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A history of the national security state in Turkey

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Citation

Sarlak, Z. (2020, August 25). *A history of the national security state in Turkey*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/135947>

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Author: Sarlak, Z.

Title: A history of the national security state in Turkey

Issue Date: 2020-08-25

A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE IN TURKEY

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op dinsdag 25 augustus 2020
klokke 13.45 uur

door

Zeynep Şarlak

geboren te Ankara

in 1971

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Dr. Andrew Gawthorpe

To my family; given and chosen
Aileme ve ailemi genişleten dostlarıma

A History of the National Security State in Turkey

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Cover photo: Mamak Military Prison in Ankara, political prisoners after the 12 September 1980 coup, by Sökmen Baykara.

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Acknowledgments

There has been a long period of time between the moment I decided to do a PhD and today. It was a complicated process. Therefore, I owe my sincere thanks and gratitude to certain exceptional people in my life. First, I owe deep gratitude to my adviser; Prof. dr. Erik-Jan Zürcher. He supported this project continuously with dedication and passionate mentorship. The second of these names is professor Faik Hadımlı, who has never lost his trust in me and provided me all the possible facilities and support despite all my shortcomings over the years. In our 20 years of acquaintance Faik hoca has been an invaluable mentor to me on both academic and personal matters. I owe him dearly.

My second thanks go to my close friend Ayşe Çavdar. Despite her immense workload, she moved to my humble flat to make me sit in front of the computer, read my whole manuscript, offered her constructive criticism, and comforted me whenever I was down. I am very much indebted to Ayşe.

I also feel deeply grateful to my dearest friends Deniz Yücelen, Bülent Bali, Ömer Suveren, Kristin Demirci, Feza Aygen, Engin Volkan and İnci Ilgın. They always gave me strength, confidence, and determination to move onward.

I also would like to extend my sincerest thanks and appreciation to Alpaslan Durmuş, my generous and beloved friend who gave his enormous media archive to me as a present.

I conducted part of my research in New York and I am very grateful to my dear friend Tomoko Nishi for her hospitality.

One of the few best moments in writing this dissertation has been sharing every step of the way with my “elder brother”, Ahmet Kuyaş. I wholeheartedly cherish our long conversations on history, current politics, and life in general.

Writing a thesis while working on a few jobs requires logistic support and serious pampering. I am thankful to my family, my aunt Nurhan Arıkan, my mother Gökçen Şarlak and particularly my sister Zeliş Şarlak Kluge for always being the best chef, caretaker, and free psychologist. I should also honor the memory of my father Recai Şarlak, my aunt Zehra Şerifoğlu, my granny Nadire Şerifoğlu and my cats Alyosa and Sıdıka whom I lost during this struggle. Their love kept me going when times got tough.

Finally, I would like to thank my better half and my soulmate Şevin Yıldız for assisting me in countless ways and her unwavering support and advice.

Introduction

This doctoral dissertation questions the validity of the following two universally accepted and often repeated convictions by scholars of Turkish studies: Turkey has been an indispensable ally of the United States ever since its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership in 1952, and the Turkish Republic's national security discourse has always been an obstacle to solving fundamental political and societal issues. The main problem with these two convictions is that they have not been read together, which has resulted in the omission of the significant relationship between them.

I mainly chose to focus on this uncharted territory in my dissertation because the unanswered questions, which formed after finishing my master's thesis in 1995, were still lingering at the back of my mind. For my master's thesis, I explored the similarities and differences in the constitutional processes of three US allies with different geographic locations; one of these partners was Turkey. These countries, Brazil in Latin America, South Korea in Asia, and Turkey in the Middle East were perceived as the legs of a tripod, which was set up as a shield against the communism threat by the US. I thought that by tracing the parallels in the institutionalization processes of the state apparatuses among these three countries, one could write a comparative understanding of military, political and societal transitions. My conclusion was as follows: The timing of the military interventions that interrupted the experiment in democracy in these three countries was pretty close. For South Korea (1961) and Brazil (1964), the military takeovers have been the starting points of repressive, long term military rules which were to last 25 and 27 years, respectively. On the other side, in Turkey, the duration of direct military rule following each intervention (1960-1961, 1971-1973, 1980-1982) was relatively short. Nevertheless, the constitutional structure subsequently established by the military shows a striking similarity to those of Brazil and South Korea. In the first place the junta councils formed for “restoration of democracy” united the legislative and the executive powers in their bodies and have undertaken intense political and legal restructuring which, before long, culminated and were systematized in the post-coup Constitutions. The constitutional restructuring undertaken by the military in all three cases demonstrated a pattern of strengthening powers of the executive in exchange for those of the legislative and the judiciary, along with a step-by-step retrogression in individual and collective rights. The military in all three countries inserted unrepresentative councils, primarily the National Security Council, into the executive structure, which it could thus penetrate. Evaluating the post-coup Constitutions of these countries item by item one can see a repetitive use of “national security” concept as an ideological instrument employed to legitimize the grounds of intervention at all levels of political and social life. The constitutions of the three countries created a system of military justice where the military jurisdiction was extended to civilians in the event of crimes against national security, state security or the military. Executive supremacy made feasible the realization of the governmental supervision of labor and regulation of capital-labor relations in these three countries. The authorization and the negotiation procedures of labor unions were

severely restricted. The constitutional provisions, together with supplementary legislation, established (or fortified) a corporatist control of labor.

In the final analysis, I asked if the role of the military, as well as the civilian-military relations in Turkey, could be seen as part of a broader political phenomenon in the Cold War world. This dissertation began with this follow-up question.

First, this dissertation argues that the Turkish Republic has gradually transformed into a national security state during the Cold War era. In the political literature “National Security State” (NSS) is used to define two distinctive state manifestation. The first one refers to the ideology and institutions established by the National Security Act of 1947 in the United States. The national security state argument for Turkey, which is put forward in this dissertation, does not build itself on a parallel comparison with the development of the national security state in the US. This dissertation employs the second and widely accepted definition of “national security state” developed by Latin Americanists. These scholars have theorized this state model to investigate the common characteristics of the US-backed military regimes in the region under the new ideological umbrella of the Cold War. The national security concept, its new doctrine, and the new apparatuses that were shaped in the US were transformed within the framework of the political histories and dynamics of these ally authoritarian regimes when their militaries transplanted them. Their approaches to finding broader applications and intervention grounds changed because these states did not have the same checks and balance mechanisms as the US did. The application of the new US national security doctrine by the Latin American militarist regimes prepared them for more profound and expansive security apparatuses. The security threat that was initially based on the perceived danger of communism in these countries was expanded to include any dissident movements, groupings, or discussions that the states regarded as flourishing beyond the desired scale. As will be shown in this dissertation, Turkey bears striking resemblances with the NSSs of Latin America, although it is geographically distant and has no evident direct US involvement in its history of military interventions.

The second aim of this dissertation is to explore if Turkey, as a distinct case study, offers a new understanding of a post-Cold War security state. Unlike many ally countries where the national security state structures have dismantled after the Cold War, the central actors of the national security state in Turkey have consolidated their power over the new forms of above-mentioned threat perceptions throughout the 1990s. A significant impetus behind the smooth operation and adoption of the national security doctrine in Turkey is the founding cadres' fears of disintegration and political Islam that formed during the early years of the Republic. The Cold-War security apparatuses of Turkey were explicitly operationalized against the state's two deeply rooted threat perceptions up until early 2000s.

The fear of partition is also known as the Sèvres Syndrome in the political science literature. This name originates from the Treaty of Sèvres, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers on August 10th, 1920, leaving the majority of the Ottoman Empire in the control of different countries. However, this treaty and its contents are not the sole reason for this syndrome. As Zürcher (2009) argued, this fear is the product of a difficult period, marked by the ending of the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans. The Ottoman Empire can also be perceived as a Balkan Empire since the region's

central location in the empire experienced a traumatic withdrawal from the region starting in the 19th century. Zürcher stated that the Republic of Turkey was founded mainly by former military members of the Committee of Union and Progress and administrators from the Balkan provinces, which were no longer Ottoman lands. He further explained the root-cause of the cadre's concerns as related to existence and security:

“In 1912 -1913, all Young Turk officers and civil servants born in the Balkan provinces, just about thirty years before this date, in a way have lost their ancestral homes and homelands. In many cases, their families had to flee and fell into the position of immigrants in various parts of the Ottoman Empire. Surprisingly however, this situation did not provoke revanchist feelings in Young Turks, nor did it lead to a plan to take back these old lands. On the contrary, it made them adopt Anatolia, which they mostly considered a foreign country, as their new homeland. [...] Furthermore, the sentiment of not letting the history repeat itself was getting stronger. Anatolia would not go through what Balkans went through. These lands, in the real sense of the word, were the “last anchor of the Turk.” (pp. 153-154)

When the nationalistic reflexes emerged after the founding of the Republic, the rhetoric of Sèvres Syndrome was synonymously used with primary national security threat. This partition fear was demonstrated by forming enemies with oppositional discourses inside and outside the country, especially with Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds, depending on their population counts and political power. In other words, the historical anxieties of the early years of the Turkish Republic would be facilitating factors in the adoption of national security ideology.

The founding cadres of the Republic perceived political Islam as the second most significant threat. Like nationalism, catching up with "modernity" was a central theme in the program that these cadres developed. This comprehension, which manifested itself in leaning towards the West in the minds of the Kemalists, brought about a radical break from the Ottoman Empire and all the identities and values attributed to it. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, where religion had a complementary role in the state affairs, the Republic of Turkey adopted strict secularism, especially in the first 20 years. While the legal and political realm was redesigned in this direction, the relationship between religion and society, which up until then was experienced in the semi-private domain created by religious sects, was passed onto the control of state bureaucracy. Within the narrative of the Republic's constantly changing political struggles, political Islam continued to be one of the ancient enemies of the "secular" state. This situation only changed in the second half of the 2000s, when the Justice and Development Party eliminated the military's domination over the political life of Turkey.

There is a significant body of scholarly work on civil-military relations in Turkey. Most of this work focuses on the dynamics of the relationship between military power and politics for a specific time period. However, these studies do not explore the impact of the Cold War's national security doctrine on the institutional and ideological transformation of the state. The limited number of studies that defined Turkey as a national security state uses this definition in relation to the decisive role of the National Security Council in political decisions and the

catchphrase quality of this concept in political jargon. In other words, the national security state discourse in these studies is not predicated on a historical and conceptual analysis; it is a name attribution. From this framework, the dissertation aims to fill this fundamental scholarship gap on the regime and military-related studies in Turkey. This research works on the following assumption: The transformation of the military in Turkey, on the axis of the US-centered Cold War national security ideology, and the institutional and political consequences of this process are not uniquely Turkish.

This dissertation draws on primary and secondary sources. The primary sources that went into this research are, previously confidential US documents that have been released to the public domain, official reports, newspaper and journal clippings from the period between 1990 and 2016, oral histories and testimonies from the actors of the period, constitutions, laws, regulations and memoranda, the print decisions and minutes of the National Security Council meetings, the general and local election statistics prepared by the Turkish Statistical Institute, and judicial statistics released by the Ministry of Justice.

Chapters

The first chapter of this dissertation explains and contextualizes the scope of the national security ideology and the two different national security state models shaped by this ideology, the one in the US and the other in Latin America. By reviewing the most widely recognized scholarly works and discussing circulating key arguments in political science literature, the chapter outlines the history of the formation of national security ideology, new institutional structures and the internal consequences of this radical shift of foreign policy in the US. Later, the chapter demonstrates how the US governments promoted and supported the right-wing military regimes to halt the progression of the left-wing movements in allied countries. Finally, this chapter shows how this entire framework, together with its new military doctrine, was adopted and translated by the military governments of US allies in Latin America. It documents the common characteristics of the national security states that were built by Latin American militaries to reveal similarities for the case of Turkey. The retelling of this particular history is an indispensable part of this dissertation mainly because scholars working on civil-military relations in Turkey have never located the development of the Turkish national security state in a global Cold War perspective.

In chapter two, this dissertation investigates how being a close ally of the US during the Cold War transformed the ideological context of the military in Turkey and the mechanisms that supported this transformation. The achievements and programs of the three coup d'états that occurred ten years apart, in 1960, 1971, and 1980, are compared to reveal how the Cold War context impacted the relationships between the army and politics in Turkey. Lastly, this chapter analyzes the new hegemonic discourse of the national security state, which reached its final stage with the 1980 military coup. In this framework, this section investigates the dynamics of the collaboration between the national security ideology, the founding ideology of the Republic and the Turkish – Islamic Synthesis project, identifying the latter as the cultural output of the open support that the US gave to moderate Islam in the Cold War context.

The third chapter describes how the national security concept permeated the institutional structure of the state and the politics, focusing on the national security apparatus. After a brief history of Turkey's transition from the national defense to the national security concept in the Cold War conjuncture, this chapter identifies the role of the national security notion in the legal architecture of this new state mechanism that was institutionalized by the 1980 coup. The following central security actors are addressed under the tutelage of the military authority within their legislative frameworks: The National Security Council (NSC) and the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (GSNSC), the National Intelligence Organization (NIO), and the State Security Courts (SSC). This chapter also demonstrates how the administrative organs that are not under the directives of these actors are put under the centralist apparatus of the security state with the caveat of "compliance with the requirements of national security policy" placed in the laws of September 12th government or later. Moreover, this chapter examines the individual and social fundamental rights and freedoms that are limited by the national security, to demonstrate how the national security phenomenon is instrumentalized not only to control the political sphere, but also the social field. Finally, State Security Courts, the judicial leg of the national security state, and their decisions on freedom of speech and freedom of thought are investigated.

The fourth chapter analyzes how the national security state has developed a strategy of survival after the Cold War by turning its face to "ancient enemies" that are Kurdish separatism and political Islam. The identity claims of these groups, which can remain a subject of political debate in this framework and can be negotiated in civilian terms, evolve into violent conflicts in which they are seen as grounds for creating legitimacy by the national security state. The national security apparatus, to maintain its hegemony over politics has transformed these two different identity claims that emerged into civilian political organizations in the 1990s into threats. This chapter is comprised of four different sub-sections. The first section, after giving historical background on the collapse of the three-party political architecture organized by the coup d'état of September 12, 1980, examines the civil-military relations of the early post-military regime period. The second section investigates how the Kurdish issue under the threat of separatism resonated with the national security state. In this framework, this section analyzes the tensions of the security state between the governments and the political parties of Kurdish origin while examining how the security field was expanded on legal and illegal grounds. The third section repeats a similar analytical reading on the rise of and the fight against the political Islam in Turkey. The introduction of this section gives a historical background of the relationship between the military as the carrier of the founding ideology of Turkey and political parties with Islamic tendencies until the 1980s. Then it examines the rise of Welfare Party as the primary representative of political Islam in Turkey and the reactions it received from the security state. In this context, this section examines the February 28th process, a political term named after the post-modern coup that occurred on February 28, 1997, which indicates a time span starting before 1997 and ending with the dissolution of the national security state. This dissertation concludes with the analysis of the February 28th process. Each political development that has occurred since this time belongs to a different period with unique dynamics and is, therefore, the subject of another study. The fundamental dynamic from this new period is the approval of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999. After this date, the national

security state entered into a dissolution process through the structural reforms required for this EU candidacy despite the stiff resistance from the military circles. For this reason, these developments that removed the military tutelage from legal and public domains are merely presented on a factual basis without a multilevel analysis of intertwined issues in the final section.

Finally, the conclusion chapter includes additional remarks on the current and future readings of the political developments because this study cannot be entirely removed from current political context of Turkey. The current political administration is utilizing the reshaped reflexes and functions of the historical period that was investigated for this dissertation, though it does not use the ideology or all the institutional structures.

Chapter I

1. The Rise of the National Security State in the US

1.1. Emergence of the National Security Idea

The origin of the phrase ‘national security’ is uncertain. Though it is acknowledged that this phrase has been used since the early days of the United States,¹ it got into circulation during World War I. When the United States became involved in the war, the phrase ‘national security’ began appearing frequently, as an undefined term in some laws enacted (Shulman, 2000, pp. 294-295). However, during the same period this phrase was incrementally conceptualized as the central tenet of a number of policy sets by the National Security League (NSL), a “small upper-class group” led public service organization founded in 1914 to “lobby for increased and improved preparation for America’s defense from enemies at home and abroad” (Ibid., pp. 290, 295). In a short time, the NSL became an influential organization, and its influence continued until the end of WWI.² Shulman noted that by the end of 1916, the NSL had 250 chapters and 100,000 members throughout the nation, and these numbers remained high until 1918. The league organized hundreds of rallies around the country and reached hundreds of thousands of Americans by sending speakers, writers, and handbooks to various kinds of get-togethers (Ibid.). During its prime, the League received a part of its financial support from the wealthy residents of New York City, including the oil titan John D. Rockefeller and banker J.P Morgan (Ibid., pp.304-305).

The NSL leaders formulated a nationalist agenda. They defined enemies as those who are not “100% American”. Non-American meant “foreign nationals, many immigrants, and political radicals,” as well as trade union members and the Congressmen opposing the legislations that the League deemed crucial (Ibid., p. 305). The League advocated for a more centralized economy in the hands of “reliable cartels or the government” in favor of power and efficiency. Any issue regarding distributional justice was out of its scope. It also demanded unrestricted rights to private property, as trade unions were perceived as a serious threat (Ibid.,

¹ The first known use of the phrase dates back to the 1790s. Students at Yale University reportedly deliberated on the question, “Does national security depend on fostering domestic industries?” (Rostow, 1975, p. 191). Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper 70, suggested that, in conducting war, “the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of national security” (cited in Relyea, 2003, p. 611). President Franklin Pierce, in his 1853 inaugural address, stated that “there is no national security but, in the nation’s, humble, acknowledged dependence upon God and His overruling providence” (Ibid.). In 1915, historian Victor S. Clark, used the phrase very closely to its current meaning to rebut the contemporary accusation that Thomas Jefferson was a weak-willed pacifist: “Likewise the lessons of two wars with the mother country had convinced many thinking men that industrial independence was a necessary adjunct of political interdependence; and even Thomas Jefferson, disinclined as he was to extend the functions of government, had come to believe that public aid of home manufacturers might be required for *national security*” (Clark, 1916, p. 58).

² For an extensive information on the purposes, membership, financial support, and activities of the NSL see, United States. Congress. House. Special Committee to Investigate the National Security League. (1918). National Security League: hearings before a special committee of the House of Representatives, sixty-fifth Congress, third session on H. Res. 469 and H. Res. 476. Washington: Government Printing Office. The full text of the hearings can be found at: <https://ia802605.us.archive.org/9/items/nationalsecurit00housgoog/nationalsecurit00housgoog.pdf>

309). Regarding defense and military matters, all NSL leaders promoted the idea of increased military expenditures and coordination of the Army and Navy at the political level. Since they believed in its strategic significance and more importantly, its moral value, the League also supported the idea of universal military training (Ibid., pp. 310, 312-313).

By the end of the war, some of the NSL's leaders overtly proposed policy recommendations, including "a consolidated defense department; national security coordination by professionals instead of a politically responsive Congress; joint military purchasing; a natural resources board; universal conscription; construction of a national highway system and English-only requirements for citizenship and residency" (Ibid., p. 319). In 1920, the League intensified its demands for "a more repressive and less representative state," and became increasingly concerned with domestic issues. The NSL proposed the centralization of all spending decisions of experts in Washington, as well as education campaigns designed to "fight Bolshevism and preach Americanism" to combat radicals at home (Ibid., p. 321). However, the conventional wisdom at the time assured that the safety of America could be guaranteed by pursuing an isolationist policy against the rest of the world. The country's geographical remoteness from the other "Great Powers," the superiority of its naval fleets, and its vast natural and industrial resources established the basis for this isolationism (Yergin, 1990, p. 197).

The League's influence faded away and its policy proposals were largely ignored by the end of World War I, and the use of the phrase 'national security' in adopted federal statutes became less frequent over the following decades (Relyea, 2003, p. 611). After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, however, despite the absence of a direct threat to the United States, President Roosevelt "began to broaden out what exactly constituted 'home defense'" and started using the term in its modern doctrinal sense (Preston, 2014, pp. 492-493). The term national security became ubiquitous in the US after December 7, 1941, when the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted a surprise military strike against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This instance legitimated the idea of national security indefinitely. Since then, as Stuart (2008) asserted, the national security has been "the standard against which all future foreign policies would be judged" (pp. 5-6). By the end of WWII, the phrase became prominent in official pronouncements, presidential directives, statutes, and agency regulations. It was (re)stated publicly during an August 1945 Senate hearing on the unification of the military services (cited in Yergin, 1990, p. 194):

"Our national security can only be assured on a very broad and comprehensive front," Navy Secretary James Forrestal, the most vigorous supporter of the concept and soon to be the first United States Secretary of Defense told the Senate. He added, "I am using the word security here consistently and continuously, rather than defense." Senator Edwin Johnson responded, "I like your words national security."

Forrestal went on to say (cited in Shulman, p.327),

"The question of national security is not merely a question of the Army and the Navy. We have to take into account our whole potential for war, our

mines, industry, manpower, research and all the activities that go into normal civilian life.”³

Following the aftermath of the war, the main proposals of the NSL were implemented while restructuring the state institutions around the concept of national security. Former NSL members and supporters of the League played significant roles in the foundation of the national security state of the Cold War era.⁴

By the end of WWII, the post-war political elite had reached consensus on the need for institutional reform around four main issues: new machinery for collecting and interpreting peacetime intelligence regarding potential enemies, new mechanisms for civilian-military dialogue, new institutions designed to promote cooperation among different military branches, and new procedures for mobilizing and managing the nation’s economic and scientific resources in support of national security (Stuart, 2008; Yergin, 1990).

These reform decisions were all made under the umbrella of national security, and this concept became a paradigm to explain the United States’ relationship to the rest of the world during World War II. According to Yergin (1990), national security was “a perception, a state of mind” which “postulate[d] the “interrelatedness of so many different political, economic, and military factors that developments halfway around the globe are seen to have automatic and direct impact on America’s core interests” (p. 196). This perception automatically suggested that any turn of events anywhere might endanger the United States’ security and any course of action could be rationalized by the need for national security. This new idea and the associated reforms necessitate the existence of an enemy to gain meaning, substance, focus, and urgency. Accordingly, in the immediate post-war years, the Soviet Union provided the necessary grounds in this regard. When the Korean War came to an end, the idea of national security also turned into the official ideology of the United States.

1.2. From an Idea to Ideology

In his prominent book on the subject of the origins of the national security state in the US, *A Cross of Iron* (1998), Hogan articulates the central components of the national security ideology using three major foreign policy documents from the early Cold War era: the well-known telegraph sent by George Kennan in 1946, and his article “*The sources of Soviet Conduct*”, published in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym “X”; the *Clifford-Elsey Report* on Soviet-American relations commissioned by President Truman less than six months after Kennan’s telegram, of which the final draft had been reviewed by Kennan⁵; President Truman’s famous speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, announcing what would later be referred to as the Truman Doctrine; and finally, the document NSC-68, which

³ This idea echoes Colmar von der Goltz’s late 19th century doctrine of the “The Nation in Arms” (Das Volk in Waffen) that was also vastly influential in Turkey as well.

⁴ Especially Prof. Edward Pendleton Herring’s name, a leading member of the National Security League comes forward during this process. (Stuart, 2008, pp. 5-6, 9-11, 27-31, 121, 231)

⁵The full text of the report can be found at <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/report-american-relations-soviet-union-clark-clifford-clifford-elsey-report>

was produced in 1950 by a subcommittee of the National Security Council. These documents reflected and reproduced American perceptions of Soviet aggressiveness and according to Hogan, determined the “basic convictions in a fashion that was coherent enough to approximate a formal ideology” (p.12).

Based on these documents, Hogan argued that the national security concept, which was adopted in conjunction with the Cold War, had five basic components: bipolar world view, military preparedness, one for all and all for one approach, need for leadership and secrecy.

1.2.1. Bipolar World View

The first component of the security ideology was the division between the ingroup and the outgroup. The world was divided into two distinctive competing camps, the free world and the communist bloc, and the competition between these two blocs was repetitively depicted as the clash between “good” and “evil” (Ibid., pp. 17-18). In the documents mentioned above from the early period of the cold War, the Soviet Union was persistently portrayed as a state that was uncompromisingly expansionist and implacably hostile to the US and the rest of the Western world. Likewise, the Soviet Union was perceived as a society of creatures captivated by a “messianic ideology” that was intent on mobilizing all its energies to dominate the entire world. In these documents about the Soviet Union, National Security Council Report 68, later shortened to *NSC-68*⁶ is the document in which the statements were repeated in the most exaggerated manner:

"The Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority. The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design."

⁶ For the full text of the NSC-68 see, <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-3.htm>.

Murray Edelman explains why leaders define their enemies not according to the harm that they cause, but by the identifying function they fulfill within the political process. He reasons that (Edelman, 1988, p. 76):

“In constructing such enemies and the narrative plots that define their place in history, people are manifestly defining themselves and their place in history as well; the self-definition lends passion to the whole transaction. To support a war against a foreign aggressor who threatens national sovereignty and moral decencies is to construct oneself as a member of a nation of innocent heroes. To define the people, one hurts as evil is to define oneself as virtuous. The narrative establishes the identities of enemy and victim savior by defining the latter as emerging from an innocent past and as destined to bring about a brighter future world cleansed of the contamination the enemy embodies.”

Wander (1997) refers to these arguments produced during the Cold War era as “prophetic dualism”. According to him “one side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God's will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between them is resolved only through the total victory of one side over the other. Since no guarantee exists that good will triumph, there is no middle ground. Hence neutrality may be treated as a delusion, compromise appeasement, and negotiation, a call for surrender” (Ibid., p.157).

1.2.2. Military Preparedness

Derived from the conviction that the United States was now locked in a long-term struggle for survival with the Soviet Union in a new era of total war, the second component of the national security ideology was its strong emphasis on the need for military preparedness. In total war, the battle was not restricted to the front lines; it extended to the home front as well. Modern weapons could inflict enormous destruction not only on the military, but also on industry, urban centers, and civilian populations. Modern war was now total war. In total war, as Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, wrote in 1945: “The armed services must be supplemented by active participation of every element of the civilian population” (cited in Orr, 2004, p. 459).

In total war, all of the nation’s resources, energy, and talent must be mobilized on behalf of the war effort, which eradicated the distinctions between citizen and soldier, and between home front and combat zone (Hogan, 1998, p.12-13, Orr, 2004, p. 459). The definition of national security therefore dictated a comprehensive program that integrated civilian and military resources and eliminated the boundaries between “peace and war.” In a special issue of the American Journal of Sociology published on the eve of U.S. entry into World War II, sociologist Robert E. Park (1941) observed that peace in this context was “little more than a preparation for future war” (p. 360).

This was an explicit manifestation of the content of institutional reforms in the new era. Modern weapons could easily shrink the dimensions of the world and bring massive destruction from far distances within a short time. Therefore, American political leaders would not have

the luxury of spending time deliberating the issue of war and peace and preparing at a slow pace. American traditional fear of long-standing army was no longer valid since, as stated in *the Clifford-Elsey report*: “the USSR might fight any time” and the United States had to be prepared against the Soviets who were maintaining a larger and more prepared army and air force than the United States military could “muster in places like Germany, Austria, and Korea.” Thus, the age of total war required a high degree of military preparedness, as a lack of readiness in the United States would encourage hostility and undermine the negotiating attempts of American diplomats.

According to Kennan, contrary to the American policy makers’ “Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise”, Soviet leaders were fanatic, dogmatic, and flawlessly hostile towards the capitalist world. Their belief in the “innate antagonism” between Russia and the US, and their disparagement about the possibility of peaceful coexistence would prevent any prospect of serious negotiation with the United States. Since the Soviets were “duplicitous” in nature, they could not be trusted to honor their commitments if an agreement were realized between the two countries (cited in Hogan, 1998, pp. 13-14). Hence, any attempt to negotiate with the Soviets would be meaningless. The only way to fight Soviet aggression was to apply “counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuver of Soviet policy” (Ibid.). *The Clifford-Elsey report* advanced this view by advocating for “military power as the only language that the disciples of power politics understand” (p. 73).

The ideology of national security therefore fervently supported the idea of a war economy that would operate into an indefinite future. Unlike the conventional understanding of war, this new era of total war would not have an agreed upon cease-fire, surrender, or an armistice (Melman, 1974, p. 16).

1.2.3. One for All and All for One

The third theme in the formal ideology of national security, which was closely linked to the strong arguments for preparedness, was the conviction that peace and freedom were indivisible. According to national security ideology, any intervention against the ingroup anywhere in the world, from either the outside or the inside, was perceived as a loss of footing; hence, counter intervention was defended as necessary. In other words, a threat to peace anywhere in the world was a threat to peace everywhere in the world, and therefore posed a threat to American security. The United States, as suggested by *the Clifford-Elsey report*, had to “support and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the USSR”, since a failure to do this would encourage Soviet aggression and increase the cost of addressing that aggression.

Truman’s special message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey on March 12, 1947 explicitly demonstrated this line of thinking. After declaring that the reason for his speech was

related to the national security of the United States, Truman stated⁷: “If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence.” According to the President “it would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries [...] should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much.” The collapse of their free institutions and loss of their independence “would be disastrous not only for them but for the world.” Therefore, the United States should “take immediate and resolute action” to maintain the freedoms of “the free peoples of the world” who “look to [the United States] for support.”

1.2.4. Every War Needs a Leader

The fourth characteristic of the national security ideology was that one nation was denoted as the bearer of these duties. In this war between good and evil, the leader of the good was the US because American society was positioned at the top of the hierarchy of humanistic and social values. This rhetoric was apparent in the Truman doctrine’s last remarks: “Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events” declared the President to the Congress. If the United States “faltered” in its leadership, the president warned that “we may endanger the peace of the world – and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.”⁸

Personification of the nation as an actor became an accommodating strategy of the new formal ideology. Using such language helped give the nation a sense of purpose and an important mission and most importantly, made it a moral and spiritual center that was considered above all other nations. Wander summarized this ideological stance as follows: The modes of argument in the United States elaborated throughout the Cold War “agree that the international community embraces a hierarchical order in which there are superior and inferior nations. Moreover, they agree that that one nation is clearly superior to all the rest, and that is the United States. The “United States,” in the rhetoric of American foreign policy, is much more than a geographical designation, an administrative unit, or a large number of people sharing a language, a culture, and a history. The United States is the manifestation of Truth, Justice, and Freedom placed on this earth by a God whose purpose is to make of it an instrument for extending his spiritual and material blessings to the rest of humanity” (p. 170).

By framing the nation as a single body with a vague single purpose, the national security ideology unreservedly transformed domestic dissidence into the notion of an internal enemy. As David Campbell (1992) argued, the strategy of ‘otherness’ from the Cold War era drew

⁷ For the full text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents Harry S. Truman 1945-9153, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=truman+doctrine&st1=>

⁸ See, President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before A Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp

boundaries of national identity that excluded domestic dissent, as well as the Soviet other, by linking these two concepts. This line of Manichean logic made it difficult for any dissident to pass judgment on the main policies associated with national security. Any criticism of the national security policy was considered an act of disloyalty by the authorities. Any type of internal opposition to the national security requirements meant crossing to the domain of 'the other', whereas any act of conformity with the concept would be within the limits of tolerance, regardless of the harmful consequences it could bring. As discussed in the following sections, while the McCarthy period was an example of the former, the United States' relations with the third-world military states where human suffering was easily overlooked, would constitute a pattern for the latter.

1.2.5. Behind Closed Doors

The fifth and last characteristic was the justification that all decisions made within the framework of this sacred mission should be left to the political or technocratic elites, and when necessary, the public should be manipulated within this framework. This characteristic formed an obstacle to political participation in decisions related to national security, something for which ordinary citizens had to pay. *NSC-68* and many other documents related to national security objectives were drafted and redrafted in secrecy by elites of the executive power. Though many of the themes in these confidential texts were publicized through the rhetoric of partisan speeches and statements, they were not subjected to public debate. They were imposed in an atmosphere of patriotic surge, which could contribute to the construction of the national security state. The comments of Clark Clifford, one of Truman's key advisers on the loyalty review program, which caused several Communists working in the federal government to quit or be fired, are explanatory (cited in Bernstein, 1989, p. 198):

"There was no substantive problem [about federal workers' loyalty]. It was a political problem. We did not believe there was a real problem. A problem was being manufactured. There was a certain element of hysteria. I don't believe any of us ever felt really threatened. [...] We gave a good deal of thought to how to respond. We had a presidential campaign ahead of us and here was a great issue, a very damaging issue, so we set up this whole kind of machinery.

1.3. Institution Building around National Security: The Bearing Institutions of the Security State

The national security ideology formulated in the early Cold War era brought new key security establishments that would institutionalize and consolidate their power in the state structure. These new institutional arrangements established within the framework of national security rhetoric is now referred to as the National Security State in American political literature. The milestone piece of legislation that was developed for this purpose was the

National Security Act of 1947 (amended in 1949)⁹. The act, in its final form, gave the Air Force an independent status (formerly the Army Air Forces). It created a unified military command called the National Military Establishment (NME), headed by a Secretary of Defense who was charged with “general direction” as well as “coordination and supervision” of the Departments of the Army (formerly the Department of War), Navy, and Air Force.

NME was renamed the Department of Defense on August 10, 1949, in an amendment to the original 1947 law. The Act also presented the statutory identities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, composed of three service chiefs, as the “principal military advisers to the president and the Secretary of Defense.” Finally, with a group of lesser-known institutions, including the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board, it established two key security actors of the Cold War period: the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the NSC’s authority (Stuart, 2008, pp.106-107). These last two institutions deserve further attention, as they were the bearing institutions in creating and applying US cold-war strategies.

1.3.1. The National Security Council

The NSC was designed as the central foreign policy coordinating organization within the executive branch. It was established as the principal forum for generating advice for and assisting the President “with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security” (Sec. 101/a). The act also provided a secretariat for the NSC under an executive secretary appointed by the President charged with paperwork. Its statutory membership included the highest level of government officials: the president; the secretaries of state, defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; the chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and other Senate-confirmed officials who the president could “designate from time to time” (Ibid.). Although the President was not required to use the council, as Zegart noted (1999), “it stood as the only statutory body that brought all of the major national security policy makers together” (p. 78).

The Council was to be solely “the President’s instrument” in that it had no legislative presence, input, or oversight (Best, 2011). During the drafting of its legislation, all proposals for certain congressmen to give the legislative branch an opportunity to interfere in the workings of the council were met with resistance from White House staffers (Stuart, 2008, p. 232). The NSC’s “advisory” status and its changeable nature of organization made the NSC a flexible organization to be used as each President saw fit.

In the Truman years (1947-1953), the related modifications included the addition of the vice president and the removal of the three service secretaries as statutory members of the NSC. The Joint Chiefs were officially designated as the principal military advisers to the council. Truman also issued Reorganization Plan no. 4, which officially located the NSC staff within the Executive Office of the President (Ibid., p.237).

⁹ For the full text of the “The National Security Act of 1947” see, <https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/National%20Security%20Act%20Of%201947.pdf>.

The President took steps to give the NSC a larger role in the formulation and management of Cold War policies. He required that all national security policies be brought to him through the council (Ibid., p. 239). In April 1951, he established the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) that was composed of the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or their designated representatives, under the patronage of the NSC. The PSB's mission was to "to authorize and provide for more effective planning, coordination, and conduct within the framework of approved national policies of psychological operations" against the Soviet Union. The founding Presidential Directive instructed the PSB to report to the National Security Council regarding "the Board's activities on the evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned." In addition to its inherited coordination role, the PSB conducted planning for the psychological operations of its constituent agencies (Harry S. Truman Papers, 1951-1953).

Although the Board did not survive into the Eisenhower era, it was important in the sense that it set an important model, as the first agency within the NSC system that was given responsibility for monitoring the performance of assigned tasks once a decision had been made by the president. Soon after coming to office, the Eisenhower administration was guided by the precedent to establish a much more ambitious Operations Coordinating Board (OCB; Ibid., p. 240). The use and the internal structure of the Council varied with the style and wishes of the US Presidents. Over time, however, the Council has gradually emerged as a major instrument in the formulation and implementation of national security policy.

1.3.2. Central Intelligence Agency: The Operational Wing of the National Security State

According to the National Security Act of 1947 the CIA was instituted as an independent agency under the authority of the NSC,¹⁰ and it was closely linked to the NSC by law. At the time of its creation, the CIA was the only agency charged with a national intelligence mission. Its function was to "advise the NSC regarding intelligence, to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of the intelligence activities of the various government agencies involved in national security, and to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence within the government" (Sec. 102/d (1), (2)). Its director of central intelligence (DCI), either a civilian or an officer, would be confirmed by the Senate. It would have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions (<https://www.cia.gov/about-cia>).

¹⁰ Before World War II, intelligence activities in the United States were mostly carried out by the Department of State, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the War Department's Military Intelligence Division (MID). Hoping for greater coordination of intelligence activities, as well as a more strategic approach to intelligence gathering and operations; on July 11, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan to head a new civilian office attached to the White House, the Coordinator of Information (COI). On June 13, 1942, the COI became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS established more than 40 overseas offices during World War II (<https://www.archives.gov/research/military/ww2/oss/>).

The Act of 1947 explicitly authorized the use of covert action¹¹ to “support identifiable foreign policy objectives” important for “the national security of the United States” (Sec. 503/a), though it made no reference to the CIA’s responsibility for such actions.¹² Instead, it created a grey area by authorizing the CIA to carry out “other functions and duties” at the direction of the NSC. Clifford, who supervised the drafting of the Act noted in his memoirs that (Clifford, 1991, pp. 169–170):

“The ‘other’ functions the CIA was to perform were purposely not specified but we understood that they would include covert activities. We did not mention them by name because we felt it would be injurious to our national interest to advertise the fact that we might engage in such activities [...]. In light of the continuing controversy over the role and activities of the CIA, it bears emphasizing that it was by act of Congress that the CIA was established and exists today, and it was by act of Congress that covert operations were authorized.”

The CIA registered its first covert action under the command of the NSC in the Italian elections.¹³ The formal institutionalization of covert actions was launched through top-secret documents, including the NSC 4-A of December 14, 1947 and the NSC 10/2 of June 18, 1948. The NSC Directive 4-A authorized the CIA to “initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations¹⁴ designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities that constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security” (Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter, December 17, 1947). NSC Directive 10/2 provided a wider and permanent mandate, putting the CIA directly in charge of planning and executing covert operations, “so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident [...] and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility” (National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, June 18, 1948). These activities include “propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries

¹¹ The term “covert action” in the act was defined as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” (Sec. 503/a).

¹² The official definition of ‘covert action’ is: “An operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the sponsoring power; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities” (<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-INTELLIGENCE/html/int023.html>)

¹³ CIA transferred an estimated \$10-30 million to several groups and parties, particularly the Christian Democrat party, to ensure the defeat of the Italian communists in the April 1948 election (Immerman, 2006, p. 18).

¹⁴ In the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1994), psychological operations are defined as ‘planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives’ (p. 362).

of the free world." This secret policy directive stated that "conducting covert operations was essential to the achievement of US national security objectives" (Ibid).

Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, which allowed the DCI to utilize unvouchered funds for the management of covert operations (Sec 8, 2-b). In NSC-68, all forms of covert actions were also accorded high priority¹⁵. During the Truman administration, with intelligence coordination, independent collection, and analysis, the CIA had expanded its activities to covert operations (Stuart, 2008; Immerman, 2006). However, the major expansion of the CIA's covert activities occurred during the Eisenhower period. The agency implemented 170 new major political, psychological, and paramilitary covert missions in 48 countries during the Eisenhower administration (Weiner, 2007, p.76). Corresponding to the new security ideology of the US, top CIA officers of this period prioritized their tasks "to alter or abolish any regime not openly allied with America" (Ibid., p.77).¹⁶

The CIA's influence has never been limited to foreign affairs. With the Department of Defense and its large budgets, the CIA has shaped civilian research and development in the United States. In education fields such as science rocketry, atomic energy, biology, health sciences, non-atomic physics, and engineering, as well as many fields of the social sciences including anthropology, psychology, and Soviet and China studies, the CIA has manipulated academia through financial support (Price, 1998, Price, 2011; Diamond, 1992; Boyce, 1997; Cummings, 1997; Robin, 2001). Clifford eventually reached the conclusion that "[...] over the years, covert activities became so numerous and widespread that, in effect, they became a self-sustaining part of American foreign operations. The CIA became a government within a government, which could evade oversight of its activities by drawing the cloak of secrecy around itself" (p. 170). Despite Congressional investigations, embarrassing exposes, and the transformation of the international security environment, the CIA has remained an infamous Cold War institution until recently.

1.4. National Consequences of the National Security State

1.4.1. A New Coalition Formed Around National Security

The fact that policy makers agreed on a major reform in the state structure did not make it easier for them to agree on the details. During the early period of the Cold War, there was a struggle between the proponents of national security and the defenders of traditional American values of anti-statism and anti-militarism (Hogan, 1998; Fordham, 1994; Hossein-zadeh, 2006; Craig & Logevall, 2009). This dispute ended in favor of the national security advocates, who sought a greater economic and political role for the United States in the international system.

¹⁵ One of the main proposals of the document involved "intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries" (IX, D-2/7).

¹⁶ On August 4, 1955 President Eisenhower signed a bill authorizing \$46 million for the construction of a CIA Headquarters Building at Langley, which has been used as metonym for the CIA since then.

Fordham (1998) indicated that President Truman's decision to increase the military budget was closely tied to the rising influence of this new coalition in his administration (p. 64). He argues that the President's efforts to maintain a balanced budget and reasonable military spending foundered when he realized that he had to maintain the support of the "internationalists" who dominated the Democratic Party. A refusal to proceed with the armament programs might have alienated this important Democratic constituency and threatened the elite coalition that had sustained the Democratic Party for the preceding 15 years. He also suggested that "there is strong evidence that the administration was committed to NSC-68 before the Korean War and that this commitment was not driven by unambiguous external events, but by political changes in the executive branch" (Ibid., p. 72). Following the completion of the NSC-68, its supporters eliminated the main proponents of a small defense budget in a short time and mobilized support for their own position. Confronted with this new powerful group within his administration, President Truman had to reverse his efforts to control excessive military spending and decided to proceed with rearmament (Ibid., pp. 72-73). External events such as the Korean War facilitated the passage of the rearmament program in Congress.¹⁷

By 1950, the process of state making had begun to challenge the United States' democratic identity and institutions. For the first time in its history, the country had created a permanent peacetime military establishment and the armed forces enjoyed an unparalleled degree of autonomy. The result, as Hogan notes, was a system that gave the armed forces considerable autonomy and institutionalized the National Military Establishment as a major rival to the State Department in the field of foreign policy (p.68). Similar challenges to civilian authority followed, especially regarding the defense budget (Ibid.). During the first two decades after the early days of the Cold War era, the legislative branch of the United States had no authority over the nation's defense management. According to Blechman (1990) in a political climate where it was not legitimate to challenge military judgments partly due to their technical ignorance as well as public support to the new national security ideology, most of the congress members generally went along with the executive branch with respect to the size and the composition of defense spending (p. 24).

This apparent permanence of military influence on the economy gradually intensified. The necessary public support to escalate the military budget was relatively easy to maintain in the midst of the anti-communist fervor (Hartley & Russett 1992; Fried, 1998). A cross-society political consensus had developed around the war economy by the 1950s. As Melman (1974) suggested: "Businessmen, industrial workers, engineers, government employees, intellectuals all joined in the confident assessment that war economy on a sustained basis was not only viable but economically desirable" (p. 17). The military spending became a continuing, significant, and legitimate end-purpose of economic activity. C. Wright Mills (1956) emphasized this new coalition in the early Cold War years. He severely criticized the new state structure and the emerging "symbiotic relationship" among the political, military, and corporate elites of the

¹⁷ Indeed, between the summer of 1949 and the winter of 1951, the annual military budget roughly tripled, rising from \$13.5 billion to nearly \$45 billion, only a fraction of which was allocated for the war in Korea. Since then, military budgets have not returned to the relatively low levels of the period between 1946 and 1950. (Fordham 1998, p.1; Hogan 1998, p. 180)

country, who consolidated their power around a common agenda at the expense of ordinary American citizens:

“Within American society, major national power now resides in the economic, the political, and the military domains. Other institutions seem off to the side of modern history, and, on occasion, duly subordinated to these. No family is as directly powerful in national affairs as any major corporation; no church is as directly powerful in the external biographies of young men in America today as the military establishment; no college is as powerful in the shaping of momentous events as the National Security Council. Religious, educational, and family institutions are not autonomous centers of national power; on the contrary, these decentralized areas are increasingly shaped by the big three, in which developments of decisive and immediate consequence now occur” (p. 6).

The aim of the massive rearmament program was less about containing communism than ensuring the survival of the nascent postwar global economy, upon which rested postwar US prosperity (Cardwell, 2011).

Approximately five years after Mill’s analysis, this consensus received the label of the ‘military-industrial complex’, a phrase first used by the United States’ President Eisenhower. He cited the term as a warning to American citizens not to let this powerful coalition of interests begin to dictate America’s actions at home or abroad. In his “Farewell Address to the Nation”, on January 17, 1961, he described the problem in this way:

“[The US has] been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. [...] In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”¹⁸

Therefore, an enormously wealthy and powerful coalition of vested interests started to influence the stance taken by the United States in world affairs. For this new coalition, each new commitment to new weaponry systems, any decision to increase military spending, and the continued production and sale of armaments to the allies resulted in substantial profits, all of which were legitimized through the context of the national security ideology (Wander, 1997,

¹⁸ For the full text of the speech see, <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm>.

pp. 174-175). This situation elicited a concentration of unchecked power in too few hands and corrupted the process of government by consent of the governed (Lens, 1970, p. 18).

The persistent growth of rearmament since the late 1940s and early 1950s has led to a number of adverse social, economic, and political consequences for the United States. Domestic socially gainful or desirable welfare programs, such as President Truman's plan for a national healthcare system disappeared from the agenda (Fordham, 1998). The defense spending masked such structural problems as unemployment, low productivity, and the inequitable division of income that have become more obvious and more serious as the national security expenditures have declined (Alperovitz & Bird 1992). By the 1970s, the free market mechanism had weakened, budget deficits had increased rapidly, the level of investment had decreased, and the basic infrastructure had decayed (Alperovitz & Bird 1992). The productive competence of many industries deteriorated, and the rate of inflation increased, which damaged the dollar as a reliable store of value (Melman, 1974, pp. 18-19). Many people, businesses, and communities became dependent on military spending; civilian culture and republican principles of government were tainted with the ethos and values of militarism; civil liberties were weakened; and increasingly aggressive foreign policies were adopted (Hosseini-zadeh, 2006, p. 26). More importantly, this national security coalition periodically created new enemies to ensure its own continuity (Tilly, 1984).

1.4.2. National Security as a Tool for Internal Cleansing

The operationalization of the national security ideology was not confined to the revenue and power maximization of the coalition. It was also successfully used to minimize the influence of the existing domestic opposition, namely, the labor militancy and their supporters, which generated reasonable costs for this new constellation. The national security policy of the Cold War era was effectively linked to an internal security agenda with harsh anti-labor and anti-radical domestic policies. This period was later referred to as the McCarthy era and its mind-set, McCarthyism, caused permanent damage to the labor movement and the democratic traditions of the country.

Ellen Schrecker, a prominent historian on American Communism, defined the McCarthy era as “the most extensive episode of political repression in American history” (Schrecker, 2002: p.2). The phenomenon of McCarthyism went far beyond the political career of the Republican senator Joseph R. McCarthy from Wisconsin, from whom it received its name. Although mainstream McCarthyism definitions occurred between the late 1940s and mid-1950s, a considerable number of historians have suggested that the anti-communist crusade, with which his name was coined, began several years before he became a media personality, and it continued for several years after his reputation was ruined. The word, therefore, refers to the multifaceted domestic campaign to dispose of the influence of every idea, institution, and individual connected to communism in America (Cherny et al. 2004).

Red baiting was not new to American politics, as labor activism had long been a fear of businesses. Ever since the late nineteenth century, attempts to suppress unions and weaken community support for organized labor had been a traditional practice for antagonistic

employers. Likewise, red baiting had been a practical weapon for conservative labor leaders and their allies to wield against their left-wing rivals (Ibid.). By the 1940s, communists and their allies were strong in American union activities. They led unions that contained approximately 20 percent of the membership of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), a union federation that organized workers in industrial unions in the United States and Canada (Ibid., pp.8-9). Communist unions and their leaders were more militant, class-conscious, and in most cases, democratic than the other unions. They demanded a wide range of social reforms and their commitment was particularly strong in the area of race relations and women's rights (Ibid., pp. 9-10).

Fordham (1998) indicated that, immediately after the war, the union movement sought to regain the ground they believed they had lost during the wartime strike prohibition (p.132). The issue became increasingly salient in the immediate postwar era and business conservatives began to heavily promote broad public concerns about domestic communism (Ibid., p.133). Even business liberals who accepted most of the New Deal Agenda were alarmed about the peril of labor militancy (Ibid., p. 134). Business leaders and influential economists of the time criticized unions, identifying them as "militant labor monopolies" that are antagonistic to the market system and calling their officials "inherently untrustworthy" (Ibid., p.1).

The business sector was not the only faction that was hostile to trade unions, as resentment towards trade unions was also common among military officers (Janowitz, 1960, p. 248). The military's anti-union sentiments were present before the rearmament period. However, the conflict between labor and the military was aggravated because the military's interest in accelerating production often conflicted with labor's interest in maintaining its ability to strike. Likewise, civilians who were in charge of military procurement did not approve of union activities. As the national security state necessitated greater sacrifices of the American economy, the bad relationship between the bureaucrats in the Department of Defense and labor activism became worse (Fordham, 1998, p.141).

A wave of strikes in many industries during 1945 and 1946 provided a pretext for business leaders to lobby against unionism. They received the support of anti-labor Republicans, conservative southern Democrats, and moderates from both major political parties (Cherny et al., p. 2). Congress enacted a new law (officially known as the Labor-Management Relations Act) on June 23 of 1947, which was informally referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act. President Harry Truman vetoed it, defining it as a "slave labor bill," yet his opposition did not suffice. It was designed to annul many of the gains that the labor movement had made since the late 1930s (McNeese, 2008, p. 141). Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act referred to the Smith Act and required all union officials to sign an affidavit affirming that "they neither were in the party nor had any sympathy for its doctrines." Unions that did not abide by the law would be deprived of the services of the National Labor Relations Board (Cherny et al., p. 10-11).

The standard reason for this law was that if the United States went to war against the Soviet Union, the left-wing unions might encourage its members to engage in physical sabotage or call political strikes to shut down defense plants. By 1949, the leaders of the left-wing unions were obligated to comply with the law, and they either signed the affidavits or quit their positions and the Party. However, the official harassment of leaders who stayed in their unions

did not end, as their compliance was not convincing to the Justice Department or the legislative branch of the US government. Most of the left-wing union leaders were subpoenaed by anticommunist investigative committees. The Court decisions reproduced the prevailing wisdom. The imposition of restrictions on Communist influence within the labor movement was justified within the context of “considerations of national security.” Union activists, many of them African Americans, were deprived of their livelihoods based on secret charges by unknown informers (Shrecker, 2004, p. 1042). By the time the anticommunist crusade ended in the mid-1960s, McCarthyism had “tamed” the entire American labor movement and brought it to “the Cold War political consensus” (Cherny et al., pp. 11-13).

In 1940 congress had passed the Alien Registration Act (unofficially known as the Smith Act), which made it illegal to be a member of any organization that supported a violent overthrow of the US government. The Act made it a criminal offense for anyone to " knowingly or willfully advocate [], abet [], advise [], or teach [] the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence” or for anyone to "organize [] . . . any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage" such an overthrow, or for anyone to be a member of or to affiliate with any such association (Alien Registration Act of 1940). The Act was passed in anticipation of a potential war with Nazi Germany. However, it was first used in 1941 against the members of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party indicted in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Immediately after the war, this law became the ultimate tool against Communist Party USA (CPUSA) which had been identified as a movement that sought to overthrow the government by force and violence.

Red baiting was not confined to the Communists in the labor unions. Based on intelligence reports that there were Soviet spies within the US government as well as the criticism that Democrats were soft on communism, President Truman initiated a loyalty review program in March 1947 (Executive Order 9835). The program’s aim was to inspect the loyalty of the federal employees and eliminate any subversives. Subversive activity included past or present membership in various organizations with communist-like ideologies.¹⁹ By that time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which was closely tied to conservative members of Congress, was established as the principal government agency responsible for internal security to “make its agenda a component of the overall national security program” (Fordham 1998, p. 132). Under J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI inspected millions of federal workers in the following years. The accused were denied their right to know who accused them, and many people were even asked about books and artwork they owned. All public employees including teachers were forced to sign loyalty oaths (on pain of perjury) to keep their jobs. Hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)²⁰ exposed “current and former Communists” who, in turn, were blacklisted by private industry, especially in Hollywood (Leab, 1984).

¹⁹ According to the Hatch Act of 1938 (named after its author, US senator Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico), Americans who joined the Communist Party were prohibited from holding federal jobs (Hanes et al., 2003).

²⁰ In May 1938, US representative Martin Dies (1900–1972) of Texas received congressional funding for this special committee called the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The HUAC was asked

By 1957, the government had indicted dozens of leaders of the CPUSA for Smith Act violations. Teaching "the principles of Marxism-Leninism" was one of the alleged overt acts (Bernstein, 2006, p.10). The defendants were only accused of advocating ideas, and not of engaging in illegal acts. Redish (2005) argued that these prosecutions were clearly unconstitutional and "the American government was responsible for wholly unjustified political repression of an unpopular ideology, in a manner ominously reminiscent of a totalitarian regime" (p. 65). The anticommunist legislations of the era were not limited to these acts. The Internal Security Act of 1950, also known as the Subversive Activities Control Act or the McCarran Act, after Senator of Nevada Pat McCarran²¹; the Immigration and Nationality Act, or McCarran-Walter Act of 1952²², and the Communist Control Act of 1954²³ were the other laws which formalized the legal basis of the anticommunist political repression during the McCarthy era for the purpose of national security.

The aggregate impact of the McCarthy Era also affected a wide variety of non-Communists. Brown (1958) estimated that one out of every five people in a labor force of about 65 million, had been subjected to a loyalty test, oath, or investigation by 1958, and approximately 11,500 persons were fired due to government and private loyalty programs. More than 100 people were convicted under the federal Smith Act, and 135 people were cited for contempt by the House Un-American Activities Committee (p.181). Cauter (1979) highlighted the difficulty of estimating the number of people who lost their jobs because of the

to investigate subversive activities by organizations that might try to overthrow the US government. HUAC claimed to find communists in labor unions and government agencies and among African American groups. Many of those who were accused of communist sympathies were fired from their jobs. Several members of Congress argued that HUAC was going too far; violating the civil rights of those accused. Dies persistently kept HUAC alive until 1944. Thanks to criticisms of the groundless accusations against fellow Americans, HUAC ceased to function, and the hunt for subversives slowed down. The committee was reestablished and made permanent in 1945 at the insistence of Democratic congressman John E. Rankin (1882–1960) from Mississippi. HUAC received funding and orders to investigate any individuals or groups it deemed possible subversives. HUAC soon compiled a list of roughly forty groups that it labeled communist fronts. (Hanes et al.,)

²¹ The act required Communist organizations to register with the United States Attorney General and established the Subversive Activities Control Board to investigate persons suspected of engaging in subversive activities or otherwise promoting the establishment of a "totalitarian dictatorship," either fascist or communist. Citizens found in violation could lose their citizenship. The act also contained an Emergency Detention statute, giving the President the authority to apprehend and detain "each person as to whom there is a reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage." It tightened alien exclusion and deportation laws. It authorized the exclusion of aliens who were once communists or members of any groups deemed to be "front" organizations for communist expansion. It also subjected to swift deportation any noncitizens living within US borders who belonged to the Communist party or engaged in any activities considered "subversive to the national security" (Tichenor, 2002, p.189). The law passed despite President Truman's veto. The act, according to Truman "would give Government officials vast powers to harass all [American] citizens in the exercise of their right of free speech." (cited in Fried, 1990, p. 187) Only seven Democratic senators voted to uphold the veto, a revealing incident which demonstrated the bi-partisan nature of the anti-communist fervor during the time (Steinberg, 1984, p. 202).

²² The Immigration and Nationality Act was enacted June 27, 1952 despite President Truman's veto, condemning the bill as "un-American" and discriminatory. The act included new exclusionary categories aimed at penalizing "political radicalism" and "social nonconformity" (Tichenor, p.190).

²³ The Communist Control Act (68 Stat. 775, 50 USC. 841-844) was a federal legislation, signed into law by Dwight Eisenhower on 24 August 1954. It openly outlawed the Communist Party of the United States and criminalized membership in, or support for the Party or "Communist-action" organizations and defined evidence to be considered by a jury in determining participation in the activities, planning, actions, objectives, or purposes of such organizations.

program, since many people preferred to resign rather than be fired and were thus not included in the statistics (p. 364).

The collaboration of public and private actors made political repression stronger (Schrecker, 2004, pp. 1044-1045). Companies used Cold War loyalty-security programs to smash unions (Fordham, 1998, pp. 138,171-172), and anticommunist unions used them to smash their left-wing rivals (Schrecker, 2004, p. 1046). The repression was also felt strongly in academia. Nearly one-half of the social science professors teaching in universities at the time expressed medium or high apprehension about possible adverse repercussions to them as a result of their political beliefs and activities (Lazarsfeld & Thielens, 1958). Many prominent figures, who had previously shown sympathy or even tolerance for Communists, were subjected to harassment, often with front-page publicity.

The McCarthy era was a period of crisis in which government action in the name of national security infringed First Amendment rights. Since the public was generally willing to support the political repression of Communists, political elites easily shaped public policy (Gibson, 1988, p. 519). In this period, the judiciary was used as an instrument of state security. The highly politicized majority in the Supreme Court, refused to stop the anticommunist crusade's violations of individual rights until the mid-1950s, and it became an actor of red baiting by legitimizing its operations (Schrecker, 2004, pp. 1045-1046). By 1957, as Bernstein (2006) stated "with the CPUSA no longer a perceived serious danger to American national security, the Supreme Court reversed itself and held that revolutionary advocacy by itself could no longer justify a conviction."

Although McCarthy era had come to an end in the late 1950s, the fear of internal enemy has persisted during the preceding decades. The 1960s, among other new social movements, witnessed the surge of the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement. In 1965, the Johnson administration officially entered the Vietnam War. As the anti-war and civil rights demonstrations spread throughout the country, the CIA, although prohibited by the law from exercising internal security functions, established several clandestine programs (such as MERRIMAC, RESISTANCE, CHAOS) to collect intelligence on anti-war groups and student movements in the late 1960s (Gibbons, 1995, p. 857).

The Army's role in domestic intelligence gathering, counterintelligence, and civil disturbances were also expanded during the same period.²⁴ Dycus (2004) stated that in the late 1960s, "the Pentagon compiled personal information on more than 100,000 politically active Americans in an effort to quell civil rights and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations and to

²⁴ In December 1967, the Johnson administration approved a Civil Disturbance Plan produced by a special task force in the Army. According to the plan, "continuous counterintelligence investigations are required to obtain factual information on the participation of subversive personalities, groups or organizations" in civil rights or antiwar activities that could result in civil disturbances. Dissident groups were susceptible to control by "subversives," and there was "very strong support to the antiwar movement" from the Communist Party and Communist-front organizations. The report concluded that "Although it cannot be substantiated that the antiwar and antidraft movements are acting in response to foreign direction, it must be pointed out that by their activities they are supporting the stated objectives of foreign elements which are detrimental to the United States" (cited in Gibbons, 1995, p. 855).

discredit protestors.” (p. 784). He added that “the Army used 1,500 plainclothes agents to watch demonstrations, infiltrate organizations, and spread disinformation” (Ibid.).

The constitutionally controversial domestic surveillance activities reached its peak during the Nixon administration. In 1969, President Nixon initiated a program called MINARET and tasked the NSA with tapping international communications to seek evidence of possible foreign involvement in the anti-Vietnam protests, and other domestic protests and the disturbances in the U.S. (Rollins, 2016, pp.113-116). During this program, the NSA created "watch lists" and files on thousands of American citizens, groups, and organizations involved in domestic anti-war and civil rights activities.²⁵

In 1972, the infamous Watergate scandal exposed the president’s personal dominance over a massive campaign of political espionage, sabotage, and other illegal activities against his real or perceived opponents. The Nixon administration claimed that these and other acts were warranted by “national security.” However, the cadre of Nixon operatives admitted that they had ties to the FBI, the CIA, and several state-sponsored terrorist groups (Robin, 2004). In 1974, the Senate Watergate Committee revealed in its report that the Nixon administration had directed national intelligence agencies to carry out constitutionally questionable domestic security operations. The same year investigative journalist Seymour Hersh (December 22, 1974) published a front-page *New York Times* article detailing that the CIA’s illegal spying operations on thousands of anti-war American activists for more than a decade. On January 27, 1975, Senator Frank Church led a new Senate committee formed to investigate these allegations. The Church Committee identified a wide range of intelligence abuses and clandestine programs by federal agencies, including the NSA, CIA, and FBI. The Committee in its final report published on April 29, 1976, concluded that “there is no inherent constitutional authority for the President or any intelligence agency to violate the law,” and recommended strengthening oversight of intelligence activities (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). The Church Committee report led to momentum in Congress to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. President Jimmy Carter signed the bill into law in 1978, establishing the need for acquiring warrants through a newly formed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before pursuing wiretapping and surveillance.

In the same period, national security, the phrase which had previously been grounds for legitimizing shady executive action inside the country’s borders, lost credibility. The concept of national security used in a pejorative sense, came to the forefront again in US internal politics after the September 11 attacks in 2001.

²⁵ For detailed information on the MINARET program see Electronic Briefing Book No. 441 (September 25, 2013) posted by National Security Archive, an independent research organization based at The George Washington University, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB441/>

2. The Transfer of the National Security Ideology

2.1. International Coalitions Built Around the National Security Ideology

After WWII, American policymakers were confronted with a new world that offered a set of new and different opportunities. The collapse of the former axis of global power, including Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, provided the United States policymaking elites a convenient chance to embrace these new opportunities. Thus, the entire process of state-making and military expansion was not simply a response to the Soviet threat or the containment of its geopolitical ambitions around the world. It was the framework by which American policymakers extended the reach of American power and influence globally (Steel (1992, p.108).

Chomsky (1992) argued that whether it is referred to as the Third World or the South, the chief functions assigned to their members have been the provision of resources, markets, cheap labor, and new investment opportunities (p. 139). Such aspirations appeared as strategic targets in top-secret government documents of the Cold War era. For example, according to the NSC 5432/1 issued in September 1954²⁶, the primary threats to US interests were “radical and nationalistic regimes” that were open to “popular demand for immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses” and responsive to pressure to increase production and diversification of their economies (Art. 1, 2). These inclinations, which would ultimately be “exploited by Communists” (Art. 3), directly contradicted the “system of private enterprise” and “the need to create a political and economic climate conducive to private investment, of both domestic and foreign capital” and “in the case of foreign capital, to repatriate a reasonable return” (Art. 9/f).

The formula that was applied to justify the interventions within “the self-declared spheres of influence” was used for the basic convictions of the national security ideology. As stated earlier, the world was divided into an evil Communist Empire controlled by Moscow and a Free World led by Washington. The Soviet Union was expansionist and hostile to all Western interests, and was thus solely responsible for any radical, social upheaval in the Third World. Any social struggles in the Third World, including the fight of peasants for land, workers for labor rights, citizens for democratic freedoms, or nationalists for self-determination, were identified as part of Soviet-orchestrated conspiracies. The national security obligations became the pretext of systematic opposition and covert or overt interventions of the US government in popular movements in the Third World for social justice, democracy, and more equitable economic arrangements. Although these demands were more of a threat to private US interests (their properties and privileges) than public security, they were translated as threats to US national security (Boyce, 1997). Furthermore, the same justification mechanism was implemented to support anti-democratic regimes, mainly the right-wing military governments, throughout the Cold War (Schmitz, 2006). As Garthoff (1992) emphasized, US governments “promoted many anti-democratic regimes into rewarded members of the Free World so long as they were anti-Communist” (p. 133).

²⁶ For the full text of NSC 5432/1 see, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d12>

In the context of this new bipolar world, the type of a government's regime did not matter if it supported American policies in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Although the choice of supporting non-democratic regimes clearly contradicted the narrative that was used to criticize the Soviet Union, the advocates of the national security ideology defended their actions using mutually nurturing arguments (Schmitz, p.2). First, fostered by the belief that non-Western Europeans were inferior by nature and vulnerable to radical ideas, authoritarian regimes were viewed as the only way for most Third World nations to maintain order, block communism, and undergo economic developments that would enable the development of more mature populations and democratic political institutions. Strong dictators, as Schmitz suggested, "were seen as bulwarks against political instability and channels for modernization" (Ibid., p.3).

