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A history of the national security state in Turkey

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Chapter II

1. The Rise of the National Security State in Turkey

1.1. Turkey-US Relations in the Early Cold War Era

Turkey has been integrated with the US-led bloc of the Cold War sides mentioned in the first chapter and continued this integration almost exclusively in both external affairs and domestic politics until the end of the Cold War. While the dominant political actors identified communism as the common enemy of Turkey, the field of ideology was reshaped in the Cold War atmosphere. The ally relations between the US and Turkey until the Second World War evolved to a level where the US wielded considerable power in the political, military and economic transformation of Turkey in the Cold War era. The Soviet threat was the main reason behind Turkey's attachment to the US.

USSR's territorial demand for Turkey emerged in a Soviet note dated March 19, 1945, and at the Molotov-Sarper meeting on June 7, 1945 (Erhan 2001, p. 523). In this meeting, Molotov demanded that the Turkish-Soviet border drawn by the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, should be changed in favor of the Soviet Union, and that Kars and Ardahan should be returned to the Soviet Union. In the same meeting, Molotov also demanded joint control over the defense of the Straits, and that the regime of the Straits defined by the Montreux Convention should be amended (Tellal 2001, p. 502). The Soviets' territorial demands from Turkey did not have any repercussions in the US administration. Truman viewed the territorial problem between the Turks and the Soviets as a private matter between the two countries (see Tellal, p. 503 Truman 1955, Volume I, pp. 415-143). The primary concern of the USA at that time was that the Straits and the Black Sea did not become solely under Soviet dominance.

Despite its efforts to convince the USA about the Soviet threat, Turkey did not find the support it expected until the declaration of the Truman Doctrine (Erhan 2001, p.528). However, starting from 1946, as the ideological differences widened more and more into open hostility with the Soviets, the USA decided that Turkey should be part of the Western Bloc. The decision of the USA was welcomed by Turkish public. In the same period, almost all Turkish politicians and opinion leaders perceived that the USA had risen to a liberating role that represented the "absolute good."³¹

³¹ For instance, Falih Rıfkı Atay on April 8, 1946, in the *Ulus* Newspaper wrote: "We know what America wants; a world based on the security of free, equal and sovereign nations, without wars and attacks, governed only by morality and legal alliances and agreements! Anyone who wants to live in a world like that should see their lucky star in the American flag," (cited in Yetkin, p. 19). The Same atmosphere pervaded the Parliament, too. At the parliament session on May 8, 1947, RPP İçel Deputy Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver known to be a fervent nationalist spoke on the podium: "[...] nations are still concerned about the future. Where does the light come from? This light has a source: Again America. Where does the hope come from? America. Where does the trust come from? America. (cheers of Bravo) [...] If today we are looking at the future with hope, if today freedom of nations is not a futile struggle, it is once again because of the military power, economic power, moral and ethical power over there." (Applause) (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 1947, May 8, p. 27). At the same session, Bursa Deputy Muhittin Baha Pars said in his speech, "This voice, at last, arose in the horizon, from the USA, as the voice of Great Roosevelt, a man so great, as clean and impeccable as the Prophet. This lordly voice is saying they will not let people be enslaved, civilization be collapsed, united with his citizens' voices is creating uproars

The USA's first symbolic gesture to Turkey was sending the body of Turkey's Washington Ambassador, Münir Ertegün who died in the USA, to Istanbul on the Missouri (the biggest battleship of the American navy) through the Dardanelles. The battleship anchoring at Dolmabahçe on April 5, 1946, was also a message to the Soviets that the status of the Turkish Straits could not be changed without the USA's consent (Ibid., pp. 524-525). The streets of the city were cleaned days before the battleship's arrival in Istanbul, and with praising articles in the newspapers, the Turkish public, especially the people of Istanbul, prepared to welcome the Americans with great hospitality (Güler 2004, pp. 211-213).³² Following this gesture, by a settlement made on May 7, 1946, the USA canceled the debts Turkey borrowed from the USA during the Second World War through the Lend-Lease Act. By 1947, as mentioned in the first chapter, USA's ideological position against the Soviet Union was fully clarified, and in this context, Truman stated the importance of Turkey and Greece for the USA in his speech, which later became a doctrine that was named after him. Truman made three requests from the Congress in this framework (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp):

1. Assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948;
2. Authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished, and for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel;
3. Provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

The structure of this assistance was finalized through Congress discussions, which determined that Turkey would receive aid in the amount of \$100,000,000. They also decided that American civilian and military personnel would be sent to both countries to assist and supervise the use this assistance, and that selected Greek and Turkish personnel would be instructed and trained in the USA (Erhan., pp. 531-532). On May 22, 1947, President Harry Truman signed the Greek-Turkish Aid Act. Pursuant to this Act, the same year the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey (JAMMAT)³³ was established in Ankara as a military

on the horizon. After that, the Americans ran to help the hungry and with their guns in hand ran to assist the enslaved. [...] Today, while I call to mind and thank for the help this great nation is giving people, I respectfully salute Roosevelt, a man clean and impeccable as the Prophet, and his successor, valuable statesman Truman; and proudly say that the Turkish nation will be with them in helping civilization in the name of humanity and peace. (Applause)" (Ibid., p. 31). Kocaeli Deputy Nihat Erim says, "The nation leading in the worldly advancements, is also leading in the spiritual dignity. Indeed, the noble role the USA played during the war and the post-war world, will be remembered as one of the greatest honors in the nation's history. [...] We see and appreciate that the USA wants to achieve good for whole humanity as the pioneers of a brand-new rule and a fresh understanding of the economy. (Bravo exclamations)" (Ibid., p. 32).

³² After the Missouri Battleship, two more American fleets visited Turkey on November 23, 1946, and May 2, 1947; and were welcomed with similar enthusiasm (Güler, 2004, p. 214).

³³ The original title was the American Mission for Aid to Turkey (AMAT). It became JAMMAT in October 1949 following a minor reorganization (Munson IV, 2012). Following admission of Turkey into NATO,

modernization program undertaken by U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Groups of the United States military, responsible for procurement and distribution of materiel to Turkish armed forces, and for training in use of such material.

The USA aid that was provided under the Truman Doctrine was appreciated by both the Turkish government and the Turkish public. On July 12, 1947, Turkey signed an agreement (Agreement on Aid to Turkey, TIAS 1629) on this aid with the USA. In its preface, the goal of the agreement was stated as "to enable Turkey to strengthen the security forces which Turkey requires for the protection of her freedom and independence and at the same time to continue to maintain the stability of her economy."³⁴ In 1948, aid to Turkey and Greece were transferred to the Foreign Assistance Act by the U.S. Congress. Thus, the one-off assistance that was provided in Truman Doctrine became permanent.³⁵

The Marshall Plan, which aimed to help rebuild the war-stricken Western European economy, followed the Truman Doctrine and Turkey signed an economic cooperation agreement (Economic Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey, TIAS 1794) with the USA regarding this plan on July 4, 1948.³⁶

American experts were sent to Turkey to help determine how the "Marshall aid" would be spent. According to the new international cooperation devised by the USA, Turkey's assigned role was to supply agricultural goods and raw materials for the Western Bloc as well as to be a potential market for American industrial goods. Sixty percent of the aid was used in agricultural sector. The USA also stipulated that some of the aid be used to improve the highways. With the initiative of American technical experts, the Turkish government abandoned the railway policy that it had initiated in the early years of the Republic and established the Directorate of Highways in 1949, shifting the primary focus of national transportation policy on highways. As a result, the number of vehicles imported to Turkey and the need for oil increased (Erhan., pp. 542).

The Truman Doctrine had substantial effects both on the foreign and domestic policy of Turkey. The polarized worldview shaped in the USA became concurrently predominant in Turkey. Turkish officials, also with the influence of England, started to follow pro-American policies against the Soviets in the Middle East. Meanwhile, since the maintenance and spare part needs of the equipment granted to the Turkish army as part of the American military aid could only be supplied from the USA, Turkey depleted its dollar reserves in a short time. The increase in imports from the US in the following years further deepened the dollar crisis and

February 18, 1952, and establishment of US EUCOM (United States European Command), August 1, 1952, JAMMAT placed under US EUCOM by US CINCEUR (Classified message 312140Z to Chief, JAMMAT, August 1, 1952), see, <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/334.html>.

³⁴For the full text of the agreement see, <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/turkey/461177/pdf/11be1163.pdf>

³⁵ With the approval of Mutual Defense Assistance Act on October 6, 1949, American aids started to be assessed within this scope and their management was assigned to the Economic Cooperation Administration (Erhan., p. 534). In years 1947-1949, the value of American aid given to Turkey, including military supplies, was \$152,500,000. In years 1947-1951, the value of military aid given, reached a total of \$400,000,000 (Ibid., pp. 534-535).

³⁶ For the complete English script of Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey, see, <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/turkey/461177/pdf/11be1166.pdf>

led to deterioration in the trade balance of the country. Thus, the aid that was received from the USA laid the foundation for Turkey's military and economic dependency. This dependency relationship played a crucial role for Turkey in shaping its traditional foreign policy choices in alignment with the American interests (Ibid., pp. 536-537).³⁷

In the early years of the Cold War, Turkey spent considerable effort to become part of all the institutions established and agreements made by the Western Bloc. The first and most important institution in this regard was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) founded in 1949. The desire of Turkey's ruling elite to be a NATO member hinged upon the belief that the Western Bloc led by the USA would protect Turkey against any threat from Soviets, and that the Western aid was essential for its economic development and military modernization. Moreover, NATO membership was considered a critical step for integration with the West, the primary objective of official ideology developed in the single-party period (Ibid., p. 544).

Turkey's two membership applications, first on May 11, 1950, during the final days of the Republican People's Party (RPP) government and later, on August 1 of 1950 during the early months of the DP government, were both refused. The DP government led by Prime Minister Menderes considered the Korean War that began in 1950 an unmissable opportunity to gain the trust of the Western states for NATO membership. Menderes acted in violation of the constitution and sent 4,500 soldiers to fight with U.S. troops (Uslu, 2003, p. 69).

Supported by public demonstrations called "Komünizmi Tel'in" (Damn Communism), this decision resulted in Turkey's participation in the Korean War as the second state to send the greatest number of soldiers after the United States. The shared desire for NATO membership among the Turkish politicians led the opposition party RPP to drop its objections to the violation of the constitution. The RPP acted in cooperation with the government to support the Turkish troops fighting in Korea. In a statement he made on October 25, 1951, the RPP Leader İsmet İnönü said: "In our country when it comes to external affairs there are no disagreements on views and principles. We are dedicated to our alliance, United Nations ideal and friendship with the USA" (cited in Erhan, p. 546). After the Korean War, on May 15, 1951, USA suggested that its allies accept Turkey and Greece in NATO. This suggestion was made by considering the conjectural developments rather than Turkey's persistence.

It is noted in the first chapter that the USA's perception of the Soviet Union as an evil that aims to rule the world and which needs to be contained was reflected in the NSC-68 document before the Korean War and that the Korean War strengthened this perception. In this context, the possibility of a Soviet occupation of Turkey gained a new significance. The U.S. authorities considered this probability as a grave threat for the future of NATO and the security of Europe. General Eisenhower argued that the admittance of Turkey and Greece would strengthen the south wing of NATO and enhance the alliance's influence on the Balkans.

³⁷ Having supported the Arab countries for years about the Palestinian problem, Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel only ten months after its establishment. Turkey would then refuse to participate in the Asian States Conference convened in 1949, stating that it was "not an Asian, but a European state." Its pro-western position became more evident at the Bandung Conference convened in 1955, at which the Non-Aligned Movement emerged (Erhan., pp. 535-537).

Turkey's closeness to the Middle East oil reserves was also rendered its membership crucial. Moreover, Turkish troops' successful performance in the Korean War and Turkish brigade's efforts to save the U.S. 2nd Division from total annihilation at the Kuruni Battle had caused the development a pro-Turkey attitude in the eyes of the American public opinion (Ibid., pp. 548-549). Upon the insistence of the USA, on February 18, 1952, Turkey and Greece became NATO members.

After Turkey's NATO membership, military and economic assistance from the USA has continued at an increasing pace (Oran, 1970, pp. 78-79). In the same period, the Turkish government enacted the Foreign Investment Incentives Law (Law No. 6224) on January 18, 1954. The law was prepared in accordance with the suggestions of American businessmen and economists, and it was granting significant privileges to American investors. It introduced such vast freedoms to foreign investors that Turkey swiftly turned into the most liberal and investor-friendly legal system in the developing world (Erhan., p. 554, Yavan & Kara, 2003, p. 29). This law was followed by a new "Petroleum Law" (Law No. 6326), which was also prepared based on the views of American experts. The Petroleum Law, which came into effect on March 7, 1954, gave the foreign companies the right to import 45% of the crude oil and the natural gas that they drilled after January 1st, 1980 (Art. 13).

1.1.1. Attitude towards the left during the early years of Cold War

The Republican elites primarily viewed leftist movements as a threat against the "classless society" ideal of the Populism principle in the constitution. The Turkish Communist Party (TCP) founded in 1920, was dissolved by the Ankara government on September 12, 1922, before the declaration of the republic. The TCP's members who operated underground were continuously prosecuted from the single-party period until they left the country in 1960 (Babalık, 2005). Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that the official authorities had adopted an anti- Soviet approach until the second half of the 1930s. An important reason for this was Bolsheviks' support to the Ankara Government during the Turkish Independence War.

However, in the early 1940s, inspired by German fascism and encouraged by the advance of Nazi Germany into the Soviet lands, Pan-Turkists desiring to gain territory from Soviet lands started a significant anti-communist propaganda. This racist discourse was also adopted by some officials, and it peaked between 1941 and 1943 when the war was in favor of the Nazis. Soviet hostility subsided after the war but was exacerbated again by the Soviet government's territorial claims about Turkey (Örnek, 2015, pp. 62-63).

Before the USA declared total war against communism, on December 4, 1945, with the provocation of the government, an attack known in Turkish political history as the Tan Press Incident happened. The attackers targeted the leftist publications, advocating for the rectification of Soviet relations. This incident was a sign that the left would not be tolerated in the newly established democratic system (Koçak 2010, pp. 772-816). After the transition to the multi-party system in 1946 and the removal of the ban on class-based organizations, two leftist political parties, the Turkish Socialist Party and the Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasants

Party were founded. However, they were dissolved by the court-martial command on December 16th of the same year. When the local aversion to organized leftist movement combined with the anticommunism of Cold War ideology, communism threat evolved into an ultimate common enemy for the political actors in rivalry. Moreover, communist charges were adopted as a method of repressing all kinds of opposition regardless of its content.

Similar to the McCarthy period, pressures on leftists, or intellectuals, academics, students, journalists, and publications considered leftist went off the rails in the 1950s. Founded by progressive intellectuals on May 12, 1950, "Barışseverler Derneği" (Pacifists Association) opposing the decision to participate in the Korean War was also dissolved and its administrators were sentenced to 10-15 months in prison. Leftist politics were impeded by amendments made to the penal law (amendments to the articles 141 and 142, made on December 12, 1951 by the law no. 5844). The members of the Turkish Communist Party as well as many intellectuals, workers, artists, and writers believed to have ties to the TCP, were arrested between 1951 and 1952 (Çavdar, 1996, pp. 36-41, 81-84; Örnek, pp. 78-88). The fear of communism was such that even the labor organizations were established with the help of American unionists (Çelik, 2010; Güzel, 1983). As rightfully stated by Örnek, "everyday politics was dominated by a mindset, which looked for communists in anything and everything" (p. 80). This state of mind prevented questioning the relations with the USA and criticizing Cold War policies or suggesting alternative policies.

