

Cover Page



Universiteit Leiden



The handle <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/18623> holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Helm, Alfred Charles van der

Title: A token of individuality : Questiones libri porphirii by Thomas Manlevelt

Issue Date: 2012-03-22

CHAPTER FIVE

Form and contents of this text

Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* combines its highly original contents with an almost 'classical' styling of its *questiones*-format. This format is the subject of the first part of this chapter. Later in this chapter a suggestion will be made as to why Manlevelt would mould his treatment of the universals to the shape of a commentary rather than an autonomous tract.¹

5.1. Questiones

The form in which this commentary is written, *questiones*, is one of the standard ways of presentation of a philosophical standpoint accepted in the later medieval intellectual community. Basically, it is the thirteenth-century standardization of the way authoritative philosophical texts had been handled since Hellenistic times.

This kind of commentary consists of a series of highly formalized disputes about the problems to which a chosen text has given rise.² Originally such questions formed only the latter part of a teacher's lectures. Gradually, the amount of straightforward, sequential commentary was replaced with a discussion of special problems. In time, consideration of these special problems, or questions (*questiones*), completely replaced the commentary.³

1 The reader is again referred to Libera 1996 and to that author's introduction to Porphyry 1998 for a most excellent survey of the history of commentaries on the *Isagoge*. Once more, the summary in De Rijk 1977 of things discussed here has proved very useful to the present writer.

2 Weijers 1997 stresses the fact that there is no general study on the subject of teaching methods in the Faculty of Arts. She points out that most studies published on the *questio* are related to theology. She adds (p. 341) that 'il vaudrait mieux parler des *questiones* de la Faculté des Arts au pluriel, car il y en a de nombreuses espèces (celles dans les commentaires, les questions indépendantes des textes de base – soit la *questio* disputée pendant une dispute, soit les questions à propos des matières enseignées – les questions servant d'exercices, celles des compendia pour les examens).'

3 On the rise of the commentary in *questiones*-format see Kenny & Pinborg 1982, 30f.;

By being ‘published’ – i.e. by copies of the lectures being rented or sold – the *questiones* format became the most important category of scholastic literature. Because it utilized the basic form of a scholastic disputation, this genre became almost synonymous with the notion of *scholastic method*.⁴

The *Questiones libri Porphyrii* has all the usual characteristics of a commentary in the *questiones* genre, and more specifically, it may by its formal distinguishing marks alone be dated as an early fourteenth sample of the genre.⁵

5.1.1. *The structuring of the Questiones*

Especially in earlier phases of the development, one finds cases of several *questiones* being telescoped into one: first the arguments of a number of different *questiones* are given, and then the *questiones* are solved one after another. This practice is absent in the present text. Each *questio* stands on its own, in the sense that the argumentation concerning the subject-matter dealt with is neatly rounded-off within the scope of each successive *questio*. One is saved the intricate linking of *questiones* as is sometimes done for example by John Duns Scotus in his commentaries on the old logic and the *Metaphysics*, where the treatment of the subject matter touched upon in one *questio* is sometimes postponed to a later *questio*.⁶

Grant 1996, 40 f. It is generally assumed that this form of commentary was instigated by the rules laid down in Aristotle’s freshly rediscovered *Topica*. According to De Rijk 1977, 24, however, the role played by the *logica nova* in these matters did not exceed that of a secondary, though powerful impulse. Gilbert of Poitiers and Clarembald of Arras, fervent propagandists of the *questio* in the first half of the twelfth century, still were deeply immersed in the *logica vetus*. If the exact starting-point of the *questio*-way of philosophizing is to be pin-pointed, it would be the year 1122, when *Sic et non* was written by Peter Abelard. As already indicated by its very title, the scholastic method as an explicit technique of establishing the truth by opposing pro and contra is to be found here *in nuce*. The most important rule is that of the logico-semantic analysis: ‘mind the different meanings terms may have in various statements’. In a sense, then, the development of the scholastic method was in fact that of medieval logic and semantics.

4 Grant 1996, 41.

5 On the general characteristics of the genre, see Kenny & Pinborg 1982, 30–33.

6 See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. R. Andrews e.a. (St. Bonaventure 1999). In the commentary on the *Isagoge* questions 7 and 8 and questions 9–11, respectively, are telescoped into one. The same holds for questions 16–17, 18–19, 20–23, 30–36 and 37–38, respectively, of the commentary on the *Categories*.

Another way of structuring such sub-questions, by dividing a *questio* into several articles, is absent in the present text as well. What we do find, however, is the fourteenth- and fifteenth-centuries' practise of structuring the solution according to conclusions and corollaries, each being defended and *dubia* being solved.

In this text as in any other commentary of the genre, the last part of a *questio* contains the refutations of the arguments leading to the solution opposite to the one advocated by the author. And for this text as well as for any other commentary of the genre goes that for determining the author's own argument, the most important part is, of course, the solution with its distinctions.

The intrinsic order within each successive *questio* is clear and highly homogenous: typically, the question, stated in the *titulus questionis* as a question usually introduced by '*Consequenter queritur utrum*', is first supplied with some confirmative arguments – in the main not more than three or four, followed by usually just one argument 'ad oppositum', traditionally the opinion of Porphyry himself or another authority of the same calibre. These arguments pro and contra are answered in the last portion of the *questio*. Between the listing of these arguments and their answering we find the body of the *questio* (or *corpus questionis*). Without the author bothering to introduce it by such a standard phrase like '*ad hoc dicendum/dico*', this body is usually made up of one or two distinctions, more likely than not consisting of the logico-semantic fine-tuning of the nuances of the key terms used, followed by a numbered set of conclusions, from which we can learn the author's own insights in the matter. The average number of conclusions is about half a dozen, sometimes less, and sometimes running up to no less than ten (*questio* 44), eleven (*questio* 14) or even twelve (*questio* 31). Ample use is made, in presenting these conclusions as well as in the answering of the initial arguments at the start of the *questio*, of the terminological subtleties laid bare in the *distinctiones*. Within the scope of a given conclusion, counterarguments are sometimes taken up and are in their turn countered again. Occasionally this leads to a confusing to and fro of arguments, counterarguments and sub-counterarguments.

Exceptions to this regularity of composition are few. In the 19th *questio* the first initial argument is countered right away, and not addressed again in the successive answering of the initial arguments at the end of the *questio*. In the 21st *questio* the place normally reserved for the distinctions is occupied by a set of (mostly anonymous) opinions on the subject whether 'being' is a genus. The 32nd *questio*, concerned with whether

only the *differentia specifica* causes differences *per se*, is complete with a distinction and some conclusions and all, but here there is a declaration inserted at the head of the body of the question, that is to say: between the argument ‘ad oppositum’ and the distinction. The 41st *questio*, whether ‘proprium’ is said in a fourfold manner, again leaves out the distinctions and replaces them with an opinion in need of reprobation. In the 44th *questio*, taking the example of a white raven as its starting point, there are no distinctions as well, but there is a set of suppositions instead. On the whole, however, the tapestry of one of the forty-five *questiones* is interchangeable with that of any of the others.

Of course, there is nothing unique in this text’s highly formalized pattern of letting the conclusions in the body of a *questio* be preceded by distinctions. This same pattern is to be found, for example, in the commentaries on the *Isagoge* and *Categories* by Albert of Saxony.⁷ I have already paid attention to the similarity in a minor detail: the reference made in both Manlevelt’s and Albert of Saxony’s commentary on the *Isagoge* to Plato’s eagle’s nose.⁸ As I remarked there, it is unclear whether this must be looked upon as a sign of intellectual kinship between the two.

5.1.2. References given

From the fourteenth century onwards there is an increasing tendency to give exact references – a tendency unfortunately not yet shared by Manlevelt, which must be taken as an indication that the present text will probably not stem from a period later than the first half of the fourteenth century.

References to opponents are strictly anonymous, ‘*aliqui*’ serving the purpose of introducing them. References to authorities are quite standard; apart from Porphyry himself and Aristotle, we find Boethius, Avi-

7 It remains a matter of further investigation, however, to make sure in how far this similarity between Thomas Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony goes with a similarity of contents. Unless a thorough study would prove otherwise, the first impression remains that from a philosophical point of view the commentaries on the old logic by Albert of Saxony are less interesting than those by our author. Compare the remark by Fitzgerald 2002, 31 that Manlevelt’s tract *De confusionibus* is a more detailed treatment than Albert’s. To Fitzgerald this suggests that our author’s treatment is really closer in time to the treatments *after* Albert, rather than *before* Albert. He does not seem to take into consideration the possibility that Manlevelt may be a sharper logician than Albert. A first comparative glance at both authors’ question-commentaries on the *Isagoge* will follow below.

8 See above, subsection 2.2.6. The use of the adjective ‘*aquilinus*’ occurs in Q. 30 CONCL. 3, 29^{vb}, of our text; Albert of Saxony, *In Porph.*, p. 260, § 268.

cenna and Averroes, and an occasional reference to Robert Grosseteste, Peter of Spain or Thomas Aquinas.⁹ Ockhamists nor Scotists are mentioned as such by Manlevelt, but for the reasons given in the previous chapters it is safe to assume that that the ‘*moderni*’ brought up by him can be identified as nominalists, or maybe even more specific as Ockhamists, while for Manlevelt the realistic tenets of the realists, or maybe even more specific: the Scotists are outworn and truly outdated.

5.2. *Why a commentary?*

The genre of the *Questiones*, being the perfect embodiment of the scholastic method, has the advantage of granting us the fullest insight in a particular author’s own thoughts on a subject. Therefore we must consider ourselves lucky that we have Thomas Manlevelt’s *questiones* on the *Isagoge*, and not for instance an *Expositio* on the same subject. In the genre of the *Expositio* it was common for medieval authors to limit themselves to a faithful explanation of an authority’s (usually Aristotle’s) view, without any criticism of this authoritative (usually Aristotelian) point of view. Whereas in the *Questiones*, which are only rather loosely connected with the authoritative text, there is ample room for the occasional deviance from authority (usually disguised as adherence to authority anyway).¹⁰ For all its originality the present text, attributed to Thomas Manlevelt, fits in quite well with the state of developments as sketched thus far, albeit that he pushes this form to its extremes. Not only does he dig deeper into this particular brand of logico-semantical subject matter connected with Porphyry’s *Isagoge* than anyone else, but quantitatively he breaks new ground as well, by composing a commentary on the *Isagoge* which is of itself already of an unprecedented size, and which is solidly interlocked with its subsequent commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, thus forming one huge treatment of the basic elements of logic. Manlevelt’s commentary on the *Isagoge* contains 62.000 words; both commentaries on the Old Logic together contain a total of 150.000 words.¹¹

9 For the exact references, see the Index to the edition below.

10 See De Rijk 1997a, 308 on Buridan’s *Questiones* and *Expositio* on the *Metaphysics*, with a sidestep to Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

11 Buridan’s more or less contemporary commentary on the *Isagoge*, for example, totals about 25.000 words, while the commentary by Oyta, writing considerably later than Manlevelt, has somewhat less than 50.000 words.

Even though he does not mention the Venerable Inceptor by name, it is safe to surmise that for Manlevelt the ongoing problem about universals had come to a conclusion by William of Ockham's presentation of them as mental signs or conceptual acts indicating individual things in reality. So it was no longer useful to write a tract on their status, seeing that their status had been secured once and for all by his great nominalist predecessor. Not that Manlevelt referred to himself, his predecessor or any of the other logicians working in the same frame of mind as 'nominalists'; he just labelled those who saw the Ockhamist light 'moderns', as opposed to those who had not seen it and who were simply referred to as 'some' or 'others'. In his work the term 'olden ones' (*antiqui*) is reserved for the really ancient philosophers, such as the contemporaries of Aristotle or Porphyry. In this we witness a sharp development if not reversal in the use of terms. William of Ockham himself had referred to his more realistic opponents as 'moderns', presenting his own view as being in accordance with the intention of the real 'Olden Ones': the revered philosophers of antiquity. As noticed before, when they come to be mentioned by Manlevelt he labels them 'antiqui' as well. So the term 'antiqui' did not shift meaning when used by Ockham and Manlevelt, respectively, but its counterpart 'moderni' did. And so it turns out that one and the same term is used in an honorific and more pejorative way within one and the same context.¹²

But why, with manners on their status settled, did Manlevelt take the trouble to occupy himself with the universals at all, and why did he choose the medium of a commentary in the form of *questiones* on the *Isagoge* – a commentary of a sheer volume never seen before in the history of commentaries on the *Isagoge*?

