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Trias ethica : the rules of statecraft

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TRIAS ETHICA

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TRIAS ETHICA

THE RULES OF STATECRAFT

Proefschrift

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To Erika

Preface

This book is designed to be a statesman's companion. It may serve as a resource for his trusted advisors. They know, like nobody else, that it is harder to do good than to know it better. 'What to do?' is the question that bothers the statesman; 'What to think of it?' is what keeps all others busy. This book is concerned with the statesman's perspective. Machiavelli's *The Prince* gave tips and tricks to those in power to stay in power. Erasmus' *The Education of a Christian Prince* was about the character formation of those who are about to assume power. This book seeks to be of counsel to any Prince, President, or Prime Minister who is in charge of conducting both domestic and foreign affairs. It offers a framework for action as well as two rules. These rules are not designed to meet the taste of any particular public, but stipulate what is called for if one is genuinely seeking an answer to the question 'What to do?' for the public good, and more particularly in the international arena.

This book combines international theory and practice. It does not offer any blueprints, which emanate from theory alone. Nor does it offer any historical accounts or case descriptions, which are based on practice alone. Instead, it offers guidance in applying theory in practice by oneself. It arrives at two rules of statecraft by following a geometrical method, much in the style of Grotius and Spinoza. The geometrical method is a distinctive feature of the present argument, which starts with an axiom from which all else follows. The axiom that is used in this book allows one to have any type of dualism (including the one between theory and practice), and have unity at the same time. This also allows one to overcome dualism in theory itself, and devise a general theory.

To devise a general theory and apply it to International Relations, is to challenge International Relations as a discipline. This is what the present theory does. It seeks to defeat the thesis that a general theory in International Relations is impossible. Two important groups of proponents of this thesis are scholars who stand in the respective traditions of International Society (or the English School) and Constructivism. The present theory takes issue with both traditions. It values both for the great contributions they have made within the discipline, but it demonstrates that these traditions fall short of the standards that the geometrical method sets. If the author disagrees with authors of high distinction and repute, it is solely because he has to, when following the line of reasoning that is warranted by the geometrical method.

Among the strongest claims this book makes is that it offers a general theory that reunites the Arts and Sciences. It asserts that International Relations cannot be studied in isolation, and that one has to understand what the findings in for instance Quantum Field Theory imply for all other fields of learning. Moreover, one may not only take recourse to the Sciences for advice on the Arts, but this also works the other way around. The present general theory makes a contribution in the latter regard by exacting how many dimensions a Theory of Everything must count.

Statecraft is the Master Science, or Master Art, for that matter. This is what Plato and Aristotle already taught us. Everything has to come together here. This is why this book has a broad scope, even if its central problem is clear-cut. This is also why this book may be of interest to a broad public: not only to students of International Relations and Political Theory, but also of Philosophy, Theology, Psychology, and Physics. Especially, in Chapter 4, paragraph 1, which is the longest section of the book as well as the most fundamental one apart from Chapter 1, there seems to be something for all. Next, for those, who are not theoretically inclined or who have limited time, Chapter 1 and the Conclusion would do, which could be supplemented with the Introductions to both Parts. However, those who want to make use of this book as a companion, and use it in practice, may want to read the whole book to understand its logic. Understanding this logic may form the basis for own reflection and subsequent advice or action.

Statecraft is in the end about mastering it. There are no fixed answers to the question ‘What to do?’. This book offers two rules that can help him or her to find the best answer in any given case. Simple as these rules may be, they follow from the axiom, which is objectively true. Combined these two rules offer a statesman’s standard framework.

Leiden, July 2007

Christward J. Dieterman

Acknowledgements

At Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government one of the first texts I got to read in the summer of 2002, was an article by Stanley Hoffmann, University Professor at Harvard. It was titled "Clash of Globalizations," and was published in *Foreign Affairs* that summer. I was struck by its conclusion:

[S]tudents of international relations face two missions. They must try to understand what goes on by taking an inventory of current goods and disentangling the threads of present networks. But the fear of confusing the empirical with the normative should not prevent them from writing as political philosophers at a time when many philosophers are extending their conceptions of just society to international relations. How can one make the global house more livable? The answer presupposes a political philosophy that would be both just and acceptable even to those whose values have other foundations.¹

I very much wanted to talk to Professor Hoffmann. I liked his implicit distinction of three realms—economic, cultural, and political,—but I was not completely satisfied with his further distinction of three forms of globalization—again economic, cultural, and political. I liked to think of globalization in terms of integrating various factors that spring from the three realms, but are still part of one process, and wanted to discuss this more integrated approach with him. More specifically, I wanted to know whether that was what he meant by a "political philosophy," and whether he would deem my account of it fit for a PhD thesis. When he said that it was exactly this kind of broad or integrated approach that was needed for tackling the main issues in International Relations, this encouraged me to proceed. Thanks to Professor Hoffmann I got started.

While I was at Harvard for a degree program in public leadership and management, I spent as much time as I could following classes in International Relations. Pursuing my postgraduate studies on a Fulbright scholarship, I knew I had signed a statement to the effect of my returning to the Netherlands upon graduation. I realized this was my chance of testing hypotheses before working them out in a PhD thesis in my own country. This led to my writing two papers, which would form the edifice on which respectively Part I and II of the present thesis have been built.

¹ Stanley Hoffmann, "Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2002), pp. 104-115, at 115.

The first paper was the result of many more conversations I had with Professor Hoffmann along the year, next to following his course on Ethics and International Relations. It was a critical appraisal of Martin Wight's *International Theory* with its 'three traditions'.² The second paper I wrote for Amartya Sen, University Professor at Harvard and Nobel Prize winner in economics. I participated in a seminar on Global Justice, which he offered together with the deans of the philosophy departments of Harvard and MIT, Tim Scanlon and Joshua Cohen. This paper was about the principles of *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité*, as applied to international affairs. The discussions that led to both papers have been invaluable for me in challenging me at an early stage. Even if some of the thoughts I had then still had to ripen much further, the strong sense I got from these discussions was that it would be worth the effort to proceed and struggle. I thank Professor Hoffmann and Professor Sen for setting the standard. Their wisdom and humanity, besides their intellectual rigour, make them the outstanding teachers they are, whom I owe respect and gratitude.

I would also like to thank Professor Joseph Nye Jr., who was at the time the Dean of the Kennedy School and is now a University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard. I participated in his seminar on Globalization, which was an exceptional experience in several ways. For one thing, Professor Nye's technique of cold-calling made every student be better prepared than anywhere else. Moreover, the participants of the class had been carefully selected so as to secure a good mix of professional experience as well as geographical spread. This allowed Professor Nye to bring in any sound that was called for at some particular moment, almost like conducting an orchestra, now calling on wood and then on brass. This seminar formed yet another opportunity for testing hypotheses, and I did this by integrating the two papers I mentioned above. At the end of the seminar students were expected to write a memo to their Minister of Foreign Affairs with speaking points and a background note for a speech to be held at the World Economic Forum. This invitation to take the statesman's perspective, focusing on "what to do," was decisive for me in deciding later on to take the same perspective when writing my PhD thesis. All through his career, Professor Nye has combined two worlds—academia and public service—in an exemplary way. I thank him for promoting and setting yet another standard, of combining analysis and action.

² Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992)

I am also indebted to another University Professor at Harvard, Samuel Huntington. I attended only one session of a seminar on the book he was working on, which was to appear under the title of *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. However, this one session was enough to convince me yet again of the importance of the cultural factor. In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, the earlier publication that had given him world renown, Professor Huntington had made this point before. At the time, commentators liked to argue that Professor Huntington's definition of 'civilization' was hazy, but after 9/11 it would become perfectly clear that culture matters, and that it may lead to clashes. In the present thesis I attribute a distinct role to culture. While my views differ from his, I pay tribute to Professor Huntington who put the cultural factor on the agenda of International Relations as a discipline.

Besides Harvard University, there are three academic institutions that have formed me: Leiden University, to which I will return later on, the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris* (called "Sciences Po"), and Christ Church, Oxford (called "The House"). The latter two institutions have been the traditional breeding places for those aspiring high offices in public service in respectively France and the United Kingdom, producing the highest number of Presidents and Prime Ministers in these countries. With the benefit of hindsight it seems perfectly appropriate I went there before writing a doctoral thesis on statecraft. I learned to use their respective methods, and understand how persons who are educated there, learn to see the world. In France, *'le plan Sciences Po'* is well known among politicians. It is the scheme that all Sciences Po students learn to use in writing any paper, and in delivering any speech. They learn to divide an argument into two parts, which they may subdivide again, where any two parts are related not in an analytic but in a dynamic way. What is meant here by 'dynamic' takes a couple of months to grasp. Needless to say, that if this is the way one is trained to frame reality, one is likely to see the world that way. I pay tribute to my teachers at Sciences Po by following *'le plan'* to a large extent in structuring my thesis. However, relating the parts the way I do, I also divert from it, not accepting the Cartesian split to pervade my argument. Aside from this, I would like to thank my professors of International Relations, Alfred Grosser and Didier Musiedlak, who introduced me to the thinking of Raymond Aron, and of Charles de Gaulle, for sure, whose press conferences I had to study religiously.

Oxford taught me other things. Apart from the river, where team spirit is ingrained during trainings in rowing, the colleges provide an excellent opportunity for getting acquainted with some conception of the Greek *polis*. The college becomes a good proxy for the state, and intercollegiate affairs for international relations. Indeed, guest dinners at Hall are like state banquets; debating at the Oxford Union is like debating in the House of Commons; and rowing against Cambridge is like waging war. While all of this is to provide a setting, the thing that I remember most vividly is how I got to see the world again in a quite different way. Before, I had learned to mostly compile knowledge of others, and to be reluctant in criticizing past masters, while Oxford invited me to come with my own story, and analyse and criticize past masters along the way. Every week I had to write papers on Jurisprudence and Political Theory for the late Professor Jim Harris, the great Kelsen expert. I will never forget how he interrupted me once while I was giving an overview of what Locke, Hobbes, and others had to say on a certain topic, exclaiming: “I want to hear the Dieterman point of view!” I pay tribute to Professor Harris by presenting a theory that is wholly my own, while allowing myself to also criticize this esteemed past master in arguing that there is more than just “points of view.”

I also thank Professor Ronald Dworkin, who opened my eyes in yet another way. In his seminars he taught how to look afresh at the Hart-Fuller debate about the relation of ‘ought’ and ‘is’ in jurisprudence, by offering a third way of looking at it: the judge’s perspective. I pay tribute to Professor Dworkin by choosing the statesman’s perspective, while dealing with dualisms in International Relations, and thus overcoming them, as I submit.

Christ Church added yet another dimension. Having a dual foundation, Christ Church is both a College and a Cathedral. The way its members, and its Governing Body, see fit to combine both parts in one institution, makes the place the way it is. I remember the former Dean of Christ Church, the Very Reverend John Drury, explaining his conception of God, and his academic interest in angels, at a garden party. When I set myself to the task of writing my PhD thesis seven years later, I realized that I would miss out something central if I were not to give a place to my own conception of God, which physicists might call a conception of a Theory of Everything. While I doubt whether John Drury, who is now the Chaplain of All Souls College at Oxford, would agree with this conception, I do know that my thinking on this point got shape at The House, when overlooking the Mercury statue from my office at Tom

Quad. I thank The House for providing the most congenial spirit thinkable for conducting anything that one might deem worthwhile both academically and otherwise.

For all the lessons I learned from the masters I mentioned, the academic mentor whom I owe most is the late Professor Henry Schermers of Leiden University. He was my mentor from the very day that I started my undergraduate studies. Along the years that I studied at Leiden, he was always there for advice, and always took a lively interest in what I was up to. Being a man of utter integrity, and an academic of the highest distinction, having founded a new field of specialization called International Institutional Law, Professor Schermers was also a great teacher. He was truly devoted to his students. Among many more initiatives, he founded Mordenate College, whose Fellows were invited every month to come over to his house at the Herengracht, where he and his lovely wife, Hotsche, gave us the feeling of belonging to an extended family. I am thankful for Professor Schermers' encouragement to acquire international experience through internships and study abroad, and to write a doctoral thesis.

After my studies I could have started writing my PhD thesis straightaway, but I felt that it would be better to first acquire some knowledge from experience of the matters that I wanted to write about. Having distinguished the economic, the political, and the cultural realms earlier on, I wanted to get acquainted with each of these three realms. I would choose my base in the realm of the polity, and explore from there the realms of civil society and the economy.

I am grateful for the help and trust I got from Dr. Abid Hussain, former Ambassador of India to the United States, as an intern at the United Nations in Geneva. Having set up the UN mandate for him in his capacity of UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, I was invited by him to work as a Visiting Fellow at the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation in New Delhi. He introduced me to its chairperson, Sonia Gandhi, and arranged a private interview with His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. I had heard His Holiness speak before, when I was at the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. At the time, the issue of the so-called universality of human rights was at stake. I would take up this issue in India, doing research on what its civil society (including universities) thought of the universality claim with respect to human rights. During that time, I learned a lot about the relation between the political and cultural realms.

As I returned to the Netherlands, I was eager to learn about the economy. I became a Policy Advisor on securities at the Netherlands Ministry of Finance, and then moved to the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC. The IMF had refused to enter into relations with the antiglobalization movement, but under Horst Köhler, then Managing Director of the IMF and now President of Germany, the IMF changed its stance. It was my job to analyse what groups and individuals the antiglobalization movement consisted of, and advise on how each category should be dealt with. When I moved to the World Bank, it was interesting for me to see how different it approached NGOs. It understood much better that if globalization causes reactions in civil society, this is not something to be suppressed but to be channelled. With great pleasure I look back at my time working with Dr. Jeff Thindwa on our World Bank project 'Promoting Enabling Legal Environments for Civic Engagement.' When travelling around the world for this project, meeting with both government officials and representatives of NGOs, I saw for myself what impact developments in the world economy have on both the polity and civil society.

At this point, I went back to school, at Harvard. Upon returning to the Netherlands, I started writing my PhD thesis next to working as Deputy Head, and later Head, of the Strategy and Communications Department of the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa). The NMa provided me with a meaningful context, where I could ascertain how the same rules apply in a national environment of what I was describing in global terms. I thank the Chairman of the Board, Pieter Kalbfleisch, for taking a genuine interest in my project.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their loving support. I thank my good friends: Ulrich Hüser for his companionship, and Hans Hintzen for giving me Spinoza's *Ethics*. Also it was good to have Edwin van de Haar, Bas van Bockel, and Nils Ole Oermann around, all of whom know what it is to write a PhD thesis. Furthermore, I cherish the conversations I had with two great men. The one is Otto von der Gablentz, former Ambassador of Germany to subsequently the Netherlands, Israel, and Russia, and former Dean of the College of Europe in Bruges, who unfortunately did not live to see the end product. The other is Max Kohnstamm, who worked closely together with Jean Monnet for 25 years before becoming the Founding President of the European University Institute in Florence. I am grateful that I may work together with him for my next publication.

The man I am most indebted to, though, is my father, Christfried Gradenwitz. It is he who has instilled in me the quest for new answers to old questions. Finally, I thank my beloved wife, Erika Kai Koehler, who has inspired me through the years. She has helped me in so many ways that any acknowledgement would be incomplete and insufficient. Therefore, I dedicate this book to Erika.

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Chapter 1: The Universal Rule

One world economy, so many cultures: how to accommodate both? That is the question that underlies some of the biggest challenges international statecraft is facing.¹ Today we live in a world that is highly interdependent and interconnected, but deeply divided at the same time. One world economy and one World Wide Web cannot change the fact that people are culturally different. The paradox is that the more we see and hear from each other, the more we become aware of ourselves and of the values we hold dear. In itself this is good, but it is not if it leads to extremism and religious fundamentalism as is the case. How to deal then with fanaticism? How to deal with the cultural factor to start with? These are questions that International Relations Theory (IR) should address. For IR to dismiss or to even downplay the cultural factor at a time that the world is fighting terrorism would be to miss the point completely. Culture matters.² IR has to accommodate the cultural factor.³

The more economic globalization forces people to see themselves as parts of a larger whole, the more there is a need to allow for a cultural space—though clearly defined—where people can feel free to experience themselves as being different, as wholes in themselves. That is the thesis I will defend in this book. Its claim is that it is up to politics to mediate

¹ For a forceful formulation of this question and a comprehensive account of addressing it, see, e.g., UNDP, *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World* (New York: UNDP, 2004).

² Cf. Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000). The publication that has been arguably most influential in emphasizing the cultural factor in IR since the mid-1990s, is Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). It formed the basis for Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). Another account of culture is presented in Joseph Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Joseph Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

³ The cultural factor as such has figured into IR debates, ever since nationalism has been studied within IR. Examples are Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, second edition (London: Verso, 1991); Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Anthony Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Ernest Gellner, *Culture, Identity, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ernest Gellner, *Reason and Culture: The Historic Role of Rationality and Rationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); and Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994).

between forces of globalization and fragmentation, *i.e.* of integration and disintegration,⁴ so as to preserve both unity and diversity. The challenge it faces is to explain how politics can do that.⁵ The promise it makes is that it will do so by providing a systemic theory that has both explanatory and predictive value. This theory can explain how the international system is composed of several sub-systems, or incentive systems for that matter, that are governed by certain principles. This theory can predict that state action is bound to fail, if politics mixes up either the sub-systems or the principles governing them.

Like any other social system, the international system is made up of two components: agency and structure⁶ (the latter of which deals with the sub-systems mentioned above). In explaining international relations, some IR scholars have focused on structure, and others on agency. Each period has its salient features, and IR tends to focus on the particular component that best accounts for those features. In the Cold War period, for instance, the bipolar structure conditioned international life almost completely, which may explain why theories that are one-sided in stressing the relative importance of the structural component make sense for that particular period.⁷ It is submitted here that what is salient for the post-Cold War period is that both structural constraints and the imminent danger from non-state actors condition international life. It is not new that there are non-state actors out there. However, it is new that they pose a clear and actual threat that has to be faced in what is said to be—and what is perceived as—a fight or even a war. The privatization of war marks a shift that IR should be able to account for.

⁴ For an exposition of this antinomy, or paradox, see, *e.g.*, Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, updated and expanded edition (New York: Anchor Books, 2000); and David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 451.

⁵ Whereas Gellner, in his account of the antinomy between the disintegrating and fragmenting consequences of 19th century industrialization and the search for a common culture—in Gellner (1994),—focuses on the extension of Western ‘civil society’, this book focuses on the role of politics. Whether something is a force of integration or of disintegration is a matter of point of view, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 2.

⁶ See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston/New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 40. See also Joseph Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, fourth edition (New York: Longman Classics in Political Science, 2003), p. 36, using the term ‘process’ instead of ‘agency’.

⁷ Waltz (1979) being the best example.

This systemic theory offers a balanced view, integrating both structure and agency by giving equal weight to both components. Thus, it is different from other theories in IR. This chapter will first explain how it differs exactly from other theories and how it relates to general debates in IR, and next what theoretical premises it is based on.

It has become commonplace to describe the development of IR as a discipline in terms of a sequence of four debates. These so-called Great Debates are always about dichotomies where IR scholars take sides. In doing so they inevitably leave out elements that do not fit, typically those of ‘the other side’. As a result they may be very consistent, but only at the expense of being one-sided. Before taking issue with the one-sidedness that characterizes most IR traditions, I will first sketch a rough outline of the various debates mentioned above. It is not necessary here to describe all ornaments and details of the buildings that IR theorists have erected; it suffices for the present purpose to inspect the foundations on which they have been built.⁸

The first debate was between liberalism and realism. Had utopian liberalism or liberal internationalism—or to use again another term: liberal idealism—prevailed during the 1920s, in the 1930s through 1960s realism took over as the winning paradigm. While the former stressed the importance of international law, international organization, interdependence, cooperation, and peace, the latter focused on power politics, security, aggression, conflict, and war. Both paradigms are based on different views of the human being and human society: the former takes human beings to be rational, and as such capable of setting up organizations for the benefit of all, the latter sees humans as self-interested and power-seeking, which could easily result in aggression. The one believes in change and human progress, the other in continuity and repetition. In short, this debate was between contending views based on morality and power respectively.

The second debate in IR concerned methodology. It was a debate between the traditional approaches and behavioralism, which endeavored to be scientific in the natural-science meaning of that term. Whereas the former saw international relations as part of the human world that could only be understood in a humanistic way by getting *inside*, attempting to understand the moral dilemmas statesmen face, the latter had no place for

⁸ For a more detailed account, see most introductory textbooks in IR, like for instance Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

morality or ethics as that involves values, which cannot be studied objectively, *i.e.* scientifically. On this view the theorist stands *outside* the subject, collecting data in order to find recurring behavioral patterns, the 'laws' of international relations. In this debate there was no real winner, but behavioralism would definitely leave its imprint on IR as a discipline.

Behavioralism brought the first debate to the next level, where both liberalism and realism reinvented themselves as neoliberalism and neorealism respectively. While neoliberalism still believes in the possibility of progress and change, it now repudiates idealism, and strives to formulate theories and apply new methods that are scientific. Neoliberalism comes in several flavors (sociological liberalism; interdependence liberalism; institutional liberalism; republican liberalism), but all of them are mutually supportive in providing an overall consistent argument for more peaceful and cooperative international relations. Thus, in the 1970s it seemed as if neoliberalism stood a chance of becoming the winning paradigm, which evaporated when Kenneth Waltz published his neorealist *Theory of International Politics* in 1979. Inspired by the scientific ambitions of behavioralism, Waltz attempted to formulate law-like statements about international relations. In doing so, he showed virtually no interest in ethics or morality, and thus departed clearly from classical realism. Waltz' focus is completely on structure. He maintains that the international system is an anarchy, as there is no worldwide government, and that it is composed of like units. These units are not 'plain bad' as classical realism viewed them, based on human nature, but they are power-seeking and security-conscious since the structure of the international system compels them to be that way.

While neoliberalism and neorealism differ in many respects, they share a common—basically neorealist—analytical starting-point, being international anarchy with states as the main actors looking after their own best interests. Methodologically, they share even more common ground in both adhering to behavioralism. However, as there is still no complete synthesis between the two traditions, the debate continues.

After this account of the influence behavioralism exerted on IR, it is hard to warrant the conclusion drawn earlier, *viz.* that the second debate, between traditional approaches and behavioralism, had no clear winner. To put things in perspective, it should be mentioned though that while the neoliberalism/neorealism debate waged in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s, in the United Kingdom a school of IR flourished that had existed throughout the period of the Cold War. This so-called English School, or International Society approach, entered the

second debate by rejecting behavioralism emphatically. At the same time, it can be regarded as an extension of the first debate, as it added another perspective to it by rejecting the sharp division between classical realist and liberal ideas.⁹ International Society scholars admit that there is an international anarchy in the sense that there is no world government, but this anarchy is a social condition—it is an ‘anarchical society’.¹⁰ Thus, International Society scholars combine realist and liberal elements, while maintaining that these different elements cannot be simplified and abstracted into a single theory.

The third debate in IR shifted the subject away from political and military issues and towards economic and social issues. Introducing the distinct socioeconomic problems of developing countries, this debate expanded the research agenda. This third debate, about the international political economy (IPE), took the shape of a neo-Marxist critique of the capitalist world economy together with liberal and realist IPE responses concerning the relationship between economics and politics in international relations. What was not new about this debate was that both the liberal and the realist tradition have specific views on IPE; what was new though was that those views were attacked by neo-Marxism. Three issues were discussed. First, there was the issue of economic globalization, arguably undermining ‘national’ economies and subjecting them to the exigencies of the global economy. The second issue concerned who wins and who loses in the process of economic globalization. The third issue was about the relative importance of economics and politics. Are forces in the former field dominating the latter, or is it the other way round? The concept of state sovereignty is central to the debate concerning all three issues. The question really is if forces of economic globalization make the sovereign state obsolete. The three approaches to IPE come up with different answers to that question. There was no clear winner in this debate.

The fourth debate in IR is between the established theoretical traditions—(neo)liberalism, (neo)realism, International Society, IPE—and alternative approaches, loosely labelled as ‘post-positivism’. Actually, there are several currents within the ‘dissident’ group—some focusing on methodological issues and others on substantial issues—that come up with rivaling answers to the question as to how IR can come to grips with

⁹ See Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992).

¹⁰ See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, third edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

the post-Cold War changes of world politics. This debate has been thrown open in the 1990s, and so far there has been one current that has attracted most attention and has been most influential, which is constructivism. This specific post-positivist approach is singled out here to conclude this brief overview of debates in IR.

Constructivism focuses on human awareness or consciousness and its place in world affairs. It postulates that human relations, including international relations, consist of thoughts and ideas and not of material conditions or forces. Furthermore, it postulates that the core ideational element consists of inter-subjective beliefs that are widely shared among people; that those beliefs compose and express the way people conceive of themselves in their relations with others (interests and identities); and that the focus should be on the ways those relations are formed and expressed. Thus, the international system is not something 'out there', but exists only as inter-subjective awareness among people. There is no objective international world apart from what states arrange among themselves in terms of practices and institutions. Taking issue with the neorealist account of the international system, constructivism maintains that 'anarchy is what states make of it'.¹¹ Everything is inter-subjective, and thus uncertain and in flux. What constructivism tries, is to explain this inter-subjective reality and to build a social science of IR.

Having outlined the major IR debates, I hasten to say that of course the labels that are used may misrepresent the way IR scholars see themselves. Most of them have struggled with the boundaries that are set by the various traditions of the discipline, and some would not like to be pigeonholed along those lines.¹² However this may be, it only underscores the need to rethink the narrow schemes that are followed in the various debates. In fact, this theory does submit that such rethinking is called for.

A key assumption of this theory is that at this juncture in history, where terrorists—*i.e.* non-state actors—pose a clear and actual threat to the national security of states, international relations have become so complex that they cannot be accounted for by one approach to the

¹¹ See Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (1992), pp. 391-425.

¹² See Iver Neumann and Ole Wæver (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* (London/New York: Routledge, 1997) for an atypical account of IR as a discipline. It does not juxtapose aspects of the work of contemporary theorists with others, presenting them as parts of a disembodied school of thought or paradigm, but instead it focuses on individual authors, presenting "the well-rounded character of some of the leading oeuvres".

exclusion of other ones, nor by focusing on one issue area to the exclusion of other ones. It does not suffice any longer to focus on structure; terrorists are—sad to say—humans and act according to their human nature and culture. It does not suffice any longer to look only at how either economic globalization or culture impacts on international relations and *vice versa*; culture, politics, and economics should be in the picture at the same time. Some authors explicitly mention these three components. Stanley Hoffmann, for instance, distinguishes among economic, political, and cultural forms of globalization.¹³ David Held, in his widely acclaimed analysis of globalization,¹⁴ also distinguishes among political, economic, and cultural forces shaping and reshaping the world in which we live. These authors, however, cannot explain how the three forms of globalization, or forces if you will, are interrelated. The challenge is to combine approaches and issues respectively and to show how they are connected. The question is how to do that.

Clearly, most traditional IR approaches cannot provide assistance. They are one-sided in one way or another. Liberalism and realism overestimate the relevance of human nature and forget about structure. Moreover, the former believes human beings to be rational, where the latter believes that they are driven by passions. Somehow, it has not occurred to anyone, in IR at least, that man could very well be a product of both reason and passions, of both culture and nature. The real question then would be how the two are related. Neoliberalism and neorealism, for sure, do not offer the solution here as they simply do away with human nature altogether. By placing themselves outside the human order, they develop laws about the international state system that may be useful at a time when structural factors within a system are prevalent, like in the Cold War period, but rather useless when human-all-too-human factors arise concerning for instance identity. IPE does not help here, as it concentrates exclusively on the relation between politics and economics. IPE leaves out the cultural factor completely, just like International Society leaves out the economic factor. Constructivism, for its part, is completely absorbed by culture alone and believes everything in IR to be ideational.

Nevertheless, two theories stand out in refusing to follow the logic of dichotomies: International Society and constructivism. We will examine both to see if they point the way in which we have to go.

¹³ Stanley Hoffmann, "Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2002), pp. 104-115.

¹⁴ Held et al. (1999).

International Society, to start with, does not follow the usual scheme, as it introduces a third perspective.¹⁵ In addition to the Kantian (or liberal) perspective, taking man to be rational, and the Hobbesian (or realistic) perspective, seeing man as driven by his passions, it identifies a Grotian perspective. The Grotian perspective could be best described as the *via media* between the other two. Theorists of International Society try to combine anarchy and society, and elaborate on the concept of the anarchical society.¹⁶ Thus, they are in fact Grotians.¹⁷ However, their own theory would not allow them to admit that, as it proclaims IR to be an ongoing debate among the three traditions, of which no resolution is to be expected. This theory is flawed as it maintains on the one hand that it cannot say anything about how the three traditions are related to each other, but on the other hand it does say that there must be exactly three traditions that have to be engaged in a constant dialogue. International Society is self-defeating as it makes a distinction between the importance of having a discussion, and the conception of the nature or structure of it, *i.e.* the theory itself, placing the latter beyond discussion. It says it can only see the parts, but it must also have some notion of the whole, even if the theory cannot admit that.

Constructivism, then, follows a different strategy. It does not escape the dichotomy—in this case between agency and structure—by adding another category, but by arguing that both are immersed in each other and are one.¹⁸ Constructivism is opposed to the reification of both agency and structure, maintaining that they constitute and reconstitute one another constantly. However, this inter-subjectivity is at odds with the goal of most constructivists to build on it a social science of IR: post-positivism is combined here with positivism. In general, the problem with constructivism seems to be that it seeks to combine everything by relating it to some concept of the larger whole. Idealist and holist as it is, it is one-sided in its interest in the whole. It says it can only see the larger whole, but it must also have some notion of the parts being wholes in themselves, even if the theory cannot admit that.

¹⁵ See Wight (1992).

¹⁶ See Bull (2002).

¹⁷ Cf. Hedley Bull, "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations," in Wight (1992), pp. xiii-xiv: "Of course, if we had to put Martin Wight into one or another of his own pigeon-holes there is no doubt that we should have to consider him a Grotian."

¹⁸ See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

In this thesis, I will seek to develop a balanced approach, giving equal weight to both components of a system: agency and structure, or—in analytical terms—parts and whole. In so doing, it takes issue with the one-sidedness of IR theories, including International Society and constructivism. It is not necessary here to prove why one-sidedness is wrong and a balanced approach is right. This choice is based on the key assumption mentioned earlier in this Chapter. However, no theory can be judged on its factual assumptions. Instead, the evaluation of any theory involves an appreciation of three elements. The first element is parsimony. The ‘rule of parsimony’ prescribes that if a simple explanation is adequate, it is preferable. The second element is the range of a theory. This is about how much behavior it accounts for. And the third element is explanatory fit. This is an evaluation of how many loose ends or anomalies it accounts for.¹⁹ To be sure, this theory claims to offer a significant contribution to IR on all three accounts. It sets itself to offer two simple rules of thumb that are applicable to the whole of IR, with a broad explanatory fit.

In constructing a new theory, I will follow the advice of Kenneth Waltz who gave the following guidelines: (i) formulate assumptions that are theoretical, not factual; (ii) conceive of a bounded realm or domain; (iii) discover some law-like regularities within it; and (iv) develop a way of explaining the observed regularities.²⁰ As this book goes in two parts, with Part I addressing agency and Part II addressing structure, I will follow this procedure twice after having made the first step, thereby building this theory in seven steps. The first step is to formulate, in this very chapter, the theoretical assumption—or rather: the axiom—the theory is based on. In Part I, the second step is to distinguish three agency levels (individual—state—international society). The third step is to establish similarities and differences among those levels. The fourth step is to account for those similarities and differences by making use of a clearly defined version of the domestic analogy, as enshrined in what I will call the Golden Rule of Statecraft. Then proceeding to Part II, the fifth step is to distinguish three functional domains (culture—politics—economics). The sixth step is to establish what incentive systems are at work within these domains. Finally, the seventh step is to formulate an Iron Rule of Statecraft that can explain why certain state actions work and other actions are bound to fail.

¹⁹ Nye (2003), pp. 35-36.

²⁰ Waltz (1979), p. 116.

Part I helps to understand, Part II to explain, and the theory as a whole to predict in a limited way (*i.e.*, of the nature of “if x obtains, then y will also obtain”). The theory as a whole takes a unique position on how Part I, on agency, and Part II, on structure, are related. This very relationship is at stake in the remainder of this chapter. As indicated above, this chapter is wholly theoretical. Therefore, it captures this relationship in a way as to constitute the axiom this theory is based on. I will call this axiom the Universal Rule. It reads as follows:

Every whole cannot exist but through its parts, and is again part of a larger whole, while every part is a whole in itself.

Before applying this Universal Rule to IR, I will scrutinize it in this chapter on its own merits first. For one thing, it does not espouse any form of one-sidedness. On the contrary, it is the quintessential expression of a formula for double-sidedness. But is it not one-sided then in its double-sidedness? Maybe, but it would also be double-sided in its one-sidedness. After all, if $x = y$ then the reverse, $y = x$, holds equally true. The Universal Rule has this unique feature of changing contradiction into paradox. Thus, the Universal Rule is not self-defeating.

Still, some other questions remain, which are pertinent to each of Aristotle’s four categories: space (form), time (process), quality (revelation), and essence (being). These questions can be best addressed by making the following four assertions.

First, the Universal Rule does not espouse an *organic theory* of the state. It is meant to be a logical devise, not an article of faith concerning growth. Using the language of wholes and parts enables one to define the distinction between analytic and systemic approaches. This is exactly what, for instance, Waltz has done when building his theory. He defines an analytic approach as one that understands the whole by studying its parts, and a systemic theory as one that shows how the whole and its parts are distinct from one another.²¹ In fact, Waltz has based his *Theory of International Politics* entirely on the distinction between wholes and parts. His distinction between reductionist and systemic theories—the defining departure for his own theory—is explicitly based on it.²² Thus, he describes reductionist theories as theories about the behavior of parts.²³

²¹ Ibid., p. 39.

²² Ibid., p. 18.

²³ Ibid., pp. 18 and 60.

When describing systemic theories, he singles out structure as the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole.²⁴ He uses the notions of wholes and parts, however, only to forget about the logic that they comport with. This thesis sets out what this logic is. Using the language of wholes and parts makes it easier to detect inconsistencies and thus to evaluate IR theories.

The Universal Rule is not necessarily to be understood organically. It must be admitted though that the Universal Rule could very well accommodate the notion of growth, which is characteristic of organic theory. What most people find problematic about this notion is that, in organic theory, growth is often understood in an Aristotelian sense, as the revelation of a pre-existing whole, that is as self-realization. Such understanding presupposes knowledge of the essence of things, and we find it hard to attach any meaning to such knowledge, if we already knew where to look for it. However, there is also a pragmatic way of using organic theory, which is what is called organization theory. In fact, this is about the nuts and bolts of making organizations work. This has nothing to do with being clairvoyant, but rather with creating space for individuals, groups or organs that have to work and grow according to their own principles, which they have to establish and adjust themselves.

To give an example, by way of second order defence, of how the Universal Rule could accommodate the notion of growth without being bound for trouble, I mention the Dutch Constitution as a case in point. What makes this constitution the perfect example is that it was written on the basis of an organic interpretation of what I call the Universal Rule. The Founding Father of the 1848 Constitution, Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, called his organic master principle the “general law of the universe”²⁵. For

²⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

²⁵ *Parlementaire Rederoeringen*, Part VI, pp. 10-11 (23 November 1854): “(...) de algemeene wet van het heelal (...), volgens welke geen individu, geen wezen bestaat dan als lid van een geheel. Te bestaan als lid van een geheel, dat is onderworpen zijn aan de wet der eenheid, dat is moeten leven naar regels, die de betrekking der deelen tot het geheel en van de deelen onderling bepalen; dat brengt de erkenning mede van eene hoogere wet dan die, naar welke het individu zich, alleen en op zichzelf beschouwd, te gedragen heeft.”

[“(...) the general law of the universe (...), according to which no individual, no being exists but as a member of a whole. To be member of a whole, is to be submitted to the law of unity, which is to live by rules that govern the relations between the parts and the whole as well as among the parts themselves; it involves the recognition that there is a higher law than the one that individuals, in and of themselves, have to comply with.” — *my own translation*]

sure, this law was neither about defending absolutism nor about fostering nationalism. Thorbecke did not believe in the declaration of so-called ‘Dutch principles’, nor did he believe in any essence waiting to be uncovered. On the contrary, in his parliamentary speeches he strongly opposed such notions²⁶ and his Constitution was exactly designed to prevent any such ideas from taking hold. Thorbecke organized the state in such a way as to allow for checks and balances, enabling the parts to prevent the whole from dominating the rest, and the other way round. Every part was a whole in itself, growing according to its own principles, but it was at the same time part of a larger whole, subject to the laws of that larger whole, and open to external influences.²⁷

The above example serves to illustrate the distinction that should be made between growth and the constitution fostering such growth. By focusing on the former, one may be tempted to conclude that there is some principle of growth explaining how pre-existing wholes reveal themselves over time. Instead, by focusing on the constitution, one is not concerned with *how* something grows, but *that* it can grow in the first place. Understanding the constitution—to define the term—is about establishing the relation between the whole and its parts, and about creating space for the parts to develop and grow according to their own principles, whatever these may be.

The Universal Rule constitutes a framework for analysis on how the whole and the parts must be related. In this sense it is about laying the foundation for a constitution. This should not be understood in a legal sense, as legal constitutions cannot account for abrupt change, whereas the Universal Rule can. I will elaborate on this below, when discussing

²⁶ Ibid., Part I, pp. 93-94 (29 May 1845); and Part VI, p. 442 (25 November 1856).

²⁷ See Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, *Bedenkingen aangaande het Regt en den Staat: Naar aanleiding van Mr. J. Kinker's Brieven over het Natuurregt* (Amsterdam: P. Meijers Warnars, 1825); Thorbecke, *Historische Schetsen*, second edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1872); Thorbecke (posthumously), *Staatsinrigting en staatsbestuur*, ed. J.P. Duyverman (Arnhem: S. Gouda Quint-D. Brouwer en zoon, 1968). See also Jan Drentje, *Thorbecke: Een filosoof in de politiek* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2004); E. Poortenga, *De scheiding tussen publiek- en privaatrecht bij Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798-1872)* (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 1987); C.H.E. de Wit, ‘Thorbecke, staatsman en historicus’, in *Sunschrift 153: Thorbecke en de wording van de Nederlandse natie* (Nijmegen: SUN, 1980); W. Verkade, *Thorbecke als Oost-Nederlands patriot* (Zutphen: De Walburg Pers, 1974); Verkade, *Overzicht der staatkundige denkebeelden van Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798-1872)* (Arnhem: Van Loghum Slaterus’ Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., 1935); C.W. de Vries, *De ongekennde Thorbecke* (Amsterdam: Engelhard van Embden & Co., 1950); and K.H. Boersema, *Johan Rudolf Thorbecke: Een historisch-critische studie* (Leiden: Brill, 1949).

the second assertion. Nevertheless, it might certainly be instructive to look at constitutions in the law, which is why I mentioned the Dutch example. Constitutions in the legal sense are the very reflections of what one believes to be true about the relation between the whole and its parts in a certain state for a certain period. Likewise, the Universal Rule could be interpreted in two ways. Either one holds it to be true, in and of itself, or one thinks it must be shown in time and space whether there is any meaning to it. To say the first would be tautological, as an axiom is true, in and of itself, by definition. To say the second would be to reaffirm the standard procedure for evaluating theories as explicated above (parsimony, range, explanatory fit).

Whereas the Universal Rule is introduced and scrutinized in this chapter as an axiom, it will be applied in the following chapters in time and space. More specifically, it will be applied to international society. Before doing so, I will first give a definition of international society. Some IR scholars would argue that no such thing exists. Yet, they would admit that an international system does exist. What then is the difference between the two? Much use has been made of the important distinction that Hedley Bull drew between ‘system’ and ‘society’ in international relations. He argued that the former obtains “where states are in regular contact with one another, and where in addition there is interaction between them sufficient to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other”. The latter, by contrast, only exists “when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”.²⁸

To reformulate the distinction between system and society in international relations by using the notions of wholes and parts, the former looks at state actors as parts (with structure bringing in the notion of a whole), while the latter looks at the parts as constituting a whole, or at least as conceiving themselves as such. The difference between the international system and international society is that the former cannot act, since it is about the interplay between agency and structure, whereas the latter can. The problem with the former is that it regards states as agency units being parts without recognizing that they—like any unit—must be wholes at the same time. Inversely, the problem with the latter is that it regards international society as a whole without making clear what

²⁸ Bull (2002), p. 13.

larger whole it could be a part of. Both problems will be addressed in Part I. However, on a theoretical level, reducing the discussion about both concepts to the simple notions of wholes and parts, it is easier to see that one can solve both problems by combining the two. The relation between the international system and international society is that the former should include the latter and can explain what it is and how it works, if at all. This thesis combines the two by providing a systemic theory about international society. Thus, it breaks with the usual schemes, and with those of the International Society tradition in the first place, which after all does not believe in the simplification of international relations into one single theory.

The second assertion is that the Universal Rule does not espouse any form of *historicism*. Historicism is based on the belief that history is the revelation of a pre-existing whole as understood within the category of time. The problem here, even more than within the category of space, is that it is very hard to think of what could be meant by the whole. Even if one were to believe in the revelation of pre-existing wholes or in the essence of being, one still does not have *a priori* knowledge of how this essence will substantiate, and how it will reveal itself as a whole over time, if at all. However, if one tries to understand the whole by looking at the parts—*i.e.*, specific time periods—one is also stuck with a problem. After all, when thinking of a specific time period as constituting a whole, one would also have to consider it as being part of a larger whole, meaning that we would have to know past, present and future. As one would never be able to know the future, the Universal Rule should be used in a different way so as to make sense.

Instead of looking for a larger whole in a diachronic way, one could do so in a synchronic way.²⁹ This means that one does not look at history as a chain of events connecting past, present and future, but at individual time periods in which individuals find themselves and reflect upon the relation between the world in that particular time period and their conception of the larger whole they have at that particular time. Thus, the Universal Rule espouses a concept of the whole that is determined by what the individual parts choose to do on the basis of

²⁹ Cf. Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, *Über das Wesen und den organischen Charakter der Geschichte* (1824), reissued in Verkade (1935); E.H. Kossmann, "Thorbecke en het historisme," *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks*, Part 45, No. 2 (Amsterdam/Oxford/New York: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1982); and J.B. Manger, *Thorbecke en de historie* (Utrecht: H&S Uitgevers, 1986).

what they conceive as the whole. This has everything to do with individuals, and nothing with collectivities. It has everything to do with the possibility of unexpected change, and nothing with historicism.

Third, the Universal Rule does not make use of any form of *dialectical reasoning*. In that strand of thought, thesis and antithesis form a synthesis, which is the new thesis evoking a new antithesis, and so on. The problem is that the synthesis is seen as a whole, in which the two parts are dissolved. However, according to the Universal Rule every whole exists through its parts. Thus, the notion of synthesis is *anathema* to the Universal Rule.

Fourth, the Universal Rule does not espouse any form of *holism*. To clarify this, I refer to what follows from the second point. In order to make sense the Universal Rule has to be applied in time and space simultaneously. If one were to apply it only in time, one is stuck with the problem of eternity (there being no beginning and no end). If one were to apply it only in space, one encounters the same problem of infinity at both far ends (being no proper ends). In the one direction, going into outer space, Einstein has made it clear how time and space are related in his theory of relativity. In the other direction, creeping into the 'inner space' of atoms, the problem must still be resolved by further developing string theory. The hypothesis the present theory is based on is that our understanding of the parts depends on the conception we have of the whole, and *vice versa*. It is not exclusively the whole that determines what the parts are, but it is a two way street. Constructivism may seem to endorse this, arguing that the parts constitute the whole, while the latter reconstitutes the former, and so on, but in essence it is concerned with the whole, with explaining what it is and how it is changing.

All previous points are related to the fact that the Universal Rule endorses the concept of a whole. From that endorsement the question follows if it also endorses each of the four principled commitments to the whole that were discussed above and that Karl Popper has warned against when dismissing any commitment to any conception of the whole.³⁰ The conclusion is that it does not do so in either case, as the Universal Rule, by definition, gives equal weight to the parts wherever it sees wholes. Thus, the Universal Rule is the principled expression of the relativity—or containment if you will—of the whole.

³⁰ Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vols. I and II (London: George Routledge & Sons Ltd., 1945).

The organization of this book also reflects the principle that is enshrined in the Universal Rule. While Part I focuses on how actors play their parts, Part II is concerned with the structure of the whole. Parts I and II combined constitute a framework that seeks to describe the constitution of international society. It is not a legal or social theory of the international system; it is a systemic theory of international society.

In developing my argument, I will build on the legacy of two Dutch scholars who have been highly influential in developing the notions of parts and whole respectively: Grotius and Spinoza. It is no coincidence that both have been teamed up within the framework of this thesis. Both authors stand out for having an eye for both parts and wholes at the same time; and they both struggled with the relation between the two, without discarding either of them. The difference between Grotius and Spinoza is that Grotius was concerned with the parts and how they ought to behave in a world that does not seem to be a whole,³¹ whereas Spinoza was concerned with explaining what the whole is all about in a world where the parts reign supreme.³² While the one has laid the foundation for public international law, and the other has had a profound and lasting influence on Western philosophy since the Enlightenment, the two have never met. In Western intellectual thought the two traditions were never combined. However, the present framework allows for exactly that. The combination of Grotian thought and Spinozist philosophy is key, since it captures the essence—if there is any—of the relation between parts and wholes as applied to international society.

Part I is based on Grotian thought, on how the parts ought to behave. More specifically, it is about the analogy of states and persons—the so-called domestic analogy,—which the Grotian theory of international law is based on.³³ The Grotian quest is the endeavour of making the domestic analogy work, in that the state acts analogously on the international scene to what it expects from its citizens domestically. There is only one way of making sense of this analogy, and that is by focusing on the paradox that the Universal Rule poses: every agency unit is a whole, and part of a larger whole at the same time. This very paradox,

³¹ See Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* [1625/1646]. English edition: *The Rights of War and Peace*, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005).

³² See Benedictus Spinoza, *Ethica* [1677]. English edition: *Spinoza: Complete Works*, ed. Michael Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), pp. 213–382.

³³ Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law,” *The British Year Book of International Law* 23 (1946), pp. 1–53 at 26–30.

which forces the agency unit to split roles, makes the state and the individual look alike. However, it is argued that role-splitting is not the same as splitting identities. If a person has a certain role at home and another role in public life, he or she still has to combine both roles in one person. Depending on how one combines the different roles in person, one develops one's ideas about the state and its conduct of domestic and international affairs. Principles of action on the one level influence the way one thinks about principles on the other level and *vice versa*. Reason forces one to be consistent, and to harmonize rules and roles. This is what I will call the Golden Rule of Statecraft. It is the conclusion of the argument in Part I.

Part II is about what the whole is, and is inspired by Spinozism. Spinoza explains how we should approach the two most vexing problems that the Universal Rule at first does not seem to solve: totality ('God') and nothingness. The former is not part of a bigger whole; the latter does not consist of parts, if it can already be conceived as a whole to start with. Spinoza has proved with mathematical precision that 'God' is infinite and eternal. 'God' is everything that is; other than 'God' there is nothing. Looking at things from a God's eye perspective is a point of view beyond time and space. The Universal Rule includes, *i.e.* allows for, this perspective. As a matter of fact, it is the only expression that captures infinity and eternity at the same time. Thus, it could be said to be a modern statement of what is commonly referred to as 'God'.

Like Spinoza starts off his *Ethics* with offering his conception of God, proceeding to man and the good life, this thesis also uses a conception of God—*i.e.* the Universal Rule—while maintaining that the whole can only exist through its parts—*i.e.* everything that is. Our awareness of everything that is, is constantly changing (or 'growing'). Through the experience of Copernican moments this leads to paradigm shifts over time.³⁴ Telling in this respect is where man has sought his God through history. God is in heaven, on earth, residing in the I, or dead. If in the West we now live at a time where the individual is seen as the centrepiece of the universe, it will be argued that it makes sense to see how the Universal Rule can be applied to the individual. Part II is about

³⁴ Cf. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, third edition (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). See Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True, *Theories of International Relations*, second edition (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 10-12, on the relevance and applicability of Kuhn's epistemological model to the social sciences.

just that. It offers a view of human being that explains exactly how it can be conceived to be a whole in itself and part of a larger whole. It connects this conception of man with the Spinozist conception of *conatus*, which makes it possible to arrive at what I will call the Iron Rule of Statecraft.

Taking Parts I and II together one is left with a scheme that can explain how several dichotomies are to be understood.³⁵ Agency and structure; voluntarism and determinism; ‘ought’ and ‘is’ are but three expressions of the same relation. It is the relation between the experience of being a whole in itself, and being only a part of the whole universe (or human nature). In fact, it is about freedom and human bondage. Whereas Part I examines the analogy that can be made between agency units, assuming that we can feel *relatively* free to decide how they ‘ought’ to relate to one another, Part II demonstrates that the only freedom we can *really* hope for, can be attained through an understanding of what ‘is’. The paradox is that an understanding of what we are under a moral obligation to do, presupposes freedom, whereas an understanding of why we feel free to do the things we find desirable presupposes an awareness of human bondage. This indicates the relation between the two Parts.

³⁵ Cf. Edward Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, reprint of second edition (New York: Perennial, [1946] 2001), p. 12, n. 1. Carr elaborates on the antithesis between utopia and reality, between theory and practice, and suggests an analogy with Jung's classification of psychological types as “introverted” and “extraverted” or William James's pairs of opposites: “Rationalist-Empiricist, Intellectualist-Sensationalist, Idealist-Materialist, Optimistic-Pessimistic, Religious-Irreligious, Free-willist-Fatalistic, Monistic-Pluralistic, Dogmatical-Sceptical”. Carr does not favor either utopia or reality, but points out that they need to mitigate one another. Carr is seen as a realist, as he wrote his book at a time when utopia reigned supreme, which he reacted against. However, his theory could be labeled idealist as well, if applied at times when reality would take precedence over anything else.

PART I

The Nature of the State

Introduction

Part I is on agency. After having posited in Chapter 1 the axiom this thesis is based on, the argument will be developed within the realms of time and space. What was axiomatic in Chapter 1, has to be applied and tested in real terms. The Universal Rule does not mean anything in and of itself; it can only become meaningful if it is substantiated in some way. Part I renders the Universal Rule specific meaning by claiming that any agency unit cannot exist but through its parts while being a whole in itself as well as part of a larger whole. Agency units act within time and space, and they can only be usefully compared in as far as they are like units. By focusing on what units are like, one can make sense of the so-called domestic analogy between states and persons. That is what Part I is all about. It is about how actors play their parts or, more precisely, about how they ought to relate to one another. It establishes this through analogical—not normative—reasoning.

The concept of ‘domestic analogy’ has been defined in very different ways. Often it is not defined at all, as it is used more often as a weapon of debate than as a tool of analysis. Thus, authors proclaim to be opponents or supporters of the domestic analogy, whereas on closer examination it may turn out that the opposite holds true. However this may be, the domestic analogy has been at the core of debates about the development of international law and relations. It has been the driving force behind this development, ever since Grotius made it the core element of his systemic theory of international law. It is an intellectual tool also with great explanatory power.¹ That is why I focus on the domestic analogy, and try to make sense of it. Before building my argument, though, I will first define both the concept of domestic analogy and analogical reasoning itself, of which the former is a specific example.

Reasoning by analogy is, to use the definition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, “the process of reasoning from parallel cases; presumptive reasoning based upon the assumption that if things have some similar attributes, their other attributes will be similar”. The need to resort to analogical reasoning could be regarded as a sign of infancy in a subject. One moves from a domain for which theory is well developed to one

¹ For an overview of the ‘debate’ about the domestic analogy, see Hidemi Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

where it is not. This is also the case with the domestic analogy. To define the term, I quote Hidemi Suganami from his leading book on the subject. He says:

the 'domestic analogy' may broadly be defined as presumptive reasoning (or a line of argument embodying such reasoning) about international relations based on the assumption that since domestic and international phenomena are similar in a number of respects, a given proposition which holds true domestically, but whose validity is as yet uncertain internationally, will also hold true internationally. A line of argument involving the domestic analogy therefore assumes explicitly or implicitly that there are some similarities between domestic and international phenomena, that there already exist some propositions which hold true domestically and internationally. It also asserts that a certain other proposition is valid with respect to the domestic sphere. And, without being able as yet to demonstrate the truth of the proposition with regard to the international sphere, it concludes, presumptively, that the proposition will hold true internationally also.²

The above definition mentions three elements that are necessary for making the domestic analogy work. First, it involves presumptive reasoning. This explains why a definition of the domestic analogy cannot consist of elements that would make for a sufficient condition for making it work. Second, it assumes some similarities between domestic and international phenomena. Critics and supporters of the domestic analogy mainly disagree on the question what these similarities are or should be. More on that will follow shortly. Third, it asserts that there must be a proposition on the one level that is susceptible of transcription to the other. Through analogical reasoning one first seeks to establish what proposition is held to be true on the domestic level, and then one suggests it might be useful to see if the proposition holds true on the international level as well. When looking for a possible analogy, one has to ascertain dispassionately what has been decided on the domestic level as to the validity of the proposition. If there is general acceptance as to the validity of a certain proposition domestically, the domestic analogy comes in sight. Thus, analogical reasoning is positivist and not normative.

When establishing what similarities exist between the domestic and international levels, which the second element is concerned with, this is *a fortiori* about what is, and not about what ought to be. Most critics of the domestic analogy think that they can dispense with it by simply stating that international society cannot enforce international law like the

² Ibid., p. 24.

state can enforce national laws. They maintain that the problem of international order is *sui generis*. The general line of reasoning is best exhibited by Hedley Bull, who may be considered one of the best-known critics of the domestic analogy in the English-speaking world. First, Bull gives his definition of the domestic analogy, which is according to him

the argument from the experience of individual men in domestic society to the experience of states, according to which the need of individual men to stand in awe of a common power in order to live in peace is a ground for holding that states must do the same. The conditions of an orderly social life, on this view, are the same among states as they are within them: they require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale.³

Next, Bull argues that “anarchy among states is tolerable to a degree to which among individuals it is not”, which means that an international executive authority is not called for. And hence, his conclusion is that the domestic analogy does not fly.

Supporters of the domestic analogy have countered the argument outlined above by maintaining that there is a distinction to be drawn between asserting that international society is *unstate-like*, and asserting that the domestic analogy does not obtain. No organization, no entity, no unit is perfectly state-like unless it actually is a state. However, this is not to say that it cannot have some residual affinity with the state, which allows the two to be usefully compared and combined. As a matter of fact, Bull does compare the domestic and international levels, and even if in the end his conclusion is that they differ, he arrives at that conclusion on the basis of analogical reasoning departing from the domestic experience. Analogy is a sign of infancy in a subject; this very state of infancy is no argument against analogy.

However valid as the counterargument may be, it does not address the real issue that Bull brings up. Bull argues that security against violence, observance of agreements and stability of property are the three primary goals of society. As he holds these goals to be most characteristic of society, he implies that they ought to be of international society as well. In other words, for any domestic analogy to obtain, these goals ought to be similar on both levels. And to protect these goals, it is necessary that “the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale”.

³ Hedley Bull, “Society and Anarchy in International Relations,” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 35.

This line of reasoning is defective, as Bull confuses the second element of Suganami's definition with the third one. According to Bull's definition, the domestic analogy must be based on propositions that ought to be similar on the domestic and international levels. He takes for a starting-point something that he thinks is different, and then he wants to take it from there. However, the second element is not about what is different or what ought to be similar, but about what is similar. Thus, Bull has his definition wrong.

To make sense of the domestic analogy one has to try and think of a proposition that holds true on both the domestic and international level. One could wonder if Bull has tried hard enough. An author who goes one step further in this regard is Michael Walzer. In his account of the domestic analogy,⁴ he acknowledges that international society as it exists today is a radically imperfect structure. Nevertheless, he stresses that this is not incompatible with the fact that our primary perceptions and judgments on the international level are the products of analogical reasoning. He maintains that the domestic analogy works, since both the state and international society are based on rights. "As we experience it," Walzer writes, "[international] society might be likened to a defective building, founded on rights."⁵ If there is no international police this only means that the 'citizens' of international society must rely on themselves and on one another. The bottom-line is that "[t]he rights of the member states must be vindicated, for it is only by virtue of those rights that there is a society at all."⁶ It would be enough if they can be upheld at least sometimes.

For Walzer the similarity between the domestic and international level is that both the individual and the state have legal personality. He takes this notion for a starting-point, and develops what he has called a 'legalist paradigm'.⁷ This legalist paradigm is the primary form of a theory of aggression that takes shape under the aegis of the domestic analogy. It consists of six propositions that have their analogues on both the domestic and international level. However, in developing his theory on the basis of this legalist paradigm, Walzer is driven toward a revisionist perspective, and he admits that his revisions are significant ones.⁸ This

⁴ See Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, third edition (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 58 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 61 ff.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

leads to at least two questions. Is it really necessary to resort to a revisionist perspective? And can we think of a theory that reaches beyond the themes of war and aggression? To be able to answer these questions concerning consistency and range of a theory of domestic analogy, we have to follow the plan that I stipulated in Chapter 1.

Part I is about agency. It takes three steps. First, it distinguishes three agency levels. Second, it establishes similarities and differences among those agency levels. Third, it accounts for these similarities and differences by making use of a clearly defined version of the domestic analogy.

The first step, then, is to distinguish the agency levels that figure into the domestic analogy. So far, we have made the distinction between the domestic level and the international level. But what exactly is it that we are comparing? One definition has it that the domestic analogy is the analogy of states and persons. This suggests that we should just compare individuals with states. But this still begs the question: in what respect can we compare the two? This question must be addressed when making the second and third step. Here, it is noted that so far, in discussing the domestic analogy, much talk was not about individuals or states, but about international society. This suggests that in fact the domestic analogy is the analogy of the state and international society. A third possibility is that the relation between individual and state should be compared with the relation between state and international society. Both the first and second option concentrates on agency units themselves; the third option on how they are related to one another.

Irrespective of the interpretation of the domestic analogy that one may choose, in any case one has to distinguish the individual, the state, and international society. Waltz elaborates on this distinction in his book *Man, the State and War*.⁹ In this book, which is about the causes of war, he distinguishes three so-called 'images' of international relations. According to the first image (inspired by Spinoza), the locus of the important causes of war is found in the nature and behaviour of man. According to the second image (inspired by Kant), the internal organization of states is the key to understanding war and peace. And according to the third image (inspired by Rousseau), the state system is key. With regard to the third image Waltz does not use the term international society, although he admits that the logical conclusion of a third-image analysis would be

⁹ See Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, [1954] 2001).

that—what is even more—world government is the remedy for world war.¹⁰ Instead, following his neorealist inclination, Waltz focuses on ‘the state among states’, *i.e.* on the state in its external relations. However wedded one may be to either one of the images, Waltz argues that in the end it is about interrelating them.

This thesis elaborates on the first image in Part II (inspired by Spinoza), and on the second and third image in Part I (inspired by Grotius). Chapter 3 is about combining the internal and external side of the state, which are first elaborated on separately in Chapter 2. The thesis as a whole is about interrelating all three. The difference between this thesis and Waltz’s approach is that Waltz singles out the third image, whereas this thesis does this with the first image. *Mutatis mutandis* one could read the last sentence of *Man, the State and War*:

The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.¹¹

Even if the first image is singled out now, in the end it is still about interrelating all three. Part II will explain what is meant here.

The second step is to establish similarities and differences among the agency levels we identified. By far the easiest way of establishing a similarity is to resort to a first-image account of international relations, and proclaim that, in the final analysis, on any agency level one has to deal with actors who are individuals. True as this may be, we just stated that a theory should not be based on one image only. Therefore, we will give all due consideration to the implications that follow from a first-image account of international relations in Part II, but here we must concentrate on what is similar on the three agency levels without using the language of any particular image. Moreover, in this Part we are concerned with the domestic analogy, and to say that two domains or objects are similar, is not to proclaim their identity.¹² After all, in that case we would be talking about one and the same thing, and not about an analogy between two things.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 238.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Cf. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston/New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 91.

At this point we have to assess the domestic analogy used by Grotius. That is to say, Grotius is always believed to make use of the domestic analogy, but does he really? Yes indeed, one may agree with Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a persistent theme in the teaching of Grotius is his dictum: *Populi respectu generis humani privatorum locum obtinent*¹³. But this analogy of states and individuals, Lauterpacht adds,

is not the result of any anthropomorphic or organic conception of the state as being—biologically, as it were—assimilated to individuals, as being an individual person ‘writ large’. The analogy is much more simple, more direct, and more convincing. The analogy—nay, the essential identity—of rules governing the conduct of states and of individuals is not asserted for the reason that states *are like* individuals; it is due to the fact that states *are composed of* individual human beings; it results from the fact that behind the mystical, impersonal, and therefore necessarily irresponsible personality of the metaphysical state there are the actual subjects of rights and duties, namely, individual human beings. This is the true meaning of the Grotian analogy of states and individuals.¹⁴

Here, Grotius is said to proclaim the essential identity of states and individuals. That is why Suganami, for instance, thinks it is doubtful whether Grotius’s thought process involved analogical reasoning.¹⁵ More precisely, Suganami thinks it is questionable that Grotius and other very early writers considered their own legal reasoning as analogical when they asserted that certain principles governed the relations of sovereigns. In that regard, Suganami writes: “These principles, in their view, were axiomatic and governed human conduct universally. It was because of this axiomatic universal validity that, in their view, natural law governed international relations.”¹⁶ Thus, they reasoned by logical deduction from a normative proposition asserted to be valid in any human context. “The force of the argument”, Suganami concludes, “does not depend on the credibility of analogical reasoning, but entirely on the validity of the normative stance taken at the outset (...).”¹⁷

Despite all, as we will see in Chapter 3, Grotius does make use of the domestic analogy. Even if his systemic theory is based on a forceful axiom—*pacta sunt servanda*—this axiom still presumes some notion of

¹³ Hugo Grotius, *Mare liberum*, ch. v. See also *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, Book II, ch. xv, § xii. 1.

¹⁴ Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law,” *The British Year Book of International Law* 23 (1946), p. 27.

¹⁵ Suganami (1989), p. 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

agency. Grotius is very clear about this notion that lies at the core of his theory, which Lauterpacht summarizes as follows: “The individual is the ultimate unit of all law, international and municipal”¹⁸. What is of interest here is the notion of a unit. After all, to see individuals as units makes it possible to see how they are similar—not identical—to states: both individuals and states *are like* units. Regarding individuals and states like units is the basic notion that makes the domestic analogy fly. As a matter of fact, Waltz also defines states as such in his *Theory of International Politics*. I will pursue this definition, and I will take the argument from there.

For Waltz, to call states ‘like units’ is to say that states are sovereign.¹⁹ What then is sovereignty? Here again, I quote Waltz in full, as this is crucial:

To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its *internal* and *external* problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them. States develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever desires they develop. It is no more contradictory to say that *sovereign states* are always constrained and often tightly so than it is to say that *free individuals* often make decisions under the heavy pressure of events [*emphasis added*].²⁰

Waltz did not mean to lay the basis for a full-fledged theory of domestic analogy. As far as Waltz was concerned the only useful analogy that can be made is the one between international politics and a market economy insofar as the self-help principle is allowed to operate in the latter.²¹ However, there can be no mistake about the implications of the analogy that concluded the above quotation. These are as broad as they could possibly be. And indeed, by assumption, Waltz’s whole theory is based on the domestic analogy.²² Yet, the domestic analogy remains in the sphere of assumptions, since Waltz cannot give it a place in his own system. Reasoning by analogy, for him, is about similarities in structure. But he did not acknowledge that a unit itself already comports with it a certain structure, which is based on the fact that it makes for the distinction between internal and external domains.

¹⁸ Lauterpacht (1946), p. 27.

¹⁹ Waltz (1979), p. 95.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 96.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 89-93.

²² Cf. Suganami (1989), p. 19.

Interestingly, Waltz does not deny the importance of the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’. On the contrary, it features prominently in his book *Man, the State and War*, through his distinction between the second and third image. He also mentions it in his *Theory of International Politics*, when defining sovereignty. In short, what Waltz says is that sovereign states are alike in that they have to face the same tasks, and decide for themselves how they will cope with their internal and external problems. What Waltz does not recognize, however, is that the very fact that sovereign states are like units, is *constitutive* of there being ‘internal’ and ‘external’ problems in the first place. Had there been no units, there would have been just problems plain, if any. To conclude, the internal-external dimension is added through the constitution or declaration of a unit.

It is to the credit of Rob Walker that state sovereignty itself has been defined in terms of the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. In his book on the inside/outside dichotomy he argues that it determines the whole framework in which IR theorizing takes shape:

The principle of state sovereignty is less an abstract legal claim than an exceptionally dense political practice. As a response to the problem of proliferating autonomies in a world of dissipating hierarchies, it articulates a specifically modern account of political space, and does so through the resolution of three fundamental contradictions. It resolves, in brief, the relation between unity and diversity, between the internal and the external and between space and time. It does so by drawing on the philosophical, theological and cultural practices of an historically specific civilisation driven by the need to realise yet also control those moments of autonomy that emerged in the complex transitions of early-modern Europe.²³

On this view, state sovereignty is the only timely solution to the need of resolving the fundamental contradictions that were mentioned.

It is hard to overestimate the depth of Walker’s analysis and its implications for IR as a discipline. A better understanding of how IR debates are framed makes it possible—*i.e.* thinkable—for IR to un-frame and reframe itself. As long as it takes the present framework for granted, I agree with Walker,

[IR] can only play with analogies and metaphors taken from discourses in which this assumption is also taken for granted: hence much of the

²³ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 154.

contemporary appeal of utilitarian micro-economic theory as a way of explaining patterns of conflict and cooperation between states. For all that they have been advanced under the banner of an epistemologically rigorous social science, utilitarian stories about rational action remain explicitly literary devices and carry enormous ontological and ideological baggage. Shifting allusions from that which is assumed to be known—the rational action of sovereign individuals in a market—to that which has to be explained—the rational/irrational action of sovereign states in an anarchical system/society—they especially have encouraged the uncritical affirmation of claims to sovereign identity in space and time that might be better placed under rather more critical suspicion.²⁴

However, the solution that Walker suggests is a bit unsettling. This is so for three reasons. First, he does not place the notion of a ‘sovereign individual’ under scrutiny. He only warns us against a certain application of the domestic analogy, without demonstrating how it could actually work.²⁵ He is so much concerned with the concept of a sovereign state, and how it is entangled in the language we use and the culture we are part of, that he does not allow himself to show *how* it emanates from the way individuals think about themselves as being ‘sovereign individuals’ at a particular time and place. Walker denounces the erasure of human subjectivity in the structural approach,²⁶ but he has nothing to say about the human being himself. Second, he presents state sovereignty as a modern account of political space, but he does not make clear why sovereignty could only be understood in territorial terms. Even if he could explain why every civilization is “driven by the need to realise yet also control those moments of autonomy” in the first place, it is still unclear why a world state would be the only alternative to a sovereign state, as territorially understood. Why not think of certain functional domains or realms, which can also be autonomous?²⁷ Third, he does not explain why there are exactly three fundamental contradictions and what they have in common. To put it differently: what is it of state sovereignty that makes it resolve all three contradictions at a time?

The answer to the above questions must be that state sovereignty is involved when states are regarded like agency units, as any agency unit must resolve the contradictions mentioned above being the interface of

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 97-99.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 98.

²⁷ Cf. Lene Hansen, “R.B.J. Walker and International Relations: Deconstructing a Discipline”, in Iver Neumann and Ole Wæver (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making* (London/New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 324.

its own divides. This means that there is nothing special to state sovereignty. It is based on personality in the sense that any person has to combine the internal and the external world. Individual persons are like agency units in that they have to live in both worlds. How individual persons manage to do that cannot be answered for once and for all. This is exactly the point that Walker makes when arguing against the structural approach. What Walker does not demonstrate, however, is how the way individual persons have thought about this human condition, has impacted on the way they have come to see the state.

To conclude the second step, the domestic analogy is to be understood as the analogy between agency units in their inter-unit relations across the levels of analysis identified in the first step.

The third step, finally, is to account for the similarities and differences across the levels of analysis by making use of a clearly defined version of the domestic analogy. It will be argued here that agency units are to be understood as wholes consisting of parts, and as parts of a larger whole at the same time. The domestic analogy can only make sense when agency units are compared in this strictly limited way. Here we may agree with Grotius and Spinoza, who both rely, in their own ways, on the domestic analogy in a strictly limited sense. With regard to Grotius we already noted that for him the domestic analogy is not, to borrow Lauterpacht's phrase, "the result of any anthropomorphic or organic conception of the state as being—biologically, as it were—assimilated to individuals". With regard to Spinoza and his conception of the domestic analogy, we should note that although he does consider the state as being an individual person 'writ large',²⁸ it is exactly this anthropomorphic element that makes his analogy break down. And yet, Spinoza's political philosophy is based on the domestic analogy. How so?

Explaining the right of the sovereign vis-à-vis the world at large, Spinoza writes in his *Political Treatise* that this right is easily understood from what he has already said:

For since the sovereign's right is nothing other than the right of Nature itself, it follows that two states are in the same relation to one another as are two men in a state of Nature, but with this exception, that a commonwealth can take precautions against being subjugated by another commonwealth. This a man in a state of nature cannot do, seeing that he is every day overcome by sleep, frequently by sickness or mental infirmity, and eventually by old age. And

²⁸ Benedictus Spinoza, *Political Treatise*, ch. iii, sec. 2, in *Spinoza: Complete Works*, ed. Michael Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), p. 690.

besides these he is exposed to other troubles against which a commonwealth can render itself secure.²⁹

Thus, Spinoza adds one to the number of his original assumptions: states are like men. According to Waltz, “[t]his was at once the great inconsistency and the saving grace of his system”³⁰. Maybe it has some grace to it, when Spinoza resolves the cause of conflict that would reside in man’s passions not by suggesting that man be reformed, but by moving from the micro to the macro level. However, is Spinoza inconsistent?

Basically, what Spinoza says is that both sovereign states and individual persons are natural things. “[E]very natural thing,” he writes, “has as much right from Nature as it has power to exist and to act. For the power of every natural thing by which it exists and acts is nothing other than the power of God, which is absolutely free.” In other words, natural things can be usefully compared as they share something: natural things are manifestations of God. But what then is God? In Chapter 1 we saw that Spinoza defines God as everything that is. God is infinite and eternal. As this does not seem to bring us any further, in Chapter 1 I offered an expression that captures both infinity and eternity and, thus, could be considered a modern statement of what is commonly referred to as ‘God’, *viz.* the Universal Rule. Applying the Universal Rule to natural things like individual persons and states, makes it possible to compare them like units. However, it is not enough to regard individual persons and states like units, as that would reduce reality to logics. In Part I, we are concerned with units in their respective capacities to *act* in specific environments: Agency units are to be understood as wholes consisting of parts, and as parts of a larger whole at the same time.

Applying the Universal Rule to agency units makes the expression real in terms of time and space. At the same time, however, it also makes us aware of the problems we are confronted with when dealing with the domestic analogy. After all, what parts does a human being consist of? And what is the larger whole that international society is part of? The former is the question into human nature; the latter is about universality. Either way, one is concerned here with the question of Being. In Chapter 1, we already indicated that this question is addressed in Part II, referring to Spinoza and his concept of totality. Here, in Part I, we can reformulate both problems as they impact on agency, short of answering the deeper question into human being.

²⁹ Ibid., ch. iii, sec. 11, p. 694.

³⁰ Waltz (2001), p. 162.

