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## **8. Søren Kierkegaard's place in Martin Heidegger's path of rethinking philosophy in his first Freiburg period**

### **8.1. Introduction**

In one of his estimations of Kierkegaard, Heidegger judges a study which investigates his historical influences as a pseudo-study: a part of the decadent situation in philosophy, which takes the easy way out and is led by curiosity. Settling with historical influences according to him is a “diversion from what is solely at issue in this course and what it all comes to.” (GA 63: 4 [5-6]) But is this indeed the case: is the search for Kierkegaard in Heidegger's path to be considered a diversion?

The aim of the current study has been to understand Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. This task indeed implies that the aim is to reckon with Kierkegaard as a historical influence on Heidegger and doubtless, during this thesis, I have curiously aimed to see what Kierkegaard has to offer to Heidegger. And yet, I contend that the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period is not a diversion from what is at issue. On the contrary, I claim that if we take seriously Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path, we must also admit something about the very core of Heidegger's philosophy. Dealing with Kierkegaard's place points pressingly to that what Heidegger is after and how he aims to achieve his task. In this way, the search for Kierkegaard gains significance in understanding Heidegger. Perhaps even more so, because what this research shows is to a certain extent in confrontation with Heidegger's own suggestions about this path.

In this final chapter I will address three questions. First, what has emerged through the analysis of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path about the latter's central problem and his manner of tackling this problem? Secondly, what can be concluded about Kierkegaard's place through Heidegger's explicit estimations of him? And finally, what emerges from Heidegger's various references to Kierkegaard, so that the latter is highlighted by Heidegger as not simply a companion, but a source of impulses? My claim is that looking at Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger first Freiburg period lecture courses enables us to clarify Heidegger's path. I hold that the central problem for Heidegger is the problem of accessing, which he unfolds in two directions: as a search for proper

methodology of philosophical investigation and for a mode of accessing in the living situation.

## 8.2. Heidegger's quest of philosophy

Is the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy to be considered a diversion as Heidegger suggests? Or does this assessment rather follow from how Heidegger wishes his path to be seen? What does the search for Kierkegaard reveal about Heidegger's path?

In this research, I took my point of departure from what can be called Heidegger's own beginning, a breakthrough to his own philosophy. I continued with Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses from this starting point, unraveling each lecture course in itself and as a path, attempting to keep some distance from what Heidegger arrives at (predominantly considered with an eye to his *Sein und Zeit*). In the latter case, as was shown, the question of the beginning can be placed not only in his KNS lecture (1919), but also to his turn to Aristotle or even in his last lecture course of the first Freiburg period, as Heidegger himself did. Each of these placements in my opinion is a possibility which develops from the views of what Heidegger's philosophy is all about, what it comes down to. With the aim of finding Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's lecture courses, I have taken this as a question. That is, with respect to the latter I have asked: what is at issue for him and how does he resolve his problem sphere in his first Freiburg lecture courses? What first of all comes out in this respect is that Heidegger's central explicitly asked question is not the meaning of Being, but rather 'what is philosophy?'. This question is always accompanied by the claim that the current situation in philosophy is in decline. As a starting point, this refers to the need to rethink philosophy. But what exactly is philosophy as a problem for Heidegger? And what is philosophy as a resolution for Heidegger? These two questions, in my opinion, point to what is the same throughout the path and what is distinct in each lecture course. As such the two questions enable us to account for the core features of Heidegger's path.

The answer to the question of philosophy as a resolution depends on which lecture course is considered. It can be said to be formalization (GA 56/57), phenomenology as consisting of three methodological moments (GA 59, GA 60), phenomenological ontology (GA 61), or hermeneutics in its connection to phenomenology and ontology (GA 63). At the same time, philosophy can be said to be found through immersing oneself in the

genuineness of life (GA 56/57). It can be intensifying concentration upon the self-world (GA 58), questioning motivated from facing God (GA 60), repetition unfolded through life's temporality (GA 61), or a mode of self-interpretation (GA 63). Each of these determinations can be seen to be a further development of what Heidegger has previously achieved, in which the execution is always somewhat distinct. And yet, all of these resolutions have something in common. What the lecture courses share comes first of all out through the problem of what each of the accounts are a resolution of. This leads to the question: what is philosophy as a problem for Heidegger?

