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## **A history of the national security state in Turkey**

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## Chapter I

### 1. The Rise of the National Security State in the US

#### 1.1. Emergence of the National Security Idea

The origin of the phrase ‘national security’ is uncertain. Though it is acknowledged that this phrase has been used since the early days of the United States,<sup>1</sup> it got into circulation during World War I. When the United States became involved in the war, the phrase ‘national security’ began appearing frequently, as an undefined term in some laws enacted (Shulman, 2000, pp. 294-295). However, during the same period this phrase was incrementally conceptualized as the central tenet of a number of policy sets by the National Security League (NSL), a “small upper-class group” led public service organization founded in 1914 to “lobby for increased and improved preparation for America’s defense from enemies at home and abroad” (Ibid., pp. 290, 295). In a short time, the NSL became an influential organization, and its influence continued until the end of WWI.<sup>2</sup> Shulman noted that by the end of 1916, the NSL had 250 chapters and 100,000 members throughout the nation, and these numbers remained high until 1918. The league organized hundreds of rallies around the country and reached hundreds of thousands of Americans by sending speakers, writers, and handbooks to various kinds of get-togethers (Ibid.). During its prime, the League received a part of its financial support from the wealthy residents of New York City, including the oil titan John D. Rockefeller and banker J.P Morgan (Ibid., pp.304-305).

The NSL leaders formulated a nationalist agenda. They defined enemies as those who are not “100% American”. Non-American meant “foreign nationals, many immigrants, and political radicals,” as well as trade union members and the Congressmen opposing the legislations that the League deemed crucial (Ibid., p. 305). The League advocated for a more centralized economy in the hands of “reliable cartels or the government” in favor of power and efficiency. Any issue regarding distributional justice was out of its scope. It also demanded unrestricted rights to private property, as trade unions were perceived as a serious threat (Ibid.,

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<sup>1</sup> The first known use of the phrase dates back to the 1790s. Students at Yale University reportedly deliberated on the question, “Does national security depend on fostering domestic industries?” (Rostow, 1975, p. 191). Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper 70, suggested that, in conducting war, “the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of national security” (cited in Relyea, 2003, p. 611). President Franklin Pierce, in his 1853 inaugural address, stated that “there is no national security but, in the nation’s, humble, acknowledged dependence upon God and His overruling providence” (Ibid.). In 1915, historian Victor S. Clark, used the phrase very closely to its current meaning to rebut the contemporary accusation that Thomas Jefferson was a weak-willed pacifist: “Likewise the lessons of two wars with the mother country had convinced many thinking men that industrial independence was a necessary adjunct of political interdependence; and even Thomas Jefferson, disinclined as he was to extend the functions of government, had come to believe that public aid of home manufacturers might be required for *national security*” (Clark, 1916, p. 58).

<sup>2</sup> For an extensive information on the purposes, membership, financial support, and activities of the NSL see, United States. Congress. House. Special Committee to Investigate the National Security League. (1918). National Security League: hearings before a special committee of the House of Representatives, sixty-fifth Congress, third session on H. Res. 469 and H. Res. 476. Washington: Government Printing Office. The full text of the hearings can be found at: <https://ia802605.us.archive.org/9/items/nationalsecurit00housgoog/nationalsecurit00housgoog.pdf>

309). Regarding defense and military matters, all NSL leaders promoted the idea of increased military expenditures and coordination of the Army and Navy at the political level. Since they believed in its strategic significance and more importantly, its moral value, the League also supported the idea of universal military training (Ibid., pp. 310, 312-313).

By the end of the war, some of the NSL's leaders overtly proposed policy recommendations, including "a consolidated defense department; national security coordination by professionals instead of a politically responsive Congress; joint military purchasing; a natural resources board; universal conscription; construction of a national highway system and English-only requirements for citizenship and residency" (Ibid., p. 319). In 1920, the League intensified its demands for "a more repressive and less representative state," and became increasingly concerned with domestic issues. The NSL proposed the centralization of all spending decisions of experts in Washington, as well as education campaigns designed to "fight Bolshevism and preach Americanism" to combat radicals at home (Ibid., p. 321). However, the conventional wisdom at the time assured that the safety of America could be guaranteed by pursuing an isolationist policy against the rest of the world. The country's geographical remoteness from the other "Great Powers," the superiority of its naval fleets, and its vast natural and industrial resources established the basis for this isolationism (Yergin, 1990, p. 197).

The League's influence faded away and its policy proposals were largely ignored by the end of World War I, and the use of the phrase 'national security' in adopted federal statutes became less frequent over the following decades (Relyea, 2003, p. 611). After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, however, despite the absence of a direct threat to the United States, President Roosevelt "began to broaden out what exactly constituted 'home defense'" and started using the term in its modern doctrinal sense (Preston, 2014, pp. 492-493). The term national security became ubiquitous in the US after December 7, 1941, when the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted a surprise military strike against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This instance legitimated the idea of national security indefinitely. Since then, as Stuart (2008) asserted, the national security has been "the standard against which all future foreign policies would be judged" (pp. 5-6). By the end of WWII, the phrase became prominent in official pronouncements, presidential directives, statutes, and agency regulations. It was (re)stated publicly during an August 1945 Senate hearing on the unification of the military services (cited in Yergin, 1990, p. 194):

"Our national security can only be assured on a very broad and comprehensive front," Navy Secretary James Forrestal, the most vigorous supporter of the concept and soon to be the first United States Secretary of Defense told the Senate. He added, "I am using the word security here consistently and continuously, rather than defense." Senator Edwin Johnson responded, "I like your words national security."

Forrestal went on to say (cited in Shulman, p.327),

"The question of national security is not merely a question of the Army and the Navy. We have to take into account our whole potential for war, our

mines, industry, manpower, research and all the activities that go into normal civilian life.”<sup>3</sup>

Following the aftermath of the war, the main proposals of the NSL were implemented while restructuring the state institutions around the concept of national security. Former NSL members and supporters of the League played significant roles in the foundation of the national security state of the Cold War era.<sup>4</sup>

By the end of WWII, the post-war political elite had reached consensus on the need for institutional reform around four main issues: new machinery for collecting and interpreting peacetime intelligence regarding potential enemies, new mechanisms for civilian-military dialogue, new institutions designed to promote cooperation among different military branches, and new procedures for mobilizing and managing the nation’s economic and scientific resources in support of national security (Stuart, 2008; Yergin, 1990).

These reform decisions were all made under the umbrella of national security, and this concept became a paradigm to explain the United States’ relationship to the rest of the world during World War II. According to Yergin (1990), national security was “a perception, a state of mind” which “postulate[d] the “interrelatedness of so many different political, economic, and military factors that developments halfway around the globe are seen to have automatic and direct impact on America’s core interests” (p. 196). This perception automatically suggested that any turn of events anywhere might endanger the United States’ security and any course of action could be rationalized by the need for national security. This new idea and the associated reforms necessitate the existence of an enemy to gain meaning, substance, focus, and urgency. Accordingly, in the immediate post-war years, the Soviet Union provided the necessary grounds in this regard. When the Korean War came to an end, the idea of national security also turned into the official ideology of the United States.

## 1.2. From an Idea to Ideology

In his prominent book on the subject of the origins of the national security state in the US, *A Cross of Iron* (1998), Hogan articulates the central components of the national security ideology using three major foreign policy documents from the early Cold War era: the well-known telegraph sent by George Kennan in 1946, and his article “*The sources of Soviet Conduct*”, published in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym “X”; the *Clifford-Elsey Report* on Soviet-American relations commissioned by President Truman less than six months after Kennan’s telegram, of which the final draft had been reviewed by Kennan<sup>5</sup>; President Truman’s famous speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, announcing what would later be referred to as the Truman Doctrine; and finally, the document NSC-68, which

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<sup>3</sup> This idea echoes Colmar von der Goltz’s late 19th century doctrine of the “The Nation in Arms” (Das Volk in Waffen) that was also vastly influential in Turkey as well.

<sup>4</sup> Especially Prof. Edward Pendleton Herring’s name, a leading member of the National Security League comes forward during this process. (Stuart, 2008, pp. 5-6, 9-11, 27-31, 121, 231)

<sup>5</sup>The full text of the report can be found at <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/report-american-relations-soviet-union-clark-clifford-clifford-elsey-report>

was produced in 1950 by a subcommittee of the National Security Council. These documents reflected and reproduced American perceptions of Soviet aggressiveness and according to Hogan, determined the “basic convictions in a fashion that was coherent enough to approximate a formal ideology” (p.12).

Based on these documents, Hogan argued that the national security concept, which was adopted in conjunction with the Cold War, had five basic components: bipolar world view, military preparedness, one for all and all for one approach, need for leadership and secrecy.

### ***1.2.1. Bipolar World View***

The first component of the security ideology was the division between the ingroup and the outgroup. The world was divided into two distinctive competing camps, the free world and the communist bloc, and the competition between these two blocs was repetitively depicted as the clash between “good” and “evil” (Ibid., pp. 17-18). In the documents mentioned above from the early period of the cold War, the Soviet Union was persistently portrayed as a state that was uncompromisingly expansionist and implacably hostile to the US and the rest of the Western world. Likewise, the Soviet Union was perceived as a society of creatures captivated by a “messianic ideology” that was intent on mobilizing all its energies to dominate the entire world. In these documents about the Soviet Union, National Security Council Report 68, later shortened to *NSC-68*<sup>6</sup> is the document in which the statements were repeated in the most exaggerated manner:

"The Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority. The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design."

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<sup>6</sup> For the full text of the NSC-68 see, <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-3.htm>.

Murray Edelman explains why leaders define their enemies not according to the harm that they cause, but by the identifying function they fulfill within the political process. He reasons that (Edelman, 1988, p. 76):

“In constructing such enemies and the narrative plots that define their place in history, people are manifestly defining themselves and their place in history as well; the self-definition lends passion to the whole transaction. To support a war against a foreign aggressor who threatens national sovereignty and moral decencies is to construct oneself as a member of a nation of innocent heroes. To define the people, one hurts as evil is to define oneself as virtuous. The narrative establishes the identities of enemy and victim savior by defining the latter as emerging from an innocent past and as destined to bring about a brighter future world cleansed of the contamination the enemy embodies.”

