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CHAPTER 8

Inheriting Horror: Historical Memory in French Socialists' and German Social Democrats' Fight for European Democracy, 1945–1958

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> *When one is an insoluble part of a people, as the SPD is of the German people, that involves consequences. No one can free himself from the bond of belonging to a class or nation. It is like an inheritance — one takes over the debts as well as the assets.* (—Kurt Schumacher to the International Socialist Conference in Zurich, 8 June 1947[1])

Two years after the end of the Second World War, Kurt Schumacher addressed a transnational conference of European socialists on behalf of his party, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Formally requesting the SPD's (re)admittance into the international socialist community, Schumacher spoke of the "debts" and "assets" that were his party's "inheritance." Schumacher was aware that before he and his international colleagues could begin to contemplate the future, there would be a frank and painful reckoning with the horrors of the recent past. Anticipating the

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at-times hostile questions that were to come, Schumacher opened the meeting by binding past, present and future together in a metaphor of mutual obligation.

The concept of inheritance is a fruitful entry point for an analysis of how historical memory shaped the political culture not only of post-war German social democracy but of French socialism as well. To bequeath is to pass a heritage through time and between people, that is, between generations. "No one can free himself from [this] bond," Schumacher said. The sense of compulsion that the past imposed on the present in the period after the Second World War is at the heart of this chapter. The argument, however, proceeds a step further. Although the emphasis of Schumacher's remark is on the "insoluble" relationship between the SPD and the German people, he places the "bond of belonging to a class" alongside that of nation. As we shall see later in this text, this allegiance to multiple (if overlapping) communities was not a remark isolated to transnational discussions; it was a strong feature of post-war SPD leaders' domestic discourses as well. These dual allegiances also emerge in statements, both public and private, of post-war French socialist leaders.

The temporal and spatial characteristics of German social democratic and French socialist discourses on democracy in the decade after the Second World War bear so much in common that it is appropriate to analyse the party leaderships as a single generation of socialist politicians in post-war Europe. Most scholars of generation and memory continue to conceptualize their objects of study within national boundaries (except for recent comparative and transnational studies of the generation of 1968).[2] This leads to a general neglect of the possibility that, under specific sets of circumstances, transnational "memory communities" and generations may emerge. Jan Assmann writes that, in national memory communities, people "live in a shared world of symbolic meaning," accept the nation's "foundational memory" based on canonical texts and incorporate their personal experiences or "biographical memory" within the overarching memory culture.[3] In cases when memory is integral to a group's identity, Pierre Nora designates these "memory communities" with "debts and inheritances from the past," concepts that emerge in the quotation from Schumacher that opens this chapter.[4] Generation, meanwhile, "remains a highly ambiguous concept" in academic literature.[5] For Jürgen Reulecke, "generation and generationality are, in the end, not tangible entities but rather mental, often very zeitgeist-dependent constructs through which people, as members of a specific age group, are located or locate themselves

historically."[6] The centrality of age and demography remains contentious in the literature on generation. Jean-François Sirinelli writes, "In political history, generation…appears [to have]…a chronologically elastic structure."[7] These authors are emblematic of their field in that they analyse generations as nationally bound entities, German in the case of Reulecke and French for Sirinelli.

Generation and memory studies have called attention to divisions within national spheres. Below the "macro-formation of one culture," according to Jan Assmann, one finds "an array of cultural micro-formations."[8] Historians of memory, such as Henri Rousso, have analysed political parties as having distinct memory cultures.[9] Scholars also agree that there was no homogenous memory discourse within Western European countries during the post-war period.[10] In France, the resistance mythology was claimed by socialists, communists and Gaullists, but they presented different narratives of recent French history and contrary visions for the future.[11] Although historians of West Germany have emphasized a "community of silence" in the 1950s, the SPD frequently objected to the prevailing memory discourse of the time.[12] Another set of historians have pointed to the importance of generational differences within political parties, for instance, the "'45ers" and "68ers" in the SPD and the post-war generation around French Socialist leader Guy Mollet, the Algerian War generation that arose in the late 1950s to oppose him and the broader generation of 1968 that then followed.[13]

Although a number of recent works have encouraged scholars to conceptualize historical memory in a European context, memory and generation studies have not really considered the impact of sustained transnational contact between sub-national groups, transnational exchanges and the possibility of the formation of transnational memory communities.[14] The international socialist community—its rituals, symbols and institutions—is an ideal subject to explore the European dimension of generation and memory. The present chapter is a step in this direction. Scholars of generation emphasise the importance of a "founding moment," especially for those who "experienced times of radical upheaval and new beginnings," that serves to foster a "common vision of historical events."[15] Social psychologists, for their part, have shown how experiences of collective trauma often serve as the strongest basis for bonds among group members.[16] This chapter explores how the chain of events from the collapse of Weimar democracy to the Second World War facilitated a convergence of socialist-memory cultures in post-war France and Germany.

French socialists and German social democrats often presented their experiences of exile, imprisonment, and torture during the Nazi and Vichy regimes as having resulted from their socialist identity in a European anti-fascist struggle. Party leaders shared much in common in their analyses of the rise of Nazism, their assessment of non-socialist political forces, and the trajectory of post-war West German and French democracy. From these memorial discourses, both parties asserted a democratic legitimacy to present a post-war program for economic and social transformation. As Schumacher claimed, "our legitimacy comes from history, from the past."[17] Expectations for the future are often at the margins of memory studies, but—as Jon Cowan writes about post-war France—"assumptions of continuity between past and future meant that debates over the nation's future essentially hinged on the politics of memory," a claim that is equally valid for West Germany.[18] This chapter explores how SPD and SFIO narratives of what went wrong in the past—the lessons that each party derived from those experiences for their present and the proposals they designed for the future—often bore more in common with one another than they did with other political forces within their own nations. The SPD and SFIO also made frequent reference to the histories of their neighbours when interpreting developments in their own country. At crucial moments when their post-war democracies appeared threatened, party leaders interpreted their politics in a wider European context rather than as being bound within national borders. Taken together, these commonalities demonstrate that is a worthwhile endeavour to analyse these politicians as a single generation in the history of European social democracy.

