already pointed out, Usener does not go into detail concerning these differences.

[106] Sacks (1983), 66-80.

[107] Costil (1949), pt. 4, ch. 5. One of the two additions discerned by Costil is to be found in the epitome's account of Philistus, which contains, unlike the *Letter to Pompeius*, references to Thucydides' incompleteness and to Thucydides' ἦθος. More on the epitome's additions in n. 109.

[108] Weaire (2002).

[109] Weaire (2002), 353. Additions in the epitome occur in the discussion of Philistus (*Imit*. 3.6), and of Theopompus (*Imit*. 3.9). For a detailed discussion of these additions, see Weaire (2002), 353-357. Weaire also discusses three other additions (*Imit*. 3.3, 3.5, 3.7) that escaped comment, but are put forward by himself (*ibid*., 357 ff.) Only one of these (*Imit*. 3.5) can hardly be explained by assuming the epitomator's interference. In this passage in the epitome, Xenophon is said to attribute 'philosophical language to ordinary men and foreigners' and to use 'language appropriate for dialogues rather than correct military usage' (tr. Weaire). In *Pomp*. 4.4, the observation is confined to the 'inappropriate character portrayal'. In this case, Weaire suggests to adopt Costil's theory of lacunae in the *Letter*, but he thinks it is hardly applicable elsewhere.

[110] Weaire (2002), 352, n. 8.

γράφω).[111] Finally, Costil's assumption on the possibility of lacunae in the *Letter* is not invalidated or ruled out by Weaire, although it also ignores Dionysius' opening words. Weaire thinks lacunae in the *Letter* might be postulated only in case of extreme and otherwise inexplicable differences between the epitome and the *Letter*.[112] Since such differences can hardly be found, and Dionysius' claim of quoting his passage from *On Imitation* in full can be taken at face value, we should – I agree with Weaire – be cautious in assuming lacunae in the *Letter*. It is more likely that in Dionysius' *Letter*, the substantial passage on the historians from his treatise *On Imitation* has been copied in its entirety.

3.3.5 Imitation of Subject Matter in the *Letter To Pompeius*

The section on the historians in the *Letter to Pompeius* forms an important source for reconstructing Dionysius' ideas on imitation, whatever its relation to the epitome and the original version of *On Imitation* may be. With regard to the πραγματικὸς τόπος, Dionysius starts his discussion by establishing the five main tasks a historian has to accomplish in the process of imitation, none of which is mentioned in the epitome. In fact, in the epitome as a whole, the πραγματικὸς τόπος plays a subordinate role; most of the virtues distinguished are stylistically oriented. Because we are not well equipped with evidence on the πραγματικὸς τόπος, I will discuss this section in the *Letter to Pompeius* in some more detail than the passage on the λεκτικὸς τόπος – qualities of style will get full attention in the last sections of this chapter.[113]

The discussion of the πραγματικὸς τόπος gets shape by an illustrative σύγκρισις between Herodotus and Thucydides. First of all, Dionysius insists that writers of whatever kind of history should 'select a beautiful and graceful subject' (ὑπόθεσιν ἐκλέξασθαι καλὴν καὶ κεχαρισμένην).[114] Here, we see that the choice of 'ideas' (νοήματα) is determined by requirements (i.e. beauty and charm) similar to those imposed on the process of composition,

[111] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1; Weaire (2002), 352. Aujac (1992), 18-19 and Battisti (1997), 31 do seem to assume that Dionysius is giving us a copy of a passage taken from *On Imitation* like he says, but they do not address the question in detail.

[112] Weaire (2002), 353.

[113] For a profound discussion of Dionysius' treatment of the five main tasks of a historian, see Heath (1989b), esp. 74-88.

[114] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.2.

the aims of which are determined to be ἡδονή and καλόν.[115] Dionysius illustrates the requirement of a beautiful and graceful subject by pointing to Herodotus, who is better than Thucydides in this respect: the former dared to write a general history of the wonderful deeds of Greeks and barbarians, relying on his ability to produce something better than his forerunners Hellanicus and Charon – in which he actually succeeded.[116] By contrast, the latter wrote on a single war which was 'neither glorious or fortunate' (οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε εὐτυχῆ), although he was free to choose a subject that ought not to have been consigned 'to silence and oblivion' (σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ).[117] It follows that a courageous attitude, a generalist approach and a keen eye for glorious events are of main importance for the historian who wants to imitate and emulate his predecessors.

Secondly, the historian should keep in mind 'where to begin and how far to go' (πόθεν τε ἄρξασθαι καὶ μέχρι ποῦ προελθεῖν).[118] In this respect too, Herodotus displays his superior taste. According to Dionysius, he does not decide to begin his narrative at the point 'where Greek affairs started to decline' (ἀφ' ἧς ἤρξατο κακῶς πράττειν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν), as Thucydides out of anti-Anthenian sentiments did, but he arranges his history by starting with the reasons why the barbarians caused harm to the Greeks and by ending with the culmination of their punishment.[119] Here, Dionysius insists on a sharp taste for and keen discernment of what is appropriate in demarcating the subject – and what is appropriate, is supposed to be chauvinistic. Indeed, this 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον – a quality that occurs elsewhere in the *Letter*) is not only one of the essential literary virtues distinguished by Theophrastus, but also one of Dionysius' four means of attaining the two aims of stylistic composition mentioned above (ἡδονή and καλόν).[120] It is even called the most essential of all virtues in the essay *On Lysias*.[121] Here, we see the boundaries between the requirements imposed on subject matter, style and composition being blurred, as is often the case in the works of Dionysius.[122]

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[115] Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 10-11.

[116] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.7.

[117] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.4.

[118] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.8.

[119] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.9.

[120] On Theophrastus, see section 3.5.2.

[121] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 9.1. For appropriateness in composition, see Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 20.

[122] Cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 20:3: ὁμολογουμένου δὴ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὅτι πρέπον ἐστὶ τὸ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἁρμόζον προσώποις τε καὶ πράγμασιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ μέν τις ἂν εἴη πρέπουσα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἡ δὲ ἀπρεπής, οὕτω δή που καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις ('it is agreed by all that appropriateness is that treatment which is fitting for the actors and the actions concerned. Just as the choice of words may be either appropriate or inappropriate to

Thirdly, the selection of the subject material deserves to get full attention of the historian: he must consider 'which events he should include in his work, and which he should omit' (τίνα τε δεῖ παραλαβεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γραφὴν πράγματα καὶ τίνα παραλιπεῖν).[123] Also in this respect, Thucydides shows himself to be inferior to Herodotus. The former 'hurtles breathlessly through an extended single war' (πόλεμον ἕνα κατατείνας, ἀπνευστὶ διεξέρχεται).[124] By contrast, the latter is aware of the fact that every narrative should have enough 'pauses' (ἀναπαύσεις) to be pleasant to its audience. What exactly should be understood by these pauses, is not explicitly addressed by Dionysius.[125] However, what he does make clear, is that these pauses, which are elsewhere designated 'changes' (μεταβολαί), were intended to increase the 'variety' (ποικιλία) of the text. Interestingly, in his work *On Composition,* Dionysius argues that 'change' (μεταβολή) is one of the four means of attaining the aims of composition.[126] Thus, here too we discern that a stylistic requirement is applicable also to the level of subject matter.

The fourth task of a historian pertains to 'distributing and arranging' (διελέσθαι τε καὶ τάξαι) his subject material.[127] In this regard, Dionysius allows no ambiguity at all. Thucydides, with his close adherence to the chronological order of the events, is 'unclear and hard to follow' (ἀσαφὴς καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητος), because he does not sufficiently give heed to the cohesion of events which are necessarily separated by time. By contrast, Herodotus follows the 'divisions as provided by the events themselves' (ταῖς περιοχαῖς τῶν πραγμάτων). In this way, he connects and explains the events taking place, and presents them as parts of a harmonious and coherent whole.[128]

The fifth requirement imposed on the historian concerns his own 'attitude' (διάθεσις) towards the events described.[129] Again, Herodotus serves as a prime example. His attitude is honest and fair, since it is 'delighting in the good things and suffering from the bad' (τοῖς μὲν

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the subject matter, so surely may the composition be'). Cf. Hagedorn (1964), 22: 'es zeigt sich also bei Dionys ganz deutlich die Tendenz, den virtutes elocutionis eine inhaltlich-gedankliche Seite anzugliedern'.

[123] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.11.

[124] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.12.

[125] In his commentary on Dion. Hal. *Pomp*., Fornaro (1997), 193 refers to pauses in Homer, which Nannini understands to be e.g. 'mutamenti tematici' ('thematic changes'), 'digressioni' ('digressions'), 'il passagio da narrazione a discorso diretto' ('the transition from narration to direct discourse').

[126] Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 19.

[127] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.13.

[128] *Ibid*.

[129] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.15.

ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα).[130] This subtlety is completely foreign to Thucydides: his attitude towards the events described is 'downright' (αὐθέκαστος) and 'harsh' (πικρά), and he revels in examining the mistakes of his native city Athens into detail because of his resentment over his exile.[131]

Thus, with regard to subject matter, the superiority of Herodotus over Thucydides should be acknowledged in every aspect: 1) the choice of a noble subject, 2) the determination of the beginning and end of a story, 3) the selection of the material, 4) the distribution and arrangement of the material, and 5) the attitude towards the events described. However, in style, Thucydides is in some respects inferior, in others superior, in others equal (cf. κατὰ δὲ τὸν λεκτικὸν τὰ μὲν ἥττων, τὰ δὲ κρείττων, τὰ δ' ἴσος).[132] Let us briefly look at the stylistic virtues Dionysius distinguishes in the same passage from the *Letter to Pompeius*.[133]

3.3.6 Imitation of Style in the *Letter To Pompeius*

The supreme stylistic virtue which should, in the view of Dionysius, accompany all other literary virtues, is the use of a language which is characterised by 'purity' (καθαρότης) and Greek idiom (together called ἑλληνισμός).[134] Both Herodotus and Thucydides – each in their own dialect – exactly meet this requirement (cf. ἀκριβοῦσιν).[135] The second point of comparison is lost in the *Letter to Pompeius*, but in the epitome we read it had been 'clarity' (σαφήνεια), for which Herodotus is given the palm.[136] Third in line comes 'conciseness'

[130] *Ibid*.

[131] *Ibid*.

[132] *Ibid*.

[133] For remarks on Dionysius' different treatment of virtues of style in the *Letter to Pompeius* and *On Lysias*, see Viidebaum (2018), 108, who argues that *On Lysias* 'displays a very clear distinction and an almost definition-like treatment of the virtues' (more than the *Letter to Pompeius*).

