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4. Phenomenology as a method: the three methodological moments

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I showed how in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger unfolds philosophy as origin-understanding. With the question of finding an access to life in its originality, Heidegger's deliberations led to the phenomenon of intensifying-concentration upon the self-world. It is a mode of experiencing in which the self-world is attained. The motives and tendencies are "brought into *foreseeing* through the consideration of factual life in the manner of *going along with* life-experiences as *participating* in it" (191-192 [254-255]). I also stated that this mode of accessing oneself is not Heidegger's final word in his consideration of philosophy. Already in this lecture course, Heidegger in passing expresses the need to develop a full methodology for accessing factual life as emerging from the origin. Thus, in the previously quoted context he also insists that consideration of factual life is "then to be *lifted out, articulated, interpreted* and *given form to*" (GA 58: 192 [254-255]). In the present chapter, I aim to show that in the subsequent lecture courses Heidegger takes up this task, namely the need to further develop a proper methodology for philosophy.

Thus, primarily in the lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation* [*Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der Philosophical Begriffsbildung*, GA 59] and the beginning of *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* [*Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*, in GA 60], Heidegger develops and articulates a strict phenomenological methodology for approaching, accessing, and expressing the subject matter of philosophy.¹⁰¹ I will bring out his methodology as consisting of three different methodological moments: phenomenological-critical destruction, phenomenological explication, and formal indication. My central claim is that these methodological moments are distinct from the mode of access described as intensifying-concentration. In this respect I claim that with the methodological moments Heidegger pursues the second direction articulated in his KNS lecture course. As I will show, this claim is not self-evident insofar as the methodological moments can be and are interpreted in several ways. I will point once again to the interpretations of Theodore Kisiel and Søren Overgaard. The respective approaches of these two researchers will be put forward by looking at their interpretations

¹⁰¹ I already presented parts of this chapter in my master's thesis (Kustassoo 2012).

of the methodological moments. Whereas Kisiel fits the methodological moments into his account of Heidegger's philosophy at the level of actualization (the same as intensification), Overgaard interprets the methodological moments on the basis of Heidegger's need for a special take on entities (to access means to carry through an investigation, which is not the same as actualized intensification). Insofar as I claim that the methodological moments constitute a different access than that of intensification, it can be presumed that I tend to agree with Overgaard to the extent that he insists that philosophy requires a specific stance towards its 'objects.' I argue that intensification is not the same as philosophical investigation. Rather, through the methodological moments Heidegger describes an additional mode of access which must be applied to actualization.

The realization that there is a difference between intensification and philosophical investigation is essential in order to understand Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg lecture courses. In the present chapter, I touch upon Kierkegaard with respect to the similarities (and dissimilarities) between Heidegger's formal indication and Kierkegaard's indirect communication. However, the significance of this chapter, considering the overall aim of this thesis, does not rest on the connection found through formal indication. Rather, the results of this chapter point ahead to what is to come in the second part of this thesis. On the basis of the recognition that the proper actualization (as well as the improper actualization) must be destroyed, explicated, and indicated formally, that is, accessed and articulated in this way, it becomes understandable in what sense Heidegger has received impulses from Kierkegaard and how Heidegger takes up what Kierkegaard has to offer to him. Let it be said in here in short: Heidegger will start to clarify Kierkegaard's actualization. That is, Kierkegaard is approached through Heidegger's own aims and investigated according to his specific philosophical method.

In what follows, I aim to bring out each of the methodological moments with respect to the problematic addressed in each of them and to point out the methodological unity to be achieved through these moments. First (section two), I consider phenomenological-critical destruction, a methodological moment which Heidegger already took up in his previous lecture course and which has the task to lead philosophy out of its alienation back to itself. Then, I turn to phenomenological explication as a methodological moment for the proper mode of accessing. Here, factual life experience as the fundamental phenomenon for philosophy is brought out by explicating it as a phenomenon. In the fourth section, I unfold formal indication as the methodological moment which primarily addresses the

problem of expression. Next, in the fifth section, I consider how Kisiel and Overgaard interpret the methodological moments and where the core of their disagreement lies. After that (section six), I turn to the connection between Heidegger and Kierkegaard with respect to formal indication. Finally, I set out the main claims of the first part of my thesis and argue for the distinction between access brought out as intensification and the access described through the three methodological moments.

4.2. Phenomenological-critical destruction

Heidegger uses phenomenological-critical destruction [*Phänomenologisch-kritischen Destruktion*] in one way or another throughout the previous lecture courses. It is primarily a methodological moment for taking up pre-given [*vorgegeben*] philosophy (the tradition), with the aim of leading out from the tradition towards the problem. As such it is a preparation for proper philosophizing. The notion of phenomenological destruction, which already comes to the fore at the end of Heidegger's 1919-1920 winter semester lecture course,¹⁰² becomes Heidegger's focus in his next lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation* [*Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der Philosophical Begriffsbildung*, GA 59], held in the summer semester of 1920¹⁰³.

When explicating the problem situation of this lecture course, Heidegger again, as in the previous lecture courses, sets himself the task of providing “a radical new foundation of philosophy” (GA 59: 5 [8]), that is to say, a ‘primordially attained’ [*ursprünglich gewonnen*] foundation of philosophy (11 [17]). What it means to be ‘primordially attained’ must become clear during the lecture course, while the primordially attained is at the same time the “new.” It is “new” over against and, at the same time, on the basis of what is. As such, the counterpart of philosophy aimed at is pre-given philosophy – the tradition or current situation in philosophy.¹⁰⁴ This means that the philosophy which Heidegger targets cannot borrow the means for the task from pre-given philosophy and yet it needs to start

¹⁰² Although Heidegger first uses the notion of phenomenological destruction in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, its roots go back to his KNS lecture and to the notion of ‘critique’ there. In his KNS lecture, Heidegger determines critique as follows: “[c]ritique is a positive sounding out of genuine motivations” (GA56/57: 96 [126]). It should be also noted that when talking of “critique”, Heidegger distinguishes two types of “criticism” (JR: 71-78, [1-10]).

¹⁰³ The lecture course was held by Heidegger from the 6th of May until the 26th of July 1920 (Strube 1993: 155 [199]). It was first published in 1993.

¹⁰⁴ In this respect, Dorothea Frede (2006: 60) points out that “[t]his ‘destruction’ is not a deconstruction, as some people would have it nowadays, but an analysis intended to show where the decisive steps of the derailment took place in Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle.” Also, it should be noted that destruction means to turn towards the tradition as the encountering comes about in its current situation (Kisiel 1995: 261)

exactly with what is to be found there. As Heidegger puts it, the task is “to lead philosophy from out of its alienation back to itself (phenomenological destruction)” (20-21 [29]). Phenomenological-critical destruction is the methodological moment for taking up pre-given philosophy and leading philosophy down to the right track. It consists of a manifold of different moments and unfolds through concrete steps.

According to Heidegger, in order to reach the possibility of the genuine self-understanding of philosophy one needs to start with a phenomenological-critical consideration of the historically pre-given philosophy (28 [39]). The aim of the critical consideration is not to modify philosophy, but rather to understand and open up the problem. One needs to turn towards predominant problems in philosophy in order to call attention to the unquestioned: to what has been taken over as given. Thus, in his previous consideration of the ‘idea of philosophy as primordial science,’ which led into the problem of circularity as well as his unfolding of science as context of manifestation, which in turn led to origin-understanding, Heidegger was employing the method of destruction.

In *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, Heidegger destroys the tradition in relation to the phenomenon of ‘life’ (8-21 [12-29]): “[t]he problem situation is characterized by the deliberately emphasized or merely implicitly positing of ‘life’ as primal phenomenon” (12 [18]). The problems of contemporary philosophy become problematic (as not being primordially attained) because they grow out of this *deliberately emphasized or merely implicitly posited* phenomenon as a primal phenomenon [*Urphänomen*]. More concretely, according to Heidegger the main groups of contemporary philosophy, namely culture philosophy and life philosophy, grow out of the same source – taking life as a primal phenomenon seen as culture or as something general (life in general) respectively. Depending on how ‘life’ is seen, the questions revolve around either (a) the problem of a priori validity or (b) the problem of the irrational. In the first case, life is debated around the opposition between an absolute a priori validity versus historical relativity, and in the second case, around the opposition between irrational versus rational. However, according to Heidegger, debating over the questions within this opposition as well as this opposition itself is highly questionable, since the problems dealt with here grow out of preconceptions and move within a pre-given framework. That is, the problems are grounded on a phenomenon which itself is left unquestioned. On this basis he can claim that all the debates in traditional philosophy (and thus the dominant situation of contemporary philosophy) revolve around unfounded problems. The problems are

unfounded insofar as the problematic is not primordially attained but simply posited – posited on the basis of an unquestioned framework. This leads to the next step of phenomenological-critical destruction.