Historical Legitimacy in French Socialist and German Social Democratic Discourses Emerging from the Second World War

In a series of meetings in 1947, European socialists debated the (re)admittance of the SPD into their family of parties, then known as COMISCO, the predecessor of the Socialist International established in 1951. A dominant feature of these discussions was the SPD's (in)action in the events leading up to the Nazi conquest of power in 1932–1933 and the relative impotence displayed by the German anti-fascist resistance during the Third Reich. Socialist delegates from the Netherlands and, in particular, from central Europe turned the proceedings into a sort of tribunal, in

which the SPD's leader, Kurt Schumacher, attempted to achieve legitimacy for his renascent party through a defence of the SPD's struggle and suffering during the preceding 15 years.

Schumacher pleaded for the understanding and sympathy of his socialist colleagues. The discussion focused at first on the SPD's decision to preserve its name, signalling organisational and ideological continuity with the inter-war and turn-of-the-century SPD. Marinus van der Goes van Naters, a Dutch delegate of the PvdA, a party that changed its name from a Socialist to a Labour party after the Second World War, pointedly demanded of Schumacher: "Is the SPD ready to acknowledge its pre-war failure and start as a new party?" In response, Schumacher conceded SPD errors, which he rarely did in public. He rejected, though, his Dutch colleague's link between inter-war failures and the necessity of renouncing his party's inheritance:

> *You must see that it was necessary to reassemble what forces were available and for this purpose the power of attraction of an old banner is stronger than any new organisation…I always belonged to the rebels in the old party, but to deny the old party on that account we will never do. The party made mistakes now and again, also tactical errors, but it was the party that strove for great principles which are today still demanded by the world and you should not make our failure your standard of judgment in all things. It is not always the better man who wins.*[19]

Here Schumacher received crucial support from French socialist representatives. Party leader Guy Mollet reminded his Socialist colleagues that his party had also resurrected its name and argued that this was no reason to exclude the SPD from international socialist meetings. In the end, COMISCO approved the (re)admittance of the SPD.

Although battles for historical legitimacy generally took place within national political arenas, the cataclysm and traumas of the Second World War transcended borders, destroyed national myths, discredited political movements of the right and hoisted to power a new set of political elites who competed with one another to articulate new discourses of national memory during a period of confusion and dislocation. Although the idea of a "Zero Hour" (*Stunde Null*) was a myth of the period, Nazi rule in Germany, the collapse of the French Third Republic and the "National Revolution" in France left ideological and mythological vacuums in Germany and in France. With fascism and collaboration having fallen into

public disrepute, French socialists and German social democrats attempted to formulate, propagate and cement new memorial discourses to legitimate their parties' claims to political power. They sought, through repetition at party congresses, political rallies, in party presses and in parliamentary bodies to win normative status for their narrations of the past in order to achieve collective authority for the politics of their present and future.[20] Central to these rhetorical efforts were assertions by both parties that they were the most democratic of the political movements in their countries during both the inter- and post-war periods.

To make these assertions convincing, the post-war generation of SPD and SFIO leaders prevented the re-emergence of inter-war party leaders whose past actions had compromised their credentials as defenders of democracy. The SPD voted against the Enabling Act that marked the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933, but it remained overwhelmingly passive as Nazi storm troopers solidified the NSDAP's political victory by conquering the streets of Germany. Schumacher was well known for advocating violent resistance to the NSDAP as a leader of the republican Iron Front in 1931–1933, activities that led to his arrest and long-term imprisonment. Such actions, however, were those of a clear minority within the SPD. Schumacher did not make much of his own resistance activities after the war, but his ascent to leadership was in effect a retroactive endorsement of his activism during this fateful period and a condemnation of the impotency of the SPD leadership in the last years of the Weimar Republic. Schumacher's reaction to a German communist campaign in 1945 to malign a prominent official of the Weimar-era SPD, Carl Severing, who had preached non-resistance as Prussian Interior Minister in 1932 and who now sought a new leadership role in the post-war SPD, was an implicit rejection of the SPD's Weimar leadership. Schumacher refused to lend his own legitimacy, nor that of his party, to Severing's public efforts to defend himself.[21]

Although the SPD unanimously rejected the Enabling Act of 1933, thus allowing it to retrospectively claim credit for having opposed the Nazis in the Reichstag, SFIO deputies split their votes when—in the chaos of the French military defeat of 1940—the National Assembly convened in Vichy and voted full powers to Marshal Philippe Pétain. Although the Socialist tally did not break down completely along the factional lines of the late 1930s, for the most part a pacifist wing around party leader Paul Faure voted for Pétain's investiture and sought to integrate itself into the new institutions of the "National Revolution." Anti-fascists around parliamentary leader Léon Blum voted in opposition and provided the first

cadres of the underground SFIO resistance. Emerging from the Second World War, the SFIO undertook the most profound post-war purge of any French political party.[22] Underground party leader Daniel Mayer pushed for the exclusion of all deputies who had voted for Pétain's investiture (the party later allowed a few to re-join if they had proven resistance credentials), all mayors who had remained in office under Vichy without explicit party approval, all socialists who had praised Vichy or the occupiers in any way and anyone known to have been involved in black-market activities.[23] These actions allowed the 1944 SFIO Congress to declare during the liberation of France, "The party has carried out a victory upon itself…It has chased from its breast traitors, cowards, weaklings."[24]

Post-war socialist leaders defended the democratic constitutions of their inter-war republics from the stigma of having failed to prevent the rise of dictatorships. The narrative developed in Blum's *À l'Échelle Humaine* set the contours around which the SFIO developed its critique of the Third Republic and its vision for a Fourth. Casting judgment on the politics of the Third Republic, Blum admitted that there were elements of "instability, of discontinuity, of inefficiency" but declared that, "Taken as a whole, the Third Republic, like the Second and the First, was an honest regime."[25] He saw the failures of the inter-war period not in democratic institutions but in those who directed them. Schumacher, for his part, said in 1946 that, "the Weimar constitution was undoubtedly the best in the world. How come this modern constitution worked so terribly[?]…it [was] due to the spirit [of the time] and the people who wielded it."[26] Fritz Erler, later an important SPD official, made a similar point in January 1947: "It was much less a sign of the weakness of the Weimar Constitution and much more of the Weimar Republic….Democracy in Germany did not surrender in 1919 during the building of the constitution, but rather in the years thereafter…".[27]