In his classes on Ethics and International Relations, Stanley Hoffmann takes both problems, mentioned above, for a starting-point in his enquiry into what is moral, and what morality there is for IR. He associates both problems with two basic approaches that are prevalent in IR: a bottom-up approach and a top-down approach. The problem with the former is that it presupposes a set of principles; the problem with the latter is that it presupposes some moral code. There are many moral codes, and if we overstep our intuitions, which come from conscience, once again we need a principle of judgment, which depends on non-moral factors. Hoffmann exemplifies this problem by discussing Kant. The Kantian system of commands is based on three types of imperatives: imperatives of skill, of prudence, and of morality. Whereas the last type is categorical, having as its maxim that propositions be universalizational, the other two are non-moral. Moreover, the Kantian system of commands is only concerned with the human being as far as practical reasoning is involved. It is about duties and obligations, not about inclinations and consequences. In the final analysis, taking issue with almost every philosopher, Hoffmann tends to agree with Kant, with the important reservation, though, that IR cannot exclude consequences.

The solution that Hoffmann offers to the problems mentioned above is not completely satisfactory. He says, in IR, morality consists in 'adopting the moral point of view'. To arrive at this point of view one has to use the method of elimination: Adopting the moral point of view is *not* about moral egoism, *not* about relativism, *not* about meta-ethical rationalism, *not* about subjectivism, and so on. But what is it then in positive terms? Does it help to refer, as Hoffmann does, to Albert Camus and his *Le mythe de Sisyphe*, claiming that we cannot know what is right and wrong in and of itself? Or is it possible to say something about what an agency unit 'ought', without going into the question of what this unit 'is'? The two aspects that are at play here Hoffmann has elaborated on in his classic *Janus and Minerva*.³¹ While Kant is good at developing the Minerva part, Janus is still a bit underdeveloped. It is the part that stands for double-sidedness. It is the part that makes that it is just different than one expected; just a bit more complicated than logic—or practical reasoning for that matter—seems to prescribe.

Chapter 2 is about facing Janus. It proposes two perspectives that are applicable to any agency unit: looking inward and looking outward.

³¹ See Stanley Hoffmann, *Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (Boulder/London: Westview Press, 1987).

The former makes the unit look like a whole, whereas the latter invites one to regard it as part of something larger. Thus, looking inward is about wholes, and looking outward about parts. One could make analogies between two different levels of analysis by focusing on just one perspective exclusively as well as on the double-sidedness that is characteristic of any agency unit. Chapter 2 looks at both perspectives separately, as wholes in themselves. Of necessity, in the end they both encounter the problem of one-sidedness, *i.e.* seeing only wholes or only parts. Chapter 3 relates both perspectives to one another, which leads us to the limits of the analogy of states and persons itself.

The hypothesis that is central to both Chapter 2 and 3, is that the analogy works in two directions: from the micro-level to the macro-level and the other way round. While the domestic analogy proper is only about reasoning from micro to macro, this thesis posits that it also works from macro to micro. The most classic statement of the reverse of the domestic analogy can be found in Plato's *Republic*, where Socrates explains to Adeimantus why this analogy is helpful and should be made:

"The inquiry we are undertaking is no easy one but calls for keen vision, as it seems to me. So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and then examine the smaller, if they are the same." "Quite so," said Adeimantus; "but what analogy to this do you detect in the inquiry about justice?" "I will tell you," I said: "there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city?" "Assuredly," said he. "Is not the city larger than the man?" "It is larger," he said. "Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then, let us first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less."³²

Revisiting the classical approach, Grotius features it as the foundation of his own theory, and gives currency to this particular kind of analogy.³³ Next, Hobbes makes use of it. His 'state of nature analogy' posits that if one wants to know how the state of nature must have

³² Plato, *The Republic*, Book II, at 368D-369B, trans. Paul Shorey in Loeb Classical Library No. 237 (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press/Heinemann, 1930), pp. 147-149.

³³ See Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

looked like in the pre-contractual situation, one should look at the ‘anarchy’ on the international level. As to its application within IR, one looks almost in vain for any authors using it. A notable exception to this lack of interest in an analogy that, it will be argued, is at least as powerful as the traditional domestic analogy, is a book by David Lumsdaine. This IR scholar writes about foreign aid, making analogies in both directions. He does so on the basis of three hypotheses, two of which I will quote here (leaving the third one for paragraph 3.2). The first hypothesis is: “The beliefs, values, and practices of daily moral discourse and domestic political life tend to be transferred to one’s understanding and conduct of foreign affairs.” The second hypothesis is: “A country tends to be influenced, both in its international dealings and in its domestic political institutions, by its experience and role in international society.”³⁴

Lumsdaine’s hypotheses could be labelled, respectively, as reasoning inside-out and outside-in. These terms are used to express the relation between inside and outside. Inside-out is about the inferences that can be drawn from the endogenous to the exogenous; outside-in is about the inferences that can be drawn from the exogenous to the endogenous. It may seem as if Part I (on agency) is about inside-out and Part II (on structure) is about outside-in, but in fact they are enmeshed in one another, as we will see.

Thus, in Part I, one is left with three distinctions.³⁵ The first distinction is the one between micro level and macro level (point of view). What the one or the other is, depends on where you stand. If you have an international society point of view, then the state level is micro. However, if you take the individual for a starting-point, then the state level is macro. The second distinction is the one between inside and outside (perspective). This distinction is about what you are looking at, from whatever position—*i.e.*, point of view—you may choose. If you look inward you see the whole; if you look outward you see the parts. The third distinction is the one between inside-out and outside-in. This distinction is about how you interpret what you see (interpretation). To conclude, IR is no different from the rest of life: What you see depends on where you stand, on where you look, and on how you interpret that. Understanding IR becomes simple.

³⁴ David Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 22.

³⁵ Martin Hollis and Steve Smith only make two distinctions, as we will see in Chapter 3, in Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

Chapter 2: Facing Janus

2.1 Inside

To see the whole is only part of what there is to see. However, this is what one sees when looking inward. The point in this section is to prove that the concept of a whole cannot prevail over the parts. To prove this point I will discuss some of the strongest positions in favour of the whole, as espoused by Plato, Hegel, and Kant.

When looking inward, an agency unit will definitely see the parts that it is composed of, but in the end it is concerned with the whole. For instance, a government, in conducting its domestic affairs, may take full cognisance of what citizens think and what pressure groups want, but in the end it is its task to do what it deems right for the state as a whole. Likewise, a person, who is looking inward, may be concerned about how certain organs are functioning, but in the end this person can only be said to be concerned about his health if he is interested in the survival of his body as a whole. On the micro level this is the organic way of putting it. There is also another way of thinking about the person as looking inward, which I will elaborate on in Part II. This is when we think of the person as an individual who is living in two worlds: an outer world and an inner world. In the outer (material) world the individual sees *particularia*; in the inner (spiritual) world he may develop an understanding for *universalia*.

Developing both an organic or biological theory of the state and a political theory of the soul, Plato combines both the organic and the idealist interpretation in his conception of the state. The ideal state appears to Plato as the perfect individual. The state and the individual are interdependent, but in the end the state is believed to be superior to the individual. For Plato, the state is a natural unit of a higher order, and the individual citizen is but an imperfect copy of it. This is why Plato uses the domestic analogy the other way round: from macro to micro.¹ When comparing the state with an organism,² or even with a human body,³ Plato takes the state as his point of view, and he looks inward. Thus, he sees the whole and emphasizes the oneness or individuality of his state. Such emphasis may be described as 'holism'. A classical formulation of political holism can be found in the *Republic*:

¹ Plato, *The Republic*, 368E, 445C, 577C.

² *Ibid.*, 462C.

³ Plato, *Laws*, 964E.

The part exists for the sake of the whole, but the whole does not exist for the sake of the part (...) You are created for the sake of the whole and not the whole for the sake of you.⁴

Plato also writes: “The law is designed to bring about the welfare of the state as a whole, fitting the citizens into one unit, by means of both persuasion and force.”⁵

Plato was not new in emphasizing oneness. Religions of all sorts have been doing that since time immemorial. Also in philosophy, Plato was not completely novel in this regard, as Parmenides is known for introducing the opposition *One—Many*. Parmenides already taught that the world is a full globe, a whole without any parts, saying: “The real being is indivisible. It is always an integrated whole, which never breaks away from its order; it never disperses, and thus need not re-unite.”⁶ On the contrary, what is new in Plato is that he transforms the Parmenidian One into a system of grades. In Plato’s philosophy there is still the one Idea, but there is an aristocratic hierarchy among people as to how they relate to that one Idea: there are the few who come close to it, the more who are their helpers, and the many, *i.e.* the mob, who do not have a clue.⁷ Opposing democracy, Plato thus establishes the foundation for his class-divided society, and by analogy for the division of the soul.⁸

Karl Popper believes that Plato’s holism is closely related to the tribal collectivism of earlier times. Plato would have been longing for the lost unity of tribal life. And indeed, Plato’s focus on the state as the primary unit seems a bit of a reactionary stance if compared to the views held by such men as Pericles, Protagoras, Democritus, Antisthenes, and, perhaps the greatest of all, Socrates.⁹ This Great Generation, as Popper likes to call them, lived in Athens during the Peloponnesian war some decades before Plato wrote his *Republic*. Already at that time they developed ideas that attributed primacy to the individual. Democritus, for instance, said: “Every man is a little world of his own (...) The wise man belongs to all countries alike, for the home of a great soul is the whole

⁴ Plato, *The Republic*, 520B, as cited in Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies—Volume I: The Spell of Plato* (London: Routledge, 1945).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 519E.

⁶ Cf. Popper (1945), vol. I, p. 253.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 264: Plato’s political theory of the soul has been the foundation of many psychologies, and is the basis of psycho-analysis too. For more on this, see Part II.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 253-254.

world.”¹⁰ This humanitarian and universalistic emphasis stands in stark contrast with the holistic views espoused by Plato.

Attacking holism (or rather ‘the closed society’), Popper chooses Plato as one of his main targets. He believes that Plato makes a serious mistake when discussing the problem of individualism and collectivism. To detect this alleged mistake the following table may be useful:

(a) Individualism	is opposed to	(a') Collectivism.
(b) Egoism	is opposed to	(b') Altruism. ¹¹

According to Popper, Plato propounds that collectivism is opposed to egoism by suggesting that one is selfish if one cannot sacrifice one's interests for the sake of the whole. However, the table shows that collectivism is neither opposed to egoism nor identical with altruism. Popper's charge is that Plato is suggesting exactly that, thereby appealing to various feelings, like the longing to belong to a group or a tribe. Popper calls this “a successful piece of anti-humanitarian propaganda, which has confused speculation on ethical matters down to our own time”.¹² He warns his readers for those who herald Plato's ethics, saying that they are preparing the way for totalitarianism.

Likewise, Popper warns against the holism expounded by Hegel and Marx. However, an important difference between Plato and Hegel is that the latter replaces Plato's transcendental Idea by an immanent Spirit. One of the two pillars of Hegelian philosophy is that reason is real, which also means that what is real must be rational. The other pillar is his dialectical triad consisting of two elements borrowed from Heraclitus: the war of opposites (*thesis* and *antithesis*) and the unity of opposites (*synthesis*). If applied to history, Hegel's dialectics combined with his philosophy of identity make for the perfect example of historicist essentialism. Positing, like Plato, the primacy of the state, Hegel proclaims that the essence of the state is the nation. For him, the history of a nation is the history of its essence or Spirit. The relation the individual man has to that Spirit is what enables him to have a definite place in the world—to belong to a powerful collective body and be something. Hegel makes an analogy here:

Just as the individual is not a real person unless related to other persons so the State is no real individuality unless related to other States. (...) The relation of

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 161-162.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 87.

¹² Ibid., p. 91.

one particular State to another presents (...) the most shifting play of (...) passions, interests, aims, talents, virtues, power, injustice, vice, and mere external chance. It is a play in which even the Ethical Whole, the Independence of the State, is exposed to accident. (...) Kant proposed an alliance of princes, which should settle the controversies of States; and the Holy Alliance probably aspired to be an institution of this kind. The State, however, is an individual; and in individuality, negation is essentially contained. A number of States may constitute themselves into a family, but this confederation, as an individuality, must create opposition and so beget an enemy.¹³

This is Hegel's historical theory of the nation in a nutshell: Not perpetual peace, but perpetual warfare is called for. To assert itself on the stage of history, the nation needs enemies.

Popper takes issue with the Hegelian idea that the essence of the state is Spirit. He points out that if we replace 'Spirit' by 'Blood' we have fascism; if we replace it by 'matter' we have Marxism.¹⁴ While Popper is mainly concerned with attacking Marxism, which he considers the most archetypical example of historicism, it is important to note that Popper points at Hegelian nationalism as providing the armoury of weapons for authoritarian movements and totalitarianism at large. As he sees it, Plato paved the way formulating his fundamental political problem by asking: Who should rule? Whereas for many centuries the answer to this question had been 'the prince', next, Rousseau came with the idea that not the prince but the people should rule. He invented the revolutionary notion of the 'general will', and he maintained that the people had to be exalted into a super-personality.

On the people, Rousseau writes the following in his *Du Contrat social*, in the chapter on the sovereign:

(...) in relation to what is external to it, it becomes one single being, one individual.¹⁵

In this invention, Popper admits, there was no tendency towards nationalism, even if it displayed a great deal of romantic collectivism.

¹³ Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts [Philosophy of Law]*, paras. 340 and 342L, as cited in Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies—Volume II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath* (London: Routledge, 1945), p. 61.

¹⁴ Popper (1945), vol. II, p. 58.

¹⁵ Rousseau, "Du Contrat social ou principes du droit politique," in Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Œuvres complètes III, Du Contrat social—Écrits politiques* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, [1762] 1964), Book 1, Chapter VII, p. 363: "(...) à l'égard de l'étranger, il [le corps du peuple] devient un être simple, un individu."

Nevertheless, Popper believes that this passage contains the germ of nationalism, “whose most characteristic doctrine is that the various nations must be conceived as personalities”.¹⁶

Having disclosed the bone of contention between Popper and the various proponents of holism and historicism he disparages, we must agree with Popper that history has laid a duty upon us to be vigilant and resilient against those forces that arise when people succumb to some concept of the whole larger than themselves. This is why we went to some length at showing in Chapter 1 why the Universal Rule, which was introduced there, is fully Popper-proof. In a sense, Popper can be said to have formulated a new paradigm, which we still adhere to by venerating relativism (or parts) and suspecting any truths (or concepts of the whole). However, if Popper’s intention is right, his methodology is self-defeating. This claim brings us to a critical appraisal of Popper’s paradigm, which serves to demonstrate that this paradigm in fact presupposes the concept of a whole. It will be argued that the challenge is to recognize this, while strongly upholding Popper’s appeal to learn from the political aberrations the 20th century has witnessed.

First, Popper uses a line of reasoning that turns against himself. In assessing Plato’s reactionary stance toward individualism, Popper is keen to show how Plato misleads his readers by appealing to feelings like the fear to be deprived of the need to belong to a group, thereby diverting their attention from the argument. Popper discredits Plato for his playing the fear card. Ironically, when targeting at Hegel, who in a sense systemized fear by both appealing to the need to have enemies and to the need to belong to a nation,¹⁷ Popper falls pray to his own verdict. Popper does exactly what he reproaches Plato for: He discredits his target by diverting from the argument itself. When claiming that Hegel, by asserting that the essence of the state is ‘Spirit’, opens the way to fascism and Marxism, as this would only involve the changing of one word, Popper does not make any point really. Endless is the list of sentences that could be rendered a dramatically different meaning by changing only one word. So what?

Popper ridicules the high level of abstraction Hegel uses, and, it must be admitted, Popper does so with great virtuosity. While this makes for the better part of his book in terms of entertainment, in terms of

¹⁶ Popper (1945), vol. II, pp. 49-50.

¹⁷ Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, sixth edition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, [1963] 1996) on the friend/enemy antagonism.

cogency it marks a serious flaw. To defeat an argument most persuasively, Mill has taught, one should do so by using its very terms. Even if it could be argued that Popper in fact does use Hegelian terms to make his case against Hegelianism, in the end he would not defeat Hegelianism but instead render support for it. Thus, it would be easy for a Hegelian to demonstrate how Popper sets up two opposites. Popper would not understand the German Spirit as constituting the synthesis of all thinking, but rather as the antithesis to the Anglo-Saxon mind: Whereas the German Spirit has more of an affinity with abstract notions, the Anglo-Saxon mind is rooted in common sense and wit. Having sublimated the German Spirit in a sense (and having taken it thus to an extreme), Hegel makes for the prime target to rally opposition against. This also enables Popper to rally support for his own proposition. To be strong one must beget an enemy; Popper applies this Hegelian lesson adroitly by even featuring it in the title of his book, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*.

Applying the Universal Rule, one can see the flaw in Popper's argument as construed above. If German scholarship has an affinity with *universalia* and abstract notions like Totality and the Whole, Anglo-Saxon scholarship has more of an affinity with *particularia*. To put it differently, some are interested in combining everything and have it fit together (synthesis), and others are interested in dissecting anything into parts (analysis). Popper's mission, if you will, was to feed suspicion—and, one may add, to instil fear—against any politician or political theorist claiming to be the Great Synthesizer. His is a lesson to be wary of the concept of a whole, and to always uphold the notion that any whole cannot exist but as part of some larger whole, without knowing what the grand total is actually all about. Thus understood, Popper is a staunch defender of relativism and democracy against absolutism and totalitarianism. However, in defending relativism Popper himself takes an absolutist stance, as he takes his search light theory to be true, or at least the method itself of acquiring knowledge through conjectures and refutations. Popper's truth also constitutes a whole in itself.

Relativism has become the new creed. One has learned to suspect the concept of a whole, which is associated with homogeneity, fraternity, communitarianism, and holism. Instead, one has embraced the respective principles of heterogeneity, freedom/equality, universalism, and individualism. Stefan Collignon nicely formulates the new creed when

reflecting on the political economy of a future European constitution.¹⁸ Collignon believes that the former set of principles should be dominated by the latter, thus subscribing to the notion that, while in every society both sets of principles—in particular holism (whole) and individualism (here: parts)—coexist, what matters is their mutual articulation, which makes one principle dominate whilst containing the other.¹⁹ This notion is at odds with a balanced view giving equal weight to the whole and its parts,²⁰ as will be espoused in Chapter 3. Instead, it is about domination that would be justified by reference to some monopoly to Truth. We have reached the point where most people in Western civilization believe that they have that kind of monopoly,²¹ and some would describe that as being like last men at the end of history.²² Ironically, this very idea is based on Hegelian premises, lending support to the historicist notion that progress has come to an end, and that the cyclical nature of history is bound to manifest itself.²³

Thus, to conclude the first point *contra* Popper, one could say that by trying to defeat historicism, he has been most instrumental in reinforcing it. If we have to assess Popper's theory by its own standard, we may even say that Popper's principled version of relativism is the "germ" that has opened Western civilization to all kinds of threats and attacks by religious fanatics who claim to defend some conception of the whole, which they feel is trampled upon by the West. By the way, this opposition does not only come from some perceived enemy outside, but also from mainstream Catholicism inside. In this regard, we may recall

¹⁸ See Stefan Collignon, *The European Republic: Reflections on the Political Economy of a Future Constitution* (London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2003).

¹⁹ L. Dumont, *Essais sur l'individualisme: une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne* [*Essays on Individualism: An Anthropological Perspective of Modern Ideology*] (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991).

²⁰ Christward Dieterman, Book Review of Stefan Collignon's *The European Republic*, in *Common Market Law Review* 41 (2004), p. 897.

²¹ Like, for instance, former EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein maintained in his 2003 John Rawls Lecture at the University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, as published in "John Rawls: filosoof in de avondschemer van de twintigste eeuw" [John Rawls: Philosopher at the Dusk of the Twentieth Century], in Bolkestein, *De twee lampen van de staatsman: Beschouwingen over politiek* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 2006), pp. 190-201 at 201.

²² See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992).

²³ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, abridged edition (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1926-1928] 1991); Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridged edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1946-1957] 1987); and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

that Pope Benedict XVI, upon his acceptance of the papacy in 2005, declared to fight relativism, which he considers to be the enemy also of the West itself.

Second, while promoting the parts, Popper seems to forget that the parts are also wholes in themselves. Popper is preoccupied with the state and society at large, and on that level he makes a clear distinction between inside and outside. A society that looks inward and sees itself as a self-governing whole is a *closed* society; a society that looks outward and sees itself as part of much more out there is an *open* society. There can be no mistake about it: Popper believes the former to be bad, and the latter to be good. However, he does not make that distinction in relation to individual persons. For him, individualism is good plain, and collectivism is bad. Popper seems to forget that individualism is about being undivided, about being part and whole at the same time. But how could he condone the concept of a whole on the level of the individual person, while disparaging it on the state level? Popper never asks himself this question, since he never takes the point of view of the individual person really. His is the point of view of the state.

Popper does make a distinction between inside and outside, but he does not between different points of view. He does not change perspectives and is unable to make analogies between two levels of analysis (micro and macro). Popper believes to have good reasons for being hesitant about using analogies, and he feels that Kant has formulated these reservations most persuasively in reaction to Herder:

A sagacity quick in picking up analogies and an imagination audacious in the use it makes of them are combined with a capability for enlisting emotions and passions in order to obtain interest for its object—an object that is always veiled in mystery. These emotions are easily mistaken for the efforts of powerful and profound thoughts, or at least of deeply significant allusions; and they thus arouse higher expectations than cool judgement would find justified (...) Synonyms are passed off as explanations, and allegories are offered as truths.²⁴

Rightly, Kant has warned generations to come not to misuse analogies. However, he never said that one should restrain from making good use of them. In fact, Kant himself has tried to do exactly that. For him, the hallmark of a good analogy is that it be based on reason, without enlisting emotions and passions. As we will elaborate on Kant's use of the

²⁴ Kant as cited in Popper (1945), vol. II, pp. 50-51.

domestic analogy later on, here it should be noted that Popper, by not using analogies, deprives himself of a valuable tool to falsify his own theory; that is, to further improve it.

To use the third distinction we mentioned in concluding the Introduction to Part I, one can make analogies inside-out and outside-in. If we want to remain faithful to the conjectures underpinning Popper's theory—*i.e.*, individual persons (as parts) are good, and collectivities (as wholes) are bad—then, in the present case, reasoning inside-out means that what we cherish on the micro level can be writ large and translated to the state level. The salient feature that Popper cherishes most in individual persons is that they are to be understood as parts without being too much concerned about the whole that they would be constitutive of. As a matter of fact, this lack of concern perfectly matches the way we like to think of international society on the macro level. Indeed, we have sovereign states, which form the parts of some larger whole, but we do not really know how this whole is to be conceived, as it seems to lack the features that are epitomized by the concept of sovereignty. One may say: so far, so good.

Conversely, reasoning outside-in, in the present case, means that what we despise on the state level has a bearing on the micro level. Here, it gets interesting. After all, what Popper despises most in the state is that it could be seen as a closed entity, that is, as a whole. Now, what bearing does this have on individual persons? For one thing, they can be seen as wholes as well. So apparently, not all about individual persons is good, and in fact there is some scope for scrutiny also on the micro level. The problem with Popper is that he lacks concern for that, and that he has nothing to say to those maintaining that society has become too individualistic. What they mean by that is that individual persons have become isolated from each other, and feel and behave like wholes in themselves. Thus, Popper may have been successful in championing the parts on the macro level, but only at the expense of inadvertently fostering the concept of a whole on the micro level. All this is to drive home the simple conclusion that, indeed, parts are also wholes in themselves.

By defending the thesis that it is all about the parts, Popper has evoked a reaction—the antithesis that it is all about the whole. Thus, he gives ammunition to historicists who will be keen to show that this is a dialectical process, comparable to a pendulum swinging from one extreme to the other. For one thing, Popper has been unable to give the final blow to historicism, as has been demonstrated above. The

tremendous success of later authors like Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington in the 1990s, who were greatly inspired by respectively Hegel and Toynbee,²⁵ serves to further testify that the concept of a whole is here to stay, and that its appeal has not decreased.

The author who has arguably been most influential in defending the concept of a whole is Kant, so it is to him that we now turn. In contrast to the authors whom Popper takes issue with, Kant does not defend the concept of a whole on the level of the state, but on that of the individual person, and on that of international society. Kant does not defend holism and communitarianism, but individualism and universalism.²⁶ Kant considers the person as a whole, and we will pursue this line of argument here. If Kant's philosophy cannot be refuted, we must conclude that the concept of a whole is not only here to stay, but here to prevail.

While Plato, Aristotle, and Christian scholasticism already made a distinction between the realms of the phenomenal (*particularia*) and the noumenal (*universalia*), which were still organically united, Kant truly separates both realms. For Kant, the former is the realm of necessity, which lies open to reason; the latter is the realm of freedom, the kingdom of ends, which is beyond cognitive reach. In the latter realm, Kant denies knowledge in order to make room for faith. Whereas Kant in his younger years had proved that we know nothing about God, freedom, and immortality, old Kant would maintain: "God is not a being outside me, but merely a thought in me. God is the morally practical self-legislative reason."²⁷ Kant's conception of the moral law was revolutionary, since the traditional way of picturing moral experience and moral action was as

a tram, following the rails of a metaphysical universe where God, the starry heavens above, history, society, and the individual were all parts of a rationally coherent whole. Kant's moral experience, since he has torn up the rails, is a

²⁵ Fukuyama (1992) takes up Hegelian themes as interpreted by Alexandre Kojève, like the validity of directional History and the possibility of a Universal History; and Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) uses the concept of a civilization much like Toynbee did, who described it as the broadest cultural entity, a "totality" (pp. 42-44).

²⁶ The terms liberalism and cosmopolitanism are also applicable. A standard text of the present debate between liberals (who see the individual as a whole) and communitarians (who see the community as a whole, but unlike historicists) is Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, second edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).

²⁷ "Kant Selections," in T.N. Greene, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938), pp. 243-244.

jeep, a land-rover, a tractor, moving where it will; its principle of motion is within itself, not outside; it is inner-directed, not other-directed. Moral experience is manifested in the creative energy of the will; and sometimes the jeep or land-rover seems more like an armoured car.²⁸

The revolutionary nature of Kant's conception of the moral law has two sides. One side is that, indeed, it has something critical and destructive about it ("since he has torn up the rails"). The other, however, is positive and constructive, being sublimated in the famous 'categorical imperative'. The categorical imperative is based on the assertion that the only good thing that can be conceived in the world is a good will. Good will is present when conduct springs neither from inclination or fear, nor from affection or benevolence, but from consciousness of duty. As Kant put it:

We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a general law.²⁹

The destructive part of Kant's philosophy is that it first declares that knowledge of the Whole (God) is impossible, and that all what is left are the parts (persons). The constructive part is that it comes up with the idea of reconstituting the whole in the individual: The individual is a whole just like the Universe is a whole. The categorical imperative could then be reformulated as: What is right for the Universe must be right for the individual. However, this is tantamount to saying that what is right for the whole must be right for the whole. What does that help? Basically, Kant only wants to make the point that we must not look outside for guidance on moral affairs, but inside. This runs parallel to the Copernican revolution that Kant executed in the realm of necessity, by assuming that objects must conform to our knowledge, and not the other way round, as had hitherto been assumed in metaphysics. Thus, in the realm of necessity Kant is theorizing inside-out. But in the realm of freedom causation does not obtain, which means that both reasoning inside-out and outside-in are not applicable here. The categorical imperative could rather be labelled 'inside-in' or 'inside plain'.

²⁸ Martin Wight, *Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini*, ed. Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 70.

²⁹ Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, [1788] 1974), p. 140: "Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft: Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne."

Nonetheless, it is striking that Kant resorts to abstractions, or general laws for that matter, for guidance on moral affairs. Would it not be much more convincing for an individualist to say that the litmus test is the possibility of individuation of a maxim of action, not universalization? Universalization is problematic because it involves a process that is purely rational. Through this thought experiment the individual is forced to understand that he must will something, and because he understands that he should, the resulting action would emanate from freedom. Still, reason forces nature. This were not the case with individuation, where a maxim of action would be right if it were to resonate with concrete individuals having reason, but also passions. We will pursue this case further in Part II. But first, we will try to make the Kantian case.

John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* provides an excellent example of what happens when morality and justice are based on abstractions. Rawls invites his readers to make a thought experiment, and have them think of themselves as being positioned in what he calls an 'original position'.³⁰ In the original position one has to decide what a just society looks like. One does not know, however, who one is, and where one will be positioned in society. One is situated behind a 'veil of ignorance'³¹ so that one does not know what one's talents are, whether one is rich or poor, disabled, old, and so forth. What is telling about this thought experiment is not so much the outcome itself, but rather the use of this veil of ignorance. Apparently, man is so weak that he would not be able to decide the right thing in the face of seduction, desire, and self-love. How inclusive, how realistic is the outcome if one is to ignore one's nature? If all this is only to make for the assumption that man is rational, would it not be much more convincing to have man face his weaknesses, and have him make the right decisions despite all?³²

³⁰ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 102-168.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-123.

³² In Western societies Islamic women are often criticized for wearing a veil. Even if the veil has become something of a symbol for some women, who take pride in wearing it for their own reasons, often it is believed that Islam requires women to wear a veil in order to avoid that men will get tempted or be seduced. If this is right, one could say that it is realistic to assume that men, like women, have their weaknesses. However, one could also maintain that women, by veiling themselves, deprive men from learning to resist temptations in the face of them, and from growing morally. Interestingly, while Westerners like to think that this is a problem of Islam, it is a problem of the West as well, but then on a much more fundamental level, as is illustrated by Rawls's theory that is taken to be paradigmatic for Western thinking since the 1970s. For the intellectual

Michael Walzer critiques Rawls's methodology of abstraction, and makes the case for a particularistic one instead.³³ As a communitarian he does not consider the individual as a whole, but the community he is part of. He argues that it would be absurd to expect of a person who conceives of himself in a 'thick', culture-laden way, to disregard his particularities and adopt a 'thin', rationalist conception when thinking of a just society. True as this may be, the communitarian only transposes the problem to another level (from the individual to the community). On the level of the community, again, one could argue that it would be not enough to regard this as a whole, because it would also constitute a part of a larger whole, that is of inter-communal or international life. Indeed, this is what Walzer would admit later, when exploring the 'thin' element that different cultures have in common while still defending the thickness of one's own history and culture.³⁴ Also Rawls would transpose his own theory to that level in his *The Law of Peoples*,³⁵ where he takes peoples as his building blocks. However, in doing so he has only added to the complexity of the issues that he meant to resolve.

By going from one level to the other one cannot escape the issues that must be resolved anyway. That is why we return to the micro level. There, one could object that Kant only sees the individual as a whole, and not the constituent parts, that is its nature. However, that would not be fair. It is true that Kant, by introducing the categorical imperative, writes off human nature in as far as anything more would be involved than reason. That is what we have discussed above. But at the same time, Kant's philosophy is based on some notion of progress, and this notion involves the idea that progress is guaranteed by nature. In his *Perpetual Peace*, Kant writes that eternal peace is guaranteed by nature (or Providence), because reason would present peace to us as a duty, and nature wills that we should do our duty. As Kant puts it in Latin:

[F]ata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt.³⁶

history of the symbolic use of the concept of a veil in general, see Pierre Hadot, *Le voile d'Isis: Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de Nature* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2004).

³³ Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

³⁴ Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

³⁵ Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

³⁶ Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf*, ed. Rudolf Malter (Stuttgart: Reclam, [1795] 1984), p. 30: "[Die Natur] tut es selbst, wir mögen wollen oder nicht." [Nature leads the willing, and drags the unwilling.]

Kant writes that nature works through the commercial spirit, and he posits that nature, thus conceived, cannot coexist with war. Therefore, nature would guarantee peace by the mechanism involved in the human inclinations themselves. That is to say, Kant attributes a central place to human nature.

Kant resolves the seeming contradiction mentioned above by positing that man is reasonable and moral by nature. Kant maintains that man's natural capacities are directed toward the use of his reason, which only develops completely in the species, not in the individual person, over time. Individual men, like nations, may pursue their purposes, but unknowingly they are advancing under the guidance of a purpose of Nature. For Kant, the highest purpose of Nature would be realized in the establishment of a universal *Cosmopolitical Institution*, as Kant agrees with Dante that only in such an institution the natural capacities of the human species could be fully unfolded and developed. Kant's ideal would be a world state, a Universal Republic, with individuals as its constituents, not states. As he realizes that states are unlikely to submit to that ideal, Kant proposes a federation of states as a negative substitute. Kant seems pretty realistic about man. He maintains that "out of such crooked material as man is made of, nothing can be hammered quite straight". In the end, however, he believes that practical moral Reason will triumph over evil, as in human nature there would always be a living respect for Right and Duty.

Two problems remain. First, if man is reasonable and moral by nature, there is no need to leave the state of nature and to conclude a social contract, as Kant prescribes. Kant embraces the concept of the social contract as well as that of the state of nature, and includes both elements in the domestic analogy he makes. Focusing on his analogy and thereby moving to the macro level, the classic argument against Kant is that his description of the actual condition of international relations and the prescription he provides for its improvement are inconsistent with one another.³⁷ How could one expect that an international social contract could ever have any meaning if it were to be concluded in an international state of anarchy, where nobody can trust anybody else? Is it not so that "covenants without the sword are but words"? Kant argues that the rules of the social contract derive their appeal from higher morality of a

³⁷ Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 48.

cosmopolitan society, dictated by the categorical imperative. Even if one were to accept that this higher morality reveals itself in the midst of anarchy, this would only mean that the state of international anarchy is not that bad after all. Thus, the Kantian demand of bringing this situation to an end loses much of its urgency. As Locke describes it for the domestic level: to crown the anarchical society with a government would be to only render it more efficient. Moreover, while this is still a formidable case to make, one of the main problems for Kantians will be that if one follows this line one will have to admit that private use of force is tolerated or even required in certain circumstances. In the Lockean world, war has a permanent and necessary place. This conflicts with the Kantian belief in the possibility and desirability of perpetual peace. So far, this is the classic argument against Kant.

Second, while looking inside within the realm of freedom and looking outside within the realm of necessity, Kant cannot relate inside and outside since he separates both realms. Within the realm of freedom, Kant does not even make a distinction between inside and outside, as he is only concerned with the whole. So as to be able to treat agency units as ends—as wholes in themselves,—Kant keeps the same perspective while changing his point of view, depending on what level the unit is acting on. For one thing, this enables Kant to make his domestic analogy, which is based on the notion that states, like individuals, should be treated as ends and owe respect to one another as wholes in themselves, thereby transcribing human dignity into state sovereignty. At the same time, it should be noted that Kant is always focused on the individual, whom he sees, much like Hierocles and other Stoics, as an agency unit surrounded by a series of concentric circles. While the first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then some more follow before arriving at the circle that takes in fellow-countrymen, going on and on until one reaches the largest one, being outside all these circles, which is humanity as a whole.³⁸ This means that the individual has many affections and affiliations, any single one of which can be evoked at any point in time, depending on what circle or level he identifies himself with at that very moment. To put it differently, the individual can associate with many wholes, but it is always the individual who stands in the centre of them.

³⁸ See Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in Martha Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), p. 9; and cf. Peter Singer, *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

Kant does make a distinction between different points of view (or circles), but he does not between inside and outside, which is the opposite of what we encountered when discussing Popper's theory. Kant recognizes that one can conceive of different wholes, but still he only sees wholes and no parts, because he is looking inward. The bone of contention between him and others who are looking inward is that they use different assumptions about which circle is most important. While, for instance, communitarians insist that the community is the most important whole to be considered, cosmopolitans propound that one should strive to reach the universal level, that is, the circle of the whole of humanity.³⁹ Kant's categorical imperative in a sense blurs all distinctions, as it is about getting the whole Universe inside, by internalising it. It is submitted here that it is pointless to even try to prove that any of these points of views is superior, as it all depends on the assumptions one uses. Why should one strive to reach individual autonomy through universal consciousness? Would it be impossible to attain freedom in different ways? What is freedom anyway? Why bother about freedom in the first place? Moreover, it is quite an assumption to say, like Rousseau does, that "man is born free; everywhere he is in chains".

When focusing on the whole, one should refrain from making absolute statements about the whole, as one's conception of it depends on the point of view one takes. The only thing that one can state with absolute certainty is that if one recognizes that there are different wholes, they must relate to one another in some way. The question is how these wholes relate to one another. Kant does not address this question, since he cannot. After all, to explain how concentric circles are related, it does not suffice to say that they all have the same centre and that all figures around it are *like* circles. It is also necessary to think in terms of wholes that are parts of larger wholes. Alexander Pope put that as follows:

God loves from Whole to Parts: but human soul
Must rise from Individual to the Whole.
Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;
The centre mov'd, a circle strait succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads,
Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace,

³⁹ Amartya Sen distinguishes between fundamental allegiance and exclusive allegiance, maintaining that a fundamental allegiance as a citizen of the world does not deny all sensitivity to other identities; see Sen, "Humanity and Citizenship," in Nussbaum (2002), p. 112.

His country next, and next all human race,
(...)⁴⁰

Whether going from part to whole or from whole to parts, one cannot escape using the notion of a part, and this does not fit Kant's scheme.

The metaphor of the concentric circles is useful as it illustrates an inconsistency—or system error—that Kant is struggling with. On the one hand, there is the categorical imperative, which does not allow one to think in terms of different wholes, but only in terms of one universal whole. On the other, there is Kant's theory of international relations, which proposes an amendment to his categorical approach, admitting that one cannot get to the Utopia of a Universal Republic at once, but only through different stages, if at all, the next one being a federation of states. This more realistic, evolutionary approach on the macro level is fully consonant with the way an individual's 'moral universe' can grow on the micro level. The wider the radius of the circle the individual associates with is—that is, the more the individual can internalise,—the more this individual is autonomous as a self-governing whole in the sense that he is not affected by factors he would consider as external. The more is inside, the less remains outside. In short, this amendment—which is also consonant with Kant's ideas on the progress of humankind—only makes sense by assuming some relation between inside and outside, and wholes and parts.

In defence of Kant one could argue that his cosmopolitanism is not to be understood in terms of concentric circles, but rather in terms of interlocking communities.⁴¹ However, the point is that the realist elements in Kant's *Perpetual Peace* and his idealist theory based on the categorical imperative do not interlock. In Kantian terms, the former belongs to the realm of necessity, and the latter to the realm of freedom; "and never the twain will meet", one should add if one were to follow Kant's scheme.

A better defence would be to improve Kant's theory so that it is internally consistent. One could only do that by separating vigorously the two realms of freedom and necessity, and by showing that the former is only about the whole. Reducing a theory thus to its basic tenets, makes it easier to appreciate what is distinctive about it. This is what Martin Wight

⁴⁰ From Alexander Pope's "An Essay on Man," cited in Sissela Bok, "From Part to Whole," in Nussbaum (2002), p. 43.

⁴¹ See Janna Thompson, *Justice and World Order: A Political Inquiry* (London/New York: Routledge, 1992).

did in the field of IR when developing his International Theory.⁴² In this seminal work of his, Wight distinguishes three perspectives, or Weberian 'ideal types', which he claims all other IR theories are variations and combinations of: the Machiavellian (or Hobbesian), Grotian, and Kantian perspectives. For Wight, these perspectives are like paradigms, or rather like primary colours that can be mixed. When describing these primary colours, Wight does not show how Machiavelli, Grotius, and Kant themselves have sometimes mixed different colours, because what matters most to him is that each of these authors uses his 'own' primary colour. Thus, if one were to posit that it is Kantian to only see the whole (*i.e.*, 'his' primary colour), some may argue that Kant in fact also faces the parts (*i.e.*, another primary colour), but what makes Kant's theory distinctively Kantian is still the categorical way in which he promotes the whole.

In IR, Charles Beitz has been most influential in promoting the Kantian ideal type, as described above. He follows Wight's distinction among three ideal types, but he labels them differently and does not treat them as perspectives, but rather as points of view. These are international scepticism (no morality), the morality of states, and the morality of persons.⁴³ Beitz is straightforward about his strategy. His is a project to prove that neither international scepticism (the Hobbesian perspective) nor the morality of states (the Grotian perspective) can stand, and to show that one cannot but resort to the Kantian perspective.⁴⁴ As the Hobbesian and Grotian perspectives will be discussed in the next section and chapter respectively, we will not scrutinize his refutations of these perspectives here. If, for a moment, we assume that Beitz is right, and allow him to set up his argument like he does, reframing the discussion in such a way that he can establish some sense of urgency to adopt the Kantian view, we are still left with two problems.

First, it is impossible to compare Beitz's theory, by its own terms, with the ones he meant to defeat. Beitz's objective is to establish that the principle of state autonomy cannot be interpreted correctly without bringing in considerations of social justice.⁴⁵ When defending his cosmopolitan conception of international morality, Beitz insists that this

⁴² Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992).

⁴³ Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*, revised edition, with a new afterword by the author (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. vii and 9.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

is not equivalent to, nor would it imply, a political program. In general, he indicates that it is important to distinguish moral structures from political ones, and he says that cosmopolitan normative theory has to be understood in the former sense.⁴⁶ In itself, this distinction enables one to appreciate the tension in Kant's work between his categorical imperative, which is moral, and his *Perpetual Peace*, where he goes in as much detail as to make clear that states should become republics and that a world federation should be our goal. However, if we accept Beitz's view we are left with a theory that, apparently, is no political theory but a moral theory. The problem is then that if he wants us to make a clear-cut distinction between the two, it gets difficult to compare.

Second, in his afterword to the 1999 edition of his *Political Theory and International Relations*, Beitz conflates his own terms by reformulating the distinction he made between the morality of states and the morality of persons. While juxtaposing what he now calls 'social liberalism' and 'cosmopolitan liberalism', he redefines the former as embodying "a two-level conception of international society in which there is a division of labor between the domestic and international levels: state-level societies have the primary responsibility for the well-being of their people while the international community serves to establish and maintain background conditions in which just domestic societies can develop and flourish."⁴⁷ It could be argued that by allowing a cosmopolitan element, if you will, through the inclusion of "background conditions", Beitz blurs his distinction between the two moralities or 'liberalisms', thereby decreasing the sense of urgency to embrace the Kantian creed. However, conversely, it could be maintained that Beitz strengthens his case by detailing how in fact one already embraces it when adhering to the morality of states. Whatever one may think of this, the fact remains that Beitz, in the final analysis, juxtaposes two positions—two points of view if you will: one of states, and one of persons—and he admits that he is unable to resolve the tension between the two.⁴⁸

Both problems buttress the point, made earlier, that the Kantian ideal type is about the whole. As it cannot see the parts, it is unable to accommodate international scepticism, which epitomizes the view that there is no whole but only parts. When comparing his conception of international morality and international scepticism, Beitz thinks he is

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 182-183.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 214-215.

⁴⁸ Cf. Beitz (1999), p. 216.

comparing two perspectives, but in fact he is comparing a point of view—of persons—(or two points of view if he is taking in the morality of states) and a perspective. While it makes sense to *combine* points of views and perspectives, it is pointless to *compare* them. Beitz reaches a deadlock, and concludes that the (Hobbesian) perspective must be wrong, not the comparison he makes. This is a reformulation of the first problem we noted. Writing off the Hobbesian perspective, Beitz is still left with two different points of view. And here the next problem arises. When distinguishing the morality of states and the morality of persons, Beitz thinks he is distinguishing two points of view, but while so doing he is taking the same perspective in both cases. Beitz tries to prove that the two moralities are different, but he has to conclude that in a sense they are the same. This is a reformulation of the second problem we noted. Thus, Beitz gives the perfect example of what happens if one accepts different points of view but only one perspective.

In essence, Kant's weakness is that he worships the whole, but that in the end he cannot reassemble the parts that he separates in the first place: the two realms of freedom (or *universalia*) and necessity (or *particularia*). The problems that Beitz faces are the problems that proponents of the Kantian ideal type have to struggle with anyhow: to be able to focus on the whole, one first has to admit that there are parts. To conclude, we may certainly say that the concept of a whole is here to stay, but there is no reason whatsoever to assert that it is here to prevail.

2.2 Outside

The only part that you can play is your part. That is how one could interpret George Kennan's most celebrated dictum: "[We should] have the modesty to admit that our own national interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and understanding."⁴⁹ Clearly, one can only say that one should focus on one's own interest if there are other interests as well. And that is our point of departure in this section, where we will be looking outward. Any agency unit can look outward. When doing so, the agency unit will definitely see itself as a whole, but only insofar as it realizes—*i.e.*, internalises—that it has to play some part in the world out there. To be an agency unit is to be part of what is external. The point in this section, though, is to prove that the concept of a part cannot prevail over the whole. To prove this point I will discuss some of the strongest positions in favour of the part, as espoused by Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes.

If in this section I say that I am not concerned with the world as it 'ought' to be, but rather with the world as it 'is', then I mean by that that I focus on what agency units—most notably, states—do in practice, and how this impacts on the way we think about how agency units ought to behave in order to survive.⁵⁰ In this sense, this section is also about 'ought', whereas Part II looks at what 'is' in terms of structure.

When looking outward, an agency unit will notice that there are many other agency units, all of which have their own interests. These interests conflict with each other, and it will only be possible to detect some unity in this chaos when looking inward in search of the whole. However, if one happens to believe that man, by nature, does not look inward but outward, then one is left with a world in which the parts reign supreme serving their own best interests. It is a world where nobody trusts anybody else—while trust is something internal,—and where everybody is concerned with his own survival. In such a world, Plautus already wrote, man is a wolf among men:

⁴⁹ George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 100.

⁵⁰ Cf. Sun-Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, trans. Roger Ames (New York: Ballantine, 1993), positing that the strategic pursuit of self-interest is the *moral* act of those who know the horrors of battle and seek to avoid them; and cf. Raymond Aron, who maintains that criticism of idealism "is not only pragmatic, it is also moral", in his *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, [1966] 2003), p. 307.

Homo homini lupus.⁵¹

Thucydides is among the first authors to describe the world that we see when looking outward. His account of the Peloponnesian War⁵² is often taken to be the seminal work of IR Theory of all time. For sure, it is the first work to introduce a comprehensive pragmatism into political discourse. Thucydides posits that human behaviour is guided by fear (*phobos*), self-interest (*kerdos*), and honour (*doxa*), which cause war and instability, and account for the human condition (*anthropinon*). When pure instinct (*physis*) triumphs over laws (*nomoi*), he argues, politics fails and is replaced by anarchy. Thucydides maintains that the solution to anarchy is not to deny fear, self-interest, and honour but to manage them for the sake of a moral outcome.

The so-called Melian Dialogue illustrates how power and self-interest motivate our calculations, while making clear that a completely amoral foreign policy is not in one's own best interest. Melos was a neutral island in the central Aegean, for which the Athenians had no strategic need. However, the Athenians had led the Greek city-states in their war against Persia, and regarded Melos as a prize. They landed a force on the island and told the Melians:

Both you and we knowing that in human disputation justice is only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get.⁵³

The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must. However, Thucydides suggests that the strong often become fearless, as they think that their greatness will last forever, which is what occurred to the Athenians. Thucydides teaches us that however powerful and affluent a state may be, it cannot deny the forces of human nature that lie beneath the veneer of civilization. As Robert Kaplan puts it: "Thucydides teaches us that civilization represses barbarism but can never eradicate it. Thus, the more socially and economically advanced the times, the more necessary it is for leaders to maintain a sense of their societies' fallibility and vulnerability: that is the ultimate defense against catastrophe."⁵⁴

⁵¹ Plautus, *Asinaria*, Act II.4.88.

⁵² Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Thomas Hobbes [1629] (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989).

⁵³ Ibid., p. 365 (V: 89).

⁵⁴ Robert Kaplan, *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), p. 50.

Thucydides holds that history repeats itself as man always has the same passions. By studying history one can learn how to recognize the recurring manifestations of human passions, and how to deal with them. As he puts it himself: "My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever."⁵⁵ And indeed, one has to admit that most themes in later realist writing—if not all—can be traced back to Thucydides. Although one should beware of shallow historical analogies between Athens and the United States, respectively the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War, it could be argued that decision-making in antiquity required a mastery of variables akin to those faced by an American president.⁵⁶ That is why it is instructive to ponder the question why Athens went to war, and, more precisely, what variables made it decide to do so. Dwelling on this, we may ask the following three questions: Had Athens no choice? Was it led by passion? And did it serve its self-interest?

First: Is it true that Athens had no choice but to go to war? This is what Pericles told Athenians in the early days of the war. Thucydides observes that war was inevitable, since "[t]he general belief was that whatever happened, war with the Peloponnese was bound to come."⁵⁷ Thus, the belief itself that war was inevitable would have played a role in causing it. But why then did Athenians believe that war was inevitable? Thucydides is very clear on what this belief was based on. It was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta. Athenians believed that Sparta would act from fear caused by the threat perceived in the growth of Athens. When formulated this way, it may seem that a perceived external threat made war inevitable. However, essentially, the growth of Athens itself made Athens decide to go to war. That is to say, internal factors—not external ones—caused war. This is even more so if we realize that, in fact, Athenian power was not growing at the time, and that Sparta did not fear Athens as much as it feared war (since it feared a slave riot when it would go to war).⁵⁸ Human decisions could have made a difference. Therefore, war was highly probable, not inevitable.

While not backing up his inevitability claim concerning the cause of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides yet demonstrates persuasively

⁵⁵ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, ed. M.K. Finley, trans. Rex Warner, (London: Penguin, 1972), p. 48.

⁵⁶ Kaplan (2003), p. 46.

⁵⁷ Thucydides (1972), p. 62.

⁵⁸ See Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaka: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 354.

how a state's foreign policy is influenced, if not dictated, by its domestic politics and regime. For Stanley Hoffmann this is a central point in Thucydides' analysis of the behaviour of states. Whereas realists would share this analysis, neorealists denounce as "reductionist" all that is concerned with what happens within states. Hoffmann, however, argues that, in his opinion, the real reductionists are neorealists, because they leave out of their study all that is important, and "reduce the realm of international politics to a limited and monotonous repertoire of balances of power"⁵⁹. While Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War is almost entirely about balances of power, he does not use this notion in terms of structure. Instead, he shows how it is related with domestic politics, and how eventually it is rooted in human nature.

Second: Were Athenians led by passion, and, more specifically, by fear or honour? Or were they led by reason? Joseph Nye argues that the Athenians may have acted rationally, and describes the security dilemma they were caught in.⁶⁰ In the absence of a higher government, he explains, building defences is a rational response to a perceived threat. For the other state it is also perfectly rational to build its strength against the first. Of course, both states could try to avoid the security dilemma by agreeing to cooperate. And yet states often do not do that. This can be explained by the Prisoners' Dilemma, which the security dilemma is a specific type of. The basic story of the Prisoners' Dilemma goes as follows:

[T]wo people are arrested. Each is held incommunicado in a police station after an armed robbery and murder have been committed. Each person is presented with a pair of unattractive options, and each is questioned separately and given a choice by the police official: "I'm pretty sure that you two were responsible for the killing, but I don't have quite enough evidence to prove it. If you will confess first and testify against the other prisoner, I will see that you are set free without any penalty, and your accomplice will be sentenced to life imprisonment. On the other hand, I am making the same proposal to your buddy, and if it's accepted, you will be the one to spend life in prison, and the other prisoner will go free. If you both confess on the same day, we will have a little mercy, but you will be badly off, because you will both be sentenced to 20 years in prison for armed robbery. If you both want to be stubborn, we cannot convict you for a major crime, but we can punish you for a small crime you

⁵⁹ Stanley Hoffmann, *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 57.

⁶⁰ See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, fourth edition (New York: Longman Classics, 2003), pp. 16-19. By the way, John Herz coined the term 'security dilemma' in "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (1950), pp. 157-180.

committed in the past—one that carries a one-year prison term. If you want to take a chance that your fellow prisoner will keep quiet, go ahead. But if not—and you know what sort of criminal your pal is—you will do very badly. Think it over.”⁶¹

The Prisoners’ Dilemma is thought to be the basic structural dilemma of independent rational action. Now, what is rational to do under the circumstances? One may say that it is rational to pursue the best outcome for oneself. In that case one has to cheat on the other, and hope that the other will not do the same. However, the irony is that if both prisoners seek their own best outcome, regardless of the outcome of the other, they both wind up with 20 years in prison. Alternatively, one may say that it is rational to pursue the best outcome for both prisoners together. In that case one has to keep silent, and hope that the other will do the same, so that both will end up with only one year in prison. However, this involves a high risk as the other may follow the former rationality and cheat on the one who keeps silent, causing him to get life imprisonment. Therefore, it seems rational not to remain silent but to cheat on the other, and see what happens. If both prisoners are rational they both cheat on each other.

The Athenians made flawed decisions as they were caught in the situation described by the Prisoners’ Dilemma. They feared that Sparta would break the truce, and therefore they did it themselves. This may seem irrational, but in terms of the Prisoners’ Dilemma it is not. Thus, one can be led by fear or honour, and still choose a course of action that could be considered rational. After all, if the Athenians were led by fear, it could be argued that they were afraid of being losers, which means that they had to cheat. If they were led by honour, it could be argued that they wanted to have a better outcome than the others, which also means that they had to cheat. In both cases they would do what is also rational to do under the circumstances. However, if they really chose their course of action on rational grounds, one cannot tell. As a matter of fact, one cannot tell anything in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. One has to speculate on the basis of perceptions one has of oneself and of the other. This turns the dilemma into what has been called a perception dilemma.⁶²

⁶¹ Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, fourth edition (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1992), p. 306.

⁶² S. Plous coined the term in “Perceptual Illusions and Military Realities: The Nuclear Arms Race,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29 (1985), pp. 363-388.

Third: Did the Athenians serve their self-interest? The answer to this question really depends on how one defines the term. If it means that one pursues the best possible outcome for oneself, regardless of the outcome of the other, then the Athenians did not. After all, in terms of the Prisoners' Dilemma, they did not manage to get free. If it means that one pursues the best possible outcome for oneself, while taking into account what the other is likely to do in his best interest, then it depends. It depends on whether the Athenians had the right perception of the Spartans, *viz.* whether the latter were indeed about to break the truce. What definition must be used in the Prisoners' Dilemma? It follows from the Prisoners' Dilemma that if one uses the former definition, both parties wind up with a bad outcome. Instead, to serve one's self-interest one has to take account of the bigger whole even if one's action is not to promote the best outcome for the whole.

What can we conclude from this? Does Thucydides' history show human nature caught in the situation of the Prisoners' Dilemma then and for all time? In that case, Thucydides' basic tenets must be qualified. First, human decisions can make a difference. Second, these decisions may be inspired by fear or honour but they can still be purely rational. Third, to be rational is to take account of the whole, not of one's own part only. However, is the Prisoners' Dilemma itself anything to go by? Does not it impose its own logic on the situation it addresses as a self-fulfilling prophecy? It sounds very rational, but is it also consistent and realistic?

The Prisoners' Dilemma makes a host of assumptions, only two of which are scrutinized here. First, it assumes that man is isolated. The Prisoners' Dilemma is set up in such a way that communication and cooperation are impossible. This is unrealistic, as in most cases both are possible, if not desirable. Second, it assumes that man is like a criminal. Trust would have no place in the human world. Strangely enough, though, we are led to believe that the criminals can trust the police. For the Prisoners' Dilemma to work it is necessary that the prisoners trust the police. Moreover, any two parties may build trust over time. If parties get to know each other through repeated Prisoners' Dilemma situations, then it may become rational not to cheat. As a matter of fact, Robert Axelrod has proved that in that case it is rational to play *tit-for-tat* by repeating what the other did before, while the best result obtains with parties not cheating on each other. Interestingly, Axelrod shows that most people play more competitively than would be best for their interest.⁶³

⁶³ See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

Nevertheless, the Prisoners' Dilemma captures the very essence of what one is led to believe when adhering to a worldview in which the parts reign supreme. What Rawls' original position is for the idealist, jail is for the realist in the Prisoners' Dilemma. Therefore, it is instructive to take this dilemma as it is, because it enables us to take issue with the core ideas underpinning the realist worldview. When doing so, we may draw three conclusions on a more fundamental level. First, the Prisoners' Dilemma shows that decisions are the product of both determinism and free will. Decision-makers have to face the facts of international life but they are free to do with these as they deem best for their own national interests. As we summarized in Chapter 1, realism is opposed to idealism in that the former embraces determinism, while the latter is based on free will. The Prisoners' Dilemma proves that the one cannot do without the other, as we already stipulated when concluding Chapter 1.

Second, when the Prisoners' Dilemma is used to explain international affairs one resorts to a principled version of the domestic analogy. What is deemed characteristic of persons is also held to be characteristic of states. To put it in terms of wholes and parts, the analogy is made fully applicable to the parts.

Third, the domestic analogy does not stop short of including in the domestic analogy some notion of the whole. This is very important to note, as later on in this Chapter we will see that realists only accept the domestic analogy up to a certain point. They believe that the state of nature can be usefully compared to how international affairs look like but they do not accept that the social contract, constituting the notion of a whole on the micro level, be reproduced on the macro level. However, the Prisoners' Dilemma reveals that, in fact, realists have already accepted it by modelling their world in such a way that there is police who dictate the rules of the game. Realists' most important claim against the domestic analogy has always been their insistence that there is no police on the international level as there is on the domestic level. The Prisoners' Dilemma shows this to be wrong. Therefore, this third conclusion is no less than ground-breaking: to use the concept of a part one has to buy into using the concept of a whole.

In the remainder of this Chapter we will show how realist writers have addressed the issues mentioned above. We will discuss Machiavelli and Hobbes in most detail. While the former takes up the issue of the relation between determinism and free will, the latter takes up the issue of the domestic analogy and its limits. Both founders of modern realism build on Thucydides' legacy, maintaining that history repeats itself in that

it shows recurring patterns. Advancement may be possible but atavistic instincts remain. Machiavelli comes to this conclusion by studying history, and Hobbes by studying human nature. Thus, they complement each other in a way while reaching the same conclusion. Moreover, they also use the same method; both Machiavelli and Hobbes use the inductive method, going from the particular to the general, which contrasts them with Kant, who uses the deductive method, going the other way round, as we saw in the first section of this Chapter. We will scrutinize both theories as they impact on the relation between parts and wholes as well as on the domestic analogy. Specifically, we will have to find if they lend support to the notion that parts are not only here to stay, but are also here to prevail. At the end of the Chapter we should be able to answer the question: Is reality, indeed, about parts only?

For Machiavelli, to start with, the domestic analogy is not much of an issue. He concentrates on the behaviour of princes, and does not think in terms of states as abstractions or units. On the contrary, for him what only matters is a ruler's ability to work with the material at hand. What is meant here is that a ruler has to face the human predicament: some things are within one's control, and other things are not. The question is: How does one use the former to handle the latter? This question is relevant for any human being, but Machiavelli uses it as his point of departure for answering the question for a ruler. In this specific context Machiavelli calls it the interplay between *virtù* and *fortuna*.⁶⁴ *Virtù* could be translated as 'ability' or 'technical virtuosity' but has several more meanings: 'virtue', 'valour', 'ingenuity', 'determination', 'energy' and 'prowess'. *Fortuna* could be translated as 'luck' or 'favour', and is taken to mean the fortuitous, the incalculable, the accident in human affairs. On a deeper level, *virtù* and *fortuna* are human freedom and fate; free will and determinism.

In *The Prince*, Machiavelli explains how *virtù* and *fortuna* are related. He knows that *fortuna* often seems stronger but he insists that a ruler can make a difference by displaying *virtù*. Machiavelli propounds that *fortuna* is the arbiter of only half our actions, while leaving us to direct the other half,⁶⁵ or perhaps a little less.⁶⁶ Thus, the more *virtù* there is in a country, the less *fortuna* has a chance. Machiavelli illustrates this with a metaphor:

⁶⁴ Machiavelli, *The Prince* [1532], chs. I, VI, and VII.

⁶⁵ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, eds. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. XXV, p. 85.

⁶⁶ Wight (2005), p. 22: Wight is citing here from another English translation.

I compare fortune to one of those dangerous rivers that, when they become enraged, flood the plains, destroy trees and buildings, move earth from one place and deposit it in another. Everyone flees before it, everyone gives way to its thrust, without being able to halt it in any way. But this does not mean that, when the river is not in flood, men are unable to take precautions, by means of dykes and dams, so that when it rises next time, it will either not overflow its banks or, if it does, its force will not be so uncontrolled or damaging.⁶⁷

Fortuna strikes where it knows that no dykes or dams have been built to restrain it. That is why a ruler must be relentless in his resolve and display *virtù*: he should always be prepared and be bold, while recognizing that the middle course is impracticable. But even then the ruler may still be unsuccessful.

Machiavelli maintains that a ruler is successful when his ways are suited to the times and circumstances.⁶⁸ This has two implications. First, it means that all depends on context. The context can warp any action or statement. In this sense, *fortuna* is the expression of irony, as irony is about the ways in which context can render a different meaning to what was intended. Machiavelli shows the ironies of politics,⁶⁹ which boil down to causal complexity. Discussing Machiavelli's sense of irony, Wight distinguishes six strands of it.⁷⁰ The first strand is mere accident. The second is multiple or cumulative causation of a single result. The third is the single causation of opposite results, or paradox. The fourth is self-frustration, or failure. The fifth is that the same policy, in different circumstances, produces different effects. And the sixth and last strand is that contrary policies, in different circumstances, produce the same effects. One may conclude that causal complexity is so great that only probabilities can be calculated. Still, one is involved and one can try to affect the outcome. This marks the difference between irony and tragedy. The latter implies that one already knows the outcome because the drama is finished, the former implies that one does not as the drama is still unfolding. For politics to be tragic it has to be history.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Machiavelli (1988), ch. XXV, p. 85.

⁶⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ch. XXV.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ See Wight (2005), pp. 19-21.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 17; cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd, 1952), in which Niebuhr falsifies the relation of irony and tragedy and proposes tragic irony, claiming that Machiavellians do not understand the nature of tragedy.

Second, it means that Machiavelli, for all the effort he makes in showing how *virtù* can make a difference, is fatalistic after all. This follows from his line of reasoning that is rather sceptic or even cynic, as some would say. It goes as follows. Machiavelli starts by maintaining, as we saw, that a ruler can only hope to be successful when he manages to relate his character to the character of the times. Next, however, he suggests that we can never hope to encounter anyone who would be able to change his character. He concludes that “since circumstances vary and men when acting lack flexibility, they are successful if their methods match the circumstances and unsuccessful if they do not”.⁷² That is to say, while the times are changing, one’s nature remains fixed. Thus, he turns the argument upside-down: political success simply depends on whether one has the good fortune to suit the spirit of the age.

What is Machiavelli saying here? Is he not contradicting himself? For one thing, his reasoning does involve two opposing powers that are contradicting one another, but the argument itself is consistent. From the outset, Machiavelli argues that *fortuna* is the arbiter of half our actions, leaving the other half to *virtù*, or a little less. His point is that if a ruler has no *virtù* at all, he will wholly depend on *fortuna*, which will annex also the other half, like a river that floods the plains. However, by displaying *virtù* he may maximize his control over “the other half”, so that he is at least on equal ground with *fortuna*. It is the difference between depending on good luck, and having the ability also to cope with bad luck. If a ruler is successful, Machiavelli would say this is so because of *fortuna*; if he is unsuccessful, it is because of lack of *virtù*.⁷³

Machiavelli was not a metaphysician but if one were to discuss his theory on a metaphysical level one could recognize in it the primacy of contradiction. The struggle for power between *virtù* and *fortuna* permeates the whole text. Wight argues that Machiavelli resembles in this respect Heraclitus,⁷⁴ who we already mentioned above when discussing Hegel. Heraclitus, it is recalled, sees in everything a battleground of opposing forces and fundamental impermanence. On this view there is only relative permanence when the balance of opposing forces is momentarily achieved. Machiavelli adopts this view and defines notions in the negative. He does not think, for instance, in terms of security but of degrees of insecurity; not peace but war; not good but evil.

⁷² Machiavelli (1988), ch. XXV, p. 87.

⁷³ Cf. Toynbee’s dictum: “One of the perennial infirmities of human beings is to ascribe their own failure to forces that are entirely beyond their control.”

⁷⁴ See Wight (2005), pp. 10-14.

Furthermore, Machiavelli establishes a balance of power between his opposites in terms of validity while tipping the balance towards the one that is most effective. This is, for instance, how he turns Cicero on his head, who used to tip the balance towards the other side, *i.e.* of what is appropriate. In *De Officiis*, Cicero observed that one can gain one's ends either by argument or by physical force, the former being proper to men and the latter to beasts.⁷⁵ He would add that beastly methods encompass fraud and force, the use of which reduces man to the level of the fox and the lion respectively.⁷⁶ Machiavelli takes up the distinction between laws and arms, but sets a trap by saying that "because the former is often ineffective, one must have recourse to the latter".⁷⁷ According to him the ruler has two natures: he should behave like a man if possible, and like a beast if necessary. This leads to his celebrated advice that a ruler, who wants to know how he should act like a beast, will do best if he learns to "imitate both the fox and the lion".⁷⁸

What about morality then? For Machiavelli politics is not the domain of morality but of expediency and effectiveness. The ruler should be only concerned with the question how he obtains power and keeps it. He should have two main worries: "one is internal, and concerns his subjects; the other is external, and concerns foreign powers".⁷⁹ With respect to both, "[a] wise ruler should rely on what is under his own control, not on what is under the control of others".⁸⁰ Interestingly, with respect to the external threat or worry, Machiavelli observes that "the best fortress a ruler can have is not to be hated by the people".⁸¹ Does this mean that a ruler has to be good? For one thing, Machiavelli believes that a ruler should be feared rather than loved, as he holds men in general to be "ungrateful, fickle, feigners and dissemblers, avoiders of danger, eager for gain", and "excessively self-interested" and bad.⁸² Otherwise, it is not really important whether a ruler has good qualities, as long as he seems to. What matters is not what he really is but what he appears to be. "For everyone is capable of seeing you, but few can touch you."⁸³

⁷⁵ Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 11, 34.

⁷⁶ Ibid., I, 13, 41.

⁷⁷ Machiavelli (1988), ch. XVIII, p. 61.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., ch. XIX, p. 64.

⁸⁰ Ibid., ch. XVII, p. 61; and also ch. XXIV, p. 84: "Only those defences that are under your control and based on your own ability are effective, certain and lasting."

⁸¹ Ibid., ch. XX, p. 75.

⁸² Ibid., ch. XVII, p. 59.

⁸³ Ibid., ch. XVIII, pp. 62-63.

To conclude, it follows from this account of *The Prince* that Machiavelli regards human freedom and fate as inseparable. *Virtù* and *fortuna* are two sides of the same coin really. On a profounder level, this means that Machiavelli considers wholes and parts as inseparable. On the one hand he maintains that, indeed, the only part that we can play is our own part. On the other hand, he recognizes that how well we play our part depends on the larger whole, which renders context and meaning to our actions. Even if we do not know the larger whole, Machiavelli maintains that we do know that it exists and he calls it *fortuna*. As Machiavelli's point of view is that of the state, we should say then that in relation to *fortuna* the state itself can be conceived as a part, while the ruler's *virtù* represents his ability to be in control of the state as a whole. Thus, from the point of view of the state, *fortuna* is about being part, and *virtù* about being whole. The inconsistency in Machiavelli is that, in principle, he is even-handed in his approach, but in his theory he always favours one side. That is why it may seem that he is talking parts, while in principle he must be also implying wholes.

In defence of Machiavelli one could try to improve his theory so that it is internally consistent. There are two ways of doing that. One is to change the theory, the other is to change the principle. As we will do the former in Chapter 3, in which we will combine the conclusions from this section and the previous one, we will now try the latter so as to construe the Machiavellian ideal-type, as Wight may have called it. By this we mean a theory that can prove that the parts reign supreme, and for this we need a theory with only one perspective: external. While Machiavelli favours this perspective (by recognizing the power of *fortuna*), he makes a distinction between inside and outside, which implies another perspective as well. To amend for this, one could do the following. As Machiavelli makes a distinction between inside and outside but not between different points of view, one could argue that what Machiavelli says holds true for the level of the state but not for the level of international society. In that case, one has to establish that *virtù*, or any other notion expressing the whole, may exist on the micro level (the state) but not on the macro level (international society). That is, one has to show that the domestic analogy stops short of including the social contract. Hobbes makes this case, so it is to him that we now turn.

Hobbes does not make an analogy from the micro to the macro level but the other way around.⁸⁴ He uses the relations among sovereign

⁸⁴ Hobbes, *Leviathan* [1651], ch. XIII.

princes as an explanation and justification for a government among individual men. Conversely, however, Hobbes does not say that because individual men need to stand in awe of a common power in order to live in peace, this must also be true on the international level. That is to say, Hobbes thinks that whereas government is a necessary condition of social life on the domestic level, this should not and cannot take place on the international level. According to Hobbes sovereignty inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system; no “government over governments”. States would not be limited by legal or moral rules. This marks the limits of the analogy on Hobbes’ view, as well as the difference with Kant, who does believe that the international anarchy should and can be brought to an end. Hobbes only makes an analogy between the state of nature and international anarchy.⁸⁵ If, indeed, the analogy can thus be limited, stopping short of including some notion of the whole, the parts can be said to reign supreme.

Does Hobbes’ limited version of the analogy make sense? As to answer this question we have to scrutinize the principal characteristics on which the analogy is based. First of all, the analogy has to be valid, which means that each of the characteristics of the state of nature must be applicable also to the international level. We should be able to inverse Hobbes’ analogy, and see if it makes for a valid *domestic* analogy.

There are three elements in Hobbes’ account of the state of nature.⁸⁶ First, he claims that there can be no industry, trade, and other refinements of living in it because men are completely absorbed by providing security against one another. As to this element, there are two objections to making the analogous case for the international level. The first objection is that states do not invest resources in war to the extent that their economies are ruined. Quite on the contrary, they invest in war to the extent that they can safeguard that their economies can flourish, by establishing the very conditions under which economic improvement may take place. The second objection is that the responsibility of states for their own security is not incompatible with economic interdependence. As a matter of fact, states are economically interdependent, but their relative economic self-sufficiency, if compared to individuals, might also explain why states are able to tolerate a looser form of social organization than is called for on the domestic level.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ See Bull (1966a).

Second, Hobbes posits that there are no legal or moral rules, or notions of right and wrong in the state of nature. Realists maintain that this holds true on the international level as well, and suggest that in international politics God helps those who help themselves. They believe that there are three general powers of behaviour—fear, self-help, and power maximization—that create powerful incentives for great powers. Even if we were to assume that this is true, this has no explanatory power for states that are not great powers, let's say states without nuclear capability.⁸⁷ These states have an interest in upholding international standards. They—as well as the great powers—are members of United Nations and other international institutions, whose effectiveness may be questioned, but whose standards stand up as points of reference even if these standards are violated. Ironically, the very violations of these standards and the reactions they provoke from everywhere around the world reaffirm more than anything else that, apparently, there are at least some moral—if not legal—rules out there.

Even an 'offensive realist' like John Mearsheimer cannot deny that people hold values, and that states—whatever their true intentions may be—at least have to present their policies and actions in a way that resonates with the values that people hold dear.⁸⁸ In one of his earlier books, Samuel Huntington has demonstrated how this works in the United States. He describes how the US Government has to be realistic in its external affairs, whereas the American people like to think of themselves as being liberal.⁸⁹ Therefore, the realist story must be presented in liberal terms, preferably mentioning 'freedom' in every second sentence. If, in general, this means that governments get in trouble when they cannot uphold the (liberal) dream any longer, because of something they did that no spin-doctor can help to explain, that creates a reality that realists cannot dismiss. It has to be factored into the realists' considerations, and, thus, the policies and actions will be contingent on moral concerns of others, which are still *moral* concerns.

⁸⁷ Whereas Hobbes believes in equal vulnerability of persons, it could be argued that the analogy does not work here because states without nuclear arms are more vulnerable than, let's say, the United States. This argument could be countered, though, by pointing at the fact that all states are equally exposed to the kind of disasters wars with such arms, but also terrorism, can unleash. The attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, of September 11, 2001, is here a tragic case in point.

⁸⁸ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 22-27.