Since opening up the problems with a view to the tradition shows that the problems addressed move within a pre-given framework, Heidegger makes a claim for the need to step out of the framework (20-21 [28-29]). Instead of entering into discussions over “problems” which have always been there or are currently at the center of philosophy, one needs to avoid lapsing into the given, falling into the accepted framework, and rather one needs to come out into the open. Thus, for example, the previously considered issue of circularity, when pointed out as a purely theoretical problem solved in the face of environmental experience, was raised to bring this problematic into the open. Here, with the demand to come out into the open, Heidegger refers further to the need to go after motives and tendencies at work in pre-given philosophy. Going after motives and tendencies at work means at the same time pointing philosophy the way out from alienation back to itself. Heidegger thus claims that phenomenological destruction leads to recognition that the task of philosophy is to go after the sense-complex of factual life experience and that this task is not simply posited, but rather takes a direction from the tradition.¹⁰⁵

What the consideration of the tradition with respect to ‘life’ has shown, according to Heidegger, is that ‘life’ has been taken as having a fixed meaning in different meaning directions. Instead of taking over the meanings fixed in tradition, he claims that destruction has led to meaning, and meanings point to contexts (25 [34]). Thus, with destruction having shown that the tradition blindly takes up meanings from the context, Heidegger suggests that the complex of meanings can and must be explicated.¹⁰⁶ It must be explicated in order to understand the concrete situation of actualization of taking up and fulfilling meaning. Furthermore, the question is from where and how the meanings depart. That is, as Heidegger puts it, the ‘pre-delineation’ “must be understood in the phenomenological basic posture, i.e., be traced back to its motives of origin” (25 [35]). In this respect, according to Heidegger, the proper problematic leads to factual life experience: insofar as something is

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger says: “[t]he leading towards the problem comes about by means of the phenomenological-critical destruction, such that above all the concealed sense-moments come to a philosophical terminus in a manner in which they press towards something decisive” (21 [29]).

¹⁰⁶ Heidegger says: “[e]very vitally understood meaning – enactment of the concrete situation in which the not necessarily theoretical objecthood which is expressed through the meaning becomes experienceable – carries within itself the direction towards primordial sense-complexes and makes their loosening up concretely possible” (138 [179]).

meaningful as such in a concrete situation for a concrete Dasein, the point of departure for philosophy is factual life experience.

For now, it is only a thesis that factual life experience belongs to the problematic of philosophy in an entirely primordial sense, namely in a sense that hitherto was concealed and became the reason for many pseudoproblems in philosophy [...]. (27 [38])¹⁰⁷

Heidegger suggests that the tradition is to be seen on the basis of and as factual life experience, since the approaches taken in pre-given philosophy unfold as tendencies of factual life experience. In other words, insofar as the tendencies at work are brought out as tendencies, they are disclosed as tendencies of factual life experience.

Further, seen through the tendencies of factual life experience, the so-called traditional approach is put forward by Heidegger as a concealing approach. For insofar as one starts out with the given (mere adoption of the standpoints and systems from history) and operates within fixed meanings, the access to the problem (of what has yet to be asked for) is concealed beforehand. Taking up the meanings from the context blindly, the tradition has failed to consider the context of meaning or rather meanings in their proper context. As such, the tendency to conceal indicates the character of factual life experience itself, the primordial character as the *fading* [*verblässen*] of meaningfulness or falling-away [*Abfall*]. The character of fading of meaningfulness, according to Heidegger, points to a transition in the experience. It is falling away from primordially into alienation, which is described as absorption into everydayness and usability (26-27, 141 [37-38, 182-183]). Philosophy is seen to be in alienation from itself insofar as the tradition neglects the relation to the primordial problematic (emerging of the meaning).

In claiming that the tradition conceals the access beforehand, Heidegger finds it important to point out that phenomenological destruction as a method is not taken over from the tradition. According to Heidegger, although destruction is critical consideration, it is not critique, which is laid upon a subject from outside or which comes afterwards. Destruction as a methodological moment in phenomenology as philosophy cannot be taken as a form within what he calls theoretical-scientific knowledge of subject matter in the service of apprehension of objects. Neither is it to be taken to have its meaningfulness from science as securing its conceptuality. It is not in the service of the theoretical (142-143 [184-185]). But nor is it without direction (24-26 [34-36]). Rather, it is important for Heidegger to maintain that destruction is bound to preconception [*vorgriffsgebunden*].

¹⁰⁷ “Vorläufig ist es nur eine These, daß *die faktische Lebenserfahrung in einem ganz ursprünglichen Sinne der Problematik der Philosophie zugehört*, und zwar in einem Sinne, der bislang verdeckt lag und Grund vieler Scheinprobleme der Philosophie wurde [...]” (GA 59: [38]).

According to him, the preconceptions which destruction needs to bring out are themselves anticipated and guide secondarily the destruction beforehand (ibid.). That is, the need for (and the mode of) destruction grows out of destruction itself: of what destruction shows. In this way Heidegger connects destruction with factual life experience through motivation. He seems to claim that destruction not only leads to factual life experience and its tendency to conceal, but also to the tendency to bring itself to light.¹⁰⁸ As such, destruction can be claimed to be motivated from factual life experience itself. All in all, Heidegger claims that destruction is the starting point for philosophy: “[i]f philosophy has to be determined as primordially enactmentally understanding [als ursprünglich vollzugsmäßig verstehendes] and attention-drawing explication of factual life experience, then this explication necessarily always starts with the destruction. It begins in the faded.” (142 [183]) To begin in the faded refers to the need to start by dismantling the concealment. It is necessary since factual life gives itself initially in a deformed manner (Kisiel 1995: 123, 129, 136). Or, as Pöggeler argues, one needs to start from destruction since factual life is historical and thus “exposing of the primordial experiences and the secret prejudices of the traditional” belongs to fundamental ontology (Pöggeler 1990 [1963]: 37 [51]).¹⁰⁹

4.3. Phenomenological explication

In the lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* Heidegger says:

The viewpoints or the questions that guide the destruction do not form a schema but are taken so formally that they do not prejudge anything, it is rather that the peculiar character of the position in question becomes apparent in the manner in which they concretely merge in the pursuit in various sense-complexes, that is, in the manner of the complex. (GA 59: 87 [112])

In the previous section, I brought out that phenomenological destruction leads to factual life experience and to the task of explicating the complex of meanings. As such, destruction is only the first step of the phenomenological method. The question of how to access something properly occasions another methodological moment – phenomenological explication [*Phänomenologische Explikation*]. Phenomenological explication is a methodological moment of philosophy which primarily concerns the problem of

¹⁰⁸ Thus, Heidegger talks in this context about the “phenomenological basic act of light-disclosing” in which pre-delineations are motivated (25 [35]).

¹⁰⁹ It should be noted that not everybody agrees with giving to destruction the position of a necessary methodological moment with which one must begin. For example, Overgaard (2004: 98) denies that destruction is a significant methodological moment for Heidegger. He argues against this view by pointing out that there are two guiding clues necessary for beginning with destruction at all: that which is to be destroyed and “basic experience.”

accessing.¹¹⁰ It is a methodological moment for proper accessing of philosophy. As such it is set against accessing as it is found in the tradition. At the same time it is a method for accessing the tradition. Furthermore, it is proper access only insofar as a claim is made about philosophical access. To put it differently, the mode of accessing found in the tradition is not proper insofar as the mode of accessing makes a claim for philosophy.

The elements of phenomenological explication are constantly present in Heidegger's different lecture courses, although mostly not clarified as such. Rather one simply repeatedly encounters in Heidegger's text the terms 'content,' 'relation,' and 'actualization' – the three sense elements of phenomenological explication, which I will explain shortly. With regard to the usage of sense elements, it could be thus said that Heidegger uses phenomenological explication throughout his works. He already talks about them extensively in his 1920 summer semester lecture course. However, in my opinion, the elements are most clearly brought together through phenomenological explication as a method at the beginning of the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* [*Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*, in GA 60] held in the winter semester of 1920-1921.¹¹¹

In the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger takes his point of departure in the consideration of phenomenological explication by once again setting philosophy against science and raising the task of releasing philosophy from the approach taken over from science: ¹¹² “[p]hilosophy is to be liberated from its ‘secularization’ to a science, or to a scientific doctrine of world-views” (8 [10]). By this time, however, the constant opposition is clearly put forward as a thesis: there is a difference in principle between science and philosophy (GA 60: 3 [3]). The differentiation between science and philosophy within the problem of philosophy is further articulated as a difference between attitudinal understanding [*einstellungsmäßiges Verstehen*] and

¹¹⁰ On phenomenological explication, see also Francisco de Lara (2008). In his book *Phänomenologie der Möglichkeit* de Lara analyses extensively all three methodological moments.