SFIO and SPD leaders put forward aggressive claims to lead their countries towards democratic futures by arguing that their parties had foreseen the dangers of fascism in the inter-war period. In the SFIO's narrative, France's property-owning class had committed treason because it preferred Adolf Hitler to Blum, who had led the Popular Front governments of 1936–1938. The underground party press declared in 1941 that the French military defeat of 1940 was a "catastrophe desired and prepared by [French fascists]."[28] In 1943, a clandestine socialist newspaper claimed that socialists had correctly understood the challenges of the inter-war period:

> *We are "men of the past"? Error: we are the men of the future. The truth is that in the past we were already the men of the future. We foresaw yesterday what would come to pass, we presented solutions that were not carried through and which, if they had been accepted, would have avoided this catastrophe…*[29]

On 6 May 1945, Kurt Schumacher struck a similar tone in his first public speech since 1933. He recalled the SPD slogan of the 1930s that "Hitler means war" and claimed in countless speeches over the next year that the German people had not adequately heeded the SPD's warning.[30] Schumacher resurrected his inter-war rhetoric, invoking his belligerent 1932 speech to the Reichstag, in which he called the Nazis "Neanderthals" and Nazism the "pinnacle of human stupidity."[31] The SPD presented a social-democratic version of the "*Sonderweg*," Germany's "special path." Schumacher assigned an economic origin to Nazism, proclaiming that "German's large property class (*Großbesitz*) knew what it was doing! … Heavy industry, armaments capital, militarism and all their vassals, who afterwards seek to distance themselves from what the Nazis tried to do, bear as mid-wives of Nazi tyranny the full responsibility for everything that happened."[32] "The Social Democratic Party," Schumacher told his international socialist colleagues in June 1947, "was the only party in Germany whose members made real sacrifices for freedom and democracy during the period of the [Weimar] Republic's crisis."[33]

The politics of memory were also central to socialist efforts to discredit other political groups. Socialists propagated their own narratives of these groups' histories. In his May 1945 speech, Schumacher portrayed a German liberal movement condemned by its historical failures: The 1848 revolutions marked the original sin of German liberalism when the German bourgeoisie sided with reactionary forces.[34] In December, he proclaimed that, "The great ideas of the great French Revolution have no place any more among our German liberals; they now only have sanctuary among the socialists."[35] Schumacher repeatedly attacked the German Communist Party (KPD) for targeting the SPD and not committing itself to the defence of Weimar democracy. He went so far as to claim that, "If the KPD had not sabotaged democracy together with the Nazis and the German Nationalists, we would have had no Third Reich and no Second World War." Nor did he spare the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by the former mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer. In his June 1947 comments to COMISCO, Schumacher said that, "The CDU is the great collector (*Sammelbecken*) of property-owners, Nazis and reactionaries."[36]

The CDU and SPD engaged in a running war of words as they competed to become the largest party of post-war Germany. In response to CDU criticisms of the passivity of SPD inter-war leaders Otto Braun and Carl Severing, Schumacher responded with this criticism of the CDU's predecessor, the Centre Party, during the final years of Weimar:

> *…since Mr. Adenauer likes to speak so much of Braun and Severing—who negotiated for a governing coalition with the Nazis in summer 1932? Who wanted to rule together with the Nazis? It was the Centre Party and also that part of the Centre Party that Adenauer and his cohort represented. And finally, dear Assembly, Mr. [Franz] von Papen was also previously a Prussian local delegate of the Centre Party. …the right-wing of the Centre Party, represented by Dr. Adenauer and his friends, is unteachable and is engaging in the same politics and the same hateful and objectionable methods with those who have already once destroyed democracy.*[37]

Schumacher concluded that, "democracy in Germany is today not much stronger than the Social Democratic Party."[38]

In France, SFIO leaders thought that socialism was "master of the hour" after the Second World War.[39] Their initial concern was to convince Free French leader Charles de Gaulle to declare publicly his support for democracy and overcome his disdain for political parties. As Mayer stated in 1944: "A democracy cannot live without parties, without the loyal competition of diverse political organisations."[40] By 1945, the party found itself locked in a dispute over the powers of the National Assembly vis-à-vis de Gaulle's executive. Socialist André Philip, who had joined de Gaulle in London exile, declared in frustration: "We want him [de Gaulle] to stay, but we also want him to get used to democracy."[41] Although Blum had called for a strong executive in *À l'Échelle Humaine*, the SFIO generally shared the republican consensus that equated republicanism with parliamentary rule. A presidential system, to the SFIO, meant "personal rule," in other words, a dictatorship based on the Bonapartist model. After de Gaulle resigned from his post as premier and gave a June 1946 speech denouncing the parliamentary system, Blum declared the need for a "Third Force" coalition charged with "republican defence" against the Gaullist right and communist left.

Soon after the ratification of a new constitution, the French Fourth Republic appeared endangered from the right and the left as de Gaulle hammered the government for inadequately defending French interests and the Communist Party adopted an aggressive attitude after the tripartite

government ended in spring 1947. In summer, Socialist Premier Paul Ramadier spoke of the need to "defend the Republic" and warned darkly of "conspirators who…have formed associations intending to wield violence against the Republic."[42] Massive strikes broke out in French industry in 1948, which the government treated as an attempted *coup d'état* to overthrow democracy and install a soviet-style system on the model of the recent Prague coup in Czechoslovakia.[43] In Germany as well, vivid memories of the inter-war period and a wave of strikes led the SPD to worry that poor economic conditions could prove fatal for post-war democratization. With democracy seemingly under siege in France by 1947 and hardly begun in Germany, French socialists and German social democrats observed in dismay that their designs for economic democracy, which they considered a necessary prerequisite for political democracy, stalled as the political winds shifted to the right. Increasingly on the defensive within a few years of the end of the war, neither French nor German socialists were confident that their nations' futures would be democratic.

