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Establishing state responsibility in the absence of effective government

Varga, A.

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Establishing State Responsibility
in the Absence of Effective Government

Establishing State Responsibility in the Absence of Effective Government

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Andrea Varga

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List of Abbreviations

AC	Appeals Chamber
ACHR	American Convention on Human Rights
ACommHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
ARSIWA	Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CoE CDDH	Council of Europe, Steering Committee for Human Rights
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECommHR	European Commission of Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HRC	Human Rights Committee
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HV	Hrvatska Vojska (Croatian Army)
HVO	Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane (Croatian Defence Council)
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IACtHR	Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IHL	international humanitarian law
ILC	International Law Commission
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
IUSCT	Iran-US Claims Tribunal
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MRT	Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria
NGO	non-governmental organization
NKR	Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCIJ	Permanent Court of International Justice
TC	Trial Chamber
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
US	United States
VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
VRS	Vojska Republike Srpske (Army of the Republika Srpska)