¹¹¹ The lecture course was given from the 29th of October 1920 until the 25th of February 1921 (Jung & Regehly 1995: 255 [339]). The text of the lecture course is reconstructed in its entirety from the notes of Heidegger and of the students present in the lecture course, the manuscript itself being lost (ibid.).

¹¹² Heidegger starts by recognizing the stance where philosophy is held to be science. According to Heidegger, this has its own motivational ground. He claims that the movement of regarding philosophy as science and employing the scientific methods in philosophy is an unquestioned movement which is based on a historical understanding of sciences as growing out of philosophy, which in turn is therefore seen as the universal science. The realization of the motivational ground of philosophy as primal science leads to the question of the original motive of philosophy. That is, philosophy needs to be seen from philosophy itself. It must be accessed from out of itself (GA 60: 5-6 [6-8]).

phenomenological understanding [*phänomenologischen Verstehen*] (33 [49]). As such, the central ground of this differentiation lies in the question of access.

Under the name attitudinal understanding Heidegger gathers the approach against which he has taken a stance from the beginning.¹¹³ It is an approach in which a subject domain is adopted from the tradition and considered to be a region as, for example, in the case of the notion of ‘life’ brought out in the previous section. This material domain is then grasped through knowledge and handled in accordance to a certain procedure – a procedure of typologizing, by which Heidegger refers to understanding through the formation of types (32 [48]). The central problem of this understanding is that it gets stuck in the material complex and treats everything as an object (33 [48]). Thus, for example, Heidegger points to the attitudinal treatment of history by saying: “[h]istory is here *the material* [*Sache*], the *object* toward which I take a cognitive attitude” (33 [48]). Similarly, it can now be said that Heidegger would consider the teleological-critical method, which leads to reification, to be attitudinal.

Heidegger confronts this attitudinal understanding in two respects. First, there is the problem of approaching the “object” through ‘taking-cognition-of’ [*Kenntnisnahme*]. According to Heidegger, the access here is dominated by a cognitive attitude. A cognitive attitude leads to loss of the living relation. Instead of taking things as they are, a cognitive attitude is orientated to forming connections between objects, typologizing these objects (10, 32 [14, 48]). Second, what is not recognized in attitudinal understanding is that the fundamental “object” to be investigated might not be an object at all (8, 11 [10, 14-15]). Thus, there arises a need to reconsider the “object” of philosophy and the manner of approaching it.

I experience myself in factual life neither as a complex of lived experiences nor as a conglomeration of acts and processes, not even as some ego-object in a demarcated sense, but rather in *that which* I perform, suffer, what I encounter, in my conditions of depression and elevation, and the like. I myself *experience not even my ego in separateness*, but I am as such always attached to the surrounding world. (10 [13])¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Heidegger brings out a double meaning of the “attitude”: “first an attitude toward the realm of the matter, secondly a ceasing of the entire human relation to the material complex” (GA 60: 33 [48]). As Heidegger says: “[a]ttitude’ is a relation to objects in which the conduct [*Verhalten*] is absorbed in the *material complex*” (GA 60: 33 [48]). Attitudinal [*einstellungsmäßig*] consideration refers to directing oneself only to the matter, focusing away from oneself.

¹¹⁴ “Ich erfahre mich selbst im faktischen Leben weder als Erlebniszusammenhang, noch als Konglomerat von Akten und Vorgängen, nicht einmal als irgendein Ichobjekt in einem abgegrenzten Sinn, sondern in dem, was ich leiste, leide, was mir begegnet, in meinem Zuständen der Depression und Gehobenheit u. ä. Ich selbst erfahre einmal mein Ich in Abgesetztheit, sondern bin dabei immer der Umwelt verhaftet” (GA 60: 13).

That is, on the side of the ‘object,’ the fundamental phenomenon for philosophy is factual life or factual life experience, as it is named in the present lecture course and has been named from the summer semester of 1920 onwards. It is the fundamental phenomenon from which philosophy arises and to which philosophy returns (6-7 [8]).¹¹⁵ As was shown, factual life experience is what comes forth in destruction, and tendencies of factual life make possible the shift away into attitudinal understanding, but it is not to be accessed through attitudinal understanding. In this respect, factual life experience does not designate for philosophy an object which could be grasped, nor does it designate the grasping subject. According to Heidegger, “[l]ife experience is more than mere experience which takes cognizance of. It designates the whole active and passive pose of the human being towards the world [...]” (8 [11]). Similarly, the experience of factual experience is not the medium between the world and the subject: “‘Experience’ [*Erfahrung*] designates: (1) the experiencing activity [*die erfahrende Betätigung*], (2) that which is experienced through this activity [*das durch sie Erfahrene*]” (7 [9]). Thus, “experience” involves both the “experiencing self” [*erfahrende Selbst*] and “what is experienced” [*das Erfahrene*] (ibid.). In short, it is not an object, but rather, it is a phenomenon which is accessed in its full meaning through phenomenological explication.

It is important to note that not everything that is, is a phenomenon. Phenomenon for Heidegger is a specific notion – it is what is accessed in a certain way, that is, accessed phenomenologically. So, when Heidegger says: “[o]bject [*Objekt*] and thing [*Gegenstand*] are not the same. All objects are things, but not the other way around; all things are not objects,” (25 [35]) and adds that “a phenomenon is neither object nor thing. However, a phenomenon, formally speaking, is also a thing – that is to say, a something at all” (ibid.), then he is calling attention to different ways of accessing. What this means, first of all, is that to have something as a phenomenon is dependent on the mode of accessing. Thus, phenomenon is something which is brought out as a phenomenon. Phenomenon is a “thing” which is explicated phenomenologically. Further, to explicate something phenomenologically is to bring out phenomenon as the totality of sense. As such,

¹¹⁵ Addressing the problem as the problem of self-understanding of philosophy, Heidegger sees philosophy as leading to factual life experience: “[i]f one grasps this problem radically, one finds that philosophy arises from factual life experience. And within factual life experience philosophy returns back into factual life experience. The concept of factual life experience is fundamental” (6-7 [8]).

phenomenology, which is the same as philosophy for Heidegger, is determined as explication of the *totality of sense* [*Sinnanzheit*] of a phenomenon (43 [63]).¹¹⁶

According to Heidegger (ibid.), every experience which is “taken in the phenomenon” (and likewise the fundamental phenomenon in question – factual life experience) is open to inquiry in three directions: (1) the original sense of the content (content sense, *Gehaltsinn*), (2) the original how of being experienced (relational sense, *Bezugssinn*), and (3) the how in which this relational sense is itself actualized (actualization sense, *Vollzugssinn*). Phenomenological explication is explication of a phenomenon in these three sense directions. It is a manner of bringing to light the phenomenon as phenomenon. Phenomenology is (formally) determined as explication of the *totality of sense* of phenomenon (ibid.). The task of phenomenology is to bring out the phenomenon out as phenomenon, that is, to access it in this way. A manner of properly accessing a phenomenon is to bring out its sense directions. Thus also, what is meant by factual life experience, towards which destruction only pointed, can be brought to light by explicating the sense directions.

The content sense, according to Heidegger, is what is factually experienced. It is not the objectively given content [*Inhalt*], but the experienced *what* in the phenomenon. As a sense direction, it is also a how – it will be asked about the sense of the experienced, about the content of concrete experience. By the content sense Heidegger refers to everyday dealings in the world:

Factual life experience puts all its weight on its *content*; the *how* of factual life experience at most emerges into its content. All alteration of life takes place in the content. During the course of a factually experienced day, I deal with quite different things; but in the factual course of life, I do not become aware of the different *hows* of my reactions to those different things. Instead, I encounter them at most in the content I experience itself: factual life experience manifests an *indifference* with regard to the manner of experiencing [Die faktische Lebenserfahrung zeigt eine *Indifferenz* in Bezug die Weise des Erfahrens]. (9 [12])

The basic category of the content sense in factual life is world [*Welt*]. World is to be understood as something in which humans may live, contrary to the world seen as object (8 [11]). The world in which I live is *my world*. I can never step out of the world. I am never simply a subject looking at the world and myself as objects from outside. In the world I meet things, others, and myself. I am always active in the world, meeting things, people, and myself. I am in the world also when I meet myself meeting things, people, and myself.