With respect to the question 'what is philosophy as a problem?', in my opinion Heidegger throughout his first Freiburg period presents the same overall structure: one which he has presented already in his KNS lecture course. Thus, first of all, in this lecture course he already establishes that philosophy has the task of expressing and accessing the pre-worldly (the basic characters, relational sense or facticity), which is connected with what is called the worldly. In this way, he has articulated both what is the thematic field for considering philosophy (factual life, factual life experience, Dasein) and that towards which philosophy must be directed (the pre-worldly, the basic characters, relational sense or facticity). These two aspects remain the same throughout Heidegger's first Freiburg period, regardless of the fact that the terminology for it changes. They describe philosophy's task, but not philosophy itself as a problem. In this respect, I would claim that the main issue which Heidegger tackles under the question 'what is philosophy?' is not the pre-worldly. Rather, the main issue, what is asked over and over again, is the problem of how to access the pre-worldly. This is what is rethought in each lecture course. Furthermore, this is what needs to be rethought insofar as the necessity of rethinking philosophy comes about from the current situation in philosophy, which is continually determined as a loss of access.

The fact that Heidegger's focus is on the question of access is also indicated by each of the resolutions Heidegger offers for the question 'what is philosophy?': they say something about the proper manner of accessing. At the same time, these resolutions indicate already another aspect of Heidegger's problem. The resolutions offer either a methodological way of investigating, or a consideration of the mode of accessing in the living situation. That is, as I have aimed to show throughout this thesis, with respect to the problem of finding the proper access, Heidegger is on a two-directional path. On the one hand, he aims to articulate a proper investigation for accessing. On the other hand, he

searches the possibility of accessing in the living situation itself in and through factual life. Throughout his lecture courses he in fact pursues philosophy in both of these directions, rethinks the possibilities and thus can be seen to articulate philosophy in different ways. At the same time, the fact that Heidegger pursues philosophy in these two directions does not mean that a two-directional path is what he aims at. On the contrary, he constantly seeks to bring these two directions together. This is attempted either by explicating factual life experience (GA 60), presenting the two directions as complementary angles of the same question (GA 61), or by bringing them together as (self-)interpretation (GA 63). From this perspective, it could even be claimed that the main problem for Heidegger is how to bring these two directions together. How to reckon with methodology, which is always somehow a stance towards the living situation (a clarification), with the very living situation itself. The fact that Heidegger seeks to bring the two sides together and even insists that he has achieved this, as was shown through his letter to Löwith and Becker in the introduction of the first part of this thesis, may lead to the problem of aiming to understand how he overcomes this gap. In my opinion however, it mainly leads to stressing one or another side of the two accounts of accessing.

As I have demonstrated in the first part of this thesis, there are two main lines of understanding Heidegger's method. I elaborated on these two lines of understanding in Chapter Four with the reference to Søren Overgaard and Theodore Kisiel. I argued that Heidegger himself gives a ground to both of these interpretations by taking up a two-directional task. I would now like to highlight these two accounts once more with an eye on what has been established about Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy. The question is: what should be said about Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy if we adopt one of the two approaches?

Throughout the analysis of Heidegger's lecture courses, it has become apparent that Kierkegaard appears as significant to Heidegger in each lecture course as soon as he addresses the question of accessing in and through factual life. Furthermore, it has been shown that in these considerations Heidegger leans quite heavily on Kierkegaard. From these results, in my view, it must be admitted that considering Kierkegaard's impact on Heidegger depends on whether one focuses on the primacy of the relational sense or of the actualization sense (see sections 4.3 and 4.5). If we give primacy to the actualization sense then Kierkegaard becomes an extremely significant source for Heidegger. If, however, we give primacy to the relational sense, Kierkegaard's role diminishes. It is a telling fact in my

opinion that Kierkegaard rarely is seriously considered when Heidegger's philosophy is seen to focus on philosophy as an investigation which gives primacy to the relational sense. Thus, Overgaard never talks of Kierkegaard's role for Heidegger's philosophy. On the other hand, if Heidegger is seen to lean towards the primacy of actualization of philosophy, Kierkegaard's influence is often thematized. Kisiel talks of Kierkegaard's significance to Heidegger on several occasions.<sup>202</sup>

