Paths towards philosophy : Søren Kierkegaard’s place in Martin Heidegger’s first Freiburg period lecture courses (1919-1923)

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6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course "Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research"

6.1. Introduction

After his religious courses Heidegger turns to Aristotle. His turn to Aristotle in the summer semester of 1921 is initiated with the seminar entitled *Phenomenological Practicum for Beginners in Conjunction with Aristotle's De Anima* [*Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluß an Aristotle, de anima*] and continued with several lectures and seminars.[156] In this move towards Aristotle (an interest which is to be continued after the first Freiburg period throughout the years to come), some researchers of Heidegger see a kind of a new beginning, a real turn towards the path which leads to *Sein und Zeit*.[157] At the center of this view is the fact that Heidegger proceeds more radically than before towards the historical character of understanding as well as towards the articulation of philosophy in terms of ontology. The fact that Heidegger indeed does so will be seen during the course of this chapter, in which I will focus on Heidegger's lecture course entitled *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* [*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 61], held in the winter semester of 1921-1922.

As I aim to show, in this lecture course Heidegger again explicitly addresses the problem of philosophy and develops his account of philosophy in two directions. In my reading of this lecture course, he first focuses on the definition of philosophy and proposes the path which philosophical investigation must take. After that, he considers philosophy in and through factical life, in which his analysis of factical life can be seen to address the problems of necessity, possibility, and the motivational ground of philosophy. Inasmuch as

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[156] During his first Freiburg period Heidegger gives two lecture courses dedicated to Aristotle: *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* [*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*] (WS 1921–22, GA 61) and *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*] ('*Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle: Ontology and Logic*,' SS 1922, GA 62). In addition, he hold four seminars on Aristotle and puts together an essay with the same title as the lecture course from the 1921–1922 winter semester: "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation" ["Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)" (1922, in GA 62)].

[157] For example Fredrik Westerlund (2014: 121) says: "[i]t is now that Heidegger becomes *the Heidegger* that has exercised such a strong influence on the subsequent development of philosophy and that has functioned as the primal point of focus for later interpretations of his thinking." Similarly, Theodore Kisiel (1995: 223) insists that the years between 1921 and 1924 are a new phase of development towards *Sein und Zeit.*

these problems are at the center of the consideration of philosophy in and through factical life, the lecture course is similar to the lecture course on Augustine. And yet, the resolution is distinct in many aspects. For one thing, in the presently viewed lecture course, Heidegger distances himself from the religious slant on the motivational ground apparent in his lecture on Augustine. As he insists: "philosophy *itself* is, as such, atheistic, if it understands itself radically" (149 [199]). The possibility of philosophy is firmly brought into factical life itself through the introduction of a number of new categories.

With respect to Kierkegaard's place in the lecture course, I aim to show that Heidegger again turns to Kierkegaard in his consideration of the problematic of philosophy in and through factical life. In the light of Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard, the latter's presence in this lecture course is not overly explicit. He mentions Kierkegaard only on two occasions. Nevertheless, in my opinion, through these references Kierkegaard's presence becomes forcefully apparent.

In order to exhibit that Heidegger develops philosophy in two directions and which place Kierkegaard occupies on Heidegger's path, I have divided the chapter into six sections. In the second section I give an overview of the aims and problems Heidegger proposes for the lecture course as well as account for his manner of addressing the proposed problematic. I suggest the need to consider the structural layout slightly differently from that presented by the editors of the lecture course. In the third section I outline Heidegger's account of philosophy in two directions: first I set out his account for the definition of philosophy at the level of principle, and then I exhibit how he unfolds philosophy categorically in and through factical life. After that, I turn to Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's lecture course. First I bring out Heidegger's explicit references to Kierkegaard. With the claim that Heidegger in this lecture course draws on Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*, I then make an excursion to this treatise in the fifth section of this chapter. Thereafter, in the sixth section, I consider Kierkegaard's significance for Heidegger's lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*. As always, I sum up the chapter with some conclusive remarks in the last section of the chapter.

6.2. The problem situation and the structure of the lecture course

The lecture course on Aristotle is opened with the statement "[w]e call research into a past philosophy – e.g., Aristotle's – a study in the history of philosophy" (3 [1]). As can be presumed from Heidegger's repeated manner of entering a subject, this statement will be

turned into a problem. That is, the wider problem which Heidegger starts to unfold is philosophy in its connection with history.

The point of departure of the concrete problematic as well as the explicit question through which Heidegger addresses the above-given problem sphere is once again the question; 'what is philosophy?' (11 [12]). The need to question philosophy is first of all motivated from the (muddiness of the) current situation of philosophy. As Heidegger states in the middle of the lecture course: "what we understand today of the sense of philosophy, i.e., how we comport ourselves in philosophy, is a matter of unclarities, conveniences, unverifiable traditions, and preferences of taste" (31 [39]). In addition, the need to reconsider philosophy rests on the claim of the historical character of philosophy. According to Heidegger, history [*die Geschichte*] is always present in philosophy and one is always in relation to history in a living way (4 [3]). Insofar as philosophy is both historical and directed towards history of philosophy, there lies a task to explicate this mode of relating. On the basis of these two claims, the starting point of the wider problematics is placed in the way that "today," that is, traditionally or in the current spiritual situation, history of philosophy is approached.

According to Heidegger, "[today] philosophy is preconceptually determined, in regard to its content, as part of Objective [*objectiv*] history, as having Objective and Object-like relations and properties" (3 [1]). Thus, the described approach will be marked by Heidegger in this lecture course as historiology [*die Historie*]. To understand what historiology means as well as what it means to be foreconceptually determined is a part of the task of the lecture, for as Heidegger states: "[t]he historiological aspect of philosophy is visible only in the very act of philosophizing. It is graspable only as existence and is accessible only out of purely factical life and, accordingly, with and through history" (3 [1]). As such, Heidegger places the research into factical life at the center of his search. This is also the way the lecture course has been mainly interpreted in the secondary literature.[158] There is a good reason for that, since the subject matter receives much attention in the lecture course. Nevertheless, I would stress that his consideration of philosophy in and through factical life is preceded by the problem of the definition of philosophy through which the manner of proceeding with philosophical investigation is

[158] That the lecture course predominantly revolves around factical life and is addressed as such is brought out by Richard Rojcewicz (2009: xiii). That it has been approached as such is shown for example by Scott M. Campbell (2012).

unfolded. That this is the case, in my opinion, becomes clear from the structure of the lecture course, which is led by the question 'what is philosophy?'.[159]

That is, by focusing on Heidegger's explicitly addressed question (what is philosophy?), he is seen to analyze the problem of philosophy in concrete steps. Specifically, on the basis of the claim that traditional philosophy has gone astray, Heidegger first outlines the erroneous approaches of the treatment of the question 'what is philosophy?' found in the tradition and subjects these to the method of destruction, in which he aims at the positive tendencies found in them. More concretely, he outlines four sorts of errors gathered into two types: overestimation and underestimation. After that, he can be seen to build up his own account on the basis of the positive tendencies found in each erroneous approach.

In my opinion, it is important to notice this structural layout of the lecture course for two reasons. First, because it enables us to see that in his consideration of factical life in the final part of his lecture course Heidegger is still addressing the question of 'what is philosophy?' and that he is doing this from a specific angle. That is, he considers philosophy in and through factical life. Secondly, it is significant because on the basis of the structure of the lecture course Heidegger's articulation of philosophy can be seen to be divided in two parts. Initially, he aims to find a solid foundation for defining philosophy and only then turns to philosophy on the basis of a lived situation. As will be shown, philosophy will be determined in two ways here: as phenomenological ontology and as repetition. Heidegger aims to bring together the two directions of asking about philosophy. In this way, he insists that the methodological part must never be fixed, but taken up ever anew on the basis of the concrete (11 [11]) and, at the same time, points to the need to establish the definition "before all else" on the basis of which the concrete can be then established (13 [15]). Thus, he clearly aims to bring out the mutual dependence of the two aspects by placing them in a circle. And yet, in this very aim the two tasks depart from each other. Furthermore, already before going into the erroneous ways of approaching philosophy, Heidegger makes the distinction felt by saying that both in overestimation and underestimation there reside genuine intentions, which lie in stressing the necessity for

[159] I suggest that the lecture course is structured by Heidegger slightly differently than proposed by the editors of the lecture course. I would contend that, content-wise, Heidegger addresses the erroneous approaches one by one, referring each time back to the previous consideration. Thus, Ch.1.A.a. is addressed in Ch.2.A, Ch.1.A.b. is addressed in Ch.2.B, Ch.1.B.a. is addressed in Ch.2.C, and Ch.1.B.b. is addressed in Part III. The significance of this structure lies in the the fact that Heidegger's unfolding of factical life, which is presented as a separate part (Part III), is a continuation of the initial problem ('what is philosophy?').

philosophy to take its orientation from a principle and in stressing the necessity of actually concrete philosophizing (14 [15-16]). How these two aspects are brought forth is the theme of the next section.