A 1959 report from the State Department entitled "Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers", revealed the convictions of the US administration regarding the role of authoritarian governments as anti-communist fighters and mediums of modernization. The report asserted that the US' "experience with the more highly developed Latin American States indicates that authoritarianism is required to lead backward societies through their socio-economic revolutions." Furthermore, it was added that if the "break-through occurs under non-Communist authoritarianism, trends toward democratic values emerge with the development of a literate middle class" (cited in Schmitz, p.15).

This report stated three additional reasons why the United States "must support military regimes": First, in a world with a severe communist threat, the "officer groups are often the most pro-Western, disciplined, and educated institution-in-being on which backward societies can draw in time of crisis." Second, military intervention in government "will continue to be necessary to supplant ineptness, corruption or slippage toward Communism." Finally, military guidance was necessary because it would take decades for the newly independent nations "to develop those institutions which establish in more advanced countries civilian control of the military" (Ibid.). In these circumstances, the "essential test [...] should be whether a particular military regime responsibly confronts the problems facing it – security and developmental progress – and, in so doing, successfully resists Communist techniques. [...] In the bi-polar world of the Cold War" the refusal of the US "to deal with a military or authoritarian regime [...] could lead almost necessarily to the establishment of that regime's friendly relations with the Soviet Bloc" (Ibid., p. 16). The analysis and the policy recommendations presented in the report were approved by the NSC on June 18, 1959.²⁷ At the same meeting President Eisenhower stated that "the trend toward military takeovers in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa was almost certainly going to continue" (Memorandum of Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council). He was asserting that the government had to do their best "to orient the potential military leaders of these countries in a pro-Western rather than a pro-Communist direction" (Ibid.).

Throughout the 1960s, support for right-wing dictators continued to shape American policy toward the Third World, as the policy expanded to include newly independent African

²⁷ For the comments of the NSC members on the report, see, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 18, 1959", <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v16/d36>.

nations. The report titled ‘The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Areas’, which was prepared by the Kennedy administration in 1962, declared that the US government had to count on the military as the “ultimate guarantors of internal security” because the “officer corps are generally the best organized pro-Western, non-Communist groups capable of leadership and wide support within an underdeveloped society” (Schmitz, p. 18). In addition, “they form a powerful potential group of ‘modernizers,’ and a conduit of contemporary Western thought and values if their full talents and knowledge of the outside world are utilized” (Ibid.).

In the Third World, military regimes provided “the best insurance against revolutions or political stagnation and the emergence of a counter-elite” that is hostile to the United States through a “benevolent authoritarianism which imparts a sense of national unity, [...] gives a role of national participation to the intelligentsia, and holds power in trust for civilians and more representative institutions” (Ibid., p. 19). The US government, therefore, had to “support military regimes which push forward with development” as they “advance US interests by maintaining stability, possibly introducing reforms which civilians might shirk, and symbolizing national unity through times of crisis and hardship – all essential to the development process” (Ibid.).

American academia justified the support given to military regimes in the Third World, in the political arena, through modernization theory.²⁸ This theory was constructed in an effort to understand the events that were occurring in the post-colonial region and to promote change that would prevent these regions from embracing communism (Gilman, 2003). The theory, while highlighting the military’s inevitable and significant role in the process, indirectly legitimized that role.

The Nixon Doctrine was unveiled in 1969 due to the rising cost of and public opposition to the Vietnam War. It solidified the support for the rightist military governments and increased dependence upon authoritarian regimes to maintain regional stability in the Third World. The Vietnam War forced the President and his national security advisers (mainly Henry Kissinger) to implement an alternative strategy, while continuing to uphold the main axioms of the US Cold War National Security policy. The Nixon Doctrine called for an end to the use of American forces in the Third World (as in Korea and Vietnam) as the main way to contain communism. As Keilers (2007) noted, one of the major tenets of the doctrine was that “the US would provide military and economic aid to countries under treaty agreements, but the requesting nation would be expected to bear primary responsibility to provide the manpower for its own defense.” The Nixon Doctrine therefore sought to prevent supervision by reinforcing the capacity of governments to impose order in their own nations and by solidifying the authority of Third World allies to provide regional stability.

Nixon reevaluated the US–Latin America relations in this context, as relations with Latin American countries enhanced the credibility of the US. Any instability in the backyard of

²⁸ For an example of the military-academia partnership on the issue, see for example Peter B. Riddleberger’s 1965 research memorandum entitled “Military Roles in Developing Countries: An Inventory of Past Research and Analysis,” prepared under the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of the American University in Washington D.C. SORO was a non-governmental organization directly operating under contract with the Department of the Army. For the full text of the report, see, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0463188.

the United States could be a barrier to becoming the leader of the free world. Therefore, it was critical for the US' leadership role, national security, and economic interests to support the right-wing military governments arising in Latin America. In 1969, the President indicated that he planned to give high priority to revitalizing relations with the region, and asked New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller to assess the effectiveness of ongoing US policy in Latin America and to make policy recommendations for its future development.

According to Rockefeller (1969) "virtually all military governments in the hemisphere have assumed the power to rescue the country from an incompetent government, or an intolerable economic or political situation." The military service was no longer attractive to the landowner class, which "was traditionally a conservative force resistant to change." The new militaries of South and Central America were composed of "young men of ambition and ability from poor families" who had entered the military "to seek an education and opportunity for advancement" (p. 505). Rockefeller announced that: "A new type of military man is coming to the fore and often becoming a major force for constructive social change in the American republics. He added that "motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency, and a stagnant political order, the new military man is prepared to adapt his authoritarian tradition to the goals of social and economic progress" (Ibid.) He suggested full support of the US to the military regimes of the hemisphere, provided that the militaries did not go in the wrong doctrinal direction, especially that of Marxism and acted "radicalized, statist and anti-US" (Ibid.). One way to offset the "simplistic Marxist approach" was through "exposure to the fundamental achievements of the US way of life that many of the military from other American countries have received through the military training programs which the US conducts in Panama and the United States" (Ibid.).

Military regimes were also supported because these establishments were the ultimate organizations to fight against internal subversion caused by Cuba's efforts to spread revolution and indigenous "urban terrorism". The communist threat was "a reality with alarming potential" in the region, and new problems stemming from economic modernization were quickly exploited by the communist forces "for their own ends" in the environment of "freedoms afforded by democratic governments" (Ibid. 506) Therefore, supporting existing and future right-wing military regimes was necessary to prevent the region from turning to radical solutions to its problems, which would seriously harm the interests of the US (Ibid. 516). The report recommended that the US cooperate with the security forces of the hemisphere in measures to strengthen internal security. These measures included increasing grants for the training of security forces, strengthening "the training program which brings military and police personnel from other hemisphere nations to the United States and to training centers in Panama", providing security forces with the essential tools and equipment as well as military and technical training for internal security purposes, and selling "major military equipment" to the "more developed nations of the hemisphere" (Ibid. 517).

The NSC endorsed the Rockefeller report's recommendation to maintain support for authoritarian governments in Latin America. Nixon outlined this new vision for US-Latin American relations in his November 10, 1969 statement on Governor Rockefeller's Report on Latin America. He explicitly stated that the report constituted a major contribution to the

formulation of US policy for this hemisphere and “both [*the*] general conceptual approach and the specific lines of action [*the government*] intends to follow have been substantially shaped by that report (Nixon’s Statement on the Rockefeller Report on Quality of Life in the Americas, 1969, December 8). Thus, Latin America’s military regimes (except Cuba) could expect full support from the White House.

The only era that demonstrated a deviation from this policy was that of President Jimmy Carter. Despite his shortcomings, Jimmy Carter conducted a different American foreign policy that focused on improving the country’s poor reputation worldwide and emphasized human rights (Craig & Logevall). In a commencement address at Notre Dame University in May of 1977, he proclaimed that “an inordinate fear of communism has led us to embrace any dictator who joined in our fear” (Ibid., p.289). In accordance with this statement, he refused to intervene and save two dictators, the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the *de facto* ruler of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, when their brutal regimes were brought down in 1979.

President Carter was criticized by advocates of the old policy, mainly by the pressure group re-formed in 1975 under the name of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) that enlisted numerous new conservatives (Ibid., p. 307). Funded by David Packard of the military-industrial giant Hewlett-Packard, the CPD justified continued American support for oppressive right-wing regimes by drawing a distinction between friendly, “authoritarian and hostile”, and “totalitarian” regimes. This approach was articulated by Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979), one of Ronald Reagan's academic advisers and a member of the CPD, in an article in *Commentary*, a leading voice of neo-conservatism. In her article defined as “the classic essay that shaped Reagan's foreign policy” in American political literature, she argued that while totalitarianism was irreversible, authoritarian regimes, unlike Communist ones, might be reformed and evolve into democratic governments. Therefore, the US would be better off opting for pro-American authoritarian regimes which offer stability and domestic order to a certain extent and often evolve into democracies.²⁹ Upon his election in 1980, Ronald Reagan readapted the classic bipolar nature of the Cold War period. Building on Kirkpatrick’s logic that pro-American authoritarian regimes were part of the “free world”, Reagan’s administration returned to provide right-wing military governments its full support (Schmitz, p.195).

2.2. Customizing the National Security State: Permanent Militarization of Politics

In many countries of the Third World, political and social reality meant being part of the post-war American Empire. The national security ideology and its organs invented by the National Security Act had repercussions in many allied nations, primarily in Latin America. Many Latin American countries, as well as others in different geographical regions, have copied the US in creating institutions with similar names and adopted this national security ideology

²⁹ According to Kirkpatrick “since many traditional autocracies permit limited contestation and participation, it is not impossible that U.S. policy could effectively encourage this process of liberalization and democratization, provided that the effort is not made at a time when the incumbent government is fighting for its life against violent adversaries, and that proposed reforms are aimed at producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight.”

and the doctrine with destructive results. Latin American history is familiar with military governments established by coups and run by individual military officers. However, in the aftermath of military coups in the early 1960s, the region ushered in a new era of authoritarian governments, under which the military as an institution ruled directly or indirectly. This time, however, military-generated doctrines on security and development were used as guides (Mares, 2007). This phenomenon has been explained under a variety of names, each underlining a distinct set of characteristics of these regimes, including: Alfred Stepan's "*New Professionalism*" (1973), Guillermo O'Donnell's "*Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime*" (1979), Jorge A. Tapia Valdés's "*Dual State*" (1989), Alan Rouquié's "*Terrorist State*" (1987), and Frederick Nunn's "*Professional Militarism*" (1992).

The indispensable role of national security doctrines as rationales for military regimes made the classification of these military governments popular under the label of "National Security State" (Coblin, 1979; Loveman, 1999; Mares, 2007; Fitch, 1998; Chomsky & Herman, 1979). Although the interpretation of these doctrines varied (i.e. there were hard-line and soft-line versions; Pion-Berlin, 1989) as Fitch (1998) suggested, they provided a "common intellectual foundation for a new military role belief stressing the professional duty of the armed forces to assume control of the government when civilian leaders proved incompetent of providing the necessary conditions for internal security and development" (p. 110). The belief in this role clearly expanded the extent of military rule and the military's "collective responsibility" for those regimes. Consequently, national security served as a justification for institutional military rule (Ibid., p. 110).

The US government had declared that the Cold War was coming to Latin America when the reformist regime headed by Colonel Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in the early 1950s allowed the Communists to increase their influence in the government and labor movement, and had implemented an agrarian reform that negatively affected the United Fruit Company. President Eisenhower's administration, including individuals occupying key posts such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and (his brother) CIA Director Allen Dulles, had key policymakers with personal and economic ties to the company. Such a situation clearly provided an impetus for the US government's conclusion that "one American nation has succumbed to Communist infiltration" (Loveman, 1999, pp. 156-157). In June 1954, the CIA executed a coup using exiled Colonel Castillo Armas as the figure-head leader of a "liberating army", and invaded Guatemala from Honduras. The communists were dispersed in the aftermath of the coup; land was returned to landowners, and thousands of indigenous peasants were killed.

The most fundamental challenge to US security occurred five years later: the Cuban Revolution. The US' response to Cuba entailed a radical policy change. In 1961 the US Congress passed the Internal Development and Security Act, explicitly changing the rationale of military assistance to Latin America from "hemispheric defense to internal defense and development." This act set the foundation for a dramatic increase in the political role of the Latin American militaries (Loveman, 1999, pp. 196-162). Latin American armies have waged a war against internal subversion and international communism since 1961 with US support. Loveman suggested that these conflicts "drastically modified the relations between the US military and its Latin American counterparts, the military tasks and doctrine of the Latin

American armed forces (and some US forces covertly engaged in counter insurgency campaigns), and the character of Latin American politics” (p. 162). Consequently, the number of military aid and training programs drastically increased.

Over 16,000 personnel were trained in The School of the Americas (SOA) between 1961 and 1964 at a US military instructional facility that was founded in the Panama Canal Zone in 1946 to train Latin American soldiers, police, and security related civilians in counter insurgency, psychological warfare, and interrogation techniques (Loveman, 1999, pp. 170-171; Maliska, 2009). This was more than twice the number of Latin American students who had received training (7,886) between the school’s inception and the eve of the Cuban Revolution (Gill 2004, p.72). Many of the military dictators and their heirs, during the period known as the Dirty Wars of the 1970s and 1980s in Central and South America, were graduates of this institution (Maliska, N. 2009).³⁰ The SOA was only one of the institutions where Latin American security personnel received training. Loveman indicates that between 1950 and 1978, the US provided training for more than 81,000 Latin American military personnel at various military training facilities. He added that this training, regardless of how technical it was, always included anticommunism ideological content (p. 182). By 1964, a wave of new military regimes achieved power in much of the region under the leadership of the post-World-War-II generation of Cold War officers. These military cadres shared a common doctrine based on the national security concept, which provided the basis for military role expansion, as well as new institutional structures and methods of repression.

Table 1: Military Regimes in Latin America, 1964-1990

Country	Years
Ecuador	1963-1966; 1972-1978
Guatemala	1963-1985
Brazil	1964-1985
Bolivia	1964-1970; 1971-1982
Argentina	1966-1973; 1976-1983
Peru	1968-1980
Panama	1968-1981
Honduras	1972-1982
Chile	1973-1990
Uruguay	1973-1984
El Salvador	1948-1984

Source: (Loveman, 1999, p. 186)

The operationalization of the national security concept in these regimes caused more devastating outcomes than those in the US. By the early 1960s, the ideology designated as the

³⁰ In 1996 it was made public that manuals advocating torture and various brutal tactics against civilian populations had been employed at the SOA and were distributed to multiple Latin American countries (Maliska, 2009).

"National Security Doctrine" (NSD) prevailed among the military elites that ruled in these Latin American states (Fitch 1998; Pion-Berlin, 1989).

2.2.1. The National Security Doctrine: A New Idea for an Old Role

The National Security Doctrine (NSD) is an interrelated set of concepts about the state, development, counter insurgency warfare, and above all, security (Pion-Berlin, 1988, p.385; Chomsky&Herman, 1979; Mares, 2007; Comblin, 1977). This doctrine is deeply affected by US military writings about national security, as well as US and French counter insurgency doctrines, though its ideological sustenance situated in the study of geopolitics was imported from Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century (Mares, 2007; Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Pion-Berlin, 1989; Coblin, 1979, Stepan, 1978). In this view, the nation and the state are perceived in organic terms (they live and die), and states are “conscious, rational entities with interests, prejudices and instincts of self-preservation” (Pion-Berlin, 1989, p. 413). Every state is involved in permanent warfare, and its form at the time was Communism versus the Free World (Chomsky & Herman, 1979). In its original version (that of Rudolf Kjellen), geopolitics defined the acquisition of territory as a necessary means to prevail over rivals and survive. Due to the difficulty of conquest, the national security doctrine redefined geopolitical strategy from acquisition of “physical space” to that of “political space”, while maintaining the organic view of state (Pion-Berlin, 1989). Corresponding to this focus on “interior frontiers”, one of the greatest threats to the state is the internal enemy (Mares, 2007).

State managers are granted unique privileges associated with ensuring the security of the nation (Pion-Berlin, 1989). Their mission is to provide harmony amongst the functions of society’s constituent parts to achieve “the common good” (Fitch, 1998; Pion-Berlin, 1989), which could include social engineering when necessary. Consequently, the definition of politics comes down to the art of achieving the common good. In NSD, national security becomes synonymous with this collective good, and the concept develops into a yardstick by which all policies are measured (Fitch, 1998; Pion-Berlin, 1989).

Parallel to the US national security ideology, the NSD produced in the War Colleges of Latin America declared that the presence of international communism was everywhere, and that there were potential guerrillas far and wide. Thus, control over "subversion" is possible only through the state elite, namely the armed forces (Chomsky & Herman, 1979) who serve “legitimately, not by fulfilling the popular will, but by carrying out national security objectives (Pion-Berlin, 1989, p. 414). Embracing the US definition of the national security concept, the doctrine considers non-military factors such as industrial mobilization, natural resources, science and technology, national unity, and statesmanship vital to a nation’s ability to defend itself. The concept of national defense was therefore replaced by “national security.” In the age of total war, planning military operations is only one security strategy; economic, political, and psycho-social, strategies are also required (Comblin, 1977; Fitch, 1998, Mares, 2007). National strategy therefore integrates the military, political, economic, and psychological elements of national power to formulate comprehensive policies for the achievement of permanent and current national objectives (Fitch, 1998, p 108). In cases where the achievement of national

security objectives is involved in a conflict with individual rights and freedoms, tensions should be resolved in favor of the state (Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Pion-Berlin, 1989; Comblin, 1977).

The willingness to assume long-term institutional responsibility for national development as part of the national security mission was a fundamental shift from the previous guardian and moderating roles of the military. The NSD defines under-development as one of the worst threats to security since economic backwardness nourishes violence. Its primary focus is on the nation's objective economic conditions, such as the lack of infrastructure, misuse of resources, deterioration of trade, high inflation, low productivity, and inefficiency (Pion-Berlin, 1988). The NSD does not contain any element of egalitarianism (Chomsky & Herman, 1979, p. 253), as providing a minimum standard of living to those who may cause societal tensions is necessary for peaceful co-existence (Pion-Berlin, 1988).

In summary, this authoritarian and elitist doctrine combined the following elements: a theory of revolutionary war that identified the nature of the internal security threat, and the appropriate military and policy measures for responding to that threat; a justification of human rights abuse as a necessary means to eradicate this revolutionary threat; the thesis of security and development, linking the internal security threat to socio-economic underdevelopment; a theoretical framework linking "national security, strategy, national objectives, and national policy"; and the conviction that military intervention is legitimate when the policy failures of civilian governments jeopardize national security (Comblin, 1977; Fitch, 1998, p 107). Although the coups were justified by reference to the historical missions of the armed forces, the military regimes in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s consolidated a new form of national security state, which demonstrated a distinctive set of common characteristics under this new dominant ideological umbrella.

2.2.2. The Key Characteristics of National Security States

The first characteristic of National Security States (NSS) is that the vanguard role of the military, as the highest authority, which directly guides the country's destiny as an institution, not as the followers of a military leader. This distinguished military rule in the NSS from preceding regimes, in which military officers seized power for personal benefit, to end undesirable government policies, reestablish law and order, and correct temporary political and economic instabilities (Mares, 2007, p. 387; Pallmeyer, 1992, Loveman, 1999).

The second distinguishing element, which is directly related to the first characteristic of NSS, is its system-transforming orientation. NSS are not totalitarian in that they do not construct a precise mass mobilization strategy at work and in politics with the same approach as fascist, corporatist, or communist regimes. The goal of the NSS was to reconstruct the manner in which "societal interests were articulated and the distribution of influence in policy making" (Mares, 2007, p. 392). Rather than restoring the old order, the NSS military governments' central target became transforming the country's political and economic institutions. They chose to rearrange unions, political parties, and other forms of civic and social organizations, creating limited and defined spaces for their existence (Ibid., p. 387).

Blaming the existing political and economic institutions of their countries for aggravating the problems, the military governments redesigned and restructured the state institutions in line with the national security ideology. National Security Councils, as a new institution imported from the US, became the highest mechanism of the State for setting permanent and current national objectives, as well the policies and strategies for their attainment (Fitch, 1998). Due to the blurred distinction between politics and national security policy, almost any policy issue could be associated with national security, and therefore require military scrutiny. This broadening of the concept of "security" made military institutions responsible, though not accountable, for political and economic outcomes (Fitch 1998; Loveman, 1999).

To achieve this goal, NSS in their traditional (direct military regimes) and contemporary forms (under pseudo-democracy) have been overwhelmingly repressive (Loveman, 1997). Regardless of the economic models and policies adopted, in NSS the primary aim of the controlling leadership has been "the destruction of any organizational threat that might challenge the attainment of state" (Chomsky & Herman, 1979, p. 254). During the first years of their rule, the military governments of the NSS banned political parties or gravely restrained their activities; temporarily closed legislatures; purged undesirable politicians; outlawed selected labor organizations or restricted their activities; prevented public criticism through extensive media censorship; and persecuted, jailed, or killed opposition journalists, while subsidizing media that favored the regime. Moreover, universities were purged of subversives, professors lost their jobs, and student organizations were suppressed (Loveman, 1999, p. 189). Any organizational structure including unions, student or professional organizations, and community groups were destroyed if they were not brought under state control (Chomsky & Herman, 1979, p. 255; Şarlak, 1994).

Another feature of NSS is their concern with legitimacy. Since the national security ideology recognizes that security and development require the institutionalization of a political and economic system, not only arbitrary "cleansing" and commanding, military leadership and its security regime require legitimacy. Such a system cannot be established by force, even by the force of arms that created the opportunity. Thus, its consolidation necessitates an expression of legitimacy from fundamental players in national development. A legal framework helped to create this desired sense of legitimate order and rule. The manner in which NSS governments dealt with the institutionalization of military leadership varied, but all sought to preserve their decisive role through constitutional restructuring or implementing far-reaching new national security legislations that were frequently supplemented with "antiterrorism" laws (Mares, 2007; Loveman, 1999). By playing a leading role in the democratic transition process, military institutions retained their key role in the political system, consolidating a form of "protected" democracy to ensure the continuity of the NSS (Loveman, 1997).

In an appearance of democracy, the military or a broader national security establishment still maintained ultimate power, and the national security ideology prevailed as the main instrument of shaping public policy. The security legislations enacted and the institutions established during direct military rule remained operative and were strengthened after the transition to elected civilian governments, including: "regimes of exceptions as basic elements of constitutions; prohibition of judicial protection of civil liberties and rights during regimes of exception and/or in applying national security laws; explicit constitutional definition of internal security and political roles of the armed forces via national security councils, making

the armed forces a virtual fourth branch of government-guardians of the nation; organic “constitutive laws” further embedding the political role and relative autonomy of the armed forces in the legal foundations of the nation; security legislation (laws pertaining to internal security, anti-terrorism, and maintenance of public order) that criminalizes certain type of political opposition [...] and expands military functions and jurisdiction even further (frequently including ample, autonomous internal intelligence roles of the armed forces); restrictions on the mass media justified by “national security” concerns; criminal codes with special provisions for political crimes and “crimes against the State,” or against “the constituted government”; military jurisdiction [...] over civilians for “crimes against internal security”, “terrorism,” or even “insulting” officers; restriction (or full exclusion) of the jurisdiction of civilian courts over military personnel [...]; formal corporate representation for the armed forces in policy making (for example, in Congress, the judiciary, executive agencies, public administration, and public enterprises); partial autonomy of the armed forces over its budget [...]; broad constitutional and statutory autonomy for the military from oversight by the legislature [...] over “professional” and “internal” matters, such as military education, promotions, retirements, reassignments, and tenure of service commanders” (Loveman 1997, pp. 372-373).

The fundamental aspects of these institutions and practices related to the national security concept change the meaning of democracy in NSS. They impose severe restrictions on public life in the areas of public contestation, electoral competition, and any form of political opposition. They give military institutions a form of ‘carte blanche’ to be directly involved in policymaking and determining the overall direction of society (Loveman, 1997; Pallmeyer, 1992). Elections in such a state structure become no more than a tool for legitimizing the democratic image of the regime without changing the established power structures of the state (Pallmeyer, 1992).

The ruling state elite in NSS consistently undervalue the normal play of conflicting interests, the significance of institutional channels for political participation and accountability, and the unavoidability of ideological conflicts over the objectives and instruments of state policy (i.e. all the indispensable elements of democratic pluralism; Fitch 1998). The institutionalization of an organic statist view of politics in the narrative and bureaucratic institutions of the national security apparatus, as Fitch asserted, “contributes to disenchantment of military officers with democratic politics” (p. 115). With this mindset, any type of social or political demand, policy change, or individual or group protest in NSS can be deprecated, and officially labeled as politically immature or subversive, and could be subject to repression. This deprecating perception towards society and its political representatives provides a rationale for an autonomous role for the armed forces as guardians of the rules and limits of the system.

As a logical corollary of their new transformative role in politics, the military institutions declare themselves as solely responsible for defining national objectives and national interests. These objectives which set behind closed doors are characterized as permanent, transcending the initiatives of individual governments. Any other interests that contradict them are disparaged as partisan, narrow, selfish, or unpatriotic (Fitch 1998). This problematic self-perception was explained by Alfred Stepan (1986) as a consequence of “new professionalism.” Stepan indicated that the military institutions’ internal security missions led

to a focus on the professionalization of their approach to the social and political conditions of the revolutionary protests. Officers in institutionalized military establishments began to acquire training on internal security matters in highly developed military schooling systems. They began to perceive that their expertise and values authorized them to identify threats to the nation that neither self-interested politicians nor ignorant masses can see. This advanced training, along with the national security doctrine, provided a basis for military officers to view themselves as possessing specific “scientific” knowledge that civilians do not have. Military officers in NSS perceive themselves as the only individuals who can realize the conditions required to defend the nation (Mares 2007, pp. 393- 394).

Another distinctive feature of NSS is their paranoia about enemies. Since threats to national security are both external (in origin) and internal (i.e. specific agents and principal battlegrounds; Fitch, 1998, p. 115), enemies of the state are everywhere. Thus, defending the state against external and internal enemies has become “a leading preoccupation of the state, a distorting factor in the economy and a major source of national identity and purpose” (Pallmeyer, p.38). In accordance with the ideological foundation of NSS, these enemies are declared as cunning and ruthless. They are officially dehumanized in the state narrative such that any means used to destroy or control them are justified (Ibid., p.39).

Military intelligence units in NSS gain autonomy and influence as a part of the national security apparatus. Escalating military concern with the relationship between socio-economic change and national security in the context of counter insurgency wars strengthened this role (French and US counter insurgency doctrines underlined the fundamental importance of timely intelligence to overcome the internal threat; Loveman, 1999; Mares, 2007). The political character of long-term internal warfare coupled with the military’s paranoid attitude towards potential enemies put a premium on the military surveillance of, and operations against, civilian opponents of the regime and guerrilla combatants. In this context, intelligence became an important tool and military intelligence units gained more autonomy and influence.

Another defining nature of the NSS is that the security apparatus draws on the support of right-wing paramilitary groups. These groups are used for intelligence purposes as well as "dirty war" functions (e.g. interrogation, kidnapping, torture, extralegal executions) with specialized military units (Loveman, 1999). In the mission of fighting insurgencies and “subversives”, their collaboration was justified by patriotism.

Turkey acquired the majority of the national security state characteristics that are discussed above as it transformed during the Cold War Era. The later chapters in this dissertation layout the transformation of Turkey, which diverges from Latin American counterparts with its stark social, historical, and political differences.

Chapter II

1. The Rise of the National Security State in Turkey

1.1. Turkey-US Relations in the Early Cold War Era

Turkey has been integrated with the US-led bloc of the Cold War sides mentioned in the first chapter and continued this integration almost exclusively in both external affairs and domestic politics until the end of the Cold War. While the dominant political actors identified communism as the common enemy of Turkey, the field of ideology was reshaped in the Cold War atmosphere. The ally relations between the US and Turkey until the Second World War evolved to a level where the US wielded considerable power in the political, military and economic transformation of Turkey in the Cold War era. The Soviet threat was the main reason behind Turkey's attachment to the US.

USSR's territorial demand for Turkey emerged in a Soviet note dated March 19, 1945, and at the Molotov-Sarper meeting on June 7, 1945 (Erhan 2001, p. 523). In this meeting, Molotov demanded that the Turkish-Soviet border drawn by the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, should be changed in favor of the Soviet Union, and that Kars and Ardahan should be returned to the Soviet Union. In the same meeting, Molotov also demanded joint control over the defense of the Straits, and that the regime of the Straits defined by the Montreux Convention should be amended (Tellal 2001, p. 502). The Soviets' territorial demands from Turkey did not have any repercussions in the US administration. Truman viewed the territorial problem between the Turks and the Soviets as a private matter between the two countries (see Tellal, p. 503 Truman 1955, Volume I, pp. 415-143). The primary concern of the USA at that time was that the Straits and the Black Sea did not become solely under Soviet dominance.

Despite its efforts to convince the USA about the Soviet threat, Turkey did not find the support it expected until the declaration of the Truman Doctrine (Erhan 2001, p.528). However, starting from 1946, as the ideological differences widened more and more into open hostility with the Soviets, the USA decided that Turkey should be part of the Western Bloc. The decision of the USA was welcomed by Turkish public. In the same period, almost all Turkish politicians and opinion leaders perceived that the USA had risen to a liberating role that represented the "absolute good."³¹

³¹ For instance, Falih Rıfık Atay on April 8, 1946, in the *Ulus* Newspaper wrote: "We know what America wants; a world based on the security of free, equal and sovereign nations, without wars and attacks, governed only by morality and legal alliances and agreements! Anyone who wants to live in a world like that should see their lucky star in the American flag," (cited in Yetkin, p. 19). The Same atmosphere pervaded the Parliament, too. At the parliament session on May 8, 1947, RPP İçel Deputy Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver known to be a fervent nationalist spoke on the podium: "[...] nations are still concerned about the future. Where does the light come from? This light has a source: Again America. Where does the hope come from? America. Where does the trust come from? America. (cheers of Bravo) [...] If today we are looking at the future with hope, if today freedom of nations is not a futile struggle, it is once again because of the military power, economic power, moral and ethical power over there." (Applause) (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 1947, May 8, p. 27). At the same session, Bursa Deputy Muhittin Baha Pars said in his speech, "This voice, at last, arose in the horizon, from the USA, as the voice of Great Roosevelt, a man so great, as clean and impeccable as the Prophet. This lordly voice is saying they will not let people be enslaved, civilization be collapsed, united with his citizens' voices is creating uproars

The USA's first symbolic gesture to Turkey was sending the body of Turkey's Washington Ambassador, Münir Ertegün who died in the USA, to Istanbul on the Missouri (the biggest battleship of the American navy) through the Dardanelles. The battleship anchoring at Dolmabahçe on April 5, 1946, was also a message to the Soviets that the status of the Turkish Straits could not be changed without the USA's consent (Ibid., pp. 524-525). The streets of the city were cleaned days before the battleship's arrival in Istanbul, and with praising articles in the newspapers, the Turkish public, especially the people of Istanbul, prepared to welcome the Americans with great hospitality (Güler 2004, pp. 211-213).³² Following this gesture, by a settlement made on May 7, 1946, the USA canceled the debts Turkey borrowed from the USA during the Second World War through the Lend-Lease Act. By 1947, as mentioned in the first chapter, USA's ideological position against the Soviet Union was fully clarified, and in this context, Truman stated the importance of Turkey and Greece for the USA in his speech, which later became a doctrine that was named after him. Truman made three requests from the Congress in this framework (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp):

1. Assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948;
2. Authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished, and for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel;
3. Provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

The structure of this assistance was finalized through Congress discussions, which determined that Turkey would receive aid in the amount of \$100,000,000. They also decided that American civilian and military personnel would be sent to both countries to assist and supervise the use this assistance, and that selected Greek and Turkish personnel would be instructed and trained in the USA (Erhan., pp. 531-532). On May 22, 1947, President Harry Truman signed the Greek-Turkish Aid Act. Pursuant to this Act, the same year the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey (JAMMAT)³³ was established in Ankara as a military

on the horizon. After that, the Americans ran to help the hungry and with their guns in hand ran to assist the enslaved. [...] Today, while I call to mind and thank for the help this great nation is giving people, I respectfully salute Roosevelt, a man clean and impeccable as the Prophet, and his successor, valuable statesman Truman; and proudly say that the Turkish nation will be with them in helping civilization in the name of humanity and peace. (Applause)" (Ibid., p. 31). Kocaeli Deputy Nihat Erim says, "The nation leading in the worldly advancements, is also leading in the spiritual dignity. Indeed, the noble role the USA played during the war and the post-war world, will be remembered as one of the greatest honors in the nation's history. [...] We see and appreciate that the USA wants to achieve good for whole humanity as the pioneers of a brand-new rule and a fresh understanding of the economy. (Bravo exclamations)" (Ibid., p. 32).

³² After the Missouri Battleship, two more American fleets visited Turkey on November 23, 1946, and May 2, 1947; and were welcomed with similar enthusiasm (Güler, 2004, p. 214).

³³ The original title was the American Mission for Aid to Turkey (AMAT). It became JAMMAT in October 1949 following a minor reorganization (Munson IV, 2012). Following admission of Turkey into NATO,

modernization program undertaken by U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Groups of the United States military, responsible for procurement and distribution of materiel to Turkish armed forces, and for training in use of such material.

The USA aid that was provided under the Truman Doctrine was appreciated by both the Turkish government and the Turkish public. On July 12, 1947, Turkey signed an agreement (Agreement on Aid to Turkey, TIAS 1629) on this aid with the USA. In its preface, the goal of the agreement was stated as "to enable Turkey to strengthen the security forces which Turkey requires for the protection of her freedom and independence and at the same time to continue to maintain the stability of her economy."³⁴ In 1948, aid to Turkey and Greece were transferred to the Foreign Assistance Act by the U.S. Congress. Thus, the one-off assistance that was provided in Truman Doctrine became permanent.³⁵

The Marshall Plan, which aimed to help rebuild the war-stricken Western European economy, followed the Truman Doctrine and Turkey signed an economic cooperation agreement (Economic Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey, TIAS 1794) with the USA regarding this plan on July 4, 1948.³⁶

American experts were sent to Turkey to help determine how the "Marshall aid" would be spent. According to the new international cooperation devised by the USA, Turkey's assigned role was to supply agricultural goods and raw materials for the Western Bloc as well as to be a potential market for American industrial goods. Sixty percent of the aid was used in agricultural sector. The USA also stipulated that some of the aid be used to improve the highways. With the initiative of American technical experts, the Turkish government abandoned the railway policy that it had initiated in the early years of the Republic and established the Directorate of Highways in 1949, shifting the primary focus of national transportation policy on highways. As a result, the number of vehicles imported to Turkey and the need for oil increased (Erhan., pp. 542).

The Truman Doctrine had substantial effects both on the foreign and domestic policy of Turkey. The polarized worldview shaped in the USA became concurrently predominant in Turkey. Turkish officials, also with the influence of England, started to follow pro-American policies against the Soviets in the Middle East. Meanwhile, since the maintenance and spare part needs of the equipment granted to the Turkish army as part of the American military aid could only be supplied from the USA, Turkey depleted its dollar reserves in a short time. The increase in imports from the US in the following years further deepened the dollar crisis and

February 18, 1952, and establishment of US EUCOM (United States European Command), August 1, 1952, JAMMAT placed under US EUCOM by US CINCEUR (Classified message 312140Z to Chief, JAMMAT, August 1, 1952), see, <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/334.html>.

³⁴For the full text of the agreement see, <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/turkey/461177/pdf/11be1163.pdf>

³⁵ With the approval of Mutual Defense Assistance Act on October 6, 1949, American aids started to be assessed within this scope and their management was assigned to the Economic Cooperation Administration (Erhan., p. 534). In years 1947-1949, the value of American aid given to Turkey, including military supplies, was \$152,500,000. In years 1947-1951, the value of military aid given, reached a total of \$400,000,000 (Ibid., pp. 534-535).

³⁶ For the complete English script of Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey, see, <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/turkey/461177/pdf/11be1166.pdf>

led to deterioration in the trade balance of the country. Thus, the aid that was received from the USA laid the foundation for Turkey's military and economic dependency. This dependency relationship played a crucial role for Turkey in shaping its traditional foreign policy choices in alignment with the American interests (Ibid., pp. 536-537).³⁷

In the early years of the Cold War, Turkey spent considerable effort to become part of all the institutions established and agreements made by the Western Bloc. The first and most important institution in this regard was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) founded in 1949. The desire of Turkey's ruling elite to be a NATO member hinged upon the belief that the Western Bloc led by the USA would protect Turkey against any threat from Soviets, and that the Western aid was essential for its economic development and military modernization. Moreover, NATO membership was considered a critical step for integration with the West, the primary objective of official ideology developed in the single-party period (Ibid., p. 544).

Turkey's two membership applications, first on May 11, 1950, during the final days of the Republican People's Party (RPP) government and later, on August 1 of 1950 during the early months of the DP government, were both refused. The DP government led by Prime Minister Menderes considered the Korean War that began in 1950 an unmissable opportunity to gain the trust of the Western states for NATO membership. Menderes acted in violation of the constitution and sent 4,500 soldiers to fight with U.S. troops (Uslu, 2003, p. 69).

Supported by public demonstrations called "Komünizmi Tel'in" (Damn Communism), this decision resulted in Turkey's participation in the Korean War as the second state to send the greatest number of soldiers after the United States. The shared desire for NATO membership among the Turkish politicians led the opposition party RPP to drop its objections to the violation of the constitution. The RPP acted in cooperation with the government to support the Turkish troops fighting in Korea. In a statement he made on October 25, 1951, the RPP Leader İsmet İnönü said: "In our country when it comes to external affairs there are no disagreements on views and principles. We are dedicated to our alliance, United Nations ideal and friendship with the USA" (cited in Erhan, p. 546). After the Korean War, on May 15, 1951, USA suggested that its allies accept Turkey and Greece in NATO. This suggestion was made by considering the conjectural developments rather than Turkey's persistence.

It is noted in the first chapter that the USA's perception of the Soviet Union as an evil that aims to rule the world and which needs to be contained was reflected in the NSC-68 document before the Korean War and that the Korean War strengthened this perception. In this context, the possibility of a Soviet occupation of Turkey gained a new significance. The U.S. authorities considered this probability as a grave threat for the future of NATO and the security of Europe. General Eisenhower argued that the admittance of Turkey and Greece would strengthen the south wing of NATO and enhance the alliance's influence on the Balkans.

³⁷ Having supported the Arab countries for years about the Palestinian problem, Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel only ten months after its establishment. Turkey would then refuse to participate in the Asian States Conference convened in 1949, stating that it was "not an Asian, but a European state." Its pro-western position became more evident at the Bandung Conference convened in 1955, at which the Non-Aligned Movement emerged (Erhan., pp. 535-537).

Turkey's closeness to the Middle East oil reserves was also rendered its membership crucial. Moreover, Turkish troops' successful performance in the Korean War and Turkish brigade's efforts to save the U.S. 2nd Division from total annihilation at the Kuruni Battle had caused the development a pro-Turkey attitude in the eyes of the American public opinion (Ibid., pp. 548-549). Upon the insistence of the USA, on February 18, 1952, Turkey and Greece became NATO members.

After Turkey's NATO membership, military and economic assistance from the USA has continued at an increasing pace (Oran, 1970, pp. 78-79). In the same period, the Turkish government enacted the Foreign Investment Incentives Law (Law No. 6224) on January 18, 1954. The law was prepared in accordance with the suggestions of American businessmen and economists, and it was granting significant privileges to American investors. It introduced such vast freedoms to foreign investors that Turkey swiftly turned into the most liberal and investor-friendly legal system in the developing world (Erhan., p. 554, Yavan & Kara, 2003, p. 29). This law was followed by a new "Petroleum Law" (Law No. 6326), which was also prepared based on the views of American experts. The Petroleum Law, which came into effect on March 7, 1954, gave the foreign companies the right to import 45% of the crude oil and the natural gas that they drilled after January 1st, 1980 (Art. 13).

1.1.1. Attitude towards the left during the early years of Cold War

The Republican elites primarily viewed leftist movements as a threat against the "classless society" ideal of the Populism principle in the constitution. The Turkish Communist Party (TCP) founded in 1920, was dissolved by the Ankara government on September 12, 1922, before the declaration of the republic. The TCP's members who operated underground were continuously prosecuted from the single-party period until they left the country in 1960 (Babalık, 2005). Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that the official authorities had adopted an anti- Soviet approach until the second half of the 1930s. An important reason for this was Bolsheviks' support to the Ankara Government during the Turkish Independence War.

However, in the early 1940s, inspired by German fascism and encouraged by the advance of Nazi Germany into the Soviet lands, Pan-Turkists desiring to gain territory from Soviet lands started a significant anti-communist propaganda. This racist discourse was also adopted by some officials, and it peaked between 1941 and 1943 when the war was in favor of the Nazis. Soviet hostility subsided after the war but was exacerbated again by the Soviet government's territorial claims about Turkey (Örnek, 2015, pp. 62-63).

Before the USA declared total war against communism, on December 4, 1945, with the provocation of the government, an attack known in Turkish political history as the Tan Press Incident happened. The attackers targeted the leftist publications, advocating for the rectification of Soviet relations. This incident was a sign that the left would not be tolerated in the newly established democratic system (Koçak 2010, pp. 772-816). After the transition to the multi-party system in 1946 and the removal of the ban on class-based organizations, two leftist political parties, the Turkish Socialist Party and the Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasants

Party were founded. However, they were dissolved by the court-martial command on December 16th of the same year. When the local aversion to organized leftist movement combined with the anticommunism of Cold War ideology, communism threat evolved into an ultimate common enemy for the political actors in rivalry. Moreover, communist charges were adopted as a method of repressing all kinds of opposition regardless of its content.

Similar to the McCarthy period, pressures on leftists, or intellectuals, academics, students, journalists, and publications considered leftist went off the rails in the 1950s. Founded by progressive intellectuals on May 12, 1950, "Barışseverler Derneği" (Pacifists Association) opposing the decision to participate in the Korean War was also dissolved and its administrators were sentenced to 10-15 months in prison. Leftist politics were impeded by amendments made to the penal law (amendments to the articles 141 and 142, made on December 12, 1951 by the law no. 5844). The members of the Turkish Communist Party as well as many intellectuals, workers, artists, and writers believed to have ties to the TCP, were arrested between 1951 and 1952 (Çavdar, 1996, pp. 36-41, 81-84; Örnek, pp. 78-88). The fear of communism was such that even the labor organizations were established with the help of American unionists (Çelik, 2010; Güzel, 1983). As rightfully stated by Örnek, "everyday politics was dominated by a mindset, which looked for communists in anything and everything" (p. 80). This state of mind prevented questioning the relations with the USA and criticizing Cold War policies or suggesting alternative policies.

1.2. Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) as a reliable ally of USA in the Cold War

The uninterrupted honeymoon period between the USA and Turkey that lasted until the 1960s rendered the USA the principal determiner of not only the international position and the economic policies of Turkey but also made her the ultimate arbiter of the country's army structure. Before the Second World War, in the context of the military modernization process, for almost 100 years, the different units of the Ottoman/Turkish army had been designed and trained by experts from different countries. Land forces were structured by Prussian (German) influence, naval forces by English and Gendarmerie by French. Özdağ (1997) stated that the underlying reason for this choice was to prevent the army from becoming dependent on a single country (p. 387). However, following the NATO membership, the Turkish the military forces became a component of the Cold War strategy promoting American interests. CIA had established a station in Adana in the early 1940s. A memorandum prepared a few years by the U.S. Joint Chiefs, on 23 August 1946, had recognized Turkey "as strategically the most important military factor in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East" (cited in Aslan, 2018 p. 115). Staff, formation and organization, training systems, field manuals, uniforms, war doctrines, and the internal rules of the army were modeled on U.S. patterns (Yetkin 2006, p. 24, Harris, 1985, p.185).

The U.S. hegemony over the army led to the emergence of a strong pro-American wing, which gradually dominated the Turkish Armed Forces (Aslan, 2018). The Democrat Party government (1950-1960) paid specific attention to appointing senior officers with most cooperative attitude with the United States. (Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the

Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1950, June 28, p. 1267). Özgürel (2007, April 18) indicated that by the end of the 1950s, Turkish officers were given promotion evaluations by American officers in the General Staff. NATO membership relieved Turkey's defense concerns but corroded the independence of the Turkish Army. Moreover, TAF's threat perception became increasingly focused on internal security. When the cooperation of dominant political actors in the struggle against the left during the 1950s turned out to be insufficient in the 1960s, the period when the left movement started to gain power, TAF became the main actor to put an end to it. Although the 1960 coup d'état deserves a different analysis than the 1971 and 1980 military interventions, when it is evaluated concerning its inner dynamics and political measures, it can easily be argued that the Turkish Army has gradually become the main institution of the Cold War ideology. This transformation led to the formation of a relationship, which was similar to the alliances that the USA has formed with coup plotters in Third World Countries.

In this context, every step Turkey took to remove itself from the Cold War axis was impeded by a military intervention. The army which has gradually become a rightist institution tried to pull the society to the right through interventions. In the meantime, leftist movements that had grown in parallel to social developments were suppressed in an increasingly violent manner with each coup d'état. Moreover, it is evident that the Turkish army, in its struggle against the left, put effort into adopting the new doctrines of the Cold War strategy by the United States. The following subsection discusses these developments.

1.2.1. Reading the coup d'états in Turkey within the context of the Cold War

The first coup d'état of the Republican era occurred on May 27, 1960. The academic literature predominantly suggests that the 1960 coup d'état was staged in response to the repressive and anti-secular policies imposed by the Democratic Party, which has been in government since 1950 (İpekçi & Coşar, 1965; Tachau & Heper, 1983; Hale, 1994; Kayalı, 2012, Karpat, 1988). There are also accounts that suggest the USA's involvement in the 1960 coup d'état (Dikerdem, 1977; Özgürel, 2009, May 30).³⁸ However their arguments do not rely on any substantive evidence. Nevertheless, Gunn (2015) claimed that it is possible, at least for the present time, to make the following two determinations based on the disclosed confidential U.S. documents. The U.S. administration was aware of the impending coup d'état on May 27, 1960 and did not warn Menderes or encourage the government to abandon its anti-democratic practices.

Indeed, a year before the coup, CIA was aware of the possibility of a military intervention in Turkey. General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, at the 406th Meeting of the National Security Council on May 13, 1959 reported the following evaluation (339. Editorial Note, p.805):

³⁸ Several politicians and bureaucrats who witnessed the era also had similar views. For example, Hasan Esat Işık, the General Manager of the Department of Commerce and Trade Agreements and later Assistant Secretary General of the Economic Affairs in 1957 during the DP government, in an interview he gave in 1989 stated the followings: "America overthrew Menderes. Surely there are events and people leading to May 27. However, it was America who wanted this coup d'état more than anyone else" (cited in Özgürel 2007, April 18)

“The Democratic Party is restricting the activities of the major opposition party, the popularity of which is increasing. Criticism of the government is growing, and riots and other disturbances are becoming more frequent. The opposition party maintains that the government is trying to have Mr. Inonu lynched. The Turkish Defense Minister recently remarked that the military leaders may have to intervene if the tension continues.”

The following statements of Suphi Gürsoytrak, who participated in the staging of the May 27 coup d'état, support Gunn's analysis (cited in Arcayürek, 2003, p.57):

"Before 1960, the U.S. had infiltrated all units of the army, even the smallest units [...] Having infiltrated all its units, America had undoubtedly placed its intelligence assets in the army. They were receiving reports all the time [...] On the one hand CIA and on the other hand the U.S. Embassy; they were monitoring every breath we took."

NUC, in a declaration written at the Military School and broadcasted at 05.25 on Ankara Radio, declared their loyalty to their alliance with the USA and their commitment to NATO and CENTO in the early hours of the campaign on May 27th. Developments after May 27 indicated that the military government referred to as the National Unity Committee (NUC), was in close cooperation with the United States.

The immediate assessment by US Embassy Ankara of the military coup contained no sign of criticism. In telegram 2743 from Ankara, May 27, Ambassador Warren reported (364. Editorial Note, p. 844):

“In unusually well-organized coup Turkish military forces took over government 0400 May 27 apparently without serious opposition and loss only about 50 lives Ankara. President Bayar, President GNA Koraltan, members Cabinet, Chief Staff Erdulhun taken into protective custody. Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir quiet; no discernible organized opposition. At this juncture, Embassy believes revolt motivated by purely internal considerations; no evidence any anti-Americanism. On contrary, member Military Council assured Embassy this morning of Turkish Armed Forces friendship for USA and desire fulfill all Turkey's international commitments, especially NATO and CENTO.”

The next day, “Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador in the United States, informed Under Secretary of State Dillon that the new government intended to honor all Turkey's existing commitments. Dillon indicated to the Ambassador that the United States might prefer, as in other similar cases, to continue relations as usual without a formal announcement” (Ibid.).

The USA granted recognition the new government on May 30th. Following this mutual declaration of consensus, the most striking development signifying cooperation between the military government and the USA was the large-scale discharge in the army under the pretense of a rejuvenation effort. The idea of forced retirement of thousands of senior and junior officers initially came from the new government. President Gürsel personally explained the reasoning and the content of the project to the U.S. Embassy (Aslan, 2018, p.160) and later to the Supreme

Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, General Norstad, and wished U.S. financial assistance in this project (*Milliyet*, May 22, 1987).³⁹ General Norstad supported the project before senior officials (including the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) with the following remarks (374. Memorandum of Conversation, August 2, 1960, p. 867):

“Such U.S. assistance at this particular early stage in the life of the Provisional Government is most important. The group of young officers in charge is well disposed toward the U.S.; many of them speak English, having received training in the U.S. They give the impression of wanting and expecting U.S. leadership and assistance, and it is most important to step in at this early stage.”

After the May 27th coup d'état, 275 generals and approximately seven thousand officers were discharged from the army (Karpat, 1970, p. 1975). Alparslan Türkeş, who served as Prime Ministry Undersecretary in the military government, also explained in his memoirs written by Hulusi Turgut (1995) that the necessary budget for these discharges was provided by the USA (p.215):

"Rejuvenation of the army required money. NATO Supreme Commander in Paris, Air Chief Marshall Norstad visited Turkey just then. We explained our project to him and asked for their help. We needed twelve million dollars for the job. This amount was provided by America. It was not NATO money. Then we started the discharges."

Colonel Dündar Seyhan, who was a military attaché in Washington at that time, was summoned to participate in the preparations for the discharges (İpekçi & Coşar, 1965, pp. 323-334). Seyhan was an officer who had trained in the USA in from 1950 to 1951 and was sent to the USA at the beginning of 1960 before May 27th (Yetkin, 2006, p. 35). A report titled "Who Among NUC Was Pro-American?" declassified 30 years after the coup indicated that the USA was closely monitoring the political tendencies of the coup plotters (*Hürriyet*, May 27, 1990). The report was prepared by the U.S. Department of State at that time, and it argued that most of the NUC members, including the leader of the coup Cemal Gürsel, were pro-American (cited in Yetkin, p. 33).

The significant increase in the levels of economic aid was another indicator of the US support of the new military regime. The US had granted the DP government 119.8 million dollars in 1960. This number was almost doubled after the coup in 1961 and reached to 232.3

³⁹ Amil Artus, who served first as Minister of State and then as the Minister of Justice in the military government, in his memoirs stated the following regarding this issue: “[...] NATO Supreme Commander Norstad visited Turkey in July. Cemal Gürsel received him. Minister of Foreign Affairs Selim Sarper and Prime Ministry Undersecretary Alparslan Türkeş were also present at the meeting. I later learned that Norstad discussed the situation of the Turkish Armed Forces. He said that the army officers should constitute a pyramid of ranks, but that there are too many high-ranking officers in the Turkish army which would decrease its war power and that it should be corrected. As a result of these discussions, it was decided that the military officer staff had to be shaped into a pyramid by retiring some of the officers whether they are eligible or not. To do that, regardless of their service time, the officers to be retired had to be given pension and compensation" (<http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1987/05/22>).

million dollars (Aslan, 2018, p. 163). According to Aslan “levels of predetermined economic aid for 1961 was increased in the instance of the May 27 coup to specifically keep alive the military government in Turkey” (p. 163-164).

Another pro-American policy that was implemented by the NUC during the coup period was assigning Kemal Kurdaş, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) employee in Washington, as the Minister of Finance. In the same period, the USA set up a radio station to counter the radio stations disseminating Soviet propaganda in Eastern Anatolia. Another significant development was the dismissal of 147 leftist faculty members by the law no 114 dated October 27, 1960. Given the number of universities in Turkey at that time, this was a significant number.

Finally, the 1960 coup generated two significant consequences which ensured the lasting involvement of the military in Turkish political life and thus, indirectly served the US interests in the Cold War. The first of these consequences was the legalization of military intervention by Article 35 of the Internal Service Law issued in 1961. This article stated that the obligation of the Turkish Armed Forces was to protect and defend "the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as determined by the Constitution." The second consequence, which will be examined in detail in the following chapter, was the incorporation of the National Security Council (NSC) imported directly from the US Cold War security apparatus in the constitutional structure.

1.2.1.1. The rise of the left

The 1961 Constitution, although criticized for authorizing military bureaucracy in the administration through the NSC and for including regulations that weakened legislative supremacy, recognized and ensured the principles of a democratic constitutional state; judicial independence; and social, political, and individual rights. It defined a constitutional order in which state-owned public institutions such as TV, radio, and university were given autonomy. All operations and actions of the state were subject to judicial control, and circumstances limiting freedom were considered exceptions (Tanör, 1986; Kili, 2000). The political space broadened with the 1961 Constitution, along with the influence of anti-imperialist movements all over the world, led to the development of leftist movements covering a diverse range of groups in Turkey during the 1960s.

During this period, an important part of the working class chose to interpret the "social state" principle of the new constitution (Art. 2) as social justice (Ünsal, 2002). Until then, there was an "American type" of unionism in Turkey, established at the beginning of the Cold War with guidance from the USA unionists (Çelik, 2010; Güzel, 1983), for which all activities were limited to economic rights, and refrained from dealing with any political issue. These unions united in 1952 under the name Türk-İş to form a nationwide organized confederation. On February 13th, 1961, 12 unionist members of Türk-İş with leftist tendencies founded a new political party named the Turkish Workers' Party (TWP). TWP aimed to represent the interests of workers in the parliament and took a socialist stance in 1962 with a new program and regulations. In the 1965 general elections, the TWP entered parliament with 15 deputies. Almost all the leftist organizations were in touch with the party at that time (Ersan 2013, p. 19). The

founding of TWP was met with a strong reaction from the confederation, which had adopted an "above party" standing. In response, Türk-İş organized a "Komünizmi Tel'in" (Damn Communism) rally on December 22nd, 1962 in Ankara declaring that "workers do not want to engage in doctrinal efforts of a party or a group" (Güzel, p. 1861).

Despite its emphasis on rejecting any kind of political engagements, after its annual meeting in 1964, Türk-İş leaned towards the right, and this choice was institutionalized by assigning unionists who were close to the right-wing Justice Party (JP) to administrative and executive committees. The shift of Türk-İş' to the right led to the discharge of unionists supporting the TWP and paved the way for the foundation of DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) with almost 40,000 members. DİSK was founded under the leadership of TWP's executives on February 13th, 1967 by the former Türk-İş Unions. By 1970, it had more than a hundred thousand members. During this period, DİSK advocated for socialism based on class struggle and embraced an anti-imperialist perspective (Koç & Koç, 2008, p. 21). The conservative majority in the Parliament proposed laws to purge DİSK due to the rapid increase in the number of its members and the social and economic gains achieved by the workers. The increasing impact of the worker protests in response to these legal actions caused serious unrest among the ruling elites, especially the military (Güzel, pp. 1864-1865).

During the same period, leftist ideology became popular among youth. The demands of socialist youth groups for extensive land reforms, leaving NATO, canceling the agreement signed with the European Economic Community, and nationalizing mines and minerals were increasing the tension of the same conservative circles. In 1966, after the Chief of Staff Cemal Tural ordered the Armed Forces to fight against the far-left, the President of the Republic Cevdet Sunay (prior chief of staff) declared that the constitution did not allow for socialism (İnsel, 2002, p. 316). Meanwhile, the JP and other rightist parties carefully organized and channeled the 'anti-communist reaction.' Through successive demonstrations such as the Awakening Rally (Uyanış Mitingi) and National Rising Rally (Milli Şahlanış Mitingi), the nationalist-conservative youth was encouraged to counterbalance the left.

Following the "Bloody Sunday"⁴⁰ incident in 1969, referred to as "an example of organized, fascist violence" by Ahmad (1977), the right and left clash among the youth intensified (p. 381). A youth militia called "commandos" was formed among the nationalist right. Leaders of the leftist university youth also began adopting armed struggle methods at the end of the 1960s (Sayarı, 2010).

The government blamed the rights and freedoms given in the constitution for its failure to end the armed struggle. Prime Minister Demirel was openly asserting that "one cannot govern a state with this constitution" (Kongar, August 28, 2016). Not only Demirel but also the high ranks of the military bureaucracy were complaining about the extent of rights and freedoms in

⁴⁰ Bloody Sunday is the public name of the incident on February 16, 1966, where the rightist groups attacked the 76 youth organizations convened to protest the American 6th Fleet at Taksim Square. The attack was carried out by the groups responding to the call "to teach the communists a lesson" by Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği (Anti-communism Association) and Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Students Union) at the Respect the Flag Rally on February 14th. Two young protesters were knifed to death. Police did not intervene with the attackers, and a limited investigation was carried out regarding the incident.

the Constitution. At an NSC meeting held at the end of 1970, then Chief of Staff Memduh Tağmaç was stating that they wanted amendments to the Constitution. General Secretary of the NSC, General Emin Alpkaya, supported Tağmaç at the council meeting on February 22nd, 1971, and claimed that "it is necessary to fill up the judiciary gaps to prevent devastating events disrupting the social order" (cited in Ünsaldı 2008, p. 82). Additional remarks from Tağmaç at the same meeting revealed that the Chief of Staff did not only target far-leftist militants, leftist unions, and student groups. He was also very uncomfortable with the fact that the leftist fractions in the army were posing a grave threat and danger of disrupting the institutional unity of the army (Ibid.):

In short, left has increased its efforts on the Armed Forces. Left wants to seize the Armed Forces and overtake the government. Today, everyone has their eyes on the Armed Forces. We need to keep the army in an authoritarian order.⁴¹

On March 12, 1971, the military wing of the NSC, which is the highest-ranking class of TAF, issued a memorandum. In the memorandum, which led to the resignation of the government, the military hierarchy blamed the parliament and the government for the social and economic unrest and anarchy in the country. It suggested the formation of a cabinet which would have an "above party" understanding, and which "inspired by Atatürk's views, [would] implement the reforms envisaged by the constitution and protect the reformist laws." It was also stated in the memorandum that if the demands were not met, the army would exercise its duty to "protect and safeguard the Republic of Turkey", and take over power itself.

The intent of the TAF's memorandum was seemingly to establish a political ground that would realize the fundamental reforms declared in the 1961 Constitution. However, the legislative regulations effectuated during this period, in which the multi-party system was de facto suspended, showed another reality.

1.2.1.2. From “Progressive” Army to the Army of “the Order”: 1971 Intervention as a Precursor of September 12

Following the memorandum, martial law was declared in 11 cities, and it lasted throughout the interim regime. During the martial law, the government under the direct rule of the military hierarchy started a systematic repression to suppress and eliminate the leftist movement, which until then had gained power on a large scale. Political meetings and seminars, as well as strikes and lockouts by trade bodies and unions, were prohibited. During the March 12 period, not only illegal parties and organizations, but also members and executives of many labour, youth, and teacher organizations that were legally founded and that operated within the scope of their charters, such as TWP, DİSK, Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları (Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East), İşsizlik ve Pahalılıkla Savaş Derneği (Society for Struggle against Unemployment and Cost of Living), and Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası (Teachers' Union of

⁴¹ On the other hand, it may be said that Tağmaç's fear was not baseless. A coup d'état by MDD inspired officers was a very real possibility in 1971.

Turkey) were put to trial. Founders and members of these organizations were accused of "membership in an illegal organization," and many received heavy sentences.

Detentions targeted not only those who were engaged directly in the Leftist organizations. People who had close relations with the leftists were also prosecuted. Prominent scientists, writers, and intellectuals of the period were arrested with unfounded allegations of being members of underground leftist organizations. Many left-oriented journals, newspapers, and publishers were shut down, and their employees, writers, and executives faced political prosecution and trial. All political criminals of the period were tried at martial courts and were detained in military prisons until their trials ended.

The operation to purge the left was implemented within the TAF as well. At that time, there was a group in the army which adopted a "national revolutionary development strategy" and in the quest of a leftist military intervention similar to the interventions seen in Egypt and Algeria. This group, named "9 Martçılar" ("March 9'ers"), was discharged from the army right after the March 12 intervention (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 272-301). Major General Celil Gürkan, who was forced to retire after the March 12 intervention, in his book, *12 Mart'a Beş Kala* (On the Brink of March 12; 1986), suggested an alternative explanation on the reason of the intervention. According to him, the intervention was made to purge the leftists in the army (p. 373).⁴²

The military hierarchy, incarcerating almost all the operations of legal leftist organizations wanted to design a political system entrapped solely in the Parliament. A short while after the memorandum, on March 26, 1971, a technocrat government was formed under the leadership of Nihat Erim, assigned as an above party prime minister. JP and RPP were represented by few ministries in this administration. However, this government only lasted 11 months. The following governments formed by the support of the army under the prime ministry of Ferit Melen and Naim Talu did not last long either. Due to the increasing domestic and foreign pressures, the parliamentary regime was restored in October of 1973. During the military rule, there had not been a significant improvement in the reform efforts in areas such as education, mines and minerals, and agriculture and health. However, the governments, in conformity with the demands of the military bureaucracy, realized many legislative regulations to "restore the power of the state."

Due to the implicit consensus between the conservative majority in the Parliament and the army on the 1961 Constitution's "extensive" freedoms, the interim government made three constitutional amendments. These constitutional amendments acted as milestones in shaping the national security state, which was consolidated later by the September 12 military junta. These amendments can be examined under three main categories (Tanör, 1986, pp. 54-60; Gözler, 2000, pp. 77-92):

The first category is related to increasing the autonomy of the military, as the amendments in this category enabled the military bureaucracy to (at least partially) evade political and judicial control. Authorities of the military justice were extended on the expanse

⁴² He based his view on the lecture that Brigadier General Ali Elverdi, the head March 12 court-martial gave at the JP Çankaya Youth Organization on March 28, 1976 on "Communism in Turkey."

of civilian justice, and judicial control over administrative acts and actions was removed from the Council of State and given to the newly established High Military Administrative Court (Art. 140). The declaration of martial law was expedited (Art. 124) and the trial of civilians by the military courts for non-military offenses was made possible (Art. 138/2). Another amendment increasing the institutional autonomy of the military was the termination of standard control over the assets of the army. It was stipulated that such control was to be "enacted in accordance with the confidentiality principles required by national defense services" (Art. 127/3). With the amendments made on the status of NSC in the 1961 Constitution, the weight of the military hierarchy in politics was increased, and the NSC's authorities were extended. Thus, the NSC was raised to a position where it could advise the government on security concerns, and any other issues it sees fit.

The second category includes amendments to empower the executive. The cabinet was given the authority to issue legislative decrees (Art. 64). The autonomy of universities was curtailed (Art.120) and the autonomy of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) was lifted (Art. 121). Amendments regarding fundamental rights and freedoms increased the state's authority vis-a-vis individuals and society. A general restrictive provision that is valid for all fundamental rights and freedoms was inserted in the Constitution (Art. 11). Reasons for legal restriction on fundamental rights and freedoms were increased (Art. 15, 22, 29, 46/1), and the basis for these restrictions was defined in vague and legally unfounded terms, such as "the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation." These restrictive legal changes had an immediate effect and were supported by changes yielding more substantial consequences. Within this scope, civil servants' right to establish trade unions was revoked (Art. 119), and academic staff members were prohibited from becoming members of political parties (Art. 120). The detention period was extended, and the defendants were removed from the control and guarantee of judges and put under the control of the police (Art. 30).

The last category consists of the amendments that disrupted judicial unity and restricted judicial control. The most important of these amendments was the establishment of the State Security Courts (SSC). SSCs were extraordinary chambers that were to try offenses against the security of the state. The government was influential in the selection of its members (Art.136). The first paragraph of the article on this subject was as such: "State Security Courts shall be established to deal with offences against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free democratic order, or against the Republic whose characteristics are defined in the Constitution, and offences directly involving the internal and external security of the State. However, provisions concerning the state of martial law and state of war are reserved." This article was used against the "leftist threat" at that time and was later used to punish all and any demands and actions contradicting the official state ideology. As such, security policy directly penetrated the judiciary. In short, in terms of the measures and practices implemented against the left, March 12 coup d'état can easily be defined as a Cold War intervention. Another significant point that deserves attention about this period was that the problems encountered with the USA during the 1960s were resolved in favor of the USA.