A New Beginning or Restoration? Socialist Doubts About French and German Democracy, 1949–1952

When West Germany held its first federal elections in August 1949, SPD leaders were convinced that a "restoration" of Germany's traditional, anti-democratic political culture was under way.[44] Party leaders argued that, without Allied interference, revolutionary elements in Germany would have enacted a more far-reaching and effective purge of the public administration and economy. Without such a purge, Schumacher declared, "for the second time the revolution threatens to wash away."[45] At party congresses, SPD officials lamented that U.S. and British occupying authorities had reinstated former Nazis to positions in the bureaucracy and police. Although they considered the underground Nazi movement to be incapable yet of "dramatic and dynamic action," they worried about the impact inter-party jockeying for the votes of former Nazis would have on the wider political culture.[46] The re-staffing of bureaucracies with people who had exhibited a marked hostility to the left during Weimar seemed to bode poorly for the inculcation of a new democratic spirit.

SFIO and SPD leaders often relied on a common set of recent historical examples to craft their assessment of German Christian democracy at the birth of the Bonn republic. Although Allied governments expressed relief that political forces programmatically committed to democracy won the

vast majority of votes in the 1949 elections, the slight advance of the CDU/Christian Social Union (CSU) over the SPD caused consternation in both the SPD and the SFIO. The SFIO launched a press campaign calling for the SPD's inclusion in a grand coalition.[47] The examples of Christian dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and inter-war Austria shaped SFIO and SPD views of Christian democracy. Salomon Grumbach, the SFIO's leading expert on Germany, told the 1949 SFIO congress, "There is the Christian-Democratic Party, which may be a democratic party, but is far more Christian," and he explicitly compared developments in Germany with those in France, noting that former Pétainists were joining the Christian democratic (MRP) and Gaullist (RPF) parties.[48] Four days after the CDU/CSU victory, Schumacher cast this judgment: "Inside the Christian Democrats there is a large right-wing movement that is very reserved towards democracy. Also, their clerical core likes more the Christian state in the style of the Austria of [Engelbert] Dolfuss or [Kurt] Schuschnigg and of [Francisco] Franco's Spain."[49] Two years later, Grumbach presented the CDU through the prism of a dangerous, transnational Catholic political ascendancy in Western Europe.[50]

As occupation controls began to fall in Germany, a moderate yet clear recrudescence of neo-Nazi activities and far-right politics made international headlines from 1949 to 1952, shaking the politics of the young republic. A series of amnesty laws to free people from de-Nazification, the readmission of former Nazis into government administration and a public campaign for the pardoning of German war criminals represented a reassertion of right-wing elements in West German society who had kept a prudent silence during the early years of occupation. Most ominous of all was the emergence of a political party of former Nazis, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), the rhetoric, means of mobilisation and organisational structure of which mimicked those of the NSDAP.[51] The SRP has received relatively little attention from historians, but its presence on the early democratic scene did much to shape the early political culture of the Bonn republic. After years arguing that Germans would more effectively de-Nazify the country if left to do it on their own, the SPD faced the situation that it was the occupation authorities, not the German government, that acted as the decisive agents in the suppression of neo-Nazi movements.[52] Abroad—as part of its campaign to regain full German sovereignty—the party argued that reports about neo-Nazism were sensationalist and exaggerated and that the far right did not represent a credible threat to German democracy. At home, however, social democrats criticized the lax attitude of the government,

engaged in direct confrontations with the far right and fretted that neo-Nazism was gaining a foothold within the more establishment parties.

In November 1949, German Party deputy and former Nazi Party member Wolfgang Hedler gave a speech in which he claimed that Germans bore "minimal guilt" for the Second World War and that anti-Nazi German resisters were "national traitors." Most incendiary of all, he said, "It is possible to have differing opinions about the question of whether gassing the Jews was the means of choice. Maybe other ways could have been found to get rid of them."[53] A social democratic official recorded his comments and reported it to the party. In January 1950, Hedler was put on trial for disparaging the memory of German resisters, for insulting Jews and for inciting violence. The list of co-plaintiffs, including Schumacher and SPD deputy Jacob Altmaier, who was Jewish, propelled the trial into the international spotlight. Two of the three presiding judges had been former Nazi party members. They created a peculiarly narrow standard of guilt: whether or not Hedler's comments indicated that he approved the gassing of Jews. On this basis, the court acquitted Hedler. To SPD leaders, the Weimar practice of judges acting leniently towards right-wing agitators appeared to be reasserting itself.

Five days after the verdict, Schumacher asked, "Who will protect us against these judges, who, due to the will of local occupation authorities, are made up of at least 70 per cent former Nazis? … Especially the judges who have lost all the respect of a large portion of the people and who carried out the work of the primitive Gestapo officers, must first earn our trust."[54] In March 1950, the SPD central committee dedicated a whole session to "Defence against Neo-fascism." The SPD's leader in Schleswig-Holstein told the meeting, "We must ensure that the police are with us and forbid any militarist organisation." Schumacher responded that, "the police are unreliable and the justice system is against us."[55] The same day as the Hedler verdict, the SPD introduced two bills into the Bundestag. The first, a "Law against the Enemies of Democracy," called for the imprisonment of those who threatened force against the republic, who "render[ed] the republic's flag contemptible or impugn[ed] the dignity of a group of people on the basis of race, belief, or [world view]," or insulted the memory of victims. The second bill would retroactively legalize the actions of those who had resisted Nazism in 1933–1945.[56]

The party executive decided to set up an internal office to track and respond to neo-Nazi movements. Personal notes from SPD Vice-Chairman Erich Ollenhauer's archive provide a snapshot of the SPD's assessment of

neo-Nazism. He wrote that there were not sufficient laws to suppress these types of parties and that the state and police were proceeding with excessive hesitation: The "State must prove its authority … [because] Neo-fascist powers only recognize strength."[57] Local SPD chapters organised counter-demonstrations with other groups each time a SRP speaker came to town. Regional SPD interior ministers, after street brawls at SRP rallies, banned SRP leaders from speaking in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, the largest bastions of far-right support in post-war West Germany. After SRP leader Fritz Dorls called the Bavarian Social Democratic Interior Minister Wilhelm Hoegner "the most despicable subject the German earth has ever brought forth" for attending the Nuremberg executions of German war criminals, the Bundestag lifted his immunity.[58] Dorls was placed on trial for slander, and Hoegner banned SRP rallies in Bavaria. In February 1950, Schumacher said that "the great sin of the Weimar Republic is repeating itself" and, due to its alleged reluctance to condemn right-wing movements, "The German middle is making the same mistake as during the Weimar Republic."[59] SPD leaders later welcomed the decision of the German constitutional court to ban the SRP in 1952.[60]

