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1. Considering Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard

1.1. Introduction

Whenever the subject of the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard comes up, a peculiar situation emerges. On the one hand, there is a shared opinion that Heidegger is greatly indebted to Kierkegaard, a view supported by Heidegger's own admissions. On the other hand, again going back to Heidegger himself, there seems to be no clarity on the extent of this indebtedness or even on where this debt exactly lies. This ambiguity concerning Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard reaches a point where his silence about Kierkegaard has become notorious and problematic in itself.

Research into the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard has mainly taken its point of departure from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and his subsequent writings. However, the opportunity to access Heidegger's earliest lecture courses has opened up the possibility of looking afresh at the relation. Taking up this possibility is the task of the present research. The theme of this research is Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period. But what is meant by Heidegger's first Freiburg period and how should we consider Kierkegaard's place in it?

In this chapter, I unfold the issues involved in the two angles of the theme addressed by the present thesis. First, I outline what is meant by Heidegger's first Freiburg period. Then, I concentrate on the problem of the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard – first I touch upon the publication history of Kierkegaard's works in Germany, second I show Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's writing, and finally I outline how this presence is interpreted in the secondary sources. As will be shown, Heidegger's stance toward Kierkegaard is quite ambiguous and considering Heidegger in relation to Kierkegaard is a task with a number of problems. In this chapter, my aim is not to resolve the issues concerning Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard. Rather, I aim to highlight the relational problem itself and thereby obtain clear outlines for the approach taken in this thesis.

1.2. Martin Heidegger's first Freiburg period

My aim is to elucidate Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy as it begins to emerge within Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. But what does it mean to

talk about Heidegger's first Freiburg period? In the present thesis, I consider Heidegger's first Freiburg period to be the period between the years 1919 and 1923. This is the period of his earliest available lecture courses as a *privatdocent* at the University of Freiburg – a period starting from the time when he made a turn to what can be called his own philosophy until his lecture course entitled *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity* (summer semester 1923) in which he articulates directly for the first time his hermeneutics of facticity. Delimiting a period in Heidegger's philosophy in this manner is somewhat artificial and highly relative, although there are reasons for doing so. In addition, my naming of this period is somewhat unconventional – I call Heidegger's path during this period a path of rethinking philosophy.

Traditionally, Heidegger's legacy has been divided into two or three periods. In both cases, with the point of departure in Heidegger's earliest period, the emphasis is usually put on Heidegger's so-called "turn" (*die Kehre*), which is interpreted as a shift in Heidegger's thought in the 1930s.⁵ Heidegger's philosophy before the turn centers around his *magnum opus Sein und Zeit* (1927) and is known as the period of the 'early Heidegger.' With the publication of Heidegger's writings preceding *Sein und Zeit*, this manner of periodizing can be called into question. There is reason to talk about a classification within Heidegger's earliest writings starting from his student years up to the year 1919, his first Freiburg lecture courses (1919-1923), and the Marburg period lecture courses (1923-1927). This last period ends with Heidegger's first major publication *Sein und Zeit* followed by his return to the University of Freiburg as a professor of philosophy, where he took over the chair of philosophy from Edmund Husserl.

Heidegger's written legacy goes back to his theological studies at the University of Freiburg.⁶ During his earliest years, Heidegger's education was dedicated to preparations for becoming a Catholic (later Jesuit) priest. Thus, as a natural progression, when Heidegger entered the University of Freiburg in 1909, he took up the study of theology. However, after four semesters, in the middle of 1911, he left his theological studies (or rather: the

⁵ About the misinterpretation and confusion over Heidegger's *Kehre*, see Thomas Sheehan 2000 and 2010.

⁶ A detailed overview of Heidegger's school years along with a thorough overview of Heidegger's studies and reading at the time can be found in Sheehan's article "Heidegger's *Lehrjahre*". In the article Sheehan, in commenting on Heidegger's CV from 1915, divides Heidegger's school years as follows (Sheehan 1988: 82):
 I. 1895 to 1909, age 6-19: Grammar school and high school, culminating in the baccalaureate.
 II. 1909 to 1911, age 20-21: First phase of higher education: Theological studies at Freiburg University.
 III. 1911 to 1913, age 22-23: Second phase of higher education: Study of mathematics, natural sciences, and philosophy at Freiburg University, culminating in the inaugural dissertation and the Ph.D. in philosophy.
 IV. 1913 to 1915, age 22-25: Preparation of the qualifying dissertation for the *Habilitation* at Freiburg University."

department of theology) at the University of Freiburg and turned to the study of philosophy. During the second part of his university studies, Heidegger's main interest is neo-Kantian philosophy, together with transcendental value-philosophy (Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask) (Kisiel 1995: 18). Transcendental-value philosophy, which emerges in the earliest published lecture courses as his constant object of criticism, is initially Heidegger's breeding ground, with its highpoint of influence being reached in his post-doctoral work (Kisiel 1995: 25). A second important source is Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Heidegger already starts to read Husserl during his theological studies at the University of Freiburg, makes his acquaintance in 1916 and consequently becomes his assistant in 1919 (until 1923). Husserl, who can be considered the greatest influence on Heidegger, is, at the same time, from the very beginning, the main partner for dialogue and the opponent to be attacked.

By the year 1919, there is a radical change in Heidegger's views. He both breaks with the Catholic Church and starts to distance himself from the views of his teachers in philosophy. On 9th of January 1919, Heidegger sends a letter to Engelbert Krebs in which he expresses his devotion to philosophy and with reference to his philosophical insights renounces "the *system* of Catholicism": "[e]pistemological insights that extend to the theory of historical knowledge have made the *system* of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me – but not Christianity and metaphysics, which, however, [I now understand] in a new sense." At the same time, Heidegger adds: "even though I have transformed my basic standpoint, I have refused to be dragged into abandoning my objective high opinion and regard for the Catholic lifeworld or into mouthing the vacuous polemics of an embittered apostate" ("Letter to Engelbert Krebs on His Philosophical Conversion": 96).

The change in Heidegger's religious convictions echoes the change taking place in his understanding of philosophy. He turns to criticize both the neo-Kantian tradition as well as Husserl.⁷ He ventures on a path which is widely accepted as a breakthrough in his thinking towards a philosophy which may be said to be his own. Thus, for example, Dorothea Frede, although acknowledging the important thoughts developed during the student years, describes Heidegger's first major works as nothing out of the ordinary:

⁷ While Heidegger's relation to Husserl unfolds in problematic steps, his relation to the neo-Kantian tradition is demarcated more clearly. He starts to distance himself from the neo-Kantian tradition by 1917 and ultimately makes his break with their views clearly known in 1919 when holding the lecture course *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Values* [*Phänomenologie und Transzendente Wertphilosophie*], where Heidegger says that he aims at a "*phenomenological critique* of transcendental philosophy of values" (GA 56/57: 97 [127]).