The impression that the logical, linguistic or ontological status of the universals is no longer an issue, is warranted by the very beginning of the text of the Commentary. Contrary to what is usual in other commentaries on the *Isagoge*, there is no discussion on the nature of logic, let alone the status of the universals that make up the basic scheme of logic. Instead there is a discussion on the use of knowing something about universals, in order to know something about the categories, that is, the way we intellectually organize our knowledge about the world and

12 A shift in the meaning of 'antiqui' takes place as well, as can be witnessed from the works of the 15th century logician Nicholas of Amsterdam, who sees William of Ockham himself as one of the 'antiqui', constantly referring to 'Ockham and the antiqui'. On Nicholas of Amsterdam see Bos's forthcoming study on this logician.

all the individual things in it. In other words, Manlevelt takes everything the 'moderns' had to say about the status of universals and about the status of the categories as one of the universals for granted, and sets out to explain the precise functioning of these universals, and the relationship between what is the subject matter of the *Isagoge* and what is the subject matter of the *Categories*; in fact, his commentary on the *Categories* proceeds seamless from his commentary on the *Isagoge*.

Seeing that Thomas Manlevelt takes the work done by William of Ockham as the strongest possible foothold, it is not to be expected that his explanation of the working of the universals, in so far as he is breaking new ground, will be incompatible with the general line of logico-semantic philosophy set out by the Venerable Inceptor. At least, Manlevelt will have no intention to deviate from Ockham's line of thinking; he simply sets out to bring the Ockhamist theory on the universals a step further by bringing into map not the individual things indicated by the rightful use of our universals, but these very universals themselves, that in their rightful use turn out to be just as individual as the things in the world indicated by them. It remains to be seen, however, what Manlevelt really does by thus exploring the boundaries of our human intellect: furthering the cause of Ockhamism or destroying the very basis under our intellectual dealings with the world.¹³ My commentary on Thomas Manlevelt's commentary will hopefully prove helpful in

13 If Manlevelt may be called a champion for the individual in the field of logic, he indeed addresses the right issues. In the Prologue to his general study of the development of the problem of individuation in scholasticism from 1150 to 1650, Gracia points out that this problem of individuation was especially fascinating for late medieval scholastics, not only on the basis of its perennial philosophical interest and the implications it has for other philosophical issues such as the problem of universals, but also because of its substantial theological ramifications. Among the theological doctrines to which the problem of individuation is related, five in particular stand out: the Trinity, original sin, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, and the nature of angels. (Gracia 1994, ix) As the problem of individuation only occurs when a philosopher maintains that there are natures or essences in individuals, in some way common to the individuals and yet diversified in them, this problem of individuation, in the usual 'metaphysical' sense of the term, does not arise in Manlevelt's philosophy, just as it does not arise in Ockham's philosophy, or Buridan's philosophy, for that matter. (Compare Maurer 1994 and King 1994.) But this does nothing to mitigate the implications of his strictly individualist tenets in logic for the other philosophical and theological issues, as sketched by Gracia. The problem of universals of course makes out the kernel of Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge*, but some of Gracia's theological doctrines are just slightly touched upon as well: the Trinity in Q. 29 and the nature of angels in Q. 14.

evaluating the merits of Manlevelt's endeavour and will just as hopefully show these merits to be worthy of deeper investigation, but will certainly and perhaps regrettably not provide the last word on this matter.

The question why Thomas Manlevelt did not write a tract on universals instead of this commentary has already been answered. The reason why he chose to tackle the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* in one sweep is obvious too: he wanted to deal with the basic concepts allowing us to think, speak and theorize about reality. And the question why he chose the genre of the commentary in the form of *questiones* to do so is not difficult to answer either. As already noticed, the most important principle with this type of commentary is that of logico-semantic analysis, the painstakingly pinpointing of the different meanings terms may have in various statements. With Manlevelt one finds this analysis brought to a higher degree, as it were: here it is the terms used to speak about the use of terms themselves that are scrutinized. Apart from being the genre best equipped to go into technical detail, the *questiones*-form offers the proper stage to bring forward the pros and cons about a certain matter, and perhaps most important, it is the genre in which one can safely raise controversial themes and present controversial opinions on these themes, provided that one stresses the hypothetical character of this free-floating philosophising in time, be it on the pro- or con-side of the matter. 'It is just something that might be said by way of thought-experiment.'¹⁴ Thus one may even freely introduce God on one of the branches of the Porphyrian Tree,¹⁵ or maintain that substance does not exist.

5.3. *The originality of Thomas Manlevelt's approach*

How far does Thomas Manlevelt depart from the customary way of dealing with the subject matter of the *Isagoge*?

In the introduction to his trilingual edition of Porphyry's *Isagoge*,¹⁶ where Porphyry's Greek text is accompanied by the Latin *Translatio Boethii* and provided with a French translation by Libera and Segonds, Libera points out that certain questions raised in the Middle Ages in connection with the *Isagoge* are typically neo-platonic in character, going

14 See for example the ninth conclusion of the forty-fourth questio: 'Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius quam exercitive determinationis.'

15 Q. 35: 'Utrum hec differentia "immortale" sit constitutiva Dei.'

16 Porphyry 1998, CXXXV–CXL.

back to the source of the treatise itself: the neo-platonic thought-world of its author, who was the pupil and biographer of Plotinus, and the editor of Plotinus' philosophical lifework, the *Enneads*. Among these neo-platonic questions are those concerning the very subject of the treatise, the universal as such.

Other questions are special to the Middle Ages, but still are prompted by the placing of the *Isagoge* at the head of the corpus of Aristotle's logic, within the philosophical canon. These are the questions centring on the status of logic as a science. What is the subject of logic: the *modus sciendi* in general, being, the syllogism? Is logic a 'real' science of things, or a science of language and thinking? Also, the famous (or infamous) questions raised but immediately discarded by Porphyry himself get a full treatment: those about the ontological status and independent being of universals. Following this path even further, certain authors do not shy away from treating fundamental metaphysical problems, like the nature and cause of individuality. Common stock is also the questioning of the sense and rightness of the definitions of the respective universals as put forward by Porphyry.

Giving no more than the mere tables of contents of four diverse commentaries on the *Isagoge* – by Martin of Dacia (d. 1304), Peter of Auvergne (d. 1303), Radulphus Brito (d. 1320) and William Russell (first half fifteenth century)¹⁷ – as a first instructive means to superficially assess the developments taking place during the Middle Ages, Libera shows the permanency of certain questions or groups of questions.¹⁸ From the question of the ontological status of the universal, to that of ascertaining if the accident is a universal or if its inherence in a subject is part of the definition of accident, not to mention the problem of the number of universals and the sufficiency of the division made by Porphyry.

Thus surveying the evolution of the commentaries on the *Isagoge*, one immediately sees the development of philosophical interests in the Middle Ages, as well as the changes of style and the technical methods and languages.

Certain technical distinctions, says Libera, run from one text to another, undergoing, however, an evolution. He gives the example of the

17 Mag. Theol., OFM, Oxford; a Scotist living in the first half of the fifteenth century, who around 1425 was the subject of lawsuits on account of heresy.

18 Porphyry 1998, CXXXV ff.

distinction between the diverse types of universals – metaphysical, physical, logical – treated in an impartial manner by Martin of Dacia in the late thirteenth century, but with a fierce realistic approach later on by the Scotist William Russell. In Thomas Manlevelt, one might add, one finds neither fierceness nor impartiality. He just treated the universals in a nominalistic approach and felt he had only to do with the logical type.

The evolution hinted at by Libera is to be described in terms of the tendency of the commentators to treat the questions raised about the *Isagoge* in a particular theoretical frame of mind, harbouring the achievements of their own respective schools of thought. While Martin of Dacia and Peter of Auvergne were still open-mindedly dealing with Aristotle and Plato, William Russell was directly confronting the theses put forward by Ockham and the ‘Ockhamists’, indifferently citing ancient authorities like Averroes and Avicenna alongside modern authorities like Albert the Great, Antoine André and John Duns Scotus. As such, Thomas Manlevelt may well have been one of the Ockhamists of days past, at whom the criticism of William Russell was directed.

Where, then, would be the place of Manlevelt within this sketch of developments? Clearly, his point in dealing with the *Isagoge* is not to confront Aristotle and Plato, but rather to harness a nominalist, anti-realistic stance in a strongly Ockhamist vein. In this he takes a stance diametrical opposite to that of William Russell, who would later defend the realistic Scotist’s viewpoint by attacking the Ockhamists. In fact, Plato has shrunk to the role of none more than the occasional opponent to Sortes in the various propositions used as examples for all kinds of logical purposes. The citing of authorities, for that matter, is done by Manlevelt in a way that resembles that of the Scotist opponent of the century to come. As already noted, with him, more or less ancient authorities like Boethius, Avicenna and above all Averroes stand side by side with more or less modern authorities like Robert Grosseteste, Peter of Spain and Thomas Aquinas. Albeit that these moderns are only mentioned sporadically.

In fact, Manlevelt seems so confident with the achievements of nominalism, that he does not care too much for a lot of the traditional, partly neo-Platonist flavoured problems posed in connection with the *Isagoge*. Seemingly, Manlevelt takes these problems to have already been solved once and for all from the outset. The subject matter of Porphyry’s tract (and therefore the status of the universal as such) is taken for granted, just as well as the status and subject matter of logic as a science.

While he refrains from handling the number and sufficiency of the universals as stated by Porphyry, Manlevelt does treat the number of the categories instead. Normally, one would expect to find this matter treated in a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, rather than in a commentary on the *Isagoge*.

Of course, he does not make a clean break with all the traditional questions, but while implicitly or explicitly solving time-honoured questions concerning the connection between Sortes old and Sortes young,¹⁹ and the colour of the raven,²⁰ Manlevelt seems to be more than any other thinker focussed on the problems concerning individuality, the atomisation of the extramental world, the token-character of our diverse instances of knowledge of a world that is itself radically broken down to individual things, etcetera. Thus Manlevelt presents us with a striking glimpse on the developments of philosophical interests, as reflected in his particular, sometimes quite radical handling of the problems occasioned by his commenting on Porphyry's age-old *Isagoge*.

Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* does not contain the usual preliminary chapters on the status and nature of logic, the formal subject of logic, or the place of logic within philosophy, let alone on the nature of philosophy itself. One will also look in vain for any treatment of the question as to the ontological status of the universals, a matter so pre-eminently tied up with the reading of the *Isagoge*, that traditionally no commentator would dare to leave it untouched. The fourth *questio*, whether universals are in the intellect, does not so much discuss the ontological status of the universal, as its exact way of being in the intellect.

Porphyry's questionnaire came down to knowing if the genera and species subsisted by themselves or were to be found, as universals, only in the intellect by which a human being does his thinking. If I now try to connect Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* to the tradition of commentaries and interpretations before him, the first thing that has to be said – with the risk of repeating myself – is that Manlevelt does not run through this questionnaire at all. Apparently he does not deem it necessary, because the matter has been settled in a satisfactory

19 Q. 28 CONCL. 5, 28^{va}: 'generaliter: omne ens differt a non ente, et omnis terminus cum alio termino a quo vere negatur, vere predicatur de seipso mediante hoc verbo "differt", sicut si "senex" vere negatur a Sorte, tunc hoc est vera: Sortes differt a Sorte sene, et sic de quocumque alio termino qui vere de Sorte negatur.'