1.2.1.3. Role of the USA in the March 12 Memorandum

There are numerous claims in the Turkish political literature about the role the USA in the March 12, 1971, coup d'état. Süleyman Demirel, in an interview he gave in 1991, summarized the troubling issues between Turkey and the USA before March 12 under four headings (Yetkin & Özen, January 11-20, 1991): The first issue was related to the rapprochement between Soviets and Turkey. In the second half of the 1960s, after being rejected by its Western allies, Turkey had started receiving financial support from the USSR for its industrial investments. Demirel claimed that this relationship bothered the USA for two reasons: the possibility of losing Turkey as an ally to the USSR and Turkey's new strategy to move from an exporter of the raw material supplier to the producer of manufactured goods.⁴³ The second issue was about combining all the mutual agreements made with the USA since the beginning of the Cold War⁴⁴ under a single agreement called the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement on July 3, 1969, and the cancellation of some of these agreements. The third issue was the ban put on American spy flights from Turkish bases to avoid a conflict with the Soviets in 1966.⁴⁵ Finally, the fourth issue was the rejection of the USA's demand to ban all opium cultivation in Turkey. According to the USA, 80% of the opium entering its domain was originating from Turkey. On the other hand, the realization of this demand would cause significant damage to approximately one hundred thousand peasant families who lived on opium cultivation at the time (Erhan, 2001, p. 703).⁴⁶

Another USA-related issue that preoccupied the left-oriented Turkish public during the 1960s was the allegations of secret CIA operations in Turkey. Leftist media began to cover many incidents with alleged CIA involvement in those days. The two failed coup attempts under the leadership of Military Academy Commander Talat Aydemir in January and May of 1963 were associated with the CIA. The press was not the only entity questioning the CIA's involvement in Turkey at that time. The two political parties of the country were also closely interested in its activities. In July 1966, then the Secretary-General of the main opposition party RPP, Bülent Ecevit, claimed that the "CIA intervenes in the domestic politics of many allied countries including Turkey through various methods" and that "it provides financial help to the

⁴³ Demirel said the followings about the USA's reactions to the industrialization move of the country (cited in Yetkin, 114): "[...] Turkey pays a lot as long as it buys refined oil instead of crude oil. So, we decided to increase the refinery capacity and build new refineries. [...] We told our intentions to the Westerners. We asked if they could finance it. They said they wouldn't. We asked the Soviets if they would finance it. They said they would. We negotiated with the Soviets and started the constructions. This bothered them. The West was bothered by it. I remember well, in 1967 the American Ambassador visited me at the Prime Ministry. I still can recall our meeting very vividly. He entered through the door, and before taking a seat asked me: "Are you changing sides?" [...] America was greatly disturbed because we had restored relations with the Soviets."

⁴⁴ There is contradicting information regarding the number of mutual agreements signed with the USA. According to a statement made by Süleyman Demirel in April 1966, Turkey and the USA have signed 54 mutual agreements in years 1952-1960. According to the official statement made in 1970, the number of agreements is 91. According to Erhan (2001), the contradiction in the figures lies in the fact that some of the agreements were confidential, so they were not brought to the Parliament (p. 556).

⁴⁵ In 1968, the USA repeated its demand for flight clearance over Turkey for its U-2 aircrafts. However, Ecevit administration refused to negotiate. Following this decision, National Intelligence Agency reports would note an increase in loan problems (Arcayürek, 2003, p.150).

⁴⁶ Demirel made the following explanation in 1969 to the representative of Nixon administration sent to Turkey on this issue: "Turkey has a city named after opium (Afyon). To tell the truth, even if we impose a ban, it would not be sustainable. It would cause great indignation; we cannot do this" (cited in Yetkin, 2006, p. 141).

political party [implying JP] it wants to win the elections" (cited in Erhan, p. 696). Furthermore, the chairman of TWP (which was dissolved after March 12), Mehmet Ali Aybar, called everyone to unite against the Anglo-American imperialism and asserted that the CIA was supporting some of the Türk-İş executives.

When the President of the USA at the time, Lyndon B. Johnson, appointed his intelligence consultant Robert Komer, an ex-CIA operative who had been involved in the secret operation in Vietnam, as ambassador to Ankara in 1968, allegations of CIA involvement in the domestic affairs of the country became more prevalent. The TWP and leftist press believed that Komer was sent to implement a plan to wipe out the leftist movement. These developments triggered a series of anti-American youth demonstrations. Thereupon the USA had to call Komer back in 1969. However, the protests continued until the March 12 military intervention (Erhan, pp. 696-697).

None of these allegations provide evidence about the U.S. involvement in the March 12 coup d'état. However, Duane R. Clarridge, CIA Turkey station chief between 1968-1973, indicated in his memoir that the CIA had advance knowledge of the military coup (Clarridge, 1997, p.117)⁴⁷. A memorandum from Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff of President Richard M. Nixon on March 25, 1971, revealed U.S. priorities. With no announcement of any concern after the military had forced the elected government to resign, Saunders merely noted that the military leaders were "the final arbiters" in the country and that the United States should now be open "to convincing the military decisionmakers of the urgency of the opium problem," the primary issue of concern to the United States at the time (442. Memorandum from Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs, March 25, 1971). In the same memo Nihat Erim, the new Prime Minister appointed by the March 12 military administration was defined as "genuinely well disposed toward the U.S." Indeed, Prime Minister Erim agreed to ban the cultivation of opium poppies by June 1972.

1.2.1.4. Towards the September 12 Coup d'état: Political Instability and Social Polarization:1973-980

The Emergence of New Political Trends

The measures of the March 12 administration neither established political stability nor prevented social polarization. Until 1980, during the six years after the memorandum, the country was ruled by seven different governments, including one temporary, three minority, and three coalitions.

⁴⁷ Clarridge noted on this subject that "Our advance knowledge coup by letter was certainly an intelligence success. We were one up on our compatriots in Ankara in that regard, but that was often the case. Although Ankara was the capital, our office in Istanbul frequently had a better perspective on what was happening in Turkey" (p. 117).

Table 2: Civilian Governments from March 12th to September 12th

Governments	Prime Minister	Structure of the Government	Term
37th Gov.	Bülent Ecevit	RPP-NSP Coalition	26.01.1974- 17.11.1974
38th Gov.	Sadi Irmak	Above-party temporary administration	17.11.1974- 31.03.1975
39th Gov.	Süleyman Demirel	Nationalist Front I (JP-NSP-RRP-NAP-Independents)	31.03.1975- 21.06.1977
40th Gov.	Bülent Ecevit	RPP Minority Government	21.06.1977- 21.07.1977
41st Gov.	Süleyman Demirel	Nationalist Front II (JP-NSP-NAP)	21.07.1977- 05.01.1978
42nd Gov.	Bülent Ecevit	RPP Minority Government (with the support of RRP & DP)	05.01.1978- 12.11.1979
43rd Gov.	Süleyman Demirel	JP Government (covert Nationalist Front III)	12.11.1979- 12.09.1980

Source: Official website of Prime Ministry; (Özdemir, 1992, pp. 236-246).

Although the political rivalry was mainly between RPP and JP, neither party managed to obtain enough votes to form a powerful government between 1974 and 1980. During that time, they did not engage in a convincing pursuit of consensus.

Another prominent development during this period was the active involvement of "marginal" political parties in the political scene, despite their relatively low voting rates. The first of these parties was the Republican Peasant National Party. In 1969 the party changed its name to the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), a name more suited to its identity. This movement, led by 1960 coup plotter Staff Colonel Alparslan Türkeş (Türkeş and his friends were discharged from the army right after the coup) became the organized force of the Turkish radical right with its "idealist" militant groups (Özdemir, 1992, pp. 223-247).

These militants, whose support was frequently used in the fight against the left before the 1980 military intervention, after a brief resentment period towards the state due to NAP's closure during the 1980 coup, would gradually regain their roles in the old and new security establishments of the country.⁴⁸ Although the severe punishments inflicted on NAP and its

⁴⁸ It is necessary to summarize the NAP's ideology, to better understand the reasons why these militants, who had taken up position against the left before September 12, volunteered to "serve" against the Kurdish movement in legal and illegal operations in the 1990s. Thus, the common intellectual grounds of the national security ideology and extreme nationalism in Turkey and the reasons for their symbiotic relationship can be more easily comprehended. Ağaoğulları (1987), asserted that NAP has adopted an "authoritarian-totalitarian" approach in its notion of state and that it had similarities with fascism at ideological and terminological levels (p. 219). NAP's doctrine was named as "nationalist-socialist" by extreme nationalists in 1970s and this was criticized for connoting "national socialism". NAP leader Türkeş's response to this criticism is enlightening: "We issued a notice in response to the abuse of our enemies and prohibited the "nationalist-socialist" expression.[...] No more making statements like according to nationalist socialism this is this, this is that!... Everything is thought of under this flag. A solution for everything is devised." (Ibid.) This self-contradictory statement refusing pluralism and free thought, perceiving the individual as an organic whole, was a clear expression of an authoritarian approach. In this context, according to NAP the political function of the state was to "herd" this homogenous whole, "motivate them to work

idealist militants by the September 12th intervention deeply wounded the pro-state stance of the party, this disagreement did not last long. Society's reactionary response to the Kurdish nationalism rising in the 1990s elevated NAP from a "marginal" party to a "center party." Its militants were once again started to be used in "covert" state operations against the Kurds (Bora & Can, 2004, p. 11). During this time, the state also rewarded their active and outsourced services boldly.

Between the years 1973-1980, a second movement within the right wing emerged with an Islamist tendency. The small and medium-sized conservative business owners of Anatolia gathered in hubs in İstanbul and İzmir in search of a new political formation. They founded the National Order Party (NOP) on January 26, 1970, under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, the former president of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. The NOP, as further studied in the last chapter, became the first Islamist political party of Turkey. Until the 1980s the military authority's reaction towards this party would oscillate between toleration and punishment. In the 1990s, this movement would reappear in 1983 under the name of Welfare Party and considerably increase its voting base in time. In the mid-1990s WP would become the archenemy of the national security state and be subjected to a "post-modern" coup d'état on February 28, 1997.

Period of Coalitions and Increased Political Polarization

In conformity with the political tradition of the country, a top ranking officer, Admiral Fahri Korutürk was elected president, and the interim regime ended with the general elections that took place on October 14th, 1973.⁴⁹ RPP, led by Bülent Ecevit, won the general elections thanks to the center-left strategy it developed after 1965, whereas JP only obtained 149 seats in the Parliament due to the separation of rightist votes. NSP, just as the TAF had hoped, managed to attract a considerable number of JP's votes. Except for the center-rightist Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi)⁵⁰ founded by ex-RPP member Prof. Dr. Turhan Feyzioğlu, all the rightist parties refused to form a coalition with RPP. After three months of uncertainty, despite resistance from both party members, on January 26, 1974, RPP and NSP formed a coalition government under the prime ministry of Bülent Ecevit. Thus RPP, losing government in 1950 and only partaking in the coalitions imposed by the military in 1961, finally managed

harder" and guide them towards the determined goals. This movement, similar to the corporative organization of Italian fascism, was placing an elite executive staff at its management and putting them under a leader who would be "not accountable to any class or group in the name of national interests" (Ibid., p. 220). NAP's nationalism contained an aggressive and belligerent discourse directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Hence, during the 1970s, all ethnic identities and minorities, particularly Kurds and Alawites, were regarded as the most dangerous enemies after communists. In this "war," a frequently resorted method was provoking poor Sunni Turks against Kurds and Alawites. NAP's ideologues while legitimizing the social inequity through religious explanations (NAP's 1973 election bulletin says; "Since God has created man with different capabilities and natures, it is natural and necessary for them to have different spiritual and material opportunities.") they were targeting the "others" as the root cause of their poverty.

⁴⁹ Except for Celal Bayar (1950-1960), all the Presidents of Turkey until 1989, were military leaders. Bayar was arrested and sentenced to death after the 1960 coup d'état. However, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to old age and on November 7, 1964; he was released because of his ill health.

⁵⁰ Republican Reliance Party won 13 seats in 1973 elections and only three seats in 1977 elections.

to come into power after a long time. This coalition government also provided the political basis for the legitimization of NSP, a party that advocated Islamic thought.

The coalition which was initially beneficial for both parties did not last long. A severe conflict arose within the government when several NSP deputies voted against the general amnesty bill included in the coalition protocol which would release the prisoners of the March 12 period. Then a new conflict arose when the two parties of the coalition had different approaches to the handling of 1974 Cyprus crisis. The government began to disintegrate when the NSP wing suggested conquering the entire island during the Cyprus operations (July 20-22 and August 14-16, 1974).

Unable to contain the disagreement within the government, Ecevit resigned, thereby triggering a collapse of the coalition government on 7 November 1974. After Ecevit's resignation, the President of the Republic Korutürk assigned contingency senator ⁵¹ Prof. Dr. Sadi Irmak as the prime minister. The Irmak administration comprised of technocrats and bureaucrats stayed in government for over four months despite failing to receive a vote of confidence. On March 1, 1975, Korutürk offered for Sadi Irmak to form a government once again, but Irmak refused. After Ecevit shared the same attitude as Irmak, the assignment to form the government was once again given to Demirel. After more than six months of crisis, Demirel succeeded in the formation of the so-called Nationalist Front, comprised of four right-wing parties (JP-NSP-RRP-NAP) and independents. With this coalition, JP was gaining prestige from the voters who demanded unity in the right, while NSP was freed from the accusation of "communist collaborator." Despite its 3.4% low vote rate, NAP enjoyed the most favorable position in this new administration by widely penetrating government agencies and state economic enterprises, particularly the Ministry of Education (Özdemir, 1992, p.241).

All parties of the coalition saw common ground in the formation of a united front against the resurgence of the left in the mid-1970s. The coalition which lasted for some time due to the early election fear of small parties fell into a crisis in 1976 because of conflicting views about SSCs. RPP together with DİSK were fervently against the existence of SSCs. The extensive authority of the SSCs was also troubling the Islamist conservatives in the coalition. The coalition failed to pass any legislation from June to November of 1976 because of this conflict. In the meantime, the law on the establishment of the SSC was annulled by the Constitutional Court and a period of one year was given to pass a new legislation (Sav, 1983, p. 918). Although he was in favor of the SSC, Demirel refrained from enacting a new law because of the frictions mentioned above. Demirel's decision was perceived as a great "treachery" by the military (Birand, Bila & Akar, 1999, p. 59).

After the transition to a civilian government in 1973, the labor movement gained momentum once again. Unions started to become influential in the society and in steering the social and economic policies of the country. Particularly in the second half of the 1970s, the majority of the working class waged an active struggle to reverse the loss in purchasing power

⁵¹ The Senate of the Republic was established by the 1961 Constitution as an upper house. The Senate was composed of 150 elected members and 15 "contingent senators" for a term of 6 years appointed by the president. It also had "natural senators," who were the former presidents and the NUC of the 1960 coup d'état (1961 Constitution, Art. 70-73). Senate of the Republic was abolished after the September 12 coup d'état.

due to high inflation. The industrial bourgeoisie, which had already been complaining about the right to collective bargaining and strike, got further annoyed by the rise in the real wage rates (Boratav, 1992, p. 343). As a confederation that was growing stronger each day, the political attitude of DİSK against the administration started to having effect upon the ranks of Türk-İş. Meanwhile, strikes for further economic and political rights, solidarity strikes, boycotts, and slowdown strikes were becoming increasingly widespread.⁵²

The working class of Turkey, especially unions under DİSK, strongly opposed the Nationalist Front. Two big worker demonstrations took place in this period. In 1976, Labor Day was celebrated by a group of over a hundred thousand people, comprised of unions affiliated to DİSK, Türk-İş, non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, artists, and youth with the slogan "a world changing towards socialism." The celebrations in 1976 were uneventful. However, the next year's Labor Day celebrations turned violent. On May 1, 1977, an unknown group of people opened fire into a large crowd gathered at the Taksim Square with the call of DİSK and led to the death of 36 people (Çavdar, 1996, pp. 246-248). This planned attack, coupled with the assassination warning sent to Ecevit by Prime Minister Demirel immediately after this incident, led to a suspicion of the existence of a secret organization called "counter-guerrilla," in the eyes of the public. Although Demirel refuted these allegations, they maintained their importance since the attackers could not be identified.

At the end of the Cold War, in August 1990, Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti admitted that in Italy and other Western European countries, clandestine armies, comprised of extreme-rightist militants, were established against communism threat under the NATO leadership (Ganser, 2005). The existence of a similar establishment in Turkey also became public in the same period.⁵³ However, many political murders and massacres attributed to this organization remained unsolved.⁵⁴

In the second half of the 1970s, violent conflicts between the right and left were spread throughout Turkey, particularly within the universities. The occupational organizations, including those of teachers, police, lawyers, and engineers, were divided into two groups with different names that were congruent with their ideologies.⁵⁵ This division also had its reflections in the coalition. While NSP was explicitly accusing NAP militants of terrorist activities, NAP

⁵² According to Ministry of Labor data, the total number of strikes in years 1963-1971 soared from 569 to 1,021 in years 1971-1980 (Türkiye İstatistik Cep Yıllığı, 1984, p. 208).

⁵³ Ecevit (1991), in his memoirs, indicated that he had learned the presence of such a stay-behind initiative in Turkey at a briefing he received from the Chief of Staff in 1974 during his government. Publicly named as counter-guerrilla, this organization was the Special Warfare Department (SWD) and its paramilitary civilian extension within the TAF. It was a USA supported organization "within, but not under the governance of the government. General Kemal Yamak, who presided the SWD in years 1971-1974, stated in his memoirs (2006) that the SWD was established in 1952 within the "covert operations concept" of NATO and that the USA sent a million dollars each year until 1974.

⁵⁴ For counter-guerrilla allegations in Turkey see, Emin M. Değer, CIA, Kontrgerilla ve Türkiye (CIA, Counter-Guerrilla and Turkey) (Ankara: Çağ Yayınları, 1979); İlhan Selçuk, Ziver Bey Köşkü (Ziver Bey Villa) (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1988); Talat Turhan, Özel Savaş, Terör ve Kontrgerilla (Special War, Terror and Counter-Guerrilla) (Istanbul: Tümm zamanlar Yayınları, 1992), Talat Turhan, Kontr-gerilla Cumhuriyeti (Republic of Counter-Guerrilla) (Istanbul: Tümm zamanlar Yayınları, 1993).

⁵⁵ Left-wing organizations such as TÖB-DER, TÜM-DER, POL-DER and their rightest counterparts Ülkücü Polisler Birliği (POL-BİR), Ülkücü Öğretmenler Birliği Derneği (ÜLKÜBİR-ÖĞRET) were examples of this division.

blamed NSP for being "green communist" (Birand et al., p, 82).

In this chaotic atmosphere, the government decided to hold an early election on June 5, 1977. RPP won about 42% of the votes, and Ecevit was appointed the prime minister. Unsuccessful in his coalition efforts, Ecevit tried to form a minority government. However, despite the President's approval, the minority government failed to win a vote of confidence in the Parliament, and Ecevit had to withdraw. The blockage in the system transformed into a regime crisis.

After a short time, rightist parties (JP, NSP, and NAP) who shared the view that "the government shall not be delivered to the left" formed the second NF administration led by Demirel. Following this development, his party ranks heavily pressured Ecevit to provide an alternative to the second NF. Ecevit convinced some JP deputies to resign from their party with the promise of appointing them as ministers and overthrow the Demirel administration by a vote of no-confidence with the support of four deputies from RRP and DP. Besides, he managed to form a new government with the help of the deputies of the same two parties (Tunçay, 1983b, p. 1990).

During the term of the third Ecevit administration, the global oil crisis deepened the economic problems of the country, and right-left conflict continued to accelerate at an increasing pace. The ideological clashes gravitated towards denominational differences (Alawite-Sunni) in those years and many violent incidents occurred, often involving the idealist militants who form the youth branches of the NAP. Alawites supported Ecevit as a bloc. The first provocations and attacks on Alawites occurred in Malatya, Sivas, and Elazığ. Alawites and Sunnis lived in these cities were pitted against each other.

The most violent incident occurred however in Kahramanmaraş on December 22, 1978. The idealist militants raided the funeral of two leftist teachers who had been assassinated. This assault suddenly turned into a massacre in which 109 people lost their lives, 176 were severely injured (Özdemir, 1992, p. 245). None of the security forces in the area, including the army, intervened in the clashes which lasted until December 25 and the citizens of Alawite origin eventually had to leave the city (Ibid). Following these incidents, the government declared martial law in 13 cities including Istanbul. However political assassinations continued through the late 1970s.⁵⁶ Assassins began to select targets to send warnings to particular groups. The police did not make any detailed investigations for most of the political killings, and the suspects who were held could easily escape the military prisons (Ahmad, 1993).

Ecevit lost the public support at the mid-term elections and resigned from his post on October 14th, 1978. Demirel then formed the Third Nationalist Front government on November 12th, 1979 with the support of NSP and NAP. This government also faced similar problems and quickly worn out. At the end of the year, the Chief of Staff and commanders-in-chief presented the President of the Republic a warning letter to deliver to the Demirel administration. In the

⁵⁶ On July 11, 1978, in Ankara, Professor Bedrettin Cömert, a member of the committee set up to investigate rightist terrorist incidents was assassinated at Hacettepe University. On February 2, 1979, the country was shocked by yet another assassination as editor-in-chief of Milliyet, Abdi İpekçi was killed by idealist militant Mehmet Ali Ağca. A liberal journalist, İpekçi was Ecevit's friend. It was alleged that the assassination of İpekçi was aimed to undermine the prime minister's and the administration's prestige.

first six months of 1980, political clashes led to the death of more than 1,400 people (Schick & Tonak, 1998, p. 393). By the summer of that year, the number of killings rose to 25 per day (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 55). From 1976, the year the murders began to escalate, to the end of 1980, more than 5,000 lost their lives in armed conflicts (see Table 2).

Table 3: Figures for Political Murders in Turkey (1969-1980)

Years	Number of Casualties
1969	9
1970	19
1971	22
1972	22
1973	15
1974	27
1975	37
1976	108
1977	315
1978	1095
1979	1362
1980	2206

Source: (Keleş & Ünsal, 1982)

Economic Crisis and January 24 Decisions

The import substitution industrialization strategy followed since 1963 and the populist economic policies implemented along with it had dragged the country into an immense foreign debt and a continually increasing inflation. The 1973 and 1974 oil shocks and the stagflation in the West had disrupted the balance of trade and boosted the current account deficit whereas the exchange rate policies had failed to stop overvaluation of the Turkish lira. The governments tried to control import expenditures and exchange rates to reestablish the economic balance. However, these policies caused foreign exchange bottlenecks and interrupted the capital good importation. As a result, the production diminished considerably. When the second oil shock in 1979 eliminated the possibility of using external sources to balance the economy, the need for a radical change in the economic order ensued.

Big investment groups that were struggling with decreasing profit margins in favor of wage rates and the economic crisis at the end of the 1970s, decided to announce their discontent to the public with an unconventional method used for the first time in Turkey's history. In May 1979, the representative of these groups, the Turkish Industry & Business Association (TÜSİAD), placed full-page adverts blaming the RPP administration (January 5, 1978-November 12, 1979) for implementing an anti-capitalist program and accused the government of being the primary reason of the economic crisis (Birand, Bilâ, & Akar, p.124). These adverts contained the views of big business on issues such as necessary economic and democratic reforms and labor peace and demanded the reorganization of democratic institutions to guarantee the economic security of the Turkish business, which has organic relations with the world monopolies (Çavdar, 1983, p. 2099). Years later, Ecevit made the following statement

about these adverts: "Leaders of some high-level investment groups went to or were called to Washington. There, Brzezinski, who was then the chief or a high-ranking member of the National Security Council, stormed at them saying how they could let such a prime minister govern the country. Right after that, those investment groups, capitalist circles placed adverts to overthrow our government" (Birand, Bilâ, & Akar, p.124). By the end of the 1970s, the interests of the Turkish bourgeoisie overlapped with the interests of USA-centered multi-nationals, IMF, and other similar international economic institutions.

Following the fall of Ecevit administration, the JP regained power in December of 1979 (Çavdar, 1983, pp. 2093-2094). The JP minority government prepared a package of "stabilization measures" aimed at addressing economic problems. Referred to as "January 24 Decisions" in the economic literature due to its announcement date in 1980, the package included a series of structural reforms to aiming to liberalize the entire economy (Akat, 1983, p. 1109).

January 24 Decisions were prepared at the end of 1979 by a small group of technocrats brought together by Turgut Özal, who was appointed as the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry State Planning Organization by Prime Minister Demirel. The program was a typical IMF prescription, which included measures to downsize the role of the state in the economy as well as liberalization of trade and capital movements. Turkey would abandon import substitution industrialization strategy and make a transition to an economic model focused on the rapid increase in cheap-to-produce exports for foreign exchange earnings. It would open for foreign competition, eliminate support prices for the agricultural sector, introduce regressive tax system, liberalize its interest rates, and privatize the State Economic Enterprises (Saygın & Çimen, 2013, p. 14). The reform package also included disturbing measures such as limiting wage increases and postponing strikes (Aydoğan, 2010; Birand, Bila, & Akar, 1999).

The government applied to the IMF and OECD consortium to open new credits and facilitate interest payments on old debts. With a three-year stand-by agreement signed on June 18, 1980, the IMF approved financial assistance of 1.2 billion Special Drawing Rights to Turkey. This amount was six times the Turkish quota of the Fund, and it constituted the highest credit extended to any country up to that time by the IMF. Turkey's letter of intent to the IMF included obligations to relieve the IMF's concerns about the progress of the collective bargaining negotiations with the trade unions (Kazdağlı, 2001, p.458).

The program received heavy resistance from the Parliament and labor organizations. DİSK fiercely opposed the regressive tax reform and the wage control since they would worsen income distribution. Some of the opposition in the Parliament, especially RPP led by Bülent Ecevit, who had strong links with labor organizations, questioned the program's constitutionality and disputed the decisions that would lead the termination of subsidies extended to State Economic Enterprises (SEE) (Işıklı, 2005). However, Prime Minister Demirel preferred to convince the General Staff rather than the Parliament about the January 24 Decisions. These radical economic reforms would concern the military elites not only because they would generate political and social repercussions in Turkey. They would also directly affect the military elites which until then had been a distinctive capitalist class in Turkey.

TAF as an Investor

TAF, by the mid-1970s, had already become one of Turkey's largest conglomerates due to the Army Forces Pension Fund (OYAK) established on March 1, 1961 (Law no. 205) issued by the National Unity Committee. Akça (2002) asserted that the military resorted to such means to improve the financial conditions of the officers, which had deteriorated during the 1950s, "ensuring their economic autonomy in the face of civilian powers" (p. 83). Indeed, the need for economic autonomy led the army to share common economic interests with capital groups. The army, which staged the 1960 coup and remained distant from the business world, was directly articulated to the capitalist class in Turkey in 1971.

Although the purpose of the legislation that formed the basis for the establishment of OYAK was "to provide social assistance to the members of the Turkish Armed Forces", the list of "institutional services", as Parla argued (2002a), clearly indicated that "a large commercial enterprise would be incorporated with the institutional structure of the armed forces" (p. 67). By the mid-1970s, OYAK had made large profit-seeking investments in the automotive, cement, real estate, petrochemical, agricultural pesticide, insurance, food, and service sectors (Akça, p. 88). What made OYAK particularly important for capital groups was the economic link it established in its investments between international capital, local monopoly capital groups, and SEEs. Parla also stated that "the existence of a perfect consensus between the military elites and the business world was proven by the fact that the emperor of the Turkish industry and commerce, Vehbi Koç and the Turkish private banking baron, Kazım Taşkent became the members of first executive board of OYAK, as well as the founding shareholders of the first important OYAK initiatives; Koç in OYAK-Goodyear and Taşkent in OYAK-Renault" (p. 72).

Behind the commercial performance of OYAK, where elite businessmen actively participated in the executive board together with the military, were tax exemptions (including corporation tax) and other similar concessions, which were determined in its statute. Furthermore, since all its goods, income, and receivables were considered "state property" (Art. 37) in the legislation, OYAK was not affected by the risks that could arise from the fluctuations of the market and was therefore protected from possible destructive effects of fair competition. As a result, OYAK became a central economic actor, which the capitalist groups competed to cooperate with. Therefore, it was important that Demirel convince the military elite about the January 24 Decisions. Demirel assigned this job to the architect of the reforms, Turgut Özal. After giving three secret briefings to the military hierarchy on the subject (Birand, Bilâ, & Akar, p.140), Özal finally received approval to initiate the reforms.

Although the government won the support of the military hierarchy for the January 24 Decisions, it did not win the support of the army regarding how to fight terrorism in the martial law areas under TAF's responsibility. Moreover, in this period a new crisis regarding the presidency of the republic emerged. The President of the Republic Korutürk's term ended in the spring of 1980, and the Parliament failed to elect a new president for months. This political bottleneck in addition to the growing street clashes and terrorist activities became the main factors that provided TAF with the necessary legitimacy for the coup. Finally, on September 12, 1980, the military command consisting of the Chief of General Staff, Commanders of

Land, Air and Naval Forces, and the General Commander of Gendarmerie, took over the government under the name of the "National Security Board" (NSB).

Following the coup d'état, NSB members who were unwilling to encounter any weaknesses in areas outside their expertise, assigned Turgut Özal the duty of implementing economic reforms within the military government. The military government, on the other hand, self-bestowed the authority to establish a new political order in which the state would be run by its "real owners."

2. Establishment of the National Security State: September 12 Regime

The September 12 coup d'état represents a milestone in the history of coups in the Republic of Turkey, with its goals for economic transformation, mass depoliticization, liquidation of political institutions, and restructuring the state. The September 12 coup, evaluated in the context of its practices, was a well-planned, intervention. Its timing was carefully chosen. Coup stagers, thanks to the political turmoil, implemented a social engineering project for a full-fledged hegemony which radically reorganized the state-citizen and state-military-politics relations.

There were two important objectives of this project: The first was to give an order to the social domain and political system and to establish the legal grounds for perpetuating the control and intervention mechanisms. The second, as explained in the previous section, was to eliminate the obstacles before the market-centered economic transformation planned in the early 1980s.

In line with the first objective, the military power has radically expanded its autonomy in the political system. In the process, it carried out intense legislative activity, devised a new constitution, and institutionalized a state and government model which would perpetuate its control. However, this was not a new model. As suggested in the introduction, this thesis argues that a national security state similar to those built in many Latin American countries by US-backed coups in the 1960s was established in Turkey by the 1980 coup d'état. From this point of view, the 1980 intervention can be interpreted as "delayed coup" in the chronology of the coups of the Cold War. In other words, the national security states established in countries like Chile (after the 1973 coup), Brazil (after the 1964 coup) or South Korea (after the 1961 coup), could only be built following the 1980 coup in Turkey. However, during its three-year administration, the military regime closed this time gap with the regulations that it made on both ideological and constitutional-institutional levels.

2.1. September 12 coup d'état and the role of the USA

Like May 27 and March 12 coups, the trigger of the September 12 intervention remained local, "chaos and terror." Nor is it possible to make a clear assessment of the extent of the US involvement in the September 12 coup with the available information. However, it is evident that the USA not only had prior knowledge of the September 12 coup d'état, but she was a fervent supporter of it.

September 12 coup was an intervention as an institution in the spirit of command chain whose top brass had very close relations with the US. In November 1979, the US Ambassador to Ankara, Ronald Spiers's (1977- 1980) sent the following message to Washington (Justification for IMET-Congressional, 1979, November 19):

“IMET⁵⁷ [*International Military Education and Training program*] has a long history in Turkey. Since 1950, 40 officers who have attended professional military education (PME) courses in the United States have subsequently achieved general/flag officer rank; of this number, 22 are still on active duty. For example, army four (4) stars - General Üruğ, 1st Army, General Demircioğlu, 3rd Army and General Demirel, Combined War Academies - Air Force four (4) stars - General Şahinkaya, Turkish Air Force, General Sözer, member National Security Council; Navy four (4) stars - Admiral Tümer, fleet commander have been trained in the United States under IMET auspices.) These officers represent a nucleus of personnel who have been extensively exposed to United States' training and military doctrine as well as American society as a whole. Many times, this number have received similar benefits through other technical or professional training courses in the U.S.”

Ambassador Spiers (1998) in an interview he gave in the context of Foreign Affairs Oral History Project on November 11, 1991, revealed the extent of his personal relationship with the military hierarchy, especially General Evren as such:

I became good friends with the Turkish military. I left Turkey as a minor hero among the military. The Chief of Staff later became President, so that my contacts were very useful. I sought them out and cultivated them carefully. [...] I did that in Turkey, Great Britain, and Pakistan. I had worked with the American military a lot, I liked them and so I gravitated to those connections. In Turkey and Pakistan, of course, they were very important in the political arena. The President of Turkey was a former admiral [*Fahri Korutürk*]. I suspect that my predecessors had not made the same approaches as I did. I think the Turkish military appreciated my efforts. The week I left, the four Chiefs of Staff - Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie - gave a dinner for me which I was told was unprecedented. It was noted as such in the Turkish newspapers. One of these officers was Kenan Evren, whom I saw again when I was in Pakistan, by which time he had become President of Turkey. As is customary, all Ambassadors go to the airport to meet an arriving Chief of State. When he got to me, he showed great surprise and

⁵⁷ IMET program was launched in 1976 to provide U.S. government funds to members of foreign military personnel from “allied and friendly nations” to take classes at U.S. military facilities. Kurlantzick (2006, June 8) explained the function of the IMET program as follows: “When it was founded, IMET focused on boosting foreign militaries’ relations with the United States and educating armed forces about U.S. weapons. IMET creates personal relationships in a way that other types of security aid cannot, and the program often includes men and women who later ascend to the ranks of colonel or general. For more than four decades, the program has played a role in bonding foreign and U.S. officers, and in cultivating U.S. influence in strategically vital nations.”

threw his arms around me. President Zia looked at me with new respect (p, 76).

Based on the accounts of James Spain, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey after Spiers, and Paul Henze, former CIA's station chief in Turkey (1974-1977) who served as assistant to Zbigniew Brzezinski in the U.S. National Security Council at the time, Demirel (2003) asserted that the "US was expecting a military intervention to take place, though they did not know its exact timing" (p.272). Demirel noted that Evren was not concerned about the reactions of NATO and the USA. He was confident that they would "show an understanding towards the intervention" (Ibid.). Indeed, the memoirs of the senior officers during the September 12 coup, the Commander of the 2nd Army General İbrahim Şenocak (2005) and Lieutenant General Necip Torumtay (1993) confirmed that the junta had received a green light from the United States before the intervention.⁵⁸

An hour in advance of the intervention, the junta warned the US Embassy in Ankara by phone to alert them of the coup (Gil, February 1981). U.S. support of the coup was also immediately acknowledged by the Paul Henze. The investigative journalist Mehmet Ali Birand (1984) indicated that after the government was overthrown, Henze cabled Washington, saying, "our boys [in Ankara] did it" (p. 213).⁵⁹ On the very same day of the coup, Department of State issued a statement declaring the US government's implicit approval of the new military regime. In the statement it was emphasized that "the United States, along with Turkey's other NATO allies and friends, has provided significant levels of assistance to help stabilize its economy and provide for the common defense. This assistance will continue" (Coups d'Etat in Turkey, Department of State Bulletin, November 1980, p.50). As U.S. Ambassador Spain (1984) asserted in his memoirs, the military regime "won tolerance and greater aid than ever from the United States" (Spain 1984, p. 27). Shortly after the coup, the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited Turkey to show the Turks and the world "that America stood behind the new regime" (Campbell 1987, p. 63).

September 12 military regime operated in a way that favored US interests beyond the pro-US policies of previous coup governments. It not only adopted the values of neo-liberalism by opening a wide space for the free market fetish, which was on the rise with the Washington Consensus, but it also eradicated all leftist movements, particularly trade unions, that openly opposed this process. As will be discussed in detail in the following sections, in conformity

⁵⁸ General Şenocak (2005), stated in his memoirs that when he asked General Evren 'if they considered how other countries particularly the USA would react and if the coup would not harm the economy. Evren received the question very well and told Şenocak not to worry because they already took care of these issues (pp. 179–180). Lieutenant General Torumtay (1993), who would become the Chief of General Staff in 1987, made similar remarks in his memoir: "On September 11, the gates of the General Staff were closed down and entire personnel were informed by proper ranking generals after dinner. At 21:00 hours the top generals met for a special evaluation of recent developments in our region and the world. Potential reactions of foreign states and international organizations were then assessed and questions coming from generals were replied. It was decided in the end that no serious problem would occur in that respect" (p. 78).

⁵⁹ Henze denied his words during an interview in 2003 that he gave to *Zaman* newspaper and blamed Birand for making it up. However, Birand, right after Henze's accusations discussed the matter in his show *Manşet* (Headline) on CNN Turk and aired the interview that he had made with Henze in 1997. See also "Cuntacılar 'bizim çocuklar' diyen ajan öldü" (*Milliyet*, June 04), <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/cuntacilara-bizim-cocuklar-diyen-ajan-oldu-1398393>

with the Green Belt doctrine advocated by the Carter administration at the end of the 1970s, it also introduced several radical policy changes in the cultural sphere to in favor of moderate Islamic movements. Moreover, it acted in accordance with Washington's preferences in foreign and military politics.

Before the coup, certain government policies were causing unrest in the US. New problems started to arise in Turkey-USA relations in 1974; tension escalated with the 1974 Cyprus intervention and the arms embargo the US imposed against Turkey in 1975. In response to the US arms embargo Turkey revoked the 1969 Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement. The USA lifted the embargo in 1978, but Turkish governments kept refusing several strategic US demands in 1979 and 1980. They denied US the use of its bases for U-2 flights over the USSR; refused to deploy the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), “a four-service reservoir of forces” to” increase capabilities for non-NATO contingencies in the Middle East; (Davis, 1982, p. 1) and vetoed the reentry of Greece into NATO (Uzgel, 2010, p. 38). Furthermore, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, a fierce critic of the Shah's regime and the CENTO alliance, instantly recognized the new regime established after the Iranian Islamic Revolution (Özcan & Özdamar, 2010).

The military government of the September coup while reversing all these decisions of the previous governments, implemented a strategy to protect the Western interests in the region harmed after the Iranian Revolution. At the request of General Bernard Rogers, commander of the NATO forces in Europe, one month after the coup, Turkey revoked its veto on Greece rejoining NATO in October. Ahmad indicated that this decision was made based on the promise of extending loans from Western states (Washington and Bonn) to the debt-ridden Turkish economy (pp. 183-184). On November 18, 1980, Turkey signed the Cooperation on Defense and Economy Agreement (CDECA), which founded the basics of Turkish-American military relations from then on. CDECA was an upgraded renewal of the 1969 Joint Defense Agreement, and until then it had been used as a valuable leverage by previous governments (TÜSİAD, 2003, p. 7). With this agreement, the USA guaranteed the preservation of its military facilities in Turkey (Atmaca, 2014, p. 28).

Another critical development in Turkey-USA relations during the military administration was the deployment of the RDJTF in Turkey. The RDJTF was established on March 1, 1980, to fortify US control in the oil region against Soviet influence. Although the military government claimed the opposite in official statements, it accepted the RDJTF's acquisition of storage facilities in Turkey on certain conditions through an official agreement (Uzgel, p. 47). On November 29, 1982, a memorandum of understanding was signed as a supplementary agreement to CDECA. With this memorandum, Turkey approved modernization of the ten existing airports, and the construction of two new airports in the eastern region, all of which would be extended to the use of the USA and NATO (Ibid.).

2.2. Immediate Measures of the Military Regime

September 12 coup was an intervention planned to the minutest details. TAF seized power on September 12, 1980, based on its authority to "protect and safeguard the Republic of

Turkey" under the "Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law" no 211, dated January 4, 1961. They immediately deposed the government and dissolved the Parliament. The junta comprised of the force commanders⁶⁰ and the Chief-of-Staff Kenan Evren assumed the executive and legislative authority themselves.

On the same day, all political parties were banned, and all facilities belonging to them were placed under the control of martial law and garrison commands. The activities of DİSK, MİSK (Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-Confederation of Turkish Nationalist Workers' Unions), and all affiliated unions, associations, and banks were halted except for the Turkish Aeronautical Association, Child Protection Agency, and the Red Crescent (Communique no. 7 of the NSB, 1980, September 12). Strikes and lockouts were postponed. Only the unions affiliated with Türk-İş were allowed to operate. The bank accounts of the rest of the unions and confederations, including DİSK⁶¹, the right-wing MİSK and Islamist Hak-İş (Confederation of Turkish Real Trade) were frozen, and the executives of DİSK and MİSK were arrested. The General Directorate of Security, which served under civilian administration, was placed under the command of the General Command of Gendarmerie (Communique No. 9 of the NSB, 1980, September 12).

The other declaration issued on the day of the coup declared the political parties as the main culprits for "the severe escalation of anarchy and terror" and "bringing the country on the brink of division" by their "uncompromising attitude" and "extreme sympathy or support." It was followed by an announcement that the party leaders were abolished from the Parliament and were banned from making statements (Notification to Party Leaders). The JP Leader Prime Minister Demirel, RPP Leader Bülent Ecevit, and NSP Leader Necmettin Erbakan were detained by military authorities. The NAP Leader Alparslan Türkeş, who knew about the coup beforehand, could not be found at home. After being informed that hiding would make him guilty, he surrendered to the Ankara Central Command Headquarters on September 14th.

At a press conference that Evren held on September 16 as the head of state, he summarized the purpose of the coup as "to protect the national unity, to prevent anarchy and terrorism, to sustain and protect state authority, to provide social peace, national understanding and solidarity and to reinstate the secular republican regime based on social justice, individual rights and liberties and human rights" (Press Conference of Kenan Evren, 1980, 16 September). At the same conference, he also indicated that the civilian administration would be reinstated at a "reasonable time" after the legislative regulations were complete. The junta issued the Law on the National Security Board (Law No. 2356) on December 12, 1980 declaring that the functions and powers of the NSB would be in effect until "the GNAT is convened and assumed its functions in accordance with the provisions of the new constitution to be prepared by the Constituent Assembly and voted by the people" (Art. 2).

Right after the coup, Evren sent the international circles two important messages

⁶⁰ General Nurettin Ersin, Commander of Land Forces, General Tahsin Şahinkaya, Commander of the Air Force, Admiral Nejat Tümer, Commander of the Navy, and General Sedat Celasun, Commander of the Gendarmerie.

⁶¹ The court would decide to annul the dismissal of DİSK and release its executives on July 16, 1991, almost 11 years after the case was opened.

regarding the structure and goals of the regime. He gave these messages in his speech named "Explanation to Turkish People" on September 12th. In this speech Evren emphasized that the military regime would "stay loyal to all alliances and agreements, including NATO" (Radio–Television Speech of Kenan Evren, 1980, September 12). He sent the second message through the press conference he held on September 16. Evren stated that "Turkey would continue to fulfill the agreements and protocols regarding the economic program, which was implemented to organize and improve the economy."

In Declaration 16, the NSB confirmed that the IMF agreement signed in the context of the January 24 Decisions was still in force. This declaration was made following the warning that Turgut Özal gave in his report titled "Recent Economic Situation of Turkey and Measures to be Taken After September 12" dated September 12, 1980 (Gemalmaz, p. 975). On the national level, Özal suggested that to prevent black-markets and hoardings, "the supply of money and goods should not be limited until the public confidence is gained", "the long-lasting strikes, which have been continuing violently for ideological purposes should be ended", and "tax reforms which were brought to the Parliament before the coup should be implemented immediately" (Ibid.). On an international level, he emphasized "the utmost importance of giving assurance [to the international financial institutions] about the implementation of January 24 Decisions" (Ibid.)

The NSB's decision was welcomed by the IMF circles. Çölaşan (1984) reported that the commitment message of the coup administration was distributed to all concerned parties within the organization by IMF on September 17th with the inscription "Not for Public Use." Immediately afterward, on September 27th, NSB sent Washington a delegation under Özal's leadership to meet with IMF and the World Bank (pp. 86-87). This move further exhibited the firm determination of the military regime to transition to a liberal economy.

It was not possible for the junta to conduct all the executive duties on its own. It needed a cabinet for the legal restructuring of the regime. On September 20th, 1980, Kenan Evren announced the appointment of Bülent Ulusu, the retired Commander of the Naval Forces as the head of government. Within the same day, Ulusu submitted the cabinet list for NSB's approval. A cabinet of 26 ministers was formed in just a day, without being published in the Official Gazette. NSB appointed retired military figures as the Minister of the Interior, Minister of National Education, Minister of Health & Welfare, Minister of Customs and Monopolies, and Minister of Youth and Sports. Eight of the thirteen civilian members of the new cabinet were prior members of the above-party government formed during the March 12 coup, and the remaining five were from academia. Turgut Özal was appointed as the Minister of Economy and Deputy Prime Minister. The previous head of the Employers' Confederation was appointed as the Minister of Public Works; while Sadık Şide the Türk-İş General Secretary at the time was appointed as the Minister of Social Security.⁶²

⁶² Şide, in a statement he made after his retirement, told that they had been informed about the coup d'état two days before. In the same statement, he recited the response of Türk-İş executives about the offers made to them to take place in the military government as follows: "Honorable Turkish Army, which had saved this country from great dangers, has once again managed to pull the country out of a fire. [...] We received the offer from the government on September 10. [...] All the executive board members accepted this offer as an honor and

The government program was prepared quickly, read by the Prime Minister on September 27th, 1980, and approved on September 30th in the fifth assembly of the NSB. The content of the program was almost identical to the prior declarations and decisions of the NSB. This uniformity was a clear indication that the junta leaders had already decided upon the measures that need to be implemented in the new period (Gemalmaz, p. 979).

In October, the military government passed the "Law on Constitutional Order" (Law No. 2324 of October 27, 1980). Like many other laws at the time, it was put into effect retroactively. This law reiterated that the Board assumed the powers of the GNAT while the Chairman of Board assumed the powers of the President of the Republic. It further ruled that no plea of unconstitutionality could be put forward concerning the laws, declarations, and decisions made by the Board (Art. 7). Thus, it rendered all past and future decisions of the new government independent of auditing. Furthermore, any possible objections to decrees were prevented with the article stating that the "suspension or repeal of parliamentary decrees and triple decrees issued after September 12, 1980, cannot be demanded."

The new government's function was limited to implementing the necessary legal and political grounds for consolidating the power of the military in the post-coup period. The civilian members of the government were chosen to this end. Nevertheless, the Board had taken precaution against any potential opposition from the government before its establishment through "the Internal regulation for the Legislative Duties of the National Security Board of the Republic of Turkey" it had enacted on September 25 (Ordinance No. 1). It was giving the NSB the authority to audit and overthrow the prime minister and the ministers (Tanör, 1995, p. 29). It was the first text to institutionalize the regime on legal grounds. Although the Board members and Cabinet were authorized to legislate (Art. 9) the vote of the Chairman of the Board (i.e., the Chief of Staff would be counted twice in case of equal votes (Art. 16).

The paranoid distrust towards civilian executives manifested itself also in the martial law regulations. Evren amended the Martial Law and changed the related clause, ordering the martial law commanders to be accountable to "the Prime Minister" to "the Chief of Staff" (Gemalmaz, p. 977). In this process, similar to the legislative and executive organs, all other administrative and autonomous structures were subjected to depoliticization.

2.2.1. Mass Cleansing: Purging of the Left

The most effective cleansing operation of the military hierarchy regarding society and institutions was realized through martial law practices. On September 12th, the junta expanded martial law nationwide (NSB Declaration No. 2, 1980, September 12), and established martial law commands in 13 districts. The martial law commanders appointed by the NSB were authorized "to implement all necessary arrangements and measures" for "the establishment of the state authority, security, peace, and safety of life & property in the country" (NSB Declaration No. 2, Art. 2). Hence, they gained the power to ban strikes, gatherings, and

privilege" (cited in Parlar, p. 128). Gemalmaz claimed that with this decision, the military wanted to prevent a direct opposition by a wide labor class, if not make them willing advocates (pp. 977-978).

demonstrations; suspend publications of newspapers and other media organizations and discharge undesirable public officials. Martial Law Courts in these districts were equipped with the authority to prosecute the ideological crimes outlined in Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code, which prohibited political activity based on social class (Hale, 1996, p.30). The NSB had the authority to appoint and dismiss judges and prosecutors who served in these courts (Tanör, 1995, p.30).

With the amendment made in the Martial Law No. 1402, the military gained the authority to dismiss all public personnel and local government employees. Following this amendment, elected members of the provincial and municipal councils, as well as the 27 governors of the 67 cities, were dismissed by the NSB (Öncü & Parla, 1981). In addition, all provincial and municipal councils were dissolved. Based on Law No. 1402, 14,509 civil servants were dismissed, and 1,322 were pushed into early retirement. In short, the majority of the elected politicians as well as public officials were liquidated for the sake of "neutral administration" (Ibid.). Article 5 of Law No. 2324, the Law on the Constitutional Order, stipulated that the "suspension of the procedures and decisions concerning the public officials made by the Ministers and personnel authorized by Ministers cannot be demanded." Thus, the dismissed personnel were stripped of the right to claim their positions. The NSB appointed retired or active army members to the vacant positions. During this period, approximately 18,000 officers, 2,000 judges, and prosecutors, 4,000 police officers, and 5,000 teachers were also forced out of their jobs (Helvacı, 1983, p. 722).

A similar purge was carried out within the army. A total of 2,000 potentially dissident officers and non-commissioned officers were discharged to safeguard the internal discipline of the military (Parlar, 1997, pp. 27-28). The desire to strengthen the state authority at the expense of institutional autonomy also manifested itself in decisions about higher education. The junta members considered universities as the hubs of political turmoil. Therefore, they tied these institutions to the central authority through the Council of Higher Education (CoHE), established by the Higher Education Law No. 2547 which entered into force on November 6th, 1981. The authority to appoint CoHE members was entrusted to the Chief of the General Staff (Ibid).

The Law on Higher Education eliminated scientific autonomy of the universities. Academic staff was stripped of the right to choose their rectors and deans. Academia was banned from engaging in politics, the involvement of academicians in associations was made subject to special dispensations. With the new Disciplinary Regulation, deans were given the authority to conduct investigations into and impose punishments on the members of academia. A dress regulation was introduced, and many faculty members were controlled by personnel policies (Gök, 1983, p. 465). Different academic institutions such as the conservatory, art academy, police academy, faculties of theology, and mechanical engineering, were subjected to the same academic and institutional standards through CoHE (İnsel, 2003, January 12).

The martial law commanders' authority to dismiss without cause, (gained by the amendments to Law No. 1402) was rendered valid for university employees as well. This law was once again applied against left-wing academics and teachers. Martial law commanders eliminated the qualified teaching staff in universities and schools under the pretext of the

maintaining security. The number of academics and teachers who were dismissed or forced to resign by the CoHE and Martial Law Command reached approximately 2,600 in this period (Özen, 2002, pp. 285-331).

The rights and freedoms that were most frequently violated during the military regime were the right to life and physical integrity. The death penalty, except the interim regime of 1971 to 1973, had not been practiced since 1964 in Turkey. However, the military courts of the September 12 regime, requested death penalty for 7,000 people, and 517 were sentenced to death. The junta insisted on the execution of death penalties. Kenan Evren asked the crowds at public rallies these two infamous rhetorical questions: "Should we not hang them?" "Should we go on feeding them?" Between 1980 and 1984, a total of 50 men, including 17-year-old, were executed. Of these, 26 were convicted of political offenses (18 leftists and eight rightists), and 23 were convicted of ordinary crimes.

Aside from arbitrary detentions and unjustified arrests, another common practice of the period was torture. It was frequently used during the detention periods as a tool for dehumanizing the detainees rather than capturing organization members. The second phase of torture was implemented in military prisons. There was not a single prison that did not implement systematic torture during the September 12 military regime. Hundreds of people lost their lives in brutal prisons of the period (Kısacık, 2011; Akman, 2010; Bademci, 2014).

Severe sanctions were imposed on suspects who were not seized during the September 12 period. NSB amended the Citizenship Law to deprive them of citizenship. The new article stipulated that "persons who engage in activities against the internal and external security or economic and financial security of the country; or have gone abroad after engaging in such activities and thus unavailable for trial or implementation of a sentence and who despite the issuance of a call to do so do not return to the country within 3 months" can be deprived of citizenship (Ersel et al., 2002, p.13). The law, as such stayed in force until 1992.⁶³ As a result of this amendment, 4,843 persons during military administration and 8,945 persons during civilian administration were deprived of citizenship. The government issued an official 'return home' call for 26 thousand suspects, and the assets of all the persons expelled from citizenship were seized by the Treasury (Ibid.). Furthermore, with an amendment to the Passport Law No. 5862 enacted on February 27, 1981, approximately 280 thousand people were banned from leaving the country. Of these people, 6,680 were not given a passport for "general security" reasons (Art. 22). Many people, who were tried for offenses against Atatürk or the personality of the state, as well as political and ideological offenses, were not given a passport for a long time until their acquittal (Nebiler, 1989, p. 485).

According to the records of the Human Rights Association, the legal score of the September 12 military regime was as follows: 650,000 people were taken into custody; 1,683,000 people were blacklisted based on the "Order on Persons to be Monitored," dated August 12, 1981; 210,000 cases opened; 230,000 people were prosecuted; 71,000 people were tried for ideological offenses by the TCC Articles 141, 142 and 163; and 98,000 people were

⁶³ This article was later nullified by Law No 3808 enacted on May 27, 1992. Most of the victims of the previous law regained their citizenship and received their assets confiscated by the Treasury.

tried for "being a member of an illegal organization." In addition, 23,000 people were sentenced to one year, 10,700 people were sentenced to one to five years, 6,100 people were sentenced to five to ten years, 2,390 people were sentenced to ten to twenty years, 939 people were sentenced to more than 20 years, and 630 people were sentenced to life imprisonment. Another 388,000 people were denied a passport. In total 30,000 people were dismissed from their jobs, 14,000 people were deprived of citizenship, 30,000 people went abroad as political refugees, 300 died under suspicious circumstances, 95 killed in armed conflict, and 14 died in a hunger strike. An additional 16 people were shot while running away, 73 were reported as natural deaths, and 43 were reported to have committed suicide during interrogation (cited in Ersel et al., p.12).

The military government also put into practice a systematic and restrictive censorship policy. Many journalists were arrested for their writings, and almost all press organs were suspended at least once. On September 14th, 1980, TRT, the only television channel at the time, was notified of a severe censorship text under the name of "Rules to be observed in the News." Its broadcasting policy was determined entirely by the NSB. During this period, the courts requested approximately 4,000 years of imprisonment for 400 journalists, and almost 40 tons of newspapers and magazines were burnt. Additionally, 937 films were banned for being "objectionable," and 272 books used in schools until then, were banned for being "subversive, ideological and political" (Ibid., p. 61).

On November 10, 1983, the military government enacted a new Press Law. According to this law, newspapers that violated national security and general morality could be suspended for three days to one month, equipment of printing houses that printed illegal material could be confiscated, and distribution of publications that violated state security could be prohibited with the order of a judge or a prosecutor. With the same law, administrative fines and sentences imposed on newspaper executives also increased (Ibid., p. 73).

Only a day after the Press Law, the military government passed the Law on Radio and Television (Law No. 2954), which stipulated state monopoly in radio and television broadcasting. The law established a new institution named the Radio and Television Supreme Council to supervise, audit, and regulate radio and television broadcasts in accordance with the broadcasting principles outlined in the law. This council was authorized to monitor the existing and future radio and television broadcasts, and to intervene in the event of nonconformity with principles including "adherence to the promise and spirit" of the 1982 Constitution (Art. 5/a), "compliance with the national security policy of the state" (Art. 5/b), and "conformity to national traditions and moral values" (Art. 5/e).

The damage the September 12 coup inflicted on the social and cultural scene was not limited to the consequences of the regime's sanctions. The atmosphere of fear created by September 12 brought along an indirect memory slaughter among the left-wing intellectuals and youth. Many had to destroy their photographs, books, letters, and writings to avoid direct allegations by the military regime. The memoirs and interviews published by the intellectuals who lived at that time revealed the devastation September 12 created in their personal lives (Ilgaz, 2000; Müftüoğlu, 2000; Önderoğlu, 2008).

2.2.2. Liquidation of Political Institutions

The dissolution of political parties was not initially among the goals of the September 12 coup d'état. It was clear that the coup would not be subject to strong opposition from a political structure lacking democratic ideals, consisting mostly of parties, which rely on populist policies and political patronage. Indeed, the leaders and members of the political parties dismissed by the September 12 regime did not engage in a serious democratic struggle, except for occasionally expressing their opinions in writing or verbally on certain policies of the military government.⁶⁴ However, they also refrained from presenting an attitude, which would indicate their open support for the military policies. This was likely the reason for the dissolution of political parties one year after the coup.

The Council first announced Decree No. 52, which imposed new bans on the political party members. This decree dictated once more that the leaders and members of political parties were "prohibited from making written or verbal statements and writing articles regarding their opinions on past, present and future political and legal state of Turkey or from holding meetings for this purpose." This decree also highlighted the ban on discussing the practices of the martial law administration. Before the convening of the Consultative Assembly that was responsible for drafting a constitution on October 16, 1981, the military government enacted a law (Law No. 2533 on the Abolition of Political Parties) that dissolved all political parties founded before September 12 and confiscated all their movable and immovable assets except for those of RPP. The Chairman of the Board Kenan Evren, in his speech broadcasted on TRT radio and television on October 16, 1981, explained the goal of the legislation as follows (Kültürel Yapılanma Grubu, n.a., pp. 41-42):

"A democratic parliamentary system based on political parties shall surely be established in Turkey. However, it will not be with the existing parties. Just as a building constructed with the debris of a collapsed building is doomed to collapse, a democracy built with the parties which brought the country to its state before September 12 is also doomed to collapse. Like a robust building constructed with new, we believe that it is only possible to build our free and democratic parliamentary system with new political parties established in accordance with the new Constitution and the Law on Political Parties; and thus we decided to dissolve existing parties. We also feel that this is the necessary course of action to ensure a nonpartisan, comfortable and peaceful working environment for the Consultative Assembly. After the public approval of the Constitution made by the Constituent Assembly, new political parties will be established in accordance with the new Law on Political Parties and general elections will be held with these parties..."

⁶⁴ On the other hand, it was almost impossible to criticize the military at that time. Both Ecevit and NSP Leader Necmettin Erbakan were detained by the martial law courts in October 1981, for having insulted the "moral personality of the state" in speeches they have made in various places. Ecevit was sentenced to 4 months of imprisonment for making a statement to a foreign press agency despite the Council's Decree No 52 (Ersel et al., p. 37-38).

The short-term purpose of this law was to isolate the members of the Consultative Assembly from all influences of and emotional connections with political parties. On the other hand, the long-term purpose of the military regime was to introduce a multi-party system with new political parties which would adhere to the military's political engineering project. Kenan Evren, following the decree, made a clear statement that the current politicians would not be able to take place in the parliament during the next elections (cited in Ersel et al., p. 34).

September 12, 1980 was a new beginning for all the components of political organizations in Turkey. The occupational organizations lost their independence.⁶⁵ Termination penalties imposed on political parties, unions, and associations were not considered sufficient. The martial law courts filed class action lawsuits for some of them. In addition to the executives of leftist parties such as WPT, the Socialist Workers Party of Turkey (SWPT), and the Workers' & Peasants' Party of Turkey (WPPT), executives of NSP and NAP were also tried in martial law courts.

NSP Leader Necmettin Erbakan and 33 party executives were litigated by the Ankara Martial Law Command Office of Military Prosecution. Although there was no evidence of Erbakan's involvement with terrorism, the former leader of NSP was charged with the violation of Article 163 of Turkish Penal Code, which guarantees the secularism principle of the Constitution. However, the trial that started in April 1981 requesting a 36-year sentence for Erbakan concluded with his release on July 24.

On the other hand, the lawsuit filed on April 29th, 1981, against NAP came as a big surprise for the idealist cadres who sympathized with the coup (Bora & Can, 1991, p. 94). In August 1981, for 49 of the 389 defendants including its leader Alparslan Türkeş, the court recommended the death penalty with the allegations of "subversiveness and inciting the public to violence" (Ibid.). The letter Türkeş wrote to Evren during his trial is significant for revealing the ideological partnership between the September 12 administration and the Idealists (Tuşalp, 1986, p. 281):

"Honorable Full General, your statements since September 12 are, in a different style, a confirmation of the ideas we have been advocating for years and will continue to advocate under all circumstances. [...]. In your efforts for the fortification of the Turkish state [...] I would sincerely wish for your success."

The quote from the motion of release submitted to the court by Türkeş' assistance, Ağâh Oktay Güner on October 11, 1982 has become one of the most referenced anecdotes of the period: "There has never been a political party, whose doctrine is in power and which itself in prison" (cited in Parlar, p. 161). The September 12 military government was still determined to make Türkeş pay for his unbridled aggression. His case lasted six years. However, Türkeş was released on April 9, 1985, after 4.5 years of imprisonment, with the initiative of Kenan Evren.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Union of Turkish Bar Associations was tied to the Ministry of Justice, Turkish Medical Association to Ministry of Health, and Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers & Architects to Ministry of Public Works.

⁶⁶ Ali Baransel, who was the press consultant of Evren during his term as President, recounted the story of Türkeş's release as follows: "Party leaders tried after September 12, were released one by one. Only Alparslan Türkeş was still in prison. Every morning, I would brief General Evren about the news in the press. That day, I

The trial ended in April 1987, and the court ruled in favor of the death penalty for five, life imprisonment for nine, and various lengths of incarceration for 219 defendants (Bora & Can, 1991, p. 94).

Trials of left-wing political parties began around the same time. Leaders and many members of the Workers' & Peasants' Party of Turkey (WPPT), Socialist Workers Party of Turkey (SWPT), and WPT were tried by military courts and had to serve long sentences. In addition to political parties, unions and associations were subjected to great pressure. Among the lawsuits filed against unionists, the most notorious case was against DİSK. As leftist union which had been active in the political domain since the second half of the 1960s, it was one of the main targets of September 12. 67 DİSK executives had already been arrested and incarcerated on the day of the coup. Following this event, the prosecutor filed a motion seeking the death penalty for 52 DİSK executives, including its leader. The DİSK member and the leader of the Leather Workers' Union (Deri-İş), Kenan Budak was killed by the police on July 25, 1981, in the middle of the street.

The trials started on December 24, 1981, at the Istanbul Martial Law Court; 160 case files were combined, and the number of defendants reached 1,477, while the number of death penalty cases rose to 78. The case concluded on December 24th, 1986. Military Court No. 2 in İstanbul ruled that the Confederation be terminated and sentenced 264 unionists and unions experts to imprisonment for times ranging from five years-six months-twenty days to fifteen years-eight months.⁶⁷ The sanctions on unions were not limited to DİSK. The unions such as the Writers' Syndicate of Turkey, Petrol-İş (refinery workers), and Yol-İş (construction workers) were also subjected to the heavy pressures during the martial law.

However, two right-wing unions whose activities were suspended on the day of the coup were treated differently. No lawsuits were filed against MİSK, known for its affinity with NAP and its support of "idealist" activities during this period. Likewise, the Hak-İş, a right-wing Islamist confederation that had enjoyed the opportunity to grow during the Nationalist Front governments, refrained from any legal action. Shortly after 12 September, the military government, for the sake of appearing impartial in the eyes of the public, had taken into custody a few executives of the Confederation They were all discharged after a short time. Although all assets and documents of unions were frozen by Declaration No 7 of the military government, those of Hak-İş were released by Decision No 45 of the NSB on February 19, 1981.

The military regime suspended 23.677 associations from activity (Ersel et al., 2002, p. 12). Two of the lawsuits filed against associations piqued the interest of the public. The first was the lawsuit filed against the 44 members of the Pacifists Association. It was especially notable for the fact that it demonstrated the September 12 regime's perception of intellectuals in Turkey. The Pacifists Association was advocating for moderation in interstate relations and

told him that the newspapers write that only Türkeş is still in prison. "Is that so?" he said. Then he instructed the Head of Legal Affairs Office of the President of the Republic, Major General Muzaffer Başkaynak to arrange for Türkeş's release with a medical committee report on the grounds of health problems. Türkeş was released by his order. If Evren had not intervened, Türkeş would have stayed in prison longer" (cited in Mercan, 2004, October 18).

