Dionysius and Quintilian: Imitation and emulation in Greek and Latin literary criticism

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Dionysius and Quintilian

Imitation and Emulation in Greek and Latin Literary Criticism

door

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Voor mijn dierbare ouders

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CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1. Dionysius of Halicarnassus:

   - References to the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Dion. Hal.) are to the chapter and section numbers of the edition by G. Aujac, *Denys d'Halicarnasse. Opuscules Rhétoriques. Tome I-V*, 1978-1992.
   - References to the fragments of Dionysius' *On Imitation* are to the edition by H. Usener & L. Radermacher, *Dionysii Halicarnasei Quae Exstant. Vol. VI. Opusculorum Volumen Secundum*, Stuttgart / Leipzig 1904-1929 (repr. 1997).
   - References to the spurious *Ars Rhetorica* (attributed to Dionysius) are to the book, chapter and line numbers of the edition by H. Usener & L. Radermacher, *Dionysii Halicarnasei Quae Exstant. Vol. VI. Opusculorum Volumen Secundum*, Stuttgart / Leipzig 1904-1929 (repr. 1997).
   - The English translations of Dionysius' stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis (*Imit.* 1.2-1.5) are adapted from R. Hunter, *Critical Moments in Classical Literature. Studies in the Ancient View of Literature and its Uses*, Cambridge / New York 2009, 109-110.
   - The English translations of passages from Dionysius' rhetorical works are borrowed and often adapted from S. Usher, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Critical Essays. Vol. I-II*, Cambridge, MA / London 1974-1985.
   - The English translations of the fragments of Dionysius' *On Imitation* are my own.
   - The English translations of passages from Dionysius' *On Imitation* are my own.
   - The English translations of passages from the *Ars Rhetorica* are my own.

2. Quintilian:

   - References to the *Institutio Oratoria* of Quintilian (Quint.) are to the book, chapter and section numbers of the edition by D.A. Russell, *Quintilian. The Orator's Education. Vol. I-V*, Cambridge, MA / London 2001.
   - The English translations of passages from Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* are borrowed and often adapted from Russell (2001).

3. Hermogenes & Syrianus:

   - References to *On Types of Style* of Hermogenes (Hermog. *Id.*) are to the chapter, section and line numbers of the edition by H. Rabe, *Hermogenis Opera*, Leipzig 1913.
   - The English translations of Hermogenes' *On Types of Style* are borrowed and often adapted from C. Wooten, *Hermogenes' On Types of Style*, Chapel Hill 1987.
   - References to the commentaries on Hermogenes' *On Issues* and *On Types of Style* by Syrianus (Syrian. *In Hermog. Status / In Hermog. De Formis*) are to the pages

and line numbers of the edition by H. Rabe, *Syriani in Hermogenem Commentaria. Fasc. I-II*, Leipzig 1913.

4. Aelius Theon:

– References to the *Progymnasmata* of Aelius Theon (Ael. Th. *Progymn.*) are to the page and line numbers of the edition by M. Patillon, *Aelius Theon. Progymnasmata*, Paris 1997.

– The English translations of Aelius Theon's *Progymnasmata* are borrowed and often adapted from G.A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition, Translated into English, with Introductions and Notes*, Fort Collins, 2000.

5. Seneca:

– References to the *Letters* of Seneca (Sen. *Ep.*) are to the letter and section numbers of the edition by R.M. Gummere, *Seneca. Epistles. Vol. II-III*, Cambridge, MA / London 1920-1925.

– The English translations of passages from Seneca's *Letters* are borrowed and adapted from Gummere (1920-1925).

6. Longinus:

– References to *On the Sublime* by Longinus (Longin. *Subl.*) are to the chapter and section numbers of the edition by W.H. Fyfe & D.A. Russell, *Longinus. On the Sublime*, Cambridge, MA / London 1995.

– The English translations of passages from Longinus' *On the Sublime* are borrowed and often adapted from Fyfe & Russell (1995).

7. Pliny the Younger:

– References to the *Letters* of Pliny the Younger (Plin. *Ep.*) are to the book, letter and section numbers of the edition by B. Radice, *Pliny. Letters and Panegyricus. Vol. I-II*, Cambridge, MA / London 1969.

– The English translations of passages from Pliny the Younger's *Letters* are borrowed and often adapted from Radice (1969).

8. Tacitus:

– References to the *Dialogue on Oratory* of Tacitus (Tac. *Dial. de Orat.*) are to the chapter and section numbers of the edition by W. Peterson & M. Winterbottom, *Tacitus. Dialogus*, Cambridge, MA / London 1914.

– The English translations of passages from Tacitus' *Dialogue on Oratory* are borrowed and often adapted from Peterson & Winterbottom (1914).

9. Dio Chrysostom:

   − References to the *Orations* of Dio (Dio *Orat.*) are to the oration and section numbers of the edition by J.W. Cohoon, *Dio Chrysostom. Discourses. Vol. II*, Cambridge, MA / London 1939.
   − The English translations of passages from Dio's *Oration* 18 are borrowed and often adapted from Cohoon (1939).

10. Unless indicated otherwise, references to other Greek and Latin authors follow the editions of the Loeb Series.

11. Abbreviations for works of reference:

L&S	C.T. Lewis & C. Short, *A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews' Edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary*, Oxford 1975.
LSJ	H.G. Liddell & R. Scott, rev. H.S. Jones (with revised supplement 1996), *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford 1996.
OCD	S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Third Revised Edition*, Oxford / New York 2003.
OLD	P.G.W. Glare (ed.), *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, Oxford 1982.

12. Abbreviations for Greek and Latin authors generally follow *OCD*. The author of *On the Sublime* is referred to as Longin. *Subl.* (see above under 6).

13. Abbreviations for the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus are as follows:

	Latin	English
Amm. I	*Epistula ad Ammaeum I*	*First Letter to Ammaeus*
Amm. II	*Epistula ad Ammaeum II*	*Second Letter to Ammaeus*
Ant. Rom.	*Antiquitates Romanae*	*Roman Antiquities*
Comp.	*De compositione verborum*	*On Composition*
Dem.	*De Demosthene*	*On Demosthenes*
Din.	*De Dinarcho*	*On Dinarchus*
Imit.	*De Imitatione*	*On Imitation*
Is.	*De Isaeo*	*On Isaeus*
Isoc.	*De Isocrate*	*On Isocrates*
Lys.	*De Lysia*	*On Lysias*
Orat. Vett.	*De oratoribus veteribus*	*On the Ancient Orators*
Pomp.	*Epistula ad Pompeium*	*Letter to Pompeius*
Thuc.	*De Thucydide*	*On Thucydides*

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 DIONYSIUS AND QUINTILIAN

There was a painter named Zeuxis, and he was admired by the people of Croton. When he was painting a picture of Helen, naked, the people of Croton sent along the young girls of their town so that he could see them naked; not that they were all beautiful, but it was not probable that they were completely ugly. The features of each which were worth painting were collected together into one single image of a body, and from the compilation of many parts, Zeuxis' craftsmanship brought together one single perfect form.[1]

Ζεῦξις ἦν ζωγράφος, καὶ παρὰ Κροτωνιατῶν ἐθαυμάζετο· καὶ αὐτῷ τὴν Ἑλένην γράφοντι γυμνὴν γυμνὰς ἰδεῖν τὰς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔπεμψαν παρθένους· οὐκ ἐπειδήπερ ἦσαν ἅπασαι καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκὸς ἦν ὡς παντάπασιν ἦσαν αἰσχραί· ὃ δ' ἦν ἄξιον παρ' ἑκάστῃ γραφῆς, ἐς μίαν ἠθροίσθη σώματος εἰκόνα, κἀκ πολλῶν μερῶν συλλογῆς ἕν τι συνέθηκεν ἡ τέχνη τέλειον [καλὸν] εἶδος.

This amusing anecdote from the life of Zeuxis is one of two narratives which are introductory to the epitome of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' treatise *On Imitation*. In this treatise, Dionysius insists on 'imitation' (μίμησις) as a perceptive and highly creative process, consisting of intensive study, the critical selection of the best features of a range of authors, and the eclectic and original composition of a new piece of art.

Imitation is at the core of Dionysius' entire oeuvre. He was a Greek rhetorician and teacher, lived and worked in Rome during the reign of Augustus, and formed part of an intriguing network of Greek and Roman intellectuals.[2] He devoted himself to the composition of a *History of Rome*, and of several literary-critical works discussing classical Greek

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[1] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4.

[2] Dionysius was born probably around 60 BC. On this date, see Hidber (1996), 2; Fromentin (1998), 13. The last attestation of his life dates back to 8/7 BC, when he published the first book of his *History of Rome*, but he probably lived on for several years, finishing the other books of the *History*. On the 'circle' or 'network' or 'elite community' of Greek and Roman intellectuals, see e.g. Roberts (1900); Wisse (1995), 78-80; De Jonge (2008), 25-34 and esp. 26, n. 134; Wiater (2011), 22-29; De Jonge & Hunter (2018), 6-11.

authors.[3] Among the addressees of his rhetorical works are both Greek and Roman scholars, acquaintances and friends.[4] Whereas his *History of Rome* provides his readers with splendid models of moral conduct to be imitated in their own lives, the rhetorical-critical essays show the orators *in spe* what literary qualities they ought to study and follow in their own compositions.[5]

Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*, devoted to a systematical discussion of imitation, may be considered a key to unlock the theories on imitation underlying many textual analyses, criticisms and judgements expressed by Dionysius in his entire corpus. Unfortunately, *On Imitation* has come down to us in battered condition. The treatise, written in Greek and addressed to the otherwise unknown Greek Demetrius, reputedly consisted of three books, but only some fragments from the first two books and a presumably faithful epitome from the second survive.[6] Nevertheless, the remaining material, as well as several passages from Dionysius' rhetorical treatises, offer a rich mosaic of his mimetic ideas, which is worth further scrutiny.

The epitome from the second book of *On Imitation* contains a 'canon' or 'reading list' of the most important classical Greek poets, historians, philosophers and orators whose works Dionysius considered recommendable for imitation.[7] His high regard for the literary works of what we call the Archaic and Classical Greek Periods, as well as his eager attempts to

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[3] Critical works of Dionysius: *On Imitation, On The Ancient Orators, On Lysias, On Isocrates, On Isaeus, On Demosthenes, On Dinarchus, On Thucydides, Two Letters to Ammaeus, Letter to Pompeius, On Composition.* More on the dating and interconnections of these works can be found in e.g. Bonner (1939); De Jonge (2008), 20-25. On Dionysius' *History of Rome*, see Gabba (1991); De Jonge & Hunter (2018).

[4] For the addressees of Dionysius' works, see e.g. De Jonge (2008), 27-28.

[5] On the central role of imitation within Dionysius' works, see e.g. Delcourt (2005), 43-47; De Jonge (2008), 19-20; De Jonge & Hunter (2018), 4-6. On the concept of imitation in Greek literature of the empire, see e.g. Whitmarsh (2001), 46-57.

[6] The manuscript of this epitome dates back to the tenth century. More on this manuscript in Aujac (1992), 23, and in this dissertation in section 3.3. The three books of *On Imitation* discuss the nature of imitation (1), the writers to be imitated (2), and the ways in which imitation should be done (3). More on this in section 3.2.

[7] In this context, 'canon' designates a prescriptive list of literature, in which the different qualities and vices of various representatives of the different genres of prose and poetry are analysed for often pedagogical purposes. Whether or not such a canon is related to the bibliographical lists compiled by Callimachus in Alexandria or the *ordines* of the librarians Aristophanes of Byzantium, Aristarchus and Apollodorus of Pergamum, remains uncertain. More on this in section 3.5.1. For (the history of) canons in antiquity, see esp. Pfeiffer (1968); 207; Kennedy (2001).

introduce these as the 'models' or 'standards' (κανόνες) for future literary production, make Dionysius a pre-eminent exponent of early imperial Roman classicism.[8]

The concepts of 'imitation' (*imitatio*) and classicism also lie at the heart of the *Institutio Oratoria,* composed by the Roman rhetorician Quintilian at the end of the first century AD. He compiled a canon of Greek literature, which he included in the tenth book of his *Institutio* together with an extensive canon of Latin literature. His two canons contain encouraging recommendations and compelling warnings for those who intend to imitate (and eventually also emulate) the literary virtues displayed in the masterpieces of Greek and Latin literature.

Dionysius and Quintilian join a long tradition of theorising on imitation, which presumably started with Plato.[9] Whereas Plato conceives of μίμησις as a concept pertaining to the connection between reality and its (literary) representation, Dionysius, Quintilian and contemporary critics understand μίμησις/*imitatio* as a notion concerning the interconnections between works of literature. Still, behind their rhetorical reinterpretation of imitation, the original Platonic concept is lurking: these critics can be said to study reality through the lenses of the classical Greek authors whose works they conscientiously explore.

Whereas extensive research has been done on Dionysius' and Quintilian's ideas on language, literature and rhetorical imitation, their works have not yet been scrutinised in close comparison, though Quintilian certainly knew Dionysius as one of his forerunners, and may have been familiar with Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*.[10] By focusing on the fascinating connections between the ideas on imitation expressed by Dionysius (in *On Imitation* and other relevant passages), Quintilian (in *Institutio* 10 and other relevant passages) and contemporary

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[8] For the phenomenon of classicism, see esp. Gelzer (1979); the volume ed. by Porter (2006). On classicism in Dionysius, see esp. Goudriaan (1989); Hidber (1996); Wiater (2011).

[9] For literature on the concepts of imitation and emulation in antiquity, see e.g. Koller (1954); Bompaire (1958); Reiff (1959); Russell (1979); Kardaun (1993); Cizek (1994); McDonald (1987). For literary imitation in the Renaissance (and its connections with ancient ideas on imitation), see Jansen (2008).

[10] Quintilian refers to Dionysius in 3.1.16, 9.3.89, 9.4.88. More on Quintilian's possible dependence on Dionysius in section 4.4. Important studies on Dionysius' works are e.g. Goudriaan (1989); De Jonge (2008); Wiater (2011); the volume ed. by De Jonge & Hunter (2018). On Dionysius' *On Imitation* or his concept of μίμησις, see e.g. Goudriaan (1989), 218-250; Aujac (1992); Classen (1994), 326-329; Battisti (1997); Citroni (2006a); Hunter (2009), 107-127; Wiater (2011), esp. 77-92. Studies on Quintilian's work are e.g. Cousin (1935-1936); Kennedy (1969); Seel (1977). On the tenth book of Quintilian's *Institutio*, see e.g. Becher (1891); Peterson (1891); Tavernini (1953); Schneider (1983).

Greek and Latin authors, this dissertation sheds light on the intercultural dialogue and exchange of ideas between Greek and Roman intellectuals in early imperial Rome.[11]

Although we may well assume that Dionysius represents a Greek, Quintilian a Roman perspective on imitation in the field of rhetoric, the twofold hypothesis of this dissertation is that these two critics 1) made use of a shared discourse of imitation, and 2) each adapted this shared discourse, and made it subservient to their own rhetorical agendas, which are determined by factors such as writing goal, readership, pedagogical aims, and developments of classicism and literary taste in the decades between their activities.

This hypothesis allows us to consider the remarkable differences and similarities between the mimetic ideas of Dionysius, Quintilian and their Greek and Latin colleagues in relation not only to the traditional parameters of 'Greekness' and 'Romanness', but also to the idea of a shared conceptual framework of imitation that could be used discretionally. Starting from the Zeuxis narrative with which the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation* opens, we will explore this framework in broad outline.

1.2 ZEUXIS AND THE CONCEPTS OF IMITATION AND EMULATION

At first sight, Dionysius' Zeuxis story (cited above) is just an enchanting and playful introduction to his canon of Greek literature.[12] As a teacher in rhetoric, Dionysius is, of course, thoroughly familiar with the principle of 'honeying the cup of medicine'; he knows that attractiveness makes his tough but salutary lessons more effective. But however playful and attractive Dionysius' story may be, in its deeper layers it encapsulates many aspects of his conception of rhetorical imitation. As such, the Zeuxis narrative can be considered programmatic for and illustrative of the crucial lessons to be learnt from the treatise *On Imitation*.

We have already seen that the painter Zeuxis closely observes a wide variety of models, selects those parts of them which are worth painting, and eclectically and originally brings these individual features together in a new piece of art. These successive activities run parallel to key ideas of rhetorical imitation coming to the fore in Dionysius' works: his insistence on 'careful study' (μάθησις ἀκριβής) of classical writers, the acquisition of

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[11] More on the conceptual model of an intercultural dialogue and reciprocal exchange of ideas in section 1.4.

[12] For other versions of this Zeuxis anecdote, see Cic. *Inv*. *Rhet*. 2.1-3; Plin. *HN* 35.64. For an analysis of different renditions of the Zeuxis story (or 'Zeuxis myth') and its reception in different times and cultures, see Mansfield (2007). She does not mention Dionysius' version.

ἐπιστήμη (which comprises both knowledge of and sound judgement passed on literature), the selection of the best features of a wide range of authors, and the eclectic composition of a new text, is salient in his treatises.[13] These aspects also play a crucial role in Quintilian, who seems to be drawing from a similar framework: 'wide reading experience' (*copia*), 'sound judgement' (*iudicium*), selection of the best features of different authors and eclecticism in composing a text are quintessential to his understanding of *imitatio*, more on which in chapter 4.3.[14]

However, there is another lesson to be learnt from the Zeuxis story. It teaches that imitation is not only about faithfully and eclectically following the literary masterpieces of others; it also pertains to the creative composition of works of art which *surpass* their models in beauty of style and content.[15] These two aspects of the process of imitation – 'imitation' and 'emulation', i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος – are crucial theoretical distinctions in Dionysius' criticisms. In his works, the terms μίμησις and ζῆλος appear to be inextricably linked and, as such, constitute two complementary parts of one and the same process of imitation – each of them referring to a specific dimension of this process.

The Latin counterparts of μίμησις and ζῆλος, *imitatio* and *aemulatio*, are also presented as complementary in Quintilian. However, Quintilian conceives of the exact meaning, value and interconnection of *imitatio* and *aemulatio* differently than Dionysius does of μίμησις and ζῆλος. Chapter 2 will elaborate on this, arguing that the divergences between Dionysius' and Quintilian's understanding and use of mimetic terminology may well be explained by taking their different cultural backgrounds into account. We will see that Dionysius, as a Greek in Rome, considers imitation (i.e. the complex of μίμησις and ζῆλος) to

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[13] For μάθησις ἀκριβής, see Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. II Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) (= U-R) = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti, more on which in section 3.3.1. For the notion of ἐπιστήμη, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.7. The idea of eclectic imitation of various qualities of various authors can be found scattered throughout the epitome.

[14] All these aspects frequently occur in Quint. 10.1-2. For *copia* and *iudicium*, see esp. Quint. 10.1.6, 8.

[15] Note the mediocre beauty of the models of Zeuxis. He should rely on virgins who are neither completely beautiful nor completely ugly. I suggest that this insistence on 'being somewhere in between' is intentional and meaningful. The 'girls' (παρθένοι) whom Zeuxis uses as models, are of liminal status. Firstly, they are neither beautiful, nor ugly. Secondly, as virgins they are on the threshold of childhood and adulthood. Thirdly, they come from Croton, a Greek colony in the southern part of Italy, and as such a liminal place, both culturally and geographically. Like the virgins, exemplary texts do not need to be completely beautiful; the selective imitation and emulation of these texts may result in a perfectly beautiful composition. More on the importance of the setting of Croton in the Zeuxis story in Cic. *Inv*. *Rhet*. 2.1-3 in Mansfield (2007), 19-38; 158-159. More on the notion of 'emulation' or 'competition' in ancient society in Damon & Pieper (2018).

be the essential means to re-express and revive Greek masterpieces in an original way, whereas the Roman teacher Quintilian makes imitation (i.e. the complex of *imitatio* and *aemulatio*) of Greek literature serve his agenda to bring Latin literature on a par with Greek.[16]

In this dissertation, I will use the term 'imitation' both in a broad sense (referring to imitation and emulation together) and, in terminological discussions, in a narrow sense (referring to μίμησις/*imitatio*, as opposed to ζῆλος/*aemulatio*).

1.3 CROSSING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN GREEKS AND ROMANS. CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF IMITATION

Although Dionysius and Quintilian share many key ideas of imitation, they define the aspects of imitation (i.e. imitation and emulation) in different ways. Likewise, they differ in their conceptualisation of imitation. The discrepancies between them are mainly based on the contrast between a high and low language register.

On the one hand, Dionysius, using imagery that is Platonically inspired, frames imitation in terms of artistic creation, wonder, mental movement, internalisation of beauty in one's soul, and mental pregnancy. His language is indicative of an aesthetic more than a practical approach of imitation, as chapters 2 and 3 will demonstrate. On the other hand, Quintilian's language of imitation is rather prosaic and abounds in metaphors of competition and an ongoing trial of strength between Greece and Rome. His judgements passed on Greek and Latin literature seem to be based on the criterion of 'rhetorical usefulness' more than on that of 'beauty', as chapters 2 and 4 will show.

This section briefly sets out how Platonic imagery is adaptively used in Dionysius' programmatic stories introducing the treatise *On Imitation*, and establishes that the conceptualisation of imitation as an exalted activity is shared by both Greeks and Romans.[17] Likewise, the type of conceptualisation of imitation used by Quintilian, which is more prosaic

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[16] In chapter 5, I will discuss terminology and theories of imitation in other Greek and Latin authors.

[17] Hunter (2009) and Wiater (2011), esp. 77 ff. pay due attention to these narratives. Hunter focuses on the predominant 'language of pregnancy and birth', which calls for a Platonic reading of Dionysius' two anecdotes. Wiater stresses the numerous verbs and nouns related to 'seeing' and 'looking', which indicate that to understand classical texts, a close observation – both physically and mentally – is indispensable. He also discusses the important concept of 'technical skill' or 'art' (τέχνη), which is of crucial importance in both the mimetic activity of studying and composing. Jansen (2008), 361-366 discusses how different renditions of the Zeuxis story shed light on the concept of emulation.

and concerned with practical usefulness, seems to cross the boundaries between Greek and Roman mimetic theories.

The moral which is added to the Zeuxis story is highly illustrative of Dionysius' peculiar imagery of imitation as a process of artistic creation and spiritual activity. Dionysius concludes the Zeuxis narrative with the following urgent message for his readers:

> Thus you too, as in a theatre, have the possibility to examine the forms of beautiful bodies and to pick what is best from their souls, and, by bringing together the contribution of your wide learning, not to mould an image that will fade with time, but an immortal, beautiful piece of art.[18]

> Τοιγαροῦν πάρεστι καὶ σοὶ καθάπερ ἐν θεάτρῳ καλῶν σωμάτων ἰδέας ἐξιστορεῖν καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ψυχῆς ἀπανθίζεσθαι τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ τὸν τῆς πολυμαθείας ἔρανον συλλέγοντι οὐκ ἐξίτηλον χρόνῳ γενησομένην εἰκόνα τυποῦν ἀλλ᾽ ἀθάνατον τέχνης κάλλος.

We can observe that for Dionysius, rhetorical imitation has both a technical-creative (cf. τυπεῖν/τέχνη) and spiritual dimension (cf. ψυχή). These two dimensions are also salient in a remaining fragment from *On Imitation*. It contains definitions of 'imitation' (μίμησις) and 'emulation' (ζῆλος), the former of which is designated as 'an activity that 'moulds' (ἐκμάττεσθαι) the model in accordance with the rules of art', the latter as 'an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful'.[19] Here, the soul of the imitator, not of the model, is at stake; nevertheless, the recurring language of mental activity and beauty is striking.

The last words of the Zeuxis narrative, 'one single perfect form' (ἓν τέλειον [καλὸν] εἶδος), as well as the final words of the moral, 'immortal, beautiful piece of art' (ἀθάνατον τέχνης κάλλος), are strongly reminiscent of Plato's theory of perfect and immortal forms, on which all objects and concepts of our evanescent world depend – as imitations on their models.[20] As Richard Hunter has observed, Zeuxis' striving for a masterpiece that can be

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[18] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.5.

[19] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti: μίμησίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια διὰ τῶν θεωρημάτων ἐκματτομένη τὸ παράδειγμα. Ζῆλος δέ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς πρὸς θαῦμα τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἶναι καλοῦ κινουμένη. For a discussion of this fragment, see sections 2.2.1 and 3.3.1.

[20] Also the marked contrasts between 1) beauty and ugliness (cf. καλαί […] αἰσχραί) and 2) body and soul (cf. καλῶν σωμάτων ἰδέας […] τῆς ἐκείνων ψυχῆς) render the narrative and moral Platonic in colouring.

called a τέλειον [καλὸν] εἶδος reminds us in particular of Plato's *Republic*, in which Socrates is looking for true justice and for a man who is 'perfectly just' (τελέως δίκαιον).[21] Socrates compares this intellectual quest to a painter depicting a 'model' (παράδειγμα) of a man who is utterly beautiful but whose existence in reality cannot be proven.[22]

Dionysius' words do not only allude to, but also contort Plato's theory of forms. Whereas Plato conceives of εἶδος as a perfect, immortal and transcendent 'idea' of which all earthly matters (and certainly paintings, which are regarded as 'images of images') are mere perishing reflections, Dionysius' notion of εἶδος refers to a perfect, beautiful and immortal piece of art in which several deficient natural manifestations (i.e. the maidens) are united and sublimated.[23] Thus, in overtly Platonic idiom, Dionysius here claims the primacy of art over nature, which runs counter to Platonic thought. In doing so, he practices the imitation theory he preaches: by originally adapting Platonic language to his own rhetorical ideas and purposes, he is able to perpetuate and breathe new life into the grand literature of the classical Greek past.[24]

The appealing narrative on the ugly farmer, which precedes the Zeuxis story in the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, enfolds an imagery of spiritual pregnancy and giving birth to beauty that is even more indebted to Plato. The story and its closing moral are as follows:

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[21] Hunter (2009), 114. U-R (1904-1929) and Aujac (1992) have τέλειον [καλὸν] εἶδος, following Kiessling in deleting καλόν and reading εἶδος. Battisti (1997) has τέλειον καλόν. Ἰδού, […].

[22] Pl. *Resp*. 5.472b-d.

[23] Plato unfolds his theory of forms esp. in his *Phaedo* and *Republic*. For his observations concerning imitation in painting, see *Resp*. 10.598a-d. For his discussion of the objects of imitation as a third remove from truth, see *Resp*. 10.602c1-3.

[24] Dionysius probably also makes a nod to Herodotus' *Histories* in the moral attached to the narrative on Zeuxis. For a discussion of his allusions to Herodotus, see also Hunter (2009), 121-122. His first allusion to Herodotus' *Histories* is the verb 'to inquire' (ἐξιστορεῖν). Herodotus uses it in 7.195.7 to describe the interrogations of two prisoners of war by the Greeks. It seems odd that in Dionysius the verb ἐξιστορεῖν, which implies an intellectual activity, has καλῶν σωμάτων ἰδέας as its object. As Hunter (2009), 121 points out, this oddity may 'reflect the shift between the Zeuxis anecdote and its moral from a purely visual and aesthetic activity to an intellectual ἱστορίη'. The second allusion to Herodotus in the moral attached to the narrative on Zeuxis is the phrase οὐκ ἐξίτηλον χρόνῳ, which overtly refers to the proem of Herodotus' *Histories*, in which the historian states that he wrote his work 'to prevent the deeds of humanity from fading with time' (ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται).

It is said that fear came upon an ugly-faced farmer that he would become the father of children like himself. This fear, however, taught him the art of generating beautiful children. After having produced beautiful images, he made his wife look at them regularly. Next, he made love with her and eventually obtained the beauty of the images <reflected in his own children>. In this way, in literature also, likeness is born through imitation, whenever someone emulates what seems to be better in each of the ancients and, as it were, constructs one stream out of many and canalises this into his soul.[25]

Ἀνδρί, φασί, γεωργῷ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσχρῷ παρέστη δέος μὴ τέκνων ὁμοίων γένηται πατήρ. Ὁ φόβος δὲ αὐτὸν οὗτος εὐπαιδίας ἐδίδαξε τέχνην. Καὶ εἰκόνας πλάσας εὐπρεπεῖς, εἰς αὐτὰς βλέπειν εἴθισε τὴν γυναῖκα· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα συγγενόμενος αὐτῇ τὸ κάλλος εὐτύχησε τῶν εἰκόνων. Οὕτω καὶ λόγων μιμήσει ὁμοιότης τίκτεται, ἐπὰν ζηλώσῃ τις τὸ παρ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν παλαιῶν βέλτιον εἶναι δοκοῦν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκ πολλῶν ναμάτων ἕν τι συγκομίσας ῥεῦμα τοῦτ' εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν μετοχετεύσῃ.

Transposed to the field of rhetoric, this story teaches that close observation of different specimens of beautiful literature is essential for producing beautiful texts.[26] Dionysius and his students are personified by both the farmer and his wife at the same time: they long for beauty out of fear for producing something ugly (like the farmer), and they give birth to beauty after intensive and repetitive study (like the farmer's wife).[27] The tenor of this story, in which art is the model for nature, can be considered an inversion of that of the Zeuxis narrative, in which nature is the model for art.[28]

Notwithstanding this proclamation of the prevalence of art over nature, the Platonic inheritance of the story on the ugly farmer (again recognised by Richard Hunter) is

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[25] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.2-3.

[26] On the aspect of close observation in this story, see esp. Wiater (2011), 83. The closing moral highlights the importance of unification of different models as well as the task of the soul, and can be regarded as a more profound reframing of the tenor of the story.

[27] Hunter (2009), 113 rightly argues that by introducing the farmer's wife, Dionysius ''normalises' the extraordinary biology of the *Symposium* in which the male gives birth [...]'.

[28] The idea of nature imitating art also seems to be diametrically opposed to Dionysius' statement that 'the greatest achievement of art is to imitate nature' (τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς [i.e. τῆς τέχνης, M.S.] μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν) (*Is*. 16.1).

remarkable.[29] In Plato's *Symposium*, the priestess Diotima teaches Socrates that while some people are physically pregnant and try to gain immortality through children, others, after having spent sufficient time in proximity of beauty, are mentally pregnant and long for immortality through intellectual offspring.[30] The Platonic allusions continue in the moral, in which Dionysius applies the metaphor of the stream to conceptualise the mimetic relationship between authors – thus suggesting a smooth continuity between the literature of the past and the present.[31]

The framing (whether or not in Platonic language) of imitation as an inspired activity catalysed by beauty is certainly not confined to Dionysius – or to Greeks – alone.[32] This particular type of discourse crosses the boundaries that have traditionally been supposed to exist between Greek and Roman critics. As chapter 5 will show, Dionysius, Aelius Theon, Longinus and Pliny all, in rather flowery language, emphasise the loftiness of imitation, and adopt a remarkably aesthetic (and sometimes archaizing) approach towards works of literature which they consider to be useful for rhetorical practice.[33] On the other hand, we can observe coherences between the framing of imitation in Tacitus, Dio Chrysostom and Quintilian, who tend to take a more modern, prosaic and opportunistic stance towards Greek literature, deeming its usefulness and efficiency in Roman rhetorical practice of even greater importance than its enchanting beauty. These latter authors may well reflect a later stage in or different form of Roman classicism.[34]

It is important to emphasise that the above 'arrangement' of authors does not claim to be normative or stringent, nor intends to substitute classifications based on the parameters of

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[29] Hunter (2009), esp. 110-113.

[30] Pl. *Symp*. 208e-209e. Plato's examples of people who are mentally pregnant are Homer, Hesiod, other great poets of the past, Lycurgus and Solon (*Symp*. 209d).

[31] For the language of the stream and of 'canalising' in this passage, see further Hunter (2009), esp. 113. For the metaphor of the stream in Quintilian's Greek reading list, see section 4.9.2. For a profound discussion of the Platonic stream of language and ideas influencing ancient literature, see Hunter (2012). For the image of the stream in Plato, see e.g. *Symp*. 206d4-7 (people with spiritual potency are said to give rise to a flow (cf. διαχεῖται) when they approach the beautiful, whereas ugliness results in desiccation); *Ion* 534a-b (poets are said to draw their inspiration from sources flowing with honey, like the bees).

[32] For a discussion of recurring metaphors in Greek and Latin sources on imitation, see chapter 5, and esp. the overview in section 5.8.

[33] Seneca is close to many of these authors in his insistence on the importance of the soul during the process of imitation.

[34] For the idea of different forms of classicism, see Porter (2006), 50, who argues that 'we are evidently having to do not with a single form of classicism but with a variety of *classicisms* in the plural […]'.

'Greekness' and 'Romanness'. On the contrary, it demonstrates the possibility to bring Greeks and Romans together in a way that accounts for the conceptual crosslinks between them regarding two quintessential mimetic criteria: literary beauty and rhetorical-practical usefulness. Although these conceptual crosslinks allow for an arrangement of two 'groups', Dionysius, Aelius Theon, Seneca, Longinus, Pliny, Tacitus, Dio Chrysostom and Quintilian all tap into a common repertoire of mimetic ideas and metaphors, from which they could select those elements that suited their own agendas and satisfied their different audiences most adequately. By assuming a shared arsenal of ideas and metaphors supplying the essential material for constructing different personal agendas, we are able to explain the numerous similarities and differences between notions of imitation in the first century AD.

1.4 Interaction between Greece and Rome. Terms and Theories

How does the idea of a discourse of imitation shared by Greeks and Romans alike relate to the scholarly debate on Greek and Roman identity in imperial Rome? In order to answer this question, let us briefly turn to different theories concerning the contacts between Greeks and Romans.

In the past, Roman responses to Greek culture have been scrutinised, but the interaction between Greeks and Romans who lived and worked together in Rome remained fairly underexposed.[35] The view has been held that the articulation of cultural expressions by Greeks and Romans should be estimated in terms of 'acculturation', a general concept overarching various perspectives on the interplay between two or more cultures.[36] The terminology of acculturation also includes notions like 'fusion', 'hybridity', 'creolisation' and 'métisage'.[37] Labels like these suppose a new, uniform culture blended from two or more different cultures, with the obsolescence of all peculiarities of the different ethnic categories

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[35] An important study on Roman approaches to Greek literature is Hutchinson (2013). Feeney (2016) analyses how the Romans took over Greek literary genres, made these genres their own, and developed a literature which presented itself as a continuation of Greek literature. Studies on Roman responses to Greek culture and learning are e.g. Woolf (1994); Stroup (2007).

[36] For the term 'acculturation', see Veyne (1979), 4.

[37] For the terms 'fusion' and 'hybridity', see Newsome (2011), 68. A useful description of 'creolisation' - a term borrowed from linguistics – is given by Wallace-Hadrill (2008), esp. 13-14, who also discusses the notion of 'métisage' (*ibid.*, 12-13).

at stake. However, this picture turns out to be hardly applicable to the situation in Augustan Rome, since it does not account for the numerous differences between Greeks and Romans in cultural and intellectual life.

Fortunately, archaeologists and historians have recently developed a different model for analysing the interaction between Greek and Roman culture. Especially the important work *Rome's Cultural Revolution* by Andrew Wallace-Hadrill gave impetus to this conceptual turn.[38] He established that Augustan culture is highly dynamic and is shaped through the reciprocal exchange of ideas between Greeks and Romans who maintained their distinctive identities: 'the cultures do not fuse, but enter into a vigorous and continuous process of dialogue with one another'.[39] This model is satisfying in that it can explain the close similarities between various Greek and Roman cultural expressions, while doing justice to the peculiar identities of Greeks and Romans.

The present dissertation builds on this notion of two different, coexisting cultures involved in a dialectical exchange of ideas, transposing it to the world of Greek and Latin mimetic theory in Rome. Dionysius of Halicarnassus was thoroughly Roman, but also thoroughly Greek. On the one hand, his activities were inextricably embedded in rhetorical education and practice in Augustan Rome, and his engagements with Roman intellectuals and students probably gave him the opportunity not only to understand the values of Augustan literary culture in depth, but also to spread his ideas on the imitation of the great literary masters of classical Greece in such a way that it suited Roman literary practice.

On the other hand, Dionysius continued to write in Greek about the stylistic magnificence of Homer and Pindar, the clarity of Alcaeus, the tension of Antimachus, the grace of Lysias, and the solemnity of Lycurgus. What would the exact aims of his reflections on these Greek authors from centuries ago have been? Obviously, his young students in rhetoric could learn much from the compositional strategies and stylistic virtues displayed by these Greek literary heroes. However, this does not sufficiently explain the often aesthetic,

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[38] Wallace-Hadrill (2008). See Gosden (2004) for the idea that cultural elements in colonialist circumstances can exist alongside each other.

[39] Wallace-Hadrill (2008), 23. Wallace-Hadrill's idea of coexisting cultural elements is sustained by the concepts of 'bilingualism' and 'code-switching', which imply that Greeks and Romans could easily switch from the Greek to the Latin language and from Greek to Latin dress and behaviour. For the idea of Augustan culture as a time of transition and experimentation which had many contributors and was far from monolithic, see the important work of Galinski (1996).

sometimes archaizing literary choices Dionysius makes in order to prepare his students for Roman rhetorical practice.

Why, then, do Dionysius' choices seem to be dictated by the intrinsic beauty of Greek literature even more than by the principle of practical usefulness? We should consider the suggestion that he may well have been concerned with a *revival* of the splendid literature of classical Greece, in order to strengthen the identity of Greeks in Rome, and to help Rome's restoration of the Attic Muse come to full fruition both in Greek and Latin literature.[40] By contrast, Quintilian, who seems to enter into a dialogue with mimetic theories and ideas that were also known to Dionysius, admires Greek literature, but merely considers it a rich reservoir to provide the Romans with the essential means to establish literary domination over Greece. Thus, while drawing from and contributing to a shared discourse, Dionysius and Quintilian seem not to compromise their own cultural identities. The present dissertation explores this idea.

1.5 STRUCTURE, CONTENT AND METHODS

The twofold, central question of this dissertation is how the theories of imitation and emulation expressed by Dionysius, Quintilian and other Greek and Latin critics are interconnected, and how the similarities and divergences between their theories can be explained. The following chapters of this dissertation will all contribute to an answer to this question. In this section, I will briefly set out the structure of this book, the content of the different chapters, and the research methods applied.

Chapter 2 ('Dionysius and Quintilian on Imitation and Emulation') is based on linguistic and contextual analysis. This chapter will provide an answer to the question how Dionysius interconnects and applies the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος throughout his works, and how Quintilian interconnects and applies the notions of *imitatio* and *aemulatio* throughout his *Institutio*. It argues that whereas the similarities between their use and interpretation of mimetic terminology point to a similar framework of imitation, the remarkable differences derive from their cultural stance towards the literary legacy of classical Greece.

A side note should be made here. The mimetic terminology in Dionysius and Quintilian (chapter 2) is discussed separately from the mimetic theory in Dionysius' *On Imitation* (chapter 3) and Quintilian's *Institutio* 10 (chapter 4). There are two important and

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[40] For the idea of Augustan Rome as the revival of classical Athens, see esp. Hidber (1996), 75-81; Wiater (2011), 60-119. For Dionysius' reference to the restoration of the Attic Muse in Rome, see *Orat. Vett.* 2.1.

compelling reasons for this distinction between terminology and theory. In the first place, mimetic terminology in Dionysius and Quintilian is of such comprehensiveness that it covers an entire chapter, and of such elementary interest that it needs to be addressed at the beginning of this dissertation. Secondly, a separate, comparative discussion of Dionysius' and Quintilian's mimetic terminology allows us to see the similarities and contrasts between their definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος and *imitatio* and *aemulatio* more clearly.[41]

In chapter 3 ('Dionysius' *On Imitation* and his Reading List of Greek Literature'), the research methods applied comprise close reading and qualitative and quantitative analysis. This chapter studies the themes and criteria for successful imitation that can be distilled and reconstructed from the fragments of *On Imitation*, an extensive quote from it in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*, and the epitome of the second book of *On Imitation*. By providing a thorough analysis of this intriguing textual evidence, which has not been scrutinised on this scale before, this chapter explains the aesthetic (and sometimes archaizing) gist of Dionysius' mimetic ideas in relation to his proclamation of offering practical advice. It establishes that Dionysius' conspicuous insistence on virtues pertaining to magnificence and beauty is counterbalanced by his cogent plea for more practical literary qualities related to e.g. clarity.

Chapter 4 ('From Dionysius to Quintilian. Quintilian's Reading Lists of Greek and Latin Literature') is based on close reading and qualitative, quantitative and comparative analysis. This chapter describes the structure, aims, choices and evaluations of authors, selection criteria and use of literary virtues in Quintilian's canons of Greek and Latin literature in comparison with Dionysius' reading list. It argues that although Quintilian has much in common with Dionysius, his choices of and judgements passed on authors are also clear reflections of a different rhetorical agenda, which essentially serves his aspiration to make the Romans worthy heirs and skilled adaptators of the sublime literary treasures of classical Greece.

In chapter 5 ('Greek and Roman Theories on Imitation in the First Century AD'), the research methods of close reading and comparative case study analysis are applied. This chapter sets out to examine the terminology and theories of imitation in Aelius Theon's

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[41] Inherent to the choice for this structure is that Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti, which contains two intriguing definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος, is discussed both in chapters 2 and (much more briefly) 3, but from a different angle. In chapter 2, fr. III U-R is examined from a terminological point of view. Chapter 3 focuses on the fragment's thematic connections with the other remnants of *On Imitation*. This difference in approach will also be noticed at the beginning of section 2.2.1.

Progymnasmata, Seneca's *Letter to Lucilius* 84, Longinus' *On the Sublime*, various letters of Pliny, Tacitus' *Dialogue on Oratory*, and Dio Chrysostom's *Oration* 18, and as such offers a variegated background for the discussions of the terminology and theories of imitation in Dionysius and Quintilian. This chapter establishes that there are several crosslinks between all of these Greek and Roman critics, not only on the level of mimetic terminology and imagery, but also in the ways in which they address the tension between literary beauty and practical usefulness in their reflections on (rhetorical) imitation. These crosslinks point to a shared, Graeco-Roman discourse.

CHAPTER 2

DIONYSIUS AND QUINTILIAN ON IMITATION AND EMULATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the introduction to the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, an anecdote derived from the life of Zeuxis relates how this painter carefully observed various Crotonian girls, and creatively rendered their most valuable features in a new composition. The story insists on 'imitation' (μίμησις) as a highly artificial process, consisting of intensive study, the critical selection of the best features of different models, and the eclectic and original composition of a new piece of art, as we have seen in the introductory chapter.

The Zeuxis narrative also encapsulates the idea that imitation is not only about studying, following and reproducing what has been made before; it also comprises the competitive desire for creating a new piece of art that *excels* its models in beauty of style and content. These two related aspects of mimetic composition – imitation and emulation, i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος – are clearly recognizable in the Zeuxis story. In this chapter, the connections between the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος and their Latin counterparts *imitatio* and *aemulatio* will be further explored on the basis of the theories of Dionysius and Quintilian.

In Dionysius' thinking, the terms μίμησις and ζῆλος turn out to be inextricably linked and, as such, constitute two essential and complementary parts of one and the same process of imitation, as Russell has rightly observed: '[…] it is important to remember that both [i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος, M.S.] are means to the same end; they are not exclusive, they complement each other […]'.[1] As μίμησις and ζῆλος are complementary to Dionysius, so are *imitatio* and *aemulatio* to Quintilian:

> *[…] nihil autem crescit sola imitatione. Quod si prioribus adicere fas non est, quo modo sperare possumus illum oratorem perfectum? Cum in iis quos maximos adhuc novimus nemo sit inventus in quo nihil aut desideretur aut reprehendatur. Sed etiam qui summa non adpetent, contendere potius quam sequi debent. Nam qui hoc agit, ut*

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[1] Russell (1979), 10. Cf. Goudriaan (1989), 220-221: 'We moeten μίμησις en ζῆλος dus beschouwen als twee aspecten van een en dezelfde zaak […]'; Cizek (1994), 19: '[…] wobei die dialektische Komplementarität dieser zwei Prozesse [i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος, M.S.] offensichtlich ist'.

prior sit, forsitan, etiam si non transierit, aequabit. Eum vero nemo potest aequare cuius vestigiis sibi utique insistendum putat: necesse est enim semper sit posterior qui sequitur.[2]

> And nothing does grow by imitation alone. But if we are not allowed to add to previous achievements, how can we hope for our ideal orator? Of the greatest orators known up to the present, nobody can be found in whom nothing is deficient or objectionable. But even those who do not aim for the top have an obligation to compete and not lag behind. For the man who tries to win a race may perhaps draw level, even if he does not get into the lead. However, no one can draw level with a man in whose footsteps he feels bound to tread: the follower is inevitably always behind.

Judging from these passages, for both Dionysius and Quintilian, there is an evident, complementary connection between imitation and emulation, but it is also clear that they conceive of this complementary connection in different ways. The Zeuxis story suggests that μίμησις and ζῆλος are of equal value, and merge within the process of imitation.[3] The passage from Quintilian's *Institutio*, however, shows a considerable gap between *imitatio* on the one hand – which is described in pejorative terms of *sequi* and *vestigiis insistendum* –, and *aemulatio* on the other hand – which is described in terms of *adicere*, *contendere*, and *aequare*.

Apparently, μίμησις and ζῆλος do not mean the same to Dionysius as *imitatio* and *aemulatio* to Quintilian. The present chapter focuses on the semantic value and connotations of mimetic terminology in Dionysius' and Quintilian's theories.[4] What do the terms μίμησις

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[2] Quint. 10.2.8-10. Quintilian is even of the opinion that it 'is a disgrace to be content merely to attain the effect you are imitating' (*turpe [...] illud est, contentum esse id consequi quod imiteris*) (10.2.7).

[3] As stated in section 1.2, I will use the term 'imitation' both in a broad sense (referring to imitation and emulation together, as it does here) and, in terminological discussions, in a narrow sense (referring to μίμησις/*imitatio*, as opposed to ζῆλος/*aemulatio*).

[4] Basic meanings of mimetic terminology in earlier Greek and Latin literature underlie this discussion. In LSJ s.v., μίμησις is described as a rather neutral term, which refers to both the mimetic process and the mimetic result, meaning 'imitation', 'reproduction of a model', or 'representation by means of art', 'representation', 'portrait'. According to LSJ, the term ζῆλος can be used both in a bad and a good sense. It can denote 'jealousy' or, more often used in a good sense, 'eager rivalry', 'emulation'. Other possible translations for ζῆλος are 'zeal' for one or something, 'fervour' and 'indignation'. The Latin terms *imitatio* and *aemulatio* are described in rather comparable ways in *OLD* s.v. *Imitatio* means 'the action of imitating an example', 'the action of producing a copy or imitation, mimicking', or 'the result of imitating, a copy, counterfeit, imitation'. *Aemulatio* can, like

and ζῆλος, as well as *imitatio* and *aemulatio* refer to when appearing in overt opposition, and how should they be interpreted when used alternately or separately from each other? In what ways does Quintilian's use of mimetic terminology differ from Dionysius', and how can such divergences be explained? These central questions, which have not been asked before, build on a more general scholarly discussion on the ancient concept of imitation. Within this dissertation, they prepare for the analysis of mimetic theories underlying Dionysius' (chapter 3) and Quintilian's (chapter 4) reading lists, as well as for the broader discussion of Greek and Latin terminology and theories of imitation in the first century AD (chapter 5).[5]

The terminology of imitation in antiquity has been analysed by various scholars. In his essay *De Imitatione*, Russell offers a clear, introductory survey of the ancient notions of imitation and emulation, both in Latin and Greek literature.[6] With regard to Greek mimetic terminology, Koller's work *Die Mimesis in der Antike* is very useful. Koller argues that μίμησις, often rendered as 'imitation' or 'representation', is originally an actional and performative term, rooted in the music, dance and speech of Greek drama.[7] In her study *Der Mimesisbegriff in der griechischen Antike*, Kardaun examines the meaning of μίμησις within

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ζῆλος, be either good or bad. In a good sense, it pertains to a 'desire to equal or excel others, emulation, ambition'. In a bad sense, it means 'unfriendly rivalry, envious emulation'. Used in a conative way, *aemulatio* pertains to the 'attempt to imitate (a person) or reproduce (a thing), imitation'. L&S s.v. offer as possible translations for *imitatio* 'imitation', 'the faculty of imitation', 'imitation of an orator' and 'imitation of a natural sound, onomatopoeia'. *Aemulatio* is defined as 'an assiduous striving to equal or excel another in any thing', 'emulation' or (in a bad sense) 'jealousy, envy, malevolence'. Interestingly, L&S describe *aemulatio* as a term denoting 'rather the mental effort, while *imitatio* regards more the mode of action'. This observation seems to be applicable also to the meanings of the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος offered by LSJ: whereas μίμησις pertains rather to the process and result of actual creation, ζῆλος is connotated with mental activity. Another correspondence between the Greek and Latin mimetic terminology is that μίμησις and *imitatio* are often used as rather neutral, objective or descriptive terms, devoid of a specific positive or negative connotation. By contrast, ζῆλος and *aemulatio* are more subjective, evaluative notions, which are prone to become either positively or negatively charged. As we will see in the following sections, both Dionysius' use of μίμησις and ζῆλος and Quintilian's use of *imitatio* and *aemulatio* may be said to fit into this general picture. However, Dionysius and Quintilian also differ on important aspects of imitation and emulation.

[5] In section 1.5, I explain the separation between the discussions of terminology and theories of imitation in Dionysius and Quintilian.

[6] Russell (1979).

[7] Koller (1954).

and outside Plato's dialogues.[8] She argues that, although we need different translations to do justice to the value of μίμησις, the idea of μίμησις as a polysemic term is not sustainable. Instead, μίμησις always covers what she defines as a 'representation through images'.[9]

As for Latin mimetic terminology, Reiff has made interesting observations in his dissertation *Interpretatio, Imitatio, Aemulatio. Begriff und Vorstellung literarischer Abhängigkeit bei den Römern*.[10] Following Heinze, he distinguishes and demonstrates different forms of Roman literary dependence: *interpretatio* ('Übersetzung'), *imitatio* ('Entlehnung von Form und Stofflichem'), and *aemulatio* ('Selbständigkeit freier Schöpfung').[11]

Other publications focus not so much on the terminology of imitation, as on the history and range of the concept. Of an unprecedented scope is the study *The Aesthetics of Mimesis* by Halliwell, in which he analyses the treatments of imitation by Plato and Aristotle against the background of the history of imitation as a variable and complex concept of the representational arts.[12] In his book *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire. The Politics of Imitation*, Whitmarsh, whose focus is on the Second Sophistic, explores a range of responses to tradition by focusing on the concepts of μίμησις and παιδεία in authors such as Dionysius, Longinus and Plutarch.[13]

Specific research on mimetic terminology in Dionysius has also been carried out. In the introduction to her commentary on Dionysius' *On Imitation*, Battisti concentrates on Dionysius' ideas on imitation, but does not elaborate on the connotations of and connections between μίμησις and ζῆλος.[14] In a thorough study on classicism in Dionysius' works, Goudriaan devotes an entire chapter to the range of nuances that the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος can have.[15] Goudriaan establishes that in Dionysius' works, μίμησις (and ζῆλος) is operating at different levels of reality, but he does not always (explicitly) distinguish between

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[8] Kardaun (1993). For a useful overview of scholarly research into the notion of μίμησις, see Kardaun (1993), 10-18.

[9] Kardaun (1993), 70.

[10] Reiff (1959).

[11] Reiff (1959), 7. For a tripartite division of imitative practice, cf. also Cizek (1994).

[12] Halliwell (2002). Halliwell also pays attention to Dionysius' conception of μίμησις (*ibid.*, 292-296), and notices a tension between μίμησις as a 'stylized fabrication' and as a 'possible means of depicting and conveying truth or nature' (*ibid.*, 295).

[13] Whitmarsh (2001).

[14] Battisti (1997).

[15] Goudriaan (1989), 220-245.

the terms.[16] Cizek also pays attention to Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος, arguing that μίμησις 'erscheint als ein passiv-rezeptives Moment', whereas ζῆλος points to 'ein dynamisches Moment, nämlich auf das Streben der Seele nach Selbsterhöhung durch Nach- bzw. Wetteifern mit dem gegebenen Vorbild'.[17]

Concerning the general ideas on imitation which are put forward in Quintilian's *Institutio*, Fantham has made some interesting remarks.[18] She discusses Quintilian's account on imitation in *Institutio* 10.2 from the perspective of the reputed first-century Roman rhetorical decline, arguing that imitation as such was not a symptom nor a cause of this decline, as it had been encouraged by the best ancient teachers – from Cicero to Quintilian.[19]

Regarding the concepts of imitation and emulation in Quintilian, Cizek observes that Quintilian prefers *aemulatio* (which he calls 'wetteifernde *imitatio*') over *imitatio*.[20] However, a profound discussion of mimetic vocabulary in Quintilian does not, to my knowledge, exist. Thus, the present chapter differs from and contributes to existing studies in that it analyses and compares Greek and Latin mimetic terminology in Dionysius and Quintilian.

By exploring the range of connotations that μίμησις and ζῆλος, as well as *imitatio* and *aemulatio* can have, this chapter establishes that Dionysius and Quintilian preponderantly conceive of the connections between μίμησις-ζῆλος/*imitatio-aemulatio* in different ways. Whereas Dionysius suggests that μίμησις and ζῆλος ideally always form a homogeneous pair in the process of imitation, Quintilian thinks *imitatio* and *aemulatio* should successively cover the whole life of the rhetorician – with *imitatio* gradually fading away as the orator has grown older and wiser.

In fact, when attested separately from ζῆλος, the notion of μίμησις in Dionysius also implies ζῆλος. It is also the other way round: when attested separately from μίμησις, ζῆλος also implies μίμησις. In such cases, the terms on their own highlight different aspects of one and the same process of imitation. To Quintilian, on the other hand, *imitatio* and *aemulatio* are more clearly separated. When one of the terms in mentioned, the meaning of the other term is,

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[16] Goudriaan (1989), 229. For literature on the general concept of μίμησις in Dionysius, see section 1.1, n. 10.

[17] Cizek (1994), 19. I agree with Cizek that the term ζῆλος is highly dynamic (although I argue it implies a process rather than a moment), but I will object to the view that μίμησις implies mere passiveness and receptivity.

[18] In his commentary on *Institutio* 10, also Peterson (1891), 122-135 makes several observations on imitation in Quintilian.

[19] Fantham (1978), 111-116.

[20] Cizek (1994), 19-20.

in most cases, not implied. We could say that the terms *imitatio* and *aemulatio* do not refer to different aspects of the same process of imitation, but to different, independent kinds of imitation, which run parallel to the orator's development.

Moreover, this chapter establishes that Dionysius and Quintilian agree, but also differ on important points in their interpretations of the concepts of μίμησις-ζῆλος/*imitatio-aemulatio*. As for μίμησις/*imitatio*, it will be argued that both critics understand this notion as a technical device for creating uniformity with models, and that both are of the opinion that μίμησις/*imitatio* is the most current and suitable term for indicating or emphasising the vertical, unequal relationship between model and imitator. Such similarities point to a shared framework of imitation. However, whereas Dionysius interprets μίμησις as a positive 're-expression' of the model and considers it to be of equal value as ζῆλος, Quintilian suggests that *imitatio* merely involves didactic 'repetition' and is, though complementarily indispensable, inferior to *aemulatio*.

Concerning ζῆλος/*aemulatio*, it will be argued that Dionysius regards ζῆλος as an – either positively or negatively motivated – aspiration of the mind to grasp the beauty of the model or to (try to) compete with it, whereas Quintilian considers *aemulatio* a highly recommended, competitive strategy, based on the idea of changing, completing and surpassing the model. These essential divergences will be explained by taking Dionysius' and Quintilian's different cultural backgrounds into account.

The first part of this chapter is dedicated to Dionysius' interpretation and use of the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος (2.2). The second part is concerned with Quintilian's understanding and use of the notions of *imitatio* and *aemulatio* (2.3), and followed by a conclusion (2.4).

2.2 DIONYSIUS' USE OF MIMETIC TERMINOLOGY

In his rhetorical treatises on the works of classical Greek authors, Dionysius' aim is often to demonstrate which of their stylistic features should be imitated and which avoided. Thus, Dionysius' mimetic ideas underly and give subtantial shape to his critical analyses. Although his mimetic theory often remains below the surface of evaluative discussions, Dionysius also explicitly reflects on the notion of imitation. One of his treatises, *On Imitation*, was entirely devoted to the subject, but also in his essay *On Dinarchus*, Dionysius approaches the concept of imitation in a rather systemetic way.

Chapter 3 deals with the publication, history and content of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*, and tries to explain from its remaining parts how Dionysius makes the concept of imitation subservient to his own rhetorical agenda. The present section has a preparatory function, focusing on Dionysius' use of mimetic terminology throughout his critical essays. It discusses Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος as preserved by Syrianus (2.2.1), Dionysius' differentation between artificial and natural μίμησις in *On Dinarchus* (2.2.2), his use of μίμησις and ζῆλος as closely related concepts (2.2.3), the uses and connotations of μίμησις (2.2.4) and of ζῆλος (2.2.5).

2.2.1 DEFINITIONS OF ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ AND ΖΗΛΟΣ

Apart from the epitome of book 2 of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, a few fragments of book 1 and 2 are preserved. One of the fragments of book 1 in particular is crucial for a better understanding of the terminology of imitation and emulation in Dionysius, and will be discussed in this section; two other fragments of book 1 will only briefly be referred to. I will return to these three fragments in section 3.3.1, in which all remnants of Dionysius' *On Imitation* are closely and coherently examined from a more general, theoretical point of view, focusing on recurring themes and stylistic peculiarities.

According to Usener-Radermacher, whose numbering system of fragments I adopt, there are five remaining fragments which reputedly formed part of the first book, but only three of them are introduced by an explicit reference to the treatise. These three fragments are included in Syrianus' commentaries on Hermogenes' *On Issues* (fr. II U-R) and *On Types of Style* (frs. III and V U-R).[21] Fragment III U-R is of special interest, since it contains two concise definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος attributed to Dionysius.

Syrianus refers to these definitions when commenting on a passage from the introduction of Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*. In this introduction, Hermogenes announces the subject of his treatise, i.e. 'types of style' (ἰδέαι), and stresses its importance for both critics and authors who wish to compose 'speeches close to the ones the ancients produced' (λόγων […] παραπλησίων τοῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων).[22] This urges him to elaborate some more on the

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[21] Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929). The fragments of *On Imitation* have been published by Usener (1889); some years later, they were published as part of Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) (= U-R). More on the numbering system and the fragments accepted in U-R, Aujac and Battisti in section 3.3.1. Fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. Fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti. Fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti.

[22] Hermog. *Id*. 1.1.7-9.

notions of imitation and emulation, both of which should, in his opinion, mainly be based on 'practice and correct training' (μελέτη καὶ τῇ κατ' ὀρθὸν ἀσκήσει), which allows 'those with less natural ability to overtake even those who are naturally talented' (καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεφυκότας οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι […] παρέλθοιεν):[23]

> Ἡ γάρτοι μίμησις καὶ ὁ ζῆλος ὁ πρὸς ἐκείνους μετὰ μὲν ἐμπειρίας ψιλῆς καί τινος ἀλόγου τριβῆς γινόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι δύναιτο τυγχάνειν τοῦ ὀρθοῦ, κἂν πάνυ τις ἔχῃ φύσεως εὖ· τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἴσως ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ σφάλλοι μᾶλλον τὰ τῆς φύσεως πλεονεκτήματα χωρὶς τέχνης τινὸς ἀλόγως ἄττοντα, πρὸς ὅ τι καὶ τύχοι· μετὰ μέντοι τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως ὅτε τις τοὺς ἀρχαίους ἐθέλοι ζηλοῦν, κἂν μετρίως ἔχῃ φύσεως, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τοῦ σκοποῦ.[24]

> Indeed imitation and emulation of the ancients that depend upon mere experience and some irrational knack cannot, I think, produce what is correct, even if a person has a lot of natural ability. Natural abilities, without some training, dashing off without guidance at random, could in fact go particularly badly. But with a knowledge and understanding of this topic, when anyone wishes to emulate the ancients he would not fail even if he has only moderate ability.

In his commentary on *On Types of Style*, it was apparently a small step for Syrianus to associate (whether in opposition or in conjunction) this Hermogenean passage with the two definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος attributed to Dionysius, which Syrianus renders as follows:

> **Fr. III U-R:** Μίμησίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια διὰ τῶν θεωρημάτων ἐκματτομένη τὸ παράδειγμα. Ζῆλος δέ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς πρὸς θαῦμα τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἶναι καλοῦ κινουμένη.[25]

> Imitation is an activity that moulds the model in accordance with the rules of art. Emulation is an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful.

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[23] Hermog. *Id*. 1.1.23-25.

[24] Hermog. *Id*. 1.1.11-19.

[25] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. III U-R (= 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti). Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog. De Formis* [265, 15], p. 3, 15-21. This fragment is also briefly discussed in section 3.3.1.

When we rely on this fragment alone, which is devoid of any information about its precise place in *On Imitation*, we can only guess as to how Dionysius estimated the value of and relationship between μίμησις and ζῆλος. However, the repetition of the noun ἐνέργεια seems suggestive of a close connection between the two notions, and encourages us to infer that Dionysius regarded both μίμησις, which is associated with technical-creative practice, and ζῆλος, which is associated with mental effort and natural susceptibility, as complementary imitative activities – whatever weight he assigned to each of them.

There is, however, another reason to suppose that imitation and emulation should be considered complementary. When we compare the introductory story and moral of *On Imitation* starring the ugly farmer (see chapter 1), we observe the same apparent antagonisms, not only of bodily creation and mental effort, but also of the teaching of strict rules (cf. ἐδίδαξε τέχνην) and the intuitive reliance on 'what seems to be better in each of the ancients' (τὸ παρ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν παλαιῶν βέλτιον εἶναι δοκοῦν).[26] In short, we discern 'the rational criterion' (τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον) and 'the irrational criterion' (τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον) which should go hand in hand.[27]

A complementary relationship between technical and natural abilities is also suggested in another fragment of the first book of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*, preserved in Syrianus' commentary on Hermogenes' *On Issues*. It says that excellence in public discourse, art and science can only be achieved by a combination of aspects belonging to nature and art: a 'ready nature' (φύσις δεξιά), 'careful study' (μάθησις ἀκριβής) and 'laborious exercise' (ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος).[28]

In his article on gendered aesthetics in Greek theory and fiction, Whitmarsh observes that Dionysius' mimetic theory is 'repeatedly imaged in terms of heterosexual erotics'.[29] He considers Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος as 'programmatic' of Dionysius' eroticised presentation of imitation, and translates them as follows:

> *Mimêsis* is an activity of receiving the impression of the model, through theorems…
> *Zêlos* is an activity of the soul when it is stirred to wonder at what seems to be beautiful.

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[26] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.1-3.

[27] On Dionysius' theories of logical and irrational evaluation of literature, see e.g. Schenkeveld (1975); Damon (1991).

[28] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. II U-R (= 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti). This fragment is discussed in section 3.3.1.

[29] Whitmarsh (2013), 279.

The sentence on μίμησις is, according to Whitmarsh, presented in terms of (female) receptivity (cf. Whitmarsh' translation of ἐκματτομένη: 'receiving the impression of'), whereas the sentence on ζῆλος is striking for what Whitmarsh calls its 'phallic imagery'. He argues: 'not only does the idea of 'stirring' (κινουμένη) the soul into 'activity' (ἐνέργεια)' suggest tumescence, but also both roots can themselves carry an obscene, sexual sense'.[30] On the basis of these observations, Whitmarsh designates Dionysian μίμησις as 'hybridised between the genders, a hermaphroditic phenomenon', seeing also that in the case of both μίμησις and ζῆλος, 'the imitative activity is described using a passive, feminine participle'.[31]

Insofar as Dionysius' presentation of imitation as a gendered phenomenon is concerned, I agree with Whitmarsh.[32] As he points out, also Dionysius' stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis depict imitation as a mix of female and male forces.[33] However, I would propose a different reading of the middle voice participle ἐκματτομένη, which, in my opinion, does not have a passive semantic value, as Whitmarsh claims, but an active, transitive one.[34]

According to LSJ, the active verb 'mould' or 'model' (ἐκμάττειν) has a rather similar meaning ('mould', 'express', 'imitate' + acc.) in the middle voice (ἐκμάττεσθαι).[35] Whitmarsh, who translates Dionysius' ἐκματτομένη τὸ παράδειγμα with 'receiving the impression of the model', apparently considers τὸ παράδειγμα an accusative of respect or cognate accusative, but this is very unlikely and devious.

I suggest that the middle participle ἐκματτομένη has an active, transitive value – interpreting τὸ παράδειγμα as a direct object. Furthermore, I suppose that Dionysius' choice for the middle voice – as opposed to the active voice – is an indicator of subject-affectedness. As Rutger Allan observes, the middle voice can be used in an indirect-reflexive way, and as such 'involves transitive events performed by a volitional subject (an agent). […] the subject has the semantic role of beneficiary'.[36]

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[30] Whitmarsh (2013), *ibid*. Strictly speaking, there is no 'stirring of the soul', since the participle κινουμένη is congruent with ἐνέργεια.

[31] Whitmarsh (2013), 280.

[32] I do so only on the basis of Dionysius' stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis; not on the basis of Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος.

[33] Whitmarsh (2013), 282-286. For the stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis, see section 1.1-3.

[34] Cf. Goudriaan (1989), 218, who also reads the verb in an active sense: 'μίμησις is een activiteit die […] het voorbeeld uitbeeldt'.

[35] Cf. LSJ s.v.

[36] Allan (2003), 112.

The subject-affectedness-highlighting value of the middle voice ἐκματτομένη fits well into Dionysius' conception of imitation, which centers around mental influence by and personal engagement with original literature.[37] Taking this into consideration, the transitive middle ἐκμάττεσθαι used by Dionysius can be translated as 'express (a model) by oneself' or 'express (a model) in oneself/in one's own style'.

In Dionysius' works, the verb 'mould' is only attested in the middle voice, and denotes the process of active, imitative 'kneading'.[38] The verb is always accompanied by a direct object, which in all cases refers to the original model or style. Dionysius, for instance, applies the verb in his treatise *On Demosthenes*, describing a speech by Demosthenes which is fashioned in the Lysianic style: ὁ […] λόγος […] ὅλος ἐστὶν ἀκριβὴς καὶ λεπτὸς καὶ τὸν Λυσιακὸν χαρακτῆρα ἐκμέμακται εἰς ὄνυχα ('the speech is precise and refined throughout and expresses the Lysianic style in every detail').[39]

In the *Ars Rhetorica*, which is a compilation of texts falsely attributed to Dionysius, we find the active participle ἐκμάττων in a rather confusing definition of μίμησις. Here, the direct object of the process of kneading is not the original model, but (a characteristic of) the imitative result:

Καὶ πᾶσα μίμησις ὧδε ἔχει· τέχνης ζῆλος ἐκμάττων ἐνθυμημάτων ὁμοιότητα.[40]

All imitation is as follows: it is the emulation of technical skill, which expresses a likeness of thoughts.

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[37] Cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.2-3.

[38] In the spurious *Ars Rhet*., however, we find the active participle ἐκμάττων. See below.

[39] Dion. Hal. *Dem*. 13.6. The reference is to Demosthenes' *Or*. 7, now often considered spurious. Cf. also *Pomp*. 5.3: τῆς δὲ λέξεως ᾗ Θουκυδίδης κέχρηται τὸ μὲν σημειῶδες καὶ περίεργον πέφευγεν, τὸ δὲ στρογγύλον καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἐνθυμηματικὸν ἐκμέμακται ('of Thucydides' style, he [i.e. Philistus, M.S.] has avoided the peculiarity and elaboration, and he has expressed its qualities of terseness, sharpness and systematic argument in his own style'); *Comp*. 25.2: ἄρξομαι δὲ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῆς ψιλῆς λέξεως, ἕνα τῶν ἀνδρῶν προχειρισάμενος ὃν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα οἶμαι τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐκμεμάχθαι φράσιν ('I shall begin with the language of prose, selecting an author who has, I think, most clearly expressed poetic diction in his own style'). For an overview of the verb ἐκμάττεσθαι in Dionysius' works, cf. Greilich (1886), 15-19, who also lists other instances of the verb in Greek literature. Greilich notices: '*metaphoricus verbi sensus est imitando exprimendi vel formandi* […]' (*ibid*., 16). For ἐκμάττειν to denote imitation (of people), cf. also Pl. *Resp*. 396d.

[40] *Ars Rhet*. 10.19.9-10. More on this definition of μίμησις in *Ars Rhet*. in n. 65.

On this basis, I suggest that Dionysius conceives of μίμησις not as an act of receptivity, but as one that actively expresses the model in a different stylistic idiom.

Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος confront us with several syntactical and lexical oddities. In the first place, it is worth noting that μίμησις and ζῆλος are described in a rather stiff and unnatural way, with the participles ἐκματτομένη and κινουμένη not congruent with an acting person, but with an 'activity' (ἐνέργεια), which is 'moulding' and 'being moved'. An emendation of κινουμένη into κινουμένης would perhaps make more sense, as the soul rather than an activity is a candidate for 'being moved'. However, the analogy in construction between the two definitions (i.e. a participle congruent with ἐνέργεια) invites us to leave the text unchanged.

Secondly, the noun ἐνέργεια, which should not be confused with ἐνάργεια ('vividness' or 'visual immediacy'), appears, apart from the fragment cited above, only four times in the corpus of Dionysius' critical works, which makes its inclusion in this fragment remarkable.[41] Like ἐνάργεια, ἐνέργεια is an Aristotelian concept, which generally refers to the final stage of a process of transformation. Aristotle distinguishes different types of ἐνέργεια, one of which is defined as 'movement' (κίνησις) in the treatise *On the Soul*.[42] Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος as an 'activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder' thus seems to be highly indebted to Aristotelian terminology.

In the context of Syrianus' commentary, the noun ἐνέργεια, although used rarely by Dionysius, does not seem to be out of tune. After having quoted Dionysius' definition of

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[41] The term ἐνέργεια in Dionysius' works can refer to (endless) labour or creative, technical production. In *Comp*. 20.14, ἐνέργεια pertains to the labour of Sisyphus. In *Comp*. 25.38, arts are discussed whose purpose is a form of 'activity' (ἐνέργεια) or 'production' (ποίησις). This use of ἐνέργεια is explicitly related to τέχναι. In *Pomp*. 1.7, Dionysius argues that only his critical method of comparison between authors can reveal their individual quality, and that this is true of all things manufactured, and 'of which activity (ἐνέργεια) is the aim'. Also in this passage, ἐνέργεια relates to technical production. It should be noted that Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) and Aujac (1992) read ἐνέργεια here, whereas Usher (1985) has ἐνάργεια. In *Imit*. 5.5, where Aeschines' style is characterised, Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) have ἐνεργής ('active'), whereas Aujac (1992) reads ἐναργής ('vivid'). (In *Amm. I* 11.5, the verb ἐνεργεῖν occurs in a quote from Philochorus' *Atthis*). For a definition of the frequently occuring stylistic virtue ἐνάργεια, see Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 7.1. For literature on the concept of ἐνάργεια, see e.g. Zanker (1981); Otto (2009); Webb (2009), 87-106 (esp. on *evidentia* in Quintilian); Plett (2012) (and extensive bibliography); Allan, De Jong & De Jonge (2017). Cf. section 3.6.1, n. 214.

[42] E.g. Arist. 1.5, *De an*. 417a16: καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις ('for movement is a form of activity') (tr. Hett 1936). Although Aristotle considers κίνησις a kind of ἐνέργεια, he overtly distinguishes between them. On Aristotle's distinction between the terms, see esp. Hagen (1984).

μίμησις and before moving on to his definition of ζῆλος, Syrianus reminds his readers of how Dionysius' successors considered μίμησις. They were of the opinion that imitation involved a 'discourse' (λόγος) or 'action' (πρᾶξις) – and it is this πρᾶξις which comes very close to Dionysius' use of the word ἐνέργεια:

Ὡς δὲ οἱ μεταγενέστεροι λέγουσιν, λόγος ἢ πρᾶξις ὁμοίωσιν εὖ ἔχουσαν τοῦ παραδείγματος περιέχουσα.[43]

But his successors argue it [i.e. imitation, M.S.] is a discourse or action which provides a successful likeness to the model.

Finally, the interpretation of the preposition πρός in the definition of ζῆλος is puzzling. In combination with an accusative, πρός in the vicinity of verbs of motion expresses 'motion or direction towards an object'. In this fragment, however, we may be inclined to think that it would make more sense to interpret πρός in an instrumental way, assuming that 'the activity of the soul' (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς) is moved 'by wonder' rather than 'towards wonder'. This is obviously the opinion of Aujac, who translates the definition of ζῆλος as follows: 'L'émulation est l'élan actif de l'âme, mis en mouvement par l'admiration de ce qui lui paraît beau'.[44]

However, I would like to suggest that an interpretation of πρός as an indicator of direction (i.e. allative πρός) is well tenable, and even more acceptable. Here I side with Battisti, who translates Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος as follows: 'L'emulazione e la spinta dell'anima mossa all' [= πρός, M.S.] ammirazione'.[45] In this interpretation, 'wonder' (θαῦμα) is not an auxiliary for ζῆλος, but instead the ultimate goal of successful, emulative composition.[46] In the first place, considering the fact that ζῆλος is a highly dynamic concept (i.e. ἐνέργεια), it is plausible to expect πρός to be used in an allative way. Secondly, Dionysius' perception of ζῆλος as a mental activity which is 'moved towards wonder' parallels Longinus' presentation of μίμησις and ζήλωσις.[47] Longinus considers these concepts,

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[43] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. III U-R (= 2 Aujac; sentence left out by Battisti). Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog. De Formis* [265, 15], p. 3, 18-20.

[44] Aujac (1992), 27. *TLG* offers no instances of the combination πρὸς θαῦμα in other Greek literature.

[45] Battisti (1997), 57. Cf. also Goudriaan (1989), 218: 'ζῆλος is een zielsactiviteit gericht op [= πρός, M.S.] bewondering van datgene wat edel lijkt'.

[46] Admittedly, in this interpretation, we would expect κινοῦσα rather than κινουμένη.

[47] More on ζήλωσις as a fairly rare derivative of ζῆλος in section 5.4.

which are apparenty closely intertwined, as 'an additional way' (ἄλλη τις […] ὁδός) leading to 'the sublime' (τὸ ὕψος):

Ἐνδείκνυται δ' ἡμῖν οὗτος ἀνήρ, εἰ βουλοίμεθα μὴ κατολιγωρεῖν, ὡς καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ τείνει. Ποία δὲ καὶ τίς αὕτη; Τῶν ἔμπροσθεν μεγάλων συγγραφέων καὶ ποιητῶν μίμησίς τε καὶ ζήλωσις.[48]

Here is an author [i.e. Plato, M.S.] who shows us, if we choose not to ignore it, that there is another road, besides those we have mentioned, which leads to sublimity. What and what manner of road is this? Imitation and emulation of the great prose writers and poets of the past.

The impact of the sublime is described in terms of mental rapture, ecstasy, enchantment and wonder.[49] For Longinus, 'wonder' (θαῦμα) is one of the most important notions suited to describe what the sublime can accomplish.[50] Since μίμησις and ζήλωσις are, in his opinion, a way towards sublimity, these notions can also be regarded as leading to θαῦμα. Thus, both Dionysius and Longinus seem to apply the terminology of sublimity and wonder to measure the scope and direction of imitation.[51] There are, however, important differences between them.

Whereas Longinus presents both μίμησις and ζήλωσις as an upward movement of the soul towards the model, μίμησις and ζῆλος are clearly distinguished by Dionysius. In

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[48] Longin. *Subl*. 13.2. This passage is also discussed in section 5.4.

[49] These sensations can be experienced both by the author (at the moment of composition) and the audience (at the moment of reading). For the inspired author, see e.g. Longin. *Subl*. 16.2: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καθάπερ ἐμπνευσθεὶς ἐξαίφνης ὑπὸ θεοῦ ('but when in a sudden moment of inspiration, as if possessed by the divine'). On the ecstatic audience, see e.g. Longin. *Subl*. 1.4: οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθὼ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ' εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ ('for the effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but to transport them out of themselves'). On the inspired author in Longinus, see further De Jonge (2012), 279-280; on the ecstatic audience, see *ibid*., 280-281.

[50] The word θαῦμα (with all (verbal and adjectival) derivatives) frequently turns up in Longinus. See e.g. Longin. *Subl*. 1.4: οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθὼ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ' εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ· πάντη δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν ἀεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ θαυμάσιον ('for the effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves. The combination of wonder and amazement always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing'); *Subl*. 30.1: ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἡ τῶν κυρίων καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκλογὴ θαυμαστῶς ἄγει καὶ κατακηλεῖ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ('how the choice of right and fine words leaves the audience in a state of wonder and enchants them').

[51] For the connections between the terminology of the sublime in Dionysius and Longinus, see De Jonge (2012).

Dionysius' thinking, ζῆλος involves an upward movement, while we are allowed to infer that μίμησις represents a countermovement from model to imitator.[52] After all, Dionysius applies the language of 'movement towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful' only in the case of ζῆλος; in the case of μίμησις, the model has come down to us, and is kneaded within and by our own hands.[53]

Moreover, Dionysius presents ζῆλος as an inner force which is moved *itself*, whereas Longinus states that μίμησις and ζήλωσις form a *route* along which we – authors and audience – can move upwards to sublimity. Thus, to Dionysius, ζῆλος is something very personal, something deeply anchored in the soul. Longinus, on the other hand, adopts a more dualistic view regarding ζήλωσις and our soul, since he images μίμησις and ζήλωσις as features of methodological nature.[54]

Notwithstanding the phraseological oddities and uncertainties of the fragment of Dionysius' *On Imitation* preserved by Syrianus, we can infer some important aspects of μίμησις and ζῆλος in Dionysius' thinking. He evidently distinguishes between the two terms. He conceives of μίμησις as an activity of merely technical reproduction. The orator is supposed to 'mould' (ἐκμάττεσθαι) his object (the verb being highly suggestive of the kinship between visual and literary arts) – i.e. to reshape the literary 'model' (τὸ παράδειγμα) and make it fit for new literary conditions.[55] This activity of 'moulding the model' is to be carried out on the basis of 'theoretical rules' (θεωρήματα).[56]

To Dionysius, the concept of emulation, ζῆλος, goes far beyond the faithful moulding of a model. It depends on 'an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful'. The language of motion and appearance used by Dionysius to designate ζῆλος is quite remarkable. Whereas μίμησις pertains to the reproductive kneading of the language material on the basis of prescriptions, ζῆλος on the other hand covers the dynamic process of the rapture of the soul caused by what 'seems to be beautiful', not by

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[52] Cf. Goudriaan (1989), 220; 227.

