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The Netherlands

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Bakker, H.T.; Bisschop, P.C.

Citation

Bakker, H. T., & Bisschop, P. C. (2019). Moksadharma 187 and 239-241 reconsidered. In *Holy Ground. Where Art and Text Meet: Studies in the Cultural History of India* (pp. 223-234). Leiden: Brill.
doi:10.1163/9789004412071_012

Version: Publisher's Version
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Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/135601>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Mokṣadharmā 187 and 239–241 Reconsidered*

HANS T. BAKKER & PETER C. BISSCHOP

PREAMBLE

In his *Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharmā (Die sāmṅhyistischen Texte)* and in the chapter on Sāmṅhya of his *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* Erich Frauwallner has shown chapters MBh 12.187 and MBh 12.239–241 of the *Mokṣadharmā* in the *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* to be of crucial importance for understanding the development of the Sāmṅhya-system.¹ The great Viennese scholar dealt with yet another chapter (MBhB 12.286), which however has been omitted in the critical edition, but is preserved in the critical apparatus to MBh 12.187. Conceived as different versions of one and the same ‘Grundtext’, they must, Frauwallner argued, have been held to be of great significance at the time and probably led an independent existence before they were included in the collection of doctrines of the *Mokṣadharmā*. Frauwallner attempted a reconstruction of this ‘Grundtext’ by sorting out words and passages that were judged by him not to have belonged to this text originally. He succeeded in giving a clear description of a distinctive philosophy, which he denominated ‘die epische Urform des Sāmṅhya’.² An important conclusion of his reconstruction is that the so called ‘evolution theory’ had not yet been developed; according to Frauwallner the evolution theory was adopted by the Sāmṅhya later from circles that taught an evolution out of Brahman.³

Van Buitenen (1956) also stressed the importance of these texts, but contrary to Frauwallner’s conclusions, he maintained that an evolution theory can be traced in them. Out of both texts he reconstructed a small tract, which

* The first version of this article was published in *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* LII.3 (1999), 459–472. [= Proceedings of the ‘Conference Sāmṅhya and Yoga’, Université de Lausanne, November 6–8 1998.]

1 Frauwallner 1925b; 1953. Frauwallner uses a different numbering, based on the Bombay edition of the *Mahābhārata*: MBhB 12.194 (= MBh 12.187) and MBhB 12.247–249 (= MBh 12.239–241). MBh 12.239–241 is also transmitted as part of the *Brahmapurāna*: BrP 237.43–238.14.

2 Frauwallner 1953, 288–299.

3 Two texts according to Frauwallner have been a major influence upon the development of the evolution theory: MBh 12.224 and the first book of the *Manusmṛti* (Frauwallner 1925a). Cf. Hacker 1961b and Rüping 1977.

somehow had come to be included in this text-group. He recovered this tract by isolating and arranging those verses in which the term *bhāva* has apparently an other meaning than it has in the rest of the texts.⁴ He emphasized the evolution process taught in this tract, which, as he put it, has a 'horizontal pattern' in contrast to a 'vertical pattern': 'Not *buddhi* into *manas*, *manas* into senses etc., but *buddhi* into *manas*, *buddhi* into senses'.⁵ Bakker (1982) accepted van Buitenen's reconstruction as a 'working-hypothesis', but criticized the interpretations of some passages; moreover he questioned van Buitenen's claim to have discovered an authentic text. He drew attention to an agreement of the reconstructed tract with the teachings of *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* 3.⁶

THREE THEMES

From all these different interpretations we may infer that the chapters under discussion contain a diversity of ideas, which are not necessarily consistent with each other. In this paper we want to look at three themes central to both texts that are relevant to the question put forward by van Buitenen, viz. whether or not we encounter an evolution theory in these chapters. It will be shown that this question is related to a difference between both texts with respect to their conception of *buddhi*. The three themes are the following:⁷

- 1 A teaching about the five elements and their respective differentiation into sense-organ, sense-faculty and sense-impression.⁸

4 Van Buitenen 1956, 153:

When we read through the two versions we are struck by the fact that the term *bhāva* occurs in two altogether different situations: first in connection with such 'sensations, qualities and conditions' as *sukha/prīti*, *duḥkha/śoka*, *moha*, *praharṣa* etc., *atuṣṭi* etc., *aviveka* etc.; secondly in connection with a process by which the *buddhi* modifies itself into *manas* as its *bhāva*.

