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## 2. The task of philosophy

### 2.1. Introduction

Heidegger's beginning, an approach to philosophy that can be called his own, is considered to be his War Emergency Semester (KNS)<sup>49</sup> lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* [*Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem*, in GA 56/57] (KNS 1919).<sup>50</sup> In the written source of this lecture course, as in the other lecture courses from the year 1919, there are no references to Kierkegaard. And yet, in order to search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period, there is a need to start exactly from here. It is necessary, since the place Kierkegaard gains is already determined in this lecture course through the tasks Heidegger sets himself in his search for philosophy in the years to come. And although not a syllable is said about Kierkegaard here, this lecture course leads the way to understanding Heidegger's words when he talks about his "historical influences" in the year 1923: "[i]mpulses were given by Kierkegaard and Husserl opened my eyes" (GA 63: 4 [5]).

In his KNS lecture course Heidegger addresses the problem of philosophy itself. What is philosophy? As will be seen, this becomes the problem which Heidegger explicitly poses over and again in each lecture course of his first Freiburg period. However, the way in which this question is approached varies. I suggest that Heidegger's search for philosophy takes two directions and that these two directions are set up in this lecture course. I argue that the significance of the lecture course lies in its setting the tasks for his search and that in this lecture course Heidegger sets the tasks for his search in a manner

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<sup>49</sup> The war emergency semester lectures were held extraordinarily and lasted from 25<sup>th</sup> of January until 16<sup>th</sup> of April 1919 (Heimbüchel 1987: 166). According to Heimbüchel (ibid.), for this semester Heidegger had initially announced a lecture course on Kant, but this was never given.

<sup>50</sup> By the year 1919 Heidegger had already some experience as a lecturer. During three semesters between the years 1915 and 1917 he gave one lecture, three courses, and two seminars. On 27<sup>th</sup> of July, Heidegger delivered his test lecture, entitled *The Concept of Time in the Science of History* [*Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft*], after which he is officially appointed as a *Privatdocent* (Sheehan 1988: 81). After that, in the winter semester of 1915-1916, Heidegger held a lecture course entitled *The Basic Trends of Ancient and Scholastic Philosophy* [*Die Grundlinien der antiken und scholastischen Philosophie*] and a seminar *On Kant's Prolegomena* [*Über Kant, Prolegomena*]. In the summer semester of 1916 he gives a course entitled *German Idealism* [*Der deutsche Idealismus*] and a seminar with Engelbert Krebs, entitled *Practicum on Texts from Aristotle's Logical Writings* [*Übungen über Texte aus den logischen Schriften des Aristoteles*]; in the winter semester of 1916-1917 he gives a course entitled *Basic Questions of Logic* [*Grundfragen der Logik*]. (Kisiel 1995: 461, 469) The lecture courses announced for the year 1918, however, are never held since Heidegger was called up to train as a reservist and was later on stationed with the Front Weather Watch (op. cit.: 469-470).

which leads him to articulate philosophy in two different ways. I aim to show that this is the case by unraveling what is known as Heidegger’s KNS schema:

The pre-theoretical something [Das vorweltliche Etwas]		The theoretical something [Das theoretische Etwas]	
Pre-worldly something [Das vorweltliche Etwas]	Worldly something [Welthaftes Etwas]	Objective formal-logical something [Formallogisches gegenständliches Etwas]	Object-like something [Objektartiges Etwas]
(fundamental moment of life as such) [(Grundmoment des Lebens überhaupt)]	(fundamental moment of definite experiential spheres; aesthetic) [(Grundmoment bestimmter Erlebnissphären)]	(motivated in the primal something) [(motiviert in Ur-etwas)]	(motivated in the genuine experiential world) [(motiviert in genuiner Erlebniswelt)]
Primal-something [ <i>Ur-etwas</i> ]	Genuine experiential world [Genuine Erlebniswelt]		

Table 1. Heidegger’s KNS schema, written down by Franz-Josef Brecht (GA 56/57: 164 [219]).

In this schema, which is not found in Heidegger’s own manuscript but in the transcripts of his student Franz-Josef Brecht, is gathered the whole story of this lecture course. It sums up both the stances towards philosophy which Heidegger finds at hand and which he believes need to be reconsidered (the traditional understanding of philosophy) and the key elements of re-established philosophy for the “new” understanding of philosophy which Heidegger proposes. Furthermore, it encapsulates not only Heidegger’s suggested thematic field for philosophy but also the ways of accessing this thematic field. I say “ways of accessing” because the question of how the theme of philosophy is to be accessed is exactly the question which leads me to claim that Heidegger steers philosophy on a two-directional path. Is philosophy purely a pre-theoretical affair or is it pre-theoretically motivated as a sort of theoretical clarification? Certainly, the views on this issue diverge. In the search for Kierkegaard’s place in Heidegger’s first Freiburg period lecture courses, the stance taken towards this problem is decisive. I claim that Heidegger provides both of these directions here. This claim will be further supported in the next chapters, where I aim to show that in the following lecture courses Heidegger takes up both of the tasks and that Kierkegaard is put forward as a central source with respect to one of the directions suggested here.

In what follows, I aim to show what Heidegger proposes to be the task of philosophy. More specifically, I aim to answer three questions: (1) how does Heidegger set himself against the tradition, (2) what does Heidegger see as the thematic field of philosophy proper, and (3) what are Heidegger's considerations with respect to the question of accessing the proposed theme of philosophy (the problem of method)? In order to answer these questions I concentrate on unfolding Heidegger's KNS schema. I take my point of departure from Heidegger's thematization of philosophy as he finds it at hand (the tradition). After that, I turn to Heidegger's reconsidered articulation of the thematic field. Finally I focus on the whole KNS schema by problematizing Heidegger's methodological considerations.

## **2.2. Traditional approaches to philosophy: philosophy as (scientific) worldview**

In the opening of the lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* Heidegger makes a move which is to become familiar in his writings. He starts out by explaining how trivial the topic he is going to undertake seems to be: “[o]ne has at one’s disposal a more or less clear conception of philosophy, especially in the present day, where philosophy, and speaking and writing about it, practically belongs to a good form” (GA 56/57: 6 [7]). By bringing the listener of the lecture course to question this common understanding, Heidegger sets the tone for what is to come, namely the path of problematizing philosophy itself.

As a first step on this path he starts to dismantle the traditional understanding of philosophy. In our lecture course he launches his programme of destruction by claiming that philosophy has always had a connection to worldview – a stance which he then claims to overthrow.<sup>51</sup> More specifically, he takes his point of departure in the statement that, in the history of philosophy, worldview has always had a connection to philosophy: whether it is considered identical with philosophy (worldview as the immanent task of philosophy) or the limit of philosophy as in the case of scientific philosophy – in any case it has had a

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<sup>51</sup> The move of calling into question the relation of worldview to philosophy stems from Edmund Husserl. In his essay “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” [*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*] (1911) Husserl calls for decisive separation from any form of *Weltanschauung* philosophy. Thus, quite probably, Heidegger is following Husserl when he opens the lecture with the thesis that philosophy must make a radical break with worldview.

connection (8-9 [10-11]).<sup>52</sup> But what if there is no connection at all? With this proposition, the either/or choice between the two standpoints is led into the possibility of neither. The claim that there is no connection at all would be a claim which, according to Heidegger, would contradict all previous conceptions of philosophy and demand a new understanding of philosophy which would strip philosophy of its traditional features (9 [11]). This new understanding is what he aims at. He claims that worldview is “a phenomenon foreign to philosophy” (10, 16 [12, 17]) and that the unphilosophical character of worldview may be brought out by placing it against philosophy itself (10 [12]), that is, against the philosophy Heidegger strives to establish. In the end, this new philosophy thus explains the tradition. However, at the same time, the new understanding is to be established out of the tradition. This requires asking what the traditional features of philosophy are. More specifically, what are worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy – the two main stances in philosophy according to Heidegger?

