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Introduction

When wandering around the corridors of an institute of philosophy, one encounters a manifold of research areas. There is for example philosophy of science, of religion, of love, of mind, of education. What all these different fields have in common is that philosophy in these phrases denotes a certain activity which is directed to a specific subject matter. It is a peculiar activity as it makes a claim for a variety of different fields: perhaps all other fields. But what kind of activity is philosophy itself? What is philosophy?

Introducing philosophy to beginners, Thomas Nagel¹ suggests that the aim of philosophy is “to push our understanding of the world and ourselves a bit deeper” (Nagel 1987: 5). Nagel presents to his readers a number of questions asked in philosophy and offers ways to address these issues. The possibilities of addressing these problems are not put forward as solutions, but rather as something to be disagreed with on the basis of well-argued considerations. Philosophy for him is about asking questions which ordinarily are not thematized, and arguing over problems in order to deepen our understanding. Insofar as philosophy is about problematizing our ordinary understanding, Nagel’s account of philosophy is similar to that of Deleuze and Guattari, who suggest that philosophy is a struggle against opinion (1994: 203).

Deleuze and Guattari² present the subject by stating that “[t]he question *what is philosophy?* can perhaps be posed only late in life, with the arrival of old age and the time for speaking concretely” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 1). They note that, before, there is too much “desire to *do* philosophy,” (ibid.) perhaps in the way that Nagel in his book offers philosophy to beginners. Talking about philosophy concretely, they state that philosophy is not a contemplation or reflection or communication (op.cit.: 6). Instead, “[t]he object of philosophy is to create concepts that are always new” (op.cit.: 5). Philosophy is concept creation on the plane of immanence, that is, on “something *that does not exist outside philosophy*, although philosophy presupposes it” (op.cit.: 41). Philosophy is an immanent activity of laying out the plane and creating concepts within the limits of the plane which has been laid out (op.cit.: 77-79).

Although Deleuze and Guattari might indeed be right that the question about philosophy can or even should be posed late in life, this assessment does not apply to

¹ See Thomas Nagel (1987) *What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy*.

² See Deleuze and Guattari (1994) *What Is Philosophy?*

Martin Heidegger, one of the two thinkers at the center of this thesis. Only 29 years old and at the dawn of his philosophical career, he announces: “the core of the problem lies in philosophy itself – it is itself a problem” (GA 56/57: 10 [12]). At his young age he turns to the question of philosophy initially in order to tackle philosophy as a worldview: as a set of opinions. According to him, worldview must be seen to be unphilosophical “when it is set over against philosophy, and then only through the methodological tools of philosophy itself” (ibid.). His early aspiration to tackle philosophy with methodological tools echoes Deleuze and Guattari when they state: “[w]e require just a little order to protect us from chaos. Nothing is more distressing than a thought that escapes itself, than ideas that fly off, that disappear hardly formed, already eroded by forgetfulness or precipitated into others that we no longer master” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 201).

Philosophy’s yearning to master the chaos, to gain some clarity, can be found in all the above-mentioned thinkers. At the same time, it becomes evident that for all of them this wish encounters resistance. Nagel does not give solutions. For Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy is a friend of wisdom, constantly seeking it, but never possessing it (op.cit.: 3). Instead of ordering the chaos, the philosopher must “plunge into the chaos,” make a leap, as for example in their view was done by Søren Kierkegaard (op.cit.: 74, 202-203). For Kierkegaard, the second thinker at the center of this thesis, philosophy teaches that life is repetition (*Gjentagelse*) (R: 131 [III 173]). What becomes decisive for him is the concrete existing individual. If philosophy has a connection to life, which revolts against being fixed in abstract systems, it must be tackled again and again.