As they denounced anti-democratic groups in Germany, SPD leaders expressed even greater concern about political developments in France. In a September 1945 speech, Schumacher highlighted how democracy was more historically implanted in England and France than in Germany.[61] However, when the new Gaullist Party (RPF) achieved great success in the 1947 French municipal elections, Schumacher looked at events in France with foreboding: "What we must consider is the fact that a people with such a tradition of democracy, with four revolutions, voted…70% in its large cities for potential hangmen of democracy." Worst of all, he declared, "is the fatal parallels in France with the political situation of Germany in 1932."[62] The growing alienation between socialist parties and working-class voters, who tended to support communists in France and in Italy, augured poorly for European democracy: "Where developments have led to distance between workers and social democrats, the middle classes are not in a position to maintain democracy over the long term. We are experiencing that already in the rocking [taking place] in Italy and in France."[63]

In private, SFIO leaders largely agreed with this dire assessment. French socialists did not view France to be immune from the fate that befell interwar German democracy. Mollet echoed Schumacher's despair in September 1947 in a SFIO party executive meeting: "if we go on like this, in six

months we will all end up in concentration camps."[64] A year later he said that, "The present situation is quite similar to that of Germany in 1932."[65] That both SFIO and SPD leaders turned to the example of 1932 Germany to interpret events in late-1940s France indicates the weight that memories of Weimar's collapse exerted on their interpretations of the present. The analogy of the Weimar Republic had such strength that SFIO leaders at times debated tactics through contrary interpretations of the "lessons" of Weimar. In January 1949, the SFIO National Council discussed whether to continue participating in a Radical-led government that was steadily moving to the right. Édouard Depreux couched his opposition to participation by stating:

> *German Social Democracy was filled with good faith when, in agreement with the Catholic Centre to fight on two fronts against Hitler and the communists, it went from concession to concession until it accepted participation in [Chancellor Heinrich] Brüning's government, the social policy of which is not so different from a government directed by the Radicals in France. Result: a large part of the German proletariat marched to the communists.*[66]

Mollet defended participation with a counter-narrative: It was only after multiple elections and permanent agitation that Hitler seized power. For Mollet, forcing the dissolution of the French Assembly would only benefit communists and Gaullists.

Operating within national boundaries, few historians have analysed how revisionist and reactionary sentiment about the wartime experience peaked in France and Germany during the same years. In 1951, the French electorate returned an Assembly considerably to the right of its predecessor. The SFIO acquiesced uncomfortably as an amnesty bill for Vichy collaborators began emptying prisons during a period when neo-Pétainist sentiment reached an apogee. Observing events across the Rhine, Schumacher stated that without the U.S., France and Italy would already be dictatorships.[67] He called France "the weak point" of democracy in Europe. His analysis of the French election was apocalyptic, and he compared the SFIO's tactics with those of the Weimar-era SPD: It was "a Hitler election result. If the Socialists enter government or tolerate a minority government, the process of dissolution will take place."[68] Grumbach recalled that a sense of fatalism helped Hitler rise to power and warned his socialist colleagues privately that it could do so in France as well.[69] As support for a new de Gaulle government grew, Mollet told a

party meeting, "That day the [SFIO] Directing Committee will have to call for a rebellion including everyone, including the [communists]. To accept de Gaulle is to accept a dictatorship. A popular demonstration could be effective even if broken."[70] The siren call of a new Popular Front—and the deep-seated resistance this eventuality evoked within the Cold War-era socialist party—complicated internal party discussions about how to effectively defend parliamentary democracy.

Historical memory of Europe's tumultuous inter-war period framed this generation of socialist leaders' understanding of the predicament facing French democracy. In September 1951, Mollet told the SFIO National Council, "De Gaulle's fascism is as dangerous for us as it was for the other democracies—even if it is different…[and] the comparison is misplaced in certain regards—the fascism of Hitler, the fascism of [Benito] Mussolini… it resembles more that of [Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira] Salazar…the day when Hitler was called to power, in Germany, it was after a quite similar electoral success…as that just achieved by the RPF."[71] Although hopes for a stable democratic regime in France rallied in the years that followed, worse was to come.

An Authoritarian Contagion? The Consolidation of Christian Democracy in West Germany and the Fall of the French Fourth Republic, 1953–1958

The CDU/CSU victory in the 1953 federal elections (its vote increased 14.2% to reach 45.2% as the SPD vote stagnated) unleashed a wave of fear in the SPD leadership that the CDU might use its newfound strength to eliminate the bases of democratic opposition in Germany. In the lead-up to the elections, Erler warned, "political Catholicism [has] a tendency towards authoritarian state-building."[72] The new party leader, Erich Ollenhauer, who replaced Schumacher after his death in 1952, stated, "We are closer today in the *Bundesrepublik* to an authoritarian system than to a free *Volksstaat*" due to "the authoritarian attitude of the government and above all of the head of government towards the parliament."[73] SPD leaders fretted that far right and unreformed Nazis were joining the Christian democrats, thereby "strengthen[ing] the restorative, nationalist and authoritarian politics of the CDU/CSU."[74] Ollenhauer's analysis in private party discussions was directly informed by the Nazi electoral

success of 1933. He warned that the CDU would likely attempt a "synchronization process" [*Gleichschaltungsprozess*] to eliminate the independence of the trade unions, the press, the arts, and the state (*Land*) governments.[75] Faced with signs of "a totalitarian and war-like danger" as the government pressed for German rearmament, Ollenhauer called on the SPD to vigorously contest such efforts "before it is too late."[76] A few years later, the party opposed the banning of the Communist Party by the Constitutional Court, a ruling that followed a request by Adenauer's government. Ollenhauer told the SPD parliamentary group that the decision was "political foolishness that will in the long term bring only damage to democracy." Furthermore, "we must strongly protest that the implementation [of the ruling] by the police, the arrests, the house searches and police seizures in certain cases are being carried out in the spirit of the purges after the Reichstag fire of February 1933."[77]

Having shared the SPD's assessments of German democracy due to a similar understanding of the recent past in 1946–1951, the experience of SFIO leaders with Christian democracy in France, and its dealings with CDU politicians in international fora in the 1950s, led them to a contrary interpretation of the 1953 election. The SFIO leadership now considered the CDU to have proven its democratic credentials and welcomed its success at the polls. No doubt to avoid a confrontation with SPD delegates at a Socialist International meeting in February 1954, Mollet crossed out the following statement from his speech: "The vote of September 1953 was a great victory for democracy and for Europe. The democratic parties—our Social Democratic friends and Adenauer's CDU, won votes and seats to the detriment of nationalists and the Communist and Nazi parties have been practically struck from the political map."[78] This comment foreshadowed the amiable spirit of cooperation that Mollet developed with Adenauer during his tenure as French premier in 1956–1957. Lamenting the state of French politics in November 1957, Mollet told a socialist audience, "I dream of a [French] conservative party on…the German model."[79] The politics of memory, despite their resiliency, are never set in stone.