6.3. The path of unfolding philosophy in the lecture course on Aristotle

As I read it, Heidegger unfolds the problematic of his lecture course by initially considering mistaken treatments of the question 'what is philosophy?' and carrying out the definition of it, and then, by drawing on the positive tendencies found in the erroneous approaches, gives his own positive account. Setting out his own positive account, he first focuses on the definition of philosophy and addresses what he has marked as the two erroneous approaches which lead to overestimation. After that, he turns to the actualization of philosophy. With respect to the erroneous approaches of the tradition, the latter consideration addresses the ways which lead to underestimation. In what follows, I will bring out how Heidegger analyzes both of these directions in two subsections. My aim is to lay bare Heidegger's account in order to establish where Kierkegaard gains significance for him.

6.3.1. Definition of philosophy

According to Heidegger, the question 'what is philosophy?' and the task of definition have been overestimated in two ways. In the first erroneous approach which leads to overestimation of the question and its resolution (acceptance of the uncritical idea of definition), he finds the positive tendency that every object has its mode of genuinely being possessed, where in every mode of possession the object is under discussion. The task of definition is to claim the object in speech and to bring it into possession from its genuine mode of being under discussion. As he states, at first the importance lies in drawing the "logic of the grasp of the object, and the conceptuality of the object in the respective definitory determination" out of "the mode *in which the object is originally accessible*" (17 [20]). Shortly, the task is first to bring out the foreconception [*Vorgriff*].[160] This task is addressed through analysis of the turn of speech [*Sprachgebrauch*].

Bringing out the foreconception means bringing out the basic relation of how something is grasped and brought into language in advance in the everyday way of speaking about it. That is, the object and the relation to it are to be searched in our own

[160] Note: translated also as 'preconception.'

concrete situation of grasping and speaking of something. In the case of philosophy it means turning towards the understanding of philosophy as it unfolds in the everyday manner of speaking about it. In order to bring out the foreconception and to clarify the tendency of understanding in which it is lived currently, as well as to point to the more original way of understanding philosophy, Heidegger contrasts the foreconception found in his surroundings with that of the foreconception found in ancient Greek (more precisely, he turns to Plato) on the basis of the expression "philosophizing."[161] He claims that philosophizing, rather than having a meaning of "to busy oneself with philosophy," should be taken as to "poetize" [*musizieren*][162] (36 [47-48]). For this claim he finds "historical grounding" in Plato.

According to Heidegger, words as they were used in Plato's context were more accessible and not as strict and objectified as in the current situation (37 [49]). Furthermore, he claims that "concepts were specifically tailored to *factical life*" (ibid.). Thus, referring back to Plato, Heidegger states that philosophy is to be seen as pointing to certain connotations: to being [*Sein*] as such, appropriating being as being (according to its being), as a manner of actualizing one's life, and lastly to considering philosophy, not as a technique, but as a mode of self-comportment [*Sichverhalten*] (37-38 [49-50]). On the basis of what has been said and by focusing on the last-mentioned aspect, Heidegger then insists that when compared to ancient Greek, what emerges about contemporary philosophy is that in the latter the comportment [*Verhalten*] and that to which one comports are separated (through objectification). This is what the turn of speech points to, and according to Heidegger this is the movement which is to be reversed for a proper understanding of philosophy.

> The comportment to … is authentic precisely if it is originally and only comportment, and that means, in today's way of speaking, if it is an indication that the genuinely appropriate comportment to … arises out of an independent comportment as pure actualization and that this actualization in turn has weight precisely for the explication of the content of that to which philosophizing comports itself as its object. (39 [52])

[161] With the discussion about the accustomed way of speaking about philosophy, Heidegger turns to familiar distinctions from his previous lecture courses, that is, discussion about worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy, where the latter again is traced back to the former. Differently from his previous ways of dismantling philosophy as a worldview, he now approaches the theme in the context of foreconception, i.e. on the basis of the expression "philosophizing." However, taking leave of the customary understanding that one can "teach and learn" only philosophizing and not philosophy, Heidegger repeats the claim that philosophizing in this sense is a formation of worldview (33-36 [43-47]).

[162] In this example I follow the change of wording by the translator Richard Rojcewicz (GA 61: 36, n.8), who has explained the adjustment with reference to the lack of the word "musicize" [Ger. *musizieren*] in English.

This genuine understanding, which according to Heidegger was self-evident to the Greek way of thinking, will now be taken up by him in order to give a definition of philosophy. He determines philosophy as follows: "*cognitive comportment to beings in terms of Being*" [*erkennendes Verhalten zu Seiendem als Sein*] (44 [58]). As such, philosophy is radical ontology – phenomenological ontology or ontological phenomenology (46 [60]). This determination is established by Heidegger through two steps. Armed with what has been shown through the turn of speech, he first explicates philosophy/philosophizing through the sense directions. It still holds true that everything can be taken into phenomenon: about everything it is possible to ask in different directions of sense (in this lecture, the fourth direction is added)[163]. Secondly, drawing additionally on the positive tendency found in the second case of erroneous approach which leads to overestimation, he articulates philosophy at the level of principle.

In his analysis of philosophizing through sense directions Heidegger points out that 'comportment in itself' carries a relation to something. This means that it is graspable in its sense of relation. Philosophizing as comportment (the relation of philosophizing) explicated in its sense of relation is determined as 'cognitive comportment' [*erkennendes Verhalten*]. Here, cognition is determined as "grasping of the object 'as' object and so is a determining of the object by way of grasping it," whereby "[t]he grasping determination 'says' that, what, and how the object is" (41 [54]). In this way, Heidegger repeats his conviction that the mode of accessing the object determines the object. Thus, it is important that the mode of accessing in philosophy must "co-respond" to its object properly (ibid). Heidegger insists that "[t]he relation holds on to something as a being […]" (ibid). That is, the sense of content (translated by Rojcewicz as the sense of holding, *Gehaltsinn*) to which the relation holds on to is a being: its something (as content) is a being [*Seienden*]. A being is determined as object in its "what" and "how" out of the full sense of phenomenon (40, 41 [53, 54]).

Now, although philosophizing is determined with respect to its relational sense as cognitive comportment, not every cognitive comportment is philosophizing nor suitable for philosophy in Heidegger's view. Sciences are also nexuses of actualization of cognitive comportment. The difference is that sciences relate to their own nexus of beings, which

[163] The fourth sense direction Heidegger adds in this lecture course is the sense of maturation [*Zeitigungssinn*]. With respect to the sense of actualization [*Vollzugssinn*] the comportment is to be seen as it takes place or actualizes with respect to the manner of taking place. The sense of maturation says how actualization temporalizes. That is, phenomenon can be determined in the way "the actualization becomes actualization, in and for its situation" (40 [53]).

determines a region of a specific science. That philosophy cannot do. Moreover, Heidegger seems to accuse sciences of being limited to 'comportment to…,' which is cut off from the 'comportment as such.' Insofar as according to Heidegger "the genuinely appropriate comportment to… arises out of an independent comportment as pure actualization" (39 [52]), he thus condemns the scientific approach to scientific objects for ending up in arbitrariness. For Heidegger, sciences take their method from somewhere outside and thus become a question of taste (42 [55-56]). The question how to avoid this in philosophy requires turning towards the positive tendency of the second erroneous approach which led to overestimation.

In order to avoid falling into arbitrariness, philosophy must turn to the principle [*Prinzip*]: "[p]hilosophy is to be determined at the level of principle; such a definition would involve a precedent exposition of what the main issue is, what really matters, so that we might then be able to direct a radical questioning at this issue" (42-43 [56]). Philosophy does not have a *region*, it is not a specific science, but a "basic science" [*"Grundwissenschaft"*], as Heidegger says (43 [57]). It is cognitive comportment at the level of principle.

> Philosophy is the cognitive comportment of something that has subsistence in itself and that can come into consideration for something else only as *principle*. (43 [57])

Principle, thus, is exactly not a being, but a principle. Philosophy grasps something at the level of principle and the determinative grasp of philosophy must then also be one of principle. What is this principle? Principle must be such that it is the ultimate issue for the beings from the beings. The principle is being [*Sein*] or, as Heidegger points out, with respect to the mode it is graspable, the sense of being (44 [58]).

All in all, Heidegger's argumentation unfolds as follows. Philosophizing according to its sense of relation is cognitive comportment. That towards which it holds is (investigated as what it is in its "what" and "how") a being. Thus, philosophy is cognitive comportment towards beings and it is this at the level of principle. At the level of principle, that towards which a being comports itself has to be a principle for such a being itself: "[t]he object of the definition is itself a comportment to…, the principle in it is the 'towards which' of the comportment, the sense of Being" (45 [59]). This principle is to be taken exactly as a principle and not as an object or a being itself. It should never be forgotten that being is not a thing. From what has been said, it follows: "[t]he object of the definition of philosophy is therefore determined as follows: *cognitive comportment to beings in terms of Being*" (44 [58]).