Explaining worldview (6-7 [7-8]), Heidegger first of all points to the common understanding of the notion as a kind of personal view on the world. Philosophy, which “practically belongs to a good form,” refers to an understanding of philosophy as having a worldview. Thus, for example a farmworker, a factory worker, and a political party are said to have their own worldview. What separates a philosopher from, for example, the politician with a worldview is the striving for a higher, autonomous worldview; the striving for origin, for what is ultimate. In this way, philosophers as “great thinkers,” who aim at ultimate and universal explanations, are considered to have an especially deep understanding: “[t]hey experience [*erleben*] and view the world with heightened inner vitality, penetrating to its final sense or origin; they recognize nature as a cosmos of the ultimate lawfulness of simple movements or energies” (6 [7-8]).

What is problematic for Heidegger, however, is not so much the situation that worldview is considered to be philosophy, but rather that philosophy itself aims at worldview. That is, worldview is the immanent task of philosophy. As such, every philosophy is identical with worldview, insofar as philosophy accomplishes itself in worldview: “[o]bjectively stated: every great philosophy realizes itself in a worldview – every philosophy is, where its innermost tendency comes to unrestricted expression, metaphysics” (7 [8]). With respect to the KNS schema, I believe that Heidegger considers

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<sup>52</sup> In the lecture course *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value [Phänomenologie und Transzendente Wertphilosophie]* Heidegger characterizes worldview as “a harmonizing of science (natural science) and the life of the spirit” (GA 56/57: 94 [122]).

worldview to be a questioning within a “genuine experiential world,” it is a “fundamental moment of definite experiential spheres; aesthetic.” However, it is a specific stance within this sphere, as Heidegger will soon reconsider it.

Scientific philosophy, seen as an alternative conception of philosophy, aims to do away with philosophy as a purely personal affair and ground it objectively. With respect to the KNS schema, it could be said that it is articulated as an “object-like something” which is “motivated in the genuine experiential world.” Scientific philosophy offers to provide a scientific foundation of philosophy. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, it is still essentially connected to worldview, because scientific philosophy “has in its system an ultimate and necessary tendency towards a worldview” (9 [12]). Scientific philosophy, then, considering itself to be non-identical with worldview, is connected to worldview as the limit or boundary of worldview. It is a scientifically grounded worldview.

Although Heidegger claims to rethink the whole philosophical tradition, it should be noted that at the same time he is mainly concerned with his own closest environment, Neo-Kantian value philosophy (more concretely, critical science of value). He is deeply engaged with detailed analysis of Neo-Kantian value philosophy with the aim to replace its domination in favor of phenomenology.<sup>53</sup> In our lecture course Heidegger builds up his argumentation against the traditional way of trying to ground philosophy by turning to the destruction of the ‘idea of philosophy as primordial science’<sup>54</sup> and focuses his argumentation on the suggestion that in the center of traditional philosophy is the problem of circularity.

Being true to his claim that the proper analysis of a problem demands the clarification of the conceptions of the topic (see 9 [11]), Heidegger initially focuses on the term ‘idea.’ He brings out the Kantian meaning of the ‘idea’ as determinable determinateness with an indeterminate object and claims that the ‘idea of primordial science’ leads to the problem of circularity. That is, the object of the idea (e.g., the content of the origin of what is sought after) is left undetermined, but the idea itself (as determinable determinateness) directs the path in advance, while what is aimed at is presupposed. Thus, this problem of circularity according to Heidegger is not an artificial difficulty, but rather “is already the expression of

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<sup>53</sup> Later on, in his next lecture course *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value* in the summer semester of 1919, which I will not be treating extensively in this thesis, Heidegger gives a more detailed account of Neo-Kantian value philosophy.

<sup>54</sup> As Heidegger utters: “[t]he cardinal question concerns the nature and concept of philosophy. But the topic is formulated as ‘the idea of philosophy,’ more precisely ‘the idea of philosophy as primordial science’” (10 [12]).

an essential characteristic of philosophy, and of the distinctive nature of its method” (15 [16]). As such, the problem of circularity requires that a way out be found: necessary circularity, “belonging to the essence of philosophy” (ibid.), requires finding methodological means of overcoming the circularity. But where to find these methodological means? According to Heidegger, in the history of philosophy the efforts to put philosophy in the position of being genuine science have taken two directions: either focusing on the objects of knowledge or on the knowledge of objects. Heidegger takes up both of these approaches in order to show that they fail in the aim to ground philosophy and leads towards his own approach.

Heidegger first shows that the tradition has not found a way out of circularity and thus a way into the ‘idea of philosophy as primordial science’ with the focus on the ‘object of knowledge.’ Neither by approaching the problem through the history of philosophy nor by finding a criterion in a scientific attitude of mind nor by approaching it through inductive metaphysics can we arrive at the essential elements for determining the ‘idea of philosophy as primordial science.’<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, the detour has not been in vain. Rather, it leads us to recognize the problem sphere and the character of this sphere which is searched for. First, philosophy is seen as a problem of science and not a problem of world-wisdom, for example.<sup>56</sup> Second, the common feature of the sciences (science as such) is that they have the character of knowledge:

Sciences are unities, context of knowledge with content. We characterize them as particular in respect to their object of knowledge. Is there any other way of looking at the matter? Clearly there is. Instead of the object of knowledge, we can focus on the knowledge of the object. With knowledge, we come to a phenomenon which must truly apply to all sciences, which indeed makes every science what it is. (23-24 [28])

Heidegger suggests that we turn from the possibilities offered by the object of knowledge to the knowledge of objects (24 [28]). He critically examines the teleological-critical method, the main feature of Neo-Kantian philosophy of value, which makes a claim to being primordial science.

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<sup>55</sup> Finding essential elements of the idea of philosophy by turning to history of philosophy cannot be of help, because the idea of genuine philosophy is dependent on philosophers’ own criterion of genuineness in their own historical context (19 [21]). Neither is it of any help to look for the criterion in personalities regarded as philosophers, that is, from an attitude or a typical stance of the philosopher – that would make philosophy coincide with worldview (20 [23]). Similarly, according to Heidegger, inductive metaphysics is condemned to failure as a simple repetition of particular sciences and is therefore unsuitable for consideration of a primordial science (23 [26-27]).

<sup>56</sup> Thus Heidegger says: “[t]he possible direction for defining the idea is already positively prefigured. Philosophy is – more precisely, should be – still more precisely: it is a problem as science, and indeed as primordial science” (21 [24]).



The teleological-critical method as Heidegger explains it (25-48 [29-62]) starts from aiming at truthful knowledge. Underlying all knowledge are ultimate concepts, basic principles, and axioms. Axioms as normative laws (norms, laws, principles, i.e. representational connections) “are the origin or ‘primal leap’ [*Ur-sprung*] of knowledge, and the science which has these origins for its own object is primordial science, philosophy” (26 [31]). Thus, the problem of philosophy is the validity of axioms, and what becomes a central question is the appropriate method for grounding the validity of axioms (28 [33]). This method is the teleological-critical method, which is supposed to ground the normative validity of axioms. In this way, it distinguishes itself from all particular sciences, including psychology. However, does it achieve what it aims for? Not according to Heidegger.