⁸⁹ Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disbarmony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

This has also implications for Machiavelli's theory. When Machiavelli says that the ruler must appear to be virtuous, there must be a need to give that impression, even if in fact he does not have to be virtuous. When Machiavelli and his ruler recognize this need, they recognize the existence and importance of virtues. Hypocrisy, then, is the tribute that vice pays to virtue.⁹⁰

Third, Hobbes is of course best known for his assertion that in the state of nature people are in a state of war with each other, which he expresses in his dictum:

Bellum omnium contra omnes.⁹¹

The war of all against all is not to be understood to consist in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto. That is a very welcome refinement of the famous phrase, but still it is not really convincing. On the international level, one could argue that there are three categories that escape this description of the war of all against all. First, there are states with common purposes, which are allies. Second, there are states with different purposes that nevertheless do not cross, which are indifferent toward one another. And third, there are states with conflicting purposes but that share a sense of community, so that war is not considered to be an option in any conflict that may arise any time soon (like, for instance, all English speaking countries).⁹² Hobbes could have countered this by saying that what counts, is not any state of affairs at any moment in time, but what is possible over time. Thus, it could be argued that over time every state has been disposed to war with every other one.

In rebuttal, instead of denying the ubiquity of war, it could be argued that war does not indicate the absence of international society, or its breakdown, but can occur as a part of its functioning.⁹³ Here, the idea is that individual members can use war as a means to enforce the law of the international society. Looked at it that way, war is far from detrimental to the working of international society, and is, instead, positively favourable to it. After all, if the existence of the international society depends upon the willingness of particular law-abiding states to undertake war against particular law-breaking ones, then the international

⁹⁰ Cf. Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

⁹¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. XIII.

⁹² Bull (1966a), p. 43.

⁹³ Ibid.

society is best served if every state is willing to enforce the law by taking up arms against any state that breaks the law.⁹⁴ On this account, our case would only become stronger if Hobbesians were to prove that there is no ground on which the three objections, mentioned above, could be made. After all, each of these objections mentioned some reason for not waging war—and, potentially, for not willing to enforce international law—in the particular case where its counterpart would be breaking it.

Having scrutinized the principal characteristics on which Hobbes' state of nature analogy is based, we may conclude that it does not lend support to the view that there is complete anarchy on the international level. True, there is no international government, but while states are politically sovereign they are economically interdependent. True, sometimes they may violate international standards, but it is only possible to violate them because they have been set by the international society in the first place. And true, they may be disposed to go to war, but most often this means that they are able and willing to enforce the standards or rules we were referring to. All this seems to suggest that Hobbes' position is not tenable. After all, if we are to look at the international level to be able to imagine what the state of nature must have looked like, as Hobbes prescribes, then we have to conclude that it is not just about war among the parts but also about certain conceptions of the whole that are figuring into his account. Ironically, it might be argued, then, that on Hobbes' own account Locke's description of the state of nature is more adequate than his, at least for the world that we live in today.

However, there is one last defence for Hobbes. He could disagree with the kind of conception of the whole that we are referring to when saying that there is no complete anarchy on the international level. This boils down to the definition of anarchy we use. If anarchy is defined as the absence of government, in purely political terms, as Hobbes and many others would maintain, one could argue as follows. The only thing that has been established above is that we live in a world that is characterized by economic interdependence and by some degree of consent in moral affairs. That is to say, the concept of a whole only figures into the notions we use in the domains of the material and the immaterial, say economics and culture. In the domain of politics, we have argued that war could be seen as part of the functioning of international society, but that is not tantamount to saying that there is an international government that can be conceived of as Leviathan, as Hobbes describes

⁹⁴ Ibid.

for the level of the state. Hobbes may concede that the analogy works for the economic and cultural domains, whereas it does not for the political domain. In that case, however, he has to show how he thinks he can separate these domains, which he does not. While it should be admitted that it may be useful to distinguish among these three domains, which we will do in Part II, it is submitted that one cannot separate them. This leads to the intermediate conclusion that the domestic analogy cannot be limited; it either works or it does not. Thus, we are left with the ultimate question: Is there, in fact, on the international level a Leviathan, or not?

To answer the question if there is an international Leviathan, we should first know who Leviathan is. Leviathan is the sovereign who emerges from the social contract among the people, because they figure that even an absolutist despot will make for a better situation than if they were to remain living in anarchy.⁹⁵ The Hobbesian paradox is that the social contract may throw up a tyrant who is worse than the state of nature. That is, Leviathan may be intolerable or just ineffective. Whereas Hobbes could not admit the former in theory, he did recognize the latter. In this regard, he writes: "The Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them".⁹⁶ Hobbes admits that "when (...) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty, then is the Commonwealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him".⁹⁷

After this description of Leviathan and the obligation of his subjects to obey him, it must be possible to go to the international level. On that level, Wight has demonstrated that, as a matter of fact, United Nations matches the description completely.⁹⁸ Wight establishes that the Security Council is the Hobbesian sovereign, or Leviathan, of the United Nations. Citing the Charter, he shows the striking similarity with Hobbes' social contract. He admits that this Leviathan has been ineffective—"it has been a schizophrenic paralytic",⁹⁹—but the resulting situation also wholly matches the description. In fact, those who framed the Charter of the United Nations were also perfectly aware that the organization could render itself ineffective when Leviathan—*i.e.*, the Great Powers of the

⁹⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. VII.

⁹⁶ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck, revised student edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. XXI, p. 153.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. XXIX, p. 230.

⁹⁸ Wight (1992), pp. 33-36.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Security Council,—would be irresolute. Taking up Hobbes' description of this sad scenario almost literally, they concluded that "[i]f such a situation arises the United Nations will have failed in its purpose and all members will have to act as seems best in the circumstances".¹⁰⁰

Hobbes' war of all against all, it was noted, is not to be understood to consist in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto. To use his own terms, one might say that Leviathan's effectiveness does not consist in his being effective, but in the known disposition to be effective. This may remind one of Walzer's version of the domestic analogy (where international society was based on rights that have to be upheld at least sometimes), which we discussed in the Introduction before we started off our inquiry into how the domestic analogy should be amended to make sense. While it may remain a matter of contention if United Nations can be held to be even in a disposition to be effective, we have argued that if we decide it is not, the conclusion must be that Hobbes' state of nature analogy cannot stand. Thus, either we adapt it as to include the concept of a whole on the international level as well, or we abandon it altogether. In either case, the conclusion is that, indeed, the concept of a part is here to stay, but it is not here to prevail.

¹⁰⁰ *Commentary on the League of Nations Covenant*, para. 88, as cited in Wight (1992), p. 35.

Chapter 3: The Grotian Quest

3.1 Analogy and Paradox

The Introduction to Part I concluded with three distinctions that can be usefully made when systemizing thought on IR: (i) micro – macro; (ii) inside – outside; and (iii) inside-out – outside-in. The first distinction is about points of view; the second is about perspectives; and the third is about interpretation. In Chapter 2, the first distinction was implied as we took the points of view of the authors we discussed, these being either the individual, or international society, but mostly the state. What was key to Chapter 2 was that whatever point of view one takes, one can take two perspectives: one can look inward and outward. That is, in Chapter 2 we focused on the second distinction. More specifically, we established what happens when one uses either of the two perspectives separately. If one takes the Kantian perspective (as an ideal type in the Weberian sense) one only looks inward; if one takes the Hobbesian perspective (again as an ideal type) one only looks outward. In the former case one sees wholes; in the latter one sees parts. We argued that in either case one reaches a deadlock: one cannot favour the part to the exclusion of the whole, nor the other way round. Chapter 1 made the axiomatic case why this is so of necessity, whereas Chapter 2 developed the argument in time and space, in terms of both Political Theory and IR Theory.

Chapter 3 points the way out of the deadlock we reached in Chapter 2, by offering a third perspective, based on the writings of Hugo Grotius. This perspective is not so much a new perspective in and of itself, but it constitutes something new by combining the other two perspectives. Instead of taking either the Kantian or the Hobbesian perspective, the Grotian perspective grasps how the two are related. The Grotian perspective offers a view of agency units as being both wholes consisting of parts, and parts of bigger wholes at the same time. This perspective is to be understood as a reformulation of the Golden Rule in time and space, in terms of IR Theory. The first paragraph will establish what the proposed perspective is, and how it can explain the divergent and even contradicting readings that one may have of Grotius' *oeuvre*, while the second paragraph will try to make sense of the Grotian perspective thus conceived.

This paragraph, then, sets out what the Grotian perspective is. It distinguishes it from the other two perspectives, and it establishes how the three are related to each other. It is noted that Martin Wight already

made the distinction among what he called the Kantian, Machiavellian, and Grotian 'traditions'.¹ As Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts put it, "[Wight] used the opposition between these three traditions to generate insights into what he regarded as some of the principal unities or conflicts of ideas in the history of thought about international relations." However, they conclude that "[a]lthough refined somewhat by Hedley Bull, the analytical potential of such an approach has not yet been fully explored."² This is exactly the task that this paragraph sets itself to. It explores the threefold approach, and it does so on an analytical level by making use of the distinctions mentioned above, concerning point of view, perspective, and interpretation. It will be argued that this account is more exact and accurate than the one that was offered by Wight. So, what is new is not the threefold approach itself, but the account of how the Kantian, Hobbesian (or Machiavellian), and Grotian perspectives should be distinguished and related.

In analytical terms the difference among the Kantian, Hobbesian, and Grotian perspectives is simple: whereas the Kantian perspective is about looking inward, and the Hobbesian perspective is about looking outward, the Grotian perspective is about looking both inward and outward. The Grotian perspective offers a view of agency units as being both wholes consisting of parts, and parts of bigger wholes at the same time. Thus, the state both consists of individuals and is itself part of international society, while individuals are parts of both the state and international society. To understand all the implications of the previous sentence is to understand all there is to say about IR Theory really. However, before scrutinizing the most important implications of the Grotian perspective, we will first elaborate a bit more on the analytical dimension. After all, so far we have only looked at one variable (perspectives). We should proceed by looking at what combinations one could make between this variable and another one (points of view), while leaving the third one (interpretations) for paragraph 3.2.

Combining points of view and perspectives, we encountered two situations so far. The first one is that there are two perspectives and only one point of view. This situation we encountered when discussing Popper, who makes a distinction between the open and the closed society

¹ See Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (London: Leicester University Press, 1996).

² Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (eds.), *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 55.

while only taking the point of view of the state. The other situation is that there is only one perspective and that there are two points of view. An example of this situation is the one we encountered when discussing Beitz, who in the end had to admit that the state and the individual are in a way the same, as wholes. The first situation is about paradox (seeing both parts and wholes), the second about analogy. While both examples are drawn from the account of the internal perspective we gave in Chapter 2, we could equally well establish that we were also bound to encounter analogy and paradox when taking the external perspective. After all, if the Prisoners' Dilemma is anything to go by, it proofs that a worldview that only sees parts is based on a domestic analogy (with prisoners), and some conception of the whole (the police). Moreover, in the situation of the Prisoners' Dilemma we saw that free will and determinism both play a role. When discussing the related concepts of *virtù* and *fortuna*, we even saw that Machiavelli believes that there should be a balance between the two.

If we now posit that it is distinctively Grotian to recognize that IR Theory is based on analogy and paradox, then are we not all Grotians? By implication, one could argue we are. But by admission, Kantians and Hobbesians are certainly not. Even if they were to admit that their respective views of human nature are based on paradoxes they are struggling with—Kantians with the Rousseauite paradox that man is born free, everywhere he is in chains; Hobbesians with the paradox that the social contract could throw up a tyrant worse than the state of nature—they would see these paradoxes rather as a nuisance than as the hallmark of a philosophy of life that is worthy of consideration. Kantians and Hobbesians are keen in 'solving' these paradoxes, and they follow different strategies to do so. One way of 'solving' a paradox is to abandon analogy, which is what Popper does when he says that he likes the concept of a whole on the level of the individual but not on that of the state. Another way is to downplay the other perspective (Machiavelli), to abandon it (Hobbes), or to create a separate domain for it and isolate it (Kant). What these strategies have in common is that they serve to abandon paradox at the expense of being one-sided.

Whereas Kantians and Hobbesians do not like paradox, Grotians face it and try to make sense of it. Grotians hold that the analogy between agency units on different levels is based on the fact that they are both parts and wholes. That is, the very basis of the analogy is a paradox. At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between two kinds of paradox, so as to make clear which has to be faced from the Grotian perspective.

There is one paradox that exists by the very constitution of a unit. After all, every unit is already a paradox in itself, being both a whole and a part. Then, there is another paradox that exists between the proposition that agency units on different levels are the same, being wholes and parts at the same time, and the fact that they are not the same in their mutual relation when the one is a part and the other a whole. By going from one point of view to the other the perspective has to change from inside to outside or *vice versa*. Thus, in the relational sphere between two levels (for instance, between states and international society) anything can be approached from opposite directions, which makes everything paradoxical. The former kind of paradox is about the structure of individual units (paradox plain), the latter is about agency units in their mutual relations (analogy and paradox). The former will be discussed in Part II, the latter in the remainder of this Part.

The Grotian perspective is based on the paradox that the Kantian and Hobbesian perspectives pose, so nicely exemplified by the notion of the ‘anarchical society’.³ It is a synthesis of opposing views. It is a paradigm that allows for counterbalancing and interweaving of opposite principles. To mention but a few, Grotius seeks to combine natural law and state practice, natural law and the law of nations, morality and law, theory and practice, general interest and self-interest, free will and determinism, integration and disintegration, unity and diversity. The question Grotius seeks to answer in all of these cases is how to combine the two. This enigma of the middle way, as it has been called,⁴ is about finding the golden mean by making use of a doctrine of *temperamenta* or moderation. This doctrine, for sure, belongs to the core of Grotian values, as much as—in random order—the sociable nature of man, the subjection of international relations to law, the search for consensus and compromise, the recognition of state sovereignty, the endorsement of the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, and the universality of international society. Nonetheless, by defining itself as the *via media* between the two extremes of the Kantian and Hobbesian perspectives, the Grotian perspective is partly defined by those very extremes. As these extremes change over time, so does the Grotian middle.⁵

³ Hedley Bull coined this term in *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, third edition (New York: Columbia University Press, [1977] 2002).

⁴ Dutch former Minister of Defence Dr. Willem van Eekelen once remarked that “Grotius has survived because he was an enigma,” as cited in Karma Nabulsi, *Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 138.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-1.

Reading Grotius, one can see either one paradigm or conflicting principles and perspectives; either the whole or its parts. This may explain why so many authors have read so many different things in Grotius' work.⁶ However, to be truthful to the Grotian approach, as we posited, one has to see both the whole and its parts. This is about understanding the nature of paradox really: at one level, one may see a contradiction; at another level, one only sees a seeming contradiction, that is, a paradox. As long as one can only see the conflicting parts, one does not get the Grotian system as a whole. In that case, one has to try harder, and look better. Conversely, as long as one can only see the system as a whole, in the abstract, one still does not know how to make sense of it here and now. In that case, one only sees the Universal Rule, whereas one has to try to establish the Grotian golden mean in time and space. Having made the case for the Universal Rule already in Chapter 1, we only need to take up the latter task here. In doing so, we will focus on three dimensions: we will look at Grotius as a man; at his theory, and the solution it provided at the time; and, in paragraph 3.2, at how the theory could provide solutions for problems or questions of our own time.

First, we look at how Grotius as a man lived his theory. Whereas textual criticism may be the appropriate method of analysis when dealing with authors who are intellectuals first and foremost, one would miss an important dimension in the appreciation of Grotius' work if one were to leave out his personality as a servant of the powerful. Grotius continually aspired public office, and his main works—*Mare Liberum* (1609) and *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres* (1625)—owe much to these aspirations and his experience with public affairs.⁷ Therefore, it has been argued that to understand his systemic theory one should not separate his *persona* and

⁶ The ambivalence or ambiguity that features in Grotius' work makes it even more so that it is interpretable in various ways. See, e.g., Bull et al. (1990); Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 51-73; Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law," *British Year Book of International Law* 23 (1946), pp. 1-53; Cornelis van Vollenhoven, *The Three Stages in the Evolution of the Law of Nations* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1919); Peter Kooijmans, "How to Handle the Grotian Heritage: Grotius and Van Vollenhoven," *Netherlands International Law Review* 30 (1983), pp. 81-92; and J. C. Willems, "How to Handle Grotian Ambivalence? A Guidance towards some Recent Guides," *Grotiana* 6 (1985), p. 106.

⁷ See C.G. Roelofsen, "Grotius and the International Politics of the Seventeenth Century," in Bull et al. (1990), p. 97; and Nabulsi (1999), p. 139.

fama—his personality and the body of his work—but combine them.⁸ When doing so, there are three episodes that are of particular interest here. One episode is the time that Grotius worked as a publicist in defence of the United East India Company (VOC). During this period he wrote what he himself referred to as *De Indis*, which was to appear as *De Jure Praedae Commentarius* only in 1864. The twelfth chapter of it, defending the natural freedoms of trade and navigation, was published anonymously as *Mare Liberum* in 1609. This text is ambiguous, as it had to suit two purposes. On the one hand, it served to challenge the Spanish/Portuguese monopolies of trade outside Europe, and could be read as a crusade for free trade and competition. On the other hand, it served to advance the interests of the Dutch VOC that had been established as a monopolistic chartered company concluding monopoly treaties, or ‘contracts’, with Indonesian chiefs and rulers.

Another episode is the one from 1613 to 1618 when Grotius was the right hand of the powerful Advocate of Holland, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, who offered him the position of Pensionary (or Mayor) of Rotterdam, one of the major town corporations of the Union. During this period, Grotius got enmeshed in what was first a theological dispute between Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants, but which grew into a political dispute, where the former were in favour of power at the level of the states of the Dutch Republic, whereas the latter wanted to centralize power at the level of the Union. Prince Maurice, heir to William of Orange, made use of his constitutional position as Stadtholder, and from 1617 onwards openly led the latter that crystallized into the ‘Orangeist’ party, opposing the former that was led by Oldenbarnevelt. Grotius had been one of the strongest advocates and main spokesman on Oldenbarnevelt’s side. Therefore, it is not surprising that when Prince Maurice managed to decide the outcome of the conflict in his favour not only Oldenbarnevelt was arrested and tried for treason but also Grotius (along with Hogerbeets, the Pensionary of Leiden). While Oldenbarnevelt was executed, Grotius got life imprisonment at Loevestein Castle, from where he famously escaped in a chest of books after two years, in 1621, thanks to his wife’s ingenuity.

⁸ See Georg Schwarzenberger, “The Grotius Factor in International Law and Relations: A Functional Approach,” in Bull et al. (1990), p. 302, who calls the compound of *persona* and *fama* the ‘Grotius factor’ (to be compared with the triple distinction we made above).

The last episode we mention is the one from 1621 to 1631, when Grotius was in exile in Paris. After Maurice had died, Grotius had high expectations of his successor-designate, Frederick Henry, with whom he had a confidential correspondence. At that time, he was writing *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* cherishing hopes of a future in Dutch politics. Although it would be unfair to suggest that his new book was simply a bid for employment, there is nothing in it that can be said to conflict with such aspiration. There is nothing revolutionary about it, as it wholly conforms to state practice.⁹ It is not surprising, then, that Grotius becomes highly respected as a figure of European establishment. Wight observes in this regard: “The cynic might say it is because he showed how governments can have their moral cake and eat it, but the contrary argument,” Wight adds, “is equally true: he reminds governments, while eating their cakes according to state-practice and the law of nations, that there are moral principles, permanently valid, which they should acknowledge, and this, too, Western governments like to remember.”¹⁰

It should be noted that the Grotius we know, as we described him in the last episode, is the Grotius who speaks to us through the second edition of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, which was published in 1631. Although all modern editions have used either the 1642 or 1646 edition, both of these largely reproduced this second edition. With regard to this edition, it is important to know that Grotius produced it in a period when he lived incognito in the United Provinces, trying really hard to prepare his official return. Richard Tuck has demonstrated that the alterations Grotius made after the first edition of 1625 clearly served the purpose of making his views appear more acceptable to the Aristotelian, Calvinist culture of his opponents within the United Provinces.¹¹ More specifically, he based his theory on a view that was closer to traditional notions of both human sociability and divine law,¹² as we will see when discussing Grotius’ theory shortly. At this point, it suffices to note that while the view was different, the theory remained the same.

Concluding the first dimension, concerning Grotius’ *persona*, we could say that Grotius changed perspectives, and also took different points of view according to the job he was up to. However, it would be

⁹ Cf. Roelofsen (1990), p. 123.

¹⁰ Martin Wight, *Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 52.

¹¹ See Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 99.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

equally true to say that he remained faithful to the same theory, which he defended from any position where fate brought him. During the first episode, Grotius took the point of view of the VOC, while adopting an international perspective. During the second episode, he took the point of view of the most powerful state within the Dutch Republic or Union, while adopting a national perspective. And during the third episode, he made an analogy between the points of view of the individual and the state, while also allowing for two perspectives and, thus, creating paradox. Now, is it a sign of weakness that Grotius adapted his theory to the situation he found, or, more generally, to the order he lived in? To this question, Bull replies that “[i]t is not a weakness but a strength of Grotius’ contribution to international law that he was no mere visionary but sought to found his views on the actual interests and policies of states”.¹³ This appreciation of the facts stands in stark contrast with Grotius’ own last words, the ultimate paradox on his death bed: “By undertaking many things I have accomplished little”. So, then, what was his contribution really?

Second, we look at Grotius’ theory, which his *fama* is based on. Again, we can do this by looking at both the parts and the whole, but now in connection with his works and its editions, stripped from any considerations concerning the interests and policies of states. If we first look at the parts, it may be interesting to see what the main difference was between the view that Grotius espouses in, respectively, the first and the second edition of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*.

As we already noted, the main difference concerns the notions he uses of human sociability and divine law. To begin with the former, the notion of human sociability he uses in the first edition is more minimal than the one he uses in the second edition. The two texts may speak for themselves. In the first edition, Grotius writes:

Among the things which are unique to man is the desire for society [*appetitus societatis*], that is for community with those who belong to his species—though not a community of any kind, but one at peace, and with a rational order [*pro sui intellectus modo ordinatae*]. Therefore, when it is said that nature drives each animal to seek its own interests, we can say that this is true of the other animals, and of man before he comes to the use of that which is special to men [*antequam ad usum eius, quod homini proprium est, pervenerit*].¹⁴

¹³ Asser Instituut (ed.), *International Law and the Grotian Heritage* (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1985), p. 137.

¹⁴ Richard Tuck’s own translation in Tuck (1999), p. 97.

And in the second edition, Grotius writes the following:

Among the things which are unique to man is the desire for society, that is for community with those who belong to his species—though not a community of any kind, but one at peace, and with a rational order: a desire which the Stoics call *oikeosis*. Therefore, when it is said that nature drives each animal to seek its own interests, this ought not to be allowed as a universal truth.¹⁵

What is particularly striking is the place that is attributed to the principle of self-interest. That is to say, in the second edition it has no place as a primary principle for human beings, but in the first edition it does have such a place, to the extent that man is not making use of “that which is special to men”, which makes him like “the other animals”.

The distinction between the two notions of sociability Grotius uses, runs parallel to the different roles he ascribes to divine law. Turning to the latter notion, it is striking to see that God plays a more minimal role in the first edition than in the second edition. Again, it may be instructive to compare the two editions. The first sentence of the *Prolegomena* reads in the first edition of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*:

The law which adjudicates between different peoples, or between the rulers of peoples, whether proceeding from nature itself or introduced by custom and tacit agreement, has been handled by few writers, and not by anyone hitherto in a systematic and comprehensive fashion.¹⁶

In this edition, Grotius makes a distinction between the *cause* of law, which can be ascribed to God who has created the natural order, and the *content* of the laws of nature, which has to be sought by observing the facts of the material universe. In the second edition, then, Grotius gives a prominent role to divine law, being the basis of natural laws, which now can be known without any examination of the material world. In this edition, Grotius inserts in the above passage after “from nature itself”: “or established by divine laws”. Whereas Grotius, in the first edition, claims that natural law would govern man “even though we should assume that there is no God”, he is less dismissive of the role of God in natural law in the second edition.

Which edition of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* is better? If we take into account the situation in which Grotius prepared his second edition, it is at least fair to pose this question, since he may have changed the text, as we

¹⁵ As cited in Tuck (1999), p. 99.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

suggested, for political reasons and not for intellectual ones. However, when answering this question, we should not be led solely by speculations about the reasons why Grotius reedited his masterpiece. Instead, it is argued that if we want to make sense of Grotius' *oeuvre* as a whole, we should pick the edition that is in accord with the rest of his work. If one compares the two editions with this in mind, I agree with Tuck that the first edition is the better one. In fact, the 1625 edition is so much in accord with Grotius' previous work that it could be regarded as an expansion of the arguments of *De Indis*. In both his first edition and *De Indis* Grotius offers a thin notion of sociability, and accords a substantial place for the principle of self-interest. In the *Prolegomena* to the *De Indis* he makes this clear, positing:

first, that It shall be permissible to defend [one's own] life and to shun that which threatens to prove injurious; secondly, that It shall be permissible to acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things which are useful for life. The latter precept, indeed, we shall interpret with Cicero as an admission that each individual may, without violating the precepts of nature, prefer to see acquired for himself rather than for another, that which is important for the conduct of life. Moreover, no member of any sect of philosophers, when embarking upon a discussion of the ends [of good and evil], has ever failed to lay down these two laws first of all as indisputable axioms. For on this point the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Peripatetics are in complete agreement, and apparently even the Academics have entertained no doubt.¹⁷

Even if these two laws only apply in the natural society, which Hobbes would call the 'state of nature', they are still offered as "indisputable axioms".

In addition to the fundamental laws of nature, Grotius stipulates two further laws—the law of inoffensiveness ('Let no one inflict injury upon his fellows') and the law of abstinence ('Let no one seize possession of that which has been taken into the possession of another')—but he posits that the former set of laws takes precedence over the latter. This natural ordering does not apply, however, when the transition is made from natural to civil society. In civil society, that is, there are again two more laws that apply:

First, Individual citizens should not only refrain from injuring other citizens, but should furthermore protect them, both as a whole and as individuals; secondly, Citizens should not only refrain from seizing one another's possessions, whether these be held privately or in common, but should

¹⁷ Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Praedae Commentarius* [1864], I, as cited in Tuck (1999), p. 85.

furthermore contribute individually both that which is necessary to other individuals and that which is necessary to the whole. (...) These laws relate (...) to the common good interpreted as the good of the unit and therefore as one's own.¹⁸

In civil society, we may conclude, the individual is both a whole in itself and part of a larger whole. Here, the former does not take precedence over the latter.

What conclusions can we draw as to how Grotius' views on human sociability relate to those of Hobbes? On this question I disagree with Tuck, who lends support to the view that Rousseau was right in positing that at bottom there is little to choose between the two. Tuck maintains that "Hobbes need not be seen as differing from Grotius over ethical matters, strictly understood, *at all*," and that "his very different conclusions can all follow solely from a disagreement about the material conditions for the application of the ethical principles".¹⁹ Tuck places Hobbes in the humanist tradition, considering him not as its *reductio ad absurdum* but as its culmination, and he seeks to demonstrate how both Rousseau and Kant accepted him as such. As a matter of fact, Tuck seeks to show what is Grotian about Hobbes, and what is Hobbesian about Rousseau and Kant.²⁰ However, apart from the fact that Hobbes could be placed, equally well, in the reason-of-state tradition, it seems a bit far-fetched to make comparisons between Grotius and Hobbes, as Tuck does, on the basis of assumptions Hobbes would make about the mutual recognition human beings accord one another.²¹ For one thing, Grotius and Hobbes can be compared insofar as Grotius propounds two axioms concerning self-preservation in the natural society (or state of nature). It seems inaccurate, though, to call these axioms 'Grotian', as Grotius himself already admits that all philosophers have agreed upon these as being indisputable. Rather, what is Grotian is not what Tuck purports it to be, but all the rest.

What is distinctive about Grotius is his account of self-interest and sociability where both are in balance. Indeed, Grotius does give self-interest and self-preservation its proper place, but it is balanced²² by what is *proprium* or special to man—his sociability. This *appetitus societatis* is the

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 87-88.

¹⁹ Tuck (1999), p. 135.

²⁰ See Tuck (1999), pp. 197 ff.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 132-33.

²² Tuck uses this term in his "Introduction" to Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), p. xxiv.

“source of *iuris*, properly so called, to which belong abstaining from another’s possessions, restoring anything which belongs to another (or the profit from it), being obliged to keep promises, giving compensation for culpable damage, and incurring human punishment”.²³ One may conclude from this passage that Grotius extends sociability only insofar as is necessary for the administration of ‘commutative’ justice (concerning punishment), and not also of ‘distributive’ justice (concerning goods), which may follow from the natural law but is not part of it. One may even agree with Tuck that “[t]his fracturing of the Aristotelian notion of social life was at the heart of Grotius’s enterprise”.²⁴ However, this is not to say that sociability is less important to Grotius than self-interest. The difference between the Aristotelian ‘thick’ notion of human sociability and the ‘thin’ one that Grotius uses, is that the former sees the human being only as part of a larger whole, whereas the latter also considers the part to be a whole in itself. Rousseau and Kant only see the former, and from their perspective, indeed, Grotius must look like a “sorry comforter”,²⁵ as Kant put it. Hobbes only sees the latter, and if one believes, as Tuck does, that this other perspective is best, indeed, Grotius must look like second-best. However, all this is to deny the necessity and the distinctive quality of combining both perspectives, which constitutes the Grotian paradox of being part and whole at the same time. Paradox lies at the heart of the Grotian position.

What is also distinctive about Grotius is the analogy he makes between natural individuals and sovereign states. Irrespective of what edition of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* one reads, this analogy is, as Tuck admits, “the simple message which its readers received and which was so important to the later seventeenth century”.²⁶ The particular kind of analogy Grotius makes is that natural individuals can be conceived of as behaving like sovereign states (rather than the other way round). This analogy, which is the reverse of the domestic analogy, is precisely what would later also lie at the heart of Hobbes’ political theory, as Rousseau has shown in his essay “The State of War”.²⁷ If there is, at bottom, nothing to choose between Grotius and Hobbes, then it is because of the Grotian analogy that Hobbes uses. This analogy is certainly not something that all

²³ Grotius (1625), as cited in Tuck (1999), p. 97.

²⁴ Tuck (1999), p. 89.

²⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 103.

²⁶ Tuck (1999), p. 96.

²⁷ Cf. Tuck (1999), p. 230.

philosophers would agree upon as being indisputable, and this makes it more distinctively ‘Grotian’ than the axioms we mentioned above. However, Grotius was not first in propounding the analogy as such. In the Introduction to Part I we already cited Plato, who should be credited for articulating the analogy most clearly and for the first time. Tacitus should also be mentioned here as the paradigm for *raison d'état* that later on would inspire his commentators to make the essential move of importing ideas about war into *civil* life.²⁸ Nevertheless, Grotius is first in using the analogy to make the case for natural rights that individuals possess vis-à-vis one another. The difference in the application of the analogy—with a critical role played in it by rights—marks the difference between Hobbes and Grotius. By using the Grotian analogy, Hobbes offers the culmination of the reason of state tradition, while Grotius stands in the natural law tradition where he produces “a new synthesis embodying many aspects of classicism and late medieval thought”,²⁹ and thus lays the foundation for modern natural law.

The natural law tradition goes back to Aristotle, the Stoics, and Cicero. Ancient politics, though, was not about rights. It was about the power of the citizen body that formed a collectivity. What is new about Grotius is that he shifts the focus from the collectivity to the individual, while accommodating both. It has been argued that the Middle Ages had prepared the ground for this shift. As Otto von Gierke puts it:

Political Thought when it is genuinely medieval starts from the Whole, but ascribes an intrinsic value to every Partial Whole down to and including the Individual. If it holds out one hand to Antique Thought when it sets the Whole before the Parts, and the other hand to the Modern Theories of Natural Law when it proclaims the intrinsic and aboriginal rights of the Individual, its peculiar characteristic is that it sees the Universe as one articulated Whole and every Being—whether a Joint-Being (Community) or a Single-Being—as both a Part and a Whole: a Part determined by the final cause of the Universe, and a Whole with a final cause of its own.³⁰

What is new is that Grotius claims that natural individuals and sovereign states are morally identical.³¹ This has, I submit, at least two implications.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁹ Charles Edwards, *Hugo Grotius: The Miracle of Holland. A Study in Political and Legal Thought*, with Introduction by Richard Falk (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), p. 141.

³⁰ Otto von Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, trans. F.W. Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900), p. 7, as cited in Tuck (1999), p. 2.

³¹ See Tuck (1999), pp. 82, 85, 228.

First, what is identical cannot be analogical. That is to say, to the extent that a state *is* an individual or that an individual *is* a state, this is about being the same in terms of individuality. Second, what is analogical goes two ways, from macro to micro and the other way round. That is to say, Grotius provides the theoretical basis not only for what we called the Grotian analogy but also for the domestic analogy we already explored in the Introduction to Part I. To the extent, then, that a state is *like* an individual or that an individual is *like* a state, this is about how agency units are alike in terms of (legal or social) personality. The distinction we make between analogy and identity, like the one between personality and individuality, marks the difference between Parts I and II respectively.

The distinction we make between personality and individuality is key in understanding Grotius' deepest conviction. Before explaining why this is so, I will first define the terms. Personality, then, comes from the Latin word *persona*, which was derived from the Greek word for a theatrical mask. This mask has become a symbol of how we see others and they see us. Individuality—not to be confused with individualism—is what is behind the mask, so to say. It also comes from Latin, denoting what is un-dividable. The difference between personality and individuality is that the former can be attributed to any agency unit, whereas the latter is intimately related to the human being. To make the same distinction in geometrical terms, agency units (*qua* persons) can be conceived of as concentric circles, while the human being (*qua* individual) can be conceived of as the middle-point of these circles.³² The distinction we make in respectively ontological and geometrical terms, is the distinction Grotius makes in legal terms between *ius gentium* (law of nations), which is part of volitional law, and *ius naturale* (law of nature), where the former is derived from custom, and the latter from reason. The two must be distinguished, but the former does not go without the latter.

³² Grotius does not use these specific terms, but he does make a mathematical analogy in treating his subject. See *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, Prolegomena LIX, in Grotius (2005), p. 132: "For I profess truly, that as Mathematicians consider Figures abstracted from Bodies, so I, in treating of Right, have withdrawn my Mind from all particular Facts." See Book I, ch. I, par. VIII, where Grotius critiques the way Aristotle uses the distinction between arithmetical (or simple) proportions and geometrical (or comparative) proportions to explain the distinction between respectively distributive and expletive justice. And in Book II, ch. XX, in Grotius (2005), p. 1027, with regard to the inferences that can be drawn from the general principles of right reason as manifested in the law of nature, Grotius writes: "It is here almost as it is in Mathematicks, where some Things are first Notions, or next to first Notions; some are Demonstrations, which are immediately both understood and assented to, some again are true, but not evident to all."

Grotius' deepest conviction was that the behaviour of states could be brought under the rule of law, both in war and in peace. His basic point is that heads of state should be accountable to law representative of the common society of all mankind, which is to be understood as a great human society formed by both individuals and heads of state. I submit that to understand this society only in terms of individuality, and not also in terms of personality, is to miss the point. If legal responsibility has shifted over time from the king to the sovereign people, and the state has become a "mystical, impersonal, and therefore necessarily irresponsible personality",³³ as Lauterpacht has it, this explains why personality has come under attack. It is clear that the personification of the state, which at some point became the apogee of all human volition, as we saw when discussing Rousseau and Hegel, poses a problem of accountability. However, to abandon the concept of personality altogether is not to solve the problem, that is, along Grotian lines. I give three arguments to support this claim.

First, authors who seek to write off personality often misconceive the term. Thus, when Lauterpacht posits, that behind the personality of the state there are "the actual subjects of rights and duties, namely individual human beings",³⁴ ironically, he gives the perfect definition of persons, not individuals. Personality is what makes states and individuals amenable to rights and duties. Second, authors who seek to write off personality³⁵ seem to do so by means of a syllogism that goes as follows: (i) Grotius thought of human beings, not abstract entities. — (ii) Persons are abstract entities. — (iii) Therefore, Grotius did not think in terms of personality. This syllogism is ill-conceived, as the first premise is false. Grotius makes clear that his masterpiece is about the law that concerns the mutual relations among states or rulers of states, while indicating that he seeks to treat his subject by abstracting from the facts much like a mathematician does when thinking of figures, not bodies. That is, Roscoe Pound may be right when suggesting that Grotius was thinking of "Ferdinand and Louis and Philip and James", but he is even more right when he admits that "they were men and hence moral and rational entities".³⁶ Moreover, with regard to the second premise, it should be born in mind that personality is always rooted in individuality, and that

³³ Lauterpacht (1946), p. 27.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ See, for instance, Edwards (1981), pp. 145-48.

³⁶ Roscoe Pound, "Philosophical Theory and International Law," in *Bibliotheca Visseriana*, 20 vols. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1925), vol. 1, pp. 71-90, as cited in Edwards (1981), p. 146.

personality and individuality are both related to the human being. Thus, the third proposition is misconstrued. Third, authors who seek to write off personality in fact undermine the Grotian project, which is all about instituting personality while placing human individuality at the centre. Without legal personality there can be no subjects of rights and duties neither on the level of the state nor on the level of individual human beings. Therefore, instead of denying personality to states, it would be Grotian rather to extend *international* legal personality to both states and individuals.³⁷

In international law theory the concept of international legal personality has been defined in several ways. In the twentieth century, restorative scholarship claimed that only states had legal personality under international law, whereas revisionist scholarship opposed this claim. The two most prominent representatives of the latter are Hans Kelsen and Georges Scelle. Kelsen redefines the concept of legal subject or person as “simply a personifying expression for the unity of a bundle of legal obligations and legal rights, that is, the unity of a complex of norms”.³⁸ Kelsen redefines the person as a relational concept, that is, as a normative *Zurechnungspunkt* of legal relationships involving rights and duties, which links the individual human being with the international legal order. Scelle, for his part, is known for his famous principle of *dédoublement fonctionnel*, according to which international law attributes to national *gouvernants* (rulers) and *agents* both national and international governmental competences.³⁹ Both Kelsen and Scelle remove the mask of state personality. However, they only do so to have personality reappear on the individual level. They transpose the problem any agency unit—by being both part and whole—has to face, and both end up with dualism. The difference between them is that Scelle locates this dualism in the ruler *qua* individual person, and tries to dissolve it there, whereas Kelsen tries to dissolve it on the level of the state through his equation of the state with law. While seeking to protect individuality, both authors completely focus on personality. This has led to the other extreme, where personality is seen as the concrete manifestation of the abstract notion of individuality.

³⁷ Cf. Janne Nijman, *The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry Into the History and Theory of International Law*, diss. Leiden University (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004).

³⁸ Hans Kelsen, *Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory*, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1934] 1992), pp. 46-7.

³⁹ See Georges Scelle, *Précis de droit des gens: Principes et systématique* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, [1932-34] 1984).

Nowadays, personality seems to be regarded as constituting the ‘real’ world, whereas individuality is seen as problematic.

To conclude the second dimension, concerning Grotius’ *fama* based on his works, we mention three contributions Grotius has made, corresponding respectively with the three episodes we described when discussing the first dimension, concerning Grotius’ *persona*. First, when working for the VOC, Grotius wrote his *Mare Liberum* as part of what he called *De Indis*, which later would be published as *De Jure Praedae*. This work was designed to demonstrate why the VOC, as a private corporation, had the same right to appropriate territory (not being used properly by indigenous peoples), and the same right of punishment—the so-called *ius gladii*—as a state does. He attributed these rights to individual persons on the assumption that every right comes to the state from private persons. In this regard, Grotius writes that “the power of the state is the result of collective agreement”, and that “[t]herefore, since no one is able to transfer a thing that he never possessed, it is evident that the right of chastisement was held by private persons before it was held by the state.”⁴⁰ Thus, he declares the natural individual to be morally identical to the state. He makes an analogy between the international arena and the state of nature, regarding states as individuals writ-large, and individuals as states writ-small. The latter type of analogy is new. While Plato used it first, Grotius revived it, and may have inspired later authors, such as Hobbes to also use it.

Second, when Grotius got involved in politics, he wrote another book in 1610, which we have not mentioned yet: *De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae*.⁴¹ In this book he applies the notions mentioned above in defending his own vision of the constitution of the United Provinces. Formally created by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1579, the Union was governed by the States-General, an assembly meeting at The Hague, while the individual Provinces each had its own supreme government, called States. It was unclear to what extent these individual Provinces remained sovereign states. However, according to Grotius, the Provinces had formed an alliance while keeping their own States, which meant that no Province had shared any part of its sovereignty. Later, in his *Apologeticus*,⁴² Grotius would elaborate on this theme, when defending his own political

⁴⁰ Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Praedae Commentarius* [1864], I, as cited in Tuck (1999), p. 82.

⁴¹ Hugo Grotius, *Liber de Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae*, ed. Collegium Classicum c.n. E.D.E.P.O.L. (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, [1610] 1995).

⁴² Hugo Grotius, *Apologeticus eorum qui Hollandiae Westfrisiaeque & vicinis quibusdam nationibus ex legibus praefuerunt ante mutationem quae evenit anno CI) I) CXVIII* [1618].

conduct. It is this kind of sovereign state that Grotius has in mind when he thinks of the natural individual (in the state of nature) as being morally identical to the state. Men relate to one another in civil society, like the sovereign Provinces relate to one another in their Union. This is how the Grotian analogy works: natural individuals can conceive of themselves as behaving like sovereign states, while facing the paradox of being both parts and wholes. When authors such as Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart⁴³ use the concept of sovereignty to understand autonomous individuals, they use the Grotian analogy exactly this way.

Finally, Grotius wrote his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. Grotius' fame is almost completely based on this work. This masterpiece of his has led some interpreters and commentators to characterize Grotius as "the father of modern natural law", and others to characterize him as "the father of international law". Still others would give him recognition for a dual paternity, while the rest may question any fatherhood. In any case, everybody would agree that Grotius has to be associated with the development of natural law theory and international legal theory.⁴⁴ What makes Grotius special, I submit, is not so much the originality of his work, but rather that he brought together elements from natural law and the law of nations, while handling these elements "in a systematic and comprehensive fashion". Grotius is first in demonstrating how natural law and volitional law (including the law of nations) are intimately related as parts of one legal system, much like I have proposed individuality and personality are related, and both connected to the human being. I have proposed that one can understand these relations by thinking of a middle-point and a circle. When using a pair of compasses, one compass leg is in the middle-point, while the other one is drawing the circle. If we focus on the latter, we still do not—since we cannot—dispense with the former. Part I features the latter, Part II the former.

⁴³ In Tuck (1999), pp. 9, 84-5, Tuck only mentions H.L.A. Hart's article "Are There Any Natural Rights?," *The Philosophical Review* 64 (1955), p. 184. However, in this article Hart only uses the concept of sovereignty in passing, without really explicating the analogy. I submit that Kelsen provides an earlier and better example of the analogy when writing about the 'sovereign I' in Kelsen ([1934] 1992), p. 116. By the way, in making analogies between international law and municipal law, Kelsen and Hart differ in that the former makes an analogy of form, insisting that both international law and municipal law possess (and must possess) a 'basic norm', while the latter recognizes that there should be one (which Hart calls a 'rule of recognition'), but posits that in fact there is still none, and that in its absence there can be only analogies of function and content, not of form. See Hart, *The Concept of Law*, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 232-7.

⁴⁴ Cf. Edwards (1981), pp. 9 ff.

This concludes our discussion of the first two dimensions, concerning Grotius' *persona* and *fama*. In the next paragraph we will focus on the third dimension, which is about drawing concentric circles, and recognizing them as such.

3.2 The Golden Rule of Statecraft

In his seminal Introduction to Edwards' book on Grotius, Richard Falk charges Lauterpacht and Bull with confusing the Grotian solution with the Grotian quest, when they suppose that the Grotian solution suggests substantive answers that can be applied directly to the state system as we know it today.⁴⁵ To avoid any confusion, in this book we will make a clear distinction between the two. After having discussed the Grotian solution in the previous paragraph, in this paragraph we will explain what the Grotian quest is. However, one can only grasp the latter by understanding the former, which is why the Grotian solution is included in this Chapter on the Grotian quest. The solution is only a timely application of some general principle or methodology that one can find by studying Grotius. We will propose a specific formulation of this methodology, which I will call The Golden Rule of Statecraft. It will be argued that this Golden Rule is consonant with the most influential methodologies within the humanities that have been proposed so far, and that the Golden Rule captures the essence of both the Grotian quest and these other methodologies, as they pertain to statecraft. Finally, it will be shown how the Golden Rule can be applied in practice, by discussing some timely problems statecraft is facing.

To begin, what is the Grotian quest? For this, we can best return to the classic definition that Falk renders in the publication mentioned above. Falk defines this notion by describing what is needed to embark on what he later calls the Grotian quest:

We require (...) a special sort of creativity that blends thought and imagination without neglecting obstacles to change. We require, in effect, an understanding of those elements of structure that resist change, as well as a feel for the possibilities of innovation that lie within the shadowland cast backward by emergent potential structures of power. Only within this shadowland, if at all, is it possible to discern "openings" that contain significant potential for reform, including the possibility of exerting an impact on the character of the emergent system.

This shadowland lies necessarily at the outer edge of the realm of politics, although its special emphasis is upon those political possibilities not yet evident to politicians. As such, it is dangerous intellectual work that often engenders rejection and may even stimulate repression.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Richard Falk, "Introduction: The Grotian Quest," in Edwards (1981), pp. xix.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. xiii-xiv.

Falk regards Grotius as an exemplary visionary of the shadowland, helping Europe make the transition from the old feudal order to the new order of sovereign states, whose birth is often associated with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, 23 years after the first publication of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. However, the solution that Grotius offered at the time, Falk insists, has only limited relevance for our situation today. If the Grotian quest is the quest for “openings to the future through shadowland exploration”, any new solution today depends on whether we can now discern new openings to change in the prevailing structure of world order.

Regarding the present transition challenge and the feasibility of a “Grotian” solution in 1978, Falk writes:

The statist logic has not yet been seriously challenged by an alternate logic that conceives the *whole* as necessarily prior to the *part* in matters of ecological stability and military security. The shadowland cast backward onto the present situation of world order does not seem yet to exist. Perhaps we await a Grotius who can teach us to “see” the shadowland, according sufficient status to international developments that depart from the premises of the state system without losing persuasiveness.⁴⁷

In the meantime, with the Cold War at an end, much has changed. More often the question is posed of whether the state has become obsolete. Some have pointed at the growing interdependence of states, others at the growing importance of other players on the stage, like multinational corporations, NGOs, but also terrorist networks. Again others, most notably Falk himself, have embarked on World Order studies. However, all this is not to change the reality that the state is still here. And the state, it seems, is also here to stay. Does this mean that there is still no shadowland to be discerned, or that we still cannot “see” the shadowland that is already there? Or does Falk simply project his own shadowland into the future?

There are two problems with Falk’s account of the Grotian quest. Falk thinks that the whole is necessarily prior to the part in certain matters, and he believes this to be Grotian. As a matter of fact, this notion lies at the heart of his conception of the Grotian quest. But, ironically, it is this notion that Grotius opposed to most strongly. Grotius opposed to the emerging statist logic, where states were seen as sovereign wholes only, and insisted that they were also parts of a larger whole. This

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. xx.

is another way of saying that he sought to bring the behaviour of states under the rule of law. The other problem concerns Falk's preoccupation with structural change. Falk thinks of the Grotian quest in terms of a search for openings to structural change, or at least in terms of an understanding of structural obstacles to change. In fact, however, Grotius did not focus on the structure of the emergent state system as such. On the contrary, he took the emerging structure for a starting-point, and focused on the behaviour of agency units. By conceiving the Grotian quest the way he does, focusing on the whole and not on the parts, and focusing on structure and not on agency, Falk does not see the two most important features of this quest: paradox and analogy respectively.

On a more fundamental level, while Falk insists on the distinction between the Grotian solution and the Grotian quest, he does not make clear what should be considered as Grotian at all. When Falk writes about shadowland explorations, one could see in it an interpretation of Plato's Allegory of the Cave, or a definition of vision in the broadest sense. The problem with Falk's definition is that anything that sounds visionary, and is both normatively grounded and future-oriented, lays claim to being Grotian. To be clear, I do not oppose the visionary element that is involved in Falk's account, but I oppose it becoming a ticket for imprecision or wishful thinking. I submit that imagination and vision are certainly needed to "see" any new solution that could be called "Grotian", but not to develop and define the methodology that is involved in the Grotian quest. The latter enterprise must meet any scholarly standard, and has nothing ado with vision.

To make the same point in terms of the three distinctions we made in the Introduction to this Part—concerning point of view, perspective, and interpretation,—there is nothing visionary about taking the point of view of the individual person, the state or international society, and there is nothing visionary about looking either inward or outward, but vision may be involved in the process of interpreting what one sees. Two persons may stand at the same place, they may look at the same thing, and yet they may "see" different things, where the one may be called visionary, and the other not. In this paragraph, we are concerned with this element of interpretation, which, it is recalled, is about the distinction between reasoning inside-out and outside-in. The Grotian quest, then, is about using the methodology that is involved in this kind of reasoning, while the Grotian solution, like any new solution that could be called "Grotian", is about making good use of it.

Instead of stipulating some new solution, as Falk does, I rather confine myself to elucidating the method of search that is used in the Grotian quest. That is to say, in Part I, on agency, I will confine myself to the question of how to search—or, in Falk's words, of how to explore the shadowland,—leaving it to others to make the best possible use of the method of search. For sure, I will mention the best possible findings I myself can think of to illustrate the applicability of it to agency units, but the point I want to make is that the validity or quality of these findings must be distinguished from an appraisal of the method of search. In the end, Part I is about defending the latter, not the former. By contrast, Part II, on structure, is about one specific 'solution', rather than about any quest. There I will propose one specific 'shadowland' of structural reform, which could be interpreted as the result of a Grotian quest, but is in fact inspired by Spinoza, focusing on the whole and not on the parts, as well as on what is and not on what ought. The difference between Grotius and Spinoza is that Spinoza derives the latter from nature, while Grotius looks at both nature (which he equates with 'right reason') and custom, which he combines in a system of law. If Part I is about custom, and Part II about nature, then on one level one may say that the relation between Parts I and II is about the relation between the thinking of Grotius and of Spinoza, or between 'ought' and 'is', but on another level one could also see in it the relation Grotius saw between volitional law (including municipal law and the law of nations) and natural law, as well as between civil society and natural society (*i.e.*, the state of nature), and between sociability and self-preservation.

So far we have seen how a combination of two points of view can make for analogy, and how a combination of two perspectives can make for paradox. Next, we will see how a combination of two interpretations can make for the Grotian quest. The method of search that is used in the Grotian quest, we noted, is about reasoning inside-out and outside-in. In the Introduction to Part I we defined these terms as expressing some link between the inside and the outside, where 'inside-out' is about the inferences that can be made from the endogenous to the exogenous, and 'outside-in' is about the reverse situation. The difference, then, between reasoning inside-out and the domestic analogy, like the one between reasoning outside-in and the Grotian analogy, is that in both comparisons the former is about consistency, whereas the latter is about similarity. While analogical reasoning is a form of presumptive reasoning based upon the assumption that if two things are similar in a number of respects (being both parts and wholes) they will also be similar in other

respects (related to the properties that were deemed similar), the Grotian quest involves a form of heuristic reasoning (which is broader than analogical reasoning) based upon inferences made from one level of analysis to another to find in what other respects the two things are similar. Is analogical reasoning a theoretical device, the Grotian quest is its practical application by agency units that are searching for answers to the question how they ought to act, being both part and whole. If the agency unit does not know the principle that is involved in answering that question on one level of analysis, it may find the answer by looking at a parallel case that may exist on another level. Consistency, then, is at stake as the agency unit seeks to apply the same principle in parallel cases.

In Plato's *Republic* we find a classic precursor of the form of heuristic reasoning that is involved in the Grotian quest. When describing how to arrive at a definition of justice, Socrates explains the method of search:

"But now let us work out the inquiry in which we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there, we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well. But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth, and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our minds." "Well," he said, "that seems a sound method and that is what we must do."⁴⁸

This method is about examining the macro-case and the micro-case "side by side", and "rubbing them against one another" like fire-sticks. In so doing, one must "refer back" to the one level, and if needed, one should "return again" to the other, as often as it takes to understand what is at hand. To use our own terms, one has to reason outside-in and inside-out as often as it takes to understand how one ought to act on the level of analysis, where action is required.

The Socratic method of going back and forth between two points of view, while using both contingent assumptions and general facts, in a sense, lies at the heart of the whole of moral philosophy from Aristotle's

⁴⁸ Plato, *The Republic*, Book IV, 434D-435, trans. P. Shorey in Loeb Classical Library No. 237 (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press/Heinemann, 1930), p. 375.

Nicomachean Ethics at least down to Henry Sidgwick's *The Methods of Ethics*. Recovering the classic tradition in moral philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century, John Rawls reminds us of the cited text of Plato's when explaining his notion of 'reflective equilibrium', which is arguably the most central methodological device in *A Theory of Justice*.

In searching for the most favored description of this situation we work from both ends. We begin by describing it so that it represents generally shared and preferably weak conditions. We then see if these conditions are strong enough to yield a significant set of principles. If not, we look for further premises equally reasonable. But if so, and these principles match our considered convictions of justice, then so far well and good. But presumably there will be discrepancies. In this case we have a choice. We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgments, for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium.⁴⁹

Even if Rawls notes that this method is not peculiar to moral philosophy, he confines himself to this field and applies the method in setting the terms for a social contract that individuals would agree to in an initial situation where nobody knows anything about oneself, which he calls the Original Position, and which we would call—to use our own terms—the middle-point of our concentric circles.⁵⁰

The Grotian quest, like the Socratic method, is about going back and forth between points of view, which means that we have to go back and forth between two concentric circles, and not, as in Rawls' case, between a circle and its middle-point. After all, the latter is no point of view. In hermeneutics this movement of going back and forth has been characterized itself as a circular movement. This is 'the hermeneutic circle of whole and part', where understanding is always about moving in this circle. To better understand the Grotian quest, we first elaborate on the circular relationship between whole and part in hermeneutics.

⁴⁹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1971] 1999), p. 18.

⁵⁰ While Rawls had great difficulty in defending the notion of an Original Position in his theory, the present framework sees its relation with any concrete point of view simply as the one between individuality and personality, or between Parts II and I respectively.

Hermeneutics is the art and technique of interpretation, or rather of understanding, which has a long tradition going back to Antiquity. In the nineteenth century it found its most systematic expression in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey,⁵¹ who grounded his general methodology of the human sciences in human consciousness (*Geist*) and lived experience (*Erlebnis*). Dilthey forcefully advanced a concept of ‘understanding’ that would form the basis of the human or social sciences. This concept has come to denote a method alternative to the study of causal connections between phenomena.⁵² Thus, the distinction Max Weber would later make between explaining (*Erklären*) and understanding (*Verstehen*)⁵³ runs parallel with the one between natural and social sciences. Interestingly, Weber attempts to bridge the chasm between the two, allowing for some middle ground of ‘explanatory understanding’ (*erklärendes Verstehen*), while he also adopts a concept of meaning as a *datum*. That is, Weber holds that “the course of human action and human expressions of every sort are open to an interpretation in terms of meaning [*sinnvolle Deutung*] which in the case of other objects would have an analogy only on the level of metaphysics.”⁵⁴ Embracing an objectivistic conception of interpretative method, Weber uses here a conception of understanding that retains a dichotomy between subject and object. Hans-Georg Gadamer, then, seeks to transcend the subject-object dichotomy, and opposes traditional hermeneutic theory by focusing on ‘pre-understanding’, which conditions any interpretative technique. While distinguishing among the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), the social sciences, and the natural sciences, Gadamer sees hermeneutics as the bridge between all sciences and the life-world. As he puts it in Wittgensteinian terms: “The language games of science remain related to the metalanguage presented in the mother tongue.”⁵⁵

⁵¹ See Wilhelm Dilthey, “Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften” [1910], in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 7 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992).

⁵² See William Outhwaite, “Hans-Georg Gadamer,” in Quentin Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 21–39, at 26 and 28.

⁵³ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, trans. and ed. Günther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, [1921] 1978), p. 4.

⁵⁴ Weber, *Roscher and Knies*, trans. Guy Oakes (New York, [1922] 1975), pp. 217–8, as cited in Outhwaite (1985), pp. 32–3.

⁵⁵ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. David Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 39, as cited in Outhwaite (1985), p. 30.

Gadamer revived the hermeneutic tradition in the twentieth century, and renewed it. He broadened its application, and rejected its stress on method, by proclaiming two central principles: the universality and the historicity of hermeneutics. For Gadamer hermeneutics is not a method that can be used by a subject who aims at understanding an object as it is in itself, but it is an awareness of how one's understanding of anything is bound up anyway with one's preconceptions and prejudices at any point in time.⁵⁶ Diverging from the nineteenth-century tradition, Gadamer posits that these preconceptions and prejudices are what make understanding possible to start with. Understanding is not about detaching oneself and forgetting one's own horizon of meanings, but about engaging oneself and fusing one's horizon with the horizon one seeks to understand. This fusion of horizons can also be taken as the basic metaphor for the historicity of understanding, where interpretation is not about the restoration of the past, but about the thoughtful mediation with contemporary life. Interpretation through engagement, mediation, and the fusion of horizons, then, constitutes in Gadamer's hermeneutics the circular structure of understanding:

We recall the hermeneutical rule that we must understand the whole in terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole. This principle stems from ancient rhetoric, and modern hermeneutics has transferred it to the art of understanding. It is a circular relationship in both cases. The anticipation of meaning in which the whole is envisaged becomes actual understanding when the parts that are determined by the whole themselves also determine this whole.⁵⁷

Gadamer regards his version of the so-called hermeneutic circle of whole and part⁵⁸ as the starting point of his attempt to lay the foundations of hermeneutics.⁵⁹

Gadamer derives the circular structure of understanding from what Martin Heidegger calls the temporality of human existence (*Dasein*). Gadamer quotes the relevant passage on the hermeneutic circle from Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

⁵⁶ See Gadamer, "Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik" [1960], in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1990). English edition: *Truth and Method*, trans. rev. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall, second revised edition (London/New York: Continuum, 2004).

⁵⁷ Gadamer (2004), p. 291.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 176, 189, 195, 218, 268-9, 291, and 293.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xxxii.

It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing, and we genuinely grasp this possibility only when we have understood that our first, last, and constant task in interpreting is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.⁶⁰

Approving Heidegger's account, Gadamer adds to his own account of the hermeneutic circle an ontological dimension. Founding hermeneutics in human existence, he propounds "the universality of human language-use (*Sprachlichkeit*) as a limitless medium that carries everything".⁶¹ Indeed, any (Wittgensteinian) language-game, then, is bound up with language-use in general, and this is something that Peter Winch seems to forget.⁶² Still, though, the thesis of hermeneutic universality commits an epistemic fallacy.⁶³ If it is true that interpretative processes play an important part in the social world, and that one cannot get access to this social world but through one's understanding of these interpretative processes—which Anthony Giddens calls 'the double hermeneutic',⁶⁴—this does not necessarily mean that this is *all* there is. That is why Jürgen Habermas insists that hermeneutics needs to reflect upon its own limits, positing that linguistic communication is only one part of more general social processes where the latter cannot be reduced to the former.⁶⁵ In a sense, this criticism goes back to Emile Durkheim who maintained that it is on the one hand agency units that produce and reproduce social structures by interpreting them, but on the other hand also deeper causes that one may not be conscious of.⁶⁶ Habermas recognizes that there is more than communication, but he confines himself to it as far as hermeneutics is concerned. Thus, he changes the *locus* of understanding matters from the universal to the truly dialogical (communicative action/interaction).

⁶⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* [1927], as cited in Gadamer (2004), p. 269.

⁶¹ Gadamer (1976), p. 25.

⁶² In Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).

⁶³ See Outhwaite (1985), pp. 36-7.

⁶⁴ See Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method* (London: Hutchinson, 1976), pp. 158-9.

⁶⁵ Jürgen Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality" [1970], in Joseph Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 190.

⁶⁶ See Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, ed. S. Lukes, trans. W.D. Halls (New York: The Free Press, [1895] 1982).

Coming full circle, it is no coincidence that the Socratic method is usually understood as a dialogue. There is a difference between the two in that the former is about moving in a circle oneself, whereas the latter is about moving in a circle connecting with another person. However, to use our own terms, in both cases the idea is to keep moving between two points of view, and to see the circular relationship between the two perspectives that go with them. The hermeneutic circle and the theories we mentioned can best be understood by making use of these very terms. It makes sense to reformulate the earlier positions, since we concluded at the end of paragraph 3.1 that this Part is about drawing concentric circles and recognizing them as such. This makes it easier to understand how the various theories are interrelated, and to assess them individually.

When drawing circles, it is reminded, one compass-leg is in the middle-point, while the other is drawing the circle. Making use of this metaphor, it becomes clear that some of the theories we mentioned are not at all concerned with drawing circles, as they are focused exclusively on either a point, or a line, or a circle (without thinking about the middle-point). Regarding the first category, Rawls' Original Position is a case in point. Dilthey's theory is another example. Dilthey thinks in terms of "structure" and of "centering in a mid-point", which is for him the same as understanding the whole.⁶⁷ He is focused on the whole, but forgets the parts. The problem with both Dilthey and Rawls is that they seek to take a point of view that cannot be taken: Dilthey wants us to centre in the object of our understanding (and to forget subjectivity), and Rawls wants us to centre in the subject so as to explore individuality (and to forget personality). In both cases we are expected to focus on the middle-point, and to forget about the circle. In fact, however, following the logic of circles, a point of view is always on a circle, which means that here *a* point is mistaken for the middle-point.

Other theories seem to make use of both compass-legs, but in fact do not. Thus, Durkheim and Weber could be read as propounding some combination of circle and middle-point. After all, they focus on both agency and structure. However, these theories define structure in relative terms, which means that the logic of circles does not apply. Structure is not constituted by a middle-point, which is always the same for any of the concentric circles around it. Instead, these theories imply a metaphor of horizontal lines that are parallel to each other, the so-called 'levels of analysis' (concerning agency levels). Following the logic of lines

⁶⁷ Gadamer mentions this aspect of Dilthey's theory in Gadamer (2004), p. 292.

or levels, one can reason either top-down or bottom-up, where structure is at the top and agency is at the bottom. When reasoning top-down, structure (*i.e.*, the system-wide component) determines agency on the lower levels, and when reasoning bottom-up, agency (*i.e.*, the nature of agents on the lowest level) determines the structure of the higher levels. Or: when reasoning top-down, the whole determines the part, and when reasoning bottom-up, the part determines the whole. As I stipulated in the Introduction to Part I, both ways, one necessarily preconceives a whole: reasoning top-down one needs a moral code, and reasoning bottom-up one needs a set of principles. Another problem with the logic of lines is that it does not say where to start. Thus, Durkheim and Weber disagree on what level to focus on in the first place: the individual person or the collectivity. Does the individual person determine collective life, or is it the other way round? In either case, one only takes one perspective.

Again other theories do follow the logic of circles, but forget about the middle-point. Compared with the first category we mentioned, these theories take the opposite position. Heidegger's and Gadamer's theories are good examples within this third category. For Heidegger the circle is the "fore-structure" of human existence. He expects us to focus on the circle exclusively. For one thing, the logic of circles solves the problem of where to start: as long as one starts moving in a circle and keeps moving, it really does not matter where one starts. However, there are still three problems, which follow from the fact that both Heidegger and Gadamer relate understanding to Being. First, this means that even if their theories involve explaining, in the end they are about understanding only. That is, they may recognize the parts, but they are about the whole really. Second, understanding is linked to the individual human being, not other agency units. That is, these theories see only one circle: the hermeneutic circle. And third, Being is understood in terms of structure, being the circle itself, not the middle-point. That is, in these theories agency and structure coincide in the circle, while the middle-point has no meaning.

The Grotian quest, like the Socratic method, does make use of both compass-legs. Socrates and Grotius, in their own distinct ways, both draw concentric circles. By definition, concentric circles are different circles with the same centre, called the middle-point. That is to say, when drawing concentric circles the circles are *alike*, because the middle-point is the same, while the distance between the two legs is different. This difference in radius also makes for the relativity of parts and wholes, depending on where (*i.e.*, on what circle) one is standing, and on whether

one is looking inward or outward. As we saw in Chapter 2, when discussing Kant, it was because of Hierocles and other Stoics that the idea of agency units seen as concentric circles around the individual got currency. What is special to Grotius, is that he compares two concentric circles, much like Socrates, by going back and forth between them. If one likes to see this movement of going back and forth as a circle, like in hermeneutics, we would have a circle with a different middle-point that connects the two concentric circles, thereby visualizing the double hermeneutic, to use Giddens' term. Moreover, Grotius acknowledges that there is more than circles. In his theory, we noted, volitional law is about the circles, whereas natural law is about the middle-point. Even if one focuses on the circles, one leg stands firm in this middle-point. In his own way, Habermas makes the same point when stating that there is more than hermeneutics. To conclude, there are two differences between hermeneutics and heuristic. Whereas the former is about moving in one circle without recognizing the middle-point, the latter is about drawing at least two circles while using the same centre, and recognizing this as being the middle-point.

IR Theory is no different here from Social and Political Theory. As a matter of fact, the Great Debates in IR, as described in Chapter 1, nicely follow the various logics that we have just outlined. Thus, the logic of points is central to the First Great Debate, about views of human being. And the logic of lines is central to the Second Great Debate, about methodology. This debate was between those who seek to get inside the object (first debate), and those who seek to get outside the subject; that is, between understanding and explaining. IR Theory illustrates that the distinction between inside and outside may suggest some circular logic in this debate, but that, in fact, there are really two lines of thought that do not even meet. Thus, trying hard to integrate both lines of thought, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith first frame IR debates along David Singer's 'levels of analysis',⁶⁸ and then pursue their lines of thought, reasoning bottom-up and top-down respectively.⁶⁹ Interestingly, the former line of reasoning is wholly based on Weber and Winch.⁷⁰ Hollis and Smith mention Giddens in the beginning only to forget him, while they ignore

⁶⁸ See J.D. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds.), *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92.

⁶⁹ See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-91.

other authors in the hermeneutic tradition, like Heidegger, Gadamer, and Habermas, altogether. Not surprisingly, then, the philosopher (Hollis) and the IR scholar (Smith) do not succeed in combining their stories, concluding that there will always be two stories to tell.

Finally, the logic of circles is central to both the Third Great Debate, about the expansion of the research agenda, including economic and social issues, and the Fourth Great Debate, about various alternative approaches opposing the established traditions. Whereas the former is about acknowledging that there is more than circles (understood as units acting in the political domain), while not drawing them, the latter is about drawing one circle and moving in it. Focusing in on this last debate, Constructivism is most representative of how this is held to work in IR Theory. Most notably, Wendt's version of Constructivism seeks to equate IR Theory with *Social* Theory, as applied to international politics. That is, his theory is not new, but its application is. Wendt's Constructivism is new in that it applies the logic of the hermeneutic circle to the understanding of international politics. On Wendt's view, agency and structure cannot be reified, since they constitute and reconstitute each other constantly. What is more, in Wendt's world of inter-subjectivity, agency and structure are immersed in one another; they are one. To use our own terms, in Wendt's theory, agency and structure coincide in the circle, while the middle-point has no meaning. Wendt is moving in a circle without acknowledging that in so doing, in fact, he is presupposing a middle-point.

What, then, does this say about the Grotian quest in IR Theory? Is there no theory that truly uses both compass-legs in drawing circles? Does not International Society scholarship profess to be inspired by Grotian thinking? Indeed, most prominently, Wight bases his *International Theory* on Grotius, and later International Society scholars would stay in the Grotian tradition either explicitly or implicitly. How, then, does Wight interpret Grotius, in terms of middle-point and circle? For one thing, relating the Grotian tradition to the Kantian and Hobbesian traditions, Wight places all three traditions literally in one circle,⁷¹ where no tradition lays claim to the truth but where the search for truth is about moving in this circle. Wight sees the search for truth in IR Theory as a never-ending dialogue, but he places the concept of dialogue itself beyond discussion. By ignoring the middle-point, then, he misrepresents Grotius. This becomes even clearer when he visualizes Grotius' theory in a diagram

⁷¹ See Wight (1996), p. 47.

with three concentric circles where, not coincidentally, the middle-point is lacking. In this picture “the inner circle was the state, with its municipal law, or *jus civile*”; the second circle was international society, subject to a volitional, positive law of nations; and the third, outer circle, surrounding the other two, was mankind, subject to natural law”.⁷² While Wight, correctly, charges Francisco de Vitoria for confusing natural law with the *jus gentium* of the second circle, Wight himself appears to be confused on four accounts.

First, in presenting a conception of what he thinks to be Grotian, Wight makes a distinction between three concentric circles, where the inner two do not differ as these circles both represent volitional, positive law. When making distinctions among different kinds of law, it is recalled, Grotius first makes a distinction between natural law and volitional law, and focusing in on the latter he makes a further distinction between divine law and human law, while within the latter again distinguishing between municipal law and the law of nations. By only picking the first kind of law and the last two, Wight does not show the whole picture. He admits that his three kinds of law correspond with Kant’s three ‘Definitive Articles for Eternal Peace’.⁷³ In fact, however, Wight confuses Grotius and Kant from the outset. Second, when associating his concentric circles also with different kinds of society, Wight confuses two kinds of expansion logic. Whereas his kinds of society expand geographically, in the end including the whole of mankind, his kinds of law expand evolutionary. Following the latter expansion logic, we would end with natural law whereas Grotius posits that it is our starting-point; even if there is no state, there is natural law. Third, by ignoring the starting-point, which would be the middle-point when drawing circles, Wight, in fact, follows a logic of lines. That is, he confuses the logics of lines and of circles. Fourth, whereas Wight acknowledges that every social or political theory is based on some view of human being, he does not position the human being in the centre, as he refuses to pick any single theory of human being to account for all. Here, however, Wight confuses the first picture (his own theory) with the second one (his conception of Grotius’ theory). The ultimate problem Wight has to face is that even if he were allowed to project his own ideas onto Grotius’ theory, misrepresenting it as a *de facto* logic of lines, he is bound, paradoxically, for his own circle that still is in need of a middle-point.

⁷² Ibid., p. 73.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 74-5.

The ultimate problem we just formulated is not only characteristic of Wight's theory, but remains at the centre of theories developed by International Society scholars until today. Robert Jackson's *Global Covenant* is a case in point. While seeking to provide the philosophy or methodology underlying what he calls 'classical' International Society scholarship, Jackson transposes the distinction Grotius makes between natural law (the middle-point) and volitional law (the concentric circles) into a distinction between 'procedural norms' and 'prudential norms'. The former set of norms Jackson characterizes as his Kelsenian *Grundnorm*, but he does not locate it at the centre of his theory. As Part II is about the middle-point, it will be argued there why Jackson's theory, like all of International Society scholarship, is self-defeating insofar as it ignores the middle-point. Here, however, we focus on the prudential norms, that is, on what could be held to be the circle. As a matter of fact, Jackson himself does not speak in terms of (concentric) circles, like Wight does, but he does characterize prudence in terms of being 'circumspectual'.⁷⁴ The ethics of statecraft, as Jackson calls it, is situational and is about looking around 360 degrees in every situation. Quoting Arnold Wolfers, Jackson defines the ethics of statecraft as "a nonperfectionist, nonnationalist ethic", based on "the best moral choice that circumstances permit".⁷⁵ Outside International Society scholarship, Hoffmann's approach, with its 'moral point of view', is very similar in this respect,⁷⁶ as is Raymond Aron's 'praxeology', with its antinomies or conflicting perspectives.⁷⁷ In the final analysis, they all focus in on the statesman who has a choice, and dismiss the domestic analogy.⁷⁸ That is to say, they focus in on the circle of the state, and they do not draw any concentric circles or a middle-point.