20 Q. 44, 41^{vb}-43^{va}: 'Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus.'

manner. And the one who has done this settling can be no other than William of Ockham, who does treat Porphyry's questionnaire in his own commentary on the *Isagoge*.²¹

What was it then that was to be found in the intellect when it came to universals?

According to scholastic realism it is an intelligible form (*species intelligibilis*), abstracted from the sensible images by the light of the active intellect. According to Ockhamist nominalism it is a concept, i.e. a conceptual act, referring to a multitude of singular objects of which it is the natural sign. And here it is that Manlevelt comes into play: by exploring exactly what it means for a conceptual act to be a sign of such a multitude of singular objects, and exactly how such a sign does what it is supposed to do. Thomas is breaking new theoretical ground here, and deserves every scholar's keenest attention, if only because what he does here is completely lacking in Ockham.

It will turn out that Manlevelt does not shy away from drawing the logical consequences from the basic tenet already adhered to by William of Ockham himself: a mental concept as well as any thing in extramental reality is really and truly an individual.²² Even a universal, though it is universal insofar as it is a sign of many things and is predicable of them, as the sign itself it is really and truly an individual. A spoken or written word is really an individual sound or blot of ink, though it can be a conventional sign of many things. A mental concept is also really and truly an individual; its universality is its function of being a natural sign of many things. Ontologically, then, every universal is a particular thing: 'quodlibet universale est una res singularis.'²³ Individuals, Ockham says, cutting even more grass from under Manlevelt's feet, are also primarily diverse (*primo diversa*): there is nothing that is one and the same in any two individuals.²⁴ We could not wish for a stronger statement of the rad-

21 Ockham, OP II, 10–16 (*Expositionis in librum Porphyrii prooemium* § 2). Ockham's most extensive and penetrating account of the subject is to be found however in the *Ordinatio*, DIST. 2, QQ 4 to 8. For a comprehensive treatment of Ockham's views as expounded in these questions from the *Ordinatio*, one may well consult Maurer 1994.

22 See Maurer 1994, 388, whose concise wording of Ockham's standpoint is thankfully reproduced here.

23 *Summa logicae* I, 14, p. 48.31.

24 *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, Q. 6, p. 212.18–23: 'dico quod aliqua esse "prima diversa" potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quia nihil est unum et idem in utroque, sed quidquid est in uno simpliciter et absolute de se non est aliquid quod est in alio; et isto modo

ical incommunicability of individuals, says Maurer.²⁵ One may wonder if he would not deem Manlevelt's subsequent treatment of individuality on the level of words and concepts *too* strong a statement of this very same radical incommunicability of individuals.

What one does find in this particular commentary on the *Isagoge* then, is a full treatment of all five Porphyrian universals, never termed 'predicables' by Manlevelt, but always thus: 'universals'. Considerable attention is paid to the individual, sometimes (but not by Thomas Manlevelt) called 'the sixth predicable',²⁶ and to the fifth of the Porphyrian predicables, the accident. It is things accidental and individual that seem to be the main interest of Thomas Manlevelt in a nutshell. The ideas expounded in this text on these subjects will form the core interest of future research, where an attempt will be made to unravel some of the leading threads running through Manlevelt's *questiones* on the *Isagoge*.

5.4. *Thomas Manlevelt's theory of signs*

To a nominalist's mind like Thomas Manlevelt's, universals derive their universality from their being signs of a multiplicity of things in the outside world.²⁷ But a full-fledged theoretical treatment of signs is not included in the *Questiones libri Porphirii*.

Manlevelt's theory of signs, as far as it can be distilled from his commentary on the *Isagoge*, seems to be quite in line with William of Ockham's theory.²⁸ For one thing, Manlevelt's juxtaposition of written, spoken and mental terms throughout this commentary is easily compatible with Ockham's view on the three levels of language.²⁹ As succinctly

concedo quod omnia individua sunt se ipsis primo diversa, nisi forte aliter sit de individuis ex quorum uno generatur aliud propter identitatem numeralem materiae in utroque.'

25 Maurer 1994, 388.

26 Manlevelt is quite explicit about this in the first conclusion of Q. 20, 18^{vb}: 'nullum individuum est universale.'

27 For a survey of medieval theories of signs, see Meier-Oeser 2008.

28 The crucial *questio* to be searched for bits and pieces of a theory of signs is Q. 14: 'Utrum species sit res distincta a termino sive a signo.'

29 In passing, Manlevelt also mentions still different types of conventional signs, like a piece of red cloth in front of a tavern signifies there being red wine to be had, and a piece of bluish-green cloth wine from the Garonne region. Also, there is the finger-language used in certain monasteries. Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}: 'Alia vero possunt poni universalialia ad placitum, quamvis ex communi usu non ponantur, sicut signa communia ex consuetudine aliquas res significantia appellative, sicut panniculus

explained by Spade,³⁰ spoken words, according to Ockham, are subordinated to concepts, and written expressions are related in the same way to spoken expressions. But for Ockham subordination is not a kind of signification relation. He agrees with everyone else that written expressions are conventionally (*ad placitum*) correlated with spoken ones, and spoken ones conventionally related with mental expressions. But he denies that this correlation amounts to a signification relation.³¹ Spoken words do not make me think of concepts, and written words do not make me think of spoken words. What a written term in personal supposition signifies is exactly what the spoken term in personal supposition signifies, which in turn is exactly the same as what the mental term in personal supposition signifies: the individual things in the outside world. The only difference being that a written or spoken term has conventional signification (but signification nevertheless), and a mental term has natural signification.³²

Neither does Manlevelt ever seem to imply a signification relation between written and spoken terms on the one hand, and mental terms on the other. Instead he accepts the three as equivalent, the written and spoken term having conventional signification (*ad placitum*), and the mental term having natural signification.³³

But again the focus is on the individualizing aspects on the part of the signs: each sign is a sign in its own right. And from this individualizing tendency when it comes to signs, it is a small step to stressing the indi-

rubeus positus ante tabernam significat vinum rubeum, et pannus glaucus significat vinum de Garunna, et motus digiti secundum quod aliqui claustrales utuntur, appellative significant sua significata. De quibus, quia non sunt in usu, non dicitur.' The example of a circle signifying wine in the tavern, by the way, is also given by Ockham, as mentioned by McCord Adams 1987, 122. Both cases brought forward by Manlevelt seem to have been stock examples of things that in the broadest sense may function as signs, anyway. Meier-Oeser 2008, 5 makes mention about 'the famous *circulus vini*, a wreath of foliage, attached outside the tavern, indicating that wine is sold inside, or the conventional gestures of monastic sign languages' already being used by Peter Abelard some two centuries before Manlevelt (Peter Abelard: *Log. 'Ingredientibus'* (1927: 335)).

30 Spade 2002, 77.

31 Spade 1982, 189 makes a reference to Ockham's *Commentarium in Perihermeneias* 1 (16a3-4).

32 For an apt visualization of a spoken or written term's subordination to the mental term, while standing in a relation of signification to things in the outside world, see Spade 2002, 140.

33 Q. 22 DIST. 2, 21th: 'aliqua sunt eadem secundum equivalentiam que differunt genere, sicut signum vocale et signum scriptum.'

vidualizing aspects when it comes to concepts, in their role as signs. It is the token-character of concepts that comes to the fore in an unprecedented manner. If Ockham stressed the individual character of all things in the extramental world, now Manlevelt in a like manner stresses the individual character of all things mental. But his radicalizing of the Ockhamist way of thinking is not without consequences or risks for the status of human knowledge. Will not the generality that is a key property of all genuine knowledge get lost in the process?³⁴

As far as logical terms are considered in their capacity to stand for individual things in the outside world, Manlevelt joins Ockham in stressing the token-character of the references made to the individuals in the outside world. Thus one might say that on the *res*-side of the matter there is nothing but individuals to refer to. But Thomas Manlevelt draws our attention to the fact that in our minds there is nothing but singular instances of referring as well. On the ratio-side of the matter as such, Manlevelt once again stresses the token-character of each instance of rational activity.³⁵ By doing so, he is nothing less than ‘singularising’ the domain of the universals, and our acts of understanding.

Questio 4, whether a universal is in the intellect, offers a fine example of Manlevelt’s ‘singularising’ method. One can hardly fail to notice the emphasis he puts on the token-character of the universals in actual use.³⁶

There is no doubt in Manlevelt’s mind about the mental universal being in the intellect in a subjective manner, that is to say, as an accident in a subject. The mental universal (just like any other concept) is an accident of the intellect in the same way as the vocally expressed universal is in the air. The only kind of universal that is not an accident is the written one, because the writing itself as a physical thing (say, the little lines of ink on a piece of paper) is a substance or rather a string of substances.³⁷

34 For a background to this question, one may consult Nuchelmans 1973 on type-utterances and token-utterances as bearers of truth and falsity, especially with Ockham (p. 202), Holkot (p. 206 ff.), Burleigh (p. 225), Pierre d’Ailly (p. 260) and Paul of Venice (p. 266). That Buridan may be counted among the renewers but not among the reckless renewers, may be clear from *De Rijk* 1994.

35 See Q. 4, 3^{rb}–4^{vb}: ‘Utrum universale sit in intellectu.’

36 On singularity, one may compare our author’s ideas to those expressed by Ockham in *Summa logicae* pars I cap. 14 (*De hoc communi ‘universale’ et de ‘singulari’, oppositè sibi*).

37 Q. 4 CONCL. 1, 3^{vb}: ‘omne universale mentale est in intellectu subiective’; CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}: ‘universale vocale est in aere tamquam in subiecto, sicut omnis vox, (...) et universale scriptum non est in aliqua substantia tamquam accidens in subiecto, quia est substantia vel substantie’. On the written universal, Manlevelt seems to deviate

In his opinion that the (mental) universal is an accident of the intellect, and that each of these mental universals is a singular accident for that matter, Manlevelt is in agreement with William of Ockham. In the *Summa logicae* it is stated that the universal that is naturally a sign predicable of many things is nothing else than an *intentio animae*, and that this *intentio animae*, signifying a plurality of things in the extramental world, is in itself singular.³⁸ Manlevelt was certainly not the only one to agree with Ockham on this matter. In fact, this opinion on the mental universals seems to have been common ground among thinkers not necessarily to be labelled followers of the Venerable Inceptor. With the Mertonian Richard of Campsall (d. ca. 1350/60), one finds the same idea of universals being singular accidents of the soul.³⁹ And as if to stress the non-Ockhamist origin of this line of thinking, Campsall as well as Ockham himself bring in the testimony of no less an authority than Avicenna.⁴⁰

Manlevelt however is not content to simply rephrase what has been stated before. He goes on to investigate what it means in actual practice to have this succession of singular universals, each signifying a multi-

from Ockham, who holds that universals are not in any way substances. See, for instance, the last paragraph of *Summa logicae* pars I, cap. 15: '(...) propositio non est nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; igitur partes eius non sunt nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; huiusmodi autem non sunt substantiae particulares. Constat igitur quod nulla propositio ex substantiis componi potest. Componitur autem propositio ex universalibus, universalis igitur non sunt substantiae ullo modo.' Manlevelt himself does not make a big thing out of this apparent deviation from Ockham's line of thought. In fact he says that we need not waste words on the written (and the spoken) universals: 'non oportet sermonem prolongari' (Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}). Remarks in this same vein are usually made by Manlevelt either when things become too self-evident, or when things quite on the contrary tend to become too out-of-the-way.