[134] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.16.

[135] *Ibid*. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.1: τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἧς ἑκάτεροι προῄρηνται διαλέκτου ἀποσῴζουσι τὸ ἴδιον […] ('with regard to precision in words, both of them preserve the characteristic of the dialect they have chosen').

[136] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.1. Cf. Fornaro (1997), 217-218, who discusses the hiatus. The virtue of σαφήνεια was the second virtue of style according to Theophrastus, after ἑλληνισμός. In the discussion of the third quality in the *Letter to Pompeius*, σαφήνεια is also referred to (*Pomp*. 3.17). Therefore, it seems all the more likely that Dionysius' second virtue had been σαφήνεια, as the epitome has it.

(συντομία), which is also called βραχύτης (cf. τὸ βραχύ).[137] In this respect, Thucydides deserves to be considered the champion. In his essay *On Thucydides*, Dionysius categorises these three qualities (καθαρότης, σαφήνεια, συντομία) as 'essential virtues' (αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι) directed towards a clear and correct exposition, thus distinguishing them from 'the additional qualities' (αἱ ἐπίθετοι) which reveal an author's individual capacities.[138]

The additional qualities make up the rest of the quote of *On Imitation* in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*. They are used to analyse and determine not only the individual genius and power of Herodotus and Thucydides, but also of the minor historians Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus. In the *Letter to Pompeius*, 'vividness' (ἐνάργεια) is ranked as the 'first of the additional virtues' (πρώτη μὲν τῶν ἐπιθέτων ἀρετῶν) in historical writing, followed by 'the representation of character and emotions' (ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν τε καὶ παθῶν μίμησις).[139] Third come the qualities which display 'grandeur' (τὸ μέγα) and 'marvelousness' (τὸ θαυμαστόν).[140] These are succeeded by a group of virtues whose effects are 'vigour' (ἰσχύς), 'tension' (τόνος) and the like.[141] The fifth group identified by Dionysius encompasses the virtues pertaining to 'pleasure' (ἡδονή), 'persuasiveness' (πειθώ) and 'delight' (τέρψις).[142] These five groups are succeeded by three individual qualities: 'naturalness' (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν), 'intensity' (τὸ δεινόν) and, most important of all, 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον), which should

[137] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.17. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.2: καὶ τὸ μὲν σύντομον ἔστι παρὰ Θουκυδίδῃ […] ('and brevity is in Thucydides'). For συντομία in Dionysius, see Geigenmüller (1908), 30.

[138] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 23.6.

[139] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.17-18. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.2: τὸ δὲ ἐναργὲς παρὰ ἀμφοτέροις. Ἐν μέντοι τοῖς ἠθικοῖς κρατεῖ ὁ Ἡρόδοτος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς παθητικοῖς ὁ Θουκυδίδης ('vividness is in both. In the representation of character, Herodotus wins, but in emotions, Thucydides wins'). For ἐνάργεια in Dionysius, see Geigenmüller (1908), 41-42. For literature on the concept of ἐνάργεια, see section 2.2.1, n. 41.

[140] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.18. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.2, where 'grandeur' (τὸ μέγα) and 'marvelousness' (τὸ θαυμαστόν) are replaced for the (related) concepts of 'eloquence' (καλλιλογία) and 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια). Both καλλιλογία and μεγαλοπρέπεια are also mentioned in Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. (resp. 5.3 & 4.3).

[141] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.19. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3, where not only ἰσχύς and τόνος, but also a virtue belonging to the same category is listed (i.e. ῥώμη), in addition with some other virtues added by the epitomator.

[142] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.19. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3: ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ πειθοῖ καὶ χάριτι καὶ τῷ αὐτοφυεῖ μακρῷ διενεγκόντα τὸν Ἡρόδοτον εὑρίσκομεν ('but in pleasure, persuasiveness, grace and spontaneity, we think Herodotus is far superior'). 'Delight' (τέρψις) is rarely used (only twice in Dionysius' rhetorical works) as a technical term. Cf. Fornaro (1997), 223. It is closely related to 'grace' (χάρις). For τέρψις, see Dion. Hal. *Dem*. 32.2.

accompany all other virtues.[143] In the discussion on the historians Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus, other additional qualities come to the fore which are strongly tied to those just mentioned.[144]

Although the additional status of these virtues might suggest they are less important than the essential ones, it is they which reveal sublimity and individuality of style, as Dionysius makes clear in his treatise *On Thucydides*:

> […] τὰς δ' ἐπιθέτους, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα διάδηλος ἡ τοῦ ῥήτορος γίνεται δύναμις, οὔτε ἁπάσας οὔτε εἰς ἄκρον ἠκούσας, ἀλλ' ὀλίγας καὶ ἐπὶ βραχύ, ὕψος λέγω καὶ καλλιρρημοσύνην καὶ σεμνολογίαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν· οὐδὲ δὴ τόνον οὐδὲ βάρος οὐδὲ πάθος διεγεῖρον τὸν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρρωμένον καὶ ἐναγώνιον πνεῦμα, ἐξ ὧν ἡ καλουμένη γίνεται δεινότης […].[145]
>
> But the additional virtues, from which an orator's special ability is revealed most clearly, are neither all present nor fully developed individually, but are found sparsely and in diluted form – I am referring to sublimity, eloquence, solemn speech and magnificence. Nor is there any tension, any gravity, or any emotion to arouse the mind, nor any robust, combative spirit, all of which are essential to what we call genius.

In this passage from *On Thucydides*, the important additional stylistic virtues identified by Dionysius seem to be closely connected to each other. Some relate to loftiness, such as 'sublimity' (ὕψος) and 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια); others to an intense spiritual severity: 'tension' (τόνος), a 'robust and combative spirit' (τὸ ἐρρωμένον καὶ ἐναγώνιον

[143] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.19-20. For τὸ δεινόν in Thucydides, see Voit (1934), 76-78. Of these three qualities of naturalness, intensity and appropriateness, 'naturalness' (τὸ αὐτοφυές) and 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον) are mentioned in Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3. Here, τὸ πρέπον is, unlike the case in the *Letter*, listed with regard to 'pragmatic treatment' (πραγματεία) and 'portrayal of character' (προσωποποιία). In Dion. Hal. *Pomp*., however, stylistic appropriateness is referred to; moreover, appropriateness in 'portrayal of character' is mentioned at another place: 4.4. This is proof of the eclectic and compiling method of the epitomator. It is also remarkable that appropriateness is mentioned in the *Letter* as part of the additional virtues, although it is called 'the most important' of all virtues. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 9.1. This may, I guess, be due to the exceptional status of appropriateness as a virtue which should accompany all others. Fornaro (1997) does not address this oddity; Grube (1965), 211, however, does.

[144] Discussing these qualities in detail would go beyond the scope of this chapter.

[145] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 23.6.

πνεῦμα) and ‘intensity’ (δεινότης). There are also virtues of style pertaining to solemnity, such as ‘solemn speech’ (σεμνολογία) and ‘gravity’ (βάρος). As we will see in section 3.6.1, in which the epitome of *On Imitation* will be discussed, many virtues referred to in the epitome can be subsumed to magnificence, tension and solemnity.

3.4 The Aims, Audience, Content and Form of *On Imitation*

As we have seen in the previous sections, the epitome of *On Imitation* is broadly consistent with the line of thought as presented in part of the *Letter to Pompeius*. When the text known as *On Imitation’s* epitome was published for the first time by Stephanus (1554), he did not identify it as being an excerpt of *On Imitation*.[146] The first to suggest so was Sylburg (1691).[147] After him, Becker (1829) and Blass (1863) demonstrated that the text of the manuscript was an epitome of Dionysius’ treatise *On Imitation*. Usener (1889) was responsible for the first critical edition of the epitome.

Slight divergences between the lost original and the epitome are likely to have been caused either by corruption of the text or by the influential factors of personal authorial preference and interpretation – which are difficult for us to grasp –, as well as text genre and audience, which can be determined at least to a certain extent. This section will focus on the possible aims and audience of the epitome of *On Imitation* by offering a brief formal analysis of its content and form, and by listing some passages in which Dionysius himself explains his intentions.

Judging from the epitome, Dionysius insisted that the writings of classical authors were studied (cf. ἐντυγχάνειν) for topical as well as stylistic purposes. Then, after continuous observation, the soul of the emulator (note the verb ζηλοῦν) would be assimilated to the stylistic character of the literary model:

> Ὅτι δεῖ τοῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐντυγχάνειν συγγράμμασιν, ἵν’ ἐντεῦθεν μὴ μόνον τῆς ὑποθέσεως τὴν ὕλην ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ζῆλον χορηγηθῶμεν. Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ

[146] Stephanus (1554) noticed that he found the text ἔν τινι παλαιῷ ἀντιγράφῳ τοῦ Διονυσίου Ἁλικαρνασσέως τέχνης, ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων ἐξετάσεως κεφαλαίῳ (‘in some old copy of Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ theory, in the chapter concerning the analysis of words’).

[147] Sylburg (1691) noticed: *eorum librorum sive* ἐκλογή *sive* ἐπιτομή *censeri potest libellus is […]* (this little book can be considered either a selection or an epitome of these books). Cf. also Battisti (1997), 32, who discusses this in more detail.

> τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχοῦς παρατηρήσεως τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ χαρακτῆρος ἐφέλκεται.[148]
>
> It is essential to keep in touch with the writings of the ancients, in order that we be equipped from them not only with the subject material but also with the sense of emulation of idiomatic expressions. For the soul of the reader attracts likeness of style by continuous study.

In this passage, there is a remarkable transition from an impersonal statement (cf. δεῖ) to 'we' (cf. χορηγηθῶμεν) to the – again rather impersonal – phrase 'the soul of the reader' (ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος). This may be a case of *variatio*, but the variety in perspective can also be interpreted as an attempt by Dionysius to present his ideas on imitation as generally accepted truths with specific implications for 'all of us orators'.