¹¹⁶ In his lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger gives two directions in connection with the notion of phenomenology: phenomenology is (formally) determined as explication of the *totality of sense* (*Sinnanzheit*) of phenomenon (43 [63]) and is considered a synonym of philosophy (4 [5]).

That is, world “can be formally articulated” as surrounding world, with-world, and self-world (8 [11]).

The relational sense refers to the fact that the content is somehow had. It asks about the manner in which something is experienced. With the relational sense, Heidegger points out that all content of experience is determined by significance: “everything that is experienced in factual life experience, as well as all of its content, bears the character of significance” (9 [13]). That is, the manner in which something is experienced (relational sense) determines what is experienced (content sense). Thus, Heidegger also insists that all the differences of what is experienced (for example, the apple as sweet or sour) come down to the content sense, so that in the factual course of life the character of significance is left unnoticed. Ordinarily one is simply absorbed into the world – in handling things and using them, this handling itself not being questioned. I walk out of the door, go into the garden to pick an apple from my favorite apple tree and enjoy my apple on this fine autumn day, without any thematization of the significance of the apple even when I encounter a worm in it – I simply throw the apple away and reach for another one. One is indifferent to relation [*Bezugsindifferenz*], that is, one does not distinguish and thematize the relation (GA 60: 9-10 [12-14]). However, the thematization of the relational sense is a central part of Heidegger’s philosophy.

Already in his previous lecture course, Heidegger points to the relational sense in connection with the question of access by stating: “[t]his relationship to access we call *relation* [*Bezug*]” (GA 59: 46 [60]). In the 1920 summer semester lecture course this is repeated when he says: “[o]ne can only characterize the manner, the *how*, of the experiencing of those worlds; that is, one can ask about the *relational sense* of factual life experience” (GA 60: 9 [12]). Further, with the relational sense, Heidegger is pointing to what later on, in his *Sein und Zeit*, becomes known as *care* [*Sorge*]. At this point in time, Heidegger leads the question of how factual life is experienced into the notion of caring [*Bekümmern*] (35 [52]). Factual life is in a relation as caring. And again, it is not a theoretical relation, rather it is about the how of being-near to people and things, the how of handling them.

The actualization sense refers to how the relation is actualized [*Vollzug*]. If it is asked how the relation is had, then it is asked in which *Vollzugssinn* the experience is lived through. Actualizing refers to having oneself in one’s relation. One has the relation in actualization, that is, it is lived through, experienced. The criterion for characterizing the

actualization sense is concrete Dasein. The experience is somehow actualized by someone concrete (GA 59: 56-66 [74-86]). As Francisco de Lara (2008: 62) points out, for Heidegger actualization indicates factual life as always my life: I am this life which I actualize and have in this actualization. In the actualizing sense, a person is concrete. The relations are actualized in concrete situations. Insofar as, according to Heidegger, attitude is also a manner of relating – has a character of relation (33 [48]) –, the relation can be actualized by concrete Dasein attitudinally. At the same time, however, the relation may also be actualized as (in terms of the previous chapter) origin-understanding: in the way that Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard are encountered to have lived. Insofar as actualization refers to the manner in which something is concretely lived through, Heidegger thus thematizes both the actualization of the sciences, as I have shown previously, but also how Paul is seen to actualize factual life through his letters and Augustine through his confession (both in GA 60).

All in all, phenomenological explication as a methodological moment is the accessing of something as a phenomenon in these three directions. Although Heidegger talks of the modes of accessing on the one hand as “covering up” or “hindering” (e.g., 11 [15-16]), and on the other hand as “originally arising” (e.g., 6 [7]), this distinction most certainly does not mean that there are correct and incorrect modes of access with respect to the phenomenon. Neither is there such a criterion as correct or incorrect factual life experience. Factual life experience lives in different ways of accessing. Thus, in *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger determines factual life experience at one point as follows: “[f]actual life experience is the ‘attitudinal, falling, relationally indifferent, self-sufficient concern for significance’” (11 [16]).

4.4. Formal indication

Formal indication [*Formale Anzeige*], like the two other methodological moments, is constantly present in Heidegger’s lecture courses. However, similarly to the sense elements, one can usually find Heidegger simply repeating that something is considered formally and/or has been indicated. Formal indication itself is concretely thematized in two lecture courses – at the beginning of the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* and in the lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* [*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 61]. Through these two

thematizations, formal indication gains meaning as a third methodological moment of phenomenology. It is a methodological moment which is connected and has been connected mainly with the problem of proper communicating and which addresses the question of grasping and expressing.¹¹⁷ In addition, in my opinion, it is the methodological moment through which all three methodological moments come tightly together.

In the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, formal indication is considered in the context of Husserl's differentiation of formalization and generalization and is placed within the idea of determining (GA 60: 38-45 [55-65]). Heidegger aims to delineate formal indication by furthering Husserl's distinction. According to Heidegger, both generalization and formalization stand within the meaning of generalizing [*Verallgemeinerung*]. They stand in determining something through more general determination. The difference between formalization and generalization lies (1) in the domain of the thing which is taken into consideration and (2) in the procedure of the act of determining itself. In that respect generalization stands in the material domain, whereas formalization is free in terms of material content: free from being bound to the materiality of things. But although it is not bound to materiality, "is not bound" does not exclude being in the domain. The same goes for the consideration of how the encounter proceeds. As Heidegger says, contrary to generalization, formalization is also free from any order of stages. In the case of formalization, there is *no need* to follow through lower generalities in ordered stages to reach the "highest generality." In this respect, what becomes the most important difference is (3) the question of what one attends to when confronted with the object of investigation. What one attends to in generalization is what-content [*Wasgehalt*], that is, the object is determined by its "what," by what-content as such. In contrast, formalization turns to relational meaning, that is, it asks about the object according to the aspect in which it is given, "to which" (GA 60: 38-45 [55-65]).

From previous characteristics, formal indication is shown to be close to formalization. Like formalization, formal indication stays away from classification, from ordering into stages, and the 'formal' of the formal indication displays closeness to formalization in standing in relational meaning. As Heidegger says: "[t]he formal is something relational" (43 [63]). What, then, is the difference?

¹¹⁷ On formal indication, see also Cameron McEwen (1995), Hent de Vries (1998), Francisco de Lara (2008), and Matthew I. Burch (2013). In this thesis, I will consider more specifically the accounts of formal indication given by Theodore Kisiel (1995) and Søren Overgaard (2004, 2005).

“One must prevent oneself from taking it for granted that its relational meaning is originally theoretical” (44 [64]). Formal indication falls outside of the common component of generalization and formalization – standing within the meaning of “general” and being attitudinally or theoretically motivated (40-41 [59]).¹¹⁸ Although both formalization and formal indication stand in relational meaning, formalization stays in connection with the attitudinal by being motivated from the attitudinal relation. The ‘formal’ in formal indication, on the other hand, is not connected to the attitudinal. Formal indication “falls outside of the attitudinally theoretical” (41 [59]). This exclusion can be seen more precisely in the characteristics of formal indication described in the *Aristotle* lecture, in which it becomes apparent what Heidegger is referring to when he says:

Why is it called “formal”? The formal is something relational. The indication should indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon – in the negative sense, however, the same as if to warn! A phenomenon must be so stipulated, such that its relational meaning is held in abeyance. One must prevent oneself from taking it for granted that its relational meaning is originally theoretical. The relation and performance of the phenomenon is *not* preliminarily determined, but is held in abeyance. (GA 60: 43-44 [63-64])¹¹⁹

In the lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*, Heidegger talks about formal indication in the context of considering the aspect of concreteness in philosophy and of characterizing ruinance [*die Ruinanz*] (GA 61: 22-28, 105-106 [27-35, 141-143]). He brings out two characters of formal indication: 1) prohibiting (preventing, deferring) character and 2) referential character.

The prohibiting character of formal indication subsumes under itself both the critique against the tradition, against the current situation of understanding philosophy, and its task as well as the differentiation of formal indication from generalization and formalization. As was said, formal indication is distinguished from both generalization and formalization insofar as the latter two are attitudinally or theoretically motivated. Formal indication refers to the need to prevent the taking of a position beforehand. It must prevent us “drifting off into autonomous, blind, dogmatic attempts to fix” (GA 61: 105 [142]). What must be prevented is that concepts are handled like objects and objects are fixed through concepts.