⁶⁷ The dissolution verdict of DİSK stayed in effect until it was acquitted by the Military Supreme Court on July 16, 1991, based on the annulment of Article 141 of Turkish Penal Code.

universal disarmament. Its founder, retired ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem, had been elected as an executive board member of the World Peace Council in September 1980. Executives and members of the association, including many journalists, authors, faculty members, lawyers, doctors, politicians, and artists, were charged for violating Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code and arrested (Hale, p. 215). The case lasted until April 21, 1991 and concluded with the acquittal of all defendants.

The next significant case was the one opened against TÖB-DER, an association with 200 thousand members representing the majority of teachers in the country. The court decided to dissolve the headquarters, and 670 branches of the TÖB-DER with the charge of "transforming from legal to illegal and aiming for a Marxist-Leninist order" (Çelenk, 1990, p. 265). Executives and some members were wrongly convicted of "being a member of an illegal organization."

During this period, legal means to resist the pressures and arbitrary actions of the military regime were severely restricted. The only course of action available for the citizens to make their voices heard was the "right to petition." Tanör made the following comment on this issue: "The only form of expression Ottoman subjects had and was accustomed to, revived during the September 12 regime; rulers, who came into power with the coup, were submitted hundreds of petitions each day" (p. 36). According to news published in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper on May 25, 1985, by the end of the seventh month of the military regime, the number of petitions submitted to the NSB had reached 59,318.

The lawsuit filed against one of these petitions towards the end of the September 12 regime once again targeted the intellectuals. 1,256 leading intellectuals of the period submitted a petition titled "Observations on & Demands for the Democratic Order in Turkey" directly to Kenan Evren. Thereupon, Ankara Martial Law Command immediately launched an investigation against this initiative. 59 of the signatories had to wait until 1986 to be cleared of baseless charges (Ersel et al., p. 101).

In conclusion, the September 12 regime terminated the search for alternatives to the existing order and its main principles on all levels. It developed an inordinate pressure mechanism against the demands for change from not only the groups accused of terrorism but from all opposing groups. However, its purpose was not limited to a mass purge and depoliticization. The military government aimed at establishing a new state model, which institutionalized authoritarian policies under the concept of national security.

2.3. Institutionalization of the Regime

Bayramoğlu (2002) described the September 12 military regime as "a period in which the military became both an institutionalizing and a constituent power" (p. 39). 669 laws were enacted from September 12, 1980, until the end of the direct military regime on December 6, 1983 (Gemalmaz, p.985). Since then, there had not been a more intense legislative period in the history of the Republic. Apart from 669 laws, the NSB passed a great number of regulations under the names of the "National Security Board Decisions/Declarations/Ordinances." When the "Decree Laws" and "Triple Decrees" are added to this equation, it can be seen that the

number of laws and regulations passed during the military regime reached a figure well above 669.

General Secretariat of the NSB announced the stages of preparation for the New Constitution as a package, named the "transition to democracy" program on November 1, 1980. According to the statement of the General Secretary Haydar Saltık, the stages of the program were as follows (cited in Tanör, 1995, p. 37):

1. "Establishing the preconditions for the founding of the Constituent Assembly;
2. Approval of the law on the founding, duties and powers of the Constituent Assembly, which would be issued as the supplement to the Law on Constitutional Order;
3. Founding of the Constituent Assembly, and drafting of the new constitution;
4. Holding of a constitutional referendum via a new referendum law and the approval of the New Constitution;
5. Preparation and enactment of new laws on parties and elections by the Constituent Assembly, based on the provisions stated in the New Constitution approved by the public;
6. The initiation of party activities, which would be established in accordance with the new constitution and the new law of political parties;
7. [...] Establishment of the GNAT after the general elections which will be held in accordance with the new law on elections;
8. Termination of duties and existence of the Constituent Assembly and the National Security Board in accordance with the provisional articles in the Constitution; and thus, complete reinstatement of the democratic political life."

The timetable for this list was clarified by the Chairman of the Council Evren. According to the timetable, the referendum would be held in the fall of 1982 and the general elections in 1983.

The law on the Constituent Assembly was enacted on June 6, 1981. According to this law, the Constituent Assembly was comprised of two wings: the NSB and the Consultative Assembly. However, between these two organs, there was a hierarchy favoring the former. Of the 160 members of the Consultative Assembly, 40 were appointed directly by the NSB and the Board selected the other 120 members from the candidates nominated by the governor of each city (Parla, 1993, p.77). One of the conditions of membership was that the candidate should have no connection with any political party before September 11, 1980 (Ibid.). Thus, the 1982 Constitution was drafted by a committee which was assigned and authorized by the military regime and completely lacked the required criteria for democratic representativeness.

In the opening speech of GNAT in October of 1981, Evren provided important clues about the state structure proposed by the 1982 Constitution (cited in Heper, 1985, p. 131):

“While trying to enhance and protect human rights and liberties, the state itself also has certain rights and obligations as far as its continuity and future is concerned. We do not have the right to put the state into a powerless and inactive position. The state cannot be turned into a helpless institution to be governed by private associations. [...] Citizens should know that freedom of thought and conscience exist. There are, however, limits to these freedoms; there is also a state founded by the individuals that together make up a collectivity. The state in question protects the individuals. This state too has a will and sovereignty of its own. Individual freedoms can be protected to the extent that the will and the sovereignty of the state are maintained. If the will and sovereignty of the state are undermined, then the only entity than can safeguard individual freedoms has withered away.”

In the same speech, Evren stated that the NSB had the last word on the Constitution and thus reminded the Consultative Assembly that its authority was limited to drafting the Constitution. During the preparations and the presentation of the final text, all means of criticism and objective judgment on the content of the Constitution were entirely obstructed.⁶⁸ The coup administration also used psychological pressure on the public against a possible rejection of the Constitution. Before the referendum, the NSB member openly declared that anyone who advocated "no to the Constitution" was "subversive and a separatist" traitor.⁶⁹ Moreover, the NSB implicitly threatened the voters by underlining that the transition to a civilian administration might be hindered if the Constitution was not approved.⁷⁰ The junta achieved the desired result. The 1982 Constitution went to referendum on November 7, 1982 and was approved by 91.4% of the votes.

With the approval of the Constitution, Evren automatically became the head of state as stated in the first provisional article of the Constitution. The office of the President of the

⁶⁸ Members of dissolved political parties as well as those of associations and corporate bodies were legally prohibited from making statements and declarations regarding the constitution (NSB Decision No 65). Same decision also stipulated that occupational organizations and institutions would need the permission of Martial Law Commands of their district, to make statements on the issue. The Council, not content with these precautions, issued a new decision to prevent negative statements about the Constitution. With temporary provisions of the Constitution, criticizing the speeches of the Head of State on radio, television and national tours, and making verbal or written statements against them were forbidden. Moreover, on September 24, 1982, Article 5/b of the "Law on Putting the Constitution on Referendum" (Law No. 2707) stipulated that the Constitution could be praised, but not criticized. Article 12 of the same law, stated that citizens who do not vote at the referendum would be deprived of their right to vote and right to hold office; and thereby an obligatory support was asked of the public for the passing of the Constitution."

⁶⁹ While a report prepared and disseminated to the press by the Office of General Staff was explicitly criminalizing the potential "No" voters, Evren, in a speech he gave in Afyonkarahisar around the same time, was declaring that people who advocated "No to the Constitution!" were cooperating with external powers (cited in Ersel et al., p. 9).

⁷⁰ President of the Constitutional Commission's statement before the referendum was as follows: "Our Constitution will be approved. [...] Because approval of the Constitution means a Law on Political Parties will be enacted and an election will be held. [...] Voters will see this and will approve the Constitution to shift to a normal order" (*Cumhuriyet*, 1982, January 26).

Republic, who was turned into the second head of executive authority by the 1982 Constitution, was held by the leader of the coup for seven years. The second provisional article of the Constitution ruled that, after the parliament has convened and assumed its functions, the NSB shall become the Presidential Council for six years, and its members shall acquire the title of members of the Presidential Council.

The functions of the Presidential Council were listed as follows:

1. To examine laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and submitted to the President of the Republic concerning: the fundamental rights and freedoms and duties, the principle of secularism, the preservation of the reforms of Atatürk, national security and public order set forth in the Constitution, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, international treaties, the sending of Armed Forces to foreign countries and the stationing of foreign forces in Turkey, emergency rule, martial law and the state of war, and other laws deemed necessary by the President of the Republic, within the first ten days of the period of fifteen days granted to the President of the Republic for his consideration;
2. On the request of the President of the Republic and within the period specified by him: to consider and give an opinion on matters relating to the holding of new general elections, the exercise of emergency powers and the measures to be taken during a state of emergency, the management and supervision of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, the training of the youth and the conduct of religious affairs;
3. According to the request of the President of the Republic, to consider and investigate matters relating to internal or external security and such other matters as are deemed necessary, and to submit its findings to the President of the Republic.

In summary, the Council would be the military tool of the regime authorized to control whether or not the country was run in accordance with coup's philosophy after the transition to democracy.

2.4. Ideology of the 1980 Coup

2.4.1. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis Project

The September 12 junta attempted to use religion and nationalism as balancing factors against the danger of the leftist movements to regain power in the political arena, especially among future generations. With this preference, The Turkish military was demonstrating that it adopted a specific political pattern that had already been applied in many other countries in the Cold War. In the 1970s, Carter's National Security Council under Zbigniew Brzezinski promulgated the Green Belt doctrine to build a shield of moderate Islam around its arch enemy the USSR. Within the context of this theory, the USA decided to support moderate Islamic ideology against the rise of the left and halt Soviet expansion (Uzgel, p. 36-37).

The September 12 military government adopted this new strategy of the USA in both internal and external politics. While some significant steps were taken to improve the relations with the Arab countries,⁷¹ a much more radical project was undertaken in the domestic arena. The military government, to integrate the country with the international capitalist system, established an oppressive regime, which repressed any reaction from the opposing left to the structural economic reforms. The ideological field that was cleared by the elimination of the left was filled with the new rightist values, which had been allowed to strengthen by the end of the 1970s. The military hierarchy endeavored to reconcile these values referred to as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) with Atatürkism/Kemalism, the official ideology of the state.

The first development that confirmed this policy choice was observed in President Evren's public speeches in the days following 12 September. Evren, regularly quoting verses from the Qu'ran tried to justify both secularism and the necessity of knowing one's religion (Başbakanlık, 1981). On August 28, 1982, the military government introduced mandatory religious education in primary and high schools. Religion classes were also made mandatory in senior high schools, with Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution. They even penetrated the prisons. The military government launched a mosque building spree. Furthermore, the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA) was astoundingly increased during this period, reaching one and a half times the budget of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and seven times the budget of Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The PRA started to publish fatwa books on a wide range of topics from sexuality to banking and interest. Also, through the Religious Foundation under its umbrella, the PRA established a conglomerate that was comprised of seven companies operating in different industries including tourism, education, entertainment, and food. From 1980 to 1982, 23 new faculties of theology were founded in universities. The Muslim World League, an organization based in Saudi Arabia, paid the salaries of religion teachers sent abroad on official duty (Uzgel, 2010). The autonomies of the Turkish Language Association (TLA) and Turkish Historical Society (THS), both of which were considered legacies of Atatürk, were revoked (Püsküllüoğlu & Özel, 1986). A new organization was formed to replace these institutions under the name Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language, and History (ASCCLH), and its management was given to nationalist/conservative groups (Law No 2876). As a part of the military government's plan, TIS was declared a state policy by a report published after ASCCLH's meeting in June 1986, three years after the end of the military term. The representatives of the September 12 institutions (Kenan Evren as the President of the Republic, Prime Minister Turgut Özal, the Chief of Staff and CoHE President at the time) decided on a national cultural policy based on a report titled "The Methods and Responsibilities in Determining Cultural Elements and a Cultural Policy." According to this report, Turkey was under the attack of foreign imperialist cultures and TIS would be the fundamental reference for fighting off these attacks. The report also reiterated that it was impossible for Turks to protect their identity without Islam and that Islam was the most suitable religion for Turks. While denying the constantly evolving nature of culture, the text was suggesting the existence of an

⁷¹ In line with the Green Belt doctrine, Head of State Kenan Evren made a significant number of visits to countries like Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Egypt, Tunisia and Pakistan during the military government (TÜSIAD 2003, p. 8).

unchanging, monolithic, cultural essence in the Turkish nation. Congruent with this discourse, the report suggested that the Turkish "national culture" should be protected by the state.

TIS was a political theory developed in the 1970s as a product of the desire to unite the two traditional wings of the Turkish right, the Islamists, and the nationalists against the left (Güvenç, B. et al., 1994; Copeaux, 1998; Taşkın, 2003). TIS was against the radicalization of Islam (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 374). This theory was conceptualized by the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı), an organization established by a group of right-winger conservative academics, journalists, and authors in 1970. It was an attempt of "reinventing history in the light of the new conservative nationalism" (Oprea, 2014, p. 136).

As Copeaux stated, it had a nationalist ideological content, which at the same time "defined Turkish personality through Islam as a religious, moral and identity-based reference" (Ibid. p.59). In this context, not only the communists but also the Kurdish separatists and the non-Muslims were identified as threats to the Turkish nation (Oprea, p. 134).

Intellectuals' Hearth was against the liberal and pluralist values, social rights, and social state principle of the 1961 Constitution. Rather than scientific coherence, it sought political influence. It had put forth considerable effort for the founding of Nationalist Front governments against Ecevit in 1970s (Özdemir, 2004), and had insistently advocated for TIS to build a cultural framework for Turkey. Intellectuals' Hearth also strongly emphasized the need for integration between the military and government and enthusiastically supported the September 12 coup d'état.

In the conjuncture explained above, the reasons for the partnership between the military hierarchy and the Intellectuals' Hearth were quite clear. TIS advocates were defending an "authoritarian democracy" in which the political rule of the military should be inherently permanent. Their threat perceptions were almost identical with those of the military, and they were emphasizing that the country should have a "national politics" above daily political conflicts (Güvenç et al., 1994, pp. 40-41). According to this thesis, national politics was "a compilation of main principles to preside in the soul of the nation for generations" (Taşkın, p. 399). It was a body of principles which "all politicians should be liable to, and all citizens have to support" (Ibid.). Therefore, TIS was utterly compatible with the homogeneous, uniform, and ordered society model envisioned by the junta.

Another causal relation between the September 12 regime and the Intellectuals' Hearth was their tendency to "normalize" the state as a subject. Conservative TIS advocates who were called for the elimination of the leftist threat were a strategic partner for building the cultural foundations of the September 12 philosophy, with their wholehearted adoption of a secular, Muslim identity, and the state authority.

Since TIS was the expression of a corporatist political philosophy, it was functional in eradicating the social demands of the left in the short and medium term. In the constitution draft they presented to the September 12 junta, while they were underlining "the divinity of state in the Turkish state tradition," (Art. 2) they were also stating that "individual rights and freedoms shall not be idolized and shall not be allowed to precede the benefits of the nation and the state"

(Art. 8). TIS advocates were more than willing to maintain the "the existing order" in return for being on the front lines of the political scene and state offices (Taşkın, pp. 381-401).

Another point of intersection between the September 12 regime and the Intellectuals' Hearth was Turgut Özal, the leader of Motherland Party (MP), which was the only political organization permitted to run in the elections aside from the two political parties established by the coup administration. Özal was known to have close relations with the Intellectuals' Hearth upon his return from the World Bank, at which he served as an advisor from 1971 to 1973. The Secretary-General of the Intellectuals' Hearth at that time, Metin Eriş, described Özal as "not an official, but almost a natural member" of their organization (cited in İridağ, 2004, para. 12). Intellectuals' Hearth played an important role in Özal's re-crossing paths with Demirel as Undersecretary of the Prime Minister. Moreover, Özal planted the seeds of the January 24 Decisions at the Intellectuals' Hearth (Ibid). The leader of the Intellectuals' Hearth at the time, Süleyman Yalçın, stated that Özal was affected by them while admitting that Özal also managed to convince them to change their minds about many subjects (Ibid). Özal, when he decided to establish a political party and resigned from the office of Deputy Prime Minister, he received the support of Intellectuals' Hearth. Moreover, some members of Intellectuals' Hearth became the founding members of the party (Ibid).

2.4.2. A Conservative Interpretation of Atatürkism

After assuring its political domination over the regime on September 12, 1980, the military hierarchy placed the official (Ataturkist/Kemalist) ideology at the center of its discourse as the only valid ground to unify the society and legitimize its authority. It was not a new notion for the constitutional structure to have an ideological character. The founding ideology of the single-party period, referred to as Kemalism or Atatürkism at times, was turned into the official ideology of Turkey and was included in the constitution in 1937.⁷² The official ideology has never been an all-inclusive totalitarian ideology; it has been, as Zürcher (1996) stated, "a compilation of attitudes and opinions," which have not been defined in detail at any time (p. 264). It has a flexible conceptual content (Ibid). Ünsaldı (2008) asserted that "the difficulty of defining Kemalism became even more complicated after the transition to a multi-party system in 1947 when competing factions attempted to instrumentalize it for political purposes" (p. 191). As it advocated a classless and unprivileged society model and embraced a statist perspective, the official ideology has constantly failed to develop an "internal rationale" that was compliant with its westernization and modernization goals. Therefore, it needed to be regularly reminded to the society as an instrument of hegemony in the face of the new political and economic challenges (Çiğdem, 1998). Atatürkism rejects any demands or differences that might arise from ethnic, religious, or class-related interests. Rather than adopting the universal human rights and democratic values of the West, it advocates a modernism perception limited to assuming technical and organizational tools and information. In this sense, it has never

⁷² The six guiding tenets of Kemalism, which are Republicanism, Secularism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism and Revolutionism, had already been incorporated in the party program at the third National Convention in 1931. Present day RPP still has the six arrows representing these principles on its emblem.

tolerated liberal, socialist, or communist trends which interpret modernization in the scope of activities, relations, interactions, and tensions of different civilian groups (Laçiner, 1998; Zürcher, p. 265).

According to Ataturkism, the subject of change is not the society, but the state, and because of this trait, it loses its unifying function as the social dynamics change (Başkaya, 1991; Caymaz, 2007; Erdoğan, 2000). Therefore, at each coup period, it needed to be made functional again as a tool of social rehabilitation. In this respect, it has always been the military elite, and to a certain extent, the state bureaucracy, who had the monopoly to (re)define it according to the changing conditions of the period.

The statement that underlined "the full dedication to the reforms of Atatürk" in the preamble of the 1961 Constitution was just one of the indicators of the military power's desire to place the official ideology in the foundations of the constitutional order. The first article of the memorandum that was issued on March 12, 1971, by the Chief of Staff and the Commanders-in-Chief to the JP administration, also reflected the same effort. It demanded, "the formation, within the context of democratic principles, of a strong and credible government, which will neutralize the current anarchical situation and which, inspired by Atatürk's views, will implement the reformist laws envisaged by the constitution" (Özbudun, 2000, p.34). However, considering the developments explained above, there were significant differences between the state practices and social visions of these two military juntas, which embraced Ataturkism as the official ideology. The March 12 junta while wielding Ataturkism as a legitimate reference to the struggle against the left, it extended the autonomy of the military by establishing or fortifying existing institutions to control political and social domains. The interpretation of Ataturkism which favored individual rights and freedoms and the social state in the 1961 Constitution was replaced by a rightist interpretation that promoted status quo and capital, laying the foundations for an oppressive state authority. The tendency towards a more conservative and nationalist definition of Ataturkism continued with the 1980 coup. This time, the "core values" of Turks and Sunni Islam were incorporated into its definition. Although religion was recorded under the "provision of secularism principle," it was inferred as a means of "national unity and national integrity" in the Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution on the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

As İnel (1998) argued, the official ideology, as had always been the case in prior periods, maintained its function of creating new "(political) crimes and prohibitions" and dictating to "the society what it is, who it is and where it should go" after 1980 (p.21). However, developments after the 1980 coup took rather a radical path, when the army adopted the role of restoring the ideological grounds of the regime which it commissioned itself to "protect and safeguard," in political and institutional platforms. Right at this point, with the assumption that a *collage* of Ataturkism and TIS would be insufficient to control the ideological and political domain; it introduced the concept of national security as a hegemonic tool. In other words, the notion, which entered the political jargon following the 1960 coup, gained depth and efficiency on ideological and institutional levels after the 1980 coup.

It is important to reemphasize that the official ideology throughout the history of the Republic has been the only means of indoctrination utilized by the Turkish state for the cultural

transformation of the society. It has thus played an indispensable role in guaranteeing the "indisputability" of the fundamental policies of the state elites, especially the military bureaucracy. As a result, the TAF, which had built all its structure on the Atatürk cult, could not be expected to abandon the Kemalist discourse. However, this time, the military power would resort to a more "global" and thus legitimate concept to build a permanent control and manipulation mechanism.

2.4.3. National Security Ideology as a New Instrument of Hegemony

The political engineering project of the military was twofold: Through the 1982 Constitution and the legislation created during the military regime, the TAF while expelling all alternative discourses except Atatürkism from the political domain, instrumentalized the national security concept as a means of deepening its power over the state and society. An important point that has not been sufficiently deliberated by researchers of the period was that the NSB, through the military-rooted members, had steered the Constitutional Assembly to prepare a text based on a draft constitution, whose content was borrowed from the national security states of the Cold War. Contrary to the statement of Prof. Sadi Irmak, the Chairman of the Consultative Assembly; "our democracy was not unique to us" (Şarлак, 1994).

Laws enacted during the first two years of the military junta restricting judicial control, bestowing excessive authority upon legislative, administrative, and law-enforcement agencies as well as limiting fundamental rights and freedoms, became constitutional provisions in the 1982 Constitution. The military junta claimed to have used two documents, the 1961 Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, as sources for the constitution (Bayramođlu, 2002, p. 39).

Although the provisions of both constitutions had stipulated the same fundamental rights and freedoms, the 1982 Constitution revoked them with special prohibitions and exceptions under the same titles. While the European Convention on Human Rights prohibited states from abusing fundamental rights and freedoms, the 1982 Constitution defined the state as a "supreme" and "divine" entity, which should be protected against society, placing it in the center of the regime as the main political value above all freedoms. It immediately rendered "national interests" as invariable truths binding the entire society and assigning the monopoly of determining national interests to the National Security Council. The new constitution left individuals defenseless against the state by bringing all sorts of secondary organizations (chambers, bars, trade unions, associations, etc.), under its direct control.⁷³ Hence the 1982 Constitution had no relevance to the texts that the military junta pretended to use as references.

Gemalmaz indicated that "there had been reports, especially in the foreign press, saying that some people influential in this process possessed the constitutions of despotic regimes like

⁷³ For extensive analysis of the 1982 Constitution see, Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Anayasalar (Constitutions in Turkey)* (Istanbul: İletişim Publications, 2002); Zafer Üskül, *Türkiye'nin Anayasa Sorunu (Constitution Problem of Turkey)* (Istanbul: Afa Publications, 1991); Bülent Tanör, *İki Anayasa 1961-1982 (Two Constitutions 1961-1982)* (Istanbul: Beta Publications, 1986); Mustafa Erdoğan, *Türkiye'de Anayasalar ve Siyaset (Constitutions and Politics in Turkey)* (Ankara: Liberte Publications, 2001)

South Korea and Taiwan" (p. 987). Gemalmaz, based on the same foreign sources, reported that legal experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the University of Georgetown in Washington D.C. were sent as advisors to the NSB by the US administration at the time (Ibid). Moreover, as mentioned in the first section, during the Cold War, the U.S.-backed coup governments in countries like South Korea or Brazil, had restructured their constitutional regimes according to the US-originated national security doctrine.

To answer the question whether such an interaction was valid for Turkey, the next chapter analyses the development and the duties of the three central security actors established in the executive, intelligence, and judiciary domains of Turkey, namely the National Security Council, the National Intelligence Organization and the State Security Courts.

Chapter III

1. The Conceptual Framework of the Transition from National Defense to National Security in Turkey

The idea of bringing together the civilian and the military authorities to solve the defense problems of Turkey gained recognition during the first years of the Cold War. Previously, the political leaders of the single-party period had not felt the need for such an institution. Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü, to prevent the Department of Chief of Staff from being wielded by their political rivals, had granted it an independent status and the post had been held by Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, for 21 years who was known for his loyalty to these two leaders.

The first step towards the formation of an intermediary institution between the government and the army was taken by the Office of the Chief of General Staff in 1946, and the foundation of this structure was built three years later (Özdemir, 1989, p.95) when the National Assembly unanimously passed Law No. 5399 (prepared by the Military Council), establishing the National Defense High Council (NDHC). According to the law, the NDHC chaired by the Prime Minister should be formed of ministers chosen by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense, and the Chief of General Staff. This institution, which was responsible only for assessing the country's defense challenges, was designed as an advisory body. The final word on national defense policies belonged to the administrative authority. Nevertheless, Bayramoğlu (2002) asserted that the NDHC had been disregarded by the governments and the prime minister had attended its meeting only once until the Council was dissolved (p. 37). During the same period, the Chief of Staff was allegedly unwilling to participate in such a council (cited in Özdemir, 1989, p. 110).

The NDHC was abrogated by the 1960 coup. As stated earlier, the same coup introduced the national security concept to the political mindset and institutional framework of Turkey. The debates on constitutional articles regulating civil-military relations that occurred in the House of Representatives of the Constituent Assembly⁷⁴ display the dynamics of this paradigm shift from national defense to national security. The 1960 coup was staged against the policies of the Democrat Party rule between 1950 and 1960, which contradicted the official ideology of the state.

⁷⁴ The Constituent Assembly consisted of the National Unity Committee (the members of the junta) and the House of Representatives. The election of members of the House of Representatives was held in accordance with the Law No. 158 of December 13, 1960. Accordingly the following institutions and organizations were authorized to send members to the House of Representatives: Head of State 10, National Unity Committee 18, Provinces 75, RPP 49, Republican Peasants' Nation Party 25, Barr 6, Press 12, Veterans' Association 2, artisan organizations 6, youth 1, trade unions 6, chambers 10, teacher organizations 6, , universities 12, judicial bodies 12. Article 18 of the law forbade those "who have supported the politics and practices contrary to the Constitution and human rights until the 27th May Revolution" from taking part in the House of Representatives. Thus, the DP, which had already been closed before the promulgation of the law, was prevented from sending any representative to the Constituent Assembly.

The National Unity Committee (NUC), except the RPP, "the political party of the Revolution," had no confidence in political formations that established clientelist relations with the masses and their traditionalist social base (Şen, 1996). The military government, as stated in the second chapter, wanted to establish a constitutional order where executive powers were relatively weak compared to those granted to the bureaucratic authority and ensure the power of the state elite on strategic fields. Accordingly, the NUC ordered a group of law professors at Istanbul University to write a draft constitution. Shortly named as "İstanbul draft," this document while curbing the power of the political parties, divided the state power between bureaucratic committees, and established various autonomous institutions and councils (Gözler, 2000, pp.77-92). One of these councils was the National Defense Advisory Council (NDAC) proposed to substitute the NDHC. The following statements were made about the NDAC in the preliminary draft (cited in Özdemir, 1989, p. 100):

“Article 123- The National Defense Advisory Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Commander of the Armed Forces, ministers of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, National Defense, and Transportation, Commanders-in-chief of Armed Forces and the Secretary of the National Defense High Council.

The National Defense Advisory Council is responsible for preparing the necessary plans to generate national power and providing military and civilian total defense of the country and submitting to the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions taken with regard to the necessary precautions in this regard.

The President of the Republic is the chairman of this council. In the absence of the President of the Republic, the Council shall convene under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The Commander of the Armed Forces is the deputy chairman.

The Council of the Ministers is responsible for total national defense and enforcing the necessary measures in this regard.”

A group in the House of Representatives objected to the new NDAC in the İstanbul Draft. "The Executive and Judiciary Subcommittee of the Constitutional Commission" criticized this newly drafted body for two reasons. These criticisms were significant because they highlighted the frailties that the establishment of such a council would create for democracy in Turkey in advance.

The first criticism emphasized the fact that such a council should be established with a mandate limited to "ensuring coordination and assistance" to the government, which is the supreme authority entrusted with the responsibility of making decisions regarding national defense (Ibid., p.101). The second criticism was related to the composition of the council. The report stated that the number of members should be kept to a minimum and the Chief of Staff should be the only military member of the council. It was also added that "there was no need for the commanders-in-chief of armed forces to be council members," since the participation of the Chief of Staff as the highest-ranking officer of the army would be sufficient to convey the

opinions of the military (Ibid.). Otherwise, the council could turn into a "superior organ" with powers to adjudicate on matters related to national defense rather than being an advisory body where the elected high-ranking members of the government work with the Chief of General Staff.

In the first round of the deliberations that occurred in the House of Representatives, some military members rejected these criticisms and insisted that the commanders-in-chief should be the members of the council. They justified their argument by stating that the Chief of Staff would be left alone during any voting phase or would be overburdened (Ibid., p. 103).⁷⁵ They also suggested that "in line with its name in other countries, "such a council should be named as "National Security High Council" and should be structured as a decision-making organ rather than an advisory body (Ibid., pp. 102-103).⁷⁶ However, the proposal of the military members was denied in the House of Representatives. This group then resorted to persuading the NUC, the upper wing of the Constituent Assembly and prevailed upon the junta to rewrite the related article as National Security Council, despite resistance from the House of Representatives (Ibid. pp.105-107).

Article 110/B established a National Security Council under the President of the Republic composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the ministers provided by law and the representatives of the armed forces. The Council was authorized to "communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers with the purpose of assisting in making of decisions related to national security and coordination." The statements of Turhan Feyzioğlu (the President of the Constituent Assembly and Minister of Education in the military government) during the parliamentary consultations on NSC were clear indicators of the paradigm shift from "national defense" to "national security" in Turkey (cited in Bayramoğlu, 2002, p. 38):

"Today when it comes to national security policy, not only in our country but in every country, we do not only mean military or foreign policy matters; issues related to health, trade policy, industry, agriculture, transportation, public works will be discussed in this council.

Like those in the many U.S. backed national security states of the Cold War period; this new security structure was shaped around the concept of internal security which legitimized the

⁷⁵ The statements of the retired Lieutenant General Hüseyin Ataman on the composition of the council were as follows: "The only presence of the Chief of General Staff in this institution would not be enough. In addition to the Chief of General Staff, the Force Commanders should also be included in this committee. This is a kind of joint General Staff. Because all three forces - the Land, Sea and Air Forces - play a major role in defense of the entire country. It is not appropriate to deprive this important institution of their opinions. [...]In order to strike a balance, it is a requirement that the Force Commanders take part in the National Defense High Council."(cited in Özdemir, 1989, p.101). Rauf Gökçen, both member of the House of Representatives and the National Union Committee, suggested a similar view in this regard. Gökçen stated that the force commanders should serve in the High Council. Otherwise, Chief of General Staff would be overloaded (Ibid., p. 103).

⁷⁶ During the discussions, retired General Fahri Belen said the following: "There is a Ministry of National Defense. [It is] directly related to the Armed Forces. [National Defense Supreme Council] is a more comprehensive institution. Its name must be National Security Council. This is consistent with the nomenclature used in other countries (cited in Özdemir, 1989 pp.102-103).

military's tendency to share state authority with elected politicians. The statements that Haydar Tunçkanat, a member of the NUC and later senator in the Parliament, made to a daily newspaper in 1966 support this argument (*Akşam*, 1966, Septembre 22):

“In order to prevent political parties that gain power through elections from corrupting the second republic to be founded with our new Constitution and cause a new military coup, the Committee has created the National Security Council via the new Constitution as a preventive measure and has clearly defined its duties, granting the President of the Republic and the military members of the Council both the duty and the responsibility to present to the Council their fundamental views on all issues concerning our national security.”

The NSC mainly focused on issues related to internal politics from 1962 to the 1971 memorandum. In his memoirs, Muhsin Batur, the Chief of the Air Staff of the 1971 junta, stated that a series of topics including the pardoning of the DP deputies, the supervision of the Justice Party government, and the military's demands for constitutional amendments were discussed in this Council (Batur, 1985).

Contrary to Tunçkanat's expectations, however, this structure did not prevent the coup d'état of March 12, 1971, and the military cadre that staged the coup signed the memorandum as the "National Security Council." Thus, the assumption that the NSC would favor a civil-military dialogue and prevent the coups failed. As far as the legal status of the NSC was concerned, there were two different usurpations of power by the military elite. First, the command echelon that was staging an in-house coup appropriated the NSC as its own and declared its control over issues related to national security. The military hierarchy then bestowed authority on the NSC beyond its advisory role that was indicated in the Constitution. The military members of the NSC, who until then had imposed their supremacy over politics on a perceptual basis, legitimized their power through new legal regulations.

As mentioned above, the constitutional amendments that were made between 1971 and 1973 increased the NSC's influence over the executive power. The expression "assists the Cabinet of Ministers," found in the first version of the 111 articles of the Constitution of 1961, was changed to "advises the Cabinet of Ministers." Besides, the amendment concerning the NSC's structure (Law No. 129, December 1, 1962) was included in the Constitution as a new article. The reference to "force representatives" in the first version of the article was replaced with "force commanders." Thus, both the number and responsibility of military authorities were increased within the council. The most fundamental regulations regarding the NSC's status were implemented during the military regime established by the military coup of September 12, 1980. These amendments made in the NSC's constitutional status during this period resulted in the institutionalization of the political role of the military hierarchy such that it eliminated the need for a new coup.

2. National Security Apparatus of the State

2.1. National Security Council as the Central Security Actor

The key regulation related to the NSC was outlined in Article 118 of the Constitution of 1982. This article ended the civilian majority within the NSC and increased its influence by making its decisions binding. Article 118 included the following statements:

- “The National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister; the Chief of the General Staff; the Minister of National Defense; Internal Affairs; Foreign Affairs; the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic. Depending on the details of the Agenda, Ministers and other concerned persons could be invited to meetings of the Council and their views could be heard.
- The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers, its views on making decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the National Security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society.
- The Agenda of the National Security Council shall be drawn up by the President of the Republic, accounting for the proposals of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff.
- In the absence of the President of the Republic, the National Security Council shall meet under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.
- The organization and duties of the General Secretariat of the National Security Council shall be regulated by law.”

The new structure included the General Commander of the Gendarmerie among the military members of the Council. Hence, the numbers of military and civilian members (five each) were equalized. Given that decisions were made based on a majority of votes, once Kenan Evren was elected President of the Republic, it was evident that the five military members were supported by a sixth member, the President himself, as the head of the NSC. The civilians on the NSC were therefore outnumbered. More importantly, decisions went from being "advisory" to "declaratory," and the NSC ceased being a constitutional advisory committee. The country's national security decisions were "given priority by the cabinet of ministers." The Council thus acquired a legal status above the government.

The Chief of General Staff's power to determine the state's priority agenda became equal to that of the Prime Minister. The military authority, from then on, could command a security field that was broadened to include "ensuring public peace and security." The executive power, which should consist of the head of the state and the government, was thus transformed

into a de facto tripartite arrangement with the addition of the TAF. The NSC, where this trilateral structure merged, became the main decision-maker on all fundamental subjects related to the regime.

The transformation of Turkey into a national security state is more apparent in Law No. 2945 (dated November 9, 1983, on the National Security Council and its General Secretariat) than in the Constitution of 1982. It is possible to trace the dynamics of this process in the introduction of the draft law sent to the Advisory Board by the military government (cited in Özdemir 1989, p. 111):

"[...] By taking advantage of the knowledge gained from the evaluation of the experiences and practices obtained between the period of the establishment of the National Security Council by the Constitution of 1961 and the date of September 12, 1980, in the new democratic order, duties, powers, working procedures and principles and organization of the National Security Council and the General Secretariat of the Security Council were reorganized in line with the needs of the State. The measures [...] identified by the National Security Council on serious [...] internal threats and other threats against the state before 12 September 1980 were not taken into consideration by the executive, legislative and judicial bodies or were not adequately put into practice. (Therefore) to prevent any reoccurrence of the problems faced in the past, [...] the duties, authority and working methods of the Council and its General Secretariat are included in the new draft."

The main goal of the military government was to institutionalize the NSC and its Secretariat as an "inner state government" that would dominate legislative, executive, and judiciary organs. As İnel (1997) stated, "instead of a military coup that could come at a heavy cost [in the future], seizing most of the power in an ordinary period right after such a coup" seemed functional for the military hierarchy (pp. 15-16). The military hierarchy chose to establish a second "institution of power" that would monopolize the issues it deemed strategic. Moreover, while doing so, it would not be accountable for the consequences of its decisions (Ibid). The definition of national security in Law No. 2945 helps clarify the NSC's expanded powers. It was defined as "the protection and safeguarding of the constitutional order, the national entity, and the unity of the state and all of its interests in the international arena, including its political, social, cultural, and economic interests, and of its conventional law, against all types of external and internal threats" and thus acquired official status.

The fact that this broad concept was formulated as "National Security Policy" in the same law constituted a more important development. National security policy was defined as "the politics comprising the principles behind domestic, foreign, and defense policies as specified by the Cabinet of Ministers, on the basis of views established by the National Security Council with the objective of ensuring national security and achieving national objectives." Since this definition could easily be interpreted as the transformation of all subjects dealt with by the NSC into state policies via NSC decisions, it acquired critical importance in Turkish political life.

These articles were a clear signal that the social and political demands in contradiction with the security policies of the state would be prevented. Moreover, such a broad definition of the national security concept not only resulted in the dominance of the military authority over the executives but also created an opportunity to officialize a political ideology through legal means, while guaranteeing immunity from potential challenges. Consequently, new ideological "thought crimes"⁷⁷ would be created and the State Security Courts that had been reactivated during the military government would be operationalized to prosecute any thought crime that contradicted the philosophy of the September 12 regime.

In the new constitutional order, the military coup declared its rule by placing the NSC at the top of the state authority organigram and defined it in such detail in Article 4 of Law No. 2945 as not to allow for any legal loopholes. The NSC's duties were as follows:

- a) Developing views on decision-making and the coordination required for the establishment, formation, and implementation of the state's national security policy;
- b) Establishing measures for the fulfillment of national objectives, national plans, and programs prepared in line with the state's national security policy;
- c) Continuously monitoring and evaluating national power elements and the country's political, social, economic, cultural, and technological situations and developments that may affect the state's national security policy, and determining core principles to ensure that they are strengthened in line with national objectives;
- d) Establishing measures that it considers necessary for the protection of the state's entity and independence, the country's unity and indivisibility, and society's peace and security;
- e) Establishing measures that it considers necessary to protect the constitutional order and achieve national unity and indivisibility, and that will gather the Turkish nation around national principles and values to steer it towards national objectives, which are congruent with Kemalist thought as well as the principles and reforms of Atatürk. It determines its views, needs and the measures it considers essential for the strategies and core principles necessary for fighting and neutralizes domestic and foreign threats against the above, as well as on planning and implementation services;
- f) Establishing its views on states of emergency, martial law, mobilization, and declaration of war;
- g) Determining the principles for services, responsibilities and plans to be carried out regarding the services and responsibilities that public and private sector bodies and organizations and citizens need to take on concerning total

⁷⁷ By thought crime, we mean political thoughts expressed orally or in written forms which are regarded as a criminal offense.

defense, national mobilization, and other matters, in the event of a state of emergency, war, situations that require war, and that follow law;

h) Establishing the necessary principles for financial, economic, social, and cultural measures and funds required by public services, as well as total defense services and issues prescribed by the state's national security policy to include in development plans, programs, and yearly budgets;

i) Establishing its views on international treaties acceded and to be acceded in areas included within the scope of national security.

j) Conveying the views, measures, and principles it establishes to the Cabinet of Ministers in the form of council decisions and fulfilling other duties assigned by law.

With this law, the state model institutionalized by the September 12 regime granted the military the right to rule an immense area on the basis of a final policy imposed by its security choices. It allowed the military not only to establish targets, but to determine threats to security policy and to take measures against these threats inside and outside of the country. Moreover, the military hierarchy acquired the power to intervene directly in choices concerning the use of resources and to issue directives on the use of budgets without being held accountable for the consequences.

It is not possible to learn the negotiation processes of the council's decisions since it is obligatory to maintain confidentiality in NSC meetings under all circumstances. According to its law (Law no: 2945, Art. 10), the NSC's decisions would be publicized only by the permission of the council. An advisory body is typically expected to disseminate information to the related institution through written reports. In practice, however, the council's decisions were presented to the Council of ministers through a public announcement made by its General Secretariat whose members were from the military cadre. It seems that this method of communication was adopted to exert a form of psychological pressure on the politicians. As explained in the fourth chapter, between 1984 and the mid-2000s, there was no single example of a government decision that was made against the council's "recommendations." The military elite ensured the transformation of the council's recommendations into government policies and follow-up with their applications by way of its General Secretariat. Secretarial services of the General Secretariat were just the tip of the iceberg compared to its other duties and authorities.

2.1.1. The General Secretariat of the National Security Council (GSNSC): The Shadow Government

The duties and powers of the General Secretariat were also regulated via Law No. 2945. According to the provisions of this law, although the GSNSC appeared on paper to be a civilian institution under the Prime Minister, its General Secretary was appointed from among the armed forces at the rank of full general or admiral; its members, kept confidential by law, were appointed at the suggestion of the General Secretary and with the approval of the Prime Minister. The General Secretary's duties (prior to the reform process in 2000s) are summarized

as follows (Art. 13): to conduct all kinds of necessary work, examinations, investigations, and assessments and to convey them and their consequences to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the NSC; to monitor and supervise the implementation of decisions made by the Cabinet of Ministers in parallel with decisions by the NSC; apart from defense policy, to conduct research on the determination, establishment, implementation, and, when necessary amendment of national security policy and to prepare plans on these subjects; to plan and implement the necessary services and activities for steering “the Turkish nation towards Kemalist thought” and related “national objectives”, and for the protection of “the state’s existence and independence, the country’s unity and indivisibility, and public peace and security;” to plan and coordinate total defense services outside the jurisdiction of the armed forces; to establish the measures to be taken and the work and processes to be carried out in a state of emergency, to determine the necessary measures to achieve coordination in implementation; to conduct cooperation and coordination with the State Planning Organization Undersecretariat in order for the measures prescribed by national security policy to be undertaken and for services to be carried out; for financial, economic, social, cultural, and other measures and funds required by public services and total defense services to be included in development plans and programs; and for allocations to be made in yearly budgets.

The “monitoring and supervision, steering, coordination and oversight” of all the duties listed above were included in the General Secretariat’s job definition (Art. 14). The General Secretariat was also granted the power to conduct all these duties “in conjunction with other ministries, bodies, and organizations when necessary” (Art. 18). All ministries, public bodies and organizations, and private legal entities were responsible for providing the GSNSC, continuously or when requested, with information and documents of public knowledge and all degrees of confidentiality (Art. 19). A separate allocation was created for the confidential expenditures of the General Secretariat (Art. 20).

The fact that the General Secretariat, contrary to the constitutional status of the NSC on whose behalf it acted, was organized as an "executive administrative" institution. Thus, the NSC could be defined as a "shadow government" of Turkey from a legal perspective. From its establishment until the constitutional amendments realized in the context of the EU harmonization process, which curbed most of its powers, the GSNC was the main institution that followed and controlled state practices. The powers of the General Secretariat, which was structured as a sub-institution to ensure that the NSC's decisions were transformed into sanctions, occasionally surpassed the influence of the upper-council, and became more politically significant.

Law No. 2945 stated that the internal work arrangements of the council, its work and relationships with ministries (Art. 18), bodies, and organizations, and the foundation, duties, and powers of the units (Art. 12) within it would be organized by a top-secret regulation (Art. 12). Its provisions would be prepared by the General Secretariat and it “*would be accepted* [emphasis added] by the Cabinet of Ministers after being discussed in the National Security Council.” At that time, two things were unlikely to happen: the rejection of the regulation single-handedly prepared by the military in an NSC where the majority were in the military wing and its disapproval by a cabinet working under the threat of a permanent military regime.

The GSNSC regulation was presented to the government as a decision only two months after the transition to civilian rule. This occurred on February 8, 1984, during the second NSC meeting of the Özal administration, which was chaired by the President of the Republic, Kenan Evren (Press release of the NSC, February 8, 1984). It was in effect until the reforms brought by the Seventh EU harmonization package in 2004 (Law No 4963). Its covert duties and secret structure began to emerge in news reports (Zeyrek, 2003; Berkan, 2003). This regulation was very critical because it created public awareness of the unknown state structure of the Republic of Turkey, which had gradually been transformed into a national security state through a series of post-coup legal restructuring.

2.1.1.1. The GSNSC's Regulation: The Constitution of the Internal Government Mechanism

This regulation, which can be regarded as a secret constitution, gave the GSNSC draconian powers that are not compatible with parliamentary democracy. It was thus discovered that along with the duties stated above, the GSNSC also held responsibilities of critical importance, such as "establishing the need for nationwide psychological operations of all types" and preparing and implementing psychological operation plans; "continuously monitoring the situation of domestic and foreign threats by evaluating all documents, information, and intelligence" that it collected concerning national security; establishing "elements that may turn into threats;" "when necessary, sending representatives to the Office of the Prime Minister, to the Cabinet of Ministers, and to relevant commissions in the TBMM;" "preparing the National Security Policy Document" and, following its "acceptance," carrying out the necessary activity for its implementation; preparing directives for the implementation of ministries; monitoring, overseeing, and coordinating the work that would be conducted in line with these directives; and informing the General Secretary of a deviation from policy principles or delay in implementation.

In addition to a legal affairs office, personnel department, and secretariat known to the public, the GSNSC included four central service units founded on the basis of the secret regulation. These were the National Security Policy Department, the Information Gathering and Assessment Group Department, the Community Relations Department (CRD), and the Total Defense Civil Services Department. Based on information provided by Bayramoğlu (2003), as of 1999, every one of the 116 personnel working for these four units as president, deputy president, chief consultants, or consultants were current or former members of the military.

The first of these four units, the National Security Policy Department, was composed of three boards (Plan Coordination and Implementation Follow-up, Defense Politics, and Foreign Policy) and two group presidencies (Internal Security-Public Administration-Education and Culture Politics, and Economy and Social Politics). This structure was divided into sub-units that were parallel to the vectors included in the definition of national security, and it provided data on security policy to the military wing in the NSC.

The task of the Information Gathering and Assessment Group Department was to present intelligence on existing internal and external enemies and priority threats, and the

information needed to identify possible threats to the Secretary-General. The department was collecting intelligence from the General Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, General Command of Gendarmerie, and Undersecretariat of the National Intelligence Organization. It also had the authority to prepare intelligence-gathering plans within the context of the intelligence needs of the General Secretariat, to make requests from relevant ministries, government institutions, and organizations, and to direct all the intelligence units within these needs.

The Community Relations Department was formed to penetrate security politics into all spheres of social life. As a coordination unit, the CRD consisted of the following group presidencies: The Directorate of Communication and Special Operations Branches, Review and Research, Planning and Orientation, and Relations with Institutions and Organizations. In addition to these sub-units, provisional service units; specialization and research commissions; and special training, planning, and implementation units could be established with the proposal of the Secretary-General and the approval of the Prime Minister. The CRD was responsible for determining different kinds of psychological operations necessitated by the state. Its duties included developing long, medium, and short-term psychological operation plans that were aligned with national policy objectives, carrying out approved plans and controlling, coordinating, and directing the practices realized by the administrative units. The functions of the CRD also included monitoring and controlling activities related to the psychological operations, implementing actions to realize the tasks in accordance with the decisions, and determining whether the expected results of the decisions were reached. In addition, the CRD was authorized to contribute actively to the process of national security policymaking and to identify the needs related to possible psychological threats. Within this framework, it had the power to direct all of the public broadcasters, including the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, in matters that fall within its sphere of responsibility.

It was affiliated with the Prime Minister on paper. Therefore, it would be the governments which would be held accountable for the political consequences of its uninterrupted psychological operations. The traces of the mentality structure mentioned above are clearly seen in an interview with the founder of the CRD during the military regime, Ertuğrul Zekai Ökte, on psychological operations (Dinç, 2002):

“We do politics on or talk about any subject related to the family. There are four fundamental rights that we defend: Security, health, education, and judiciary services. We want to warn, enlighten the public on these subjects. We want to purge and mobilize the family, youth and the surrounding; the minds are dirty. (*Against whom are you going to mobilize?*) Against the threat. (*Whose threat?*) Everyone’s. (*Who is everyone? Are our four fronts covered with the enemy?*) Not our four fronts but everywhere is covered with the enemy. I wish it were only the four fronts. (*Do we have them inside, these enemies?*) Inside, outside, they are everywhere. (*Are organizations such as Gladio, Ergenekon, and Counter-guerrilla necessary for a State?*) Counter-guerrilla is a thing of the past. Many things were written about me on this subject. There are even books. I was staging a coup without tanks,

cannons⁷⁸ so and so. [...] So, what happens if I do or I don't? I do, or I don't. [...] I started the psychological warfare. (*Who employs psychologic warfare in Turkey?*) Public Relations Department under the NSC does it. The clandestine ones are carried out by the National Intelligence Agency. Noone else does it. (*Was the psychological warfare unit within the army while you were working there?*) It was always the case. (*Is there a setting that necessitates an Independence War?*) There is even worse. Today, the situation in Turkey is far worse than the conditions in 1919. (*Why?*) We are under threats coming from everywhere. Also, the threat is unclear. Maybe you are a threat! (*Can we concretize these threats?*) No, you cannot list them. Maybe you are the threat. Who knows? (*But what you do, is a sort of McCarthyism?*) I don't know what it is."

The structure of the security state and political system that were institutionalized by the September 12 regime can be summarized as follows: While defense policy was prepared directly by the Office of the Chief of General Staff, the general principles of national security policy, which included a broad area encompassing economy, culture, education, and social and foreign policy, were established by the NSC General Secretary. Within this framework, the General Secretary outranked all other public institutions, including ministries, and the armed forces were the only institution that is free from the NSC General Secretary's interference. The NSCGS's authority to intervene was not limited to executive and administrative organs but extended to legislative bodies as well via the presence of General Secretariat members in parliamentary commissions and budgetary planning processes. Psychological operations were conducted among civil society; the intelligence network was also restructured on the basis of this reasoning, and a new institution was created where the intelligence originating from all units of the state was gathered by military authorities.

Practical matters are also handled in the same hierarchical order. As discussed in detail in the next section, the national security policies determined by an institution that was headed by a full general were turned into an official document that was renewed every five years according to the conjuncture under the name of the National Security Policy Document. After its submission to the NSC and its forced approval by the prime minister, it entered into force. This set of instructions was used to remind the governments of their duties, as well as the "red lines" of the military regarding their course of action.

When security policies are nationalized, those who object these policies can easily be declared as traitors. As explained in the following chapter, many dissident democrats, journalists, and social scientists were labeled as such in the 1990s. The secret structure designed as "State within State" (i.e., the real State within the official, constitutional State) contradicted the universal principles of the rule of law. The rule of law refers to a state order which provides legal safety to citizens. It is defined as one in which the following four universal principles are upheld (<http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law>):

⁷⁸ Ökte is referring to the book written by Fatih Güllapoğlu called *Tanksız Topsuz Harekat (Operation without Tank or Cannon)*. (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1991)

1. "The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities are accountable under the law.
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient.
4. Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals that are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve."

This regulation reversed all these principles and even contradicted the 1982 Constitution, which the military itself had shaped. First, the existence of a secret regulation is a contradiction for a state that defines itself as a "democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of law" in its Constitution (Art. 2). Moreover, in Article 124 of the 1982 Constitution, the terms and conditions of the regulations are explained in detail. In this arrangement, there was no mention of the possibility that the regulations might be secret. Second, the secret regulation gave the General Secretariat the authority to direct the Ministries and supervise them under these directives. However, in the 1982 Constitution, only the president and prime minister were called to supervise all public administrations. Its law stated that the secretariat would use all its powers "on behalf of the prime minister." However, what could not be explained in the legal grounds was that the prime minister was transferring his constitutional supervisory authority (1982 Constitution, Art. 112/3) to a secretariat, which was seemingly a consultative institution among hundreds of public institutions. This occurred because, constitutionally, the part of the supervisory authority related to the ministries belongs to the Prime Minister and not the Prime Ministry.

In the law no. 2945, the scope of the matters to be arranged by regulations is wide and vague. Any actions of an institution that had the power to make regulatory decisions on almost every aspect of social life were excluded from judicial review. Thus, Article 125 of the constitution, which stated that recourse to judicial review, must be available against all actions and acts of the administration were violated. This regulation was contrary to the existing system of domestic law and the principles of the rule of law.

The 1982 Constitution, while being highly problematic regarding the principles of the current democratic state of law, does not explicitly or exclusively reject universal political values on paper. On the other hand, the internal state mechanism established during the military regime hindered the effective and permanent use of certain rights of the citizens specified in the constitution. In summary, Turkey had been governed by a second-de facto-constitution in the form of a secret regulation for nearly 20 years. The practices of this regime were primarily determined by security concerns and managed by the NSC through its General Secretariat. Therefore, the NSC and the GSNAC can be defined as institutions in which the boundaries of this dual structure intertwined. Both have enjoyed constitutional protection, and by secret

regulations, deepened their already large field of intervention while establishing an internal power mechanism free from judicial supervision.

In the context of this state structure, the administrative institutions that were not under direct control of the military were confined to "to obey the requirements of the national security policy" by law enacted during and after the 1980 coup and they functioned as the centralist mechanisms of the security state. Thus, all the layers of the executives and their range of action were surrounded by the national security taboo.

2.2. National Security and the Limits of Politics and Rights

2.2.1. National Security as a Legal Tool for Military Control of Administration

According to the 1982 Constitution, "the formation, abolition, functions, powers, and organization of the ministries shall be regulated by law" (Art.113). In this context, the military government issued Decree No. 174 dated December 13, 1983, called the "Decree Law on the Establishment and Duties of Ministries." This decree is important for two reasons: First, the decree appointed the Presidencies of the Research Planning and Coordination Council, which is responsible for determining the working principles and main service policies of the ministers and the ministry, to produce policy within the framework of national security policy. According to Article 21 of this decree law, "the ministers are responsible for carrying out the ministry's services so that they comply with legislation, the general policy of the government, the national security policy, and they have to answer to the Prime Minister." Among the duties of the Research, Planning and Coordination Board of the Ministry were "determining the working principles of the Ministry for the fulfillment of the orders and duties defined within the framework of national security policy" and "assisting the preparation of the ministry's main service policy and plans in accordance with these principles." Yet, the 1961 Constitution, referred to as the reference text of the 1982 Constitution, only held the Council of Ministers accountable for the general policy of the government. In the 1961 Constitution, no official policy is mentioned under national security politics.

The second important point in relation to the Decree Law is that the above-mentioned articles would be "cut-and-paste" in the decrees and laws which would be issued after this date to regulate the structures and duties of the individual ministries (Decree-Law No. 180 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Public Works and Housing, December 14, 1983; Decree-Law No. 181 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Health, December 14, 1983; Decree-Law No. 441 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Areas, August 9, 1991; Decree-Law No.178 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Finance, December 14, 1983; Law No. 2992 for Amendments of Decree-Law on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Justice, March 29, 1984; Law No. 4856 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Environment and Forestry, May 8, 2003; Act. No. 3154 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, March 1, 1985; Act. No. 3152 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Internal Affairs, February 23, 1985; Law No. 179 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Education, June 8, 1984; Law No. 3143 on Organization and Duties

of Ministry of Industry and Commerce, January 18, 1985; Law No. 3348 on Organization and Duties of Ministry of Transport, April 17, 1987).

Both during the presidency of Kenan Evren, when the entire September 12th Coup cadre took over the government, and later during the presidency of Turgut Özal as the first civilian president in the post-coup period, the laws and decrees concerning the ministries had the above-mentioned articles in them verbatim. The same job definition is reported in the laws regarding the undersecretaries of the prime minister's office: "The undersecretaries, as the highest rank personnel of their organization, are responsible for carrying out their services in compliance with the general politics of the government, the national security, development plans, and annual programs. Furthermore, they are responsible for maintaining coordination and collaboration in their field of operation with other related governmental institutions."

The Research, Planning and Coordination Department Presidencies reporting to the Undersecretariats were given the task of "determining the working principles for the fulfillment of orders and duties given within the framework of national security policy, and assisting with the preparation of the main service policy and plans of the Undersecretariat in accordance with these principles" (Decree-Law No. 491 on Organization and Duties of Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs, August 19, 1993; Decree-Law No. 485 on Organization and Duties of Undersecretariat of Customs, July 13, 1993; Decree-Law No. 188 on Organization and Duties of Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, December 13, 1983)

Prime Minister's Office had six undersecretariats during the period that this dissertation covers: The Undersecretariat of Treasury, the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade⁷⁹, the Undersecretariat of Maritime, the Undersecretariat of Customs, the Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, and the Undersecretariat of the National Intelligence Organization. Since it has a decisive role in the subject matter of this dissertation, there is a separate chapter on the Undersecretariat of the National Intelligence Organization. For the remaining five undersecretariats, except for the Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, the task definition was to fulfill the requirements of the national security policy. As mentioned above, the GSNSC worked independently with the State Planning Organization to ensure that the financial, economic, and social measures required by the national security policy are included in the development plans and budget of the GSNSC. In summary, ministries and all undersecretariats affiliated with the Prime Ministry are legally obligated to act in accordance with the national security policy.

The same picture emerges in the legislation of the general directorates affiliated with the Prime Ministry and ministries. The seven directorates of various ministries share a common article titled "The Duties of the General Director," which states that "the General Director [...] is responsible to the Minister for carrying out the services of the administration [...] in accordance with [...] the legislation and decisions of the Board of Directors and *national security policy*" (Decree-Law No. 231 on Organization and Duties of Directorate General of

⁷⁹ The Undersecretariat of Treasury and the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade were separated 11 years after their establishment by the Law No.4056 on Organization and Duties of Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Undersecretariat Foreign Trade issued on December 20, 1994.

Press and Information, June 18, 1984; Decree-Law No. 227 on Organization and Duties of Directorate General of Foundations, April 18, 1984; Law No. 3289 on Organization and Duties of General Directorate of Youth and Sports, May 28, 1986; Law No. 3234 on Organization and Duties of General Directorate of Forestry, November 8, 1985; Law No. 3202 on Organization and Duties of General Directorate of General Directorate of Rural Services, May 22, 1985; Decree-Law No. 320 on Organization and Duties of Directorate General of National Lottery Administration, June 6, 1986; Law No. 3254 on General Directorate of State Meteorological Services, January 14, 1986). Even the Presidencies of the Research Planning and Coordination Department working under the General Directorate are bound by the same task of determining "the working principles to fulfill the orders and duties given in the framework of national security policy." The seven administrative units under the Prime Ministry were the General Directorate of Press and Information, General Directorate of Foundations, General Directorate of Youth and Sports, General Directorate of Rural Services working under Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, General Directorate of Forestry working under the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, General Directorate of State Meteorological Works, and General Directorate of National Lottery working under the Ministry of State Finances.

The regulation that was brought to the National Lottery Administration is another example of how the national security obsession crept into the quotidian realms, seemingly far from the domain of politics. The fact that 95 % of the net revenue of the National Lottery was allocated to the Defense Industry Support Fund established in 1985 was likely the underlying reasons for this reflex.

Abiding by the rules of national security politics or the obligation to serve the power that shapes these politics is not limited to the above-mentioned administrative institutions. It appears that these stereotypes were introduced into the legislation of many institutions that the September 12th regime created or rearranged within the framework of security ideology. For example, the legal regulation made in 1984 regarding the State Institute of Statistics, obliged the chairman of the Institute to act in accordance with the national security policy (Decree-Law No. 219 on Organization and Duties of Presidency of State Institute of Statistics, June 18, 1984). The expectation that the head of an institution, which compiles and assess "independent, objective and reliable" statistical data and information (as stated in its official website) in Turkey, should behave in accordance with the national security policy, shows that the autonomy of this institution was undermined.

Similarly, among the principles to be applied in the services and activities of Atatürk Supreme Council of Culture, Language, and History (also mentioned in the second chapter) there is one that declares its goal as "being the guardian and the protector of the *requirements of the national unity and security*, national moral values and national traditions" (Law No. 2876 on Organization and Duties of Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History, August 17, 1983). This council, in one of its reports published in 1986 (Turkish Culture Planning Organization Report) makes this critical statement: "The cultural policy is part of the national security politics of the state."

The concept of national security is also found in the Supreme Council for Science and Technology, which was established during the military government period. In the first article

of the related decree law (Decree-Law No. 77 on Organization and Duties of Supreme Council for Science and Technology, October 4, 1983), the goal of this council was explained as “establishing that the research and development policies within the fields of science and technology are in line with economic development, social improvement and *national security goals* and giving direction to them to ensure they are coordinated.”⁸⁰ As a result, the state mechanism that emerged from the relational chain between the constitution, provisions of code, and regulatory articles of the September 12th regime was as follows: The national security policy was determined by a seemingly civil security secretary under the supervision of the General Staff, employees of which were soldiers but were working under the prime ministry. The military hierarchy, in the form of the NSC and through its decisions, presented the policies to the government. These decisions were reviewed as a "priority" by the cabinet, and after they were smoothly approved in the context of national security politics, the executive organs which were composed of ministers and their administrative units were all mobilized by the military bureaucracy.

2.2.2. National Security as the Restrictive Criterion of Rights and Liberties

Chapter 2 argues that the 1980 regime established a constitutional system that accepts exceptions and limitations as rules, rather than defining individual rights and liberties as the fundamental means of social life and the state as a regulatory–supervisory entity. The criteria Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution declares that fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, "with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public morals and public health, which are mentioned both in the 1982 Constitution and in the legal statues passed during that period, are highly ambiguous and legally problematic. However, due to the limitations of this dissertation, the analysis is confined to the national security criterion. Restrictions based on national security are of great importance, as the concept constitutes the legal basis for the actions of the institutions at the top of the state hierarchy. Although it dominates a vast field, there is no clear definition of this phenomenon. In the context of the state-individual and state-society relations, it is used as a trump card in favor of the former.

The national security concern entered the stream of policy through the legislative and constitutional amendments of the 1971 interim government, and it quickly became one of the restriction criteria on the rights and liberties in the Turkish judicial system. The Constitutional Amendment Law No. 1488 of September 20, 1971, interfered with most of the libertarian elements of the 1961 Constitution. The 1961 Constitution stated that the fundamental rights and freedoms could not be touched, even for “public morality, public order, social justice and

⁸⁰ However, it should be noted that, the "fears" of those importing security paradigms in Turkey have not allowed them to support academic and scientific work, especially in social sciences. It was stated at the 2005 council meeting that no support was provided to those working in social sciences until the 2000s, the period when integration efforts with the EU accelerated. The fundamental reason for this lack of support was explained in the same meeting as the deep-rooted "prejudiced approach" to social sciences "coming from the past" (TÜBİTAK, 2005, pp. 2-4).

national security" reasons. With the amendment made in 1971 to the related article, however, the "protection of national security" was considered one of the pillars that could restrict basic rights and liberties by "law" (Art. 11\Par. 1). This clause was passed on to the 1982 Constitution, with an additional provision stating that "the general restriction terms apply to all basic rights and liberties" (Art. 13).

The national security concerns also created an opportunity for interventions into the freedom of information and freedom of the press. The 1961 Constitution declared that the freedom of press and information could be restricted by law "to protect national security"(Art. 22). In the 1971 amendment, a new article gave the administrative authority to confiscate, shut down and charge newspapers and magazines "in cases where there was a delay in the protection of "national security," "indivisible integrity of the state and its nation," or "public order." The 1982 Constitution adopted this amendment with small changes in wording, and it included a new paragraph stating, "any publication which clearly bears the characteristics of being a continuation of a suspended periodical is prohibited" (Art. 28/Par. 9). Additionally, 'newspapers and magazines' were changed to 'periodicals and non-periodicals,' such that books were included in the sanction. Article 30, also made possible the seizure, confiscation, or barring from operation of the printing press or publishing houses "in cases where offenses against the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, against the fundamental principles of the Republic or national security leading to conviction, are involved."

One of the most important direct interventions made to the freedom of information was the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) Act, issued during the military government (Law No. 2954, November 14, 1983). This law eliminated the principles of objectivity and impartiality of public broadcasting in the 1961 constitution and removed the autonomy of TRT. The new law included "the fulfillment of the requirements of the State's national security policy" as one of the broadcasting principles of TRT (Art. 5\c). Moreover, article 15 of this law authorized TRT to establish temporary advisory councils with the purpose of "benefitting from their special expertise," and made GSNCS solely responsible for the issues related to national security. Given that the monopoly of TRT continued until the first half of the 1990s and a CRP, authorized to conduct psychological operations, it was almost impossible to receive news in Turkey that was not biased or manipulated on sensitive subjects for the state.

This legal framework also prevented the radios and TV networks that were set up after the state monopoly regulations in 1994 from developing a free and impartial broadcasting policy on the issues addressed by the NSC. The law of private radio and television issued in 1994 stipulated that broadcasts should comply with national security requirements (Law No. 3984 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Broadcasts, April 20, 1994). Moreover, the same law established the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTSC) to organize radio and television broadcasts and authorized the General Secretariat of the National Security Council to appoint one of the members of RTSC (Art.3/d). Thus, the Secretary-General had direct control over the compliance of the broadcasts with the security policy and, if necessary, held the authority to intervene.