1.2. Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) as a reliable ally of USA in the Cold War

The uninterrupted honeymoon period between the USA and Turkey that lasted until the 1960s rendered the USA the principal determiner of not only the international position and the economic policies of Turkey but also made her the ultimate arbiter of the country's army structure. Before the Second World War, in the context of the military modernization process, for almost 100 years, the different units of the Ottoman/Turkish army had been designed and trained by experts from different countries. Land forces were structured by Prussian (German) influence, naval forces by English and Gendarmerie by French. Özdağ (1997) stated that the underlying reason for this choice was to prevent the army from becoming dependent on a single country (p. 387). However, following the NATO membership, the Turkish the military forces became a component of the Cold War strategy promoting American interests. CIA had established a station in Adana in the early 1940s. A memorandum prepared a few years by the U.S. Joint Chiefs, on 23 August 1946, had recognized Turkey "as strategically the most important military factor in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East" (cited in Aslan, 2018 p. 115). Staff, formation and organization, training systems, field manuals, uniforms, war doctrines, and the internal rules of the army were modeled on U.S. patterns (Yetkin 2006, p. 24, Harris, 1985, p.185).

The U.S. hegemony over the army led to the emergence of a strong pro-American wing, which gradually dominated the Turkish Armed Forces (Aslan, 2018). The Democrat Party government (1950-1960) paid specific attention to appointing senior officers with most cooperative attitude with the United States. (Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the

Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1950, June 28, p. 1267). Özgürel (2007, April 18) indicated that by the end of the 1950s, Turkish officers were given promotion evaluations by American officers in the General Staff. NATO membership relieved Turkey's defense concerns but corroded the independence of the Turkish Army. Moreover, TAF's threat perception became increasingly focused on internal security. When the cooperation of dominant political actors in the struggle against the left during the 1950s turned out to be insufficient in the 1960s, the period when the left movement started to gain power, TAF became the main actor to put an end to it. Although the 1960 coup d'état deserves a different analysis than the 1971 and 1980 military interventions, when it is evaluated concerning its inner dynamics and political measures, it can easily be argued that the Turkish Army has gradually become the main institution of the Cold War ideology. This transformation led to the formation of a relationship, which was similar to the alliances that the USA has formed with coup plotters in Third World Countries.

In this context, every step Turkey took to remove itself from the Cold War axis was impeded by a military intervention. The army which has gradually become a rightist institution tried to pull the society to the right through interventions. In the meantime, leftist movements that had grown in parallel to social developments were suppressed in an increasingly violent manner with each coup d'état. Moreover, it is evident that the Turkish army, in its struggle against the left, put effort into adopting the new doctrines of the Cold War strategy by the United States. The following subsection discusses these developments.

1.2.1. Reading the coup d'états in Turkey within the context of the Cold War

The first coup d'état of the Republican era occurred on May 27, 1960. The academic literature predominantly suggests that the 1960 coup d'état was staged in response to the repressive and anti-secular policies imposed by the Democratic Party, which has been in government since 1950 (İpekçi & Coşar, 1965; Tachau & Heper, 1983; Hale, 1994; Kayalı, 2012, Karpat, 1988). There are also accounts that suggest the USA's involvement in the 1960 coup d'état (Dikerdem, 1977; Özgürel, 2009, May 30).³⁸ However their arguments do not rely on any substantive evidence. Nevertheless, Gunn (2015) claimed that it is possible, at least for the present time, to make the following two determinations based on the disclosed confidential U.S. documents. The U.S. administration was aware of the impending coup d'état on May 27, 1960 and did not warn Menderes or encourage the government to abandon its anti-democratic practices.

Indeed, a year before the coup, CIA was aware of the possibility of a military intervention in Turkey. General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, at the 406th Meeting of the National Security Council on May 13, 1959 reported the following evaluation (339. Editorial Note, p.805):

³⁸ Several politicians and bureaucrats who witnessed the era also had similar views. For example, Hasan Esat Işık, the General Manager of the Department of Commerce and Trade Agreements and later Assistant Secretary General of the Economic Affairs in 1957 during the DP government, in an interview he gave in 1989 stated the followings: "America overthrew Menderes. Surely there are events and people leading to May 27. However, it was America who wanted this coup d'état more than anyone else" (cited in Özgürel 2007, April 18)

“The Democratic Party is restricting the activities of the major opposition party, the popularity of which is increasing. Criticism of the government is growing, and riots and other disturbances are becoming more frequent. The opposition party maintains that the government is trying to have Mr. Inonu lynched. The Turkish Defense Minister recently remarked that the military leaders may have to intervene if the tension continues.”

The following statements of Suphi Gürsoytrak, who participated in the staging of the May 27 coup d'état, support Gunn's analysis (cited in Arcayürek, 2003, p.57):

"Before 1960, the U.S. had infiltrated all units of the army, even the smallest units [...] Having infiltrated all its units, America had undoubtedly placed its intelligence assets in the army. They were receiving reports all the time [...] On the one hand CIA and on the other hand the U.S. Embassy; they were monitoring every breath we took."

NUC, in a declaration written at the Military School and broadcasted at 05.25 on Ankara Radio, declared their loyalty to their alliance with the USA and their commitment to NATO and CENTO in the early hours of the campaign on May 27th. Developments after May 27 indicated that the military government referred to as the National Unity Committee (NUC), was in close cooperation with the United States.

The immediate assessment by US Embassy Ankara of the military coup contained no sign of criticism. In telegram 2743 from Ankara, May 27, Ambassador Warren reported (364. Editorial Note, p. 844):

“In unusually well-organized coup Turkish military forces took over government 0400 May 27 apparently without serious opposition and loss only about 50 lives Ankara. President Bayar, President GNA Koraltan, members Cabinet, Chief Staff Erdulhun taken into protective custody. Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir quiet; no discernible organized opposition. At this juncture, Embassy believes revolt motivated by purely internal considerations; no evidence any anti-Americanism. On contrary, member Military Council assured Embassy this morning of Turkish Armed Forces friendship for USA and desire fulfill all Turkey's international commitments, especially NATO and CENTO.”

The next day, “Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador in the United States, informed Under Secretary of State Dillon that the new government intended to honor all Turkey's existing commitments. Dillon indicated to the Ambassador that the United States might prefer, as in other similar cases, to continue relations as usual without a formal announcement” (Ibid.).

The USA granted recognition the new government on May 30th. Following this mutual declaration of consensus, the most striking development signifying cooperation between the military government and the USA was the large-scale discharge in the army under the pretense of a rejuvenation effort. The idea of forced retirement of thousands of senior and junior officers initially came from the new government. President Gürsel personally explained the reasoning and the content of the project to the U.S. Embassy (Aslan, 2018, p.160) and later to the Supreme

Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, General Norstad, and wished U.S. financial assistance in this project (*Milliyet*, May 22, 1987).³⁹ General Norstad supported the project before senior officials (including the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) with the following remarks (374. Memorandum of Conversation, August 2, 1960, p. 867):

“Such U.S. assistance at this particular early stage in the life of the Provisional Government is most important. The group of young officers in charge is well disposed toward the U.S.; many of them speak English, having received training in the U.S. They give the impression of wanting and expecting U.S. leadership and assistance, and it is most important to step in at this early stage.”

After the May 27th coup d'état, 275 generals and approximately seven thousand officers were discharged from the army (Karpat, 1970, p. 1975). Alparslan Türkeş, who served as Prime Ministry Undersecretary in the military government, also explained in his memoirs written by Hulusi Turgut (1995) that the necessary budget for these discharges was provided by the USA (p.215):

"Rejuvenation of the army required money. NATO Supreme Commander in Paris, Air Chief Marshall Norstad visited Turkey just then. We explained our project to him and asked for their help. We needed twelve million dollars for the job. This amount was provided by America. It was not NATO money. Then we started the discharges."

Colonel Dündar Seyhan, who was a military attaché in Washington at that time, was summoned to participate in the preparations for the discharges (İpekçi & Coşar, 1965, pp. 323-334). Seyhan was an officer who had trained in the USA in from 1950 to 1951 and was sent to the USA at the beginning of 1960 before May 27th (Yetkin, 2006, p. 35). A report titled "Who Among NUC Was Pro-American?" declassified 30 years after the coup indicated that the USA was closely monitoring the political tendencies of the coup plotters (*Hürriyet*, May 27, 1990). The report was prepared by the U.S. Department of State at that time, and it argued that most of the NUC members, including the leader of the coup Cemal Gürsel, were pro-American (cited in Yetkin, p. 33).

The significant increase in the levels of economic aid was another indicator of the US support of the new military regime. The US had granted the DP government 119.8 million dollars in 1960. This number was almost doubled after the coup in 1961 and reached to 232.3

³⁹ Amil Artus, who served first as Minister of State and then as the Minister of Justice in the military government, in his memoirs stated the following regarding this issue: “[...] NATO Supreme Commander Norstad visited Turkey in July. Cemal Gürsel received him. Minister of Foreign Affairs Selim Sarper and Prime Ministry Undersecretary Alparslan Türkeş were also present at the meeting. I later learned that Norstad discussed the situation of the Turkish Armed Forces. He said that the army officers should constitute a pyramid of ranks, but that there are too many high-ranking officers in the Turkish army which would decrease its war power and that it should be corrected. As a result of these discussions, it was decided that the military officer staff had to be shaped into a pyramid by retiring some of the officers whether they are eligible or not. To do that, regardless of their service time, the officers to be retired had to be given pension and compensation" (<http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1987/05/22>).

million dollars (Aslan, 2018, p. 163). According to Aslan “levels of predetermined economic aid for 1961 was increased in the instance of the May 27 coup to specifically keep alive the military government in Turkey” (p. 163-164).

Another pro-American policy that was implemented by the NUC during the coup period was assigning Kemal Kurdaş, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) employee in Washington, as the Minister of Finance. In the same period, the USA set up a radio station to counter the radio stations disseminating Soviet propaganda in Eastern Anatolia. Another significant development was the dismissal of 147 leftist faculty members by the law no 114 dated October 27, 1960. Given the number of universities in Turkey at that time, this was a significant number.

Finally, the 1960 coup generated two significant consequences which ensured the lasting involvement of the military in Turkish political life and thus, indirectly served the US interests in the Cold War. The first of these consequences was the legalization of military intervention by Article 35 of the Internal Service Law issued in 1961. This article stated that the obligation of the Turkish Armed Forces was to protect and defend "the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as determined by the Constitution." The second consequence, which will be examined in detail in the following chapter, was the incorporation of the National Security Council (NSC) imported directly from the US Cold War security apparatus in the constitutional structure.

1.2.1.1. The rise of the left

The 1961 Constitution, although criticized for authorizing military bureaucracy in the administration through the NSC and for including regulations that weakened legislative supremacy, recognized and ensured the principles of a democratic constitutional state; judicial independence; and social, political, and individual rights. It defined a constitutional order in which state-owned public institutions such as TV, radio, and university were given autonomy. All operations and actions of the state were subject to judicial control, and circumstances limiting freedom were considered exceptions (Tanör, 1986; Kili, 2000). The political space broadened with the 1961 Constitution, along with the influence of anti-imperialist movements all over the world, led to the development of leftist movements covering a diverse range of groups in Turkey during the 1960s.

During this period, an important part of the working class chose to interpret the "social state" principle of the new constitution (Art. 2) as social justice (Ünsal, 2002). Until then, there was an "American type" of unionism in Turkey, established at the beginning of the Cold War with guidance from the USA unionists (Çelik, 2010; Güzel, 1983), for which all activities were limited to economic rights, and refrained from dealing with any political issue. These unions united in 1952 under the name Türk-İş to form a nationwide organized confederation. On February 13th, 1961, 12 unionist members of Türk-İş with leftist tendencies founded a new political party named the Turkish Workers' Party (TWP). TWP aimed to represent the interests of workers in the parliament and took a socialist stance in 1962 with a new program and regulations. In the 1965 general elections, the TWP entered parliament with 15 deputies. Almost all the leftist organizations were in touch with the party at that time (Ersan 2013, p. 19). The

founding of TWP was met with a strong reaction from the confederation, which had adopted an "above party" standing. In response, Türk-İş organized a "Komünizmi Tel'in" (Damn Communism) rally on December 22nd, 1962 in Ankara declaring that "workers do not want to engage in doctrinal efforts of a party or a group" (Güzel, p. 1861).

Despite its emphasis on rejecting any kind of political engagements, after its annual meeting in 1964, Türk-İş leaned towards the right, and this choice was institutionalized by assigning unionists who were close to the right-wing Justice Party (JP) to administrative and executive committees. The shift of Türk-İş' to the right led to the discharge of unionists supporting the TWP and paved the way for the foundation of DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) with almost 40,000 members. DİSK was founded under the leadership of TWP's executives on February 13th, 1967 by the former Türk-İş Unions. By 1970, it had more than a hundred thousand members. During this period, DİSK advocated for socialism based on class struggle and embraced an anti-imperialist perspective (Koç & Koç, 2008, p. 21). The conservative majority in the Parliament proposed laws to purge DİSK due to the rapid increase in the number of its members and the social and economic gains achieved by the workers. The increasing impact of the worker protests in response to these legal actions caused serious unrest among the ruling elites, especially the military (Güzel, pp. 1864-1865).

During the same period, leftist ideology became popular among youth. The demands of socialist youth groups for extensive land reforms, leaving NATO, canceling the agreement signed with the European Economic Community, and nationalizing mines and minerals were increasing the tension of the same conservative circles. In 1966, after the Chief of Staff Cemal Tural ordered the Armed Forces to fight against the far-left, the President of the Republic Cevdet Sunay (prior chief of staff) declared that the constitution did not allow for socialism (İnsel, 2002, p. 316). Meanwhile, the JP and other rightist parties carefully organized and channeled the 'anti-communist reaction.' Through successive demonstrations such as the Awakening Rally (Uyanış Mitingi) and National Rising Rally (Milli Şahlanış Mitingi), the nationalist-conservative youth was encouraged to counterbalance the left.

Following the "Bloody Sunday"⁴⁰ incident in 1969, referred to as "an example of organized, fascist violence" by Ahmad (1977), the right and left clash among the youth intensified (p. 381). A youth militia called "commandos" was formed among the nationalist right. Leaders of the leftist university youth also began adopting armed struggle methods at the end of the 1960s (Sayarı, 2010).

The government blamed the rights and freedoms given in the constitution for its failure to end the armed struggle. Prime Minister Demirel was openly asserting that "one cannot govern a state with this constitution" (Kongar, August 28, 2016). Not only Demirel but also the high ranks of the military bureaucracy were complaining about the extent of rights and freedoms in

⁴⁰ Bloody Sunday is the public name of the incident on February 16, 1966, where the rightist groups attacked the 76 youth organizations convened to protest the American 6th Fleet at Taksim Square. The attack was carried out by the groups responding to the call "to teach the communists a lesson" by Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği (Anti-communism Association) and Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Students Union) at the Respect the Flag Rally on February 14th. Two young protesters were knifed to death. Police did not intervene with the attackers, and a limited investigation was carried out regarding the incident.

the Constitution. At an NSC meeting held at the end of 1970, then Chief of Staff Memduh Tağmaç was stating that they wanted amendments to the Constitution. General Secretary of the NSC, General Emin Alpkaya, supported Tağmaç at the council meeting on February 22nd, 1971, and claimed that "it is necessary to fill up the judiciary gaps to prevent devastating events disrupting the social order" (cited in Ünsaldı 2008, p. 82). Additional remarks from Tağmaç at the same meeting revealed that the Chief of Staff did not only target far-leftist militants, leftist unions, and student groups. He was also very uncomfortable with the fact that the leftist fractions in the army were posing a grave threat and danger of disrupting the institutional unity of the army (Ibid.):

In short, left has increased its efforts on the Armed Forces. Left wants to seize the Armed Forces and overtake the government. Today, everyone has their eyes on the Armed Forces. We need to keep the army in an authoritarian order.⁴¹

On March 12, 1971, the military wing of the NSC, which is the highest-ranking class of TAF, issued a memorandum. In the memorandum, which led to the resignation of the government, the military hierarchy blamed the parliament and the government for the social and economic unrest and anarchy in the country. It suggested the formation of a cabinet which would have an "above party" understanding, and which "inspired by Atatürk's views, [would] implement the reforms envisaged by the constitution and protect the reformist laws." It was also stated in the memorandum that if the demands were not met, the army would exercise its duty to "protect and safeguard the Republic of Turkey", and take over power itself.