The recognition that philosophy has to be reconciled with concrete life comes out also in Heidegger’s early lecture courses. Furthermore, like Kierkegaard before him, he announces that philosophy is repetition both by averring this directly (GA 61: 62 [80])³ and through his presentation as he rethinks the question of philosophy over and again. And yet, in his path of rethinking philosophy an overwhelming desire to master the chaos is constantly present. In this way, he is faced with the question: how to reconcile the desire for clarity with the demands of concrete life? What is philosophy? This question will be repeatedly asked during this thesis, in which Heidegger’s early development is under scrutiny, with the aim of finding Kierkegaard’s place therein. As will be shown in this

³ Thus, in his lecture on Aristotle Heidegger says: “‘Repetition’: everything depends on its sense. Philosophy is a basic mode of life itself, in such a way that it authentically ‘brings back,’ i.e., brings life back from its downward fall into decadence, and this ‘bringing back’ [or re-petition, re-seeking], as radical re-search, is life itself” (GA 61: 62 [80]).

thesis, Heidegger's quest for philosophy unfolds between the yearning for clarity and the demand to account for the living situation. Philosophy for him is distinct from what has been suggested by both Nagel as well as Deleuze and Guattari. It remains to be seen what kind of role Kierkegaard plays within Heidegger's struggles.

The theme of this thesis is Søren Kierkegaard's place in Martin Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. I will ask: what is Heidegger after in his first Freiburg period, where we find the very early development of his thought, and where does he turn to Kierkegaard?

With the aim of searching for Kierkegaard within Heidegger's first Freiburg period, this research seeks to offer new perspectives in two respects. First, it aims to contribute to the research of Heidegger's early development. Exploring young Heidegger's philosophy has been acknowledged as a promising research area for developing a more adequate understanding of Heidegger's philosophy (see for example Van Buren 2006: 19) and yet, due to the prolonged lack of access to the sources, it has gained the attention of Heidegger's researchers only in recent decades. As Scott M. Campbell pointed out just five years ago: "[t]here are currently three book-length analyses of the early Heidegger: *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* by Theodore Kisiel, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* by John van Buren, and *Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity* by Benjamin Crowe" (Campbell 2012: xv). Secondly, although there are many researches into Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, there is currently not yet a study dedicated to the place of Kierkegaard in Heidegger's philosophy during his first Freiburg period: in the commencement of the latter's path in which, considering Heidegger's overall reluctance to mention Kierkegaard, a remarkable number of references to Kierkegaard are to be found.

The initial impetus for the present research was recognition that the research of Heidegger's early lecture courses promises new ways of understanding his philosophy, along with the fact that in his first Freiburg period lecture courses Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard on a noteworthy number of occasions. This led me to believe that exploration of Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard as it unfolds during this specific period of Heidegger's thought might lead to a better understanding of the themes which both of them invested in. And indeed, this hypothesis proved to be correct. As will be shown throughout this thesis, the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses has enabled me to pinpoint a number of themes and notions which both thinkers

thematize and develop. It allows further understanding of the notions which have already been in the spotlight of this research area (for example the notion of anxiety) and leads to the consideration of new connecting themes, as for example the notion of fate.

And yet, these concrete themes in themselves did not become the focal point of this thesis. What rather became a question was Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy seen from the latter's own problem situation during his early lecture courses. This question came to occupy a central position in this thesis, for it became clear that the consideration of specific themes relating the two thinkers is dependent on the researcher's attitude towards Heidegger's philosophy and the views on Kierkegaard's presence in his philosophy as such. First of all, it is not at all uncommon to ignore Kierkegaard when Heidegger's philosophy is researched. Secondly, if Kierkegaard is considered a source for Heidegger, his specific impact and the extent of his influence are highly debatable.

One of the main reasons behind the problem of considering Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard is what the researchers of this relation view as Heidegger's silence about Kierkegaard. This theme of silence refers to the situations where Kierkegaard's presence is found in Heidegger's writings without any explicit reference by the latter. For example, consider Heidegger's contemplation on his philosophical path. According to Heidegger's own reflection, this path has been led by a 'single thought' (see N I: 4 [475], GA 8: 50 [53]). When explicating this claim Otto Pöggeler states that initially Heidegger keeps his silence about what this thought is for him: "[h]e knew as well as Nietzsche that 'as soon as one communicates his knowledge, he no longer loves it well enough' (NI, 265f). [...] Furthermore, each direct communication of that which is thought can again lead to misunderstanding" (Pöggeler: 1 [7-8]). Only years later, according to Pöggeler, does Heidegger express that traveling on the path of this single thought involves wandering in the neighborhood of Being (op.cit.: 2 [9]).