[53] For the movement from model to imitator, cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.2-3, where the idea of mental influence from original literature into the imitator's soul is expressed. For the metaphor of the stream, see section 1.3, n. 31.

[54] The image of the soul also plays an important role in the conceptualisations of the process of imitation by Aelius Theon (section 5.2) and Seneca (section 5.3).

[55] On the use of e.g. sculptural metaphors in the works of Dionysius, see Lockwood (1937), who offers a useful list of different kinds of metaphorical expressions. Cf. De Jonge (2008), 186 ff. for a discussion of architectural metaphors.

[56] For the sculptural language used to describe the process of imitation, see also section 5.2 on Aelius Theon.

'what is beautiful'. Judging from the entire text corpus of Dionysius, this connection between ζῆλος and 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν) is an evident one.[57]

2.2.2 NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ

For Dionysius' ideas on imitation, we can also turn to a passage in his essay *On Dinarchus*, in which the distinction is not between μίμησις and ζῆλος, but between natural and artificial μίμησις:

> Ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, δύο τρόπους τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς πρὸς τὰ ἀρχαῖα μιμήσεως εὕροι τις ἄν· ὧν ὁ μὲν φυσικός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκ πολλῆς κατηχήσεως καὶ συντροφίας λαμβανόμενος, ὁ δὲ τούτῳ προσεχὴς ἐκ τῶν τῆς τέχνης παραγγελμάτων. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ προτέρου, τί ἄν τις καὶ λέγοι; Περὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, τουτὶ ἂν ἔχοι τις εἰπεῖν ὅτι πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἀρχετύποις αὐτοφυής τις ἐπιτρέχει χάρις καὶ ὥρα, τοῖς δ' ἀπὸ τούτων κατεσκευασμένοις, κἂν ἐπ' ἄκρον μιμήσεως ἔλθωσι, πρόσεστίν τι ὅμως τὸ ἐπιτετηδευμένον καὶ οὐκ ἐκ φύσεως ὑπάρχον.[58]

> Generally speaking, two different forms of imitation can be found with regard to ancient models: one is natural, and is acquired by rehearsal and familiarity; the other is related to it, but is acquired by following the precepts of art. About the first, what more is there to say? And about the second, what is there to be said except that a certain spontaneous charm and freshness emanates from all the original models, whereas in the artificial copies, even if they attain the height of imitative skill, there is present nevertheless a certain element of contrivance and unnaturalness also?

In *On Dinarchus*, Dionysius applies the notion of μίμησις as a criterion for establishing the authenticity of literature.[59] He discusses two different forms of μίμησις in order to explain the failure of the orator Dinarchus, who 'is neither uniform in all his speeches nor the inventor of an individual style by which one can recognize him with accuracy' (οὔτε ὅμοιος ἐν ἅπασίν

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[57] See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 48.2; *Ant. Rom.* 2.18.2; 8.30.5 (*Ant. Rom.* = ed. Jacoby 1885-1905).

[58] Dion. Hal. *Din.* 7.5-7.

[59] Untersteiner (1971) devoted a study to this. Cf. also the thorough discussion of the function of μίμησις in *On Dinarchus* by Goudriaan (1989), 230-240. On the opposition between natural and artificial imitation in *Din.* 7, see esp. Goudriaan (1989), 236-239. For the connection between *Din.* 7 and *Imit.* fr. II U-R (= 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti), see section 3.3.1.

ἔστιν οὔτ' ἰδίου τινὸς εὑρετής, δι'οὗ γνώσεταί τις αὐτὸν ἀκριβῶς).[60] The passage has also been discussed by Wiater, who points out that Dionysius' 'unmistakable criterion by which to distinguish his [i.e. Dinarchus', M.S.] speeches from those of the original classical orators' is his lack of stylistic 'uniformity' (ὁμοείδεια). It is this uniformity which Dionysius presents as 'the most effective means of recognition' (μεγίστη γνῶσις) of the speeches of the orators whom Dinarchus imitates.[61]

The criterion of 'uniformity' (ὁμοείδεια) is two-sided. On the one hand, it concerns homogeneity within and individuality of a style, which evidently results from a balanced, imitative blending of a wide variety of models in a new, organic textual unity, and will not be achieved by the orator who, like Dinarchus, 'in some places […] shows a close resemblance to Lysias, in others to Hyperides, and in others to Demosthenes' (καὶ τοῖς Λυσίου παραπλήσιος ἔστιν ὅπου γίνεται καὶ τοῖς Ὑπερείδου καὶ τοῖς Δημοσθένους λόγοις).[62]

On the other hand, the notion of ὁμοείδεια expresses the idea of μίμησις which aims at uniformity with classical models – that means, at composing a speech which *is* classical instead of *appearing* so.[63] This aspect of the criterion of ὁμοείδεια in relation to models explicitly comes to the fore when Dionysius observes that Dinarchus unfortunately 'displays many examples of imitation and of difference from the original models of the speeches themselves' (πολὺ γὰρ ἐμφαίνει μιμήσεις τε καὶ αὐτῶν ὡς πρὸς τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀρχέτυπον διαφοράν).[64] The idea of uniformity with classical models is also crucial in the passage on natural and artificial μίμησις quoted above.[65]

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[60] Dion. Hal. *Din*. 6.5.

[61] Wiater (2011), 88. See Dion. Hal. *Din*. 6.2. Wiater rightly observes that this lack of stylistic uniformity is connected with the hybrid life of Dinarchus, who 'lived in both classical and non-classical times, began as a classical and ended as a non-classical orator, […] first supported democracy and then oligarchy' (*ibid*., 87).

[62] Dion. Hal. *Din*. 5.2. In *Din*. 1.1, Dionysius explains that he did not discuss Dinarchus in his writings on the ancient orators 'because he was neither the inventor of an individual style, as were Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus, nor the perfecter of styles which others had invented, as I judge Demosthenes, Aeschines and Hyperides to have been' (διὰ τὸ μήτε εὑρετὴν ἰδίου γεγονέναι χαρακτῆρος τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰσοκράτην καὶ τὸν Ἰσαῖον, μήτε τῶν εὑρημένων ἑτέροις τελειωτήν, ὥσπερ τὸν Δημοσθένη καὶ τὸν Αἰσχίνη καὶ <τὸν> Ὑπερείδην ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν).

[63] Cf. Wiater (2011), 89: '[…] Dinarchus' attempt to look classical, instead of *being* classical, betrays him as an epigone, an imitator. Dinarchus' heterogeneous life-and-style thus demonstrates *ex negativo* how historical continuity is to be achieved through homogeneity of style (ὁμοείδεια)'.

[64] Dion. Hal. *Din*. 6.5.

[65] The concept of μίμησις is also connected with the notion of uniformity in a passage from the tenth chapter of *Ars Rhet*., which is an anthology of different rhetorical texts, probably dating from the early second century AD

Judging from Dionysius' words, the original models, which have 'a spontaneous charm and freshness' (αὐτοφυής τις […] χάρις καὶ ὥρα), can be imitated in two different ways: naturally and artificially. It is important to note that Dionysius hastens to define artificial imitation as 'bordering' (προσεχής) upon natural imitation. Apparently, the two kinds of imitation are affiliated. Unlike natural imitation, however, artificial imitation is based on the precepts of art and therefore always gives the impression of contrivance and unnaturalness. In deviating from the original models, it is deprived from spontaneity and charm.

We may understand 'artificial imitation' in this context as one aspect of what Dionysius defines as μίμησις, i.e. the artificial 'moulding of the example'. I suggest that artificial imitation is certainly not a deprecatory form of μίμησις, as Untersteiner posits, but one of its essential aspects, which needs to be supplemented by something adjacent: natural

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and falsely attributed to Dionysius. On the date and authorship of the chapters 8-11, see Heath (2003), 81, who argues that 'the *Art of Rhetoric* attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus is not by Dionysius and is not an art of rhetoric. It is a disparate assemblage of essays on a variety of rhetorical themes rather than a systematic treatise, and it contains the work of more than one rhetorician'. The passage in question (10.19.3-10) contains a definition of what Dionysius thinks μίμησις is and is not, and interestingly also mentions the concept of ζῆλος: ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν παλαιότητα μὴ ἐν τῇ θέσει τῶν βυβλίων νομίζωμεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ χρήσει τῆς ὁμοιότητος. Μίμησις γὰρ οὐ χρῆσίς ἐστι τῶν διανοημάτων, ἀλλ' ἡ ὁμοία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔντεχνος μεταχείρισις. Καὶ μιμεῖται τὸν Δημοσθένην οὐχ ὁ τὸ <Δημοσθένους λέγων ἀλλ' ὁ> Δημοσθενικῶς, καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα ὁμοίως καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον. Καὶ πᾶσα μίμησις ὧδε ἔχει· τέχνης ζῆλος ἐκμάττων ἐνθυμημάτων ὁμοιότητα ('moreover, we think that old age too is not in the disposition of books, but in the use of likeness. For μίμησις is not the use of thoughts, but a skillful practice similar to that of the ancients. And not he who expresses what is from Demosthenes imitates Demosthenes, but he who expresses himself in a Demosthenic way, and [neither does he imitate] Plato and Homer [who expresses what is from Plato and Homer]. And all imitation is as follows: it is the emulation of technical skill, which expresses a likeness of thoughts'). On this passage, see also Heath (2003), 97. Although the attribution of the *Ars Rhet*. to Dionysius is evidently spurious, in this passage we can recognize two important parallels with Dionysius' definition of μίμησις (*Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti) and his description of natural imitation (Dion. Hal. *Din*. 7.5-7). In the first place, μίμησις is connected with artistic skill and the activity of 'moulding', as is true for Dionysius' definition of μίμησις. Secondly, μίμησις goes hand in hand with the idea of creating 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) to the model, which is e.g. evident from the passage in Dion. Hal. *Din*. 7, but also from other passages in the works of Dionysius (see e.g. section 3.4). In some aspects, however, the quote from the *Ars Rhet*. differs from what can be considered Dionysius' genuine thoughts (frs. and epitome of *Imit*.). For instance, the remarkable definition of μίμησις as an 'emulation of technical skill' (τέχνης ζῆλος) is inconsistent with Dionysius' overt distinction between μίμησις and ζῆλος; instead, it seems to conflate both notions to describe the complex of imitation and emulation together.

μίμησις.[66] In this passage, we are left in the dark as to what this natural kind of imitation is about – Dionysius refuses to define it, obviously convinced of its meaning being evident to all.[67]

Although we may be inclined to read Dionysius' description of the original models, which have 'a spontaneous charm and freshness' (αὐτοφυής τις […] χάρις καὶ ὥρα), as an indirect characterisation of natural imitation also, this does not follow from Dionysius' words. In the first place, it would be inconsistent for Dionysius to define natural imitation in a veiled manner after having suggested that it does not require further explanation.

Secondly, when we assume that Dionysius' description of original models also applies to the natural kind of imitation, the implication would be that natural imitation is preferred above or hierarchically superior to artificial imitation, which, as we have seen, possesses 'contrivance and unnaturalness' (τὸ ἐπιτετηδευμένον καὶ οὐκ ἐκ φύσεως). However, since both kinds of μίμησις are presented as 'contiguous' (προσεχής), Dionysius rather suggests they are on the same level, and go hand in hand.

So far, we have seen that when Dionysius reflects on the concept of imitation in a systematical way, he divides it into two indispensable and complementary stages: μίμησις and ζῆλος. Within this general division, μίμησις can be further subdivided into two closely related imitative forms: natural and artificial μίμησις. The following sections focus on how the terms μίμησις and ζῆλος are used in the huge corpus of Dionysius' critical and rhetorical works, and show that in its actual application, Dionysius' mimetic theory is less clear cut.

[66] Untersteiner (1971), 651.

[67] I have thought of considering natural imitation an equivalent of ζῆλος. However, the only clear parallel between Dionysius' concepts of ζῆλος and natural imitation is that an 'activity of the soul' (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς) can be regarded as 'natural'. It is difficult to observe more parallels, unless we accept a passage from Longinus' treatise *On the Sublime* as an intermediate step. In language which reminds us of Dionysius' description of original models which emanate charm and freshness, Longinus argues that emulators (οἱ ζηλοῦντες) share in the flow of inspiration which emanates from the natural genius of models (*Subl.* 13.2): οὕτως ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων μεγαλοφυΐας εἰς τὰς τῶν ζηλούντων ἐκείνους ψυχὰς ὡς ἀπὸ ἱερῶν στομίων ἀπόρροιαί τινες φέρονται, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἐπιπνεόμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ λίαν φοιβαστικοὶ τῷ ἑτέρων συνενθουσιῶσι μεγέθει ('so, too, from the natural genius of those old writers there flows into the hearts of their admirers as it were an emanation from those holy mouths. Inspired by this, even those who are not easily moved to prophecy share the enthusiasm of these others' grandeur'). From this Longinean passage, which presents ζῆλος in terms of 'nobleness of nature' (μεγαλοφυΐα), movement (cf. φέρονται) and inspiration (cf. ἐπιπνεόμενοι, φοιβαστικοί, συνενθουσιῶσι), it is only a small step to Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος, in which the soul of the imitator is said to 'be moved' (κινουμένη) by the apparent beauty of literary models. Thus, only by inference, Dionysius' understanding of 'natural imitation' can be vaguely linked with his conception of ζῆλος. This is, I think, too weak an argument to see a connection.

2.2.3 Μιμησις and Ζηλος as Closely Related Concepts

In Dionysius' treatises, μίμησις and ζῆλος can appear in close conjunction. Sometimes there is no (clear) difference in meaning between the two notions.[68] In these cases, we may be inclined to regard the terms as manifestations of *variatio* or even synonymy. However, other passages contextualise μίμησις and ζῆλος more clearly, and allow us to infer that the terms – although closely intertwined – cover different aspects of the process of imitation. This section argues that μίμησις is often used as a descriptive term denoting (the result of) imitative creation; ζῆλος, in turn, is more evaluative, and as such relates to the imitative process of aspiring engagement with and mental perception and interpretation of models.

An example from *On Thucydides* shows that a distinctive value of μίμησις and ζῆλος is not easily recognizable for modern readers. Reading μιμεῖσθαι λέγοντες and ζηλοῦν λέγοντες in quite similar sentences, we may even suppose *variatio*. What is clear, is that two groups of people are opposed (cf. οἱ μέν […] οἱ δέ): those who claim to imitate Plato, and those who claim to emulate Thucydides. Their imitative efforts are in vain, and result in undesirable stylistic contortions of the original:

> Καὶ οἱ μὲν Πλάτωνα μιμεῖσθαι λέγοντες καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον καὶ ὑψηλὸν καὶ εὔχαρι καὶ καλὸν οὐ δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν, διθυραμβώδη δὲ ὀνόματα καὶ φορτικὰ εἰσφέροντες κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐλέγχονται ῥαδίως. Οἱ δὲ Θουκυδίδην ζηλοῦν λέγοντες καὶ τὸ μὲν εὔτονον καὶ στερεὸν καὶ δεινὸν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια χαλεπῶς ἐκλαμβάνοντες, τοὺς δὲ σολοικοφανεῖς σχηματισμοὺς καὶ τὸ ἀσαφὲς προχειριζόμενοι […].[69]

> Again, those who claim to imitate Plato, and are unable to capture his pristine quality, his sublimity, his grace and beauty, but who rather introduce inflated and vulgar language, these are easily exposed on this count. Those who claim to be emulating Thucydides, and find difficulty in assimilating his characteristic vigour, compactness and intensity, resort instead to ungrammatical constructions and to obscurity […].

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[68] Cf. Goudriaan (1989), 220, who argues: 'Beide termen komen we steeds afwisselend tegen, meestal zonder aantoonbaar verschil in betekenis […]'.

[69] Dion. Hal. *Din*. 8.1.

Also in two other passages, the terms μίμησις and ζῆλος are hardly distinguishable, and might even give the impression of being used as synonyms:[70]

Ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις ἄξια ζήλου τε καὶ μιμήσεως ἐφάνη […].[71]

This and narratives like it seemed to me admirable and worthy of emulation and imitation […].

Μίαν μὲν δὴ ταύτην ἀρετὴν ἀξίαν ζήλου καὶ μιμήσεως εὑρίσκω παρὰ τῷ ῥήτορι […].[72]

This, then, is one quality [i.e. 'purity of language' (καθαρότης), M.S.] I find in our orator [i.e. Lysias] which deserves emulation and imitation […].

In these two passages, μίμησις and ζῆλος seem to be used rather idiomatically: in both cases, they appear in the same order and as complements of the same adjective ἄξιον ('worthy'). This may lead us to suppose that there is no intended difference in meaning between them. However, the adjective ἄξιον can also be accompanied by ζῆλος or μίμησις alone, which implies that Dionysius deliberately chooses to mention either both terms or one of them.[73] Seeing also that absolute symmetry between two terms within the same semantic field is unlikely, we do well to infer that in the passages from *On Thucydides* and *On Lysias* quoted above, μίμησις and ζῆλος as complements of ἄξιον highlight different aspects of the same process of imitation. From these passages, however, we do not get a clue as to what exactly these aspects are understood to be.

An examination of some other passages confirms that when μίμησις and ζῆλος are mentioned in one breath, they relate to different components of the general process of imitation. Here, it emerges what these components are like. Let us first consider the use of μίμησις and ζῆλος in the moral attached to the narrative on the ugly farmer at the beginning of the epitome of *On Imitation*:

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[70] E.g. McAdon (2018), 24 points to the synonymous relationship between the two terms in Dionysius.

[71] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 27.1.

[72] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 2.3.

[73] For the adjective ἄξιον followed by ζῆλος alone, see Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 4.3; *Thuc*. 48.2; *Imit*. 3.9. Cf. also ζῆλος followed by ἐπιτήδειον in *Comp*. 26.7. For the adjective ἄξιον followed by μίμησις alone: see Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 8.3.

Οὕτω καὶ λόγων μιμήσει ὁμοιότης τίκτεται, ἐπὰν ζηλώσῃ τις τὸ παρ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τῶν παλαιῶν βέλτιον εἶναι δοκοῦν […].[74]

In this way, in literature also, likeness is born through imitation, whenever someone emulates what seems to be better in each of the ancients […].

Here, Dionysius easily switches from the noun μιμήσει to the verb ζηλώσῃ, without explicitly suggesting any shift in meaning. However, we should note that μίμησις is presented as a creative activity which is said to bring forth (cf. τίκτειν) something (i.e. 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) to models), whereas ζῆλος relates to what is *perceived* to be excellent.[75] Thus, ζῆλος is connected to inner reflection and interpretation, and has to do with an 'activity of the soul' (cf. Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος).

Also the description of Homer's qualities in *On Imitation* is typical of the flexible and distinctive use of μίμησις and ζῆλος within the space of one sentence:

Τῆς μὲν οὖν Ὁμηρικῆς ποιήσεως οὐ μίαν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος μοῖραν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκτύπωσαι τὸ σύμπαν, καὶ λάβε ζῆλον ἠθῶν τε τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ παθῶν καὶ μεγέθους, καὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἁπασῶν εἰς ἀληθῆ τὴν παρὰ σοὶ μίμησιν ἠλλαγμένων.[76]

Of the poetry of Homer, do not express one aspect of the corpus, but the whole, and emulate the representation of character there, and the emotions, grandeur, and the disposition and all other qualities, provided that they are modified for a true and personal imitation.

In this passage, Homer is presented as an author whose qualities should be emulated (cf. λάβε ζῆλον) and altered for a 'true and personal imitation' (εἰς ἀληθῆ τὴν παρὰ σοὶ μίμησιν). What is clear, is that the term μίμησις here pertains not so much to the process as to the actual result of imitating, which should express the essence of the model in a faithful and original way. The preposition εἰς, which signifies purpose, invites this interpretation of μίμησις, as well as the resultative perfect participle ἠλλαγμένων. By contrast, the words λάβε ζῆλον indicate the incentive to pursue the emulation of specific virtues of style, or, to put it differently, refer to

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[74] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.3.

[75] Note, however, that μίμησις appears in a passive construction; it is not explicitly marked as *agens*.

[76] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.1.

mimetic aspiration. This use of ζῆλος to express aspiration and endeavour is compatible with Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος as a principle of 'activity of the soul, of being moved'.

That μίμησις and ζῆλος cover different aspects of imitation can also be deduced from a passage in Dionysius' treatise *On Thucydides*:

> Ταῦτα δὴ τὰ Θουκυδίδου ζηλωτὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τὰ μιμήματα τοῖς ἱστοριογραφοῦσιν ὑποτίθεμαι λαμβάνειν.[77]

> These are the speeches of Thucydides which can be emulated, and it is from these that I suggest writers of history should derive their imitations.

The adjective ζηλωτά and the noun μιμήματα refer to different subjects: ζηλωτά is connected with the exemplary 'speeches of Thucydides' (τὰ Θουκυδίδου ἔργα); μιμήματα indicates the imitations derived from these speeches. Thus, in this passage, ζῆλος implies the aspiring engagement and rivalry with the discussed speeches of Thucydides, whereas μίμημα adverts to the result of inductive (cf. ἀπὸ τούτων) appropriation (cf. λαμβάνειν) – that is, we could say, to a 'moulding of the model' (cf. Dionysius' definition of μίμησις) in order to make it fit one's own literary purposes.

In another passage, μίμησις and ζῆλος are less easy to interpret:

> […] ταύτας μιμεῖσθαι τὰς κατασκευὰς ἐν αἷς ἥ τε βραχύτης καὶ ἡ δεινότης καὶ ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ τόνος καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ αἱ συγγενεῖς ταύταις ἀρεταὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶ φανεραί· τὰς δὲ αἰνιγματώδεις καὶ δυσκαταμαθήτους καὶ γραμματικῶν ἐξηγήσεων δεομένας καὶ πολὺ τὸ βεβασανισμένον καὶ τὸ σολοικοφανὲς ἐν τοῖς σχηματισμοῖς ἐχούσας μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε μιμεῖσθαι. Ἵνα δὲ συνελὼν εἴπω, ἀμφότερα μὲν ἐπ' ἴσης ζηλωτὰ εἶναι, τά τε μὴ σαφῶς εἰρημένα ὑπὸ τοῦ συγγραφέως καὶ τὰ προσειληφότα σὺν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς τὴν σαφήνειαν, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον.[78]

> They should imitate those specimens of his composition in which his brevity, rhetorical power, force, intensity, impressiveness and other related virtues are plain for all men to see; while those which are allusive and difficult to follow, and require a commentary, and those which are full of tortured and apparently ungrammatical constructions deserve neither to be admired nor imitated. To sum up, it does not make

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[77] Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 42.5.

[78] Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 55.2-3.

sense for us that the passages in Thucydides which lack clarity and those which possess clarity in addition to his other virtues should be equally emulated […].

Dionysius advises 'those who practice political oratory' (τοῖς ἀσκοῦσι τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους) only to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) those virtues which are evidently worthy of imitation, and not to 'admire' (θαυμάζειν) and 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) what should be regarded as a literary perversity. Apparently, when it comes to the selective act of students imitating specific literary virtues, μίμησις is the most obvious and current term.

When Dionysius summarises his words (cf. συνελὼν εἴπω) in a general rule (cf. οὐκ ἔχει λόγον), it is not so evident how we should understand his shift from μιμεῖσθαι to 'what should be emulated' (ζηλωτὰ εἶναι), unless we recognize that the verb θαυμάζειν is connected with the notion of ζῆλος, and probably prepares for it. Considering Dionysius' definition (fr. III U-R) of ζῆλος as 'an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder' (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς πρὸς θαῦμα […] κινουμένη), we are allowed to infer that in this passage from *On Thucydides*, ζῆλος is connotated with 'admiration', and implies a rather subjective engagement with models.

From the examples discussed above, we may conclude that when the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος appear within the same passage, we should always be aware of their difference in meaning. Although the specific, distinctive meaning of both terms cannot be determined in some passages, others clearly show that μίμησις and ζῆλος cover different, but closely related aspects of the complex of imitation: whereas μίμησις is a more descriptive term which often adverts to (the result of) imitative creation, ζῆλος is more evaluative, and often designates the aspiring engagement with and mental perception and interpretation of models. Let us now consider how Dionysius uses μίμησις and ζῆλος as separated concepts.

2.2.4 ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ

The term μίμησις is clearly the most current term of the two. When used on its own, μίμησις refers to the complex of imitation (i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος together), but highlights the technical aspect of it – the 'moulding of the model'. In Dionysius' works, μίμησις, like ζῆλος, is preponderantly used in an intertextual sense, referring to the imitator's adaptation of styles, aspects of styles or subjects derived from a wide variety of models. In most cases, ζῆλος is limited to this intertextual kind of imitation. However, μίμησις embraces more. It can also apply to the imitative relationship between form and content of one and the same text (for

example, rough vowels used to describe a rough event), or to the faithful, linguistic representation of various natural, real life-phenomena (for example, events, human character traits, or what is understood to be the uncontrived language spoken by ordinary people).[79] Like ζῆλος, the term can even, in a moral sense, pertain to the imitation not of an author's style, but of his way of life.

When μίμησις is used to describe the expression of (aspects of) reality in art, the notion appears in its original, Platonic sense, which is not so prominent in Dionysius' rhetorical works. In this section, the focus is on the connotations of the intertextual kind of μίμησις. There are, broadly speaking, two aspects that are intrinsically connected with the concept of μίμησις: 1) artful creation of uniformity between model and imitator and 2) substantial inequality of the relationship between model and imitator.

As we have seen in section 2.2.2 discussing a passage from *On Dinarchus*, every product of imitation should meet the primary criterion of 'uniformity' (ὁμοείδεια). This connection between μίμησις and 'uniformity' is not incidental, nor limited to the works of Dionysius. In fact, Dionysius seems to be indebted to Aristotle, who argues that the pleasure of beholding art is caused by the mental process of 'comparison' (συλλογισμός) of model to

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[79] For μίμησις denoting the imitative relationship between form and content, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 20.14-15, in which Homer's artful description of the torments of Sisyphus is discussed: τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν ὀνομάτων ψύγμα καὶ ἡ τῶν τραχυνόντων γραμμάτων παράθεσις τὰ διαλείμματα τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὸ τοῦ μόχθου μέγεθος· […] καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ φύσεώς ἐστιν αὐτοματιζούσης ἔργα ἀλλὰ τέχνης μιμήσασθαι τὰ γινόμενα πειρωμένης ('the drawing-in of breath between the words and the juxtaposition of rough letters indicate the pauses in his [i.e. Sisyphus', M.S.] efforts and the hugeness of his labour […]. And these effects are not the work of nature improvising, but of art trying to represent events'). For μίμησις pertaining to the representation of reality, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Is*. 16.1, in which the artful representation of 'nature and truth' by Lysias is praised: τοῦ Λυσίου μὲν οὖν τις ἀναγινώσκων τὰς διηγήσεις οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπολάβοι λέγεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην ἢ πονηρίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια φέρει, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τῆς τέχνης τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν ('any reader of Lysias' narratives would suppose that no art or dishonesty had gone into their composition, but that they are written in accordance with nature and truth. He would not know that this illusion is itself the product of an art whose greatest achievement was to imitate nature'). For μίμησις pointing to the representation of character traits and emotion, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.18: μετὰ ταύτην συνίσταται τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν τε καὶ παθῶν μίμησις ('after this quality [i.e. vividness, one of the qualities required in historiography, M.S.] comes the imitation of traits of character and of emotions'). For μίμησις indicating the skillful representation of uncontrived speech, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 1.13: ποιητικῆς τε κατασκευῆς τὸν ἀποίητον ἐκμιμουμένης λόγον καὶ σφόδρα ἐν τῇ μιμήσει κατορθούσης αὐτοῦ <τί> τὸ κράτος ('and in what consists the effectiveness of that poetical artistry which closely imitates uncontrived speech and succeeds well in its purpose').

copy, and is not determined by the beauty or ugliness of what is represented.[80] In a rather similar way, Plutarch establishes that the quality of art depends on the extent to which it attains 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) to the original.[81]

Also in another passage (already discussed in the previous section), μίμησις and ὁμοείδεια are associated terms. It says that 'close adherence' or 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) to the original text is said to be born by μίμησις (the birth metaphor is motivated by the preceding narrative on the ugly farmer, whose wife gives birth to beautiful children after having observed beautiful images):

[…] μιμήσει ὁμοιότης τίκτεται.[82]

[…] likeness is born through imitation.

The concept of 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) is also prominent in the opening lines of the treatise *On Imitation*, though it is not explicitly associated with either μίμησις or ζῆλος:

Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχοῦς παρατηρήσεως τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ χαρακτῆρος ἐφέλκεται […].[83]

For the soul of the reader attracts likeness of style by continuous study […].

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[80] Arist. *Rhet*. 1.11, 1371b4-10: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει ('and since learning and admiring are pleasant, all things connected with them must also be pleasant; for instance, a work of imitation, such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not pleasant; for it is not this that causes pleasure or the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and the object imitated are identical, so that the result is that we learn something') (tr. Freese 1926). A scholion to a sentence within this passage from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* contains a reference to Dionysius. More on this in section 3.3.3.

[81] Plut. *Quomodo adul*. 18a: γεγραμμένην σαύραν ἢ πίθηκον ἢ Θερσίτου πρόσωπον ἰδόντες ἡδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ὅμοιον. Οὐσίᾳ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναται καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ αἰσχρόν· ἡ δὲ μίμησις, ἄν τε περὶ φαῦλον ἄν τε περὶ χρηστὸν ἐφίκηται τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἐπαινεῖται ('when we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the ugly cannot become beautiful; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended') (tr. Babbitt 1927).

[82] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.3.

[83] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.2.

A phrase like this, which is a statement on the act of imitation in general, contains elements that belong to both μίμησις and ζῆλος, and hence testifies to the intertwinedness of these concepts. The notion of likeness is, as we have seen, associated with μίμησις, but the language of mental activity reminds us of Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος.[84] However, unlike this definition, which presents the soul as 'being moved', the soul is active here: it 'attracts' (ἐφέλκεται) likeness to the model of the past, and it even absorbs it (cf. μετοχετεύσῃ, 1.3). Through this enclosure of the stylistic 'character' (χαρακτήρ) of the model within the soul of the imitator, literature of the past can be reincarnated in the present in an original way.

The alternate and flexible use of the language of activeness and passiveness is distinctive for and essential to Dionysius' understanding of the complex of imitation and emulation.[85] This complex basically comprises an organic unity of opposites: conscientious study and absorption of models versus innate talent; an active 'moulding of the model' and a passive rapture of the soul. As we have already seen, it is the notion of μίμησις (as opposed to its partner ζῆλος) which is associated with the active and creative part of the complex of imitation, and which brings forth uniformity by closely and faithfully following models.

However, another observation about μίμησις should be made. An examination of all occurrences of μίμησις in the rhetorical works of Dionysius teaches that the notion is most suited to designate the vertical, inequal relationship between the great orators of the past and those of the present, although in these cases, we also regularly find ζῆλος.[86] The notion of ζῆλος, on the other hand, is more apt for contexts in which the horizontal imitative relationship between the well-matched, great orators of the past themselves is at stake, though here μίμησις also occurs now and then.

The following examples should be sufficient to illustrate that the term μίμησις preponderantly denotes the vertical connection between models of the past and imitators of the present. In a passage from *On Lysias*, Dionysius stimulates his readers to imitate Lysias to enhance their skills in the narration of facts:

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[84] Cf. section 2.2.1. More on this definition in section 3.3.1.

[85] Whitmarsh (2013) pays attention to the language of activeness and passiveness in Dionysius' mimetic theory, as we have seen in section 2.2.1.

[86] For Dionysius' ideas on ζῆλος, see section 2.2.5.

Πᾶσί τε καὶ παντὸς μάλιστα τοῦτο παρεκελευσάμην ἀσκεῖν τὸ μέρος ἐν τοῖς Λυσίου παραδείγμασι ποιουμένους τὰς γυμνασίας. Κράτιστα γὰρ <ἂν> ἀποδείξαιτο ταύτην τὴν ἰδέαν ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα μιμησάμενος.[87]

I should advice all students to practice this part of the speech [i.e. the narration of facts, M.S.] above all in their training from Lysianic examples; for the one who imitates this orator most closely will make the best showing in this kind of oratory.

Here, the term μίμησις also highlights Dionysius' insistence on mimetic technique. In the same treatise, Lysias' composition should be exemplary for a student in rhetoric, who should become a μιμητής:

Τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὖν τις ἐπιτηδεύων καὶ φύσεως μιμητὴς γίνεσθαι βουλόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τῇ Λυσίου συνθέσει χρώμενος· ἑτέραν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εὕροι ταύτης ἀληθεστέραν.[88]

Therefore the student of realism and naturalism would not go wrong if he were to follow Lysias in his composition, for he will find no model who is more true to life.

There are more passages in which μίμησις is the proper term to designate the more distant relationship between model of the past and imitator of the present. As we have seen in the previous section, Dionysius, for instance, encourages students of political oratory to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) some specific literary virtues of Thucydides in his treatise *On Thucydides*.[89] In *On Imitation*, he argues that it is recommendable to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) all poets other than Homer as far as they exhibit stylistic excellence (2.1), and he enjoins his readers 'also to imitate Aristotle' (παραληπτέον δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην εἰς μίμησιν) for different stylistic qualities (4.3). *On Isocrates* 4.4 contains an incentive to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) the principles of Isocrates, and in *On Thucydides* 25.2, Dionysius declares that the aim of writing this treatise is to assist those who want to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) Thucydides. Thus, μίμησις tends to refer to the efforts of students who would like to achieve the technical level of the classical Greek literary masters.

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[87] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 18.5-6.

[88] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 8.7.

[89] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 55.2.

Only in a minority of cases is the term μίμησις applied with respect to the rather equal, imitative relationship between orators of the past. Demosthenes, for instance, is said to have been imitating the enthymemes of Thucydides (*Pomp*. 3.20) and, in general, all best stylistic aspects of his forerunners (*Din*. 6.4). Philistus is considered both an imitator and emulator of Thucydides in some respects (*Imit*. 3.6), and Isocrates an imitator of Lysias (*Lys*. 2.2). Probably the focus in these cases is on matters of technique.

An explanation for this remarkable distribution of μίμησις may be that the term by definition is confined to denote more distant, unequal imitative connections which are based on the transfer of merely technical skill, whereas ζῆλος is more flexible: it can imply both (rather) equal literary combat and the strong mental aspiration that, in the end, will allow for such an equal combat. Let us now take a closer look at Dionysius' understanding of ζῆλος.

2.2.5 ΖΗΛΟΣ

As we have seen, the meaning of ζῆλος is sometimes difficult to distinguish from that of μίμησις. In section 2.2.3, I discussed the conjunct occurrence of μίμησις and ζῆλος in different passages, and suggested that both terms highlight different aspects of the complex of imitation and emulation. I tried to make plausible that ζῆλος (as opposed to μίμησις) is likely to concern the aspiring engagement with and mental perception and interpretation of models, which is aimed at (the obtainment of) wonder. In this section, we will see that when ζῆλος is used on its own, it refers to the complex of imitation (μίμησις and ζῆλος together), but highlights the mental aspect of it – i.e. aspiration and zealous competition. The following connotations are often evoked by the notion of ζῆλος: 1) (the zealous aspiration that possibly leads to) equality of the relationship between model and imitator, 2) literary-critical jealousy and 3) zeal for what should *not* be imitated.

In the previous section, I already touched upon the fact that the term ζῆλος, unlike μίμησις, frequently turns up in passages concerning a competition between great literary masters of the past who are more or less tied in skill. For instance, in Dionysius' essay *On Demosthenes*, we read that Aeschines, who is inferior to Demosthenes regarding the composition of his works, still tried to emulate his long time rival Demosthenes:

Περὶ δὲ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν οὔτε μεῖζον <οὔτ᾽ ἔλαττον εὗρεν αἰσχύνην> ἢ καταγέλωτα φέρων. Καὶ οὐχὶ τοῦτό πω θαυμάζειν <ἄξιον>, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καὶ μαρτυρῶν πολλαχῇ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῷ ῥήτορι κατάδηλός ἐστι καὶ ζηλῶν.[90]

But regarding his composition Aeschines is unable to bring any charges, great or small, or any that might expose Demosthenes to censure or to ridicule. Even this is not altogether surprising; what is remarkable is that in many passages he plainly acknowledges Demosthenes' ability in this respect and tries to emulate him.

Here, ζῆλος implies a specific, qualitative difference between model and imitator, which the imitator, who himself is 'a man with a brilliant natural talent for speaking' (ἀνὴρ λαμπροτάτῃ φύσει περὶ λόγους χρησάμενος, *Dem.* 35.3), should pertinaciously try to overcome. Moreover, ζῆλος also bears a negative connotation here, as it hints at the notorious political and private enmity between Demosthenes and Aeschines.[91]

In Dionysius' treatise *On Thucydides,* the difference between model and imitator is not so much qualitative as generic: the greatest of all orators, Demosthenes, is said to have been an emulator not only of Thucydides, but of all who excelled in their own field:[92]

Ῥητόρων δὲ Δημοσθένης μόνος, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι μέγα τι καὶ λαμπρὸν ἔδοξαν ποιεῖν ἐν λόγοις, οὕτω καὶ Θουκυδίδου ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο κατὰ πολλὰ […].[93]

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[90] Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 35.5 (additions by Aujac).

[91] For the rivalry between Demosthenes and Aeschines, see e.g. Buckler (2000), 114-158.

[92] On Demosthenes' eclectic emulation of all outstanding authors, cf. also Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 8.2: τοιαύτην δὴ καταλαβὼν τὴν πολιτικὴν λέξιν ὁ Δημοσθένης οὕτω κεκινημένην ποικίλως, καὶ τηλικούτοις ἐπεισελθὼν ἀνδράσιν ἑνὸς μὲν οὐθενὸς ἠξίωσε γενέσθαι ζηλωτὴς οὔτε χαρακτῆρος οὔτε ἀνδρός, ἡμιέργους τινὰς ἅπαντας οἰόμενος εἶναι καὶ ἀτελεῖς, ἐξ ἁπάντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὅσα κράτιστα καὶ χρησιμώτατα ἦν ἐκλεγόμενος ('thus political oratory had gone through a variety of changes when Demosthenes came on the scene. He found himself following in the footsteps of some illustrious men, but refused to make any single orator or any single style his model, for he considered everyone to be imcomplete and imperfect. Instead he selected the best and most useful elements from all of them'); *Dem.* 33.3: τοῦτον δὲ ἑνὸς μὲν οὐδενὸς ἀποφηνάμενος οὔτε χαρακτῆρος οὔτ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ζηλωτὴν γενέσθαι, ἐξ ἁπάντων δὲ τὰ κράτιστα ἐκλεξάμενον κοινὴν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον τὴν ἑρμηνείαν κατεσκευακέναι <καὶ> κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων ('I showed that he [i.e. Demosthenes, M.S.] pretended to no single style and imitated no single orator, but by selecting the best qualities from all of them developed a style with a universal appeal, which is what chiefly distinguishes him from all other writers').

[93] Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 53.1. Demosthenes also deviated from Thucydides: see Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 10.4.

> Demosthenes, alone among the orators, just as he emulated all who seemed to him to have achieved greatness and distinction in their field, emulated Thucydides in many ways […].

More examples include some passages in the *Letter to Pompeius*, where we read that Plato 'had been vying with the people in the circle of Gorgias' (ζηλώσας τοὺς περὶ Γοργίαν, 2.2), that Herodotus was an 'emulator of Homer' (Ὁμήρου ζηλωτής, 3.11) and Xenophon an 'emulator of Herodotus' (Ἡροδότου ζηλωτὴς, 4.1; cf. 4.2. and *Imit*. 3.4). In his treatise *On Isaeus*, Dionysius presents Isaeus as 'being an emulator of Lysias' (Λυσίου […] ζηλωτὴν ὄντα, 20.5).

Apparently, imitation within the classical Greek Period itself is characterised by ζῆλος rather than μίμησις. In this respect, ζῆλος implies a combat between geniuses who stand out in different aspects of rhetoric or in different literary genres, and who are willing to recognize and benefit from each other's specific superiority. In the case of Demosthenes and Aeschines, however, this combat is grim in nature.

Dionysius also applies the notion of ζῆλος to designate the imitative relationship between classical Greek models and imitators of the present. The epitome of *On Imitation* provides many examples of recommended ζῆλος within a didactic context.[94] It is noteworthy that this kind of ζῆλος does not apply to minor authors who can easily be emulated; instead, those 'emulatable' are authors like Homer (2.1), Pindar (2.5), Isocrates (5.2), Lycurgus (5.3) and Hyperides (5.6).

We can also infer from other treatises that ζῆλος is certainly not confined to those imitative situations in which model and imitator are contemporaneous and rather evenly matched. Thus, in these cases, the notion of ζῆλος does not indicate a battle between compeers, but instead one between masters and students. That it is almost a foregone conclusion who will win, is not important; what apparently counts, is that such an honourable confrontation inspires the young men to measure up against the experienced literator. In this sense, ζῆλος has to do with mental aspiration rather than with serious combat and actual emulation. This is how the following two passages could be explained:

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[94] Cf. Cizek (1994), 19, who observes with respect to Dionysius' interpretation of the notion of ζῆλος: 'Der Übergang von der Übung zum selbstandigen Schaffen wird hier impliziert'.

[…] ὅ τι δ' ἂν (ὅμοιον) τῷ κατεσκευασμένῳ καὶ ἐντέχνῳ, ζήλου καὶ σπουδῆς ἐπιτήδειον τυγχάνειν οἴομαι.[95]

[…] only that [prose style, M.S.] which resembles the artistic and skilful kind I regard as fit for serious emulation.

Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις καλὰ καὶ ζήλου ἄξια ἡγοῦμαι.[96]

These and similar passages I consider beautiful and worthy of emulation.

In the latter passage, there may well have been an important trigger for Dionysius to use the term ζῆλος, for the examplary passages mentioned here are said to be 'beautiful' (καλά). There is a structural and close connection between ζῆλος and beauty in Dionysius' thinking – to which also his definition of ζῆλος testifies.

In addition to this use of ζῆλος for equal as well as unequal imitative connections, Dionysius often applies the term to refer to a perverse literary-critical attitude. He uses ζῆλος to designate the behaviour of those people who, for instance, criticise literary masters out of jealousy:

[…] ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοις πολὺ τὸ φιλαίτιον ἔνεστιν <εἴ τε κατὰ τὸν ζῆλον> τῶν ἀρχαίων γινόμενον εἴ τε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροψίαν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡλικίας εἴ τε κατ' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη κοινὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ὄντα φύσεως.[97]

[…] but on account of all those others who take great delight in finding fault, whether because they envy the writers of old or because they despise their own contemporaries, or for both these reasons, which are common human failings.

In his *Letter to Pompeius*, Dionysius reproaches Plato for his 'envious stance' (ζηλοτυπία) towards Homer, just as Longinus compares Plato's attitude towards Homer with the overconfidence of a 'young antagonist' (ἀνταγωνιστὴς νέος) who duels with 'someone whose reputation has already been established' (ἤδη τεθαυμασμένον):[98]

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[95] Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 26.7.

[96] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 48.2.

[97] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 2.1.

[98] Longin. *Subl*. 13.4: καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπακμάσαι μοι δοκεῖ τηλικαῦτά τινα τοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγμασι καὶ εἰς ποιητικὰς ὕλας πολλαχοῦ συνεμβῆναι καὶ φράσεις, εἰ μὴ περὶ πρωτείων νὴ Δία παντὶ θυμῷ πρὸς Ὅμηρον,

[…] ἦν γάρ, ἦν ἐν τῇ Πλάτωνος φύσει, πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐχούσῃ, τὸ φιλότιμον. Ἐδήλωσε δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα διὰ τῆς πρὸς Ὅμηρον ζηλοτυπίας, ὃν ἐκ τῆς κατασκευαζομένης ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πολιτείας ἐκβάλλει […].[99]

For there was indeed in Plato's nature, for all its virtues, a measure of jealousy. He showed this especially in his envious stance towards Homer, whom he expels from his imaginary commonwealth […].

The entire first chapter of the *Letter to Pompeius* deals with the contrast between fair, respectful criticism and envious attacks. Apparently, the healthy mental aspiration which is often referred to by the term ζῆλος can also easily turn into its opposite, and induce craze, envy as well as blunt and unfair judgements.

In some passages, ζῆλος does not evoke jealousy, but a silly appreciation for what should evidently be avoided. In *On the Ancient Orators*, Dionysius' criticism is aimed at those people who have a 'craze' (ζῆλος) for a silly rhetorical style (which, fortunately, will not last long):

Καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, τηλικαύτης μεταβολῆς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ γεγενημένης, εἰ μηκέτι χωρήσει προσωτέρω μιᾶς γενεᾶς ὁ ζῆλος ἐκεῖνος τῶν ἀνοήτων λόγων· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς εἰς ἐλάχιστον συναχθὲν ῥάδιον ἐξ ὀλίγου μηδὲ εἶναι.[100]

And since this great revolution has taken place in so short a time, I should not be surprised if that craze for a silly style of oratory fails to survive another single generation; for what has been reduced from omnipotence to insignificance can soon easily be wiped out altogether.

The treatise *On Demosthenes* provides two other striking examples of wrongly oriented ζῆλος. The first pillories Isocrates for having emulated the immature figures of Gorgias:

ὡς ἀνταγωνιστὴς νέος πρὸς ἤδη τεθαυμασμένον ('so many of these qualities would never have flourished among Plato's philosophic tenets, nor would he have entered so often into the subjects and language of poetry, had he not striven, with heart and soul, to contest the prize with Homer, like a young antagonist with someone whose reputation has already been established').

[99] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 1.13.

[100] Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett*. 3.3.

Ἁμαρτάνει δὲ ἐν οἷς ὡραΐζεταί ποτε, τοὺς Γοργίου νεαροὺς σχηματισμοὺς ζηλοῦσα […].[101]

And sometimes the style fails when it makes a display, trying to emulate the immature figures of Gorgias.

The second contains a rhetorical question, in which ζῆλος pertains to something that nobody who is endowed with common sense would ever pursue:

[…] (τίς γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πικρᾶς καὶ περιέργου ζῆλος ὀνομασίας;) […].[102]

[…] for surely nobody would want to emulate a harsh and laboured vocabulary?

The fact that astute judgement is a *conditio sine qua non* for sound ζῆλος, is also clear from a passage from *On Thucydides* 55.3 (already discussed in section 2.2.3), which contains the warning not to emulate Thucydides' literary specimens indiscriminately.

Apparently, for Dionysius, ζῆλος is more prone to a negative connotation, or more apt for negative contexts, than μίμησις.[103] Let us now see how Quintilian conceives of the terms *imitatio* and *aemulatio*.

2.3 QUINTILIAN'S USE OF MIMETIC TERMINOLOGY

Quintilian treats the subject of imitation systematically in *Institutio* 10.2 (see section 4.3), but the entirety of this work is imbued with (often very brief) references to imitation. Especially the reading lists of Greek and Latin literature, to be found in 10.1, testify to Quintilian's belief in the indispensability of literary models, and underscore the importance of imitation (*imitatio*) and emulation (*aemulatio*) of these models. It is striking that Quintilian does not allow for much ambiguity concerning the meaning of the concepts of *imitatio* and *aemulatio*:

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[101] Dion. Hal. *Dem*. 4.4.

[102] Dion. Hal. *Dem*. 35.6.

[103] Note, however, that in the preceding sentence the verb 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) also applies to 'compositional specimens' (κατασκευαί) which should be avoided. Thus, the notion of μίμησις is also incidentally connected with negative objects of imitation.

in several passages he differentiates more clearly between them than Dionysius does between μίμησις and ζῆλος.[104]

The present section is intended to shed light on Quintilian's use of mimetic idiom, and as such offers the preliminary terminological tools for the discussion in chapter 4, which is devoted to Quintilian's reading lists of Greek and Latin literature, and tries to explain how the critical judgements he passes there – though highly indebted to Dionysius' – reflect an imitative approach and use of (classical Greek) literature which is strongly coloured by his own rhetorical agenda. Quintilian's understanding and use of the concepts of *imitatio* (2.3.1) and *aemulatio* (2.3.2) will now be discussed successively.

2.3.1 *IMITATIO*

What does *imitatio* mean to Quintilian, what connotations does the term bear and in what ways is it attested? In the *Institutio*, *imitatio* does not only cover the imitation of (the stylistic characteristics of) one author by another; also the representation of reality or real life-phenomena (for example, the cosmos, human character traits, behaviour, ways of speaking, emotions) – either within or outside literature – can be the object of *imitatio*.[105] The focus of this section is on *imitatio* in an intertextual sense.

Immediately after presenting his reading lists of Greek and Latin literature (10.1), Quintilian opens the second chapter of book 10 by observing that imitation of the authors recommended involves the movement of the soul towards 'the model of all virtues' (*exemplum virtutum omnium*):

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[104] Therefore, the structure of this section differs from the previous section dedicated to Dionysius' ideas on imitation.

[105] For the literary imitation of reality, see e.g. Quint. 5.12.22: *igitur et ille quem instituimus adulescens quam maxime potest componat se ad imitationem veritatis* ('so let the young man whom we are educating prepare himself, as far as he can, to imitate real life'). For imitation of the cosmic order by the lyre, see 1.10.12: *mundum ipsum ratione esse compositum, quam postea sit lyra imitata* ('that the world itself was constructed on the principle which the lyre later imitated'). For imitation of emotions, see e.g. 6.2.26: *nam et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio* ('the mere imitation of grief or anger or indignation may in fact sometimes be ridiculous'). Cf. also 11.3.61-62, 11.3.156. For the imitation of character and behaviour, see e.g. 9.1.30: *morum ac vitae imitatio* ('representation of character and life'). Cf. also 9.1.45; 9.2.58. For the imitation of a way of speaking, see e.g. 11.3.165: *mollior nonnumquam cum reprensione diversae partis imitatio* ('a more effeminate manner may sometimes be right for the critical portrayal of an adversary').

Ex his ceterisque lectione dignis auctoribus et verborum sumenda copia est et varietas figurarum et componendi ratio, tum ad exemplum virtutum omnium mens derigenda.[106]

It is from these and other authors worth reading that our stock of words must be drawn, as well as the variety of our figures, and our system of composition, and our mind must be guided towards the model of all virtues.

Whereas Dionysius applies the language of mental movement to describe the stage of ζῆλος, Quintilian connects it with *imitatio*.[107] This, I think, is not a deliberate transposition; it is more likely that Quintilian draws from a similar discourse of imitation. It is also possible that he, at the beginning of the chapter, refers to a general concept of imitation and emulation together by mentioning only the term *imitatio*. However, this would be quite exceptional, for Quintilian tends to make a clear distinction between *imitatio* and *aemulatio*.

The following survey concentrates on Quintilian's use of the notion of *imitatio*. It will be argued that *imitatio* 1) designates the faithful, artificial repetition of a model's features, and 2) often occurs in passages in which the substantial inequality of the relationship between model and imitator – the latter often operating in a didactic context – is salient.

Imitatio, we learn, is an important component of technical skill, and comprises the compliance (cf. the verb *sequi*) with fundamental rules:

Neque enim dubitari potest quin artis pars magna contineatur imitatione. [...] Sic litterarum ductus, ut scribendi fiat usus, pueri secuntur, sic musici vocem docentium, pictores opera priorum, rustici probatam experimento culturam in exemplum intuentur, omnis denique disciplinae initia ad propositum sibi praescriptum formari videmus.[108]

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[106] Quint. 10.2.1. Cf. Quint. 1.8.5, which is about the very start of reading literature (cf. *lectio inciperet*): *et sublimitate heroi carminis animus adsurgat et ex magnitudine rerum spiritum ducat et optimis inbuatur* ('and let the mind be uplifted by the sublimity of the heroic poems, and inspired and filled with the highest principles by the greatness of their theme').

[107] In 10.2.5, where Quintilian probably discusses and justifies *aemulatio,* the language of mental activity returns: *an illi rudes sola mentis natura ducti sunt in hoc, ut tam multa generarent: nos ad quaerendum non eo ipso concitemur, quod certe scimus invenisse eos qui quaesierunt*? ('if those primitives were led by the sheer nature of their spirit to create so many things, are we not to be stimulated in our search if only because we know for sure that they who sought, found?').

[108] Quint. 10.2.1-2.

It cannot be doubted that a large part of art consists of imitation. […] Children follow the outlines of letters so as to become accustomed to writing; singers find their model in their teacher's voice, painters in the works of their predecessors, and farmers in methods of cultivation which have been tested by experience. In a word, we see the rudiments of every branch of learning shaped by standards prescribed for it.

Apparently, Quintilian uses the term *imitatio* to refer to an artificial approach of models, which themselves give shape (cf. *formare*) to all kinds of results of imitative practice. He categorises *imitatio* explicitly as *ars*:

Facultas orandi consummatur natura arte exercitatione, cui partem quartam adiciunt quidam imitationis, quam nos arti subicimus.[109]

The faculty of speech is brought to perfection by nature, art, and practice; some add a fourth factor, imitation, but I include this under art.

Quintilian often applies the notion of *imitatio* with respect to didactic situations, arguing that the life of young boys should be devoted to the imitation of the language of their nanny (1.1.5), teacher (2.3.1, 2.4.12) and fellow pupils (1.2.29, 2.3.10). Thus, *imitatio* has to do with the meticulous and artful repetition of all kinds of approved language in which children are immersed. Its quintessential principle seems to be 'uniformity' or 'likeness' (*similitudo*) to the model, which, however, proves to be infeasible:

Adde quod plerumque facilius est plus facere quam idem: tantam enim difficultatem habet similitudo ut ne ipsa quidem natura in hoc ita evaluerit, ut non res quae simillimae quaeque pares maxime videantur utique discrimine aliquo discernantur.[110]

Furthermore, it is generally easier to improve on something than simply to repeat it. Total similarity is so difficult to achieve that even nature has failed to prevent things which seem to match and resemble each other most closely from being always distinguishable in *some* respect.

By inference, where *imitatio* or 'doing the same' (*idem facere*) runs up against its limits, *aemulatio* (cf. *plus facere*), which is considered easier, should take over.

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[109] Quint. 3.5.1.

[110] Quint. 10.2.10.

As Quintilian conceives of *imitatio* as an activity of artistic skill, so does Dionysius conceive of μίμησις as an activity of 'moulding the model'. Yet, there is a manifest difference between their views. As I hope to have made clear, Dionysius' idea of 'moulding the model' is far away from the mantra of 'doing the same' (*idem facere*) or 'being formed' (*formari*) by the model; instead, it refers to giving expression to the model by using a personal and original style. Hence, Dionysius' conception of μίμησις is less mechanical and, one could safely say, more autarkic and positive than Quintilian's understanding of *imitatio*, which merely involves an instructive copying.[111]

This being said, it may seem puzzling that the term *imitatio* in Quintilian can also imply that the imitator attains not only the model's technical level, but also his power in speech. For example, when Quintilian reports that Calvus was an 'imitator of the Attic orators' (*imitator Atticorum*, 10.1.115), and that Cicero 'devoted himself to the imitation of the Greeks' (*ad imitationem Graecorum contulisset*, 10.1.108), it is obvious that their imitation was not just built on artificial pillars, since both Calvus and Cicero are praised for their stylistic force (*vehementia*) (10.1.110, 115). This force in speech is overtly separated by Quintilian from the realm of *imitatio*:

> *[...] et cum iis felicissime cessit imitatio, verbis atque numeris sunt non multum differentes, vim dicendi atque inventionis non adsecuntur [...].*[112]

> Even when their imitation is most successful, though they may not be very different from the model in vocabulary or rhythm, they do not attain its power of speech or invention […].

It follows that force belongs to *aemulatio*.[113] Hence, when Quintilian refers to great authors as 'imitators', the idea of *aemulatio* resonates with the term *imitatio*.[114]

Another passage in Quintilian also shows us that force in speech cannot be the result of *imitatio*. Discussing the need of making additions to what has been written before,

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[111] Note that Quintilian's understanding of *imitatio* is very close to one of the two kinds of μίμησις discerned by Dionysius: artificial μίμησις.

[112] Quint. 10.2.16.

[113] Pliny, however, links 'force' with *imitatio*. More on this in section 5.5.

[114] In the *Institutio*, there are more examples of great authors who are said to have been imitators. See e.g. 8.3.20 (Horace 'imitated' (*imitatus est*) an expression of Vergil); 8.6.72 (Cicero 'imitated' (*imitatus*) an expression of Pindar).

Quintilian argues that 'all imitation is artificial' (*omnis imitatio ficta est*), whereas the literary models themselves have their own 'nature and real force' (*natura et vera vis*) (which, of course, should also be characteristic of every new composition):

> *Namque iis quae in exemplum adsumimus subest natura et vera vis, contra omnis imitatio ficta est et ad alienum propositum commodatur.*[115]

> […] the models we choose have their own nature and real force, whereas all imitation is artificial and adapted to another's purpose.[116]

This passage reminds us of the distinction that Dionysius makes between artificial and natural imitation.[117] There is, however, a crucial difference. Whereas Dionysius regards artificial and natural imitation as two subcategories or aspects of μίμησις, Quintilian radically removes the virtues of 'nature and real force' (*natura et vera vis*) from what can be counted among and captured by *imitatio*. Hence, he suggests a connection between these virtues and the concept of *aemulatio*, which in this passage is referred to by the verbs 'add' (*adicere*, 10.2.9), 'compete' (*contendere*, 10.2.9) and 'improve' (*plus facere*, 10.2.10).

Finally, that a forceful style can hardly be seen as the fruit of *imitatio*, is also demonstrated by Quintilian's claim that the second-rank historian Philistus was an 'imitator of Thucydides' (*imitator Thucydidi*), but did not achieve his force – he was 'much weaker' (*multo infirmior*).[118] When stylistic force by inference has to do with *aemulatio*, what else belongs to the realm of *aemulatio*?

2.3.2 AEMULATIO

Let us start with the remarkable observation that the term *aemulatio* (and derivatives) is, despite Quintilian's insistence on competition, much less frequently attested than *imitatio* throughout the whole *Institutio*: only 17 times (versus 97 times *imitatio* and derivatives). In this section, it is posited that the intended audience of the work explains not only the relative underrepresentation of the notion of *aemulatio*, but also the rather clear distinction between

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[115] Quint. 10.2.11.

[116] As Peterson (1891), *ad loc.* observes, *alienum propositum* means: the purpose of the imitator, not of the author of the original.

[117] See section 2.2.2.

[118] Quint. 10.1.74.

imitatio and *aemulatio*. Furthermore, this section argues that *aemulatio* comprises 1) the victory-oriented battle with models, and 2) the crucial addition of something personal and new to what already exists.

As we have already seen, *imitatio* is a notion often applied to denote the practice of artificial repetition of models in divergent didactic contexts. Schoolboys, as well as novices in rhetoric who are concerned with the acquisition of technicall skill, dedicate themselves to what Quintilian names *imitatio*: the creation of likeness. Their teachers, but of course also these students themselves, form the intended readership of Quintilian's *Institutio*, which is devoted to the orator's education from cradle to law court. This explains Quintilian's striking attention to matters of imitative skill.

Whereas Quintilian is of the opinion that *imitatio* merely belongs to (different types of) students or to orators specifically interested in matters of technique, he considers mature orators, who fall largely outside his scope, to be concerned with *aemulatio*:

> *Namque et consummati iam patroni veteribus aemulantur et eos iuvenum ad optima tendentium imitatur ac sequitur industria.*[119]

> The mature advocates rival the ancients, and the efforts of the promising and aspiring young imitate and follow them.

A similar statement can be found in the first book:

> *Sed sicut firmiores in litteris profectus alit aemulatio, ita incipientibus atque adhuc teneris condiscipulorum quam praeceptoris iucundior hoc ipso quod facilior imitatio est.*[120]

> But, while rivalry nurtures literary progress when it is more firmly established, beginners and the very young find imitation of their fellow pupils more agreeable than imitation of their masters, because it is easier.

That the reading lists of Greek and Latin literature are still imbued with a strong sense of competition, and that the *idea*, not the actual occurrence of the term *aemulatio* is crucial there,

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[119] Quint. 10.1.122.

[120] Quint. 1.2.26. Cf. 1.2.29: *utile igitur habere quos imitari primum, mox vincere velis* ('it is useful to have people whom you would like first to imitate and soon to surpass').

is not so much because Quintilian incites his students to emulate (*aemulari*) the models recommended; rather, he describes the connection between consummate Greeks and Romans in terms of emulation.

In the *Institutio*, there are many examples of experienced orators who are motivated by *aemulatio*; for instance, Gorgias was an 'emulator' (*aemulus*) of Corax and Tisias (3.1.9), Athenaeus 'seems to have been an emulator' (*aemulus videtur fuisse*) of Hermagoras (3.1.16), Stesichorus could have rivalled (*aemulari*) Homer if he had controlled himself (10.1.62), Cicero was an emulator of Plato (10.1.123) and Hortensius of Cicero (11.3.8).

This connection between *aemulatio* and rhetorical maturity is rather in line with Dionysius' tendency to use the term ζῆλος for the horizontal imitative relationship between classical masters themselves. However, as we have seen, Dionysius also does not hesitate to urge his students to be motivated by ζῆλος, which, to his taste, can likewise be a *road* towards the acquisition of mature literary mastery. This explains why Dionysius can recommend ζῆλος with respect to Homer (*Imit.* 2.1), whereas Quintilian poses that 'it takes a great mind, I will not say to rival, for that is impossible, but to follow his [i.e. Homer's, M.S.] virtues' (*ut magni sit viri virtutes eius non aemulatione, quod fieri non potest, sed intellectu sequi*.[121]

Aemulatio is quite a loaded term in Quintilian, and occurs only once in a deprecatory context.[122] The term *aemulatio* is not defined by Quintilian. However, is it obvious that he does give a description of *aemulatio* (cf. the verb *superasse*) as opposed (cf. *vero*) to *imitatio* in the last paragraphs of 10.2. Here, he conceives of *aemulatio* in terms of 'add' (*adicere*), 'supply' (*supplere*) and 'prune' (*circumcidere*):

> *Haec si perviderimus, tum vere imitabimur. Qui vero etiam propria his bona adiecerit, ut suppleat quae deerant, circumcidat si quid redundabit, is erit quem quaerimus perfectus orator: quem nunc consummari potissimum oporteat, cum tanto plura exempla bene dicendi supersunt quam illis qui adhuc summi sunt contigerunt. Nam erit haec quoque laus eorum, ut priores superasse, posteros docuisse dicantur.*[123]

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[121] Quint. 10.1.50.

[122] Quint. 10.2.17: *[qui] praecisis conclusionibus obscuri Sallustium atque Thucydiden superant; tristes ac ieiuni Pollionem aemulantur* ('writers whose amputated sentences make them obscure are going one better than Sallust or Thucidides; the dreary and jejune are rivals of Pollio').

[123] Quint. 10.2.27-28.

If we thoroughly grasp all this [e.g. the propriety with which the great men handle circumstances and persons, their strategy, their arrangement, the way in which is everything is aimed at victory, M.S.], we shall be 'imitators' in the true sense of the word. But it is the man who also adds his own good qualities to these, making good the deficiencies and cutting out any superfluities, who will be the perfect orator we are seeking; and it would be particularly appropriate that he should come to perfection in our time, when there are so many models of good oratory to be found than were available to those who were the greatest masters in the past. These masters will acquire another glory too: that of being said to have surpassed their predecessors and taught their successors.

This passage reveals that for Quintilian, *aemulatio* is the crucial completion of *imitatio* in the second stage of an orator's career; it involves the addition of one's 'own good qualities' (*propria bona*) to a perspicuous understanding of things of rather technical nature, which belong to the field of *imitatio*. Moreover, the passage makes clear that *aemulatio* concerns a winnable battle with the excellent Greek and Latin models of the past, and that it is the actual victory rather than the battle itself which is his concern. Quintilian's conceptualisation of *aemulatio* as a battle is in line with his insistence on literary force, which can only be achieved by *aemulatio*.

Earlier in the same chapter, there is a similar distinction between *imitatio* and a connected concept, which is easily recognizable as *aemulatio*. Quintilian notices, as we have seen, that 'nothing does grow by imitation alone' (*nihil [...] crescit sola imitatione*), and argues that 'imitation on its own is not sufficient' (*imitatio per se ipsa non sufficit*). In short, there is something complementary. [124] What Quintilian means by this, is to 'discover something new which did not exist before' (*reperiri aliquid [...] quod ante non fuerit,* 10.2.5), to 'dig out other things' (*eruendas alias,* 10.2.6), to 'add to previous achievements' (*prioribus adicere,* 10.2.9), to 'compete' (*contendere,* 10.2.9), and to 'improve' (*plus facere,* 10.2.10). [125]

The term *aemulatio* is often used in the case of strongly competitive situations, in which the combatants are well matched, or at each other's heels. Already in the educational setting of a school, young boys, who are devoted to *imitatio*, should develop a keen sense for

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[124] Quint. 10.2.8, 4.

[125] As Peterson (1891), *ad loc.* observes, Quintilian follows Cicero in his figurative use of *eruendas*; cf. Cic. *De Or.* 2.146.

aemulatio 'when they compete with each other by asking one another all sorts of little questions' (*cum positis invicem cuiusque generis quaestiunculis aemulantur*).[126]

Metaphors derived from the battefield, gladiator fights, running races and other competitive situations abound in the *Institutio*, and can appear either with or without references to the concept of *aemulatio*. Metaphors of strife in Quintilian's Greek and Latin canons will be examined in sections 4.9.3 and 4.9.6. Especially in the Latin reading list, in which the trial of strength with Greece plays a central role, there is a great density of metaphors of strife. However, Quintilian also draws up the Greeks in order of battle. For instance, he presents Stesichorus, who is an *aemulus* of Homer, as involved in a running race with this unrivalled master of epic poetry:

> *[...] si tenuisset modum videtur aemulari proximus Homerum potuisse [...].*[127]

> [...] and, if he [i.e. Stesichorus, M.S.] had exercised restraint, he might have been Homer's nearest rival [...].

In general, we can say that whereas *imitatio* aims at likeness to the model and relates to the repetition of things already invented by others, *aemulatio* is a polarising term, based on the idea of *difference* with the model, and concerned with things to be invented by ourselves. For Quintilian, the notions, however contrasting, complement each other; for we can only really surpass our models when we have come as close as possible.

2.4 CONCLUSION

There is an evident and complementary connection between imitation and emulation for Dionysius and Quintilian, but they conceive of this connection in different ways. For Dionysius, μίμησις and ζῆλος go hand in hand during the process of imitation in whatever stage of the orator's career. When used separately, μίμησις and ζῆλος refer to the complex of imitation and emulation together (in other words: they imply their missing partner). For Quintilian, *imitatio* and *aemulatio* are not co-existing, but successive and often easily distinguishable stages, covering different periods of the orator's life.

As it comes to the valuation of μίμησις and *imitatio*, Dionysius and Quintilian share the idea that these notions pertain to a technical-creative device, suited for imitative

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[126] Quint. 1.3.11.

[127] Quint. 10.1.62.

relationships in which model and imitator are not evenly matched. However, Dionysius and Quintilian also differ substantially. The former is of the opinion that μίμησις involves an original re-expression of the model; the latter, by contrast, frames *imitatio* in pejorative terms of basic repetition and copying for merely didactic purposes. In short, Dionysius thinks μίμησις and ζῆλος are complementary and essentially of equal value, while Quintilian pictures *imitatio* and *aemulatio* as complementary, but unequal in value.

To Dionysius, ζῆλος is defined as an activity of the soul in response to the contemplation of beauty. The term is often connotated with mental perception, interpretation and wonder, and implies an aspiring imitative approach of former literature. The notion of ζῆλος is frequently used in the case of ancient orators who are evenly matched, or, less often, in the case of students who may well eventually attain the level of their models. It is also striking that ζῆλος tends to appear in passages concerning literary-critical jealousy, overconfidence or zeal for what should *not* be the object of imitative production.

As for Quintilian, *aemulatio* consists of the highly recommended rivalry with the model. It is a pregnant, loaded term, which is intrinsically associated with the idea of changing, completing and surpassing the model by means of one's own *propria bona*. *Aemulatio*, which demands originality, can easily be distinguished from *imitatio*, which is more passive and servile in character (it is a process of 'being formed' (*formari*)). In Quintilian, *aemulatio* is only once negatively charged by the context.

I suggest that the discrepancy between Dionysius' and Quintilian's conception of μίμησις/*imitatio* and ζῆλος/*aemulatio* is related to their cultural stance towards the literary heritage of classical Greece. As a Greek in Rome who is concerned with the composition of Greek texts, Dionysius approves of μίμησις as a procedure of faithfully re-expressing the texts of venerable Greek predecessors, in such a way that the beauty and grandeur of these masterpieces is evoked and revived in an original stylistic idiom. For Quintilian, who addresses Latin teachers and students, *imitatio* of Greek models is useful only as a preparatory exercise, the fruits of which should always be 'translated' into the Latin language.

The idea of competition with Greek masterpieces is certainly present in Dionysius. Just as the painter Zeuxis tried to create perfect beauty by imitating what was imperfect (see section 1.1-3), the orator should ideally compete with different Greek models and make his work even better, thanks to theirs. At the same time, however, Dionysius seems to be rather reluctant in using the term ζῆλος to designate the relation between model of the past and imitator of the present, and often outlines situations in which ζῆλος is abject and degenerates into jealouzy. This is, I suggest, because he is fully aware of the differences between ancient

Greece and modern Rome – differences which apparently do not always allow for sound ζῆλος, nor for a literary match. Thus, both idealism and realism seem to guide Dionysius in his ideas on ζῆλος.

By contrast, the Roman teacher Quintilian is not very concerned with a *revival* of classical Greece. His rhetorical agenda consists of bringing Latin literature on a par with Greek literature, and the whole reading list of Latin literature is imbued with the aspiration of competing with and conquering Greece. As a result, *aemulatio* is such a loaded and pregnant term for him – more than for Dionysius.

CHAPTER 3

DIONYSIUS' *ON IMITATION* AND HIS READING LIST OF GREEK LITERATURE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The nuances in Dionysius' mimetic terminology mirror a refined theory of imitation, set out in his rhetorical essays. In these essays, Dionysius shows himself to be particularly interested in providing the greatest literary models for imitation.[1] He quotes extensively from a wide range of classical authors and submits their works to concise critical analyses and methods, such as close reading, rearrangement or *metathesis* (μετάθεσις) and 'comparison' (σύγκρισις) of two or more authors. To arrange his material and thoughts, he identifies different virtues of specific authors and discusses these more or less in depth. In employing such a classifying system of virtues to cast light on the best characteristics for imitation, Dionysius was definitely not alone. The so-called theory of 'virtues of style' (ἀρεταὶ λέξεως) is a traditional one, going back at least to Theophrastus and Demetrius.[2] However, the composition of separate essays on the 'manner of life and style of writing' (προαιρέσεις τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ λόγου) of a few selected authors is, as Dionysius claims, his own invention.[3]

Dionysius also decided to devote a separate treatise to the subject of imitation, in which its nature and methods were not discussed rather incidentally – as part of literary-critical analyses – but in a quite systematic and comprehensive way. His work *On Imitation*, which consists of three books and is dedicated to an unknown Greek called Demetrius, is the fruit of this undertaking. That Demetrius is the addressee of *On Imitation* is revealed by Dionysius in his *Letter to Pompeius*.[4] However, in his treatise *On Thucydides*, Dionysius

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[1] In fact, even in Dionysius' historical writings, imitation is a central concept. Imitation is 'the central concept that may be said to encapsulate the intentions of all of Dionysius' works', according to De Jonge & Hunter (2018), 4.

[2] For a brief overview of theories of virtues of style, see section 3.5.2.

[3] Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett.* 4.2. On the preface to *Orat. Vett.*, see Hidber (1996).

[4] Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.1. Goold (1961), 188 argues that Demetrius, the author of the treatise *On Style*, is the same Demetrius as the addressee of Dionysius' *On Imitation*. For discussions on the addressee of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, see e.g. Aujac (1992), 163; Fornaro (1997), 163.

makes it clear that we should actually see all orators *in spe* as the intended audience of *On Imitation*.[5]

It is important to realise that Dionysius was writing in Greek to the Greek Demetrius on Greek authors of the classical past. From this Greek perspective, which, judging from the epitome, leaves no room for references to the political and social reality of the Roman world, we should analyse and interpret the treatise *On Imitation* and its aims. However, it is essential not to forget that the Greek Dionysius was also thoroughly Roman.[6] He lived in Rome, wrote the *Roman Antiquities* using both Greek and Roman sources, had many Roman acquaintances among scholars, teachers and pupils, and addressed some of his rhetorical treatises to Romans, like Metilius Rufus (*On Composition*) and Quintus Aelius Tubero (*On Thucydides*). Therefore, Dionysius' claim of offering practically useful recommendations for future rhetoricians in his handbook *On Imitation* strongly involves his own city of Rome in his programme of rhetorical imitation.

Unlike most of Dionysius' works that survived the wear and tear of time, *On Imitation* is only preserved in the form of a few fragments of the first and second book, and an epitome of the second book, which contains a Greek reading list. In this chapter, I present an analysis of the aims, audience, content and form (3.4) and the application of literary virtues (3.6) in *On Imitation*. I do so on the basis of the epitome which, judging from an important section on the historians, can be considered a rather faithful though reduced presentation of Dionysius' views.[7] This analysis, which is accompanied by a brief section on the history of canons (3.5.1) and theories of virtues of style (3.5.2), is preceded by a discussion of the remaining fragments

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[5] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.1-2. This passage is also discussed in section 3.4.

[6] For Dionysius' Greek and Roman network, see esp. De Jonge & Hunter (2018), 6-11. For other literature on the network of Greek and Roman intellectuals, see section 1.1, n. 2.

[7] Fortunately, we are able to compare a passage from Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*, in which he quotes an extensive section on the historians Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus from the second book of *On Imitation*, with the epitomised version of *On Imitation*. Deviations turn out to be not very substantial. Cf. Bonner (1939), 39: 'It is possible [...] to accept the epitome as representing the gist of Dionysius' remarks on the style of the authors mentioned in it'. Cf. also Aujac (1992), 15: 'Vaille que vaille, l'Épitomé nous livre au moins le plan suivi par Denys dans le livre II'. Cf. also Battisti (1997), 7: 'Pur nella sua frammentarietà, il testo pervenuto offre sufficienti indicazioni per ricostruire una precisa idea del concetto di imitazione letteraria così come viene elaborato da Dionigi [...]'. Correspondences between *On Imitation* and *On the Ancient Orators*, especially *On Lysias*, reinforce the supposition that the epitome reflects the tenor of Dionysius' views rather faithfully. On the close parallels between the system of virtues in *On Imitation* and *On Lysias*, see e.g. Bonner (1939), 45.

of *On Imitation* (3.3), including an often overlooked scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.11, 1371b6 which – as I will argue – is very likely to contain a quote from *On Imitation* (3.3.3), and an extensive quote from *On Imitation* in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* (3.3.4-6).

The objective of this chapter is to disclose Dionysius' purposes in *On Imitation* by distilling and reconstructing important mimetic themes and criteria, not only on the basis of what is left of *On Imitation*, but also taking into account other relevant works of his.[8] By analysing this fruitful material, which, as far as I can tell, has not been explored to this extent before, this chapter establishes that Dionysius tries to counterbalance his overt emphasis on poetical magnificence and beauty by insisting also on stylistic virtues which are more effective in Roman rhetorical practice, such as clarity.

Chapter 4, in which Quintilian's Greek and Latin reading lists (included in *Institutio* 10) will be central, forms a diptych together with the present chapter.[9] Both chapters build on the discussion of the use of mimetic terminology in Dionysius and Quintilian in chapter 2. By analysing the reading lists of Dionysius (first century BC) and Quintilian (first century AD), the present and the following chapter shed light on parallels and divergences in Dionysius' and Quintilian's ideas on rhetorical imitation.

Chapter 5 broadens the perspective by analysing the ideas on imitation expressed by Greeks and Romans who lived in the decades between Dionysius and Quintilian. The mimetic ideas of Aelius Theon, Seneca, Longinus, Pliny, Tacitus and Dio reveal that some of these authors tend to emphasise the aesthetic qualities of (often more ancient) literature suited for imitation, while others rather highlight the imitation of (often more recent) literature that is useful for Roman rhetorical practice. As we will see in the present chapter, Dionysius' work, in which both the aesthetic qualities of literature and its usefulness are taken into account, may well have played a steering role in their considerations.

Within the broader perspective of chapter 4 and 5, it will be argued that the parallels and divergences between Dionysius and Quintilian (and other Greek and Roman critics) can be explained by assuming that they drew from a shared discourse and conceptual framework

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[8] I.e. the essays *On the Ancient Orators*, *Letter to Pompeius*, *On Dinarchus* and *On Thucydides*.

[9] Hunter (2009), 108 remarks on both reading lists: 'The striking parallelism between the writers considered in the *Epitome* and the judgements passed on them and the similar material in Quintilian 10.1 [...] allows some confidence that the task of reconstruction [i.e. of the three books of *On Imitation*, M.S.] is not a hopeless one'. I would like to make the side note that caution is needed when reconstructing Dionysius' views on imitation on the basis of Quintilian's reading list as presented in book 10. There are striking correspondences in their approach of exemplary classical literature, but their preferences also show significant divergences.

of imitation, and adapted elements from this discourse and framework to their own rhetorical agendas. These agendas can be considered to reflect a gradual shift in Roman classicism – from a stage more characterised by a traditional, aesthetic approach of imitation to one more inclined to adhere to rhetorical-practical considerations.[10]

3.2 THE PUBLICATION OF *ON IMITATION*

From a passage of Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*, we know what each of the three books of *On Imitation* was about:

> Τούτων ὁ μὲν πρῶτος αὐτὴν περιείληφε τὴν περὶ τῆς μιμήσεως ζήτησιν, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος περὶ τοῦ τίνας ἄνδρας μιμεῖσθαι δεῖ ποιητάς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους, ἱστοριογράφους <τε> καὶ ῥήτορας, ὁ δὲ τρίτος περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι μέχρι τοῦδε ἀτελής.[11]

> The first of these contains an enquiry into the nature of imitation itself. The second discusses the question of which particular poets and philosophers, historians and orators, should be imitated. The third, on the question of how imitation should be done, is as yet incomplete.

