Abstract and Keywords

Although the literature shows a bewildering variety of typologies of representative democracy, the most important distinctions can be subsumed under a basic dichotomy with, on the one hand, a populist-majoritarian model, and on the other hand a liberal/consensual model. That latter model comes in two varieties: a liberal model based on the division of power, and a consensual model based on the sharing of power. The search for the best model is hampered by the fact that so many criteria are biased in favour of a particular model, and by the ambition to find a universally valid answer, ignoring the interaction of the institutional architecture with the structure and culture of society.

Keywords: representative democracy, populist-majoritarian tradition, liberal/consensual tradition, legitimacy, Locke, Rousseau, Madison, Calhoun, J.S. Mill, Lijphart

Introduction

REPRESENTATIVE democracy implies an indirect relationship between citizens and the political decision-making process. This relationship is often conceptualized in terms of a principal–agent framework: citizens (the principals) delegate the authority to make public policy to representatives (the agents), who in most political systems in turn act as principals who further delegate this authority to their agents—the government. The model can be extended to include policy implementation—from the government to individual ministers, and from ministers to civil servants. This chain of delegation is mirrored by a chain of accountability from the policymakers directly or indirectly to the citizens. The model is a simplification of reality, assuming for example that citizens have exogenous preferences that can be entrusted to their representatives, thereby ignoring that such preferences may also be endogenous to the representative relationship (e.g. Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996). But in all its simplicity, the principal–agent framework serves to illustrate that the chains of delegation and accountability can be designed in very different ways: citizens may delegate to a single agent who sub-delegates, or to multiple agents as in presidential

systems of government, and agents can be accountable to one or to several principals, as when governments have to answer (p. 96) to unicameral or bicameral parliaments. Related to such variables, representative democracies may emphasize different combinations of mechanisms that govern the relationship between principals and agents: various ex ante controls such as drawing up a contract and selection of agents and/or ex post controls such as reporting requirements and monitoring (e.g. Strøm 2000, 2003; Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013). In summary: the daily functioning of representative democracy is facilitated, but also constrained, by the design of the institutional framework in which the representative relationship is embedded.

This chapter first seeks to tease out two basic principles that underlie the great variety in the institutional architecture of representative democracy, and their philosophical roots. Second, the chapter discusses the search for an answer to the question of which model of representative democracy is the best, and how this search is marred by both the dearth of unbiased criteria and the ambition to find a universal answer.

From Bewildering Variety to Basic Dichotomy

A widespread recognition of the existence of several models of representative democracy is combined with a lack of agreement about what these models are. There have been numerous attempts to categorize the empirical variety of representative democracies. In constitutional law a distinction is made between parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems of government but each of these three types comes in different varieties (Shugart and Carey 1992; Elgie 2011).

In comparative political science, several projects have developed different typologies. The aptly named 'Varieties of Democracy' project, for example, uses expert judgements on over 350 indicators to score countries on five 'Democracy Ideals' (Lühmann et al. 2018). The Democracy Barometer likewise aims to position countries on five (different) dimensions of democracy (Bühlman et al. 2012). And these two projects are not the only ones proposing a typology of forms of representative democracy (e.g. Lane and Ersson 2003; Kriesi et al. 2016).

The situation is not much different in political theory. Weale (1999: 19–39), for example, outlines three varieties of representative democracy in addition to two forms of direct democracy. In his history of the idea of democracy, Held (2006: 17, fig. 1) distinguishes nine models of democracy, five or six of which can be regarded as a variety of representative democracy. There is some overlap in the aspects and theorists discussed, but the resulting typologies are quite different (also see Chapter 1 in this *Handbook*).