When one researches Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, as in the present thesis, this deliberation over keeping silence about the single thought stands out. The words catch the eye first of all because the claim of being led by a single thought can also be found in Kierkegaard, who said about himself: "[f]inally, for the sake of recollection, if a thinker can be engaged in concentrating and having concentrated all his intellectual activity in one single thought – this has been granted to me" (translation from PV: 265).⁴ Similarly, as Pöggeler perhaps aims to indicate by the words "direct communication," a notion stemming

⁴ On the similarities on the theme of a single thought see also Clare Carlisle 2013: 422.

from Kierkegaard, the argument for not revealing this thought (that is, when the thought is communicated, the love for it may be lost) is also to be found in Kierkegaard. Thus, for example, Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, discussing the explanation in relation to Christianity, argues: "[i]f any other understanding ever forces itself upon him [the concrete existing individual in his relation to Christianity, or the believer], he sees that he is about to lose his faith, just as a girl, when she has become the beloved's wife, upon discovering that it is easy to understand that she became this man's chosen one, ought to see that this explanation is easily understood as an indication that she is no longer in love" (CUP: 224-225 [VII 189]).

That these similar motives are found in Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), who precedes Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), raises the question whether Heidegger's foregoing reflections could have been influenced by Kierkegaard. On the one hand, since Heidegger does not mention Kierkegaard in this context, Kierkegaard's role can be easily rejected. Furthermore, since in general Heidegger seldom mentions Kierkegaard, it is possible to disregard Kierkegaard as a significant source for him. On the other hand, insofar as these reflections seem to lead to Kierkegaard, it is equally possible to claim that Heidegger is simply silent about Kierkegaard's impact on his thought. Furthermore, the claim of Heidegger's silence on Kierkegaard's influence can be seen as supported by the fact that Heidegger rarely mentions Kierkegaard and yet a number of motives similar to Kierkegaard are present in his writings. All in all, one thus finds oneself in a situation where Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger's philosophy can be questioned, accepted or rejected. Moreover, the controversial possibilities of accounting for Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy are not limited to those occasions where Kierkegaard seems to be silently present. The views on Kierkegaard's influence diverge even when Heidegger explicitly mentions him. In this respect, let me point to the example of another theme which will be central to this thesis: the problem of Heidegger's consideration of the philosophically proper mode of access or his methodology.

For the question whether Kierkegaard had any significant impact on Heidegger's development of his philosophical methodology can be roughly answered in two conflicting ways. On the one hand, it is not rare for Kierkegaard to be altogether ignored in connection with Heidegger's development of philosophy's proper mode of accessing its theme. It is rather accepted that when considering Heidegger's methodology, he is to be seen as a follower of Husserl: he belongs to the Husserlian phenomenological tradition and there is

no reason to talk of Kierkegaard's influence when thinking of Heidegger's methodology. On the other hand, there are number of researchers who do find that Kierkegaard has had an impact on Heidegger in his development of method. They cite for example Heidegger's review of Jaspers and his praise for Kierkegaard's consciousness of methodological rigor found there (GA 9: 101 [41]). With reference to Heidegger's acknowledgment of Kierkegaard, John van Buren has even said that "Heidegger's model regarding method is really Kierkegaard" (Van Buren 1989: 468). Insofar as in his review of Jaspers Heidegger does explicitly acknowledge Kierkegaard with respect to the issue of methodology, this example shows that accounting for Kierkegaard's significance does not depend only on whether Heidegger has mentioned Kierkegaard or not. In both cases one can find contradictory views.