Thus, Dionysius completed books 1 and 2 before or during the writing of his *Letter to Pompeius*, which in turn was a response to Pompeius' objections to Dionysius' treatment of Plato in *On Demosthenes*.[12] It is not certain whether the third book of *On Imitation*, of which nothing is left, was ever published or became just one of the studies which Dionysius did not prepare for publication.[13] His statement in *On Thucydides* that he 'had published his treatise *On Imitation* earlier' is inconclusive, for it does not mention the completion of the third book:

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[10] On this gradual shift, see esp. the end of section 4.8.3. This premise builds on De Jonge's ideas on the development of classicism between Dionysius and Dio. See De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.).

[11] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1. On this important passage, which can be considered a remaining fragment of *On Imitation*, see sections 3.3.4-6.

[12] It follows that *On Demosthenes*, just like two of the books of *On Imitation*, must have been completed when Dionysius wrote his *Letter to Pompeius*. Perhaps Dionysius had been working on at least his treatises *On Demosthenes* and *On Imitation* simultaneously.

[13] This is also suggested by Bonner (1939), 37.

Ἐν τοῖς προεκδοθεῖσι περὶ τῆς μιμήσεως ὑπομνηματισμοῖς ἐπεληλυθὼς οὓς ὑπελάμβανον ἐπιφανεστάτους εἶναι ποιητάς τε καὶ συγγραφεῖς […].[14]

In the published commentaries on imitation, I discussed those poets and prose authors whom I considered to be outstanding.

Although the discussion on the relative order of Dionysius' works continues, the treatise *On Imitation* is generally considered an early work.[15] The main point of disagreement between various scholars is whether the treatise was published before or during the composition of the important essays collected in *On the Ancient Orators*. Bonner (followed by Usher) argues that it is 'extremely unlikely' that Dionysius would have substituted Isaeus with Lycurgus in *On Imitation* after having devoted a special essay to Isaeus, whom he regards as a very important forerunner of Demosthenes in *On Isaeus*.[16] In my opinion, however, Dionysius' inclusion of Lycurgus instead of Isaeus could also have been inspired by the fact that Lycurgus was a more traditional and current choice, and the treatise *On Imitation* more elementary, practical and traditional in character than the essays on the orators. For example, Isaeus is never mentioned by Cicero, and is completely left out of the orators' list in Dio's *Oration* 18.11, in which Lycurgus does get mentioned. We do not know whether Lycurgus and Isaeus were both listed in the lost treatise that may have established the basis for later reading lists: *On the Style of the Ten Orators*, ascribed to Caecilius of Caleacte.[17]

Another argument sustaining the assumption that books 1 and 2 of *On Imitation* were written before *On the Ancient Orators*, is Bonner's observation that Demosthenes' unique character is not well expressed, and that he can hardly be differentiated from the other orators in *On Imitation*, notwithstanding his eminent position in *On the Ancient Orators*. Due to this

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[14] Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 1.1. Cf. also the spurious *Ars Rhet.* attributed to Dionysius: 10.6.35-38: τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ἔλεγχον τὸν τοῦ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀκολουθίαν μόνος Δημοσθένης ἐξέφυγεν κατὰ μίμησιν τὴν Πλάτωνος· πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ἐν τῷ περὶ μιμήσεως πειρασόμεθα ('only Demosthenes escaped from this criticism of not knowing the necessary order by imitating Plato: how and in what manner, we will put to the test in the treatise on imitation'); 10.19.10-11: μακρότερος ὁ περὶ μιμήσεως λόγος, ὃν ἀλλαχῇ μεταχειριούμεθα ('the discussion on imitation which we will have elsewhere is more extensive').

[15] E.g. Bonner (1939), 37; Grube (1965), 209; Innes (1989), 267; Aujac (1992), 11-13. For a brief discussion of the relative chronology of the works of Dionysius and a useful list of secondary literature on this subject, see De Jonge (2008), 20-25.

[16] Dion. Hal. *Is.* 1.1. Bonner (1939), 37; Usher (1974), xxv.

[17] We also do not know if this lost treatise preceded Dionysius' *On Imitation*. More on Caecilius of Caleacte in section 3.5.1.

discrepancy, Bonner concludes that the first two books of *On Imitation,* in which Dionysius' views are not yet crystallised, must have been published or composed when Dionysius started working on his essays *On the Ancient Orators.*[18] Bonner may well be right in assuming an early date for *On Imitation* on the basis of a perceived improvement and maturity of Dionysius' critical methods in later works, but we should also allow for the possibility of Dionysius writing a concise manual on imitation suitable for novice learners. For indeed, the intended audience as well as the text genre and text goal must have been decisive for the choices Dionysius made in *On Imitation*, and for the degree of profundity with which he explores his subject.[19]

Aujac on the other hand asserts that Dionysius started composing *On Imitation* after having published the first volume of *On the Ancient Orators* and the provisory version of the first essay of the second volume, *On Demosthenes.*[20] The first volume – consisting of the essays *On Lysias*, *On Isocrates* and *On Isaeus*, in which μίμησις is of central concern – would have urged Dionysius to sharpen his mind on the nature (book 1), the literary objects (book 2) and the methods (book 3) of imitation. Aujac is quite psychologizing in that she is trying to identify the methodological problems Dionysius must have come across while writing his essays *On Lysias*, *On Isocrates*, *On Isaeus* and *On Demosthenes.*[21] Her assumption is

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[18] Bonner (1939), 37, 43. Bonner, who clearly sees an improvement of Dionysius' critical methods over time, is rather negative about *On Imitation*, which is in his eyes an immature work in which Dionysius shows himself to be 'merely a calculator, a mechanical worker dogmatically stating his results for undisputed acceptance by his pupils' (*ibid*., 42). In my opinion, his criticism is rather unfounded, for it is only based on some fragments and an epitome. Grube (1965), 209-210, however, draws the same conclusion as Bonner on the basis of the extant fragment of *On Imitation* in the *Letter to Pompeius*. According to Grube, '[…] this well-known passage undoubtedly shows Dionysius at his worst and weakest'. Instead of assuming that Dionysius developed from a superficial critic in *On Imitation* to a competent one in later works, I would stress the importance of taking the intended audience, text genre and text goal of *On Imitation* into account (more on which in section 3.4). In my opinion, these factors more adequately explain Dionysius' tone and attitude in *On Imitation*. Cf. De Jonge (2017), 650-651, who (following Weaire (2005)) wants to explain differences in tone between Dionysius' remarks on Thucydides in his *Letter to Pompeius* and *On Imitation* on the one hand and *On Thucydides* on the other by focusing on Dionysius' professional situation and intended audience rather than by assuming a significant development in Dionysius' critical thinking.

[19] For a discussion of the aims and audience of *On Imitation*, see section 3.4.

[20] Aujac (1992), 11.

[21] Aujac (1992), 12. For a thorough discussion of *Parisinus gr*. 1741, see e.g. Harlfinger & Reinsch (1970), who argue about its date: 'will man innerhalb des 10. Jhs. eine nähere Eingrenzung wagen, kommen wohl am ehesten die Mitte oder die zweite Hälfte in Frage' (*ibid*., 32).

plausible, but perhaps too speculative. However, for the present chapter it is only important to realise that Dionysius composed *On Imitation* probably early in his writing career, and that he is likely to have been working on different treatises at the same time.

3.3 REMNANTS OF *ON IMITATION*

The epitome of book 2 is the only rather substantial remnant of *On Imitation*. Together with *inter alia* Dionysius' treatise *On Composition*, it was written on some folios of the manuscript *Parisinus gr*. 1741, dating back to the middle or second part of the tenth century.[22] All copies of the epitome derive from this unique source. Unfortunately, the text of the epitome is preserved in a corrupt and unreliable state, due to a large amount of corrections, restitutions, and conjectures by successive editors.[23] Therefore, due caution is needed when we try to reconstruct Dionysius' views, which, of course, also have been compressed by the epitomator – and perhaps sometimes slightly altered or differently ordered.[24]

We do not know who this epitomator was, nor what his intentions for summarizing the second book may have been. Usener suggests that he belonged to late-antique Neoplatonic circles.[25] Judging from the epitomator's rather straightforward and didactic approach, it seems likely that he aimed at providing students in oratory with a list for easy consultation of Greek authors whom Dionysius (and perhaps also he himself) considered worth reading and imitating.[26] Apart from the epitome of book 2, a few (possible) fragments of book 1 and 2 of *On Imitation* are preserved, which will be discussed in the following sections.

3.3.1 (POSSIBLE) FRAGMENTS OF BOOK 1

In this section, I examine the textual evidence of book 1 of *On Imitation*. As we have seen in section 2.2.1, Usener-Radermacher accept five remaining fragments representing the first book; of these five fragments, Aujac accepts only fragments II, III and V U-R (= 1, 2 and 3 Aujac = 1, 2 and 3 Battisti), because these are, unlike fragments I and IV U-R, introduced by

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[22] Aujac (1992), 23.

[23] *Ibid*. Whereas the text of the epitome of *On Imitation* is corrupt, the content seems to represent Dionysius' ideas rather faithfully. Cf. n. 7.

[24] Hunter (2009), 108 warns against the corruptness of the text.

[25] Usener (1889), 6.

[26] On the didactic tone of the epitome of *On Imitation*, see section 3.4.

an explicit reference to the first book of the treatise.[27] These three fragments are included in Syrianus' commentaries on Hermogenes' *On Issues* (fr. II U-R) and *On Types of Style* (frs. III and V U-R). To give a complete overview of all (possible) remaining textual evidence from *On Imitation*, I will discuss all five passages which are presented by Usener-Radermacher as fragments of *On Imitation*.[28] I adopt the numbering system of the fragments used in their edition, each time arguing whether or not the passage in question should be considered a fragment stemming from *On Imitation*.[29]

Fragment I U-R, which is very Aristotelian in phrasing, lacks a reference to *On Imitation*, and may well not derive from it. The passage provides an interesting definition of rhetoric as an artificial skill pertaining to persuasiveness in politics. It is attributed to Dionysius – sometimes, however, taken to be the grammarian Dionysius Thrax here:[30]

> **Fr. I U-R:** Ῥητορική ἐστι δύναμις τεχνικὴ πιθανοῦ λόγου ἐν πράγματι πολιτικῷ, τέλος ἔχουσα τὸ εὖ λέγειν.[31]
>
> Rhetoric is a technical ability of persuasive discourse in political content, having eloquence as its goal.

Like fragment III U-R (discussed above in section 2.2.1), which contains Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος as presented in *On Imitation*, this passage takes the form of a definition.[32] We can recognize some concepts which easily fit in with Dionysius' ideas on rhetorical imitation, but also with rhetorical theory in general: ability, persuasiveness, political

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[27] See Aujac (1992), 13-14, where she briefly explains her choice. As for the fragments of the first book of *On Imitation*, Battisti (1997) follows Aujac's choice and order.

[28] Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929). The fragments of *On Imitation* have been published by Usener (1889); some years later, they were published as part of Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) (= U-R). In the case of frs. V and VIII, U-R also render the words of Syrianus surrounding the quotes from Dionysius, as does Aujac (3 Aujac and 4 Aujac; 4 Aujac quotes more from Syrianus than VIII U-R). If relevant, I summarise Syrianus' words, but I do not render them as part of the fragments. In this, I follow Battisti (1997).

[29] Aujac's motivation for rejecting some fragments that were accepted by Usener-Radermacher is often very brief; I will reconsider the rejected fragments carefully.

[30] This fragment is attributed to Dionysius Thrax by the commentator Doxopater in his *Prolegomena in Aphthonii Progymnasmata*, 14.106.22-23 (*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Rabe 1931).

[31] This passage can also be found in *Epitome Artis Rhetoricae* 3.611.4-6 (*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Walz 1834) (without the explicitation that Dionysius is Dionysius Thrax).

[32] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti.

oratory, and eloquence or beauty of speech.

Rhetoric is characterised as a 'technical ability' (δύναμις τεχνική) – δύναμις also being the word used by Aristotle in his definition of rhetoric.[33] The term frequently occurs in Dionysius' works, as in other rhetorical treatises. In all its ambiguity, δύναμις evokes different domains which are closely intertwined: rhetorical ability, stylistic force and political reign (to which rhetoric is explicitly confined in this fragment – cf. ἐν πράγματι πολιτικῷ).[34] The notion of δύναμις returns in fragment V U-R, which is introduced by a reference to Dionysius' *On Imitation*.[35]

It is this fragment V U-R which provides us with a weighty argument for rejecting fragment I U-R as deriving from *On Imitation*. Whereas δύναμις denotes a technical ability in fragment I U-R, it occurs in a non-technical sense in fragment V U-R, i.e. as a reference to 'talent', the most important part of which is said to be located in 'nature' (φύσις). This may, of course, imply that the word δύναμις is not intrinsically connected with either art or nature, but derives its specific meaning from the context. However, the fact remains that in Dionysius' works the notion of δύναμις is preponderantly used to denote a power of natural origin. Since δύναμις τεχνική is probably an unusual and self-contradictory expression for Dionysius – and its Aristotelian resonances are suspiciously strong –, fragment I U-R may well be a conflation of different, Aristotelian-inspired sources, or a free adaptation of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric.[36]

There are other arguments for assuming a Peripatetic origin of the fragment. The words πιθανοῦ λόγου ('persuasive discourse') may also be considered an echo of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as an 'ability […] to see the available means of persuasion' (δύναμις […] τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν).[37] Of course, the idea of persuasiveness plays an important role in Dionysius' thinking; as one of the virtues of style, 'persuasiveness' (πειθώ) is closely intertwined with such important stylistic qualifications as 'vigour' (ἰσχύς) and 'strength' (ῥώμη), which are richly represented in his treatise *On Imitation*.[38] The notion of

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[33] Arist. *Rh*. 1.2, 1355b25-26. On the (ambiguity of the) term δύναμις in Aristotle, see Haskins (2013).

[34] For δύναμις meaning 'ability', see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 5.1. For δύναμις as a reference to the stylistic virtue of 'power', see e.g. *Lys*. 20.2. For δύναμις denoting 'political reign', see e.g. *Isoc*. 6.1.

[35] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti.

[36] We might consider the possibility that Dionysius adds the word τεχνική exactly because he conceives of δύναμις as a power of natural origin. However, I think he would have avoided the notion of δύναμις.

[37] Arist. *Rh*. 1.2, 1355b25-26.

[38] More on the literary virtue of πειθώ in n. 217.

persiasiveness is also at the core of an often overlooked scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.11, 1371b6, which is attributed to a 'Dionysius' and may well be regarded as a remnant of *On Imitation*, as I will argue in section 3.3.3. However, the insistence on rhetorical persuasiveness is so common in ancient rhetorical criticism that it offers insufficient proof for attributing fragment I U-R to Dionysius.

Finally, also the idea of rhetoric 'having eloquence as its goal' (τέλος ἔχουσα τὸ εὖ λέγειν) seems to be inspired by Aristotle's classification of discourse according to its specific 'goal' (τέλος) throughout his *Rhetoric*. The idea of eloquence leading to a 'goal' is for instance expressed in Dionysius' proclamation in *On Imitation* that Lysias' oratory reaches its 'goal' (σκοπός).[39] That 'speaking well' or 'eloquence' (τὸ εὖ λέγειν) is the ultimate goal of all imitative efforts by rhetoricians, becomes clear from Dionysius' introduction to his treatise *On Thucydides*, in which he explains that he wrote *On Imitation* 'in order that those who intend to write and speak well should have sound and approved standards' (ἵνα τοῖς προαιρουμένοις γράφειν τε καὶ λέγειν εὖ καλοὶ καὶ δεδοκιμασμένοι κανόνες ὦσιν).[40] However, this idea is also too common to allow for an attribution of fragment I U-R to Dionysius. Therefore, we should reject the fragment as a whole.

Fragment II U-R is included in a passage in which Syrianus discusses 'the divine Plato' (τῷ θείῳ Πλάτωνι). He explicitly attributes the quote to the first book of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*. It says that excellence in public discourse, art and science can only be achieved by a 'clever nature' (φύσις δεξιά), 'careful study' (μάθησις ἀκριβής) and 'laborious exercise' (ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος), i.e. by faculties belonging to nature, art and training:

> **Fr. II U-R:** Τρία ταῦτα τὴν ἀρίστην ἡμῖν ἔν τε τοῖς πολιτικοῖς λόγοις ἕξιν καὶ ἐν πάσῃ τέχνῃ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ χορηγήσει· φύσις δεξιά, μάθησις ἀκριβής, ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος· ἅ περ καὶ τὸν Παιανιέα τοιοῦτον ἀπειργάσατο.[41]

The following three elements will in our opinion be principal in attaining eminence in political oratory, every art and branch of science: a clever nature, careful study and

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[39] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.1.

[40] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.2. For the combination εὖ λέγειν in Dionysius, see also *Dem*. 51.5; *Dem*. 51.7; *Comp*. 1.5; *Comp*. 3.10.

[41] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog. Status* [133, 4], p. 4, 19 – p. 5, 5. For a brief discussion of this fragment, cf. Walker (2005), 138-139. The fragment is briefly referred to in section 2.2.1.

laborious exercise – things which also formed the man of [the deme of, M.S.] Paiania [i.e. Demosthenes, M.S.] as he is now.

The insistence on nature, study and exercise is in line with the ideas on the creation and reception of literary texts that Dionysius articulates elsewhere.[42] The notion of φύσις δεξιά points to the inventive, natural ability or talent with which a rhetorician should be endowed in order to create texts, whereas μάθησις ἀκριβής comprises his cognitive capacity to critically examine and receive literary theories.[43] The ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος, then, pertains to the need of

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[42] The notion of φύσις (as opposed to τέχνη) plays a crucial role in Dionysius' discussions on style, syntax and word order. Cf. De Jonge (2008), 251 ff. On φύσις with regard to an orator's natural ability or talent, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 34.2, 34.7. The word μάθησις is rare in Dionysius' works. On μάθησις and πολυμαθεία, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.5 (the moral attached to the introductory story of Zeuxis); cf. also Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 4.3, where he insists on the special attention one should pay to the 'wide learning' (πολυμαθεία) displayed by Aristotle. On the notion of ἄσκησις, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 52.1; *Comp.* 25.37. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 1.2, in which Dionysius states that rhetoricians *in spe* should have beautiful and approved 'standards' (κανόνες) by which to carry out 'their exercises' (τὰς […] γυμνασίας) (see also section 3.4). Also instructive on ἄσκησις is Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 11.4, where training of irrational sense is central: τοῦτο κἀγὼ τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τίς ἡ παρ' αὐτῷ χάρις ἐστὶ βουλομένοις μαθεῖν ὑποθείμην ἂν ἐπιτηδεύειν, χρόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ μακρᾷ τριβῇ καὶ ἀλόγῳ πάθει τὴν ἄλογον συνασκεῖν αἴσθησιν ('I would advise those readers of Lysias who wish to learn the nature of his grace to do the same: to train the irrational sensibility over a long period of time, by diligent practice, and irrational experience'.

[43] That 'invention' (εὕρεσις) for the most part depends on φύσις is clear from e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 34.2: ἐν ᾧ πρώτην μὲν ἔχει μοῖραν ἡ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τε καὶ νοημάτων εὕρεσις, δευτέραν δὲ ἡ τῶν εὑρεθέντων χρῆσις· ἐκείνη μὲν <ἐν> τῇ φύσει μᾶλλον ἔχουσα τὴν ἰσχύν, αὕτη δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ('in the treatment of this [i.e. content and style of Thucydides' speeches, M.S.] the first place is occupied by the invention of arguments and ideas, the second by the deployment of this material, the former depending more upon native talent, the latter more upon art'). The notion of φύσις cannot only pertain to the process of creating a text, but also to the reception of texts by means of irrational criteria. For the reception or judgement of works of art, which can be based on rational criteria (related to τέχνη) and irrational criteria (related to φύσις), see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 27.1: τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ τούτῳ τῷ γένει τῆς λέξεως ἄγεται, καὶ οὔτε τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον, ᾧ πεφύκαμεν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ἡδέων ἢ ἀνιαρῶν, ἀλλοτριοῦται πρὸς αὐτό, οὔτε τὸ λογικόν, ἐφ' οὗ διαγιγνώσκεται τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ καλόν ('observing that this style of writing [i.e. a Thucydidean passage full of sublime eloquence, beauty of language and rhetorical brilliance, M.S.] appeals to all minds alike, since it offends neither our irrational aesthetic faculty, which is our natural instrument for distinguishing the pleasant from the distasteful, nor our reason, which enables us to judge individual technical beauty'. For a discussion of Dionysius' concept of the rational and irrational perception of literature, cf. e.g. Schenkeveld (1975); Goudriaan (1989), 142-154, 230-240, 466-468; De Jonge (2008), 379-384 (esp. 384) (discussion of '*metathesis*'); Hunter (2018), 46 ff. For irrational perception esp. in relation to Lysias' virtue of 'grace' (χάρις), see Viidebaum (2018), esp. 117 ff.

persevering in repetitive writing practices which will imbue the rhetorician *in spe* with empirical skill. This triad of nature, art and training as (possible) prerequisites for attaining eminence in speech is a common one, also put forward by e.g. Cicero and Quintilian.[44]

Fragment II U-R calls into mind the remarkable distinction Dionysius makes between artificial and natural imitation in his essay *On Dinarchus* (a passage discussed in section 2.2.2).[45] Judging from Dionysius' words, natural imitation is obtained by 'familiarity' (συντροφία) – closely related to the 'clever nature' (φύσις δεξιά) in fragment II U-R – and 'intensive learning' (κατήχησις), which can be assimilated to the requirement of 'careful study' (μάθησις ἀκριβής) in fragment II U-R. By contrast, artificial imitation, which is said to be 'related' (προσεχής) to natural imitation, is based on the precepts of art and therefore always gives the impression of contrivance and unnaturalness. Here we observe that the concept of τέχνη in Dionysius' ideas on imitation can be ambiguous: on the one hand, it forms a crucial component of the imitative practice of a rhetorician, whereas on the other, it may effectuate a soulless copy of the original without any trace of spontaneous charm and freshness. Consequently, artistic skill within the process of imitation should always be balanced with natural talent and a profound affiliation with literary models.[46]

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[44] Cicero considers the triad of *ars-natura-exercitatio* e.g. in *Inv. rhet.* 1.2, and also brings in 'study' (*studium*) and 'gift of nature' (*facultas ab natura profecta*). Cf. Cic. *Brut.* 25. Quintilian discusses *ars* and *natura* in 2.19; in 3.5.1, he mentions *natura*, *ars* and *exercitatio*, and notices that some people also add *imitatio*.

[45] On this passage, see also Wiater (2011), 285.

[46] I do not agree with Whitmarsh (2001), who argues that Dionysius presents μίμησις as an 'artificial concoction' (*ibid.*, 71) and 'an artificial elaboration upon nature' (*ibid.*, 73), and who plays down the status of *natura* in Dionysius' notion of μίμησις by posing that 'the celebration of nature's limited role in the education of the rhetorician can be discerned in the very project of *On mimesis*' (*ibid.*, 72). Whitmarsh draws this conclusion mainly on the ground that both the programmatic narratives of the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis 'exemplify the artificiality of education through literary μίμησις' (*ibid.*, 73). Thus, we may infer that he does not reckon a 'clever nature' (φύσις δεξιά, *Imit.* fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti) among Dionysius' main concerns. This is contrary to the view of Untersteiner (1971), who argues that Dionysius was a staunch exponent of an irrational approach of literature both in its creation and evaluation. What seems to lay behind these conceptions is the persistent dichotomistic view of some scholars (among them Pavano (1936)) that ancient literary criticism was guided either by a rational and *ars*-related approach, or by an irrational and *natura*-related approach. Goudriaan (1989), 467 and De Jonge (2008), 255, n. 16 have rightly noticed (with references to relevant text passages) that Dionysius' works do not support this supposition, since they explicitly state that nature and art work together. E.g. in *Lys.* 11.5, Dionysius refuses to declare whether art or nature is the source of Lysias' charm. This suggests that the boundaries between artistic skill and natural talent are blurred, and that specific virtues of style may well be caused by a 'mix' of both, as Dionysius assumes (*ad loc.*). Cf. the interesting observations of Halliwell

Fragment III U-R contains a definition of 'imitation' (μίμησις) as opposed to 'emulation' (ζῆλος) formulated by Dionysius in his first book of *On Imitation*:

Fr. III U-R: Μίμησίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια διὰ τῶν θεωρημάτων ἐκματτομένη τὸ παράδειγμα. Ζῆλος δέ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς πρὸς θαῦμα τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἶναι καλοῦ κινουμένη.[47]

Imitation is an activity that moulds the model in accordance with the rules of art. Emulation is an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful.

Since these definitions of imitation and emulation were discussed at length in section 2.2.1, I will confine myself to some remarks on the connections between this fragment and the other ones.

Like fragment II U-R, this fragment, with its rather puzzling syntax and its vague Aristotelian resonance (cf. ἐνέργεια), suggests a complementary relationship between artistic skill – based on knowledge of 'theoretical rules' (θεωρήματα) – and natural abilities – related to a movement of the soul.[48] This complementary relationship between art and nature is crucial in Dionysius' mimetic theory, as we have already seen. Fragment V U-R (discussed below) will also focus on the role played by nature, as is true for fragment X U-R (discussed below), which is about the 'hidden artfulness' of Lysias' natural style.[49] The close thematic correspondences between these fragments (which are all provided with a reference to Dionysius' *On Imitation*) make it plausible that they at least reflect the gist of *On Imitation* and should be considered rather reliable remains of this treatise.

Fragment IV U-R (not accepted by Aujac and Battisti) originates from a rather obscure, anonymous source: *The Life of Epiphanius*. It contains the name of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but it is not a foregone conclusion that it derives from his work *On Imitation*:

(2002), who argues that 'nature and artistry form an intricate partnership in Dionysius' argument: a general human instinct for μίμησις becomes the basis of a highly artificial, self-conscious manipulation of language […]' (*ibid.*, 294).

[47] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog. De Formis* [265, 15], p. 3, 15-21.

[48] On the Aristotelian resonances of fragment III U-R, see section 2.2.1.

[49] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti. Fr. X U-R = 6a Aujac = 7 Battisti.

Fr. IV U-R: Ἔλεγεν γὰρ Διονύσιος ὁ Ἁλικαρνασσεύς, ὅτι πρόσωπα προσώποις ἀλλήλως θεωρούμενα ἢ καλλιστεύειν δύνανται ἢ ***. Κακοὶ καλοῖς συμφυρέντες ἐν ἑνὶ ξύλῳ τανυσθήσονται.[50] Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἕνα χιτῶνα φορῶν ἀνάξαντον τὸ σῶμα διαφυλάξει. Ἡ γὰρ πλείστη συντυχία πλείστους λόγους παρέχει· ὅπου δὲ πλεῖστοι λόγοι, πολυπειρία πραγμάτων διαφόρων.[51]

For Dionysius of Halicarnassus said that some characters, compared to others, are either able to be the most beautiful or ***. Ugly characters mixed with beautiful ones will be strained on one bow. For none of the people will keep his body combed again wearing only one chiton. For a great spontaneous mixture will provide the greatest amount of words: an abundance of different matters is where the greatest amount of words is.

The fragment as a whole is quite confusing and should probably be understood metaphorically. Two things stand out. In the first place, there is great emphasis on the idea of comparison (cf. πρόσωπα προσώποις ἀλλήλως θεωρούμενα, συμφυρέντες, συντυχία). Secondly, the language of variety is very prominent.

The insistence on comparison can be understood in different ways. It may be suggested that an aesthetic judgement can only be based on comparison and contrast (that means, things can only be designated as 'beautiful' in comparison with other things which are more or less beautiful, or not beautiful at all). Seen in this way, ἀλλήλως should probably be interpreted as παραλλήλως ('next to each other (in a contrastive way)'), and as such points to a judgement based on and made possible by dissimilarity between things which are placed together. In this interpretation, the fact that ugly characters mixed with beautiful ones 'will be strained on one bow' (ἐν ἑνὶ ξύλῳ τανυσθήσονται) would mean that beauty and ugliness ideally occur alternately in a text. As I understand it, this mixture of things of different nature results in a certain tension (cf. τανυσθήσονται).

Another way of interpreting the insistence on comparison and contrast is to assume that something is beautiful only in the context of other beautiful things – that means, beauty

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[50] U-R (1904-1929) (app. crit.) note that ἢ κακοὶ is attested, but suggest to read καλοὶ κακοῖς.

[51] Cf. Epiph. *Opera Omnia* 336e (ed. Petavius 1622) / t I, 25, 20 (Dindorf 1859-1862) (*non vidi*). Epiphanius (ca. 310-403 AD) was a saint from Constantia. Aujac (1992), 14 rejects this passage as a fragment from Dionysius' *On Imitation* because of its deviating content: 'son lien avec le traité qui nous occupe [i.e. *On Imitation*, M.S.] est loin d'être évident'.

exists by virtue of cumulation. Seen in this way, ἀλλήλως (or παραλλήλως) would mean that something beautiful can only be seen 'in conjunction with' things alike (i.e. other beautiful things), because they reinforce each other. Following this interpretation, ξύλον probably designates something negative: not a bow, but a tool for punishment or torture (option also given by LSJ). That ugly characters mixed with beautiful ones 'will be strained on one gallow' (ἐν ἑνὶ ξύλω τανυσθήσονται) would mean that both the beautiful and the ugly ones will perish, because of their juxtaposition.

In the last two sentences of this obscure fragment, the insistence seems to be on 'variety'. I suppose we should understand ἀνάξαντον as derived from ἀναξαίνω ('comb again' or 'card' – a verb e.g. used with respect to textile/wool), not from ἀναξαίνω ('tear open'). The combing possibly refers to a refreshment or cleaning of the surface of the body, i.e. the chiton. Then we read that 'wearing only one chiton, none of the people will keep his body combed again' (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἕνα χιτῶνα φορῶν ἀνάξαντον τὸ σῶμα διαφυλάξει), possibly meaning that when you have got only one jacket, you cannot clean it. The last sentence of this fragment transposes this rather enigmatic message to the field of rhetoric, arguing that a 'great spontaneous mixture' (πλείστη συντυχία) will provide the 'greatest amount of words' (πλείστους λόγους), just like wearing different chitons allows someone to display a great variety of colours, materials and cuts.[52] Thus, this passage seems to make a plea for pragmatic and stylistic 'variety' and 'change' (ποικιλία, μεταβολή), which play a crucial role in Dionysius' works.[53]

This interpretation is plausible when we realise that the image of a coat used to refer to a rhetorical style can also be found in other (Latin) sources, e.g. in Quintilian.[54] However, his use of this image serves a different purpose; instead of recommending stylistic ποικιλία, Quintilian warns for colourfulness that defeats its goal. In his discussion of the usefulness of historiography for the future rhetorician, Quintilian claims that historical works are very different from political speeches in that they are e.g. full of 'brilliance' (cf. *nitor*, 10.1.33) and not equipped for rhetorical battles, which need the 'arms of soldiers' (cf. *militum lacertis*, *ibid*.) rather than the 'muscles of athletes' (cf. *athletarum toris*, *ibid*.). As an example of a rhetorician whose ornamental speeches are too spectacular and ineffective, Quintilian nominates Demetrius of Phalerum, whose famous 'coat of many colours' (cf. *versicolorem*

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[52] The comparison goes wrong because someone cannot wear different chitons at the same time, whereas 'the greatest amount of words' is likely to be displayed in one text.

[53] See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 19.

[54] See e.g. Cic. *Brut*. 274; Tac. *Dial*. *de Orat*. 26. I owe the latter reference to Peterson (1891), 38.

vestem, ibid.) was not apt for the 'dust of the forum' (cf. *forensem pulverem, ibid.*).[55] This flamboyant coat alludes to Demetrius' adorned style which was of little use in the political arena.[56]

That being said, we return to the enigmatic fragment IV U-R, which is likely to contain a recommendation of stylistic 'variety' (ποικιλία) and alternation. Does it suggest an alternation between beautiful and ugly things which are juxtaposed, or between beautiful things and other beautiful things, which enhance and reinforce each other? The fragment is too obscure to allow for a solution; we can only speculate as to what would fit Dionysius' rhetorical ideas most. There are several passages in Dionysius' work in which the juxtaposition of words, characters and events of *different* nature and appearance comes to the fore. One example is Dionysius' story on Zeuxis selecting beautiful and less beautiful parts of his female models (*Imit.* 1.4); another is a passage from his treatise *On Composition*, in which he analyses Homer's juxtaposition of words of unattractive sounds and euphonious words in his catalogue of ships.[57] Because no style consists entirely of the finest words, this juxtaposition of beautiful and less beautiful words is, according to Dionysius, inevitable, and can result in a beautiful composition. On the basis of such passages, we might infer that fragment IV U-R as a whole touches upon Dionysius' discussion of the commendable alternation of a wide variety of words, characters and events of differing beauty.

The introduction to fragment V U-R makes explicit reference to the last part of the first book of Dionysius' *On Imitation*. In this fragment, 'power' or 'talent' (δύναμις) is discussed as being opposed to 'deliberate choice' or 'intention' (προαίρεσις, i.e. the choice of how to apply one's talent). The fragment makes it clear that since 'talent' (δύναμις) should be seen as a phenomenon to a great extent depending on 'nature' (φύσις) – and thus, by

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[55] Quintilian also mentions Demetrius of Phalerum in his reading list (10.1.80).

[56] Cf. Peterson (1891), *ad loc.*, who observes that '*vestis* is more than a metaphor here: Demetrius was as foppish in dress as he was in his style'. For the clothing metaphor, cf. also Quint. 8 *proem.* 20: *similiter illa translucida et versicolor quorundam elocutio res ipsas effeminat quae illo verborum habitu vestiantur* ('in the same way, the translucent and many-coloured style of some speakers emasculates subjects which are clothed in this kind of verbal dress').

[57] Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 16:19: ἅπας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατάλογος αὐτῶν τοιοῦτος καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα, ἐν οἷς ἀναγκασθεὶς ὀνόματα λαμβάνειν οὐ καλὰ τὴν φύσιν ἑτέροις αὐτὰ κοσμεῖ καλοῖς καὶ λύει τὴν ἐκείνων δυσχέρειαν τῇ τούτων εὐμορφίᾳ ('the whole of his [i.e. Homer's, M.S.] list is of the same character, as are many other passages in which, being forced to handle words which are not naturally beautiful, he places them in a setting of beautiful ones, counteracting their ungainly effect by the shapeliness of the others'). Cf. also *Comp.* 18.2, where Dionysius discusses the juxtaposition of words with a beautiful and mean rhythm. More on this in De Jonge (2008), 77-84.

implication, for a minor part also on 'art' (τέχνη) – we cannot control it as we wish.[58] By contrast, 'intention' (προαίρεσις) is a matter fully in our 'control' (ἐξουσία):

> **Fr. V U-R:** Τῆς μὲν δυνάμεως τὴν κυριωτάτην εἶναι μοῖραν ἐν τῇ φύσει, ἣν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν οἵαν ἀξιοῦμεν ἔχειν· τῆς δὲ προαιρέσεως οὐδὲν μέρος ἐστιν οὗ μὴ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν.[59]

> Of talent, the most important part lies in nature, of which it is not in our control to have it as we wish. But of intention, there is not a single part which is not in our control.

The opposition between δύναμις and προαίρεσις in fragment V U-R seems to correspond to the message in fragment II U-R, which shows that, in order to achieve literary perfection, the endowment with a 'clever nature' (φύσις δεξιά), significantly mentioned first, should be accompanied by the accomplishment of 'careful study' (μάθησις ἀκριβής) and 'laborious exercise' (ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος). The notion of δύναμις seems to be equivalent in value to φύσις δεξιά; προαίρεσις in turn can be seen as the fruit of μάθησις ἀκριβής and ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος. In Dionysius' works, the notion of προαίρεσις is more often contrasted with natural talent, for instance in the *Letter to Pompeius*, where Dionysius argues that 'Xenophon and Philistus […] did not resemble one another either in their nature or in the intentions they adopted' (Ξενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Φίλιστος […] οὔτε φύσεις ὁμοίας εἶχον οὔτε προαιρέσεις).[60]

As we have seen, of the five fragments which are said to represent the first book of *On Imitation*, fragment I U-R is of a different nature than the other ones. It contains a statement on the subject of rhetoric in general, not on imitation. Moreover, its Aristotelian resonances are suspiciously strong. On this basis, the fragment may be regarded as spurious.

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[58] For the term δύναμις used with reference to a faculty which may have been acquired through the mixture of nature and art, cf. also Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 11.5 (in this case: Lysias' 'grace' (χάρις)).

[59] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [265, 25], p. 5, 24 – p. 6, 5.

[60] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 4.1. The opposition between δύναμις and προαίρεσις is also a rather common one, e.g. occuring in Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 5.6, where Dionysius criticises Philistus' uniformity: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μεγέθεσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν συνεξισῶν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ ψοφοδεεῖς καὶ τοὺς <κρατίστους> δημηγοροῦντας καταλείπων τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς προαιρέσεις ὁμοίους ἅπαντας ποιεῖ ('he does not even make his speeches measure up to the stature of his speakers, but makes his popular orators so crowd-shy that they all alike abandon their faculties and their principles'). For other passages in which δύναμις and προαίρεσις are juxtaposed, see Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 12.8, 20.2; *Is*. 2.1; *Dem*. 2.3, 16.1, 41.1; *Thuc*. 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.1, 16.4, 24.12.

Fragment IV U-R remains problematic. It seems to emphasise the importance of pragmatic and stylistic mixture and variety, which are important topics in Dionysius' treatises. Although this fragment may be attributed to another Dionysius than 'our' Dionysius, we do well to allow for the possibility that it derives from *On Imitation*.

Fragments II and V U-R bear witness to a rather coherent view on the very important roles of natural talent on the one hand and active, technical effort on the other in the imitative process of composing a text. Finally, fragment III U-R clearly defines and contrasts the notions of imitation and emulation, also by alluding to the concepts of φύσις and τέχνη. Therefore, these fragments, which are thematically interconnected and provided with a reference to Dionysius' *On Imitation*, are likely to be genuine remains of the treatise's first book.

3.3.2 (POSSIBLE) FRAGMENTS OF BOOK 2

In addition to the epitome, a few fragments and a long quote in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* are preserved of the second book of *On Imitation*.[61] In their edition of *On Imitation*, Usener-Radermacher included what they consider to be a fragment (VI^a) in which there seems to be a reference to Dionysius' introductory story on the painter Zeuxis.[62] The passage is found in the Byzantine grammarian and philologist Maximus Planudes, who may have adapted it from Dionysius' *On Imitation*. Whether Planudes is quoting or paraphrasing from his source, remains unclear. Neither can we establish whether his source was the original of *On Imitation*, the epitome or another text, but what we can observe is that his rendition of the story of a 'certain painter' corresponds to the Zeuxis story in *On Imitation*'s epitome, although only in broad outline:

> **Fr. VI^a U-R:** Ὅτι ζωγράφος τις κάλλος ἄριστον γράψαι βουλόμενος τὰς κατὰ τὴν χώραν καλὰς γυναῖκας συνήθροισε, καὶ ἀφ' ἑκάστης τὸ τῶν μελῶν μιμούμενος κάλλιστον, τῆς μὲν ὀφθαλμούς, τῆς δὲ ῥῖνα, τῆς δὲ ὀφρύας καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλης ἄλλο (οὐδὲ

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[61] In this section, I will not discuss Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. XI U-R. This fragment is adopted from *Ars Rhet*., falsely attributed to Dionysius. I quote this fragment in n. 14 (first quote). I will also pay no further attention to Dionysius' own reference (ὁ δὲ τρίτος περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι) to book 3 of *On Imitation*, presented as a fragment in the editions of Usener-Radermacher and Aujac. This is a borrowing from Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1.

[62] In the edition of U-R, the text of the epitome is listed as fr. VI, whereas the fragment under discussion is numbered 'VI^a'. This fragment VI^a is not accepted by Aujac (1992) and Battisti (1997).

γὰρ ἦν ἁπάσας καλὰ φέρειν τὰ πάντα), κάλλιστον εἶδος ἀπηκριβώσατο. Ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτο λαβεῖν ἐκ τοῦ Ὁμήρου. Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὑπογράφων τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ὄμματα (μὲν φησί) καὶ κεφαλὴν ἴκελος Διὶ <τερπικεραύνῳ>, Ἄρεϊ δὲ ζώνην, στέρνον δὲ Ποσειδάωνι.[63]

A painter who wanted to depict the utmost beauty, gathered the beautiful women from the region, and while he was imitating of each of them their most beautiful part – the eyes from this one, the nose from another one, the eyebrows from yet another one and from each of them something different – (for it was not possible that they all were beautiful in all parts), he carefully worked out the most beautiful form. He seems to have been adopting this from Homer. For the latter says in describing Agamemnon that with respect to his eyes and face he was like Zeus hurling the thunderbolt, with respect to his waist like Ares, and with respect to his breast like Poseidon.[64]

Deviations from the epitome's Zeuxis story occur in the omission of the name of the story's protagonist, but also in the more detailed description of the physical objects of imitation (specific facial parts). Although it is striking that nothing is said either on the city of Croton (Zeuxis' working place), or on Helen (his object of painting) and the virginal status of the selected Crotonian women, we may have enough reason to assume that Planudes indeed had a version of *On Imitation* at his disposal, if only because of the remarkable parallels in the choice of words between the epitome's Zeuxis story and Planudes' rendition of a remarkably similar narrative.[65] The associative reference to Homer seems to be Planudes' own addition.

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[63] Cf. 'Intorno ai Collectanea di Massimo Planude', in *Rivista di filologia* 2.157c47 (ed. Piccolomini 1874) (*non vidi*).

[64] The reference is to Hom. *Il*. 2.477-479.

[65] I.e. συνήθροισε ('he gathered') vs. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4: ἠθροίσθη ('were collected') (note, however, that ἠθροίσθη is used not for assembling the maidens, but for assembling their most beautiful features in one single picture of a body). Other comparable expressions are: κάλλος ἄριστον ('utmost beauty') vs. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4: τέλειον [καλὸν] εἶδος ('a perfect [beautiful] form'); ἀφ' ἑκάστης τὸ τῶν μελῶν μιμούμενος κάλλιστον ('imitating of each of them their most beautiful part') vs. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4: ὃ δ' ἦν ἄξιον παρ' ἑκάστῃ γραφῆς […] κἀκ πολλῶν μερῶν συλλογῆς ('what was worth paining in each of them […] and from the compilation of many parts'); οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἁπάσας καλὰ φέρειν τὰ πάντα ('for it was not possible that they all were beautiful in all parts') vs. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4: οὐκ ἐπειδήπερ ἦσαν ἅπασαι καλαί ('not that they were all beautiful').

Fragment VII U-R encompasses the extensive quote from *On Imitation* in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*. As it is of great interest, it will be discussed separately in sections 3.3.4-6.[66]

Fragment VIII U-R can be found in Syrianus' commentary on Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*. In the introduction to this fragment, Dionysius is said to have proclaimed that a discourse which should be labelled 'poetical' is characterised 'by figurative, metaphorical and dithyrambic composition' (τροπικῇ τε καὶ μεταφορικῇ καὶ διθυραμβώδει συνθήκῃ), and that Gorgias' political speeches bear witness to this.

Syrianus' reference to Dionysius' criticism of Gorgias is triggered by Hermogenes' discussion of different types of style. In the introduction to his treatise, Hermogenes indicates that he will discuss these types of style on themselves before analysing the style of an author who pre-eminently combines all the types – whom he considers to be the orator Demosthenes. A demonstration of i.a. the 'individual features' (τά […] μέρη καθ᾽ ἕκαστον) of this author and the 'general character' (τὸ ὅλον εἶδος) of his work will serve as an account of every individual type of style.[67] Moreover, it will clarify how these types can be combined and 'how, as a result of these combinations, the style can be poetical or unpoetical' (καὶ πῶς μιγνυμένων τῶν αὐτῶν τοτὲ μὲν ποιητικός, τοτὲ δὲ οὐ ποιητικός).[68] In his comment on this passage in Hermogenes, Syrianus refers to Dionysius as follows:

> **Fr. VIII U-R:** Πρῶτος γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, *ὥς φησι Διονύσιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ μιμήσεως δευτέρῳ*, τὴν ποιητικὴν καὶ διθυραμβώδη λέξιν εἰς τοὺς πολιτικοὺς εἰσήνεγκε λόγους.[69]
>
> He [i.e. Gorgias, M.S.] was, as Dionysius argues in the second book of *On Imitation*, the first to introduce a poetical and dithyrambic vocabulary in political speeches.

Syrianus adds that poetical discourse shares in a 'beautiful rhythm and a continual harmony' (εὐρυθμίας μὲν καὶ ἁρμονίας ὁμαλῆς) caused by the 'meticulous composition of periods and clauses' (περιόδων καὶ κώλων ἀπηκριβωμένην σύνθεσιν), and is 'far away from rivalling with the dithyrambic and poetical composition such as the style of Isocrates is' (τὴν δέ γε διθυραμβώδη καὶ ποιητικὴν συνθήκην ἥκιστα ζηλώσαντα, οἵα τίς ἐστιν ἡ Ἰσοκράτους

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[66] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. VII U-R = 7 Aujac = 5 Battisti.

[67] Hermog. *Id*. 1.1.48-49.

[68] Hermog. *Id*. 1.1.52-53.

[69] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. VIII U-R = 4 Aujac = 4 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [266, 31], p. 10, 9-20. On the views of Gorgias, Dionysius and Longinus on poetical speech, see e.g. De Jonge (2008), 332-340.

φράσις). After having mentioned Isocrates, Syrianus quotes Dionysius again, this time referring to his treatise *On Isocrates*, in which Dionysius expresses his distaste for the orator's use of rhythms which are 'not far removed from those of verse' (οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντι τοῦ ποιητικοῦ μέτρου).[70]

From Syrianus' (introduction to the) quote from the second book of *On Imitation*, it becomes clear that Dionysius was of the opinion that 1) dithyrambic elements are inherent to poetical discourse, and 2) Gorgias introduced poetical and dithyrambic vocabulary in political speeches.[71] There are several passages in which Dionysius pays attention to the (unsuccessful) incorporation of dithyrambic discourse by prose writers. Especially for Gorgias' grand prose style, which heavily leans against poetical discourse, Dionysius expresses his contempt by using the term 'dithyramb' (διθύραμβος).[72] We find this word also in his deprecatory characterisations of the grand styles of Thucydides and Plato.[73]

It is striking that Gorgias is mentioned in this (and the following) fragment, whereas he is entirely omitted in the epitome of the second book.[74] From the existence of these two fragments, it follows that Dionysius may have mentioned more and/or other authors than those recorded by the epitomator.

In the quite extensive fragment IX U-R of book 2, Dionysius elaborates on his idea that Gorgias transferred poetical expression to political speeches to distinguish himself from ordinary people. Gorgias is contrasted with Lysias, who did the opposite: his style was, according to Dionysius, clear and common for all people, in accordance with his belief that current and simple language would be best suited for persuading the layman:

Fr. IX U-R: Γοργίας μὲν τὴν ποιητικὴν ἑρμηνείαν μετήνεγκεν εἰς λόγους πολιτικούς, οὐκ ἀξιῶν ὅμοιον τὸν ῥήτορα τοῖς ἰδιώταις εἶναι. Λυσίας δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐποίησε· τὴν γὰρ φανερὰν ἅπασι καὶ τετριμμένην λέξιν ἐζήλωσεν ἔγγιστα νομίζων εἶναι τοῦ πεῖσαι τὸν ἰδιώτην τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ὀνομασίας καὶ ἀφελές· ἥκιστα γὰρ ἄν τις εὕροι τὸν Λυσίαν

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[70] Dion. Hal. *Isoc*. 2.5.

[71] From this latter statement it follows that dithyrambic vocabulary can be distinguished from poetical discourse, though it also forms an intrinsic part of it.

[72] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 3.4 The dithyramb is a choral song of relatively free harmony and form, performed in honour of Dionysus.

[73] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 29.4 (on Thucydides); *Dem*. 6.4 (on Plato); *Dem*. 7.4 (on Plato); *Dem*. 29.4 (on Plato). More on Dionysius' characterisation of the styles of Gorgias, Thucydides and Plato as 'dithyrambic' in De Jonge (2008), 354.

[74] Aujac (1992), 21 also observes this.

τροπικῇ καὶ μεταφορικῇ λέξει κεχρημένον· σεμνὰ δὲ καὶ περιττὰ καὶ μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα ποιεῖ τοῖς κοινοτάτοις ὀνόμασι χρώμενος καὶ ποιητικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος κατασκευῆς.[75]

Gorgias transferred poetical expression to political speech, for he did not consider it right for the rhetorician to be equal to laymen. By contrast, Lysias did the opposite: he aspired to a style clear to all and used constantly by all, believing that a current and simple vocabulary comes closest to persuading the laymen. Indeed, one could least of all find Lysias using figurative and metaphorical speech: he makes his subject matter seem solemn and extravagant and grand by applying the commonest words and not adhering to poetical ornamentation.

From other works of Dionysius, it becomes clear that he preferred the approach of Lysias to that of Gorgias.[76] In his essay *On Lysias*, but also in the epitome of book 2 of *On Imitation*, Dionysius highly recommends Lysias' purity, common language and clarity.[77] In the discussion of fragment VIII U-R above, I already touched upon Dionysius' aversion to Gorgias' 'dithyrambic' prose style. In *On Lysias*, Gorgias is introduced as a deterrent example of an orator who, when trying to add 'colour' (κόσμος) to his speeches, chooses to resort 'to poetical expression' (εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν), 'using a lot of metaphors, exaggerations and other forms of figurative language' (μεταφοραῖς τε πολλαῖς χρώμενοι καὶ ὑπερβολαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τροπικαῖς ἰδέαις).[78] By contrast, Lysias succesfully 'makes his subject matter seem solemn, extravagant and grand by applying the commonest words and not adhering to poetical ornamentation' (καὶ σεμνὰ καὶ περιττὰ καὶ μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα ποιεῖ τοῖς κοινοτάτοις χρώμενος ὀνόμασι καὶ ποιητικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος κατασκευῆς).[79]

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[75] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [266, 31], p. 11, 19 - p. 12, 3.

[76] As a critic, Dionysius was not really interested in designating one particular composition type and style as superior to another in the process of literary imitation, because he expected his students to imitate all styles in a creative and eclectic way. He nevertheless expressed his preference for the 'well-blended' middle style, e.g. in *Comp*. 24. What Dionysius did care about was excellence in one of the three styles he distinguished: the grand, the plain (of which Lysias was the role model) and the middle, which he himself considered most worth pursuing.

[77] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 2.1, 3.8-9, 4.1; Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.1.

[78] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 3.3.

[79] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 3.2. Note that this is the same sentence as the final sentence of Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti, except for the reversal of the order of χρώμενος ὀνόμασι.

As for fragment X U-R, Syrianus states that it comes from the second book of *On Imitation*, but its message can, in a slightly different form, also be found in *On Lysias* 8.5. Like the former fragment, the quote casts light on the subject of poetical discourse. This time, however, Dionysius is not concerned with its presence, but with its absence in prose. Syrianus declares that for Dionysius, 'unpoetical' is 'what seems to be not artful' (τὸ δοκοῦν ἀνεπιτήδευτον εἶναι), and he critically notes that Dionysius would have done better completely to avoid the term 'unpoetical' in favour of 'not artful'. The following is, according to Syrianus, what Dionysius had to say about the seemingly loose and not artful style of Lysias:

> **Fr. X U-R:** Δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀποίητός τις εἶναι καὶ ἀτεχνίτευτος ὁ τῆς ἑρμηνείας αὐτοῦ [τοῦ Λυσίου] χαρακτήρ, καὶ πολλοῖς ἂν καὶ τῶν φιλολόγων παράσχοι δόξαν, ὅτι ἀνεπιτηδεύτως καὶ οὐ κατὰ τέχνην, αὐτομάτως δέ πως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε σύγκειται. Ἔστι δὲ παντὸς ἔργου μᾶλλον τεχνικοῦ κατεσκευασμένος· πεποίηται γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀποίητον καὶ δέδεται τὸ λελυμένον, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ δοκεῖν δεινῶς κατεσκευάσθαι τὸ δεινὸν ἔχει.[80]

> His [Lysias'] type of style seems to be an unpoetical and artless one, and he may give many people, even among philologists, the impression that he is composing unartfully and without competence, but rather accidentally and casually. But his style is more artificially constructed than whatever technical work: for the unpoetical element of his work is the fruit of effort and its loose character is strongly tied, and even in the respect in which it does not seem to be skilfully constructed, it possesses skill.

The last line of this fragment is quoted a second time in Syrianus' commentary on Hermogenes' *On Types of Style* (fr. 6b Aujac), though in a slightly different form.[81]

The fragment, along with many passages in the treatise *On Lysias*, clearly shows that a casual style such as Lysias' often creates the impression that the author lacks the ability to compose his work in a solid way and in accordance with the rules of the art. Looseness of style, however, certainly does not always indicate a lack of talent, according to Dionysius. In

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[80] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. X U-R = 6a Aujac = 7 Battisti. Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [266, 31], p. 12, 7-15.

[81] Syrian. *In Hermog*. *De Formis* [394, 24], p. 87, 19-21.

the case of Lysias, it is established by great virtuosity which completely obscures itself.[82] This concealment of craftsmanship requires even more artistic competence than the overt display of it.

The four fragments of the second book of *On Imitation* discussed above show that Dionysius did not intend to provide his readers with a mere enumeration of classical authors, devoid of any theoretical consideration. Yet, this is the impression we get from him in the epitome, in which his views on imitation seem to be rather simplistic and unfounded. Judging from the remaining fragments, however, we can conclude that Dionysius also elaborated on subjects like art and nature, the poetical element in prose, and on stylistic nonchalance as a mask of great artistic skill – themes which are also prominent in the rest of his works.

3.3.3 AN OVERLOOKED FRAGMENT?

In his commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1.11, 1371b6), Spengel points to the existence of a scholion in the margin of codex A, containing a reference to 'Dionysius':[83]

> Καὶ ὁ Διονύσιός φησιν ὅτι τὰ πιθανὰ κρείττονά εἰσι τῶν ἀληθῶν ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ μιμήματα τῶν πρωτοτύπων, οἷον βοῦν μὲν ἰδεῖν τίκτουσαν οὐ θαυμαστόν, τὴν δὲ ποιηθεῖσαν τῷ Φειδίᾳ βοῦν τίκτουσαν ἰδεῖν θαυμαστόν.

> Also Dionysius says that what is convincing is more powerful than what is true, and that imitations are more powerful than their models: for example, seeing a cow bearing is not miraculous, whereas seeing that the cow made by Phidias is bearing is.

In *Rhetoric* 1.11, 1371b, Aristotle discusses the pleasure of learning and admiration, and all things connected, such as good works of imitation which are pleasant even if the object of imitation is not.[84] Observing these imitations excites pleasure which arises from the recognition of 'likeness' (συλλογισμός) between model and imitation – which is an act of learning. Aristotle adds that the same may be said from sudden changes and escapes from danger, which induce 'wonder' (θαῦμα).

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[82] There are many comparable comments of Dionysius concerning Lysias' (hidden) skill in the treatise *On Lysias*. See e.g. *Lys*. 8.4 ff., but also 17.1, where Lysias is called 'the most skilful' (δεξιώτατον) of all orators in composing introductions.

[83] Spengel (1867), 166.

[84] I touched upon this passage in section 2.2.4, n. 80.

Spengel doubts whether the quote in the scholion to this passage is to be attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He claims that the author of this scholion could hardly have used other works of Dionysius than those known to us, and that in Dionysius' treatises which have stood the test of time, ideas are expressed which are not compatible with the message of the scholion. Spengel must have thought of Dionysius' discussion of both 'persuasiveness' and 'truthfulness' as (equally) important literary virtues, as well as those passages reflecting the idea which is at the heart of Dionysius' theory of imitation: that of the (preliminary) supremacy of models over imitations (e.g. *On Dinarchus* 7.5-7).[85]

The interesting scholion is rescued from oblivion by Radermacher, who admits that the idea of convincing things being superior to true things and imitations being superior to their models cannot be reconciled with Dionysius' surviving works.[86] However, Radermacher thinks it is 'well thinkable' ('wohl denkbar') that Dionysius has emphasised the *possibility* of the superiority of τὰ πιθανά and τὰ μιμήματα to truth and models, suggesting that in the scholion the word 'sometimes' (ἐνίοτε) has disappeared after φησὶν ὅτι.[87] He supposes that the reference in the scholion may be to a fragment of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*. I agree with this hypothesis, accepting one of Radermacher's two arguments and proposing other arguments to make a reference to a fragment of Dionysius' *On Imitation* in the Aristotle-scholion more plausible.

Supporting his suggestion that *On Imitation* is the original source of the quote, Radermacher points to fragment I U-R, which contains the definition of rhetoric as δύναμις τεχνικὴ πιθανοῦ λόγου ('technical ability of persuasive discourse'). As I have argued above, it is plausible that this definition is a conflation of different, Aristotelian-inspired sources, or a free adaptation of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric. Therefore, unlike Radermacher, I do not

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[85] For the importance of both persuasiveness and truthfulness, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Din*. 7.2, where Dionysius is concerned with establishing whether texts should be attributed to Lysias or to Dinarchus: ἐὰν δὲ μήτε <τὸ> χάριεν ὅμοιον εὑρίσκῃ μήτε τὸ πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀκριβὲς μήτε <τὸ> τῆς ἀληθείας ἁπτόμενον, ἐν τοῖς Δεινάρχου λόγοις αὐτοὺς ἐάτω ('but if he [i.e. the man who tries to attribute texts to Lysias or Dinarchus, M.S.] finds no such qualities of grace or persuasiveness or precision of language or close adherence to reality, let him leave them [i.e. the texts he examines, M.S.] among the speeches of Dinarchus'). In Dion. Hal. *Din*. 7.6, Dionysius endows original models with 'a certain spontaneous grace and freshness' (αὐτοφυής τις ἐπιτρέχει χάρις καὶ ὥρα), whereas imitations run the risk of being contrived and unnatural. See section 2.2.2.

[86] Radermacher (1940), 78-80.

[87] Radermacher (1940), 79: 'man könnte dem geforderten Sinne geradezu durch Einschub von ἐνίοτε hinter φησὶν ὅτι aufhelfen'.

consider this fragment an argument for maintaining that Dionysius in the scholion is 'our' Dionysius.

To announce *On Imitation* as the possible object of reference in the Aristotle-scholion, Radermacher also brings in the Zeuxis story at the beginning of the epitome of the second book of *On Imitation*, which is centered around the idea that reality can be sublimated in artistic imitations – that means, that imitations should ideally surpass their objects through skilful selection and arrangement. This is in line with the statement in the scholion that 'imitations are [or – following Radermacher's plausible suggestion – 'are sometimes', M.S.] more powerful than their models' and the proclamation that Phidias' representation of a bearing cow is 'marvelous' (θαυμαστόν), in contrast to the real-life scene of a bearing cow.[88] In my opinion, the Zeuxis story offers Radermacher a valid argument for reconsidering the Aristotle-scholion as a probable remnant of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, which simply must have been overlooked by Usener, his forerunner Rössler and by Rabe, who edited the scholia to Aristotle.[89] There are, however, more reasons to suppose that it stems from Dionysius' *On Imitation*, as I will show.

Seeing that Dionysius for reasons of clarity and illustration often refers to art and architecture, and the epitome of *On Imitation* mentions the painter Zeuxis, the reference to the artist Phidias, one of the greatest Athenian sculptors from the fifth century BC and a prominent figure in Dionysius' works, should come as no surprise. Therefore, in my opinion, Radermacher's suggestion that the scholion's illustrative sentence (οἷον βοῦν μὲν ἰδεῖν τίκτουσαν etc.) is an addition of the scholiast, is an unconvincing attempt to solve the problem that we do not know of a sculpted cow made by Phidias. In fact, it is quite possible that he made one, just as his contemporary Myron is known to have made a cow of bronze. Radermacher's proposition that the second-century AD sculptor Phidias, 'son of Phidias', is meant instead of the fifth-century BC Athenian sculptor is, to my taste, an improbable argument for holding a scholiast, and not Dionysius, responsible for the remarkable οἷον βοῦν-sentence.[90]

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[88] Radermacher (1940), 79 notes that the example (οἷον βοῦν μὲν ἰδεῖν τίκτουσαν etc.) may well be an addition of the scholiast.

[89] *Ibid*. The scholion is not mentioned in editions of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, except for the edition of Battisti (1997), 28-29, n. 74, who excludes the fragment because of scarcity of evidence ('data la scarsità di evidenza').

[90] The names of the second-century AD Phidias and his brother Ammonius occur on a basalt statue (159 AD) of a crouching monkey, discovered in the great Serapeum in Rome.

The scholion also contains other elements which frequently occur in the works of Dionysius. The virtue of stylistic 'persuasiveness' is proclaimed everywhere in his works; in the epitome of *On Imitation*, Herodotus is said to be superior to Thucydides i.a. 'in persuasion' (πειθοῖ).[91] The criterion of 'truthfulness' appears four times in the epitome, and is scattered throughout Dionysius' other treatises.[92] Quite rare is the word μίμημα; it is attested once in the epitome of *On Imitation*, once in *On Thucydides* and once in *On Composition*.[93] The word πρωτότυπον could be a hapax in Dionysius' works; we do find its equivalent ἀρχέτυπον. Finally, the image of a cow is absent in Dionysius' treatises, but 'conception' and 'birth' (cf. τίκτουσαν), 'observation' (cf. ἰδεῖν) and 'marvel' (cf. θαυμαστόν) are crucial concepts in the epitome's introductory stories of the ugly farmer (whose wife observes beautiful pictures and brings forth beautiful children) and the painter Zeuxis (who closely observes his female models).[94] The emotion of 'marvel' (θαῦμα) is even intrinsically connected with the activity of ζῆλος in fragment III U-R of *On Imitation*.[95]

On the basis of these observations, it must be considered plausible that the scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.11, 1371b6 discovered by Spengel refers to a lost passage in Dionysius' *On Imitation*, in which Dionysius touches upon important mimetic theoretical concepts (persuasion, truth, and the interconnection between literary model and imitation) in an appealing and highly illustrative way.

3.3.4 A QUOTE IN THE *LETTER TO POMPEIUS*

That Dionysius' work *On Imitation* was less schematic than we may conclude from the epitome, is suggested not only by the fragments preserved by Syrianus, but also by an important fragment cited by Dionysius himself in his *Letter to Pompeius*. When comparing the fragment with the passage in the epitome, we can conclude that the epitomator has presented the views of Dionysius rather faithfully, though in a strongly condensed form.[96]

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[91] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3.

[92] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.1; 2.12; 5.1; 5.3. *Imit*. 3.8 discusses Philistus' usefulness 'for real debates' (πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθεῖς ἀγῶνας).

[93] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.5; *Thuc*. 42.5; *Comp*. 16.3.

[94] See section 1.1-3.

[95] See the discussion of this fragment in section 2.2.1; 3.3.1.

[96] Aujac (1992), 18-20 is not very positive about the epitomator's work, but she does admit that the epitomised section on style properly reflects the tenor in the quote from the *Letter to Pompeius*: 'sur le style en revanche, l'Épitomé fournit un résumé assez fidèle de ce qu'avait dit Denys […]'.

The *Letter to Pompeius* is Dionysius' response to Cn. Pompeius Geminus, who received copies from Dionysius' works from Zeno, a friend of both of them, who is otherwise unknown to us.[97] Most scholars assume that Pompeius was Greek, but it is also suggested that he was Roman.[98] The character and 'nationality' of the addressee is a matter of great importance, as recent articles of Weaire and De Jonge have shown regarding Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* and *On Thucydides*.[99] As De Jonge observes, in the *Letter to Pompeius* (which quotes a passage from *On Imitation*), Dionysius criticises Thucydides rather frankly for his anti-Athenian attitude (*Pomp*. 3.15), whereas in *On Thucydides* 8.1, the attentive reader notices that Dionysius expresses the same criticism in a more implicit and concealed way.

De Jonge, following Weaire, suggests that this discrepancy can be explained by taking into account Dionysius' professional situation and his intended audience rather than by assuming a significant development in Dionysius' critical thinking. The treatise *On Thucydides* was addressed to the Roman Aelius Tubero, one of the passionate admirers of Thucydides in Rome, who was obviously discontented with Dionysius' explicit rejection of Thucydides' anti-Athenian bias in *On Imitation*.[100] The recipient of *On Imitation*, however, was, as we have seen, the otherwise unknown Greek Demetrius, who probably did not take offence at such criticism.

We cannot determine Pompeius' 'nationality', but what we do know is that he objected to the critical judgements Dionysius passed on Plato in *On Demosthenes*.[101] This treatise contains a famous comparison between Plato and Demosthenes, in which Dionysius shows how Plato (just like Isocrates) in his application of the middle style falls short in comparison with Demosthenes' superior stylistic qualities.

After having received an objection from Pompeius to his critical assessments of Plato, Dionysius – insisting on the fact that he too is an admirer of Plato – defends his σύγκρισις between Plato and Demosthenes by arguing that he intended to do justice to Demosthenes as

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[97] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 1.1. Cf. Rhys Roberts (1900), 439-440, who observes that nothing is known about Pompeius and Zeno. For scholarly discussions of Dion. Hal. *Pomp*., see e.g. Heath (1989b); Fornaro (1997), esp. 162 ff.; Wiater (2011), 132-154.

[98] Hidber (1996), 7, n. 50.

[99] Weaire (2005); De Jonge (2017).

[100] We know from e.g. Cic. *Orat*. 30-32 that Thucydides was very popular in Rome.

[101] Pompeius stands at the beginning of a tradition in which Dionysius is sharply criticised for his harsh attitude towards Plato.

the greatest of all literators, not as one of the best. The comparative method, so Dionysius, is the only truthful tool of analysis to determine whose style is the most excellent of all.

Dionysius' defence of his critical comparative method covers the first two chapters of the *Letter to Pompeius*; the remainder is an extensive quote from a passage in his treatise *On Imitation*, in which he discusses the historians whom he judges most suitable for imitation: Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus – who are discussed pairwise in comparison – and finally Theopompus. By quoting this passage, Dionysius meets Pompeius' request to learn his opinion of Herodotus and Xenophon.[102] The quote is preceded by a general description of the content of book 1, 2 and 3 of *On Imitation*.

Dionysius' discussion on the historians is split into two parts concerning 'subject matter' (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) and 'style' (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος). The epitomator seems to have been only interested in Dionysius' discussion on style, for he reduces the section on the πραγματικὸς τόπος of the historians to no more than one sentence, in which Herodotus is declared superior to Thucydides in this respect.[103]

In the section on the λεκτικὸς τόπος, the epitomator allows himself some liberties concerning the construction of sentences, the choice of words and, less frequently, the presentation of ideas. The majority of these deviations, however, may have occurred due to condensation of the material and different emphasis – which in turn may be caused by the genre of the epitome, the personal preferences of the epitomator and his intended audience.[104]

Although it may be considered sufficient to explain the discrepancies between the epitome of the second book of *On Imitation* and the extant fragment in the *Letter to Pompeius* by pointing to these influential factors of genre, personal preference and audience, much effort has been made to provide other solutions.

Usener, partly followed by Heath, tries to explain the points of difference by assuming that the *Letter to Pompeius* was drawn from an early draft of *On Imitation*, whereas the epitomator had the final version at his disposal, which contained additional material that is not

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[102] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1.

[103] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.1.

[104] It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all correspondences between the epitome of *On Imitation* and the relevant section in the *Letter to Pompeius* in detail. Weaire (2002) partly deals with this subject, as well as Aujac (1992), 18-20. For a short discussion on the intended audience and the aim of the treatise *On Imitation*, see section 3.4.

included in the *Letter*.[105] Sacks on the other hand argues that the differences between the epitome and the *Letter* (and especially the additions in the *Letter*) are so substantial that the passage on the historians in the *Letter* must reflect an entire reconsideration of Dionysius' views on the ancient historians.[106] Finally, Costil states that the discrepancies between both sources (and particularly the apparent additions in the epitome) are established by lacunae in our text of the *Letter* – thus dismissing the idea of separate versions of *On Imitation*.[107]

As Weaire has shown – and in my opinion in a convincing way –, all of these explanations are more or less deficient, because they do not (or not sufficiently) account for the editorial procedure of omission and addition of the epitomator.[108] The additions, according to Weaire, are so minor – Costil, Sacks and Heath discuss only three examples – that they could be as easily attributed to the epitomator as the omissions.[109] Dionysius indeed seems to present to Pompeius an extract from a work in progress, but, according to Weaire, 'there is nothing in Dionysius' words that suggests that *Imit*. 2 was in need of further revision', as Usener claims in sustaining his idea that the fragment included in the *Letter* was based on a draft.[110]

Sacks' view that in his *Letter* Dionysius presents a revised version of the section on the historians in *On Imitation* is, as Weaire rightly argues, at variance with Dionysius' opening words that he literally, not periphrastically or partially, quotes from this work (τάδε

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[105] Usener (1889), 8; Heath (1989a). As Weaire (2002),353 already pointed out, Usener does not go into detail concerning these differences.

[106] Sacks (1983), 66-80.

[107] Costil (1949), pt. 4, ch. 5. One of the two additions discerned by Costil is to be found in the epitome's account of Philistus, which contains, unlike the *Letter to Pompeius*, references to Thucydides' incompleteness and to Thucydides' ἦθος. More on the epitome's additions in n. 109.

[108] Weaire (2002).

[109] Weaire (2002), 353. Additions in the epitome occur in the discussion of Philistus (*Imit*. 3.6), and of Theopompus (*Imit*. 3.9). For a detailed discussion of these additions, see Weaire (2002), 353-357. Weaire also discusses three other additions (*Imit*. 3.3, 3.5, 3.7) that escaped comment, but are put forward by himself (*ibid*., 357 ff.) Only one of these (*Imit*. 3.5) can hardly be explained by assuming the epitomator's interference. In this passage in the epitome, Xenophon is said to attribute 'philosophical language to ordinary men and foreigners' and to use 'language appropriate for dialogues rather than correct military usage' (tr. Weaire). In *Pomp*. 4.4, the observation is confined to the 'inappropriate character portrayal'. In this case, Weaire suggests to adopt Costil's theory of lacunae in the *Letter*, but he thinks it is hardly applicable elsewhere.

[110] Weaire (2002), 352, n. 8.

γράφω).[111] Finally, Costil's assumption on the possibility of lacunae in the *Letter* is not invalidated or ruled out by Weaire, although it also ignores Dionysius' opening words. Weaire thinks lacunae in the *Letter* might be postulated only in case of extreme and otherwise inexplicable differences between the epitome and the *Letter*.[112] Since such differences can hardly be found, and Dionysius' claim of quoting his passage from *On Imitation* in full can be taken at face value, we should – I agree with Weaire – be cautious in assuming lacunae in the *Letter*. It is more likely that in Dionysius' *Letter*, the substantial passage on the historians from his treatise *On Imitation* has been copied in its entirety.

3.3.5 IMITATION OF SUBJECT MATTER IN THE *LETTER TO POMPEIUS*

The section on the historians in the *Letter to Pompeius* forms an important source for reconstructing Dionysius' ideas on imitation, whatever its relation to the epitome and the original version of *On Imitation* may be. With regard to the πραγματικὸς τόπος, Dionysius starts his discussion by establishing the five main tasks a historian has to accomplish in the process of imitation, none of which is mentioned in the epitome. In fact, in the epitome as a whole, the πραγματικὸς τόπος plays a subordinate role; most of the virtues distinguished are stylistically oriented. Because we are not well equipped with evidence on the πραγματικὸς τόπος, I will discuss this section in the *Letter to Pompeius* in some more detail than the passage on the λεκτικὸς τόπος – qualities of style will get full attention in the last sections of this chapter.[113]

The discussion of the πραγματικὸς τόπος gets shape by an illustrative σύγκρισις between Herodotus and Thucydides. First of all, Dionysius insists that writers of whatever kind of history should 'select a beautiful and graceful subject' (ὑπόθεσιν ἐκλέξασθαι καλὴν καὶ κεχαρισμένην).[114] Here, we see that the choice of 'ideas' (νοήματα) is determined by requirements (i.e. beauty and charm) similar to those imposed on the process of composition,

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[111] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.1; Weaire (2002), 352. Aujac (1992), 18-19 and Battisti (1997), 31 do seem to assume that Dionysius is giving us a copy of a passage taken from *On Imitation* like he says, but they do not address the question in detail.

[112] Weaire (2002), 353.

[113] For a profound discussion of Dionysius' treatment of the five main tasks of a historian, see Heath (1989b), esp. 74-88.

[114] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.2.

the aims of which are determined to be ἡδονή and καλόν.[115] Dionysius illustrates the requirement of a beautiful and graceful subject by pointing to Herodotus, who is better than Thucydides in this respect: the former dared to write a general history of the wonderful deeds of Greeks and barbarians, relying on his ability to produce something better than his forerunners Hellanicus and Charon – in which he actually succeeded.[116] By contrast, the latter wrote on a single war which was 'neither glorious or fortunate' (οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε εὐτυχῆ), although he was free to choose a subject that ought not to have been consigned 'to silence and oblivion' (σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ).[117] It follows that a courageous attitude, a generalist approach and a keen eye for glorious events are of main importance for the historian who wants to imitate and emulate his predecessors.

Secondly, the historian should keep in mind 'where to begin and how far to go' (πόθεν τε ἄρξασθαι καὶ μέχρι ποῦ προελθεῖν).[118] In this respect too, Herodotus displays his superior taste. According to Dionysius, he does not decide to begin his narrative at the point 'where Greek affairs started to decline' (ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἤρξατο κακῶς πράττειν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν), as Thucydides out of anti-Anthenian sentiments did, but he arranges his history by starting with the reasons why the barbarians caused harm to the Greeks and by ending with the culmination of their punishment.[119] Here, Dionysius insists on a sharp taste for and keen discernment of what is appropriate in demarcating the subject – and what is appropriate, is supposed to be chauvinistic. Indeed, this 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον – a quality that occurs elsewhere in the *Letter*) is not only one of the essential literary virtues distinguished by Theophrastus, but also one of Dionysius' four means of attaining the two aims of stylistic composition mentioned above (ἡδονή and καλόν).[120] It is even called the most essential of all virtues in the essay *On Lysias*.[121] Here, we see the boundaries between the requirements imposed on subject matter, style and composition being blurred, as is often the case in the works of Dionysius.[122]

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[115] Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 10-11.

[116] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.7.

[117] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.4.

[118] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.8.

[119] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.9.

[120] On Theophrastus, see section 3.5.2.

[121] Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 9.1. For appropriateness in composition, see Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 20.

[122] Cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 20:3: ὁμολογουμένου δὴ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὅτι πρέπον ἐστὶ τὸ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἁρμόζον προσώποις τε καὶ πράγμασιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ μέν τις ἂν εἴη πρέπουσα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἡ δὲ ἀπρεπής, οὕτω δή που καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις ('it is agreed by all that appropriateness is that treatment which is fitting for the actors and the actions concerned. Just as the choice of words may be either appropriate or inappropriate to

Thirdly, the selection of the subject material deserves to get full attention of the historian: he must consider 'which events he should include in his work, and which he should omit' (τίνα τε δεῖ παραλαβεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γραφὴν πράγματα καὶ τίνα παραλιπεῖν).[123] Also in this respect, Thucydides shows himself to be inferior to Herodotus. The former 'hurtles breathlessly through an extended single war' (πόλεμον ἕνα κατατείνας, ἀπνευστὶ διεξέρχεται).[124] By contrast, the latter is aware of the fact that every narrative should have enough 'pauses' (ἀναπαύσεις) to be pleasant to its audience. What exactly should be understood by these pauses, is not explicitly addressed by Dionysius.[125] However, what he does make clear, is that these pauses, which are elsewhere designated 'changes' (μεταβολαί), were intended to increase the 'variety' (ποικιλία) of the text. Interestingly, in his work *On Composition*, Dionysius argues that 'change' (μεταβολή) is one of the four means of attaining the aims of composition.[126] Thus, here too we discern that a stylistic requirement is applicable also to the level of subject matter.

The fourth task of a historian pertains to 'distributing and arranging' (διελέσθαι τε καὶ τάξαι) his subject material.[127] In this regard, Dionysius allows no ambiguity at all. Thucydides, with his close adherence to the chronological order of the events, is 'unclear and hard to follow' (ἀσαφὴς καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητος), because he does not sufficiently give heed to the cohesion of events which are necessarily separated by time. By contrast, Herodotus follows the 'divisions as provided by the events themselves' (ταῖς περιοχαῖς τῶν πραγμάτων). In this way, he connects and explains the events taking place, and presents them as parts of a harmonious and coherent whole.[128]

The fifth requirement imposed on the historian concerns his own 'attitude' (διάθεσις) towards the events described.[129] Again, Herodotus serves as a prime example. His attitude is honest and fair, since it is 'delighting in the good things and suffering from the bad' (τοῖς μὲν

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the subject matter, so surely may the composition be'). Cf. Hagedorn (1964), 22: 'es zeigt sich also bei Dionys ganz deutlich die Tendenz, den virtutes elocutionis eine inhaltlich-gedankliche Seite anzugliedern'.

[123] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.11.

[124] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.12.

[125] In his commentary on Dion. Hal. *Pomp*., Fornaro (1997), 193 refers to pauses in Homer, which Nannini understands to be e.g. 'mutamenti tematici' ('thematic changes'), 'digressioni' ('digressions'), 'il passagio da narrazione a discorso diretto' ('the transition from narration to direct discourse').

[126] Dion. Hal. *Comp*. 19.

[127] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.13.

[128] *Ibid*.

[129] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.15.

ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα).[130] This subtlety is completely foreign to Thucydides: his attitude towards the events described is 'downright' (αὐθέκαστος) and 'harsh' (πικρά), and he revels in examining the mistakes of his native city Athens into detail because of his resentment over his exile.[131]

Thus, with regard to subject matter, the superiority of Herodotus over Thucydides should be acknowledged in every aspect: 1) the choice of a noble subject, 2) the determination of the beginning and end of a story, 3) the selection of the material, 4) the distribution and arrangement of the material, and 5) the attitude towards the events described. However, in style, Thucydides is in some respects inferior, in others superior, in others equal (cf. κατὰ δὲ τὸν λεκτικὸν τὰ μὲν ἥττων, τὰ δὲ κρείττων, τὰ δ' ἴσος).[132] Let us briefly look at the stylistic virtues Dionysius distinguishes in the same passage from the *Letter to Pompeius*.[133]

3.3.6 IMITATION OF STYLE IN THE *LETTER TO POMPEIUS*

The supreme stylistic virtue which should, in the view of Dionysius, accompany all other literary virtues, is the use of a language which is characterised by 'purity' (καθαρότης) and Greek idiom (together called ἑλληνισμός).[134] Both Herodotus and Thucydides – each in their own dialect – exactly meet this requirement (cf. ἀκριβοῦσιν).[135] The second point of comparison is lost in the *Letter to Pompeius*, but in the epitome we read it had been 'clarity' (σαφήνεια), for which Herodotus is given the palm.[136] Third in line comes 'conciseness'

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[130] *Ibid.*

[131] *Ibid.*

[132] *Ibid.*

[133] For remarks on Dionysius' different treatment of virtues of style in the *Letter to Pompeius* and *On Lysias*, see Viidebaum (2018), 108, who argues that *On Lysias* 'displays a very clear distinction and an almost definition-like treatment of the virtues' (more than the *Letter to Pompeius*).

[134] Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.16.

[135] *Ibid.* Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.1: τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἧς ἑκάτεροι προῄρηνται διαλέκτου ἀποσῴζουσι τὸ ἴδιον […] ('with regard to precision in words, both of them preserve the characteristic of the dialect they have chosen').

[136] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.1. Cf. Fornaro (1997), 217-218, who discusses the hiatus. The virtue of σαφήνεια was the second virtue of style according to Theophrastus, after ἑλληνισμός. In the discussion of the third quality in the *Letter to Pompeius*, σαφήνεια is also referred to (*Pomp.* 3.17). Therefore, it seems all the more likely that Dionysius' second virtue had been σαφήνεια, as the epitome has it.

(συντομία), which is also called βραχύτης (cf. τὸ βραχύ).[137] In this respect, Thucydides deserves to be considered the champion. In his essay *On Thucydides*, Dionysius categorises these three qualities (καθαρότης, σαφήνεια, συντομία) as 'essential virtues' (αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι) directed towards a clear and correct exposition, thus distinguishing them from 'the additional qualities' (αἱ ἐπίθετοι) which reveal an author's individual capacities.[138]

The additional qualities make up the rest of the quote of *On Imitation* in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*. They are used to analyse and determine not only the individual genius and power of Herodotus and Thucydides, but also of the minor historians Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus. In the *Letter to Pompeius,* 'vividness' (ἐνάργεια) is ranked as the 'first of the additional virtues' (πρώτη μὲν τῶν ἐπιθέτων ἀρετῶν) in historical writing, followed by 'the representation of character and emotions' (ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν τε καὶ παθῶν μίμησις).[139] Third come the qualities which display 'grandeur' (τὸ μέγα) and 'marvelousness' (τὸ θαυμαστόν).[140] These are succeeded by a group of virtues whose effects are 'vigour' (ἰσχύς), 'tension' (τόνος) and the like.[141] The fifth group identified by Dionysius encompasses the virtues pertaining to 'pleasure' (ἡδονή), 'persuasiveness' (πειθώ) and 'delight' (τέρψις).[142] These five groups are succeeded by three individual qualities: 'naturalness' (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν), 'intensity' (τὸ δεινόν) and, most important of all, 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον), which should

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[137] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.17. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.2: καὶ τὸ μὲν σύντομον ἔστι παρὰ Θουκυδίδῃ […] ('and brevity is in Thucydides'). For συντομία in Dionysius, see Geigenmüller (1908), 30.

[138] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 23.6.

[139] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.17-18. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.2: τὸ δὲ ἐναργὲς παρὰ ἀμφοτέροις. Ἐν μέντοι τοῖς ἠθικοῖς κρατεῖ ὁ Ἡρόδοτος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς παθητικοῖς ὁ Θουκυδίδης ('vividness is in both. In the representation of character, Herodotus wins, but in emotions, Thucydides wins'). For ἐνάργεια in Dionysius, see Geigenmüller (1908), 41-42. For literature on the concept of ἐνάργεια, see section 2.2.1, n. 41.

[140] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.18. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.2, where 'grandeur' (τὸ μέγα) and 'marvelousness' (τὸ θαυμαστόν) are replaced for the (related) concepts of 'eloquence' (καλλιλογία) and 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια). Both καλλιλογία and μεγαλοπρέπεια are also mentioned in Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. (resp. 5.3 & 4.3).

[141] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.19. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3, where not only ἰσχύς and τόνος, but also a virtue belonging to the same category is listed (i.e. ῥώμη), in addition with some other virtues added by the epitomator.

[142] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.19. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3: ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ πειθοῖ καὶ χάριτι καὶ τῷ αὐτοφυεῖ μακρῷ διενεγκόντα τὸν Ἡρόδοτον εὑρίσκομεν ('but in pleasure, persuasiveness, grace and spontaneity, we think Herodotus is far superior'). 'Delight' (τέρψις) is rarely used (only twice in Dionysius' rhetorical works) as a technical term. Cf. Fornaro (1997), 223. It is closely related to 'grace' (χάρις). For τέρψις, see Dion. Hal. *Dem*. 32.2.

accompany all other virtues.[143] In the discussion on the historians Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus, other additional qualities come to the fore which are strongly tied to those just mentioned.[144]

Although the additional status of these virtues might suggest they are less important than the essential ones, it is they which reveal sublimity and individuality of style, as Dionysius makes clear in his treatise *On Thucydides*:

> [...] τὰς δ' ἐπιθέτους, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα διάδηλος ἡ τοῦ ῥήτορος γίνεται δύναμις, οὔτε ἁπάσας οὔτε εἰς ἄκρον ἠκούσας, ἀλλ' ὀλίγας καὶ ἐπὶ βραχύ, ὕψος λέγω καὶ καλλιρρημοσύνην καὶ σεμνολογίαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν· οὐδὲ δὴ τόνον οὐδὲ βάρος οὐδὲ πάθος διεγεῖρον τὸν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρρωμένον καὶ ἐναγώνιον πνεῦμα, ἐξ ὧν ἡ καλουμένη γίνεται δεινότης [...].[145]

> But the additional virtues, from which an orator's special ability is revealed most clearly, are neither all present nor fully developed individually, but are found sparsely and in diluted form – I am referring to sublimity, eloquence, solemn speech and magnificence. Nor is there any tension, any gravity, or any emotion to arouse the mind, nor any robust, combative spirit, all of which are essential to what we call genius.

In this passage from *On Thucydides*, the important additional stylistic virtues identified by Dionysius seem to be closely connected to each other. Some relate to loftiness, such as 'sublimity' (ὕψος) and 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια); others to an intense spiritual severity: 'tension' (τόνος), a 'robust and combative spirit' (τὸ ἐρρωμένον καὶ ἐναγώνιον

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[143] Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.19-20. For τὸ δεινόν in Thucydides, see Voit (1934), 76-78. Of these three qualities of naturalness, intensity and appropriateness, 'naturalness' (τὸ αὐτοφυές) and 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον) are mentioned in Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3. Here, τὸ πρέπον is, unlike the case in the *Letter*, listed with regard to 'pragmatic treatment' (πραγματεία) and 'portrayal of character' (προσωποποιία). In Dion. Hal. *Pomp*., however, stylistic appropriateness is referred to; moreover, appropriateness in 'portrayal of character' is mentioned at another place: 4.4. This is proof of the eclectic and compiling method of the epitomator. It is also remarkable that appropriateness is mentioned in the *Letter* as part of the additional virtues, although it is called 'the most important' of all virtues. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 9.1. This may, I guess, be due to the exceptional status of appropriateness as a virtue which should accompany all others. Fornaro (1997) does not address this oddity; Grube (1965), 211, however, does.

[144] Discussing these qualities in detail would go beyond the scope of this chapter.

[145] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 23.6.

πνεῦμα) and 'intensity' (δεινότης). There are also virtues of style pertaining to solemnity, such as 'solemn speech' (σεμνολογία) and 'gravity' (βάρος). As we will see in section 3.6.1, in which the epitome of *On Imitation* will be discussed, many virtues referred to in the epitome can be subsumed to magnificence, tension and solemnity.

3.4 THE AIMS, AUDIENCE, CONTENT AND FORM OF *ON IMITATION*

As we have seen in the previous sections, the epitome of *On Imitation* is broadly consistent with the line of thought as presented in part of the *Letter to Pompeius*. When the text known as *On Imitation's* epitome was published for the first time by Stephanus (1554), he did not identify it as being an excerpt of *On Imitation*.[146] The first to suggest so was Sylburg (1691).[147] After him, Becker (1829) and Blass (1863) demonstrated that the text of the manuscript was an epitome of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*. Usener (1889) was responsible for the first critical edition of the epitome.

Slight divergences between the lost original and the epitome are likely to have been caused either by corruption of the text or by the influential factors of personal authorial preference and interpretation – which are difficult for us to grasp –, as well as text genre and audience, which can be determined at least to a certain extent. This section will focus on the possible aims and audience of the epitome of *On Imitation* by offering a brief formal analysis of its content and form, and by listing some passages in which Dionysius himself explains his intentions.

Judging from the epitome, Dionysius insisted that the writings of classical authors were studied (cf. ἐντυγχάνειν) for topical as well as stylistic purposes. Then, after continuous observation, the soul of the emulator (note the verb ζηλοῦν) would be assimilated to the stylistic character of the literary model:

Ὅτι δεῖ τοῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐντυγχάνειν συγγράμμασιν, ἵν' ἐντεῦθεν μὴ μόνον τῆς ὑποθέσεως τὴν ὕλην ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ζῆλον χορηγηθῶμεν. Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ

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[146] Stephanus (1554) noticed that he found the text ἔν τινι παλαιῷ ἀντιγράφῳ τοῦ Διονυσίου Ἁλικαρνασσέως τέχνης, ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων ἐξετάσεως κεφαλαίῳ ('in some old copy of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' theory, in the chapter concerning the analysis of words').

[147] Sylburg (1691) noticed: *eorum librorum sive* ἐκλογή *sive* ἐπιτομή *censeri potest libellus is [...]* (this little book can be considered either a selection or an epitome of these books). Cf. also Battisti (1997), 32, who discusses this in more detail.

τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχοῦς παρατηρήσεως τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ χαρακτῆρος ἐφέλκεται.[148]

It is essential to keep in touch with the writings of the ancients, in order that we be equipped from them not only with the subject material but also with the sense of emulation of idiomatic expressions. For the soul of the reader attracts likeness of style by continuous study.

In this passage, there is a remarkable transition from an impersonal statement (cf. δεῖ) to 'we' (cf. χορηγηθῶμεν) to the – again rather impersonal – phrase 'the soul of the reader' (ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος). This may be a case of *variatio*, but the variety in perspective can also be interpreted as an attempt by Dionysius to present his ideas on imitation as generally accepted truths with specific implications for 'all of us orators'.

The passage also presents imitation as describing 'the transition of the Classical ideal into the Classicist's soul and its re-emergence in the Classicist's texts', as Wiater puts it.[149] The story of the ugly farmer, whose wife contemplates beautiful images and then gives birth to beautiful children who reflect the images, serves as an illustration of this idea, which implies both activeness and passiveness on the part of the classicist. Indeed, he has to 'encounter' (ἐντυγχάνειν) the ancient writings, to 'be equipped with' (χορηγηθῆναι) all that is useful, so that he 'attracts' (ἐφέλκεται) the likeness of style.[150] There is no longer a distance between the classical Greek past and the Roman present; the boundaries of time and place are blurred. So are those between the Classicist's language and his character, with the result that 'the Classicist's diction seems to embody the past and to implement it in the present […]'.[151] I agree with Wiater, who sees the essence of Dionysian imitation as 'uniformity' (ὁμοείδεια), but I would like to add that it is also 'like-mindedness' (ὁμοφροσύνη) and originality which characterise the classicist's imitative practice.[152] To be sure, imitation does not involve the

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[148] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.1. These opening words of the epitome form the prelude to the story of the ugly farmer, whose wife absorbs the beauty of the images made by her husband and thus gets beautiful children. For this story, see section 1.3. It is striking that the exceptional verb χορηγεῖν is not only used three times in the epitome (in this case in the passive voice, not in the active, as Aujac (1992), 31, n. 1 argues), but also in *Imit*. fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. In the rest of Dionysius' works, it does not occur.

[149] Wiater (2011), 117.

[150] On activeness and passiveness in Dionysius' language of imitation, see esp. sections 2.2.1; 2.2.4.

[151] Wiater (2011), 117.

[152] *Ibid*.

mechanical copying of one or more literary models; it circles around originality in both language and thought which spring from the classical Greek spirit.

At the end of the epitome, Dionysius makes it clear that he not only intends to offer the reader assistance in choosing the right models for imitation of subject matter and style, but that he also makes a plea for a strong sense of awareness and attentiveness when reading the literary masterpieces of the classical past. In other words, he encourages his readers to read carefully and thoroughly, as he himself proclaims to have done in his treatise. His audience should keep in mind that the approach and analysis of Greek literature should be based on 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη) instead of superficiality and unawareness:

> Τούτου δὲ ἕνεκα τὰς τῶν προειρημένων ἁπάντων ἰδέας διεξῆλθον, ὡς ὑποδεδεῖχθαι τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπιμελοῦς ἀναγνώσεως, ἐξ ἧς ὑπάρξει τὸ παρ' ἑκάστοις κατορθούμενον αἱρουμένοις μήτε παρέργως τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐντυγχάνειν μήτε λεληθότως τὴν ὠφέλειαν προσγινομένην περιμένειν ἀλλ' ἐπιστημόνως […].[153]

> For this reason I went completely through the styles of all those discussed before, in order to show the method of attentive reading, which will make it possible for those who choose in each of them what is right, not to approach the ancients casually or obliviously wait for the profit to come, but knowingly […].

In this way, Dionysius casts himself as a theoretical example worth of imitation: he provides his readers with the notions they need to assess the value of Greek literature and, hence, with the tools to imitate it.

In his treatise *On Thucydides*, Dionysius clarifies the approach adopted in *On Imitation*, after which he makes his aims known to his addressee Quintus Aelius Tubero:

> Ἐν τοῖς προεκδοθεῖσι περὶ τῆς μιμήσεως ὑπομνηματισμοῖς ἐπεληλυθὼς οὓς ὑπελάμβανον ἐπιφανεστάτους εἶναι ποιητάς τε καὶ συγγραφεῖς, ὦ Κόϊντε Αἴλιε Τουβέρων, καὶ δεδηλωκὼς ἐν ὀλίγοις τίνας ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἰσφέρεται πραγματικάς τε καὶ λεκτικὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ πῇ μάλιστα χείρων ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται κατὰ τὰς ἀποτυχίας, εἴ τε τῆς προαιρέσεως οὐχ ἅπαντα κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβέστατον λογισμὸν ὁρώσης εἴ τε τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ἔργοις κατορθούσης, ἵνα τοῖς προαιρουμένοις γράφειν τε καὶ λέγειν εὖ καλοὶ καὶ δεδοκιμασμένοι κανόνες ὦσιν, ἐφ' ὧν ποιήσονται τὰς κατὰ

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[153] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.7.

μέρος γυμνασίας μὴ πάντα μιμούμενοι τὰ παρ’ ἐκείνοις κείμενα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν ἀρετὰς αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντες, τὰς δ’ ἀποτυχίας φυλαττόμενοι […].[154]

In the published commentaries on imitation, Quintus Aelius Tubero, I discussed those poets and prose authors whom I considered to be outstanding. I indicated briefly the good qualities of content and style contributed by each of them, and where his failings caused him to fall furthest below his own standards, either because his purpose did not enable him to grasp the scope of his subject in the fullest detail, or because his literary powers did not measure up to it throughout the whole of his work. I did this in order that those who intend to become good writers and speakers should have sound and approved standards by which to carry out their individual exercises, not imitating all the qualities of these authors, but adopting their good qualities and guarding against their failings.

According to Dionysius, he only discussed the content and style of the authors whom he considered to be outstanding. He did not only endeavour to identify their virtues, but also their shortcomings in προαίρεσις and δύναμις, in order to provide his readers from falling in the same trap.[155]

The faults or flaws of Greek literary masters should, so Dionysius, be explained in two ways: they were either not able to do justice to the whole scope of the subject, or their literary capacities fell short now and then. Dionysius continues by revealing that his intention to write his treatise *On Imitation* was to offer the orators *in spe* useful literary ‘standards’ (κανόνες) by which they could do their exercises.

The word ‘standard’ or ‘canon’ (κανών) is likely to refer not to literary masterpieces, but to the classical authors themselves (i.e. their βίος and λόγος).[156] It is they who embody

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[154] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.1-2. Cf. Dionysius’ introduction of the topic of his essays on the ancient orators (Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett*. 4.2): τίνες εἰσὶν ἀξιολογώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων τε καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν ἐγένοντο προαιρέσεις τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τί παρ’ ἑκάστου δεῖ λαμβάνειν ἢ φυλάττεσθαι (‘who are most worthy of mention of the ancient orators and historians? What manner of life and style of writing did they adopt? Which characteristics of each of them should we imitate, and which should we avoid?’ It is clear that *On Imitation*, unlike the essays on the ancient orators, adopts a stylistic focus, and takes into account all literary genres, not only rhetoric and historiography.

[155] For a discussion of this passage and these terms, see e.g. Hunter (2018), 38 ff.

[156] Cf. Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett*. 4.2. The word ‘canon’ (κανών) means ‘straight rod’ or ‘bar’ (used by a weaver or carpenter), then ‘rule’ or ‘standard’ in music, law, art and astronomy (LSJ s.v.). It could also pertain to the field

both language and thought. There is an abundance of parallels in Dionysius' works which make this interpretation of the word κανών plausible; one of these passages is to be found in Dionysius' quote from *On Imitation* in his *Letter to Pompeius*.[157] Here, Herodotus is considered the 'best canon' (ἄριστος κανών) of Ionic historiography, while Thucydides is of Attic.[158]

It is the interaction of prescriptive theory and rhetorical practice (i.e. of a guided, meticulous reading and studying of κανόνες, of doing γυμνασίαι and composing texts) which lies at the heart of Dionysius' conception of imitation.[159] Hence, it seems safe to argue that Dionysius' work *On Imitation* must have had a practical aim, as its title already suggests: it does not purport to be a historical overview of Greek literature, but is instead presented as a practical guide for future orators.[160]

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of chronology, where it designated certain fixed points in time. In the fifth century, Polycleitus moulded his famous bronze statue *Doryphoros* to illustrate the perfect and harmonious human proportions he described in his lost treatise *Canon*. It is important to realise that the ancients never used the word 'canon' in order to refer to certain authoritative lists of important works of literature or art, as we do from the late eighteenth century onwards. In fact, the ancients did not have a word at all to designate what we understood as 'canon'. Cf. e.g. O'Sullivan (1997), 27.

[157] Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.16. Kennedy (2001), 106 observes that this is 'the earliest application of κανών to describe written texts'.

[158] For other instances of the word κανών denoting a classical author in Dionysius, see e.g. *Lys.* 2.1: καθαρός ἐστι τὴν ἑρμηνείαν πάνυ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς γλώττης ἄριστος κανών ('he [i.e. Lysias, M.S.] is completely pure in his vocabulary, and is the perfect model of the Attic dialect'); *Dem.* 1.3: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ περιττὴ καὶ ἐγκατάσκευος καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις ἅπασι συμπεπληρωμένη λέξις, ἧς ὅρος καὶ κανὼν ὁ Θουκυδίδης ('this passage illustrates the striking, extravagant style which is remote from normality and is full of every kind of accessory embellishment. Thucydides is the standard and pattern of this style'); *Dem.* 41.2: ταύτης τῆς ἁρμονίας κράτιστος μὲν ἐγένετο κανὼν ὁ ποιητὴς Ὅμηρος ('Homer became the standard of excellence of this style [i.e. the third, mixed style, M.S.]; (negative standard) *Thuc.* 9.10: ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ κανὼν οὗτος οὐδ' οἰκεῖος ἱστορίᾳ, δῆλον ('it is clear that Thucydides' standard [of not presenting history as an uninterrupted sequence of events, M.S.] is wrong and ill-suited to history'). For (the rare use of) κανών denoting a classical text in Dionysius, see *Lys.* 12.2: ὧν ἐστι καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς Ἰφικράτους εἰκόνος, ὃν οἶδ' ὅτι πολλοὶ καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἡγήσαιντο ἂν καὶ κανόνα τῆς ἐκείνου δυνάμεως ('one of these is the speech about the statue of Iphicrates, which I know many would regard as a typical example and model of his [i.e. Lysias', M.S.] art').

[159] On the inseparable connection between theory and practice in Dionysius' conception of imitation, see e.g. Gelzer (1979), 10-11; De Jonge (2008), 11; Wiater (2011), 43.

[160] Bonner (1939), 39 also suggests that the title of *On Imitation* is suggestive of its practical character. See also *ibid.*, 14, where he deals with Dionysius' critical works in general: 'It becomes [..] a matter of the greatest

A global formal analysis of the epitome can only confirm this. The tone of the work is very didactic and normative due to the frequent use of diverse adhortative grammatical forms. Firstly, the epitomator employs a large amount of directives: e.g. ἐκτύπωσαι and λάβε (2.1), παρατήρει (2.6), ὅρα (2.7) and σκόπει (2.8). Secondly, he inserts two first person plural adhortative subjunctives: ἴωμεν (2.9) and φιλοτιμώμεθα (4.3). Thirdly, in the epitome there are many verbal adjectives, such as μιμητέον (2.14, 4.2), θεωρητέον (2.14), ἀναγνωστέον (4.1), παραληπτέον (4.3), ῥητέον (4.4) and ζηλωτέον (5.2, 5.6). Finally, the epitomator uses other grammatical constructions in order to insist on the necessity and desirability of the things he (and probably also Dionysius) advocates: e.g. χρὴ μιμεῖσθαι (2.1), ἱκανόν ἐστιν (2.9), ἄξιος ζήλου (3.9), ἡμῖν ἀναγκαῖον (4.4) and χρὴ ζηλοῦν (5.3).

Adhortative constructions can also be found in other didactive contexts, such as grammatical treatises: Dionysius Thrax' *Grammatical Art*, Apollonius Dyscolus' *On Pronouns* and Herodianus' *On Prosody in General*.[161] They also turn up in Longinus' *On the Sublime*, Demetrius' *On Style* and Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*.[162] In the epitome of *On Imitation*, the adhortative constructions are counterbalanced by indicative, descriptive formulas, which often demonstrate a psychologizing or normative bias towards the compositorial practice of the classical authors described: e.g. ἐφρόντισεν (2.2), ἤρεσεν (2.12), ἐζήλωκεν (3.6), διήμαρτεν (3.12) and παραλυποῦσιν (4.1).

It is striking that one individual group of grammatical forms in particular seems to be clustered in the epitome: the directives. These only appear in the discussion of the poets – to be more precise, in the description of Homer and the lyric poets Simonides, Stesichorus and Alcaeus.[163] On the other hand, we only have two first person plural adhortative subjunctives:

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importance to stress the fact that Dionysius was led to literary criticism by practical and utilitarian considerations […]'.

[161] Dionysius Thrax (ed. Uhlig (1883)): e.g. ἀναγνωστέον (1.1.6.6), ὑποτακτέον (1.1.74.1); Apollonius Dyscolus (ed. Schneider (1878)): e.g. λεκτέον (2.6.20), ὁριστέον (2.9.11), ῥητέον (2.9.16); Herodian (ed. Lentz (1867)): e.g. παραιτητέον (3.59.24), σημειωτέον (3.108.7), παραφυλακτέον (3.392.35). For the connections between the grammatical theories (esp. concerning the 'parts of speech' (μέρη λόγου)) of Dionysius Thrax, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Apollonius Dyscolus, see e.g. De Jonge (2008), esp. 91-95, 134-139, who argues that they belonged to the same philological tradition in which Alexandrian and Stoic influences are combined and integrated. On these grammarians, see further Matthaios (2001).

[162] Longin. *Subl.*: e.g. ἡμῖν διαπορητέον (2.1), ἐπισκεπτέον (7.1); Demetr. *Eloc.* (ed. Radermacher 1901): e.g. λεκτέον (6.9), χρηστέον (55.1), σκεπτέον (69.1); Hermog. *Id.*: e.g. πειρατέον (1.1.23, 1.1.95), ῥητέον (1.1.121).

[163] In the discussion of Pindar, we do not have an imperative, but instead we read that he was ζηλωτός ('to be emulated').

in the sections on the tragic poets and the philosophers. The amount of verbal adjectives is undeniably dominating the relatively short section on the philosophers (as many as four times). The extant fifth section, on the orators, turns out to contain not very much of the adhortative constructions mentioned above. Instead, it is dominated by an indicative and descriptive tone.

To draw conclusions on the basis of the above observations would be premature, but the remarkable distribution of different grammatical pointers in the epitome of *On Imitation* at least suggests that the individual sections on the lyric poets, the philosophers and the orators had been stylistically distinguished from each other in the original version of the treatise.[164] In my opinion, these stylistic divergences might by explained in two ways: 1) either the original version of *On Imitation* was a compilation of sections composed at different times and/or for different audiences which required different forms of address or 2) the different sections in the original version of *On Imitation* are to be traced back to different sources (i.e. treatises on authors within the same genre) characterised by different stylistic peculiarities, which were taken over by Dionysius. I consider option 2 the most likely. After all, it is well thinkable that Dionysius made extensive and accurate use of different sources for those sections concerning other genres than historiography and rhetoric, whereas he could afford more freedom to develop his own, rather descriptive tone in discussing the topics with which he, as a historian and rhetorician, was most familiar.

3.5 CANONS AND STYLES

When Dionysius for the composition of his treatise *On Imitation* probably made extensive and accurate use of critical sources on specific literary genres, what role did the literary-critical tradition play in Dionysius' decision not only to construct a canon or reading list of Greek literature, but also to present his ideas on various Greek authors by using a rich repertoire of literary virtues and vices? This section elaborates on (the place of *On Imitation* in) the history of canons and virtues of style.

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[164] Of course, we should also consider the possibility that the epitomator inserted the adhortative constructions to make Dionysius' treatise on imitation more easily accessible in a didactive context. A comparison between Dionysius' quote from *On Imitation*'s section on historiography in his *Letter to Pompeius* and the section on the historiographers in the epitome is not very insightful; after all, in this section in the epitome, the tone is descriptive rather than imperative, as is true for the quote in the *Letter*. What we can observe is that the adhortative phrase ἄξιος ζήλου (*Imit.* 3.9) is absent in the *Letter*.

3.5.1 THE HISTORY OF CANONS

As we have already seen, Dionysius listed classical Greek authors worthy of imitation and emulation according to the genre in which they were specialised. It is not certain whether such prescriptive lists had been composed before, and whether or not they should be seen in connection with the bibliographical 'tables' (Πίνακες) drawn up in Alexandria by Callimachus. Other suggestions concern Aristophanes of Byzantium, his successor Aristarchus or Apollodorus of Pergamum.[165] We do know of (a reference in the *Suda* to) a lost work concerned with ten classical Greek orators. Its author is said to have been the Greek Caecilius of Caleacte, a contemporary of Dionysius, working in Rome like him.[166] Neither Dionysius nor his Roman successor Quintilian mention this list of Caecilius when presenting their own literary canons, and we know nothing of its content or purposes.[167]

What becomes evident from the canons of Dionysius, Quintilian and also Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 18), is that by their time the literary genres were rather fixed, but the number and identity of representatives were fluctuating.[168] This suggests that possible lists of authors predating the one of Dionysius were not untouchable and strictly authoritative, but that they

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[165] For literature on the date and compiler of the canon of ten Attic orators, see e.g. Jebb (1876); Brzoska (1883); Douglas (1956); Worthington (1994); Smith (1995); Roisman, Worthington & Waterfield (2015), 6-10.

[166] This view is held by e.g. Roisman & Worthington (2015), 9. For a recent edition of fragments of Caecilius of Caleacte, see Woerther (2015). For a discussion of Caecilius, see O'Sullivan (1997), who – in refuting Douglas (1956) – convincingly argues that Caecilius, as the *Suda* claims, is very likely to have been writing a canon of ten Attic orators, which must have largely contributed to the rise of the Atticist movement. Douglas (1956), 39-40 casts doubt on the reference to Caecilius' *On the Style of the Ten Orators* in the *Suda*, mainly because this treatise is never referred to by Caecilius' successors. Likewise, Rutherford (1992), 357 argues that the notion of a canon of ten orators may well not go back much before Hermogenes (Second Sophistic Period).

[167] Dionysius' one and only reference to Caecilius (τῷ φιλτάτῳ Καικιλίῳ) can be found in *Pomp.* 3.20. More on this reference in Tolkiehn (1908), who assumes that the rhetoricians Dionysius and Caecilius were closely connected - seeing that the word φίλτατος is rare in Dionysius' oeuvre. But cf. Kennedy (1972), 364, who argues that 'the friendship need not to be elaborated into a close professional association […]'. I owe this latter reference to Hidber (1996), 5-6, n. 43. Quintilian links Dionysius and Caecilius in 3.1.16 and 9.3.89. Although Quintilian does not refer to Caecilius in his canon, he does mention a group of ten orators living within the time frame of one generation (10.1.76).

[168] For the history and genre divisions of canons, see esp. Steinmetz (1964); for canons of style with a focus on the Antonine Age, see Rutherford (1992). Even within the works of Dionysius himself, we see a shift in choice: he replaces Lycurgus for Isaeus in *On the Ancient Orators*. On this replacement, see section 3.2.

allowed for a certain freedom in selectivity.[169] According to the epitome, Dionysius distinguished between poets (epic, lyric, tragic and comic poets – the only comedian being mentioned being Menander) and prose writers (historians, philosophers and rhetoricians). Whereas the historians, philosophers and rhetoricians form separate categories, the different kinds of poets are (merely) perceived as a unity.

Of all classical poets, Homer, Hesiod, Antimachus and Panyasis are listed in the epic genre. Pindar, Simonides, Stesichorus and Alcaeus represent the lyric genre; Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Menander the dramatic genre. There are five historians whom Dionysius considers worth imitating: the famous Herodotus and Thucydides, as well as Xenophon (also listed as a philosopher) and the minor historians Philistus and Theopompus. After history, Dionysius moves to the philosophers, mentioning the Pythagoreans, Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle. The last category is devoted to oratory. Unlike Caecilius' alleged list of ten, Dionysius mentions six orators: Lysias, Isocrates, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, Aeschines and Hyperides. In chapter 4, I will further explore Dionysius' selection of exemplary authors, since his preferences for including specific writers and his positive evaluation of especially the more archaic authors can best be considered in comparison with the (often deviant) choices that Quintilian makes in his reading list.

3.5.2 THEORIES OF VIRTUES OF STYLE

It is impossible to consider Dionysius' method in *On Imitation* without taking into account the fact that tradition had supplied him with a system of virtues and vices of style evolved and perfected by generations of scholars.[170] The first of them was Aristotle, for whom style had only one virtue, 'clarity' (σαφήνεια):

> […] ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι· σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον· καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν […].[171]

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[169] On the fluctuating number of esp. orators considered worth imitating, cf. Smith (1995), who describes the ancient literary canons or reading lists as 'suggestive', not 'prescriptive' (*ibid.*, 73).

[170] On Dionysius' mixture of different theories and methods in general, see De Jonge (2008), 34-41. On the development of the theory of virtues of style in Dionysius, see Bonner (1939), 15-24; Schenkeveld (1964), 72-76 (esp. 74-75); Innes (1985).

[171] Arist. *Rh.* 3.2, 1404b1-4.

Let the virtue of style be defined as 'to be clear' – the proof of this is that the speech, if it does not make its meaning clear, will not perform its proper function – and neither base nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate.[172]

Judging from these words, Aristotle's single virtue of style was in fact a tripartite one, consisting of the interdependent virtues of 1) 'clarity' (σαφήνεια), 2) 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον) and 3) 'ornamentation' (κατασκευή).[173] According to Cicero (*Orat*. 79), Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus developed this single Aristotelian virtue. He probably did so by dividing the different aspects of σαφήνεια into four separate and autonomous virtues, which he presumably designated 1) 'correctness' (ἑλληνισμός), 2) 'clarity' (σαφήνεια), 3) 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον) and 4) 'ornamentation' (κατασκευή).[174]

The Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylon expanded the system by adding a fifth virtue: that of 'brevity' (συντομία).[175] Another systematic attempt to refine the system was made by Dionysius, who also alluded to the efforts of several scholars in this field.[176] As we have already seen, in Dionysius' critical essays the system of the literary virtues had evolved into a complex and variegated system which not only reckoned with a couple of essential virtues, but also with a wide variety of additional ones.[177] This may be credited to Dionysius himself, but we should also allow for the possibility that it were indeed Hellenistic modifications which formed the backbone of his subdivisions.[178] Taking into account that

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[172] Tr. adapted from Kennedy (1991), 220.

[173] De Jonge (2008), 349, n. 87 offers useful references to literature in this field, i.a. Hendrickson (1904), 129; Innes (1985), 255-256, who argue that Aristotle's single virtue of style consists of three associated items. Fortenbaugh (2003), 224, n. 2, who first argued that there is a single Aristotelian virtue, agrees with Innes (1985) that Aristotle's virtue is a tripartite one. Bonner (1939), 15-16 rather seems to interpret Aristotle's words as referring to only one virtue of style (i.e. clarity), as do Grube (1965), 95; Kennedy (1994), 62. Rutherford (1998), 10 sees a single virtue of style with four subdivisions. For a brief overview of the history of the literary virtues, see De Jonge (2014), 328-329.

[174] Innes (1985), 256.

[175] This information is based on Diog. Laert. 7.59.

[176] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 22.2: εἴρηται πολλοῖς πρότερον ('this has been said before by many'). For passages possibly containing implicit references to the system of virtues of style, see e.g. Cic. *Part. or*. 31; *Brut*. 261; *De Or*. 3.52. I owe these references to Usher (1974), 523.

[177] Cf. section 3.3.6.

[178] Cf. e.g. Bonner (1939), 18. A case in point which is also observed by Bonner (*ibid*.) is Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.17: ἐνάργεια μετὰ ταῦτα τέτακται πρώτη μὲν τῶν ἐπιθέτων ἀρετῶν ('next in order, vividness is established as the first of the additional virtues').

Dionysius' system contains more than double the number of virtues defined earlier, this even seems to be plausible.

It is argued that Dionysius paved the way for further, more essential revisions of the system of virtues in Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*.[179] This may be true, for Dionysius is mentioned by Hermogenes – and in fact, he is the only one mentioned. However, instead of 'virtues of style' (ἀρεταὶ λέξεως), Hermogenes' stylistic system consists of six main 'ideas' (ἰδέαι), some of which are subdivided: 'clarity' (σαφήνεια), 'grandeur' (μέγεθος), 'beauty' (κάλλος), 'agility' (γοργότης), 'moral character' (ἦθος) and 'intensity' (δεινότης). The subdivisions included, they make a total of twenty ideas.

The ideas of Hermogenes in some respects resemble Dionysius' literary virtues, but, to use the words of Rutherford, 'none of these correspondences is an exact fit'.[180] Both systems share the thought that ideas/virtues should best be mixed. However, the idea-theory is more clearly arranged than Dionysius' system of stylistic virtues, the vocabulary of which is very extensive. In idea-theory, style is systematically divided into different levels or strata, such as subject matter, expression, composition, rhythm and clausula. These strata are (at least formally) absent in Dionysius' works.[181]

Another difference between the theory of Hermogenes and that of Dionysius (and other pre-Hermogenean systems) is that the former divides literature up into the two major categories of ὁ πανηγυρικὸς λόγος and ὁ πολιτικὸς λόγος, whereas Dionysius distinguishes poetry – which comes first – and prose.[182] Notwithstanding the differences between both systems, Dionysius may have been of influence to Hermogenes, especially regarding the concept of the mixture of stylistic qualities.[183]

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[179] Cf. Hagedorn (1964), 23, whose aim it is 'die Entstehung der hermogenischen Ideen aus den ἀρεταὶ λέξεως des Dionysios glaubhaft zu machen'.

[180] Rutherford (1998), 12.

[181] Rutherford (1998), 12 ff.

[182] Rutherford (1998), 44. For a schematic presentation of the divisions made in the pre-Hermogenean lists of Dionysius, Quintilian and Dio Chrysostom, see Rutherford (1992), 363-364.

[183] E.g. Rutherford (1992), 359. For Dionysius' influence on the idea-theorist Aelius Aristides, see Rutherford (1998), 96 ff.

3.6 Literary Virtues in *On Imitation*

On Imitation's epitome confronts us with a large number of literary virtues which are attributed to a wide range of classical authors representing different literary genres. Most of these virtues are related to magnificence. It does not become clear what Dionysius' considerations have been in assessing a particular quality to a particular author. However, from his treatise *On Isocrates* we know that he knew to assay the 'grandeur' (μέγεθος), 'solemnity' (σεμνότης) and 'extravagance' (περιττότης) of texts by means of the concepts of 1) 'choice of words' (ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων), 2) 'composition' (ἁρμονία) and 3) 'figures of speech' (σχήματα), which were, as Dionysius argues, distinguished by Theophrastus.[184] Thus, it is important to realise that these concepts may have been the (often invisible) criteria on the basis of which the virtues in *On Imitation* were assigned to classical Greek authors. Hence, in my opinion, the treatise may be considered less superficial and simplistic than has been judged from the epitome and the quote in the *Letter to Pompeius*.[185]

As is evident from Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* 3-6, in which he sets out his system of literary virtues, the three 'essential virtues' (ἀναγκαῖαι) he perceives resemble those distinguished long since: 'purity' (καθαρότης), 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) and 'brevity' (συντομία). Every good (i.e. bright and easily understandable) exposition is built on these pillars. By contrast, the wealthy presence of the 'additional virtues' (ἐπίθετοι) is, according to Dionysius, a sign of true and personal genius.[186]

As we have seen in the discussion on the *Letter to Pompeius*, the additional virtues identified by Dionysius are numerous; the most important ones are 'vividness' (ἐνάργεια), 'representation of characters and emotions' (ἠθῶν τε καὶ παθῶν μίμησις), 'grandeur' (μέγεθος) and 'marvelousness' (τὸ θαυμαστόν), 'vigour' (ἰσχύς) and 'tension' (τόνος), 'pleasure' (ἡδονή), 'persuasiveness' (πειθώ), 'delight' (τέρψις), 'naturalness' (φύσις), 'intensity' (δεινότης) and, most important of all, 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον). Elsewhere, Dionysius claims the additional virtues to be related to 'sublimity' (ὕψος), 'beauty of language' (καλλιρρημοσύνη), 'solemn speech' (σεμνολογία) and 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια).[187]

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[184] Dion. Hal. *Isoc*. 3.1. Cf. Theophrastus, fr. 5 Schmidt.

[185] We have already seen that Bonner (1939) passes a negative judgement on *On Imitation*; Grube (1965) criticises Dionysius' quote from *On Imitation* in his *Letter to Pompeius*. See n. 18.

[186] See section 3.3.6.

[187] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 23.6. Cf. section 3.3.6.

Both the categories of essential and additional virtues are used without distinction in the epitome of *On Imitation*. Often they could be applied to both the level of 'subject matter' (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) and 'style' (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος). In most cases, however, Dionysius does not specify to which level the virtues are assigned, as I stated before. Because of his strong stylistic orientation in the application of ἀρεταί – his quote from *On Imitation* in the *Letter to Pompeius* shows this pre-eminently –, we may assume that these ἀρεταί should be understood in a stylistic sense.[188] However, since the boundaries between stylistic and pragmatic virtues are also frequently blurred, we must be on our guard.[189]

The general and overarching levels of subject matter and style are further subdivided, but in the epitome this is never done in an explicit, let alone systematic way. From the epitome, we can for instance distil that subject matter should be understood to comprise i.a. 'invention' (εὕρεσις, 5.6), 'arrangement' (οἰκονομία, 2.1, 2.4, 3.4, 3.6, 3.9), 'choice of subject' (ὑπόθεσις, 1.1, 2.7, 3.4, 3.6, 3.9), 'moral character' (ἦθος, e.g. 2.7) and 'emotional treatment' (πάθος, 2.12), whereas style must plausibly include 'selection of words' (ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων, 2.6, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5), 'composition' (σύνθεσις, 2.2, 2.6, 3.5, 3.10), 'order' (τάξις, 3.6, 5.4), 'diction' or 'storytelling' (ἀπαγγελία, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2), 'ornamentation' (κατασκευή, 2.5, 5.6), 'interpretation' or 'explanation' (ἑρμηνεία, 3.8, 4.3), 'proverbial language' (γνωμολογία, 2.5), use of 'figures of speech' (σχήματα, 2.5, 2.8, 3.3, 3.7, 3.11), 'phrasing' (φράσις, 5.1, 5.4, 5.6, 5,7), 'moral character' (ἦθος, e.g. 2.14) and 'emotional style' or 'emotional treatment' (πάθος, e.g. 3.7).[190]

The literary virtues mentioned in the epitome are, if specified at all, connected either to the general levels or sublevels mentioned above, or to the units to which these sublevels in turn are applied: 'words' (ὀνόματα) and 'periods' (περίοδοι).[191] It is hard to establish why

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[188] In *Pomp*. 3, Dionysius makes use of a system of virtues only when the styles of Herodotus and Thucydides are his topics.

[189] Because of this ambivalence, I would prefer speaking of 'literary virtues' instead of 'virtues of style'.

[190] Kremer (1907), 2-3 discusses the organisation of subject matter and style in Dionysius. For a discussion of the meaning and development of the terms οἰκονομία, ὑπόθεσις, τάξις and ἦθος, see Meijering (1987). The role of ἦθος and its derivatives – which is very prominent in the epitome – is questionable. The term ἦθος is very ambiguous and can pertain not only to the representation, but also to the production of moral qualities. Cf. Damon (1991), 37-39. Moreover, ἦθος constitutes a heading both under the categories of subject matter and style (as is true for πάθος). The distinction between portrayal and production of πάθος is less clear than that of ἦθος. Cf. Damon (1991), 40.

[191] The unit of 'clauses' (κῶλα) is omitted in the epitome. The epitome even focuses on vowels in the discussion of the historian Theopompus (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.11), who is said to fall short e.g. in avoiding clashes of vowels.

these frequent shifts in levels (i.e. in the degree of precision) are made. Of course, they may partly have been the work of the epitomator, but we should also allow for the possibility that Dionysius himself evinced this flexibility in switching between levels without differentiation. The overall impression, consequently, is one of imbalance, especially when levels and sublevels themselves are presented as or take the place of literary virtues.[192] However, we can also explain the frequent shifts in levels by assuming an aspiration for variety.

3.6.1 CLUSTERS OF LITERARY VIRTUES

Despite the rich and often unsystematic vocabulary used in the epitome to establish which literary virtues should be imitated and which avoided, it is possible to create some order by categorising cognate literary virtues.[193] It is remarkable (and confusing as well) that some of these cognate virtues tend to appear in succession.[194] Bringing them together will allow us to see 1) on which qualities Dionysius probably insisted, 2) how these qualities are distributed over the different literary genres, and 3) how they relate to the practical aims Dionysius propagates. This section establishes that in his theory of rhetorical imitation, Dionysius aspires to a well-balanced, cross-generic mixture of literary virtues, conciliating his salient insistence on poetic beauty with his propagation of rhetorical-practical usefulness.

The tables following below show five important categories of cognate literary virtues that are used as touchstones for evaluating the styles of the auteurs under discussion. My corpus consisted of both the fragments and the epitome of *On Imitation*.[195] The categories of

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[192] E.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.9: Θεόπομπος δὲ ὁ Χῖος πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῷ προελέσθαι τοιαύτας ἱστορίας ὑποθέσεις ἄξιος ζήλου· μετὰ δέ, οἰκονομίας <ἔνεκεν> (ἔχει γοῦν τὸ εὐπαρακολούθητον καὶ σαφὲς ἡ γραφή)· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῆς ποικιλίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ('Theopompus of Chios is worth emulating in the first place for his choice of such [i.e. beautiful, M.S.] historical subjects. Secondly, because of his arrangement (easy to follow and clear is his writing): moreover, also because of the variety in his content').

[193] As far as I could verify, this has not been done before. For a comparison between the reading lists of Dionysius and Dio Chrysostom and the virtues of style applied in these lists, see De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.). On Dionysius' rhetorical system, see Kremer (1907). Hagedorn (1964), 11-12 (following Geigenmüller (1908) and Bonner (1939)) attempts to clarify the stylistic system of Dionysius mainly on the basis of evidence found in *On Lysias, Letter to Pompeius* and *On Thucydides*.

[194] A remarkable enumeration consists of 'strength' (ῥώμη), 'vigour' (ἰσχύς) and 'tension' (τόνος) (Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.3). Cf. also 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) and 'purity' (καθαρότης) (Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.14); 'grace' (εὐχάρεια) and 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) (Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.5); 'terseness' (στρογγυλότης) and 'denseness' (πυκνότης) (Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.7); 'solemnity' (σεμνότης) and 'stateliness' (πομπή) (Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.10).

[195] As a matter of course, the quote in the *Letter to Pompeius* does not form part of this corpus.

cognate literary virtues are far from normative or stringent, nor do they suggest that no other arrangements and connections between literary virtues can be made. Rather, they try to create some order and insight in the bulk of literary virtues. If possible, I converted substantively used adjectives to nouns to enhance the uniformity of the tables. I also counted the derivatives of the nouns listed, as well as those virtues appearing in adjectival form to characterise other virtues (e.g. ἀγωνιστικὴ τραχύτης, 2.3).

In the epitome, there is an abundant reservoir of virtues referring to 'magnificence', 'transcendence' or 'elevation' with an aesthetic dimension. The virtues belonging to this category are cognate in that they all point to the transition beyond a certain level – in other words: to a form of *excess*, which is perceived as beautiful. The elements of excess and beauty are already present in Aristotle's conception of magnificence. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle conceived of 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια) as a moral virtue pertaining to generosity on a very large scale, at the right time and for the right purposes. As such, it also gets an aesthetic dimension: the magnificent man spends his great wealth 'because of beauty' (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), and when magnificence is exhibited in an undesirable way, it is described as i.a. 'unfamiliarity with beauty' or 'tastelessness' (ἀπειροκαλία).[196]

Aristotle's conception of magnificence has obviously influenced ancient rhetorical theory. As a virtue of style, magnificence is closely intertwined with excess and beauty, but also with poetical discourse. For Cicero, the orator who is 'magnificent, opulent, stately and ornate' (*amplus*, *copiosus*, *gravis*, *ornatus*) – virtues which are strongly associated with redundancy, poetical discourse and beauty – represents the grand style.[197] In *On the Sublime*, Longinus describes and recommends several virtues with often different nuances labeling 'sublimity' (which is not a characterisation of the grand style, but rather a special effect; see section 5.4): these are e.g. 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια), 'grandeur' (μέγεθος) and 'sublimity' (ὕψος). Such virtues pertaining to greatness are often accompanied by references to beauty, but also to extremeness.[198]

Also Quintilian refers to elevation by drawing from a reservoir of terms: in the tenth book we find e.g. 'sublimity' (*sublimitas*, e.g. 10.1.46) and 'magnificence' (*magnificentia*,

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[196] Arist. *Eth.Nic.* 4.2, 1122b6-7; 2.7, 1107b19. On the aesthetic dimension of magnificence in Aristotle, see e.g. also Maclaren (2003); Curzer (2012), 118.

[197] Cic. *Orat.* 97.

[198] For the combination of beauty and sublimity, see e.g. Longin. *Subl.* 5.1; 17.2; 30.1. These and other passages are listed by Porter (2008), 312, n. 95, who argues that 'Longinus' tendency is not to oppose the sublime to beauty' (*ibid.*).

e.g. 10.1.61), but also adjectives such as 'grand' (*grandis*, e.g. 10.1.65), 'eminent' (*eminens*, e.g. 10.1.86) and 'exalted' (*grandilocus*, e.g. 10.1.66), and infinitives such as 'to excel' (*excedere*, 10.1.50) and 'to rise' (*adsurgere*, 10.1.52). The close connection observed by Quintilian between these virtues of stylistic elevation on the one hand and poetic beauty and excess on the other is an important reason for him to warn the reader against *magnificentia* in narrations: 'a speech which rises above normal level' (*supra modum se tollens oratio*) is not always 'useful' (*utilis*), but sometimes rather out of place.[199] Hence, *magnificentia* must fall outside the domain of essential virtues of narrations, so Quintilian.

Dionysius considers μεγαλοπρέπεια first and foremost a poetical virtue, pointing out that it is the prime quality which, among others, contributes to 'beauty' (καλόν).[200] In his works, 'magnificence' (μεγαλοπρέπεια) and 'sublimity' (ὕψος) and other related virtues often seem to be interchangeable concepts, as Porter (following Voit) has observed.[201] In Porter's words: 'he [i.e. Dionysius, M.S.] has a plethora of characterisations at the ready, not all of which are always exactly interchangeable but which do the work of labeling sublimity for him'.[202] I found that this near interchangeability applies to a great amount of the literary virtues listed per category below.

It is important to note that the virtues of style listed below appear in the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation* either because a specific author possesses them (in most cases) or because he does not (sufficiently) possess them or applies them in the wrong way (in some cases, as made explicit in the footnotes). Remarkably enough, when Dionysius observes that a specific author lacks a virtue of style to some extent, he sometimes even approves of this. The following passage in the epitome should illustrate this.

In his description of Simonides, Dionysius urges his readers to observe i.a. Simonides' talent to express 'pity not in a magnificent, but in an emotional way' (τὸ οἰκτίζεσθαι μὴ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀλλὰ παθητικῶς).[203] This expression of non-magnificent pity is to be praised in Simonides, for Dionysius observes (*ibid.*): 'in which respect he is found even better than Pindar' (καθ' ὃ βελτίων εὑρίσκεται καὶ Πινδάρου). Thus, whereas μεγαλοπρέπεια is one of

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[199] Quint. 4.2.61.

[200] Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 11.2: ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν τήν τε μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ βάρος καὶ τὴν σεμνολογίαν καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια ('and under beauty I list magnificence, gravity, solemn speech, dignity, emotional treatment and qualities like them').

[201] Porter (2016), 228 following Voit (1934), 41, 46.

[202] Porter (2016), 228.

[203] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.6.

the most important virtuous characteristics of style for Dionysius, its absence can in specific cases (i.e. in Simonides' expressions of pity, but also, one could say, within his style as a whole) be to an author's credit. The judgement passed on Simonides clearly shows that Dionysius does not rigidly apply his theory of literary virtues; rather, because he is aware of the uniqueness of every style, he assesses whether specific virtues of style are appropriate and appropriately and moderately applied within their literary context.

The following qualities can be reckoned among the category of magnificence:[204]

1. Category of MAGNIFICENCE	Number of occurrences in *On Imitation*
Magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια)[205]	11
Amplification (αὔξησις)[206]	5
Grandeur (μέγεθος)[207]	4
Extravagance (περιττότης)[208]	3
Sublimity (ὕψος)[209]	3
Exaggeration (δείνωσις)[210]	2
Greatness of nature (μεγαλοφυΐα)[211]	2
Elevation of style (δίαρμα)[212]	1
	TOTAL: 31

[204] There are more virtues of style which are obviously related to magnificence in the works of Dionysius, as Porter (2016), 228 suggests. Some examples are 'tension' (τόνος) and 'dignity' (ἀξίωμα). However, I judged these qualities intrinsically more connected to respectively the categories of 'intensity' and 'solemnity', which are, of course, contiguous to 'magnificence'.

[205] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5 (2x), 2.6 (there is absence of μεγαλοπρέπεια in Simonides' expression of pity), 2.7, 2.10, 2.14, 3.2, 3.5, 3.10, 4.1, 4.2.

[206] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 5.1 (Lysias' amplification is intermittent), 5.3, 5.5, 5.6 (Hyperides is rarely using amplification).

[207] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.1, 2.13, 3.8 (Philistus' speech does unfortunately not weigh up against the grandeur of the subject matter described), *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti.

[208] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.13 (Sophocles is not extravagant in his words), 3.3, *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti.

[209] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.10, 2.13 (Euripides is neither sublime nor plain), 3.5 (Xenophon is not successful in i.a. sublimity).

[210] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 5.3. The virtues of 'amplification' (αὔξησις) and 'exaggeration' (δείνωσις) seem to form a pair: they are mentioned together not only in Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, but also in *Lys*. 19.5.

[211] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.8, 2.12 (Euripides was less successful in expressing i.a. the greatness of nature of his characters than Sophocles).

[212] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.3 (διηρμένος).

The following category is dominated by virtues pertaining to the essential qualities of clarity and intelligibility:

2. Category of CLARITY	Number of occurrences in *On Imitation*
Clarity (σαφήνεια)[213]	10
Vividness (ἐνάργεια)[214]	5
Common language (κοινότης)[215]	3
Purity (καθαρότης)[216]	2
Persuasiveness (πειθώ)[217]	2
Ease to follow (τὸ εὐπαρακολούθητον)[218]	1
Current language (κυριότης)[219]	1

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[213] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.5, 2.8, 2.14, 3.1, 3.5, 3.9, 3.10, 4.1, 4.3, 5.1.

[214] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 3.2, 3.5, 5.2, 5.5 (here, Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) have ἐνεργής; for the difference between ἐνέργεια and ἐνάργεια, see also section 2.2.1, n. 41). The term ἐνάργεια is very complex; it comprises, e.g., 'distinctness' (which is also strongly related to 'clarity'), as well as 'vividness'; see LSJ s.v. Cf. Meijering (1987), 29, who argues that the term generally refers to visual clarity, and Nünlist (2009), 194 ff., who argues that it is 'a visual concept and designates the graphic description that enthrals the audience'. For Dionysius' short definition of ἐνάργεια in *Lys*. 7.1, see n. 217. For literature on the concept of ἐνάργεια, see section 2.2.1, n. 41.

[215] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.10, *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti (2x).

[216] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.14, 3.5.

[217] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. I U-R. The virtue of 'persuasiveness' (πειθώ) is difficult to classify. For a while I thought of considering πειθώ as a virtue of intensity, since it implies intrusiveness and force of argument. However, from Dionysius' essay on Lysias, 'the most persuasive of all the orators' (10.1), it can be deduced that πειθώ and ἐνάργεια are cognate, and thus that πειθώ originates from and contributes to clarity. In *Lys*. 7.1, ἐνάργεια is described as 'an ability to bring words to the senses of the audience' (δύναμίς τις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα). This provides evidence of the 'plausibility' (τὸ εἰκός) of actions, feelings, thoughts and words of the persons described (7.3) – to put it differently, it makes them credible and persuasive. It should not be seen as inconsistent that in *Comp*. 11.2 Dionysius lists τὸ πιθανόν under 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) – here identified as one of the two aims of composition (the other one being 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν)). After all, in this passage Dionysius is concerned with connecting different literary qualities to two general aims. For the connection between πειθώ and ἡδονή, see also Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.19 and *Imit*. 3.3.

[218] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.9.

[219] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.10 (here, κυριότης is used as an adjective defining the λέξις of Aeschines). In Dionysius' works, the terms κοινότης and κυριότης appear more than once in combination with σαφήνεια. See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.10 for the combination of κοινότης and σαφήνεια; see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 8.3 for the combination of κυριότης and σαφήνεια.

	TOTAL: 24

Other virtues, which often appear in clusters, are cognate in that they refer to force and asperity:

3. Category of FORCE	Number of occurrences in *On Imitation*
Tension (εὐτονία / ἐντόνια / τόνος)[220]	6
Intensity (δεινότης)[221]	5
Energetic / combative style (τὸ ἐναγώνιον / τὸ ἀγωνιστικόν)[222]	4
Harshness (πικρότης)[223]	3
Vehemence (σφοδρότης)[224]	1
Roughness (τραχύτης)[225]	1
Power (δύναμις)[226]	1
Strength (ῥώμη)[227]	1
Vigour (ἰσχύς)[228]	1
	TOTAL: 23

Two other important clusters of cognate virtues can be discerned. The first of them is dominated by virtues of delicacy and pleasure:[229]

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[220] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.3, 2.5, 3.3, 3.7, 3.10, 5.4.

[221] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.8, 2.14, 4.3, 5.5, 5.6. The meaning of the term δεινότης differs in the works of Dionysius. For him, it is an important stylistic virtue, 'realised either in general skill in rhetoric, particularly with respect to invention, or in forcefulness of style […]', so Rutherford (1992), 372. Only the second meaning is observed here; for the first meaning, cf. e.g. *Imit.* fr. X U-R = 6a Aujac = 7 Battisti.

[222] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.3 (here τὸ ἀγωνιστικόν is used as an adjective: Antimachus' τραχύτης is ἀγωνιστική), 3.7, 3.8, 5.2 (Isocrates' eloquence is not combative).

[223] Dion Hal. *Imit.* 2.5, 3.10, 5.5.

[224] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 5.5 (+ 3 times as adverb).

[225] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.3.

[226] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.5. The two instances of δύναμις in frs. 1 and 5 of *On Imitation* refer to ability rather than to power. Hence, I did not include them in this number.

[227] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.3.

[228] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.3.

[229] In Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 11.2, Dionysius lists under 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) the following virtues: 'freshness' (ὥρα), 'grace' (χάρις), 'euphony' (εὐστομία), 'sweetness' (γλυκύτης), 'persuasiveness' (τὸ πιθανόν) and 'all such virtues' (πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα).

4. Category of PLEASURE	Number of occurrences in *On Imitation*
Pleasure (ἡδονή)[230]	11
Grace (χάρις / εὐχάρεια)[231]	7
Elegance (κομψότης)[232]	2
Subtlety (λεπτότης)[233]	1
	TOTAL: 21

The last important category encompasses virtues which are related to (sacred) gravity:

5. Category of (SACRED) GRAVITY	Number of occurrences in *On Imitation*
Solemnity (σεμνότης)[234]	10
Stateliness (πομπή)[235]	3
Gravity (βάρος)[236]	2
Dignity (ἀξίωμα)[237]	2
Piety (εὐσέβεια)[238]	1
Festivity (τὸ πανηγυρικόν)[239]	1
	TOTAL: 19

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[230] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, 3.3, 3.5, 3.10, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 5.3 (Lycurgus' speech is not pleasurable), 5.5.

[231] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.3, 3.5, 4.2, 5.1 (2x), 5.4, 5.6. Viidebaum (2018) analyses the connotations of χάρις in classical poetry, and establishes that Dionysius' emphasis on this virtue, with its appeal to the 'irrational perception' (ἄλογος αἴσθησις) of the reader and its connotations of simplicity, wit and humour, could 'capture the new trends in contemporary Roman (Augustan) rhetoric' (*ibid*., 122).

[232] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5,1, 5.2.

[233] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.6.

[234] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5, 2.12 (Euripides reflects what is ἄσεμνον in a very accurate way), 3.7, 3.10, 4.1, 5.2 (2x), 5.3, 5.4, *Imit*. fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti.

[235] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.10, 5.2, 5.5.

[236] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.7, 5.5.

[237] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.7, 2.11 (in both cases, ἀξίωμα has to do with character representation). Unlike Hagedorn (1964), 31, who regards ἀξίωμα is a synonym of μεγαλοπρέπεια, I count it primarily among the category of solemnity, since it is a virtue pertaining to esteem even more than to elevation or height. Of course, ἀξίωμα is closely related to magnificence, as Hagedorn argues (*ibid*.). Cf. also the reference to Porter (2016) in n. 201-202.

[238] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5.

[239] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.2.

The five categories mentioned above are the most obvious in the epitome of *On Imitation*, but there are other important categories, such as that of 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν or κάλλος), which also comprises the virtues of 'elegance of language' (καλλιλογία) and 'ornament' or 'decency' (κόσμος), making a total of 16 instances.[240] One may perhaps wonder why the virtue of 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν) does not prevail in the epitome. After all, beauty, together with 'pleasure' (ἡδονή), is not only determined by Dionysius as central objective (cf. στοχάζεσθαι, *Comp.* 10.1) of a writer 'who wants to compose well' (τὸν βουλόμενον συντιθέναι τὴν λέξιν εὖ, *ibid.*); as we have seen in the introductory chapter 1, it is also the quintessential idea in the epitome's programmatic stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis.

The answer is that Dionysius considers several of the virtues he identifies and recommends (not only μεγαλοπρέπεια, as we have already seen, but also βάρος, σεμνολογία, ἀξίωμα, πάθος and virtues like these) subservient and contributing to 'beauty' (τὸ καλόν).[241] In fact, it is Dionysius' overarching and predominant ideal of beauty which catalyses the recommendation of many literary qualities in *On Imitation*. Dionysius' insistence on aesthetic qualities in Greek poetry and prose in his reading list has recently also been observed by De Jonge.[242]

To give a further impression of the richness of the literary abilities mentioned in the epitome, I would like to single out in random order some minor categories, such as those of 1) naturalness, 2) brevity, 3) effectiveness, 4) soberness and 5) balance.[243] There are also virtues which do not fit in all these categories and are difficult to classify otherwise, such as 'variety' (ποικιλία), 'smoothness' (λειότης, opposite to τραχύτης), 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον, which is exceptional in that it accompanies all other virtues; cf. n. 143), 'truthfulness' (ἀλήθεια) and

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[240] For τὸ καλόν and derivatives, see Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.2, 1.4 (2x), 1.5, *Imit.* fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti, *Imit.* fr. VIᵃ U-R (5x). For καλλιλογία, see Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 3.2, 3.7. For κόσμος, see Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.10, 2.11 (Euripides often lacks decency), 5.2, 5.4.

[241] Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 11.2. This passage is quoted in n. 200. As we have seen earlier in this section, magnificence is already endowed with an aesthetic dimension in Aristotle.

[242] De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.): "[…] Dionysius makes it clear that his selection of classical authors is to a large extent based on the aesthetic appreciation of the literature of a distant past […]'.

[243] First category: 'naturalness' (αὐτοφυές) and 'greatness of nature' (μεγαλοφυΐα, which I also included in the category of magnificence). Second category: 'brevity' (συντομία), 'shortness' (βραχύτης), 'terseness' (στρογγυλότης), 'denseness' (πυκνότης). Third category: 'effectiveness' (ἐπίτευξις), 'accomplishment' (ἄνυσις), 'necessity' (ἀνάγκη), 'usefulness' (τὸ συμφέρον), 'skill in shooting at a mark' (εὐστοχία), 'usefulness' (χρῆσις). Fourth category: 'spareness' (ἰσχνότης), 'simplicity' (ἁπλότης, which also contributes to clarity). Fifth category: 'equilibrium' (ὁμαλότης), 'symmetry' (συμμετρία), 'harmony' (ἐμμέλεια).

'frankness' (παρρησία). Moreover, the epitome of *On Imitation* informs us on the faults of the authors mentioned, being e.g. 'unfitness of times' (ἀκαιρία), 'unmanliness' (ἀνανδρία), 'meanness' (μικρότης), 'baseness' (ταπεινότης) and 'frigidity' (ψυχρία). It follows that their opposites are recommendable stylistic features.

3.6.2 DISTRIBUTION OF LITERARY VIRTUES

Within the most prominent categories, the distribution of different virtues over the four genres (poetry, historiography, philosophy and rhetoric) shows a rather clear patron, made clear in the table below. Of course, we should see the numbers in proportion, for the sections on the different genres are not the same size. Still, the distribution of virtues over the genres can be considered significant. In the table, the five categories mentioned above are listed. The numbers indicate the occurrences of virtues belonging to these categories within the genres of poetry, historiography, philosophy, rhetoric, and the fragments of *On Imitation*:

	Poetry	Historiography	Philosophy	Rhetoric	Fragments
1. magnificence	15	6	2	6	2
2. clarity[244]	5	10	2	3	3
3. force	8	8	1	6	--
4. pleasure	3	5	3	10	--
5. (sacred) gravity	5	4	1	8	1

The virtues belonging to the category of magnificence (total number: 31) predominantly occur in the section on poetry: no less than 15 times. Qualities belonging to the category of clarity have a strong preference for the section on the historians, in which they occur 10 times. Poets and historiographers mentioned in the epitome are equally often associated with qualities of force: both groups 8 times. Finally, virtues of pleasure and (sacred) gravity are important criteria especially for judging rhetoricians, occurring in their section 10 and 8 times respectively.

What can we learn from this scheme? Firstly that, according to the epitome, it is Dionysius' greatest interest to recommend the imitation of a first and foremost *poetic* virtue, i.e. magnificence, in rhetorical contexts; secondly, that 'clarity' – a virtue of great importance

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[244] One virtue belonging to the category of clarity, i.e. σαφήνεια, occurs in the epitome's introduction.

– is to be found primarily in historiography; thirdly, that the rhetorician *in spe* should particularly study the masterpieces of his own forerunners to be equipped with splendid examples of styles which are both pleasant and grave. Thus, we see that Dionysius' idea of eclectic composition, voiced in his programmatic story on the painter Zeuxis, is not confined to certain genres; instead, it crosses all generic boundaries. The aesthetics of literature in general are of greater importance than the generic distinction between poetry and prose.[245]

It is absolutely striking that the five smaller categories briefly mentioned above (being naturalness, brevity, effectiveness, soberness and balance) contain literary virtues which tend to occur in the section on the orators: no less than 13 out of all 25 instances are to be found in the section on oratory.[246] In fact, the virtues pertaining to effectiveness (i.e. 'effectiveness' (ἐπίτευξις), 'accomplishment' (ἄνυσις), 'necessity' (ἀνάγκη), 'usefulness' (τὸ συμφέρον), 'skill in shooting at a mark' (εὐστοχία) and 'usefulness' (χρῆσις)) and soberness (i.e. 'spareness' (ἰσχνότης) and 'simplicity' (ἁπλότης)) are distilled from this section (almost) completely, which may suggest that according to Dionysius, especially these qualities should distinguish the rhetorician from his literary colleagues.[247]

We can conclude that not one of the essential virtues, but the additional virtue of μεγαλοπρέπεια, which is first and foremost a poetical quality closely related to beauty, predominates in the epitome of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*. Thus, Dionysius propagates an elevated style for, as he himself declares, rhetorical-practical purposes (although references to performative skills are absent). One may wonder whether the average student in Augustan Rome was able to give a speech which could meet the requirements of the Roman courts and, at the same time, bear traces of e.g. Homer's μέγεθος – a question which is also raised by De Jonge.[248] How practical is Dionysius?

In a comparison between Dio Chrysostom's reading list in *Oration* 18 (cf. section 5.7) and Dionysius' canon (and sideways also Quintilian's canons), De Jonge rightly argues that

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[245] Cf. e.g. De Jonge (2008), 365, who observes that the focus on aesthetic qualities more than on the formal distinction between prose and poetry is also characteristic for Dionysius' work *On Composition*.

[246] Section on poetry: 7 times. Section on historiography: 5 times. Section on philosophy: 0 times.

[247] One virtue of effectiveness, i.e. 'necessity' (ἀνάγκη), also appears in the section on poetry: 2.13.

[248] De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.). Goold (1961), 168-192 (esp. 190) thinks that Dionysius and other Greeks in Rome were not interested in influencing Roman literature and oratory; they formed a 'professorial circle' whose aim it was to preserve the Greek literary heritage: 'their writings contain no direct reference to the times in which they lived' (*ibid.*, 190). Here I side with Worthington (1994), 257, who, in refuting Goold's view, rightly points to the didactic tone of the works of Greeks in Rome. On the didactic tone of the epitome of *On Imitation*, see section 3.4.

'Dionysius may be said to be less practically minded […]. Dionysius makes it clear that his selection of classical authors is to a large extent based on the aesthetic appreciation of the literature of a distant past rather than on the practical considerations required by public speech performances in Augustan Rome'.[249] In addition, I would like to emphasise that Dionysius' work also testifies to a reconciliation of his overt insistence on poetic beauty with his propagation of rhetorical-practical usefulness.

How then does Dionysius warrant the feasibility of the imitation and integration of the aesthetics of classical Greek literature in Roman rhetorical practice? My suggestion is that he ensures that the weighty criteria pertaining to poetic magnificence are counterbalanced by especially requirements of clarity (for which historiography provides splendid paragons) and pleasure (which is displayed pre-eminently by rhetoricians themselves). In other words: he makes sure that his appreciation for literary aesthetics and magnificence is not at the expense of those virtues of style which make a text understandable and enjoyable in a performative context. The last table above gives proof of this. Thus, for Dionysius, the secret of practically-oriented rhetorical imitation seems to be located in a well-balanced, cross-generic mixture of literary virtues, which should result in a beautiful, but also effective and persuasive speech.

3.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter was dedicated to the analysis, distillation and reconstruction of important themes and criteria for successful imitation in Dionysius' *On Imitation*, and to the investigation of the purposes of the reading list presented in the second book of this treatise. What have we learned?

A thorough examination of the surviving fragments of *On Imitation* has shown that many of these fragments are thematically interconnected, can be related to the epitome of *On Imitation* and/or to other treatises of Dionysius, and/or demonstrate an imaginative, narrative and illustrative style for rhetorical instruction to which Dionysius, judging e.g. from his programmatic stories on the ugly farmer and Zeuxis, was far from averse. When no (sufficiently reliable) testimony of a fragment's origin is given in its contexts, thematic and stylistic correspondences can make it more plausible that the fragment in question is from *On Imitation*, as I hope to have made clear especially in the case of the often overlooked scholion

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[249] De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (eds.) (forthc.).

to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (section 3.3.3) which, I argue, deserves inclusion in text editions of Dionysius' *On Imitation*.

In the fragments which (possibly) stem from book 1 of *On Imitation*, important themes are stylistic mixture and variety (fr. IV U-R), natural talent versus active study and exercise (fr. II U-R), natural talent versus intention (fr. V U-R), and imitation and emulation (fr. III U-R).[250] The remnants of book 2 which are possibly genuine discuss topics such as eclectic imitation of beauty (fr. VIª U-R), the (absence of the) poetical element in prose (frs. VIII, IX and X U-R) and stylistic nonchalance as a mask of artistic skill (fr. X U-R).[251] The scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* can be considered a fragment of *On Imitation* concerned with persuasion, truth, and the interconnection between model and imitation. All of these topics seamlessly fit in with those discussed in Dionysius' critical works in general and/or in the (stories introducing the) epitome of *On Imitation* in particular.

The analysis of Dionysius' extensive quote from *On Imitation* in his *Letter to Pompeius* has made clear not only that the epitome can be regarded as a rather faithful representation of the original, but also that Dionysius' focus in his comments on the imitation of historiographic masterpieces was not exclusively on matters of style, but also on the πραγματικὸς τόπος. We also learned that virtues which are highly regarded by Dionysius, such as 'variety' (ποικιλία), can function both on the levels of subject matter and style. This is important to keep in mind when reading the epitome, in which these levels are not frequently distinguished.[252] Moreover, we have seen that in the quote in the *Letter to Pompeius* three virtues of historiographic writing elsewhere classified as 'essential' are followed by several 'additional' virtues, and that especially these additional virtues (e.g. vividness, grandeur, marvelousness, vigour, tension) occupy an important place in the epitome – not only in the section on historiography, but in all sections.

In the discussion of the audience and aim of *On Imitation* it was pointed out that although Demetrius is the formal addressee of *On Imitation* (see *Pomp*. 3.1), in *On Thucydides* 1.1-2 Dionysius proclaims that we should actually see all orators *in spe* as the intended audience of his treatise. From the same passage in *On Thucydides* it also becomes

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[250] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. Fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti. Fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti.

[251] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. VIII U-R = 4 Aujac = 4 Battisti. Fr. IX U-R = 5 Aujac = 6 Battisti. Fr. X U-R = 6a Aujac = 7 Battisti.

[252] However, as I noted, Dionysius' strong stylistic orientation urges us to interpret many virtues in the epitome as qualities primarily pertaining to style.

evident that *On Imitation* was intended to be a practical guide of literary κανόνες for future orators, showing them which qualities they should observe and which they should avoid in each of the authors, and providing them with material for their own γυμνασίαι and – eventually – their own compositions. We have also seen that Dionysius' intention is not only to offer the young orator assistance in choosing ancient – often archaic – Greek models for imitation of subject matter and style, but also to make him an attentive reader – one who is endowed with ἐπιστήμη (*Imit*. 5.7).[253]

The instructive, didactic character of Dionysius' list is expressed in the frequent use of a variety of adhortative formulas, on the basis of which the different sections on poetry, historiography and rhetoric can be distinguished stylistically. These stylistic deviations per genre, I suggested, can best be explained by supposing that the different sections in *On Imitation* are to be traced back to different sources characterised by different stylistic features, which were taken over by Dionysius.

Finally, this chapter has shown that the models that should be carefully observed often display magnificence and beauty of style. Dionysius' overt emphasis on poetical magnificence and beauty for rhetorical-practical purposes is counterbalanced by his insistence on other, more prosaic virtues such as clarity and pleasure, as well as by his passionate plea for mimetic eclecticism and stylistic mixture. Exactly because of this mixture, the young orator can, in an original way and in a new, Roman context, breathe new life into the grand and beautiful literary masterpieces of classical Greece.

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[253] In section 4.3, we will see that Quintilian makes cognition and a sound *iudicium* his prime concerns in his recommendations regarding the process of imitation.

CHAPTER 4

FROM DIONYSIUS TO QUINTILIAN.
QUINTILIAN'S READING LISTS OF GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In turning from Dionysius to Quintilian, we bridge a period of decades in which many Greek and Roman critics contributed to rhetorical theory and practice. A selection of Greek and Roman authors who explicitly reflected upon the notion of (rhetorical) imitation will be discussed in chapter 5, which puts in broader perspective the discussions of Dionysius' and Quintilian's mimetic terminology and ideas. The present chapter explores the structure of Quintilian's reading lists of Greek and Latin literature and the choices made in them in comparison with Dionysius' canon, and as such forms a diptych together with chapter 3.

First, some remarks about the role of oratory during the first century AD should be made.[1] It has long been thought that from the establishment of the principate onwards, oratory stopped fulfilling the vital function it always had in the different political systems of classical Greece and Republican Rome. However, recent research has shown that political oratory remained important, especially in the senate and in the assemblies in (the eastern part of) the Roman Empire.[2] Also the branches of epideictic and forensic oratory continued to play a considerable role in public life.[3]

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[1] For a brief overview of the history of rhetoric in the first century AD, see e.g. Kennedy (1972), 428-442; Leeman & Braet (1987), 27-30; Steel (2006) and esp. Rutledge (2007).

[2] See e.g. Steel (2006), 20: 'one of the curious aspects […] of oratory at Rome is how much continuity there is in the functions of oratory between Republic and Empire'. On the role and influence of rhetoric in the first century AD in the eastern part of the Roman Empire, see esp. Goudriaan (1989), 29-38, who addresses the topic as part of his discussion of Dionysius' views on rhetoric. Rutledge (2007), Ramsey (2007) and Rees (2007) offer useful discussions of respectively 'Oratory and Politics in the Empire', 'Roman Senatorial Oratory' and 'Panegyric'.

[3] See e.g. Steel (2006), 22. She rightly notes that although epideictic oratory remained important in the Empire, its role was 'fundamentally transformed' (*ibid*.). Quintilian displays a remarkable judicial orientation of oratory, especially in his discussion of Latin orators. Cf. e.g. 10.1.110 (*iudicem ferat*); 10.1.112 (*regnare in iudiciis*); 10.1.115 (*in accusando multa urbanitas*); 10.1.119 (*privatis tamen causis quam publicis melior*); 10.1.122 (*consummati [...] patroni*). Cf. also the introduction to the canons: 10.1.16 (*fortuna [...] iudicii*); 10.1.22 (*utrimque habitas legere actiones*); 10.1.36 (*non tamen eandem esse condicionem sciamus litium ac disputationum*).

Notwithstanding the passage of time and the developments that literary and rhetorical tastes necessarily experienced, Quintilian, like Dionysius, admired the literary treasures of classical Greece, and recommended these for rhetorical imitation. In his reading lists of Greek and Latin literature presented in the tenth book of his *Institutio*, Quintilian urges future orators to study and imitate authors like Sophocles and Euripides, Herodotus and Thucydides, Demosthenes and Aeschines. This chapter shows that although Quintilian shares his preference for the literature of classical Greece with Dionysius, his choices of authors and judgements passed on them also clearly mirror a different rhetorical program of classicism.

A brief discussion of the *status quaestionis* (4.2) will show that many scholars have been wrongly inclined to emphasise the similarities between Quintilian's canons and those of others (esp. Dionysius'). Section 4.3 is dedicated to key concepts in Quintilian's theoretical discussion of imitation in *Institutio* 10.2, and compares these to the important ideas on imitation aired by Dionysius.

Section 4.4 provides insight in the general structure of Dionysius' and Quintilian's canons, whereas the following sections discuss their order of authors (4.5) and Quintilian's insertion of Hellenistic authors (4.6). These three sections establish that the various differences – in arrangement, accents and choices of authors – are essential to our understanding of the relationship between Dionysius' and Quintilian's views on imitation.

Section 4.7 embarks on important correspondences and differences between Dionysius and Quintilian in their judgements of authors, and offers suggestions to explain these. Next, Quintilian's application of literary virtues in his Greek and Latin canons (4.8), as well as the clusters of virtues that can be composed (4.8.1-3), will be discussed. As such, section 4.8 runs parallel to section 3.6, in which Dionysius' Greek canon was subjected to a similar analysis.

The last analytical section (4.9) of this chapter is dedicated to the ways in which Greece and Rome and their literary identities come to the fore in Quintilian's canons. This section sheds light on the different metaphors and motifs by which Quintilian frames the Greek and Latin reading lists – the former as a completed and rather unanimously accepted unity, the latter as an incomplete and hybrid list in which literary potential and competition are crucial concepts.

The conclusion (4.10) recapitulates all sections, and suggests that for Dionysius, imitation means a revival of the illustrious Greek literary history in order not only to strengthen the identity of Greeks in Rome, but also to inspire both Greek and Latin authors, whereas for Quintilian, imitation pertains to the use of Greek literature as cradle of and

legitimation for Latin stylistic competence, as well as to the adequate, adaptive and especially competitive use of Greek literary treasures in a Roman context.[4]

The specific aims of this chapter are 1) to argue that Quintilian often arranges his Greek canon differently than Dionysius, and makes the structure of his list serve his own rhetorical purposes, which are to emphasise the importance of or coherences between authors, to parallel the (rather compelling) order of equivalent authors in the Latin reading lists, and to bridge the chronological gap between Greek and Latin literature, 2) to explain the differences between Dionysius and Quintilian in their choices of and judgements passed on Greek authors by pointing to Quintilian's salient pedagogical differentiation between novice students and mature orators – a differentiation which is less decisive in Dionysius' canon –, his different interpretation of (the status of) rhetorical 'usefulness' of reading lists, his different audience, and developments in classicism and literary taste, 3) to argue that Quintilian, though recommending many Greek literary virtues that also appear in Dionysius' canon, emphasises different stylistic qualities to be imitated, 4) to claim that Quintilian presents his Latin canon, which is dominated by the idea of literary competition between Greece and Rome, as a strongly redefined continuum of the Greek reading list, and 5) to establish that the connections between Dionysius' and Quintilian's ideas on imitation relate to a similar discourse and conceptual framework, from which they could select those elements that suited their own rhetorical agendas, and that helped them preserve the integrity of their Greek respectively Roman identity.