Wander (1997) refers to these arguments produced during the Cold War era as “prophetic dualism”. According to him “one side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God's will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between them is resolved only through the total victory of one side over the other. Since no guarantee exists that good will triumph, there is no middle ground. Hence neutrality may be treated as a delusion, compromise appeasement, and negotiation, a call for surrender” (Ibid., p.157).

### ***1.2.2. Military Preparedness***

Derived from the conviction that the United States was now locked in a long-term struggle for survival with the Soviet Union in a new era of total war, the second component of the national security ideology was its strong emphasis on the need for military preparedness. In total war, the battle was not restricted to the front lines; it extended to the home front as well. Modern weapons could inflict enormous destruction not only on the military, but also on industry, urban centers, and civilian populations. Modern war was now total war. In total war, as Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, wrote in 1945: “The armed services must be supplemented by active participation of every element of the civilian population” (cited in Orr, 2004, p. 459).

In total war, all of the nation’s resources, energy, and talent must be mobilized on behalf of the war effort, which eradicated the distinctions between citizen and soldier, and between home front and combat zone (Hogan, 1998, p.12-13, Orr, 2004, p. 459). The definition of national security therefore dictated a comprehensive program that integrated civilian and military resources and eliminated the boundaries between “peace and war.” In a special issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* published on the eve of U.S. entry into World War II, sociologist Robert E. Park (1941) observed that peace in this context was “little more than a preparation for future war” (p. 360).

This was an explicit manifestation of the content of institutional reforms in the new era. Modern weapons could easily shrink the dimensions of the world and bring massive destruction from far distances within a short time. Therefore, American political leaders would not have

the luxury of spending time deliberating the issue of war and peace and preparing at a slow pace. American traditional fear of long-standing army was no longer valid since, as stated in *the Clifford-Elsey report*: “the USSR might fight any time” and the United States had to be prepared against the Soviets who were maintaining a larger and more prepared army and air force than the United States military could “muster in places like Germany, Austria, and Korea.” Thus, the age of total war required a high degree of military preparedness, as a lack of readiness in the United States would encourage hostility and undermine the negotiating attempts of American diplomats.

According to Kennan, contrary to the American policy makers’ “Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise”, Soviet leaders were fanatic, dogmatic, and flawlessly hostile towards the capitalist world. Their belief in the “innate antagonism” between Russia and the US, and their disparagement about the possibility of peaceful coexistence would prevent any prospect of serious negotiation with the United States. Since the Soviets were “duplicitous” in nature, they could not be trusted to honor their commitments if an agreement were realized between the two countries (cited in Hogan, 1998, pp. 13-14). Hence, any attempt to negotiate with the Soviets would be meaningless. The only way to fight Soviet aggression was to apply “counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuver of Soviet policy” (Ibid.). *The Clifford-Elsey report* advanced this view by advocating for “military power as the only language that the disciples of power politics understand” (p. 73).

The ideology of national security therefore fervently supported the idea of a war economy that would operate into an indefinite future. Unlike the conventional understanding of war, this new era of total war would not have an agreed upon cease-fire, surrender, or an armistice (Melman, 1974, p. 16).

### ***1.2.3. One for All and All for One***

The third theme in the formal ideology of national security, which was closely linked to the strong arguments for preparedness, was the conviction that peace and freedom were indivisible. According to national security ideology, any intervention against the ingroup anywhere in the world, from either the outside or the inside, was perceived as a loss of footing; hence, counter intervention was defended as necessary. In other words, a threat to peace anywhere in the world was a threat to peace everywhere in the world, and therefore posed a threat to American security. The United States, as suggested by *the Clifford-Elsey report*, had to “support and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the USSR”, since a failure to do this would encourage Soviet aggression and increase the cost of addressing that aggression.

Truman’s special message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey on March 12, 1947 explicitly demonstrated this line of thinking. After declaring that the reason for his speech was

related to the national security of the United States, Truman stated<sup>7</sup>: “If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence.” According to the President “it would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries [...] should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much.” The collapse of their free institutions and loss of their independence “would be disastrous not only for them but for the world.” Therefore, the United States should “take immediate and resolute action” to maintain the freedoms of “the free peoples of the world” who “look to [the United States] for support.”

#### *1.2.4. Every War Needs a Leader*

The fourth characteristic of the national security ideology was that one nation was denoted as the bearer of these duties. In this war between good and evil, the leader of the good was the US because American society was positioned at the top of the hierarchy of humanistic and social values. This rhetoric was apparent in the Truman doctrine’s last remarks: “Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events” declared the President to the Congress. If the United States “faltered” in its leadership, the president warned that “we may endanger the peace of the world – and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.”<sup>8</sup>

Personification of the nation as an actor became an accommodating strategy of the new formal ideology. Using such language helped give the nation a sense of purpose and an important mission and most importantly, made it a moral and spiritual center that was considered above all other nations. Wander summarized this ideological stance as follows: The modes of argument in the United States elaborated throughout the Cold War “agree that the international community embraces a hierarchical order in which there are superior and inferior nations. Moreover, they agree that that one nation is clearly superior to all the rest, and that is the United States. The “United States,” in the rhetoric of American foreign policy, is much more than a geographical designation, an administrative unit, or a large number of people sharing a language, a culture, and a history. The United States is the manifestation of Truth, Justice, and Freedom placed on this earth by a God whose purpose is to make of it an instrument for extending his spiritual and material blessings to the rest of humanity” (p. 170).

By framing the nation as a single body with a vague single purpose, the national security ideology unreservedly transformed domestic dissidence into the notion of an internal enemy. As David Campbell (1992) argued, the strategy of ‘otherness’ from the Cold War era drew

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<sup>7</sup> For the full text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents Harry S. Truman 1945-9153, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=truman+doctrine&st1=>

<sup>8</sup> See, President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before A Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/trudoc.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp)

boundaries of national identity that excluded domestic dissent, as well as the Soviet other, by linking these two concepts. This line of Manichean logic made it difficult for any dissident to pass judgment on the main policies associated with national security. Any criticism of the national security policy was considered an act of disloyalty by the authorities. Any type of internal opposition to the national security requirements meant crossing to the domain of 'the other', whereas any act of conformity with the concept would be within the limits of tolerance, regardless of the harmful consequences it could bring. As discussed in the following sections, while the McCarthy period was an example of the former, the United States' relations with the third-world military states where human suffering was easily overlooked, would constitute a pattern for the latter.

### ***1.2.5. Behind Closed Doors***

The fifth and last characteristic was the justification that all decisions made within the framework of this sacred mission should be left to the political or technocratic elites, and when necessary, the public should be manipulated within this framework. This characteristic formed an obstacle to political participation in decisions related to national security, something for which ordinary citizens had to pay. *NSC-68* and many other documents related to national security objectives were drafted and redrafted in secrecy by elites of the executive power. Though many of the themes in these confidential texts were publicized through the rhetoric of partisan speeches and statements, they were not subjected to public debate. They were imposed in an atmosphere of patriotic surge, which could contribute to the construction of the national security state. The comments of Clark Clifford, one of Truman's key advisers on the loyalty review program, which caused several Communists working in the federal government to quit or be fired, are explanatory (cited in Bernstein, 1989, p. 198):

"There was no substantive problem [about federal workers' loyalty]. It was a political problem. We did not believe there was a real problem. A problem was being manufactured. There was a certain element of hysteria. I don't believe any of us ever felt really threatened. [...] We gave a good deal of thought to how to respond. We had a presidential campaign ahead of us and here was a great issue, a very damaging issue, so we set up this whole kind of machinery.

## **1.3. Institution Building around National Security: The Bearing Institutions of the Security State**

The national security ideology formulated in the early Cold War era brought new key security establishments that would institutionalize and consolidate their power in the state structure. These new institutional arrangements established within the framework of national security rhetoric is now referred to as the National Security State in American political literature. The milestone piece of legislation that was developed for this purpose was the

National Security Act of 1947 (amended in 1949)<sup>9</sup>. The act, in its final form, gave the Air Force an independent status (formerly the Army Air Forces). It created a unified military command called the National Military Establishment (NME), headed by a Secretary of Defense who was charged with “general direction” as well as “coordination and supervision” of the Departments of the Army (formerly the Department of War), Navy, and Air Force.

NME was renamed the Department of Defense on August 10, 1949, in an amendment to the original 1947 law. The Act also presented the statutory identities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, composed of three service chiefs, as the “principal military advisers to the president and the Secretary of Defense.” Finally, with a group of lesser-known institutions, including the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board, it established two key security actors of the Cold War period: the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the NSC’s authority (Stuart, 2008, pp.106-107). These last two institutions deserve further attention, as they were the bearing institutions in creating and applying US cold-war strategies.

### ***1.3.1. The National Security Council***

The NSC was designed as the central foreign policy coordinating organization within the executive branch. It was established as the principal forum for generating advice for and assisting the President “with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security” (Sec. 101/a). The act also provided a secretariat for the NSC under an executive secretary appointed by the President charged with paperwork. Its statutory membership included the highest level of government officials: the president; the secretaries of state, defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; the chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and other Senate-confirmed officials who the president could “designate from time to time” (Ibid.). Although the President was not required to use the council, as Zegart noted (1999), “it stood as the only statutory body that brought all of the major national security policy makers together” (p. 78).

The Council was to be solely “the President’s instrument” in that it had no legislative presence, input, or oversight (Best, 2011). During the drafting of its legislation, all proposals for certain congressmen to give the legislative branch an opportunity to interfere in the workings of the council were met with resistance from White House staffers (Stuart, 2008, p. 232). The NSC’s “advisory” status and its changeable nature of organization made the NSC a flexible organization to be used as each President saw fit.