His early work, if not actually dull, is at least rather conventional and must look at first blush as of historical interest at best. Neither his thesis, “The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism” (1913), nor his monograph, *The Theory of Categories and Meaning of Duns Scotus* (1915), would seem to promise great originality, let alone revolutionary thinking. Had Heidegger done no more, he would rightly have vanished without a trace in the archives. (Frede 2006: 46)⁸

Historically perhaps interesting, but nothing more – a devastating assessment at first sight. However, it is to be agreed with insofar as the ground of Frede’s assessment lies in the search for Heidegger as a philosopher in his own right. This breakthrough has been traced to his 1919 lecture courses. It marks Heidegger’s embarkment on his own philosophical course, or as Kovacs puts it: from the texts of 1919 the readers can see “the emergence of Heidegger’s own philosophy” (Kovacs 1994: 92-93).⁹ It is widely accepted that Heidegger takes up a path of his own in his KNS (*Kriegsnotsemester*, War Emergency Semester) lecture course. Similarly, it is often accepted that this breakthrough can be seen as a breakthrough towards *Sein und Zeit*. Thus, for example in his *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Theodore Kisiel asks: “[w]here does BT really begin?,” and answers: “[i]t all began in KNS 1919, in the upshot of the effort ‘to go all out after the factic’ by finding a method to approach it” (Kisiel 1995: 21). With this view, common to both Frede and Kisiel among many others, Heidegger’s earlier writings (those from 1919) assume importance as the development towards *Sein und Zeit*. Often this means simultaneously that Heidegger is considered to be engaged with one central question throughout his early period.¹⁰

A somewhat opposing view to the previous one is expressed by John van Buren,¹¹ who says in his article “The young Heidegger and phenomenology”:

I would thus like to present a re-constructive reading of his youthful phenomenological apprenticeship between the years 1919 and 1926. More specifically, I want to argue, first, that his [Heidegger’s] youthful, phenomenological *Denkweg* in the early twenties is a unique period in his development and thus cannot be absorbed into either his *Being and Time* or his later writings, as he himself and others have attempted to do; second, I want to argue further that the young Heidegger had already worked out the themes of the “question of being,” the “turn,” the “end of philosophy,” and the “other beginning,”

⁸ The original titles of the mentioned thesis and habilitation (teaching qualification dissertation) are: *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* and *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik* (both in GA 1).

⁹ The texts to which Kovacs is referring to are Heidegger’s lecture courses gathered in Heidegger’s GA 56/57.

¹⁰ Thus, for example, Jeff Malpas periodizes Heidegger’s thought around the central subject of Being as follows: 1) the early period, which is centered on the “meaning of being” (1910s and 1920s), 2) the middle period, which is centered around the “truth of being” (1930s and 1940s), 3) the late period, where the “place of being” comes to the fore (from mid-1940s onward) (Malpas 2006: 2-3). Kisiel puts the beginning of the so-called early Heidegger in 1919 (until 1929), as distinct from the so-called young Heidegger (1909-1919) (Kisiel 1995: xiii).

¹¹ The conviction that Heidegger’s early writings have a distinct meaning is repeated by Van Buren again and again. Thus, in “The Earliest Heidegger: A New Field of Research,” John van Buren starts by saying: “[t]he rediscovery of the earliest Heidegger, made possible by the recent publication of his hitherto virtually forgotten writings before his 1927 *Being and Time*, has today led to a new field of Heidegger scholarship and changed the whole face of Heidegger studies. We now understand this thinker much differently than we did a decade ago.” (Van Buren 2006: 19)

of which the last-mentioned are often thought to belong exclusively to his later period after 1930; [...] On the whole, I wish to show that, in allowing us to see all this, his youthful lecture courses offer a new and more adequate way of reading and appropriating his entire thought. (Van Buren 1990: 239-240)

Like Kisiel and Frede above, Van Buren agrees that Heidegger's first Freiburg period is a period of a development – it is a path.¹² However, in opposition to the previous accounts, Van Buren expresses a conviction that when we are talking about the earliest Heidegger we have a distinct period on our hands – a period which at the same time offers much towards an understanding of Heidegger's later writings.

In my reading of Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses I tend to agree to a certain extent with both aforementioned views. On the one hand, and especially with the focus on Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's early lecture courses (but not limited to this focus), it can be clearly shown that the period under question has distinctive features and at the same time offers many possibilities for a better understanding of what is found in Heidegger's later writings. On the other hand, because it is a period of development, it can be considered a path towards a destination. However, it can be also seen as a path developing from somewhere. This is how I will approach Heidegger's first Freiburg period: as a path in its own right on to which Heidegger steps in his 1919 lecture courses. I will call this path a path of rethinking philosophy.

To call Heidegger's first Freiburg period a path of rethinking philosophy is somewhat controversial. One could easily claim that Heidegger's main concern at the time was facticity or even (the meaning of) being. Thus, Theodore Kisiel, arguing that Heidegger's path during the first Freiburg period was a path towards *Sein und Zeit*, says:

It all began in KNS 1919, in the upshot of the effort "to go all out after factic" by finding a method to approach it. The breakthrough to the topic is a double play of matter and method, What and How, drawn to a point where they are one and the same: a hermeneutic of facticity. (Kisiel 1995: 21)

With the claim that Heidegger's first Freiburg period is a path of rethinking philosophy, I do not aim to lessen the importance of the question of facticity. To a certain extent Kisiel's words, which stress the continuity of the path towards *Sein und Zeit*, illustrate perfectly Heidegger's whole path during his first Freiburg period. Throughout this path, Heidegger is aiming to find a proper access to his thematic field and by the end of his first Freiburg period he reaches a hermeneutics of facticity. By calling this path a path of rethinking philosophy, I want to bring out the peculiarity of Heidegger's first Freiburg period, namely that Heidegger's consideration unfolds through an explicit turn to the question of

¹² The consideration of Heidegger's earliest thinking as a way or a path stems from Otto Pöggeler and is widely accepted (see Pöggeler 1990 [1963]: 2-3 [8-11]).

philosophy. This question is rethought in each lecture course, in which philosophy is articulated as pre-theoretical primal science, as original science of life in itself, as phenomenological ontology and finally as hermeneutics of facticity, which is then said not to be philosophy at all. Furthermore, by stressing this explicitly addressed question, I wish to highlight that Heidegger's rethinking of philosophy unfolds in two directions insofar as proper access is sought. In this respect philosophy is also regarded as intensifying concentration and as repetition. In addition, if we see Heidegger's first Freiburg period as a path of rethinking philosophy, which from his 1919 lecture course is led by him into a two-directional path, this enables us to show where and how Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard and makes use of the latter's writings available to him.

1.3. Availability of Kierkegaard's writings (and secondary sources on Kierkegaard) to Heidegger

From Heidegger's own words, we know that he already started to read Kierkegaard's works during his student years between 1910 and 1914.¹³ By that time Heidegger could access a noteworthy part of Kierkegaard's writings translated into German. The translation of Kierkegaard's works into the German language already started in 1861 (Himmelstrup 1962: 25) and before the turn of the century a considerable number of Kierkegaard's writings had been translated.¹⁴ Heidegger's theological background plays an important part in his acquaintance with Kierkegaard, as at the time mainly theologians knew and read Kierkegaard's translated works.¹⁵ With respect to Heidegger's access to Kierkegaard's writings translated into German, the work of Christopher Schrempf and Theodore Haecker [Häcker] have central importance.