It is important to keep in mind that so far the fundamental objectivity of philosophy, factical life, is not concretely brought forth. Heidegger is here still dealing with the task of determining 'what is philosophy?' and how to define it. Everything that is said should be rather seen as tasks on the path of determining philosophy (determining its proper objectivity and how this objectivity should be grasped). Therefore, when Heidegger articulates the sense-directions in the context of philosophizing as comportment, these directions indicate what must be taken into consideration on this path. Similarly, it should be noticed that by Heidegger's own account the previously given definition of philosophy is formally indicative (46 [60]). It is not yet a full determination of philosophy insofar as it is formally empty. At the same time, the given definition functions in the manner of giving directions. In this sense Heidegger further insists that the object of the definition is not the object of philosophy. Rather, "[t]he proper possessing of comportment *qua* comportment, however, is a mode of its actualization" (45 [60]). With these statements Heidegger turns to the consideration of philosophy in and through factical life. In doing so, he addresses the two erroneous approaches leading to underestimation (the decision in favor of "concrete work" and the claim that philosophy can only be lived) through the positive tendencies of which he makes a claim, first, for the need of the definition of philosophy to hold on to the reference to the concrete and, secondly, for the need to bring philosophy alive.

6.3.2. Actualization and maturation of philosophy

With the statement that the proper mode of possessing comportment is a mode of actualization, Heidegger takes up the analysis of the modes of actualizing philosophy. Asking about a concrete situation in which philosophy is actualized, he points to the university as the nexus in which philosophy is alive. After all, philosophy is being done – it is and is 'alive' – in the universities (48 [63-64]). Through his consideration of the appropriateness of taking the university as a proper point of access – more concretely through two possible objections to this consideration – he makes two important claims. First, he claims that philosophy is in a decadent situation (58 [77]). That is, the current situation is in decline [*der Abfall*]. Secondly, he claims that the university as life nexus is a "part of our own factically historical life" (58 [78]). In this way, he posits the need to turn towards factical life, so that the necessity of taking up the problem of philosophy in and through factical life is brought into the current situation, which is claimed to be in decline.

His task can therefore be seen as that of reversing the decline of philosophy. In my opinion, this is Heidegger's main aim in his following analysis of factical life.

According to my reading of the lecture course, Heidegger thus turns to the question of how factical life is accessible in and through factical life itself, in which the analysis of factical life aims at addressing both the possibility of the decline and the possibility of overcoming the decline. This aim is taken up through a categorial[164] explication starting with the notion of 'life' and its basic categories (or the basic characters as they are known from his earlier lecture courses). In this lecture course many new categories are introduced, some of which will be quickly abandoned and never used again. In what follows, I will outline these categories in order to lay bare Heidegger's account of the possibility of philosophy in and through factical life in this lecture course. When explicating Augustine, Heidegger found this possibility in the search for God. The question is how Heidegger considers this possibility in his lecture course on Aristotle. As I read it, Heidegger unfolds his account in three steps. After arguing for life as worldly, historical and meaningful, he turns to the categories of relationality of life and movement. Through these categories he can be seen to address the question of the possibility of decline in and through factical life as well as open the way to the possibility of authentic access. How exactly authentic access in the situation of decline comes about is unfolded through the thematization of ruinance, in the third step of the analysis.

Thus, Heidegger begins by establishing that to which the access is searched for in terms of life as worldly, historical and meaningful. Taking his point of departure in factical life with the term 'life,' he first states that the term 'life' is vague and ambiguous today. According to him, this vagueness of life, which is exhibited through the intransitive and transitive sense of the verb 'to live,' is a trait of life itself and should be taken as such, because in life itself resides the possibility to take hold of life in its ambiguity. Secondly, Heidegger claims that the term 'life' radically expresses the temporality and historicality inherent in life itself through three senses. First of all, 'life' has the meaning of "unity of

[164] According to Heidegger, the following basic senses (world, caring, etc.), are to be understood as categories [*Kategorien*]. For categories, Heidegger gives the following determination: "[i]n this context, the term 'category' refers to something which, according to its sense, interprets a phenomenon in a direction of sense, in a determinate way, at the level of principle, and brings the phenomenon to intelligibility as the interpretatum" (65 [86]). According to Heidegger, categories are not something laid upon life from outside, but rather they are alive in life itself. He insists that all the categorial nexuses are alive in genuinely concrete life as opposed to being trivial observations. He also asserts that the interpretation of the categories must take the entirety of life and the full sense into account, and that categorial interpretation must be repeated (65-67 [86-89]). Furthermore, according to Heidegger, they are "understood only insofar as life is compelled to interpretation" (66 [87]).

succession and maturation" as unity of extension over the totality of life. In addition, "life" is brought out as a "delimited unity of succession." In this case, 'life' is what bears possibilities and is itself a possibility. The last sense of the notion of 'life' Heidegger calls 'fate' [*Schicksal*]. With 'fate' the two previous senses are said to be intertwined, thus giving 'life' a sense of the unity of extension in possibility and of possibility taken as a reality (64 [84–85]).[165] Life is radically temporal and historical and the term 'life' as unfolded above expresses just that.

In addition, Heidegger stresses that in the expression 'to live' the world is simultaneously encountered, and the other way around: in the expression 'world' we are simultaneously talking about 'life'. World is brought into life as that something "in," "out of," "for," "with," "against," "following," "from" which life lives (65 [85]). To live means to live in the world. Life and world go together, and not as two things standing next to each other. Rather, they are to be seen as sense directions of a phenomenon through which the full sense of a phenomenon is to be interpreted. In this respect, as in Heidegger's previous lecture courses, world is the basic category of the content-sense in the phenomenon life (65 [86]). World is the corresponding content for life understood in its relational sense (65 [85]). With the category of relation – caring [*Sorgen*] – life and world are brought together even more closely. Caring is "*the* basic relational sense of life in itself" (67 [89]). It is the relational sense according to which living is to be interpreted. As Heidegger puts it: "here, as everywhere, 'to live' means to care" (68 [90]). Furthermore, it means to relate through meaning.

> What we care for and about, what caring adheres to, is equivalent to what is meaningful. *Meaningfulness* is a categorial determination of the world; the objects of the world, worldly, world-some objects, are lived inasmuch as they embody the character of meaningfulness. (68 [90])

This means that everything encountered in life – the something which is encountered – is always meaningful as something. Heidegger also says that the categorial sense of meaningfulness needs to be taken in two ways: it needs to be taken as a categorial character of objects and in a "broad way" (68 [90]). As a categorial character of objects the character of meaningfulness points to the way objects are there in the lived world. World and worldly objects are present in the act of caring in which they are encountered. This means that the basic mode of objects is not to be taken as some kind of naked pure realities, but rather

[165] Heidegger brings these senses together by saying: "[t]hese three senses of the noun contain the following structural indications, which are connected together categorially: the characters of extension, unity of succession, and manifold actualization; the articulation as possibility, delivered over to possibility, developing possibility; furthermore, as reality, power in its opacity, fate" (64 [84–85]).

through their character as encountered things. Considered in the broader sense the character of meaningfulness is explicated by Heidegger as something which life has a need for, or rather, care is in search of. In this respect, the basic mode of life is articulated as a lack,[166] to which Heidegger opposes full possession found in objectivity (ibid.). In this way, he repeats the same motif present throughout his lecture courses: that meaningfulness itself is not mostly the "object" of care, not explicitly experienced, but it can be experienced. Furthermore, it can be lived, where living in meaningfulness refers to authentic actualization of factical life, that is, according to itself (70 [93]).[167] This leads to the following step of Heidegger's consideration.

According to my reading, what becomes the question now for Heidegger is how life as worldly, historical and meaningful becomes accessible from out of itself. After all, he has already insisted that in (the vagueness and ambiguity of) life itself, there is a possibility to get hold of itself as well as a motivation to do that insofar as the basic mode of life is claimed to be lack. At the same time, however, he is committed to the claim that the current situation is in decline. In this respect, addressing the possibility of authentic access must go through the possibility of losing this access. How this is the case is explained by Heidegger through the analysis of the categories of relationality of life [*Bezugssinn des Lebens*] and the categories of movement [*Bewegung*]: the categories in which resides the novelty of this lecture course. Here, it must be noticed that in what follows, Heidegger is simultaneously talking about temporality. It is about maturation [*Zeitigung*] of the actualization. Thus, he insists that he considers the modes of movedness [*Bewegtheit*] to be constituted by time. Time makes the movedness possible and is the factical movedness. Furthermore, time makes possible the historiological approach, regarded as ruinant life which "has no time" (103-104 [138-140]). Aiming to express movement as intrinsic to life, Heidegger thus first introduces four categories of the relationality of life – inclination, distance, sequestration (blocking off), and the easy. Each of these must go through the previous one and they are then to be seen as concrete expressions of life's movement intrinsic to caring.

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[166] With the reference to lack Heidegger considers meaningfulness in the broader sense by declaring: "[i]n its broadest relational sense, to live is to care about one's 'daily bread'" (68 [90]). This, according to Heidegger, must be understood very generally, as a formal indication: "*'Privation'* (*privation, carentia*) is both the relational and the intrinsic basic mode and sense of the Being of life" (68 [90]).