4.2 *STATUS QUAESTIONIS*

Over the centuries, much effort has been made to assess the relationship between Quintilian and his rhetorical predecessors – not only for the *Institutio* as a whole, but also for his canons of Greek and Latin literature incorporated in book 10. After briefly discussing some important views on Quintilian's originality in general, the focus of this section on the *status quaestionis* will be on literature concerning the originality displayed by Quintilian in his ideas on imitation and in the composition of his two canons.

With regard to Quintilian's originality throughout the *Institutio*, Odgers published a concise and enlightening article in which he tries to establish not only the extent of

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[4] On the revival of classical Athens in Augustan Rome, see Hidber (1996), 75-81.

Quintilian's indebtedness to earlier rhetorical theorists, but also that of his originality.[5] Odgers showed that Quintilian, who knew the works of both Greek and Latin theorists thoroughly, refers to approximately 50 Greek and 30 Roman authorities, with whom he disagrees in most cases.[6] According to Odgers, 'he [i.e. Quintilian, M.S.] exhibits a wholesomely critical attitude toward his predecessors, disagreeing at times even with Cicero, whom he regards as his greatest authority'.[7] Quintilian's method, as Odgers argues, runs midway between uncritical and unscrupulous imitation of predecessors and unrestrained eagerness to display independence and originality.[8]

Odgers' (relatively early) article is quite remarkable in a persistent scholarly tradition in which Quintilian is seen as a critic who followed (whether or not consciously) the footsteps of others. One exponent of this view is Kennedy, who framed Quintilian as original only in his capacity as synthesist and evaluator of earlier discussions for his own purposes.[9] After him, a similar idea is expressed e.g. by Barilli.[10] Fairly recently, Logie pointed out that Quintilian's dependence gradually decreases in the *Institutio*, and that he supposes his students to follow – from cradle to lawcourt – this growing distance from tradition, a development described by Logie as a progression 'from relatively passive consumption of exemplary texts, to competent imitation, building finally to the creation of original compositions'.[11]

Not only Quintilian's originality has been doubted; also his knowledge of the Greek literature he was commenting on has been deemed scant.[12] It is in this light that Quintilian's

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[5] Odgers (1935), 25-36. On Quintilian's originality, see Odgers (1933), 182-188.

[6] Odgers (1935), 31-32. When Quintilian does not refer to his sources, one is to infer that he is in complete agreement with them, according to Odgers (*ibid*., 28).

[7] *Ibid*., 27-28.

[8] *Ibid*., 29.

[9] Kennedy (1969), 123.

[10] Barilli (1989), 35.

[11] Logie (2003), 359. For a more detailed discussion of the ideas of Kennedy and Barilli (and also of Butler, who published a translation of the *Institutio* in the Loeb Classical Library Series 1920-1922), see Logie (2003), to whom I owe the reference to Barilli (1989).

[12] The impression of Quintilian as a mere imitator might have been powered by such lists as the 'Index scriptorum et artificum' in the edition of Halm, as has been suggested by Peterson (1891), xxviii. Odgers (1933) published an article on Quintilian's references to passages not only in Latin, but also in Greek literature. According to Odgers, 'almost 85% of his [i.e. Quintilian's, M.S.] identified references to Greek and Latin literature, including quotations, are concerned with Latin literature alone' (*ibid*., 183). As an explanation, he suggests that Quintilian 'probably felt that a large number of his readers knew or remembered but little Greek'

canons have frequently been judged to be based primarily on former reading lists – especially Dionysius'.[13] This view was still persistent in 1873, when Claussen argued for Dionysius as Quintilian's direct source.[14] In 1889, however, Usener claimed that Quintilian composed his canons independently from Dionysius, and established the idea that Dionysius and Quintilian relied on a common source which was based on the Alexandrian canons.[15] As a side effect, Usener initiated a fairly heated academic debate on the origin and the history of library lists or canons.[16]

Rather harsh in his verdict on Quintilian's putative dependence and lack of originality in his canons was Nettleship in an article published in 1890. He wrote that 'in the case of the first list, or list of Greek authors, he [i.e. Quintilian, M.S.] gives his readers fair warning that he is only repeating other people's criticisms, not pronouncing his own'.[17] In his elaborate commentary (1891, repr. 1967) on the tenth book of the *Institutio*, Peterson responded that 'he [i.e. Quintilian, M.S.] is not slavishly following any single authority' and that 'his career as teacher had probably impressed on his memory many *dicta* which he could hardly fail to reproduce, in one form or another [...]'.[18] Peterson concluded that Quintilian, instead of

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(*ibid*., 185). An exponent of the tradition of criticizing Quintilian for his smattering of Greek is Kennedy (1962), 143, who argues that 'it is the nature of the references as much as their relatively small numbers which seems to indicate a lack of familiarity with the subject'.

[13] For this brief overview, I gratefully made use of the research of Citroni (2006a), 1, n. 1, who gives a summary of the debate on the originality of Quintilian's canons. See also Rutherford (1998), 40-42. For a more profound discussion of (ideas expressed with regard to) Quintilian's originality and integration of other sources, see Nicolai (1992), 251-322.

[14] Claussen (1873), 348 calls Dionysius Quintilian's *primus et praecipuus fons*.

[15] Usener (1889), 110-111, 132 ff. Among the supporters of the idea of a common source of Dionysius and Quintilian is Steinmetz (1964), 456, who followed Radermacher. Battisti (1997), 35 does not take a position. Also Citroni (2006a), 9 leaves the question more or less open: '[...] Quintilian knew Dionysius, or used a source that he also had used'. A scholar who thought of Quintilian having a direct knowledge of Dionysius' work is e.g. Heydenreich (1900). Kennedy (1962), 142 remains vague: 'The [i.e. Quintilian's, M.S.] Greek list [...] is derived from some Hellenistic rhetorician; we have an example in the fragmentary work *On Imitation* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and it has been thought that Quintilian used this, or something very like it'.

[16] For a discussion of Quintilian's canons in the light of the old canons of Callimachus and the Alexandrians, cf. e.g. Steinmetz (1964), 456-466; Zetzel (1983), 97 ff.; Schmidt (1987); Vardi (2003). I dedicated some words to the origin and history of canons in section 3.5.1.

[17] Nettleship (1890), 258. Nettleship refers to Quintilian's numerous references to other critics, e.g. in 10.1.27, 10.1.52-53, 10.1.58-59.

[18] Peterson (1891), xxxii, xxx.

relying upon one single source, made use of an amalgam of various Greek and Roman sources (of whom Dionysius was certainly an important one), with the contribution of his rich experience as a teacher and scholar.[19] In my opinion, Peterson justly tried to rehabilitate Quintilian by putting forward the idea of a shared cultural memory or common discourse from which Quintilian – as Quintilian himself often readily admitted – borrowed and adapted (whether or not consciously), and to which he evidently also contributed.[20]

In the first half of the twentieth century, scholars like Lemarchand and Cohoon tended to emphasise the similarities between the canons of Dionysius and Quintilian, but they also included the reading list of Dio Chrysostom (*Oration* 18) in their comparison. The recent observations of Rutherford, Billault and De Jonge also take Dionysius, Dio and Quintilian into account. Rutherford and Billault pay due attention to the similarities between their lists; De Jonge fruitfully focuses on the differences between Dio (and Quintilian) on the one hand, and Dionysius on the other.[21] More on these discussions can be found in section 5.1.

Other scholars are concerned with Dionysius and Quintilian alone. In 1953, Tavernini emphasised that the coincidences between Dionysius and Quintilian are formal rather than substantial, and that the substratum of thought ('il substrato di pensiero') is different.[22] In more recent years, however, many scholars again shared the propensity to disregard the important divergences between Dionysius' and Quintilian's canons in favour of stressing rather superficial similarities. In his Loeb edition of Quintilian's ninth and tenth book, Russell claims that Quintilian appears to be 'heavily dependent' on Dionysius' *On Imitation*.[23] Although Vardi notices deviations in choices of authors in Quintilian, he emphasises that we

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[19] Cf. e.g. Hutchinson (2013), 12, n. 14, who thinks that Dionysius was one of Quintilian's Greek sources. Like Peterson, Cousin (1935) and Tavernini (1953) considered Ciceronian influence on Quintilian important. For a comparison between Dionysius' and Quintilian's canons, see Peterson (1891), xxx-xxxiv.

[20] This idea was already expressed by Claussen (1873), 343: *[…] nonnullos locos memoria tenuit, adeo ut inscius interdum auctorum verba referret*. For contributions of Quintilian to literary theory, see Peterson (1891), xxxix-lvii.

[21] Rutherford (1998), 43; Billault (2004), 505; De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.).

[22] For a discussion of similarities and differences between Dionysius and Quintilian, see Tavernini (1953), 17-51 (esp. 50-51).

[23] Russell (2001), 246. Cf. also Russell (1979), 6: 'for the Greek material, he [i.e. Quintilian, M.S.] relies almost word for word on Dionysius […]; in the Latin part of the chapter, on the other hand, he airs his own views […]'.

cannot escape noting a 'striking resemblance' between him and Dionysius in names of authors, evaluative criteria and, at times, in wording.[24]

Thus, the gist of the scholarly comments concerning Dionysius and Quintilian is that their canons yield several similarities concerning textual structure, focus and concept. However, on closer inspection these canons also reveal substantial divergences both in choices of authors and critical judgements passed on them. A more detailed and comparative investigation will allow us to address precisely these issues.[25] For example, how are Quintilian's contributions to and adaptations of Dionysius' canon to be explained within the broader framework of the development of Roman literary taste?[26] And what exactly made Quintilian insert a Greek canon to enhance his readers' eloquence in Latin?

In a 2004 article, Citroni dealt with these questions and, more broadly speaking, with the estimation of Quintilian's tenth book as an account with a more general literary interest rather than a narrow rhetorical focus.[27] He claims that Quintilian, whose source – he thinks – must have been either Dionysius or one that was common to Dionysius and himself, explicitly

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[24] Vardi (2003), 136. Vardi stresses the uniformity of the lists of the literary critics and rhetoricians Horace, Dionysius, Quintilian, Diomedes (*De Poem.*), Caesius Bassus (*De Metr.*), Proclus apud Photium, Tzetzes (*ad Lyc.*), and Byzantine MSS (cf. table in *ibid.*, 151). See *ibid.*, 143: 'but to come back to the extensive lists of both literary critics and teachers of rhetoric, let us note that the uniformity they reveal goes beyond the authors they name, and is even more manifest in their structure'.

[25] An interesting, detailed discussion of Quintilian's canons and the internal order of authors is e.g. provided by Schwindt (2000), esp. 160-164, but his approach is not comparative in essence.

[26] Cf. Kühnert (1969), 45: '[…] dass Quintilian bei den einzelnen Autoren eine meist kurze Charakteristik und Beurteilung gibt, in der sich offenbar die *communis opinio* seiner Zeit widerspiegelt'.

[27] Citroni (2006a), 2, n. 2 refers to the works of Cova (1990) and Taekema (2003), who, like him, assume a more general literary interest in Quintilian. On the contrary, Schneider (1983), 118 is of the opinion that Quintilian's reading list is entirely focused on the development of rhetorical progress: '[…] auch innerhalb der Literaturübersicht betont er [i.e. Quintilian, M.S.] immer wieder, dass es ihm hierbei nur um die Förderung des rednerischen Vermögens geht'. That Quintilian has both a rhetorical and general literary interest, is argued by Steinmetz (1964), 455, who observes that 'Rhetorik und Stilkritik sich in vieler Beziehung eng berühren […]'. According to him, Quintilian adapted the 'stilkritische Literaturgeschichte' (*ibid.*, 456) of the Alexandrians and used it for his own rhetorical purposes. Sometimes, however, traces of the literary-historical character of the Alexandrian sources can still be discerned in Quintilian's 'glänzende philologische und literar-historische Bemerkungen' (*ibid.*, 457). His observation seems to be rather in line with that of Schwindt (2000), 164, who argues: 'die Literaturgeschichte ist das Koordinatensystem, in dem die rhetorische Pragmatie des Quintilian sich bewegt'.

broke with (in Citroni's words) the 'Varronian-Ciceronian canon'.[28] This 'canon', with its focus on drama and its reverend admiration for ancient writers such as Ennius, is characterised by a 'framework of emulative correspondences between the Roman and Greek production'.[29] According to Citroni, Quintilian aligned himself with the taste of the Flavian poets of his own age, who accepted as reference points 'no longer the great poets of the Greek canon, but the Augustan poets'; in so doing, he rejected the archaising tradition of Varro and Cicero.[30]

The role played by Dionysius in this process – which is not assessed by Citroni – will throw a different light on the interpretation and contextualisation of Quintilian's Greek and Latin canons. In my analysis of Quintilian's lists, I will argue that classical Greek literature can be considered an essential part of Quintilian's rhetorical program of imitation. First, however, I will briefly discuss Quintilian's theory of imitation, and make a comparison with key concepts of imitation in Dionysius. Then I will pass on to the general structure of Quintilian's canons, the internal order of authors, and the inclusion of writers who do not appear in Dionysius' list.

4.3 QUINTILIAN'S THEORY OF IMITATION

Before turning to Quintilian's theory of imitation, to which he dedicated especially the second section of *Institutio* 10, let us recall that there are some substantial differences between Quintilian's understanding and use of the terms *imitatio* and *aemulatio* throughout his *Institutio*, and Dionysius' understanding and use of the terms μίμησις and ζῆλος throughout his rhetorical treatises. As we have seen in chapter 2, Dionysius presents μίμησις as involving an original, technical re-expression of the model, while he frames ζῆλος as an aspiring state of mind caused by the contemplation of beauty. For Dionysius, μίμησις cannot do without ζῆλος; neither can ζῆλος without μίμησις. By contrast, Quintilian tends to make a rather clear

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[28] On the dependence of Quintilian on Dionysius, see Citroni (2006a), 7, 9. On the break of Quintilian with the archaising tradition of Varro, Cicero and the academics and grammarians, see Citroni (2006a), 12-14. More on the Varronian 'canon' in Fantham (1989), 242-244. See argues that this canon was determined 'indirectly at least' by Varro, who probably started his literary research by investigating the archives of the magistrates of dramatic festivals. The Varronian canon was 'certainly known to Cicero when he composed the *Brutus*' (*ibid.*, 244). For connections between Varro's and Quintilian's ideas on *latinitas*, see Grebe (2000a).

[29] Citroni (2006a), 12.

[30] Citroni (2006a), 16.

distinction between *imitatio* and *aemulatio*. The former designates technical, basic repetition of models, the latter comprises competitive change and completion of models in order to transcend them. Consequently, Quintilian's notion of *imitatio* is merely limited to the first stages of an orator's career, whereas *aemulatio* is reserved to describe the mimetic activities of the mature rhetorician. In this section, which contains an overview of Quintilian's theory of imitation unfolded in *Institutio* 10.1-2, we will see that both Quintilian and Dionysius, notwithstanding the differences in the meaning and use of mimetic idiom in their works, construct a theory of imitation grounded on remarkably similar ideas.[31]

Not only do Quintilian's canons give voice to his theory of imitation; the entire tenth book of the *Institutio* is devoted to the acquisition of stylistic competence by reading – hence the two canons of Greek and Latin literature –, writing and speaking. As such, it continues the account of *elocutio* in books 8 and 9, but, as Russell notes, there is a 'change of perspective'.[32] Whereas books 8 and 9 are highly technical and theoretical in their discussions on *elocutio*, book 10 aims at offering the reader some models and practical guidelines on how to obtain 'firm facility, which the Greeks call *hexis*' (*firma [...] facilitas, quae apud Graecos hexis nominatur*).[33] Quintilian's main intention is to discuss those authors whose works are most valuable and practically useful for acquiring this facility.[34] He shares this aim with Dionysius, who also emphatically insists on the practical usefulness of his own canon and on the achievement of ἕξις, which, as we have seen in section 3.3.1, consists of a clever nature, careful study and laborious exercise (fr. II U-R).[35] Quintilian's book 10 covers the following subjects: acquisition of stylistic competence (1.1-45), canons of Greek and Latin literature (1.46-84, 1.85-131), imitation (2.1-28), methods of writing (3.1-33), correction (4.1-4), objects of writing exercises (5.1-23), mental preparation (6.1-7) and improvisation (7.1-33).

In 10.1.1-45, Quintilian presents some preliminary remarks to the reading lists of Greek and Latin literature. After his insistence on *facilitas*, which is acquired first and

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[31] For an analysis of Quintilian's argument in sections 10.1-2, see also Peterson (1891), 1-6; Russell (2001), 246-249.

[32] Russell (2001), 246.

[33] Quint. 10.1.1. For Greek rhetorical terminology in Quintilian, see Cousin (1936).

[34] Quintilian's references to (imitating what is useful in) rhetorical practice are abundant; see e.g. 10.1.4; 10.1.15-16; 10.1.40; 10.1.57.

[35] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. For Dionysius' reference to the practical usefulness of his canon, see *Thuc*. 1.1-2. For references to usefulness in *Imit*., see e.g. 3.8; 5.4; 5.7. Other references to ἕξις in Dionysius are *Lys*. 11.5; *Dem*. 52.1, 52.5.

foremost through 'speaking' (*dicere*), then through 'imitation' (*imitatio*) and then through 'the discipline of writing' (*scribendi diligentia*), Quintilian proceeds to his main goal, which is to make clear 'by what kind of exercise the athlete, who has learned all the standard moves from his trainer, can be prepared for the competition' (*athleta qui omnis iam perdidicerit a praeceptore numeros quo genere exercitationis ad certamina praeparandus sit*).[36] In 10.1.6-16, it turns out that this preparation for rhetorical practice mainly consists of the development of two capacities that are essential to an orator: 'wealth' (*copia*, also called *ubertas* or *divitia*) and 'sound judgement' (*iudicium*).[37] These capacities are the fruits of frequent reading of and listening to the best models.[38] It is not immediately clear what the exact difference is between being endowed with *firma facilitas* or *copia*.[39] Both terms seem to be closely intertwined – the former referring merely to the *application* of wide literary knowledge, the latter pertaining to the *possession* of it. In this way, we could say that *copia* is the prerequisite of *firma facilitas*.

'Sound judgement' (*iudicium*) also seems to be inextricably linked with *copia*, as Quintilian's advice reveals that 'we should pair wealth with sound judgement' (*nobis autem copia cum iudicio paranda est*) 'by reading and hearing the best' (*optima legendo atque audiendo*).[40] But what exactly does *iudicium* refer to? As Taekema points out, the term is ambivalent.[41] On the one hand, it indicates having gained a keen eye for literary qualities and a sound understanding of which of these qualities fit one's own capabilities.[42] Seen in this way, it is a wide reading experience (*copia*) that results in a rather general *iudicium* – which, in turn, should form the basis of the actual process of imitation, as Quintilian makes clear.[43]

On the other hand, the term *iudicium* seems to pertain to a sharp sense of what is appropriate in various contexts. Thus, *iudicium* also has a strong applicatory-oriented connotation and makes up a crucial part not only of critical literary study, but also of the actual imitative process. In this practical sense, it is connected primarily to the level of words, for Quintilian argues that 'reading will provide us with an abundance' (*ubertatem ac divitias*

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[36] Quint. 10.1.3-4.

[37] Quint. 10.1.8, 13. Peterson (1891) *ad loc.* notices that *ubertatem ac divitias* is a hendiadys consisting of synonymous nouns; he refers to Cic. *De or.* 1.161 for the metaphorical use of *divitia*.

[38] Quint. 10.1.10, 8.

[39] On *copia*, see e.g. Lausberg (2008), 676. On *facilitas*, see *ibid.*, 703.

[40] Quint. 10.1.8. On *iudicium*, see e.g. Lausberg (2008), 733.

[41] Taekema (2003), 255.

[42] Cf. Quint. 10.2.18-19.

[43] Quint. 10.1.8.

dabit lectio) of synonymous terms to be applied not only at pleasure, 'but also as is fitting' (*sed etiam quo modo oportet*).[44] Elsewhere, Quintilian points out that reading will enable us not only to learn the proper names of things, but also what name is 'the most appropriate in each place' (*quoque loco [...] aptissimum*).[45] Hence, *iudicium* involves not only the sound assessment of literature as such and in relation to one's own capacities, but also the estimation of its usability in given situations.[46]

In his *On Imitation*, Dionysius too proclaims the necessity of a profound knowledge of literary models. The closing paragraph of this treatise mentions the 'method of attentive reading' (τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπιμελοῦς ἀναγνώσεως), which does not approach the ancients 'casually' (παρέργως) nor 'obliviously waits for the profit to come' (λεληθότως τὴν ὠφέλειαν προσγινομένην περιμένειν), but 'knowingly' (ἐπιστημόνως).[47] In this passage, sound judgement – which is equal to knowledge – is bound to the contemplation of literature, not to its actual incorporation in a new context. The stage of literary contemplation is in fact very important in Dionysius' conception of the process of imitation. Nevertheless, we have seen that Dionysius also insisted on knowledge during the stages of selecting models and eclectically composing new masterpieces, for instance in his programmatic narrative on Zeuxis, who thoughtfully picked out and painted only those parts of his models which were worth reproducing.[48]

In the rest of the prelude to his canons (10.1.17-36), Quintilian discusses the usefulness of reading the different genres of oratory, poetry, historiography and philosophy, and pays due attention to the differences between these genres.[49] In 10.1.37-46, Quintilian

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[44] Quint. 10.1.13.

[45] Quint. 10.1.8.

[46] Its Greek counterpart κρίσις has a similar ambivalence, designating the judgement of literary qualities as well as the estimation of situation and context. On κρίσις, see e.g. Lausberg (2008), 234-235.

[47] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.7. For a discussion of this passage, see also section 3.4.

[48] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.4. For this story, see sections 1.1-3.

[49] With respect to oratory, he insists again on repeated and careful reading (10.1.19) of only the best models (10.1.20) for the development of a 'more sure judgement' (*certius iudicium*, 10.1.17) regarding the structure of speeches. Furthermore, he advises to take note of the pleadings on both sides (10.1.22) and not to imitate those passages of the best authors which are worse (10.1.25; cf. 10.2.14-15). (For the idea of authors falling below their own standards, cf. Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 1.1). Reading poetry is useful and inspiring, but should be done prudently by the orator; after all, unlike rhetoric, the genre of poetry 'aims at pleasure alone' (*solam petit voluptatem*, 10.1.28) and, forced to making digressions because of metrical restrictions, often derogates truth. Historiography can nurture the orator 'with its rich and delicious milk' (*uberi iucundoque suco*, 10.1.31) and

elaborates on the selection criteria he adopted in the composition of his reading lists. Although he admits that every writer can be of some use, he declares to select only those authors who contribute 'to the formation of style' (*ad faciendam [...] phrasin*), and of them only 'the best' (*eminentissimi*) and the most appropriate 'for those who intend to become orators' (*intendentibus ut oratores fiant*).[50]

In book 1 of the *Institutio*, Quintilian provides an explanation for offering a novice learner only the highlights of literature: although the young man is not yet able to grasp their qualities completely, his mind rises by reading their 'honourable texts' (*honesta*).[51] Later, when he is endowed 'with a firmer judgement' (*firmiore iudicio*), he is allowed to venture to tragic and, with certain reservations, lyrical poets, who also 'nourish' the mind (cf. *alunt et lyrici*).[52] This pedagogical differentiation within the reading program (which will be further discussed in this chapter) is very prominent in Quintilian's theory of imitation, but is a less easily recognizable catalyst for the choices he makes in his Greek and Latin canons.[53]

By conspicuously paying attention to his own method of choosing authors, Quintilian is casting himself as an exponent of sagacious selection, for the authors he recommends have all been subjected to his own severe criteria pertaining to practical usefulness, as he makes clear.[54] Although the analogy between his own selective methods and those supposed to be carried out by his students is not explicit, the similarities are unmistakable. This is less prominent in Dionysius, who indeed singles out only those authors worth imitating, but does

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provide him with sound *exempla* (10.1.34); nevertheless, it should be approached with caution as well, for 'it is written to narrate, not to prove' (*scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum*, 10.1.31). To the philosophers, the rhetoricians gave up the best of their task, which is the discussion of moral concepts (10.1.35). Although the argumentations, interrogations and debates of philosophers can help the orator in his preparations, he should keep in mind that the condition in legal processes and philosophical debates differs (10.1.36).

[50] Quint. 10.1.42, 45. For the idea that every writer has useful qualities, cf. also 10.1.57. For the idea of selecting only the best authors, see also 10.1.20. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 1.1-2, where *On Imitation* is discussed: οὓς ὑπελάμβανον ἐπιφανεστάτους εἶναι ποιητάς τε καὶ συγγραφεῖς ('I discussed those poets and prose authors whom I considered to be outstanding') and *Orat. Vett.* 4.4, where the selection of orators in the essays *On the Ancient Orators* is at issue: τοὺς δὲ χαριεστάτους ἐξ αὐτῶν προχειρισάμενος ('after having selected the most elegant of them'). For Dionysius' description of the intended audience of his reading list, which resembles Quintilian's description, see *Thuc.* 1.2: τοῖς προαιρουμένοις γράφειν τε καὶ λέγειν εὖ ('for those who intend to write and speak well').

[51] Quint. 1.8.4.

[52] Quint. 1.8.5-6.

[53] For the idea of pedagogical differentiation, see also Quint. 1.8.12.

[54] Quint. 10.1.44-45.

not reflect upon his own method of selecting authors in a way that overtly invites the reader to consider it an illustration of selective imitation.[55] As we have seen in section 3.4, Dionysius does cast himself as a theoretical example worth following regarding his 'method of attentive reading'.[56]

Institutio 10.2 is more theoretical in nature. Like Dionysius, Quintilian frames the process of imitation in terms of a mental movement or elevation (cf. *mens derigenda*).[57] He proceeds to discuss the successive stages of *imitatio* (i.e. basic repetition of the model) and *aemulatio* (i.e. original adaption of and addition to the model) are discussed.[58] Although his reading lists of Greek and Latin literature are intended 'for those who intend to become orators' and who are necessarily concerned with *imitatio*, Quintilian here reveals that he attaches more value to *aemulatio*. *Imitatio*, he argues, is insufficient on its own, since it does not facilitate stylistic progress.[59] Moreover, the scope of *imitatio* is limited: those qualities of an orator which are the most important (i.e. 'genius' (*ingenium*), 'invention' (*inventio*), 'force' (*vis*) and 'facility' (*facilitas*)), are inimitable.[60]

Again emphasising the importance of understanding (cf. *intellegat*) the object of imitation and knowing (cf. *sciat*) why it is good, Quintilian advises novice students to investigate whom they should imitate (10.2.14), what elements they should imitate (*ibid*.), and what their own capacities allow for (10.2.19).[61] Quintilian points out again that they should be aware of differences in the 'law' (*lex*) and 'standard of appropriateness' (*decor*) of the genres, but also hastens to notice that 'all eloquence has something in common' (*habet [...] omnis eloquentia aliquid commune*).[62] It is this common element that should be imitated. After some remarks on the need of imitating a wide range of models instead of following only one, Quintilian concludes this section by insisting that imitation is not limited to words; it also

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[55] For Dionysius' remarks on his criteria for selection and evaluation and his aims in *On Imitation*, see *Thuc*. 1.1-2. Cf. *Orat. Vett*. 4.2 and 4.4, where Dionysius elaborates on the selection and presentation of orators.

[56] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.7.

[57] Quint. 10.2.1. Cf. 1.8.5: *animus adsurgat*. Dionysius, however, explicitly connects this mental movement with the concept of ζῆλος (*Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti). Cf. sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1, where the idea of mental movement is also touched upon.

[58] For Quintilian's understanding and use of the notions of *imitatio* and *aemulatio*, see section 2.3.

[59] Quint. 10.2.4.

[60] Quint. 10.2.12.

[61] For the reference to knowledge, see Quint. 10.2.18.

[62] Quint. 10.2.22.

deals with how these words are applied.[63] The orator who is 'perfect' (*perfectus*) should 'see through' (*pervideri*) e.g. an author's appropriateness, strategy and composition, and should try to improve his models by tapping into his 'own good qualities' (*propria bona*).[64] It is in hopeful expectation that Quintilian waits this *perfectus orator* to come.

4.4 STRUCTURE OF DIONYSIUS' AND QUINTILIAN'S CANONS

In the previous section, we have seen that Quintilian's theory of imitation revolves around prominent concepts such as 'facility' (*facilitas*), 'wealth' (*copia*), 'sound judgement' (*iudicium*), selection of the best features of different authors, and eclectic and original composition. These concepts are also quintessential to Dionysius' understanding of imitation. By offering an analysis of the structure of Quintilian's and Dionysius' canons, the present and following sections intend to show that within a rather similar conceptual framework of imitation, different choices are made concerning the selected authors (4.4 and 4.6) and the order of their appearance (4.5).

As the section on the *status quaestionis* (4.2) makes clear, the canons of Dionysius and Quintilian have been examined and interpreted by several scholars who frequently tended to emphasise the points of contact in structure and content. Many of them thought the resemblances were so striking that it was likely either that Quintilian knew Dionysius' *On Imitation*, or that their works could be traced back to a common Alexandrian source.[65] In my opinion, both options may well be true, even at the same time, although it cannot be substantiated that Quintilian had direct access to Dionysius' treatise. After all, similarities in structure, in thought, in phrasing – however remarkable – may all go back to a common source. More important to establish, therefore, is that within the tradition of compiling canons, Dionysius' and Quintilian's reading lists are, if only because of their strong rhetorical focus, inextricably connected and, what is more, testify to a shared discourse of imitation.

In his Greek and Latin canons, Quintilian distinguishes, like Dionysius, two main categories: poetry (10.1.46-72) and a threefold prose category divided into history (73-75),

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[63] For the idea of imitating a range of models, cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.3, 5.7.

[64] Quint. 10.2.27-28.

[65] In any case, Quintilian was familiar with some of Dionysius' works, since he refers to him three times in his *Institutio*: 3.1.16, 9.3.89, 9.4.88. Cf. section 1.1, n. 10. In his canon of Greek literature, Quintilian explicitly refers to the Alexandrian canon makers Aristarchus (10.1.54, 59) and Aristophanes (10.1.54).

oratory (76-80) and finally philosophy (81-84).[66] In total, 44 Greek authors and two groups of authors (Socratics and old Stoics) are listed, as well as no fewer than 60 Latin authors, whereas in the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, only 26 Greek writers and the group of Pythagoreans are chronicled.[67] The order of treatment in Dionysius is different: he has philosophy third and completes his canon with oratory.[68] The poetic genre, which comprises many more names than in the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, is built up from authors representing epic, lyrical, tragic and comic poetry.[69] In the Greek (as well as in the Latin) canon, there is also the cursory addition of two second-rank subgenres not included in Dionysius' canon: elegiac and iambic poetry, represented by Callimachus, Philetas and Archilochus, of whom only the latter is stylistically characterised.[70]

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[66] On the macro structure of Quintilian's canons, cf. e.g. Peterson (1891), xxx-xxxiv; Rutherford (1998), 40-43; Schwindt (2000), 159-160.

[67] In Dionysius' canon, Xenophon occurs twice.

[68] An explanation for putting the category of philosophers last may be Quintilian's aversion against philosophers, who had usurped what Quintilian believed to belong to rhetoricians alone. On this aversion against philosophers in general and Seneca in specific, see Peterson (1891), xxiv-xxviii. Dominik (1997), 53 argues that 'the fact that philosophy is the last genre treated by Quintilian [...] is a strong indication not only of his view of its relative importance to the practice of oratory but also of his general aversion to the philosophers, including Seneca'. Rutherford (1992), 361, n. 26 provides two other possible explanations, suggesting that Quintilian either wanted to end with the philosopher Seneca and thus had to change the order of the Greek canon (which I find very convincing), or that he thought of philosophy as a 'more advanced stage in the curriculum'. Regarding this last suggestion, cf. Laureys (1991), 124, who argues that 'Seneca must be read by students who have already been trained by 'safer' authors'. Dominik (1997) explains Seneca's last place by suggesting that he was difficult to assess, and 'does not really conform to Quintilian's generic expectations of a writer. Certainly his style does not fit into any of the three traditional stylistic classifications of plain, grand and intermediate mentioned by Quintilian as a prelude to his survey (10.1.44, cf. 12.10.58 ff.)' (*ibid*., 56).

[69] As in the Alexandrian lists, poetical genres are defined only by metre, not by content. See Steinmetz (1964), 462; Zetzel (1983), 97.

[70] In 10.1.58, Quintilian explicitly notices that he is not unique in including Callimachus and Philetas in his list: *princeps habetur Callimachus, secundas confessione plurimorum Philetas occupavit* ('Callimachus is regarded as the leader, and Philetas is generally admitted to have taken second place'). For recording Archilochus, Quintilian relies upon the authority of Aristarchus, who selected two other writers of iambics besides Archilochus (i.e. Semonides of Amorgos and Hipponax of Ephesus) (10.1.59): *ex tribus receptis Aristarchi iudicio scriptoribus iamborum* ('of the three writers of iambics accepted by Aristarchus' ruling').

This generic division, which is tailored to Greek literature, is also used for Latin literature, which, however, was much more characterised by a blending of genres.[71] Satire, too, gets separate mention – a genre which Quintilian calls 'entirely ours' (cf. *satura [...] tota nostra est*).[72] As a result of the rather artificial use of a fixed, traditional scheme, Ovid and Horace oddly enough appear in three sections, and Cicero in two. In the case of the Latin authors, it seems very likely that Quintilian composed a list which 'probably reflects more authentically [than is the case in the Greek canon, M.S.] the attitudes and judgements of Quintilian and of the culture of his time [...]', in the words of Citroni.[73] It is also striking that Quintilian refers more frequently to the opinions of other critics in the Latin canon than in the Greek one.[74] Moreover, in the Latin canon he often takes a more confident (and more critical) stance with respect to the opinions of others than in the Greek list, in which the language of consensus prevails. Quintilian's relatively larger independence from other critics in the Latin list may have to do with the fact that we do not know of a Latin canon compiled in the comprehensive way Quintilian did.[75] All pre-existing lists were limited in scope, from the first

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[71] Cf. Zetzel (1983), 89, who elaborates on the blending of genres and of literary elements (both classical and Hellenistic) with Roman themes.

[72] Quint. 10.1.93.

[73] Citroni (2006a), 1. Cf. Citroni (2005), 15-16. Cf. also Peterson (1891), xxxvii; Kennedy (1962), 142; Schwindt (2000), 167; Russell (2001), 248.

[74] The following expressions in the Latin canon are Quintilian's references to other critics: 10.1.86: *verbis isdem quae ex Afro Domitio iuvenis excepi* ('let me quote the words I heard from Domitius Afer when I was a young man'); 10.1.89: *ut est dictum* ('as has been said'); 10.1.93: *sunt qui [...] malint* ('some prefer'); *ibid.*: *quosdam [...] amatores* ('some admirers'); 10.1.97: *Accio plus tribuitur* ('Accius is given more credit'); *ibid.*: *qui esse docti adfectant* ('people who claim to be learned'); 10.1.98: *senes [...] putabant, [...] confitebantur* ('older men thought […], but admitted'); 10.1.99: *Varro [...] dicat* ('Varro holds'); *ibid.*: *veteres laudibus ferant* ('older critics extol'); *ibid.*: *Terenti scripta ad [...] referantur* '(Terence's works are attributed to'); 10.1.102: *mihi egregie dixisse videtur Servilius Nonianus* ('it seems to me that Servilius Nonianus was absolutely right to say'); 10.1.104: *habet amatores – nec inmerito –* ('has its admirers, and rightly so'); 10.1.109: *ait Pindarus* ('Pindar says'); 10.1.112: *non inmerito ab hominibus aetatis suae [...] dictus est* ('it was not without reason that his contemporaries said'); 10.1.113: *quibusdam [...] videatur* ('some think'); 10.1.115: *inveni qui [...] praeferrent [...], inveni qui [...] crederent* ('I have found some who prefer […], and I have found others who believe').

[75] Cf. e.g. Kennedy (1962), 142: 'there is no known precedent for the idea of a Latin reading list [...]'. Citroni (2006b), 220 ff., however, does speak of an 'archaic Latin canon', but he apparently conceives of a 'canon' as a set of names widely esteemed and mentioned. This 'archaic Latin canon' to which Citroni refers, was formed over a period of time between the age of Caesar and that of Augustus, and contained only names of the past (Ennius, Naevius, Livius Andronicus, Pacuvius, Accius, Plautus, Caecilius, Terence, Afranius). Among the critics who contributed to this 'canon' were Cicero, Velleius Paterculus and Varro. This archaic 'canon' was,

known 'canon' of Latin comic authors by Volcacius Sedigitus dating from around 100 BC, to the literary criticisms uttered by Cicero (*Hortensius*), Horace and others.[76]

A schematic representation will help to clarify the structure of Dionysius' and Quintilian's canons:

	Dion. Hal. *Imit.*	Quint. (Greek canon)	Quint. (Latin canon)
POETS			
hexametric	Homer Hesiod Antimachus Panyasis	Homer Hesiod Antimachus Panyasis Apollonius Aratus Theocritus Pisander Nicander Euphorion Tyrtaeus	Vergil Macer Lucretius Varro of Atax Ennius Ovid Cornelius Severus Serranus Valerius Flaccus Saleius Bassus Rabirius Pedo Lucan Domitian
elegiac		Callimachus Philetas	Tibullus Propertius Ovid Gallus
satirical			Lucilius Horace Persius Terentius Varro
iambic		Archilochus	Catullus Bibaculus Horace
lyrical	Pindar Simonides Stesichorus Alcaeus	Pindar Stesichorus Alcaeus Simonides	Horace Caesius Bassus

according to Citroni (*ibid*., 220), 'soon to be largely supplanted' by the Augustan poets, who wanted to introduce their own, new standards of Latin literature which would make the Greek canon superfluous. Cf. also Zetzel (1983), 101, who observes that the great Augustan poets aimed for 'canonicity in a new way'.

[76] References to the work of Volcacius Sedigitus can be found in Gell. *NA* 15.24.

tragic	Aeschylus Sophocles Euripides	Aeschylus Sophocles Euripides	Accius Pacuvius Varius Ovid Pomponius Secundus
comic	All authors, incl. Menander	Aristophanes Eupolis Cratinus Menander Philemon	Plautus Caecilius Terence Afranius
HISTORIANS	Herodotus Thucydides Xenophon Philistus Theopompus	Thucydides Herodotus Theopompus Philistus Ephorus Clitarchus Timagenes Xenophon	Sallust Livy Servilius Nonianus Aufidius Bassus Cremutius
RHETORICIANS[77]	Lysias Isocrates Lycurgus Demosthenes Aeschines Hyperides	Demosthenes Aeschines Hyperides Lysias Isocrates Demetrius of Phal.	Cicero Asinius Pollio Messala Julius Caesar Caelius Calvus Servius Sulpicius Cassius Severus Domitius Afer Julius Africanus Trachalus Vibius Crispus Julius Secundus
PHILOSOPHERS	Pythagoreans Xenophon Plato Aristotle	Plato Xenophon Socratics Aristotle Theophrastus Stoics	Cicero Brutus Cornelius Celsus Plautus Catius Seneca
Total:	27	46	60

The structural similarities suggest a strong connection between the lists. Quintilian enumerates the same hexametric poets as Dionysius in like order, but with the addition of the names of five Hellenistic authors who are, as Quintilian explicitly admits in the case of

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[77] In this scheme, I adopt the order in Quint. 10: rhetoricians before philosophers.

Apollonius, not named 'in the list of the grammarians' (*in ordinem a grammaticis datum*).[78] Quintilian also refers to an established canon of 'nine lyrical poets' (cf. *novem [...] lyricorum*), but chooses to list only Pindar, Stesichorus, Alcaeus and Simonides – the only four who also appear in Dionysius' list, though differently arranged.[79]

The famous triad of the tragic poets Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides can be found in both Dionysius and Quintilian. But whereas Dionysius starts with tragic poetry and then only names Menander as the representative of comic poetry, Quintilian begins with old comedy – recording Aristophanes, Eupolis and Cratinus –, then proceeds to tragedy and eventually dwells on the importance of Menander, the great figurehead of new comedy who closes the line of poets in which Homer (who is also discussed at length) takes first place.[80] A similar arrangement can be discerned in the Latin canon, in which Vergil leads and Afranius closes the chain of poets.[81] As in Dionysius' canon, it is Euripides who marks the transition to Menander, who 'greatly admired him' (*hunc et admiratus maxime est*).[82] However, as Citroni rightly notices, 'the final position of Menander is even more notable than in Dionysius, seeing that Quintilian had already dealt with comedy in a previous section [...]'.[83] Moreover,

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[78] Quint. 10.1.54. Curiously, also the poets Pisander and – inserted under the influence of Horace – Tyrtaeus (10.1.56) are placed among the Hellenistic authors, though they lived well before them and Tyrtaeus was not an epic poet, but an elegist and lyricist. On Quintilian's insertion of Tyrtaeus, see Citroni (2006a), 8, n. 20 and esp. his references to other literature. The additions made by Quintilian not only in the poetry sections but also in the prose sections will be examined in section 4.6.

[79] Quint. 10.1.61-64. Besides those authors mentioned here, Alcman, Sappho, Ibycus, Anacreon and Bacchylides belong to the canon of nine lyricists.

[80] On Homer-Menander, cf. Steinmetz (1964), 457-458; Citroni (2006a), 9-12. The connection between Homer and Menander as formally expressed in Dionysius and Quintilian is probably a reflection of the opinion of Aristophanes of Byzantium (ascribed to him on a herm), who took Menander as being second only to Homer. Homer and Menander are paired in several double herms. More on their conjunction in art and literature in Körte (1936); Citroni (2006a), 11, n. 27; esp. Fontaine (2014), 549 (with useful references). As comic poets, Quintilian names, besides Menander, Aristophanes, Eupolis, Cratinus (belonging to old comedy) and Philemon (belonging to new comedy), whereas Dionysius recommends all comic poets, and particularly Menander (*Imit.* 2.14).

[81] This is also observed by Steinmetz (1964), 458. Afranius, unlike Menander, is not highly regarded by Quintilian (10.1.100). Welsh (2010), 120 explains Quintilian's negative judgement on Afranius by assuming a 'scant knowledge of the dramatist'. Goldberg (1987) elaborates on the curious prominence of Greek comedy in relation to the negative discussion of Latin comedy.

[82] Quint. 10.1.69. Cf. Peterson (1891), xxxii; Steinmetz (1964), 457-458.

[83] Citroni (2006a), 10.

Quintilian explicitly presents Menander as imitator of Euripides (cf. *secutus*), while such a connection is not pointed out in the epitome of *On Imitation*.[84]

As for the historians, Quintilian mentions all five names that are also singled out by Dionysius, though again three Hellenistic authors (i.e. Ephorus, Clitarchus and Timagenes) are added. Remarkably enough, Polybius, whose Greek work concerns the Roman Republic in the Hellenistic Word, is not mentioned. As a historian, Xenophon is only mentioned to facilitate the transition to the philosophers, to which category Quintilian thinks he actually belongs.[85] Moreover, the order of historians differs, and remarkable precedence is given by Quintilian to the minor historian Theopompus, who comes third, right after Thucydides and Herodotus.

In the case of the rhetoricians, Quintilian refers to a canon of ten whom 'a single age produced at the same time in Athens' (*simul Athenis aetas una tulerit*).[86] Like Dionysius, though in a different sequence, Quintilian mentions Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes and Aeschines, but he includes Demetrius of Phalerum, with whom he closes the section on rhetoric, instead of Lycurgus.[87] In the genre of philosophy, Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle appear in different order both in Dionysius and Quintilian.[88] Quintilian adds the Socratics (others than Xenophon) before and Theophrastus right after Aristotle. The old Pythagoreans who headed this section in Dionysius are replaced by the Hellenistic Stoics, who close the line of philosophers in Quintilian – and therewith the entire Greek canon.

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[84] Quint. 10.1.69.

[85] Quintilian mentions Xenophon among the historians (10.1.75), but only to avoid the impression that he did not think about him. He considers him merely a philosopher (10.1.82), as was common in his days (cf. Dio *Orat.* 18.13-17, where Xenophon is reckoned among the Socratic writers; cf. also Diog. Laert. 2.48), and thus 'probably followed an older tradition', as Peterson (1891), xxxiii argues by pointing to Cic. *De Or.* 2.58. Xenophon's classification as a philosopher is designated by Steinmetz (1964), 463 as a 'Zeittendenz'.

[86] Quint. 10.1.76. For literature on the (alleged) canon of ten Attic orators (Aeschines, Andocides, Antiphon, Demosthenes, Dinarchus, Hyperides, Isaeus, Isocrates, Lycurgus, Lysias), see section 3.5.1, n. 165.

[87] Demetrius of Phalerum is not one of the ten Attic orators. Except for Demetrius of Phalerum, Cicero (*De Or.* 3.28) selects the same orators as Quintilian, though presents them in different order. For praise of Demetrius of Phalerum in Cicero, see e.g. *De or.* 2.95; *Orat.* 92.

[88] Peterson (1891), xxxiv rightly notices that both Dionysius and Quintilian place Xenophon and Plato before Aristotle.

4.5 THE ORDER OF AUTHORS IN DIONYSIUS AND QUINTILIAN

Structural deviations in arrangement which come to the fore when observing the canons of Dionysius and Quintilian have often been dismissed in favour of stressing the general points of contact. Nevertheless, these differences between Dionysius and Quintilian in the order of authors belonging to the same genre suggest that 'order' is in fact a matter of significant importance. Thus, we are confronted with the question what kind of organizing principle lays behind the internal structure of the individual sections. Steinmetz argues that in the Greek canon of Quintilian, the order is not just a reflection of chronology, but is determined by the interdependence of the authors listed.[89] As he argues, the marked transition from Euripides to Menander, suggestive of their close interrelationship, is an illustration of this, as well as the placement of Homer at the beginning and Menander at the end of the poetry section. These broad structural devices, however, also occur in Dionysius' canon. How then can the more detailed deviations in the sequence of poets, historians, philosophers and rhetoricians in Dionysius and Quintilian be explained?

Three factors of varying influence on the internal order of authors within the various generic sections can (and already have been) distinguished: chronology, coherence and literary importance.[90] I define these factors as follows. Chronology means that the oldest author comes first. Coherence pertains to an explicitly mentioned stylistic interconnection between authors which is often based on the principle of imitation. The literary importance of an author is determined by an amalgam of factors: traditional consensus on an author's pre-eminence, the critic's personal taste and rhetorical agenda, and the preferences of the contemporary literary scene.

In my view, chronology seems to be the most important factor for sequencing the authors in Dionysius' canon, whereas Quintilian more frequently ignores it.[91] We can see it (almost) perfectly at work in no less than four out of six sections in Dionysius: in that on tragic poetry, and in all prose sections (history, philosophy and rhetoric).[92] Within the sections

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[89] Steinmetz (1964), 457, who speaks of 'innere Zusammenhänge'.

[90] 'Coherence' is what Steinmetz calls 'innere Zusammenhänge'. Different scholars have pointed to (some of) these factors; see e.g. Steinmetz (1964); Aujac (1992); Schwindt (2000); Citroni (2006a).

[91] Of course, chronology can run parallel with literary significance, as is for example true for Homer, who is both the oldest and the best author.

[92] The section on comic poets is not taken into consideration, because there is no sequence of authors here (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.14).

on hexametric and lyrical poetry, however, chronology is not rigidly maintained by Dionysius when it does violence to the coherence of authors, or when the undisputed superiority of an author strongly requires a top position.[93] Two examples will show this.

First, the sequence of the hexametric poets Antimachus and Panyasis in Dionysius (and also Quintilian) illustrates the ultimate prevalence of coherence over chronology. Here, Panyasis is, in spite of his earlier birth, placed after Antimachus, apparently because 'Panyasis combines the virtues of both [i.e. Hesiod and Antimachus, M.S.] and surpasses these in subject matter and in peculiar disposition' (Πανύασις δὲ τάς τε ἀμφοῖν ἀρετὰς ἠνέγκατο, καὶ αὐτὰς πραγματείᾳ καὶ τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν οἰκονομίᾳ διήνεγκεν).[94] Like Dionysius, Quintilian places Panyasis last and commends him in strikingly similar terms, referring to grammarians (cf. *putant*) who think that Panyasis is 'mixed from both' (*ex utroque mixtum*) and that 'Hesiod is surpassed by him in subject matter, Antimachus in disposition' (*alterum [...] ab eo materia, alterum disponendi ratione superari*).[95]

Secondly, the sequence of lyrical poets in Dionysius (and also in Quintilian) suggests that literary superiority takes precedence over chronology. Both Dionysius and Quintilian have the youngest poet Pindar at the head of the list.[96] The sequence of the following authors, however, seems to be determined first and foremost by the principle of coherence; chronology is maintained only when it does not disturb the line of coherence. Wat is remarkable, is that Dionysius and Quintilian conceive of this coherence in different ways. Let us first look at their order. Dionysius gives second place to Pindar's contemporary Simonides, who was born only some decades earlier (a choice which is, hence, rather in line with chronology). Simonides is followed by the much older Stesichorus (for reasons of coherence, as we will see) and Alcaeus. In Quintilian's list, it is Stesichorus who directly follows Pindar, and who

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[93] In explaining a deviation from chronology in Dionysius' placement of Pindar, Aujac (1992), 17 points to factors of hierarchy and internal cohesion rather than chronological structure of lists of poets circulating at schools: 'les listes de poètes qui circulaient dans les écoles cherchaient à établir un classement hiérarchique plutôt que chronologique, et à relever des liens d'affinités entre les auteurs'.

[94] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.4.

[95] Quint. 10.1.54.

[96] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.5; Quint. 10.1.61. Cf. Schwindt (2000), 160: 'innerhalb der einzelnen Gattungsabschnitte wird in der Regel der als führend anerkannte oder von Quintilian für führend gehaltene Autor zuerst genannt'. According to Schwindt, the same holds true for the Latin canon (*ibid*., 161).

gets due attention.[97] After him come Alcaeus and Simonides, who are treated more summarily. The judgements passed on the authors at stake shed light on the motivations for this difference in order in Dionysius and Quintilian.[98]

Dionysius compares and connects Simonides with Pindar by arguing that 'he is regarded' (εὑρίσκεται) as even better than Pindar where 'the evocation of pity' (τὸ οἰκτίζεσθαι) is concerned.[99] Quintilian argues that 'his [i.e. Simonides', M.S.] main merit is in arousing pity' (*praecipua tamen eius in commovenda miseratione virtus*).[100] However, he dissociates himself from the idea that with regard to this virtue Simonides is the best. This view is held by 'some' unnamed critics: because of Simonides' ability to arouse pity 'some even prefer him to all other writers of the same genre in this respect' (*quidam in hac eum parte omnibus eiusdem operis auctoribus praeferant*).[101]

What is striking, is that Quintilian does not observe a specific connection between Pindar and Simonides. Hence, there seems to be no need of marking a stylistic coherence between these authors by placing them in succession. Instead of mentioning Simonides next to Pindar, Quintilian links Stesichorus with Pindar. To both of these lyrical poets Quintilian attributes a grand style, and he uses similar imagery to make their connection even more obvious. He employs the metaphor of a river to characterise the expressions of Stesichorus, who 'bursts his banks' (*effunditur*) as a 'fault of wealth' (*copiae vitium*) – which is, of course, a good thing *per se*.[102] Like Stesichorus, Pindar also excels 'in enormous wealth' (*beatissima*

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[97] Aujac (1992), 16 regards Quintilian's placement of Stesichorus before Simonides as a chronological correction of the order in Dionysius, which, of course, is true. However, I think that the coherence between Pindar and Stesichorus plays an even more crucial role in Quintilian's ranking.

[98] It does not become clear from the judgements passed on Simonides in the epitome that Dionysius regards him as a more significant writer than Stesichorus and Alcaeus. On the contrary, Stesichorus and Alcaeus get more space, and the former is even 'dominating in those aspects in which they [i.e. Pindar and Simonides, M.S.] are inferior' (ὧν ἐκεῖνοι λείπονται κρατοῦντα) (Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.7). Thus, here coherence seems to influence the sequence rather than literary significance. Quintilian on the other hand pays much more attention to Stesichorus than to Alcaeus and Simonides, whom he discusses rather critically. Here, in addition to coherence, literary significance may determine the order. It seems to be of secondary importance that coherence and literary significance are in line with chronology.

[99] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.6.

[100] Quint. 10.1.64.

[101] *Ibid*. *Quidam* may perhaps also include Dionysius; though he too refers to a tradition (cf. εὑρίσκεται) of considering Simonides the champion of τὸ οἰκτίζεσθαι, he does not explicitly distance himself from this view.

[102] Quint. 10.1.62.

copia) and 'in a flood of eloquence' (*quodam eloquentiae flumine*), though without the rampant redundancy exhibited by Stesichorus.[103] Still, they are closely related in style.[104]

As stated before, chronology plays a less important role in most of the sections of Quintilian's Greek canon, though it can be (more or less flawlessly) discerned in his discussions on tragic poetry and philosophy. Where the order of the hexametric poets Homer, Hesiod, Antimachus and Panyasis is concerned, Quintilian sides with Dionysius and adopts a chronology in which only Antimachus and Panyasis seem to be reversed; however, in his addition of Hellenistic hexametric poets, Quintilian leaves chronology behind. As we have already seen in passing, the internal coherence and the importance of the authors mentioned in Quintilian's list are more crucial determinants for the specific order of their appearance, whether this is in accordance with chronology or not.[105] 'Coherence' is probably why we have the young minor historian Theopompus, who – Quintilian thinks – was 'closest' (*proximus*) both to Thucydides and Herodotus, directly placed after these two models, and after him in turn the older Philistus, who is said to have been only an 'imitator of Thucydides' (*imitator Thucydidi*), not of Herodotus.[106]

However, literary importance also plays a role in this ranking: Theopompus was 'inferior' (*minor*) to his two models, whereas Philistus was 'feebler' (*infirmior*) than Thucydides. 'Literary importance' is apparently also why the slightly older Xenophon (who is extremely useful for rhetoricians *in spe*) does not precede the great Plato in the section on philosophy (as he does in Dionysius' list).[107] We can see this principle of literary importance at work in many (though not all) sections of Quintilian's canon, and especially in the first rank positions: the best authors per genre (Homer, Callimachus, Pindar, Demosthenes, Plato) are mentioned first of all.[108]

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[103] Quint. 10.1.61. I will elaborate on the metaphor of the stream in section 4.9.2.

[104] Alcaeus, who comes third in Quintilian, is also praised because of e.g. magnificence in eloquence, but he 'played games' (*lusit*, 10.1.63); Simonides, who is 'lightweight' (*tenuis*, 10.1.64), comes latest.

[105] This observation comes close to the claim of Schwindt (2000), 161: 'die Abfolge der den Führenden nachgeordneten Autoren ist bald von chronologischen (Epos, Lyrik, Philosophie), bald qualitativen (Geschichtsschreibung), bald technisch-ästhetischen Rücksichten (Rhetorik) bestimmt'.

[106] Quint. 10.1.74. Schwindt (2000), 162 argues that Theopompus, being called *proximus* to Herodotus and Thucydides, 'steht dem Rang nach am nächsten'. Although *proximus* certainly pertains to the (lower) level of Theopompus as a historian, I also think *proximus* refers to similarities in historical style and thought.

[107] Quint. 10.1.82; 10.1.73.

[108] Literary importance is not a determinant in the section on tragedy, which starts with the 'coarse' (*rudis*) and 'unpolished' (*incompositus*) Aeschylus (10.1.66).

This being said, the order of the names of Thucydides and Herodotus deserves further attention. In his remarkably brief section on the Greek historians, Quintilian opens with a *synkrisis* between the most important representatives, Thucydides and Herodotus. Quintilian does not seem to cherish any preference for one or the other, for, as he makes clear, 'their different excellences have deserved almost equal praise' (*quorum diversa virtus laudem paene est parem consecuta*).[109] Nevertheless, Thucydides comes first, which is in contradiction with Dionysius' list, in which the *synkrisis* is opened (and closed) by Herodotus.[110] Why does Quintilian have Thucydides first when he understands of Thucydides and Herodotus as being rather evenly matched?[111]

The order of their appearance may reflect Thucydides' greater general prestige in Quintilian's days, whereas the judgements Quintilian passes on him and Herodotus are mainly based on the specific criterion of usefulness for the improvement of rhetorical style.[112] Still, it remains curious that Quintilian nowhere expresses Thucydides' general literary pre-eminence, and – referring to the authoritative Cicero – casts doubt on Thucydides' usefulness for rhetorical purposes rather than on Herodotus'.[113] Moreover, it is puzzling that Quintilian's order deviates not only from that of Dionysius, but also from that of Cicero and Dio Chrysostom.

In his discussion of the historians, Quintilian often seems to adhere to the opinions of Cicero who, though giving Herodotus and Thucydides equal praise, mentions Herodotus before Thucydides.[114] Also Quintilian's contemporary Dio Chrysostom has Herodotus first

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[109] Quint. 10.1.73.

[110] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.1. The qualities Quintilian attributes to these historians differ from those expressed by Dionysius.

[111] Theopompus, the historian who comes third in Quintilian, is, as we have seen, 'very close' (*proximus*) to Thucydides and Herotodus equally (10.1.74). Therefore, his third place is not likely to have influenced the order in the *synkrisis* between Herodotus and Thucydides.

[112] Citroni (2006a), 4 argues that not so much the order as the selection of authors is based on their prestige, and that the judgements passed on these authors are based on the criterion of rhetorical usefulness (see section 4.6). Especially in the first century BC, Thucydides enjoyed great popularity among Roman historians and rhetoricians.

[113] In 10.1.32-33, Quintilian argues that Sallust and Livy are of limited use for the orator *in spe*, and that Cicero had the same opinion regarding Thucydides and Xenophon.

[114] For Cicero's influence on Quintilian's choices (especially in dealing with the historians), see e.g. Peterson (1891), xxxiii ff. Like Quintilian, Cicero gave equal praise to Herodotus and Thucydides (*Orat*. 39), but he mentions Herodotus before Thucydides (*De Or*. 2.55-56).

and Thucydides second, but considers the latter the most useful for his addressee – an active politician.[115] Then, what could explain Quintilian's different order? My suggestion is that there is another organizing principle at work in Quintilian's Greek canon: the desirability of parallelism to the order of authors in the Latin canon.[116]

Especially the high-ranked Greek prose authors seem to be aligned to the order in which Quintilian presents their Latin counterparts.[117] At the head of the section on the Latin historians, first Sallust is mentioned, then Livy. They stand in a mimetic relationship: Livy 'has followed Sallust's immortal rapidity with different virtues' (*illam inmortalem Sallusti velocitatem diversis virtutibus consecutus est*).[118] It is said of Sallust and Livy that they are 'rather equal than alike' (*pares [...] magis quam similes*), just like Thucydides and Herodotus.[119] Nevertheless, elsewhere Quintilian confesses that though Livy is more useful for children, he considers Sallust a better historian.[120] Thus, the order of Sallust and Livy is, for reasons of literary importance and chronological-mimetic connection, quite compelling.

Quintilian does not hesitate 'to match Sallust with Thucydides' (*opponere Thucydidi Sallustium*), and argues that 'Herodotus should not be indignant about the fact that Livy is put on the same level with him' (*nec indignetur sibi Herodotus aequari Titum Livium*).[121]

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[115] Dio *Orat*. 18.10.

[116] Many scholars have rightly pointed to the steering influence of Quintilian's Greek canon on his Latin list. See e.g. Peterson (1891), xxxviii, who argues: 'it is this idea of making 'canons' of Latin writers, to correspond as nearly as possible with those which he [i.e. Quintilian, M.S.] had accepted from former critics for the classical writers of Greece, that gives an air of artificiality to Quintilian's criticism of Latin literature […]'. Citroni (2006a), 18 argues that Quintilian's Greek canon 'offers the guidelines for the subsequent review of Latin works'. I suggest that it is sometimes also the other way round: Quintilian's Latin canon also influences (the order of authors within) the Greek canon.

[117] Of course, the parallels between Greek and Latin authors can also be distinguished in the poetry sections, but here the Latin canon seems to have no salient influence on the order of Greek writers, because Quintilian makes use of an order which is rather undisputed (cf. Dionysius' list). On top of each section is the author who is undeniably the best. E.g. Vergil is linked with Homer (10.1.85); Varius with 'whomever of the Greeks' (*cuilibet Graecarum*, 10.1.98). Pindar is strongly tied to and explicitly brought into connection with Horace as a critic (10.1.61). Horace is also connected with him as the first and foremost representative of Latin lyrical poetry (10.1.96).

[118] Quint. 10.1.102.

[119] *Ibid*.

[120] Quint. 2.5.19.

[121] Quint. 10.1.101.

Thucydides and Herodotus seem to have been arranged in such a way that their close connection with Sallust and Livy is prepared for and strengthened.

The desired parallelism between the Greek and Latin canon may also well explain the placement of the discussion of philosophy at the end of Quintilian's Greek reading list.[122] It is obvious that in the Latin canon, Quintilian wants to close with the talented philosopher Seneca, whose 'corrupted' style had an alarmingly large influence on the young and thus formed the ultimate test for students of rhetoric who were involved in imitation.[123] In analogy with the placement of the section on Latin philosophy, the section on Greek philosophy takes a final, isolated place, which is in remarkable deviation from Dionysius' canon in which, as we have seen, the philosophers are treated before the rhetoricians.

Also within the section on Greek philosophy, it cannot be a coincidence that Quintilian, in deviation from Dionysius and Dio, puts Plato ahead of the row of philosophers – to this choice, as he states, inspired by Plato's imitator Cicero – whereas Cicero himself is presented as the frontrunner in the corresponding Latin section.[124] Plato's status was, of course, still huge, but wouldn't also Xenophon, whose prestige was immense in Quintilian's days, be an obvious choice for a first rank position in the row of philosophers?[125] The answer is, apparently, 'no': here too, the required parallelism between Greek and Latin writers seems to have a steering influence on the order of their appearance.

Likewise, in deviation from Dionysius, Quintilian places Demosthenes at the top of his list of six rhetoricians, instead of the older, venerable Lysias, who comes fourth in Quintilian and first in Dionysius.[126] Quintilian not only considers Demosthenes 'by far the most important' (*longe princeps*), but probably also ranks him first because he wants to prepare for the *synkrisis* in the Latin canon between Demosthenes and the undisputed Roman rhetorical

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[122] This has already been suggested by Rutherford (1992), 361, n. 26. Cf. n. 68.

[123] Quint. 10.1.125-131. On Quintilian's judgement of Seneca, see e.g. Gelzer (1970), 212-223; Laureys (1991); Dominik (1997), 50-68; Taoka (2011).

[124] For Cicero's imitative connection with Plato, see Quint. 10.1.81; 10.1.108; 10.1.123.

[125] On Xenophon's popularity among first-century Roman authors, see De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.) and bibliography. Xenophon is the author who is placed on top by Dio Chrysostom (*Orat*. 18.14), for reasons of usefulness.

[126] Quint. 10.1.78. Dio considers both Demosthenes and Lysias (mentioned in this order) the best orators (*Orat*. 18.11). In Quintilian, between Demosthenes and Lysias come Aeschines and Hyperides (10.1.77). Literary importance or coherence between these authors do not seem to be at stake; it is rather the degree of usefulness which determines their order.

champion Cicero.[127] Dionysius, however, notwithstanding his exceptional admiration for Demosthenes, lets chronology and usefulness prevail in the section on rhetoric, arguing that 'the eloquence of Lysias is sufficient for utility and necessity' (ὁ Λυσιακὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν αὐτάρκης).[128] By contrast, Quintilian is more concerned not only with stressing the pre-eminence of Demosthenes, but also with the coherence between this Greek orator and Cicero, which is to be expressed in the structure of his canons.

In the past, the interconnections between the Greek and Latin authors listed in Quintilian's canons have been frequently noticed and commented upon. It is said – and rightly so – that the Latin authors are constantly presented as involved in a contest with the Greeks, and that the Latin canon mirrors the structure of the preceding Greek list.[129] I hope to have shown that it is worth noticing that the Greek canon also seems to be shaped by Quintilian in accordance with the Latin list. With his emphasis not so much on chronology as on literary superiority and coherence, Quintilian attunes and structures the Greek canon in such a way that it is tied to and prepares for the list of Latin literature, which is framed as a strongly redefined continuum of Greek literary history.[130] An analysis of Quintilian's additions of Hellenistic authors will confirm this preparatory function of the Greek canon in relation to the Latin list.

4.6 Hellenistic Authors in Quintilian's Greek Canon

As we have seen, in his Greek canon Quintilian chooses to name a selection of Hellenistic authors. Dionysius does not pay attention to these authors; scholarly attempts to indicate a possible source for their inclusion in Quintilian have been fruitless. In an interesting attempt to explain the additions of Hellenistic authors, Citroni suggests that Quintilian's proclaimed criterion of rhetorical usefulness mainly, though not exclusively, pertains to the judgements he passes on the single authors, not to the choice of the authors listed.[131] This choice, as

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[127] Quint. 10.1.76; 10.1.105-108. For a discussion of four different comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero (in Caecilius, Plutarch, Longinus and Quintilian), see De Jonge (2018).

[128] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.1.

[129] See e.g. Peterson (1891), xxxviii.

[130] Cf. Kühnert (1969), 45: 'das Bewusstsein einer einheitlichen griechisch-römischen Kultur spricht sich darin [i.e. in Quintilian's canons, M.S.] aus'. Feeney (2016) analyses i.a. how the Romans developed a literature which presented itself as a continuation of Greek literature.

[131] Citroni (2006a), 2 ff.

Citroni says, is instead motivated by the popularity and genre-representativeness of these authors in poetic circles in Quintilian's own time: '[…] the list includes, as a rule, those authors who were considered to be most prestigious in the culture of the time, and for each of them, Quintilian gives the reader his opinion about his usefulness for the creation of the rhetorical style'.[132] Contrary to Citroni's view, the present section argues that Quintilian's criterion of rhetorical usefulness also motivates his choice of Hellenistic authors.

For the section on Greek poetry, Citroni has in my opinion convincingly argued that the addition of less useful or not further characterised (late-) Hellenistic poets, who are not or only sporadically attested in the Greek catalogues before Quintilian known to us, may well be explained by the influence of contemporary authors like Statius, Propertius and especially Martial, who took these authors as models for their poetic compositions whenever there were no Augustan or Neronian models.[133] Still, I am strongly inclined to think that Quintilian in his mention of Hellenistic authors was less inspired by the opinions of his contemporaries – whom he does not mention at all – than by the Augustan poets, who frequently turn out to be an important touchstone for his own criticisms.[134] Moreover, I certainly do not believe that the prestige of the Hellenistic poets mentioned is the most important explanation of their appearance in Quintilian's Greek list.

The names of the Hellenistic poets included by Quintilian comprise the epic poets Apollonius Rhodius, Aratus, Theocritus, Nicander and Euphorion, the elegiac poets Callimachus and Philetas, and the comic poets Menander (who also appears in Dionysius) and

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[132] Citroni (2006a), 2. Cf. also Citroni (2005), esp. 18, 30. Strange omissions of Greek poets who were greatly admired in Roman literary circles – Sappho, for instance, who is also absent in Dionysius –, as well as anomalous additions of Greek poets with minor influence – Pisander and Panyasis, the latter also chronicled by Dionysius – are, although noticed, not explained by Citroni.

[133] Citroni (2006a), 2-3, esp. 7, 14-19. Apollonius Rhodius, Aratus and Theocritus are sometimes included in Greek lists of epic poets. So are Callimachus and Philetas. Nicander and Euphorion are excluded from the Greek lists of epic poets known to us. More on this in Kroehnert (1897) (*non vidi*). For a discussion of the adherence of Flavian poets to Augustan models, see e.g. Mayer (1982), 317, who argues that 'the Flavians […] look to Augustans *and* Neronians as models'.

[134] E.g. Quint. 10.1.56: *Quid? Nicandrum frustra secuti Macer atque Vergilius? Quid? Euphorionem transibimus? Quem nisi probasset Vergilius idem […] Quid? Horatius frustra Tyrtaeum Homero subiungit?* ('Were Macer and Vergil wrong to follow Nicander? Shall we leave out Euphorion? If Vergil had not approved of him […] And has Horace no reason for putting Tyrtaeus next to Homer?'). Cf. 10.1.61: *propter quae Horatius eum merito nemini credit imitabilem* ('Horace rightly thinks him [i.e. Pindar, M.S.] inimitable for these reasons').

Philemon.[135] Also the ancient Greek poets Pisander – author of a *Heracleia* – and Tyrtaeus are included in the list of epic poets – the latter on the authority of Horace.[136] Admittedly, all these poets are mostly discussed very superficially, if characterised at all. Hence, we may wonder why Quintilian includes them – especially those who are not immediately useful for the formation of style, or to whose styles Quintilian strongly objects.[137] We should be cautious in assuming that Quintilian mentions them as a mere reflection of the prestige these authors enjoyed in the contemporary literary scene, completely irrespectively of rhetorical purposes. On the contrary, by inserting Hellenistic authors, Quintilian is able 1) to meet the existing needs of more advanced students in rhetoric and, more importantly, 2) to bridge the chronological gap between the Greek and the Latin canon.

As we have seen, Quintilian's aim is to pass judgements from a rhetorical perspective to direct his students towards achieving *firma facilitas*. In other words: his main (and openly proclaimed) intended audience consists of novice learners. However, although having underscored the selectiveness of his lists in order to meet the needs of the young, Quintilian also seems to anticipate or respond to questions of more advanced readers, who wish to be confirmed in their literary experiences and tastes, or who might reproach him for not having mentioned a particular author.[138]

The added poets, though not the best, *are* useful, but only for those orators who are 'already in perfect condition' (*iam perfectis constitutisque viribus*), as Quintilian argues.[139] Consequently, he is bound not to elaborate on these poets – bound to isolate them somewhat, as he does with Seneca.[140] He compares their works with the cheaper dishes coming after the finest meals, and giving us the pleasure of 'variety' (*varietas*).[141] Savouring this variety is

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[135] See the scheme in section 4.4.

[136] Quint. 10.1.56.

[137] An example of a poet mentioned without being useful for the orator is Theocritus (10.1.55). An example of a poet whose work is 'of a consistent mediocrity' (*aequali quadam mediocritate*) is Apollonius (10.1.54).

[138] This is suggested by Quintilian's remark introducing the names of Pisander, Nicander and Euphorion (10.1.56). Here, he admits that he seems 'to hear people proposing from all sides the names of many poets' (*audire [...] undique congerentis nomina plurimorum poetarum*).

[139] Quint. 10.1.58. The insertion of the elegiac poets Callimachus and Philetas (10.1.58-59) is motivated by the same criterion of differentiation: *tunc et elegiam vacabit in manus sumere* ('there will be time enough then [i.e. when our powers have become mature, M.S.] to take up even elegy').

[140] Quintilian considers Seneca an author who should have been imitated only by rhetoricians whose talents could meet the great talent of Seneca himself (10.1.127). Cf. n. 68 (esp. the reference to Laureys (1991)).

[141] Quint. 10.1.58.

apparently reserved for rhetoricians endowed with a firmer *iudicium*. Thus, not only the prestige of the Hellenistic poets makes Quintilian insert them in his list, but also his inclination to give differentiated instruction instead of offering only an elementary reading list.[142] In fact, this pedagogical differentiation lies at the heart of the whole *Institutio*.

Here, an observation should be made concerning the insertion of Greek poets in general. As Citroni rightly argues, Quintilian's Greek canon guides the Roman production 'in fields where there are no great Augustan models'.[143] Citroni points especially to the genres of tragedy and comedy, but the case of Archilochus, the greatest Greek representative of iambic poetry, may even be more suited to illustrate this; after all, his name is absent from Dionysius' list and explicitly added by Quintilian.[144] Unlike the Hellenistic poets, Archilochus' qualities are covered rather extensively because, as we should infer, he stands as the sole model of a genre which in Roman literature (Catullus, Bibaculus and Horace) is only to be found mixed with other poetic forms.[145] Thus, Archilochus' name seems to fill a gap in the Latin canons' section on iambic poetry.

So far, we have seen that Hellenistic poets are added by Quintilian because of their prestige or their usefulness for more advanced rhetoricians. Moreover, it has been established that insertions within the Greek canon of poetry can function as a guide for (still inferior) Roman literary production, as Citroni argued. But how can Quintilian's insertion of not particularly popular Hellenistic prose authors be explained in those genres in which the Romans also proved to be successful? The answer is that these Hellenistic prose authors are uniquely suited to bridge the chronological gap between Greek and Latin literature.

The added prose authors comprise the historians Ephorus, Clitarchus and Timagenes, the philosopher Theophrastus and the Stoics, and the orator Demetrius of Phalerum. Of the added historians, two left their marks on Roman literature. Clitarchus, whose style was considered pretentious, served as a model for the Roman historian Lucius Cornelius Sisenna;

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[142] This differentiation is reflected upon in e.g. Quint. 1.8.1-12, 2.5.18-23.

[143] Citroni (2006a), 18.

[144] Cf. Citroni (2006a), 17: 'in the case of tragedy and comedy, where there were no recognized Augustan models, it was impossible to avoid making reference to the authors of the archaic canon […]'. Citroni argues that Quintilian shows a certain disdain for what is old. Although it is true that Quintilian often prefers more recent authors to ancient writers, I think we should be cautious in assuming disdain for the ancients. In any case, in the Latin canon, Quintilian is more critical and condemnatory towards the literature of yore than in the Greek one.

[145] Quint. 10.1.59-60; 10.1.96. The same may be true for the addition of the representatives of old comedy: Aristophanes, Eupolis and Cratinus (10.1.66), whose level Roman comedy cannot reach (10.1.99).

Timagenes was active in Rome and connected to Caecilius of Caleacte.[146] Timagenes, who went to Rome around 55 BC, is not recommended for his style, but rather because he gave an impulse to Greek and Roman historiography: 'he revived the lapsed tradition of historical writing with renewed praise' (*intermissam historias scribendi industriam nova laude reparavit*).[147] This reminds us of the periodic 'Dreischritt' of literary splendour-decline-restoration, a principle of classicism also prominently expressed in Dionysius' *On the ancient orators*.[148]

Theophrastus and the Stoics (who do not appear in Dionysius' list, which records the Pythagoreans) seem to prepare for the section on Roman philosophers containing names like Cicero, Plautus and Seneca, to whose works they gave great impetus.[149] In the section on the rhetoricians, the death of Demetrius of Phalerum, who is 'almost the last of the Attics who can be called an orator' (*ultimus est fere ex Atticis qui dici possit orator*), marks the transition to a new era of rhetorical decline: 'he is said to have been the first to set eloquence on the downward path' (*inclinasse eloquentiam dicitur*).[150] This eventually resulted in a literary revival by the efforts of Roman orators, who 'can put Roman eloquence on equal terms with Greek' (*Latinam eloquentiam parem facere Graecae possunt*).[151] For instance, Calvus, who is said to have been an 'imitator of the Attic orators' (*imitator [...] Atticorum*), can be considered a successor of Demetrius of Phalerum, just like Domitius Afer, who one may 'count among the old masters' (*in numero veterum habere*).[152] These Romans thus continued the venerable tradition that had ended with Demetrius of Phalerum.

The observations made above are intended to show that the insertion of authors in Quintilian's Greek reading list can be explained in four different ways. Whereas the names of the added poets are mentioned because of their prestige, their usefulness for mature students or their ability to fill gaps in the Roman canon, the Hellenistic prose authors have been included in order to overpass the chronological hiatus between Greek and Latin literature.

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[146] Ephorus, pupil of Isocrates, was known for his accuracy.

[147] Quint. 10.1.75.

[148] Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett.* 1-3. For the notion of 'klassizistische Dreischritt', see Gelzer (1979), 278 and *ibid.*, esp. 3-13 for the concepts behind it. Hidber (1996), 3-13 applies the term in relation to Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett.*

[149] In Quint. 10.1.84, Theophrastus is recommended for his style; the Stoics are listed because of their virtuous lives, power of argument and of proving their principles.

[150] Quint. 10.1.80.

[151] Quint. 10.1.105.

[152] Quint. 10.1.115, 118.

Hence, Quintilian strongly suggests an ongoing tradition, in which the Romans are presented as the ultimate heirs and successors of the Greeks. This is not to say that Greek literature does not have its own intrinsic values within the framework of Quintilian's rhetorical program of imitation.[153] As we will see, the discourse of Quintilian's Greek canon (section 4.9), his (motives for the) judgements of the authors belonging to it (section 4.7), as well as his theory and application of literary virtues (section 4.8) prove to be interesting testimonies to his adaptive interaction with the heritage of Greek literature and literary theory.[154]

4.7 JUDGEMENTS OF AUTHORS IN DIONYSIUS AND QUINTILIAN

Many correspondences have been noticed between the virtues attributed to individual authors by Dionysius and Quintilian, for instance in Aujac's edition of *On Imitation* and in Peterson's commentary on the tenth book of the *Institutio*.[155] For example, Homer deserves praise because of μέγεθος (*Imit*. 2.1) / *sublimitas* (Quint. 10.1.46); Hesiod because of λειότης (*Imit*. 2.2) / *levitas* (Quint. 10.1.52); Pindar because of μεγαλοπρέπεια (*Imit*. 2.5) / *magnificentia* (Quint. 10.1.61); Simonides because of τὸ οἰκτίζεσθαι (*Imit*. 2.6) / *miseratio* (Quint. 10.1.64); Alcaeus because of βραχύτης (*Imit*. 2.8) / *brevitas* (Quint. 10.1.63) & μεγαλοφυΐα (*Imit*. 2.8) / *magnificentia* (Quint. 10.1.63); Herodotus because of ἡδονή (*Imit*. 3.3) / *dulcitudo* (Quint. 10.1.73); Thucydides because of ἰσχύς (*Imit*. 3.3) / *vis* (Quint. 10.1.73); Aristotle because of πολυμάθεια (*Imit*. 4.3) / *scientia rerum* (Quint. 10.1.83); Lysias because of εὐχάρεια (*Imit*. 5.1) / *elegantia* (Quint. 10.1.78); Hyperides because of χάρις (*Imit*. 5.6) / *dulcitudo* (Quint. 10.1.77) – to pick out only some similarities.