- 38 *Summa logicae* pars I, cap. 14: 'universale naturaliter, quod scilicet naturaliter est signum praedicabile de pluribus (...) non est nisi intentio animae' (*Opera Philosophica* I, 49); 'tenentes quod universale est quaedam qualitas mentis praedicabilis de pluribus, non tamen pro se sed pro illis pluribus, dicere habent quod quodlibet universale est vere et realiter singular: quia (...) intentio animae, significans plures res extra, est vere et realiter singularis et una numero, quia est una et non plures res, quamvis significet plures res' (*Opera Philosophica* I, 48).
- 39 'Ideo dicendum est quod genus et species et huiusmodi universalis non sunt res extra animam (...) sed sunt formae universales existentes in anima sicut in subiecto, quae tamen sunt formae singulares in essendo sicut alia accidentia in anima.' Cited in William of Ockham *Opera Philosophica* I, 48 n. 2. For Campsall see E.A. Synan, 1982, 15 ('Contra ponentes' §8).
- 40 Reference with Ockham is to Avicenna, *Metaph.*, v, c. 1, with Campsall to the same work, c. 2.

plicity of things in the outer world, going on in our minds. In doing this, he remains perfectly in line with the main tenets of Ockhamism, and with the course later medieval logic would take in general. As succinctly explained by Meier-Oeser,⁴¹ thirteenth century terminist logicians like William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain had not been particularly interested in the concept of signification. Leaning on the insights unfolded by Biard,⁴² who characterizes Ockham's logic as 'régie par le concept de signe',⁴³ Meier-Oeser points out that with Ockham, however, the concepts of sign and signification take centre stage in logic.

The description fits quite well with Manlevelt as well: logic is seen as exclusively concerned with signs, primarily with mental signs, secondarily with vocal or written signs.⁴⁴ Traditional ontological issues, as for instance the questions of universals and the number of categories – the first of which, of course, is the main subject of the present text, and the second of which finds a place within the context of Manlevelt's treatment of the universals⁴⁵ – are reformulated as semantic questions. Ockham's logic, says Meier-Oeser,⁴⁶ marks an important step in the progressive 'mentalization' of the sign, characteristic of the mentalist logic arising in the early fourteenth century, and remaining dominant throughout the later Middle Ages. Thus, Ockham's semantics, as well as his theory of mental language built on trans-idiomatic mental words (*verba mentis*) or mental concepts governed by a trans-idiomatic mental grammar, transformed terminist logic into a theory of thought processes. In general, the importance of the concept of sign was undisputed among logical authors from the fourteenth century onward. This is not to say that Ockham's specific theories did not come under severe criticism by his opponents. Also, they were no less severely modified by his followers – among them Thomas Manlevelt.

The possibilities and difficulties of us having two or more universals in mind at the same time run as a leading thread to the conclusions of

41 Meier-Oeser 2008, 11 f.

42 Biard 1981, Biard 1989.

43 Biard 1989, 102. Cited by Meier-Oeser 2008, 11.

44 In the present text by Thomas Manlevelt, the number of references to signs as logic's core business is legion. Usually the mentioning of 'sign' comes in a pair with 'term': 'signum vel terminus'. With Manlevelt as well as it already was with Ockham, it is the sign within a propositional context that counts.

45 Q. 22, 20^{va}–22^{ra}: 'Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora'. On Manlevelt's treatment of the number of the categories, see above, footnote 9 to section 3.1, and below, the paragraph on Q. 22 in subsection 5.5.5 of this Chapter.

46 Meier-Oeser 2008, 12.

Questio 4, about a universal being in our intellect.⁴⁷ Experience shows that it is possible for two mental universals to be in one intellect simultaneously, as we can have a proposition like ‘man is a living being’ in our mind.⁴⁸ This fact of experience can also be proven in a more fundamental way. Two accidental things that are not mutually incompatible can be in the same subject simultaneously, like light and sound in the air, or whiteness and sweetness in milk. Well then, just such mutually non-conflicting accidental things are the subject and predicate of the proposition ‘man is a living being’; therefore two universals can be in one intellect simultaneously.⁴⁹ Experience also tells us that it is possible to have two universals of the same *species specialissima* simultaneously in one intellect, like in ‘man is man’.⁵⁰

Manlevelt is taking a step in a more psychological direction⁵¹ with the next conclusion, which states that an intense universal and a weakened universal can be simultaneously in the intellect. To show this, Manlevelt once again points to our daily experience: we can learn one thing while our head is with another thing.⁵² From here on, Manlevelt seems to

47 Q. 4, 3^{rb}–4^{vb}: ‘Utrum universale sit in intellectu.’

48 Q. 4 CONCL. 2, 3^{vb}: ‘Secunda conclusio est ista quod duo universalia mentalia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Ista conclusio probatur per experientiam, qua experimur nos habere talem propositionem in mente nostra: “homo est animal”’

49 Q. 4 CONCL. 2, 3^{vb}: ‘Item, quecumque duo accidentalia et non repugnantia possunt simul (esse) in eodem subiecto, in quo quodlibet eorum naturaliter potest esse; sed talia duo accidentalia sunt subiectum et predicatum istius conclusionis “homo est animal”, que sunt duo universalia, igitur aliqua duo universalia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Maior videtur evidens, quia nulla ratio potest assignari quare talia duo accidentalia non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, sicut lumen et vox, quia in nullo repugnant quia possunt simul (esse) in aere, sicut dulcedo et albedo que simul sunt in lacte, et sic de aliis.’

50 Q. 4 CONCL. 3, 3^{vb}: ‘Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua duo universalia eiusdem speciei specialissime possunt simul esse (in) intellectu. Ista declaratur, quia talis propositio mentalis: “homo est homo”, “animal est animal” potest tota simul esse (in) intellectu; et predicatum et subiectum sunt duo universalia mentalia eiusdem speciei specialissime, igitur duo universalia mentalia eiusdem speciei specialissime possunt simul esse in intellectu. Maior videtur haberi per experientiam; minor nota est de se.’

51 On this point Manlevelt’s ideas seem to advance beyond the mere ‘mentalization’ of the sign, which Meier-Oeser considers to be a defining trait of logic from the early fourteenth century onward, and begin – as will be touched upon below in the paragraph on Q. 4 in subsection 5.5.5 – to foreshadow the psychologically oriented logic of Port-Royal by some centuries.

52 Q. 4 CONCL. 4, 3^{vb}: ‘universale intensum et universale remissum possunt simul esse intellectu. Ista declaratur per experientiam, quia experimur nos frequenter addiscere aliquam rationem de qua remisse arguamus, et simul cum hoc cogitare de aliqua alia ratione intense.’

be breaking new ground, making serious business of the melting of logical principles with psychological observations. The rather startling fifth conclusion is that two intense universals cannot be in the intellect simultaneously. This is already demonstrated by experience, as we cannot intensely think about two different things at the same time, just like we cannot write while giving a speech. The principle that two most intense universals are in no way incompatible – adduced earlier to support the conclusion that two universals can be in one intellect simultaneously – does not hold. The reason is not an incompatibility of the universals, but an incompatibility of attention on the part of the intellect itself. The intellect cannot intensely occupy itself with two different things at the same time. True, the subject and predicate of the mental proposition ‘man is a living being’ are in the intellect simultaneously, but not both equally intense.⁵³ In his treatment of the principal arguments of this *questio*, Manlevelt explains that the intensity of the universals is a matter of succession: first the subject of the proposition is in the mind in an intense manner, and then the predicate.⁵⁴ This makes one wonder how genuine human knowledge is possible. If not even the subject and predicate of one and the same proposition can be paid intense attention simultaneously, how do we save the possibility of this subject and predicate really getting joined before the intellect? After all, the establishing of the right relationship between subjects and predicate is what knowledge and science are ultimately built on. What kind of worldview arises from such radical nominalism? An extramental world seemingly existing of nothing more than a myriad of loose particles. And the intellect grasping nothing more than a myriad of loose mental little contents.

53 Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 3^{vb}–4^{ra}: ‘duo universalia intensa non possunt simul esse in intellectu. Ista declaratur iam per experientiam, quia experimur nos non posse distinctis cogitationibus intense de distinctis rebus cogitare, sicut non possumus scribere et cum hoc aliquam orationem intentissime dicere. Contra istam conclusionem instatur, et videtur quod contrariatur predictis, nam talia duo universalia intensissima in nullo repugnant, igitur possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, circa quod habent fieri. Ad istud breviter dicitur quod causa quare non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, non est repugnantia universalium, sed est repugnantia advertentiarum ipsius intellectus, qui non potest, saltem dummodo est in corpore, advertere se intense distinctis advertentiis distinctis rebus. Et si dicatur quod ista duo universalia que sunt subiectum et predicatum istius propositionis mentalis “homo est animal”, (sunt) simul in intellectu sicut supra positum est, ad istud breviter dicitur quod ista duo universalia non sunt simul intense (...)’.

54 Q. 4 AD 4., AD PROBATIONEM PRIME PROPOSITIONIS, 4^{rb}: ‘Est ergo primus conceptus causatus per subiectum, et alius per predicatum secundario causatum (...)’.

In passing, Manlevelt seems to suggest that intellectual difficulties of this kind are just part of the burden we have to bear by being alive. These shortcomings will be over once the soul is freed from its corporeal cage. For what different interpretation can be given to his contention that the intellect cannot intensely pay attention to different things, as long as it is in a body.⁵⁵

If, however, Manlevelt's radicalizing of Ockhamism entails the possible destruction of human knowledge, is not this radicalizing of Ockhamism then an act of self-destruction on the part of Ockhamism? In other words, in going one step beyond where the Venerable Inceptor himself made a halt, does Thomas Manlevelt not lay bare the intrinsic incompatibilities of the very Ockhamist program? It makes one think of what Libera has to say about the reasons for the continued existence of realism after Ockham. One of these reasons has to do with the intrinsic shortcomings of Ockhamism, and the weak spots in its challenging of rival systems.⁵⁶

But let me turn my attention first to the text of Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* itself. After all, apart from the obvious objective of having something to lecture about, why did he compose this commentary? Not to involve himself in the battle of the universals, because that battle had already been fought, and, to Manlevelt's firm conviction, was won by William of Ockham. What Manlevelt set out to do was to elaborate the status of the five predicables in an Ockhamist sense. The work that was to be done was to be found in the field of semantics.

In this sense, the present text, attributed to Thomas Manlevelt, fits in quite well with the state of developments as sketched in the first part of this chapter.

55 Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}: 'intellectus, (...) non potest, saltem dummodo est in corpore, advertere se intense distinctis advertentiis distinctis rebus.'

56 See Libera 1996, 402 for a listing of reasons why realism could survive Ockham, chief among which 'les insuffisances et faiblesses mêmes de la position nominaliste sur plusieurs points de doctrine ou d'argumentation précis.' Mention is made of some of these deficits: 'celui de la critique occamiste du représentationnisme thomiste, qui méconnaît le sens et la portée de la théorie thomassienne de la forme intelligible (...), ou, dans le système d'Occam lui-même, celui de la réduction du concept à un signe naturel et celui de la notion cardinal d'intuition intellectuelle du singulier.'

5.5. *A brief summary of the contents of the questiones*

Some of the subjects that Thomas Manlevelt feels inspired to tackle on the occasion of his reading of the *Isagoge* most certainly deserve a full thematical treatment. This edition will have served its purpose if it does indeed give rise to further studies, in which the main ideas expounded in the text of the *Questiones libri Porphirii* will be treated. It may prove helpful, however, to start with a brief summary of the contents of each of these successive *questiones*.

5.5.1. *The individuum*

Manlevelt's *Questiones libri Porphirii* do lend themselves to a grouping along the lines of the five universals.⁵⁷ However, there is one extra element that keeps cropping up. And this element is the *individuum*, which is always in the back of Manlevelt's mind, guiding his thoughts and serving as his ultimate goal of investigation. True, the individual is never with so many words added as an extra universal to Porphyry's list of five, to which he faithfully adhered. Indeed, as we have seen, the *individuum* is explicitly denied his status in the first conclusion of Q. 20.⁵⁸ But the apparent *contradictio in terminis* notwithstanding, 'individuum' is *de facto* accepted as the sixth 'universal' in one meaningful passage towards the end of Manlevelt's commentary.⁵⁹ Here, *individuum* together with *species*, *proprium*, *accidens* and *differentia specifica* form an exhaustive list of all that divides the *genus* (*dividit genus*).⁶⁰

The primacy of the individual over the universal cannot be better expressed than it has been by the thirteenth century Franciscan thinker Roger Bacon: one individual is worth more than all universals in the world.⁶¹ This primacy of the individual found a fierce defender in Bacon's

57 See below, subsection 5.5.3.

58 See above, section 5.3. In Q. 20 CONCL. 1, 18^{vb} it is stated: 'nullum individuum est universale.'

59 Q 37 CONCL. 5, 36^{rb}: '(...) omne quod dividit genus, vel est species, vel individuum, vel est proprium, vel accidens, vel differentia specifica.'