The intent of the TAF's memorandum was seemingly to establish a political ground that would realize the fundamental reforms declared in the 1961 Constitution. However, the legislative regulations effectuated during this period, in which the multi-party system was de facto suspended, showed another reality.

1.2.1.2. From “Progressive” Army to the Army of “the Order”: 1971 Intervention as a Precursor of September 12

Following the memorandum, martial law was declared in 11 cities, and it lasted throughout the interim regime. During the martial law, the government under the direct rule of the military hierarchy started a systematic repression to suppress and eliminate the leftist movement, which until then had gained power on a large scale. Political meetings and seminars, as well as strikes and lockouts by trade bodies and unions, were prohibited. During the March 12 period, not only illegal parties and organizations, but also members and executives of many labour, youth, and teacher organizations that were legally founded and that operated within the scope of their charters, such as TWP, DİSK, Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları (Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East), İşsizlik ve Pahalılıkla Savaş Derneği (Society for Struggle against Unemployment and Cost of Living), and Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası (Teachers' Union of

⁴¹ On the other hand, it may be said that Tağmaç's fear was not baseless. A coup d'état by MDD inspired officers was a very real possibility in 1971.

Turkey) were put to trial. Founders and members of these organizations were accused of "membership in an illegal organization," and many received heavy sentences.

Detentions targeted not only those who were engaged directly in the Leftist organizations. People who had close relations with the leftists were also prosecuted. Prominent scientists, writers, and intellectuals of the period were arrested with unfounded allegations of being members of underground leftist organizations. Many left-oriented journals, newspapers, and publishers were shut down, and their employees, writers, and executives faced political prosecution and trial. All political criminals of the period were tried at martial courts and were detained in military prisons until their trials ended.

The operation to purge the left was implemented within the TAF as well. At that time, there was a group in the army which adopted a "national revolutionary development strategy" and in the quest of a leftist military intervention similar to the interventions seen in Egypt and Algeria. This group, named "9 Martçılar" ("March 9'ers"), was discharged from the army right after the March 12 intervention (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 272-301). Major General Celil Gürkan, who was forced to retire after the March 12 intervention, in his book, *12 Mart'a Beş Kala* (On the Brink of March 12; 1986), suggested an alternative explanation on the reason of the intervention. According to him, the intervention was made to purge the leftists in the army (p. 373).⁴²

The military hierarchy, incarcerating almost all the operations of legal leftist organizations wanted to design a political system entrapped solely in the Parliament. A short while after the memorandum, on March 26, 1971, a technocrat government was formed under the leadership of Nihat Erim, assigned as an above party prime minister. JP and RPP were represented by few ministries in this administration. However, this government only lasted 11 months. The following governments formed by the support of the army under the prime ministry of Ferit Melen and Naim Talu did not last long either. Due to the increasing domestic and foreign pressures, the parliamentary regime was restored in October of 1973. During the military rule, there had not been a significant improvement in the reform efforts in areas such as education, mines and minerals, and agriculture and health. However, the governments, in conformity with the demands of the military bureaucracy, realized many legislative regulations to "restore the power of the state."

Due to the implicit consensus between the conservative majority in the Parliament and the army on the 1961 Constitution's "extensive" freedoms, the interim government made three constitutional amendments. These constitutional amendments acted as milestones in shaping the national security state, which was consolidated later by the September 12 military junta. These amendments can be examined under three main categories (Tanör, 1986, pp. 54-60; Gözler, 2000, pp. 77-92):

The first category is related to increasing the autonomy of the military, as the amendments in this category enabled the military bureaucracy to (at least partially) evade political and judicial control. Authorities of the military justice were extended on the expanse

⁴² He based his view on the lecture that Brigadier General Ali Elverdi, the head March 12 court-martial gave at the JP Çankaya Youth Organization on March 28, 1976 on "Communism in Turkey."

of civilian justice, and judicial control over administrative acts and actions was removed from the Council of State and given to the newly established High Military Administrative Court (Art. 140). The declaration of martial law was expedited (Art. 124) and the trial of civilians by the military courts for non-military offenses was made possible (Art. 138/2). Another amendment increasing the institutional autonomy of the military was the termination of standard control over the assets of the army. It was stipulated that such control was to be "enacted in accordance with the confidentiality principles required by national defense services" (Art. 127/3). With the amendments made on the status of NSC in the 1961 Constitution, the weight of the military hierarchy in politics was increased, and the NSC's authorities were extended. Thus, the NSC was raised to a position where it could advise the government on security concerns, and any other issues it sees fit.

The second category includes amendments to empower the executive. The cabinet was given the authority to issue legislative decrees (Art. 64). The autonomy of universities was curtailed (Art.120) and the autonomy of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) was lifted (Art. 121). Amendments regarding fundamental rights and freedoms increased the state's authority vis-a-vis individuals and society. A general restrictive provision that is valid for all fundamental rights and freedoms was inserted in the Constitution (Art. 11). Reasons for legal restriction on fundamental rights and freedoms were increased (Art. 15, 22, 29, 46/1), and the basis for these restrictions was defined in vague and legally unfounded terms, such as "the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation." These restrictive legal changes had an immediate effect and were supported by changes yielding more substantial consequences. Within this scope, civil servants' right to establish trade unions was revoked (Art. 119), and academic staff members were prohibited from becoming members of political parties (Art. 120). The detention period was extended, and the defendants were removed from the control and guarantee of judges and put under the control of the police (Art. 30).

The last category consists of the amendments that disrupted judicial unity and restricted judicial control. The most important of these amendments was the establishment of the State Security Courts (SSC). SSCs were extraordinary chambers that were to try offenses against the security of the state. The government was influential in the selection of its members (Art.136). The first paragraph of the article on this subject was as such: "State Security Courts shall be established to deal with offences against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free democratic order, or against the Republic whose characteristics are defined in the Constitution, and offences directly involving the internal and external security of the State. However, provisions concerning the state of martial law and state of war are reserved." This article was used against the "leftist threat" at that time and was later used to punish all and any demands and actions contradicting the official state ideology. As such, security policy directly penetrated the judiciary. In short, in terms of the measures and practices implemented against the left, March 12 coup d'état can easily be defined as a Cold War intervention. Another significant point that deserves attention about this period was that the problems encountered with the USA during the 1960s were resolved in favor of the USA.

1.2.1.3. Role of the USA in the March 12 Memorandum

There are numerous claims in the Turkish political literature about the role the USA in the March 12, 1971, coup d'état. Süleyman Demirel, in an interview he gave in 1991, summarized the troubling issues between Turkey and the USA before March 12 under four headings (Yetkin & Özen, January 11-20, 1991): The first issue was related to the rapprochement between Soviets and Turkey. In the second half of the 1960s, after being rejected by its Western allies, Turkey had started receiving financial support from the USSR for its industrial investments. Demirel claimed that this relationship bothered the USA for two reasons: the possibility of losing Turkey as an ally to the USSR and Turkey's new strategy to move from an exporter of the raw material supplier to the producer of manufactured goods.⁴³ The second issue was about combining all the mutual agreements made with the USA since the beginning of the Cold War⁴⁴ under a single agreement called the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement on July 3, 1969, and the cancellation of some of these agreements. The third issue was the ban put on American spy flights from Turkish bases to avoid a conflict with the Soviets in 1966.⁴⁵ Finally, the fourth issue was the rejection of the USA's demand to ban all opium cultivation in Turkey. According to the USA, 80% of the opium entering its domain was originating from Turkey. On the other hand, the realization of this demand would cause significant damage to approximately one hundred thousand peasant families who lived on opium cultivation at the time (Erhan, 2001, p. 703).⁴⁶

Another USA-related issue that preoccupied the left-oriented Turkish public during the 1960s was the allegations of secret CIA operations in Turkey. Leftist media began to cover many incidents with alleged CIA involvement in those days. The two failed coup attempts under the leadership of Military Academy Commander Talat Aydemir in January and May of 1963 were associated with the CIA. The press was not the only entity questioning the CIA's involvement in Turkey at that time. The two political parties of the country were also closely interested in its activities. In July 1966, then the Secretary-General of the main opposition party RPP, Bülent Ecevit, claimed that the "CIA intervenes in the domestic politics of many allied countries including Turkey through various methods" and that "it provides financial help to the

⁴³ Demirel said the followings about the USA's reactions to the industrialization move of the country (cited in Yetkin, 114): "[...] Turkey pays a lot as long as it buys refined oil instead of crude oil. So, we decided to increase the refinery capacity and build new refineries. [...] We told our intentions to the Westerners. We asked if they could finance it. They said they wouldn't. We asked the Soviets if they would finance it. They said they would. We negotiated with the Soviets and started the constructions. This bothered them. The West was bothered by it. I remember well, in 1967 the American Ambassador visited me at the Prime Ministry. I still can recall our meeting very vividly. He entered through the door, and before taking a seat asked me: "Are you changing sides?" [...] America was greatly disturbed because we had restored relations with the Soviets."

⁴⁴ There is contradicting information regarding the number of mutual agreements signed with the USA. According to a statement made by Süleyman Demirel in April 1966, Turkey and the USA have signed 54 mutual agreements in years 1952-1960. According to the official statement made in 1970, the number of agreements is 91. According to Erhan (2001), the contradiction in the figures lies in the fact that some of the agreements were confidential, so they were not brought to the Parliament (p. 556).

⁴⁵ In 1968, the USA repeated its demand for flight clearance over Turkey for its U-2 aircrafts. However, Ecevit administration refused to negotiate. Following this decision, National Intelligence Agency reports would note an increase in loan problems (Arcayürek, 2003, p.150).

⁴⁶ Demirel made the following explanation in 1969 to the representative of Nixon administration sent to Turkey on this issue: "Turkey has a city named after opium (Afyon). To tell the truth, even if we impose a ban, it would not be sustainable. It would cause great indignation; we cannot do this" (cited in Yetkin, 2006, p. 141).

political party [implying JP] it wants to win the elections" (cited in Erhan, p. 696). Furthermore, the chairman of TWP (which was dissolved after March 12), Mehmet Ali Aybar, called everyone to unite against the Anglo-American imperialism and asserted that the CIA was supporting some of the Türk-İş executives.

When the President of the USA at the time, Lyndon B. Johnson, appointed his intelligence consultant Robert Komer, an ex-CIA operative who had been involved in the secret operation in Vietnam, as ambassador to Ankara in 1968, allegations of CIA involvement in the domestic affairs of the country became more prevalent. The TWP and leftist press believed that Komer was sent to implement a plan to wipe out the leftist movement. These developments triggered a series of anti-American youth demonstrations. Thereupon the USA had to call Komer back in 1969. However, the protests continued until the March 12 military intervention (Erhan, pp. 696-697).

None of these allegations provide evidence about the U.S. involvement in the March 12 coup d'état. However, Duane R. Clarridge, CIA Turkey station chief between 1968-1973, indicated in his memoir that the CIA had advance knowledge of the military coup (Clarridge, 1997, p.117)⁴⁷. A memorandum from Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff of President Richard M. Nixon on March 25, 1971, revealed U.S. priorities. With no announcement of any concern after the military had forced the elected government to resign, Saunders merely noted that the military leaders were "the final arbiters" in the country and that the United States should now be open "to convincing the military decisionmakers of the urgency of the opium problem," the primary issue of concern to the United States at the time (442. Memorandum from Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs, March 25, 1971). In the same memo Nihat Erim, the new Prime Minister appointed by the March 12 military administration was defined as "genuinely well disposed toward the U.S." Indeed, Prime Minister Erim agreed to ban the cultivation of opium poppies by June 1972.

1.2.1.4. Towards the September 12 Coup d'état: Political Instability and Social Polarization:1973-980

The Emergence of New Political Trends

The measures of the March 12 administration neither established political stability nor prevented social polarization. Until 1980, during the six years after the memorandum, the country was ruled by seven different governments, including one temporary, three minority, and three coalitions.

⁴⁷ Clarridge noted on this subject that "Our advance knowledge coup by letter was certainly an intelligence success. We were one up on our compatriots in Ankara in that regard, but that was often the case. Although Ankara was the capital, our office in Istanbul frequently had a better perspective on what was happening in Turkey" (p. 117).

Table 2: Civilian Governments from March 12th to September 12th

Governments	Prime Minister	Structure of the Government	Term
37th Gov.	Bülent Ecevit	RPP-NSP Coalition	26.01.1974- 17.11.1974
38th Gov.	Sadi Irmak	Above-party temporary administration	17.11.1974- 31.03.1975
39th Gov.	Süleyman Demirel	Nationalist Front I (JP-NSP-RRP-NAP-Independents)	31.03.1975- 21.06.1977
40th Gov.	Bülent Ecevit	RPP Minority Government	21.06.1977- 21.07.1977
41st Gov.	Süleyman Demirel	Nationalist Front II (JP-NSP-NAP)	21.07.1977- 05.01.1978
42nd Gov.	Bülent Ecevit	RPP Minority Government (with the support of RRP & DP)	05.01.1978- 12.11.1979
43rd Gov.	Süleyman Demirel	JP Government (covert Nationalist Front III)	12.11.1979- 12.09.1980

Source: Official website of Prime Ministry; (Özdemir, 1992, pp. 236-246).

Although the political rivalry was mainly between RPP and JP, neither party managed to obtain enough votes to form a powerful government between 1974 and 1980. During that time, they did not engage in a convincing pursuit of consensus.

Another prominent development during this period was the active involvement of "marginal" political parties in the political scene, despite their relatively low voting rates. The first of these parties was the Republican Peasant National Party. In 1969 the party changed its name to the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), a name more suited to its identity. This movement, led by 1960 coup plotter Staff Colonel Alparslan Türkeş (Türkeş and his friends were discharged from the army right after the coup) became the organized force of the Turkish radical right with its "idealist" militant groups (Özdemir, 1992, pp. 223-247).

These militants, whose support was frequently used in the fight against the left before the 1980 military intervention, after a brief resentment period towards the state due to NAP's closure during the 1980 coup, would gradually regain their roles in the old and new security establishments of the country.⁴⁸ Although the severe punishments inflicted on NAP and its

⁴⁸ It is necessary to summarize the NAP's ideology, to better understand the reasons why these militants, who had taken up position against the left before September 12, volunteered to "serve" against the Kurdish movement in legal and illegal operations in the 1990s. Thus, the common intellectual grounds of the national security ideology and extreme nationalism in Turkey and the reasons for their symbiotic relationship can be more easily comprehended. Ağaoğulları (1987), asserted that NAP has adopted an "authoritarian-totalitarian" approach in its notion of state and that it had similarities with fascism at ideological and terminological levels (p. 219). NAP's doctrine was named as "nationalist-socialist" by extreme nationalists in 1970s and this was criticized for connoting "national socialism". NAP leader Türkeş's response to this criticism is enlightening: "We issued a notice in response to the abuse of our enemies and prohibited the "nationalist-socialist" expression.[...] No more making statements like according to nationalist socialism this is this, this is that!... Everything is thought of under this flag. A solution for everything is devised." (Ibid.) This self-contradictory statement refusing pluralism and free thought, perceiving the individual as an organic whole, was a clear expression of an authoritarian approach. In this context, according to NAP the political function of the state was to "herd" this homogenous whole, "motivate them to work

idealist militants by the September 12th intervention deeply wounded the pro-state stance of the party, this disagreement did not last long. Society's reactionary response to the Kurdish nationalism rising in the 1990s elevated NAP from a "marginal" party to a "center party." Its militants were once again started to be used in "covert" state operations against the Kurds (Bora & Can, 2004, p. 11). During this time, the state also rewarded their active and outsourced services boldly.