In the Truman years (1947-1953), the related modifications included the addition of the vice president and the removal of the three service secretaries as statutory members of the NSC. The Joint Chiefs were officially designated as the principal military advisers to the council. Truman also issued Reorganization Plan no. 4, which officially located the NSC staff within the Executive Office of the President (Ibid., p.237).

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<sup>9</sup> For the full text of the “The National Security Act of 1947” see, <https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/National%20Security%20Act%20Of%201947.pdf>.

The President took steps to give the NSC a larger role in the formulation and management of Cold War policies. He required that all national security policies be brought to him through the council (Ibid., p. 239). In April 1951, he established the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) that was composed of the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or their designated representatives, under the patronage of the NSC. The PSB's mission was to "to authorize and provide for more effective planning, coordination, and conduct within the framework of approved national policies of psychological operations" against the Soviet Union. The founding Presidential Directive instructed the PSB to report to the National Security Council regarding "the Board's activities on the evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned." In addition to its inherited coordination role, the PSB conducted planning for the psychological operations of its constituent agencies (Harry S. Truman Papers, 1951-1953).

Although the Board did not survive into the Eisenhower era, it was important in the sense that it set an important model, as the first agency within the NSC system that was given responsibility for monitoring the performance of assigned tasks once a decision had been made by the president. Soon after coming to office, the Eisenhower administration was guided by the precedent to establish a much more ambitious Operations Coordinating Board (OCB; Ibid., p. 240). The use and the internal structure of the Council varied with the style and wishes of the US Presidents. Over time, however, the Council has gradually emerged as a major instrument in the formulation and implementation of national security policy.

### ***1.3.2. Central Intelligence Agency: The Operational Wing of the National Security State***

According to the National Security Act of 1947 the CIA was instituted as an independent agency under the authority of the NSC,<sup>10</sup> and it was closely linked to the NSC by law. At the time of its creation, the CIA was the only agency charged with a national intelligence mission. Its function was to "advise the NSC regarding intelligence, to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of the intelligence activities of the various government agencies involved in national security, and to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence within the government" (Sec. 102/d (1), (2)). Its director of central intelligence (DCI), either a civilian or an officer, would be confirmed by the Senate. It would have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions (<https://www.cia.gov/about-cia>).

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<sup>10</sup> Before World War II, intelligence activities in the United States were mostly carried out by the Department of State, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the War Department's Military Intelligence Division (MID). Hoping for greater coordination of intelligence activities, as well as a more strategic approach to intelligence gathering and operations; on July 11, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan to head a new civilian office attached to the White House, the Coordinator of Information (COI). On June 13, 1942, the COI became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS established more than 40 overseas offices during World War II (<https://www.archives.gov/research/military/ww2/oss/>).

The Act of 1947 explicitly authorized the use of covert action<sup>11</sup> to “support identifiable foreign policy objectives” important for “the national security of the United States” (Sec. 503/a), though it made no reference to the CIA’s responsibility for such actions.<sup>12</sup> Instead, it created a grey area by authorizing the CIA to carry out “other functions and duties” at the direction of the NSC. Clifford, who supervised the drafting of the Act noted in his memoirs that (Clifford, 1991, pp. 169–170):

“The ‘other’ functions the CIA was to perform were purposely not specified but we understood that they would include covert activities. We did not mention them by name because we felt it would be injurious to our national interest to advertise the fact that we might engage in such activities [...]. In light of the continuing controversy over the role and activities of the CIA, it bears emphasizing that it was by act of Congress that the CIA was established and exists today, and it was by act of Congress that covert operations were authorized.”

The CIA registered its first covert action under the command of the NSC in the Italian elections.<sup>13</sup> The formal institutionalization of covert actions was launched through top-secret documents, including the NSC 4-A of December 14, 1947 and the NSC 10/2 of June 18, 1948. The NSC Directive 4-A authorized the CIA to “initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations<sup>14</sup> designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities that constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security” (Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter, December 17, 1947). NSC Directive 10/2 provided a wider and permanent mandate, putting the CIA directly in charge of planning and executing covert operations, “so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident [...] and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility” (National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, June 18, 1948). These activities include “propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries

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<sup>11</sup> The term “covert action” in the act was defined as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” (Sec. 503/a).

<sup>12</sup> The official definition of ‘covert action’ is: “An operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the sponsoring power; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities” (<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-INTELLIGENCE/html/int023.html>)

<sup>13</sup> CIA transferred an estimated \$10-30 million to several groups and parties, particularly the Christian Democrat party, to ensure the defeat of the Italian communists in the April 1948 election (Immerman, 2006, p. 18).

<sup>14</sup> In the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1994), psychological operations are defined as ‘planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives’ (p. 362).

of the free world." This secret policy directive stated that "conducting covert operations was essential to the achievement of US national security objectives" (Ibid).

Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, which allowed the DCI to utilize unvouchered funds for the management of covert operations (Sec 8, 2-b). In NSC-68, all forms of covert actions were also accorded high priority<sup>15</sup>. During the Truman administration, with intelligence coordination, independent collection, and analysis, the CIA had expanded its activities to covert operations (Stuart, 2008; Immerman, 2006). However, the major expansion of the CIA's covert activities occurred during the Eisenhower period. The agency implemented 170 new major political, psychological, and paramilitary covert missions in 48 countries during the Eisenhower administration (Weiner, 2007, p.76). Corresponding to the new security ideology of the US, top CIA officers of this period prioritized their tasks "to alter or abolish any regime not openly allied with America" (Ibid., p.77).<sup>16</sup>

The CIA's influence has never been limited to foreign affairs. With the Department of Defense and its large budgets, the CIA has shaped civilian research and development in the United States. In education fields such as science rocketry, atomic energy, biology, health sciences, non-atomic physics, and engineering, as well as many fields of the social sciences including anthropology, psychology, and Soviet and China studies, the CIA has manipulated academia through financial support (Price, 1998, Price, 2011; Diamond, 1992; Boyce, 1997; Cummings, 1997; Robin, 2001). Clifford eventually reached the conclusion that "[...] over the years, covert activities became so numerous and widespread that, in effect, they became a self-sustaining part of American foreign operations. The CIA became a government within a government, which could evade oversight of its activities by drawing the cloak of secrecy around itself" (p. 170). Despite Congressional investigations, embarrassing exposes, and the transformation of the international security environment, the CIA has remained an infamous Cold War institution until recently.

## **1.4. National Consequences of the National Security State**

### ***1.4.1. A New Coalition Formed Around National Security***

The fact that policy makers agreed on a major reform in the state structure did not make it easier for them to agree on the details. During the early period of the Cold War, there was a struggle between the proponents of national security and the defenders of traditional American values of anti-statism and anti-militarism (Hogan, 1998; Fordham, 1994; Hossein-zadeh, 2006; Craig & Logevall, 2009). This dispute ended in favor of the national security advocates, who sought a greater economic and political role for the United States in the international system.

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<sup>15</sup> One of the main proposals of the document involved "intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries" (IX, D-2/7).

<sup>16</sup> On August 4, 1955 President Eisenhower signed a bill authorizing \$46 million for the construction of a CIA Headquarters Building at Langley, which has been used as metonym for the CIA since then.

Fordham (1998) indicated that President Truman's decision to increase the military budget was closely tied to the rising influence of this new coalition in his administration (p. 64). He argues that the President's efforts to maintain a balanced budget and reasonable military spending foundered when he realized that he had to maintain the support of the "internationalists" who dominated the Democratic Party. A refusal to proceed with the armament programs might have alienated this important Democratic constituency and threatened the elite coalition that had sustained the Democratic Party for the preceding 15 years. He also suggested that "there is strong evidence that the administration was committed to NSC-68 before the Korean War and that this commitment was not driven by unambiguous external events, but by political changes in the executive branch" (Ibid., p. 72). Following the completion of the NSC-68, its supporters eliminated the main proponents of a small defense budget in a short time and mobilized support for their own position. Confronted with this new powerful group within his administration, President Truman had to reverse his efforts to control excessive military spending and decided to proceed with rearmament (Ibid., pp. 72-73). External events such as the Korean War facilitated the passage of the rearmament program in Congress.<sup>17</sup>

By 1950, the process of state making had begun to challenge the United States' democratic identity and institutions. For the first time in its history, the country had created a permanent peacetime military establishment and the armed forces enjoyed an unparalleled degree of autonomy. The result, as Hogan notes, was a system that gave the armed forces considerable autonomy and institutionalized the National Military Establishment as a major rival to the State Department in the field of foreign policy (p.68). Similar challenges to civilian authority followed, especially regarding the defense budget (Ibid.). During the first two decades after the early days of the Cold War era, the legislative branch of the United States had no authority over the nation's defense management. According to Blechman (1990) in a political climate where it was not legitimate to challenge military judgments partly due to their technical ignorance as well as public support to the new national security ideology, most of the congress members generally went along with the executive branch with respect to the size and the composition of defense spending (p. 24).

This apparent permanence of military influence on the economy gradually intensified. The necessary public support to escalate the military budget was relatively easy to maintain in the midst of the anti-communist fervor (Hartley & Russett 1992; Fried, 1998). A cross-society political consensus had developed around the war economy by the 1950s. As Melman (1974) suggested: "Businessmen, industrial workers, engineers, government employees, intellectuals all joined in the confident assessment that war economy on a sustained basis was not only viable but economically desirable" (p. 17). The military spending became a continuing, significant, and legitimate end-purpose of economic activity. C. Wright Mills (1956) emphasized this new coalition in the early Cold War years. He severely criticized the new state structure and the emerging "symbiotic relationship" among the political, military, and corporate elites of the

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<sup>17</sup> Indeed, between the summer of 1949 and the winter of 1951, the annual military budget roughly tripled, rising from \$13.5 billion to nearly \$45 billion, only a fraction of which was allocated for the war in Korea. Since then, military budgets have not returned to the relatively low levels of the period between 1946 and 1950. (Fordham 1998, p.1; Hogan 1998, p. 180)

country, who consolidated their power around a common agenda at the expense of ordinary American citizens:

“Within American society, major national power now resides in the economic, the political, and the military domains. Other institutions seem off to the side of modern history, and, on occasion, duly subordinated to these. No family is as directly powerful in national affairs as any major corporation; no church is as directly powerful in the external biographies of young men in America today as the military establishment; no college is as powerful in the shaping of momentous events as the National Security Council. Religious, educational, and family institutions are not autonomous centers of national power; on the contrary, these decentralized areas are increasingly shaped by the big three, in which developments of decisive and immediate consequence now occur” (p. 6).