The passage also presents imitation as describing 'the transition of the Classical ideal into the Classicist's soul and its re-emergence in the Classicist's texts', as Wiater puts it.[149] The story of the ugly farmer, whose wife contemplates beautiful images and then gives birth to beautiful children who reflect the images, serves as an illustration of this idea, which implies both activeness and passiveness on the part of the classicist. Indeed, he has to 'encounter' (ἐντυγχάνειν) the ancient writings, to 'be equipped with' (χορηγηθῆναι) all that is useful, so that he 'attracts' (ἐφέλκεται) the likeness of style.[150] There is no longer a distance between the classical Greek past and the Roman present; the boundaries of time and place are blurred. So are those between the Classicist's language and his character, with the result that 'the Classicist's diction seems to embody the past and to implement it in the present […]'.[151]
I agree with Wiater, who sees the essence of Dionysian imitation as 'uniformity' (ὁμοείδεια), but I would like to add that it is also 'like-mindedness' (ὁμοφροσύνη) and originality which characterise the classicist's imitative practice.[152] To be sure, imitation does not involve the

[148] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.1. These opening words of the epitome form the prelude to the story of the ugly farmer, whose wife absorbs the beauty of the images made by her husband and thus gets beautiful children. For this story, see section 1.3. It is striking that the exceptional verb χορηγεῖν is not only used three times in the epitome (in this case in the passive voice, not in the active, as Aujac (1992), 31, n. 1 argues), but also in *Imit*. fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. In the rest of Dionysius' works, it does not occur.

[149] Wiater (2011), 117.

[150] On activeness and passiveness in Dionysius' language of imitation, see esp. sections 2.2.1; 2.2.4.

[151] Wiater (2011), 117.

[152] *Ibid*.

mechanical copying of one or more literary models; it circles around originality in both language and thought which spring from the classical Greek spirit.

At the end of the epitome, Dionysius makes it clear that he not only intends to offer the reader assistance in choosing the right models for imitation of subject matter and style, but that he also makes a plea for a strong sense of awareness and attentiveness when reading the literary masterpieces of the classical past. In other words, he encourages his readers to read carefully and thoroughly, as he himself proclaims to have done in his treatise. His audience should keep in mind that the approach and analysis of Greek literature should be based on 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη) instead of superficiality and unawareness:

> Τούτου δὲ ἕνεκα τὰς τῶν προειρημένων ἁπάντων ἰδέας διεξῆλθον, ὡς ὑποδεδεῖχθαι τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπιμελοῦς ἀναγνώσεως, ἐξ ἧς ὑπάρξει τὸ παρ' ἑκάστοις κατορθούμενον αἱρουμένοις μήτε παρέργως τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐντυγχάνειν μήτε λεληθότως τὴν ὠφέλειαν προσγινομένην περιμένειν ἀλλ' ἐπιστημόνως […].[153]
>
> For this reason I went completely through the styles of all those discussed before, in order to show the method of attentive reading, which will make it possible for those who choose in each of them what is right, not to approach the ancients casually or obliviously wait for the profit to come, but knowingly […].

In this way, Dionysius casts himself as a theoretical example worth of imitation: he provides his readers with the notions they need to assess the value of Greek literature and, hence, with the tools to imitate it.

In his treatise *On Thucydides*, Dionysius clarifies the approach adopted in *On Imitation*, after which he makes his aims known to his addressee Quintus Aelius Tubero:

> Ἐν τοῖς προεκδοθεῖσι περὶ τῆς μιμήσεως ὑπομνηματισμοῖς ἐπεληλυθὼς οὓς ὑπελάμβανον ἐπιφανεστάτους εἶναι ποιητάς τε καὶ συγγραφεῖς, ὦ Κόϊντε Αἴλιε Τουβέρων, καὶ δεδηλωκὼς ἐν ὀλίγοις τίνας ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἰσφέρεται πραγματικάς τε καὶ λεκτικὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ πῇ μάλιστα χείρων ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται κατὰ τὰς ἀποτυχίας, εἴ τε τῆς προαιρέσεως οὐχ ἅπαντα κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβέστατον λογισμὸν ὁρώσης εἴ τε τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ἔργοις κατορθούσης, ἵνα τοῖς προαιρουμένοις γράφειν τε καὶ λέγειν εὖ καλοὶ καὶ δεδοκιμασμένοι κανόνες ὦσιν, ἐφ' ὧν ποιήσονται τὰς κατὰ

[153] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.7.

> μέρος γυμνασίας μὴ πάντα μιμούμενοι τὰ παρ' ἐκείνοις κείμενα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν ἀρετὰς αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντες, τὰς δ' ἀποτυχίας φυλαττόμενοι […].[154]
>
> In the published commentaries on imitation, Quintus Aelius Tubero, I discussed those poets and prose authors whom I considered to be outstanding. I indicated briefly the good qualities of content and style contributed by each of them, and where his failings caused him to fall furthest below his own standards, either because his purpose did not enable him to grasp the scope of his subject in the fullest detail, or because his literary powers did not measure up to it throughout the whole of his work. I did this in order that those who intend to become good writers and speakers should have sound and approved standards by which to carry out their individual exercises, not imitating all the qualities of these authors, but adopting their good qualities and guarding against their failings.

According to Dionysius, he only discussed the content and style of the authors whom he considered to be outstanding. He did not only endeavour to identify their virtues, but also their shortcomings in προαίρεσις and δύναμις, in order to provide his readers from falling in the same trap.[155]

The faults or flaws of Greek literary masters should, so Dionysius, be explained in two ways: they were either not able to do justice to the whole scope of the subject, or their literary capacities fell short now and then. Dionysius continues by revealing that his intention to write his treatise *On Imitation* was to offer the orators *in spe* useful literary 'standards' (κανόνες) by which they could do their exercises.

The word 'standard' or 'canon' (κανών) is likely to refer not to literary masterpieces, but to the classical authors themselves (i.e. their βίος and λόγος).[156] It is they who embody

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[154] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.1-2. Cf. Dionysius' introduction of the topic of his essays on the ancient orators (Dion. Hal. *Orat*. *Vett*. 4.2): τίνες εἰσὶν ἀξιολογώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων τε καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν ἐγένοντο προαιρέσεις τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τί παρ' ἑκάστου δεῖ λαμβάνειν ἢ φυλάττεσθαι ('who are most worthy of mention of the ancient orators and historians? What manner of life and style of writing did they adopt? Which characteristics of each of them should we imitate, and which should we avoid?' It is clear that *On Imitation*, unlike the essays on the ancient orators, adopts a stylistic focus, and takes into account all literary genres, not only rhetoric and historiography.

[155] For a discussion of this passage and these terms, see e.g. Hunter (2018), 38 ff.

[156] Cf. Dion. Hal. *Orat*. *Vett*. 4.2. The word 'canon' (κανών) means 'straight rod' or 'bar' (used by a weaver or carpenter), then 'rule' or 'standard' in music, law, art and astronomy (LSJ s.v.). It could also pertain to the field

both language and thought. There is an abundance of parallels in Dionysius' works which make this interpretation of the word κανών plausible; one of these passages is to be found in Dionysius' quote from *On Imitation* in his *Letter to Pompeius*.[157] Here, Herodotus is considered the 'best canon' (ἄριστος κανών) of Ionic historiography, while Thucydides is of Attic.[158]

It is the interaction of prescriptive theory and rhetorical practice (i.e. of a guided, meticulous reading and studying of κανόνες, of doing γυμνασίαι and composing texts) which lies at the heart of Dionysius' conception of imitation.[159] Hence, it seems safe to argue that Dionysius' work *On Imitation* must have had a practical aim, as its title already suggests: it does not purport to be a historical overview of Greek literature, but is instead presented as a practical guide for future orators.[160]

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of chronology, where it designated certain fixed points in time. In the fifth century, Polycleitus moulded his famous bronze statue *Doryphoros* to illustrate the perfect and harmonious human proportions he described in his lost treatise *Canon*. It is important to realise that the ancients never used the word 'canon' in order to refer to certain authoritative lists of important works of literature or art, as we do from the late eighteenth century onwards. In fact, the ancients did not have a word at all to designate what we understood as 'canon'. Cf. e.g. O'Sullivan (1997), 27.

[157] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.16. Kennedy (2001), 106 observes that this is 'the earliest application of κανών to describe written texts'.

[158] For other instances of the word κανών denoting a classical author in Dionysius, see e.g. *Lys*. 2.1: καθαρός ἐστι τὴν ἑρμηνείαν πάνυ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς γλώττης ἄριστος κανών ('he [i.e. Lysias, M.S.] is completely pure in his vocabulary, and is the perfect model of the Attic dialect'); *Dem*. 1.3: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ περιττὴ καὶ ἐγκατάσκευος καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις ἅπασι συμπεπληρωμένη λέξις, ἧς ὅρος καὶ κανὼν ὁ Θουκυδίδης ('this passage illustrates the striking, extravagant style which is remote from normality and is full of every kind of accessory embellishment. Thucydides is the standard and pattern of this style'); *Dem*. 41.2: ταύτης τῆς ἁρμονίας κράτιστος μὲν ἐγένετο κανὼν ὁ ποιητὴς Ὅμηρος ('Homer became the standard of excellence of this style [i.e. the third, mixed style, M.S.]; (negative standard) *Thuc*. 9.10: ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ κανὼν οὗτος οὐδ' οἰκεῖος ἱστορίᾳ, δῆλον ('it is clear that Thucydides' standard [of not presenting history as an uninterrupted sequence of events, M.S.] is wrong and ill-suited to history'). For (the rare use of) κανών denoting a classical text in Dionysius, see *Lys*. 12.2: ὧν ἐστι καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς Ἰφικράτους εἰκόνος, ὃν οἶδ' ὅτι πολλοὶ καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἡγήσαιντο ἂν καὶ κανόνα τῆς ἐκείνου δυνάμεως ('one of these is the speech about the statue of Iphicrates, which I know many would regard as a typical example and model of his [i.e. Lysias', M.S.] art').

[159] On the inseparable connection between theory and practice in Dionysius' conception of imitation, see e.g. Gelzer (1979), 10-11; De Jonge (2008), 11; Wiater (2011), 43.

[160] Bonner (1939), 39 also suggests that the title of *On Imitation* is suggestive of its practical character. See also *ibid*., 14, where he deals with Dionysius' critical works in general: 'It becomes [..] a matter of the greatest

A global formal analysis of the epitome can only confirm this. The tone of the work is very didactic and normative due to the frequent use of diverse adhortative grammatical forms. Firstly, the epitomator employs a large amount of directives: e.g. ἐκτύπωσαι and λάβε (2.1), παρατήρει (2.6), ὅρα (2.7) and σκόπει (2.8). Secondly, he inserts two first person plural adhortative subjunctives: ἴωμεν (2.9) and φιλοτιμώμεθα (4.3). Thirdly, in the epitome there are many verbal adjectives, such as μιμητέον (2.14, 4.2), θεωρητέον (2.14), ἀναγνωστέον (4.1), παραληπτέον (4.3), ῥητέον (4.4) and ζηλωτέον (5.2, 5.6). Finally, the epitomator uses other grammatical constructions in order to insist on the necessity and desirability of the things he (and probably also Dionysius) advocates: e.g. χρὴ μιμεῖσθαι (2.1), ἱκανόν ἐστιν (2.9), ἄξιος ζήλου (3.9), ἡμῖν ἀναγκαῖον (4.4) and χρὴ ζηλοῦν (5.3).