The real breakthrough in Kierkegaard becoming more broadly known in Germany took place when Kierkegaard's collected works in twelve volumes (consisting of fifteen

¹³ Thus, Heidegger himself places his reading of Kierkegaard at the time of his school years in Freiburg: "[w]hat the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequately expressed. I can only indicate it by a selective enumeration: the second edition of Nietzsche's *Wille zur Macht*, [reprinted with scholarly notes in 1911], expanded to twice the size of the original [1906] edition; the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in translation; my awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling; Rilke's works and Trakl's poems; Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften* [1914ff.]" (GA 1: [x], translation with remarks from Sheehan 1988: 97-98)

¹⁴ Thus, already before the turn of the century most of Kierkegaard's so-called edifying discourses (and not only edifying writings) were translated separately by Albert Bärthold (see Himmelstrup 1962: 25-28). How many of them were known to Heidegger, if any, has not come to my attention so far.

¹⁵ The wider publication in the sphere of theological studies (taking into account both Kierkegaard's own works and commentaries on his works) can be clearly traced in Himmelstrup's *Kierkegaard International Bibliography* (Himmelstrup 1962: 25-28, 111ff.).

writings) were published during 1909-1922.¹⁶ Although the translations of the Schrempf collection are considered to be highly questionable by current standards, to put it mildly, this collection, nevertheless, made Kierkegaard accessible for German readers.¹⁷ Before the publication of these works, Kierkegaard was hardly known in Germany. In connection with the present study, the importance of these works lay not only in the fact that Kierkegaard was introduced to German readers, but also in the fact that these collected works, mostly translated by Schrempf himself, are the ones which Heidegger mainly refers to in his lecture courses when he is indicating Kierkegaard's primary text. Thus, during his first Freiburg period Heidegger quotes the Schrempf edition (not all translated by Schrempf) of Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*, *Practice in Christianity* (both in GA 61), *The Sickness unto Death*, and *The Concept of Anxiety* (both in GA 60).¹⁸ Also, he quotes Schrempf's and Dorner's translation of Kierkegaard's "*The Single Individual*": *Two "Notes" Concerning My Work As An Author* [entitled in German "*Der Einzelne*", *zwei Bemerkungen zu meiner Schriftstellerischen Thätigkeit*] from the collection of Kierkegaard's later writings *Kierkegaards Angriff auf die Christenheit* ('*Kierkegaard's Attack upon Christendom*')¹⁹ (in GA 63).

In addition to Christoph Schrempf's work, a significant role in connection with Heidegger's reading of Kierkegaard was played by Theodore Haecker [Häcker].²⁰ It is known that Heidegger had access to Theodor Haecker's translations of Kierkegaard's works, which started to appear in 1914 in *Der Brenner* – an Austrian periodical of which Heidegger had been a subscriber since 1911 (Janik 1984: 220). Via Haecker's translations Heidegger had access to, for example, Kierkegaard's journals, which he quotes in his

¹⁶ Søren Kierkegaard: *Gesammelte Werke*, vols. 1-12. Ed. by Christoph Schrempf. Jena: Diederichs, 1909-1922. The collected works had appeared almost completely by 1914 (except for two volumes, the tenth and the eleventh).

¹⁷ Referring to the words of Hannah Arendt and Paul Tillich, Marcia Morgan has stated that in the 1880s Kierkegaard was all but unknown in Germany. In addition, she has pointed out the inadequacy of the translations by Christoph Schrempf by referring to Kiefhaber's words: "[g]rave deficiencies of the Schrempf and Gottsched edition lay, above all, in Kierkegaard's difficult philosophical texts and short works. It is therefore no surprise that, as already mentioned, this edition received little attention in the early reception and research. The translators were obviously overwhelmed by the deft syntax of Kierkegaardian dialectic, such that they made fairly considerable abridgements and inserted chance formulations (Kiefhaber, 26. [Martin Kiefhaber, *Christentum als Korrektiv*, Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald Verlag, 1997, 26])." (Morgan 2003: 2) Similarly, according to Adam Buben, "Schrempf is notorious for his inaccurate translations and interpretations" (Buben 2011: 167-251).

¹⁸ Entitled in German: *Entweder/Oder, Einübung im Christentum, Die Krankheit zum Tode, Der Begriff der Angst*.

¹⁹ The collection has been partly translated by Walter Lowrie. However, Lowrie's collection entitled *Kierkegaard's Attack upon Christendom* does not include Kierkegaard's "The Single Individual."

²⁰ About Theodore Haecker's role in translating Kierkegaard into the German language, see also Markus Kleinert (2013: 91-114) and Gerhard Thonhauser (2014: 331-334).

lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity* (GA 63: 13 [16-17]). Additionally, through *Der Brenner* he had access to Kierkegaard's *Kritik der Gegenwart* ('*Critique of the Presence*,' published for the first time in July 1914 in *Der Brenner* and consists of the translation of parts of Kierkegaard's *A Literary Review*).

In the 1950s, the second published collected works of Kierkegaard's writings by Emanuel Hirsch took over the position of Schrempf's collection. As with Schrempf's edition before him, Hirsch's translations were considered to be the most reliable source of Kierkegaard's translations for a certain period of time. Note that this estimation has long been re-evaluated by now. These early translations are considered to be of dubious value. Since Hirsch's first translation of Kierkegaard's text "To Need God Is a Human Being's Highest Perfection" (entitled in German *Gottes bedürfen ist des Menschen höchste Vollkommenheit*) was published in 1923 (Wilke 2012: 164), his translations do not play any role for this present study. Nevertheless, Emanuel Hirsch was the leading Kierkegaard scholar of his time and played an important role in making Kierkegaard known in Germany (especially) amongst theologians, even before his translations were published. It is important to notice that together with Kierkegaard's own works, Heidegger would have had access to secondary literature about Kierkegaard, where it can be assumed that Heidegger's background in theological studies made the secondary studies on Kierkegaard more familiar for him.

On the philosophical side it can be said that Heidegger himself, besides Karl Jaspers, was the central figure in bringing Kierkegaard into the philosophical discourse in Germany at the beginning of the century. At the same time, Heidegger was already influenced in his reading of Kierkegaard by Jasper's work. The fact that Heidegger was not only familiar with but also intensively worked through Jaspers's view of Kierkegaard becomes apparent from Heidegger's review of Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* [*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*],²¹ in which Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard on four different occasions (JR: 78-79, 90, 100, 101 [10-11, 27, 40, 41]).²²

²¹ For more about Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard through Jaspers's work, see Vincent McCarthy 2011.

²² In the review of Karl Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews*, Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard on four different occasions. On each occasion, it may be presumed, Heidegger is dealing with Jaspers's approach to Kierkegaard. In doing so, Heidegger criticizes Jaspers's understanding of Kierkegaard. Thus, for example, Heidegger comments on Jasper's stance towards Kierkegaard by saying: "[t]hrough a student of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Jaspers displays in this section a very rare talent and energy, giving these free play in his breakdown and treatment of 'psychical state' and compiling the respective phenomena in a valuable, even if only classificatory, manner" (JR: 78-79 [11]).

1.4. Kierkegaard's overall presence in Heidegger's writings

Although Kierkegaard's works in German at the time were of dubious quality by current standards, it is clear that Heidegger had access to and made use of this access to Kierkegaard's writings. That Heidegger intensively read Kierkegaard's books accessible to him in the German language becomes mainly clear through the short but nevertheless numerous remarks he makes on Kierkegaard throughout his works. However, Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's writings can be found in different forms. I distinguish three forms of Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's writings:²³ 1) one longer treatment of a part of Kierkegaard's philosophy, 2) short remarks in which Heidegger gives an estimation of Kierkegaard or mentions him (by name or through quotation), 3) Kierkegaard's presence in philosophical and methodological structures, motives, and attitudes which are recognizably similar to Kierkegaard's philosophy or reducible to it (further named as the level of motives or structures).