The aim of the massive rearmament program was less about containing communism than ensuring the survival of the nascent postwar global economy, upon which rested postwar US prosperity (Cardwell, 2011).

Approximately five years after Mill’s analysis, this consensus received the label of the ‘military-industrial complex’, a phrase first used by the United States’ President Eisenhower. He cited the term as a warning to American citizens not to let this powerful coalition of interests begin to dictate America’s actions at home or abroad. In his “Farewell Address to the Nation”, on January 17, 1961, he described the problem in this way:

“[The US has] been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. [...] In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”<sup>18</sup>

Therefore, an enormously wealthy and powerful coalition of vested interests started to influence the stance taken by the United States in world affairs. For this new coalition, each new commitment to new weaponry systems, any decision to increase military spending, and the continued production and sale of armaments to the allies resulted in substantial profits, all of which were legitimized through the context of the national security ideology (Wander, 1997,

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<sup>18</sup> For the full text of the speech see, <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm>.

pp. 174-175). This situation elicited a concentration of unchecked power in too few hands and corrupted the process of government by consent of the governed (Lens, 1970, p. 18).

The persistent growth of rearmament since the late 1940s and early 1950s has led to a number of adverse social, economic, and political consequences for the United States. Domestic socially gainful or desirable welfare programs, such as President Truman's plan for a national healthcare system disappeared from the agenda (Fordham, 1998). The defense spending masked such structural problems as unemployment, low productivity, and the inequitable division of income that have become more obvious and more serious as the national security expenditures have declined (Alperovitz & Bird 1992). By the 1970s, the free market mechanism had weakened, budget deficits had increased rapidly, the level of investment had decreased, and the basic infrastructure had decayed (Alperovitz & Bird 1992). The productive competence of many industries deteriorated, and the rate of inflation increased, which damaged the dollar as a reliable store of value (Melman, 1974, pp. 18-19). Many people, businesses, and communities became dependent on military spending; civilian culture and republican principles of government were tainted with the ethos and values of militarism; civil liberties were weakened; and increasingly aggressive foreign policies were adopted (Hosseini-zadeh, 2006, p. 26). More importantly, this national security coalition periodically created new enemies to ensure its own continuity (Tilly, 1984).

#### ***1.4.2. National Security as a Tool for Internal Cleansing***

The operationalization of the national security ideology was not confined to the revenue and power maximization of the coalition. It was also successfully used to minimize the influence of the existing domestic opposition, namely, the labor militancy and their supporters, which generated reasonable costs for this new constellation. The national security policy of the Cold War era was effectively linked to an internal security agenda with harsh anti-labor and anti-radical domestic policies. This period was later referred to as the McCarthy era and its mind-set, McCarthyism, caused permanent damage to the labor movement and the democratic traditions of the country.

Ellen Schrecker, a prominent historian on American Communism, defined the McCarthy era as “the most extensive episode of political repression in American history” (Schrecker, 2002: p.2). The phenomenon of McCarthyism went far beyond the political career of the Republican senator Joseph R. McCarthy from Wisconsin, from whom it received its name. Although mainstream McCarthyism definitions occurred between the late 1940s and mid-1950s, a considerable number of historians have suggested that the anti-communist crusade, with which his name was coined, began several years before he became a media personality, and it continued for several years after his reputation was ruined. The word, therefore, refers to the multifaceted domestic campaign to dispose of the influence of every idea, institution, and individual connected to communism in America (Cherny et al. 2004).

Red baiting was not new to American politics, as labor activism had long been a fear of businesses. Ever since the late nineteenth century, attempts to suppress unions and weaken community support for organized labor had been a traditional practice for antagonistic

employers. Likewise, red baiting had been a practical weapon for conservative labor leaders and their allies to wield against their left-wing rivals (Ibid.). By the 1940s, communists and their allies were strong in American union activities. They led unions that contained approximately 20 percent of the membership of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), a union federation that organized workers in industrial unions in the United States and Canada (Ibid., pp.8-9). Communist unions and their leaders were more militant, class-conscious, and in most cases, democratic than the other unions. They demanded a wide range of social reforms and their commitment was particularly strong in the area of race relations and women's rights (Ibid., pp. 9-10).

Fordham (1998) indicated that, immediately after the war, the union movement sought to regain the ground they believed they had lost during the wartime strike prohibition (p.132). The issue became increasingly salient in the immediate postwar era and business conservatives began to heavily promote broad public concerns about domestic communism (Ibid., p.133). Even business liberals who accepted most of the New Deal Agenda were alarmed about the peril of labor militancy (Ibid., p. 134). Business leaders and influential economists of the time criticized unions, identifying them as "militant labor monopolies" that are antagonistic to the market system and calling their officials "inherently untrustworthy" (Ibid., p.1).

The business sector was not the only faction that was hostile to trade unions, as resentment towards trade unions was also common among military officers (Janowitz, 1960, p. 248). The military's anti-union sentiments were present before the rearmament period. However, the conflict between labor and the military was aggravated because the military's interest in accelerating production often conflicted with labor's interest in maintaining its ability to strike. Likewise, civilians who were in charge of military procurement did not approve of union activities. As the national security state necessitated greater sacrifices of the American economy, the bad relationship between the bureaucrats in the Department of Defense and labor activism became worse (Fordham, 1998, p.141).

A wave of strikes in many industries during 1945 and 1946 provided a pretext for business leaders to lobby against unionism. They received the support of anti-labor Republicans, conservative southern Democrats, and moderates from both major political parties (Cherny et al., p. 2). Congress enacted a new law (officially known as the Labor-Management Relations Act) on June 23 of 1947, which was informally referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act. President Harry Truman vetoed it, defining it as a "slave labor bill," yet his opposition did not suffice. It was designed to annul many of the gains that the labor movement had made since the late 1930s (McNeese, 2008, p. 141). Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act referred to the Smith Act and required all union officials to sign an affidavit affirming that "they neither were in the party nor had any sympathy for its doctrines." Unions that did not abide by the law would be deprived of the services of the National Labor Relations Board (Cherny et al., p. 10-11).

The standard reason for this law was that if the United States went to war against the Soviet Union, the left-wing unions might encourage its members to engage in physical sabotage or call political strikes to shut down defense plants. By 1949, the leaders of the left-wing unions were obligated to comply with the law, and they either signed the affidavits or quit their positions and the Party. However, the official harassment of leaders who stayed in their unions

did not end, as their compliance was not convincing to the Justice Department or the legislative branch of the US government. Most of the left-wing union leaders were subpoenaed by anticommunist investigative committees. The Court decisions reproduced the prevailing wisdom. The imposition of restrictions on Communist influence within the labor movement was justified within the context of “considerations of national security.” Union activists, many of them African Americans, were deprived of their livelihoods based on secret charges by unknown informers (Shrecker, 2004, p. 1042). By the time the anticommunist crusade ended in the mid-1960s, McCarthyism had “tamed” the entire American labor movement and brought it to “the Cold War political consensus” (Cherny et al., pp. 11-13).

In 1940 congress had passed the Alien Registration Act (unofficially known as the Smith Act), which made it illegal to be a member of any organization that supported a violent overthrow of the US government. The Act made it a criminal offense for anyone to " knowingly or willfully advocate [], abet [], advise [], or teach [] the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence” or for anyone to "organize [] . . . any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage" such an overthrow, or for anyone to be a member of or to affiliate with any such association (Alien Registration Act of 1940). The Act was passed in anticipation of a potential war with Nazi Germany. However, it was first used in 1941 against the members of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party indicted in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Immediately after the war, this law became the ultimate tool against Communist Party USA (CPUSA) which had been identified as a movement that sought to overthrow the government by force and violence.

Red baiting was not confined to the Communists in the labor unions. Based on intelligence reports that there were Soviet spies within the US government as well as the criticism that Democrats were soft on communism, President Truman initiated a loyalty review program in March 1947 (Executive Order 9835). The program’s aim was to inspect the loyalty of the federal employees and eliminate any subversives. Subversive activity included past or present membership in various organizations with communist-like ideologies.<sup>19</sup> By that time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which was closely tied to conservative members of Congress, was established as the principal government agency responsible for internal security to “make its agenda a component of the overall national security program” (Fordham 1998, p. 132). Under J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI inspected millions of federal workers in the following years. The accused were denied their right to know who accused them, and many people were even asked about books and artwork they owned. All public employees including teachers were forced to sign loyalty oaths (on pain of perjury) to keep their jobs. Hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)<sup>20</sup> exposed “current and former Communists” who, in turn, were blacklisted by private industry, especially in Hollywood (Leab, 1984).

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<sup>19</sup> According to the Hatch Act of 1938 (named after its author, US senator Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico), Americans who joined the Communist Party were prohibited from holding federal jobs (Hanes et al., 2003).

<sup>20</sup> In May 1938, US representative Martin Dies (1900–1972) of Texas received congressional funding for this special committee called the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The HUAC was asked

By 1957, the government had indicted dozens of leaders of the CPUSA for Smith Act violations. Teaching "the principles of Marxism-Leninism" was one of the alleged overt acts (Bernstein, 2006, p.10). The defendants were only accused of advocating ideas, and not of engaging in illegal acts. Redish (2005) argued that these prosecutions were clearly unconstitutional and "the American government was responsible for wholly unjustified political repression of an unpopular ideology, in a manner ominously reminiscent of a totalitarian regime" (p. 65). The anticommunist legislations of the era were not limited to these acts. The Internal Security Act of 1950, also known as the Subversive Activities Control Act or the McCarran Act, after Senator of Nevada Pat McCarran<sup>21</sup>; the Immigration and Nationality Act, or McCarran-Walter Act of 1952<sup>22</sup>, and the Communist Control Act of 1954<sup>23</sup> were the other laws which formalized the legal basis of the anticommunist political repression during the McCarthy era for the purpose of national security.