A closer look at Dionysius' and Quintilian's judgements, however, reveals that Quintilian often differs from Dionysius in the attribution of virtues to specific authors.[156] This section argues that Quintilian, though he possibly adopted the rough frame of the Greek canon from Dionysius and/or others, and occasionally expressed judgements that can also be found

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[153] I do not agree with Grebe (2000b), 300-301, 313-316, who argues that the greater space dedicated to Roman authors mirrors Quintilian's extreme chauvinism. Rather, I think that Quintilian's canon of Greek literature gives prove of his attention for the intrinsic value of Greek literature.

[154] This is contrary to the view of Kühnert (1969), 45: 'die Wertung der griechischen Literatur und die Urteile über die einzelnen Vertreter dieser Literatur waren z. Z. Quintilians längst festgelegt und hatten weitgehend kanonisches Ansehen gewonnen, wie Quintilian selbst wiederholt andeutet, so dass Quintilians Standpunkt in dieser Hinsicht weder originell noch besonders bemerkenswert ist'.

[155] Another detailed comparison can be found in Nettleship (1890), 258-262.

[156] These divergences are in fact too numerous to elaborate on, as they appear in every single author assessment.

in Dionysius, evaluated the literary virtues of the authors from his own point of view, which is determined by his writing goal, his audience, and the character of classicism and literary taste of his own time. As a case in point, I will focus on the section on the playwrights Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Menander, in which Quintilian particularly deviates from Dionysius.[157]

For reasons of rhetorical usefulness, Quintilian displays great sympathy for the younger playwrights Euripides and Menander, to the disadvantage of the older Aeschylus and Sophocles. Quintilian considers Aeschylus sublime, grave and grandiloquent, but objects that he is coarse and unpolished.[158] In Dionysius, Aeschylus is presented as the best tragedian. He is sublime, magnificent and appropriate in his representation of characters and emotions; moreover, he is more varied in the introduction of new characters than Euripides and Sophocles.[159]

The sublime Sophocles is praised by Quintilian, but his specific virtues (gravity, tragic style and tragic sound) are only briefly mentioned by reference to what other people have said about him.[160] Moreover, Quintilian thinks 'Euripides will be much the more useful for those preparing for a rhetorical career' (*iis qui se ad agendum comparant utiliorem longe fore Euripiden*) than Sophocles.[161] Dionysius, however, seems to prefer Sophocles over Euripides, acknowledging the former for e.g. his representation of characters and emotions, the dignity of his characters, and his sense of necessity.[162]

Euripides gets Quintilian's praise for his proverbial language, his expression of philosophical ideas, his way of speaking and responding, his use of emotions and his ability to arouse pity.[163] By contrast, in Dionysius' comparison between Sophocles and Euripides, the latter is rather critically assessed; though Dionysius thinks he is concerned with truth and current affairs, his vices (e.g. his focus on what is dishonourable, unmanly and mean) are commented upon in more detail.[164] Thus, for Dionysius, the intrinsic stylistic qualities of the

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[157] For a comparison between the judgements of Dionysius, Dio and Quintilian passed on the playwrights, see De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.).

[158] Quint. 10.1.66.

[159] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.10.

[160] Quint. 10.1.67-68.

[161] Quint. 10.1.67.

[162] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.11-13.

[163] Quint. 10.1.68.

[164] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.12-13. As De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.) rightly argues, 'the whole σύγκρισις of Sophocles and Euripides builds on the schematic contrast between high and low […]'.

sublime Sophocles seems to outweigh the usefulness of the rather base Euripides, who, he admits, is 'full of rhetorical presentation' (πολὺς ἐν ταῖς ῥητορικαῖς εἰσαγωγαῖς).[165]

After Euripides comes, both in Dionysius and Quintilian, his imitator Menander, whose status is differently conceived. Quintilian dedicates a lot of space to the discussion of Menander's qualities (more than to the tragedians altogether), arguing that careful reading of his work 'would be sufficient to develop all the qualities we are recommending' (*ad cuncta quae praecipimus effingenda sufficiat*).[166] Thus, again, usefulness is Quintilian's argument for strongly approving of an author. He considers Menander to be outstanding in e.g. representation of life, wealth in invention, facility in phrasing, and propriety. In Dionysius, however, only one line is devoted to Menander. Being the only comic poet mentioned by name, he is praised because of his treatment of subject matter.[167]

It is clear that Quintilian more overtly adheres to his claim of offering a list which is practically useful than Dionysius. Whereas the former considers the stylistic sublimity and gravity of the ancient writers subordinate to the rhetorical usefulness of younger authors, the latter tries to find a way to incorporate qualities of sublimity and beauty of style in his rhetorical-practical program. In chapter 3, we have seen that by insisting also on more pragmatic virtues such as clarity and pleasure, Dionysius aspires to bring ancient stylistic sublimity and modern practical needs closer together.

The divergences between Dionysius and Quintilian may also be explained by pointing to their different audiences as well as to the development of classicism and literary taste in the first century AD.[168] Dionysius' Greek addressee Demetrius – and all of Dionysius' students who read the treatise *On Imitation* – plausibly still approved of the more traditional advice to read the undisputedly sublime masterpieces of their own Greek literature rather than those less exalted works that would benefit their practical skills perhaps more effectively. By contrast, for Quintilian's Roman students, the ancient poets Aeschylus and Sophocles, however intriguing, were far away: they wrote their works in a difficult and lofty register of the foreign, Greek language, and were a less obvious choice for imitation than the more modern

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[165] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.13.

[166] Quint. 10.1.69.

[167] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.14.

[168] In order to explain the differences between the reading lists of Dionysius, Dio and Quintilian, these factors (among others) are also suggested by De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.). Cf. section 5.1, n. 16.

and useful writers Euripides and Menander, whose popularity increased in Rome during the first century AD.[169]

4.8 LITERARY VIRTUES IN QUINTILIAN'S CANONS

The previous section has shown that in some cases Quintilian expresses the same judgements of authors as Dionysius, while he also frequently evaluates them from a different perspective. Quintilian's own voice in the canons of Greek and Latin literature can most clearly be heard when analysing what literary qualities function as his touchstones for determining the aptness of literature for rhetorical imitation. In the following sections, the large amounts of commendable literary qualities in the Greek and Latin canons will be arranged in categories of cognate virtues, in order to help us understand how Quintilian conceives of rhetorical imitation. First, however, let us consider what Quintilian has to say about literary virtues and the different levels to which they can be applied.[170]

In section 3.6, we have seen that Dionysius distinguished between on the one hand three essential virtues (ἀναγκαῖαι): 'purity' (καθαρότης), 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) and 'brevity' (συντομία), and on the other the so called 'additional virtues' (ἐπίθετοι), which are by far the most prominent in the epitome of *On Imitation*. These essential and additional virtues, though clearly differentiated in theory, are used without distinction and applied to the level of 'subject matter' (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) or 'style' (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος), which in turn are further subdivided.[171] In many cases, it remains unclear whether the virtues discussed by Dionysius should be understood in a pragmatic or stylistic sense. However, the strong stylistic orientation of his list often favours a lexical interpretation.

Unlike Dionysius, Quintilian does not explicitly distinguish between essential and additional virtues – neither in theory, nor in practice. In the eighth book of the *Institutio*, he does mention four virtues to which every text must measure up anyway, being 1) 'correctness' (*Latinitas*), 2) 'clarity' (*perspicuitas*), 3) 'ornamentation' (*ornatus*) and 4) 'appropriateness'

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[169] This has also been suggested by De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.): 'it is plausible that Dionysius' list represents a traditional Greek approach, whereas Dio and Quintilian display a more modern taste that is tailored to the needs of Roman society'.

[170] On Quintilian's literary qualities and the earlier systems of virtues, see Valienė (2007) (*non vidi*).

[171] Quintilian also pays attention to the actual 'delivery' (*pronuntiatio*) of a speech in his tenth book, although this subject is more profoundly covered in book 11. See e.g. Quint. 10.1.119.

(*decor*).[172] They are essentially stylistic, but *perspicuitas* and *decor* also pertain to subject matter.[173] These four virtues are accompanied by a rich stock of qualities, which is set forth in the canons. Although these canons are incorporated in a book dedicated to *elocutio*, we can see that thoughtful imitation of pragmatic virtues also plays an important role here. In fact, subject matter and style are closely related, as the student should gain a 'wealth of ideas and words' (*copia rerum ac verborum*).[174]

In Quintilian's canons (as in Dionysius'), the general levels of subject matter and style are further subdivided. Falling into the category of 'subject matter' (*res*) are, for instance, 'invention' (*inventio*) – consisting of e.g. 'strategy' (*consilium*), 'arrangement' (*ordo*), 'division' (*divisio*), 'preparation' (*praeparatio*) and 'proof' (*probatio*) –, representation of '(moral) character' (*personae, mores*) and of 'emotions' (*affectus*).[175] Among the category of 'style' (*verba, elocutio*) are 'composition' (*compositio*), a 'sound choice of words' (*ars verborum*), 'emotional treatment' (*affectus*), 'amplifications' (*amplificationes*), 'proverbial language' (*sententiae*), 'figures of thought' (*figurae*), 'metaphors' (*tralationes*) etcetera. Whereas Dionysius goes so far as to focus on clashes of vowels in the works of Theopompus, Quintilian adopts a less meticulous philological approach of literary texts in his canons.[176]

Literary virtues and vices mentioned by Quintilian in his two canons are connected either to the general levels of subject matter and style or to the sublevels just mentioned.[177] This is not always done in an explicit way, but in most cases, the context leaves no room for

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[172] The first three virtues of style are discussed in Quint. 8.1-3. The fourth and last virtue, *decor*, which is grouped under *ornatus* in 1.5.1, is treated separately in 11.1-93 – probably because it is the most important one, as is argued in Quint. 1.5.1; 11.1.1.

[173] *Latinitas* should be kept in mind in the choice of words and the combination of words (8.1.1); *perspicuitas* can be achieved by choosing words in their proper sense, by arranging these words rightly and by limiting the sentence length (8.2.22); *ornatus* can be expressed by popular expressions, brilliant words, pleasant figures of thought, magnificent metaphors and elaborate composition (8.3.12); *decor* pertains to 'this whole ability to say the right things at the right place' (*totum hoc apte dicere*) (11.1.7). Clarity and appropriateness are also effective in the field of subject matter. Pragmatic clarity is discussed in 4.2.36 (though the term *perspicuitas* is absent here); appropriateness should be observed during the *inventio* and *dispositio* of the subject material.

[174] Quint. 10.1.6.

[175] Cf. section 3.6, n. 190 on the ambiguous meaning of 'moral character' (ἦθος in Greek).

[176] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 3.11. For Dionysius' focus on linguistic elements, see section 3.6, esp. n. 191.

[177] As in Dionysius, there are frequent shifts in level, e.g. in Quint. 10.1.61, where Pindar is called the greatest in 'inspiration, magnificence, proverbial language, figures of thought, an enormous wealth of ideas and words and, as it were, a flood of eloquence' (*spiritu, magnificentia, sententiis, figuris, beatissima rerum verborumque copia et velut quodam eloquentiae flumine*).

ambiguity.[178] Still, the overwhelming amount of virtues makes it difficult to assess what specific qualities should make an orator stand out, and how the different genres in Greek and Latin literature can provide assistance in the process of rhetorical imitation. By categorising cognate virtues of style mentioned in Quintilian's canons, the following sections will shed light on this.

4.8.1 SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Following the structure of the section on clusters of literary virtues in the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation* (3.6.1), closely related or even synonymous virtues mentioned by Quintilian in his Greek and Latin canons will be brought together in tables. These will allow us to see 1) what literary qualities Quintilian emphasises, and 2) how these qualities in Greek literature relate to those in the Latin reading list.[179] Finally, some remarks are presented on how the connection between Dionysius' and Quintilian's ideas on literary virtues can best be interpreted.

There is a difficulty in analysing recommended literary virtues in Quintilian: they appear in the form of substantives, adjectives, adverbs, metaphors and other (often flowery) expressions used to describe style and/or subject matter. I took all of them into account, converting them to nouns if possible, in order to enhance the uniformity of the tables. I also converted finite verb forms to infinitives. Those expressions with which Quintilian (neutrally or disapprovingly) notes the absence of highly preferable virtues are also taken into account, and provided with an explanation in the footnote. Sometimes I isolated words appearing in a heterogeneous combination, e.g. *persuadendi deam* (10.1.82), because they pertain to different qualities (i.e. persuasiveness and divinity of style). My corpus consisted of 10.1.46-

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[178] This is contrary to Dion. Hal. *Imit.*, in which it is sometimes difficult to establish whether the virtues recommended are meant to be understood stylistically or pragmatically. Quintilian's rather essayistic presentation of the canons largely solves this problem.

[179] The size of the different sections in Quintilian's Greek and Latin canons differs so greatly, that analysing the distribution of the most important literary virtues over the different genres will provide no clear picture. In the Greek canon, the poetical genres are discussed in much more length than Greek historiography, rhetoric and philosophy. In Quintilian's Latin canon, the situation is quite different. Here, the actual size of the section on rhetoric is far more extensive than whatever section in the Greek and Latin canons, and suggests a strong rhetorical focus.

84 for literary virtues recommended in Greek literature and 10.1.85-131 for literary virtues recommended in Latin literature.

I will present five important categories of virtues in the Greek canon (tables 1-5) and four in the Latin canon (tables 6-9). The virtues in the tables below are mentioned by Quintilian either because a specific author possesses them, or because he does not (sufficiently) possess them or applies them in the wrong way. Passages indicating a lack or wrong application of literary virtues are commented upon in the footnotes. The tables below are not presented as being normative or stringent, nor do they intend to suggest that there are no other possible arrangements of cognate literary virtues. What they do show, is that in the case of Greek literature, Quintilian does not display a remarkable preference for one literary virtue in particular: the occurrences of his recommendations of qualities pertaining to pleasure, magnificence, (sacred) solemnity, tension and brevity do not differ much from each other. However, in Latin literature, virtues related to skillfulness get remarkable attention.

4.8.2 CLUSTERS OF LITERARY VIRTUES IN THE GREEK CANON

In Quintilian's Greek (and Latin) canon, qualities of pleasure are richly represented, as the first table below shows. We have seen that also Dionysius pays due attention to ἡδονή, χάρις, εὐχάρεια, κομψότης and λεπτότης. In a recently published article, Viidebaum argues that Dionysius' emphasis on χάρις, with its appeal to the 'irrational perception' (ἄλογος αἴσθησις) of the reader and its connotations of simplicity, wit and humour, could 'capture the new trends in contemporary Roman (Augustan) rhetoric'.[180] Though this may well be possible, we should not forget that Dionysius' main stylistic focus – i.e. magnificence – may have received little acclaim among young Roman students. In any case, we can see that Dionysius places a high value on (especially Lysias') elusive charm, and that his admiration for this quality is shared by Quintilian.

Cognate literary virtues related to pleasure in Quintilian's Greek canon can be brought together as follows:[181]

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[180] Viidebaum (2018), 122.

[181] In the following tables, the virtues marked with an asterisk only appear in the Greek canon, not in the Latin.

Greek canon 1. Category of PLEASURE	Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.46-84
Pleasure (*iucunditas*)[182]	4
Elegance (*elegantia*)[183]	3
Grace (*gratia*)[184]	2
Sweetness (*dulcitudo*)[185]	2
Adornment (*comptus*)*[186]	1
Loveliness (*venus*)[187]	1
Attractiveness (*suavitas*)*[188]	1
Charm (*venustas*)*[189]	1
	TOTAL: 15

Another important category is made up by virtues related to magnificence. In this category, I included all qualities pertaining to great dimension or the transition beyond a certain level.[190] The status of magnificence in Quintilian may surprise us. In 4.2.61-62, Quintilian expresses his reservations regarding *magnificentia*, which he thinks is not an indispensable virtue. Nevertheless, in his canon of Greek literature, *magnificentia* plays an important role:

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[182] 10.1.46, 10.1.53 (negative: Antimachus is weak in pleasure), 10.1.64, 10.1.82.

[183] 10.1.65, 10.1.78, 10.1.83.

[184] 10.1.65, 10.1.82 (the Graces themselves seem to have moulded Xenophon's style).

[185] 10.1.73, 10.1.77.

[186] 10.1.79.

[187] 10.1.79 (*dicendi veneres*).

[188] 10.1.83.

[189] 10.1.65.

[190] Cf. section 3.6.1 on virtues related to μεγαλοπρέπεια in Dionysius.

Greek canon 2. Category of MAGNIFICENCE[191]	Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.46-84
Magnificence (*magnificentia*)[192]	4
Sublimity (*sublimitas*)[193]	3
Grandeur (*granditas*)[194]	2
Eminence (*eminentia*)[195]	1
To excel (*excedere*)*[196]	1
To rise to heights rarely (*raro adsurgere*)*[197]	1
Grandiloquent (*grandilocus*)*[198]	1
To soar (*surgere*)*[199]	1
	TOTAL: 14

Another group of virtues can be discerned. The common element of the virtues belonging to this category is their relation to (sacred) gravity, whether or not of divine origin. There is a close affiliation to virtues of magnificence. However, whereas virtues of magnificence imply great size and dimension, virtues of (sacred) gravity carry the connotation of heaviness:

Greek canon 3. Category of (SACRED) GRAVITY[200]	Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.46-84
Gravity (*gravitas*)[201]	4

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[191] Indirectly pleading for magnificence and gravity are those deprecatory expressions related to baseness. For instance, in 10.1.53, Antimachus is praised i.a. because of his 'sort of speech which is far removed from everyday language' (*minime vulgare eloquendi genus*). I did not count such expressions.

[192] 10.1.61, 10.1.63, 10.1.78 (neutral: Lysias is more like the pure spring than the *magnum flumen*), 10.1.84 (neutral: the early Stoics were acute in subject matter rather than *oratione magnifici*).

[193] 10.1.46, 10.1.66, 10.1.68.

[194] 10.1.65, 10.1.77.

[195] 10.1.46 (here, I regard *eminentia* as somewhat ambiguous: it seems to pertain to Homer's exceptionally high status as well as to his elevated type of style).

[196] 10.1.50.

[197] 10.1.52 (negative: Hesiod rarely rises to heights; the plea for elevation is implicit).

[198] 10.1.66.

[199] 10.1.81. In the Latin canon, we find *insurgit* (10.1.96).

[200] See n. 191 for a side note concerning virtues of gravity.

[201] 10.1.46, 10.1.53, 10.1.66, 10.1.68.

Decency (*honestas*)*[202]	2
Divinity (*divinitas*)*[203]	2
Dignity (*dignitas*)*[204]	1
Goddess (*dea*)*[205]	1
Delphic oracle (*Delphicum oraculum*)*[206]	1
Tragic style (*coturnus*)*[207]	1
Tragic sound (*sonus*)*[208]	1
	TOTAL: 13

Two other important categories can be singled out: those of force and brevity:

Greek canon **4. Category of FORCE**	**Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.46-84**
Force (*vis*)[209]	5
Power (*valetudo*)*[210]	2
Muscular tension (*nervis intentio*)*[211]	1
Blood (*sanguis*)[212]	1
Muscles (*lacerti*)*[213]	1
Zeal (*spiritus*)[214]	1

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[202] 10.1.79, 10.1.84.

[203] 10.1.81 (*eloquendi facultate divina quadam et Homerica*), 10.1.83 (*nitor divinus*). Divinity can possibly also be considered a virtue related to magnificence.

[204] 10.1.62.

[205] 10.1.82 (*persuadendi dea*, i.e. a personification of Peitho). Divinity can possibly also be considered a virtue related to magnificence (cf. n. 203).

[206] 10.1.81 (Plato seems to be inspired by the oracle of Delphi).

[207] 10.1.68. The *coturnus* is a high boot of the tragic actor. As Russell (2001), 286-287, n. 72 observes, it stands by metonymy for tragic grandeur. *Coturnus* may also be reckoned among the category of 'magnificence' (as is true for *sonus*).

[208] 10.1.68.

[209] 10.1.53, 10.1.60, 10.1.65, 10.1.73, 10.1.76.

[210] 10.1.60 (*validae sententiae*), 10.1.62 (*ingenio validus*).

[211] 10.1.76.

[212] 10.1.60.

[213] 10.1.77 (negative: Aeschines has more flesh and less muscles).

[214] 10.1.61.

To fight (*pugnare*)[215]	1
	TOTAL: 12

Greek canon **5. Category of BREVITY**	**Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.46-84**
Brevity (*brevitas*)*[216]	5
Denseness (*densitas*)*[217]	4
Pression (*pressio*)[218]	1
Compact (*adstrictus*)[219]	1
Nothing can be taken away (*nihil detrahi potest*)[220]	1
	TOTAL: 12

Other significant categories consist of virtues related to fluency and wealth.[221] Moreover, it is possible to compose categories of virtues which pertain to vividness, genius, diligence, purposefulness, sharpness, appropriateness, moral criticism, luminosity, and naturalness, but these virtues are less numerous.

The categories mentioned above reveal that the idea of Greek literature as a source of pleasure, magnificence, (sacred) gravity, force and brevity is quite persistent: both Dionysius and Quintilian discern these virtues, and consider them important. Of course, we should be reluctant in making a comparison between the preferences for specific Greek literary virtues expressed in the extensive, flowery list of Quintilian and in the concise epitome of Dionysius'

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[215] 10.1.106 (appears in the Latin canon with respect to Demosthenes).

[216] 10.1.46, 10.1.49, 10.1.60 (*breves sententiae*), 10.1.63, 10.1.73.

[217] 10.1.68 (*sententiis densus*), 10.1.73, 10.1.76, 10.1.106 (appears in the Latin canon with respect to Demosthenes).

[218] 10.1.46.

[219] 10.1.106 (appears in the Latin canon with respect to Demosthenes).

[220] 10.1.106 (appears in the Latin canon with respect to Demosthenes).

[221] Fluency is a good thing *per se*, but every orator should be cautious for a verbiage coming out of its banks: 'to overflow' (*redundare*) and 'to burst one's banks' (*effundere*) are vices originating from something good: *copia* (10.1.62). The category of fluency consists of 'source' (*fons*), 'fluent' (*fusus*), 'river' (*flumen*), 'ocean' (*oceanus*), 'stream' (*amnis*). The category of wealth consists of 'wealth' (*copia*), 'richness' (*plenitudo*), 'flesh' (*carnis*), 'lavishness' (*laetitia*).

On Imitation. However, we can rather safely say that both critics emphasise different qualities.

Whereas magnificence seems to be the ultimate and most important quality for Dionysius, this virtue has no such exceptional status in Quintilian, who pays attention to different virtues in a more proportional way. Moreover, Dionysius often emphasises virtues of clarity – which are considerably less important in Quintilian –, while qualities of brevity play a more important role in Quintilian than in Dionysius.[222] There may be a few explanations for this.

On the one hand, Dionysius may be more loyal to early (Aristotelian and Peripatetic) theories of virtues of style, which recognized 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) as essential.[223] Moreover, the practically useful virtues of clarity are perfectly suited to counterbalance Dionysius' great insistence on the less useful virtues of magnificence, as we have seen in sections 3.6.1-2. On the other hand, Quintilian may prefer to emphasise qualities of 'brevity' (*brevitas*) rather than those of 'clarity' (*claritas*) in Greek literature, since he does not seem to find proper examples of brevity in Latin authors.[224] This would sustain the idea that the Greek canon is also designed to fill certain gaps in the Latin one.[225]

4.8.3 CLUSTERS OF LITERARY VIRTUES IN THE LATIN CANON

Let us consider the literary virtues in the Latin canon in some more detail. Below, three categories are defined, with the same proviso as before: they display possible arrangements of literary qualities. Many of these relate to skillfulness, which is first and foremost a personal characteristic of the *vir bonus* himself, but, of course, also finds expression in his style. Interestingly, however, this quality is not a specific stylistic virtue like, for instance, *brevitas* or *iucunditas*; it actually is the fruit of innate talent and/or the persistent study of both Greek and Latin literature – it is the *copia rerum ac verborum* that is acquired by an author in many

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[222] In Quintilian, clarity is recommended by virtues such as *candor* (e.g. 10.1.73) and *lux* (e.g. 10.1.74). *Claritas* often pertains to personal glory of the authors at stake, not to style. For virtues of brevity singled out by Dionysius, cf. section 3.6.1, n. 243.

[223] Cf. section 3.5.2. 'Brevity' (συντομία) was added later by Diogenes of Babylon.

[224] In the Latin reading list, we only read that Servilius Nonianus was less 'concise' (*pressus*) than the authority of history requires (10.1.102).

[225] For this idea, cf. section 4.6.

different ways, and expressed in his composition. The following virtues can be included in the category of skillfulness:[226]

Latin canon 6. Category of SKILLFULNESS	Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.85-131
Genius (*ingenium*)[227]	9
Skillfulness (*doctrina*)*[228]	3
Learning (*eruditio*)*[229]	3
Shrewdness (*consilium*)*[230]	3
Diligent study (*studium*)[231]	3
Facility (*facilitas*)[232]	2
Knowledge (*scientia*)[233]	1
Expertise (*peritia*)*[234]	1
Ability (*facundia*)[235]	1
Cognition (*cognitio*)*[236]	1
Natural talent (*indoles*)*[237]	1
	TOTAL: 28

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[226] In the following tables, the qualities marked with an asterisk only appear in the Latin canon, not in the Greek.

[227] 10.1.88 (negative: Ovid is too much an *amator ingenii sui*), 10.1.90, 10.1.98 (negative: Ovid should have controlled his *ingenium*), 10.1.102, 10.1.109, 10.1.115, 10.1.117, 10.1.128, 10.1.130. I tried to count those instances of *ingenium* related to/being expressed in style. As such, *ingenium* is often provided with an adjective (e.g. *vehemens et poeticum ingenium*, 10.1.90; *ingenium facile et copiosum*, 10.1.128). Sometimes, the relation to style remains implicit (e.g. in 10.1.115: *multum ingenii in Caelio*). However, in such cases it is still clear that *ingenium* first and foremost characterises the style, not the man (since style is Quintilian's focus). I disregarded the occurrences of *ingenium* designating young, promising people (10.1.96, 10.1.119, 10.1.122).

[228] 10.1.91, 10.1.95, 10.1.97.

[229] 10.1.94, 10.1.95, 10.1.98.

[230] 10.1.106, 10.1.113, 10.1.117 (negative: Cassius Severus yielded to his temper more than to his shrewdness).

[231] 10.1.109, 10.1.114, 10.1.128. I tried to count those instances of *studium* related to/being expressed in style.

[232] 10.1.111, 10.1.128 (*ingenium facile*).

[233] 10.1.95.

[234] 10.1.95.

[235] 10.1.121.

[236] 10.1.128.

[237] 10.1.89.

Other substantial categories are made up by virtues connected with pleasure and vehemence:

Latin canon 7. Category of PLEASURE	Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.85-131
Pleasure (*iucunditas*)[238]	7
Elegance (*elegantia*)[239]	4
Grace (*gratia*)[240]	3
Sweetness (*dulcitudo*)[241]	2
Delight (*delectatio*)*[242]	1
	TOTAL: 17

Latin canon 8. Category of VEHEMENCE	Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.85-131
Force (*vis*)[243]	5
Vehemence (*vehementia*)*[244]	3
Passion (*concitatio*)[245]	3
Spirit (*animus*)*[246]	2
Agressiveness (*pugnacitas*)[247]	2
Temper (*stomachus*)*[248]	1
Heat (*ardor*)*[249]	1
	TOTAL: 17

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[238] 10.1.96, 10.1.101, 10.1.108, 10.1.110, 10.1.113 (negative: Asinius Pollio is far away from e.g. Cicero's pleasure), 10.1.119, 10.1.124 (Catius is a not unpleasant author).

[239] 10.1.87, 10.1.93, 10.1.99, 10.1.114.

[240] 10.1.96, 10.1.99, 10.1.121.

[241] 10.1.101, 10.1.129 (negative: *dulcibus vitis*).

[242] 10.1.119.

[243] 10.1.108, 10.1.109, 10.1.110, 10.1.113 (negative: Messala lacks force), 10.1.114.

[244] 10.1.90 (*vehemens ingenium*), 10.1.110, 10.1.115.

[245] 10.1.90, 10.1.114, 10.1.118.

[246] 10.1.113, 10.1.114.

[247] 10.1.106, 10.1.120 (negative: if he had lived longer, Julius Secundus would have developed more agressiveness).

[248] 10.1.117 (negative).

[249] 10.1.90.

In Quintilian's Latin canon, also virtues of (sacred) gravity are prominent. However, note that the virtues *sacertudo*, *vetustas*, *antiquitas* and *religio* are ambiguously assessed. Ennius, who is praised mainly for these qualities, is nevertheless considered old and not so useful: 'there are others closer to us in time and more useful for our present purpose' (*propiores alii atque ad hoc de quo loquimur magis utiles*), according to Quintilian.[250] Still, gravity turns out to be an important concept in Quintilian's judgements:

Latin canon 9. Category of (SACRED) GRAVITY	Number of occurrences in Quint. 10.1.85-131
Weight (*pondus*)*[251]	4
Gravity (*gravitas*)[252]	3
Authority (*auctoritas*)*[253]	3
Sacred (*sacer*)*[254]	1
Venerability of old age (*vetustas*)*[255]	1
Antiquity (*antiquitas*)*[256]	1
Solemnity (*religio*)*[257]	1
Nobility (*nobilitas*)*[258]	1
Sanctity (*sanctitas*)*[259]	1
	TOTAL: 16

Other considerable categories of virtues in the Latin reading list relate to e.g. carefulness and (radiant) beauty.[260] Moreover, it is possible to discern (smaller) categories of virtues

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[250] 10.1.88.

[251] 10.1.97, 10.1.106, 10.1.123, 10.1.130 (the last two passages concern weight of subject matter).

[252] 10.1.97, 10.1.115, 10.1.116 (negative: Cassius Severus lacks e.g. gravity).

[253] 10.1.97, 10.1.102, 10.1.111.

[254] 10.1.88 (metaphorical: we should worship Ennius as we worship sacred woods). As far as I know, there is no current substantive of *sacer*.

[255] 10.1.88 (further specification of the woods).

[256] 10.1.88 (*id*.).

[257] 10.1.88 (*id*.).

[258] 10.1.113.

[259] 10.1.115.

[260] The category of diligence consists of 'diligence' (*diligentia*), 'care' (*cura*), 'refined' (*tersus*), 'finish' (*cultus*), 'smooth' (*compositus*). The category of beauty consists of 'polish' (*nitor*), 'lucidity' (*candor*), 'well-formedness' (*species*), 'beauty' (*pulchritudo*).

pertaining to e.g. wealth, sublimity, wit, clarity, sharpness, boldness, brevity, naturalness, and emotion.

This overview of the main categories of virtues in Quintilian's Latin reading list learns us that skillfulness has an exceptional status in Quintilian's perception of Latin literature; qualities of skillfulness are to be found in many Latin authors, and should apparently have a key role to play in rhetorical imitation.[261] In Quintilian's Greek canon, skillfulness and learning are of minor importance. An explanation for this may be that Quintilian draws from the same repertoire of ideas as Dionysius, who is also not particularly concerned with the stylistic display of learning in Greek literature – though he recommends e.g. Aristotle's πολυμαθεία and strongly advocates skillfulness and erudition especially in the process of imitation (note e.g. his insistence on κατήχησις).[262] However, we may also suggest that Quintilian was somewhat suspicious of Greek (philosophical) learning and argumentation, and wanted to claim these qualities as specifically Roman.[263]

In Quintilian's Greek canon, no virtue can be found with an exceptional status; the substantial categories of virtues of pleasure, magnificence, (sacred) gravity, force and brevity are rather of the same importance. Furthermore, it turns out that the categories of pleasure and (sacred) gravity are important both in Quintilian's Greek and Latin canons. Also virtues related to force appear in both lists; yet they bear slightly different connotations. In Quintilian's Greek canon, force frequently pertains to stylistic strength, whereas the same virtue in the Latin reading list mainly concerns emotional vehemence and hot temper.

Quintilian's judgements of authors reveal that many of his key ideas of rhetorical imitation are deeply rooted in Greek literary criticism. For both Dionysius and Quintilian, literature that is useful and suitable for imitation should be pleasant, magnificent, grave, and forceful. At the same time, however, Quintilian's Greek canon testifies to a redefinition of what is useful in and should be adapted and emulated from Greek literature. We can observe different accents, adaptations and additions in Quintilian's criticisms, which may well be considered resonances of a gradual shift in Graeco-Roman classicism under the influence of literary taste and rhetorical-practical needs: from the rather traditional proclamation of stylistic magnificence in Dionysius in order to actually revive classical Athens after Rome's

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[261] This will also become apparent from Seneca's *Letter to Lucilius* 84, with its marked use of the terms *ingenium* and *animus* referring to the role of our intellect in the process of imitation. More on this in section 5.3.

[262] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 4.3; *Din*. 7.5.

[263] Zetzel (1983), 95 notes that the (Alexandrian) influence of erudition, learning and urbanity can be discerned from the very beginnings of Roman literature onwards.

'restoration of the Attic Muse', to the more practical recommendation of intellectual agility and skill in Quintilian.[264]

4.9 GREECE AND ROME IN QUINTILIAN'S CANONS

Quintilian's canons of Greek and Latin literature are different in tone and imagery. What image do we get of Greece and Rome?

4.9.1 DISCOURSE AND CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY

A rich stock of metaphors and motifs comes to the fore in Quintilian's reading lists. In this section, I reflect on the most important ones, arguing that Quintilian's discourse frames Greece and Rome and their literary identities in different ways.[265] The metaphors and motifs discussed below will also throw the literary virtues reflected upon in the previous sections into relief, and show how these virtues are embedded in the discourse of the canons.

From the Greek and Latin reading lists, some important metaphors and motifs can be distilled. In the Greek canon, Quintilian uses various terms pertaining to 1) flowing, 2) strife, 3) physical power, and 4) divine inspiration. His comments on the Latin authors are mainly inflected through references to 1) strife, 2) literary (im)maturity and potential, and 3) indications of time and period.

4.9.2 THE METAPHOR OF THE STREAM

The metaphor of the stream is a very common one in Greek literature and in Greek literary theory.[266] It is not only used with reference to the influence of one author upon another, but also to characterise a style which runs like a babbling brook or a mighty river.[267] Dionysius'

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[264] For the restoration of the Attic Muse in Rome, see Dion. Hal. *Orat*. *Vett*. 2.1.

[265] For metaphors in Quintilian, see Assfahl (1932) (*non vidi*).

[266] For (an overview of) metaphors of water and flood in Greek literature/rhetoric, cf. e.g. Van Hook (1905), 12-13; Nünlist (1998), 178-205; Hunter (2012).

[267] In the latter case, the metaphor of the stream is associated with 'wealth' (*copia*, *ubertas*). Cf. e.g. Quint. 10.1.62, where Quintilian argues that Stesichorus 'bursts his banks' (*effunditur*), which is a 'fault of (unbridled) wealth' (*copiae vitium*). The 'milky richness' (*lactea ubertas*, 10.1.32) of Livy may be another example displaying the relation between a flowing and rich style. However, as Hays (1986-1987) argues, the adjective *lactea* does not so much pertain to a fluent, as to a nutritive style.

moral attached to his story on the ugly farmer serves as a good example of the use of the metaphor as an image of the imitative relationship between authors: here, it is argued that likeness through imitation is born when 'after having constructed one stream out of many, someone canalises this into his soul' (ἐκ πολλῶν ναμάτων ἕν τι συγκομίσας ῥεῦμα τοῦτ' εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν μετοχετεύσῃ.[268] In his Greek reading list, Quintilian frequently uses the metaphor of the stream in both ways.[269] His evaluation of Homer contains a fine example of the metaphor as an image of literary influence. As the ultimate model of imitation, Homer provides the origin of every branch of eloquence 'like he himself says that the course of all rivers and springs takes its origin from the Ocean' (*quem ad modum ex Oceano dicit ipse <omnium> amnium fontiumque cursus initium capere*).[270] An example of Quintilian's application of the metaphor of the stream as a marker of style can be found in the case of Herodotus, who is called 'expansive' (*fusus*).[271]

4.9.3 THE METAPHOR OF STRIFE (1)

Another important metaphor in Quintilian's Greek canon is that of strife. This metaphor is also common in Greek rhetorical criticism.[272] Most of the authors in Quintilian's Greek reading list are ranked, and, as we have seen, placed in a sequence that sometimes mirrors their hierarchy.[273] Also Dionysius pays due attention to the excellences of one author over another, but these excellences mostly pertain to very *specific* aspects of subject matter or style.[274] Hence, they do not necessarily make the author better overall – a question to which

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[268] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.3. Dionysius also uses water metaphors to characterise a style, e.g. 'purity' (καθαρότης, *Imit*. 2.14). On this metaphor, see Van Hook (1905), 12.

[269] We can also find the metaphor in the Latin canon, e.g. *fluunt inlaborata* (10.1.111), where it is used to describe the movement of the wonderful passages of Cicero. In the following footnotes of this section, I will, for reasons of brevity, leave translations of all parallel passages behind.

[270] Quint. 10.1.46.

[271] Quint. 10.1.73. The metaphor also occurs in other passages: *velut quodam eloquentiae flumine* (10.1.61); *redundat atque effunditur* (10.1.62); *magis fusus* (10.1.77); *puro tamen fonti quam magno flumini propior* (10.1.78). For the metaphor in the Latin canon: *non enim pluvias, ut ait Pindarus, aquas colligit* [subject: Cicero, M.S.], *sed vivo gurgite exundat* (10.1.109).

[272] For an overview of the terminology of strife in Greek rhetoric, cf. Van Hook (1905), 23-26.

[273] Expressions related to competition and comparison are e.g. *superari* (10.1.54); *subiungit* (10.1.56); *princeps habetur [...] secundas [...] occupavit* (10.1.58); *meruit credi secundus* (10.1.72).

[274] See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.6, where it is argued that in arousing pity Simonides is even better than Pindar.

Dionysius does not seem to be particularly dedicated. By contrast, Quintilian is much more inclined to put certain authors on a pedestal because of the general quality of their work – notwithstanding the fact that other writers may surpass them in some specific points.

The language that Quintilian uses to describe who is the best in the hierarchical literary order is frequently derived from poetry festivals or footraces, in which the winners were rewarded with a victory palm.[275] One case in point is Quintilian's description of Hesiod as the champion of the middle style: 'to him the victory palm is given in the middle style' (*daturque ei palma in illo medio genere dicendi*).[276] Closely affiliated are those expressions pertaining to the hierarchical order in the military system. When Quintilian introduces his section on Greek rhetoricians, he raises the image of a group of soldiers coming into view: 'a vast army of orators follows' (*sequitur oratorum ingens manus*).[277] Of these soldiers, Demosthenes 'comes with a big lead in the first place' (*longe princeps*).[278] The language is suggestive of hierarchical competition and spatial separation between members of the group of ten Attic orators – as if they are involved in a footrace.[279]

4.9.4 THE METAPHOR OF PHYSICAL POWER

Display of power is another important concept in Quintilian's Greek canon. As we have seen in section 3.6.1, Dionysius attributes many virtues pertaining to force to the Greek writers he recommends in his reading list. In fact, virtues related to force, such as δύναμις, ῥώμη and ἰσχύς, are remarkably important in the epitomised version of Dionysius' treatise. The

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[275] On terms derived from athletics in Quintilian, see Grodde (1997), 30-44. Also in the introduction to the canons, some references to the world of athletes occur, such as *athleta [...] praeparandus sit* (10.1.4); *labuntur* (10.1.24); *athletarum toris* (10.1.33). The leading position of authors of a certain genre is not only reflected by the language of strife in Quintilian, but also by expressions related to the antithesis between brightness and shadow: *sed longe clarius inlustraverunt* (10.1.67); *fulgore quodam suae claritatis tenebras obduxit* (10.1.72); *quem* [i.e. Aristotle, M.S.] *clariorem putem* (10.1.83); *loquendi nitor ille divinus* (*ibid*.). In 10.1.30, a passage dealing with the brilliance of deterrent arms, we see the metaphors of strife and brightness combined (*fulgorem in iis* [i.e. *armis*, M.S.] *esse*).

[276] Quint. 10.1.52. In his Latin canon, Quintilian incidentally refers to a laurel (*inter victrices hederam tibi serpere laurus*, 10.1.92), quoting Vergil's *Eclogues* 8.13 in his panegyric of Domitian.

[277] Quint. 10.1.76.

[278] *Ibid*.

[279] We can also see references to spatially conceived hierarchy in the following expressions: *proximus Homerum* (10.1.62); *his proximus* (10.1.74). Expressions referring to spatial separation and hierarchical distance also appear in the Latin canon: see n. 293.

metaphorical language of power is even more significant in Quintilian, and is often endowed with a physical connotation.[280] For example, Archilochus is said to have 'plenty of blood and sinews' (*plurimum sanguinis atque nervorum*), whereas Stesichorus 'is bearing with his lyre the weight of epic' (*epici carminis onera lyra sustinentem*).[281] Two other examples can be found in the section on the rhetoricians, in which all of Demosthenes' style is described as 'strained as it were by muscles' (*quibusdam nervis intenta*) and Aeschines is labelled with the following evocative qualification: 'he has more flesh, less muscles' (*carnis tamen plus habet, minus lacertorum*), which suggests that his style is voluminous rather than forceful.[282]

Another related metaphor designating (a lack of) physical power can be found in the description of Isocrates. This orator, who is said to be 'polished' (*nitidus*) and 'adorned' (*comptus*), is considered 'more suited to the wrestling school than to the battlefield' (*palaestrae quam pugnae magis accommodatus*); he aimed at 'all the graces of speaking' (*omnes dicendi veneres*), because he had prepared himself 'for the lecture room, not for the courts' (*auditoriis enim se, non iudiciis compararat*).[283] The opposition between a wrestling school and the battlefield seems to be suggestive of the contrast between a rather playful, theatrical display of literary force on the one hand (which is, apparently, characteristic for Isocrates), and, on the other, the exhibition of real stylistic force required for serious speeches in court.[284]

4.9.5 THE MOTIF OF DIVINE INSPIRATION

Remarkable at last is also the language of divine inspiration used in Quintilian's Greek canon. It is entirely limited to the relatively small section on Greek philosophy, in which Plato takes

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[280] On metaphors pertaining to the human body in Greek rhetoric, cf. Van Hook (1905), 18-23. For biological/medical metaphors used to describe language and texts, see Sluiter (2010).

[281] Quint. 10.1.60, 10.1.62.

[282] Quint. 10.1.76, 10.1.77.

[283] Quint. 10.1.79. For terms borrowed from the battlefield in Quintilian, see Grodde (1997), 16-21. For terms derived from gladiator fights in Quintilian, see *ibid*., 22-30. In the introduction to Quintilian's canons, references to the battlefield occur in the following expressions: *in procinctu paratamque [...] eloquentiam* (10.1.2); *nos vero armatos stare in acie et summis de rebus decernere et ad victoriam niti* (10.1.29); *fulgorem in iis* [i.e. *armis*, M.S.] *esse* (10.1.30); *pugnamque praesentem* (10.1.31); *militum lacertis* (10.1.33).

[284] Cf. Peterson (1891), *ad loc.*: 'Isocrates had not the vigorous compression of style necessary for real contests'.

first place.[285] According to Quintilian, Plato is supreme 'for the almost divine and Homeric versatility of his style' (*eloquendi facultate divina quadam et Homerica*), and 'seems to be inspired not by human genius, but as it were by the oracle of Delphi' (*non hominis ingenio sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus*).[286] Xenophon, passed over in the section on the historians, is fully compensated by the praise that 'the Graces themselves seem to have moulded his style' (*ipsae sermonem finxisse Gratiae videantur*) and that 'some goddess of persuasion sat upon his lips' (*in labris eius sedisse quandam persuadendi deam*).[287] Finally, in Theophrastus, 'there is such divine brilliance of style that he is said to have derived also his name [possibly meaning 'he who speaks like a god', M.S.] from this' (*tam est loquendi nitor ille divinus ut ex eo nomen quoque traxisse dicatur*).[288] It is with this great insistence on divinely inspired Greek philosophy in mind that the reader makes the transition to the Latin canon.

Divinity, by contrast, is almost absent from the Latin canon; in his discussion of Vergil at the beginning of this list, Quintilian explicitly notes that 'we [i.e. the Romans, M.S.] must yield to his [i.e. Homer's, M.S.] heavenly and immortal nature' (*illi naturae caelesti atque inmortali cesserimus*).[289] This comment sets the pace, and prepares for the strongly competitive gist of the entire canon of Latin literature. Whereas Greeks are presented as admiring, following and competing with each other, the Romans are not only involved in a mutual struggle, but are also and in particular competing with the Greeks.[290] Quintilian's Latin reading list evokes a rather hybrid impression: leaning quite heavily upon the preceding

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[285] Thus, it seems unlikely that the section on philosophy, which is dominated by language of divine inspiration, is placed last because Quintilian was not favourably disposed at philosophers, as Peterson has suggested (cf. n. 68).

[286] Quint. 10.1.81.

[287] Quint. 10.1.82. With these latter words, the writer of Old Comedy Eupolis had described Pericles' eloquence.

[288] Quint. 10.1.83.

[289] Quint. 10.1.86. In the Latin canon (10.1.91), Domitian is brought in connection with divine inspiration, but this should perhaps be seen against the background of imperial panegyric and Domitian's own claim of being a son of Minerva rather than as a serious qualification of Domitian's style.

[290] An example of admiration among Greek authors is Menander's appreciation for Euripides: *hunc et admiratus maxime est* (10.1.69). An example of explicitly proclaimed imitation among Greek authors is Theopompus, who was an 'imitator of Thucydides' (*imitator Thucydidi*, 10.1.74).

Greek list, it lacks the sense of autarky, internal unity, completion and coherence that in a unique way comes to the fore in the Greek canon.[291]

4.9.6 THE METAPHOR OF STRIFE (2)

Examples of comparative and competitive language in the Latin reading list are abundant. Almost every section of it is introduced by references to competition and strife.[292] The metaphors of strife are mostly derived from the battlefield or general combative situations, though some – as is predominantly the case in the Greek canon – seem to refer to poetry festivals or footraces.[293] Expressions like *vincimur* (10.1.86), *pensamus* (*ibid.*), *amisimus* (10.1.89), *provocamus* (10.1.93), *comparari potest* (10.1.98), *vix levem consequitur umbram* (10.1.100), *non [...] cesserit* (10.1.101), *nec opponere [...] verear* (*ibid.*), *nec indignetur [...] aequari* (*ibid.*), *parem facere [...] possunt* (10.1.105) and *vincimus* (10.1.107) all indicate rather general combative situations between Greeks and Romans, whereas 'strife' in the Greek canon is framed in rather specific terms of cultural events and sports competitions among the Greeks themselves. The differences in the language of strife in Quintilian's canons of Greek and Latin literature may well reflect his different understanding of Greek and Latin society: the former more culturally inspired, the latter more dominated by bellicose expansionism.[294]

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[291] Cf. e.g. Steinmetz (1964), 463: 'demnach erscheint dem Quintilian die griechische Literatur als eine relative Einheit […]'. Cf. *ibid.*, 464: 'diese Sicht der griechischen Literatur, die ohne Markierung eines epochalen Einschnitts die archaische, die klassische und die hellenistische Literatur zu einem einheitlichen Komplex zusammenfasst, findet sich nun nirgends in einer von einem Griechen verfassten Darstellung der griechischen Literatur'. Of course, the fact that Greek literature is presented as a unity may also be caused by the fact that it was produced long before and, as a whole, could be evaluated and interpreted extensively in the centuries following. Quintilian himself refers to the idea that a sound judgement passed on contemporary Latin literature is hard to achieve, e.g. in his discussion of Domitian (10.1.92).

[292] Quint. 10.1.85; 10.1.93; 10.1.99; 10.1.101; 10.1.105; 10.1.123.

[293] E.g. *proximus* (10.1.85); *cesserimus* (10.1.86); *ceteri omnes longe secuntur* (10.1.87); *vindicaret sibi iure secundum locum* (10.1.89); *claudicamus* (10.1.99).

[294] Apparently, oratory can (pre-eminently) bear traces of this bellicosity; Julius Caesar 'seems to have spoken with the same spirit as he waged war' (*eodem animo dixisse quo bellavit appareat*, 10.1.114).

4.9.7 THE MOTIF OF LITERARY (IM)MATURITY

In most literary genres, Romans had to surrender to the Greeks.[295] As a cause of or excuse for their inability to conquer the Greeks, their literary immaturity or (partial) incompetence is frequently put forward by Quintilian. In fact, the idea of immaturity dominates the Latin canon in such a way, that it can be called topical. Two striking examples of the language of immaturity can be found in Quintilian's discussion of Serranus and Saleius Bassus.

According to Quintilian, an 'untimely death' (*mors inmatura*) prevented Serranus from coming to fruition.[296] There is an implied contrast here with Saleius Bassus' talent, that just 'did not mature in his elderly years' (*nec ipsum senectute maturuit*), though it had been 'vehement and poetical' (*vehemens et poeticum*), and thus very promising.[297] Quintilian's language of immaturity, however, does not originate from a deeply rooted pessimistic view on the future of Latin literature and rhetoric.[298] On the contrary, he often gives a positive, didactic twist to immaturity by emphasising the great opportunities and potential of the authors who nonetheless disappointed him in the end – thus encouraging his readers to take it up where they had let it go.[299]

The Latin reading list is crammed with such expressions of literary potential, either frustrated by an early death and lack of literary development or taste, as we just saw in the cases of Serranus and Saleius Bassus, or by bad personality traits, the inability of attaining one's own high standards, lack of time and the absence of some specific virtues of style. An example of the negative influence of an author's character is provided by Ovid, whose *Medea* is, according to Quintilian, indicative of 'how much this man could have achieved if he had

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[295] This is true for hexametric poetry (10.1.85-92), iambic and lyrical poetry (10.1.96), tragedy (though implicitly) and comedy (10.1.97-99), and philosophy (10.1.123-131). Thus, the only genres in which the Romans can truly compete with the Greeks are elegiac poetry (10.1.93), history (10.1.101-104) and rhetoric (10.1.105-122). Finally, satire (10.1.93-94) is an entirely Roman invention.

[296] Quint. 10.1.89. For literary talent frustrated by an early death: e.g. *dignusque vir cui et mens melior et vita longior contigisset* (10.1.115); *properata mors* (*ibid.*); *Iulio Secundo si longior contigisset aetas* (10.1.120); *interceptus quoque* (10.1.121).

[297] Quint. 10.1.90.

[298] Cf. e.g. Orentzel (1978), who points to Quintilian's optimistic view on the future of Latin oratory.

[299] The fact, however, remains that Quintilian is generally rather severe in his verdict on Latin authors and that his praise is seldom undivided. A great abundance of litotic expressions used to designate that an author is not bad or deserves no blame or oblivion may illustrate this: e.g. *non spernendus quidem* (10.1.87); *non indigni cognitione* (10.1.90); *non sine cultu ac nitore* (10.1.124); *non iniucundus* (*ibid.*).

preferred to restrain rather than revel in his genius' (*quantum ille vir praestare potuerit si ingenio suo imperare quam indulgere maluisset*).[300] Aufidius Bassus is illustrative of a good but rather whimsical author who 'sometimes does not live up to his own abilities' (*in quibusdam suis ipse viribus minor*).[301] Quintilian's description of Julius Caesar makes it clear that lack of time could prevent an author from reaching the top, whereas Cassius Severus could have been among the greatest rhetoricians 'if only he had added colour and gravity of style to his other virtues' (*si ceteris virtutibus colorem et gravitatem orationis adiecisset*).[302]

4.9.8 INDICATIONS OF TIME AND PERIOD

Not only the metaphor of combat and the motifs of (im)maturity and potential permeate the Latin canon – also indications of time and period are significant, especially since these are almost completely absent from the Greek reading list. Quintilian frequently places the authors under discussion in chronological order and demarcates whether they belong to the ancients, the more recent authors – some of whom Quintilian was even able to hear himself – or the contemporaneous, on whom he does not choose to elaborate.[303]

It is said that Quintilian believed the authors of the distant past to be unsuitable models for the present.[304] However, his estimation of the usefulness of their qualities is rather

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[300] Quint. 10.1.98. Cf. *indulgent ingeniorum suorum voluptati* (10.1.24); *plus stomacho quam consilio dedit* (10.1.117).

[301] Quint. 10.1.103. Cf. e.g. *si tamen (ut est dictum) ad exemplar primi libri bellum Siculum perscripsisset* (10.1.89).

[302] Quint. 10.1.114; 10.1.116. According to Peterson (1891) *ad loc.*, *color* in this case means 'proper tone'. For the desirable addition of some specific literary virtues, cf. also *adiecisset enim atque adiciebat ceteris virtutibus suis quod desiderari potest* (10.1.120).

[303] Indications of the times in which the recommended authors lived, are e.g. *propiores alii* (10.1.88); *multum [...] nuper amisimus* (10.1.90); *dicent [...] futura saecula, nunc [...] laus ista praestringitur* (10.1.92); *primus [...] Lucilius* (10.1.93); *sunt clari hodieque et qui olim nominabuntur* (10.1.94); *prius saturae genus* (10.1.95); *quem nuper vidimus* (10.1.96); *ingenia viventium* (*ibid.*); *tragoediae scriptores veterum [...] clarissimi* (10.1.97); *magis videri potest temporibus quam ipsis defuisse* (*ibid.*); *eorum quos viderim* (10.1.98); *mihi egregie dixisse videtur Servilius Nonianus* (10.1.102); *paulum aetate praecedens* (10.1.103); *exornat aetatis nostrae gloriam* (10.1.104); *videri possit saeculo prior* (10.1.113); *eorum quos viderim* (10.1.118); *erant clara et nuper ingenia* (10.1.119); *eos qui nunc vigent* (10.1.122).

[304] E.g. Citroni (2006a), 13.

nuanced, although he condemns their lack of 'polish' (*nitor*).[305] Quintilian's judgement of Ennius, for instance, who should be admired for the 'solemnity' (*religio*) of his works rather than for their 'well-formedness' (*species*), does not need to be understood as a dismissal.[306] After all, Quintilian assures that 'words recovered from the past' (*verba a vetustate repetita*) possess the 'authority of antiquity' (*auctoritas antiquitatis*), and that reading the ancients is indeed very instructive, but only to more advanced students endowed 'with firm judgements' (*firmis iudiciis*) and the ability to take over from the ancients their solid force of manly genius 'after the roughness of a coarse century has been rubbed off' (*deterso rudis saeculi squalore*).[307] Thus, as we have seen before, the pedagogical differentiation between novices and advanced students in rhetoric is crucial for the interpretation of the judgements Quintilian passes on all writers.[308]

To the group of beginners – Quintilian's primary target group, of which the aim should be to achieve *firma facilitas* – more recent authors are better suited.[309] We may, however, wonder what the predicates 'old' and 'more recent' mean exactly – chronologically speaking. Of the hexametric poets, Ennius' style is explicitly associated with *vetustas* and *antiquitas* (10.1.88), but it is evident that also the authors Macer, Lucretius and Varro of Atax, mentioned in one breath with Ennius (10.1.87), should be judged according to the standards of the past.[310] Quintilian presents these four men as a group of good, but deficient writers, introduced by the words *ceteri omnes* (10.1.88). Also poets such as Lucilius (10.1.93), Terentius Varro (10.1.95), Accius and Pacuvius (10.1.97) and Caecilius (10.1.99) should be

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[305] Quint. 10.1.97, 10.1.113. In e.g. 10.1.118 it becomes clear that it is a privilege being reckoned 'among the old masters' (*in numero veterum*).

[306] Quint. 10.1.88.

[307] Quint. 1.6.39; 2.5.23. Ancient texts are also advantageous because of their 'majesty' (*maiestas*) and 'delight' (*delectatio*), as Quintilian poses in 1.6.39. In 1.8.8-9, other virtues of ancient literature are listed, i.e. 'genius' (*ingenium*), 'wealth of words' (*copia verborum*); in old tragedy one can find 'gravity' (*gravitas*); in old comedy 'elegance' (*elegantia*), 'atticism' (*atticismos*), 'simplicity' (*oeconomia*), 'sanctity' (*sanctitas*) and 'manliness' (*virilitas*).

[308] The negative judgement of Quintilian passed on the modern writer Seneca should be seen in the same light of pedagogical differentiation. Seneca is best read by advanced students. Cf. 10.1.131 (*iam robustis et severiore genere satis firmatis legendus*).

[309] E.g. Quint. 2.5.21; 10.1.88.

[310] Citroni (2006a), 12-14 argues that Quintilian displays a modern, literary taste that marks 'a complete break with the tradition of Varro, Cicero and the academics and grammarians' (*ibid*., 14), who greatly adhered to such archaic writers as Ennius.

seen as representatives of ancient Latin literature.[311] This means, roughly speaking, that the generations before Cicero are labelled 'ancient', which is confirmed by Quintilian's telling comment on Asinius Pollio. According to Quintilian, this man 'is so far away from Cicero in polish and pleasure that he could be thought a century earlier' (*a nitore et iucunditate Ciceronis ita longe abest ut videri possit saeculo prior*).[312]

Authors can be called 'more close' (*propiores*) from the Augustan period onwards.[313] Also the authors Quintilian experienced himself belong to this category: having passed away somewhere in the Augustan period or later seems to be the decisive criterion for being reckoned among the *propiores*. The contemporaneous authors are those still living at the time of the composition of the *Institutio*. They are – if mentioned at all – always discussed in *praeteritio*, because Quintilian wants to leave it to his successors to assess them soundly.[314] Whereas he can be rather critical in his assessment of the ancient and more recent authors, it is remarkable that contemporary authors are seen as extremely promising. A striking example is the description of an unnamed historian, who may probably be identified as Fabius Rusticus: 'there still survives, to enhance the glory of our times, a man worthy to be remembered in future ages' (*superest adhuc et exornat aetatis nostrae gloriam vir saeculorum memoria dignus*).[315]

Quintilian's discourse frames Greek and Latin literary identity in different ways. His language of flowing, strife, physical power and divine inspiration evokes the image of an influential, intraculturally competitive, powerful and authoritative Greek culture. His references to strife and literary (im)maturity, as well as his numerous indications of time and period in the Latin canon are suggestive of a Roman society which is extraculturally competitive, maturing and searching for internal structure and balance. The Roman canon can be considered a hybrid testament of progression and development characterised by trial and error, whereas the Greek reading list displays a great sense of stability and unity. However,

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[311] For these representatives of old poetry, see also Quint. 1.8.10-11.

[312] Quint. 10.1.113.

[313] Quint. 10.1.88. Ovid is the first 'more recent' author mentioned here.

[314] Quint. 10.1.122.

[315] E.g. Quint. 10.1.104. Vardi (2003), 148 explains Quintilian's insertion of very recent Latin authors as follows: 'the impression such a representation [i.e. of recent Latin authors, M.S.] is meant to create is, I suspect, one of great but long past and gone Greek achievements, whose only successors are their lively Roman rivals'.

with their great potential, the Romans are expected to continue the reverent Greek literary tradition in their own way.

4.10 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, Quintilian's conception of imitation has been further explored in relation to the ideas on imitation aired by Dionysius. We have seen that Quintilian constructs his theory of imitation using building blocks which also give shape to Dionysius' framework of imitation. Dionysius' ideas on ἕξις, ἐπιστήμη (which comprises both knowledge and judgement), coming to the fore in the epitome of *On Imitation*, find their counterparts in Quintilian's concepts of 'facility' (*facilitas*), 'wealth' or 'a wide reading experience' (*copia*), and 'sound judgement' (*iudicium*). Moreover, Dionysius and Quintilian share an emphasis on mimetic selection and eclectic composition.

Also the structure of and choices made in Quintilian's reading lists of Greek and Latin literature were analysed in comparison with Dionysius' canon. We have seen that Quintilian frequently arranges his Greek canon differently than Dionysius, and makes the order of writers serve his own rhetorical purposes. Rather than taking chronology as a guideline (which is a more important factor in Dionysius' list), Quintilian chooses to arrange Greek authors drawing from an amalgam of criteria: literary superiority of and coherence between writers, and parallelism with the order of equivalent authors in the Latin reading list.

In the inclusion of Hellenistic and other poets, we have seen that Quintilian seems to have been guided by various principles as well. He mentions their names because of their prestige, their usefulness for more advanced students (who are formally beyond his scope), and their suitability to compensate for certain gaps within the Roman canon. The Hellenistic prose authors have been included to bridge the chronological hiatus between the glorious period of archaic and classical Greek literature on the one hand and Latin literature on the other. By inserting their names, Quintilian suggests a continuing literary tradition, in which the Romans are presented as the ultimate heirs and successors of the Greeks. The suggestion of a continuum – though a strongly redefined one – grants legitimacy to Latin literary production.

Although Quintilian possibly adopted the frame of the Greek canon from Dionysius and/or others and sometimes expressed judgements that also appear in Dionysius, his evaluations of authors clearly reflect his own rhetorical program, which is determined by his stringent aim of mimetic usefulness, his audience of novice learners, the literary taste of the

Flavian Age and developments in classicism. Thus, for Quintilian, Greek literature is not just a reference point to be emulated by Roman rhetoricians, nor a mere backup in case of deficiencies in the Latin list. On the contrary, the Greek canon has its own intrinsic value in offering a redefinition of what is useful in and can be adapted and emulated from Greek literature in a Roman context.

An overview of important literary virtues in Quintilian's Greek canon teaches us that Quintilian travels together with Dionysius in his idea of Greek literature as a source of pleasure, magnificence, (sacred) gravity, force and brevity. Unlike Dionysius, however, Quintilian is not exceptionally concerned with magnificence; he rather tends to give proportional attention to different literary virtues. Moreover, he seems to insist on 'brevity' (*brevitas*) in Greek authors rather than on 'clarity' (*claritas*), which may be explained by assuming an attempt to compensate for the lack of proper examples of the important quality of brevity in Latin authors.

In Quintilian's perception of Latin literature, skillfulness has an exceptional status, which may be a trace of the influential Alexandrian focus on erudition and learning. Other important virtues in Latin literature, pertaining to pleasure, vehemence and (sacred) gravity, also appear abundantly in Quintilian's Greek list – whether or not bearing a slightly different connotation. These virtues seem to be a mark of good literature in general rather than of Latin or Greek literature in particular. However, the specific character of Latin as opposed to Greek literature is pre-eminently reflected in Quintilian's distinctive use of metaphors and motifs. We have seen that these metaphors and motifs have a larger defining reach than literature alone: they help to construct the identity of both Greeks and Romans, and to reveal the several differences and points of contact between them.

In the extensive debate on the construction of Greek and Roman identity in the Roman World, the analysis of the classicising ideas on imitation expressed by Dionysius and Quintilian may bring us a small step further.[316] We have observed that in their recommendations of classical Greek literature, both critics tap into a common discourse and framework of imitation, selecting those elements that fit their own agenda. Preserving their own cultural identity seems to be one of their items. Dionysius' inclination to stimulate the imitation of Greek literary paragons of beauty and magnificence in Roman rhetorical practice can best be explained by his proud desire to *revive* the literature of his own people, in order not only to strengthen their identity in Rome, but also to further inspire both Greek and Latin

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[316] On this debate, see section 1.4.

orators by the 'Attic Muse' who has already been restored. For Quintilian, Greek literature, – which is the reverent literature of others –, is the cradle of and legitimation for Latin literary production, and can serve as a brilliant arsenal to provide the Romans with the effective weapons to compete with their Greek heroes, to appropriate and adapt their heritage and, in the end, to establish Roman literary reign.

CHAPTER 5

GREEK AND ROMAN THEORIES ON IMITATION IN THE FIRST CENTURY AD

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In the time between Dionysius and Quintilian, many Greek and Roman critics in Rome either casually or explicitly dealt with issues of imitation. To be sure, imitation had been a key concept in Greek and Latin literature for a long time. No self-respecting Greek or Roman author ever escaped from taking a stance towards the illustrious Greek literary past by modelling his own new compositions after the exemplary works of others.[1] Imitation had always helped to construct people's identities in the present against the background of the past and, above that, to *anchor* 'the new' into 'the old'.[2] As such, imitation formed a quintessential topic in Greek and Latin literary theory.

In imperial Rome, the concept of imitation of classical models as a means to define one's role in the present had yet another dimension. Rome's intellectual elite consisted of both Greeks and Romans who lived and worked together under Roman rule, and were often educated in the same schools. We have already seen that among Dionysius' addressees were both Greeks and Romans, who formed part of an intriguing network of intellectuals; also Quintilian must have been deeply involved in the Greek and Roman circles of theorists and authors of his own time.[3] Greeks and Romans in Rome were deeply interested in the same classical Greek literary heritage, which inspired them to compose new texts both in Greek and Latin, and which helped them to construct and express their artistic and cultural identities.

As the previous chapters on Dionysius and Quintilian have shown, within this cultural pluriformity of Rome, theories on imitation do not only shed light on the value of classical Greek models for the construction of identity of Greeks and Romans separately, but also on the intercultural dialogue and exchange of ideas between them, which was catalysed by the

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[1] Cf. Russell (1979), 16 (cf. also 12): 'The imitation must be tacitly acknowledged, on the understanding that the informed reader will recognize and approve the borrowing. The borrowing must be 'made one's own', by individual treatment and assimilation to its new place and purpose'.

[2] For the concept of 'anchoring' what is new in what is old, see Sluiter (2017).

[3] For Dionysius' network of Greek and Roman intellectuals, see section 1.1, n. 2. For Dionysius' addressees, see sections 3.1; 3.3.4; 3.4. For Quintilian's Greek and Roman acquaintances, see e.g. section 4.6.

contemplation of the same models.[4] By examining a number of Greek and Latin texts from the first century AD, this chapter will put in perspective the terminology and theories of imitation in Dionysius and Quintilian, and show how both critics relate to a wider network of Greek and Roman authors.

In recent years, many scholars have paid due attention to the concept of imitation in the Augustan Period as well as in the classicising movement of the Second Sophistic (50-250 AD). Important research on the concept of imitation in the Augustan Period has, for instance, been done by Richard Hunter and Nicolas Wiater, who both published on Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*.[5] In section 2.1, I referred to a monograph by Whitmarsh, who examines two concepts, μίμησις and παιδεία, which are fundamental for the construction of Greek identity in both Greek and Roman authors, and especially in those belonging to the Second Sophistic.[6] For a better understanding of the connections between Augustan classicism and classicising tendencies in the first century AD, it is crucial to investigate Dionysius' and Quintilian's ideas on imitation in conjunction with notions on imitation expressed by Greeks and Romans who lived in the decades between them.

Six Greek and Roman authors, all of whose works are characterised by a strong classicising approach, are singled out per section: Aelius Theon (*Progymnasmata*, section 5.2), Seneca (*Letter to Lucilius* 84, section 5.3), Longinus (*On the Sublime*, section 5.4), Pliny the Younger (various letters, section 5.5), Tacitus (*Dialogue on Oratory*, section 5.6) and Dio Chrysostom (*Oration* 18, traditionally entitled *On Training for Public Speaking*, section 5.7). Since the precise dates of the publications of most of these authors are uncertain, the order of their appearance in this chapter is determined by coherence in thought and discourse – which is also my focus – rather than chronology.[7] In this discussion, Pliny holds a special, intermediate place. On the one hand, he shows himself indebted to the Platonic language of

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[4] For the role played by (the imitation of former) literature in the construction of Greek identity in the Second Sophistic Period in Rome, see Whitmarsh (2001). Wallace-Hadrill (2008) (see esp. 237-239) adopts a very broad cultural perspective on imitation instead of a purely literary one, discussing many different forms of interaction between Greeks and Romans which redefined their cultural identities.

[5] Hunter (2009); Wiater (2011).

[6] Whitmarsh (2001).

[7] In fact, only the letters of Pliny can be dated with certainty, namely between 96 and 109 AD. On the other authors, see the specific sections devoted to them.

mental pregnancy and inspiration used by Dionysius and Longinus; on the other hand, he is also closely connected with the ideas of his friend Tacitus and his teacher Quintilian.[8]

The broad similarities between the approaches to imitation in the authors mentioned above are obvious. A remarkable correspondence between their observations on imitation concerns the designation of various stages within the imitative process, i.e. 1) the intensive and repeated study of a wide variety of literary models, 2) the acquisition of a sharp judgement, 3) the selection of what is best in the models chosen, and 4) the eclectic and original composition of a new work of literature.[9] Furthermore, they all mention and (more or less profoundly) discuss classical Greek models whom they consider to be of paramount use for people involved with rhetoric. However, whereas Dionysius, Dio and Quintilian present a reading list which is formally recognizable or explicitly presented as a 'canon', the evaluative remarks on Greek authors made by Aelius Theon, Seneca, Longinus, Pliny, and Tacitus can be found in (extensive) passages or more or less scattered throughout their works.

In the past, some scholars have paid attention to the crosslinks between the rhetorical works of Dionysius and Aelius Theon, Dionysius and Longinus, Longinus and Pliny, Pliny and Tacitus, Pliny and Quintilian and Tacitus and Quintilian, but they have not (specifically or exclusively) focused on their notions of imitation.[10]

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[8] Plin. *Ep*. 7.20, 8.7, 9.23 (references to Tacitus); Plin. *Ep*. 2.14.9, 6.6.3 (references to Quintilian).

[9] Cf. Russell (1979), 5, who distinguishes two central points in ancient theories of imitation: 'One is that the true object of imitation is not a single author, but the good qualities abstracted from many. […] The second point, related to the first, is that the imitator must always penetrate below the superficial, verbal features of his exemplar to its spirit and significance'. The latter idea partly corresponds to the second stage I distinguish (the acquisition of a sharp judgement), but also to the first stage (intensive and repeated study). Of course, Russell is right in arguing that many ancient critics insisted on the idea that 'an imitator must always penetrate below the superficial, verbal features of his exemplar', but we should not forget that critics like Dionysius and Quintilian tried to grasp the spirit and significance of texts precisely by studying verbal features: choice of words, composition and figures of speech.

[10] Patillon (1997) (esp. xcviii-c) touches upon the resemblances between Dionysius, Aelius Theon and Quintilian. For the relation between Dionysius and Longinus, see e.g. Halliwell (2002) (esp. 292-296 and 310-312); De Jonge (2012). For Longinus and Pliny (and Seneca), see e.g. Armisen-Marchetti (1990). For Pliny and Tacitus, see e.g. Griffin (1999); Marchesi (2008), 97-143; Johnson (2010), 63-73; Whitton (2012) and bibliographies. For Quintilian and Pliny, see e.g. Whitton (forthc.) and bibliography. For Tacitus and Quintilian, see e.g. Brink (1989). For Aelius Theon and Quintilian, see e.g. Lana (1951); Henderson (1991), who discusses the relationship between Quintilian and progymnasmatic writers, among whom Aelius Theon.

Other scholars have pointed to the connections between the literary canons of Dionysius, Dio (presented in his *Oration* 18) and Quintilian.[11] Usener claimed that Quintilian did not borrow the judgements on Greek poets and authors from Dionysius.[12] Cohoon and Lemarchand argued that Dio's list is built upon the same ideas as expressed in the accounts of Dionysius and Quintilian.[13] More recently, Billault expressed the opinion that there are no substantial differences between the reading lists in Dio, Dionysius and Quintilian, nuancing this statement by observing that Dio's list is very brief and insists on the 'usefulness' of literature for its addressee, a Greek statesman.[14] In his study on canons of style in the Antonine age, Rutherford observed that the lists of Dionysius, Dio and Quintilian distinguish the same categories of poetry, history, oratory and philosophy, and that poetry indisputably comes first, followed by the prose categories in varying order.[15] Recently, De Jonge rightly argued that Dio's list is in fact fundamentally different from that of Dionysius, and that Quintilian on important issues sides with Dio.[16]

The present chapter offers an examination of the mimetic ideas of Aelius Theon, Seneca, Longinus, Pliny, Tacitus, and Dio altogether. The first aim of this chapter is to argue that Greeks and Romans drew from and contributed to a shared discourse of imitation.[17] Correspondences in the use of terminology and metaphors of imitation in both Greek and Latin authors point to this shared discourse, which can probably also be traced back to their training in the rhetorical schools in Rome.[18] As for mimetic terminology, we will observe that there is generally a loose formal distinction between μίμησις/ζῆλος and *imitatio/aemulatio*, and that often one of these terms seems to purport the complex of imitation and emulation

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[11] I mentioned their discussions before in section 4.2.

[12] Usener (1889), 132: *iudicia de poetis scriptoribusque Graecis non a Dionysio Quintilianus mutuatus est*.

[13] Lemarchand (1926), 10: 'comme on le voit, il n'y a à peu rien dans la lettre XVIII qui ne se retrouve chez Denys d'Halicarnasse et Quintilien. Ce sont les recettes courantes, les procédés traditionnels que contenaient tous les manuels d'art oratoire'. Cohoon (1939), 209: 'Dio Chrysostom, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Quintilian, gave select lists of authors for students to read. The fact that there are no great divergences in these lists gives the impression that there was general agreement in the ancient schools as to which were the best authors for students'.

[14] Billault (2004), 505.

[15] Rutherford (1998), 43.

[16] See De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.). De Jonge explains the divergences between Dionysius and Dio by pointing to their different addressees, purposes, literary preferences and text genres.

[17] Cf. Russell (1979), 1, who speaks of a 'general Greco-Roman acceptance of imitation'.

[18] For the role of imitation and emulation in ancient rhetorical education, see e.g. Marrou (1975); Morgan (1998); Cribiore (2001).

together. As for metaphors of imitation, we will e.g. see that in both Greek and Latin texts 1) images of the movement of the soul designate the inspiration by and internalisation of literary models, 2) images of food digestion mirror the importance of internalizing and harmonizing a great variety of (aspects of) different literary models, and 3) images related to weather conditions represent the striking effects of successful imitation upon an audience.

The second aim of this chapter, which is in close alignment with the first, is to show that each of the Greek and Roman authors to be discussed adapts the common discourse of imitation to his own, individual agenda, which is determined by factors such as text genre and text goal, the addressee, personal literary taste, specific attittudes towards prose and poetry and present and past, and different interpretations and valuations of the concepts of literary beauty on the one hand and rhetorical-practical usefulness on the other. All of these factors, which can adequately explain the differences between these authors, will (if relevant) be taken into account in the different sections of this chapter.

By focusing not only on the shared framework and discourse of the selected authors, but also on their personal agendas, this chapter casts light on the similarities and differences between notions of imitation in the first century AD. Building on the few studies concerning crosslinks between specific Greek and Latin authors, this chapter confirms the fact that the traditional distinction between Greeks and Romans fails to account for the remarkable correspondences in thought between them. On the basis of these correspondences, the authors discussed can also be arranged on the basis of parameters other than 'Greekness' and 'Romanness'.

On the one hand, we can group the like-minded critics Dionysius, Aelius Theon, Longinus and Pliny together, who all, in rather lofty language, adopt a remarkably aesthetic (and sometimes archaizing) approach of classical Greek literature for rhetorical-practical purposes. Seneca, who does not explictly address his mimetic approach and preferences in his *Letter to Lucilius* 84, is close to many of these authors (i.e. Dionysius, Aelius Theon and Longinus) in his conceptualisation of imitation as an activity of the soul. On the other hand, we can discern coherences between the views of Tacitus, Dio Chrysostom and Quintilian, who seem to insist on the usefulness of the corpus of Greek literature more than on its beauty – an approach which may well reflect a later stage in Roman Classicism.

5.2 AELIUS THEON'S *PROGYMNASMATA*

Aelius Theon's *Progymnasmata* is a technical Greek text concerning preliminary exercises to Greek rhetoric.[19] The attribution of the *Progymnasmata* to Aelius Theon is based upon the *Suda*, which has an entry by Hesychius for Aelius Theon of Alexandria, reportedly the author of a treatise on *progymnasmata*, several works on rhetoric and commentaries on Xenophon, Isocrates, and Demosthenes. This Aelius Theon of Alexandria is the 'leading candidate' for authorship of the *Progymnasmata*, as Kennedy claims.[20] Theon's *Progymnasmata* provides teachers in rhetoric with a series of rhetorical exercises for their students, in order to facilitate the transition from the instruction of the *grammatikos* to the training of the rhetorician.[21]

Theon's *Progymnasmata* cannot be dated with certainty, but many scholars suppose an early (i.e. first century AD) dating.[22] To Patillon, the most decisive evidence for a first-century origin is provided by the text's structure, which is remarkable when compared to other attestations of *progymnasmata*. Patillon observes that Aelius Theon places the exercise of *chreia* first, which is only in line with Suetonius' *On Grammarians and Rhetors* 25.4, but not with any other extant text. Heath, however, considers it possible that 'Theon's order, placing *chreia* first, was accepted by Athanasius, around the end of the fourth century'.[23] Heath also observes that 'Nicolaus discussed this order [i.e. the one adopted by Aelius Theon, M.S.] in the fifth century, and it is not self-evident that his discussion is purely antiquarian'.[24] In other words, the currency of Theon's *Progymnasmata* in late Antiquity – to which an Armenian translation of the treatise also testifies – is an important reason for Heath to assume

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[19] On *progymnasmata*, see e.g. Lausberg (2008), 532-546; Kraus (2005), who discusses the history of *progymnasmata* from the Hellenistic period to the twentieth century. There are three other Greek texts on the preliminary exercises to rhetoric, by pseudo-Hermogenes (third century), Aphthonius (fourth century), and Nicolaus of Myra (fifth century). Their texts are published in the *Rhetores Graeci* (ed. Spengel 1854-1856). For a discussion and English translation of these treatises, see Kennedy (2000). Heath (2002) provides an interesting discussion of the history of technical literature on rhetorical *progymnasmata*, and especially Theon's place in it. In Latin, we only have Quintilian's discussion (2.4) of twelf *primae exercitationes* in the education of grammar. On *progymnasmata* in Latin, see e.g. Bonner (1977), 250-276.

[20] Kennedy (2000), 1.

[21] Patillon (1997), xvii.

[22] Cf. e.g. Patillon (1997) and Kennedy (2000). For an overview of the discussion on the dating of Aelius Theon's work, see Stegemann (1934). I owe this reference to Heath (2002), 129, n. 1.

[23] Heath (2002), 144.