⁷⁴ Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 19.

⁷⁵ Arnold Wolfers, "Statesmanship and Moral Choice," in *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), pp. 64 and 51, as cited in Jackson (2000), p. 148.

⁷⁶ See Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

⁷⁷ See Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. R. Howard & A. Baker Fox (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, [1966] 2003).

⁷⁸ Jackson plainly dismisses the domestic analogy, in Jackson (2000), pp. 41-3; Hoffmann only discusses Walzer's 'legalist paradigm', in Hoffmann (1981), pp. 57 ff; and Aron makes an analogy between foreign policy and sport as well as economics when explaining the distinctions among his four modes or levels of conceptualization—theory, sociology, history, praxeology,—in Aron (2003), pp. 8-15.

Ian Clark's *Legitimacy in International Society* is a notable exception. Dissenting from Jackson's notion of international society as a moral and legal framework, Clark develops a political framework with legitimacy at its core.⁷⁹ Clark's point is that the core principles of legitimacy constitute international society, and this notion would offer a truly parsimonious theory of international society. On this view, norms of legality, morality, and constitutionality do add substance to what is considered as legitimate, but are to be distinguished from legitimacy as such, which is related to political consensus. Following Tim Dunne in this regard, Clark conceives of legitimacy in a dual fashion, as possessing an inward and an outward dimension. The two faces of legitimacy are rightful membership and rightful conduct respectively,⁸⁰ or, as Jack Donnelly has it, 'principles and practices of international legitimacy' and 'principles and practices of domestic legitimacy'.⁸¹ On the relationship between the inward and outward dimensions, which lies at the heart of his theory, Clark writes:

'Domestic' legitimacy has always contained an essentially international aspect, not least because it gives rise to collective acts of recognition. At the same time, it has frequently been the case that 'international' legitimacy has done much to bolster the 'domestic' legitimacy of individual regimes. (...) Indeed, in terms of historical evolution, one of the most striking trends is precisely the intensification of this relationship. Increasingly, the two faces of legitimacy have come to operate in tandem, such that 'rightful membership' is presented as the key instrument for generating 'rightful conduct'.⁸²

Whereas Clark ignores the middle-point, he does draw concentric circles. Making the distinction between inside and outside, Clark does use a logic of circles (not of lines). He reasons both inside-out and outside-in. Looking inward, there are the ideals of democratic self-determination and of the promotion of human rights, and looking outward there are the ideals of order and peace. Clark interrelates the two dimensions:

The logic that has united these two ambitions is the assumed intimate connection between adherence to domestic legitimacy precepts and legitimate international conduct. The overarching theory that makes sense of both is that

⁷⁹ See Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 7.

⁸⁰ Cf. Tim Dunne, "Sociological Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist and Coercive Interpretations of International Society," *Millennium* 30 (2001), p. 89.

⁸¹ Cf. Jack Donnelly, "Ancient Greece and International Relations Theory" (Paper presented at BISA annual conference, London, 2002), p. 15.

⁸² Clark (2005), p. 5.

it is only in the former that there can be any proper guarantee of the latter. In a nutshell, this is the all-embracing legitimacy theory to which international society has increasingly, if intermittently, subscribed over the past century. It has reached an important culmination point at the end of the twentieth century, and in the early years of the twenty-first.⁸³

Clark sees a tension between the two dimensions, as he observes “a contradiction between international society’s preference for democracy as the constitutive form of the state, and its own inability to operate on that basis in matters of international action”.⁸⁴ However, for Clark this contradiction is no reason for abandoning analogical reasoning. As a matter of fact, the analogical part is the assumption he makes at the outset about the “intimate connection” between the two faces of legitimacy, which forms the basis for the inferences he makes inside-out and outside-in. The latter part can be described as the Grotian quest, or as “the putative quest to reinvent international society on a more selective democratic basis”,⁸⁵ as he calls it. Basically, it is the quest to turn contradiction into paradox by integrating two elements and securing consistency. In this regard, Clark points the way to further this quest:

[R]ightful membership and rightful conduct have fallen increasingly out of alignment, the greater has been the attempt to integrate them. There are now serious tensions between those two parameters of legitimacy. The explanation is the rapid development of legitimacy as rightful membership in a purportedly solidarist direction, at a time when legitimacy as rightful conduct has lagged behind, and remains firmly rooted in pluralist processes. To resolve the tension, the procedures of rightful conduct would need also to take on a more solidarist hue, and that is precisely what underlies the recent attempts to reinvent international society. The notion that the voice of international society can best be expressed through its democratic members is an attempt to square this particular circle.⁸⁶

Clark focuses on procedural rules, emphasizing the indeterminate nature of legitimacy. For him, legitimacy is a factual matter about how each time international society perceives a situation and reaches political consensus. Deep down, however, Clark admits that there remains a tension between these procedural rules and basic values.⁸⁷

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

Outside International Society scholarship, David Lumsdaine exposes the tension between fact and value by combining Jackson's normative circle approach and Clark's factual concentric circles approach *avant la lettre*. In his 1993 book Lumsdaine argues that peoples and their leaders determine state interests and policies on the basis of both uncontested facts about the world and values. Regarding the latter, he propounds that "the way in which countries respond to their international political situation is inherently affected by their values and principles, for reasoned outlooks on life and politics are necessarily value laden".⁸⁸ The larger argument of his book is that moral vision shapes international politics, looking at beliefs and values as a basis for regimes. Lumsdaine offers three hypotheses, two of which have been mentioned already at the end of the Introduction to Part I. These first two hypotheses, it is recalled, are about reasoning inside-out and outside-in respectively, where the former is about the influence of domestic norms on international politics, and the latter is about the influence of international society. The third hypothesis, then, is about the influence of the international system. This "reflectivist" or "constructivist" hypothesis goes as follows: "International regimes and practices often have an inherent social meaning, so that the change in those international practices which are constituted around well-grounded moral norms tends to be ongoing, norm-governed change".⁸⁹ Whereas Wendt would fully agree with this hypothesis, the difference with Lumsdaine is that the latter grounds his work in a detailed empirical analysis. Lumsdaine looks at how states act, as this would often reflect the values and principles they hold. Testing his hypotheses, he starts with facts, and takes it from there.

While the combination of reasoning inside-out and outside-in, as well as the combination of fact (circle) and value (middle-point), reminds us of the Grotian quest, nevertheless Lumsdaine only focuses on one half of what lies at the heart of this quest. Lumsdaine focuses on analogy, and not on paradox. Likewise, Clark also misses one half by only focusing on facts, and not on values. In order to arrive at some rule that reflects the Grotian quest in its entirety, we conclude this 'quest for the Grotian quest' with an exposition of some of the thinking of Amitai Etzioni's, who offers the respective opposites to Lumsdaine's and Clark's theses. Etzioni focuses on paradox, not analogy. And in the end, Etzioni is in

⁸⁸ David Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 288.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

search of core values, not facts. I will describe how he treats these halves, and then I will show how these halves must be combined with their other halves respectively, and can be integrated into a larger whole. This larger whole I will call the Golden Rule of Statecraft.

Etzioni is the founder of the communitarian movement, which is to be distinguished from communitarianism as a philosophical position. The latter is best understood in opposition to liberal political theory, where liberals view people as distinct from their ends (or values, or conceptions of the good) and communitarians view them as related to their ends.⁹⁰ An example of this theoretical debate between liberals and communitarians is the exposition in Chapter 2 of the distinct positions taken by Rawls and Walzer. In that chapter I have discussed the limitations of both positions. The former, then, is the popular appropriation of the term by what is a political movement, proposing policy positions.⁹¹ It is to this popular version that we now turn. This version is, in fact, a completely new position, which combines the liberal and communitarian positions as described above. For Etzioni, “the communitarian quest”, as he calls it, “is to seek a way to blend elements of tradition (order based on virtues) with elements of modernity (well-protected autonomy)”, which in his view “entails finding an equilibrium between universal individual rights and the common good (too often viewed as incompatible concepts), between self and community, and above all how such an equilibrium can be achieved and sustained.”⁹² At the outset, this quotation makes clear how paradox and values figure into Etzioni’s theory. It also shows how important the notion of equilibrium is if it comes to the quest of combining order and autonomy.

We will first discuss Etzioni’s ideal of equilibrium by way of definition, next what is meant by the communitarian quest in dynamic terms, and finally we will focus on what Etzioni is searching for—the final arbiters of community’s values—while assessing how he treats analogical reasoning as well as fact-based reasoning on his way. First, what is meant by the notion of equilibrium between order and autonomy? For Etzioni, in essence, this notion comprises all that is commonly

⁹⁰ See Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, second edition (Oxford: Blackwells Publishers, 1996).

⁹¹ See Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda* (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1993). The present argument is mainly based on a later publication by the same author: Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

⁹² Etzioni (1996), p. xviii.

referred to as the Golden Rule, which appears in the Holy Scriptures of all world religions as well as in philosophy (and most notably, in Kant's version of it, *viz.* the categorical imperative).⁹³ The main point that Etzioni makes is that he distinguishes the 'old' golden rule from his version of it. Etzioni makes this distinction as follows:

The old golden rule (actually, *rules*, because this precept appears in many cultures, albeit in somewhat different versions) contains an unspoken tension between what ego would prefer to do to others, and that which the golden rule urges ego to recognize as the right course of action. And the old rule is merely interpersonal. The new golden rule proposed here seeks to greatly reduce the distance between ego's preferred course and the virtuous one, while recognizing that this profound source of social and personal struggle cannot be eliminated. And it seeks a good part of the solution on the macro, societal level rather than merely, or firstly, on the personal one. I shall argue that a new golden rule should read: Respect and uphold society's moral order as you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy.⁹⁴

This 'new' golden rule is based on the distinction between two levels in sociology—the personal level and the macro, societal level—and it sees a dynamic between the two.

Second, what is meant by the communitarian quest? For Etzioni, this is exactly about the kind of dynamic we just referred to. "And this dynamic (...) is not that of a universal march of progress from the dark ages of imposed order to a world full of liberties, but a quest to formulate the elements that a society is lacking so as to bring it closer to a virtuous equilibrium, the golden rule." It entails attention to "the historical and cultural context in which the virtues of liberty *or* order are applied",⁹⁵ which is often sorely lacking. What does this mean in practice?

A good, communitarian society (...) requires more than seeing the whole; it calls on those who are socially aware and active, people of insight and conscience, to throw themselves to the side opposite that *toward* which history is tilting.⁹⁶

⁹³ Cf. Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*, second edition (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 141: "The Golden Rule can be found, in differing formulations, in a wide variety of cultures and religious teachings, including, in roughly chronological order, those of Zoroaster, Confucius, Mahavira (the founder of Jainism), the Buddha, the Hindu epic *Mahabharata*, the *Book of Leviticus*, Hillel, Jesus, Mohammed, Kant, and many others."

⁹⁴ Etzioni (1996), p. xviii.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xix.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. xix-xx.

The communitarian quest is based on the distinction between two levels in Etzioni's argument—the sociological and the historical level—and it is aimed at maintaining or regaining inner balance in the latter respect.⁹⁷

Third, what are the final arbiters of community's values? The answer Etzioni gives starts with the distinction between procedural and substantive values, where the former may provide legitimacy through the way community reaches closure (by some form of consensus building), and the latter may enhance the standing of the chosen values (as ensconced in the constitution or other such laws). Next, Etzioni concurs with Habermas that both kinds of values must be agreed upon through inter-subjective discourse, which transposes the above distinction into procedural dialogues and dialogues of convictions (substance). Then, Etzioni propounds that "[w]hat is still missing is a way to determine if the values a community embraces, left as the dialogues advance, are virtuous by some criterion other than that they are the outcome of a dialogue." While looking for a final arbiter, Etzioni considers analogical reasoning, positing that "[a]t first blush, it may seem that one can provide a crowning criterion on the global level by applying to societies the same framing criterion we apply to communities within a society."⁹⁸ However, he believes that this approach runs into difficulties, which is why he seeks the final touchstone somewhere else, "draw[ing] on the observation that *certain concepts present themselves to us as morally compelling in and of themselves.*"⁹⁹

In the end, Etzioni focuses on basic values, while arguing that it is necessary to combine some universal principles with particularistic ones, instead of only focusing on the former, as is the case with Kant's categorical imperative. Etzioni writes in this respect the following:

Like many other dichotomies, that between universalism and particularism stands in the way of developing a solid paradigm, and recognizing the merit of combination moves us forward. (...)

The fact that the universal and particularistic considerations clash at some points does not invalidate the approach; on the contrary, it is compatible with the neofunctionalist notion that the virtuous society is not one that is all cut from one moral cloth but one in which there is a continuous tension between two forces, and that it approximates best the good society when these two forces are kept in carefully crafted, continuously challenged, but ultimately restored balance.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 231.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 241.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 248.

When all is said and done, every actor must judge whether the values of their communities or societies square with those he finds compelling. As Etzioni puts it, “I have a strong moral obligation to check and double-check, and review one more time, whether or not I am holding on to an erroneous principle or misapplying one, and whether I am sticking to my position out of inappropriate motives such as pride, desire to seem consistent, or partisanship.”¹⁰¹ After having considered all facts, however, it may also be the case that the others need to be swayed. Here, the ultimate moral arbitrator is the actor himself. The community provides one with a starting-point, but if community’s moral course deeply offends the actor’s values, he must do whatever he deems appropriate (short of using violence). “This is the ultimate reason that the communitarian paradigm entails a profound commitment to moral order that is basically voluntary, and to a social order that is well balanced with socially secured autonomy—the new golden rule.”¹⁰²

To summarize Etzioni’s argument in our own terms, he features paradox by combining two perspectives. He combines autonomy and order, which is what he sees when looking inward and looking outward respectively, presenting the individual person as a whole, and as part of a larger whole. The dynamic between these two perspectives Etzioni understands in terms of a dialogical movement in a hermeneutic circle. However, he acknowledges that there is more than a circle, which is why in the end he is in search of the middle-point. The dynamic between circle and middle-point Etzioni understands as the dichotomy or tension between universalism and particularism. Etzioni’s quest is to strike a balance between those two.

To conclude, if Etzioni’s own argument could be said to have a universalist and a particularistic component by its distinction between a sociological and a historical level—*i.e.*, between theory and practice,—Etzioni’s quest must be to strike a balance between these two levels. If this is the case, however, Etzioni confuses two dynamics, where he formulates his quest in terms of the relation between circle and middle-point (like we saw Rawls does when defining ‘reflective equilibrium’), whereas he says he is concerned with a new golden rule that is about the dynamic of moving in a circle. Alternatively, if this is not the case, it remains unclear how the two levels are related. For one thing, Etzioni seeks his final arbiter in the middle-point, whereas he does not see the

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 256.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 257.

point—or value, for that matter—of comparing (concentric) circles. He dismisses analogy, as he deems it unfit to rely on empirical observation of facts (like we saw Lumsdaine and Clark do). Moreover, Etzioni argues that by resorting to analogy one is likely to find very little, as there would be global consensus on only few issues. The problem, then, is that on both accounts Etzioni's argument is based on a fallacy. To begin with the latter, Etzioni admits that by resorting to revelation and moral voice—or the notion of compelling moral concepts—one is also likely to find only few basic virtues, and arguably, I submit, even less than the number of issues that are susceptible to analogical reasoning. Thus, the quantitative argument is not wholly convincing. Regarding the former, which we may call the qualitative argument, Etzioni confuses two things. It is one thing to say that analogical reasoning is necessary and sufficient for reaching closure, to say that it is necessary *but not sufficient* is quite another. By focusing on the former, while excluding the latter, Etzioni deprives himself of a powerful tool to really live up to the high standard he sets himself when propounding “a strong moral obligation to check and double-check, and review one more time”. By confining himself to hermeneutics, and excluding heuristic (most notably, analogical) reasoning, Etzioni falls foul of the standard he sets himself. He argues that an individual person is both a whole in itself and part of a larger whole, but he does not see that the state has personality as well, being both a whole and part of a larger whole.

The Grotian quest places personality at the heart of a general theory of agency, which combines parts and wholes—as well as paradox and analogy—by resorting to both hermeneutic and heuristic reasoning, and applies it to the state in its relation to international society. That is, the Grotian quest is about using personality as a heuristic device in search of an answer to the question of how the state ought to act in time and space. This heuristic device can be conceived of as a circle with individuality as its middle-point. Individual persons and corporate persons (here: states), then, can be conceived of as concentric circles, where the circles are alike and the middle-point is the same. Whenever persons act, it is human beings who act, which is why what one *is* (as an individual) always resonates with what one *does* (as a person). Or, whenever drawing circles, one leg stands firm in the middle-point. Using this metaphor, the over-all argument of this thesis is about how to combine both legs, while this Part is about how to draw concentric circles, focusing on the one leg that is actually drawing.

Finally, the Golden Rule of Statecraft is the result of a theoretical quest that serves to offer a starting-point for statesmen embarking on the Grotian quest in practice. The Golden Rule of Statecraft reads as follows:

Respect and uphold human dignity as you would have international society respect and uphold state sovereignty.

The Golden Rule of Statecraft has to be combined with what we get from Part II. At this point, anything that has been duly tested and agreed upon consensually on one level (the hermeneutic part), would seem to be amenable to be brought to the other level (the heuristic part). It is not as simple as that, as we will see. However, at this point it is certainly possible to draw some intermediate conclusions as is concerned the implications of the Golden Rule of Statecraft itself. After all, this rule works two ways: inside-out and outside-in. When a state applies some principle in domestic affairs, it should be prepared that international society will apply it vis-à-vis itself. And, *vice versa*, when a state proposes or invokes some principle in international affairs, it should be prepared that its citizens propose or invoke the same principle in domestic affairs.

To conclude Part I, the Golden Rule of Statecraft is founded on the analogy of human dignity and state sovereignty, and this analogy can shed light on what the nature of state sovereignty is, and how it evolves. If state sovereignty means, as Waltz defines the term, “that the state decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them,”¹⁰³ two things follow from respectively the definition and the analogy. First, state sovereignty is here to stay, since a state will always have to cope with both internal and external affairs.¹⁰⁴ Or, to paraphrase Walker: state sovereignty

¹⁰³ This is Waltz’ definition that I already quoted in the Introduction to Part I. In this context I should mention that the founder of international institutional law, the late Henry Schermers, coined the “paradox of sovereignty”, in H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, third edition (The Hague: Kluwer, 1995), p. 1188: “the remarkable paradox that, to remain sovereign, they [states] must cooperate, *inter alia*, through international organisations”.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Nico Schrijver, “The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty,” *British Year Book of International Law* 70 (1999), ed. J. Crawford and V. Lowe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). When coming to what he calls the “essence” of sovereignty, Schrijver makes a distinction between “internal sovereignty” and “external sovereignty” (pp. 70-1). While Schrijver does not explain why he elevates these two adjectives above the 18 other ones he refers to, this is in line with the reasoning in Part I.

is the only solution to the need of resolving the three fundamental contradictions of unity and diversity; internal and external; and space and time.¹⁰⁵ Second, the concept of state sovereignty evolves just like the concept of human dignity does. For one thing, these concepts are by no means absolute and static. On the contrary, it follows from the argument in Part I that any concept has to be interpreted in time and space, while moving in a hermeneutic circle. However, even if some authors propose to do this when interpreting the concept of state sovereignty,¹⁰⁶ they do not do this with respect to the concept of human dignity, and they do not make use of the analogy between the two. That is, they make use of hermeneutics, but not of heuristic. The present argument adds heuristic through analogy. I submit that this is an addition that is valuable in two respects. First, it enables one to get a grip on two concepts that are notoriously vague, but which cannot be circumvented when discussing the foundations of the polity. By rallying the two through analogy, the meaning of each is circumscribed, and becomes both more relative and precise. Second, it enables one not only to understand how the meaning of state sovereignty has evolved until now, but also to see in what direction it is likely to evolve further on.¹⁰⁷ This second element is important in the present argument, as it is designed to meet the need of the statesman, who is concerned with the question that is both action-oriented and future-oriented: What to do?

The analogy between human dignity and state sovereignty may help the statesman to “see” the shadowland. Human dignity, then, is the shadowland of state sovereignty, and *vice versa*. Both concepts evolve in tandem, and to see how this evolution gets shape, one has to look at how the interpretation of, most notably, the non-intervention principle has changed over time. The non-intervention principle is a “master principle”

¹⁰⁵ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 154, as discussed in the Introduction to Part I.

¹⁰⁶ See, for instance, Schrijver (1999/2000) for an account of state sovereignty as a “relative” and “dynamic” concept, the nature, extent and substance of which differ “according to time and place” (pp. 70, 97-8); and Alfred van Staden and Hans Vollaard, “The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a Post-Territorial World?,” in Gerard Kreijen, Marcel Brus, Elsbeth de Vos, and John Dugard (eds.), *State, Sovereignty, and International Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 165-184.

¹⁰⁷ This is not to deny that hermeneutic reasoning could lead to ideas on the future, as is testified by, for instance, Nico Schrijver, “The Future of the Charter of the United Nations,” *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 10 (2006), pp. 1-34. However, when somebody else happens to have a different idea about the future, heuristic can help in coming to terms by showing “the shadowland cast backward” in the present.

of public international law,¹⁰⁸ which provides the legal basis for state sovereignty. This principle is based on the concept of “*le domaine réservé*” of the state, being in charge of its own domestic affairs.¹⁰⁹ It is laid down in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter, which reads as follows:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII [on “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” including, most notably, the right of individual or collective self-defence].

While the principle itself antedates the above provision, it is interesting to see how the interpretation of this principle as it also applies to individual persons, has evolved over time. For long, this principle was thought to be equivalent to Mill’s harm principle, *viz.* that one may feel free to do whatever one likes as long as it does not harm anybody else, but things have changed drastically in the last century. In certain cases, where other states are not harmed but where the international community is shocked, humanitarian intervention is accepted. Likewise, in Western societies, in certain cases, where other households are not harmed but where the whole society is shocked (*e.g.*, when children are maltreated by their parents at home), ‘humanitarian intervention’ is accepted (and the police may enter the home). While in jurisprudence one may advance arguments *pro* and *contra* the enforcement of morals in these domestic cases,¹¹⁰ my point is that the arbiter in these cases may be found in the judgment in the analogical cases on the international level, if the debate has already ripened more on that level. In other cases, where the debate has ripened more on the domestic level, the statesman can see how he can make use of that for a possible analogical case on the international level. This may help the statesman in understanding what *ought* to be.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, fourth edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 291.

¹⁰⁹ This is foundational of internal sovereignty, while the principle of sovereign equality is foundational of external sovereignty. See Peter Kooijmans, *The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States: An Inquiry into the Foundations of International Law* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1964).

¹¹⁰ For the classic introduction to this debate in jurisprudence, see Patrick Devlin, *The Enforcement of Morals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), and H.L.A. Hart, *Law, Liberty and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). In political thinking, see Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

In seeking the right course of action, the statesman should respect, by analogy, the ethics and politics of humanitarian intervention.¹¹¹ Analogical reasoning can help the statesman in deciding whether he has a case to intervene. He would better be conscientious about his decisions here, as there is an appeal of last resort. If his judgment is wrong, the international community may decide to intervene with his domestic affairs. Moreover, it follows from the Golden Rule of Statecraft that if a state enters the *domaine réservé* of the individual person, the international community is perfectly entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of that state, in principle if not in law.

¹¹¹ There are no authors who use the ethics and politics of humanitarian intervention by analogy. For the development and application of these ethics and politics as such, cf. Stanley Hoffmann, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), Hoffmann (1981), Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, third edition (New York: Basic Books, [1977] 2000), and Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

PART II

The State of Nature

Introduction

Part II is on structure. After having explained in Part I how agency units play their parts, Part II is about understanding the international structure as a whole. Structure is defined as the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole. It has been argued that this component should be treated as distinct from the attributes and interactions of the units of the system. This is how Kenneth Waltz has devised his *Theory of International Politics*. He makes a distinction between interacting units and the international structure, and locates the two on two different levels.¹ The present theory locates this distinction in the human being itself. It places the human being at the point of intersection of three axes. The *x*- and *y*-axis, which make up the horizontal dimension, relate agency units to one another and is about how they ought to interact; the *z*-axis or vertical dimension is about how human beings struggle individually with their most basic attributes, which are to be understood as constraining forces that the human being cannot change and that determine the international structure as much as itself. Part I was about the horizontal dimension (the logics of points, lines and circles); Part II introduces the vertical one (the logic of spheres).

What Part I and II have in common is that they both apply the Universal Rule in time and space. What makes the two Parts different is how they do that. While Part I conceives of parts and wholes in territorial terms, Part II does this in functional terms. In Part II, we think of the human being as living in two worlds: an outer world and an inner world.²

¹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston/New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 40.

² In Ancient India the distinction between an inner and an outer world was not made. Both were in complete harmony. Only in Ancient Persia the distinction was first made. When looking at the sun, one believed that one saw Ahura Mazda. Looking outward, one tried to find Ormuzd; looking inward one could be initiated into the mysteries of Mithras. However, one could not see them united in the god Zarathustra, who was in fact unknown. In Ancient Egypt it came to a real separation of the two worlds, which is symbolized by the separation of Isis and Osiris. In Ancient Greece, both worlds existed next to each other. Looking inward, Apollo was at one's side; looking outward, Dionysus was around. Both worlds were reunited in the god Jahweh, who can be found inside, but only through revelations from outside. One could see the sun, as it were, only through the reflection of the moon. Through Christ one can find the sun—to use this metaphor once again—shining in oneself. One has to look inward. One is no longer dependent of a world of gods, but connected with a spiritual world. In our time, some believe God is dead; others believe that the Spirit—or Ghost, for that matter—is holy.

In the world material ('outside') the human being sees parts (*particularia*), and he may be able to explain how they are related; in the world spiritual ('inside') he may develop an understanding for wholes (*universalia*). In this sense the Universal Rule also applies, meaning that the one world is always the flipside of the other. Thus, if one does not understand what is inside, one may find the answer by looking outside. Likewise, one has to understand what is inside to be able to explain what is outside.³ That is to say, if one wants to explain what forces constrain us, as we do in Part II, one has to understand what the human condition is. As we will see later on, this application of the Universal Rule, and its bearing on the conception of human being, are based on Spinoza's conceptions of God and Man, which are foundational of Part II.

Understanding the human condition helps to explain the world's predicament. That is to say, one has to understand what is inside to be able to explain what is outside. The paradox that lies at the heart of these propositions puts much of vested IR theories on its head, as we will see later on. For one thing, the dimension that is added in Part II completes the framework that was left unfinished in Part I. That is, Part II takes up the deeper question into being that remained unanswered in Part I. How then is the argument structured? This theory is structured along seven steps, as stipulated in Chapter 1. After having taken the first step in that same chapter, we took three more steps in Part I. Next, in Chapter 4, the fifth step is to distinguish three functional domains (culture—politics—economics); and the sixth step is to establish what incentive systems are at work within these domains. In Chapter 5, the seventh step is to formulate an Iron Rule that can explain why certain state actions work and other actions are bound to fail.

As for now, this Introduction will address three preliminary issues. First, it will explain why we need a view of human being, constituting a distinct dimension. Second, it will explain that this dimension is about identity, whereas the other is about analogy. And third, it will explain why the present framework cannot be labelled as reductionist.

First, we have to explain why we need a view of human being or—what can be used in this sense interchangeably—of human nature. The basic point here is that we always use a view of human being, even if

³ These notions are used universally, and are by no means exclusively or typically Western. As a matter of fact, these notions first appeared in Ancient India: "Tat tvam asi" [Thou art that, outside]; and "Aham brahma asmi" [I am brahman, I am all, inside].

we do not admit it or are unaware of it. As Wight puts it, “[a]ll political theory presupposes some kind of theory about human nature, some basic anthropological theory”.⁴ We would better clarify what we are assuming or presupposing, since the view of human being that we employ has a direct bearing on the worldview that we have. The world we live in is a human world. Whenever agency units—be it families, tribes, communities, cities, bureaucracies, states, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, terrorist networks, multinational corporations, and what have you—act, it is human beings who act, and only human beings. All agency units are human constructs. The structures we live in are intimately related to the human being. And, consequently, this holds true also for the international system that is made up by both agency and structure. Therefore, the view of human being we employ has, indeed, far-reaching consequences for everything we see around, as much as for all theorizing about it in IR.

Robert Jackson, in probing the philosophy or methodology underlying classical International Society scholarship, would agree with everything that has been said so far about international relations as a human activity,⁵ and yet he would not base his theory on human nature. Jackson posits that human nature is a shaky foundation,⁶ and he comes to this conclusion by looking at human activity, which he defines as activity between and among people, *inter homines*.⁷ Jackson maintains that human activity takes place in the historical world, which he distinguishes categorically from the natural world.⁸ He posits that there is no part of human activity that is controlled by non-human forces, that is by nature.⁹ To understand international relations as a human activity would be to take the internal perspective, as distinguished from explaining external forces. By using one’s mind one can take the internal perspective, and become part of the subject, which is Jackson’s definition of being human¹⁰ as well as the foundation of his methodology. In his view, IR must be a study of minds. He admits that human nature remains the same

⁴ Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. 25.

⁵ Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁷ Cf. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

⁸ Cf. R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

⁹ Jackson (2000), p. 33.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

in as far as human beings have minds, but in the final analysis his point is that minds are unpredictable.¹¹ Human beings share a common humanity, but they conceive of their humanity and display it in different ways,¹² which is why Jackson believes in human natures, not human nature.¹³

Jackson's line of reasoning warrants critical scrutiny, especially so, since International Society scholarship itself professes to be clear about conceptions of human nature. To be sure, Jackson does use a conception of human nature (in the singular), even if he likes to think in terms of human natures rather. While Jackson is focused on the world *inter homines*, and tries to be consistent in understanding the human being as an agency unit in 'horizontal' terms only, he cannot avoid looking at *homo* as a being in itself, that is, in 'vertical' terms. When Jackson takes an empirical view,¹⁴ observing that there are many different manifestations of humanity and human nature in the world *inter homines*, he nevertheless admits that human beings share a common humanity and one human nature, which he believes to consist in their having minds. As a matter of fact, Jackson is even willing to expand on what it is to be human in substantive terms. Jackson maintains that human beings, in using their minds, everywhere have the ability to recognize each other as fellow human beings,¹⁵ and posits that human activity can only be human if it affirms the values of human freedom and dignity.¹⁶

Jackson is inconsistent on two accounts. First, he posits that to be human one has to take the internal view by using one's mind, but when trying to explain what human nature is he takes an external view, using his body or, more precisely, his physical senses. Here, Jackson should either admit that it is human to have both a mind and a body, or maintain that it is all about the human mind, and then also admit that human nature is not about the many external manifestations of humanity and human nature but about human nature itself, which must be taken to consist in thinking about thinking. Clearly, Jackson does not consider the former, since in his view this would lead to a conception of human being that is living in two worlds, which could only stem from the mind of a "split personality".¹⁷ This is what he reproaches Max Weber for when

¹¹ Ibid., p. 72.

¹² Ibid., p. 74.

¹³ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 55.

Weber first makes the distinction between a physical event and its social content, and then holds that social actions are never merely physical events but a combination of physical and social. Interestingly, Jackson amends for this ‘mistake’ by making the distinction between a physical (external) phenomenon and the *human* (internal) episode.¹⁸ That is, the human being is social, and nature is not human. Jackson admits that human beings are limited in their choices and actions by both human and physical circumstances, but he proposes to only focus on human circumstances, and to set aside the physical ones without further ado.¹⁹

Second, Jackson posits that the human being is a social being that can only be understood in terms of human relations and activity, but when trying to understand this human activity he prescribes the internal perspective, and takes the individual for a starting-point while thinking about thinking. Indeed, he thus gives the perfect definition of the human being conceived of as an individual. Although Jackson is inconsistent here again, it could be argued that, paradoxically, this inconsistency itself is fully consistent with what Jackson deems “obvious from experience, observation, and common sense”: the human proclivity to adhere to “the antithetical ideas of paternalism and independence”.²⁰ Following J.S. Mill in this regard, Jackson acknowledges that human beings share a common humanity, but are inclined to live apart from others.²¹ We could rephrase Jackson as follows: in horizontal terms human beings form a whole, but organize themselves in parts. While focusing on the latter, Jackson recognizes that these parts are wholes in themselves, and parts of a bigger whole at the same time. The fundamental political problem, he argues, is the mutual accommodation of parts and wholes.²² Here, at last, we have a view of human being, which forms the basis of Jackson’s account of the political theory underlying International Society scholarship.

The fundamental theoretical problem with Jackson’s line of reasoning is that, apart from its inconsistencies, it conflates or confuses the horizontal and vertical dimension of the distinction between inside and outside. The problem is that Jackson only wants to see the horizontal

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 99.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 42-3.

²¹ Cf. J.S. Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” in *Essays on Politics and Culture*, ed. G. Himmelfarb (New York: Anchor Books, 1963); and also Immanuel Kant, “On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political Right,” in *Kant’s Political Writings*, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 74.

²² Jackson (2000), p. 43.

dimension, interpreting parts and wholes in social and political terms, while in fact he takes the vertical dimension for a starting-point when associating the internal view with the mind, and the external view with body or nature. Thus, when discussing Oakeshott, he focuses on the term *inter homines*, while almost forgetting about the distinction that Oakeshott, like so many others, makes in the first place between the human mind and the human body. Jackson is only interested in this distinction insofar as it is categorical, as Oakeshott claims, which means to Jackson that one cannot combine them without becoming a split personality. His strategy for not becoming this himself is simply to forget about the human body. Knowingly or unknowingly, Jackson transposes the tension between mind and body, which is still there, to the horizontal dimension and ends up with what could be called Jackson's Universal Declaration of Human Proclivity, which forms the theoretical basis for the Global Covenant he proposes.

If it is hard to understand this world in terms of both time and space, shall we then just forget about space? This is exactly what Jackson does. His view filters out one dimension, and yet he admits that one needs to see this dimension.²³ When taking issue with advocates of the globalization thesis, who look at both moral-legal standards of conduct and socio-economic patterns of behaviour, he reproaches them for conflating or confusing the two, which he argues should be distinguished categorically. But at the same time he admits that statespeople must deal with technological, economic or social circumstances.²⁴ How can they deal with something, if they cannot see it? On three accounts it does not make sense to filter out the natural world when trying to understand world politics. First, one leaves out of the picture an important dimension that one has to face anyhow, which is impractical. Second, by isolating the human world from the natural world, one gets an unrealistic if not utopian picture that bears only limited resemblance to the world out there. Third, from a methodological point of view, there is no need to isolate categories, as the example of time and space illustrates. As a matter of fact, this example makes perfectly clear that if one were to assert the opposite, one would first have to prove that Einstein's theory of relativity is wrong. As Jackson has not given any such proof, and nothing of it can be construed as providing it, his assumptions must be wrong.

²³ Ibid., p. 99.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

To summarize, Jackson's theory is based on a conception of human nature, which provides a foundation that is less than shaky. He maintains that it is human to recognize fellow human beings as well as to affirm the values of human freedom and dignity, as this would be a matter of experience, observation, and common sense. That is, while endorsing the internal view only—and thus taking the individual for a starting-point, not the world *inter homines*,—he takes, in fact, both the internal view (common sense) and the external view (experience and observation). Next, Jackson conflates or confuses the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the distinction between these views. Whereas, in fact, he uses the vertical dimension, he conceives of it in horizontal terms. He charges others, who try to reconcile the two, with a split personality, and seeks to avoid becoming this himself by categorically ignoring the vertical dimension. Ironically, he ends up with a notion of human proclivity that provides the very constitution of the split personality, in the horizontal sense.

To conclude, even if the theoretical foundation of International Society scholarship is weak, Jackson's description of it is excellent. The internal inconsistencies of the International Society approach that he inadvertently helps to uncover, nicely match its claim that the human mind is unpredictable. As Bull puts it, IR can only be “a scientifically imperfect procedure”, which has at best a “tentative and inconclusive status”.²⁵ If one is left with a sense of incompleteness, this is exactly what this approach strives for. However, for all the good that Jackson does in trying to make sense of this approach, which is all about the horizontal dimension we discussed in Part I, he does not establish that the horizontal dimension is all there is in human affairs. On the contrary, he presupposes the vertical dimension but he cannot give it a place in his theory. This leads to the final conclusion that International Society scholarship is half right at best.

Constructivism does exactly what International Society forbids by trespassing the boundaries that the latter sets itself. Both schools share common ground in founding their theories on the same fundamental distinction, *viz.*, between the natural world that is made by God, and the historical world that is made by human beings. This distinction is by no means new, since it can be traced back at least to the writings of

²⁵ Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,” in K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 20.

Giambattista Vico,²⁶ who used the distinction in the eighteenth century in order to focus on the historical world. For one thing, one can agree with Jackson that there is nothing revolutionary about the way Constructivism studies human relations.²⁷ Constructivism and International Society are united in opposing the view of Kenneth Waltz, Thomas Schelling and other positivist theorists of IR, who believe in the notion of an external, objective reality. Instead, they only accept an inter-subjective reality, while using their own framework to describe it. However, for all they share, at this point they part company, as Constructivism goes further where International Society stops in building upon this inter-subjective reality a positivist social science of IR. At this point, International Society scholars like Jackson believe that a methodological problem emerges for Constructivism, since it would have a split personality: it is not positivist in emphasizing inter-subjectivity, but it is positivist in building a scientific discipline emphasizing explanations rather than understanding.²⁸

The distinction between understanding and explaining brings us to the heart of the epistemological debate in IR, which we already mentioned in Chapter 1 as one of the great debates within the discipline. The point that Alexander Wendt makes in formulating what has become the most authoritative statement of Constructivism so far,²⁹ is that it is not much of a debate really, as the protagonists on both sides lack any common ground to be able to talk to each other. Wendt purports that his theory establishes the *via media* in epistemology, which would show that at least there is something to talk about.³⁰ Instead of making a categorical distinction between the natural world that we can try to explain, and the social world that we can try to understand, Wendt argues that there is no epistemological difference between understanding and explaining, and that the positivist, scientific approach can be applied to both natural and social kinds. When thinking about these two kinds of “stuff”, however, Wendt does admit that there are significant analytical or methodological differences between what he calls causal and constitutive types of theorizing. Thus, he reframes the distinction between understanding and explaining, but admits that there are always two stories to tell.³¹

²⁶ Vico: *Selected Writings*, ed. Pompa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 26.

²⁷ Jackson (2000), p. 53.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

²⁹ For this discussion of Constructivism I mainly draw on Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³⁰ Ibid., p. 40.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 85-6.

The main point Wendt makes, marking the difference between him and constructivists like Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie,³² is that IR scholars should be more concerned with ontological questions (about what there is) than with epistemological theories (about how we know it, if we can know anything at all). While Wendt argues that “positivists” and “post-positivists” alike are at least tacit scientific realists,³³ he posits that the real questions are ontological of nature, and should be discussed along two different axes. Along the *x*-axis, Wendt posits, there is the individualism-holism debate, which is about the relation between agency and structure, and along the *y*-axis there is the materialism-idealism debate.³⁴ Wendt imports the distinction he made in epistemological terms between causality and constitution into the discussion of ontological questions on both axes. As a matter of fact, on the *x*-axis he tries to resolve the apparent paradox between the two by applying it to the notion of individuality. He argues that one should make a distinction between individuality *per se* and individuality in social terms,³⁵ where the former is about being independent, and the latter about being dependent. This distinction would allow us to see how agents and structure, which Wendt understands as culture,³⁶ can be both “mutually constituted” and “co-determined”. Whereas Anthony Giddens sees the relationship between agents and structure only in terms of “duality” (two sides of the same coin), and not of “dualism” (distinct phenomena interacting over time), Wendt maintains it is both duality and dualism.³⁷

If Wendt tries to solve the paradox between causality and constitution by offering a conception of individuality along the *x*-axis, he provides its foundation in human nature by using a conception of materiality along the *y*-axis. As a matter of fact, he follows the same procedure with materialism, as we saw with individualism. First, he makes the distinction between object and subject, *i.e.*, between materialism and materiality (like between individualism and individuality); and then, while focusing on the latter, he makes a distinction between materiality *per se*

³² Cf. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” *International Organization* 40 (1986), pp. 753-775.

³³ Wendt (1999), p. 47.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-29.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141: Wendt uses the term in his theory as meaning socially shared knowledge, that is, as knowledge that is both common and connected between individuals. Bull’s “society” is a subset of what Wendt calls “culture”.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 180-84.

and materiality and its context (like between individuality *per se* and individuality in social terms). That is, Wendt does not deny material forces as such, but posits that cultural phenomena can be as constraining and real as power and interest.³⁸ His view of human nature, which he admits is foundational of his whole theory,³⁹ is that it is constituted as a material base with an ideational superstructure. As the former is concerned, Wendt stipulates a rump materialist “theory” of human nature, which is no more than a listing of material needs in roughly descending order of importance, *viz.*, (i) physical security; (ii) ontological security; (iii) sociation; (iv) self-esteem; and (v) transcendence.⁴⁰ However, the ensuing material needs and forces, Wendt posits, are “far less important and interesting than the contexts of meaning that human beings construct around them”.⁴¹ Thus, on the *y*-axis, Wendt admits that there is no denying that there is a material base, but he focuses almost completely on the ideational superstructure. Likewise, on the *x*-axis, he admits that one can think of individuality as such, but he claims that individuality is to be understood in social terms first and foremost. Here, at last, we have the foundation of Wendt’s theory, which he calls idealist and holistic, or social and constructivist, by which he means the same.

What contribution does Wendt’s Constructivism make to IR when it comes to the question into human nature? Does it establish the *via media* that it purports to be? In the following, we will assess what it does and what it does not. For one thing, Wendt himself already makes some reservations. He admits that those who claim that there is no *via media* between the epistemological and ontological positions he seeks to reconcile, “may be right”.⁴² Even if it exists, though, one can doubt if one is establishing a middle position when taking a “positivist” position in one field (epistemology), and a “post-positivist” position in another (ontology). However, for sure, we can say that Wendt does not establish any *via media* within either epistemology or ontology. Indeed, he makes a distinction between causal and constitutive types of theorizing in epistemology, but he strongly favours the latter type. Thus, when applying these types of theorizing to ontology, he does make a distinction between individuality/materiality *per se* and individuality/materiality in social or contextual terms, but he favours the latter.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 136.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 131–32.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 131–32. Wendt derives his list from, among others, Giddens and Maslow.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 136.

⁴² Ibid., p. 40.

Whenever Wendt makes a distinction, and creates an imbalance, this is because of the view of human nature he uses. As we saw, he makes a distinction between the material base and its ideational superstructure first, and then declares the latter to be pervasive. He has no strong arguments to demonstrate why the latter is more important than the former, and admits that “[w]hat IR scholars will disagree about, fiercely, is how significant this cultural superstructure is in governing state behavior, relative to the base of rump material conditions”.⁴³ As a matter of fact, he also admits that he has not much to offer when it comes to describing what the material base is, in itself. As he concedes that any theory presupposes such base, he understands that one cannot dodge the issue. This is why at least he “stipulates” a rump materialist “theory”, which is not more than an arbitrary list of fundamental needs, while not even examining competing views or theories concerning the material base.⁴⁴ If this is the base of Wendt’s theory, and the foundation of the building that Constructivism erects, one may wonder if it is a building at all.

Wendt’s view of human nature appears to be an afterthought. Wendt begins his theory by positing that natural and social kinds should not be distinguished categorically. However, later on he posits that

at some level material forces are constituted independent of society, and affect society in a causal way. Material forces are not constituted solely by social meanings, and social meanings are not immune to material effects. On the other hand, it is only because of their interaction with ideas that material forces have the effects that they do (...) So the relationship between material forces and ideas works both ways, but we can only properly theorize this relationship if we recognize that at some level they are constituted as different kinds of independently existing stuff. This formulation of the materialism-idealism problem is ultimately Cartesian, insofar as it separates the world into two kinds of phenomena—in effect, mind and body—and may be criticized for that reason. But I do not see any other way to think about the problem if we are to be scientific realists about social life.⁴⁵

By adhering to Descartes’ view of human being,⁴⁶ Wendt gets in trouble as he institutionalises dualism by separating mind and body, which is

⁴³ Ibid., p. 190.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 131.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 111-12.

⁴⁶ Wendt perseveres in adhering to this view, as is testified by Alexander Wendt, “Social Theory as Cartesian Science: An Auto-Critique From a Quantum Perspective,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics* (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 181-219.

inconsistent with his claim that his theory can account for both dualism and duality. Thus, his view of human being is not only an afterthought, but it is also a wrong one in terms of internal consistency.

If Wendt were to start with his view of human being, as he claims one should, he would have to use the x - and y -axis to denote the dualism and/or duality he sees with respect to the human being, and not to abstract debates. Instead, what we see is that Wendt puts the materialism-idealism debate about mind and body on his y -axis. Next, he puts the individualism-holism debate on the x -axis, and makes the distinction between individuality *per se* and individuality in social terms. When it comes to describing the difference between the two, it turns out that the former stands for the body and the latter for the mind. Although one could argue that what he describes on the x -axis is consistent with what he describes on the y -axis, it would be more accurate to say that he describes the same thing on both axes, and that he confuses or conflates the two. The conclusion is that Wendt has his axes wrong, which means that there is no foundation for his theory.

To summarize, Wendt's theory is based on a conception of human being that separates mind and body, which is inconsistent with the theory itself. Wendt posits that there are always two stories to tell, but he is not able to convey how his causal and constitutive types are related in a principled manner. To understand this relation one has to use the terms of wholes and parts, which Wendt does not. Causality, then, is about being part of some larger whole, where one is affected by something external of oneself. Constitution is about being whole in itself, and being in charge of what is internal. Parts and wholes are the most basic concepts that causality and constitution rest on, and only they can express how causality and constitution are intimately related: they constitute duality, being each other's flip-side. This has far-reaching consequences for Wendt's theory. Since the distinction between causality and constitution underlies all fundamental distinctions he makes, his theory must be wrong insofar as he favours one side after having made his distinction. After all, wherever there is a part there is a whole, which means that causality and constitution should be in balance, just as mind and body, and—according to his theory—agency and structure. In Part II, we will develop a view of human being that can account for that, while being internally consistent, and more principled than this theory.

To conclude, Constructivism is fundamentally different from International Society scholarship, in that it includes what we have called the vertical dimension in the picture (not to be confused with the y -axis

of Constructivism itself). Unlike International Society, Constructivism allows itself to include the question into human being or human nature. Even if one disagrees with the idea that the “I” can be equated with the body, as Wendt has it, he at least poses the question. Perhaps, it is indeed the singularly most important contribution Wendt makes in IR, that in posing questions he makes a shift from epistemology to ontology. As, in fact, he sets himself this goal when developing his theory,⁴⁷ one must conclude that Wendt has been successful on his own terms in setting the agenda within IR, however flawed his theory is in itself. While we have argued that his theory is wrong because of inconsistencies concerning mind and body, it could still be argued that it brings horizontal reasoning to the next level. As a matter of fact, Wendt’s Constructivism is much the same as International Society, in that it focuses on horizontal reasoning. Wendt even copies Wight’s distinction between his “three traditions”, and transposes it into “three cultures of anarchy”⁴⁸—Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian—claiming that anarchy is what states make of it, since it is (almost) all about culture and inter-subjectivity. When developing a conception of social construction, Wendt acknowledges a material base; like Jackson acknowledges that we share a common humanity, when focusing on its different manifestations in the social world. While locating their base in different spheres, they share two things: they both focus on the social or horizontal dimension, and they both admit that they do not know too much about the other dimension. The present theory promises that it can do better than that.

Second, after having given two examples of how IR theories, of necessity, presuppose or assume some view of human being, we now proceed to the question what the vertical dimension is about. We already stipulated that it is about structure, or the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole. When making the third point, we will see how this component is intimately related with the human being itself. However, we have to establish first what kind of questions we are dealing with in Part II. In this regard, we noted in Chapter 1 that Part I is about how the parts (agency units) *ought* to relate to one another, and that Part II is about what the whole (structure) *is*. Whereas the distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ is central to the study of jurisprudence, the distinction is used here only to flag a shift in terms of methodology. While in Part I we made use of analogical reasoning to

⁴⁷ Wendt (1999), p. 40.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 246-312.

address the question of how agency units ought to act, in Part II we will make use of ontological reasoning to address the question of what is. After all, ontology is about that question. As we concluded above, Wendt already prepared the shift to ontology in IR. However, Wendt conflates his terms and gets confused, settling with a view of human being that he cannot (but he thinks he has to) support. So what did he do wrong? For this we have to go back to basics, and see what ontology has to say about part and whole.

The relation between part and whole is a central topic of ontology. In ontology, however, this relation is not understood in terms of acting but in terms of being. Most famously, Plato addressed it when making his distinction among three parts of the soul, which we will elaborate on in Chapter 4. He formulates the ontological problem of the relation between part and whole, having Socrates explain it as follows:

“But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly.” “I think so too,” he said. “Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way.” “How?” “It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was not the same thing functioning but a plurality.” “Very well.”⁴⁹

While this general principle of opposition, as it is called, is not a necessary but, at most, a sufficient condition on something having parts, the passage does pose the ontological problem, which is about identity.

In discussing Plato’s metaphysics of structure, as construed from passages of the *Parmenides*, the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, the *Philebus*, and the *Timaeus*, and its relevance for modern discussions of composition and identity, Verity Harte distinguishes two groups of discussions of part and whole.⁵⁰ The first group adopts a model of composition according to which a whole is identical to its collective parts. It claims that composition (the relation of many parts to one whole) *is* identity (the

⁴⁹ Plato, *The Republic*, Book IV, 436B-C, trans. Paul Shorey, in Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press/Heinemann, 1930), pp. 381-83.

⁵⁰ See Verity Harte, *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).

relation of one thing to itself), which leads to the paradox that one thing is the same thing as many things. Some in this group retreat from this claim, and only endorse an analogy between the composition relation and the identity relation, which is the basis of the thesis of composition *as* identity.⁵¹ The second group adopts a model of composition according to which a whole is a structure, the identity of whose parts is determined only in the context of the whole they compose. One could view both groups of discussions as complementary in giving an account of the composition of a whole from its parts such that a whole is an individual rather than a mere collection. They are both concerned with the nature of a whole as an individual.⁵²

Nevertheless, the two groups of discussions differ in the way they think about the role that is played by structure in the constitution of a whole. The former thinks structure is not essential to the whole; the latter thinks it is. In sociology, methodological individualism and structural sociology represent the same divide, being methodological counterparts of the dualism between subject and social object in the social sciences. Anthony Giddens has been influential in reconceptualizing this dualism as a duality—the duality of structure. Giddens’ theorem of the duality of structure is crucial to his structuration theory, which is mentioned here as a precursor of Wendt’s theory. According to this theorem, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize, while they do not exist outside of action. Structure is held to be more internal than external to individuals, and it is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling.⁵³ Whereas Wendt would say that there is dualism insofar as structure is external to individuals, Giddens stresses that ‘structural forces’ are always nothing more and nothing less than the consequences of action.⁵⁴ His point is that whenever one could say that structure is external, it is internal at the same time, and *vice versa*: this is the duality of structure.

If structure is connected with human doing, what does that mean in terms of the view of human being? Does Giddens propose a duality of mind and body, instead of the Cartesian dualism? Interestingly, Giddens does mention the human body and its spatiality that is essential in the

⁵¹ See David Lewis, *Parts of Classes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 82.

⁵² Harte (2002), p. 5.

⁵³ Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), p. 25.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

interaction with others who are physically co-present,⁵⁵ but his structuration theory is about human knowledgeability really, that is, about the human mind. How so? In Giddens' theory, the mind is thought to operate on different levels of abstraction, the most abstract of which is the level of structural principles. These structural principles would operate in contradiction, and Giddens uses this concept in two senses: that of 'existential contradiction' and that of 'structural contradiction'.⁵⁶ While the former lies "at the very heart of the human condition, in the sense that life is predicated upon nature, yet is not of nature and is set off against it",⁵⁷ the latter refers to the constitutive features of human societies, to be found in capitalist (nation-)states in which "a 'private' sphere of 'civil society' is created by, but is separate from and in tension with, the 'public' sphere of the state".⁵⁸ Giddens takes an evolutionary approach, and holds that the existential contradiction is only pre-eminent in tribal societies, whereas the structural contradiction is pre-eminent in states. He admits, though, that the suppression of existential questions is not—because it cannot be—complete: "Indeed, they are fundamental to the structural contradictions introduced by capitalism and are part of what gives them their peculiarly explosive potential."⁵⁹

Giddens admits that existential contradiction is the fundamental notion that lies at the heart of his structuration theory, but he only mentions it to forget it. When he discusses the structural contradiction between the 'public' and 'private' sphere, which he calls a 'primary contradiction', he also mentions a 'secondary contradiction' between economy and polity: the tension between the internationalising of capital and the internal consolidation of nation-states. In this regard, Giddens maintains that "the separation of the 'economic', as a sphere of continued and rapid change, has as its necessary condition the power of the modern state".⁶⁰ Taking the primary and secondary contradiction together, we are left with three spheres: civil society, polity, and economy. As the earlier citation suggests, Giddens may have felt that the structural contradictions among these spheres are somehow connected with the existential contradiction. The present theory can explain how in fact they are connected with the existential contradiction, and how they are intimately

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 64 ff.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 193 ff.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 193.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 197.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 198.

related to the human condition. As we will see, it is all about the vertical dimension. While structuration theory acknowledges this dimension, it only focuses on the horizontal one. Therefore, it misses the point.

Third, after having argued that any IR theory is based on some view of human being, whose existential features are to be understood in terms of identity, we will now explain why this approach, and the framework that it is based upon, cannot be labelled as reductionist. To establish this, we first have to define the term, and we will do so by making use of the definition that Waltz offers. In fact, he offers three definitions. Defining reductionism in terms of wholes and parts, he says that it is “[e]ssential to the reductionist approach (...) that the whole shall be known through the study of its parts”.⁶¹ In terms of the distinction between inside and outside, he says that the claim of reductionist theories is “[t]hat internal forces produce external outcomes”.⁶² And, finally, in terms of levels of analysis, he states that “[t]heories of international politics that concentrate at the individual or national level are reductionist”.⁶³ The last definition makes clear that reductionism is to be understood in horizontal terms, since levels of analysis are about the different points of view one can take when trying to understand or explain how agency units relate to each other. Thus, the first and second definition is to be understood in a horizontal sense as well. Reductionism is what we have called ‘inside-out’ in Part I, and it only makes sense in the context of Part I.

While Part I made use of analogical reasoning to explain how inter-unit relations can be usefully compared across different levels of analysis, Part II is about identity. Analogy and identity differ in that the former presumes two things that can be compared in certain respects (which makes reductionism possible), while the latter is about one thing (which cannot be ‘reduced’ to itself). The former is about interactions of agency units that are understood in terms of (legal or social) personality; the latter is about individuality. The difference between personality and individuality, it is recalled, is that the former can be attributed to any agency unit, whereas the latter is intimately related to the human being. To make the same distinction in geometrical terms, agency units can be conceived of as concentric circles that can be drawn if one has an *x*- and *y*-axis (personality). These concentric circles are around the human being,

⁶¹ Waltz (1979), pp. 18-19.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

which is at the centre of these circles, and also adds a new dimension of itself: the vertical dimension or z -axis (individuality). The human being combines personality (with dualism constituted by two axes) and individuality (with duality constituted on one axis), and provides structure that way. That is, the human being is at the point of intersection of all three axes, and is constitutive of these. All three axes are infinite; they are no parts of some larger whole, but they are constitutive of the system of co-ordinates that structures everything. They form the structure of the whole. The human being constitutes the system-wide component of the whole. Reductionism does not apply here.

Chapter 4 is about the human condition. It provides the system of co-ordinates that makes it possible to devise a standard framework. Chapter 5 is about this standard framework as applied to international society.

Chapter 4: Flying Icarus

4.1 The Human Condition

The World is Flat is the title of Thomas Friedman's book that became a bestseller in 2005.¹ Friedman describes in it the state of the world, or rather the worldview that we have come to accept. Even if this book is not likely to become accepted as part of the academic core of IR Theory, and even less of the prep school curriculum in geography, it does go to the core of how people live their lives in the present world. As a matter of fact, it can be taken as a nice metaphor for the way we like to see the world in 'horizontal' terms, that is, as a world *inter homines*. If taken that way, the title can be seen as paradigmatic, also for how IR theorists have come to explain the world while focusing almost exclusively on the horizontal dimension. In a sense, the only thing IR theorists can do is provide intellectual frameworks that somehow match the world out there. But if that is so, and IR theorists claim, if metaphorically, that the world is flat, then there must be a disconnect between the world 'inside' and the world 'outside'. While some would argue that this disconnect is exactly what defines modernity, the present thesis argues that this is beside the point. Modernity is history. Today we live in a world that is debating what comes next after postmodernism. IR theories that are still based upon modernity are lagging behind; that is the point. In this paragraph, I will show that the two most influential IR theories, in fact, are lagging behind. The world is not flat, and this holds true for the world 'inside' as much as for the world 'outside'. I will demonstrate in geometrical terms what exact structure the former has, and why this is so of mathematical necessity. This structural framework will serve to explain both the world 'inside' and the world 'outside', with the human being as the central tissue.

The German Nobel Laureate Werner Heisenberg, who was one of the founders of quantum physics and the author of the indeterminacy principle, once remarked that after Galileo Galilei man encounters only himself.² To grasp the full meaning of this statement is to face the predicament of the modern age. After all, it is commonplace to posit that with Galileo's discovery of the telescope we enter the modern age.

¹ Thomas Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, expanded edition (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2006).

² Werner Heisenberg, *Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch, 1955), pp. 17-18.

Therefore, it is useful to get clear what it was precisely that set the stage.³ Interestingly, it was not the discovery itself that caused much of a stir. Rather, what did it was how Galileo made this discovery instrumental to his demonstrating that the laws of falling bodies are applicable to both the fall of terrestrial bodies and the movement of heavenly bodies. The assertion itself that the earth was no different than the other bodies was again not revolutionary. For a fact, the philosophers Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno, as well as the astronomers Nicolaus Copernicus and Johannes Kepler had already challenged the Ptolemaic system with its finite, geocentric worldview. What was revolutionary about Galileo's discovery, though, was that he used the telescope to render the secrets of the universe to human cognition through sense-perception. This is what marked the beginning of modern natural science.

Modern natural science gave rise to both triumph and despair: we found the Archimedean point but lost reality. How so? On the one hand, Galileo's discovery demonstrated that there were universal laws, applicable both on earth in terrestrial nature and also in extraterrestrial spheres. While we were still bound to the earth by the human condition, we came to look at ourselves, and all of terrestrial nature, from a universal point of view outside the earth. That is, without actually standing there, we found the Archimedean point. However, on the other hand, Galileo's discovery came with two possible nightmares. The first nightmare would be that what we think of as reality is but a dream, since we cannot trust the senses any longer and need instruments to really see reality. And the second nightmare would be that we may be convinced that there is some truth but can never reach it, as the human condition prevents us from getting there. Both nightmares were at the wake of modern philosophy. While universal doubt was looming, it was René Descartes who arrived at the solution, which he compressed in the famous phrase *cogito ergo sum*: I think while doubting, and as I doubt and think I exist. Descartes secured this one certainty as the starting-point for modern philosophy, which was not to be found in matter but in one's own mind. Later thinkers would build on the edifice Descartes had laid, much like on Vico's later dichotomy between the natural world and the human world. In the modern age the focus would be on the mind and the human world, that is, on introspection and consciousness of the self. Thus, what Galileo is to modern natural science, Descartes is to modern philosophy.

³ See for a more extensive historical account Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, second edition (Chicago/London: Chicago University Press, [1958] 1998), pp. 248 ff.

The next step, then, was from the modern age into modernity. Even if the distinction between the two sounds a bit redundant from a semantic point of view, it marks a shift in worldview that is again no less than revolutionary. This shift was preceded by two new discoveries in the sciences in the beginning of the twentieth century: Albert Einstein's theory of relativity, and the theory of quantum physics. While the former is concerned with the cosmos as a whole, the latter is with the smallest parts, called particles. Whereas we will examine both theories in more detail later, what is of interest here is that they led to a shift in the point of view that man would take vis-à-vis the world. Is it characteristic of the modern age that man found the Archimedean point but could not yet stand there, the step he could make to actually reach this point on the basis of the new theories marks the shift from the modern age into modernity. The distinction between these two points of view has been characterized as respectively science with a universal standpoint, yet bound to the earth through the human condition, and "universal" science with a cosmic standpoint outside earthly nature. From the latter point of view everything is the same basic substance. And this new acquired perspective led once again to both triumph and despair. Not only had man acquired the power to impose universal laws onto the earth, comporting both mastery over the earth and the ability to destroy her as well as oneself, he was also haunted by yet another possible nightmare. This nightmare would be that the macrocosmos and microcosmos are the same, as there is only one substance, but that there is an evil spirit that mocks us to the effect that in what we take to be of universal validity we encounter only the patterns of our own minds.

If thought patterns are indicative of the patterns of the human mind, philosophy can be regarded as following those patterns almost automatically. Hannah Arendt makes this case, while pointing at the way Plato reverses the Homeric worldview in his allegory of the Cave, where the body is the shadow of the soul, and not the other way round:

Academic philosophy, as a matter of fact, has ever since been dominated by the never-ending reversals of idealism and materialism, of transcendentalism and immanentism, of realism and nominalism, of hedonism and asceticism, and so on. What matters here is the reversibility of all these systems, that they can be turned "upside down" or "downside up" at any moment in history without requiring for such reversal either historical events or changes in the structural elements involved. (...) These reversals already began with the philosophical schools in late antiquity and have remained part of the Western tradition. It is still the same tradition, the same intellectual game with paired antitheses that rules, to an extent, the famous modern reversals of spiritual

hierarchies, such as Marx's turning Hegelian dialectic upside down or Nietzsche's revaluation of the sensual and natural as against the supersensual and supernatural.⁴

Much in this tradition Arendt describes the human condition as the result of certain dichotomies that prevail in intellectual history at a given time. Thus, she characterizes the modern age by the disappearance of the old dichotomy between earth and sky,⁵ and its substitution by two new dichotomies: the one between Being and Appearance⁶ (leading to doubt), and the other between mind and matter⁷ (leading to two separate methods for research: introspection and experiment). Modernity, then, she characterizes by the dichotomy between man and the universe.⁸

Interestingly, in building her own argument, Arendt gets locked in into the structures of her own mind, and thus provides a typical example. At the outset she makes clear that hers is a project to show that the human being is not thinking but doing, and to declare the victory of *animal laborans* over *homo sapiens*. In order to get there, she needs a couple of distinctions, the first one of which is the distinction between the *vita contemplativa* (with its search for eternity in metaphysical thought) and the *vita activa* (with its striving for immortality through the creation of great works). Whereas the former had always been at the top of the hierarchy, most notably in the Platonic idea of man, Arendt proposes a reversal in the hierarchical order by attributing prime standing to the latter in the modern age.⁹ Next, she uses her own distinction among three categories within the *vita activa*: labour (the human condition of which is biological life), work (the human condition of which is worldliness, as distinct from all natural surroundings), and action (with plurality as its human condition).¹⁰ Whereas Aristotle includes the category of action (*praxis*), together with speech (*lexis*), in what he calls the *bios politikos*, distinguishing it from the *bios theoretikos*, he does not consider labour and work as worthy of a *bios* in its own right. This, then, is the second reversal Arendt proposes, introducing *homo faber* in the modern age, who does not know truth but only knows what he makes himself by his works.¹¹

⁴ Ibid., pp. 292-293.

⁵ Ibid., p. 262.

⁶ Ibid., p. 275.

⁷ Ibid., p. 283.

⁸ Ibid., p. 270.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 289-294.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 294-304.

While reversing the hierarchical order within the antithetical pairs she respectively reproduces and fabricates, Arendt affirms in both cases the existence and importance of the part that is superseded. After all, it is necessary and sufficient in defining what the other part, which is elevated to the highest rank, is not. The problem with Arendt's reasoning is that she is not prepared to admit this, while arguing, instead, that this part disappears. Thus, with respect to the first reversal, Arendt argues that the *vita contemplativa* does not just get a lower rank in the hierarchical order but disappears altogether.¹² To be able to eliminate it, she has to make a distinction between contemplation and some other form of thinking, as it would be a tough call to declare the end of thinking (especially so, when describing an age that is epitomized by the famous *cogito ergo sum*). In the rich armoury of distinctions Antiquity provides, she finds the one between contemplation, as the beholding of truth, which is described as *arrheton* or 'beyond speech' in both Plato and Aristotle, and *eme emanto*, which is the inner dialogue in which one speaks with oneself in the Socratic tradition.¹³ The trick that Arendt does is that she incorporates the latter in her category of action, and forgets about the distinction Aristotle makes, within the *bios politikos*, between action (*praxis*) and speech (*lexis*). In a sense, thinking truly disappears as Arendt eliminates speech. And this is more than just leaving the activity of thinking out of consideration, as she proposes at the outset. Nevertheless, Arendt's goal is "to think what we are doing", which is the central theme of the book.¹⁴ It is a bit puzzling, then, how this is supposed to work.

Arendt wants to rewrite intellectual history from the vantage point of the actions of which humankind is capable, but she cannot escape using her own intellect, while imposing the distinctions she deems fit. This also applies to the third reversal, which is supposed to lead, finally, to the victory of *animal laborans* over *homo faber*. This reversal marks the transition from the mechanistic worldview as espoused by Descartes, who saw the relation between nature and God as the one between a watch and a watchmaker, to an evolutionary worldview. This new worldview was ushered in by David Hume's criticism of the causality principle. Hume posited that its twofold central axiom—*nihil sine causa*, and the cause must be more perfect than its most perfect effect—may be applicable in the realm of fabrication but not in that of organic life

¹² Ibid., p. 291. However, Descartes exposes his fundamental insights on doubt in a dialogue that is about contemplation: *La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle*.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

development, where evolution shows that a lower being causes the appearance of a higher being. In what is perhaps the most stunning example of Arendt's turning upside down or downside up, however one likes to see it, she describes this new insight as a belated victory of the method of introspection over the method of experiment, which had both emerged from Galileo's discovery. How so?

The split between subject and object, inherent in human consciousness and irremediable in the Cartesian opposition of man as *res cogitans* to a surrounding world of *res extensae*, disappears altogether in the case of a living organism, whose very survival depends upon the incorporation, the consumption, of outside matter. Naturalism, the nineteenth-century version of materialism, seemed to find in life the way to solve the problems of Cartesian philosophy and at the same time to bridge the ever-widening chasm between philosophy and science.¹⁵

For one thing, this line of reasoning is inconsistent. It starts out with the substitution of introspection by "the incorporation, the consumption of outside matter". Next, it argues that this consumption of outside matter is what life is all about. And it concludes that this way of seeing life provides the solution for the split between mind and matter (which the Cartesian opposition of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* is really about). However, only either one can be true: either life is about matter and nothing else, or life is about bridging the divide between matter *and* mind.

The only way out would be that the divide between mind and matter could be bridged by the incorporation of mind *in* matter. It could be argued that Arendt, in a sense, goes this way when explaining the alleged victory of *animal laborans* over *homo faber*. She holds that the former could assert itself because of Christianity and its fundamental belief in the sacredness of life. And this could be construed as meaning that Christ is seen as God Incarnate, that is, as the incorporation of the immaterial in the body. Here, however, three points are in order. First, Arendt confuses or conflates different meanings of Life. While she herself defines it as biological or physical life, connecting it with *animal laborans*, the Christian definition of life is richer than that, including the spiritual dimension.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 312-313.

¹⁶ If one is prepared to follow a theological line of reasoning, in the first place, one has to make one step further. Indeed, Christ could be seen as embodying the spiritual world, as God's Son or God Incarnate; that is, as the incorporation of the mind in the body. But to stop here, would be to misrepresent Christianity, which is not only about the Father and the Son but also about the Holy Ghost or Holy Spirit. Irrespective of

Arendt does not make any effort at exploring this dimension. While acknowledging Blaise Pascal and Søren Kierkegaard as “the two greatest religious thinkers of modernity”¹⁷ who “fully realized” the potentialities of the Cartesian method of introspection,¹⁸ Arendt posits later on that we may “leave aside” Kierkegaard and his “non-worldly, inward-directed acting”.¹⁹ Instead, she is only keen at showing how one apostle, St. Paul, could be interpreted as “the apostle of labour”.²⁰ Leaving religion aside, we could make the same point in philosophy. Arendt regards Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Henri Bergson as the greatest representatives of modern life philosophy, insofar as they all equate Life and Being.

whether it is a Holy Ghost or a Holy Spirit, it is something immaterial. And irrespective of what Bible reading one prefers, it is this immaterial element that is called holy. This immaterial element has everything to do with Christ’s crucifixion on Golgotha and Christianity’s belief in His resurrection, which is to be understood in spiritual terms. After all, waiting for Christ to reappear physically, would be like waiting for Godot. Instead, resurrection is taken to mean that the grave is empty, but the heart is full. The heart of the matter, here, is that one believes that “Christ is in me”. The historical significance of this is that at some point in intellectual history, apparently, it becomes imaginable and thinkable that the locus of the divine is in oneself. This amounts to a revolutionary turn in thinking, more broadly, as much as in religious life itself, where one does not look up or outside for guidance but only inside. This is what is meant by introspection. In one’s self one can make space for the Holy Spirit, so to say, and search for Truth, but this is not tantamount to saying that one’s self—or biological life, for that matter—is sacred or holy. Self-consciousness is a starting-point, not a sacred end. As such, paradoxically, it is the new creed, which has remained unshaken by secularisation.

¹⁷ Arendt (1998), p. 319. Whereas Arendt herself does not discuss Kierkegaard’s thinking in substantive terms, it is important to mention the existential paradox he formulates. In a sense, this paradox is about the human condition really, whereas Christianity marks a certain stage in human consciousness. The existential paradox describes the starting position from where one may or may not take one step further into the consciousness we described in the previous note. For explaining this paradox, Kierkegaard uses the myth of Adam and Eve and their ejection from the Garden of Eden. Interpreting this myth, he posits that if you eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, you will get an awareness of your own mortality. The ejection from the Garden of Eden symbolizes a descent from innocence, a fall into self-consciousness; man becomes capable of reflecting upon his dual nature, which consists in the mortality of the body and his partial divinity. For some, this awareness brings with it the desire to retreat to the lost innocence and take a step back; and for others, the desire to look for some Other—Yahweh—to come with a solution. Christ, then, could be seen as the representative of humankind who combines both parts in his own being on earth. To put it differently, man is born into the dilemma of having to unify, within his being, the opposites of life and death. This is the existential paradox. (See *The Concept of Anxiety* [1844]).

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 293.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 313.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 316.

However, they all rely on introspection, in that they can only arrive at this equation by having man look into himself, as Arendt admits.²¹ Even if what one finds inside would be more about action than contemplation, there is yet place, apparently, for introspection, not mere incorporation or consumption. Arendt makes a travesty of the concept of Life.

Second, Arendt contradicts herself. The thrust of her argument is that philosophy suffered from modernity, while its influence decreased as never before. She puts this as follows:

After Descartes based his own philosophy upon the discoveries of Galileo, philosophy has seemed condemned to be always one step behind the scientists and their ever more amazing discoveries, whose principles it has strived arduously to discover *ex post facto* and to fit into some over-all interpretation of the nature of human knowledge. As such, however, philosophy was not needed by the scientists, who—up to our time, at least—believed that they had no use for a handmaiden, let alone one who would “carry the torch in front of her gracious lady” (Kant).²²

However, Arendt also posits, as we saw, that nineteenth-century naturalism marks the belated victory of the method of introspection over the method of experiment, and at the same time “bridge[s] the ever-widening chasm between philosophy and science”. This means that there would not only be a link between the two, but that philosophy (or to put it in Cartesian terms: *res cogitans*) plays first fiddle. In fact, Arendt herself inadvertently illustrates the primacy of the mind, as she points at Christianity as the reason for the alleged emergence of *animal laborans*. Even if she likes to see Christianity as the precursor of materialism, she cannot equate Christianity with secularisation and materialism. If one can already say that the former led to the latter two, it was still the former that came first. Arendt thinks that she gives primacy to matter, while what matters in what she is doing, in the first place, is thinking.