Between the years 1973-1980, a second movement within the right wing emerged with an Islamist tendency. The small and medium-sized conservative business owners of Anatolia gathered in hubs in İstanbul and İzmir in search of a new political formation. They founded the National Order Party (NOP) on January 26, 1970, under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, the former president of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. The NOP, as further studied in the last chapter, became the first Islamist political party of Turkey. Until the 1980s the military authority's reaction towards this party would oscillate between toleration and punishment. In the 1990s, this movement would reappear in 1983 under the name of Welfare Party and considerably increase its voting base in time. In the mid-1990s WP would become the archenemy of the national security state and be subjected to a "post-modern" coup d'état on February 28, 1997.

Period of Coalitions and Increased Political Polarization

In conformity with the political tradition of the country, a top ranking officer, Admiral Fahri Korutürk was elected president, and the interim regime ended with the general elections that took place on October 14th, 1973.⁴⁹ RPP, led by Bülent Ecevit, won the general elections thanks to the center-left strategy it developed after 1965, whereas JP only obtained 149 seats in the Parliament due to the separation of rightist votes. NSP, just as the TAF had hoped, managed to attract a considerable number of JP's votes. Except for the center-rightist Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi)⁵⁰ founded by ex-RPP member Prof. Dr. Turhan Feyzioğlu, all the rightist parties refused to form a coalition with RPP. After three months of uncertainty, despite resistance from both party members, on January 26, 1974, RPP and NSP formed a coalition government under the prime ministry of Bülent Ecevit. Thus RPP, losing government in 1950 and only partaking in the coalitions imposed by the military in 1961, finally managed

harder" and guide them towards the determined goals. This movement, similar to the corporative organization of Italian fascism, was placing an elite executive staff at its management and putting them under a leader who would be "not accountable to any class or group in the name of national interests" (Ibid., p. 220). NAP's nationalism contained an aggressive and belligerent discourse directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Hence, during the 1970s, all ethnic identities and minorities, particularly Kurds and Alawites, were regarded as the most dangerous enemies after communists. In this "war," a frequently resorted method was provoking poor Sunni Turks against Kurds and Alawites. NAP's ideologues while legitimizing the social inequity through religious explanations (NAP's 1973 election bulletin says; "Since God has created man with different capabilities and natures, it is natural and necessary for them to have different spiritual and material opportunities.") they were targeting the "others" as the root cause of their poverty.

⁴⁹ Except for Celal Bayar (1950-1960), all the Presidents of Turkey until 1989, were military leaders. Bayar was arrested and sentenced to death after the 1960 coup d'état. However, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to old age and on November 7, 1964; he was released because of his ill health.

⁵⁰ Republican Reliance Party won 13 seats in 1973 elections and only three seats in 1977 elections.

to come into power after a long time. This coalition government also provided the political basis for the legitimization of NSP, a party that advocated Islamic thought.

The coalition which was initially beneficial for both parties did not last long. A severe conflict arose within the government when several NSP deputies voted against the general amnesty bill included in the coalition protocol which would release the prisoners of the March 12 period. Then a new conflict arose when the two parties of the coalition had different approaches to the handling of 1974 Cyprus crisis. The government began to disintegrate when the NSP wing suggested conquering the entire island during the Cyprus operations (July 20-22 and August 14-16, 1974).

Unable to contain the disagreement within the government, Ecevit resigned, thereby triggering a collapse of the coalition government on 7 November 1974. After Ecevit's resignation, the President of the Republic Korutürk assigned contingency senator ⁵¹ Prof. Dr. Sadi Irmak as the prime minister. The Irmak administration comprised of technocrats and bureaucrats stayed in government for over four months despite failing to receive a vote of confidence. On March 1, 1975, Korutürk offered for Sadi Irmak to form a government once again, but Irmak refused. After Ecevit shared the same attitude as Irmak, the assignment to form the government was once again given to Demirel. After more than six months of crisis, Demirel succeeded in the formation of the so-called Nationalist Front, comprised of four right-wing parties (JP-NSP-RRP-NAP) and independents. With this coalition, JP was gaining prestige from the voters who demanded unity in the right, while NSP was freed from the accusation of "communist collaborator." Despite its 3.4% low vote rate, NAP enjoyed the most favorable position in this new administration by widely penetrating government agencies and state economic enterprises, particularly the Ministry of Education (Özdemir, 1992, p.241).

All parties of the coalition saw common ground in the formation of a united front against the resurgence of the left in the mid-1970s. The coalition which lasted for some time due to the early election fear of small parties fell into a crisis in 1976 because of conflicting views about SSCs. RPP together with DİSK were fervently against the existence of SSCs. The extensive authority of the SSCs was also troubling the Islamist conservatives in the coalition. The coalition failed to pass any legislation from June to November of 1976 because of this conflict. In the meantime, the law on the establishment of the SSC was annulled by the Constitutional Court and a period of one year was given to pass a new legislation (Sav, 1983, p. 918). Although he was in favor of the SSC, Demirel refrained from enacting a new law because of the frictions mentioned above. Demirel's decision was perceived as a great "treachery" by the military (Birand, Bila & Akar, 1999, p. 59).

After the transition to a civilian government in 1973, the labor movement gained momentum once again. Unions started to become influential in the society and in steering the social and economic policies of the country. Particularly in the second half of the 1970s, the majority of the working class waged an active struggle to reverse the loss in purchasing power

⁵¹ The Senate of the Republic was established by the 1961 Constitution as an upper house. The Senate was composed of 150 elected members and 15 "contingent senators" for a term of 6 years appointed by the president. It also had "natural senators," who were the former presidents and the NUC of the 1960 coup d'état (1961 Constitution, Art. 70-73). Senate of the Republic was abolished after the September 12 coup d'état.

due to high inflation. The industrial bourgeoisie, which had already been complaining about the right to collective bargaining and strike, got further annoyed by the rise in the real wage rates (Boratav, 1992, p. 343). As a confederation that was growing stronger each day, the political attitude of DİSK against the administration started to having effect upon the ranks of Türk-İş. Meanwhile, strikes for further economic and political rights, solidarity strikes, boycotts, and slowdown strikes were becoming increasingly widespread.⁵²

The working class of Turkey, especially unions under DİSK, strongly opposed the Nationalist Front. Two big worker demonstrations took place in this period. In 1976, Labor Day was celebrated by a group of over a hundred thousand people, comprised of unions affiliated to DİSK, Türk-İş, non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, artists, and youth with the slogan "a world changing towards socialism." The celebrations in 1976 were uneventful. However, the next year's Labor Day celebrations turned violent. On May 1, 1977, an unknown group of people opened fire into a large crowd gathered at the Taksim Square with the call of DİSK and led to the death of 36 people (Çavdar, 1996, pp. 246-248). This planned attack, coupled with the assassination warning sent to Ecevit by Prime Minister Demirel immediately after this incident, led to a suspicion of the existence of a secret organization called "counter-guerrilla," in the eyes of the public. Although Demirel refuted these allegations, they maintained their importance since the attackers could not be identified.

At the end of the Cold War, in August 1990, Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti admitted that in Italy and other Western European countries, clandestine armies, comprised of extreme-rightist militants, were established against communism threat under the NATO leadership (Ganser, 2005). The existence of a similar establishment in Turkey also became public in the same period.⁵³ However, many political murders and massacres attributed to this organization remained unsolved.⁵⁴

In the second half of the 1970s, violent conflicts between the right and left were spread throughout Turkey, particularly within the universities. The occupational organizations, including those of teachers, police, lawyers, and engineers, were divided into two groups with different names that were congruent with their ideologies.⁵⁵ This division also had its reflections in the coalition. While NSP was explicitly accusing NAP militants of terrorist activities, NAP

⁵² According to Ministry of Labor data, the total number of strikes in years 1963-1971 soared from 569 to 1,021 in years 1971-1980 (Türkiye İstatistik Cep Yıllığı, 1984, p. 208).

⁵³ Ecevit (1991), in his memoirs, indicated that he had learned the presence of such a stay-behind initiative in Turkey at a briefing he received from the Chief of Staff in 1974 during his government. Publicly named as counter-guerrilla, this organization was the Special Warfare Department (SWD) and its paramilitary civilian extension within the TAF. It was a USA supported organization "within, but not under the governance of the government. General Kemal Yamak, who presided the SWD in years 1971-1974, stated in his memoirs (2006) that the SWD was established in 1952 within the "covert operations concept" of NATO and that the USA sent a million dollars each year until 1974.

⁵⁴ For counter-guerrilla allegations in Turkey see, Emin M. Değer, CIA, Kontrgerilla ve Türkiye (CIA, Counter-Guerrilla and Turkey) (Ankara: Çağ Yayınları, 1979); İlhan Selçuk, Ziver Bey Köşkü (Ziver Bey Villa) (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1988); Talat Turhan, Özel Savaş, Terör ve Kontrgerilla (Special War, Terror and Counter-Guerrilla) (Istanbul: Tümm zamanlar Yayınları, 1992), Talat Turhan, Kontr-gerilla Cumhuriyeti (Republic of Counter-Guerrilla) (Istanbul: Tümm zamanlar Yayınları, 1993).

⁵⁵ Left-wing organizations such as TÖB-DER, TÜM-DER, POL-DER and their rightest counterparts Ülkücü Polisler Birliği (POL-BİR), Ülkücü Öğretmenler Birliği Derneği (ÜLKÜBİR-ÖĞRET) were examples of this division.

blamed NSP for being "green communist" (Birand et al., p, 82).

In this chaotic atmosphere, the government decided to hold an early election on June 5, 1977. RPP won about 42% of the votes, and Ecevit was appointed the prime minister. Unsuccessful in his coalition efforts, Ecevit tried to form a minority government. However, despite the President's approval, the minority government failed to win a vote of confidence in the Parliament, and Ecevit had to withdraw. The blockage in the system transformed into a regime crisis.

After a short time, rightist parties (JP, NSP, and NAP) who shared the view that "the government shall not be delivered to the left" formed the second NF administration led by Demirel. Following this development, his party ranks heavily pressured Ecevit to provide an alternative to the second NF. Ecevit convinced some JP deputies to resign from their party with the promise of appointing them as ministers and overthrow the Demirel administration by a vote of no-confidence with the support of four deputies from RRP and DP. Besides, he managed to form a new government with the help of the deputies of the same two parties (Tunçay, 1983b, p. 1990).

During the term of the third Ecevit administration, the global oil crisis deepened the economic problems of the country, and right-left conflict continued to accelerate at an increasing pace. The ideological clashes gravitated towards denominational differences (Alawite-Sunni) in those years and many violent incidents occurred, often involving the idealist militants who form the youth branches of the NAP. Alawites supported Ecevit as a bloc. The first provocations and attacks on Alawites occurred in Malatya, Sivas, and Elazığ. Alawites and Sunnis lived in these cities were pitted against each other.

The most violent incident occurred however in Kahramanmaraş on December 22, 1978. The idealist militants raided the funeral of two leftist teachers who had been assassinated. This assault suddenly turned into a massacre in which 109 people lost their lives, 176 were severely injured (Özdemir, 1992, p. 245). None of the security forces in the area, including the army, intervened in the clashes which lasted until December 25 and the citizens of Alawite origin eventually had to leave the city (Ibid). Following these incidents, the government declared martial law in 13 cities including Istanbul. However political assassinations continued through the late 1970s.⁵⁶ Assassins began to select targets to send warnings to particular groups. The police did not make any detailed investigations for most of the political killings, and the suspects who were held could easily escape the military prisons (Ahmad, 1993).

Ecevit lost the public support at the mid-term elections and resigned from his post on October 14th, 1978. Demirel then formed the Third Nationalist Front government on November 12th, 1979 with the support of NSP and NAP. This government also faced similar problems and quickly worn out. At the end of the year, the Chief of Staff and commanders-in-chief presented the President of the Republic a warning letter to deliver to the Demirel administration. In the

⁵⁶ On July 11, 1978, in Ankara, Professor Bedrettin Cömert, a member of the committee set up to investigate rightist terrorist incidents was assassinated at Hacettepe University. On February 2, 1979, the country was shocked by yet another assassination as editor-in-chief of Milliyet, Abdi İpekçi was killed by idealist militant Mehmet Ali Ağca. A liberal journalist, İpekçi was Ecevit's friend. It was alleged that the assassination of İpekçi was aimed to undermine the prime minister's and the administration's prestige.

first six months of 1980, political clashes led to the death of more than 1,400 people (Schick & Tonak, 1998, p. 393). By the summer of that year, the number of killings rose to 25 per day (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 55). From 1976, the year the murders began to escalate, to the end of 1980, more than 5,000 lost their lives in armed conflicts (see Table 2).

Table 3: Figures for Political Murders in Turkey (1969-1980)

Years	Number of Casualties
1969	9
1970	19
1971	22
1972	22
1973	15
1974	27
1975	37
1976	108
1977	315
1978	1095
1979	1362
1980	2206

Source: (Keleş & Ünsal, 1982)

Economic Crisis and January 24 Decisions

The import substitution industrialization strategy followed since 1963 and the populist economic policies implemented along with it had dragged the country into an immense foreign debt and a continually increasing inflation. The 1973 and 1974 oil shocks and the stagflation in the West had disrupted the balance of trade and boosted the current account deficit whereas the exchange rate policies had failed to stop overvaluation of the Turkish lira. The governments tried to control import expenditures and exchange rates to reestablish the economic balance. However, these policies caused foreign exchange bottlenecks and interrupted the capital good importation. As a result, the production diminished considerably. When the second oil shock in 1979 eliminated the possibility of using external sources to balance the economy, the need for a radical change in the economic order ensued.

Big investment groups that were struggling with decreasing profit margins in favor of wage rates and the economic crisis at the end of the 1970s, decided to announce their discontent to the public with an unconventional method used for the first time in Turkey's history. In May 1979, the representative of these groups, the Turkish Industry & Business Association (TÜSİAD), placed full-page adverts blaming the RPP administration (January 5, 1978-November 12, 1979) for implementing an anti-capitalist program and accused the government of being the primary reason of the economic crisis (Birand, Bilâ, & Akar, p.124). These adverts contained the views of big business on issues such as necessary economic and democratic reforms and labor peace and demanded the reorganization of democratic institutions to guarantee the economic security of the Turkish business, which has organic relations with the world monopolies (Çavdar, 1983, p. 2099). Years later, Ecevit made the following statement

about these adverts: "Leaders of some high-level investment groups went to or were called to Washington. There, Brzezinski, who was then the chief or a high-ranking member of the National Security Council, stormed at them saying how they could let such a prime minister govern the country. Right after that, those investment groups, capitalist circles placed adverts to overthrow our government" (Birand, Bilâ, & Akar, p.124). By the end of the 1970s, the interests of the Turkish bourgeoisie overlapped with the interests of USA-centered multi-nationals, IMF, and other similar international economic institutions.

Following the fall of Ecevit administration, the JP regained power in December of 1979 (Çavdar, 1983, pp. 2093-2094). The JP minority government prepared a package of "stabilization measures" aimed at addressing economic problems. Referred to as "January 24 Decisions" in the economic literature due to its announcement date in 1980, the package included a series of structural reforms to aiming to liberalize the entire economy (Akat, 1983, p. 1109).

January 24 Decisions were prepared at the end of 1979 by a small group of technocrats brought together by Turgut Özal, who was appointed as the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry State Planning Organization by Prime Minister Demirel. The program was a typical IMF prescription, which included measures to downsize the role of the state in the economy as well as liberalization of trade and capital movements. Turkey would abandon import substitution industrialization strategy and make a transition to an economic model focused on the rapid increase in cheap-to-produce exports for foreign exchange earnings. It would open for foreign competition, eliminate support prices for the agricultural sector, introduce regressive tax system, liberalize its interest rates, and privatize the State Economic Enterprises (Saygın & Çimen, 2013, p. 14). The reform package also included disturbing measures such as limiting wage increases and postponing strikes (Aydoğan, 2010; Birand, Bila, & Akar, 1999).