These are just illustrative examples of empirical and normative typologies of representative democracy. It is not difficult to find yet other specimens of at least partially different categorizations. Given the huge variety, it is impossible to capture all the (p. 97) available nuances in one simple dimension, but it has been claimed that the most important distinctions can be subsumed under a single basic dichotomy (e.g. Thomassen 1995). Sabine

(1952), for example, argues that two great European revolutions led to two fundamentally different conceptualizations of what representative democracy is about. The 1689 Glorious Revolution in England, and the 1789 French Revolution, he suggests, were both middle-class revolts against feudalism, but the concrete issues at stake differed, and as a consequence each moulded a different view of representative democracy. The English Revolution was to a considerable extent a fight over religious tolerance, for nonconformist Protestants first, but later also for Catholics. Thus, 'What the English Revolution contributed to the democratic tradition was the principle of freedom for minorities, together with a constitutional system both to protect and to regulate that freedom' (Sabine 1952, 457). The French Revolution on the other hand, was a fight over social, economic, and political privileges linked to social positions. Thus, its contribution was the notion of 'a uniform citizenship giving equal political rights and imposing equal political obligations on everyone' (Sabine 1952, 462). Since then we have had an Anglo-Saxon perspective prioritizing freedom from tyranny for all, and a French or continental perspective emphasizing popular sovereignty and political equality for all, and 'As is the habit of revolutions, each had its philosopher: in the one case John Locke, in the other Rousseau. These men were the intellectual ancestors of the two democratic traditions' (Sabine 1952, 453).

The Populist-Majoritarian Tradition

If we start with Rousseau and the combination of popular sovereignty and equality, it is well known that Rousseau would prefer direct democracy if only it were viable. For reasons of scale it is not and representative democracy is seen, in Dahl's famous words, as 'a sorry substitute for the real thing' (Dahl 1982: 13). In this tradition representative democracy should be designed so as to approximate the ideal and that implies that there should be an identity between represented and representatives, and that the decision rule should treat all individuals equally. Of course, the very concept of representation presupposes a lack of identity between represented and representatives: it means 'the making present *in some sense* of something that is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact' (Pitkin 1967: 8–9). The unavoidable distance between the represented and the representatives can be reduced if the representatives act as faithful delegates of those they represent, even if they themselves would have divergent preferences. Such a role conception can be reinforced by institutional mechanisms such as binding the representatives to a strictly worded mandate (e.g. the instructions ministers in some EU member states receive from their parliament before leaving for Brussels to represent their country) or giving the represented the right of 'recall' if their representatives stray from their mandate (as exists in some US states). Since political parties have all but replaced individual politicians as representative actors, the identity (p. 98) between citizens and representatives is thought to be achieved by parties presenting their plans to the voters, voters choosing the party with the plans they prefer, and parties being held accountable by the voters at the next elections. Thus, 'the doctrine of responsible party government' (e.g. Ranney 1954) fits this conceptualization of democracy.

The decision rule in this democratic tradition is majoritarian—although in practice it is often pluralitarian. Decision by majority flows from the equality of all individuals. The alternative decision rule would be unanimity, and unanimity effectively gives a veto to the minority over the majority. On a more practical level, a unanimity requirement would be conservative as it would privilege the status quo. In the long run, maintaining the status quo against the wishes of the majority is not democratic in the eyes of the populist-majoritarian tradition. When, in his first inaugural address as US President, Lincoln warned that the Southern states had no right to block the abolition of slavery, he set out the majoritarian position: 'A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. (…) Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left' (Lincoln 1861). Note that Lincoln refers to constitutional constraints on the majority, but this is an element that fits better the 'other' democratic tradition, as we shall discuss momentarily. In fact, in order to implement the will of the popular majority as undiluted as possible, the parliamentary majority should ideal-typically not be subjected to any checks and balances, least of all by non-majoritarian countervailing powers such as a judiciary.

The emphasis on identity with the represented population and on decision by majority explains why this democratic tradition is referred to by labels such as 'populistic' (Dahl 1956), 'populist' (Riker 1982), 'collectivist' (Rejai 1967), or as 'adversary' (Mansbridge 1980), 'majoritarian' (Powell 2000), or 'Westminster' (Lijphart 2012).