5 Van Buitenen 1957a, 22.

6 Bakker 1982b, 144:

[...] The most striking agreement of the epic with the Upaniṣad appears from the fact that the act of consciousness itself, when it has actualized the senses, evolves the objects (epic: *artha* /KauṣU.: *bhūtamātra*) of the latter. Or rather, at the very moment *buddhi* (or *prajñā*) actualizes the senses it evolves (epic: *vikurute* /KauṣU.: *abhivisṛjate*) the object that is apprehended.

7 In addition to these three, there may be distinguished three more themes (in both texts): an introductory question concerning the self (*adhyātman*) which forms the beginning of both texts (MBh 12.187.1–3; 239.1–2), a teaching about the three *bhāvās* ('states of mind') *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (MBh 12.187.14, 21–35; 239.16, 20–25; 240.6cd–8, 10–11) and a soteriology (MBh 12.187.44–47, 51–60; 240.13–15; 241.5–14). Many of these themes, or parts of them, have parallels in other chapters of the *Mokṣadharmā*; so, for example, part of the teaching about the three *bhāvās* is found also in MBh 12.212.25–31. Study of these parallels may throw light on the composition and transmission of the *Mokṣadharmā*, as, *mutatis mutandis*, the *Nārāyaṇīya-Studien* by Peter Schreiner and others (1997) has demonstrated.

8 MBh 12.187.4–10; 239.3–12.

- 2 A teaching about the intellect (*buddhi*) and its relation to the ‘knower of the field’ (*kṣetrajñā*), the mind (*manas*) and the senses (*indriyāṇi*).⁹
- 3 A teaching about the relationship between the *sattva* and the *kṣetrajñā*.¹⁰

The five elements

The first theme forms a coherent whole, which can be distinguished quite easily from the rest of the texts. The five elements are regarded as the (material) cause of all sentient beings. They evolve into three modifications (*guṇa*): a sense-organ, a sense-faculty and a sense-impression. So, for instance, the element *ākāśa* evolves into the ears, hearing and sound.¹¹ The characteristic feature of this treatment of the elements is the epistemological point of view, which entails that the essential qualities of the elements are characterized by their impression on the senses.¹²

In addition to the five elements as the material cause, this section speaks of the *bhūtakṛt* (‘creator of beings’) as a kind of efficient cause (Appendix: A).¹³ The *bhūtakṛt* appears to cause the differentiation of the elements into the triple modification of sense-organ, sense-faculty and sense-impression (MBh 187.7; MBh 239.6–7). The conclusion seems justified that in this section of both texts a consistent doctrine is presented, which considers the elements to be the material out of which sentient beings (*bhūta*) are made, a process set in motion by a *bhūtakṛt*. This section forms a teaching of its own; this is evident also from the fact that none of the words playing a key role in the rest of the texts, such as *kṣetrajñā*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *bhāva* and *sattva*, are used here.

The intellectual apparatus

The transition to the next theme can be illustrated by MBh 187.10cd–11ab (Appendix: B). Whereas 10cd enumerates the five elements with the *manas* as sixth, the following verse 11ab enumerates the five senses and the *manas*; the *buddhi* and the *kṣetrajñā* being respectively the seventh and the eighth (11cd).¹⁴ These verses indicate a transition in both texts: nothing is said about the elements any more, the senses are given and the teaching about

9 MBh 12.187.11–20; 239.13–15, 17–19; 240.1–6ab, 9–10ab, 12.

10 MBh 12.187.37–43, 48–50; 240.19–22; 241.1–4.

11 MBh 12.187.8ab: *śabdaḥ śrotraṃ tathā khāni trayam ākāśayonijam* |

12 This epistemological perspective remains in classical Sāṃkhya, where the five elements are considered to originate from the so called ‘subtle elements’ (*tanmātra*). These *tanmātrās*, in fact, are the sense-impressions: *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha*.