The government applied to the IMF and OECD consortium to open new credits and facilitate interest payments on old debts. With a three-year stand-by agreement signed on June 18, 1980, the IMF approved financial assistance of 1.2 billion Special Drawing Rights to Turkey. This amount was six times the Turkish quota of the Fund, and it constituted the highest credit extended to any country up to that time by the IMF. Turkey's letter of intent to the IMF included obligations to relieve the IMF's concerns about the progress of the collective bargaining negotiations with the trade unions (Kazdağlı, 2001, p.458).

The program received heavy resistance from the Parliament and labor organizations. DİSK fiercely opposed the regressive tax reform and the wage control since they would worsen income distribution. Some of the opposition in the Parliament, especially RPP led by Bülent Ecevit, who had strong links with labor organizations, questioned the program's constitutionality and disputed the decisions that would lead the termination of subsidies extended to State Economic Enterprises (SEE) (Işıklı, 2005). However, Prime Minister Demirel preferred to convince the General Staff rather than the Parliament about the January 24 Decisions. These radical economic reforms would concern the military elites not only because they would generate political and social repercussions in Turkey. They would also directly affect the military elites which until then had been a distinctive capitalist class in Turkey.

TAF as an Investor

TAF, by the mid-1970s, had already become one of Turkey's largest conglomerates due to the Army Forces Pension Fund (OYAK) established on March 1, 1961 (Law no. 205) issued by the National Unity Committee. Akça (2002) asserted that the military resorted to such means to improve the financial conditions of the officers, which had deteriorated during the 1950s, "ensuring their economic autonomy in the face of civilian powers" (p. 83). Indeed, the need for economic autonomy led the army to share common economic interests with capital groups. The army, which staged the 1960 coup and remained distant from the business world, was directly articulated to the capitalist class in Turkey in 1971.

Although the purpose of the legislation that formed the basis for the establishment of OYAK was "to provide social assistance to the members of the Turkish Armed Forces", the list of "institutional services", as Parla argued (2002a), clearly indicated that "a large commercial enterprise would be incorporated with the institutional structure of the armed forces" (p. 67). By the mid-1970s, OYAK had made large profit-seeking investments in the automotive, cement, real estate, petrochemical, agricultural pesticide, insurance, food, and service sectors (Akça, p. 88). What made OYAK particularly important for capital groups was the economic link it established in its investments between international capital, local monopoly capital groups, and SEEs. Parla also stated that "the existence of a perfect consensus between the military elites and the business world was proven by the fact that the emperor of the Turkish industry and commerce, Vehbi Koç and the Turkish private banking baron, Kazım Taşkent became the members of first executive board of OYAK, as well as the founding shareholders of the first important OYAK initiatives; Koç in OYAK-Goodyear and Taşkent in OYAK-Renault" (p. 72).

Behind the commercial performance of OYAK, where elite businessmen actively participated in the executive board together with the military, were tax exemptions (including corporation tax) and other similar concessions, which were determined in its statute. Furthermore, since all its goods, income, and receivables were considered "state property" (Art. 37) in the legislation, OYAK was not affected by the risks that could arise from the fluctuations of the market and was therefore protected from possible destructive effects of fair competition. As a result, OYAK became a central economic actor, which the capitalist groups competed to cooperate with. Therefore, it was important that Demirel convince the military elite about the January 24 Decisions. Demirel assigned this job to the architect of the reforms, Turgut Özal. After giving three secret briefings to the military hierarchy on the subject (Birand, Bilâ, & Akar, p.140), Özal finally received approval to initiate the reforms.

Although the government won the support of the military hierarchy for the January 24 Decisions, it did not win the support of the army regarding how to fight terrorism in the martial law areas under TAF's responsibility. Moreover, in this period a new crisis regarding the presidency of the republic emerged. The President of the Republic Korutürk's term ended in the spring of 1980, and the Parliament failed to elect a new president for months. This political bottleneck in addition to the growing street clashes and terrorist activities became the main factors that provided TAF with the necessary legitimacy for the coup. Finally, on September 12, 1980, the military command consisting of the Chief of General Staff, Commanders of

Land, Air and Naval Forces, and the General Commander of Gendarmerie, took over the government under the name of the "National Security Board" (NSB).

Following the coup d'état, NSB members who were unwilling to encounter any weaknesses in areas outside their expertise, assigned Turgut Özal the duty of implementing economic reforms within the military government. The military government, on the other hand, self-bestowed the authority to establish a new political order in which the state would be run by its "real owners."

2. Establishment of the National Security State: September 12 Regime

The September 12 coup d'état represents a milestone in the history of coups in the Republic of Turkey, with its goals for economic transformation, mass depoliticization, liquidation of political institutions, and restructuring the state. The September 12 coup, evaluated in the context of its practices, was a well-planned, intervention. Its timing was carefully chosen. Coup stagers, thanks to the political turmoil, implemented a social engineering project for a full-fledged hegemony which radically reorganized the state-citizen and state-military-politics relations.

There were two important objectives of this project: The first was to give an order to the social domain and political system and to establish the legal grounds for perpetuating the control and intervention mechanisms. The second, as explained in the previous section, was to eliminate the obstacles before the market-centered economic transformation planned in the early 1980s.

In line with the first objective, the military power has radically expanded its autonomy in the political system. In the process, it carried out intense legislative activity, devised a new constitution, and institutionalized a state and government model which would perpetuate its control. However, this was not a new model. As suggested in the introduction, this thesis argues that a national security state similar to those built in many Latin American countries by US-backed coups in the 1960s was established in Turkey by the 1980 coup d'état. From this point of view, the 1980 intervention can be interpreted as "delayed coup" in the chronology of the coups of the Cold War. In other words, the national security states established in countries like Chile (after the 1973 coup), Brazil (after the 1964 coup) or South Korea (after the 1961 coup), could only be built following the 1980 coup in Turkey. However, during its three-year administration, the military regime closed this time gap with the regulations that it made on both ideological and constitutional-institutional levels.

2.1. September 12 coup d'état and the role of the USA

Like May 27 and March 12 coups, the trigger of the September 12 intervention remained local, "chaos and terror." Nor is it possible to make a clear assessment of the extent of the US involvement in the September 12 coup with the available information. However, it is evident that the USA not only had prior knowledge of the September 12 coup d'état, but she was a fervent supporter of it.

September 12 coup was an intervention as an institution in the spirit of command chain whose top brass had very close relations with the US. In November 1979, the US Ambassador to Ankara, Ronald Spiers's (1977- 1980) sent the following message to Washington (Justification for IMET-Congressional, 1979, November 19):

“IMET⁵⁷ [*International Military Education and Training program*] has a long history in Turkey. Since 1950, 40 officers who have attended professional military education (PME) courses in the United States have subsequently achieved general/flag officer rank; of this number, 22 are still on active duty. For example, army four (4) stars - General Üruğ, 1st Army, General Demircioğlu, 3rd Army and General Demirel, Combined War Academies - Air Force four (4) stars - General Şahinkaya, Turkish Air Force, General Sözer, member National Security Council; Navy four (4) stars - Admiral Tümer, fleet commander have been trained in the United States under IMET auspices.) These officers represent a nucleus of personnel who have been extensively exposed to United States' training and military doctrine as well as American society as a whole. Many times, this number have received similar benefits through other technical or professional training courses in the U.S.”

Ambassador Spiers (1998) in an interview he gave in the context of Foreign Affairs Oral History Project on November 11, 1991, revealed the extent of his personal relationship with the military hierarchy, especially General Evren as such:

I became good friends with the Turkish military. I left Turkey as a minor hero among the military. The Chief of Staff later became President, so that my contacts were very useful. I sought them out and cultivated them carefully. [...] I did that in Turkey, Great Britain, and Pakistan. I had worked with the American military a lot, I liked them and so I gravitated to those connections. In Turkey and Pakistan, of course, they were very important in the political arena. The President of Turkey was a former admiral [*Fahri Korutürk*]. I suspect that my predecessors had not made the same approaches as I did. I think the Turkish military appreciated my efforts. The week I left, the four Chiefs of Staff - Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie - gave a dinner for me which I was told was unprecedented. It was noted as such in the Turkish newspapers. One of these officers was Kenan Evren, whom I saw again when I was in Pakistan, by which time he had become President of Turkey. As is customary, all Ambassadors go to the airport to meet an arriving Chief of State. When he got to me, he showed great surprise and

⁵⁷ IMET program was launched in 1976 to provide U.S. government funds to members of foreign military personnel from “allied and friendly nations” to take classes at U.S. military facilities. Kurlantzick (2006, June 8) explained the function of the IMET program as follows: “When it was founded, IMET focused on boosting foreign militaries’ relations with the United States and educating armed forces about U.S. weapons. IMET creates personal relationships in a way that other types of security aid cannot, and the program often includes men and women who later ascend to the ranks of colonel or general. For more than four decades, the program has played a role in bonding foreign and U.S. officers, and in cultivating U.S. influence in strategically vital nations.”

threw his arms around me. President Zia looked at me with new respect (p, 76).

Based on the accounts of James Spain, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey after Spiers, and Paul Henze, former CIA's station chief in Turkey (1974-1977) who served as assistant to Zbigniew Brzezinski in the U.S. National Security Council at the time, Demirel (2003) asserted that the "US was expecting a military intervention to take place, though they did not know its exact timing" (p.272). Demirel noted that Evren was not concerned about the reactions of NATO and the USA. He was confident that they would "show an understanding towards the intervention" (Ibid.). Indeed, the memoirs of the senior officers during the September 12 coup, the Commander of the 2nd Army General İbrahim Şenocak (2005) and Lieutenant General Necip Torumtay (1993) confirmed that the junta had received a green light from the United States before the intervention.⁵⁸

An hour in advance of the intervention, the junta warned the US Embassy in Ankara by phone to alert them of the coup (Gil, February 1981). U.S. support of the coup was also immediately acknowledged by the Paul Henze. The investigative journalist Mehmet Ali Birand (1984) indicated that after the government was overthrown, Henze cabled Washington, saying, "our boys [in Ankara] did it" (p. 213).⁵⁹ On the very same day of the coup, Department of State issued a statement declaring the US government's implicit approval of the new military regime. In the statement it was emphasized that "the United States, along with Turkey's other NATO allies and friends, has provided significant levels of assistance to help stabilize its economy and provide for the common defense. This assistance will continue" (Coups d'Etat in Turkey, Department of State Bulletin, November 1980, p.50). As U.S. Ambassador Spain (1984) asserted in his memoirs, the military regime "won tolerance and greater aid than ever from the United States" (Spain 1984, p. 27). Shortly after the coup, the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited Turkey to show the Turks and the world "that America stood behind the new regime" (Campbell 1987, p. 63).

September 12 military regime operated in a way that favored US interests beyond the pro-US policies of previous coup governments. It not only adopted the values of neo-liberalism by opening a wide space for the free market fetish, which was on the rise with the Washington Consensus, but it also eradicated all leftist movements, particularly trade unions, that openly opposed this process. As will be discussed in detail in the following sections, in conformity

⁵⁸ General Şenocak (2005), stated in his memoirs that when he asked General Evren 'if they considered how other countries particularly the USA would react and if the coup would not harm the economy. Evren received the question very well and told Şenocak not to worry because they already took care of these issues (pp. 179–180). Lieutenant General Torumtay (1993), who would become the Chief of General Staff in 1987, made similar remarks in his memoir: "On September 11, the gates of the General Staff were closed down and entire personnel were informed by proper ranking generals after dinner. At 21:00 hours the top generals met for a special evaluation of recent developments in our region and the world. Potential reactions of foreign states and international organizations were then assessed and questions coming from generals were replied. It was decided in the end that no serious problem would occur in that respect" (p. 78).

⁵⁹ Henze denied his words during an interview in 2003 that he gave to *Zaman* newspaper and blamed Birand for making it up. However, Birand, right after Henze's accusations discussed the matter in his show *Manşet* (Headline) on CNN Turk and aired the interview that he had made with Henze in 1997. See also "Cuntacılar 'bizim çocuklar' diyen ajan öldü" (*Milliyet*, June 04), <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/cuntacilara-bizim-cocuklar-diyen-ajan-oldu-1398393>

with the Green Belt doctrine advocated by the Carter administration at the end of the 1970s, it also introduced several radical policy changes in the cultural sphere to in favor of moderate Islamic movements. Moreover, it acted in accordance with Washington's preferences in foreign and military politics.

Before the coup, certain government policies were causing unrest in the US. New problems started to arise in Turkey-USA relations in 1974; tension escalated with the 1974 Cyprus intervention and the arms embargo the US imposed against Turkey in 1975. In response to the US arms embargo Turkey revoked the 1969 Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement. The USA lifted the embargo in 1978, but Turkish governments kept refusing several strategic US demands in 1979 and 1980. They denied US the use of its bases for U-2 flights over the USSR; refused to deploy the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), “a four-service reservoir of forces” to” increase capabilities for non-NATO contingencies in the Middle East; (Davis, 1982, p. 1) and vetoed the reentry of Greece into NATO (Uzgel, 2010, p. 38). Furthermore, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, a fierce critic of the Shah's regime and the CENTO alliance, instantly recognized the new regime established after the Iranian Islamic Revolution (Özcan & Özdamar, 2010).

The military government of the September coup while reversing all these decisions of the previous governments, implemented a strategy to protect the Western interests in the region harmed after the Iranian Revolution. At the request of General Bernard Rogers, commander of the NATO forces in Europe, one month after the coup, Turkey revoked its veto on Greece rejoining NATO in October. Ahmad indicated that this decision was made based on the promise of extending loans from Western states (Washington and Bonn) to the debt-ridden Turkish economy (pp. 183-184). On November 18, 1980, Turkey signed the Cooperation on Defense and Economy Agreement (CDECA), which founded the basics of Turkish-American military relations from then on. CDECA was an upgraded renewal of the 1969 Joint Defense Agreement, and until then it had been used as a valuable leverage by previous governments (TÜSIAD, 2003, p. 7). With this agreement, the USA guaranteed the preservation of its military facilities in Turkey (Atmaca, 2014, p. 28).

Another critical development in Turkey-USA relations during the military administration was the deployment of the RDJTF in Turkey. The RDJTF was established on March 1, 1980, to fortify US control in the oil region against Soviet influence. Although the military government claimed the opposite in official statements, it accepted the RDJTF's acquisition of storage facilities in Turkey on certain conditions through an official agreement (Uzgel, p. 47). On November 29, 1982, a memorandum of understanding was signed as a supplementary agreement to CDECA. With this memorandum, Turkey approved modernization of the ten existing airports, and the construction of two new airports in the eastern region, all of which would be extended to the use of the USA and NATO (Ibid.).

2.2. Immediate Measures of the Military Regime

September 12 coup was an intervention planned to the minutest details. TAF seized power on September 12, 1980, based on its authority to "protect and safeguard the Republic of

Turkey" under the "Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law" no 211, dated January 4, 1961. They immediately deposed the government and dissolved the Parliament. The junta comprised of the force commanders⁶⁰ and the Chief-of-Staff Kenan Evren assumed the executive and legislative authority themselves.

On the same day, all political parties were banned, and all facilities belonging to them were placed under the control of martial law and garrison commands. The activities of DİSK, MİSK (Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-Confederation of Turkish Nationalist Workers' Unions), and all affiliated unions, associations, and banks were halted except for the Turkish Aeronautical Association, Child Protection Agency, and the Red Crescent (Communique no. 7 of the NSB, 1980, September 12). Strikes and lockouts were postponed. Only the unions affiliated with Türk-İş were allowed to operate. The bank accounts of the rest of the unions and confederations, including DİSK⁶¹, the right-wing MİSK and Islamist Hak-İş (Confederation of Turkish Real Trade) were frozen, and the executives of DİSK and MİSK were arrested. The General Directorate of Security, which served under civilian administration, was placed under the command of the General Command of Gendarmerie (Communique No. 9 of the NSB, 1980, September 12).