[167] Heidegger states: "[m]eaningfulness becomes explicit in the proper interpretation of life with respect to itself, and thence we can first fully understand what it 'is' and means to live factically 'in' meaningfulness. The abbreviated expression, 'to live in meaningfulness,' means to live in, out of, and from objects whose content is of categorial character of the meaningful." (70 [93])

Inclination [*Neigung*] (75-77 [100-102]) is characterized as giving life weight, which pulls towards something. It is actualized (that is, caring is carried out) as proclivity, which is said to impel life into its world. It is a direction of gravity in and from life which pulls life towards its world and does so constantly through a new kind of weight. That is, it pulls to the manifold of meaningfulness which encountered things may have and which in their changeable overwhelmingness take hold of life and thereby carry life. As Heidegger puts it, life gets to the mode of being transported or taken along by the world (ibid.). As such, life is thrown into dispersion, which leads to a further character – distance [*Abstand*] (77-78 [102-105]). More concretely, life being dispersed into the meaningful things in the world, distance is exactly what is lacking. Distance is not something one sees in life, but rather distance over-sees it, which as such is a source for mis-measuring of life. Life itself seeks to distance itself within meaningful things, feeding the dispersion and becoming thus 'hyperbolic.' By saying that life becomes hyperbolic, Heidegger is referring to life's falling increasingly into the manifold of meaningful things, until the manifold itself becomes the object of care. Insofar as distance refers to lack, the category is also articulated as 'abolition of distance' [*Abstandstilgung*]. In life's identifying itself with the meaningful things, in its lacking distance from the world and the things in the world, having something 'before' [*vor*] oneself is suppressed (ibid.). The category which Heidegger uses to characterize blocking off the possibility of having something 'before' oneself is sequestration [*Abriegelung*] (78-81 [105-108]). Sequestration characterizes the fact that the more fully life lives in its worlds, the more the worldly concerns are increased and the more life has to do with itself. It is the way life in its increasing concern about the world brings into maturation (temporalizes) the actual non-caring about itself. Life, developing ever new possibilities of meaningfulness, increases the possibilities of mistaking. Thus, according to Heidegger, in sequestration, life leaves itself out. Furthermore, by inclining, suppressing distance and sequestrating and in its direction taking, life puts itself on the path towards the 'easy' (ibid.).

The easy [*Leichte*] (81-82 [108-110]) is the category through which Heidegger expresses life's tendency to seek an easy way out. As before, through the claim that life has a tendency to secure itself, Heidegger now points out that life aims to safeguard itself by looking away from itself. This mode of caring is a mode that Heidegger names carefreeness [*Sorglosigkeit*], which has to satisfy itself through constant increase (ibid.). With the claim that the main direction life takes is towards finding an easy way, Heidegger can

simultaneously claim that this mode of concern, carefreeness, becomes hyperbolic and "it is unwilling to be posed *upon* a primal decision and *in* it (repeating it)" (81 [109]). This leads to the question of the possibility of being posed upon a primal decision. More specifically, it leads to the question where in life itself lies the possibility to appropriate the 'before' – that which Heidegger has claimed to get lost and which at the same time needs to be gained in order to grasp oneself in an appropriate measure.[168] From this perspective, the categories of movement are introduced.

According to Heidegger, each category of the relational sense of life named above expresses something of the movement of life. More specifically, each of them expresses the categories of relucence [*Reluzenz*] and prestruction [*Praestruktion*] (87-97 [117-130]). These are the movement of life towards itself through which life is opened to its world (relucent movement) and the movement towards securing forehaving [*Vorhabe*][169] for itself in its world (prestructive movement). Thus, Heidegger first insists that "inclination shows itself as something which moves itself toward itself" (89 [119]). This movement Heidegger names relucence, that is, "*the movement of life toward itself within every encounter*" (ibid.). What inclination indicates is that life offers itself to itself in a worldly way. What life encounters in inclination is life itself. Life "reflects light back to itself" (ibid.). In this way, what life cares about can be claimed to stem from life as care. Furthermore, life can be claimed to have a tendency to secure itself in the forehaving, insofar as life is also said to be prestructive. The prestructive movement, which is at work in inclination too, takes the upper hand in distantiation, where the same movedness of securing the foreconceptions and turning back towards itself are present. However, in distantiation the moving back occurs now in the worldly way, so that the worldly distantiations are formed prestructively and life caringly comes back to itself, this time in the form of worldly distantiation. In short: life builds up distances prestructively, and life turns back to itself with these distances at hand and carries out the actualization of care on this basis. Seen from the categories of movement, the third category of relationality of life, sequestration, has its center in the aim to escape from the life of encounters and to look away. But exactly in this wish for flight,

[168] Appropriating the 'before' means to explicitly possess the distance in the actualization of life: "[t]hat in which I live my life of caring, that toward which I comport myself in care, is something that can stand explicitly 'before' me, taking 'before' in the phenomenological rather than spatial sense. The 'before' means: I comport myself explicitly to something in care, I live explicitly on the basis of something, and, in the 'explicitly before' me, the 'me', the 'I myself' (factically speaking, my own world) is *thereby experienced*. In caring, this 'before' can be set in relief and explicitly appropriated." (79 [105])

[169] Note: translated also as 'pre-possession.'

relucence is claimed to show itself pressingly. Thus, life itself makes itself look away from itself and at the same time pushes in the opposite direction and lets life encounter itself.

> This power of relucence in the movedness of sequestration expresses itself precisely in the fact that in this "away from itself" of life, life itself builds up a "toward itself" and "exists" in and through this structure (in movedness, in its basic sense of Being: facticity), and factical life, as caring, directs itself precisely in this "away from it." (92 [123])

All in all, through these rather complicated categories, Heidegger has expressed how life itself has in itself a possibility to encounter itself. Furthermore, he has grounded the possibility both to lose and to gain authentic access to life's movement. In this way, temporality can be seen to become the constitutive moment of his analysis. Life's movement constitutes the possibilities of encounter. The question how this encounter concretely takes place in the actualization of life leads to the third step of Heidegger's analysis. That is, actualization of access is further explained by Heidegger with the thematization of ruinance [*Ruinanz*] (98-115 [131-155]).[170] Through this notion, Heidegger can be seen to offer his view of the possibility of authentic access in the situation which is considered to be in decline.

Ruinance is formally indicatively determined as follows: "the movedness of factical life which 'actualizes' and 'is' factical life *in* itself, *for* itself, *out of* itself, and, and, in all this, *against* itself" (98 [131]). Heidegger analyzes ruinance by first referring back to the basic category of caring and the categories of movement. He insists that in caring, where the categories of movement are alive, the aim of the care in actualization is care itself. However, the itself which caring aims at may be both not as itself and as itself. In both cases, in the actualization of caring, life encounters itself and in both cases caring is encountered in a worldly way. Caring taken up by care and thus contained in care Heidegger names apprehension [*Besorgnis*] (101 [136]). In apprehension, according to Heidegger, a heightening takes place, because its own movedness is moved by itself. In this way, caring is pulled down by caring itself. The specific character of the movedness in the moment of heightening (intensifying movement) Heidegger names a collapse [*Sturtz*] (ibid.). What happens is heightening of ambiguity and losing the possibility of the 'before' as described through sequestration. In apprehension, life lets itself be transported and commits itself to the world to the extent of being absolutely pulled into the business of happenings. In this heightening, care does not know itself as itself. In apprehension factical

[170] Scott M. Campbell (2012: 83) points out that what Heidegger names "ruinance" in this lecture course is what will become later on known as fallenness.

life covers itself up (101-102 [135-137]). As ruinant, factical life covers itself up. But not only.

Heidegger states that the constitutive character of ruinance is the character of seductiveness (106 [142]). What this character shows is that factical life's "own ontological sense is such that this sense ex-poses it and that the 'collapse' in the Being of factical life ex-poses life at any time to its world" (ibid.). That is, with the character of seducing Heidegger expresses that in the movedness of life, life is seduced to move towards itself. The question is towards what exactly life moves in ruinance. This question is approached by Heidegger in the form of the question: where does collapsing arrive? In a way there is nothing that could receive the collapse, but rather "collapse is purely and simply collapse [*der Sturz ist lediglich und nur Sturz*]" (108 [145]). As such, collapse does not arrive at something foreign to it. Rather, the "whereto" of the collapse is itself of the character of factical life, and as such it is determined as *"the nothingness of factical life"* (108 [145]). The nothingness of factical life is determined formally as follows:

> the nothingness of factical life is life's own proper *non-occurrence of itself in ruinant existence*, a non-occurrence brought to maturation by and for factical life itself, within life and within surrounding world (facticity). (110 [148])

Thus, that at which collapse arrives is oneself as non-occurrence. That is, at oneself as not an occurrence, not something present at hand. Furthermore, the non-occurrence encountered in collapse in this context has a meaning of being set against the historiological non-having of time. At the same time, the 'non-occurrence' of factical life itself does not mean that life does not exist anymore or that it lacks its worldly character. Life is still worldly. However the world is encountered as an enigma. In this way, certainty becomes questionable. Factical life, which has a tendency towards clarification, experiences resistance. In the aggravation of the collapse, nothingness is constantly encountered, and thus in ruinance something is constantly lacking. In this way, resistance is constantly alive in factical life and ruinant movement makes counter-ruinant movement possible. Thus, it can be claimed that the possibility of movement as a counter-movement lies for Heidegger in the movedness of life itself and takes its point of departure from the collapse of nothingness.