13 The Appendix contains the text of some passages of the critical edition. It is meant to facilitate comparison: the left column contains a passage of MBh 12.187, the right column contains the parallel of MBh 12.239–241 and *vice versa*. A blank means there is no parallel for a passage.

14 That we are here concerned with a break is also evident from the parallel passage which omits 187.11ab, and instead of *mahābhūtāni pañcaiva* (MBh 187.10c) reads *indriyāṇi nare pañca* (MBh 239.14a).

their origin out of the elements seems to be forgotten. Whereas up to this point we had a description of material nature, after it both texts seem to be dealing with ideal nature only. Although the following teaching about the *buddhi* does not form such a clear section as the foregoing teaching about the elements, the verses which we consider to belong to this teaching all have one thing in common: they deal with a psychic or ideal principle distinct from the (material) elements.

The teaching starts with an enumeration of eight principles: the five senses, the *manas*, the *buddhi* and the *kṣetrajñā*. Their respective functions are given:

The eye is for seeing, the mind causes reflection, the intellect serves determination, the knower of the field is called the onlooker.¹⁵

While both texts agree on these functions they disagree about the relationship between the *buddhi* and the *kṣetrajñā*. This disagreement can be deduced from a small, but important variation in the parallel passages 187.20 and 240.6 (Appendix: C). According to both passages the ‘invisible one’ governs the senses, but whereas 187.20 uses the masculine *adrśyaḥ*, 240.6 uses the feminine *adrśyā*.¹⁶ Therefore in 187.20 the term ‘invisible one’ refers to the *kṣetrajñā*, whereas in 240.6 it refers to the *buddhi*. In the parallel passages 187.13 and 239.18 (Appendix: D) there is a similar variation. Both verses deal with the question: who is the one that sees everything that is above the soles of the feet and inhabits all this? 187.13 seems to teach that it is the *kṣetrajñā*, as in the preceding verse the *kṣetrajñā* is called the onlooker. 239.18 however explicitly states it is the *buddhir uttamā* (‘supreme intellect’). These variations indicate a difference with respect to the relationship between the *buddhi* and the *kṣetrajñā*. Whereas according to 187 the *buddhi* and the *kṣetrajñā* are utterly distinct, in that the one is the active knowledge-principle responsible for the activity of the senses and the other an absolute, non-active onlooker or subject, in some parts of 239–241 the *buddhi* and the *kṣetrajñā* seem to be two sides of one and the same principle.

The difference between the two texts can be illustrated by comparing those verses that explain the relation of the *buddhi* to the senses (appendix: E). In 187.18–19 the senses are characterized as instruments which the *buddhi* employs for apperception:

The eye is what it sees with, what it hears with is called the ear, the nose they say is what it smells with, with the tongue it experiences flavour and with the skin it feels touches.

In the parallel passage of 240.4–5, however, it is not the instrumental case (*yena paśyati*) that is used, but the active present participle together with the finite verb *bhavati*:

15 MBh 12.239.15: *cakṣur ālocanāyaiva saṃśayaṃ kurute manaḥ | buddhir adhyavasānāya sākṣī kṣetrajñā ucyate ||*

16 Some manuscripts of 240.6 also read *adrśyaḥ*. No manuscript of 187.20 reads *adrśyā*.

While hearing it becomes hearing, while touching it is called touch, while seeing it becomes sight, while tasting it becomes taste, while smelling it becomes smell.

The *buddhi* does not employ the senses as instruments, but it is or becomes itself the senses. The word *indriyāṇi* used in both text passages (187.20; 240.6) does not seem to have exactly the same meaning: in 240 it denotes the sense-faculties, whereas in 187 its connotation seems to encompass the sense-organs as well.¹⁷ In 240 a sense is not so much an instrument, as a modification of the *buddhi*, viz. a state of mind characterized by sense-perception. In this way it is said that the *buddhi* evolves the complex of the senses, just as a tortoise sticks out its limbs (239.17).