The Liberal/Consensual Tradition

The development of the other democratic tradition has been more complicated. That Sabine regards Locke as the philosopher of the liberal tradition is easy to understand. Not only was Locke personally involved in the English Revolution, his idea that individuals possess some basic rights that even the rulers of the day have to respect exemplifies the definition of democracy as freedom from tyranny. For Locke the threat to an ordinary citizen's rights came from an unelected ruler, but it received a radical amendment by the American founding fathers. They regarded the introduction of popular elections as inevitable, but feared that their own landowner interests would not be safe under mass suffrage. To put it unkindly: whereas Locke sought to protect the (p. 99) ordinary citizens from the rulers, the US founding fathers wanted to protect the ruling classes from the ordinary citizens. Hence the obsession of Madison *cum suis* with the risk of a majoritarian tyranny. As Hamilton argued in the Federal Convention: 'In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few and the many. Hence separate interests will arise (…) Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have power, that each may defend itself against the other' (Hamilton 1787).

Interestingly, neither Locke nor the American founding fathers sought to protect the interests of the minority against the majority by substituting the majority decision rule with the unanimity decision rule. Locke defended decision by majority albeit on practical rather than theoretical grounds (Manin 1997: 189). Madison likewise stuck with majority rule, and sought protection for the interests of the minority through a separation of powers, speculating that in a large and thus heterogeneous polity, it is unlikely that all elected institutions (in the US: the executive and both Houses of Congress), at all levels of the federal government, would have an identically composed majority. In addition to such checks and balances between majoritarian institutions, there is the additional constraint of an independent judiciary that is empowered to adjudicate disputes between the various branches of government. In this way, this democratic tradition became intertwined with the principle of rule of law, or *Rechtstaat*.

In the United States it was Calhoun who took the next logical step by proposing to abandon the majoritarian decision rule. He feared that the checks and balances put in place by Madison *cum suis* would be an insufficient safeguard of minority interests against the majority. In his *Disquisition on Government* (1851), he developed his theory of the 'concurrent majority'. He argued that a majority decision does not represent the will of the people: '(…) the numerical majority, instead of being the people, is only a portion of them (…)'. The solution is to 'Give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execution'. If there is to be majority decision-making, it is within 'each division', and all divisions should then unanimously support any new policy. Calhoun's political motivation for the 'concurrent majority' thesis was to protect the slave-owning states from being outvoted by the Northern abolitionists—his embrace of the unanimity rule stands in direct opposition to the view of Lincoln in the same dispute quoted above—and the association with slavery may have limited the appeal of the concurrent majority. Theoretically, however, it is a logical step from the protection of the interests of the minority to the inclusion of the minority in decision-making. In a sense, this is what Dahl does when he presents two dimensions of what he called 'Polyarchy': competition and inclusion (Dahl 1971; cf. Coppedge et al. 2008). Although Calhoun thought of the US states when he talked about 'divisions', the idea is applicable to other types of minorities: mechanisms such as the cross-community vote in Northern Ireland, or special majority laws in Belgium, requiring consent from not just an overall majority, but a majority of representatives from both religious groups (p. 100) (Northern Ireland) or both language groups (Belgium), are manifestations of the concurrent majority.

In this line of reasoning, Calhoun's concurrent majority was an amendment on Madison's checks on the majority, which itself was an amendment on Locke's constraints on the ruler. Historically, however, the idea of decision by unanimity may be much older, certainly in non-Western countries (e.g. Lewis 1965). Mansbridge traces it back to classical (direct) democracy which, although formally deciding by majority, actually preferred unanimity (*homonoia*). It was only since Hobbes that 'Over the generations, the idea gradually gained acceptance that a democracy should weigh and come to terms with conflicting selfish interests rather than trying to reconcile them or to make them subordinate to a

larger common good' (Mansbridge 1980: 16). More important than the precise historical sequence, Mansbridge points to an interesting connection between the unanimity rule and deliberation among representatives in order to define the 'common good'. They clearly belong to the same family, and it is not accidental that Schumpeter (1950), a proponent of the other (populist-majoritarian) tradition, based his definition of democracy on a rejection of the 'common good'. And if we argued above that the role conception of the delegate fits with the populist/majoritarian tradition, the role conception of a Burkean trustee is more appropriate in the liberal/consensual tradition, particularly because in Burke's view a trustee's freedom from his constituents' instructions is to be used to deliberate with other trustees about the common good. In a famous quote: 'Parliament is not a *congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of *parliament*' (Burke 1774: 81).