Adhortative constructions can also be found in other didactive contexts, such as grammatical treatises: Dionysius Thrax' *Grammatical Art*, Apollonius Dyscolus' *On Pronouns* and Herodianus' *On Prosody in General*.[161] They also turn up in Longinus' *On the Sublime*, Demetrius' *On Style* and Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*.[162] In the epitome of *On Imitation*, the adhortative constructions are counterbalanced by indicative, descriptive formulas, which often demonstrate a psychologizing or normative bias towards the compositorial practice of the classical authors described: e.g. ἐφρόντισεν (2.2), ἤρεσεν (2.12), ἐζήλωκεν (3.6), διήμαρτεν (3.12) and παραλυποῦσιν (4.1).

It is striking that one individual group of grammatical forms in particular seems to be clustered in the epitome: the directives. These only appear in the discussion of the poets – to be more precise, in the description of Homer and the lyric poets Simonides, Stesichorus and Alcaeus.[163] On the other hand, we only have two first person plural adhortative subjunctives:

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importance to stress the fact that Dionysius was led to literary criticism by practical and utilitarian considerations […]'.

[161] Dionysius Thrax (ed. Uhlig (1883)): e.g. ἀναγνωστέον (1.1.6.6), ὑποτακτέον (1.1.74.1); Apollonius Dyscolus (ed. Schneider (1878)): e.g. λεκτέον (2.6.20), ὁριστέον (2.9.11), ῥητέον (2.9.16); Herodian (ed. Lentz (1867)): e.g. παραιτητέον (3.59.24), σημειωτέον (3.108.7), παραφυλακτέον (3.392.35). For the connections between the grammatical theories (esp. concerning the 'parts of speech' (μέρη λόγου)) of Dionysius Thrax, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Apollonius Dyscolus, see e.g. De Jonge (2008), esp. 91-95, 134-139, who argues that they belonged to the same philological tradition in which Alexandrian and Stoic influences are combined and integrated. On these grammarians, see further Matthaios (2001).

[162] Longin. *Subl.*: e.g. ἡμῖν διαπορητέον (2.1), ἐπισκεπτέον (7.1); Demetr. *Eloc.* (ed. Radermacher 1901): e.g. λεκτέον (6.9), χρηστέον (55.1), σκεπτέον (69.1); Hermog. *Id.*: e.g. πειρατέον (1.1.23, 1.1.95), ῥητέον (1.1.121).

[163] In the discussion of Pindar, we do not have an imperative, but instead we read that he was ζηλωτός ('to be emulated').

in the sections on the tragic poets and the philosophers. The amount of verbal adjectives is undeniably dominating the relatively short section on the philosophers (as many as four times). The extant fifth section, on the orators, turns out to contain not very much of the adhortative constructions mentioned above. Instead, it is dominated by an indicative and descriptive tone.

To draw conclusions on the basis of the above observations would be premature, but the remarkable distribution of different grammatical pointers in the epitome of *On Imitation* at least suggests that the individual sections on the lyric poets, the philosophers and the orators had been stylistically distinguished from each other in the original version of the treatise.[164] In my opinion, these stylistic divergences might by explained in two ways: 1) either the original version of *On Imitation* was a compilation of sections composed at different times and/or for different audiences which required different forms of address or 2) the different sections in the original version of *On Imitation* are to be traced back to different sources (i.e. treatises on authors within the same genre) characterised by different stylistic peculiarities, which were taken over by Dionysius. I consider option 2 the most likely. After all, it is well thinkable that Dionysius made extensive and accurate use of different sources for those sections concerning other genres than historiography and rhetoric, whereas he could afford more freedom to develop his own, rather descriptive tone in discussing the topics with which he, as a historian and rhetorician, was most familiar.

3.5 Canons and Styles

When Dionysius for the composition of his treatise *On Imitation* probably made extensive and accurate use of critical sources on specific literary genres, what role did the literary-critical tradition play in Dionysius' decision not only to construct a canon or reading list of Greek literature, but also to present his ideas on various Greek authors by using a rich repertoire of literary virtues and vices? This section elaborates on (the place of *On Imitation* in) the history of canons and virtues of style.

[164] Of course, we should also consider the possibility that the epitomator inserted the adhortative constructions to make Dionysius' treatise on imitation more easily accessible in a didactive context. A comparison between Dionysius' quote from *On Imitation*'s section on historiography in his *Letter to Pompeius* and the section on the historiographers in the epitome is not very insightful; after all, in this section in the epitome, the tone is descriptive rather than imperative, as is true for the quote in the *Letter*. What we can observe is that the adhortative phrase ἄξιος ζήλου (*Imit*. 3.9) is absent in the *Letter*.

3.5.1 The History of Canons

As we have already seen, Dionysius listed classical Greek authors worthy of imitation and emulation according to the genre in which they were specialised. It is not certain whether such prescriptive lists had been composed before, and whether or not they should be seen in connection with the bibliographical 'tables' (Πίνακες) drawn up in Alexandria by Callimachus. Other suggestions concern Aristophanes of Byzantium, his successor Aristarchus or Apollodorus of Pergamum.[165] We do know of (a reference in the *Suda* to) a lost work concerned with ten classical Greek orators. Its author is said to have been the Greek Caecilius of Caleacte, a contemporary of Dionysius, working in Rome like him.[166] Neither Dionysius nor his Roman successor Quintilian mention this list of Caecilius when presenting their own literary canons, and we know nothing of its content or purposes.[167]

What becomes evident from the canons of Dionysius, Quintilian and also Dio Chrysostom (*Or*. 18), is that by their time the literary genres were rather fixed, but the number and identity of representatives were fluctuating.[168] This suggests that possible lists of authors predating the one of Dionysius were not untouchable and strictly authoritative, but that they

[165] For literature on the date and compiler of the canon of ten Attic orators, see e.g. Jebb (1876); Brzoska (1883); Douglas (1956); Worthington (1994); Smith (1995); Roisman, Worthington & Waterfield (2015), 6-10.

[166] This view is held by e.g. Roisman & Worthington (2015), 9. For a recent edition of fragments of Caecilius of Caleacte, see Woerther (2015). For a discussion of Caecilius, see O'Sullivan (1997), who – in refuting Douglas (1956) – convincingly argues that Caecilius, as the *Suda* claims, is very likely to have been writing a canon of ten Attic orators, which must have largely contributed to the rise of the Atticist movement. Douglas (1956), 39-40 casts doubt on the reference to Caecilius' *On the Style of the Ten Orators* in the *Suda*, mainly because this treatise is never referred to by Caecilius' successors. Likewise, Rutherford (1992), 357 argues that the notion of a canon of ten orators may well not go back much before Hermogenes (Second Sophistic Period).

[167] Dionysius' one and only reference to Caecilius (τῷ φιλτάτῳ Καικιλίῳ) can be found in *Pomp*. 3.20. More on this reference in Tolkiehn (1908), who assumes that the rhetoricians Dionysius and Caecilius were closely connected - seeing that the word φίλτατος is rare in Dionysius' oeuvre. But cf. Kennedy (1972), 364, who argues that 'the friendship need not to be elaborated into a close professional association […]'. I owe this latter reference to Hidber (1996), 5-6, n. 43. Quintilian links Dionysius and Caecilius in 3.1.16 and 9.3.89. Although Quintilian does not refer to Caecilius in his canon, he does mention a group of ten orators living within the time frame of one generation (10.1.76).

[168] For the history and genre divisions of canons, see esp. Steinmetz (1964); for canons of style with a focus on the Antonine Age, see Rutherford (1992). Even within the works of Dionysius himself, we see a shift in choice: he replaces Lycurgus for Isaeus in *On the Ancient Orators*. On this replacement, see section 3.2.

allowed for a certain freedom in selectivity.[169] According to the epitome, Dionysius distinguished between poets (epic, lyric, tragic and comic poets – the only comedian being mentioned being Menander) and prose writers (historians, philosophers and rhetoricians). Whereas the historians, philosophers and rhetoricians form separate categories, the different kinds of poets are (merely) perceived as a unity.

Of all classical poets, Homer, Hesiod, Antimachus and Panyasis are listed in the epic genre. Pindar, Simonides, Stesichorus and Alcaeus represent the lyric genre; Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Menander the dramatic genre. There are five historians whom Dionysius considers worth imitating: the famous Herodotus and Thucydides, as well as Xenophon (also listed as a philosopher) and the minor historians Philistus and Theopompus. After history, Dionysius moves to the philosophers, mentioning the Pythagoreans, Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle. The last category is devoted to oratory. Unlike Caecilius' alleged list of ten, Dionysius mentions six orators: Lysias, Isocrates, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, Aeschines and Hyperides. In chapter 4, I will further explore Dionysius' selection of exemplary authors, since his preferences for including specific writers and his positive evaluation of especially the more archaic authors can best be considered in comparison with the (often deviant) choices that Quintilian makes in his reading list.

3.5.2 Theories of Virtues of Style

It is impossible to consider Dionysius' method in *On Imitation* without taking into account the fact that tradition had supplied him with a system of virtues and vices of style evolved and perfected by generations of scholars.[170] The first of them was Aristotle, for whom style had only one virtue, 'clarity' (σαφήνεια):

> […] ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι· σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον· καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν […].[171]

[169] On the fluctuating number of esp. orators considered worth imitating, cf. Smith (1995), who describes the ancient literary canons or reading lists as 'suggestive', not 'prescriptive' (*ibid*., 73).

[170] On Dionysius' mixture of different theories and methods in general, see De Jonge (2008), 34-41. On the development of the theory of virtues of style in Dionysius, see Bonner (1939), 15-24; Schenkeveld (1964), 72-76 (esp. 74-75); Innes (1985).

[171] Arist. *Rh*. 3.2, 1404b1-4.