Throughout his works, Heidegger explicitly takes up Kierkegaard in only one longer treatment. That is, in *Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus* ('*Metaphysics of German Idealism*' GA 49: 19-75) from 1941, there are two sections in which Heidegger talks about Kierkegaard: *Der Existenzbegriff Kierkegaards* ('*Kierkegaard's concept of Existence*,' § 10) and *Kierkegaard, "Existenzphilosophie" und "Sein und Zeit"* (1927) ('*Kierkegaard, "Philosophy of Existence" and "Being and Time"*,' § 11). This longer thematization of Kierkegaard by Heidegger is both noteworthy and dubious at the same time.

Heidegger's longer treatment of Kierkegaard is noteworthy and exceptional with respect to Heidegger's general and notorious silence concerning Kierkegaard throughout his life. The situation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that in his contribution to a conference dedicated to the 150th anniversary of Kierkegaard's birth ("Kierkegaard vivant," held in Paris in 1964), which bears the title "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" [*Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens*], Heidegger does not even mention Kierkegaard's name. This situation, where Kierkegaard seems to be present somewhere in the background, without Heidegger explicitly mentioning him, is paradigmatic of Heidegger's treatment of Kierkegaard. Furthermore, on the occasions when Heidegger does explicitly mention Kierkegaard, he tends to leave much room for interpretation or even presents his estimations of Kierkegaard in such a way that his words become questionable.

²³ For this distinction I have previously argued in Kustassoo 2008.

It is well known that in those brief moments where Heidegger does mention Kierkegaard in his writings, he does so in a highly controversial way. On the one hand, Heidegger seems to have a great appreciation of Kierkegaard. On the other hand, he is quite reluctant to acknowledge Kierkegaard's influence on his work in general. Rather, he seems to emphasize strongly the difference between himself and Kierkegaard, who for him is not a thinker, but a "religious writer" (GA 5: 186 [249]). Thus, according to Heidegger, although Kierkegaard in his analysis of anxiety "has gone farthest," he nevertheless only stays within the "theological context of a 'psychological' exposition of the problem of original sin" (SuZ: 492 n. iv [190 n. 1]), and although Kierkegaard "has seen the *existentiell* phenomenon of the moment of vision with the most penetration," he nevertheless "clings to the ordinary concept of time" (SuZ: 497 n. iii [338 n. 1]). Furthermore, Kierkegaard is judged by Heidegger as being confined within a Hegelian framework and as having nothing to say about the question of being (GA 8: 213 [216]; SuZ 494 n. vi [235 n. 1]).

These contradictory estimations of Heidegger, along with Heidegger's reluctance to refer to Kierkegaard, have created a situation in which Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's philosophy is to be considered on the level of similarities in structures and motives. This usually entails a great deal of "scholarly detective work," as Clare Carlisle has put it (Carlisle 2013: 422).

Since, however, one cannot have first-hand clarity about Kierkegaard's presence on the level of motives, one is initially left with short remarks in which Heidegger just mentions Kierkegaard. Thus, at least a starting point for researching the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard is taken from short remarks in which Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard explicitly. Most of the time the interpreters focus on the few references Heidegger makes to Kierkegaard in *Sein und Zeit* (there are altogether three allusions to Kierkegaard there) and in some passages from his later writings.²⁴ However, as Gerhard Thonhauser has already pointed out, the actual number of passages in which Heidegger takes up Kierkegaard is higher than commonly thought, although they cover only a few themes.²⁵ While Thonhauser mainly concentrates on Heidegger's writing after *Sein und Zeit*

²⁴ Gerhard Thonhauser has shown that Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard is based usually on three sources, which in addition to the passages from *Sein und Zeit* include one quotation from the essay "Nietzsche's Word 'God is dead'" (see GA 5: 186 [249]) and another quotation from a lecture series *What is Called Thinking?* (see GA 8: 213 [216]) (Thonhauser 2013: 2).

²⁵ Gerhard Thonhauser refers to six different texts published during Heidegger's lifetime in which Kierkegaard is mentioned: GA 2 (*Sein und Zeit*), "Nietzsche's Word 'God is Dead'" in GA 5, GA 8 (*What is Called Thinking?*), "Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics" (named by Thonhauser in German: "Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik") included in GA 6.2, "Comments on Karl Jasper's

(admittedly, he also mentions a few passages preceding *Sein und Zeit*), it will be shown in the present thesis that a look into Heidegger's earliest lecture courses also exposes a number of new passages in which Kierkegaard is mentioned by Heidegger. Within the published lecture courses given by Heidegger during his first Freiburg period, together with the review of Karl Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* [*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*], there are 19 different contexts in which Heidegger directly names or mentions Kierkegaard. Notably, Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard in his early Freiburg period also reveal a wide range of themes in which the two thinkers can be brought together. I will return to this subject later. For the moment, however, I will focus on how the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard has been researched. Considering the controversies about the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard and the actual extent of Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's writings, it is no wonder that the relation has grabbed the attention of many researchers.

1.5. Relation of Heidegger and Kierkegaard in secondary literature

Since decades, the aim to establish that Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger is traceable and even considerable has taken the form of a detailed analysis of different issues in which the two thinkers are brought together. Looking back, one notices that, through time, the comparisons move from searching for similarities (while the influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger is still claimed to be largely unacknowledged) to more detailed accounts in which the focus turns towards the differences between them (within the acknowledgment of strong similarities) and then back again to similarities on a new level. That is, one notices that attention moves increasingly to structural similarities, regardless of whether Heidegger himself explicitly mentions Kierkegaard or not. This situation shows that scholars take Heidegger's so-called silence about Kierkegaard as a given fact and question Heidegger's own estimations of Kierkegaard and the latter's role in his philosophy. At the same time, despite the increasing number of studies, the amount of questions surrounding the relation between the two thinkers has not decreased. Rather, it seems that the more the subject is researched, the more questions it raises.

Psychology of Worldviews" and "Hegel and the Greeks," both found in GA 9. In addition to the writings published during Heidegger's lifetime, Thonhauser shows that during the period from 1930 to 1944 one can find 13 different lecture courses in which Kierkegaard is mentioned by Heidegger, amounting to more than 50 pages (Thonhauser 2013: 4-5).

As would be expected, most of the secondary interpretations of the Heidegger–Kierkegaard relation are comparative studies and/or ask about Kierkegaard’s concrete influence on Heidegger. Both approaches are problematic. First of all, there is a difficulty of distinguishing Kierkegaard’s contribution to Heidegger from other influences. Furthermore, one must also take into account influences from shared sources. As Vincent McCarthy has pointed out: “[f]or Heidegger is resonating not only with Kierkegaard but with a host of figures that played a major role in the development of Kierkegaard’s own thought, including Socrates, Aristotle, Paul, Augustine, and Luther” (McCarthy 2011: 97). In addition, as Clare Carlisle has pointed out, the interpretations are more and more “mutually-informed” (Carlisle 2013: 422). This means that Heidegger may easily be read into Kierkegaard and vice versa. Moreover, the interpretations may have the footprints of later thinkers. For example, it is not always explicitly noticed when a third philosopher’s criticism of Heidegger is directing the analysis of the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Within these complications, there is the possibility of getting lost and implicitly reading Kierkegaard into Heidegger or Heidegger into Kierkegaard. Or one may be explicitly considered in the sphere to which the other is commonly assigned. In what follows, I will briefly look into different ways of examining the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. My aim is not to bring out the specifics of one or another secondary commentator, but rather to outline broader directions which the research into the Heidegger–Kierkegaard relation takes.