The aggregate impact of the McCarthy Era also affected a wide variety of non-Communists. Brown (1958) estimated that one out of every five people in a labor force of about 65 million, had been subjected to a loyalty test, oath, or investigation by 1958, and approximately 11,500 persons were fired due to government and private loyalty programs. More than 100 people were convicted under the federal Smith Act, and 135 people were cited for contempt by the House Un-American Activities Committee (p.181). Cauter (1979) highlighted the difficulty of estimating the number of people who lost their jobs because of the

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to investigate subversive activities by organizations that might try to overthrow the US government. HUAC claimed to find communists in labor unions and government agencies and among African American groups. Many of those who were accused of communist sympathies were fired from their jobs. Several members of Congress argued that HUAC was going too far; violating the civil rights of those accused. Dies persistently kept HUAC alive until 1944. Thanks to criticisms of the groundless accusations against fellow Americans, HUAC ceased to function, and the hunt for subversives slowed down. The committee was reestablished and made permanent in 1945 at the insistence of Democratic congressman John E. Rankin (1882–1960) from Mississippi. HUAC received funding and orders to investigate any individuals or groups it deemed possible subversives. HUAC soon compiled a list of roughly forty groups that it labeled communist fronts. (Hanes et al.,)

<sup>21</sup> The act required Communist organizations to register with the United States Attorney General and established the Subversive Activities Control Board to investigate persons suspected of engaging in subversive activities or otherwise promoting the establishment of a "totalitarian dictatorship," either fascist or communist. Citizens found in violation could lose their citizenship. The act also contained an Emergency Detention statute, giving the President the authority to apprehend and detain "each person as to whom there is a reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage." It tightened alien exclusion and deportation laws. It authorized the exclusion of aliens who were once communists or members of any groups deemed to be "front" organizations for communist expansion. It also subjected to swift deportation any noncitizens living within US borders who belonged to the Communist party or engaged in any activities considered "subversive to the national security" (Tichenor, 2002, p.189). The law passed despite President Truman's veto. The act, according to Truman "would give Government officials vast powers to harass all [American] citizens in the exercise of their right of free speech." (cited in Fried, 1990, p. 187) Only seven Democratic senators voted to uphold the veto, a revealing incident which demonstrated the bi-partisan nature of the anti-communist fervor during the time (Steinberg, 1984, p. 202).

<sup>22</sup> The Immigration and Nationality Act was enacted June 27, 1952 despite President Truman's veto, condemning the bill as "un-American" and discriminatory. The act included new exclusionary categories aimed at penalizing "political radicalism" and "social nonconformity" (Tichenor, p.190).

<sup>23</sup> The Communist Control Act (68 Stat. 775, 50 USC. 841-844) was a federal legislation, signed into law by Dwight Eisenhower on 24 August 1954. It openly outlawed the Communist Party of the United States and criminalized membership in, or support for the Party or "Communist-action" organizations and defined evidence to be considered by a jury in determining participation in the activities, planning, actions, objectives, or purposes of such organizations.

program, since many people preferred to resign rather than be fired and were thus not included in the statistics (p. 364).

The collaboration of public and private actors made political repression stronger (Schrecker, 2004, pp. 1044-1045). Companies used Cold War loyalty-security programs to smash unions (Fordham, 1998, pp. 138,171-172), and anticommunist unions used them to smash their left-wing rivals (Schrecker, 2004, p. 1046). The repression was also felt strongly in academia. Nearly one-half of the social science professors teaching in universities at the time expressed medium or high apprehension about possible adverse repercussions to them as a result of their political beliefs and activities (Lazarsfeld & Thielens, 1958). Many prominent figures, who had previously shown sympathy or even tolerance for Communists, were subjected to harassment, often with front-page publicity.

The McCarthy era was a period of crisis in which government action in the name of national security infringed First Amendment rights. Since the public was generally willing to support the political repression of Communists, political elites easily shaped public policy (Gibson, 1988, p. 519). In this period, the judiciary was used as an instrument of state security. The highly politicized majority in the Supreme Court, refused to stop the anticommunist crusade's violations of individual rights until the mid-1950s, and it became an actor of red baiting by legitimizing its operations (Schrecker, 2004, pp. 1045-1046). By 1957, as Bernstein (2006) stated "with the CPUSA no longer a perceived serious danger to American national security, the Supreme Court reversed itself and held that revolutionary advocacy by itself could no longer justify a conviction."

Although McCarthy era had come to an end in the late 1950s, the fear of internal enemy has persisted during the preceding decades. The 1960s, among other new social movements, witnessed the surge of the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement. In 1965, the Johnson administration officially entered the Vietnam War. As the anti-war and civil rights demonstrations spread throughout the country, the CIA, although prohibited by the law from exercising internal security functions, established several clandestine programs (such as MERRIMAC, RESISTANCE, CHAOS) to collect intelligence on anti-war groups and student movements in the late 1960s (Gibbons, 1995, p. 857).

The Army's role in domestic intelligence gathering, counterintelligence, and civil disturbances were also expanded during the same period.<sup>24</sup> Dycus (2004) stated that in the late 1960s, "the Pentagon compiled personal information on more than 100,000 politically active Americans in an effort to quell civil rights and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations and to

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<sup>24</sup> In December 1967, the Johnson administration approved a Civil Disturbance Plan produced by a special task force in the Army. According to the plan, "continuous counterintelligence investigations are required to obtain factual information on the participation of subversive personalities, groups or organizations" in civil rights or antiwar activities that could result in civil disturbances. Dissident groups were susceptible to control by "subversives," and there was "very strong support to the antiwar movement" from the Communist Party and Communist-front organizations. The report concluded that "Although it cannot be substantiated that the antiwar and antidraft movements are acting in response to foreign direction, it must be pointed out that by their activities they are supporting the stated objectives of foreign elements which are detrimental to the United States" (cited in Gibbons, 1995, p. 855).

discredit protestors.” (p. 784). He added that “the Army used 1,500 plainclothes agents to watch demonstrations, infiltrate organizations, and spread disinformation” (Ibid.).

The constitutionally controversial domestic surveillance activities reached its peak during the Nixon administration. In 1969, President Nixon initiated a program called MINARET and tasked the NSA with tapping international communications to seek evidence of possible foreign involvement in the anti-Vietnam protests, and other domestic protests and the disturbances in the U.S. (Rollins, 2016, pp.113-116). During this program, the NSA created "watch lists" and files on thousands of American citizens, groups, and organizations involved in domestic anti-war and civil rights activities.<sup>25</sup>

In 1972, the infamous Watergate scandal exposed the president’s personal dominance over a massive campaign of political espionage, sabotage, and other illegal activities against his real or perceived opponents. The Nixon administration claimed that these and other acts were warranted by “national security.” However, the cadre of Nixon operatives admitted that they had ties to the FBI, the CIA, and several state-sponsored terrorist groups (Robin, 2004). In 1974, the Senate Watergate Committee revealed in its report that the Nixon administration had directed national intelligence agencies to carry out constitutionally questionable domestic security operations. The same year investigative journalist Seymour Hersh (December 22, 1974) published a front-page *New York Times* article detailing that the CIA’s illegal spying operations on thousands of anti-war American activists for more than a decade. On January 27, 1975, Senator Frank Church led a new Senate committee formed to investigate these allegations. The Church Committee identified a wide range of intelligence abuses and clandestine programs by federal agencies, including the NSA, CIA, and FBI. The Committee in its final report published on April 29, 1976, concluded that “there is no inherent constitutional authority for the President or any intelligence agency to violate the law,” and recommended strengthening oversight of intelligence activities (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). The Church Committee report led to momentum in Congress to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. President Jimmy Carter signed the bill into law in 1978, establishing the need for acquiring warrants through a newly formed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before pursuing wiretapping and surveillance.

In the same period, national security, the phrase which had previously been grounds for legitimizing shady executive action inside the country’s borders, lost credibility. The concept of national security used in a pejorative sense, came to the forefront again in US internal politics after the September 11 attacks in 2001.

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<sup>25</sup> For detailed information on the MINARET program see Electronic Briefing Book No. 441 (September 25, 2013) posted by National Security Archive, an independent research organization based at The George Washington University, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB441/>

## **2. The Transfer of the National Security Ideology**

### **2.1. International Coalitions Built Around the National Security Ideology**

After WWII, American policymakers were confronted with a new world that offered a set of new and different opportunities. The collapse of the former axis of global power, including Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, provided the United States policymaking elites a convenient chance to embrace these new opportunities. Thus, the entire process of state-making and military expansion was not simply a response to the Soviet threat or the containment of its geopolitical ambitions around the world. It was the framework by which American policymakers extended the reach of American power and influence globally (Steel (1992, p.108).

Chomsky (1992) argued that whether it is referred to as the Third World or the South, the chief functions assigned to their members have been the provision of resources, markets, cheap labor, and new investment opportunities (p. 139). Such aspirations appeared as strategic targets in top-secret government documents of the Cold War era. For example, according to the NSC 5432/1 issued in September 1954<sup>26</sup>, the primary threats to US interests were “radical and nationalistic regimes” that were open to “popular demand for immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses” and responsive to pressure to increase production and diversification of their economies (Art. 1, 2). These inclinations, which would ultimately be “exploited by Communists” (Art. 3), directly contradicted the “system of private enterprise” and “the need to create a political and economic climate conducive to private investment, of both domestic and foreign capital” and “in the case of foreign capital, to repatriate a reasonable return” (Art. 9/f).