Although fears of renewed German militarism reached a crescendo in French politics during the European Defence Community debates of 1954, concerns for German democracy steadily lost their potency within the SFIO leadership during the 1950s. The SPD's reaction to the CDU's thumping victory of 1957, when the CDU/CSU became the first party in German history to reach an absolute majority, demonstrates that the SPD leadership, unlike SFIO leaders, continued to mistrust Adenauer. The

party press stated, "German democracy must now pass its trial by fire" because "the electors of the Federal Republic have given the CDU an absolute majority and with it carte blanche to build one party rule."[80] Important elements within the party privately argued that such fears were exaggerated, but publicly the SPD sounded the alarm against Adenauer. In January 1958, Ollenhauer wrote, "The attempted *Gleichschaltung* of regional elections, the plans of the Interior Minister to build a state security office and Adenauer's dangerous line of thought that the opposition has no rights shows [that]…the governing party is orienting itself more and more in a conservative-restorative direction." Adenauer, the text went on, "is exploiting his position of power to build an authoritarian one-man-system in a centralized unity state and is therefore endangering democracy."[81]

It was France, however, that faced the most serious threat to parliamentary democracy. After a narrow victory in 1951 for pro-regime parties, the December 1955 national elections took place amidst a popular tax revolt led by Pierre Poujade. The small-town, lower middle–class demographics of the Poujadist movement and its violent anti-parliamentary rhetoric invited comparisons with inter-war fascism.[82] In October 1955, socialist Gérard Jaquet worried that little was needed to spark a fascist uprising.[83] After the election, Mollet gave a similar view: "We know well that in France there is a permanent fascist movement …" more dangerous than the Gaullists because it contains "the hardest, youngest, most aggressive elements. The immense danger I see in Poujadism are the violent demonstrations that it will provoke, that could lead to a new Popular Front directed by the [PCF] and the [Communist-aligned trade union] C.G.T."[84] In a dynamic that recalled 1934–1935, the leadership received reports of local SFIO chapters collaborating with Communists, portending a grassroots Popular Front from below. The perceived danger of the far right and left-wing unity efforts played a role in the SFIO's decision to lead a "Republican Front" governing coalition in January 1956. Whereas Mollet worried that "an impotent majority" led by the Socialists would be "suicide [for] the party and democracy," André Philip and Christian Pineau put forth the "republican defence" argument that, when the republic was in danger, the SFIO must come to its aid. Under party pressure, Mollet agreed to become premier.

Mollet's government was the longest lasting of the Fourth Republic, but it struggled to contain growing domestic discontent, runaway inflation, and an escalating war to maintain French rule in Algeria, the success

of which many socialists believed vital to the survival of the regime. Other socialists broke with the government over Algeria, with Philip, for instance, accusing Mollet of "creating the psychological conditions that slowly formed in Germany after 1930 and brought about the basis of the fascist movement."[85] Mollet's government was followed by a series of short-lived, acrimonious coalitions in 1957–1958. Socialist participation in these ad hoc coalitions faced growing internal opposition.[86] Comments from disgruntled SFIO deputies were similar to the view Ollenhauer had expressed a few years earlier of the miniscule Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI), which allied with Italy's Christian democratic-led government: "A Social Democratic Party that enters a coalition in which its political power is not necessary, but rather represents only an auxiliary resource, carries itself to its own grave."[87]

The prospect of a military "State within a State" à la Weimar had done much to shape the SPD's opposition to German rearmament in the 1950s. Now it reset the terms of debate within the SFIO. On 13 May 1958, the Algiers European population revolted against the government for allegedly preparing to abandon French Algeria. In the dramatic days and weeks of May–June 1958, much of the military leadership in Algeria rallied to its side. Facing a military revolt, the dominant historical analogy for Mollet was not Germany in 1932 but rather the attempted coup by Spanish General Francisco Franco in 1936 and the eventual victory of his forces in the ensuing Spanish Civil War. Jules Moch, again Interior Minister, reported that the army was in full revolt and that he had no faith that the metropolitan police would resist a military invasion of Paris. Backroom bargaining, rumours, and memories of the June 1940 Assembly investiture of Pétain combined to create a toxic mood in the party. As calls for "de Gaulle to power" mounted throughout the country, the socialist parliamentary group was furious to learn that its leadership had entered into secret negotiations with him. Whispers of "treason" punctuated socialist meetings. Many socialists saw Franco's image in de Gaulle, but Mollet now disagreed, saying that he preferred de Gaulle to a "Francoist government" or a "government of colonels."[88] Casting his eye over recent European history, Mollet reminded his colleagues that no internal revolution had overthrown a military regime in Europe without foreign intervention. Monnet's narrative of the Spanish Civil War's implications for France signalled his new openness to allying with de Gaulle to break the impasse in Algeria.