To begin with, as said, one way of bringing Heidegger and Kierkegaard together is by considering one of them within the tradition with which the other is commonly connected. Thus, roughly speaking, Kierkegaard is primarily seen as an existentialist philosopher and a religious author and Heidegger as developing a hermeneutical phenomenology. In this respect, one is perhaps instantly reminded of Heidegger’s own attempts to reject the reading of his *Sein und Zeit* as an existentialist book. Contrary to Heidegger’s own wishes, however, reading Heidegger as an existentialist philosopher is by no means a rarity, although the tendency has perhaps decreased through time. Reading Heidegger as a religious author, on the other hand, has gained a firmer footing through time. The topic of Heidegger’s religious origin is very much at the center of academic interest and has received much attention in recent years (especially after Heidegger’s earlier lecture courses started to become available as published texts). In this respect, with the focus on tracing Heidegger’s religious origins, Heidegger is sometimes firmly placed within the framework

of the theological tradition. For example, István M. Fehér claims: “[r]oughly, fundamental ontology as the discipline destined to elaborate the Being-question may be seen to be of Catholic origin, whereas the existential analytic, as a continuation and radicalization of the early hermeneutics of facticity, may be traced back to (and seen to take up and radicalize in a specifically formalized and de-theologized manner) the Luther-Kierkegaardian sort of Protestant tradition centering around subjectivity and the believer’s existential enactment of faith” (Fehér 2009: 102). Fehér argues “that it was with an eye to, and drawing upon, his previous understanding of religion and religious life, as well as of the relation between faith and theology, that Heidegger was to conceive of philosophy and its relation to human existence in *Being and Time*” (ibid.).

Conversely, as far as Heidegger is roughly regarded as developing a hermeneutical phenomenology, one may find attempts to read Kierkegaard either in connection with what is considered to be the tradition of hermeneutics or that of phenomenology. The attempts to read Kierkegaard within the hermeneutical or the phenomenological tradition are different from the consideration of Heidegger as existentialist or within a theological framework. That is, Kierkegaard’s placement in these spheres is taken up as an inquiry which explicitly asks whether there is a possibility of connecting Kierkegaard with one or the other sphere. In this way, careful attempts to connect Kierkegaard with the hermeneutical tradition can be found for example in the book *Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication*, a collection of papers from the Fourth International Kierkegaard Conference. Kierkegaard’s role within the phenomenological tradition has lately become a subject for more heated debates. On the one hand, there are those who see Kierkegaard as more or less strongly connected with the phenomenological tradition. On the other hand, there are those who argue firmly against this view.²⁶ Both positions can be found in the collection *Kierkegaard as a Phenomenologist*, where attempts are made “to uncover the roots of his [Kierkegaard’s] only recently acknowledged influence on phenomenological thought” (Hanson 2010: xi).

Certainly, all of the considerations I have outlined above (taking into account specifically the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard) rest on a commonly acknowledged indebtedness and similarities between the two thinkers, which are unfolded through detailed analysis. That is, the research on the relation between Heidegger and

²⁶ Perhaps the most outspoken critic of seeing Kierkegaard within the phenomenological tradition is Georg Pattison (see e.g. Pattison 2013 and 2010).

Kierkegaard mainly takes place on a very concrete level where one can talk about certain themes through which the two are brought together. This is done in the context of the question of how Kierkegaard has influenced Heidegger with respect to one or another theme or with the focus centering on a certain theme to which both are seen to have contributed or by looking for similarities between the two via a third notion. With respect to the source materials, broadly speaking a division can be made between the early Heidegger (meaning in the majority of cases Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*) and the later Heidegger. Here, clearly the dominant text on Heidegger's side is his *Sein und Zeit* – especially (but not limited to) the second division of *Sein und Zeit*.

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in three footnotes (SuZ: 492 n. iv [190 n. 1]; 494 n. vi [235 n. 1]; 497 n. iii [338 n. 1]). Although these references take a central position in considerations of the relation between the two, there is not really a subject-matter in the second division of *Sein und Zeit* which cannot be traced back to or cannot be seen as worth comparing with Kierkegaard in some respect. It is generally accepted that at the level of motives Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* is to be seen as leaning much more heavily on Kierkegaard than he himself acknowledges. Whether it is the question of the need to grasp Dasein in its wholeness, the phenomenon of death, attesting the authentic potentiality-for-being with the themes of conscience and guilt, anticipatory resoluteness and repetition, the consideration of everydayness, historicizing of Dasein in fateful destiny or the problem of temporality as a whole, there is not really a single subject which in some way has not been taken up as a theme within the research on Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard. This list gathered roughly from Heidegger's table of contents of the second division of *Sein und Zeit* is of course artificial, but perhaps helps to bring out the range of the themes under question.²⁷

Considering the range of the themes in which some connection has been found, it is not surprising to find large numbers of writings which concentrate on the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Although usually researchers focus on a particular theme and not on Kierkegaard's contribution to *Sein und Zeit* as a whole (or the second division as a

²⁷ Thus, John D. Caputo claims that chapters 64, 65, and 74 of *Sein und Zeit* have been directly taken over from Kierkegaard (Caputo 1987: 82-83). Another helpful source for getting an overview of the range of the themes in which Heidegger and Kierkegaard are brought together is Vincent McCarthy's article "Kierkegaard's Influence Hidden and in Full," in which McCarthy, among other references and relying on John van Buren, points to the following list: "[i]n subsequent years, according to van Buren, Heidegger continued to rely on Jaspers' detailed exposition of such Kierkegaardian concepts as existent, the individual, subjective truth, passion, anxiety, and death in which Heidegger often followed Kierkegaard point by point. Additional Kierkegaardian categories found in Heidegger include dispersion, repetition, curiosity, inclosing reserve, conscience, guilt, indirect communication, time and the moment." (McCarthy 2011: 101)

whole), the different themes often come into question and overlap with each other in different writings. However, taken broadly, certain specific subjects appear more central. Here, it is noticeable that the central themes are not always limited to the subjects in which Heidegger himself has explicitly referred to Kierkegaard. Nor does the clearness of the connection depend on Heidegger's explicit thematization. This is plainly seen when looking at Heidegger's considerations of the phenomenon of anxiety, death, and repetition as examples.

The phenomenon of anxiety is probably the most well-known theme that connects Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Although it is one of the few notions in which Heidegger himself refers to Kierkegaard (along with the notions of existence and *Augenblick*) and which thus is clearly traceable to Kierkegaard, Heidegger's own reference far from clarifies the issue of anxiety and the relation of Kierkegaard and Heidegger within this theme.²⁸

Besides the phenomenon of anxiety, the phenomenon of death is also a theme which is at the center of shared consideration.²⁹ Although there are some suggestions of primary influences other than Kierkegaard for Heidegger's account of death,³⁰ predominantly Heidegger is seen to lean heavily on Kierkegaard here. Heidegger himself does not mention Kierkegaard directly in *Sein und Zeit* in connection with his treatment of the phenomenon of death.³¹ However, whether one concentrates on Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger or on the phenomenon itself through reading Kierkegaard and Heidegger, there is considerable agreement on the question to whom Heidegger is indebted in his deliberations. Thus, the debates focus more on the question of the extent of Heidegger's indebtedness to Kierkegaard, that is, on the question where exactly lie the similarities and dissimilarities and which one gives a deeper or better account of the phenomenon of death (on the basis of the context where death plays a role for each) than on the question of whether there is a connection at all.