The formula that was applied to justify the interventions within “the self-declared spheres of influence” was used for the basic convictions of the national security ideology. As stated earlier, the world was divided into an evil Communist Empire controlled by Moscow and a Free World led by Washington. The Soviet Union was expansionist and hostile to all Western interests, and was thus solely responsible for any radical, social upheaval in the Third World. Any social struggles in the Third World, including the fight of peasants for land, workers for labor rights, citizens for democratic freedoms, or nationalists for self-determination, were identified as part of Soviet-orchestrated conspiracies. The national security obligations became the pretext of systematic opposition and covert or overt interventions of the US government in popular movements in the Third World for social justice, democracy, and more equitable economic arrangements. Although these demands were more of a threat to private US interests (their properties and privileges) than public security, they were translated as threats to US national security (Boyce, 1997). Furthermore, the same justification mechanism was implemented to support anti-democratic regimes, mainly the right-wing military governments, throughout the Cold War (Schmitz, 2006). As Garthoff (1992) emphasized, US governments “promoted many anti-democratic regimes into rewarded members of the Free World so long as they were anti-Communist” (p. 133).

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<sup>26</sup> For the full text of NSC 5432/1 see, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d12>

In the context of this new bipolar world, the type of a government's regime did not matter if it supported American policies in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Although the choice of supporting non-democratic regimes clearly contradicted the narrative that was used to criticize the Soviet Union, the advocates of the national security ideology defended their actions using mutually nurturing arguments (Schmitz, p.2). First, fostered by the belief that non-Western Europeans were inferior by nature and vulnerable to radical ideas, authoritarian regimes were viewed as the only way for most Third World nations to maintain order, block communism, and undergo economic developments that would enable the development of more mature populations and democratic political institutions. Strong dictators, as Schmitz suggested, "were seen as bulwarks against political instability and channels for modernization" (Ibid., p.3).

A 1959 report from the State Department entitled "Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers", revealed the convictions of the US administration regarding the role of authoritarian governments as anti-communist fighters and mediums of modernization. The report asserted that the US' "experience with the more highly developed Latin American States indicates that authoritarianism is required to lead backward societies through their socio-economic revolutions." Furthermore, it was added that if the "break-through occurs under non-Communist authoritarianism, trends toward democratic values emerge with the development of a literate middle class" (cited in Schmitz, p.15).

This report stated three additional reasons why the United States "must support military regimes": First, in a world with a severe communist threat, the "officer groups are often the most pro-Western, disciplined, and educated institution-in-being on which backward societies can draw in time of crisis." Second, military intervention in government "will continue to be necessary to supplant ineptness, corruption or slippage toward Communism." Finally, military guidance was necessary because it would take decades for the newly independent nations "to develop those institutions which establish in more advanced countries civilian control of the military" (Ibid.). In these circumstances, the "essential test [...] should be whether a particular military regime responsibly confronts the problems facing it – security and developmental progress – and, in so doing, successfully resists Communist techniques. [...] In the bi-polar world of the Cold War" the refusal of the US "to deal with a military or authoritarian regime [...] could lead almost necessarily to the establishment of that regime's friendly relations with the Soviet Bloc" (Ibid., p. 16). The analysis and the policy recommendations presented in the report were approved by the NSC on June 18, 1959.<sup>27</sup> At the same meeting President Eisenhower stated that "the trend toward military takeovers in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa was almost certainly going to continue" (Memorandum of Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council). He was asserting that the government had to do their best "to orient the potential military leaders of these countries in a pro-Western rather than a pro-Communist direction" (Ibid.).

Throughout the 1960s, support for right-wing dictators continued to shape American policy toward the Third World, as the policy expanded to include newly independent African

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<sup>27</sup> For the comments of the NSC members on the report, see, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 18, 1959", <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v16/d36>.

nations. The report titled ‘The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Areas’, which was prepared by the Kennedy administration in 1962, declared that the US government had to count on the military as the “ultimate guarantors of internal security” because the “officer corps are generally the best organized pro-Western, non-Communist groups capable of leadership and wide support within an underdeveloped society” (Schmitz, p. 18). In addition, “they form a powerful potential group of ‘modernizers,’ and a conduit of contemporary Western thought and values if their full talents and knowledge of the outside world are utilized” (Ibid.).

In the Third World, military regimes provided “the best insurance against revolutions or political stagnation and the emergence of a counter-elite” that is hostile to the United States through a “benevolent authoritarianism which imparts a sense of national unity, [...] gives a role of national participation to the intelligentsia, and holds power in trust for civilians and more representative institutions” (Ibid., p. 19). The US government, therefore, had to “support military regimes which push forward with development” as they “advance US interests by maintaining stability, possibly introducing reforms which civilians might shirk, and symbolizing national unity through times of crisis and hardship – all essential to the development process” (Ibid.).

American academia justified the support given to military regimes in the Third World, in the political arena, through modernization theory.<sup>28</sup> This theory was constructed in an effort to understand the events that were occurring in the post-colonial region and to promote change that would prevent these regions from embracing communism (Gilman, 2003). The theory, while highlighting the military’s inevitable and significant role in the process, indirectly legitimized that role.

The Nixon Doctrine was unveiled in 1969 due to the rising cost of and public opposition to the Vietnam War. It solidified the support for the rightist military governments and increased dependence upon authoritarian regimes to maintain regional stability in the Third World. The Vietnam War forced the President and his national security advisers (mainly Henry Kissinger) to implement an alternative strategy, while continuing to uphold the main axioms of the US Cold War National Security policy. The Nixon Doctrine called for an end to the use of American forces in the Third World (as in Korea and Vietnam) as the main way to contain communism. As Keilers (2007) noted, one of the major tenets of the doctrine was that “the US would provide military and economic aid to countries under treaty agreements, but the requesting nation would be expected to bear primary responsibility to provide the manpower for its own defense.” The Nixon Doctrine therefore sought to prevent supervision by reinforcing the capacity of governments to impose order in their own nations and by solidifying the authority of Third World allies to provide regional stability.

Nixon reevaluated the US–Latin America relations in this context, as relations with Latin American countries enhanced the credibility of the US. Any instability in the backyard of

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<sup>28</sup> For an example of the military-academia partnership on the issue, see for example Peter B. Riddleberger’s 1965 research memorandum entitled “Military Roles in Developing Countries: An Inventory of Past Research and Analysis,” prepared under the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of the American University in Washington D.C. SORO was a non-governmental organization directly operating under contract with the Department of the Army. For the full text of the report, see, [https://archive.org/details/DTIC\\_AD0463188](https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0463188).

the United States could be a barrier to becoming the leader of the free world. Therefore, it was critical for the US' leadership role, national security, and economic interests to support the right-wing military governments arising in Latin America. In 1969, the President indicated that he planned to give high priority to revitalizing relations with the region, and asked New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller to assess the effectiveness of ongoing US policy in Latin America and to make policy recommendations for its future development.

According to Rockefeller (1969) "virtually all military governments in the hemisphere have assumed the power to rescue the country from an incompetent government, or an intolerable economic or political situation." The military service was no longer attractive to the landowner class, which "was traditionally a conservative force resistant to change." The new militaries of South and Central America were composed of "young men of ambition and ability from poor families" who had entered the military "to seek an education and opportunity for advancement" (p. 505). Rockefeller announced that: "A new type of military man is coming to the fore and often becoming a major force for constructive social change in the American republics. He added that "motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency, and a stagnant political order, the new military man is prepared to adapt his authoritarian tradition to the goals of social and economic progress" (Ibid.) He suggested full support of the US to the military regimes of the hemisphere, provided that the militaries did not go in the wrong doctrinal direction, especially that of Marxism and acted "radicalized, statist and anti-US" (Ibid.). One way to offset the "simplistic Marxist approach" was through "exposure to the fundamental achievements of the US way of life that many of the military from other American countries have received through the military training programs which the US conducts in Panama and the United States" (Ibid.).

Military regimes were also supported because these establishments were the ultimate organizations to fight against internal subversion caused by Cuba's efforts to spread revolution and indigenous "urban terrorism". The communist threat was "a reality with alarming potential" in the region, and new problems stemming from economic modernization were quickly exploited by the communist forces "for their own ends" in the environment of "freedoms afforded by democratic governments" (Ibid. 506) Therefore, supporting existing and future right-wing military regimes was necessary to prevent the region from turning to radical solutions to its problems, which would seriously harm the interests of the US (Ibid. 516). The report recommended that the US cooperate with the security forces of the hemisphere in measures to strengthen internal security. These measures included increasing grants for the training of security forces, strengthening "the training program which brings military and police personnel from other hemisphere nations to the United States and to training centers in Panama", providing security forces with the essential tools and equipment as well as military and technical training for internal security purposes, and selling "major military equipment" to the "more developed nations of the hemisphere" (Ibid. 517).

The NSC endorsed the Rockefeller report's recommendation to maintain support for authoritarian governments in Latin America. Nixon outlined this new vision for US-Latin American relations in his November 10, 1969 statement on Governor Rockefeller's Report on Latin America. He explicitly stated that the report constituted a major contribution to the

formulation of US policy for this hemisphere and “both [*the*] general conceptual approach and the specific lines of action [*the government*] intends to follow have been substantially shaped by that report (Nixon’s Statement on the Rockefeller Report on Quality of Life in the Americas, 1969, December 8). Thus, Latin America’s military regimes (except Cuba) could expect full support from the White House.

The only era that demonstrated a deviation from this policy was that of President Jimmy Carter. Despite his shortcomings, Jimmy Carter conducted a different American foreign policy that focused on improving the country’s poor reputation worldwide and emphasized human rights (Craig & Logevall). In a commencement address at Notre Dame University in May of 1977, he proclaimed that “an inordinate fear of communism has led us to embrace any dictator who joined in our fear” (Ibid., p.289). In accordance with this statement, he refused to intervene and save two dictators, the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the *de facto* ruler of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, when their brutal regimes were brought down in 1979.