¹¹⁸ “What is common to formalization and generalization is that they stand within the meaning of ‘general,’ whereas the formal indication has nothing to do with generality. The meaning of ‘formal’ in the ‘formal indication’ is *more original*” (GA 60: 40-41 [59]).

¹¹⁹ “Was heißt sie ‘formal’? Die Formale ist etwas Bezugsmaßiges. Die Anzeige soll vorweg den Bezug des Phänomens anzeigen – in einem negative Sinn allerdings, gleichsam zur Warnung! Ein Phänomenon muß vorgegeben sein, daß sein Bezugssinn in der Schweben gehalten wird. Man muß sich davor hüten, anzunehmen, sein Bezugssinn sei ursprünglich der theoretische. Der Bezug und Vollzug des Phänomens wird *nicht* im Voraus bestimmt, er wird Schweben gehalten” (GA 60: [63-64]).

But this is exactly what happens in the attitudinal, theoretical approach to the object, where the regional demarcations are viewed as absolute.

The referential character of formal indication points to the positive task of formal indication. Standing against fixation of the basic properties of being, formal indication refers to a need for openness, a need to leave the content empty when determining it. This openness, however, is not meant in the complete sense:

The term, “formally indicated,” does not mean merely represented, meant, or intimated in some way or other, such that it would remain completely open how and where we are to gain possession of the object itself. “Indicated” here means that that which is said is of the character of the “formal,” and so is admittedly improper. Yet precisely in this “im-” there resides at the same time a positive reference. The empty content in its sense-structure is at the same time that which provides direction toward actualization. (GA 61: 26 [33])¹²⁰

Content is left empty in determining, but at the same time it is positively indicated towards a quite definite direction. What does it mean? Whence stems the direction? Heidegger continues:

There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of arriving at what is proper [*Eigentlichen*], namely by exhausting and fulfilling what is improperly indicated, by following the indication. (GA 61: 26 [33])

What is indicated, then? As I will show in the next section, there are different ways to interpret Heidegger’s formal indication. In my opinion, the core of the different interpretations lies in what I call the question of primacy. That is, which sense element has primacy for Heidegger in his formal indication: is it the actualization sense or the relational sense? In my opinion, Heidegger expresses here what he already brought out in his KNS lecture course. Philosophy must indicate the ‘pre-worldly something’ as not-yet (that is, potentially) worldly. In terms of the sense moments this means that philosophy (starting with the destruction of how something is actualized) must express the relational sense as that which is potentially actualized. However, in my opinion, formal indication as well as the two other methodological moments do not belong to the pre-theoretical sphere in terms of the KNS schema. They are methodological moments for philosophical investigation: they belong to ‘formalization’ as Heidegger articulated it in his KNS lecture course – a wording which he now rejects, but not the idea itself. Formal indication as a methodological moment has the task to avoid lapsing into the attitudinal understanding in which the tradition stands, as brought out through phenomenological destruction, and to

¹²⁰ “‘*Formal angezeigt*’ heißt nicht, irgendwie nur vorgestellt, vermeint, angedeutet, daß es nun freistände, den Gegenstand selbst irgendwo und -wie ins Haben zu bekommen, sondern angezeigt so, daß das, was gesagt ist, vom Charakter des ‘Formalen’ ist, uneigentlich, aber gerade in diesem ‘un’ zugleich positiv die Anweisung. Das leer Gehaltliche in seiner Sinnstruktur ist zugleich das, was die Vollzugsrichtung gibt” (GA 61: 26 [33]).

indicate the proper mode of access in accordance with the consideration of the sense directions brought out through phenomenological explication. As a method for expressing it demands that something is to be said in the manner of indicating the direction and, at the same time, in the manner of leaving it open to each concrete actualization.¹²¹

4.5. The interpretations of the methodological moments

In the second chapter, I claimed that Heidegger takes up a two-directional task as he aims at rethinking philosophy. I also claimed that in this way he himself provides the possibilities of different interpretations of his philosophy. In connection with the question of access (Heidegger's method), I pointed to two main positions by referring to the works of Kisiel and Overgaard. As I showed, Kisiel's and Overgaard's views on Heidegger's method diverge first of all when Heidegger's proximity to Husserl is considered. According to Kisiel, in developing his philosophy Heidegger turns away from Husserl and denies any possibility of grasping the pre-worldly methodologically. Philosophy must rather repeat the access which life already has to itself in the fullness of life, without disturbing it. In this way, Heidegger's philosophy is considered radically historical. Overgaard, on the other hand, argues for Heidegger's close proximity to Husserl. According to Overgaard, Heidegger is most of all indebted to Husserl's intentionality. Furthermore, Overgaard insists that Heidegger works within the framework of Husserl's epochē. In order to thematize entities phenomenologically, a certain procedure (a special mode of accessing) is needed, in which 'natural' knowledge is kept away. Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology is seen as sharing "the basic interests of transcendental phenomenology" (Overgaard 2004: 94).¹²²

On this basis of what has been said I suggested that Kisiel and Overgaard follow different sides of what Heidegger offers as he pursues philosophy. As I see it, Kisiel emphasizes philosophy as intensification, which addresses the question of how the (always historical) pre-worldly is accessed in the living flow of life. Alternatively, Overgaard, in my

¹²¹ Using the term *Dasein* would be an example of indicating something formally, as Overgaard points out (2005: 154-155).

¹²² More specifically considering Heidegger's proximity to Husserl's phenomenological reduction, Overgaard (2004: 94) distinguishes two questions in Heidegger's phenomenology: the question of the meaning of being and the question of transcendence. The first question is "about the modes of being that 'occur,' and more generally, what 'being' as such means" (ibid.). The second question asks "*which structures make possible the understanding of being,*" whereby this understanding makes possible "any kind of relation to entities" (ibid.). According to Overgaard, with respect to the second question, Heidegger's approach is "almost identical to Husserl's reduction" (ibid.). With respect to the first question, Overgaard concludes that there are differences between Heidegger and Husserl; however, in consideration of the method, Heidegger works with Husserl's epochē, but also adds to it a "terminological" epochē (op. cit.: 202).

opinion, stresses Heidegger's methodological considerations: philosophy unfolds as a specific stance a philosopher must take. A philosopher must carry through a specific investigation in order to point to the (necessary) pre-worldly. In arguing for both sides being present in Heidegger's philosophy, I thus am suggesting that both Kisiel and Overgaard emphasize one angle of Heidegger's philosophy. With respect to the methodological moments brought out previously, this does not mean that one or the other neglects them. Rather, they interpret the moments differently and give priority to different aspects of these moments. Insofar as I am claiming that Kisiel's account emphasizes philosophy as intensification and, at the same time, I am arguing that Heidegger takes up a twofold task, it may perhaps be presumed that in my reading of his methodological moments I tend to side with Overgaard's interpretation. However, I focus on only a particular part of Overgaard's account and side with him on a very specific aspect.

With respect to phenomenological-critical destruction, Overgaard and Kisiel disagree on whether it has any importance for Heidegger's method. According to Overgaard, destruction has only secondary importance in Heidegger's phenomenology or, as he puts it, at least in *Sein und Zeit* it is not an "indispensable methodological component" (Overgaard 2004: 98). Rather, for Overgaard, destruction presupposes a foregoing investigation which is not in any way dependent on destruction (Overgaard 2004: 97-100). Kisiel, on the other hand, finds destruction to be of the utmost importance. Thus, one can find Kisiel (1995: 261) saying that "[h]ermeneutics realizes its task only by way of *destruction*". According to Kisiel, through destruction one reaches the sense of actualization, a process in which it is necessary to ascertain whether this actualization is original or not and in which "an actualization is original when it is the actualization of a genuine relation, which is at least co-directed by the self-world" and is renewable as such (op. cit.: 129). Accordingly, Kisiel can affirm that philosophy is always philosophizing – it is always self-worldly and situational.

While Kisiel and Overgaard disagree when it comes to the role of destruction, they both regard formal indication as perhaps the most important feature of Heidegger's method. However, their interpretations of formal indication differ quite strongly. In my opinion, both the difference between the two interpretations of formal indication and the core of their disagreement about Heidegger's method are related to the sense moments of phenomenological explication. The question is: what has been given primacy, *Bezugsinn* or *Vollzugsinn*?