Thus, if Heidegger is not considered to be on a two-directional path, then with respect to Heidegger's central aims Kierkegaard is to be seen either as insignificant (the central question being how one must proceed with philosophical investigation) or as central source of influence (the central question being where in life itself lies the possibility of philosophy). Neither of which in my opinion is the case. Rather, I claim that if we take Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy seriously, we must also admit something about Heidegger's path: namely, exactly the fact that he unfolds his central problem during his first Freiburg period in two directions. That is, when curiously looking for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy, his path will show itself as two-directional. With this claim, I do not wish to say that without considering Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy one cannot arrive at the same conclusion. Rather, in my opinion, it is difficult to bypass the fact that Heidegger is on a two-directional path, when searching for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. Furthermore, I claim that Heidegger himself brings out the distinction between two manners of accessing, especially when explicitly estimating Kierkegaard's role for his philosophy. That this is the case will be shown in the next section.

### **8.3. Questioning Heidegger's estimation of Kierkegaard**

The fact that Heidegger's realization of his problem appears differently from what he claims to have achieved in the letter to Löwith and Becker, as well as his dismissal of the attempts to reckon with his historical influences, raises an additional issue in connection with Kierkegaard. Namely, Heidegger's own explicit estimations of Kierkegaard.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I pointed out that Heidegger's own evaluations of Kierkegaard are often put under question. The reason for this lies, for example, in the fact that Kierkegaard's influence has been found in the thematizations in Heidegger's works

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<sup>202</sup> From this perspective we should perhaps also highlight the interesting fact that from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* Kierkegaard has been constantly connected with the themes of the second division of this book, and not with the first (see in chapter one, section five).

without Heidegger himself acknowledging this. In this respect, Heidegger's words expressing his attitude toward reckoning with historical influences might be considered an attempt to explain his reluctance to highlight his sources. Even in his considerations of, for example, Aristotle and Augustine, he does not say much about these thinkers, but rather unfolds their respective treatises through his own aims. Taking this into account, it might be also the case that Heidegger does not aim to explain anything, but rather in complete sincerity considers dealing with his historical influences a diversion: a diversion from his own agenda. And yet, I claimed that looking into Kierkegaard's place has been helpful for pinpointing what this agenda is. Now I claim that the same is the case with Heidegger's explicit thematizations of Kierkegaard: in my opinion, the considerations of his sources are not distractions, but rather enable us to highlight his concerns. More specifically, I claim that by looking at Heidegger's assessments of Kierkegaard, Heidegger himself can be seen to support the claim that he is on a two-directional path.

From Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses,<sup>203</sup> one can find five more or less explicit estimations of Kierkegaard. Most clearly he brings out his views on Kierkegaard and the latter's role for his philosophy in his lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity*. In his previous lecture courses, Heidegger only hints at his appreciation of Kierkegaard. Thus, as was shown, in his lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Kierkegaard is mentioned by name along with Augustine and Luther as occasions of “powerful eruptions” of self-assertion of Christianity within a more general process of deformation of early Christian achievement (GA 58: 155 [205]).<sup>204</sup> If we link Kierkegaard in this way with Heidegger's consideration of ‘intensifying-concentration of factual life upon the self-world,’ Heidegger is seen to express affinity to what Kierkegaard has to offer. That Heidegger appreciates Kierkegaard as a source is also expressed in the motto (“Motto, along with a grateful indication of the source”) added to the lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, to which he adds: “[i]n order to characterize the intention of the interpretation, I cite a motto, which is prefixed to this introduction to phenomenological research” (137 [182]). Both of these references show Heidegger's appreciation of Kierkegaard without offering any explicit thematization of Kierkegaard.