Within the same framework, the freedom of association and the freedom of assembly were also restricted on a national security basis. While the 1961 Constitution limited the "right

to establish associations" only to protect public order and general morality, the 1971 amendments added the measures of "indivisible integrity of the state and nation" as well as the "protection of national security" to the provision (Art. 29). A supplementary provision was also added to the constitution, stating that the activities of associations may be terminated by order of an administrative authority in cases where a "delay endangers national security" (Art. 29/3). Not only were these amendments adopted by the 1982 Constitution, but with a new provision, the operations of the associations, classified as public institutions and professional organizations, could be terminated by an "an authority designated by law" if they posed a threat to national security (Art. 33/Par. 4). Similarly, the 1982 Constitution inserted "strong possibility of violation of national security requirements" as criteria that constituted the prohibition of meetings and demonstration marches. In the 1961 Constitution, the intervention to these rights had been limited only to the protection of public order.

The 1982 Constitution blocked off the voicing of the alternative views on the subjects, which the national security state kept in a status quo circle. This legal barrier based on security discourse was further enhanced with the passing of two laws after the adoption of the 1982 Constitution "Associations Law" (Law No. 2908, November 7, 1983) and "Meetings and Demonstration Marches Law" (Law No. 2911 of November 8, 1983).

Restrictions on trade union rights, collective bargaining agreements, and strike and lockout rights were legitimized by a similar logic. With the 1971 amendments, the protection of national security became a restrictive criterion in the legal system for the rights of those employees and employers who wanted to establish unions or to join or leave them. The related articles of the 1982 Constitution, did not give a reference to the national security. However, the 1983 Collective Agreement, Strike and Lock-out Law stipulated that the collective contracts could not contain any provisions in conflict with the national security. Likewise, strikes and lockouts could not pursue goals against [...] national security (Law no. 2822 on Collective Agreements, Strike and Lock-out, May 7, 1983). In the same law, it was also affirmed that an ongoing strike or lockout, or those about to begin, could be postponed for 60 days by the decisions of the Council of Ministers if they might affect national security (Art. 33).

As a result, the legal regulations of September 12 placed the highly ambiguous national security concept into the foundations of the administrative structure of the state, and it became the restrictive measure of rights and liberties ranging from freedom of the press to individual and social rights. This discourse created a legal (if not legitimate) ground to define any peaceful opposition against national security policies or challenges against the ideological positioning of the determining actors as a crime to be eliminated. Thus, the administrative mechanism reached a final form that constitutionally secured the hegemonic state structure rather than citizenship rights.

2.3. The Intelligence Unit of the National Security State: National Intelligence Organization

The first official intelligence organization of the Republic of Turkey was established under the name the Directorate of National Security Service (DNSS; Milli Emniyet Hizmetleri

Riyaseti) on January 6th, 1926. It was a secret unit that reported to the Intelligence Office of the General Staff (Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Riyaseti'nin İstihbarat Dairesi), which is currently known as the headquarters of the Turkish Armed Forces (İlter, 2002). With the direct orders of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk for the cabinet, DNSS became an official unit and was housed under the Office of the Prime Minister. The regulation about DNSS's secret cadres was published in the official gazette of the parliament and was eliminated in 1943 (Ibid.). Loan personnel from military and law enforcement cadres primarily ran the DNSS, and its operations were limited to the domestic sphere (Tunçkanat, 1987 p. 93). With the beginning of the Cold War in the 1950s, the CIA started using the DNSS for its own purposes and interests (Ibid.). This continued to such an extent that some portion of the staff salaries at the organization was directly paid through the CIA.

Salih Korur, then counselor to the prime minister, made the following statement about the unit during his trials about slush fund corruption in the High Court (cited in Tunçkanat, pp. 93-94):

"There were a lot of rumors, Americans dominated our National Law Enforcement, due to their fiscal connections, [sic] they are exerting influence. All our cases are in the hands of the American National Security Service. We have heard these rumors. When I started my job, I realized that a school, Istanbul Police Department, and Yeşilkoy Investigation Unit were completely taking orders from the Americans. They were directly paying the salaries at that school to the school's principal. The Yeşilkoy Investigation Unit was also directly financed by the Americans; same was true for the Istanbul Police Department. [...] Americans were directly paying our officers, and since they were paying them, they took the liberty to use them as their own. Our staff at the interception services was also at their disposal."

Adnan Menderes, the prime minister at the time stated the followings on the subject (Ibid, pp. 94-95):

"[...] As the counselor clarified, we heard about the bugging of schools. As he also added, we wanted to prevent that from happening. In essence, the reason for my appointment of him into the service is about "going in and trying to understand what was going on." We said let's put an end to it after we achieve what we wanted. We did not want to be on bad terms with the Americans, we need their help indefinitely, and I just wanted to prevent our officers from being paid by them."

Tunçkanat recorded that after the coup d'état on May 27th in 1960, DNSS was largely cleared of the CIA influence. However, according to him, the CIA's was still partly involved in the organization since they could not identify the informants who continued to work for the Americans (p. 97).

In 1963, the secret service sent a new draft bill to the parliament to restructure the state according to the national security axis. Below is a quote from the speech of then Prime Minister

İsmet İnönü; it provides insight into the process of this secret service-related draft bill (cited in Özdemir, 1989, p. 165):

"The National Intelligence Organization is being established to address the security and the national policy of the state as a whole. It also aims to maintain its conduct. This organization will collect the most updated and reliable news to pass them onto the National Security Council, which is founded as a body of the Constitution. [...] Once this organization is founded, the institutions and state bodies, which collect information and news will not only have to think where to pass those on but they will also do better and well-planned intelligence service by knowing which information to acquire or means of getting them. At the very same time, they would be completing an updated intelligence work up to par with National Security Council standards."

Two important conclusions came from these hearings. First, like its American counterpart, the NIO was designed as an institution closely linked to the National Security Council. Second, unlike the CIA, the state gave the NIO the task of internal and external intelligence operations, such that national security could be maintained. The NIO's duties and tasks were summarized as follows in the scope of Law no. 644, which was adopted on July 6th, 1965 with almost a two-year delay: "NIO is entrusted with powers to collect military, political, commercial, economic, financial, industrial, scientific, technical, biographical, psychological and national security-related intelligence that would be essential in the preparation of national security plans of the state. It is also responsible for the dissemination and transfer of this information to the National Security Council and the Prime Minister and other related official bodies. Furthermore, it is expected to coordinate actions and intelligence among all the intelligence units and institutions of the State and to fulfill the necessities of psychological defense systems and to counteract external intelligence."

While the NSB of the September 12th coup strengthened the institutional structure of the security state, it also reorganized its main intelligence body. NIO achieved its current status with Law no. 2937, on the State Intelligence Services and the Law of National Intelligence Organization that was passed pursuant the approval of the 1982 Constitution. With this law, the NSC's sanctions on NIO increased considerably compared to the regulations of 1965. After analyzing the language and tone of this new law that regulates the task and duties of NIO, it is evident that the crucial administrative project of the September 12th regime was to restructure the state along the lines of national security.

The first task of NIO was defined as "establishing National Security Intelligence on the State level and transmitting this intelligence to the President, Prime Minister, Chief of Defense and the General Secretary of National Security Council respectively" (Art. 4\Par a). The second essential duty was "assisting the President, the Prime Minister, Chief of Defense, the General Secretary of National Security Council and other related ministers with the intelligence input and needs when they prepare the plans related to the national security agenda of the state" (Art. 4\ Par b). As such, parallel to the state perception of the September 12th coup generals, the hierarchical order of the state actors, i.e., the security protocol was reorganized by moving the

Chief of Defense and the General Secretary of the National Security Council ahead of the ministers. Furthermore, the new law made the ministries and other state bodies responsible for passing on any intelligence they collected on national security to NIO (Art. 5). As such, the ministers of an elected government were not only reduced to operational units of the security agenda defined by the military cadres; they were also assigned duties as the intelligence officers of the state status quo.

Moreover, according to its law, NIO would submit any proposals it prepared to guide the intelligence operations of the state enterprises first to the NSC and then to the Prime Minister (Art. 4/ Par. c). With the passing of this law, a new unit called the National Intelligence Coordination Council was established under the direction of the NIO Undersecretary. The goal of this council was to outline foundational ideas, such that intelligence topics could be identified, managed, and coordinated. The compositional structure of this council was in line with the conventional military-civil hierarchy of the state, which meant that the General Secretary of the National Security Council (or his deputy secretary) and the General Staff Intelligence Director (or his deputy director) were the first two members of the council succeeding the Counselor. The counselors of the various ministries and other civil public officers received lower ranks in the intelligence protocol.

The fact that the President and the Prime Minister were in the upper ranks of this hierarchy was not significant in this context because the election of the undersecretary of NIO was tied to the NSC's decision. In other words, it was impossible for a civilian to obtain this position if the military cadres did not approve of them. Regarding the practices of the State from the establishment of NIO until the coup d'état of September 12th, all NIO Undersecretaries were selected from the high-ranking military officers, and a significant number of NIO staff were either active military officers or retired ones.⁸¹ Until the beginning of the 1990s, military officers directed the operations of NIO and the army had direct domination over the organization (Özkan, 1996, Ünlü, 2005; Kılıç, 2009).

⁸¹ The list of undersecretaries who have served in NIO is as follows (<http://www.mit.gov.tr/mustesarlar.html>):

- 1- Avni Kantan (Military Officer) 14.07.1965-07.04.1966
- 2- Fuat Doğu (Military Officer) 02.03.1966-23.07. 1971
- 3- Nurettin Ersin (Military Officer) 02.08.1971-25.07.1973
- 4- Bülent Türker (Military Officer) 26.07.1973-27.02.1974
Bülent Türker (Military Officer) 26.09.1974-24.11.1974
- 5- Bahattin Özülkler (Military Officer) 28.02.1974-26.09.1974
- 6- Hamza Gürgüç (Military Officer) 25.11.1974-13.07.1978
- 7- Adnan Ersöz (Military Officer) 13.07.1979-19.11.1979
- 8- Bülent Türker (Military Officer) 19.11.1979-07.09.1981
- 9- Burhanettin Bigalı (Military Officer) 07.09.1981-14.08.1986
- 10- Hayri Ündül (Military Officer) 05.09.1986-29.08.1988
- 11- Teoman Koman (Military Officer) 29.08.1988-27.08.1992
- 12- Sönmez Köksal (Civilian) 09.11.1992-11.02.1998
- 13- Şenkal Atasagun (Civilian) 11.02.1998-11.06.2005
- 14- Emre Taner (Civilian) 15.06.2005-26.05.2010
- 15-Hakan Fidan (Civilian) 27.05.2010-10.02.2015

Given the military bureaucracy's deep and steady mistrust in civilians, it is not wrong to assume that NIO's true loyalty was with the military wing of the NSC rather than the president. An example of this can be found in the fact that NIO did not inform the civilian governments about the impending military coups in 1971 and 1980. İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 1971 government, said that he had heard about the coup from the Iranian Shah on an official visit (cited in Arcayürek, 1989, p. 61). Demirel, when asked in a newspaper interview in 2005 if he had heard about the coup from NIO, he said "No, in Turkey these sorts of news don't come from official channels. It is the state tradition. NIO or the Police Departments do not warn you about this. Even if they know, they would not" (Yetkin, 2005).

Özkan (1996) claimed that the military personnel from NIO participated in planning the September 12th coup (p.285). He also claimed that the NIO personnel who had infiltrated almost all of the ideological organizations from every political inclination before the 1980 coup played an essential role in escalating the terrorist acts, let alone prevented them. Many examples of such incidents were verified in the official reports sent to the military courts (Ibid). Before the coup, although the martial law declared in 13 cities gave the military the necessary authority to intervene in the situation, it refrained from action. With the September 12th coup, however, all the terror acts stopped suddenly.⁸² Immediately after the coup, all the organizations which were labelled as illegal were overthrown with the help of the intelligence that came from NIO. The fact that an intelligence service waited for the coup to occur to intervene into the situation proved the control of the military within the intelligence organization.

In the 1990s, due to the civilization efforts within the NIO, Hiram Abas, a notorious U.S. trained civilian intelligence agent of the 1970s, was appointed as deputy undersecretary. In his letter to president Özal, Abas revealed how the military still had extensive influence within the organization (Analiz 07: Gehlen ve İstihbarat, 1991):

“[...] In democracies, since the intelligence services do not take on the responsibility of safeguarding the regime against its own public, there is no need for the army to be in close contact with the intelligence service. In democracies, the main duty of the intelligence services is about foreign affairs and intelligence is considered to be an expert field. Because of this, highly competent and trained intelligence agents are preferred for top rank positions. In democracies, the relationship of the intelligence services and the military forces is limited to the sharing and passing on the intelligence of foreign states targeted by the army. The services operate under the governance and control of the democratic political authority. [...] In our state, it is not clear under which office the NIO operates.”

⁸² In an interview realized in 2010, Demirel said the followings on this subject: I said, "How come the bloodshed on September 11th stopped suddenly on September 13th?" They told me (referring to the junta) "We did not have the authority." I said "Where did your authority come from on September 13th? The authority you had on September 13 had existed on September 11th. You had every authority of the martial law." And I have to say with regret that September 12th is the collapse of the state. It is not vice versa. I mean, the state had collapsed, and someone is rising it up. We destroyed the state with our own hand. And after that in my opinion, Turkey's regime has suffered a great deal, and everything has been wounded. (Demirel'den Evren'e Kanlı Suçlama, *Radikal*, October 8, 2010)

The appointment of the first civilian Undersecretary to the NIO occurred in 1992 during the True Path Party and Social Democratic Populist Party coalition government. Based on the criticisms of İsmet Sezgin, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the coalition, against the military dominance in the organization, the government proposed the establishment of a new civilian Undersecretariat to fight against terrorism. The purpose of this new unit, which would be housed under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was to ensure coordination among all the intelligence units of the state and to unify the intelligence apparatus. However, all the efforts towards this goal failed. The NIO refused to report to such a new establishment and conveyed this message to the ministry by saying "We would only loan personnel if it is established" (*İkibin'e Doğru*, 1992). The military circles also rejected the second plan of the government proposing that the NIO should only deal with the foreign intelligence while the domestic intelligence should be handled by a new establishment modeled after the FBI. The last military undersecretary, Lieutenant General Teoman Koman, warned the government through an announcement he made to the press stating that he was against any restructuring efforts at the NIO. Meanwhile, the Chief of Defense Güreş further reinforced the role of the army in the selection of the Undersecretary by saying that "Having my approval is a must" (Ibid).

In the light of these developments, it does not seem meaningful to argue that the appointment of a civilian undersecretary to NIO in 1992 was a critical step towards democratization or civilianization for two reasons: First, a substantial military intelligence network was already established. By 1990s, the General Secretary had already taken steps towards forming its own intelligence units with officers selected from the NIO. The new headquarters of the General Secretary was organized for this purpose (Özkan, 1996). The other reason is the military's definitive convictions of their influence within NIO. According to the NIO's law, the military personnel to be recruited into the NIO would be jointly chosen by the Department of the Chief of Staff and its Undersecretary. The decision of the Council of Ministers was not required for the appointment of officers and noncommissioned officers to the NIO (Art. 11). Therefore, the NIO cadres were all under the control of the military.

In summary, the national intelligence in Turkey was designed to be the intelligence unit of the army. However, as analyzed in the last chapter, the military would not be satisfied with the existing intelligence structure and establish new legal and illegal intelligence units to wage war against the "new" enemies of the state (Kurdish separatism and the political Islam) after the end of the Cold War.

2.4. The Judiciary Leg of the National Security State: State Security Courts

2.4.1. The Establishment, Development, and Powers of SSCs

The previous chapter explained how State Security Courts (SSCs) were first introduced through a constitutional amendment in 1973, during the interim regime of March 12th, for reviewing the offenses committed against the security of the state. However, in October 1976, the Constitutional Court of Turkey abolished these courts. However, the September 12th military regime re-established these courts by the 1982 Constitution with enlarged authority and mandate covering loosely defined offenses against the security of the state. From this time, until

their terminal closing through legal amendments in 2004 in the context of the EU membership process, these courts operated as agents to support the continuity of the hegemonic regime of September 12th and served to protect the state against individuals and oppositional fractions of society.

Under normal circumstances article no. 142 in the constitution states that "courts can only be established by law." The peculiar aspect of the SSCs' history is the fact that they were directly established by the 1982 Constitution and gained constitutional legitimacy. Article no. 143 of the 1982 Constitution defined the role of SSCs as follows: "State Security Courts shall be established to deal with offences against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free democratic order, or against the Republic whose characteristics are defined in the constitution, and offences directly involving the internal and external security of the State."

The related law proposed the establishment of SSCs throughout the country, in eight key cities (Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, İstanbul, İzmir, Malatya, and Van). While the courts were seated in these specific cities, their jurisdictional powers extended to the entire country (Art. 1 and 2). The NSC approved the law that resurrected SSCs (Law No. 2845 on the Establishment and Operation of State Security Courts, June 18, 1983) in 1983. These exceptional courts officially began their function on April 1st, 1984. Several features of the State Security Court system raised serious questions about the availability of a fair trial for defendants within the system. The first issue was regarding the nature of membership of the courts. SSCs consisted of a three-member panel of judges. The 1982 Constitution stated that the one principal and one reserve member of the SSC panels would be appointed from a pool of military judges. As such, in an anti-democratic and hybridized method, these courts paved the way to the trail of civilian defendants by the military judges.

According to the law of SSC, the military members of the courts and public prosecutor's assistants were to be selected by a council consisting of the Head of Personnel of the Chief of Staff, the Head of Personnel of the Force Command they are affiliated with and their legal advisors, and the President of the Military Justice Department of the Ministry of National Defense (additional Art. 8). Besides, the first and the second registry officers authorized to arrange and submit registry documents to military judges who serve in these courts were the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense and the Minister of National Defense (Ibid). Military judges were obliged to participate in activities such as drills and maneuvers if their commanding officers deemed them necessary. Those who were appointed in foreign countries were chosen by the Chief of General Staff in line with the plan of the Ministry of National Defense. Their promotion to a higher rank was realized by the decision of the Supreme Military Council.

The General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense were primarily responsible for their employee personal rights. Given that the Chief of Staff was the de facto head of the Ministry of National Defense, the contradictory nature of these courts becomes more apparent

regarding the principle of independence of the judiciary.⁸³ The fundamental problem here was not about the military judges' ability to give objective and fair decisions but their military status. The foundational premises of the SSCs made it difficult for the judges to detach their consciences from the looming military authority.

Upon a request for review (22678/93) submitted to the European Court of Human Rights (HUDOC) on April 14th, 1997, HUDOC examined the SSCs in Turkey. On June 9th, 1998, the court declared that the foundation of SSCs was against the 6th article of the Human Rights Convention, which gives individuals the right to a fair trial. The main reason for this decision was based on the presence of the military judge which would jeopardize the possibility of a fair and objective trial process (Ankara Barosu İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, 1999).

Due to the internal criticism, new standards brought by EU Membership procedures, and a high number of the HUDOC convictions of the Turkish State, the article no. 143 of the constitution was amended in 1999. This amendment replaced all the military judges and other military members with civilian ones. A new regulation also required attorneys who worked in the SSCs to be appointed by Judges and the Attorneys High Council, as is the norm with general courts and judicial reconstitution. The main objective of this regulation, in the name of judiciary independence, was to sideline the government's executive powers over SSCs. However, these changes did not eliminate the problems caused by the exceptional status of the SSCs.

The SSCs and their applied methods while carrying out judiciary processes contradicted the international law standards. The SSCs were governed by special procedures that afforded fewer protections for defendants than procedures in Turkey's ordinary criminal courts (Report of the Joseph R. Crowley Program, 1998). Suspects accused of political crimes within the jurisdiction of SSCs were subject to extended periods of detention. The custody period was 48 hours according to the SSCs foundational statute. In the case of offenses committed collectively (3 or more persons) this period was extended to 15 days. According to the article no. 120 of the constitution, the custody period for individuals detained in places that were under the decree of a state of emergency was 30 days. For this reason, the torture and mistreatment allegations concentrated on cases reviewed by SSCs. One of the applications of this new law was the "officer in the court" rule, in which the accused individuals and their attorneys were asked to leave the courtroom. This situation would continue indefinitely if it were considered necessary. Also, the accused could be arrested due to alleged inappropriate language and behavior and were penalized without the right to appeal (İnanıcı 2011, pp. 44-45). Other applications of the

⁸³ Law No. 1324 on the Duties and Organization of the General Staff and Law No. 1325 on the Duties and Organization of Ministry of National Defense adopted both on July 31, 1970, granted the Chief of General Staff a significant political autonomy in determining "defense plans and strategies, military promotions and appointments, the defense budgets as well as weapons procurement" (Eldem, 2017, p. 174). The Ministry of National Defense was not more than a "support apparatus" and solely responsible for carrying out "administrative, financial, and procurement services" in various transactions (Ibid). The supremacy of the military bureaucracy over the Ministry was so much so that one of the "visions" which had been listed in the official site of the institution until the mid-2000s was expressed as "providing expert consultancy services to the Turkish Armed Forces" (http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/MSBAnaSayfa/Fs_MSBMisyon.htm). Moreover, a large number of the staff of this ministry, including its undersecretary, was made up of soldiers. Between 1960 and 1987 the undersecretaries were appointed from among full generals and from 1987 onwards among lieutenant generals.

SSCs included the execution of the one third of a sentence of the convicted and arrested individuals in their cells, the finalization of trials in the absence of the accused persons, the continuation of trials during legal holidays, and the participation of the recused judges, in their own requisition appeals (Ibid).

The review powers of the SSCs, which are illustrated in the table below, were expanded with the 1991 Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) (Law No. 3713 on the Fight Against Terrorism, April 12, 1991). The ATA took effect with the abolishment of articles 140, 141, 142, and 163 in Turkish Criminal Code no. 765. As stated earlier, these articles had been used against the perceived threats of communism, Kurdish nationalism, and the Islamist movements by the Turkish Republic. This process, which was deemed as a positive aspect of the democratization efforts, took a completely different turn when its contents were explored. ATA not only punished those who exerted brutal force or supported violence, but they also endorsed a political regime that prioritized national security and eliminated personal freedom, human security, and human rights in the name of the "fight against terrorism" (Hukukçular Derneği 2005).

Table 4: Political Crimes entered into force by Law No. 3713

Article	Definition of crime	Penalty
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing a terrorist organization and organizing its activities. Being a member of a terrorist organization. Aiding members of a terrorist organization and spreading propaganda for a terrorist organization. 	<p>Heavy prison terms ranging from 5-10 years and a heavy fine</p> <p>Heavy prison terms ranging from 3-5 years and a heavy fine</p> <p>Heavy prison terms ranging from 1-5 years and a heavy fine.</p>
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spreading written or oral propaganda; organizing meetings, demonstration and holding a protest march with the aim of harming the indivisible integrity of the state and nation of the Republic of Turkey irrespective of the method, purpose, or thought. 	<p>Heavy prison terms ranging from 2-5 years and a heavy fine. For owners and editors in chief of written press and news agencies, heavy prison terms ranging from 6 months-2 years and a heavy fine. For radios and televisions, broadcasting ban ranging from 1-15 days. For mass media, the punishment range can be increased to one third to half times.</p>

The main problem arose from the definition of "terrorism" in the Law on Fight Against Terrorism. According to this definition, terrorism was "[...] any criminal act aiming to change; the principles of the Republic as stated in the constitution, to transform its political, legal, social, secular and economic conditions, to disrupt the indivisible integrity of the state and its people,

to jeopardize the presence of Turkish State and the Republic, to weaken the state authority, to destroy it or to seize it, to destroy the fundamental rights and liberties and finally to stage acts, as members of an oppositional group, to disrupt the internal and external security of the State or to disrupt the peace and order of the general public." Such a flexible and vague definition turned every dissident voice that disagreed with the security policy of the state through peaceful means into a potential terrorist. This terrorism definition combined with the exceptional powers of the SSCs further collided with the internationally set democratic and legal human rights standards and pulled the judiciary system into an unlawful domain. This definition stayed in use until the 6th EU Harmonization Package in 2003.⁸⁴

While ATA included some of the judiciary articles of the SSCs directly in the scope of terror acts, it regarded numerous other offenses as terror acts when they were committed with the aim of terrorism, as defined in article no.1. Also, article no. 145 from the Turkish Criminal Code, which lays out the legal sanctions for insulting the Turkish flag, and articles 6, 7, and eight from Law no. 3713 (as shown in the table above) were incorporated in the same scope. The ATA also increased the penalties that were given to these offenders by half. The act proposed that SSCs had to review the cases that were within its scope. As a result, most of the cases that were taken to SSCs after the law took full effect were considered acts of terrorism.

In its initial form, the ATA had rulings that protected the perpetrators of torture acts. The law stated that the offenses of civil servants and other staff members who were involved in the fight against terrorism and whose offenses occurred as a result of their jobs, would be trialed through a pending suit and would not be arrested (Art. 15. /Para 1). Moreover, except for crimes of murder and attempted murder, these public officials were put under the protection of the Law No. 4483 on Procedures for Prosecution and the Trials of Civil Servants and Other Public Servants for their acts, (Art. 15/Para. 3). As such, the trial of these accused would only be possible with the approval of their superiors. The two clauses of this article, no. 15, which granted privileges to civil servants, were later canceled, and repealed by the constitutional court. However, during the short time when the article was in effect, numerous torture cases were reviewed under Law No. 4483, which gave them an administrative leave option, and torture perpetrators were let go.

According to the Justice Department statistics, between 1994 and 2004, the number of persons who were arrested under ATA was 9083.


⁸⁴ With this package, the definition of terror was changed to approach its definition in international treaties. Further amendments were made in 2006 and 2010 and 2012. However as argued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee the legislation is still very problematic mainly in three areas: "the vagueness of the definition of a terrorist act", "the far-reaching restrictions imposed on the right to due process" and "the high number of cases in which human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and even children are charged for the free expression of their opinions and ideas" (Turkey, United Nations: Criticism of Anti-Terrorism Laws, November 8, 2012).

Table 5: Yearly distribution of cases and number of defendants in the framework of ATA

Years	Number of cases	Number of defendants
1992	860	3191
1993	1174	2750
1994	1750	3508
1995	1496	2924
1996	1440	2666
1997	1377	2104
1998	1572	2587
1999	1260	2451
2000	631	1455
2001	509	1226
2002	472	975
2003	569	1437
2004	1025	2773
Total	14135	30047

Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Justice General Directorate of Judicial Record and Statistics, the official website, www.adli-sicil.gov.tr/Istatistikler/dgm.htm

Graph 1: Yearly distribution of cases and number of defendants in the framework of ATA



When these numbers are chronologically analyzed, it is evident that between 1993 and 2002, there was a decreasing trend in the number of cases and defendants. However, this trend was reversed between 2002 and 2004 (Graph 1).


Table 6: The distribution of verdicts of the cases reviewed in the framework of ATA

Years	Conviction	Acquittal
1994	643	246
1995	821	261
1996	934	182
1997	2144	153
1998	1099	155
1999	1317	227
2000	324	83
2001	202	97
2002	714	446
2003	405	441
2004	480	256
Total	9083	2547

Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Justice General Directorate of Judicial Record and Statistics, the official website, www.adli-sicil.gov.tr/Istatistikler/dgm.htm.

On the other hand, despite the increase in the overall number of defendants in the 2000s, there was a reverse trend in the number of cases that resulted in imprisonment and an increase in acquittal decisions (Graph 2).

Graph 2: Yearly distribution of verdicts of the cases reviewed in the framework of ATA



The main reason behind this relationship was the effect of EU Harmonization Process. The reforms that took place were not only at the political or legal levels; they were also directly projected onto the judiciary executions. The relationship between the political climate and the court decisions followed a directly proportional path, especially during the 2003-2004 reform years. Throughout this process, all the judges and attorneys were trained according to the

convictions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. The Ministry of Justice distributed seven guidebooks on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to fair trials, and the prevention of torture to the courts in Turkey, including the SSCs. These initiatives were successful to the point that courts started to implement these reforms, and high courts (such as the Supreme Court) began to make decisions that were compatible with these reform laws. Eventually, this change came to the SSC court cases that were based on contentious articles.⁸⁵

2.4.2. SSCs and Freedom of Expression and Thought

Due to its authoritarian and prohibitionist nature, the 1982 Constitution limited freedom of thought on both the general (Art. 13) and private (Art. 26) fronts. SSCs interpreted the existing and new articles of Turkish Criminal Code, which limited freedom of thought and freedom of expression, according to the tone and language of the 1982 Constitution. The two greatest obstacles to the freedom of expression in Turkey were Article no. 312 of Turkish Criminal Code (TCC) and Article no. 8 of ATA that was passed in 1991, at a time when PKK attacks intensified, and the Kurdish issue gained more visibility. In Sancar's words (2000), this last article titled "Propaganda against the Indivisibility of the State," "expanded the category of thought crime indefinitely" (p. 163).⁸⁶

While those who disagreed with how the Turkish State imagined its society were penalized with the former, individuals, who proposed alternative non-military solutions to the Kurdish issue were trialed within the scope of the latter. Making statements about ethnic differences was regarded as causing discrimination.

2.4.2.1. The Safeguarding of the Status Quo: TCC Article 312

Before the ATA was passed, the most contentious legal regulation on freedom of thought and freedom of expression, among other political offenses reviewed by SSCs, was paragraph 2 of article no.312. Before the founding of SSCs, penal courts reviewed and tried offenses that were defined by this article. In 1981, SSCs began to review the dossiers of these alleged offenses due to the changes made during the first year of the military regime. The main objective of this regulation was to penalize the oppositional thoughts and statements directed at the status quo.

⁸⁵ The 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession stated that "as regards prosecutions brought under Articles 159, 169 and 312 of the Penal Code and Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law, the courts have in many cases acquitted defendants prosecuted under these Articles" (p. 27).

⁸⁶ As a striking example of the ideological interpretation of Article 8, it is sufficient to look at the explanation of Ankara State Security Court prosecutor Talat Şalk following his indictment on the book of the sociologist İsmail Beşikçi titled *Bilim Yöntemi* (Scientific Methodology). Talk, in connection with the case, stated that there were no Kurds in Turkey in following words (*Gündem*, 1994, July 24): "It is scientifically proven by the historians that our citizens living in the South and the Southeast of Turkey, for various historical reasons have forgotten the Turkish language gradually, in decades and started to speak Kurdish."

Lawmakers worded article no. 312 in such a flexible way that the judiciary became vulnerable to the external political pressures of privileging the state against the individuals. Moreover, such a wording paved the way for contradictory interpretations. The scope of the freedom of expression could contract and expand according to the political climate of the day because the criteria of provoking the public were loosely defined in the law. The application followed suit. All the dissident voices led by the statements on the Kurdish issue and political Islam that crossed the 'red lines' of the state, ranging from radical left to extreme right, faced allegations put forward by the interpretation of this article. Many public intellectuals, journalists, writers, human rights advocates, and elected officials were tried in courts under this article.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court jurisprudence, which was formed by the decisions of lawmakers that interpreted the vague expressions of the article in the harshest way possible, treated nearly every stated opinion as an offense. The fact that those who were tried under Article no. 312 would lose their rights to be elected and to form political organizations, turned this article into a tool for a political witch hunt and caused the erasure of many rising political figures. For example, Akin Birdal, who was a well-known and well-respected human rights activist for his peaceful solutions to the Kurdish issue, was sentenced according to the article no. 312. After the court's decision, Birdal had to step down from his position as the general director of Human Rights Foundation. Besides, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the closed and allegedly unsecular Welfare Party, was put on trial in Diyarbakir SSC for a talk he gave in Bingöl in 1994, and he was given a one-year jail sentence. Since he was sentenced according to 312, he was banned from the political scene for the rest of his life. During this time, he lost his right to be a party founder and a candidate for parliamentary membership. Similarly, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was the mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Region, was also sentenced under article no.312 in 1988. His sentence was linked to a poem he read and a speech he gave in Siirt.

The Eighth Chamber of the State Council terminated the mayorship of Erdogan based on the finalized penalty under 312 and concluded that he lost his eligibility to be reelected. After the confirmation of his sentence by the Supreme Court, Erdogan was jailed for four months. The leader of the pro-Kurdish party HADEP, Murat Bozlak, and the former leader of the Rebirth Party (Yeniden Doğu Partisi), Hasan Celal Güzel, were also among the convicted political leaders. These examples can be multiplied for the leading public figures of Turkey. There was also a drastic rise in the number of other individuals who were tried under the scope of article no. 312 at the beginning of the 1990s, due to an increase in the oppositional views of different fractions in society, and the security state kept adding them to the list of potential threats. This trend became visible in the mid-1990s.

According to the statistics of the Ministry of Justice, between the years 1986 and 1989, a total of 108 cases under the scope of 312 were brought to court, and 175 were prosecuted in the courts. As seen in Table 7, there was a sharp increase in the number of cases opened based on article no. 312 in the 1990s. In 1999, an additional 1345 defendants were sent to SSCs. Also, 2638 cases were opened based on this article and 5212 defendants were prosecuted between


1990 and 1999. According to the same source, between 2000 and 2003, the same legal regulation tried 3115 people in 1405 new cases.

Table 7: Distribution of State Security Court cases according to types of crime

Years	TCC Article 312		TCC Article 155	
	Number of cases	Number of Defendants	Number of cases	Number of Defendants
1986	13	15	4	4
1987	33	54	-	-
1988	16	39	-	-
1989	46	67	-	-
1990	210	435	3	8
1991	104	196	2	5
1992	94	190	11	21
1993	87	159	8	17
1994	167	328	14	24
1995	319	458	15	20
1996	537	797	14	15
1997	317	730	72	84
1998	323	574	1	3
1999	480	1345	1	5
2000	351	780	23	37
2001	352	722	5	10
2002	359	822	2	3
2003	343	791	16	44
TOTAL	4151	8502	191	300

Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Justice General Directorate of Judicial Record and Statistics, the official website, www.adli-sicil.gov.tr/Istatistikler/dgm.htm.

Graph 3: Yearly distribution of cases and defendants in the framework of Art. 312



According to the official statistics (Table 7), 1705 people were charged between 1994 and 2001 based on article no. 312. During this period, the number of convictions was higher than the acquittals (Table 8).

During the post-modern coup period of February 28th, 1997, which is explored further in the following chapter, the number of convictions was more than double the average (Graph 4). It is crucial to determine whether the briefings given to judges and attorneys by General


Staff during this period were influential in these decision processes. Similar to these briefings, which aimed to create publicity for these perceived threats, there were other initiatives for civil society as well.

Table 8: Distribution of State Security Court's cases according to verdicts

Years	Type of verdict			
	TCC Article 312		TCC Article 155	
	Conviction	Acquittal	Conviction	Acquittal
1994	52	37	2	1
1995	105	59	-	-
1996	226	56	20	12
1997	550	67	-	-
1998	218	108	-	-
1999	246	136	-	-
2000	179	91	-	-
2001	129	120	-	1
Sub Total	1705	674	22	14
2002	na	na	na	na
2003	127	341	0	14

Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Justice General Directorate of Judicial Record and Statistics, the official website, www.adli-sicil.gov.tr/Istatistikler/dgm.htm

Graph 4: Yearly distribution of verdicts in the framework of TCC Art. 312



During the EU Harmonization process, the state also made improvements to the scope of article no.312. During the coalition government of DLP-MP-NAP led by Ecevit, Mesut Yilmaz (the minister in charge of conducting negotiations with the EU) argued that article no.312 was criticized harshly inside and outside of the country and claimed that its presence jeopardized EU membership. However, there were many people inside the government and in the public, who did not agree with Yilmaz. According to the coalition partner NAP, article no.312 was securing the continuity of the state, and it opposed the abrogation or modification of it (http://www.belgenet.com/secim/anayasad_b07.html#2). The conservative circles in the press and judiciary also supported NAP's stance.

While NAP was resistant to the idea, the government managed to secure the support of the oppositional party, and within the framework of EU Harmonization process, it made softening changes to the article no. 312. Later, on April 1st, 2005, the new Turkish Criminal Code came into effect, and 312 took its final form. The new article in the new Code was numbered as 216 and it declared that "the persons, who provoke one segment of the society to show hostility and spite towards another segment of the society, based on ethnic, social class, racial, religious, sectarian and regional differences, will be sentenced to jail time from year up to 3 years if these provocations openly and imminently threaten public safety." With the help of the 'openly and imminently threaten' clause, the penalization of the accused based only on speech was eliminated.

2.4.2.2. The Intellectual Blockade Around the Kurdish Issue: ATA 8

As soon as the ATA came into effect in 1991, the pressures around freedom of expression and freedom of thought increased significantly. The first paragraph of article no. 8 stated that: "Whatever the reason, the means, and the ideology might be, one cannot organize meetings, put on protests or initiate marches that would aim to threaten the indivisible union of the Turkish Republic with its public."

The clause "whatever the reason, the means and the ideology," led to the prosecution of non-violent statements that were not related to terrorism. This provision was a typical legal regulation defining "crime of thought." Article no. 8 did not clarify what type of written and oral propaganda constituted a threat to the "indivisible union of the state with its public." Therefore, it became possible for the judiciary to penalize people arbitrarily based on written and oral statements. In other words, to prosecute and sentence someone, it was sufficient to assume that the accused aimed to disrupt peace and attack the union of the country. It was insignificant to investigate the real probability of this attack or to search for supporting evidence. As Erman (1996) stated, this legal framework was paving the way for penalizing the intention rather than the action itself (p.50).

As was the case with article no. 312, the interpretation of Article no. 8 depended on the political climate of the day. Many writers and publishers were prosecuted, and some were sentenced to jail in accordance with this article. Even the Supreme Court, which was the court of appeals for SSC judgments, did not look for evidence that pointed to assumed offenses; it accepted general intent as enough evidence for sentences (TÜSİAD 1997, pp. 115-116). In cases, where this article could not be used, article no.312 was implemented.

The first amendments to the article no. 8 were made on October 27th, 1995 through Law no. 4126. These amendments made it possible for people to ask for monetary penalization when they were sentenced to jail time, and the standard two-year to the five-year sentence was reduced to one to three years. Furthermore, the expression "whatever the reason, the means and the ideology" was removed from the article. In 1995, the courts reviewed all the cases based on the amendment and freed 143 people. On the other hand, some old cases that were predicated on article no.8 were reopened for a second assessment following the amendments made to the article (Human Rights Watch 1997).

The second major amendment came through the First EU Harmonization Law (Law no. 4744), resulting in adaptations to the monetary fines. In both amendments, no changes were made to the content of the offense that the article deemed as a threat. Finally, with the arrival of the Sixth EU Harmonization package (Law No. 4928), the article was rescinded. There are no official statistics on the number of cases, accusations, or sentences predicated upon article no. 8 from the ATA. However, the 1996 Turkey report of Human Rights Watch claimed that approximately 2,000 cases accrued in SSCs by mid-1995.

There was a significant increase in the press-related cases when the article came into effect. According to the data released in the TÜSİAD 1997 Report, in 1992, journalists and writers were sentenced to 25 years and 11 months in total, and they received monetary fines equaling 5 billion 976 million Turkish Liras. In 1993, jail sentences increased seven-fold, adding up to 165 years, and monetary fines increased eight-fold and reached 38 billion and 267 million Turkish Liras. This article was also used to ban and seize books and print sources. In 1991, the courts withdrew 121 newspapers and journals and 29 books from the market. The following year they banned and seized 189 newspapers and journals and 20 books, and in 1993, these figures boosted to 425 paper and journals and 29 books (TÜSİAD 1997, p. 124).

The Human Rights Association discovered that between 1994 and 2002, 2595 publications were either banned or withdrawn from the public domain. However, there is no information on the direct relationship between these decisions and article no.8. Regardless of the legal precondition, this action instilled fear of withdrawal into the press organs and caused self-censorship. The fact that it was legally possible and easy to prosecute the thinkers and their intellectual publications might have hindered the freedom of expression.

The only local political initiative was taken during the term of the 1991 TPP-SDP coalition government as a step towards democratization. While this coalition government was in power, a new legal framework was established in the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) to secure the right to legal defense and prevent torture practices. These changes to the legal framework, which included decreasing the duration of detention and improvement of the defense conditions, were due to the efforts of the SDP, the junior partner in the coalition. This draft bill that included the offenses reviewed by the SSCs, passed in the Parliament on May 21st, 1992. However, President Özal vetoed this draft bill due to the pressures exerted by the military cadres in the NSC and the governor of the state of exception at that time.

The military hierarchy suggested that the jurisdictional transfer of the offenses reviewed by SSCs to CCP would create a vacuum or a vulnerable spot in the fight against terrorism. Hereupon, the coalition parties tried to agree on a principle, which stated that these offenses would be subjected to this new legal framework with a two-year delay. However, when the nationalist faction in DYP also gave its support to the veto reasons, the law no. 3842 passed on November 18th, 1992 by accommodating the restrictive demands of the NSC. In the final analysis, the CCP provisions that incorporated the changes of the new law were not applied to the offenses that were reviewed by SSCs. Only those who were arrested for ordinary crimes could benefit from these changes.

This situation created two separate judiciary systems and attracted opposition from the bars. The heads of the bar associations defined the inapplicability of these amended provisions

to the offenses reviewed by the SSCs as unlawful (CMUK'um lütfen, *Hürriyet*, 1993, February 20). Furthermore, they claimed that the nature of the offense and the boundaries of the jurisdiction should not be left to the "arbitrary decisions of the law enforcement officers who had no expertise in the field" (Ibid.). However, due to the heavy pressure of the NSC on the government, the criticisms and objections of the legal circles remained futile.

Another draft bill that concerned SSCs was presented to the parliament on September 27th, 1996 during the "Refah-Yol" coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan. One of the main goals of this bill was to remove article no.312 on thought crimes from the jurisdiction of SSCs, but this attempt also failed (U.S. Department of State, March 1996). The final amendment that ended discriminatory regulations and enabled the implementation of CCP provisions for all offenses came with the scope of the Sixth Harmonization Package (Law no. 4928) that was put into effect in 2003.

2.4.3. Crime of Thought after SSCs

SSCs were formally abolished, Article 8 was abrogated, and the scope of Article 312 was limited. However, those changes did not automatically lead to an improvement in the situation of thought crimes in Turkey. After the abolishment of the SSCs, the structure of these courts with its full staff and court cases continued to operate as 'Special Assize Courts' (Özel Yetkili Ağır Ceza Mahkemeleri). They were finally eliminated in 2014 with the passing of Law No. 6526.

But, as Sancar convincingly argued that, "the mindset that presents a direct relationship between the banning of ideas and the security of the state still dominates the political discourse whatever the institutional rearrangements might be (p. 164). The moment state ideology is questioned on various issues ranging from the Armenian genocide to the granting of ethnic rights, the nationalist reflexes harshly take center stage, and the prosecutors and courts start using various other articles in CPP against the freedom of thought. This chain reaction shows that the national security discourse, which in the past shaped the judiciary system in sync with political conjuncture, still survives not only on an intellectual level but also in physical form.

It can undoubtedly be argued that the majority of the political movements in Turkey which objected to the bans and pressures on freedom of thought in their past, have never adopted it as a core principle but defended it as a tool to get rid of their victimhood. This pragmatist and profoundly opportunist interpretation of the concept seems to be the main reason behind the deadlock of democracy. The way that Justice and Development Party (JDP) government whose leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had been prosecuted under Article no. 312 in the past, addressed this issue constitutes an example of such an approach. In their new Turkish Criminal Code, as part of their democratization process, this government safeguarded Article no 159, which penalizes offenses that insult Turkishness and state organs, under item Article 301.⁸⁷ Judging

⁸⁷ Article 301 is as follows: "(1) A Person who publicly denigrates Turkish Nation, the State of the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Government of the Republic of Turkey or the judicial bodies of the State, shall be sentenced a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and two years. (2) A person who publicly denigrates the military or security structures shall be punishable according to the first

from the wording of this article, the identification of the difference between criticism and insult is an ambiguous process that paves the way for the arbitrary decisions of the prosecutors and judges. It only created a public outcry and backlash when internationally well-known and respected intellectuals were prosecuted for these said offenses. Article no. 301 has constantly been operationalized in favor of the state taboos through the 2000s.⁸⁸

The improvement in the realm of freedom of thought has only been done on a cosmetic level to put up a false façade of democratization but permanent improvements never arrived to resolve the real deadlock.

When Human Rights Joint Platform⁸⁹ initiated a campaign on “Freedom to Thought”, AKP government's then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul made a declaration to the representatives of this campaign in October 2006. This declaration further supports what has been argued in the previous paragraphs. In his declaration, Gul stated that even if the said article was abolished, other articles in the same law could continue to be in effect because the real legal change would require a "mentality shift" (Keskin, November 24, 2006). Based on this official

paragraph. (3) Expression of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime. (4) The prosecution under this article shall be subject to the approval of the Minister of Justice." The final paragraph is added to hinder public prosecutors in filing suits arbitrarily.

⁸⁸ Mazlum Der (The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed) Vice President Şehmus Ülek was prosecuted under 301 of the new TPC due to his speech on 14 December 2004, in the conference titled 'Global Security, Terror and Human Rights, Multiculturalism, and Minorities.' Ülek faced prison sentence for criticizing the nation-building project of the Turkish Republic with reference to Kurdish issue. In May 2005, publisher Ragıp Zarakolu was charged under Article 301 for publishing two books, one referring to the mass deportations of Armenians in 1915 (*The Truth will Set Us Free* by George Jerjian) and another entitled *An Armenian Doctor in Turkey* by Dara Zakayan, carrying a seven and a half and a six-year sentence respectively. Similarly, around the same time Fatih Taş, the owner of the publishing house called Aram Yayınevi was charged under Article 301 for publishing the book of an academic, John Tirman entitled *Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade*. The section of the book on human rights violations committed by the security forces against the Kurds in the 1980s and 1990s contained in the indictment as "denigration" of the Turkish military. Another example of the charges filed under Article 301 was that of Murat Pabuç, a retired military man. Pabuç was prosecuted for his book entitled *Boyalı Bank Nöbetini Terk Etmek*, (İstanbul: Nazım Kültürevi, 2005) criticising the corporatization of the army and its imperialist dependency relations. Journalist Birol Duru was accused of "denigrating the security forces" on November 17, 2005, on the grounds of broadcasting information given by the Human Rights Associations on forest burnings of the security forces in Bingöl and Tunceli, in Dicle News Agency. See Amnesty International Press releases for the details of the cases (AI Index: EUR 44/035/2005; <http://www.amnesty.org.tr/sindex.php3?sindex=vifois1312200501>). Many high-profile names were prosecuted under Article 301. Nobel laureate writer Orhan Pamuk, internationally acclaimed writer Elif Şafak, academic, and journalist Baskın Oran, writer, and journalist Perihan Mağden are just a few among these names. However, the criticisms against Article 301 became very public after the murder of Hrant Dink on the morning of January 19, 2007, editor of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, by an extreme rightist militant in front of the newspaper. Dink had been malevolently charged under Article 301 based on an article in his newspaper regarding relations between Armenians and Turks. There is a general consensus that Dink's assassination is the result of a chauvinist wave of the 2000s led by retired military men who are working hand in hand with certain ultranationalist civilian groups. The comment made by journalist Mehmet Ali Birand (Hürriyet, 2007, January 23) right after Dink's murder is very relevant: We caught the hand that pulled the trigger to Hrant. But the real killer will not be found again. Because we are the real killer of Hrant. We brought our killers into being in the mentality and environment that we created with Article 301."

⁸⁹ Human Rights Joint Platform is a national umbrella organization for Turkish human rights organizations. Its founding members were the Human Rights Association (İHD, 1986), Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı - TİHV, 1990), Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar Derneği - Mazlumder, 1991), Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği-HYD, 1993), Amnesty International - Turkey (Uluslararası Af Örgütü - UAÖ, 1995), and the Human Rights Research Association (İnsan Hakları Araştırmaları Derneği- İHAD, 2006).

statement, one can say that the state's national security shapers in the 1990s directly handed down their causal reading between the "societal depression," "terrorism" and "freedom of thought" to their successors in 2000s. As will be discussed in the conclusion this inclination would change for the worse during the JDP government in a way that blatantly violated human rights, annihilated democracy, and the rule of law.

Chapter IV

1. Consolidation of National Security State: “New” Enemies of the Post-Cold War Era

The 1990s was an era during which the policies implemented by the military to lift the barriers before market-based economic transformation and to consolidate the social sphere and the political system have backfired. In this period, traditional political powers entered into the process of disintegration in response to the rising demands of different political and social identities. Consequently, this state of dissolution has eroded into a representation crisis. The neoliberal capital formation model and Turk-Islam synthesis implemented by the military elite with relation to the anticommunist Green Belt doctrine in the 1980s yielded results contradicting the military authority's objective of creating a "political system of few parties" and a homogenous social base merging around moderate conservatism. In the 1990s, the military hierarchy was faced with a multiple and complicated opposition, of which it had contributed its development. The hegemonic discourse redefined as Atatürkism during the September 12 military regime lost its function as a social mortar. Social classes ostracized from the political system gathered around parties and movements advocating their new identities and started to raise their voices through their "intellectuals, media and institutions" (Bayramoğlu 2001, pp. 16-17).

These new organizations eventually enabled the recognition and legitimization of the political demands of Kurds and Islamists who had been excluded from the political field during the Republican era for opposing the construction of the Turkish and secular identity. However, their demands for integration into the system triggered the authoritarian reflexes of the central security actors. At this point, it is important to remind that an identity argument putting forward the symbols of the Kurdishness or Islam has never been viewed as legitimate by the state throughout the history of the Republic. Western-oriented, modernist, centralist, nationalist, populist and secular tenets of the founding ideology and the authoritarian structure of the regime have always suppressed the advocates of these two identities, particularly the first one, using means of violence and force.

During this period, backed by the international political conjuncture which saw a more confident assertion of political liberalism and a greater emphasis on human rights, the political demands of the Kurds grew stronger. Meanwhile, the Islamists became increasingly visible in daily life, the public realm, and finally in institutional and corporate life through gains enabled by the liberalized economic sphere and the cultural channels opened by the military. Therefore, following the ending of the Cold War, the security apparatus built by the military regime was faced with a two-sided threat. Consequently, the central security actors developed their security policies based on "separatist threat" instigated by the demands of the Kurds and the "fundamentalist threat" instigated by those of the Islamists.

When the hegemonic project of the 1980 coup d'état yielded results that were opposite to their expectations, the military members of the NSC strived to prevent the erosion of status quo. This attempt to restore the hegemonic project commenced a process that reminded the

ostracized of their ostracized position while creating new ostracized groups. In other words, the crises arising from the rapid collapse of the political setup of the 1980 coup d'état were instrumentalized as excuses for the consolidation of the security state.

Within this new framework outlined by the national security ideology, the military hierarchy while redefining Atatürkism with a more secular tone against the religionizing civilian society, its nationalist rhetoric evolved in a more rightist direction as the Kurdish identity gained visibility in the 1990s. On the secularism axis, the mistake made in the 1980s was corrected by reestablishing the old template by a fourth military intervention occurred on February 28, 1997.

Full Admiral Güven Erkaya, one of the architects of the February 28 coup, criticized the 1980 coup d'état's approach to religion as follows (Baytok 2001, p. 226):

"September 12 Coup emphasized that communism is a regime that rejects religion and encouraged the people to stake a claim on their religion. When this was overdone, this movement which started with good faith, helped to create an atmosphere which would benefit the "religion-exploiters" in the country."

For all these reasons, evaluating the 1990s as a period of the "consolidation of the National Security State" rather than "a Kemalist restoration" proves to be a more solid approach. After all, the justification of the basic mechanisms developed during the September 12 military regime to ensure de facto continuation of military intervention, even after the transition to democracy, was based on the "national security" concept defined by the military. Furthermore, as analyzed further below, the national security state responded to this loss of hegemony by increasing the number and authorities of security-related institutional mechanisms.

This chapter aims to demonstrate the consolidation process of the national security state through its reactions to the Kurdish problem and political Islam. Although the political Islam and Kurdish problem constituted two separate perspectives regarding institutionalization of the national security state, they ultimately served as common enemies of this state mentality. The reason why they are treated in the same chapter is this (common) functionality in the framework of national security notion.

1.1. The Collapse of the September 12 Political Stability Project

A short time after the approval of 1982 Constitution, the military government started to form the legal basis for the transition to democracy. Following the arrangement of electoral rolls on April 25, 1983, it enacted a new Law on Political Parties (Law no. 2812). Provisional articles of this law imposed bans on parties that were active on September 11th, 1980 as well as their members. The military administration prohibited founding of political parties which would be a continuation of dissolved parties. All active members of the dissolved political parties were also restrained from being the founder, executive, or supervisor of the new political parties. Moreover, central executives of the old political parties and "members, who have caused the party to be dissolved" have been forbidden to participate in politics for ten years.

The founding of political parties whose majority of members were prior members of a dissolved party, was also prohibited. The same law also decreed that the founders of a new party shall be approved by the NSB. Moreover, the required number of provinces in which a party had to be organized was raised to exclude small parties from the political system.

The coup administration also decreed Order no. 99, which declared that the political parties, of which 30 founding members were not approved by the NSC, could not participate in the elections. The Board decided that the elections for a new single-chamber National Assembly were to be held later that year on November 6, 1983.

By early 1983, the military signaled its intention to establish a bi-party system. The first of these parties was the center-rightist Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), which the military administration openly supported. The second was the Populist Party (PP), which had adopted a tamed leftist discourse and was constructed as a "loyal opposition." The NDP's cadres were primarily comprised of retired military officers led by Turgut Sunalp, a retired general and an ally of NSB and President Kenan Evren. PP was led by Necdet Calp, the prime ministry undersecretary of the military regime.

In total, fifteen parties were established by August 1983; the NSC disqualified all but three of them on the grounds that they had ties to banned political leaders. The Great Turkey Party (GTP) and the True Path Party (TPP) as a continuation of the JP tradition and the Social Democracy Party (SDP) as a continuation of RPP tradition failed to reach the required number of founders due to the arbitrary vetoes of the NSB.⁹⁰ Welfare Party (WP) founded by NSP supporters and the Conservative Party (CP) founded by extreme nationalist were also vetoed. In the end, only three political parties acquired the right to participate in the elections. The only party approved to take part in elections besides the NDP and PP was the Motherland Party (MP) led by Turgut Özal. He was the man behind the January 24 Decisions and had served in the military government from 1980 to 1982 as deputy prime minister for economic affairs.

During the election campaigns, the coup government openly gave its support for the NDP. In a speech he gave on television two days before the elections, Evren (1991) called the citizens to vote for the NDP by saying, "if you are pleased with what the National Security Board has accomplished in the last three years, I believe that you will elect to power the party, which would not lead the country back into anarchy" (pp. 393-399).

For the first time in Turkey, new leaders addressed the people through televised speeches during their election campaigns. The NDP leader Sunalp tried to win support by emphasizing the importance of preventing the resurgence of terrorism. The PP leader Necdet Calp highlighted the strengthening of social justice and public sector. MP, although seemingly adhering strictly to the liberal economic norms and conservative cultural values, had in its cadre members from four different political tendencies of the pre-1980 period. MP had united the liberal, nationalist, and Islamist fractions of the right and some fractions of social democracy under one party. In other words, the rivals before 1980 formed an intraparty coalition against

⁹⁰ It is noteworthy that Erdal İnönü, the founder of SDP and the son of İsmet İnönü who has served as prime minister during the single-party period and as President of the Republic after Atatürk's death, was also among the vetoed.

the military regime through the MP. The direct support of the coup government for the MDP and the PP became the main leverage of MP leader. Özal while presenting himself as the only democratic leader in the elections (Zürcher, 1996, p. 411) he billed himself as a pragmatist who can solve the economic problems of the country with liberal expansion.

The election results came as a negative surprise for the military. MP had emerged as the first party with 45.15% of the votes. Following it was the PP with 30.46% of the votes, which was higher than expected. The NDP, the party of the status quo, managed to obtain only 23.27% of the votes. Due to the advantages that the election system provides for the first party, MP gained the absolute majority in the Assembly by winning 211 of the 400 seats. After a long time, a government which did not need to search for a coalition came to power in Turkey. In the face of this unexpected result, the military elite accepted the transfer of the governmental power to the MP.

1.1.1. Dissolution of the Tutelage Parties at the Elections

The results of the first general elections after the coup signaled that the political project of the September 12 regime would collapse soon. Political parties left out of the Assembly because of the military regime's vetoes started to apply considerable pressure to return to the political arena. The 1982 Constitution stipulated that the local elections would be held in the year following the first convening of the GNAT, therefore, in 1984. A commonly discussed issue before the elections was whether the parties excluded from the Assembly by the September 12 regime, particularly SDP and TPP as the representatives of traditional political cleavages would partake in the local elections.

Özal was initially against to this option (*Cumhuriyet*, 1984, January 5). He implicitly supported the coup government's decision to dissolve these parties, arguing that the political cadre from before 1980 would obstruct the economic reforms pioneered by MP. However, shortly after, he changed his mind on the subject.⁹¹ Thus, the 1984 local elections acquired critical importance for the future of the political arena.

Until that day, there was no law specific to local elections in Turkey. Fully taking advantage of this opportunity, MP prepared the Law on the Local Governments and Neighborhood Masters and Neighborhood Executive Committees (Law no. 2972 of 1984) which would work in its best interest. The MP government passed the law despite the opposition of the NDP and PP and announced the election date as March 25. Once again, both leftist and rightist parties embarked on a political competition and yet this time more divided than pre-1980. At this election, the center-right was divided into four political parties as MP, TPP, NDP, and WF and the center-left was divided into two as PP and SDP.

⁹¹ At least for that time, it may be misleading to read his change of attitude as his desire for democratization. In fact, considering the statements he made during those days, it seems Özal wanted to eliminate any potential criticism against the legitimacy of his government. Özal, at a later date, explained his attitude as: "Parties unable to participate in the election are saying 'we would win if we could participate.' Others applied pressure on us, too. I thought about it and said, 'bring it on.' Because we believe the people will do the right thing" (*Cumhuriyet* 1984, February 25).

During the election campaigns, the NDP repeated the mainstream discourses of the military regime, particularly underlining the need for "powerful state." The NDP leader Sunalp often blamed the rival political parties for being communists, involving extremists, and betraying September 12 (Cumhuriyet 1984, March 4). He claimed that not only leftist and but also the rightist parties would "lead the country back to pre-September 12 era". PP followed a similar discourse and insistently refused SDP's call for a united left, blaming its principal rival for being an extreme leftist.

These two parties failed to offer satisfactory solutions for the voters' problems but instead built their campaigns on themes used by September 12th junta for old parties. This aggressive discourse backfired spectacularly in the elections.

The elections yielded the following results:

Table 9: 1984 Local Elections Results

Parties	Mayor (%)	Number of Cities	City Council (%)	Provincial Council (%)
MP	43.2	55*	43.6	41.5
SDP	24.9	8	24.5	23.4
TPP	11.8	-	12.0	13.3
PP	7.8	-	8.1	8.8
NDP	5.4	2**	5.7	7.1
WP	3.7	2	5.0	4.4
Independents	3.1	-		

Source: Supreme Election Council

*Including the three big cities Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir.

**When the results were announced, NDP was the winner of the Ağrı municipal election. This result was revoked upon the objection of MP, and MP won the municipal elections held later for Ağrı.

These results confirmed that the NDP and PP were artificial parties with no real ties with the society. Both of them failed to pass the 10% general election threshold in the local elections and lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the constituents in a short time. This situation increased the possibility of failing to get into parliament for the divided opposition parties in case a general election. This strong risk forced left and right-wing parties to pull themselves together. PP leader Necdet Calp, who had been resisting to the idea of unification, resigned after his defeat (Tanör, 1995, p. 63). Following his resignation, PP and SODEP united under the name Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP). The result of the local elections also had an impact on NDP. At the First Convention of the party held on July 13, 1985, Sunalp lost the leadership (Ersel et al., 2002, p. 159). The NDP dissolved itself in May 1986. Its deputies transferred to MP and TPP (Ibid., p. 171).

1.1.2. Return of the Banned Politicians

Political parties founded under new names were led by proxy-leaders for a certain period of time. TPP acted under the covert leadership of Demirel. The prior leader of RPP, Bülent

Ecevit, orchestrated the founding of the Democratic Left Party (DLP) in November 1985, a new political party which he led behind the scenes, and challenged SDPP in the race to share the legacy of RPP (Zürcher 1996, p. 413). During the same period, extreme nationalist CP assumed the name Nationalist Labor Party (NLP), waiting for the development of necessary conditions to assign Alparslan Türkeş as the party leader.

At the by-elections held on September 28, 1986, for the 11 vacant seats, SDPP Leader İnönü, Hüsametdin Cindoruk who led TPP as Demirel's proxy, along with three other TPP members got into parliament (Ersel et al., pp. 164-165). During the by-election campaigns, the bans imposed on old politicians by the 1982 Constitution (Provisional Art. 4) were openly broken. A constitutional amendment was needed to eliminate this forced contradiction between the law and practice. The President of the Republic Kenan Evren was aware that the parties designed by the September 12 administration had completely lost their legitimacy. Still, instead of directly opposing such an amendment in principle, he demanded a referendum with the expectation that the public would vote against lifting the political bans (Tanör 1995, p. 67). Özal agreed with Evren's proposal. During this process, leaders of SDPP, DLP, and TPP continued to challenge the government, by making a joint declaration for a constitutional amendment to lift the bans.

At the referendum held on September 6, 1987, despite Özal's opposing propaganda, political bans were lifted by 50.24% "yes" votes against 49.76 "no" votes. The Provisional Article 4, which outlawed former political party leaders and executives, was repealed. As soon as they returned to active politics, the pre-September 12 political leaders assumed the leadership of newly founded parties from their "proxies."⁹²

The lifting of the bans reinvigorated the far-left political movements which were in exile in Europe at that time. WPT and the Communist Party of Turkey (CPT) held a meeting in Brussels and merged under the name the United Communist Party of Turkey (UCPT). However, the party executives (Leader Nihat Sarın and General Secretary Haydar Kutlu) who came to Turkey to officially found the party were arrested upon their arrival (Zürcher 1996, p. 415). Party executives, following two and a half years long sentence, submitted a petition to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and officially founded UCPT in 1990. Immediately after its foundation, the Constitutional Court filed a closure case against the UCPT based on the Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Law. The party was once again dissolved in 1991 on the grounds that the party's statute and program were undermining the principle of "territorial unity of the state and the unity of the nation" and that it had incorporated the word "communist" in its name. In other words, it was dissolved by a verdict reflecting the Cold War politics (Ersel et al., p. 200).

Prime Minister Özal, right after the referendum, decided to hold an early election. Following this decision, MP passed an amendment to the country's election law which added to electoral districts a threshold higher than the parliamentary one of 10%. As such, a party

⁹² At the extraordinary congress held on September 24, Süleyman Demirel was assigned as the leader of TPP. DLP elected Bülent Ecevit as leader on September 13. Likewise, Alpaslan Türkeş was chosen as the leader of NLP on October 5, 1987 and Necmettin Erbakan as the leader of WF on October 12, 1987.

which failed to pass the threshold in a particular district would lose all its votes in that district, and its votes were going to be distributed to the larger parties in relative proportions (Zürcher 1996, p. 414).

Table 10: 1987 General Election Results

PARTIES	VOTE RATES (%)
MP	36.31
SDPP	24.74
TPP	19.14
DLP	8.53
WP	7.16
NLP	2.93
RDP*	0.82
Independants	0.37

Source: Supreme Election Council

*Reformist Democracy Party (Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi)

Due to the changes it made to the electoral law, MP managed to keep most of the seats in the parliament despite having won only 36.3% of the votes in the 1987 general elections. The other two parties which got into GNAT were SDPP with 24.8% of the votes and Demirel's TPP with 19.2% of the votes. Since the other parties failed to pass the threshold of approximately five million votes (one-fifth of the valid votes), they were not to be represented in the parliament.

After 1980, the old political leaders preferred to found new parties instead of doing politics in parties of common ideological bases. As a result, the political array became more divided than the pre-September 12 periods. Meanwhile, the overwhelming impact of an economic liberalization implemented without any effective regulations or good management was rapidly depreciating the support for MP. Electoral defeats suffered one after another prompted disintegration in the party. At the local elections held on March 26, 1989, MP dropped down to the third rank.