He destroys the teleological-critical method from inside out and saps the foundations of its attempts to look for philosophy as the idea of primordial science by scrutinizing the three elements of the teleological-critical method (material pre-giveness [*Materialvorgebung*], the giving of the ideals, and the problem of linkage between these two).<sup>57</sup> According to Heidegger, the teleological-critical method, which aims to be primordial science, not only gets bogged down in circularity, which it is supposed to overcome by depending on the consciousness of the ideal (of thought), which is both the value criterion for judgment and what is searched for, but also contains a number of presuppositions which make it impossible to achieve its own aims.<sup>58</sup> Importantly, having taken the analysis of the teleological-critical method to the extreme, he claims that this

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<sup>57</sup> The procedure of the teleological-critical method is described in short by Heidegger as follows: “[i]n carrying out the critical-teleological method, I have before me the pre-given material [*vorgegebene Material*], the universal characteristics, for example, of psychic thought-process. Having this present, at the same time I direct my attention to the ideal of thought. With this view, I determine from the given material those elements that are necessary conditions for the realization of the ideal.” (34 [42-43])

<sup>58</sup> The teleological-critical method (32-48 [39-62]) not only contradicts its attempt to free itself from particular sciences by depending on psychology and history for providing the given material, but also is filled with presuppositions with respect to declaring something as a value (like the phenomenon of ‘ought’ in Rickert’s philosophy, or the relating of ‘validity’ of propositions to value). According to Heidegger, declaring something a value is a theoretical derivation of more original ‘worth-taking,’ i.e., what is experienced in the lived life in itself. To put it differently, in the experience nothing like a ‘value’ is found, but rather something is experienced as ‘worth-taking.’ Similarly, the teleological-critical method presupposes the character of relatedness between the material pre-giving [*Materialvorgebung*] and the giving of the ideals [*Idealgebung*]: “critical-teleological judgement presupposes such a connection, namely that material stands ‘under’ a norm, that a norm is ‘norm for’ a material” (43[54]). Heidegger stresses that, of necessity, the link between the two is theoretically broken, both poles of the relation being presumed to have a certain character. Thus, the character of the giving of the ideals is presumed to be distinct from the material pre-giveness, which “makes material available” and provides “the field and ground for critical normative judgement” (44 [55-56]). However, Heidegger insists that the giving of ideals, which belongs to the psychic, is itself given as a sphere. This means that the ideal giving as a psychic phenomenon considered in the totality is brought into material relations and thus to the sphere of the material thing (32-48 [39-62]).

method is stuck with the sphere of material things [*Sachsphäre*]. It is a “pure dedication to the subject-matter [*Sache*],” where one thing is described by another thing and presented as a fact (48 [61]). Everything is reified! And now what?

Is there even a single thing when there are only things? Then there would be no thing at all; not even *nothing*, because with the sole supremacy of the sphere of things there is not even the ‘there is’ [*es gibt*]. Is there the ‘there is’? (48 [62])

Having reduced everything to the minimum, to the most general of reflective categories (*es gibt*), Heidegger is ready to bring this into meaningful context.<sup>59</sup> He concludes his analysis by claiming that all the previously considered attempts to get closer to the problematic at hand are restricted to the theoretical sphere (46 [59]). Thus, Heidegger has given a name to the sphere which *seems* to become the main opposition with respect to the question of philosophy proper – the theoretical sphere. Halfway through the lecture course he states: “[t]his primacy of the theoretical must be broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical, and not in order to introduce something that shows the problems from a new side, but because the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical” (47 [59]).

### 2.3. Thematic field reconsidered

Having arrived in his previous analysis at the primacy of the theoretical, which is located in the sphere of the material as a pre-given field, Heidegger states that in the domination of the sphere of things, there is nothing, not even the ‘there is’ [*es gibt*] (48 [62]). Or is there?

We are standing at the methodological cross-road which will decide on the very life or death of philosophy. We stand in an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute reification, pure thingness, or we leap into *another world*, more precisely, we manage for the first time to make the leap [*Sprung*] into the world as such. (51 [63])

With this statement Heidegger turns to the path he has promised at the beginning of the lecture – a new understanding of philosophy. He opens his second part by calling to enact two experiences [*Erlebnisse*]: the experience of the question ‘is there something?’ and the experience of the lectern. Through these two examples, in my opinion, Heidegger introduces what is to be considered the proper thematic field of philosophy. With respect to the KNS schema the examples give an explanation of what is meant by the ‘pre-theoretical’ sphere. More concretely, the examples help us to understand what Heidegger is referring to by ‘pre-worldly something’ and by ‘worldly something,’ the latter of which pair is reconsidered. In addition, as Heidegger promised in his initial problematization of

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<sup>59</sup> See more on the historical background of Heidegger’s use of ‘es gibt’ in Kisiel (1995: 42-44).

philosophy, on the basis of the rethought ‘worldly something’ he will rip out the foundation underneath traditional philosophy.

### 2.3.1. The question “Is there something”

“Already in the opening of the question ‘Is there...?’ there is something” (51 [63]). The question ‘is there something?’ is to be taken up again in a new manner – by leaping into the lived experience. Heidegger calls for a remaining with the lived experience itself, without leaning to theories beforehand through the “stubborn habit of thought” (52 [65]). That is, the experience of the question, questioning, is brought out as ‘lived experience’ and not as a question of the knowledge of a thing. Rather than dwelling on the psychic processes of a psychic subject, the enactment of the very questioning itself needs to be taken up. The experience must be vitalized: “[i]t is a matter of sounding out the motives from which it lives” (53 [65]). The question to be asked is how this question (‘Is there something?’) itself is experienced. Thus, it is not to be asked how the experience is given, but how it is lived. It is not to be considered a process in me or in front of me. Rather, Heidegger stresses that in questioning ‘I comport myself’ [ *ich verhalte mich* ]. What is the significance of ‘I comport myself’ in asking ‘Is there something?’ What characterizes this comporting oneself or, rather, what happens in questioning, in ‘I comport myself’?

But what is decisive is that simple inspection [*Hinsehen*] does not discover anything like an ‘I’. What I see is just that ‘it lives’ [*es lebt*], moreover that it lives towards something, something that is itself questionable. (53 [66])<sup>60</sup>

That is, Heidegger leads the experience of the question ‘is there something?’ taken as a lived experience in three directions: (1) relatedness in questioning; (2) meaningful context through what is questioned, that is, the questionable; and (3) the one who questions, that is, the questioner.

Thus, with the example of the experience of the question ‘is there something?’ Heidegger first of all shows himself a student of Husserl, reflecting on phenomenology and aiming to further it. He describes questioning as pure directedness. What is observed in questioning, in ‘I comport myself’ is directedness or relatedness: what I see in the simple inspection is that ‘it lives towards something.’ Here one could stop, but this would mean leaving the path of what is found in the experience. By staying with the experience, however, Heidegger brings out of isolation what is questioned in questioning and makes a

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<sup>60</sup> “Entscheidend ist: Das schlichte Hinsehen findet nicht so etwas wie ein ‘Ich’. Ich sehe: Es lebt, und weiter, es lebt auf etwas hin, und diese ‘Leben auf hin’ ist ein ‘fragend Leben auf etwas hin’, und das Etwas selbst steht im Charakter der Fraglichkeit” (GA 56/57: 66).

move to a meaningful context of the questioning. That is, secondly, ‘it lives towards something that is itself questionable.’