There is no doubt that for Kisiel formal indication is an extremely significant methodological feature of Heidegger's philosophy (see Kisiel 1995: 172, 140, 224). For him, it is a methodological moment through which Heidegger overcomes Husserl (op. cit.: 49).¹²³ As I already brought out in chapter two, Kisiel considers formal indications to be expressions "which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves" (op. cit.: 59). Formal indications "ultimately seek a nondisruptive access to the very temporality and historicity of the pretheoretical phenomena" (op. cit.: 219). Kisiel interprets this methodological moment very much in the direction of leaving everything undecided, always subject to the historical situation (op. cit.: 170, 178). According to Kisiel, formal indication enables philosophy to stay in a never-ending scepticism (op. cit.: 233, 235). In this respect, the most important feature of formal indication is to leave everything open to actualization. In Kisiel's interpretation, the actualization sense is the primary sense direction. He not only emphasizes the actualization sense throughout his work, but also explicitly states it to be the "decisive sense of direction" (op. cit.: 179). Furthermore, according to Kisiel, "the authentic having of philosophizing is in the 'full stretch' (*Voll-zug*) of the actualizing sense (*Vollzugssinn*) itself, pursuant to the temporalizing sense of always being 'under way'" (op. cit.: 235). With respect to philosophy, other sense directions have only secondary importance for Kisiel. At one point, he even claims that formal indication not only leaves the content empty, but also warns against relational sense (op. cit.: 170). However, in my opinion, this claim should rather be seen in the context of his emphasis on the priority of the actualization sense. That is, Kisiel does not absolutely leave out the relational sense, as I will also show in the next section. It is simply that priority is clearly and strongly given to the actualization sense.

For Overgaard, who argues that Heidegger is largely a follower of Husserl, formal indication is also a decisive methodological moment, although for a very different reason. According to Overgaard, with this methodological moment Heidegger adds something significant to Husserl's phenomenology. When it comes to Heidegger's method, Overgaard insists that radical ontology would not be possible without a special take on entities. Heidegger works in the framework of the epochē, seen as a certain procedure (Overgaard 2003: 169-170). Furthermore, according to Overgaard, Heidegger finds in Husserl's

¹²³ Kisiel (1995: 49) interprets formal indication as a solution to both problems of phenomenology raised by Natorp (reflection and description).

intentionality an access which makes it possible to investigate things in their mode of *being* (op. cit.: 168). With formal indication, which Overgaard predominantly considers a method for phenomenological conceptualizing, Heidegger adds something to Husserl's account by taking the issue of terminology much more seriously. He emphasizes the need for what Overgaard calls "a *second* 'epochē-like' move – a conceptual epochē" (op. cit.: 170-171).¹²⁴

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go more deeply into Overgaard's argumentation. What is significant for the present thesis is firstly that, according to Overgaard, formal indication is a conceptual epochē, a methodological procedure for philosophical investigation. Secondly, according to Overgaard, the mode of being is expressed through formally indicative concepts. Overgaard does not use the notion of relational sense in his consideration. However, in terms of the sense directions of phenomenological explication, Overgaard's accentuation that philosophical investigation aims to access and express the mode of *being*, the "how of its [entity] being encountered" (Overgaard 2003: 169, 170), refers to the fact that through philosophical investigation the relational sense is brought out. That is, as far as philosophical investigation is concerned, the task consists of accessing and expressing the intentional moment, the relational sense.

Neither Kisiel's nor Overgaard's interpretation of Heidegger focuses specifically on building their argument on the three methodological moments brought out above. Rather, these are thematized along with their central problematics, which cannot be outlined more extensively here. What is important for the present thesis is to show that these two main interpretations of Heidegger's method (the question of accessing and expressing the pre-worldly) which the works of Kisiel and Overgaard exemplify are both provided by Heidegger himself. That is, Heidegger himself offers the possibility of both previously given ways of approaching him by unfolding his philosophy in two directions. This brings me back to my previous claims about Heidegger's two tasks. However, before I return to this, another stop is needed, which is Kierkegaard's role with respect to the methodological moments.

¹²⁴ In a different article Overgaard (2005: 162) further argues with respect to Heidegger's formally indicative notion of Dasein that this manner of conceptualizing allows a better understanding of the entity we ourselves are than was possible before. According to Overgaard, "[f]ormal indication has to do with the choice of proper concepts in a philosophical investigation" (op. cit.: 151).

4.6. Kierkegaard's place and Heidegger's methodological consideration

It is of importance that Heidegger does not mention Kierkegaard in his consideration of the methodological moments in the lecture courses from the summer semester of 1920 and winter semester of 1920-1921. With respect to phenomenological-critical destruction and phenomenological explication as methodological moments, Kierkegaard never emerges as being of importance for the young Heidegger. However, with respect to formal indication the situation is different. In this respect, the connection between Kierkegaard and Heidegger can be and indeed has been found. The main source for this is Heidegger's review of Jaspers.¹²⁵

In this review, Heidegger considers the question of method. Most importantly, in this work he points to formal indication as the means of pursuing the phenomenon of existence, which aims at the phenomenon of "I am" (JR: 78-79 [10-11]). In this text several references to Kierkegaard are found,¹²⁶ including the following remark:

Concerning Kierkegaard, we should point out that such a heightened consciousness of methodological rigor as his has rarely been achieved in philosophy or theology (the question where he has achieved this rigor is not important here). One loses sight of nothing less than the most important aspect of Kierkegaard's thought when one overlooks this consciousness of method, or when one's treatment of it takes it to be of secondary importance. (101 [41])¹²⁷

In his review, Heidegger chiefly talks about Kierkegaard with respect to Jaspers's failure to understand and approach him (78-79, 90, 100, 101 [10-11, 27, 40, 41]). By distancing himself from Jaspers's approach, Heidegger gives an important intimation of his own manner of treating Kierkegaard, that is, by pointing to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as examples of particular interpretations of existence, Heidegger insists that in formal indication one needs to avoid "uncritical leaps into a particular interpretation of existence" (78-79 [10-11]). This should be avoided in order to "free up the possibility of pursuing a genuine sense of the phenomenon of existence and explicate what comes to the fore in this pursuit" (ibid.). This reference gives us an insight into Heidegger's own approach to Kierkegaard. That is, as I claim in this thesis, Kierkegaard's interpretation is to be explicated. However, Heidegger never specifies in this text or anywhere else what he means

¹²⁵ The review is entitled "Comments on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*" [*Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers' "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen"* in GA 9]. Heidegger apparently worked on his review of Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* during the years 1919-1920, but the review was published much later.

¹²⁶ In his Jaspers review, Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in four different contexts (JR: 78-79, 90, 100, 101 [10-11, 27, 40, 41]).

¹²⁷ "Hinsichtlich Kierkegaards muß doch darauf hingewiesen werden, daß nicht oft in der Philosophie beziehungsweise Theologie (wo, ist hier gleichgültig) eine solche Höhe strengen Methodenbewußtseins erreicht worden ist wie gerade von ihm. Man gibt gerade das Entscheidende an Kierkegaard aus der Hand, wenn dieses Methodenbewußtsein übersehen, beziehungsweise in sekundärer Bedeutung genommen wird" (JR: 41).

by Kierkegaard's consciousness of method, which he apparently appreciates. Nor does he trace formal indication explicitly back to any methodological element from Kierkegaard. In spite of this, the connection has been found and not in a weak but in a strong sense.¹²⁸

The connection between Heidegger and Kierkegaard with respect to formal indication is primarily found through a reference to Kierkegaard's indirect communication [*indirekte Meddelelse*].¹²⁹ Roughly speaking, Kierkegaard considers indirect communication (as distinct from direct communication) to be a way of communicating truth which concerns existing individuals (distinct from communicating mere information). The subject of indirect communication is thematized explicitly by Kierkegaard in, for example, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, *Practice in Christianity* and *The Point of View*. However, as a method of communicating, it is put to work by Kierkegaard throughout his authorship. Thus, for example, writing under pseudonyms is an application of the method of indirect communication. In this respect, Kierkegaard states:

When I had grasped this, [the fact that, in all this knowledge, one has forgotten what it is to exist and what inwardness means] it also became clear to me that, if I wanted to communicate anything on this point, the main thing was that my exposition be in the indirect form. (CUP: 203 [VII 220])

In this way, indirect communication is a means of communicating (relation between speaker and listener) by one existing individual to another existing individual the fact that they are existing individuals. Furthermore, it is a means which aims to show that each individual must appropriate the truth by themselves. Thus, when communicating indirectly, the communicator may only point to the possibilities without giving fixed solutions, so that each individual in his/her living situation must make the decision by themselves. The central technique of Kierkegaard's method here is repeatedly claimed to be ambiguity (see further Turnbull 2009: 15). The previous citation also brings out that through indirect communication something is to be prevented – namely taking a stance towards the individual through what is known. Later on in this thesis, this theme will be reconsidered for Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger with respect to the single individual (in chapter seven). Here, it is important to note that the preventing aspect of indirect communication does not require taking up what is previously given. Although it works as a criticism of modern society, it does not include a necessary turnedness towards what is criticized. Even

¹²⁸ Thus, for example, Otto Pöggeler (1994: 141) states: "Heidegger nevertheless wanted to derive the method, that is, a binding logic, of philosophy directly from Kierkegaard."