Table 11: 1989 Local Elections Results

Parties	Mayor (%)	City Council (%)	Provincial Council (%)
SDPP	32.8	33.2	28.7
MP	23.7	23.5	21.8
TPP	23.5	23.7	25.1
WP	8.7	8.9	9.8
DLP	6.5	6.7	9.0
NLP	3.0	3.3	4.1
RDP	0.5	0.5	0.9
Independents	1.3	0.2	0.5

Source: Supreme Election Council

During all these developments, as discussed in more detail below, a broad conservative mass emerged as a result of the September 12 regime's radical policy changes in economic, political and ideological platforms. According to Çakır (1995), this mass demanded and expected the WP to become a mass party and take advantage of the void created by a severely bleeding MP (p.28). WP won 9.8% of the provincial council votes in the 1989 local elections and increased hopes of getting into parliament in the next general elections. More importantly, the results of the 1989 local elections signaled that Turkey was about to enter another period of coalitions.

In the 1991 general elections, WP got into parliament winning 16.88% of the votes. In the same elections, the first of Turkey's pro-Kurdish parties, the People's Labor Party (PLP) also managed to get into parliament by winning 22 seats thanks to the alliance it formed with SDPP in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Thus, and so, the political setup implemented by the September 12 coup to ensure political stability had collapsed in only seven years.

Table 12: 1991 General Election Results

PARTIES	VOTE RATES (%)
TPP	27.03
SDPP	20.75
MP	24.01
WP	16.88
DLP	10.75
FP	0.44
Independents	0.13

Source: Supreme Election Council

1.2. Civil-military relations during the transition period

During the MP administrations led by Prime Minister Özal between 1983 and 1989, the influence of coup powers on the politics was evident. The 1982 Constitution gave the President of the Republic, a more extensive and superior role than the 1961 Constitution. The President was empowered to summon the Turkish Grand National Assembly to meet, promulgate laws, return laws to the National Assembly to be reconsidered and call for new elections. He might also submit constitutional amendments to referendum and challenge the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly. Some of his executive functions included appointing the Prime Minister, convening or presiding over the Council of Ministers and the National Security Council, proclamation of martial law or state of emergency, issuing decrees having the force of law, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Ministers under his or her chairmanship, deciding on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces and ratification and promulgation of international treaties.

The 1981 constitution also provided the president with vast appointive powers that he (or she) can exercise independently of the cabinet. For example, he was empowered to appoint the Chief of the General Staff, the members of the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of the

members of the Council of State, the members of the Military High Court of Appeals, the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, the Higher Education Council, the State Supervisory Council, as well as the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, all university rectors and all diplomatic representatives.

Moreover, Evren had a new legal instrument called the State Supervisory Council established by the 1980 constitution. The council was borrowed from the South Korean Constitution (Şarlak 1994) and was authorized to conduct investigations and inspections of public organizations at President's request (Gemalmaz, p. 997).

Other military figures of the NSB became involved in the civilian regime through a constitutional body designed specifically for them. According to the Provisional Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution, the NSB was turned into the Presidential Council for six years, starting from the first convening of the Assembly. The members of the NSB automatically became the members of the Presidential Council and were given the personal rights and immunities that deputies enjoyed.

The Presidential Council was "to examine laws concerning the fundamental rights and freedoms and duties, the principle of secularism, the preservation of the reforms of Atatürk, national security and public order set forth in the 1982 Constitution, Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, international treaties, the sending of Armed Forces to foreign countries and the stationing of foreign forces in Turkey, emergency rule, martial law and the state of war and other laws deemed necessary by the President of the Republic." It also had the authority to consider and offer opinions on matters relating to "the training of youth" and "the conduct of religious affairs." It would also actively participate in the holding of new general elections on the request of the President of the Republic. The Presidential Council was also responsible for preparing reports on internal and external security and such other matters deemed necessary and submitting its findings to the President of the Republic. In a nutshell, during its term of six years, the Council would control if the country were being governed in conformity with the September 12 philosophy.

Therefore, as Gemalmaz asserted, the termination of the legal existence of NSB after the transition to civilian government was nothing more than a "rough pretense" (Ibid). Although the scope of the nationwide martial law declared by the September 12 regime was gradually narrowed, it remained in effect until 1987. It was another means for the coup government to preserve its influence on the seemingly civilian regime.

In such a context, in which social and political dynamics were trying to be stabilized by authoritarian institutions and regulations under the direct control of the military hierarchy, the mission given to MP was limited to economic management of the country. Policy developments in all other the other strategic areas were under the control of the NSC.

The NSC, during this period, did not confine itself to determining macro state policies related to national security definition outlined in the Constitution and its law. It also imposed its decisions on some seemingly trivial matters to the MP administration, such as extending the airtime of television shows (NSC's Press Release of September 24, 1985), or broadcasting the

radio and television programs of Anadolu University Faculty of Open Higher Education designed to provide two-year associate degrees for primary school teachers (NSC's Press Release of September 27, 1985).⁹³

However, it is not accurate to evaluate MP's loyalty to military authority as a natural outcome of the conditions of the time. MP, as a political party which owed its existence to the conditions created by September 12 coup, particularly during its early period, perceived the coup and military authority actions as legitimate. Some remarks in the first MP government program explicitly indicate its approval of the coup (45. Government Program):

"In the pre-September 12 periods, the authority of the Turkish State was damaged and subjected to serious threats. Acts of anarchy, terror, and separatism have brought the country to the brink of a civil war. National Security Board temporarily assumed the government to reinstate national solidarity and integrity, provided peace, security and public order and saved our nation and State from dangers with its well-intentioned and successful actions. It is again a consequence of this well-intended effort that the path to democracy leading up to the November 6 elections had opened following the approval of the new Constitution by the majority of the people on November 7, 1982."

On the other hand, as one of the first representatives of the neo-conservative movement born in the U.S., the "authentic neo-con" Özal steadfastly believed that the democratization would be achieved by the opportunities brought about by economic liberalization. Because of this belief, he was at peace with the duties allocated to him in the division of labor made between the military and civilian authorities. Having a close relationship with the Hearth of Intellectuals, which aimed to redefine "national solidarity" through "Turk-Islam synthesis," Özal's "traditionalist" discourse on the cultural realm, was in line with the policies adopted by the state institutions of post-September 12. MP, under Özal's leadership, assuming it could contain if needed, created enormous opportunities for religious organizations that had been gradually increasing their influence on Turkish political life since the transition to the multi-party system. This approach, as Köker argued (1996), was a continuation of the cultural policies implemented by September 12 junta who wanted to use religion to create an "obedient" society based on the understanding that "subjects loyal to their religion will also be loyal to their state" (p.1225).

On the other hand, MP's relation with the military authority was an ordinary example of the Turkish right's pragmatic and ambivalent attitude in search for balance in domestic politics against the de facto authority of the military. For instance, Özal did not let Bülent Ulusu, who served as prime minister during the military government, be elected as the Speaker of the GNAT and refrained from appointing names close to the NSB to cabinet positions. However, at the same time, he paid attention to maintaining close relationships with the President and the

⁹³ NSC adopted these interventions as a behavioral pattern and continued to produce policies on unthinkable details unrelated to national security even after the September 12 cadre resigned from active politics. Other examples include prevention of smuggling in livestock export; afforestation of fire damaged forest land; requesting the General Directorate of State Theaters to hold a contest involving plays on PKK terror (*Cumhuriyet*, 1995, February 15; Gemalmaz, p. 998; *Radikal*, 1997, October 28).

board members. He even persuaded his party to decline the motion to investigate the corruption allegations against the prior Commander of the Air Forces Tahsin Şahinkaya, a prominent figure in the military regime despite Evren's consent. Özal also ignored the opposition's proposals to rescind the Provisional Article 15 of the 1982 Constitution which granted immense immunities to the coup powers (Tanör, 1995, p. 61). Moreover, the MP government accepted all NSC decisions with absolute obedience and approval (Köker, p.1255).

The contradictory stance of MP towards the military authority based on political pragmatism, and particularly the nationalist-conservative elements it brought about in the cultural realm, were embraced by all rightist political parties of the time. This stance caused the right-wing parties in Turkey to be stuck within a limited framework in their understanding of democracy. This narrow democracy perspective hindered their understanding of the reasons behind the growing support given to Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK), the militant nationalist Kurdish organization which was formally founded by Abdullah Öcalan in late 1978 and launched an armed campaign against Turkey in 1984. The political cadres, feeding on the fear of another coup, gradually gave in to the military solutions concerning the Kurdish problem. Thus, the group which started with small-scale terrorist attacks against government installations and officials, as well as Kurds perceived as government collaborators, gained considerable credibility in Eastern and Southeastern regions where Kurds were densely populated. By the mid-1990s, this security-centered approach created immense social, economic and human costs for the entire country, especially for the people living in the state of emergency regions and generated a vicious cycle of reciprocal violence.

This vicious cycle paradoxically provided a basis for the expansion of military bureaucracy's already existing autonomous field in the state. The military hierarchy by way of addressing all the issues related to the Kurdish problem through a "security" perspective militarized the politics. In this framework, it re-activated the former security structures and established the new ones including the village guard system, Special Operation Department, clandestine paramilitary networks, and assassination teams. As explained in detail below, the strategy of "struggle through illegal means" adopted by the NSC in the framework of the "total war" concept that it declared in 1993, resulted in an unprecedented penetration of state by gangs engaging in a multitude of illegal activities, particularly drug trafficking.

1.3. Kurdish movement as the “new” security threat

The Turkish state, from the mid-1920s until the end of the 1980s, consistently avoided recognizing the existence of Kurds as an ethnic identity on Turkish territory. As Yeğen (1999) rightfully analyzed, despite denying their very existence, the state has always speculated on the Kurdish problem “as an issue of either political reaction, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but never an ethno-political question” (p. 555). The state considered the Kurds as equal citizens of the Turkish nation as long as they defined themselves as potential members of the Turkish ethno-cultural community. The resisters as Yeğen (2009) asserted “were not Kurds with an ethno-political cause, but simply (Kurdish) tribes, bandits, sheikhs- all the evils of Turkey’s pre-modern past” who should be suppressed and punished (pp. 598-599).

On the legal platform, primarily the 1982 Constitution, as well as a series of fundamental laws was made based on this ideological narrative.⁹⁴ In this framework, as mentioned in Chapter III, the formulation of "indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation" and the criterion of "provoking hostility and spite based on ethnic, social class, racial, religious, sectarian and regional differences" were used to punish thought crimes related to the Kurdish problem. Most radical decision made in this respect by the September 12 military regime was to ban Kurdish language, even in private life.

The law on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than Turkish (Law no. 2932 of October 19, 1983) enacted by the coup administration declared that "the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens was Turkish" and prohibited the use of any language but Turkish "as a mother tongue."⁹⁵

Illegal acts of this new high dose of nationalism at the state level led to much more devastating results. During the military regime, torture at penal institutions became a nationwide systematic practice, especially in Diyarbakır. The prisons were transformed into "suppression centers" for the denial of Kurdish identity (İmset, 1993, p.93). Many commentators who have been observing PKK since 1984 agree on the fact that the inhuman treatments, which started in Diyarbakır Prison in 1981, have turned even the apolitical and sympathizer cadres and petty criminals to the future leading cadres of the PKK, and that the Diyarbakır Prison has functioned as a "Party School" for the militant organization (Birand, 1992; Cemal, 2010).⁹⁶

In this framework, the imposition of a homogenous "Turkish nation" initiated as Turk-Islam synthesis by the September 12 regime and the violent practices of the security actors encouraged by this imposition garnered considerable political legitimacy and momentum to the Kurdish movement, particularly after 1987 (Cizre, 2001, pp. 233- 234). By the end of the 1980s,

⁹⁴ During the September 12 military regime, a wide range of new provisions was made for further securing homogenous Turkish identity. The main ones were as follows: "Children cannot be given names unsuitable to Turkish national culture, moral rules and customs" (Law no. 1587, Art.164); "non-Turkish names shall be changed by the Ministry of Interior Affairs upon conferring on the Standing Provincial Committee" (Law no. 5422, Article 1); "No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education" (1981 Constitution, Art. 42); "No language other than Turkish may be taught to Turkish citizens in educational establishments" (Law no. 2923, Art. 2/a); "Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education shall be determined by taking into consideration the view of the National Security Council" (Law no. 2923, Art. 2/c); A work of cinema, video or music can be banned or prosecuted if it is considered by a local administrative to "violate the inseparable unity including the territory and the nation, or to contravene national sovereignty, national security, [...] or customs and traditions" (Law no. 3257, Art. 9/3); "It is forbidden to found an association for the purpose of putting forward the proposition that there are minorities within the Turkish Republic based on differences of class, race, language, religion or region, or creating minorities by protecting, promoting or spreading languages or cultures separate from the Turkish Language and culture [...]. (Law no. 2908, Art. 5/Par. 6); "Political parties cannot put forward that minorities based on national, religious, confessional, racial or language differences exist in the Republic of Turkey" (Law no. 2820, Art. 81).

⁹⁵ The purpose of this law was also stated as "to protect the indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security and public order."

⁹⁶ An inmate at Diyarbakır Prison has told Birand (1992) those times as follows: "Prison authority was torturing so much and was in such a demeaning attitude that people unavoidably developed solidarity among themselves. [...] We were amazed at the resistance of the PKK militants. They became greater all of a sudden. So did the name of PKK with them. Otherwise, no one knew even their names. They virtually promoted a Kurdish awareness" (p. 119).

the ending of the Cold War and the integration of the country into the world gave this momentum an international dynamism.

By the mid-1980s, the state was far from comprehending the social explosion behind the PKK's escalating effectiveness and increasing members despite the military defeats the organization suffered. Two legal and institutional arrangements made during this period were particularly significant. The first was the implementation of the "Provisional Village Guard System." The second one was the declaration of a State of Emergency (SOE) in Eastern and Southeastern cities upon the demand of the NSC because of the rapid increase in conflicts.

1.3.1. "Provisional Village Guard System" as a New Security Actor

The Provisional Village Guard System is the name of a paramilitary organization established by the state to arm and organize the civilian Kurds, whom the state assumed would take its side against PKK (SÜREÇ Araştırma Merkezi, 2015, p. 7). It was first accommodated in 1924 when most of the population lived in rural areas (Law no. 422 on Villages, March 18, 1924). Based on the concerns that the conflict with PKK could spread to the villages, the village guard system once again gained currency after 1980. Military and political elites embraced it as a convenient method for the villages sparsely scattered in rural areas, without routine monitoring of security forces, to defend themselves. Thus, the Provisional Village Guard System was approved by the parliament with the arrangement made in Article 74 of the Law on Villages (3175/1) on March 26, 1985. The arrangement enabled the village guards to be employed as "temporary" public servants (Ibid., p. 15). This supposedly provisional paramilitary structure still in force has played an active role for over 30 years of struggle against the PKK.

The village guard system is comprised of provisional and voluntary village guards. Although it is difficult to find reliable information on their exact number, it is fair to say the village guard system is an immensely large organization. As expressed by the Minister of Interior Affairs of the time, 7,933 village guards were employed for duty at the time the system was implemented. According to Kirişçi & Winrow (1997), this number increased to 63,000 by the mid-1990s (p. 136). It is claimed that a total of 70,000 armed village guards were serving in the region as of 2014 (SÜREÇ Araştırma Merkezi, p.21).

This paramilitary structure was not subjected to any regulations until the issuance of the Village Guard Regulations on July 1, 2000, determining the basis and procedures of their employment, duties, responsibilities, and authorities to use arms, training, discharge, and other personal rights. This vagueness in the scope of their functions enabled the military to use this structure as it pleased. Primarily tasked with defending their village, the village guards participated in armed conflicts and intelligence activities beyond their duties, including cross-border operations (Özar, Uçarlar & Aytar, 2013, p. 9; SÜREÇ Research Center, p. 24).

Re-activated as a security policy against PKK, this system brought about many human rights violations. The State's village guard employment policy played a definitive role in this regard. The State preferred to hire the guards among the regional clans known to be "pro-state" since the Ottoman times, particularly the clans with a long criminal record. Aside from arming

these clans in return for clearing their records, the state also accepted the voluntary applications of villagers, who wanted to have the state support against their enemies stemming from inter-family disputes, a widespread situation in the region. Besides, beneficiaries of the repentance laws, i.e., the former criminals were also deemed suitable for employment as village guard (Ibid., p. 172).

However, it is necessary to indicate that some of the village guards had to assumed duty because of the military's threats to evacuate and burn down their villages. The system, which the poor villagers initially entered for a steady pay, by the 1990s, brought them into an impasse, especially those who had nowhere else to go and who could not dare to migrate (Ibid., p. 134, 139-140). Studies on this issue demonstrate that many village guards used their arms for their personal interests and became the primary authority in their villages and the region with the support of the state forces (SÜREÇ Araştırma Merkezi, p. 15). Moreover, many village guards participated in clandestine organizations like JITEM (as explained later) and engaged in a multitude of illegal activities including unsolved murders, illegal land occupations, rapes, and drug and human trafficking (Kurban, 2010, pp. 207-208).⁹⁷

The provisional village guard system was used as a means to assess the Kurdish tribes' "loyalty to the state" in the region. Especially in the 1990s, parallel to the "total war" strategy implemented against PKK, refusing to become a village guard was perceived by the military as an indicator of direct or indirect support for PKK. Villages and hamlets which refused the village guard system were evacuated for the suspicion of providing logistic support to PKK.⁹⁸ Most of the time, they were burned down and destroyed. Villagers were subjected to beatings, torture, and massacres. Those who accepted to be in the system were settled in evacuated villages (SÜREÇ Research Center, p. 11).

The village guard system turned into a mechanism that prevented ordinary villagers from staying neutral in the conflict. This condition constituted the main reason for the mandatory migration in the rural areas during the 1990s.⁹⁹ Villagers who refused the village guard system and got caught between the PKK and the state oppression were forced to migrate to city centers of the East and then to other cities, particularly Istanbul. In the process, the villagers either lost what was left of their belongings or had to sell them to merchants for low

⁹⁷ According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the 18 years between 1985 and 2003, legal action was taken against 4,804 village guards who committed crimes; 376 of which were ordinary crimes, while 2,375 consisted of aiding and abetting the PKK. Some official data exist also regarding crimes committed by voluntary village guards. As of 2003, there were 12,279 voluntary village guards, 264 of whom were convicted for "murder and attempted murder, opposition to Law No. 6136, opening fire in residential areas, and trafficking of forestry products and weapons," while 78 were convicted for aiding and abetting the PKK.

⁹⁸ Chief of Staff of the time Doğan Güreş, in July 1994, has explicitly stated that the village evacuations were an element of state strategy against the PKK (*Reuters*, 1994, July 30).

⁹⁹ This analysis was an outcome of a nationwide questionnaire commissioned by the JDP administration to the Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, upon the request of the United Nations to determine the situation of people forced to migrate. Carried out between July 2004 and June 2006 under the coordination of the State Planning Organization, findings of the study named "Survey on Migration and Displaced Population" were announced publicly on December 6, 2006. The report contained significant findings regarding the reasons, results, and statistics of this involuntary migration or "internal displacement" which took place between 1984 and 1999. According to this report "the size of the migrant population originating from the 14 provinces due to security-related reasons is between 953,680 and 1,201,200." Approximately two-thirds of this population was displaced in the first half of the 1990s and one third between 1985 and 1990 (Kurban, 2006, December 31).

prices. The Eastern cities with insufficient infrastructure failed to accommodate this influx of people. Rising unemployment and poverty made matters worse for the people in the region (TESEV, 2008).

1.3.2. State of Emergency as an Instrument of Military Tutelage

State of emergency (SOE), meant the suspension of constitutional rights and freedoms for essentially the Kurdish citizens living in the Eastern and Southeast Eastern provinces of the country. Of the 19 executive orders issued with the declaration of SOE during the period, only three were submitted for the approval of the Assembly. Almost all political parties, except for NMT, promised they would lift the emergency rule when they came to power. However, they failed to obtain the approval of the NSC. Until it was revoked in 2002, SOE continued to be one of the leading instruments in the consolidation of the institutional power of military authority. The struggle against PKK provided the grounds for military intervention and rendered the authoritarian institutional structure dominant in politics (İnsel, 2003b; pp. 294-295).

In 1987, the MP government with the consent of Evren issued an executive order on July 19 and established a new security structure in the Kurdish region under the name of Governorship of the State of Emergency Region and Command of Public Order Corps. The Governor of the SOE was given extensive powers such as to change location or merge villages and hamlets, to discharge or reassign anyone except judges, prosecutors, and gendarmerie (Decree-Law no. 285). Military forces and the NIO in the region were to report to the Governor, and his expenditures would not be subject to state bidding law and auditing by the Court of Accounts (Ibid.). However, the powers of the governor were only on paper. In fact, he was just the civilian executioner of the measures deemed necessary by the military authorities. As mentioned in the previous chapter, according to the confidential statute of the General Secretariat of the NSC, the authority to make general evaluations on the emergency rule and determine any measures necessary to eliminate the threat belonged to the military.

On August 17, 1989, the Chief of Staff Army General Necip Torumtay confirmed this legal fact by a written statement emphasizing that the authority concerning the Kurdish politics was in the hands of the military and that the problem could only be solved by expanding the use of military methods. This declaration once again demonstrated that the army had absolute dominance over the region. The "Special War" methods put in practice following this declaration further shook the confidence in democratic administrations and led to growing support for PKK (İmset, pp. 140-147). On the same date of Torumtay's statement, Prime Minister Özal asserted that they were not considering taking any political action about the region and they would expand the existing military measures (Ibid., pp. 254-256). In the same year, SDPP's proposal to revoke the Law no. 2932 forbidding the Kurdish language was rejected by the parliamentary commission on the grounds of "separatism" (Üster 1999).

During this period, coercive measures of security forces such as systematic human rights violations, village evacuations, raiding and burning down of villages which refuse to arm against PKK, or destruction of settlements to prevent logistic support to the organization

deepened the antagonistic nature of the relationship the locals had with the state.¹⁰⁰ In agreement with the military authority on the preservation of emergency conditions, MP lacked the cultural, social, and political vision to solve the Kurdish problem through democratic means. This political deficiency laid the grounds for the military authority to reinforce its power, not only in the emergency rule region but also throughout the country by using the SOE as a pretext.¹⁰¹

Özal would later make a U-turn on his stance on the Kurdish issue, and repeatedly pointed up the necessity of a political solution to the Kurdish problem during his term as President of the Republic between 1989 and 1993. He would respond to a critical question of why he had never chosen this path during his prime ministry as follows (Barlas, 1994, p. 117):

"This Southeastern issue could have been dealt before; we could have searched for political solutions. But remember. During the first MP administration, the struggle was to switch to a civilian regime. For about 1.5-2 years, some of my ministers paid attention to Kenan Pasha more than me. They feared him, not me. We also had to overcome the bottlenecks in the economy and the foreign currency problems. That was what we had to do to prevent new military coups in a country which had just come out of a military regime."

The fast and multilateral emergence of the Kurdish problem in the Turkish political agenda was almost concurrent with Özal's presidency. The escalation of PKK attacks, expansion of protests from villages to towns and cities, the founding of pro-Kurdish People's Labor Party (PLP), and the growing number of demonstrations in the Eastern settlements coincided with the same dates.

In August 1989, ER Governor Hayri Kozakçioğlu declared that "the PKK attacks have increased one-fold since the year before." SDPP Leader İnönü conveyed his impressions after his visit to the region, saying that "the force of the terrorist organization in the East is increasing" (Ersel et al., 2003, p. 277).

In March 1990, a massive popular uprising took place in the towns of Nusaybin and Cizre, two Kurdish-populated cities in the Southeast. The incident which was soon dubbed the 'Kurdish intifada' was triggered by the funeral of a young PKK militant in Nusaybin on March 14. The funeral turned into a mass demonstration of approximately five thousand people. The special army units trying to disperse the cortege faced a massive resistance of the people. The troops opened fire on the crowd, killing one and wounding six. The security forces detained

¹⁰⁰ Even Abdullah Öcalan's brother, Osman Ferhat Öcalan, felt obliged to thank Turkish state for the policies it pursued. According to him, Cizre (a city in the Southeast Anatolia) has become the stronghold of the PKK due to violent practices of the security forces. Öcalan said, "Half of Cizre, we won. The other half, T.R. offered us on a silver platter." (İmset, p. 140)

¹⁰¹ The central political objective of the MP administrations led by Prime Minister Özal was the economic development of the region. To that effect, they implemented many economic measure packages, primarily "Southeastern Anatolia Project" (GAP). The only civilian initiative to ensure security in the region was limited to the Repentance Law, which, despite Kenan Evren's veto, passed on June 6, 1985, and was reissued a few more times (Gençkaya, 2001, p. 109). After being elected President of the Republic, Özal made a self-criticism regarding the terror and the Kurdish issue in the 1983-1991 period saying, "We determined the right policies, but failed in the implementation" (Sazak, 1991, December 29).

500 people and declared a curfew in the town. On March 20th, the uprising spread to the neighboring town of Cizre, where the shops were also closed down. Here too, thousands of protestors clashed with the security forces, and the troops once again fired into the crowd, killing five. The next day, during the Newroz Festival, thousands protested in the town, with Öcalan posters and PKK flags. On the same days, shops and businesses remained closed, this time in Diyarbakır, İdil, Silopi, and Midyat in solidarity with Nusaybin and Cizre. Right after the demonstrations, PKK militants killed a teacher for not teaching in Kurdish. (Ersel et al., pp. 277-278, 322-323)

In the face of these developments, after a series of meetings of the NSC, the government enacted several executive orders imposing severe sanctions on the emergency rule region. Chaired by President Turgut Özal for the first time the MP cabinet met in session on April 9 and adopted the Decree No. 413. Publicly known as Decree on Censorship and Exile, the Decree no. 413 included the following regulations:

- The SOE Governor could ban and confiscate "any publication found guilty of "wrongly representing incidents occurring in a region which is under a state of emergency, disturbing its readers with distorted news stories or commentaries, causing anxiety among people in the region and obstructing security forces in the performance of their jobs.(Art. 11/e); The regional governor was empowered to stop distribution of these publications and confiscate them, no matter where they were printed, and even to close down their entire printing plants.
- The SOE governor might force the individuals who are observed to be acting against the general security and public order to compulsory relocation. The relocation site would be determined by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Art. 11/k).
- The SOE governor could request position or placement changes of "harmful" or underperforming public employees.
- The SOE governor could control "all union activities, including strikes and lockouts, declarations of intent and referendums"; and prohibit them entirely if necessary. He could also prevent boycotts, slow-down schemes, and even close-down of workplaces (Art. 11/ö).
- The State Security Courts could open litigation in all kinds of cases requested by the regional governor, as long as they were included in the category of crimes handled by the court.
- Although seemingly unrelated, Article 158 of the Turkish Penal Code which prohibited "insulting the President of the Republic" was incorporated in the Decree. The penal code already stipulated up to three years imprisonment for those who insult the president. With the new addition, publications which insult the president would pay a fine up to 100 million TL (\$33,000). Besides, their owners would be fined according to circulation sales, with their responsible editors, paying half of this amount. The same penalty would be applied for insulting Parliament, the government, ministers, and

high-level state executives. Identical regulations would apply to cases stated in Article No. 268 of the Turkish Penal Code. This article already called for a maximum three-year prison sentence for insulting public officeholders.

The decree also increased the penalties for "separatist" activities (Provisional Art. 1). Besides, the decree added the NSC General Secretariat into the equation by obliging the SOE Governor "to be in coordination and cooperation with General Directorate of TRT, Ministry of Internal Affairs and General Secretariat of the NSC" on decisions concerning broadcasts about a region under the state of emergency (Provisional Art. 4). Article 33 of the decree also prevented any legal actions being taken against The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the SOE governor or any of his officials.

In a short while, the government issued another executive order, Decree No. 421 on April 14th. It expanded the SOE region, including the cities of Muş, Bitlis, and Adiyaman and the scope of sanctions imposed on the press broadened nationwide.

Decrees No. 413 and No. 421 were then combined with Decree No 424 issued on May 10, 1989 and gave the authority of censorship enforcement also to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The goal of the decree was to prevent the news feed from the emergency rule region, as well as news and commentaries on Kurdish problem from being published in the press. The new emergency measures had an immediate effect on the Turkish press.¹⁰² Issued on the same date, Decree No 425 extended the SOE governor's authority to postpone or suspend strikes and lockouts from one month to three months (Art. 11/ö). This decree also eliminated the possibility of challenging the administrative decisions of the SOE governor and the Ministry before the administrative court (Art. 33).

All the opposition parties in the parliament reacted strongly against these decrees. SDPP appealed to the Constitutional Court for the repeal of Decree No 424. Also, PLP, the party which represented the Kurdish identity in the parliament, addressed a parliamentary question concerning decrees No. 424 and No. 425. However, it was not put in process by the GNAT Speaker because "it did not qualify as a question." In December 1990 and May 1991, the Constitutional Court ruled the Decree No. 413 and the decrees after it as unconstitutional. However, the ruling was not published in the Official Gazette. The decrees in question stayed in effect until 1992 (Ibid; Düzgören 1994, p. 201).

In a speech, he made in July 1990 President Özal, argued that there was an insurgency against the state in the Southeast and that the decrees were issued solely for ending it, but not for censoring the media in general.¹⁰³ In the same speech, however, while underlining that the official language of the country was Turkish, he also stated that Law No 2932 could be annulled.

Özal later said in an interview that his first effort to change the official Kurdish policy was "opening the doors for the Peshmergas fleeing the Halepçe massacre" in Iraq. He added

¹⁰² 2000'e Doğru and Halk Gerçeği journals promulgating the developments in the region were shut down indefinitely, and its printing house was shut down for ten months (Ersel et al., p. 306). The owners of printing houses, journals newspapers, as well as the writers and journalists, had to exercise self-censorship to avoid constant vexatious prosecutions (HRW, 1999).

¹⁰³ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/ayintarihi/1990/temmuz1990.htm>

that the military has fiercely opposed his decision (Birand & Yalçın, p. 451). However, the incident which played a significant role in changing Özal's approach to the Kurdish problem was the Gulf Crisis, which started with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Seeing the opportunity to make Turkey a major player in the wider region, he had instantaneously supported the American-initiated economic blockade of Iraq and strongly advocated the need to make peace with the Kurds to achieve this end.

1.3.3. Political Initiatives and Failures

1.3.3.1. Özal's Efforts as the President of the Republic

After the Gulf War, among his promises to the Western countries Özal vowed to engage in political reforms to accommodate the aspirations of the regional cultures, helping them to meet their socio-cultural demands (Gençkaya, 2001, p. 144). Gaining sympathy by saying, "my grandmother was a Kurd" (*Cumhuriyet* 1991, March 28), Özal persuaded the MP government, over which he still had control, to repeal the September 12 ban on "talking and singing in Kurdish" on April 11, 1991. Then, until his death, while establishing an indirect channel of communication with Abdullah Öcalan for a ceasefire, he also developed policy recommendations such as passing a repentance law to grant immunity from prosecution for Kurdish guerrillas, permitting education and TV broadcasting in the Kurdish language (Gençkaya, pp. 105-149). He believed it was a major mistake that the PLP, the only formal legal bridge between the Kurds and the state, was not allowed to run in the local elections. He regularly emphasized that all the political parties in Turkey, including MP, were rigid institutions which were closed to negotiation. And more importantly, he realized that the Kurdish problem could not be reduced to a question of terrorism to be solved by embracing violent and oppressive military measures.¹⁰⁴

Although during his prime ministry Özal agreed with the NSC on the continuation of "emergency state conditions", as Bozarslan stated he was "the only political figure who openly criticized the 'anachronic' structure of Turkey and the 'founding taboos of the Republic' primarily by exposing the Kurdish reality" (Bozarslan, 2001, p. 142). However, his peculiar efforts to break taboos of the national security state did not translate into state policies.

The main reasons for this impasse were the friend-foe distinction made by the central security actors, their strict pro-status quo ideological positions, and their legal authorities giving them the power to directly intervene in the civilian realm. In the NSC, military authority categorically opposed any political solutions to the Kurdish issue and rejected all democratic aspirations by simultaneously identifying them as "separatist" intentions. This dichotomy

¹⁰⁴ Özal, in a statement he made to the press in January 1993 said, "Problems cannot be solved with violence and conflict. [...] Assume there were an uprising in the Southeast, and we reacted harshly. It would be of no use. Sometimes one should let the steam off. Time will solve some problems. One should be a little understanding. Then things will loosen up. That's what was done in Turkey, partially. They wanted to engage in an uprising similar to Palestinians in the Southeast. But they failed. I don't think the people in the Southeast want that. The important thing is to demonstrate if they were treated differently or not" (*Gündem*, 1993, January 14). A short while before his death, in a statement he made regarding the issue, he said, "There can't be a military solution to a crisis as such. The solution should be together with the people" (*Meydan*, 1993, April 6).

deepened the dilemma in the relations between the Kurdish citizens and the state, not only in the emergency rule region but also throughout the country. No matter what ethnic origin they come from, any civilian organization or individual proposing non-violent political solutions to the problem was officially stigmatized as internal enemies instantly. Political parties, which had made promises of democratization when in opposition, were easily tamed during their governments by the central security actors.

1.3.3.2. A Weak Initiative: TPP-SDPP Coalition under Demirel's Prime Ministry

The government program of the TPP-SDPP coalition under the prime ministry of Demirel formed a month after the general elections held on October 20, 1991, involved ambitious goals for democratization. The coalition parties announced to the public that they had agreed on a radical reform package to expand freedoms and end restrictions on the Kurdish citizens. Among the titles agreed upon were the recognition of Kurdish identity; repealing the ban on books, newspapers, tapes and records in Kurdish; lifting of the village guard system and gradually, the emergency rule; strengthening the local administrations in the region; and granting some autonomy to their municipal councils and establishment of a Kurdish Institute (Düzgören, pp. 119-120).

Prime Minister Demirel, right after the announcement of this new package, made a speech at Diyarbakır, which created the impression that the traditional official attitude towards the Kurdish issue was going to be abandoned. In his speech, Demirel said, "We can preserve the unity of Turkey only by treating the different ethnicities as equals. [...] We name people who talk Kurdish and say they are of Kurdish origin, as the 'Kurdish identity.' It is no longer possible to oppose this. [...] Turkey has recognized the Kurdish reality. For me, that is the most important progress of the last year. The recognition of the Kurdish reality is not an obstacle for preserving the unity of Turkey" (*Tercüman*, 1991, December 9). After this declaration, he made an additional remark that the military solution would be abandoned in the approach to the Kurdish issue. Even after a minor armed conflict between PKK and security forces, Demirel gave the following message: "First the bloodshed has to be stopped. The state has lost its deterrence power. You cannot use violence to restore it. Violence does not befit the state" (cited in Düzgören, p.121).

However, within the first month of the coalition during which peace messages were spoken aloud, the military power demanded from Demirel the authority to activate a "regional cleansing" plan to crush the PKK for good. The same plan had been offered to and approved by the MP government under the name "Operation Spring," but it was not put in motion because of the elections. Its approval by the coalition shadowed the government's determination to solve the issue on the political platform. Demirel, who had been overthrown on the grounds of not giving sufficient power to military authority before 1980 coup, in January 1992, complied with the military power. (İmset, pp. 311-312).

The national security policies of the NSC prevailed over the government's promises regarding the Kurdish issue. At the first NSC meeting of the coalition government held on November 29, 1991, none of the subjects of the reform package in the government protocol

became part of the council's agenda. The press release of the meeting also demonstrated no signs of an apparent deviation from the official state discourse.¹⁰⁵ In all the NSC meetings held during this coalition government, the only non-military measure suggested for the Kurdish issue was about the regional development. The civilian government could not stand firm against the imposition by the military authority to "continue with the military formula until the terror is crushed," nor could they prevent the security forces deployed in the region from regularly abusing their authority and committing human rights violations.

The large-scale civilian-military clashes which started with the Newroz festivities on March 12, 1992, confirmed that the politicians and the high-ranking civilian bureaucrats working in the region had no control or power over the security forces. The clashes were triggered by a relatively minor incident in Şırnak when a group of people gathered for the Newroz resisted the body search. This small-scale conflict turned into an uprising. The security forces who succumbed to provocations opened fire on the crowd. According to the data provided by the Human Rights Foundation, the events led to the death of 90 civilians along with hundreds who were injured, detained, and tortured, and loss of property. Demirel's advisor, journalist İlnur Çevik, in a statement made to BBC after the incident, declared that the bloodshed during Newroz was caused by security officers who refused to obey the civilian authority (cited in Düzgören, p. 169).

A research group in the coalition partner SDPP prepared a report on the events.¹⁰⁶ The report claimed that the governor and sub-governors had no control or power over the police and military and that some of the members of the security forces displayed intolerance and excessive violence towards the protestors in the region, opening fire on civilians and leading to bloodshed and escalation of events. Prepared by a team including General Comptroller and Assistant General Secretaries of the party, the report emphasized that the Kurdish problem could not be solved with violence and added that "the democratization program in the government agenda was necessary, but not sufficient for a peaceful solution." However, both SDPP Leader and Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü and General Secretary of SDPP opposed the report on account of the fact that it "falsely criticized the State and the security forces" (Ibid, p. 174).

The contradiction between the discourse and the practice continued for some time. Right after the Newroz events, Prime Minister Demirel announced a new Southeastern package involving targets, such as the establishment of closer relations with the Kurdish citizens, frequent visits to the region by members of parliament, lifting the ban on Kurdish publications and broadcasts, and ending the emergency rule (Ibid, p. 173). The emergency rule, as stipulated in the law, was re-declared for four-month terms at NSC meetings. The issue first came up at

¹⁰⁵ The NSC meeting held on November 29 was led by President of the Republic Özal. It was the first NSC meeting Demirel participated as prime minister and SDPP leader Erdal İnönü as deputy prime minister. The decision taken at the meeting was as follows: "The Council, in this meeting, reviewed the general security, public order, and exterior developments and decided to publicly declare its agreement on the facts that the indivisibility of the state with its territory and its nation is indisputable; well-being of all citizens is under state protection; operability and credibility of the state shall be ensured; peace and security of the citizens shall be maintained adhering to the principles of democratic constitutional state; all citizens are entitled to equal rights and freedoms; mutual trust between the citizens and the state shall be established while maintaining security and public order, and that all these issues shall be implemented as a state policy."

¹⁰⁶ For full text of the report see, İmset, pp. 347-357.

the NSC meeting that took place at the War Academies Command on June 23rd. The press release did not involve any explanation except that the emergency rule in ten cities was extended for another four months (NSC Bulletin, June 23, 1992). On the same day, coalition leaders addressed the deputies at the parliamentary group meetings of their parties and repeated the importance of implementing the NSC decisions. The following statement made by the Chief of Staff at the time Doğan Güreş on October 16, 1992, indicated that the government's promise to "remove the emergency rule" was prevented by the military wing of the NSC (cited in Düzgören, p. 277): "As a soldier, I cannot think of any other means than a state of emergency. However, if the PKK runs rampant, I will suggest a martial law without hesitation."

The most important development confirming the binding influence of the military authority on Kurdish policy of the governments was the approval of the National Security Policy Document at the NSC meeting held on July 31, 1992. In the memorandum of the meeting it was stated that "[...] the 'Turkish National Security Policy Document', *re-formulated* for protecting and safeguarding of the constitutional order, national entity, integrity and interests of the state, [...] was reviewed, deemed acceptable and *decided to be submitted to the Government for approval* (we made the italics)". The name of this document, which was adopted at the council meeting attended by the President of the Republic Özal, Prime Minister Demirel, Minister of State, and Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü, Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, and External Affairs, had not been heard before by politicians or the public as yet. However, as can be inferred from the expression "re-formulated," the document had already been in the military wing's vault.

This meeting was notable for another reason. Up to that date, although NSC decisions had been unconditionally implemented by the governments, the written declarations never involved the expression "submitting for approval." Whereas at the meeting bulletin on July 31st, the NSC, for the first time, went beyond "reporting" the government about a decision and yet openly demanded its approval. Thus, an NSC decision, even in its wording, openly turned into an administrative sanction imposed upon the government by an allegedly advisory council.

The document identified separatism as the primary national security threat. With this document, the military authority was confining the Kurdish issue to a security-based perspective, precluding a political settlement. As mentioned in Chapter III, this secret document prepared by the NSCGS and of which the legal basis was then unknown to the public, meant that the security policies could only be determined by the military authority.

The document had yet another effect on the political realm. It stopped the governments, which intended to develop alternative solutions before any suggestions started to take shape. As such, not only on paper but also in reality, national security became a large field, where governments had no say in its development but had to assume the political responsibility for its consequences. Moreover, since this text, which determined the main internal and external threats according to a military mindset was a top-secret document; it was exempt from parliamentary supervision. From that day on, this document has served as an unlawful but an official reference text for restricting the political projects of parties that came to power through democratic channels as well as containing social aspirations.

During this time, two developments (not directly related to the Kurdish issue), which occurred out of the NSC, were critical for indicating the political failure of the government against the military authority. The first of these was related to the government's promise of confronting the organizers of the 1980 coup. On January 1993, the TPP-SDPP coalition declared that they would make a constitutional amendment to lift the immunity of the NSB. This proposal, which meant declaring the September 12 regime illegitimate, was among the election promises of the coalition parties. Opposition parties also agreed to support the constitutional amendment in the parliament (*Hürriyet*, 1993, January 8). However, the government backed down in no time and dropped its proposal to rescind the Provisional Article 15 of the Constitution, which rendered the September 12 executives immune to prosecution.

The second development was concerning the draft law introduced in the same month to attach the General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense. According to this draft law, Chief of General Staff would henceforth report to the minister of defense. The president and prime minister would have the authority to giving orders directly to commanders without going through the once all-powerful Chief of General Staff. A similar proposal had been discussed during the prime ministry of Özal but could not be introduced fearing Evren's veto. However, this time despite Özal's implicit support, Prime Minister Demirel made a U-turn on his government's initiative, and the law was rejected by the votes of the coalition members in GNAT Commission on Defense (TBMM Savunma Komisyonu) (newspapers dated January 14, 1993).

The military authority opposed both proposals claiming that they would weaken the institutional credibility of the army. This warning was enough for the civilian government to refrain from challenging the military authority.

In summary, the TPP-SDPP coalition government's pledges of removing the emergency rule and pursuing democratization all turned out to be empty promises. The democratization objectives put forth by the political leaders, especially during the early period of their governments, were easily forestalled in the NSC. Süleyman Demirel along with some prominent deputies of TPP embraced the military authority's approach to the Kurdish problem right after he became prime minister in November 1991. Ironically, despite its social-democrat identity and democratic discourse on the Kurdish issue, SDPP¹⁰⁷ also chose to adopt the military approach in exchange for maintaining its position as the coalition partner of the administrations led by Prime Minister Çiller between June 1993 and March 1996.¹⁰⁸ After the death of President

¹⁰⁷ In early 1995 SDPP merged with RPP assumed the name RPP.

¹⁰⁸ Before the general elections on October 20, 1991, SDPP, aside from PLP, was the only political actor to demand radical democratic reforms about the Kurdish issue. During this period, SDPP presented the public the "Report on Southeast" on the reasons behind the strengthening of the PKK. Prepared by a commission of five under the chairmanship of General Secretary Deniz Baykal, the report determined the reasons for the sympathy for PKK in the region as the oppressive policies including forced village evacuations and migrations. It suggested freedom for Kurdish language, recognition of cultural rights and the establishment of a Kurdish Institute. The "Report on Southeast" was unanimously accepted at the SDPP Party Group. SDPP Leader Erdal İnönü stated that democracy is absent not only in the Southeast but throughout Turkey and presented the report to the public as part of the program SDPP would follow when they come into power. The SSC had already instituted an inquiry for 25 deputies for their statements on Kurdish problem. Likewise, a short while after the report was publicized, Ankara SSC, opened an investigation against SDPP in July 1990 on the grounds that the report contained remarks against state security. The lawsuit ended with Supreme Court's dismissal of charges. SDPP, despite the pressure of SSC,

Özal, the only authority in the government to demonstrate an initiative to steer the issue in a relatively more democratic and civilian direction, the Kurdish issue entirely fell in the hands of the military hierarchy.

1.3.3.3. Ciller Administration: from Submission to Voluntary Collaboration

The PKK leader Öcalan, on March 17, 1993, right before the Newroz festivities, announced a unilateral ceasefire that would last until April 15th. Özal's efforts had played an essential role in this decision. Although the security forces did not officially accept the ceasefire, Özal considered it an opportunity and argued that new policies should be developed to make it permanent. He made the government and then Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş accept to postpone the Operation Spring which aimed to deliver a major blow to the PKK. During the ceasefire, a significant relief was experienced in the conflict regions. Özal desired to carry the armed conflict to a political platform. To that end, he started to prepare an extensive repentance law (Ersel et al., p. 369). Özal told his political advisor, journalist Cengiz Çandar, that if Prime Minister Demirel did not take a concrete step to settle on a plan of action, he would take the issue in hand at any cost (cited in Dündar 1999). Given the President of the Republic's moderate diplomacy, on April 16, 1993, Öcalan announced that the ceasefire would be extended "indefinitely." However, the day after the announcement Özal died, and the peaceful atmosphere was disrupted.

After Özal's death, on May 16, the parliament elected Prime Minister Demirel head of state, and after defeating two other candidates at the extraordinary party congress on June 13, Tansu Çiller became the new Prime Minister and the leader of TPP. At the meeting held on May 24, 1993, chaired by Demirel, the NSC decided upon a limited repentance law which allowed PKK members who have played no direct part in violent actions to give themselves up. (NSC Bulletin dated May 24, 1993). However, on the same day, 33 unarmed privates were killed by PKK militants, and the repentance law was suspended. Öcalan's statements of not knowing the attack were not found plausible. During the period when Demirel became the President of the Republic, and Tansu Çiller, the Prime Minister, the national security regime

continued to criticize the practices in the emergency rule region. It also decided to collaborate with PLP, when PLP was not let to run in the general elections. Deputies who had founded PLP upon their dismissal from SDPP ran in the general elections as SDPP candidates and got into parliament. However, in November 1991, five months after SDPP became the ruling partner, the internal conflicts on the Kurdish issue started to become evident. Another report on Southeast prepared by SDPP General Comptroller Ziya Halis, Assistant General Secretaries Mustafa Gazalcı and Ercan Karakaş, was denied by SDPP Leader İnönü and General Secretary Cevdet Selvi for loudly criticizing the state and the security forces. Around the same time Supreme Court Prosecutors Office, filed a suit in the Constitutional Court to close PLP. With the lawsuit, the legitimacy of PLP started to be discussed in the political arena. MP's new leader Mesut Yılmaz claimed that even a party advocating independence for Kurdistan could be established. SDPP Leader Erdal İnönü also seemed to be supporting the idea of a pro-Kurdish party. Only TPP Leader and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel were against the idea. SDPP acted in line with TPP's stance and agreed with its coalition partner on a law on political parties that would prohibit the founding of a pro-Kurdish party (Düzgören, p. 45, 103, 174, 204; Ersel et al., p. 278; <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/ayintarihi/1990/temmuz1990.htm>; <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/ayintarihi/1990/agustos1990.htm>.)

intensified without stumbling upon any legal obstacle and became the primary reference for the bureaucracy and politics.

Tansu Çiller, a professor of the most liberal university of Turkey with a doctorate from Yale, was brought forth by Demirel as a "democrat" and "modern" woman. However, during her term as TPP Leader and Prime Minister, after wavering between these attributes and "the necessities of politics," she would end up with embracing the military discourse.

Following the signing of an ambitious government protocol on "democratization and restructuring of the State" with the SDPP, Çiller assumed office as the first female Prime Minister of Turkey on June 25, 1993.¹⁰⁹ In her early days, taking the initiative similar to Özal's and backed by her coalition partner, she embarked on a search for a political solution to the Kurdish problem. Before she assumed office, the statement she gave regarding the Kurdish issue on June 19, 1993, was as follows: "We will determine a common attitude with SDPP towards TV, radio, and education in Kurdish. I see the ethnic and regional richness of Turkey like the variation and coloration of a mosaic. There is no great harm in expressing cultural differences. We want to remove the emergency rule" (cited in Dözüören, p. 392). However, she also simultaneously pursued a balanced policy vis-a-vis the demands of the military authority. Chief of Staff and commanders-in-chief were expecting Çiller to announce her full support for the military operation they were to start in the Southeast. Only two weeks after her promise of a democratic opening, Çiller said that giving Kurds cultural rights would be "meeting the PKK's demands" (newspapers dated July 4, 1993).¹¹⁰

Çiller exhibited a conflicted attitude towards the Kurdish problem during this period. First, she decided to meet with party leaders to develop a political solution. In the meetings she had with the party leaders in July, she made a surprise announcement and opened the subjects of education and broadcasting in the Kurdish language into the discussion. SDPP and RPP made public statements defending these reform proposals. RPP leader Deniz Baykal also made an unexpected suggestion, stating that the TAF should withdraw from the Southeast. The leader of TPP's strongest rival at the time, Mesut Yılmaz, while arguing that the issue should be discussed at the NSC, he said that "the fight against terrorism should not be left to the army" (cited in Düzgören, p. 404). However, the strongest reaction to Çiller's initiative came from President Demirel. He immediately hindered the debate before any military involvement by stating "cultural issues cannot be opened to discussion before the terrorism is resolved" (Ibid.).

Çiller's last initiative to develop a political solution to the Kurdish issue in this period was to suggest the possibility of autonomy for the Kurdish region along the lines of the "Basque Model" following a meeting with his Spanish counterpart (*Hürriyet*, October 10, 1993).¹¹¹ In

¹⁰⁹ For the coalition protocol of the first Çiller administration see, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/KP50.htm>

¹¹⁰ Çiller's statement to press on July 4, 1993, was as follows: "We cannot allow TV and education in Kurdish. He (Öcalan) says the first step is broadcasting in Kurdish and the second step is the education in Kurdish. Can we say that we will 'allow' the first step of a plan to 'destroy the territorial integrity of Turkey step by step'? If PKK escalates, we will do the same. I will surely win the war against PKK. I have never lost any battle in my life."

¹¹¹ Spain, after dealing with Basque terrorism for long years, has solved the problem to a great extent by giving the region some rights, including rights to use their language, open their schools, train their teachers and

this framework, Çiller further argued that strengthening local administrations in the Southeast would be effective in the fight against terrorism, saying, "some regions should be given different status for a successful local administration" (*Milliyet*, 1993, October 11). Immediately after returning to the country, she discussed the issue with her coalition partner and decided to send a delegation to make a study visit to Spain.

The SDPP wing of the coalition declared their open support to Çiller's decision. Deputy Prime Minister Murat Karayağın, who had been elected as SDPP's new leader at the Ordinary Party Congress held on September 11-12, 1993 and replaced Erdal İnönü, made the following statement on the issue: "There is no need to look for another model. If municipalities are given these powers, and the number of personnel in the emergency rule region is increased, we can take an important step in solving the issue" (Düzgören, p. 443). However, a short time after these statements made by the coalition leaders, the General Staff announced its firm disapproval to any political solutions including the Basque model through a memorandum-like report publicized on October 13, 1993. In the report, all actors opening the fundamental principles of the state to the discussion, particularly the media organs which covered the subject, were sternly warned (Düzgören, p.444; Cerrahoğlu 1995).¹¹² The General Staff repeated similar warnings through press releases as articles calling for a political solution continued to appear in the press. Çiller was so harshly rebuked by the military leaders and President Demirel that she not only withdrew her suggestion but denied ever making it.¹¹³

Thus "the era of falcons" started in the fight against terrorism. A new security apparatus was established in the context of the new strategy publicly announced as "low-intensity warfare" by the Chief of Staff Güreş. Interestingly enough, low-intensity warfare was a politico-military concept developed by the military experts of the United States during Reagan's administration in the Cold War against Third World insurgencies, otherwise named as low-intensity conflicts (Hippler 1988). In essence, it was a doctrine for countering revolution. As stated by Klare and Kornbluh (1988) low-intensity warfare embraces a wide range of covert political and psychological operations variously described as "special operations," "special

determine their curriculum. In the framework of this new policy, a new parliament was established in the Basque region, and an almost autonomous structure was built. All public services, except for defense, foreign relations and economic management, were left to the Basque administration.

¹¹² Following warning was given in the report: "It is perceived to be imperative for the security, peace, and welfare of the State of Republic of Turkey that fundamental principles like the unitary state structure, secularism, and official state language being Turkish shall not be subject to discussion; all parties, including the press, shall contribute to the determination on these fundamental issues" (cited in Düzgören, p.445). Chief of Staff Güreş, in an interview he gave, stated his opinions on the subject as follows: "I do not accept the Basque Model on no account. Assume we gave them autonomy; you tell me the consequence. We'll disintegrate. Spain has two neighbors: Portuguese and France. If our neighboring countries one day become democratic, we too would have it under control like Spain. But we live in geography acting on emotions. [...] the first requirement is the military solution. After that, the social and economic problems can be dealt with. [...] What will they do with education in Kurdish? What good would it make if they are educated in Kurdish? Will people employ Kurdish speakers? Any leader attempting to allow education in Kurdish will lose leadership. Our disposition does not allow for that. There is an emotional aspect here. [...] I do not understand the political solution" (Cerrahoğlu, 1995).

¹¹³ When the journalists reminded Güreş that Çiller gave a green light to a political solution, the Chief of Staff invited the Prime Minister on the scene for a power play saying, "honorable Prime Minister, they are asking me the political solution, and I am asking them. Have them explain to me so I'd learn what the political solution is." Çiller responded to this invitation saying, "there is no regional regulation; everything is nationwide" (Ergin, 1993).

activities," and "unconventional warfare." Therefore, it necessitated Special Forces and other paramilitary "assets" than a conventional army. So, during this period, the military hierarchy in Turkey by adopting another strategy of the Cold War became increasingly oriented towards internal enemies, rather than external enemies. With this new strategy, the job descriptions of the military and the police became closely intertwined (Bora 2006).

The Era of Falcons

The belief that the "guerrilla warfare" going on in the Southeast could only be won by Special Forces led to the approval of the military leaders to transfer authority and resources to the police force, which the army had remained distant until then. Çiller appointed Mehmet Ağar as the Chief of General Directorate of Security in July 1993. Ağar presented a detailed report to the NSC on the reorganization of security forces. Ağar served under the General Secretariat of the NSC, and during his time of service, the influence of police teams under the Special Operations Department was significantly increased (Beşe, 2006, p. 115). The Special Operations Department chaired by İbrahim Şahin, a name from ultra-nationalist milieu, gained a privileged position over time. Retired lieutenant colonel Korkut Eken was charged with the training of the special operation teams (SOT), defined as the "professional army" by the public, to fight PKK using guerilla warfare tactics (*Zaman*, September 11, 1993).¹¹⁴

Ağar, Şahin, and Eken held the key roles in this new security apparatus. Their names would often be mentioned as the principal actors of organized crime activities as well as death squads, intimidations, and abductions, in the context of the politics-mafia-police triangle, which would be revealed in the following years due to a car crash publicly known as Susurluk Scandal.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, by late September, declared that the preparations for the special army against terrorism were almost complete. Her statements on the issue on September 30 were as follows: "They say there are 5-6 thousand terrorists in the mountains. So, we are sending specially trained 10 thousand commandos to the mountains. They will live there. I am so happy about it." Çiller also confirmed her choice of the military solution as the only way, saying that they had refused "a recent ceasefire demand from the PKK circles" (*Sabah*, September 30, 1993).

¹¹⁵ Susurluk Scandal began as an ordinary traffic accident on November 3, 1996, outside the town of Susurluk in the west of Turkey. Three of the four passengers were killed: Hüseyin Kocadağ, a former captain in the Special Operations Unit; a man named Mehmet Özbay; and Özbay's girlfriend, Gonca Us. The only survivor was Sedat Bucak, a True Path Party member of parliament from the southeast city of Urfa known for his army of village guards set up to protect that region from the PKK. It came out that Özbay was none other than Abdullah Çatlı, a right-wing Idealist and a terrorist from 1970s. He had been searched for by Interpol since his escape from a Swiss prison in 1982, where he had been held on drug charges. Further investigation in the days following the accident revealed that Çatlı had numerous valid national identity cards made out in different names. He also held two Turkish diplomatic passports which had been personally signed by Mehmet Ağar, who later became True Path Party's interior minister of the time. Moreover, the local police declared finding a cache of automatic weapons and silencers, many of them the property of the Interior Ministry, inside the trunk of the car. In the parliamentary investigation that followed, Ağar refused to discuss Çatlı's relation to the state for national security reasons. However, as a result of further investigations, it has become clear that during the 1990s, certain elements of the Turkish security apparatus developed a relationship with criminals, with official sanction. The criminals were reportedly assigned to perform killings (mostly of left-wing activists or Kurdish nationalists) and to carry out other

In rural areas, SOTs served under the military authorities, and most of their members were chosen among extreme rightist NMP militants. As early as its establishment, there was news in the press about most applicants being NMP militants and that approximately five thousand idealists (*ülküci*) had lined up to join the "special army" (PKK'ya Karşı Ülkücü Ordusu," *Hürriyet*, 1993, August 6). Thereby, the idealist cadres who had served the mission of "helping the state" before the September 12 regime were allotted to the state cadres in the context of the Kurdish issue (Bora, 2004, pp. 117-120).

Another phase of this new structuring led by NSCGS was the implementation of a new strategy that intended to use illegal methods in the fight against the PKK. This strategy was designed by the Gendarmerie General Command under the name of the "Castle Plan" in the early 1990s when the support for the PKK started to rapidly grow among the locals after the Newroz incident (İnsel, 2000). It was claimed that the Castle Plan was submitted to the NSC by Commander of the Gendarmerie Lieutenant General Eşref Bitlis in 1991. It was later revealed that the same plan was brought to the attention of the Demirel-İnönü coalition during Turgut Özal's Presidency (Ibid). The Castle Plan proposed a "two-phased struggle against the PKK" to "eliminate" the logistic support elements as well as armed units of the PKK both in and out of the country. The plan included the assassination of the Kurdish businessmen believed to supply funding to the PKK, and the leftist Kurds suspected to support the organization. SOE Governor of the time Ünal Erkan claimed that many businessmen, including contractors, paid monthly tributes to the PKK on a regular basis (cited in Dözüören, p. 422).

However, the plan was not executed until Çiller became Prime Minister (Ibid.). Following Çiller's statement, "We know the list of businessmen and artists subjected to racketeering by the PKK, and we shall bring their members to account" (Ibid), the number of unsolved murders increased significantly.

attacks or counter-terrorist operations. The Susurluk trial came before the State Security Court in Istanbul at the beginning of June 1997 and ended in early 2002. The charges against Sedat Bucak—for not having denounced Abdullah Çatlı, who was wanted by the police for setting up a criminal organization and for carrying weapons—were dropped because of parliamentary immunity. Charges against Mehmet Ağar were dropped for the same reason. However, İbrahim Şahin, and Korkut Eken, both were sentenced to six years in prison for creating and controlling a criminal organization. In the same year, several retired high-ranking army officials voiced their solidarity with Colonel Korkut Eken by declaring "He did what he did in accordance with the chain of military command" (*Hürriyet*, February 14, 2002). Eken was released after two years and five months of imprisonment. Other defendants, (police officers from the Special Task Force and Sedat Bucak's bodyguards who were also involved in the murders) were sentenced to four years in prison for forming a criminal organization. Several senior officials, including Kemal Yazıcıoğlu (the chief of the Istanbul Police between 1996 and 1997), were suspended from their duties but escaped criminal sanctions for his offense. After Ağar lost his political immunity in 2007, he was sentenced to imprisonment of five years on charges of "establishing an armed organization to commit crimes" in 2011 (*BIA News Center*, 2011, September 16). In April 2013, he was released on probation. For an extensive analysis of Susurluk Scandal, see Massicard (2010).

Table 13: Unsolved murders related to the Kurdish problem

Years	Number of Murders
1989-1991	41
1992	362
1993	467
1994	423
1995	166
1996	78
Total	1538

Source: Ersel et al., 2002 p. 433.

The report of the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, which classified the unsolved murders according to the term of office of the Chiefs of General Directorate of Security, stated that 830 of the 1500 unsolved killings committed between 1991 and 1996 occurred during Mehmet Ağar's time (cited in Taygar, 1997). Ağar, as one of the chief executors of the dirty war officially launched against the PKK in 1993, responded to the criticisms by highlighting two points. Firstly, he stated that what has been done so far was merely "eliminating the threats against the security of the state through illegal means" (cited in İnsel, p. 5). Secondly, "he did not decide to deviate from the routine on his own" (Ibid).

It was later revealed that the state used two organizations during this period; one was established directly by the "deep" security cadres, the other was an organization with activities that were overlooked on the principle that "my enemy's enemy is my friend". The first organization was Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism, abbreviated as JITEM; its existence was denied by the military authorities for a long time. The second one was the Turkish Hezbollah, a radical Islamist organization active in the Southeast.

Illegal Components of the Security State: Gendarmerie Anti-Terrorism Intelligence (JITEM) and Turkish Hezbollah:

JITEM was a department established within the Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization without any legal grounds. The existence of the organization was first exposed to the public

when disappointed JITEM members, who were promised impunity or extenuated sentences for their crimes¹¹⁶, disclosed its illegal activities to certain journalists and researchers.¹¹⁷

The existence of JITEM and its illegal activities have also been verified in official reports produced by parliamentary committees. These documents are the Susurluk Report produced by Chief of the Prime Ministry Inspection Committee Kutlu Savaş who was commissioned to investigate the infamous Susurluk accident happened on November 3, 1996; the Turkish Grand National Assembly ad-hoc Susurluk Committee Report and Minutes completed in 1997; the Parliamentary Investigation Committee's report on Unsolved Political Murders in Various Regions of Our Country dated 12 October 1995 and the "Susurluk Summary" of the Istanbul State Security Court General Prosecutor dated 30 January 1997.¹¹⁸

Hanefi Avcı, the Deputy Director of the Police Intelligence Department at the time, in his deposition to the Parliamentary Research Commission on Susurluk on February 4, 1997 said that "Following the PKK's serious activities, some government officials began believing that the government had shortcomings in dealing with PKK members and big PKK supporters through legal means, that an illegal approach had to be adopted, and that as a result, JITEM

¹¹⁶ İbrahim Babat was one of the first informants of JITEM. He was apprehended in 1997 after an armed conflict in İstanbul and was sentenced to 17 years and six months of imprisonment instead of the promised sentence of 7 years. So, he petitioned to testify before the SSC in İstanbul, and Prime Ministry Inspection Board tasked with investigating the connections behind the Susurluk accident in November 1996. Babat's testimony was included in the Susurluk Report prepared by the Prime Ministry Inspection Committee. However, a significant part of his testimony was censored as "state secret" and extracted from the publicized version of the report. However, years later, the censored pages of the Susurluk Report were inserted in the indictment of the lawsuit publicly known as Ergenekon Case. Babat, in his confession, told that in 1990 there had been some radical alterations in the JITEM and some of the confessors following their release were enlisted in the JITEM Group Command as military personnel. He further added that in the meantime, an unlawful body was established under JITEM in which he was deployed. He also divulged their bombing activities that took place in 1991 (cited in Ertan Beşe, TESEV, 173).

¹¹⁷ One of the first studies on JITEM was Soner Yalçın's book titled *Binbaşı Erserver'in Anıları* (Memoirs of Major Erserver) compiled from the interviews he made with Major Erserver, a high-rank JITEM executive, who was executed in 1993 with two others from his team. First published in 1994, the book stated that JITEM was established in 1987 by Major Arif Doğan as a unit under Gendarmerie Intelligence Department and organized in İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Diyarbakır, Samsun, and Erzurum. In its cadre were assigned military personnel and PKK confessors freed in exchange for their participation in the organization. The book also revealed some of the assassinations committed by the PKK confessors who served in JITEM. Later, Cem Erserver's family friend, journalist Çetin Ağaç published a book titled *Jitem Gerçeği* (JITEM Reality). The appendix of Ağaç's work included two relevant official documents confirming the existence of JITEM. First of these was a letter of appreciation dated November 30, 1990, given to "JITEM Group Commander Senior Major" Erserver signed by Gendarmerie Commander of Public Security Major-General Köksal. The second one was the 1994 phone directory of Gendarmerie General Command which included the phone numbers of JITEM Group Commander and the JITEM units in the cities.

¹¹⁸ GNAT ad-hoc Unsolved Murders Committee Report referred JITEM as such: "We fail to understand the nature of JITEM's activities in the region. [...] It is seen that "some governmental bodies moved outside legal limits, abused their authority, and formed new structures by making use of legal loopholes." [...] The fact that JITEM is staging operations in a precinct without informing the police makes the citizens question authority [...] It would be a positive step for our government that holds the rule of law above everything to terminate the activities of this institution with no legal basis, an institution that deviated from its initial path and got involved in illicit activities." (Yedig 2005, November 20). Savaş's Susurluk Report made the following points about the organizations: "Although denied by the General Command of Gendarmerie, the existence of JITEM cannot be ignored. [...] JITEM had developed parallel to the southeast problem, which was more or less its *raison d'être*. [...] But the confessors and locals who were employed by JITEM became the source of a separate and significant problem when they were left to their own devices. Not only the locals but also the regular intelligence employees were left out of the military hierarchy."

official Cem Ersever began to operate in this manner” (cited in Beşe, p. 175). However, despite all the reports, books, official documents such as certificates of appreciation, governmental salary rolls, depositions, and personal testimonies, JITEM's existence was incessantly denied by the high-rank military authorities. The General Commander of Gendarmerie at the time and the former undersecretary of the NIO between 1988 and 1992, Teoman Koman, rejected the invitation of the Susurluk commission twice saying "We have no such organization!"¹¹⁹ Similarly, Former Chief of Staff Necdet Üruğ refused to answer the questions of the Research Commission regarding the mafia-state relations. Documents requested from the General Staff, Gendarmerie General Command, and other military units were also not submitted to the Commission. Many high-ranking military officials, including the Former Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş, made several written and verbal statements saying that an organization called JITEM had never existed (Beşe, pp. 171-172).

However, after Susurluk Report was made public in January 1998 by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, the military authority had to change its allegations about JITEM. Yılmaz, upon reading the report became convinced of the existence of such an organization. Following his meetings with some military officials, he publicly announced that "JITEM does not exist anymore because it has been cleaned out” (Ibid., p. 173). Following Yılmaz's announcement, some military figures made several declarations regarding JITEM's dissolution.¹²⁰

After a long time, two incidents that occurred in 2005 brought JITEM back into the spotlight. In May 2005, a former PKK confessor was apprehended with a JITEM identity card while trying to extort tribute from a member of DPP, an active Kurdish party at the time ("İtirafçı Timurtaş yakalandı," 2005 May 5, *Radikal*). And on November 9, 2005, a bookstore (Umut Kitapevi) owned by an alleged former PKK member was bombed in Şemdinli, a district of Hakkari within the past emergency rule region. After the explosion which killed one and injured six, people gathered around, caught two noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and a civilian they thought to be related to the incident and handed them over to security forces. According to the media, during the search of the vehicle, the police found guns, bombs, military equipment and some files containing a list of names and addresses of various people labeled such as "potentially harmful" or "harmless." The civilian suspect turned out to be a former PKK

¹¹⁹ Mehmet Elkatmış, who took part in both investigation commissions on Susurluk incidents, told to the press in 2008 that they had encountered legal and practical impediments while investigating the chain of events leading to Susurluk incident. Elkatmış further stated that General Commander of the Gendarmerie at the time Teoman Koman had openly threatened him saying "This has become a power play between the Assembly and the military," in a letter he sent in response to the invitation of the commission. Elkatmış also noted that their request to examine the banking transactions of an alleged hitman (Mahmut Yıldırım codenamed "Green") were denied on the grounds that they were 'commercial secrets.' He also indicated that the NIO, like the military, did not provide any help ("Paşa tehdidi nasıl olur?", 2008, August 19, Haber5; "Elkatmış: Koman Paşa bizi yanılttı, 2008, August 19, *Yeni Şafak*).

¹²⁰ For example, former Commander of the Gendarmerie in the State of Emergency Region retired Lieutenant General Altay Tokat, stated in an interview that JITEM was a "public disclosure of an intelligence unit that fought against the PKK in the SOE region" and that it had "fulfilled its role and was dissolved. Its units were transferred from a central structure to a regional structure. They now report to their local gendarmerie command posts" (*Zaman*, December 29, 2004.) The statement of (retired Colonel) Arif Doğan, said to be the founder of JITEM, gave on August 11, 2008, when jailed pending trial on the Ergenekon case is also important. As stated in the publicized parts of Doğan's affidavit, JITEM was "a structure established to be tried within the knowledge of commanders," and its operating field was the emergency rule region.

confessor and the other two waiting for him in the car from gendarmerie intelligence (Şemdinli İddianamesi 2006, p.74). All three were arrested. During the ongoing investigation, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, Yaşar Büyükanıt, publicly stated that he knew one of the officers in person: "I know that petty officer. He worked under my command. He speaks Kurdish. He was with me in northern Iraq during the Swift Force Operation" (Ibid.).

Hereupon, two parliamentary commissions were established to investigate the new allegations about JITEM. The first commission's report determined that the activities said to be carried out by JITEM deepened the Kurdish problem and increased the support for the PKK.¹²¹ The work of the second commission was recorded in the GNAT archives as "report not discussed (null & void)".¹²² In the meantime, the intelligence activities of the Gendarmerie Command were legalized and became official by Law No 5397 enacted in 2005.¹²³ With this law, JITEM assumed the name Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization (GIO) and gained legal status and the "surveillance" authority in its jurisdiction (Sarıbrahimoğlu, 2006, p. 102).

The second illegal body used by the military in the emergency rule region was the Turkish Hezbollah. Ruşen Çakır (2001), in his book titled *Derin Hizbullah* (Deep Hezbollah), asserted that the security forces did not interfere with this organization during the years the Turkish Hezbollah eliminated the militants of the PKK, considering the organization as its regional rival in the Southeast. According to Çakır, "although the state did not directly employ the Hezbollah, it has overlooked its attacks against the PKK militants and sympathizers (p. 76). Mehmet Açar, during his term as the Minister of Internal Affairs, in a TV appearance, after underlining that "the state could not have an official policy such as cooperating with Hezbollah, he admitted that "some low-rank security forces might have "given Hezbollah militants a fair shake" (Ibid.). However, the incidents in the region have demonstrated the existence of a closer relationship between the state and the Hezbollah than Açar claimed. For example, it would later come out that the heavy artillery, which was confiscated during an operation on Hezbollah in 2001, belonged to the army. Although some of the defendants were sentenced to three to seven years in prison for "being a member of a terrorist organization, no legal action was taken against the seized weapons. They were returned to the army (Cebe 2008).

Many killings committed by JITEM and Hezbollah members during the 1990s, were not brought to trial. In the same way, no criminal investigation has ever been launched against the members of the ultra-nationalist Special Operation Teams serving in the region despite the allegations of extrajudicial killings and human rights violations.

¹²¹ For full text of Investigation report on Hakkari Şemdinli, see, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhak/insanhaklari.htm>

¹²² See, "Geçmiş Dönem Meclis Araştırması Komisyonları Sorgu Formu" (Interrogation Form for Former Terms Parliamentary Research Commissions), Term/Lesigative Year: 22/4, Docket No: 10 / 322, 323, 324, Title: "Hakkari Merkez, Yüksekova ve Şemdinli İlçelerinde Meydana Gelen Olayların Araştırılması Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu" (Parliamentary Research Commission for Investigating the Event Took Place in Hakkari Center, Yüksekova and Şemdinli Towns), http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/arastirma_onergesi_gd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_no=430

¹²³ See, Provisional Article 5 of Law No. 5397 on Ammendements on Some Laws of 2005.

1.3.3.4. Last Kurdish Initiative in the Security State: REFAH-YOL (WELFARE-PATH) Coalition Period

The last attempt to solve the Kurdish problem through political negotiations in the 1990s was made during the Refah-Yol coalition administration led by Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. In 1996 WP, after forming the government started the preparations to implement a new Southeast policy they had been developing for some time. They desired to adopt an approach that separates the identity demands of the Kurds from terrorism. The Minister of State at the time Abdullah Gül claimed the new policy would take its final shape by the end of the year. He further announced that they intend to change the old approach which has "fallen-behind-events," and execute "a new master plan" which takes into account the connection between the Southeast, terrorism and our borders" (Turkish Daily News, August 26, 1996; Hürriyet August 24, 1996). WP executives emphasized that they intended to implement a series of reforms which had been on the political agenda for years. Prime Minister Erbakan stated that they plan to coordinate and advocate the reform process in a comprehensive manner. Thus, the political and administrative components of the "Kurdish opening" would be finalized within 1996. The contents of the reform package were released to the public under five headings:

First of these headings was related to the Kurdish cultural rights. The government proposed to lift the official and arbitrary bans on TV broadcasting in Kurdish, the improvement of the Kurdish language and culture, and testifying at court in Kurdish.

Among the objectives of the coalition government was to narrow down the emergency rule region from ten to four cities located on the Southeastern border. The government stated that the extension of the emergency rule in these four cities was imperative for border security and that they intended to remove the emergency rule entirely from the region "when the conditions were right." WP announced that it would summon the Assembly to an extraordinary session to discuss the amendments to the related laws.

The third component of the government's plan was the dissolution of the village guard system in the southeast. The government proposed an amendment to the Law on Firearms to regulate the collection of guns possessed by almost 60 thousand village guards deployed in the Southeast.

The fourth component of WP's plan for establishing peace in the region was the proclamation of a partial amnesty for people who were sentenced for aiding and abetting terrorism. The aim was to release the ordinary villagers who had been convicted for providing shelter, food, and clothing to the PKK militants.

Lastly, having identified the root-cause of the Kurdish problem as the underdevelopment of the region, the government proposed to take economic measures specific to the Southeast.

In response to the government's new arrangements for sharing the responsibility of dealing with the Kurdish issue with the military authority, Chief of Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, sternly warned Prime Minister Erbakan with the following words: "Any intervention to the military authority from out of chain of command would create weakness in the struggle against the terrorism. It is imperative and essential to include the views of the General Staff as a whole

in draft laws. Otherwise, both the fight against terrorism and the lifting of the emergency rule would be difficult" (*Cumhuriyet*, August 26, 1996).

The military leaders took the issue to the NSC meeting held on August 27th. The resolutions of the meeting once again confirmed the supremacy of the military authority over the civilian government. The statement of the military in the aftermath of the meeting explicitly indicated that the reform proposals of the coalition government were to be discarded: the government should "refrain from implementing policies which would weaken the good momentum achieved in the fight against terrorism" as well as "activities and initiatives which would instantly eliminate the measures which had been implemented for years." As had been the case for every former government, Erbakan, too, approved the decisions suggested by the military wing (*Hürriyet*, August 28, 1996).

The unnamed civil war in Turkey lasted until the joint U.S.-Kenyan-Turkish abduction of Kurdish Worker's Party leader Abdullah Öcalan in Nairobi on February 15, 1999. After Öcalan's arrest, the PKK declared a ceasefire and sent its members out of Turkey. During the same period, as part of the reform process following the official recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU full membership, Turkey abolished the capital punishment and laid the grounds for Öcalan's extradition to Turkey.

1.3.4. Mass Kurdish Political Experience and Pressures

As demonstrated in Chapter III, during the 1990s many intellectuals, journalists, and writers, no matter their ethnic origin, were put on trial for their thoughts based on the Anti-terror Law. Similarly, many NGOs that evaluated the problem outside of the security paradigm were also suppressed by the security forces. Their alternative suggestions for a peaceful solution of the problem were publicly negated.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Two reports which created serious public debates are of importance in this regard. First of these is the report commissioned by The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) to a research team led by Prof Dr. Doğu Ergil in 1995. Titled as "The Eastern Question: Diagnosis and Findings," this study aimed to assess the solution proposals of the people living in the region. It covered a total of 6 cities and 1,267 respondents selected from the Southeast. The findings of the study were as follows: First, the Kurds required the official recognition and the free exercise of their cultural identity. Secondly, they ask the state to address the problems of Kurdish citizens instead of prioritizing the PKK. Thirdly, the ultra-nationalist 'special operation teams' sent to the region on counter-insurgency missions repeatedly harassed and mistreated the civilians. Fourthly, village evacuations and destructions, as a part of a military policy aimed at denying a civilian base of support to the PKK, were alienating large segments of the Kurdish population living in the region. Similarly, the inhabitants were complaining about the adverse consequences of the village guard system. Consequently, based on these findings, the report suggested that the national solidarity should be built under a democratic system of government recognizing different cultural identities. The phrase "Turkish nation," should be replaced by the "nation of Turkey." The Kurdish reality should not be a taboo for the state anymore. As a final remark, the report also pointed out that seeing PKK terrorism merely as a public security issue was nourishing the organization (newspapers dated August 4, 1995). The report, which radically criticized the sanctions implemented in the region and the state's ideological approach to the problem, received a severe reaction from the military and some "civilian" circles. Prime Minister Çiller, who was known to be close to the TOBB president at the time Yalım Erez, publicly declared that she was not informed of the existence of such research and denied its relationship with her party. Meanwhile, the two of the central security actors of Turkey proceeded to discredit the contents of the report legally and publicly. Prosecutor's Office for the Istanbul SSC started an investigation as to whether the report contradicted the Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (*Cumhuriyet*, August 8, 1995). Whereas the General Directorate of Security officials,

Pro-Kurdish political parties which could serve as an alternative interlocutor to the PKK had their share of this repressive period. Despite their high vote rates in the emergency rule regions, all these political parties suffered from tremendous political and legal pressures of the security actors. Many members of these parties became the victims of "unsolved murders."¹²⁵

Turkey's parliament had deputies of Kurdish origin. These people however as Bruinessen asserted "usually refrained from expressing themselves as Kurds; at best they attempted to dispense patronage to their local constituencies" (van Bruinessen 1996, p. 20) However the Kurdish parties established from 1990 onwards, though avoided using the phrase Kurd in their names due to legal obstacles, aimed to represent the Kurdish nationalism in the political realm. However, due to the 10% threshold included in the Law on Political Parties by the September 12 regime, they were not able to get into parliament for a long time during the 1990s. Mostly preferred by Kurds living in the Southeast, because of their voter base and regions, these parties were identified with the PKK and due to the separatism allegations, either had to dissolve themselves or were closed by the Constitutional Court (*BIA Haber Merkezi*, 2009, December 12; *NTV*, 2009, December 8). The closure cases were brought to the European

who identified the report as "the crippled offspring of inbreeding," upon the instruction of Mehmet Ađar (the Director General of the Public at the time), publicized an alternative questionnaire, they conducted in the Southeast, immediately after the release of the TOBB report to the public. Results of the questionnaire, conducted by the Police Intelligence claimed to be carried out nationwide (in 79 cities) covering 4,170 respondents, were surprisingly in line with the state's discourse on the issue. Some of the results were as follows: "Reasons of terror in our country": 37% "Economic", 13% "Ethnic", 7% "Democratization" and 43% "International Terror". "Sources of terror": 22.4% "Western countries and Russia", 18.6% "Middle East countries", 50% "Both" and 10% "Other Factors". "Effectiveness of Terror": 7% "Successful", 21% "Unsuccessful", 10% "Preventable" and 7% "Other Factors." "Effectiveness of State Against Terror": 68% "Successful", 12% "Unsuccessful", 10% "State-Terror in balance" and 10% "Other Factors". "Suggestion for prevention of terror in general": 34% "New legal regulations", 11% "Physical measures", 50% "Increasing the public sensitivity", 5% "Other Factors". "Solution suggestions against PKK terror": 24% "Military solution", 14% "Political solution", 57% "Clear attitude towards neighboring countries", and 5% "Other Factors". Officials stated that this questionnaire was conducted "to understand public opinion, to direct intelligence activities and to shed light on assessments." They also stated that a similar questionnaire had been conducted in 1993, too. They added that "the comparison of the results of the two questionnaires revealed pleasing findings regarding security" (*Yeni Yüzyıl*, August 19, 1995). The second study which received negative reactions from the same circles was the report called "Democratization Perspectives in Turkey" (1997), commissioned by TUSIAD and prepared by Prof. Dr. Bülent Tanör. This report included many reform suggestions regarding the restructuring of political regime on the foundations of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. To that end, the report stated that "for the demilitarization of the regime, the General Staff should be affiliated to the Ministry of National Defense and the National Security Council should cease to be a constitutional institution." The report also addressed the Kurdish issue and pointed out the necessity of extending the freedom of expression to debate on the problem. In this context, the report insisted on effective Kurdish political participation and criticized the closure of pro-Kurdish parties. Mentioned in the report were also provisions in the legal statute which disregarded the existence of a Kurdish identity which needed to be amended. The report received much criticism from conservative circles, especially from the General Staff (Muradođlu na).

¹²⁵ First of these unsolved murders was that of PLP Diyarbakır Provincial Chairman Vedat Aydın in 1991. Aydın who was a lawyer and human rights activist was taken from his home by two men claiming to be police. His body was found on a garbage heap a few days later. However, as stated by Van Bruinessen (1996) "while Aydın's assassination was the first, the most shocking and, in many respects, the most revealing case was the murder of Mardin Deputy of Demokrasi Partisi (DEP) Mehmet Sincar, on September 4, 1993 (p.20-21). He was leading an investigation on the unsolved political assassinations that had until then taken the lives of 53 members and local leaders of the HEP and DEP. He was murdered in the middle of the street in Batman together with another DEP member Metin Özdemir, right after the police teams escorting them lifted their protections for an "unknown reason" (Ibid., p.21).

Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and ECHR ruled that the European Convention on Human Rights was violated in all these closure cases (Fendođlu, 2011, January 3).

Table 14: Vote rates of Kurdish political parties in General Elections

Year	Vote Rates	Votes / Deputies	Political Parties
1991	Electoral alliance with SDPP	18 deputies	HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi- People's Labour Party)
1995	%4.17	1,171,623 / 0	HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-People's Democracy Party)
1999	%4.75	1,482,194 / 0	HADEP
2002	%6.14	1,933,680 / 0	DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi-Democratic People's Party)
2007	%3.92	1,334,518 / 22	Thousand Hope Candidates*
2011	%5.67	2,435,133 / 35	Labour, Democracy and Freedom Bloc**
2015	%12.96	5,847,134 / 80	HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi-People's Democracy Party)

Sources: Gathered from the websites <http://www.secim-sonuclari.com/> and bianet.org

* Independent candidates' bloc, an electoral alliance supported by Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP-Democratic Society Party) and several socialist parties (FSP, LP and SDP).

** Independent candidates' bloc formed by Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP-Peace and Democracy Party) with several other socialist parties.

The first political party of the Kurdish nationalist movement to get into parliament after 1980 was the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP- People's Labor Party). Some SDPP deputies of Kurdish origin, who attended the Kurdish Conference convened in Paris in October 1989, were expelled from the SDPP in November 1989. Five more deputies resigned from the SDPP on November 23rd in protest of the expulsions. These protests were followed by mass resignations from the SDPP Diyarbakır organization. The HEP was established on June 7, 1990, by some former SDPP members and Kurdish intellectuals. In the 1991 general election, they formed an electoral alliance with the SDPP and got into parliament with 21 deputies. However, following the Kurdish oath-taking crisis in March 1992 and the events that led to the death of 110 people at the Newroz Festivities on March 21, 1992, 18 HEP deputies resigned from SDPP upon the request of SDPP Leader Erdal İnönü. On July 3, 1992, a closure lawsuit was filed against HEP. HEP deputies, who resigned from the SDPP, joined the Demokrasi Partisi (DEP-Democracy

Party) established on May 7, 1993, in case HEP was closed. The Constitutional Court ruled unanimously in favor of HEP's closure on July 14, 1993. About eight months after this incident, in March 1994, parliamentary immunities of 13 DEP deputies were lifted by the GNAT General Assembly. Of these deputies, Leyla Zana, DEP Leader Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan, and Selim Sadak were sentenced to 15 years on charges of treason and affiliation with the PKK and served ten years of their sentences.

Hereafter, they continued to run in elections with several new parties, each established as a substitute to another. It took until 2007 for the Kurdish political movement to get into parliament again. At that time organized under the name of the Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP-Democratic Society Party), the Kurdish nationalist movement changed strategy to overcome the 10% threshold and ran in the 2007 general elections with independent candidates supported by an electoral alliance with three other socialist parties, Labour Party (EMEP), Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) and the Socialist Democracy Party (SDP). The alliance named "Thousand Hopes Candidates" polled strongly in the south-east, winning 3.81% of the national vote and managed to win 20 seats in the parliament. However, on November 16, 2007, the Prosecutor's Office for the Supreme Court filed a lawsuit asking for the closure of the DTP since it allegedly became a hub of activities against "the indivisibility of the state with its territory and nation." The DTP was closed on December 11, 2009, by the Constitutional Court order. The Constitutional Court also banned 37 persons from politics for five years and expelled the party leader from the parliament.

The Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-BDP) was established on May 2, 2008, as a backup for DTP. BDP received 5.7% of the nationwide votes in the 2009 local elections and won 99 mayorships. Like its predecessor, it ran in the elections as an independent bloc. BDP formed the Labor, Democracy, and Freedom Bloc (Emek, Demokrasi ve Özgürlük Bloku) with almost 20 socialist parties and movements and participated in the 2011 elections with this broad alliance. The Labor, Democracy, and Freedom Bloc ran the elections in 41 cities with 65 independent candidates and won 35 seats in the parliament. These parties continued their efforts to improve the collaboration and organize an extensive opposition. They extended this collaboration by convening a congress in October of 2011. Named as the Peoples' Democratic Congress (Halkların Demokratik Kongresi) it was convened by the participation of 820 delegates from 81 cities, comprised of representatives from socialist parties, unions, women movements, LGBT, environmental movements, rights-based NGOs, and various religious minorities living in Anatolia. This movement organized another congress on October 27, 2013, and became a political party called the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP-Halkların Demokratik Partisi). HDP won 12.9% of the votes in the June 7, 2015, general elections and became the first political organization aiming to solve the Kurdish issue to get into parliament as a political party.

1.4. Political Islam as the “new” enemy

1.4.1. Islam fear of Turkey’s founding ideology

Leaders of the New Republic launched the nation-building project by further advancing the process of modernization and Westernization that had started in the late period of the Ottoman Empire. A large part of this effort was dedicated to the secularization of the state. The aim was to replace the Ottoman society, which was composed of autonomous religious congregations organized around a faith-based hierarchy with a nation-state model based on equal citizenship with a determined central authority (Berkes 1998). During the early years of the republican era, the Caliphate was abolished; religious orders and institutions were closed down; religious schools and education were banned; Sunnah Islam was put under the state control; the use of religious speech, propaganda, and organization for political purposes was outlawed; the shari'a was abolished; a Western civil code was enacted that gave women equal rights with men; and the power of the ulema (learned men of religion) within the state administration was eliminated (Toprak, 2005, p. 169-170, Ahmad, 1993, pp. 52-71; Zürcher, 1996, pp. 271-283).

The modernization process and policies, along secularist lines, as Dağı (2005) stated "resulted in the exclusion of Islamic leaders, groups and thought from the centers of power, eliminating appearances of Islam in the public sphere" (p. 23). Although in the 1920s and 1930s some Islamist groups revolted against this new role attributed to religion by the Republican elites, the forces of the new regime managed to repress them in a short time and consolidate its power (Toprak, p. 170).

For the Islamists, "the republican reforms made it clear that it was not the West per se but the westernizers and the westernization program that swept them away from the centers of political and social order. They felt not only excluded but also that their identity and discourse were being de-legitimized and marginalized in the process of radical secularization in which Islamic social space was threatened by the sweeping program of republican westernization" (Dağı 2005, p. 23). The disagreement over the role of Islam in public affairs had reflections on political life the moment the system opened for competitive politics. Toprak indicated that of the 24 parties founded in that period, eight had Islamic themes in their programs (p. 171). By 1950 only one, the Nation Party (Millet Partisi), could gain enough support to enter the elections. However, it could only emerge with a single seat in the parliament. The Islamist votes went to center-right parties that offered a sound economic program along with cultural policies that were designed to appease the Islamists (Ibid.).

In the process of restructuring Turkish politics following the 1960 military intervention, Islam's political appeal increased. However, it was not until the 1970s that an explicitly religious party was able to make any headway in elections. The first outright political expression of political Islam was the establishment of the National Order Party (NOP) (Milli Nizam Partisi) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan established on January 6, 1970.

NOP was a new political organization representing the interests of small and medium-sized conservative business owners of Anatolia against the big business gathered in central cities such as Istanbul and Izmir. The main factor triggering this political movement was the increasing pressure from the monopolized industrial bourgeoisie, which was affiliated with

international companies, on the merchants and notables of the rural areas in the early 1970s. Anatolian merchants have become, as Çavdar put it, "agencies" of these national monopolies at that time (Çavdar, 1983, pp. 2093-2094). JP's generous capital-favoring policies during its government had deepened the conflict of interest between the center and the periphery. These groups turned away from the West insofar as they could not integrate with the center economically and culturally and expressed their economic discontent through a political discourse they legitimized with religious motifs. Defining itself as "nationalist and religious," NOP adopted a discourse proposing to restructure the social and cultural life in line with Islamic values and principles. This movement managed to obtain considerable support from leading religious orders and congregations such as Naqshbandi, Nur Movement, and Kadirîlik (Çakır, 1990).

However, NOP was closed immediately after the March 12 intervention for promoting policies against secularism. Although it was the only other party closed by the March 12 regime along with WPT, NOP's executives and supporters were spared the pressures exerted on WPT. A short while after the NOP was closed during the interim regime (October 11, 1972) the same group was permitted to establish a new political party named the National Salvation Party (NSP).

There were three main reasons for the military authority to allow the founding of the NSP. The first one was the potential to utilize Islamic teaching against the propagation of communism in line with the Cold War mission. The second reason was related to the army's distrust of the Justice Party (JP), which was the successor of the Democratic Party (DP) overthrown by the 1960 coup (Batur, 1985). Authors of the March 12 memorandum were expecting that the NSP would divide the rightist votes and weaken JP. Thirdly, NSP cadres, particularly Necmettin Erbakan were loyal to the statist tradition. Moreover, NSP cadres had adopted a relatively moderate Islamic rhetoric, and its seeming mission was to "legitimize Islam as part of modern and political life" (Sarıbay, 1999, p.74). Military power believed that NSP's integration with the political system would prevent the Islamist groups from radicalizing and posing a threat against the regime.

1.4.2. Islamism after the 1971 memorandum

In the 1970s, the NSP formulated its ideology as "Milli Görüş" (National Outlook-NO). The term came to be used as the name of the movement to differentiate it from what NSP leaders called the "Western Club." According to the NSP leaders, all the other parties were members of the "Western Club" and could not develop solutions to problems unique to Turkey (Toprak, p 182). The fact that the NOP was closed after the 1971 coup for its prior Islamic references led the Islamists to develop a new linguistic strategy during this period. To differentiate itself from the "Western Club" the NSP used words such as "Ottoman" and "tradition" instead of Islam (Dağı, p. 24), thus, filling the gap left by Islamic references with those borrowed from the Ottoman past. In that respect, the "national" in the party's name corresponded to the Ottoman "millet system" based on confessional communities and challenged the universal nation definition of the Republic. The NSP, similar to the Islamist counterparts in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, also drew a line separating the civil and moral content of the West from its

technological progress and advocated for a developmentalist policy regime (Turan 2012, 489-495). Rapid engagement of the country in heavy industry constituted the basis of the economic policy of the Islamists in this period. Meanwhile, its promise for the poor was confined to increasing social welfare by decreasing inflation (Ibid., p. 171). Its profoundly bold foreign policy promises included the establishment of alternative institutions to those in the West, such as United Muslim Nations, Muslim Defense Alliance, Muslim Common Market, and an Islamic currency and making Turkey one of the leading countries of the world by assuming the leadership of the Muslim world. The only democratic claim it made was that the Muslims who formed the majority in the country should have more say in its government. This poor conception of democracy has always been the problem for all parties established within or after the National Outlook tradition, which came to power by addressing religious-conservative votes (Toprak p. 175).

The NSP was relatively successful at the polls in the 1970s under Erbakan's leadership. It received 11.8 percent and 8.6 percent of the votes in the 1973 and 1977 elections, respectively, and joined in all coalition governments between 1973 and 1980, becoming an important political actor in Turkish politics. However, the NSP was closed like all other political parties with the 1980 coup, and its leaders were banned from politics. When a parliamentary system was put in effect again in 1983, while some politicians from National Outlook tradition joined MP, the others established a new party of under the name of the Welfare Party on July 19th, 1983.

1.4.3. The Rise of the Welfare Party

As paradoxical as it seems, it was the military policies after the 1980 coup that reinforced political Islam in Turkey through two means. The first of these, as explained in Chapter II, was the TIS project implemented parallel to the Green Belt doctrine. The second and more important one was its direct support for the implementation of January 24 Decisions, which brought about a radical transformation in the economic structure of the country. This shift, which dragged the country into the neoliberal globalization wave rising in the 1980s, had far-reaching destructive effects on large groups of the society as it had in many countries. Neoliberal globalization resulted in the "termination of the Keynesian agreement based on capital-labor collaboration after the Second World War," which was supported by the welfare state (Palley 2005), and caused the nation-state and local labor to lose their bargaining power against the international capital and multinational companies. The effects of this process were felt much more severely in third world countries, which in comparison to those in the West or the Far East had much lower per capita income and public resources, and which went through this process in a much more unplanned and hasty manner (Stiglitz 2002, p. 5).

Social-democrat parties advocating for the workers, peasants, low-level clerks and the poor classes against unemployment and erosion in income distribution, failed to achieve any progress because of their limited range of maneuver on an economic level. In the end, the demands of the globalization victims were left unclaimed by the traditional political parties. This political void was filled with either extreme nationalist or religious movements (Öniş

1997). During this period, in which cultural pluralism and democratic values were simultaneously on the rise worldwide, individuals and communities feeling vulnerable about their future, started to express their neglected identities and organize around them. The most striking of these identity-based movements was political Islam. However, it would be misleading to assert that political Islam was adopted as a way of expression only by the poor and marginal social classes who had fallen victim to globalization. Prominent studies on this subject, point out that in the 1990s also involved in these movements were well-educated big city dweller professionals and intellectuals, as well as businessmen working with modern, technological methods (Yavuz 2009, 51; Genel & Karaosmanoğlu 2006, 476; Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu 2009, 101). Moreover, despite their modernist leanings and having achieved a considerable rise in their social status, these groups had not found a place among the elites shaping the political system they live in. Therefore, these people, who may be called a "secondary elite" or "new bourgeoisie" revolved around a common Islamic identity to reinforce their socio-political status. In the 1990s, although in different ways, the shared trait between the poor who had adopted the new consumption patterns and the "secondary elites" who enjoy the benefits of modern city life was "exclusion." This shared feeling of being excluded from the political life found a way of representation in political Islam. In other words, political Islam became a protest movement which gradually strengthened as it was shared by different social classes (Öniş, pp. 748-749). The post-1980 neoliberal economic structuring supported by the military disrupted the capital-labor balance in favor of former in Turkey. This economic restructuring process, which had its reflections in the related articles of the 1982 Constitution, although achieved about 5% annual real growth in the gross national product during the 1980s, caused grave deterioration in the income distribution.

During this phase in which the labor market was disciplined through legal means (suspending union activities, banning strikes, litigating DİSK executives, replacing collective bargaining with High Board of Arbitration for wage determination, anti-labor articles of *the* 1982 Constitution, the Law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lock-out, etc.), all price controls were gradually removed. The immediate effect of economic liberalization was a serious increase in the general price levels, which consequently caused deterioration not only in real wage rates, but also retirement bonuses, severance pays, and agricultural subsidies (Boratav 1995, p. 163). The unions, particularly those affiliated with Türk-İş which were closely tied to the state through corporatist methods, could not have any influence until 1988 (Ibid.). According to Boratav, the Özal period were the years during which a 'corrupt' populism was in its heyday. As far as the poor urban groups are concerned, the chief objective of these policies was to create large masses of voters who "lack any class consciousness yielding to the program and ideology of the capitalist class" (pp. 164-165).

City municipalities, of which majority was won by the ruling party at the 1984 local elections, played a key role in realizing this strategy. Title documents and deeds of informal squatter settlements, zoning exceptions and pardons for illicit urban acts, and construction permits lacking any framing urban planning vision enabled rapid urbanization to reach the impoverishing urban classes and as a consequence created high expectations (Ibid., p. 165). Rural poor continued to migrate to cities with the desire to profit from urban rent revenue.

However, the immigrants' work skills were low-quality for the urban production processes. As a result, these groups were drawn to low-skilled informal sector jobs (Peker, pp. 171-181).

On the other hand, the abundance of the imported consumer goods brought about by the liberalization influenced all social classes. These policies implemented without giving any compromise to class-based economic demands resulted in the emergence of a massive "urban poor consumer population living in squatter houses (Boratav, p. 165). During the TPP-SDPP coalition government, particularly during Tansu Çiller's prime ministry, neoliberal policies were followed with the same fanaticism. Impoverishing deepened with ever increasing inflation and successive economic crises during the 1990s hence accelerated the rate of migration from the periphery to the cities.

As previously mentioned, forced migration of the villagers living in the conflict regions in the Southeast further aggravated the situation. Overcrowding of the cities increased unemployment and worsened the income distribution. In the face of these developments, coalition partner SDPP, despite its social democrat identity, showed no presence on the economic platform and merely approved Çiller's decisions. The public support SDPP gained by its "clean government" discourse, depreciated because of the corruption allegations raised against its municipalities, particularly those in the metropolitan areas.

In the early 1990s at a time when income inequality and lack of social justice became the two dominant social issues in the country, the WP managed to attract the attention of the ostracized groups struck in a poverty trap with the slogan "Just Order" (Adil Düzen). WP emerged as the first party in 1995 General Elections with 21.38% of the votes while the SDPP decreased its votes from 20.75% to 10.75%. However, the WP voters were not solely comprised of the poor. Parallel to the aforementioned global developments, in Turkey too, by the 1990s the WP was backed by a new Islamist bourgeoisie, which until then had become an influential capitalist group. This new class was comprised of numerous conservative groups of Anatolia which had rapidly enriched under the unregulated free market conditions, owing largely to the massive inflow of Green Capital in the 1980s (European Stability Initiative, 2005)

In 1990, a group of young businessmen among these new capitalists established an association named MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association). The association, reaching up to 3,000 members of large and medium-sized companies in a short time, became an alternative pressure group to TÜSİAD, which had the biggest conglomerates of Turkey as its members (Buğra 1998; Güllalp 2001). MÜSİAD, contrary to TÜSİAD, at least for the time being, was against the Customs Union and EU. In economic and foreign affairs, in line with the WP's rhetoric, it was favoring a rapprochement with the Islamic countries and advocating an "Asian-Tigers" style capitalist model (Öniş, pp. 759-760). WP, established as the heir of NSP, became the voice of this new interest group in the political arena. MÜSİAD members, on the other hand, provided the necessary funding for WP to offer to the poor in exchange for their vote (Eligür 2010, pp. 201-209).

1.4.4. February 28 Period

When the WP became the leading party in the wake of the 1995 national elections and formed a coalition government with TPP in 1996, the military opened up a second front in the domestic realm. As Cizre and Çınar (2003) rightly suggested, the military "took the accession of the WP into government as confirmation of its belief that Islamist reactionism, *irtica* in Turkish, had become a substantial threat to the secular character of the Republic" (p. 309). By classifying the Islamic groups as the number one internal enemy of the country and denouncing the WP as their ultimate advocate, the principal goal of the military leaders was to overthrow the government and fortify the secular system. Consequently, to that end, the military wing of the NSC indirectly forced the Erbakan led coalition government to step down by imposing the prime minister a list of measures at a February 28, 1997, meeting of the council. In Turkish political literature, the phrase "February 28 process" indicates both "the far-reaching implications of the NSC decisions" and "the suspension of normal politics until the secular correction was completed" (Ibid., p. 310).

In this process, the military as the sole determiner of "all standards for measuring and judging" the scope of the Islamist threat, has formed new security devices for the sake of combating it. These new institutions have afforded the TAF an immense scope to influence, this time not only the political decisions but also public policy without any oversight of any kind. In doing this, it once again took advantage of his extensive legal authority to redefine the national security priorities (Ibid., pp. 321-322).

While the security state was reaching into the deepest pockets of political, social, and economic life, all the political parties, mainly the WP, chose to turn a blind eye to the tutelage problem in the political system. As Toprak indicated (2005) through its short-lived government "squeezed between exigencies of attempting to become a "catch-all party" of the center-right versus the expectations of its radicalized followers", the WP leadership "found it expedient to abide by the rules of the secular Republic in its policies, on the one hand, and to 'play to the tribunes,' as the media called it, by using a radical discourse to its followers" (p. 173). Hence, this duplicitous strategy of the WP, while polarizing the society as "seculars" and "Islamists," also gave an ideal pretext to the military for suspension of normal politics and refashioning the country's political and social life.

The following section analyzes this process in the context of further institutionalization of the national security state in Turkey.

1.4.4.1. The Army's Reactions to the Election Results

The time that the military elevated Islamic reactionism as the number one threat to the national security of Turkey coincided with the WP's electoral success in municipal elections that took place on March 27, 1994. WP won a total of 327 municipalities including the local administrations in six major Turkish cities (İstanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Konya, Kayseri). It appeared in the press that the General Staff was very perturbed by the results. Higher ranks of the military interpreted the WP's victory as "doping of the masses through religious exploitation." Commanders stated that if the WP "doubled or tripled its seats in the parliament

in the upcoming elections, their unrest would escalate considerably" (Değer, 1994, April 1). Similarly, the election results came as a huge shock for the judiciary circles. The Attorney General of the Istanbul SSC Ahmet Köksal warned the public against the imminent "irtica threat" (*Milliyet*, April 2, 1994). Arcayürek, who was then the advisor to President Süleyman Demirel, remarked that the General Staff assigned a polling firm to assist them to predict the upcoming general election results (cited in Aslan, 2016, p. 367).

Then followed the reports of the NSCGS and the NIO on fundamentalist threat presented to the coalition government of the time at NSC meetings one after another (cited in Güner 1995, February 25). Political parties were reminded of the possibility of a coup with the implication that the civilian politics should eliminate the "irtica threat" before the military takes action. TAF increased the pressure right before the 1995 general elections. The military warned the public against the Islamic threat, by way of retired military officers who showed up on media channels at every turn, directly pointing the finger at WP. However, the warnings did not work out, and WP emerged as the first party in the general elections with 21.4% of the votes. When the vote distribution obliged the parties to form a coalition government, this time the military leaders compelled the other political parties to refrain from joining in a coalition government led by WP.

As expected, President of the Republic Demirel first appointed WP leader Erbakan to form a government. However, Erbakan turned empty-handed from his meetings with the political party leaders. TPP leader Çiller was then appointed to form a government. She also failed to achieve any result in her search for a coalition partner. Then the assignment was given to MP leader Mesut Yılmaz. Yılmaz came close to making a deal with the WP, which desired to come to power under any circumstances. However, the military hierarchy blocked this alliance behind closed doors. High ranking officers warned leaders of the two center-right political parties, TPP and MP against the "unpleasant" consequences of a coalition with the WP through informal means and urged them to reconcile and form an anti-WP government as soon as possible (Kalemlı 2002). Mustafa Kalemlı (2002), the Chairman of the GNAT of the time stated in his memoirs that Chief of General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı visited him to express the military's reservations on the WP and asked him to convey their concerns to other political leaders (p. 245). Karadayı, in the same period, also paid a visit to Çiller and delivered the military's demand for an MP-TPP coalition personally to the TPP's Chairperson (Yüksel 2005, p. 12).

The military's intervention in the coalition talks yielded the desired result. MP and TPP formed an artificial coalition with the additional pressure of big capitalist circles and their media organs. The MP-TPP coalition government led by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz assumed office on March 12, 1996. However, it was short-lived due to the keen rivalry between Çiller and Yılmaz. This condition presented the WP with an outstanding opportunity. First, the WP, based on procedural irregularities, appealed to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the vote of confidence. Then the party brought corruption dossiers on TPP leader Çiller to establish a special investigation committee. Yılmaz, who had leaked some of the incriminating documents to the WP, took advantage of this opportunity to eliminate his chief rival and joined the WP in the process (Yavuz, 2003). Not surprisingly, the coalition dissolved on June 6, 1996. When

Erbakan once again was entrusted with the task of forming the government, Çiller was cornered with the parliamentary inquiries that could lead to her impeachment by the Supreme Court. Erbakan persuaded Çiller to take part in his coalition government in exchange for her acquittal from all corruption charges (Akpınar, 2001, pp. 41-52). Eventually, the WP-TPP coalition government was formed under the leadership of Erbakan on June 29, 1996. Called as Refah-yol government, this coalition would come to be the most contested partnership in the entire political history of Turkey.

1.4.4.2. Military-Government Conflict during the REFAH-YOL Period

Throughout the Refah-yol government's term, high ranks of the military went on expressing their "sensitivity" about secularism and reminding to both the politicians and the public their "protective" and "regulatory" position in the regime at every opportunity. Graduation and handover ceremonies of military schools, national holidays, etc. were considered as opportunities for warning the public to be on their guards against the dangers facing the secular regime of Turkey.

Commanders attempted to subdue the government right off. Only three days after the Refah-yol government won the vote of confidence, Chief of Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı paid a visit to Prime Minister Erbakan. On 23rd of July, Erbakan was invited to the General Staff Headquarters for a briefing on subjects that entirely challenged the party's political messages. In the briefing, the military authority highlighted the TAF's "concerns about separatist and extreme religious activities aimed at annihilating the Atatürkist, secular and democratic order." Erbakan was also warned against the support given to the PKK and Islamist terrorist organizations by some neighboring countries, notably Iran and Syria. Moreover, the military informed the prime minister about the benefits of the military cooperation agreement, which was to be signed with Israel, a settlement which was met with grave criticism by the WP's social base (Hürriyet, 1996, July 24).

Erbakan, during his term as prime minister that lasted less than a year, accepted the military decisions on some fundamental state policies despite the opposite declarations in its party program. For instance, he signed the military cooperation agreement with Israel without any objection. Although having openly opposed to Turkey's membership to the Custom's Union, he was the one to announce that it would be for the benefit of Turkey to stay in the trade bloc. He even gave his approval to the dishonorable discharges of soldiers presumed to have connections with Islamists circles.

On the other hand, WP leadership, to preserve the support of their followers, took a series of highly provocative steps in domestic and foreign politics. The most sensational incidents that contributed to perception of rising reactionary movement against the secular structure of the Republic included the followings: plan to build a mosque on Taksim Square; decision to open Hagia Sophia to worship; initiatives to lift the headscarf ban in universities; the iftar (breaking the fast during Ramadan) at the Prime Ministry given to the sheiks of religious brotherhoods; visits to Libya and Iran, the two states listed as terrorist countries by the USA and known for their support to the PKK; initiation of relations with Islamist groups

such as Algerian Salvation Front, Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; meetings with the Muslim Brotherhood held in Turkey; and the plan to jointly produce helicopters with Iran.¹²⁶ Pro-sharia statements and demonstrations of the WP's provincial leadership cadres further damaged the credibility of the party in their commitment to democracy among the military and secular circles. WP has regularly been accused of doing "takiyye," the right of Muslims to hide their true beliefs in hostile milieus.

WP's voluntary collaboration with the military in defense of the state's interests did not help the party gain legitimacy in the eyes of the security actors. Among the most telling examples of this cooperation were voting yes on lifting the parliamentary immunities of DEP deputies to dissolve the party, turning down the Amnesty International's request to deploy a representative in Turkey, and above all discrediting the spontaneous protests broke out after the Susurluk Scandal (Toprak, 2005, p. 176).

The military demanded Islamist reactionism threat be included in the NSC's agenda for the first time at the NSC meeting held in August 1996 (Bölügiray 1999, p.33). At around the same time, Higher Judicial Bodies also made anti-WP statements. The President of the Court of Cassation Müfit Utku, in his speech at the judicial year opening ceremony held on September 6th, directly aimed at criticizing the Prime Minister and government. He stated that no one has ever possessed the power to "establish sharia in Turkey" (*Hürriyet*, 1996, September 7). At the same ceremony, President of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations Eralp Özgen made similar statements saying that the country was being governed by "a mentality" which was "misusing religion for political gains" (Ibid). The leader of the main opposition party, Mesut Yılmaz, and the chief of general staff also spoke of the "rising reactionary danger" and the "obligation of protecting the secular state." The current emphasis made on these themes was an early warning of the upcoming campaign against the coalition government.

General Staff General Secretary at the time Erol Özkasnak after his retirement, stated that the February 28 process started with the briefing given to President of the Republic, Süleyman Demirel on January 17, 1997. It was the first time in Turkish history a Turkish President was summoned for such a briefing to the General Staff Headquarters. At the briefing, the commanders told Demirel that reactionary activities had become a top priority issue for the military and that the General Staff would start making the necessary changes in TAF's internal regulations according to this new situation. Indeed, in April 1996, TAF declared that it made an adjustment to the National Military Strategic Concept (NMSC), a military document that evaluates threats to Turkey. By this change, internal threat ranked above the external one for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic (*Hürriyet*, 1997, April 30). Obviously, what was meant by internal threat was the rise of political Islam, hence the ruling party WP. The new NMSC "stipulated the need for suppression of subversive fundamentalist activity by military

¹²⁶ The invitation of the President of the Republic of Iran Hashemi Rafsanjani to Turkey was another radical divergence from the traditional foreign policy of Turkey. A joint helicopter production plan with Iran received a harsh reaction from the USA. US Ambassador to Ankara visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and delivered a verbal note stating that the USA would unquestionably oppose such an agreement with a terrorist country (*Hürriyet* 1996, December 20).

force if necessary" (Aktan & Koknar, 2002 p. 266). At the Supreme Military Council, Erbakan approved this text which aimed at toppling him and his party (Bayramođlu, 2002, p. 43).

On 22-24 January 1997, top-ranking generals met at the Navy Command in Gölçük for a war simulation. There, they decided to give an official warning to the government within legal boundaries. At the NSC meeting held on January 27, 1997, the military leaders once again demanded fundamentalist threat to be included in the following meeting's program. Upon the insistence of the commanders, President of the Republic Demirel agreed on putting the military's proposal on the agenda of the February meeting.

Having been deeply concerned about the military's determination, the Minister of Industry and Commerce at the time, Yalım Erez, warned Çiller against the possibility of a coup. Çiller's response to Erez signified that the USA had been following the developments closely. Çiller said to Erez, "Don't worry. I talked to the American government. There is no need for concern. There can't be a coup at this time and age" (cited from Ergin by Yüksel, p.58; *Hürriyet*, 1997, August 23).

On 4 February 1997, a sudden incident happened in Ankara. Tanks roamed the streets of Sincan, a conservative suburb of the capital. The official explanation by the military was that tanks were on their way to a regular military exercise. However, everybody knew that it was a reaction to an event held on January 30th organized by the WP Mayor of Sincan, Bekir Yıldız. So-called "Jerusalem Night," the performance was a continuation of a tradition started by Iranian Islamic Revolution Leader Ayatollah Khomeini to commemorate the occupied Al-Quds. For the event, a tent similar to the one in the Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa in Al-Quds was set up right across the Atatürk bust in the Sincan Square, and Iran Ambassador Muhammed Rıza Begheri was among the guests. In the play, the performers protested Arafat, repeated the statements of the militant Hezbollah and called for the return of Shari'a. In his speech he made at the event, Mayor Yıldız said that "a country with 99% Muslim population has already recognized sharia" (Akpınar, 2001, pp. 166-169).

On February 21st at the American Turkish Council meeting in Washington, The deputy chief of staff at the time, General Çevik Bir made the following comment on the incident: tanks moved on the streets of Sincan to "finetune Turkey's democracy" (Ercan, 1997, February 21). In the NSC meeting held exactly one week after Çevik Bir's statement, Turkey experienced its first "postmodern" coup.

1.4.4.3. February 28 Post-Modern Coup

The term 'postmodern coup' was coined by Türker Alkan, a professor of sociology and columnist (1997, June 13). It later became the main indicator of the period. The February 28 postmodern coup was certainly the fourth coup in Turkey. However, it was the first serious intervention, which aimed at ousting not only one or all political parties but also the lifestyles and belief systems of their supporters. In other words, this coup was not simply an intervention against a specific political target nor was it staged to establish a particular political order; it aimed at banishing the civilian society that created the source of that power and its potential to transform the system. The Islamist threat was different from the Kurdish threat in the sense that

it could not be eliminated by armed struggle. Thus, the methods to fight it had to be different. The war had to be waged both in the political and social arenas, hence required partners. What made the February 28 intervention postmodern, as stated by Sariibrahimoğlu (2008) "was the mobilization of an army of civilian allies who voluntarily defended the military over 'fundamentalism' by evoking the reactions of the press and many non-governmental organizations (NGOs)" (p. 70). In this context, the conservative, religious, and Islamist groups who were relatively protected in the previous military coups would be subject to intense attacks in all their deeds.

NSC Decisions

The infamous NSC meeting on February 28, 1997, was very tense and lasted approximately for nine hours, (Donat, 1999, pp.407-408). At the beginning of the meeting, the military leaders presented a report that underlined the following assessments (Bölügiray, 1999, pp. 34-35):

- "The purpose of these movements, which identify the democratic and the secular Republic of Turkey as enemy is to establish an Islamic State run by Shari'a law in Turkey.
- The fundamentalist movements anticipate achieving this objective in three stages: notification, congregation, and cihad. In the end, they aim to establish an Islamic State by motivating people to join an armed uprising.
- Religious orders have become institutions exploited by some self-seeking interest groups.
- Having adopted more modern organization models, on the other hand, the religious movements aspire to address a broader population through associations, foundations, Qur'anic courses, private dormitories, university prep schools and private colleges.
- Hezbollah and İBDA-C (The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front) are Islamist terrorist organizations, which organize around some bookstores and magazines.
- Some NGOs provide support and funding for the religious movements."

Afterwards, the military leaders compelled the Refah-yol coalition to adopt a list of measures to be implemented right away. These resolutions had been previously drafted after the NSC meeting in December 1996, by the office of the Chief of General Staff (Rubin and Kirişçi, p. 19; Aslan, 2016, p. 368). Handed to the government as a document titled "The Measures to be Taken Against Religious Reactionist Hostilities Against the Regime," the military resolutions included 18 articles as follows (cited in Yavuz, 2003, pp. 275-276):

1. The principle of secularism should be strictly enforced, and laws should be modified for that purpose, if necessary.

2. Private dormitories, foundations, and schools affiliated with religious orders must be put under the control of relevant state authorities and eventually transferred to the Ministry of Education.
3. An eight-year uninterrupted primary education system must be implemented across the country, and necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that Qur'anic courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental consent, operate under the responsibility and control of the Ministry of Education.
4. National education institutes charged with raising enlightened clergy loyal to the republican regime and Kemal Atatürk's principles and reforms must conform to the essence of the Law on Unified Education.
5. Religious facilities built in various parts of the country must not be used for political exploitation, and such facilities must be built in coordination with local governments and relevant authorities.
6. Activities of religious orders banned by law no. 667, as well as all entities prohibited by said law, must be ended.
7. Media groups that oppose the military and depict its members as inimical to religion should be brought under control.
8. Personnel expelled from military service because of fundamentalist activities, disciplinary problems, or connections with illegal organizations must not be employed by other public agencies and institutions or otherwise encouraged.
9. The measures taken within the framework of existing regulations to prevent infiltration of the military by the extremist religious sector should also be applied in other public institutions and establishments, particularly in universities and other educational institutions at every level of the bureaucracy, and in judicial establishments.
10. Iran's efforts to destabilize Turkey's regime should be closely watched and policies to prevent Iran from meddling in Turkey's internal affairs should be adopted.
11. Legal and administrative means must be used to prevent the dangerous activities of the extremist religious sector that seeks to create polarization in society by fanning sectarian differences.
12. Legal and administrative proceedings against those responsible for incidents that contravene the constitution and laws of the Turkish Republic should be concluded in a short period of time, and firm measures should be taken at all levels not to allow repetition of such incidents.
13. Practices that violate the attire law and that may give Turkey a backward image must be prevented.

14. Licensing procedures for short and long-barrel weapons, which have been issued for various reasons, must be reorganized on the basis of police and gendarmerie districts.
15. The collection of (animal) sacrifice hides by anti-regime and “uncontrolled” (unregulated) organizations and establishments for the purpose of securing financial resources should be prevented.
16. Legal proceedings against private bodyguards dressed in special uniforms and those responsible for them should be concluded speedily, and all such should be disbanded.
17. Initiatives that aim at solving Turkey’s problems on the basis of the concept of “ümmet” (religious worldview) rather than the concept of “nation” (or a secular worldview) and that encourage the separatist terrorist organization (PKK) by approaching it on the same basis (Islamization of Kurdish nationalism) should be prevented by legal and administrative means.
18. The Law no. 5816 defining crimes against Atatürk, including acts of disrespect, must be fully implemented.

Another decision of the meeting was the establishment of a unit under the NSCGS's coordination to oversee the implementation of these measures (İba, 1999, p. 229).

Prime Minister Erbakan initially attempted to reject these resolutions which meant the expulsion of his party's core political base from the public sphere. The Prime Minister, who had ignored the tutelage problem until then, stated that government policies were formed in the parliament, not at the NSC (Ibid., p. 230). For the first time in Turkey's history, a prime minister refrained from signing the NSC resolutions. However, he backed down after his coalition partner Çiller's assurance to take the decisions to the parliament for discussion (*Hürriyet*, 1997, March 6).¹²⁷

However, none of those decisions were brought before the Parliament for debate thanks to the pressures from the military as well as the pro-secular NGOs and the media. The rising reactions of TPP's members also played an essential role in Çiller's failure to keep her promise (İba, p. 231). GNAT Speaker at the time, Mustafa Kalemli, was also among those who "strongly and immediately" objected to taking the NSC decisions to the Parliament on the grounds that it might lead to a military government (cited in Yüksel, p.80).

¹²⁷ Çiller's said to Erbakan the followings (cited in Akpınar, 2001, p. 214): "I cannot control the deputies in my party. Heavy pressure from the army and the media leaves no choice but to sign these decisions. Otherwise, we cannot go on with this government. You sign the decision, and then we take them to the Parliament. (...) Let's open a general discussion at the Parliament (...) and discuss them from all angles. Because the Parliament is the highest authority in all matters."

1.4.4.4. Operation of “Unarmed” Forces: Overthrowing of the WP

Another significant aim of the February 28 process was to shape the public opinion against all organized groups with a religious orientation. To this end, the military gave briefings to the judiciary, the representatives of trade unions and professional organizations, academics, businesspeople, and mass media. These briefings, as asserted by Aydın and Çolak (2004) "signified a total cultural war eliminating all "anti-secular" life forms" (pp. 214-215).

In fact, the briefing marathon had started before the February 28. Right after the briefing presented to the President of the Republic in January, three generals had had a meeting with unionists and the representatives of the Atatürkist Thought Association at the office of Ankara Chamber of Commerce President Ahmet Çavuşoğlu. Also, in mid-February, RPP and several NGOs had organized the "Women's March against Shari'a" with the participation of the wives of military officers (*Hürriyet*, 1997, February 16).

However, after the February NSC meeting, the relations with the "unarmed forces" as coined by the TAF's top brass for its civil society partners, became much more systematic. Aside from the "fundamentalist threat," the briefings covered other major national security concerns such as "Turkish-Greek problems" and "PKK terrorism." In some of these briefings, the top-ranking officers underlined that the army would not refrain from a direct intervention to eliminate the internal threats.¹²⁸

Many NGOs reciprocated this joint operation call aiming to overthrow the WP government. TÜSİAD, TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK, the Confederation of Employer Unions of Turkey (TİSK), the Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen of Turkey (TESK), the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange of Turkey (TOBB), Associations of Atatürkist Thought, Turkish Medical Association, vocational chambers, and associations as well as the bars in some cities made written and verbal statements condemning the anti-secular activities and called on the government to resign. On the other hand, some pro-government associations, and foundations such as Hak-İş Confederation and MÜSİAD, along with some unions affiliated with TÜRK-İŞ, made contrary declarations opposing the February 28 process. The secular-Islamist clash spread to the streets. The squares and the days which have symbolic meanings in the political history of Turkey became the arena of confronting demonstrations between the supporters and opponents of the February 28 process.¹²⁹

TAF's collaboration with the judiciary also yielded results in a short time. On May 21, 1997, Chief Public Prosecutor Vural Savaş filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court for the

¹²⁸ On April 29, 1997, at the briefing given by the General Staff Command to media executives and journalists, General Çetin Doğan said the following: "Turkish Armed Forces is also responsible for internal threats desiring to ruin the secular, democratic and social state of law. All citizens are responsible for it. Our difference is that we have arms. And we have the consciousness to use arms at the right time and the right place, in line with the people's wishes" (Akpınar, 2001, pp. 262-263).

¹²⁹ For example, "The Foundation of Voluntary Organizations of Turkey" (Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekkülleri) organized a public meeting themed "Do not Touch My İmam Hatip Schools and Quran Courses" in Sultanahmet Square attended by 30 thousand (*Hürriyet*, 1997, May 12). Whereas on May 19th, the date Atatürk landed in Samsun to start the War of Independence, pro-secular demonstrations took place all over the country (Akpınar, 2001).

"permanent dissolution of the Welfare Party for it had become a focal point of anti-secular activities."¹³⁰

Another area in which the judiciary was put into action by the military was related to the economic embargo that the army placed over the Islamic companies. Named as the "green capital" by the media, the General Staff blacklisted around one hundred so-called Islamic companies that allegedly provided financial support to the fundamentalists and barred them from participating in all sorts of military tenders.

The General Staff on June 10th gave the judges and prosecutors a briefing titled "Financial and Education Strategy of the Islamic Capital" (*Hürriyet*, 1997, June 10). Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor Office had delivered a verbal warning of the Ministry of Justice to all legal officials, stating that unauthorized attendance to the briefing would be a crime. However, 400 judges and prosecutors responded to the call of the military. Among the points raised in the briefing were the income stream of Islamist companies, the proliferation of the fundamentalist cadres in the judiciary and the delayed processing of charges about the offenses against Atatürk and the regime (İba, pp.235-236). The companies listed in the blacklist of the military were put under scrutiny by the judiciary insofar as they had to place ads on newspapers to purge themselves of the allegations.

In this period, the members of higher judicial bodies, judges, and prosecutors of SSCs who had participated to "the briefings at the General Staff Headquarters ruled decisions beyond the limits of the legislation in force. As analyzed in the third chapter, the political climate of the February 28 process reflected upon the impartiality and the trustworthiness of the judicial decisions.

The relationship between the media and the General Staff carried particular importance in the February 28 process. Traditionally, the mainstream media has always been in a voluntary collaboration with the military in creating and manipulating the public agenda. Duran (1996), in his book titled *Apoletli Medya* (Media in Epauettes) published before February 28, meticulously reveals the motives and reasons behind this rapport. Not surprisingly, during this period, the vast majority of the media organs approved and supported the de facto intrusions of the military. They functioned as a public relations department of the General Staff during this process. Media bosses and operatives often saw and published the military's demands even before they were told to do so. The popular newspapers of the time contained many memoranda like statements of unknown sources that were attributed to "a high-ranking military officer" (Yüksel, 2005, pp. 289-290). Moreover, they assisted the military during the whole process by creating favorable conditions to the extent that they fabricated and manipulated the news.

On the other hand, the dissident journalists who contested with the military's anti-WP campaign were heavily pressured. During the February 28 period, the commanders did not hesitate to blatantly threaten some media bosses, executive editors, media representatives, and

¹³⁰ For the full text of the indictment see, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/1997deki-refah-partisi-kapatma-davasi-iddianamesi-8460645>

prominent journalists.¹³¹ During this process, many media members had to exercise self-censorship, while some journalists lost their job because of the military's pressure.

On some occasions, some military units staged psychological operations to bring notable opposing journalists into disrepute. The most scandalous of those was known as the "Andıç Case." This case was also the finest example of a military strategy that used the two principal security threats against each other. On April 26, 1998, two of the leading newspapers of Turkey, *Hürriyet* and *Sabah*, published news based on the testimony of a former PKK commander captured by the security forces in early 1998. According to the alleged "confession" of Sakık, Cengiz Çandar and Mehmet Ali Birand, two prominent liberal journalists of the period were on the payroll of the PKK. Both journalists were suddenly labeled as "PKK agents" by the mainstream media, which took as fact the information leaked by the military. Birand and Çandar lost their jobs right away (Elmas & Kurban, 2011, p. 24).

Approximately one year later, in October 1999, Can Ataklı, the publishing coordinator of *Sabah* Newspaper at the time, in an interview he gave to *Öküz* magazine, admitted that the false documents related to the confessions of Sakık were fabricated by Çevik Bir, the second in command of the Chief of Staff at the time. In another interview, he gave to Bilal Aydın, Ataklı also revealed that during the February 28 period "90 percent of the news printed especially in big newspapers and TV channels were lies" (*Zaman*, December 22, 1999).

Indeed, the documents that surfaced later revealed that it was all part of a psychological operation initiated by some top-ranking generals in the context of a "Strong Action Plan." Besides Çandar and Birand the plan aimed at damaging the reputation of other well-known journalists and public intellectuals through propagating fake information based on Sakık's testimony. After the military leaked the fake news, President of the Human Rights Association of Turkey, Akın Birdal barely survived an assassination attempt. The Turkish Revenge Brigade, an ultra-nationalist militant organization, claimed the responsibility of the attack.

Following the media briefings after February 28th, anti-WP news reports augmented considerably. Old tapes featuring provocative statements of some WP deputies were drawn from the NIO archives and broadcasted by leading TV channels (İba, p. 239).

The coalition partner TPP, due to fear of a coup, decided to withdraw from the coalition unless Çiller became the prime minister. Erbakan, who preferred to maintain the coalition, submitted his resignation to the President of the Republic on June 18th. While resigning from his office, he requested Demirel to assign the task of forming the new government to Çiller. Erbakan also submitted the President "a notarized list of 282 names signed by WP, TPP, and Great Union Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi) deputies" to convince him that he had the necessary

¹³¹ For example, the military leaders summoned İlnur Çevik, the owner and executive editor of the pro-government Turkish Daily News, to the General Staff Headquarters to warn him of his paper's news content. Eventually, the publication strategy of the newspaper changed profoundly (Yüksel, p. 289). Similarly, Enver Ören, the owner of TGRT and Türkiye newspapers "blacklisted" by the military following a meeting with the Chief of General Staff ousted the top executives in his media group (Ibid.). Even the pro-secular newspapers were not free from intervention. For example, Deputy Chief of Staff of the time Çevik Bir attended to the editorial board meeting of Milliyet, a pro-secular newspaper at that time to rebuke the columnists who "wrote wrong" on the headscarf issue (cited in Yetkin, p. 313).

support to stay in office (Ibid., p. 242). However, on June 20th, Demirel, contrary to established practices of the politics, gave the task to MP Leader Mesut Yılmaz. Yılmaz formed a coalition government (ANASOL-D), with Democratic Left Party of Ecevit and Democrat Turkey Party founded by a group of deputies resigned from the TTP. The new artificial minority government secured the vote of confidence with the external support of the Republican People's Party and assumed office on June 30, 1997.

Following the overthrowing of the Refah-yol government, the military established a body called the Western Study Group (WSG) within the military structure to track down and eliminate fundamentalist activities. WSG's duty was to expose information on the ideological inclinations of political actors from all sorts of civil society groups as well as public officials to members of the media.¹³²

WSG was started with the initiative of then Commander of Naval Forces, Güven Erkaya and had an office in almost all levels of the TAF. All garrisons and military posts in residential areas were ordered to collect intelligence on high-ranking public officials and members or employees of all associations, foundations, vocational institutions, labor and employer unions, universities, student dormitories, provincial and city councils, local TV and radio stations, local newspapers, magazines, and media institutions. Any suspected person or event would be reported to the headquarters of WSG at the General Staff in Ankara in the form of "Western Study Group Daily Situation Reports" or Western Study Group Incident Notification Reports (Aslan, 2016, p. 368; Bayramoğlu, p. 46). Later, with a new directive issued by the Turkish Land Forces Command, the intelligence gathering duty was extended to the spouses and children of the TAF personnel.¹³³

WSG reports later became essential tools for keeping the issue in focus. The military notified the proper state authorities, NGO's, and the media organs about the 'religious reactionist' activities through another series of briefings. The fight against reactionary Islam was the central theme of the first NSC meeting held by the new government. The first significant act of Yılmaz government was the enacting of the eight-year mandatory education law, considered as the most critical article of the February 28 decisions. With this new law, secondary schools of *İmam Hatip Lycees* were closed, and their high school sections were turned into four-year lycees providing merely vocational training. Consequently, the graduates of these schools were prevented from entering universities, except the theology faculties. Hence in couple of years, the number of students attending them fell sharply (Çakmak, 2009, p. 836).

¹³² As cited by Çekirge (1997, July 10), in the preamble of WSG statute, its duty was described as follows: "Western Study Group is established to monitor and control all activities contravening Atatürk's principles and reforms and the state of law defined in the Constitution as the fundamental principles of the State of the Republic of Turkey. Having been tasked with monitoring fundamentalist activities, the group will inform the public through briefings."

¹³³ According to the Order no. 63 of the Second Army Corps Command, "Protecting and safeguarding the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces is the duty of TAF personnel and their spouses and children, as well as every Turkish citizen. In that respect, all Land Forces personnel and their families are sources of information. All Land Forces personnel and their families should deliver all documents, information, and reports to the high command through the command chain, and without speculating whether they are already known by the high command or not [...]" (cited in *Yeni Şafak*, 1997, July 10).