President Carter was criticized by advocates of the old policy, mainly by the pressure group re-formed in 1975 under the name of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) that enlisted numerous new conservatives (Ibid., p. 307). Funded by David Packard of the military-industrial giant Hewlett-Packard, the CPD justified continued American support for oppressive right-wing regimes by drawing a distinction between friendly, “authoritarian and hostile”, and “totalitarian” regimes. This approach was articulated by Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979), one of Ronald Reagan's academic advisers and a member of the CPD, in an article in *Commentary*, a leading voice of neo-conservatism. In her article defined as “the classic essay that shaped Reagan's foreign policy” in American political literature, she argued that while totalitarianism was irreversible, authoritarian regimes, unlike Communist ones, might be reformed and evolve into democratic governments. Therefore, the US would be better off opting for pro-American authoritarian regimes which offer stability and domestic order to a certain extent and often evolve into democracies.<sup>29</sup> Upon his election in 1980, Ronald Reagan readapted the classic bipolar nature of the Cold War period. Building on Kirkpatrick’s logic that pro-American authoritarian regimes were part of the “free world”, Reagan’s administration returned to provide right-wing military governments its full support (Schmitz, p.195).

## **2.2. Customizing the National Security State: Permanent Militarization of Politics**

In many countries of the Third World, political and social reality meant being part of the post-war American Empire. The national security ideology and its organs invented by the National Security Act had repercussions in many allied nations, primarily in Latin America. Many Latin American countries, as well as others in different geographical regions, have copied the US in creating institutions with similar names and adopted this national security ideology

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<sup>29</sup> According to Kirkpatrick “since many traditional autocracies permit limited contestation and participation, it is not impossible that U.S. policy could effectively encourage this process of liberalization and democratization, provided that the effort is not made at a time when the incumbent government is fighting for its life against violent adversaries, and that proposed reforms are aimed at producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight.”

and the doctrine with destructive results. Latin American history is familiar with military governments established by coups and run by individual military officers. However, in the aftermath of military coups in the early 1960s, the region ushered in a new era of authoritarian governments, under which the military as an institution ruled directly or indirectly. This time, however, military-generated doctrines on security and development were used as guides (Mares, 2007). This phenomenon has been explained under a variety of names, each underlining a distinct set of characteristics of these regimes, including: Alfred Stepan's "*New Professionalism*" (1973), Guillermo O'Donnell's "*Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime*" (1979), Jorge A. Tapia Valdés's "*Dual State*" (1989), Alan Rouquié's "*Terrorist State*" (1987), and Frederick Nunn's "*Professional Militarism*" (1992).

The indispensable role of national security doctrines as rationales for military regimes made the classification of these military governments popular under the label of "National Security State" (Coblin, 1979; Loveman, 1999; Mares, 2007; Fitch, 1998; Chomsky & Herman, 1979). Although the interpretation of these doctrines varied (i.e. there were hard-line and soft-line versions; Pion-Berlin, 1989) as Fitch (1998) suggested, they provided a "common intellectual foundation for a new military role belief stressing the professional duty of the armed forces to assume control of the government when civilian leaders proved incompetent of providing the necessary conditions for internal security and development" (p. 110). The belief in this role clearly expanded the extent of military rule and the military's "collective responsibility" for those regimes. Consequently, national security served as a justification for institutional military rule (Ibid., p. 110).

The US government had declared that the Cold War was coming to Latin America when the reformist regime headed by Colonel Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in the early 1950s allowed the Communists to increase their influence in the government and labor movement, and had implemented an agrarian reform that negatively affected the United Fruit Company. President Eisenhower's administration, including individuals occupying key posts such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and (his brother) CIA Director Allen Dulles, had key policymakers with personal and economic ties to the company. Such a situation clearly provided an impetus for the US government's conclusion that "one American nation has succumbed to Communist infiltration" (Loveman, 1999, pp. 156-157). In June 1954, the CIA executed a coup using exiled Colonel Castillo Armas as the figure-head leader of a "liberating army", and invaded Guatemala from Honduras. The communists were dispersed in the aftermath of the coup; land was returned to landowners, and thousands of indigenous peasants were killed.

The most fundamental challenge to US security occurred five years later: the Cuban Revolution. The US' response to Cuba entailed a radical policy change. In 1961 the US Congress passed the Internal Development and Security Act, explicitly changing the rationale of military assistance to Latin America from "hemispheric defense to internal defense and development." This act set the foundation for a dramatic increase in the political role of the Latin American militaries (Loveman, 1999, pp. 196-162). Latin American armies have waged a war against internal subversion and international communism since 1961 with US support. Loveman suggested that these conflicts "drastically modified the relations between the US military and its Latin American counterparts, the military tasks and doctrine of the Latin

American armed forces (and some US forces covertly engaged in counter insurgency campaigns), and the character of Latin American politics” (p. 162). Consequently, the number of military aid and training programs drastically increased.

Over 16,000 personnel were trained in The School of the Americas (SOA) between 1961 and 1964 at a US military instructional facility that was founded in the Panama Canal Zone in 1946 to train Latin American soldiers, police, and security related civilians in counter insurgency, psychological warfare, and interrogation techniques (Loveman, 1999, pp. 170-171; Maliska, 2009). This was more than twice the number of Latin American students who had received training (7,886) between the school’s inception and the eve of the Cuban Revolution (Gill 2004, p.72). Many of the military dictators and their heirs, during the period known as the Dirty Wars of the 1970s and 1980s in Central and South America, were graduates of this institution (Maliska, N. 2009).<sup>30</sup> The SOA was only one of the institutions where Latin American security personnel received training. Loveman indicates that between 1950 and 1978, the US provided training for more than 81,000 Latin American military personnel at various military training facilities. He added that this training, regardless of how technical it was, always included anticommunism ideological content (p. 182). By 1964, a wave of new military regimes achieved power in much of the region under the leadership of the post-World-War-II generation of Cold War officers. These military cadres shared a common doctrine based on the national security concept, which provided the basis for military role expansion, as well as new institutional structures and methods of repression.

**Table 1: Military Regimes in Latin America, 1964-1990**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Years</b>
Ecuador	1963-1966; 1972-1978
Guatemala	1963-1985
Brazil	1964-1985
Bolivia	1964-1970; 1971-1982
Argentina	1966-1973; 1976-1983
Peru	1968-1980
Panama	1968-1981
Honduras	1972-1982
Chile	1973-1990
Uruguay	1973-1984
El Salvador	1948-1984

Source: (Loveman, 1999, p. 186)

The operationalization of the national security concept in these regimes caused more devastating outcomes than those in the US. By the early 1960s, the ideology designated as the

<sup>30</sup> In 1996 it was made public that manuals advocating torture and various brutal tactics against civilian populations had been employed at the SOA and were distributed to multiple Latin American countries (Maliska, 2009).

"National Security Doctrine" (NSD) prevailed among the military elites that ruled in these Latin American states (Fitch 1998; Pion-Berlin, 1989).

### ***2.2.1. The National Security Doctrine: A New Idea for an Old Role***

The National Security Doctrine (NSD) is an interrelated set of concepts about the state, development, counter insurgency warfare, and above all, security (Pion-Berlin, 1988, p.385; Chomsky&Herman, 1979; Mares, 2007; Comblin, 1977). This doctrine is deeply affected by US military writings about national security, as well as US and French counter insurgency doctrines, though its ideological sustenance situated in the study of geopolitics was imported from Europe in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Mares, 2007; Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Pion-Berlin, 1989; Coblin, 1979, Stepan, 1978). In this view, the nation and the state are perceived in organic terms (they live and die), and states are “conscious, rational entities with interests, prejudices and instincts of self-preservation” (Pion-Berlin, 1989, p. 413). Every state is involved in permanent warfare, and its form at the time was Communism versus the Free World (Chomsky & Herman, 1979). In its original version (that of Rudolf Kjellen), geopolitics defined the acquisition of territory as a necessary means to prevail over rivals and survive. Due to the difficulty of conquest, the national security doctrine redefined geopolitical strategy from acquisition of “physical space” to that of “political space”, while maintaining the organic view of state (Pion-Berlin, 1989). Corresponding to this focus on “interior frontiers”, one of the greatest threats to the state is the internal enemy (Mares, 2007).

State managers are granted unique privileges associated with ensuring the security of the nation (Pion-Berlin, 1989). Their mission is to provide harmony amongst the functions of society’s constituent parts to achieve “the common good” (Fitch, 1998; Pion-Berlin, 1989), which could include social engineering when necessary. Consequently, the definition of politics comes down to the art of achieving the common good. In NSD, national security becomes synonymous with this collective good, and the concept develops into a yardstick by which all policies are measured (Fitch, 1998; Pion-Berlin, 1989).

Parallel to the US national security ideology, the NSD produced in the War Colleges of Latin America declared that the presence of international communism was everywhere, and that there were potential guerrillas far and wide. Thus, control over "subversion" is possible only through the state elite, namely the armed forces (Chomsky & Herman, 1979) who serve “legitimately, not by fulfilling the popular will, but by carrying out national security objectives (Pion-Berlin, 1989, p. 414). Embracing the US definition of the national security concept, the doctrine considers non-military factors such as industrial mobilization, natural resources, science and technology, national unity, and statesmanship vital to a nation’s ability to defend itself. The concept of national defense was therefore replaced by “national security.” In the age of total war, planning military operations is only one security strategy; economic, political, and psycho-social, strategies are also required (Comblin, 1977; Fitch, 1998, Mares, 2007). National strategy therefore integrates the military, political, economic, and psychological elements of national power to formulate comprehensive policies for the achievement of permanent and current national objectives (Fitch, 1998, p 108). In cases where the achievement of national

security objectives is involved in a conflict with individual rights and freedoms, tensions should be resolved in favor of the state (Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Pion-Berlin, 1989; Comblin, 1977).

The willingness to assume long-term institutional responsibility for national development as part of the national security mission was a fundamental shift from the previous guardian and moderating roles of the military. The NSD defines under-development as one of the worst threats to security since economic backwardness nourishes violence. Its primary focus is on the nation's objective economic conditions, such as the lack of infrastructure, misuse of resources, deterioration of trade, high inflation, low productivity, and inefficiency (Pion-Berlin, 1988). The NSD does not contain any element of egalitarianism (Chomsky & Herman, 1979, p. 253), as providing a minimum standard of living to those who may cause societal tensions is necessary for peaceful co-existence (Pion-Berlin, 1988).

In summary, this authoritarian and elitist doctrine combined the following elements: a theory of revolutionary war that identified the nature of the internal security threat, and the appropriate military and policy measures for responding to that threat; a justification of human rights abuse as a necessary means to eradicate this revolutionary threat; the thesis of security and development, linking the internal security threat to socio-economic underdevelopment; a theoretical framework linking "national security, strategy, national objectives, and national policy"; and the conviction that military intervention is legitimate when the policy failures of civilian governments jeopardize national security (Comblin, 1977; Fitch, 1998, p 107). Although the coups were justified by reference to the historical missions of the armed forces, the military regimes in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s consolidated a new form of national security state, which demonstrated a distinctive set of common characteristics under this new dominant ideological umbrella.

### ***2.2.2. The Key Characteristics of National Security States***

The first characteristic of National Security States (NSS) is that the vanguard role of the military, as the highest authority, which directly guides the country's destiny as an institution, not as the followers of a military leader. This distinguished military rule in the NSS from preceding regimes, in which military officers seized power for personal benefit, to end undesirable government policies, reestablish law and order, and correct temporary political and economic instabilities (Mares, 2007, p. 387; Pallmeyer, 1992, Loveman, 1999).

The second distinguishing element, which is directly related to the first characteristic of NSS, is its system-transforming orientation. NSS are not totalitarian in that they do not construct a precise mass mobilization strategy at work and in politics with the same approach as fascist, corporatist, or communist regimes. The goal of the NSS was to reconstruct the manner in which "societal interests were articulated and the distribution of influence in policy making" (Mares, 2007, p. 392). Rather than restoring the old order, the NSS military governments' central target became transforming the country's political and economic institutions. They chose to rearrange unions, political parties, and other forms of civic and social organizations, creating limited and defined spaces for their existence (Ibid., p. 387).

Blaming the existing political and economic institutions of their countries for aggravating the problems, the military governments redesigned and restructured the state institutions in line with the national security ideology. National Security Councils, as a new institution imported from the US, became the highest mechanism of the State for setting permanent and current national objectives, as well the policies and strategies for their attainment (Fitch, 1998). Due to the blurred distinction between politics and national security policy, almost any policy issue could be associated with national security, and therefore require military scrutiny. This broadening of the concept of "security" made military institutions responsible, though not accountable, for political and economic outcomes (Fitch 1998; Loveman, 1999).

To achieve this goal, NSS in their traditional (direct military regimes) and contemporary forms (under pseudo-democracy) have been overwhelmingly repressive (Loveman, 1997). Regardless of the economic models and policies adopted, in NSS the primary aim of the controlling leadership has been "the destruction of any organizational threat that might challenge the attainment of state" (Chomsky & Herman, 1979, p. 254). During the first years of their rule, the military governments of the NSS banned political parties or gravely restrained their activities; temporarily closed legislatures; purged undesirable politicians; outlawed selected labor organizations or restricted their activities; prevented public criticism through extensive media censorship; and persecuted, jailed, or killed opposition journalists, while subsidizing media that favored the regime. Moreover, universities were purged of subversives, professors lost their jobs, and student organizations were suppressed (Loveman, 1999, p. 189). Any organizational structure including unions, student or professional organizations, and community groups were destroyed if they were not brought under state control (Chomsky & Herman, 1979, p. 255; Şarlak, 1994).

Another feature of NSS is their concern with legitimacy. Since the national security ideology recognizes that security and development require the institutionalization of a political and economic system, not only arbitrary "cleansing" and commanding, military leadership and its security regime require legitimacy. Such a system cannot be established by force, even by the force of arms that created the opportunity. Thus, its consolidation necessitates an expression of legitimacy from fundamental players in national development. A legal framework helped to create this desired sense of legitimate order and rule. The manner in which NSS governments dealt with the institutionalization of military leadership varied, but all sought to preserve their decisive role through constitutional restructuring or implementing far-reaching new national security legislations that were frequently supplemented with "antiterrorism" laws (Mares, 2007; Loveman, 1999). By playing a leading role in the democratic transition process, military institutions retained their key role in the political system, consolidating a form of "protected" democracy to ensure the continuity of the NSS (Loveman, 1997).

In an appearance of democracy, the military or a broader national security establishment still maintained ultimate power, and the national security ideology prevailed as the main instrument of shaping public policy. The security legislations enacted and the institutions established during direct military rule remained operative and were strengthened after the transition to elected civilian governments, including: "regimes of exceptions as basic elements of constitutions; prohibition of judicial protection of civil liberties and rights during regimes of exception and/or in applying national security laws; explicit constitutional definition of internal security and political roles of the armed forces via national security councils, making

the armed forces a virtual fourth branch of government-guardians of the nation; organic “constitutive laws” further embedding the political role and relative autonomy of the armed forces in the legal foundations of the nation; security legislation (laws pertaining to internal security, anti-terrorism, and maintenance of public order) that criminalizes certain type of political opposition [...] and expands military functions and jurisdiction even further (frequently including ample, autonomous internal intelligence roles of the armed forces); restrictions on the mass media justified by “national security” concerns; criminal codes with special provisions for political crimes and “crimes against the State,” or against “the constituted government”; military jurisdiction [...] over civilians for “crimes against internal security”, “terrorism,” or even “insulting” officers; restriction (or full exclusion) of the jurisdiction of civilian courts over military personnel [...]; formal corporate representation for the armed forces in policy making (for example, in Congress, the judiciary, executive agencies, public administration, and public enterprises); partial autonomy of the armed forces over its budget [...]; broad constitutional and statutory autonomy for the military from oversight by the legislature [...] over “professional” and “internal” matters, such as military education, promotions, retirements, reassignments, and tenure of service commanders” (Loveman 1997, pp. 372-373).

The fundamental aspects of these institutions and practices related to the national security concept change the meaning of democracy in NSS. They impose severe restrictions on public life in the areas of public contestation, electoral competition, and any form of political opposition. They give military institutions a form of ‘carte blanche’ to be directly involved in policymaking and determining the overall direction of society (Loveman, 1997; Pallmeyer, 1992). Elections in such a state structure become no more than a tool for legitimizing the democratic image of the regime without changing the established power structures of the state (Pallmeyer, 1992).

The ruling state elite in NSS consistently undervalue the normal play of conflicting interests, the significance of institutional channels for political participation and accountability, and the unavoidability of ideological conflicts over the objectives and instruments of state policy (i.e. all the indispensable elements of democratic pluralism; Fitch 1998). The institutionalization of an organic statist view of politics in the narrative and bureaucratic institutions of the national security apparatus, as Fitch asserted, “contributes to disenchantment of military officers with democratic politics” (p. 115). With this mindset, any type of social or political demand, policy change, or individual or group protest in NSS can be deprecated, and officially labeled as politically immature or subversive, and could be subject to repression. This deprecating perception towards society and its political representatives provides a rationale for an autonomous role for the armed forces as guardians of the rules and limits of the system.

As a logical corollary of their new transformative role in politics, the military institutions declare themselves as solely responsible for defining national objectives and national interests. These objectives which set behind closed doors are characterized as permanent, transcending the initiatives of individual governments. Any other interests that contradict them are disparaged as partisan, narrow, selfish, or unpatriotic (Fitch 1998). This problematic self-perception was explained by Alfred Stepan (1986) as a consequence of “new professionalism.” Stepan indicated that the military institutions’ internal security missions led

to a focus on the professionalization of their approach to the social and political conditions of the revolutionary protests. Officers in institutionalized military establishments began to acquire training on internal security matters in highly developed military schooling systems. They began to perceive that their expertise and values authorized them to identify threats to the nation that neither self-interested politicians nor ignorant masses can see. This advanced training, along with the national security doctrine, provided a basis for military officers to view themselves as possessing specific “scientific” knowledge that civilians do not have. Military officers in NSS perceive themselves as the only individuals who can realize the conditions required to defend the nation (Mares 2007, pp. 393- 394).

Another distinctive feature of NSS is their paranoia about enemies. Since threats to national security are both external (in origin) and internal (i.e. specific agents and principal battlegrounds; Fitch, 1998, p. 115), enemies of the state are everywhere. Thus, defending the state against external and internal enemies has become “a leading preoccupation of the state, a distorting factor in the economy and a major source of national identity and purpose” (Pallmeyer, p.38). In accordance with the ideological foundation of NSS, these enemies are declared as cunning and ruthless. They are officially dehumanized in the state narrative such that any means used to destroy or control them are justified (Ibid., p.39).

Military intelligence units in NSS gain autonomy and influence as a part of the national security apparatus. Escalating military concern with the relationship between socio-economic change and national security in the context of counter insurgency wars strengthened this role (French and US counter insurgency doctrines underlined the fundamental importance of timely intelligence to overcome the internal threat; Loveman, 1999; Mares, 2007). The political character of long-term internal warfare coupled with the military’s paranoid attitude towards potential enemies put a premium on the military surveillance of, and operations against, civilian opponents of the regime and guerrilla combatants. In this context, intelligence became an important tool and military intelligence units gained more autonomy and influence.

Another defining nature of the NSS is that the security apparatus draws on the support of right-wing paramilitary groups. These groups are used for intelligence purposes as well as "dirty war" functions (e.g. interrogation, kidnapping, torture, extralegal executions) with specialized military units (Loveman, 1999). In the mission of fighting insurgencies and “subversives”, their collaboration was justified by patriotism.

Turkey acquired the majority of the national security state characteristics that are discussed above as it transformed during the Cold War Era. The later chapters in this dissertation layout the transformation of Turkey, which diverges from Latin American counterparts with its stark social, historical, and political differences.