Now, the possibility of philosophy is to be seen as this counter-ruinant movement: as lying in the questionability arising from factical life itself. Similarly, through the movedness (relucently towards itself and prestructively securing itself in forehaving), philosophy has its task. As Heidegger says:

> A counter-ruinant movedness is the one of the actualization of philosophical interpretation, and indeed it is actualized in the appropriation of the mode of access to questionability. It is precisely questioning that factical life attains its genuine self-giveness. (113 [153])

Factical life arrives at questionability and has the task of maintaining genuine questioning, which arises and receives direction from factical life. It is the task which must be taken up ever anew to perform the temporal constitution of factical life and which can be taken up due to the temporal constitution. At the same time, taking up the questioning ever again is not without directions. It is a counter-ruinant movement which grounds the taking up towards what is. In that sense ruinance is "the movedness of factical life which 'actualizes' and 'is' factical life *in* itself, *for* itself, *out of* itself, and, an all this, *against* itself" (98 [131]). It is and it is against itself. In this way, Heidegger explicates the ruinant against as referring to the direction: "[t]he (ruinant) 'against' indicates a '*presupposition*' of the interpretation, to which the interpretation itself has to revert back, whereby it becomes important to determine the type and the mode, how and 'where' this presupposition can be attained" (98 [132]). On the loose pages added to the lecture course, Heidegger explains that the presupposition takes a direction towards what is "posed" in philosophy (119 [158]). Presupposition leads to the historiological-historical pre-existence, which needs to be tackled in order to lead towards authentic access as well as to ward off the historiological "inappropriate time" in which the work is carried out (119 [157]). As was said, philosophy according to Heidegger is in a decadent situation, it is in ruinance (58 [77]). Thus, the overall task of philosophy, what Heidegger has been aiming at, is to bring philosophy back from its decline.

> "Repetition" ["*Wiederholung*"]: everything depends on its sense. Philosophy is a basic mode of life itself, in such a way that it authentically "brings back," [*eigentlich je wieder-holt*] i.e., brings life back [*zurücknimmt*] from its downward fall into decadence, and this "bringing back" [or re-petition, "re-seeking"], as radical re-search, is life itself. (62 [80])

The proper way of philosophy leads to what is, and repeats what is in the manner of bringing life back to itself from itself. Its possibility as well as its task arises from factically temporal life. Considered in and through factical life, philosophy for Heidegger is repetition – and for Kierkegaard as well, as I will show in what follows. In the next subsections, I will ask where concretely Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard. So far it has been shown that Heidegger can be seen still to follow the two-directional path insofar as in the present lecture course he addresses the question of proper access in two ways and also gives two determinations of philosophy. In the previous chapters I have claimed that Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard in his actualizational consideration. However, insofar as Heidegger regards Kierkegaard as a religious author, it is perhaps not surprising that he took up Kierkegaard

within his thematization of Augustine. It remains to be seen what kind of place Kierkegaard has in the lecture course where Heidegger has turned to Aristotle and claimed that philosophy must be atheistic.

6.4. Kierkegaard's explicit presence in Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle

In the presently viewed lecture course Heidegger points explicitly to Kierkegaard on two different occasions: once in the (margin of the) lecture course itself by naming Kierkegaard, and once on a page added to the lecture course under the title "Motto, along with a grateful indication of the source." The motto is inserted with the words: "[i]n order to characterize the intention of the interpretation, I cite a motto, which is prefixed to this introduction to phenomenological research" (137 [182]).

Heidegger's reference to Kierkegaard in the margin of the running text of the lecture course appears next to the following text:

> The genuine [*genuine*] principle is to be acquired *existentiell*-philosophically only in the basic experience of passion. There it is unclarified. "Away from principles" means from the outside, "without suffering", in reflection, having become lost. In principle, no "retention". "Away from principles", we can be and have everything (Kierkegaard). (20 [24])

This reference has been traced back by John van Buren (1994: 169) to Kierkegaard's notion of passion as distinct from reflection as well as his distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective truth.' According to Van Buren, this was done "in order to work out a definition of the *Sache* of ontology as not only 'being' (content-sense), but also the individual philosopher's passionate historical comportment to being (relational and enactment-sense)" (ibid.). This last point of Van Buren helps to highlight what in my opinion is the most significant aspect of this rather confusing reference made by Heidegger. That is, as I have argued throughout this thesis, Kierkegaard gains significance for Heidegger as soon as he considers philosophy as it is lived in and through factical life. I would insist that this naming of Kierkegaard in the margin of the text in which Heidegger deliberates over principle becomes understandable as far as Heidegger here aims to point ahead to the need for the actualizational consideration. Where exactly Kierkegaard is a source of influence with respect to accounting for philosophy in and through factical life is brought closer through Heidegger's second reference.

In the added "Motto", Heidegger refers to Kierkegaard alongside with Luther by reproducing two passages from each. The quotations from Kierkegaard appear as follows (137 [182]):

> "All of modern philosophy is based on something which both ethics and Christianity would consider a frivolity. Instead of deterring people and calling them to order by speaking of despair and exasperation, it has winked at people and invited them to pride themselves on doubting and on having doubted. For the rest, philosophy, as abstract, floats in the indeterminateness of the metaphysical. Instead of admitting this to itself and then pointing people (individuals) to the ethical, the religious, and the existential, philosophy has given rise to the pretence that humans could, as is said prosaically, speculate themselves out of their own skin and into pure appearance." [S.*Kierkegaard*, Einübung im Christentum (Diederichs IX, 1912), S. 70, Anm. 1.]
>
> "On the contrary, what both philosophy and the philosopher find difficult is stopping." [*Kierkegaard*, Entweder – Oder I, (Diederichs, I, 1911), S. 35.] (To stop at the genuine beginning!)

These two passages from Kierkegaard have been seen by Van Buren to highlight Kierkegaard's consideration of the individual and Heidegger's aim to destroy Western metaphysics.[171] The fact that the first citation leads to consideration of the individual is due to the context of the reference, which is Kierkegaard's note "A Brief Summary of the Contents of This Exposition" in *Practice in Christianity* [*Indøvelse i Christendom*]. In this note, Kierkegaard makes a claim for despair and offence (with which the individual's relation to Christ in faith is considered) as opposed to doubt. In addition, in this text, Kierkegaard makes a brief reference to temporality and insists that "no relation to the God-Man is possible without beginning with the situation of contemporaneity" (PC 82 [XII 79]).

The second citation stems from the first part of *Either-Or* [*Enten-Eller*], in the text entitled "Either/Or: An Ecstatic Discourse." In a somewhat extended context, the citation reads as follows:

> Experience shows that it is not at all difficult for philosophy to begin. Far from it. It begins, in fact, with nothing and therefore can always begin. But it is always difficult for philosophy and philosopher to stop. This difficulty, too, I have avoided, for if anyone thinks that I, in stopping, actually stop, he demonstrates that he does not have a speculative comprehension. The point is that I do not stop now, but I stopped when I began. My philosophy, therefore, has the advantageous characteristic of being brief and of being irrefutable, for if anyone disputes me, I daresay I have the right to declare him mad. The philosopher, then, is continually *aeterno modo* and does not have, as did the blessed Sintenis, only specific hours that are lived for eternity." (E/O I: 39-40 [I 24])

In addition to bringing the problematic of the beginning in philosophy into the limelight and connecting it with the problem of time, another important claim appears in this passage with respect to Heidegger's account. That is, philosophy is said to begin with 'nothing.' Insofar as the claim that the possibility to begin with philosophy is placed in 'nothing' is not self-evident, it enables us to make a further connection between Heidegger's account

[171] Thus, Van Buren (1994: 169) first states that "[o]ne of the mottos that he took from Kierkegaard for his WS 1921-22 lecture course highlighted precisely Kierkegaard's key theme of 'the individual human being'." Secondly, Van Buren points out that "these passages also tell us that, as Gadamer and Pöggeler have suggested, Heidegger's very project of 'the end of philosophy' (that is, the destruction of the Aristotelian being-question back to historicity) and a new 'genuine beginning' in WS 1921-22 derived primarily from his readings of Luther, Kierkegaard, and other anti-Greek Christian sources (cf. HW 145)" (op. cit.: 167). That the second citation refers to Heidegger's aim to destroy Western metaphysics is repeated by Van Buren in the article "The Earliest Heidegger: A New Field of Research" (2005: 20).

and that of Kierkegaard. In order to show that this is the case, I will next make an excursion to Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*. In this treatise, one can find both Kierkegaard's account of 'nothing,' by which Heidegger can be seen to be influenced, and the articulation of the wider thematic field coming to the fore in Heidegger's explicit references: the problematic of beginning anew in history and its connection to the questioning of philosophy. Thus, in my opinion, this treatise by Kierkegaard, to which Heidegger has not referred here but in his lecture on Augustine, achieves its full significance in the presently viewed lecture course. Furthermore, I contend that Heidegger's unfolding of the actualization of philosophy in the lecture on Aristotle shows the extent to which he has read Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*.