The revision of the National Security Policy Document (NSPD) was another critical development of this period. The military identified Islamic fundamentalism as equal to separatism in threatening the national security of Turkey. The revisions were approved at the NSC meeting held on October 31, 1997 (*Anadolu Agency*, 1997, October 31), and fighting against the rise of political Islam became an official state policy.¹³⁴

The public became aware of the existence of the NSPD through the regular references that the military authority made to the document. Prime Minister Yılmaz, politically legitimized its mandatory power in a statement he made right after its major revision (*Hürriyet*, 1997, November 4):

"The document is binding for all ministries. It is a classified document. If any discrepancies arise between the document and a law, decree, or an international agreement, they must be removed."

Following the approval of the NSPD, the Office of General Staff started to give briefings under the title of "The Geopolitical Structure of Turkey, Internal and External Threats" to all high-ranking state bureaucrats (İba, p. 257). In these briefings, the NSPD was defined as "the official document containing the national security policy of the state" (Ibid).

Finally, the principal objective of the postmodern coup was realized when, on 21 May 1997, the Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, Vural Savaş filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court to outlaw the WP. In his suit, Savas claimed that the Welfare Party "has become a focus of actions contrary to the principle of secularism in the Constitution and has pushed our country toward a civil war atmosphere." The Constitutional Court dissolved the WP in January 1998. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, then Chief Judge of the Constitutional Court, said in announcing the ruling, "This court has decided to close the Welfare Party because of evidence confirming its actions against the principles of the secular republic" (*The New York Times*, January 17, 1998). The court also seized the party's assets and barred Erbakan and other key members from political activity for five years (*Cumhuriyet*, 1998, January 17; *Hürriyet*, 1998, January 17).

However, the military authority was not satisfied with the pace of anti-fundamentalist reforms undertaken by the current government. Rumors broke out that the military would submit a memorandum to the Prime Minister at the upcoming NSC meeting. These allegations brought a stern reaction from Yılmaz who said that the fighting against fundamentalist activities was the responsibility of his government and that "mind its own business" ("ANAP'tan yanıt," *Hürriyet*, 2001, August 8). The General Staff gave a harsh response to Yılmaz on March 20th with a written statement asserting that the accusatory claims of the Prime Minister on the commanders were "unfortunate remarks made for the sake of personal interests and political ambitions" (*Cumhuriyet*, 1998, March 21). Although Yılmaz made an effort to appease the tension, the reactions extended to the civil society actors. The major NGOs including TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK, TİSK, TOBB, and TESK sided with the military in this process and once again

¹³⁴ As reported by the press, aside from the political Islam and separatism, the document also identified Turkish nationalist movements that verged on racism, far right-nationalist mafia, and extremist left-wing movements as domestic threats of top priority.

declared the army as the guardian of the secular and democratic republic. Forty-six mass organizations organized a rally in Ankara on March 28th with the slogan "shoulder to shoulder against fundamentalism."

After seventeen months in power, the ANASOL-D government collapsed losing a no-confidence motion over corruption allegations on November 25, 1998. It was replaced by a transition government led by the DLP Leader Bülent Ecevit. This government stayed in power until the early general elections held on April 18, 1996. Meanwhile, the WP cadres founded a new party under the name of Virtue Party (VP-Fazilet Partisi). VP proclaimed a softer Islamic profile than the WP to the extent that it advocated full integration with the West to ensure civilian rule and democracy. VP fared well in the 1998 municipal elections but came in third in the 1999 general elections with 15.5 percent of the votes. Ecevit's DLP came first achieving 21.6 percent of the votes, while NAP became the second largest party in the parliament with 18.1 percent of the votes. The MP and TPP could only get 13.4 and 12.3 percents of the votes respectively. The RPP could not pass the national threshold and failed to get into parliament. After the 1999 elections, Ecevit found a three-party coalition government with the NAP and MP.

1.4.4.5. National Security State's Gains by February 28

During the February 28 process, the military broadened its mandate to include direct intervention in civilian incidents under the pretext of "combatting crisis" by two new security arrangements. The first of these was the founding of the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center and the second was the signing of the "EMASYA Protocol," the protocol on Security, Public Order and Assistance Units (EMASYA).

The Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center: Civilian organization of the military

A short time before the NSC meeting on February 28, the Refah-yol government issued a by-law (By-Law No. 22872, on Office of the Prime Minister Crisis Management Center, 9 January 9, 1997) which enabled the military authority to supervise and manage the response to any given crisis situation through a new body called Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center (PMCMC). With this new regulation, the extent of the authority that the military held over the key political and social realms during the September 12 period through the secret regulation of the NSCGS became visible in many ways. This center, as Insel (1997) rightly stated, was an "institutional countermeasure" of the state against the ideologically undesirable groups and their organizations which had gained sufficient power to create their private "hegemonic spaces" (p. 15). The new legal arrangement, in addition to the national security notion, introduced a highly vague and ill-defined concept of "crisis" which functioned as a tool for legitimizing the military's further involvement in civilian affairs.

The "crisis situations" were defined in this document (Art. 4/Para. b) as follows:

"hostile attitudes against the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, serious violent acts endangering the constitutional rights and

freedoms and the existence of the democratic order, natural disasters, dangerous epidemics, big fires, major chemical and technological incidents like radiation and air pollution, severe economic depressions, mass migrations."

Affiliated with a civilian authority on paper, this center was to serve under the NSC General Secretariat to weather the crises "in line with the national interests" (Art. 1 & 3). Thus, it was once more confirmed that no political power would contradict the TAF in interpreting the "national interests." The topics under the direct responsibility of NSCGS were listed as follows:

"a) Abroad; signs of widespread acts of violence targeting the territorial integrity, the right of sovereignty, and the national goals and interests of Turkey.

b) Domestic; emergence and development of widespread acts of violence against the constitutional rights and freedoms and the democratic order, or serious deterioration of public order due to violent acts.

(1) Terrorist activities,

(2) Illegal strikes, lockouts, and work stoppages,

(3) Conflicts arising from ethnic, religious, and sectarian differences."

Thus, from determining whether any given phenomenon might be considered a crisis to managing and supervising the measures to counter it, the Prime Minister handed over his authority to the NSC General Secretary (Art. 6/Para. b).

On the other hand, the coordination and management of tangible crises response like natural disasters and severe economic depressions were left to the relevant ministries, on the condition that the NSCGS personnel were included in the coordination and "assessment and monitoring" boards (Art. 3/Para. b, c, d & Annex-4). The regulation also furnished the PMCMC with authority to recommend the government to declare of State of Emergency, Martial Law, Mobilization and State of War (Art. 6/Para. d).

Among the duties of the center were determining the "principles for political directives about the crisis," deciding on the required changes in the existing directives or the National Security Policy Document, ensuring the implementation of all counter-measures, and if necessary "make the necessary attempts" to turn them into Cabinet Decrees (Art. 8/Subparagraph b/Para. 1&2). Moreover, "depending on the nature of events causing the crises," the regulation gave the Chief of General Staff the authority to "establish 'Crisis Centers' in relevant Ministries, provinces, and districts."

The PMCMC was designed as a permanent body. The regulation also established a Secretariat seemingly affiliated to the Center but in fact, hosted by the Information Gathering and Assessment Group Department of the NSCGS (Art. 6/Para. b). The Secretariat's core cadre

and personnel were to be appointed upon the proposal of the NSC General Secretary and the approval of the Prime Minister" (Art. 10/Para. a).

Hence, the secret "double-headed structure" of the state, thanks to the PMCMC body, was converted to a "binary government," where the military side directed the civilian one. It was only the Istanbul Bar that reacted against the establishment of the PMCMC. The Bar challenged the constitutionality of its regulation by filing a lawsuit in court in 1998. The Bar also asked the political parties to join in the lawsuit and yet did not get any response from its call. The court rejected the Bar's attempt to nullify the regulation. However, during the case process, it was learned that the regulation was allegedly based on the NATO agreement (*Radikal*, 2002, 3 June).

Shortly before the February 28, Prime Minister Erbakan issued a decree dated on January 31 and sent a formal letter to the NSCGS that handed the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center to its absolute authority. The decree also gave the NSC General Secretary and its staff the authority to make "review visits" on behalf of the Prime Minister" (*Aktüel*, March 1997). According to the decree, the purpose for these visits was "to inspect, steer and coordinate in situ the implementations of the decisions of the NSC" in ministries, public agencies, and provinces (Ibid.). The decree also provided that personnel from the relevant agencies could join the General Secretariat staff to run these inspections, but that this could only be possible with the NSCGS's approval (Balci, 2000, p. 195).

Consequently, by way of this new legal arrangement, the military undoubtedly ensured its supervisory authority over the government regarding the implementation of its future directives. The PMCMC was put into action a short time after the toppling of the Refah-yol government by a circular (B.02.PPG.0.12383/20062) issued on September 1, 1997.

EMASYA Protocol

During the February 28 process, the second critical legal change that paved the way for the military to intervene in domestic security matters was related to the EMASYA Units (Security and Public Order Assistance Units) operating under the General Command of Gendarmerie. Before further examining these units, it should be noted that in theory, the General Command of Gendarmerie is a military security force operating by all appearances under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in times of peace, and under the command of the land forces as part of the TAF in times of war. In practice, however, different from its counterparts in the Western democracies (France and Italy), Gendarmerie is a security force "operating under the command of the General Staff, as confirmed by its duties in the armed forces, organizational precepts, budget, promotion system and personnel training and education" (Sarıbrahimoğlu, 2006, p.100).

EMASYA units had existed since the 1960s, but its structure and responsibilities were altered immediately after the February 28, by a protocol signed on July 7, 1997, between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Staff. The protocol, consisting of 27 provisions concerning the application of Article 11/D of the Provincial Administrative Law (no.5442), was mainly regulating the intervention of military forces in cases of public disorder and security

situations. It was also significant for it formed the basis of TAF'S new internal security doctrine in the post-February 28 era.

The protocol established "Public Order Safety Councils" in every province and district under the authority of the Garrison and Provincial Gendarmerie Commands. These councils were assigned the authority to gather and assess intelligence on "terrorist activities and social incidents." More importantly, Article 9 of the protocol authorized the EMASYA units to intervene in social conflicts whenever the military deemed it necessary without the need for governor's approval. Moreover, according to the protocol, during security operations, the Police Force's Special Operations Teams and village guards would function under the command of the EMASYA Commands (Aksoy, 2009, pp. 175-176). In other words, as stated by Bayramoğlu, "the sphere of authority of the governor, the head of the district and the police force was taken over by the soldiers" (Neşe Düzel's interview with Ali Bayramoğlu, *Radikal* 2004, April 14).

As soon as the protocol came into force, the EMASYA units became regular squads on duty 24/7 (Ibid.). Consequently, the task of maintaining public order was entrusted to the army. The idea of taking precautions before surfacing of any threat brought about an understanding of permanent intelligence gathering on all segments of society. The protocol paved the way for a constant flow of intelligence to the "Public Order Safety Councils." Hence, acting upon secret orders from gendarmerie commands, the EMASYA officials began to collect all information about social groups or political organizations at these centers.¹³⁵

1.4.4.6. Social Consequences of February 28

During the second half of the 1990s, the country was suffering from a severe and continuous economic crisis. The center-right parties, all of which failed to develop a democratic

¹³⁵ EMASYA units came into question in 2004 with a scandal called "high-society tagging." This scandal led to serious debates on intelligence gathering methods as well as what their content constituted. *Hürriyet* newspaper, in a headline report on March 10, 2004, wrote that the 2nd Armored Brigade Command sent a memo to military units and district governors demanding intelligence about persons and institutions engaging in "separatist and subversive" activities. According to the memo, among the targeted persons and institutions were "EU candidacy supporters, U.S. sympathisers, high-society groups, art circles, children of rich families, religious orders, Satanists sects, Ku Klux Klan members, free-masons, online communities, groups formed around sexual proclivities, drugs, meditation, and spiritualism." The directive ordered the following to be investigated in relation to the above-mentioned groups: their intentions and objectives, activities and their effects on the society and whether they were involved in any form of blackmailing. The directive also asked for information about "anti-state authors, and thinkers" and their media connections, "minorities and groups who identify as minorities (Cherkes, Romany, Abkhasian, Albanian, and Bosniac, etc.)". It was later discovered that the question concerning the Ku Klux Klan had been directly translated from field manuals of the US Army (Sariibrahimoğlu, 2006, p. 109). The General Command confirmed the filing activities (http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/anadoluyahaberler-yeni/2004/mart/ah_11_03-04.htm). Right after the issue was publicized, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stated that intelligence-gathering was not TAF's duty and emphasized that filing was a crime (*Cumhuriyet*, 2004, March 15). In the meantime, the RPP submitted a parliamentary question about the alleged activities of the EMASYA units (<http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d22/7/7-2336s.pdf>). No official answer was given to this parliamentary question. However, Minister of Defence Vecdi Gönül stated that "the employment Turkish Armed Forces for EMASYA missions was in line with the Constitution, laws and established international practices," and added that "no person or group were surveilled" on the basis of belonging to a particular social or subcultural group (*Yeni Asya*, 2004, June 7).

resistance against the military's demands during the February 28 process were also tainted with corruption allegations. The political vacuum created in the process was filled by the army, which expanded its enforcement authority over the socio-political realm through monopolizing the power of threat evaluation. Although the phrase, "irtica" (reactionary Islam), appeared in almost every major official document produced in the process, the fact that it lacked any precise definition, enabled the military to label every religious group in the society as "internal enemy." The military elite declared all kinds of action, speech, activity, or thought, directly or indirectly linked to "Islam," as a component of fundamentalist threat.

Unlike the previous coups, the objective of the February 28 intervention was not confined to eliminating political Islam from the political realm. The military elite specifically aimed at cleansing Islamic visibility from the public sphere by intruding on every aspect of daily life intersecting with the state. This choice had devastating consequences on the lives of ordinary pious Muslim believers.

Defining the *türban* (kerchief) as a "political symbol," the national security state denied the right of thousands of female students to pursue higher education. The female students in İmam Hatip Schools and universities who refused to uncover their heads were barred from attending classes. The Ministry of Internal Affairs issued two confidential memos in 1998. The first was asking the university administrators to "enlighten and persuade" the new students to remove their "türban" and remind the legal regulation to those who insisted on doing so. The other memo, after criticizing the rapid release of detainees held in connection with "türban protests" and identifying their aim as changing the fundamental features of the Republic (Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu Raporu -*Parliamentary Research Commission Report*-, 2012, p. 1178), asked the security forces to determine the nature of the offense meticulously and transfer the detainees to Public Prosecution Office right away. In the memo, it was further stated that crimes that go unpunished played an essential role in the escalation of events and recommended the police force to maintain close relations with judges and prosecutors. Many female students stuck between their beliefs and their futures either abandoned education or went abroad.

Similarly, many female teachers were given various punishments because of kerchief. During 1997-2001, Ministry of Education dismissed 804 teachers for contravening the dress code (Ibid., p.1174). Many provosts and deans were allegedly accused of being "fundamentalist" or "appointing religious radicals to important positions." Numerous academics acted as informants, sending anonymous, or signed letters about their colleagues' activities to the Presidency of the Republic and the Council of Higher Education. Many research associates, assistant professors, and doctoral students were expelled from universities. Numerous graduate students sent abroad through education grants were called back, and their academic lives were ended. In this process, the vested rights of many public officials were taken away due to the retroactive effects of the legal measures (Eğitim-Bir-Sen 2014, p. 6).

During this period, the number of military personnel discharged from the army for their alleged connection with fundamentalist activities increased considerably (Ibid.). Since the Supreme Military Council (SMC) decisions were unappealable during this period, the officers discharged from the military could not appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to return their posts (Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu Raporu, pp. 1153-1154).

The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) personnel who were suspected of engaging in fundamentalist activities were tagged. Although their alleged crimes could not be legally "proven," these personnel, mostly working as imam, preacher, and mufti, were appointed to other places or were subjected to various disciplinary punishments (Ibid., p.1163). A telling example of the social engineering project of TAF during the February 28 process was the establishment of a body called the "Research Center on Religious Affairs" under DRA. The center's staff was comprised of retired military officers, and it was tasked with "gathering information on and guiding the religious life in Turkey." The head of the center was also appointed as a consultant to DRA (Ibid., p. 1166).

Bureaucrats also received their share from this cleansing operation taking place in the public realm. During this period, many bureaucrats were either removed from duty or assigned to elsewhere because of their political affiliations and religious beliefs. Approximately 300 high-ranking bureaucrats were discharged from duty during the first two months of the ANASOL-D government (Eğitim-Bir-Sen, p. 24).

However, the overall effect of the February 29 process was particularly devastating for the civilian institutions. Political parties were dissolved. Associations and foundations were put under intense pressure. Numerous NGOs and their branches, especially those working in the field of human rights, were closed down. During this period, the military forced the government to outlaw eight foundations including the National Youth Foundation unofficially linked to the banned Welfare Party (Parliamentary Research Committee Report, p. 1170).

2. Dissolution of the National Security State: Democracy from Above

The primary reason that brought about the demise of the national security state was the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession to the European Union (EU) at the Helsinki Summit held in December 1999. In the following period, significant steps were taken to democratize the civil-military relations on an institutional level in line with the EU criteria. The early months of process did not run so smoothly, however. The first to open the taboo of national security to discussion among political leaders was Mesut Yılmaz, state minister, and vice prime minister in the 57th government, who did so in 2001 at his party's Seventh Ordinary Convention. Referring to the "national security syndrome's" obstructive role in the EU harmonization process, Yılmaz stated that, "only Turkey could have succeeded in turning a concept that enables the survival of the state into one that drains its lifeblood." (*Radikal*, August 5, 2001). Following Yılmaz's criticism, the military reacted rather harshly, by declaring that, "it was not only unfortunate but also dangerous to blame the national security concept for negative developments in the country" and that "national security should not be an issue of exploitation" (cited in Güney, 2015, p. 113).

His government was only able to take the first step towards reducing the NSC's role because of the support of the EU integration process. Within this framework, the number of civilian members in the NSC was increased by a constitutional amendment introduced on October 3, 2001, which made Vice Prime Ministers and the Minister of Justice members of the council. The statement that NSC decisions to be taken by the NSC "would be given priority by

the Cabinet of Ministers” was changed to “would be taken into consideration by the Cabinet of Ministers,” and NSC decisions were downgraded to recommendations.

However, the process of harmonizing Turkish legislative practice with those of other EU countries has gained momentum during the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government. The JDP was established in August 2001, by a group reformist Islamic politician led by Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (former mayor of Istanbul between 1994 and 1998). Just 15 months after its establishment, JDP won a landslide victory at the November 2002 general elections and formed Turkey’s first majority government since the late 1980s.

The JDP’s earliest effort towards civilianization of the polity was the lifting of the emergency rule in Kurdish cities in Turkey’s eastern and southeastern regions. The state of emergency, which had lasted for almost two decades and become “the norm” for the whole region, was lifted entirely on November 30, 2002 (Bezci & Öztan, 2016). Its termination led to the gradual easing of the military hold on these provinces, characterized by high troop numbers, regular checkpoints, curfews, arbitrary detentions, human right violations, and a lack of recourse to the courts.

A second reform towards circumscribing the role of the military in the political process was carried out under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. On August 7, 2003, despite the resistance from some of the commanders,¹³⁶ the JDP government adopted the Seventh Harmonization Package which redefined the NSC as an advisory body, stripping of its executive powers. The package transferred the authority of the General Secretariat to “coordinate and monitor” the implementation of NSC decisions to the Deputy Prime Minister. It changed appointment procedures enabling civilians to serve as Secretary-General. It decreased the council’s budget by 60 percent and established bi-monthly, rather than monthly, NSC meetings. The power of the Chief of General Staff to “select, approve, and appoint the Secretary-General” was transferred to the Prime Minister (Kutay, 2016, pp. 15-16).

The annulment of the NSCGS’s secret regulation occurred with the Cabinet of Ministers’ decision No. 6688 on December 29, 2003. This was the most fundamental reform to the structure of the NSC General Secretariat, as it significantly restricted the General Secretariat’s duties and authority and discontinued the activities of the National Security Policy Department, the Information Gathering and Assessment Group Department, and the Public Relations Department. The latter, which was responsible for planning and implementing psychological operations, reportedly had a budget of USD 3,000,000; this sum was transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister. In accordance with the new regulation, a new unit entitled Research and Development Office Department (Araştırma ve Değerlendirme Dairesi Başkanlığı, AR-DE) was established within the NSC to prepare documents on matters covered by the definition of national security and to create a data and documentation center on these matters (By-law No. 25340 of 2004).

¹³⁶ For instance, NSC General Secretary at the time Lieutenant General Tuncer Kılınç claimed that appointing a civilian as the NSC General Secretary would politicize the institution and prevent it from fulfilling its function to contribute to security policies (*Radikal*, 2003, August 25).

In addition to these positive steps towards civilianization, former Ambassador to Athens, Yiğit Aldogan was appointed in August 2004 as NSC General Secretary. Kenan İpek, who returned to headquarters while on duty as an undersecretary in Washington, and Gürsel Demirok, who returned to Ankara from the post of Consul General in Zurich and who was well known in Europe for a report he prepared on civilianization, were appointed as chief advisors to Alpdogan.

On November 20, 2004, Alpdogan broke new ground by opening the doors of the NSC to all media, regardless of any accreditation-based distinction. In his speech to the press, Alpdogan said that from then on the General Secretariat would work as a “think-tank” and its duty would be limited to providing the members of the NSC, which is an advisory organ on domestic and foreign threats, with intellectual content (*Yeni Şafak*, 2004, December 1). In 2005, Gürsel Demirok was appointed as President of AR-DE, which had been until then ruled by proxy by a Brigadier General. That year, along with the chief advisor to the NSC and heads of some departments, the contracts of 20 of the 53 retired military members of the Secretariat were not renewed, and the staff members started to be appointed among civilians (Özcan, 2006, p. 43).

Criticism of the anti-democratic elements in both the preparation process of the National Security Policy Document and the content itself continued for a long time after the new NSPD was debated by the NSC and proposed to the Cabinet of Ministers on October 24, 2005. The document was accepted by the Cabinet of Ministers in a March 20, 2006, meeting. In the wake of this event, the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği-İHD) and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey petitioned the Council of State on March 24, 2006, requesting that the Cabinet of Ministers suspend its decision to accept and ratify the NSDP.¹³⁷ The judiciary rejected the case concluding that the NSPD was simply a recommendation.¹³⁸ Prof. Cengiz Aktar, an expert on the EU accession process, claimed that “the EU will not be concerned by what is said by an advisory institution; however if the contents of the document leaked to the press are implemented, the EU would take up the matter.” Likewise, Professor Dr. Zafer Üskül, a prominent academic on constitutional law, said that if the document’s policy recommendations were implemented by the government, this would result in some consequences, but that “in its present state it could not be considered unlawful” (*Bianet*, 2005, November 1).

A significant development, believed to result in a lessening of the NSC'S influence over domestic security matters, especially the fight against terrorism, happened in early 2006. During the December 29, 2005, NSC meeting, it was decided that the Supreme Council for

¹³⁷ This request was based on the conflict with Articles 2 and 6 of the Constitution to determine the authority of the Cabinet and with Articles 112 and 118, which determine the NSC's authority, as well as the conflicts with Law No. 2945 on the NSC General Secretariat, with UN conventions, and with the European Convention on Human Rights, of which Turkey is a party.

¹³⁸ In August 2006 the Court on Call rejected the case without examining the document, on the grounds that “the document qualifies as a recommendation” (*Birgün*, July 22, 2006). The plaintiffs objected, but the State of Council’s Council of Chambers of Administrative Cases, which heard the objection on October 12, confirmed that the document “qualified as a recommendation” and deemed unsuitable the plaintiffs’ grounds for objection (*Radikal*, August 30, 2006).

Counterterrorism (Terörle Mücadele Yüksek Kurulu, TMYK) would become functional and would include a secretariat. Following the February 23, 2006, NSC meeting, in line with this decision, the government decided to raise the Department of Security Affairs to the level of a general directorate and to grant it broader authorities. The draft law regarding this new Secretariat called the “General Directorate of Security Affairs” (Güvenlik İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, GIGM), was presented to the parliament on March 7, 2006. The draft bill defined the institution’s aim as “ensuring that the Office of the Prime Minister plays a more effective role in security matters and counter-terrorism.”¹³⁹ GIGM became operational after the related law was published in the Official Gazette on May 30, 2006.

Later in February 2010, the parliament adopted a new law (Law No. 5952 of February 17, 2010) establishing an “Under-secretariat for Public Order and Security” under the Ministry of the Interior. The Undersecretariat, which was later attached to the Prime Ministry (Decree Law No. 643 of June 3, 2011) in 2011 was tasked with “developing policies on counter-terrorism, evaluating strategic intelligence and ensuring coordination in the implementation of the measures taken” by the government. This new institution further strengthened the hands of the civilian government against the military bureaucracy in security-related matters.¹⁴⁰

In the meantime, other substantive changes were made in the framework of accession process to the European Union. With an amendment made to the relevant articles of the Military Criminal Code in June 2006, the military jurisdiction over civilians was terminated in peacetime. The decisions of the Supreme Military Council were opened to judicial review, and in June 2009 legal adjustments were made for high-ranking officers to be tried by civilian courts for crimes subject to Heavy Penal Court jurisdiction under article 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including coup d’état attempts, crimes against national security, and organized crime. Military representation in the Council on Higher Education and Higher Board of Radio and Television were ended. State Security Courts were abolished. Provisional Article 15, which had provided immunity from prosecution to all actors of the military regime established by the 1980 coup, was canceled. The law on the Court of Accounts passed in December 2010, opened the way to supervise the military expenditures, and extra-budgetary defense spending by the demand of the president of the parliament (Güney, pp. 115-118). Also, the cabinet decrees and prime ministry mandates issued during the February 28 process were repealed. The Prime Ministry Implementation, Follow-up and Coordination Committee, the predecessor of Western Study Group, was abolished. In January 2012, the compulsory national security courses taught

¹³⁹ The duties of the GIGM were: “conducting the relationships between the Office of the Prime Minister and the institutions responsible for domestic security, foreign security, and counter-terrorism (TAF, Gendarmerie, General Directorate of Security, National Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Command, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and, when necessary, ensuring coordination among these institutions; carrying out investigations and research into matters related to domestic security, foreign security, and counterterrorism, evaluating them, and making proposals; in regions where martial law or a state of emergency has been declared, gathering and evaluating information and ensuring coordination on relevant matters; informing the public of its duties; conducting the secretariat work of councils established on subjects related to its duties; and fulfilling other duties as assigned by the authorities.” (Law No. 5508, May 30, 2006).

¹⁴⁰ For the full text of the legislation for the Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security and Counter-Terrorism Act, in English see, http://www.kdgm.gov.tr/kurumlar/kdgm.gov.tr/eski_site/upload/kitaplar/eng/LEGISLATION%20OF%20THE%20UNDERSECRETARIAT.pdf

by military officers in high schools were finally removed from the curriculum. These courses had been severely criticized for reinforcing militarism and encouraging hatred towards minority groups living in Turkey by the educators and relevant NGOs (Coşkun & Ediğ, 2013).

The 2010 National Security Policy Document was mainly prepared by the civilian experts. The "reactionary threat" was removed from the text (*Hürriyet* 2014, October 13). Instead, the text mentioned "radical groups exploiting religion," a term, which under the Turkish Criminal code refers to fundamentalist groups that employ violent methods (Güzeldere, p. 230). Other official domestic security related official documents were readjusted accordingly. Finally, the major improvement on both practical and symbolic levels came with the amendment of the controversial Article 35 of the TAF Internal Service Law. The law which had previously tasked the army with the duty of "protecting and safeguarding the Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic," with an amendment made on July 13, 2013, was modified as "defending the country against external threats from abroad."

However, all these changes, which considerably demised the power of the military vis-a-vis the civilian authority, did not necessarily bring about the consolidation of democratic governance in Turkey. In fact, the security state of Turkey, whose establishment, consolidation, and finally dissolution were analyzed in this thesis, took a sharp turn after 2010. As shown in the concluding chapter, the JDP government (and principally its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan), which had undergone a significant transformation during its almost eight consecutive years of experience in ruling the country, after 2010, would gradually identify any form of peaceful opposition as a terrorist threat to its very existence and reactivate the security apparatus with new mechanisms and authorities. Most tragic of all, however, despite all the reforms undertaken in the last fifteen years, Turkey was faced with yet another coup attempt on July 15, 2016.

Conclusion

As seen in this dissertation, in the framework of the national security ideology through which the US assumed leadership role in the new bipolar world, political developments around the globe were gradually seen to have automatic and direct impact on America's national security and economic interests. The US, efficiently linking the national security ideology of the Cold War era to an internal security agenda with harsh anti-communist, anti-labor and anti-radical domestic policies, accomplished its internal cleansing by mid-1950s and expected the same from its allies.

In this context, trusting the elected governments of the Third World appeared less reliable and practical than cooperating directly with their armies, which were seen as the most disciplined and educated institutions of their countries. According to the US governing elite, non-westerns were susceptible to radical ideas, and their civilian leaders were most of the time incapable of providing the necessary conditions for internal security and development in line with the US preferences. Therefore, these underdeveloped populations could easily be manipulated to adopt the Soviet Union's stance. Second, the US governments were convinced that the trend toward military takeovers in these underdeveloped countries was going to continue. Therefore, right-wing authoritarian regimes were viewed as the most reasonable choice for most Third World nations to maintain order, block communism, and undergo economic policies that would enable the establishment of democratic political institutions in the future. To this end, the US promoted a new military doctrine, the NSD, which identified a new internal security threat directly connected with the Soviet expansion. The NSD was exported to these countries by providing their military personnel and security-related civilians, training them in counterinsurgency, psychological warfare, and interrogation techniques as well as military equipment and technical assistance.

The whole process resulted in the establishment and consolidation of a new form of national security state in different geographical areas of the globe through military regimes. The operationalization of the national security ideology in these states led to more destructive consequences than those in the US. The security threat that was initially based on the perceived danger of communism in these countries was expanded to include any dissident movements, groupings, or discussions that the states regarded as flourishing beyond the desired scale.

As argued in the introduction of this thesis, Turkey gradually turned into one of those national security states of the Cold War. In the context of the Marshall Aid, Turkey was assigned the role to supply commodities for the Western Bloc as well as to be a potential market for American goods. It was an ally country but not a significant one at first. When NATO was established in 1949 to deter Soviet expansionism on the European continent, the secular and pro-western governing elite of Turkey spent considerable effort to become part of it. Finally backed by the US, Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Following the NATO membership, TAF became a component of the Cold War strategy promoting American interests. Staff, formation, and organization, training systems, field manuals, uniforms, war doctrines, and the internal rules of the army were gradually developed as identical to the US army.

After that time Turkey experienced three military interventions (1960, 1971 and 1980) and the US governments had known about all three before they were staged. Right after every coup, the military governments declared their loyalty to their alliance with the USA and their commitment to NATO and other US-led international institutions. More importantly, the problems encountered with the US before every coup were resolved in favor of the US interests during the military regimes. The cooperation between the Turkish army and the US was to such an extent that despite the TAF's firm commitment to secularism, the last Cold War military regime of Turkey did not refrain from adopting the Green Belt doctrine of Carter's administration in political and cultural realms under the name of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. This new ideological stance would later play a critical role in the rise of political Islam, and the military would try to halt it with yet another coup in 1997.

As it was discussed in chapter one through the cases of other countries, a model national security state operating under the military tutelage was founded in Turkey after the military coup of September 12th. In this context, when one compares the common characteristics of military-led national security states among the close allies of the US with those of Turkey, the following similar points come forward:

Legitimacy has always been an important issue in Turkey as it is in all the national security states. The military hierarchy, defining itself as the spokesman of a monolithic institution, legitimized the coups on the basis of establishing law and order and providing political and economic stability. In the aftermath of every coup, the military governments have engaged in extensive legal and constitutional restructuring with the aim of transforming the political institutions of the country. In the coup climate, all civilian actors of the political scene were forced to adapt to this transformation. In this context, like other national security states, the first practices of the military regimes were to shut down political parties (one in 1960, two in 1971, and then all parties in 1980). Further actions included rendering the legislature temporarily dysfunctional, banning the disapproved politicians, shutting down or restricting the activities of labor unions, silencing political criticism through censoring media, suppressing universities and in this context firing the "undesired" academics and entirely abolishing student organizations.

On the other hand, Turkey diverges from other security states in Latin America because the army in Turkey did not assume direct responsibility for country's economic development. However, it can easily be said that the military regime of the 1980 coup became the ultimate guarantor of the radical economic transformation project that had been decided at the end of 1979 with the TAF's consent.

With each coup, the army has expanded its institutional autonomy and has distanced itself from civilian politics in domains including military education, military jurisdiction and military personal rights in its favor. As a Cold War institution imported from the USA, the NSC as the leading institution that unified government and the state, became a dominant actor in the functioning of the military guardianship after the transition to "democracy." The NSC's General Secretariat served as a semi-clandestine body to prevent all possible political and social opposition that went against the views of the military hierarchy. By way of these institutions and the far-reaching "national security" definition, which it had itself inserted in the

constitutional and legal architecture, the military hierarchy has become the decision-maker on many issues, no matter how significant or trivial, without bearing any responsibility for their consequences.

The theoretical framework of the national security doctrine linking "national security, strategy, national objectives, and national policy" found its place in the constitutional and legal architecture of the Turkish state. Thus, based on its legal authority to protect "national interests" and define "national objectives," the military has acquired the monopoly for determining the "enemies of the nation." In this framework, those whose demands did not overlap with the targets and interests determined by the military were easily labeled as "servant of foreign interests," "traitor" or "partisan." The existence of "internal enemy" as specific agents of external enemies was constantly emphasized. Therefore "national security" concerns, almost at a paranoia level, legitimized the violations of freedom of expression and information. In this context, laws about "anti-terrorism," "crimes against the state," or "maintenance of public order" and the security apparatus under the authority of the military established alongside including State Security Courts, became the principal means of subduing political and social opposition.

Similar to other security states, the internal warfare, which has been going on in Turkey since the early 1980s, has been used by the military as an excuse to extend the scale and scope of its intelligence gathering activities over the entire society. In this context, the national security state in Turkey, like those elsewhere, cooperated with right-wing paramilitary organizations. The dirty war functions carried out by these agencies such as unlawful killings, kidnapping, torture, and extortion were justified by patriotism and they became exempt from all kinds of investigations and judgments under the state's indirect or direct protection.

Different from other national security states of the Cold War period; however, the least common denominators of social cohesion in Turkey were formed with a vocabulary that prioritized secularism and the unitary state based on Turkish nationalism in accordance with the foundational ideology of the early Republic rather than adopting system-transforming rhetoric. Therefore, Atatürk himself, as the cult actor of the founding ideology, was used as a frequent reference in the coup settings.

However as demonstrated in the last chapter, the demands of the different social actors (on the Kurdish issue and political Islam) and their organizational capacities have expanded to the extent that they started to challenge the hegemonic discourse of the state. As a result, this challenge moved the Turkish state/military to a place that was different from other national security states established during the Cold War. While many national security states, following the collapse of the USSR and the ending of the Cold War, abandoned their military tutelages for more democratic and civil structures, Turkey not only retained this state structure but also reinforced it. The global rise of the human rights-based identity demands in the 1990s did not resonate with Turkey on a state level and went on being perceived as a threat. The state once again used "the indivisible integrity of Turkey" and "the unitary state" concepts to silence the democratic demands of the Kurds, while imposing a rigid form of secularism (*laïcité*) on the pious masses. Therefore, the national security state in Turkey during the 1990s acquired political mobility and an institutional depth in accordance with its threat perceptions.

The resistance through the different strata of the society that denied the rights of Kurds as equal citizens functioned as a form of a covert legitimization of the political repression against the Kurds. In this framework, the rhetoric of the centrist parties regarding the solution of the Kurdish problem presented vast differences depending on whether they were in power or opposition. While they seemed to develop a more democratic perspective in an opposition role, they swiftly adopted the language of the national security state when they came to power.

The approach taken in the civilian political arena against the rise of WP, which then represented political Islam, was more complicated. The orthodox secular Kemalists' base, which found its representation in RPP, directly supported the military to oppose WP. The central right parties, which throughout the history of the republic demonstrated an ambivalent attitude concerning military tutelage and the secular nature of the regime, turned a blind eye to the closing of the WP, despite its significant number of voters. However, these political parties, when they came to power, resisted implementing the harsh decisions of the February 28 postmodern coup. Their actions were an attempt to regain these large voting bases that had become more conservative since the coup d'état of September 12.

The artificial coalitions formed under pressure of the military in the February 28 period did not bring any solution to the conflicts in the society. The economic crises when coupled with rampant corruption during the 1990s brought about the collapse of all the political parties that existed within the coalition governments. A group of WP politicians, who wisely analyzed the consequences of direct clashes with military tutelage and who saw the gap in the center right, established the JDP. Only one year after its foundation in 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, JDP won the general elections and became the fourth party to come to power alone in the multi-party period of the Turkish history.

In its first years, JDP portrayed itself as a "neoliberal" party in economic matters and rather a "liberal" one in political decisions. Early on, JDP stressed that the state should solely take on a regulatory and supervisory role and refrain from interfering with all sorts of economic activities. It also emphasized the necessity of privatization, the participatory democracy as well as the maintenance of the relations with the EU, the World Bank, the IMF and other international organizations. In its first years, the JDP, with the help of the abundance of money supply in the global financial system, made significant progress in economic development. While the effects of the 2001 economic crisis diminished over time, the level of unemployment and inflation decreased. These achievements in the economy played a decisive role in raising the percentage of their vote to 42 % in the 2004 local elections.

On the other hand, the mobilization that was initiated in the February 28 period by the military leaders and its supporters against the religious factions in the society, continued after the JDP came to power in 2002. The tension between the military, its supporters and the JDP escalated in 2007 when JDP nominated Abdullah Gül for the presidency. This polarization in society deepened with the street demonstrations backed by the mainstream media and turned into a full-blown crisis with a declaration of an "e-memorandum" on the website of the Department of Chief of the General Staff on April 27.

In this tense environment, JDP under Erdoğan's leadership, won a victory in the general elections of July 22, 2007, under Erdoğan's leadership, and it ended up raising its share of the

vote to 47 percent. In the face of the JDP's electoral success, the anger and panic at the centers of military circles resulted in a lawsuit to close down JDP. However, on 30 July 2008, the Constitutional Court dismissed the request for the closing of the party as only six (instead of seven) of the eleven judges ruled in favor.

While one of the reasons for JDP's success was the rise in the overall income levels, another one was Erdoğan's political mastery in presenting a set of demands of the conservative sections of the society, especially the right to wear a headscarf in public institutions as a democratic struggle. In such a political environment, the party cunningly presented the criticisms directed at the JDP as the indicators of supporting military tutelage.

At the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the JDP government and its leader Erdoğan abandoned the emphasis on pluralism and participatory democracy. As Erdogan got rid of the tools and mechanisms of the military guardianship, he took a turn to further solidify and secure his power rather than strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law. For this purpose, he reshaped the security state's instruments and re-introduced the security discourse with new contents. Erdoğan's new "New Turkey" claim was adorned with increasingly religious and anti-western practices and a significant dose of empire nostalgia overtly juxtaposed against the values and missions of the founding cadres of the early republic. The "national will" rhetoric, which has always been used by the right-wing parties to emphasize the superiority of the civil and elected governments, was co-opted by the JDP and yet in a highly ill-defined manner. In this rhetoric, the nation was reduced to JDP supporters, and the national values were associated with the symbols and phenomena that the party represented.

Regarding itself as the only genuine political force of democratic progress, the JDP chose to feed the polarization between its supporters and the rest of the society to secure the extent of its domination and its status as the ruling party. In this approach, democracy was reduced down to election results. Criticisms of the government's oppressive practices on issues ranging from abortion rights to alcohol restrictions were either deliberately ignored or were discredited in multiple ways including accusations of treason.

The JDP, to spread its conservative rhetoric and degrade its opponents, used partisan media organs and pro-government social media accounts called "Ak-Trolls." During the same period, the media organs or the NGOs criticizing Erdogan were either silenced or tamed with state instruments such as tax penalties, audits, or removal from bidding processes. To make things worse, with a series of blanket laws (September 9th, 2014, March 26th, 2015), the Presidency of Telecommunication & Communication was given vast powers that allowed the institution to block internet access or deactivate websites that it found suspicious without a court order, but on the basis of "the protection of national security and public order and the prevention of the commitment of crimes."

In the second half of the 2000s, JDP consolidated its powers even more and as part of its mission to decrease the "influence of the military on civilian politics," and it orchestrated a series of "democratization" moves. These steps, following this fundamental mission, were carried out through high-profile public cases, known as Ergenekon and Balyoz Operations, targeting many high-ranks and retired military personnel, academics, politicians, journalists, lawyers as well as business people with claims that they were preparing to topple or obstruct the functions of the government. A high number of anti-government figures were tried and imprisoned with allegations of being an armed member of a "terrorist group" and attempting to

obstruct political life by creating chaos in the society. The judiciary, a majority of whose members belonged to the Gülen movement, approved these allegations that in the end were made by the testimonials of fake witnesses and informants or fake evidence.¹⁴¹ Later, one of the founders of the JDP admitted that his party allowed the members of the Gülen movement to infiltrate in the security apparatus of the country to eliminate any coup attempt that could come from the secular factions of these institutions (HDP'li Fırat: Cemaat'i emniyete, askere ve MİT'e karşı biz yerleştirdik, *Cumhuriyet*, 2016, July 21).

This coalition with the Gülenists only came to an end when the movement directly got into a power conflict with JDP and exposed the corruptions of the government. After Erdoğan managed to suppress the corruption operations carried out by the Gülenists in the judiciary and law enforcement on December 17 and 25, 2013, the government proclaimed this movement the number one threat to national security. Consequently, after many years, the NSC once again returned to the scene hand in hand with the executive powers, as the highest authority legitimizing the national security policies. The 17/25 December operations also gave Erdoğan a perfect pretext to put the judiciary under his control (Law No. 6524 of 2015). The national security regime protected by the SSC left its place to an Erdoğan regime protected by an entire judicial system.

The most significant social reaction to eleven years of JDP government's repressive politics was the Gezi Park Protests in 2013. An urban renewal project to redevelop Istanbul's Gezi Park at the foot of Taksim square, the most symbolic political space in Turkey, sparked the largest wave of protests in Turkey's history. The disproportionate violence used by the police forces against a handful of environmental activists shortly turned into massive demonstrations by people from diverse background that ranged from environmentalists to soccer fans, Kurds to secular nationalists, and even leftist Islamists.

Erdoğan fiercely endorsed the police force. After Erdogan's open support for the police violence and his insistence on the construction of a shopping mall on the site of the Gezi Park, the protests turned into anti-government demonstrations across the country. In almost every city of the country, millions of people joined the rallies. The excessive force that the police used against protesters injured thousands of people and seven civilians lost their lives, including a 14-year-old child. Erdoğan, while blessing the harsh stance of the police against the protesters, invited his artisan supporters onto the streets as a paramilitary force ("Erdoğan: 'Esnaf gerektiğinde asker, polis ve hakimdir,'" *cnnturk.com*, 2014, November 26). These protests were labeled as a coup attempt by the JDP, and in its aftermath, on the personal initiative of Erdoğan,

¹⁴¹ The movement is named after the US-based Islamic cleric (İmam) Fethullah Gülen who is regarded as a spiritual leader by his followers whose numbers are said to be millions in Turkey. During the 1980 military regime, he was charged with attempting to topple the government and was arrested after six years on the run. Later he was freed and yet was once again charged in 2000 and remained in the US where he was having medical treatment. Gülen comes from the tradition of Islamic scholar Said Nursi (1878-1960), who focused on faith and morality rather than politics. The movement, also known as *Hizmet* (Service) in Turkey, on a rhetorical level has promoted a tolerant "cultural Islam" which emphasized the importance of altruism, and education. It has opened schools all over Turkey and around the world. However, a broad consensus regards the movement's covert motif as obtaining a critical position within the judiciary and the security apparatus to transform the secular state structure of Turkey by gradually joining its ranks. Most observers also agree that this effort began in the 1970s and had been unknowingly supported by the majority political leaders including Bülent Ecevit, a staunch secularist, and leftist. See, Çakır & Sakallı (2014) and Şık (2017) for an extensive analysis of the Gülen movement.

the government organized "Respect to Popular Will" rallies in five cities including İstanbul and Ankara.

The presidential elections in August 2014 became the beginning of a new era for Turkey. Prime Minister Erdoğan became the country's first directly elected president- a supposedly ceremonial role. After publicly declaring that he would be a "different" president, Erdoğan exceeded his limits of constitutional authority and continued to be JDP's de-facto leader. He interfered with his successor, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's decisions on many occasions. He had the dissident voices eliminated in the JDP and transformed the party into his private organization. In this process, as a manifestation of his desire to secure his power, he argued that Turkey should move from parliamentary regime to a "Turkish type presidential system."

Transition to presidential system took place under a separate title in the election statement of the JDP before the 7 June 2015 general elections. President Erdoğan asked for 400 deputies from the citizens without openly naming the ruling party and turned the general elections into a plebiscite for regime transformation. However, the HDP which entered the 7 June elections with a simple slogan saying "We will not allow you to become President" surpassed the steep 10% threshold for entering parliament and took more than 12% of the vote. The HDP victory denied Erdoğan's party its parliamentary majority (with 40.8% of the vote) and disabled him to call a referendum on the constitution intending to convert Turkey into a presidential system.

JDP's loss of its simple majority in parliament due to pro-Kurdish party gains resulted in cutting off the Kurdish Opening or Initiative (aka as the Democratic Opening/Initiative) which had been announced by the ruling party in 2009 and had gathered pace in 2012 with direct communications with the PKK's imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan. The two and a half years of non-violence and ceasefire period came to an end. From this date on, the developments showed that Erdoğan instrumentalized the Kurdish issue to reestablish the JDP's one-party government and achieve his political goals. In the first instance, despite the unwillingness of leading JDP members including the prime minister and ex-President Abdullah Gül, Erdoğan ensured the approval of the Internal Security Package with provisions designed to bypass the judiciary in a series of situations that normally require judicial decisions. He empowered police and public administrators as the decision-makers (Law No. 6638 of 2015).

Then, the JDP government suspended all negotiations with Öcalan and blocked his contact with his lawyers and declared many districts in the Southeast as "Temporary Special Security Zones." The security operations accelerated in these areas and deepened the conflict. With the control over mainstream media, he highlighted the fear tactic that any other option outside his leadership would make the security concerns a routine and inescapable part of everyday life. In these regions, during weeks of uninterrupted curfews, hundreds of civilians lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands were displaced. The racist and humiliating messages towards the Kurds left by the Special Operations Teams in the conflict areas revealed the fact that the partnership with the right-wing idealists in the 1990s was re-established as a state policy in the JDP period. The government hampered investigations of human rights violations against civilians during operations. Those who criticized the state's oppressive practices were faced with enormous pressure.

On October 10, 2015, the most lethal suicide bombing (with 103 people killed and 250 wounded) in Turkey's history took place during the Peace Rally held by the HDP and a large

number of non-governmental organizations in Ankara. The protestors had gathered to stand against violence between the Turkish authorities and the PKK. Following this terrorist attack, the statement of the then Prime Minister Davutoğlu in a live broadcast became the most revealing examples of the government's strategy of regaining its power. He stated, "After the Ankara Attack, our votes are in a rising trend towards the 43-44 percent band" (*Cumhuriyet*, 2015, October 20).

Due to the uncooperative attitude of the JDP government, for the first time in Turkey's political history, the largest party in the parliament has failed to form a coalition. This was, in fact, a pre-meditated strategy of the President. Hereupon Erdoğan called for a return to the polls and set the new parliamentary elections to be held on November 1st. Erdoğan deployed his calculated political strategy in a campaign that played on voters' fears of uncertainty and insecurity. Almost five months after the previous general elections Erdoğan managed to re-establish his one-party rule in an environment where the opposition parties, especially the HDP, could not hold public demonstrations or even convey their messages through media. The JDP won over 49% of the vote. Although the HDP once again passed the 10 % threshold, many conservative Kurds who had given support to the HDP in the previous elections, returned to the JDP (KONDA 2015). The JDP also captured a considerable number of nationalist voters in line with its aggressive strategy to the Kurdish conflict. After this date, for the JDP, the HDP became the enemy to be destroyed and the NMP, a political party that would be torn apart by vote transfers. The RPP, which has never gone beyond its reactionary and weak opposition status, maintained its position as an instrument of legitimization for the democratic appearance of the regime.

In the ongoing process, the JDP removed the parliamentary immunity of the MPs as a maneuver to reduce the number of HDP's seats in parliament and by this way put the Parliament under its tutelage. Meanwhile, President Erdoğan forced out Prime Minister Davutoğlu, with whom his partnership fell out due to differing opinions on several issues, and thus he eliminated the last obstacle before his absolute control over the party. Subsequently, he replaced Davutoğlu with Binali Yıldırım, a politician who would agree with the President on every issue.

The close partnership established with paramilitary organizations during the 1990s resurged in the same period. However, what was new in Turkey's political history in this context is that Erdoğan did not confine himself to clandestine state agents but instead activated a private security structure compatible with his ideology. One of the most significant indicators of this strategy was the establishment of International Defense Consulting (SADAT), "the first and the only private company in Turkey that internationally provides consultancy and military training services" as stated on its official website (<http://www.sadat.com.tr/>). SADAT was founded by expelled, retired and noncommissioned officers who are close to Erdoğan. The existence of SADAT was brought into the spotlight during the widespread urban warfare started between the Turkish Armed Forces and PKK. On one particular instance, it was alleged that 34 villagers from Lice were gathered together by a paramilitary force and were about to be burned alive

when an officer from the Armed Forces arrived and prevented the mass killing (“Lice’de ‘köylü yakma’ iddiasında adı geçen Sadat, savunma şirketiymiş”, *Diken*, 2016, July 11).¹⁴²

Another source that provides paramilitary support to Erdoğan is the Osmanlı Ocakları, which was established in 2009 and got swiftly organized in 73 cities of Turkey by the cadres separated from the youth organization (Alperen Ocakları) of far-right Islamist and nationalist Great Unity Party. Its members who define themselves as "soldiers of Erdoğan" played a significant role in the lynching attempts against the Kurds, the attacks on the RPP and HDP buildings, as well as the media organs and journalists targeted by Erdogan (Oğuz 2016, pp. 111-112). The notorious ultra-nationalist convicted mob leader Sedat Peker and his cadres were also among the organizations that signed up for Erdoğan's paramilitary army. Peker, who was supported by the state in the 1990s against the Kurdish mafia, expressed support for JDP in the period leading up to the November elections. He has been launching vitriolic attacks against Turkish opposition since then. The paramilitary support given to Erdoğan does not end here. Pro-government fan mobs created through taking over or reviving old sports clubs by certain JDP municipalities, Islamic gangs such as "Esedullah team" (team of Allah's lions) used in military operations in Kurdish provinces (Cengiz, November 25, 2015), ultra-conservative civilian organizations such as the Anatolia Muslim Youth Association calling for "intervention" against the LGBT Pride Marches are among other examples of paramilitary organizations of Erdoğan's Turkey (Oğuz, p. 112).

If we compare the post-2010 Erdogan period with the preceding one, we can say the following: In the preceding era, the Turkish Armed Forces as a whole, perceiving themselves as the guardians of the secular and unitary nature of the Republic, placed the security apparatus under their control. The JDP government, which has gradually lifted the military guardianship during the 2000s however, contrary to its initial rhetoric of promoting democracy and pluralism, has redirected the security apparatus and made its mission to guarantee Erdoğan's staying in power. The JDP government, which first eliminated and then adopted the security state, with this move aimed to constitute a state-nation-leader cohesion. In other words, the government, re-arming it with new extensive authority, attached the security apparatus to itself. Nationalism provided the common ideological ground between these two. While adopting the distinctive practices of the national security state, the JDP/Erdoğan government attempted to articulate a new hegemonic discourse that prioritized nationalism with a neo-Ottomanist imperial vision.

The coup attempt, which took place on July 15, 2016, resulted in the loss of 240 lives, of which 173 were civilians. This failed coup, which could have turned into a massacre if had it been successful, made very clear how a security organization based on "loyalty" and so-called ideological partnership instead of merit, could create a great security weakness.

In the wake of the coup d'état, a nationwide state of emergency was declared to purge all public institutions from Gülen community members and sympathizers. However, the developments that have been taking place until now demonstrate that the state of emergency is

¹⁴² Kurdish MPs parliamentary question on whether the allegations towards the SADAT soldiers were correct or not, was not answered by the government. (<https://medium.com/@turkeyobserved/erdogans-revolutionary-guard-sadat-b9f80a6354d7>)

used for the silencing of all political dissidents and criticism rather than for eliminating the Gülenists.

As a final word of this dissertation it is possible to make the following evaluation: Recently, Turkey has decided to switch to a presidential system after a controversial plebiscite on 16th April 2017. This plebiscite not only legalized Erdoğan's de-facto and unconstitutional role as a partisan president but also granted him sweeping new powers as head of government, head of state and head of the ruling party. In this context, the political regime of Turkey is moving far beyond national security state towards fascism. This is, however, the subject of another study.

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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)

Dit proefschrift betwijfelt de geldigheid van twee opvattingen die vrijwel universeel geaccepteerd worden door wetenschappers in Turkse studies: dat Turkije een onmisbare bondgenoot is van de Verenigde Staten sinds het lidmaatschap van de Noord-Atlantische Verdragsorganisatie (NAVO) in 1952, en dat het nationale veiligheidsdiscours van de Turkse Republiek altijd een obstakel is geweest voor het oplossen van fundamentele politieke en maatschappelijke problemen. Het voornaamste probleem van deze twee opvattingen is dat ze niet samen worden gelezen, waardoor hun significante relatie over het hoofd wordt gezien.

Ten eerste beweert dit proefschrift dat de Turkse Republiek in het tijdperk van de Koude Oorlog geleidelijk werd omgevormd tot een nationale veiligheidsstaat. In de politieke literatuur wordt "Nationale Veiligheidsstaat" gebruikt om twee onderscheidende staatsuitingen te definiëren. De eerste verwijst naar de ideologie en instituties die zijn ingesteld door de *National Security Act* van 1947 in de Verenigde Staten. Het argument van de nationale veiligheidsstaat voor Turkije, dat in dit proefschrift naar voren wordt gebracht, is echter niet gebaseerd op een vergelijking met de opkomst van de nationale veiligheidsstaat in de VS. Dit proefschrift maakt gebruik van een tweede algemeen aanvaarde definitie van "nationale veiligheidsstaat", ontwikkeld door Latijns-Amerikaanse onderzoekers. Deze wetenschappers hebben dit staatsmodel theoretisch onderzocht om zo de overeenkomsten in kaart te brengen van de door de VS gesteunde militaire regimes in de regio, in de context van de Koude Oorlog. Het concept van nationale veiligheid en de bijpassende doctrines en machtsapparaten waren aanvankelijk in de VS ontwikkeld, maar werden door deze autoritaire regimes getransformeerd: hun aanpak voor het vinden van omvangrijkere toepassingen en draagvlak moest veranderen, aangezien deze staten niet over dezelfde "checks and balances"-mechanismen bezaten als de VS. De toepassing van de nieuwe Amerikaanse nationale veiligheidsdoctrine door Latijns-Amerikaanse militaristische regimes bereidde hen dus voor op een veel omvangrijkere veiligheidsstaat. Bedreigingen die aanvankelijk waren gebaseerd op het vermeende gevaar van communisme werden uitvergroet om alle dissidente bewegingen, groeperingen of debatten te omvatten. Zoals in dit proefschrift wordt aangetoond, vertoont Turkije opvallende gelijkenissen met de NSS in Latijns-Amerika, ondanks de geografisch afstand en de afwezigheid van directe betrokkenheid van de VS bij de geschiedenis van Turkije's militaire interventies. Een belangrijke stimulans voor de soepele werking en goedkeuring van de nationale veiligheidsdoctrine in Turkije was de angst onder haar grondleggers voor desintegratie en politieke islam, zoals die zich in de beginjaren van de Republiek vormden. De Turkse veiligheidsstaat werd tijdens de Koude Oorlog geoperationaliseerd tegen deze diepgewortelde perceptie van bedreiging, wat voortduurde tot aan de beginjaren van deze eeuw.

Het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift verklaart en contextualiseert de reikwijdte van de nationale veiligheidsideologie en de twee verschillende nationale veiligheidsmodellen die door deze ideologie worden gevormd, de ene in de VS en de andere in Latijns-Amerika. Door de meest erkende wetenschappelijke bronnen te analyseren en de belangrijkste argumenten in de politieke wetenschappelijke literatuur te bespreken, schetst het hoofdstuk de geschiedenis van de vorming van nationale veiligheidsideologie, nieuwe institutionele structuren en de interne

gevolgen van deze radicale verschuiving van buitenlands beleid in de VS. Later laat het hoofdstuk zien hoe de Amerikaanse regeringen de rechtse militaire regimes hebben bevorderd en ondersteund, om zo de voortgang van de linkse bewegingen in geallieerde landen te stoppen. Ten slotte laat het hoofdstuk zien hoe dit raamwerk, tezamen met de nieuwe militaire doctrine, werd overgenomen en vertaald door de militaire regeringen van Amerikaanse bondgenoten in Latijns-Amerika. Het brengt daarnaast de gemeenschappelijke kenmerken in kaart van de nationale veiligheidsstaten die werden opgebouwd door Latijns-Amerikaanse militairen, om daarmee de overeenkomsten met de Turkse context aan het licht te brengen.

Hoofdstuk twee onderzoekt hoe Turkije's bondgenootschap met de VS gedurende de Koude Oorlog de ideologische context van het leger in Turkije heeft getransformeerd en welke mechanismen deze transformatie ondersteunden. De prestaties en programma's van de drie staatsgrepen die tien jaar na elkaar plaatsvonden, in 1960, 1971 en 1980, worden vergeleken om te laten zien hoe de Koude Oorlog de relaties tussen het leger en de politiek in Turkije sterk heeft beïnvloed. Ten slotte analyseert dit hoofdstuk het nieuwe hegemone discours van de nationale veiligheidsstaat, dat zijn laatste fase bereikte met de militaire staatsgreep van 1980. Dit deel onderzoekt de dynamiek van de samenwerking tussen de nationale veiligheidsideologie, de ideologie van de grondleggers van de Republiek en het Turks - Islamitische Synthese-project, waarbij de laatste wordt geïdentificeerd als de culturele uitkomst van de open steun die de VS gaf aan de gematigde islam tijdens de Koude Oorlog.

Het derde hoofdstuk beschrijft hoe het nationale veiligheidsconcept de institutionele structuur van de staat en de politiek doordrong, in het bijzonder op het nationale veiligheidsapparaat. Na een beknopt historisch overzicht van de overgang van Turkije van de nationale defensie naar het nationale veiligheidsconcept ten tijde van van de Koude Oorlog, identificeert dit hoofdstuk de rol van het nationale veiligheidsbegrip in de juridische architectuur van dit nieuwe staatsmechanisme, dat geïnstitutionaliseerd raakte na de staatsgreep van 1980. De volgende centrale veiligheidsactoren worden door de militaire autoriteit betrokken bij hun wetgevende kaders: de Nationale Veiligheidsraad (NSC) en het secretariaat-generaal van de Nationale Veiligheidsraad (GSNSC), de Nationale Inlichtingenorganisatie (NIO) en de staat Beveiligingsrechtbanken (SSC). Dit hoofdstuk laat ook zien hoe bestuursorganen die niet onder het gezag van deze actoren staan onder het centralistische apparaat van de veiligheidsstaat worden geplaatst, met als waarschuwing "naleving van de eisen van het nationale veiligheidsbeleid", zoals vermeld in de wetten van de "12 september"-regering en later. Bovendien wordt in dit hoofdstuk ingegaan op de individuele en sociale grondrechten en vrijheden die door de nationale veiligheid worden beperkt, om aan te tonen hoe het nationale veiligheidsfenomeen niet alleen wordt gebruikt om de politieke sfeer te beheersen, maar ook het sociale veld. Ten slotte worden de staatsveiligheidsrechtbanken, de rechterlijke macht van de nationale veiligheidsstaat en hun beslissingen over vrijheid van meningsuiting en vrijheid van gedachte onderzocht.

Het vierde hoofdstuk analyseert hoe de nationale veiligheidsstaat een overlevingsstrategie ontwikkelde na de Koude Oorlog door zich te richten op "oude vijanden": Koerdische separatisten en politieke islam. De identiteitsclaims van deze groepen, die legitieme onderwerpen van politiek debat zouden kunnen blijven en waarover in civiele termen zou

kunnen worden onderhandeld, evolueren naar gewelddadige conflicten waarin ze worden gezien als grond voor het creëren van legitimiteit door de nationale veiligheidsstaat. Om zijn hegemonie over de politiek te handhaven, heeft het nationale veiligheidsapparaat deze twee identiteitsclaims, die in de jaren negentig in civiele politieke organisaties waren ontstaan, omgezet in bedreigingen. Dit hoofdstuk bestaat uit vier verschillende subsecties. Het eerste deel onderzoekt de civiel-militaire relaties van de vroege post-militaire regimeperiode, na een historische achtergrond te hebben gegeven over de ineenstorting van de politieke architectuur van drie partijen, georganiseerd door de staatsgreep van 12 september 1980. Het tweede deel onderzoekt hoe de Koerdische kwestie resoneerde met de nationale veiligheidsstaat. Het analyseert de spanningen tussen de regeringen en Koerdische politieke partijen en onderzoekt hoe het veiligheidsveld op zowel legale als illegale gronden werd uitgebreid. Het derde deel herhaalt een soortgelijke analytische lezing over de opkomst en de strijd tegen de politieke islam in Turkije. De introductie van deze sectie geeft een historische achtergrond tot de jaren '80 van de relatie tussen het leger, drager van de ideologische grondslagen van Turkije, en politieke partijen van islamitische signatuur. Vervolgens onderzoekt het de opkomst van de Welvaartspartij als primaire vertegenwoordiger van de politieke islam in Turkije en de reacties die het ontving van de veiligheidsstaat. In dit verband wordt het proces van 28 februari besproken, een politieke term die is vernoemd naar de staatsgreep die plaatsvond op 28 februari 1997 en die een tijdspanne aangeeft die begint vóór 1997 en eindigt met de ontbinding van de nationale veiligheidsstaat. Het proefschrift wordt afgesloten met de analyse van het proces van 28 februari. De politieke ontwikkelingen die zich sinds deze tijd hebben voorgedaan, behoren tot een andere periode met een eigen dynamiek en zijn daarom het onderwerp van een ander onderzoek. De fundamentele dynamiek uit deze nieuwe periode is de goedkeuring van de EU-kandidatuur van Turkije in 1999. Na deze datum is de nationale veiligheidsstaat aan een ontbindingsproces begonnen, door middel van structurele hervormingen die nodig waren voor EU-lidmaatschap, ondanks het hevige verzet uit militaire kringen. Om deze reden worden in het laatste deel de ontwikkelingen die de militaire voorgedij uit juridische en publieke domeinen hebben verwijderd, uitsluitend gepresenteerd op feitelijke basis, zonder een multilevel analyse van met elkaar verweven kwesties.

Het concluderende hoofdstuk bevat aanvullende opmerkingen over huidige en toekomstige politieke ontwikkelingen in Turkije, aangezien de studie niet los kan worden gezien van de Turkse politieke actualiteit. Zo maakt het politieke bestuur van de AK-partij (Partij voor Rechtvaardigheid en Ontwikkeling) gebruik van de hervormde reflexen en functies van de historische periode die in dit proefschrift zijn onderzocht, hoewel het niet expliciet gebruik maakt van de ideologie of alle institutionele structuren.

Curriculum Vitae

Zeynep Şarлак was born in Ankara in 1971. She graduated from Ankara College in 1988. She obtained her BA degree at Boğaziçi University, Department of Economics in 1992. She received her first MA degree in Political Science and International Relations at the same university in 1995. She enrolled at Sorbonne University to learn French in 1995 and finished her second MA in Comparative Politics at Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris in 1997. She worked as a research assistant at Galatasaray University, Department of Political Science, between 1999 and 2006. She worked as the team coordinator and researcher in the international research project entitled "Crime and Culture" within the Sixth Framework Program of the European Commission between 2006-2009. She participated in the "Curriculum and Material Development Project in Family Education" undertaken by the General Directorate of Family and Social Research as Economics Specialist and Consultant between 2008-2011. She enrolled in the PhD program in Turkish Studies at Leiden University in 2011. She worked as a researcher at Helsinki Citizens' Assembly in the project titled Cross-border Citizens' Network for Peace, Inter-communal Reconciliation & Human Security supported within the context of Partnership Programmes for Civil Society Organizations of the European Commission between 2013- 2016. She has taught High Level Economics courses for International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme in various high schools for 18 years, until 2019. Her research interest covers Turkish political history and sociology of corruption.