[24] *Ibid*.

a late, fifth-century AD date of composition. This assumption is based on the premise that early technical writings on rhetoric 'were preserved for functional reasons, and hence were likely to be lost when they were superseded'.[25]

To consider in depth whether Aelius Theon's *Progymnasmata* should be dated in the first or the fifth century, would be beyond the scope of this section. For now, it should be sufficient to note that Theon's particular interest in Greek writers from the Classical Period (and especially in Thucydides) may well reflect the classicising tendencies of the early Roman Empire.[26] Moreover, as we will soon see, Theon's conceptualisation of μίμησις indicates a close adherence to the ideas expressed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, to whom he also refers in *Progymnasmata* 14.[27] These observations strengthen the view that the *Progymnasmata* were conceived in the first century, and not, as Heath supposes, four centuries later.[28]

In his *Progymnasmata*, Aelius Theon discusses a range of classical Greek authors, such as Homer, Herodotus, Euripides, Thucydides, Philistus, Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes and Theopompus. His aim is to provide his students with material suited for rhetorical exercises, which, in turn, prepare for rhetorical practice.[29] Reading their works (i.e. reading aloud or listening to others reading) is one of the three pillars of imitation distinguished by Theon – the other two being the paraphrasing of models and oral presentation. The reason why Aelius Theon recommends these authors is twofold: in the first place, their works function as the 'nourishment of style' (τροφὴ λέξεως) and thus help to acquire a rich stock of words and ideas.[30] Secondly, they offer instructive material for exercises, and, as such, greatly

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[25] Heath (2002), 143.

[26] Theon also discusses Theopompus, Philistus and Ephorus, who, as Kennedy (2000), 1 rightly argues, 'are largely ignored by later rhetoricians'.

[27] The latest authors to whom Aelius Theon refers are Theodorus of Gadara and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Kennedy (2000), 1 argues that this indicates that 'he [i.e. Aelius Theon, M.S.] was writing no earlier than the late first century BC'. The *Progymnasmata* is probably earlier than Quintilian's *Institutio*, if we accept that Quintilian refers to Aelius Theon in 3.6.48 and 9.3.76.

[28] The objection that Dionysius was also read in the fifth century AD and that Aelius Theon in this way could have come to know Dionysius' ideas (cf. Heath (2002), 11), does not offer a satisfactory explanation for Theon's classicising approach of Greek literature, which is particularly characteristic of the early Roman Empire.

[29] Cf. Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 60.1-3: ὡς δὲ καὶ παντελῶς εἰσιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύναμιν ἀναλαμβάνουσιν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄδηλον ('that they [i.e. different exercises, M.S.] are quite necessary for those acquiring the art of oratory, that too is obvious'). These exercises differ in degree of difficulty and are carried out either individually or collectively.

[30] Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 61.31. The idea that reading does not only serve the acquisition of stylistic competence, but also that of 'an abundance of ideas' (τῶν διανοημάτων τὸ πλῆθος), is expressed in *Progymn*. 62.5-6. On the

contribute to a skilful rhetorical performance. Thus, 'usefulness' in the *Progymnasmata* has a formative-stylistic as well as a practical connotation.

With respect to the formation of style, Aelius Theon, like Dionysius, adopts an aesthetic approach of imitation. Virtues like 'purity of language' (τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν καθαρόν), a 'harmonious composition' (σύνθεσις ἡρμοσμένη) and 'urbanity of sound' (ἀκρόασις ἀστεία) are summarised as 'the beauties of the art of rhetoric' (τῶν ἐν τῇ ῥητορικῇ καλῶν), which should be observed, imitated and trained during daily exercises, in order to 'be of use' (cf. χρήσιμον) for those who are going to engage in rhetoric.[31] In the *Progymnasmata*, models (παραδείγματα) are three times designated as 'beautiful' (καλά), for instance in a passage which is devoted to the representation of character:[32]

> Προσωποποιΐας δὲ τί ἂν εἴη παράδειγμα κάλλιον τῆς Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως καὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων καὶ τῶν Μενάνδρου δραμάτων;[33]

> What would be a more beautiful example of representation of character than (speeches in) the poetry of Homer and the dialogues of Plato and other Socratics and the dramas of Menander?

In this passage, Theon's insistence on the beauty of models is not the only parallel with Dionysius. Also his arrangement of names reminds us of Dionysius' reading lists: the great Homer comes as the first poetic model for προσωποποιΐα, whereas Menander (who is also one

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twofold meaning of the usefulness (i.e. formative-stylistic and rhetorical-practical) of the discussion of different authors, cf. also Patillon (1997), xcix: 'Quant au bénéfice à attendre de ces lectures, il concerne sans doute le vocabulaire, mais plus généralement le style et avant cela la connaissance des éléments développés dans les discours, leur organisation et les procédés de leur mise en oeuvre. En même temps l'exercice de lecture est un entraînement à l'action oratoire, qui prépare à l'exercice public de la parole'.

[31] Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 62.6-8.

[32] Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 62.6-8. The imitation of aesthetic virtues of style also plays an important role in other passages in Aelius Theon's *Progymnasmata*. Words pertaining to 'beauty' occur almost 50 times. 'Models' (παραδείγματα) are also designated as 'beautiful' (καλά) in two other passages: *Progymn*. 61.32-33: τυπούμενοι γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ καλῶν παραδειγμάτων κάλλιστα καὶ μιμησόμεθα ('we imitate most beautifully when our mind has been stamped by beautiful examples'); *Progymn*. 66.16-18: διηγήσεως δὲ παραδείγματα ἂν εἴη κάλλιστα τῶν μὲν μυθικῶν ἢ Πλάτωνος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς Πολιτείας περὶ τοῦ δακτυλίου τοῦ Γύγου ('the most beautiful examples of narration of the mythical sort would be those by Plato in the second book of the *Republic* on the ring of Gyges').

[33] Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 68.22-25.

of the literary champions of Dio and Quintilian) closes the list.[34] Likewise, in Dionysius (and Quintilian), Menander, the great figurehead of comic poetry, closes the row in which Homer takes place as the first poet to be imitated.

Theon does not differentiate between μίμησις and ζῆλος, but seems to use the verb μιμήσασθαι to refer to the process of imitation and emulation as a whole – just as Dionysius mostly does.[35] It is evident that Theon does not have a purely technical and rational mimetic process in mind, but one in which one's natural abilities are also involved. In fact, he is of the opinion that innate capacities should be augmented and complemented with exercises:

> […] πειρατέον τὰ μὲν φυσικὰ πλεονεκτήματα αὔξειν, τὰ δὲ ἐλλείποντα ταῖς ἀσκήσεσιν ἀναπληροῦν […].[36]

> We should try to augment natural advantages and fill in deficiencies with exercises.

Theon's goal is to encourage his students to achieve rhetorical versatility and concentrate not only on great subjects, as did Aeschines, or only on small subjects, as did Lysias, but to have 'preparation for both, as did Demosthenes' (πρὸς ἀμφότερα παρασκευὴν […], ὡς Δημοσθένης).[37] His insistence on rhetorical versatility is also reflected in his recommendation to read a wide variety of models – an idea to which also Dionysius, as we have seen, strongly adheres. The old-Armenian translation of parts of Theon's *Progymnasmata*, for the content of which I must rely on the French translation of Patillon, contains a passage on the need of eclecticism and personal adaptation in the process of imitation:

> 'Lorsque quelqu'un admire ce qu'il y a de bon chez tous et entreprend d'y conformer sa pensée, du fait qu'il existe en lui une sorte de matrice du discours, que chacun peut modeler d'après sa propre nature, il ne se voit pas contraint à fixer les yeux sur un style, mais il acquiert spontanément à son usage personnel une part de tous ces biens'.[38]

In language which is strongly reminiscent of the sculptural metaphor used by Dionysius to describe μίμησις, Aelius Theon makes it clear that imitation is about a personal modelling of a

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[34] For Menander in Dionysius and Quintilian, see e.g. section 4.4.

[35] The verb μιμήσασθαι occurs twice: see Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 61.33; 71.1.

[36] Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 72.20-22.

[37] Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 72.23-24.

[38] Patillon (1997), 105.

'matrix of speech', which consists of the best characteristics of different models.[39] Moreover, imitation involves a conformation of the imitator's mind to what is good in a wide variety of authors. These two crucial elements, of modelling and mental conformation, are echoed in two other passages. The language of modelling recurs in a passage concerning the pedagogical method of ἀνάγνωσις ('reading aloud'):[40]

> […] τυπούμενοι γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ καλῶν παραδειγμάτων κάλλιστα καὶ μιμησόμεθα […].[41]

> […] we will imitate most beautifully when our mind has been stamped by beautiful examples.

Here, an artistic activity (see τυπούμενοι) has the 'soul' (ψυχή) as its direct object, not a matrix or 'standard' of speech, as is the case in the French translation of the old-Armenian text of the *Progymnasmata*.[42]

The image of mental conformation recurs when Aelius Theon elaborates on the internalisation of the fundaments provided by classical models:

> Ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα οἱονεὶ θεμέλια πάσης τῆς τῶν λόγων ἰδέας, καὶ ὡς ἂν αὐτά τις ὑπάγηται τῇ τῶν νέων ψυχῇ, ἀνάγκη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν […].[43]

> These [i.e. the various exercices taken from the literary models discussed, M.S.] are, as it were, the foundation of every kind of discourse, and depending on how one instills them in the soul of the young, necessarily the results make themselves felt in the same way later.

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[39] Cf. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti, discussed in sections 2.2.1 and 3.3.1.

[40] Cf. Bompaire (1958), 42, who points to the connection between this passage in Aelius Theon and Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 1.2. Cf. also Cizek (1994), 42, who points to the connection between this passage in Aelius Theon and Dionysius' emphasis on the contemplation of beautiful models in his story on the ugly farmer (*Imit*. 1.2).

[41] Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 61.32-33. Hunter (2014), 20, n. 1 observes: 'Theon is here very close to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Imitation*'.

[42] Cf. Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 13.

[43] Ael. Th. *Progymn*. 70.29-31.

The similarities with Dionysius' image of a 'stream' (ῥεῦμα) which the imitator 'canalises into his soul' (εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν μετοχετεύσῃ) are striking, and may well be explained by assuming that Aelius Theon was familiar with Dionysius' conceptualisation of imitation, and/or drew from and contributed to the same discourse of imitation as he did.[44]

We may conclude that for Aelius Theon – as for Dionysius –, the process of imitation as a whole involves more than artfully creating something new to the likeness of models: it comprises mental engagement with, conformation to and even integration of these models, in order to compose a beautiful, new text which is in accordance with one's own nature.[45]

5.3 SENECA'S *LETTER TO LUCILIUS* 84

Seneca's *Letter to Lucilius* 84 is a private epistle addressed to his friend Lucilius, in which the process and purpose of careful reading and writing are discussed. It is generally assumed that Seneca composed this and the other letters to Lucilius in his final years – that means, in the period 63-65 AD.[46] Many of Seneca's letters are characterised by a similar structure, presenting a concrete event – for instance a voyage, as in *Letter* 84 – as the direct occasion and justification of philosophically inspired reflections on subjects of very diverse nature. The general character of the letters can thus be considered essayistic rather than personal; the addressee Lucilius is often mentioned by name, but, as Gummere observes, 'his identity is secondary to the main purpose'.[47] This is also true for the addressees of Dionysius' 'letter-essays': Pompeius (*Letter to Pompeius*), Ammaeus (*Two Letters to Ammaeus*), as well as for

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[44] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.3. Cf. Plut. *Aem.* 1.3: τὰς τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ δοκιμωτάτων μνήμας ὑποδεχομένους ἀεὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ('always receiving in the soul the records of the noblest and most estimable characters') (tr. adapted from Perrin 1918). Whitmarsh (2001), 55-57 briefly discusses Plutarch's idea of μίμησις as a process of 'receiving' (ὑποδεχομένους) good exemplars into the soul. He argues that through this mental reception models get 'an actual physical presence' (*ibid.*, 55). For Dionysius' conception of μίμησις as embodiment of models, see Wiater (2011), 92: '*Mimesis* describes both the process by which classical *ethos* is acquired through reading and by which it is enacted through composing Classical texts. Dionysius ascribes to language an almost physical immediacy […]'.

[45] Cf. Patillon (1997), xcix: '[…] il [i.e. Aelius Theon, M.S.] indique aussi que l'imitation n'est pas une pure copie des modèles, mais une assimilation qui permet à chacun de modeler son propre style d'après sa propre nature. C'est, en condensé, la même théorie que celle qu'on lit dans l'exposé du traité sur l'*Imitation* de Denys d'Halicarnasse et dans le chapitre (10, 2) que Quintilien consacre au même sujet'.

[46] See e.g. Gummere (1917), xi.

[47] Gummere (1917), xii.

Demetrius (the addressee of *On Imitation*). In the works addressed to them, personal affairs are overshadowed by literary-critical issues.[48]

'Imitation' is the central topic of *Letter* 84. Seneca does not explicate what kind of imitation he is writing about: rhetorical, literary or philosophical imitation. One passage, however, reveals that he must have been thinking of rhetorical imitation in particular:

> *"Quid ergo? Non intellegetur, cuius imiteris orationem, cuius argumentationem, cuius sententias?"*[49]

> "What," you say, "will it not be seen whose speech you are imitating, whose method of reasoning, whose pungent sayings?"

What texts should be the objects of imitation, is not clear from Seneca's words. He recommends reading literature in general, without distinguishing between prose and poetry, or between literary genres. Hence, we may infer that he advocates the imitation of all useful sorts of literature within a rhetorical context. His quote of Vergil's *Georgics* (84.3) also points to this.

As we will see in this section, the most important message that Seneca conveys in *Letter* 84 is that the process of imitation ideally consists of two phases: 1) the eclectic assemblage of the best virtues of a wide variety of literary models, and 2) the digestion and internalisation of these virtues in order to compose an original and harmonious literary unity. Seneca does not distinguish between *imitari* and *aemulari* in his *Letter* 84.[50] Only the verb *imitari* occurs in *Letter* 84, and in both of the two cases in a sentence which exhorts the reader to 'follow the example of the bees' (*apes [...] imitari*), whose behaviour, as Seneca says, stands model for the successive stages within the process of imitation.[51] Thus, the verb *imitari*

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[48] The term 'letter-essay' is adopted from Stirewalt (1991), who argues that letters such as Dionysius' were intended to be read by a wider audience.

[49] Sen. *Ep.* 84.8.

[50] It is remarkable that also Tacitus does not distinguish between *imitatio* and *aemulatio* in his *Dialogue on Oratory* (section 5.6) – nor does Dio in *Oration* 18 (section 5.7), but he differentiates between μίμησις and ζῆλος in many other works. As I see it, the lack of distinction between literary *imitatio* and *aemulatio* and μίμησις and ζῆλος can be explained by the fact that the subject of imitation is not discussed in a critical, theoretical way.

[51] Sen. *Ep.* 84.3: *apes, ut aiunt, debemus imitari* ('we should follow, men say, the example of the bees'); *Ep.* 84.5: *nos quoque has apes debemus imitari* ('we also ought to copy these bees'). For the reception of Seneca's image of the bees in the Renaissance (esp. in Petrarca), see Jansen (2008), 279-284.

in Seneca's *Letter* 84 does not pertain to the actual imitation of literary masterpieces, but to the imitation of those reputedly involved in a rather comparable process: the honeybees.

Seneca complicates his analogy with the bees somewhat by referring to two different explanations for the origin of honey.[52] The first depends on what people say happens in India, namely that honey as such is produced by a dew particularly characteristic of that climate. This sediment of honey is reputedly gathered by bees from the leaves of reed. Hence, in this version, in which traces of the concept of πνεῦμα (a composite of the elements air and fire (warmth), i.e. ἀήρ) can be seen, honey is not the result of the fermentation of nectar by bees, but a purely natural and unprocessed product from heaven. Thus, the bees need only gather the honey from the leaves of reed. Remarkably enough, Seneca does not dismiss this explanation, which consequently keeps resonating and surrounds the process of imitation with an air of divine miraculousness and inspiration, even when a more probable alternative is offered.[53] According to this explanation, honey is obtained by 'storage and conservation' (*conditura et dispositione*) as well as 'fermentation' (*fermento*) of what the bees 'have culled from the most delicate of blooming and flowering plants' (*ex tenerrimis virentium florentiumque decerpserint*).[54]

Seneca transposes this latter explanation to the field of literature, arguing that the imitative production of a harmonious blend of literary virtues requires the tough efforts exhibited by the bees. In using this bee simile for the imitative production of literature, Seneca is certainly not alone. The image of bees ranging among different flowers and plants is a true *topos,* already used by Pindar to refer to the imitative production of a new piece of literature, but also very prominent in e.g. Plato's *Ion*, Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo*, Lucretius, Horace's *Ode* 4.2 and in the fourth book of Vergil's *Georgics*, at least if one is willing to interpret this didactic poem metaphorically.[55] Like the bees, we must, Seneca urges, make a good selection of works to be imitated:

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[52] Sen. *Ep*. 84.4.

[53] Seneca's refusal to reject the first version of the spontaneous origin of honey explicitly is somewhat confusing, especially since the idea of being free from efforts of processing recurs when Seneca discusses the processing of food in our stomach, which happens naturally and 'without any labour' (*sine ulla opera nostra*, *Ep*. 84.6). In many other passages, however, Seneca underscores the importance of 'constant effort' (*adsidua intentio*, *Ep*. 84.11). An explanation for this apparent contradiction may be that Seneca sometimes considers our soul a separate entity, which naturally digests the spiritual food without needing our supervision, whereas in most cases, he conceives of 'we' and 'our soul' as collaborating parts.

[54] Sen. *Ep*. 84.4.

[55] Pind. *Pyth*. 10.53-54; Pl. *Ion*; Call. *Ap*. 110-112; Lucr. *DRN* 3.11-12; Hor. *Od*. 4.2.25-32; Verg. *G*. 4.

[...] quaecumque ex diversa lectione congessimus, separare [...], deinde adhibita ingenii nostri cura et facultate in unum saporem varia illa libamenta confundere [...].[56]

[We must, M.S.] sift whatever we have gathered from a varied course of reading […], then, by applying the supervising care with which our nature has endowed us, […] we should blend those several flavours into one delicious compound.

Thus, imitation requires 'constant effort' (*adsidua intentio*) and can be considered a skilful digestion and unification of various literary materials.

As we have seen, the image of the soul plays an important role in the conceptualisation of imitation in Dionysius and Aelius Theon. In Seneca's *Letter* 84, the activity of reception and internalisation of the best paradigms of literature is accomplished by what he calls our 'mind' (*ingenium*, also called *animus*).[57] The philosophical notions of *ingenium* and *animus*, the exact meaning of which is not easy to grasp, play a crucial role in Seneca's conception of imitation.

The four different renderings by Gummere for *ingenium* in *Letter* 84 (i.e. 'mind', 'nature', 'higher nature' and 'reasoning power') are clear indications of the elusiveness of the term.[58] Its meaning becomes even more puzzling when Seneca all of a sudden substitutes it with the term *animus* in the second part of *Letter* 84.[59] *Letter* 114, which deals with different literary styles, reveals that Seneca conceives of *ingenium* and *animus* as two distinctive, but closely 'interwoven' (*permixtum*) psychological entities.[60] The former (*ingenium*) pertains to our speaking ability, which can be seen as the embodiment of the latter, our 'mind' (*animus*).[61] As Graver puts it, *ingenium* 'provides a means to observe the character of the *animus* […]'.[62]

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[56] Sen. *Ep*. 84.5. For the idea of a mixture of the best literary qualities of models, cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 5.7. Of course, the comparison with bees gathering their nectar falls short in that nectar is a product of nature, while the literary masterpieces of yore are not.

[57] The word *ingenium* occurs in Sen. *Ep*. 84.1, 5, 6, 7.

[58] Gummere (1920).

[59] The word *animus* occurs in Sen. *Ep*. 84. 7, 10. It is used in the second part of the letter, whereas *ingenium* appears in the first part.

[60] Sen. *Ep*. 114.3.

[61] Cf. Graver (2014), 281: '*ingenium* does sometimes refer to one's intellectual aptitude in a broad sense, and with qualifiers added it may also indicate other aspects of temperament; a *saevum ingenium*, for instance, is a

In *Letter* 84, *ingenium* and *animus* both refer to the deepest layers of our intellect, but we should note that there is a subtle difference. *Ingenium* can fulfill different roles within the process of mimetic nourishment: it can be nourished by reading (cf. *alit lectio ingenium*, 84.1 / *his, quibus aluntur ingenia*, 84.6), but it also contributes to digestion after reading (cf. *adhibita ingenii nostri cura*, 84.5). When the term *animus* appears, the scope of *imitatio* is broadened; *animus* is an ordering principle, used with respect to the storage (cf. *abscondat*, 84.8) and presentation (cf. *ostendat*, *ibid*.) of 'all things by which it [i.e. *animus*, M.S.] has been aided' (*omnia, quibus est adiutus, ibid*.). These things include the following:

> *Talem animum nostrum esse volo; multae in illo artes, multa praecepta sint, multarum aetatum exempla, sed in unum conspirata.*[63]

> I want our mind to be like this; many arts, many precepts, and examples taken from many epochs of history should form part of it, but all should blend into one.

Seneca combines the idea of *ingenium* and *animus* which internalise the influence of different models with the metaphor of spiritual nourishment and digestion, to which, as we have seen, also Aelius Theon pays attention, and which can also be found in Quintilian. While emphasising the importance of careful and repeated reading, the latter urges his readers to 'let their reading be made available for memory and imitation, not in an undigested form, but, as it were, softened and pulverised by frequent repetition' (*lectio non cruda sed multa iteratione mollita et velut confecta memoriae imitationique tradatur*).[64] According to Seneca, however, 'reading nourishes the mind' (*alit lectio ingenium*), which, in turn, has to digest what has been read, lest it becomes a 'burden' (*onus*):[65]

> *Quod in corpore nostro videmus sine ulla opera nostra facere naturam: alimenta, quae accepimus, quamdiu in sua qualitate perdurant et solida innatant stomacho, onera sunt; at cum ex eo, quod erant, mutata sunt, tum demum in vires et in sanguinem transeunt. Idem in his, quibus aluntur ingenia, praestemus, ut quaecumque*

warlike temperament. But in Seneca it often refers much more narrowly to a person's rhetorical and literary abilities as demonstrated in actual pieces of writing'.

[62] Graver (2014), 283.

[63] Sen. *Ep*. 84.10-11.

[64] Quint. 10.1.19. Cf. Quint. 10.1.58 for another metaphor of food.

[65] Sen. *Ep*. 84.1. The activity of reading stimulates the imitator's *iudicium* and *cogitatio* – terms which Seneca applies in the first lines of his letter. On the burden of undigested food, see Sen. *Ep*. 84.6.

hausimus, non patiamur integra esse, ne aliena sint. Concoquamus illa; alioqui in memoriam ibunt, non in ingenium. Adsentiamur illis fideliter et nostra faciamus, ut unum quiddam fiat ex multis [...].[66]

> This is what we see nature doing in our own bodies without any labour on our part; the food we have eaten, as long as it retains its original quality and floats in our stomachs as an undiluted mass, is a burden; but it passes into force and blood only when it has been changed from its original form. So it is with the food that nourishes our mind, – we should see to it that whatever we have absorbed should not be allowed to remain unchanged, or it will be no part of us. We must digest it; otherwise it will merely enter the memory and not the mind. Let us loyally welcome such foods and make them our own, so that something that is one may be formed out of many elements […].

For Seneca, entrance of literary food into the 'memory' (*memoria*) is not sufficient for original imitation; Quintilian advises that through a process of thorough digestion 'reading should be made available to memory and imitation' (*lectio [...] memoriae imitationique tradatur*). The difference between Quintilian and Seneca may be explained by pointing to the context of Quintilian's advice. He is concerned with novice students in oratory who should learn to form their own opinions in response to reading literature. In this primary stage of their training, *imitatio* – which means basic repetition – is an essential part of the curriculum, whereas the requirement of originality is embedded in the program for the advanced student, who pursues *aemulatio*. By contrast, Seneca is addressing his younger friend Lucilius.

Food is not only used by Seneca as an image for the wide range of literature that has to become an inherent part of our mind. Also the final product of our digestion of literature is portrayed in terms of nourishment. What we have to compose from all different literary ingredients is a harmonious meal, of which every single component may or may not be recognizable.[67] By implication, the process of imitation is seen as an endless chain; after

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[66] Sen. *Ep*. 84.6-7.

[67] Cf. Sen. *Ep*. 84.5: *[...] ut etiam si apparuerit, unde sumptum sit, aliud tamen esse quam unde sumptum est, appareat* ('even though it [i.e. the new composition, M.S.] betrays its origin, yet it nevertheless is clearly a different thing from that whence it came'); *Ep*. 84.8: *puto aliquando ne intellegi quidem posse, si imago vera sit; haec enim omnibus, quae ex quo velut exemplari traxit, formam suam inpressit, ut in unitatem illa conpetant* ('I think that sometimes it is impossible for it to be seen who is being imitated, if the copy is a true one; for a true copy stamps its own form upon all the features which it has drawn from what we may call the original, in such a way that they are combined into a unity').

having digested the delicacies from a rich variety of banquets, every respectable author will himself prepare an original and harmonious 'compound' (*saporem*) to be digested by others.[68]

Seneca's insistence on the originality of the imitator's composition is strengthened by the analogy of the relationship between a father and son. Although a son's physiognomy often resembles that of his father, he is no dead copy (*imago [...] mortua*) of him, but instead a living variation with unique features. When we transpose this to the field of literature, it means that even when traces of likeness with the literary paragon are perceivable (which is not a *conditio sine qua non*), the newly composed work should – as is in accordance with nature – bear the true sign of individuality and originality.[69]

This way of conceiving the process of imitation is reminiscent of the introductory story on the ugly farmer which precedes the Greek reading list in Dionysius' treatise *On imitation*.[70] Here, the figure of the father does not symbolise the whole complex of literary models, but the imitator (i.e. the farmer) himself, whose relationship with his children is one of complete dissimilarity. His children, like amalgams, mirror the beauty of the different models which were at the disposition of the farmer's wife, but they do not exactly match with any one of them in particular. Thus, for Seneca as for Dionysius, new texts are unique variations on a variety of congenital themes.

According to Seneca, however, originality is not the only characteristic of a good composition. In his *Letter* 84, an even more prominent role is reserved for the requirement of unity. We have seen that Seneca emphasises the notion of unity by the analogy of a balanced meal consisting of a wide variety of ingredients, but he also elaborates on it by sketching a picture of a choir 'which the old-time philosophers knew' (*quem veteres philosophi noverant*), the blended sound of which arises from the multiplicity of separate voices and instruments:

> *Non vides, quam multorum vocibus chorus constet? Unus tamen ex omnibus redditur; aliqua illic acuta est, aliqua gravis, aliqua media. Accedunt viris feminae, interponuntur tibiae. Singulorum illic latent voces, omnium apparent.*[71]

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[68] Sen. *Ep*. 84.5.

[69] Cf. the brief discussion of *Letter* 84 by Henderson (2004), 46-47, who argues with respect to Seneca's analogy of the relationship between a father and son: 'we are to put *our* raw materials under wraps, and show up our *product* instead. Even if admiration fixes deep in you the 'likeness' of a paragon […]'.

[70] For this story, see section 1.3.

[71] Sen. *Ep*. 84.9-10.

Do you not see how many voices there are in a chorus? Yet out of them all only one voice results. In that chorus one voice takes the tenor, another the bass, another the baritone. There are women, too, as well as men, and the flute is mingled with them. In that chorus the voices of the individual singers are hidden; what we hear is the voices of all together.

All these different vocal and instrumental sounds from the past represent various literary models from different periods of time, which can be made to resonate simultaneously in a new, harmonious text.[72] Seen in this way, Seneca's *Letter* 84, with its accumulation of allusions, analogies and metaphors, is itself a patchwork of reminiscences of a wide range of Greek and Latin texts.

5.4 LONGINUS' *ON THE SUBLIME*

As much as we know of Seneca, as little do we know of the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*.[73] Of the most important, tenth-century manuscript of the treatise, a meagre sixty percent has come down to us. The copyist of this manuscript (Parisinus 2036), a Byzantine scholar, probably copied an anonymous text of *On the Sublime*, which urged him to speculate on its authorship. His manuscript has in the title 'Dionysius Longinus' and in the table of contents 'Dionysius or Longinus', two authors of critical treatises on rhetoric whom the copyist apparently regarded as plausible candidates for authorship of *On the Sublime*. Dionysius should be identified as 'our' Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whereas the name of Longinus refers to the third-century author Cassius Longinus.

It has often been argued that both options are implausible.[74] Considering the style of *On the Sublime*, Dionysius is unlikely to be the author of the treatise. The same holds true for Cassius Longinus, whose aesthetic views are not in line with the ideas expressed in *On the Sublime*. Heath, however, did not accept this conclusion. He thoroughly re-examined all

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[72] Here again, Seneca applies a metaphor commonly used to describe the euphony of great works of literature.

[73] The following information on date and authorship of *On the Sublime* is mainly based on Russell (1964), xxii-xxx.

[74] On date and authorship of *On the Sublime*, see further e.g. Crossett & Arieti (1975); Fyfe & Russell (1995), 145-148; Heath (1999).

available arguments, on the basis of which he designated Cassius Longinus as the author.[75] His article, however, did not enjoy undivided acclaim.

As De Jonge, reacting to Heath's dating, makes clear, 'one of the most important arguments against the authorship of Cassius Longinus is the final chapter of *Peri hupsous*: the discussion of the decline of rhetoric fits the first rather than the third century C.E., and the reference to "the world's peace" […] suits the Augustan period rather than the third century C.E.'.[76] Thus, since Dionysius is not a likely candidate, we are invited to suppose a first-century author, whom we refer to by the name Longinus for convenience.[77] In line with De Jonge's claim that there is a remarkable continuity between the critical discourse of the concept of the 'sublime' in Dionysius and Longinus, we will see that the Platonic-inspired conceptualisation of the process of imitation in both critics is also in remarkable accordance, and may well confirm the idea of a first-century date of Longinus' activity.

The treatise *On the Sublime* is framed as a polemical response to a work written by the Augustan critic Caecilius of Caleacte. This work by Caecilius is lost, but judging from the words of Longinus, it was a technical treatise (τεχνολογία, 1.1) on the sublime which did not live up to its practical purposes.[78] Longinus argues that it merely showed what the sublime is, not in what ways the sublime could be obtained.[79] By contrast, Longinus sets his mind on showing his otherwise unknown Roman addressee, the young man (cf. ὦ νεανία, 15.1) Postumius Terentianus, how the sublime should be defined, and on fulfilling the pragmatic aspirations that Caecilius in his opinion could not accomplish: he shows his readers the ways which lead to the sublime, one of which is, as we will see, μίμησις.[80] In spite of the lofty and almost poetic style which he uses to describe such concepts as genius and divine inspiration, Longinus announces his treatise *On the Sublime* as a 'notebook' (ὑπόμνημα, cf. ὑπομνηματίσασθαι, 1.2) which is supposed to be 'of value for public speakers' (ἀνδράσι πολιτικοῖς […] χρήσιμον, *ibid*.) who want to achieve sublimity of style.[81]

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[75] Heath (1999).

[76] De Jonge (2012), 273, n. 5.

[77] Following common practice, I will use this name for the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*.

[78] For the relationship between Longinus and Caecilius of Caleacte, see Innes (2002). She exploits evidence from Tiberius' *On Figures in Demosthenes*, which has been influenced by Caecilius' treatise.

[79] Longin. *Subl*. 1.1.

[80] Fyfe & Russell (1995), 148 suggest that Postumius Terentianus is the Terentianus who served in Egypt in 85/86 AD (cf. Martial 1.86), or the man whose name is on a lead water pipe of the second century (C.I.L. XV.2.7373). This, however, is mere speculation.

[81] Longin. *Subl*. 1.1. Cf. also *Subl*. 36.1: οὐκοῦν ἐπί γε τῶν ἐν λόγοις μεγαλοφυῶν, ἐφ᾽ ὧν οὐκέτ᾽ ἔξω

What, then, does sublimity mean, and how is it related to imitation? In a *praeteritio*, Longinus argues that the wide knowledge of his addressee Postumius Terentianus eliminates the need to elaborate on 'how the sublime consists in a consummate excellence and distinction of language and that this alone gave to the greatest poets and prose writers their preeminence and clothed them with immortal fame' (ὡς ἀκρότης καὶ ἐξοχή τις λόγων ἐστὶ τὰ ὕψη, καὶ ποιητῶν τε οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ συγγραφέων οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἐπρώτευσαν καὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν περιέβαλον εὐκλείαις τὸν αἰῶνα).[82] To Longinus, this excellence and distinction of language is brilliantly shown by Homer, Demosthenes and Plato, whose sublimity of style should be the focus of our imitation:

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν διαπονῶμεν ὑψηγορίας τι καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης δεόμενον, καλὸν ἀναπλάττεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πῶς ἂν εἰ τύχοι ταὐτὸ τοῦθ᾽ Ὅμηρος εἶπεν, πῶς δ᾽ ἂν Πλάτων ἢ Δημοσθένης ὕψωσαν ἢ ἐν ἱστορίᾳ Θουκυδίδης.[83]

> We too, then, when we are working at some passage that demands sublimity of expression and greatness of mind, should do well to form in our souls the question, 'how might Homer have said this same thing, how would Plato or Demosthenes or (in history) Thucydides have made it sublime'?

From this statement, we can deduce two important things. In the first place, for Longinus, sublimity is not restricted to any genre in particular: it can be found in all manifestations of literature. In the second place, imitation serves the concept of the sublime. This is made explicit by Longinus in the following passage:

> Ἐνδείκνυται δ᾽ ἡμῖν οὗτος ἀνήρ, εἰ βουλοίμεθα μὴ κατολιγωρεῖν, ὡς καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ τείνει. Ποία δὲ καὶ τίς αὕτη; Τῶν ἔμπροσθεν μεγάλων συγγραφέων καὶ ποιητῶν μίμησίς τε καὶ ζήλωσις. Καί γε τούτου, φίλτατε, ἀπρὶξ ἐχώμεθα τοῦ σκοποῦ […].[84]

> Here is an author [i.e. Plato, M.S.] who shows us, if we choose not to ignore it, that there is another road, besides those we have mentioned, which leads to sublimity.

τῆς χρείας καὶ ὠφελείας πίπτει τὸ μέγεθος ('in dealing, then, with writers of genius, whose grandeur is of a kind that comes within the limits of use and profit').

[82] Longin. *Subl*. 1.3.

[83] Longin. *Subl*. 14.1. On the same authors (except for Thucydides), cf. *Subl*. 36.2.

[84] Longin. *Subl*. 13.2. This passage is also briefly discussed in section 2.2.1.

What and what manner of road is this? Imitation and emulation of the great prose writers and poets of the past. That is the aim, dear friend; let us hold to it with all our might.

Not only the idea of blurring poetry and prose in the selection phase of imitation, but also the emphasis on eminence as the ultimate goal of all imitative efforts, is in line with the message that Dionysius puts forward in his treatise *On Imitation*.

Before turning to Longinus' notions of μίμησίς and ζήλωσις, it is important to examine what the sublime, to which i.a. imitation should lead, encompasses.[85] 'Sublimity' is obviously not a qualification of the grand style (as opposed to the middle and plain style). Rather, the sublime is, in the words of Russell, a 'special effect', which inspires the author and makes the audience ecstatic.[86] Since sublimity does not depend on register of style, it can be found in the eminent works of Homer and Plato, but also in a simple utterance of Moses in *Genesis*.[87] What makes expressions sublime, is the author's sharp sense for 'the appropriate moment' (καιρός) to use them in order to enchant the audience and carry it away.[88] The impact of the sublime is often unexpected like a thunderbolt – a metaphor by which Longinus illustrates the

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[85] For a thorough discussion of the essence of the sublime, see e.g. Porter (2012), who designates the sublime not as an 'aesthetic value', but as a 'measure of thought pressed to its utmost limits' (*ibid*., 68).

[86] Russell (1964), 37. Interestingly, in Dionysius, the term ὕψος can be used to describe 'the general style of a longer passage', as De Jonge (2012), 284 makes clear. However, Dionysius too 'knows something similar to the sublime effect that is Longinus' concern' (*ibid*.), since he distinguishes 'sublimity' (ὕψος) as one of the ancillary qualities of style which implicates a strong involvement of the audience. As a striking example, De Jonge (2012) cites a passage (*ibid*., 284-285) in which Dionysius argues why Lysias' style is *not* sublime or grand, 'nor has the power to grip the listener's attention, and to keep it in rapt suspense' (οὐδὲ ἀφὰς ἔχει καὶ τόνους ἰσχυροὺς, *Lys*. 13.4). On the relation between Dionysius' and Longinus' conception of the sublime, see further Porter (2016), 235-245.

[87] For the words of Moses, see Longin. *Subl.* 9.9: "εἶπεν ὁ θεός," φησί· τί; "γενέσθω φῶς, καὶ ἐγένετο· γενέσθω γῆ, καὶ ἐγένετο" ("God said"—what? 'let there be light,' and there was light, 'Let there be earth,' and there was earth.").

[88] On the concept of καιρός in Longinus, cf. Innes (2002), 67. For the effects upon the audience, see e.g. Longin. *Subl.* 1.4: οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθὼ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ' εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ· πάντη δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν ἀεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ θαυμάσιον [...] ('for the effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves. Invariably what inspires wonder, with its power of amazing us, always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing'); Longin. *Subl.* 30.1: ἡ τῶν κυρίων καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκλογὴ θαυμαστῶς ἄγει καὶ κατακηλεῖ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ('the choice of the right word and the fine word has a marvellously moving and seductive effect upon an audience').

magnificent ferocity of Demosthenes.[89] However, the element of abruptness may also be absent, as is shown by Cicero, whose sublime style burns like 'a spreading fire' (ἀμφιλαφής τις ἐμπρησμός).[90] Also crucial for understanding the concept of the sublime is the element of 'risk': in trying to reach the peaks of sublimity, one has to confront the ever-looming danger of falling down, unlike those who decide to stay on firm ground:

> […] μήποτε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ, τὸ τὰς μὲν ταπεινὰς καὶ μέσας φύσεις διὰ τὸ μηδαμῆ παρακινδυνεύειν μηδὲ ἐφίεσθαι τῶν ἄκρων ἀναμαρτήτους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀσφαλεστέρας διαμένειν, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα ἐπισφαλῆ δι' αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος.[91]

> Perhaps it is inevitable that humble, mediocre natures, because they never run any risks and never aim at the heights, should remain to a large extent safe from error, while in great natures their very greatness spells danger.

How, then, do μίμησις and ζήλωσις, which are presented as 'another way' (ἄλλη τις […] ὁδός, 13.2) leading to the sublime, fit into Longinus' general scheme of five 'sources' (πηγαί) of the sublime? Let us start with the sources. Longinus distinguishes 1) 'the power of grand conceptions' (τὸ περὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἁδρεπήβολον), 2) 'the inspiration of vehement emotion' (τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν πάθος), 3) 'the proper construction of figures' (ἥ τε ποιὰ τῶν σχημάτων πλάσις), 4) 'nobility of language' (ἡ γενναία φράσις), and 5) 'dignified and elevated word-arrangement' (ἡ ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ διάρσει σύνθεσις).[92] It is evident that 'imitation' cannot be seen as an equal counterpart of these five categories, forming, as it were,

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[89] Longin. *Subl.* 12.4.

[90] *Ibid.* For the metaphor of thunder and lightning used to describe the overwhelming and ardent power of rhetorical sublimity in Longinus, see *Subl.* 1.4: ὕψος δέ που καιρίως ἐξενεχθὲν τά τε πράγματα δίκην σκηπτοῦ πάντα διεφόρησε ('a well-timed flash of sublimity shatters everything like a bolt of lightning'); *Subl.* 12.4: ὁ μὲν ἡμέτερος διὰ τὸ μετὰ βίας ἕκαστα ἔτι δὲ τάχους ῥώμης δεινότητος οἷον καίειν τε ἅμα καὶ διαρπάζειν σκηπτῷ [in deviation from Fyfe & Russell (1995), who read σκηπρῷ, M.S.] τινι παρεικάζοιτ' ἂν ἢ κεραυνῷ ('our countryman [i.e. Demosthenes, M.S.] with his violence, yes, and his speed, his force, his terrific power of rhetoric, burns, as it were, and scatters everything before him, and may therefore be compared to a flash of lightning or a thunderbolt'); *Subl.* 34.4: ὡσπερεὶ καταβροντᾷ καὶ καταφέγγει τοὺς ἀπ' αἰῶνος ῥήτορας· καὶ θᾶττον ἄν τις κεραυνοῖς φερομένοις ἀντανοῖξαι τὰ ὄμματα δύναιτο ἢ ἀντοφθαλμῆσαι τοῖς ἐπαλλήλοις ἐκείνου πάθεσιν ('[Demosthenes, M.S.] out-thunders, as it were, and outshines orators of every age. You could sooner open your eyes to the descent of a thunderbolt than face his repeated outbursts of emotion without blinking').

[91] Longin. *Subl.* 33.2.

[92] Longin. *Subl.* 8.1.

a sixth source. Rather, imitation is, as James Porter has pointed out, the 'premise' of the treatise *On the Sublime*.[93] It is the actual answer to the question by which means 'we may be enabled to develop our natures to some degree of grandeur' (δι' ὅτου τρόπου τὰς ἑαυτῶν φύσεις προάγειν ἰσχύοιμεν ἂν εἰς ποσὴν μεγέθους ἐπίδοσιν).[94] The five sources of the sublime can be considered different technical domains of sublime writing which 'produce sublimity as their effect', as Porter puts it.[95]

Since imitation is the premise of *On the Sublime*, it is crucial to understand what Longinus means by it. He only differentiates between μίμησις and ζήλωσις in the passage which presents these concepts as 'another way' leading to the sublime' (13.2, see above).[96] First of all, something must be said about Longinus' use of ζήλωσις instead of ζῆλος (ζήλωσις being a fairly rare derivative of ζηλόω). We see the term ζήλωσις gaining ground only from the first century AD onwards, in authors such as Philo of Alexandria, Flavius Josephus, Cassius Dio, John Chrysostom and Damascius. The suffix -σις of ζήλωσις not only emphasises the close connection between μίμησις and ζήλωσις in a formal way; it also emphatically frames ζήλωσις as a noun of process/action.[97] What is clear, is that the two notions of μίμησις and ζήλωσις represent two connected stages of the same process of imitation.[98] Once a formal distinction between the two is made, Longinus refuses to keep mentioning them separately, but confines himself to using the term ζήλωσις. However, as Russell already noticed, 'what he [i.e. Longinus, M.S.] […] says refers to the whole complex idea of 'μίμησις and ζήλωσις', not to ζήλωσις without its partner'. In fact, μίμησις and ζήλωσις are complementary and cannot be seen apart from each other.[99]

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[93] Porter (2016), 68 describes the status of imitation in Longinus as follows: '[…] imitation is not one of the sources listed in 8.1, nor does it constitute a belated correction to that list, comprising, as it were, source number six. On the contrary, imitation of sublimity is the *premise* of *On the Sublime*, as is the desire (or felt "need") to make oneself sublime'. For a thorough discussion of sublime μίμησις, see also Whitmarsh (2001), 57-71.

[94] Longin. *Subl*. 1.1.

[95] Porter (2016), 68.

[96] On the notion of competition in Longinus, see De Jonge (2018).

[97] We may also interpret the suffix –σις as an allusion to authors such as Antiphon and Thucydides, who frequently used nouns with this morphology.

[98] This is also observed by Russell (1979), 10.

[99] In this respect, Russell (1979), 10 rightly draws a comparison with Horace, *AP* 410-11: *alterius sic altera poscit opem res et coniurat amice* ('so much they [i.e. *ars* and *natura*, M.S.] need each other's help and friendship'.

Longinus expounds the combative etymology of ζήλωσις by presenting an image of Plato, the representative of the genius who takes risks, and who is 'certainly the focus of attention in the discussion of μίμησις 13.2-14', as Russell observes.[100] In competing with Homer, Plato is, Longinus argues, 'like a young antagonist' (ὡς ἀνταγωνιστὴς νέος) fighting with 'one who had already won his spurs' (ἤδη τεθαυμασμένον).[101] In *On the Sublime* 14.1, the notion of ζήλωσις recurs, now combined with the Platonic image of the rapture of the imitator's soul:

Προσπίπτοντα γὰρ ἡμῖν κατὰ ζῆλον ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ οἷον διαπρέποντα τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνοίσει πως πρὸς τὰ ἀνειδωλοποιούμενα μέτρα […].

For when in our emulation those great characters [i.e. Homer, Plato, Demosthenes, Thucydides, M.S.] come suddenly and as it were radiantly before our eyes, they will lead our souls to the ideal standards of perfection.

Thus, as in Dionysius, ζήλωσις is conceptualised in terms of mental activity and movement (ψυχὰς ἀνοίσει […] πρός), whereas the etymology of combat, which is omnipresent in Quintilian, is also exploited.[102] However, when Longinus introduces the complex of imitation and emulation (μίμησίς τε καὶ ζήλωσις, 13.2), the soul is not presented as moving towards models; instead, Longinus uses the image of the *influence* of models *upon* the soul. Just as divine vapour inspires the Pythian priestess after being inhaled by her, so it is with the stream of literature entering the souls of 'emulators' (τῶν ζηλούντων):

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[100] Russell (1981), 78.

[101] Longin. *Subl.* 13.4. Cf. Russell (1979), 11 who notices that for Longinus the most positive outcome of a battle with the literary masters of the Classical Greek Period is 'an honourable defeat'.

[102] Cf. esp. Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti. Although the idea of competition is present in Longinus, to make profit of a model does not mean that one should overpower it. As Longinus makes clear, 'even to be worsted by our forerunners is not without glory' (καὶ τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τῶν προγενεστέρων οὐκ ἄδοξον, *Subl.* 13.4). As Innes (2002), 267-268 already noted, the idea of imitation as an upward motion of the soul is also aired in *Subl.* 13.3, in a quote of the famous passage of Plato's *Republic* 586a-b, where people are described who look downward to the ground like cattle, not upward to truth. Longinus subtly makes this quote serve and confirm his own idea of the sublime, thus giving his reader a *leçon par l'example* on imitation.

[…] οὕτως ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων μεγαλοφυΐας εἰς τὰς τῶν ζηλούντων ἐκείνους ψυχὰς ὡς ἀπὸ ἱερῶν στομίων ἀπόρροιαί τινες φέρονται, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἐπιπνεόμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ λίαν φοιβαστικοὶ τῷ ἑτέρων συνενθουσιῶσι μεγέθει.[103]

[…] so, too, from the natural genius of those old writers there flows into the hearts of their emulators as it were an emanation from those holy mouths. Inspired by this, even those who are not easily moved to prophecy share the enthusiasm of these others' grandeur.

Longinus shares the idea of influence of models upon the soul not only with Dionysius (cf. εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν μετοχετεύσῃ, *Imit*. 1.3), but also with Aelius Theon (cf. ὑπάγηται τῇ τῶν νέων ψυχῇ, *Progymn*. 70.31) and Seneca (cf. *ibunt* [i.e. *alimenta*, M.S.] *in ingenium*, *Ep*. 84.7).

The language of the overpowering force of the sublime – let alone the many other striking metaphors of mental rapture, ecstasy and enchantment – may give the impression that for Longinus, the idea of 'sublimity' rests on an understanding of imitation as a highly irrational and emotional activity (emotion is in fact the second of the five distinguished sources of the sublime).[104] But does this emotion in Longinus' conception of imitation outweigh thought?[105]

Giving an affirmative answer would be to dismiss the essence of Longinus' treatise. We should not think of sublimity as 'an indomitable force that cannot be governed by the rules of art', as Porter rightly observes.[106] This rejected conclusion for a large part depends on a misinterpretation of some passages of *On the Sublime*, in which nature is glorified. In 8.1, for instance, Longinus argues that of the five sources of the sublime as discussed above, the first two ('the power of grand conceptions' and 'the inspiration of vehement emotion') are 'for the most part congenital', and that the first source – preponderantly resulting from natural

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[103] Longin. *Subl*. 13.2.

[104] This second source of the sublime, emotion, is omitted by Caecilius, as we learn from Longin. *Subl*. 8.2.

[105] This is a central question in the discussion of emotion ('ecstasy') and thought ('truth') in Longinus by Halliwell (2011), 331. In his book *Between Ecstasy and Truth*, Halliwell dedicates a chapter to the role of ecstasy (i.e. an irrational, non-cognitive state of mind) and truth (i.e. cognition) in Longinus' *On the Sublime*, arguing that both ecstasy and truth are essential to Longinus' ideas on sublimity. Halliwell's discussion touches upon what Innes (2002), 273 calls 'key ideas throughout his [i.e. Longinus', M.S.] treatise, […] an over-arching division between nature and art […]'. For the concept of ecstasy in Longinus, see also De Jonge in J. Grethlein e.a. (ed.) (forthc.).

[106] Porter (2016), 63.

abilities, as we have just learned – is the most important of all five. In like manner, Longinus assures his addressee that 'in all production she [i.e. nature, M.S.] is the first and primary element' (αὕτη μὲν πρῶτόν τι καὶ ἀρχέτυπον γενέσεως στοιχεῖον ἐπὶ πάντων ὑφέστηκεν, 2.2).

We should, however, not forget Longinus' marked statement that genius needs 'the curb as often as the spur' (ὡς κέντρου πολλάκις, οὕτω δὲ καὶ χαλινοῦ, *ibid*.). The insistence on technique in achieving sublimity is also reflected in the frequent use of terms pertaining to training: a 'system' (μέθοδος) guarantees 'the safest practice and use' (ἀπλανεστάτην ἄσκησίν τε καὶ χρῆσιν, *ibid*.). And what is more: imitation itself is called an additional 'method' (ὁδός) that leads to the sublime.[107] Even the judgement of true sublimity is presented by Longinus as depending on rational, 'repeated contemplation' (ἀναθεώρησις) by the readership.[108] Thus, within the process of imitation, rationality is certainly not dismissed by Longinus; we should rather be inclined to suppose a 'cognitivist model of the sublime, a model in which thought and emotion […] work in close harness', as Halliwell argues.[109] Rationality is an indispensable element of true genius and, as such, lies at the heart of Longinus' treatise.[110] It is, however, not so easily recognizable: the sublime, with its overwhelming power, obscures (and indeed should obscure) what belongs to the realm of technique:

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λόγων τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ὕψη, ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐγγυτέρω κείμενα, διά τε φυσικήν τινα συγγένειαν καὶ διὰ λαμπρότητα ἀεὶ τῶν σχημάτων προεμφανίζεται καὶ τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν ἀποσκιάζει καὶ οἷον ἐν κατακαλύψει τηρεῖ.[111]

> What is sublime and moving lies nearer to our hearts, and thus, partly from a natural affinity, partly from brilliance of effect, it always strikes the eye long before the figures, thus throwing their art into the shade and keeping it hidden as it were under a bushel.

We can regard Longinus' own sublime and elaborate style as a preeminent *leçon par l'example* on how to cover artistic skill with sublimity. For instance, he proficiently alludes to

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[107] Longin. *Subl.* 13.2.

[108] Longin. *Subl.* 7.3.

[109] Halliwell (2011), 337. Innes (2002), 273 speaks of a 'partnership'.

[110] Cf. Russell (1964), 113, who argues that 'imitation implies a deliberate effort and persistent vigilance that only art can sustain'.

[111] Longin. *Subl.* 17.3.

Plato in presenting imitation as a magnetic chain of divine inspiration which moves to us from the genius of old writers as from the earthly chasm to the Pythia in Delphi.[112] The key texts here are Plato's *Ion,* in which inspiration is said to trickle down from Muse to poet to rhapsode to audience, but also his *Phaedrus*, in which the prophetic 'madness' (μανία) of the Pythia is paralleled with the madness of inspired poets and lovers.[113] Both sublime passages from Plato are inventively brought together in a new, sublime passage which serves a completely different purpose: 'to evoke the creative power of μίμησις', as Innes puts it.[114] Thus, like Dionysius, who brings his theory of imitation into practice by presenting two Platonic-inspired stories as introduction to the second book of *On Imitation*, Longinus illustrates what he had argued before on the composition of sublime texts through artful, eclectic imitation:[115]

> […] ἐξ ἀνάγκης γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν ὕψους αἴτιον τὸ τῶν ἐμφερομένων ἐκλέγειν ἀεὶ τὰ καιριώτατα καὶ ταῦτα τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐπισυνθέσει καθάπερ ἕν τι σῶμα ποιεῖν δύνασθαι […].[116]

> […] it follows of necessity that we shall find one factor of sublimity in a consistently happy choice of these constituent elements, and in the power of combining them together as it were into one body.

What the imitator should select, are 'the most striking and intense' (τὰ ἄκρα […] καὶ ὑπερτεταμένα) of the expressions of his model.[117] To Longinus, true sublimity lies in 'the

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[112] Longin. *Subl*. 13.2. For this allusion, see also Innes (2002), 268. The status of Plato in *On the Sublime* is exceptional; he is a pre-eminent model of the 'flawed genius with his strengths and weaknesses', which is 'at the very heart of Longinus' concept of the sublime', according to Innes (2002), 261. On the chain of imitation in Longinus, see esp. Flashar (1979), 90-91, who articulates the implications of this chain as follows: 'der Schnitt liegt jetzt nicht mehr so sehr zwischen den kanonischen Vorbildern unter den alten Autoren auf der einen Seite, sondern zwischen allen vorbildlichen, nachgeahmten und nachahmenden, insgesamt also 'kanonischen' Autoren und Rednern der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart gegenüber einer Zukunft als Rezeptionsinstanz' (*ibid.*, 91).

[113] Plato, *Ion* 533d; *Ph*. 244a-245c; 265a-b.

[114] Innes (2002), 268 also points to other allusions to Plato in Longinus, for instance in the last chapter (44) of *On the Sublime*, which is a dialogue with a philosopher.

[115] For a discussion of these stories in Dionysius, see section 1.1-3.

[116] Longin. *Subl*. 10.1.

[117] *Ibid*. These words refer to Sappho's skilful description of all kinds of emotion. Cf. also Longin. *Subl*. 10.3: ἡ λῆψις δ᾽ ὡς ἔφην τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἡ εἰς ταὐτὸ συναίρεσις ἀπειργάσατο τὴν ἐξοχήν ('the skill with which she [i.e.

choice of right and lofty words' (ἡ τῶν κυρίων καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκλογή) that grants our style 'grandeur' (μέγεθος), 'beauty' (κάλλος), 'old-world charm' (εὐπίνειαν), 'weight' (βάρος), 'force' (ἰσχύν), 'strength' (κράτος) and a 'sort of lustre, like the bloom on the surface of the most beautiful bronzes' (γάνωσίν τινα τοῖς λόγοις ὥσπερ ἀγάλμασι καλλίστοις δι᾽ αὐτῆς ἐπανθεῖν παρασκευάζουσα).[118] Such virtues of style should in a veiled way contribute to sublimity.

In a passage on splendid examples of hyperbaton which deserve imitation, Longinus approaches the idea of 'hidden artfulness' from a different angle. We learn that artfulness is not only veiled by true sublimity – it should also veil itself by giving the impression of being 'natural'. Longinus remarks: 'art is only perfect when it looks like nature and nature succeeds only when she conceals latent art' (ἡ τέχνη τέλειος, ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν φύσις εἶναι δοκῇ, ἡ δ᾽ αὖ φύσις ἐπιτυχής, ὅταν λανθάνουσαν περιέχῃ τὴν τέχνην).[119] We should note that in this passage, τέχνη (which means *hyperbaton* here) imitates human 'nature' (φύσις) and emotions. Thus, the contemplation of exemplary technical passages exhibiting *hyperbata* provides a window into human nature, and displays how manifestations of it should ideally be imitated by linguistic means.[120] Seen in this way, 'rhetorische Mimesis ist also zugleich […] traditionelle Mimesis zweiten Grades', as Woldemar Görler has observed.[121]

Dionysius provides an important impulse to this incorporation of the traditional kind of μίμησις (i.e. representation of (manifestions of) reality and human behaviour) within the concept of rhetorical (i.e. intertextual) μίμησις. He insists on natural (that means: approaching normal speech, realistic) style, syntax, word order and choice of words, but also on the trueful linguistic representation of the events and emotions described – that is, on a close

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Sappho, M.S.] takes up the most striking and combines them into a single whole'); Longin. *Subl.* 10.7: ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐξοχὰς ὡς <ἂν> εἴποι τις ἀριστίνδην ἐκκαθήραντες ἐπισυνέθηκαν, οὐδὲν φλοιῶδες ἢ ἄσεμνον ἢ σχολικὸν ἐγκατατάττοντες διὰ μέσου ('what they [i.e. Sappho, Aratus, Archilochus and Demosthenes, M.S.] have done is to clean up, as it were, the very best of the main points, and to fit them together, allowing nothing affected or undignified or pedantic to intervene').

[118] Longin. *Subl.* 30.1.

[119] Longin. *Subl.* 22.1. This reminds us of Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 8.6, where the seeming artlessness of Lysias' style is said to be the product of art.

[120] Cf. Flashar (1979), 93: 'der angehende Rhetor kann an den vorbildlichen Autoren anhand deren Verwendung des Hyperbaton studieren, wie diese die Auspragungen menschlicher Natur in der Leidenschaft mimetisch dargestellt haben, um ihrerseits auf dem Wege der imitatio der Autoren das gleiche leisten zu konnen'.

[121] See a written report of the discussion after an exposé of Hellmut Flashar on μίμησις in Flashar (1979), 99.

correspondence between linguistic art and reality.[122] We could say that in Dionysius, and even more in Longinus, manifestations of nature are recommended to be imitated through the filter of the artful writings of Greek literary masters from the Classical Period.[123]

Longinus' insistence on the imitation of beauty and sublimity in the works of classical Greek authors closely links him to Dionysius and Aelius Theon (and Pliny as well, who will be discussed next). Moreover, his eagerness to describe the process of imitation in Platonic-coloured terms of mental activity in a remarkable way corresponds to what we read in Dionysius, Aelius Theon, and Seneca, which suggests that these authors made use of (elements of) a shared discourse. However, more than any of these writers, Longinus emphasises the role of divine ecstasy and inspiration within the process of imitation.

5.5 PLINY THE YOUNGER'S *LETTERS*

So far, we have seen that imitation theories occur in a range of literary genres and contexts. Pliny the Younger (61/62-113 AD) devotes attention to the subject of imitation in several of his private letters. Nine books of letters survive, containing 247 epistles in sum. This massive amount of letters testifies to Pliny's wide circle of both Greek and Roman friends, acquaintances and colleagues. Among his addressees are the emperor Trajan and his close friend Tacitus, the historian, but also people who are not well-known to us.

The order of Pliny's nine books of letters is chronological, but the order of the letters within these books is not. It has been suggested that his *Letters* were written between 96 and 109.[124] Each book contains epistles which display a variety of different styles – from poetic to colloquial – and they may discuss completely different topics, such as law, politics, natural phenomena, domestic news and literary criticism.

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[122] The idea of 'naturalness' of style is omnipresent in Dionysius' works. For a thorough discussion of this, see De Jonge (2008), 251 ff. An example of Dionysius' preference for linguistic features representing the events described is his discussion of Homer's description of the labour of Sisyphus (*Comp.* 20.12). Dionysius praises Homer for his skill in representing Sisyphus' perseverance in the very way he composes his sentences: ἐνταῦθα ἡ σύνθεσίς ἐστιν ἡ δηλοῦσα τῶν γινομένων ἕκαστον ('here it is the composition that illustrates each of the details'). Cf. also *Pomp.* 4.3, where Xenophon is praised for his natural choice of words: ἐκλέγει δὲ ὀνόματα συνήθη τε καὶ προσφυῆ τοῖς πράγμασι ('the words he chooses are familiar and correspond to the nature of the subject').

[123] Cf. Flashar (1979), 100: 'die Verbindung der beiden Arten von Mimesis [i.e. philosophical and rhetorical imitation, M.S.] wird ja bei Dionys nicht wirklich durchgefuhrt'.

[124] On the date of Pliny's *Letters*, see e.g. Whitton (2013), §3.

In this latter field, Pliny displays a conspicuous enthusiasm for oratory, and especially for the orators Cicero and Demosthenes – the two champions of Latin and Greek rhetoric who are paired in a σύγκρισις by Longinus and Quintilian.[125] Some of his letters show that Pliny is very much concerned with the imitation of Cicero and Demosthenes; others express his insistence on sublimity and expansiveness of style, which seems to be tributary to the views of Dionysius and especially Longinus. Pliny's philhellenism is remarkable, and 55 letters with Greek references to 37 different recipients bear witness to this enthusiasm.[126]

Like Dionysius and Longinus, who distinguish between μίμησις and ζῆλος/ζήλωσις, Pliny distinguishes between *imitatio* and *aemulatio*. He uses both *imitari* (or *adsequi*) and *aemulari*, and often casually switches between the terms. *Letter* 1.5, addressed to Voconius Romanus, illustrates this alternating use of the terms *imitatio* and *aemulatio* best:

> *"Est enim" inquam "mihi cum Cicerone aemulatio, nec sum contentus eloquentia saeculi nostri; nam stultissimum credo ad imitandum non optima quaeque proponere.*[127]

> "Personally I do try to emulate Cicero," I said, "and I am not satisfied with the oratory of today. It seems to me most foolish not to imitate the highest standards."

Since *aemulatio* and *imitatio* are mentioned in the same breath, we may at first sight be inclined to think that the notions are used without a clear difference. It is, however, significant that the concept of *imitatio* is used in general, unspecific terms, whereas *aemulatio* defines Pliny's specific stance towards a concrete and close model, namely Cicero, with whom Pliny competes not only in his literary achievements, but also in his political career:

> *Te quidem, ut scribis, ob hoc maxime delectat auguratus meus, quod M. Tullius augur fuit. Laetaris enim quod honoribus eius insistam, quem aemulari in studiis cupio.*[128]

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[125] Pliny also names Aeschines, Lysias and Isocrates. For Pliny on Demosthenes, see e.g. *Ep.* 1.2.2; 6.33.11; 7.30. For Cicero as a literary model or patron for Pliny, see e.g. *Ep.* 1.20.4-10; 3.15.1; 5.3.5; 7.4.3.6; 7.17.13.

[126] For references to Greek language in Pliny, see Deane (1918a); *ibid.* (1918b) for references to Greek literature. For Pliny's philhellenism, see Rees (2014), 109 ff.

[127] Plin. *Ep.* 1.5.13.

[128] Plin. *Ep.* 4.8.4.

And you, as you say in your letter, are particularly pleased to see me an augur because Cicero held the same priesthood, for you are glad that I am stepping into his offices as I am so anxious to emulate him [i.e. Cicero, M.S.] in my literary work.

Marchesi observes that the term *aemulatio* used by Pliny to sketch his approach to Cicero is quite 'loaded', as it stands in opposition to the more common term *imitatio*.[129]

This latter term is not only used in unspecific contexts, as we have just seen in the quoted passage from *Letter* 1.5; it is also the appropriate qualification of Pliny's imitative approach of the works of a more distant, Greek model, Demosthenes, and of the highly esteemed Calvus, whose literary force Pliny wants to capture in his own speech. Whereas Quintilian emphatically argues that 'force' (*vehementia/vis*) in speech cannot be achieved through *imitatio*, but only through *aemulatio*, Pliny links 'force' (*vis*) with *imitatio* – probably because he is less concerned with sharp theoretical divisions:[130]

> *[...] eo magis quod nihil ante peraeque eodem ζήλῳ scripsisse videor. Temptavi enim imitari Demosthenen semper tuum, Calvum nuper meum [...] nam vim tantorum virorum, 'pauci quos aequus ...' adsequi possunt.*[131]

> [...] and the more so because I don't think I have written anything before with quite so much emulation. For I have tried to imitate Demosthenes, as you always do, and lately my favourite Calvus [...] for the force of great men like these can only be followed by the favoured few.

We notice that Pliny in this passage from a letter to Maturus Arrianus easily switches from the Greek noun ζῆλος to *imitari* (in an explanatory *enim*-clause) to *adsequi*, apparently without supposing any difference between the terms. However, ζῆλος and *imitatio* cannot be understood as synonyms. What we should observe, is that *imitari* and *adsequi* involve a tempering of Pliny's (unrealistically) high aspiration (ζῆλος).[132] This aspiration (note the verb

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[129] Marchesi (2008), 227.

[130] For Quintilian's ideas on force and imitation, see section 2.3.1.

[131] Plin. *Ep.* 1.2.

[132] Sherwin-White (1966), 89 argues that Pliny 'hints at a new turn of style by using the word ζῆλος, which means more than *sollicitudo* in a similar context, 2.5.2'. I agree that ζῆλος is quite a pregnant term, but I don't know what Sherwin-White means by 'a new turn of style'.

temptari) is the ultimate force that stirs an author to compete with his models.[133] Imitative trial and error (cf. *temptavi [...] imitari*), however, make him level-headed and fill him with a kind of diffidence and modesty – connotations which, at least in this passage, adhere to Pliny's understanding of *imitatio*.

This sense of modesty as a connotation of *imitatio* is also apparent from a letter addressed to Julius Genitor, in which Pliny discusses his model Demosthenes again:[134]

> *[...] sed cum lego, ex comparatione sentio quam male scribam, licet tu mihi bonum animum facias, qui libellos meos de ultione Helvidi orationi Demosthenis κατὰ Μειδίου confers. Quam sane, cum componerem illos, habui in manibus, non ut aemularer (improbum enim ac paene furiosum), sed tamen imitarer et sequerer [...].*[135]

> [...] though comparison with my reading only makes me realise how badly I write, however much you encourage me by comparing my speech in vindication of Helvidius with Demosthenes' speech against Meidias. I admit that I had this by me while I was writing my own speech, not with any idea of emulating it – for this would be impudent and mad – but imitating and following it [...].

From this passage we can conclude that *aemulatio* runs the risk of degenerating into something insane (cf. *furiosum*) when one's talents fall short.[136] Although Dionysius, other

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[133] In several of his letters, Pliny refers to people driven by ζῆλος. In *Ep*. 7.12.2, he calls his addressee Minicius Fundanus and companions εὔζηλοι (people who advocate Atticism in oratory) – thus implying that there are also people who have a bad sense of ζῆλος (οἱ κακόζηλοι, those traditionally associated with Asianism in oratory). Pliny reproaches οἱ εὔζηλοι with being extreme and excessively critical: they cut out the best passages (cf. *optima quaeque detrahitis*, 7.12.3) and adopt a narrow view on what good literature is. Cf. e.g. also Quint. 12.10.21. On κακόζηλοι/*cacozelon*, see e.g. also Longin. *Subl*. 3.4; Quint. 8.3.56-58.

[134] Cf. Plin. *Ep*. 1.2 above.

[135] Plin. *Ep*. 7.30.4-5.

[136] It is difficult to distinguish the precise roles played by *ars* and *natura/ingenium* in Pliny's conception of imitation. As I see it, *aemulatio* merely points to an emotional and competitive incentive for attaining the high artistic level of particular models, whereas *imitatio* is the more neutral term, from which the idea of zeal is absent. Pliny's focus seems to be on *natura*, for he argues that facing 'the difference between talents of a great and small man' (*diversitas ingeniorum maximi et minimi*) is one of the factors which should prevent the imitator from being too zealous (*Ep*. 7.30.5). A similarly humble stance towards his own small talent and the great *ingenium* of Cicero (whom he nevertheless wants to emulate) can be found in *Ep*. 9.2.2-3*: illi enim et copiosissimum ingenium, et par ingenio qua varietas rerum qua magnitudo largissime suppetebat; nos quam*

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than Pliny, warns against ζῆλος resulting from jealousy or bad literary taste (as we have seen in section 2.2.5), we can observe a clear parallel between Dionysius' and Pliny's caution with regard to ζῆλος/*aemulatio*.[137] What appears from the passage above is that for Pliny, *aemulatio* is out of place especially when revered, but more distant authors like Demosthenes stand model; when a highly esteemed, but closer model like Cicero is the object of imitation, Pliny is more ready to use *aemulatio* as the proper term, as we have already seen.[138]

For Pliny, as for the Greek and Roman critics discussed above, a careful selection from different literary models is crucial in the process of imitation. This is apparent from *Letter* 7.9, which is a very valuable source for Pliny's ideas on imitation. In this letter, which is entirely devoted to the importance of writing in the process of imitation, Pliny refuses to prescribe in an explicit way what authors should be read, presuming that this is quite obvious to his addressee Fuscus Salinator:

> *Non enim dixi quae legenda arbitrarer: quamquam dixi, cum dicerem quae scribenda. Tu memineris sui cuiusque generis auctores diligenter eligere. Aiunt enim multum legendum esse, non multa.*[139]

> I have said nothing about what I think you should read, though this was implied when I was telling you what to write. Remember to make a careful selection from representative authors in each subject, for the saying is that a man should be deeply, not widely, read.

Pliny's aphorism that 'man should be deeply, not widely read' (*multum legendum esse, non multa*) is a playful reference to a *sententia* of Quintilian, who states that 'we should form our minds and take our tone from extensive reading, rather than from reading many authors' (*multa magis quam multorum lectione formanda mens et ducendus color*).[140] This reference

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angustis terminis claudamur etiam tacente me perspicis ('he [i.e. Cicero, M.S.] was not only richly gifted but was supplied with a wealth of varied and important topics to suit his abilities, though you [i.e. the addressee, Statius Sabinus, M.S.] know without my telling you the narrow limits confining me').

[137] For Dionysius' ideas on ζῆλος, see esp. section 2.2.5.

[138] For Pliny's relationship with Cicero and other instances of references to Cicero in Pliny's *Letters*, see Marchesi (2008), 226 ff.

[139] Plin. *Ep*. 7.9.15.

[140] Cf. Quint. 10.1.59. On references to Quintilian in this letter, see Sherwin-White (1966), 412-413.

may well explain why Pliny does not offer his addressee a list of recommended readings: Quintilian's extensive reading list in 10.1 is the text to which he wants to refer Fuscus.

Pliny's version of this *sententia* of Quintilian displays, as Whitton points out, 'all the hallmarks of imitation'.[141] It is very much like the model, for instance in the repetition of the antithetical polyptoton: *multa – multorum* (Quintilian) versus *multum – multa* (Pliny). But clearly, there are also conspicuous differences, such as the variation of substantive and gerund: *lectione* (Quintilian) and *legendum* (Pliny).[142] Thus, Pliny originally reworks the passage of his revered teacher Quintilian, and brings into practice what he preaches in the same letter:

> *[...] imitatione optimorum similia inveniendi facultas paratur.*[143]

> [...] imitation of the best models leads to the aptitude for inventing similar things.

According to Pliny, translating Greek into Latin and vice versa nourishes this sense for 'invention', since it cultivates 'perception and critical sense' (*intellegentia [...] et iudicium*), the latter being a key concept in the reading list of Quintilian.[144] Only when this perception and critical sense is obtained, is the imitator allowed to compete with his model, at the risk of being inferior in every aspect:

> *Nihil offuerit quae legeris hactenus, ut rem argumentumque teneas, quasi aemulum scribere lectisque conferre, ac sedulo pensitare, quid tu, quid ille commodius. Magna gratulatio si non nulla tu, magnus pudor si cuncta ille melius.*[145]

> When you have read a passage sufficiently to remember the subject-matter and line of thought, there is no harm in your trying to emulate it; then compare your efforts with the original and consider carefully where your version is better or worse. You may well congratulate yourself if yours is sometimes better and feel much ashamed if the other is always superior to yours.

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[141] See Whitton (forthc.). According to Whitton, this whole letter of Pliny is 'bursting with references to *Inst.* 10'.

[142] For a more profound discussion of the parallels and differences in this passage, see Whitton (forthc.).

[143] Plin. *Ep*. 7.9.2.

[144] *Ibid*. For the concept of *iudicium* in Quintilian, see esp. section 4.3.

[145] Plin. *Ep*. 7.9.3.

Here, as in Longinus, we see that the danger and risk of failure is inherent to *aemulatio*.[146] Hence, Pliny prefers a 'private attempt' (*secreta contentio*, 7.9.4) – which is opposite to Longinus' idea of publicly taking risks to become successful. When someone confidently contends with his model, having the intention to follow it rather than conquer it, his reward may even be to win, according to Pliny:

> *[...] quamquam multos videmus eius modi certamina sibi cum multa laude sumpsisse, quosque subsequi satis habebant, dum non desperant, antecessise.*[147]

> [...] and yet we see many people entering this type of contest with much praise and, by not lacking confidence, outstripping the authors whom they intended only to follow.

Thus, the victory over a splendid model is often the unintentional result of modest confidence during the process of imitation.

But what literary virtues should be imitated according to Pliny? Like Dionysius and Longinus, Pliny strongly favours aesthetic qualities. In a letter addressed to Cornelius Tacitus, Pliny complains about a man of learning who prefers nothing in forensic oratory so much as 'brevity' (*brevitas*), and who makes Lysias, the brothers Gracchus and Cato his authorities.[148] Although Pliny admits that well-dosed conciseness should be 'observed' (*custodiendam*), he retorts that 'most points gain weight and emphasis by a fuller treatment' (*plerisque longiore tractatu vis quaedam et pondus accedit*).[149] According to Pliny, this is demonstrated by the speeches of Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Pollio, Caesar, Caelius, and Cicero.[150]

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[146] The idea of the inevitability of risk is also present in Dionysius. In *Pomp*. 2.4, Dionysius writes that he criticised Plato earlier (*Dem*. 5-7), but that he agrees with Pompeius that great success necessarily involves a risk of failure: [...] ἐν δὲ τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μεγάλως ἐπιτυχεῖν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ μὴ τοιαῦτα τολμῶντα καὶ παραβαλλόμενον, ἐν οἷς καὶ σφάλλεσθαι ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ('but this one point I strongly affirm, that it is not possible to achieve great success in any direction without facing and accepting risks of such a kind as must involve the possibility of failure').

[147] Plin. *Ep*. 7.9.4.

[148] Plin. *Ep*. 1.20.19.

[149] Plin. *Ep*. 1.20.4.

[150] *Ibid*.

In words which are strongly reminiscent of the metaphors of thunder and lightning used by Longinus, Pliny pleads for literary sublimity, such as is displayed by Pericles, rather than a 'curtailed and restricted speech' (*amputata oratio et abscisa*):[151]

> *[...] lata et magnifica et excelsa* [*oratio*, M.S.] *tonat fulgurat, omnia denique perturbat ac miscet.*[152]
>
> [It is, M.S.] a grand speech, spacious and sublime, which can thunder, lighten, and throw a world into tumult and confusion.

Like Longinus, Pliny seems to conceive of the sublime as a sudden and highly interactive phenomenon, which can be compared with grandiose weather events like thunder and lightning. At the end of the same letter, Pliny expresses his preference for an expansive, 'snowy' speech, thus alluding to Homer's description of the words of Odysseus which flutter down like snowflakes:[153]

> *[...] si tamen detur electio, illam orationem similem nivibus hibernis, id est crebram et adsiduam sed et largam, postremo divinam et caelestem volo.*[154]
>
> But, if I were given my choice, I prefer the speech like the winter snows, one which is fluent and vigorous, but also expansive, which is in fact divinely inspired […].

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[151] Plin. *Ep*. 1.20.19.

[152] *Ibid*.

[153] Pliny's insistence on beauty, sublimity and expansiveness implies a tight integration of poetic virtues of style within the domain of rhetoric. This he makes explicit in the letter to Fuscus Salinator (7.9.8-9), which says that 'often even in a speech the subject calls for a narrative or even a poetic style of description' (*saepe in oratione quoque non historica modo sed prope poetica descriptionum necessitas incidit*). In this letter, Pliny recommends to his addressee to take notice of different literary genres. For instance, historical narratives enhance a sense for poetic description, while writing letters promotes the qualities of 'brevity and simplicity of style' (*pressus sermo purusque*).

[154] Plin. *Ep*. 1.20.22-23. Cf. Hom. *Il*. 3.221-223: ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἴη καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν, οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆΐ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος ('but when from his chest he sent out a sonorous sound and words which were like hibernal snowflakes, no other mortal man could be on par with Odysseus') (tr. Schippers). Elsewhere in the *Iliad*, the metaphor of snowflakes is used to describe 'density', either of a hail of stones falling down (*Il*. 12.156, 278) or of an advancing army (*Il*. 19.357).

Pliny's disapproval of the 'curtailed and restricted speech' (*amputata oratio et abscisa*) as opposed to a speech which is 'grand and spacious' (*lata et magnifica*), may well bring back to mind Quintilian's rejection of Seneca's style. Quintilian disapprovingly defines Seneca's compositions as 'broken by all kinds of error' (*omnibus vitiis fractum*).[155] Although Quintilian does not focus on aesthetic or sublime virtues as overtly as Dionysius, Aelius Theon, Longinus and Pliny do, he dislikes the pointed, truncated and sensationalist style that had emerged and gained ground in the first century AD. If carried through too far, *brevitas* apparently degenerates into an undesirably fragmentary style. As is testified by Quintilian's extensive recommendations of Greek and Latin poets, it is his opinion that poetic features should balance this exorbitant fondness of brevity, and Pliny explicitly agrees with his teacher.

It is striking that Pliny not only shares with Longinus the preference for and conceptualisation of a grand and spacious effect of speech; like Longinus, he also regards risk of failure (already mentioned above) as an inherent element of aspiration to elevation and sublimity, as is clear from his *Letter* 9.26:

> *Debet enim orator erigi attolli, interdum etiam effervescere ecferri, ac saepe accedere ad praeceps; nam plerumque altis et excelsis adiacent abrupta. Tutius per plana sed humilius et depressius iter [...].*[156]

> The orator ought in fact to be roused and heated, sometimes even to boiling-point, and to let his feelings carry him on till he treads the edge of a precipice; for a path along the heights and peaks often skirts the sheer drop below. It may be safer to keep to the plain, but the road lies too low to be interesting.

According to Pliny, it is precisely this risk which commands the respect of the audience:

> *Nam ut quasdam artes ita eloquentiam nihil magis quam ancipitia commendant.[...] Sunt enim maxime mirabilia quae maxime insperata, maxime periculosa utque Graeci magis exprimunt, παράβολα.*[157]

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[155] Quint. 10.1.125. According to Quintilian, 'brokenness' is not only noticeable in Seneca's style, but also in the way he presents his ideas. See 10.1.130: *si rerum pondera minutissimis sententiis non fregisset* ('if he had not broken up his weighty ideas in his tiny little epigrams').

[156] Plin. *Ep*. 9.26.2.

[157] Plin. *Ep*. 9.26.3-4.

Eloquence is in fact one of the skills which gain most from the risks they run. […] for it is the most unexpected and dangerous feats which win most admiration: ventures which the Greeks can define so well in a single word, παράβολα.

In sum, Pliny can be said to unite different, already existing ideas on imitation into a coherent mimetic framework that fits first-century literary production in a Graeco-Roman world: the classicising reverence for Greek oratory in general and Demosthenes in particular, whose genius, as he thinks, is too great to be emulated; the emphasis on originality and reworking of the models at one's disposal; the understanding of *aemulatio* as the competitive, but modest aspiration to surpass those masterpieces (especially Cicero's) which one's *intellegentia* and *ingenium* can grasp thoroughly; and, last but not least, the need for literary sublimity and expansiveness which urge the author to take risks in order to overwhelm his audience.

5.6 TACITUS' *DIALOGUE ON ORATORY*

Publius Cornelius Tacitus, a close friend of Pliny's as well as one of his addressees, was born about 56 AD and probably died around 120 AD.[158] He completed his training as an orator in 75 under Marcus Aper and Julius Secundus, both of whom figure in his *Dialogue on Oratory*. Tacitus, a *homo novus*, advanced far in the politics of Rome under the reign of Domitian, Nerva and Trajan. The crowning glory of his political career was the governorship of the Roman province of Asia in Western Anatolia in 112-113 AD.

Tacitus' eloquence was exceptional. Pliny also testifies to this (*Ep*. 2.11.17). In 100 AD, Tacitus and Pliny took legal action against Marius Priscus, governor of Africa, who had extorted his province ruthlessly. They won the case and Priscus was sentenced, but hardly punished. From this time on, Tacitus did not appear as an orator anymore; instead, he devoted himself to composing his *Dialogue on Oratory* (precise date unknown) and two historiographical works: the *Histories* (105 AD, finished in 109 AD) and finally his *Annals* (probably published about 120 AD).[159]

The *Dialogue on Oratory* is never mentioned in ancient sources known to us, nor does the work reveal its author. It was found in the fifteenth century as part of a manuscript which contained other works of Tacitus. However, attribution of the *Dialogue* to Tacitus was

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[158] The following information is based on Mayer (2001) and Gerbrandy (2010).

[159] Before he stopped working as an advocate, Tacitus had written the *Agricola* (98 AD) and an ethnographic treatise on the Teutons.

problematic, not only because his other works are all concerned with historiography, but also because the fluent style of the *Dialogue* is closer to Cicero's.[160] Hence, the work has long been attributed to Quintilian and Pliny, but unfairly so. The fact that the style of the *Dialogue* deviates from that of Tacitus' historiographical works, may well be explained by the difference in genre. There is, however, another important reason to assume that Tacitus had indeed been the author.

In 1832, Lange discovered an undisputable argument for Tacitus as the author of the *Dialogue*. In one of his letters to his friend Tacitus (written in about 107 AD), Pliny contrasts his own laborious writings with the poems 'which you think are finished most easily in the woods and groves' (*quae tu inter nemora et lucos commodissime perfici putas*), thus alluding to the words of Aper in the *Dialogue,* who states that poets have to withdraw 'into the woods and groves' (*in nemora et lucos*) to be able to finish their work.[161] With this reference in a letter of Pliny, we have a *terminus ante quem* for the *Dialogue* (107 AD). We can also be rather sure about its *terminus post quem*: the death of Domitian in 96 AD, which allowed the interlocutors to discuss freedom of speech openly.

Tacitus' *Dialogue* is the representation of an amicable conversation during the sixth year of the reign of Verspasian (75 AD). Tacitus himself joined the conversation, but, like Plato in the *Symposium* and Cicero in *On the Orator*, keeps completely in the background. The most prominent of all four participants in the discussion are Marcus Aper, who fervently defends – perhaps as an *advocatus diaboli* – modern rhetoric as opposed to 'old' poetry, as well as Curiatius Maternus – according to Aper a gifted rhetorician, who decided to dedicate himself to poetry. In the *Dialogue,* a tripartite structure may be discerned. The first part (5-13) reflects the confrontation between Aper and Maternus, who discuss the complex relation between poetry and prose; the second part (16-26) represents the discussion between Aper and Messala about the supposed qualitative differences between the rhetoric of the past and the present; in the last part, different explanations for the decline of rhetoric are offered.[162]

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[160] That Cicero is an unlikely candidate for author, is convincingly demonstrated by e.g. Mayer (2001), 27-31.

[161] Plin. *Ep*. 9.10.2; Tac. *Dial*. *de Orat*. 9.6.

[162] Messalla explains the decline of rhetoric by pointing to indolence in raising and education; by contrast, Maternus suggests that the decline is caused by changes in the political situation. The interpretation of especially this last part of the *Dialogue* is far from unambiguous: for instance, is Maternus, who is urged to be prudent in expressing his ideas in his tragedy *Cato*, sincere in his statement that Vespasian restored the golden age, or are his words a form of *dissimulatio*?

Although the concept of imitation is, at first sight, not explicitly reflected upon in the *Dialogue*, much of what the participants discuss touches upon what imitation is and what the object of imitation should (not) be. The focus of the discussion is, of course, on Latin literature and practical rhetoric, although figureheads of Greek poetry, such as Homer, Euripides and Sophocles, are also mentioned and, just as in Quintilian's reading list, brought into close connection with Latin writers.[163] The same goes for the heterogeneous group of the Attic orators Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Lysias and Lycurgus, which is brought in by Messalla as a parallel and justification for the pluriformity of the group of the Latin orators Cicero, Calvus, Asinius, Caesar, Caelius and Brutus – men who, as he argues, differ in character and age, but whose styles all share the characteristic of 'healthfulness' (*sanitas*) as opposed to the stylistic malady of the more distant past:

> *Sed quo modo inter Atticos oratores primae Demostheni tribuuntur, proximum autem locum Aeschines et Hyperides et Lysias et Lycurgus obtinent, omnium tamen concessu haec oratorum aetas maxime probatur, sic apud nos Cicero quidem ceteros eorundem temporum disertos antecessit, Calvus autem et Asinius et Caesar et Caelius et Brutus iure et prioribus et sequentibus anteponuntur. Nec refert quod inter se specie differunt, cum genere consentiant. [...] omnes [...] eandem sanitatem eloquentiae (prae se) ferunt, ut si omnium pariter libros in manum sumpseris scias, quamvis in diversis ingeniis, esse quandam iudicii ac voluntatis similitudinem et cognationem.*[164]

But just as in Attic oratory the palm is awarded to Demosthenes, while next in order come Aeschines, Hyperides, Lysias, and Lycurgus, and yet this era of eloquence is by universal consent considered as a whole the best; so with us it was Cicero who outdistanced the other speakers of his own day, while Calvus and Asinius and Caesar and Caelius and Brutus are rightly classed both above their predecessors and above those who came after them. In the face of this generic agreement it is unimportant that there are special points of difference. […] they all exhibit the same healthfulness of style, to such an extent that if you take up all their speeches at the same time you will find that, in spite of diversity of talent, there is a certain family likeness in taste and

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[163] Homer, Euripides and Sophocles are mentioned in Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 12.5, where Maternus argues that the reputation of these poets is comparable with that of magnificent prose writers. For the relationship between Tacitus' and Quintilian's stylistic ideas esp. in their estimation of Seneca, see Dominik (1997).

[164] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 25.3-4.

aspiration.

We should note that Greeks and Romans, despite a shared stylistic *sanitas*, are presented as different, competing parties (cf. *inter Atticos [...] apud nos*). In Quintilian too, the first plural *nos* as opposed to *illi* (the Greeks) frequently turns up in the reading list of Latin literature (10.1.85-131).[165]

Although the names of especially Latin authors are scattered throughout the *Dialogue*, there is no systematic treatment of what writers should be imitated. However, Aper ironically enough does establish a kind of 'anti-reading list' (22.1-23.4), containing those Latin authors who lack *sanitas* and belong to 'the same sick-bay' (*eodem valetudinario*) of the literature from the distant, coarse past, that approves only of 'the familiar skin and bones' (*haec ossa et hanc maciem*) of style from which modern orators should keep far away.[166]

The participants in the *Dialogue* do not distinguish between *imitari* and *aemulari*; only the verb *imitari* occurs (twice).[167] In the first case, Aper applies the verb *imitari* to refer to the undesirable imitation by Calvus, Caelius and even Cicero of the rough ways of expression of authors from a distant past, such as Servius Galba and Gaius Carbo:

> *Haec ideo praedixi ut, si qua ex horum oratorum fama gloriaque laus temporibus adquiritur, eam docerem in medio sitam et propiorem nobis quam Servio Galbae aut C. Carboni quosque alios merito antiquos vocaverimus; sunt enim horridi et impoliti, et rudes et informes, et quos utinam nulla parte imitatus esset Calvus vester aut Caelius aut ipse Cicero.*[168]

> The reason why I have said all this by way of introduction is that I wanted to show that we have a common property in any lustre the name and fame of these orators may shed upon the times, and that it is nearer to us than to Servius Galba, or Gaius Carbo, and all the rest who may properly be called 'ancients'; for they are really rough and unfinished, crude and inartistic, and generally with such qualities that one could wish

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[165] E.g. Quint. 10.1.85.

[166] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 21.1 ff. On *malignitas* as a term of aesthetic evaluation in e.g. Tacitus' *Dialogue*, see Van den Berg (2008).

[167] The noun *aemuli* (Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 34.5) occurs in the sense of 'antagonists'. In other works of Tacitus, the notion of *aemulatio* frequently occurs, but rarely in a context denoting literary emulation.

[168] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 18.1.

that neither your admired Calvus, nor Caelius, nor Cicero himself had imitated him in anything.

That in this passage the process of imitation is seen as an unfortunate mistake, is not implied by the verb *imitari* itself, which is a neutral term; it is the object of imitation (i.e. the rude literary works of the ancients) which invites the negative connotation. This follows from the other occurrence of the verb *imitari* in a passage in which Aper refers to the imitation of the best stylistic features of different writers from former days:

> *Vos vero, <viri> disertissimi, ut potestis, ut facitis, inlustrate saeculum nostrum pulcherrimo genere dicendi. Nam et te, Messalla, video laetissima quaeque antiquorum imitantem [...].*[169]

> Do you, my eloquent friends, continue – as you are able to do – to shed lustre on this age of ours by your brilliant way of speaking. You, Messalla, imitate, as I observe, all that is richest in the eloquence of former days [...].

But what virtues does the 'richest eloquence of former days' comprise? In the *Dialogue*, the discussion of different styles is, especially in the first part of the discussion, presented along the lines of two polarisations: that between poetry and prose and between the past and the present. At the beginning of the *Dialogue*, there is a strong tension between a poetic style, defined by Maternus as 'eloquence in its higher and holier form' (*sanctiorem [...] et augustiorem eloquentiam*), and a rhetorical prose style which is, according to Maternus' opponent Aper, 'more productive of practical benefits' (*ad utilitatem fructiosus*).[170] Poetry, by contrast, is, according to Aper, not beneficial at all for the orator himself:

> *Nam carmina et versus, quibus totam vitam Maternus insumere optat [...], neque dignitatem ullam auctoribus suis conciliant neque utilitates alunt; voluptatem autem brevem, laudem inanem et infructuosam consequuntur.*[171]

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[169] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 23.5-6.

[170] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 5.4. In the *Dialogue*, the leading character Curiatius Maternus, who is a poet himself, is an advocate of the art of poetry; Marcus Aper, who defends modern rhetoric, is his main opponent. To Aper, the utility of rhetoric lies in the fact that all people take advantage from being protected by the eloquence of others. The notion of the utility of rhetoric is combined with the idea of the 'pleasure of rhetorical eloquence' (*voluptatem oratoriae eloquentiae*, 6.1), caused by the general attention and admiration for eloquent people.

[171] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 9.1.

As for poetry and verse-making, to which Maternus is eager to devote the whole of his life […], they neither bring their authors any respect nor do they feed their material welfare; and the satisfaction they furnish is short-lived, the fame empty and profitless.

Moreover, it is the crowd of rhetoricians which, in Aper's view, is committed to 'private and present-day controversies' (*privatas et nostri saeculi controversias*), while poets are considered asocial and concerned not only with the past, but also with subject matter that is irrelevant and none of their business.[172] This opposition between poetry and prose is remarkable. As we have seen, Dionysius, Aelius Theon and Longinus all tend to blur the boundaries between poetry and prose for the sake of eclectic imitation, which prospers from the benefits of both genres; especially in the first part of Tacitus' *Dialogue*, however, the connection between poetry and prose is the subject of a heated and polarizing debate.

As the conversation goes on, the opposition between a poetic and rhetorical style gives way to another contrast: that between the rhetoric of a 'gloomy and rough antiquity' (*tristem et impexam antiquitatem*) on the one hand and modern rhetoric on the other. Modern rhetoric is characterised by 'good-going proof, or piquant utterances, or brilliant and highly wrought pen-pictures' (*aut cursu argumentorum aut colore sententiarum aut nitore et cultu descriptionum*).[173] That Aper distances himself from the rhetoric of a 'gloomy and rough antiquity', however, does not mean that he despises Demosthenes, Hyperides, or Cicero. The space in time between them and the present is, as he argues, negligible; these orators are the ones 'whom the same persons [i.e. old men, M.S.] could have heard with their own ears' (*quos eorundum hominum aures agnoscere [...] potuerunt*).[174]

By presenting venerable rhetoricians like Demosthenes, Hyperides and Cicero in close connection with the orators of the present, Aper paves the way for arguing that there is no such thing as a 'decline' of rhetoric. In fact, it turns out that the real opposition is not between 'past' and 'present', but between stylistic roughness and refinement – characteristics of style which are not bound to specific decades.[175] Modern rhetoric should overcome the tendency to

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[172] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 10.8. For the asociality of poets, cf. e.g. *Dial. de Orat.* 9.5-6; for their focus on the past, cf. e.g. *Dial. de Orat.* 3.4; for their tendency to deal with cases which are not of their concern, cf. e.g. *Dial. de Orat.* 10.6. Maternus himself is an excellent target for Aper's aversion of poets: the day before the dialogue took place, Maternus' tragedy *Cato* (now lost) was performed in public.

[173] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 20.2-3.

[174] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 17.6.

[175] Aper illustrates this by designating the style of Lucilius, Lucretius, Sisenna, Varro and Calvus as 'oldfashioned' (*more prisco*, *Dial. de Orat.* 23.3), whereas the much older Demosthenes is said to live in the

imitate what is ancient, rough and bad; instead, it should explore and imitate those refined works of literature which lead to 'novel and choice methods of eloquence' (*novis et exquisitis eloquentiae itineribus*).[176]

Apparently, only when Aper has argued that there is no real separation between models of the Classical Period and orators of the present, does he feel allowed to integrate and revive aesthetic virtues of classical literature into the present, and to make these virtues acceptable in a modern context. Here, the problematisation of the relation between poetry and prose in the first part of the *Dialogue* turns out to be merely a construct. That the relation between poetry and prose in the *Dialogue* is less antagonistic than one might judge from the confrontation between Maternus and Aper, is suggested by Aper's reference to the desirable integration of poetic features in rhetorical prose, which meets the expectations and requirements of a modern audience:

> *Vulgus quoque adsistentium et adfluens et vagus auditor adsuevit iam exigere laetitiam et pulchritudinem orationis [...] sive sensus aliquis arguta et brevi sententia effulsit, sive locus exquisito et poetico cultu enituit.*[177]

> The general audience, too, and the casual listeners who flock in and out, have come now to insist on a flowery and ornamental style of speaking […] whether it be the flash of an epigram embodying some conceit in pointed and terse phraseology, or the glamour of some passage of choice poetical beauty.

According to Aper, the audience prefers a 'flowery and ornamental style of speaking' (*laetitiam et pulchritudinem orationis*), as well as an effective style which, in metaphors which remind us of Longinus and Pliny, 'lights up' (*effulsit*) and 'sparkles through a remarkable and poetic ornamentation' (*exquisito et poetico cultu enituit*).[178] Whereas poetry

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present (*Dial. de Orat.* 16.7): *incipit Demosthenes vester, quem vos veterem et antiquum fingitis, non solum eodem anno quo nos, sed etiam eodem mense extitisse* ('it follows that your boasted Demosthenes, whom you make out to be an ancient, one of the olden times, must have lived not only in the same year as ourselves, but also in the same month').

[176] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 19.5.

[177] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 20.3-5.

[178] *Ibid.* More than any of the other authors discussed, Tacitus focuses on the active role played by the audience, and on the fastidious requirements it imposes on the orator. Cf. e.g. Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 20.4: *non solum audire, sed etiam referre domum aliquid inlustre et dignum memoria volunt* ('they are eager not only to hear but also to take home with them some striking and memorable utterance').

was the object of Aper's rejection and disdain in the first part of the *Dialogue*, he now allows poetic features to form the essential components of what a good speech is expected to be like in his own days.[179] Beauty and poetic embellishment are thus desirable stylistic features as long as they are not associated with the past. Consequently, what is good about the past – its beautiful Greek and Latin treasures – is simply annexed by the present and should be imitated, whereas all literary monstrosities (whether or not composed long before the present) should be contemptuously attributed to the atmosphere of a 'gloomy and rough antiquity'.

This pejorative stance towards *antiquitas* in the *Dialogue* is different from the approach of Dionysius and Longinus, for whom the classical past is a treasury of paragons of good style. Even more in the opinion of Longinus than in that of Dionysius, aesthetic and poetic virtues of style are often inseparably linked to the notion of archaism.[180] Their works are imbued with the idea that the literary masterpieces of Homer, Plato, Demosthenes and other champions of classical Greek literature are beautiful *because*, not despite of their age, although Dionysius also rejects some features of what he considers to be 'archaic' in Thucydides and Plato.[181] By the process of imitation, the aesthetic qualities of exemplary classical Greek authors cannot only be honoured, but also revived in the present. Thus, there is an element of archaism in Dionysius' and Longinus' conception of aesthetics, which grants

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[179] Cf. Mayer (2001), 152-153, who argues that 'the increasing use of poetic language and even syntax in the prose of the early Principate is indeed remarkable […]; from Aper's remark we learn that it was a deliberate choice'.

[180] Cf. Porter (2001), 80 on Longinus' *On the Sublime*: "There is an "archaicism" to the classicism of the sublime. […] Indeed, classicist criticism of the Imperial period standardly incorporates archaicism in the heart of its aesthetics'. For the notion of archaism, see also Porter (2006), 326-333, and especially his observation that 'elsewhere [e.g. in Longinus, M.S.], in other writers [than Dionysius, M.S.], archaism is more freely admitted to be a mark of all classical writing' (*ibid*., 328). For Dionysius on poetic and aesthetic virtues of style, see esp. section 3.6.2. For Longinus on poetic and aesthetic virtues of style, see section 5.4.

[181] For archaism as a vice in Thucydides, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 24.1: ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ἐκλογῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν τροπικὴν καὶ γλωττηματικὴν καὶ ἀπηρχαιωμένην καὶ ξένην λέξιν προελόμενος ἀντὶ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ συνήθους τοῖς κατ' αὐτὸν ἀνθρώποις ('in his choice of words he preferred those which were metaphorical, obscure, archaic and outlandish to those which were common and familiar to his contemporaries'). Cf. Dion. Hal. *Amm. II*, 2.2. For other passages in Dionysius discussing a style which is ἀπηρχαιωμένη, see Porter (2006), 327-328. For archaism as a vice in Plato, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Dem*. 5.5: ἐκχεῖται δ' εἰς ἀπειροκάλους περιφράσεις πλοῦτον ὀνομάτων ἐπιδεικνυμένη κενόν, ὑπεριδοῦσά τε τῶν κυρίων καὶ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ χρήσει κειμένων τὰ πεποιημένα ζητεῖ καὶ ξένα καὶ ἀρχαιοπρεπῆ ('it [i.e. Plato's style, M.S.] abandons itself to tasteless circumlocutions and an empty show of verbal exuberance and, in defiance of correct usage and standard vocabulary, seeks artificial, exotic and archaic forms of expression').

literary compositions the beautiful, but dim and weathered layer of corrosion (called 'patina') that is so characteristic of old statues.[182]

In his discussion of examples of rough harmony in the compositions of poets and lyricists, Dionysius points to the works of Aeschylus and Pindar, which display a 'nobility and venerability of harmony preserving the antique patina' (εὐγένεια καὶ σεμνότης ἁρμονίας τὸν ἀρχαῖον φυλάττουσα πίνον).[183] Striking is also Dionysius' description of the austere style as one of which 'the beauty consists in its patina of antiquity' (τὸν ἀρχαϊσμὸν καὶ τὸν πίνον ἔχουσα κάλλος).[184]

Also to Longinus, it is 'the choice of right and lofty words' (ἡ τῶν κυρίων καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκλογή) that grants our style 'grandeur' (μέγεθος), 'beauty' (κάλλος), 'old-world charm' (εὐπίνειαν), 'weight' (βάρος), 'force' (ἰσχύν), 'strength' (κράτος) and a 'sort of lustre, like the bloom on the surface of the most beautiful bronzes' (γάνωσίν τινα τοῖς λόγοις ὥσπερ ἀγάλμασι καλλίστοις δι᾽ αὐτῆς ἐπανθεῖν παρασκευάζουσα).[185] As in Dionysius, beauty and old-world charm are thus inextricably linked, and paralleled with the beautiful, but faded rust which settles on the surface of bronze statues.

This image of the beauty of dimness, incrustation and decay is reversed in Tacitus, who has Aper arguing that the temples of the present, contrary to the coarse sanctuaries of the past, 'glitter in marble and are all agleam with gold' (*marmore nitent et auro radiantur*), but are no less solid in their construction.[186] There is an even more explicit reversal of the idea of the beauty of πίνος or εὐπίνεια in a passage in which Aper discusses things which should be omitted because they are 'obsolete and musty' (*oblitterata et olentia*).[187] One of his advices is that a word should, as it were, not be 'affected with rust' (*rubigine infectum*).[188] He continues by designating the styles of Lucilius, Lucretius, Sisenna, Varro and Calvus as 'mournful and

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[182] Porter (2001), 80 also notes this correspondence between Dionysius and Longinus.

[183] Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 39.7. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 5.3: πίνος […] ὁ τῆς ἀρχαιότητος ('the patina of old age'); Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 38.6: χνοῦς ἀρχαιοπινής ('a delicate bloom of antique patina'). For a style which is 'antiquity minded' (φιλάρχαιος), cf. *Dem.* 36.5; *Dem.* 38.1; *Dem.* 49.1.

[184] Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 22.6. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 22.12: κάλλος ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀρχαϊκὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ αὐστηρόν ('the austere beauty of the distant past'); *Comp.* 22.35: ἀρχαϊκὸν δέ τι καὶ αὔθαδες […] κάλλος ('a sort of archaic and independent beauty of its own').

[185] Longin. *Subl.* 30.1.

[186] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 20.7.

[187] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 22.5.

[188] *Ibid.*

uncultivated' (*maesti et inculti*)', thus contrasting their gloomy and dim stylistic *color* with 'brilliance and refinement of words' (*nitorem et cultum verborum*).[189]

We are allowed to conclude that in Tacitus' *Dialogue*, the idea is prominently expressed that beauty is not connected to what is old, fragmentary and damaged – the 'past' is a dirty word –, or, as Porter writes in relation to the notion of the sublime, to what 'is lost or nearly so';[190] rather, beauty is intrinsically linked to the gleaming splendour of newly built literary compositions, or to those masterpieces (whether they belong to prose or poetry) which meet modern aesthetic taste and, hence, should be reckoned among the present. A style which is beautiful, flowery, lightning, captivating and free of rust (be it the style of a classical orator or a modern writer) transcends all temporal distinctions: it is modern and universal. Only when Tacitus has made a distinction between the 'real', coarse past on the one hand and a past which, regarding mindset and literary taste, should actually be considered 'present', he can pave the way for a direct competition between Greeks and Romans of all times.

5.7 DIO CHRYSOSTOM'S *ORATION* 18

Antiquity and modernity are also important themes in Dio Chrysostom's *Oration* 18. Dio (ca. 40 AD – ca. 120 AD) is considered one of the leading figures of the Second Sophistic.[191] He became a rhetorician and philosopher, and as such travelled through the Roman world during the reigns of Vespasian, Titus, Domitian, Nerva and Trajan. In 82, he was involved in a political intrigue and banished by emperor Domitian from Rome, Italy and even from his native Bithynia. Afther the death of Domitian in 96, Dio's exile came to an end and he was rehabilitated by Nerva. Dio resumed his travels and gave many lectures on ethical, political and rhetorical matters, which were often imbued with his nostalgic affection for the achievements of Ancient Greece. The writings of Dio that have come down to us comprise 76 essays and speeches.

Oration 18, traditionally entitled *On Training for Public Speaking* (Περὶ λόγου ἀσκήσεως), is a speech in which Dio puts forward a reading list of the most important Greek poets and prose authors. Although the date of origin of the work is not certain, many scholars

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[189] Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 23.6. Cf. n.104.

[190] Porter (2001), 82. Cf. his striking definition (*ibid.*) of the sublime as '[the emotion, M.S.] of the greatness of what is to be Greek on the verge of the attainment or loss of this greatness'. On the defence of modernity in Tacitus' *Dialogue*, see Goldberg (1999).

[191] The following information is based on Cohoon (1932), ix-xvi and Swain (2000), 1-10.

assume that the speech belongs to the earlier works of Dio and is written in the period before his exile, somewhere between 60 AD and 80 AD.[192] Being the only speech which is given the form of a letter within the corpus Dioneum, *Oration* 18 is addressed to an anonymous, busy Greek or Roman statesman, although salutations at the beginning and end of the letter are absent. Dio's epistolary reading list is structured around the same generic categories of literature as appear in Dionysius and Quintilian: first comes poetry, then prose. As for prose, however, Dionysius adopts the order of historiography, philosophy and oratory, whereas Dio and Quintilian have historiography, oratory, and philosophy.[193]

The addressee, an unknown statesman who is 'second to none in influence' (δυνάμει οὐδενὸς λειπόμενον), had not enjoyed thorough rhetorical training for reasons unknown.[194] Therefore, he wants to 'acquire training in eloquent speaking' (φιλοκαλεῖν περὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων ἐμπειρίαν) within a short period of time.[195] In adopting an almost obsequious and servile tone, Dio answers to his request by offering him an extensive list with recommendations. That Dio's selection of Greek poets and prose authors is entirely tailored to a late learner who wants to receive a crash course in rhetoric, is of great importance for understanding the unconventional choices he makes, the unusual judgements he passes on different authors, and the unprecedented advice to keep far away from tough labour:[196]

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[192] See e.g. Von Arnim (1898), 139.

[193] This is also observed by Rutherford (1998), 43.

[194] Dio *Orat*. 18.1.

[195] Dio *Orat*. 18.1. It is not clear who exactly Dio's correspondent – certainly a man of high position – might have been, and whether he was a Roman or a Greek statesman. He has been associated with Titus (e.g. Billault (2004), 515-518) and with Nerva (e.g. von Christ (1920), 363) before they became emperors; other scholars like Hammer (1898), 838 and Lemarchand (1926), 6 are of the opinion that Dio did not address his letter to an actual person. They support the view that *Oration* 18 should be regarded as a sophistic school exercise.

[196] As De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.) offers a detailed examination of the differences between the lists of Dionysius and Dio (and Quintilian), I will confine myself to the most obvious deviations. As for the poets, Dio mentions only three names, and reverses the list of Dionysius (and Quintilian) by placing Menander first and the great Homer last. Dio prefers Euripides and Menander (like Quintilian!), whereas Dionysius' ranking is Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. As for the historians, Dio mentions four names: Herodotus, Thucydides, Theopompus and Ephorus, while Xenophon is discussed as a philosopher. Unlike Dionysius, Dio considers Thucydides more useful than Herodotus and names Xenophon as the most useful author in the entire body of Greek literature, whereas Dionysius thinks Xenophon is only a good imitator of Herodotus, but in this capacity still lacks virtues like sublimity and grandeur. Quintilian, like Dio, admires Xenophon. As for the philosophers, Dio praises Xenophon and excludes all other philosophers (in Dionysius: the Pythagoreans, Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle; in Quintilian: Plato, Xenophon, the Socratics, Aristotle, Theophrastus and the

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ πρῶτον ἴσθι, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ σοι πόνου καὶ ταλαιπωρίας […].[197]

So first of all, you should know that you have no need of toil or exacting labour […].

This is also pointed out by De Jonge, who, in a thorough comparison between the lists of Dionysius and Dio, argues that Dio's 'shortcut to paideia' should be seen as a 'fanciful adaptation of the genre of rhetorical imitation'.[198] As we will see, this 'fanciful adaptation' is also recognizable in Dio's flexible and ambivalent use of the term μίμησις.

In *Oration* 18, Dio applies the term μίμησις three times, and in each case with respect to the authors he admires most: Menander (1x) and Xenophon (2x). The term ζῆλος is absent in this speech, although it frequently turns up in other speeches of Dio.[199] The first instance of μίμησις in *Oration* 18 does not pertain to the influence of one model upon another, but it is, in a Platonic sense, meant to designate Menander's convincing representation of reality:

[…] ἥ τε γὰρ τοῦ Μενάνδρου μίμησις ἅπαντος ἤθους καὶ χάριτος πᾶσαν ὑπερβέβληκε τὴν δεινότητα τῶν παλαιῶν κωμικῶν […].[200]

[…] for Menander's portrayal of every character and every charming trait surpassed all the skill of the old writers of comedy […].

Also interesting is Dio's application of the term μίμησις with respect to Xenophon. He argues that Xenophon's richness of content may well be a 'norm' (κανών) to anyone who wishes to be guided by him:

Εἰ γοῦν ἐθελήσειας αὐτοῦ τῇ περὶ τὴν Ἀνάβασιν πραγματείᾳ σφόδρα ἐπιμελῶς ἐντυχεῖν, οὐδένα λόγον εὑρήσεις τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ λεχθῆναι δυνησομένων, ὃν οὐ

Stoics). As for the orators, Dio mentions the same names as Dionysius, leaving out only Isocrates, and adding more recent authors. Quintilian has the same orators as Dionysius, but inserts Demetrius of Phalerum instead of Lycurgus. Although Dio can be said to mention almost the same names, his evaluation of these orators is completely different from especially Dionysius' treatise. Dio recommends Hyperides, Aeschines and Lycurgus for reasons of usefulness, although he admits that Demosthenes and Lysias, champions for Dionysius, are the best.

[197] Dio *Orat*. 18.6.

[198] De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.). On Dio's reading list in comparison with esp. Dionysius and Quintilian, see also Mérot (2017).

[199] Cf. e.g. Dio *Orat*. 21.11, a speech on beauty.

[200] Dio *Orat*. 18.7.

διείληπται καὶ κανόνος ἂν τρόπον ὑπόσχοι τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπευθῦναι ἢ μιμήσασθαι βουλομένῳ.[201]

> If, for instance, you should be willing to read his work on the *March Up Country* very carefully, you will find no speech, such as you will one day possess the ability to make, whose subject matter he has not dealt with and can offer as a kind of norm to any man who wishes to steer his course by him or imitate him.

Here, μιμήσασθαι, because of its conjunction with the verb ἀπευθῦναι ('steer'), has a regulatory connotation: whoever makes Xenophon's speech his model (κανών), may well hope for his vices to be repaired.

From the last occurrence of the term μίμησις, it also becomes clear that imitation is a means to learn and improve one's eloquence. This time, however, Dio uses the verb in a pejorative way, arguing that a hero like Xenophon, with his wide experience in politics, warfare and rhetoric, did not need to 'copy' what others before him had achieved:

> Ἅτε γὰρ, οἶμαι, μιγνὺς ταῖς πράξεσι τοὺς λόγους, οὐκ ἐξ ἀκοῆς παραλαβὼν οὐδὲ μιμησάμενος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς πράξας ἅμα καὶ εἰπών, πιθανωτάτους ἐποίησεν ἐν ἅπασί τε τοῖς συντάγμασι […].[202]

> For I imagine that it is because he [i.e. Xenophon, M.S.] combines words with deeds, because he did not learn by hearsay nor by imitating, but by doing deeds himself as well as telling of them, that he made his speeches most convincingly true to life in all his works […].

Thus, we may infer that μίμησις is presented as a highly practical means to correct one's errors and to acquire the versatile and realistic eloquence of those great authors who themselves could do without copying others, because their words were based on deeds.

The term used by Dio to designate the ability in eloquent speaking is, as in Quintilian, ἕξις, and Dio's addressee is encouraged to achieve this ability as easily as possible.[203] He

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[201] Dio *Orat*. 18.15.

[202] Dio *Orat*. 18.17.

[203] Cf. e.g. Dio *Orat*. 18.18: […] ἔπειτα πρὸς δύναμιν μὲν ἧττον συλλαμβάνει τοῦ γράφειν, πρὸς ἕξιν δὲ πλεῖον ('again, while it [i.e. dictating to a secretary, M.S.] contributes less to effectiveness than writing does, it contributes more to your habit of readiness').

should, for instance, not read Demosthenes and Lysias, but rather Hyperides and Aeschines, who are more useful:

> […] τούτων γὰρ ἁπλούστεραί τε αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ εὐληπτότεραι αἱ κατασκευαὶ καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἐκείνων λειπόμενον.[204]

> […] for the faculties in which they excel are simpler, their rhetorical embellishments are easier to grasp, and the beauty of their diction is not one whit inferior to that of the two who are ranked first.

It is Xenophon, however, on whose literary qualities Dio dwells most extensively. Xenophon's protreptic speeches, which he made 'most convincingly true to life' (πιθανωτάτους ἐποίησεν), not only aroused all listeners.[205] They also showed them, for instance, how to 'cope with proud people' (μέγα φρονοῦσι […] ὁμιλῆσαι), how to 'arrange secret deliberations with generals whether or not in the company of soldiers' (ἀπορρήτοις […] λόγοις […] χρήσασθαι καὶ πρὸς στρατηγοὺς ἄνευ πλήθους καὶ πρὸς πλῆθος), how to 'converse with kings' (βασιλικοῖς […] διαλεχθῆναι), how to 'deceive enemies to their detriment and friends to their benefit' (ἐξαπατῆσαι […] πολεμίους μὲν ἐπὶ βλάβῃ, φίλους δ' ἐπὶ τῷ συμφέροντι), how to 'tell needlessly disturbed people the truth without causing offence' (μάτην ταραττομένοις ἀλύπως τἀληθὲς καὶ πιστῶς εἰπεῖν), and how 'not to trust too readily your superiors' (τὸ μὴ ῥᾳδίως πιστεύειν τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι).[206] Thus, the concept of 'usefulness' in Dio's reading list is entirely meant to serve the social-political duties and aspirations of the addressee, and to allow him to get along with different people in different situations.

The pragmatically oriented Dio, however, does not rule out 'beauty' as a virtue of style, as he argues that the 'simpler faculties' (ἁπλούστεραί […] αἱ δυνάμεις) of Hyperides and Aeschines do not make their styles inferior to 'the beauty of words' (τὸ κάλλος τῶν ὀνομάτων) of Demosthenes and Lysias.[207] Apparently, to Dio 'beauty' *is* a criterion, although

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[204] Dio *Orat.* 18.11.

[205] Dio *Orat.* 18.17.

[206] Dio *Orat.* 18.16.

[207] Dio *Orat.* 18.11. Cf. De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.), who argues that 'this crucial passage brings out the contrast between two essentially different approaches to classical literature: it is the difference between Dionysius' *On Imitation* and Dio's *On Training for Public Speaking*. Demosthenes and Lysias may be the best orators, as Dio acknowledges; but they are not the most useful reading for an active statesman'.

not a decisive one; it is of subordinate importance compared to what is applicable in modern contexts.[208]

This pragmatic perspective also guides Dio in his preference for the usefulness of more recent compositions over the beauty of older literature, and for prose over poetry.[209] For this, he brings in the comparison of physicians giving their patients what is curative, not what is exuberant:

> […] οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰς πολυτελεστάτας τροφὰς συντάττουσι τοῖς θεραπείας δεομένοις, ἀλλὰ τὰς ὠφελίμους.[210]

> For physicians do not prescribe the most costly diet for their patients, but that which is salutary.

'Salutary' are for example, as we have seen, Menander's virtues of the 'portrayal of every charming character and every charming trait' (μίμησις ἅπαντος ἤθους καὶ χάριτος), but also Euripides' skills of 'suavity and plausibility' (προσήνεια καὶ πιθανότης), and his ways of treating 'characters and moving incidents' (ἤθη καὶ πάθη) and 'maxims' (γνῶμαι).[211] To Dio, the distance between these authors and the present can easily be bridged, as is expressed by the image of Xenophon 'reaching out a hand' to whoever reads his works thoroughly:

> Καὶ εὖ ἴσθι, οὐδένα σοι τρόπον μεταμελήσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν βουλῇ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ ὀρέγοντός σοι χεῖρα αἰσθήσῃ τοῦ ἀνδρός, εἰ αὐτῷ προθύμως καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐντυγχάνοις.[212]

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[208] The pragmatic focus of Dio's letter can be explained by pointing to his addressee, his purpose, the stylistic preferences of the Flavian Age, and the genre and tone of a literary letter. On this, see De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.).

[209] For Dio's appeal to read more recent authors, see *Orat*. 18.12: μηδὲ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀπείρως ἔχειν) ('not to remain unacquainted with the more recent orators, those who lived a little before our time'). For Dio's remarks on the limited usability of poetry for someone preparing himself for a political career, see *Orat*. 18.8: μέλη δὲ καὶ ἐλεγεῖα καὶ ἴαμβοι καὶ διθύραμβοι τῷ μὲν σχολὴν ἄγοντι πολλοῦ ἄξια· τῷ δὲ πράττειν τε καὶ ἅμα τὰς πράξεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὔξειν διανοουμένῳ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρὸς αὐτὰ σχολή ('lyric and elegiac poetry too, and iambics and dithyrambs are very valuable for the man of leisure, but the man who intends to have a public career and at the same time to increase the scope of his activities and the effectiveness of his oratory, will have no time for them').

[210] Dio *Orat*. 18.7.

[211] Dio *Orat*. 18.7.

[212] Dio *Orat*. 18.17.

And be well assured that you will have no occasion for regret, but that both in the senate and before the people you will find this great man extending his hand to you if you earnestly and diligently read him.

Dio shows himself perfectly aware of the abnormality of his favourable stance towards more recent authors, for he preemptively covers himself against 'more advanced critics' (τῶν σοφωτέρων) who probably want to chide him for 'selecting Menander's plays in preference to the Old Comedy, or Euripides in preference to the early writers of tragedy' (προκρίναντα τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας τὴν Μενάνδρου ἢ τῶν ἀρχαίων τραγῳδῶν Εὐριπίδην).[213] One of these 'advanced critics' may well have been someone like Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[214]

Unlike Dio, Dionysius for instance supports the view that the old and reverent Aeschylus, whom he calls 'sublime' (ὑψηλός), comes first, followed by Sophocles and Euripides.[215] Menander, whose content and style Dionysius admires, is – at least in the epitome – deemed worthy only of a brief mention.[216] Dionysius' exclusive admiration for classical Greek authors is dismissed by Dio, since he is of the opinion that it impairs a student's self-confidence by enslaving his judgement:

> Αἱ γὰρ τούτων δυνάμεις καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν εἶεν ἡμῖν ὠφέλιμοι, ᾗ οὐκ ἂν ἐντυγχάνοιμεν αὐτοῖς δεδουλωμένοι τὴν γνώμην, ὥσπερ τοῖς παλαιοῖς. Ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ δύνασθαί τι τῶν εἰρημένων αἰτιάσασθαι μάλιστα θαρροῦμεν πρὸς τὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἡμεῖς, καὶ ἥδιόν τις παραβάλλει αὐτὸν ᾧ πείθεται συγκρινόμενος οὐ καταδεέστερος, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ βελτίων ἂν φαίνεσθαι.[217]

> For the powers they [i.e. the more recent authors, M.S.] display can be more useful to us also in this way because when we read them, our judgement is not enslaved, as it is when we approach the ancients. For when we find that we are able to criticise what was said, we are most encouraged to attempt the same things ourselves. And one will more happily compare oneself to another when one believes that in the comparison he should be found to be not inferior to him, with the chance, occasionally, of being even superior.

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[213] Dio *Orat*. 18.7.

[214] This is also observed by De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.).

[215] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.10-13.

[216] Dion. Hal. *Imit*. 2.14.

[217] Dio *Orat*. 18.12.

The motif of the enslavement of our judgement by studying ancient writers can be found in a reversed way in Longinus.[218] At the end of *On the Sublime*, Longinus posits that it is the freedom of Athenian democracy which fostered the production of great literature, whereas people in his own time are enslaved by self-indulgence and greed – causes for the decline of rhetoric which are also presented in Tacitus' *Dialogue*.[219] Thus, here again, Dio deviates in a playful way from other classicising critics.

Dio, however, is not alone in his attitude to make authors whose works display 'beauty' and 'sublimity' subordinate to those for whom pragmatic virtues have greater priority, nor is he unique in favouring Euripides, although this tragedian's qualities 'perhaps do not completely attain the grandeur of the tragic poet's [i.e. Sophocles', M.S.] way of deifying his characters, or his high dignity' (τοῦ μὲν τραγικοῦ ἀπαθανατισμοῦ καὶ ἀξιώματος τυχὸν οὐκ ἂν τελέως ἐφικνοῖτο).[220] It is Quintilian who, in surprisingly similar idiom, shares and repeats Dio's ideas that Euripides is the 'most useful' (*utiliorem*) tragedian, though he admits that Sophocles is often considered 'more sublime' (*sublimior*) for his 'dignity' (*gravitas*), 'tragic grandeur' (*coturnus*) and 'resonance' (*sonus*).[221] Although Dio in many of his choices differs not only from Dionysius, but also from Quintilian and even all traditional rhetoric, we can conclude that in some respects, both he and his contemporary Quintilian do not adopt the deep-rooted aesthetic approach which is so characteristic of Dionysius' treatises, but also of the ideas on imitation expressed by Aelius Theon, Longinus and Pliny.[222]

5.8 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have seen that the Greek and Roman authors discussed drew from and contributed to a common discourse of imitation, but also adapted (elements from) this shared discourse to their own, personal agenda, which is determined by factors such as text genre and text goal, the person of the addressee, personal literary taste, specific attittudes towards prose and poetry, present and past, and different interpretations of the concepts of beauty and usefulness of literature. All these factors allow us to discern various interconnections between

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[218] This is also observed by De Jonge in J. König & N. Wiater (forthc.).

[219] Longin. *Subl*. 44; Tac. *Dial. de Orat*. 28-29.

[220] Dio *Orat*. 18.7.

[221] Quint. 10.1.67-68. Cf. section 4.7.

[222] In Tac. *Dial. de Orat*., beauty is an important criterion as far as it is connected with the present.

Greek and Latin authors, and to arrange them in groups on the basis of parameters other than 'Greekness' and 'Romanness'.

First of all, for all of the Greek and Latin authors discussed the process of imitation consists of a set of stages, which are distinguished more or less clearly: 1) the intensive and repeated study of a wide variety of literary models, 2) the acquisition of a sharp judgement, 3) the selection of what is best in the models chosen, and 4) the eclectic and original composition of a new work of literature. Furthermore, they all discuss classical Greek models whom they consider to be of paramount use for people involved with rhetoric.

The notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος and *imitatio* and *aemulatio* need not (always) be distinguished. When only μίμησις or *imitatio* is used, it is likely that ζῆλος or *aemulatio* is also implied, unless the terms are clearly opposed (as is often the case in the *Letters* of Pliny, as in Quintilian's *Institutio*). Possibly the term *aemulatio* denoting literary emulation was not yet fully established in the first century AD, which could also explain Quintilian's wary paraphrases of *aemulatio* in the *Institutio*. As a result of the general tendency to refer to the complex of imitation and emulation together by using only one term, we observe an amalgam of metaphors which often remind us of the conceptualisations of μίμησις and ζῆλος in Dionysius and *imitatio* and *aemulatio* in Quintilian as discussed in chapter 2. The use of similar metaphors suggests that the authors discussed articulated and exchanged rhetorical-critical ideas, and shared a Graeco-Roman framework of imitation with which they probably became acquainted during their training in the rhetorical schools of Rome.

Concerning the activity of imitating, we have seen that Aelius Theon, Longinus, and Seneca adopt the image of the movement of the soul to designate the inspiration by and thorough internalisation of literary models. This reminds us of Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος as an 'activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful' (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς πρὸς θαῦμα τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἶναι καλοῦ κινουμένη, *Imit.* fr. III U-R), but also of Quintilian's statement that 'our mind must be guided towards the model of all virtues' (*ad exemplum virtutum omnium mens derigenda*, 10.2.1).[223]

Another recurring metaphor for the activity of imitating is that of food and digestion. This metaphor, which is suggestive of the importance of internalizing and harmonizing a great variety of (aspects of) different literary models, is applied by Aelius Theon, who insists on a 'nourishment of style' (τροφὴ λέξεως, *Progymn.* 61.31), but also by Seneca, who argues that

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[223] Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti.

'reading nourishes the mind' (*alit lectio ingenium, Ep.* 84.1).[224] The latter, however, also expands the use of the metaphor of food, applying it not only as an image for the wide range of literature that has to become an inherent part of our mind, but also for the product of imitation, which is comparable to a balanced meal consisting of a wide variety of ingredients.

The activity of imitating is also frequently described in terms of competition and competitive aspiration. This is especially true for Longinus, whose concept of ζήλωσις (which overshadows the concept of μίμησις) is outlined by the image of Plato fighting with Homer, but also for Pliny, who understands *aemulatio* as the competitive aspiration of surpassing those masterpieces (especially Cicero's) which one's *intellegentia* and *ingenium* can grasp thoroughly. For Pliny, however, *aemulatio* can also be out of place and become impudent and mad. Here he sides with Dionysius, who refers to the positive, competitive and aspirative aspect of imitation by using the notion of ζῆλος, but also to literary zeal which degenerates into craze and jealousy. For Quintilian, *aemulatio* is only a highly recommended, competitive concept, often (and more prominently than in Greek texts) presented with the imagery of foot races, battles, and gladiator fights.

In both Greek and Latin texts, the striking effects of the product of imitation – i.e. the text of the imitator – upon the audience are often conceptualised by using imagery of natural phenomena. Longinus' use of metaphors of thunder and lightning, fire and raging streams to express the overwhelming power of rhetorical sublimity is, as we have seen, abundant. In his *Letters*, Pliny makes a plea for a style which is 'grand, spacious and sublime' (*lata et magnifica and excelsa*, 1.20.19), which 'thunders and lightens' (*tonat, fulgurat, ibid.*), and is 'like the winter snows' (*similem nivibus hibernis*, 1.20.22). Tacitus applies the imagery of lightning to describe the astonishing effects that speeches can (and indeed should) have upon the audience (cf. *effulsit, Dial. de Orat.* 20.3). Of course, the framing of language in terms of weather conditions is as old as Homer. Nevertheless, the fact that contemporary Greek and Latin authors who are (more or less critically) concerned with imitation and style drew from a similar treasury of metaphors, suggests that these authors could select from a common literary-critical discourse and reservoir of ideas those aspects that could serve their rhetorical agenda most effectively.

The agenda of each of the authors discussed is in the first place determined by factors such as text genre, text goal and the person of the addressee. Aelius Theon provides teachers

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[224] Cf. e.g. also Quint. 10.1.58, who draws a comparison between reading good and less good authors and eating exquisite and less exquisite dishes for the sake of variety.

in rhetoric with mimetic exercises for their students, who should become acquainted with beautiful literature; in a letter to his friend Lucilius, Seneca rather essayistically reflects on the subject of literary imitation in general; Longinus claims to offer his Roman addressee Postumius Terentianus a ὑπόμνημα in which imitation is presented as a road towards the ultimate goal of all literary effort, i.e. sublimity; Pliny touches upon his interpretation and activities of imitation and emulation in several of his letters to a variety of Roman recipients; in a highly literary dialogue, Tacitus renders the words of Roman men of letters who are concerned with issues such as imitation and rhetorical decline; and finally, Dio addresses an unknown Greek or Roman statesman who needs a crash course in literature for the sake of his own career. Not surprisingly, all these different frameworks induce different choices and accents concerning the subject of imitation. This is perhaps most obvious in Dio, who, as we have seen, playfully reverses the traditional mimetic mantra of laborious study because his addressee has little time.

However different the angles from which the Greek and Latin authors approach the subject of imitation, they are confronted with the very same tension between two quintessential mimetic criteria: literary beauty on the one hand and rhetorical-practical usefulness on the other.[225] In addressing this problem, the authors discussed – whatever their purpose – more or less explicitly reveal their personal tastes and deep-rooted convictions concerning the status of and connections between these criteria. Apart from the various correspondences and crosslinks between Greek and Latin authors on the level of mimetic terminology and metaphorical imagery, we can also clearly observe cross-cultural parallels in the ways in which the tension between literary beauty and rhetorical-practical usefulness is addressed. While insisting on practical usefulness, Aelius Theon, Longinus and Pliny, like Dionysius, advocate a remarkably aesthetic interpretation of imitation, in which the study of often more ancient authors who are famous for their beauty and magnificence of style is of central concern. By contrast, Dio and (the interlocutors in) Tacitus, like Quintilian, proclaim a study of often more modern authors, the aim of which is practically oriented even more than aesthetically motivated. They may well represent a later stage in the history of imperial classicism, which is not so much focused on a revival of Greek paragons of stylistic beauty and magnificence as on the applicability of former Greek literature in a modern Roman society.

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[225] In *Ep*. 84, Seneca does not touch upon literary beauty and usefulness. Therefore, I can only fruitfully compare him with the Greek and Latin authors discussed as far as the discourse of imitation is concerned.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have analysed the classicising ideas on imitation in Dionysius and Quintilian by focusing on the use of mimetic terminology throughout their works, as well as on the form and content of their reading lists. A selection of works written by contemporary Greek and Roman authors, who also embarked on themes related to imitation, formed the variegated background of my investigation. By closely examining the mimetic ideas of Dionysius, Quintilian and some of their contemporaries, this study casts new light on the interferences between Greek and Roman intellectuals, who turn out to have tapped into a common reservoir of language and ideas to describe the process of imitation, whilst selecting and adapting from this reservoir those elements that adequately suit their rhetorical agendas. I will summarise the most important outcomes of this dissertation.

In chapter 2, I explored the ways in which the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος and *imitatio* and *aemulatio* are interpreted, applied and interconnected in the works of Dionysius and Quintilian. For both critics, there is an evident, complementary connection between imitation and emulation, but they conceive of this connection in different ways. Whereas Dionysius suggests that μίμησις and ζῆλος are of equal value, imply each other when appearing separately, form part of the same process of imitation, and ideally always form a homogeneous pair in this process, Quintilian thinks that *imitatio* is subordinate to *aemulatio* and should gradually fade away in the orator's career, leaving the field open for *aemulatio*. I argued that the underlying reason for this discrepancy between Dionysius and Quintilian is a different notion of what exactly μίμησις-ζῆλος and *imitatio-aemulatio* mean. Although both critics draw from a similar conceptual framework in their interpretation of μίμησις/*imitatio* as a technical-creative device in order to create uniformity with a higher-placed model, they also adapt elements from this framework to their own ideas and purposes. Dionysius interprets μίμησις as an original re-expression of literary models, whereas Quintilian expresses the idea that *imitatio* involves the basic repetition and copying of literary models. Their interpretations of ζῆλος and *aemulatio* differ even more significantly. In Dionysius' thinking, ζῆλος is an aspiring movement of the soul generated by the contemplation of paragons of astonishing literary beauty, which either inspires the imitator to parallel and surpass these models in his own work, or fills him with degenerated and misguided zeal. Quintilian's notion of *aemulatio*

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dominates his mimetic ideas, and is almost always positively charged. It encapsulates the idea of changing, completing and surpassing literary examples in a trial of strength. The differences between Dionysius' and Quintilian's understanding and use of mimetic terminology have been explained by pointing to their different cultural backgrounds. The Greek Dionysius propagates an original revival of the magnificent masterpieces of classical Greece through μίμησις and ζῆλος. By contrast, Quintilian's rhetorical programme of imitation mainly serves his aspiration to make Latin literature as great as Greek, and it is *aemulatio* which pre-eminently allows him to achieve his goal.

Chapter 3 and 4, which form a diptych, were concerned with the ways in which Dionysius' and Quintilian's theoretical ideas on imitation are related to the practical reading advice in their canons. Chapter 3 threw new light on Dionysius' ideas on imitation by presenting a thorough analysis of often unexplored textual material. I distilled and reconstructed important themes and criteria for imitation from the various remnants of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, and analysed the purposes, audience, content and form of the epitome of this treatise. I showed that on the basis of thematic and stylistic correspondences with the works of Dionysius, some fragments which lack an explicit reference to 'our' Dionysius may well be considered genuine descendants from the treatise *On Imitation*, such as a remarkable, but often neglected scholion to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. From the analysis of the extensive quote from *On Imitation* in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*, I deduced that the epitome rather faithfully summarises the original text, and that Dionysius in his treatise *On Imitation* has been concerned not only with style (on which the epitome focuses), but also with subject matter. Moreover, the quote from the *Letter to Pompeius* taught us that the various literary virtues distinguished by Dionysius can often be applied both to the level of subject matter and style. The qualities which his *Letter to Pompeius* labels as 'additional' turned out to play a more important role in his epitome (and in the rest of his works) than the 'essential' virtues. Regarding the epitome, this chapter also established that the wide variety of adhortative formulas – directives, adhortative subjunctives and verbal adjectives, which are often clustered in particular sections of the epitome – not only reflects Dionysius' pedagogical purpose to offer a reading list for young orators *in spe*, but also seems to bear traces of the stylistically different sources employed by Dionysius to give shape to his reading advice concerning the specific genres of poetry and prose. In the last sections of this chapter, I examined the literary virtues used in the epitome to designate the styles of the selected authors. I concluded that Dionysius' recommendations of practical virtues such as clarity

compensate for his predominant insistence on poetical virtues related to magnificence and beauty, and contribute to achieving his ideal of stylistic mixture.

In chapter 4, we turned to an inquiry of the structure, aims, choices and evaluations of authors, selection criteria and use of literary virtues in Quintilian's canons of Greek and Latin literature. A comparison with Dionysius' canon of Greek literature yielded many correspondences and differences which, I argued, resulted from their adaptive use of a shared repertoire of language and notions. I observed that Dionysius and Quintilian make use of similar building blocks to construct their theory of imitation: the concepts of rhetorical facility, wide knowledge, sound judgement, scrupulous selection and eclecticism form the backbones of their methodologies of imitation. The structure of their canons, their evaluations of writers and their preferences for literary virtues displayed many similarities, but also remarkable deviations, the most important of which turned out to be the following. Unlike Dionysius, who is inclined to rely on the guideline of chronology in structuring his canon, Quintilian arranges the authors in his Greek list by tapping into an amalgam of criteria, of which the desired parallelism with the often more cogent order of affiliated authors in his Latin reading list is a rare, but striking example. I established that in his insertion of different Hellenistic authors (who are absent in Dionysius' list), Quintilian gives voice to the popularity of these writers in his own days, tries to satisfy more advanced students who are formally beyond his scope, and attempts to compensate for the lacunae in Latin literary genres which are not yet fully developed. Moreover, we have seen that the names of Hellenistic authors serve to suggest a chronological continuum between classical Greek and Latin literature. In the more detailed analysis of the judgements Quintilian passes on various authors, I argued that he travels together with Dionysius in many cases, but is also guided by his own rhetorical agenda, which is determined by factors such as the criterion of rhetorical usefulness, the audience of novice learners, and the literary tastes of the Flavian Age. Quintilian's stringent aim of rhetorical usefulness may also pre-eminently explain why he is much less concerned with the poetical virtues of literary beauty and magnificence than Dionysius, and instead focuses on practical qualities displayed by more modern authors. After having turned to the last sections of this chapter, I elaborated on the metaphors and motives used by Quintilian in his two canons, arguing that his peculiar language clearly frames Greek and Roman identity in different ways. Whereas he evokes the image of an authoritative and autarkic Greek culture, he outlines Roman society as maturing, promising and embroiled with Greece in a battle for literary rule. His mission, clearly, is to make the Romans surpass Greek literature by translating, adapting and improving on its achievements. We have seen that such competitive

purposes are far removed from Dionysius. Focusing on the literary magnificence and beauty of Greek texts, this Greek in Rome rather tries not only to strengthen the identity of Greeks in Rome by accomplishing a revival of their 'own' literature, but also to help the Attic Muse gain even more ground than Rome on its own could provide.

Chapter 5 placed Dionysius' and Quintilian's mimetic terminology and ideas as discussed in chapter 2-4 in a broader perspective by selecting and comparing various Greek and Roman sources on imitation and emulation: Aelius Theon's *Progymnasmata*, Seneca's *Letter to Lucilius* 84, Longinus' *On the Sublime*, various letters of Pliny, Tacitus' *Dialogue on Oratory*, and Dio Chrysostom's *Oration* 18. An examination of their use and conceptualisations of the notions of μίμησις-ζῆλος and *imitatio-aemulatio* yielded various similarities and differences. In their construction of a framework of imitation, we have discerned various constants, the most important of which is that they distinguish between μίμησις-ζῆλος and *imitatio-aemulatio* only sporadically. When either μίμησις/*imitatio* or ζῆλος/*aemulatio* appears without its partner, this partner is likely to be implied. This general tendency to refer to the complex of imitation and emulation together by using only one term results in an amalgam of metaphors which often remind us of the imagery used to describe the more clearly distinguished notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος in Dionysius and *imitatio* and *aemulatio* in Quintilian. We have seen that some Greek and Latin authors, like Dionysius, adopt the image of the movement of the soul; others frame imitation in terms of the digestion of food, or by reference to competition and eager aspiration, like Quintilian. Whereas I argued that the recurring ideas and metaphors of imitation in these sources suggest a common discourse of imitation from which their Greek and Roman composers evidently draw and to which they contribute, I explained the differences in accents and nuances by assuming that these authors eclectically gather from this shared discourse the material to realise their aims (which are often bound to specific requirements of genre and addressee) and to express their literary tastes. Influenced by all these factors of text genre, audience, text goal, and personal preferences, the authors at stake address the tension between two quintessential mimetic criteria: literary beauty on the one hand and rhetorical-practical usefulness on the other. This chapter established that also in addressing this crucial issue, the crosslinks between Greeks and Romans are obvious. Aelius Theon, Longinus and Pliny (like Dionysius) adopt a remarkably aesthetic and sometimes archaizing approach of literature, whereas Dio and Tacitus (like Quintilian) propagate the mimetic use of (more modern) literature which is practically oriented more than aesthetically inspired. These latter authors possibly reflect a newer, later stage in Roman classicism.

This study has shown that Greek and Roman critics do not operate separately from each other, but draw from a shared discourse in order to profile their rhetorical agendas. Whereas some Greek and Roman authors espouse the idea that literary beauty – often displayed by more archaic poets and prose authors – should be a leading mimetic principle serving rhetorical-practical purposes, others are inclined to emphasise that rhetoricians *in spe* should concentrate rather on the practical usefulness of former literature by studying more recent writers. Dionysius can be seen as an important representative of the former, Quintilian of the latter branch, both of which are sprung from the very same, dialogical tradition of classicising theorisation on imitation in Rome.

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SAMENVATTING

Dit proefschrift biedt een comparatieve analyse van terminologie, theorieën en conceptualiseringen van retorische imitatie in Dionysius' *De imitatione* en Quintilianus' *Institutio Oratoria*, en wel tegen de achtergrond van het toenmalige Grieks-Romeinse literaire classicisme. Uit deze analyse blijkt enerzijds dat Grieken en Romeinen van een gemeenschappelijk discours gebruikmaakten om het proces van imitatie te beschrijven, anderzijds dat zij dat discours op selectieve wijze benutten ter profilering van hun persoonlijke agenda, die in belangrijke mate werd bepaald door het sociaal-culturele karakter van de kringen waarin zij verkeerden. Op grond van deze constatering kunnen zowel de overeenkomsten als de verschillen tussen noties over imitatie van Grieken en Romeinen in de eerste eeuw n.Chr. worden verklaard.

Hoofdstuk 1 ('Introduction') introduceert Dionysius' *De imitatione* (waarvan slechts fragmenten en een samenvatting van het tweede boek zijn overgeleverd) en Quintilianus' *Institutio Oratoria* 10. Beide teksten doen, onder meer in de vorm van een zogenaamde 'leeslijst' of 'canon', aanbevelingen over de retorische imitatie en emulatie van een selectie van klassiek-Griekse auteurs. Daarnaast behandelt dit inleidende hoofdstuk de twee programmatische, Platonisch-geïnspireerde verhalen die (de samenvatting van) Dionysius' tweede boek van *De imitatione* inleiden. Aan de hand van deze verhalen schetst het in kort bestek de fascinerende overeenkomsten en verschillen die bestaan tussen de terminologie en conceptualiseringen van imitatie in Dionysius, Quintilianus en contemporaine Griekse en Latijnse auteurs. Vervolgens verklaart dit hoofdstuk hoe het onderhavige onderzoek naar Griekse en Romeinse theorieën over literaire imitatie in het vroeg-keizerlijke Rome zich verhoudt tot het brede, moderne wetenschappelijke debat over de dialectische ideeënuitwisseling tussen Grieken en Romeinen en over de manieren waarop zij hun identiteit vormden. Tot besluit worden de structuur, inhoud en onderzoeksmethoden van dit proefschrift summier uiteengezet en toegelicht.

Hoofdstuk 2 ('Dionysius and Quintilian on Imitation and Emulation') beschrijft de manieren waarop Dionysius en Quintilianus in hun werk de begrippen μίμησις en ζῆλος/*imitatio* en *aemulatio* onderling verbinden, interpreteren en hanteren. Het betoogt enerzijds dat de overeenkomsten tussen hun interpretaties en gebruikswijzen van mimetische terminologie kunnen worden verklaard door het gemeenschappelijke discours waarvan zij deel uitmaakten; anderzijds stelt het dat de verschillen tussen hun interpretaties en gebruikswijzen van mimetische terminologie voortvloeien uit hun selectieve en adaptieve

gebruik van dat gemeenschappelijke discours. Hun selectieve en adaptieve werkwijze is een gevolg van hun uiteenlopende, sociaal-cultureel bepaalde bedoelingen met en houdingen ten aanzien van de literaire erfenis van klassiek Griekenland. Zowel Dionysius als Quintilianus lijken μίμησις en ζῆλος/*imitatio* en *aemulatio* als twee complementaire stadia te beschouwen. Zij hebben echter een verschillende voorstelling van die complementariteit. Dionysius suggereert dat μίμησις en ζῆλος gelijkwaardig zijn, elkaar impliceren als ze afzonderlijk voorkomen, van één en hetzelfde proces van imitatie deel uitmaken en daarbinnen idealiter een homogeen paar vormen. Quintilianus daarentegen laat blijken dat *imitatio* ondergeschikt is aan *aemulatio* en daarvoor geleidelijkerwijs – dat wil zeggen: gedurende de loopbaan van een retor – moet plaatsmaken. Deze verschillen tussen Dionysius en Quintilianus komen voort uit hun uiteenlopende duidingen van de begrippen μίμησις en ζῆλος/*imitatio* en *aemulatio*. Hoewel beide critici uit hetzelfde discours putten in hun beschrijving van μίμησις/*imitatio* als een technisch-creatief middel tot het scheppen van gelijkvormigheid met een achtenswaardig literair voorbeeld, brengen zij ook veel elementen uit dat discours in overeenstemming met hun eigen retorische programma. Dionysius interpreteert μίμησις als de originele re-expressie van literaire voorbeelden, terwijl *imitatio* voor Quintilianus wijst op de basale herhaling en kopiëring van literaire modellen. Wat betreft ζῆλος/*aemulatio* zijn de verschillen tussen Dionysius en Quintilianus echter nog significanter. Dionysius verstaat onder ζῆλος een stuwende zielsbeweging die wordt veroorzaakt door de bestudering van literaire voorbeelden van uitzonderlijke schoonheid. Daardoor kan de imitator zijn voorbeelden evenaren of overtreffen, maar evengoed bestaat de kans dat zijn ζῆλος degenereert en leidt tot misplaatste competitiezucht. In Quintilianus' werk is *aemulatio* een sterk competitief gekleurd begrip, dat van overheersend belang is en bijna altijd positief geladen is. Het beduidt een literaire krachtmeting: de aanpassing, voltooiing en overtreffing van voorbeelden. Quintilianus' veelvuldige gebruik van strijdmetaforen in de beschrijving van de verhouding tussen Latijnse en Griekse literatuur is, net als zijn insisteren op *aemulatio*, suggestief voor een te behalen Romeinse *eindoverwinning* op het Griekse literaire erfgoed. Dit staat in contrast met een door Dionysius gepropageerde *herleving* van de schoonheid van klassiek-Griekse literaire meesterwerken in zowel Griekse als Latijnse literatuur door middel van μίμησις en ζῆλος.

In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4, die een tweeluik vormen, staat centraal op welke wijzen de imitatietheorieën van Dionysius en Quintilianus in praktische leesadviezen worden vertaald. Hoofdstuk 3 ('Dionysius' *On Imitation* and his Reading List of Greek Literature') werpt, door nog nauwelijks ontgonnen tekstmateriaal te analyseren, nieuw licht op Dionysius' ideeën over imitatie in zijn fragmentarisch overgeleverde traktaat *De imitatione*. Het destilleert en

reconstrueert belangrijke thema's en criteria van imitatie op grond van de overgeleverde tekstuele overblijfselen van *De imitatione*; verder toont het aan dat sommige fragmenten en testimonia waarvan de authenticiteit wordt betwijfeld, op basis van thematische en stilistische correspondenties met de rest van Dionysius' werk wel degelijk als restanten van *De imitatione* kunnen worden beschouwd. Een nauwkeurige analyse van het lange citaat uit het tweede boek van *De imitatione* in Dionysius' *Epistula ad Pompeium* leert ons in de eerste plaats dat de samenvatting van het tweede boek van *De imitatione* de originele tekst tamelijk getrouw resumeert. Ten tweede blijkt hieruit dat Dionysius' aandacht in *De imitatione* niet alleen uitgaat naar stijl (zoals de samenvatting van het tweede boek misschien doet vermoeden), maar ook naar inhoudelijke kwesties. In de derde plaats wordt duidelijk dat de verschillende literaire deugden die Dionysius noemt, in veel gevallen zowel op stijl als op inhoud betrekking hebben. Bovendien kan worden geconstateerd dat niet de essentiële deugden (ἀναγκαῖαι) die Dionysius in zijn *Epistula ad Pompeium* onderscheidt, maar de door hem als 'additioneel' bestempelde deugden (ἐπίθετοι) een cruciale rol spelen in de samenvatting van het tweede boek van *De imitatione* (en in de rest van Dionysius' werk). Van die samenvatting worden in een volgende sectie tekstdoel, publiek, inhoud en vorm besproken. De belangrijkste vaststelling in dat verband is wel dat de grote hoeveelheid aansporende formules – directieven, adhortatieve conjunctieven en verbale adjectieven, die vaak geclusterd in bepaalde secties van de samenvatting voorkomen – niet alleen duiden op het pedagogische karakter van Dionysius' werk *De imitatione*, dat als praktische gids voor toekomstige redenaars heeft gediend; ook lijken zij de sporen te bevatten van de diverse, stilistisch uiteenlopende bronnen die Dionysius heeft geraadpleegd om zijn leesadviezen met betrekking tot de genres van proza en poëzie vorm te geven. Hoofdstuk 3 besluit met een ordening en bespreking van de talloze literaire deugden die in de samenvatting van het tweede boek van Dionysius' *De imitatione* worden gebruikt om de stijlen van verschillende auteurs te kenschetsen. Hieruit blijkt dat de grote nadruk die Dionysius legt op poëtische verhevenheid en schoonheid voor retorisch-praktische doeleinden niet alleen wordt gecompenseerd door zijn aanbevelingen van prozaïscher deugden als 'helderheid' (σαφήνεια) en 'plezier' (ἡδονή), maar ook door zijn vurige pleidooi voor mimetisch eclecticisme en stilistische menging.

Hoofdstuk 4 ('From Dionysius to Quintilian. Quintilian's Reading Lists of Greek and Latin Literature') onderzoekt, in nauwe vergelijking met de in hoofdstuk 3 besproken leeslijst van Dionysius, de structuur en doelstellingen van Quintilianus' Griekse en Latijnse leeslijsten, en stelt zijn selectie en evaluatie van navolgenswaardige auteurs aan de orde. De talrijke overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de Griekse leeslijsten van Dionysius en Quintilianus

zijn, zo betoogt dit hoofdstuk, het gevolg van hun selectieve en adaptieve gebruik van een gemeenschappelijk repertoire van taalidioom en conceptualiseringen. Voor hun theorieën van imitatie gebruiken zij vergelijkbare bouwstenen; retorische vaardigheid, brede kennis, scherpzinnige oordeelsvorming, scrupuleuze selectie van na te volgen literaire deugden en eclectische compositie van een nieuwe tekst vormen het geraamte van hun methodologieën van imitatie. In de structuur van hun leeslijsten, maar ook in hun evaluaties van auteurs en voorkeuren voor bepaalde stijldeugden, openbaren zich niet alleen overeenkomsten, maar ook belangrijke verschillen. Waar Dionysius geneigd is zich bij de structurering van zijn leeslijst te verlaten op de leidraad van de chronologie van auteurs, ordent Quintilianus de schrijvers in zijn Griekse canon door te putten uit een amalgaam van criteria. 'Coherentie' tussen auteurs (dat wil zeggen: een expliciet gemaakte connectie, die vaak is gebaseerd op het principe van imitatie) en de 'literaire superioriteit' van een auteur (bepaald door traditionele consensus of ingegeven door de persoonlijke literaire smaak, de eigen retorische agenda en/of de voorkeuren van contemporaine literaire kringen) lijken voor hem zwaarwegender factoren te zijn in de volgordebepaling dan voor Dionysius. In zeldzame gevallen laat Quintilianus zich in de rangschikking van Griekse auteurs zelfs leiden door de (kennelijk dwingender) volgorde waarin hij hun Latijnse evenknieën laat verschijnen. Door zijn toevoeging van diverse namen van Hellenistische auteurs, die in Dionysius' lijst ontbreken, geeft Quintilianus stem aan de toenmalige populariteit van deze schrijvers, komt hij aan de wensen van gevorderde studenten tegemoet die formeel buiten zijn aandachtsgebied vallen, en probeert hij de lacunes binnen zich nog ontwikkelende Latijnse literaire genres te ondervangen. Bovendien wekt hij door het invoegen van verschillende namen van Hellenistische auteurs de suggestie van een chronologisch continuüm tussen de klassiek-Griekse en Latijnse literatuur. Wat betreft de beoordeling van literaire kwaliteiten van verschillende auteurs gaan Dionysius en Quintilianus vaak gelijk op, maar soms bewandelen zij ook verschillende wegen. Wanneer Quintilianus een ander oordeel velt over een auteur dan Dionysius, zijn daarop bijvoorbeeld de volgende factoren van invloed: Quintilianus' lezerspubliek van beginnelingen, het door hem streng gehanteerde principe van bruikbaarheid van een auteur in een retorische context, en de heersende literaire smaak in de Flavische Periode. Quintilianus' stringente principe van de retorische bruikbaarheid van een auteur verklaart ook bij uitstek waarom de poëtische deugden van literaire schoonheid en verhevenheid voor hem van minder overheersend belang zijn dan voor Dionysius; Quintilianus insisteert eerder op de praktische kwaliteiten die door modernere Griekse en Latijnse auteurs aan de dag worden gelegd. Door zijn gebruik van metaforen en motieven in de Griekse en Latijnse leeslijsten framet hij de Griekse en Latijnse

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identiteit op verschillende manieren. Het beeld van een gezaghebbende en autarkische Griekse cultuur plaatst hij tegenover dat van een rijpende, veelbelovende Romeinse samenleving, die met Griekenland verwikkeld is in een verhitte strijd om de literaire heerschappij. Zijn missie is er duidelijk op gericht om de Romeinen de Griekse literatuur te laten overtreffen door die te vertalen, adapteren en verbeteren. Zulke competitieve doelstellingen zijn Dionysius vreemd. Door een *herleving* van de verhevenheid en schoonheid van Griekse literatuur te bevorderen, probeert hij niet alleen de identiteit van Grieken in Rome te versterken, maar ook de 'Attische Muze' nog meer terrein te laten winnen dan Rome alleen haar kon bieden.

Hoofdstuk 5 ('Greek and Roman Theories on Imitation in the First Century AD') plaatst de mimetische terminologie, theorieën en conceptualiseringen van Dionysius en Quintilianus, zoals besproken in de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4, in een breder perspectief door verschillende Griekse en Latijnse bronnen over imitatie bijeen te brengen en met elkaar te vergelijken. Het betreft Aelius Theons *Progymnasmata*, Seneca's *Epistula* 84, Longinus' *De Sublimitate*, diverse brieven van Plinius, de *Dialogus de Oratoribus* van Tacitus en *Oratio* 18 van Dio Chrysostomus. Een analyse van hun gebruik en conceptualiseringen van de begrippen μίμησις en ζῆλος/*imitatio* en *aemulatio* brengt diverse overeenkomsten en verschillen aan het licht. Waar het hun raamwerk van imitatie betreft, zijn vooral constanten aanwijsbaar. De belangrijkste is wel dat tussen μίμησις en ζῆλος/*imitatio* en *aemulatio* sporadisch wordt onderscheiden. Wanneer de term μίμησις/*imitatio* zonder zijn partner ζῆλος/*aemulatio* verschijnt (of vice versa), dan wordt die partner vaak toch geïmpliceerd. Deze algemene tendens om aan het complex van imitatie en emulatie te refereren bij gebruikmaking van slechts één term, leidt tot een amalgaam van metaforen. Die doen sterk denken aan de beeldtaal die Dionysius en Quintilianus inzetten om de (bij hen veel duidelijker onderscheiden) noties van respectievelijk μίμησις en ζῆλος/*imitatio* en *aemulatio* te beschrijven. Net als Dionysius gebruiken sommigen van de besproken Griekse en Latijnse schrijvers het beeld van de zielsbeweging om het imitatieproces aan te duiden; anderen framen imitatie in termen van voedselvertering of door te refereren aan competitie en gretige aspiratie, zoals Quintilianus dat ook doet. De vergelijkbare ideeën en metaforen in deze verschillende bronnen suggereren wederom een gemeenschappelijk discours waaruit Grieken en Romeinen konden putten en waaraan zij konden bijdragen; de verschillen in accenten en nuances daarentegen lijken erop te wijzen dat deze auteurs vrijelijk en op eclectische wijze uit dit gedeelde discours het materiaal destilleerden dat ze konden gebruiken. Zo konden ze hun (vooral door tekstgenre en adressaat bepaalde) doelen verwezenlijken en hun literaire smaak

tot uitdrukking brengen. Ondanks hun verschillende oogmerken, motieven en voorkeuren moesten deze auteurs zich tot dezelfde twee essentiële criteria van imitatie verhouden: literaire schoonheid enerzijds en retorisch-praktisch nut anderzijds. Ook in dit opzicht blijken er duidelijke dwarsverbindingen tussen Grieken en Romeinen te bestaan. Aelius Theon, Longinus en Plinius stonden, net als Dionysius, een opvallend esthetische en soms ook archaïserende invulling van imitatie voor. Dio en Tacitus daarentegen bepleitten, net als Quintilianus, een mimetische omgang met (modernere) literatuur die praktisch-gericht eerder dan esthetisch-geïnspireerd was. Deze laatste groep auteurs representeert mogelijkerwijs een nieuwe, latere fase in het Romeinse classicisme.

Hoofdstuk 6 ('Conclusion') presenteert de resultaten van dit proefschrift. Tot besluit stelt het dat de besproken Griekse en Romeinse critici niet als afzonderlijke groepen opereerden, maar gebruikmaakten van een gemeenschappelijk discours, dat hen van dié bouwstenen voorzag die zij konden benutten om hun eigen, persoonlijke agenda te profileren. Op grond van deze constatering kan men verwantschappen tussen de besproken auteurs aanwijzen die niet (uitsluitend) betrekking hebben op de vaak gebruikte parameters van 'Grieksheid' en 'Romeinsheid', maar die veeleer berusten op inhoudelijk-conceptuele denkkaders. Sommige Grieken en Romeinen omarmden het idee dat literaire schoonheid – die vaak te vinden is bij de oudere dichters en prozaschrijvers – een leidend mimetisch principe moest zijn bij de verwezenlijking van retorisch-praktische doelen; andere Grieken en Romeinen waren geneigd te benadrukken dat jonge redenaars *in spe* zich moesten concentreren op de praktische bruikbaarheid van literatuur door vooral recentere auteurs te bestuderen. Dionysius kan worden beschouwd als een belangrijke vertegenwoordiger van de eerste, Quintilianus van de tweede groep, die beide hun oorsprong hadden in dezelfde, dialogische traditie van classicistische theorievorming over imitatie in Rome.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Adriana Maria (Marianne) Schippers werd geboren op 23 december 1987 te Heemstede. Zij studeerde klassieke talen (GLTC) aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Haar BA-graad verwierf zij in 2011 (*cum laude*); haar MA-graad in 2013 (*cum laude*). Voor haar masterscriptie *Aan de rand der tijdeloosheid. De receptie van de klassieke oudheid in* De hovenier *van Ida G.M. Gerhardt* ontving zij de Masterscriptieprijs van de Faculteit der Letteren VU 2013. Tijdens haar studie werkte zij als docent klassieke talen op middelbare scholen te Nieuw-Vennep en Amsterdam.

In 2014 werd zij aangesteld als PhD-onderzoeker bij de vakgroep klassieke talen van de Universiteit Leiden. Zij voerde, onder supervisie van prof. dr. I. Sluiter en dr. C.C. de Jonge, een promotieonderzoek uit dat deel uitmaakte van het NWO-VIDI-project 'Greek Criticism and Latin Literature. Classicism and Cultural Interaction in Late Republican and Early Imperial Rome' (geleid door dr. C.C. de Jonge). Gedurende haar onderzoek gaf zij BA1-colleges aan de Universiteit Leiden en verzorgde zij lezingen in binnen- en buitenland. In 2018 kreeg zij een tijdelijke vervangingsaanstelling als UD Griekse Taal- en Letterkunde aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, waar zij onderwijs gaf binnen het gehele BA-programma klassieke talen (GLTC).

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