In enacting the question ‘is there something?’ there are two directions observable: it is asked whether ‘there is’ something and it is asked whether there is ‘something.’ Asking about the meaning of ‘there is’ he points out that in the experience of the questioning ‘is there something,’ the ‘there is’ [*es gibt*] may be filled with different meanings: each time the ‘there is’ is concretized (there is a table, there are words) and it has a different meaning (54 [67]).

And yet: the meaning of ‘something’, primitive as it appears to be, shows itself in accord with its sense as motivator of a whole process of motivations. This is already suggested by the fact that, in attempting to grasp the meaning of ‘something in general’ [*Etwas überhaupt*], we return to individual objects with particular concrete content. Perhaps this reversion is necessary. In the final analysis it belongs to the meaning of ‘something in general’ to relate to something concrete, whereby the meaningful character of this ‘relating’ [*Sinncharakter dieses “Angewiesenseins selbst”*] still remains problematic. (54-55 [68])

That is, there is a tendency to fill what is questioned with a concrete content. The significance of this is double-edged. On the one hand, Heidegger seems to aim to show how objectification takes place in the questioning – reification through the tendency to fill what is questioned with concrete content and to fix it as such. In this manner it becomes possible that scientific philosophy leads to total reification. There is the living tendency to objectify by filling the meaning with concrete content. On the other hand, the tendency towards the concrete does not need to result in objectification. What is significant is only the tendency towards the concrete – the ‘there is’ tends towards concretization, towards something beyond itself: “[o]nce again a new element of meaning refers the question and its content (there is) beyond itself” (54 [67]). That is: the relation does not need to be objectifying, but rather it is “still problematic.”

In addition, despite assuming different meanings, the ‘there is’ is “in each case with an identical moment of meaning” (54 [67]). That is, asking about the ‘something’ of the questioning, Heidegger insists further that this ‘something’ is not something already filled with a concrete content, but it *can* (emphasis KK) be taken as ‘anything whatsoever’ (54 [68]). In this respect, the least to be said is that something is something. However, this something is not in isolation. As such, what needs to be asked is how the anything whatsoever relates to something concrete.<sup>61</sup> At this point Heidegger is very brief in his

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<sup>61</sup> Later on, Heidegger explicates this further by saying: “[a]nything that can be experienced at all is a possible something, irrespective of its genuine world-character. The meaning of ‘something’ is just ‘the experienceable as such’” (88 [115]). In that sense, the experience of the question ‘is there something?’ is not

explication, but it is clear that he aims both to bring out the sphere which is not yet concretized and to point to this sphere as stretching out beyond the emptiness towards the meaningful context. In isolation, there indeed would not even be ‘there is.’ Would there be an ‘I’? As brought out previously: “[b]ut what is decisive is that simple inspection [*Hinsehen*] does not discover anything like an ‘I’” (53 [66]). How to consider the presence of I-relatedness in a lived experience?

That anything like an ‘I’ is not discovered in the simple inspection does not mean that there is no relation to the ‘I’ whatsoever. Rather, this says that in first instance something like an ‘I’ is not immediately apprehended in the experience:

Precisely because the question relates in general to *an* ‘I’, it is without relation to *my* ‘I’. These two phenomena necessarily motivate each other. *Just because the sense of the experience is without relation to my ‘I’ (to me as so and so), the still somehow necessary ‘I’ and I-relation are not seen in simple inspection.* (55 [69])

It is not that in experiencing there is an explicit ‘I’ present. However, the relation to ‘I’ is never absolutely cut off. Rather, the experience of the question is characterized as ‘I-remote’ [*Ich-fern*]. This example emphasizes the distance from and at the same time the dependence on a particular ‘I’ to whom the experience belongs (55 [69]).

To sum up, by considering the question ‘is there something?’ as a lived experience, Heidegger has brought out the way an experience is to be taken up in its initial mode.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, as I will argue shortly, with this example Heidegger has articulated the sphere which philosophy must aim at, that is, the ‘pre-worldly something’ in the KNS schema. Philosophy must reach the ‘pre-worldly’ as lived experience, and through consideration of the experience of the question ‘is there something?’ as a lived experience the question gains a new dimension.

Yet the experience *is*, even when I avoid every kind of reification and insertion into reifying context. It has *now*, it is there – and is even somehow *my* experience. I am there with it, I experience it vitally, it belongs to *my* life, but it is still so detached from me in its sense, so absolutely far from the ‘I’, so absolutely ‘I-remote’ [*Ich-fern*]. (55 [69])<sup>63</sup>

Heidegger stresses that in a lived experience it is not the case that ‘relating to’ is a thing which is connected to another thing, to a fixed ‘something.’ Rather it is historical and

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limited to its specific world-character, but rather Heidegger aims to point out the relatedness of intentional structures to the worldly through potentiality.

<sup>62</sup> Looking ahead we can say that by calling to actualize the question through which relation is observable along with a content with its multiplicity of meaning, Heidegger can be seen to have already opened his three-directional sense totality through which *phenomenon* will be determined later on (in GA 60: 43). I will show what this specifically means in chapter four.

<sup>63</sup> “Aber das Erlebnis *ist* doch auch, wenn ich jede Verdinglichung und Einfügung in einen Sachzusammenhang vermeide, hat doch ein *Jetzt*, es ist da – und es ist sogar irgendwie *mein* Erlebnis. Ich bin doch dabei, ich er-lebe es, es gehört *meinem* Leben zu, und doch ist es seinem Sinn nach so losgelöst von mir, so absolut *Ich-fern*” (GA 56/57: 69).

lively. He concludes his analysis by stating: “[n]evertheless, from this experience a ground-laying and essential insight can now be achieved. (Characterization of the lived experience as event [*Er-eignis*] – meaningful, not thing-like)” (56 [69]).

### 2.3.2. The lectern: introduction to environmental experience

“[C]oming into the lecture-room, I see the lectern” (56 [71]). In this manner Heidegger asks his students to appropriate the experience of encountering a lectern, in order to lead them into the environmental experience. The lectern is to serve as Heidegger’s introduction to the *Umwelt*.

I see the lectern at which I am to speak. You see the lectern, from which you are to be addressed, and from where I have spoken to you previously. In pure experience there is no ‘founding’ interconnection, as if I first of all see interesting brown surfaces, which then reveal themselves to me as a box, then as a desk, then as an academic lecturing desk, a lectern, so that I attach lectern-hood to the box like a table. [...] I see – and immediately so – a book lying upon it as annoying to me [...], I see the lectern in an orientation, an illumination, a background. (57 [71])

In this way, the experience of the lectern is distinct from the experience of the question ‘is there something?’ Where lies the contrast? First of all, the experience of the lectern, differently than the experience of the questioning ‘is there something?’, is far from being distant from the particular ‘I’: “I see the lectern at which I am to speak” (ibid.). Furthermore, the experience of the lectern very much ‘worlds’ [*weltet*] – has the character of world: “I see the lectern in an orientation, an illumination, a background” (ibid.). The experience of the lectern is something individual, has an individual meaning – in seeing the lectern Heidegger sees something different than what his students, or, as he puts it (57 [71]), than what “a Negro from Senegal suddenly transplanted here from his hut” would see; you see it differently than I do. Furthermore, the lectern is seen from out of the immediate environment or surroundings – it is not an isolated box with the name of a lectern. The environment does not consist of things which stand next to each other. Rather, in an environmental experience the lectern is already meaningful. Its meaning is given primarily and immediately.<sup>64</sup> That is to say, through the experience of the lectern, experience of something is brought forth as always my experience, as having the character of world (it worlds [*es weltet*]) and as being already meaningful. In the experience of a lectern, the particular ‘I’ is somehow already there and necessarily so:

only through the accord of this particular ‘I’ does it experience something environmental, where we can say ‘it worlds’. Wherever and whenever ‘it worlds’ for me, I am somehow there. (58 [73])

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<sup>64</sup> Thus Heidegger says: “[i]n the experience of seeing the lectern something is given *to me* from out of an immediate environment” (58 [72]) and “the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing oriented apprehension” (58 [73]).