6.5. Excursion: Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*

In *The Concept of Anxiety* [*Begrebet Angest*], Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Virgilius Haufniensis sets himself the task of a psychological treatment of 'anxiety,' in such a way that the dogma of hereditary sin [*Arvesynd*] and thus the concept of sin are kept in mind (CA: 14 [IV 286]). According to Kierkegaard, "[a]nxiety is the psychological state which precedes sin" (92 [362]). Sin itself, however, is not a state, but rather must be "continually annulled" (15 [287]). Thus, Kierkegaard does not ask what sin is, but rather how sin can came into existence [*bliver til*], its possibility (22-23 [294-295]). Insofar as sin is kept in mind, the theme of the consideration becomes simultaneously that of the individual, because according to Kierkegaard the mood of sin is earnestness and to be truly earnest means to take oneself as the object of earnestness (15, 150 [287, 415]).[172] Since anxiety is treated in connection with the doctrine of hereditary sin, the individual is thematized in his/her historical situation. The underlying feature of the whole consideration becomes the problem of how an individual in history becomes anew. In what follows I will focus on this angle of Kierkegaard's treatise. The question is how Kierkegaard develops his account of beginning anew in history. Furthermore, through this analysis I will aim to bring out Kierkegaard's account of repetition, which he sees as determinative of philosophy (see Introduction).

[172] As Kierkegaard writes: "[h]aving become truly earnest about that which is the object of earnestness, a person may very well, if he so wishes, treat various things earnestly, but the question is whether he first becomes earnest about the object of earnestness. This object every human being has, because it is *himself* […]" (CA 150 [IV 415]).

Through the consideration of hereditary sin Kierkegaard articulates an individual as historical and concrete. As he repeatedly declares, an individual is himself and a part of the human race (for example: 28, 31, 46, 98 [301, 304, 317, 368]).

> For the history of the race proceeds quietly on its course, and in this no individual begins at the same place as another, but every individual begins anew, and in the same moment he is at the place where he should begin in history. (34-35 [306])

On the one hand, every individual is a part of a race [*Slægten*][173] and of the history of the race. The race does not begin anew with every individual (33 [305]). On the other hand, however, every individual by himself brings sin in the world by a qualitative leap: every individual makes a leap in the same way as Adam did. To put it differently, every subsequent individual loses his innocence through guilt in the same way as Adam did (35 [307]). Thus, every person participates with a qualitative leap in history (33 [305]).

Because every individual begins anew with a qualitative leap in the same way as Adam did, every subsequent man's loss of innocence can be explained through Adam's loss of innocence. Kierkegaard describes innocence as ignorance, in which the spirit in man is dreaming (synthesis is not actual). It is a state where there is nothing against which it strives. (41 [313]) Insofar as innocence's ignorance is about nothing, it is at the same time anxiety. That is, spirit (which cannot get rid of itself) relates to itself and its conditionality as anxiety (44 [315]). What manifests itself in anxiety, according to Kierkegaard, is freedom's possibility: the possibility of *being able* (ibid.).[174] This determination holds also for every form of anxiety in each subsequent individual, who loses his innocence in the same way as Adam did, and yet differently.

In awakening this possibility lies the significance of Adam and hereditary sin: "[i]n the moment actuality is posited, possibility walks by its side as nothing that entices every thoughtless man" (50 [321]). As was said, every individual is himself and a part of the human race. Adam's sin has significance for every subsequent individual, since the individual takes part in the race and thus is related to the sins of others. Kierkegaard explains this as anxiety, which is the consequence of sin. It is the anxiety which enters quantitatively into the world on each occasion when sin is posited and as such makes itself felt in the individual (52, 54 [323, 325]). The claim that anxiety enters quantitatively into the world is also expressed by Kierkegaard with the statement that in each subsequent individual, anxiety is more reflective. That is, the nothing of anxiety becomes increasingly

[173] By the term 'race' Kierkegaard refers to humankind through the generations, to what is specifically human. See more on Kierkegaard's use of the term 'race' in Joseph Ballan (2015: 185-190).
[174] Kierkegaard expresses this also by saying that anxiety is freedom's possibility (155 [422]).

something (53, 60, 61 [324, 331, 332]). It becomes 'more' (72-74, 77 [341-343, 345]). With respect to the 'more' of anxiety (the quantitative accumulation of anxiety), in which the object of anxiety becomes increasingly something, anxiety as a psychological state is found in different forms according to Kierkegaard. More concretely, he thematizes these forms first in terms of anxiety, which is absence of the consciousness of sin, and then under the flag of sin-consciousness.

Within the anxiety which has no consciousness of sin, Kierkegaard considers the immediate and the religious genius. Both of them have in common that the object of their anxiety (which properly is nothing) is something: fate and guilt respectively. As something, this object is what is feared. Thus, the immediate genius fears fate, to which he is related and yet cannot come into relation. He is related to it for he fears it and is drawn to it at the same time: Kierkegaard calls this the sympathetic and antipathetic relation (97 [367]). The case is the same with the religious genius, who fears being guilty, but does not recognize himself as guilty. The difference between being anxious about guilt and being anxious about fate is demonstrated by Kierkegaard in the text "The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama" in the book *Either/Or* I. In this text Kierkegaard considers guilt and fate within the distinction between the tragic in ancient and modern drama. He distinguishes the two first of all by stating that in the modern or in our age subjectivity is reflected in itself, whereas in the ancient world it is not (E/O I: 143 [I 121]).[175] The meaning of fate lies in the significance of the others, whereas guilt gains meaning as turnedness towards oneself. Thus, we hear that the heroine of ancient tragedy sorrows over her father's fate, whereas the heroine of modern tragedy is great in her reflective pain. The latter case is about being closed within one's subjectivity and wanting to be one's own creator. One does not aim to be understood by the others. As Kierkegaard put it: "[o]ur age has lost all substantial categories of family, state and kindred" (149 [126]). And yet, "[e]very individual, however original he is, is still a child of God, of his age, of his nation, of his family, of his friends, and only in them does he have his truth" (145 [123]). In this way, our age is condemned for being reflectively closed within subjectivity and what our age needs is to relate to fate.[176]

[175] Thus, Kierkegaard states: "[t]he tragic hero [in modern tragedy] is subjectively reflected in himself, and this reflection has not only reflected him out of every immediate relation to state kindred, and fate but often has even reflected him out of his own past life" (E/O I: 143 [I 121]).

[176] Kierkegaard also expresses this distinction in the "The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama" by stating that "[i]n ancient tragedy, the sorrow is more profound, the pain less; in the modern tragedy, the pain is greater, the sorrow less" (E/O I: 147-148 [I 125]). According to him, the ancient

Viewed under the flag of sin-consciousness, the nothing of anxiety becomes determinate something. It is anxiety about evil or anxiety about the good (CA: 109 [IV 379]). In this case anxiety relates itself to the future possibility of the new state seen through the consequence – the possibility to sin. What is feared is the transition into a new state. Thus, an individual might be in the state of the good and anxious about evil, or in the state of evil and anxious about the good. The latter individual Kierkegaard calls demonic, because the demonic is said to become apparent through his attitude towards disclosure. He is determined as inclosing reserve and unfreely disclosed (126-129 [393-396]). Similar to the heroine of modern drama, the demonic wants to stay in silence. He does not want to disclose himself, but rather wishes to close himself off from others. And yet, he is unfreely disclosed. That is, in the demonic state, one nevertheless discloses oneself contrary to one's will and one does that through language or expression (ibid.). Thus, Kierkegaard expresses the view that one is disclosed in one way or another in spite of one's aims. Importantly, as is clear, for Kierkegaard the demonic as well as every other form of anxiety emerges as conditioned by time. The problem is that in the previously described modes one does not have a proper relation to time.[177] This leads to the question of Kierkegaard's account of time. Certainly, for Kierkegaard there is a need to relate properly to time.

Kierkegaard turns to unfold his account of time by rejecting what he calls Hegel's and the Hegelian school's insistence on a presuppositionless beginning of philosophy (81-85 [350-354]). Therefore, he considers time with respect to the problem of contemporary philosophy and addresses the issue of how the new begins within history. According to Kierkegaard, in order to understand the true beginning (as transition), time must be correctly accounted for and "one must not forget that the new is brought about through the leap" (85 [354]). He insists that in this respect two significant aspects emerge in Christianity. First of all, as can be read from Kierkegaard's lengthy footnote (n. 82-84 [n. 351-354]), differently from Greek and modern philosophy, Christianity takes non-being to be present everywhere ("as sin, as sensuousness removed from spirit, as the temporal forgotten by eternal") and as something which one must overcome ("the task is to do away with it in order to bring forth being"). In this overcoming lies the true beginning (in

rests in fate, whereas the modern suffers total guilt. What is needed is the opposite. Thus, "[t]he true tragic sorrow requires an element of guilt, the true tragic pain an element of guiltiness" (151 [128]). The means of this "assimilation" is said to be anxiety (154 [131]).