For the present thesis, the fact that Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy is considered in contradictory ways leads to the question: what conditions such a difference in accounting for Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy? One of the central claims of this thesis is that the possibility of these conflicting approaches is conditioned not so much by Heidegger's silence about Kierkegaard as by the attitude taken towards Heidegger's philosophy. I will also claim that the attitude taken towards Heidegger's philosophy is in turn conditioned by Heidegger himself: he himself creates room for considering his philosophy in two very distinct ways. Furthermore, I will contend that in doing so Heidegger also conditions the possibility to consider Kierkegaard's role in his philosophy in different ways. In order to show that the approach towards Kierkegaard's significance for Heidegger is conditioned by Heidegger's philosophy, this thesis starts by scrutinizing Heidegger's early philosophy from his own problem situation and searches for Kierkegaard's place therein.

Looking for Kierkegaard's place in this thesis is needed also for another reason related to the previous problem. That is, largely due to the manner in which Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard, those who do consider Kierkegaard a source of influence on Heidegger face the question: what is the extent of this impact and how does one measure it? Vincent McCarthy for example points out that "[t]hose who want to argue for a major influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger must contend with the fact that Heidegger never devoted a single lecture to Kierkegaard, far less a lecture cycle as he did with Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Dilthey, and others" (McCarthy (2011: 124 n33)). The statement that Heidegger does not dedicate *a* lecture (cycle) to Kierkegaard holds

true also for Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. But does this fact inevitably imply the need to reject Kierkegaard's strong influence on Heidegger?

One could counter this possible argument against Kierkegaard's substantial effect on Heidegger by referring to the silence Heidegger maintains with regard to certain themes as well as thinkers. It could be argued that the fact of not dedicating a lecture cycle to Kierkegaard is itself evidence of Kierkegaard's extreme importance for Heidegger, insofar as the silence could be considered a means of preserving the love for what is significant: in this case for Kierkegaard. However, taking this line of reasoning is dangerous. It can be asked how far can we take the argumentation of Heidegger's silence about certain subjects. McCarthy himself argues for Kierkegaard's importance to Heidegger by referring to specific notions in which the two thinkers clearly come together. Thus, his previously given statement continues with the words: "[s]till, a comparison of *The Concept of Anxiety* and the discussion of anxiety in *Being and Time* makes a powerful case for a major influence of Kierkegaard upon Heidegger in a very major category in Heidegger's thought" (McCarthy (2011: 124 n. 33)). But does this mean that within Heidegger's overall aims Kierkegaard is simply a passer-by from whom Heidegger occasionally takes over or finds support for a theme he is interested in? Or is there something more to Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard? This issue will be addressed by looking for Kierkegaard's place throughout the lecture courses of Heidegger's first Freiburg period. Although Heidegger indeed does not dedicate even one subsection, still less a lecture, to Kierkegaard during his first Freiburg period, it will be shown that Kierkegaard does gain a specific place in Heidegger's path.

On the basis of the considerations given above, this thesis will undertake a thorough and radical examination of Heidegger's early development regarding his own problem situation and Kierkegaard's place in his early development.

Research into what Heidegger is after in his first Freiburg period reveals that this period is unique in many respects. Most importantly, it is striking that whereas traditionally Heidegger is known as a philosopher whose main question is directed to Being, this is not what he explicitly asks about in his first Freiburg period lecture courses. Rather, as I will show, throughout these lecture courses Heidegger's central and explicitly asked question is directed to philosophy: 'what is philosophy?' That this is the case does not entail a rejection of Heidegger's claim that he has traveled in the 'neighborhood of Being.' However, it does

mean that inquiry into philosophy gains a central place. This is the question which Heidegger repeatedly addresses and rethinks during the different lecture courses of his first Freiburg period.

The answers which Heidegger offers to this explicitly asked question lead to the central claim of this thesis. I will claim that Heidegger rethinks philosophy in two directions and gives two different accounts of philosophy. Or as I will put it, he unfolds his problem in two directions: he is on a two-directional path. The claim that Heidegger is on a two-directional path does not mean that philosophy for Heidegger must pursue multiple spheres. Rather, this claim suggests that he takes up two different modes of accessing what philosophy must aim at. On the one hand, philosophy as it is actualized is philosophizing, a mode of access in the living situation. On the other hand, philosophy is about a proper methodology for accessing and expressing its subject matter: it is a mode of investigation. Showing that Heidegger develops his philosophy in both of these directions is decisive with respect to accounting for Kierkegaard's place in this path. That is, as I will claim and exhibit in different chapters of this thesis, Kierkegaard appears in one of these directions: when Heidegger considers access in the living situation.

Recognition of the fact that Heidegger leads his philosophy in two directions and that Kierkegaard appears in one of these directions enables us explain both the controversial approaches to Kierkegaard's influence to Heidegger's philosophy and the level of the impact itself. First of all, as I will argue, considering Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy depends on what kind of stance is taken towards Heidegger's philosophy. In order to show this, I will highlight two dominant approaches to Heidegger with respect to the question of his method. As examples of these two stances towards Heidegger's philosophy I will consider the approaches of Theodore Kisiel and Søren Overgaard. I will claim that these approaches differ with respect to what is considered to be the focus of Heidegger's philosophy. By arguing that Heidegger develops philosophy in two directions, I will claim that each of the two approaches to his philosophy emphasizes either one or the other side of what Heidegger puts forth. In this way, the possibility of having two very distinct accounts of Heidegger's philosophy is shown to be conditioned by Heidegger himself. That Heidegger's philosophy is approached in two distinct ways depending on which side of his consideration of philosophy is given primacy, together with the fact that Kierkegaard appears in one of those sides, thus enables us to account for the different takes on Kierkegaard role in Heidegger's philosophy. On the one hand, Kierkegaard is

considered a significant source for Heidegger. On the other hand, Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy is more or less ignored. Insofar as Heidegger is shown to offer scope for both of these approaches, it is thus possible to gain insight into how Heidegger himself preconditions two contradictory accounts of Kierkegaard's significance to him.

However, even when we acknowledge that Heidegger himself creates these different possibilities and establish that Kierkegaard appears when Heidegger considers philosophy in the living situation, the extent of Kierkegaard's influence may still be questioned. As was brought out previously, Heidegger does not give a compact account of Kierkegaard during his first Freiburg period lecture courses. Instead, he only occasionally names or quotes Kierkegaard, mostly without giving any further explanation of why Kierkegaard has been mentioned. Nevertheless, I will claim that analysis of Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard leads to recognition of the latter's strong impact on Heidegger's philosophy. Through this thesis I will exhibit that Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard within a specific sphere of questioning, regardless of to whom he has dedicated his lectures. In this respect, the extent of Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger can be shown not to depend on whether Heidegger dedicates *a* lecture to Kierkegaard or not. What instead speaks loudly for Kierkegaard's significance is the fact that Kierkegaard is present regardless of to whom the lecture is dedicated. Furthermore, it is important that Kierkegaard appears in Heidegger's different lecture courses although Heidegger develops and rethinks his account of philosophy throughout his path during his first Freiburg period. Thus, the analysis of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses leads me to argue in the following chapters that Kierkegaard for Heidegger is not simply a companion from whom he randomly borrows some notions and themes, but a central source of inspiration with respect to philosophy as it is actualized. Kierkegaard appears as soon as Heidegger faces the difficult task of accounting for philosophy in a concrete living situation.

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter I will address the issues involved in the consideration of Heidegger's first Freiburg period and of his relation to Kierkegaard: I will explain what is meant by Heidegger's first Freiburg period; bring out the availability of Kierkegaard's works for Heidegger as well as specific sources used in this thesis; thematize Kierkegaard's overall presence in Heidegger's different writings; and outline how the relation between Kierkegaard and Heidegger has been interpreted in the secondary literature. My aim here is first of all to bring out the problems which surround

the consideration of the relation between these two thinkers and to draw out the specifics of the approach I will take in my search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses.

The following six chapters are dedicated to Heidegger's lecture courses in chronological order and are gathered into two parts. This division comes about first of all from the manner in which Heidegger unfolds his problematic in specific lecture courses and from Kierkegaard's presence in these lecture courses. By separating Heidegger's lectures into two parts, my aim is to bring out clearly Heidegger's problematic and its development as well as Kierkegaard's position in his lecture courses.

In the first part, I will establish that Heidegger takes up the questioning of philosophy in two directions and how he does this. In this part, the focus is on Heidegger's lecture courses from 1919 to the winter semester of 1920-21. Starting with Heidegger's lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* (KNS 1919, in GA 56/57), I first claim that Heidegger steers his quest for philosophy in two directions: he articulates the task of proper philosophy by suggesting two different modes of accessing. Furthermore, I will claim that in doing so he makes possible two dominant ways of interpreting his philosophy. In the following two chapters, I argue that Heidegger takes up both of these directions one after another in his subsequent lecture courses. First (in chapter three), I will show that in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (WS 1919/20, GA 58) he considers the possibility of philosophy in the living situation. I will claim that proper philosophy in this lecture course is articulated as intensifying-concentration upon the self-world. In this lecture course Kierkegaard is mentioned for the first time by Heidegger. He appears as a thinker whom Heidegger regards as bringing to life this proper mode of accessing. After that (in chapter four), primarily on the basis of the lecture courses *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation* (SS 1920, GA 59) and the beginning of *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* (WS 1920-21, in GA 60), I will argue that Heidegger then turns to consideration of philosophy as an investigation by focusing on the question of methodology. I will claim that Heidegger describes philosophical investigation through three methodological moments (phenomenological destruction, phenomenological explication and formal indication). Having outlined these three methodological moments, I turn back to the two dominant modes of interpreting Heidegger's philosophy and show where the difference between them lies. I assert that the interpretations differ with respect to giving primacy to

different sense directions which Heidegger has pointed to: relational sense and actualizational sense. My central claim is that Heidegger himself develops his philosophy in both of these sense directions and thus conditions two different approaches to him which give primacy to one or the other direction. That this is the case will be reaffirmed in the second part of this thesis, in which Kierkegaard's presence becomes more prominent.

In the second part, I will analyze Heidegger's three lecture courses from 1921 to 1923: a lecture course on Augustine (GA 60), on Aristotle (GA 61) and on hermeneutics of facticity (GA 63). I will show that in each lecture course under view Heidegger rethinks philosophy, each time considering two modes of access, both of which are always developed further. That this is the case becomes evident when analyzing Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard. By focusing on Kierkegaard's place in each of the three lecture courses analyzed in three chapters, I will exhibit that each time Kierkegaard proves significant to Heidegger as soon as he turns to accounting for philosophy in the living situation. Furthermore, I will show that Kierkegaard occurs in each lecture course, regardless of whom the lecture is dedicated to or how the account of philosophy is developed by Heidegger.

In the final chapter of this thesis, I will reflect on what the journey of looking for Kierkegaard in Heidegger's first Freiburg period has offered. I will ask what this path shows about what Heidegger has been after: what does the question 'what is philosophy?' refer to? I will claim that this question leads back to the question of the proper mode of access. In addition, I will claim that Heidegger's own brief explicit thematizations of Kierkegaard confirm the central claims made in this thesis. When aiming to find an access within the living situation, Kierkegaard is an important source of impulses for Heidegger. Finally, I will address the question of which aspect of Kierkegaard's philosophy can be seen as central to Heidegger's interest in him. I will suggest that the examination of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path reveals the latter's interest in Kierkegaard's mastery in throwing the reader into questioning. Recognizing the need for questionability becomes decisive when considering philosophy in the concrete living situation, which rebels against fixed determinations. Encountering Kierkegaard, Heidegger cannot bypass this difficulty in his search for philosophy.