This strong presence of the ‘I’ in the environmental experience makes it different than what is encountered in the analysis of the experience of the question ‘is there something?’. However, at the same time, Heidegger brings them firmly together by claiming that the experience of the lectern is an ‘event of appropriation’ [*Ereignis*] (60 [75]), just as the lived experience reached through the consideration of the question ‘is there something?’ was claimed to be previously. What does this mean? How do these two examples come together? Most importantly, what should be considered the proposed thematic field for philosophy?

### 2.3.3. The pre-theoretical something

In my reading, the two examples serve to explain what in the KNS schema is called the ‘pre-theoretical something.’ What Heidegger was pointing towards with his consideration of the example of the question ‘is there something?’ is what in Heidegger’s KNS schema is called the ‘primal something’ [*Ur-etwas*]. It is the ‘pre-worldly something,’ the ‘experienceable as such’ [*Erlebbare überhaupt*]. According to Heidegger, the primal something is indifferent to any genuine world character, but this does not mean that it is to be seen as removed from the lived experience. The indifference to the world should be rather understood as ‘not-yet’ in the sense that it has yet to ‘world out’ [*auswelten*] – it is “not yet broken out into genuine life” (88 [115]). It is a possible something: “[a]nything that can be experienced at all is a possible something, irrespective of its genuine world-character” (ibid.). Further, as not-yet, the primal something is seen as the intentional moment: “[b]ut this means that the sense of the something as the experienceable implies the moment of ‘out towards’ [*auf zu*], of ‘direction towards,’ ‘into a (particular) world,’ and indeed in its undiminished ‘vital impetus’” (ibid.). It is the relation (which Heidegger later on calls *Bezugssinn*). Understood in this way, Heidegger claims that its meaning lives in the fullness of life and it should be regarded as “a moment of essence of life in and for itself” (88 [116]). It is the pure out-towards, a pre-worldly which has a connection to or dependence on the ‘worldly something.’<sup>65</sup>

The lectern, as it is experienced in the environmental experience, is the ‘worldly something’ in its proper sense. The ‘worldly something’ is expressed in the KNS schema as the ‘genuine experiential world.’ Within this ‘worldly something’ the ‘pre-worldly

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<sup>65</sup> In connection with Heidegger’s lecture course which I will look at in chapter three, it is significant that Heidegger also describes the ‘pre-worldly something’ as the basic character of life: “[t]he primal character of ‘something in general’ is the basic character of life as such” (GA 56/57: 163 [218]).

something' can be distinguished: pre-worldly as not-yet, that is, potentially worldly. As Heidegger brought out in the example of the experience of the question 'is there something?': something in this questioning *can* be taken as *anything whatsoever*. It is the potentiality which is essential and distinct from fixation of the content beforehand. It is the character of the potentiality of the pre-worldly which can be worldly.

Further, both of the examples are brought together by Heidegger as 'event of appropriation' [*Ereignis*].<sup>66</sup> According to Heidegger, "[t]he experiences are events of appropriation in so far as they live out of one's 'own-ness,' and life lives only in this way" (60 [75]). What Heidegger means by "one's 'own-ness'" is left unclarified here. However, I agree with Campbell, who points out that the 'own-ness' here suggests what will be called factual life later on.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, I would claim that by the 'event of appropriation' Heidegger refers to one mode of accessing the pre-worldly in its dependence on the worldly. I will explain this claim further in chapter 2.4.

Explaining the 'event of appropriation' negatively, Heidegger contrasts it with what he calls 'process' [*Vorgang*]. The experience regarded as 'event of appropriation' [*Ereignis*] is a non-process (ibid.). By the term process Heidegger refers to a specific theoretical comportment – the firm fixing of the object. According to Heidegger, the grasping of the 'anything whatsoever' as firm fixation of the object which does not touch *me* is a de-vivification [*Ent-leben*]: "[w]hat is objectified, what is known, is as such removed [*ent-fernt*], lifted out of the actual experience" (59 [74]). This objective happening is called "process" – a happening which passes before the knowing 'I.' It is "the objective occurrence, the happening as objectified and known" (ibid.). That is, the process refers to objectification, whereby something is known by the 'I' (objectified subject) in front of which the process passes. It is the theoretical comportment: "[i]n the theoretical comportment I am directed to something, but *I* do not live (as historical 'I') towards this or that worldly element" (ibid.).<sup>68</sup> This 'I' is not only de-vivified, but also de-historicized: "[t]he historical 'I' is de-historicized into the residue of specific 'I-ness' as the correlate of

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<sup>66</sup> According to Heidegger, the pre-worldly and worldly meet in the 'event of appropriation': "[w]hat is essential about the pre-worldly and worldly signifying functions is that they express the character of the appropriating event, i.e. they go together (experiencing and experiencing experienced) with experience itself, they live in life itself and, going along with life, they are at once originating and carrying their provenance in themselves" (89 [117]).

<sup>67</sup> According to Campbell (2012: 30): "[f]actual life is, rather, the primordial experience of one's own self, which Heidegger calls here 'one's own-ness' (*G* 56/57:75/60)."

<sup>68</sup> From Brecht's transcript about the clarification of the process, two modes of the theoretical are found: "[t]heoretical comportment is a process first because it flows through a chain of grounding, but secondly because it tears itself from the contexture of life with ever novel spontaneity" (158 [212]).



thingness; and only in following through the theoretical does it have its ‘who’, i.e. merely ‘deducible’?!” (70 [89]). With respect to the KNS schema, the term process refers to the sphere named ‘object-like something.’ It is still motivated from the ‘worldly something,’ but its mode of accessing is such that the worldly loses its worldliness.

Thus, Heidegger distinguishes several different spheres in his analysis. As I have argued and will argue further, for him philosophy proper must reach the pre-worldly as the intentional moment which is dependent on the ‘genuine experiential world.’ That is, philosophy must find an access and the possibility of expressing the pre-worldly in the ‘worldly something’ regarded as environmental experience. That this is the case becomes clearer when looking at Heidegger’s considerations of method. However, before I turn to his positive account of the way of accessing the pre-worldly (or rather ways of accessing), the traditional approach needs to be considered once more. According to Heidegger, the gateway to philosophy is to be taken from environmental experience. Furthermore, through environmental experience he claims to resolve the central problem (the problem of circularity) of traditional philosophy. It is significant that the ‘genuine experiential world,’ within which worldview philosophy gains its meaning and in which the ‘object-like something’ is motivated (thus scientific philosophy has its motivation), is reconsidered as environmental experience by Heidegger. How does Heidegger sever the connection between philosophy and worldview on the basis of the re-established ‘worldly something’?

#### **2.3.4. Environmental experience versus objectifying theoretization**

Heidegger shows what it means to regard environmental experience as the passage for philosophy and exhibits his reasoning behind the claim to resolve the problems of the theoretical approach by accounting for the possible objections to lifting environmental experience to the foreground of philosophy. For he addresses the issue that if one takes the environmental experience as a gateway to philosophy, one cannot dismiss the problem of the presupposition of these experiences themselves (along with the presupposition of the givenness of the experience). The environmental experience as such is full of presuppositions. This traditionally raises the question “[d]oes my environing world really exist?” (61 [77]). Thus, Heidegger takes up a possible objection expressed in questioning the reality of the external world and the two possible solutions to the problem: critical realism and idealism. Who is correct, Aristotle or Kant, (61, 63 [78, 79]) Heidegger boldly asks, with the answer already at hand: neither of them.