60 The overview of diagrammatic representations of the Tree of Porphyry in texts of the Arts Faculty, 1200–1500, contained in Verboon 2010, 57–78, makes it clear that individuals tend to find a place in these quite naturally, as a kind of little 'roots' to the trees.

61 'Unum individuum excellit omnia universalialia de mundo,' from Roger Bacon's *Liber I Communium Naturalium* pars 2, d. 2, c. 7 (ed. R. Steele, page 94). The force of Bacon's wording is testified by its regularly being used as a reference in present

fourteenth century fellow-Franciscan William of Ockham. And the quickest glance on the present commentary on the *Isagoge* will reveal that Thomas Manlevelt, whose possible Franciscan background was touched upon earlier,⁶² is a warm supporter of the individual as well. What does this primacy of the individual over the universal amount to?

To Thomas Manlevelt as well as to Ockham, it is of the greatest importance to draw a sharp distinction between the level of thinking (*ratio*) and that of things (*res*).⁶³ The two domains must be kept apart in all considerations.

Now according to Ockham reality outside the knowing subject consists of individual things (substances and qualities) and none other than individual things. Things of a general nature do not exist in extramental reality. There are no *genera* or *species* as such to be found in the real world, nor any other universal, let alone such out of the way things as Platonic Ideas.

So the only object of our thought that can be found in reality is the individual. This individual is somehow known in a non-abstract manner.⁶⁴ On the other hand, the intellect does not know the individual in its individuality (*sub propria ratione singularitatis*).⁶⁵ It is observed by De Rijk⁶⁶ that even Ockham does not escape from understanding the *singulare* according to its external, sensible qualities. On the *res*-side, Ockham saw no other possibility than to interpret the 'humanity' and the 'whiteness' of an individual person as some kind of entities, albeit that they only exist in a concrete form, in a concrete individual. And, one may add, even to Ockham there is no other way to convey knowledge about an individual on the *ratio*-side than to make use of notions that each in turn will be catalogued as one of the five predicables, which are general in character.

Ockham was not unique in giving the individual, as far as we have knowledge about it, a certain prominence in his logical considerations. As observed by Libera in his authoritative study on the war of the uni-

day studies on the philosophical status of the individual, for example in Aertsen 1996, XI, De Rijk 1983, 8.

62 Above, section 3.5.

63 For the importance of this distinction, and the gradual sharpening of it, within the works of Ockham, see Bos 1987, 7 ff.

64 *Ordinatio* 1, d.3, q.5.

65 *Ordinatio* 1, d.2, q.6.

66 De Rijk 1983, 20.

versals, the problem of the intellectual knowledge of the individual was a distinguishing mark of the fourteenth century treatises on the universals. 'En ce qui concerne les universaux, le trait saillant du xive siècle est l'arrivée au premier plan du problème de la *connaissance intellectuelle intuitive du singulier*.'⁶⁷

But it is the change of view that matters. Whereas other thinkers broke their minds over the question how the universal is individualised, taking the universal as their starting point to try and reach the individual, Ockham thought it would be wiser and certainly less foolish to investigate how the singular, the individual could become a universal, and in what highly limited sense it could do so.

In short, to cite Spade on this matter, one does not need a *metaphysical* 'principle of individuation'; one needs an *epistemological* 'principle of universalization'.⁶⁸ On this, Ockham is honest enough to admit that he simply does not have the answer. In forming universal concepts, he says, 'nature works in a hidden way'. Nevertheless, it is clear that the focus has been shifted in Ockham from a metaphysical question to an epistemological one.⁶⁹

In his commentary on the *Isagoge* Thomas Manlevelt however does not address the epistemological question, but simply accepts the fact of there being universal concepts applied to individual things.

It is no new thing of course for Thomas Manlevelt to treat the individual in connection to the five predicables. In fact, the individual already found its natural place within Porphyry's own *Isagoge*. Its inclusion in the considerations from this very start onward has resulted in its sometimes half-seriously being referred to as the 'sixth predicable'.⁷⁰ This is not to be said, however, that all the questions raised about the individual in the context of the predicables are necessarily standard. Starting from Porphyry's text and the questions instigated by him, the commentators gradually moved on to exploring fields that were not at all covered by the *Isagoge* itself. When the theory of the predicables was moulded into a *compendium examinitorium* (basically, a series of questions that a student must be able to answer in order to pass an exam on the subject) in Paris in the first decades of the thirteenth century, no mention of

67 Libera 1996, 306.

68 Spade 1994, 109.

69 Spade 1994, 109f.

70 See for instance Bos 1987, 73. On the candidature of the *individuum* as sixth predicable see also above, section 5.3.

the individual was made in the division of Porphyry's text as presented there, but at any rate two out of the twenty-nine questions which the student should be able to answer in an exam were about the properties of individuals.⁷¹ These questions did not move the student an inch from the text under examination. Halfway into the thirteenth century, the fundamental metaphysical hints made in passing by Porphyry began to get full attention. In the subsequent commentaries on the *Isagoge*, *questiones* are devoted to such problems as the nature and cause of individuation and whether the universals are separated from the singulars. In his introduction to the French translation of the *Isagoge Libera* traces such *questiones* in the commentaries by modist thinkers like Martin of Dacia (d. 1304) and Radulphus Brito (d. 1304), and by Peter of Auvergne (d. 1320).⁷² So even though other thinkers, like John Duns Scotus (d. 1308), do not devote any *questiones* in their commentaries on the *Isagoge* to the individual and even William of Ockham does not have a chapter on the individual in his *Expositio*, to include some *questiones* on the individual was not an unusual thing to do in Thomas Manlevell's days, when compiling a commentary on the *Isagoge*. And it did not go out of usage afterwards. Henry Totting of Oyta's commentary, for example, probably written in the 1370s, also includes a couple of *questiones* on the individual. The second of these is completely sensible, moreover, when seen in an Ockhamist way: whether a principle of individuation is necessarily required for there being an individual.⁷³ Of special interest in this context seems to be the commentary by William of Russell, who according to Libera openly challenges the theses by Ockham and the 'Occamistae', especially the one that states that the individuals of one species are by themselves (*se ipsis*) alike and dislike, and the one that in his view reduces the universal to a 'natural sign of the singular things' like smoke for a fire.⁷⁴ Russell's own stance is a hardened realist's. According to him, a logical universal has as its basis a truly existing common nature existing in a plurality of things in the outside world.⁷⁵

71 See Porphyry 1998, cxxxi–cxxxiv, taking as his point of reference a manuscript edited by Cl. Lafleur from c. 1230–1240.

72 Porphyry 1998, cxxxv–cxxxix.

73 Heinrich Totting von Oyta, *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii*, Q. 11: *Utrum necessario ad esse individui principium individuationis requiratur* (ed. J. Schneider).

74 Porphyry 1998, cxxxix.

75 'Est (...) universale logicum, quod est intentio communis fundata super rem communem, de pluribus praedicabilis. Est etiam universale metaphysicum, quod est illa res communis subiecta tali intentioni, quae est vera res existens in pluribus extra

But notwithstanding the fact that he is by no means original or unique in spending a few *questiones* on the *individuum*, Thomas Manlevelt stands apart from all other commentators in the prominence given to the individual-related questions.

In his commentary, the *questiones* dealing explicitly with the individual come right after the introductory *questiones* dealing with universals in general, and the *questiones* about the first among the predicables, the genus. In fact, in the tenth *questio*, *genus* and *individuum* are directly linked to each other, when Thomas Manlevelt explicitly raises the question whether genus differs from *individuum*. This may all seem evident enough, but it all depends on how one considers the *individuum*: whether *large* (in first intention) or *stricte* (in second intention).

The predicable generally taken to be of the least importance, the accident, is accordingly treated in the very last *questiones* of our commentary, but takes on an unexpected importance, when seen in the light of the individuality that is so important to Manlevelt's logical scheme of things. Is not the individual most properly characterized by its individual accidents?

In this, as in all matters, Thomas Manlevelt starts from an unmistakable Ockhamist stance. From there, however, he goes where no Ockhamist has gone before.

Individuality-related problems neither touched nor resolved in Manlevelt's commentary are those concerning the *principium individuationis*, which as already remarked is not really something an Ockhamist deems worthy to trouble our minds about, and those concerning our direct knowledge of individual things, which is an epistemological problem and not a logical one. Then, of course, problems like these are better reserved for commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and on the *De anima*, respectively. But Thomas Manlevelt shies away from no logical question concerning individuality. Throughout the commentary he tackles all kinds of questions, approaching all sides of the matter. Thus he has interesting things to say about the individual character of all reality. He presents *individuum* largely taken as a transcendent term.⁷⁶ He draws a sharp

animam.' Cited by Libera in Porphyry 1998, cxxxix, from A.D. Conti, 'A Short Scotist Handbook on Universals: The *Compendium super quinque universalialia* of William Russell, O.F.M., *Cahiers de l'Institut de Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin*, 44 (1983), 39–60. The citation is from page 46.

76 Q. 11 CONCL. 3, 9^{va}: 'Tertia conclusio est ista quod "individuum" large acceptum est transcendens. Ista statim patet quia "individuum" sic acceptum convertitur cum "ente".'

distinction between *individuum* in its *large* or first intentional sense, and *individuum* in its strict or second intentional sense,⁷⁷ and even seems to be discerning a strictest sense, meaning *individuum* taken personally.⁷⁸ The individualising tendency with Thomas Manlevelt is not restricted to the *res*-side of the matter, but is manifest on the *ratio*-side as well, in the way he stresses the concrete, individual character of references, propositions and knowledge.

But what does Manlevelt really mean by all this? The individual on the *res*-side: what does it look like? And the individual on the *ratio*-side: how does this function? What does the individual's central place in Manlevelt's thinking really amount to? Does it involve a turning upside-down of the relative value of the five predicables, accident being the distinguishing mark of the individual? It is a question commonly asked by all commentators coming before and after Thomas Manlevelt, also by those differing from him in intellectual outlook: in what measure does the individual add something to the species? And the answer would be: what is added is the accidental.⁷⁹ So it seems only natural that the relative value of the predicables is turned upside down when the individual is the centre of attention.⁸⁰

Being an Ockhamist, Thomas Manlevelt not only takes it for granted that reality is strictly individual in nature and in no sense common or universal – which is to say that in the outer world there are only individual things, and that all universality is to be confined to our concepts referring to these things – , but he also fully subscribes to Ockham's tenet

77 Q. 10 DIST., 8^{va}: 'Distinctio premittenda est ista quod iste terminus individuum potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet, large vel stricte. Large secundum quod est nomen prime intentionis, significans re(m) materialiter existentem sive istud sit signum sive res que non est signum. Stricte secundum quod est nomen secunde intentionis, significans signum quod significative sumptum non predicatur de pluribus saltem univoce. Et sic accipit Porphyrius individuum quando dicit quod individuum est quod predicatur de uno solo.'

78 Q. 11 CONCL. 5, 9^{va}: "'individuum" strictissime et propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis.'

79 See, for example, the titles of the 19th and 20th question of the early fourteenth century *Quaestiones super Isagogen Porphyrii* by the modist Radulphus Brito, as summed up by Libera in Porphyry 1998, cxxxvii f. Q. 19: 'Utrum individuum addat aliquid reale super speciem'. Q. 20: 'Utrum illud accidens quod individuum addit supra speciem includatur in significato individui.'