Third, Arendt is not describing the human condition, but various stages, if contentious, of human consciousness. Moreover, in so doing, she misses out large parts of humanity. When attributing central importance to Christianity, Arendt appeals to only one part of humanity, while leaving out other parts. One may agree with the central importance of Christianity, but one still has to acknowledge that not everybody is prepared to accept that. One may agree with the central importance of individuality that Christianity has given rise to, but one still has to

²¹ Ibid., p. 313.

²² Ibid., p. 294.

acknowledge that in some cultures the individual comes only second to the collectivity. When Arendt writes that she wants to think what we are doing, she does not take the vantage point of doing, but rather of what some people are thinking in some part of the world at some point in time. For one thing, she does admit that this is a matter of thought, but somehow she believes that this kind of thought is to be distinguished from the “thoughtlessness—the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of ‘truths’ which have become trivial and empty”—that she considers “among the outstanding characteristics of our time.”²³ If not others, for their own reasons, had already acclaimed Arendt as a great representative of our time, one could have argued that she qualifies, ironically, for this epithet by her own characterization.

To conclude our discussion of Arendt’s *magnum opus*, we may say that, indeed, Arendt gets locked in into the structures of her own mind, and thereby provides a typical example of what modernity is about. By the same token, she provides a perfect example of what postmodernism seeks to uncover and unravel.

Postmodernism is preoccupied with the idea that man cannot escape his horizons, and that he is caught in conceptual prisons. Jacques Derrida seeks to demonstrate that one cannot but buy into various binary oppositions, like the inside/outside and mind/body dichotomies. The point Derrida makes is that these dichotomies are supposed to be value-neutral, but that in practice there is always one pole that is privileged over the other. Using his method of ‘deconstruction’, Derrida shows how in practice dualisms are both negated and preserved (or *aufgehoben*, as Hegel would have it).²⁴ Instead of explaining this method in theory, the above discussion of Arendt’s argument may serve to illustrate it, in the way I have shown that she favours one pole while eliminating the other. As this elimination is impossible, from a postmodernist point of view Arendt’s line of reasoning must lead to the conclusion that either there is no human condition, or this condition were to consist in the human struggle itself to understand his condition. Michel Foucault, this other great exponent of postmodernism, would embrace both alternatives at the same time. He posits that there is no human ‘condition’ or ‘nature’ outside the webs of contingency that human beings are caught in.²⁵

²³ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁴ In IR Theory, Robert Walker applies the method of deconstruction while focusing, as we saw in the Introduction to Part I, on the inside/outside dichotomy.

²⁵ In IR Theory, Richard Ashley takes a similar view, conceiving power as a network of disciplinary practices that help to constitute our identity as constructed selves.

Struggle he deems both demanded by, and a condition of this patternless process. However, apart from the fact that human beings may and will struggle, what Foucault does not make clear, is why they *should*. Nor does he make clear what they should struggle *for*. While the answers to these questions presuppose some conception of the human good (which in turn presupposes some conception of human nature or the human condition), Foucault offers none.²⁶

Searching for the sources of the self, Charles Taylor offers a way out. His general point is that greatness comes with misery. In his view, it would be a cardinal mistake to believe that a good must be invalid if it leads to suffering or destruction. Avoiding the dilemma is impossible, and yet one-sided judgements prevail. Taylor observes that we tend in our culture to stifle the spirit, and his intention is to retrieve and rearticulate the buried goods.²⁷ For one thing, he opposes postmodernism, and shows that its method of deconstruction is inconsistent when presenting his ethics of authenticity:

Briefly, we can say that authenticity (A) involves (i) creation and construction as well as discovery, (ii) originality, and frequently (iii) opposition to the rules of society and even potentially to what we recognize as morality. But it is also true, as we saw, that it (B) requires (i) openness to horizons of significance (for otherwise the creation loses the background that can save it from insignificance) and (ii) a self-definition in dialogue. That these demands may be in tension has to be allowed. But what must be wrong is a simple privileging of one over the other, of (A), say, at the expense of (B), or vice versa.

This is what the trendy doctrines of “deconstruction” involve today. They stress (A.i), the constructive, creative nature of our expressive languages, while altogether forgetting (B.i). And they capture the extremer forms of (A.iii), the amorality of creativity, while forgetting (B.ii), its dialogical setting, which binds us to others.²⁸

The deconstruction of the self is a negation of horizons. It denies that selfhood is intertwined with the good. Thus leaving out one part of authenticity, Taylor posits, life is flattened. Instead, one should face both parts, and live the tension or struggle, of which no definitive solution is to be expected. This struggle should not be *over* authenticity, but *about* it.

²⁶ Cf. Mark Philp, “Michel Foucault,” in Quentin Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 79.

²⁷ See Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).

²⁸ Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 66-67.

To accept Taylor's argument, one has to believe in three things as he himself admits: (i) Authenticity is a valid ideal; (ii) one can argue in reason about ideals; and (iii) these arguments can make a difference.²⁹ While the first two things will be covered later in this Chapter, the third thing we will start with, so as to see if it is of any use to proceed along this line anyway. Even if this way of proceeding illustrates the primacy of instrumental reason, which Taylor considers among the malaises of our time, calling it in Weberian terms an "iron cage",³⁰ one can make a difference by escaping the iron cage. Paradoxically, Taylor's point is that one can escape the iron cage of instrumental reason by recognizing the inescapable structural requirements of human agency. It is the step, as he sees it, from disengaged reason to the recognition of the embodied, dialogical, temporal nature of the human being. Interestingly, whereas Taylor disapproves of mathematical thinking, which he associates with the former,³¹ he makes use of it when elaborating on the latter. Taylor himself does not offer a full-scale alternative picture, but he propounds that any picture must include "three axes"³² (a sense of respect for and obligations to others; understanding of what makes a full life; and human dignity). Thus, he buys into a mathematical logic.

The question that follows after postmodernism is: If we are not stuck, and if there is a way out, how can we find that way? When searching for it, we must turn to mathematics, as it underlies our quest. This is not only the case with Taylor's argument, but also, as we saw, with Grotius' theory, and with Spinoza's, as we will see. That is also why, in explaining the Grotian position, I used geometrical terms. To use such terms, though, is to follow the logic they comport with. And if we turn to mathematics here, it is to understand that logic, not to say that it is all there is. It must be absolutely clear that human life, of course, cannot be reduced to mathematics. On the contrary, human life is not like mathematics, but mathematics surely is part of human life. That is to say, as far as it plays any part in human life, we have to be sure about what it amounts to, and how it relates to other parts of human life and nature. To put it again differently, if we are concerned with the mind, we should resort to the purest faculty it caters for, and see how it relates to ourselves

²⁹ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁰ For a modern version of this term, one may think of Friedman's "golden straitjacket", in Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, updated and expanded edition (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).

³¹ Taylor (1991), pp. 101-103.

³² Taylor (1989), p. 15.

and to the world we live in. This relation is thought to change over time, which becomes clear when we highlight the features of the modern age and modernity, while focusing on mathematics.

The modern age, then, is characterized by Descartes' *reductio scientiae ad mathematicam*. This reduction is a departure from the Platonic idea of mathematics as the proper introduction to the structure of the universe. With the shift from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican system and the alienation from the earth in the modern age, mathematics moves from *geo*-metry to algebra. It becomes the science of the structure of the mind. From there, Einstein takes the step into modernity, while reinventing geometry and adding a new dimension. His general theory of relativity demonstrates that the mathematical conversion implicit in every equation is real. $E=mc^2$ is not just a formula, but energy is really convertible into mass and *vice versa*. This is no less than revolutionary. In fact, it marks the shift to a centre-less worldview with relativity at its core. Surprising, though, about the general theory of relativity is that it could be proved to be valid without any knowledge of its applicability or meaning. Henceforth, any construction of pure mathematics that is valid must be held to be possibly applicable. What is troubling here, is that in this mathematically preconceived world, the structure of the human mind becomes a conceptual prison.

But what is the structure of the mind really? How do we frame reality? In mathematics one always used Euclidean geometry with its three dimensions of space, making for straight lines, planes, and solids.³³ In the nineteenth century, however, ideas started to develop away from Euclidean geometry with Johann Heinrich Lambert, Carl Friedrich Gauss, Nicolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky, János Bolyai, Bernhardt Riemann, Eugenio Beltrami and others. Hermann Minkowski, then, added to the three dimensions of space a fourth one, which is the dimension of time. Minkowski demonstrated that time is not absolute but forms a continuum with space. He concluded: "Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality."³⁴ Einstein

³³ See Euclid, *The Thirteen Books of the Elements*, 3 vols., trans. Sir Thomas L. Heath, second edition unabridged (New York: Dover Publications, 1956).

³⁴ See Minkowski's address at the 80th Assembly of German Natural Scientists and Physicians in Cologne on 21 September 1908, translated and published as "Space and Time," in Hendrick Lorentz, Albert Einstein, Hermann Minkowski, and Hermann Weyl, *The Principle of Relativity: A Collection of Original Memoirs on the Special and General Theory of Relativity* (New York: Dover Publications, [1923] 1952), p. 75.

applied the idea of four-dimensional space, or spacetime, as it is called now, in his special theory of relativity of 1905 that preceded his general theory.³⁵ Thus, non-Euclidean geometry received general currency. What is important here is that Einstein, with his spacetime dimensionality, still describes the world we can observe. However, this changes with string theory, which started with Gabriele Veneziano in 1968, and was taken up, most notably, by Michael Green, John Schwartz, and Edward Witten in 1978.³⁶ String theory has taken the mathematical community in its grip ever since. It has become the fashion for all seasons, a movement, almost a religion. It seeks to offer a theory of everything, and initially it thought it could do so by increasing the number of spacetime dimensions from 4 to 26! Even if this was later reduced to 10 dimensions in superstring theory, which led to 'the second superstring revolution' in 1995, the theory is still contested. The same holds true for the enigmatic (since yet-unknown) 'M-theory', which supposedly encompasses the five different types of string theory as well as 11-dimensional supergravity. As Sir Roger Penrose, emeritus professor of mathematics at Oxford University, puts it: "For theories whose spacetime dimensionality exceeds what we directly observe (namely $1 + 3$), I see no reason to believe that, in themselves, they carry us much further in the direction of *physical* understanding."³⁷

So what is the way ahead? As nobody knows the answer to this question, it may be instructive, at least, to see what a highly esteemed mathematician like Penrose has to say about what worked in the past:

Throughout the history of physical science, progress has been through finding the correct balance between, on the one hand, the strictures, temptations, and revelations of mathematical theory and, on the other, precise observation of the actions of the physical world, usually through carefully controlled experiment. When experimental guidance is absent, as is the case with most current fundamental research, this balance is thrown out of kilter. (...) String theory, in particular, has stimulated beautiful mathematical research and gains considerable strength from this mathematical appeal. (...) But it is unclear to what degree this is indicative of any underlying accord with physical reality.³⁸

³⁵ See Albert Einstein, *Relativity: The Special and General Theory*, trans. Robert W. Lawson, with introduction by Roger Penrose, and commentary by Robert Geroch (New York: Pi Press, [1916] 2005).

³⁶ See Michael Green, John Schwartz, and Edward Witten, *Superstring Theory*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

³⁷ Roger Penrose, *The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 1011.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1014 and 1016.

What is needed is a balance between mathematical aesthetics and physical insight. While both the general theory of relativity and string theory are led by mathematical aesthetics, the difference between the two is that the former was also led by physical insight, and the latter is not or, at least, significantly less. Ironically, by his own admission, the same imbalance holds true for the theory that Penrose devoted most of his time to: twistor theory.³⁹

The goal that mathematicians and physicists alike seek to attain is a theory of everything that, more specifically, can unite the physics of the small and the physics of the large, that is, quantum mechanics (or particle physics) and relativity (or cosmology). While string theorists regularly claim they have found such a quantum-gravity union, twistor theorists seek to attain the same goal but would deny, as Penrose does, that string theorists are already there. As twistor theory uses $(1 + 3)$ -dimensional spacetime, and string theory depends on extra dimensions, either one must be wrong. An interesting development in this regard is that, only recently, Witten has reverted to an interpretation of string theory within a standard $(1 + 3)$ -dimensional spacetime, where the extra dimensions are not taken to be spacetime dimensions but ‘internal’ dimensions of some kind.⁴⁰ Thus, the two theories would not be incompatible any longer, and could lead to important new developments.⁴¹ However, the previous warning about imbalance between mathematical aesthetics and physical insight, which in effect concerns both theories, still stands.

Quantum physics remained out of the picture so far. Yet, for all the clamour with which string theory asserts itself as the prevalent theory of the day, it is quantum physics and its development into quantum field theory (QFT), that may very well turn out to be the most successful theory after all. In this regard, Penrose asserts: “When it is completed—which I would anticipate happening some time in the 21st century—it will, no doubt, represent an even greater achievement than Einstein’s general theory of relativity”.⁴² In what sense, then, is quantum physics still incomplete? To answer this question, we go back to its inception. Werner Heisenberg, Max Born, and Pascual Jordan provided the general framework for quantum physics, whereas Paul Dirac fully formulated it in

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 1003-1004.

⁴⁰ See Edward Witten, *Perturbative Gauge Theory as a String Theory in Twistor Space* (2003), which is accessible via the internet on <http://www.arxiv.org/hep-th/0312171>.

⁴¹ Penrose (2004), pp. 927, 1004, 1027, and 1042.

⁴² Ibid., p. 1011.

1930.⁴³ Seeking to make this quantum theory for particle physics consistent with the requirements of Einstein's *special* theory of relativity, Dirac also laid the foundation for QFT. While QFT now appears to figure into almost all theories that try to explain the universe at its deepest levels, the foundation of it remains unchallenged (mainly because of the extremely impressive and precise agreement, or balance, between quantum theory and experimental fact). However, the question also remains if QFT has to be modified to make it consistent with the (gravitational) principles of Einstein's *general* theory of relativity.

Another question in quantum theory that is yet unanswered is of an ontological nature. The question is if the formalism of quantum mechanics tells us anything about an actual quantum reality of the world. This question has to do with the duality of the two quantum processes U and R, where U stands for the deterministic process of unitary evolution, and R stands for the quantum state reduction that takes place when a 'measurement' is performed. The issue is how R can come about, when the state has to evolve according to U. This constitutes a measurement problem or paradox. There are various viewpoints, of which the so-called 'Copenhagen interpretation', expressed by Niels Bohr, is best known. This viewpoint holds that there is no reality but the experimenter's reality, which means that the mysterious quantum jumps according to R between particles and waves—the central feature of quantum physics—would be nothing but jumps in the experimenter's knowledge. The wavefunction is not real but in the observer's mind. Most other viewpoints also depend on the observer's own consciousness, the only two exceptions being the de-Broglie-Bohm viewpoint, and the type of viewpoints requiring some fundamental change of quantum mechanics, where U and R would become approximations to an objectively real physical evolution. On the last view, objective R (or OR) takes over from U with gravitational phenomena. This OR would not depend on any conscious observer. This runs counter to most other viewpoints but also against the so-called anthropic principle,⁴⁴ which takes for a starting-point the position that the universe we perceive must be of such a nature as will allow for beings who can perceive it. The idea here is that "[a]ny universe that can 'be observed' must, as a logical necessity, be capable of supporting conscious mentality, since consciousness is precisely what plays the ultimate role of

⁴³ See Paul Dirac, *The Principles of Quantum Mechanics*, fourth edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1930] 1982).

⁴⁴ See Penrose (2004), pp. 757-762.

‘observer’.”⁴⁵ Hence, “[t]his fundamental requirement could well provide constraints on the universe’s physical laws, or physical parameters, in order that conscious mentality can (and will) exist.”⁴⁶ From an OR viewpoint, the opposite holds true: it is not the consciousness that is responsible for the R process, but it is, as Penrose gives as his personal view, “a physically real R process that is (partly) responsible for consciousness!”⁴⁷ In his view, there are three separate worlds—Platonic-mathematical, physical, and mental—where each of these “has its own kind of reality, and where each is (deeply and mysteriously) founded in the one that precedes it (the worlds being taken cyclicly).”⁴⁸ Here, consciousness (or mentality) is dependent upon physicality, not the other way round. Either way, consciousness plays an essential part.

To summarize this overview of developments in mathematical thinking, there are three issues that stand out in the search for ‘a theory of everything’. First, there is the issue of balance between mind and matter (or mathematics and physics). Second, there is the issue of the number of dimensions (that is needed to reach quantum-gravity union). And third, there is the issue of consciousness (and whether it is our own mind that determines the number of dimensions we see).

Returning to the search for a theory of the human condition, we may now look at how the three issues identified above underlie this quest. The point is that these very issues, either by admission or assumption, figure into all thinking about the human condition. Of necessity, they constitute the structural requirements of human agency. The task that lies ahead is to show, in the remainder of this paragraph, how the structural requirements make up for a framework that allows for a full-scale alternative picture, offering a new conception of the human condition. In assuming this task, I will provide a new framework whilst discussing the three issues identified above. Finally, while using this framework, I will discuss some influential authors, and show how their respective views of the human condition focus in on only part of the picture each time. The task that I set myself above could be reformulated, then, as the endeavour to provide a framework that can help us see the whole picture. By looking for the whole picture, I take up the question that postmodernism fails to address. After all, while postmodernism does believe in the need for a new grand theory, it is only concerned with sabotaging existing theories.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 1030.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 1032.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 1029; see also pp. 17-21.

Apparently, it is much more fun to deconstruct buildings, and to leave the place in shambles. What I will do, instead, is not construct a new building or offer a blueprint for it—which would be unforgivable after the lessons we received from Popper, as well as from Friedrich von Hayek,⁴⁹—but explicate the structural requirements that every architect will agree upon as being foundational of any construction.

The framework that is at stake—and only the framework itself—is invariant, objective, and necessarily true,⁵⁰ in the same way as the rules of mathematics are.⁵¹ Basically, there are two ways of finding what is invariant, and what thus constitutes objectiveness. When recognizing the inescapable dichotomy between inside and outside, either one follows the way outward by arguing that evolutionary cosmology gives us objective worlds (in that we can find what is invariant under significant transformations in cosmology), or one follows the way inward by arguing that one can only find objectiveness in the sources of the Self (in that we can find what is invariant under significant transformations of the Self). The former is what Robert Nozick does in the last book he would write, called *Invariances*.⁵² In it, he first focuses on the outside world and the physical laws governing it, and then he proceeds to the human world that he regards as part of this outside world. Nozick holds that “[t]he physical tail wags the metaphysical dog”, as scientists make sense of data by developing theories that may countenance what previously was unthinkable in metaphysics. However, one could also argue the other way round, which is what is characteristic of the latter approach. Here, one primarily focuses, like Taylor does, on the inside world, starting with self-

⁴⁹ See Friedrich von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1944] 1994), and his *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1960] 1978).

⁵⁰ Authors who oppose using the scientific notion of objectiveness in the social sciences, like Hayek in *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, [1952] 1979), fail to acknowledge the interrelatedness of the framework and what is framed, that is, of (objective) structure and (inter-subjective) agency.

⁵¹ See, for instance, Alfred North Whitehead & Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1910] 1997); Kurt Gödel, *On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems* [Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme], trans. B. Meltzer (New York: Dover Publications, [1931] 1992); Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam, *Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings*, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Hilary Putnam, *Philosophical Papers, Vol. I: Mathematics, Matter and Method*, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

⁵² See Robert Nozick, *Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World* (Cambridge, Mass./London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001).

consciousness, and taking it from there to explaining the outside world next. As a matter of fact, history supports this sequence, as we saw in the beginning of this paragraph, most notably, in the case of Copernicus and Kepler paving the way for Galileo. Even if Galileo is regarded as the father of modern natural science, we are talking of a “Copernican revolution” after all. The difference, then, between the two approaches is that the former is about the structure of the *objective world*, and the latter about the *objective structure* of the world. Either way one is concerned with the question of what is objective.

The Archimedean point I propose is ‘thinking about thinking’. This is markedly different from the famous *cogito*, where Descartes derives his certainty of Being from his faculty of thinking and doubting. Instead, the point of thinking about thinking is that this constitutes the only situation where subject and object coincide. Here, subject and object are one and the same. When thinking about thinking, we may arrive at a general rule governing all thinking, which is what we called the Universal Rule, making for the distinction between parts and wholes, as well as the one between inside and outside. It follows from the Universal Rule that if we want to understand the whole, we have to look at the parts, and *vice versa*. Likewise, if we want to understand the inside world, we have to explain the outside world, and *vice versa*. Since, in this book, we are concerned with the rules of statecraft that apply in the outside world of international politics, this means that we have to choose the way inward. However, are we not biased in favour of the internal route, in that we are already using it at the point that we decide to be thinking about thinking? Here, it is important to note that as we enter the inside world, the outside world is in the picture at the same time, as we just posited. Specifically, thinking may be governed by physical laws, or is at least contingent on the physical. More precisely, if we recall that we are concerned with the mind when looking inward and with matter when looking outward, it follows from the Universal Rule that where we have mind there is matter at the same time, and *vice versa*. Two points follow from this. First, mind and matter are in balance. And second, we should be able to arrive at this conclusion also when going the way outward, which is what we found when following Penrose in his quest for a theory of everything in physics. As a matter of fact, the balance of mind and matter was one of the three central issues that we got from the inquiry into the outside world. Having established this first issue, then, also in the inside world, we may now proceed to the two other issues: the number of dimensions, and consciousness.

As is concerned the number of dimensions we need for depicting the structural requirements that make up for a framework offering a new conception of the human condition, we may look again at the account we received from the outside world first. What is more, we learned from the conclusion of the first issue above that what we find outside may be taken for an answer of what we search inside. What we found outside, then, is that there are $(1 + 3)$ spacetime dimensions, for sure, and maybe more if string theory is right. However, even if string theory proposes 10 dimensions, it has been argued that this can be taken to be compatible with standard $(1 + 3)$ -dimensional spacetime if the dimensions exceeding $(1 + 3)$ are of another kind, being 'internal' dimensions. This distinction is important, as it marks the difference between what the second and the third issue seek to address, concerning dimensionality and consciousness respectively. While we will discuss the latter later, now we are concerned with the standard framework. In these terms, it is beyond dispute that there are $(1 + 3)$ spacetime dimensions. This has important implications for our view of the human condition, as for the IR theories we have discussed. To start with the latter, we have seen in the Introduction to Part II that all IR theories confine themselves to only two dimensions. That is, to explain their logic geometrically—be it a logic of lines or a logic of circles—one can confine oneself to drawing two axes. At the same time, however, we have seen in the Introduction that the theories that are founded on two dimensions are in need of a third axis. Thus, in the inside world, on purely logical grounds, one arrives at the conclusion that, in terms of space, we need three axes. In Part II, on structure, we will focus on these space dimensions that make up the structural framework. In addition to these three dimensions, though, there is the fourth dimension, of time, which we already focused on in Part I, when discussing agency. That is, Parts I and II are on agency and structure, but on a deeper level these Parts are concerned with time and space respectively (which is why the two Parts are so intimately related, and, in the end, cannot be studied in isolation).

Geometrically, we can only understand the human condition by making use of an x -, y -, and z -axis. Indeed, we need three axes, but there is also the extra dimension of time. To include this dimension we should not add a fourth axis, since then we would make it part of the structural set-up. Instead, we may recall that Part I was about moving in circles in hermeneutics and heuristic. If Part I is, on a deeper level, concerned with time, and we said it is, this means that the movement in circles constitutes the fourth dimension. More precisely, we need a (three-dimensional) solid

that allows for a movement in circles (fourth dimension), when revolving on its surface around the z -axis: a sphere. That is, for explaining the human condition we need three axes, and for understanding it we need a logic of spheres.

As the first issue can be reduced to the Universal Rule, and the second issue to a system of co-ordinates, with agency understood in terms of moving in circles, we have been talking mathematics so far. The third issue, which is about consciousness, places the human being at the point of intersection of the three axes, which is also the centre of the sphere whose logic can account for the human condition. Positioning the human being at the centre makes it possible to relate to the mathematical system of co-ordinates as a human being. It allows for objectiveness and realism with a human face. After all, this objectiveness and realism can now be taken to consist in exploring the subjective Self. This is the paradox that lies at the heart of the third issue, which is about self-consciousness really. To follow through on this, self-consciousness is about knowing how the Universal Rule applies to the human condition if one believes in OR, or, if not, how the human condition constitutes the Universal Rule. Irrespective of the view of (objective) reality one may have, the human being can be conscious of itself as being both part and whole in exactly two ways. Firstly, the human being is both part and whole in its relation with other human beings. Secondly, the human being is both part and whole as an individual being. That is, in the first case the human being is seen as a whole that is also part of a larger world, whereas in the second case the individual human being is seen as a whole that is also constituted by parts itself. Thus, self-consciousness may lead to the awareness that, of necessity, two dichotomies lie at the heart of the human condition: Self/Other and Mind/Body.

In terms of the inside/outside dichotomy we could make the same point. After all, the inside/outside dichotomy can be understood in both horizontal and vertical terms. The horizontal interpretation, then, can be understood in terms of (concentric) circles, requiring an x - and a y -axis; the latter adds the z -axis, which is needed for drawing a sphere that can connect two poles (Mind and Body, understood as 'inside' and 'outside' respectively) in one whole. While this brings us back, once more, to mathematics we gladly use the present geometrical framework as it helps us define the terms we need when describing the human condition. As a matter of fact, we just noted that the third issue can be explained in both mathematical and non-mathematical—that is, purely 'human'—terms. Before resorting to the latter, we start with the former.

Geometrically, we can draw seven conclusions from interpreting the present framework. First, the difference between the horizontal and the vertical dimension is that the former consists of two axes (x - and y -axis), whereas the latter consists of one (z -axis). The two dimensions are the same, though, in that they both serve to clarify one dichotomy each. Therefore, the horizontal dimension constitutes dualism (with two axes and one circle), and the vertical dimension duality (with one axis and two poles). Second, the Self/Other dichotomy must be a dualism, requiring two axes, as, by definition, what is 'other' cannot be the same. That is, the Self/Other dichotomy must be explained in horizontal terms. As there is only one axis left, then, it follows that the Mind/Body dichotomy must be a duality that can only be explained in vertical terms. Thus, the x -axis is the Self; the y -axis is the Other; and the z -axis connects two poles, with the Mind being one pole, and the Body the other.⁵³ Third, the horizontal dimension is, as we concluded in Part I, about personality, which can be understood by drawing circles (being the x - and y -dimension of a sphere). When drawing circles, one can think of two movements: moving back and fro between concentric circles (heuristic), and moving in one circle (hermeneutics). Using the present framework for defining these movements, the former is concerned with comparing different levels of the Self, while the latter is concerned with relating Self and Other. Fourth, the vertical dimension is, as we concluded in Part I, about individuality, which can be understood as a line (the z -axis) going through the middle-point, while connecting two poles. That is, these two poles are on the same line of individuality, and thus undividable. This explains why it does not matter if one considers the Mind or the Body as being 'North' and the other as being 'South'. They are the same really, thus constituting identity. Fifth, the point of intersection of the x -, y -, and z -axis must be the central position that explains everything, *viz.* the point from which emanates the Universal Rule. Some would say that this point must be God. And it is true, in a sense, that the Universal Rule provides a God's

⁵³ Whereas it could be argued that the x -axis is the Other and the y -axis the Self, from a logical point of view what matters is that Self and Other are different, and yet united in a circle, which means that the two are relative in that the one cannot be understood without the other (that is, for drawing circles one needs two axes). Likewise, it does not really matter if one likes to see the Mind or the Body as being 'North', and the other as being 'South', since what is relevant from a logical point of view is that they are not dependent on anything different from themselves (that is, the two poles are on the same axis). If I picture the Mind, then, as being 'North', it is only because the North is usually pictured by a compass needle that is pointing 'up', which resonates with the common view of the Mind as being 'up in the sky', and the Body as being 'down to earth'.

eye perspective or view. However, it is the human being itself who can envision it by formulating the Universal Rule. The central point is that the human being always lives on the surface of the sphere, yet can imagine that there is a centre, which we called the Archimedean point. This point can be approached by thinking about thinking, and can be reached by really living it, that is, by forgetting about everything that is attached to one's personality and encompassing a living consciousness of everything that is and is not, which is practically unreachable. The paradox is that the Universal Rule allows for this God's eye perspective, without really requiring one to be God. It is the centre explained in terms of the surface, which is the only language we can speak as persons. As the centre of all there is, is also, of necessity, the centre of any human being, it can be explained as related to the human being, without making any sacrifice to OR, as physicists would call it. The point of intersection of the x -, y -, and z -axis, then, is the 'P'. Sixth, this point of intersection is exactly in the middle between the two poles on the line of individuality. That is, the x - and y -axis make for a mid-position on the z -axis (like the z -axis provides a mid-point for the circles on the x - and y -axis, which we already discussed in Part I). Thus, on the z -axis, we have three points that may be distinguished but cannot be divided. Seventh, taking the x -, y -, and z -axes together, we arrive at a logic of spheres. This logic of spheres includes both dualism and duality, which in itself amounts to contradiction. Only in the centre, contradiction can be turned into paradox, which is what the Universal Rule does.

We now leave the domain of geometry and mathematics. That is, taking up the last conclusion first, we start with exploring the dimensions that geometry cannot describe, and we proceed with discussing the other conclusions in geometrical terms. As is concerned the last conclusion, one could say that much of the mystery of human life, which cannot be grasped in geometrical terms, is concentrated in the question what it is of the centre of a sphere that it can turn contradiction into paradox. For one thing, logic can show the way to answering this question, as it is concerned with the avoidance of contradiction. Logically, then, one has to start with thinking about thinking, and go through seven stages⁵⁴ in order to be able to make the turn from contradiction to paradox. The first stage of contradiction is that, while thinking about thinking, one is

⁵⁴ For the following account of the seven stages of contradiction I have based myself on the exposition of it by the philosopher and engineer Carl Unger (1878-1929). It should be noted, though, that Unger does not seek to explain the nature of paradox, nor any logic of spheres.

focused exclusively on the *T*, which is taken as its own object. The contradiction here is that the absolute subject—the thinker—, by the act of thinking about thinking, is its own object: the ego is the non-ego at the same time. The second stage of contradiction is that what was united in the ego must be separated. In the first place, this results in the differentiation of form and content: the ego is the form for the non-ego as content. This means that the ego negatives itself as content. The third stage of contradiction is that it negatives itself even further, to the point that the ego also leaves its form to the non-ego: form and content are again united but now in the non-ego. This amounts to a self-focusing of the non-ego. At this point, after triple negating the ego, one is still left with two contradictories: the ego and the non-ego. Looking for an into-one-position, one has to negative the universality of the two contradictories, and posit the reality of the identity of the ego and the non-ego. For cognition, this reality of the identity is individuality. And more fundamentally, the principle of identity is the logical postulate for the science of space, where every concept *excludes* what is other than it. This fundamental notion points the way to the fourth stage of contradiction. After all, since Minkowski we know that space cannot be separated from time. Spatial logic must be seen as a special case of the logic of becoming. If time, then, must bear identity within itself, the axiom of the logic of becoming is that every concept *includes* what is other than itself. This axiom allows for change over time, and, thus, it overcomes space through time. The difference between the third and the fourth stage is, in reality, the one between the mineral realm and plants respectively. The mineral realm can be explained in physics and chemistry, where the first three stages correspond with three dimensions. The first dimension is about forces that act upon something (a “force”, in physics, corresponds with the geometrical symbol of a line); the second dimension is about the forces that are in equilibrium with it (a “state”, in physics, as any “tension”, corresponds with the geometrical symbol of a plane); and the third dimension is about the forces that emanate from it (“mass”, in physics, corresponds with the geometrical symbol of a solid). The growth of plants can be explained in biology, by using the logic of the fourth stage. Plants change over time, and, thus, contradict the mineral realm, where time is still something extraneous. That is, the plant overcomes space through time. The fifth stage of contradiction is that the animal overcomes time and space through causality. Animals act from certain drives, and here the concept of becoming does not suffice. What is needed is a logic of inwardness (psychology), which leads us into the

realm of what one may call the ‘internal’ dimensions. At this stage, more specifically, a logic of causality is needed, where every concept *acts* by what is other than it. Summarizing the five stages so far, we may say that the first three represent the three space dimensions, describing “this-beside-that”; that the fourth one represents the time dimension, describing “one-after-another”; and that the fifth stage describes “this-because-that”. The sixth stage of contradiction, then, manifests itself in man, who has to overcome, or contradict, his animal nature in order to be man. At this stage, self-consciousness is key. Through self-consciousness, man can make himself the master of space, time and causality by setting his own goal and destiny in freedom. If one can speak at this stage in terms of logic at all, its axiom would be that the ego creates itself out of what is other than it. For fulfilling himself as a creative being, man must strive beyond himself. The last stage is that self-consciousness leads to the awareness that immediate creative force constitutes the seventh dimension, and undimensionality at the same time. Here, one may find possibility, and the source of appearance, as the culmination of contradiction.

Having used contradiction as a guide through the various stages of reality,⁵⁵ we may draw three conclusions, which respectively serve to qualify the three issues that we found after exploring the outside world. First, if we saw in the outside world that there be balance between mind and body, in the inside world we see that the relation between the two is in fact one of identity. The consequences of this, both in philosophy and in IR Theory, I will discuss in Chapter 5, which is based on Spinoza, who

⁵⁵ It follows from the above account that these ‘stages’ are not to be understood only in a developmental or diachronic way (“one-after-another”). If time figures into our account of reality, and surely it does from the fourth stage onwards, the stages must also be understood in a synchronic way (“this-beside-that”). That is, Darwin’s evolution theory is right in that it allows for the possibility of moving from one stage to the other (from the fifth to the sixth stage, more specifically). This was also the reason why the mechanistic view of Descartes’, which was based on causality (that is, the fifth stage), was deemed anachronistic, as we noted, once Hume ushered in the evolutionary view. However, Fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history is wrong in that it fails to grasp the reality that, by definition, human beings are in the sixth stage, where they may struggle endlessly with the contradiction that they find there. They have been doing this from the very beginning of human life onwards, and it would be both arbitrary and even self-contradictory to declare the end of history at any point in time in the sixth stage, as opposed to any other (earlier) point in that very same stage. Dialectical reasoning only sees the diachronic part; it fails to see the synchronic part. In the inside world, time moves in a line (allowing for linear progress); in the outside world, that is, in the Universe, everything that moves, moves in circles (allowing for infinity).

propounds the identity relation as opposed to the Cartesian view. Second, if we saw in the outside world that there be $(1 + 3)$ spacetime dimensions, in the inside world we see that there are three more dimensions of some 'internal' kind. Thus, we have $(3 + 1 + 3)$ dimensions, with three external ones (space) and three internal ones, which are connected by a constant movement that constitutes yet another dimension (time). Here, the time dimension could be seen as the mirror, which shows the identity relation between the outside and the inside world.⁵⁶ Of logical necessity (while allowing for freedom and possibility at respectively the sixth and the seventh stage of contradiction), there are seven dimensions, with the last one being of an incomprehensible nature. Third, if we saw in the outside world that there be consciousness, in the inside world we see what this is actually all about. To be sure, it is because of self-consciousness that we can think of three internal dimensions as mirroring the three external ones. Originating from the 'I', self-consciousness thus lies at the heart of the two other conclusions just drawn. And while it may seem egocentric, in the usual sense of the term, to put the 'I' at the centre of the sphere we live in, we have seen that the 'I' includes both ego and non-ego.⁵⁷ The 'I' includes everything really that is and is not.⁵⁸ That is, on one level we give a central position to time, which leads to a reality of seven dimensions, including at the seventh stage of contradiction a 'quantum jump' from dimensionality to undimensionality. And on another level, the 'I' takes the central position over from time, being the mirror of some other reality we cannot grasp. Instead of making the quantum jump from the sixth to the seventh dimension, the 'I' negatives the six dimensions of being into six

⁵⁶ If the time dimension could be said to have a central position in the account of Being, this explains why Heidegger's theory of *Being and Time*, which we mentioned in Part I, resonates with many philosophers, and is, indeed, sound in at least one important way. However, Heidegger does not distinguish seven dimensions.

⁵⁷ Whereas it could be argued that it is typically Western to put one's ego at the centre of one's thinking, it is not typically Western to position the 'I' at the centre of one's thinking and Being. See, for instance, Nozick's interpretation of Zen enlightenment within Buddhist philosophical theory, in Robert Nozick, *The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 249-250.

⁵⁸ Being includes Nothingness. Existentialism regards the relation of these concepts as the central problem of philosophy; see, most notably, Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'être et le néant: Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique* [*Being and Nothingness*] (Paris: Gallimard, [1943] 1988). As we saw in the Introduction to Part II, Giddens bases his structuration theory on what he calls the 'existential contradiction', but he mentions it only to forget it, while focusing on his 'structural contradiction' in horizontal terms. The present framework puts the existential contradiction—or rather: paradox—in its proper place: the vertical axis through the centre.

dimensions of non-being or nothingness. Thus, from the view of the 'I' there are not seven but twelve dimensions. If at this point one starts wondering what bearing these abstractions have on reality, one is likely to have the same reservations regarding string theory. The point here is that in terms of abstraction the two lines of reasoning are alike.

After having moved outside-in, we have reached the point where we may conclude that the human being constitutes either seven or twelve dimensions, depending on how consciousness is related to (objective) reality. If we are conscious of our Self, we are seeing six dimensions and are disposed of thinking of yet another dimension, which we may call the seventh dimension or undimensionality. If we are conscious of the 'I', we are in a position to think in terms of twelve dimensions. The former, then, is linked with the movement in circles (Self), while the latter can be seen as providing a structure of six lines going through the centre ('I'), and intersecting at twelve points on each and every concentric circle. Thus, time plays the central role in the seven-dimensional view, as space does in the twelve-dimensional view. Reformulating, then, the above conclusion, we may posit that the struggle of the human being to combine the two views is, basically, the predicament of living in standard $(1 + 3)$ -dimensional spacetime. After having discussed the 'internal' or higher dimensions, we may now move back, inside-out, and return to a view with $(1 + 3)$ spacetime dimensions. Even if we now know that there are more dimensions,⁵⁹ we can confine ourselves to $(1 + 3)$, as this number allows us to include time and space, which is all we need really for explaining the outside world. That is also why we may use the sphere as the geometrical solid that can serve to visualize the logic explaining reality: it allows for a combination of circular movement, constituting a dimension of its own, with three-dimensional structure. This brings us back to the interpretation of the new framework in geometrical terms.

⁵⁹ Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Vol. I: Human Nature* (Louisville/London: Westminster John Knox Press, [1941] 1996), p. 124: "Man is not measured in a dimension sufficiently high or deep to do full justice to either his stature or his capacity for both good and evil or to understand the total environment in which such a stature can understand, express and find itself. One might define this total environment most succinctly as one which includes both eternity and time; but the concept of eternity without further definition may be too ambiguous to clarify the point at issue. The eternity which is part of the environment of man is neither the infinity of time nor yet a realm of undifferentiated unity of being. It is the changeless source of man's changing being." Niebuhr propounds that man cannot comprehend the whole, nor himself in his full stature of freedom. However, as we saw in Chapter 1, the Universal Rule shows that it is possible for man at least to formulate it.

The logic of spheres poses some challenges, which follow from the seven conclusions we drew above in geometrical terms. Arguably, the most important one is the challenge we discussed above to turn contradiction into paradox, which follows from the seventh conclusion. Another challenge we will discuss now is the one that follows from the sixth conclusion: on the vertical axis there are three points that may be distinguished but cannot be divided (the two poles, and the centre in between). This sixth conclusion presupposes the other five conclusions so that we will discuss all of these insofar these pertain to our challenge. Since there are three points on the vertical axis, then, all existing views of the human being that focus in on one point or two points only are incomplete. These views cannot give a clue really as to what the human being is. In a sense, this may remind us of the scheme we uncovered in Part I, when discussing the Kantian, the Hobbesian, and the Grotian views in relation to the horizontal dimensions. There, we found that the Kantian view (focusing on the whole) and the Hobbesian view (focusing on the parts) are antipoles that are one-sided and mutually exclusive, whereas the Grotian view provides a mid-position combining both other views (seeing both parts and wholes), and constituting something of and in itself as well—a third view. Having made the argument for the tripartite scheme already in Part I at length, I will not repeat it here.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ For an exposition of the same logic applied to the vertical dimension, see Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 16-49. Parekh gives an excellent account of what he calls naturalism or moral monism. It focuses on human nature, and it posits that one can arrive at one rational way of understanding the human being, the world, and what the good life is. It can take various forms, three of which are most influential: rationalist monism (Plato, Aristotle), theological monism (Augustine, Aquinas), and the regulative monism of classical liberalism (John Locke, Jeremy Bentham). Whereas the various forms of monism largely depend on the time in which they were conceived, Parekh shows that monism goes in two flavours, irrespective of time: there are substantive or 'thick' views of human nature, and there are formal or 'thin' views of human nature (pp. 10 and 18). He argues convincingly that monists reach a deadlock in both cases (pp. 47-49), much like in Part I we saw that the Kantian and Hobbesian views do. Reformulating this conclusion in terms of the present framework, we may say that the two flavours of 'thick' and 'thin' represent our two poles on the vertical axis, and that they do not make sense in isolation. Basically, this is the vertical interpretation of the Universal Rule, which says that one cannot see the whole ('thick') and the part ('thin') in isolation. While Parekh mentions the dichotomy between 'thick' and 'thin', he mainly focuses on what he—mistakenly—sees as the 'polarity' of monism and culturalism or pluralism. Pluralism focuses on human culture (Vico, Montesquieu, and Herder). It assumes that human beings are culturally constituted, and that they vary from culture to culture (pp. 50-79). However, it is not about the Mind (pole on z -axis), but about Self/Other (x - and y -axes).

Instead, I will give an overview of how some of the most influential views of the human being, which do include three points, fit into this scheme if applied to the vertical dimension. This is possible in three different ways. I will discuss these, and I will conclude this paragraph by trying to show the whole picture.

First, it is possible to focus on one point, while projecting the other two points into it. This category of views is about identity, and could be called *Spinozist*. Spinoza focuses on the middle-point, which is the point where Mind and Body coincide if these are taken in horizontal terms. He propounds the identity of Mind and Body, and this will be the subject of Chapter 5. Here, it may be noted that if one focuses on the middle-point only, it is important to see that this point has two attributes, as Spinoza would have it (*i.e.*, Mind and Body), and that these attributes could be seen as distinct points. Thus, we have three points.⁶¹

Second, one may focus on two points, while taking position in the third. This category of views is about establishing balance, and could be called *Faustian*. Even if the Faust-theme, as expressed most forcefully by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, is about three points, in that it is about two opposing powers that seek to take possession of the Soul (constituting the third point), the focus is on the two powers really, and on how to establish a balance between the two. Goethe expresses the essence of what he takes to be the human condition, when he has his Dr. Faustus exclaim in despair:

Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;
Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust,
Sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organen;
Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.
O gibt es Geister in der Luft,
Die zwischen Erd und Himmel herrschend weben,
So steiget nieder aus dem goldnen Duft
Und führt mich weg zu neuem, buntem Leben!⁶²

⁶¹ Spinoza focuses on the identity relation of the two attributes. Martin Buber has argued that Spinoza leaves out of his account the horizontal relation of Self and Other, which would make for a third “attribute” (as it is only concerned with the third point, being the middle-point of the circle on the horizontal axes). In addition to the attributes of *Geisthaftigkeit* and *Naturhaftigkeit*, Buber proposes *Personhaftigkeit*, in his 1957 afterword in Buber, *Ich und Du*, 11th ed. (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, [1923] 1983), p. 158.

⁶² Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust: Der Tragödie erster Teil* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1986), 1112-1121, p. 33.

Goethe here describes the duality of Mind and Body. While the two poles have a tendency of presenting themselves as a dualism, where the two appear to be separated with the one overruling the other in turn, Dr. Faustus sighs for a life in which the two can be combined. As it turns out in Dr. Faustus' life, this point where one can find Mind and Body in harmony cannot be obtained in and of itself. Every human being has to struggle individually in seeking to establish some balance between the two, and re-establishing it every time once we have lost it again. This brings Goethe to the conclusion, expressed by Dr. Faustus:

Ja! diesem Sinne bin ich ganz ergeben,
Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluß:
Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben,
Der täglich sie erobern muß.⁶³

Indeed, Goethe does recognize the third point, which is even at the heart of all else. However, when he has his Chorus Mysticus say the last words ("Das Ewig-Weibliche / Zieht uns hinan"),⁶⁴ he uses a metaphor for the quest for the harmonious whole, that is, for the lasting balance between the two poles, which is in fact beyond reach.⁶⁵ The struggle to yet obtain this balance reminds one of the myth of Icarus. Having fabricated his wings from wax and feathers, he seeks to fly over the sea like his father, Daedalus, but he flings his father's warning to the winds to keep the middle between the water and the sun. While flying too high, Icarus gets too close to the sun, which causes the wax to melt. And, consequently,

⁶³ Goethe, *Faust: Der Tragödie zweiter Teil* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1986), 11573-11576, p. 199.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 12110-12111, p. 214.

⁶⁵ Mind and Body (or Reason and Nature) are the two gods of modern man. Bertrand Russell, for instance, distinguishes two natures of human being, one "particular, finite, self-centered; the other universal, infinite and impartial", in "The Essence of Religion," in Al Seckel (ed.), *Bertrand Russell on God and Religion* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1986), pp. 95-108. On the relation between the two, he writes in one of his letters, cited in Ronald Clark, *Bertrand Russell* (London: Cape, 1975), p. 174: "I can't imagine God not full of conflict (...) So I prefer no God. Life seems to me essentially passion, conflict, rage; moments of peace are brief and destroy themselves. A God must be calm like Spinoza's, merely the course of nature. All this is autobiography, not philosophy." The loss of the harmonious whole, as a given, is epitomized, most famously, by Friedrich Nietzsche in his *Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen* (Augsburg: Goldmann Verlag, [1891] 1987). In it, he has Zarathustra, descending from his mountain after ten years of seclusion, say to himself in wonder while reflecting upon a conversation he just had with a man of God: "Sollte es denn möglich sein! Dieser alte Heilige hat in seinem Walde noch nichts davon gehört, daß *Gott tot ist!*" (p. 11).

Icarus perishes.⁶⁶ On this view, the human being is not exposed to two powers representing good and evil, but to two powers representing two respective forms of evil (or one-sidedness). Here, the good can be found each time a human being establishes, for a moment, a balance between the two evils. Basically, it is an admonition to follow the Universal Rule by seeking to understand, in vertical terms, that every human being is both part and whole.

Third, one can also focus on all three points. This category of views is about ternary syntheses, not binary syntheses, and could be called *Schillerian*. Friedrich Schiller, the German poet, discussed the difference between the two types extensively with his friend Goethe, and I will

⁶⁶ For expressing the human condition, the myth of Icarus, as we know it from Ovid, is better suited than two other myths that are sometimes mentioned in this respect. The first one is the myth of Prometheus ("Mr. Forethought"), which is about Prometheus' stealing the fire (being a symbol of civilization, or the Mind) from the gods and bringing it to the human world. As Hesiod describes, Zeus decides that human beings may keep the fire, but he sees to it that they suffer hardship for all the good they reap from it. To that effect, he sends Miss Pandora as a present to Epimetheus ("Mr. Afterthought"), who is Prometheus' brother. Epimetheus marries Pandora, and only afterwards—of course—he realizes the mistake he has made, as she famously lifts the cover from a box containing all diseases, which evaporate and haunt human beings ever since, except for one, being Hope (*E/pis*). While this myth captures the idea of 'the divine spark' in human beings, it takes the opposition of good and evil as its central tissue (instead of two forms of evil, which, if balanced, constitute the good). Another element of this myth is the punishment that is inflicted on Prometheus himself, who, as Aeschylus describes it, gets chained to the rocks, in the middle between earth and sky, where an eagle picks his liver every day, while it increases before the eagle returns. It reminds one of the second myth—the one of Sisyphus—as described by Homer. Sisyphus betrays the gods, and when Death is sent to him Sisyphus puts him in irons. Consequently, nobody dies anymore, until Hades goes personally to the underworld to release Death. Sisyphus is taken to the underworld, and there his punishment is to push a rock onto the top of a mountain, while every time he seems to get there he has to start anew. This theme has been taken up by existentialists, and, most notably, in Albert Camus, *Le mythe de Sisyphe: Essai sur l'absurde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1942), as well as in IR by Stanley Hoffmann, in his *The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe 1964-1994* (Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press, 1995). The difference between the two myths, for one thing, is that Prometheus is released in the end, whereas Sisyphus is not, being captured in circularity. If Prometheus is a would-be representative of the human struggle in vertical terms (mixing up good and evil), Sisyphus is a would-be representative of the human struggle in horizontal terms (excluding the notions of balance, the good, and progress). What both myths have in common is that they are typical products of Antiquity, both struggling with the human being in its relation with the gods. The myth of Icarus is special in that it is completely focused on the individual, struggling to find a 'divine' balance in life by making use of his Icarian wings.

explain next what is at issue here. Like Goethe, Schiller characterizes the human being by his mixed nature, and he extends the polar opposite between Mind and Body by means of homonyms to all kinds of polarity, thereby featuring duality. Like Goethe, he attributes central importance to some notion of unity that consists of the dynamic interplay of opposing forces, and he also sees freedom as *Aufgabe*. However, Schiller differs from Goethe in *how* he conceives of the interplay of opposing forces. While Goethe sees the two in terms of collaboration, like between brothers and sisters, Schiller sees the two in terms of antagonism between hostile forces, holding each other in check (although this “antagonism of sense and spirit is not, in his view, primary; not an inevitable result of our being creatures of two worlds, but only a result of our mismanagement of the ‘mixed nature’ which is our human condition”⁶⁷). While Goethe is concerned with countering one-sidedness, Schiller is with finding a point where the diametrically opposed forces can meet exactly half-way if they make equal concessions on both sides. That is, while Goethe is focused on a balance of two things, Schiller is on what he calls a ‘third thing’.

Schiller repeatedly calls for the need of a third thing, and in every third letter in his famous series of letters on the aesthetic education of man he makes it clearer what he means by that:

In Letter III it is a ‘third character’ which shall combine the virtues of both man’s natures, his animal and his rational. In VI it becomes clear that this third character will have to be something different from the wholeness and harmony of the Greeks. In IX Schiller exposes the circularity of his argument and the need for a third term if the dilemma is to be solved. In XII he starts the argument for a ‘third drive’ born of the reciprocal subordination of the two basic drives, the material and the formal. In XV beauty is defined as the objective correlative of this third drive, as a third quality resulting from the synthesis of life and form. In XVIII it is a third state that is postulated, a ‘middle condition’ mediating between passivity and activity and combining the advantages of each. In XXI this third state is at last named: it is the aesthetic mode of the psyche, defined as a ‘Null’ which is nevertheless infinitely fruitful. In XXIV we embark on the complex relation of this third state to each of the three phases through which both individual and race must pass if they are to complete ‘the cycle of their destiny’. Finally, in XXVII, Schiller gathers together all these ‘thirds’ in his vision of a ‘Third State’ (...).⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, “Introduction,” in Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man, In a Series of Letters [English and German Facing]*, trans. and ed. Wilkinson and Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1795] 2005), p. lxx.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. li.

The notion of a Third State is a combination of the ‘third thing’ and the idea that the political state is the objective archetype of a human being, constituting the kind of unity that the human being cannot attain but only strive for. Promoting a constitution that respects variety, Schiller posits that “if man is ever to solve that problem of politics in practice he will have to approach it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through Beauty that man makes his way to Freedom”.⁶⁹ However, Schiller makes it clear that the ‘political artist’ is not like any other artist:

With the pedagogic or the political artist things are very different indeed. For him Man is at once the material on which he works and the goal towards which he strives. In this case the end turns back upon itself and becomes identical with the medium; and it is only inasmuch as the whole serves the parts that the parts are in any way bound to submit to the whole. The statesman-artist must approach his material with a quite different kind of respect from that which the maker of Beauty feigns towards his. The consideration he must accord to its uniqueness and individuality is not merely subjective, and aimed at creating an illusion for the senses, but objective and directed to its innermost being.⁷⁰

Schiller propounds that “the State as at present constituted has been the cause of the evil”, and he concludes that “we must continue to regard every attempt at political reform as untimely, and every hope based upon it as chimerical, as long as the split within man is not healed, and his nature so restored to wholeness that it can itself become the artificer of the State (...)”.⁷¹ While Schiller wrote this for his own age, we will see in the next paragraph of this Chapter what it means for our age.

Seeking to heal the split within man, Schiller focuses on the “innermost being” of individuality. He famously captures his view of the human being as follows:

For, to mince matters no longer, man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays.⁷²

To fully grasp what is said here, it is important to note that Schiller makes a distinction between two drives, which are linked with what he calls the

⁶⁹ Ibid., II.5, pp. 8/9.

⁷⁰ Ibid., IV.4, pp. 18/19 and 20/21.

⁷¹ Ibid., VII.1, pp. 44/45.

⁷² Ibid., XV.9, pp. 106/107: “Denn, um es endlich auf einmal herauszusagen, der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Worts Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt.”

“two fundamental laws of man’s sensuo-rational nature”, the one insisting on absolute reality (*i.e.*, in the outer world or world material), the other on absolute formality (*i.e.*, in the inner world or world immaterial).⁷³ The first one is the sensuous drive (*Stofftrieb*), emanating from man’s physical or sensuous nature; the second one is the formal drive (*Formtrieb*), emanating from his rational nature.⁷⁴ Schiller’s version of the Fall is not that man is born into a mixed nature, but that he has a choice of either managing or mismanaging the opposite drives that go with it. The fundamental drive to actually manage the combination of the other two drives, Schiller calls the play-drive (*Spieltrieb*).⁷⁵ This play-drive is the key to man’s true freedom, which itself is the product of the two opposed drives.⁷⁶ While the ideal is to establish some equilibrium between the two drives, in actuality the best man can do is to manage an oscillation between both.⁷⁷

The proper management of the human condition consists of reciprocal sub- and co-ordination, by which Schiller means that the drives have to be subordinated reciprocally, and have to be coordinated in that they exist next to each other, being parts of the same whole.⁷⁸ It involves an appraisal of the total situation, both within and without. Wilkinson and Willoughby reduce this specific combination of inside and outside, which is original with Schiller, to the following scheme:

The more reciprocity between self and world, the more likelihood of reciprocal sub- and co-ordination between the forces within the self—and vice versa.

The less reciprocity between self and world, the more likelihood of usurpation and trespassing between the forces within the self—and vice versa.⁷⁹

This paradigm is the foundation for Schiller’s theory of ternary syntheses (with the physical and the moral, united in the aesthetic), as well as for his theory of the three stages of cultural development (from the physical to the moral, *via* the aesthetic).⁸⁰ In both cases, Schiller distinguishes among

⁷³ Ibid., XI.9, pp. 76/77.

⁷⁴ Ibid., XII, pp. 78/79 ff.

⁷⁵ Ibid., XIII, pp. 84/85 ff.

⁷⁶ Ibid., XIX.12, pp. 136/137.

⁷⁷ Ibid., XVI.1, pp. 110/111.

⁷⁸ Ibid., XIV, pp. 94/95 ff.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. lxxxi.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. xliii–xlvi: Wilkinson and Willoughby argue convincingly why Hans Lutz misses the point completely when he sees these two theories as unreconciled, and irreconcilable, strata of thought (the one discernible in Letters IV, VI, VII, XI–XV, and XVII–XXVII; the other, respectively, in II, III, V, VIII, X, and XVI). Schiller oscillates between the two, also within one and the same letter, which is exactly the central point.

three drives that operate in their own distinct spheres, or “States”, *viz.* the dynamic, the aesthetic, and the ethical State.⁸¹

The distinction itself, *viz.* among three realms, as related to three parts of the human being, is not original with Schiller. Plato was first in making this distinction in his political theory of the soul. He distinguishes among three classes in society: farmers and craftsmen providing goods and services in the economy, guardians providing security in and of the state, and philosopher-kings providing leadership by good reasoning. The three classes are active in three distinct realms: economics, politics, and ethics. To be a member of a class one has to dispose of certain qualities. What is new with Plato, if compared with the Indian Vedanta that distinguishes among ‘castes’ as well, is that one is not born into a certain class like in the caste system, but that it all depends on the qualities one has. Plato’s Myth of Metals has it that, depending on whether “iron or bronze” has been laid in one’s soul, or “silver” or “gold”, one is destined to become a member of either one of the three classes respectively. Characteristic of Plato’s theory is that it focuses on the state, and on the human being only by analogy, as we saw in Part I. Furthermore, his theory submits that one can only live in one class or sphere exclusively. And, finally, it propounds a fixed hierarchy among the classes or realms. In the Middle Ages, these three tenets are broadly copied in its societal structure based on the ‘three estates’ (with the working classes becoming the ‘fourth estate’ at some point). Also today, Plato’s political theory of the soul is still influential, since it has been the foundation of many psychologies, like Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis.⁸²

⁸¹ Ibid., XXVII.9, pp. 214/215.

⁸² To Freud, individual and social psychology are virtually identical. First, in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* [*Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse* (1921)], trans. & ed. James Strachey: The Standard Edition (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, [1959] 1989), Freud posits that he has done “nothing original” in taking love in a ‘wider’ sense: “In its origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the ‘Eros’ of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido of psycho-analysis” (p. 30). While this assertion is contestable, as, subsequently, he gives to love instincts the name of “sexual instincts”, thereby equating love and sex, Freud also proposes a “structural theory” of the mind, in his classic *The Ego and the Id* [*Das Ich und das Es* (1923)], The Standard Edition (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1962). It visualizes the mind as divided into three distinct yet interacting parts—the id, the ego, and the super-ego—which, by analogy, resembles Plato’s distinction among three classes. Other psychologies have departed from there. Like Freud features the will to pleasure, Alfred Adler speaks of the will to power (or the striving of superiority), whereas Viktor Frankl focuses on the will to meaning (turning existentialism into ‘logotherapy’). While Frankl champions the ‘mind’, and the other two the ‘body’, all three favor one ‘class’.

What is new in Schiller's theory, then, is that it changes all three tenets, while preserving the distinction among the realms. Firstly, it focuses on the human being as the clue to political reform on the state level (and never the other way round, like in Plato and Hegel). Secondly, it posits that every human being lives in all three realms at the same time, and that it is up to him to either manage or mismanage the combination of the three (which not only depends on his qualities or ability, but also on his being conscious of his task, in the first place, as well as his will to assume it). Thirdly, it does not propose a hierarchy among the realms, but a ternary synthesis (with two realms being the points that make for a non-horizontal 'base', and the third or middle one being the 'top' of a triangle). This is fundamentally different from dialectical reasoning where thesis and antithesis are dissolved (*aufgehoben*) in the synthesis that comes *after* the opposition (like in Hegel). In Schiller's thought, reciprocal subordination always goes together with coordination. That is, the diachronic is combined with the synchronic.⁸³ To conclude this

⁸³ Carl Jung, this other great psychologist, has coined the term 'synchronicity', in his "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle" ["Synchronizität als ein Prinzip akausaler Zusammenhänge" (1952)], in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche* [*Naturerklärung und Psyche*], vol. 8 of *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, trans. R.F.C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). In this classic essay, Jung defines it as "a meaningful coincidence of two or more events, where something other than the probability of chance is involved" (p. 520). By this he does not mean to focus primarily on two things happening at the same time (synchronism), but rather on the "parallelism" between the two things, as they happen (synchronicity). Specifically, he is concerned here with the connecting principle between Mind and Body, which cannot be explained in terms of causality. Arthur Koestler sees synchronicity as a manifestation of some universal principle—"i.e., the integrative tendency operating through both causal and acausal agencies"—in his *Janus: A Summing Up* (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 265, 270. On this principle, see also F. David Peat, *Synchronicity: The Bridge between Matter and Mind* (New York: Bantam, 1987). Another principle that is central in Jung's thought, is 'quaternity'. It is closely related to what he calls the 'mandala', and what we have called a 'circle'. While the latter is in both Eastern and Western civilizations the symbol for the centre and the goal of the Self as psychic totality, the former stands for the number 'four', which he describes as the minimal logical requirement that is key for attaining it. He argues that anything that represents totality goes in (a multiple of) four. Likewise, in psychology, he posits that there are four orientation points on the psychic circle, where, respectively, one is aware of something (sensing); one thinks about what it is (thinking); one likes it or not, and accepts it or not (feeling); and one sees where it is coming from and going to (intuition). Jung notes that the structure of quaternity is often (1 + 3), with one point taking an exceptional position. However, if this is meant to be, as Jung argues, so as to allow for the integration of this point in the whole, reaching totality, the symbol of the circle does not capture this at all. The present framework does capture it, with vertical (sensing/thinking) and horizontal (feeling) axes in space; and time (intuition).

exposition of views that focus on three points at the same time, one could say that Schiller, in a sense, turns Plato's political theory of the soul on its head, but sticks to the threefold scheme, which is a constant through intellectual history, while he reformulates and refines it as he deems fit for his own age, bringing the individual human being to the centre of all realms.⁸⁴

Having discussed the three ways in which one can include three points on the vertical axis—*i.e.*, by focusing on one of the three, on two of the three, or all three respectively—, one may wonder how these three ways of looking at the human being are related. The answer to this is simple: these views are identical, as either of the three points is located on

⁸⁴ The threefold scheme can also be found in the tripartite distinction that some of the world religions make. Thus, Zen Buddhism speaks in terms of opening the 'Third Eye', and Christianity in terms of a Holy Trinity, including the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit or Ghost. As the development of spiritual thought is intimately connected with intellectual history, the dogma of the Holy Trinity—to focus in on this one—has been interpreted differently through the centuries, with differing emphasis on either one of the three elements. With Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, for instance, the human being has become in charge of his life more than ever before. In his *Oratio de Hominis Dignitate* (1487), Pico writes: "Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal have we created thee, so that thou mightest be free according to thy own will and honor, to be thy own creator and builder. To thee alone we gave growth and development depending on thy own free will. Thou bearest in thee the germs of a universal life." At this point in intellectual history, the human being is seen as being at the center of a sphere. But also then and there, the question remains how the three entities of the Holy Trinity are related. Niebuhr answers this question in the twentieth century, in Niebuhr (1996), p. 60, as follows: "The will of God is the norm, the life of Christ is the revelation of that will, and the individual faces the awful responsibility of seeking to do God's will." Giving a central place to the Myth of the Fall, Niebuhr posits that human beings understand themselves as creatures made in the image of God and yet haunted by a universal sinfulness. Like Niebuhr, in theology, focuses in on the human condition, while taking account of the changes in human thinking, Erich Fromm does so in psychology, in his *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Owl Books, [1941] 1994), and Quentin Skinner in political science, in his *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). When taking a broader time span than any of the above authors, one could say, in diachronic terms, that human awareness has changed locus from cosmos (cosmic awareness), via mythos (human 'awareness' of the gods), to logos (self-consciousness that makes it possible to reinterpret the earlier ones, changing them into mythology and cosmology, such as Einstein's). However, logos is not all there is, since we may distinguish, in synchronic terms, the three elements that Aristotle already mentions in *The Art of Rhetoric*: logos (intellectual quality of the message), ethos (virtues of the messenger himself), and pathos (physical co-presence with the audience). Professor Gary Orren, in his persuasion classes at Harvard University, adds to these three a fourth one, constituting balance among the three, which he calls 'syzygy'.

the vertical axis, and anything that is on the vertical axis, as we concluded above, amounts to the same. While this may suffice as geometrical proof in space, we may pose the same question in time. In a diachronic sense, then, it may be interesting to know that the Spinozist, the Faustian, and the Schillerian views are intimately connected on a time line where Goethe was self-declaredly much inspired by Spinoza, like Schiller was by Goethe. This is only to make plausible that, fundamentally, the three views are in accord with one another. To declare their identity, however, the question has to be taken in a synchronic sense. Thus, we may look at Plato, who unites in his thought the unity of the Soul; the image he uses, in his *Phaedrus*, of the charioteer and the two horses (which stands for the mixed nature of man, but which one may also see as an image of the threefold nature of the soul, if one includes the charioteer, standing for reason); and the three classes. Likewise, we may look at the Schillerian view, and see that it embraces, at the same time, the oneness of Beauty as an Idea (one point); the mixed nature of man (two points); and the three drives within distinct States (three points).⁸⁵

If the Schillerian view, then, includes both other views, being identical with these geometrically, how does it relate to the framework we have built for offering a new conception of the human condition? While making three points in answering this question (or rather the same point

⁸⁵ A more contemporaneous example of the coincidence of a two-pointer and a three-pointer, can be found in Buber (1983), p. 12. Buber makes a distinction here between two key-words (*Zweifalt der Grundworte*): Self-Other (*Ich-Du*) and I-Id (*Ich-Es*). The former is about the relational world; the latter about the world as awareness or experience. Right next, he focuses in on the former and there he distinguishes three spheres (*Sphären*), which are all included in the Other: living with nature, living with human beings, and living with spiritual entities. He relates these three spheres with cosmos, eros, and logos respectively (p. 121). The middle one he considers to be most important, as it unites all three (p. 122). This is exactly the attribute (*Personhaftigkeit*) that Buber adds to the two (*Naturhaftigkeit* and *Geisthaftigkeit*) that Spinoza already uses (pp. 158-9). Another example is Russell's view of the mixed nature of man, which he combines with the following triad, when focusing in on the infinite part of man, in Clark (1975), p. 190: "In thought, it rises above the life of the senses, seeking always what is general and open to all men. In desire and will, it aims simply at the good, without regarding the good as mine or yours. In feeling, it gives love to all, not only to those who further the purposes of the self. Unlike the finite self, it is impartial; its impartiality leads to truth in thought, justice in action, and universal love in feeling." A third example is Hilary Putnam, who combines the transition from dualism to duality, in his *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2002) with a concept of trinity, in his *The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

on three different levels), I will finally try to draw the big picture. In so doing, I will recall what we have found before, and show what the Schillerian view adds to it as well as what it misses.

First, we may use the sphere as the geometrical solid that can serve to visualize the logic explaining reality:⁸⁶ it allows for a combination of circular movement, constituting a dimension of its own (time), with three-dimensional structure (space). As we use our consciousness of the world and its forms when thinking about reality, we should acknowledge this by placing the human being at the point of intersection of the three axes, forming the centre, respectively the structure, of the sphere. And as we use our *self*-consciousness when thinking about thinking, subject and object coincide, so that this structure is both subjective and objective. To account for this, we should recognize that the point of intersection, which unites the horizontal dimensions and the vertical one at the centre of the sphere, is the 'I' really.⁸⁷ While Schiller certainly agrees with the conclusion, he does not make any contribution here in terms of finding the right geometrical expressions to capture this point.⁸⁸ True, Schiller

⁸⁶ Cf. Peter Sloterdijk, *Sphären* [Spheres], Vol. I: *Blasen/Mikrosphärologie* [Bubbles] – Vol. II: *Globen/Makrosphärologie* [Globes] – Vol. III: *Schäume/Plurale Sphärologie* [Foams] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998-2004). Astounding as this trilogy is, both in its depth and its scope, it sees the Self/Other relation, *rather than* the 'I', as constitutive of a sphere, which the present theory challenges by demonstrating balance.

⁸⁷ While Niebuhr maintains that one part of human nature is that man has been made in the image of God, he also posits in Niebuhr (1996) that sinfulness is the other part, and that the ultimate sin is to claim to be or to represent God. He puts it in biblical terms, when saying that, goaded by anxiety, people practice "idolatry", or exhibit "pride". Niebuhr describes both as related to "self-centeredness": people make themselves the center of their world, as if they were that center. It is important to note, that in terms of the present framework this means that it can be called idolatrous if one places the Self at the center, instead of the 'I'. However, if we say that the 'I' is or represents God, this is by no means idolatrous on Niebuhr's terms, as the 'I' includes all that is and is not, including both Self and Other. Another author who should be mentioned here is Michael Ignatieff, who argues in his *Human Rights As Politics and Idolatry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) that "[h]uman rights is misunderstood (...) if it is seen as a 'secular religion.' It is not a creed; it is not a metaphysics. To make it so is to turn it into a species of idolatry: humanism worshipping itself" (p. 53). The ultimate sin here would be to claim that human rights is the 'center of human dignity'.

⁸⁸ The opposite holds true for Buber, who would disagree with the conclusion, but who does find a geometrical expression—if flawed—to capture his point. In Buber (1983), his main point is that the 'eternal' Other (*das ewige Du*) is 'God' (pp. 91-2), which he places at the center of a circle (p. 119), with radii connecting it with 'Self' points on the circle (p. 136). The problem is, however, that Buber propounds that the relational world of the Other "does not know of any system of co-ordinates" (p. 39).

defines the aesthetic mode of the psyche as a “Nought”, which he relates with “infinity”.⁸⁹ True, he does make an effort at explaining his theory by mathematical analogy in a letter to Goethe.⁹⁰ True, commentators have argued that Schiller’s strategy is “not linear but circular”, while pointing at his “concentric approach” featuring both “circularity” and “multi-dimensionality”.⁹¹ However, Schiller does not use any mathematical terms or analogies consistently so as to provide the structure for his theory, and he certainly does not mention the sphere as providing it. Therefore, the present framework is not based on Schiller’s theory, but rather, the other way around, Schiller could have based his theory on this framework. That is, the present framework has a broader scope, as I hope to demonstrate shortly, and it provides a structure that is objectively true.

Second, when taking the ‘I’ as a starting-point, self-consciousness may lead to the awareness that, of necessity, two dichotomies lie at the heart of the human condition: Self/Other and Mind/Body. The former is about the division from each other; the latter about the division within.⁹² We may also see the dichotomies as interpretations of the inside/outside dichotomy, which can be understood in both horizontal and vertical terms. While the difference between the horizontal and the vertical dimension is that the former consists of two axes, whereas the latter consists of one, the two dimensions are the same in that they both serve to clarify one dichotomy each, thus constituting dualism (with two axes and one circle) and duality (with one axis and two poles) respectively.⁹³ I

⁸⁹ See Schiller (2005), XXI, pp. 144/145.

⁹⁰ See Wilkinson and Willoughby, in Schiller (2005), p. xlviii.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. li, lv, lxxvi, and lvi respectively.

⁹² Cf. Taylor (1989), pp. 500-1. Taylor posits that the division within splits reason from sense (p. 500). With respect to the division from each other, he writes that it may be overcome by borrowing George Herbert Mead’s term of ‘significant others’, who are “not simply external to me; they help constitute my own selfhood” (p. 509). Mead has coined this term in his *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, [1934] 1967). It may remind one of Buber’s famous phrase, in Buber ([1923] 1983), p. 37: “Der Mensch wird am Du zum Ich.” In the present framework this is visualized in the circle that unites Self and Other, while, at the same time, Self and Other are the two separate axes that provide the structure for this circle.

⁹³ Niebuhr diverges here once again. When discussing individual and social morality in Niebuhr, *Moral Man & Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, [1932] 2001), pp. 270 ff, he concludes that it seems better to accept only dualism in morals. While we discussed this in Part I, which is about agency units and their morals, what is of interest here, in Part II, is that what appears to underlie this dualism is a structural distinction between Self and Other, and between individuals and groups. If we reformulate these two aspects of Niebuhr’s dualism in our

have demonstrated that the horizontal dimension constitutes the dualism of Self and Other, and is about personality and analogy; and that the vertical dimension constitutes the duality of Mind/Body, and is about individuality and identity. While Schiller also makes the distinction between horizontal and vertical thinking in his paradigm of reciprocal sub- and co-ordination, he focuses on the forces within the human being, lying on the vertical dimension. His goal is to heal the split within man, and he attains this goal extremely well in theory. His contribution here is that he shows how the human being can achieve 'self-wholeness', as some would call it (instead of 'individuality', which would be more appropriate). Insofar as Schiller is also concerned with the reciprocity between Self and "world", he does not make any contribution really to horizontal thinking, on how human beings relate to one another. Except for the notion of reciprocity, all of Part I of the present theory is missing in Schiller's.