According to Heidegger, both critical realism and critical-transcendental idealism are in agreement as regards the first givenness of the experience. What is primarily given are sensations, the data of sense [*Empfindungsdaten*], and everything is decided by the explanation of these sense data (63 [84]). The point of disagreement starts with the different questions which the two pose: “[c]ritical realism asks: how do I get out of the ‘subjective sphere’ of the sense data to knowledge of the external world?” (63 [80]) and “[c]ritical-transcendental idealism poses the problem: how, remaining within the ‘subjective sphere,’ do I arrive at objective knowledge?” (ibid.). Thus, both starting with the sense data, one goes in the direction of teaching “the possibility of knowing the things in themselves” (64 [82]) and the other proceeds with the sense data as data “only in so far as we are *conscious* of them” (64-65 [82]). As such, they are simply two different directions within the common sphere – in both cases the point of departure is taken from the givenness of the sense data and in both cases the way out is sought by theoretical means. They insist on the primacy of the theoretical without realizing this.<sup>69</sup>

In what sense are the givenness of the sense data and being theoretically oriented seen as problematic? According to Heidegger, this can be seen with reference to the environmental experience. Referring back to the experience of the lectern, he brings out that in the case of the lectern, what is seen immediately is the lectern, not sense data. To get to the sense data, one needs to strip the lectern of everything which makes it a lectern in order to get to something like the brownness of the lectern – one needs to make it an object for oneself. Furthermore, for the lectern to be *given*, the ‘historical I’ needs to be removed: “[g]ivenness’ signifies the initial objectifying infringement of the environment, its initial placement before the *still* historical ‘I’” (69 [89]). That is, it needs to be de-vivified, it needs to be brought into the theoretical attitude. The environmental experience, having already the character of world, does not allow the kind of isolation needed in the cases of both critical realism and idealism – both of which (contrary to their own view) not only do not have the *immediate* which they presume to have, but furthermore the immediate experience gets lost in them.<sup>70</sup> Heidegger’s solution is to turn the tables around. It is not that

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<sup>69</sup> At this time, Heidegger calls this explanation, which disfigures the environmental experience for the sake of theory, destruction: “[e]xplanation through dismemberment, i.e. destruction: one wants to explain something which one no longer has as such, which one cannot and will not recognize as such in its vitality” (67-68 [86]). It should be noted that Heidegger uses the notion of destruction here very differently than what destruction starts to signify later on in his early works, when phenomenological destruction assumes a specific meaning as a moment in phenomenological method.

<sup>70</sup> More specifically Heidegger explains this loss of the environmental in critical realism and idealism as follows: “[t]he incoherence of critical realism consists not just in its cancellation of the meaningful dimension

the theoretical way can explain the immediate experience, but rather the problem of the theoretical needs to be solved based on the environmental experience:

One of the most difficult problems is that of *transgressing the limits of environmental experience toward initial objectification*. This, and the problem of the theoretical as such, can only be solved by an understanding of environmental experience and its deeper problematic.” (71 [91])

In this way, seen from the environmental experience, the problems with which one has been struggling up till now are perhaps not problematic at all. In the environmental experience the problem situation for critical realism and idealism, that of the problem of the reality of the external world, turns out not to be really a problem: “[e]nvironmental experience for its part itself presupposes reality” (72 [92]). It is already valid, proven or not proven and thus the problem of the reality of the external world is seen as absurd in the light of the environmental experience: “[w]hen I attempt to explain the enviroing world theoretically, it collapses upon itself” (68 [86]). Furthermore, the whole problematic behind the struggle to find the ‘idea of philosophy as primordial science’ assumes a different meaning.

Heidegger started his search for the ‘idea of philosophy as primordial science’ by bringing out the problem of circularity, which somehow needed to be surmounted. Now (asking about the meaning of the presupposition of the reality in the environmental experience), he turns back to this starting point (the problem of the self-presupposition of the primordial sciences and the problem of circularity as an integral part of it) and turns it around: “[c]ircularity is an eminently theoretical phenomenon, it is really the most refined expression of a purely theoretical difficulty” (74 [95]). Thus, it is problematic only insofar as the theoretical has taken primacy. Instead, Heidegger now suggests: “[i]f the circle is to be superseded, then there must be a science that is pre-theoretical or supra-theoretical, at any rate non-theoretical, a genuinely *primordial* science from which the theoretical itself originates” (75 [96]). According to Heidegger, this science is ‘phenomenology as pre-theoretical primordial science.’ Phenomenology as the pre-theoretical primordial science somehow provides the access to (and the means to express) experience as such. How to access the pre-worldly is the question.

## 2.4. The problem of the method

The problem Heidegger is addressing in this lecture course is that of the nature of philosophy itself. Via various detours the problem of philosophy has taken the form of the

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of the enviroing world, in the fact that it does not and cannot see the dimension. Instead, it already comes armed with the theory and attempts to explain one being by another” (68 [86-87]); “What realism *cannot* see, idealism does not *want* to see, because it holds *stubbornly* to a *one-sided* goal. Critical idealism rests upon an unjustified absolutization of the theoretical” (68 [87]).

problem of method. Specifically, Heidegger finds the problem to concern the methodological apprehension of the lived experience as such, which is considered by taking the environmental experience into account (76 [98]).<sup>71</sup> In apprehending the lived experience methodologically there is a risk of falling back into a de-vivifying theoretization [*Theoretisierung*], which Heidegger has shown to fail in its attempts. Is there a possibility of avoiding such theoretization in the attempt to apprehend the lived experience? With respect to the KNS schema, one can read in Franz-Josef Brecht's transcripts of the lecture course: "[i]t is necessary to see the fundamental necessity for phenomenology: that the 'something in general' does not belong in the de-vivification process of theoretization [*Entlebensprozeß der Theoretisierung*], but rather in the primal phenomenological sphere" (163 [217]). How is this shown?

Previously, outlining the thematic field of philosophy, I claimed that for Heidegger the thematic field is articulated through the 'pre-theoretical something' in the schema. As I brought out, the 'pre-worldly something' is the basic character of life. It is the pure out-towards, which has a connection to or dependence on the 'worldly something.' This connection is to be understood as potentiality: the pre-worldly is potentially worldly. Philosophy according to Heidegger must reach the primal something (the pre-worldly) in its connection to the 'worldly something.' The question is how to access the pre-worldly without de-vivifying the experience. This how-question is the question of philosophical method. In this lecture course, in my opinion, Heidegger gives two different answers to this question and thus it is not surprising that we find two clearly distinct interpretations of Heidegger's method.

On the one hand, according to Heidegger, "[i]t [the 'something' as pre-worldly] is a basic phenomenon that can be experienced in understanding, e.g. in the living situation of gliding from one world of experience to another genuine life-world, or in moments of especially intensive life; not at all or seldom in those types of experiences that are firmly anchored in a world *without* reaching, precisely within this world, a much greater life-intensity" (88 [115]). That is to say, the access is to be found within the pre-theoretical sphere by diving into the environmental experience. It is in the very rhythm of life, in its motivated tendency and tending motivation (Heidegger's initial pair for what is to become the thrownness-project pair, as Kisiel (1995: 53-54) already pointed out) in which the pre-

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<sup>71</sup> "The basic problem is clear, namely the problem of the methodological apprehension of lived experience as such: how is a science of experience as such possible? We wish to decide this question by looking at how environmental experience is to be considered" (76 [98]).

worldly shows itself.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, in the last instance it seems that Heidegger is claiming that eventually the ‘pre-worldly something’ is only reached in the living situation, in the “sympathy with life” (84 [110])<sup>73</sup>. Is that what Heidegger means when he says: “[b]ut *philosophy* can progress only through an absolute sinking into life as such, for *phenomenology* is never concluded, only *preliminary*, it always sinks itself into the preliminary” (165 [220])? It seems so, because he goes on to say that “[t]he genuine insight, however, can only be arrived at through honest and uncompromising sinking into the genuineness of life as such, in the final event only through the genuineness of *personal life* as such” (ibid.).

