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Politics, Bureaucracy and Successful Governance

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Prof.dr. K.J. Meier

Politics, Bureaucracy and Successful Governance



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Discover the world at Leiden University

Politics, Bureaucracy and Successful Governance

Inaugural lecture delivered by

Prof.dr. K.J. Meier

at the acceptance of Professor,

of Public Administration

Leiden University,

on Monday 20 May 2019



**Universiteit
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The Netherlands

Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, your Excellencies, zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders,

The first lecture is both an opportunity to introduce oneself to one's fellow scholars and to define a research agenda for my professorship on Bureaucracy and Democracy at Leiden University. I am a social scientist with wide ranging interests who believes that several different perspectives are valuable in addressing broad questions of governance in modern society. This leads me to avoid specialization in a single policy area or country and engage in what often might appear to be unconnected scholarship with the eventual objective of arriving at a more generalizable and coherent scholarly statement. I am also a design scientist who believes that my fellow social scientists should be concerned not just with how things are, but how they might be. This view has been much influenced by my time at the University of Wisconsin and "the Wisconsin ideal," the idea that the university has no walls and should focus its efforts on real world problems.

One of the major questions, perhaps the major question, in the field of public administration is how to reconcile the need for bureaucracy with the democratic process. Bureaucracies after all are not seen as democratic institutions and operate based on hierarchy and expertise rather than popular will (see Mosher 1968). I take a distinctly minority view in the field, seeing bureaucracy not so much as a threat to democracy in existing mature democracies but as a necessary precondition for the existence of democracy in modern society (Meier 1997). Democracy is a system of governance with high transactions costs that seeks democratic ideals of representation, equity, and fairness with only modest, if any, concern for efficiency. Effective bureaucracies are the institutions that produce the outcomes that build public support for democracy and in a sense generate the surplus that allows democratic processes to survive and flourish. Although bureaucracies may have none of the trappings of democracy internally, their role in contributing to democratic governance means that they

should also be considered democratic institutions. Scholars, politicians, and citizens need to be concerned about preserving and protecting bureaucracy just as they seek to preserve and protect our official institutions of democracy.

Within the general theme of bureaucracy and democracy, this lecture will address two major concerns – (1) the failure of politics which severs the crucial link between voters and elected officials and poses major challenges to bureaucrats seeking to administer effective programs, and (2) the subsequent need for bureaucracy to also become an institution that represents the public. Within this concern about bureaucratic representation, the lecture will address how bureaucracies can assess the needs of citizens, and more narrowly how representative bureaucracy can be and is instrumental to the bureaucracy, and finally the limits of symbolic representation within bureaucracies.

The Failure of Politics

The predominant approach to bureaucracy and democracy is the idea of overhead democracy. The electoral process is assumed to create a linkage between the public and elected officials such that elected officials will seek the policy goals of the general public. Elected representatives in turn then impose these values on the bureaucracy creating a principal-agent chain that runs from the public through elected officials to government bureaucrats. Within this framework, most discussions of bureaucracy and democracy start with a discussion of the claimed problems of bureaucracy such as inefficiency, citizen abuse, lack of effectiveness or other maladies (Goodsell 2014). The arguments then proceed to remedies for bureaucratic reform often with catchy phrases like "reinventing government" that seek to reform the bureaucracy and, in the process, contribute to better governance within a democratic system. Political scientists often present such arguments in terms of principal-agent models where solutions are presented in terms of how the principals (the politicians) can control the behavior of the agents (the bureaucrats) for

the benefits of everyone. Problems in any principal-agent relationship, however, can have their origins in either the actions of the agent or the actions of the principal so that considering the full relationship between politics or democracy and bureaucracy is merited. Too often scholars focus solely on bureaucratic agents and ignore the political principals.

The starting point for any discussion of democracy and bureaucracy or of politics and administration should be the classic work by Frank Goodnow (1900), *Politics and Administration*, a book that is widely cited but rarely read. Goodnow is frequently misinterpreted to advocate a separation of politics from administration, but in fact he argues not for a separation, but a symbiosis. The functions are not separable, and rather both need to be performed for effective governance. As Goodnow (1900, p. 16) himself states about politics and administration:

“That is, while the two primary functions of government are susceptible of differentiation, the organs of government to which the discharge of these functions is intrusted [sic] cannot be clearly defined. It is impossible to assign each of these functions to separate authority.”