However, despite this occasional ambiguity, the verses in this section do not deal with material nature, but with ideal nature. The *buddhi* is therefore not looked upon as a material entity as it is in classical Sāṃkhya. In this connection some remarks have to be made on Frauwallner's observation—in the introduction to his translation of the reconstructed 'Grundtext', published in his *Nachgelassene Werke II*—to the effect that the *buddhi* in this text-group is ranked among material nature.

Besondere Bedeutung kommt in ihm [viz. the 'Grundtext'] der Psychologie zu. Weltseele und Materie sind nämlich nach ihm scharf getrennt. Dabei werden nicht nur die Sinnesorgane, sondern auch die psychischen Organe, Denken (*manah*) und Erkennen (*buddhih*) der Materie zugerechnet.¹⁸

In our opinion this is certainly not true for some passages in *adhyāya* 240. This becomes evident when we consider MBh 240.3 (Appendix: F). After the progressive enumeration of the *indriyāṇi*, the *arthās*, the *manas*, the *buddhi* and the *ātman*, which we also encounter with some variations in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*,¹⁹ it is said that:

The intellect is the self of man; the intellect indeed is the essence of the self; when it produces a *bhāva* it is / becomes mind.²⁰

17 In classical Sāṃkhya the *indriyāṇi* as faculties are explicitly distinguished from the organs, which are called their 'seats' (*adhiṣṭhānāni*)—e.g. in the *Yuktīdīpikā* (YD ad SK 26cd, p. 197):

*ucyate: adhiṣṭhānād indriyaprthaktvaṃ śaktiviśeṣopalambhāt | yathā śarīrāsambhavinō viśayavyavasāyalakṣaṇasya śaktiviśeṣasyopalambhād arthāntaraṃ buddhir anu-
mīyata evam adhiṣṭhānāsambhavinō viśayagrahaṇalakṣaṇasya śaktiviśeṣasyopal-
ambhād arthāntaram indriyam iti |*

The use of the term in these texts of the *Mokṣadharmā*, however, is ambiguous. Thus in MBh 12.239.11cd the 'complex of the senses' (*indriyagrāma*) is described as 'derived from the five elements' (*pañcabhautika*), thereby implying its material nature, whereas MBh 187.20 seems to conflate the *adhiṣṭhānāni* and the *indriyāṇi*.

18 Frauwallner 1992, 78.

19 *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* III.10–11; VI.7–8a.

20 MBh 12.240.3: *buddhir ātmā manuṣyasya buddhir evātmano 'tmikā | yadā vikurute bhāvaṃ tadā bhavati sā manah ||*

The *buddhi* is regarded as the essence of the self in this verse. In the preceding verse however the self is stated to be higher than the *buddhi*. Consequently the *buddhi* seems to exist in two ways: 1) as an absolute, non-intentional self, corresponding to the *kṣetrajñā*; 2) as an empirical, intentional activity, when it evolves through the *manas* into the senses. In the latter case the *buddhi* exists as a *bhāva*, i.e. in a ‘state of modification’. It is obvious that this doctrine differs materially from the one found in MBh 187, where the *buddhi* is treated as an hypostasis of empirical intellect, fundamentally distinct from the transcendental subject, *kṣetrajñā*, as well as separated from the senses.²¹

Sattva and kṣetrajñā

The difference between the two texts can be illustrated further by comparing the passages that deal with the relationship between *sattva* and *kṣetrajñā* (Appendix: G). If we understand *sattva* here, not as referring to a material principle comparable to the *prakṛti*, but as referring to the *buddhi*,²² a remarkable agreement with the foregoing appears. According to both texts the *sattva* creates (*srjate*) the *guṇās*, whereas the *kṣetrajñā* is only their observer. The *guṇās* are to be interpreted here as the modifications of the *buddhi*, just as in the teaching about the elements the word *guṇa* denotes the modification of the elements. The difference between the two texts lies in the relationship of *kṣetrajñā* and *sattva* to the self (*ātman*). For, whereas 187.40cd states that the self is the one who observes the *guṇās* (i.e. is the *kṣetrajñā*) but wrongly thinks himself to be their creator, according to the parallel passage 240.19ab the self in reality (*yathātatham*) is both, the observer (*paridraṣṭr*) and the creator (*sraṣṭr*) of the