Finally, when arriving at a view of the human condition showing man as being part of three realms at the same time—*i.e.*, the physical realm, the realm of the mind or spirit, and, in between, the relational realm *inter homines*—, the question is how to unite these three parts in the human being. In addressing this question, Schiller has arguably made his greatest contribution. This contribution lies, primarily, in the notion of the play-drive, being the key to man's true freedom.⁹⁴ Being caught by

own terms, they focus in on the distinction between the *x*- and *y*-axis, and on the distinction between the *z*-axis (going through the center) and a larger (concentric) circle. While the former, indeed, does constitute dualism, the latter does not. That is to say, it follows from the present framework that if one were to look at the *z*-axis only, which Niebuhr does not do, one would see duality; and that if one looks at it in its relation to the other two axes (that make up for the concentric circle), one sees trinity. Interestingly, Niebuhr does not see it here, but he does when he distinguishes among three types of power in social life, *viz.* spiritual, political, and economic or physical power, in Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Vol. II: Human Destiny* (Louisville/London: Westminster John Knox Press, [1943] 1996), pp. 260-264. If he sees something different on the social level, as compared with the individual level, this would, in itself, be consistent with his own claim of dualism. However, as it turns out, Niebuhr does, in fact, use a concept of trinity also on the individual level. As we will see shortly, he endorses the Schillerian view.

⁹⁴ Cf. Niebuhr (1996: I): Niebuhr makes reference to Schiller's three drives (p. 27), and quotes him on the need to establish a balance between the sensuous drive and the formal drive (p. 33). Niebuhr himself becomes truly Schillerian, at least in one respect, when he analyses the easy conscience of modern man: "[The modern man] tries to interpret himself in terms of natural causality or in terms of his unique rationality; but he does not see that he has a freedom of spirit which transcends both nature and reason" (p. 96). He also endorses the Schillerian combination of sub- and co-ordination (p. 277).

two other drives—*i.e.*, the sensuous drive and the formal drive—, which govern in the respective spheres of Body and Mind, the human being can be set free, if it tries to consciously strike a balance between these two drives, while living a life *inter homines*. As such balance cannot be obtained as something in and of itself, Freedom must be seen as *Aufgabe* as well as struggle. For Schiller, to face this struggle, is to play; and to play, is to be a human being in the fullest sense of the word. The historian Johan Huizinga expands on this theme in his *Homo Ludens*, in which he explores the play element of culture (as he expressly indicates; not *in* culture, as his editor preferred),⁹⁵ and Aron discusses this celebrated work as it applies to IR, making a comparison of war and games that both oscillate between brutality and formalized conflict (thereby showing the limits of culture).⁹⁶ In moral philosophy and ethics, Taylor, making extensive reference to Schiller in his seminal *Sources of the Self*, bases his *The Ethics of Authenticity* completely on the Schillerian play-drive or struggle. In it, he features a polarization between “boosters and knockers”, who “[b]oth in a sense conspire to identify [the understanding of any ideal or good] with its lowest, most self-centred expressions”. In this context, he posits that there is a struggle between higher and lower forms of freedom, whose outcome is continually up for grabs. Furthermore, when presenting his ideal of authenticity, Taylor makes an analogy between self-discovery and artistic creation.⁹⁷ That is, his ideal of authenticity, which we mentioned above as providing the arguments for why the method of deconstruction is inconsistent, is based on some notion of beauty. While Foucault, in a late interview, went into this direction by his invocation of the aesthetic,⁹⁸ Taylor takes it as a starting-point, and in so doing Schillerian thought appears to be key in getting beyond postmodernism.

Also in the Sciences, the aesthetic appears to be key in reaching breakthroughs. We have already seen above how (super)string theory and

⁹⁵ See Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, [1938] 1971). Huizinga has coined the term *homo ludens*. For a critical appraisal of his contribution to Schiller scholarship, see Wilkinson and Willoughby, in Schiller (2005), pp. clxxxvi-clxxxvii. They assume that Huizinga can have read little more of Schiller's theory than the single Letter (XIV) to which he actually refers.

⁹⁶ See Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, [1966] 2003), pp. 769-771.

⁹⁷ See Taylor (1991), pp. 80, 78, 79, and 61-65. And cf. Rollo May, *The Courage to Create* (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, [1975] 1994).

⁹⁸ See Michel Foucault, interview, in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 245, 251.

M-theory manifestly show that “the more deeply we probe Nature’s secrets, the more profoundly we are driven into Plato’s world of mathematical ideals as we seek our understanding”.⁹⁹ Concluding our overview of major developments in mathematical thinking, we posited that one of the issues that stand out in the search for ‘a theory of everything’ is the balance between mathematical aesthetics and physical insight. While we used the term ‘aesthetics’ there not yet in the Schillerian sense, *viz.* as the art of making everything fit together in the mind in one overarching theory, rather than of establishing balance between mind and matter, Heisenberg clearly shows that it is the Schillerian play-drive in the latter sense that is at issue really:

When looking back at the history of science, one may observe that the right representation of the appearances in nature has emerged from exactly the tension [*Spannung*] between the two opposing conceptions. The purely mathematical speculation becomes fruitless, as it cannot find its way back to the few forms [*Formen*] that are really formative of nature when it has first indulged in a play [*Spiel*] with an abundance of possible forms. And the purely empirical method becomes fruitless, as eventually it is stifled by the endless list of tables without inner coherence. It is only from the tension or play between the abundance of facts and the possibly corresponding mathematical forms that break-throughs may emerge. [*my own translation*]¹⁰⁰

Heisenberg demonstrates that the breakthroughs that were reached by, most notably, Copernicus and Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Einstein, and the group of physicists who developed Quantum Physics, Heisenberg himself included, emerged from aesthetics or what we may call the Schillerian play-drive as applied to the sciences.

Thus, the Arts and Sciences are identical in their conception of Beauty. As Heisenberg recalls, since Antiquity there have always been, in fact, two conceptions of Beauty in both the arts and sciences. The one defines Beauty as the right relation of the parts among each other as well as with the whole. The other, going back to Plotinos, defines it by the eternal ‘One’ that shows through the physical appearances, without mentioning any parts at all.¹⁰¹ Schiller often writes about the relation of parts and wholes, but sometimes he seems to tilt more to the second

⁹⁹ Penrose (2004), p. 1029.

¹⁰⁰ Heisenberg, “Die Bedeutung des Schönen in der exakten Naturwissenschaft” [The Meaning of Beauty in Natural Science] (1977), in *Quantentheorie und Philosophie* [*Quantum Theory and Philosophy*] (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1979), p. 99.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

definition. In a letter to a friend of his he writes: “One stands for all, and all stands for one” (*“Eins steht für alles und alles steht für Eins”*). This tautology is, in a sense, the essence of Schiller’s theory. Wilkinson and Willoughby here conclude that

[Schiller] talks of forcing the reader to *think*, to interpret the parts by reference to the whole and the whole by reference to the parts. What he was trying to offer him was a rigorously coherent system of relations which nevertheless activated him to move freely—to carry on Schiller’s work of substitution and transposition according to the state of knowledge arrived at in his own generation.¹⁰²

Even if one may wonder whether Schiller’s theory was that “rigorously coherent” after all, any doubt on this is only added reason for feeling free to think *oneself* about the relation of parts and wholes.

Schiller, in his age, sought to devise a theory that could meet two objectives, or rather demands, *viz.*, “the demand for a cultural ideal which shall transcend the antithesis between Greek harmony and Modern differentiation; and the demand for an aesthetic which shall transcend the antithesis between intuitive impressionism and rational analysis”. Thus, one can say that the crux of Schiller’s theory is formed by two questions, the one posed by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*—What is the relation of insight to action?—, and the other by Plato in his *Republic*—What is the relation of art to politics?¹⁰³ When Schiller seeks to answer these questions, propounding that it is only through Beauty that man makes his way to Freedom, he is concerned with the individual. As he makes it perfectly clear, though, that there is a great difference between an individual artist and the “statesman-artist”, it is not so clear what guidance he has to offer for the latter. Furthermore, we live in an age that is different from Schiller’s in many ways. As is concerned our conception of the human condition, it has changed in the way I have described in the beginning of this Chapter. As time and space have been harmonized in science, in the rest of life Greek harmony has gotten further away than ever before. On the whole, one could say that it is the theory of relativity that makes us part from Schiller’s age. For one thing, reality is no longer transcendental, like in his age, but immanent in the ‘I’. The ‘I’ connects and unites in itself the spiritual world and the physical world, or the Mind and the Body, which is what I have proposed in this Chapter. The

¹⁰² Wilkinson and Willoughby, in Schiller (2005), p. cxxvi.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. xiii and I.

difference here with Schiller is best explained in geometrical terms: Whereas Schiller's concept of trinity is a triangle (with a base and a 'transcendental' top),¹⁰⁴ I have proposed a vertical axis with three points (two poles and a centre). This vertical line, which the 'T' literally is, I have called the line of identity, to be compared with Schiller's tautology. While the 'T' constitutes reality in the present age, we have to be sure that our view of the human being is right so that our view of reality has any chance of being objectively true.

The present theory, then, seeks to offer a new framework for explaining the human condition from the vantage point of the 'T'. It starts with making the subject into its own object, and it takes it from there, using three axes and a sphere as visualizing the logic that can explain it all. It also provides a new formulation of the relation of parts and wholes, which we have called the Universal Rule in Chapter 1. We have argued that this Universal Rule has to be applied in concrete terms, and we have indicated that this can be done in two ways: horizontally (making use of the *x*- and *y*-axis) and vertically (making use of the *z*-axis). If it is seen that way, the crux of the present theory is formed by two questions, the one posed by Grotius in his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*—What is the relation of Self and Other?—, and the other by Spinoza in his *Ethics*—What is the relation of Mind and Body? As we have discussed the first question in Part I, resulting in a Golden Rule that can offer guidance in answering the same question in concrete terms, we are discussing the second question now in Part II, which will form the basis for the Iron Rule that we will formulate in the next chapter. The Iron Rule wholly follows from the view of the human being as has been developed in this section. It applies it to the forces that are active in the three spheres as we can distinguish them in the workings of international society—culture/religion, economics, and law/politics in between. However, before we can focus in on the question of how the play-drive can be seen to be operative on the world level in Chapter 5, we first have to establish in the remainder of Chapter 4 what forces are operative in each of the functional domains individually, as distinguished above.

To conclude the present section: I offer a view of the human condition that does not see the human being as *homo sapiens* only, or as *animal laborans* only, but sees the human being as struggling to combine them both, being *homo ludens* really. In using this term, I derive as little from Huizinga as the latter did from Schiller, but yet it captures it best.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 348-350: "Appendix III: Visual Aids".

4.2 Trias Ethica

The geometrical framework we developed in the previous section is designed to offer guidance in politics. When seeking to provide guidance to domestic societies that would be morally adrift in a postmodernist world where anything goes, one needs a framework to provide such guidance. As this framework has to be based on some theory that is objectively true, postmodernism reaches a deadlock since it excoriates the notion of objective truth. Postmodernism has nothing to offer when dealing with practical questions of statecraft. While it is granted that the notion of objective truth is dangerous, as we learnt from Popper, we may also recall Taylor's lesson that we should not bury the goods that may lead to suffering or destruction. Almost any good may be potentially dangerous, but one has to face this, not hide it. That is why we continued our quest for a framework, and found, in the end, that life itself is a quest, and even a struggle. Featuring this struggle, the previous section shows the whole picture of human being, while this section explains what this picture tells us about society, and international society in particular. That is, if the previous section distinguishes among three different spheres in relation to the individual human being, this section shows how these spheres on the micro level are constitutive of and identical with three spheres on the macro level—culture, economics, and politics—, and how each sphere (*i.e.*, sub-system, or functional domain, or realm, which all can be used interchangeably) is governed by its own principle. The main point of this section is to demonstrate that state action is bound to fail, if politics mixes up either the sub-systems or the principles governing them.

The proposition from where we start is that, of logical necessity, there are three categories, which make for three realms. In the previous section we followed a geometrical logic and arrived at the conclusion that there must be 'three points' on the $\mathbb{R}$ -axis, but one can also demonstrate in formal logic why the threefold distinction has to be the starting-point. For this, we have to return to the Universal Rule. The Universal Rule, it is recalled, is about wholes and parts, and it is submitted here that one can combine wholes and parts in three distinct ways making for three types of relations: whole-whole, part-part, and whole-part (or part-whole, being the same relation). In Part I we already applied this logical distinction in horizontal terms, when we discussed the Kantian, the Hobbesian, and the Grotian perspectives respectively. The difference, however, between the horizontal interpretation of the threefold distinction and the vertical one is that the former at first only sees wholes as such, or parts as such, and in

the end combines wholes and parts by establishing a *composition* relation (the relation of many parts to one whole), whereas the latter is about seeing three kinds of *identity* relation (the relation of one thing to itself). If this is the difference between the horizontal and vertical interpretation, how can we distinguish within the latter category among three kinds? Surely, in the case of 'whole = whole' and 'part = part' we are dealing with two kinds of identity relation, but what about 'whole = part'? Is not that, by definition, a composition relation? The answer must be that it is not, since what is meant here is that a 'whole = also a part itself', whereas the composition relation is that a 'whole = its collective parts'. Yet, the third equation can be taken both ways. In the debate in ontology, which we mentioned in the Introduction to Part II, between those who maintain that composition *is* identity (positing that the parts constitute the whole) and those who maintain that it is not (positing that the whole constitutes the parts), both sides are right, and the present theory can explain why: To say 'whole = part' is to take the middle position, which is the point of intersection of the x -, y -, and z -axes, and this position can be interpreted both horizontally and vertically (where in the case of the former it makes a difference if one means 'whole = part' or 'part = whole', in the case of the latter it does not). As I have demonstrated above, in either interpretation there are three categories in the first place.

Next, the question is how the three categories, if taken vertically, can be understood to make for their own realms or sub-systems. This question can be answered in two steps. The first step is to establish in real terms that each one of the three kinds of identity relation corresponds with one of the three points on the z -axis, which we found in geometrical terms. That is, in the previous section we already concluded that one has to distinguish among three 'points', which stand respectively for Mind, Body, and the 'I', located in the middle between the poles of Mind and Body as well as at the centre of the circular relation of Self–Other, but now we must establish how this triad is to be matched with the universal triad of whole, part, and whole/part in real terms. Taking up this question by proceeding from where we started in the Introduction to Part II, we have to look at the human being as living in two worlds: an outer and an inner world. In vertical terms, it is recalled, this means that the human being itself may look outward and see the world material; and may look inward and see the world immaterial. For the former man needs a body; for the latter he needs a mind. While the one can never do without the other, the body is instrumental in making man experience himself as part of the world out there when looking outward, while the mind is

instrumental in making man think of himself as a whole when looking inward. Thus, the mind constitutes the whole, while the body constitutes the part. And as the identity relation of 'whole = part' (meaning the same here as 'part = whole') applies as well, the same holds true for Mind and Body: standing in the middle, *viz.* the third position, man can see that they are each other's flipside, and are, as we will see in Chapter 5, the same. However, before taking either of these alternative views (*i.e.*, seeing two 'points' or one), which we called Faustian and Spinozist in the previous section, we will first focus here on the distinctive features of all of the three 'worlds' that lie behind the Mind, the Body, and the 'I' respectively. That is, in this Chapter we will look at the three realms individually, and in the next Chapter we will see how they are related to each other.

As we have established that the Mind is about wholes, the Body is about parts, and the 'I' is, in this context, about combining Mind and Body, which are related in the same way as wholes and parts, the second step is to show how these three couples make for three realms respectively. In Chapter 1 as well as in the previous section, I used the hypothesis that these realms are culture, economics, and politics, thus following the distinction that Held, Hoffmann and many others make. There seems to be some general consensus that this series covers about everything. However, it is never explained why this is so of necessity. That is what I will do now. In short, culture has to be, as it encompasses the world immaterial, where wholes reign supreme; economics has to be, as it encompasses the world material, where parts reign supreme; and politics has to be, as it encompasses the world *inter homines*, where culture and economics go together like wholes and parts. Two points are in order here. First, the notions of culture, economics, and politics are only shorthand for a much richer texture in each case. Thus, one could also distinguish, in broader terms, among culture/religion/ethics; nature/economics; and law/politics. Whenever I use 'culture/nature/law', or 'ethics/economics/politics', I mean to refer to the realms, as broadly understood. Second, the Mind, the Body, and the 'I' constitute these respective realms, not the other way around. As there is Mind in the first place, there be culture, and so on.

What is new so far? What is not, is the distinction itself among three realms. What is, however, is the above demonstration of why there are exactly three, and why these three spheres have to be associated with precisely culture, economics, and politics respectively. What is also new is that these three spheres are rallied to a view of human being, and together form one paradigm that will be elaborated on in Chapter 5. This view is

different from Plato's in that Plato thinks in terms of three classes, where one belongs to only one, whereas the present view is about three realms, where there is no need for making any choice. As a matter of fact, if one likes it or not, one is part of all three realms at the same time, and at any moment when one is alive. Even if these realms—like Plato's classes—are autonomous, being governed by their own distinctive principles, in the present view they only make sense in combination.

What is next is a demonstration of what principles govern the three realms. More specifically, I will first establish what respective principles are at work in the respective realms. Then, I will explain why state action is bound to fail, if politics mixes up either the realms or the principles governing these. And finally, I will propose a new trias doctrine, which can serve as a statesman's standard framework, and which I will call the "Trias Ethica".

First, what respective principles, or incentive systems, are at work in the respective realms of culture, economics, and politics? To start with culture, we enter the realm of the Mind or the immaterial, which we see when looking inward. In this realm, man may choose to be reclusive in his own world, or he may associate with others on the basis of ideas, or ideals, he shares with them. In either case, in this realm he experiences himself as constituting a whole, while taking the inward view. What is characteristic here is the following: To be constitutive of a whole, is to experience inclusiveness. After all, if it is oneself who determines how large the whole is, one has to conclude that it could always include again some new idea yet unknown before, thus extending the whole into infinity. In the world of ideas there are no boundaries. Irrespective of how the ideas actually materialize—be it by worshipping God, by artistic expression, or by using reason in the arts and sciences—through the act of creation one may experience what it is to constitute a whole, being an instance of Infinity. For instance, when starting to draw a picture or to write a poem or a treatise, you have an empty piece of paper, and a pen or some other utensil, and all the rest is in your hands really. This very feeling of total command of making choices beforehand, however incomplete or imperfect one may judge the outcome afterwards, points us at the principle that is key in the realm of culture: *liberté*, viz. the liberty to constitute any whole that may come to mind.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ There is an extensive list of books that have been published on liberty. Among the most influential ones, I mention John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1859), and Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" [1958], in *Liberty*, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 166-217.

While proceeding to economics, we now enter the realm of the Body or the material, which we see when looking outward. In this realm, man may pursue his own interests in terms of physical desires and material needs, or he may lack the resources to satiate these. In either case, in this realm he experiences himself as being part of one world, while taking the outward view. What is characteristic here is the following: To be part of a larger whole, is to experience exclusiveness. After all, if the one appropriates a thing for his own consumption, this excludes any other from appropriating and consuming the same thing. Clearly, we are not thinking here of collective or public goods, which fall within the third realm that we will discuss next. At issue here are the building blocks for economics: goods for private consumption. However large may be the abundance of any good in particular, in terms of quantity it is always limited to a certain number. Economics is about scarcity. But what does that mean for economics in principle? In this realm, the experience of being only a part of a larger whole brings with it the awareness that one is dependent of something outside oneself. And this holds equally true for a national as for an individual household, which is why international economic relations are said to be about interdependence. Globalization, as a term, has many dimensions, but is often understood by solely the economic one. If taken more broadly, it is about the awareness not only of being interdependent vis-à-vis other economies, but also of having some responsibility in terms of sustainability vis-à-vis next generations and the planet Earth as a whole. This broader awareness of interdependence as one encounters it among brothers and sisters (where differences in wealth and health are facts of life but where one sees to it that the family, as a whole, can survive), points us at the principle that is at play with the family of nations in the realm of economics: *fraternité*, viz. the solidarity that is involved in playing one's part, while taking account of so-called economic 'externalities' by seeking win-win positions instead of playing zero-sum games.¹⁰⁶

As is concerned politics, we next enter the realm of the 'I' that combines the former two. In this realm, man may experience his personality by looking at himself in his relation to the Other, or he may experience his individuality by seeking to relate Mind and Body. In either

¹⁰⁶ Least has been written about this one of the three principles. The term is best known from Lech Walesa's Solidarność Free Trade Union in Poland in the 1980s. The most influential book that has been published so far on fraternity, is by the Founding President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Jacques Attali, *Fraternités: Une nouvelle utopie* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).

case, in this realm he experiences himself as part and whole at the same time. What is characteristic here is the following: To be a whole as an individual, presupposes that one is part of the world *inter homines*, and *vice versa*. Thus, reciprocity is key in this sphere. This reciprocity exists in the relation between the horizontal and vertical interpretation of wholes and parts, as well as within either of these interpretations individually. This is what I called in the previous section, in Schillerian terms, reciprocal sub- and co-ordination. And this is also what led us to finding the basic position, which describes the human condition. It is not coincidental then that this reciprocity—or reciprocal sub- and co-ordination—stemming from being both part and whole, makes human beings truly human. Reciprocity makes for human dignity, being the central tissue of our shared humanity. What does that mean for politics in principle? For one thing, it does not mean that human dignity is about treating human beings solely as ends or wholes in themselves, like Kant would have it. Indeed, human beings should always be treated as wholes in themselves, but that is only half the story, as they are always parts as well. The notion that all human beings are the same in that they are both parts and wholes, points us at the principle that is at play in the realm of politics: *égalité*, viz. the equality that is involved to the extent that human beings are in fact the same.¹⁰⁷

Summarizing the first point, about what respective principles are at work in the respective realms, we established that liberty or freedom is the leading principle in the cultural realm; that fraternity or solidarity is in the economic realm; and that equality is in the lego-political realm. Irrespective of whether these principles may or may not lead to considerations of what ought, they are based on what is. Liberty is based on the experience of being a whole; solidarity is based on the experience of being part of a larger whole; and equality is based on the experience of being both part and whole. What is more, each of the three principles can only obtain if the corresponding experience also obtains; the latter is constitutive of the former. For example, if it were possible to think of the human being as being a whole only, it would be impossible to have a

¹⁰⁷ There is again an endless list of publications on equality. Among the most influential ones, I mention Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality" [1962], in *In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 97-114, and Ronald Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare" and "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 10 (1981), pp. 185-246, 282-345, and "What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty," *Iowa Law Review* 73 (1987), pp. 1-54.

notion of solidarity that is meaningful. By the way, if people live their lives as Robinson Crusoes, while yet being parts of a larger whole as well, this can account for why solidarity may exist in principle but not in fact.

Second, what happens when either the spheres or the principles get mixed up? That is what we can see all around really. After all, while the three spheres have been distinguished since Plato, and while the three principles have been distinguished since the French Revolution, there has been only very little progress as is concerned the relation between the two sets of tripartite distinctions. That is, the two are not combined at all, which amounts, as we will see, to complete anarchy in functional terms. The good news, though, is that both sets of distinctions are rooted now in the individual human being, which makes at least for some starting-point for change. As we noted in the previous section, Plato's distinction among three classes or 'realms' now mainly endures as the foundation of psychology, with, most notably, Freud's tripartite distinction of id, ego, and super-ego (which in itself is not Platonic at all, but yet is based on Plato's tripartite distinction). As is concerned the three principles, in the French Revolution these were proclaimed as abstract ideals, whereas now these are thought to lie at the basis of our human dignity as enshrined in specific human rights that are mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Its Article 1 reads:

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Here we find the basis for a whole catalogue of human rights. Even if some may agree with Jeremy Bentham that human rights are "nonsense upon stilts", while others may disagree with the so-called universality of human rights,¹⁰⁸ or with the inclusion of certain specific rights,¹⁰⁹ Article 1 points at the source of all human rights, which is accepted by one and all: human dignity. And, clearly, human dignity is to be understood in terms of equality; not as an abstract principle but as rallied to a view of human being that also includes and combines liberty and fraternity.

¹⁰⁸ The so-called universality of human rights first became an issue at the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. Being a member of the Dutch delegation to this conference, I recall that a group of Asian states had prepared a document, the so-called Bangkok Declaration, challenging this universality. Especially, Malaysia and China took the lead. This marked the beginning of an ongoing debate.

¹⁰⁹ Paul Cliteur, for instance, has argued at various occasions that the inclusion of some 'human rights', like Article 24 on the right to leisure, amounts to an inflation of the term.

Before taking stock of the state of anarchy that is characteristic of the application of the three principles in combination, it may be useful to first formulate what is actually called for. ‘Human rights talk’, being the legal language for discussing what constitutes our shared humanity, is instructive in getting this straight. For one thing, human rights talk is not an exercise in futility, as political realists would have it. Political realists are right in pointing at the fact that political power can block the human rights machinery from being effective, but they are wrong in ignoring the fact that the latter can mount political pressure on the former to comply with the international standard that is complied with by the majority of states. When discussing Machiavelli in Part I, we already explained how this works. For another, however, that human rights, more precisely, be universal is contestable, to say the least. For something to be universal, it has to be at the centre of the sphere, but when taking human rights seriously, we have to place human dignity at the centre and human rights at the surface of the sphere. When discussing Grotius in Part I, we already explained how natural law and volitional law are related that way, although we could only see two dimensions there, while talking in terms of a circle and its centre. There, we saw that individuality and personality are related in the same way, where personality is seen as the concrete manifestation of the abstract notion of individuality. There, we also saw that the middle-point is seen as problematic, and the surface as constituting the ‘real’ world. With human dignity and human rights it is the same. Human dignity is seen as problematic, and hence one concentrates on human rights, proclaiming the latter, instead of the former, to be universal.

Human dignity and human rights are related as “*der Begriff und dessen Verwirklichung*”, to put it in Hegelian terms as Peter Kooijmans does.¹¹⁰ Kooijmans posits that human rights are the instruments with which human dignity can be realized. Unlike human dignity, human rights are never absolute and always changing. In this regard, it has become common to refer to various “generations of human rights”.¹¹¹ The first generation of human rights, then, is called the generation of freedom rights. These rights have been laid down in the International Covenant on

¹¹⁰ See Peter Kooijmans, “Human Rights – Universal Panacea? Some Reflections on the So-called Human Rights of the Third Generation,” *Netherlands International Law Review* 37 (1990), p. 321.

¹¹¹ Karel Vasak coined the term and developed it in “A 30-Year Struggle: The Sustained Effort to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” *UNESCO Courier* (November 1977), p. 29.

Civil and Political Rights of 1966. The second generation of human rights is called the generation of equality rights. These rights have been laid down in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of the same year. While the two covenants were adopted even on the same day, one may still speak in terms of two 'generations'. The first and the second generation, I submit, relate to each other like the First and the Second Principle do in Rawls' theory of justice. The two are ranked in a "lexical order", where two priority rules apply: the Priority of Liberty, and the Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare.¹¹² The first generation (about the state that has to refrain from acting in order to respect freedom) was supposed to be implemented immediately, while the second (about the state that has to act itself in order to guarantee equality of opportunity) was supposed to be of such a nature that it could only materialize over the years. At the time, it was decided that the two generations called for different international control systems, which is why there are two covenants and not one. The third generation of human rights, finally, is called the generation of solidarity rights. This generation, including so-called collective rights such as the right to development and the right to peace, is most problematic, as it is highly questionable if this generation is about rights at all.

The three generations of human rights are associated with the three principles of the French Revolution, and they are thought to come after each other like generations do. To follow this analogy, however, it is also possible that three generations live simultaneously. This is exactly what the third generation teaches us. The human rights rhetoric of every time proliferating a next generation, points us at the fact that we have now reached the limits of law's empire, and that to further strengthen the system as a whole one has to focus on structural questions, concerning the international order we live in. I submit that Kooijmans is right in saying that the third generation is nothing more really than Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,¹¹³ which creates space for human dignity to be realized in time. It reads:

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Articles 1 and 28 combined are the alpha and omega of all human rights. Strictly speaking, Article 28, by itself, is no right. Therefore, to assert the

¹¹² Cf. Rawls (1999a), pp. 266-7.

¹¹³ See Kooijmans (1990), pp. 328-9.

so-called ‘rights’ to peace and to development is nonsense upon stilts. However, this is not to deny that the very assertion raises an important question. It is the question of how the three generations can live together, which is not a question of human rights or public international law but a question of international order. After liberty, equality and fraternity were first understood as ideals in the spiritual realm, and after they were next interpreted as rights in the legal realm, the challenge is now to make sense of the triad while also taking into account the realities of the economic realm. If taken that way, in a sense, the research on ‘the right to development’ goes to the core of the challenge we are facing in this section.¹¹⁴ However, if one only focuses on the interface between the legal and the economic realm, while forgetting about the initial principles or ideals in the spiritual realm, something important is missing.

Having used human rights talk as a metaphor for getting straight what is called for when it comes to combining all of the three principles with all of the three realms at the same time, we may now proceed to describing the present situation in the real world. As a matter of fact, this situation is alarming, and it is so in four respects. I will describe each of the four types of situation, as these provide the key for explaining the most pressing problems in IR that are discussed in the next Chapter.

The first type of situation, then, is that one realm annexes the other two. An example of this type is the kind of worldview that is based on a view of man as *homo economicus*. Obviously, economists are likely to see the world that way. What is remarkable, though, is that most people in the Western world have come to adopt that outlook. On the production side, everything is about money, and the only things that

¹¹⁴ In 2004–2007, important work has been done for the UN by a High-Level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development. This independent expert body, including among its members Nico Schrijver, enhances co-operation between the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the one hand, and the World Bank, IMF, WTO, UNCTAD, and UNDP on the other. This co-operation is a major step forward. I recall that in December 2001 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson delivered the Presidential Lecture for the personnel of the World Bank. World Bank President James Wolfensohn stressed the importance of the occasion, as he admitted that up till then human rights issues had been avoided at the World Bank as these could create political problems in the dealings with governments, which was also why the “use of the C word (Corruption) was forbidden”, as he discovered when he arrived at the Bank in 1995. Much has changed since then. Not only the Bank, but also the other international financial institutions are now prepared to take a broader view, including human rights.

matter are the bottom-line and growth.¹¹⁵ On the other side, consumers expect value for money. And there is nothing wrong with that if they also expect that when buying a ticket for a concert or something else in the cultural realm. But what is wrong is that the cultural realm gets more and more commercialised. Producers get more and more hold on the cultural realm, while determining what is on the programme. Does that mean, for instance, that business may not tell universities how they would like their graduates to be equipped when entering the job market? Surely not, since I will argue later on that trisector partnerships (including also the political realm) have great potential, but what would be wrong is that universities would have business dictate the curriculum. As I have argued, the cultural realm is based on liberty, creating space for any talents however ‘useless’ they may seem at first impression. Yet, economic imperatives seem to be pervasive, and they are also allowed to reign in the political realm, where numbers and statistics often seem to be the only compass politicians trust (without bothering too much about the assumptions economists make to arrive at those numbers and statistics, which boil down to the religious belief in the existence of *homo economicus*). If the economic realm is taken broadly, as including everything that is associated with the outside world, we may conclude that the annexation by the ‘outside world’ of everything else is almost complete. In the political realm, elections are more and more about looks than about visions. And in the cultural realm, the social sciences are more and more about explaining phenomena in terms of correlations and co-variances than about understanding the inner coherence.

¹¹⁵ Growth has become an article of faith not only of economics as a discipline but in general. See William Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics* (Cambridge, Mass./London: The MIT Press, 2002) on how the World Bank and the IMF performed up till 2000 while seeking to enable growth; see Paul Bairoch, *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) on the accepted truths of modern economic history, including the belief in what leads to growth; see Gregg Easterbrook, *The Progress Paradox: How Life Gets Better While People Feel Worse* (New York: Random House, 2004), whose title is self-explanatory; and see Richard Layard, *Happiness: Lessons from a New Science* (New York: Penguin, 2005) on what really makes life worth living, and why economics does not have a clue. Lord Layard puts it as follows: “[D]oes economics have the answer? Yes and no. The framework is terrific. We start from the individuals and their wants. Then we have the market where they interact—and where their wants get satisfied, either more or less. What is wrong is the theory of human nature, which is largely based on an outdated version of behaviourism” (pp. 127-8).

Like the economic realm can be seen to annex the other two realms, one could also focus in on either of the other realms. Thus, we end up with a view of three extremisms. If one happens to believe that it is good that economics dictates all else, one has market fundamentalism. If one happens to believe that it is good that religion dictates all else, one has religious fundamentalism. If politics dictates all else, one has totalitarianism. While most political theories are designed to prevent the third kind of extremism from getting hold, the other two kinds of evil are neglected, in political theory that is. Here we have one reason why the theoretical framework needs to be updated for our own time.

The second type of situation is that one principle is applied in all realms. An example of this type is how political parties often use their political ideologies. In the Netherlands, for instance, there are three main streams in the political landscape: there are the Christian democrats (being at the centre of the political spectrum), the social democrats (being left-wing), and the liberals (being a right-wing free market party). Each of these streams, or political parties, has a political ideology that is based on one principle: the liberals promote liberty, the social democrats promote equality, and the Christian democrats promote a specific kind of solidarity vis-à-vis next generations (*'rentmeesterschap'*). Of course, the ideologists of the various parties have been wise enough to integrate all three principles in some form or shape into the lofty declarations of each party. However, in the end, it is the master principle that is applied to anything in theory, while, in practice, it gets connected with the sector that the political party happens to be associated with historically. Thus, the liberals (liberty) focus on business while distrusting government, the social democrats (equality) focus on the labour force while having a predilection for government when solving problems, and the Christian democrats (solidarity) focus on families, farmers and civil society organizations (*'maatschappelijke middenveld'*) while seeking to combine market and morals.

While the Dutch situation has its own particularities,¹¹⁶ it is representative of the political situation in other European states, as far as

¹¹⁶ See Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, second edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," *World Politics* 26 (1974), p. 616, and Daalder "On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland," *International Social Science Journal* 23 (1971), pp. 355-70. Lijphart describes how Dutch society was divided into four "pillars"—a Catholic, a Protestant, a socialist, and a general or liberal one (the last one being a rest category and not a true pillar)—where only the elites cooperated in politics. This elite cooperation in politics forms the

the co-existence of the three political streams is concerned. As a matter of fact, each EU member state has political parties for Christian democrats (or conservatives), social democrats, and liberals, and on the European level each of these parties has associated with its counterparts in other states by forming three groups in the European Parliament: the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats, the Socialist Group, and the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. Of course, there are also other Groups, just like there are also other political parties in each of the EU member states, but these three consistently make for about three-quarters of all seats (while the other quarter is of a special kind, being a mix of very diverse groups). Whereas it is perfectly understandable that political *parties*, by definition, only play one part, this book is concerned with the statesman's or government's perspective, which is about the confluence of the three (or more) political streams into one whole.¹¹⁷ Since the statesman needs to know how to channel these streams, this is another reason for having a framework that can provide guidance.

The third type of situation is that two principles are confused. An example of this type is the confusion of liberty and equality in the case of multiculturalism. Many EU member states are bogged with this issue,¹¹⁸ which is deadly serious as it directly affects the very foundations of

basis of what Lijphart calls a consociational democracy. Whereas Lijphart argues that this kind of democracy emerged in the Netherlands around 1917, Daalder propounds that accommodationist styles already developed in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Nowadays, whereas the divisions in society have faded away, and the elites are no longer elites, the Catholic and Protestant pillars have grown into one political party, while the rest category has become a political party in its own right. What has endured, though, is the institution that was founded in 1950 as the crown on the Dutch consociational democracy: the Social Economic Council (SER), being a body of representatives of trade unions, employers' organizations, and independent "crown members". This tripartite organization would form the basis of a new Dutch model, which got currency worldwide in the 1990s as the '*polder model*'. A left-wing version of it is Giddens' so-called 'third way'. See Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

¹¹⁷ This applies in both consensus democracies and majoritarian democracies, where the majority rules respectively with and without restraint to minorities. For the distinction between the two see Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1984). Lijphart's distinction is about two different models of accountability as is concerned the statesman, or government, whereas what is meant in the present case is the difference of task of a statesman as compared to a member of a political party in parliament.

¹¹⁸ See, for instance, P.B. Cliteur and V. van den Eeckhout (eds.), *Multiculturalisme, cultuurrelativisme en sociale cohesie* (The Hague: Boom, 2001).

Western society. The question is how to deal, more specifically, with Islam in Western society.¹¹⁹ While it is important to note that many Muslims should be commended for the way they have managed to integrate with the Western population of the state they are living in, what is at issue is that some Muslims are categorical in placing the shari'a legislation above the Constitution of this state that they owe civic duties to. These Muslims argue that they are equal to others in that they have constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to freedom of religion, which is right. However, if the same people play the liberty card and the equality card in order to defend their liberty to believe in the inequality of women, it is clear that something is wrong. One cannot both invoke the Constitution and undermine it. How do these individuals actually manage to do that? What they, in principle, say is this: "As *you* find liberty and equality important, you should grant *me* equal liberty, so that *I* have the freedom to negate liberty and equality to women." While it is clear that these individuals position themselves as outlaws from the outset, when referring to *your* Constitution (and not mine), what is lacking in their line of reasoning is the notion of reciprocity (the Golden Rule), which, as we noted in Part I, is enshrined in the Holy Scriptures of all world religions.

How to deal with the issue of multiculturalism? There are two matters, here, to be discussed: the one is about principles, and the other is about personal effectiveness when dealing with this issue. I address the last question first, since it is important to know what belongs to the personal before arriving at the principles. It is a question of leadership, and to be able to answer it, obviously, one has to know what leadership is. Leadership is a term that is much used and misused these days. For one thing, it is not the same as statecraft, which is a more specific form of leadership that is called for when one is a head of state. Leadership, in the broad sense,¹²⁰ comes in two flavours: leadership with authority and leadership without authority. In the former case, someone is leading while having the authority that is attached to a specific position or office he or she holds. In the latter case, one does not hold such a position or office. Thus, leadership can be exerted by anybody who is able to mobilize group resources, irrespective of the position or office he or she holds. There are also two kinds of challenges that leaders may face: technical challenges and adaptive challenges. The former kind has to be faced by a

¹¹⁹ For a critique of the postmodernist approach to this subject, see Paul Cliteur, "The Postmodern Interpretation of Religious Terrorism," *Free Inquiry* 27 (2007), pp. 38-41.

¹²⁰ I propose the Harvard definition. See Ronald Heifetz, *Leadership Without Easy Answers* (Cambridge, Mass./London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1994).

leader with authority, who himself applies current know-how. The latter can be faced by both types of leaders, while now the leader has to see to it that the work is done by the people with the problem, who must learn new ways themselves. To meet adaptive challenges, people must change their hearts as well as their behaviours. It is an empirical rule, though, that people do not like to change themselves, and that they even dislike it more to be told so. They will do everything they can to avoid that they themselves have to do the work, and to that effect they use either one of four techniques: seduction, marginalization, diversion, or attack (with assassination being the most extreme example). Leadership, then, is the art of staying alive while facing these dangers.¹²¹

When facing an adaptive challenge, the leader has to change the status quo, which will always produce heat, and while so doing the leader has to control the temperature. Ronald Heifetz and Marty Linsky explain how this works:

There are really two tasks here. The first is to raise the heat enough that people sit up, pay attention, and deal with the real threats and challenges facing them. Without some distress, there is no incentive for them to change anything. The second is to lower the temperature when necessary to reduce a counterproductive level of tension. Any community can take only so much pressure before it becomes either immobilized or spins out of control. The heat must stay within a tolerable range—not so high that people demand it be turned off completely, and not so low that they are lulled into inaction. We call this span the productive range of distress.¹²²

Anybody who takes the lead, risks to be “assassinated” on the spot. Leaders may end up being lightning-rods, while acting with the best of intentions. In general, though, it is more difficult to be effective when exerting leadership *without* authority than when exerting it *with* authority. As Heifetz puts it, without authority, one can shape the stimulus, but one cannot manage the response; one can spark the debate, but one cannot orchestrate it. Without authority, a leader must regulate distress by modulating the provocation.¹²³ However, either way, provocation does not suffice. In the end, a leader has to be able to unite people in support of a positive vision that people can aspire to. For this, he has to know what principles apply.

¹²¹ See Ronald Heifetz & Marty Linsky, *Leadership on the Line: Staying Alive through the Dangers of Leading* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002).

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 107-8.

¹²³ See Heifetz (1994), pp. 207 ff.

The other question, indeed, is what principles are involved when dealing with the issue of multiculturalism. As Jonathan Israel puts it—What is more important: the freedom of religion or the freedom of opinion and expression? While Israel suggests that it would be in line with the Spinozist tradition of Radical Enlightenment, as he calls it, if the freedom of opinion and expression be given precedence over the freedom of religion,¹²⁴ I think, with all due respect, this is a question *malposée*. Even if Spinoza posed this question and answered it that way, it does not make sense for us to pose it the same way in our own time. Yesterday's freedoms have become today's human rights, so that we do not speak in terms of freedoms any longer, but of *rights to* specific freedoms. Thus, we now have Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the *right to* freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and Article 19 on the *right to* freedom of opinion and expression.¹²⁵ As there is no hierarchy between these two rights within the human rights system, the question is rather how in each and every article the right relates to the freedom. As I argued, then, rights belong to the lego-political, and freedoms to the cultural realm. The combination of the two, forces us to see the relation between the principles that reign in these respective realms: equality and liberty. How this liberty is related to equality: that is the question. And this is a different question from how liberty rights and equality rights are related.

As long as one does not know how liberty and equality are related, multiculturalism, and, most notably, radical Islam will continue to pose a clear and imminent threat to the foundations of Western society. As we saw above, radical Islam is adroit in turning the principles of

¹²⁴ Jonathan Israel put it this way in his 2006 Thomas More Lecture, which he delivered at the Radboud University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, on 10 November 2006 (see www.ru.nl/soeterbeeckprogramma/thomasmorelezing), the day after he had received an honorary doctorate from Professor Wiep van Bunge at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. In this lecture, he argued that to give in to the assertion that religious feelings are the highest good in society, is to pave the way to political and social disaster. He backed up this claim with a historical account of how Spinoza addressed the central question. Cf. Paul Cliteur, *Moreel Esperanto: Naar een autonome ethiek* (Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Arbeiderspers, 2007).

¹²⁵ Pursuant to UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/45, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Abid Hussain, wrote his first Report to the Commission (E/CN.4/1994/33 of 26 January 1994), in which he asked attention, in paragraph 43 (p. 8), for the need for close cooperation with the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance, and for a clear conceptual distinction to be made between the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the right to freedom of opinion and expression.

liberty and equality against the societies that espouse these. Ironically, this is a blessing in disguise, as it creates a sense of urgency to make sense of these principles. However, there is a choice here: one can either hit back and try to defeat the other, or try to become stronger oneself. That is, one can make either war or peace (which holds true for anything in the world *inter homines* really).¹²⁶ What is underneath this difference in tactic is a difference of interpretation of what reciprocity means. The first interpretation of reciprocity is based on the notion of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. The second interpretation is that human beings owe each other equal rights as human beings with human dignity, however grave and inhuman their wrongdoings may be. In Christian terms, it is the difference between the Old and the New Testament. In terms of civilization, it could be argued that it marks the difference between the United States of America and Europe, where the former condones the death penalty and the latter does not.¹²⁷ Returning to the issue of multiculturalism, Western societies have to face the challenge of radical Islam by following the tactic of making oneself stronger while keeping the peace or, at least, sticking to principles when it comes to 'war'. That is, they have to combine Spinoza's Radical Enlightenment (getting stronger) with the Humanitarianism of Grotius (respecting laws to and in war), while Europe will also seek to advance the Humanism of Erasmus (keeping the peace).

So how does it all come together? Multiculturalism stands or falls with the concept of culture one uses. I agree with Parekh that the most important notion here is that a culture has two dimensions: a community whose culture it is and the content and character of that culture.¹²⁸ Thus, respect for a culture has two different bases. When confronted with another culture, one should respect every community's equal right to its culture, while one's respect for the culture itself depends on one's

¹²⁶ For the application of this rule in public international law, see Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, [1625] 2005). In other fields, see also Sun-Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, trans. Roger Ames (New York: Ballantine, 1993); Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. M.E. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1832] 1989); Aron (2003); and, in fiction, see Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace* (1869), who espouses a particular view of history though.

¹²⁷ In IR, Ronald Kagan has provoked a lot of discussion on the difference between the two continents, saying that "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus". He juxtaposes war and peace in favour of the former. See Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

¹²⁸ See Bhiku Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 176.

assessment of its content that one should feel free to judge. The overall response should then be based on both elements. As Parekh points out, this is where both monists and pluralists (or culturalists) go wrong:

The former argue that since some cultures are superior, they have a right to impose themselves on others, making the mistake of concentrating on the content of the culture and ignoring both the community's right to it and the basic respect owed to each culture. Culturalists make the opposite mistake of assuming that since every community has a right to its culture, we are not entitled to judge, criticize or press for changes in it. (...) In exceptional cases when [its beliefs and practices] are outrageous and it seems incapable of changing them, we might wonder if we should continue to respect its right to autonomy. However, no cultural community is devoid of reformist resources, its constitutive beliefs and practices are best changed from within, and the outsider is unlikely fully to understand its complexity. While we may rightly press for change, and urge that the community should practice internal democracy and allow public debate, we should generally respect its autonomy. (...) The greater its involvement with the wider society, the greater is the latter's right and duty to be concerned about its way of life.¹²⁹

While this is about respecting cultures, Parekh does not touch the logic that lies behind it. I will go into this now, and I will argue that it also applies to the right to freedom of religion.

The logic that applies to all rights to certain freedoms, including the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, is that in each case one has to distinguish between a *lego-political* dimension, where equality is the leading principle, and a *cultural* dimension, where liberty is. The two dimensions, or realms, must be distinguished, but they do not exist in isolation. Take the extreme case of radical Islam. If individuals propagating radical Islam invoke their equal right to freedom of religion, and use that freedom to advance ideas that defeat the very notion of equal rights, then their ideas—irrespective of whether they belong to some religion or culture, or not—impact on the *lego-political* realm. What is more, these ideas seek to defeat the leading principle of that realm, which amounts to a direct attack of one of the foundations of society. Even if this attack is mounted against a European state that stands in the Erasmian tradition of peace, if attacked it has the duty *vis-à-vis* its citizens to make use of its right of self-defence. At this point, it leaves the Erasmian zone and enters the Grotian one. And here, the Grotian rules of warfare apply. What is very important to understand is that this is meant in a purely metaphorical way, like Sun-Tzu is used in

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-8.

business schools and leadership classes, without implying that anybody should ever be killed. The Grotian rules are used by analogy as they are applicable in the world *inter homines* in all kinds of conflicts, where—and this is what makes it ‘Grotian’—one should always respect certain principles and humanitarian concerns. This means that one should not wage a ‘total war’, making ‘casualties’ among innocent Muslims who do not support the ideas of radical Islam. Just like in a real war, if peaceful means do not work any longer, since diplomatic and other pressures have no effect, one does not resort, as the next step, to ‘cluster-bombing’ whole cities, but rather to ‘precision bombing’ and making use of flexible and quick ‘reaction forces’ that are able to give a targeted response. While Sun-Tzu already argued that war is about preventing it, it also means that making ‘casualties’ is never a goal in itself. It should be avoided, but as it happens, when, for instance, certain associations are being prohibited for propagating ideas or actions against the principles underlying the human rights system, one owes the members of these associations—or if terrorism is involved: the members of terrorist networks—equal respect, not for their ideas but for their right to a fair trial on the basis of the very principles that they themselves sought to defeat.¹³⁰ That is, one should not debate with them, but adjudicate them in the realm of law.

Concluding the discussion of the type of situation where two principles, and, more specifically, liberty and equality, are confused, we have come to the fundamentals as they apply in general. These are based on a view of human being, which has two dimensions: a horizontal and a vertical one. When dealing with rights to certain freedoms, each time one has to relate the horizontal and the vertical dimension with each other. Fundamentally, in any situation with human beings, the two dimensions must be related. In that sense, everybody really has to combine the Grotian and Spinozist traditions.¹³¹ Having made clear, thus, to whom the above logic applies, I should also add that this logic does not allow states to do anything at all, if they disrespect the principles that every state must vindicate: liberty in the cultural realm, and equality in the lego-political

¹³⁰ This is where the difference between the two interpretations of the concept of reciprocity comes in. According to the first interpretation, equal respect would mean that—in the most extreme case of terrorism—a terrorist has no respect for the life of others, which means that one should not respect his life either, so that it would be ‘fair’ to impose the death penalty. However, by infringing the norm oneself, in the process of vindicating the right that is to institute that very norm, one is not convincing in the end.

¹³¹ This is, again, why this book seeks to combine these traditions by having two Parts, where the former features Grotian thinking and the latter Spinozist thought.

realm. This follows from the Golden Rule of Statecraft, which, in this context, is to be taken as meaning that a state that does not respect the liberty and equality of its citizens, cannot invoke the same principles with respect to its own sovereignty if the international community decides to call on that state to respect those principles. In the final analysis, then, this leaves the statesman with the question of how he can best advance the proper application of liberty and equality in their own realms. Only in exceptional cases when the very foundations of society are under attack, as in the case of radical Islam and terrorism, or when the existence of the state is at stake, as in the case of a traditional war, the statesman has to act *against* something, within his own lego-political realm. As the discussion of multiculturalism and leadership has shown, though, the general rule is that the statesman should always respect the other realms as being autonomous, and do within the lego-political realm whatever he can *in favour* of having people face adaptive challenges within the realms where they must be faced. After all, peace-enforcement only works if the people themselves believe in the principles that make peace possible. As the statesman needs to know how he can prevent conflicts between any two 'spheres of influence', and as he also needs to make a 'Plan for Peace' each time when realms and principles do clash, this is yet another reason for having a framework.

The fourth type of situation, lastly, is that one principle is forgotten. An example of this type, in the Western world, is the principle of fraternity. Even if this principle is taken to mean the same as either of the two other terms that one comes across—solidarity or brotherhood—there is still little to be found, if compared to its two sisters, liberty and equality. True, in the field of human rights we found the notion of so-called 'solidarity rights'. There, implementation of these so-called rights is even seen as the biggest challenge to be faced. What we saw, however, is that it is hard to face that challenge within the lego-political realm, as it is concerned with phenomena that lie outside that realm, like the environment and economic development. Thus, we saw that human rights lawyers seek to overstep the boundaries of law's empire and, quite naturally, seek engagement with organizations like the World Bank and the IMF, which have expertise of and influence in the economic realm. True, among the main streams of political ideologies in the EU we found that the stream of Christian democrats promotes a specific kind of solidarity. However, both in the case of human rights and that of politics, which are concerned respectively with solidarity vis-à-vis the rest of the world and vis-à-vis next generations, this principle lies far away from

people's direct experience, in the Western world that is. As long as they can live their lives in equal liberty, why would they bother about brotherhood?

Fraternity is associated with the economic realm, as I explained above. While there may also be a connection, as Erasmus argues, between fraternity and peace, or, as Kant argues,¹³² between the economic sphere and peace (which is, for instance, why the predecessor of the EU was founded on economic cooperation), the most fundamental experience that lies at the basis of understanding the economic realm itself is being part of a larger whole, where one is dependent of something that is outside oneself. If it is put that way, one can see that one has this experience in any kind of situation all the time. Interestingly, though, when it comes to the principle that is based on this experience of being a part only—fraternity or solidarity,—it is only mentioned in the context of globalization, and the great problems that planet Earth is facing, like, most notably, global warming. Extremely important as these global issues are, it is also extremely important to understand that the solidarity that is needed to face these issues is ultimately footed in the reality that people experience in their daily lives. If one calls on a principle that does not resonate with people, one is not likely to be successful in advancing it.

What could a statesman do within his own state to advance fraternity? There are four things. First, he should respect the autonomy of the economic realm, and see what corporations do themselves at seeking win-win positions, including 'externalities', promoting sustainability, and thereby advancing fraternity. Second, as far as he sees a role for the state to play within the lego-political realm for advancing fraternity, by giving, for instance, incentives in terms of legislation or taxation, he has to be clear on what kind of fraternity he is to advance. Like Berlin offered two concepts of liberty, I hereby submit that there are two concepts of fraternity: solidarity with the rest of the world (in space), and solidarity with next generations (in time). Third, with regard to the former, he should beware of interpreting 'the rest of the world' as meaning the larger 'family' one feels one belongs to. What gets lost in narrowing the world to a family, is the non-human part, whereas what is special about fraternity is that it is about our relation to the material world, which the human body is part of and dependent on. If he still likes to think of a

¹³² See Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf*, ed. Rudolf Malter (Stuttgart: Reclam, [1795] 1984), p. 33: "Es ist der Handelsgeist, der mit dem Kriege nicht zusammen bestehen kann, und der früher oder später sich jedes Volks bemächtigt. (...) Auf die Art garantiert die Natur (...) selbst den ewigen Frieden (...)"

family of nations or persons, that is possible, but then he enters the lego-political realm, which is about equality in the world *inter homines*. In short, here we have another source of confusion between two principles, which we could have discussed under the third type of situation. In politics, we see that social democrats often confuse the two by talking about solidarity while meaning equality in terms of rights. In legal philosophy, Dworkin confuses the two by talking about “fraternal associations” while detailing that the members of these associations should have “*equal* concern” for the well-being of each of the other members, so that he calls these associations in that sense conceptually “egalitarian”.¹³³

Finally, if the statesman concludes that there is any role to be played by the state in having people face adaptive challenges within the economic realm, he also has to make use of the ‘spiritual resources’ that are available in society.¹³⁴ Thus, to give one example, if it is generally known that Muslims have a special connection with the notion of fraternity, the question is how this special affinity or talent can be made available to the public good. When facing adaptive challenges, a statesman has to make use of anything positive that he can find, however overwhelming the negative side may be, which is always there as well, and from which he may not turn away. As a matter of fact, it is not good leadership, but simply good management. It is what one learns in every management training: to look for somebody’s talents and see how both the person and the organization can grow. Returning to the case of fraternity, it is a sign of bad stewardship if a statesman allows only negative things to be said about Islam, or about anything else really. Instead, he may do well in figuring out how he could give incentives for having Muslims play a positive role in, most notably, the economic realm where fraternity is to reign supreme. It is up to the economic realm itself to also make use of the spiritual resources that Islam provides to have the economy work in a way that is acceptable for all brothers and sisters. That is, it is up to the statesman to facilitate leadership in the economic realm in finding this win-win position. This requires vision; otherwise, he will find nothing at all. While this is only one example, which is about the positive role that Muslims can play, the statesman has to see how he can be a matchmaker in all kinds of fields, facilitating win-win positions all the time. Each time he needs keen vision, as he has to see something that,

¹³³ Cf. Ronald Dworkin, *Law’s Empire* (London: Fontana Press, 1991), pp. 200-1. He also annexes liberty into equality’s empire, thus falling under the first, second and third type.

¹³⁴ Cf. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Penguin Classics, [1905] 2002). For more on the sociology of religion, see Chapter 5.

in a sense, is not there yet. As it is important for any politician really to understand that it is not about *him* but about *them*, he must be sure that he is not imposing some construction, plan or blueprint onto society, but that he ensures that society grow according to its own principles and make use of its own forces. Therefore, the statesman should be able to really see what positive forces are at work in the various realms. This is the last reason for having a framework.

Summarizing the second point, about the various ways in which politics mixes up either the realms or the principles as identified in the discussion of the first point, we established that there are four types of situation. These are the following: (a) one realm annexes the other two; (b) one principle is applied in all realms; (c) two principles are confused; or (d) one principle is forgotten. In either of these types of situation politics is bound to fail, as it then frustrates the forces that are inherent in society, being inherent in the human beings that constitute it. And while politicians have demonstrated in history that they can resist those forces for some time, history has shown that those politicians are doomed to fail at some point, or else their legacy. Communism and fascism provide good examples. Both systems, as well as any form of religious fundamentalism, are perfect examples of the first type of situation, which can be regarded as the most basic political ‘sanity check’. After this first check one has to pass through three more checkpoints. Each of the four types of situations provides lessons for the statesman. We established the following four lessons respectively: (i) know the times; (ii) stand above the parties; (iii) face adaptive challenges; and (iv) have a positive vision. We also established that each of these lessons calls for a framework.

Third, then, must be: What is the standard framework that a statesman can use? It follows from the previous two points that this standard framework be based on a new trias doctrine, which I will now propose. First, I will explain what this new trias doctrine is, and next, I will explain how it differs from other trias doctrines.¹³⁵ To start with the

¹³⁵ I am concerned here with trias doctrines that give advice to statecraft, as opposed to doctrines that are concerned first and foremost with the positive role of civil society organizations. For the latter category, see, e.g., Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Jean Cohen And Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1994), Leslie Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System*, second edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), and Nicanor Perlas, *Shaping Globalization: Civil Society, Cultural Power and Threefolding* (Saratoga Springs, NY: GlobeNet3/CADI, 2000). The last author, who is a recipient of the Right Livelihood Award (also known as the Alternative Nobel Prize) of 2003, describes in his book the “threefold” nature of social life. Although I am indebted to his

new doctrine, there are two things that are important to note. The one is that, in order to avoid that realms and principles get mixed up, what is needed is that the incentive systems (whole, whole/part, part) and the principles that they constitute (liberty, equality, fraternity) be contained to the realms where they belong respectively (culture, polity, economy). The other is that, as these realms are always immersed in each other in the same way as the individual always combines the three realms in its Being, they may only be distinguished conceptually while the *institutional powers* that are active within these respective realms can be separated physically, *viz.* civil society (henceforth used as the equivalent of all not-for-profit organizations and individuals), government (henceforth used as the equivalent of all public sector organizations), and business (henceforth used as the equivalent of all for-profit organizations). The two things combined lead to what I will call the “Trias Ethica”:

Civil society, government, and business are autonomous within their respective realms of culture, the polity, and the economy, where the respective principles of liberty, equality and fraternity reign supreme.

This is the standard framework. It is not about what *ought* to be; only the Golden Rule of Statecraft can help in understanding that. It is, like the Iron Rule of Statecraft that will amplify this framework, about what *is*. This trias can explain why actions are bound to be a failure, if one mixes up the realms or the principles governing them.

The *trias ethica* is fundamentally different from Montesquieu’s *trias politica*.¹³⁶ It is in three ways. First, both doctrines may use a separation of powers, but the *trias politica* is about a separation of powers *within* the realm of the polity, whereas the *trias ethica* looks at that realm as a whole, setting it off against the realms of culture and the economy. This explains why both doctrines do not oppose each other, but complement each other: the *trias ethica* is about all three realms, while the *trias politica* focuses in on one of these. Second, the *trias ethica* is not about separating powers in the sense that one could only have a position or office in *either* civil society, *or* government, *or* business. The only threshold is a practical one;

insights, the framework that I develop is different from his. Perlas’ framework is two-dimensional, and amounts to an organic theory, while the present framework is at least four-dimensional, and develops a geometrical argument.

¹³⁶ Cf. Charles de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, “De l’esprit des lois” [“Of the Spirit of the Laws”] (1748), Book XI, Chapter 6, in Montesquieu, (*Œuvres complètes*, vol. II, ed. Roger Caillois, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1951).

not a categorical one as in the case of the *trias politica*.¹³⁷ Third, in the *trias politica* the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches are seen as equals (which nicely follows the leading principle within the lego-political realm). In the *trias ethica*, however, the realm of the polity is a *primus inter pares*, in the sense that it has a special position: in the middle, between the other two realms.

How does the *trias ethica*, then, relate to Plato's trias? To be sure, there are two fundamental differences between both. The first difference is that the former proposes three specific principles that the latter does not have. The second difference is that the former sees three distinct yet equivalent realms with every individual participating in all three, where the latter sees a hierarchy of three classes (corresponding with a hierarchy of three parts of the soul, which was based on what is called a "noble lie", viz. the Myth of Metals). However, both can be usefully compared as far as the respective realms of the former can be said to have the same kind of autonomy as the respective parts of the soul in the latter have. If the concept of 'classes' has become completely outdated, though, the concept of autonomy has evolved over time. What is interesting to see, in this respect, is how 'interference' and its ensuing 'harm' are interpreted. Plato writes: "The interference with one another's business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly works it harm."¹³⁸ It could be seen as the answer on the macro level to the question that is posed on the micro level later on: "Must not this be a kind of civil war of these three principles, their meddlesomeness and interference with one another's functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle?"¹³⁹ While it is clear that Plato uses an analogy here, his words should still be reinterpreted in the light of the

¹³⁷ I have argued elsewhere that the separation of powers, as described by Montesquieu, is generally misunderstood, and that it takes in a less prominent role than is generally assumed. It is part of a descriptive chapter of Book XI of *De l'esprit des lois*: Chapter 6, on the English constitution, which was characterized at the time by balance of power, not separation of powers. The central notion is one of a balanced constitution where "le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir". See Christward Dieterman, "De rol van de rechter" [The Role of the Judge], in Henry Schermers, Theo Bellekom, and Petra van Kampen (eds.), *De rol van de rechter in de moderne westerse samenleving*, Mordenate College Publications No. 2 (Leiden: Universitaire Drukkerij, 1993), pp. 7-18.

¹³⁸ Plato, *The Republic*, Book IV, at 434C, p. 373.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 444B, p. 417.

way we have come to use the key concepts now. How are we, then, to reinterpret the terms ‘interference’ and ‘harm’?

In Part I, I already introduced the principle of non-intervention. There, I used it in a classical sense, in horizontal terms. Here, I submit that just like the statesman has to respect the non-intervention principle within the realm of the polity, he would better respect it as well in his relations with the other two realms, if he does not want to be bound for trouble. That is, I propose to use the principle of non-intervention also in vertical terms. In principle, then, the statesman should stay in his own realm, *viz.* the realm of the polity. But if the statesman is to apply the same principle of non-intervention in the vertical dimension, he may intervene, in specific cases, in the ‘domestic affairs’ of the realms of culture or the economy. In these cases he should respect, by analogy, the ethics and politics of humanitarian intervention. The *trias ethica* can help the statesman in deciding whether he has a case to intervene. If society is upset by a lack of freedom within the realm of culture (not the economy, where this principle does *not* belong, as I demonstrated above), or by a lack of solidarity within the realm of the economy (not the polity, where this principle does *not* belong), the statesman has a case to intervene. He would better be conscientious about his decisions here, as there is also in the vertical dimension an appeal of last resort. If his judgment is wrong, the own citizens may decide to start a ‘civil war’.

In conclusion, liberty has to be redefined. Positive liberty (Berlin’s “liberty to”) plays its own distinct role in the realm of culture, and nothing changes there. Negative liberty (Berlin’s “liberty from”), though, is the precondition for there being any realms at all, and this negative liberty must be redefined. Now, it is often associated with libertarianism, which is taken as meaning that government is bad, that it should do as little as possible, and that it should certainly not interfere in the economy. However, negative liberty only creates space for something positive. From the *trias ethica* it follows, of necessity, that in the case of culture this is positive liberty, that in the case of the polity this is equality, and that in the case of the economy this is fraternity (or solidarity). If either of the institutional powers—that is, civil society, government, or business—fails to live up to its task in its distinct realm, the state is bound for trouble. If government mixes up the realms or the principles governing them, state action is bound to fail.

Chapter 5: The Spinozist Lens

5.1 Identity and Power

The Introduction to Part II concluded with the distinction between analogy and identity. While the former is about interactions of agency units that are compared in terms of (legal or social) personality, the latter is about individuality. It is the distinction between the horizontal axes and the vertical one. Looking at the vertical axis, Part II distinguishes three points on it: Mind and Body (the two poles), and the 'P' (middle-point). Chapter 4 made the distinction among three categories of view of the human being—(i) the Spinozist; (ii) the Faustian; and (iii) the Schillerian view,—which correspond with three kinds of identity relation, where the first one focuses on the identity of the 'P', the second one on the balance between Mind and Body, and the third one on the synthesis of all three. Chapter 4 took the Schillerian view for a starting-point. It demonstrated that on this view each of the three points constitutes its own domain, and its own drive within it. The three domains and the three corresponding drives combined make up, as we saw, a *trias ethica*. This new trias doctrine includes the middle-point, and associates it with a finite mode, which Waltz calls a 'unit' (forming a unity in itself). After all, while Chapter 1 was about formulating what the middle-point is, in infinity, which we called the Universal Rule, or our concept of 'God', the rest of this book is about what it means in time and space. Part II is about seeing how it can be translated in terms of the individuality of finite modes, where all three views are identical, in that they form three dimensions of the same reality.

Chapter 5 features the Spinozist view, which includes, in a sense, the Faustian view. Benedict de Spinoza focuses on the middle-point, which he calls 'substance', and which is his conception of God or Nature. This one substance has infinite 'attributes', as Spinoza calls it, but if the notion of substance is understood as the individuality of a human being in time and space, it has only two: Mind and Body. While Spinoza focuses on how these two attributes coincide in the middle-point, forming one substance, Goethe was self-declaredly much inspired by Spinoza but focused rather on the two attributes and their opposite drives (*Formtrieb* and *Stofftrieb*, to put it in Schillerian terms), which we called the Faustian view. What the two views have in common is that they both seek to establish some balance between the two attributes, much like Heisenberg and Penrose seek to balance theory and experiment, and like Aristotle seeks to find the 'golden mean' of any two antipoles. What distinguishes

the Spinozist view, though, from the Faustian one is that the former sees a balance irrespective of whether one can establish one oneself. To be more precise: One may or may not search for any balance between the two attributes (both Faustian and Spinozist view), but irrespective of whether one finds it the world is as it is, being always balanced as one substance (only Spinozist view). The first paragraph is about finding and seeing the identity relation of the two attributes or domains that form one substance, and the second paragraph is about what that means for IR, where I will introduce the Iron Rule of Statecraft that emanates from the all-pervasive drive to persevere and to survive, which we called the 'play drive' (*Spieltrieb*), being the Schillerian version for human beings of what Spinoza calls *conatus* or power with respect to all Being.

This paragraph, then, sets out what the Spinozist view is. Having distinguished it already from the other two views, and having established already how the three are related to each other, the main argument of this paragraph is that Spinoza's *Ethics* provides the best starting-point for modern philosophy by demonstrating in geometrical order what is true, of necessity, but that it needs to be updated as it is based on Euclidean geometry. Since Minkowski's introduction of the notion of spacetime and Einstein's use of it in his theory of relativity, the world has entered modernity, seeing a Universe of not three but four dimensions, and thus allowing for non-Euclidean geometry. In a sense, Einstein himself has already updated Spinoza, whom he mentions as his main source of inspiration as we will see, but he only applied his update to cosmology. My main point is that Spinoza's *Ethics* must be updated so that it can be made applicable not only to the physics of the larger whole, but also to the physics of small parts, and everything in between. I will try to do this, while postulating that a complete update is consonant with Spinoza's version of historical hermeneutics. This version is different, though, from the one we used in Part I when interpreting Grotius' *oeuvre*.¹ While Grotius' version allows for the use of information one has of the author as a person, who is living a life in the world *inter homines*, Spinoza's version precludes this, which is why I will discuss Spinoza's work without making reference to his life (even if the two are in complete harmony with each other).²

¹ Cf. Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 447-8, where Israel compares Spinoza's hermeneutics with Grotius' when discussing different methods of interpreting the Bible.

² For more on Spinoza's life, see Steven Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

It is important to try to update Spinoza's *Ethics*, because then philosophy could get reconnected with the Sciences, and has at least a chance of playing the role that it used to have. It could again "carry the torch in front of her gracious lady" while advising the Sciences where to search for new discoveries and how to interpret any findings. The reunion, more broadly, of the Arts and Sciences is a means toward the higher goal of seeing one substance, and, as such, a goal in itself. At the time, leading scientists like Christiaan Huygens and Robert Boyle were much inspired by Spinoza's philosophy,³ which combined religion and science. Nowadays, the Arts and Sciences are separated, as C.P. Snow famously observed in his 1959 Rede Lecture, *The Two Cultures*, where he described this for the mid-twentieth century.⁴ Much of philosophy is based, either by assumption or admission, on this separation as laid down in the systems of, most notably, Descartes and Kant. Instead of updating Spinoza, most philosophers have receded to the Cartesian position that Spinoza meant to criticize in the seventeenth century.⁵ Thus, instead of taking a step forward, philosophy has taken a step backward if compared to Spinoza's position. With theoretical physics now trying hard to get in a sense "beyond postmodernism" while working on a theory of everything, philosophy is, fundamentally, still in the early modern age. No wonder that scientists believe that they have no use for "a handmaiden" any longer! Today, this handmaiden would be good, at best, at advising Galileo on how to proceed.⁶ However, if any theory of everything is to be

³ See Israel (2001), pp. 242-257.

⁴ See C.P. Snow, *The Two Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1959] 1998), in which he distinguishes "two polar groups".

⁵ Cf. Sir Stuart Hampshire, "Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom", in *Spinoza and Spinozism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), in which he concludes this influential 1962 essay of his with the following passage where he, specifically, promotes an update of Mill's definition of freedom that is based in empiricism as it emerged from Cartesian dualism (pp. 198-9): "We continue to speculate without conviction about freedom and social co-operation in the traditional terms of political philosophy, without any serious attention to the psychopathology of the individual, and as if all the discoveries in clinical psychology in the last fifty years had never been made. And this is, I think, why political philosophy seems stagnant and lacks conviction, except as an interpretation of the past. It has lost contact with the revolutionary and relevant moral science of its time. It is contrary to reason, and contrary also to John Stuart Mill's own principles in philosophy, that we should still cling to Mill's definition of freedom, when the philosophy of mind upon which he based it is discredited. We thereby preserve the letter, and lose the spirit, of empiricism, and of the liberal beliefs that were derived from it."

⁶ Stephen Hawking regrets this situation in his *The Theory of Everything: The Origin and Fate of the Universe* (Beverly Hills: New Millennium Press, 2002), pp. 166-7.

found at all, it has to start with explaining how the Arts and Sciences (or the Humanities, the Natural Sciences, and the Social Sciences) are related in dealing with the same reality, as forming one substance.⁷

Before updating Spinoza's *Ethics*, I will first give a brief summary of what Spinoza's argument in it is, but I will start by saying what it is not. When comparing Spinoza and Grotius, one could say that what Grotius is, Spinoza is not: While the former focuses on what is good and what is evil through reasoning on the horizontal axes, the latter establishes what is virtue and what is vice through reasoning on the vertical axis. Thus, the Spinozist view complements the Grotian perspective. While Spinoza has his famous doctrine of the relativity of good and evil, leaving space for Grotian thinking, Grotius has his theory that leaves space for Providence and the miraculous, which Spinoza fills in with his philosophy. When reformulating these complements in terms of differences, the main difference between the two is that Grotius believes in Providence and the miraculous, and Spinoza does not.⁸ This also marks the difference between Spinoza and Descartes, just like with Gottfried von Leibniz and John Locke. All three, and most prominently Descartes, hold that motion is external to matter, and leave space for the divine as being the mover of all things, while placing the two in different worlds. Enlightenment, then, is about all things that have been cleared up; Radical Enlightenment, as Israel calls it, is about also clearing up this last anomaly, which consists in the correction of Descartes' error.⁹ Spinoza has corrected this error by

⁷ If either were to take exception for the human being, forming a realm of its own, then it would fall back to a position that Diderot ridiculed, when positing in intuitive terms that "[i]t would be very singular that all planets, all nature, should obey eternal laws and that there should be a little animal five feet high, who in contempt of these laws could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice," as cited in Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Vol. I: Human Nature* (Louisville/London: Westminster John Knox Press, [1941] 1996), p. 102.