[177] The demonic does not have a proper relation to time: the demonic is determined as sudden, which is an abstraction of continuity (129-130 [396-367]). According to Kierkegaard, continuity in nothingness is boring (132-133 [399-400]). Although this notion, 'boring,' does not come under discussion for Heidegger in his early Freiburg lecture courses, it is used by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*.

history), which is brought about through the leap in the moment. In the proper understanding of the moment lies the second significance of Christianity according to Kierkegaard. For in Christianity the eternal is properly taken into account. Eternity is not to be taken as an abstraction, nor as something past, as by the Greeks. Rather, it is important to realize how the eternal is lived in time.[178]

According to Kierkegaard, time is first of all infinite succession. As such, time itself does not have the distinct units of past, present, and future: a distinction, which is obtained when time is represented, is spatialized (85-86 [355]). Time is not to be considered a series of now-points. Furthermore, life in time has no present, according to him. True presence is rather the eternal and it is full, the fullness of time (86 [356]). That is, only when time and eternity touch each other is there a moment and is temporality posited.

> The moment is that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept of *temporal* is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time. As a result, the above-mentioned division acquires significance: the present time, the past time, the future time. (89 [359])

The present time, past time, and future time do not gain significance as a sequel of units, but as fullness of time in which the future has a certain primacy. The future gains this primacy through the meaningfulness of the eternal: as the "first expression of the eternal, and its incognito" (91 [361]). That is, the future is the eternal's possibility in the individual. The eternal expresses itself as incognito and as such, as anxiety. In this respect, the future is also said by Kierkegaard to be "the whole of which the past is a part," and it can "in certain sense signify the whole" (89 [359]). It is a whole, insofar as the future is a reappearing of the past and posits the past at the same time. That is, the past time is not simply something which has passed, but rather it is experienced as and through future possibility. In this respect, Kierkegaard is able to say: "[o]nly with the moment does history begin" (89 [359]). This means that both Adam's sin and the possibility to overcome through the leap gain significance in the moment in which the eternal touches time and thus temporality is posited. In this respect, "this eternal is also the future and the past" (90 [360]). Or, as was said, an individual is both himself and the race. Furthermore, when temporality and history are properly taken into account, the new begins in history as repetition.

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[178] In order to understand Kierkegaard's account of the moment, it must be first brought out that his consideration takes its point of departure from the distinction between the eternal and the temporal: "man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal" (85 [355]). For Kierkegaard, time and the eternal must meet. The eternal must be lived in time. If the eternal is conceived as past (as in the case of the Greeks), it is abstracted and one arrives at recollection (89-90 [359-360]). If the eternal in man is denied, abstracted or twisted into time, the demonic is there. If the eternal is conceived of metaphysically, one has a pure I (153 [418-419]).

The notion of repetition appears to have utmost significance for Kierkegaard. So much so that in the book *Repetition* [*Gjentagelsen*], to which Haufniensis also refers (CA: 17-19, 21, 151 [IV 289-291, 293, 417]), Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Constantin Constantius states:

> Say what you will, this question [whether a repetition is possible] will play a very important role in modern philosophy, for *repetition* is a crucial expression for what "recollection" was to the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowledge is recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is repetition. (R: 131 [III 173])

By contrasting repetition and recollection, Kierkegaard stresses the fact that the truth is not to be regarded as something past which must be remembered, but rather as the new becoming of what has been. It signifies the orientation towards the future possibilities of the historically situated individual. At the same time, with the notion of repetition, Kierkegaard stresses the brute fact of the individual's temporality by rejecting the possibility of numerical repetition of a situation for an individual, as is seen through the young man's trip to Berlin in *Repetition*. To (numerically) "repeat" the undertaking is impossible, for even if each step is reduplicated, nevertheless all is different in terms of meaning. It is again but new. As Kierkegaard declares: "[t]he dialectic of repetition is easy, for that which is repeated has been – otherwise it could not be repeated – but the very fact that it has been makes the repetition into something new" (149 [189]). As such, repetition also becomes the task: what is to become is to be taken back and regained as new.[179] Thus, *The Concept of Anxiety* brings repetition together with earnestness: "[t]he earnest person is earnest precisely through the originality with which he returns in repetition" (CA: 149 [IV 413]).[180]

For Kierkegaard, in order to overcome sin and rest in atonement, both human action and the ability to receive are needed. Earnestness (as well as certitude and inwardness, by which earnestness is specified) is thematized on the side of the individual's action. Thus, inwardness and certitude are said to be attained by and in action, as well as *in concreto*. Furthermore, "[i]nwardness is an understanding, but *in concreto* the important thing is how this understanding is to be understood" (142 [408]). This means that the question is about

[179] It should be noticed that repetition is a highly complex notion which gathers not only the key features of Kierkegaard's understanding of time, but signifies also the movement of faith: of becoming oneself or Christian; gaining everything back by giving everything up. This motive is clearly present in his book *Fear and Trembling* [*Frygt og bæven*], where repetition signifies the movement of faith or of becoming oneself. Furthermore, the pseudonymous author Johannes de Silentio insists that there is a need to repeat the movement ever again, or to be able "to change the leap into walking" (FT: 41 [III 92]). It is to be able to leap like a ballet dancer, who in the very leap assumes the posture without straining towards it (ibid.).

[180] The same claim is expressed in the book *Repetition*: "[r]epetition – that is the actuality and the earnestness of existence. The person who wills repetition is mature in earnestness" (R: 133 [III 175]).

the how of relating and it is about relating to oneself. With respect to relating to oneself Kierkegaard rejects relating through knowledge. Let us recall that earnestness was said to be the mood corresponding to sin. It is relation through mood and not through knowledge. The latter Kierkegaard considers to be demonic (n. 143 [n. 409]). Furthermore, in this respect, Kierkegaard charges the present age with a lack of certitude in which truth is increasing in quantity and directed at producing the new.

When talking of earnestness Kierkegaard explicitly denies the possibility to define it. Instead, he explicates the notion by thematizing Rosenkranz's disposition (unity of feeling and self-consciousness). According to Kierkegaard, earnestness is an "acquired originality of disposition" (147-149 [413-414]). It is not something one can be born with, but it must be acquired and in the acquiring of this disposition anxiety again has its significance. As I pointed out previously, according to Kierkegaard, every individual begins anew in the race in the same way as Adam did, and Adam lost his innocence by relating to himself and his conditionality as anxiety, in which freedom's possibility manifests itself. At the end of the treatise Kierkegaard returns to this claim and states that the ultimate is to learn to be anxious in a right way (155 [421]). For Kierkegaard, to be anxious in a right way means to be educated by possibility and this in two ways.

On the one hand, to be educated by possibility denotes relating to oneself as possible. In this respect, Adam's loss of innocence by relating to himself and his conditionality can be explained without placing him fantastically outside of history, through recognizing his conditionality as openness towards himself as possible: his possible self, the self which he is not. As such, Adam, like every other person, "himself produces the anxiety" (155 [421]) and thus anxiety, through which the individual comes to himself, is not something outside of a person. On the other hand, to be educated by possibility means to relate to oneself as one is. Nothingness is the object of anxiety, which itself is not an object, but expresses that (through constantly present anxiety) an individual faces what he is not. In this way, the 'not' is the possibility to discover oneself as one is. This is seen in Kierkegaard's claim that anxiety discovers faith and guilt (159-161 [425-427]).[181] Faith and guilt represent the actuality of an individual. That they are discovered by being educated by possibility means

[181] What one is as historical and temporal is articulated by Kierkegaard in terms of sin and guilt as follows: "[t]he concept of sin and guilt posit precisely the single individual as the single individual. There is no question about his relation to the whole world or to all the past. The point is only that he is guilty, and yet he is supposed to have become guilty by fate, consequently by all that of which there is no question, and thereby he is supposed to have become something that precisely cancels the concept of fate, and this he is supposed to have become by fate." (98 [367-368])

that one discovers oneself as concrete and historical: as an individual and a part of a race. It means discovering oneself as a historically situated temporal individual. At the same time, to be educated by possibility, that is, to be anxious in a right way, does not annul anxiety. Rather, as Vincent A. McCarthy (1985: 108) points out: "[t]he nothing of anxiety will appear again, and the dialectic of 'something' (the actualized self) and 'nothing' (possible self) will continue as long as there is life." Hence, the need for repetition: to take oneself back as anew again and again. When time is correctly accounted for, the new begins in history as repetition. The possibility of relating to oneself as historical and concrete is opened through relating to nothing: through anxiety.