²⁸ Thus, a number of researchers have written on the subject, among them Arne Grøn (2008), Kristen Huxsel (2005), Walter Schweidler (1988), Dan Magurshak (1985).

²⁹ The subject has been treated by, among others, Adam Buben (2013, 2011), Georg Hunsinger (1969), Marius Gunnar Timmann Mjaaland (2006, 2008), Michael Theunissen (2000), Charles Guigon (2011).

³⁰ Walter Kaufmann has suggested that the main inspiration for Heidegger's account of death is to be found in Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* (Kaufmann 1959: 80-81). Reinhard May, acknowledging different possible sources, has looked into possible East Asian influences on the directions Heidegger took in his development of the notion of death (May 2005: 85-91). Along with possible Buddhist influences through Jaspers and acquaintance with Tanabe Hajime and the Kyoto School in Japan, May also refers to the influence of Augustine and of Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (op.cit.: 114 n. 31).

³¹ According to Theunissen, the footnote from *Sein und Zeit* in which Heidegger claims that one may learn more from Kierkegaard's edifying discourses refers to Kierkegaard's *At the Graveside* (Theunissen 2000: 46-47). *At the Graveside* is often seen as crucial to tracing Heidegger's treatment of the phenomenon of death back to Kierkegaard's unfolding of the phenomenon.

Among the different themes which have been traced back to Kierkegaard, there are some which, regardless of the fact that Heidegger himself (during his *Sein und Zeit* or subsequent writings) does not make the connection at all, have been seen as penetrating into the very center of Heidegger's philosophy. Such is, for example, the concept of repetition (in Danish, *Gjentagelsen*; in German, *Wiederholung*). For instance, John D. Caputo claims in his *Radical Hermeneutics*: "the Kierkegaardian project of 'repetition' enters into the heart of what Heidegger means by hermeneutics in *Being and Time*. Despite Heidegger's own failure to acknowledge his debt to Kierkegaard, and the tendency among Heidegger commentators to ignore Kierkegaard, the Kierkegaardian origin of what Heidegger calls '*Wiederholung*' (retrieval, repetition) cannot be denied" (Caputo 1987: 12).³² In a similar manner, repetition is awarded a central role in bringing the two philosophers together through the very task of philosophy.³³

Considering the large amount of literature on the different themes, one may already assume that there are also many different stances taken on and claims made about the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. However, whether Heidegger explicitly mentions Kierkegaard or whether the similarities are found on the level of motives, Heidegger is not seen as simply taking over these themes from Kierkegaard. Rather, Heidegger is seen as secularizing, ontologizing, or formalizing Kierkegaard's notions and themes.³⁴ In addition, it is not always the case that Heidegger is viewed as furthering Kierkegaard's considerations. Taking their point of departure from Kierkegaard's side (but not only within the consideration of Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard), researchers more than often criticize Heidegger for the abstractness and empty formalism of his approach in *Sein und Zeit*. Thus, Daniel Berthold-Bond claims: "[h]owever, as we turn now to look more closely at Heidegger's anatomy of the structures of authentic being – most notably, anxiety, being-towards-death, conscience, and resoluteness – we will see that this account is in fact very formal and abstract indeed" (Berthold-Bond 1991: 125). Whether this possible Kierkegaardian critique of Heidegger is grounded on aesthetic, ethical, or religious

³² According to John D. Caputo, "[i]n Heidegger, the Kierkegaardian project of 'repetition' (*Gjentagelse*) becomes one of 'retrieval' (*Wiederholung*), and the structure of *kinesis*, of the movement in which Dasein's Being is caught up, is taken to be circular" (Caputo 1987: 60).

³³ See Patricia A. Johnson (1984); for further writings on the notion of repetition, see also Clare Carlisle (2005) and Wenche Marit Quist (2002).

³⁴ See for example Dreyfus and Rubin (2001: 299 etc.), Patricia J. Huntington (1995: 44), Janko Lozar (2014: 431).

concerns,³⁵ or whether the accusation of empty formalism is directed at more specific structures (like that of authentic-being), or at the whole problem of existence, as for example in Michael Weston,³⁶ in general Kierkegaard is seen in this respect as the one who has more to offer than Heidegger with his abstract formalism. Similarly, Kierkegaard is found to give a better account than Heidegger in his *Sein und Zeit*, where Heidegger is accused of placing Dasein in an overly dominant position. At the same time, in connection with this accusation, Heidegger is, interestingly enough, seen to move closer to Kierkegaard in his later writings.

With respect to Heidegger's later writings, the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard has received somewhat less attention, although the number of remarks where Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard increases. The central later writings in which the connection with Kierkegaard emerges are, as Thonhauser (2013: 2) has rightly pointed out, the essay "Nietzsche's Word 'God is Dead'" [*Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'*, 1943] and Heidegger's series of lectures named *What is Called Thinking* [*Was heisst Denken?*, 1952]. However, as Thonhauser (2013: 4-5) also has shown, the later texts in which Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard are certainly not limited to these two. Nor are the texts under consideration by researchers confined to the two above-mentioned texts.³⁷ As the number of texts in which Kierkegaard is mentioned increases, so does the amount of references to Kierkegaard – although not perhaps the variation of themes.

In spite of the growing number of remarks made by Heidegger on Kierkegaard in his later writings, researchers' interest in Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard slackens considerably compared to the attention paid to Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*. What seems to underlie the decline is the view of the shift which has taken place in Heidegger's philosophy, that is, the view that Kierkegaard has ceased to be of interest to Heidegger and Heidegger strikes out on a different path. This distancing is put down to

³⁵ The distinction is made by Adam Buben, who in disputing with Berthold-Bond and Huntington states that "[i]t does indeed seem that Kierkegaard would reject the empty formality and abstractedness of Heidegger's notion of anticipatory resoluteness, but on religious – and specifically Christian – grounds rather than aesthetic or ethical grounds" (Buben 2012: 75).

³⁶ Thus Michael Weston contends: "[t]he philosopher, in raising the question of the Being of human in general, bypasses the nature of the 'problem of existence' which only has sense in terms of the passion with which the individual lives their own life" (Weston 2003: 55).

³⁷ For example, in considering Heidegger's *Mindfulness* [*Besinnung*, GA 66], George T. Seidel contemplates how *Seyn* is thought, or rather not thought, by Heidegger with Kierkegaard and claims that "[i]n *Besinnung*, indeed, Heidegger continues to pursue this course of theo-logical reflection, above all in relation to Kierkegaard" (Seidel 2001: 404).