On the other hand, however, the problem of accessing the pre-worldly comes down to the possibility of the connection between the ‘pre-worldly something’ and the ‘objective formal-logical something.’ Thus, Heidegger first makes a distinction within the theoretical. He claims that in order not to confuse the phenomenological attitude, a fundamental distinction must be made clear, namely that there are two fundamentally different kinds of the theoretical, as can be seen already from the KNS schema. From the de-vivifying theoretical a formal theoretization which is “*qualitatively* different” is to be distinguished (87 [114]). These two are the ‘object-like something’ and the ‘objective formal-logical something’ in the KNS schema.

Thus, on the one hand, there is a process of theoretization, in which there is no relation to a world-content: “[i]t is the absolutely worldless, world-foreign; it is the sphere which takes one’s breath away and where no one can live” (86 [112]). This process of theoretization proceeds in different levels of de-vivification. Heidegger brings out that these levels are restricted to particular spheres in which it is possible on every different level to make a judgment: ‘it is something’ (as it is said in the schema: the ‘object-like something’ is motivated in the ‘genuine experiential world’). Thus, in the case of the lectern, one can say “it is brown; brown is a color; color is a genuine sense datum” (86 [113]). These kinds of theoretizations (Heidegger uses the plural here) he calls “*the specific level-boundedness of the steps in the process of de-vivification*” (87 [114]).

On the other hand, Heidegger now claims that there is a different kind of theoretization: formal theoretization. Formal theoretization is seen as not belonging to the

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<sup>72</sup> According to Heidegger, “[l]ife is in itself motivated and tendential: motivating tendency, tending motivation” (163 [218]).

<sup>73</sup> Heidegger also uses the term ‘sympathy’ in explaining Husserl’s principle of principle, saying that “it expresses the fundamental life-stance of phenomenology: the sympathy of experience with life!” (162 [216]).

de-vivification process, because it is free from *level-boundedness* – it is not bound to specific steps and levels in the process of de-vivification, not bound to dualistic approaches. Furthermore, Heidegger claims that “its motivational origin from life is qualitatively and essentially different” (87 [114]). It is different, since there is no need for motivation on specific levels of theoretization. Rather, Heidegger seems to suggest that it reaches ‘the experienceable as such’ (88 [115]). Formal theoretization is motivated in the ‘pre-worldly something’ as the pure out-towards, which has a connection to or dependence on the ‘worldly something.’

Thus, it seems that Heidegger pushes towards a philosophy in which the question of access is put forward in terms of intensified experience. The access to the pre-worldly is to be reached in certain situations in genuineness of life. In this case he avoids theoretization and, with respect to the KNS schema, stays within the sphere of the pre-theoretical something. Then again, he also seems to want to hold on to the idea that philosophy must be understood as a kind of science – it should be a pre-theoretical science. Therefore, his solution to the access question as presented in the KNS schema lies in formalization (the ‘formal-logical something’). For the access to the pre-worldly a form of the theoretical which does not de-vivify the experience should be sought. What to think of these two possibilities?

Up to this day the question of what to make of Heidegger’s method is one of the most widely debated issues among the interpreters of Heidegger. Within this debate two main approaches can be distinguished. There are those according to whom Heidegger’s approach is radically historical and his methodology proceeds through hermeneutics and destruction of our pre-understanding. But there are also those who would claim that Heidegger is a transcendental phenomenologist and methodologically follows Husserl. In this respect, the distinction between the two standpoints can be articulated in terms of the question of Heidegger’s methodological closeness to Husserl. As such, the disagreement in these debates, which mostly do not revolve around the interpretation of Heidegger’s earliest lecture courses, has been traced back to his KNS lecture course and to his thematization of Paul Natorp’s criticism of phenomenology.<sup>74</sup> The views on Heidegger’s stance towards

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<sup>74</sup> In this lecture course Heidegger addresses Paul Natorp’s criticism directed against two aspects of phenomenological method: reflection and description (77-85 [99-112]). The problem with reflection is that the experiences are brought out from the living stream, out of immediacy and placed in front of us as objects to be reflected on. This means that in reflection one is theoretically oriented and the stream of lived experiences is ‘stilled’ (78 [101-102]). Description faces a similar charge: since description proceeds through concepts, which means that it falls under generalization, it not only is dependent on but also presupposes a

Natorp's criticism diverge in the same way as the overall views on his method. Heidegger is either seen as dismissing Natorp's criticism – in this view his methodological considerations are a continuance of Husserl's method of reflective intuition (admittedly in such a way that one or another aspect of it is developed further) – or he is seen to break free from Husserl and to take a different path, one which surmounts Natorp's objections.

In this debate Theodore Kisiel, for example, holds that Heidegger distances himself from Husserl's phenomenology. According to Kisiel (1995: 48-50, 55), Heidegger takes Natorp's criticism (immediate experience is inaccessible and inexpressible) seriously and rejects phenomenology's attempts to grasp the primal something (the pre-worldly), whereas the aim to grasp it methodologically would inevitably lead to theoretization. Kisiel states that Heidegger responds to the objections with understanding as a non-intuitive form of access and formal indication as non-objectifying conceptualization. That is, with the hermeneutical understanding which follows life, Heidegger points to "a certain familiarity which life already has to itself and which phenomenology needs only to repeat" within the stream of life without disturbing it (op. cit.: 48). In interpreting Heidegger's KNS lecture course, Kisiel thus says:

Philosophy is accordingly an orienting comportment (*Verhalten*), a praxis of striving, and a protreptic encouraging such a striving. Its expressions are only "formal indications" which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves. [...] In short philosophy is more a form of life on the edge of expression rather than a science. (Kisiel 1995: 59)

As could be expected, Kisiel also dismisses the relevance of formal objectification for Heidegger: "[d]espite Heidegger's effort to revive it, formal objectification is finally still unliving in its rigid duality of the subject over against the object, which must be dismantled and revived by the unified relation of motive to tendency, which is at the 'heart' of the intentional movement here" (op. cit.: 53).

An opposing view to Kisiel's can be found in Søren Overgaard's interpretation. Overgaard, to my knowledge, does not explicitly thematize Heidegger's stance towards Natorp's criticism, but he clearly represents the opposing pole in the debate over Heidegger's method. Although Overgaard (2003: 169) points out significant differences between Heidegger and Husserl,<sup>75</sup> he insists that with respect to method Heidegger is "to a

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theory. Thus, one must conclude that theoretization is unavoidable if an experience is to be made into an object of science and therefore there is no immediate apprehension of experience (78 [101]). This Natorpian criticism can be seen as the starting point of the disagreement between the two main approaches to Heidegger's method insofar as the two lines of interpretation diverge from each other in their opinion on whether Heidegger takes this criticism seriously.

<sup>75</sup> With respect to Heidegger's differences from Husserl, Overgaard (2003: 159-166) shows how Heidegger is able to resist "layer ontology" more consistently than Husserl by articulating the mode of being of things we

great extent a follower of Husserl.” According to Overgaard, Heidegger’s work is dependent first and foremost on intentionality. Especially he is indebted to Husserl’s insight into how phenomenology thematizes the objects of the intentional acts and these acts themselves: not by turning to natural objects, but to how they are intended – which requires a different approach to entities (op. cit.: 167-168). There must be a special way of accessing entities. In this respect, Overgaard argues further that Heidegger works within the framework of Husserl’s epochē, which he describes as a procedure by which ‘natural’ knowledge is prevented from entering phenomenological work and which at the same time makes a phenomenological thematization of entities possible (“the entity in the How of its being-encountered”) (op. cit.: 169-170). Furthermore, according to Overgaard’s interpretation, for Heidegger this kind of access makes phenomenological research possible (op. cit.: 168). All in all, Overgaard claims that Heidegger’s critique of Husserl is internal critique – Heidegger does not put forward a different phenomenology, but develops it further. The most significant development of phenomenology in Heidegger lies in his attention to expressions, which is brought out by the term ‘formal indication’ and what Overgaard calls the second ‘epochē-like’ move (op. cit.: 170-171).

Certainly, in between these two approaches one can find many interpretations which lean to one or another side to a different degree. Among them, siding more with Overgaard, Steven Galt Crowell (2001: 4-5), for example, argues that although in many respects Heidegger develops Husserl’s account further, Heidegger is still profoundly indebted to Husserl. In his review of Kisiel’s *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Crowell criticizes Kisiel for his lack of attention to Heidegger’s relation to Husserl, insofar as it leads to an underdeveloped interpretation of Heidegger’s method. Arguing against Kisiel’s interpretation, Crowell asserts that there is a distinction between simply following life and grasping it. Philosophy aims to clarify lived life. Crowell argues that “Heidegger all along follows Husserl’s view that philosophical cognition, phenomenology, is not objective theory but ‘clarification,’ a kind of comportment that works by methodologically exploiting the ‘turning back upon itself’ implicit in life’s own course” (Crowell 1995: 445, 2001: 126). This insight of Crowell’s that philosophy aims to clarify the living of life leads me back to Heidegger’s two different accounts of method found in his KNS lecture course.

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encounter as “readiness to hand.” Also, Overgaard shows how Heidegger, by paying more attention to terminology, is able to articulate “subjectivity” (with Dasein as a formally indicated concept) more adequately than Husserl.



I would suggest that Heidegger himself gives a ground for both of the main lines of interpretation of his method mentioned above (all of which are well argued as well as textually supported). In the same way that Heidegger once gave an opportunity to Löwith and Becker to have their distinct approaches to his philosophy, he paved the way for two quite distinct interpretations of his method. This can be seen already in the two descriptions of the ways of accessing the pre-worldly found in the KNS lecture course. The question here is not that of choosing between either/or. Rather, both of them are presented by Heidegger. He indeed describes two different ways of accessing. One, which is to be found in the living situation itself (in lived experience), and the other, which serves the purpose of philosophical “clarification” and can be seen as following Husserl to a great extent.

In our lecture course, Heidegger does not develop either of the two described ways of accessing the pre-worldly much further. However, as I aim to show in the following chapters, Heidegger takes up both of the directions, which allows me to claim that in this lecture course only the two-directional *task* is presented. As I intend to demonstrate, Heidegger balances between these two tasks throughout his first Freiburg period and thus also articulates the proper access sought in philosophy in two different ways. The final testimony to Heidegger’s struggle between two different angles is found in the lecture course *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, where Heidegger articulates his hermeneutics of facticity as self-understanding of facticity (which can be seen as addressing the access found in the living situation) and at the same time distinguishes it from philosophy (mode of access with which philosophical investigation must proceed in order not to de-vivify the experience).

With respect to Kierkegaard’s place in Heidegger’s first Freiburg lecture courses, the distinction between the two modes of access will prove to be significant. Furthermore, I claim that Heidegger’s controversial judgments of Kierkegaard finally make sense only when one recognizes the distinction between finding an access in the living situation and establishing it through specific philosophical investigation. As I will show, Heidegger focuses on Kierkegaard very intently when he addresses the issue of the possibilities of reaching the pre-worldly in the living situation (thus rightly recognizing his debt to Kierkegaard). However, he mostly dismisses Kierkegaard when considering how one must proceed in philosophical investigation, to the point of dismissing Kierkegaard as a philosopher (GA 63: 25 [30]). Before I reach this point, I turn to Heidegger’s following

lecture courses in order to show that Heidegger indeed takes up two different tasks and how he does this.

## 2.5. Conclusion

I began this chapter with the claim that in the lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* Heidegger sets the tasks for his search in a manner which leads him to articulate philosophy in two different ways. My aim was to underpin this claim by unraveling Heidegger's KNS schema, which summarizes the story of this lecture course.

In this lecture course, Heidegger claims to re-establish philosophy by overthrowing the traditional understanding of philosophy determined here as worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy. With respect to the KNS schema, the first of these operates within a 'definite experiential sphere' – a sphere which is misconstrued in the worldview and which Heidegger re-establishes under the term 'environmental experience.' The other one works within the sphere named the 'object-like something,' which is 'motivated in the genuine experiential world,' but de-vivifies this genuine world through its objectifying stance. Instead of these two unfortunate approaches of and to philosophy, Heidegger suggests that philosophy must turn towards the 'pre-worldly something' as its theme. Insofar as the 'pre-worldly something' is a 'fundamental moment of life as such,' that is, is always a moment of the 'worldly something' (understood as environmental experience), the thematic field of philosophy becomes 'the pre-theoretical something' in the KNS schema. Now philosophy must find a way to access and express the 'pre-worldly something' as the moment of the 'worldly something.'

The problem of how Heidegger approaches the question of access has been the subject of debates among interpreters of Heidegger. I have claimed that Heidegger gives two different accounts of how the access to the pre-worldly must be established and thus paves a way for both main sides of the debate. On the one hand, philosophy should remain in 'the pre-theoretical' sphere and thus find an access to the pre-worldly within the 'genuine experiential world,' that is, in lived life. On the other hand, philosophy should find a method for accessing and expressing the pre-worldly. In this case, philosophy would be a theoretical approach (the 'objective formal-logical something'), but an approach which does not de-vivify the experience. Rather, it is 'motivated in the primal something.' Philosophy here is an investigation in accordance with a methodology which must be established.

In our lecture course, these directions are presented only as tasks: as directions which philosophy must take up. In the following two chapters I will show that Heidegger takes up both of these tasks in his subsequent lecture courses and elucidate how he does this. First, he develops the access which belongs to the ‘pre-theoretical’ sphere and is called ‘the intensifying-concentration upon the self-world.’ After that, he will focus on the second kind of approach by articulating three methodological moments of phenomenology. With respect to Kierkegaard’s place in Heidegger’s lecture courses, the two-sided consideration of the question of access becomes significant. As I will seek to show, Kierkegaard has importance for Heidegger within the first of these directions. He will become one of the central sources for finding an access to the pre-worldly in lived life: the one who, according to Heidegger himself, has given “impulses” to him (GA 63: 4 [5]). However, Heidegger also articulates a strict method for accessing and expressing the pre-worldly – a method for “clarification,” as Crowell has acutely expressed it. Insofar as philosophy is this kind of investigation for Heidegger, Kierkegaard for him stands outside of philosophy, (25 [30]) and rather indeed Husserl has “opened [Heidegger’s] eyes” (4 [5]).