> Let the virtue of style be defined as 'to be clear' – the proof of this is that the speech, if it does not make its meaning clear, will not perform its proper function – and neither base nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate.[172]

Judging from these words, Aristotle's single virtue of style was in fact a tripartite one, consisting of the interdependent virtues of 1) 'clarity' (σαφήνεια), 2) 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον) and 3) 'ornamentation' (κατασκευή).[173] According to Cicero (*Orat*. 79), Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus developed this single Aristotelian virtue. He probably did so by dividing the different aspects of σαφήνεια into four separate and autonomous virtues, which he presumably designated 1) 'correctness' (ἑλληνισμός), 2) 'clarity' (σαφήνεια), 3) 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον) and 4) 'ornamentation' (κατασκευή).[174]

The Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylon expanded the system by adding a fifth virtue: that of 'brevity' (συντομία).[175] Another systematic attempt to refine the system was made by Dionysius, who also alluded to the efforts of several scholars in this field.[176] As we have already seen, in Dionysius' critical essays the system of the literary virtues had evolved into a complex and variegated system which not only reckoned with a couple of essential virtues, but also with a wide variety of additional ones.[177] This may be credited to Dionysius himself, but we should also allow for the possibility that it were indeed Hellenistic modifications which formed the backbone of his subdivisions.[178] Taking into account that

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[172] Tr. adapted from Kennedy (1991), 220.

[173] De Jonge (2008), 349, n. 87 offers useful references to literature in this field, i.a. Hendrickson (1904), 129; Innes (1985), 255-256, who argue that Aristotle's single virtue of style consists of three associated items. Fortenbaugh (2003), 224, n. 2, who first argued that there is a single Aristotelian virtue, agrees with Innes (1985) that Aristotle's virtue is a tripartite one. Bonner (1939), 15-16 rather seems to interpret Aristotle's words as referring to only one virtue of style (i.e. clarity), as do Grube (1965), 95; Kennedy (1994), 62. Rutherford (1998), 10 sees a single virtue of style with four subdivisions. For a brief overview of the history of the literary virtues, see De Jonge (2014), 328-329.

[174] Innes (1985), 256.

[175] This information is based on Diog. Laert. 7.59.

[176] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 22.2: εἴρηται πολλοῖς πρότερον ('this has been said before by many'). For passages possibly containing implicit references to the system of virtues of style, see e.g. Cic. *Part. or*. 31; *Brut*. 261; *De Or*. 3.52. I owe these references to Usher (1974), 523.

[177] Cf. section 3.3.6.

[178] Cf. e.g. Bonner (1939), 18. A case in point which is also observed by Bonner (*ibid*.) is Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.17: ἐνάργεια μετὰ ταῦτα τέτακται πρώτη μὲν τῶν ἐπιθέτων ἀρετῶν ('next in order, vividness is established as the first of the additional virtues').

Dionysius' system contains more than double the number of virtues defined earlier, this even seems to be plausible.

It is argued that Dionysius paved the way for further, more essential revisions of the system of virtues in Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*.[179] This may be true, for Dionysius is mentioned by Hermogenes – and in fact, he is the only one mentioned. However, instead of 'virtues of style' (ἀρεταὶ λέξεως), Hermogenes' stylistic system consists of six main 'ideas' (ἰδέαι), some of which are subdivided: 'clarity' (σαφήνεια), 'grandeur' (μέγεθος), 'beauty' (κάλλος), 'agility' (γοργότης), 'moral character' (ἦθος) and 'intensity' (δεινότης). The subdivisions included, they make a total of twenty ideas.

The ideas of Hermogenes in some respects resemble Dionysius' literary virtues, but, to use the words of Rutherford, 'none of these correspondences is an exact fit'.[180] Both systems share the thought that ideas/virtues should best be mixed. However, the idea-theory is more clearly arranged than Dionysius' system of stylistic virtues, the vocabulary of which is very extensive. In idea-theory, style is systematically divided into different levels or strata, such as subject matter, expression, composition, rhythm and clausula. These strata are (at least formally) absent in Dionysius' works.[181]

Another difference between the theory of Hermogenes and that of Dionysius (and other pre-Hermogenean systems) is that the former divides literature up into the two major categories of ὁ πανηγυρικὸς λόγος and ὁ πολιτικὸς λόγος, whereas Dionysius distinguishes poetry – which comes first – and prose.[182] Notwithstanding the differences between both systems, Dionysius may have been of influence to Hermogenes, especially regarding the concept of the mixture of stylistic qualities.[183]

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[179] Cf. Hagedorn (1964), 23, whose aim it is 'die Entstehung der hermogenischen Ideen aus den ἀρεταὶ λέξεως des Dionysios glaubhaft zu machen'.

[180] Rutherford (1998), 12.

[181] Rutherford (1998), 12 ff.

[182] Rutherford (1998), 44. For a schematic presentation of the divisions made in the pre-Hermogenean lists of Dionysius, Quintilian and Dio Chrysostom, see Rutherford (1992), 363-364.

[183] E.g. Rutherford (1992), 359. For Dionysius' influence on the idea-theorist Aelius Aristides, see Rutherford (1998), 96 ff.

3.6 Literary Virtues in *On Imitation*

On Imitation's epitome confronts us with a large number of literary virtues which are attributed to a wide range of classical authors representing different literary genres. Most of these virtues are related to magnificence. It does not become clear what Dionysius' considerations have been in assessing a particular quality to a particular author. However, from his treatise *On Isocrates* we know that he knew to assay the 'grandeur' (μέγεθος), 'solemnity' (σεμνότης) and 'extravagance' (περιττότης) of texts by means of the concepts of 1) 'choice of words' (ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων), 2) 'composition' (ἁρμονία) and 3) 'figures of speech' (σχήματα), which were, as Dionysius argues, distinguished by Theophrastus.[184] Thus, it is important to realise that these concepts may have been the (often invisible) criteria on the basis of which the virtues in *On Imitation* were assigned to classical Greek authors. Hence, in my opinion, the treatise may be considered less superficial and simplistic than has been judged from the epitome and the quote in the *Letter to Pompeius*.[185]

As is evident from Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* 3-6, in which he sets out his system of literary virtues, the three 'essential virtues' (ἀναγκαῖαι) he perceives resemble those distinguished long since: 'purity' (καθαρότης), 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) and 'brevity' (συντομία). Every good (i.e. bright and easily understandable) exposition is built on these pillars. By contrast, the wealthy presence of the 'additional virtues' (ἐπίθετοι) is, according to Dionysius, a sign of true and personal genius.[186]

As we have seen in the discussion on the *Letter to Pompeius*, the additional virtues identified by Dionysius are numerous; the most important ones are 'vividness' (ἐνάργεια), 'representation of characters and emotions' (ἠθῶν τε καὶ παθῶν μίμησις), 'grandeur' (μέγεθος) and 'marvelousness' (τὸ θαυμαστόν), 'vigour' (ἰσχύς) and 'tension' (τόνος), 'pleasure' (ἡδονή), 'persuasiveness' (πειθώ), 'delight' (τέρψις), 'naturalness' (φύσις), 'intensity' (δεινότης) and, most important of all, 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον). Elsewhere, Dionysius claims the additional virtues to be related to 'sublimity' (ὕψος), 'beauty of language' (καλλιρρημοσύνη), 'solemn speech' (σεμνολογία) and 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια).[187]

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[184] Dion. Hal. *Isoc*. 3.1. Cf. Theophrastus, fr. 5 Schmidt.

[185] We have already seen that Bonner (1939) passes a negative judgement on *On Imitation*; Grube (1965) criticises Dionysius' quote from *On Imitation* in his *Letter to Pompeius*. See n. 18.

[186] See section 3.3.6.

[187] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 23.6. Cf. section 3.3.6.

Both the categories of essential and additional virtues are used without distinction in the epitome of *On Imitation*. Often they could be applied to both the level of 'subject matter' (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) and 'style' (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος). In most cases, however, Dionysius does not specify to which level the virtues are assigned, as I stated before. Because of his strong stylistic orientation in the application of ἀρεταί – his quote from *On Imitation* in the *Letter to Pompeius* shows this pre-eminently –, we may assume that these ἀρεταί should be understood in a stylistic sense.[188] However, since the boundaries between stylistic and pragmatic virtues are also frequently blurred, we must be on our guard.[189]

The general and overarching levels of subject matter and style are further subdivided, but in the epitome this is never done in an explicit, let alone systematic way. From the epitome, we can for instance distil that subject matter should be understood to comprise i.a. 'invention' (εὕρεσις, 5.6), 'arrangement' (οἰκονομία, 2.1, 2.4, 3.4, 3.6, 3.9), 'choice of subject' (ὑπόθεσις, 1.1, 2.7, 3.4, 3.6, 3.9), 'moral character' (ἦθος, e.g. 2.7) and 'emotional treatment' (πάθος, 2.12), whereas style must plausibly include 'selection of words' (ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων, 2.6, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5), 'composition' (σύνθεσις, 2.2, 2.6, 3.5, 3.10), 'order' (τάξις, 3.6, 5.4), 'diction' or 'storytelling' (ἀπαγγελία, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2), 'ornamentation' (κατασκευή, 2.5, 5.6), 'interpretation' or 'explanation' (ἑρμηνεία, 3.8, 4.3), 'proverbial language' (γνωμολογία, 2.5), use of 'figures of speech' (σχήματα, 2.5, 2.8, 3.3, 3.7, 3.11), 'phrasing' (φράσις, 5.1, 5.4, 5.6, 5,7), 'moral character' (ἦθος, e.g. 2.14) and 'emotional style' or 'emotional treatment' (πάθος, e.g. 3.7).[190]

The literary virtues mentioned in the epitome are, if specified at all, connected either to the general levels or sublevels mentioned above, or to the units to which these sublevels in turn are applied: 'words' (ὀνόματα) and 'periods' (περίοδοι).[191] It is hard to establish why

[188] In *Pomp*. 3, Dionysius makes use of a system of virtues only when the styles of Herodotus and Thucydides are his topics.

[189] Because of this ambivalence, I would prefer speaking of 'literary virtues' instead of 'virtues of style'.

[190] Kremer (1907), 2-3 discusses the organisation of subject matter and style in Dionysius. For a discussion of the meaning and development of the terms οἰκονομία, ὑπόθεσις, τάξις and ἦθος, see Meijering (1987). The role of ἦθος and its derivatives – which is very prominent in the epitome – is questionable. The term ἦθος is very ambiguous and can pertain not only to the representation, but also to the production of moral qualities. Cf. Damon (1991), 37-39. Moreover, ἦθος constitutes a heading both under the categories of subject matter and style (as is true for πάθος). The distinction between portrayal and production of πάθος is less clear than that of ἦθος. Cf. Damon (1991), 40.

[191] The unit of 'clauses' (κῶλα) is omitted in the epitome. The epitome even focuses on vowels in the discussion of the historian Theopompus (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.11), who is said to fall short e.g. in avoiding clashes of vowels.

these frequent shifts in levels (i.e. in the degree of precision) are made. Of course, they may partly have been the work of the epitomator, but we should also allow for the possibility that Dionysius himself evinced this flexibility in switching between levels without differentiation. The overall impression, consequently, is one of imbalance, especially when levels and sublevels themselves are presented as or take the place of literary virtues.[192] However, we can also explain the frequent shifts in levels by assuming an aspiration for variety.

3.6.1 Clusters of Literary Virtues

Despite the rich and often unsystematic vocabulary used in the epitome to establish which literary virtues should be imitated and which avoided, it is possible to create some order by categorising cognate literary virtues.[193] It is remarkable (and confusing as well) that some of these cognate virtues tend to appear in succession.[194] Bringing them together will allow us to see 1) on which qualities Dionysius probably insisted, 2) how these qualities are distributed over the different literary genres, and 3) how they relate to the practical aims Dionysius propagates. This section establishes that in his theory of rhetorical imitation, Dionysius aspires to a well-balanced, cross-generic mixture of literary virtues, conciliating his salient insistence on poetic beauty with his propagation of rhetorical-practical usefulness.

The tables following below show five important categories of cognate literary virtues that are used as touchstones for evaluating the styles of the auteurs under discussion. My corpus consisted of both the fragments and the epitome of *On Imitation*.[195] The categories of

[192] E.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.9: Θεόπομπος δὲ ὁ Χῖος πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῷ προελέσθαι τοιαύτας ἱστορίας ὑποθέσεις ἄξιος ζήλου· μετὰ δέ, οἰκονομίας <ἕνεκεν> (ἔχει γοῦν τὸ εὐπαρακολούθητον καὶ σαφὲς ἡ γραφή)· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῆς ποικιλίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ('Theopompus of Chios is worth emulating in the first place for his choice of such [i.e. beautiful, M.S.] historical subjects. Secondly, because of his arrangement (easy to follow and clear is his writing): moreover, also because of the variety in his content').

[193] As far as I could verify, this has not been done before. For a comparison between the reading lists of Dionysius and Dio Chrysostom and the virtues of style applied in these lists, see De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.). On Dionysius' rhetorical system, see Kremer (1907). Hagedorn (1964), 11-12 (following Geigenmüller (1908) and Bonner (1939)) attempts to clarify the stylistic system of Dionysius mainly on the basis of evidence found in *On Lysias*, *Letter to Pompeius* and *On Thucydides*.

[194] A remarkable enumeration consists of 'strength' (ῥώμη), 'vigour' (ἰσχύς) and 'tension' (τόνος) (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3). Cf. also 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) and 'purity' (καθαρότης) (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.14); 'grace' (εὐχάρεια) and 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.5); 'terseness' (στρογγυλότης) and 'denseness' (πυκνότης) (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.7); 'solemnity' (σεμνότης) and 'stateliness' (πομπή) (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.10).

[195] As a matter of course, the quote in the *Letter to Pompeius* does not form part of this corpus.

cognate literary virtues are far from normative or stringent, nor do they suggest that no other arrangements and connections between literary virtues can be made. Rather, they try to create some order and insight in the bulk of literary virtues. If possible, I converted substantively used adjectives to nouns to enhance the uniformity of the tables. I also counted the derivatives of the nouns listed, as well as those virtues appearing in adjectival form to characterise other virtues (e.g. ἀγωνιστικὴ τραχύτης, 2.3).

In the epitome, there is an abundant reservoir of virtues referring to 'magnificence', 'transcendence' or 'elevation' with an aesthetic dimension. The virtues belonging to this category are cognate in that they all point to the transition beyond a certain level – in other words: to a form of *excess*, which is perceived as beautiful. The elements of excess and beauty are already present in Aristotle's conception of magnificence. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle conceived of 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια) as a moral virtue pertaining to generosity on a very large scale, at the right time and for the right purposes. As such, it also gets an aesthetic dimension: the magnificent man spends his great wealth 'because of beauty' (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), and when magnificence is exhibited in an undesirable way, it is described as i.a. 'unfamiliarity with beauty' or 'tastelessness' (ἀπειροκαλία).[196]

Aristotle's conception of magnificence has obviously influenced ancient rhetorical theory. As a virtue of style, magnificence is closely intertwined with excess and beauty, but also with poetical discourse. For Cicero, the orator who is 'magnificent, opulent, stately and ornate' (*amplus*, *copiosus*, *gravis*, *ornatus*) – virtues which are strongly associated with redundancy, poetical discourse and beauty – represents the grand style.[197] In *On the Sublime*, Longinus describes and recommends several virtues with often different nuances labeling 'sublimity' (which is not a characterisation of the grand style, but rather a special effect; see section 5.4): these are e.g. 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια), 'grandeur' (μέγεθος) and 'sublimity' (ὕψος). Such virtues pertaining to greatness are often accompanied by references to beauty, but also to extremeness.[198]

Also Quintilian refers to elevation by drawing from a reservoir of terms: in the tenth book we find e.g. 'sublimity' (*sublimitas*, e.g. 10.1.46) and 'magnificence' (*magnificentia*,

[196] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 4.2, 1122b6-7; 2.7, 1107b19. On the aesthetic dimension of magnificence in Aristotle, see e.g. also Maclaren (2003); Curzer (2012), 118.

[197] Cic. *Orat.* 97.

[198] For the combination of beauty and sublimity, see e.g. Longin. *Subl.* 5.1; 17.2; 30.1. These and other passages are listed by Porter (2008), 312, n. 95, who argues that 'Longinus' tendency is not to oppose the sublime to beauty' (*ibid.*).

e.g. 10.1.61), but also adjectives such as 'grand' (*grandis*, e.g. 10.1.65), 'eminent' (*eminens*, e.g. 10.1.86) and 'exalted' (*grandilocus*, e.g. 10.1.66), and infinitives such as 'to excel' (*excedere*, 10.1.50) and 'to rise' (*adsurgere*, 10.1.52). The close connection observed by Quintilian between these virtues of stylistic elevation on the one hand and poetic beauty and excess on the other is an important reason for him to warn the reader against *magnificentia* in narrations: 'a speech which rises above normal level' (*supra modum se tollens oratio*) is not always 'useful' (*utilis*), but sometimes rather out of place.[199] Hence, *magnificentia* must fall outside the domain of essential virtues of narrations, so Quintilian.

Dionysius considers μεγαλοπρέπεια first and foremost a poetical virtue, pointing out that it is the prime quality which, among others, contributes to 'beauty' (καλόν).[200] In his works, 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια) and 'sublimity' (ὕψος) and other related virtues often seem to be interchangeable concepts, as Porter (following Voit) has observed.[201] In Porter's words: 'he [i.e. Dionysius, M.S.] has a plethora of characterisations at the ready, not all of which are always exactly interchangeable but which do the work of labeling sublimity for him'.[202] I found that this near interchangeability applies to a great amount of the literary virtues listed per category below.

It is important to note that the virtues of style listed below appear in the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation* either because a specific author possesses them (in most cases) or because he does not (sufficiently) possess them or applies them in the wrong way (in some cases, as made explicit in the footnotes). Remarkably enough, when Dionysius observes that a specific author lacks a virtue of style to some extent, he sometimes even approves of this. The following passage in the epitome should illustrate this.

In his description of Simonides, Dionysius urges his readers to observe i.a. Simonides' talent to express 'pity not in a magnificent, but in an emotional way' (τὸ οἰκτίζεσθαι μὴ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀλλὰ παθητικῶς).[203] This expression of non-magnificent pity is to be praised in Simonides, for Dionysius observes (*ibid.*): 'in which respect he is found even better than Pindar' (καθ' ὃ βελτίων εὑρίσκεται καὶ Πινδάρου). Thus, whereas μεγαλοπρέπεια is one of

[199] Quint. 4.2.61.

[200] Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 11.2: ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν τήν τε μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ βάρος καὶ τὴν σεμνολογίαν καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια ('and under beauty I list magnificence, gravity, solemn speech, dignity, emotional treatment and qualities like them').

[201] Porter (2016), 228 following Voit (1934), 41, 46.

[202] Porter (2016), 228.

[203] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.6.

the most important virtuous characteristics of style for Dionysius, its absence can in specific cases (i.e. in Simonides' expressions of pity, but also, one could say, within his style as a whole) be to an author's credit. The judgement passed on Simonides clearly shows that Dionysius does not rigidly apply his theory of literary virtues; rather, because he is aware of the uniqueness of every style, he assesses whether specific virtues of style are appropriate and appropriately and moderately applied within their literary context.

The following qualities can be reckoned among the category of magnificence:[204]

1. Category of MAGNIFICENCE	**Number of occurrences in *On Imitation***
Magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια)[205]	11
Amplification (αὔξησις)[206]	5
Grandeur (μέγεθος)[207]	4
Extravagance (περιττότης)[208]	3
Sublimity (ὕψος)[209]	3
Exaggeration (δείνωσις)[210]	2
Greatness of nature (μεγαλοφυΐα)[211]	2
Elevation of style (δίαρμα)[212]	1
	TOTAL: 31

[204] There are more virtues of style which are obviously related to magnificence in the works of Dionysius, as Porter (2016), 228 suggests. Some examples are 'tension' (τόνος) and 'dignity' (ἀξίωμα). However, I judged these qualities intrinsically more connected to respectively the categories of 'intensity' and 'solemnity', which are, of course, contiguous to 'magnificence'.

[205] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5 (2x), 2.6 (there is absence of μεγαλοπρέπεια in Simonides' expression of pity), 2.7, 2.10, 2.14, 3.2, 3.5, 3.10, 4.1, 4.2.

[206] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 5.1 (Lysias' amplification is intermittent), 5.3, 5.5, 5.6 (Hyperides is rarely using amplification).

[207] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.1, 2.13, 3.8 (Philistus' speech does unfortunately not weigh up against the grandeur of the subject matter described), *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti.

[208] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.13 (Sophocles is not extravagant in his words), 3.3, *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti.

[209] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.10, 2.13 (Euripides is neither sublime nor plain), 3.5 (Xenophon is not successful in i.a. sublimity).

[210] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 5.3. The virtues of 'amplification' (αὔξησις) and 'exaggeration' (δείνωσις) seem to form a pair: they are mentioned together not only in Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, but also in *Lys*. 19.5.

[211] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.8, 2.12 (Euripides was less successful in expressing i.a. the greatness of nature of his characters than Sophocles).

[212] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.3 (διηρμένος).

The following category is dominated by virtues pertaining to the essential qualities of clarity and intelligibility:

2. Category of CLARITY	**Number of occurrences in *On Imitation***
Clarity (σαφήνεια)[213]	10
Vividness (ἐνάργεια)[214]	5
Common language (κοινότης)[215]	3
Purity (καθαρότης)[216]	2
Persuasiveness (πειθώ)[217]	2
Ease to follow (τὸ εὐπαρακολούθητον)[218]	1
Current language (κυριότης)[219]	1

[213] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.5, 2.8, 2.14, 3.1, 3.5, 3.9, 3.10, 4.1, 4.3, 5.1.

[214] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 3.2, 3.5, 5.2, 5.5 (here, Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) have ἐνεργής; for the difference between ἐνέργεια and ἐνάργεια, see also section 2.2.1, n. 41). The term ἐνάργεια is very complex; it comprises, e.g., 'distinctness' (which is also strongly related to 'clarity'), as well as 'vividness'; see LSJ s.v. Cf. Meijering (1987), 29, who argues that the term generally refers to visual clarity, and Nünlist (2009), 194 ff., who argues that it is 'a visual concept and designates the graphic description that enthrals the audience'. For Dionysius' short definition of ἐνάργεια in *Lys*. 7.1, see n. 217. For literature on the concept of ἐνάργεια, see section 2.2.1, n. 41.

[215] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.10, *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti (2x).

[216] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.14, 3.5.

[217] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3, *Imit*. fr. I U-R. The virtue of 'persuasiveness' (πειθώ) is difficult to classify. For a while I thought of considering πειθώ as a virtue of intensity, since it implies intrusiveness and force of argument. However, from Dionysius' essay on Lysias, 'the most persuasive of all the orators' (10.1), it can be deduced that πειθώ and ἐνάργεια are cognate, and thus that πειθώ originates from and contributes to clarity. In *Lys*. 7.1, ἐνάργεια is described as 'an ability to bring words to the senses of the audience' (δύναμίς τις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα). This provides evidence of the 'plausibility' (τὸ εἰκός) of actions, feelings, thoughts and words of the persons described (7.3) – to put it differently, it makes them credible and persuasive. It should not be seen as inconsistent that in *Comp*. 11.2 Dionysius lists τὸ πιθανόν under 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) – here identified as one of the two aims of composition (the other one being 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν)). After all, in this passage Dionysius is concerned with connecting different literary qualities to two general aims. For the connection between πειθώ and ἡδονή, see also Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.19 and *Imit*. 3.3.

[218] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.9.

[219] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.10 (here, κυριότης is used as an adjective defining the λέξις of Aeschines). In Dionysius' works, the terms κοινότης and κυριότης appear more than once in combination with σαφήνεια. See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.10 for the combination of κοινότης and σαφήνεια; see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 8.3 for the combination of κυριότης and σαφήνεια.

	TOTAL: 24

Other virtues, which often appear in clusters, are cognate in that they refer to force and asperity:

3. Category of FORCE	**Number of occurrences in *On Imitation***
Tension (εὐτονία / ἐντόνια / τόνος)[220]	6
Intensity (δεινότης)[221]	5
Energetic / combative style (τὸ ἐναγώνιον / τὸ ἀγωνιστικόν)[222]	4
Harshness (πικρότης)[223]	3
Vehemence (σφοδρότης)[224]	1
Roughness (τραχύτης)[225]	1
Power (δύναμις)[226]	1
Strength (ῥώμη)[227]	1
Vigour (ἰσχύς)[228]	1
	TOTAL: 23

Two other important clusters of cognate virtues can be discerned. The first of them is dominated by virtues of delicacy and pleasure:[229]

[220] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.3, 2.5, 3.3, 3.7, 3.10, 5.4.

[221] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.8, 2.14, 4.3, 5.5, 5.6. The meaning of the term δεινότης differs in the works of Dionysius. For him, it is an important stylistic virtue, 'realised either in general skill in rhetoric, particularly with respect to invention, or in forcefulness of style […]', so Rutherford (1992), 372. Only the second meaning is observed here; for the first meaning, cf. e.g. *Imit*. fr. X U-R = 6a Aujac = 7 Battisti.

[222] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.3 (here τὸ ἀγωνιστικόν is used as an adjective: Antimachus' τραχύτης is ἀγωνιστική), 3.7, 3.8, 5.2 (Isocrates' eloquence is not combative).

[223] Dion Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 3.10, 5.5.

[224] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.5 (+ 3 times as adverb).

[225] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.3.

[226] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5. The two instances of δύναμις in frs. 1 and 5 of *On Imitation* refer to ability rather than to power. Hence, I did not include them in this number.

[227] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3.

[228] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3.

[229] In Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 11.2, Dionysius lists under 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) the following virtues: 'freshness' (ὥρα), 'grace' (χάρις), 'euphony' (εὐστομία), 'sweetness' (γλυκύτης), 'persuasiveness' (τὸ πιθανόν) and 'all such virtues' (πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα).

4. Category of PLEASURE	Number of occurrences in *On Imitation*
Pleasure (ἡδονή)[230]	11
Grace (χάρις / εὐχάρεια)[231]	7
Elegance (κομψότης)[232]	2
Subtlety (λεπτότης)[233]	1
	TOTAL: 21

The last important category encompasses virtues which are related to (sacred) gravity:

5. Category of (SACRED) GRAVITY	Number of occurrences in *On Imitation*
Solemnity (σεμνότης)[234]	10
Stateliness (πομπή)[235]	3
Gravity (βάρος)[236]	2
Dignity (ἀξίωμα)[237]	2
Piety (εὐσέβεια)[238]	1
Festivity (τὸ πανηγυρικόν)[239]	1
	TOTAL: 19

[230] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, 3.3, 3.5, 3.10, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 5.3 (Lycurgus' speech is not pleasurable), 5.5.

[231] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3, 3.5, 4.2, 5.1 (2x), 5.4, 5.6. Viidebaum (2018) analyses the connotations of χάρις in classical poetry, and establishes that Dionysius' emphasis on this virtue, with its appeal to the 'irrational perception' (ἄλογος αἴσθησις) of the reader and its connotations of simplicity, wit and humour, could 'capture the new trends in contemporary Roman (Augustan) rhetoric' (*ibid*., 122).

[232] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5,1, 5.2.

[233] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.6.

[234] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 2.12 (Euripides reflects what is ἄσεμνον in a very accurate way), 3.7, 3.10, 4.1, 5.2 (2x), 5.3, 5.4, *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti.

[235] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.10, 5.2, 5.5.

[236] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.7, 5.5.

[237] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.7, 2.11 (in both cases, ἀξίωμα has to do with character representation). Unlike Hagedorn (1964), 31, who regards ἀξίωμα is a synonym of μεγαλοπρέπεια, I count it primarily among the category of solemnity, since it is a virtue pertaining to esteem even more than to elevation or height. Of course, ἀξίωμα is closely related to magnificence, as Hagedorn argues (*ibid*.). Cf. also the reference to Porter (2016) in n. 201-202.

[238] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5.

[239] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.2.

The five categories mentioned above are the most obvious in the epitome of *On Imitation*, but there are other important categories, such as that of 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν or κάλλος), which also comprises the virtues of 'elegance of language' (καλλιλογία) and 'ornament' or 'decency' (κόσμος), making a total of 16 instances.[240] One may perhaps wonder why the virtue of 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν) does not prevail in the epitome. After all, beauty, together with 'pleasure' (ἡδονή), is not only determined by Dionysius as central objective (cf. στοχάζεσθαι, *Comp*. 10.1) of a writer 'who wants to compose well' (τὸν βουλόμενον συντιθέναι τὴν λέξιν εὖ, *ibid*.); as we have seen in the introductory chapter 1, it is also the quintessential idea in the epitome's programmatic stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis.

The answer is that Dionysius considers several of the virtues he identifies and recommends (not only μεγαλοπρέπεια, as we have already seen, but also βάρος, σεμνολογία, ἀξίωμα, πάθος and virtues like these) subservient and contributing to 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν).[241] In fact, it is Dionysius' overarching and predominant ideal of beauty which catalyses the recommendation of many literary qualities in *On Imitation*. Dionysius' insistence on aesthetic qualities in Greek poetry and prose in his reading list has recently also been observed by De Jonge.[242]

To give a further impression of the richness of the literary abilities mentioned in the epitome, I would like to single out in random order some minor categories, such as those of 1) naturalness, 2) brevity, 3) effectiveness, 4) soberness and 5) balance.[243] There are also virtues which do not fit in all these categories and are difficult to classify otherwise, such as 'variety' (ποικιλία), 'smoothness' (λειότης, opposite to τραχύτης), 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον, which is exceptional in that it accompanies all other virtues; cf. n. 143), 'truthfulness' (ἀλήθεια) and

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[240] For τὸ καλόν and derivatives, see Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.2, 1.4 (2x), 1.5, *Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti, *Imit*. fr. VI[a] U-R (5x). For καλλιλογία, see Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.2, 3.7. For κόσμος, see Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.10, 2.11 (Euripides often lacks decency), 5.2, 5.4.

[241] Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 11.2. This passage is quoted in n. 200. As we have seen earlier in this section, magnificence is already endowed with an aesthetic dimension in Aristotle.

[242] De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.): "[…] Dionysius makes it clear that his selection of classical authors is to a large extent based on the aesthetic appreciation of the literature of a distant past […]'.

[243] First category: 'naturalness' (αὐτοφυές) and 'greatness of nature' (μεγαλοφυΐα, which I also included in the category of magnificence). Second category: 'brevity' (συντομία), 'shortness' (βραχύτης), 'terseness' (στρογγυλότης), 'denseness' (πυκνότης). Third category: 'effectiveness' (ἐπίτευξις), 'accomplishment' (ἄνυσις), 'necessity' (ἀνάγκη), 'usefulness' (τὸ συμφέρον), 'skill in shooting at a mark' (εὐστοχία), 'usefulness' (χρῆσις). Fourth category: 'spareness' (ἰσχνότης), 'simplicity' (ἁπλότης, which also contributes to clarity). Fifth category: 'equilibrium' (ὁμαλότης), 'symmetry' (συμμετρία), 'harmony' (ἐμμέλεια).