Heidegger's own attitude, although perhaps not rightly so. As Otto Pöggeler has expressed it:

Thus like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard could become decisive not by formalizing his religious assertions alone but rather by reflecting upon what is metaphysical in the preconception from which Kierkegaard sets out. Heidegger certainly does not think so: either Kierkegaard or Nietzsche is decisive for his dynamic thinking; where Kierkegaard's religious assertions are formalized (in *Sein und Zeit*), Nietzsche's thinking is not essential; where Nietzsche has become decisive, there Kierkegaard retreats. (Pöggeler 1990 [1963]: 252 [307] n. 38; see also pp. 154-155 [191-192])

In spite of Heidegger's own stance, there are researchers who would claim that within this shift, instead of moving away from Kierkegaard, Heidegger moves even closer towards him in one or another aspect. This moving closer is attributed for example to their common concern over nihilism³⁸ and to the thematization of the dependence on "receptivity to a call" (Carlisle 2013: 435)³⁹. Here, as can be seen in Clare Carlisle's claims (see n. 39), when Heidegger is seen to move closer to Kierkegaard, he is also seen as addressing a problem often ascribed to *Sein und Zeit*. Whether it is seen in terms of overcoming "voluntarism and humanism," as Carlisle puts it, or in terms of making room for "saving grace" to effect authenticity, as John D. Caputo states,⁴⁰ the movement towards to Kierkegaard, interestingly enough, goes hand in hand with a movement away from the overly dominant position of Dasein.

All in all, whether Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard is considered with regard to Heidegger's earlier or later period of thought, one is left with a multitude of approaches and attitudes in which Heidegger's own estimation of Kierkegaard is often called into question. Although there are a number of researchers who agree with Heidegger's explicit estimation of Kierkegaard, the rejections of Heidegger's stance towards Kierkegaard as exhibited

³⁸ Thus, Dreyfus and Rubin write: "[t]o sum up, after Kierkegaard's profound but mostly unacknowledged influence on early Heidegger, we find Kierkegaard and the later Heidegger following separate but parallel paths. They agree that nihilism is the most crucial issue of our time, but they differ in their responses to that issue." (Dreyfus and Rubin 1991: 339) A similar thought is expressed by Dreyfus when he claims elsewhere: "[h]is early interest in the existential structure of the self had shifted to another Kierkegaardian concern – the lack of meaning and seriousness in the present age." (Dreyfus 2006: 346)

³⁹ In her consideration of Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger's later work, Carlisle (2013: 435) also states: "[b]ut if Heidegger's philosophical development from the 1930s onwards includes a corrective to the humanism and voluntarism of his earlier work, this is not accomplished by abandoning his formalism, but rather by expanding it to encompass structures of the Christian life that he had hitherto overlooked. One unacknowledged consequence of this development, then, is that Heidegger's thought moves, in its essence, even closer to Kierkegaard's. The immediately recognizable Kierkegaardian concepts and categories – such as moment, repetition, anticipation, anxiety, and the symptoms of inauthentic modern life – may no longer be in play in Heidegger's later writings, but what does emerge is a clearer sense that the proper relationship between Being and (human) beings is one of giving and receiving: the moment of gift."

⁴⁰ John D. Caputo's states that "Heidegger later on concedes [...] [t]hat the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity is not something effected *by* man but rather something effected *in* man by a saving grace" (Caputo 1993: 222).

above are by no means unusual.⁴¹ Similarly, there are researchers who see Heidegger as further developing Kierkegaard's account,⁴² and those who consider Heidegger falling short with his deliberation when compared with that of Kierkegaard.⁴³ There are those, who see Heidegger as offering a secularized version of Kierkegaard's religiousness A⁴⁴ and those in whose opinion Heidegger can be seen best in comparison with Kierkegaard's aesthetic sphere.⁴⁵ Among this multitude of approaches and attitudes, there seems to be only one thing which most of the researchers agree upon. No matter how much the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard is researched, no matter what kind of direction one or another researcher takes, something has remained the same – the relationship has been commonly declared obscure and it continues to be declared obscure till this day. In finding clarity in this situation, no straightforward answer should be expected to be found from Heidegger himself. And yet, as a starting point, nothing more is given than Heidegger's words.

1.6. The source materials and the basis of researching Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses

During the first Freiburg period, Heidegger did not publish anything.⁴⁶ All the sources stemming from Heidegger's first Freiburg period were published later on, most of them posthumously. The larger part of the materials from this time period has been collected in seven volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (from GA 56/57 up to GA 63), gathering materials from 10 different lecture courses which he actually held, and sketches of one course which in the end was not held by him. Since none of these lecture courses was prepared by Heidegger for publication, all of the published lecture courses available for the

⁴¹ Thus, when questioned, Heidegger's own remarks about Kierkegaard and his own estimation of Kierkegaard, Heidegger's words are not taken at face value. Whether it is Heidegger's claim that Kierkegaard is not a thinker, but a "religious writer," that he is confined within a theological context or Hegelian paradigm, or when Heidegger accuses Kierkegaard of staying in the ontic or *existentiell* sphere, Heidegger's own estimation of Kierkegaard is called into question. Cf. George Pattison (2013: 182-183), Adam Buben (2013: 980; 2011: 193), John van Buren (1994: 438 n 14), Dan Magurshak (1987: 210).

⁴² Agreeing with Heidegger's estimation, see for example Tsutomu Ben Yagi (2009: 61).

⁴³ Cf. Marius Gunnar Timmann Mjaaland (2008: 99-107).

⁴⁴ Cf. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jane Rubin (1991: 283-340).

⁴⁵ Cf. Daniel Berthold-Bond (1991: 121).

⁴⁶ The period in which Heidegger did not publish anything is actually longer than only the first Freiburg period. It reaches from his post-doctoral work (in the year 1916) until the time *Sein und Zeit* was published in 1927. Nevertheless, there are texts which have been prepared for publication, for example the essay "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection to Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation" ["Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)"] prepared in 1922, but published posthumously in 1989 in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 6: 237-274, and "Comments on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*" ["Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*"] which was prepared between 1919-1921, but was not published until 1973.

reader have been constructed by editors. The texts of the lecture courses, which consist of Heidegger's manuscript for the lecture course along with numerous remarks he made in the margin of the running text, are usually supplemented with Heidegger's own notes and sketches presumed to belong to the lecture course as well as the notes from students attending the lectures. Often parts of the manuscripts have been lost or are fragmented, punctuation is largely lacking and the text of the manuscript has not always been clearly readable for the editors.⁴⁷ Thus, there are many questions about the source material. With respect to searching for Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's lecture course, the layout of the sources is significant.

Within the published lecture courses given by Heidegger during his first Freiburg period, there are 15 different contexts in which Heidegger directly names or mentions Kierkegaard. The explicit references are found in four different lecture courses: *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, *Augustine and Neoplatonism*, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle* and *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Often these references are not to be found in the running text of the lecture course, but in the marginal notes or in the notes and sketches added to the lecture course. Furthermore, as I will argue in chapter five, Heidegger can also be seen to quote Kierkegaard without using quotation marks (see also Appendix One). At the same time, there are lecture courses in which Heidegger presents a consideration of themes which seem to stem from Kierkegaard and yet he does not mention Kierkegaard at all (for example, 'moment' [*Augenblick*] in the explication of Paul's letters (in GA 60) and in the 1922 essay on Aristotle (in GA 62)). Taking into account this situation as well as the specific characteristics of Heidegger's first Freiburg period and the considerations behind the possibilities and difficulties in researching Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, I have adopted a specific strategy for the following research.