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<sup>203</sup> Not including Heidegger's review of Jaspers here.

<sup>204</sup> The citation in full reads as follows: “[t]his early Christian achievement was deformed and submerged by the infiltration of ancient science into Christianity. From time to time it asserts itself yet again in powerful eruptions (as in *Augustine*, in *Luther*, in *Kierkegaard*).” (GA 58: 155 [205])



This leaves us with the estimations given in the lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity*.

In the assessments found in the last lecture course of his first Freiburg period, Heidegger presents his relation to Kierkegaard in a similar vein as found in *Sein und Zeit*. He both expresses his appreciation of Kierkegaard as a source of impulses and distances himself from what Kierkegaard has to offer. More concretely, in his thematizations of Kierkegaard, Heidegger says first of all that Kierkegaard has given impulses for his research (GA 63: 4 [5-6]), and that from Kierkegaard stem the “[s]trong impulses for the hermeneutical explication presented in here” (25 [30]). Thus, Heidegger clearly admits his indebtedness to Kierkegaard. At the same time, these acknowledgments are accompanied by a dismissal of Kierkegaard. More specifically, Heidegger distances himself from Kierkegaard with respect to “presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal” (ibid.). The difference is further clarified with the claim that Kierkegaard made these aspects “too easy for himself” and that Kierkegaard was interested only in “the kind of personal reflection he pursued” (ibid.). All in all, Kierkegaard is said to be a theologian, who “stood within the realm of faith, in principle outside of philosophy” (25 [30]).

These evaluations of Kierkegaard, although perhaps highly confusing at first sight, in my opinion clearly point to what kind of place Kierkegaard has been given by Heidegger in his considerations. As I see it, Kierkegaard's significance for Heidegger lies exactly in the profound “personal reflection.” From Kierkegaard, Heidegger finds the actualization of the deepest concern of oneself. At the same time, he distances himself from Kierkegaard with respect to his view on how this actualization is to be clarified philosophically. That is, how philosophy must investigate its theme: what philosophy aims at, how it approaches its theme and executes the investigation. In short, how proper philosophy is to investigate, access and express its thematic field as well as what this thematic field is supposed to be according to Heidegger.

That Heidegger distances himself from Kierkegaard with respect to the manner of approach comes further out in Heidegger's third estimation of Kierkegaard found in the lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity*. On this occasion, Heidegger first commends Kierkegaard for having “documented most clearly” what he calls “the pertinacity of dialectics” (GA 63: 33 [41-42]). Having said that, he then states “[i]n the properly philosophical aspect of his [Kierkegaard's] thought, he did not break free from Hegel.”

The pertinacity of dialectic, which draws its motivation from a very definite source, is documented most clearly in Kierkegaard. In the properly philosophical aspect of his thought, he did not break free from Hegel. His later turn to Trendelenburg is only added documentation for how little radical he was in philosophy. He did not realize that Trendelenburg saw Aristotle through the lens of Hegel. His reading the Paradox into the New Testament and things Christian was simply negative Hegelianism. But what he really wanted (phenomenal) was something different. When today the attempt is made to connect the authentic fundamental tendency of phenomenology with dialectic, this is as if one wanted to mix fire and water. (33 [41-42])

What is most significant in this passage in my opinion is not the fact that Heidegger considers Kierkegaard to be a Hegelian. Rather, it is significant that Heidegger says that Kierkegaard does not break free from Hegel in “the properly philosophical aspect.” Furthermore, Heidegger asserts the incompatibility of “the authentic fundamental tendency of phenomenology” and dialectics. Therefore, this passage does not just say that Kierkegaard according to Heidegger was a Hegelian. It says that Kierkegaard’s mistake in Heidegger’s eyes was to approach “the authentic fundamental tendency” in dialectics. This ‘authentic fundamental tendency’ is not to be mixed with dialectics but with ontological-phenomenology. In this distinction lies the answer to the question in what sense Heidegger does not consider Kierkegaard to be a philosopher.

Let it be remembered that Heidegger makes the previous assessment in the final lecture of his first Freiburg period. As I stated in the first chapter of this thesis and hopefully have been able to show through the analysis of Heidegger’s different lecture courses, there is not one understanding of philosophy in Heidegger’s first Freiburg period. Furthermore, in his various lecture courses, Heidegger has aimed in different ways to bring together the two accounts of accessing. In this respect it is important to keep in mind where Heidegger makes this statement: it must be seen in the context of what is presented in the lecture on hermeneutics of facticity. Taking this into consideration, what Heidegger’s currently viewed estimation shows is that in his last lecture course Heidegger gives the upper hand to the specific methodological considerations: philosophy must clarify life by pointing to its relational sense (facticity). Husserl has opened his eyes. To put it very simply, for Heidegger, Kierkegaard is not a phenomenologist and thus not a philosopher, insofar as philosophy is to be seen as ontological phenomenology gathered into hermeneutics. Furthermore, insofar as for Heidegger philosophy in the end is an ontological study, Kierkegaard is not radical enough for him. But this only as far as Heidegger can be seen to give primacy to what he has brought out about the proper manner of how one must carry through the investigation in philosophy.

The fact that the methodological approach in this way takes an upper hand for Heidegger in his consideration of philosophy enables us to highlight another aspect of Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard. As I pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, when Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard is considered (predominantly with respect to Heidegger's writings posterior to his first Freiburg period), then usually it is admitted that Heidegger does not simply take over something from Kierkegaard. Rather he is claimed to formalize, secularize, or ontologize Kierkegaard. That this is the case comes out also in the analysis of Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. Furthermore, this fact once again enables us to establish that Heidegger is on a two-directional path. That is, in his consideration of philosophy in and through factual life he does not simply repeat his sources, but rather aims to "clarify" their respective accounts. In this respect Heidegger aims to achieve conceptual clarity about Augustine's *Confessions, Book X* as well as unfold his take on Aristotle with an eye on the basic characters. It can be claimed that he does the same with Kierkegaard: he unfolds what he has found in Kierkegaard according to his own agenda and through the investigation deemed to be properly philosophical in Heidegger's eyes. But is this the whole story of Kierkegaard's impact on Heidegger? Or is Kierkegaard somehow special? Does he take from Kierkegaard something which penetrates into the very core of his philosophy? After all, according to Heidegger himself, Kierkegaard is not simply a companion for him (as for example he claimed Luther and Aristotle to be), but rather has given *impulses* to Heidegger. What does this mean?

#### **8.4. Kierkegaard as a source of impulses**

Throughout this thesis, I have shown where Heidegger explicitly mentions Kierkegaard and, on the basis of these references, have aimed to trace Kierkegaard's place and significance for Heidegger. But is there something that Heidegger finds in Kierkegaard which distinguishes the latter from his other sources?

The research of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period has enabled us to exhibit that there are connections to be found in a wide range of themes. It has allowed to reaffirm Heidegger's interest in the themes with which the connection has been found in his later writings (for example, the notion of anxiety), as well as give a firm grounding to the themes in which connections have been found on the level of motives and structures (for example, death and repetition). Furthermore, the research of Heidegger's first Freiburg period reveals a number of themes which have not been connected to

Kierkegaard through Heidegger's later writings. Each of these themes deserves more attention than was given here. What I have rather been aiming at is Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path. Here, I have claimed that Kierkegaard gains importance for Heidegger in his consideration of access in and through factual life. Now, I would like to pay attention to a further aspect of this placement. The question is whether Kierkegaard offers to Heidegger simply certain themes which Heidegger stumbles upon and half randomly takes up, or whether Heidegger finds a thought from Kierkegaard which penetrates into the very core of Heidegger's philosophy (as for example Kierkegaard's notion repetition has done as Caputo (1987:12) has claimed with reference to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*). To put it differently: what does it mean that Kierkegaard has given 'impulses' [(An)stöße] for Heidegger, as opposed to being just a companion as he has claimed Luther and Aristotle to be (GA 63: 4 [5-6])?

With this question in mind, it is first of all significant to notice two facts. First, that Heidegger develops distinct accounts of accessing in each of his lecture courses. Second, that Kierkegaard appears in these lecture courses as soon as Heidegger discusses the problem of access in and through factual life. That is, Kierkegaard emerges as significant with respect to philosophy as it is sought in the living situation regardless of the fact that Heidegger has offered a rethought version of it. For, considering Kierkegaard's significance to Heidegger, this situation leads to the question: what do these different versions by Heidegger have in common? As has been shown, all of them address the question of access, where in each case both authentic and inauthentic access is unfolded. But these accounts of philosophy in and through factual life share another feature. Namely, in whatever way the access is claimed to be achieved, what one must confront is claimed to be oneself as questionable. That is, in all of his three lecture courses, which I analyzed in *Part Two*, Heidegger's articulation of philosophy in and through factual life comes down to questionability. The way he arrives at the need for questioning as well as how questionability is said to break forth is different in each case. In the lecture on Augustine the questionability breaks forth through facing God, in the lecture on Aristotle this possibility is found in life's temporal movement, as a counter-movement from facing nothingness, and in the lecture on hermeneutics of facticity something becomes questionable through unfamiliarity. In each case, Heidegger was shown to lean on Kierkegaard, regardless of the way that Heidegger arrived at his respective accounts.

In order to show how this becomes decisive for reckoning with Kierkegaard's role for Heidegger's philosophy during his first Freiburg period, I will return to Heidegger's estimation of Kierkegaard found in the review of Jaspers and thematized by me in the fourth chapter of this thesis. Namely, in his review of Jasper, Heidegger claims that "such a heightened consciousness of methodological rigor as his [Kierkegaard's] has rarely been achieved in philosophy or theology (the question where he [Kierkegaard] has achieved this [methodological] rigor is not important here)" (JR: 101 [41]).<sup>205</sup> Previously I claimed that what is significant for the present thesis is exactly where this rigor has been achieved. Addressing this question, which Heidegger constantly deflects, will help to pinpoint Kierkegaard as a source of impulses for Heidegger.

In the fourth chapter (section 4.6) I showed that Heidegger's acknowledgment of Kierkegaard's methodological rigor has been traced back to Kierkegaard's indirect communication and connected to Heidegger's formal indication. With an eye on Heidegger's method, I argued that Heidegger's formal indication is different from Kierkegaard's indirect communication. More specifically, with reference to Otto Pöggeler and Theodore Kisiel I highlighted two distinct features of Heidegger's formal indication which make it different from Kierkegaard's indirect communication. That is, Heidegger's formal indication has the task of pointing at a specific sense direction (relational sense) and must be seen in the context of destruction. Formal indication is therefore one methodological moment among others (destruction and phenomenological explication). However, the fact that Kierkegaard's indirect communication is in these respects distinct from Heidegger's formal indication still leaves the possibility open that Heidegger's reference should be seen as pointing to Kierkegaard's indirect communication. Indeed, I suggest that with this recognition of Kierkegaard's method, Heidegger in fact refers to Kierkegaard's indirect communication: he appreciates Kierkegaard's method of communicating. But indirect communication should not primarily be related to Heidegger's formal indication. Rather, the analysis of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses shows that this appreciation moves to the center of Heidegger's philosophy in and through factual life in the form of the claim for questionability. How this

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<sup>205</sup> The citation in full reads as follows: "[c]oncerning Kierkegaard, we should point out that such a heightened consciousness of methodological rigor as his has rarely been achieved in philosophy or theology (the question where he has achieved this rigor is not important here). One loses sight of nothing less than the most important aspect of Kierkegaard's thought when one overlooks this consciousness of method, or when one's treatment of it takes it to be of secondary importance." (JR: 101 [41])

is the case comes out through the consideration of Kierkegaard as an author who aims to communicate indirectly.