⁸ Cf. Israel (2001), p. 447.

⁹ Cf. Sir Stuart Hampshire, "Spinoza and Spinozism," in Hampshire (2005), p. xxxvii: "Being someone who spent his life grinding lenses and studying optics, Spinoza knew at first hand that both Lucretius' account of perception and Descartes' account of perception were mistaken from beginning to end. From this mistake, or mistakes, flowed the errors of metaphysical dualism, and these mistakes have haunted British empiricists until the present day." This does not hold true only for philosophy. For an example of how Descartes' error persists in the Sciences as well, see Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: HarperCollins/Quill, [1994] 2000). For the solution by the same author, who is one of the world's foremost neurologists, see Damasio, *Looking For Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (Orlando: Harcourt, 2003).

perfecting the use of the geometrical method, in Euclidean fashion, which Descartes (and also Grotius) had employed. It is useful to see how he did that, since Descartes' error persists down to the present day. In IR, for instance, Constructivism is based on this error, as we already saw in the Introduction to Part II. What, then, is Spinoza's point?

Spinoza makes his point in the *Ethics* in three steps¹⁰ (even if the book goes in five Parts):¹¹ God, man, and man's well-being. In his first step he focuses on one point, which is God. Spinoza's God is basically all that is, and that is not. Most importantly, God is one infinite "substance", which Spinoza defines as what is in itself and is conceived through itself. His point is that this substance has infinite (that is, *all possible*) attributes, and as he demonstrates that there cannot be two substances that have the same attribute, it follows that the existence of the substance with infinite attributes excludes the existence of any other substance.¹² Spinoza's argument in Part I leads to his famous Proposition 14:

There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God.¹³

Later on, Spinoza distinguishes between nature, regarded as active (*Natura naturans*), which he identifies with God and the rules that govern the Universe, and nature regarded as passive (*Natura naturata*), which he identifies with the state of nature and also the laws of nature.¹⁴ However, since Spinoza proves that one cannot separate any worlds or domains, he famously uses his standard phrase "God or Nature" (*Deus sive Natura*) while identifying God with Nature, always meaning one and the same.

¹⁰ For an appreciation of Spinoza's *Ethics* as derived from critical reflection on the Cartesian system, see Edwin Curley, *Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). I will follow his way of structuring the argument, even if I do not follow his appreciation of the argument on all accounts.

¹¹ See Benedict Spinoza, "Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order" [1677b], in *Spinoza: Complete Works*, ed. Michael Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), pp. 213-382, which is the translation (largely based on the Gebhardt Heidelberg text of 1926) that I will use; and his "Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being" [1910], in Spinoza (2002), pp. 31-107. Other translations into English are *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, vol. 1, trans. and ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); and *Ethics*, trans. and ed. G.H.R. Parkinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

¹² For the chain of argument leading up to his conclusion, cf. Curley (1988), pp. 9 ff.

¹³ Cf. "Except God, no substance can be or be conceived." (Curley translation) – & cf. "Besides God no substance can exist or be conceived." (Parkinson translation).

¹⁴ See Part I, Proposition 29, Scholium.

Taking the second step, Spinoza shifts focus from the infinite whole to the parts that also constitute wholes in themselves. This step is, more particularly, about man as a finite mode of the infinite substance. While substance has infinite attributes, there are only two that are discoverable to the human intellect: Mind and Body. In Part II, in the Scholium following Proposition 21, Spinoza propounds:

Mind and body are one and the same individual thing, conceived
now under the attribute of Thought and now under the attribute of Extension.

This is a distinction between two concepts, but the two are intimately related in the connection between any idea and its *ideatum*. Regarding this connection, one may read in Proposition 7 the definitive statement:

The order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of things.

Even if this statement can be construed as establishing a doctrine of parallelism, Spinoza goes further than seeing parallels, as he holds that there is an identity relation between the two (“is the same as”).¹⁵ Next, while focusing on this identity relation, and assessing whether ideas are adequate or not, Spinoza distinguishes three kinds of knowledge. Knowledge of the first kind, being “knowledge from casual experience” or from symbols, he refers to as “opinion” or “imagination”. Knowledge of the second kind, being knowledge based on logical deduction in terms of geometrically related proportions, he refers to as “reason” or correct inference. And knowledge of the third kind, being “knowledge that proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things”, he refers to as “intuition”.¹⁶ Spinoza demonstrates that knowledge of the first kind is false, and that the other two are necessarily true.¹⁷ As is concerned the third kind of knowledge, Spinoza expands on this in Part V, when writing on what it is to see things *sub specie aeternitatis* (under a form of eternity). After first having enunciated his doctrine of the eternity of the mind, he makes clear in Proposition 33 that this doctrine is about the third kind of knowledge really: “The intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal”.

¹⁵ Cf. Curley (1988), pp. 62 ff.

¹⁶ See Part II, Proposition 40, Scholium 2.

¹⁷ See Part II, Proposition 41.

The last step, then, is that Spinoza turns to the question of man's well-being in Parts III through V, where he treats of the nature and the strength of the emotions, as well as the mind's power over them. Spinoza expressly does *not* "conceive of man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom", which is why he uses the same method here as he does when treating of God and the mind, and hence considers "human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies".¹⁸ While the second step was about how two attributes are one and the same, this last step is about Being, as a pre-stage to well-being. The key to understanding Spinoza's conception of Being lies in his doctrine of *conatus*, which he formulates in Part III, in Proposition 6:

Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being.¹⁹

Spinoza's philosophy of man and indeed of Nature in general is based on this very doctrine. It plays an important role in his psychology and moral philosophy. The term *conatus* is not new with Spinoza—Cicero used it for expressing Aristotle's and the Stoics' notion of *horme* (impulse), and Hobbes did so for connoting the natural tendency of an organism to preserve itself,—but Spinoza gives it a new usage. This is particularly pertinent in the case of Proposition 7, where he makes clear that it is the actual essence of a thing:

The *conatus* with which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.

Conatus can be translated as 'endeavour' or 'striving', and Spinoza himself uses the term 'power'. Spinoza distinguishes among three other terms that all express one aspect of *conatus*: Will (*voluntas*) when it is related to the mind alone, Appetite (*appetitus*) when related to mind and body,²⁰ and Desire (*cupiditas*) when one is conscious of one's appetite. And he relates his definition of good and bad to these aspects of *conatus*, arguing that "we do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be good", but "judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will,

¹⁸ Part III, Preface.

¹⁹ Cf. "Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being." (Curley translation)

²⁰ This is the pivot in Spinoza's philosophy on which Grotian thinking turns. While the former positions *appetitus* in the centre, combining mind and body in vertical terms, the latter circles around it in horizontal terms, featuring *appetitus societatis*.

seek after and desire it”.²¹ Furthermore, Spinoza sees Desire as one of the three primary emotions, with Pleasure (*laetitia*) and Pain (*tristitia*) being the other two. Pleasure he defines as an increase in the power of activity of a thing, and Pain as the decrease of it.²² These two other notions make it possible to redefine good and bad later on, when Spinoza relates the former with Pleasure and the latter with Pain.²³ In Part IV, then, Spinoza introduces the notion of utility, which appears to be central in both his doctrine of *conatus* and in his doctrine of the relativity of good and bad, since now he defines good as “that which we certainly know to be useful to us”, and bad as “that which we certainly know to be an obstacle to our attainment of some good”,²⁴ while something is “useful” if it leads to an increase of Pleasure, and hence to an increase in power. In the final analysis, Spinoza propounds that the terms “good” and “bad”, “indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions which we form from comparing things with one another”. Nonetheless, he claims that “these terms ought to be retained”, as man finds it useful to have some “model of human nature”. He concludes: “So in what follows I shall mean by “good” that which we certainly know to be the means for our approaching nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves, and by “bad” that which we certainly know prevents us from reproducing the said model.”²⁵ What he writes about good and bad, also holds for “perfect” and “imperfect”. In both cases, it is unclear, though, what the implied reference to a standard entails, or, more precisely, how this model or standard is to be understood. How does the subjectivity of moral judgments compare to the implied objectivity? The notion of virtue seems to be key here in resolving this tension. Spinoza propounds that the knowledge and love of God is the *summum bonum*,²⁶ which leads to true peace of mind.²⁷ While he adds that to know God is also the “highest virtue”, he defines “virtue” by identifying it with power, that is, with the striving to preserve one’s being. This leads to the conclusion that, if virtue is to follow one’s own *conatus*, virtue is its own reward.²⁸

²¹ Part III, Proposition 9, Scholium.

²² Part III, Proposition 11, and Scholium.

²³ Part III, Proposition 39, Scholium.

²⁴ Part IV, Definitions 1 and 2.

²⁵ Part IV, Preface.

²⁶ Part IV, Proposition 28.

²⁷ Part V, Proposition 42, Scholium.

²⁸ Cf. Part V, Proposition 42.

Summarizing Spinoza's position in terms of wholes and parts, one could say that his first step is about the whole, the second step about wholes and parts (with mathematical proportion being Spinoza's sole criterion of truth),²⁹ and his third step about the parts only (while he also combines this with the previous step by demonstrating how one can master the parts by seeing the whole). This is also how one could distinguish Spinoza's three kinds of knowledge, where, in reverse order, intuition is about grasping the whole in one single vision, reason is about inferring knowledge in geometrical order (in the way Spinoza himself does in his *Ethics*), and opinion is about loose parts that are not related to each other or to a whole.³⁰ What is characteristic of Spinoza's position is that he demonstrates in geometrical order the identity of parts and whole, in the sense that the whole and its parts constitute individuality, rather than that both wholes and parts are double-faced (which is the horizontal interpretation of the vertical logic that is at stake here).

The identity relation of the two attributes, to use Spinoza's terms, is key: Mind and Body are one and the same. That is why it is wrong when commentators, like Curley, for instance, call Spinoza a materialist. Indeed, he does not deny the nature and the strength of the emotions, thereby attributing positive meaning to the part of the Body. Indeed, he uses the state of nature as a measuring-rod, maintaining that "all men have one and the same nature; it is power and culture which misleads us".³¹ On the whole, however, there can be no mistake about the central meaning that is given to the notion of *conatus*, combining Mind and Body. Whenever Spinoza sees Body he also sees Mind, so that it would be very arbitrary, or at least one-sided, to call him a materialist. This also goes the other way round. While we know nothing about Spinoza's whereabouts in daily life, since, as Hampshire puts it, "Spinoza deliberately effaced his

²⁹ Cf. Israel (2001), p. 235.

³⁰ I do not mean to suggest that Spinoza's "third step" itself is a token of this kind, which is why I explicitly mention the *Ethics*, as a whole, as belonging to the knowledge of the second kind (pointing the way to knowledge of the third kind). Even if it could be argued, as Curley and others have done, that in the "third step" Spinoza makes value judgments without making clear why these would have to be understood as necessary truths, he does make clear that he means to treat of emotions in a geometrical order. He actually does that, I offer, by relating his description and judgment of emotions—whatever one may think of the truth of that in itself—to the desire to master these emotions, through his conception of *conatus*. This conception, I offer, is the ideal-type of knowledge of the second kind, as understood in the "third step". Spinoza demonstrates that it is possible to reason about opinion.

³¹ Cf. Israel (2001), p. 271, where he cites from Spinoza's *Tractatus Politicus*.

own personality and wished his philosophy to stand alone”,³² many commentators like to think of Spinoza as a person who supposedly lived the life of a saint, or at least of an ascetic, giving primary status to the Mind, which, it is suggested, would be consonant with his philosophy. Here again, indeed, Spinoza does attribute a very distinct and positive role to the Mind, as enabling the human being to overcome human bondage to emotions. However, there is nothing in Spinoza’s work that can be construed as meaning that one may not indulge in bodily pleasures, as long as one has the presence of mind to understand why it is that one likes to indulge in those pleasures. On the contrary, Spinoza is all for it:

[T]he more we are affected with pleasure, the more we pass to state of greater perfection; that is, the more we necessarily participate in the divine nature. Therefore, it is the part of a wise man to make use of things and to take pleasure in them as far as he can (but not to the point of satiety, for that is not taking pleasure). It is, I repeat, the part of a wise man to refresh and invigorate himself in moderation with good food and drink, as also with perfumes, with the beauty of blossoming plants, with dress, music, sporting activities, theaters, and the like, in which every man can indulge without harm to another. For the human body is composed of many parts of various kinds which are continually in need of fresh and varied nourishment so that the entire body may be equally capable of all the functions that follow from its own nature, and consequently that the mind may be equally capable of simultaneously understanding many things.³³

Spinoza adds that this way of life is not only in agreement with common practice, but also that it is the best way of life, concluding that “[t]here is no need for me to deal more clearly or at greater length with this subject”.

In interpreting Spinoza’s *political* theory, as has been elaborated in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and his *Tractatus Politicus* in horizontal terms, it may be useful to see how it differs from Hobbes’ political theory, with which it is in agreement to some extent. While Hobbes and Spinoza use the same starting-point for their political theories, and while they arrive at similar conclusions, they deduce these conclusions from very different premises.³⁴ That is, they both take for a starting-point the proposition that human beings necessarily seek their own preservation by extending indefinitely their power and liberty, and they both arrive at theories that seek to avoid the war of all against all, promoting peace and security.

³² Sir Stuart Hampshire, “Spinoza: An Introduction to his Political Thought” [1951], in Hampshire (2005), p. 168.

³³ Part IV, Proposition 45, Scholium 2.

³⁴ Cf. Hampshire (2005), pp. 134 ff.

What is key here is that power, and not some moral notion, is regarded as the fundamental concept in the study of societies and of the causes of their decline. However, Hobbes and Spinoza part company at the point where they make clear what they mean by power and liberty. To start with the latter, Hobbes and Spinoza hold diametrically opposed positions as to what 'freedom' means. Whereas Hobbes conceives of freedom as the degree to which somebody can actually satisfy his desires, with reason always being the slave of the passions, Spinoza sees freedom not just as a means to the satisfaction of desires, but as the supreme goal itself, where the sole criterion for judging political organizations is the degree to which it impedes or makes possible the free man's rational love and understanding of Nature. In this context, it may be worthwhile to note that Spinoza was a precursor of the tradition of toleration and freedom of thought. For a fact, Spinoza was also the first of the great philosophers who was a democrat. It is important to bear these things in mind, when we now turn to the discussion of what Hobbes and Spinoza mean by power. There is always an amoral and scientific element involved, as far as the starting-point is concerned, but in the case of Spinoza there is also this other element of the idealistic vision of a free society. As Hampshire rightly observes "there is always a tendency for the determinist to obscure the idealist, or for the idealist to obscure the determinist".³⁵

As is concerned 'power', Hobbes and Spinoza have two different conceptions of *conatus*. Whereas Spinoza is concerned with the power that man needs to master his passions, Hobbes is with man who submits himself to a sovereign whose power is absolute. Moreover, while both Spinoza and Hobbes recognize that man needs mutual aid when striving to survive and to increase his own pleasure, so that man ends up with entering into various kinds of compacts, they differ on what 'right' and 'duty' mean when it comes to observing and obeying these compacts. Here, Spinoza goes further than Hobbes in not attributing any moral meaning to these terms. In fact, Hampshire is right in suggesting that wherever Spinoza uses the word 'right' one may replace it by 'power'.³⁶ The great difference, then, between Hobbes and Spinoza is that the former sees civil society in contrast to the state of nature, and as replacing it as soon as one enters into a social contract, whereas the latter holds that underneath the surface of civil society the state of nature still exists. On this view, the sovereign has as much right as he has power in excess

³⁵ Ibid., p. 138.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 139.

of the power of the collected individuals. That is, the sovereign's effectiveness in action determines if he will be obeyed, while civil society has a 'right' to revolt if it reckons that the temporary downslide into anarchy, which it may lead to, is the lesser evil. The proper art of government, then, or rather the statecraft that is 'right', is based in an understanding of how one can exercise one's power and liberty of action by pushing the boundaries as far as one can without being dislodged from power as a result of a revolt. It is important to note, though, that there is a great difference here between Spinoza and Machiavelli in that the latter sees the art or technique of obtaining and preserving state-power as an end in itself, whereas the former does not. Nonetheless, Spinoza does seek to be realistic and rational about all political problems, as about anything else really. And by seeing the state of nature and civil society as operating at the same time, Spinoza can be consistent in any type of situation. As a matter of fact, it is the only theory that can account for international practice, where now it adheres to the standards of public international law, and now it falls short of them. It explains why this happens, and it tells what 'right' states have (which goes further than what Hobbes allows). In doing so, Spinoza's political theory solves the Hobbesian paradox, *viz.* that the social contract may throw up a tyrant who is worse than the state of nature. Moreover, Spinoza is in accord with Grotian thinking, where the latter distinguishes between the law of nations (in international society) and the law of nature (being applicable also when international society collapses into a state of nature). They both see a horizontal and a vertical dimension, but they each focus on one.

Returning to the vertical dimension, what remains at the centre of the sphere, is God or Nature, as Spinoza maintains. This is the God that inspired Einstein and so many others who are seeking to understand and explain the Universe as a whole. Einstein puts this as follows:

While it is true that scientific results are entirely independent from religious or moral considerations, those individuals to whom we owe the great creative achievements of science were all of them imbued with the truly religious conviction that this universe of ours is something perfect and susceptible to the rational striving for knowledge. If this conviction had not been a strongly emotional one and if those searching for knowledge had not been inspired by Spinoza's *Amor Dei Intellectualis*, they would hardly have been capable of that untiring devotion which alone enables man to attain his greatest achievements.³⁷

³⁷ Albert Einstein, "Religion and Science: Irreconcilable?" [1948], in *Ideas and Opinions* (New York: Random House/Wings Books, 1954), p. 52.

Einstein believes in Spinoza's God, leaving no space for Providence or the miraculous. As Einstein puts it: "God does not play dice". This famous phrase goes back to Spinoza's geometrical proof of why there can only be one substance, and not two, as Descartes has it. For one thing, Spinoza's *Amor Dei* includes the whole of Nature, and this cannot be construed as meaning that Spinoza is an atheist. If Spinoza's God is not a man with a beard floating on a cloud, this still does not mean that God does not exist. With Spinoza, to be clear, God is not transcendent but immanent, and, thus, God or Nature can be known by means of knowledge of the third kind, while knowledge of the second kind, with its geometrical method, is a good proxy.

However, if Spinoza has corrected Descartes' error by perfecting the use of the geometrical method, its perfection does constitute, paradoxically, another flaw. As I mentioned already at the beginning of this paragraph, Euclidean geometry is only about Space, even though it also leaves space for Time. I suggested that Spinoza's thought should be updated, so as to include also non-Euclidean geometry, and I wrote that that would be consonant with Spinoza's own rules of hermeneutics. Indeed, it is perfectly appropriate to assess Spinoza's philosophy in geometrical terms. Nevertheless, when positing that Spinoza focuses on Space and not on Time, while also insisting that Spinoza must be "updated", there is a paradox. This can be easily countered, though, as the point is that Spinoza thought that his theory was timeless, whereas, apparently, it is not. Nowadays, the starting-point must be that Minkowski was right when saying that spacetime is to be conceived as a continuum, and then the rest follows from that. That is, Time must have been implied somehow when Spinoza focused on Space, even if he does not account for it. The task of updating consists in bringing Time into the picture. There is one author, who set himself to that task, about a century ago: Samuel Alexander, born in Australia, educated at Oxford, and the rest of his life a professor of philosophy at the University of Manchester. Alfred North Whitehead, who would write the *Principia Mathematica* together with Russell, was one of his pupils when Alexander was still teaching in Oxford, and they became good friends, being Spinozists in their own ways. Alexander's own *magnum opus*, which is almost unknown today, is *Space, Time, and Deity*, which appeared in 1920.³⁸

³⁸ Samuel Alexander, *Space, Time, and Being: The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-1918*, Parts I and II (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, [1920] 2004).

In 1921, Alexander delivered a lecture at Oxford on “Spinoza and Time”,³⁹ in which he tried to update Spinoza by introducing the notion of spacetime. I consider it to be a remarkable accomplishment, magnificent in its conception, but flawed in its execution. Alexander starts out by repeating what Spinoza says about Time, which is not much. Basically, Spinoza sees Time as existing in the imagination, being knowledge of the first kind. Next, Alexander asks what difference it would make to Spinoza’s philosophy if Time were seen as an attribute of God, being knowledge of the second kind. He answers this question as follows. While with Spinoza Extension and Thought are the only two attributes the human intellect can discover, Alexander posits that Thought is not an attribute at all, and should be replaced by Time. Thus, Extension and Thought become Space and Time, while he equates spacetime with motion (which was explained by Descartes and others through the invocation of Providence or the miraculous). For Alexander this ultimate reality ceases to be substance, and it is also no longer identifiable with God.⁴⁰ While he also abandons the concept of *conatus* along the way, substituting it with *nisus*, or the effort of the world as a whole, through its evolution,⁴¹ he concludes that reality is identifiable with only God’s body, and not with God’s deity: “God is immanent in nature, is pantheistic, in respect of his body, but in respect of his divinity transcends us, though still remaining within nature, and is theistic”.⁴² This combination of immanentism and transcendentalism has nothing to do with Spinoza’s *Deus sive Natura*, but everything with Alexander’s brand of *Natura sive Deus*, as espoused in his own theory of ‘emergent evolution’ in *Space, Time, and Deity*, where he propounded that through a process of evolution ever higher levels of existence emerge (being what he described as *nisus*). Alexander admits that he makes his hypotheses on the basis of the conclusions he had reached already before, and he warns that the “upgrading” of Time leads to a remodeling of the whole. However, if one is to accept this, the question is how much remodelling is really called for on the basis of what hypotheses.

³⁹ This Fourth Arthur Davis Memorial Lecture was delivered before the Jewish Historical Society at University College, Oxford, on May 1, 1921, and it was published by George Allen & Unwin the same year, reprinted as “Spinoza and Time,” Piece XIV in Samuel Alexander, *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, ed. by his literary executor (Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers, [1939] 1970), pp. 349–385.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 360–1.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 378 ff.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 383.

Alexander's hypotheses for updating Spinoza are wrong, even if Alexander's own system, from which he derives these hypotheses, is absolutely brilliant in its own right. What is plainly wrong, is that he decides that Thought cannot be an attribute, whereas this has no relation with any requirement for updating Spinoza. In his own scheme he does not wish to use it as a category or attribute, and that is why he proposes this change. The rest follows almost automatically, and this can be seen most easily when picturing it as a sphere. On the vertical axis, then, Alexander sees two poles, being Time and Space. In Alexander's sphere, the middle-point, next, becomes spacetime or Motion. And, finally, God is dethroned from the middle-point and must now be somewhere outside the sphere. This picture is highly problematic. For one thing, to put spacetime at the centre of the sphere, means that there cannot be anything outside spacetime, since it is at the centre of everything. This leaves no space for infinity and eternity, and not for God. Here, we have an inconsistency, since Alexander does give some place to God outside the sphere. Another problem is that Alexander equates spacetime with Motion, which is thereby also positioned in the middle-point. However, a point cannot be in motion, and it can certainly not symbolize it. On the contrary, if the middle-point symbolizes anything at all, it is not Motion but Rest, with everything else moving around it. It follows that Alexander makes the wrong hypotheses, which lead to a remodelling of the whole that is not any longer in the spirit of the philosopher, whom the remodelling was designed to pay tribute to. To make things worse, even if it were right, in this context, to turn Spinoza upside down, my point is that Alexander's reinterpretation or "gloss", as he calls it, of Spinoza's text is inconsistent, and does not make sense.

Updating Spinoza, I will offer a hypothesis that allows spacetime to be included in Spinoza's philosophy, which is consistent both in itself and with the spirit of Spinoza's text, in that the remodelling involves no changes in his text, but only an addition without compromising the meaning of the existing part. This hypothesis is that there are not two attributes but three. I will clarify this by making use, again, of the logic of spheres, which in Chapter 4 I have demonstrated to be the only logic that is valid. There, I applied it to the human being, by drawing a sphere with Mind and Body being the poles on the z -axis, Self and Other being the x - and y -axes, and the 'I' being at the centre. Here, we are concerned with the whole world and everything within it. This leads to the same sphere, but now with a different geographical index, being interchangeable with the former one. Thought and Extension are the two poles on the z -axis,

while this z -axis constitutes Space together with the x - and y -axes. The point of intersection of the three axes that form the system of co-ordinates is also the centre of the sphere, where one may find Rest. To assert that there is Rest, is also to imply that there must be Motion. And, indeed, Motion can be found on the surface, where one may move in any direction from one point to the other. So far, everything is in full agreement with what Spinoza already envisaged. However, in addition to this, if we do not want to account for Space only (in Euclidean terms), but also for Time and spacetime (in non-Euclidean terms), I propound that the only way of picturing this within the logic of spheres, is by admitting that Motion, as it is understood in Space by the attribute of Extension, can only be understood by the attribute of Thought in terms of Time. Thus, Motion appears to be the connecting tissue that accounts for spacetime, which, however, cannot be found in the centre, but only on the surface of the sphere. In the final analysis, that is, there are three attributes with God or Rest (or the 'I') at the centre: Thought (or Mind), Extension (or Body), and *Motion (or spacetime)*. Between brackets, then, are the terms corresponding with the topography that was used in the previous Chapter.

The hypothesis that there are three attributes, I submit, is the better one, since it has the best explanatory fit, while it leaves Spinoza's philosophy intact. Moreover, if one follows the logic of spheres, this is the only way of explaining things. What, then, follows from this account? For one thing, it explains why Spinoza considers Time to be associated with knowledge of the first kind, since it lies on the surface of the sphere in a circle (with knowledge of the second kind being symbolized by radii, and knowledge of the third kind by the centre). It also explains why the discovery of spacetime does not change anything in this respect. Spacetime still lies on the surface, and, therefore, it would be consistent for Spinoza to leave it aside. At this point, however, it is important to note that while Spinoza leaves it aside, he leaves space for it at the same time. Whereas Descartes and others associated Motion with Providence and the miraculous, Spinoza incorporated it in the one substance, leaving it to be discovered as spacetime. In fact, Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity fills the gap in physics that Spinoza identified in philosophy.⁴³

⁴³ Although one can only speculate as to if and how Spinoza would have filled this gap, he did make clear in his second last letter, of July 15, 1676, that he wanted to elaborate his ideas in physics, writing that "perhaps, if I live long enough, I shall some time discuss this with you more clearly; for as yet I have not had the opportunity to arrange in due order anything on this subject". See Letter 83, in Spinoza (2002), p. 958.

After all, in his Special Theory, Einstein relates Space and Time to one another as forming a continuum in curved spacetime. In his General Theory of Relativity, next, he does not go the way on the surface in search of the equatorial circle, but now he stays on the vertical axis explaining the identity of Thought and Extension, which he reformulates in exact terms as the identity of energy and mass ($E = mc^2$). The logic of spheres works here again wonderfully well, since curved spacetime, in the General Theory, is often explained by an analogy where one goes from three to two dimensions.

If there are three attributes, then, including also spacetime, this has the following consequences for the reappraisal of Spinoza. First, it means that the identity relation of the 'old' two attributes—Mind and Body—still stands, with no reservation. The vertical dimension remains the quintessential foundation on which Spinoza's philosophy rests. Second, it means that Spinoza cannot leave out the horizontal dimension when treating of human beings. Personality cannot be separated from individuality. This is what Buber already pointed out when he argued that Spinoza should have added one attribute, which he called *Personhaftigkeit*,⁴⁴ to the 'old' two attributes, *Geisthaftigkeit* and *Naturhaftigkeit*, which make for individuality. Third, it means, more broadly, that knowledge of the first kind (imagination) has to be taken seriously. Einstein has reasserted the importance of imagination. And it is exactly this imagination that is key in what we have discussed in Part I: heuristic. Thus, one could say that it is heuristic that is reasserted, which is tantamount to saying that heuristic also plays a role in knowledge of the second kind (logical inference). And indeed, in mathematics one of the most influential mathematicians of the twentieth century, George Polya, has made it clear how mathematics does make use, and has to make use, of rules of heuristic all the time, with analogy being only one example.⁴⁵ Heuristic is about the methods and rules of discovery and invention, and heuristic reasoning is about making plausible guesses before one can obtain complete certainty about the solution. Aptly, Polya makes the following analogy here: "We need heuristic reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we need scaffolding when we erect a building".⁴⁶ Modern

⁴⁴ See the 1957 afterword, in Martin Buber, *Ich und Du*, eleventh edition (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, [1923] 1983), p. 158

⁴⁵ See George Polya, *How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method*, second edition, with a new foreword by John Conway (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, [1957] 2004).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

heuristic, Polya posits, is concerned with the mental operations typically useful in the process of solving problems. It has to take into account both the logical and the psychological background, and should certainly not neglect unbiased experience. Polya writes on this: “Experience in solving problems and experience in watching other people solving problems must be the basis on which heuristic is built”.⁴⁷ In psychology, to mention a more recent example from another academic discipline, the application of this kind of modern heuristic formed the basis of groundbreaking work by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,⁴⁸ which earned the latter a Nobel Prize in economics in 2002.

The third attribute connects the vertical dimension with the horizontal one. It connects Space and Time in spacetime. What we earn from the addition of a third attribute is that it stipulates that, in terms of the organization of this book, Parts I and II have to be connected in the same way. While Part I is about agency (in time), and Part II about structure (in space), the two cannot be seen in isolation from each other. In IR Theory, it provides the definitive proof that agency and structure form a continuum. How these can be combined in international practice remains for the Conclusion. In this Chapter, I will first explain, in the remainder of this paragraph, what this means on a fundamental level, in terms of the relation between the Arts and Sciences, and of the nature of *conatus*. In the next paragraph, then, I will explain how the notion of *conatus* can be seen to be operative in international affairs, in terms of the relation of culture and economics, and how this *conatus* makes for what I will call the Iron Rule of Statecraft.

A general theory is called for, encompassing both the Arts and the Sciences. While it already follows from the identity relation of Mind and Body on the vertical axis that the Humanities (associated with the Mind) and the Natural Sciences (associated with the Body) are intimately related, what follows from the addition of the third attribute is that the Social Sciences (associated with the horizontal axis) are also related, in the sense that they influence the other two and *vice versa*. This means two things. First, any existing general theory that does not attribute equal

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 129-130. With respect to his ideas on modern heuristic, Polya expresses his indebtedness to the physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach, the mathematician Jacques Hadamard, and the psychologists William James and Wolfgang Köhler (p. 134).

⁴⁸ See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” *Science* 185 (1974), pp. 1124-1131, as reprinted in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1982] 2005), pp. 3-20.

importance to Mind and Body must be wrong. It is relatively easy to survey existing general theories in this respect, since there are only two serious⁴⁹ candidates that seek to combine the Social Sciences with the Natural Sciences and the Humanities. The one is the formidable attempt by Harvard biologist Edward Wilson, who devised a general theory of ‘consilience’, as he calls it.⁵⁰ However impressive this theory may be in its scope, and in its zeal to establish unity of knowledge, it fails from the outset, as it only sees the Body, not the Mind. Wilson attacks Cartesian dualism, but he replaces it by another one, *viz.* between transcendentalism and—what he favours himself—empiricism. Wilson’s article of faith, paradoxically, comes out most clearly at the end of his book: “The central idea of the consilience worldview is that all tangible phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, are based on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics”.⁵¹ Even if he admits that this kind of

⁴⁹ By ‘serious’ theories, I mean theories that seek to combine knowledge of the first and second kind. Theories that claim to offer knowledge of the third kind may be even more serious, and also more profound, but they can only be grasped by intuition, if at all. Moreover, if the so-called knowledge of the third kind is not linked to knowledge of the second kind, one cannot tell if it is knowledge of the first kind. Therefore, knowledge of the second kind has to play a role. This is the case, for instance, in anthroposophy, which was developed by the Austrian philosopher Rudolf Steiner in the beginning of the twentieth century. In the final analysis, anthroposophy is about intuitive knowledge, but it is solidly based in Western philosophy, while disagreeing with Kant and building on Goethe’s physics. Thus, much of anthroposophy can be regarded as knowledge of the second kind, insofar as it prepares the reader to reason in a way that might enable him to reach knowledge of the third kind by himself. An interesting study into the method that is employed here, is Jaap Sijmons’s dissertation at Utrecht University, which is titled *Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Analyse der Struktur und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners* [*Phenomenology and Idealism: An Analysis of the Structure and Method of Rudolf Steiner’s Philosophy*] (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2006). To give an example of a person who is also influential but who does not base his thinking in traditional philosophy, as Steiner does, is psychologist Ken Wilber. Wilber has written many books with titles that make big promises—like Wilber, *Eye to Eye: The Quest for the New Paradigm*, third revised edition (Boston: Shambhala, [1983] 2001), and his *A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spirituality* (Boston: Shambhala, 2000),—but it is at least questionable what he really delivers. While his approach should not be confused with what goes under the label of ‘New Age’, Wilber is yet problematic, since he is as mystic as the M-theory that he seeks to apply. Needless to say that there are more theories that fall within the latter category, and do not substantiate any claims of providing knowledge of the third kind. For the present purpose, I label these theories as ‘not serious’.

⁵⁰ See Edward O. Wilson, *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1998).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

reductionism is “a vampire in the sacristy” of the Humanities and the Social Sciences, he believes that the more physics can explain, the less we will ultimately need philosophy to understand. The other candidate for a general theory is positioned at the other far end, and is equally impressive, if not more. It is the collected works of Berkeley physicist Fritjof Capra.⁵² His theory is not reductionist but holistic, as it seeks to offer a unified view of mind, matter, and life. Capra also attacks Cartesian dualism, and instead of Descartes’ mechanistic worldview he proposes a paradigm shift to what he calls ‘deep ecology’ (where ‘deep’ means that it is not just human-centred). As Capra sees it, quantum physics prepared the way for this new paradigm that champions the whole: “Whereas in classical mechanics the properties and behavior of the parts determine those of the whole, the situation is reversed in quantum mechanics: it is the whole that determines the behavior of the parts”.⁵³ While Capra here refers to the wavelike patterns of probabilities that emerge at the subatomic level, where one never ends up with any “things” but interconnections among things, which, in turn, are also interconnections of other things, and so on, he seems to forget for a moment that these waves look like particles at other moments, and that this remains the big mystery that is to be resolved. Capra does not use any logic of spheres, but if he were, he would be bound to believe that the Whole could be found in the centre, instead of the Universal Rule, governing the relation of wholes *and* parts, which are equally important. Therefore, even if in Capra’s theory Mind and Body seem to be in balance,⁵⁴ it is flawed on the most fundamental level of wholes and parts.

⁵² See, e.g., Fritjof Capra, *The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems* (New York: Anchor Books/Random House, 1996), and Capra, *The Hidden Connections: A Science for Sustainable Living* (New York: Anchor Books/Random House, 2002).

⁵³ Capra (1996), p. 31.

⁵⁴ Cf. Capra (2002), pp. 34–38. Capra bases his theory on the so-called Santiago Theory of Cognition that shows that at all levels of life, mind and matter, but also process and structure, are inseparably connected. For more on this theory, where cognition is seen as being wider than consciousness, maintaining that it is true of all things that “to know is to live”, see Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, *Autopoiesis and Cognition* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). See also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh* (New York: Basic Books, 1999): “Reason, even in its most abstract form, makes use of, rather than transcends, our animal nature. Reason is thus not an essence that separates us from other animals; rather, it places us on a continuum with them” (p. 4). Capra seems to believe that the Santiago Theory is—with the exception of the psychology of ‘forerunner’ William James—the first one to break the Cartesian spell. Apparently, he does not know of Spinoza’s *conatus*.

Second, any existing general theory that does not attribute equal importance to the horizontal and the vertical dimension must be flawed as well. That is, the way we interpret the parts through experiments in the Natural Sciences, is partly determined by the way we conceive the whole in the Humanities at a certain point in time, but also by the way the relation of parts and wholes is conceived in the Social Sciences. The few theories that pass the first test, regarding the identity relation of Mind and Body, overestimate the impact of the Natural Sciences on the other two branches of learning, while they underestimate the impact of the latter on the former. They are preoccupied with the Natural Sciences, while not making use of heuristic reasoning in the horizontal dimension for finding solutions in the vertical dimension. This issue of whether one may or may not weigh in the 'human factor' into the interpretation of experiments in nature is nothing more than an echo of what we discussed in the previous Chapter concerning the role of consciousness in quantum mechanics. Now, we may submit that it follows from the existence of a third attribute that the horizontal dimension—and the consciousness of it—does play a role that is equally important as the vertical dimension itself—and as objective reality (OR) that can be found in it. This is what Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer mean when arguing that scientists, in the way they interpret experiments, are influenced by the community they belong to, and by philosophy. Both authors analysed the "polity of science" by describing the debate that raged between Hobbes and Boyle, in their classic *Leviathan and the Air-Pump*,⁵⁵ which earned them the prestigious Erasmus Prize in 2005.

In conclusion, there are three things that follow from the above account. Each of these concluding points will address one of the puzzles Spinoza scholarship is wrestling with: (i) the reflection or correspondence of attributes; (ii) eternity of the mind; and (iii) infinity of attributes. While infinity and eternity are symbolized in the logic of spheres by respectively the axes and the circle, what remains is the relation of Mind and Body, the issue of consciousness, and the number of attributes, which is linked to the number of dimensions. The concluding remarks seek to address these issues, which we saw, in the previous Chapter, were also central in the challenges that physics is facing: Mind-Body balance, consciousness, and dimensionality. These remarks will only be conclusive insofar as they end a logical chain of reasoning, but they seek to open up new thinking.

⁵⁵ See Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

First, Mind and Body are identical and this identity relation is symbolized in the logic of spheres by the centre, which is God or Nature in Spinoza's philosophy, the 'P' in the topography of the human condition, and OR in physics. All these notions signify the same thing in the present framework, so that the first conclusion is that what God or Nature is to Spinoza, the 'P' or OR is to those who follow the present framework. This is also implied in the next two points.

Second, of necessity, consciousness does play a role in perceiving reality, and hence also in perceiving quantum jumps, but this does not preclude the existence of the 'P' or OR. On the contrary, the quantum jumps of our mind, which make us perceive waves and particles (or wholes and parts) after one another, is fully compatible with the reality of the first conclusion, *viz.* that everything is whole and part at the same time, which is the definition of what is at the centre. Only at the centre one can see the identity of wholes and parts. To be at the centre, is to see *both* wholes *and* parts; to be on the surface, is to see *either* wholes *or* parts.⁵⁶ This is the situation one has to face in quantum mechanics in spacetime, where one has to make quantum jumps between seeing wholes and seeing parts, where one can only see either one at a time. This situation, then, leads to the second conclusion that what quantum jumps are to quantum physicists, the idea of the two different conceptions of the same thing "now under the attribute of Thought and now under the attribute of Extension" is to Spinoza.

Third, if the 'P' and OR are the same, and if they are both at the centre, one can either try to position oneself in the centre, or one looks at the centre while staying on the surface of the sphere, which, in the human topography, involves a consciousness of the 'P' and the Self respectively. As we argued in the previous Chapter, both forms of consciousness make the difference between a reality with respectively 12 or seven dimensions. If one prefers to take position in the centre, one has to end up, of necessity, with 12 dimensions. This means two things. First, it means that one is bound to go a mental journey, since the centre cannot be found in spacetime. It is the journey that string theorists go, who could be criticized for their dependence on theory to the exclusion of experiment. Second, if we forget this criticism for a moment, it also means that if string theory is now set for 11-dimensional M-theory, it misses one

⁵⁶ In existential terms, it could be said to characterize the human condition, as described, most notably, in Søren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life*, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Books, [1843] 1992).

dimension. Somehow the missing dimension has to be brought into the picture, even if it involves the remodelling of all that has been calculated. Only if string theory manages to develop a theory with 12 dimensions, which is also internally consistent, it may assume that it has found a Theory of Everything. In that case, it will also be able to counter the criticism that this theory is only supported by theoretical consistency and not by experiment. After all, the present framework, as it has been developed in the previous Chapter, demonstrates how the reality of the mathematicians interlocks with the reality of the philosophers. It contains a philosophy that can account for 12 dimensions, and it gives an opening for thoughts on how these dimensions are to be associated with real life experiences. However, such a philosophy could only be conceived as a pre-stage to a reality where one really experiences or 'sees' 12 dimensions, and if one is of the opinion that such a reality is way too far-fetched, and not likely to be perceived that way in the next centuries or so, this also means that the alleged truth of string theory will be contested for the same period of time. That is, all depends on the advances people make in how they experience their consciousness of the 'I', and the way these advances find their reflection in philosophy and the Social Sciences, or, when theory informs practice, the other way round. This follows from Shapin and Schaffer.

Alternatively, if one does not like to anticipate a new reality, but prefers to take position in the present reality, in spacetime, where one may seek the golden mean between theory and experiment, one is more likely to follow the way that quantum mechanics goes. With quantum mechanics one remains in spacetime, on the surface of the sphere. As I pointed out in the previous Chapter, on the surface, Time mirrors the three space dimensions onto the inside world, making for three other dimensions. Thus, we have three external dimensions and three internal dimensions, with the surface being the fourth dimension, in the middle. What is peculiar about quantum mechanics is that it has only focused on the external dimensions on the surface, so that it has only seen $(1 + 3)$ dimensions so far, whereas one also needs to see the internal dimension of each of the external ones, to establish equilibrium between inside and outside, or theory and experiment. In that case one has $(3 + 1 + 3)$ dimensions. If one brings in the internal dimensions, one will also close the gap between the view one has on the surface and the view one would have at the centre. And the way to do that, I submit, is to bring in gravity, which is the force that applies to all things on the surface or outside the sphere (*i.e.*, everything external). Gravity marks the difference between

the Special and the General Theory of Relativity, where the former is about spacetime on the surface, and the latter about the centre. That is why Penrose, for instance, expects so much from quantum field theory (QFT) and its search for quantum-gravity union. Quantum-gravity union, I submit, is about uniting the external and internal dimensions. Whereas now, we see three space dimensions and one time dimension, the inclusion of gravity will enable us to see the three internal dimensions as well. Again, consciousness plays an important role here, but now, in the case of consciousness of the Self, theory seems to match practical experience much better. After all, it only involves, as we argued in the previous Chapter, the distinction among causality, self-consciousness, and the immediate awareness of creative force (which is rooted in the distinction among animals, human beings, and God). Thus, gravity provides the key for a theory that is more likely to resonate with the real life experiences that people have in the present world. Therefore, I concur with Penrose that QFT, and not string theory, is likely to be the greatest promise for the 21st century. Of necessity, then, QFT will end up with $(3 + 1 + 3)$ dimensions, including three internal ones. If one is not prepared to accept the seventh dimension (*i.e.*, God), which indeed constitutes a paradox (*i.e.*, being the dimension of undimensionality), the only way out is to solve the paradox by adding to the remaining six dimensions their antipoles, so that one has both six dimensions of Being, and six dimensions of non-Being (or Nothingness), which is what string theory could be said to entail (and what, in fact, leads to the notion of God beyond paradox). If this last move from six to 12 dimensions is one bridge too far, and I have argued it is, all depends on our conception of gravity.

So, what is gravity at last? Gravity is a force or power that is centripetal, which makes it possible for a planet to stick together,⁵⁷ and to persevere while moving in circles. This leads to the ultimate conclusion, which may serve as a heuristic in finding quantum-gravity union in physics, and in international affairs in the human world, as we will see: What gravity is to Einstein, *conatus* is to Spinoza.

⁵⁷ Cf. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust: Der Tragödie erster Teil* (Stuttgart: Reclam, [1808] 1986), 382-3, p. 13, where Dr. Faustus exclaims that he has studied all Arts and Sciences, and that he has even taken recourse to magic, but that he still does not know “was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält” [what keeps the world together in its innermost being].

5.2 The Iron Rule of Statecraft

The statesman has a choice: He can either fight the state of nature, or he can make use of it. However, what he cannot do, is do away with it. For centuries it has pleased political philosophers to think of the state in terms of a social contract, marking the transition from the state of nature to a state with a civil society. Even if it is granted that this social contract is never thought of as a historical fact but only as a thought experiment, this thought experiment is nevertheless wrong, while political philosophy is still largely based on it. What is wrong about social contract theories is that they treat the two states as following one another, where the state of nature disappears as soon as civil society is established. In fact, however, they operate in tandem, simultaneously. The state of nature is always there, under the layer of veneer that civil society is.⁵⁸ This is what we got from Grotius in Part I, where we distinguished between public international law (being an instance of volitional law) and natural law (being applicable also in the state of nature); and this is also what we got from Spinoza in Part II, in the previous paragraph, in terms of power. This paragraph demonstrates what follows from the latter with respect to statecraft. The main argument in this paragraph is that the only power a statesman has is the power that is attributed to him by the laws of nature. He would better know what these laws are, since they explain everything that is concerned with power. I will focus on the most important law of nature, which is in a very true sense the political law of gravity, and which I will call the Iron Rule of Statecraft.

⁵⁸ The very fact that a civil society exists and abides by customary rules as well as laws does not preclude the other fact that there may be an underworld at the same time, abiding by the rules of the jungle in the state of nature. Global crime is a fact, and it would be wrong not to account for it. It would also be wrong, though, to believe that the state of nature is the preserve of criminals only. The state of nature is part of everybody's constitution. An example from daily life is marriage. When people get married they enter into a true social contract, promising each other—and often also God Almighty (which adds a vertical dimension to the contract)—to love and take care of one another, and to be faithful. However, nothing on earth can guarantee that this contract will not be broken. As a matter of fact, statistics show that in many societies a high percentage of the married population is adulterous. The question is what to do against it. The answer may involve some understanding of what makes a happy marriage, some thoughts on what a partner should do and not do, but in the end one can only be held responsible for the part that one plays oneself. If one is not in a position to force the other to do something or refrain from it, one has to resort to 'soft power', to use the term that Joseph Nye coined in the field of IR in the late 1980s. Soft power is about using the ability not to coerce but to attract.

The *trias ethica* is key for understanding the Iron Rule of Statecraft. Therefore, I will begin by reformulating this new trias doctrine, including the findings that followed from the reasoning that started with Spinoza's. In the last paragraph, we came to the conclusion that there are not two but three attributes, where Motion was added to Mind and Matter (or Body). This notion can be related to the *trias ethica*, when we realize that each of these attributes corresponds with one realm: Mind with the cultural realm, Motion with the political realm (as we have seen in Part I when moving in circles), and Matter with the economic realm. In terms of dimensions, I have demonstrated that the Mind has three internal dimensions, that Motion has one time dimension, and that Matter has three external dimensions. While Spinoza only used the last three external dimensions by subscribing to Euclidean geometry, and while non-Euclidean geometry adds the time dimension, what is still lacking in all accounts is the inclusion of the three internal dimensions. I concluded the previous paragraph by stating that this inclusion is the same as including gravity in QFT, since gravity is about bringing in the internal dimensions. That is, in terms of the *trias ethica*, it is about accommodating the cultural realm next to the other two.

The internal dimensions are the external dimensions mirrored by the time dimension, which leads to a total of $(3 + 1 + 3)$ dimensions. Two things follow from this. First, the internal dimensions follow a reverse logic in the sense that the fifth, sixth, and seventh dimension are the images of respectively the third, second, and first dimension. That is, the 'fifth' dimension has three dimensions; the 'sixth' dimension has two dimensions; and the 'seventh' dimension has one dimension. The question now is what these three internal dimensions really stand for. In Chapter 4 we can find two clues. When exploring the inside world, we already distinguished seven stages in logic, with the last three being causality, self-consciousness, and immediate creative force respectively. Next, in the logic of spheres, we made a distinction among three views of reality, corresponding with three ideal types—Spinozist, Faustian, and Schillerian—that focus on respectively one, two, and three points on the vertical axis. In reverse order, these three ideal types appear to be typical, then, of the three internal dimensions. The fifth dimension is about the three Schillerian drives that can be seen to be operative in the Humanities (*Formtrieb*), Social Sciences (*Spieltrieb*), and Natural Sciences (*Stofftrieb*); the sixth dimension is about the Faustian struggle between two worlds as these are studied in the Arts (inside world) and Sciences (outside world); and the seventh dimension is about the Spinozist notion of one substance

(*Amor Dei Intellectualis*). If we like to think of all three internal dimensions in Spinozist terms, then the fifth dimension is knowledge of the first kind; the sixth dimension is knowledge of the second kind; and the seventh dimension is knowledge of the third kind. In terms of wholes and parts, finally, the fifth dimension is about parts, the sixth about parts and wholes, and the seventh about the whole.⁵⁹ Second, it follows also from the mirror relation between the external and internal dimensions that nature (or economics, which is also about the outside world) and culture are the same. That is, if some force or power is operative in nature, it is mirrored by some countervailing power in culture, and *vice versa*.

The mirror relation between nature and culture, in the present theory, is different from existing accounts. Arguably, the most influential of these is Manuel Castells'. In his seminal trilogy *The Information Age*,⁶⁰ Castells does mention "mirroring" when positing that this is characteristic of a form of organization and intervention of social movements that are "counteracting" what he calls "the networking logic of domination in the informational society".⁶¹ While this mirroring refers to the fundamental opposition, which Castells sees, "between the bare logic of capital flows and the cultural values of human experience",⁶² on the most fundamental level, however, of the two poles of human existence—nature and culture (or Matter and Mind)—it appears that Castells does not see this mirror relation as one between nature and culture. Surveying the changing patterns of relationships between nature and culture in sociology, he distinguishes between two models, where the first is characterized by the domination (for millennia) of nature over culture, and where the second is by the triumph of reason, leading to the domination of culture over nature. According to Castells, after these two stages "[w]e are just entering a new stage in which culture refers to culture, having superseded nature to the point that nature is artificially revived ("preserved") as a cultural form".⁶³ Castells summarizes his point by positing that this does not entail the end of history, but rather the beginning:

⁵⁹ Since one cannot understand the whole (here: knowledge of the third kind) in and of itself, one can only try to express this in terms of wholes *and* parts (knowledge of the second kind), which is reflected in the formulation of the Universal Rule.

⁶⁰ See Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. I: *The Rise of the Network Society* (2000a) – Vol. II: *The Power of Identity* (2004) – Vol. III: *End of Millennium* (2000b), second edition (Oxford: Blackwell, [1996-1998] 2000-2004).

⁶¹ Castells (2004), II, p. 427.

⁶² Castells (2000a), I, p. 507.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

[A]fter millennia of a prehistoric battle with nature, first to survive, then to conquer it, our species has reached the level of knowledge and social organization that will allow us to live in a predominantly social world. It is the beginning of a new existence, and indeed the beginning of a new age, the Information Age, marked by the autonomy of culture *vis-à-vis* the material bases of our existence. But this is not necessarily an exhilarating moment. Because, alone at last in our human world, we shall have to look at ourselves in the mirror of historical reality. And we may not like the vision.⁶⁴

Castells proclaims the autonomy of culture, abandoning the tension with nature. He sees the vertical relation of nature and culture in horizontal terms within culture, while propounding that “[w]e are embodied time.”⁶⁵ He does not seem to acknowledge that one could equally well highlight the embodied part, then, and posit that “Time is the mind of Space” (to use the phrase of some commentators summarizing Alexander’s theory). While Castells writes that Time “bewildered St. Augustine, misled Newton, inspired Einstein, and obsessed Heidegger,”⁶⁶ one may add that it absorbed Castells.

The problem with Castells’ trilogy is that it is based on the same flaw as we identified when discussing the theories of Giddens and Wendt, and, to some extent, of Jackson. They all focus on the horizontal dimension and forget about the vertical one, which, however, is always there, beneath the surface. Maybe Castells’ theory, then, provides itself the best mirror by showing that in the present age—however we like to call it—we cannot see any longer what is beneath the surface. Castells’ theory is long on empirical data, and short on vision and predictive value. Castells would consider this a compliment, as this is exactly what he set out to offer. However, what he cannot avert is that the tension, which is there, on the vertical axis, is bound to manifest itself also in his theory under some guise. Even if he thinks he abandons the tension between nature and culture, it reappears in his central theme, *viz.* the paradox between globalization (the “Net”) and fragmentation (“Self”). He thinks he abandons the traditional view of society “with technology and economy in the basement, power on the mezzanine, and culture in the penthouse,” while offering his plural perspective that “brings together cultural identity, global networking, and multidimensional politics,”⁶⁷ but in the end this perspective features exactly the same tension between

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 508-9.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 460.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 494.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 22-27, at 26 and 27.

material power and the search for identity. He describes this tension as an “ongoing struggle between global economic flows and cultural identity.”⁶⁸ In this relation, he admits, one has to think in terms of mirroring, and that is why he writes about globalization and its “symmetrical” opposing challenges.⁶⁹

The fundamental difference between Castells’ theory and the present one, is that Castells thinks in terms of globalization and the “parallel” affirmation of cultural identity,⁷⁰ whereas I have demonstrated that the relation between the two is not one of parallelism but of identity. Identity is not about culture or the Mind only, but about how Mind and Body are on one line. This follows from the framework we developed in Chapter 4, and does not only affect Castells’ theory. After all, it has become common to refer to what is called the “globalization paradox” between economic integration and cultural fragmentation. However, all thinking that is based—either explicitly or implicitly—on this paradox is fundamentally wrong, since a paradox presupposes two things, whereas identity is about one thing. Globalization is not about paradox; it is about identity. And this is new if compared to existing accounts of the relation between nature and culture, as applied to globalization.

What does all this mean for statecraft? In effect, it means that the statesman will be able to explain why certain forces or powers can be seen to be operative in the economic and cultural realms, and he will be able to predict what is going to happen in the one realm if something changes in the other. It means very specifically that if we know that globalization is characterized by economic integration worldwide, we should also know that these forces in the economic realm always go together with countervailing forces in the cultural realm. Economic integration and cultural fragmentation are two expressions of one and the same process. When people are confronted every day with the fact that they are connected to the world economy and are just parts of a larger world like everybody else, it follows from the Universal Rule that whenever and wherever they have to be parts, they will be wholes as well. In Part II, this wholeness does not result from a logical relation between cause and effect, but rather from a physical one between action and reaction, which is instantaneous. In this context, I could reformulate the *conatus* doctrine as it applies to the international system: Every system

⁶⁸ Castells (2000b), III, p. 67.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 339.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

seeks to preserve itself by continuously striving to establish a balance between its constituent parts and the whole. This is what happens in nature, irrespective of whether we are conscious of it or not. If we are unconscious of it,⁷¹ we will be caught by surprise every time when a countervailing force manifests itself or hits us. After all, when economic forces get stronger and stronger, countervailing forces will increase by the same degree, and will mount a certain pressure that is bound to find an outlet. However, if we are conscious of it,⁷² we may identify any force within the economic realm with a force within the cultural realm, and *vice versa*. The political power of the statesman, then, is the ability to use this consciousness in channelling the forces to the realms where they belong, and to accommodate the balance between them.

The statesman will have to fight the state of nature if he is unconscious of how *conatus* manifests itself within the international system, and acts in contravention of it. However, if he is conscious of *conatus* he may be able to make use of the powers that are unleashed in

⁷¹ In psychology, Sigmund Freud has famously explored the subconscious. He has a deterministic view of life as being based on a universal unconscious drive to self-preservation, which he features in his conception of *libido*. On this view, any frustration of the unconscious drive finds its counterpart in some disturbance in one's conscious life. The drive reigns supreme, and only by understanding it, one can get to terms with it, and change its direction. In terms of wholes and parts, one could rephrase this by positing that the parts reign supreme, and that only consciousness of the whole can set one free. While the present theory is not based on Freud's conception of *libido*, it could be argued that there is a parallel between this notion and Spinoza's *conatus*—see Sir Stuart Hampshire, "Spinoza: An Introduction to his Philosophical Thought" (1951), in Hampshire, *Spinoza and Spinozism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 110-11.

⁷² In psychology, Viktor Frankl has been influential in propounding that man's primary motivational force is his search for meaning (which is not a "secondary rationalization" of instinctual drives). In Viktor Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning [Ein Psycholog erlebt das Konzentrationslager]*, revised and updated (New York: Simon & Schuster, [1946] 1984), he develops his logotherapy, which in this context could be taken to mean that man can only survive as long as he is able to accommodate the parts he is conscious of in a whole, which he has to think of himself as giving meaning to his life. Logotherapy is future-oriented, and features responsibility. Its categorical imperative is: "Live as if you were living already for the second time and as if you had acted the first time as wrongly as you are about to act now!" (pp. 131-2). Logotherapy is targeted against inner emptiness or "existential vacuum," which is as real in this century as in his, as is testified by the tremendous success of what has become one of the most celebrated books on leadership—Stephen Covey, *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People: Restoring the Character Ethic* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989)—which is based on Frankl. While the present theory is not based on Frankl's logotherapy, it does pose the existential question featuring *conatus*.

the state of nature. The only way he can do that is by making institutional space for both wholeness and partness in different realms (*i.e.*, culture and the economy, next to its own realm of the polity, which is about combining wholeness and partness), and by following the principles of the *trias ethica*. I already demonstrated that this trias follows from the state of nature. Now, we can also relate this trias with political power, which leads to what I will call the Iron Rule of Statecraft:

The power, or virtue, of the state is commensurate with its ability to comply with the trias ethica.

That is, the political power that a statesman has depends on his ability to ensure that civil society, government, and business are autonomous within their respective realms of culture, the polity, and the economy, where the respective principles of liberty, equality and fraternity reign supreme.

The Iron Rule of Statecraft, I posited at the beginning of this paragraph, is the political law of gravity. The statesman cannot ignore it. While the Golden Rule of Statecraft is about the world in horizontal terms, and is concerned with the realm of the polity only, the Iron Rule of Statecraft is about the world in vertical terms, involving the realms of the economy and culture. The statesman cannot ignore the forces that are there in the economy and in culture. It is in his own best interest to see the identity relation between those forces, if he does not want to be hit by them. This very identity relation, as I demonstrated, means that whenever there is an economic force there must be a countervailing force in the cultural realm, and *vice versa*. In this sense, the identity relation can help to explain and predict, and this seems particularly welcome in an age of globalization, where the vertical axis bears heavy traffic. Globalization is by no means new,⁷³ but what is new about the present form of it is that the economic forces are stronger than ever before. At the same time, one

⁷³ Cf. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). This publication addresses the question of what is new and what is not new about globalization by using an analytical framework that distinguishes four “spatio-temporal” dimensions of globalization—extensity (of global networks), intensity (of global interconnectedness), velocity (of global flows), and impact (propensity of global interconnectedness)—and four dimensions that map its organizational profile—infrastructures (of globalization), institutionalization (of global networks and the exercise of power), (the pattern of) stratification, and modes of interaction (that are dominant globally) (pp. 14-28).

can see that developments in the cultural realm have become explosive, or at least highly inflammable, and that the nation state is now often said to be in crisis. What most theories offer, is an account of either one of these three aspects of globalization, in isolation, that is. There are few theories that treat globalization in its economic, political, *and* cultural forms, but these theories still do not identify the three with one another. What the present theory offers, is an integrated account of globalization that shows how its economic, political, and cultural manifestations are three expressions of one and the same process. In the remainder of this Chapter, I will discuss the “singular” and “cumulative” accounts of globalization, while I will end by showing what the integrated account adds, featuring the Iron Rule of Statecraft in its practical application.

There are three models of the post-Cold War era that set the stage for the “singular” accounts of respectively political, cultural, and economic globalization. First, the model of the post-Cold War era that has been influential in featuring the political, is Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man*.⁷⁴ It is about the triumph of liberal democracy, and its implied finality. Fukuyama builds his argument on Plato’s view of human being, distinguishing three parts of the soul: a desiring part, a reasoning part, and, in the middle, a part called *thymos*, or “spiritedness”. He sets out to “recover the whole of man and not just his economic side”⁷⁵ (that only corresponds with his desiring part). However, in fact he vindicates *thymos*, to the exclusion of the other parts. He acknowledges that desire and reason can explain much, “[b]ut they cannot explain the striving for liberal democracy, which ultimately arises out of *thymos*, the part of the soul that demands recognition.”⁷⁶ Rewriting history as a struggle for recognition, he posits that the concept of recognition itself has changed over time. In the French and American revolutions the relationship of lordship and bondage were abolished, and this would have had a similar effect on the relationship between states:

Liberal democracy replaces the irrational desire to be recognized as greater than others with a rational desire to be recognized as equal. A world made up of liberal democracies, then, should have much less incentive for war, since all nations would reciprocally recognize one another’s legitimacy.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin Books, 1992).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xx.

The transition from *megalothymia* (superior worth, associated with war and pride) to *isothymia* (equal worth, associated with peace and prosperity) marks “the end of history” and the emergence of the “last man”. Last men, as Nietzsche has it, are “men without chests”, composed entirely of desire and reason, and lacking in any *megalothymia*. While Fukuyama suggests that we have reached the end of history, he also adds that anyone could restart history at any moment. Last man may get bored, and may long for struggle, and thus become a first man again. That is, either he may become dissatisfied with liberal democracy, as it would continue to recognize equal people unequally in the world economy, or “the absence of regular and constructive outlets for *megalothymia* may simply lead to its later resurgence in an extreme and pathological form”.⁷⁸

Second, the model of the post-Cold War era that has been influential in featuring the cultural, is Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.⁷⁹ Huntington argues that in the present world the critical distinctions between people are not primarily political or economic, but cultural. He draws a new map of the world reconfiguring world politics along cultural lines, while maintaining that the new hot spots of world politics are on the “fault lines” between “civilizations.” These notions are key for understanding Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilizations. To begin with the latter, Huntington defines civilizations in the plural—as distinguished from civilization in the singular, which is the opposite of barbarism—as being the broadest cultural unit, where all subunits can only be fully understood by reference to it. Its defining characteristics are blood, language, and way of life, but most importantly, religion. Huntington posits that even if civilizations have no clear-cut boundaries, they are real. This reality manifests itself on the fault lines between civilizations. What Huntington means by this other notion is that within each civilization there are “core states” and “concentric circles,” and that new conflicts are in the periphery where different civilizations clash. The fault line between two civilizations may be between two states or within one and the same state. In any type of conflict, Huntington propounds that the best way of avoiding conflicts from becoming major intercivilizational wars is to comply with three rules: the abstention rule (“that core states abstain from intervention in conflicts in other civilizations”), the joint mediation rule (“that core states

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 328.

⁷⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

negotiate with each other to contain or to halt fault line wars between states or groups from their civilizations”), and the commonalities rule (that “peoples in all civilizations should reach for and attempt to expand the values, institutions, and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations”).⁸⁰ The third rule for peace in a multicivilizational world is interesting, as it is more about civilization in the singular than in the plural really. To understand what Huntington is getting at, one has to interrelate both connotations. On the one hand, he believes in the ubiquity of conflict. This belief is based on his view of human being:

It is human to hate. For self-definition and motivation people need enemies: competitors in business, rivals in achievement, opponents in politics. They naturally distrust and see as threats those who are different and have the capability to harm them. The resolution of one conflict and the disappearance of one enemy generate personal, social, and political forces that give rise to new ones.⁸¹

Self and Other need each other, and there is a tendency to see the two in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Huntington argues that it would be useless to try to create a universal civilization. Universalism and multiculturalism would not make sense: the former eradicates the Other, the latter obliterates the Self.⁸² On the other hand, he agrees with Walzer that even if cultures are “thick,” having maximalist moralities, there is also an element that is “thin,” which is the minimalist morality that they all have in common. In the final analysis, Huntington is concerned with both elements that are constitutive of respectively civilization in the plural and in the singular:

In the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately. In the greater clash, the global “*real* clash,” between Civilization and barbarism, the world’s great civilizations, with their rich accomplishments in religion, art, literature, philosophy, science, technology, morality, and compassion, will also hang together or hang separately.⁸³

While Huntington acknowledges that there is more than the dynamic between Self and Other, he does not specify this any further.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 316 and 320.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 130.

⁸² In Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) he expands on this; cf. Christward Dieterman, “Geloven in Amerika” [Belief in America], *Internationale Spectator* 58 (2004b), pp. 493-4, reviewing this book.

⁸³ Huntington (1996), p. 321.

Third, the model—or rather: epic—of the post-Cold War era that has been influential in featuring the economic, is Thomas Friedman’s *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*.⁸⁴ The core thesis of this bestseller is that globalization is not some trend or fad but the new system that has replaced the old Cold War system, comporting with it its own rules and logic. And, to be sure, these rules and logic are about the global economy. For a state to abide by these rules is like putting on what Friedman calls a “Golden Straitjacket”:

To fit into the Golden Straitjacket a country must either adopt, or be seen as moving toward, the following golden rules: making the private sector the primary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets, making its currency convertible, opening its industries, stock and bond markets to direct foreign ownership and investment, deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic competition as possible, eliminating government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks as much as possible, opening its banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership and competition and allowing its citizens to choose from an array of competing pension options and foreign-run pension and mutual funds. When you stitch all of these pieces together you have the Golden Straitjacket.⁸⁵

The Golden Straitjacket is one-size-fits-all, but “it’s the only model on the rack this historical season”. To thrive in the globalization system, one has to put it on, and one also has to join what Friedman calls the “Electronic Herd”. It consists of “all the faceless stock, bond and currency traders sitting behind computer screens all over the globe, moving their money around from mutual funds to pension funds to emerging market funds,

⁸⁴ Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, updated and expanded edition (New York: Anchor Books/Random House, 2000). Probably, Friedman himself would object to being categorized that way, as he likes to think of himself as offering a holistic approach (see p. xx-xxi). He would recommend instead Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), which could be added to the other two books that seek to catch “The One Big Thing” in a single thought. In Kennedy’s case that would be “that there exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact upon social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states and empires” (p. 439).

⁸⁵ Friedman (2000), p. 105.

or trading on the Internet from their basements,” as well as “the big multinational corporations who now spread their factories around the world, constantly shifting them to the most efficient, low-cost producers.”⁸⁶ States become more and more dependent on the Electronic Herd for growth capital, which they need for running balanced budgets to fit into the Golden Straitjacket. The Golden Straitjacket is all that the Electronic Herd wants to see in a state, and it will reward states that wear it with investment capital, whereas it will discipline those that do not wear it. Friedman posits that “[t]his interaction among the Electronic Herd, nation-states and the Golden Straitjacket is at the center of today’s globalization system.”⁸⁷ All this represents the “Lexus” part of Friedman’s argument, to which there is also an “olive tree” part, though, representing culture and identity. Friedman recognizes that everybody needs his olive tree, and he also sees an important task for the state to make sure that everybody can have his. Thus, he favours a balanced approach, but in the final analysis he celebrates the new system, which is, in a way, epitomized in his “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention”, which says “that no two countries that both have McDonald’s have ever fought a war against each other since they each got their McDonald’s.”⁸⁸

To be sure, all three models that set the stage for the “singular” accounts of globalization are far less isolated or one-sided than they are usually reported as being. After all, Fukuyama speculates on a restart of history by a resurgence in the economic or cultural domain; Huntington does not only see clashes but also commonalities between civilizations; and Friedman thinks in terms of having both a Lexus and an olive tree. However, it is true that all three models have been construed as providing “The One Big Thing” in a single thought, which is why they have become the bestsellers they are, and which is also why they have been interpreted as Weberian ideal-types more than anything else. Moreover, when using the framework of the present theory one can see that these ideal-types are not only limited in scope, but in Huntington’s case also flawed. Fukuyama is concerned with *thymos* on the horizontal axis, featuring recognition of Self and Other, while forgetting that it is also there on the vertical axis, as the middle position between Body and Mind (or desire and reason, as he calls it). Friedman takes the opposite position: he focuses on the vertical axis, where he sees Body and Mind (or the Lexus and the olive tree, as he

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 109.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 110.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. ix.

calls it), while forgetting that the state is not only there to balance the two, but also to play its part on the horizontal axis. Finally, Huntington is concerned with cultural identity, but he understands this term in horizontal terms as “sense of Self”, not in vertical terms.⁸⁹

The “cumulative” accounts add some complexity in that they give equal weight to politics, culture, and economics. Again I will give three examples, but this time they serve to show how the three domains are combined in some way, not how they are separated. Here, I should first mention David Held *cum suis*,⁹⁰ who offer a truly balanced approach, which in their case is almost encyclopaedic. The problem with this account, though, is that with all it has to say about each of the three domains, it does not even try to relate the three domains to each other when describing the “cumulative impacts” of contemporary globalization on states. Next, there is Castells’ account of globalization,⁹¹ in which he offers what he calls a “plural perspective.” Castells does relate the three domains to each other, but he does so in terms of paradox or parallelism. As I already noted, he thinks in horizontal terms, and this also applies to the way he defines identity as a social construction that “always takes place in a context marked by power relationships.” He sees three forms and origins of identity building: legitimizing identity (“introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination *vis à vis* social actors”), resistance identity (“generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society”), and project identity (“when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social structure”).⁹² Castells’ point is that the state is positioned between the power of global networks and the challenge of singular identities, while facing a situation where legitimizing identity has drained away, resistance identity emerges, and project identity will become key. In this new set-up power is redefined, being sited in people’s minds, and the state operates according to a “variable geometry,” being influential if not powerful.⁹³

⁸⁹ Cf. Dieterman (2004b), p. 494.

⁹⁰ Held et al. (1999).

⁹¹ Castells (2000-2004).

⁹² Castells (2004), II, pp. 7-8.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 419-28.

Another great example of a “cumulative” account is Stanley Hoffmann’s “Clash of Globalizations” in *Foreign Affairs*.⁹⁴ In this article Hoffmann makes a distinction among three forms of globalization, each with its own problems. There is economic globalization, which has become a cause of inequality within and among states, posing a dilemma between efficiency and fairness. There is cultural globalization, which has to face the key choice between uniformization and diversity, resulting in a Weberian “disenchantment of the world” and a reaction against uniformity. Finally, there is political globalization, which is a product of the other two, with America oscillating between the temptations of domination and isolation.⁹⁵ And all of these three forms of globalization would clash with the fragmentation of states (and the state system).

The integrated account of globalization does not see a disconnect, a paradox or a clash between forces of fragmentation and of integration, but declares their identity. More specifically, this account is about the identity relation of *cultural* fragmentation and *economic* integration, with politics mediating between the two if necessary, and balancing them out if possible. While Spinoza provided the philosophical underpinnings for such an account, by demonstrating the identity of Mind and Matter, I will briefly discuss an author who advanced ideas about this identity relation in terms of ethics and economics exactly one century later: Adam Smith. Adam Smith was both a pioneer of economics and a professor of moral philosophy. However, he is only remembered as an economist, or rather as the ‘guru’ of self-interest. The passage that is cited time and again, is the one on the butcher and the brewer:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages.⁹⁶

Arguably, no author has been misrepresented more badly than Smith has been by his latter-day admirers. If one were to read Smith’s work oneself, one would see that this particular passage is not only taken out of context, but that the arrived meaning goes against the very essence of

⁹⁴ Stanley Hoffmann, “Clash of Globalizations,” *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2002), pp. 104-115. This article and, more specifically, my discussion of it with Hoffmann formed the starting-point for my theory in its present form.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-8.

⁹⁶ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1776] 1976), pp. 26-7.

what Smith maintains himself. For one thing, the passage occurs in a chapter on the division of labour, in which he notes that mutually advantageous trades are common, without exacting or implying, though, that self-love would be the only principle making for a good society. On the contrary, Smith was much inspired by the Stoics, and gave a central place to self-command. The union of this self-command and the qualities of reason and understanding is what Smith calls 'prudence'. And next to prudence he champions 'sympathy'. These two notions are key in the Smithian view, but they have been lost in the reception of Smith's works.