80 An altogether different topic would be the conventionality of written and spoken terms, which would add another dimension to the different ways of looking at things.

that ontologically, as an actual act of knowing, that is as an actual mental quality, a universal is really and truly an individual: ‘quodlibet universale est una res singularis.’⁸¹ Just like a spoken or written word is really an individual sound or blot of ink, while being universal insofar as it is the conventionally established sign of many things and is predicable of them, a mental concept is also really and truly an individual, while being universal insofar as it is a natural sign of many things.⁸²

What Manlevelt seems to have for his program is to draw out the consequences of this Ockhamist individualism on the conceptual side of affairs, and see what all this means for our possibility to gain knowledge of things.⁸³

5.5.2. *The accident*

Closely related to this emphasis on the individual is the attention paid by Manlevelt to all things accidental.

The forty-second out of forty-five *questiones libri Porhirii* is the first one directly concerned with the discussion of the fifth out of five predicables. It puts us in the middle of Manlevelt’s view of things real and things logical.

The subject matter of this *questio* is as traditional as can be: whether an accident can be present without the subject being destroyed.⁸⁴ Before answering this question however Manlevelt sets up three *distinctiones* in which he draws a sharp line between first and second intentions, between logic and reality.

81 William of Ockham, *Summa logicae* I, 14, *Opera Philosophica* I, p. 48.31.

82 On William of Ockham’s successive thoughts on the universal, see Maurer 1994. This concise rendering of Ockham’s view on the matter of universals fitting so neatly with our author’s view may count as a sure sign that Manlevelt indeed is an Ockhamist in any reasonable sense of that term.

83 See McCord Adams 1987, 105 ff. for an account of Ockham’s thoughts on the matter. Ockham, she explains, will be identifying each universal with a really existent mental act. In creatures, a mental act is a quality, namely, an accident inhering in a mental substance (*Summa logicae* I, c. 17 (*Opera Philosophica* I, 58, 60); *Quodlibeta* V, Q. 13 (*Opera Theologica* IX, 521)). Only particulars really exist. Hence, each mental act is a particular. All universals – genera, species, differentia, propria and accidents – are particular qualities, and hence: an accident. What makes names universal and what sorts them into one category rather than another is not what they *are*, but what and how they signify. All that really exists are particular substances and particular qualities.

84 Q. 42, 39^{vb}–40^{vb}: ‘Utrum aliquod accidens absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem.’

We should remember that to the medieval mind there existed only two things: the extramental world and our knowledge about it. And these are supposed to fit neatly together. Busying himself with the logical side of this bifurcated reality, Manlevelt works out the nominalist scheme to its utter Ockhamist consequences. The logical scheme and reality should fit one another like the proportionate mall fits a clay figure. But what if the clay of reality keeps slipping off the sides of the mall, no matter how hard you try to fit the one to the other? What if reality turns out to be a completely shapeless lump of clay once you try to lift the mall for even a second?

If the picture just presented is appropriate, it should give an indication of the out-of-the-way world-view Manlevelt's project results in. But a word of caution may be in order here. Manlevelt invariably takes one step back after presenting his most revolutionary ideas, and states that these are only a kind of thought-experiment. This can be interpreted as a sign of modesty, maybe, or as a sign of prudence. I feel inclined to be just as modest (or prudent) in presenting my interpretation of these rather wild ideas.

The program carried out by Thomas Manlevelt involves the consequent keeping apart of logic and extramental reality. And maybe it is not a coincidence that he stresses this bifurcation in this very *questio* on the accidents, by dedicating a set of *distinctiones* to it. But in the course of this *questio* Manlevelt at least gives the impression of being simply unable to uphold the strict bifurcation.

Yes, we get to see strange scenes unfold before our eyes, with the blurring of the border between logic and extramental reality: the whitening of a black-skinned Ethiopian,⁸⁵ a fire existing without heat, an animal losing his natural body-heat.⁸⁶ Are we not witnessing then the dawning of a Heraclitean sort of reality, in which everything tends to flood over into everything else? Everything seems to be constantly moving; nothing seems to remain the same from one instant to the next. And mixed into this Heraclitean frame is there not a hint of Anaxagoreism as well?

85 Q. 44 AD OPP., 43^{ra}: 'intellectus potest assentire huic propositioni "corvus est albus" et huic "Ethiops est albus", et hoc intellectis significatis vocabulorum, quia corvus et nigredo sunt res totaliter distincte, et nigredo non sequitur corvum nec Ethiopem ratione suorum principiorum essentialium, sed ratione alicuius complexionis accidentalis.'

86 Q. 42 CONCL. 4, 40^{rb}: 'Patet igitur quod sine omni caliditate potest ignis existere, et per consequens omnis caliditas est separabilis ab igne, et consimiliter sine omni calore naturali potest hoc animal existere.'

Might not all be all in all? With Manlevelt we have an Ockhamist setting eye on all this strangeness. But remarkably enough insights into the floating world not at all unlike those developed by Thomas Manlevelt are also traceable in the works of his contemporary Francis of Mayronnes, also known as the Prince of Scotists.⁸⁷ So the shift from a stable and solid Aristotelian worldview to a highly instable and fluent Heraclitean worldview, unexpected as its occurrence may be, was not at all limited to thinkers of a highly nominalist frame of mind, but occurred within the realist camp of Scotists as well.

In the first distinction preceding the body of Q. 42, Manlevelt distinguishes two ways in which an accident may be accepted. First, for the term that is predicated in an accidental manner, and in this way we have the fifth universal. Secondly, for a thing belonging to a subject with which it does not form a unity, and in this way we use the term in its first intention, signifying something in the outside world.⁸⁸ Thus, this preliminary distinction is just enough to draw a sharp enough line between the physical world and the world of logics; between the first intentions and the second intentions; between falsehood *de virtute sermonis* and truth *secundum intellectum auctoris*. In fact, it is the very subject-matter of this *questio* that is thus decided: whether an accident is present or absent without the subject being destroyed. For it is true not *de virtute sermonis* but *secundum intellectum auctoris*, who *means* to say that an accident *may* be present or absent without the subject being destroyed.⁸⁹

Maybe the distinction between the different ways in which an accident is accepted, will also shed some further light on the status of the individual thing, that is to say: the connection of the presumably 'stable' individual subject to its presumably changeable accidents.

Questio 42 has just that for its subject matter: can an accident be present and absent without the subject being destroyed? In other words: is this description of the accident given by Porphyry a correct one?

87 On Mayronnes, see Bos 2003.

88 Q. 42 DIST. 1, 40^{ra}: 'Prima distinctio est ista quod "accidens" accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, hoc est, non per se primo modo vel secundo modo dicendi per se. Et sic accidens est quintum universale. Et isto modo iste terminus "accidens" est nomen secunde intentionis. Alio modo accipitur "accidens" pro aliqua re inherente alicui subiecto cum quo non facit per se unum, sive talis res sit signum, sive non. Et sic iste terminus "accidens" est nomen prime intentionis.'

89 Q. 42 CONCL. 2, 40^{ra}: 'hec propositio: "accidens adest et abest etcetera" est vera secundum intellectum auctoris, quia stat loco istius "accidens potest adesse et abesse preter subiecti corruptionem".'

The twofold manner, then, in which ‘accident’ can be accepted, is in fact announced somewhat earlier in Manlevelt’s commentary, namely in the first distinction of the thirtieth *questio*, where the problem is raised whether one thing can differ from another by an inseparable accident.⁹⁰ Here it is stated simply that accident is accepted in a logical context for a term that is predicated in an accidental manner, and in the context of reality as a thing which inheres in a subject in an accidental manner.⁹¹ The full treatment however of this subject matter is in the forty-second *questio*.

First, ‘accident’ can be accepted as a term which is accidentally predicated. That is to say: a term which is not predicated *per se*, in the first nor the second way in which *per se* is said. These two ways in which a term can be predicated *per se* may need some clarification. This clarification is to be found elsewhere in Manlevelt’s commentary.⁹² In the first way a term is said to be predicated *per se* not according to any of the parts of the subject, but according to the subject as a whole; the second way according to a part of the subject. Thus, genus and species are predicated *per se primo modo*; *differentia* and *proprium* are predicated *per se secundo modo*. And accident is predicated *per se* neither *primo modo* nor *secundo modo*. For accident, as already indicated by its very name, is predicated not *per se* at all, but only accidentally.

90 Q. 30, 29^{va}–30^{tb}: ‘Utrum aliquid ab alio differat inseparabili accidente.’

91 Q. 30 DIST. 1, 29^{va}-b: ‘In ista questione primo premittitur distinctio de accidente reali et de accidente logicali, non quod sic differt, scilicet quod nullum accidens logicale sit accidens reale scilicet realiter alicui subiecto inherens, sed quod accidens logicale accipiatur tantummodo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, et reale pro re que accidentaliter inheret alicui subiecto, de quo plus dicitur capitulo de accidente.’

92 In the second distinction of the ninth *questio*, the two ways of predicating are discerned when considering the predication *in quid* and *in quale* in Q. 9 DIST. 2, 7^{vb}: ‘Secunda distinctio est ista quod predicari in quid vel predicari in quale accipitur dupliciter: uno modo primo, idest, non ratione alicuius partis, alio modo non primo, quia ratione alicuius partis.’ On *differentia* and *proprium* being predicated *per se secundo modo*, see for example the fourth conclusion of the thirty-seventh *questio*: ‘Quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla differenti a specifica est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species secundo modo per se, quia talis divisio potest fieri per proprium quod competit tali speciei per se secundo modo, ut si fiat talis divisio: animalium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile, in qua divisione nulla ponitur differentia specifica, et tamen genus dividitur in suas species, idest: per aliqua que contrahunt genus ad standum pecise pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc proprium “risibile” contrahit hoc genus “animal” ad standum precise proprie pro suppositis “hominis.”’

Secondly, ‘accident’ can be accepted as a thing inherent to a subject with which it does not form a unity on itself, whether such a thing is a sign, or not.

In the first manner, accident is the fifth universal, and the term ‘accident’ is a name of second intention.

In the second manner, the term ‘accident’ is a name of first intention, and is not to be confused with the fifth universal. Just like, as it is remarked in passing in the aforementioned distinction of the thirtieth *questio*, no logical accident is a real accident, in a real manner inhering in a subject.

‘Presence and absence’ and ‘subject of an accident’ are likewise accepted in the same twofold manner, that is to say: either in a real manner on the level of first intentions, meaning the real inherence or separation, or in a logical manner on the level of second intentions, meaning the affirmative or negative *divisio*.

Something is *logicaliter* said to be ‘present or absent’ by affirmative or negative division; *realiter* by real inherence or real separation.⁹³

And then ‘subject of an accident’ is *logicaliter* taken to be that of which an accident is accidentally predicated; *realiter* that in which an accident realiter inheres.

Taking this sharp distinction between logic and reality as his starting point, Manlevelt goes on to draw some conclusions that may be said to range from the over-obvious to the highly remarkable.

The first conclusion states the obvious, namely that the law of contradiction does not allow that an accident can be both present and absent, either in logic or in reality.⁹⁴ The famous definition of the accident as something that is present and absent without the subject being destroyed, is easily saved however, if we are prepared not to stick with its literal meaning, but take into account the intention of the author. And that is what Manlevelt does in the second conclusion. What is really meant by the definition is that the accident can be present and absent without the

93 Q. 42 DIST. 2, 40^{ra}: ‘Logicaliter aliquid dicitur “adesse et abesse” per divisionem affirmativam vel negativam, realiter per realem inherentiam vel per realem separationem.’

94 Q. 42 CONCL. 1, 40^{ra}: ‘Prima conclusio est ista quod nullum accidens adest et abest preter subiecti corruptionem, et hoc qualitercumque accipitur “accidens” sive “adesse et abesse”, quia ex hoc sequeretur quod aliquid competeret alicui et istud non competeret eidem, quod est manifesta contradictio, sicut pretangebatur (in) argumento principali.’

subject being destroyed.⁹⁵ And this is the interpretation that Manlevelt is to follow throughout his discussion of the famous definition.