6.6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle

In the previous chapter it was shown that Heidegger's interest to Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* reaches back to his lecture course on Augustine (SS 1921). The fact that Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard in his analysis of anxiety is well known also from *Sein und Zeit*, because he mentions Kierkegaard's anxiety there (SuZ: 492 n. iv [190 n. 1]). Insofar as this notion is thematized in *Sein und Zeit*, it is thus also one of the most researched subjects with respect to these two thinkers.[182] With regard to the presently viewed lecture course, anxiety is not the only notion in which Kierkegaard's footprint in Heidegger has been seen. Rather, quite a number of different themes have been connected to Kierkegaard by different researchers. Thus, for example Janko Lozar (2014: 428-429), who argues for the possibility to understand many of Kierkegaard's notions as 'existentiale', points not only to the notion of 'anxiety,' but also to 'care' and 'guilt.'[183] Van Buren, who draws connections through Jaspers's work, shows that the range of themes in which Heidegger's consideration can be traced back to Kierkegaard is quite outstanding.[184]

My aim is not to set out a comprehensive account of different notions and themes which Heidegger might have drawn from Kierkegaard. For this task each notion, citation,

[182] That this is the case was brought out also in the first chapter of this thesis.

[183] Lozar (2014: 427-429), who does not engage with Heidegger's earliest lecture courses, also points to 'existentiale' such as faith, despair, and hope. In addition, he brings out a number of other similarities between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Specifically, he lays bare the similarities found in connection with anxiety, but also points to formal indication, possibility as standing higher than actuality, authenticity, and hermeneutics of facticity (op. cit. 427-429).

[184] According to Van Buren (1994: 182): "[i]n Jaspers's study and in the German translations of Kierkegaard that Heidegger was reading, we meet up with many of the key terms of Heidegger's own descriptions of falling and the inauthenticity/authenticity distinction from his lecture course of WS 1921-22 (with its motto from Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*) to SZ: namely, *Existenz*, temptation (*Versuchung*), curiosity (*Neugier*), idle talk (*Gerede*), ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*), dispersion (*Zerstreuung*), comfort (*Beruhigung*), and closing off (*Verschliessen*)."

and theme must be treated and deserves to be treated separately. Rather, as before, I take the point of departure from Heidegger's own explicit references to Kierkegaard and I aim to draw attention to the structural similarities between Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* and Heidegger's unfolding of philosophy in and through factical life as it is presented in his lecture on Aristotle. I claim that Heidegger draws on Kierkegaard when he considers how possible access unfolds in and through factical life. With respect to Heidegger's own explicit references to Kierkegaard, I will focus on the theme which can be gathered into the question: how does the new begin in philosophy?

What stands out first of all is that according to both Heidegger and Kierkegaard the possibility of new beginning is articulated as repetition. Let it be remembered that Heidegger arrives at this determination of philosophy in his consideration of philosophy in and through factical life. Considering Kierkegaard's possible influence on Heidegger, what is important is how they both reach the notion of repetition. In this respect, the similarities can be traced back to the analysis of how the possibility, necessity, and motivational ground for beginning anew is found.

As was shown, Heidegger insists that philosophy is currently in a decadent situation, it is in decline. This conviction is an underlying feature of Heidegger's approach. It is a claim which makes his aim of rethinking philosophy necessary. Thus, Heidegger also exhibits that this is the case in each step of his rethinking of philosophy, which means that it is not restricted to the consideration of philosophy in and through factical life. However, it is also a necessary part of the actualizational consideration. The decline must be accounted for. Considering the actualization of factical life, Heidegger claims that in the very movement of factical life there is a pull towards decline, towards taking the easy way and thus closing genuine access to oneself. It is a way of securing oneself against the ambiguity of life, thus facilitating a specific (inauthentic) consideration of temporality and approach to oneself. At the same time, this possibility is inherent in factical life's manner of maturation. That is, it is inherent in life's own temporality. In this respect, decline unfolds through authentic temporality which facilitates inauthentic access to time (historiological) and oneself (objectified).

Similar motives are to be found in Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*. As was shown, Kierkegaard presents different ways of being anxious as unfolding out of genuine temporality (one is anxious because one turns to a possible something). Also, he presents an account of how the genuine approach is lost not only by thematizing explicitly the question

of temporality but also through what he calls the modern and ancient approaches. In these approaches the objectification of oneself is seen through guilt and fate respectively as something which is feared. Since it is well known from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* that he has noticed Kierkegaard's distinction between fear and anxiety (fear as directed to object and anxiety to nothing), it should be brought out that Heidegger is likely to have seen this distinction already during his lecture on Augustine.[185] In the present lecture course, Heidegger seems to make use of the distinction by thematizing 'nothing.' This leads to the theme of the possibility of beginning anew.

Heidegger shows the possibility of overcoming the decline as inherent in life itself. It is possible, since life itself facilitates a counter-ruinant movement. This is described by Heidegger as culminating in a collapse in which one faces oneself as non-occurrence. Thus, what is brought forth is oneself as not occurring, not an instance, but rather as temporally constituted as well as historically situated. Above all else, facing the 'nothing' for Heidegger is the possibility of uncovering oneself as not an object, as not static and fixed. As such the notion refers not only to the need to stand against objectification of factical life, but also to proper temporality. In Kierkegaard's treatise the temporal aspect takes the upper hand. To be anxious in the right way means to be educated by possibility. That is, by facing what one is not yet, by being able. But also by facing what one is as a part of the race. In this respect, Kierkegaard is seen to state that anxiety discovers fate. That this expression has caught Heidegger's eye is clear from the fact that Heidegger in his lecture on Augustine quotes this very phrase from Kierkegaard. In the present lecture course Heidegger uses the notion of 'fate' again in his brief thematization of the temporality of life within the notion of 'to live.' With respect to the notion of fate, it seems to be significant to Heidegger that Kierkegaard has criticized modern philosophy as lacking the relation to one's environment, or as Kierkegaard declared: "[o]ur age has lost all substantial categories of family, state and kindred" (149 [126]). From Heidegger's perspective, this is exactly what must be accounted for. That is, the fact that one is always already in the world with others. Thus, both Kierkegaard and Heidegger would insist that genuine access to oneself means accessing oneself as one is in one's historical situation. Furthermore, both of them find motivation for regaining genuine access by considering the historical situation.

[185] Consider Heidegger's thematization of directionless anxiety in the loose page "Anxiety" in his lecture course on Augustine as well as his distinction between 'timor castus' and ' timor servilis' (GA 60: 201-202 [268], 222-226 [293-297]). With respect to the latter, see also Heidegger's thematization in *Sein und Zeit* (492 n. iv [190 n. 1]).

According to Heidegger, the motivational ground for beginning anew in history or finding an authentic access to oneself lies in factical life itself. In decline, in ruinant movement something is constantly lacking, a lack which is felt in life. Arriving at factical life as non-occurrent is a maturation of factical life itself. The circle is closed and there is no need to face anything outside of oneself (for example, to confess before God) in order to be thrown into the search. For Kierkegaard, regaining a genuine relation to oneself is always also dependent on the relation to God. However, with respect to anxiety Kierkegaard states that the person "himself produces anxiety" (155 [421]). In this respect, the motivation is brought into the individual, who takes part in hereditary sin, which makes itself felt in the individual.

As Heidegger is engaged with criticism of the tradition throughout his path, I am hesitant in claiming that this motive stems from Kierkegaard. Also, since Heidegger constantly targets worldly life, I would not suggest that he takes this from Kierkegaard's thematization of fate. However, I do claim that he draws on Kierkegaard when he unfolds philosophy in his lecture course on Aristotle as maturation of life which peaks in nothingness and demands repetition. I also insist that Kierkegaard is again on Heidegger's radar when he considers philosophy in and through factical life, despite the fact that Heidegger offers a rethought account of it.

6.7. Conclusion

In this chapter I focused on Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle. As before, I aimed to show how Heidegger's lecture course develops and where on this path Kierkegaard finds his place. I claimed that although Heidegger takes a new turn with his philosophy, he is still engaged with the question of what philosophy is and addresses it in two directions. Thus, philosophy was first shown to be articulated as phenomenological ontology. As ontological, philosophy in principle has the task of indicating being. Furthermore, according to its mode of accessing, philosophy is determined as a cognitive comportment towards beings. This determination says how philosophical investigation is to access its theme. Secondly, addressing authentic access in and through factical life, Heidegger showed that philosophy is determined as repetition, which he established by thematizing movedness, in which a collision with oneself as nothingness takes place and which thus gives rise to questionability. With respect to the search for Kierkegaard's place in this lecture course, I claimed that Kierkegaard becomes significant for Heidegger in his consideration of

philosophy in and through factical life. By analyzing Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard, through which the question of how the new begins in history was highlighted, and making an excursion to Kierkegaard's treatise *The Concept of Anxiety*, it was shown that Heidegger yet again draws on Kierkegaard for his rethought account of philosophy in and through factical life. Thus, it was shown that Heidegger leans on Kierkegaard also in his consideration of philosophy as repetition.