Previously (section 4.6), I pointed out that Kierkegaard's indirect communication refers to a mode of communicating by one existing individual to another existing individual the fact that they are existing individuals. It is a notion which gathers a need for each individual to make the decision by themselves and appropriate the truth by themselves. The central feature of his way of communicating, in line with Kierkegaard's view on existing individuals, is to throw the reader into questioning. In order to achieve this, Kierkegaard uses a manifold of techniques by which he takes away the possibility of gaining ready-made solutions. He himself explains this for example in *Practice in Christianity* in the following way:

For example, it is indirect communication to place a jest and earnestness together in such a way that the composite is a dialectical knot – and then to be nobody oneself. If anyone wants to have anything to do with this kind of communication, he will have to untie the knot himself. Or, to bring attack and defense into a unity in such a way that no one can directly say whether one is attacking or defending, so that the most zealous supporter of the cause and its most vicious foe can both seem to see in one an ally – and then to be nobody oneself, an absentee, an objective something, a nonperson. (PI: 133 [XII 124])

Placing the reader in the situation of facing the knot which the reader himself needs to untie is a constantly present feature of Kierkegaard's writings. In this way he writes under different pseudonyms, unfolding his problems from different angles and expressing views which contradict each other. His aim is to lead the reader himself to understand himself: the task is, to become “an individual existing human being instead of being part of the race and saying ‘we’, ‘our age’, ‘the nineteenth century’” (CUP: 355 [VII 308]). With indirect communication, Kierkegaard aims to achieve what in *The Single Individual* was pointed to as “without authority” (see section 7.5). As it comes out in this treatise, Kierkegaard does not take the question of his own authorship lightly. Rather, he is deeply concerned with the issue of communicating, as is also highlighted by the thematization of different ways of relating in his treatise *The Sickness unto Death*. Through his attention to the concern of communicating and the extent to which he develops it, Kierkegaard can be claimed to be the master of throwing the reader into questioning. In this he indeed achieved exceptional mastery: a rigor rarely seen among philosophers or theologians, as Heidegger claims.

Kierkegaard's manner of communicating arises from his acknowledgment of each existing individual. Heidegger accuses Kierkegaard of pursuing only personal reflection and making his approach too easy for himself (GA 63: 25 [30]). However, for Kierkegaard, to bring the concrete existing individual in the center of focus is definitely not to take the

easy way out, but rather exactly face the difficulty. In this respect, it could perhaps be claimed that from Kierkegaard's perspective it is not he but Heidegger himself who makes things too easy if philosophical investigation gains primacy. As was pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, compared to Kierkegaard, Heidegger is often criticized for his abstractness and empty formalism. Kierkegaard on the other hand tries to keep away from abstraction as much as possible: "[t]o abstract from existence is to remove the difficulty" (CUP 354 [VII 307]). But then again, the analysis of Heidegger's first Freiburg period has shown that he also always considers philosophy in and through factual life. In this he can be seen to take Kierkegaard extremely seriously. It even seems that Heidegger takes him so seriously that Kierkegaard, who shows pressingly that one cannot do away with the living situation, has pushed Heidegger, whose eyes with respect to phenomenological method have been opened by Husserl, into the path of two directions and to the constant struggle to unite them. Let it be remembered that in two of his lecture courses Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in the middle of considering the proper investigation in connection with the need to account also for the living situation (see section 6.4 and 7.4). In this way, it seems that Kierkegaard, the master of questionability, plays a role for Heidegger's philosophy in setting him the difficult task of always also thinking "the abstract human concretely."

Instead of having the task of understanding the concrete abstractly, as abstract thinking has, the subjective thinker has the opposite task of understanding the abstract concretely. Abstract thinking turns from concrete human beings to humankind in general; the subjective thinker understands the abstract concept to be the concrete human being, to be this individual existing human being. (CUP: 352 [VII 306])

Providing a method for investigation is never enough. It must be circled through concrete actualization or it ceases to be meaningful. And Heidegger agrees with that, for he states: "[t]he formal indication of the 'I am,' which is the indication that plays the leading role in the problematic of the sense of the Being of life, becomes methodologically effective by being brought into its genuine factual actualization, i.e., by becoming actualized in the demonstrable character of the *questionability* ('restlessness') of factual life as the concretely historiological question, 'am I?'" (GA 61: 131 [174]).