21 This difference may also explain the parallel verses 187.23 and 240.8. According to 187.23 the essence of the *buddhi* consists of the three *bhāvās* (viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) and it never transcends them; according to 240.8 however it does transcend the three *bhāvās*, although its essence is said to consist in them (*bhāvātmikā*). In both chapters the passage at issue has variant readings—some manuscripts of 187.23 read *ativartate* instead of *nātivartate*, while some manuscripts of 240.8 read *nātivartate* instead of *ativartate*—yet this variance may be significant and point to an original difference of doctrine rather than being due to mere textual corruption. In 187.23 the *buddhi* does not transcend the three *bhāvās*, because only the ‘invisible one’, viz. the *kṣetrajñā*, transcends them. In 240.8 the *buddhi* does transcend them, since it is equated to the absolute self and as such is the transcendental ‘invisible one’.

22 Frauwallner (1992) translates *sattva* in this part of the texts with ‘die Güte’; Edgerton (1965) translates it with ‘essential (material) reality’. Van Buitenen (1957b, 95) distinguishes five meanings of the word *sattva* in the context of proto-Sāṃkhya: ‘1. *sattva* as the material counterpart of the *kṣetrajñā*; 2. as the *buddhi*; 3. as a *bhāva* of the *buddhi*; 4. as a state of well-being amounting to release; 5. as the first of the three *guṇās*’. Although van Buitenen takes *sattva* here in the first meaning, he observes that there is no real difference between the first and the second meaning: ‘In these early forms of Sāṃkhya creation does not necessarily start from a higher principle than the *buddhi*, e.g., *avyakta*, *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*, but from the *buddhi* itself; nor has the *ahaṃkāra* yet taken over the evolutionary functions of the *buddhi*. As the *buddhisattva* is indeed creation and thus the ‘material’ counterpart of the unaffected *kṣetrajñā*’ (1957b, 96–97). Cf. also Johnston 1937, 50–51.

guṇās. The doctrine underlying MBh 240 therefore seems to be that *kṣetrajñā* and *sattva* are two aspects of one and the same principle, viz. the *buddhi*, which is defined as the Self of man (MBh 240.3ab). If our analysis of these chapters is correct, it may explain a statement in the *Anugītā*.

Some wise men who are well established in knowledge declare the identity of the *kṣetrajñā* and the *sattva*, this is not correct.²³

This verse may be taken to refer to those passages of 239–241 that teach the unity of the *kṣetrajñā* and the *sattva* within the self. This unity appears as two aspects (dialectical moments) of the *buddhi*: on the one hand as the transcendental subject, styled ‘*kṣetrajñā*’, on the other hand as the phenomenality (intentionality) of consciousness, styled ‘*sattva*’ (‘being’), that is intellect (*buddhi*) as activity, which comprises *manas*, the senses and their objects.

The ‘evolution theory’

We now return to the ‘evolution theory’ that van Buitenen found in his reconstructed tract. The verses van Buitenen used for his tract are those that deal with the modification of the *buddhi*. However, he mixes passages from 187 and 239–241, thereby blurring the difference between them. Frauwallner also conflates the texts, selecting material from all three dialogues and blending them into one ‘Grundtext’. The unacceptable consequences of this conflation can be seen when we look at the important difference between the *buddhi* using the sense-organs in 187 and the *buddhi* becoming the sense-faculties in 240, which difference is obliterated in the verses 18–19 of his ‘Grundtext’.