I hereby propound that the position that is ascribed to Adam Smith is in fact the position that was defended by Bernard Mandeville in his *Fable of the Bees* of 1714.⁹⁷ While Mandeville is relatively little known, it has been argued that his influence on both ethics and economics is immense. Smith, but also Voltaire, was indebted to Mandeville considerably, and Montesquieu slightly. What is original about Mandeville is that he offered a systematic account, and devised a true *laissez-faire* theory, based on a philosophy, and a view of man. With defences of *laissez-faire* having been opportunistic before, Mandeville made it a matter of general principle.⁹⁸ A nice formulation of this principle can be found in the following passage:

Thus every Part was full of Vice,
Yet the whole Mass a Paradise;
Flatter'd in Peace, and fear'd in Wars,
They were th'Esteem of Foreigners,
And lavish of their Wealth and Lives,
The Balance of all other Hives.
Such were the Blessings of that State;
Their Crimes conspir'd to make them Great:
And Virtue, who from Politicks
Had learn'd a Thousand Cunning Tricks,
Was, by their happy Influence,
Made Friends with Vice: And ever since,
The worst of all the Multitude
Did something for the Common Good.
This was the State's Craft, that maintain'd
The Whole of which each Part complain'd
(...)⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Bernard Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits*, ed. F.B. Kaye, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1714] 1924).

⁹⁸ F.B. Kaye, "Introduction," in Mandeville (1924), pp. ci-iii, cxxxiv-cxlv.

⁹⁹ Mandeville (1924), I, p. 24.

Mandeville is first in furnishing a genuine philosophy for individualism in trade. However, he does see a role for the state, propounding “that Private Vices by the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician may be turned into Publick Benefits.”¹⁰⁰ Individuals would be led by the instinct for self-preservation, and politicians would have to channel the ensuing private vices in such a way that they result in public benefits. Like Mandeville, Smith believes that in a proper institutional setting self-interest can lead to socially beneficial results.¹⁰¹ That is, both are not opposed to government, and attribute it a positive role. However, the difference between the two is that Smith does not speak of self-interest in the narrow sense of selfishness—which he regards as inappropriate, if not immoral,—but as involving sympathy.¹⁰² That is, with Smith, less channelling is called for and more *laissez-faire* is warranted, since he believes in virtuous self-interest that results in invisible cooperation.

Smith’s own invention is the metaphor of the “invisible hand.” The interpretation of this term, though, often goes beyond Smith’s original discussion. Economists like to see the invisible hand as the balancing mechanism by which markets settle on product distribution and prices that are beneficial to the entire community. However, for Smith the invisible hand is not a mechanism but a natural inclination. It may be interesting to see how Smith uses this term precisely, since it has received so much prominence in economic thinking. He uses the term only three times. In *The Wealth of Nations* he uses it in an argument for what economic historians call “home bias,” when discussing domestic versus foreign trade. This first passage is best known, and reads as follows:

[Every individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 369.

¹⁰¹ The Stoics already said that good could come out of evil.

¹⁰² In the eighteenth century, various authors would claim the identity of private and public goods, while differing with each other on what to focus on. Thus, Bishop Butler argues that one should advance the public good, if one wants to pursue one’s private good; Lord Shaftesbury argues the other way round, requiring the individual pursuit of “rational self-interest”; and Francis Hutcheson broadly agrees with the latter, substituting personal intuition or “moral sense” for rational self-interest. This moral faculty Hutcheson sees as acting instinctively and immediately, in the same way as man acts to preserve his body. Hutcheson strongly opposes Hobbes and Mandeville, and influences Smith, his pupil. Smith learns about Mandeville via Hutcheson, and agrees with the latter while substituting “sympathy” for the moral sense.

value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.¹⁰³

The second passage is derived from Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, where Smith uses the term once again in an economic context, when explaining the distribution of wealth:

The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.¹⁰⁴

The third passage is least known. It is to be found in Smith's *History of Astronomy* that was published posthumously. Here he uses the term for the first time, when describing polytheistic religions:

[I]t may be observed, that in all Polytheistic religions, among savages, as well as in the early ages of Heathen antiquity, it is the irregular events of nature only that are ascribed to the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns, and water refreshes; heavy bodies descend, and lighter substances fly upwards, by the necessity of their own nature; nor was the invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in those matters.¹⁰⁵

In its original form, Smith does not use the term in an economic context, but he associates it with, among other things, gravity.

¹⁰³ Smith (1976), I, p. 456.

¹⁰⁴ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1759] 1976), pp. 184-5.

¹⁰⁵ Adam Smith, "The Principles which lead and direct Philosophical Enquiries; illustrated by the History of Astronomy", in *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, ed. W.L.D. Wightman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1795] 1980), p. 49; and see A.L. Macfie, "The Invisible Hand of Jupiter," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32 (1971), pp. 595-9.

The metaphor of the invisible hand, in its original conception, is an expression of the natural inclination of things. It is the constitution of the state of nature. Or, when following Spinoza's *Deus sive Natura*, while identifying God with nature, it is the hand of God.¹⁰⁶ In the human world, the invisible hand is applicable, generally, to any situation where, in the absence of a central and visible command, individual action has unintended consequences with a patterned effect on the community.¹⁰⁷ In economics, this involves the Smithian inclusion of ethics, as we saw. And the problem with modern economics is that it excludes categorically all ethics.¹⁰⁸ The standard assumption of economic theory is that self-interest maximization is characteristic of actual behaviour of human beings. This assumption is based on conviction, though, and not on empirical verification. By making predictions on that basis one is likely to only see what one is already convinced of, while dismissing any divergences as 'externalities' or 'irrational behaviour'. Thus, economists confirm what they already believe, and dismiss the real problems that exist as irrelevant. They focus on what has been called the logistic or engineering approach of economics, and neglect the ethical approach. What is tragic about this, is that economics imposes a model on reality, which rules out ethics. Man is supposed to be self-interested in the narrow sense, as this would be good for society as a whole. What is ironical here, is that this position is ascribed to Smith, who is worshipped for a position never taken. As I will argue, next, if one is to face the real challenges that exist in economics and ethics, one can only do so by seeing the identity relation between the two sets of challenges. That is, to meet the challenge one has to revisit Smith, and "see", for the first time, the invisible hand.

The only forefront economist who makes the case for bringing economics closer to ethics is Amartya Sen, recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1998. Sen is also a philosopher. He holds that both ethics and economics would benefit from a closer contact between the two, and for this view he bases himself explicitly on Smith.¹⁰⁹ While it is not special

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*, fourth revised edition (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, [1949] 1996), in which he claims that Smith's invisible hand is God's hand (p. 147, n. 3), without invoking Spinoza.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Nozick (1974), in which he argues that the metaphor of the invisible hand is not only applicable to economics, but is substantively similar to concepts that exist in various other areas of academic discourse under different names (pp. 18-22).

¹⁰⁸ For a well-articulated defence of the view that people only act in pursuit of their self-interest, see George Stigler, "Ethics or Economics?," in S. McMurrin (ed.), *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

¹⁰⁹ See Amartya Sen, *On Ethics and Economics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

for an economist to make reference to Smith, what is special is that Sen is arguably the only economist who has not only taken the trouble of reading Smith, but also has a thorough understanding of his moral theory. This makes Sen's view particularly salient in the present framework. The key to understanding Sen's own view is his "capabilities approach." What Sen means by this is an approach that focuses on positive freedom. In his *Development as Freedom*,¹¹⁰ he argues that the removal of unfreedoms is constitutive of development, positing that the expansion of the real freedoms that people enjoy is both the primary end and the principal means of development. Focusing on human freedoms, Sen takes a broad view of development, in contrast with other views that only focus on the growth of gross national product. Instead of looking at merely some of the means to development, however important these are, he directs attention to the ends that make development important. Sen argues that his focus on the quality of life and substantive freedoms, rather than just on income or wealth, is in tune with the broader approach that was taken in professional economics right from the beginning, with Aristotle focusing on "flourishing" and "capability," and Smith on "necessities" and conditions of living. While contemporary economics has departed from this tradition, "[t]he capability perspective involves, to some extent, a return to an integrated approach to economic and social development championed particularly by Adam Smith (both in the *Wealth of Nations* and in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*)."¹¹¹

What does the integrated account entail in practical terms, when applied to globalization? For one thing, it entails a fundamental criticism of economic globalization, as it purports to add something that is sorely lacking. There are many critics of economic globalization. Among them are outsiders like Naomi Klein, who describes how the economy infiltrates cultural life,¹¹² and Noreena Hertz, who posits that the economy has taken over the state.¹¹³ However, there are also insiders like George Soros, who seeks to develop a counterweight to the financial system through the emergence of a global open society,¹¹⁴ and Joseph

¹¹⁰ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

¹¹² Naomi Klein, *No Logo* (New York: Picador, 2000).

¹¹³ Noreena Hertz, *The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 2001).

¹¹⁴ George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), Soros, *Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism* (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), and Soros, *On Globalization* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).

Stiglitz, who criticizes the IMF in particular. The latter's *Globalization and Its Discontents*¹¹⁵ is noteworthy, since it contains the fiercest criticism by someone who is a double insider, being a former chief economist of the World Bank, and the winner of the Nobel Prize in economics of 2001. In spite of all his IMF bashing, Stiglitz admits that it would be pointless to abolish the IMF, since government leaders want some international agency to be in charge in times of international financial crises: "Were the Fund to be abolished, it would most likely be recreated in some other form."¹¹⁶ So what is the problem?

The problem is not with globalization, but with how it has been managed. Part of the problem lies with the international economic institutions, with the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, which help set the rules of the game. They have done so in ways that, all too often, have served the interests of the more advanced industrialized countries—and particular interests within those countries—rather than those of the developing world.¹¹⁷

Stiglitz attacks the hypocrisy of Western countries that have forced poor countries to eliminate trade barriers, while keeping up their own barriers. He does not see the greatest challenge in the institutions but in mind-sets.

The discontent with globalization arises not just from economics seeming to be pushed over everything else, but because a particular view of economics—market fundamentalism—is pushed over all other views.¹¹⁸

What is meant here is the view that combines the Washington Consensus policies, and the notion that there is a single set of policies that is right (the "Golden Straitjacket"). While one may agree with Stiglitz that this particular view has to be revised, the real question is whether the minds of those to whom the international economic institutions are accountable (*i.e.*, central bankers, finance ministers, trade ministers) are ripe for it.

For another, the integrated account of globalization entails an understanding of what the invisible hand is actually doing, as it purports to add something that a cumulative account cannot see. The key notion here, it is recalled, is that whenever there is an economic force there must be a countervailing force in the cultural realm, and *vice versa*. It follows

¹¹⁵ Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-5.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 220-1.

from this that as long as there is market fundamentalism, there will be religious fundamentalism as well. Market fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism are intimately related. The two are like *Stofftrieb* and *Formtrieb* in Schillerian terms. This means three things. First, if religious fundamentalism or terrorism poses a problem, one may start a ‘war on terror’ that may seem successful at moments, when attacks have allegedly been annihilated, but in the end such a war is bound to be a failure, and even worse: counterproductive. It will only incite the *Formtrieb*, which will get stronger, and will find its outlets anyhow. Second, if market fundamentalism or dominance poses a problem to the rest of the world, the hegemonic powers may ignore this, but this goes at a price. The more one will give free reigns to the *Stofftrieb*, the more it will meet opposition. And even if the economic power can be backed by military power, as in the case of the United States, Joseph Nye makes it clear that if the United States only uses its hard power to look after its own narrow interests it will squander its considerable fund of “soft power”, which he defines as getting others to want what you want. By being powerful and arrogant, it will lose power; this is what he calls “the paradox of American power.”¹¹⁹ Third, if there are problems in terms of *Stofftrieb* and *Formtrieb*, then the solution must be the *Spieltrieb*, which is about relating the two. In fact, this is also what Nye suggests when he concludes his argument by positing that if it wants to continue to be number one, “America must not only maintain its hard power but understand its soft power and how to combine the two in the pursuit of national and global interests.”¹²⁰ However, Nye’s distinction between hard and soft power is not exactly the same as the one between the economy and culture, and the present theory can explain and predict more than Nye’s theory does.

In the final analysis, the present theory shows how the invisible hand falls together with gravity and *conatus*. This theory adds to the external dimensions also the internal ones, and I have already argued at the beginning of this section that these two sets of dimensions stand in a mirror relation to each other. There, I have also argued what this mirror relation actually means, and this is fully applicable here. In addition to that, there is still something else. After all, it could be argued that there is nothing new about internal dimensions, as we have used the distinction between inside and outside all through Part I of this book. However, it is

¹¹⁹ Joseph Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and for more on soft power see Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

¹²⁰ Nye (2002), p. 171.

recalled that the distinction between inside and outside was understood there in horizontal terms, whereas in Part II we are concerned with explaining how the distinction between inside and outside manifests itself in vertical terms. This turn from horizontal to vertical thinking involves some rethinking of IR concepts that are usually understood in horizontal terms only. The most fundamental change here is that Waltz' three 'images of international relations,'¹²¹ which correspond with his three levels of analysis (our concentric circles), could be interpreted in vertical terms as well. This means that there are three other images, which I will call the three 'images of power.' In concluding this Chapter, I will show what these images are, and, next, how they can help to explain and predict international affairs in the present age.

The first image of power, then, is associated with the Spinozist view and the seventh dimension. It is about the invisible hand, being the hand of God or Nature. This image one cannot really see, but if one were to view the Universe as being in rest or in permanent equilibrium, irrespective of what mankind does, one is close. This image shows a deterministic view of the world, where everything always falls together.

The second image of power is associated with the Faustian view and the sixth dimension. It is about balance of power. David Hume points out that the basic principle involved in the balancing of political power is as old as history,¹²² but the term 'balance of power' gained significance when it was first mentioned in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. In IR Theory it was Yale professor Nicholas Spykman, who elevated it to the level of an unchallenged truism, while also making the expression 'the struggle for power' a standard phrase in international discourse.¹²³ While balance of power is the game, Spykman describes the struggle for power as an obsession for predominance:

The truth is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used. Whatever the theory and the rationalization,

¹²¹ See Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, [1959] 2001).

¹²² David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power," in *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, [1741] 1987).

¹²³ Cf. Charles Edwards, *Hugo Grotius, The Miracle of Holland: A Study of Political and Legal Thought* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), pp. 172-3.

the practical objective is the constant improvement of the state's own relative power position. The balance desired is the one which neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice.¹²⁴

The doctrine of balance of power in IR received its classical statement in Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*.¹²⁵ He describes the various patterns and methods of the balance of power in horizontal terms. For the present all of this is relevant, as is all other literature on the subject, but it is understood and applied here in vertical terms. This turn will shed new light on the balance of power, and on the problems to be resolved in the post-Cold War era. Since powers manifest themselves now first and foremost in the vertical sense (with economics and cultural identity being at the core of conflicts), it amounts to a reassertion of this classic doctrine of IR, which is bound to be as powerful in the present age as the horizontal interpretation has proved to be all through history. The turn that is called for can be best apprehended by first seeing what kind of balance E.H. Carr was seeking in his *The Twenty Years' Crisis*:

All healthy human action, and therefore all healthy thought, must establish a balance between utopia and reality, between free will and determinism. The complete realist, unconditionally accepting the causal sequence of events, deprives himself of the possibility of changing reality. The complete utopian, by rejecting the causal sequence, deprives himself of the possibility of understanding either the reality which he is seeking to change or the processes by which it can be changed. The characteristic vice of the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility.¹²⁶

While Carr is concerned with the antithesis of utopia and reality, and of theory and practice, the present theory is with Mind and Body; culture and economics; religious fundamentalism and market fundamentalism. In each case, either of the two strives for predominance while balancing.

The third image of power is associated with the Schillerian view and the fifth dimension. It is about the "holder" of the balance, adding a third element. Morgenthau explains what is meant here:

¹²⁴ Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, [1942] 2007), pp. 21-2.

¹²⁵ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, sixth edition, revised by Kenneth Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., [1948] 1985).

¹²⁶ Edward Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, second edition (New York: Perennial, [1946] 2001), pp. 11-12.

The system may (...) consist of two scales plus a third element, the “holder” of the balance or the “balancer.” The balancer is not permanently identified with the policies of either nation or group of nations. Its only objective within the system is the maintenance of the balance, regardless of the concrete policies the balance will serve. In consequence, the holder of the balance will throw its weight at one time in this scale, at another time in the other scale, guided only by one consideration—the relative position of the scales. Thus it will put its weight always in the scale that seems to be higher than the other because it is lighter.¹²⁷

The classic example of the balancer is Great Britain, especially in view of its position and behaviour in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Waltz even posits that the notion of a balancer is more of a generalization from the British experience than a theoretical concept. He writes that “[b]alance-of-power theory cannot incorporate the role of balancer because the playing of the role depends on such narrowly defined and historically unlikely conditions.”¹²⁸ And this, indeed, is very true of the third image of power. It is not about theory, but about practice. It shows the statesman, who may “see” the invisible hand, and who may know that some balance of power is to be established, but who now has to decide what to do. In vertical terms, this means that he has to decide, every time again, what he should do within the political realm so as to hold the balance between opposing forces in respectively the economic and cultural realms.

The three images of power may help the statesman in deciding what to do in the political realm so as to hold the balance between powers in the economic and cultural realms. The first image tells him that whenever he sees only one power in either the economic or cultural realm, there must be another one as well in the other realm. A good example here is religious fundamentalism. In the West, people are concerned about religious fundamentalism, and they see religious terrorism as a great threat, which it certainly is. However, what they do not see is that it is intimately related with another extreme, *viz.* market fundamentalism, which poses a threat to the Rest. Both forms of fundamentalism go together as countervailing powers. As long as there is market fundamentalism, there shall be religious fundamentalism as well. If one wants to change the latter one has to effectuate a change in the former, and *vice versa*. That is, if one wants to fight religious

¹²⁷ Morgenthau (1985), pp. 213-4.

¹²⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), p. 164.

fundamentalism, one can only be successful in the long run by attacking market fundamentalism. To give just another example of a situation with extremes, there is the global problem of climate change. Even if one only sees this problem in its manifestation in the external world, which I called the “economic” realm but which includes all that belongs to the material or outside world really, one has to look for the countervailing power that is bound to manifest itself in the inside world. That is, if one wants to do something about climate change, one has to change people’s mindsets.¹²⁹ While it may seem counterintuitive to handle extremes this way, in fact it involves intuitive knowledge to see the other power and focus on it.

The second image, next, may help to explain how balancing works between economic and cultural powers. Here, the idea is that there is always a relation between the power of economic integration (being part of a larger whole) and the power of cultural disintegration (being whole in itself), while either has a tendency to dominate the other. The example of the two fundamentalisms shows how both powers can go to extremes. As long as there is no third party, there will be an “arms race” between the two (like we have seen in the Cold War, in horizontal terms), where at some point they will have to face the situation, and may decide to start a process of “disarmament.” That is to say, in each and every situation there may be a balance (as the first image shows), but one may wonder whether it is the right kind of balance.

The third image, then, may help to see how the statesman can hold the balance that is virtuous. This is about seeing that the statesman can attain fraternity in the economic realm by accommodating liberty in the cultural realm; and that he can attain liberty in the cultural realm by accommodating fraternity in the economic realm. This image shows that holding the balance involves two types of actions. Firstly, the statesman has to see to it that he can be the holder of two scales. That is, he has to see to it that there are three realms that are autonomous (reserving the third realm for himself). This is often not the case. Taking the example of fundamentalism, for instance, one realm annexes the other two. This does not only happen in extreme cases, though, as there are many states where legislation is in place that makes it impossible for civil society organizations to be founded, let alone to function freely. While government often sees these organizations as a threat, the third image

¹²⁹ In 2007 a United Nations panel declared that it had proven that human beings are responsible for climate change. This is a good example of how research along empirical lines leads to a conclusion that could already be predicted along the lines of the present theory.

shows that government would better empower them, since the whole state benefits from civic engagement, by itself, and vis-à-vis the IMF and World Bank, when trying to establish and maintain real “ownership” of its own course of development.¹³⁰ Secondly, the statesman has to see to it that he puts his weight in the right scale. If one is of the opinion that religious fundamentalism is the big problem, then the statesman should not focus on the cultural but on the economic realm. If one moves there from a situation of exploitation to a situation of brotherly relations with fair trade (and loans), the invisible hand will also move things in the cultural realm. While it may be hard to see how this is supposed to operate, it may be useful to recall Sen’s capabilities approach of development as freedom, which is about the reverse situation where one focuses on the cultural realm in order to affect development also in the economic realm. The idea is that in the case of extreme poverty one can boost development by expanding the freedoms that people enjoy. Here one could think, for instance, of opportunities for people of having access to food and shelter, in the first place, but also to education, which may enable them to develop themselves as well as the communities they are part (and constitutive) of.

In the foregoing I have focused on the challenges that we are facing at a time of globalization. I have also indicated how the statesman can face those challenges. However, if he wants to see how certain actions work out, or if he wants to see what globalization will bring us in terms of new challenges, one may look at the European Union. By this I do not mean to suggest that the European Union is necessarily an example to be followed, but it is the most advanced expression of the process of globalization.¹³¹ Arguably, the European Union is the best example of a community of law, which seeks economic integration

¹³⁰ As a matter of fact, the IMF and the World Bank have promoted “ownership” also themselves. The former institution, though, has been criticized for using this term as window-dressing. While in the past the IMF would more or less impose conditions on states that needed loans, the difference that “ownership” would make is that states still have to do what the IMF dictates, but now also have to say “Thank you, we understand why this is good for us, and we want this ourselves!” Anyhow, the real problem here is that one can never solve economic problems by only talking economics. In this respect, the World Bank has a better chance of being effective, since it is actively involved in mobilizing civil society forces in developing countries, as is testified, for instance, by a World Bank project promoting “enabling legal environments for civic engagement” in various countries worldwide in 2002. The idea here was that ownership only makes sense if civil society is engaged in decisions on development.

¹³¹ Cf. Castells (2000b), III, p. 348.

amongst its members, while struggling to also give a place to cultural identity. If one looks at how the process of “ever closer union” in Europe evolves, one can learn many lessons that are also relevant in the context of globalization. One of these is that one can see that with the European economies integrating more and more, the call for an own cultural identity on the (sub-)national level gets louder and louder. The European Union is only to survive as an entity if it is able to accommodate the cultural factor. Irrespective of whether one likes this or not, it is the invisible hand. As a matter of fact, the whole European project has been built on the invocation of the invisible hand. Seeking to establish peace in Europe, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman decided to focus on the integration of the economies first and foremost. Whereas culture now poses one of the biggest challenges in Europe, it would be wrong, though, to focus on it on the European level.¹³² Instead, the statesman should accommodate the call for an own identity on the (sub-)national level, while making space for civil society in the cultural realm, and keeping it clearly separate from the political realm.¹³³

To conclude, the statesman has a choice: He can either resist the *trias ethica*, or he can comply with it. It follows from the Iron Rule of Statecraft that if he resists it he will unleash powers against himself, and if he complies with it powers will work in his favour.

¹³² In 1982, at a meeting for European ministers of Culture in Naples, Jack Lang declared that if Jean Monnet were still alive he might have affirmed that if he had to do it all over again, he would have started perhaps with culture (“Si l’Europe était à refaire, il faudrait peut-être commencer par la Culture”). Ever since, this has been quoted as an apocryphal remark of Monnet’s himself, which it is not.

¹³³ While this brief discussion of the further evolution of the European Union focuses on the internal perspective, there is also the question of what role the European Union should play in the world. Jean Monnet had an eye for both perspectives. He saw all too well that by becoming a whole—or an “ever closer union”—Europe would also be able to play a part in the larger whole. While Monnet is known as a pragmatic man, who was always concerned with what was needed in practical terms in taking the next step in the European project, he may also be remembered as a visionary, who acted on the basis of ideas on this larger whole, which he expressed in discussions with close associates over the years, and only to some extent in his memoirs—for the latter, see Jean Monnet, *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976). Monnet’s “political theory” is little known, if at all. It is the topic of another publication, which I will co-author with Max Kohnstamm, who worked closely together with Monnet for 25 years before becoming Founding President of the European University Institute, in Florence.

Conclusion: On Statecraft

One world economy, so many cultures: how to accommodate both? That was the question I posed at the beginning of this book. I posed this particular question, since it underlies some of the biggest challenges international statecraft is facing. In answering this question, I ventured to shed light also on statecraft itself. I promised to offer a systemic theory that has both explanatory and predictive value. In this Conclusion, I seek to establish that the present theory has such value. I will first summarize the main line of argument of Parts I and II, and I will conclude by bringing the two Parts together. I will argue that the two Parts combined provide a general theory, which (i) is more parsimonious; (ii) has a broader range; and (iii) has a better explanatory fit than other IR theories.

Every conclusion depends on the starting-point one chooses as well as the method one follows. As is concerned the starting-point, this is not the point where the author starts writing, but it is the assumptions he uses in developing his argument the way he does. Thus, the line of argument that I have followed in the present theory does not start with the question into how to combine the economy and culture. It starts with the theoretical assumption on which the whole theory is built, *viz.* the Universal Rule. It reads as follows:

Every whole cannot exist but through its parts, and is again part of a larger whole, while every part is a whole in itself.

This theoretical assumption has the status of an axiom. It follows from this axiom that the theory is to take a balanced view, in that wholes and parts always go together. What is more, this axiom is objectively true. Even if the existence of objective truth is as controversial as the existence of God, I have argued that the Universal Rule is the modern statement of what is commonly referred to as ‘God’. God is infinite and eternal, and what is extraordinary about the Universal Rule is that it expresses both infinity and eternity, allowing for a point of view beyond time and space. Chapter 1 is about this God’s eye perspective beyond time and space.

In the present theory everything follows from the Universal Rule. As is concerned the method that is used, it is deduction. By using the method of deduction, I have developed a theory that is objectively true, of necessity. This theory has two Parts, where the first one is about the way the parts ought to act, and the second one is about what the structure of the whole is. The distinction between agency and structure is by no

means new; agency and structure are the two components that make up any social system, also the international system. However, the way they are associated with the parts and the whole, and are related to each other is new. In building my argument, I have taken seven steps. The first step is that, in Chapter 1, I formulated assumptions that are theoretical, not factual: the Universal Rule. Next, in Part I, I took the second, third, and fourth step. The second step is that I conceived of a bounded realm or domain. The third step is that I focused on law-like regularities within it. And the fourth step is that I developed a way of explaining the observed regularities. In Part II, I repeated the same three steps but now in relation to structure, making for the fifth, sixth, and seventh step. In summarizing my argument, I will briefly elaborate on each step.

After having taken the first step of formulating the Universal Rule, the second step is that I distinguished, in the Introduction to Part I, three agency levels: man, the state, and international society. The third step is about the so-called domestic analogy of states and persons, which has been the driving force behind the development of IR and international law since Grotius made it the core element of his systematic theory of international law. I established, also in the Introduction, that this domestic analogy can only make sense if it is to be understood as the analogy between agency units in their inter-unit relations across the levels of analysis identified in the second step. Being like units, all agents have to resolve the seeming contradiction created by the distinction between internal/external, which is inherent in the very constitution or declaration of a unit. This distinction is directly related with the Universal Rule and its distinction between parts and wholes: When looking inward the agent sees itself as a whole; when looking outward the agent sees itself as a part of a larger whole. In Chapter 2, I argued that most IR theories only look in one direction (either inside or outside), and I demonstrated that all of these theories are false in claiming that what they then see is all there is. The structure of a unit comports with it a logic that distinguishes but also combines inside and outside. State sovereignty has been defined as deciding oneself how one combines the two in coping with both internal and external problems. In that sense, sovereignty is just one expression, on the state level, of what is applicable on all three agency levels, and what is called (legal) personality.

The fourth step is that I made three distinctions. The first one follows from the second step and is about point of view; it is the distinction between micro and macro level. The second one follows from the third step and is about perspective; it is the distinction between inside

and outside. The third one is new and is about interpretation; it is the distinction between inside-out and outside-in. This last distinction is about in what direction the analogy works. Whereas in IR there is only talk about the domestic analogy, which works from micro to macro level, the present theory shows that the analogy also works the other way around, which is how for instance Socrates and Grotius used the analogy. Featuring these three distinctions, I posited that IR is no different from the rest of life: What you see depends on where you stand, on where you look, and on how you interpret that. When trying to understand IR, one may combine points of view, and see analogy (being like units); one may combine perspectives, and see paradox (being both part and whole); and one may combine interpretations, and see what it is to be embarked on what is called the Grotian Quest. Chapter 3 elaborates on this quest by making sense of analogy through facing paradox. I demonstrated in it that for the statesman there is only one way of doing that, and that is by following what I called the Golden Rule of Statecraft:

Respect and uphold human dignity as you would have international society respect and uphold state sovereignty.

The principle of reciprocity, which is given a particular meaning here, is enshrined in the Holy Scriptures of all world religions. This provides a check for the validity of the argument so far. After all, if the Universal Rule is a modern statement of what is commonly referred to as ‘God’, and if the Golden Rule of Statecraft follows from it, then it is logical that all world religions pay tribute to its core principle. Moreover, if religion is to play any role at all, no statesman can ever claim that religion prevents him from following the Golden Rule of Statecraft.

Part II repeats the same procedure, but applies it to the structure of the whole, which is the system-wide component. In the Introduction to Part II, I argued that this structure is best conceived by looking at individuality. The human being constitutes individuality, which is about being a whole, not a part (thereby countering the charge of reductionism). Constituting individuality, the human being combines the inner and outer world. That is, the inside/outside distinction gets another dimension here in that the mind is seen as giving access to the inner world, and the body as giving access to the outer world. Individuality, then, means that mind and body form one substance. Whereas Descartes split the two, Spinoza saw that the two are one and the same really. I posited that International Society and Constructivism are based on the “Cartesian error”, and that it

is only the Spinozist position that can correct for this error. I developed this argument in Part II. The fifth step is that I distinguished, in Chapter 4, three functional realms: culture, polity, and economy. These realms are connected with the tripartite distinction that follows from the Universal Rule, if applied to the question into Being. This question is about identity, not analogy, and one can think of exactly three identity relations: whole = whole; whole = part (being the same here as: part = whole); part = part. I demonstrated how each identity relation corresponds with one functional realm, where the whole is connected with looking inside, by using the mind, which is constitutive of the realm of culture; and where the part is connected with looking outside, by using the bodily senses, which is constitutive of the realm of the economy; and where the realm of the polity connects the two. I argued that one can look at these three identity relations again in three different ways, which could be viewed as three internal dimensions: either one says it is all about the same (being the Spinozist view), or one says it is all about the duality of wholes and parts (being what I called the Faustian view), or one says that all three are related, but are different (being what I called the Schillerian view).

The sixth step, then, expanded on the Schillerian view in that I established what respective incentive systems, or principles, are at work within the three functional realms, as identified in the fifth step. These incentive systems, or principles, again follow from the Universal Rule and its three dimensions. I explained how being a whole is constitutive of the principle of liberty, while being both whole and part is constitutive of the principle of equality, and being a part is constitutive of fraternity. The combination of realms and principles with three ‘institutional powers’ (that have their bases in the respective realms) makes for what I called the *trias ethica*:

Civil society, government, and business are autonomous within their respective realms of culture, the polity, and the economy, where the respective principles of liberty, equality and fraternity reign supreme.

This is the standard framework that the statesman can use. If he ignores it, and if politics mixes up either the realms or the principles governing these, state action is bound to fail.

The seventh step, finally, is that, in Chapter 5, I sought to explain why certain state actions work and other actions are bound to fail. To see this, one has to look through the Spinozist Lens. That is, one has to see how the three views, as distinguished in the sixth step, are interrelated,

and show one and the same thing really. In terms of the Universal Rule, it is about seeing the identity of wholes and parts. The Spinozist position is that it connects this identity relation with the doctrine of *conatus*, which is about the struggle for power in the state of nature. It says that each thing endeavours to persist in its own being; insofar as a thing exists, it has *conatus*. In terms of the Universal Rule, it could be taken to mean that every system seeks to preserve itself by continuously striving to establish a balance between its constituent parts and the whole. I argued that, in the present context, this implies that whenever there is an economic force there must be a countervailing force in the cultural realm, and *vice versa*. The polity, then, has to relate both forces, and accommodate them. Relating political power, or *conatus*, to the *trias ethica*, I arrived at what I called the Iron Rule of Statecraft:

The power, or virtue, of the state is commensurate with its ability to comply with the trias ethica.

There are three ways of interpreting the Iron Rule of Statecraft, since I established that there are three ‘images of power’, following from the three internal dimensions I distinguished. The first image of power shows the invisible hand, which operates in the Universe where everything is in rest or in permanent equilibrium. The second image of power is about balance of power (between economic and cultural powers), which has a certain dynamic to it where either side tries to dominate the other by a slight margin, thus going to extremes while re-establishing balances (for instance, between market fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism). The third image of power adds a third element: the “holder” of the balance. This image is about the statesman who has to hold the balance that is virtuous, while avoiding extremes. For finding this balance, the statesman has to comply with the *trias ethica*. It follows from the Iron Rule of Statecraft that if he resists this trias he will fight the state of nature, unleashing powers against himself, and if he complies with it powers will work in his favour.

Having outlined the argument in a systemic fashion, I could do the same in geometrical terms. Both Grotius and Spinoza used these terms in developing their respective arguments, and this theory seeks to apply this geometrical method, and update it so as to accommodate new findings in geometry. To use the geometrical method, is not to assert that life can be reduced to mathematics. However, the geometrical method is useful in detecting inconsistencies and other flaws in arguments that

otherwise may seem reasonable or correct. As a matter of fact, I have tried to demonstrate in geometrical order why the leading IR theories so far are false or only partly correct, and how the Great Debates in IR all focus on only one part of the whole picture. Following Euclidean geometry, like Grotius and Spinoza did, I distinguished three dimensions, which can be pictured as the three axes in a system of co-ordinates, and which can be called the x -, y -, and z -axes, intersecting each other at the centre in O (0,0,0). I argued that the First Great Debate, about views of human being, was about understanding O, without taking any interest in the axes that could be used for explaining IR. It confined itself to what I called a logic of points. The Second Great Debate, about methodology, was about two lines of thought—reasoning bottom-up or top-down,—which made for the distinction between understanding and explaining IR. It was unable to combine the two lines in one circle, and confined itself to what I called a logic of lines (being the first dimension in Euclidean geometry: one axis). The Third Great Debate, about the expansion of the research agenda, including economic and social issues, and the Fourth Great Debate, about various alternative approaches opposing the established traditions, resorted to what I called a logic of circles (using two axes). Following the logic of circles, one can only draw a circle by using two compass-legs, with one standing in the centre. The problem with the Third Great Debate was that it acknowledges that there is more than circles, without drawing any circles; while the Fourth Great Debate is about drawing a circle and moving in it, without acknowledging, though, that in so doing one presupposes a centre.

Applying the geometrical method, I sought to establish that all IR theories so far can be understood or explained by using a logic of points, of lines, or of circles, and that in Euclidean geometry one only needs two axes for depicting these forms of logic. I also sought to establish two other things. First, in the second half of Chapter 3, I argued that *some* IR theories are false, as they either confuse the various forms of logic or are inconsistent in using one. More specifically, I established that the most influential exponent of the Fourth Great Debate, Wendt's version of Constructivism, is inconsistent, as it uses a logic of circles, without attributing any meaning to the centre. I argued that International Society confuses the logics of circles and of lines; both Wight and Jackson think they use a logic of circles, whereas they do not recognize the centre, and in fact follow a logic of lines. Second, in the Introduction of Part II, I sought to establish that *all* IR theories are flawed in following a logic that can be understood or explained by making use of two axes only. If IR

theories seek to have any bearing to the real world, they have to follow the logic of the real world. This logic has no less than three axes, when following Euclidean geometry. Thus, I argued that the two IR theories I singled out in Chapter 1, International Society and Constructivism, are in the end not only flawed if assessed on their own terms, but also in real terms. After all, both theories maintain that two dimensions suffice, whereas in fact they both assume another dimension, which they cannot give a place in their own theories. This third dimension is the z -axis. While Part I, then, is about making the best of theorizing in horizontal terms, using the x - and y -axes, Part II demonstrates that one cannot do without the z -axis, which makes for what I called a logic of spheres (using all three dimensions of Euclidean geometry).

If the geometrical argument so far is abstract, which by definition it is, it may be useful to relate it to the human being. This is appropriate, as the vertical axis goes through the centre of the circles that we already drew, where the centre is about the structure of Being. We can best find this structure by focusing on our own human being, since this allows one to be thinking about thinking, so that subject and object coincide. If this is our Archimedean point for finding an objective structure of the world, one can give concrete meaning to the three axes we mentioned before. In this particular context I argued that understanding the human condition helps to explain the world's predicament. In the present theory, then, I arrived at a view of human being, which follows from the logic of spheres. I demonstrated that, on this view, the x -axis stands for the Self; the y -axis for the Other; and that the z -axis makes for two poles, where the one is the Mind and the other the Body. It follows from this that the Self/Other dichotomy makes for dualism (two axes), and that the Mind/Body dichotomy makes for duality (one axis and two poles). Whereas each of these dichotomies is not new, the combination of the two makes for a completely new view of human being. By using geometrical terms, I demonstrated why other views of human being must be wrong, including, most notably, Arendt's account of the human condition. I also demonstrated why IR theories are wrong when assuming that Mind and Body constitute dualism, instead of duality. International Society and Constructivism are both based on this flaw, by adhering to a Cartesian view of human being. The main point of Part II is to show what implications it has for IR, if one is to amend for the Cartesian error, by resorting to the Spinozist view. Spinoza demonstrated in geometrical order that Mind and Body are two attributes that make for one substance. The present theory expands this argument.

Updating the geometrical method that Spinoza most famously used, I took the next step by moving from three to four dimensions. After all, while Spinoza used Euclidean geometry with three dimensions, since Minkowski and Einstein we also have non-Euclidean geometry, which is about a fourth dimension, being Time. In non-Euclidean geometry Space and Time form a continuum in spacetime, and the present theory updates Spinoza to that effect. I demonstrated that this means that there are not two but three attributes: Mind, Matter, and Motion (with the last one accounting for spacetime). Motion is also part of the logic of spheres; it is not a separate axis, but it is about moving in circles on the surface of the sphere, while God, or the “T”, or Rest are at the centre. For one thing, I argued that it accounts for the movement in the circle that connects Self and Other, which I described in Part I. For another, I argued that it accounts for the quantum jumps in Quantum Theory, where at one point one sees parts (a particle) and at another one sees wholes (waves). Motion can be understood in Space by the attribute of Matter (or Extension), and by the attribute of Mind (Thought) in terms of Time, so that Motion unites two different conceptions of the same thing “now under the attribute of Thought and now under the attribute of Extension.” This inference makes sense, since in the Spinozist view Arts (inside) and Sciences (outside) are not separated. This leads to the last step in the geometrical argument. If Motion is the connecting tissue that accounts for spacetime, I argued that Motion can be seen as a mirror, where one has as many internal dimensions as there are external ones. In IR, I argued, it follows from this that there are not only three so-called images of international relations (external), but also what I called three images of power (internal), making for $(3 + 1 + 3)$ dimensions in total.

Having summarized the main line of argument of Parts I and II first in systemic terms, and next in geometrical order, I now conclude by bringing the two Parts together. Taking Parts I and II together, I posited at the end of Chapter 1, one is left with a scheme that can explain how several dichotomies are to be understood. There, I already mentioned those between agency and structure; voluntarism and determinism; and ‘ought’ and ‘is’. I posited that these dichotomies all boil down to the most basic one between whole and part, which makes for freedom and human bondage. Here, I could add personality and individuality; Self/Other and Mind/Body; dualism and duality; analogy/paradox and identity/power; logics of points, lines and circles and logic of spheres; circles and centre; horizontal and vertical. When combining some of these notions, one could say that Part I is about the interplay between Self and Other, where

agency units were understood in terms of personality, and Part II about the structure of the human being, conceived as a whole, with Mind and Body constituting individuality. The difference, then, between expressing the dichotomy in Chapter 1, and next in Parts I and II, is that Chapter 1 is about the world beyond time and space, taking the God's eye-view, whereas Parts I and II are situated in spacetime. If we are to characterize, now, the dichotomy in terms of two archetypes that are pertinent to the world of statecraft, then these can be said to be the nature of the state and the state of nature. However, if we are to figure how the two are related, then we only have to recall the dichotomy that we found on the highest (or deepest) level that we discussed in Chapter 1: they are related like parts and whole.

The crux of the present theory is that the nature of the state and the state of nature are two sides of the same coin. They are inseparable really. I argued that, of necessity, all social contract philosophers, who maintain that the state of nature disappears as soon as the state is established, are fundamentally wrong in this respect. The state of nature is always there, under the layer of veneer that civil society is. The very fact that political philosophy has not recognized this yet, explains why it has been unable so far to account for the workings of international society that in some cases seems to work, and in other cases not. If one thinks one can explain this by making reference to state sovereignty only, one misses the point. While it is very important, indeed, to understand the nature of the state, as well as the changing nature of state sovereignty, it is only half the story. The other half is that irrespective of how states relate to each other in legal or political terms, there are powers at work that are driven either culturally or economically. I argued that the cultural and economic powers are intimately related, and are governed by an invisible hand. I also argued that it is appropriate to use the term this way, as I established that Adam Smith is not the guru of self-interest that he is purported to be, but a moral philosopher who combined ethics and economics. To combine, then, the two halves I mentioned, is to combine dualism and duality. And to combine dualism (two) and duality (one), is to constitute a trias (three). That is why the crux of the present theory can be found in the *trias ethica* that I presented.

In the present theory heuristic plays a central role. It follows from the update of Spinoza's *Ethics* that there be three attributes, including Motion. I demonstrated that Motion is to be understood in spacetime, and that everything in space and time is linked in Spinozist thinking with a distinct type of knowledge: imagination. Whereas Spinoza did not value

this type of knowledge as much as the other two he distinguished— inference and intuition,—the inclusion of Motion in spacetime amounts to a promotion of imagination. It is no coincidence, then, that Einstein himself not only introduced spacetime, but also stressed the importance of imagination. Imagination is key in heuristic, and heuristic is used in many fields, including mathematics and economics. In the present theory, heuristics have an important role in analysing the mental operations that are typically useful in the process of solving international problems. In Part I, the domestic analogy is one such heuristic. This analogy was also held to be applicable in the reverse direction, from macro to micro. While Socrates and Grotius used the analogy this way, nobody has used it so far in IR. In Part II, the invisible hand, as it was originally conceived, is another example of a heuristic. While Adam Smith used it the way I described above, nobody has used it that way in IR. Thus, Part I was about learning to see the shadowland, as Falk puts it, which requires keen vision; and Part II was about looking in the mirror, which requires insight into identity relations. When taking the two Parts together, a useful heuristic may be that whenever one is used to apply a certain principle in horizontal terms, one also tries to imagine what the findings could mean in vertical terms, and *vice versa*. An example here is the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. While this principle is usually understood in horizontal terms only, I argued that it is applicable in vertical terms as well, when the statesman is to reckon if he should intervene in the realm of the economy, and the realm of culture respectively.

In the present theory Arts and Sciences are reunited. Following the geometrical method, I demonstrated that in the logic of spheres one can find in the centre the 'I', God, and OR (as physicists call objective reality) at the same time. While Einstein already made the equation between God and OR, referring to Spinoza's *Amor Dei Intellectualis*, the present theory builds on that foundation. The implications of this go far beyond IR as a discipline. For one thing, it means that one has acquired the most powerful heuristic so far, *viz.* that one can use the findings in the fields of enquiry into the human being, God, and Nature respectively, for solving problems in either of the two other fields. Thus, the present theory makes use of the latest developments in the Sciences so as to see what implications these have for the Arts. This leads to the update of Spinoza's theory to the effect of my introducing a third attribute, next to the two existing ones, which accommodates spacetime in non-Euclidean geometry. While this addition has a great impact on further theorizing, the procedure itself, though, of looking at the Sciences for advice for the

Arts, is a trusted device. Arguably, the biggest claim this theory makes is that it follows from it that one can also look at the Arts for advice for the Sciences. Stephen Hawking, and others, have suggested that a Theory of Everything may be found in physics, if it can be founded in philosophy. This theory seeks to provide a contribution in this regard. By enquiring into the world of the 'I' one has a heuristic for the enquiry into the physical world. I formulated this heuristic as follows: What gravity is to Einstein, *conatus* is to Spinoza. Thus, I demonstrated (in the world of the 'I') that, of necessity, there have to be either seven or 12 dimensions, depending on the position one takes. If one believes in a balance between Mind and Matter, or theory and experiment, there are seven dimensions. I argued that it is Quantum Field Theory that has to find the three 'missing' (internal) dimensions, and only if it is able to find these I would concur with Roger Penrose that the completion of Quantum Field Theory will represent an even greater achievement than Einstein's general theory of relativity. Alternatively, if one believes in a balance between Being and Non-Being, which can only be found in theory, there are 12 dimensions. I argued that string theory, being set now on 11 dimensions, can only claim to have found the Theory of Everything if it is able to include the 'missing' dimension. Of course, this also holds the other way around. If it were established beyond doubt that Quantum Field Theory does *not* need seven dimensions for finding quantum-gravity union, and that string theory does *not* need 12 dimensions for arriving at a Theory of Everything, then the present theory is false. Thus, it is the connection with the Sciences that makes this theory falsifiable.

In the final analysis, the present theory is a *general* theory. It is a general theory that is applied to IR, but could be applied to other fields as well. Comparing this general theory to IR theories, I submit that it is more parsimonious. It formulates one Universal Rule, and everything else follows from it deductively. Next, I submit that it has a broader range. This follows from it being a general theory. And finally, I submit that it has a better explanatory fit. It agrees with Martin Hollis and Steve Smith that there are always two stories to tell, but it takes this in a completely new way, which makes it possible to see these stories as two Parts of one Whole. In combining Grotian thinking and Spinozist thought, this general theory offers a standard framework that can be helpful in both understanding and explaining international relations as well as in seeing the invisible hand.

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Trias Ethica: De Regels van Staatsmanskunst

Eén wereldeconomie, zo vele culturen: hoe kan aan beide recht worden gedaan? Dat is de centrale probleemstelling van dit boek. Deze probleemstelling ligt ten grondslag aan enkele van de grootste uitdagingen waarvoor staatslieden zich nu gesteld zien. Door de vraag te beantwoorden, die in deze probleemstelling besloten ligt, is het mogelijk om ook licht te werpen op de vraag welke de vereisten zijn van goede staatsmanskunst. Staatsmanskunst—of de kunst die de man of vrouw aan het hoofd van de staat zich eigen dient te maken—is daarmee het centrale thema van dit boek. Dit thema is geplaatst in de context van de verschillende theorieën die zijn ontwikkeld in het vakgebied van de internationale betrekkingen. Aangezien internationale betrekkingen niet in isolatie bestaan, en het vakgebied dus evenmin, is het thema ook in een bredere context gezet met invalshoeken vanuit de politieke theorieën, de filosofie, de theologie, maar ook zeer nadrukkelijk de geometrie en theoretische natuurkunde. Terwijl in het vakgebied van de internationale betrekkingen wordt aangenomen dat een algemene theorie ondenkbaar is, luidt de stelling van dit boek dat een dergelijke theorie weldegelijk denkbaar is als men in staat is de genoemde invalshoeken te combineren.

Dit boek biedt een theorie aan, die zowel verklarende als voorspellende waarde heeft. Het bestaat uit twee delen, die tezamen—zo luidt de claim—een algemene theorie constitueren, die (i) eleganter, want eenvoudiger is; (ii) een groter toepassingsbereik heeft; en (iii) betere verklaringswaarde heeft dan andere theorieën in internationale betrekkingen. Het lijkt geen twijfel dat deze redelijk forse claim zware eisen aan de bewijsvoering stelt.

Voor de bewijsvoering maakt dit boek gebruik van de meest zuivere methode die de wetenschap te bieden heeft: de geometrische methode. Bij andere bewijsmethoden ligt de conclusie mede besloten in de aannamen die per definitie impliciet zijn en buiten de bewijsvoering vallen. Vaak wordt bijvoorbeeld onbewust een mensbeeld gehanteerd dat volstrekt arbitrair is. De geometrische methode daarentegen kiest zijn vertrekpunt in axiomata, die expliciet zijn, waaruit elke verdere stap volgt langs een lijn van deductie. De keuze in deze methode voor rationaliteit kan ook expliciet een plaats krijgen, evenals een eventueel gewenste aanvulling vanuit het empirisme. De argumentatielijnen in dit boek begint met één enkel axioma, waaruit al het andere volgt. Deze samenvatting volgt de argumentatielijnen stap voor stap.

Het argument ontvouwt zich in zeven stappen. De eerste stap is de formulering van het axioma, waarop alles is gebaseerd: de zogenoemde Universele Regel. Van deze Regel hangt veel af, want als deze niet juist is, dan kan men letterlijk stoppen met verderlezen. Daarom kiest dit boek zijn vertrekpunt in een Regel, die evident juist en ook allesomvattend is. De Universele Regel luidt:

Ieder geheel bestaat in zijn delen en is zelf weer deel van een groter geheel, terwijl ieder deel ook een geheel op zich is.

De Universele Regel is een uitdrukking van eeuwigheid en oneindigheid. Het is de enig denkbare uitdrukking van datgene dat buiten tijd en ruimte staat. Gelovigen noemen dit achterliggende concept 'God'; natuurkundigen noemen het de 'Theorie van Alles'. Zoals het onmogelijk is om het bestaan van God te bewijzen, of een Theorie van Alles, zo is het ook met de Universele Regel. Deze is in en voor zich waar en is niet te falsificeren. In die zin onttrekt hij zich aan het wetenschappelijke discours. Echter, deze Regel kan daarbinnen betekenisvol, want falsificeerbaar, worden als ervan wordt gededuceerd in tijd en ruimte.

De Delen I en II zijn gesitueerd in tijd en ruimte. Deel I houdt zich bezig met handeling en Deel II met structuur. Deze onderverdeling volgt het klassieke onderscheid tussen beide in systeemtheorieën in de sociale wetenschappen. Dit boek geeft specifieke betekenis aan dit onderscheid, waarbij het eerste gaat over dat wat zich na elkaar voltrekt als handeling in de tijd; en het tweede over dat wat naast elkaar (tegelijktijd) plaatsheeft in ruimte. In de conclusie komt het er dan op aan om de beide Delen met elkaar in verband te brengen en deze ook werkelijk te zien als twee delen van één geheel. Anders dan de Universele Regel in Hoofdstuk 1, moet dit geheel (dat tegelijk ook deel is van een groter geheel en zelf uit delen bestaat) echter niet worden begrepen als een godsbegrip, maar als geplaatst in tijd en ruimte, waarbij beide echt samenvallen in wat natuurkundigen noemen 'ruimetijd'.

Nadat de eerste stap is gezet in Hoofdstuk 1, waarin een nieuw godsbegrip is gedefinieerd als axioma, volgen drie verdere stappen in Deel I met betrekking tot handeling, die alledrie opnieuw worden gezet in Deel II met betrekking tot structuur. Het gaat er in beide gevallen om eerst bepaalde domeinen te omschrijven, vervolgens daarbinnen regelmatigheden of zelfs wetmatigheden te herkennen en tenslotte deze regelmatigheden of wetmatigheden te verklaren. Nu volgen dan eerst de drie stappen die in Deel I worden gezet.

De tweede stap is de omschrijving van verschillende domeinen, die ten aanzien van agentschap kunnen worden onderscheiden. Deze domeinen zijn de drie analyseniveaus die worden gehanteerd in theorieën van internationale betrekkingen: personen, staten en het internationale systeem. Terwijl dit klassieke onderscheid nooit is gebaseerd op de Universele Regel, dient op de drie concrete domeinen welzeker de Universele Regel te worden toegepast, die daarmee ook meteen concrete betekenis krijgt. Het gaat erom die betekenis nader te concretiseren langs deductieve weg, in de volgende stappen.

De derde stap is de herkenning van regelmatigheden of zelfs wetmatigheden binnen de hierboven genoemde domeinen van personen, staten en het internationale systeem. Vaak is in het verleden reeds getracht een regelmatigheid aan te tonen die is gestoeld op een analogie, waarbij de relatie van staten tot het internationale systeem analoog zou zijn aan die van personen tot de staat. Hugo Grotius heeft met name een grote bijdrage geleverd aan de uitwerking van deze analogie, die aan de basis ligt van het door hem ontwikkelde volkenrecht. Deze analogie is ook echter vaak weersproken en zeker binnen het vakgebied van de internationale betrekkingen. De enige wijze waarop de analogie klopt, zo luidt de redenering in dit boek, is deze te zien als een analogie tussen eenheden van handeling. Ongeacht of het gaat om een persoon of een staat, voorzover het eenheden van handeling zijn, zijn ze vergelijkbaar. Elk heeft de tegenstelling in zich op te lossen van zowel een binnen- en een buitenkant te hebben. Naar binnen kijkend is de eenheid een geheel; naar buiten kijkend is de eenheid een deel. Zo is het onderscheid binnen/buiten, dat inherent is aan de constitutie van een eenheid, nauw verbonden met het onderscheid deel/geheel en daarmee met de Universele Regel. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien hoe sommige invloedrijke theorieën van internationale betrekkingen uitsluitend naar binnen kijken en het geheel zien (Kantiaans perspectief) en andere uitsluitend naar buiten kijken en losse delen zien (Hobbesiaans perspectief). Beide perspectieven bieden uiteindelijk geen uitzicht op een voldragen theorie. Het volgt uit de Universele Regel dat alleen die benadering perspectief biedt, die een eenheid van handeling begrijpt als zowel deel als geheel (Grotiaans perspectief).

De vierde stap is de verklaring van de genoemde regelmatigheden. Deze verklaring is te geven met behulp van drie onderscheiden. Het eerste onderscheid gaat over gezichtspunten en ligt besloten in de tweede stap: het onderscheid tussen micro- en macro-niveau. Afhankelijk van waar men staat, is de staat micro- of macro-niveau in de analogie tussen

twee analyseniveaus. Het tweede onderscheid gaat over perspectieven en ligt besloten in de derde stap: het onderscheid tussen binnen en buiten. Het derde onderscheid is nieuw en gaat over interpretatie. Dit is het onderscheid tussen binnenste-buiten en buitenste-binnen. Deze laatste twee maken het verschil van in welke richting de analogie werkt. Terwijl in het vakgebied van internationale betrekkingen alleen sprake is van een analogie die eventueel van micro- naar macro-niveau werkt, toont de huidige theorie aan dat deze niet alleen zeker werkt op de omschreven wijze, maar ook van macro- naar micro-niveau. Kortom: als men wil weten hoe men op micro-niveau moet handelen, dan zoek men naar de analoge situatie op macro-niveau, waar het antwoord wellicht gemakkelijker te vinden is. Op die manier gebruikte Socrates de analogie, en Grotius soms ook. Sindsdien is de buitenste-binnen-variant in onbruik geraakt. Deze theorie maakt voor het eerst weer gebruik hiervan.

Met de genoemde drie onderscheiden kan worden gesteld dat het in de internationale betrekkingen er niet anders aan toegaat dan in de rest van het leven: Wat je ziet, hangt af van waar je staat, welke kant je opkijkt en hoe je interpreteert wat in je blikveld ligt. Wanneer je probeert internationale betrekkingen te begrijpen, kun je verschillende gezichtspunten of posities combineren en een analogie zien (door twee eenheden te vergelijken); kun je verschillende perspectieven combineren en een paradox zien (door deel en geheel te zijn); en kun je verschillende interpretaties combineren en zien wat het is om op zoek te zijn, wat in dit verband wel is genoemd de Grotiaanse queeste. Hoofdstuk 3 werkt deze queeste nader uit door de zoektocht te omschrijven als het betekenis geven aan analogie door paradox niet uit de weg te gaan. Dit boek zet uiteen dat er maar één manier is voor een staatsman om dat te doen en dat is de zogenoemde Gulden Regel van Staatsmanskunst te volgen. Deze Gulden Regel van Staatsmanskunst luidt:

Huldig menselijke waardigheid, gelijk U ook wilt dat de internationale gemeenschap staatssoevereiniteit huldigt.

Het reciprociteitsprincipe, dat is neergelegd in de Heilige Schriften van alle wereldreligies, krijgt hier een specifieke betekenis. Staatssoevereiniteit kan worden gedefinieerd als het voorrecht zelf te besluiten hoe om te gaan met zowel interne als externe problemen. Soevereiniteit is in die betekenis slechts een uitdrukking op het niveau van de staat van datgene wat op alledrie de analyseniveaus toepasselijk is: (rechts)persoonlijkheid. De Gulden Regel ziet reciprociteit op basis van persoonlijkheid.

Deel II is een herhaling van zetten, nu echter met betrekking tot structuur. Structuur is de systeem-wijde component van een theorie en kan het best worden benaderd door niet naar de (rechts)persoonlijkheid te kijken van eenheden van handeling, maar naar de eenheid van Zijn: individualiteit. De mens constitueert het individu, hetgeen erin bestaat geheel te zijn. De mens combineert als individu een innerlijk en een uiterlijk leven, wat weer een nieuwe dimensie geeft aan het eerdere onderscheid van binnen/buiten. De geest geeft toegang tot het innerlijk leven en het lichaam tot het uiterlijk leven. Individualiteit betekent zo dat geest en lichaam één substantie vormen.

De vijfde stap is erop gericht verschillende domeinen te onderscheiden als het gaat om structuur. Kijkend naar de structuur van het individu onderscheidt Hoofdstuk 4 drie functionele domeinen: het geestelijk leven (waar cultuur toe behoort), het rechtsleven (waar politiek toe behoort) en het economische leven. Deze domeinen zijn verbonden met het tripartite onderscheid dat volgt uit de Universele Regel, zoals toegepast op de vraag naar het Zijn. Die vraag gaat over identiteit, niet analogie, en er zijn precies drie manieren om over identiteit na te denken: geheel = geheel; geheel = deel (wat hier hetzelfde is als deel = geheel); deel = deel. Elk van deze identiteitsrelaties correspondeert met een functioneel domein, waar het geheel verbonden is met naar binnen kijken, door gebruik te maken van de geest, die constitutief is voor het domein van het geestelijke leven; het deel verbonden is met naar buiten kijken, door gebruik te maken van de zintuigen van het lichaam, dat constitutief is voor het domein van het economische leven; en het domein van het rechtsleven de twee eerdere domeinen verbindt (in de identiteitsrelatie: geheel = deel). Deze laatste identiteitsrelatie is constitutief voor zowel menselijke waardigheid als staatssoevereiniteit, die erin bestaan respectievelijk de mens en de staat als zowel deel als geheel te zien. Er zijn wederom drie manieren om tegen de drie identiteitsrelaties aan te kijken. Volgens de eerste gaat het allemaal om één en hetzelfde (te weten identiteit); volgens de tweede om dualiteit (te weten de twee dingen die aan beide kanten van het gelijkheidsteken staan); en volgens de derde om drie verschillende dingen (te weten drie verschillende relaties). Deze drie benaderingswijzen, of interne dimensies, heten in dit boek respectievelijk Spinozistisch, Faustiaans en Schilleriaans.

De zesde stap is de herkenning van regelmatigheden of zelfs wetmatigheden binnen de bovengenoemde, functionele domeinen van het geestelijke, het politieke en het economische leven. Het is daarmee een uitwerking van de Schilleriaanse dimensie, volgens welke de drie

domeinen verschillend zijn. In alle drie de domeinen zijn verschillende principes werkzaam. Deze principes volgen wederom uit de Universele Regel. Het geestelijke leven, om te beginnen, was het domein van het geheel. Het principe nu dat zijn grondslag vindt in het geheel, is vrijheid. Iets of iemand is namelijk alleen vrij voorzover het begrepen kan worden als geheel op zich. Voorzover het deel is van een groter geheel, heeft het te gehoorzamen aan de regels en wetten van dat grotere geheel en is het afhankelijk. Kortom, het geheel is constitutief voor het principe van vrijheid. Het economische leven, vervolgens, was verbonden met het domein van de delen. Hier is het dus zo dat afhankelijkheid centraalstaat. Toegepast op de mensenwereld gaat het om het gegeven niet alleen op de wereld te zijn, maar aangewezen te zijn op medemensen en natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Het principe dat deze afhankelijkheid van datgene wat buiten jezelf ligt tot uitdrukking brengt, is broederschap. Kortom, het deel is constitutief voor het principe van broederschap. Tenslotte was het rechts- of politieke leven het domein van deel en geheel gecombineerd. Voorzover iets of iemand zowel deel als geheel is, is het gelijk aan ieder ander ding of mens. Dit volgt nog het meest direct uit de Universele Regel. Kortom, de combinatie van deel en geheel is constitutief voor het principe van gelijkheid. Resumerend, heerst het principe van vrijheid in het geestelijke leven, het principe van gelijkheid in het rechts- en politieke leven en het principe van broederschap in het economische leven. Dit volgt uit de Universele Regel.

De combinatie van domeinen en principes met ook institutionele sectoren, die de beschreven regelmatigheden voorzien van een concrete basis, leidt tot wat in dit boek wordt benoemd als *trias ethica*. Deze luidt:

De samenleving, de politiek en het bedrijfsleven zijn autonoom binnen de respectievelijke domeinen van het geestelijke leven, het rechts- en politieke leven en het economische leven, waar de respectievelijke principes van vrijheid, gelijkheid en broederschap heersen.

De *trias ethica* komt niet in de plaats van Montesquieu's *trias politica*, want die blijft uiteraard van onverminderde betekenis. Beide vullen elkaar aan, waarbij de *trias politica* het rechts- en politieke leven als geheel op zich ziet en de *trias ethica* deze ziet als deel van een groter geheel. Voor het overige verschillen beide trias-leren fundamenteel van elkaar. Evenzo is de *trias ethica* zowel gerelateerd aan als fundamenteel verschillend van Plato's trias-leer. Het belang van de *trias ethica* is gelegen in de verklarende werking die deze heeft voor de wereld waarin wij nu leven. Daarbij is het

van belang te erkennen dat deze nieuwe trias-leer niet ziet op wat behoort te zijn (zoals het geval is bij de Gulden Regel van Staatsmanskunst), maar op wat is (evenals het geval is bij de IJzeren Regel van Staatsmanskunst, zoals straks blijkt). De staatsman kan de *trias ethica* gebruiken als standaard raamwerk. Als hij of zij dit raamwerk veronachtzaamt, ofwel de domeinen of principes verwart, dan is zijn of haar optreden vroeg of laat gedoemd te mislukken.

De zevende stap, tenslotte, is de verklaring van de genoemde wetmatigheid, dat het ene overheidsoptreden kans van slagen heeft en het andere gedoemd is te mislukken. Hoofdstuk 5 tracht deze verklaring te geven—niet alleen onder verwijzing naar de Universele Regel, maar ook met behulp van de eerder genoemde, Spinozistische benaderingswijze, volgens welke alles behoort tot één substantie. Terwijl Spinoza zelf zich toelegde tot de betekenis hiervan voor de mens als individu, geeft de huidige theorie aan wat dit betekent voor internationale betrekkingen. Hiervoor is het in het geheel niet nodig om te speculeren. Immers, als Spinoza het heeft over de eenheid van lichaam en geest, dan spreekt het voor zich dat de domeinen die in lichaam en geest hun bestaansgrond vinden zich identiek verhouden. Kortom, het economische (of ruimer verwoord: het materiële) en geestelijke leven vormen een eenheid. Overal waar je het ene ziet, daar is ook het andere tegelijk aanwezig. Dit betekent concreet dat marktfundamentalisme en religieus fundamentalisme, om dit actuele voorbeeld te nemen, altijd samengaan. Immers, steeds wanneer een economische kracht zich manifesteert, is er ook een tegenkracht in het geestelijke leven (en *vice versa*), hetgeen niets anders is dan een manifestatie van het evenwicht tussen lichaam en geest en hun beider domeinen. Bij Spinoza vindt deze wetmatigheid haar beslag in zijn conceptie van *conatus*, die ziet op het vermogen van ieder ding om voort te bestaan. Dit vermogen, of deze macht, speelt in de huidige context binnen het domein van het rechts- en politieke leven, dat de beide andere domeinen moet verbinden en in evenwicht moet houden door ze gelijkkelijk te accommoderen. Deze theorie legt op eigen gezag een verband tussen *conatus* en *trias ethica*, wanneer zij komt tot de IJzeren Regel van Staatsmanskunst:

De macht, of deugdzaamheid, van de staat is evenredig aan zijn vermogen te handelen volgens de trias ethica.

De IJzeren Regel van Staatsmanskunst is in feite een regel van politieke overlevingskunst. Deze komt naast de Gulden Regel.

Er zijn drie manieren om de IJzeren Regel van Staatsmanskunst te interpreteren, die leiden tot drie verschillende beelden. Deze sluiten aan op de drie interne dimensies die werden onderscheiden in de vijfde stap. Zo zijn er dan naast de ‘drie beelden van internationale betrekkingen,’ die klassiek worden onderscheiden in het vakgebied en kunnen worden waargenomen in de drie externe dimensies van ruimte, ook ‘drie beelden van macht,’ zoals ze in dit boek worden genoemd. Het eerste beeld van macht toont de ‘onzichtbare hand,’ die zich manifesteert in het Universum waar alles in rust is of in permanent evenwicht. Het tweede beeld van macht toont machsevenwicht tussen economische en culturele krachten, die zich manifesteert in een zekere dynamiek tussen beide waar de ene probeert de andere te overheersen met een kleine marge en die aldus tot extremen gaan, terwijl ze in steeds extremere mate nieuwe balansen herstellen (bijvoorbeeld zoals bij marktfundamentalisme en religieus fundamentalisme). Het derde beeld van macht voegt een nieuw element hieraan toe: de ‘houder’ van het evenwicht. Dit beeld gaat over de staatsman die het evenwicht moet houden dat deugdzaam is en niet vervalt tot extremen. Om dit evenwicht te vinden, moet de staatsman voldoen aan de vereisten van de *trias ethica*. Het volgt uit de IJzeren Regel van Staatsmanskunst dat als hij of zij indruist tegen deze vereisten, de staatsman krachten tegen zichzelf uitlokt en moet vechten tegen de natuurtoestand. Wanneer de staatsman echter aan de vereisten voldoet, werken deze krachten juist in zijn of haar voordeel.

De conclusie brengt de Delen I en II bij elkaar. Dit leidt tot een geheel, dat anders dient te worden begrepen dan het godsbegrip van Hoofdstuk 1. De Delen I en II waren gesitueerd in tijd en ruimte en het is ook nu zaak om de conclusie te trekken in diezelfde tijd en ruimte, of beter gezegd in de heuse combinatie van beide: ruimtetijd. Het komt er in feite op neer God te zoeken in de natuur (wat op zich geen vreemde gedachte is, omdat Spinoza de twee al gelijkstelde in zijn beroemde *Deus sive Natura*). In de natuurkunde vindt deze zoektocht al vele jaren plaats, waarbij God wordt geconcipeerd als de ‘Theorie van Alles’. Deze is alleen nog niet gevonden. Terwijl in de snaartheorie vrij regelmatig wordt beweerd dat de oplossing (bijna) is gevonden, blijkt toch elke keer weer dat er te vroeg is gejuicht. Eigenlijk kan men het al niet eens worden over het aantal dimensies dat de werkelijkheid heeft. Terwijl sommigen het erop houden dat er niet meer dimensies kunnen zijn, dan wij kunnen waarnemen in ruimtetijd, dus $(3 + 1)$, geloven snaartheoretici heilig in het bestaan van wel 10 dimensies of zelfs 11 in de allesomvattende M-theorie. Wie heeft er gelijk? Wat is het Geheel?

Tot de meest opmerkelijke uitkomsten van de huidige theorie moet worden gerekend dat deze een bijdrage kan leveren aan de zoektocht naar de Theorie van Alles. Dat hangt samen met twee dingen. Allereerst is het zo dat als er één substantie is, er ook geen scheiding kan bestaan tussen de alpha-, bèta- en gamma-wetenschappen. De hereniging betekent dat men niet alleen te rade kan gaan bij de bèta-wetenschappen om te zien hoe men verder moet in de alpha- en gamma-wetenschappen, maar ook andersom. Kortom, fundamenteel gesproken zou deze theorie een bijdrage kunnen leveren aan het oplossen van problemen in de bèta-wetenschappen. Vervolgens is de claim dat deze theorie dat ook doet, doordat zij in het discours van internationale betrekkingen conclusies trekt over het aantal dimensies waaruit de werkelijkheid bestaat. Door toepassing van de geometrische methode heeft deze theorie de invloedrijke theorieën binnen het vakgebied tegen het licht gehouden. Onderdeel van deze benadering is dat wordt gezien of de desbetreffende theorieën kunnen worden gevat in een logica van punten, van lijnen of van cirkels. Uitkomst was dat alle theorieën geometrisch konden worden vervat met gebruikmaking van ten hoogste twee assen. Uitkomst was ook dat er drie assen nodig zijn om tot een kloppende theorie te komen, waarbij nog een vierde, niet-ruimtelijke dimensie (geen *as* dus) moet worden toegevoegd voor tijd (beweging in cirkel). Deze vierde dimensie bleek een soort spiegel-functie te hebben voor de drie externe dimensies, die per definitie ook een pendant hebben in de vorm van interne dimensies, zoals eerder is vastgesteld. Om kort te gaan, volgt uit deze theorie dat er òf $(3 + 1 + 3)$ òf 12 dimensies zijn, afhankelijk van welke weg men kiest. Zolang Quantum Field Theory niet uitkomt op zeven dimensies en snaartheorie niet op 12 dimensies, hebben ze geen Theorie van Alles te pakken. Andersom, als onomstotelijk komt vast te staan dat één van beide wèl een dergelijke Theorie heeft gevonden met een ander aantal dimensies, dan is de huidige theorie onjuist. Deze uiterste gevolgtrekking maakt de huidige theorie falsificeerbaar.

In het vakgebied van internationale betrekkingen is eveneens een belangrijke conclusie te trekken door de Delen I en II samen te brengen. Samen staan ze in zekere zin model voor een wijze waarop verschillende dichotomieën kunnen worden overwonnen, die ook in de theorieën van internationale betrekkingen vaak voorkomen. Het gaat hier om onder meer handeling en structuur; voluntarisme en determinisme; en ‘Sollen’ en ‘Sein’. Op het meest basale niveau komen deze dichotomieën evenwel neer op die van de staat (die regels en wetten kent in een samenleving van burgers) en de natuurtoestand (waarin men de staat moet wegdenken en

men zich moet voorstellen hoe mensen zich *dán* zouden gedragen). Niet voor niets zijn daarom de Delen I en II respectievelijk vernoemd naar de staat en de natuurtoestand. De crux van de huidige theorie is dat deze twee de verschillende zijden zijn van dezelfde medaille, precies zoals deel en geheel dat ook zijn. Ze zijn in de meest letterlijke zin onafscheidelijk. Een vergaande gevolgtrekking die hieruit volgt, is dat sociale contract-filosofen ongelijk hebben, omdat die zeggen dat de natuurtoestand verdwijnt op het moment dat de staat wordt ingesteld. Echter, de natuurtoestand blijft op de achtergrond altijd voortbestaan en kan op elk moment van onder het fineerlaagje van de staat tevoorschijn komen. In de politieke theorieën wordt nog tezeer vastgehouden aan de oude denkbeelden van de sociale contract-filosofen, hetgeen verklaart dat men nog niet in staat is gebleken te duiden waarom het internationale systeem de ene keer wel functioneert en de andere keer niet. Het is een misvatting te veronderstellen dat men dit kan verklaren onder uitsluitende verwijzing naar staatssoevereiniteit en de veranderende rol van de staat. Dat is slechts de ene helft van het verhaal. De andere helft is, dat ongeacht hoe staten zich tot elkaar verhouden in politieke of juridische termen, er altijd ook krachten werkzaam zijn die cultureel of economisch zijn, zoals hiervoor beschreven. Door de twee helften te combineren, wordt in feite de grondslag gelegd voor de *trias ethica*.

Curriculum Vitae

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2002-2003 Harvard University: Master of Public Administration

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