The other declaration issued on the day of the coup declared the political parties as the main culprits for "the severe escalation of anarchy and terror" and "bringing the country on the brink of division" by their "uncompromising attitude" and "extreme sympathy or support." It was followed by an announcement that the party leaders were abolished from the Parliament and were banned from making statements (Notification to Party Leaders). The JP Leader Prime Minister Demirel, RPP Leader Bülent Ecevit, and NSP Leader Necmettin Erbakan were detained by military authorities. The NAP Leader Alparslan Türkeş, who knew about the coup beforehand, could not be found at home. After being informed that hiding would make him guilty, he surrendered to the Ankara Central Command Headquarters on September 14th.

At a press conference that Evren held on September 16 as the head of state, he summarized the purpose of the coup as "to protect the national unity, to prevent anarchy and terrorism, to sustain and protect state authority, to provide social peace, national understanding and solidarity and to reinstate the secular republican regime based on social justice, individual rights and liberties and human rights" (Press Conference of Kenan Evren, 1980, 16 September). At the same conference, he also indicated that the civilian administration would be reinstated at a "reasonable time" after the legislative regulations were complete. The junta issued the Law on the National Security Board (Law No. 2356) on December 12, 1980 declaring that the functions and powers of the NSB would be in effect until "the GNAT is convened and assumed its functions in accordance with the provisions of the new constitution to be prepared by the Constituent Assembly and voted by the people" (Art. 2).

Right after the coup, Evren sent the international circles two important messages

⁶⁰ General Nurettin Ersin, Commander of Land Forces, General Tahsin Şahinkaya, Commander of the Air Force, Admiral Nejat Tümer, Commander of the Navy, and General Sedat Celasun, Commander of the Gendarmerie.

⁶¹ The court would decide to annul the dismissal of DİSK and release its executives on July 16, 1991, almost 11 years after the case was opened.

regarding the structure and goals of the regime. He gave these messages in his speech named "Explanation to Turkish People" on September 12th. In this speech Evren emphasized that the military regime would "stay loyal to all alliances and agreements, including NATO" (Radio–Television Speech of Kenan Evren, 1980, September 12). He sent the second message through the press conference he held on September 16. Evren stated that "Turkey would continue to fulfill the agreements and protocols regarding the economic program, which was implemented to organize and improve the economy."

In Declaration 16, the NSB confirmed that the IMF agreement signed in the context of the January 24 Decisions was still in force. This declaration was made following the warning that Turgut Özal gave in his report titled "Recent Economic Situation of Turkey and Measures to be Taken After September 12" dated September 12, 1980 (Gemalmaz, p. 975). On the national level, Özal suggested that to prevent black-markets and hoardings, "the supply of money and goods should not be limited until the public confidence is gained", "the long-lasting strikes, which have been continuing violently for ideological purposes should be ended", and "tax reforms which were brought to the Parliament before the coup should be implemented immediately" (Ibid.). On an international level, he emphasized "the utmost importance of giving assurance [to the international financial institutions] about the implementation of January 24 Decisions" (Ibid.)

The NSB's decision was welcomed by the IMF circles. Çölaşan (1984) reported that the commitment message of the coup administration was distributed to all concerned parties within the organization by IMF on September 17th with the inscription "Not for Public Use." Immediately afterward, on September 27th, NSB sent Washington a delegation under Özal's leadership to meet with IMF and the World Bank (pp. 86-87). This move further exhibited the firm determination of the military regime to transition to a liberal economy.

It was not possible for the junta to conduct all the executive duties on its own. It needed a cabinet for the legal restructuring of the regime. On September 20th, 1980, Kenan Evren announced the appointment of Bülent Ulusu, the retired Commander of the Naval Forces as the head of government. Within the same day, Ulusu submitted the cabinet list for NSB's approval. A cabinet of 26 ministers was formed in just a day, without being published in the Official Gazette. NSB appointed retired military figures as the Minister of the Interior, Minister of National Education, Minister of Health & Welfare, Minister of Customs and Monopolies, and Minister of Youth and Sports. Eight of the thirteen civilian members of the new cabinet were prior members of the above-party government formed during the March 12 coup, and the remaining five were from academia. Turgut Özal was appointed as the Minister of Economy and Deputy Prime Minister. The previous head of the Employers' Confederation was appointed as the Minister of Public Works; while Sadık Şide the Türk-İş General Secretary at the time was appointed as the Minister of Social Security.⁶²

⁶² Şide, in a statement he made after his retirement, told that they had been informed about the coup d'état two days before. In the same statement, he recited the response of Türk-İş executives about the offers made to them to take place in the military government as follows: "Honorable Turkish Army, which had saved this country from great dangers, has once again managed to pull the country out of a fire. [...] We received the offer from the government on September 10. [...] All the executive board members accepted this offer as an honor and

The government program was prepared quickly, read by the Prime Minister on September 27th, 1980, and approved on September 30th in the fifth assembly of the NSB. The content of the program was almost identical to the prior declarations and decisions of the NSB. This uniformity was a clear indication that the junta leaders had already decided upon the measures that need to be implemented in the new period (Gemalmaz, p. 979).

In October, the military government passed the "Law on Constitutional Order" (Law No. 2324 of October 27, 1980). Like many other laws at the time, it was put into effect retroactively. This law reiterated that the Board assumed the powers of the GNAT while the Chairman of Board assumed the powers of the President of the Republic. It further ruled that no plea of unconstitutionality could be put forward concerning the laws, declarations, and decisions made by the Board (Art. 7). Thus, it rendered all past and future decisions of the new government independent of auditing. Furthermore, any possible objections to decrees were prevented with the article stating that the "suspension or repeal of parliamentary decrees and triple decrees issued after September 12, 1980, cannot be demanded."

The new government's function was limited to implementing the necessary legal and political grounds for consolidating the power of the military in the post-coup period. The civilian members of the government were chosen to this end. Nevertheless, the Board had taken precaution against any potential opposition from the government before its establishment through "the Internal regulation for the Legislative Duties of the National Security Board of the Republic of Turkey" it had enacted on September 25 (Ordinance No. 1). It was giving the NSB the authority to audit and overthrow the prime minister and the ministers (Tanör, 1995, p. 29). It was the first text to institutionalize the regime on legal grounds. Although the Board members and Cabinet were authorized to legislate (Art. 9) the vote of the Chairman of the Board (i.e., the Chief of Staff would be counted twice in case of equal votes (Art. 16).

The paranoid distrust towards civilian executives manifested itself also in the martial law regulations. Evren amended the Martial Law and changed the related clause, ordering the martial law commanders to be accountable to "the Prime Minister" to "the Chief of Staff" (Gemalmaz, p. 977). In this process, similar to the legislative and executive organs, all other administrative and autonomous structures were subjected to depoliticization.

2.2.1. Mass Cleansing: Purging of the Left

The most effective cleansing operation of the military hierarchy regarding society and institutions was realized through martial law practices. On September 12th, the junta expanded martial law nationwide (NSB Declaration No. 2, 1980, September 12), and established martial law commands in 13 districts. The martial law commanders appointed by the NSB were authorized "to implement all necessary arrangements and measures" for "the establishment of the state authority, security, peace, and safety of life & property in the country" (NSB Declaration No. 2, Art. 2). Hence, they gained the power to ban strikes, gatherings, and

privilege" (cited in Parlar, p. 128). Gemalmaz claimed that with this decision, the military wanted to prevent a direct opposition by a wide labor class, if not make them willing advocates (pp. 977-978).

demonstrations; suspend publications of newspapers and other media organizations and discharge undesirable public officials. Martial Law Courts in these districts were equipped with the authority to prosecute the ideological crimes outlined in Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code, which prohibited political activity based on social class (Hale, 1996, p.30). The NSB had the authority to appoint and dismiss judges and prosecutors who served in these courts (Tanör, 1995, p.30).

With the amendment made in the Martial Law No. 1402, the military gained the authority to dismiss all public personnel and local government employees. Following this amendment, elected members of the provincial and municipal councils, as well as the 27 governors of the 67 cities, were dismissed by the NSB (Öncü & Parla, 1981). In addition, all provincial and municipal councils were dissolved. Based on Law No. 1402, 14,509 civil servants were dismissed, and 1,322 were pushed into early retirement. In short, the majority of the elected politicians as well as public officials were liquidated for the sake of "neutral administration" (Ibid.). Article 5 of Law No. 2324, the Law on the Constitutional Order, stipulated that the "suspension of the procedures and decisions concerning the public officials made by the Ministers and personnel authorized by Ministers cannot be demanded." Thus, the dismissed personnel were stripped of the right to claim their positions. The NSB appointed retired or active army members to the vacant positions. During this period, approximately 18,000 officers, 2,000 judges, and prosecutors, 4,000 police officers, and 5,000 teachers were also forced out of their jobs (Helvacı, 1983, p. 722).

A similar purge was carried out within the army. A total of 2,000 potentially dissident officers and non-commissioned officers were discharged to safeguard the internal discipline of the military (Parlar, 1997, pp. 27-28). The desire to strengthen the state authority at the expense of institutional autonomy also manifested itself in decisions about higher education. The junta members considered universities as the hubs of political turmoil. Therefore, they tied these institutions to the central authority through the Council of Higher Education (CoHE), established by the Higher Education Law No. 2547 which entered into force on November 6th, 1981. The authority to appoint CoHE members was entrusted to the Chief of the General Staff (Ibid).

The Law on Higher Education eliminated scientific autonomy of the universities. Academic staff was stripped of the right to choose their rectors and deans. Academia was banned from engaging in politics, the involvement of academicians in associations was made subject to special dispensations. With the new Disciplinary Regulation, deans were given the authority to conduct investigations into and impose punishments on the members of academia. A dress regulation was introduced, and many faculty members were controlled by personnel policies (Gök, 1983, p. 465). Different academic institutions such as the conservatory, art academy, police academy, faculties of theology, and mechanical engineering, were subjected to the same academic and institutional standards through CoHE (İnsel, 2003, January 12).

The martial law commanders' authority to dismiss without cause, (gained by the amendments to Law No. 1402) was rendered valid for university employees as well. This law was once again applied against left-wing academics and teachers. Martial law commanders eliminated the qualified teaching staff in universities and schools under the pretext of the

maintaining security. The number of academics and teachers who were dismissed or forced to resign by the CoHE and Martial Law Command reached approximately 2,600 in this period (Özen, 2002, pp. 285-331).

The rights and freedoms that were most frequently violated during the military regime were the right to life and physical integrity. The death penalty, except the interim regime of 1971 to 1973, had not been practiced since 1964 in Turkey. However, the military courts of the September 12 regime, requested death penalty for 7,000 people, and 517 were sentenced to death. The junta insisted on the execution of death penalties. Kenan Evren asked the crowds at public rallies these two infamous rhetorical questions: "Should we not hang them?" "Should we go on feeding them?" Between 1980 and 1984, a total of 50 men, including 17-year-old, were executed. Of these, 26 were convicted of political offenses (18 leftists and eight rightists), and 23 were convicted of ordinary crimes.

Aside from arbitrary detentions and unjustified arrests, another common practice of the period was torture. It was frequently used during the detention periods as a tool for dehumanizing the detainees rather than capturing organization members. The second phase of torture was implemented in military prisons. There was not a single prison that did not implement systematic torture during the September 12 military regime. Hundreds of people lost their lives in brutal prisons of the period (Kısacık, 2011; Akman, 2010; Bademci, 2014).

Severe sanctions were imposed on suspects who were not seized during the September 12 period. NSB amended the Citizenship Law to deprive them of citizenship. The new article stipulated that "persons who engage in activities against the internal and external security or economic and financial security of the country; or have gone abroad after engaging in such activities and thus unavailable for trial or implementation of a sentence and who despite the issuance of a call to do so do not return to the country within 3 months" can be deprived of citizenship (Ersel et al., 2002, p.13). The law, as such stayed in force until 1992.⁶³ As a result of this amendment, 4,843 persons during military administration and 8,945 persons during civilian administration were deprived of citizenship. The government issued an official 'return home' call for 26 thousand suspects, and the assets of all the persons expelled from citizenship were seized by the Treasury (Ibid.). Furthermore, with an amendment to the Passport Law No. 5862 enacted on February 27, 1981, approximately 280 thousand people were banned from leaving the country. Of these people, 6,680 were not given a passport for "general security" reasons (Art. 22). Many people, who were tried for offenses against Atatürk or the personality of the state, as well as political and ideological offenses, were not given a passport for a long time until their acquittal (Nebiler, 1989, p. 485).

According to the records of the Human Rights Association, the legal score of the September 12 military regime was as follows: 650,000 people were taken into custody; 1,683,000 people were blacklisted based on the "Order on Persons to be Monitored," dated August 12, 1981; 210,000 cases opened; 230,000 people were prosecuted; 71,000 people were tried for ideological offenses by the TCC Articles 141, 142 and 163; and 98,000 people were

⁶³ This article was later nullified by Law No 3808 enacted on May 27, 1992. Most of the victims of the previous law regained their citizenship and received their assets confiscated by the Treasury.

tried for "being a member of an illegal organization." In addition, 23,000 people were sentenced to one year, 10,700 people were sentenced to one to five years, 6,100 people were sentenced to five to ten years, 2,390 people were sentenced to ten to twenty years, 939 people were sentenced to more than 20 years, and 630 people were sentenced to life imprisonment. Another 388,000 people were denied a passport. In total 30,000 people were dismissed from their jobs, 14,000 people were deprived of citizenship, 30,000 people went abroad as political refugees, 300 died under suspicious circumstances, 95 killed in armed conflict, and 14 died in a hunger strike. An additional 16 people were shot while running away, 73 were reported as natural deaths, and 43 were reported to have committed suicide during interrogation (cited in Ersel et al., p.12).

The military government also put into practice a systematic and restrictive censorship policy. Many journalists were arrested for their writings, and almost all press organs were suspended at least once. On September 14th, 1980, TRT, the only television channel at the time, was notified of a severe censorship text under the name of "Rules to be observed in the News." Its broadcasting policy was determined entirely by the NSB. During this period, the courts requested approximately 4,000 years of imprisonment for 400 journalists, and almost 40 tons of newspapers and magazines were burnt. Additionally, 937 films were banned for being "objectionable," and 272 books used in schools until then, were banned for being "subversive, ideological and political" (Ibid., p. 61).

On November 10, 1983, the military government enacted a new Press Law. According to this law, newspapers that violated national security and general morality could be suspended for three days to one month, equipment of printing houses that printed illegal material could be confiscated, and distribution of publications that violated state security could be prohibited with the order of a judge or a prosecutor. With the same law, administrative fines and sentences imposed on newspaper executives also increased (Ibid., p. 73).

Only a day after the Press Law, the military government passed the Law on Radio and Television (Law No. 2954), which stipulated state monopoly in radio and television broadcasting. The law established a new institution named the Radio and Television Supreme Council to supervise, audit, and regulate radio and television broadcasts in accordance with the broadcasting principles outlined in the law. This council was authorized to monitor the existing and future radio and television broadcasts, and to intervene in the event of nonconformity with principles including "adherence to the promise and spirit" of the 1982 Constitution (Art. 5/a), "compliance with the national security policy of the state" (Art. 5/b), and "conformity to national traditions and moral values" (Art. 5/e).

The damage the September 12 coup inflicted on the social and cultural scene was not limited to the consequences of the regime's sanctions. The atmosphere of fear created by September 12 brought along an indirect memory slaughter among the left-wing intellectuals and youth. Many had to destroy their photographs, books, letters, and writings to avoid direct allegations by the military regime. The memoirs and interviews published by the intellectuals who lived at that time revealed the devastation September 12 created in their personal lives (Ilgaz, 2000; Müftüoğlu, 2000; Önderoğlu, 2008).

2.2.2. Liquidation of Political Institutions

The dissolution of political parties was not initially among the goals of the September 12 coup d'état. It was clear that the coup would not be subject to strong opposition from a political structure lacking democratic ideals, consisting mostly of parties, which rely on populist policies and political patronage. Indeed, the leaders and members of the political parties dismissed by the September 12 regime did not engage in a serious democratic struggle, except for occasionally expressing their opinions in writing or verbally on certain policies of the military government.⁶⁴ However, they also refrained from presenting an attitude, which would indicate their open support for the military policies. This was likely the reason for the dissolution of political parties one year after the coup.

The Council first announced Decree No. 52, which imposed new bans on the political party members. This decree dictated once more that the leaders and members of political parties were "prohibited from making written or verbal statements and writing articles regarding their opinions on past, present and future political and legal state of Turkey or from holding meetings for this purpose." This decree also highlighted the ban on discussing the practices of the martial law administration. Before the convening of the Consultative Assembly that was responsible for drafting a constitution on October 16, 1981, the military government enacted a law (Law No. 2533 on the Abolition of Political Parties) that dissolved all political parties founded before September 12 and confiscated all their movable and immovable assets except for those of RPP. The Chairman of the Board Kenan Evren, in his speech broadcasted on TRT radio and television on October 16, 1981, explained the goal of the legislation as follows (Kültürel Yapılanma Grubu, n.a., pp. 41-42):

"A democratic parliamentary system based on political parties shall surely be established in Turkey. However, it will not be with the existing parties. Just as a building constructed with the debris of a collapsed building is doomed to collapse, a democracy built with the parties which brought the country to its state before September 12 is also doomed to collapse. Like a robust building constructed with new, we believe that it is only possible to build our free and democratic parliamentary system with new political parties established in accordance with the new Constitution and the Law on Political Parties; and thus we decided to dissolve existing parties. We also feel that this is the necessary course of action to ensure a nonpartisan, comfortable and peaceful working environment for the Consultative Assembly. After the public approval of the Constitution made by the Constituent Assembly, new political parties will be established in accordance with the new Law on Political Parties and general elections will be held with these parties..."

⁶⁴ On the other hand, it was almost impossible to criticize the military at that time. Both Ecevit and NSP Leader Necmettin Erbakan were detained by the martial law courts in October 1981, for having insulted the "moral personality of the state" in speeches they have made in various places. Ecevit was sentenced to 4 months of imprisonment for making a statement to a foreign press agency despite the Council's Decree No 52 (Ersel et al., p. 37-38).

The short-term purpose of this law was to isolate the members of the Consultative Assembly from all influences of and emotional connections with political parties. On the other hand, the long-term purpose of the military regime was to introduce a multi-party system with new political parties which would adhere to the military's political engineering project. Kenan Evren, following the decree, made a clear statement that the current politicians would not be able to take place in the parliament during the next elections (cited in Ersel et al., p. 34).

September 12, 1980 was a new beginning for all the components of political organizations in Turkey. The occupational organizations lost their independence.⁶⁵ Termination penalties imposed on political parties, unions, and associations were not considered sufficient. The martial law courts filed class action lawsuits for some of them. In addition to the executives of leftist parties such as WPT, the Socialist Workers Party of Turkey (SWPT), and the Workers' & Peasants' Party of Turkey (WPPT), executives of NSP and NAP were also tried in martial law courts.

NSP Leader Necmettin Erbakan and 33 party executives were litigated by the Ankara Martial Law Command Office of Military Prosecution. Although there was no evidence of Erbakan's involvement with terrorism, the former leader of NSP was charged with the violation of Article 163 of Turkish Penal Code, which guarantees the secularism principle of the Constitution. However, the trial that started in April 1981 requesting a 36-year sentence for Erbakan concluded with his release on July 24.

On the other hand, the lawsuit filed on April 29th, 1981, against NAP came as a big surprise for the idealist cadres who sympathized with the coup (Bora & Can, 1991, p. 94). In August 1981, for 49 of the 389 defendants including its leader Alparslan Türkeş, the court recommended the death penalty with the allegations of "subversiveness and inciting the public to violence" (Ibid.). The letter Türkeş wrote to Evren during his trial is significant for revealing the ideological partnership between the September 12 administration and the Idealists (Tuşalp, 1986, p. 281):

"Honorable Full General, your statements since September 12 are, in a different style, a confirmation of the ideas we have been advocating for years and will continue to advocate under all circumstances. [...]. In your efforts for the fortification of the Turkish state [...] I would sincerely wish for your success."

The quote from the motion of release submitted to the court by Türkeş' assistance, Ağâh Oktay Güner on October 11, 1982 has become one of the most referenced anecdotes of the period: "There has never been a political party, whose doctrine is in power and which itself in prison" (cited in Parlar, p. 161). The September 12 military government was still determined to make Türkeş pay for his unbridled aggression. His case lasted six years. However, Türkeş was released on April 9, 1985, after 4.5 years of imprisonment, with the initiative of Kenan Evren.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Union of Turkish Bar Associations was tied to the Ministry of Justice, Turkish Medical Association to Ministry of Health, and Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers & Architects to Ministry of Public Works.

⁶⁶ Ali Baransel, who was the press consultant of Evren during his term as President, recounted the story of Türkeş's release as follows: "Party leaders tried after September 12, were released one by one. Only Alparslan Türkeş was still in prison. Every morning, I would brief General Evren about the news in the press. That day, I

The trial ended in April 1987, and the court ruled in favor of the death penalty for five, life imprisonment for nine, and various lengths of incarceration for 219 defendants (Bora & Can, 1991, p. 94).

Trials of left-wing political parties began around the same time. Leaders and many members of the Workers' & Peasants' Party of Turkey (WPPT), Socialist Workers Party of Turkey (SWPT), and WPT were tried by military courts and had to serve long sentences. In addition to political parties, unions and associations were subjected to great pressure. Among the lawsuits filed against unionists, the most notorious case was against DİSK. As leftist union which had been active in the political domain since the second half of the 1960s, it was one of the main targets of September 12. 67 DİSK executives had already been arrested and incarcerated on the day of the coup. Following this event, the prosecutor filed a motion seeking the death penalty for 52 DİSK executives, including its leader. The DİSK member and the leader of the Leather Workers' Union (Deri-İş), Kenan Budak was killed by the police on July 25, 1981, in the middle of the street.

The trials started on December 24, 1981, at the Istanbul Martial Law Court; 160 case files were combined, and the number of defendants reached 1,477, while the number of death penalty cases rose to 78. The case concluded on December 24th, 1986. Military Court No. 2 in İstanbul ruled that the Confederation be terminated and sentenced 264 unionists and unions experts to imprisonment for times ranging from five years-six months-twenty days to fifteen years-eight months.⁶⁷ The sanctions on unions were not limited to DİSK. The unions such as the Writers' Syndicate of Turkey, Petrol-İş (refinery workers), and Yol-İş (construction workers) were also subjected to the heavy pressures during the martial law.

However, two right-wing unions whose activities were suspended on the day of the coup were treated differently. No lawsuits were filed against MİSK, known for its affinity with NAP and its support of "idealist" activities during this period. Likewise, the Hak-İş, a right-wing Islamist confederation that had enjoyed the opportunity to grow during the Nationalist Front governments, refrained from any legal action. Shortly after 12 September, the military government, for the sake of appearing impartial in the eyes of the public, had taken into custody a few executives of the Confederation They were all discharged after a short time. Although all assets and documents of unions were frozen by Declaration No 7 of the military government, those of Hak-İş were released by Decision No 45 of the NSB on February 19, 1981.

The military regime suspended 23.677 associations from activity (Ersel et al., 2002, p. 12). Two of the lawsuits filed against associations piqued the interest of the public. The first was the lawsuit filed against the 44 members of the Pacifists Association. It was especially notable for the fact that it demonstrated the September 12 regime's perception of intellectuals in Turkey. The Pacifists Association was advocating for moderation in interstate relations and

told him that the newspapers write that only Türkeş is still in prison. "Is that so?" he said. Then he instructed the Head of Legal Affairs Office of the President of the Republic, Major General Muzaffer Başkaynak to arrange for Türkeş's release with a medical committee report on the grounds of health problems. Türkeş was released by his order. If Evren had not intervened, Türkeş would have stayed in prison longer" (cited in Mercan, 2004, October 18).

⁶⁷ The dissolution verdict of DİSK stayed in effect until it was acquitted by the Military Supreme Court on July 16, 1991, based on the annulment of Article 141 of Turkish Penal Code.

universal disarmament. Its founder, retired ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem, had been elected as an executive board member of the World Peace Council in September 1980. Executives and members of the association, including many journalists, authors, faculty members, lawyers, doctors, politicians, and artists, were charged for violating Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code and arrested (Hale, p. 215). The case lasted until April 21, 1991 and concluded with the acquittal of all defendants.

The next significant case was the one opened against TÖB-DER, an association with 200 thousand members representing the majority of teachers in the country. The court decided to dissolve the headquarters, and 670 branches of the TÖB-DER with the charge of "transforming from legal to illegal and aiming for a Marxist-Leninist order" (Çelenk, 1990, p. 265). Executives and some members were wrongly convicted of "being a member of an illegal organization."

During this period, legal means to resist the pressures and arbitrary actions of the military regime were severely restricted. The only course of action available for the citizens to make their voices heard was the "right to petition." Tanör made the following comment on this issue: "The only form of expression Ottoman subjects had and was accustomed to, revived during the September 12 regime; rulers, who came into power with the coup, were submitted hundreds of petitions each day" (p. 36). According to news published in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper on May 25, 1985, by the end of the seventh month of the military regime, the number of petitions submitted to the NSB had reached 59,318.

The lawsuit filed against one of these petitions towards the end of the September 12 regime once again targeted the intellectuals. 1,256 leading intellectuals of the period submitted a petition titled "Observations on & Demands for the Democratic Order in Turkey" directly to Kenan Evren. Thereupon, Ankara Martial Law Command immediately launched an investigation against this initiative. 59 of the signatories had to wait until 1986 to be cleared of baseless charges (Ersel et al., p. 101).

In conclusion, the September 12 regime terminated the search for alternatives to the existing order and its main principles on all levels. It developed an inordinate pressure mechanism against the demands for change from not only the groups accused of terrorism but from all opposing groups. However, its purpose was not limited to a mass purge and depoliticization. The military government aimed at establishing a new state model, which institutionalized authoritarian policies under the concept of national security.

2.3. Institutionalization of the Regime

Bayramoğlu (2002) described the September 12 military regime as "a period in which the military became both an institutionalizing and a constituent power" (p. 39). 669 laws were enacted from September 12, 1980, until the end of the direct military regime on December 6, 1983 (Gemalmaz, p.985). Since then, there had not been a more intense legislative period in the history of the Republic. Apart from 669 laws, the NSB passed a great number of regulations under the names of the "National Security Board Decisions/Declarations/Ordinances." When the "Decree Laws" and "Triple Decrees" are added to this equation, it can be seen that the

number of laws and regulations passed during the military regime reached a figure well above 669.

General Secretariat of the NSB announced the stages of preparation for the New Constitution as a package, named the "transition to democracy" program on November 1, 1980. According to the statement of the General Secretary Haydar Saltık, the stages of the program were as follows (cited in Tanör, 1995, p. 37):

1. "Establishing the preconditions for the founding of the Constituent Assembly;
2. Approval of the law on the founding, duties and powers of the Constituent Assembly, which would be issued as the supplement to the Law on Constitutional Order;
3. Founding of the Constituent Assembly, and drafting of the new constitution;
4. Holding of a constitutional referendum via a new referendum law and the approval of the New Constitution;
5. Preparation and enactment of new laws on parties and elections by the Constituent Assembly, based on the provisions stated in the New Constitution approved by the public;
6. The initiation of party activities, which would be established in accordance with the new constitution and the new law of political parties;
7. [...] Establishment of the GNAT after the general elections which will be held in accordance with the new law on elections;
8. Termination of duties and existence of the Constituent Assembly and the National Security Board in accordance with the provisional articles in the Constitution; and thus, complete reinstatement of the democratic political life."

The timetable for this list was clarified by the Chairman of the Council Evren. According to the timetable, the referendum would be held in the fall of 1982 and the general elections in 1983.

The law on the Constituent Assembly was enacted on June 6, 1981. According to this law, the Constituent Assembly was comprised of two wings: the NSB and the Consultative Assembly. However, between these two organs, there was a hierarchy favoring the former. Of the 160 members of the Consultative Assembly, 40 were appointed directly by the NSB and the Board selected the other 120 members from the candidates nominated by the governor of each city (Parla, 1993, p.77). One of the conditions of membership was that the candidate should have no connection with any political party before September 11, 1980 (Ibid.). Thus, the 1982 Constitution was drafted by a committee which was assigned and authorized by the military regime and completely lacked the required criteria for democratic representativeness.

In the opening speech of GNAT in October of 1981, Evren provided important clues about the state structure proposed by the 1982 Constitution (cited in Heper, 1985, p. 131):

“While trying to enhance and protect human rights and liberties, the state itself also has certain rights and obligations as far as its continuity and future is concerned. We do not have the right to put the state into a powerless and inactive position. The state cannot be turned into a helpless institution to be governed by private associations. [...] Citizens should know that freedom of thought and conscience exist. There are, however, limits to these freedoms; there is also a state founded by the individuals that together make up a collectivity. The state in question protects the individuals. This state too has a will and sovereignty of its own. Individual freedoms can be protected to the extent that the will and the sovereignty of the state are maintained. If the will and sovereignty of the state are undermined, then the only entity than can safeguard individual freedoms has withered away.”

In the same speech, Evren stated that the NSB had the last word on the Constitution and thus reminded the Consultative Assembly that its authority was limited to drafting the Constitution. During the preparations and the presentation of the final text, all means of criticism and objective judgment on the content of the Constitution were entirely obstructed.⁶⁸ The coup administration also used psychological pressure on the public against a possible rejection of the Constitution. Before the referendum, the NSB member openly declared that anyone who advocated "no to the Constitution" was "subversive and a separatist" traitor.⁶⁹ Moreover, the NSB implicitly threatened the voters by underlining that the transition to a civilian administration might be hindered if the Constitution was not approved.⁷⁰ The junta achieved the desired result. The 1982 Constitution went to referendum on November 7, 1982 and was approved by 91.4% of the votes.

With the approval of the Constitution, Evren automatically became the head of state as stated in the first provisional article of the Constitution. The office of the President of the

⁶⁸ Members of dissolved political parties as well as those of associations and corporate bodies were legally prohibited from making statements and declarations regarding the constitution (NSB Decision No 65). Same decision also stipulated that occupational organizations and institutions would need the permission of Martial Law Commands of their district, to make statements on the issue. The Council, not content with these precautions, issued a new decision to prevent negative statements about the Constitution. With temporary provisions of the Constitution, criticizing the speeches of the Head of State on radio, television and national tours, and making verbal or written statements against them were forbidden. Moreover, on September 24, 1982, Article 5/b of the "Law on Putting the Constitution on Referendum" (Law No. 2707) stipulated that the Constitution could be praised, but not criticized. Article 12 of the same law, stated that citizens who do not vote at the referendum would be deprived of their right to vote and right to hold office; and thereby an obligatory support was asked of the public for the passing of the Constitution."

⁶⁹ While a report prepared and disseminated to the press by the Office of General Staff was explicitly criminalizing the potential "No" voters, Evren, in a speech he gave in Afyonkarahisar around the same time, was declaring that people who advocated "No to the Constitution!" were cooperating with external powers (cited in Ersel et al., p. 9).

⁷⁰ President of the Constitutional Commission's statement before the referendum was as follows: "Our Constitution will be approved. [...] Because approval of the Constitution means a Law on Political Parties will be enacted and an election will be held. [...] Voters will see this and will approve the Constitution to shift to a normal order" (*Cumhuriyet*, 1982, January 26).

Republic, who was turned into the second head of executive authority by the 1982 Constitution, was held by the leader of the coup for seven years. The second provisional article of the Constitution ruled that, after the parliament has convened and assumed its functions, the NSB shall become the Presidential Council for six years, and its members shall acquire the title of members of the Presidential Council.