Wodurch es sieht, das ist das Auge. Hörend wird es Gehör genannt. Riechend wird es zum Geruch. Schmeckend ist es der Geschmack. Mit der Haut berührt es die Berührung. Vielfach wandelt sich das Erkennen. Wenn es etwas begehrt, dann wird es zum Denken.²⁴

However, Frauwallner was right in his observation that the evolution theory of the Sāṃkhya is not attested in this text-group. Frauwallner has given three features of the evolution theory:

Die Vorstellung der Urmaterie (*prakṛti*), die Lehre von den drei Eigenschaften (*guṇās*) der Urmaterie und die Lehre von den 25 Wesenheiten.²⁵

23 MBh 14.48.9: *āhur eke ca vidvāṃso ye jñāne supraṭiṣṭhitāḥ | kṣetrajñāsattvayor aikyam ity etan nopapadyate ||*

24 Frauwallner 1992, 82–83. Frauwallner’s eclectic translation finds some support in MBhB 12.286.19–20, since this text also seems to be a mixture of both theories (cf. Frauwallner 1992, 82, n. 34–36):

*yena paśyati tac cakṣuḥ śṛṇvati śrotram ucyate |
jighratī bhavati ghrāṇaṃ rasatī rasanā rasān || 19 ||
sparśanaṃ sparśatī sparśān buddhir vikriyate ‘sakṛt |
yadā prārthayate kimcit tadā bhavati sā manaḥ || 20 ||*

25 Frauwallner 1953, 300.

We find none of them in these texts. What van Buitenen has styled a ‘horizontal evolution theory’ is different from what Frauwallner called an ‘evolution theory’. We would prefer to call the former a ‘teaching about the modification of the *buddhi*’. This teaching does not have a cosmological but a psychological status: it explains how the *buddhi* evolves the *manas* as its *bhāva* and subsequently differentiates into the sense-faculties. The ontological implications of this teaching conflict with the teaching about the elements in the first part of both texts, where it is said that not only the sense-organs and the sense-impressions, but also the sense-faculties have their origin in the elements. These texts therefore do not contain a consistent philosophy, but display the same diversity as so much of the *Mokṣadharmā*.

THE MOKṢADHARMA: A PLURALITY OF VIEWS

The above analysis raises a number of questions, which—though, admittedly, they cannot all be answered—need to be addressed, if any progress into the early history of the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition is to be made. These questions are closely connected with the source material from which we have to reconstruct that history; in this particular case: how do we conceive of the coming into being of the *Mahābhārata* text corpus, especially its largest book, the *Śāntiparvan*. Frauwallner’s hypothesis of one ‘Grundtext’ that had been transmitted independently for a long time, had consequently developed into three different recensions, before the latter were included in the text of the *Mokṣadharmā* by one or more redactors, only to be further mutilated in the course of transmission, that hypothesis proves untenable. As we have shown there are clearly different views underlying the dialogues of Yudhiṣṭhira and Bhīṣma (*adhyāya* 187) on the one hand, and that of Śuka and Vyāsa (*adhyāyas* 239–241) on the other. An irreconcilable discrepancy had also been van Buitenen’s starting point, but to explain it this scholar applied basically the same method as Frauwallner, though in more textual detail, when he constructed a new, smaller text out of both dialogues: ‘simply a text legitimately restored on the basis of two incomplete and corrupt versions’.²⁶

However, instead of postulating or ‘restoring’ a ‘Grundtext’, we may make another assumption, namely that the redactor(s) of the *Mokṣadharmā* was acquainted with various guru-traditions (see below, p. 511), which he aimed to represent in different dialogues. These philosophical lineages may have been closely related, enough to employ the same jargon, including technical terms, expressions, metaphors and even verses; but within them different techniques to obtain inner tranquillity (*yoga*) may have developed, and accordingly different views to account for these experiences.

²⁶ Van Buitenen 1956, 156.