In a climate of fear that paratroopers would soon land in Paris, Mollet and other leading politicians attained enough concessions from de Gaulle to maintain the pretence of republican legality for a transitional government. After 13 years of denouncing de Gaulle, Mollet now asked the SFIO to support his return to power. A series of tense meetings, in which some socialist deputies called for a broad anti-fascist coalition with the PCF, resulted in a 77–74 vote in de Gaulle's favour. However, a slim majority of SFIO deputies then voted against de Gaulle's investiture in the National Assembly on 1 June 1958. Mollet and two other Socialists entered de Gaulle's cabinet, to which the parliament granted full powers and charged with the task of writing a new constitution. Angry and bitter, a large number of SFIO deputies who opposed de Gaulle seceded to form the Autonomous Socialist Party (PSA), which later became the Unified Socialist Party (PSU). As the SPD's envoy to a PSA party congress reported to Ollenhauer, the socialists of the new party "think that democracy no longer exists (police measures, newspaper censorship, one-sided radio broadcasting, military intervention in political events)" and "fear—and say it openly—that de Gaulle is preparing a military dictatorship that will support itself strongly on the upper clergy of the Catholic Church."[89]

As the Fourth Republic collapsed, Ollenhauer warned party officials privately in June 1958 that, "the developments of the last ten years in France bear certain resemblances to the period between 1930 and 1932 in Germany."[90] The SPD sympathized with the SFIO's anti-Gaullist faction, but after Moch told Ollenhauer that he had lost authority over the police, the SPD leadership urged party members to restrain their criticism of Mollet. As events unfolded in France, Herbert Wehner said to the SPD central committee, "The strengthening appetite for authoritarian tendencies can also be a formidable problem for us," while Ollenhauer warned that "repercussions are to be feared in Germany."[91] In October, Ollenhauer said that "there are plenty of people [in Germany] who would very much like to imitate de Gaulle's example."[92] In the face of a possible civil war in France, the SPD could do little more than hope that the Fifth Republic would prove less authoritarian than it feared while girding itself against Adenauer's alleged wish "to be a second de Gaulle."[93] After the new French constitution created a presidential system to replace parliamentary rule, the SPD worried that events in France would act as a contagion in Germany, especially after Adenauer launched a campaign to move from the Chancellorship to the Presidency.[94] Ollenhauer told SPD officials,

"One must unfortunately say that the prospects that the November [1958] elections in France will result in a parliament that conforms to our conception of parliamentary democracy…is quite slim…What will this mean for Europe? What will this mean for Germany…? Our [Christian democrats] already have a lot of sympathy for a system in between democracy and dictatorship…and [will say] that we must now adjust our constitution…"[95] Memories of the inter-war years, when dictatorship spread from one European nation to the next, loomed large in the SPD's ominous analysis of events in France at the dawn of the Fifth Republic.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how a transnational collective memory of the inter-war period among the first generation of post-war SFIO and SPD leaders informed their analyses of democracy in France and in West Germany from 1945 to 1958. In private discussions, each party considered the other country's past, and that of other Western European countries, to be directly relevant to their understanding of political developments in their own nations. This generation of post-war SFIO and SPD leaders interpreted their recent traumas and the prospects for democratic futures not only within national but also within transnational and European perspectives. In addition, this chapter has argued that, under the influence of narratives of what happened in Europe in 1932–1945, the SPD and SFIO leaderships viewed their democracies to be under sustained threat for more than a decade after the war, a threat borne out by events in France in 1958 if not in Germany. The SFIO leadership gained confidence in West German democracy before the SPD, whose leaders looked to the future with caution and even pessimism through the 1950s. Historical experiences and narratives sustained a psychological atmosphere of fear, isolation and mistrust among the post-war generation of SPD leaders.

In 1959–1960, the pull of the past weakened within each party. The SPD abandoned its revolutionary program of social and economic transformation at its Bad Godesberg party congress in 1959. In 1960–1961, it began a public campaign to find "common ground" (*Gemeimsamkeit*) and stopped criticizing the "authoritarian" nature of Christian democracy, most dramatically when it took a moderate stance in the 1962 *Spiegel* affair after Adenauer's government threatened to bring treason charges against a leading magazine for publishing secret documents and for criticizing German defence policy. During the 1960s, the SPD presented itself

to the German electorate as the "better party" rather than the only true democratic party. With the nomination of the youthful Willy Brandt as SPD candidate for chancellor in 1961, the SPD dampened the apocalyptic tone of its historical narratives and sought alliances with liberals and Christian democrats, thus paving the way for the party's participation in ruling coalitions from 1966 to 1982. The context of French politics shifted as well. Many socialists continued to denounce the authoritarian tendencies of de Gaulle's presidency, branded him a dictator-in-the-making, and hoped to restore parliamentary rule in France. In contrast, a larger group of socialists saw de Gaulle as the only person capable of resolving the Algerian War without destroying French democracy. In the mid-1960s the political culture of France and Germany changed as socialist leaders found themselves contesting new interpretations of the traumas and lessons of the inter-war period that were being aggressively put forth by the student generation of '68. Politics in Western Europe had entered a new era.

Notes

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3. Assmann, Jan. *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 37, 116.
4. Booth, W. James. "Communities of Memory: On Identity, Memory, and Debt." *The American Political Science Review* 93: 2 (1999), 249.
5. Prochnow, Jeanette/Rohde, Caterina. "Generations of Change. Introduction." *InterDisciplines* 2, 2011, 6.
6. Reulecke, Jürgen. "Generation/Generationality, Generativity, and Memory." In Nell, Astrid/Nünning, Ansgar, eds. *Media and Cultural Memory/Medien und kulturelle Erinnerung.* Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010, 119.

7. Sirinelli, Jean-François. "Génération et histoire politique." *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 22 (1989), 79.
8. Assmann, *Cultural Memory*, 120.
9. Rousso, Henry. *Le syndrôme de Vichy, 1944–1987*. Paris: Seuil, 1987, 12.
10. Lagrou, Pieter. *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 3.
11. Rousso, *Le syndrôme de Vichy*, 36.
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13. Sirinelli, *Génération*, 70–74; Bergounioux, Alain. "Générations socialistes." *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 22 (1989), 93–101; Jalabert, Laurent. "Aux origines de la génération 1968: Les étudiants français et la guerre du Vietnam." *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 55 (1997), 78 f.
14. See Assmann, Aleida. "Europe: A Community of Memory?" *GHI Bulletin* 40 (2007); the Introduction in François, Étienne/Schulze, Hagen, ed. *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2007, 2001; the final essay of Judt's *Postwar*; and Sierp, Aline. *History, Memory, and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions*. New York: Routledge, 2014.
15. Sirinelli, *Génération*, 73; Reulecke, *Generation*, 119; Prochnaw/Rohde, *Generations of Change*, 5.
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17. "Rede Dr. Schumacher SPD Kreisverein Husum 07.07.1946." Schumacher 37, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD).
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19. "Extract from the Proceedings of the International Socialist Conference, Zurich, 06–09.06.1947."
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23. See Sadoun, Marc. *Les socialistes sous l'occupation: résistance et collaboration*. Paris: Presses universitaires des sciences politiques, 1982, 229–233.