The political function is to resolve conflict, to take the cacophony of interests and voices and generate a policy. The administrative or bureaucratic function is to create policy via the implementation process. There are times when political branches engage in administration, and there are times when bureaucracies generate policy. The functions often intertwine within an institution. It is important, however, that both functions be performed for effective policy, otherwise, as concluded by Goodnow (1900, p. 23), “Lack of harmony between the law and its execution results in political paralysis. A rule of conduct, i.e. an expression of the state, will practically amount to nothing if it is not executed.”

In the symbiotic relationship between politics and bureaucracy, the advantages of the bureaucracy are maximized under specific conditions. Bureaucracies are an optimal policy instrument for a variety of problems, and they can perform well or perhaps even best when (1) given clear goals, (2) there is political support for these goals, (3) adequate resources are provided, and (4) the bureaucracy is given autonomy to devise solutions based on expertise (Meier 1997; Meier et al. 2018). These givens are, of course, what the political system and the political function is designed to provide. Effective bureaucracies (and effective governance), therefore, require an effective political process.

Examples of the failure of the political process to generate conditions where bureaucracy can be effective can be found around the world (see Meier, et al. 2018), but let me illustrate from the case I know best, the United States. Rather than resolving conflict, the US political system lurches from crisis to crisis and exacerbates conflict as candidates and political parties quest for political advantage in the next cycle of elections. We see periodic shutdowns of the federal government, the failure to adopt a federal budget coincident with its own fiscal year, tax policies that rely on faith rather than rational analysis, and at least 70 reputed attempts by Congress to repeal the Affordable Care Act (Riotta, 2017). Nor does the US political system generate clear goals for government policies. Extensive work by Hal Rainey and colleagues (Chun & Rainey, 2005; Rainey, 1993) indicates that government agencies are frequently tasked with unclear, ambiguous and at times conflicting goals (e.g., the US Postal Service needs to provide universal service and at the same time not run deficits, but cannot set prices). On the question of adequate resources, the chronic budget crises and emergency appropriations have left many programs underfunded forcing clients to engage in queuing processes that often undercut effective services (e.g., the VA hospitals in 2014). Lastly,

several cases suggest that bureaucratic agencies are not granted sufficient autonomy to best use their expertise. The military services are frequently required to accept weapons systems that they would prefer not to have (Cox, 2015), and federal family planning programs are saddled with a requirement for abstinence-only approaches to sex education despite the negative consequences of such policies (Kohler et al., 2008; Lindberg & Maddow-Zimet, 2012).

The failure of political institutions to fulfill the key political roles of setting goals, providing political support, allocating resources, and granting autonomy has three implications for bureaucracies. First, bureaucracies and bureaucratic managers need to both fill the traditional implementation role and also undertake the political role normally perceived to be the realm of politicians. The US evidence indicates that historically that is possible. Given the fragmentation of political power both in terms of separation of powers and federalism in the US (Long 1949), many bureaucracies were forced into highly political roles that might appear out of place in other countries. Government bureaucracies have built strong political support among interest groups and members of Congress (e.g., the Army Corps of Engineers, the National Institutes of Health, see McConnell 1970; Freeman 1955); they have used expertise to engender autonomy (e.g., agriculture research, the early Postal Service, see Carpenter 2001); they have developed political skills to influence the budget process to gain resources (Wildavsky 1964); and they have been able to clarify goals via policy implementation. That performing both roles is possible, however, does not mean it is easily done; the job of the bureaucratic manager becomes significantly more difficult. The skills needed in top and middle bureaucratic positions now must be varied and wide ranging. The addition of this degree of difficulty means that the probability of policy failure increases, simply because bureaucrats must circumvent both administrative problems and political problems.

Second, the failure of politics means policy success or failure rests on the actions of the bureaucracy not on those of the political institutions. The capacity of the bureaucracy becomes far more important to policy success than the actions of the legislature. Third, not all bureaucratic activities in such situations are functional since bureaucracies must move to protect capacity and in doing so can further distort public policy and perhaps undercut the democratic process. This will at times lead to bureaucracies challenging the political process (O'Leary, 2013; Rourke 1969) or engaging in activities that benefit the bureaucracy but not the broader public.