A scenario opposite to the one proposed by Frauwallner may be envisaged: in the course of composition, redaction, transmission, further revision, and fixation of the *Mokṣadharmā* a tendency may have been at work to straighten out contradicting views. If this were the case, the starting point may not have been one ‘Grundtext’ that degenerated into various distorted representations, but rather a plurality of theories and views that found textual expression and was amalgamated in a *parvan* or sub-*parvan*, which became gradually more homogeneous in a process of composition-in-transmission (cf. above, p. 177). This process may have been concomitant with the rise of the classical school of Sāṃkhya. In other words, rather than for an underlying unity we should search for diversity behind the apparent homogeneity. Paradoxically, greater philosophical homogeneity may have been accomplished at the cost of more textual inconsistencies. This genetic model would imply that, though the *Mokṣadharmā* as we have it offers already a bewildering diversity of often contradicting views, the historical reality at the time of its first composition was still more complex—each ashram, so to speak, having its own competing version of proto-Sāṃkhya philosophy and being keen on having it canonized in the *Smṛti*.

An original plurality may not only account for the essential differences between both dialogues, but also for unsolved philosophical problems within each. How does the theory of the five *mahābhūtas* and their differentiation within sensitive beings concord with the psychological or ideal world treated in the rest of both dialogues? We are here apparently concerned with a cosmological theory in which God, the *bhūtakṛt* mentioned in 187.7 and 239.6, plays a key role.²⁷ This same theory is found in other chapters of the *Mokṣadharmā*, which by Frauwallner are not styled ‘epische Urform des Sāṃkhya’.

This brings us to our final point. What justification, if any, is there to annex the two dialogues at issue to the Sāṃkhya tradition and not, for instance, the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati? If the hallmark of Sāṃkhya is a rift between the material and ideal world, all three dialogues may be said to belong to the same multifarious stream from which classical Sāṃkhya emerged.

27 Cf. MBh 12.121.55, 12.175.16.

APPENDIX

Some parallels of Mokṣadharmā 187 and 239–241

Mokṣadharmā 187	Mokṣadharmā 239–241
<p>A</p> <p>महाभूतानि पञ्चैव सर्वभूतेषु भूतकृत् । अकरोत्तेषु वैषम्यं तत्तु जीवो ऽनुपश्यति ॥ 187.7</p>	<p>इति तन्मयमेवेदं सर्वं स्थावरजङ्गमम् सर्गं च प्रलये चैव तस्मान्निर्दिश्यते तथा ॥ 239.5</p> <p>महाभूतानि पञ्चैव सर्वभूतेषु भूतकृत् । अकरोत्तात वैषम्यं यस्मिन्यदनुपश्यति ॥ 239.6</p> <p>शुक उवाच । अकरोद्यच्छरीरेषु कथं तदुपलक्षयेत् । इन्द्रियाणि गुणाः केचित् कथं तानुपलक्षयेत् ॥ 239.7</p>
<p>B</p> <p>ब्रेयं घ्राणं शरीरं च ते तु भूमिगुणास्त्रयः । महाभूतानि पञ्चैव षष्ठं तु मन उच्यते ॥ 187.10</p> <p>इन्द्रियाणि मनश्चैव विज्ञानान्यस्य भारत । सप्तमी बुद्धिरित्याहुः क्षेत्रज्ञः पुनरष्टमः ॥ 187.11</p>	<p>ब्रेयं घ्राणं शरीरं च भूमेरेते गुणास्त्रयः ॥ 239.11ab</p> <p>इन्द्रियाणि नरे पञ्च षष्ठं तु मन उच्यते ।</p> <p>सप्तमीं बुद्धिमेवाहुः क्षेत्रज्ञं पुनरष्टमम् ॥ 239.14</p>
<p>C</p> <p>अधिष्ठानानि बुद्धेर्हि पृथगर्थानि पञ्चधा । पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि यान्याहुस् तान्यदृश्यो ऽधितिष्ठति ॥ 187.20</p>	<p>अधिष्ठानानि वै बुद्ध्या पृथगेतानि संस्मरेत् ॥ 240.9cd</p> <p>इन्द्रियाणीति तान्याहुस् तेष्वदृश्याधितिष्ठति ॥ 240.6ab</p>

Mokṣadharmā 187

Mokṣadharmā 239–241

D चक्षुरालोकनायैव
संशयं कुरुते मनः ।
बुद्धिरध्यवसायाय
क्षेत्रज्ञः साक्षिवत्स्थितः ॥ 187.12