¹²⁹ On the connection of Heidegger's formal indication with Kierkegaard's indirect communication, see also John van Buren (1989: 456-470). Like Kisiel and Pöggeler, Van Buren makes the connection between Heidegger's formal indication and Kierkegaard's indirect communication through Heidegger's consideration in the Jaspers review.

if indirect communication would be indispensable for removing illusions in modern society, indirect communication does not require turning towards the illusion for its own sake. This leads me back to the consideration of Heidegger's account of formal indication.

Heidegger's familiarity with indirect communication is evident, first, from the fact that Heidegger has thoroughly examined Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* [*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*], in which Jaspers writes extensively on Kierkegaard and his indirect communication (Jaspers 1919: 332-335). Furthermore, it becomes clear through the similarities between formal indication and indirect communication.

Both Heidegger's formal indication and Kierkegaard's indirect communication as modes of expression take existence into account. They are similar as far as an individual in his/her concrete situation is considered. As I have shown, formal indication is a mode of expression that does not fall into fixed concepts by leaving the content open to actualization. In that sense, Kierkegaard's demand to leave the decision open for each individual, brought out through indirect communication, is close to what Heidegger is suggesting. However, there are also significant differences between Heidegger's formal indication and Kierkegaard's indirect communication. I will explain these by looking at the considerations of Kisiel and Pöggeler, both of whom, in comparing Kierkegaard's notion of indirect communication and Heidegger's formal indication, refer back to Heidegger's review of Jaspers and the notion of existence as referring to the "I am" (Kisiel 1995: 140, Pöggeler 1994: 142). I want to draw attention to what each of them has to say about the distinctness of the two notions.

First of all, Pöggeler asserts that Heidegger does not detect in Kierkegaard a necessary turnedness towards destruction. He says:

If indirect communication is unfolded as formal indication, then one is denied the possibility of following Kierkegaard's or Nietzsche's specific conception of existence "uncritically." Kierkegaard was not taken up by Heidegger as the edifying writer he had ultimately wanted to be; rather, precisely through the indirect communication of his pseudonymous works, he points to that which remained undeveloped in his work, that is, to the logic of philosophy whose method immediately presupposes a destruction of tradition. Heidegger could not find this necessary destruction in Jaspers any more than he could in Kierkegaard. (Pöggeler 1994: 142)

That is, for Heidegger formal indication must refrain from fixing notions beforehand. However, this does not mean that they should not be taken up critically. On the contrary: destruction is an essential moment in the phenomenological method. The tradition is to be taken up and explicated. The tendencies of the tradition should be indicated.

Kisiel, in turn, points to a difference, first, by claiming that Heidegger approaches existence as a formal indication "precisely to avoid merely lapsing back into the particulars

in which Kierkegaard and Nietzsche understood the term” (Kisiel 1995: 140) and then by referring to the “ontological twist” or spin which Heidegger “years later” gives to formal indication (op. cit.: 140, 144). He goes on to suggest that Heidegger’s problem of formal indication refers to the question of what sort of apprehension must find expression (op. cit.: 146). As Kisiel says:

The original experience of phenomenology is a (pre)ontological experience. Radical phenomenology is ontology, an ontology of “Da sein,” an ontology of the “(I) am.” Existence, a term subject to the same incidental and casual uses as “being,” is to indicate the “sense of being” (*Seinsinn*) of the “I am”. (Op. cit.: 146)

Thus, although, as I have shown previously, Kisiel gives primacy to the actualization sense, he nevertheless assures that the “sense of being” of the “I am” must be brought into apprehension. According to Kisiel, this “sense of being” must then find its sense of actualization (ibid.). Thus, he never backs down from the position that actualization has primacy. However, the distinction between Kierkegaard’s indirect communication and Heidegger’s formal indication is made clear here. In this respect, it should perhaps be asked: if Heidegger regards Kierkegaard as someone who has actualized intensification, can we consider the “sense of actualization” which the “sense of being” must find, to be the same as intensification?

What these two interpretations show is that (1) formal indication gains its meaning among other methodological moments and (2) for Heidegger, a specific sense direction must find expression. Thus, formal indication for Heidegger appears as one methodological moment which arrives at its full meaning within and through the other methodological moments. The function of formal indication is to tie them together. Methodologically, it requires the consideration of the tradition not only in order to show the tendencies and the dangers which must be avoided, but also in order to lead from there towards the proper way of accessing. The positive task of formal indication not only lies in the need to leave the phenomenon open to actualization, but also indicates a concrete direction, namely in terms of the sense directions of phenomenological explication, the relational sense.

In themselves, the above-mentioned dissimilarities between Kierkegaard’s indirect communication and Heidegger’s formal indication seem perhaps marginal as far as Kierkegaard’s place in Heidegger’s philosophy is considered. One could simply admit that Kierkegaard has had influence on Heidegger’s formal indication and that Heidegger did not merely adopt Kierkegaard’s indirect communication but developed his method further. However, what has been brought out raises a significant point. What is important for the present thesis is exactly “the question where he [Kierkegaard] has achieved this

[methodological] rigor” (JR: 101) – a question which would help us to understand Kierkegaard’s role in Heidegger’s thinking and which the latter constantly deflects. Furthermore, it is important to see in which respects Heidegger sees himself as departing from Kierkegaard’s method. As I have aimed to show throughout this part, Heidegger gives to Kierkegaard a very specific place in his philosophy, as Kierkegaard for him is the writer who succeeds in actualizing intensifying-concentration. However, I insist that, in addition to intensification, Heidegger articulates further philosophical methodology for accessing and expressing philosophy’s theme.

4.7. Heidegger’s two-directional philosophy

In chapter two, I claimed on the basis of an analysis of the KNS lecture course that Heidegger articulates a twofold task for establishing philosophy, which aims to access the pre-worldly as potentially worldly. On the one hand, the access is to be found within the pre-theoretical sphere, in a living situation. On the other hand, Heidegger suggests that the access is to be established as a kind of theoretical approach – a theoretical approach which does not de-vivify. In chapter three, I claimed that in the lecture course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* philosophy is articulated in the first of these directions. Philosophy is described as a mode of experiencing (intensification). More concretely, Heidegger determines philosophy in this lecture course as origin-understanding, whereby the access to the pre-worldly is found in intensifying-concentration upon the self-world. It is an access in life itself which according to Heidegger was actualized by Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard. Now, in this chapter, I am suggesting that Heidegger takes up the second direction in the subsequent lecture courses by focusing on the three methodological moments. In order to maintain this claim (and thus the claim that there are two paths with respect to the question of access), I must show that the modes of access described through the three methodological moments are not the same as intensification. Certainly, this is not self-evident, insofar as, for example, in Kisiel’s interpretation of Heidegger’s method the two are brought together.

My interpretation does not rest on a preference for Overgaard’s view over that of Kisiel. Rather, I aim to show that Overgaard provides a better account for considering the methodological moments, which Kisiel integrates into intensification. Bluntly, I claim that the methodological moments are not reducible to, nor a part of, let alone the same as, intensification. Rather these are different modes of access. Intensification is a manner of

experiencing, living factually in the basic situation according to itself in all its relations, whereby these relations are expressed or brought into foreseeing. However, that the relations (pre-worldly) are expressed does not mean that they are articulated as such in the intensification. On the contrary, the methodological moments describe how one must proceed in philosophical investigation in order to articulate factual life in all its relations. Thus, first of all, I wish to stress the character of the three methodological moments. They are not simply ways in which life is lived through, that is: actualized. They are not modes of experiencing found in life itself. Rather, they describe how philosophical investigation must proceed. There must be a special take on entities, as Overgaard has pointed out.

Second, what can and must be brought to articulation through the investigation is relational sense. As I have pointed out, Heidegger himself stresses that “[o]ne can only characterize the manner, the *how*, of the experiencing of those worlds; that is, one can ask about the *relational sense* of factual life experience” (GA 60: 9 [12]). Both content sense and actualization sense cannot be what philosophy articulates, insofar as these unfold in concreteness. In this respect, what destruction achieves is recognition of factual life as the point of departure by admitting tendencies and opening the problem up towards the character of meaningfulness. Most significantly, in formal indication, which must prevent fixation of the content beforehand and leave it open to actualization, the relational sense comes forth as the “formal” which must be indicated. “The formal is something relational,” as Heidegger says (43 [63]). In this respect, it can be said that both intensification and the methodological moments must point to the relation (pre-worldly in terms of the KNS lecture course). However, they differ with respect to the way of accessing.

Third, in addition to stressing that philosophical investigation can and must access and express the relational sense (it becomes the primary sense in the sense complex), my interpretation is based on the claim that there is a difference between *Vollzugsinn* and philosophical investigation. For philosophical investigation I have used the term “clarification.” I encountered this term in Steven Galt Crowell’s interpretation, but I do not agree fully with the interpretation itself. Crowell uses this term when arguing against Kisiel’s interpretation and for Heidegger’s close proximity to Husserl. He uses the term specifically in the context of considering Heidegger’s answer to Heinrich Rickert’s objection to *Lebensphilosophie*: that this project is unsuccessful in distinguishing between thinking about life and living life (Crowell 1995: 444, 2001: 125). Crowell elaborates the claim with (the) reference to the notion of ‘repetition’ within Heidegger’s lecture course

Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (GA 61), a lecture course which I will turn to in the following part of this thesis, in chapter six. His argumentation is based on the claim that there is a difference between the relational sense and the actualization sense, a claim which I fully agree with. What I do not agree with is that Crowell equates so-called proper actualization (what is regarded so far as intensification) with the access had through proper methodology. That is, he separates authentic and inauthentic actualization (that is, an improminent and prominent mode of experiencing in terms of what was brought out in chapter three) and claims (rightfully in my opinion) that the difference between the two actualizations “requires appeal to a way of evident *having*, or access” (Crowell 1995: 445, 2001: 126). He further claims that philosophical (authentic) actualization differs from inauthentic (*fallen* or *ruinant*) actualization in the mode of access, in which philosophical actualization requires a methodological approach. Thus, Crowell says: “[o]ne sees, then, how Heidegger’s notion of research might answer Rickert: the method of formal indication does ‘repeat’ the self-interpretation of life, but it *differs* from a mere going along with lived life because it is an explicitly cognitive-illuminating self-recollection (‘reflection’) and is oriented toward evident (‘intuitive’) self-having” (Crowell 1995: 445, 2001: 127). Here, my view departs from Crowell’s. What Crowell suggests is an inverted version of what Kisiel has offered. They both interpret Heidegger’s account of philosophy as a form of actualization. Where Kisiel fits the methodological moments into his account of Heidegger’s philosophy as actualization described as intensification (in the lived life), Crowell fits the authentic mode of actualization into the methodologically approached access. In my opinion, these interpretations are possible only if two things which are distinct are considered the same. What should rather be recognized is that “clarification” is not only a different form of actualization, but it also differs profoundly from the access found in and through actualization.¹³⁰ The latter is rather described by Heidegger as intensification.

Certainly, Dasein is one as far as it is considered to be what we ourselves are in each case. However, Dasein is accessed in several ways. From what has been said in the

¹³⁰ In his explanation Crowell refers to “clarification” as follows: “[...] Heidegger all along follows Husserl’s view that philosophical cognition, phenomenology, is not objective theory but “clarification,” a kind of comporment that works by methodologically exploiting the ‘turning back upon itself’ implicit in life’s own course. Repetition is ‘reflection’” (Crowell 1995: 445, 2001: 126). In my opinion, Crowell rightfully brings out that Heidegger does follow Husserl and that philosophical cognition is not an objective theory, but rather is “methodologically exploiting” life’s own course, thus is “clarification.” I disagree with Cromwell because he ignores the fact that actualization lies in life’s own course and that exploiting life’s course methodologically is not the same as life’s own course. In this respect, I would also not identify repetition with reflection (see chapter six).

previous chapters I conclude that Heidegger operates with three modes of accessing. First, having oneself, a mode of accessing within the fullness of life, always already understanding life. At this level there is no possibility of distinguishing whether the access had is proper or not. Second, the proper (according to itself) mode of accessing at the level of actualization, described as intensifying concentration of factual life upon the self-world. This is the mode of authentic existence whereby life is lived according to itself in all of its relations. Thirdly, “clarifying” philosophical access. That is, the access had by grasping factual life in accordance with proper non-de-vivifying methodology, which should be motivated from factual life itself. When it comes to the problem of philosophy, only the two last-mentioned modes of accessing come under consideration. I do not deny that Heidegger aims to remove the gap between these two modes. In this respect, it is important for Heidegger that the three methodological moments should access their subject matter in such a way that the thematic field itself is not be de-vivified, but is motivated from the very theme itself. ‘Being motivated from the pre-theoretical’ is considered to be what links the two spheres. But this does not mean that they are one and the same.

Previously I claimed that all three methodological moments are to be seen as a part of the philosophical investigation, the process of accessing and expressing phenomena. Therefore, in my opinion it is not the case that any of them is less important or exchangeable for Heidegger. Philosophy must destroy what is, explicate what is (access it phenomenologically), and indicate it formally in the direction of the relational sense, so that it is open to actualization (express it in this way). This allows accessing and expressing factual life without de-vivification. I would also suggest, along with Pöggeler (see p. 87, n. 100), that Heidegger not only destroys the tradition which has concealed the access, the faded. As Kisiel (1995: 261), in my opinion, has rightly pointed out, destruction is destruction of the way in which the present is encountered. Philosophy for Heidegger must take its point of departure from what is (how something is actualized) both with respect to how something is lived through in the mode of concealing the access (tradition), and to the way in which something is lived through in the mode of accessing described as intensification. Both of these modes must be brought to philosophical articulation (destroyed, explicated, and indicated formally). In the next part of this thesis, I will show that this is the case. Here, it perhaps would be useful simply to point out that in the next lecture course Heidegger will start to explicate Paul’s letters and Augustine’s *Confessions* Book X, and in the context of the latter, as I will claim, also Kierkegaard. In this respect,

one could ask what sense it would make to explicate authentic actualization (intensification) if explication and this actualization were one and the same.

4.8. Conclusion

What kind of place does Kierkegaard have in Heidegger's first Freiburg lecture courses? Throughout the first part of my thesis, I have aimed to understand what Heidegger is initially searching for during the period under consideration. In the second chapter of this thesis, I claimed that in connection with the question of access, Heidegger articulates a two-directional task for philosophy. I further claimed that in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* he takes up the first of these directions, that is, he articulates proper access within the pre-theoretical sphere. In the present chapter, I claimed that in his following lecture courses he takes up the second task given in his KNS lecture course. For this claim I needed to show that the three methodological moments which Heidegger puts forward should not be integrated into the notion of philosophy as it was set out in the third chapter. Rather, Heidegger offers two different ways of accessing with respect to philosophy. Both modes either express or articulate the pre-worldly (intentional moment, basic characters, relational sense, or the how-content). That is, they access what philosophy aims at. The difference lies in the *mode* of accessing what is aimed at. In intensification, the pre-worldly is actualized, lived through and as such brought to expression "in the living situation of gliding from one world of experience to another genuine life-world, or in moments of especially intensive life" (GA 56/57: 88 [115]). With the methodological moments, however, Heidegger provides concrete steps which must be followed in order to bring the pre-worldly to articulation. By following these steps the pre-worldly can be brought out. Following these steps does not mean actualizing the pre-worldly, nor does actualizing the pre-worldly mean that these steps are followed, nor does actualizing the pre-worldly mean that the pre-worldly is articulated. In this respect, it is rather the case that the proper actualization and what is achieved in it must be further investigated and properly articulated for Heidegger.

I showed in chapter three that Heidegger considers Kierkegaard among those who have attained the self-world and thus actualized and expressed the proper access within the pre-theoretical sphere. In the present chapter, I showed that Heidegger praises Kierkegaard for his consciousness of methodological rigor and yet, in the comparison of Kierkegaard's indirect communication and Heidegger's formal indication, Kierkegaard is seen to fail to

bring out methodologically what needs to be articulated according to Heidegger. Thus, in Heidegger's opening lecture courses of his first Freiburg period, Kierkegaard occupies a place as someone who has brought to life proper actualization of factual life within the pre-theoretical sphere. This actualization, however, must be brought to philosophical articulation. In what follows, I will show that Kierkegaard continues to have significance for Heidegger as having actualized the proper access to factual life. This actualization Heidegger will clarify, nonetheless. He will destroy, explicate, and indicate it formally.