The functions of the Presidential Council were listed as follows:

1. To examine laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and submitted to the President of the Republic concerning: the fundamental rights and freedoms and duties, the principle of secularism, the preservation of the reforms of Atatürk, national security and public order set forth in the Constitution, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, international treaties, the sending of Armed Forces to foreign countries and the stationing of foreign forces in Turkey, emergency rule, martial law and the state of war, and other laws deemed necessary by the President of the Republic, within the first ten days of the period of fifteen days granted to the President of the Republic for his consideration;
2. On the request of the President of the Republic and within the period specified by him: to consider and give an opinion on matters relating to the holding of new general elections, the exercise of emergency powers and the measures to be taken during a state of emergency, the management and supervision of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, the training of the youth and the conduct of religious affairs;
3. According to the request of the President of the Republic, to consider and investigate matters relating to internal or external security and such other matters as are deemed necessary, and to submit its findings to the President of the Republic.

In summary, the Council would be the military tool of the regime authorized to control whether or not the country was run in accordance with coup's philosophy after the transition to democracy.

2.4. Ideology of the 1980 Coup

2.4.1. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis Project

The September 12 junta attempted to use religion and nationalism as balancing factors against the danger of the leftist movements to regain power in the political arena, especially among future generations. With this preference, The Turkish military was demonstrating that it adopted a specific political pattern that had already been applied in many other countries in the Cold War. In the 1970s, Carter's National Security Council under Zbigniew Brzezinski promulgated the Green Belt doctrine to build a shield of moderate Islam around its arch enemy the USSR. Within the context of this theory, the USA decided to support moderate Islamic ideology against the rise of the left and halt Soviet expansion (Uzgel, p. 36-37).

The September 12 military government adopted this new strategy of the USA in both internal and external politics. While some significant steps were taken to improve the relations with the Arab countries,⁷¹ a much more radical project was undertaken in the domestic arena. The military government, to integrate the country with the international capitalist system, established an oppressive regime, which repressed any reaction from the opposing left to the structural economic reforms. The ideological field that was cleared by the elimination of the left was filled with the new rightist values, which had been allowed to strengthen by the end of the 1970s. The military hierarchy endeavored to reconcile these values referred to as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) with Atatürkism/Kemalism, the official ideology of the state.

The first development that confirmed this policy choice was observed in President Evren's public speeches in the days following 12 September. Evren, regularly quoting verses from the Qu'ran tried to justify both secularism and the necessity of knowing one's religion (Başbakanlık, 1981). On August 28, 1982, the military government introduced mandatory religious education in primary and high schools. Religion classes were also made mandatory in senior high schools, with Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution. They even penetrated the prisons. The military government launched a mosque building spree. Furthermore, the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA) was astoundingly increased during this period, reaching one and a half times the budget of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and seven times the budget of Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The PRA started to publish fatwa books on a wide range of topics from sexuality to banking and interest. Also, through the Religious Foundation under its umbrella, the PRA established a conglomerate that was comprised of seven companies operating in different industries including tourism, education, entertainment, and food. From 1980 to 1982, 23 new faculties of theology were founded in universities. The Muslim World League, an organization based in Saudi Arabia, paid the salaries of religion teachers sent abroad on official duty (Uzgel, 2010). The autonomies of the Turkish Language Association (TLA) and Turkish Historical Society (THS), both of which were considered legacies of Atatürk, were revoked (Püsküllüoğlu & Özel, 1986). A new organization was formed to replace these institutions under the name Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language, and History (ASCCLH), and its management was given to nationalist/conservative groups (Law No 2876). As a part of the military government's plan, TIS was declared a state policy by a report published after ASCCLH's meeting in June 1986, three years after the end of the military term. The representatives of the September 12 institutions (Kenan Evren as the President of the Republic, Prime Minister Turgut Özal, the Chief of Staff and CoHE President at the time) decided on a national cultural policy based on a report titled "The Methods and Responsibilities in Determining Cultural Elements and a Cultural Policy." According to this report, Turkey was under the attack of foreign imperialist cultures and TIS would be the fundamental reference for fighting off these attacks. The report also reiterated that it was impossible for Turks to protect their identity without Islam and that Islam was the most suitable religion for Turks. While denying the constantly evolving nature of culture, the text was suggesting the existence of an

⁷¹ In line with the Green Belt doctrine, Head of State Kenan Evren made a significant number of visits to countries like Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Egypt, Tunisia and Pakistan during the military government (TÜSIAD 2003, p. 8).

unchanging, monolithic, cultural essence in the Turkish nation. Congruent with this discourse, the report suggested that the Turkish "national culture" should be protected by the state.

TIS was a political theory developed in the 1970s as a product of the desire to unite the two traditional wings of the Turkish right, the Islamists, and the nationalists against the left (Güvenç, B. et al., 1994; Copeaux, 1998; Taşkın, 2003). TIS was against the radicalization of Islam (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 374). This theory was conceptualized by the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı), an organization established by a group of right-winger conservative academics, journalists, and authors in 1970. It was an attempt of "reinventing history in the light of the new conservative nationalism" (Oprea, 2014, p. 136).

As Copeaux stated, it had a nationalist ideological content, which at the same time "defined Turkish personality through Islam as a religious, moral and identity-based reference" (Ibid. p.59). In this context, not only the communists but also the Kurdish separatists and the non-Muslims were identified as threats to the Turkish nation (Oprea, p. 134).

Intellectuals' Hearth was against the liberal and pluralist values, social rights, and social state principle of the 1961 Constitution. Rather than scientific coherence, it sought political influence. It had put forth considerable effort for the founding of Nationalist Front governments against Ecevit in 1970s (Özdemir, 2004), and had insistently advocated for TIS to build a cultural framework for Turkey. Intellectuals' Hearth also strongly emphasized the need for integration between the military and government and enthusiastically supported the September 12 coup d'état.

In the conjuncture explained above, the reasons for the partnership between the military hierarchy and the Intellectuals' Hearth were quite clear. TIS advocates were defending an "authoritarian democracy" in which the political rule of the military should be inherently permanent. Their threat perceptions were almost identical with those of the military, and they were emphasizing that the country should have a "national politics" above daily political conflicts (Güvenç et al., 1994, pp. 40-41). According to this thesis, national politics was "a compilation of main principles to preside in the soul of the nation for generations" (Taşkın, p. 399). It was a body of principles which "all politicians should be liable to, and all citizens have to support" (Ibid.). Therefore, TIS was utterly compatible with the homogeneous, uniform, and ordered society model envisioned by the junta.

Another causal relation between the September 12 regime and the Intellectuals' Hearth was their tendency to "normalize" the state as a subject. Conservative TIS advocates who were called for the elimination of the leftist threat were a strategic partner for building the cultural foundations of the September 12 philosophy, with their wholehearted adoption of a secular, Muslim identity, and the state authority.

Since TIS was the expression of a corporatist political philosophy, it was functional in eradicating the social demands of the left in the short and medium term. In the constitution draft they presented to the September 12 junta, while they were underlining "the divinity of state in the Turkish state tradition," (Art. 2) they were also stating that "individual rights and freedoms shall not be idolized and shall not be allowed to precede the benefits of the nation and the state"

(Art. 8). TIS advocates were more than willing to maintain the "the existing order" in return for being on the front lines of the political scene and state offices (Taşkın, pp. 381-401).

Another point of intersection between the September 12 regime and the Intellectuals' Hearth was Turgut Özal, the leader of Motherland Party (MP), which was the only political organization permitted to run in the elections aside from the two political parties established by the coup administration. Özal was known to have close relations with the Intellectuals' Hearth upon his return from the World Bank, at which he served as an advisor from 1971 to 1973. The Secretary-General of the Intellectuals' Hearth at that time, Metin Eriş, described Özal as "not an official, but almost a natural member" of their organization (cited in İridağ, 2004, para. 12). Intellectuals' Hearth played an important role in Özal's re-crossing paths with Demirel as Undersecretary of the Prime Minister. Moreover, Özal planted the seeds of the January 24 Decisions at the Intellectuals' Hearth (Ibid). The leader of the Intellectuals' Hearth at the time, Süleyman Yalçın, stated that Özal was affected by them while admitting that Özal also managed to convince them to change their minds about many subjects (Ibid). Özal, when he decided to establish a political party and resigned from the office of Deputy Prime Minister, he received the support of Intellectuals' Hearth. Moreover, some members of Intellectuals' Hearth became the founding members of the party (Ibid).

2.4.2. A Conservative Interpretation of Atatürkism

After assuring its political domination over the regime on September 12, 1980, the military hierarchy placed the official (Ataturkist/Kemalist) ideology at the center of its discourse as the only valid ground to unify the society and legitimize its authority. It was not a new notion for the constitutional structure to have an ideological character. The founding ideology of the single-party period, referred to as Kemalism or Atatürkism at times, was turned into the official ideology of Turkey and was included in the constitution in 1937.⁷² The official ideology has never been an all-inclusive totalitarian ideology; it has been, as Zürcher (1996) stated, "a compilation of attitudes and opinions," which have not been defined in detail at any time (p. 264). It has a flexible conceptual content (Ibid). Ünsaldı (2008) asserted that "the difficulty of defining Kemalism became even more complicated after the transition to a multi-party system in 1947 when competing factions attempted to instrumentalize it for political purposes" (p. 191). As it advocated a classless and unprivileged society model and embraced a statist perspective, the official ideology has constantly failed to develop an "internal rationale" that was compliant with its westernization and modernization goals. Therefore, it needed to be regularly reminded to the society as an instrument of hegemony in the face of the new political and economic challenges (Çiğdem, 1998). Atatürkism rejects any demands or differences that might arise from ethnic, religious, or class-related interests. Rather than adopting the universal human rights and democratic values of the West, it advocates a modernism perception limited to assuming technical and organizational tools and information. In this sense, it has never

⁷² The six guiding tenets of Kemalism, which are Republicanism, Secularism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism and Revolutionism, had already been incorporated in the party program at the third National Convention in 1931. Present day RPP still has the six arrows representing these principles on its emblem.

tolerated liberal, socialist, or communist trends which interpret modernization in the scope of activities, relations, interactions, and tensions of different civilian groups (Laçiner, 1998; Zürcher, p. 265).

According to Ataturkism, the subject of change is not the society, but the state, and because of this trait, it loses its unifying function as the social dynamics change (Başkaya, 1991; Caymaz, 2007; Erdoğan, 2000). Therefore, at each coup period, it needed to be made functional again as a tool of social rehabilitation. In this respect, it has always been the military elite, and to a certain extent, the state bureaucracy, who had the monopoly to (re)define it according to the changing conditions of the period.

The statement that underlined "the full dedication to the reforms of Atatürk" in the preamble of the 1961 Constitution was just one of the indicators of the military power's desire to place the official ideology in the foundations of the constitutional order. The first article of the memorandum that was issued on March 12, 1971, by the Chief of Staff and the Commanders-in-Chief to the JP administration, also reflected the same effort. It demanded, "the formation, within the context of democratic principles, of a strong and credible government, which will neutralize the current anarchical situation and which, inspired by Atatürk's views, will implement the reformist laws envisaged by the constitution" (Özbudun, 2000, p.34). However, considering the developments explained above, there were significant differences between the state practices and social visions of these two military juntas, which embraced Ataturkism as the official ideology. The March 12 junta while wielding Ataturkism as a legitimate reference to the struggle against the left, it extended the autonomy of the military by establishing or fortifying existing institutions to control political and social domains. The interpretation of Ataturkism which favored individual rights and freedoms and the social state in the 1961 Constitution was replaced by a rightist interpretation that promoted status quo and capital, laying the foundations for an oppressive state authority. The tendency towards a more conservative and nationalist definition of Ataturkism continued with the 1980 coup. This time, the "core values" of Turks and Sunni Islam were incorporated into its definition. Although religion was recorded under the "provision of secularism principle," it was inferred as a means of "national unity and national integrity" in the Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution on the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

As İnel (1998) argued, the official ideology, as had always been the case in prior periods, maintained its function of creating new "(political) crimes and prohibitions" and dictating to "the society what it is, who it is and where it should go" after 1980 (p.21). However, developments after the 1980 coup took rather a radical path, when the army adopted the role of restoring the ideological grounds of the regime which it commissioned itself to "protect and safeguard," in political and institutional platforms. Right at this point, with the assumption that a *collage* of Ataturkism and TIS would be insufficient to control the ideological and political domain; it introduced the concept of national security as a hegemonic tool. In other words, the notion, which entered the political jargon following the 1960 coup, gained depth and efficiency on ideological and institutional levels after the 1980 coup.

It is important to reemphasize that the official ideology throughout the history of the Republic has been the only means of indoctrination utilized by the Turkish state for the cultural

transformation of the society. It has thus played an indispensable role in guaranteeing the "indisputability" of the fundamental policies of the state elites, especially the military bureaucracy. As a result, the TAF, which had built all its structure on the Atatürk cult, could not be expected to abandon the Kemalist discourse. However, this time, the military power would resort to a more "global" and thus legitimate concept to build a permanent control and manipulation mechanism.

2.4.3. National Security Ideology as a New Instrument of Hegemony

The political engineering project of the military was twofold: Through the 1982 Constitution and the legislation created during the military regime, the TAF while expelling all alternative discourses except Atatürkism from the political domain, instrumentalized the national security concept as a means of deepening its power over the state and society. An important point that has not been sufficiently deliberated by researchers of the period was that the NSB, through the military-rooted members, had steered the Constitutional Assembly to prepare a text based on a draft constitution, whose content was borrowed from the national security states of the Cold War. Contrary to the statement of Prof. Sadi Irmak, the Chairman of the Consultative Assembly; "our democracy was not unique to us" (Şarлак, 1994).

Laws enacted during the first two years of the military junta restricting judicial control, bestowing excessive authority upon legislative, administrative, and law-enforcement agencies as well as limiting fundamental rights and freedoms, became constitutional provisions in the 1982 Constitution. The military junta claimed to have used two documents, the 1961 Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, as sources for the constitution (Bayramođlu, 2002, p. 39).

Although the provisions of both constitutions had stipulated the same fundamental rights and freedoms, the 1982 Constitution revoked them with special prohibitions and exceptions under the same titles. While the European Convention on Human Rights prohibited states from abusing fundamental rights and freedoms, the 1982 Constitution defined the state as a "supreme" and "divine" entity, which should be protected against society, placing it in the center of the regime as the main political value above all freedoms. It immediately rendered "national interests" as invariable truths binding the entire society and assigning the monopoly of determining national interests to the National Security Council. The new constitution left individuals defenseless against the state by bringing all sorts of secondary organizations (chambers, bars, trade unions, associations, etc.), under its direct control.⁷³ Hence the 1982 Constitution had no relevance to the texts that the military junta pretended to use as references.

Gemalmaz indicated that "there had been reports, especially in the foreign press, saying that some people influential in this process possessed the constitutions of despotic regimes like

⁷³ For extensive analysis of the 1982 Constitution see, Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Anayasalar (Constitutions in Turkey)* (Istanbul: İletişim Publications, 2002); Zafer Üskül, *Türkiye'nin Anayasa Sorunu (Constitution Problem of Turkey)* (Istanbul: Afa Publications, 1991); Bülent Tanör, *İki Anayasa 1961-1982 (Two Constitutions 1961-1982)* (Istanbul: Beta Publications, 1986); Mustafa Erdoğan, *Türkiye'de Anayasalar ve Siyaset (Constitutions and Politics in Turkey)* (Ankara: Liberte Publications, 2001)

South Korea and Taiwan" (p. 987). Gemalmaz, based on the same foreign sources, reported that legal experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the University of Georgetown in Washington D.C. were sent as advisors to the NSB by the US administration at the time (Ibid). Moreover, as mentioned in the first section, during the Cold War, the U.S.-backed coup governments in countries like South Korea or Brazil, had restructured their constitutional regimes according to the US-originated national security doctrine.

To answer the question whether such an interaction was valid for Turkey, the next chapter analyses the development and the duties of the three central security actors established in the executive, intelligence, and judiciary domains of Turkey, namely the National Security Council, the National Intelligence Organization and the State Security Courts.