ऊर्ध्वं पादतलाभ्यां यद्
अर्वागूर्ध्वं च पश्यति ।
एतेन सर्वमेवेदं
विद्ध्यभिव्याप्तमन्तरम् ॥ 187.13

E येन पश्यति तच्चक्षुः
शृणोति श्रोत्रमुच्यते ।
जिघ्रति घ्राणमित्याह
रसं जानाति जिह्वया ॥ 187.18
त्वचा स्पृशति च स्पर्शान्
बुद्धिर्विक्रियते ऽसकृत् ।
येन संकल्पयत्यर्थं
किञ्चिद्भवति तन्मनः ॥ 187.19

F

चक्षुरालोचनायैव
संशयं कुरुते मनः ।
बुद्धिरध्यवसानाय
साक्षी क्षेत्रज्ञ उच्यते ॥ 239.15
यथा कूर्म इहाङ्गानि
प्रसार्य विनियच्छति ।
एवमेवेन्द्रियग्रामं
बुद्धिः सूष्ट्वा नियच्छति ॥ 239.17
यदूर्ध्वं पादतलयोर्
अवाण्मूर्ध्वञ्च पश्यति ।
एतस्मिन्नेव कृत्ये वै
वर्तते बुद्धिरुत्तमा ॥ 239.18

शृण्वती भवति श्रोत्रं
स्पृशती स्पर्श उच्यते ॥ 240.4cd
पश्यन्ती भवते दृष्टी
रसती रसनं भवेत् ।
जिघ्रती भवति घ्राणं
बुद्धिर्विक्रियते पृथक् ॥ 240.5
यदा प्रार्थयते किञ्चित्
तदा भवति सा मनः ॥ 240.9ab

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था
अर्थेभ्यः परमं मनः ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्
बुद्धेरात्मा परो मतः ॥ 240.2
बुद्धिरात्मा मनुष्यस्य
बुद्धिरेवात्मनो ऽत्मिका ।
यदा विकुरुते भावं
तदा भवति सा मनः ॥ 240.3
इन्द्रियाणां पृथग्भावाद्
बुद्धिर्विक्रियते ह्यणु ॥ 240.4ab

Mokṣadharmā 187

Mokṣadharmā 239–241

G सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञयोरेतद्
अन्तरं पश्य सूक्ष्मयोः ।
सृजते तु गुणानेक
एको न सृजते गुणान् ॥ 187.37
मशकोदुम्बरौ चापि
संप्रयुक्तौ यथा सदा ।

अन्योन्यमन्यौ च यथा
संप्रयोगस्तथा तयोः ॥ 187.38
पृथग्भूतौ प्रकृत्या तौ
संप्रयुक्तौ च सर्वदा ।
यथा मत्स्यो जलं चैव
संप्रयुक्तौ तथैव तौ ॥ 187.39
न गुणा विदुरात्मानं
स गुणान्वेत्ति सर्वशः ।
परिदृष्टा गुणानां च
संज्ञा मन्यते सदा ॥ 187.40

सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञयोरेतद्
अन्तरं विद्धि सूक्ष्मयोः ॥ 240.19cd
सृजते तु गुणानेक
एको न सृजते गुणान् ॥ 240.20ab
मशकोदुम्बरौ चापि
संप्रयुक्तौ यथा सह ॥ 240.21cd
इषीका वा यथा मुञ्जे
पृथक्च सह चैव च ।
तथैव सहितावेताव्
अन्योन्यस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठितौ ॥ 240.22

पृथग्भूतौ प्रकृत्या तौ
संप्रयुक्तौ च सर्वदा ॥ 240.20cd
यथा मत्स्यो ऽद्भिरन्यः सन्
संप्रयुक्तौ तथैव तौ ॥ 240.21ab
न गुणा विदुरात्मानं
गुणान्वेद स सर्वदा ॥ 240.18cd
परिदृष्टा गुणानां स
स्रष्टा चैव यथातथम् ॥ 240.19ab