24. Congrès national extraordinaire des 9, 10, 11 et 12 novembre 1944, www.archives-socialistes.fr
25. Blum, Léon. *À l'Échelle humaine*. Paris: Gallimard, 1945, 57 f., 75.
26. "SPD-Kundgebung in Frankfurt." 25.06.1946 *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Schumacher 37 AdsD.
27. Erler, Fritz. "Über Verfassungsfragen." *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, January 1947. Emphasis in original.
28. Ibid., 183.
29. "La France de Demain: Une concentration des Partis sera-t-elle possible?" *Le Populaire*, 31.02.1943 in Mayer, 195.
30. "Wir verzweifeln nicht! Rede, gehalten vor sozialdemokratischen Funktionären am 6. Mai 1945," and August 1945, "Politische Richtlinien fuer die S.P.D. in ihrem Verhältnis zu den anderen politischen Faktoren". Schumacher 34 AdsD.
31. Schumacher. "Der entscheidende Gegensatz." *Volksblatt*, 08.02.1950, Schumacher 50 AdsD.
32. "Wir verzweifeln nicht!"
33. Sitzung des Kontakt-Komitees in Nürnberg am 30. Juni 1947, SI 349, IISH.
34. "Wir verzweifeln nicht!"
35. "Die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratischen Partei." 01.12.1945 in Düsseldorf. Schumacher 35 AdsD.
36. Sitzung des Kontakt-Komitees in Nürnberg am 30. Juni 1947.
37. "Dr. Kurt Schumacher auf der Wahlkundgebung am 6. Oktober 1946 auf dem Burgplatz in Duisburg." Schumacher 39 AdsD.
38. "Rede Dr. Schumacher am Sonntag, dem 03.02.1946 in Köln." Schumacher 36 AdsD.
39. Quilliot, Roger. *La S.F.I.O. et l'exercice du pouvoir, 1944–1959*. Paris: Fayard, 1971, 26.
40. "La France de Demain: Une concentration des Partis sera-t-elle possible?" Mayer, 196.
41. Graham, Bruce Desmond. *The French Socialists and Tripartisme, 1944–1947*. Canberra: The Australian National University Press, 1965, 131.
42. *Journal Officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires*, 02.07.1947 and 04.07.1947, 2638, 2756.
43. Shaev, Brian. "Workers' Politics, the Communist Challenge, and the Schuman Plan: A Comparative History of the French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties and the First Treaty for European Integration." *International Review of Social History* 61: 2 (2016), 251–281.
44. Schumacher consistently called for a new beginning (*Neubau*) rather than restoration (*Wiederaufbau*). "Dr. Kurt Schumacher, Hannover: Was wollen die Sozialdemokraten? Neubau-nicht Wiederaufbau!" Schumacher 35 AdsD.

45. Kurt Schumacher "Hunger und Nationalismus". *Sopade* Nr. 38, 28.11.1946. Schumacher 39 AdsD.
46. See the speeches of Andreas Gayk, Herbert Kriedemann, Wilhelm Knothe, and Ernst Winter. *Protokoll des SPD-Parteitages Hannover 1946*, 10–11, 97, 172–6.
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53. Ibid., 237–250.
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55. Parteivorstand 13.03.1950 in Bonn. AdsD.
56. Frei, *Adenauer's Germany*, 244–245.
57. Undated notes. Ollenhauer 180. AdsD.
58. Hansen, *Die Sozialistische Reichspartei*, 187.
59. Schumacher. "Presse-Konferenz am 24. März 1950", Schumacher 50 AdsD.
60. "Dr. Schumacher zur Entscheidung der Bundesregierung über die SRP." 04.05.1951, Schumacher 55 AdsD.
61. "Die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratischen Partei." 01.12.1945 in Düsseldorf. Schumacher 35 AdsD.
62. "Referat Dr. Schumacher auf der Redakteurkonferenz der Parteipresse am 30.11.1947 in Hannover." Schumacher 43 AdsD.
63. "Rede Dr. Schumachers vor Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss auf der Tagung vom 14.03.1950 in Bonn, Bundeshaus." Schumacher 50 AdsD.
64. Comité directeur, 06.09.1947. OURS.
65. Comité directeur, 08.09.1947. OURS.
66. Conseil national, 27.02.1949. OURS.
67. "Rede Dr. Schumacher vor Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss auf der Tagung vom 13.04.1950."
68. Parteivorstand, 22–23.06.1951. AdsD.
69. Comité directeur, 12.09.1951. OURS.
70. Ibid.
71. Conseil national, 1er décembre 1951. OURS.

72. "Abschnitt Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft—Europäische Politische Gemeinschaft." July 1953. Erler 9 AdsD.
73. "Referat des Vorsitzenden der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands Erich Ollenhauer auf dem Wahlkongress der SPD am 10. Mai 1953 in Frankfurt/Main." Erich Ollenhauer 92, AdsD.
74. "Erklärung Erich Ollenhauers auf der SPD-Pressekonferenz am 07.09.1953." Erich Ollenhauer 98, AdsD.
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76. "Das Ergebnis des 6. September." *Neuer Vorwärts*, 11.09.1953, Ollenhauer 98 AdsD.
77. "Gen. Ollenhauer. Fraktionssitzung auf September 11.09.56." Erich Ollenhauer 126 AdsD.
78. "G. Mollet 54 discours au Congrès de l'I.S. Les Autorités européennes." AGM 106 OURS.
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81. "Eilt." January 1958. Ollenhauer 139 AdsD.
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91. "Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 9. Juni 1958 in Bonn." Parteivorstand AdsD.
92. "Parteiausschuss-Sitzung 24.10.1958." Erich Ollenhauer 143 AdsD.
93. "SPD-Bezirkskonferenz in Bielefeld: Ollenhauer fragt die Regierung nach ihrem Deutschlandplan." *Freie Presse*, 26.02.1959. Ollenhauer 145 AdsD.
94. "Politik aus der erster Hand," 15.04.1959, Ollenhauer 145 AdsD.
95. Rede Erich Ollenhauer auf der Parteiratsitzung vom 11. Juli 1958.