The failure of politics not only disrupts the relationship between elected officials and government bureaucrats, but it also severs the linkage between the electorate and their representatives as politicians seek short term electoral gains at the expense of longer term policy objectives. If voters are not presented with policy choices by political candidates, then the public cannot inform politicians of their preferences, and the principal-agent link between voters and elected officials collapses. The failure of politics, thus, breaks down both linkages in overhead democracy, that between citizens and elected officials and that between elected officials and bureaucrats.

Bottom Up Democracy

Overhead democracy is not the only way to reconcile bureaucracy with democratic governance; bureaucracies can also act as democratic institutions and take citizen preferences into account when making decisions. Even if one does not go so far as to claim a constituent function for bureaucracy, that is, as Cook (1992) argues the purpose of bureaucracy is to create democratic citizens; it is clear that bureaucracy can aggregate and respond to the interests of citizens as part of service delivery directly. In the US, the highly decentralized governance system has forced bureaucracy into this role

(Long 1949). There is now an extensive literature on citizen engagement and methods of improving citizen engagement (Goetz and Jenkins 2001; Reddel and Woolcock 2004; Roberts 2004). My concerns focus on two more specific issues, how the bureaucracy can improve the ability of citizens to evaluate government and government services and the contributions bureaucracy can make through what is termed “representative bureaucracy.”

Effective democracy requires informed citizens and that should include the ability to assess the quality of public services. After all, the contested elections in mature democracies focus on policy issues about what services the government should provide for the public and how to finance them. The growth in governments seeking stakeholder evaluations of services stands in contrast to an existing literature on difficulties of evaluating such services given the basic perceptual biases that psychologists have found that most individuals have (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Similar biases in public perceptions have been found in the growing literature on behavioral public administration (Belle, Cantarelli and Belardinelli 2018; James et al. 2016; Marvel 2015; Olsen 2017).

Notwithstanding the complex nature of government services and the basic psychology of perception and judgment, new evidence on users’ ability to judge the quality of public services is being published. A study of New York city indicates that citizens adjusted their evaluations of public schools based on test scores, outside evaluations, the level of school safety and other factors with some indications that they see value in schools beyond performance on standardized tests (Favero and Meier 2013). A study of Seoul, Korea, schools found that parents responded more to the schools’ overall performance than the performance of their own children suggesting the ability to make evaluations in a broader context (Song and Meier 2018). A cross-national study of education in 18 countries finds that policy design is important; parents can better judge the quality of schools when standards for

performance are set nationally but local schools are given discretion in terms of managing human resources (Song, An, and Meier 2018). In the evaluation of US hospitals, patients face major barriers of information asymmetry complicated by outcome bias that should prevent patients from accurately evaluating services, yet patient assessments are positively correlated with established medical performance standards (Cheon et al. 2019).

Much work remains to be done in the area of citizen evaluation of government programs. We need to understand what government agencies can do to facilitate the ability of citizens to make accurate evaluations. This includes how to frame communication so that the purpose is to inform not to advocate, how much detail to provide, what types of comparisons to make (given that performance is inherently a comparative exercise), how the source of performance information can be made more reliable, and many other issues. Additional issues are present in simply the measurement of performance in terms of the interests of the public. All agency outcomes are multidimensional and finding out how to measure the dimensions that the public cares about but are not presently part of official indicators is important. The Danish effort to assess both student well being and teacher well being in addition to standard performance indicators is a positive innovation.

Representative Bureaucracy

Representative bureaucracy is a flourishing literature that argues a bureaucracy that looks like the citizens it serves is more likely to produce outputs that benefit those citizens. Some scholars even advocate representative bureaucracy as a major method for reconciling bureaucracy with democracy (Ricucci and Van Ryzin 2017). The correspondence between the composition of the bureaucracy and the benefits it produces via representation can occur in two general ways. First, the bureaucrats can actively represent the interests of those who look like them and, thus, seek to provide some

direct benefit to the citizen. Second, the citizen might change his or her behavior simply because the bureaucrat looks like them and be more willing to change that behavior in a positive way whether that is greater cooperation or providing more effort. Students might adopt a teacher who looks like them as a role model and work harder in school (Dee 2004) or a sexual assault victim might be more willing to report the crime if she notices more female police officers (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Because the second process does not require the bureaucrat to do anything different, it is referred to as symbolic representation. Two issues in representative bureaucracy that I would like to address here are whether representative bureaucracy generates bias and limits to symbolic representation.

Representation as Instrumental

Some critics of representative bureaucracy rely on Weber's (1946) ideal-typical view of bureaucracy as a neutral instrument and criticize representative bureaucracy for inducing bias into a process that seeks to treat all individuals equally (Lim 2006). Organizations establish rules and procedures to limit the discretion of bureaucrats so that decisions reflect the objectives of the organization. These actions are then reinforced through organizational socialization.

The tension between bureaucratic representation and organizational socialization is the driving force behind much of the theoretical and empirical work in representative bureaucracy (Meier and Nigro 1976; Romzek and Hendricks 1982). Organizational socialization is designed to persuade employees to subordinate their own values to those of the organization and thus to increase the productivity of the organization (Barnard 1938). The tension between socialization and representation occurs because representation is perceived as something that might encourage a bureaucrat to make a decision that would not otherwise be made and that would affect the organization's effectiveness (Lim 2006). Although this logic has motivated substantial research

examining the assumption of conflict between socialization and representation (Carroll 2017; Dolan 2002a; Romzek and Hendricks 1982), it is useful to reexamine the relationship theoretically because there are reasons to believe that the two do not always lead to cross pressures. In essence the question is whether or not representation can be instrumental in the eyes of the organization – might it lead to a more effective agency and under what conditions might that be possible.

The socialization concerns (and the bias concerns see Lim 2006) focus on active representation at the individual level that results in decisions that would not normally be generated by the bureaucracy, but several cases of active representation can be viewed as instrumental in terms of agency goals. First, there might be cases where the minority bureaucrats actively represent by engaging in policy discussions with others in the organization and in the process persuade the organization to change policies. As an example, minority teachers might convince a school that in-school suspensions are superior to out-of-school suspensions and expulsions (see Roch, Pitts and Navarro 2010), and such ameliorative forms of discipline appear to have fewer negative consequences than punishment-oriented discipline. The result will be changes in disciplinary practices that benefit minority students and nonminority students with the end result being better school performance. Active representation that generates *policy* changes would need to be evaluated for whether or not the policy changes are instrumental; they cannot on their face be considered negative for the organization unless organization objectives have to be considered static rather than something that evolves as the organization changes.

Second, the minority identity being represented might match up well with the mission of the agency. The US military has long overrepresented individuals from Southern states where the military is held in high regard and seen as a potential career (Kane 2006). A similar tradition involves the elite Welsh Guard units in the United Kingdom which appear to cultivate

traditional Welsh identities from a historic tradition (Harden 2011). More directly, representation of lived experiences is often used when drug treatment programs rely on former drug addicts as counselors or when former convicts are used to operate halfway houses for prisoners who are transitioning back into society (Hecksher 2007). Such lived experiences give the bureaucrat insight into client problems and at the same time provide a role model for the client.

Third, this second element of active representation implies a range of other instrumental representations that would occur if the minority bureaucrat brings skills to the organization that improve the functioning of the organization. For example, a US police officer who speaks Spanish (or another language spoken in the community) has a greater chance of effective communication with residents and, thus, is more likely to gain information that solves crimes. Calderon (2018), in a study of immigration enforcement in the US, demonstrated that policies designed to increase language diversity in law enforcement were associated with fewer overall law enforcement stops and arrests but more arrests of individuals with serious criminal records. In short, these immigration officers were better able to meet the goals of the organization by focusing in important cases and avoiding the trivial ones. The minority bureaucrat might not bring skills per se but a better understanding of the needs of the clientele. The use of former drug addicts in treatment programs operates under this premise (Hecksher 2007). This understanding is especially important in minority and immigrant communities where cultural norms differ from those of the rest of population.

Fourth, minority bureaucrats might also bring more valuable skills to the organization as the result of segmented labor markets. Research on education has long demonstrated that women teachers in elementary and secondary education have higher levels of skills than male teachers as the result of long historical stereotyping of teaching as a female profession (for cross national results on this question see An, Song, and Meier

2017). A similar pattern appears in Texas where talented first generation Latinos opt for teaching careers over other professions because they see teaching as a profession that is open to them (Meier and O'Toole 2006). A classical example of this in the private sector is the extensive over representation among high steel construction workers among the Mohawk (see Blanchard 1983). The special skills argument is a general case of an argument found in two somewhat distinct literatures. The diversity management literature contends that more diverse workforces bring a wider range of ideas and information to the organization with the result that this should generate better quality decisions (Ashikali and Groeneveld 2015; Groeneveld and Verbeek 2012). The representative bureaucracy and distributional equity literature (Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999) posits that nonrepresentative bureaucracies are likely to discriminate in the labor market and thus have lower quality employees.

Fifth, given that many public programs are implemented through networks of public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in non hierarchical delivery systems (O'Toole 1997), minority bureaucrats might bring their own unique networks to the organization, networks that majority bureaucrats cannot access. For example, the outreach of government programs in the African American community can be greatly aided by the multifunctional nature of African American churches, and one would expect that many African American bureaucrats would have pre-existing ties to such organizations (McDaniel 2009). The same argument can be applied to the various minority social service fraternities and sororities. These ties might be useful to the agency both in terms of program implementation and also in terms of building political support in the community.

In addition to these active representation aspects that are instrumental for the organization, there are also two cases where symbolic representation is likely to benefit the organization. First, there are several documented cases

in the literature where symbolic representation appears to change the behavior of clients in such a way that it benefits the organization: greater parental involvement in schools (Vinopal 2017), willingness of women to report sexual assaults (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006), and a great trust of police officers among African Americans (Ricucci, Van Ryzin and Jackson 2018). Second, it is possible that contagion effects exist whereby the presence of minority bureaucrats changes the behavior of majority bureaucrats or gives them access to a better understanding of client needs; a US study of teen pregnancy in Georgia is relevant here as it documents how white male teachers interact with their African American female colleagues to address the problem (Atkins and Wilkins 2013).

These instrumental aspects of representative bureaucracy, either active or symbolic, not only challenge the empirical and normative contentions of those opposed to representative bureaucracy, but also link into the growing literature that finds representative bureaucracies are more effective (see among others Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999; Hong 2016a; 2016b; Roch, Pitts and Navarro 2010; Andrews, Ashworth and Meier 2014; Schuck and Hemp 2016). Additional research is needed on when and under what conditions representation contributes to the effectiveness of public organizations.

Symbolic Representation

Symbolic representation might be considered the free lunch of representative bureaucracy; by simply being passively representative of the population, the bureaucracy gains the cooperation of citizens and is able to implement more effective public policy. No changes are required by the bureaucracy in theory; the causal path is solely via the actions of the client. Although the notion of symbolic representation has long appeared in the literature (see Mosher 1968) and much of the empirical literature noted it before investigating active representation (Meier and Nigro 1976), the empirical literature expressly looking for symbolic representation has its origins in

the theoretical work of Keiser et al. (2002; but see Thielemann and Stewart 1996). Meier and Nicholson-Crotty's (2006) study of sexual assault used the extensive under-reporting of sexual assaults to argue that an increase in women on the police force sent a signal to women that reports of sexual assault would be taken more seriously and this would, in turn, encourage more women to report these assaults. Finding empirical correlations consistent with this hypothesis, they concluded that symbolic representation was likely the explanation. They also found an increase in the number of arrests but that might have resulted from active representation rather than just the symbolic representation. Much subsequent empirical work also conceded that finding a positive correlation between passive representation and outcomes that benefit the clients who are passively represented might mean either active representation occurred or that symbolic representation might have been the reason. In short, such studies could not determine if the bureaucrat did something different or if the client acted in a different way (Lim 2006). This was often a conclusion of the literature from education where it was not possible to distinguish between active teacher representation and the student adopting a role model and changing behavior (Dee 2004).

The effort to disentangle symbolic and active representation was pushed forward by experimental work by Ricucci and colleagues (Ricucci, Van Ryzin and Li 2016; Ricucci, Van Ryzin and Jackson 2018) focusing primarily on race and police. Ricucci et al. (2018) found that African American respondents rated police forces with more African Americans more positively controlling for the level of performance of the police in regard to racial complaints. Such findings were consistent with observational findings that indicated African American motorists were more likely to rate the behavior of an African American officer as fair even when the contact resulted in a negative outcome for the motorist (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Symbolic representation, as a result, holds out the promise that bureaucracies will be more effective

or perceived as more effective without actually changing anything that bureaucrats do.

Probing the microtheory behind symbolic representation, however, suggests that there are clear limits to it. Examining the symbolic representation process from a behavioral perspective would be valuable. Why might a client change behavior simply because the visible identity of the bureaucrat matches that of the citizen? The logic is that the client sees a bureaucrat who looks like herself and assumes that they share common experiences. As a result, the client thinks that the bureaucrat is more likely to respond to the problems that the client faces and treat the client fairly. Why might they have these expectations? These are expectations that come from lived experiences; experiences with either bureaucrats or nonbureaucrats and often colored by experiences with racism or sexism or other forms of discrimination. All of these experiences contribute to a Bayesian prior in regard to how the client expects to be treated.

The symbolic logic, however, is based on the notion that you have no actual prior experience with either the individual bureaucrat or the bureaucratic agency represented by the bureaucrat. Any prior experience is likely to adjust this Bayesian prior in the direction of that experience. If African American parents have found that African American teachers are more interested in their child or have been more effective in teaching their child, they are likely to increase their expectation that an African American teacher will benefit their child and respond with greater parental coproduction (Vinopal 2017). Just as positive experiences adjust the expectation upward, negative expectations adjust the expectation downward.

Bureaucratic interactions in this logic might be considered the equivalent of a repeat game with each interaction resulting in an adjustment of priors. The client then adjusts his or her behavior (level of trust, perception of legitimacy) accordingly.

This logic suggests clear limits to symbolic representation. If an African American man is consistently treated poorly by African American police officers or sees that behavior affect others like himself, he is likely to see the police officer as blue (or even white) not black. Wright's (2018) analysis of the Washington DC police, as an example, reveals substantial public skepticism among African Americans of the DC police even though nearly 60% of police officers are African American. Rosenbaum et al. (2005) finds that attitudes toward the police are affected by both prior encounters and encounters between the police and others that the citizen knows about. As one moves to the extremes in this behavior, the limits are clearly obvious from the historical examples of Vichy France or Quisling Norway. The use of Irish troops to suppress Irish revolts against the United Kingdom generated little symbolic representation benefits and likely further inflamed tensions (see also van Gool 2008 on caste in India).

Symbolic representation, therefore, has limits. It cannot be a permanent solution to tension between bureaucrats and clients if there is no commitment to change bureaucratic behavior. Any organization seeking symbolic representation will also need to accommodate pressures for active representation.

Conclusion

In sum, I see four major issues related to bureaucracy and democracy that provide an agenda for future research. First, the symbiotic relationship between electoral institutions and bureaucracy is threatened by the failure of electoral institutions to resolve conflict and contribute effective public policy. This political failure affects both the linkage between the public and elected officials and the relationship between elected officials and government bureaucrats. The upshot of this failure is that public administrators must perform both the traditional administrative functions and also engage in the political process. As a result, the job of the public administrator has become more difficult and policy failures will be more frequent. As an aside, I should note that it complicates the

teaching of public administration also because in general our curricula do not cover how to manage the political process. Because the failure of politics weakens the process of overhead democracy in providing guidance for bureaucracy, bureaucracies must also expand their activities that can represent the interests of the public directly.

Second, for the bureaucracy to represent, it needs information on the policy preferences of the general public and one method of ascertaining these preferences is through citizen evaluations of public services. Research is needed on the most effective way to communicate the performance information of government programs to avoid problems or perceptual bias and allow the public to make rational choices about the services they would like to receive. Designing performance criteria that match those of the citizens is also important.

Third, bureaucracies need to expand their representational roles to contribute more to bottom up democracy in the policy process. For this to occur, public bureaucracies need to understand that bureaucratic representation does not necessarily create biases or generate results that the organization would like to avoid. Many aspects of bureaucratic representation are functional for an organization and can lead to better overall performance and more citizen satisfaction. Understanding the instrumental aspects of representative bureaucracy is important.

Fourth, symbolic representation appears to benefit government organizations by enhancing legitimacy and creating trust and willingness to coproduce. I have argued today that symbolic representation without changes in actual policy outputs is unlikely to produce any of the benefits that organizations seek. Symbolic representation might be viewed as an implicit contract that some form of active representation is likely.

These four questions are my starting point for my professorship on bureaucracy and democracy. I am confident

that the list will expand over the next several years at Leiden University and that new issues will arise that merit study.

Finally, I would like to thank the Executive Board of Leiden University for appointing me to the chair for Bureaucracy and Democracy at the Institute of Public Administration. I would like to thank the faculty of the Institute for making my past visits stimulating and engaging and would especially like to thank Sandra Groeneveld for her leadership in facilitating my relationship with Leiden University.

Ik heb gezegd.

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
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