'frankness' (παρρησία). Moreover, the epitome of *On Imitation* informs us on the faults of the authors mentioned, being e.g. 'unfitness of times' (ἀκαιρία), 'unmanliness' (ἀνανδρία), 'meanness' (μικρότης), 'baseness' (ταπεινότης) and 'frigidity' (ψυχρία). It follows that their opposites are recommendable stylistic features.

3.6.2 Distribution of Literary Virtues

Within the most prominent categories, the distribution of different virtues over the four genres (poetry, historiography, philosophy and rhetoric) shows a rather clear patron, made clear in the table below. Of course, we should see the numbers in proportion, for the sections on the different genres are not the same size. Still, the distribution of virtues over the genres can be considered significant. In the table, the five categories mentioned above are listed. The numbers indicate the occurrences of virtues belonging to these categories within the genres of poetry, historiography, philosophy, rhetoric, and the fragments of *On Imitation*:

	Poetry	Historiography	Philosophy	Rhetoric	Fragments
1. magnificence	15	6	2	6	2
2. clarity[244]	5	10	2	3	3
3. force	8	8	1	6	--
4. pleasure	3	5	3	10	--
5. (sacred) gravity	5	4	1	8	1

The virtues belonging to the category of magnificence (total number: 31) predominantly occur in the section on poetry: no less than 15 times. Qualities belonging to the category of clarity have a strong preference for the section on the historians, in which they occur 10 times. Poets and historiographers mentioned in the epitome are equally often associated with qualities of force: both groups 8 times. Finally, virtues of pleasure and (sacred) gravity are important criteria especially for judging rhetoricians, occurring in their section 10 and 8 times respectively.

What can we learn from this scheme? Firstly that, according to the epitome, it is Dionysius' greatest interest to recommend the imitation of a first and foremost *poetic* virtue, i.e. magnificence, in rhetorical contexts; secondly, that 'clarity' – a virtue of great importance

[244] One virtue belonging to the category of clarity, i.e. σαφήνεια, occurs in the epitome's introduction.

– is to be found primarily in historiography; thirdly, that the rhetorician *in spe* should particularly study the masterpieces of his own forerunners to be equipped with splendid examples of styles which are both pleasant and grave. Thus, we see that Dionysius' idea of eclectic composition, voiced in his programmatic story on the painter Zeuxis, is not confined to certain genres; instead, it crosses all generic boundaries. The aesthetics of literature in general are of greater importance than the generic distinction between poetry and prose.[245]

It is absolutely striking that the five smaller categories briefly mentioned above (being naturalness, brevity, effectiveness, soberness and balance) contain literary virtues which tend to occur in the section on the orators: no less than 13 out of all 25 instances are to be found in the section on oratory.[246] In fact, the virtues pertaining to effectiveness (i.e. 'effectiveness' (ἐπίτευξις), 'accomplishment' (ἄνυσις), 'necessity' (ἀνάγκη), 'usefulness' (τὸ συμφέρον), 'skill in shooting at a mark' (εὐστοχία) and 'usefulness' (χρῆσις)) and soberness (i.e. 'spareness' (ἰσχνότης) and 'simplicity' (ἁπλότης)) are distilled from this section (almost) completely, which may suggest that according to Dionysius, especially these qualities should distinguish the rhetorician from his literary colleagues.[247]

We can conclude that not one of the essential virtues, but the additional virtue of μεγαλοπρέπεια, which is first and foremost a poetical quality closely related to beauty, predominates in the epitome of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*. Thus, Dionysius propagates an elevated style for, as he himself declares, rhetorical-practical purposes (although references to performative skills are absent). One may wonder whether the average student in Augustan Rome was able to give a speech which could meet the requirements of the Roman courts and, at the same time, bear traces of e.g. Homer's μέγεθος – a question which is also raised by De Jonge.[248] How practical is Dionysius?

In a comparison between Dio Chrysostom's reading list in *Oration* 18 (cf. section 5.7) and Dionysius' canon (and sideways also Quintilian's canons), De Jonge rightly argues that

[245] Cf. e.g. De Jonge (2008), 365, who observes that the focus on aesthetic qualities more than on the formal distinction between prose and poetry is also characteristic for Dionysius' work *On Composition*.

[246] Section on poetry: 7 times. Section on historiography: 5 times. Section on philosophy: 0 times.

[247] One virtue of effectiveness, i.e. 'necessity' (ἀνάγκη), also appears in the section on poetry: 2.13.

[248] De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.). Goold (1961), 168-192 (esp. 190) thinks that Dionysius and other Greeks in Rome were not interested in influencing Roman literature and oratory; they formed a 'professorial circle' whose aim it was to preserve the Greek literary heritage: 'their writings contain no direct reference to the times in which they lived' (*ibid*., 190). Here I side with Worthington (1994), 257, who, in refuting Goold's view, rightly points to the didactic tone of the works of Greeks in Rome. On the didactic tone of the epitome of *On Imitation*, see section 3.4.

'Dionysius may be said to be less practically minded […]. Dionysius makes it clear that his selection of classical authors is to a large extent based on the aesthetic appreciation of the literature of a distant past rather than on the practical considerations required by public speech performances in Augustan Rome'.[249] In addition, I would like to emphasise that Dionysius' work also testifies to a reconciliation of his overt insistence on poetic beauty with his propagation of rhetorical-practical usefulness.

How then does Dionysius warrant the feasibility of the imitation and integration of the aesthetics of classical Greek literature in Roman rhetorical practice? My suggestion is that he ensures that the weighty criteria pertaining to poetic magnificence are counterbalanced by especially requirements of clarity (for which historiography provides splendid paragons) and pleasure (which is displayed pre-eminently by rhetoricians themselves). In other words: he makes sure that his appreciation for literary aesthetics and magnificence is not at the expense of those virtues of style which make a text understandable and enjoyable in a performative context. The last table above gives proof of this. Thus, for Dionysius, the secret of practically-oriented rhetorical imitation seems to be located in a well-balanced, cross-generic mixture of literary virtues, which should result in a beautiful, but also effective and persuasive speech.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter was dedicated to the analysis, distillation and reconstruction of important themes and criteria for successful imitation in Dionysius' *On Imitation*, and to the investigation of the purposes of the reading list presented in the second book of this treatise. What have we learned?

A thorough examination of the surviving fragments of *On Imitation* has shown that many of these fragments are thematically interconnected, can be related to the epitome of *On Imitation* and/or to other treatises of Dionysius, and/or demonstrate an imaginative, narrative and illustrative style for rhetorical instruction to which Dionysius, judging e.g. from his programmatic stories on the ugly farmer and Zeuxis, was far from averse. When no (sufficiently reliable) testimony of a fragment's origin is given in its contexts, thematic and stylistic correspondences can make it more plausible that the fragment in question is from *On Imitation*, as I hope to have made clear especially in the case of the often overlooked scholion

[249] De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.).

to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (section 3.3.3) which, I argue, deserves inclusion in text editions of Dionysius' *On Imitation*.

In the fragments which (possibly) stem from book 1 of *On Imitation*, important themes are stylistic mixture and variety (fr. IV U-R), natural talent versus active study and exercise (fr. II U-R), natural talent versus intention (fr. V U-R), and imitation and emulation (fr. III U-R).[250] The remnants of book 2 which are possibly genuine discuss topics such as eclectic imitation of beauty (fr. VI[a] U-R), the (absence of the) poetical element in prose (frs. VIII, IX and X U-R) and stylistic nonchalance as a mask of artistic skill (fr. X U-R).[251] The scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* can be considered a fragment of *On Imitation* concerned with persuasion, truth, and the interconnection between model and imitation. All of these topics seamlessly fit in with those discussed in Dionysius' critical works in general and/or in the (stories introducing the) epitome of *On Imitation* in particular.

The analysis of Dionysius' extensive quote from *On Imitation* in his *Letter to Pompeius* has made clear not only that the epitome can be regarded as a rather faithful representation of the original, but also that Dionysius' focus in his comments on the imitation of historiographic masterpieces was not exclusively on matters of style, but also on the πραγματικὸς τόπος. We also learned that virtues which are highly regarded by Dionysius, such as 'variety' (ποικιλία), can function both on the levels of subject matter and style. This is important to keep in mind when reading the epitome, in which these levels are not frequently distinguished.[252] Moreover, we have seen that in the quote in the *Letter to Pompeius* three virtues of historiographic writing elsewhere classified as 'essential' are followed by several 'additional' virtues, and that especially these additional virtues (e.g. vividness, grandeur, marvelousness, vigour, tension) occupy an important place in the epitome – not only in the section on historiography, but in all sections.

In the discussion of the audience and aim of *On Imitation* it was pointed out that although Demetrius is the formal addressee of *On Imitation* (see *Pomp*. 3.1), in *On Thucydides* 1.1-2 Dionysius proclaims that we should actually see all orators *in spe* as the intended audience of his treatise. From the same passage in *On Thucydides* it also becomes

[250] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. Fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti. Fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti.

[251] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. VIII U-R = 4 Aujac = 4 Battisti. Fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti. Fr. X U-R = 6a Aujac = 7 Battisti.

[252] However, as I noted, Dionysius' strong stylistic orientation urges us to interpret many virtues in the epitome as qualities primarily pertaining to style.

evident that *On Imitation* was intended to be a practical guide of literary κανόνες for future orators, showing them which qualities they should observe and which they should avoid in each of the authors, and providing them with material for their own γυμνασίαι and – eventually – their own compositions. We have also seen that Dionysius' intention is not only to offer the young orator assistance in choosing ancient – often archaic – Greek models for imitation of subject matter and style, but also to make him an attentive reader – one who is endowed with ἐπιστήμη (*Imit*. 5.7).[253]

The instructive, didactic character of Dionysius' list is expressed in the frequent use of a variety of adhortative formulas, on the basis of which the different sections on poetry, historiography and rhetoric can be distinguished stylistically. These stylistic deviations per genre, I suggested, can best be explained by supposing that the different sections in *On Imitation* are to be traced back to different sources characterised by different stylistic features, which were taken over by Dionysius.

Finally, this chapter has shown that the models that should be carefully observed often display magnificence and beauty of style. Dionysius' overt emphasis on poetical magnificence and beauty for rhetorical-practical purposes is counterbalanced by his insistence on other, more prosaic virtues such as clarity and pleasure, as well as by his passionate plea for mimetic eclecticism and stylistic mixture. Exactly because of this mixture, the young orator can, in an original way and in a new, Roman context, breathe new life into the grand and beautiful literary masterpieces of classical Greece.

[253] In section 4.3, we will see that Quintilian makes cognition and a sound *iudicium* his prime concerns in his recommendations regarding the process of imitation.