As remarked before, this is not the first nor the only time that Thomas Manlevelt opposes the literal meaning, that is to say the meaning *de virtute sermonis*, to what is really meant by the author, that is to say the *intentio auctoris*.⁹⁶ In the thirtieth *questio*, for example, we read about an accident being inseparable in a general manner of speaking, but not in its literal sense.⁹⁷ Elsewhere the meaning *de virtute sermonis* is equated to the proper sense and opposed to the figurative sense: a certain proposition is held to be false *de virtute sermonis sive in sensu proprio*, but true *in sensu transsumptivo*.⁹⁸ A pair of opposites to be reckoned with in this context, although not to be equated to the opposition between the meaning *de virtute sermonis* versus the *intentio auctoris*, is the *actus exercitus* in opposition to the *actus significatus*. Both of these are logical acts, but whereas the proposition fulfilling an *actus exercitus* is to be identified by the use of e.g. the copula ‘est’, the proposition referring to an *actus significatus* is to be identified by the use of e.g. the verb ‘predicatur’. The difference between these two logical acts is succinctly brought to the fore by Nuchelmans: ‘The very act of predicating, of which the conventional copula indicates that it is being simultaneously performed by the speaker, may subsequently be made the object of a reflective predication of higher level in which the initial performed act is merely conceived of and described rather than effectively performed, and thus becomes an *actus significatus*.’⁹⁹ In the twenty-fifth *questio*, whether several men by participating in a species are one man,¹⁰⁰ the two pairs of

95 Q. 42 CONCL. 2, 40^{ra}: ‘Secunda conclusio est ista quod hec propositio: “accidens adest et abest etcetera” est vera secundum intellectum auctoris, quia stat loco istius “accidens potest adesse et abesse preter subiecti corruptionem”’

96 See above, section 3.4.

97 Q. 30 CONCL. 3, 29^{vb}: ‘si dicatur quod si hoc accidens sit inseparabile, igitur est non separabile, igitur non-separabile, dico quod ista propositio “hoc accidens est inseparabile” in communi locutione stat loco istius “hoc accidens ab aliquo subiecto est inseparabile”, et ideo, si cui placeat, potest distingui secundum amphiboliam, et dici in sensu propria et in sensu transsumptivo vera secundum quod iam declaratum.’

98 Q. 31 CONCL. 9, 31^{ra}: ‘conceditur communiter ista propositio: “Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime nullo termino existente”, que quidem proprie falsa est de virtute sermonis sive in sensu proprio, sed vera est in sensu transsumptivo. Et est sensus “Sortes et Plato habent formas similes ultimata similitudine”, et hoc extendendo nomen “similitudinis” ad substantiam.’

99 Nuchelmans 1987, 57.

100 Q. 25, 24^{va}–25^{va}: ‘Utrum participatione specie plures homines sunt unus homo.’

opposites happen to be nicely matched when it comes to interpreting the proposition that ‘several men are one man.’ In its proper sense, that is to say according to its meaning *de virtute sermonis*, we have to do with an *actus exercitus*. But taken not in its proper but in its figurative sense, we have to do with an *actus significatus*, and then the *intentio auctoris* can be reconstructed thus: of several men, that is to say, of several names of men is predicated ‘one man.’ ‘Sortes is one man,’ ‘Plato is one man,’ and so forth.¹⁰¹ This is not to say, of course, that in general there exists a one-to-one relationship between *actus significatus* and the *intentio auctoris* on the one hand, and *actus exercitus* and the *virtus sermonis* on the other hand.

Of course, the paired opposition between the *actus exercitus* as the literal meaning and the *actus significatus* as the intention of the author comes in very convenient for any nominalist trying to do away with all hints of realism. Ockham himself has made proper use of it on several occasions. He uses the opposition to lay out the ways in which genera and species can or cannot be said to be substances, and the ways in which substance can or cannot be said to be not in a subject. In at least one passage he explicitly links each of these logical acts to its proper intentional domain: the *actus exercitus* has to do with first intentions; the *actus significatus* with second intentions.¹⁰²

Manlevelt finishes off his treatment of the status of the diverse terms, and at the same time his commentary on the *Isagoge*, by securing the status of each and every predicable as accidents, in a way.¹⁰³ Accidents taken in their being of second intention, that is.

101 Q. 25 DIST. 2, 25^{ra}: ‘Secunda distinctio est ista quod ista propositio “plures homines sunt unus homo” est distinguenda eo quod poterit accipi in sensu proprio vel in sensu transsumptivo. Sensus proprius est actus exercitus, qui accipitur ex virtute sermonis et ex constructione grammaticali, sicut termini iacent. Sensus vero transsumptivus sive improprius est actus significatus, scilicet iste: de pluribus hominibus, hoc est, de pluribus nominibus hominum predicatur unus homo. Qui actus significatus debet sic exerceri: “iste homo est homo, et iste homo est homo, et sic de singulis”, vel sic: “Sortes est unus homo, Plato est unus homo, et sic de singulis”’

102 Ockham *Summa logicae* I 72; *Oph* I 222.216–228 on genera and species being substances; *Summa logicae* I 43, *Oph* I 123.7–16 and *Expositio in librum predicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 9, *Oph* II 184.67–73 on substance being in a subject. For an exposition of Ockham’s view on these matters, see Kaufmann 1994, 128 ff.

103 Q. 45 CONCL. 1, 43^{ra}: ‘omne genus substantiale est accidens, et omnis species substantialis, et omnis differentia, et omne proprium, quia quodlibet istorum est terminus, et ultra: igitur aliquod accidens est genus substantiale, et aliquod accidens est species, etcetera.’

The reason for this is that each term can be said to be used in an accidental manner to refer to something, up to the least likely candidate for such a way of referring: the substantial genus. Manlevelt does not have to look very far to find an example, for Aristotle provides him with the master, who only accidentally is called a man or an animal.¹⁰⁴ Essentially, of course, a master is the master of a slave. ‘Master’, in other words, is an item belonging to the category of relation. And for this reason ‘man’, being an item belonging to the category of substance, can only be predicated trans-categorically, that is to say, accidentally of ‘master’. So even the prime example of a substantial genus, animal, can be used in an accidental manner to refer to something, and therefore, in this way is an accident.

To push matters still a little further, Manlevelt even mentions God as being an accident in this way, for God is used in an accidental manner to refer to the knower of some proposition *A* – an item belonging to the category of relation.¹⁰⁵ It was already revolutionary for Manlevelt to hold that an accident can be truly ascribed to God, namely, ‘knowing the (contingent) proposition *A* at a time when this proposition *A* happens to be true’.¹⁰⁶ After all, in the very first *Questio* of this commentary on the *Isagoge* God was given full honour as being the First Science and First Cause, without Whom no knowledge whatsoever would be possible.¹⁰⁷ But now God himself, or at least the term ‘God’ is awarded the status of a mere accident. But if even a substantial genus is an accident, so is every substantial species, and every difference, and every property, for all of these are terms and as such are accidents, in the way that they are verified of something in an accidental manner, just like ‘man’ is verified in accidental manner of ‘master’.¹⁰⁸

104 Aristoteles, *Categoriae*, 7, 7a35–39, tr. Boethii: ‘ut si servus ad dominum dicitur, circumscriptis omnibus quae sunt accidentia domino, ut esse bipedem vel scientiae susceptibilem vel hominem, relicto vero solo dominum esse, semper servus ad illud dicitur; servus enim domini servus dicitur.’

105 Q. 45 CONCL. 1, 43^{ra}: ‘sicut “homo” est accidens domino, ita “Deus” est accidens scienti *A* propositionem.’

106 Q. 43 CONCL. 3, 41^{va}: ‘accidente isto modo accepto, scilicet, pro uno predicabili accidentaliter, Deo potest competere aliquod accidens, quia: capiatur ista propositio “Sortes sedet”, que tantum sit vera per unam horam, et vocetur *A*, tunc hoc accidens “sciens *A*” competit Deo, quia hec est vera: “Deus est sciens *A*”, et hoc accidens potest adesse Deo et potest abesse, sicut de se notum est.’

107 Q. 1 CONCL. 1, 1^{rb}: ‘prima scientia que est prima causa est necessaria, et sine ipsa nulla cognitio potest haberi.’

108 In his two-volume study on Aristotle’s semantics and ontology, De Rijk makes a case for an onomastic approach to Aristotle’s ‘speaking about things’. That is to say, the

Of course, all terms are not accidents in every sense of the term ‘accident’. In this context, Manlevelt distinguishes three senses of ‘accident’, the first one being the sense in which all predicables – as terms – are accidents because they are verified of something in an accidental manner. The second sense of ‘accident’ is the well-known one of being able to be there or not be there without the subject being destroyed, for example ‘sitting’ as an accident of ‘man’. And the third sense in which something extrinsic which is an accident is in reality inherent in a subject, such as for example the term ‘black’ connotes something extrinsic to a raven, which is realiter in the raven as an accident in a subject.

The second sense, needless to say, is not the sense in which any substantial genus is an accident. For of whatever subject the term ‘animal’ is predicated in a true manner, of this same subject ‘animal’ cannot be veritably denied without the subject being destroyed in the process.

What are we to make of this? Is this just an innocent device by Manlevelt, to hold that every predicable in a sense is only an accident? Or does this conclusion weigh heavier, if only we take in account the place it takes our text, namely, as its finale?

The least one can say is that the link between terms and reality tends to look rather thin, if the linking takes place on an accidental level only. Of course, adhering to a conventional relationship linking the terms to reality is nothing unusual. In fact, it is the Aristotelian manner of seeing these things. But is Manlevelt not taken (albeit with some reserve) to be the author of a treatise, devastating to the modist way of thinking?¹⁰⁹ Might not, then, his stressing of the merely *accidental* status of the five Porphyrian *predicables* when applied to the real world, be a thinly-disguised way of criticising the ‘natural’ link supposed to exist between terms and things by some, presumably the modists so severely attacked by him in another context? But I am entering the field of speculation here.

basic mental activity involved on this score, according to De Rijk 2002a, 404, should be taken in terms of onomastics (‘naming’, ‘appellating’), rather than, as is commonly done, in terms of apophantics (‘sentence predication’ and ‘statement-making’). Should perhaps Thomas Manlevelt’s approach be taken in terms of onomastics as well? And would Manlevelt then be immune to De Rijk’s verdict on present-day scholars like Cohen, Matthews and Bäck, namely that their apophantically inspired conclusions about Aristotle are ‘entirely beside the point?’ (De Rijk 2002a, 407) This would be a fruitful matter of future investigation, that can best be undertaken on the occasion of the critical edition of Thomas Manlevelt’s *Questiones super Predicamenta*, which I intend to produce as a follow-up to the present edition.

¹⁰⁹ See above, section 2.1 on the anti-modist *Tractatus de improbatione modorum significandi*.

5.5.3. *The general structure of the text*

The foregoing interpretation of Manlevelt's intentions may serve as a starting point and a guiding thread for future studies, in which any one of his basic themes could be scrutinized. To finish off this Introduction, first the general structure of his text needs examining. The general grouping of *questiones* in Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* then is as follows.

QQ. 1–4 are concerned with general questions about our knowledge of the universals as related to our knowledge of the categories, and to our capacity to make divisions and definitions, and about the location of universals in our intellect.

The first universal, *genus*, is treated in QQ. 5–13, with QQ. 11–13 concentrating on the individual rather than the genus.

The second universal, *species*, is treated within the context of QQ. 14–27, with QQ. 20 and 24 again concerning itself with the individual, and QQ. 21–23 with more general themes like the *transcendentia*, the exact number of *genera*, and the highest *genera*.

The third universal, *differentia*, gets ample treatment in no less than thirteen consecutive *questiones*: QQ. 28–40.