In aid of the inclusion of minorities, and the deliberation about the common good, it would be helpful if parliament would reflect the composition of the whole population, rather than only the majority of the population. This representativeness of parliament can be in terms of demography or identity, as in pleas for 'descriptive representation' if need be by enforcing a quota for particular minorities (e.g. Phillips 1995), but it is more commonly interpreted in terms of ideological preferences to be achieved by an electoral system of proportional representation rather than a system based on majority or plurality support in a constituency. One of proportional representation's early advocates, John Stuart Mill (1861), seems to echo Calhoun in his choice of words in a chapter entitled 'Of True and False Democracy; representation of all, and representation of the majority only': proportional representation acts as a check on 'the ascendancy of the numerical majority' because 'it secures a representation, in proportion to numbers, of every division of the electoral body: not two great parties alone (…) but every minority in the nation' (cited in Friedrich 1946: 274).

(p. 101) The inclusion of minorities in political decision-making is still not complete, however. Advocates of descriptive or proportional representation largely confine themselves to representation in parliament, ignoring the next step in the chain of delegation: the government. Mill, for example, considered parliamentary debate to be of crucial importance, and proportional representation serves to guarantee that parliament is 'A place where every interest and shade of opinion can have its cause even passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other interests and opinions' (cited in Judge 1999: 30). In Mill's view parliament is a debating, not a decision-making, body, although it has to give consent to decisions taken by the government (Manin 1997: 191): 'in reality the only thing [it] decides is which two, or at most three, parties (…) shall furnish the executive government' (cited in Judge 1999, 29). This implies a parliamentary system of government, and indeed most countries that have adopted proportional representation have also chosen a parliamentary system. However, a parliamentary system, being defined as a sys-

tem in which the government's survival depends on the confidence of a parliamentary majority, follows a majoritarian logic. Thus, the institutional design is inconsistent: representativeness for the relation between citizens and parliament, and majority for the relation between parliament and government. The German liberal politician Friedrich Naumann makes this very point when he is quoted as saying: 'The result of proportional elections is the impossibility of parliamentary government; parliamentary government and proportionalism exclude each other' (in Friedrich 1946: 290–1). Although combinations of proportionalism and parliamentary government do occur, Friedrich 'explains away' such cases by arguing that only small states can afford to be inconsistent, or by pointing to the monarchy as an alternative source of legitimacy for the government in states that combine the two. Whatever the merits of cases of proportional representation with parliamentary government and their explanations, from a theoretical perspective it would be logical to extend the inclusion of all minorities into the composition of the government. This is sometimes referred to as 'assembly government', *gouvernement conventionnel* or 'directory government' (although the first two terms strictly speaking refer to systems in which parliament is also the government; see Loewenstein 1965: 79–85, 116–20) in which the government is a microcosm of parliament, just as the latter is a microcosm of the people. An example is the Swiss federal government in which the government is not dependent on a majority in parliament, and in which a 'magic formula' has guaranteed the continued representation of all four main parties in government for a long time. The idea can also be recognized in the constitutional rule that requires an equal number of francophone and Dutch speaking ministers in Belgium, or in the informal understanding that (nearly) all provinces should be represented in the Canadian government, or in the formation of 'grand' or at least 'oversized' governing coalitions in general.

In conclusion, whereas the populist/majoritarian tradition of thinking about representative democracy was relatively straightforward to describe, the tradition based on freedom from tyranny actually contains two different strands of thought. One variety shares the majoritarian decision rule with the populist-majoritarian tradition, but puts (p. 102) in place checks and balances to constrain the 'numerical majority'. The other variety includes all 'divisions' in the decision-making process through mechanisms such as proportional representation. In its most radical form, this variety replaces majority as a decision rule with unanimity. The two varieties are easily recognized in Lijphart's two dimensions of power sharing: first, 'the executives-parties dimension' consisting of proportional representation, executive power sharing, and corporatism, and second 'the federal-unitary dimension' consisting of federalism, bicameralism, rigid constitutions, and judicial review (Lijphart 2012). As Lijphart himself suggests 'the first dimension could also be labeled the joint-responsibility or joint-power dimension and the second the divided-responsibility or divided-power dimension' and these labels would be 'theoretically more meaningful' (Lijphart 2012: 5). Both dimensions may be subsumed under the general heading of power-sharing, but they refer to different meanings of the word 'sharing': sharing a taxi together involves sitting in the car together and coordinating where the driver should go first; sharing a cake together merely involves dividing it in portions and each 'partner' eating it separately. Thus, this tradition is referred to by two clusters of