As I brought out previously, Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's written legacy takes different forms. It was also shown that in researching Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, no clarity should be expected from Heidegger. Rather, in the search for Kierkegaard one should be prepared to look for traces hidden somewhere on the level of

⁴⁷ See on GA 56/57 Bernd Heimbüchel (1987, 1999: 166-169 [221-225]); on GA 58 Hans-Helmut Gander (1992: 199-204 [265-273]); on GA 59 Claudius Strube (1993: 155-157 [199-202]); on GA 60 Matthias Jung and Thomas Regehly (1995: 255-258 [339-343]) as well as Claudius Strube (1995: 259-263 [345-351]); on GA 61 Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (1994: 153-154 [201-203]); on GA 62 Günther Neumann (2005: [421-451]); on GA 63 Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (1987: 88-90 [113-116]).

motives and structures. At the same time, one should be cautious about the influences and be wary of being led by later interpretations. This is the case also with the research into Heidegger's approach to Kierkegaard in his first Freiburg period. As such, these considerations prescribe the approach taken in this thesis.

Thus, on the one hand, I take my point of departure for finding Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path from the analysis of Heidegger's different lecture courses. That is, the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period will be unfolded within the analysis of the specific lecture courses and through the consideration of Heidegger's overall aims. As I brought out in the second section of this chapter, Heidegger's first Freiburg period is a path in which he is constantly developing his account. In this respect, as will be seen, Heidegger has something distinct to offer in each lecture course. And yet, what is offered comes out as a further step from what has been given previously. Furthermore, Heidegger focuses on specific questions. Taking the point of departure from Heidegger's central explicitly addressed question in his different lecture courses of his first Freiburg period, I have named this path as a path of rethinking philosophy. As was shown, the breakthrough to this path is made by Heidegger in his 1919 lecture course. Insofar as my wider aim is to search for Kierkegaard's place in this path, I thus will start with the lecture course in which Heidegger strikes out on the path of philosophy which is seen to be his own and in which Kierkegaard is not mentioned at all. Although Kierkegaard is not to be found in this lecture course, this starting point is necessary in order to bring out clearly Heidegger's consideration of Kierkegaard in the lecture courses to come. As I will claim, in his 1919 lecture course Heidegger leads his search for philosophy in two directions and rethinks philosophy throughout his first Freiburg period in these two directions, in which Kierkegaard occupies a specific place with respect to those directions.

On the other hand, in order to have a firm basis for bringing out Kierkegaard's concrete input to Heidegger's philosophy, I will focus on Heidegger's explicit references to Kierkegaard (by name or through quotations). At the same time, the research will not be limited to explicit remarks themselves. Rather, the explicit remarks will also offer a pathway to the structural similarities. Here, certain treatises of Kierkegaard will be highlighted. As was shown in section three of this chapter, by the time of his first Freiburg period Heidegger had access to most of Kierkegaard's writings in the German language. Throughout this thesis I will point out which of Kierkegaard's treatises Heidegger has explicitly referred to. Certainly, the fact that Heidegger has not mentioned one or another

work does not inevitably mean that he is not acquainted with or has not made any use of the work. However, in my consideration of different treatises of Kierkegaard, I will take my point of departure from the text which Heidegger has explicitly referred to. In this respect, I will highlight and make an excursion to three Kierkegaardian treatises: *The Sickness unto Death*, *The Concept of Anxiety* and “The Single Individual: Two ‘notes’ concerning my work as an author.”

In addition, as was brought out, Heidegger’s own stance toward Kierkegaard is extremely problematic. In the final chapter of this thesis I will aim to address some of the issues which have emerged in the overall consideration of Heidegger’s stance toward Kierkegaard on the basis of the analysis of Kierkegaard’s presence in Heidegger’s first Freiburg period lecture courses. True enough, in his first Freiburg period Heidegger exhibits a similar approach to Kierkegaard to that found in his later writings. Mostly Heidegger’s naming or quoting of Kierkegaard is inserted into the text (chiefly in (marginal) notes) without any further clear explanation, thus leaving the meaning of Kierkegaard’s presence at best open to a wide range of interpretations or, on some occasions, simply a matter of guesswork. When, however, he does give an estimation of Kierkegaard, he does not give a straightforward account of why or how or where the influence is to be sought. Furthermore, he both praises Kierkegaard and distances himself from Kierkegaard to the extent that the words uttered seem to be highly questionable. Thus, for example, in his lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity* Heidegger states:

Strong impulses for the hermeneutical explication presented here stem from the work of Kierkegaard. But his presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal were fundamentally different, insofar as he made these too easy for himself. What was basically in question for him was nothing but the kind of personal reflection he pursued. He was a theologian and stood within the realm of faith, in principle outside of philosophy. The situation today is different one. (GA 63: 25 [30])

Looking at this estimation, one could ask what is to be considered an impulse when “presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal” are left out. In the final chapter of this thesis I will address the question of the meaning of this estimation of Kierkegaard by Heidegger. Seen on the basis of the analysis of Heidegger’s path through the different lecture courses and Kierkegaard’s place therein, perhaps Heidegger’s estimation in the end is not so odd at all.

1.7. Conclusion

Researching Kierkegaard’s place in Heidegger’s philosophy is a task with many problems. Not only is Heidegger himself generally known to be reluctant to express his views on

Kierkegaard explicitly, but also, when he does say anything about Kierkegaard, he seems to make the issue more complicated. His estimations usually lack clarification and even seem to be contradictory. Furthermore, his short explicit remarks about, quotations of or references to Kierkegaard are open to a wide range of interpretations because Heidegger himself refuses to give any clear explanations. This has created a situation where Kierkegaard's impact on Heidegger's philosophy requires looking beyond Heidegger's own words. As most of the researchers agree, Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger is much stronger than Heidegger himself admits, because Kierkegaard is seen to be present also on the level of motives and structures in which he is not explicitly mentioned. At the same time, the search for Kierkegaard's hidden presence in Heidegger's philosophy is further complicated by the fact that their shared sources of influence as well as the impact of later interpretations must be taken into account. In this respect, Heidegger's own words give the firmest footing in the search for Kierkegaard's role in his philosophy. These considerations prescribe my approach in the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period.

In what follows, I will look for Kierkegaard's place by tracing Heidegger's path through his first Freiburg period. In order to analyze Kierkegaard's place within Heidegger's overall aims, I will start with the 1919 lecture course which is commonly held to be Heidegger's breakthrough to the path of his own philosophy. In this lecture course, Heidegger does not mention Kierkegaard. And yet, it proves to be necessary to commence from the beginning of Heidegger's path which, with an eye to his explicitly presented question, I will call the path of rethinking philosophy. It is necessary insofar as in this lecture course Heidegger presents the aims guiding his considerations throughout his first Freiburg period. Furthermore, it enables us to see where and how Kierkegaard becomes significant in his subsequent lecture courses. As I will argue, with his 1919 lecture course Heidegger takes up a two-directional path and Kierkegaard is to be found in one of those directions.

Besides clarifying Heidegger's overall aims in his first Freiburg period lecture courses, I will further focus on the lecture courses in which Kierkegaard is explicitly present. The aim is to understand Kierkegaard's place by analyzing Heidegger's concrete lecture courses and pointing out where Kierkegaard becomes significant for Heidegger through his explicit references to Kierkegaard. Furthermore, by considering how Heidegger unfolds his account in a specific lecture course as well as through his explicit references to

Kierkegaard, the latter's presence on the level of motives and structures will be looked for. In sum, by analyzing Heidegger's concrete lecture courses on the path of his first Freiburg period and tracing the explicit references to Kierkegaard, I will look for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses.