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Paths towards philosophy : Søren Kierkegaard’s place in Martin Heidegger’s first Freiburg period lecture courses (1919-1923)

Kustassoo, K.

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Karin Kustassoo

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by

Karin Kustassoo

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first Freiburg period lecture courses (1919-1923)
Karin Kustassoo
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Promotor	Prof. dr. R.D.N. van Riessen
Co-promotor	Dr. R. Uljée

Promotiecommissie	Dr. F. Chouraqui, Universiteit Leiden
	Dr. L. Foran, University of Newcastle, United Kingdom
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	Prof. dr. G.J. van der Heiden, Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

1. Considering Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard 13
   1.1. Introduction 13
   1.2. Martin Heidegger's first Freiburg period 13
   1.3. Availability of Kierkegaard's writings (and secondary sources on Kierkegaard) to Heidegger 18
   1.4. Kierkegaard's overall presence in Heidegger's writings 21
   1.5. Relation of Heidegger and Kierkegaard in secondary literature 23
   1.6. The source materials and the basis of researching Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses 31
   1.7. Conclusion 34

PART ONE 37

2. The task of philosophy 41
   2.1. Introduction 41
   2.2. Traditional approaches to philosophy: philosophy as (scientific) worldview 43
   2.3. Thematic field reconsidered 48
      2.3.1. The question "Is there something" 49
      2.3.2. The lectern: introduction to environmental experience 52
      2.3.3. The pre-theoretical something 53
      2.3.4. Environmental experience versus objectifying theoretization 55
   2.4. The problem of the method 57
   2.5. Conclusion 64

3. Phenomenology as origin-understanding 67
   3.1. Introduction 67
   3.2. The basic characters of life in itself 69
   3.3. Science as a context of manifestation 72
   3.4. The possibility of philosophy as origin-understanding 76
      3.4.1. Self-world 76
      3.4.2. The character of meaningfulness 78
   3.5. Philosophy as origin-understanding 81

3.5.1. Attaining the self-world 82
3.5.2. Intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world and the significance of Kierkegaard 84
3.6. Conclusion 88

4. Phenomenology as a method: the three methodological moments 91
4.1. Introduction 91
4.2. Phenomenological-critical destruction 93
4.3. Phenomenological explication 97
4.4. Formal indication 103
4.5. The interpretations of the methodological moments 107
4.6. Kierkegaard's place and Heidegger's methodological consideration 111
4.7. Heidegger's two-directional philosophy 115
4.8. Conclusion 119

PART TWO 121
5. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course "Augustine and Neoplatonism" 125
5.1. Introduction 125
5.2. Heidegger's lecture course on Augustine 126
5.3. The path of explicating Augustine's *Confessions*, Book X 129
5.3.1. Motivational ground 129
5.3.2. Finding oneself in the search for God 130
5.3.3. Characters of Factical life 132
5.3.4. Having oneself before God 136
5.4. Kierkegaard's explicit presence in Heidegger's lecture course on Augustine 138
5.5. Excursion: "Sin is ignorance" – Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death* 142
5.6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course on Augustine 145
5.7. Conclusion 148

6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course "Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research" 151
6.1. Introduction 151
6.2. The problem situation and the structure of the lecture course 152
6.3. The path of unfolding philosophy in the lecture course on Aristotle 155
6.3.1 Definition of philosophy 155
6.3.2 Actualization and maturation of philosophy 159

6.4. Kierkegaard's explicit presence in Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle 168
6.5. Excursion: Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* 170
6.6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle 177
6.7. Conclusion 180

7. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course "Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity" 183
7.1. Introduction 183
7.2. The problem situation and the structure of the lecture course 184
7.3. Heidegger's path of hermeneutics of facticity 185
7.3.1. Redetermining ontology and phenomenology: the directives for hermeneutics of facticity 186
7.3.2. Being-interpreted in the today and being-there of Dasein 192
7.4. Kierkegaard's explicit presence in Heidegger's lecture course on hermeneutics of facticity 201
7.5. Excursion: Kierkegaard's "The Single Individual: Two „notes" concerning my work as an author" 203
7.6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course on hermeneutics of facticity 207
7.7. Conclusion 209

8. Søren Kierkegaard's place in Martin Heidegger's path of rethinking philosophy in his first Freiburg period 211
8.1. Introduction 211
8.2. Heidegger's quest of philosophy 212
8.3. Questioning Heidegger's estimation of Kierkegaard 215
8.4. Kierkegaard as a source of impulses 219

Concluding Remarks 225

Appendix One: Heidegger's loose page entitled "Sin" 229
Bibliography 231
Summary in Dutch 241
Summary in Estonian 249
Acknowledgments 257
Curriculum Vitae 259

Introduction

When wandering around the corridors of an institute of philosophy, one encounters a manifold of research areas. There is for example philosophy of science, of religion, of love, of mind, of education. What all these different fields have in common is that philosophy in these phrases denotes a certain activity which is directed to a specific subject matter. It is a peculiar activity as it makes a claim for a variety of different fields: perhaps all other fields. But what kind of activity is philosophy itself? What is philosophy?

Introducing philosophy to beginners, Thomas Nagel[1] suggests that the aim of philosophy is "to push our understanding of the world and ourselves a bit deeper" (Nagel 1987: 5). Nagel presents to his readers a number of questions asked in philosophy and offers ways to address these issues. The possibilities of addressing these problems are not put forward as solutions, but rather as something to be disagreed with on the basis of well-argued considerations. Philosophy for him is about asking questions which ordinarily are not thematized, and arguing over problems in order to deepen our understanding. Insofar as philosophy is about problematizing our ordinary understanding, Nagel's account of philosophy is similar to that of Deleuze and Guattari, who suggest that philosophy is a struggle against opinion (1994: 203).

Deleuze and Guattari[2] present the subject by stating that "[t]he question *what is philosophy?* can perhaps be posed only late in life, with the arrival of old age and the time for speaking concretely" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 1). They note that, before, there is too much "desire to *do* philosophy," (ibid.) perhaps in the way that Nagel in his book offers philosophy to beginners. Talking about philosophy concretely, they state that philosophy is not a contemplation or reflection or communication (op.cit.: 6). Instead, "[t]he object of philosophy is to create concepts that are always new" (op.cit.: 5). Philosophy is concept creation on the plane of immanence, that is, on "something *that does not exist outside philosophy*, although philosophy presupposes it" (op.cit.: 41). Philosophy is an immanent activity of laying out the plane and creating concepts within the limits of the plane which has been laid out (op.cit.: 77-79).

Although Deleuze and Guattari might indeed be right that the question about philosophy can or even should be posed late in life, this assessment does not apply to

[1] See Thomas Nagel (1987) *What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy*.
[2] See Deleuze and Guattari (1994) *What Is Philosophy*?

Martin Heidegger, one of the two thinkers at the center of this thesis. Only 29 years old and at the dawn of his philosophical career, he announces: "the core of the problem lies in philosophy itself – it is itself a problem" (GA 56/57: 10 [12]). At his young age he turns to the question of philosophy initially in order to tackle philosophy as a worldview: as a set of opinions. According to him, worldview must be seen to be unphilosophical "when it is set over against philosophy, and then only through the methodological tools of philosophy itself" (ibid.). His early aspiration to tackle philosophy with methodological tools echoes Deleuze and Guattari when they state: "[w]e require just a little order to protect us from chaos. Nothing is more distressing than a thought that escapes itself, than ideas that fly off, that disappear hardly formed, already eroded by forgetfulness or precipitated into others that we no longer master" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 201).

Philosophy's yearning to master the chaos, to gain some clarity, can be found in all the above-mentioned thinkers. At the same time, it becomes evident that for all of them this wish encounters resistance. Nagel does not give solutions. For Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy is a friend of wisdom, constantly seeking it, but never possessing it (op.cit.: 3). Instead of ordering the chaos, the philosopher must "plunge into the chaos," make a leap, as for example in their view was done by Søren Kierkegaard (op.cit.: 74, 202-203). For Kierkegaard, the second thinker at the center of this thesis, philosophy teaches that life is repetition (*Gjentagelse*) (R: 131 [III 173]). What becomes decisive for him is the concrete existing individual. If philosophy has a connection to life, which revolts against being fixed in abstract systems, it must be tackled again and again.

The recognition that philosophy has to be reconciled with concrete life comes out also in Heidegger's early lecture courses. Furthermore, like Kierkegaard before him, he announces that philosophy is repetition both by averring this directly (GA 61: 62 [80])[3] and through his presentation as he rethinks the question of philosophy over and again. And yet, in his path of rethinking philosophy an overwhelming desire to master the chaos is constantly present. In this way, he is faced with the question: how to reconcile the desire for clarity with the demands of concrete life? What is philosophy? This question will be repeatedly asked during this thesis, in which Heidegger's early development is under scrutiny, with the aim of finding Kierkegaard's place therein. As will be shown in this

[3] Thus, in his lecture on Aristotle Heidegger says: "'Repetition': everything depends on its sense. Philosophy is a basic mode of life itself, in such a way that it authentically 'brings back,' i.e., brings life back from its downward fall into decadence, and this 'bringing back' [or re-petition, re-seeking], as radical re-search, is life itself" (GA 61: 62 [80]).

thesis, Heidegger's quest for philosophy unfolds between the yearning for clarity and the demand to account for the living situation. Philosophy for him is distinct from what has been suggested by both Nagel as well as Deleuze and Guattari. It remains to be seen what kind of role Kierkegaard plays within Heidegger's struggles.

***

The theme of this thesis is Søren Kierkegaard's place in Martin Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. I will ask: what is Heidegger after in his first Freiburg period, where we find the very early development of his thought, and where does he turn to Kierkegaard?

With the aim of searching for Kierkegaard within Heidegger's first Freiburg period, this research seeks to offer new perspectives in two respects. First, it aims to contribute to the research of Heidegger's early development. Exploring young Heidegger's philosophy has been acknowledged as a promising research area for developing a more adequate understanding of Heidegger's philosophy (see for example Van Buren 2006: 19) and yet, due to the prolonged lack of access to the sources, it has gained the attention of Heidegger's researchers only in recent decades. As Scott M. Campbell pointed out just five years ago: "[t]here are currently three book-length analyses of the early Heidegger: *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* by Theodore Kisiel, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* by John van Buren, and *Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity* by Benjamin Crowe" (Campell 2012: xv). Secondly, although there are many researches into Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, there is currently not yet a study dedicated to the place of Kierkegaard in Heidegger's philosophy during his first Freiburg period: in the commencement of the latter's path in which, considering Heidegger's overall reluctance to mention Kierkegaard, a remarkable number of references to Kierkegaard are to be found.

The initial impetus for the present research was recognition that the research of Heidegger's early lecture courses promises new ways of understanding his philosophy, along with the fact that in his first Freiburg period lecture courses Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard on a noteworthy number of occasions. This led me to believe that exploration of Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard as it unfolds during this specific period of Heidegger's thought might lead to a better understanding of the themes which both of them invested in. And indeed, this hypothesis proved to be correct. As will be shown throughout this thesis, the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses has enabled me to pinpoint a number of themes and notions which both thinkers

thematize and develop. It allows further understanding of the notions which have already been in the spotlight of this research area (for example the notion of anxiety) and leads to the consideration of new connecting themes, as for example the notion of fate.

And yet, these concrete themes in themselves did not become the focal point of this thesis. What rather became a question was Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy seen from the latter's own problem situation during his early lecture courses. This question came to occupy a central position in this thesis, for it became clear that the consideration of specific themes relating the two thinkers is dependent on the researcher's attitude towards Heidegger's philosophy and the views on Kierkegaard's presence in his philosophy as such. First of all, it is not at all uncommon to ignore Kierkegaard when Heidegger's philosophy is researched. Secondly, if Kierkegaard is considered a source for Heidegger, his specific impact and the extent of his influence are highly debatable.

One of the main reasons behind the problem of considering Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard is what the researchers of this relation view as Heidegger's silence about Kierkegaard. This theme of silence refers to the situations where Kierkegaard's presence is found in Heidegger's writings without any explicit reference by the latter. For example, consider Heidegger's contemplation on his philosophical path. According to Heidegger's own reflection, this path has been led by a 'single thought' (see N I: 4 [475], GA 8: 50 [53]). When explicating this claim Otto Pöggeler states that initially Heidegger keeps his silence about what this thought is for him: "[h]e knew as well as Nietzsche that 'as soon as one communicates his knowledge, he no longer loves it well enough" (NI, 265f). […] Furthermore, each direct communication of that which is thought can again lead to misunderstanding" (Pöggeler: 1 [7-8]). Only years later, according to Pöggeler, does Heidegger express that traveling on the path of this single thought involves wandering in the neighborhood of Being (op.cit.: 2 [9]).

When one researches Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, as in the present thesis, this deliberation over keeping silence about the single thought stands out. The words catch the eye first of all because the claim of being led by a single thought can also be found in Kierkegaard, who said about himself: "[f]inally, for the sake of recollection, if a thinker can be engaged in concentrating and having concentrated all his intellectual activity in one single thought – this has been granted to me" (translation from PV: 265).[4] Similarly, as Pöggeler perhaps aims to indicate by the words "direct communication," a notion stemming

[4] On the similarities on the theme of a single thought see also Clare Carlisle 2013: 422.

from Kierkegaard, the argument for not revealing this thought (that is, when the thought is communicated, the love for it may be lost) is also to be found in Kierkegaard. Thus, for example, Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, discussing the explanation in relation to Christianity, argues: "[i]f any other understanding ever forces itself upon him [the concrete existing individual in his relation to Christianity, or the believer], he sees that he is about to lose his faith, just as a girl, when she has become the beloved's wife, upon discovering that it is easy to understand that she became this man's chosen one, ought to see that this explanation is easily understood as an indication that she is no longer in love" (CUP: 224-225 [VII 189]).

That these similar motives are found in Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), who precedes Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), raises the question whether Heidegger's foregoing reflections could have been influenced by Kierkegaard. On the one hand, since Heidegger does not mention Kierkegaard in this context, Kierkegaard's role can be easily rejected. Furthermore, since in general Heidegger seldom mentions Kierkegaard, it is possible to disregard Kierkegaard as a significant source for him. On the other hand, insofar as these reflections seem to lead to Kierkegaard, it is equally possible to claim that Heidegger is simply silent about Kierkegaard's impact on his thought. Furthermore, the claim of Heidegger's silence on Kierkegaard's influence can be seen as supported by the fact that Heidegger rarely mentions Kierkegaard and yet a number of motives similar to Kierkegaard are present in his writings. All in all, one thus finds oneself in a situation where Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger's philosophy can be questioned, accepted or rejected. Moreover, the controversial possibilities of accounting for Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy are not limited to those occasions where Kierkegaard seems to be silently present. The views on Kierkegaard's influence diverge even when Heidegger explicitly mentions him. In this respect, let me point to the example of another theme which will be central to this thesis: the problem of Heidegger's consideration of the philosophically proper mode of access or his methodology.

For the question whether Kierkegaard had any significant impact on Heidegger's development of his philosophical methodology can be roughly answered in two conflicting ways. On the one hand, it is not rare for Kierkegaard to be altogether ignored in connection with Heidegger's development of philosophy's proper mode of accessing its theme. It is rather accepted that when considering Heidegger's methodology, he is to be seen as a follower of Husserl: he belongs to the Husserlian phenomenological tradition and there is

no reason to talk of Kierkegaard's influence when thinking of Heidegger's methodology. On the other hand, there are number of researchers who do find that Kierkegaard has had an impact on Heidegger in his development of method. They cite for example Heidegger's review of Jaspers and his praise for Kierkegaard's consciousness of methodological rigor found there (GA 9: 101 [41]). With reference to Heidegger's acknowledgment of Kierkegaard, John van Buren has even said that "Heidegger's model regarding method is really Kierkegaard" (Van Buren 1989: 468). Insofar as in his review of Jaspers Heidegger does explicitly acknowledge Kierkegaard with respect to the issue of methodology, this example shows that accounting for Kierkegaard's significance does not depend only on whether Heidegger has mentioned Kierkegaard or not. In both cases one can find contradictory views.

For the present thesis, the fact that Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy is considered in contradictory ways leads to the question: what conditions such a difference in accounting for Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy? One of the central claims of this thesis is that the possibility of these conflicting approaches is conditioned not so much by Heidegger's silence about Kierkegaard as by the attitude taken towards Heidegger's philosophy. I will also claim that the attitude taken towards Heidegger's philosophy is in turn conditioned by Heidegger himself: he himself creates room for considering his philosophy in two very distinct ways. Furthermore, I will contend that in doing so Heidegger also conditions the possibility to consider Kierkegaard's role in his philosophy in different ways. In order to show that the approach towards Kierkegaard's significance for Heidegger is conditioned by Heidegger's philosophy, this thesis starts by scrutinizing Heidegger's early philosophy from his own problem situation and searches for Kierkegaard's place therein.

Looking for Kierkegaard's place in this thesis is needed also for another reason related to the previous problem. That is, largely due to the manner in which Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard, those who do consider Kierkegaard a source of influence on Heidegger face the question: what is the extent of this impact and how does one measure it? Vincent McCarthy for example points out that "[t]hose who want to argue for a major influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger must contend with the fact that Heidegger never devoted a single lecture to Kierkegaard, far less a lecture cycle as he did with Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Dilthey, and others" (McCarthy (2011: 124 n33). The statement that Heidegger does not dedicate *a* lecture (cycle) to Kierkegaard holds

true also for Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. But does this fact inevitably imply the need to reject Kierkegaard's strong influence on Heidegger?

One could counter this possible argument against Kierkegaard's substantial effect on Heidegger by referring to the silence Heidegger maintains with regard to certain themes as well as thinkers. It could be argued that the fact of not dedicating a lecture cycle to Kierkegaard is itself evidence of Kierkegaard's extreme importance for Heidegger, insofar as the silence could be considered a means of preserving the love for what is significant: in this case for Kierkegaard. However, taking this line of reasoning is dangerous. It can be asked how far can we take the argumentation of Heidegger's silence about certain subjects. McCarthy himself argues for Kierkegaard's importance to Heidegger by referring to specific notions in which the two thinkers clearly come together. Thus, his previously given statement continues with the words: "[s]till, a comparison of *The Concept of Anxiety* and the discussion of anxiety in *Being and Time* makes a powerful case for a major influence of Kierkegaard upon Heidegger in a very major category in Heidegger's thought" (McCarthy (2011: 124 n. 33). But does this mean that within Heidegger's overall aims Kierkegaard is simply a passer-by from whom Heidegger occasionally takes over or finds support for a theme he is interested in? Or is there something more to Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard? This issue will be addressed by looking for Kierkegaard's place throughout the lecture courses of Heidegger's first Freiburg period. Although Heidegger indeed does not dedicate even one subsection, still less a lecture, to Kierkegaard during his first Freiburg period, it will be shown that Kierkegaard does gain a specific place in Heidegger's path.

***

On the basis of the considerations given above, this thesis will undertake a thorough and radical examination of Heidegger's early development regarding his own problem situation and Kierkegaard's place in his early development.

Research into what Heidegger is after in his first Freiburg period reveals that this period is unique in many respects. Most importantly, it is striking that whereas traditionally Heidegger is known as a philosopher whose main question is directed to Being, this is not what he explicitly asks about in his first Freiburg period lecture courses. Rather, as I will show, throughout these lecture courses Heidegger's central and explicitly asked question is directed to philosophy: 'what is philosophy?' That this is the case does not entail a rejection of Heidegger's claim that he has traveled in the 'neighborhood of Being.' However, it does

mean that inquiry into philosophy gains a central place. This is the question which Heidegger repeatedly addresses and rethinks during the different lecture courses of his first Freiburg period.

The answers which Heidegger offers to this explicitly asked question lead to the central claim of this thesis. I will claim that Heidegger rethinks philosophy in two directions and gives two different accounts of philosophy. Or as I will put it, he unfolds his problem in two directions: he is on a two-directional path. The claim that Heidegger is on a two-directional path does not mean that philosophy for Heidegger must pursue multiple spheres. Rather, this claim suggests that he takes up two different modes of accessing what philosophy must aim at. On the one hand, philosophy as it is actualized is philosophizing, a mode of access in the living situation. On the other hand, philosophy is about a proper methodology for accessing and expressing its subject matter: it is a mode of investigation. Showing that Heidegger develops his philosophy in both of these directions is decisive with respect to accounting for Kierkegaard's place in this path. That is, as I will claim and exhibit in different chapters of this thesis, Kierkegaard appears in one of these directions: when Heidegger considers access in the living situation.

Recognition of the fact that Heidegger leads his philosophy in two directions and that Kierkegaard appears in one of these directions enables us explain both the controversial approaches to Kierkegaard's influence to Heidegger's philosophy and the level of the impact itself. First of all, as I will argue, considering Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy depends on what kind of stance is taken towards Heidegger's philosophy. In order to show this, I will highlight two dominant approaches to Heidegger with respect to the question of his method. As examples of these two stances towards Heidegger's philosophy I will consider the approaches of Theodore Kisiel and Søren Overgaard. I will claim that these approaches differ with respect to what is considered to be the focus of Heidegger's philosophy. By arguing that Heidegger develops philosophy in two directions, I will claim that each of the two approaches to his philosophy emphasizes either one or the other side of what Heidegger puts forth. In this way, the possibility of having two very distinct accounts of Heidegger's philosophy is shown to be conditioned by Heidegger himself. That Heidegger's philosophy is approached in two distinct ways depending on which side of his consideration of philosophy is given primacy, together with the fact that Kierkegaard appears in one of those sides, thus enables us to account for the different takes on Kierkegaard role in Heidegger's philosophy. On the one hand, Kierkegaard is

considered a significant source for Heidegger. On the other hand, Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy is more or less ignored. Insofar as Heidegger is shown to offer scope for both of these approaches, it is thus possible to gain insight into how Heidegger himself preconditions two contradictory accounts of Kierkegaard's significance to him.

However, even when we acknowledge that Heidegger himself creates these different possibilities and establish that Kierkegaard appears when Heidegger considers philosophy in the living situation, the extent of Kierkegaard's influence may still be questioned. As was brought out previously, Heidegger does not give a compact account of Kierkegaard during his first Freiburg period lecture courses. Instead, he only occasionally names or quotes Kierkegaard, mostly without giving any further explanation of why Kierkegaard has been mentioned. Nevertheless, I will claim that analysis of Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard leads to recognition of the latter's strong impact on Heidegger's philosophy. Through this thesis I will exhibit that Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard within a specific sphere of questioning, regardless of to whom he has dedicated his lectures. In this respect, the extent of Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger can be shown not to depend on whether Heidegger dedicates *a* lecture to Kierkegaard or not. What instead speaks loudly for Kierkegaard's significance is the fact that Kierkegaard is present regardless of to whom the lecture is dedicated. Furthermore, it is important that Kierkegaard appears in Heidegger's different lecture courses although Heidegger develops and rethinks his account of philosophy throughout his path during his first Freiburg period. Thus, the analysis of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses leads me to argue in the following chapters that Kierkegaard for Heidegger is not simply a companion from whom he randomly borrows some notions and themes, but a central source of inspiration with respect to philosophy as it is actualized. Kierkegaard appears as soon as Heidegger faces the difficult task of accounting for philosophy in a concrete living situation.

***

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter I will address the issues involved in the consideration of Heidegger's first Freiburg period and of his relation to Kierkegaard: I will explain what is meant by Heidegger's first Freiburg period; bring out the availability of Kierkegaard's works for Heidegger as well as specific sources used in this thesis; thematize Kierkegaard's overall presence in Heidegger's different writings; and outline how the relation between Kierkegaard and Heidegger has been interpreted in the secondary literature. My aim here is first of all to bring out the problems which surround

the consideration of the relation between these two thinkers and to draw out the specifics of the approach I will take in my search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses.

The following six chapters are dedicated to Heidegger's lecture courses in chronological order and are gathered into two parts. This division comes about first of all from the manner in which Heidegger unfolds his problematic in specific lecture courses and from Kierkegaard's presence in these lecture courses. By separating Heidegger's lectures into two parts, my aim is to bring out clearly Heidegger's problematic and its development as well as Kierkegaard's position in his lecture courses.

In the first part, I will establish that Heidegger takes up the questioning of philosophy in two directions and how he does this. In this part, the focus is on Heidegger's lecture courses from 1919 to the winter semester of 1920-21. Starting with Heidegger's lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* (KNS 1919, in GA 56/57), I first claim that Heidegger steers his quest for philosophy in two directions: he articulates the task of proper philosophy by suggesting two different modes of accessing. Furthermore, I will claim that in doing so he makes possible two dominant ways of interpreting his philosophy. In the following two chapters, I argue that Heidegger takes up both of these directions one after another in his subsequent lecture courses. First (in chapter three), I will show that in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (WS 1919/20, GA 58) he considers the possibility of philosophy in the living situation. I will claim that proper philosophy in this lecture course is articulated as intensifying-concentration upon the self-world. In this lecture course Kierkegaard is mentioned for the first time by Heidegger. He appears as a thinker whom Heidegger regards as bringing to life this proper mode of accessing. After that (in chapter four), primarily on the basis of the lecture courses *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation* (SS 1920, GA 59) and the beginning of *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* (WS 1920-21, in GA 60), I will argue that Heidegger then turns to consideration of philosophy as an investigation by focusing on the question of methodology. I will claim that Heidegger describes philosophical investigation through three methodological moments (phenomenological destruction, phenomenological explication and formal indication). Having outlined these three methodological moments, I turn back to the two dominant modes of interpreting Heidegger's philosophy and show where the difference between them lies. I assert that the interpretations differ with respect to giving primacy to

different sense directions which Heidegger has pointed to: relational sense and actualizational sense. My central claim is that Heidegger himself develops his philosophy in both of these sense directions and thus conditions two different approaches to him which give primacy to one or the other direction. That this is the case will be reaffirmed in the second part of this thesis, in which Kierkegaard's presence becomes more prominent.

In the second part, I will analyze Heidegger's three lecture courses from 1921 to 1923: a lecture course on Augustine (GA 60), on Aristotle (GA 61) and on hermeneutics of facticity (GA 63). I will show that in each lecture course under view Heidegger rethinks philosophy, each time considering two modes of access, both of which are always developed further. That this is the case becomes evident when analyzing Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard. By focusing on Kierkegaard's place in each of the three lecture courses analyzed in three chapters, I will exhibit that each time Kierkegaard proves significant to Heidegger as soon as he turns to accounting for philosophy in the living situation. Furthermore, I will show that Kierkegaard occurs in each lecture course, regardless of whom the lecture is dedicated to or how the account of philosophy is developed by Heidegger.

In the final chapter of this thesis, I will reflect on what the journey of looking for Kierkegaard in Heidegger's first Freiburg period has offered. I will ask what this path shows about what Heidegger has been after: what does the question 'what is philosophy?' refer to? I will claim that this question leads back to the question of the proper mode of access. In addition, I will claim that Heidegger's own brief explicit thematizations of Kierkegaard confirm the central claims made in this thesis. When aiming to find an access within the living situation, Kierkegaard is an important source of impulses for Heidegger. Finally, I will address the question of which aspect of Kierkegaard's philosophy can be seen as central to Heidegger's interest in him. I will suggest that the examination of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path reveals the latter's interest in Kierkegaard's mastery in throwing the reader into questioning. Recognizing the need for questionability becomes decisive when considering philosophy in the concrete living situation, which rebels against fixed determinations. Encountering Kierkegaard, Heidegger cannot bypass this difficulty in his search for philosophy.

1. Considering Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard

1.1. Introduction

Whenever the subject of the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard comes up, a peculiar situation emerges. On the one hand, there is a shared opinion that Heidegger is greatly indebted to Kierkegaard, a view supported by Heidegger's own admissions. On the other hand, again going back to Heidegger himself, there seems to be no clarity on the extent of this indebtedness or even on where this debt exactly lies. This ambiguity concerning Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard reaches a point where his silence about Kierkegaard has become notorious and problematic in itself.

Research into the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard has mainly taken its point of departure from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and his subsequent writings. However, the opportunity to access Heidegger's earliest lecture courses has opened up the possibility of looking afresh at the relation. Taking up this possibility is the task of the present research. The theme of this research is Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period. But what is meant by Heidegger's first Freiburg period and how should we consider Kierkegaard's place in it?

In this chapter, I unfold the issues involved in the two angles of the theme addressed by the present thesis. First, I outline what is meant by Heidegger's first Freiburg period. Then, I concentrate on the problem of the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard – first I touch upon the publication history of Kierkegaard's works in Germany, second I show Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's writing, and finally I outline how this presence is interpreted in the secondary sources. As will be shown, Heidegger's stance toward Kierkegaard is quite ambiguous and considering Heidegger in relation to Kierkegaard is a task with a number of problems. In this chapter, my aim is not to resolve the issues concerning Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard. Rather, I aim to highlight the relational problem itself and thereby obtain clear outlines for the approach taken in this thesis.

1.2. Martin Heidegger's first Freiburg period

My aim is to elucidate Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy as it begins to emerge within Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. But what does it mean to

talk about Heidegger's first Freiburg period? In the present thesis, I consider Heidegger's first Freiburg period to be the period between the years 1919 and 1923. This is the period of his earliest available lecture courses as a *privatdocent* at the University of Freiburg – a period starting from the time when he made a turn to what can be called his own philosophy until his lecture course entitled *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity* (summer semester 1923) in which he articulates directly for the first time his hermeneutics of facticity. Delimiting a period in Heidegger's philosophy in this manner is somewhat artificial and highly relative, although there are reasons for doing so. In addition, my naming of this period is somewhat unconventional – I call Heidegger's path during this period a path of rethinking philosophy.

Traditionally, Heidegger's legacy has been divided into two or three periods. In both cases, with the point of departure in Heidegger's earliest period, the emphasis is usually put on Heidegger's so-called "turn" (*die Kehre*), which is interpreted as a shift in Heidegger's thought in the 1930s.[5] Heidegger's philosophy before the turn centers around his *magnum opus Sein und Zeit* (1927) and is known as the period of the 'early Heidegger.' With the publication of Heidegger's writings preceding *Sein und Zeit*, this manner of periodizing can be called into question. There is reason to talk about a classification within Heidegger's earliest writings starting from his student years up to the year 1919, his first Freiburg lecture courses (1919-1923), and the Marburg period lecture courses (1923-1927). This last period ends with Heidegger's first major publication *Sein und Zeit* followed by his return to the University of Freiburg as a professor of philosophy, where he took over the chair of philosophy from Edmund Husserl.

Heidegger's written legacy goes back to his theological studies at the University of Freiburg.[6] During his earliest years, Heidegger's education was dedicated to preparations for becoming a Catholic (later Jesuit) priest. Thus, as a natural progression, when Heidegger entered the University of Freiburg in 1909, he took up the study of theology. However, after four semesters, in the middle of 1911, he left his theological studies (or rather: the

[5] About the misinterpretation and confusion over Heidegger's *Kehre*, see Thomas Sheehan 2000 and 2010.

[6] A detailed overview of Heidegger's school years along with a thorough overview of Heidegger's studies and reading at the time can be found in Sheehan's article "Heidegger's *Lehrjahre*". In the article Sheehan, in commenting on Heidegger's CV from 1915, divides Heidegger's school years as follows (Sheehan 1988: 82):
"I. *1895 to 1909, age 6-19:* Grammar school and high school, culminating in the baccalaureate.
II. *1909 to 1911, age 20-21:* First phase of higher education: Theological studies at Freiburg University.
III. *1911 to 1913, age 22-23:* Second phase of higher education: Study of mathematics, natural sciences, and philosophy at Freiburg University, culminating in the inaugural dissertation and the Ph.D. in philosophy.
IV. *1913 to 1915, age 22-25:* Preparation of the qualifying dissertation for the *Habilitation* at Freiburg University."

department of theology) at the University of Freiburg and turned to the study of philosophy. During the second part of his university studies, Heidegger's main interest is neo-Kantian philosophy, together with transcendental value-philosophy (Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask) (Kisiel 1995: 18). Transcendental-value philosophy, which emerges in the earliest published lecture courses as his constant object of criticism, is initially Heidegger's breeding ground, with its highpoint of influence being reached in his post-doctoral work (Kisiel 1995: 25). A second important source is Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Heidegger already starts to read Husserl during his theological studies at the University of Freiburg, makes his acquaintance in 1916 and consequently becomes his assistant in 1919 (until 1923). Husserl, who can be considered the greatest influence on Heidegger, is, at the same time, from the very beginning, the main partner for dialogue and the opponent to be attacked.

By the year 1919, there is a radical change in Heidegger's views. He both breaks with the Catholic Church and starts to distance himself from the views of his teachers in philosophy. On 9th of January 1919, Heidegger sends a letter to Engelbert Krebs in which he expresses his devotion to philosophy and with reference to his philosophical insights renounces "the *system* of Catholicism": "[e]pistemological insights that extend to the theory of historical knowledge have made the *system* of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me – but not Christianity and metaphysics, which, however, [I now understand] in a new sense." At the same time, Heidegger adds: "even though I have transformed my basic standpoint, I have refused to be dragged into abandoning my objective high opinion and regard for the Catholic lifeworld or into mouthing the vacuous polemics of an embittered apostate" ("Letter to Engelbert Krebs on His Philosophical Conversion": 96).

The change in Heidegger's religious convictions echoes the change taking place in his understanding of philosophy. He turns to criticize both the neo-Kantian tradition as well as Husserl.[7] He ventures on a path which is widely accepted as a breakthrough in his thinking towards a philosophy which may be said to be his own. Thus, for example, Dorothea Frede, although acknowledging the important thoughts developed during the student years, describes Heidegger's first major works as nothing out of the ordinary:

[7] While Heidegger's relation to Husserl unfolds in problematic steps, his relation to the neo-Kantian tradition is demarcated more clearly. He starts to distance himself from the neo-Kantian tradition by 1917 and ultimately makes his break with their views clearly known in 1919 when holding the lecture course *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Values* [*Phänomenologie und Transzendentale Wertphilosophie*], where Heidegger says that he aims at a "*phenomenological critique* of transcendental philosophy of values" (GA 56/57: 97 [127]).

> His early work, if not actually dull, is at least rather conventional and must look at first blush as of historical interest at best. Neither his thesis, "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism" (1913), nor his monograph, *The Theory of Categories and Meaning of Duns Scotus* (1915), would seem to promise great originality, let alone revolutionary thinking. Had Heidegger done no more, he would rightly have vanished without a trace in the archives. (Frede 2006: 46)[8]

Historically perhaps interesting, but nothing more – a devastating assessment at first sight. However, it is to be agreed with insofar as the ground of Frede's assessment lies in the search for Heidegger as a philosopher in his own right. This breakthrough has been traced to his 1919 lecture courses. It marks Heidegger's embarkment on his own philosophical course, or as Kovacs puts it: from the texts of 1919 the readers can see "the emergence of Heidegger's own philosophy" (Kovacs 1994: 92-93).[9] It is widely accepted that Heidegger takes up a path of his own in his KNS (*Kriegsnotsemester*, War Emergency Semester) lecture course. Similarly, it is often accepted that this breakthrough can be seen as a breakthrough towards *Sein und Zeit*. Thus, for example in his *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, Theodore Kisiel asks: "[w]here does BT really begin?," and answers: "[i]t all began in KNS 1919, in the upshot of the effort 'to go all out after the factic' by finding a method to approach it" (Kisiel 1995: 21). With this view, common to both Frede and Kisiel among many others, Heidegger's earlier writings (those from 1919) assume importance as the development towards *Sein und Zeit*. Often this means simultaneously that Heidegger is considered to be engaged with one central question throughout his early period.[10]

A somewhat opposing view to the previous one is expressed by John van Buren,[11] who says in his article "The young Heidegger and phenomenology":

> I would thus like to present a re-constructive reading of his youthful phenomenological apprenticeship between the years 1919 and 1926. More specifically, I want to argue, first, that his [Heidegger's] youthful, phenomenological *Denkweg* in the early twenties is a unique period in his development and thus cannot be absorbed into either his *Being and Time* or his later writings, as he himself and others have attempted to do; second, I want to argue further that the young Heidegger had already worked out the themes of the "question of being," the "turn," the "end of philosophy," and the "other beginning,"

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[8] The original titles of the mentioned thesis and habilitation (teaching qualification dissertation) are: *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* and *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik* (both in GA 1).

[9] The texts to which Kovacs is referring to are Heidegger's lecture courses gathered in Heidegger's GA 56/57.

[10] Thus, for example, Jeff Malpas periodizes Heidegger's thought around the central subject of Being as follows: 1) the early period, which is centered on the "meaning of being" (1910s and 1920s), 2) the middle period, which is centered around the "truth of being" (1930s and 1940s), 3) the late period, where the "place of being" comes to the fore (from mid-1940s onward) (Malpas 2006: 2-3). Kisiel puts the beginning of the so-called early Heidegger in 1919 (until 1929), as distinct from the so-called young Heidegger (1909-1919) (Kisiel 1995: xiii).

[11] The conviction that Heidegger's early writings have a distinct meaning is repeated by Van Buren again and again. Thus, in "The Earliest Heidegger: A New Field of Research," John van Buren starts by saying: "[t]he rediscovery of the earliest Heidegger, made possible by the recent publication of his hitherto virtually forgotten writings before his 1927 *Being and Time*, has today led to a new field of Heidegger scholarship and changed the whole face of Heidegger studies. We now understand this thinker much differently than we did a decade ago." (Van Buren 2006: 19)

> of which the last-mentioned are often thought to belong exclusively to his later period after 1930; […] On the whole, I wish to show that, in allowing us to see all this, his youthful lecture courses offer a new and more adequate way of reading and appropriating his entire thought. (Van Buren 1990: 239-240)

Like Kisiel and Frede above, Van Buren agrees that Heidegger's first Freiburg period is a period of a development – it is a path.[12] However, in opposition to the previous accounts, Van Buren expresses a conviction that when we are talking about the earliest Heidegger we have a distinct period on our hands – a period which at the same time offers much towards an understanding of Heidegger's later writings.

In my reading of Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses I tend to agree to a certain extent with both aforementioned views. On the one hand, and especially with the focus on Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's early lecture courses (but not limited to this focus), it can be clearly shown that the period under question has distinctive features and at the same time offers many possibilities for a better understanding of what is found in Heidegger's later writings. On the other hand, because it is a period of development, it can be considered a path towards a destination. However, it can be also seen as a path developing from somewhere. This is how I will approach Heidegger's first Freiburg period: as a path in its own right on to which Heidegger steps in his 1919 lecture courses. I will call this path a path of rethinking philosophy.

To call Heidegger's first Freiburg period a path of rethinking philosophy is somewhat controversial. One could easily claim that Heidegger's main concern at the time was facticity or even (the meaning of) being. Thus, Theodore Kisiel, arguing that Heidegger's path during the first Freiburg period was a path towards *Sein und Zeit*, says:

> It all began in KNS 1919, in the upshot of the effort "to go all out after factic" by finding a method to approach it. The breakthrough to the topic is a double play of matter and method, What and How, drawn to a point where they are one and the same: a hermeneutic of facticity. (Kisiel 1995: 21)

With the claim that Heidegger's first Freiburg period is a path of rethinking philosophy, I do not aim to lessen the importance of the question of facticity. To a certain extent Kisiel's words, which stress the continuity of the path towards *Sein und Zeit*, illustrate perfectly Heidegger's whole path during his first Freiburg period. Throughout this path, Heidegger is aiming to find a proper access to his thematic field and by the end of his first Freiburg period he reaches a hermeneutics of facticity. By calling this path a path of rethinking philosophy, I want to bring out the peculiarity of Heidegger's first Freiburg period, namely that Heidegger's consideration unfolds through an explicit turn to the question of

[12] The consideration of Heidegger's earliest thinking as a way or a path stems from Otto Pöggeler and is widely accepted (see Pöggeler 1990 [1963]: 2-3 [8-11]).

philosophy. This question is rethought in each lecture course, in which philosophy is articulated as pre-theoretical primal science, as original science of life in itself, as phenomenological ontology and finally as hermeneutics of facticity, which is then said not to be philosophy at all. Furthermore, by stressing this explicitly addressed question, I wish to highlight that Heidegger's rethinking of philosophy unfolds in two directions insofar as proper access is sought. In this respect philosophy is also regarded as intensifying concentration and as repetition. In addition, if we see Heidegger's first Freiburg period as a path of rethinking philosophy, which from his 1919 lecture course is led by him into a two-directional path, this enables us to show where and how Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard and makes use of the latter's writings available to him.

1.3. Availability of Kierkegaard's writings (and secondary sources on Kierkegaard) to Heidegger

From Heidegger's own words, we know that he already started to read Kierkegaard's works during his student years between 1910 and 1914.[13] By that time Heidegger could access a noteworthy part of Kierkegaard's writings translated into German. The translation of Kierkegaard's works into the German language already started in 1861 (Himmelstrup 1962: 25) and before the turn of the century a considerable number of Kierkegaard's writings had been translated.[14] Heidegger's theological background plays an important part in his acquaintance with Kierkegaard, as at the time mainly theologians knew and read Kierkegaard's translated works.[15] With respect to Heidegger's access to Kierkegaard's writings translated into German, the work of Christopher Schrempf and Theodore Haecker [Häcker] have central importance.

The real breakthrough in Kierkegaard becoming more broadly known in Germany took place when Kierkegaard's collected works in twelve volumes (consisting of fifteen

[13] Thus, Heidegger himself places his reading of Kierkegaard at the time of his school years in Freiburg: "[w]hat the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequately expressed. I can only indicate it by a selective enumeration: the second edition of Nietzsche's *Wille zur Macht*, [reprinted with scholarly notes in 1911], expanded to twice the size of the original [1906] edition; the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in translation; my awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling; Rilke's works and Trakl's poems; Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften* [1914ff.]." (GA 1: [x], translation with remarks from Sheehan 1988: 97-98)

[14] Thus, already before the turn of the century most of Kierkegaard's so-called edifying discourses (and not only edifying writings) were translated separately by Albert Bärthold (see Himmelstrup 1962: 25-28). How many of them were known to Heidegger, if any, has not come to my attention so far.

[15] The wider publication in the sphere of theological studies (taking into account both Kierkegaard's own works and commentaries on his works) can be clearly traced in Himmelstrup's *Kierkegaard International Bibliography* (Himmelstrup 1962: 25-28, 111ff.).

writings) were published during 1909-1922.[16] Although the translations of the Schrempf collection are considered to be highly questionable by current standards, to put it mildly, this collection, nevertheless, made Kierkegaard accessible for German readers.[17] Before the publication of these works, Kierkegaard was hardly known in Germany. In connection with the present study, the importance of these works lay not only in the fact that Kierkegaard was introduced to German readers, but also in the fact that these collected works, mostly translated by Schrempf himself, are the ones which Heidegger mainly refers to in his lecture courses when he is indicating Kierkegaard's primary text. Thus, during his first Freiburg period Heidegger quotes the Schrempf edition (not all translated by Schrempf) of Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*, *Practice in Christianity* (both in GA 61), *The Sickness unto Death*, and *The Concept of Anxiety* (both in GA 60).[18] Also, he quotes Schrempf's and Dorner's translation of Kierkegaard's *"The Single Individual": Two "Notes" Concerning My Work As An Author* [entitled in German *"Der Einzelne", zwei Bemerkungen zu meiner Schriftstellerischen Thätigkeit*] from the collection of Kierkegaard's later writings *Kierkegaards Angriff auf die Christenheit* ('*Kierkegaard's Attack upon Christendom*')[19] (in GA 63).

In addition to Christoph Schrempf's work, a significant role in connection with Heidegger's reading of Kierkegaard was played by Theodore Haecker [Häcker].[20] It is known that Heidegger had access to Theodor Haecker's translations of Kierkegaard's works, which started to appear in 1914 in *Der Brenner* – an Austrian periodical of which Heidegger had been a subscriber since 1911 (Janik 1984: 220). Via Haecker's translations Heidegger had access to, for example, Kierkegaard's journals, which he quotes in his

[16] Søren Kierkegaard: *Gesammelte Werke*, vols. 1-12. Ed. by Christoph Schrempf. Jena: Diederichs, 1909-1922. The collected works had appeared almost completely by 1914 (except for two volumes, the tenth and the eleventh).

[17] Referring to the words of Hannah Arendt and Paul Tillich, Marcia Morgan has stated that in the 1880s Kierkegaard was all but unknown in Germany. In addition, she has pointed out the inadequacy of the translations by Christoph Schrempf by referring to Kiefhaber's words: "[g]rave deficiencies of the Schrempf and Gottsched edition lay, above all, in Kierkegaard's difficult philosophical texts and short works. It is therefore no surprise that, as already mentioned, this edition received little attention in the early reception and research. The translators were obviously overwhelmed by the deft syntax of Kierkegaardian dialectic, such that they made fairly considerable abridgements and inserted chance formulations (Kiefhaber, 26. [Martin Kiefhaber, *Christentum als Korrektiv*, Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald Verlag, 1997, 26])." (Morgan 2003: 2) Similarly, according to Adam Buben, "Schrempf is notorious for his inaccurate translations and interpretations" (Buben 2011: 167-251).

[18] Entitled in German: *Entweder/Oder*, *Einübung im Christentum*, *Die Krankheit zum Tode*, *Der Begriff der Angst*.

[19] The collection has been partly translated by Walter Lowrie. However, Lowrie's collection entitled *Kierkegaard's Attack upon Christendom* does not include Kierkegaard's "The Single Individual."

[20] About Theodore Haeckers's role in translating Kierkegaard into the German language, see also Markus Kleinert (2013: 91-114) and Gerhard Thonhauser (2014: 331-334).

lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity* (GA 63: 13 [16-17]). Additionally, through *Der Brenner* he had access to Kierkegaard's *Kritik der Gegenwart* ('*Critique of the Presence*,' published for the first time in July 1914 in *Der Brenner* and consists of the translation of parts of Kierkegaard's *A Literary Review*).

In the 1950s, the second published collected works of Kierkegaard's writings by Emanuel Hirsch took over the position of Schrempf's collection. As with Schrempf's edition before him, Hirsch's translations were considered to be the most reliable source of Kierkegaard's translations for a certain period of time. Note that this estimation has long been re-evaluated by now. These early translations are considered to be of dubious value. Since Hirsch's first translation of Kierkegaard's text "To Need God Is a Human Being's Highest Perfection" (entitled in German *Gottes bedürfen ist des Menschen höchste Vollkommenheit*) was published in 1923 (Wilke 2012: 164), his translations do not play any role for this present study. Nevertheless, Emanuel Hirsch was the leading Kierkegaard scholar of his time and played an important role in making Kierkegaard known in Germany (especially) amongst theologians, even before his translations were published. It is important to notice that together with Kierkegaard's own works, Heidegger would have had access to secondary literature about Kierkegaard, where it can be assumed that Heidegger's background in theological studies made the secondary studies on Kierkegaard more familiar for him.

On the philosophical side it can be said that Heidegger himself, besides Karl Jaspers, was the central figure in bringing Kierkegaard into the philosophical discourse in Germany at the beginning of the century. At the same time, Heidegger was already influenced in his reading of Kierkegaard by Jasper's work. The fact that Heidegger was not only familiar with but also intensively worked through Jaspers's view of Kierkegaard becomes apparent from Heidegger's review of Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* [*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*],[21] in which Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard on four different occasions (JR: 78-79, 90, 100, 101 [10-11, 27, 40, 41]).[22]

[21] For more about Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard through Jaspers's work, see Vincent McCarthy 2011.
[22] In the review of Karl Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews*, Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard on four different occasions. On each occasion, it may be presumed, Heidegger is dealing with Jaspers's approach to Kierkegaard. In doing so, Heidegger criticizes Jaspers's understanding of Kierkegaard. Thus, for example, Heidegger comments on Jasper's stance towards Kierkegaard by saying: "[t]hough a student of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Jaspers displays in this section a very rare talent and energy, giving these free play in his breakdown and treatment of 'psychical state' and compiling the respective phenomena in a valuable, even if only classificatory, manner" (JR: 78-79 [11]).

1.4. Kierkegaard's overall presence in Heidegger's writings

Although Kierkegaard's works in German at the time were of dubious quality by current standards, it is clear that Heidegger had access to and made use of this access to Kierkegaard's writings. That Heidegger intensively read Kierkegaard's books accessible to him in the German language becomes mainly clear through the short but nevertheless numerous remarks he makes on Kierkegaard throughout his works. However, Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's writings can be found in different forms. I distinguish three forms of Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's writings:[23] 1) one longer treatment of a part of Kierkegaard's philosophy, 2) short remarks in which Heidegger gives an estimation of Kierkegaard or mentions him (by name or through quotation), 3) Kierkegaard's presence in philosophical and methodological structures, motives, and attitudes which are recognizably similar to Kierkegaard's philosophy or reducible to it (further named as the level of motives or structures).

Throughout his works, Heidegger explicitly takes up Kierkegaard in only one longer treatment. That is, in *Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus* (*'Metaphysics of German Idealism'* GA 49: 19-75) from 1941, there are two sections in which Heidegger talks about Kierkegaard: *Der Existenzbegriff Kierkegaards* (*'Kierkegaard's concept of Existence,'* § 10) and *Kierkegaard, "Existenzphilosophie" und "Sein und Zeit"* (1927) (*'Kierkegaard, "Philosophy of Existence" and "Being and Time",'* § 11). This longer thematization of Kierkegaard by Heidegger is both noteworthy and dubious at the same time.

Heidegger's longer treatment of Kierkegaard is noteworthy and exceptional with respect to Heidegger's general and notorious silence concerning Kierkegaard throughout his life. The situation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that in his contribution to a conference dedicated to the 150th anniversary of Kierkegaard's birth ("Kierkegaard vivant," held in Paris in 1964), which bears the title "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" [*Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens*], Heidegger does not even mention Kierkegaard's name. This situation, where Kierkegaard seems to be present somewhere in the background, without Heidegger explicitly mentioning him, is paradigmatic of Heidegger's treatment of Kierkegaard. Furthermore, on the occasions when Heidegger does explicitly mention Kierkegaard, he tends to leave much room for interpretation or even presents his estimations of Kierkegaard in such a way that his words become questionable.

[23] For this distinction I have previously argued in Kustassoo 2008.

It is well known that in those brief moments where Heidegger does mention Kierkegaard in his writings, he does so in a highly controversial way. On the one hand, Heidegger seems to have a great appreciation of Kierkegaard. On the other hand, he is quite reluctant to acknowledge Kierkegaard's influence on his work in general. Rather, he seems to emphasize strongly the difference between himself and Kierkegaard, who for him is not a thinker, but a "religious writer" (GA 5: 186 [249]). Thus, according to Heidegger, although Kierkegaard in his analysis of anxiety "has gone farthest," he nevertheless only stays within the "theological context of a 'psychological' exposition of the problem of original sin" (SuZ: 492 n. iv [190 n. 1]), and although Kierkegaard "has seen the *existentiell* phenomenon of the moment of vision with the most penetration," he nevertheless "clings to the ordinary concept of time" (SuZ: 497 n. iii [338 n. 1]). Furthermore, Kierkegaard is judged by Heidegger as being confined within a Hegelian framework and as having nothing to say about the question of being (GA 8: 213 [216]; SuZ 494 n. vi [235 n. 1]).

These contradictory estimations of Heidegger, along with Heidegger's reluctance to refer to Kierkegaard, have created a situation in which Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's philosophy is to be considered on the level of similarities in structures and motives. This usually entails a great deal of "scholarly detective work," as Clare Carlisle has put it (Carlisle 2013: 422).

Since, however, one cannot have first-hand clarity about Kierkegaard's presence on the level of motives, one is initially left with short remarks in which Heidegger just mentions Kierkegaard. Thus, at least a starting point for researching the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard is taken from short remarks in which Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard explicitly. Most of the time the interpreters focus on the few references Heidegger makes to Kierkegaard in *Sein und Zeit* (there are altogether three allusions to Kierkegaard there) and in some passages from his later writings.[24] However, as Gerhard Thonhauser has already pointed out, the actual number of passages in which Heidegger takes up Kierkegaard is higher than commonly thought, although they cover only a few themes.[25] While Thonhauser mainly concentrates on Heidegger's writing after *Sein und Zeit*

[24] Gerhard Thonhauser has shown that Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard is based usually on three sources, which in addition to the passages from *Sein und Zeit* include one quotation from the essay "Nietzsche's Word 'God is dead'" (see GA 5: 186 [249]) and another quotation from a lecture series *What is Called Thinking?* (see GA 8: 213 [216]) (Thonhauser 2013: 2).

[25] Gerhard Thonhauser refers to six different texts published during Heidegger's lifetime in which Kierkegaard is mentioned: GA 2 (*Sein und Zeit*), "Nietzsche's Word 'God is Dead'" in GA 5, GA 8 (*What is Called Thinking?*), "Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics" (named by Thonhauser in German: "Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik") included in GA 6.2, "Comments on Karl Jasper's

(admittedly, he also mentions a few passages preceding *Sein und Zeit*), it will be shown in the present thesis that a look into Heidegger's earliest lecture courses also exposes a number of new passages in which Kierkegaard is mentioned by Heidegger. Within the published lecture courses given by Heidegger during his first Freiburg period, together with the review of Karl Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* [*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*], there are 19 different contexts in which Heidegger directly names or mentions Kierkegaard. Notably, Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard in his early Freiburg period also reveal a wide range of themes in which the two thinkers can be brought together. I will return to this subject later. For the moment, however, I will focus on how the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard has been researched. Considering the controversies about the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard and the actual extent of Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's writings, it is no wonder that the relation has grabbed the attention of many researchers.

1.5. Relation of Heidegger and Kierkegaard in secondary literature

Since decades, the aim to establish that Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger is traceable and even considerable has taken the form of a detailed analysis of different issues in which the two thinkers are brought together. Looking back, one notices that, through time, the comparisons move from searching for similarities (while the influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger is still claimed to be largely unacknowledged) to more detailed accounts in which the focus turns towards the differences between them (within the acknowledgment of strong similarities) and then back again to similarities on a new level. That is, one notices that attention moves increasingly to structural similarities, regardless of whether Heidegger himself explicitly mentions Kierkegaard or not. This situation shows that scholars take Heidegger's so-called silence about Kierkegaard as a given fact and question Heidegger's own estimations of Kierkegaard and the latter's role in his philosophy. At the same time, despite the increasing number of studies, the amount of questions surrounding the relation between the two thinkers has not decreased. Rather, it seems that the more the subject is researched, the more questions it raises.

Psychology of Worldviews" and "Hegel and the Greeks," both found in GA 9. In addition to the writings published during Heidegger's lifetime, Thonhauser shows that during the period from 1930 to 1944 one can find 13 different lecture courses in which Kierkegaard is mentioned by Heidegger, amounting to more than 50 pages (Thonhauser 2013: 4-5).

As would be expected, most of the secondary interpretations of the Heidegger–Kierkegaard relation are comparative studies and/or ask about Kierkegaard's concrete influence on Heidegger. Both approaches are problematic. First of all, there is a difficulty of distinguishing Kierkegaard's contribution to Heidegger from other influences. Furthermore, one must also take into account influences from shared sources. As Vincent McCarthy has pointed out: "[f]or Heidegger is resonating not only with Kierkegaard but with a host of figures that played a major role in the development of Kierkegaard's own thought, including Socrates, Aristotle, Paul, Augustine, and Luther" (McCarthy 2011: 97). In addition, as Clare Carlisle has pointed out, the interpretations are more and more "mutually-informed" (Carlisle 2013: 422). This means that Heidegger may easily be read into Kierkegaard and vice versa. Moreover, the interpretations may have the footprints of later thinkers. For example, it is not always explicitly noticed when a third philosopher's criticism of Heidegger is directing the analysis of the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Within these complications, there is the possibility of getting lost and implicitly reading Kierkegaard into Heidegger or Heidegger into Kierkegaard. Or one may be explicitly considered in the sphere to which the other is commonly assigned. In what follows, I will briefly look into different ways of examining the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. My aim is not to bring out the specifics of one or another secondary commentator, but rather to outline broader directions which the research into the Heidegger–Kierkegaard relation takes.

To begin with, as said, one way of bringing Heidegger and Kierkegaard together is by considering one of them within the tradition with which the other is commonly connected. Thus, roughly speaking, Kierkegaard is primarily seen as an existentialist philosopher and a religious author and Heidegger as developing a hermeneutical phenomenology. In this respect, one is perhaps instantly reminded of Heidegger's own attempts to reject the reading of his *Sein und Zeit* as an existentialist book. Contrary to Heidegger's own wishes, however, reading Heidegger as an existentialist philosopher is by no means a rarity, although the tendency has perhaps decreased through time. Reading Heidegger as a religious author, on the other hand, has gained a firmer footing through time. The topic of Heidegger's religious origin is very much at the center of academic interest and has received much attention in recent years (especially after Heidegger's earlier lecture courses started to become available as published texts). In this respect, with the focus on tracing Heidegger's religious origins, Heidegger is sometimes firmly placed within the framework

of the theological tradition. For example, István M. Fehér claims: "[r]oughly, fundamental ontology as the discipline destined to elaborate the Being-question may be seen to be of Catholic origin, whereas the existential analytic, as a continuation and radicalization of the early hermeneutics of facticity, may be traced back to (and seen to take up and radicalize in a specifically formalized and de-theologized manner) the Luther-Kierkegaardian sort of Protestant tradition centering around subjectivity and the believer's existential enactment of faith" (Fehér 2009: 102). Fehér argues "that it was with an eye to, and drawing upon, his previous understanding of religion and religious life, as well as of the relation between faith and theology, that Heidegger was to conceive of philosophy and its relation to human existence in *Being and Time*" (ibid.).

Conversely, as far as Heidegger is roughly regarded as developing a hermeneutical phenomenology, one may find attempts to read Kierkegaard either in connection with what is considered to be the tradition of hermeneutics or that of phenomenology. The attempts to read Kierkegaard within the hermeneutical or the phenomenological tradition are different from the consideration of Heidegger as existentialist or within a theological framework. That is, Kierkegaard's placement in these spheres is taken up as an inquiry which explicitly asks whether there is a possibility of connecting Kierkegaard with one or the other sphere. In this way, careful attempts to connect Kierkegaard with the hermeneutical tradition can be found for example in the book *Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication*, a collection of papers from the Fourth International Kierkegaard Conference. Kierkegaard's role within the phenomenological tradition has lately become a subject for more heated debates. On the one hand, there are those who see Kierkegaard as more or less strongly connected with the phenomenological tradition. On the other hand, there are those who argue firmly against this view.[26] Both positions can be found in the collection *Kierkegaard as a Phenomenologist*, where attempts are made "to uncover the roots of his [Kierkegaard's] only recently acknowledged influence on phenomenological thought" (Hanson 2010: xi).

Certainly, all of the considerations I have outlined above (taking into account specifically the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard) rest on a commonly acknowledged indebtedness and similarities between the two thinkers, which are unfolded through detailed analysis. That is, the research on the relation between Heidegger and

[26] Perhaps the most outspoken critic of seeing Kierkegaard within the phenomenological tradition is Georg Pattison (see e.g. Pattison 2013 and 2010).

Kierkegaard mainly takes place on a very concrete level where one can talk about certain themes through which the two are brought together. This is done in the context of the question of how Kierkegaard has influenced Heidegger with respect to one or another theme or with the focus centering on a certain theme to which both are seen to have contributed or by looking for similarities between the two via a third notion. With respect to the source materials, broadly speaking a division can be made between the early Heidegger (meaning in the majority of cases Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*) and the later Heidegger. Here, clearly the dominant text on Heidegger's side is his *Sein und Zeit* – especially (but not limited to) the second division of *Sein und Zeit*.

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in three footnotes (SuZ: 492 n. iv [190 n. 1]; 494 n. vi [235 n. 1]; 497 n. iii [338 n. 1]). Although these references take a central position in considerations of the relation between the two, there is not really a subject-matter in the second division of *Sein und Zeit* which cannot be traced back to or cannot be seen as worth comparing with Kierkegaard in some respect. It is generally accepted that at the level of motives Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* is to be seen as leaning much more heavily on Kierkegaard than he himself acknowledges. Whether it is the question of the need to grasp Dasein in its wholeness, the phenomenon of death, attesting the authentic potentiality-for-being with the themes of conscience and guilt, anticipatory resoluteness and repetition, the consideration of everydayness, historicizing of Dasein in fateful destiny or the problem of temporality as a whole, there is not really a single subject which in some way has not been taken up as a theme within the research on Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard. This list gathered roughly from Heidegger's table of contents of the second division of *Sein und Zeit* is of course artificial, but perhaps helps to bring out the range of the themes under question.[27]

Considering the range of the themes in which some connection has been found, it is not surprising to find large numbers of writings which concentrate on the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Although usually researchers focus on a particular theme and not on Kierkegaard's contribution to *Sein und Zeit* as a whole (or the second division as a

[27] Thus, John D. Caputo claims that chapters 64, 65, and 74 of *Sein und Zeit* have been directly taken over from Kierkegaard (Caputo 1987: 82-83). Another helpful source for getting an overview of the range of the themes in which Heidegger and Kierkegaard are brought together is Vincent McCarthy's article "Kierkegaard's Influence Hidden and in Full," in which McCarthy, among other references and relying on John van Buren, points to the following list: "[i]n subsequent years, according to van Buren, Heidegger continued to rely on Jaspers' detailed exposition of such Kierkegaardian concepts as existent, the individual, subjective truth, passion, anxiety, and death in which Heidegger often followed Kierkegaard point by point. Additional Kierkegaardian categories found in Heidegger include dispersion, repetition, curiosity, inclosing reserve, conscience, guilt, indirect communication, time and the moment." (McCarthy 2011: 101)

whole), the different themes often come into question and overlap with each other in different writings. However, taken broadly, certain specific subjects appear more central. Here, it is noticeable that the central themes are not always limited to the subjects in which Heidegger himself has explicitly referred to Kierkegaard. Nor does the clearness of the connection depend on Heidegger's explicit thematization. This is plainly seen when looking at Heidegger's considerations of the phenomenon of anxiety, death, and repetition as examples.

The phenomenon of anxiety is probably the most well-known theme that connects Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Although it is one of the few notions in which Heidegger himself refers to Kierkegaard (along with the notions of existence and *Augenblick*) and which thus is clearly traceable to Kierkegaard, Heidegger's own reference far from clarifies the issue of anxiety and the relation of Kierkegaard and Heidegger within this theme.[28]

Besides the phenomenon of anxiety, the phenomenon of death is also a theme which is at the center of shared consideration.[29] Although there are some suggestions of primary influences other than Kierkegaard for Heidegger's account of death,[30] predominantly Heidegger is seen to lean heavily on Kierkegaard here. Heidegger himself does not mention Kierkegaard directly in *Sein und Zeit* in connection with his treatment of the phenomenon of death.[31] However, whether one concentrates on Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger or on the phenomenon itself through reading Kierkegaard and Heidegger, there is considerable agreement on the question to whom Heidegger is indebted in his deliberations. Thus, the debates focus more on the question of the extent of Heidegger's indebtedness to Kierkegaard, that is, on the question where exactly lie the similarities and dissimilarities and which one gives a deeper or better account of the phenomenon of death (on the basis of the context where death plays a role for each) than on the question of whether there is a connection at all.

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[28] Thus, a number of researchers have written on the subject, among them Arne Grøn (2008), Kristen Huxsel (2005), Walter Schweidler (1988), Dan Magurshak (1985).

[29] The subject has been treated by, among others, Adam Buben (2013, 2011), Georg Hunsinger (1969), Marius Gunnar Timmann Mjaaland (2006, 2008), Michael Theunissen (2000), Charles Guigon (2011).

[30] Walter Kaufmann has suggested that the main inspiration for Heidegger's account of death is to be found in Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* (Kaufmann 1959: 80-81). Reinhard May, acknowledging different possible sources, has looked into possible East Asian influences on the directions Heidegger took in his development of the notion of death (May 2005: 85-91). Along with possible Buddhist influences through Jaspers and acquaintance with Tanabe Hajime and the Kyoto School in Japan, May also refers to the influence of Augustine and of Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (op.cit.: 114 n. 31).

[31] According to Theunissen, the footnote from *Sein und Zeit* in which Heidegger claims that one may learn more from Kierkegaard's edifying discourses refers to Kierkegaard's *At the Graveside* (Theunissen 2000: 46-47). *At the Graveside* is often seen as crucial to tracing Heidegger's treatment of the phenomenon of death back to Kierkegaard's unfolding of the phenomenon.

Among the different themes which have been traced back to Kierkegaard, there are some which, regardless of the fact that Heidegger himself (during his *Sein und Zeit* or subsequent writings) does not make the connection at all, have been seen as penetrating into the very center of Heidegger's philosophy. Such is, for example, the concept of repetition (in Danish, *Gjentagelsen*; in German, *Wiederholung*). For instance, John D. Caputo claims in his *Radical Hermeneutics*: "the Kierkegaardian project of 'repetition' enters into the heart of what Heidegger means by hermeneutics in *Being and Time*. Despite Heidegger's own failure to acknowledge his debt to Kierkegaard, and the tendency among Heidegger commentators to ignore Kierkegaard, the Kierkegaardian origin of what Heidegger calls '*Wiederholung*' (retrieval, repetition) cannot be denied" (Caputo 1987: 12).[32] In a similar manner, repetition is awarded a central role in bringing the two philosophers together through the very task of philosophy.[33]

Considering the large amount of literature on the different themes, one may already assume that there are also many different stances taken on and claims made about the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. However, whether Heidegger explicitly mentions Kierkegaard or whether the similarities are found on the level of motives, Heidegger is not seen as simply taking over these themes from Kierkegaard. Rather, Heidegger is seen as secularizing, ontologizing, or formalizing Kierkegaard's notions and themes.[34] In addition, it is not always the case that Heidegger is viewed as furthering Kierkegaard's considerations. Taking their point of departure from Kierkegaard's side (but not only within the consideration of Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard), researchers more than often criticize Heidegger for the abstractness and empty formalism of his approach in *Sein und Zeit*. Thus, Daniel Berthold-Bond claims: "[h]owever, as we turn now to look more closely at Heidegger's anatomy of the structures of authentic being – most notably, anxiety, being-towards-death, conscience, and resoluteness – we will see that this account is in fact very formal and abstract indeed" (Berthold-Bond 1991: 125). Whether this possible Kierkegaardian critique of Heidegger is grounded on aesthetic, ethical, or religious

[32] According to John D. Caputo, "[i]n Heidegger, the Kierkegaardian project of 'repetition' *(Gjentagelse)* becomes one of 'retrieval' *(Wiederholung)*, and the structure of *kinesis*, of the movement in which Dasein's Being is caught up, is taken to be circular" (Caputo 1987: 60).
[33] See Patricia A. Johnson (1984); for further writings on the notion of repetition, see also Clare Carlisle (2005) and Wenche Marit Quist (2002).
[34] See for example Dreyfus and Rubin (2001: 299 etc.), Patricia J. Huntington (1995: 44), Janko Lozar (2014: 431).

concerns,[35] or whether the accusation of empty formalism is directed at more specific structures (like that of authentic-being), or at the whole problem of existence, as for example in Michael Weston,[36] in general Kierkegaard is seen in this respect as the one who has more to offer than Heidegger with his abstract formalism. Similarly, Kierkegaard is found to give a better account than Heidegger in his *Sein und Zeit*, where Heidegger is accused of placing Dasein in an overly dominant position. At the same time, in connection with this accusation, Heidegger is, interestingly enough, seen to move closer to Kierkegaard in his later writings.

With respect to Heidegger's later writings, the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard has received somewhat less attention, although the number of remarks where Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard increases. The central later writings in which the connection with Kierkegaard emerges are, as Thonhauser (2013: 2) has rightly pointed out, the essay "Nietzsche's Word 'God is Dead'" [*Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'*, 1943] and Heidegger's series of lectures named *What is Called Thinking* [*Was heisst Denken?*, 1952]. However, as Thonhauser (2013: 4-5) also has shown, the later texts in which Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard are certainly not limited to these two. Nor are the texts under consideration by researchers confined to the two above-mentioned texts.[37] As the number of texts in which Kierkegaard is mentioned increases, so does the amount of references to Kierkegaard – although not perhaps the variation of themes.

In spite of the growing number of remarks made by Heidegger on Kierkegaard in his later writings, researchers' interest in Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard slackens considerably compared to the attention paid to Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*. What seems to underlie the decline is the view of the shift which has taken place in Heidegger's philosophy, that is, the view that Kierkegaard has ceased to be of interest to Heidegger and Heidegger strikes out on a different path. This distancing is put down to

[35] The distinction is made by Adam Buben, who in disputing with Berthold-Bond and Huntington states that "[i]t does indeed seem that Kierkegaard would reject the empty formality and abstractedness of Heidegger's notion of anticipatory resoluteness, but on religious – and specifically Christian – grounds rather than aesthetic or ethical grounds" (Buben 2012: 75).

[36] Thus Michael Weston contends: "[t]he philosopher, in raising the question of the Being of human in general, bypasses the nature of the 'problem of existence' which only has sense in terms of the passion with which the individual lives their own life" (Weston 2003: 55).

[37] For example, in considering Heidegger's *Mindfulness* [*Besinnnung*, GA 66], George T. Seidel contemplates how *Seyn* is thought, or rather not thought, by Heidegger with Kierkegaard and claims that "[i]n *Besinnung*, indeed, Heidegger continues to pursue this course of theo-*logical* reflection, above all in relation to Kierkegaard" (Seidel 2001: 404).

Heidegger's own attitude, although perhaps not rightly so. As Otto Pöggeler has expressed it:

> Thus like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard could become decisive not by formalizing his religious assertions alone but rather by reflecting upon what is metaphysical in the preconception from which Kierkegaard sets out. Heidegger certainly does not think so: either Kierkegaard or Nietzsche is decisive for his dynamic thinking; where Kierkegaard's religious assertions are formalized (in *Sein und Zeit*), Nietzsche's thinking is not essential; where Nietzsche has become decisive, there Kierkegaard retreats. (Pöggeler 1990 [1963]: 252 [307] n. 38; see also pp. 154-155 [191-192])

In spite of Heidegger's own stance, there are researchers who would claim that within this shift, instead of moving away from Kierkegaard, Heidegger moves even closer towards him in one or another aspect. This moving closer is attributed for example to their common concern over nihilism[38] and to the thematization of the dependence on "receptivity to a call" (Carlisle 2013: 435)[39]. Here, as can be seen in Clare Carlisle's claims (see n. 39), when Heidegger is seen to move closer to Kierkegaard, he is also seen as addressing a problem often ascribed to *Sein und Zeit*. Whether it is seen in terms of overcoming "voluntarism and humanism," as Carlisle puts it, or in terms of making room for "saving grace" to effect authenticity, as John D. Caputo states,[40] the movement towards to Kierkegaard, interestingly enough, goes hand in hand with a movement away from the overly dominant position of Dasein.

All in all, whether Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard is considered with regard to Heidegger's earlier or later period of thought, one is left with a multitude of approaches and attitudes in which Heidegger's own estimation of Kierkegaard is often called into question. Although there are a number of researchers who agree with Heidegger's explicit estimation of Kierkegaard, the rejections of Heidegger's stance towards Kierkegaard as exhibited

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[38] Thus, Dreyfus and Rubin write: "[t]o sum up, after Kierkegaard's profound but mostly unacknowledged influence on early Heidegger, we find Kierkegaard and the later Heidegger following separate but parallel paths. They agree that nihilism is the most crucial issue of our time, but they differ in their responses to that issue." (Dreyfus and Rubin 1991: 339) A similar thought is expressed by Dreyfus when he claims elsewhere: "[h]is early interest in the existential structure of the self had shifted to another Kierkegaardian concern – the lack of meaning and seriousness in the present age." (Dreyfus 2006: 346)

[39] In her consideration of Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger's later work, Carlisle (2013: 435) also states: "[b]ut if Heidegger's philosophical development from the 1930s onwards includes a corrective to the humanism and voluntarism of his earlier work, this is not accomplished by abandoning his formalism, but rather by expanding it to encompass structures of the Christian life that he had hitherto overlooked. One unacknowledged consequence of this development, then, is that Heidegger's thought moves, in its essence, even closer to Kierkegaard's. The immediately recognizable Kierkegaardian concepts and categories – such as moment, repetition, anticipation, anxiety, and the symptoms of inauthentic modern life – may no longer be in play in Heidegger's later writings, but what does emerge is a clearer sense that the proper relationship between Being and (human) beings is one of giving and receiving: the moment of gift."

[40] John D. Caputo's states that "Heidegger later on concedes […] [t]hat the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity is not something effected *by* man but rather something effected *in* man by a saving grace" (Caputo 1993: 222).

above are by no means unusual.[41] Similarly, there are researchers who see Heidegger as further developing Kierkegaard's account,[42] and those who consider Heidegger falling short with his deliberation when compared with that of Kierkegaard.[43] There are those, who see Heidegger as offering a secularized version of Kierkegaard's religiousness A[44] and those in whose opinion Heidegger can be seen best in comparison with Kierkegaard's aesthetic sphere.[45] Among this multitude of approaches and attitudes, there seems to be only one thing which most of the researchers agree upon. No matter how much the relation between Heidegger and Kierkegaard is researched, no matter what kind of direction one or another researcher takes, something has remained the same – the relationship has been commonly declared obscure and it continues to be declared obscure till this day. In finding clarity in this situation, no straightforward answer should be expected to be found from Heidegger himself. And yet, as a starting point, nothing more is given than Heidegger's words.

1.6. The source materials and the basis of researching Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses

During the first Freiburg period, Heidegger did not publish anything.[46] All the sources stemming from Heidegger's first Freiburg period were published later on, most of them posthumously. The larger part of the materials from this time period has been collected in seven volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (from GA 56/57 up to GA 63), gathering materials from 10 different lecture courses which he actually held, and sketches of one course which in the end was not held by him. Since none of these lecture courses was prepared by Heidegger for publication, all of the published lecture courses available for the

[41] Thus, when questioned, Heidegger's own remarks about Kierkegaard and his own estimation of Kierkegaard, Heidegger's words are not taken at face value. Whether it is Heidegger's claim that Kierkegaard is not a thinker, but a "religious writer," that he is confined within a theological context or Hegelian paradigm, or when Heidegger accuses Kierkegaard of staying in the ontic or *existentiell* sphere, Heidegger's own estimation of Kierkegaard is called into question. Cf. George Pattison (2013: 182-183), Adam Buben (2013: 980; 2011: 193), John van Buren (1994: 438 n 14), Dan Magurshak (1987: 210).
[42] Agreeing with Heidegger's estimation, see for example Tsutomu Ben Yagi (2009: 61).
[43] Cf. Marius Gunnar Timmann Mjaaland (2008: 99-107).
[44] Cf. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jane Rubin (1991: 283-340).
[45] Cf. Daniel Berthold-Bond (1991: 121).
[46] The period in which Heidegger did not publish anything is actually longer than only the first Freiburg period. It reaches from his post-doctoral work (in the year 1916) until the time *Sein und Zeit* was published in 1927. Nevertheless, there are texts which have been prepared for publication, for example the essay "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection to Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation" ["Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)"] prepared in 1922, but published posthumously in 1989 in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Pilosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 6: 237-274, and "Comments on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*" ["Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen"] which was prepared between 1919-1921, but was not published until 1973.

reader have been constructed by editors. The texts of the lecture courses, which consist of Heidegger's manuscript for the lecture course along with numerous remarks he made in the margin of the running text, are usually supplemented with Heidegger's own notes and sketches presumed to belong to the lecture course as well as the notes from students attending the lectures. Often parts of the manuscripts have been lost or are fragmented, punctuation is largely lacking and the text of the manuscript has not always been clearly readable for the editors.[47] Thus, there are many questions about the source material. With respect to searching for Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's lecture course, the layout of the sources is significant.

Within the published lecture courses given by Heidegger during his first Freiburg period, there are 15 different contexts in which Heidegger directly names or mentions Kierkegaard. The explicit references are found in four different lecture courses: *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, *Augustine and Neoplatonism*, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle* and *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Often these references are not to be found in the running text of the lecture course, but in the marginal notes or in the notes and sketches added to the lecture course. Furthermore, as I will argue in chapter five, Heidegger can also be seen to quote Kierkegaard without using quotation marks (see also Appendix One). At the same time, there are lecture courses in which Heidegger presents a consideration of themes which seem to stem from Kierkegaard and yet he does not mention Kierkegaard at all (for example, 'moment' [*Augenblick*] in the explication of Paul's letters (in GA 60) and in the 1922 essay on Aristotle (in GA 62)). Taking into account this situation as well as the specific characteristics of Heidegger's first Freiburg period and the considerations behind the possibilities and difficulties in researching Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, I have adopted a specific strategy for the following research.

As I brought out previously, Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's written legacy takes different forms. It was also shown that in researching Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, no clarity should be expected from Heidegger. Rather, in the search for Kierkegaard one should be prepared to look for traces hidden somewhere on the level of

[47] See on GA 56/57 Bernd Heimbüchel (1987, 1999: 166-169 [221-225]); on GA 58 Hans-Helmut Gander (1992: 199-204 [265-273]); on GA 59 Claudius Strube (1993: 155-157 [199-202]); on GA 60 Matthias Jung and Thomas Regehly (1995: 255-258 [339-343]) as well as Claudius Strube (1995: 259-263 [345-351]); on GA 61 Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (1994: 153-154 [201-203]); on GA 62 Günther Neumann (2005: [421-451]); on GA 63 Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (1987: 88-90 [113-116]).

motives and structures. At the same time, one should be cautious about the influences and be wary of being led by later interpretations. This is the case also with the research into Heidegger's approach to Kierkegaard in his first Freiburg period. As such, these considerations prescribe the approach taken in this thesis.

Thus, on the one hand, I take my point of departure for finding Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path from the analysis of Heidegger's different lecture courses. That is, the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period will be unfolded within the analysis of the specific lecture courses and through the consideration of Heidegger's overall aims. As I brought out in the second section of this chapter, Heidegger's first Freiburg period is a path in which he is constantly developing his account. In this respect, as will be seen, Heidegger has something distinct to offer in each lecture course. And yet, what is offered comes out as a further step from what has been given previously. Furthermore, Heidegger focuses on specific questions. Taking the point of departure from Heidegger's central explicitly addressed question in his different lecture courses of his first Freiburg period, I have named this path as a path of rethinking philosophy. As was shown, the breakthrough to this path is made by Heidegger in his 1919 lecture course. Insofar as my wider aim is to search for Kierkegaard's place in this path, I thus will start with the lecture course in which Heidegger strikes out on the path of philosophy which is seen to be his own and in which Kierkegaard is not mentioned at all. Although Kierkegaard is not to be found in this lecture course, this starting point is necessary in order to bring out clearly Heidegger's consideration of Kierkegaard in the lecture courses to come. As I will claim, in his 1919 lecture course Heidegger leads his search for philosophy in two directions and rethinks philosophy throughout his first Freiburg period in these two directions, in which Kierkegaard occupies a specific place with respect to those directions.

On the other hand, in order to have a firm basis for bringing out Kierkegaard's concrete input to Heidegger's philosophy, I will focus on Heidegger's explicit references to Kierkegaard (by name or through quotations). At the same time, the research will not be limited to explicit remarks themselves. Rather, the explicit remarks will also offer a pathway to the structural similarities. Here, certain treatises of Kierkegaard will be highlighted. As was shown in section three of this chapter, by the time of his first Freiburg period Heidegger had access to most of Kierkegaard's writings in the German language. Throughout this thesis I will point out which of Kierkegaard's treatises Heidegger has explicitly referred to. Certainly, the fact that Heidegger has not mentioned one or another

work does not inevitably mean that he is not acquainted with or has not made any use of the work. However, in my consideration of different treatises of Kierkegaard, I will take my point of departure from the text which Heidegger has explicitly referred to. In this respect, I will highlight and make an excursion to three Kierkegaardian treatises: *The Sickness unto Death*, *The Concept of Anxiety* and "The Single Individual: Two 'notes' concerning my work as an author."

In addition, as was brought out, Heidegger's own stance toward Kierkegaard is extremely problematic. In the final chapter of this thesis I will aim to address some of the issues which have emerged in the overall consideration of Heidegger's stance toward Kierkegaard on the basis of the analysis of Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. True enough, in his first Freiburg period Heidegger exhibits a similar approach to Kierkegaard to that found in his later writings. Mostly Heidegger's naming or quoting of Kierkegaard is inserted into the text (chiefly in (marginal) notes) without any further clear explanation, thus leaving the meaning of Kierkegaard's presence at best open to a wide range of interpretations or, on some occasions, simply a matter of guesswork. When, however, he does give an estimation of Kierkegaard, he does not give a straightforward account of why or how or where the influence is to be sought. Furthermore, he both praises Kierkegaard and distances himself from Kierkegaard to the extent that the words uttered seem to be highly questionable. Thus, for example, in his lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity* Heidegger states:

> Strong impulses for the hermeneutical explication presented here stem from the work of Kierkegaard. But his presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal were fundamentally different, insofar as he made these too easy for himself. What was basically in question for him was nothing but the kind of personal reflection he pursued. He was a theologian and stood within the realm of faith, in principle outside of philosophy. The situation today is different one. (GA 63: 25 [30])

Looking at this estimation, one could ask what is to be considered an impulse when "presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal" are left out. In the final chapter of this thesis I will address the question of the meaning of this estimation of Kierkegaard by Heidegger. Seen on the basis of the analysis of Heidegger's path through the different lecture courses and Kierkegaard's place therein, perhaps Heidegger's estimation in the end is not so odd at all.

1.7. Conclusion

Researching Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy is a task with many problems. Not only is Heidegger himself generally known to be reluctant to express his views on

Kierkegaard explicitly, but also, when he does say anything about Kierkegaard, he seems to make the issue more complicated. His estimations usually lack clarification and even seem to be contradictory. Furthermore, his short explicit remarks about, quotations of or references to Kierkegaard are open to a wide range of interpretations because Heidegger himself refuses to give any clear explanations. This has created a situation where Kierkegaard's impact on Heidegger's philosophy requires looking beyond Heidegger's own words. As most of the researchers agree, Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger is much stronger than Heidegger himself admits, because Kierkegaard is seen to be present also on the level of motives and structures in which he is not explicitly mentioned. At the same time, the search for Kierkegaard's hidden presence in Heidegger's philosophy is further complicated by the fact that their shared sources of influence as well as the impact of later interpretations must be taken into account. In this respect, Heidegger's own words give the firmest footing in the search for Kierkegaard's role in his philosophy. These considerations prescribe my approach in the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period.

In what follows, I will look for Kierkegaard's place by tracing Heidegger's path through his first Freiburg period. In order to analyze Kierkegaard's place within Heidegger's overall aims, I will start with the 1919 lecture course which is commonly held to be Heidegger's breakthrough to the path of his own philosophy. In this lecture course, Heidegger does not mention Kierkegaard. And yet, it proves to be necessary to commence from the beginning of Heidegger's path which, with an eye to his explicitly presented question, I will call the path of rethinking philosophy. It is necessary insofar as in this lecture course Heidegger presents the aims guiding his considerations throughout his first Freiburg period. Furthermore, it enables us to see where and how Kierkegaard becomes significant in his subsequent lecture courses. As I will argue, with his 1919 lecture course Heidegger takes up a two-directional path and Kierkegaard is to be found in one of those directions.

Besides clarifying Heidegger's overall aims in his first Freiburg period lecture courses, I will further focus on the lecture courses in which Kierkegaard is explicitly present. The aim is to understand Kierkegaard's place by analyzing Heidegger's concrete lecture courses and pointing out where Kierkegaard becomes significant for Heidegger through his explicit references to Kierkegaard. Furthermore, by considering how Heidegger unfolds his account in a specific lecture course as well as through his explicit references to

Kierkegaard, the latter's presence on the level of motives and structures will be looked for. In sum, by analyzing Heidegger's concrete lecture courses on the path of his first Freiburg period and tracing the explicit references to Kierkegaard, I will look for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses.

PART ONE

> I work concretely and factically out of my "I am," out of my intellectual and wholly factical origin, milieu, life-context, and whatever is available to me from these as vital experience in which I live … To this facticity of mine belongs what I would in brief call the fact that I am "Christian theo*logian*." This involves a particular radical personal concern, a particular radical scientificity, a strict objectivity *in* the *facticity*; in it is to be found the historical consciousness, the consciousness of "intellectual and cultural history." And I am all this in the life-context of the university.[48]

The aim of this thesis is to find Søren Kierkegaard's place in Martin Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. In the following pages it might seem at times that I have forgotten Kierkegaard in my research. At other times it might look as if the search for Kierkegaard determines my interpretation of Heidegger too strongly. The fact is that my search has been led by the question of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's lecture courses. Having Kierkegaard as the objective I begin the search by analyzing Heidegger's philosophy as it starts to unfold in his first Freiburg lecture courses. It is a period in which the central problem Heidegger explicitly addresses is that of philosophy itself.

I have headed *Part One* with a quotation. These words of Heidegger belong to a letter addressed to Löwith and Becker in the year 1921. As we can read in Theodor Kisiel, the letter was written by Heidegger in order to reject the fissile approaches which these two students of Heidegger had taken towards his philosophy. Löwith and Becker were drawn to two different aspects of Heidegger's philosophy: to emphasis on "existential pathos" and to "science and method in phenomenological concept formation" respectively (Kisiel 1995: 78). The letter, as we hear from Kisiel, was written in order to reject the split between the two aspects, which belong together "in deeper motivation of his factic existence" (ibid.). I mention this letter because I will argue for this split. I will argue for the presence of different directions in Heidegger's philosophy which Löwith and Becker in their respective approaches could have sensed when listening to Heidegger's lecture courses. On the one hand, philosophy is aimed to be established as a "particular radical scientificity," as Heidegger puts it in this quotation, and, on the other hand, philosophy is seen as a "personal concern."

This claim seems to contradict Heidegger's own aims with this letter. The fact that he works out of his own "I am," his "intellectual and wholly factical origin," indeed lets us know that the split should be rejected. But at the same time it also confirms the split insofar

[48] Martin Heidegger, Letter to Karl Löwith, August 19, 1921, quoted in Kisiel (1995: 78). The original can be found in Papenfuss and Pöggeler (eds.), (1990).

as the aim is to articulate something (philosophy) in the life-context, out of the intellectual origin in which a certain self-interpretation is at work – "in the life-context of the university." Furthermore, Heidegger's aim to overcome the distinction (an aim which I would not deny) bespeaks itself the sense of the distinction. As such, the fissile approaches at work can be viewed as evidenced by Heidegger's own claim. All in all, I would assert that the reason for Löwith's and Becker's respective approaches lies in the very manner in which Heidegger addresses and explicates the problem he puts forth. To show that this is the case is the aim of the first part of this thesis.

In the first part of this thesis I seek to show how Heidegger starts to address the problem of philosophy. I claim that Heidegger sends his search for philosophy in two directions and gives two different articulations of philosophy: he asks (1) where, in life itself as it is lived, the possibility of philosophy is to be found, and (2) where lies the method which secures the accessibility and expressibility of philosophy in accordance with the fundamental phenomenon (we ourselves). Furthermore, in the first part I aim to show that through the consideration of these two directions it is possible to see in which problem sphere of Heidegger's philosophy Kierkegaard is to be found as well as how Heidegger approaches what Kierkegaard has to offer to him. The fact that Heidegger considers Kierkegaard within a concrete sphere and explicates what Kierkegaard has to offer in a distinct manner will be further proven in the second part through Heidegger's concrete references to Kierkegaard in Heidegger's subsequent lecture courses.

I take my point of departure from the lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* [*Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem*] (chapter two). By unraveling Heidegger's so called KNS schema I aspire to show that Heidegger leads philosophy in two different directions and how he does this. By two different directions I do not mean that there are two spheres which philosophy should strive for according to Heidegger. Rather, by claiming that Heidegger sets philosophy on two different paths I mean that he suggests two different modes of accessing. On the one hand, philosophy is described as hermeneutics, an event of appropriation, intensification – in short, philosophy is philosophizing, a mode of accessing in the living situation. On the other hand, philosophy is described as a kind of "theoretization" – philosophy proper is about proper methodology for accessing and expressing its subject matter. In addition, I aim to demonstrate that in interpreting Heidegger's philosophy the one or the other mode of accessing can be and has been taken up as a dominant direction for accounting for his

philosophy. Instead of pushing towards either/or, I then make a claim for both. That is, I claim that Heidegger takes up both of the tasks and, at least during his first Freiburg period, articulates philosophy proper in two different ways. How he does this will be shown in the following two chapters respectively.

In chapter three, I argue that in Heidegger's lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* [*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, (WS 1919/20)] philosophy is unfolded in the first direction mentioned. Philosophy proper as origin understanding is articulated as an intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world. In this lecture course Heidegger addresses the problem of accessibility and expressibility within the living situation. He works towards finding access to the basic characters of factical life (the pre-worldly) as they are lived and brought to expression as such. Furthermore, in this context Heidegger points to Kierkegaard as someone who has brought to life this kind of access, has actualized his life in this way.

In the next chapter (four), I will further argue that after the lecture course mentioned Heidegger turns to the problem of articulating the proper methodology – phenomenology, which is considered identical with philosophy – with which factical life is to be accessed and expressed. I seek to demonstrate that Heidegger describes the proper methodology of philosophy through three methodological moments: phenomenological destruction, phenomenological explication and formal indication. I also show how in the two dominant accounts of Heidegger's method brought out in chapter two the methodological moments are interpreted in a different manner. I demonstrate that the interpretations differ in the sense which is given primacy: the actualization sense or the relational sense. I argue that philosophical investigation described through three methodological moments (phenomenological destruction, phenomenological explication and formal indication) is to be regarded as accessing the pre-worldly at a different level from the access put forward in chapter three.

All in all, in this part of the thesis I wish to show that Kierkegaard acquires a specific place in Heidegger's consideration of philosophy: Kierkegaard has brought to life the access within the living situation. However, this actualization for Heidegger must undergo a further investigation – it must be clarified: accessed and articulated according to a specific methodology.

2. The task of philosophy

2.1. Introduction

Heidegger's beginning, an approach to philosophy that can be called his own, is considered to be his War Emergency Semester (KNS)[49] lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* [*Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungusproblem*, in GA 56/57] (KNS 1919).[50] In the written source of this lecture course, as in the other lecture courses from the year 1919, there are no references to Kierkegaard. And yet, in order to search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period, there is a need to start exactly from here. It is necessary, since the place Kierkegaard gains is already determined in this lecture course through the tasks Heidegger sets himself in his search for philosophy in the years to come. And although not a syllable is said about Kierkegaard here, this lecture course leads the way to understanding Heidegger's words when he talks about his "historical influences" in the year 1923: "[i]mpulses were given by Kierkegaard and Husserl opened my eyes" (GA 63: 4 [5]).

In his KNS lecture course Heidegger addresses the problem of philosophy itself. What is philosophy? As will be seen, this becomes the problem which Heidegger explicitly poses over and again in each lecture course of his first Freiburg period. However, the way in which this question is approached varies. I suggest that Heidegger's search for philosophy takes two directions and that these two directions are set up in this lecture course. I argue that the significance of the lecture course lies in its setting the tasks for his search and that in this lecture course Heidegger sets the tasks for his search in a manner

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[49] The war emergency semester lectures were held extraordinarily and lasted from 25th of January until 16th of April 1919 (Heimbüchel 1987: 166). According to Heimbüchel (ibid.), for this semester Heidegger had initially announced a lecture course on Kant, but this was never given.

[50] By the year 1919 Heidegger had already some experience as a lecturer. During three semesters between the years 1915 and 1917 he gave one lecture, three courses, and two seminars. On 27th of July, Heidegger delivered his test lecture, entitled *The Concept of Time in the Science of History* [*Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenshaft*], after which he is officially appointed as a *Privatdocent* (Sheehan 1988: 81). After that, in the winter semester of 1915-1916, Heidegger held a lecture course entitled *The Basic Trends of Ancient and Scholastic Philosophy* [*Die Grundlinien der antiken und scholastischen Philosophie*] and a seminar *On Kant's Prolegomena* [*Über Kant, Prolegomena*]. In the summer semester of 1916 he gives a course entitled *German Idealism* [*Der deutsche Idealismus*] and a seminar with Engelbert Krebs, entitled *Practicum on Texts from Aristotle's Logical Writings* [*Übungen über Texte aus den logischen Schriften des Aristoteles*]; in the winter semester of 1916-1917 he gives a course entitled *Basic Questions of Logic* [*Grundfragen der Logik*]. (Kisiel 1995: 461, 469) The lecture courses announced for the year 1918, however, are never held since Heidegger was called up to train as a reservist and was later on stationed with the Front Weather Watch (op. cit.: 469-470).

which leads him to articulate philosophy in two different ways. I aim to show that this is the case by unraveling what is known as Heidegger's KNS schema:

The pre-theoretical something [Das vorweltliche Etwas]		The theoretical something [Das theoretische Etwas]	
Pre-worldly something [Das vorweltliche Etwas]	Worldly something [Welthaftes Etwas]	Objective formal-logical something [Formallogisches gegenständliches Etwas]	Object-like something [Objektartiges Etwas]
(fundamental moment of life as such) [(Grundmoment des Lebens überhaupt)]	(fundamental moment of definite experiential spheres; aesthetic) [(Grundmoment bestimmer Erlebnissphären)]	(motivated in the primal something) [(motiviert in Ur-etwas)]	(motivated in the genuine experiential world) [(motiviert in genuiner Erlebniswelt)]
Primal-something [*Ur-etwas*]	Genuine experiential world [Genuine Erlebniswelt]		

Table 1. Heidegger's KNS schema, written down by Franz-Josef Brecht (GA 56/57: 164 [219]).

In this schema, which is not found in Heidegger's own manuscript but in the transcripts of his student Franz-Josef Brecht, is gathered the whole story of this lecture course. It sums up both the stances towards philosophy which Heidegger finds at hand and which he believes need to be reconsidered (the traditional understanding of philosophy) and the key elements of re-established philosophy for the "new" understanding of philosophy which Heidegger proposes. Furthermore, it encapsulates not only Heidegger's suggested thematic field for philosophy but also the ways of accessing this thematic field. I say "ways of accessing" because the question of how the theme of philosophy is to be accessed is exactly the question which leads me to claim that Heidegger steers philosophy on a two-directional path. Is philosophy purely a pre-theoretical affair or is it pre-theoretically motivated as a sort of theoretical clarification? Certainly, the views on this issue diverge. In the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses, the stance taken towards this problem is decisive. I claim that Heidegger provides both of these directions here. This claim will be further supported in the next chapters, where I aim to show that in the following lecture courses Heidegger takes up both of the tasks and that Kierkegaard is put forward as a central source with respect to one of the directions suggested here.

In what follows, I aim to show what Heidegger proposes to be the task of philosophy. More specifically, I aim to answer three questions: (1) how does Heidegger set himself against the tradition, (2) what does Heidegger see as the thematic field of philosophy proper, and (3) what are Heidegger's considerations with respect to the question of accessing the proposed theme of philosophy (the problem of method)? In order to answer these questions I concentrate on unfolding Heidegger's KNS schema. I take my point of departure from Heidegger's thematization of philosophy as he finds it at hand (the tradition). After that, I turn to Heidegger's reconsidered articulation of the thematic field. Finally I focus on the whole KNS schema by problematizing Heidegger's methodological considerations.

2.2. Traditional approaches to philosophy: philosophy as (scientific) worldview

In the opening of the lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* Heidegger makes a move which is to become familiar in his writings. He starts out by explaining how trivial the topic he is going to undertake seems to be: "[o]ne has at one's disposal a more or less clear conception of philosophy, especially in the present day, where philosophy, and speaking and writing about it, practically belongs to a good form" (GA 56/57: 6 [7]). By bringing the listener of the lecture course to question this common understanding, Heidegger sets the tone for what is to come, namely the path of problematizing philosophy itself.

As a first step on this path he starts to dismantle the traditional understanding of philosophy. In our lecture course he launches his programme of destruction by claiming that philosophy has always had a connection to worldview – a stance which he then claims to overthrow.[51] More specifically, he takes his point of departure in the statement that, in the history of philosophy, worldview has always had a connection to philosophy: whether it is considered identical with philosophy (worldview as the immanent task of philosophy) or the limit of philosophy as in the case of scientific philosophy – in any case it has had a

[51] The move of calling into question the relation of worldview to philosophy stems from Edmund Husserl. In his essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" [*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*] (1911) Husserl calls for decisive separation from any form of *Weltanschauung* philosophy. Thus, quite probably, Heidegger is following Husserl when he opens the lecture with the thesis that philosophy must make a radical break with worldview.

connection (8-9 [10-11]).[52] But what if there is no connection at all? With this proposition, the either/or choice between the two standpoints is led into the possibility of neither. The claim that there is no connection at all would be a claim which, according to Heidegger, would contradict all previous conceptions of philosophy and demand a new understanding of philosophy which would strip philosophy of its traditional features (9 [11]). This new understanding is what he aims at. He claims that worldview is "a phenomenon foreign to philosophy" (10, 16 [12, 17]) and that the unphilosophical character of worldview may be brought out by placing it against philosophy itself (10 [12]), that is, against the philosophy Heidegger strives to establish. In the end, this new philosophy thus explains the tradition. However, at the same time, the new understanding is to be established out of the tradition. This requires asking what the traditional features of philosophy are. More specifically, what are worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy – the two main stances in philosophy according to Heidegger?

Explaining worldview (6-7 [7-8]), Heidegger first of all points to the common understanding of the notion as a kind of personal view on the world. Philosophy, which "practically belongs to a good form," refers to an understanding of philosophy as having a worldview. Thus, for example a farmworker, a factory worker, and a political party are said to have their own worldview. What separates a philosopher from, for example, the politician with a worldview is the striving for a higher, autonomous worldview; the striving for origin, for what is ultimate. In this way, philosophers as "great thinkers," who aim at ultimate and universal explanations, are considered to have an especially deep understanding: "[t]hey experience [*erleben*] and view the world with heightened inner vitality, penetrating to its final sense or origin; they recognize nature as a cosmos of the ultimate lawfulness of simple movements or energies" (6 [7-8]).

What is problematic for Heidegger, however, is not so much the situation that worldview is considered to be philosophy, but rather that philosophy itself aims at worldview. That is, worldview is the immanent task of philosophy. As such, every philosophy is identical with worldview, insofar as philosophy accomplishes itself in worldview: "[o]bjectively stated: every great philosophy realizes itself in a worldview – every philosophy is, where its innermost tendency comes to unrestricted expression, metaphysics" (7 [8]). With respect to the KNS schema, I believe that Heidegger considers

[52] In the lecture course *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value* [*Phänomenologie und Transzendentale Wertphilosophie*] Heidegger characterizes worldview as "a harmonizing of science (natural science) and the life of the spirit" (GA 56/57: 94 [122]).

worldview to be a questioning within a "genuine experiential world," it is a "fundamental moment of definite experiential spheres; aesthetic." However, it is a specific stance within this sphere, as Heidegger will soon reconsider it.

Scientific philosophy, seen as an alternative conception of philosophy, aims to do away with philosophy as a purely personal affair and ground it objectively. With respect to the KNS schema, it could be said that it is articulated as an "object-like something" which is "motivated in the genuine experiential world." Scientific philosophy offers to provide a scientific foundation of philosophy. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, it is still essentially connected to worldview, because scientific philosophy "has in its system an ultimate and necessary tendency towards a worldview" (9 [12]). Scientific philosophy, then, considering itself to be non-identical with worldview, is connected to worldview as the limit or boundary of worldview. It is a scientifically grounded worldview.

Although Heidegger claims to rethink the whole philosophical tradition, it should be noted that at the same time he is mainly concerned with his own closest environment, Neo-Kantian value philosophy (more concretely, critical science of value). He is deeply engaged with detailed analysis of Neo-Kantian value philosophy with the aim to replace its domination in favor of phenomenology.[53] In the our lecture course Heidegger builds up his argumentation against the traditional way of trying to ground philosophy by turning to the destruction of the 'idea of philosophy as primordial science'[54] and focuses his argumentation on the suggestion that in the center of traditional philosophy is the problem of circularity.

Being true to his claim that the proper analysis of a problem demands the clarification of the conceptions of the topic (see 9 [11]), Heidegger initially focuses on the term 'idea.' He brings out the Kantian meaning of the 'idea' as determinable determinateness with an indeterminate object and claims that the 'idea of primordial science' leads to the problem of circularity. That is, the object of the idea (e.g., the content of the origin of what is sought after) is left undetermined, but the idea itself (as determinable determinateness) directs the path in advance, while what is aimed at is presupposed. Thus, this problem of circularity according to Heidegger is not an artificial difficulty, but rather "is already the expression of

[53] Later on, in his next lecture course *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value* in the summer semester of 1919, which I will not be treating extensively in this thesis, Heidegger gives a more detailed account of Neo-Kantian value philosophy.

[54] As Heidegger utters: "[t]he cardinal question concerns the nature and concept of philosophy. But the topic is formulated as '*the idea* of philosophy,' more precisely 'the idea of philosophy as primordial science'" (10 [12]).

an essential characteristic of philosophy, and of the distinctive nature of its method" (15 [16]). As such, the problem of circularity requires that a way out be found: necessary circularity, "belonging to the essence of philosophy" (ibid.), requires finding methodological means of overcoming the circularity. But where to find these methodological means? According to Heidegger, in the history of philosophy the efforts to put philosophy in the position of being genuine science have taken two directions: either focusing on the objects of knowledge or on the knowledge of objects. Heidegger takes up both of these approaches in order to show that they fail in the aim to ground philosophy and leads towards his own approach.

Heidegger first shows that the tradition has not found a way out of circularity and thus a way into the 'idea of philosophy as primordial science' with the focus on the 'object of knowledge.' Neither by approaching the problem through the history of philosophy nor by finding a criterion in a scientific attitude of mind nor by approaching it through inductive metaphysics can we arrive at the essential elements for determining the 'idea of philosophy as primordial science.'[55] Nevertheless, the detour has not been in vain. Rather, it leads us to recognize the problem sphere and the character of this sphere which is searched for. First, philosophy is seen as a problem of science and not a problem of world-wisdom, for example.[56] Second, the common feature of the sciences (science as such) is that they have the character of knowledge:

> Sciences are unities, context of knowledge with content. We characterize them as particular in respect to their object of knowledge. Is there any other way of looking at the matter? Clearly there is. Instead of the object of knowledge, we can focus on the knowledge of the object. With knowledge, we come to a phenomenon which must truly apply to all sciences, which indeed makes every science what it is. (23-24 [28])

Heidegger suggests that we turn from the possibilities offered by the object of knowledge to the knowledge of objects (24 [28]). He critically examines the teleological-critical method, the main feature of Neo-Kantian philosophy of value, which makes a claim to being primordial science.

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[55] Finding essential elements of the idea of philosophy by turning to history of philosophy cannot be of help, because the idea of genuine philosophy is dependent on philosophers' own criterion of genuineness in their own historical context (19 [21]). Neither is it of any help to look for the criterion in personalities regarded as philosophers, that is, from an attitude or a typical stance of the philosopher – that would make philosophy coincide with worldview (20 [23]). Similarly, according to Heidegger, inductive metaphysics is condemned to failure as a simple repetition of particular sciences and is therefore unsuitable for consideration of a primordial science (23 [26-27]).

[56] Thus Heidegger says: "[t]he possible direction for defining the idea is already positively prefigured. Philosophy is – more precisely, should be – still more precisely: it is a problem as science, and indeed as primordial science" (21 [24]).

The teleological-critical method as Heidegger explains it (25-48 [29-62]) starts from aiming at truthful knowledge. Underlying all knowledge are ultimate concepts, basic principles, and axioms. Axioms as normative laws (norms, laws, principles, i.e. representational connections) "are the origin or 'primal leap' [*Ur-sprung*] of knowledge, and the science which has these origins for its own object is primordial science, philosophy" (26 [31]). Thus, the problem of philosophy is the validity of axioms, and what becomes a central question is the appropriate method for grounding the validity of axioms (28 [33]). This method is the teleological-critical method, which is supposed to ground the normative validity of axioms. In this way, it distinguishes itself from all particular sciences, including psychology. However, does it achieve what it aims for? Not according to Heidegger.

He destroys the teleological-critical method from inside out and saps the foundations of its attempts to look for philosophy as the idea of primordial science by scrutinizing the three elements of the teleological-critical method (material pre-givenness [*Materialvorgebung*], the giving of the ideals, and the problem of linkage between these two).[57] According to Heidegger, the teleological-critical method, which aims to be primordial science, not only gets bogged down in circularity, which it is supposed to overcome by depending on the consciousness of the ideal (of thought), which is both the value criterion for judgment and what is searched for, but also contains a number of presuppositions which make it impossible to achieve its own aims.[58] Importantly, having taken the analysis of the teleological-critical method to the extreme, he claims that this

[57] The procedure of the teleological-critical method is described in short by Heidegger as follows: "[i]n carrying out the critical-teleological method, I have before me the pregiven material [*vorgegebene Material*], the universal characteristics, for example, of psychic thought-process. Having this present, at the same time I direct my attention to the ideal of thought. With this view, I determine from the given material those elements that are necessary conditions for the realization of the ideal." (34 [42-43])

[58] The teleological-critical method (32-48 [39-62]) not only contradicts its attempt to free itself from particular sciences by depending on psychology and history for providing the given material, but also is filled with presuppositions with respect to declaring something as a value (like the phenomenon of 'ought' in Rickert's philosophy, or the relating of 'validity' of propositions to value). According to Heidegger, declaring something a value is a theoretical derivation of more original 'worth-taking,' i.e., what is experienced in the lived life in itself. To put it differently, in the experience nothing like a 'value' is found, but rather something is experienced as 'worth-taking.' Similarly, the teleological-critical method presupposes the character of relatedness between the material pre-giving [*Materialvorgebung*] and the giving of the ideals [*Idealgebung*]: "critical-teleological judgement presupposes such a connection, namely that material stands 'under' a norm, that a norm is 'norm for' a material" (43[54]). Heidegger stresses that, of necessity, the link between the two is theoretically broken, both poles of the relation being presumed to have a certain character. Thus, the character of the giving of the ideals is presumed to be distinct from the material pre-giveness, which "makes material available" and provides "the field and ground for critical normative judgement" (44 [55-56]). However, Heidegger insists that the giving of ideals, which belongs to the psychic, is itself given as a sphere. This means that the ideal giving as a psychic phenomenon considered in the totality is brought into material relations and thus to the sphere of the material thing (32-48 [39-62]).

method is stuck with the sphere of material things [*Sachsphäre*]. It is a "pure dedication to the subject-matter [*Sache*]," where one thing is described by another thing and presented as a fact (48 [61]). Everything is reified! And now what?

> Is there even a single thing when there are only things? Then there would be no thing at all; not even *nothing*, because with the sole supremacy of the sphere of things there is not even the 'there is' [*es gibt*]. Is there the 'there is'? (48 [62])

Having reduced everything to the minimum, to the most general of reflective categories (*es gibt*), Heidegger is ready to bring this into meaningful context.[59] He concludes his analysis by claiming that all the previously considered attempts to get closer to the problematic at hand are restricted to the theoretical sphere (46 [59]). Thus, Heidegger has given a name to the sphere which *seems* to become the main opposition with respect to the question of philosophy proper – the theoretical sphere. Halfway through the lecture course he states: "[t]his primacy of the theoretical must be broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical, and not in order to introduce something that shows the problems from a new side, but because the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical" (47 [59]).

2.3. Thematic field reconsidered

Having arrived in his previous analysis at the primacy of the theoretical, which is located in the sphere of the material as a pre-given field, Heidegger states that in the domination of the sphere of things, there is nothing, not even the 'there is' [*es gibt*] (48 [62]). Or is there?

> We are standing at the methodological cross-road which will decide on the very life or death of philosophy. We stand in an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute reification, pure thingness, or we leap into *another world*, more precisely, we manage for the first time to make the leap [*Sprung*] into the world as such. (51 [63])

With this statement Heidegger turns to the path he has promised at the beginning of the lecture – a new understanding of philosophy. He opens his second part by calling to enact two experiences [*Erlebnisse*]: the experience of the question 'is there something?' and the experience of the lectern. Through these two examples, in my opinion, Heidegger introduces what is to be considered the proper thematic field of philosophy. With respect to the KNS schema the examples give an explanation of what is meant by the 'pre-theoretical' sphere. More concretely, the examples help us to understand what Heidegger is referring to by 'pre-worldly something' and by 'worldly something,' the latter of which pair is reconsidered. In addition, as Heidegger promised in his initial problematization of

[59] See more on the historical background of Heidegger's use of 'es gibt' in Kisiel (1995: 42-44).

philosophy, on the basis of the rethought 'worldly something' he will rip out the foundation underneath traditional philosophy.

2.3.1. The question "Is there something"

"Already in the opening of the question 'Is there…?' there is something" (51 [63]). The question 'is there something?' is to be taken up again in a new manner – by leaping into the lived experience. Heidegger calls for a remaining with the lived experience itself, without leaning to theories beforehand through the "stubborn habit of thought" (52 [65]). That is, the experience of the question, questioning, is brought out as 'lived experience' and not as a question of the knowledge of a thing. Rather than dwelling on the psychic processes of a psychic subject, the enactment of the very questioning itself needs to be taken up. The experience must be vitalized: "[i]t is a matter of sounding out the motives from which it lives" (53 [65]). The question to be asked is how this question ('Is there something?') itself is experienced. Thus, it is not to be asked how the experience is given, but how it is lived. It is not to be considered a process in me or in front of me. Rather, Heidegger stresses that in questioning 'I comport myself' [*'ich verhalte mich'*]. What is the significance of 'I comport myself' in asking 'Is there something'? What characterizes this comporting oneself or, rather, what happens in questioning, in 'I comport myself'?

> But what is decisive is that simple inspection [*Hinsehen*] does not discover anything like an 'I'. What I see is just that 'it lives' [*es lebt*], moreover that it lives towards something, something that is itself questionable. (53 [66])[60]

That is, Heidegger leads the experience of the question 'is there something?' taken as a lived experience in three directions: (1) relatedness in questioning; (2) meaningful context through what is questioned, that is, the questionable; and (3) the one who questions, that is, the questioner.

Thus, with the example of the experience of the question 'is there something?' Heidegger first of all shows himself a student of Husserl, reflecting on phenomenology and aiming to further it. He describes questioning as pure directedness. What is observed in questioning, in 'I comport myself' is directedness or relatedness: what I see in the simple inspection is that 'it lives towards something.' Here one could stop, but this would mean leaving the path of what is found in the experience. By staying with the experience, however, Heidegger brings out of isolation what is questioned in questioning and makes a

[60] "Entscheidend ist: Das schlichte Hinsehen findet nicht so etwas wie ein 'Ich'. Ich sehe: Es lebt, und weiter, es lebt auf etwas hin, und diese 'Leben auf hin' ist ein 'fragend Leben auf etwas hin', und das Etwas selbst steht im Charakter der Fraglichkeit" (GA 56/57: 66).

move to a meaningful context of the questioning. That is, secondly, 'it lives towards something that is itself questionable.'

In enacting the question 'is there something?' there are two directions observable: it is asked whether 'there is' something and it is asked whether there is 'something.' Asking about the meaning of 'there is' he points out that in the experience of the questioning 'is there something,' the 'there is' [*es gibt*] may be filled with different meanings: each time the 'there is' is concretized (there is a table, there are words) and it has a different meaning (54 [67]).

> And yet: the meaning of 'something', primitive as it appears to be, shows itself in accord with its sense as motivator of a whole process of motivations. This is already suggested by the fact that, in attempting to grasp the meaning of 'something in general' [*Etwas überhaupt*], we return to individual objects with particular concrete content. Perhaps this reversion is necessary. In the final analysis it belongs to the meaning of 'something in general' to relate to something concrete, whereby the meaningful character of this 'relating' [*Sinncharakter dieses "Angewiesenseins selbst"*] still remains problematic. (54-55 [68])

That is, there is a tendency to fill what is questioned with a concrete content. The significance of this is double-edged. On the one hand, Heidegger seems to aim to show how objectification takes place in the questioning – reification through the tendency to fill what is questioned with concrete content and to fix it as such. In this manner it becomes possible that scientific philosophy leads to total reification. There is the living tendency to objectify by filling the meaning with concrete content. On the other hand, the tendency towards the concrete does not need to result in objectification. What is significant is only the tendency towards the concrete – the 'there is' tends towards concretization, towards something beyond itself: "[o]nce again a new element of meaning refers the question and its content (there is) beyond itself" (54 [67]). That is: the relation does not need to be objectifying, but rather it is "still problematic."

In addition, despite assuming different meanings, the 'there is' is "in each case with an identical moment of meaning" (54 [67]). That is, asking about the 'something' of the questioning, Heidegger insists further that this 'something' is not something already filled with a concrete content, but it *can* (emphasis KK) be taken as 'anything whatsoever' (54 [68]). In this respect, the least to be said is that something is something. However, this something is not in isolation. As such, what needs to be asked is how the anything whatsoever relates to something concrete.[61] At this point Heidegger is very brief in his

[61] Later on, Heidegger explicates this further by saying: "[*a*]*nything that can be experienced at all is a possible something, irrespective of its genuine world-character*. The meaning of 'something' is just 'the experienceable as such'" (88 [115]). In that sense, the experience of the question 'is there something?' is not

explication, but it is clear that he aims both to bring out the sphere which is not yet concretized and to point to this sphere as stretching out beyond the emptiness towards the meaningful context. In isolation, there indeed would not even be 'there is.' Would there be an 'I'? As brought out previously: "[b]ut what is decisive is that simple inspection [*Hinsehen*] does not discover anything like an 'I'" (53 [66]). How to consider the presence of I-relatedness in a lived experience?

That anything like an 'I' is not discovered in the simple inspection does not mean that there is no relation to the 'I' whatsoever. Rather, this says that in first instance something like an 'I' is not immediately apprehended in the experience:

> Precisely because the question relates in general to *an* 'I', it is without relation to *my* 'I'. These two phenomena necessarily motivate each other. *Just because the sense of the experience is without relation to my 'I' (to me as so and so), the still somehow necessary 'I' and I-relation are not seen in simple inspection.* (55 [69])

It is not that in experiencing there is an explicit 'I' present. However, the relation to 'I' is never absolutely cut off. Rather, the experience of the question is characterized as 'I-remote' [*Ich-fern*]. This example emphasizes the distance from and at the same time the dependence on a particular 'I' to whom the experience belongs (55 [69]).

To sum up, by considering the question 'is there something?' as a lived experience, Heidegger has brought out the way an experience is to be taken up in its initial mode.[62] Furthermore, as I will argue shortly, with this example Heidegger has articulated the sphere which philosophy must aim at, that is, the 'pre-worldly something' in the KNS schema. Philosophy must reach the 'pre-worldly' as lived experience, and through consideration of the experience of the question 'is there something?' as a lived experience the question gains a new dimension.

> Yet the experience *is*, even when I avoid every kind of reification and insertion into reifying context. It has *now*, it is there – and is even somehow *my* experience. I am there with it, I experience it vitally, it belongs to *my* life, but it is still so detached from me in its sense, so absolutely far from the 'I', so absolutely '*I*-remote' [*Ich-fern*]. (55 [69])[63]

Heidegger stresses that in a lived experience it is not the case that 'relating to' is a thing which is connected to another thing, to a fixed 'something.' Rather it is historical and

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limited to its specific world-character, but rather Heidegger aims to point out the relatedness of intentional structures to the worldly through potentiality.

[62] Looking ahead we can say that by calling to actualize the question through which relation is observable along with a content with its multiplicity of meaning, Heidegger can be seen to have already opened his three-directional sense totality through which *phenomenon* will be determined later on (in GA 60: 43). I will show what this specifically means in chapter four.

[63] "Aber das Erlebnis *ist* doch auch, wenn ich jede Verdinglichung und Einfügung in einen Sachzusammenhang vermeide, hat doch ein *Jetzt*, es ist da – und es ist sogar irgendwie *mein* Erlebnis. Ich bin doch dabei, ich er-lebe es, es gehört *meinem* Leben zu, und doch ist es seinem Sinn nach so losgelöst von mir, so absolut *Ich*-fern" (GA 56/57: 69).

lively. He concludes his analysis by stating: "[n]evertheless, from this experience a ground-laying and essential insight can now be achieved. (Characterization of the lived experience as event [*Er-eignis*] – meaningful, not thing-like)" (56 [69]).

2.3.2. The lectern: introduction to environmental experience

"[C]oming into the lecture-room, I see the lectern" (56 [71]). In this manner Heidegger asks his students to appropriate the experience of encountering a lectern, in order to lead them into the environmental experience. The lectern is to serve as Heidegger's introduction to the *Umwelt*.

> I see the lectern at which I am to speak. You see the lectern, from which you are to be addressed, and from where I have spoken to you previously. In pure experience there is no 'founding' interconnection, as if I first of all see interesting brown surfaces, which then reveal themselves to me as a box, then as a desk, then as an academic lecturing desk, a lectern, so that I attach lectern-hood to the box like a table. […] I see – and immediately so – a book lying upon it as annoying to me […], I see the lectern in an orientation, an illumination, a background. (57 [71])

In this way, the experience of the lectern is distinct from the experience of the question 'is there something?' Where lies the contrast? First of all, the experience of the lectern, differently than the experience of the questioning 'is there something?', is far from being distant from the particular 'I': "I see the lectern at which I am to speak" (ibid.). Furthermore, the experience of the lectern very much 'worlds' [*weltet*] – has the character of world: "I see the lectern in an orientation, an illumination, a background" (ibid.). The experience of the lectern is something individual, has an individual meaning – in seeing the lectern Heidegger sees something different than what his students, or, as he puts it (57 [71]), than what "a Negro from Senegal suddenly transplanted here from his hut" would see; you see it differently than I do. Furthermore, the lectern is seen from out of the immediate environment or surroundings – it is not an isolated box with the name of a lectern. The environment does not consist of things which stand next to each other. Rather, in an environmental experience the lectern is already meaningful. Its meaning is given primarily and immediately.[64] That is to say, through the experience of the lectern, experience of something is brought forth as always my experience, as having the character of world (it worlds [*es weltet*]) and as being already meaningful. In the experience of a lectern, the particular 'I' is somehow already there and necessarily so:

> only through the accord of this particular 'I' does it experience something environmental, where we can say 'it worlds'. Wherever and whenever 'it worlds' for me, *I* am somehow there. (58 [73])

[64] Thus Heidegger says: "[i]n the experience of seeing the lectern something is given *to me* from out of an immediate environment" (58 [72]) and "the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing oriented apprehension" (58 [73]).

This strong presence of the 'I' in the environmental experience makes it different than what is encountered in the analysis of the experience of the question 'is there something?'. However, at the same time, Heidegger brings them firmly together by claiming that the experience of the lectern is an 'event of appropriation' [*Ereignis*] (60 [75]), just as the lived experience reached through the consideration of the question 'is there something?' was claimed to be previously. What does this mean? How do these two examples come together? Most importantly, what should be considered the proposed thematic field for philosophy?

2.3.3. The pre-theoretical something

In my reading, the two examples serve to explain what in the KNS schema is called the 'pre-theoretical something.' What Heidegger was pointing towards with his consideration of the example of the question 'is there something?' is what in Heidegger's KNS schema is called the 'primal something' [*Ur-etwas*]. It is the 'pre-worldly something,' the 'experienceable as such' [*Erlebbare überhaupt*]. According to Heidegger, the primal something is indifferent to any genuine world character, but this does not mean that it is to be seen as removed from the lived experience. The indifference to the world should be rather understood as '*not-yet*' in the sense that it has yet to 'world out' [*auswelten*] – it is "not yet broken out into genuine life" (88 [115]). It is a possible something: "[*a*]*nything that can be experienced at all is a possible something, irrespective of its genuine world-character*" (ibid.). Further, as not-yet, the primal something is seen as the intentional moment: "[b]ut this means that the sense of the something as the experienceable implies the moment of 'out towards' [*auf zu*], of 'direction towards,' '*into* a (particular) world,' and indeed in its undiminished 'vital impetus'" (ibid.). It is the relation (which Heidegger later on calls *Bezugssinn*). Understood in this way, Heidegger claims that its meaning lives in the fullness of life and it should be regarded as "a moment of essence of life in and for itself" (88 [116]). It is the pure out-towards, a pre-worldly which has a connection to or dependence on the 'worldly something.'[65]

The lectern, as it is experienced in the environmental experience, is the 'worldly something' in its proper sense. The 'worldly something' is expressed in the KNS schema as the 'genuine experiential world.' Within this 'worldly something' the 'pre-worldly

[65] In connection with Heidegger's lecture course which I will look at in chapter three, it is significant that Heidegger also describes the 'pre-worldly something' as the basic character of life: "[t]he primal character of 'something in general' is the basic character of life as such" (GA 56/57: 163 [218]).

something' can be distinguished: pre-worldly as not-yet, that is, potentially worldly. As Heidegger brought out in the example of the experience of the question 'is there something?': something in this questioning *can* be taken as *anything whatsoever*. It is the potentiality which is essential and distinct from fixation of the content beforehand. It is the character of the potentiality of the pre-worldly which can be worldly.

Further, both of the examples are brought together by Heidegger as 'event of appropriation' [*Ereignis*].[66] According to Heidegger, "[t]he experiences are events of appropriation in so far as they live out of one's 'own-ness,' and life lives only in this way" (60 [75]). What Heidegger means by "one's 'own-ness'" is left unclarified here. However, I agree with Campbell, who points out that the 'own-ness' here suggests what will be called factical life later on.[67] Furthermore, I would claim that by the 'event of appropriation' Heidegger refers to one mode of accessing the pre-worldly in its dependence on the worldly. I will explain this claim further in chapter 2.4.

Explaining the 'event of appropriation' negatively, Heidegger contrasts it with what he calls 'process' [*Vorgang*]. The experience regarded as 'event of appropriation' [*Ereignis*] is a non-process (ibid.). By the term process Heidegger refers to a specific theoretical comportment – the firm fixing of the object. According to Heidegger, the grasping of the 'anything whatsoever' as firm fixation of the object which does not touch *me* is a de-vivification [*Ent-leben*]: "[w]hat is objectified, what is known, is as such re-moved [*ent-fernt*], lifted out of the actual experience" (59 [74]). This objective happening is called "process" – a happening which passes before the knowing 'I.' It is "the objective occurrence, the happening as objectified and known" (ibid.). That is, the process refers to objectification, whereby something is known by the 'I' (objectified subject) in front of which the process passes. It is the theoretical comportment: "[i]n the theoretical comportment I am directed to something, but *I* do not live (as historical 'I') towards this or that worldly element" (ibid.).[68] This 'I' is not only de-vivified, but also de-historicized: "[t]he historical 'I' is de-historicized into the residue of specific 'I-ness' as the correlate of

[66] According to Heidegger, the pre-worldly and worldly meet in the 'event of appropriation': "[w]hat is essential about the pre-worldly and worldly signifying functions is that they express the character of the appropriating event, i.e. they go together (experiencing and experiencing experienced) with experience itself, they live in life itself and, going along with life, they are at once originating and carrying their provenance in themselves" (89 [117]).

[67] According to Campbell (2012: 30): "[f]actical life is, rather, the primordial experience of one's own self, which Heidegger calls here 'one's own-ness' (*G* 56/57:75/60)."

[68] From Brecht's transcript about the clarification of the process, two modes of the theoretical are found: "[t]heoretical comportment is a process first because it flows through a chain of grounding, but secondly because it tears itself from the contexture of life with ever novel spontaneity" (158 [212]).

thingness; and only in following through the theoretical does it have its 'who', i.e. merely 'deducible'?!" (70 [89]). With respect to the KNS schema, the term process refers to the sphere named 'object-like something.' It is still motivated from the 'worldly something,' but its mode of accessing is such that the worldly loses its worldliness.

Thus, Heidegger distinguishes several different spheres in his analysis. As I have argued and will argue further, for him philosophy proper must reach the pre-worldly as the intentional moment which is dependent on the 'genuine experiential world.' That is, philosophy must find an access and the possibility of expressing the pre-worldly in the 'worldly something' regarded as environmental experience. That this is the case becomes clearer when looking at Heidegger's considerations of method. However, before I turn to his positive account of the way of accessing the pre-worldly (or rather ways of accessing), the traditional approach needs to be considered once more. According to Heidegger, the gateway to philosophy is to be taken from environmental experience. Furthermore, through environmental experience he claims to resolve the central problem (the problem of circularity) of traditional philosophy. It is significant that the 'genuine experiential world,' within which worldview philosophy gains its meaning and in which the 'object-like something' is motivated (thus scientific philosophy has its motivation), is reconsidered as environmental experience by Heidegger. How does Heidegger sever the connection between philosophy and worldview on the basis of the re-established 'worldly something'?

2.3.4. Environmental experience versus objectifying theoretization

Heidegger shows what it means to regard environmental experience as the passage for philosophy and exhibits his reasoning behind the claim to resolve the problems of the theoretical approach by accounting for the possible objections to lifting environmental experience to the foreground of philosophy. For he addresses the issue that if one takes the environmental experience as a gateway to philosophy, one cannot dismiss the problem of the presupposition of these experiences themselves (along with the presupposition of the givenness of the experience). The environmental experience as such is full of presuppositions. This traditionally raises the question "[d]oes my environing world really exist?" (61 [77]). Thus, Heidegger takes up a possible objection expressed in questioning the reality of the external world and the two possible solutions to the problem: critical realism and idealism. Who is correct, Aristotle or Kant, (61, 63 [78, 79]) Heidegger boldly asks, with the answer already at hand: neither of them.

According to Heidegger, both critical realism and critical-transcendental idealism are in agreement as regards the first givenness of the experience. What is primarily given are sensations, the data of sense [*Empfindungsdaten*], and everything is decided by the explanation of these sense data (63 [84]). The point of disagreement starts with the different questions which the two pose: "[c]ritical realism asks: how do I get out of the 'subjective sphere' of the sense data to knowledge of the external world?" (63 [80]) and "[c]ritical-transcendental idealism poses the problem: how, remaining within the 'subjective sphere,' do I arrive at objective knowledge?" (ibid.). Thus, both starting with the sense data, one goes in the direction of teaching "the possibility of knowing the things in themselves" (64 [82]) and the other proceeds with the sense data as data "only in so far as we are *conscious* of them" (64-65 [82]). As such, they are simply two different directions within the common sphere – in both cases the point of departure is taken from the givenness of the sense data and in both cases the way out is sought by theoretical means. They insist on the primacy of the theoretical without realizing this.[69]

In what sense are the givenness of the sense data and being theoretically oriented seen as problematic? According to Heidegger, this can be seen with reference to the environmental experience. Referring back to the experience of the lectern, he brings out that in the case of the lectern, what is seen immediately is the lectern, not sense data. To get to the sense data, one needs to strip the lectern of everything which makes it a lectern in order to get to something like the brownness of the lectern – one needs to make it an object for oneself. Furthermore, for the lectern to be *given*, the 'historical I' needs to be removed: "'[g]ivenness' signifies the initial objectifying infringement of the environment, its initial placement before the *still* historical 'I'" (69 [89]). That is, it needs to be de-vivified, it needs to be brought into the theoretical attitude. The environmental experience, having already the character of world, does not allow the kind of isolation needed in the cases of both critical realism and idealism – both of which (contrary to their own view) not only do not have the *immediate* which they presume to have, but furthermore the immediate experience gets lost in them.[70] Heidegger's solution is to turn the tables around. It is not that

[69] At this time, Heidegger calls this explanation, which disfigures the environmental experience for the sake of theory, destruction: "[e]xplanation through dismemberment, i.e. destruction: one wants to explain something which one no longer has as such, which one cannot and will not recognize as such in its vitality" (67-68 [86]). It should be noted that Heidegger uses the notion of destruction here very differently than what destruction starts to signify later on in his early works, when phenomenological destruction assumes a specific meaning as a moment in phenomenological method.

[70] More specifically Heidegger explains this loss of the environmental in critical realism and idealism as follows: "[t]he incoherence of critical realism consists not just in its cancellation of the meaningful dimension

the theoretical way can explain the immediate experience, but rather the problem of the theoretical needs to be solved based on the environmental experience:

> One of the most difficult problems is that of *transgressing the limits of environmental experience toward initial objectification.* This, and the problem of the theoretical as such, can only be solved by an understanding of environmental experience and its deeper problematic." (71 [91])

In this way, seen from the environmental experience, the problems with which one has been struggling up till now are perhaps not problematic at all. In the environmental experience the problem situation for critical realism and idealism, that of the problem of the reality of the external world, turns out not to be really a problem: "[*e*]*nvironmental experience for its part itself presupposes reality*" (72 [92]). It is already valid, proven or not proven and thus the problem of the reality of the external world is seen as absurd in the light of the environmental experience: "[w]hen I attempt to explain the environing world theoretically, it collapses upon itself" (68 [86]). Furthermore, the whole problematic behind the struggle to find the 'idea of philosophy as primordial science' assumes a different meaning.

Heidegger started his search for the 'idea of philosophy as primordial science' by bringing out the problem of circularity, which somehow needed to be surmounted. Now (asking about the meaning of the presupposition of the reality in the environmental experience), he turns back to this starting point (the problem of the self-presupposition of the primordial sciences and the problem of circularity as an integral part of it) and turns it around: "[c]ircularity is an eminently theoretical phenomenon, it is really the most refined expression of a purely theoretical difficulty" (74 [95]). Thus, it is problematic only insofar as the theoretical has taken primacy. Instead, Heidegger now suggests: "[i]f the circle is to be superseded, then there must be a science that is pre-theoretical or supra-theoretical, at any rate non-theoretical, a genuinely *primordial* science from which the theoretical itself originates" (75 [96]). According to Heidegger, this science is 'phenomenology as pre-theoretical primordial science.' Phenomenology as the pre-theoretical primordial science somehow provides the access to (and the means to express) experience as such. How to access the pre-worldly is the question.

2.4. The problem of the method

The problem Heidegger is addressing in this lecture course is that of the nature of philosophy itself. Via various detours the problem of philosophy has taken the form of the

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of the environing world, in the fact that it does not and cannot see the dimension. Instead, it already comes armed with the theory and attempts to explain one being by another" (68 [86-87]); "What realism *cannot* see, idealism does not *want* to see, because it holds *stubbornly* to a *one-sided* goal. Critical idealism rests upon an unjustified absolutization of the theoretical" (68 [87]).

problem of method. Specifically, Heidegger finds the problem to concern the methodological apprehension of the lived experience as such, which is considered by taking the environmental experience into account (76 [98]).[71] In apprehending the lived experience methodologically there is a risk of falling back into a de-vivifying theoretization [*Theoretisierung*], which Heidegger has shown to fail in its attempts. Is there a possibility of avoiding such theoretization in the attempt to apprehend the lived experience? With respect to the KNS schema, one can read in Franz-Josef Brecht's transcripts of the lecture course: "[i]t is necessary to see the fundamental necessity for phenomenology: that the 'something in general' does not belong in the de-vivification process of theoretization [*Entlebungsprozeß der Theoretisierung*], but rather in the primal phenomenological sphere" (163 [217]). How is this shown?

Previously, outlining the thematic field of philosophy, I claimed that for Heidegger the thematic field is articulated through the 'pre-theoretical something' in the schema. As I brought out, the 'pre-worldly something' is the basic character of life. It is the pure out-towards, which has a connection to or dependence on the 'worldly something.' This connection is to be understood as potentiality: the pre-worldly is potentially worldly. Philosophy according to Heidegger must reach the primal something (the pre-worldly) in its connection to the 'worldly something.' The question is how to access the pre-worldly without de-vivifying the experience. This how-question is the question of philosophical method. In this lecture course, in my opinion, Heidegger gives two different answers to this question and thus it is not surprising that we find two clearly distinct interpretations of Heidegger's method.

On the one hand, according to Heidegger, "[i]t [the 'something' as pre-worldly] is a basic phenomenon that can be experienced in understanding, e.g. in the living situation of gliding from one world of experience to another genuine life-world, or in moments of especially intensive life; not at all or seldom in those types of experiences that are firmly anchored in a world *without* reaching, precisely within this world, a much greater life-intensity" (88 [115]). That is to say, the access is to be found within the pre-theoretical sphere by diving into the environmental experience. It is in the very rhythm of life, in its motivated tendency and tending motivation (Heidegger's initial pair for what is to become the thrownness-project pair, as Kisiel (1995: 53-54) already pointed out) in which the pre-

[71] "The basic problem is clear, namely the problem of the methodological apprehension of lived experience as such: how is a science of experience as such possible? We wish to decide this question by looking at how environmental experience is to be considered" (76 [98]).

worldly shows itself.[72] Indeed, in the last instance it seems that Heidegger is claiming that eventually the 'pre-worldly something' is only reached in the living situation, in the "sympathy with life" (84 [110])[73]. Is that what Heidegger means when he says: "[b]ut *philosophy* can progress only through an absolute sinking into life as such, for *phenomenology* is never concluded, only *preliminary*, it always sinks itself into the preliminary" (165 [220])? It seems so, because he goes on to say that "[t]he genuine insight, however, can only be arrived at through honest and uncompromising sinking into the genuineness of life as such, in the final event only through the genuineness of *personal life* as such" (ibid.).

On the other hand, however, the problem of accessing the pre-worldly comes down to the possibility of the connection between the 'pre-worldly something' and the 'objective formal-logical something.' Thus, Heidegger first makes a distinction within the theoretical. He claims that in order not to confuse the phenomenological attitude, a fundamental distinction must be made clear, namely that there are two fundamentally different kinds of the theoretical, as can be seen already from the KNS schema. From the de-vivifying theoretical a formal theoretization which is "*qualitatively* different" is to be distinguished (87 [114]). These two are the 'object-like something' and the 'objective formal-logical something' in the KNS schema.

Thus, on the one hand, there is a process of theoretization, in which there is no relation to a world-content: "[i]t is the absolutely worldless, world-foreign; it is the sphere which takes one's breath away and where no one can live" (86 [112]). This process of theoretization proceeds in different levels of de-vivification. Heidegger brings out that these levels are restricted to particular spheres in which it is possible on every different level to make a judgment: 'it is something' (as it is said in the schema: the 'object-like something' is motivated in the 'genuine experiential world'). Thus, in the case of the lectern, one can say "it is brown; brown is a color; color is a genuine sense datum" (86 [113]). These kinds of theoretizations (Heidegger uses the plural here) he calls "*the specific level-boundedness of the steps in the process of de-vivification*" (87 [114]).

On the other hand, Heidegger now claims that there is a different kind of theoretization: formal theoretization. Formal theoretization is seen as not belonging to the

[72] According to Heidegger, "[l]ife is in itself motivated and tendential: motivating tendency, tending motivation" (163 [218]).
[73] Heidegger also uses the term 'sympathy' in explaining Husserl's principle of principle, saying that "it expresses the fundamental life-stance of phenomenology: the sympathy of experience with life!" (162 [216]).

de-vivification process, because it is free from *level-boundedness* – it is not bound to specific steps and levels in the process of de-vivification, not bound to dualistic approaches. Furthermore, Heidegger claims that "its motivational origin from life is qualitatively and essentially different" (87 [114]). It is different, since there is no need for motivation on specific levels of theoretization. Rather, Heidegger seems to suggest that it reaches 'the experienceable as such' (88 [115]). Formal theoretization is motivated in the 'pre-worldly something' as the pure out-towards, which has a connection to or dependence on the 'worldly something.'

Thus, it seems that Heidegger pushes towards a philosophy in which the question of access is put forward in terms of intensified experience. The access to the pre-worldly is to be reached in certain situations in genuineness of life. In this case he avoids theoretization and, with respect to the KNS schema, stays within the sphere of the pre-theoretical something. Then again, he also seems to want to hold on to the idea that philosophy must be understood as a kind of science – it should be a pre-theoretical science. Therefore, his solution to the access question as presented in the KNS schema lies in formalization (the 'formal-logical something'). For the access to the pre-worldly a form of the theoretical which does not de-vivify the experience should be sought. What to think of these two possibilities?

Up to this day the question of what to make of Heidegger's method is one of the most widely debated issues among the interpreters of Heidegger. Within this debate two main approaches can be distinguished. There are those according to whom Heidegger's approach is radically historical and his methodology proceeds through hermeneutics and destruction of our pre-understanding. But there are also those who would claim that Heidegger is a transcendental phenomenologist and methodologically follows Husserl. In this respect, the distinction between the two standpoints can be articulated in terms of the question of Heidegger's methodological closeness to Husserl. As such, the disagreement in these debates, which mostly do not revolve around the interpretation of Heidegger's earliest lecture courses, has been traced back to his KNS lecture course and to his thematization of Paul Natorp's criticism of phenomenology.[74] The views on Heidegger's stance towards

[74] In this lecture course Heidegger addresses Paul Natorp's criticism directed against two aspects of phenomenological method: reflection and description (77-85 [99-112]). The problem with reflection is that the experiences are brought out from the living stream, out of immediacy and placed in front of us as objects to be reflected on. This means that in reflection one is theoretically oriented and the stream of lived experiences is 'stilled' (78 [101-102]). Description faces a similar charge: since description proceeds through concepts, which means that it falls under generalization, it not only is dependent on but also presupposes a

Natorp's criticism diverge in the same way as the overall views on his method. Heidegger is either seen as dismissing Natorp's criticism – in this view his methodological considerations are a continuance of Husserl's method of reflective intuition (admittedly in such a way that one or another aspect of it is developed further) – or he is seen to break free from Husserl and to take a different path, one which surmounts Natorp's objections.

In this debate Theodore Kisiel, for example, holds that Heidegger distances himself from Husserl's phenomenology. According to Kisiel (1995: 48-50, 55), Heidegger takes Natorp's criticism (immediate experience is inaccessible and inexpressible) seriously and rejects phenomenology's attempts to grasp the primal something (the pre-worldly), whereas the aim to grasp it methodologically would inevitably lead to theoretization. Kisiel states that Heidegger responds to the objections with understanding as a non-intuitive form of access and formal indication as non-objectifying conceptualization. That is, with the hermeneutical understanding which follows life, Heidegger points to "a certain familiarity which life already has to itself and which phenomenology needs only to repeat" within the stream of life without disturbing it (op. cit.: 48). In interpreting Heidegger's KNS lecture course, Kisiel thus says:

> Philosophy is accordingly an orienting comportment (*Verhalten*), a praxis of striving, and a protreptic encouraging such a striving. Its expressions are only "formal indications" which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves. […] In short philosophy is more a form of life on the edge of expression rather than a science. (Kisiel 1995: 59)

As could be expected, Kisiel also dismisses the relevance of formal objectification for Heidegger: "[d]espite Heidegger's effort to revive it, formal objectification is finally still unliving in its rigid duality of the subject over against the object, which must be dismantled and revivified by the unified relation of motive to tendency, which is at the 'heart' of the intentional movement here" (op. cit.: 53).

An opposing view to Kisiel's can be found in Søren Overgaard's interpretation. Overgaard, to my knowledge, does not explicitly thematize Heidegger's stance towards Natorp's criticism, but he clearly represents the opposing pole in the debate over Heidegger's method. Although Overgaard (2003: 169) points out significant differences between Heidegger and Husserl,[75] he insists that with respect to method Heidegger is "to a

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theory. Thus, one must conclude that theoretization is unavoidable if an experience is to be made into an object of science and therefore there is no immediate apprehension of experience (78 [101]). This Natorpian criticism can be seen as the starting point of the disagreement between the two main approaches to Heidegger's method insofar as the two lines of interpretation diverge from each other in their opinion on whether Heidegger takes this criticism seriously.

[75] With respect to Heidegger's differences from Husserl, Overgaard (2003: 159-166) shows how Heidegger is able to resist "layer ontology" more consistently than Husserl by articulating the mode of being of things we

great extent a follower of Husserl." According to Overgaard, Heidegger's work is dependent first and foremost on intentionality. Especially he is indebted to Husserl's insight into how phenomenology thematizes the objects of the intentional acts and these acts themselves: not by turning to natural objects, but to how they are intended – which requires a different approach to entities (op. cit.: 167-168). There must be a special way of accessing entities. In this respect, Overgaard argues further that Heidegger works within the framework of Husserl's epochē, which he describes as a procedure by which 'natural' knowledge is prevented from entering phenomenological work and which at the same time makes a phenomenological thematization of entities possible ("the entity in the How of its being-encountered") (op. cit.: 169-170). Furthermore, according to Overgaard's interpretation, for Heidegger this kind of access makes phenomenological research possible (op. cit.: 168). All in all, Overgaard claims that Heidegger's critique of Husserl is internal critique – Heidegger does not put forward a different phenomenology, but develops it further. The most significant development of phenomenology in Heidegger lies in his attention to expressions, which is brought out by the term 'formal indication' and what Overgaard calls the second 'epochē-like' move (op. cit.: 170-171).

Certainly, in between these two approaches one can find many interpretations which lean to one or another side to a different degree. Among them, siding more with Overgaard, Steven Galt Crowell (2001: 4-5), for example, argues that although in many respects Heidegger develops Husserl's account further, Heidegger is still profoundly indebted to Husserl. In his review of Kisiel's *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, Crowell criticizes Kisiel for his lack of attention to Heidegger's relation to Husserl, insofar as it leads to an underdeveloped interpretation of Heidegger's method. Arguing against Kisiel's interpretation, Crowell asserts that there is a distinction between simply following life and grasping it. Philosophy aims to clarify lived life. Crowell argues that "Heidegger all along follows Husserl's view that philosophical cognition, phenomenology, is not objective theory but 'clarification,' a kind of comportment that works by methodologically exploiting the 'turning back upon itself' implicit in life's own course" (Crowell 1995: 445, 2001: 126). This insight of Crowell's that philosophy aims to clarify the living of life leads me back to Heidegger's two different accounts of method found in his KNS lecture course.

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encounter as "readiness to hand." Also, Overgaard shows how Heidegger, by paying more attention to terminology, is able to articulate "subjectivity" (with Dasein as a formally indicated concept) more adequately than Husserl.

I would suggest that Heidegger himself gives a ground for both of the main lines of interpretation of his method mentioned above (all of which are well argued as well as textually supported). In the same way that Heidegger once gave an opportunity to Löwith and Becker to have their distinct approaches to his philosophy, he paved the way for two quite distinct interpretations of his method. This can be seen already in the two descriptions of the ways of accessing the pre-worldly found in the KNS lecture course. The question here is not that of choosing between either/or. Rather, both of them are presented by Heidegger. He indeed describes two different ways of accessing. One, which is to be found in the living situation itself (in lived experience), and the other, which serves the purpose of philosophical "clarification" and can be seen as following Husserl to a great extent.

In our lecture course, Heidegger does not develop either of the two described ways of accessing the pre-worldly much further. However, as I aim to show in the following chapters, Heidegger takes up both of the directions, which allows me to claim that in this lecture course only the two-directional *task* is presented. As I intend to demonstrate, Heidegger balances between these two tasks throughout his first Freiburg period and thus also articulates the proper access sought in philosophy in two different ways. The final testimony to Heidegger's struggle between two different angles is found in the lecture course *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, where Heidegger articulates his hermeneutics of facticity as self-understanding of facticity (which can be seen as addressing the access found in the living situation) and at the same time distinguishes it from philosophy (mode of access with which philosophical investigation must proceed in order not to de-vivify the experience).

With respect to Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg lecture courses, the distinction between the two modes of access will prove to be significant. Furthermore, I claim that Heidegger's controversial judgments of Kierkegaard finally make sense only when one recognizes the distinction between finding an access in the living situation and establishing it through specific philosophical investigation. As I will show, Heidegger focuses on Kierkegaard very intently when he addresses the issue of the possibilities of reaching the pre-worldly in the living situation (thus rightly recognizing his debt to Kierkegaard). However, he mostly dismisses Kierkegaard when considering how one must proceed in philosophical investigation, to the point of dismissing Kierkegaard as a philosopher (GA 63: 25 [30]). Before I reach this point, I turn to Heidegger's following

lecture courses in order to show that Heidegger indeed takes up two different tasks and how he does this.

2.5. Conclusion

I began this chapter with the claim that in the lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* Heidegger sets the tasks for his search in a manner which leads him to articulate philosophy in two different ways. My aim was to underpin this claim by unraveling Heidegger's KNS schema, which summarizes the story of this lecture course.

In this lecture course, Heidegger claims to re-establish philosophy by overthrowing the traditional understanding of philosophy determined here as worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy. With respect to the KNS schema, the first of these operates within a 'definite experiential sphere' – a sphere which is misconstrued in the worldview and which Heidegger re-establishes under the term 'environmental experience.' The other one works within the sphere named the 'object-like something,' which is 'motivated in the genuine experiential world,' but de-vivifies this genuine world through its objectifying stance. Instead of these two unfortunate approaches of and to philosophy, Heidegger suggests that philosophy must turn towards the 'pre-worldly something' as its theme. Insofar as the 'pre-worldly something' is a 'fundamental moment of life as such,' that is, is always a moment of the 'worldly something' (understood as environmental experience), the thematic field of philosophy becomes 'the pre-theoretical something' in the KNS schema. Now philosophy must find a way to access and express the 'pre-worldly something' as the moment of the 'worldly something.'

The problem of how Heidegger approaches the question of access has been the subject of debates among interpreters of Heidegger. I have claimed that Heidegger gives two different accounts of how the access to the pre-worldly must be established and thus paves a way for both main sides of the debate. On the one hand, philosophy should remain in 'the pre-theoretical' sphere and thus find an access to the pre-worldly within the 'genuine experiential world,' that is, in lived life. On the other hand, philosophy should find a method for accessing and expressing the pre-worldly. In this case, philosophy would be a theoretical approach (the 'objective formal-logical something'), but an approach which does not de-vivify the experience. Rather, it is 'motivated in the primal something.' Philosophy here is an investigation in accordance with a methodology which must be established.

In our lecture course, these directions are presented only as tasks: as directions which philosophy must take up. In the following two chapters I will show that Heidegger takes up both of these tasks in his subsequent lecture courses and elucidate how he does this. First, he develops the access which belongs to the 'pre-theoretical' sphere and is called 'the intensifying-concentration upon the self-world.' After that, he will focus on the second kind of approach by articulating three methodological moments of phenomenology. With respect to Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's lecture courses, the two-sided consideration of the question of access becomes significant. As I will seek to show, Kierkegaard has importance for Heidegger within the first of these directions. He will become one of the central sources for finding an access to the pre-worldly in lived life: the one who, according to Heidegger himself, has given "impulses" to him (GA 63: 4 [5]). However, Heidegger also articulates a strict method for accessing and expressing the pre-worldly – a method for "clarification," as Crowell has acutely expressed it. Insofar as philosophy is this kind of investigation for Heidegger, Kierkegaard for him stands outside of philosophy, (25 [30]) and rather indeed Husserl has "opened [Heidegger's] eyes" (4 [5]).

3. Phenomenology as origin-understanding

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I claimed that in his KNS lecture course Heidegger sets a two-directional task to re-establish philosophy. On the one hand, he suggests that philosophy must find the possibility of accessing the pre-worldly within the pre-theoretical sphere. On the other hand, he talks about the task of going after a philosophical method (which must avoid de-vivification) in terms of the formal-logical something. In the two following chapters (three and four), I aim to show that Heidegger takes up both of these tasks and how he does it. In the present chapter, I aim to show that in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* [*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 58] (WS 1919-1920)[76] Heidegger pursues philosophy in the first of the previously described directions. Already at the end of the lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, we hear through Franz-Josef Brecht's transcript Heidegger apparently stating in the lecture room: "[t]he genuine insights, however, can only be arrived at through honest and uncompromising sinking into the genuineness of life as such, in the final event only through the genuineness of *personal life* as such" (GA 56/57: 165 [220]). Roughly half a year after finishing this lecture course, Heidegger takes up this task of uncompromising sinking into the genuineness of life.[77] Formal objectification is deemed an "empty conceptual schema" which does not allow genuine understanding (GA 58: 121 [158]). Rather, genuine access is to be found in going along with life in its vital pull.

In this lecture course, as in the KNS lecture course previously, Heidegger again addresses the problem of philosophy itself: "'[b]asic problems of phenomenology' – the most burning, most original, and ultimate basic problem of phenomenology, one which is never to be effaced, is *it itself* for itself" (GA 58: 2 [1]). Phenomenology, which is the same as philosophy for Heidegger here, is what is aimed to be established.[78] In addition, again as

[76] Not to be confused with the lecture course from the summer semester of 1927 which bears an identical title (*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24).

[77] The lecture course was held in the winter semester of 1919-1920, from October through January (Kisiel 1995: 554, n. 7). Initially, Heidegger was supposed to give in this semester a lecture course on *The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism* [*Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik*], which was cancelled (Kisiel 1995: 554, n. 8).

[78] In the transcripts of Oskar Becker we find Heidegger apparently saying: "[p]henomenology is the original science of life itself. Phenomenology is synonymous with philosophy. It is not a pre-science. This means that there is a weakening of the philosophical intuition when one judges the phenomenological as particulars that

in the KNS lecture course, establishing phenomenology for Heidegger simultaneously means taking up the whole tradition of philosophy: "[t]his innermost, living calling, the destiny of philosophy, its idea, whose greatest manifestation we know under the names of Plato, Kant, Hegel, needs to be brought to 'life,' in an original and radical way, from out of a new basic situation" (2 [1-2]). As becomes clear, in each lecture course Heidegger rethinks philosophy. Thus, in this lecture course, too, the search for phenomenology as *pre-theoretical primordial science* (GA 56/57) turns into a search for phenomenology initially determined as *original science of life itself* [*Ursprungswissenschaft vom Leben an sich*] (GA 58: 176 [233]).[79] More concretely, the lecture course is directed to explicating philosophy as origin-understanding.

In what follows, I aim to show how, via different steps, Heidegger reaches and unfolds philosophy as origin-understanding. As such, philosophy, which from the beginning aims at the basic structures of factical life in the fullness of life, is brought into the circle and rhythm of the structures manifesting themselves and the concreteness in which the manifestation takes place. How to access the characters in this rhythm becomes a central question of philosophy for which science cannot lend a helping hand. Rather, proper understanding of philosophy is reached through consideration of trivialities which point towards the necessary direction. Philosophy proper is origin-understanding. Furthermore, as I aim to show by the end of the chapter, origin-understanding as philosophy proper lies in the intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world – a peculiar phenomenon in which the proper access to factical life is reached within the pre-theoretical and through which Heidegger can be seen to refer to Kierkegaard as someone who has lived and expressed philosophy proper. My overall aim in this chapter is to put forward a claim: insofar as philosophy is origin-understanding and insofar as origin-understanding is brought to life in the intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world, Kierkegaard is to be seen as one who has lived and expressed origin-understanding. In a wider context, in this chapter I aim to ground a further claim, namely that insofar as Heidegger in this lecture course takes up one of the directions of the proposed task of philosophy in the KNS lecture course, and Kierkegaard is proven to have significance within this direction, Kierkegaard

need to be combined through a system of forms. In that case, the system of forms no longer has a relation to the basic intuition" (176 [233]).

[79] That is, phenomenology is initially determined as *the original science of life in itself*: "[i]t is *the* primal science, the science of the absolute *origin* of the spirit [*Geist*] in and for itself – 'life in and for itself'" (2 [1]). As in the KNS lecture course, the initial determination will be turned around by Heidegger as he unfolds the problematic.

can already be seen as occupying a concrete place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. The second claim, however, cannot be fully justified before the second direction proposed in the KNS lecture course is also elaborated in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

3.2. The basic characters of life in itself

Heidegger starts his inquiry by brushing aside the main streams of contemporary philosophy. He does it with the ease of sweeping the crumbs of bread left on the table after breakfast into the palm of his hand. Critical realism is nothing more than "dull non-philosophy" (6 [7]), admiration of Spengler "simply laughable" (7 [9]), Neo-Kantianism and Neo-Hegelianism unable to problematize and advance from their standpoints, which are considered ultimate (7 [8]). One can imagine that the arrogance exhibited by the young lecturer might have raised some eyebrows in the lecture room and perhaps even made some question the sanity of the speaker. And yet, there would soon enough be a different reason to raise eyebrows – in amazement, when Heidegger opens up a new world, a world which is absolutely familiar to every listener. He turns to bring this familiar world, which is so out of reach due to its nearness, a little closer to his listeners, who all stand in this familiarity. The point of departure for the search for the original science of "life in itself," of factical life, is factical life itself.[80] It is what we ourselves are.

Factical life is not a thing to look at, nor is it a notion to be abstractly taken up, Heidegger tells his students. Rather, "we are it itself and only see ourselves out of life itself" (24 [29]). It is this that we are mostly so much absorbed in that it escapes our notice. It is the lived life itself, which Heidegger now wants to bring closer in its "general typicality" while remaining in it (25 [30]). Through a series of examples adduced from going along with life itself, Heidegger starts outlining the basic characters of factical life.

First of all, life is always lived in a direction (it has a character of tendency [*Tendenz*]) and in a world. Heidegger does not define what a tendency is, neither does he

[80] It should be noted that Heidegger's use of the notions are not strictly developed and fluctuate in their meaning. As Campbell (2012: 32) has brought out: "[i]f, at the very end of *G* 59, Heidegger names facticity as the primary subject matter of philosophical research, it is not abundantly clear from the rest of the course that he was leading up to this conclusion." In addition, Heidegger was constantly rethinking and developing his notions. Thus, as Kisiel has already pointed out, Heidegger's terminology for this sphere from which the origin must be won goes through several changes during the lecture courses: "'life in and for itself' (KNS) to 'factic life experience' (WS 1919-1920) and 'concrete actual Dasein' (SS 1920)" (Kisiel 1995: 117). In the present lecture course Heidegger moves from "life in itself" to "factic life." For the sake of clarity, I will mostly use "factical life" in what follows. An exception is made for quotations and if it is necessary for the clarity of the content.

define what a world is, but rather puts forward these characters of life through examples which he then calls "trivialities" (29 [36]).

> I sit down at the table; I feel tired, need something to liven me up; I go to a concert, listen to Bach; another time I look at picture, read poems; I *belong* to a religious community – the "I belong" (*a latent and yet alert tendency*) –, on certain days and hours, I am especially active, living in it; I busy myself in an academic association; I play sports, go to vote, am politically active – "I keep" myself always "on" "somewhere". (26 [32])

The listener is deemed to recognize that one is always directed towards something, is always taken over by (a multiplicity of) tendencies, as s/he is also deemed to recognize not having noticed this – recognize that this tendential living is mostly lived in absorption, in dealings without being explicitly there for oneself. One simply lives in this *keeping oneself always on somewhere*, being *towards something*, only occasionally being there for oneself (27 [33]).

Drawn into noticing life as it is factically lived, the listeners will be led to recognize the inevitability of the surroundings, people and even oneself encountered in this fullness of life, so that Heidegger may in full recognition state: "[o]ur life is the world, in which we live, into which and in each case within which the tendencies of life flow. And our life is only lived *as life* insofar as it lives in a world." (27 [34]) The students already present at Heidegger's KNS lecture course are by now familiar with the experience as environmental experience. Now, stressing the world-character of life, Heidegger puts life even more firmly in the world and brings out the lived world (or lifeworlds) in its fullness as environing world (*Umwelt*), with-world (*Mitwelt*), and self-world (*Selbstwelt*) (27 [33]). One always lives in a world, within one's surroundings, encountering things and others from out of one's personal rhythm. It becomes readily accepted that life in itself lives in this living stream and flooding fullness. It should be recognized that life lives in its "trivialities."

Now Heidegger makes a claim: this lived life, which is always imperfect, fragmented and not fully satisfied and is always lived in a direction and in a world, is also always sufficient to itself. It grows out of its own motivation and fulfills its own tendencies. He determines "self-sufficiency" [*Selbstgenügsamkeit*], the basic aspect of this life, as the "form of life's fulfillment" (25 [31]). That is, in itself it brings itself to fulfillment: "[i]t [life] carries within itself, structurally (which pervades every how and what in their innermost content), the availabilities necessitated by itself as possibilities of fulfillment of the tendencies growing out of itself" (34 [42]). In order to fulfill its tendencies, it does not need to come out of itself. Rather, life both addresses itself and in its own language answers itself (25, 34 [31, 42]). This claim of life's self-sufficiency might strike us as questionable,

but the questionability of this claim does not concern us here. For Heidegger, life is self-sufficient and as such must give answers to its own questions. What instead will be questioned are the trivialities themselves. Saying that everything described previously are trivialities and calling our attention to the self-evidence of life as it is brought forth, Heidegger makes a turn and raises the need to "listen in to these trivialities," which are "*absolutely problematic*" (29 [36]). By calling to listen in to these trivialities, he leads the listener to the next character of factical life: manifestation [*Bekundung*].

With the examples of encountering a lecture course and a book Heidegger leads his students towards a realization that the content of this encounter always shows itself in a different manner (35-36 [43-45]). One can encounter a lecture in a manifold of ways – one day you are annoyed by the chair, another day you are drawn by the lecturer or find him boring. What remains the same throughout these different encounters is that everything shows itself somehow. That is, everything manifests (or expresses) itself: "[e]verything that we encounter in living life *manifests* itself in a context of occurrences. The tendencies and the fulfillment of tendencies somehow always express themselves." (36 [45]) Everything encountered manifests itself, expresses itself, and gives itself somehow. That is, it is a phenomenon, Heidegger says.[81] But what about the differences? Certainly, the ways in which something shows itself do differ.

Heidegger dismisses the thought as if the question of the differences here would refer to a right or wrong kind of manifestation. It is not as if in something encountered (a book, for example) "I manifest its genuine being, that which stands therein" (41 [53]). Rather, what is at issue is that the encountered is encountered in various contexts of manifestation: "[t]here are, again, other contexts in painting, sculpture, poetry and, indeed, there again, various ones in creative design and in aesthetic pleasure. Again, there are others in religion and, again, there are others, highly complex ones, in the possible sciences of such regions of life" (41 [53]). How something manifests itself is dependent on the context of manifestation in which it is depicted. Does this mean that one is doomed to recognize every encounter as contextual without the possibility of any further consideration? Furthermore, does it mean that all the basic characters of life in itself, as Heidegger has brought them out, are dependent on one or another context of manifestation? For Heidegger, surely not! Rather, the way out of depending on specific context is exactly what is searched for. In this

[81] As Heidegger says: "[t]hat some such thing, something experienced, always *somehow* gives itself (what encounters me – I myself, the I encounters me in various ways), we can also formulate in such a way that it *appears*, is a *phenomenon*" (39 [50]).

search, the four characters Heidegger has pointed out (that life in itself is tendential and has world-character as well as the characters of self-sufficiency and manifestation) become some of the leading features of his analysis. However, with regard to the fullness of life in its closeness, these characters at the same time become a problem. They are not simply seen in life in itself, according to Heidegger. Rather, in the search for (the original science of) factical life, the question of the possibility of accessing (pointing out in advance) the characters of factical life, which initially have been discovered by listening in to trivialities, becomes the central problem.

3.3. Science as a context of manifestation

The task of the lecture course is to establish phenomenology "*itself* for itself" (2 [1]). It addresses the problem of the beginning, since "all questioning related to phenomenology should itself be phenomenological and should be settled phenomenologically" (4 [4]). The phenomenology sought after is initially determined as the 'original science of life in itself.' In his usual manner of stepping into the problematic at hand, Heidegger turns to dismantle the tradition in order to lead the problematic out of the tradition onto a different path. Thus, he focuses on the possibility of addressing the issue through a context of manifestation which claims to have primacy over other contexts: the context of "science." It is a context of manifestation among other contexts, and yet a specific one – one which claims to take hold of life and worlds and which Heidegger has placed at the center of the search of phenomenology by determining it as 'the original science of factical life.'

Heidegger does not deny that the life-worlds can be taken hold of and brought to objective scientific expression in the context of manifestation of the sciences. However, according to him, the context of manifestation itself manifests something in accordance with its own content (54 [66]). Science for him is a context of manifestation of a life-region in which this context of manifestation (which manifests something in its own content) is somehow created. That is, the context needs to be prepared. The something which will manifest itself in the sciences will then be brought into the created context of manifestation. What does this mean and how is it problematic? In the present lecture course, "science" as a context of manifestation or expression is determined as follows: "[*s*]*cience is the concrete logic of its subject-area, which grows out of a particular ground of experience in a particular gradation*" (54 [66]). That is, science is unfolded through three keywords

("ground of experience," "subject area," and "concrete logic") [82] and explicated with respect to experience [*Erfahrung*].

In the present lecture course, Heidegger talks of experience as being both encountering and what is encountered (54 [67]). What is decisive about experience is that encountering takes place in what is already available (55 [67-68]). Experience, understood as both encountering and what is encountered, has the character of availability. The possibility of encounter is available itself – it makes itself available and does so passively (55 [68]). Different contexts of experiences are also such availabilities, which may be encountered in different ways. From this context, certain aspects, growing out ot availabilities, can be and are accentuated (ibid.). Heidegger turns to show that providing a ground of experience in the sciences is a process in which a certain slice of the availabilities is lifted out and brought forth. This accentuating of certain aspects from out of availabilities is itself available. In the sciences a unified character-of-subject-matter [*Sachcharacter*] is lifted out from the ground of experience (initially understood as the factical context of experience of factical life), and thus the subject-area [*Sachgebiet*] can be defined from the slice, which is lifted out and brought forth (56 [69]). The process of making a subject area available for the sciences is the process of preparing a ground of experience, that is, a starting ground for itself (ibid.).

Within this preparation of the subject-area a certain mode of expression is already at work. Science is 'a concrete logic of' the subject-area (58 [72]). Such a concrete logic involves a manifold of structural forms according to which the subject-area is measured. Thus, it is "[l]ogic, insofar as it has to do with the determinations of objects, the comportment of objects and the subject-matter – contexts of state-of-affairs, which are now determined as such a 'concrete' logic through the material, concrete fullness of the subject-area mediated through the ground of experience." (59 [74]) That is, concrete logic is a specific manner of taking hold of the subject-area. Here, there is an interplay between the subject-area and concrete logic. On the one hand, the subject-area is concretized through the theoretical structure offered by concrete logic. One the other hand, concrete logic and the structural forms by which the subject-area is measured have themselves grown out of the subject-area. Concrete logic is motivated by the subject-area, as Heidegger puts it (60 [74]).

[82] Heidegger also mentions the "preparation of the ground of experience, formation of the subject area, cultivation and stabilization of genuine parts of concrete logic" as the three steps of the process of science (60-61 [75]).

To put it very simply, Heidegger wants to say that the apple, which lies on my table as available in its different possible availabilities – to be taken a bite from by me, to be left to rot or to be approached scientifically –, would in the last case be taken into a specific context. Within this context the apple would be subjected to a specific logic, which then determines the apple according to the context into which it has been taken. What happens with the apple when it is taken into the scientific context of manifestation is that it gains a specific meaning. The meaning gained thereby, however, is created. It is created according to a certain pre-given logic.

As in his KNS lecture course, Heidegger's analysis of science (of what is) must help to lead towards a positive direction which philosophy must take. In this way, Heidegger first of all insists that science as the context of manifestation is a possibility which grows out of factical life: "[t]hey [the sciences] grow out of factical life-world and the living multiplicity of the encounters of factical life in it" (53 [66]). This process of making the subject-area available for itself is the process of preparation of the ground of experience (the created starting ground of the sciences) for itself from out of the life-world which is already pre-given. Factical life itself, which has a character of always tending towards something in one way or another, as it lives towards the world, has the tendency towards scientific expression as a possibility. The process of the three steps, through which a slice of life-world is to become a context of expression as science, is itself a tendency of factical life. It is not as if science is detached from life or that it is not directed towards the fullness of life. Rather, what is at issue here is how the sciences establish themselves out of factical life and what kind of consequences this process has.

Heidegger insists that factical life does not need to create for itself a ground of experience, which the sciences offer to provide. Furthermore, when science creates a ground of experience for understanding life, this life becomes a creation of science. For Heidegger science fails to live up to the criterion of liveliness. Life in its richness is cut off: "[*t*]*hrough science, life-worlds are taken into a tendency of devivification*, and thereby factical life is robbed of the actual living possibility of its factically vital actualization" (62 [77-78]). Through the process of bringing out a pure subject-area, a slice from the life-world is taken out of the richness of the relations at work in the fullness of life. Only one slice of the life-world is lifted from pre-given availabilities. Thus, with respect to the vitality of life, the ground of experience of science is defined as follows: "[g]round of

experience means: the availabilities stripped of their connection to the self-world and prepared for the involvement *of* new tendencies" (56 [70]).[83]

Now Heidegger insists that scientific expression as it was brought out confronts the idea of phenomenology as the original science of life in itself – the idea sought after – with three difficulties (63-64 [78-81]). Firstly, considering that the sciences result in de-vivification, is it at all possible to talk about the science of life in itself? Is it not a contradiction, an absurdity, in the light of what has been brought out? Secondly, isn't phenomenology as the original science of life factically unfeasible, because life cannot be grasped factically as a whole, but rather what is achieved is always simply a limited slice of the life-world? Furthermore, it seems factically unfeasible to have life as a whole, because having it as a whole is always too late. Factical life has always already progressed further from the moment it would be had as a whole. Thirdly, isn't phenomenology as the original science of life in itself superfluous in aiming to bring together all the various life-worlds? What to make of these objections?

Heidegger's response to all of the objections outlined above is brought under one central claim: phenomenology as the original science of life does not aim to grasp life and its worlds and all its contents (which would make it superfluous), but rather aims at "life *as arising*, as emerging out of an origin" (65 [81]). Aiming to understand life as arising from an origin, phenomenology thus has no need to provide a ground of experience and to aim at grasping the whole of life understood as the totality of its available contents. What is aimed at, rather, is factical life as arising from the origin and the other way around – the origin must be grasped as arising from factical life. In order to access factical life in its originality, it is of no help to turn to the sciences with the aim of adopting their methods. What is needed is rather to look at the motives: "[t]hus, motivating indications must be found factically in this, which point into origin in advance" (66 [82]). With this task, Heidegger turns to factical life and to the basic experience [*Grunderfahrung*], which has the character of indicating the origin, has the motivation to do that. The what-content (towards which we are mainly directed and from where the sciences take their point of departure) is unable to give this kind of motivation. No what-content shows itself as privileged to have the character of this something from which life arises. Rather, this 'indicating towards' is to be

[83] As will be shown, the expression "availabilities being stripped from their connection to the self-world" refers to the subject-object split insofar as self-life and life-worlds are theoretically separated.

found in the how-content, in which life shows itself without being tied with a particular "what" (67-68 [84-85]).

3.4. The possibility of philosophy as origin-understanding

Having dismantled the term "science," Heidegger claims that phenomenology is not science at all (174 [230]). Rather, philosophy as phenomenology is determined as origin-understanding:

> The phenomenological-philosophical understanding is an origin-understanding that takes its leave from the concrete forms of life. (181 [240])

Phenomenology as origin-understanding is not to be considered through one or another context of manifestation. Rather, phenomenology is aimed at life as arising from an origin. What does this mean and where lies the possibility of philosophy? In his way towards the possibility of philosophy, Heidegger calls for a looking into experience before the theoretical infringement of full factical life: into pre-theoretical life. The aim is once again to bring life and its self-understanding closer in the fullness of life. How is something experienced in the fullness of life, in its abundance of relations? To put it differently: what is the significance of the notion of the self-world and where lies its primacy? In this section, I focus on the initial mode of non-objectified access, understanding in the self-world experience. I will also point to Heidegger's insistence on the need for a second type of access. In this respect, he articulates two different pre-theoretical modes of experiencing: an improminent [*Unabgehoben*] self-world experience and a mode of experience in which the self-world is brought into prominence [*Abgehobenheit*].

3.4.1. Self-world

Having started his analysis with the so-called trivialities, Heidegger has led the listener to recognize that life is tendentially lived in the world. The aim is to point to the basic characters of life. But the descriptions also lead to the realization that your experience is different from my experience – we still view the lectern differently. What is experienced manifests itself in a manifold of ways. With these considerations, my particular circumstantiality comes to the foreground of the search. Each experience belongs to a particular self-life. Everything manifests itself in a concrete experience. The self-life is put in the limelight as the center of manifestation. That everything is experienced in this way is seen even when we look more closely at the concrete work of the sciences. Although science is aimed at only one aspect of life, whereby life is stabilized, objectified and taken

out of its worldly directions, it still works out of the availabilities, which then are taken into a scientific context. The question for Heidegger is how something is encountered before taking it into a scientific context. He is pursuing the possibility of pointing ahead to (the basic characters of) factical life in life's vitality. With this aim, he turns to the forms of expression where life is seen to express itself in its pre-theoretical relations. He finds these forms in biographical and autobiographical works.

Heidegger claims that in biographical and autobiographical works factical life comes to light in a distinctive way.[84] For in such works the self-life and life-worlds emerge as intertwined, even if the aim is then to take the self into a scientific context of expression. It becomes visible that the self-life is always lived in the world and in the direction of the life-worlds. To put it differently: in appealing to autobiographical and biographical works, Heidegger makes a claim for the primacy of the self-world. The self-world becomes central in two respects. On the one hand, life is shown to be lived always already in the worldly directions. On the other hand, attaining the self-world as such becomes the aim of philosophy.

With the term self-world, the self and the world are brought together in life in itself as it is lived in its fullness so that the objective-subjective split between them is removed. According to Heidegger, as soon as the self-life is brought forth, it expresses at the same time the life-world, the living context of the self-world and its rhythm. Furthermore, from the self-world, which echoes the life-worlds, the tendencies and motives, the possibility of their fulfillment arises:

> Life as factical centers in a certain way in a temporal particular self-world. From out of this temporally particular self-world grow the tendencies. Out of the self*world's* own history, the motivations to new tendencies awaken, and the fulfillments of these always run back, as such, into the *self*world and its temporally particular situations awaiting fulfillment, which are the factical [situations] of factical life. (48-49 [63])

Insofar as the self-life and the life-worlds are intertwined, insofar as there is echoing between the self-life and the life-worlds, one's own life is to be seen as the manifestation of the life-worlds. There is an interconnection between the temporally particular self-world and the forms of manifestation. The life-world manifests itself in some way in the current situation of the self-world. Factical life and its basic characters manifest themselves in the temporally particular situation in which it is lived. Thus, Heidegger is able to say that the

[84] For as Heidegger says: "[t]his mode of depiction of the self-life in biographical research, historically understood, underlies the conviction that factical life and its world can be centered somehow in the self-life, inasmuch as the self-world gives itself initially as changeable circumstantiality. It shows *that factical life can be lived, experienced, and, correspondingly, even historically understood in a peculiar intensifying-concentration on the self-world*" (46 [59]).

characters themselves "can be immediately experienced and that is *accented by the self-world*" (46 [60]). Certainly, this also means that the basic characters of factical life can be experienced and are experienced everywhere in life. However, as Heidegger insists, most of the time the accentuation[85] of the self-world is improminent [*Unabgehoben*][86]. The accentuation of the self-world is not necessarily brought into prominence [*Abgehobenheit*]. As such, the reference to self-world does not yet indicate how to point ahead to factical life. That is, it does not enable production of the access searched for in terms of philosophy. Rather, with the reference to self-world the possibility of accessing factical life and its characters within factical life itself is affirmed and the direction for philosophy has been given. That is, philosophy must turn towards the self-world. The question of how to access factical life and its basic characters now becomes the question of how to bring the accentuation of the self-world into prominence. In order to lead towards the possibility and meaning of a prominent experience without being entangled in a theoretical approach to the self-world,[87] Heidegger calls once again for a looking into the full factical life-experience, into improminent experience. How does one have oneself in improminent experience, in the genuine life which is now to be seen as echoing the life-worlds?

3.4.2. The character of meaningfulness

One lives mostly a factically full life. That is, one is mostly absorbed into life and lives factically in the *what* of everydayness.[88] However, in order to find life as arising from the origin, no what-content comes to the fore as preferable. Rather, one must turn to the *how*.

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[85] When talking about the accentuation of the self-world, Heidegger says at a certain point that by that he means "*indexing of tendencies and world-characters* from out of it" (46 [60]).

[86] By the term "improminent" [*Unabgehoben*] Heidegger is referring to a mode of experiencing. It is a mode in which everything is experienced in the fullness of life, but factical life is not co-experienced, it is not made prominent. It is the mode of experiencing of the *They* or everyone [*das Man*], to use Heidegger's later terminology. In the lecture course Heidegger offers the following description in explaining the term "improminent": "'[i]mprominent' – concerns 'experiencing' and 'the experienced world.' Initially: what one encounters in factical life is always an Other in its what and how. The experiencing itself underlies various modification, but in such a way that a *basic style*, in which everything is experienced, sustains itself. It even belongs to the sense of the mode of experience that it is not experienced as such according to its self. It does not push itself out, it does not make itself prominent over against others. It cannot do so because there are no others. Seen with respect to factical life, this experiencing is absolute, its domain is factically undoubted" (80 [100]).

Also, for understanding Heidegger's distinction between the improminent and prominent modes of experiencing, it perhaps would be helpful to consider his later analysis of the authentic-inauthentic existence.

[87] With respect to aiming at the self-world scientifically, Heidegger points to psychology as the "science of the self-world" (69-80 [87-101]).

[88] In the present context everydayness is referred to as synonymous with trivialities (82 [103]). In a similar manner, Heidegger already uses the term "everydayness" [*Alltäglichkeit*] in the first half of the lecture course. There, too, he connects the term "everydayness" with the determination of life as going along with it and not bringing it into prominence (31-32 [39]).

How is something experienced in factical life? Initially, how does one experience something in the improminent self-world experience?

> What am I experiencing? Trivialities, everydayness – but that does not bother us; we could also experience something weighty. Above all, what I experience really exists: the acquaintance really greets me; the music is really playing; it really occurs to me; the Swiss stogies that I tuck into my real briefcase really exist; the gentleman behind the store-counter really exists; the boy on the street really is making the dog angry; he really behaves badly; the fearful and desperate beginner in phenomenology whom I encourage really is fearful and dissatisfied with himself. (82-83 [103-104])

As in his KNS lecture course, Heidegger once again brings the environmental consideration to the fore. He insists that everything experienced is real. Everything experienced in life is real for me. Furthermore, everything encountered in life is already meaningful (83 [104]). The meaningfulness [*Bedeutsamkeit*] arises from the context of meaningfulness, in which the world is always co-experienced: "[i]n context of meaningfulness, I, in living, experience the world. The world manifests itself as real in each one of those contexts" (85 [107]). When a neighbor greets me in the street, this already has a meaning for me. I greet him back without a need to reflect knowingly on the neighbor or the street I am walking in. Factically one lives in a particular context of meaningfulness. Furthermore, the context of meaningfulness, according to Heidegger, is centered in a situation. The situation is not a closed situation. Rather, meaningfulness is always an open situation stretching backwards and forwards: "[t]he meaning of 'existence' lies in factical life in the currently experienced, remembered, or expected meaningfulness, so that memory-wise, experience-wise or expectation-wise, experiencing determined in such and such a way, actualizes itself in a full, concrete unity (opened situation)" (84 [106]). What is currently experienced in life has its meaningfulness from out of the opened horizon of factical life, already coming from as well as stretching ahead to expectations. Factically one lives in relations of meaningfulness.

By stressing that everything in life is experienced as meaningful, Heidegger can be seen to point to the so called 'pre-worldly' in the 'genuine experiential world' in terms of the KNS lecture course. Living in the *what* of everydayness, every concrete meaning in a concrete situation has a common *how*, namely the character of meaningfulness. There is "an identical moment of meaning," as Heidegger stated in his KNS lecture course (GA 56/57: 54 [67]; see chapter 2.3.1). Furthermore, by pointing to the character of meaningfulness, Heidegger is now able to make a further claim:

> In our description of factical life, we emphasized three characters: *self-sufficiency, expression, meaningfulness*. These three characters are indices, not in the sense of generalization, but rather as life's forms of expression for its understanding of itself. Life speaks to itself in its own language. (GA 58: 174 [231])

We have found that according to Heidegger factical life is self-sufficient, which means that, structurally, life does not need to come out of itself – every questionability in life itself finds an answer within the structural form of factical life. We have also found that factical life has the character of manifestation or expression, which means that everything expresses itself somehow. Now, by pointing out that everything encountered in life has a character of meaningfulness (everything that is experienced is meaningful), Heidegger can say that life is also already understandable, it is already accessible. That is, by pointing to the character of meaningfulness, he claims that factical life is always already accessible to oneself – one always already understands oneself. One has oneself in every experience. That life is always already understandable is further pointed out by Heidegger through the notion of 'having-oneself' [*Sich-selbst-Habens*].

> We thus ask: when I go along with factical life-experience itself, which originally is "worldly" directed, – how do I have *myself* there, even though my self is completely engrossed in this experience, mirrors itself in it, goes along with it? (192 [255])

By the term 'having myself' Heidegger does not refer to having oneself before one's gaze. Nor does the notion refer to bringing the self-world into prominence. Rather, in vital life-experience it is an improminent character which refers to familiarity with oneself in all (self-world) experiencing.

This familiarity is what is brought out by the notion of 'having': "[a]rticulation of the 'having': life's being-familiar with the world in which I myself live" (194 [257]). The self in this having is not an 'I' which one should or could find. In factical life it is not asked what the self is. Rather, what the self indicates is having a certain form of expression (127, 195 [166, 258]). What is experienced expresses me and my familiarity with myself. In the experience I am there. Furthermore, according to Heidegger, the self has a form of expression which is present in a situation. A situation is determined as that "peculiar character in which I have myself" (196 [260]). Through the term 'situation,' Heidegger not only makes every experience concretely meaningful (I am concrete in a situation[89]), but also brings factical life into the horizon of time as stretching out (see above). Thus, having oneself is about being understandable to oneself in the living flow of life. It is about being "intelligible" to oneself in one's "coming from and a leaning-forward" to the horizon of life (126 [165]). As such, this having oneself is not a momentary familiarity with oneself, but it rather expresses the rhythm of life's familiarity with itself (ibid.).

[89] As Heidegger says: "[t]he life-world manifests itself in this way and that way in and for a current situation of the self-world. This changeable, flowing circumstantiality of the self-world always determines the "somehow" of the life-world as a situational-character" (48 [62]).

> Having-me-myself is no starting at the I as an object. It is rather the process of life's winning and losing a certain familiarity with itself. It is something that is pulsating there [*schwingungsmäßig da*], so to speak, and disappears again ('rhythm'). (194 [258])

According to Heidegger, this rhythm of experiencing is what we can hope to find (195 [258]). This pulsating is what phenomenology is after. It aims to grasp life in its wholeness. To get hold of life in its wholeness means to grasp life in its originality. Grasping life in itself with respect to the origin by no means implies seizing the origin of factical life as a thing which can be taken into a fixed determination. Rather, "[o]rigin is not a universal principle, a source of power. It is rather the form of production of life in all its situations, *the* form, which I always understand and reach only in a particular *quality of form*" (114 [148]). That is, factical life needs to remain within rhythmic echoing if it wants to remain within vitality and grasp itself as such. But this also means that grasping factical life phenomenologically is not the same as having-oneself. It is necessary to go further. Philosophy, which aims at factical life, needs to turn towards bringing the accentuation of the self-world into prominence. Insofar as life is self-sufficient, all issues in the search for factical life may be addressed within the circle of this life itself. This in turn means that the possibility of bringing the accentuation of the self-world into prominence is also to be found in life in itself.

3.5. Philosophy as origin-understanding

At the beginning of this chapter, I claimed that in this lecture course Heidegger develops further one of the directions he set for philosophy in his KNS lecture course. That is, he aims at philosophy within the sphere which is named 'pre-theoretical' in the KNS-scheme. The pre-theoretical sphere is further articulated through potentiality as an interconnected relation between the 'pre-worldly something' and the 'worldly something.' By determining philosophy as origin-understanding and calling for a going after life as emerging from the origin, Heidegger is taking up the problem of how genuine life (the 'worldly something') emerges as the potentiality of the pre-worldly[90] and how the pre-worldly can be grasped within life as emerging. It is about going after the pre-worldly from out of the worldly, going after the rhythm of the emerging. In this respect, accessing oneself in the self-world experience is not enough for philosophy. Philosophy, which aims at the possibility of pointing in advance to the basic characters, must find a way to bring the self-world

[90] Thus Heidegger says: "[w]e are searching for the way out of natural life and into the original region" and "[p]hilosophy can start out from every point of life and begin there with the method of origin-understanding" (172, 181 [228, 239]). That is, philosophy takes its point of departure from the genuineness of life, with the task of going after the originality of life.

experience into prominence in life itself. What does bringing the self-world into prominence mean and how does Heidegger articulate philosophy in this lecture course? Furthermore, what kind of place is given to Kierkegaard in this context?

3.5.1. Attaining the self-world

For Heidegger, life is not "dull and chaotic" but rather "it is understood as something meaningful, concretely expressing itself" (181 [239]). To go after life as emerging from the origin means to aim at pointing out and bringing forth these basic characters of life which express themselves in the fullness of life. It is about the possibility in life itself of accessing the rhythm of the movement of this emerging from out of itself. In this sense, going after life as emerging is the same as going after the fluctuation of life as motivated and tendential.[91] According to Heidegger: "[i]n life there is a particular coming-from [*Herkommen*] of particular *motives* as well as going-forth [*Fortgehen*] and an inclination-toward according to particular *tendencies*" (196 [260]).[92] He refers to motives and tendencies as "the horizons that [are] given in life-experience itself" (192 [254]). Thus, when Heidegger calls for a search for motives which indicate the origin, he aims at philosophical understanding within and from this horizon. But what does gaining such an access mean, and how is it gained?

As has been brought out previously, for Heidegger life is self-sufficient. It is always already meaningful and always already expressing itself. As such, life is already understandable – one has oneself in life in one way or another. Furthermore, the characters of factical life are always already immediately experienced. And yet, an access is looked for – an access which leads to the primacy of the self-world. The self-world has a certain primacy in connection with the access searched for in going after the fluctuation of life: "[l]ife-tendencies thus run out of the self-world, and their fulfillments reach out to the self-world yet again" (156 [207]). The self-world, which Heidegger sees as life's form of expression, becomes what needs to be brought into prominence in philosophy. What does bringing the self-world into prominence mean in the context of the claim that one always already has oneself in each experience?

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[91] According to Heidegger, the life of the original world and original understanding meet there where the motive is constituted by originality and at the same time the "consideration of factical life should bring motives for understanding life out of the origin" (107, 176 [139, 234]).

[92] In Oskar Becker's transcript Heidegger is also found to be saying that "philosophical activity itself requires a releasement of itself [*ein sich Loslassen*] into the ultimate tendencies of life and return into its ultimate motives. […] what is demanded is a deepening of the self into its originality" (198 [263]).

To bring the self-world into prominence is not the same as to have oneself. Nor is it about taking notice of one's life or oneself.[93] Rather, to bring the self-world into prominence is to attain it, to win it [*Gewinnen*]. Bringing the self-world into prominence refers to the need to attain the basic experience of the self-world (76 [95]). To attain is not simply to actualize the experience, but rather "to get hold of it in full actualization and being-actualized, in order to see how *the self-world is encountered in it*" (76 [95]). Nor is attaining the experience meant in the sense of grasping it from somewhere outside. It involves living in the world and in a certain sense already having attained the experience. With respect to motives and tendencies, Heidegger thus insists that "[t]hese motives and tendencies in life-experience are to be brought into *foreseeing* through the consideration of factical life in the manner of *going along with* life-experiences as *participating* in it" (191-192 [254-255]). That is, the self-world is to be brought to life and lived as such. But also, to attain is to get hold of how the self-world as such is lived and brought to expression. To put it differently: it is historical understanding.

According to Oskar Becker's transcript of the concluding part of the lecture course, Heidegger apparently stated: "[t]he proper *organon of understanding life* is *history*, not as the science of history or as a collection of curiosities, but rather as lived life, how it goes along in living life" (193 [256]). History, as 'the proper organon of understanding life' is further determined as "vital co-experiencing, as life's being-familiar with itself and its fullness" and "living with life and as life's being-familiar with itself in all its relations" (122, 190 [159-160, 252]). *Being-familiar with itself in all its relations* is the key for understanding Heidegger's consideration of the need to attain the self-world. Indeed, in improminent experience, one already understands oneself and the (one's) world, which is already meaningful. Life is actualized in this way. However, it is not actualized as meaningful, but simply lived in this meaningful relation. In this respect, Heidegger

[93] Taking-notice [*Kenntnisnehmen*] is a phenomenon which is determined as explicating the modification of factical experiencing (87-100 [110-128]). What is decisive is that in taking notice one stays in vital facticity and at the same time one explicates experiences in the context of meaningfulness. Taking-notice, which at the same time is giving notice in its expression, expresses the bearing of meaningfulness, that is, "what is meant in that which is expressed and the how of what is meant" (88 [112]). It has its context out of the context of factically flowing life. Taking notice explicates a context not known in experiencing, a context which swims along in its direction of expectation. Importantly, Heidegger further calls this formation a stabilizing formation. "What is decisive is that life, instead of advancing into tendencies of expectation and building life, gives form to the lived life from out of itself, stabilizing the meaning of the context of expectation and taking it as an explicit tendency" (93 [119]). Thus in factical life itself there are availabilities, which in turn make possible a process of form-giving stabilization. This formation when radicalized leads to theoretization. This means that in factical life itself there are possibilities which lead to reification and thus to objectification and subjectification.

characterizes improminent experience as a mode of experience to whose meaning it belongs that "it [experiencing] is not experienced as such according to its self" (80 [100]). To experience life according to its self means to actualize life in all of its relations (for example, to actualize life as meaningful). In this respect, prominent self-world experience is also a mode of experiencing. Through this specific mode of experiencing, it will be seen how the self-world as such is lived in the self-life.

3.5.2. Intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world and the significance of Kierkegaard

The problem of establishing philosophy for itself leads to the necessity of questioning both factical life and the possibility of accessing it from within. Such philosophy is not to be found by turning towards the sciences. Rather, philosophy is origin-understanding – it aims at life as emerging from the origin and takes its point of departure from concrete forms of life. Its possibility lies in the self-world experience, the accentuation of which needs to be brought into prominence. In the end, philosophy is a mode of life. It can only be lived and brought to expression as such.

In the present lecture course, Heidegger brings out how origin-understanding concretely takes place and has taken place in factical life by focusing on intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world [*Die Zugespitztheit des faktischen Lebens auf die Selbstwelt*]. I claim that (in the present lecture course), insofar as philosophy is origin-understanding in the previously described sense, intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world refers to philosophical access in the living situation. Throughout the lecture course, Heidegger does not present the notion in an overly clear manner, but through the fragments the following picture will emerge.

Philosophy, which aims at life as emerging, needs to find a possibility of attaining the basic characters without de-vivifying life. This means, for example, that the character of meaningfulness is not simply actualized, but is co-experienced in the actualization. It means that the how-content of the experience comes forth in the experiencing and becomes intelligible.[94] This is what is achieved in intensifying-concentration.

> [intensifying-concentration upon the self-world] can be found experientially within various life-worlds. Thus, factical life here presses, so to speak, a certain functional rhythm out of itself, which is not

[94] Heidegger clearly insists that the basic characters become intelligible in intensifying-concentration by stating: "[t]he intensifying-concentration on the self-world [*Die Zugespitztheit auf die Selbstwelt*] is always there in factical life, in such a way that from out of here, the characters that we have so far found in factical life become more intelligible: the self-sufficiency of life in itself and its character of manifestation (likewise the particular groups of phenomena that we already have considered)" (46 [60]).

> bound to particular life-worlds. It presses out a *how*-content, in which factical life expresses itself and does so, indeed, with respect to its dynamic, its dynamic structure. (134 [175])

'Not bound to particular life-worlds' means that intensifying-concentration is not contextually dependent, not hinged on the what-content. Furthermore, by not being bound to a particular life-world, this mode of experiencing brings the various life-worlds together (an aspect with which the sciences were shown to have difficulties). In this respect, it is an attainment through which traditional philosophy can be brought to life "in an original and radical way" (2 [2]; see chapter 3.1). Heidegger suggests that in intensifying-concentration, factical life is reached in its temporality and liveliness. It expresses life's dynamic structure and thus is not always too late (another aspect with which the sciences were shown to have problems). Life is not de-historicized and de-vivified, as in the case of the scientific approach.[95] Rather, exactly the contrary is the case. According to Heidegger, the methodological meaning of intensifying-concentration is to be a guide for understanding in a way that "phenomenologically the dissociation of life is undone" (151 [197]). In this respect, intensifying-concentration is an attainment.

Intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world is a mode of experiencing in which accentuation of the self-world it is brought to prominence, it is attained. It is not only self-worldly experience, but rather life is lived in a self-worldly way. In this respect, Heidegger determines intensifying-concentration by saying that "[i]t is 'seen,' lived and living in a basic situation" (48 [62]). The question is: how is this concretely conceivable?

> What does that mean: "Factical life is intensified, concentrated on the self-life"? The self-life always faces the "world" in a particular aspect. In the self we always have self-permeating situation in which the character of the world manifests itself. The context of expression in which the world gives itself is a function of the particular situational-context of the self-world. (156 [206])

What Heidegger suggests is that intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world is a kind of positioning of factical life into the self-world. It is "[a] new and proper positioning of the self to its world" (48 [62]). As 'new,' intensifying-concentration is a shift in focus from one positioning to another (for example, from the environing-world to the self-world). It is proper with respect to the environing-world and with-world, insofar as in intensifying-concentration these life-worlds are encountered and lived from the situation of

[95] Heidegger thus clearly brings out the opposition between science as described previously and intensifying-concentration as the mode of accessing that he is proposing. According to Heidegger, in intensifying-concentration the manifestation and the situation of the self-world are co-given (61 [76]). In the scientific context of expression this co-given relation is cut off. Rather, something from the unscientific life-world is at issue there. According to Heidegger, in the process of the steps involved in science there is a transformation of the situation of the self-world, whereby the personal relations are broken off (in order to be "objective") (62 [77-78]).

the self (48 [62]). Furthermore, according to Heidegger, in the intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world's situation "the turnedness [*Zugekehrheit*] of all life-encounters and their qualitative forms and contents toward the self-world" shows itself (49 [64-65]).[96] It is a mode in which factical life manifests itself. And it manifests itself as a (self-world) rhythm. This also means that the environing-world and with-world are never cut off in this mode of experiencing. As Scott M. Campbell (2012: 42) points out: "this twofold process of realizing that life-worlds are centered in the self-world and then drawing the life-worlds out of the self-world is not in any way linear." It is not a back and forth movement with fixed results, but a rhythmic echoing (ibid.).[97] It is attainment of the self-world in the self-world experience.

All in all, intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world is a mode of experiencing in which the self-world is attained – brought to life and lived as such. It is a proper positioning of the self into world – one does not objectify the world in this positioning, but actualizes it as worldly. What is significant about this mode is that it reaches the rhythm of life (lives as such and brings it to expression) and thus reaches that which phenomenology needs to point out in the living situation in order to stay with the vitality of life. According to Heidegger, intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world refers to the question of the "new basic experience of life in and for itself and how a possible theory of life in and for itself prefigures itself out from itself" (171 [227]).

In his account of intensifying-concentration, Heidegger says on the one hand that it is always there in factical life and can be found in different life-worlds (46, 134 [60, 175]). And yet, on the other hand, he very clearly insists that it takes place and has taken place in rare cases, and the instances where Heidegger finds this kind of positioning become significant for him. Primarily he claims that this positioning can be found in the life of the primordial Christians:

> The deepest historical paradigm for the peculiar process whereby the main focus of factical life and the life-world shifted into the self-world and the world of inner experiences gives itself to us in the emergence of Christianity. The self-world as such comes into life and is lived as such. What is there in the life of the primal Christian communities signals a radical rearrangement of the usual directions of life, whereby much thought is given to a denial of the world and to asceticism (*the Kingdom-of-God-notions, Paul* (compare, above all, Ritschl)). Here lie the motives for the cultivation of completely new

[96] In this respect, it is important to note that according to Heidegger the origin is a form which I reach as a particular quality of form (114 [148]).
[97] In his interpretation Campbell (2012: 43) stresses that the originality points to factical life's incompleteness. It is incomplete insofar as each life-world is constantly pulled into another. Furthermore, it must be understood as incomplete since it expresses factical life's temporality: "[t]o understand factical life as emerging from the origin means to understand it as temporal and, therefore, as constantly renewing itself" (ibid.).

> contexts of expression that life creates for itself, even up to the level of that which today we call *history*. (47 [61])

Heidegger describes this shift as the "great revolution against ancient science" (ibid.). As the revolutionaries in this context he names medieval mysticism[98] and above all Augustine (47-48 [61-62]). Importantly for the present study, Kierkegaard is put forward by Heidegger as such a revolutionary. From Oskar Becker's transcripts we can see that in appealing to the intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world, Heidegger had Kierkegaard in mind:

> This early Christian achievement was deformed and submerged by the infiltration of ancient science into Christianity. From time to time it asserts itself yet again in powerful eruptions (as in *Augustine*, in *Luther*, in *Kierkegaard*). (155 [205])[99]

The early Christian achievement lies exactly in the attention to the self-world in its vitality, emphasizing factical life as self-worldly. The deforming of this by ancient science refers to the theoretical distortion of this pre-worldly experience. As Kisiel (1995: 77) points out in this context: "Augustine's *Confessions* penetrates much more deeply into the self-world than Descartes, for example, who takes his starting point from modern science. […] His [Augustine's] *crede ut intelligas* (Believe so that you may understand) means that the self must realize itself in the fullness of life before it can truly know." Or as Otto Pöggeler (1990 [1963]: 25 [38]) states: "[t]he primordial Christian faith experiences life in its actuality."[100] This factical experience of life (this actualization), this achievement, will prove to be of utmost significance to Heidegger, as I will show in chapter five. This also applies to Heidegger's stance towards Kierkegaard.

From the way Kierkegaard is brought out here, there is no pressing reason to draw Kierkegaard into any specific aspect of Heidegger's unfolding of phenomenology as origin-

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[98] More concretely, in this list Heidegger names Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventure, Eckhart, Tauler, and Luther (47-48 [62]).

[99] "Diese altchristliche Errungenschaft wurde durch das Eindringen der antiken Wissenschaft in das Christentum verbildet und verschüttet. Von Zeit zu Zeit setzt sie sich in gewaltigen Eruptionen wieder durch (wie in *Augustinus*, in *Luther*, in *Kierkegaard*). Die mittelalterliche Mystik ist allein von hier auf zu verstehen" (GA 58: 205; Anhang B; I. Ergänzungen zur ausgearbeiteten Vorlesung aus der Nachschrift von Oskar Becker; Ergänzungen 4.).

[100] The meaning of this Christian achievement is clarified by Pöggeler as follows: "[s]ince according to the view of the early Heidegger, primordial Christian religion is factical life-experience, it needs only to be 'explicated.' In later history, however, this life-experience is no longer kept up in its purity. To be sure, thinkers such as Augustine, the medieval mystics, Luther, and Kierkegaard recover this experience in spite of all the distortions; nevertheless, it is permeated by a metaphysical conceptualization which ultimately remains inadequate to the experience. In the case of Augustine the factical experience of life is distorted by Neoplatonic concepts. Therefore, Augustine may not only be explicated; he must also be destroyed. The interpretation must grasp through the concepts at the experience which is truly at the core in order to free this experience from the inadequate concepts by which it is expressed." (Pöggeler 1990 [1963]: 26 [38]) With this insight of Pöggeler's that the factical experience of life of primordial Christians must, according to Heidegger, be both destructed and explicated, I fully agree. This fact comes to the fore most clearly in chapter five of this thesis, where I show how Heidegger explicates Book X of Augustine's *Confessions*.

understanding in this lecture course. However, what can be claimed is that Heidegger clearly places Kierkegaard among those whom he regards as having attained the self-world: that Kierkegaard has lived and expressed the origin-understanding. This is significant, because it means that for Heidegger Kierkegaard has actualized, lived in this way and expressed the origin-understanding. To what extent Heidegger appreciates Kierkegaard in this respect is the theme for the second part of this thesis.

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter I concentrated on Heidegger's lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. I claimed that in this lecture course Heidegger follows one of the two directions he proposed as a task for philosophy in his KNS lecture course, namely the task to establish philosophy within the pre-theoretical sphere. I aimed to show that in this lecture course Heidegger articulates philosophy as origin-understanding and states that this lies in *intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world*. Furthermore, I sought to prove that Heidegger refers to Kierkegaard as one who has lived and expressed an origin-understanding. With this, I paved the way for the claim that in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses Kierkegaard is given a significant place with respect to accessing the pre-worldly within the pre-theoretical sphere. That is, in Kierkegaard Heidegger sees somebody who has actualized philosophy proper as far as the pre-theoretical sphere is considered.

As I have shown so far, Heidegger brings out the problem of philosophical access first of all as a problem of the possibility of pointing ahead to the basic characters of factical life from out of the fullness of life in itself. That is, access to (the basic characters of) factical life must be such that the living flow of life is sustained and it must be reached as motivated out of itself. Thus, philosophy must keep away from objectification and turn to the rhythmic echoing of the self-world – to the factical manner of how life lives in the world and becomes understandable for itself. The fact that life is always already in the world and lives in the context of meaningfulness allows Heidegger to claim that one always already has oneself, is familiar with the world and oneself. This also means that the characters to which the access is searched for are immediately experienced. And yet, the access is searched for. For Heidegger, having oneself is not the same as origin-understanding – 'having oneself' does not simply give factical life from out of itself. Rather, there are different modes of experiencing. Origin-understanding refers to the mode

of experience in which the accentuation of the self-world is brought into prominence. That is, the experience is not simply lived through in the familiarity, but actualized in the way that the characters are co-experienced. The self-world is lived according to itself. In this mode of experiencing, factical life manifests itself and thus should be considered philosophy proper. In the present lecture course, Heidegger names this mode of experiencing *intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world*. By this expression he refers to a proper positioning of oneself into the world, in which factical life pushes a functional rhythm out of itself. Intensifying-concentration, in which one turns towards the how-content and aims at the rhythm of life whereby the basic characters can be attained is a mode of accessing which has been put forward as origin-understanding. It is an actualization in which life as factical is lived and brought to expression according to itself.

For the present thesis it is decisive that Kierkegaard is named as one of the few who have lived and expressed (actualized) factical life in the manner which Heidegger calls 'intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world.' This justifies the claim that Kierkegaard according to Heidegger has reached the origin-understanding, or to put it differently: Kierkegaard has accessed and expressed factical life within the pre-theoretical sphere.

As I aim to show in the next chapter, philosophy as origin-understanding is not Heidegger's final account in addressing the question of accessing and expressing factical life. He further aims to articulate a concrete philosophical methodology for accessing and expressing factical life. He provides a procedure for philosophical investigation. In what is to come Heidegger will no longer talk about philosophy using the term intensifying-concentration. However, this manner of actualizing factical life remains central for Heidegger. Thus, in the second part of this thesis I will argue that Heidegger starts to unfold what Kierkegaard has to offer (his actualization of intensification) through the phenomenological method and how he does this.

4. Phenomenology as a method: the three methodological moments

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I showed how in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger unfolds philosophy as origin-understanding. With the question of finding an access to life in its originality, Heidegger's deliberations led to the phenomenon of intensifying-concentration upon the self-world. It is a mode of experiencing in which the self-world is attained. The motives and tendencies are "brought into *foreseeing* through the consideration of factical life in the manner of *going along with* life-experiences as *participating* in it" (191-192 [254-255]). I also stated that this mode of accessing oneself is not Heidegger's final word in his consideration of philosophy. Already in this lecture course, Heidegger in passing expresses the need to develop a full methodology for accessing factical life as emerging from the origin. Thus, in the previously quoted context he also insists that consideration of factical life is "then to be *lifted out*, *articulated*, *interpreted* and *given form to*" (GA 58: 192 [254-255]). In the present chapter, I aim to show that in the subsequent lecture courses Heidegger takes up this task, namely the need to further develop a proper methodology for philosophy.

Thus, primarily in the lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation* [*Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der Philosophical Begriffsbildung*, GA 59] and the beginning of *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* [*Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*, in GA 60], Heidegger develops and articulates a strict phenomenological methodology for approaching, accessing, and expressing the subject matter of philosophy.[101] I will bring out his methodology as consisting of three different methodological moments: phenomenological-critical destruction, phenomenological explication, and formal indication. My central claim is that these methodological moments are distinct from the mode of access described as intensifying-concentration. In this respect I claim that with the methodological moments Heidegger pursues the second direction articulated in his KNS lecture course. As I will show, this claim is not self-evident insofar as the methodological moments can be and are interpreted in several ways. I will point once again to the interpretations of Theodore Kisiel and Søren Overgaard. The respective approaches of these two researchers will be put forward by looking at their interpretations

[101] I already presented parts of this chapter in my master's thesis (Kustassoo 2012).

of the methodological moments. Whereas Kisiel fits the methodological moments into his account of Heidegger's philosophy at the level of actualization (the same as intensification), Overgaard interprets the methodological moments on the basis of Heidegger's need for a special take on entities (to access means to carry through an investigation, which is not the same as actualized intensification). Insofar as I claim that the methodological moments constitute a different access than that of intensification, it can be presumed that I tend to agree with Overgaard to the extent that he insists that philosophy requires a specific stance towards its 'objects.' I argue that intensification is not the same as philosophical investigation. Rather, through the methodological moments Heidegger describes an additional mode of access which must be applied to actualization.

The realization that there is a difference between intensification and philosophical investigation is essential in order to understand Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg lecture courses. In the present chapter, I touch upon Kierkegaard with respect to the similarities (and dissimilarities) between Heidegger's formal indication and Kierkegaard's indirect communication. However, the significance of this chapter, considering the overall aim of this thesis, does not rest on the connection found through formal indication. Rather, the results of this chapter point ahead to what is to come in the second part of this thesis. On the basis of the recognition that the proper actualization (as well as the improper actualization) must be destroyed, explicated, and indicated formally, that is, accessed and articulated in this way, it becomes understandable in what sense Heidegger has received impulses from Kierkegaard and how Heidegger takes up what Kierkegaard has to offer to him. Let it be said in here in short: Heidegger will start to clarify Kierkegaard's actualization. That is, Kierkegaard is approached through Heidegger's own aims and investigated according to his specific philosophical method.

In what follows, I aim to bring out each of the methodological moments with respect to the problematic addressed in each of them and to point out the methodological unity to be achieved through these moments. First (section two), I consider phenomenological-critical destruction, a methodological moment which Heidegger already took up in his previous lecture course and which has the task to lead philosophy out of its alienation back to itself. Then, I turn to phenomenological explication as a methodological moment for the proper mode of accessing. Here, factical life experience as the fundamental phenomenon for philosophy is brought out by explicating it as a phenomenon. In the fourth section, I unfold formal indication as the methodological moment which primarily addresses the

problem of expression. Next, in the fifth section, I consider how Kisiel and Overgaard interpret the methodological moments and where the core of their disagreement lies. After that (section six), I turn to the connection between Heidegger and Kierkegaard with respect to formal indication. Finally, I set out the main claims of the first part of my thesis and argue for the distinction between access brought out as intensification and the access described through the three methodological moments.

4.2. Phenomenological-critical destruction

Heidegger uses phenomenological-critical destruction [*Phänomenologisch-kritischen Destruktion*] in one way or another throughout the previous lecture courses. It is primarily a methodological moment for taking up pre-given [*vorgegeben*] philosophy (the tradition), with the aim of leading out from the tradition towards the problem. As such it is a preparation for proper philosophizing. The notion of phenomenological destruction, which already comes to the fore at the end of Heidegger's 1919-1920 winter semester lecture course,[102] becomes Heidegger's focus in his next lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation* [*Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der Philosophical Begriffsbildung*, GA 59], held in the summer semester of 1920[103].

When explicating the problem situation of this lecture course, Heidegger again, as in the previous lecture courses, sets himself the task of providing "a radical new foundation of philosophy" (GA 59: 5 [8]), that is to say, a 'primordially attained' ['*ursprünglich gewonnen*'] foundation of philosophy (11 [17]). What it means to be 'primordially attained' must become clear during the lecture course, while the primordially attained is at the same time the "new." It is "new" over against and, at the same time, on the basis of what is. As such, the counterpart of philosophy aimed at is pre-given philosophy – the tradition or current situation in philosophy.[104] This means that the philosophy which Heidegger targets cannot borrow the means for the task from pre-given philosophy and yet it needs to start

[102] Although Heidegger first uses the notion of phenomenological destruction in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, its roots go back to his KNS lecture and to the notion of 'critique' there. In his KNS lecture, Heidegger determines critique as follows: "[c]ritique is a positive sounding out of genuine motivations" (GA56/57: 96 [126]). It should be also noted that when talking of "critique", Heidegger distinguishes two types of "criticism" (JR: 71-78, [1-10]).

[103] The lecture course was held by Heidegger from the 6th of May until the 26th of July 1920 (Strube 1993: 155 [199]). It was first published in 1993.

[104] In this respect, Dorothea Frede (2006: 60) points out that "[t]his 'destruction' is not a deconstruction, as some people would have it nowadays, but an analysis intended to show where the decisive steps of the derailment took place in Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle." Also, it should be noted that destruction means to turn towards the tradition as the encountering comes about in its current situation (Kisiel 1995: 261)

exactly with what is to be found there. As Heidegger puts it, the task is "to lead philosophy from out of its alienation back to itself (phenomenological destruction)" (20-21 [29]). Phenomenological-critical destruction is the methodological moment for taking up pre-given philosophy and leading philosophy down to the right track. It consists of a manifold of different moments and unfolds through concrete steps.

According to Heidegger, in order to reach the possibility of the genuine self-understanding of philosophy one needs to start with a phenomenological-critical consideration of the historically pre-given philosophy (28 [39]). The aim of the critical consideration is not to modify philosophy, but rather to understand and open up the problem. One needs to turn towards predominant problems in philosophy in order to call attention to the unquestioned: to what has been taken over as given. Thus, in his previous consideration of the 'idea of philosophy as primordial science,' which led into the problem of circularity as well as his unfolding of science as context of manifestation, which in turn led to origin-understanding, Heidegger was employing the method of destruction.

In *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, Heidegger destroys the tradition in relation to the phenomenon of 'life' (8-21 [12-29]): "[t]he problem situation is characterized by the deliberately emphasized or merely implicitly positing of '*life*' as primal phenomenon" (12 [18]). The problems of contemporary philosophy become problematic (as not being primordially attained) because they grow out of this *deliberately emphasized or merely implicitly posited* phenomenon as a primal phenomenon [*Urphänomen*]. More concretely, according to Heidegger the main groups of contemporary philosophy, namely culture philosophy and life philosophy, grow out of the same source – taking life as a primal phenomenon seen as culture or as something general (life in general) respectively. Depending on how 'life' is seen, the questions revolve around either (a) the problem of a priori validity or (b) the problem of the irrational. In the first case, life is debated around the opposition between an absolute a priori validity versus historical relativity, and in the second case, around the opposition between irrational versus rational. However, according to Heidegger, debating over the questions within this opposition as well as this opposition itself is highly questionable, since the problems dealt with here grow out of preconceptions and move within a pre-given framework. That is, the problems are grounded on a phenomenon which itself is left unquestioned. On this basis he can claim that all the debates in traditional philosophy (and thus the dominant situation of contemporary philosophy) revolve around unfounded problems. The problems are

unfounded insofar as the problematic is not primordially attained but simply posited – posited on the basis of an unquestioned framework. This leads to the next step of phenomenological-critical destruction.

Since opening up the problems with a view to the tradition shows that the problems addressed move within a pre-given framework, Heidegger makes a claim for the need to step out of the framework (20-21 [28-29]). Instead of entering into discussions over "problems" which have always been there or are currently at the center of philosophy, one needs to avoid lapsing into the given, falling into the accepted framework, and rather one needs to come out into the open. Thus, for example, the previously considered issue of circularity, when pointed out as a purely theoretical problem solved in the face of environmental experience, was raised to bring this problematic into the open. Here, with the demand to come out into the open, Heidegger refers further to the need to go after motives and tendencies at work in pre-given philosophy. Going after motives and tendencies at work means at the same time pointing philosophy the way out from alienation back to itself. Heidegger thus claims that phenomenological destruction leads to recognition that the task of philosophy is to go after the sense-complex of factical life experience and that this task is not simply posited, but rather takes a direction from the tradition.[105]

What the consideration of the tradition with respect to 'life' has shown, according to Heidegger, is that 'life' has been taken as having a fixed meaning in different meaning directions. Instead of taking over the meanings fixed in tradition, he claims that destruction has led to meaning, and meanings point to contexts (25 [34]). Thus, with destruction having shown that the tradition blindly takes up meanings from the context, Heidegger suggests that the complex of meanings can and must be explicated.[106] It must be explicated in order to understand the concrete situation of actualization of taking up and fulfilling meaning. Furthermore, the question is from where and how the meanings depart. That is, as Heidegger puts it, the 'pre-delineation' "must be understood in the phenomenological basic posture, i.e., be traced back to its motives of origin" (25 [35]). In this respect, according to Heidegger, the proper problematic leads to factical life experience: insofar as something is

[105] Heidegger says: "[t]he leading towards the problem comes about by means of the phenomenological-critical destruction, such that above all the concealed sense-moments come to a philosophical terminus in a manner in which they press towards something decisive" (21 [29]).
[106] Heidegger says: "[e]very vitally understood meaning – enactment of the concrete situation in which the not necessarily theoretical objecthood which is expressed through the meaning becomes experienceable – carries within itself the direction towards primordial sense-complexes and makes their loosening up concretely possible" (138 [179]).

meaningful as such in a concrete situation for a concrete Dasein, the point of departure for philosophy is factical life experience.

> For now, it is only a thesis that factical life experience belongs to the problematic of philosophy in an entirely primordial sense, namely in a sense that hitherto was concealed and became the reason for many pseudoproblems in philosophy […]. (27 [38])[107]

Heidegger suggests that the tradition is to be seen on the basis of and as factical life experience, since the approaches taken in pre-given philosophy unfold as tendencies of factical life experience. In other words, insofar as the tendencies at work are brought out as tendencies, they are disclosed as tendencies of factical life experience.

Further, seen through the tendencies of factical life experience, the so-called traditional approach is put forward by Heidegger as a concealing approach. For insofar as one starts out with the given (mere adoption of the standpoints and systems from history) and operates within fixed meanings, the access to the problem (of what has yet to be asked for) is concealed beforehand. Taking up the meanings from the context blindly, the tradition has failed to consider the context of meaning or rather meanings in their proper context. As such, the tendency to conceal indicates the character of factical life experience itself, the primordial character as the *fading* [*verblassen*] of meaningfulness or falling-away [*Abfall*]. The character of fading of meaningfulness, according to Heidegger, points to a transition in the experience. It is falling away from primordiality into alienation, which is described as absorption into everydayness and usability (26-27, 141 [37-38, 182-183]). Philosophy is seen to be in alienation from itself insofar as the tradition neglects the relation to the primordial problematic (emerging of the meaning).

In claiming that the tradition conceals the access beforehand, Heidegger finds it important to point out that phenomenological destruction as a method is not taken over from the tradition. According to Heidegger, although destruction is critical consideration, it is not critique, which is laid upon a subject from outside or which comes afterwards. Destruction as a methodological moment in phenomenology as philosophy cannot be taken as a form within what he calls theoretical-scientific knowledge of subject matter in the service of apprehension of objects. Neither is it to be taken to have its meaningfulness from science as securing its conceptuality. It is not in the service of the theoretical (142-143 [184-185]). But nor is it without direction (24-26 [34-36]). Rather, it is important for Heidegger to maintain that destruction is bound to preconception [*vorgriffsgebunden*].

[107] "Vorläufig ist es nur eine These, daß *die faktische Lebenserfahrung in einem ganz ursprünglichen Sinne der Problematik der Philosophie zugehört*, und zwar in einem Sinne, der bislang verdeckt lag und Grund vieler Scheinprobleme der Philosophie wurde […]" (GA 59: [38]).

According to him, the preconceptions which destruction needs to bring out are themselves anticipated and guide secondarily the destruction beforehand (ibid.). That is, the need for (and the mode of) destruction grows out of destruction itself: of what destruction shows. In this way Heidegger connects destruction with factical life experience through motivation. He seems to claim that destruction not only leads to factical life experience and its tendency to conceal, but also to the tendency to bring itself to light.[108] As such, destruction can be claimed to be motivated from factical life experience itself. All in all, Heidegger claims that destruction is the starting point for philosophy: "[i]f philosophy has to be determined as primordially enactmentally understanding [als ursprünglich vollzugsmäβig verstehendes] and attention-drawing explication of factical life experience, then this explication necessarily always starts with the destruction. It begins in the faded." (142 [183]) To begin in the faded refers to the need to start by dismantling the concealment. It is necessary since factical life gives itself initially in a deformed manner (Kisiel 1995: 123, 129, 136). Or, as Pöggeler argues, one needs to start from destruction since factical life is historical and thus "exposing of the primordial experiences and the secret prejudices of the traditional" belongs to fundamental ontology (Pöggeler 1990 [1963]: 37 [51]).[109]

4.3. Phenomenological explication

In the lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* Heidegger says:

> The viewpoints or the questions that guide the destruction do not form a schema but are taken so formally that they do not prejudge anything, it is rather that the peculiar character of the position in question becomes apparent in the manner in which they concretely merge in the pursuit in various sense-complexes, that is, in the manner of the complex. (GA 59: 87 [112])

In the previous section, I brought out that phenomenological destruction leads to factical life experience and to the task of explicating the complex of meanings. As such, destruction is only the first step of the phenomenological method. The question of how to access something properly occasions another methodological moment – phenomenological explication [*Phänomenologische Explikation*]. Phenomenological explication is a methodological moment of philosophy which primarily concerns the problem of

[108] Thus, Heidegger talks in this context about the "phenomenological basic act of light-disclosing" in which pre-delineations are motivated (25 [35]).

[109] It should be noted that not everybody agrees with giving to destruction the position of a necessary methodological moment with which one must begin. For example, Overgaard (2004: 98) denies that destruction is a significant methodological moment for Heidegger. He argues against this view by pointing out that there are two guiding clues necessary for beginning with destruction at all: that which is to be destroyed and "basic experience."

accessing.[110] It is a methodological moment for proper accessing of philosophy. As such it is set against accessing as it is found in the tradition. At the same time it is a method for accessing the tradition. Furthermore, it is proper access only insofar as a claim is made about philosophical access. To put it differently, the mode of accessing found in the tradition is not proper insofar as the mode of accessing makes a claim for philosophy.

The elements of phenomenological explication are constantly present in Heidegger's different lecture courses, although mostly not clarified as such. Rather one simply repeatedly encounters in Heidegger's text the terms 'content,' 'relation,' and 'actualization' – the three sense elements of phenomenological explication, which I will explain shortly. With regard to the usage of sense elements, it could be thus said that Heidegger uses phenomenological explication throughout his works. He already talks about them extensively in his 1920 summer semester lecture course. However, in my opinion, the elements are most clearly brought together through phenomenological explication as a method at the beginning of the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* [*Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*, in GA 60] held in the winter semester of 1920-1921.[111]

In the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger takes his point of departure in the consideration of phenomenological explication by once again setting philosophy against science and raising the task of releasing philosophy from the approach taken over from science: [112] "[p]hilosophy is to be liberated from its 'secularization' to a science, or to a scientific doctrine of world-views" (8 [10]). By this time, however, the constant opposition is clearly put forward as a thesis: there is a difference in principle between science and philosophy (GA 60: 3 [3]). The differentiation between science and philosophy within the problem of philosophy is further articulated as a difference between attitudinal understanding [*einstellungsmäßiges Verstehen*] and

[110] On phenomenological explication, see also Fransisco de Lara (2008). In his book *Phänomenologie der Möglichkeit* de Lara analyses extensively all three methodological moments.

[111] The lecture course was given from the 29th of October 1920 until the 25th of February 1921 (Jung & Regehly 1995: 255 [339]). The text of the lecture course is reconstructed in its entirety from the notes of Heidegger and of the students present in the lecture course, the manuscript itself being lost (ibid.).

[112] Heidegger starts by recognizing the stance where philosophy is held to be science. According to Heidegger, this has its own motivational ground. He claims that the movement of regarding philosophy as science and employing the scientific methods in philosophy is an unquestioned movement which is based on a historical understanding of sciences as growing out of philosophy, which in turn is therefore seen as the universal science. The realization of the motivational ground of philosophy as primal science leads to the question of the original motive of philosophy. That is, philosophy needs to be seen from philosophy itself. It must be accessed from out of itself (GA 60: 5-6 [6-8]).

phenomenological understanding [*phänomenologischen Verstehen*] (33 [49]). As such, the central ground of this differentiation lies in the question of access.

Under the name attitudinal understanding Heidegger gathers the approach against which he has taken a stance from the beginning.[113] It is an approach in which a subject domain is adopted from the tradition and considered to be a region as, for example, in the case of the notion of 'life' brought out in the previous section. This material domain is then grasped through knowledge and handled in accordance to a certain procedure – a procedure of typologizing, by which Heidegger refers to understanding through the formation of types (32 [48]). The central problem of this understanding is that it gets stuck in the material complex and treats everything as an object (33 [48]). Thus, for example, Heidegger points to the attitudinal treatment of history by saying: "[h]istory is here *the material* [*Sache*], the *object* toward which I take a cognitive attitude" (33 [48]). Similarly, it can now be said that Heidegger would consider the teleological-critical method, which leads to reification, to be attitudinal.

Heidegger confronts this attitudinal understanding in two respects. First, there is the problem of approaching the "object" through 'taking-cognition-of' [*Kenntnisnahme*]. According to Heidegger, the access here is dominated by a cognitive attitude. A cognitive attitude leads to loss of the living relation. Instead of taking things as they are, a cognitive attitude is orientated to forming connections between objects, typologizing these objects (10, 32 [14, 48]). Second, what is not recognized in attitudinal understanding is that the fundamental "object" to be investigated might not be an object at all (8, 11 [10, 14-15]). Thus, there arises a need to reconsider the "object" of philosophy and the manner of approaching it.

> I experience myself in factical life neither as a complex of lived experiences nor as a conglomeration of acts and processes, not even as some ego-object in a demarcated sense, but rather in *that which* I perform, suffer, what I encounter, in my conditions of depression and elevation, and the like. I myself *experience not even my ego in separateness*, but I am as such always attached to the surrounding world. (10 [13])[114]

[113] Heidegger brings out a double meaning of the "attitude": "first an attitude toward the realm of the matter, secondly a ceasing of the entire human relation to the material complex" (GA 60: 33 [48]). As Heidegger says: "'[a]ttitude' is a relation to objects in which the conduct [*Verhalten*] is absorbed in the *material complex*" (GA 60: 33 [48]). Attitudinal [*einstellungsmäßig*] consideration refers to directing oneself only to the matter, focusing away from oneself.

[114] "Ich erfahre mich selbst im faktischen Leben weder als Erlebniszusammenhang, noch als Konglomerat von Akten und Vorgängen, nicht einmal als irgendein Ichobjekt in einem abgegrenzten Sinn, sondern in dem, was ich leiste, leide, was mir begegnet, in meinem Zuständen der Depression und Gehobenheit u. ä. Ich selbst erfahre einmal mein Ich in Abgesetztheit, sondern bin dabei immer der Umwelt verhaften" (GA 60: 13).

That is, on the side of the 'object,' the fundamental phenomenon for philosophy is factical life or factical life experience, as it is named in the present lecture course and has been named from the summer semester of 1920 onwards. It is the fundamental phenomenon from which philosophy arises and to which philosophy returns (6-7 [8]).[115] As was shown, factical life experience is what comes forth in destruction, and tendencies of factical life make possible the shift away into attitudinal understanding, but it is not to be accessed through attitudinal understanding. In this respect, factical life experience does not designate for philosophy an object which could be grasped, nor does it designate the grasping subject. According to Heidegger, "[l]ife experience is more than mere experience which takes cognizance of. It designates the whole active and passive pose of the human being towards the world […]" (8 [11]). Similarly, the experience of factical experience is not the medium between the world and the subject: ""Experience" [*Erfahrung*] designates: (1) the experiencing activity [*die erfahrende Betätigung*], (2) that which is experienced through this activity [*das durch sie Erfahrene*]" (7 [9]). Thus, "experience" involves both the "experiencing self" [*erfahrende Selbst*] and "what is experienced" [*das Erfahrene*] (ibid.). In short, it is not an object, but rather, it is a phenomenon which is accessed in its full meaning through phenomenological explication.

It is important to note that not everything that is, is a phenomenon. Phenomenon for Heidegger is a specific notion – it is what is accessed in a certain way, that is, accessed phenomenologically. So, when Heidegger says: "[o]bject [*Objekt*] and thing [*Gegenstand*] are not the same. All objects are things, but not the other way around; all things are not objects," (25 [35]) and adds that "a phenomenon is neither object nor thing. However, a phenomenon, formally speaking, is also a thing – that is to say, a something at all" (ibid.), then he is calling attention to different ways of accessing. What this means, first of all, is that to have something as a phenomenon is dependent on the mode of accessing. Thus, phenomenon is something which is brought out as a phenomenon. Phenomenon is a "thing" which is explicated phenomenologically. Further, to explicate something phenomenologically is to bring out phenomenon as the totality of sense. As such,

[115] Addressing the problem as the problem of self-understanding of philosophy, Heidegger sees philosophy as leading to factical life experience: "[i]f one grasps this problem radically, one finds that philosophy arises from factical life experience. And within factical life experience philosophy returns back into factical life experience. The concept of factical life experience is fundamental" (6-7 [8]).

phenomenology, which is the same as philosophy for Heidegger, is determined as explication of the *totality of sense* [*Sinnganzheit*] of a phenomenon (43 [63]).[116]

According to Heidegger (ibid.), every experience which is "taken in the phenomenon" (and likewise the fundamental phenomenon in question – factical life experience) is open to inquiry in three directions: (1) the original sense of the content (content sense, *Gehaltsinn*), (2) the original how of being experienced (relational sense, *Bezugssinn*), and (3) the how in which this relational sense is itself actualized (actualization sense, *Vollzugssinn*). Phenomenological explication is explication of a phenomenon in these three sense directions. It is a manner of bringing to light the phenomenon as phenomenon. Phenomenology is (formally) determined as explication of the *totality of sense* of phenomenon (ibid.). The task of phenomenology is to bring out the phenomenon out as phenomenon, that is, to access it in this way. A manner of properly accessing a phenomenon is to bring out its sense directions. Thus also, what is meant by factical life experience, towards which destruction only pointed, can be brought to light by explicating the sense directions.

The content sense, according to Heidegger, is what is factically experienced. It is not the objectively given content [*Inhalt*], but the experienced *what* in the phenomenon. As a sense direction, it is also a how – it will be asked about the sense of the experienced, about the content of concrete experience. By the content sense Heidegger refers to everyday dealings in the world:

> Factical life experience puts all its weight on its *content*; the *how* of factical life experience at most emerges into its content. All alteration of life takes place in the content. During the course of a factically experienced day, I deal with quite different things; but in the factical course of life, I do not become aware of the different *hows* of my reactions to those different things. Instead, I encounter them at most in the content I experience itself: factical life experience manifests an *indifference* with regard to the manner of experiencing [Die faktische Lebenserfahrung zeigt eine *Indifferenz* in Bezug die Weise des Erfahrens]. (9 [12])

The basic category of the content sense in factical life is world [*Welt*]. World is to be understood as something in which humans may live, contrary to the world seen as object (8 [11]). The world in which I live is *my world*. I can never step out of the world. I am never simply a subject looking at the world and myself as objects from outside. In the world I meet things, others, and myself. I am always active in the world, meeting things, people, and myself. I am in the world also when I meet myself meeting things, people, and myself.

[116] In his lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger gives two directions in connection with the notion of phenomenology: phenomenology is (formally) determined as explication of the *totality of sense* (*Sinnganzheit*) of phenomenon (43 [63]) and is considered a synonym of philosophy (4 [5]).

That is, world "can be formally articulated" as surrounding world, with-world, and self-world (8 [11]).

The relational sense refers to the fact that the content is somehow had. It asks about the manner in which something is experienced. With the relational sense, Heidegger points out that all content of experience is determined by significance: "everything that is experienced in factical life experience, as well as all of its content, bears the character of significance" (9 [13]). That is, the manner in which something is experienced (relational sense) determines what is experienced (content sense). Thus, Heidegger also insists that all the differences of what is experienced (for example, the apple as sweet or sour) come down to the content sense, so that in the factical course of life the character of significance is left unnoticed. Ordinarily one is simply absorbed into the world – in handling things and using them, this handling itself not being questioned. I walk out of the door, go into the garden to pick an apple from my favorite apple tree and enjoy my apple on this fine autumn day, without any thematization of the significance of the apple even when I encounter a worm in it – I simply throw the apple away and reach for another one. One is indifferent to relation [*Bezugsindifference*], that is, one does not distinguish and thematize the relation (GA 60: 9-10 [12-14]). However, the thematization of the relational sense is a central part of Heidegger's philosophy.

Already in his previous lecture course, Heidegger points to the relational sense in connection with the question of access by stating: "[t]his relationship to access we call *relation* [*Bezug*]" (GA 59: 46 [60]). In the 1920 summer semester lecture course this is repeated when he says: "[o]ne can only characterize the manner, the *how*, of the experiencing of those worlds; that is, one can ask about the *relational sense* of factical life experience" (GA 60: 9 [12]). Further, with the relational sense, Heidegger is pointing to what later on, in his *Sein und Zeit*, becomes known as *care* [*Sorge*]. At this point in time, Heidegger leads the question of how factical life is experienced into the notion of caring [*Bekümmerung*] (35 [52]). Factical life is in a relation as caring. And again, it is not a theoretical relation, rather it is about the how of being-near to people and things, the how of handling them.

The actualization sense refers to how the relation is actualized [*Vollzug*]. If it is asked how the relation is had, then it is asked in which *Vollzugssinn* the experience is lived through. Actualizing refers to having oneself in one's relation. One has the relation in actualization, that is, it is lived through, experienced. The criterion for characterizing the

actualization sense is concrete Dasein. The experience is somehow actualized by someone concrete (GA 59: 56-66 [74-86]). As Fransisco de Lara (2008: 62) points out, for Heidegger actualization indicates factical life as always my life: I am this life which I actualize and have in this actualization. In the actualizing sense, a person is concrete. The relations are actualized in concrete situations. Insofar as, according to Heidegger, attitude is also a manner of relating – has a character of relation (33 [48]) –, the relation can be actualized by concrete Dasein attitudinally. At the same time, however, the relation may also be actualized as (in terms of the previous chapter) origin-understanding: in the way that Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard are encountered to have lived. Insofar as actualization refers to the manner in which something is concretely lived through, Heidegger thus thematizes both the actualization of the sciences, as I have shown previously, but also how Paul is seen to actualize factical life through his letters and Augustine through his confession (both in GA 60).

All in all, phenomenological explication as a methodological moment is the accessing of something as a phenomenon in these three directions. Although Heidegger talks of the modes of accessing on the one hand as "covering up" or "hindering" (e.g., 11 [15-16]), and on the other hand as "originally arising" (e.g., 6 [7]), this distinction most certainly does not mean that there are correct and incorrect modes of access with respect to the phenomenon. Neither is there such a criterion as correct or incorrect factical life experience. Factical life experience lives in different ways of accessing. Thus, in *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger determines factical life experience at one point as follows: "[f]actical life experience is the 'attitudinal, falling, relationally indifferent, self-sufficient concern for significance'" (11 [16]).

4.4. Formal indication

Formal indication [*Formale Anzeige*], like the two other methodological moments, is constantly present in Heidegger's lecture courses. However, similarly to the sense elements, one can usually find Heidegger simply repeating that something is considered formally and/or has been indicated. Formal indication itself is concretely thematized in two lecture courses – at the beginning of the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* and in the lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* [*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 61]. Through these two

thematizations, formal indication gains meaning as a third methodological moment of phenomenology. It is a methodological moment which is connected and has been connected mainly with the problem of proper communicating and which addresses the question of grasping and expressing.[117] In addition, in my opinion, it is the methodological moment through which all three methodological moments come tightly together.

In the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, formal indication is considered in the context of Husserl's differentiation of formalization and generalization and is placed within the idea of determining (GA 60: 38-45 [55-65]). Heidegger aims to delineate formal indication by furthering Husserl's distinction. According to Heidegger, both generalization and formalization stand within the meaning of generalizing [*Verallgemeinerung*]. They stand in determining something through more general determination. The difference between formalization and generalization lies (1) in the domain of the thing which is taken into consideration and (2) in the procedure of the act of determining itself. In that respect generalization stands in the material domain, whereas formalization is free in terms of material content: free from being bound to the materiality of things. But although it is not bound to materiality, "is not bound" does not exclude being in the domain. The same goes for the consideration of how the encounter proceeds. As Heidegger says, contrary to generalization, formalization is also free from any order of stages. In the case of formalization, there is *no need* to follow through lower generalities in ordered stages to reach the "highest generality." In this respect, what becomes the most important difference is (3) the question of what one attends to when confronted with the object of investigation. What one attends to in generalization is what-content [*Wasgehalt*], that is, the object is determined by its "what," by what-content as such. In contrast, formalization turns to relational meaning, that is, it asks about the object according to the aspect in which it is given, "to which" (GA 60: 38-45 [55-65]).

From previous characteristics, formal indication is shown to be close to formalization. Like formalization, formal indication stays away from classification, from ordering into stages, and the 'formal' of the formal indication displays closeness to formalization in standing in relational meaning. As Heidegger says: "[t]he formal is something relational" (43 [63]). What, then, is the difference?

[117] On formal indication, see also Cameron McEwen (1995), Hent de Vries (1998), Fransisco de Lara (2008), and Matthew I. Burch (2013). In this thesis, I will consider more specifically the accounts of formal indication given by Theodore Kisiel (1995) and Søren Overgaard (2004, 2005).

"One must prevent oneself from taking it for granted that its relational meaning is originally theoretical" (44 [64]). Formal indication falls outside of the common component of generalization and formalization – standing within the meaning of "general" and being attitudinally or theoretically motivated (40-41 [59]).[118] Although both formalization and formal indication stand in relational meaning, formalization stays in connection with the attitudinal by being motivated from the attitudinal relation. The 'formal' in formal indication, on the other hand, is not connected to the attitudinal. Formal indication "falls outside of the attitudinally theoretical" (41 [59]). This exclusion can be seen more precisely in the characteristics of formal indication described in the *Aristotle* lecture, in which it becomes apparent what Heidegger is referring to when he says:

> Why is it called "formal"? The formal is something relational. The indication should indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon – in the negative sense, however, the same as if to warn! A phenomenon must be so stipulated, such that its relational meaning is held in abeyance. One must prevent oneself from taking it for granted that its relational meaning is originally theoretical. The relation and performance of the phenomenon is *not* preliminarily determined, but is held in abeyance. (GA 60: 43-44 [63-64])[119]

In the lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*, Heidegger talks about formal indication in the context of considering the aspect of concreteness in philosophy and of characterizing ruinance [*die Ruinanz*] (GA 61: 22-28, 105-106 [27-35, 141-143]). He brings out two characters of formal indication: 1) prohibiting (preventing, deferring) character and 2) referential character.

The prohibiting character of formal indication subsumes under itself both the critique against the tradition, against the current situation of understanding philosophy, and its task as well as the differentiation of formal indication from generalization and formalization. As was said, formal indication is distinguished from both generalization and formalization insofar as the latter two are attitudinally or theoretically motivated. Formal indication refers to the need to prevent the taking of a position beforehand. It must prevent us "drifting off into autonomous, blind, dogmatic attempts to fix" (GA 61: 105 [142]). What must be prevented is that concepts are handled like objects and objects are fixed through concepts.

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[118] "What is common to formalization and generalization is that they stand within the meaning of 'general,' whereas the formal indication has nothing to do with generality. The meaning of 'formal' in the 'formal indication' is *more original*" (GA 60: 40-41 [59]).

[119] "Was heiβt sie 'formal'? Die Formale ist etwas Bezugsmäβiges. Die Anzeige soll vorweg den Bezug des Phänomens anzeigen – in einem negative Sinn allerdings, gleichsam zur Warnung! Ein Phänomenon muβ vorgegeben sein, daβ sein Bezugssinn in der Schwebe gehalten wird. Man muβ sich davor hüten, anzunehmen, sein Bezugssinn sei ursprünglich der theoretische. Der Bezug und Vollzug des Phänomens wird *nicht* im Voraus bestimmt, er wird Schwebe gehalten" (GA 60: [63-64]).

But this is exactly what happens in the attitudinal, theoretical approach to the object, where the regional demarcations are viewed as absolute.

The referential character of formal indication points to the positive task of formal indication. Standing against fixation of the basic properties of being, formal indication refers to a need for openness, a need to leave the content empty when determining it. This openness, however, is not meant in the complete sense:

> The term, "formally indicated," does not mean merely represented, meant, or intimated in some way or other, such that it would remain completely open how and where we are to gain possession of the object itself. "Indicated" here means that that which is said is of the character of the "formal," and so is admittedly improper. Yet precisely in this "im-" there resides at the same time a positive reference. The empty content in its sense-structure is at the same time that which provides direction toward actualization. (GA 61: 26 [33])[120]

Content is left empty in determining, but at the same time it is positively indicated towards a quite definite direction. What does it mean? Whence stems the direction? Heidegger continues:

> There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of arriving at what is proper [*Eigentlichen*], namely by exhausting and fulfilling what is improperly indicated, by following the indication. (GA 61: 26 [33])

What is indicated, then? As I will show in the next section, there are different ways to interpret Heidegger's formal indication. In my opinion, the core of the different interpretations lies in what I call the question of primacy. That is, which sense element has primacy for Heidegger in his formal indication: is it the actualization sense or the relational sense? In my opinion, Heidegger expresses here what he already brought out in his KNS lecture course. Philosophy must indicate the 'pre-worldly something' as not-yet (that is, potentially) worldly. In terms of the sense moments this means that philosophy (starting with the destruction of how something is actualized) must express the relational sense as that which is potentially actualized. However, in my opinion, formal indication as well as the two other methodological moments do not belong to the pre-theoretical sphere in terms of the KNS schema. They are methodological moments for philosophical investigation: they belong to 'formalization' as Heidegger articulated it in his KNS lecture course – a wording which he now rejects, but not the idea itself. Formal indication as a methodological moment has the task to avoid lapsing into the attitudinal understanding in which the tradition stands, as brought out through phenomenological destruction, and to

[120] "'*Formal angezeigt*' heiβt nicht, irgendwie nur vorgestellt, vermeint, angedeutet, daβ es nun freistände, den Gegenstand selbst irgendwo und -wie ins Haben zu bekommen, sondern angezeigt so, daβ das, was gesagt ist, vom Charakter des 'Formalen' ist, uneigentlich, aber gerade in diesem 'un' zugleich positiv die Anweisung. Das leer Gehaltliche in seiner Sinnstruktur ist zugleich das, was die Vollzugsrichtunge gibt" (GA 61: 26 [33]).

indicate the proper mode of access in accordance with the consideration of the sense directions brought out through phenomenological explication. As a method for expressing it demands that something is to be said in the manner of indicating the direction and, at the same time, in the manner of leaving it open to each concrete actualization.[121]

4.5. The interpretations of the methodological moments

In the second chapter, I claimed that Heidegger takes up a two-directional task as he aims at rethinking philosophy. I also claimed that in this way he himself provides the possibilities of different interpretations of his philosophy. In connection with the question of access (Heidegger's method), I pointed to two main positions by referring to the works of Kisiel and Overgaard. As I showed, Kisiel's and Overgaard's views on Heidegger's method diverge first of all when Heidegger's proximity to Husserl is considered. According to Kisiel, in developing his philosophy Heidegger turns away from Husserl and denies any possibility of grasping the pre-worldly methodologically. Philosophy must rather repeat the access which life already has to itself in the fullness of life, without disturbing it. In this way, Heidegger's philosophy is considered radically historical. Overgaard, on the other hand, argues for Heidegger's close proximity to Husserl. According to Overgaard, Heidegger is most of all indebted to Husserl's intentionality. Furthermore, Overgaard insists that Heidegger works within the framework of Husserl's epochē. In order to thematize entities phenomenologically, a certain procedure (a special mode of accessing) is needed, in which 'natural' knowledge is kept away. Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology is seen as sharing "the basic interests of transcendental phenomenology" (Overgaard 2004: 94).[122]

On this basis of what has been said I suggested that Kisiel and Overgaard follow different sides of what Heidegger offers as he pursues philosophy. As I see it, Kisiel emphasizes philosophy as intensification, which addresses the question of how the (always historical) pre-worldly is accessed in the living flow of life. Alternatively, Overgaard, in my

[121] Using the term Dasein would be an example of indicating something formally, as Overgaard points out (2005: 154-155).

[122] More specifically considering Heidegger's proximity to Husserl's phenomenological reduction, Overgaard (2004: 94) distinguishes two questions in Heidegger's phenomenology: the question of the meaning of being and the question of transcendence. The first question is "about the modes of being that 'occur,' and more generally, what 'being' as such means" (ibid.). The second question asks "*which structures make possible the understanding of being*," whereby this understanding makes possible "any kind of relation to entities" (ibid.). According to Overgaard, with respect to the second question, Heidegger's approach is "almost identical to Husserl's reduction" (ibid.). With respect to the first question, Overgaard concludes that there are differences between Heidegger and Husserl; however, in consideration of the method, Heidegger works with Husserl's epochē, but also adds to it a "terminological" epochē (op. cit.: 202).

opinion, stresses Heidegger's methodological considerations: philosophy unfolds as a specific stance a philosopher must take. A philosopher must carry through a specific investigation in order to point to the (necessary) pre-worldly. In arguing for both sides being present in Heidegger's philosophy, I thus am suggesting that both Kisiel and Overgaard emphasize one angle of Heidegger's philosophy. With respect to the methodological moments brought out previously, this does not mean that one or the other neglects them. Rather, they interpret the moments differently and give priority to different aspects of these moments. Insofar as I am claiming that Kisiel's account emphasizes philosophy as intensification and, at the same time, I am arguing that Heidegger takes up a twofold task, it may perhaps be presumed that in my reading of his methodological moments I tend to side with Overgaard's interpretation. However, I focus on only a particular part of Overgaard's account and side with him on a very specific aspect.

With respect to phenomenological-critical destruction, Overgaard and Kisiel disagree on whether it has any importance for Heidegger's method. According to Overgaard, destruction has only secondary importance in Heidegger's phenomenology or, as he puts it, at least in *Sein und Zeit* it is not an "*indispensable* methodological component" (Overgaard 2004: 98). Rather, for Overgaard, destruction presupposes a foregoing investigation which is not in any way dependent on destruction (Overgaard 2004: 97-100). Kisiel, on the other hand, finds destruction to be of the utmost importance. Thus, one can find Kisiel (1995: 261) saying that "[h]ermeneutics realizes its task only by way of *destruction*". According to Kisiel, through destruction one reaches the sense of actualization, a process in which it is necessary to ascertain whether this actualization is original or not and in which "an actualization is original when it is the actualization of a genuine relation, which is at least co-directed by the self-world" and is renewable as such (op. cit.: 129). Accordingly, Kisiel can affirm that philosophy is always philosophizing – it is always self-worldly and situational.

While Kisiel and Overgaard disagree when it comes to the role of destruction, they both regard formal indication as perhaps the most important feature of Heidegger's method. However, their interpretations of formal indication differ quite strongly. In my opinion, both the difference between the two interpretations of formal indication and the core of their disagreement about Heidegger's method are related to the sense moments of phenomenological explication. The question is: what has been given primacy, *Bezugsinn* or *Vollzugsinn*?

There is no doubt that for Kisiel formal indication is an extremely significant methodological feature of Heidegger's philosophy (see Kisiel 1995: 172, 140, 224). For him, it is a methodological moment through which Heidegger overcomes Husserl (op. cit.: 49).[123] As I already brought out in chapter two, Kisiel considers formal indications to be expressions "which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves" (op. cit.: 59). Formal indications "ultimately seek a nondisruptive access to the very temporality and historicity of the pretheoretical phenomena" (op. cit.: 219). Kisiel interprets this methodological moment very much in the direction of leaving everything undecided, always subject to the historical situation (op. cit.: 170, 178). According to Kisiel, formal indication enables philosophy to stay in a never-ending scepticism (op. cit.: 233, 235). In this respect, the most important feature of formal indication is to leave everything open to actualization. In Kisiel's interpretation, the actualization sense is the primary sense direction. He not only emphasizes the actualization sense throughout his work, but also explicitly states it to be the "decisive sense of direction" (op. cit.: 179). Furthermore, according to Kisiel, "the authentic having of philosophizing is in the 'full stretch' (*Voll-zug*) of the actualizing sense (*Vollzugssinn*) itself, pursuant to the temporalizing sense of always being 'under way'" (op. cit.: 235). With respect to philosophy, other sense directions have only secondary importance for Kisiel. At one point, he even claims that formal indication not only leaves the content empty, but also warns against relational sense (op. cit.: 170). However, in my opinion, this claim should rather be seen in the context of his emphasis on the priority of the actualization sense. That is, Kisiel does not absolutely leave out the relational sense, as I will also show in the next section. It is simply that priority is clearly and strongly given to the actualization sense.

For Overgaard, who argues that Heidegger is largely a follower of Husserl, formal indication is also a decisive methodological moment, although for a very different reason. According to Overgaard, with this methodological moment Heidegger adds something significant to Husserl's phenomenology. When it comes to Heidegger's method, Overgaard insists that radical ontology would not be possible without a special take on entities. Heidegger works in the framework of the epochē, seen as a certain procedure (Overgaard 2003: 169-170). Furthermore, according to Overgaard, Heidegger finds in Husserl's

[123] Kisiel (1995: 49) interprets formal indication as a solution to both problems of phenomenology raised by Natorp (reflection and description).

intentionality an access which makes it possible to investigate things in their mode of *being* (op. cit.: 168). With formal indication, which Overgaard predominantly considers a method for phenomenological conceptualizing, Heidegger adds something to Husserl's account by taking the issue of terminology much more seriously. He emphasizes the need for what Overgaard calls "a *second* 'epochē-like' move – a conceptual epochē" (op. cit.: 170-171).[124]

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go more deeply into Overgaard's argumentation. What is significant for the present thesis is firstly that, according to Overgaard, formal indication is a conceptual epochē, a methodological procedure for philosophical investigation. Secondly, according to Overgaard, the mode of being is expressed through formally indicative concepts. Overgaard does not use the notion of relational sense in his consideration. However, in terms of the sense directions of phenomenological explication, Overgaard's accentuation that philosophical investigation aims to access and express the mode of *being*, the "how of its [entity] being encountered" (Overgaard 2003: 169, 170), refers to the fact that through philosophical investigation the relational sense is brought out. That is, as far as philosophical investigation is concerned, the task consists of accessing and expressing the intentional moment, the relational sense.

Neither Kisiel's nor Overgaard's interpretation of Heidegger focuses specifically on building their argument on the three methodological moments brought out above. Rather, these are thematized along with their central problematics, which cannot be outlined more extensively here. What is important for the present thesis is to show that these two main interpretations of Heidegger's method (the question of accessing and expressing the pre-worldly) which the works of Kisiel and Overgaard exemplify are both provided by Heidegger himself. That is, Heidegger himself offers the possibility of both previously given ways of approaching him by unfolding his philosophy in two directions. This brings me back to my previous claims about Heidegger's two tasks. However, before I return to this, another stop is needed, which is Kierkegaard's role with respect to the methodological moments.

[124] In a different article Overgaard (2005: 162) further argues with respect to Heidegger's formally indicative notion of Dasein that this manner of conceptualizing allows a better understanding of the entity we ourselves are than was possible before. According to Overgaard, "[f]ormal indication has to do with the choice of proper concepts in a philosophical investigation" (op. cit.: 151).

4.6. Kierkegaard's place and Heidegger's methodological consideration

It is of importance that Heidegger does not mention Kierkegaard in his consideration of the methodological moments in the lecture courses from the summer semester of 1920 and winter semester of 1920-1921. With respect to phenomenological-critical destruction and phenomenological explication as methodological moments, Kierkegaard never emerges as being of importance for the young Heidegger. However, with respect to formal indication the situation is different. In this respect, the connection between Kierkegaard and Heidegger can be and indeed has been found. The main source for this is Heidegger's review of Jaspers.[125]

In this review, Heidegger considers the question of method. Most importantly, in this work he points to formal indication as the means of pursuing the phenomenon of existence, which aims at the phenomenon of "I am" (JR: 78-79 [10-11]). In this text several references to Kierkegaard are found,[126] including the following remark:

> Concerning Kierkegaard, we should point out that such a heightened consciousness of methodological rigor as his has rarely been achieved in philosophy or theology (the question where he has achieved this rigor is not important here). One loses sight of nothing less than the most important aspect of Kierkegaard's thought when one overlooks this consciousness of method, or when one's treatment of it takes it to be of secondary importance. (101 [41])[127]

In his review, Heidegger chiefly talks about Kierkegaard with respect to Jaspers's failure to understand and approach him (78-79, 90, 100, 101 [10-11, 27, 40, 41]).). By distancing himself from Jaspers's approach, Heidegger gives an important intimation of his own manner of treating Kierkegaard, that is, by pointing to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as examples of particular interpretations of existence, Heidegger insists that in formal indication one needs to avoid "uncritical leaps into a particular interpretation of existence" (78-79 [10-11]). This should be avoided in order to "free up the possibility of pursuing a genuine sense of the phenomenon of existence and explicate what comes to the fore in this pursuit" (ibid.). This reference gives us an insight into Heidegger's own approach to Kierkegaard. That is, as I claim in this thesis, Kierkegaard's interpretation is to be explicated. However, Heidegger never specifies in this text or anywhere else what he means

[125] The review is entitled "Comments on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*" [*Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen"* in GA 9]. Heidegger apparently worked on his review of Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* during the years 1919-1920, but the review was published much later.

[126] In his Jaspers review, Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in four different contexts (JR: 78-79, 90, 100, 101 [10-11, 27, 40, 41]).

[127] "Hinsichtlich Kierkegaards muß doch darauf hingewiesen werden, daß nicht oft in der Philosophie beziehungsweise Theologie (wo, ist hier gleichgültig) eine solche Höhe strengen Methodenbewußtseins erreicht worden ist wie gerade von ihm. Man gibt gerade das Entscheidende an Kierkegaard aus der Hand, wenn dieses Methodenbewußtsein übersehen, beziehungsweise in sekundärer Bedeutung genommen wird" (JR: 41).

by Kierkegaard's consciousness of method, which he apparently appreciates. Nor does he trace formal indication explicitly back to any methodological element from Kierkegaard. In spite of this, the connection has been found and not in a weak but in a strong sense.[128]

The connection between Heidegger and Kierkegaard with respect to formal indication is primarily found through a reference to Kierkegaard's indirect communication [*indirekte Meddelelse*].[129] Roughly speaking, Kierkegaard considers indirect communication (as distinct from direct communication) to be a way of communicating truth which concerns existing individuals (distinct from communicating mere information). The subject of indirect communication is thematized explicitly by Kierkegaard in, for example, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, *Practice in Christianity* and *The Point of View*. However, as a method of communicating, it is put to work by Kierkegaard throughout his authorship. Thus, for example, writing under pseudonyms is an application of the method of indirect communication. In this respect, Kierkegaard states:

> When I had grasped this, [the fact that, in all this knowledge, one has forgotten what it is to exist and what inwardness means] it also became clear to me that, if I wanted to communicate anything on this point, the main thing was that my exposition be in the indirect form. (CUP: 203 [VII 220])

In this way, indirect communication is a means of communicating (relation between speaker and listener) by one existing individual to another existing individual the fact that they are existing individuals. Furthermore, it is a means which aims to show that each individual must appropriate the truth by themselves. Thus, when communicating indirectly, the communicator may only point to the possibilities without giving fixed solutions, so that each individual in his/her living situation must make the decision by themselves. The central technique of Kierkegaard's method here is repeatedly claimed to be ambiguity (see further Turnbull 2009: 15). The previous citation also brings out that through indirect communication something is to be prevented – namely taking a stance towards the individual through what is known. Later on in this thesis, this theme will be reconsidered for Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger with respect to the single individual (in chapter seven). Here, it is important to note that the preventing aspect of indirect communication does not require taking up what is previously given. Although it works as a criticism of modern society, it does not include a necessary turnedness towards what is criticized. Even

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[128] Thus, for example, Otto Pöggeler (1994: 141) states: "Heidegger nevertheless wanted to derive the method, that is, a binding logic, of philosophy directly from Kierkegaard."

[129] On the connection of Heidegger's formal indication with Kierkegaard's indirect communication, see also John van Buren (1989: 456-470). Like Kisiel and Pöggeler, Van Buren makes the connection between Heidegger's formal indication and Kierkegaard's indirect communication through Heidegger's consideration in the Jaspers review.

if indirect communication would be indispensable for removing illusions in modern society, indirect communication does not require turning towards the illusion for its own sake. This leads me back to the consideration of Heidegger's account of formal indication.

Heidegger's familiarity with indirect communication is evident, first, from the fact that Heidegger has thoroughly examined Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews* [*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*], in which Jaspers writes extensively on Kierkegaard and his indirect communication (Jaspers 1919: 332-335). Furthermore, it becomes clear through the similarities between formal indication and indirect communication.

Both Heidegger's formal indication and Kierkegaard's indirect communication as modes of expression take existence into account. They are similar as far as an individual in his/her concrete situation is considered. As I have shown, formal indication is a mode of expression that does not fall into fixed concepts by leaving the content open to actualization. In that sense, Kierkegaard's demand to leave the decision open for each individual, brought out through indirect communication, is close to what Heidegger is suggesting. However, there are also significant differences between Heidegger's formal indication and Kierkegaard's indirect communication. I will explain these by looking at the considerations of Kisiel and Pöggeler, both of whom, in comparing Kierkegaard's notion of indirect communication and Heidegger's formal indication, refer back to Heidegger's review of Jaspers and the notion of existence as referring to the "I am" (Kisiel 1995: 140, Pöggeler 1994: 142). I want to draw attention to what each of them has to say about the distinctness of the two notions.

First of all, Pöggeler asserts that Heidegger does not detect in Kierkegaard a necessary turnedness towards destruction. He says:

> If indirect communication is unfolded as formal indication, then one is denied the possibility of following Kierkegaard's or Nietzsche's specific conception of existence "uncritically." Kierkegaard was not taken up by Heidegger as the edifying writer he had ultimately wanted to be; rather, precisely through the indirect communication of his pseudonymous works, he points to that which remained undeveloped in his work, that is, to the logic of philosophy whose method immediately presupposes a destruction of tradition. Heidegger could not find this necessary destruction in Jaspers any more than he could in Kierkegaard. (Pöggeler 1994: 142)

That is, for Heidegger formal indication must refrain from fixing notions beforehand. However, this does not mean that they should not be taken up critically. On the contrary: destruction is an essential moment in the phenomenological method. The tradition is to be taken up and explicated. The tendencies of the tradition should be indicated.

Kisiel, in turn, points to a difference, first, by claiming that Heidegger approaches existence as a formal indication "precisely to avoid merely lapsing back into the particulars

in which Kierkegaard and Nietzsche understood the term" (Kisiel 1995: 140) and then by referring to the "ontological twist" or spin which Heidegger "years later" gives to formal indication (op. cit.: 140, 144). He goes on to suggest that Heidegger's problem of formal indication refers to the question of what sort of apprehension must find expression (op. cit.: 146). As Kisiel says:

> The original experience of phenomenology is a (pre)ontological experience. Radical phenomenology is ontology, an ontology of "Da sein," an ontology of the "(I) am." Existence, a term subject to the same incidental and casual uses as "being," is to indicate the "sense of being" (*Seinsinn*) of the "I am". (Op. cit.: 146)

Thus, although, as I have shown previously, Kisiel gives primacy to the actualization sense, he nevertheless assures that the "sense of being" of the "I am" must be brought into apprehension. According to Kisiel, this "sense of being" must then find its sense of actualization (ibid.). Thus, he never backs down from the position that actualization has primacy. However, the distinction between Kierkegaard's indirect communication and Heidegger's formal indication is made clear here. In this respect, it should perhaps be asked: if Heidegger regards Kierkegaard as someone who has actualized intensification, can we consider the "sense of actualization" which the "sense of being" must find, to be the same as intensification?

What these two interpretations show is that (1) formal indication gains its meaning among other methodological moments and (2) for Heidegger, a specific sense direction must find expression. Thus, formal indication for Heidegger appears as one methodological moment which arrives at its full meaning within and through the other methodological moments. The function of formal indication is to tie them together. Methodologically, it requires the consideration of the tradition not only in order to show the tendencies and the dangers which must be avoided, but also in order to lead from there towards the proper way of accessing. The positive task of formal indication not only lies in the need to leave the phenomenon open to actualization, but also indicates a concrete direction, namely in terms of the sense directions of phenomenological explication, the relational sense.

In themselves, the above-mentioned dissimilarities between Kierkegaard's indirect communication and Heidegger's formal indication seem perhaps marginal as far as Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy is considered. One could simply admit that Kierkegaard has had influence on Heidegger's formal indication and that Heidegger did not merely adopt Kierkegaard's indirect communication but developed his method further. However, what has been brought out raises a significant point. What is important for the present thesis is exactly "the question where he [Kierkegaard] has achieved this

[methodological] rigor" (JR: 101) – a question which would help us to understand Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's thinking and which the latter constantly deflects. Furthermore, it is important to see in which respects Heidegger sees himself as departing from Kierkegaard's method. As I have aimed to show throughout this part, Heidegger gives to Kierkegaard a very specific place in his philosophy, as Kierkegaard for him is the writer who succeeds in actualizing intensifying-concentration. However, I insist that, in addition to intensification, Heidegger articulates further philosophical methodology for accessing and expressing philosophy's theme.

4.7. Heidegger's two-directional philosophy

In chapter two, I claimed on the basis of an analysis of the KNS lecture course that Heidegger articulates a twofold task for establishing philosophy, which aims to access the pre-worldly as potentially worldly. On the one hand, the access is to be found within the pre-theoretical sphere, in a living situation. On the other hand, Heidegger suggests that the access is to be established as a kind of theoretical approach – a theoretical approach which does not de-vivify. In chapter three, I claimed that in the lecture course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* philosophy is articulated in the first of these directions. Philosophy is described as a mode of experiencing (intensification). More concretely, Heidegger determines philosophy in this lecture course as origin-understanding, whereby the access to the pre-worldly is found in intensifying-concentration upon the self-world. It is an access in life itself which according to Heidegger was actualized by Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard. Now, in this chapter, I am suggesting that Heidegger takes up the second direction in the subsequent lecture courses by focusing on the three methodological moments. In order to maintain this claim (and thus the claim that there are two paths with respect to the question of access), I must show that the modes of access described through the three methodological moments are not the same as intensification. Certainly, this is not self-evident, insofar as, for example, in Kisiel's interpretation of Heidegger's method the two are brought together.

My interpretation does not rest on a preference for Overgaard's view over that of Kisiel. Rather, I aim to show that Overgaard provides a better account for considering the methodological moments, which Kisiel integrates into intensification. Bluntly, I claim that the methodological moments are not reducible to, nor a part of, let alone the same as, intensification. Rather these are different modes of access. Intensification is a manner of

experiencing, living factically in the basic situation according to itself in all its relations, whereby these relations are expressed or brought into foreseeing. However, that the relations (pre-worldly) are expressed does not mean that they are articulated as such in the intensification. On the contrary, the methodological moments describe how one must proceed in philosophical investigation in order to articulate factical life in all its relations. Thus, first of all, I wish to stress the character of the three methodological moments. They are not simply ways in which life is lived through, that is: actualized. They are not modes of experiencing found in life itself. Rather, they describe how philosophical investigation must proceed. There must be a special take on entities, as Overgaard has pointed out.

Second, what can and must be brought to articulation through the investigation is relational sense. As I have pointed out, Heidegger himself stresses that "[o]ne can only characterize the manner, the *how*, of the experiencing of those worlds; that is, one can ask about the *relational sense* of factical life experience" (GA 60: 9 [12]). Both content sense and actualization sense cannot be what philosophy articulates, insofar as these unfold in concreteness. In this respect, what destruction achieves is recognition of factical life as the point of departure by admitting tendencies and opening the problem up towards the character of meaningfulness. Most significantly, in formal indication, which must prevent fixation of the content beforehand and leave it open to actualization, the relational sense comes forth as the "formal" which must be indicated. "The formal is something relational," as Heidegger says (43 [63]). In this respect, it can be said that both intensification and the methodological moments must point to the relation (pre-worldly in terms of the KNS lecture course). However, they differ with respect to the way of accessing.

Third, in addition to stressing that philosophical investigation can and must access and express the relational sense (it becomes the primary sense in the sense complex), my interpretation is based on the claim that there is a difference between *Vollzugsinn* and philosophical investigation. For philosophical investigation I have used the term "clarification." I encountered this term in Steven Galt Crowell's interpretation, but I do not agree fully with the interpretation itself. Crowell uses this term when arguing against Kisiel's interpretation and for Heidegger's close proximity to Husserl. He uses the term specifically in the context of considering Heidegger's answer to Heinrich Rickert's objection to *Lebensphilosophie*: that this project is unsuccessful in distinguishing between thinking about life and living life (Crowell 1995: 444, 2001: 125). Crowell elaborates the claim with (the) reference to the notion of 'repetition' within Heidegger's lecture course

Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (GA 61), a lecture course which I will turn to in the following part of this thesis, in chapter six. His argumentation is based on the claim that there is a difference between the relational sense and the actualization sense, a claim which I fully agree with. What I do not agree with is that Crowell equates so-called proper actualization (what is regarded so far as intensification) with the access had through proper methodology. That is, he separates authentic and inauthentic actualization (that is, an improminent and prominent mode of experiencing in terms of what was brought out in chapter three) and claims (rightfully in my opinion) that the difference between the two actualizations "requires appeal to a way of evident *having*, or access" (Crowell 1995: 445, 2001: 126). He further claims that philosophical (authentic) actualization differs from inauthentic (*fallen* or *ruinant*) actualization in the mode of access, in which philosophical actualization requires a methodological approach. Thus, Crowell says: "[o]ne sees, then, how Heidegger's notion of research might answer Rickert: the method of formal indication does 'repeat' the self-interpretation of life, but it *differs* from a mere going along with lived life because it is an explicitly cognitive-illuminating self-recollection ('reflection') and is oriented toward evident ('intuitive') self-having" (Crowell 1995: 445, 2001: 127). Here, my view departs from Crowell's. What Crowell suggests is an inverted version of what Kisiel has offered. They both interpret Heidegger's account of philosophy as a form of actualization. Where Kisiel fits the methodological moments into his account of Heidegger's philosophy as actualization described as intensification (in the lived life), Crowell fits the authentic mode of actualization into the methodologically approached access. In my opinion, these interpretations are possible only if two things which are distinct are considered the same. What should rather be recognized is that "clarification" is not only a different form of actualization, but it also differs profoundly from the access found in and through actualization.[130] The latter is rather described by Heidegger as intensification.

Certainly, Dasein is one as far as it is considered to be what we ourselves are in each case. However, Dasein is accessed in several ways. From what has been said in the

[130] In his explanation Crowell refers to "clarification" as follows: "[…] Heidegger all along follows Husserl's view that philosophical cognition, phenomenology, is not objective theory but "clarification," a kind of comportment that works by methodologically exploiting the 'turning back upon itself' implicit in life's own course. Repetition is 'reflection'" (Crowell 1995: 445, 2001: 126). In my opinion, Crowell rightfully brings out that Heidegger does follow Husserl and that philosophical cognition is not an objective theory, but rather is "methodologically exploiting" life's own course, thus is "clarification." I disagree with Cromwell because he ignores the fact that actualization lies in life's own course and that exploiting life's course methodologically is not the same as life's own course. In this respect, I would also not identify repetition with reflection (see chapter six).

previous chapters I conclude that Heidegger operates with three modes of accessing. First, having oneself, a mode of accessing within the fullness of life, always already understanding life. At this level there is no possibility of distinguishing whether the access had is proper or not. Second, the proper (according to itself) mode of accessing at the level of actualization, described as intensifying concentration of factical life upon the self-world. This is the mode of authentic existence whereby life is lived according to itself in all of its relations. Thirdly, "clarifying" philosophical access. That is, the access had by grasping factical life in accordance with proper non-de-vivifying methodology, which should be motivated from factical life itself. When it comes to the problem of philosophy, only the two last-mentioned modes of accessing come under consideration. I do not deny that Heidegger aims to remove the gap between these two modes. In this respect, it is important for Heidegger that the three methodological moments should access their subject matter in such a way that the thematic field itself is not be de-vivified, but is motivated from the very theme itself. 'Being motivated from the pre-theoretical' is considered to be what links the two spheres. But this does not mean that they are one and the same.

Previously I claimed that all three methodological moments are to be seen as a part of the philosophical investigation, the process of accessing and expressing phenomena. Therefore, in my opinion it is not the case that any of them is less important or exchangeable for Heidegger. Philosophy must destroy what is, explicate what is (access it phenomenologically), and indicate it formally in the direction of the relational sense, so that it is open to actualization (express it in this way). This allows accessing and expressing factical life without de-vivification. I would also suggest, along with Pöggeler (see p. 87, n. 100), that Heidegger not only destroys the tradition which has concealed the access, the faded. As Kisiel (1995: 261), in my opinion, has rightly pointed out, destruction is destruction of the way in which the present is encountered. Philosophy for Heidegger must take its point of departure from what is (how something is actualized) both with respect to how something is lived through in the mode of concealing the access (tradition), and to the way in which something is lived through in the mode of accessing described as intensification. Both of these modes must be brought to philosophical articulation (destroyed, explicated, and indicated formally). In the next part of this thesis, I will show that this is the case. Here, it perhaps would be useful simply to point out that in the next lecture course Heidegger will start to explicate Paul's letters and Augustine's *Confessions* Book X, and in the context of the latter, as I will claim, also Kierkegaard. In this respect,

one could ask what sense it would make to explicate authentic actualization (intensification) if explication and this actualization were one and the same.

4.8. Conclusion

What kind of place does Kierkegaard have in Heidegger's first Freiburg lecture courses? Throughout the first part of my thesis, I have aimed to understand what Heidegger is initially searching for during the period under consideration. In the second chapter of this thesis, I claimed that in connection with the question of access, Heidegger articulates a two-directional task for philosophy. I further claimed that in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* he takes up the first of these directions, that is, he articulates proper access within the pre-theoretical sphere. In the present chapter, I claimed that in his following lecture courses he takes up the second task given in his KNS lecture course. For this claim I needed to show that the three methodological moments which Heidegger puts forward should not be integrated into the notion of philosophy as it was set out in the third chapter. Rather, Heidegger offers two different ways of accessing with respect to philosophy. Both modes either express or articulate the pre-worldly (intentional moment, basic characters, relational sense, or the how-content). That is, they access what philosophy aims at. The difference lies in the *mode* of accessing what is aimed at. In intensification, the pre-worldly is actualized, lived through and as such brought to expression "in the living situation of gliding from one world of experience to another genuine life-world, or in moments of especially intensive life" (GA 56/57: 88 [115]). With the methodological moments, however, Heidegger provides concrete steps which must be followed in order to bring the pre-worldly to articulation. By following these steps the pre-worldly can be brought out. Following these steps does not mean actualizing the pre-worldly, nor does actualizing the pre-worldly mean that these steps are followed, nor does actualizing the pre-worldly mean that the pre-worldly is articulated. In this respect, it is rather the case that the proper actualization and what is achieved in it must be further investigated and properly articulated for Heidegger.

I showed in chapter three that Heidegger considers Kierkegaard among those who have attained the self-world and thus actualized and expressed the proper access within the pre-theoretical sphere. In the present chapter, I showed that Heidegger praises Kierkegaard for his consciousness of methodological rigor and yet, in the comparison of Kierkegaard's indirect communication and Heidegger's formal indication, Kierkegaard is seen to fail to

bring out methodologically what needs to be articulated according to Heidegger. Thus, in Heidegger's opening lecture courses of his first Freiburg period, Kierkegaard occupies a place as someone who has brought to life proper actualization of factical life within the pre-theoretical sphere. This actualization, however, must be brought to philosophical articulation. In what follows, I will show that Kierkegaard continues to have significance for Heidegger as having actualized the proper access to factical life. This actualization Heidegger will clarify, nonetheless. He will destroy, explicate, and indicate it formally.

PART TWO

Since the central phenomenon for philosophy is factical life, it can be said that for Heidegger philosophy must find an access to life as factical. Philosophy must find an access to the pre-worldly (intentional moment, basic characters, relational sense, or the how-content). The pre-worldly was shown to be interconnected with the worldly – it is what is potentially worldly, the intentional moment or relational sense of the phenomenon. In the previous part of this thesis, I brought out through three of Heidegger's lecture courses from the years 1919 to 1920 that with respect to the problem of access Heidegger rethinks philosophy in two directions and how he does this.

It was shown that, on the one hand, Heidegger articulates philosophy in terms of philosophical investigation. In this way he addresses the question of how philosophy must proceed in order to gain an access to its theme, factical life. It was brought out that for this purpose he articulates three methodological moments (phenomenological destruction, phenomenological explication, and formal indication), through which philosophy should approach its theme. On the other hand, Heidegger aims to establish access in the living situation: from the way factical life is actualized. In this way he addresses the question of where in life itself lies the possibility of philosophy – the possibility to win access to its theme, factical life. In this respect, philosophy is described as intensification: a mode of actualization. In what follows, I will call this a mode of accessing in and through factical life.

In addition, as came out of the analysis of the previous lecture courses, for Heidegger both ways of finding an access must account for the loss of this access. As far as philosophy has lost the genuine access to its theme, the task of rethinking philosophy is brought out by Heidegger as a necessity. In this respect, considering philosophy in the living situation leads to the thematization of authentic and inauthentic actualization. Similarly, with respect to philosophical investigation, Heidegger articulates the need to start with destruction.

In what follows in part two, I will aim to show that throughout his three next first Freiburg period lecture courses Heidegger on the one hand will continue to address philosophy within the overall structure which has emerged from his previous consideration. On the other hand, however, he simultaneously rethinks the account of philosophy in each of the following courses.

Thus, on the one hand I insist that Heidegger continues to develop his account in two directions. In this respect, there is an interesting movement observable in the following lecture courses. First, in the lecture course on Augustine (GA 60), Heidegger applies his methodology and explicates Augustine's actualization. In this lecture course he is predominantly occupied with the possibility of philosophy in and through factical life. Next, in the lecture course on Aristotle (GA 61), Heidegger aims to bring the two directions together by unfolding them as parts of one inquiry. However, it will be shown that in the aim to unify the two sides, both of them still clearly come out and are articulated separately. Finally, in the last lecture course of his first Freiburg period (GA 63), Heidegger thematizes hermeneutics as an investigation, which at the same time is claimed to be self-interpretation with the task of developing wakefulness in philosophy. As such, with hermeneutics the two manners of accessing are aimed to be brought together. And yet, in this lecture course too Heidegger addresses the question of access in two ways: he asks about the proper manner of investigation and articulates how proper access is found within the concrete work of interpretation. Through the latter, hermeneutics can be seen as a further development of the account of accessing in and through factical life.

On the other hand, I claim that in each of his following lecture courses Heidegger rethinks both philosophy as the proper investigation and his account of accessing in the living situation. With regard to the overall aim of this thesis, that is, finding Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses, this is significant, whereas it is not self-evident that each time Heidegger rethinks his account of philosophy Kierkegaard should regain his position. And yet, as I will show, this is exactly the case. Kierkegaard continues to have the same position he has already been given.

Previously I have claimed that in what Heidegger has established Kierkegaard gains a specific place: he has significance for Heidegger with respect to the latter's search for the possibility of philosophy in the living situation, that is, in and through factical life. Kierkegaard has been brought out by Heidegger as a thinker who has actualized the proper access: he has brought into expression the attainment of the self-world. In what is to come I will argue that Kierkegaard continues to have significance to Heidegger within the same sphere, also during the latter part of his first Freiburg period lecture courses. However, while in the previous lecture courses Kierkegaard was mentioned by Heidegger only once, in the following lecture courses Kierkegaard's presence becomes more palpable. As I aim to show, Kierkegaard can be seen to become Heidegger's constant partner in his unfolding

of the possibility of philosophy in and through factical life. That is, despite the fact that Heidegger rethinks his account in each lecture course, he nevertheless always draws on Kierkegaard and does so continually when considering access in and through factical life. With the aim of exhibiting the extensiveness of Kierkegaard's impact, in what follows I will also make excursions to Kierkegaard's treatises. These are chosen in each case by considering what Heidegger explicitly brings out about Kierkegaard. Here, as Heidegger rethinks his philosophy, different treatises of Kierkegaard also come to the fore as of significance to him. In order to show where and how Heidegger exactly leans on Kierkegaard, I will thus start to track Heidegger's path through his following lectures courses.

In chapter five, I concentrate on Heidegger's lecture course *Augustine and Neoplatonism* (SS 1921). In this lecture course Heidegger explicates Augustine's *Confessions*, Book X. The fact that Heidegger explicates Augustine's book in this lecture course is already telling, with respect to the claims made in the first part of this thesis. It says that Augustine's actualization is investigated philosophically (or clarified) by Heidegger. In addition, as I will aim to show, Kierkegaard is persistently present in Heidegger's analysis of Augustine's *Confessions*. Within this deliberation I also show that a necessary adjustment must be made in the published text of the lecture course in order to point out a text which has been ascribed to Heidegger as his own, but which will be proven to be nothing less than his summary of the second part of Kierkegaard's treatise *The Sickness unto Death*.

In chapter six, I turn to Heidegger's next lecture course: *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle* (WS 1921–1922). With respect to claims made in part one of this thesis, it will be shown that in this lecture course Heidegger again addresses the problem of philosophy in two different ways: it is asked 1) how one must proceed with philosophical investigation and 2) where lies the possibility of philosophy in the living situation (as it is actualized). These different sides are brought forth as parts of the same question, and yet analyzed distinctly. In showing that this is the case I will suggest a slightly different layout for the published text of the lecture course and bring out Kierkegaard's significance for Heidegger with respect to the latter's rethought account of philosophy in and through factical life. In order to highlight Kierkegaard's role for Heidegger's account I will make an excursion to Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*.

In the final chapter of this part, I will analyze Heidegger's last lecture course of his first Freiburg period: *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (SS 1923). I will bring out both Heidegger's articulation of the meaning of hermeneutics and his account of the concrete work of interpretation. With respect to Kierkegaard, it will be shown that Heidegger once again is influenced by Kierkegaard when he articulates what is established through the concrete work of interpretation: a rethought account of possible access in and through factical life. Furthermore, in this lecture course Heidegger explicitly attests Kierkegaard's importance to his work. Whether this attestation coincides with what has emerged from the analysis of his lecture courses remains to be seen.

5. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course "Augustine and Neoplatonism"

5.1. Introduction

Previously I argued that in his 1920 summer semester lecture course as well as at the beginning of the 1920–1921 winter semester lecture course Heidegger is engaged in articulating the phenomenological method. The fact that Heidegger explains the methodology for philosophical investigation only in the first part of the latter lecture course is significant. That is, in the middle of the lecture course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger makes a sudden turn. Having just started to explain formal indication within phenomenological explication he unexpectedly breaks off the discussion and moves to the interpretation of Paul's letters. This sudden break with the methodological issues was apparently prompted by the students present in the lecture course, who complained to the dean about the lectures not being religious enough for philosophy of religion as it was called (Kisiel 171-172).[131] For a researcher of Heidegger it is a great sadness to consider where the lecture was interrupted, and yet this sudden turn itself is telling. That is, Heidegger turns from explaining the methodology to applying this methodology. The fact that the methodology is applied to Paul's letters and then to Augustine (who has previously been claimed to achieve and express proper actualization), allows me to reaffirm that Heidegger works with two accounts of accessing factical life.

In this chapter I focus on Heidegger's lecture course *Augustine and Neoplatonism* [*Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*, in GA 60].[132] That Heidegger in this lecture course *explicates* Augustine's account has been pointed out several times,[133] and will be reaffirmed in what follows. As I will argue: in the lecture course on Augustine, Heidegger articulates phenomenologically what he considers to be Augustine's actualization of factical life. I will also claim that when interpreting Augustine, Heidegger at the same time has Kierkegaard constantly in mind. I aim to show that in his interpretation of Augustine, Heidegger not

[131] See also Matthias Jung and Thomas Regehly (1995: 255).
[132] I will focus on the lecture course on Augustine and not on Heidegger's explication of the letters of Paul, since no mention of Kierkegaard is found in the latter. However, the fact that Heidegger does not mention Kierkegaard during his phenomenological explication of Paul's letters is surprising since in there Heidegger thematizes for example the notion of 'moment' [*Augenblick*] (see GA 60: 70, 106-107 [99-100, 150-151]), which later on in his *Sein und Zeit* he explicitly traces back to Kierkegaard (SuZ: 497 n. iii [338 n. 1]).
[133] The fact that Heidegger both explicates and destroys Augustine's account in this lecture course has been pointed out for example by Robert J. Berg (2005: 109) and Pöggeler (1990 [1963]: 26 [38]).

only considers Kierkegaard within his analysis of the possibility of proper access in and through factical life, but also leans heavily on Kierkegaard when building up his own account of the possibilities of living factically.

The present chapter is divided into seven sections. In what follows, in the second section (chapter 5.2), I give an overview of the lecture course and explain how Heidegger's two-directional approach becomes apparent in it. After that, I focus on Heidegger's explication of Augustine's path in four central steps, in which Heidegger analyzes the problematic of relating in and through factical life. Then I will turn to consider Kierkegaard's role in this lecture course. First, in section four, I outline Heidegger's explicit references to Kierkegaard in this lecture course. Most importantly, I claim that one of the loose pages added to the lecture course is Heidegger's summary of the second part of Kierkegaard's treatise *The Sickness unto Death*. On the basis of this acknowledgment I then (in chapter 5.5) make a short excursion to this text by Kierkegaard, which has been proven to be significant to Heidegger. Next, on the basis of what has been brought out previously, I will point to structural similarities between what comes out in Kierkegaard's text and what Heidegger suggests in his analysis of Augustine's *Confessions*, *Book X*. I will conclude that Kierkegaard is present throughout Heidegger's explication of Augustine's treatise. Furthermore, the manner in which Kierkegaard is present in this lecture course allows me to claim that Heidegger gained significant impulses from what Kierkegaard offered.

5.2. Heidegger's lecture course on Augustine

In the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger acknowledges Augustine as one who shifted his focus from the usual direction of life towards the self-world. He says:

> Only according to these basic motives for a new positioning of the self-world, which were breaking out anew, is it understandable why something like Augustine's "*Confessions*" and "*On the City of God*" can encounter us. *Crede, ut intelligas* [believe, so that you may understand]: live your self vitally – and understanding establishes itself only on this ground of experience, your ultimate and fullest self-experience. In "*inquietum cor nostrum*" [our hearts are restless] Augustine saw the great disquiet of life. He gained a wholly original aspect, not at all just a theoretical one. Rather, he lived in it and brought it to expression. (GA 58: 48 [62])

This shift of focus Heidegger called "intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world". As I have shown in chapter three, this expression refers to a living situation in which the originality of life expresses itself. To put it differently, it is actualizing one's life in the manner that factical life experience manifests itself. How exactly factical life experience comes into expression in Augustine's *Confessions* is the question to be asked,

since Heidegger also clearly holds the same opinion about Augustine in the summer semester of 1921, when he held his lecture on *Augustine and Neoplatonism*. At the same time, however, it is also to be asked how Augustine is to be approached. That is, the question how what is expressed by Augustine is brought out methodologically is not to be taken lightly. Rather, according to Heidegger, what Augustine saw must be brought out in a distinct manner.

> "*Vita*" (life) is no mere word, no formal concept, but a structural complex which Augustine himself saw—without, however, yet achieving sufficient conceptual clarity. Today, this clarity has still not been attained, because Descartes moved the study of the self as a basic phenomenon in a different, falling direction. Modern philosophy in its entirety has not been able to rid itself of this. (GA 60: 226 [298])

In my opinion, through these words Heidegger expresses his own aim. The conceptual clarity which according to Heidegger has not been achieved today is what he aims at in his approach. The claim that this conceptual clarity was not achieved by Augustine, who nevertheless expressed life as a structural complex, designates the twofold task of the lecture course. Heidegger both unfolds factical life experience as it manifests itself through Augustine's confession and aims to articulate what Augustine expressed in a distinct manner. On the basis of Heidegger's methodological considerations brought out in the previous chapter, it can be said that in this lecture course Heidegger destroys interpretations of Augustine and explicates factical life experience as it is found in Augustine's *Confessions*, Book X. These two tasks of the lecture course are seen from the way the lecture course has been structured.

The lecture course is divided into two parts: the introductory part, in which Heidegger undertakes three different interpretations of Augustine, and the main part, in which he carries out his own phenomenological interpretation of Book X of Augustine's *Confessions*. In the introductory part Heidegger takes up the destruction of what he calls the "three most prominent interpretations and evaluations" of Augustine (GA 60: 115 [160]).[134] By bringing out these interpretations he aims to demarcate his own approach. The three interpretations he considers are those of Ernst Troeltsch, Adolf von Harnack, and Wilhelm Dilthey. As always in his destruction, he wants to establish the access employed by the interpreter and the motivational basis of the interpretations. According to Heidegger, the sense of access [*Zugangssinn*] is the same in all three cases – they are dominated by an

[134] As Frederick van Fletteren (2005: 4) points out, Heidegger has limited himself here to German philosophy and theology, neglecting for example French scholarship, which was influential at that time. According to van Fletteren, this shows Heidegger's unawareness of the contemporary discussions of Augustine and, also, due to the nationalistic perspective, puts him into an intellectual isolation (ibid.).

object-historical attitude (120-121 [166-167]). However, the interpretations differ from each other in respect of their motivational basis [*Motivationsbasis*] (121-122 [168-169]).[135] Not surprisingly, Heidegger dismisses all the motives by questioning their philosophical meaningfulness.[136] He claims that the task of the lecture course will become clear with respect to these interpretations as distinguished from his own.[137] That is, his overall task is to bring out a specific approach. According to Heidegger, the object-historical attitude must be replaced with the phenomenological one, which aims at an actualization-historical [*vollzugsgeschichtlich*] interpretation (125, 173 [173, 232]).[138] That is, Augustine's *Confessions* is to be approached by explicating it phenomenologically, the aim being actualizational-historical understanding. In the lecture on Paul's letters, he determines the actualizational-historical approach as one in which "the complex of happenings will be experienced [*erfahren*], at any point, situationally" (104 [147]). That is, he aims to follow Augustine's confession as an actualization of a concrete historical situation and bring it into expression through phenomenological explication, by indicating the relations opened up in this actualization. This aim is taken up in the second part of the lecture course.

What in my opinion becomes essential for Heidegger in his interpretation of Augustine's *Confessions,* Book X is to follow Augustine's path of confessing as his personal path of searching – how this path unwinds. He does not direct himself towards asking the same questions Augustine is asking, but rather he aims at what is revealed about factical life experience through Augustine's path of confessing. It is a step-by-step unfolding of personal inquiry after God through which the characters of factical life are brought out. The leading question here is the question of the possibility of gaining authentic access to factical life in and through factical life itself. At the same time, Heidegger's consideration is continually informed by his firm conviction that this authentic access has been lost, which means that he simultaneously aims to bring out how this loss is

[135] The motivational basis is either "effort toward a specifically characterized philosophy of culture" (Troeltsch); "effort is directed toward the theological understanding of faith" (van Harnack); or "effort strives for the foundation or the structure of the historical human sciences" (Dilthey) (121 [168-169]).
[136] From the destruction Heidegger draws for his own interpretation two central demarcation points: first, he distinguishes his own interpretation from object-historical studies (122-124 [169-172]); secondly, he will distance himself from historical-typological studies (124-125 [172-173]).
[137] That this is the case is supported by Heidegger's opening statement of the lecture course: "[t]he task set before us is a limited one; to what extent it is limited will become clear, at least negatively, in its demarcation from other interpretations and evaluations of Augustine" (115 [159]).
[138] In the English translation of this lecture course the German '*Vollzug*' is translated as 'enactment.' In order to sustain coherence throughout the thesis, I will use from here on the notion of 'actualization' as in previous chapters, except in cases when quoting the translated text of Heidegger's lecture course.

conditioned by factical life itself. Seen from these two angles, the inquiry aims to express the possibility and necessity of philosophy in and through factical life.

5.3. The path of explicating Augustine's *Confessions*, Book X

According to my reading, Heidegger analyzes Augustine's *Confessions*, Book X in four steps. First, he foregrounds the distinction between relating to other human beings and relating to God, in which he stresses the significance of Augustine's manner of relating: confessing before God. Secondly, he makes a move towards questioning factical life by thematizing the search (for God). The focus moves to the significance of the actualization of the search, which pushes the questioner into the foreground and thus leads into the inquiry of one's own facticity. Thirdly, through the inquiry into how Augustine experiences his life in his confession, Heidegger points to the fundamental structures of factical life experience and delineates three modes of relating in which the authentic relation to God and to oneself is lost. Fourthly, Heidegger outlines a further mode of relating: the authentic relation to God and to oneself.

In what follows, I bring out Heidegger's analysis of Augustine's text in these four steps, where I focus on what I consider to be Heidegger's central claims and point to the peculiarity of his approach. As I see it, in his explication Heidegger targets the problem of the possibility of accessing factical life in and through factical life as well as the problem of the conditionality of losing this access.

5.3.1. Motivational ground

Starting his phenomenological interpretation of Augustine's Book X of *Confessions* from the beginning of the book, Heidegger fixes his eye on Augustine's motives for confessing. He points to two directions. First, he calls attention to Augustine's wish to confess about "what he is now" (128 [177]) and asks: "[b]ut why give a report about the present condition?" (129 [178]). Secondly, according to Heidegger, what is at issue for Augustine is to become clear about the meaning of confessing before God for whom everything is already known. He states:

> So Augustine wants to dare confess himself. And he will confess what he "knows" about himself. Augustine admits not knowing everything about himself. He wants to confess that too. *Quaestio mihi factus sum*. [I have become a question to myself.] "To comprehend is the range of man's relation to the human, but to believe is man's relation to the divine." [S. Kierkegaard, Die Krankheit zum Tode, übersetzt v. H. Gottsched, Gesammelte Werke Bd. 8, Jena 1911, S. 93.] *Terra difficultatis*. [Difficult territory.] Observe the different relational sense [*Bezugssinn*]! (129–130 [178])

The passage refers to three aspects: 1) there is a distinction between confessing before God and confessing before fellow human beings [*bekennen gegenüber den Mitmenschen*]; 2) in these ways of confessing, different manners of accessing (relational sense) are observable; 3) in Christianity, in the face of God, the land of unknownness (the difficulty) arises and one becomes a question to oneself. Thus, the significance of confessing before God is first grounded in the acknowledgment of the difference between confessing before (the all-knowing) God and before other human beings. Insofar as in the face of God there is the sphere of not knowing everything about oneself, one becomes the question for oneself. Before God the acknowledgement of not knowing everything about oneself pushes into the search. The starting point of the search from facing the difficulty brings forward the difference of the how of relating, the access. On the one hand, by relating to other human beings, one is directed towards what is known; on the other hand, in relating to God, one is directed towards the unknown. Thus, by entering into the theme with Augustine's motivational considerations, Heidegger can be seen to stress from the start the fact that the manner of placing the question leads the possible access beforehand.

5.3.2. Finding oneself in the search for God

Heidegger continues by turning to Augustine's search for God: "[y]et one thing is certain for him: that he loves God. 'Quid autem amo, cum te amo?' [But what do I love, when I love you?]" (130 [178]). What is searched when God is looked for and where to look for God? More importantly, how is this questioning unfolded phenomenologically?

As Heidegger himself admits, in unfolding Augustine's search he does not strictly follow Augustine's layout of the chapters (132-133 [182]). Indeed, he diverges strongly from Augustine's whole consideration, clearly developing something of his own. As Frederick van Fletteren has said: "[r]etrojection of Heidegger's view on Augustine's text leads to misinterpretation" (van Fletteren 2005: 8). To what extent Heidegger shifts away from Augustine's text is not under consideration here. The only reasons for pointing out that Heidegger departs from Augustine lies in the need to stress that I am concentrating on Heidegger's own manner of addressing the problem and that I am not making any claims about Augustine. The fact is that in unfolding Augustine's search Heidegger leads the discussion towards his own aims.

What first of all proves significant for Heidegger in his viewing of Augustine's search for God is that the search takes a direction towards analyzing the problematic from lived

life. Heidegger points to the wavering that takes place at the beginning of Augustine's confession between two starting points: the attitudinal and the actualizational.[139] What is then decisive is that the questioning is led into the consideration of concrete actualization. As such, the search for God by questioning the earth, nature, the sea, the whole cosmos and so on, leads back to the change of the very question and ultimately to the questioner himself: "the question is no longer whether this or that *is* God, but whether I can find God 'therein' = 'thereby' = 'living therein'" (132 [181]). Having exhibited the importance of taking the path from how the search is lived through (actualized), Heidegger then can be seen to turn his focus on the search itself. By concentrating on the different twists and turns taking place in the search, he unfolds his interpretation with an eye on relational sense, on the basis of which he makes several central claims.

First of all, he claims that to search for something means to already have this something, where what is had may be had in different forms. That is, having arrived at the question of whether God is found therein, Heidegger steps with Augustine into the field of *memoria* and the wonder over the diversity of ways that things become present and offer themselves when they are searched for. On the one hand, having something in the memory is different from current experience [*Erfahren*]. For example in the case of affects. The memory of being afraid is different from the experience of being afraid: "as if the phenomenologist of hate or fear constantly had to be fearful" (136 [187]). And yet, in memory the fear is also intended. Only if I have it can I characterize it (136-137 [187]). Heidegger points out that it is not an object which enters into memory, nor is it a representation of the object, but rather the meaning itself. In this way, the meaning which is had in the memory is somehow at one's disposal (ibid.). Similarly, Augustine's thematization of forgetting is brought out by Heidegger as the question of how forgetting is present. Heidegger insists that the problem of forgetfulness must be seen from the relational sense. Seen from the relational sense, forgetting is not a radical privation, but rather it is present as non-presence, present in concealment: what is remembered is concealed (137-139 [188-189]).

Thus, having claimed that one can search for something only if one already somehow had it, Heidegger insists that even if something is lost, it is still had in some way: "[t]he

[139] In this respect, Heidegger states: "[c]f., in the following, the back and forth of the considerations regarding experience as the means objectively present at hand and as interpretation regarding enactment! The wavering itself is an expression of what? The starting point for the existential break-through of the order and object-relation – psychology, or interpretation and grasping of the problem from factical life concretely historical-existentially." (132 [181])

woman who searched for and found the lost drachma – how could she search for and find it if she did not somehow still have it present to herself?" (139 [190]). However, he also stresses that this, what is already found in the search, may not be found at all: "[a]nd even if what I searched for were there, and I did not recognize it as such, it would not be *found*" (ibid.). There is difference between 'to have' and 'to have.' From these realizations the search for God gains a different meaning: "([t]hus I cannot say at all that I do *not* have something, and so I also "have" God in some way?) What does 'searching' mean?" (139 [190]). In this way, according to Heidegger, the search for God has led into "general *theory* of access" (141 [193]). This leads to Heidegger's next central claim. Namely, that the search for God leads to the search for factical life.

> That is, in my search of God, something in me does not only reach "expression," but, makes up my facticity and my concern for it. (According to what do I recognize and grasp something as God? What gives the fulfillment of meaning: "*sat est*" [it suffices]? *Vita* [Life].) That means, in searching for this something as God, I myself assume a completely different role. I am not only the one from whose place the search proceeds and who moves toward some place, or the one in whom the search takes place; but the enactment of the search itself is something of the self. What does it mean I "am"? (The self gains an "idea" [*Vorstellung*] of itself, what kind of idea I have of myself. Kierkegaard). (141 [192])[140]

What comes out in the former quotation is first of all that in the actualization of the search for God, the point of access is led into the very person asking the question, into factical life experience and the possibilities open to him. As Heidegger insists, in the actualization of the search, the "I am" constantly pushes itself forward to the point of becoming the question of the search. Secondly, according to Heidegger, the search itself makes up the concrete concern for the facticity of the searcher. Through the search one assumes a different role. How this is the case becomes clearer in his following consideration.

5.3.3. Characters of Factical life

Armed with the previously made claims, Heidegger turns to the analysis of the concrete actualization of the access. As he has insisted in the previous lecture courses, not every manner of accessing is authentic. Thus initially, the question is about the ways of relating in which the authentic relation is somehow lost. Everybody can stand before God and ask about God and God answers everybody, but not everybody is able to hear (150 [203-204]).

> When it concerns them themselves, and when it shakes them up and questions their own facticity and existence [*Existenz*], then it is better to close one's eyes just in time, in order to be enthused by the choir's litanies which one has staged before oneself. (148 [201])

[140] It should be noticed that the reference to Kierkegaard is made by Heidegger in the margin of the running text of the lecture course.

> Thus, human beings do wish that the "truth" ["*Wahrheit*"] reveals itself to them, that nothing is closed off to them (aesthetic), but they themselves close themselves off against it: "ab ea manifestari nolunt" [they do not want to be discovered by it]. (148 [201])

It does not suffice to wish to have the truth [*Wahrheit*], but rather the manner of relating to the truth becomes significant. The question is not only how one relates, but also how one relates authentically: "[s]o the 'questioning' and 'hearing' does not suffice unless their How has been appropriated genuinely [*echt angeeignet ist*]" (150 [204]). The meaning of *not* to "appropriate the how genuinely" refers in my opinion to the question of how one closes oneself off from the authentic relation. At the same time, according to Heidegger, by closing oneself off from the truth, the truth becomes concealed, but "he [the human being] does not become concealed before it [truth]" (148 [201]). That is, even when one closes oneself off, something of the truth comes forth. Thus, it should be asked, what of the truth comes forth when the appropriation is not authentic and how is authentic access lost according to Heidegger in his analysis of Augustine's experience of life?

With respect to pointing out that something of the truth comes forth even when authentic access is lost, Heidegger emphasizes that Augustine experiences life as a burden: he experiences himself as a burden to himself. For Heidegger this is an essential insight for two reasons. Augustine experiences himself as a burden to himself, while he experiences his life as scattered into a manifold (*defluxus*). And yet, God demands a counter-movement, that is, a movement into 'the One'. This is what is really desired, what is hoped for (151-152 [205-206]). At this point Heidegger sees in Augustine's confessions the fundamental character of factical life arising – it is concern [*Bekümmerung*]. Life as scattered into a manifold and directed to a hope is experienced in the manner of being concerned. Life as it is experienced is a life in concern of things and others. Life is lived in this way. Furthermore, to the extent that there is a hope for a counter-movement, Heidegger points out the historicality of factical life in this concern, which opens into the horizon of awaiting [*Erwartungshorizont*] (153-154 [207-209]). As he states to the students taking part of the lecture course: "[l]ife is enacted [*vollzieht sich*] in the direction of that which expectation runs ahead" (205 [272]).

That life is lived in this way – as concerned and actualized in the direction of hope (that is, actualized in the horizon of expectation, being-ahead) – and how life is lived in different directions come about through Augustine's confession of how different temptations take hold of him. At the same time, through *tentatio*, as the fundamental character in which Augustine experiences life, Heidegger can be seen to articulate the ways

of closing oneself off. In this respect, he emphasizes that Augustine's aim – the search for God – must be kept in mind (155 [209-210])! Seen from the search for God, the temptations are to be regarded as referring to the fact that life is pulled down. That is, the three forms of *tentatio* are at the same time seen as three directions of the possibility of *defluxus* (155-157 [210-212]).[141]

The first form of temptation is *concupiscentia carnis* (desire of the flesh). How are the temptations gathered under the name of desires of the flesh experienced? They are experienced as the troubles of the day, the daily troubles (158 [214]). Such as for example eating and drinking, necessities of life and yet experienced as temptations. How are they temptations? Not in themselves, but rather as they become delights which are aimed at. The possibility of (life itself) taking delight in necessities creates uncertainty which then quickly turns to excuses and escapes to momentary experiences in order to bury any trace of itself. It is tempting to set aside possibilities and settle oneself into what is meaningful [*Bedeutsamkeit*][142]. It is tempting to escape into multitude, seeking endlessly something new and beautiful, not to let oneself be disturbed but simply to be drawn into the joyful and multiply the manifold (162-165 [218-221]). And not only tempting, but rather the manifold is experienced as taking over, whereby the genuine and authentic [*echte und eigentliche*] relation is lost:

> "Ego capior miserabiliter" [I am miserably captured], I am being drawn into it miserably. "Haereo in ubique sparsis insidiis" [I become in the snares laid everywhere] and thus lose the genuine and authentic orientation toward the *lux vera, illa pulchritudo* "cui suspirat anima mea die ac nocte," *deus decus meum* [true light, that beauty "after which my soul sighs day and night," my God and beauty]. (164-165 [221])

The second form of temptation, *concupiscentia oculorum* (desire of the eye or the superfluous curiosity of knowing) is dominated by the desire to see. It is curiosity, which aims to know (167 [224]). Heidegger describes it as accessing through 'taking-cognizance-of' [*Kenntnisnahme*], that is, the familiar manner of approaching from the previous lecture courses: grasping through ordering and objectifying whatever is aimed to be accessed. In the present lecture course he adds that in this case the relational sense is self-willed. This relation directs life and determines how something is experienced (169 [226]). In this way, the objectifying access is also applied to the search for God:

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[141] In connection with Heidegger's explication of three forms of temptations, Claudius Strube (1995: 261) for example considers this theme to be at the center of Heidegger's attention when interpreting Augustine. According to Strube, Heidegger already developed here what later on in *Sein und Zeit* will be accomplished as the existential analytic of fallenness (ibid.).

[142] In the English translation of this lecture course the German '*Bedeutsamkeit*' is translated as 'significance.' In order to sustain coherence throughout the thesis, I will use from here on the notion of 'meaningfulness' as in previous chapters, except in cases when quoting the translated text of Heidegger's lecture course.

> (God has to endure becoming a factor in human experiments. He has to respond to an inquisitive, pompous, and pseudo-prophetic curiosity, that is, a curious looking-about-oneself in regard to Him, which does *not* submit [*fügt*] to His sense of objecthood, that is, which is non-sense [*Un-fug*].) (167 [224])

In the third form of temptation, *ambitio saeculi* ("secular ambition"), self-importance becomes the end of delight (170 [228]). It is a manner of bringing oneself to the fore within the context of the with-world[143], arranging one's life in order to be loved or feared by others (171 [229]). It is a mode which aims to validate oneself within the with-world and is seen as motivated by cowardly weakness and insecurity (171, 173-174 [229, 232-233]). In this temptation, one is not directed towards God anymore, but rather to oneself seen from other human beings: "[e]t a veritate tua gaudium nostrum deponamus, atque in hominum fallacia ponamus [And we give up our joy in your truth, and place it in the deceitfulness of human beings]" (174 [233]).

For Heidegger, these three forms of temptation are factical manners of experiencing. In all these three forms, factical life experience is expressed and yet authentic access is concealed. However, as was said, although humans conceal the truth for themselves in these forms, something of the truth nevertheless is expressed. What comes forth (is expressed) are the basic characters. As such, according to Heidegger, each manner of temptation reveals the basic character of life – concern. Life is lived in the concern of things and others around oneself. Also, in all experience as concern, the basic tendency – delight – is always co-present (165-166 [222]). This means that all experiencing is always directed. It is directed to a certain *appetitus* (appetite), as Heidegger says (166 [222]). What one is directed towards in different forms of temptation differs. In the first form of *tentatio*, one is directed towards being entertained. In the second form, one desires to know. It is the appetite "of *looking-about-oneself* (not of dealing-with) in the various regions and fields, 'what is going on there'" (166 [223]). In the third form, one desires to "validate oneself" (173 [232]). Now, according to Heidegger, what one is directed towards, what is hoped for makes up one's own factical concern. In this sense, Heidegger is able to confirm his claim that the search itself makes up one's (my) concern for facticity (141 [192]). The question is in what sense these manners of experiencing are regarded as closing off authentic access.

Indeed, each form of temptation is seen as the search for God, as the search for a happy life. However, for Heidegger, not being directed towards what is searched for

[143] In the translation of this text the *Mitwelt* is translated as 'communal world.' In order to sustain coherence throughout, I will use from here on the notion of 'with-world' as in previous chapters, except in cases when quoting the translated text of Heidegger's lecture course.

authentically (according to oneself), simultaneously means to close oneself off from oneself. For this reason, he leads the problem of access to the thematization of the question of how the self unfolds through the forms of temptation. According to Heidegger, in the first case, the self is absorbed into the dealings-with. In the second form, the self is not absorbed nor had – it simply does not come to itself. In both of these forms, according to Heidegger, self as self does not articulate itself actualizationally, but rather is being lived by the world and determined by with-worldly relations (170 [228]). With respect to the access had in these forms, Heidegger insists that in the first case the relational sense remains in content, is pulled into it, and in the second case the relational sense is self-willed (166, 169 [222-223, 226]). In the third form the self articulates itself actualizationally (self as self is aimed at), but according to Heidegger, in the manner how self is articulated here the self is lost for itself in its ownmost way (170, 171 [228, 229]). The self is lost, as far as it is motivated by self-importance. One relates to oneself with respect to others and thus the self-world becomes directed by the with-world (170, 179 [227, 239]). All in all, each form of temptation as a possibility of *defluxtion* thus closes the access to what is searched for. It remains to ask: how is access properly gained?

5.3.4. Having oneself before God

In all three forms of temptation, one is directed towards something which is taken as a delight. In all these forms, however, the temptation is seen as centered around "false happiness," which threatens true happiness (174-175 [233-234]). With respect to the search for God (or the *vita beata*), this means that life is pulled down, it is entangled with dealings and the with-world. But where lies true happiness?

> The significance [*Bedeutsamkeit*] in relation to oneself, of which one can dispose is a *donum Dei* [gift of God]. (175 [234]).

The genuine relation to oneself is that of before God as a gift of God. Not as an objective relation, but as a how of experiencing. It is not a state in which one stands and looks at things from a higher perspective. Rather it is being open and refraining from securing oneself. It is a manner of relating in which one stands in a relation to oneself by giving oneself over to the facticity of one's own life. As such, it is a mode of relating which differs from previously described modes of relating and yet is connected to them. In what sense it is different from relating through self-importance (the only one of previous modes in which

the self actualizationally articulates itself) becomes apparent in Heidegger's consideration of four possibilities of falling (178-180 [237-241]).

That is, according to Heidegger, relating to oneself as a gift of God is different from relating which takes its importance from what one does or has done in which the good is appropriated by oneself. It is also different from creating the good by oneself or even from assuming self-importance by uplifting oneself as worthy of the gift. And it is different in separating oneself from others, whereby one is objectively cut off from oneself. In this way all these forms are to be seen as possibilities and modes of one's own factical life, in which, however, one does not authentically have oneself. At the same time, to have oneself is to have these possibilities (178-179 [238-239]). In this respect, authentic relating is brought out by Heidegger as overcoming [*Überwindung*].

Heidegger determines overcoming as "[a] genuine enacting or understanding of enactment [*Echtes Vollziehen bzw. Vollzugsverstehen*]. Explicatively: *tentatio* as an existential complex of expression" (180 [240]). This says that what is opened is not suddenly cut off from temptations. Rather, the experiential complex in its possibilities becomes visible. Overcoming is not a sudden leap into clarity, but is rather described as intensified concern and refers to *coming over from*. As Heidegger stresses, one can be led to self-revelation by overcoming *tentatio* (179 [240]). More specifically, it is said to 'leap off' in a self-importance (180 [240]). It is a movement described as a "groundless dive" and "authentic losing oneself" – a difficulty which creates anxiety, in which factical life itself has this "anxiety-producing-character" (180 [241]). That is, factical life itself has the possibilities – it can! In this way, Heidegger insists that in life itself there is a possibility to lose proper access to oneself and a possibility to win it. He articulates life as giving to itself these possibilities in the last hours of the lecture course in terms of "having-of-oneself" [*Sichselbsthabens*] and by explicating the possibility of losing and winning in terms of "the more life lives, the more life comes to itself" (181-182 [241-243]).

That is, for Heidegger, the tendency to lose is there in life itself insofar as life in itself has the tendency to pull down or endanger itself. This is what is expressed through "the more life lives." It means that the more fully life is lived in all of its directions and the more engaged the concern is, the more life is pulled down. By 'pulling life down' the factical life is actualized in the manner of endangering itself by itself. In contrast, what is expressed through "the more life comes to itself" is that life also is somehow attained. It is the experiencing in life that life itself, its being [*Sein*], is what is at issue and at risk. There is

the possibility to win the being of life (182 [243-242]). As such, having-of-oneself in concrete actualization "gives itself at the same time the full, concrete, factical 'opportunity' to arrive at the *being* of its ownmost life [*Sein des eigensten Lebens*]" (183 [244]). However, it should be noticed that 'having oneself' is not winning oneself, but the *how* of having oneself plays itself out in concrete actualization. Having-of-oneself is "the concern for the *being* of itself" (183 [245]). How this concern is actualized is different. It can be enacted in the manner of losing oneself or of winning oneself. What is had in winning oneself is one's life in its directedness.

> In this tendency toward a radical factical historical having-of-oneself in its specific self-clarity, the concrete "worldly" experiential complex of enactment [*Erfahrungsvollzugszusammenhang*] first becomes fully visible (cf. *tentatio*). The directions of experience as directions of experience, their possibilities as possibilities of this factical experience in its own enactment [*eigenvollzugshaft*], and that means the sense of *molestia*, are determined by the authentic [*eigentlichen*] How of life itself. (182 [244])

Thus, what becomes apparent in the authentic mode of relating is what is hidden in human being, its directions and possibilities, the ways life forms itself. Insofar as it is a manner of relating whereby one stands in a relation to oneself by giving oneself over to the facticity of one's own life, it is not a relation to an object. Rather, grasping the proper direction of concern is grasping oneself as questionable. Thus, at the end of the lecture course, Heidegger arrives back at the beginning. "What am I?" he asks. I am the "'[q]uestionable' in the experiential directions, in experiencing and having myself" (184 [246]). What is decisive is the motivational ground for entering into questioning. Facing the unknown!

5.4. Kierkegaard's explicit presence in Heidegger's lecture course on Augustine

The lecture course *Augustine and Neoplatonism* as a published text which is available for the reader has been put together by the editor Claudius Strube. As Strube brings out in his afterword (1995: 259-263 [345-351]), the original text of the lecture course consists of 19 handwritten pages (folio format). As was Heidegger's usual practice, he wrote the progressive text of the lecture on the left side of the pages and added different notes on the right side of the page. In the original text, there are a high number of notes on each page which often lack clarity concerning the connection with the continuous text (ibid.). As published, the text of the lecture course consists of (1) Heidegger's manuscript of the lecture course; (2) supplements, which are thought to belong to the lecture course, but which were found in a different collection of papers gathered by Heidegger for preparing a

later seminar on Augustine; and (3) notes from his student Oskar Becker. With regard to Kierkegaard's presence in the lecture course, this is significant.

In the text as published, Heidegger is seen to mention Kierkegaard directly in this lecture course on six separate occasions. Mostly he does so through quotations. There are altogether seven clearly marked passages from two of Kierkegaard's treatises: *The Sickness unto Death* and *The Concept of Anxiety*. However, on one occasion Heidegger simply names Kierkegaard without directly saying anything further in the written source available to us. The passages quoted by Heidegger from Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death* stem from the second part of the book, "Despair is Sin." The passages quoted by Heidegger from Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* derive from the third and fifth chapter of the book respectively. From the six separate occasions where we find Kierkegaard in the text of the lecture course as it is given in the *Gesamtausgabe*, two are marked as found in the margins of the lecture manuscript. On the other four occasions Kierkegaard is to be found in the sketches which have been added to the published text of the lecture course in "Appendix I" (in *Notes and Sketches for the Lecture Course*). Thus, Heidegger has not named Kierkegaard in the running text of the lecture course. In addition, throughout the lecture course Heidegger does not say anything *about* Kierkegaard. And yet, it can be claimed that Kierkegaard is constantly by Heidegger's side and through this presence, Heidegger tacitly credits Kierkegaard with utmost importance.

The first (1) reference to Kierkegaard is already made by Heidegger in his opening of the interpretation. That is, in the margin of the discussion about the motivation for confessing, Heidegger has added a quotation from Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*: "[t]o comprehend is the range of man's relation to the human, but to believe is man's relation to the divine" (GA 60:130 [178]; SuD: 95 [XI 206]).[144] In this way, Kierkegaard enters the discussion about the significance of the motivational ground in the search for access. In the second (2) reference found in the margin of the text of the lecture course Heidegger has named Kierkegaard within the context of the problematic of the search (GA 60: 141 [192]).[145] Since there is no explanation for this insertion of Kierkegaard's name in this case, the only direct conclusion which can be drawn from this reference is that Kierkegaard is somehow on Heidegger's mind within the consideration of the search and the turnedness towards oneself therein.

[144] See the reference (1) in chapter 5.3.1.
[145] See the reference (2) in chapter 5.3.2.

In the notes and sketches added to the lecture course in "Appendix I," there are four additional references to Kierkegaard. One of them (3) is linked by the editors to the same context as the first of the previously mentioned marginal notes. In this case Heidegger has marked out two quotations of Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*. The quotations Heidegger has added are the following (GA 60: 185 [248]; SuD: 79, 80 [XI 191, 192])[146]:

> "The criterion for the self is always: that directly before which it is a self, but that in turn is the definition of 'criterion.'" [S. Kierkegaard, Die Krankheit zum Tode, übersetzt v. H. Gottsched, G. W. Bd. 8, Jena 1911, S.76.]
> "The greater the conception of God, the more self there is; the more self, the greater the conception of God." [A. a. O., S. 77.]

These quotations may well be read in the context of the motivational considerations, but meaning-wise the passage also refers to the problematic of the search and of the 'having-of-oneself'. The fact that Kierkegaard had Heidegger's attention when he considered the possibility of the authentic manner of relating in having-of-oneself can be concluded also from the two following explicit references. Both of these cases are to be found in the notes and sketches and in both of them Heidegger appends quotations from Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*. According to the editors, the first of these (4) are made by Heidegger in connection with the discussion about "Light." The quotations appear as follows (GA 60: 192 [257]; see CA: 109 [IV 378]):

> "Guilt is a more concrete conception, which becomes more and more possible in the relation of possibility to freedom." [S. Kierkegaard, Der Begriff der Angst, übers. v. Chr. Schrempf, G. W. Bd. 5, Jena 1912, S. 107] "But whoever becomes guilty also becomes guilty of that which occasioned the guilt. For guilt never has an external occasion, and whoever yields to temptation is himself guilty of the temptation." [Ebd.]

These quotations can be linked to Heidegger's claim that the manner of searching makes up one's concern for facticity, as well as with the final part of Heidegger's consideration on the manners of having-of-oneself. Heidegger's next reference (5) is not connected to any concrete part of the text of the lecture course by the editors. In this case Heidegger has added the following quotation from Kierkegaard on a loose page (GA 60: 202 [268]; see CA: 159 [IV 425]): "[a]nxiety discovers fate."[147] This reference to Kierkegaard can be linked to the final chapters of the lecture course, where Heidegger briefly touches upon the subject of anxiety. All in all, the references to Kierkegaard are thus to be found in many

[146] The quotations (3) appear right after the following remark: "[h]ow the self wins its existence, and in what existence consists, already through the searching: placing oneself somehow before God or *vita beata* [the happy life]. In searching, it places itself in the absolute distance, and tries to win the distance. Explicated phenomenologically?" (185-186 [248])
[147] The quotation is marked with the reference "S. Kierkegaard, Der Begriff der Angst, a.a.O., S. 160" (GA 60: [268]).

different thematizations. The question to be asked is: how do all these references come together?

Considering how the references mentioned previously are found in Heidegger's lecture course, it is at first sight highly problematic to conclude with full confidence anything about Kierkegaard's significance for Heidegger. First of all, because initially the certainty of the above-mentioned reference belonging to the concrete lecture course can be questioned in three cases out of the five.[148] Secondly, because the two references which clearly were made in the margin of the text of the lecture course are not very helpful: the first of them might be simply supportive, and nothing much can be said about the significance of the second reference. Nevertheless, I will claim that the references can in fact be connected with the lecture course and this, indeed, in the manner of how they appear. I base the claim on the sixth occasion on which Heidegger has mentioned Kierkegaard. Although I concede that this occasion is also not to be found in Heidegger's manuscript of the lecture course, it can clearly be shown to belong to the preparation of the lecture course. Furthermore, it can be shown that Heidegger was heavily engaged with Kierkegaard during this lecture course and especially with the second part of his *The Sickness unto Death*.

On this sixth occasion (6), the reference to Kierkegaard is found on another loose page, which has been added to the lecture course. On this loose page (198-199 [264-265]), with the heading "Sin" [*Sünde*], Heidegger has marked one sentence as a quotation stemming from Kierkegaard.[149] I claim that this loose page, in which a concrete quotation from Kierkegaard is to be found, is nothing less than Heidegger's summary of his reading of the second part of Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*. The fact that so far this page has not been recognized as a summary of Kierkegaard's treatise lies in Heidegger's failure to use quotation marks. However, when compared to the 1911 German translation of Kierkegaard's treatise which Heidegger used at the time (a fact which is confirmed by the references to the quotations he has clearly marked), it can be shown that Heidegger in this paper simply sums up and quotes Kierkegaard (see Appendix One). Furthermore, I claim,

[148] As the editor says, these belong to the preparation of the lecture course "with reasonable certainty" (Strube 1995: 260). Thus, the possibility that Heidegger did not really make these references during the time of the lecture course must be considered.

[149] The quotation from Kierkegaard explicitly presented by Heidegger in this context (6) is the following: "[t]herefore, interpreted Christianly, sin has its roots in willing, not in knowing, and this corruption of willing embraces the individual's consciousness." [S. Kierkegaard, Die Krankheit zum Tode, übers. u. mit einem Nachwort von H. Gottsched, Jena 1911, S. 93.] (GA 60: 199 [265]; SuD: 95 [XI 206])

that this loose page reveals Heidegger's center of interest with respect to Kierkegaard in this lecture course.

In my opinion, in the present lecture course Heidegger focuses mainly on Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*. However, although it can be shown that Heidegger's references to the *The Concept of Anxiety*, as well as the loose page entitled "Anxiety" (201-202 [268]), were clearly created during the time when the lecture course on Augustine was held (this fact becomes apparent through textual similarities), in my opinion Heidegger's attention to this treatise by Kierkegaard does not yet reach its full strength here. Rather, I insist that the full importance of the notion of anxiety and Kierkegaard's treatise *The Concept of Anxiety* to Heidegger becomes apparent in his next lecture course. With this reasoning, I will turn to this treatise by Kierkegaard in the following chapter and concentrate in this chapter on his *The Sickness unto Death*. Thus, in what follows, I will make an excursion to Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death* in order later on to bring out Heidegger's extensive engagement with this treatise of Kierkegaard as well as the clear structural similarities between the writings of the two thinkers.

5.5. Excursion: "Sin is ignorance" – Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*

In *The Sickness unto Death* [*Sygdommen til Døden*] (1849) Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Anti-Climacus considers this sickness, despair, as a sickness of the self. According to Kierkegaard this sickness is universal – everybody who has not become a Christian is in despair.[150] Thus, this sickness is to be overcome. Until one overcomes the sickness, whether one is aware of it or not, one is in one way or another in despair. Overcoming despair means becoming one's self, that is, becoming Christian. In this way, becoming one's self designates a form of relating to oneself.[151] The aim of the book can be seen as an unfolding of the theme of becoming one's self through the analysis of different forms of despair.

Throughout *The Sickness unto Death*, Kierkegaard unfolds different ways of being in despair. He does so, at first, by considering despair through the constituents of the synthesis

[150] Thus, Kierkegaard states in *The Sickness unto Death*: "[i]n any case, no human being ever lived and no one lives outside of Christendom who has not despaired, and no one in Christendom if he is not a true Christian, and insofar as he is not wholly that, he still is to some extent in despair." (SuD: 22 [XI 136])

[151] That both despair and overcoming despair are forms of relating to oneself according to Kierkegaard becomes clear in his claim that one never can get rid of one's self: "[f]or despair is not attributable to the misrelation but to the relation that relates itself to itself. A person cannot rid himself of the relation to himself any more than he can rid himself of his self, which, after all, is one and the same thing, since the self is the relation to oneself." (17 [131])

which designates a 'human being' (SuD: 13 [XI 127]). After that, in the second part of the book, he considers despair as a sickness of the self, that is, Kierkegaard takes up a new characterization of self in this part: "[t]his self is no longer the merely human self but is what I, hoping not to be misunderstood, would call the theological self, the self directly before God" (79 [191]). In this second part Kierkegaard considers despair as sin, putting emphasis on the necessity of 'before God'.

The passages from Kierkegaard to which Heidegger refers in his Augustine lecture stem from the second part of *The Sickness unto Death*. Within the discussion of despair as sin Kierkegaard considers what he calls the Socratic definition of sin: "sin is ignorance" (87 [199]). His goal in doing so is to "use this Socratic definition to bring out the latter [Christian one] in its radicality" (88 [199]). Thus, the consideration should be seen as keeping Kierkegaard's goal in mind. The question is what the difference is between the Greek understanding of sin as ignorance and the Christian understanding of sin as ignorance (Kierkegaard admits that in Christianity too sin is to be comprehended as ignorance (96 [207])). In what follows, I bring out Kierkegaard's consideration by focusing on what proves to become essential for Heidegger later on.

To begin with, as was said, Kierkegaard makes a distinction between the Christian and the Socratic or Greek understanding of sin as ignorance. It is important to notice that there is a wider context to which this distinction refers. With the reference to Socrates, Kierkegaard points to the highest relation one human may have to another. In respect of Kierkegaard's theory of the spheres or stages of existence,[152] Socrates is considered an ethicist (89 [200]). One central aspect which distinguishes the ethical sphere is that the ethical is to be understood as the general [*det Almene*]. An ethical person chooses himself within the general, that is, grounds himself through other human beings. In contrast, in the religious sphere one is alone in front of God.

In accordance with what has just been declared, Kierkegaard claims in *The Sickness unto Death* that the Socratic definition 'sin is ignorance' depends upon positing "an intellectual categorical imperative" (90 [201]). According to Kierkegaard, the Greek understanding of 'sin is ignorance' suggests that if one knows what is right, one does what is right and if one does not do what is right (that is, sins), one has not understood what is right: "ergo, sin is ignorance" (93 [204]). Thus, there is a direct transition from

[152] The distinction between different ways of living or spheres of existence runs through different writings of Kierkegaard. According to Kierkegaard (here under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus): "[t]here are three existence-spheres: the aesthetic, the ethical, the religious" (CUP: 501-502 [VII: 436]).

understanding to doing in the Greek version of 'sin is ignorance'. In Christianity, however, the situation is different according to Kierkegaard.

Turning towards the Christian definition, Kierkegaard continues: "[i]n the world of actuality, however, where the individual person is involved, there is this tiny little transition from having understood to doing" (93-94 [204-205]). This "tiny little transition" lies in will: "[i]n this transition Christianity begins; by taking this path, it shows that sin is rooted in willing and arrives at the concept of defiance" (93 [204]).

At the very beginning of *The Sickness unto Death* Kierkegaard claims that despair can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self, in despair not to will to be oneself (despair in weakness), and in despair to will to be oneself (defiance) (13 [127]). Within the qualification 'before God' only the last two come under consideration and through these two forms the phenomenon of sin gets to be determined:

> Sin is: *before God, or with the conception of God, in despair not to will to be oneself, or in despair to will to be oneself*. Thus sin is intensified weakness or intensified defiance: sin is the intensification of despair. (77 [189])

Thus, sin as despair is a form of being conscious of having a self. It is an intensification of one's self, an intensified despair, in which will plays a role. At the same time, however, also the situation where despair has been overcome has an element of willing to be oneself.

> The formula that describes the state of the self when despair is completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it. (14 [128])

From the foregoing, two questions arise: first, where lies the difference between the willing in which one despairs and the willing in which despair can be overcome, and, second, what is the significance of this "tiny little transition"?

Kierkegaard analyzes the two forms of conscious despair (in despair not to will to be oneself and in despair to will to be oneself) as forms which both lead to a will to get rid of oneself. Importantly, being in despair in willing to be oneself is described as the will to create oneself, to master oneself. The problem with the willing to be oneself which is tangled up with despair is that "it is unwilling to begin with losing itself but wills to be itself" (67 [179]). In addition, Kierkegaard states:

> In other words, he wants to begin a little earlier than do other men, not at and with the beginning, but "in the beginning"; he does not want to put on his own self, does not want to see his given self as his task—he himself wants to compose his self by means of being the infinite form. (68 [179])

From what has been brought out in connection with the form of despair in which one wills to be oneself, it becomes clearer what Kierkegaard has in mind when talking about the will to be oneself in overcoming despair. What is needed in the latter case is to see one's

established self as the task "at and with the beginning." In addition, within the consideration of sin as ignorance Kierkegaard states: "no man of himself and by himself can declare what sin is, precisely because he is in sin" (95 [205-206]). From the Christian point of view, "sin is indeed ignorance: it is ignorance of what sin is" (96 [207]). Thus, what is needed to gain is oneself as one already is, as one is established. For Kierkegaard, standing before God is needed for that: "man has to learn what sin is by a revelation from God" (95 [206]).

By analyzing the phenomenon of sin within the opposition between the Christian version of 'sin is ignorance' and the Greek conception of 'sin is ignorance,' Kierkegaard shows that for the individual person there is no simple transition from understanding what is right to doing what is right. Rather, in actuality there lies a possibility of not understanding because not willing to understand and a possibility of understanding with the lack of will to act based on one's understanding. In Christianity "sin is not a matter of a person not having understood what is right but of his being unwilling to understand it, of his not willing what is right" (95 [206]). Thus, sin is not a consequence of not understanding. Rather, Kierkegaard holds fast to the claim that to understand and to understand are two different things (90 [202]).[153] Within understanding an understanding is to be found and for that a specific kind of entrance is needed in order not to go astray. The "tiny little transition" called will is an attestation to both of these possibilities being open within understanding.

5.6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course on Augustine

The fact that Kierkegaard plays a role for Heidegger's analysis of Augustine has not gone unnoticed by researchers of Heidegger.[154] What I want to draw attention to are the remarkable structural similarities between Heidegger's explication of Augustine and Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*, a treatise whose influence on Heidegger on the basis of his *Sein und Zeit* was still a matter of uncertainty.[155] My claim is that the so-called

[153] Within the aim to further the Christian definition through Socrates, Kierkegaard says: "[i]nstead of going beyond Socrates, it is extremely urgent that we come back to this Socratic principle—to understand and to understand are two things—not as a conclusion that ultimately assists men in their deepest misery, since that annuls precisely the difference between understanding and understanding, but as the ethical conception of everyday life." (92 [203])

[154] See for instance: Janko Lozar 2014, John D. Caputo 2010: 247, Gregory P. Floyed 2016.

[155] In this respect Dan Magurshak (1987), who offers a compelling account of the possible influence of *The Sickness unto Death* on Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, was at the time of writing his article unable to assert the fact that Heidegger explicitly referred to this treatise by Kierkegaard. Furthermore, Magurshak (op.cit.: 237) also suggests that Kierkegaard's influence wanes in the second part of *The Sickness unto Death*. The look into

loose page entitled "Sin" enables us to see that Heidegger dealt extensively with the second part of Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*. Furthermore, it enables us to establish the significance of each marginal reference in which Heidegger has pointed to Kierkegaard throughout his lecture course and the other way around: each reference in turn helps to establish Kierkegaard's role. Since it must be taken into account that Augustine can be considered a common source for both Heidegger and Kierkegaard, this is important: it is relevant to notice that Heidegger concretely refers to Kierkegaard during his deliberation. As comes out, Kierkegaard is present in every step of Heidegger's explication of Augustine.

At first sight, Heidegger and Kierkegaard address different questions in their respective treatises. Kierkegaard asks how to become a Christian, whereas Heidegger is interested in the possibility of philosophy. However, insofar as Heidegger addresses philosophy as accounting for the possibility of gaining access to factical life in and through factical life as well as accounting for the possibility of losing this access, and Kierkegaard regards the problem of becoming a Christian as gaining a proper relation to oneself by overcoming despair (understood as a mis-relation to oneself), the two already come very close to each other. They both take up the path of finding a proper relation to oneself. The fact that Heidegger has referred to Kierkegaard with respect to the aim of accounting for access in the living situation I have shown already in the previous part. Here, I will point to concrete similarities, which reaffirm that for Heidegger Kierkegaard has something to offer with respect to accessing factical life in and through factical life experience.

As was shown, what is first of all significant for Heidegger in his analysis of Augustine is the question of the motivational ground for confessing. He points to the difference between confessing before God and confessing before other human beings and claims that there is a difference in the relational sense observable in these two approaches. As was also shown, Kierkegaard in *The Sickness unto Death* analyzes the same distinction. By thematizing the claim that 'sin is ignorance' he separates Greek and Christian understanding with respect to their different ways of relating: a knowing relation between human beings and standing alone in front of God. The qualification 'before God' becomes decisive for the task, since it leads to the recognition that to understand and to understand

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Heidegger's lecture course on Augustine allows us to claim that this is not the case. Rather, the second part of *The Sickness unto Death* is of the utmost significance to Heidegger.

are two different things. That this gained Heidegger's attention is proved by the fact that Heidegger makes his first reference to Kierkegaard in this context.

Further, by unfolding Augustine's thematization of memory Heidegger makes a claim that when considered from the relational sense (the "how" of relating), one always has oneself in one or another way (including having as having lost). Furthermore, he claims that what makes up one's concern for facticity is the search itself: that towards which one is directed in the search. Kierkegaard asks how to become oneself in terms of how to become a Christian. He states that everyone who has not become a Christian is in despair, because he "cannot rid himself of the relation to himself" (SuD: 17 [130]), or, let us say, since one always already has oneself in one or another way. The way one has oneself depends first of all on what one is directed towards. Or, as is seen from the quotation which Heidegger (GA 60: 185 [248]) has taken from Kierkegaard: "[t]he criterion for the self is always: that directly before which it is a self, but that in turn is the definition of 'criterion'" (SuD: 79 [191]). In this way, both acknowledge the possibility of relating in a way which is not in accordance with oneself and aim at establishing the authentic relation to oneself.

Thus, through Augustine's thematization of temptation, Heidegger initially articulates three forms of relating (as three directions of concern, each with its own delight) in which one has oneself in one way or another and yet is closed off from oneself. As such, these forms of relating constitute the possibilities for alienation in and through factical life itself. The same argumentation is found in Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*. In his analysis, Kierkegaard identifies three forms of despair which are not only notably similar to the ones found in Heidegger's study, but also, seen as forms of despair (mis-relation), they all represent possibilities of losing the authentic relation to oneself. Furthermore, for both of them, willing becomes decisive in achieving authentic access. The fact that this motive in Kierkegaard has caught Heidegger's eye can be seen from the only clearly marked quotation on the loose page entitled "Sin": "[t]herefore, interpreted Christianly, sin has its roots in willing, not in knowing, and this corruption of willing embraces the individual's consciousness" (GA 60: 199 [265]; SuD: 95 [206]).

Lastly, in addition to the modes of accessing, which close off the authentic relation, Heidegger articulates a mode of relating to oneself as a gift of God. What separates this relation from the previous form, in which one wishes to have oneself, is that in this wish one is not allowing oneself to be discovered (by truth). Having oneself as a gift of God signifies that one allows oneself to be discovered (by truth) as one is. In the latter mode of

actualizing the relation, what is had is oneself in all of one's relation. The manner of arriving at this actualization is articulated as overcoming, as more and more. Similarly, Kierkegaard arrives at the manner of proper relation to oneself, of being a Christian, through the analysis of mis-relations. What separates the proper relation from a form of being in despair in which one wills to be oneself is that in this will one is not allowing oneself to be revealed to oneself as one is (in sin). Overcoming despair signifies that one allows oneself to be revealed as a task "at and with the beginning," as one is established. In this way, Kierkegaard develops the path towards becoming oneself as an overcoming of despair, which unfolds as intensification. Again, Heidegger's interest in this aspect of Kierkegaard's consideration is supported by a reference: "[t]he greater the conception of God, the more self there is; the more self, the greater the conception of God" (GA 60: 185 [248]; SuD: 80 [192]).

All in all, when we look at Heidegger's consideration with an eye on the central problems in his unfolding of philosophy (the motivational ground, the necessity, and the possibility of philosophy) in and through factical life, I conclude that Kierkegaard is constantly by his side. Taking into account Heidegger's own admission of departing from Augustine in his problematization and considering Heidegger's closeness to Kierkegaard in his explanation, I suggest that the latter not only accompanies and supports Heidegger in his deliberation, but also extensively influences him. At the same time, it must be admitted that Heidegger strikes out on his own path and Kierkegaard comes into play in a specific place. That is, in the consideration of the possibility of philosophy in the living situation: when Heidegger aims to unfold philosophy in and through factical life.

5.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have focused on Heidegger's lecture course on Augustine. My aim in doing so was twofold. As I have claimed previously, Heidegger aims to establish philosophy in two directions: he not only aims to account for factical life in and through itself, but endeavors to clarify it philosophically, that is, to explicate the actualization which Augustine as well as Kierkegaard have achieved. In this respect, my objective was to show that both Augustine and Kierkegaard become significant for Heidegger with respect to the problem of gaining access to factical life in and through itself. This claim was upheld by showing that in his analysis of Augustine, Heidegger concentrated on Augustine's path as concrete actualizational consideration with the aim of explicating it (bringing it into

conceptual clarity). With respect to Kierkegaard, the claim was supported by showing that Kierkegaard is considered by Heidegger within his analysis of Augustine's concrete path of actualization. Furthermore, by focusing on Kierkegaard's concrete input in Heidegger's analysis of Augustine, the second aim was addressed. It was shown through the analysis of Kierkegaard's presence in this lecture course that Heidegger leans heavily on Kierkegaard when building up his own account. Kierkegaard is seen to be present in each step of addressing the problem of philosophy in and through factical life: its motivational ground, possibility and necessity.

6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course "Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research"

6.1. Introduction

After his religious courses Heidegger turns to Aristotle. His turn to Aristotle in the summer semester of 1921 is initiated with the seminar entitled *Phenomenological Practicum for Beginners in Conjunction with Aristotle's De Anima* [*Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluß an Aristotle, de anima*] and continued with several lectures and seminars.[156] In this move towards Aristotle (an interest which is to be continued after the first Freiburg period throughout the years to come), some researchers of Heidegger see a kind of a new beginning, a real turn towards the path which leads to *Sein und Zeit*.[157] At the center of this view is the fact that Heidegger proceeds more radically than before towards the historical character of understanding as well as towards the articulation of philosophy in terms of ontology. The fact that Heidegger indeed does so will be seen during the course of this chapter, in which I will focus on Heidegger's lecture course entitled *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* [*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 61], held in the winter semester of 1921-1922.

As I aim to show, in this lecture course Heidegger again explicitly addresses the problem of philosophy and develops his account of philosophy in two directions. In my reading of this lecture course, he first focuses on the definition of philosophy and proposes the path which philosophical investigation must take. After that, he considers philosophy in and through factical life, in which his analysis of factical life can be seen to address the problems of necessity, possibility, and the motivational ground of philosophy. Inasmuch as

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[156] During his first Freiburg period Heidegger gives two lecture courses dedicated to Aristotle: *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* [*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*] (WS 1921–22, GA 61) and *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*] ('*Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle: Ontology and Logic*,' SS 1922, GA 62). In addition, he hold four seminars on Aristotle and puts together an essay with the same title as the lecture course from the 1921–1922 winter semester: "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation" ["Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)" (1922, in GA 62)].

[157] For example Fredrik Westerlund (2014: 121) says: "[i]t is now that Heidegger becomes *the Heidegger* that has exercised such a strong influence on the subsequent development of philosophy and that has functioned as the primal point of focus for later interpretations of his thinking." Similarly, Theodore Kisiel (1995: 223) insists that the years between 1921 and 1924 are a new phase of development towards *Sein und Zeit.*

these problems are at the center of the consideration of philosophy in and through factical life, the lecture course is similar to the lecture course on Augustine. And yet, the resolution is distinct in many aspects. For one thing, in the presently viewed lecture course, Heidegger distances himself from the religious slant on the motivational ground apparent in his lecture on Augustine. As he insists: "philosophy *itself* is, as such, atheistic, if it understands itself radically" (149 [199]). The possibility of philosophy is firmly brought into factical life itself through the introduction of a number of new categories.

With respect to Kierkegaard's place in the lecture course, I aim to show that Heidegger again turns to Kierkegaard in his consideration of the problematic of philosophy in and through factical life. In the light of Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard, the latter's presence in this lecture course is not overly explicit. He mentions Kierkegaard only on two occasions. Nevertheless, in my opinion, through these references Kierkegaard's presence becomes forcefully apparent.

In order to exhibit that Heidegger develops philosophy in two directions and which place Kierkegaard occupies on Heidegger's path, I have divided the chapter into six sections. In the second section I give an overview of the aims and problems Heidegger proposes for the lecture course as well as account for his manner of addressing the proposed problematic. I suggest the need to consider the structural layout slightly differently from that presented by the editors of the lecture course. In the third section I outline Heidegger's account of philosophy in two directions: first I set out his account for the definition of philosophy at the level of principle, and then I exhibit how he unfolds philosophy categorically in and through factical life. After that, I turn to Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's lecture course. First I bring out Heidegger's explicit references to Kierkegaard. With the claim that Heidegger in this lecture course draws on Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*, I then make an excursion to this treatise in the fifth section of this chapter. Thereafter, in the sixth section, I consider Kierkegaard's significance for Heidegger's lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*. As always, I sum up the chapter with some conclusive remarks in the last section of the chapter.

6.2. The problem situation and the structure of the lecture course

The lecture course on Aristotle is opened with the statement "[w]e call research into a past philosophy – e.g., Aristotle's – a study in the history of philosophy" (3 [1]). As can be presumed from Heidegger's repeated manner of entering a subject, this statement will be

turned into a problem. That is, the wider problem which Heidegger starts to unfold is philosophy in its connection with history.

The point of departure of the concrete problematic as well as the explicit question through which Heidegger addresses the above-given problem sphere is once again the question; 'what is philosophy?' (11 [12]). The need to question philosophy is first of all motivated from the (muddiness of the) current situation of philosophy. As Heidegger states in the middle of the lecture course: "what we understand today of the sense of philosophy, i.e., how we comport ourselves in philosophy, is a matter of unclarities, conveniences, unverifiable traditions, and preferences of taste" (31 [39]). In addition, the need to reconsider philosophy rests on the claim of the historical character of philosophy. According to Heidegger, history [*die Geschichte*] is always present in philosophy and one is always in relation to history in a living way (4 [3]). Insofar as philosophy is both historical and directed towards history of philosophy, there lies a task to explicate this mode of relating. On the basis of these two claims, the starting point of the wider problematics is placed in the way that "today," that is, traditionally or in the current spiritual situation, history of philosophy is approached.

According to Heidegger, "[today] philosophy is preconceptually determined, in regard to its content, as part of Objective [*objectiv*] history, as having Objective and Object-like relations and properties" (3 [1]). Thus, the described approach will be marked by Heidegger in this lecture course as historiology [*die Historie*]. To understand what historiology means as well as what it means to be foreconceptually determined is a part of the task of the lecture, for as Heidegger states: "[t]he historiological aspect of philosophy is visible only in the very act of philosophizing. It is graspable only as existence and is accessible only out of purely factical life and, accordingly, with and through history" (3 [1]). As such, Heidegger places the research into factical life at the center of his search. This is also the way the lecture course has been mainly interpreted in the secondary literature.[158] There is a good reason for that, since the subject matter receives much attention in the lecture course. Nevertheless, I would stress that his consideration of philosophy in and through factical life is preceded by the problem of the definition of philosophy through which the manner of proceeding with philosophical investigation is

[158] That the lecture course predominantly revolves around factical life and is addressed as such is brought out by Richard Rojcewicz (2009: xiii). That it has been approached as such is shown for example by Scott M. Campbell (2012).

unfolded. That this is the case, in my opinion, becomes clear from the structure of the lecture course, which is led by the question 'what is philosophy?'.[159]

That is, by focusing on Heidegger's explicitly addressed question (what is philosophy?), he is seen to analyze the problem of philosophy in concrete steps. Specifically, on the basis of the claim that traditional philosophy has gone astray, Heidegger first outlines the erroneous approaches of the treatment of the question 'what is philosophy?' found in the tradition and subjects these to the method of destruction, in which he aims at the positive tendencies found in them. More concretely, he outlines four sorts of errors gathered into two types: overestimation and underestimation. After that, he can be seen to build up his own account on the basis of the positive tendencies found in each erroneous approach.

In my opinion, it is important to notice this structural layout of the lecture course for two reasons. First, because it enables us to see that in his consideration of factical life in the final part of his lecture course Heidegger is still addressing the question of 'what is philosophy?' and that he is doing this from a specific angle. That is, he considers philosophy in and through factical life. Secondly, it is significant because on the basis of the structure of the lecture course Heidegger's articulation of philosophy can be seen to be divided in two parts. Initially, he aims to find a solid foundation for defining philosophy and only then turns to philosophy on the basis of a lived situation. As will be shown, philosophy will be determined in two ways here: as phenomenological ontology and as repetition. Heidegger aims to bring together the two directions of asking about philosophy. In this way, he insists that the methodological part must never be fixed, but taken up ever anew on the basis of the concrete (11 [11]) and, at the same time, points to the need to establish the definition "before all else" on the basis of which the concrete can be then established (13 [15]). Thus, he clearly aims to bring out the mutual dependence of the two aspects by placing them in a circle. And yet, in this very aim the two tasks depart from each other. Furthermore, already before going into the erroneous ways of approaching philosophy, Heidegger makes the distinction felt by saying that both in overestimation and underestimation there reside genuine intentions, which lie in stressing the necessity for

[159] I suggest that the lecture course is structured by Heidegger slightly differently than proposed by the editors of the lecture course. I would contend that, content-wise, Heidegger addresses the erroneous approaches one by one, referring each time back to the previous consideration. Thus, Ch.1.A.a. is addressed in Ch.2.A, Ch.1.A.b. is addressed in Ch.2.B, Ch.1.B.a. is addressed in Ch.2.C, and Ch.1.B.b. is addressed in Part III. The significance of this structure lies in the the fact that Heidegger's unfolding of factical life, which is presented as a separate part (Part III), is a continuation of the initial problem ('what is philosophy?').

philosophy to take its orientation from a principle and in stressing the necessity of actually concrete philosophizing (14 [15-16]). How these two aspects are brought forth is the theme of the next section.

6.3. The path of unfolding philosophy in the lecture course on Aristotle

As I read it, Heidegger unfolds the problematic of his lecture course by initially considering mistaken treatments of the question 'what is philosophy?' and carrying out the definition of it, and then, by drawing on the positive tendencies found in the erroneous approaches, gives his own positive account. Setting out his own positive account, he first focuses on the definition of philosophy and addresses what he has marked as the two erroneous approaches which lead to overestimation. After that, he turns to the actualization of philosophy. With respect to the erroneous approaches of the tradition, the latter consideration addresses the ways which lead to underestimation. In what follows, I will bring out how Heidegger analyzes both of these directions in two subsections. My aim is to lay bare Heidegger's account in order to establish where Kierkegaard gains significance for him.

6.3.1. Definition of philosophy

According to Heidegger, the question 'what is philosophy?' and the task of definition have been overestimated in two ways. In the first erroneous approach which leads to overestimation of the question and its resolution (acceptance of the uncritical idea of definition), he finds the positive tendency that every object has its mode of genuinely being possessed, where in every mode of possession the object is under discussion. The task of definition is to claim the object in speech and to bring it into possession from its genuine mode of being under discussion. As he states, at first the importance lies in drawing the "logic of the grasp of the object, and the conceptuality of the object in the respective definitory determination" out of "the mode *in which the object is originally accessible*" (17 [20]). Shortly, the task is first to bring out the foreconception [*Vorgriff*].[160] This task is addressed through analysis of the turn of speech [*Sprachgebrauch*].

Bringing out the foreconception means bringing out the basic relation of how something is grasped and brought into language in advance in the everyday way of speaking about it. That is, the object and the relation to it are to be searched in our own

[160] Note: translated also as 'preconception.'

concrete situation of grasping and speaking of something. In the case of philosophy it means turning towards the understanding of philosophy as it unfolds in the everyday manner of speaking about it. In order to bring out the foreconception and to clarify the tendency of understanding in which it is lived currently, as well as to point to the more original way of understanding philosophy, Heidegger contrasts the foreconception found in his surroundings with that of the foreconception found in ancient Greek (more precisely, he turns to Plato) on the basis of the expression "philosophizing."[161] He claims that philosophizing, rather than having a meaning of "to busy oneself with philosophy," should be taken as to "poetize" [*musizieren*][162] (36 [47-48]). For this claim he finds "historical grounding" in Plato.

According to Heidegger, words as they were used in Plato's context were more accessible and not as strict and objectified as in the current situation (37 [49]). Furthermore, he claims that "concepts were specifically tailored to *factical life*" (ibid.). Thus, referring back to Plato, Heidegger states that philosophy is to be seen as pointing to certain connotations: to being [*Sein*] as such, appropriating being as being (according to its being), as a manner of actualizing one's life, and lastly to considering philosophy, not as a technique, but as a mode of self-comportment [*Sichverhalten*] (37-38 [49-50]). On the basis of what has been said and by focusing on the last-mentioned aspect, Heidegger then insists that when compared to ancient Greek, what emerges about contemporary philosophy is that in the latter the comportment [*Verhalten*] and that to which one comports are separated (through objectification). This is what the turn of speech points to, and according to Heidegger this is the movement which is to be reversed for a proper understanding of philosophy.

> The comportment to … is authentic precisely if it is originally and only comportment, and that means, in today's way of speaking, if it is an indication that the genuinely appropriate comportment to … arises out of an independent comportment as pure actualization and that this actualization in turn has weight precisely for the explication of the content of that to which philosophizing comports itself as its object. (39 [52])

[161] With the discussion about the accustomed way of speaking about philosophy, Heidegger turns to familiar distinctions from his previous lecture courses, that is, discussion about worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy, where the latter again is traced back to the former. Differently from his previous ways of dismantling philosophy as a worldview, he now approaches the theme in the context of foreconception, i.e. on the basis of the expression "philosophizing." However, taking leave of the customary understanding that one can "teach and learn" only philosophizing and not philosophy, Heidegger repeats the claim that philosophizing in this sense is a formation of worldview (33-36 [43-47]).

[162] In this example I follow the change of wording by the translator Richard Rojcewicz (GA 61: 36, n.8), who has explained the adjustment with reference to the lack of the word "musicize" [Ger. *musizieren*] in English.

This genuine understanding, which according to Heidegger was self-evident to the Greek way of thinking, will now be taken up by him in order to give a definition of philosophy. He determines philosophy as follows: "*cognitive comportment to beings in terms of Being*" [*erkennendes Verhalten zu Seiendem als Sein*] (44 [58]). As such, philosophy is radical ontology – phenomenological ontology or ontological phenomenology (46 [60]). This determination is established by Heidegger through two steps. Armed with what has been shown through the turn of speech, he first explicates philosophy/philosophizing through the sense directions. It still holds true that everything can be taken into phenomenon: about everything it is possible to ask in different directions of sense (in this lecture, the fourth direction is added)[163]. Secondly, drawing additionally on the positive tendency found in the second case of erroneous approach which leads to overestimation, he articulates philosophy at the level of principle.

In his analysis of philosophizing through sense directions Heidegger points out that 'comportment in itself' carries a relation to something. This means that it is graspable in its sense of relation. Philosophizing as comportment (the relation of philosophizing) explicated in its sense of relation is determined as 'cognitive comportment' [*erkennendes Verhalten*]. Here, cognition is determined as "grasping of the object 'as' object and so is a determining of the object by way of grasping it," whereby "[t]he grasping determination 'says' that, what, and how the object is" (41 [54]). In this way, Heidegger repeats his conviction that the mode of accessing the object determines the object. Thus, it is important that the mode of accessing in philosophy must "co-respond" to its object properly (ibid). Heidegger insists that "[t]he relation holds on to something as a being […]" (ibid). That is, the sense of content (translated by Rojcewicz as the sense of holding, *Gehaltsinn*) to which the relation holds on to is a being: its something (as content) is a being [*Seienden*]. A being is determined as object in its "what" and "how" out of the full sense of phenomenon (40, 41 [53, 54]).

Now, although philosophizing is determined with respect to its relational sense as cognitive comportment, not every cognitive comportment is philosophizing nor suitable for philosophy in Heidegger's view. Sciences are also nexuses of actualization of cognitive comportment. The difference is that sciences relate to their own nexus of beings, which

[163] The fourth sense direction Heidegger adds in this lecture course is the sense of maturation [*Zeitigungssinn*]. With respect to the sense of actualization [*Vollzugssinn*] the comportment is to be seen as it takes place or actualizes with respect to the manner of taking place. The sense of maturation says how actualization temporalizes. That is, phenomenon can be determined in the way "the actualization becomes actualization, in and for its situation" (40 [53]).

determines a region of a specific science. That philosophy cannot do. Moreover, Heidegger seems to accuse sciences of being limited to 'comportment to…,' which is cut off from the 'comportment as such.' Insofar as according to Heidegger "the genuinely appropriate comportment to… arises out of an independent comportment as pure actualization" (39 [52]), he thus condemns the scientific approach to scientific objects for ending up in arbitrariness. For Heidegger, sciences take their method from somewhere outside and thus become a question of taste (42 [55-56]). The question how to avoid this in philosophy requires turning towards the positive tendency of the second erroneous approach which led to overestimation.

In order to avoid falling into arbitrariness, philosophy must turn to the principle [*Prinzip*]: "[p]hilosophy is to be determined at the level of principle; such a definition would involve a precedent exposition of what the main issue is, what really matters, so that we might then be able to direct a radical questioning at this issue" (42-43 [56]). Philosophy does not have a *region*, it is not a specific science, but a "basic science" [*"Grundwissenschaft"*], as Heidegger says (43 [57]). It is cognitive comportment at the level of principle.

> Philosophy is the cognitive comportment of something that has subsistence in itself and that can come into consideration for something else only as *principle*. (43 [57])

Principle, thus, is exactly not a being, but a principle. Philosophy grasps something at the level of principle and the determinative grasp of philosophy must then also be one of principle. What is this principle? Principle must be such that it is the ultimate issue for the beings from the beings. The principle is being [*Sein*] or, as Heidegger points out, with respect to the mode it is graspable, the sense of being (44 [58]).

All in all, Heidegger's argumentation unfolds as follows. Philosophizing according to its sense of relation is cognitive comportment. That towards which it holds is (investigated as what it is in its "what" and "how") a being. Thus, philosophy is cognitive comportment towards beings and it is this at the level of principle. At the level of principle, that towards which a being comports itself has to be a principle for such a being itself: "[t]he object of the definition is itself a comportment to…, the principle in it is the 'towards which' of the comportment, the sense of Being" (45 [59]). This principle is to be taken exactly as a principle and not as an object or a being itself. It should never be forgotten that being is not a thing. From what has been said, it follows: "[t]he object of the definition of philosophy is therefore determined as follows: *cognitive comportment to beings in terms of Being*" (44 [58]).

It is important to keep in mind that so far the fundamental objectivity of philosophy, factical life, is not concretely brought forth. Heidegger is here still dealing with the task of determining 'what is philosophy?' and how to define it. Everything that is said should be rather seen as tasks on the path of determining philosophy (determining its proper objectivity and how this objectivity should be grasped). Therefore, when Heidegger articulates the sense-directions in the context of philosophizing as comportment, these directions indicate what must be taken into consideration on this path. Similarly, it should be noticed that by Heidegger's own account the previously given definition of philosophy is formally indicative (46 [60]). It is not yet a full determination of philosophy insofar as it is formally empty. At the same time, the given definition functions in the manner of giving directions. In this sense Heidegger further insists that the object of the definition is not the object of philosophy. Rather, "[t]he proper possessing of comportment *qua* comportment, however, is a mode of its actualization" (45 [60]). With these statements Heidegger turns to the consideration of philosophy in and through factical life. In doing so, he addresses the two erroneous approaches leading to underestimation (the decision in favor of "concrete work" and the claim that philosophy can only be lived) through the positive tendencies of which he makes a claim, first, for the need of the definition of philosophy to hold on to the reference to the concrete and, secondly, for the need to bring philosophy alive.

6.3.2. Actualization and maturation of philosophy

With the statement that the proper mode of possessing comportment is a mode of actualization, Heidegger takes up the analysis of the modes of actualizing philosophy. Asking about a concrete situation in which philosophy is actualized, he points to the university as the nexus in which philosophy is alive. After all, philosophy is being done – it is and is 'alive' – in the universities (48 [63-64]). Through his consideration of the appropriateness of taking the university as a proper point of access – more concretely through two possible objections to this consideration – he makes two important claims. First, he claims that philosophy is in a decadent situation (58 [77]). That is, the current situation is in decline [*der Abfall*]. Secondly, he claims that the university as life nexus is a "part of our own factically historical life" (58 [78]). In this way, he posits the need to turn towards factical life, so that the necessity of taking up the problem of philosophy in and through factical life is brought into the current situation, which is claimed to be in decline.

His task can therefore be seen as that of reversing the decline of philosophy. In my opinion, this is Heidegger's main aim in his following analysis of factical life.

According to my reading of the lecture course, Heidegger thus turns to the question of how factical life is accessible in and through factical life itself, in which the analysis of factical life aims at addressing both the possibility of the decline and the possibility of overcoming the decline. This aim is taken up through a categorial[164] explication starting with the notion of 'life' and its basic categories (or the basic characters as they are known from his earlier lecture courses). In this lecture course many new categories are introduced, some of which will be quickly abandoned and never used again. In what follows, I will outline these categories in order to lay bare Heidegger's account of the possibility of philosophy in and through factical life in this lecture course. When explicating Augustine, Heidegger found this possibility in the search for God. The question is how Heidegger considers this possibility in his lecture course on Aristotle. As I read it, Heidegger unfolds his account in three steps. After arguing for life as worldly, historical and meaningful, he turns to the categories of relationality of life and movement. Through these categories he can be seen to address the question of the possibility of decline in and through factical life as well as open the way to the possibility of authentic access. How exactly authentic access in the situation of decline comes about is unfolded through the thematization of ruinance, in the third step of the analysis.

Thus, Heidegger begins by establishing that to which the access is searched for in terms of life as worldly, historical and meaningful. Taking his point of departure in factical life with the term 'life,' he first states that the term 'life' is vague and ambiguous today. According to him, this vagueness of life, which is exhibited through the intransitive and transitive sense of the verb 'to live,' is a trait of life itself and should be taken as such, because in life itself resides the possibility to take hold of life in its ambiguity. Secondly, Heidegger claims that the term 'life' radically expresses the temporality and historicality inherent in life itself through three senses. First of all, 'life' has the meaning of "unity of

[164] According to Heidegger, the following basic senses (world, caring, etc.), are to be understood as categories [*Kategorien*]. For categories, Heidegger gives the following determination: "[i]n this context, the term 'category' refers to something which, according to its sense, interprets a phenomenon in a direction of sense, in a determinate way, at the level of principle, and brings the phenomenon to intelligibility as the interpretatum" (65 [86]). According to Heidegger, categories are not something laid upon life from outside, but rather they are alive in life itself. He insists that all the categorial nexuses are alive in genuinely concrete life as opposed to being trivial observations. He also asserts that the interpretation of the categories must take the entirety of life and the full sense into account, and that categorial interpretation must be repeated (65-67 [86-89]). Furthermore, according to Heidegger, they are "understood only insofar as life is compelled to interpretation" (66 [87]).

succession and maturation" as unity of extension over the totality of life. In addition, "life" is brought out as a "delimited unity of succession." In this case, 'life' is what bears possibilities and is itself a possibility. The last sense of the notion of 'life' Heidegger calls 'fate' [*Schicksal*]. With 'fate' the two previous senses are said to be intertwined, thus giving 'life' a sense of the unity of extension in possibility and of possibility taken as a reality (64 [84–85]).[165] Life is radically temporal and historical and the term 'life' as unfolded above expresses just that.

In addition, Heidegger stresses that in the expression 'to live' the world is simultaneously encountered, and the other way around: in the expression 'world' we are simultaneously talking about 'life'. World is brought into life as that something "in," "out of," "for," "with," "against," "following," "from" which life lives (65 [85]). To live means to live in the world. Life and world go together, and not as two things standing next to each other. Rather, they are to be seen as sense directions of a phenomenon through which the full sense of a phenomenon is to be interpreted. In this respect, as in Heidegger's previous lecture courses, world is the basic category of the content-sense in the phenomenon life (65 [86]). World is the corresponding content for life understood in its relational sense (65 [85]). With the category of relation – caring [*Sorgen*] – life and world are brought together even more closely. Caring is "*the* basic relational sense of life in itself" (67 [89]). It is the relational sense according to which living is to be interpreted. As Heidegger puts it: "here, as everywhere, 'to live' means to care" (68 [90]). Furthermore, it means to relate through meaning.

> What we care for and about, what caring adheres to, is equivalent to what is meaningful. *Meaningfulness* is a categorial determination of the world; the objects of the world, worldly, world-some objects, are lived inasmuch as they embody the character of meaningfulness. (68 [90])

This means that everything encountered in life – the something which is encountered – is always meaningful as something. Heidegger also says that the categorial sense of meaningfulness needs to be taken in two ways: it needs to be taken as a categorial character of objects and in a "broad way" (68 [90]). As a categorial character of objects the character of meaningfulness points to the way objects are there in the lived world. World and worldly objects are present in the act of caring in which they are encountered. This means that the basic mode of objects is not to be taken as some kind of naked pure realities, but rather

[165] Heidegger brings these senses together by saying: "[t]hese three senses of the noun contain the following structural indications, which are connected together categorially: the characters of extension, unity of succession, and manifold actualization; the articulation as possibility, delivered over to possibility, developing possibility; furthermore, as reality, power in its opacity, fate" (64 [84–85]).

through their character as encountered things. Considered in the broader sense the character of meaningfulness is explicated by Heidegger as something which life has a need for, or rather, care is in search of. In this respect, the basic mode of life is articulated as a lack,[166] to which Heidegger opposes full possession found in objectivity (ibid.). In this way, he repeats the same motif present throughout his lecture courses: that meaningfulness itself is not mostly the "object" of care, not explicitly experienced, but it can be experienced. Furthermore, it can be lived, where living in meaningfulness refers to authentic actualization of factical life, that is, according to itself (70 [93]).[167] This leads to the following step of Heidegger's consideration.

According to my reading, what becomes the question now for Heidegger is how life as worldly, historical and meaningful becomes accessible from out of itself. After all, he has already insisted that in (the vagueness and ambiguity of) life itself, there is a possibility to get hold of itself as well as a motivation to do that insofar as the basic mode of life is claimed to be lack. At the same time, however, he is committed to the claim that the current situation is in decline. In this respect, addressing the possibility of authentic access must go through the possibility of losing this access. How this is the case is explained by Heidegger through the analysis of the categories of relationality of life [*Bezugssinn des Lebens*] and the categories of movement [*Bewegung*]: the categories in which resides the novelty of this lecture course. Here, it must be noticed that in what follows, Heidegger is simultaneously talking about temporality. It is about maturation [*Zeitigung*] of the actualization. Thus, he insists that he considers the modes of movedness [*Bewegtheit*] to be constituted by time. Time makes the movedness possible and is the factical movedness. Furthermore, time makes possible the historiological approach, regarded as ruinant life which "has no time" (103-104 [138-140]). Aiming to express movement as intrinsic to life, Heidegger thus first introduces four categories of the relationality of life – inclination, distance, sequestration (blocking off), and the easy. Each of these must go through the previous one and they are then to be seen as concrete expressions of life's movement intrinsic to caring.

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[166] With the reference to lack Heidegger considers meaningfulness in the broader sense by declaring: "[i]n its broadest relational sense, to live is to care about one's 'daily bread'" (68 [90]). This, according to Heidegger, must be understood very generally, as a formal indication: "*'Privation'* (*privation, carentia*) is both the relational and the intrinsic basic mode and sense of the Being of life" (68 [90]).

[167] Heidegger states: "[m]eaningfulness becomes explicit in the proper interpretation of life with respect to itself, and thence we can first fully understand what it 'is' and means to live factically 'in' meaningfulness. The abbreviated expression, 'to live in meaningfulness,' means to live in, out of, and from objects whose content is of categorial character of the meaningful." (70 [93])

Inclination [*Neigung*] (75-77 [100-102]) is characterized as giving life weight, which pulls towards something. It is actualized (that is, caring is carried out) as proclivity, which is said to impel life into its world. It is a direction of gravity in and from life which pulls life towards its world and does so constantly through a new kind of weight. That is, it pulls to the manifold of meaningfulness which encountered things may have and which in their changeable overwhelmingness take hold of life and thereby carry life. As Heidegger puts it, life gets to the mode of being transported or taken along by the world (ibid.). As such, life is thrown into dispersion, which leads to a further character – distance [*Abstand*] (77-78 [102-105]). More concretely, life being dispersed into the meaningful things in the world, distance is exactly what is lacking. Distance is not something one sees in life, but rather distance over-sees it, which as such is a source for mis-measuring of life. Life itself seeks to distance itself within meaningful things, feeding the dispersion and becoming thus 'hyperbolic.' By saying that life becomes hyperbolic, Heidegger is referring to life's falling increasingly into the manifold of meaningful things, until the manifold itself becomes the object of care. Insofar as distance refers to lack, the category is also articulated as 'abolition of distance' [*Abstandstilgung*]. In life's identifying itself with the meaningful things, in its lacking distance from the world and the things in the world, having something 'before' [*vor*] oneself is suppressed (ibid.). The category which Heidegger uses to characterize blocking off the possibility of having something 'before' oneself is sequestration [*Abriegelung*] (78-81 [105-108]). Sequestration characterizes the fact that the more fully life lives in its worlds, the more the worldly concerns are increased and the more life has to do with itself. It is the way life in its increasing concern about the world brings into maturation (temporalizes) the actual non-caring about itself. Life, developing ever new possibilities of meaningfulness, increases the possibilities of mistaking. Thus, according to Heidegger, in sequestration, life leaves itself out. Furthermore, by inclining, suppressing distance and sequestrating and in its direction taking, life puts itself on the path towards the 'easy' (ibid.).

The easy [*Leichte*] (81-82 [108-110]) is the category through which Heidegger expresses life's tendency to seek an easy way out. As before, through the claim that life has a tendency to secure itself, Heidegger now points out that life aims to safeguard itself by looking away from itself. This mode of caring is a mode that Heidegger names carefreeness [*Sorglosigkeit*], which has to satisfy itself through constant increase (ibid.). With the claim that the main direction life takes is towards finding an easy way, Heidegger can

simultaneously claim that this mode of concern, carefreeness, becomes hyperbolic and "it is unwilling to be posed *upon* a primal decision and *in* it (repeating it)" (81 [109]). This leads to the question of the possibility of being posed upon a primal decision. More specifically, it leads to the question where in life itself lies the possibility to appropriate the 'before' – that which Heidegger has claimed to get lost and which at the same time needs to be gained in order to grasp oneself in an appropriate measure.[168] From this perspective, the categories of movement are introduced.

According to Heidegger, each category of the relational sense of life named above expresses something of the movement of life. More specifically, each of them expresses the categories of relucence [*Reluzenz*] and prestruction [*Praestruktion*] (87-97 [117-130]). These are the movement of life towards itself through which life is opened to its world (relucent movement) and the movement towards securing forehaving [*Vorhabe*][169] for itself in its world (prestructive movement). Thus, Heidegger first insists that "inclination shows itself as something which moves itself toward itself" (89 [119]). This movement Heidegger names relucence, that is, "*the movement of life toward itself within every encounter*" (ibid.). What inclination indicates is that life offers itself to itself in a worldly way. What life encounters in inclination is life itself. Life "reflects light back to itself" (ibid.). In this way, what life cares about can be claimed to stem from life as care. Furthermore, life can be claimed to have a tendency to secure itself in the forehaving, insofar as life is also said to be prestructive. The prestructive movement, which is at work in inclination too, takes the upper hand in distantiation, where the same movedness of securing the foreconceptions and turning back towards itself are present. However, in distantiation the moving back occurs now in the worldly way, so that the worldly distantiations are formed prestructively and life caringly comes back to itself, this time in the form of worldly distantiation. In short: life builds up distances prestructively, and life turns back to itself with these distances at hand and carries out the actualization of care on this basis. Seen from the categories of movement, the third category of relationality of life, sequestration, has its center in the aim to escape from the life of encounters and to look away. But exactly in this wish for flight,

[168] Appropriating the 'before' means to explicitly possess the distance in the actualization of life: "[t]hat in which I live my life of caring, that toward which I comport myself in care, is something that can stand explicitly 'before' me, taking 'before' in the phenomenological rather than spatial sense. The 'before' means: I comport myself explicitly to something in care, I live explicitly on the basis of something, and, in the 'explicitly before' me, the 'me', the 'I myself' (factically speaking, my own world) is *thereby experienced*. In caring, this 'before' can be set in relief and explicitly appropriated." (79 [105])

[169] Note: translated also as 'pre-possession.'

relucence is claimed to show itself pressingly. Thus, life itself makes itself look away from itself and at the same time pushes in the opposite direction and lets life encounter itself.

> This power of relucence in the movedness of sequestration expresses itself precisely in the fact that in this "away from itself" of life, life itself builds up a "toward itself" and "exists" in and through this structure (in movedness, in its basic sense of Being: facticity), and factical life, as caring, directs itself precisely in this "away from it." (92 [123])

All in all, through these rather complicated categories, Heidegger has expressed how life itself has in itself a possibility to encounter itself. Furthermore, he has grounded the possibility both to lose and to gain authentic access to life's movement. In this way, temporality can be seen to become the constitutive moment of his analysis. Life's movement constitutes the possibilities of encounter. The question how this encounter concretely takes place in the actualization of life leads to the third step of Heidegger's analysis. That is, actualization of access is further explained by Heidegger with the thematization of ruinance [*Ruinanz*] (98-115 [131-155]).[170] Through this notion, Heidegger can be seen to offer his view of the possibility of authentic access in the situation which is considered to be in decline.

Ruinance is formally indicatively determined as follows: "the movedness of factical life which 'actualizes' and 'is' factical life *in* itself, *for* itself, *out of* itself, and, and, in all this, *against* itself" (98 [131]). Heidegger analyzes ruinance by first referring back to the basic category of caring and the categories of movement. He insists that in caring, where the categories of movement are alive, the aim of the care in actualization is care itself. However, the itself which caring aims at may be both not as itself and as itself. In both cases, in the actualization of caring, life encounters itself and in both cases caring is encountered in a worldly way. Caring taken up by care and thus contained in care Heidegger names apprehension [*Besorgnis*] (101 [136]). In apprehension, according to Heidegger, a heightening takes place, because its own movedness is moved by itself. In this way, caring is pulled down by caring itself. The specific character of the movedness in the moment of heightening (intensifying movement) Heidegger names a collapse [*Sturtz*] (ibid.). What happens is heightening of ambiguity and losing the possibility of the 'before' as described through sequestration. In apprehension, life lets itself be transported and commits itself to the world to the extent of being absolutely pulled into the business of happenings. In this heightening, care does not know itself as itself. In apprehension factical

[170] Scott M. Campbell (2012: 83) points out that what Heidegger names "ruinance" in this lecture course is what will become later on known as fallenness.

life covers itself up (101-102 [135-137]). As ruinant, factical life covers itself up. But not only.

Heidegger states that the constitutive character of ruinance is the character of seductiveness (106 [142]). What this character shows is that factical life's "own ontological sense is such that this sense ex-poses it and that the 'collapse' in the Being of factical life ex-poses life at any time to its world" (ibid.). That is, with the character of seducing Heidegger expresses that in the movedness of life, life is seduced to move towards itself. The question is towards what exactly life moves in ruinance. This question is approached by Heidegger in the form of the question: where does collapsing arrive? In a way there is nothing that could receive the collapse, but rather "collapse is purely and simply collapse [*der Sturz ist lediglich und nur Sturz*]" (108 [145]). As such, collapse does not arrive at something foreign to it. Rather, the "whereto" of the collapse is itself of the character of factical life, and as such it is determined as *"the nothingness of factical life"* (108 [145]). The nothingness of factical life is determined formally as follows:

> the nothingness of factical life is life's own proper *non-occurrence of itself in ruinant existence*, a non-occurrence brought to maturation by and for factical life itself, within life and within surrounding world (facticity). (110 [148])

Thus, that at which collapse arrives is oneself as non-occurrence. That is, at oneself as not an occurrence, not something present at hand. Furthermore, the non-occurrence encountered in collapse in this context has a meaning of being set against the historiological non-having of time. At the same time, the 'non-occurrence' of factical life itself does not mean that life does not exist anymore or that it lacks its worldly character. Life is still worldly. However the world is encountered as an enigma. In this way, certainty becomes questionable. Factical life, which has a tendency towards clarification, experiences resistance. In the aggravation of the collapse, nothingness is constantly encountered, and thus in ruinance something is constantly lacking. In this way, resistance is constantly alive in factical life and ruinant movement makes counter-ruinant movement possible. Thus, it can be claimed that the possibility of movement as a counter-movement lies for Heidegger in the movedness of life itself and takes its point of departure from the collapse of nothingness.

Now, the possibility of philosophy is to be seen as this counter-ruinant movement: as lying in the questionability arising from factical life itself. Similarly, through the movedness (relucently towards itself and prestructively securing itself in forehaving), philosophy has its task. As Heidegger says:

> A counter-ruinant movedness is the one of the actualization of philosophical interpretation, and indeed it is actualized in the appropriation of the mode of access to questionability. It is precisely questioning that factical life attains its genuine self-giveness. (113 [153])

Factical life arrives at questionability and has the task of maintaining genuine questioning, which arises and receives direction from factical life. It is the task which must be taken up ever anew to perform the temporal constitution of factical life and which can be taken up due to the temporal constitution. At the same time, taking up the questioning ever again is not without directions. It is a counter-ruinant movement which grounds the taking up towards what is. In that sense ruinance is "the movedness of factical life which 'actualizes' and 'is' factical life *in* itself, *for* itself, *out of* itself, and, an all this, *against* itself" (98 [131]). It is and it is against itself. In this way, Heidegger explicates the ruinant against as referring to the direction: "[t]he (ruinant) 'against' indicates a '*presupposition*' of the interpretation, to which the interpretation itself has to revert back, whereby it becomes important to determine the type and the mode, how and 'where' this presupposition can be attained" (98 [132]). On the loose pages added to the lecture course, Heidegger explains that the presupposition takes a direction towards what is "posed" in philosophy (119 [158]). Presupposition leads to the historiological-historical pre-existence, which needs to be tackled in order to lead towards authentic access as well as to ward off the historiological "inappropriate time" in which the work is carried out (119 [157]). As was said, philosophy according to Heidegger is in a decadent situation, it is in ruinance (58 [77]). Thus, the overall task of philosophy, what Heidegger has been aiming at, is to bring philosophy back from its decline.

> "Repetition" ["*Wiederholung*"]: everything depends on its sense. Philosophy is a basic mode of life itself, in such a way that it authentically "brings back," [*eigentlich je wieder-holt*] i.e., brings life back [*zurücknimmt*] from its downward fall into decadence, and this "bringing back" [or re-petition, "re-seeking"], as radical re-search, is life itself. (62 [80])

The proper way of philosophy leads to what is, and repeats what is in the manner of bringing life back to itself from itself. Its possibility as well as its task arises from factically temporal life. Considered in and through factical life, philosophy for Heidegger is repetition – and for Kierkegaard as well, as I will show in what follows. In the next subsections, I will ask where concretely Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard. So far it has been shown that Heidegger can be seen still to follow the two-directional path insofar as in the present lecture course he addresses the question of proper access in two ways and also gives two determinations of philosophy. In the previous chapters I have claimed that Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard in his actualizational consideration. However, insofar as Heidegger regards Kierkegaard as a religious author, it is perhaps not surprising that he took up Kierkegaard

within his thematization of Augustine. It remains to be seen what kind of place Kierkegaard has in the lecture course where Heidegger has turned to Aristotle and claimed that philosophy must be atheistic.

6.4. Kierkegaard's explicit presence in Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle

In the presently viewed lecture course Heidegger points explicitly to Kierkegaard on two different occasions: once in the (margin of the) lecture course itself by naming Kierkegaard, and once on a page added to the lecture course under the title "Motto, along with a grateful indication of the source." The motto is inserted with the words: "[i]n order to characterize the intention of the interpretation, I cite a motto, which is prefixed to this introduction to phenomenological research" (137 [182]).

Heidegger's reference to Kierkegaard in the margin of the running text of the lecture course appears next to the following text:

> The genuine [*genuine*] principle is to be acquired *existentiell*-philosophically only in the basic experience of passion. There it is unclarified. "Away from principles" means from the outside, "without suffering", in reflection, having become lost. In principle, no "retention". "Away from principles", we can be and have everything (Kierkegaard). (20 [24])

This reference has been traced back by John van Buren (1994: 169) to Kierkegaard's notion of passion as distinct from reflection as well as his distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective truth.' According to Van Buren, this was done "in order to work out a definition of the *Sache* of ontology as not only 'being' (content-sense), but also the individual philosopher's passionate historical comportment to being (relational and enactment-sense)" (ibid.). This last point of Van Buren helps to highlight what in my opinion is the most significant aspect of this rather confusing reference made by Heidegger. That is, as I have argued throughout this thesis, Kierkegaard gains significance for Heidegger as soon as he considers philosophy as it is lived in and through factical life. I would insist that this naming of Kierkegaard in the margin of the text in which Heidegger deliberates over principle becomes understandable as far as Heidegger here aims to point ahead to the need for the actualizational consideration. Where exactly Kierkegaard is a source of influence with respect to accounting for philosophy in and through factical life is brought closer through Heidegger's second reference.

In the added "Motto", Heidegger refers to Kierkegaard alongside with Luther by reproducing two passages from each. The quotations from Kierkegaard appear as follows (137 [182]):

> "All of modern philosophy is based on something which both ethics and Christianity would consider a frivolity. Instead of deterring people and calling them to order by speaking of despair and exasperation, it has winked at people and invited them to pride themselves on doubting and on having doubted. For the rest, philosophy, as abstract, floats in the indeterminateness of the metaphysical. Instead of admitting this to itself and then pointing people (individuals) to the ethical, the religious, and the existential, philosophy has given rise to the pretence that humans could, as is said prosaically, speculate themselves out of their own skin and into pure appearance." [S.*Kierkegaard*, Einübung im Christentum (Diederichs IX, 1912), S. 70, Anm. 1.]
>
> "On the contrary, what both philosophy and the philosopher find difficult is stopping." [*Kierkegaard*, Entweder – Oder I, (Diederichs, I, 1911), S. 35.] (To stop at the genuine beginning!)

These two passages from Kierkegaard have been seen by Van Buren to highlight Kierkegaard's consideration of the individual and Heidegger's aim to destroy Western metaphysics.[171] The fact that the first citation leads to consideration of the individual is due to the context of the reference, which is Kierkegaard's note "A Brief Summary of the Contents of This Exposition" in *Practice in Christianity* [*Indøvelse i Christendom*]. In this note, Kierkegaard makes a claim for despair and offence (with which the individual's relation to Christ in faith is considered) as opposed to doubt. In addition, in this text, Kierkegaard makes a brief reference to temporality and insists that "no relation to the God-Man is possible without beginning with the situation of contemporaneity" (PC 82 [XII 79]).

The second citation stems from the first part of *Either-Or* [*Enten-Eller*], in the text entitled "Either/Or: An Ecstatic Discourse." In a somewhat extended context, the citation reads as follows:

> Experience shows that it is not at all difficult for philosophy to begin. Far from it. It begins, in fact, with nothing and therefore can always begin. But it is always difficult for philosophy and philosopher to stop. This difficulty, too, I have avoided, for if anyone thinks that I, in stopping, actually stop, he demonstrates that he does not have a speculative comprehension. The point is that I do not stop now, but I stopped when I began. My philosophy, therefore, has the advantageous characteristic of being brief and of being irrefutable, for if anyone disputes me, I daresay I have the right to declare him mad. The philosopher, then, is continually *aeterno modo* and does not have, as did the blessed Sintenis, only specific hours that are lived for eternity." (E/O I: 39-40 [I 24])

In addition to bringing the problematic of the beginning in philosophy into the limelight and connecting it with the problem of time, another important claim appears in this passage with respect to Heidegger's account. That is, philosophy is said to begin with 'nothing.' Insofar as the claim that the possibility to begin with philosophy is placed in 'nothing' is not self-evident, it enables us to make a further connection between Heidegger's account

[171] Thus, Van Buren (1994: 169) first states that "[o]ne of the mottos that he took from Kierkegaard for his WS 1921-22 lecture course highlighted precisely Kierkegaard's key theme of 'the individual human being'." Secondly, Van Buren points out that "these passages also tell us that, as Gadamer and Pöggeler have suggested, Heidegger's very project of 'the end of philosophy' (that is, the destruction of the Aristotelian being-question back to historicity) and a new 'genuine beginning' in WS 1921-22 derived primarily from his readings of Luther, Kierkegaard, and other anti-Greek Christian sources (cf. HW 145)" (op. cit.: 167). That the second citation refers to Heidegger's aim to destroy Western metaphysics is repeated by Van Buren in the article "The Earliest Heidegger: A New Field of Research" (2005: 20).

and that of Kierkegaard. In order to show that this is the case, I will next make an excursion to Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*. In this treatise, one can find both Kierkegaard's account of 'nothing,' by which Heidegger can be seen to be influenced, and the articulation of the wider thematic field coming to the fore in Heidegger's explicit references: the problematic of beginning anew in history and its connection to the questioning of philosophy. Thus, in my opinion, this treatise by Kierkegaard, to which Heidegger has not referred here but in his lecture on Augustine, achieves its full significance in the presently viewed lecture course. Furthermore, I contend that Heidegger's unfolding of the actualization of philosophy in the lecture on Aristotle shows the extent to which he has read Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*.

6.5. Excursion: Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*

In *The Concept of Anxiety* [*Begrebet Angest*], Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Virgilius Haufniensis sets himself the task of a psychological treatment of 'anxiety,' in such a way that the dogma of hereditary sin [*Arvesynd*] and thus the concept of sin are kept in mind (CA: 14 [IV 286]). According to Kierkegaard, "[a]nxiety is the psychological state which precedes sin" (92 [362]). Sin itself, however, is not a state, but rather must be "continually annulled" (15 [287]). Thus, Kierkegaard does not ask what sin is, but rather how sin can came into existence [*bliver til*], its possibility (22-23 [294-295]). Insofar as sin is kept in mind, the theme of the consideration becomes simultaneously that of the individual, because according to Kierkegaard the mood of sin is earnestness and to be truly earnest means to take oneself as the object of earnestness (15, 150 [287, 415]).[172] Since anxiety is treated in connection with the doctrine of hereditary sin, the individual is thematized in his/her historical situation. The underlying feature of the whole consideration becomes the problem of how an individual in history becomes anew. In what follows I will focus on this angle of Kierkegaard's treatise. The question is how Kierkegaard develops his account of beginning anew in history. Furthermore, through this analysis I will aim to bring out Kierkegaard's account of repetition, which he sees as determinative of philosophy (see Introduction).

[172] As Kierkegaard writes: "[h]aving become truly earnest about that which is the object of earnestness, a person may very well, if he so wishes, treat various things earnestly, but the question is whether he first becomes earnest about the object of earnestness. This object every human being has, because it is *himself* […]" (CA 150 [IV 415]).

Through the consideration of hereditary sin Kierkegaard articulates an individual as historical and concrete. As he repeatedly declares, an individual is himself and a part of the human race (for example: 28, 31, 46, 98 [301, 304, 317, 368]).

> For the history of the race proceeds quietly on its course, and in this no individual begins at the same place as another, but every individual begins anew, and in the same moment he is at the place where he should begin in history. (34-35 [306])

On the one hand, every individual is a part of a race [*Slægten*][173] and of the history of the race. The race does not begin anew with every individual (33 [305]). On the other hand, however, every individual by himself brings sin in the world by a qualitative leap: every individual makes a leap in the same way as Adam did. To put it differently, every subsequent individual loses his innocence through guilt in the same way as Adam did (35 [307]). Thus, every person participates with a qualitative leap in history (33 [305]).

Because every individual begins anew with a qualitative leap in the same way as Adam did, every subsequent man's loss of innocence can be explained through Adam's loss of innocence. Kierkegaard describes innocence as ignorance, in which the spirit in man is dreaming (synthesis is not actual). It is a state where there is nothing against which it strives. (41 [313]) Insofar as innocence's ignorance is about nothing, it is at the same time anxiety. That is, spirit (which cannot get rid of itself) relates to itself and its conditionality as anxiety (44 [315]). What manifests itself in anxiety, according to Kierkegaard, is freedom's possibility: the possibility of *being able* (ibid.).[174] This determination holds also for every form of anxiety in each subsequent individual, who loses his innocence in the same way as Adam did, and yet differently.

In awakening this possibility lies the significance of Adam and hereditary sin: "[i]n the moment actuality is posited, possibility walks by its side as nothing that entices every thoughtless man" (50 [321]). As was said, every individual is himself and a part of the human race. Adam's sin has significance for every subsequent individual, since the individual takes part in the race and thus is related to the sins of others. Kierkegaard explains this as anxiety, which is the consequence of sin. It is the anxiety which enters quantitatively into the world on each occasion when sin is posited and as such makes itself felt in the individual (52, 54 [323, 325]). The claim that anxiety enters quantitatively into the world is also expressed by Kierkegaard with the statement that in each subsequent individual, anxiety is more reflective. That is, the nothing of anxiety becomes increasingly

[173] By the term 'race' Kierkegaard refers to humankind through the generations, to what is specifically human. See more on Kierkegaard's use of the term 'race' in Joseph Ballan (2015: 185-190).
[174] Kierkegaard expresses this also by saying that anxiety is freedom's possibility (155 [422]).

something (53, 60, 61 [324, 331, 332]). It becomes 'more' (72-74, 77 [341-343, 345]). With respect to the 'more' of anxiety (the quantitative accumulation of anxiety), in which the object of anxiety becomes increasingly something, anxiety as a psychological state is found in different forms according to Kierkegaard. More concretely, he thematizes these forms first in terms of anxiety, which is absence of the consciousness of sin, and then under the flag of sin-consciousness.

Within the anxiety which has no consciousness of sin, Kierkegaard considers the immediate and the religious genius. Both of them have in common that the object of their anxiety (which properly is nothing) is something: fate and guilt respectively. As something, this object is what is feared. Thus, the immediate genius fears fate, to which he is related and yet cannot come into relation. He is related to it for he fears it and is drawn to it at the same time: Kierkegaard calls this the sympathetic and antipathetic relation (97 [367]). The case is the same with the religious genius, who fears being guilty, but does not recognize himself as guilty. The difference between being anxious about guilt and being anxious about fate is demonstrated by Kierkegaard in the text "The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama" in the book *Either/Or* I. In this text Kierkegaard considers guilt and fate within the distinction between the tragic in ancient and modern drama. He distinguishes the two first of all by stating that in the modern or in our age subjectivity is reflected in itself, whereas in the ancient world it is not (E/O I: 143 [I 121]).[175] The meaning of fate lies in the significance of the others, whereas guilt gains meaning as turnedness towards oneself. Thus, we hear that the heroine of ancient tragedy sorrows over her father's fate, whereas the heroine of modern tragedy is great in her reflective pain. The latter case is about being closed within one's subjectivity and wanting to be one's own creator. One does not aim to be understood by the others. As Kierkegaard put it: "[o]ur age has lost all substantial categories of family, state and kindred" (149 [126]). And yet, "[e]very individual, however original he is, is still a child of God, of his age, of his nation, of his family, of his friends, and only in them does he have his truth" (145 [123]). In this way, our age is condemned for being reflectively closed within subjectivity and what our age needs is to relate to fate.[176]

[175] Thus, Kierkegaard states: "[t]he tragic hero [in modern tragedy] is subjectively reflected in himself, and this reflection has not only reflected him out of every immediate relation to state kindred, and fate but often has even reflected him out of his own past life" (E/O I: 143 [I 121]).

[176] Kierkegaard also expresses this distinction in the "The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama" by stating that "[i]n ancient tragedy, the sorrow is more profound, the pain less; in the modern tragedy, the pain is greater, the sorrow less" (E/O I: 147-148 [I 125]). According to him, the ancient

Viewed under the flag of sin-consciousness, the nothing of anxiety becomes determinate something. It is anxiety about evil or anxiety about the good (CA: 109 [IV 379]). In this case anxiety relates itself to the future possibility of the new state seen through the consequence – the possibility to sin. What is feared is the transition into a new state. Thus, an individual might be in the state of the good and anxious about evil, or in the state of evil and anxious about the good. The latter individual Kierkegaard calls demonic, because the demonic is said to become apparent through his attitude towards disclosure. He is determined as inclosing reserve and unfreely disclosed (126-129 [393-396]). Similar to the heroine of modern drama, the demonic wants to stay in silence. He does not want to disclose himself, but rather wishes to close himself off from others. And yet, he is unfreely disclosed. That is, in the demonic state, one nevertheless discloses oneself contrary to one's will and one does that through language or expression (ibid.). Thus, Kierkegaard expresses the view that one is disclosed in one way or another in spite of one's aims. Importantly, as is clear, for Kierkegaard the demonic as well as every other form of anxiety emerges as conditioned by time. The problem is that in the previously described modes one does not have a proper relation to time.[177] This leads to the question of Kierkegaard's account of time. Certainly, for Kierkegaard there is a need to relate properly to time.

Kierkegaard turns to unfold his account of time by rejecting what he calls Hegel's and the Hegelian school's insistence on a presuppositionless beginning of philosophy (81-85 [350-354]). Therefore, he considers time with respect to the problem of contemporary philosophy and addresses the issue of how the new begins within history. According to Kierkegaard, in order to understand the true beginning (as transition), time must be correctly accounted for and "one must not forget that the new is brought about through the leap" (85 [354]). He insists that in this respect two significant aspects emerge in Christianity. First of all, as can be read from Kierkegaard's lengthy footnote (n. 82-84 [n. 351-354]), differently from Greek and modern philosophy, Christianity takes non-being to be present everywhere ("as sin, as sensuousness removed from spirit, as the temporal forgotten by eternal") and as something which one must overcome ("the task is to do away with it in order to bring forth being"). In this overcoming lies the true beginning (in

rests in fate, whereas the modern suffers total guilt. What is needed is the opposite. Thus, "[t]he true tragic sorrow requires an element of guilt, the true tragic pain an element of guiltiness" (151 [128]). The means of this "assimilation" is said to be anxiety (154 [131]).

[177] The demonic does not have a proper relation to time: the demonic is determined as sudden, which is an abstraction of continuity (129-130 [396-367]). According to Kierkegaard, continuity in nothingness is boring (132-133 [399-400]). Although this notion, 'boring,' does not come under discussion for Heidegger in his early Freiburg lecture courses, it is used by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*.

history), which is brought about through the leap in the moment. In the proper understanding of the moment lies the second significance of Christianity according to Kierkegaard. For in Christianity the eternal is properly taken into account. Eternity is not to be taken as an abstraction, nor as something past, as by the Greeks. Rather, it is important to realize how the eternal is lived in time.[178]

According to Kierkegaard, time is first of all infinite succession. As such, time itself does not have the distinct units of past, present, and future: a distinction, which is obtained when time is represented, is spatialized (85-86 [355]). Time is not to be considered a series of now-points. Furthermore, life in time has no present, according to him. True presence is rather the eternal and it is full, the fullness of time (86 [356]). That is, only when time and eternity touch each other is there a moment and is temporality posited.

> The moment is that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept of *temporal* is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time. As a result, the above-mentioned division acquires significance: the present time, the past time, the future time. (89 [359])

The present time, past time, and future time do not gain significance as a sequel of units, but as fullness of time in which the future has a certain primacy. The future gains this primacy through the meaningfulness of the eternal: as the "first expression of the eternal, and its incognito" (91 [361]). That is, the future is the eternal's possibility in the individual. The eternal expresses itself as incognito and as such, as anxiety. In this respect, the future is also said by Kierkegaard to be "the whole of which the past is a part," and it can "in certain sense signify the whole" (89 [359]). It is a whole, insofar as the future is a reappearing of the past and posits the past at the same time. That is, the past time is not simply something which has passed, but rather it is experienced as and through future possibility. In this respect, Kierkegaard is able to say: "[o]nly with the moment does history begin" (89 [359]). This means that both Adam's sin and the possibility to overcome through the leap gain significance in the moment in which the eternal touches time and thus temporality is posited. In this respect, "this eternal is also the future and the past" (90 [360]). Or, as was said, an individual is both himself and the race. Furthermore, when temporality and history are properly taken into account, the new begins in history as repetition.

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[178] In order to understand Kierkegaard's account of the moment, it must be first brought out that his consideration takes its point of departure from the distinction between the eternal and the temporal: "man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal" (85 [355]). For Kierkegaard, time and the eternal must meet. The eternal must be lived in time. If the eternal is conceived as past (as in the case of the Greeks), it is abstracted and one arrives at recollection (89-90 [359-360]). If the eternal in man is denied, abstracted or twisted into time, the demonic is there. If the eternal is conceived of metaphysically, one has a pure I (153 [418-419]).

The notion of repetition appears to have utmost significance for Kierkegaard. So much so that in the book *Repetition* [*Gjentagelsen*], to which Haufniensis also refers (CA: 17-19, 21, 151 [IV 289-291, 293, 417]), Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Constantin Constantius states:

> Say what you will, this question [whether a repetition is possible] will play a very important role in modern philosophy, for *repetition* is a crucial expression for what "recollection" was to the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowledge is recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is repetition. (R: 131 [III 173])

By contrasting repetition and recollection, Kierkegaard stresses the fact that the truth is not to be regarded as something past which must be remembered, but rather as the new becoming of what has been. It signifies the orientation towards the future possibilities of the historically situated individual. At the same time, with the notion of repetition, Kierkegaard stresses the brute fact of the individual's temporality by rejecting the possibility of numerical repetition of a situation for an individual, as is seen through the young man's trip to Berlin in *Repetition*. To (numerically) "repeat" the undertaking is impossible, for even if each step is reduplicated, nevertheless all is different in terms of meaning. It is again but new. As Kierkegaard declares: "[t]he dialectic of repetition is easy, for that which is repeated has been – otherwise it could not be repeated – but the very fact that it has been makes the repetition into something new" (149 [189]). As such, repetition also becomes the task: what is to become is to be taken back and regained as new.[179] Thus, *The Concept of Anxiety* brings repetition together with earnestness: "[t]he earnest person is earnest precisely through the originality with which he returns in repetition" (CA: 149 [IV 413]).[180]

For Kierkegaard, in order to overcome sin and rest in atonement, both human action and the ability to receive are needed. Earnestness (as well as certitude and inwardness, by which earnestness is specified) is thematized on the side of the individual's action. Thus, inwardness and certitude are said to be attained by and in action, as well as *in concreto*. Furthermore, "[i]nwardness is an understanding, but *in concreto* the important thing is how this understanding is to be understood" (142 [408]). This means that the question is about

[179] It should be noticed that repetition is a highly complex notion which gathers not only the key features of Kierkegaard's understanding of time, but signifies also the movement of faith: of becoming oneself or Christian; gaining everything back by giving everything up. This motive is clearly present in his book *Fear and Trembling* [*Frygt og bæven*], where repetition signifies the movement of faith or of becoming oneself. Furthermore, the pseudonymous author Johannes de Silentio insists that there is a need to repeat the movement ever again, or to be able "to change the leap into walking" (FT: 41 [III 92]). It is to be able to leap like a ballet dancer, who in the very leap assumes the posture without straining towards it (ibid.).

[180] The same claim is expressed in the book *Repetition*: "[r]epetition – that is the actuality and the earnestness of existence. The person who wills repetition is mature in earnestness" (R: 133 [III 175]).

the how of relating and it is about relating to oneself. With respect to relating to oneself Kierkegaard rejects relating through knowledge. Let us recall that earnestness was said to be the mood corresponding to sin. It is relation through mood and not through knowledge. The latter Kierkegaard considers to be demonic (n. 143 [n. 409]). Furthermore, in this respect, Kierkegaard charges the present age with a lack of certitude in which truth is increasing in quantity and directed at producing the new.

When talking of earnestness Kierkegaard explicitly denies the possibility to define it. Instead, he explicates the notion by thematizing Rosenkranz's disposition (unity of feeling and self-consciousness). According to Kierkegaard, earnestness is an "acquired originality of disposition" (147-149 [413-414]). It is not something one can be born with, but it must be acquired and in the acquiring of this disposition anxiety again has its significance. As I pointed out previously, according to Kierkegaard, every individual begins anew in the race in the same way as Adam did, and Adam lost his innocence by relating to himself and his conditionality as anxiety, in which freedom's possibility manifests itself. At the end of the treatise Kierkegaard returns to this claim and states that the ultimate is to learn to be anxious in a right way (155 [421]). For Kierkegaard, to be anxious in a right way means to be educated by possibility and this in two ways.

On the one hand, to be educated by possibility denotes relating to oneself as possible. In this respect, Adam's loss of innocence by relating to himself and his conditionality can be explained without placing him fantastically outside of history, through recognizing his conditionality as openness towards himself as possible: his possible self, the self which he is not. As such, Adam, like every other person, "himself produces the anxiety" (155 [421]) and thus anxiety, through which the individual comes to himself, is not something outside of a person. On the other hand, to be educated by possibility means to relate to oneself as one is. Nothingness is the object of anxiety, which itself is not an object, but expresses that (through constantly present anxiety) an individual faces what he is not. In this way, the 'not' is the possibility to discover oneself as one is. This is seen in Kierkegaard's claim that anxiety discovers faith and guilt (159-161 [425-427]).[181] Faith and guilt represent the actuality of an individual. That they are discovered by being educated by possibility means

[181] What one is as historical and temporal is articulated by Kierkegaard in terms of sin and guilt as follows: "[t]he concept of sin and guilt posit precisely the single individual as the single individual. There is no question about his relation to the whole world or to all the past. The point is only that he is guilty, and yet he is supposed to have become guilty by fate, consequently by all that of which there is no question, and thereby he is supposed to have become something that precisely cancels the concept of fate, and this he is supposed to have become by fate." (98 [367-368])

that one discovers oneself as concrete and historical: as an individual and a part of a race. It means discovering oneself as a historically situated temporal individual. At the same time, to be educated by possibility, that is, to be anxious in a right way, does not annul anxiety. Rather, as Vincent A. McCarthy (1985: 108) points out: "[t]he nothing of anxiety will appear again, and the dialectic of 'something' (the actualized self) and 'nothing' (possible self) will continue as long as there is life." Hence, the need for repetition: to take oneself back as anew again and again. When time is correctly accounted for, the new begins in history as repetition. The possibility of relating to oneself as historical and concrete is opened through relating to nothing: through anxiety.

6.6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle

In the previous chapter it was shown that Heidegger's interest to Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* reaches back to his lecture course on Augustine (SS 1921). The fact that Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard in his analysis of anxiety is well known also from *Sein und Zeit*, because he mentions Kierkegaard's anxiety there (SuZ: 492 n. iv [190 n. 1]). Insofar as this notion is thematized in *Sein und Zeit*, it is thus also one of the most researched subjects with respect to these two thinkers.[182] With regard to the presently viewed lecture course, anxiety is not the only notion in which Kierkegaard's footprint in Heidegger has been seen. Rather, quite a number of different themes have been connected to Kierkegaard by different researchers. Thus, for example Janko Lozar (2014: 428-429), who argues for the possibility to understand many of Kierkegaard's notions as 'existentiale', points not only to the notion of 'anxiety,' but also to 'care' and 'guilt.'[183] Van Buren, who draws connections through Jaspers's work, shows that the range of themes in which Heidegger's consideration can be traced back to Kierkegaard is quite outstanding.[184]

My aim is not to set out a comprehensive account of different notions and themes which Heidegger might have drawn from Kierkegaard. For this task each notion, citation,

[182] That this is the case was brought out also in the first chapter of this thesis.

[183] Lozar (2014: 427-429), who does not engage with Heidegger's earliest lecture courses, also points to 'existentiale' such as faith, despair, and hope. In addition, he brings out a number of other similarities between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Specifically, he lays bare the similarities found in connection with anxiety, but also points to formal indication, possibility as standing higher than actuality, authenticity, and hermeneutics of facticity (op. cit. 427-429).

[184] According to Van Buren (1994: 182): "[i]n Jaspers's study and in the German translations of Kierkegaard that Heidegger was reading, we meet up with many of the key terms of Heidegger's own descriptions of falling and the inauthenticity/authenticity distinction from his lecture course of WS 1921-22 (with its motto from Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*) to SZ: namely, *Existenz*, temptation (*Versuchung*), curiosity (*Neugier*), idle talk (*Gerede*), ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*), dispersion (*Zerstreuung*), comfort (*Beruhigung*), and closing off (*Verschliessen*)."

and theme must be treated and deserves to be treated separately. Rather, as before, I take the point of departure from Heidegger's own explicit references to Kierkegaard and I aim to draw attention to the structural similarities between Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* and Heidegger's unfolding of philosophy in and through factical life as it is presented in his lecture on Aristotle. I claim that Heidegger draws on Kierkegaard when he considers how possible access unfolds in and through factical life. With respect to Heidegger's own explicit references to Kierkegaard, I will focus on the theme which can be gathered into the question: how does the new begin in philosophy?

What stands out first of all is that according to both Heidegger and Kierkegaard the possibility of new beginning is articulated as repetition. Let it be remembered that Heidegger arrives at this determination of philosophy in his consideration of philosophy in and through factical life. Considering Kierkegaard's possible influence on Heidegger, what is important is how they both reach the notion of repetition. In this respect, the similarities can be traced back to the analysis of how the possibility, necessity, and motivational ground for beginning anew is found.

As was shown, Heidegger insists that philosophy is currently in a decadent situation, it is in decline. This conviction is an underlying feature of Heidegger's approach. It is a claim which makes his aim of rethinking philosophy necessary. Thus, Heidegger also exhibits that this is the case in each step of his rethinking of philosophy, which means that it is not restricted to the consideration of philosophy in and through factical life. However, it is also a necessary part of the actualizational consideration. The decline must be accounted for. Considering the actualization of factical life, Heidegger claims that in the very movement of factical life there is a pull towards decline, towards taking the easy way and thus closing genuine access to oneself. It is a way of securing oneself against the ambiguity of life, thus facilitating a specific (inauthentic) consideration of temporality and approach to oneself. At the same time, this possibility is inherent in factical life's manner of maturation. That is, it is inherent in life's own temporality. In this respect, decline unfolds through authentic temporality which facilitates inauthentic access to time (historiological) and oneself (objectified).

Similar motives are to be found in Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*. As was shown, Kierkegaard presents different ways of being anxious as unfolding out of genuine temporality (one is anxious because one turns to a possible something). Also, he presents an account of how the genuine approach is lost not only by thematizing explicitly the question

of temporality but also through what he calls the modern and ancient approaches. In these approaches the objectification of oneself is seen through guilt and fate respectively as something which is feared. Since it is well known from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* that he has noticed Kierkegaard's distinction between fear and anxiety (fear as directed to object and anxiety to nothing), it should be brought out that Heidegger is likely to have seen this distinction already during his lecture on Augustine.[185] In the present lecture course, Heidegger seems to make use of the distinction by thematizing 'nothing.' This leads to the theme of the possibility of beginning anew.

Heidegger shows the possibility of overcoming the decline as inherent in life itself. It is possible, since life itself facilitates a counter-ruinant movement. This is described by Heidegger as culminating in a collapse in which one faces oneself as non-occurrence. Thus, what is brought forth is oneself as not occurring, not an instance, but rather as temporally constituted as well as historically situated. Above all else, facing the 'nothing' for Heidegger is the possibility of uncovering oneself as not an object, as not static and fixed. As such the notion refers not only to the need to stand against objectification of factical life, but also to proper temporality. In Kierkegaard's treatise the temporal aspect takes the upper hand. To be anxious in the right way means to be educated by possibility. That is, by facing what one is not yet, by being able. But also by facing what one is as a part of the race. In this respect, Kierkegaard is seen to state that anxiety discovers fate. That this expression has caught Heidegger's eye is clear from the fact that Heidegger in his lecture on Augustine quotes this very phrase from Kierkegaard. In the present lecture course Heidegger uses the notion of 'fate' again in his brief thematization of the temporality of life within the notion of 'to live.' With respect to the notion of fate, it seems to be significant to Heidegger that Kierkegaard has criticized modern philosophy as lacking the relation to one's environment, or as Kierkegaard declared: "[o]ur age has lost all substantial categories of family, state and kindred" (149 [126]). From Heidegger's perspective, this is exactly what must be accounted for. That is, the fact that one is always already in the world with others. Thus, both Kierkegaard and Heidegger would insist that genuine access to oneself means accessing oneself as one is in one's historical situation. Furthermore, both of them find motivation for regaining genuine access by considering the historical situation.

[185] Consider Heidegger's thematization of directionless anxiety in the loose page "Anxiety" in his lecture course on Augustine as well as his distinction between 'timor castus' and ' timor servilis' (GA 60: 201-202 [268], 222-226 [293-297]). With respect to the latter, see also Heidegger's thematization in *Sein und Zeit* (492 n. iv [190 n. 1]).

According to Heidegger, the motivational ground for beginning anew in history or finding an authentic access to oneself lies in factical life itself. In decline, in ruinant movement something is constantly lacking, a lack which is felt in life. Arriving at factical life as non-occurrent is a maturation of factical life itself. The circle is closed and there is no need to face anything outside of oneself (for example, to confess before God) in order to be thrown into the search. For Kierkegaard, regaining a genuine relation to oneself is always also dependent on the relation to God. However, with respect to anxiety Kierkegaard states that the person "himself produces anxiety" (155 [421]). In this respect, the motivation is brought into the individual, who takes part in hereditary sin, which makes itself felt in the individual.

As Heidegger is engaged with criticism of the tradition throughout his path, I am hesitant in claiming that this motive stems from Kierkegaard. Also, since Heidegger constantly targets worldly life, I would not suggest that he takes this from Kierkegaard's thematization of fate. However, I do claim that he draws on Kierkegaard when he unfolds philosophy in his lecture course on Aristotle as maturation of life which peaks in nothingness and demands repetition. I also insist that Kierkegaard is again on Heidegger's radar when he considers philosophy in and through factical life, despite the fact that Heidegger offers a rethought account of it.

6.7. Conclusion

In this chapter I focused on Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle. As before, I aimed to show how Heidegger's lecture course develops and where on this path Kierkegaard finds his place. I claimed that although Heidegger takes a new turn with his philosophy, he is still engaged with the question of what philosophy is and addresses it in two directions. Thus, philosophy was first shown to be articulated as phenomenological ontology. As ontological, philosophy in principle has the task of indicating being. Furthermore, according to its mode of accessing, philosophy is determined as a cognitive comportment towards beings. This determination says how philosophical investigation is to access its theme. Secondly, addressing authentic access in and through factical life, Heidegger showed that philosophy is determined as repetition, which he established by thematizing movedness, in which a collision with oneself as nothingness takes place and which thus gives rise to questionability. With respect to the search for Kierkegaard's place in this lecture course, I claimed that Kierkegaard becomes significant for Heidegger in his consideration of

philosophy in and through factical life. By analyzing Heidegger's references to Kierkegaard, through which the question of how the new begins in history was highlighted, and making an excursion to Kierkegaard's treatise *The Concept of Anxiety*, it was shown that Heidegger yet again draws on Kierkegaard for his rethought account of philosophy in and through factical life. Thus, it was shown that Heidegger leans on Kierkegaard also in his consideration of philosophy as repetition.

7. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course "Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity"

7.1. Introduction

Heidegger held his last lecture course of his first Freiburg period in the summer semester of 1923. After that (in the winter semester), Heidegger takes up a position as a fulltime professor in the Distinguished Chair of Philosophy at the University of Marburg. This last lecture course held in Freiburg is entitled *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*[186] [*Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, GA 63]. It was held once a week one hour at a time and thus in all it consists of a mere thirteen hours of lectures. However, during these thirteen hours Heidegger presents once again a rethought account of his philosophy.

As the title of the lecture course suggests, with this lecture course Heidegger turns to hermeneutics and affirms that his concern is the study of ontology, the study of being. Furthermore, in this lecture course he starts to use consistently the term Dasein instead of 'factical life' and its adaptations. On this basis, it is perhaps not surprising that Heidegger himself considers this lecture course to be the "first drafts of *Being and Time*" (GA 12: 9, see also 30 [90, see also 116]). However, he has not arrived at his hermeneutics, which takes its leave from ontology, from nowhere. Indeed, he does develop his account further and the articulation found here is quite different from what has been seen in the analysis of his previous lecture courses. However, I insist that his account presented here unfolds from the path Heidegger has been on for years now. With respect to the two-directional task, this lecture course does not exhibit a break from what has gone before. Rather, with hermeneutics, Heidegger aims to bring the two modes of accessing together. As I will claim, with hermeneutics Heidegger both demands that philosophy must turn to access in the living situation (actualization) and insists that this living situation must be articulated in a certain way: the character of being, facticity, must be brought out in a specific way.

With respect to Kierkegaard's presence in this lecture course, it will be shown that in this lecture course too Kierkegaard emerges as significant with respect to Heidegger's consideration of factical life as it is actualized. Heidegger explicitly mentions Kierkegaard

[186] Initially the title of the lecture course was not intended to be "Ontology" but "Logic," the reason for changing the course name being that another professor wished to advertise a course entitled "Logic" at the same time (Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns 1987: 88 [113]). The translator Van Buren (2008: 101, n. 1) holds that Heidegger was still thinking in this lecture course of "ontology" in its unity with "logic" and with "phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity."

in this lecture course on six different occasions. Significantly, Kierkegaard is not only put forward through one or another quotation, but also is thematically considered by Heidegger. In what follows, I will point out these thematizations. However, in this chapter I will predominantly concentrate on Kierkegaard's concrete input to this lecture course (specifically by considering the remarkable similarities between Heidegger's account and what Kierkegaard articulated in his treatise *The Single Individual*) and focus on Heidegger's estimations of Kierkegaard in the next and final chapter of this thesis.

In order to reveal Kierkegaard's place in this lecture course, the present chapter is divided into six parts. As before, I will begin with some remarks about the problem situation and the structure of this lecture course. After that (section three), I will follow Heidegger's approach in this lecture course in two steps. First, I focus on Heidegger's account of hermeneutics with respect to ontology and phenomenology. Then, I turn to Heidegger's explication of the factical modes of interpretation and his articulation of authentic access. In the fourth section, I will bring out Heidegger's explicit references to Kierkegaard, on the basis of which I will then make an excursion to Kierkegaard's treatise *The Single Individual* (fifth section). The importance of this treatise to Heidegger will be pointed out in the sixth section of this chapter, in which I will claim that Kierkegaard can be seen as important to Heidegger when he turns to the concrete actualization of the interpretation. Also, in this section, I will take up Heidegger's explicit thematizations of Kierkegaard, which will be further analyzed in the following chapter. Having asked about Kierkegaard's place in this lecture course, I will end this chapter with some concluding remarks.

7.2. The problem situation and the structure of the lecture course

Similar to his earlier lecture courses, Heidegger's presently viewed text accessible for the reader in the *Gesamtausgabe* is a construction from his manuscripts and notes from his students. As with all Heidegger's early lecture courses, it is not written by him to be a finished text. Thus, we need to remember that the text of this lecture course is structured into chapters and sections by the editor and that the text is not complete insofar as parts of the manuscripts are either lost or unreadable (Bröcker-Oltmanns: 89-90 [114-116]). Regardless of this fact, I insist that in this lecture course Heidegger follows a clear structure which is familiar from his previous courses. Furthermore, although the central, explicitly addressed question here is not articulated by Heidegger in terms of 'what is philosophy?,'

as in his previous lecture courses, in my opinion this question is not placed aside. Rather, I suggest that it is rethought once again, and the reason why this question is not explicitly addressed lies in his reconsidered account.

As I see it, in this lecture course Heidegger is engaged with two main concerns. On the one hand, he articulates what kind of investigation is to be taken up. In this respect, he thematically unfolds hermeneutics. On the other hand, he follows through with a concrete work of hermeneutical interpretation through which possible access in and through factical life (Dasein) is set out. Insofar as Heidegger's lecture course develops in these two directions, it is structurally similar to his previous lecture courses. What the listener is presented with is 1) an account of the investigation which must be taken up, and 2) this investigation at work with the aim of finding access in and through factical life (Dasein). Within the latter the access had is described in two directions: as access at work considered as decline and as authentic access produced through the mode of accessing at work in the tradition.

What makes this lecture course distinct from his previous ones is the fact that Heidegger reconsiders both his account of the proper investigation determined here as hermeneutics and his clarification of gaining authentic access. Most importantly, if previously Heidegger's two-directional concern led repeatedly to two distinct accounts of philosophy (one as investigation and one as actualization), where it could be said that he applies what he has established as proper investigation to his consideration of accessing in and through factical life, now the situation is turned around. That is, he develops his account of proper investigation by taking into account what has been revealed about the modes of accessing in and through factical life. Furthermore, hermeneutics is intended to be a mode of actualization which takes its directions from what has previously been established about philosophy as phenomenological ontology. How this is the case as well as how Heidegger resolves his account of modes of accessing in the living situation in the presently viewed lecture course will be demonstrated in the following section.

7.3. Heidegger's path of hermeneutics of facticity

In the present lecture course, differently from his previous ones, Heidegger places at the center of the study the hermeneutics of facticity. As I read it, with hermeneutics Heidegger first presents his account of the proper mode of investigation as self-interpretation, after which he turns to addressing the theme of how this self-interpretation is at work

(actualized). On this basis I have divided this section into two subsections. First I address the question how Heidegger unfolds hermeneutics as a mode of investigation. After that, I unfold the concrete work of interpretation. As will be seen, by unfolding hermeneutics as interpretation at work Heidegger once again offers a different account of authentic access by first considering the manner of losing this access. Thus, in order to bring out how Heidegger explains these possibilities in the present lecture course, I will ask in the second subsection of this chapter where according to Heidegger lies the possibility of uncovering access and how has it been covered up.

7.3.1. Redetermining ontology and phenomenology: the directives for hermeneutics of facticity

Introducing the theme of the lecture course, hermeneutics of facticity, Heidegger relates it to ontology and phenomenology. In doing so, he first reconsiders both ontology and phenomenology as they are found in the tradition, and then, on the basis of what has been achieved, points to the direction he wants to take with hermeneutics. Thus, seeking to delineate the meaning of hermeneutics, I take point my point of departure from Heidegger's re-articulation of ontology and phenomenology. The aim of this section is to understand what hermeneutics stands for and how Heidegger arrives at his account of hermeneutics of facticity.

In the present lecture course Heidegger rejects ontology as it is found in the tradition, using the same move with which he has rejected "philosophies" in his previous lecture courses: on the grounds that they take a pre-given stance towards the thematic field, which is fixed as a "definite region." According to Heidegger, ontology as it is found in the tradition – both ancient ontology and modern ontology – takes its theme to be "being-an-object" [*Gegenstandsein*] (1-2 [1-3]). This regional demarcation of its theme results in cutting off beforehand its own possibility, since 1) what should be taken as a direction is filled with fixed content, and 2) the question about the field of being (Dasein) from which the meaning of Being is drawn never arises (ibid.). Thus, instead of taking the lead from the traditional manner of considering ontology, Heidegger insists that the term ontology must be reconsidered. It must be taken formally indicatively – as empty and directive:

> "*Ontology*" means doctrine of being. If we hear in this term only the indefinite and vague directive that, in the following, being should in some thematic way come to be investigated and come to language, then the word has performed its possible service as the title of the course. (1 [1])

Ontology is a study of being [*Sein*]. It is about what is at issue and has something to say, as Heidegger expressed in his lecture on Aristotle. It indicates the direction and warns against

taking a narrow and fixed attitude towards the thematic field. Furthermore, insofar as ontology refers to being in the widest sense, it does not exclude all the "failed" modes of ontology. As Heidegger puts it: "[t]hus the term 'ontological' refers to the posing of the questions, explications, concepts, and categories which have arisen from looking at beings as be-ing [*Seiendes als Sein*] or, alternatively, have failed to do so" (2 [3]). The fact that ontology is determined in this way (with reference to two modes of looking at beings as being and failing to do so) leads to Heidegger's consideration of phenomenology and its relation to hermeneutics.

Heidegger talks of phenomenon and phenomenology in this lecture course slightly differently compared to how he has spoken about it previously. On the one hand, phenomenology for Heidegger remains the proper manner of research. Furthermore, the triad of the phenomenological method (phenomenological explication in three sense directions, formal indication, and destruction) are constantly at work. On the other hand, however, with respect to philosophy's task to find an access to its proper theme, hermeneutics is given a certain primacy before phenomenology. That this is the case is significant for understanding how Heidegger rethinks philosophy in this lecture course and what hermeneutics stands for.

The point of departure for explicating the (history of the) term phenomenon and phenomenology is again taken by Heidegger from Greek philosophy, phenomenon being determined as "that which shows itself as something showing itself" (53 [67]). As such, phenomenon refers to a distinctive mode [*Weise*] of being an object: "being-present as an object from out of itself" (ibid.). From this determination Heidegger makes two important claims. First, he states that initially the subject matter is not fixed content-wise. Secondly, "phenomenon" as determined above involves the dismissal of non-genuine but possible and factically dominant modes of being-an-object (53, 59-60 [67-68, 75-76]). This second point, in my opinion, becomes central for Heidegger's turn to hermeneutics as preceding phenomenology.

That is, according to Heidegger, within the whole tradition including Brentano and Husserl, the subject matter with regard to the phenomenon remained the same. He articulates how phenomenology and phenomenon have been understood (by Husserl) as follows:

> "Phenomenon" is thus not primarily a category, but initially has to do with the how of access, of grasping and bringing into true safekeeping. Phenomenology is therefore initially nothing other than a *mode of research*, namely: addressing something just as it shows itself and only to the extent that it shows itself. (56 [71])

The center of Heidegger's reconsideration of phenomenology's position is directed to the final part of this determination and lies in the insight of what is missing there. For, what has been disregarded is that what shows itself may show itself in the manner of hiding itself. Heidegger now says: "[p]henomenology needs to be understood *in accord with its possibility* as something which is not publicly and self-evidently given" (58 [74]). He insists that to phenomenology, which is a distinctive 'how of research' whereby objects come to be defined just as they give themselves, the subject matter must first be presented. What is needed is to provide in advance the character of being of the object of philosophy: the character in which it becomes the object and the manner of accessing it and bringing it to safekeeping properly (ibid.). Thus, determining the "phenomenon" while keeping in mind its traditional meaning, Heidegger says:

> Should it turn out that *to be in* the mode of *covering-itself-up* and self-veiling belongs to the character of *being of the being* [Seins*charakter des Seins*] which constitutes the object of philosophy, and indeed not in an accessorial sense but in accord with the character of its being, then the category of "phenomenon" will become a truly earnest matter. The task involved – making it a phenomenon – will become phenomenological in a radical sense. (60 [76])

That is, making something into a phenomenon needs to take into consideration the possibilities of the modes of being (58 [74]). To put it differently, how something is already had (forehaving) must first be brought out and then articulated phenomenologically. The investigation which must establish this is hermeneutics. As such, hermeneutics takes the front seat of the investigation. Phenomenology is to be considered according to its possibility (58 [74]), which is presented through hermeneutics.

> This is the path the *hermeneutics of facticity* attempts to travel. It calls itself interpretation, i.e., it does not merely depict matters in terms of the aspect under which they first appear. All interpretation is an interpretation with respect to something, on the basis of it, and with the view to it. The *forehaving*, which is to be interpretively explicated, must be put into the context of the object and seen there. One must step away from the subject matter initially given and back to that on which it is based. (60 [77])

In my opinion, what Heidegger has so far expressed about phenomenology is not very different from how he has considered it before (see chapter 4.3). Phenomenological understanding is a specific manner of accessing. Phenomenon is something which is brought out as a phenomenon: accessed phenomenologically. What is rather stressed by considering phenomenology's relation to hermeneutics is the starting point of the investigation. Here, insofar as hermeneutics is given primacy before phenomenology on the basis of the claim that there is a possibility that subject matter may show itself in the manner of hiding itself, Heidegger can be seen to integrate his previous considerations of philosophy in and through factical life, in which these two modes of accessing have been constantly highlighted, into the description of proper investigation. At the same time, in my

opinion, Heidegger does not abandon phenomenology as developed previously, but rather it can be seen to be at work in establishing hermeneutics. In this way, with hermeneutics Heidegger presents an investigation which integrates both what has been brought out previously about philosophy as ontological-phenomenology and what has been achieved as regards the modes of accessing in the considerations of philosophy in and through factical life. At the same time, hermeneutics itself is ultimately claimed to be a mode of actualization. In this way, it becomes an account of philosophy which binds together different directions of addressing the question of accessing its proper theme.

First of all, in stressing that hermeneutics is ontological study, Heidegger can be seen to unfold hermeneutics on the basis of what he has established about philosophy as ontological-phenomenology in the lecture course on Aristotle. Thus, according to Heidegger, insofar as the research is ontological, hermeneutics of facticity is in some sense directed to being as such (2 [3]). However, being is not itself an object to be had (5 [7]). Rather, what is to be investigated is the being to whom being is in some way accessible. The being to whom the meaning of being is accessible is Dasein.[187] Dasein has the priority insofar as it is this "object" which "has its being as something capable for interpretation and in need of interpretation and that to be in some sort of having-been interpreted belongs to its being" (11 [15]).[188] Dasein is what is interrogated: it is that "from out of which and for the sake of which, philosophy 'is'" (2 [3]). However, insofar as the search is ontological, Dasein must be interrogated in a specific direction. In this respect, the theme of hermeneutics is said to be facticity. Facticity says in which respect Dasein is interrogated. It is interrogated with respect to its character of being [*Seinscharacter*]: "[t]he theme of this

[187] As has been pointed out by Kisiel and Van Buren, Heidegger uses Dasein as a technical term first in the summer semester of 1923, where it occurs in conjunction with *jeweiligkeit* (temporal particularity), facticity, and being (Kisiel 1995: 493; Van Buren 2008: 107). According to Kisiel (1995: 493), Dasein is what Heidegger first calls "the historical I of the "primal something" (life in and for itself), the situation I, factic life, factic life experience." Dasein in connection with human life (human life described as "concrete actual life") is first used in the summer semester of 1920 (ibid.). With the term Dasein Heidegger is avoiding the traditional understanding of human life. In the presently viewed lecture course this comes out through Heidegger's destruction of the concept of 'man' as found in the tradition. He looks into the concept of man determined as (1) a living being endowed with reason and (2) person or personhood. (17-24 [21-29]) According to Heidegger, these concepts "have arisen within experiencing and looking at contexts of objects in the world which were in each case given in advance in a definite manner" (GA 63: 17 [21]). That is, they unfold within attitudinal understanding and can be seen as approaching 'human life' in a way that closes the access beforehand. What is avoided with the term Dasein is that 'human life' is seen in hierarchical terms within a context of objects: Dasein is not one thing among others, something amidst plants and animals with the distinction of being endowed with reason (17-24 [21-29]).

[188] In these lecture courses Heidegger does not articulate this priority as ontological-ontical priority as he does in *Sein und Zeit*.

investigation is facticity, i.e., our own Dasein insofar as it is interrogated with respect to, on the basis of, and with the view to the character of its being" (24 [29]).

Secondly, Heidegger brings the results from actualizational consideration into the articulation of hermeneutics as suggested by his criticism of phenomenology found in the tradition. He insists that what must come under discussion are the different modes of being of the being for whom the meaning of being is accessible. That is, both the mode of covering-itself-up and self-veiling are to be considered. This means that with respect to facticity there is no (ethical) priority. Facticity is the term which refers to the mode of being as one is in whichever way one is. And yet, according to Heidegger, making Dasein accessible to itself in regard to the character of its being (facticity) means that a possibility is developed for understanding itself in terms of being wakeful (as the how of Dasein) to itself (14-15 [18-19]).

> Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case our own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being, communicating Dasein to itself in this regard, hunting down the alienation from itself with which it is smitten. In hermeneutics what is developed for Dasein is a possibility of its becoming and being for itself in the manner of an *understanding* of itself. (11 [15])

These words suggests that understanding and understanding are two different things. As Heidegger has insisted before with respect to thematizing having-oneself, to be in alienation from itself is not not-to-be. Rather it is a manner of relating. To bring out the character of this manner is the work of hunting down the alienation and developing the possibility of being itself in the manner of a wakeful understanding. That is, it still holds that Dasein is always already there for itself, understands itself in one way or another. It is not the case that Dasein lacks understanding. Rather, what is suggested is that the manner of understanding itself (in) which Dasein always is (i.e., Dasein always rather is its understanding) needs to be interpreted, insofar as Dasein has the tendency to (mis)understand itself. This leads to the further determination of hermeneutics.

Aiming at the original meaning of the term 'hermeneutics,' Heidegger further turns to what could be called, bearing in mind his lecture on Aristotle (GA 61), the 'turn of speech.' He once again claims that in the course of history hermeneutics has gained a meaning as a certain technique of understanding in which the original meaning has been lost. Thus, he rejects the modern meaning of hermeneutics and makes use of the philosophy of the ancient Greeks (Plato and Aristotle), for whom according to Heidegger the central sense of the notion of hermeneutics can be encapsulated as 'making accessible' or facilitating access.

On the basis of this original meaning (in which it has been seen in a living manner), he draws his own determination as follows:

> a definite unity in actualization of ἑρμηνεύειν (of communicating), i.e., of the *interpreting of facticity* in which facticity is being encountered, seen, grasped, and expressed in concepts (11 [14]).

Thus, hermeneutics already includes grasping and expressing facticity and at the same time is said to be a unity of actualization. In this regard, Heidegger further declares that the relationship between hermeneutics and facticity is not the relationship of the method to its object. Rather, interpretation itself is a something of the character of the facticity. It is the *how* of Dasein, which means that interpretation is itself a mode of being. In what sense it is a mode of being is expressed by Heidegger's claim that the character of Dasein's being lies first of all in being-possible [*Möglichsein*].

In explicating hermeneutics through the character of being-possible, Heidegger first points to *existence* [*Existenz*] as "[t]he *ownmost* possibility of be-ing itself which Dasein (factically) is," which he links with 'authentic being' [*eigentliche Sein*] (12 [16]). This refers to the task of hermeneutics as developing wakefulness [*Wachsein*]. With respect to authenticity, according to Heidegger, facticity is brought into forehaving in hermeneutics with the conceptuality at work in the investigation for which Heidegger employs the notion of existentials [*Existenzialien*]. The existentials need to be seen as pointing to the way things are at the moment [*des Augenblicks*], and as such pointing to the forehaving and foreconception (12-13 [16]). That is, secondly, the fact that hermeneutics must take its lead from the character of Dasein whose being lies in being possible means that it must take into account the temporality of Dasein. Dasein is fundamentally temporal. As Heidegger puts it: "[t]he object Dasein is Dasein only in *itself*. It *is*, though as the *being-on-the-way* of *itself*" (13 [17]). For this, Heidegger also employs the term *anticipatory leap* [*Vorsprung*]: "[t]he anticipatory leap forward: not positing an end, but reckoning with being-on-the-way, giving *it* free play, disclosing it, holding fast to *being-possible*" (13 [17]). Hermeneutical understanding is never fixed, but puts itself to work ("engages itself and brings into play" [*Einsatz*]) in a situation from and by which the forehaving is directed, offering no path into an exhaustively carried out account. It is an existential knowing, which "lives and is at work in a primordial *self-interpretation*" (14 [18]). Thus, hermeneutics becomes a specific mode of actualization. It is a mode in which proper investigation is at work. In this way, it becomes a fused version of Heidegger's two-directional path and as such makes itself felt in Heidegger's account of philosophy in this lecture course.

Keeping in mind Heidegger's constant engagement with the question of philosophy, it is important to notice that in the present lecture course Heidegger determines philosophy in relation to hermeneutics in two distinct ways. On the one hand, he insists that philosophy itself has about itself a *self-understanding*. As such, "[p]hilosophy is a mode of knowing which is in factical life itself and in which factical Dasein is ruthlessly dragged back to itself and relentlessly thrown back upon itself" (14 [18]). Thus, hermeneutics itself is regarded philosophy. The wakefulness achieved with hermeneutics is given by philosophy itself to itself. It makes Dasein's self-encounter possible. On the other hand, however, Heidegger says:

> As far as I am concerned, if this personal comment is permitted, I think that hermeneutics is not philosophy at all, but in fact something preliminary which turns in advance of it and has its own reason for being [...]. (15 [20])

And again,

> Hermeneutics is itself not philosophy. It wishes only to place an object which has hitherto fallen into forgetfulness before today's philosophers for their "well-disposed considerations". (16 [20])

In my opinion, this last remark by Heidegger refers to his critical approach to traditional philosophy. Hermeneutics aims to be something preliminary to what "today's philosophers" understand by the notion of philosophy. In the first quotation, however, I believe that Heidegger is reflecting on his own path. He has rethought philosophy once again and reached the point where even the term philosophy needs to be reconsidered. However, if philosophy has so far marked the search for the proper access to and manner of expressing the pre-worldly or factical life, hermeneutics which aims to access facticity of Dasein is to be seen as a rethought account of philosophy, which is unfolded so far as a proper mode of investigation. Furthermore, as in his previous lecture courses, Heidegger also gives a second account of accessing: that of in and through factical life.

7.3.2. Being-interpreted in the today and being-there of Dasein

As was brought out previously, to Dasein belongs some state of having-been-interpreted. This means that one always already has oneself and one's world (things in the world) in one way or another. One lives in and out of already having-itself (24, 39, 40 [30, 49, 52]). How exactly one lives in and out of the forehaving is the question which will be addressed through the concrete work of hermeneutical interpretation. That is, as in his previous courses, after explaining what is to be considered a proper investigation, Heidegger turns to actualizational consideration. This is outlined in the familiar manner by first outlining the everyday manner of being in which some sort of understanding of being is already at work

and which is seen as a manner of losing access (what it means to lose the access searched for) and then turning to the possibility of gaining authentic access. His execution, however, is yet again different from the previous ones. Since Kierkegaard can be seen to influence also how Heidegger unfolds his account here, in what follows I will bring out Heidegger's argumentation in order to point out later on Kierkegaard's place in this lecture course. In the present lecture course Heidegger takes his point of departure from the way that Dasein mostly ("for-the-most-part and for-most-of-us" [*Zunächst als Zumeist*]) finds itself. The interpretation starts from the 'today' [*Heute*] (26-27 [31-32]).

The term 'today' refers to the mode of interpreting (a how of facticity) which is closest to Dasein. With the task of explicating 'today' hermeneutically, Heidegger insists from the start that today is not to be understood as a discussion about the interesting things happening in the world in the present situation, nor as fixating on a self as of something drawn from the ego (24, 25 [29, 30]). Rather, 'today' must be understood (according to its ontological character) as the how of facticity. As the 'how of facticity,' the 'today' is also presented from the start as a term with wordly and temporal denotation for the everyday manner of being and having.

> A defining feature of the awhileness of temporal particularity is the *today* – in each case whiling, tarrying for a while, in the present, in each case our own present [Eine Bestimmung der Jeweiligkeit ist das *Heute,* das Je-Verweilen in Gegenwart, der je eigenen]. (Dasein as historical Dasein, its present. Being "in" the world, being lived "from out of" the world – the present-everyday.) (24 [29])

In this way, today refers to the 'awhileness of temporal particularity' [*Jeweiligkeit*] gathering as such the aspects of whiling [*weilen*] as well as particularity or "in each case" [*je*]. It gains the meaning of tarrying for a while of Dasein in its particular present. It is a mode of being and as such the mode of having: having things in this manner as present.[189] More specifically, 'today' is the mode of being in which one is absorbed into the world in its specific temporality. As a specific mode of being it is further explicated by Heidegger with the following keywords: publicness [*Öffentlichkeit*], talk [*Gerede*], averageness [*Durchschnittlichkeit*], every-one [*das Man*], and masking [*Maske*]. In this way, 'today' is a notion through which Heidegger describes the average everyday state of understanding conceived as the way of being 'every-one' and as being in 'fallenness' [*Verfall*] (24-27 [29-33]).

For, according to Heidegger, Dasein has its 'open space of publicness,' in which Dasein has its specific mode of discourse (talk) and a mode of interpretation (every-one)

[189] Thus, Heidegger ontologically determines "today" as follows: "[t]he today ontologically: *the present of those initial givens which are closest to us*, every-one, being-with-each-other – our time" (24 [30]).

(25 [31]). In responding to the public way of being, Dasein already has at its disposal what Heidegger calls 'having-been-interpreted' [*Ausgelegtheit*]. That is, there is already an interpretation on the basis of which Dasein lives and turns towards itself. As publicness, this what is at one's disposal is taken up and followed from and in the publicness. This mode of being of Dasein is described as 'every-one.' It is living in a definite mode of interpretation (having-been-interpreted) in which one does not explicitly thematize this having. Similarly, in 'talk,' Dasein has itself in advance in a certain way: predominantly addresses itself as *what*. In the open space of publicness these modes of having oneself in advance are taken up and held on to as averageness to be followed by every-one. Importantly, the public manner of being-interpreted ('being interpreted in the today') is described as only a 'mask,' the aim of which is to keep anxiety away from oneself (26 [32]). The every-one is described as no-one, which haunts itself and feeds itself. It is the educated consciousness, is the decline in universities, the familiar themes from Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle. As such, it is something from which the way out must be found, insofar as the authentic mode of relating is aimed at. At the same time, Heidegger insists that talking about everything, as the publicness does in its actualization of itself, Dasein also must be under discussion in some way. That is, in the 'today,' Dasein is already seen. In this way, it is the mode from which the analysis of facticity can take its point of departure in order to achieve wakefulness (24-27 [29-33]).

How interpretation is already at work in the 'today' is brought closer by Heidegger with the thematization of historical consciousness [*geschichtliche Bewußtsein*] and (traditional) philosophy. His analysis rests on a claim that in talking about itself in historical consciousness and in (traditional) philosophy, Dasein must already have some understanding of itself. [190] The question is what comes forth in these understandings.

With historical consciousness as demonstrating the 'being-interpreted in the today' (28-31, 40-45 [35-39, 52-57]), Heidegger stresses a certain temporal criterion found there.[191] He claims that in historical human sciences, in which historical consciousness emerges, the past is made accessible in the present as a finished and available possession for giving it over. For Heidegger, historical consciousness operates within anticipatory

[190] In this respect, Heidegger states: "[h]istory and philosophy are modes of interpretation, something which Dasein itself is, in which it lives – and insofar as Dasein itself comes forth and appears in them, these modes which are in Dasein itself are modes of its having itself in a definite manner" (39 [48-9]).

[191] Heidegger claims that "[t]he manner in which a time (the today which is in each case for a while at the particular time) sees and addresses the past (either its own past Dasein or some other past Dasein), holding onto it and preserving it or abandoning it, is a sign of how a present stands regarding itself, how it as a being-there *is* in its 'there'." (28 [35-36])

forehaving, which gives in advance the path for the research and is characterized relationally as "holding-in-view which observes" (41 [53]). That is, what is encountered is considered to be already there in the past to be looked into. Moreover, not only is 'the past' given to it objectively, but also 'the present' and 'the future,' which becomes predictable and calculable. He states that in the actualization of this work one holds oneself in one's 'there' as "'already there' of beings-which-have-been" (43 [54]). This actualization Heidegger names curiosity [*Neugier*]. It is a curious looking around, which according to Heidegger is pulled [*Zug*][192] along by its own object. Thus, he can be seen to expresses here a similar motive to that in his lecture on Aristotle. That is, this what is looked into pulls towards itself and demands the constant pursuit of looking anew. In this way, historical consciousness is described as "*curiosity which is led and pulled along,* i.e., led along by its object" and as "*a mode of the public being of life*" (43 [54]).

The interpretation at work in (traditional) philosophy (32-34, 45-50 [40-43, 58-64]) is both similar to and distinct from historical consciousness. The theme of (traditional) philosophy is said to be the universal, the *totality of beings* (32 [40]). As thematically including everything, the task of philosophy is to systemize the multiplicity included in this totality. As universal classification, philosophy aims at classifying and filing away something as something [*Hineinordnen von etwas in etwas*] (46 [59]). It is similar to historical consciousness inasmuch as it takes its material for its point of departure from empirical material made available in the publicness, "in the comportment of the curiosity which is pulled along by its objects" (47 [60]). However, it is distinct with respect to its manner of proceeding. That is, having taken something as an object, philosophy proceeds with ordering, whereby a context of a classificatory order which provides places to these objects is developed. In this respect, it is not only being pulled by the objects, but also constantly developing its own possibilities: "being-everywhere-and-nowhere" is not curiosity which is simply pulled along, but is rather "*absolute curiosity which leads itself along*" (49 [62]). Thus, decisive about this interpretation is the fact that it is a creative developing of the classificatory order. Here, the relational definitions of the classificatory order are found in 'as-well-as,' which means that something is in itself as well as the other and all others. As such, the 'as-well-as' provides the limitlessness of its universality (48-49 [61-62]).

[192] The 'pull' Heidegger is talking about is soon brought closer with the words: "([t]he pull: world, life, publicness, what was going on)" (42[54]).

Looking back to Heidegger's previous lecture courses, we can see that through these two modes of interpretations Heidegger repeats his view on different types of losing proper access: either by Dasein being pulled by its objects or by misleading itself through creative power. In this lecture course Heidegger insists that in these modes of interpretation Dasein itself is after something: namely, having itself objectively there for itself. It is after certainty as objective certainty,[193] in which "[b]oth directions of interpretation bring Dasein itself before its highest and pure *present*" (51 [65]). Dasein is encountered as objective being of its 'having been' and its 'always-being-in-such-a-manner' (ibid.). All in all, Heidegger insists that the basic phenomenon which lives and is at work in both of these modes of interpretation is curiosity. Curiosity is the manner of self-comporting "which consists in being-directed towards something in the mode of knowing and defining" (61 [79]). Furthermore, the modes of 'being interpreted in today' are based on taking up and following publicness. This, however, is not the only possible mode of access, nor is it the authentic mode of accessing. Rather, as could be expected, the approach named as 'being interpreted in today' and regarded as curiosity (a how of caring) needs to be brought authentically into view.

With the claim that Dasein itself must disclose itself in respect to definite characters of its being, Heidegger thus turns to forehaving [*Vorhabe*] (61-62 [79-80]). He observes that the possibility and productivity of curiosity have their roots in *what* Dasein is in advance approached and defined *as*. Looking at and defining already has in advance what is looked into. This, what is had in advance, and what is at work in accessing in each case in this way, is determined as forehaving. Thus, on the one hand, the forehaving is already at work in the description of curiosity. On the other hand, according to Heidegger, the approach to phenomenon depends on the primordiality and genuineness of forehaving. The forehaving must be empty so that it can be filled out with the look at the concrete (ibid.). As Heidegger says: "[e]verything depends upon our understanding being guided from out of the indefinite and vague but still intelligible content of the indication onto the right *path of looking* [*Blickbahn*]" (62 [80]). Here, the success of getting onto the right path is said to depend on rejecting the positions of looking which at a particular time might press themselves upon us as they are dominant in a certain situation. One must avoid the subject-

[193] Thus, according to Heidegger, they show that these are "modes *of being-there of Dasein*, paths which are held open and preserved in itself, on which *it is under way* and *finds itself* in its characteristic manner (of falling away), i.e., on which it *is taking possession of itself*, i.e., *making itself certain and secure* about itself" (51 [65]).

object schema as well as demand observations which are free from standpoints.[194] The guiding line must rather be taken from the everydayness and the task is to make the forehaving visible (60, 65 [77, 85]). This leads to the thematization of authentic access. Here, his point of departure is similar to that of his previous lecture course, but not his execution.

According to Heidegger, to everydayness belongs a certain averageness (the everyone) whereby the possibility of authenticity (the fact that Dasein is 'our own') is covered up. In uncovering Dasein in its average everydayness, what will be demonstrated is that first of all "factical life (the being-there of Dasein) means being in the world" (65 [85]). In this way, Heidegger once again insists that world is encountered. It is something we are concerned about [*Besorgte*]. The fundamental mode of being is characterized as 'caring' [*Sorgen*], the distinctiveness of which lies in that "it '*is*' its world, the very world it has encountered" (66 [86]). Insofar as the world is encountered as what one is concerned about, according to Heidegger it needs to be asked "*what* the world is encountered *as*" (66 [87]). More specifically, it is to be asked *as* what it is encountered in the initial givens, as closest to us in awhileness of temporal particularity of an average everydayness (67 [87]).[195]

In order to bring out what is meant by "what the world is encountered as," Heidegger offers two contrasting views of encountering a/the table. As with the example of encountering the lectern in his KNS lecture (*The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, see chapter two), the contrasting approaches serve first of all the purpose of bringing the table into the worldly context as *the* table. Thus, Heidegger insists that adducing the example of a/the table is in the service of bringing into relief "an authentic analysis" as well as characterizing "disastrous mistakes which are easily made in such primitive descriptions" (67 [88]). This disastrous mistake (considering 'a table' as

[194] In this lecture course Heidegger once again and very clearly insists that what must be avoided most pressingly is the subject-object schema. According to him, this schema underlying the endless discussions ("the object is dependent on the subject, or the subject on the object, or both on each other in a correlative manner" (63 [81])) lies in constructive forehaving, which cuts off the access to factical life (Dasein). Thus, he holds that no modifications of this schema are to be taken up and that no infiltration of it in phenomenology is to be allowed. In addition, he states: "90% of the literature is preoccupied with ensuring that such wrongheaded problems have not disappeared and are confounded still more and in ever new ways. Such literature dominates the industry – everyone sees and gauges the progress and vitality of academic disciplines with it." (ibid.) The second misunderstanding which must be avoided (demanding observations which are free from standpoints) creates according to Heidegger a false sense of self-evidence of the demand of being unbiased. He insists that all seeing is seeing and thus this 'freedom from standpoints' is also simply an "*appropriation of our position of looking*" (64 [82-83]).

[195] The awhileness refers to a situation circumscribed by initial and temporally particular givens. The *tarrying awhile* is for the most part not observation but being occupied with something at the moment. It is to be understood as temporalizing itself, which consists in being-on-the-way (67 [87]).

something which is encountered as an object in space) is said by Heidegger to stand in the "influence of *the* fate" (70 [91]). This, I believe, refers to approaching something as it has been handed down, interpretation from the publicness. With respect to the "authentic analysis," and again as in the KNS lecture course, the example serves as an introduction to the theme of meaningfulness [*Bedeutsamkeit*].[196] The center of Heidegger's break from the consideration of 'a table' towards 'the table' lies in the claim that meaningfulness is not a characteristic of things, but a how of being (66, 68 [86, 89]).

Meaningfulness is the character of the being-encountered (66, 71 [86, 93]). More specifically, Heidegger determines meaningful [*Bedeutsam*] as follows: "being, being there, in the how of definite signifying and pointing [Sein, Dasein im Wie eines bestimmten Bedeutens]" (71 [93]). As such, it designates the character of the "being-there" of the world as "worldly" and leads to the question "how significance [*Bedeutsamkeit*] constitutes this worldly *being-there*" (74 [97]). With this question, meaningfulness is thematized as disclosedness [*Erschlossenheit*], which in turn is said to show itself in two unified basic characteristics: (1) the characteristic of availability in advance [*Vorhandenheit*] and (2) the characteristic of the advance appearance of the with-world [*Mitweltliche Vorschein*] (71-76 [93-99]). Through these two characteristics Heidegger gives his account of how things closest to us in awhileness of temporal particularity of an average everydayness are encountered and lead to the possibility of this authentic mode of accessing.

With the characteristic of availability in advance, Heidegger points out that the being that is encountered in a worldly manner is encountered as being a means to: its being-there is a 'being-there-for-this.' That is, originally a thing is encountered as 'in-order-to' and 'as-what' (75 [97-98]). Thus, for example, the table is encountered as something on which to write or as too small for all the papers.

> What is there in such being-there-ready-to-hand as such, and there as something well-known and disclosed, is the *in-order-to*, and this in the mode of being of a definite everyday being-*in-such-and-such-a-manner* – e.g., in order to have a meal (this alone or with definite others and at different times of the day). (71 [93])

Furthermore, it is encountered as having been there and expected to be there again. That is, with the characteristic of availability in advance, Heidegger also points to temporality:

> Even *this definite everydayness and temporality* are thus *available in advance*. Already having been there in such and such a manner and expecting to be there again in such and such a manner. Past and

[196] In the English translation of this lecture course the German '*Bedeutsamkeit*' is translated similarly to GA 60 as 'significance.' In order to sustain coherence throughout the thesis, I will use from here on the notion of 'meaningfulness' as in previous chapters, except in cases when quoting the translated text of Heidegger's lecture course.

> future as definite horizons which each define the present – pressing forth into the there from out of the past and future. (71-72 [94])[197]

Bringing these two aspects to the foreground, Heidegger then states that these point to authentic encountering. He claims that "[t]he beings-which-are-there do not stand within the definiteness of definition, but rather within that of everydayness and its historicity" (72 [94]). 'In-order-to' and 'for-what' make up the originally given 'there' which is closest to us. Thus, in-order-to and for-what "are defined in the awhileness of their temporal particularity from out of a historical everydayness, defining and redefining themselves anew *from out of* such everydayness and *for* it in ways cut to the measure of its temporality" (75 [98]).

With respect to the characteristic of the advance appearance of the with-world, Heidegger additionally points to the fact that the availability in advance brings about the appearance of the others:

> Available in advance in such a manner, the there in advance brings about the appearance of "the others" in its being-*there*, a definite sphere of those with us in life which defines itself from out of everydayness […]. (72 [94])

The others come to appearance in everydayness not in isolation, but in what one pursues and is occupied with. The factical lives of others are encountered in a worldly manner as those 'with,' where the appearance of the with-world takes place in advance in availability (the for-what and in-order-to). For example, the table shows itself as that around which my family gathers at dinner time. In this way, the 'with' is also understood through 'one-self' [*man selbst*] as having to do with them (75-76 [98-99]). Furthermore, others bring 'one-self' with them: "[i]n the appearance of those who are being encountered in a with-world, one-self is therewith what one pursues, 'one-self,' one's status, reputation, accomplishments, successes and failures among the others" (76 [99]). Thus, Heidegger insists that in the encounter of things both others and one-self are there in an inexplicit but obvious manner. One-self is there not as observing oneself, but rather as being occupied with worldly dealings and showing itself in one's own temporality as one's world. In this respect, Heidegger can claim that 'one-self' shows itself as one's world: "[w]hat one pursues, that wherein one tarries for a while – one-self "is" this world [diese Welt "ist" man selbst]" (72 [94]). One is one's world and is this always with others – defines itself from and against others.

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[197] Temporality is thus brought out with the words: "there from that time, for, during, for the sake of [von damals, für, bei, umwillen da]" (72 [94]).

On the basis of what has been brought out, Heidegger is able to claim further that what is encountered in advance is encountered from out of familiarity [*Vertrautheit*] (76-77 [99-100]). What we encounter in advance is well-known, in the sense that "they are the wherein in which *one*, corresponding to what and who is to be encountered, knows one's way around, one-self" (77 [99]). Being-well-known is what is average. In this way, it is shown how the possibility of interpreting as being-interpreted in 'today,' on the basis of publicness, lies in factical life itself. However, publicness for Heidegger covers up authentic access. How authentic access becomes possible in and through factical life is unfolded by Heidegger in this lecture course as encountering the strange or unfamiliar.

According to Heidegger the strange emerges only on the basis of familiarity as something unfamiliar, uncomfortable, hindering (77 [100]). The strange is inexplicit familiarity which is awakened and thus encountered in the character of the unfamiliar. Furthermore, he claims that "[t]hrough the disturbability of inexplicit familiarity, what is being encountered is there in its *unpredictability*, its *incalculability*" (ibid.). This is not as the previously described 'historical consciousness' and 'philosophy' would interpret. Rather, the strange is disturbed familiarity which awakens interpretation different from what one knows: something is seen not as it was thought or planned. This awakening is described by Heidegger as an intensified moment.

> As such, it has in the character of its there a pronounced oppressiveness, a heightened "there." The possibility of the intensification of the character of there of something comes down on us like a storm or is already there as an inconvenience lies right within the inexplicit self-evidence of the familiarity of there of the everyday world. (77 [100])

In this way, Heidegger reaffirms the motive seen from his earlier lecture courses that philosophy's possibility lies in the intensification through which questionability breaks forth. This time, it breaks forth from averageness.

Thus, the "authentic mode of being" [*Eigentliche Weise des Seins*] in the world according to Heidegger is caring: "[i]n its caring, life approaches itself and addresses itself in a worldly manner" (79 [102]). As he insisted before, the caring is always concerned about itself and attends to itself in some manner. For itself it might disappears in habits, in which case it is covered up: "[b]eing-concerned-about and going about dealings have the immediate aspect of *carefreeness* [*Sorglosigkeit*]" (80 [103]). Or as Heidegger also states: "care is asleep" (ibid.). However, in life itself there is a possibility to access itself according to itself (as caring). As in the lecture on Aristotle, this possibility of authentic access as well as the possibility of covering up this access is firmly anchored in Dasein itself.

> On account of this, the possibility ever remains that distress will suddenly break forth in the world. The world can be encountered as something distressing only insofar as it is a world which is of significance [*Bedeutsam*] to us.
> (I must break off at this point.) (80 [102])

The thirteen hours are up. What has been achieved will be rethought again in Marburg, where certain elements and motives from different steps through first Freiburg period will be carried on to *Sein und Zeit* and further. Some of these motives will become self-evident and thus not explicated by Heidegger later on, but simply put to work. Perhaps in the same manner as Heidegger has carried his previous considerations into this lecture course, by rethinking his central questions, following a similar structure, and at the same time unfolding his account yet again differently. My concern is how Kierkegaard appears in this lecture course. Does he occupy the same place as before, despite the fact that Heidegger's consideration of possible access in and through factical life has been significantly changed? In what follows, I will aim to show that this is exactly the case: Heidegger once again can be seen to lean on Kierkegaard in his consideration of finding access in the living situation.

7.4. Kierkegaard's explicit presence in Heidegger's lecture course on hermeneutics of facticity

Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard on six separate occasions in this lecture course. On three of those occasions Heidegger states something about his relation to Kierkegaard. Since I will be focusing on Heidegger's assessments of Kierkegaard in the final chapter of this thesis, I will point out how Heidegger thematizes Kierkegaard in this lecture course in the latter section of this chapter. Here my main aim is to show where exactly Kierkegaard can be seen to influence Heidegger's consideration in the presently viewed lecture course. Therefore, the three other occasions where Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard must be considered. For in this lecture course Heidegger also reproduces two quotations from Kierkegaard and names him once without any further explanation.

The occasion where Heidegger simply names Kierkegaard is to be found in the loose page added to the lecture course. There Kierkegaard's name appears in the following context:

> See especially Paul: glory of Χριστός [Christ] as the Redeemer – the exile of humanity into distress and death! The *death* of Christ – the problem! Experience of death in any sense, death – life – Dasein (Kierkegaard). (86 [111])

In the wider context of the research into the relatedness between Heidegger and Kierkegaard, the fact that Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in the context of considering death is significant. As I brought out in the first chapter of this thesis, a number of

researchers have claimed that Heidegger's treatment of the phenomenon of death in his *Sein und Zeit* can be traced back to Kierkegaard, although no explicit reference in this respect is to be found there from Heidegger himself. Thus, this reference enables us to affirm that Heidegger indeed has made a connection with respect to this phenomenon. However, in this lecture course Heidegger does not yet consider the phenomenon of death more extensively. Rather, as with the phenomenon of anxiety mentioned in the lecture on Augustine, which was taken up by Heidegger more thoroughly later on, it apparently is the case that what he finds about death in Kierkegaard is yet to become significant for him. However, the fact that death has caught his eye with respect to Kierkegaard in this lecture course as a theme to be taken up comes out also from one of the quotations Heidegger has used in this lecture course. In the middle of the discussion about the possibility of questionableness in forehaving the following quotation from Kierkegaard is to be found:

> "Life can be interpreted only after it has been lived, just as Christ did not begin to explain the Scriptures and show how they taught of him until after he was resurrected" [Kierkegaard, Tagebuch 15. IV. 1838]. (13 [16-17])

That this quotation also refers to the fact that Heidegger has an interest in Kierkegaard's treatment of death can be seen from the fact that the citation is followed soon after with the following consideration and a question:

> It is in questionableness and in it alone that *the* position can be taken in which there could be something like: "fixing" on an end. This only where what is fixed on, or what is not fixed on, *has being* as a how of Dasein! How is the problem of death related to this? (13 [17])

This question, however, is not addressed in this lecture course. It is simply posed, and posed with reference to Kierkegaard. However, in connection with the present lecture course, it must be also pointed out that this quotation of Kierkegaard appears in the paragraph in which Heidegger talks of hermeneutics as self-interpretation and the character of being-possible, using the term '(anticipatory) leap,' a familiar wording from Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*. That is, Kierkegaard appears in the context where hermeneutics is considered to be a mode of actualization. In this respect, Heidegger can be seen to make note of Kierkegaard while considering the proper investigation again in connection with the demand to account for the living situation. I say "again," because a reference in the context pointing to the need to consider the actualizational account was also found in the lecture course on Aristotle (see chapter six). The fact that Heidegger leans on Kierkegaard in articulating his account of finding an access in and through factical life (Dasein) or in the concrete work of interpretation comes out through the second occasion where Kierkegaard is quoted. The quotation reads as follows:

> "To be a human being means to belong to a race endowed with reason, to belong to it as a specimen, so that the race or species is higher than the individual, which is to say that there are no individuals, only specimens" [Ki., Angriff 461.]. (83 [108])

At first sight, what is stated in this citation is contradictory to everything Heidegger stands for. On closer inspection, however, this reference leads to what in my opinion is at the center of Heidegger's attention with respect to Kierkegaard in this lecture course. This quotation stems from Kierkegaard's little treatise *The Single Individual*. In order to show that in this lecture course Heidegger draws heavily on this treatise, I will next make an excursion to Kierkegaard's treatise. After that, I will return to the consideration of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's presently viewed lecture course in order to highlight what Kierkegaard has offered to Heidegger as well as to bring out the latter's explicit estimations of Kierkegaard found in this lecture course.

7.5. Excursion: Kierkegaard's "The Single Individual: Two „notes" concerning my work as an author"

> The *single individual* is the category through which, in a religious sense, the age, history, the human race must go. And the one who stood at Thermopylae was not so secure as I, who have stood, in order at least to bring about an awareness of it, at this narrow pass, *the single individual*. His particular task was to keep the hordes from pressing through the narrow pass; if they pressed through, he would have been lost. My task at least exposes me far less to the danger of being trampled down, since it was as a lowly servant (but, as I have said from the beginning and repeat again and again, *without authority*) to prompt, if possible, to invite, to induce the many to press through this narrow pass, *the single individual*, through which, please note, no one presses except by becoming the single individual; the opposite is indeed a categorical impossibility (TSI: 118 [XIII 604]).

Kierkegaard's little treatise *The Single Individual*[198] [*Den Enkelte*, 1846-47, with postscripts 1849, 1855, posthumously published in 1859] consists of (along with the preface and a postscript) two notes and centers, as the title says, around the category of 'the single individual.' This category in turn is unfolded with respect to the thematization of the concept of 'the crowd' (understood as a danger which categorically corresponds to 'the single individual' (TSI: 120 [XIII 606])) and within the consideration of Kierkegaard's own aims of his authorship with regard to his reader in the present age. In what follows I will bring out how Kierkegaard unfolds these themes, with the aim of clarifying what Heidegger took from this treatise. I will ask: how should we understand the category of 'the single

[198] With time, the little work has been seen as addition to the book *The Point Of View For My Work As An Author* in which Kierkegaard also thematizes his own authorship and which was similarly published posthumously. However, as we hear from Kierkegaard himself, in the footnote of the text, it was intended at first to go with the dedication for the *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* [*Opbyggelige taler I forskjellig aand*] (105 [XIII 591]). Heidegger accessed this writing within the collection *Kierkegaards Angriff auf die Christenheit*, Vol. 1., ('*Kierkegaard's Attack upon Christendom*') in which the editors A. Dorner and C. Schrempf have collected a number of Kierkegaard's writings.

individual' and its counterpart, 'the crowd,' and in what sense is 'the single individual' the narrow pass through which the age, history and the human race must go?

What first of all comes out in this little treatise is that with the notion of 'the single individual' Kierkegaard does not refer to the distinction of a person or personality against or within the context of other human beings. It has nothing to do with the numerical one among many. Neither does the notion refer to a human being as an entity taken out from the world and history. In this respect, it is not an entity at all but a category. It is a category which needs to be understood in its *doubleness*.[199] According to Kierkegaard, the category of 'the single individual' expresses the doubleness of the human individual – it is a category which gathers both an individual and what is universally human: "[*t*]*he single individual* can mean the most unique of all, and *the single individual* can mean everyone" (115 [601]). For Kierkegaard, "every human being is indeed an individual human being" (117 [603]). Thus the question of 'the single individual' has nothing to do with measuring the individuality of one human being against another. Every human being is a human being and every human being is individual and can be 'the single individual.' In this respect, the category of 'the single individual' is rather a task:

> The single individual, not the single individual in the sense of the outstanding and especially gifted, but the individual in the sense in which every human being, unconditionally every human being, can be and should be an individual, should place his honor – but will also truly find his salvation – in being an individual. (117 [603]).

Thus, 'the single individual' points to a path one can take. As a path which one can take the category expresses the manner of relating. That this is the case comes out through Kierkegaard's explication of the distinction of 'the single individual' from 'the crowd.'

'The crowd' is not something which would be distinguished from 'the single individual' in the sense of there being this crowd, a mass of people and there standing the lonely single individual. Rather, 'the crowd' is a category, it is "a purely formal conceptual qualification" (n. 107 [n. 593]). According to Kierkegaard, as soon it is taken otherwise than as a category, that is, as soon it is taken numerically, 'the crowd' has already spoken

[199] In connection with the doubleness Kierkegaard explains the category of 'the single individual' through his writings, which are divided into pseudonymous books and upbuilding books. According to Kierkegaard, the difference of these writings lay in their respective connotations. That is, in the pseudonymous books 'the single individual' is "the outstanding individual," a person; in the upbuilding books 'the single individual' is brought out as "someone every human being is or can be": "[i]n other words, the point of departure of the pseudonymous writers is the difference between person and person with regard to intelligence, culture etc.; the point of departure of the upbuilding discourses is in the upbuilding, that is, in the universally human" (115 [XIII 601]). In explicating his category of 'the single individual' Kierkegaard makes it very clear that both of these connotations are to be taken together. To read the category of 'the single individual' any differently would be a misunderstanding (ibid.).

(n. 107 [n. 593]). He describes 'the crowd' as impersonal, an abstraction, cowardly and without responsibility. It flees from being 'a single individual' (108 [594]). These characteristics are not simply the characteristics of the many, that is, what the many have against what one individual has. Rather, what is described is a manner of relating. Kierkegaard explicates this in his text through the example of the killing of Caius Marius, whom no one would dare to kill on their own, but who was killed by three or four women "conscious of or with the idea of being a crowd" (107 [594]). In this respect, he insists that it might as well have been one individual, but what is essential is that the one doing the killing related as 'a crowd.' It is not a concept which articulates the distinction between the many and the one. Rather, a "crowd is formed by individuals" (112 [598]). That is, an individual is always an individual, who, however, may relate as many.

> A crowd is abstraction, which does not have hands; but every individual ordinarily has two hands, so when he, an individual, lays his two hands on Caius Marius, then they are that individual's two hands, certainly not those of his neighbors, even less of the crowd, which has no hands. (108 [594])

In this sense Kierkegaard can say: "[n]o one, no one, is excluded from being an individual, except the one who excludes himself by becoming many" (112 [598]). "Becoming many" refers to relating as 'a crowd.' Insofar as the category refers to relating, Kierkegaard claims that "the/a crowd is untruth" (107, 109 [593, 595]).

By claiming that "the crowd is untruth," Kierkegaard makes it clear from the beginning that the (un)truthfulness is not considered with respect to the practical dealings in the world.[200] Rather, truth is a path, a way of relating. Both truth and untruth are for Kierkegaard ways of relating. In this sense, neither of them is strictly speaking wrong. The difference (and the significance) of the two refers to the access which is opened or closed in these respective ways of relating. Thus, "crowd is untruth" only insofar as the concept of 'the crowd' expresses the way of relating! In this respect, Kierkegaard insists that both addressing 'the crowd' (communicating with 'the crowd' and not with 'the single individual') and addressing as 'crowd' (communicating out of 'the crowd' and not as 'a single individual') make the communication of truth an impossibility. For Kierkegaard, truth "can be communicated by and received only by *the single individual*, who as a matter

[200] As he says in a footnote: "[y]et it is perhaps most appropriate to mention once and for all something that is self-evident and something I certainly have never denied – namely, that with respect to all temporal, earthly, worldly goals, the crowd can have its validity, even its validity as the decisive factor, that is as an authority. But I am not speaking about such matters, no more than I occupy myself with such things. I am speaking about the ethical, the ethical-religious, about *the truth*, and I say that from the ethical-religious point of view the crowd is untruth if it is supposed to be valid as the authority for what *truth* is." (n. 106 [n. 592])

of fact could be every person who is living" (111 [597]). The decisiveness of the category of 'the single individual' is brought out by Kierkegaard in two interrelated directions.

On the one hand, according to Kierkegaard, truth can be communicated and received only by 'the single individual' with the help of the personal God (as opposed to an impersonal God). That is, 'the single individual' is decisive with respect to Christianity: "*[t]hat single individual* – with this category the cause of Christianity stands or falls, now that world-development has gone as far as it has in reflection" (122 [608]). Thus, the formal conceptual category 'the crowd' seen as a manner of relating becomes untruth which blocks the relation (abolishes the kinship) with the divine as well as truthful understanding of the other human as 'the neighbor' (111 [597]).

On the other hand, the category of 'the single individual' not only denotes the manner of relating in order to become a Christian, but is also thematized through "the present age." At the beginning of the treatise stands a claim: "[i]n these times everything is politics" (103 [589]). It is important to notice that the opposition to this understanding of 'the single individual' is unfolded by Kierkegaard with an eye on the present conditions, with an eye on "the condition of these times" (116 [602-603]). Kierkegaard regards the manner of relating which he names 'the crowd' as the dominant manner of relating in the present age. Thus, he talks about the wretchedness of our time, which lies exactly in the type of understanding described as 'the crowd.' It is the dominance of the public, the press, in which the anonymous author writes to nobody and in which 'the crowd' is considered to be authoritative (110, 116, 119-120 [596, 602, 605]). Against this approach the category of 'the single individual' stresses the relation from the concrete to the concrete. This is what Kierkegaard claims to have aimed at with his authorship without authority (118 [604]). He states that throughout his different writings he has aimed at bringing out the category of 'the single individual' in order to bring awareness and waken the possibility of becoming 'the single individual,' as well as to point out that it is impossible to build up *en masse* (119 [605], 117 [603]). As Heidegger has noticed, the aim is exactly to show what it is to consider only the specimens or to lift the race higher than the individual (107 [593]; GA 63: 83 [108]). Thus, with his writings and with the category of 'the single individual,' Kierkegaard claims to oppose the system and fight against the present age: what he sees around himself in Denmark, as a little country in which publishing is reduced to daily newspapers (TSI: 116 [602]). Heightening awareness of the category of 'the single

individual' builds the way to overcome the dominant (mis-)understanding and thus pave the way to understanding, that is, the possibility to become 'the single individual.'

7.6. Kierkegaard in Heidegger's lecture course on hermeneutics of facticity

The excursion to Kierkegaard's treatise *The Single Individual* presented in this chapter was prompted by the quotation Heidegger used in his lecture course. It is an interesting choice by Heidegger to quote this passage, which at first sight seems to express a view contrary to his own. Nevertheless, the reference enables us to see how extensively Heidegger has made use of Kierkegaard in his deliberation. The context of the quotation reveals first of all that these words of Kierkegaard cited by Heidegger exemplify what Kierkegaard also argues against. Furthermore, the reference exposes the significance of this little treatise to Heidegger. In my opinion, there is no doubt that Heidegger has made use of Kierkegaard's treatise for his treatment of the 'today' and his analysis of 'being-interpreted in the today.' Kierkegaard's 'crowd' as relating, which rejects publicness and is a mode of relating as many, is strikingly similar to Heidegger's central theme of his lecture on hermeneutics of facticity. In this way, this theme, which through *Sein und Zeit* becomes know under the notion of *das Man*, translated for example as 'they,' 'they-self,' 'every-one' or 'anyone,' can be seen to have its source in Kierkegaard: as explicitly traced back to Kierkegaard. Similarly, Heidegger's estimation of the tradition as living in the self-interpretation based on the 'open space of publicness' is concurrent with Kierkegaard's judgement of the present age relating as 'crowd.' Furthermore, both describe 'the crowd' as cowardly or fleeing from what is claimed to be an authentic relation, achievement of the latter being for both thinkers a difficult task. However, in this lecture course Heidegger's method of gaining authentic access through un-familiarity is not to be found in Kierkegaard. Furthermore, we should note that the way Heidegger explicates the relations at work is quite distinct from Kierkegaard. Heidegger's detailed analysis, which aims to bring out the characters of being and in which he works out his approach by destroying traditional approaches, is not something one encounters in Kierkegaard. More importantly for the present thesis, Heidegger is never seen to be turning towards Kierkegaard when he considers his investigation to be an ontological study or aims to unfold his phenomenological approach. Rather, as in all his lecture courses, Kierkegaard appears as a significant source as soon as Heidegger applies his investigative tools to express the living situation; as soon as he considers access in and through factical life. That this is the case is

supported, in my opinion, by Heidegger's own brief and not overly explicit estimations of Kierkegaard.

As was said, in the present lecture course, Heidegger explicitly thematizes Kierkegaard on three separate occasions. The way he talks about Kierkegaard reflects how he has chosen the previously highlighted quotations: not in a straightforward manner. Thus, in his estimations too he both acknowledges Kierkegaard and dismisses him in one breath.

The first of these acknowledgments is to be found in the "Foreword" of the lecture course, which was not delivered in the lecture itself. Here, Heidegger states:

> Companions in my searching were the young Luther and the paragon Aristotle, whom Luther hated. Impulses were given by Kierkegaard, and Husserl opened my eyes. This for those who "understand" something only when they reckon it up in terms of historical influences, the pseudo-understanding of an industrious curiosity, i.e., diversion from what is solely at issue in this course and what it all comes to. One should make their "tendency of understanding" as easy as possible for them so that they will perish of themselves. Nothing is to be expected of them. They care only about the pseudo. (4 [5-6])

On the second occasion the acknowledgment was made during the lecture course (in the middle of the discussion about the notion of 'today') and, apparently for the first time, in public.[201] In this acknowledgment Heidegger simultaneously distances himself from Kierkegaard. Heidegger declares:

> Strong impulses for the hermeneutical explication presented here stem from the work of Kierkegaard. But his presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal were fundamentally different. Insofar as he made these too easy for himself. What was basically in question for him was nothing but the kind of personal reflection he pursued. He was a theologian and stood within the realm of faith, in principle outside of philosophy. The situation today is different one. (25 [30])

On the third occasion Kierkegaard is mentioned in a similarly dismissive fashion in the context of dialectics:

> The pertinacity of dialectic, which draws its motivation from a very definite source, is documented most clearly in Kierkegaard. In the properly philosophical aspect of his thought, he did not break free from Hegel. His later turn to Trendelenburg is only added documentation for how little radical he was in philosophy. He did not realize that Trendelenburg saw Aristotle through the lens of Hegel. His reading the Paradox into the New Testament and things Christian was simply negative Hegelianism. But what he really wanted (phenomenal) was something different. When today the attempt is made to connect the authentic fundamental tendency of phenomenology with dialectic, this is as if one wanted to mix fire and water. (33 [41-42])

These thematizations of Kierkegaard by Heidegger are quite exceptional. As has been seen in the analysis of the previous lecture courses, Heidegger does not often say anything explicitly about Kierkegaard. When, however, he does say something about Kierkegaard, what he says is not explicated in detail. That Heidegger leaves a lot of room for

[201] This is also brought out by Kisiel, who writes: "[e]ven though he here first publicly acknowledges his debt to Kierkegaard, in particular in his descriptions of the 'public' (GA 63:30) – Heidegger adds 'everydayness' (GA 63:85; it was first used in WS 1919-20) and 'chatter' (GA 63:31), for the first time in this course, to his descriptions of the averageness of the Anyone – he is apparently still wary of the modishness of 'Kierkegaardism' at this time." (Kisiel 1995: 275)

interpretation in his estimation of Kierkegaard is evident in these citations too. If we look back to what has been brought out in previous lecture courses, the fact that Heidegger makes a strong effort to distance himself from Kierkegaard underlines the need to be cautious. However, my aim is not to speculate here about Heidegger's motives for dismissing Kierkegaard. Rather, I would like to pay attention to three aspects emerging from these citations. First of all, it is clear that Heidegger does not consider Kierkegaard to be a philosopher in his own right. Secondly, Heidegger distances himself from Kierkegaard by saying that their "presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal were fundamentally different." Thirdly, Heidegger acknowledges Kierkegaard twice as giving impulses to his present research specified as "the hermeneutical explication presented here." These three aspects lead me back to the central claim of this thesis: that Heidegger follows a two-directional path during his first Freiburg period and that Kierkegaard gains importance within the consideration of actualization, with respect to access in and through factical life. In the context of the present lecture course, let it be remembered that according to Heidegger hermeneutics is a self-interpretation which has the task of bringing wakefulness to philosophy. As far as this self-interpretation is a proper mode of actualization, it falls under one of the two directions followed by Heidegger throughout his first Freiburg period. That is, according to my reading, in the three above-mentioned citations, Heidegger affirms explicitly Kierkegaard's significance with respect to gaining access in and through factical life as he did in his lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. I will return to this claim in the final chapter of this thesis, in which I will look back at the search for Kierkegaard in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses.

7.7. Conclusion

In this chapter I aimed to establish Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's lecture course *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity.* As in the previous two chapters I showed how Heidegger gives a rethought account of philosophically proper access in two directions and established Kierkegaard's place by (1) tracking Heidegger's path through the lecture course, (2) making an excursion to Kierkegaard's treatise *The Single Individual*, which can be seen to be significant to Heidegger, and (3) considering the remarkable similarities between the two texts as well as Heidegger's explicit references to Kierkegaard. On the basis of what was brought out, I claimed that Kierkegaard emerges as an important source for Heidegger when he explains in this lecture course how interpretation is at work in and

through factical life (Dasein). By showing that this is the case, the overall claim of this thesis was reaffirmed. For, despite the fact that Heidegger rethinks his specific accounts, he nevertheless continuously addresses the question of proper access in two directions and is seen to turn to Kierkegaard when considering possible access in and through factical life.

8. Søren Kierkegaard's place in Martin Heidegger's path of rethinking philosophy in his first Freiburg period

8.1. Introduction

In one of his estimations of Kierkegaard, Heidegger judges a study which investigates his historical influences as a pseudo-study: a part of the decadent situation in philosophy, which takes the easy way out and is led by curiosity. Settling with historical influences according to him is a "diversion from what is solely at issue in this course and what it all comes to." (GA 63: 4 [5-6]) But is this indeed the case: is the search for Kierkegaard in Heidegger's path to be considered a diversion?

The aim of the current study has been to understand Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. This task indeed implies that the aim is to reckon with Kierkegaard as a historical influence on Heidegger and doubtless, during this thesis, I have curiously aimed to see what Kierkegaard has to offer to Heidegger. And yet, I contend that the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period is not a diversion from what is at issue. On the contrary, I claim that if we take seriously Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path, we must also admit something about the very core of Heidegger's philosophy. Dealing with Kierkegaard's place points pressingly to that what Heidegger is after and how he aims to achieve his task. In this way, the search for Kierkegaard gains significance in understanding Heidegger. Perhaps even more so, because what this research shows is to a certain extent in confrontation with Heidegger's own suggestions about this path.

In this final chapter I will address three questions. First, what has emerged through the analysis of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path about the latter's central problem and his manner of tackling this problem? Secondly, what can be concluded about Kierkegaard's place through Heidegger's explicit estimations of him? And finally, what emerges from Heidegger's various references to Kierkegaard, so that the latter is highlighted by Heidegger as not simply a companion, but a source of impulses? My claim is that looking at Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger first Freiburg period lecture courses enables us to clarify Heidegger's path. I hold that the central problem for Heidegger is the problem of accessing, which he unfolds in two directions: as a search for proper

methodology of philosophical investigation and for a mode of accessing in the living situation.

8.2. Heidegger's quest of philosophy

Is the search for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy to be considered a diversion as Heidegger suggests? Or does this assessment rather follow from how Heidegger wishes his path to be seen? What does the search for Kierkegaard reveal about Heidegger's path?

In this research, I took my point of departure from what can be called Heidegger's own beginning, a breakthrough to his own philosophy. I continued with Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses from this starting point, unraveling each lecture course in itself and as a path, attempting to keep some distance from what Heidegger arrives at (predominantly considered with an eye to his *Sein und Zeit*). In the latter case, as was shown, the question of the beginning can be placed not only in his KNS lecture (1919), but also to his turn to Aristotle or even in his last lecture course of the first Freiburg period, as Heidegger himself did. Each of these placements in my opinion is a possibility which develops from the views of what Heidegger's philosophy is all about, what it comes down to. With the aim of finding Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's lecture courses, I have taken this as a question. That is, with respect to the latter I have asked: what is at issue for him and how does he resolve his problem sphere in his first Freiburg lecture courses? What first of all comes out in this respect is that Heidegger's central explicitly asked question is not the meaning of Being, but rather 'what is philosophy?'. This question is always accompanied by the claim that the current situation in philosophy is in decline. As a starting point, this refers to the need to rethink philosophy. But what exactly is philosophy as a problem for Heidegger? And what is philosophy as a resolution for Heidegger? These two questions, in my opinion, point to what is the same throughout the path and what is distinct in each lecture course. As such the two questions enable us to account for the core features of Heidegger's path.

The answer to the question of philosophy as a resolution depends on which lecture course is considered. It can be said to be formalization (GA 56/57), phenomenology as consisting of three methodological moments (GA 59, GA 60), phenomenological ontology (GA 61), or hermeneutics in its connection to phenomenology and ontology (GA 63). At the same time, philosophy can be said to be found through immersing oneself in the

genuineness of life (GA 56/57). It can be intensifying concentration upon the self-world (GA 58), questioning motivated from facing God (GA 60), repetition unfolded through life's temporality (GA 61), or a mode of self-interpretation (GA 63). Each of these determinations can be seen to be a further development of what Heidegger has previously achieved, in which the execution is always somewhat distinct. And yet, all of these resolutions have something in common. What the lecture courses share comes first of all out through the problem of what each of the accounts are a resolution of. This leads to the question: what is philosophy as a problem for Heidegger?

With respect to the question 'what is philosophy as a problem?', in my opinion Heidegger throughout his first Freiburg period presents the same overall structure: one which he has presented already in his KNS lecture course. Thus, first of all, in this lecture course he already establishes that philosophy has the task of expressing and accessing the pre-worldly (the basic characters, relational sense or facticity), which is connected with what is called the worldly. In this way, he has articulated both what is the thematic field for considering philosophy (factical life, factical life experience, Dasein) and that towards which philosophy must be directed (the pre-worldly, the basic characters, relational sense or facticity). These two aspects remain the same throughout Heidegger's first Freiburg period, regardless of the fact that the terminology for it changes. They describe philosophy's task, but not philosophy itself as a problem. In this respect, I would claim that the main issue which Heidegger tackles under the question 'what is philosophy?' is not the pre-worldly. Rather, the main issue, what is asked over and over again, is the problem of how to access the pre-worldly. This is what is rethought in each lecture course. Furthermore, this is what needs to be rethought insofar as the necessity of rethinking philosophy comes about from the current situation in philosophy, which is continually determined as a loss of access.

The fact that Heidegger's focus is on the question of access is also indicated by each of the resolutions Heidegger offers for the question 'what is philosophy?': they say something about the proper manner of accessing. At the same time, these resolutions indicate already another aspect of Heidegger's problem. The resolutions offer either a methodological way of investigating, or a consideration of the mode of accessing in the living situation. That is, as I have aimed to show throughout this thesis, with respect to the problem of finding the proper access, Heidegger is on a two-directional path. On the one hand, he aims to articulate a proper investigation for accessing. On the other hand, he

searches the possibility of accessing in the living situation itself in and through factical life. Throughout his lecture courses he in fact pursues philosophy in both of these directions, rethinks the possibilities and thus can be seen to articulate philosophy in different ways. At the same time, the fact that Heidegger pursues philosophy in these two directions does not mean that a two-directional path is what he aims at. On the contrary, he constantly seeks to bring these two directions together. This is attempted either by explicating factical life experience (GA 60), presenting the two directions as complementary angles of the same question (GA 61), or by bringing them together as (self-)interpretation (GA 63). From this perspective, it could even be claimed that the main problem for Heidegger is how to bring these two directions together. How to reckon with methodology, which is always somehow a stance towards the living situation (a clarification), with the very living situation itself. The fact that Heidegger seeks to bring the two sides together and even insists that he has achieved this, as was shown through his letter to Löwith and Becker in the introduction of the first part of this thesis, may lead to the problem of aiming to understand how he overcomes this gap. In my opinion however, it mainly leads to stressing one or another side of the two accounts of accessing.

As I have demonstrated in the first part of this thesis, there are two main lines of understanding Heidegger's method. I elaborated on these two lines of understanding in Chapter Four with the reference to Søren Overgaard and Theodore Kisiel. I argued that Heidegger himself gives a ground to both of these interpretations by taking up a two-directional task. I would now like to highlight these two accounts once more with an eye on what has been established about Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy. The question is: what should be said about Kierkegaard's role in Heidegger's philosophy if we adopt one of the two approaches?

Throughout the analysis of Heidegger's lecture courses, it has become apparent that Kierkegaard appears as significant to Heidegger in each lecture course as soon as he addresses the question of accessing in and through factical life. Furthermore, it has been shown that in these considerations Heidegger leans quite heavily on Kierkegaard. From these results, in my view, it must be admitted that considering Kierkegaard's impact on Heidegger depends on whether one focuses on the primacy of the relational sense or of the actualization sense (see sections 4.3 and 4.5). If we give primacy to the actualization sense then Kierkegaard becomes an extremely significant source for Heidegger. If, however, we give primacy to the relational sense, Kierkegaard's role diminishes. It is a telling fact in my

opinion that Kierkegaard rarely is seriously considered when Heidegger's philosophy is seen to focus on philosophy as an investigation which gives primacy to the relational sense. Thus, Overgaard never talks of Kierkegaard's role for Heidegger's philosophy. On the other hand, if Heidegger is seen to lean towards the primacy of actualization of philosophy, Kierkegaard's influence is often thematized. Kisiel talks of Kierkegaard's significance to Heidegger on several occasions.[202]

Thus, if Heidegger is not considered to be on a two-directional path, then with respect to Heidegger's central aims Kierkegaard is to be seen either as insignificant (the central question being how one must proceed with philosophical investigation) or as central source of influence (the central question being where in life itself lies the possibility of philosophy). Neither of which in my opinion is the case. Rather, I claim that if we take Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy seriously, we must also admit something about Heidegger's path: namely, exactly the fact that he unfolds his central problem during his first Freiburg period in two directions. That is, when curiously looking for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy, his path will show itself as two-directional. With this claim, I do not wish to say that without considering Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's philosophy one cannot arrive at the same conclusion. Rather, in my opinion, it is difficult to bypass the fact that Heidegger is on a two-directional path, when searching for Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. Furthermore, I claim that Heidegger himself brings out the distinction between two manners of accessing, especially when explicitly estimating Kierkegaard's role for his philosophy. That this is the case will be shown in the next section.

8.3. Questioning Heidegger's estimation of Kierkegaard

The fact that Heidegger's realization of his problem appears differently from what he claims to have achieved in the letter to Löwith and Becker, as well as his dismissal of the attempts to reckon with his historical influences, raises an additional issue in connection with Kierkegaard. Namely, Heidegger's own explicit estimations of Kierkegaard.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I pointed out that Heidegger's own evaluations of Kierkegaard are often put under question. The reason for this lies, for example, in the fact that Kierkegaard's influence has been found in the thematizations in Heidegger's works

[202] From this perspective we should perhaps also highlight the interesting fact that from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* Kierkegaard has been constantly connected with the themes of the second division of this book, and not with the first (see in chapter one, section five).

without Heidegger himself acknowledging this. In this respect, Heidegger's words expressing his attitude toward reckoning with historical influences might be considered an attempt to explain his reluctance to highlight his sources. Even in his considerations of, for example, Aristotle and Augustine, he does not say much about these thinkers, but rather unfolds their respective treatises through his own aims. Taking this into account, it might be also the case that Heidegger does not aim to explain anything, but rather in complete sincerity considers dealing with his historical influences a diversion: a diversion from his own agenda. And yet, I claimed that looking into Kierkegaard's place has been helpful for pinpointing what this agenda is. Now I claim that the same is the case with Heidegger's explicit thematizations of Kierkegaard: in my opinion, the considerations of his sources are not distractions, but rather enable us to highlight his concerns. More specifically, I claim that by looking at Heidegger's assessments of Kierkegaard, Heidegger himself can be seen to support the claim that he is on a two-directional path.

From Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses,[203] one can find five more or less explicit estimations of Kierkegaard. Most clearly he brings out his views on Kierkegaard and the latter's role for his philosophy in his lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity*. In his previous lecture courses, Heidegger only hints at his appreciation of Kierkegaard. Thus, as was shown, in his lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Kierkegaard is mentioned by name along with Augustine and Luther as occasions of "powerful eruptions" of self-assertion of Christianity within a more general process of deformation of early Christian achievement (GA 58: 155 [205]).[204] If we link Kierkegaard in this way with Heidegger's consideration of 'intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world,' Heidegger is seen to express affinity to what Kierkegaard has to offer. That Heidegger appreciates Kierkegaard as a source is also expressed in the motto ("Motto, along with a grateful indication of the source") added to the lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, to which he adds: "[i]n order to characterize the intention of the interpretation, I cite a motto, which is prefixed to this introduction to phenomenological research" (137 [182]). Both of these references show Heidegger's appreciation of Kierkegaard without offering any explicit thematization of Kierkegaard.

[203] Not including Heidegger's review of Jaspers here.
[204] The citation in full reads as follows: "[t]his early Christian achievement was deformed and submerged by the infiltration of ancient science into Christianity. From time to time it asserts itself yet again in powerful eruptions (as in *Augustine*, in *Luther*, in *Kierkegaard*)." (GA 58: 155 [205])

This leaves us with the estimations given in the lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity*.

In the assessments found in the last lecture course of his first Freiburg period, Heidegger presents his relation to Kierkegaard in a similar vein as found in *Sein und Zeit*. He both expresses his appreciation of Kierkegaard as a source of impulses and distances himself from what Kierkegaard has to offer. More concretely, in his thematizations of Kierkegaard, Heidegger says first of all that Kierkegaard has given impulses for his research (GA 63: 4 [5-6]), and that from Kierkegaard stem the "[s]trong impulses for the hermeneutical explication presented in here" (25 [30]). Thus, Heidegger clearly admits his indebtedness to Kierkegaard. At the same time, these acknowledgments are accompanied by a dismissal of Kierkegaard. More specifically, Heidegger distances himself from Kierkegaard with respect to "presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal" (ibid.). The difference is further clarified with the claim that Kierkegaard made these aspects "too easy for himself" and that Kierkegaard was interested only in "the kind of personal reflection he pursued" (ibid.). All in all, Kierkegaard is said to be a theologian, who "stood within the realm of faith, in principle outside of philosophy" (25 [30]).

These evaluations of Kierkegaard, although perhaps highly confusing at first sight, in my opinion clearly point to what kind of place Kierkegaard has been given by Heidegger in his considerations. As I see it, Kierkegaard's significance for Heidegger lies exactly in the profound "personal reflection." From Kierkegaard, Heidegger finds the actualization of the deepest concern of oneself. At the same time, he distances himself from Kierkegaard with respect to his view on how this actualization is to be clarified philosophically. That is, how philosophy must investigate its theme: what philosophy aims at, how it approaches its theme and executes the investigation. In short, how proper philosophy is to investigate, access and express its thematic field as well as what this thematic field is supposed to be according to Heidegger.

That Heidegger distances himself from Kierkegaard with respect to the manner of approach comes further out in Heidegger's third estimation of Kierkegaard found in the lecture course *Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity*. On this occasion, Heidegger first commends Kierkegaard for having "documented most clearly" what he calls "the pertinacity of dialectics" (GA 63: 33 [41-42]). Having said that, he then states "[i]n the properly philosophical aspect of his [Kierkegaard's] thought, he did not break free from Hegel."

> The pertinacity of dialectic, which draws its motivation from a very definite source, is documented most clearly in Kierkegaard. In the properly philosophical aspect of his thought, he did not break free from Hegel. His later turn to Trendelenburg is only added documentation for how little radical he was in philosophy. He did not realize that Trendelenburg saw Aristotle through the lens of Hegel. His reading the Paradox into the New Testament and things Christian was simply negative Hegelianism. But what he really wanted (phenomenal) was something different. When today the attempt is made to connect the authentic fundamental tendency of phenomenology with dialectic, this is as if one wanted to mix fire and water. (33 [41-42])

What is most significant in this passage in my opinion is not the fact that Heidegger considers Kierkegaard to be a Hegelian. Rather, it is significant that Heidegger says that Kierkegaard does not break free from Hegel in "the properly philosophical aspect." Furthermore, Heidegger asserts the incompatibility of "the authentic fundamental tendency of phenomenology" and dialectics. Therefore, this passage does not just say that Kierkegaard according to Heidegger was a Hegelian. It says that Kierkegaard's mistake in Heidegger's eyes was to approach "the authentic fundamental tendency" in dialectics. This 'authentic fundamental tendency' is not to be mixed with dialectics but with ontological-phenomenology. In this distinction lies the answer to the question in what sense Heidegger does not consider Kierkegaard to be a philosopher.

Let it be remembered that Heidegger makes the previous assessment in the final lecture of his first Freiburg period. As I stated in the first chapter of this thesis and hopefully have been able to show through the analysis of Heidegger's different lecture courses, there is not one understanding of philosophy in Heidegger's first Freiburg period. Furthermore, in his various lecture courses, Heidegger has aimed in different ways to bring together the two accounts of accessing. In this respect it is important to keep in mind where Heidegger makes this statement: it must be seen in the context of what is presented in the lecture on hermeneutics of facticity. Taking this into consideration, what Heidegger's currently viewed estimation shows is that in his last lecture course Heidegger gives the upper hand to the specific methodological considerations: philosophy must clarify life by pointing to its relational sense (facticity). Husserl has opened his eyes. To put it very simply, for Heidegger, Kierkegaard is not a phenomenologist and thus not a philosopher, insofar as philosophy is to be seen as ontological phenomenology gathered into hermeneutics. Furthermore, insofar as for Heidegger philosophy in the end is an ontological study, Kierkegaard is not radical enough for him. But this only as far as Heidegger can be seen to give primacy to what he has brought out about the proper manner of how one must carry through the investigation in philosophy.

The fact that the methodological approach in this way takes an upper hand for Heidegger in his consideration of philosophy enables us to highlight another aspect of Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard. As I pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, when Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard is considered (predominantly with respect to Heidegger's writings posterior to his first Freiburg period), then usually it is admitted that Heidegger does not simply take over something from Kierkegaard. Rather he is claimed to formalize, secularize, or ontologize Kierkegaard. That this is the case comes out also in the analysis of Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. Furthermore, this fact once again enables us to establish that Heidegger is on a two-directional path. That is, in his consideration of philosophy in and through factical life he does not simply repeat his sources, but rather aims to "clarify" their respective accounts. In this respect Heidegger aims to achieve conceptual clarity about Augustine's *Confessions, Book X* as well as unfold his take on Aristotle with an eye on the basic characters. It can be claimed that he does the same with Kierkegaard: he unfolds what he has found in Kierkegaard according to his own agenda and through the investigation deemed to be properly philosophical in Heidegger's eyes. But is this the whole story of Kierkegaard's impact on Heidegger? Or is Kierkegaard somehow special? Does he take from Kierkegaard something which penetrates into the very core of his philosophy? After all, according to Heidegger himself, Kierkegaard is not simply a companion for him (as for example he claimed Luther and Aristotle to be), but rather has given *impulses* to Heidegger. What does this mean?

8.4. Kierkegaard as a source of impulses

Throughout this thesis, I have shown where Heidegger explicitly mentions Kierkegaard and, on the basis of these references, have aimed to trace Kierkegaard's place and significance for Heidegger. But is there something that Heidegger finds in Kierkegaard which distinguishes the latter from his other sources?

The research of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period has enabled us to exhibit that there are connections to be found in a wide range of themes. It has allowed to reaffirm Heidegger's interest in the themes with which the connection has been found in his later writings (for example, the notion of anxiety), as well as give a firm grounding to the themes in which connections have been found on the level of motives and structures (for example, death and repetition). Furthermore, the research of Heidegger's first Freiburg period reveals a number of themes which have not been connected to

Kierkegaard through Heidegger's later writings. Each of these themes deserves more attention than was given here. What I have rather been aiming at is Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's path. Here, I have claimed that Kierkegaard gains importance for Heidegger in his consideration of access in and through factical life. Now, I would like to pay attention to a further aspect of this placement. The question is whether Kierkegaard offers to Heidegger simply certain themes which Heidegger stumbles upon and half randomly takes up, or whether Heidegger finds a thought from Kierkegaard which penetrates into the very core of Heidegger's philosophy (as for example Kierkegaard's notion repetition has done as Caputo (1987:12) has claimed with reference to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*). To put it differently: what does it mean that Kierkegaard has given 'impulses' [(*An*)*stöβe*] for Heidegger, as opposed to being just a companion as he has claimed Luther and Aristotle to be (GA 63: 4 [5-6])?

With this question in mind, it is first of all significant to notice two facts. First, that Heidegger develops distinct accounts of accessing in each of his lecture courses. Second, that Kierkegaard appears in these lecture courses as soon as Heidegger discusses the problem of access in and through factical life. That is, Kierkegaard emerges as significant with respect to philosophy as it is sought in the living situation regardless of the fact that Heidegger has offered a rethought version of it. For, considering Kierkegaard's significance to Heidegger, this situation leads to the question: what do these different versions by Heidegger have in common? As has been shown, all of them address the question of access, where in each case both authentic and inauthentic access is unfolded. But these accounts of philosophy in and through factical life share another feature. Namely, in whatever way the access is claimed to be achieved, what one must confront is claimed to be oneself as questionable. That is, in all of his three lecture courses, which I analyzed in *Part Two*, Heidegger's articulation of philosophy in and through factical life comes down to questionability. The way he arrives at the need for questioning as well as how questionability is said to break forth is different in each case. In the lecture on Augustine the questionability breaks forth through facing God, in the lecture on Aristotle this possibility is found in life's temporal movement, as a counter-movement from facing nothingness, and in the lecture on hermeneutics of facticity something becomes questionable through unfamiliarity. In each case, Heidegger was shown to lean on Kierkegaard, regardless of the way that Heidegger arrived at his respective accounts.

In order to show how this becomes decisive for reckoning with Kierkegaard's role for Heidegger's philosophy during his first Freiburg period, I will return to Heidegger's estimation of Kierkegaard found in the review of Jaspers and thematized by me in the fourth chapter of this thesis. Namely, in his review of Jasper, Heidegger claims that "such a heightened consciousness of methodological rigor as his [Kierkegaard's] has rarely been achieved in philosophy or theology (the question where he [Kierkegaard] has achieved this [methodological] rigor is not important here)" (JR: 101 [41]).[205] Previously I claimed that what is significant for the present thesis is exactly where this rigor has been achieved. Addressing this question, which Heidegger constantly deflects, will help to pinpoint Kierkegaard as a source of impulses for Heidegger.

In the fourth chapter (section 4.6) I showed that Heidegger's acknowledgment of Kierkegaard's methodological rigor has been traced back to Kierkegaard's indirect communication and connected to Heidegger's formal indication. With an eye on Heidegger's method, I argued that Heidegger's formal indication is different from Kierkegaard's indirect communication. More specifically, with reference to Otto Pöggeler and Theodore Kisiel I highlighted two distinct features of Heidegger's formal indication which make it different from Kierkegaard's indirect communication. That is, Heidegger's formal indication has the task of pointing at a specific sense direction (relational sense) and must be seen in the context of destruction. Formal indication is therefore one methodological moment among others (destruction and phenomenological explication). However, the fact that Kierkegaard's indirect communication is in these respects distinct from Heidegger's formal indication still leaves the possibility open that Heidegger's reference should be seen as pointing to Kierkegaard's indirect communication. Indeed, I suggest that with this recognition of Kierkegaard's method, Heidegger in fact refers to Kierkegaard's indirect communication: he appreciates Kierkegaard's method of communicating. But indirect communication should not primarily be related to Heidegger's formal indication. Rather, the analysis of Kierkegaard's place in Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses shows that this appreciation moves to the center of Heidegger's philosophy in and through factical life in the form of the claim for questionability. How this

[205] The citation in full reads as follows: "[c]oncerning Kierkegaard, we should point out that such a heightened consciousness of methodological rigor as his has rarely been achieved in philosophy or theology (the question where he has achieved this rigor is not important here). One loses sight of nothing less than the most important aspect of Kierkegaard's thought when one overlooks this consciousness of method, or when one's treatment of it takes it to be of secondary importance." (JR: 101 [41])

is the case comes out through the consideration of Kierkegaard as an author who aims to communicate indirectly.

Previously (section 4.6), I pointed out that Kierkegaard's indirect communication refers to a mode of communicating by one existing individual to another existing individual the fact that they are existing individuals. It is a notion which gathers a need for each individual to make the decision by themselves and appropriate the truth by themselves. The central feature of his way of communicating, in line with Kierkegaard's view on existing individuals, is to throw the reader into questioning. In order to achieve this, Kierkegaard uses a manifold of techniques by which he takes away the possibility of gaining ready-made solutions. He himself explains this for example in *Practice in Christianity* in the following way:

> For example, it is indirect communication to place a jest and earnestness together in such a way that the composite is a dialectical knot – and then to be nobody oneself. If anyone wants to have anything to do with this kind of communication, he will have to untie the knot himself. Or, to bring attack and defense into a unity in such a way that no one can directly say whether one is attacking or defending, so that the most zealous supporter of the cause and its most vicious foe can both seem to see in one an ally – and then to be nobody oneself, an absentee, an objective something, a nonperson. (PI: 133 [XII 124])

Placing the reader in the situation of facing the knot which the reader himself needs to untie is a constantly present feature of Kierkegaard's writings. In this way he writes under different pseudonyms, unfolding his problems from different angles and expressing views which contradict each other. His aim is to lead the reader himself to understand himself: the task is, to become "an individual existing human being instead of being part of the race and saying 'we', 'our age', 'the nineteenth century'" (CUP: 355 [VII 308]). With indirect communication, Kierkegaard aims to achieve what in *The Single Individual* was pointed to as "without authority" (see section 7.5). As it comes out in this treatise, Kierkegaard does not take the question of his own authorship lightly. Rather, he is deeply concerned with the issue of communicating, as is also highlighted by the thematization of different ways of relating in his treatise *The Sickness unto Death*. Through his attention to the concern of communicating and the extent to which he develops it, Kierkegaard can be claimed to be the master of throwing the reader into questioning. In this he indeed achieved exceptional mastery: a rigor rarely seen among philosophers or theologians, as Heidegger claims.

Kierkegaard's manner of communicating arises from his acknowledgment of each existing individual. Heidegger accuses Kierkegaard of pursuing only personal reflection and making his approach too easy for himself (GA 63: 25 [30]). However, for Kierkegaard, to bring the concrete existing individual in the center of focus is definitely not to take the

easy way out, but rather exactly face the difficulty. In this respect, it could perhaps be claimed that from Kierkegaard's perspective it is not he but Heidegger himself who makes things too easy if philosophical investigation gains primacy. As was pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, compared to Kierkegaard, Heidegger is often criticized for his abstractness and empty formalism. Kierkegaard on the other hand tries to keep away from abstraction as much as possible: "[t]o abstract from existence is to remove the difficulty" (CUP 354 [VII 307]). But then again, the analysis of Heidegger's first Freiburg period has shown that he also always considers philosophy in and through factical life. In this he can be seen to take Kierkegaard extremely seriously. It even seems that Heidegger takes him so seriously that Kierkegaard, who shows pressingly that one cannot do away with the living situation, has pushed Heidegger, whose eyes with respect to phenomenological method have been opened by Husserl, into the path of two directions and to the constant struggle to unite them. Let it be remembered that in two of his lecture courses Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in the middle of considering the proper investigation in connection with the need to account also for the living situation (see section 6.4 and 7.4). In this way, it seems that Kierkegaard, the master of questionability, plays a role for Heidegger's philosophy in setting him the difficult task of always also thinking "the abstract human concretely."

> Instead of having the task of understanding the concrete abstractly, as abstract thinking has, the subjective thinker has the opposite task of understanding the abstract concretely. Abstract thinking turns from concrete human beings to humankind in general; the subjective thinker understands the abstract concept to be the concrete human being, to be this individual existing human being. (CUP: 352 [VII 306])

Providing a method for investigation is never enough. It must be circled through concrete actualization or it ceases to be meaningful. And Heidegger agrees with that, for he states: "[t]he formal indication of the 'I am,' which is the indication that plays the leading role in the problematic of the sense of the Being of life, becomes methodologically effective by being brought into its genuine factical actualization, i.e., by becoming actualized in the demonstrable character of the *questionability* ('restlessness') of factical life as the concretely historiological question, 'am I?'" (GA 61: 131 [174]).

Concluding Remarks

The theme of this thesis has been Søren Kierkegaard's place in Martin Heidegger's first Freiburg period lecture courses. The aim was to search for Kierkegaard within Heidegger's early development through the latter's own problem situation. In this way, the research has sought to offer further understanding of Heidegger's early development and his relation to Kierkegaard during this specific period. At the same time, as suggested in the *Introduction*, the investigation also aimed at a better understanding of Heidegger's account of philosophy and his relation to Kierkegaard in more general terms. Here, I would like to devote some final words to these issues. I will thus step back from the detailed analysis and focus on the overall structures which have emerged during this study in order to consider the issues brought out in the Introduction.

The point of departure in this research was taken from Heidegger's own problem situation. That is, by focusing on the question which he explicitly poses and rethinks throughout his different lecture courses: the question 'what is philosophy?' The pursuit of Heidegger's path of rethinking philosophy and the determination of Kierkegaard's place therein occasioned the two central claims of this thesis. First, I claimed that Heidegger addresses the problem of philosophy as a problem of access in two directions: philosophical access is to be found in the living situation and as a form of investigation. Rethinking philosophy in these two directions was shown to be Heidegger's task throughout his different lecture courses. Secondly, I claimed that Kierkegaard occupies a specific place in these lecture courses: he appears when Heidegger considers philosophy as a mode of accessing in the living situation.

Observing this overall structure grounded my argumentation with respect to the two general issues in the reception of Heidegger's relation to Kierkegaard, which were highlighted in the Introduction of this thesis. First, I pointed out that in the secondary literature the consideration of Kierkegaard as a source for Heidegger's philosophy occurs in controversial ways. On the one hand, Kierkegaard is regarded as a source for Heidegger; on the other hand, it is not at all uncommon to ignore Kierkegaard within studies of Heidegger. I asked how it is possible to arrive at these opposing positions and claimed that these conflicting approaches are enabled by Heidegger himself. That this is the case was shown by bringing out two dominant approaches to Heidegger's philosophy and by exhibiting that both of them give primacy to one of the directions which emerge in Heidegger's search. It

was also shown that consideration of Kierkegaard's significance as a source for Heidegger in these approaches correlates with where and how Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard in his lecture courses. On this basis I claimed that by unfolding his philosophy in two directions and thematizing Kierkegaard in one of them, Heidegger himself conditions two different approaches to his philosophy as well as distinct views on Kierkegaard's significance for him.

Secondly, I highlighted the problem of measuring Kierkegaard's impact on Heidegger if he is considered a source. As was pointed out through Vincent McCarthy's argumentation, since Heidegger does not devote a lecture cycle to Kierkegaard, it is difficult to credit him with any strong influence beyond certain notions and themes brought out by Heidegger himself. I countered this view by moving from the references in which Heidegger explicitly mentions Kierkegaard towards the similarities at the level of motives and structures, and by showing thus that Kierkegaard occupies a specific place in Heidegger's different lecture courses. I claimed that Kierkegaard's significance should not be measured by the fact that Heidegger does not dedicate a lecture to Kierkegaard, but rather by looking at where and how Heidegger turns to Kierkegaard in his different lecture courses, regardless of whom the specific lecture is dedicated to.

The above claims come strongly to the fore as different lecture courses throughout Heidegger's path are researched. Within a single lecture course or text, as Heidegger only occasionally mentions Kierkegaard, only specific notions and themes from the latter might indeed seem to be in Heidegger's focus. Furthermore, if each lecture course is taken separately, Heidegger's account of philosophy can be apprehended more easily as a compact whole. However, the nature of this whole appears differently when the details of different lectures are focused on. And yet, even closer examination of the source materials allows us to see certain structural similarities arising from Heidegger's path.

During the course of this thesis I have emphasized the need to pay attention to the difficulties with the source materials, mainly in order to clarify Kierkegaard's presence in Heidegger's lecture courses as these are available to the reader. I have pointed out that Heidegger's lecture courses are not prepared as published texts, but are put together from Heidegger's manuscripts, drafts and notes from the listeners attending the orally presented lectures. That this is the case is both a blessing and a curse for the researcher. On the one hand, the rawness of the drafts makes extra demands on research of the materials, where the notions at times are reconsidered within one lecture course or even within the different

drafts of thinking through the same problem. On the other hand, however, the roughness of the material, where Heidegger at times can be seen to search his way into the specific problem and to try out the ways to articulate something, gives an extraordinary insight into his own actualization of philosophy. In these texts the very process of developing his philosophy shines through in each step of the way. Thus, Heidegger is seen to probe his way into the problems by thinking and rethinking the themes and notions. I mention this in order to highlight the problem of philosophy touched upon in the Introduction. For a point of comparison in addressing the issue of Heidegger's account of philosophy, allow me once more to place him in the context of the deliberation over this subject offered by Thomas Nagel and Deleuze/Guattari.

When viewed from the previously given angle, considering how Heidegger's own actualization of his philosophy takes place, it seems that the account of philosophy given by Deleuze and Guattari is applicable to Heidegger too. If we look at and talk about philosophy concretely, it indeed appears to be a process of concept creation: an immanent activity on a laid-out plane (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 76-83). Furthermore, in different steps along his path Heidegger is seen to take up specific problems, discuss particular questions and place before the listener/reader argumentations for disagreeing. He literally seems to do philosophy in the form suggested by Nagel. And yet, content-wise, Heidegger would neither agree with Deleuze's and Guattari's account of philosophy nor with Nagel's. That Heidegger's account of philosophy is distinct from all these thinkers becomes clear by looking at the overall structure of Heidegger's quest for philosophy.

Throughout his lecture courses Heidegger repeats the same overall structure with regard to both of the directions in which he addresses the issue of philosophy. Everything always starts with his conviction that philosophy has gone astray: the current situation of philosophy is in decline, as it rests on unfounded presuppositions. As in any correct examination, he then offers an analysis of the (problems in the) current situation (which he considers to be in decline) followed by his own positive account. What is significant, however, is that when analyzing the problems at hand, he does not enter into an argument over these problems. It is not about agreeing or disagreeing with the problems at hand. Rather, he targets the source of the problems argued over. Here, he traces back this source to how the problems are posed and approached: to the manner of accessing. This becomes the central issue for Heidegger, which leads to his two core concerns: how this access has been lost and how it could be regained. Thus, his analysis of the current situation becomes

the analysis of the conditions of losing the access, and his positive account is about the proper access. These two, however, are not put forward as simple alternatives. Rather, Heidegger aims at the proper access by analyzing the loss of this access. The manner in which the access has been lost must guide the way to regaining what has been lost. That the issue is to regain the access already suggests that for Heidegger the access is to be re-attained from and through the situation at hand. Thus, philosophy for Heidegger is not about creating concepts nor about disagreeing over problems, although both of these elements are part of his concrete work. Rather, for Heidegger philosophy aims at the origin of understanding and must arise from how something is concretely understood. This aim, in my opinion, also puts Heidegger on a two-directional path. For what his actualization of philosophy additionally shows is his genuine struggle for philosophy as understanding, which aims to point at that what is above or underneath each concrete understanding in and through this very concreteness. In the end, in my view, this struggle of Heidegger's also underlies his relation to Kierkegaard. Heidegger does not simply take over his notions in order to agree or disagree with what he finds, nor does he simply appropriate Kierkegaard. Rather, Kierkegaard, the master of throwing the reader into questioning, appears as a discussion partner who presents him with difficulties to be taken seriously. As has been shown, Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in his manuscripts and drafts mostly without further explanation. Kierkegaard's name or a quotation from him is brought out as something to be considered. What Kierkegaard has offered is to be taken into account and thought over. Kierkegaard appears as someone who has something to say about the object of Heidegger's search and is not merely a companion but rather a source of impulses, as Heidegger himself states (GA 63: 4 [5-6]).

Appendix One: Heidegger's loose page entitled "Sin"

1. Martin Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*. Translated by Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 198-9

What is base has its power in pulling toward itself, in blocking *authentic* understanding and in obscuring it. Understanding passes on to the side of the will, follows the falling inclination and even confirms that this is what is authentic. Christian complex of motivation: 1. Not understanding what is right, 2. Not wanting to understand, 3. Not *wanting*. The human being [?] [...]* what is not genuine, although he understood what is right, has the authentic defiance. "Therefore, interpreted Christianly, sin has its roots in willing, not in knowing, and this corruption of willing embraces the individual's consciousness." [Kierkegaard, *Sickness unto Death*, p. 95] That the sin is before God is precisely what is positive about it. The category of sin is the category of individuality.

2. Comparison of Heidegger's loose page entitled "Sin" and the German translation of Kierkegaard's *The Sickness unto Death*.

Martin Heidegger (GA 60: [264-265]) loose page "Sünde"	Søren Kierkegaard, *Die Krankheit zum Tode*, übers. u. mit einem Nachwort von H. Gottsched, Jena 1911
Das Niedere hat seine Stärke im Hinziehen, im Absperren vom *eigentlichen* Verstehen und Verdunkeln dieses. Das Verstehen geht auf die Seite des Willens über, folgt der abfallen Neigung und bestätigt sogar, das sei das Eigentliche.	"Darüber wird die Erkenntnis immer dunkler, und das Niedere siegt immer mehr; ach, den das Gute muß sogleich getan werden, sogleich wenn es erkannt ist […], aber das Niedere hat seine Stärke im Hinziehen. Der Wille hat nicht gerade etwas dagegen, daß dies geschiet, er sieht dabei fast durch die Finger. Und wenn dann die Erkenntnis gehörig dunkel geworden ist, so können Erkenntnis und Wille einander besser verstehen; zuletzt stimmen sie ganz zusammen, denn nun ist die Erkenntnis auf die Seite des Willens übergegangen und erkennt, daß es ganz richtig ist, wie er will." (KzT 1911, 91)
Christlicher Motivationszusammenhang: 1. nicht verstehen das Rechte, 2. nicht verstehenwollen, 3. nicht *wollen*.	"Darum fängt das Christentum auch auf eine andere Weise damit an, daß eine Offenbarung von Gott dazu gehört, den Menschen darüber aufzuklären, was Sünde ist: daß die Sünde doch nicht darin liegt, daß der Mensch das Rechte nicht verstanden hat, sonder darin, daß er es nicht verstehen will, und darin, daß er es nicht will." (KzT 1911, 92)

Der Mensch[?] […*Ein Wort unleserlich*] das Unechte, obgleich er das Rechte verstand, hat den eigentlichen Trotz.	"Und dann lehrt es, daß ein Mensch das Unrechte tue (der eigentliche Trotz), obgleich er das Rechte verstanden habe, oder das Rechte zu tun unterlasse, obgleich er es verstanden habe; […]" (KzT 1911, 92)
"Christlich verstanden liegt also die Sünde im Willen, nicht in der Erkenntnis; und diese Verderbtheit des Willens geht über das Bewuβtsein des einzelnen hinaus."	*direct quotation marked as such by Heidegger and with the reference to Kierkegaard as follows:* [S. Kierkegaard, Die Krankheit zum Tode, übers. u. mit einem Nachwort von H. Gottsched, Jena 1911, S. 93.]
Das die Sünde *vor Gott* ist, ist gerade das Positive an ihr.	"Daß die Sünde vor Gott ist, ist gerade das Positive an ihr." (KzT 1911, 97)
Die Kategorie der Sünde ist die Kategorie der Einzelheit.	"Die Kategorie der Sünde ist die Kategorie der Einzelheit" (KzT 1911, 116)

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In all references where dual page numbers are given, the initial page number refers to the text in the English translation, the second (in square brackets) to the text in its original form. In the case of Søren Kierkegaard's texts this means that in the square brackets the reference is given to the first edition of the Danish collected works (Søren Kierkegaard, *Samlede Værker*, edited by A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange, 14 vols., Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1901-1906).

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Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de plaats van Søren Kierkegaard in de colleges van Martin Heidegger gedurende zijn eerste periode in Freiburg (1919-1923). De hoofdvraag is: waarnaar is Heidegger op zoek in deze eerste periode in Freiburg, waar zijn vroege denkontwikkeling plaatsvond, en waar wendt hij zich tot Kierkegaard?

Het was mijn doel om door het verduidelijken van de plaats van Søren Kierkegaard in Martin Heideggers colleges tijdens deze eerste Freiburger jaren een bijdrage te leveren aan het onderzoek naar Heideggers vroege ontwikkeling, en bovendien meer licht te werpen op de relatie tussen deze twee denkers. Het onderzoek is vernieuwend in twee opzichten: ten eerste is deze periode van Heideggers denken die nog steeds grotendeels onontgonnen terrein en wordt zij tegelijk gezien als een veelbelovend onderzoeksgebied. In de tweede plaats bestaat er nog geen studie over de betekenis van Kierkegaard voor Heideggers denken in de tijd dat de laatste zijn eerste colleges gaf als *Privatdozent* aan de Universiteit van Freiburg. Deze studie probeert dit tekort aan te vullen. Maar dit is niet het enige resultaat, want uit het onderzoek komt naar voren dat de zoektocht naar de plaats van Kierkegaard in Heideggers vroege ontwikkeling ook openingen biedt om meer algemene kwesties rondom het onderzoek naar hun relatie in een breder perspectief aan de orde te stellen.

De relatie tussen Heidegger en Kierkegaard heeft al tientallen jaren de aandacht van onderzoekers getrokken en de bestudering ervan heeft inmiddels vele vormen aangenomen. Maar desondanks is de precieze aard van hun relatie nog steeds in het duister gehuld, en wordt zij vaak als ‘obscuur’ bestempeld. Een van de belangrijkste oorzaken van deze duisterheid is de manier waarop Heidegger over Kierkegaard spreekt en schrijft. Verwijzingen van Heidegger naar Kierkegaard kunnen vaak op veel verschillende manieren geduid worden, en soms is het zelfs een kwestie van gissen naar de bedoeling van de verwijzing. Bovendien menen de meeste wetenschappers in dit onderzoeksveld dat Kierkegaard vaak aanwezig is in Heideggers geschriften zonder dat de laatste dit expliciet erkent. Vandaar dat zij spreken van het *zwijgen* van Heidegger over Kierkegaard, en vandaar ook dat zij naar Kierkegaards invloed zoeken buiten de expliciete verwijzingen om, op het niveau van wat ik de ‘motieven en structuren’ noem. Maar al met al heeft de ambiguë manier waarop Kierkegaard aanwezig is in zijn werken geleid tot een situatie waarin Kierkegaards betekenis voor Heidegger regelmatig wordt betwist. Dit leidt tot de

merkwaardige tweespalt dat Kierkegaard aan de ene kant wordt beschouwd als een belangrijke bron voor Heidegger, terwijl aan de andere kant de rol van Kierkegaard vaak helemaal genegeerd wordt. En ook wanneer Kierkegaard als een bron beschouwd wordt, dan verschillen de meningen over de vraag hoe groot zijn invloed nu werkelijk is geweest. Bovendien wordt de bijdrage van Kierkegaard aan Heideggers filosofie vaak beperkt tot de ontwikkeling van bepaalde begrippen, zoals 'angst', 'existentie' of de notie van het *'Augenblick'*. Maar de vraag kan gesteld worden of dit alles is. Is Kierkegaard voor Heidegger niet meer dan een religieuze schrijver die een paar interessante ideeën heeft? Wat is precies de plaats van Kierkegaard in de werken van Heidegger?

Gezien de manier waarop Kierkegaard wordt aangetroffen in de werken van Heidegger (het feit dat hij hem slechts een enkele keer met name noemt, meestal zonder verdere uitleg) en ook vanwege andere problemen rondom het onderzoek naar deze twee denkers (zoals de invloed van gedeelde bronnen en de mogelijke invloed van latere denkers op de interpretaties), is voor een specifieke benadering gekozen in dit onderzoek. Mijn analyse van Kierkegaards plaats in Heideggers vroege colleges begint daarom met een grondig onderzoek naar deze colleges vanuit Heideggers eigen probleemsituatie. Verder is gezocht naar Kierkegaards aanwezigheid in iedere collegeserie door Heideggers expliciete verwijzingen naar Kierkegaard op te sporen. Deze verwijzingen heb ik vervolgens gebruikt om Kierkegaards rol ook op het niveau van motieven en structuren te onderzoeken.

Als we ons uitgangspunt nemen in Heideggers eigen probleemsituatie, dan worden we geconfronteerd met de vraag: 'wat is filosofie?', een vraag die Heidegger expliciet aan de orde stelt in verschillende collegeseries tijdens zijn eerste periode in Freiburg. Hij is op weg om het eigen karakter en de taak van filosofie opnieuw te doordenken. In zijn concrete werk op dit gebied lijkt hij te bevestigen wat Deleuze en Guattari (1994) aanwijzen als de kern van de filosofische activiteit: het zou gaan om een activiteit van begripsvorming. Door het problematiseren van ons begrip van filosofie op basis van goed beargumenteerde overwegingen, lijkt Heidegger bovendien filosofie te bedrijven op de manier van Thomas Nagel (1987). En toch komt er in het opnieuw doordenken van wat filosofie is bij Heidegger een heel ander idee van de filosofie naar voren. Voor Heidegger gaat het in de filosofie niet filosofie over de activiteit van begripsvorming, en het is hem evenmin te doen om het uitwisselen van argumenten over bepaalde grensproblemen, hoewel deze beide elementen deel uitmaken van zijn concrete werk. Eerder richt de filosofie zich volgens Heidegger op de oorsprong en de voorwaarden van het begrijpen zelf, en daarom moet zij

ontstaan uit de manier waarop we erin slagen iets concreet te begrijpen. Daarmee richt hij zich op de bron van de filosofische problemen zelf, en met name op de vraag hoe deze problemen aan de orde gesteld en benaderd moeten worden. Voor Heidegger wordt dit de centrale kwestie wanneer hij telkens weer de vraag naar de filosofie aan de orde stelt.

De antwoorden op deze expliciet gestelde vragen leiden tot de centrale stellingen van deze dissertatie. Gesteld wordt dat Heidegger de filosofie in twee richtingen opnieuw doordenkt en dat hij daarbij twee verschillende beschrijvingen van filosofie geeft. Of, zoals ik het graag verwoord: Heidegger ontvouwt zijn centrale probleem hier in twee richtingen, en hij begeeft zich zodoende op een weg die twee mogelijke richtingen wijst. Hiermee wordt niet gezegd dat de filosofie zich Heidegger met meerdere gebieden moet bezighouden, maar dat er voor hem twee verschillende manieren zijn om toegang te krijgen tot datgene waar de filosofie zich op moet richten. Enerzijds is de filosofie (zoals die gerealiseerd wordt) de activiteit van het *filosoferen*, dat zich een toegang verschaft tot de concrete leefsituatie. Anderzijds is de filosofie erop gericht een adequate methode te ontwikkelen om toegang te krijgen tot haar onderwerp: filosofie is dan een manier van onderzoeken. Ik toon in deze dissertatie aan dat Heidegger zijn filosofie tegelijkertijd in deze beide richtingen ontwikkelt in de eerste Freiburger periode, en precies dat is van doorslaggevend belang om de plaats van Kierkegaard op zijn weg te kunnen verklaren. Want, zoals in verschillende hoofdstukken van deze dissertatie wordt gesteld en aangetoond: Kierkegaard blijkt van invloed te zijn in één van de beide genoemde richtingen, namelijk wanneer Heidegger mogelijkheid onderzoekt voor de filosofie om toegang te krijgen tot de concrete leefsituatie, of, zoals ik het ook noem, de toegang in en door het factische leven.

Op basis van dit inzicht, dat Heidegger zijn filosofie in twee richtingen leidt en dat Kierkegaard in een van deze richtingen naar voren treedt, is het bovendien mogelijk een verklaring te geven voor zowel de verschillende meningen over de invloed van Kierkegaard op Heideggers filosofie als voor de mate waarin deze invloed zich doet gelden. Ten eerste wordt betoogd dat het zicht op de rol van Kierkegaard in Heideggers filosofie afhangt van het standpunt dat men inneemt met betrekking tot Heideggers filosofie. Om dit aan te tonen, worden twee dominante benaderingen van de kwestie van Heideggers methode naar voren gehaald en wordt gesteld dat deze benaderingen verschillen in wat zij zien als het brandpunt van Heideggers filosofie. Verder betoog ik dat elke van deze twee benaderingen tot zijn filosofie (de gegeven voorbeelden zijn Theodore Kisiel en Søren Overgaard) de

nadruk legt op hetzij de ene hetzij de andere kant van wat Heidegger naar voren brengt. Op deze manier wordt duidelijk dat Heidegger zelf twee heel verschillende beschrijvingen van zijn filosofie mogelijk maakt. Het feit dat Heideggers filosofie op twee onderscheiden manieren benaderd wordt (al naargelang het aspect van zijn filosofiebeschouwing dat de voorrang krijgt), gecombineerd met het gegeven dat Kierkegaard met name in één van deze aspecten naar voren treedt, maakt het mogelijk om de verschillende meningen over de rol van Kierkegaard in Heideggers filosofie te verklaren. Aan de ene kant wordt Kierkegaard beschouwd als een belangrijke bron voor Heidegger, aan de andere kant wordt deze rol min of meer genegeerd. Voor zover Heidegger ruimte laat voor deze beide benaderingen, kan men dus inzien hoe Heidegger in zijn eigen werkwijze de oorzaak gezocht moet worden voor het bestaan van de twee tegenovergestelde duidingen van Kierkegaards belang voor zijn denken .

Een analyse van Heideggers verwijzingen naar Kierkegaard laat duidelijk zien dat de laatste een sterke invloed uitoefende op Heideggers filosofie. Heidegger wendt zich tot Kierkegaard binnen een bepaald vraaggebied, ongeacht waar zijn lezingen over gaan. Ook wordt aangetoond dat Kierkegaard in alle verschillende collegeseries een plaats heeft, ook al doordenkt Heidegger de weg die hij aflegt tijdens de eerste Freiburger periode telkens opnieuw. Zo leidt de analyse van de plaats van Kierkegaard in de collegeseries uit deze periode tot de stelling dat Kierkegaard voor Heidegger niet zomaar een metgezel is van wie hij slechts een aantal begrippen en thema's leent, maar dat zijn geschriften eerder dienen als een centrale inspiratiebron voor filosofie zoals deze geactualiseerd wordt. Kierkegaard komt te voorschijn zodra Heidegger voor de moeilijke taak staat om rekenschap te geven van de filosofie in een concrete leefsituatie.

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Deze dissertatie is verdeeld in acht hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 1 behandelt kwesties die spelen bij het kijken naar Heideggers eerste periode in Freiburg en naar zijn relatie tot Kierkegaard. Er wordt uitgelegd wat bedoeld wordt met Heideggers eerste periode in Freiburg; gewezen op de beschikbaarheid van Kierkegaards werken voor Heidegger en op specifieke bronnen die in deze dissertatie gebruikt worden; gethematiseerd in welke mate Kierkegaard aanwezig is in Heideggers verschillende geschriften; en geschetst hoe de relatie tussen Kierkegaard en Heidegger geduid is in de secundaire literatuur. Het voornaamste doel hier is om zicht te geven op de problemen die zich voordoen bij het onderzoeken van de relatie tussen deze twee denkers en op de specifieke benadering die ik

gekozen heb voor het bepalen van de plaats van Kierkegaard in Heideggers colleges tijdens zijn eerste periode in Freiburg.

De volgende zes hoofdstukken zijn gewijd aan Heideggers collegeseries in chronologische volgorde. De splitsing van deze hoofdstukken in twee delen is gebaseerd op de manier waarop Heidegger zijn problematiek ontvouwt in specifieke colleges en de aanwezigheid van Kierkegaard daarin. Met het aanbrengen van een indeling in twee delen probeer ik duidelijker zicht te geven op Heideggers problematiek en de ontwikkeling ervan, en op Kierkegaards positie in zijn colleges.

In het eerste deel richt ik mij op Heideggers colleges vanaf 1919 tot het wintersemester van 1920-21. In dit deel stel ik vast dat Heidegger het bevragen van de filosofie in twee richtingen opneemt en verduidelijk ik de manier waarop hij dit doet. Beginnend bij Heideggers colleges over *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem* (KNS 1919, in GA 56/57), laat ik eerst zien dat Heidegger zijn zoektocht naar de filosofie in twee richtingen ontwikkelt: hij verwoordt de taak van correcte filosofie door twee verschillende toegangswijzen aan voor te stellen. Verder wordt gesteld dat Heidegger hiermee de weg opent naar twee dominante manieren om zijn filosofie te interpreteren. In de volgende twee hoofdstukken betoog ik dat Heidegger deze beide richtingen na elkaar oppakt in zijn volgende lezingencyclussen. Eerst laat hoofdstuk drie zien dat hij in de lezingencyclus *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (WS 1919/20, GA 58) kijkt naar de mogelijkheid van filosofie in de concrete leefsituatie. Adequate filosofie is volgens deze colleges intensiverende concentratie op de wereld van het zelf. In deze collegeserie noemt Heidgger Kierkegaard voor het eerst, als de denker die deze adequate toegangswijze gestalte weet te geven. Daarna betoogt hoofdstuk vier, voornamelijk op basis van de collegeseries *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung* (SS 1920, GA 59) en het begin van *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* (WS 1920-21, in GA 60), dat Heidegger zich vervolgens richt op filosofie als onderzoek door zich te concentreren op de vraag van de methodologie. Hier laat ik zien dat dat Heidegger het filosofische onderzoek beschrijft door middel van drie methodologische momenten (fenomenologische destructie, fenomenologische explicatie en formele indicatie). Na het schetsen van deze drie methodologische momenten, gaat de aandacht weer terug naar de twee voornaamste manieren om Heideggers filosofie te duiden en wordt getoond waar het verschil tussen beide ligt. De interpretaties verschillen daarin, dat ze voorrang geven aan verschillende zinrichtingen (*Sinnrichtungen*) in het

uitleggen van een fenomeen waar Heidegger op gewezen heeft: relatiezin (Bezugssinn) en actualisatiezin (Volzugssinn). Mijn belangrijkste argument is nu dat Heidegger zelf zijn filosofie tegelijkertijd in deze beide richtingen ontwikkelt en zo zelf de basis legt voor twee verschillende benaderingen van zijn filosofie waarin één van beide richtingen de voorrang krijgt. Dat dit het geval is, wordt bevestigd in het tweede deel van deze dissertatie, waarin de aanwezigheid van Kierkegaard meer prominent wordt.

Het tweede deel analyseert Heideggers drie collegeseries van 1921 tot 1923: over Augustinus (GA 60), over Aristoteles (GA 61) en over de hermeneutiek van de facticiteit (GA 63). In al deze colleges doordenkt Heidegger de filosofie opnieuw, waarbij hij telkens twee toegangswijzen onderzoekt, die beide steeds verder ontwikkeld worden. Door nauwkeurig te kijken naar de plaats van Kierkegaard in elk van de drie collegeseries, toon ik aan dat Kierkegaard belangrijk wordt voor Heidegger zodra hij rekenschap wil geven van de filosofie in de concrete leefsituatie. Verder wordt duidelijk dat Kierkegaard in iedere lezingencyclus aan de orde komt, ongeacht de vraag aan wie de lezing gewijd is of hoe de beschrijving van de filosofie door Heidegger ontwikkeld wordt.

In hoofdstuk vijf wordt betoogd dat wanneer Heidegger de *Belijdenissen* (boek X) van Augustinus uitlegt in de lezingencyclus *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus* (SS 1921), hij tegelijkertijd steeds Kierkegaard in gedachten heeft. Duidelijk wordt dat in zijn interpretatie van Augustinus, Heidegger niet alleen Kierkegaard beschouwt binnen zijn analyse van de mogelijkheid van de juiste toegang in en door het factische leven, maar dat hij daarnaast ook zwaar op Kierkegaard leunt bij het ontwikkelen van zijn eigen beschrijving van de mogelijkheden die voor het factische leven openstaan. Om dit te laten zien, gaat dit hoofdstuk ook in op Kierkegaards *De ziekte tot de dood*. Bovendien stel ik in dit hoofdstuk een aanpassing voor van de gepubliceerde tekst van de lezingencyclus. Het is namelijk noodzakelijk om aan te geven dat een tekst die aan Heidegger zelf toegeschreven in feite een samenvatting blijkt te zijn van het tweede deel van Kierkegaards verhandeling *De ziekte tot de dood* (zie ook Appendix One).

In hoofdstuk zes gaat de aandacht uit naar Heideggers collegeserie *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* (WS 1921–1922). Aangetoond wordt dat Heidegger hier opnieuw het probleem van de filosofie op twee verschillende manieren aan de orde stelt: hij vraagt 1) hoe men te werk moet gaan met het filosofische onderzoek en 2) waar de mogelijkheid ligt voor de filosofie om toegang te krijgen tot de actuele leefsituatie. Deze verschillende aspecten worden gepresenteerd als onderdelen van dezelfde

vraag, maar worden apart geanalyseerd. Ik laat zien dat de analyse van het probleem van de filosofie zich in deze twee richtingen ontvouwt, en stel daarom een iets andere opmaak van de gepubliceerde tekst van de lezingencyclus voor. Bovendien geef ik een uitleg van het belang dat Kierkegaard voor Heidegger in deze opnieuw overdachte beschrijving van filosofie zoals die geactualiseerd wordt. Om de rol van Kierkegaard voor Heidegger hierin naar voren te halen, maak ik een uitweiding naar Kierkegaards *Het begrip angst*.

Het zevende hoofdstuk analyseert de laatste lezingencyclus van Heideggers eerste periode in Freiburg: *Ontologie – Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (SS 1923). Zowel Heideggers verwoording van de betekenis van de hermeneutiek als zijn beschrijving van het concrete werk van interpreteren worden gethematiseerd. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat Heidegger met name door Kierkegaard wordt beïnvloed als hij formuleert wat er gerealiseerd wordt door het concrete werk van interpreteren: een opnieuw overdachte beschrijving van de mogelijke toegang in en door het factische leven. In het bijzonder wordt Kierkegaards inbreng in deze lezingencyclus naar voren gehaald door te kijken naar de opmerkelijke overeenkomsten tussen Heideggers uiteenzetting en wat Kierkegaard verwoordt in een verhandeling waar Heidegger expliciet naar verwijst: *The Single Individual*. *[Den Enkelte]*.

Het laatste hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie (hoofdstuk acht) reflecteert op de resultaten van mijn zoektocht naar Kierkegaard in Heideggers eerste periode in Freiburg. Gevraagd wordt wat deze weg zegt over Heideggers doel: waar verwijst de vraag ‘wat is filosofie?’ uiteindelijk naar? Betoogd wordt dat deze vraag terugvoert naar het probleem van de juiste toegangswijze. Bovendien wordt gesteld dat Heideggers eigen korte thematiseringen van Kierkegaard de centrale beweringen van deze dissertatie bevestigen. Kierkegaard is een belangrijke bron van impulsen voor Heidegger wanneer hij zich ten doel stelt om een toegang te vinden tot de concrete leefsituatie. Tenslotte stel ik de vraag aan de orde welk aspect van Kierkegaards filosofie centraal staat in Heideggers belangstelling voor hem. Mijn voorstel, op basis van dit onderzoek, is dat Heidegger met name geïnteresseerd is in de meesterlijke manier waarop Kierkegaard erin slaagt de lezer zelf aan het vragen te zetten. Het erkennen van de noodzaak van vragen blijkt doorslaggevend te zijn, met name wanneer filosofie beschouwd wordt als toegangsweg tot de concrete leefsituatie die zich verzet tegen vaste bepalingen. De indringende ontmoeting met Kierkegaard maakte het voor Heidegger onmogelijk om voorbij te gaan aan dit probleem in zijn zoektocht naar de vraag wat de eigenlijke taak van filosofie is.

(Translation: Anthony Runia)

Kokkuvõte

Käesolevas doktoritöös uurin Søren Kierkegaardi kohta Martin Heideggeri esimese Freiburgi perioodi loengukursustes (1919–1923). Keskseteks küsimusteks on: mis oli Heideggeri esimese Freiburgi perioodi, kust leiame tema väga varase mõttearengu, otsingute siht ning kuskohas ta pöördub Kierkegaardi poole.

Selgitades Kierkegaardi kohta Heideggeri esimese Freiburgi perioodi loengukursustes, olen käesoleva uurimusega püüdnud panustada nii Heideggeri varase arengu uurimisse kui ka nimetatud kahe mõtleja suhestumise mõistmisse. Uurimistöö on uuenduslik kahes aspektis: esiteks, kuigi antud väitekirjas analüüsitud spetsiifilist Heideggeri mõtteperioodi peetakse paljutõotavaks uurimisalaks, on see siiani suures osas uurimata. Teiseks puudub seniajani uurimus, mis vaatleks Kierkegaardi tähendust Heideggeri filosoofiale tema varasemates kättesaadavates loengukursustes ehk ajal, mil ta tegutses kui *Privatdozent* Freiburgi Ülikoolis. Käesolev töö püüab antud lünka täita. Ent see ei ole töö ainus tulem. Kierkegaardi koha uurimine Heideggeri varases arengus võimaldas ühtlasi avada laiemat probleemistikku, mis ümbritseb kahte mõtlejat.

Heideggeri ja Kierkegaardi suhestumine on juba aastakümneid haaranud uurijate tähelepanu ning selle uurimine on võtnud mitmeid vorme. Hoolimata suurest hulgast uurimustest, mis on antud teemale pühendatud, on nende kahe mõtleja suhestumine sageli ‘hämaraks’ kuulutatud. Peamine põhjus selle hämaruse taga on viis, kuidas Heidegger Kierkegaardist kõneleb ja kirjutab. Nimelt, kui Heidegger Kierkegaardi oma kirjutistes eksplitsiitselt mainib, jätab ta tavaliselt viite Kierkegaardile avatuks mitmetele erinevatele tõlgendustele või isegi pelgalt aimamise valda. Lisaks sellele on Kierkegaardi-Heideggeri uurijate seas laialt tunnustatud asjaolu, et Kierkegaard on Heideggeri kirjutistes tihti kohal ka ilma, et viimane Kierkegaardile otsesõnu osutaks. See on loonud aluse kõnelda Heideggeri *vaikimisest* seoses Kierkegaardiga ning viinud Kierkegaardi otsingutele Heideggeri kirjutistes ka väljaspool eksplitsiitseid viiteid: motiivide ja struktuuride tasandil, nagu ma seda nimetan. Kokkuvõtvalt on see ebaselge viis, kuidas Kierkegaard on Heideggeri kirjutistes kohatav, loonud olukorra, kus Kierkegaardi tähendust Heideggeri jaoks nähakse pidevalt vastuolulisena. On tekkinud märkimisväärne ebakõla, kus ühest küljest peetakse Kierkegaardi Heideggeri jaoks oluliseks allikaks, ent teisest küljest ei ole üldse haruldane Heideggeri uurimustes Kierkegaardi osatähtsust täielikult eirata. Kui aga Kierkegaardi nähaksegi Heideggeri jaoks allikana, siis lähevad arvamused tema mõju

tegeliku suuruse üle lahku. Kuna Heidegger mainib Kierkegaardi eksplitsiitselt seoses üksikute mõistetega (näiteks äng, eksistents ja *Augenblick*), on Kierkegaardi panust Heideggeri filosoofiasse tihti seostatud nende spetsiifiliste teemadega. Ent võiks küsida, kas see on kõik? Kas Kierkegaard on Heideggeri jaoks religioosne kirjanik, kellel on pakkuda vaid üksikuid huvitavaid ideid? Missuguse koha hõivab Kierkegaard täpsemalt Heideggeri kirjutistes?

Pidades silmas nii seda viisi, kuidas Kierkegaard on Heideggeri kirjutistest leitav (asjaolu, et Heidegger eksplitsiitselt nimetab või mainib Kierkegaardi üksnes kohati ja peamiselt ilma edasiste selgitusteta), kui ka teisi probleeme, mis ümbritsevad nende kahe mõtleja suhestumise uurimist (näiteks mõlema mõjutatust ühiste allikate poolt ja hilisemate mõtejate võimalikku mõju tõlgendustele), kujundasin käesoleva uurimuse jaoks spetsiifilise lähenemise. Nimelt, alustasin Kierkegaardi koha analüüsi Heideggeri loengukursustes Heideggeri konkreetsete loengukursuste põhjaliku uurimisega, lähtudes tema enda probleem-situatsioonist. Täiendavalt otsisin Kierkegaardi kohalolu igas loengukursuses jälitades Heideggeri eksplitsiitseid viiteid Kierkegaardile. Seejärel kasutasin antud viiteid Kierkegaardi kohalolu uurimiseks motiivide ja struktuuride tasandil.

Võttes lähtepunktiks Heideggeri enda probleemsituatsiooni, seisame silmitsi küsimusega ʻmis on filosoofia?ʼ. See on küsimus, mille Heidegger oma esimese Freiburgi perioodi erinevates loengukursustes eksplitsiitselt tõstatab. Ta on filosoofia taas-mõtestamise teel. Tema poolt läbi viidud konkreetses töös filosoofia otsingutel võib näha kinnitust sellele, mida Deleuze ja Guattari (1994) nimetavad filosoofilise tegevuse tuumaks: filosoofia seisneb mõistete loomises. Enamgi veel, problematiseerides meie tavaarusaamu filosoofiast hästi argumenteeritud kaalutlustest lähtudes, näib Heidegger filosoofias tegutsevat viisil nagu Thomas Nagel (1987) on seda kirjeldanud. Ent ometi avab Heideggeri filosoofia taas-mõtestamise teekond täiesti erineva arusaama filosoofiast. Heideggeri jaoks ei seisne filosoofia mõistete loomises ega ka mitte argumentide vahetamises teatavate piiriprobleemide üle, kuigi mõlemad toodud elemendid on osa tema konkreetsest tööst. Pigem püüdleb filosoofia Heideggeri kohaselt mõistmise enese algupära ja tingimuste järele ning peab seetõttu tärkama sellest, kuidas midagi on konkreetselt mõistetud. Nõnda keskendub ta filosoofiliste probleemide allikatele ja eriti küsimusele, kuidas need probleemid on püstitatud ning kuidas neile on lähenetud – ligipääsuviisile. Sellest saab Heideggeri jaoks keskne teema tema üha korduvas filosoofia küsimuse kõnetuses.

Vastused sellele eksplitsiitselt tõstatatud küsimusele viivad käesoleva dissertatsiooni kesksete väideteni. Väidan, et Heidegger taas-mõtestab filosoofiat kahes suunas ja annab kaks erinevat kirjeldust filosoofiast. Teisiti öelduna: Heidegger on kahesuunalisel teel. Ta avab oma keskse probleemi kahes suunas ja liigub teel, mis osutab kahele võimalikule suunale. Öelduga ei taha ma väita, et Heideggeri jaoks peab filosoofia taotlema mitmeid valdkondi, vaid seda, et tema jaoks on kaks erinevat ligipääsuviisi sellele, mida filosoofia peab sihtima. Ühelt poolt on filosoofia (sellisena nagu see on täide viidud) filosofeerimine, ligipääsuviis konkreetses elusituatsioonis. Teiselt poolt seisneb filosoofia oma teemale kohase ligipääsumeetodi väljatöötamises – see on uurimisviis. Käesolevas doktoritöös näitan, et esimesel Freiburgi perioodil arendab Heidegger oma filosoofiat samaaegselt nendes mõlemates suundades, ning et justnimelt see asjaolu on otsustav selgitamaks Kierkegaardi kohta tema teekonnal. Nagu käesoleva dissertatsiooni erinevates peatükkides väidan ja demonstreerin: Kierkegaard ilmub nähtavale ühes nendest suundadest ja nimelt siis, kui Heidegger uurib võimalust saavutada ligipääs konkreetses elusituatsioonis või, nagu ma seda samuti nimetan, ligipääs faktilises elus ja selle kaudu.

Äratundmine, et Heidegger juhib oma filosoofiat kahes suunas ning Kierkegaard ilmneb ühes nendest suundadest, võimaldas selgitada nii vastukäivaid lähenemisi Kierkegaardi võimaliku mõju kohta Heideggeri filosoofiale, kui ka seda, milline on selle mõju ulatus. Esmalt, argumenteerin käesolevas töös, et vaade sellele, missugust rolli Kierkegaard Heideggeri filosoofias mängib, sõltub sellest, milline seisukoht on võetud Heideggeri filosoofiale. Selle tõestamiseks tõstan esile kaks domineerivad lähenemist Heideggerile seoses tema meetodi küsimusega ning näitan, et nende lähenemiste erinevus seisneb selles, milles nähakse Heideggeri filosoofia keset. Järgnevalt (argumenteerides, et Heidegger arendab oma filosoofiat kahes suunas) toon esile, et mõlemad domineerivad lähenemised tema filosoofiale (näitlikustatud Theodore Kisiel'i ja Søren Overgaardi tööde kaudu) rõhutavad üht või teist poolt sellest, mida Heidegger välja pakub. Sel viisil saab selgeks, et Heidegger ise teeb võimalikuks kaks väga erinevat käsitlust oma filosoofiast. Et Heideggeri filosoofiale lähenetakse kahel erilaadsel viisil, sõltuvalt sellest kummale poolele tema kaalutlustest filosoofia üle on antud ülimuslikkus, koos asjaoluga, et Kierkegaard ilmneb ühel nendest pooltest, võimaldab ühtlasi selgitada erinevaid lähenemisi Kierkegaardi rollile Heideggeri filosoofias. Ühelt poolt nähakse Kierkegaardis Heideggeri jaoks olulist allikat, teisalt on Kierkegaardi osatähtsust Heideggeri filosoofiale suuremas osas eiratud. Kuniks on näidatud, et Heidegger ise jätab ruumi erilaadseteks lähenemisteks

oma filosoofiale, on võimalik ühtlasi näha, kuidas Heidegger ise tingib kaks vastukäivat lähenemist Kierkegaardi olulisusele tema jaoks.

Heideggeri Kierkegaardi-viidete analüüs lubab ühtlasi selgelt näha, et viimane avaldas Heideggeri filosoofiale tugevat mõju. Käesolevas dissertatsioonis näitan läbivalt, et Heidegger pöördub Kierkegaardi poole spetsiifilises küsimise sfääris, sõltumata sellest, kellele Heidegger on loengu pühendanud. Samuti näitan, et Kierkegaard ilmneb Heideggeri erinevates loengukursustes hoolimata asjaolust, et läbi oma esimese Freiburgi perioodi teekonna Heidegger aina arendab ja taas-mõtestab oma käsitlust filosoofiast. Seega suunab Kierkegaardi koha analüüs Heideggeri esimese Freiburgi perioodi loengukursustes mind väitma, et Heideggeri jaoks ei ole Kierkegaard pelgalt teekonnal kohatav kaaslane, kellelt ta laenab üksnes mõned mõisted ja teemad, vaid pigem funktsioneerivad Kierkegaardi kirjutised Heideggeri jaoks kesksete inspiratsiooni allikatena, mis puudutab filosoofiat sellisena, nagu see on täide viidud. Kierkegaard ilmneb niipea, kui Heidegger seisab silmitsi keerulise ülesandega anda käsitlus filosoofiast konkreetses elusituatsioonis.

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Käesolev doktoritöö on jagatud kaheksaks peatükiks. Esimeses peatükis käsitlen teemasid, mis on seotud Heideggeri esimese Freiburgi perioodiga ja tema suhestumisega Kierkegaardi. Seletan, mida peetakse silmas Heideggeri esimese Freiburgi perioodi all; osutan Kierkegaardi tekstidele, mis olid Heideggerile kättesaadavad ja spetsiifilistele allikatele, mida on käesolevas doktoritöös kasutatud; tematiseerin Kierkegaardi kohalolu Heideggeri erinevates kirjutistes ja kirjeldan, kuidas Kierkgaardi ja Heideggeri suhestumist on sekundaarkirjanduses tõlgendatud. Minu peamine püüdlus antud peatükis on anda ülevaade probleemidest, mis ümbritsevad nende kahe mõtleja suhestumise uurimist ja joonistada välja selle lähenemise eripära, mille olen valinud otsimaks Kierkegaardi kohta Heideggeri esimese Freiburgi perioodi loengukursustes.

Järgnevad kuus peatükki on pühendatud Heideggeri loengukursustele kronoloogilises järjestuses koondatuna kahte ossa. Antud peatükkide jagamine kaheks põhineb viisil, kuidas Heidegger avab konkreetsetes loengukursustes oma problemaatika ja Kierkegaardi kohalolul nendes loengukursustes. Jagades Heideggeri loengud kahte ossa, oli minu eesmärk tuua selgelt välja nii Heideggeri problemaatika ja selle areng kui ka Kierkegaardi positsioon tema loengukursustes.

Töö esimeses osas keskendun Heideggeri loengukursustele alates aastast 1919 kuni talvesemestrini 1920–1921. Selles osas väidan, et Heidegger võtab ette filosoofia järele

küsimise kahes suunas ning selgitan, kuidas ta seda teeb. Alustades (teises peatükis) loengukursusega *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem* (KNS 1919, GA 56/57), näitan esmalt, et Heidegger arendab oma filosoofiaotsinguid kahes suunas: ta artikuleerib kohase filosoofia ülesande, pakkudes välja kaks erinevat lähenemisviisi. Enamgi veel, väidan, et seda tehes, avab ta ühtlasi tee enda filosoofia tõlgendamiseks kahel erineval domineerivaks kujunenud viisil. Järgnevas kahes peatükis argumenteerin, et oma edasistes loengukursustes võtab Heidegger mõlemad need suunad üksteise järel ette. Esmalt (kolmandas peatükis) näitan, et loengukursuses *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (WS 1919/1920, GA 58) vaatleb Heidegger filosoofia võimalikkust konkreetses elusituatsioonis. Selles loengukursuses on kohane filosoofia määratletud kui intensiivistunud keskendumine ise-ilmale. Ühtlasi mainib Heidegger siin esmakordselt Kierkegaardi. Ta tunnustab Kierkegaardi kui mõtlejat, kes on suutnud tuua elu selle päristise ligipääsuni. Töö neljandas peatükis, mis põhineb esmajärgus loengukursusel *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung* (SS 1920, GA 59) ja loengukursuse *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* (WS 1920–1921, GA 60) algusosal, argumenteerin, et järgnevalt pöördub Heidegger filosoofia kui uurimisviisi poole, keskendudes metodoloogia küsimusele. Väidan, et Heidegger kirjeldab filosoofilist uurimust kolme metodoloogilise momendi kaudu: fenomenoloogiline destruktsioon, fenomenoloogiline eksplikatsioon ja formaalne indikatsioon. Olles visandanud need kolm metodoloogilist momenti, pöördun taas kahe domineeriva Heideggeri filosoofia tõlgendamisviisi juurde ja näitan, milles seisneb nende vaheline erinevus. Antud tõlgendused erinevad selle poolest, et nad annavad esmasuse erinevatele Heideggeri poolt välja toodud fenomeni eksplitseerimise tähendussuundadele (*Sinnrichtungen*): suhtetähendusele (*Bezugssinn*) ja täideviiduse tähendusele (*Vollzugssinn*). Minu keskseks väiteks on, et Heidegger ise arendab oma filosoofiat samaaegselt mõlemas eelnimetatud suunas ja loob seega aluse kaheks erinevaks lähenemiseks oma filosoofiale, mis kumbki annavad esmasuse ühele kahest suunast. Seda väidet kinnitan taas käesoleva dissertatsiooni teises osas, milles Kierkegaardi kohalolu saab üha enam silmapaistvaks.

Töö teises osas analüüsin Heideggeri kolme loengukursust aastatest 1921 kuni 1923: loengukursuseid, mis on pühendatud Augustinusele (GA 60), Aristotelesele (GA 61) ja faktilisuse hermeneutikale (GA 63). Demonstreerin, et igas vaatluse all olevas loengukursuses Heidegger taas-mõtestab filosoofia, kaalutledes iga kord kaht ligipääsuviisi, millest mõlemad on omakorda alati edasi arendatud. Keskendudes Kierkegaardi asendile

igaühes neist kolmest loengukursusest, mida analüüsin vastavalt kolmes peatükis, näitan, et Kierkegaard osutub iga kord Heideggeri jaoks oluliseks niipea, kui viimane pöördub andma ülevaadet filosoofiast konkreetses elusituatsioonis. Samuti saab selgeks, et Kierkegaard ilmneb igas loengukursuses olenemata sellest, kellele või millele loengukursus on pühendatud või kuidas Heidegger oma käsitlust filosoofiast on edasi arendanud.

Viiendas peatükis argumenteerin, et eksplitseerides loengukursuses *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus* (SS 1921) Augustinuse teost *Pihtimused* (Raamat X), on Heideggeril samaaegselt Kierkegaard lakkamatult mõtteis. Demonstreerin, et oma Augustinuse tõlgenduses Heidegger üksnes ei arvesta Kierkegaardiga, analüüsides päristist ligipääsu faktilises elus ja selle kaudu, vaid toetub suures osas Kierkegaardile, ehitades üles oma käsitlust faktilisele elule avatud võimalikkustest. Öeldu tõestuseks teen antud peatükis ekskursi Kierkegaardi teosesse *Surmatõbi*. Lisaks toonitan, et vaadeldava loengukursuse publitseeritud teksti tuleks teha möödapääsmatu kohandus selleks, et osutada selles sisalduvale tekstiosale, mis on omistatud Heideggerile kui tema enda kirjutis, ent mille puhul tegelikkuses on tegemist tema kokkuvõtega Kierkegaardi teose *Surmatõbi* teisest osast (vt ka Appendix One).

Kuuendas peatükis keskendun Heideggeri loengukursusele *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* (WS 1921–1922). Näitan, et selles loengukursuses Heidegger tõstatab taaskord filosoofia probleemi kahel erineval viisil. Ta küsib: 1) kuidas toimida filosoofilises uurimuses ja 2) kus lasub filosoofia võimalikkus saavutada ligipääs elusituatsioonile selle täideviiduses. Need erinevad aspektid on esitatud sama küsimuse osadena, ent ometi analüüsitakse neid eraldi. Näidates, et filosoofia probleemi analüüs selles loengukursuses avaneb neis kahes suunas, pakun välja mõneti erineva ülesehituse loengukursuse publitseeritud tekstile. Samuti selgitan Kierkegaardi olulisust Heideggeri jaoks seoses viimase taas-mõtestatud käsitlusega filosoofiast sellisena nagu see on täide viidud. Tõstmaks esile Kierkegaardi rolli Heideggeri käsitluses, teen ühtlasi ekskursi Kierkegaardi teosesse *Ängi mõiste*.

Seitsmendas peatükis analüüsin Heideggeri viimast esimese Freiburgi perioodi loengukursust *Ontologie – Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (SS 1923). Tematiseerin nii selle, kuidas Heidegger sõnastab hermeneutika tähenduse, kui ka tema käsitluse tõlgendamise konkreetsest tööst. Antud peatükis demonstreerin, kuidas Heidegger on mõjutatud Kierkegaardi poolt, kui ta sõnastab seda, mis saavutatakse tõlgendamise konkreetses töös: taas-mõtestatud käsitlus võimalikust ligipääsust faktilises elus ja selle kaudu. Täpsemalt

rõhutan Kierkegaardi panust sellesse loengukursusesse, vaadeldes Heideggeri käsitluse tähelepanuväärseid sarnasusi sellega, mida Kierkegaard väljendab kirjutises, millele Heidegger on eksplitsiitselt viidanud: *The Single Individual* [*Den Enkelte*].

Käesoleva dissertatsiooni viimases peatükis (peatükk kaheksa), reflekteerin selle üle, mida Heideggeri esimese Freiburgi perioodi loengukursustest Kierkegaardi otsingute teekond on pakkunud. Küsin, mida see teekond on Heidegger otsingute ja eesmärkide kohta näidanud: millele küsimus 'mis on filosoofia?' lõppkokkuvõttes viitab? Argumenteerin, et see küsimus juhatab kohase ligipääsu probleemini. Lisaks toon välja, et Heideggeri enda lühidad eksplitsiitsed Kierkegaardi tematiseeringud kinnitavad selles dissertatsioonis tehtud keskseid väiteid. Kierkegaard on Heideggeri jaoks oluline impulsside allikas viimase püüdlustes leida ligipääs konkreetses elusituatsioonis. Lõpuks tõstatan küsimuse, milline aspekt Kierkegaardi filosoofias nähtub kesksena Heideggeri huvis tema vastu. Käesoleva uurimuse põhjal teen ettepaneku, et Heideggeri tähelpanu kese seisneb Kierkegaardi meisterlikkuses tõugata lugeja ise küsimise teele. Küsitavuse vajaduse äratundmine on otsustava tähtsusega kui kaalutletakse filosoofiat kui ligipääsuviisi konkreetses elusituatsioonis, mis tõstab mässu fikseeritud määratluste vastu. Läbilõikav kokkupuude Kierkegaardiga tegi Heideggeri jaoks sellest probleemist möödavaatamise võimatuks, otsides vastust küsimusele, mis on filosoofia päristine ülesanne.

(Translation: Karin Kustassoo)

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Curriculum Vitae

Karin Kustassoo was born in Pärnu, Estonia, April 18th, 1983. After having received her gymnasium diploma from Pärnu Hansagümnaasium in 2001, she entered the University of Tartu to study history, and soon after also philosophy. In 2006 she received a degree of *Baccalaureus Artium* by defending the thesis on Heraclitus' *Fragment B 50* in the Department of History and a bachelor's degree in Humanities (Philosophy) by defending a thesis on Kierkegaard's conception of despair in the Department of Philosophy. In 2006 she began her master's studies at the University of Tartu, which she finished *cum laude* in 2008 having defended the thesis "Søren Kierkegaard Martin Heideggeri varajases loengukursuses Augustinus ja neoplatonism" ['Søren Kierkegaard in Martin Heidegger's early lecture course *Augustine and Neoplatonism*']. In 2009 she started her PhD project on Kierkegaard and early Heidegger at the University of Tartu, combined with master's studies at the University of Copenhagen (Department of Media, Cognition and Communication; Philosophy) where she defended in 2012 the master's thesis "Martin Heidegger's notion of formal indication as particular methodological level of phenomenological explication." In the spring semester of 2011 she was a visiting researcher at the Protestantse Theologische Universiteit (Kampen) in the Department of Systematic Theology, and in 2012 she continued her PhD project – financed by the Archimedes Foundation (*Kristjan Jaak doctoral studies abroad*) – on Kierkegaard and Heidegger at Leiden University. Karin Kustassoo has published several articles on Kierkegaard in Estonian. She held a lecture series on Søren Kierkegaard as a visiting lecturer at the University of Tartu (spring semester 2012). At Leiden University she has for several years led a reading-group focusing mainly on Heidegger's philosophy (including four semesters on Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*). From May 2015 to April 2016 she acted as a member of the PhD Council of the Institute for Philosophy at Leiden University. During her PhD studies she has presented her work in different conferences as well as co-organized an international conference in Tartu (2013) *Kierkegaard's existentialism in the contemporary understanding*, with which she helped to bring the celebrations of Kierkegaard's 200th birthday into Estonia.