terms: 'Madisonian' (Dahl 1956), 'individual' (Rejai 1967), or 'liberal' (Riker 1982) democracy on the one hand, and 'unitary' (Mansbridge 1980), 'proportional' (Powell 2000), 'inclusive' (Lane and Ersson 2003), or 'consensus' (Lijphart 2012) democracy on the other hand.

Ideal Types of Representative Democracy

This leaves us with two main traditions of conceptualizing representative democracy, with one of these two traditions being subdivided into two variants. Table 4.1 provides an overview of these traditions, including their consequences for the institutional design of representative democracy. We emphasize that we should not expect actual institutional frameworks to conform to these designs in full: they are ideal types, with real political systems being mixtures or combinations of design elements from different traditions. Even otherwise strongly majoritarian systems are rarely without any constitutional constraints on the majority will, and even systems that are quite inclusive rarely do without decision by majority altogether. However, we maintain that some representative democracies are inspired more by one tradition or the other, and that this shows in an emphasis on institutional elements that are peculiar to that tradition.

The Institutional Framework of Representative Democracy: Comparing the Populist-Majoritarian and the Liberal/Consensual Model

Table 4.1 Two Traditions of Representative Democracy: An Overview			
	Populist-Majoritarian	**Liberal/Consensual**	
Historical origin	French Revolution 1789	English Revolution 1688	
Core values	Popular sovereignty; political equality	Freedom from tyranny; Protection of minority interests	
Decision rule	Majority (plurality) without constraints	Majority (plurality) with constraints: federalism; bicameralism; rigid constitution; judicial review	Unanimity/consensus
Electoral system	Majority (plurality)	Majority (plurality)	Proportional representation
Governmental system	Parliamentary (minimal winning)	Presidential	Directory/Assembly ('Grand', oversized)
Representation	Delegate:	Trustee:	Descriptive representation;

		aggregating votes; binding mandate; re-call	Deliberation on common good; ban on binding in-structions	Trustee:Deliberation on common good; ban on binding instructions
Au-thors		Rousseau;	Locke;	Calhoun;
		Schumpeter;	Madison	J.S. Mill;
		Ranney		Lijphart
Typi-cal la-bels		Populist(ic);	Madisonian;	Unitary;
		Majoritarian;	Liberal;	Inclusive;
		Collectivist;	Individual	Consensus;
		Adversary;		Proportional
		Westminster		

The Quest for the Best Model

Faced with two different traditions of representative democracy, a core question is: which of these traditions provides us with the best model for political representation? That question is well nigh impossible to answer for at least two reasons. First, there is a (p. 103) dearth of unbiased criteria by which we can assess which model is best. And second, there may not be an answer that has universal applicability.

Biased Criteria

A host of criteria has been employed to assess the relative merits of the two models, including criteria such as economic performance, domestic conflict, gender and income equality (e.g. Lijphart 2012). However, the relevance of some of these criteria is not value-free, and they are all criteria for the quality of the political system as a whole, not for the quality of the system of political representation specifically. The strength of the democratic linkage between citizens, politicians, and policy is a more (p. 104) obvious criterion (Dahl 1971; Dalton et al. 2011: 7), and it is most usually operationalized as the extent to which politicians are representative of the citizens, that is, the ideological or issue congruence between voters and politicians at a given point in time (see Chapter 18 in this

Handbook), or the responsiveness (or dynamic representation) of politicians to changes in voter preferences over time (see Chapter 25 in this *Handbook*).

A substantial part of the literature on congruence and responsiveness focuses on the effect of the electoral system: proportional versus plurality. This is, admittedly, a very rough (and partial) operationalization of our two models of democracy, but on the other hand, elections are crucial 'instruments of democracy' (Powell 2000). As Chapter 18 in this *Handbook* discusses at length, the original finding that proportional representation produces better congruence between the median voter and the government than plurality systems (Powell 2000) has not been replicated in some more recent studies (e.g. Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010), sparking a debate about the data, the time frame, and measurements used (e.g. Powell 2009; Golder and Lloyd 2014).

What this debate makes clear is how dependent the outcome is on the exact operationalization used. Most studies measure the distance between the median voter and the government. Under the assumption of a one-dimensional policy space, the median voter has the majority vote, and we can compare her policy preference to that of the (weighted mean of the policy positions of the parties forming the) government. However, the logic behind this operationalization is majoritarian: congruence between the voter representing the majority and the government usually having majority support; and the resulting bias is in favour of majoritarian systems. However, Golder and Stramski (2010) have outlined several alternative operationalizations (see Chapter 18 in this *Handbook*) including 'many-to-many' congruence in which the full distribution of the preferences of the voters is compared with the complete distribution of the preferences of the representatives. The logic behind this operationalization is consensual: all groups in society should be included in policymaking, and the result is biased in favour of proportional systems.

The same risk of bias arises in the choice of representative agent (Golder and Ferland 2018). Studies may compare the very start of the representative chain (citizens) with the very end (policy outcomes). This would fit best with the populist-majoritarian view in which the ultimate test for representative democracy would be that the policy outcome is identical to the outcome under direct democracy. Proponents of the liberal/consensual model, however, do not expect or even desire the policy outcome to approximate the aggregate of the people's preferences under direct democracy: the intervention of representatives and their deliberation about the common good are expected to result in a different (better) outcome. There should still be linkage between the preferences of the citizens and the initial preferences of the representatives, but not necessarily with the eventual policy outcome. Thus, in this view we should focus on only part of this chain: the link between citizens and representatives' preferences at election time.

(p. 105) The same problem of potential bias arises when we examine the way in which representative linkage is achieved, for example through parties fulfilling electoral mandates. From a majoritarian 'responsible party model' perspective it arguably matters most that government parties translate their mandate into government policy, while from a consensual perspective parliamentary representation of both opposition and government par-

ties' views in parliament is a crucial quality of democratic systems (Louwerse 2011). Thus it is not surprising that, all in all, the advantage of proportional electoral systems in terms of democratic linkage seems to depend on what you are looking at. When it comes to many-to-many congruence and to the difference between voters and legislators, PR systems fare better than plurality systems, but this advantage does not exist when comparing the median voter to the position of the government.

Political Legitimacy

Instead of trying to assess the two models of democracy in terms of the quality of representative linkage, we can also look at the political legitimacy or political support of democracies. This approach tries to circumvent the use of potentially biased criteria by focusing on whether citizens are more satisfied with, and eager to participate in, the democratic system (Beetham 2013). Quite a large number of studies analyse the relationship between political institutions, mostly operationalized in terms of the proportionality of the electoral system, and indicators of political legitimacy. Therefore, our discussion also considers the extent to which citizens are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Blais et al. 2017; Bowler 2017), their trust in major political institutions (Van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017; Zmerli and Hooghe 2011; Zmerli and Van der Meer 2017), and the level of turnout in elections (Blais and Aarts 2006; Cox 2015).

The positive relationship between proportional electoral systems and turnout is convincingly documented in empirical research on established democracies (Cox 2015; Geys 2006). Under plurality electoral systems (in single member districts) voters may refrain from voting in uncompetitive districts and parties have stronger incentives to campaign everywhere and mobilize more voters under a proportional system (but see Karp et al. 2008). Nonetheless, Blais and Aarts (2006) argue that this pattern does not seem to replicate outside of established democracies. The degree to which a high turnout matters depends on one's normative position. For some, voting might be seen as something purely instrumental and if voters do not participate in uncompetitive districts this is not a huge problem—except for, perhaps, the detrimental effect on accountability and responsiveness of the local representative. For others, turnout is intrinsically linked to their (consensual) understanding of democracy. Therefore, proponents of a liberal/consensual model of representative democracy might see the findings on the relationship between proportional representation and turnout as (p. 106) support for their model, while proponents of a populist/majoritarian system might not really care. Turnout is often used, but it may be a poor indicator of legitimacy, and it may also be a biased indicator when it comes to measuring the effects of the models of representative democracy.

Theoretically opposing arguments of the impact of electoral institutions on legitimacy beliefs have been made. Some argue that proportional representation fosters trust in institutions and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy because parliament more closely mirrors society (Karp and Banducci 2008). More people feel represented in parliament; even generally dissatisfied voters can see their concerns represented by small or

new parties (Van der Meer 2017). The gap between 'winning' and 'losing' elections is generally smaller in proportional systems, which may make citizens more satisfied and trusting overall (Anderson and Guillory 1997). Others, however, argue that the lower levels of accountability under proportional representation may result in voters not feeling they have a real choice with real consequences (Powell 2000; Magalhães 2006: 192).

The empirical findings are, however, decidedly mixed. Some studies show that systems with proportional representation have higher levels of satisfaction and trust (Van der Meer and Dekker 2011; Rose and Mishler 2011: 130; Banducci et al. 1999; Magalhães 2006; Van der Meer 2010; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Lijphart 2012). Other studies find no relationship between proportionality and democratic satisfaction or trust (Blais and Loewen 2007: 51; Norris 2011) or only a weak relationship between institutions and trust (Bowler 2017). Van der Meer and Hakhverdian (2017) find higher levels of satisfaction with democracy in systems with proportional representation, but no difference when it comes to confidence in institutions. A third group of studies points to higher levels of satisfaction in democracies with disproportional electoral rules (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Karp and Bowler 2001; Norris 1999).

It should be noted that many of these studies use (some indicator of) proportionality as one explanatory (or control) variable in a larger model. This makes causal interpretation of these findings problematic, as there is potential omitted variable as well as post-treatment bias. Together with differences in measurement, and (country and time) coverage, this may explain the wide range of findings in the literature.

Horses for Courses?

So far, we have treated the preference for one conceptualization of democracy over the other as an exogenous choice. Obviously this assumption is not correct. Just as we noted how Lincoln's defence of majority rule, or Madison's preference for checks and balances, were inexorably linked to their position in the political context in which they found themselves, so we may assume more generally that the choice for institutional devices that fit one of our basic models is endogenous to the social and political (p. 107) situation at the time of that choice. It may well be that we also have to judge the performance of the institutional framework in that context. In situations with 'a majority (…) always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinion and sentiments', as we cited Lincoln, the populist-majoritarian model may perform better than in situations with fixed majorities and minorities of an ascriptive nature, in particular when there has been a history of discrimination and repression of one or several of the minorities. There are reasons why Northern Ireland has adopted many institutional devices from the liberal/consensual model, while the United Kingdom as a whole stuck to its largely populist-majoritarian framework, and any assessment of the relative merits of the models needs to take them into account.

The discussion about the consequences of Lijphart's majoritarian and consociational or consensus types of democracy is a case in point. Originally, Lijphart advocated consocia-

tional democracy only for deeply divided countries, and warned that consociational politics in a homogeneous society eventually would prompt citizens to vote for anti-system parties: deprived of a meaningful choice within the system, they would vote against the system (Lijphart 1968). But in his more recent work on consensus democracy, Lijphart takes up a radically different position: 'The consensus option is the more attractive option for countries designing their first democratic constitutions or contemplating democratic reform. This recommendation is particularly pertinent, and even urgent, for societies that have deep cultural and ethnic cleavages, *but it is also relevant for more homogeneous countries*' (Lijphart 2012: 296, emphasis added). Faced with this contrast between the younger Lijphart's warning against universal implementation of consociational devices and the older Lijphart's recommendation of consensus democracy as a horse for all courses, Andeweg argues that consociational democracies in which the erstwhile social cleavages have eroded seem particularly vulnerable to challenges by right-wing populist parties, and that this vindicates the position taken by Lijphart in his earlier work (Andeweg 2001; also see Hakhverdian and Koop 2007).

The vulnerability to anti-system challenges is only one of the consequences of the design of representative democracy of which the universal or conditional applicability has been debated. Lijphart (2012) argues, for instance, that consensus democracies are just as effective as majoritarian democracies, and that consensus democracies score higher on democratic quality. In the ensuing debate both Lijphart and his critics aim for a universal answer to the question of which model is best. Bernauer et al. (2016: 474) acknowledge that 'Obviously institutions also have to fit the societies they govern', but this condition plays no role in their analysis. Doorenspleet and Pellikaan (2013) are exceptional in including the interaction with the homogeneity/segmentation of society in their analysis of the effect of shared power (proportional representation) and divided power (decentralization). Proportional representation turned out to be beneficial regardless of societal structure, but decentralization had positive effects only in divided societies whereas centralization was the best choice for homogeneous societies (also see Doorenspleet and Maleki 2018).

(p. 108) Conclusion

In this chapter we have used a basic dichotomy of thinking about democracy to capture most of the bewildering variety of typologies that faces the student of institutional frameworks of representative democracy. Of these two traditions, the populist-majoritarian view emphasizes popular sovereignty and political equality, and seeks to design the institutional framework in such a way that an identity between citizens and representatives is approximated, and that decisions are taken by majority rule. The other, liberal/consensual view conceptualizes representative democracy in terms of freedom from tyranny and protection of minority interests against the majority. This second tradition contains two varieties. In the liberal or Madisonian variety, minority interests are protected by an institutional framework that constrains the majority through checks and balances; in the con-

sensual variety those interests are protected by including minorities in the decision-making process.

The question of which of these models of democracy is best is as obvious as it is difficult to answer for several reasons. First, real existing representative democracies do not treat these models as set menus, but may pick institutional elements from several models à la carte, although with an emphasis based on a preference for one model. Second, so many other variables may impinge upon the relationship between institutional framework and performance that it is not easy to isolate the institutional effects. Third, as the models depart from different definitions of what democracy is, it is hard to find criteria that are not inherently biased to favour one or the other model. And fourth, as the choice of a particular model of representative democracy is likely to be related to the societal structure and culture of a country, it is also likely that particular models have a better performance in particular types of societies.

It is therefore hardly surprising that our review of the literature suggests that more inclusive systems provide a better congruence between the distributions of political opinion in society and in the legislature, and that majoritarian systems produce better congruence between the median voter and the government. Given the fact that the differences between the models are usually differences of degree only, it is also not surprising that, in terms of legitimacy beliefs, the evidence is largely inconclusive. The fact that it seems beyond doubt that consensual systems have a higher turnout may be an indicator of inclusiveness rather than of legitimacy.

However, we should also note that the above conclusions are based on rather imperfect evidence. First, these studies, and studies of issue congruence in particular, look primarily at only one aspect of the institutional framework: the electoral system. Other elements, such as the dominant style of representation, the governmental system, or available checks and balances receive less attention. Second, and related to this, the comparison is largely restricted to the populist-majoritarian model on the one hand, and the consensual variant of the liberal/consensual model on the other. The consequences of the liberal or Madisonian variant are less frequently addressed. Lijphart (2012: 272–3, 293) does mention the effects of his 'federal-unitary' dimension (p. 109) almost in passing. Others have criticized Lijphart for using only his 'shared power' dimension and not his 'divided power' dimension in this analysis (Armingeon 2002; Schmidt 2002; McGann and Latner 2012; Bernauer et al. 2016). Rohrschneider's finding that the quality of the judiciary affects perceptions of representation also points to the importance of including that dimension (Rohrschneider 2005). Both these weaknesses, the lack of attention to other institutional factors than the electoral system and the relative neglect of the liberal variant of the liberal/consensual model, clearly need to be addressed in any agenda for further research into the consequences of the models of representative democracy.

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