The fourth universal, *proprium*, is awarded one *questio*: Q. 41.

The last four *questiones*, QQ. 42–45 are dedicated to the fifth universal, *accidens*.

5.5.4. *A comparison to other questiones-commentaries on the Isagoge*

It is up to future investigations to thematically probe a little deeper into the text of Manlevelt's commentary. Meanwhile, a bird's eye one-by-one view on the respective *questiones* may already give an indication as to what problems are raised and solved in the text to follow.

In fact, the mere enumeration of the *questiones* asked by Thomas Manlevelt about Porphyry's text and the comparing of these *questiones* to tables of contents of *questiones*-commentaries by fellow-nominalists¹¹⁰ is enough to strengthen my conviction that Manlevelt was a nominalist of an Ockhamist denomination.

¹¹⁰ This quick scan of question-titles is a not uncommon short-cut to obtain a good first impression of a questions-commentary. Kenny and Pinborg 1982, 30: 'The selection of *tituli* (*questionis*) reflects current interests, and so a mere list of questions is often indicative of the time and place of origin of the commentary.'

I will limit my attention to three examples.¹¹¹ John Buridan and Albert of Saxony are two philosophers whose names are frequently mentioned in connection with Thomas Manlevelt; Henry Totting of Oyta's views on logic have not recently been studied, but on first sight a comparison between his and Manlevelt's views may be worthwhile. Let us see to what questions the *Isagoge* gave rise to for John Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Henry Totting of Oyta, respectively.¹¹²

John Buridan: *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii*:¹¹³

1. Utrum logica sit scientia;
2. Utrum logica sit scientia speculativa vel practica;
3. Utrum universale sit subiectum proprium in libro Porphyrii;
4. Utrum universalia sint substantiae;
5. Utrum ista propositio 'animal est genus' vel 'homo est species' debeat concedi vel negari;
6. Utrum propositio in qua subicitur terminus materialiter sumptus sit universalis particularis indefinita vel singularis;
7. Utrum definitio generis sit bona;
8. Utrum definitio speciei sit bona;
9. Utrum definitio individui sit bona;
10. De arbore Porphyrii;
11. Utrum definitio differentiae sit bona quam ponit Porphyrius;
12. Utrum definitio proprii sit bona quam ponit Porphyrius;
13. Utrum definitio accidentis sit bona;

¹¹¹ Otherwise a comparison to, e.g. the *Tractatus de universalibus* by Ockham's critic Wyclif might have come into consideration. Wyclif does round off the fifteen chapters of his treatise with four chapters discussing six questions, whose enumeration do not promise much in the way of a concordance between Manlevelt's logico-semantical inspired treatment of the universals and Wyclif's seemingly more theologically-orientated interest in the matter: 1. – Is substance said univocally of primary and secondary substances?; 2. – Can a universal be generated, changed, or created?; 3. – Is annihilation compatible with the postulation of universals as set out above?; 4. What are we to say about specific distinctions?; 5. – Whether genus and species could be fuller, or extend over more suppositis than they do now?; 6. – Is everything universal? And if so, is it not superfluous to posit universals of the second intention of nature? (John Wyclif 1985, 125–178)

¹¹² A similar comparison between the mere tables of contents of commentaries on the *Isagoge* by Martin of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito and William Russell is given by Libera in Porphyry 1998 cxxxv ff.; somewhat deeper goes the comparison of Andrew of Cornwall's questions on the *Isagoge* with the Porphyry questions by Simon of Faversham and John Duns Scot in Andrews 1999.

¹¹³ Source: John Buridan 1986.

14. Utrum sint quinque praedicabilia non plura neque pauciora;
15. Utrum universale sit genus ad quinque praedicabilia seu universalia;
16. Utrum genus species differentia et proprium suscipiant magis et minus sicut et accidens.

John Buridan: *Tractatus de differentia universalis ad individuum (pars secunda)*, a.k.a. *Duae quaestiones de universali*:¹¹⁴

1. Utrum universale sit actu praeter animam;
2. Utrum universale sit praeter animam unum unitate alia ab unitate numerali.

Albert of Saxony: *Alberti de Saxoniam Quaestiones in Porphyrii librum praedicabilium*:¹¹⁵

PROOEMIUM:

1. Utrum de quinque praedicabilibus sit una scientia;
2. Utrum universale sit proprium subiectum scientiae huius;
3. Utrum quodlibet universale sit ens;
4. Utrum hic terminus universale sit genus ad quinque universalia;
5. Utrum isti termini genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens et individuum possint definiri;
6. Utrum praedicabilia sint quinque et non plura neque pauciora;
ALBERTI PARVI QUAESTIO UNICA DE GENERE:
7. Utrum definitio generis sit bona;
ALBERTI PARVI QUAESTIO PRIMA DE SPECIE:
8. Utrum definitio speciei quam ponit Porphyrius sit bona;
QUAESTIO SECUNDA [DE SPECIE]:
9. Utrum definitio individui quam ponit Porphyrius sit bona;
QUAESTIO TERTIA [DE SPECIE]:
10. Utrum haec propositio sit vera, scilicet 'aliquis homo est species';
ALBERTI PARVI QUAESTIO UNICA [DE DIFFERENTIA]:
11. Utrum definitio differentiae sit bona;
ALBERTI PARVI QUAESTIO UNICA DE PROPRIO:
12. Utrum definitio proprii sit bona;
QUAESTIO UNICA DE ACCIDENTI ALBERTI PARVI:
13. Utrum definitio accidentis sit bona.

¹¹⁴ Source: John Buridan 1987.

¹¹⁵ Source: García 1988.

Henry Totting of Oyta: *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii*:¹¹⁶

1. Utrum notitia quinque universalium sit inter species scientiae collocanda;
2. Utrum universale sit subiectum scientiae Porphyrii;
3. Utrum obiecta scientifica conclusionum in Porphyrio traditarum sint omnibus incomplexis significantibus realiter condistincta;
4. Utrum cognitio quinque universalium sit necessaria et ad cognitionem praedicamentorum, ad diffinitionem et ad divisionem, nec non ad ea, quae requiruntur ad demonstrationem;
5. Utrum universale sit aliqua res extra animam, ab omnibus suis singularibus participatum;
6. Utrum sint tantum quinque universalia;
7. Utrum universale sit genus ad quinque universalia, ista scilicet genus, species, differentia, proprium et accidens;
8. Utrum genus sit principium specierum sub se contentarum;
9. Utrum diffinitio generis a Porphyrio data sit bona;
10. Utrum unum individuum sit tantum de uno solo praedicabile;
11. Utrum necessario ad esse individui principium individuationis requiratur;
12. Utrum diffinitio speciei specialissimae data a Porphyrio sit bona;
13. Utrum species possit salvari tantum unico ipsius individuo existente;
14. Utrum ens dicatur univoce de decem praedicamentis;
15. Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo;
16. Utrum inferius possit praedicari de suis superioribus;
17. Utrum aliquid differt a seipso differentia communiter dicta;
18. Utrum differentia specifica sive differentia inter proprie dicta habeat facere diversitatem essentialem entium specificis distinctorum;
19. Utrum differentia sit divisiva generis et constitutiva speciei;
20. Utrum aliqua diffinitionum differentiae a Porphyrio datarum sit bona et convertibiliter conveniens eidem;
21. Utrum diffinitio proprii a Porphyrio data sit bona, ista scilicet: 'Proprium inest soli omni et semper';
22. Utrum omne proprium realiter sit distinctum ab eo, cuius est proprium;

¹¹⁶ Source: Henry Totting of Oyta 1979.

23. Utrum diffinitio accidentis data a Porphyrio, scilicet quod 'adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem', sit bona;
24. Utrum corvus potest intelligi albus et Aethiops nitens candore.

Thomas Manlevelt: *Questiones libri Porphirii*:

1. Utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam;
2. Utrum scire quid sit genus etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem faciendam;
3. Utrum noscere quid sit genus sit necessarium ad assignationem diffinitionem.;
4. Utrum universale sit (in) intellectu;
5. Utrum genus sit equivocum.;
6. Utrum genus sit cui supponitur species, et hoc est querere utrum illa diffinitio generis sit bene data;
7. Utrum genus sit principium suarum specierum;
8. Utrum genus predicetur de pluribus differentibus specie;
9. Utrum omne genus predicatur in quid;
10. Utrum genus differat ab individuo;
11. Utrum individuum predicetur de uno solo;
12. Utrum aliquod individuum sit terminus communis;
13. Utrum proprietas unius individui inveniatur in altero;
14. Utrum species sit res distincta a termino sive a signo;
15. Utrum homo sit species animalis;
16. Utrum genus et species sint sibi invicem relativa;
17. Utrum in diffinitione speciei sit necesse poni genus;
18. Utrum ista diffinitio speciei 'species est que predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit', sit bona;
19. Utrum omne quod est ante individua, sit species specialissima;
20. Utrum individuum sit nomen appellativum;
21. Utrum unum sit genus omnium; hoc est querere, utrum talia transcendentia aliquid, res, ens, sint genera;
22. Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora;
23. Utrum genera generalissima sint principia rerum;
24. Utrum infinita relinquenda sint ab arte;
25. Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo;
26. Utrum inferiora predicentur de superioribus;
27. Utrum species sit pars generis;
28. Utrum aliquid differat a seipso;
29. Utrum aliqua substantia differat ab alia separabili accidente;

30. Utrum aliquid ab alio differat inseparabili accidente;
31. Utrum differentia specifica semper faceat aliquid ab alio differre specie;
32. Utrum omne faciens per se differre sit differentia specifica;
33. Utrum differentia per se suscipit magis et minus;
34. Utrum hec differentia 'animatum sensibile' sit constitutiva substantie animalis;
35. Utrum hec differentia 'immortale' sit constitutiva Dei;
36. Utrum eadem differentia sit discretiva generis et constitutiva speciei;
37. Utrum differentia specifica sit necessaria ad divisionem generis;
38. Utrum differentia specifica sit necessaria ad diffinitionem faciendam;
39. Utrum ista diffinitio differentie sit bene data: 'differentia est qua abundat species a genere';
40. Utrum aliqua alia diffinitio differentie convertitur cum differentia;
41. Utrum proprium dicatur quadrupliciter;
42. Utrum aliquod accidens absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem;
43. Utrum ex subiecto et accidente componatur aliquod per se unum;
44. Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus;
45. Utrum aliquod accidens sit genus substantiale.

As I set out at the beginning of this chapter,¹¹⁷ certain *questiones* receive a more complex treatment than others; they may contain sub-arguments and reports of alternative positions.¹¹⁸ It is Andrews's readily to be endorsed surmise that this sort of complexity grows out of a tradition of successive treatments of an issue. It is generally previous authors and their opinions that are responsible for alternative opinions inserted into the ordinary progression of argument. Increased complexity is then a sure sign that we are getting further along in the chain of development of tradition. An obvious mark of continuous tradition is similarity of questions, which is all the more remarkable when the questions are only loosely prompted by the original text. Similarities in preliminary arguments do not so much argue direction of influence, but do indicate a shared tradition.¹¹⁹

117 This Introduction, section 5.1.

118 As indicated in section 5.1, this applies especially to *questiones* 19, 21, 32, 41 and 44.

119 Andrews 1999, 108.

The outcome then is that common arguments and turns of phrase are the signs of direct influence. Therefore, if it so happens that one author quotes and rejects views which another author sets forth as his considered opinion, one can be sure that the first author has read the other, and not the other way around.¹²⁰

Keeping this in mind, I will confine myself now to a bird's eye view of the lists of *questiones*. What is to be seen then is that the commentaries by John Buridan and Albert of Saxony more or less form a pair, and the commentaries by Thomas Manlevelt and Henry Totting of Oyta more or less the other pair.

Albert and John seem content to run through the definitions given of the respective universals, while refraining from going into matters too loosely prompted by Porphyry's original text. Of the thirteen questions posed by Albert, no less than ten are also to be found in John's commentary. Of course this is largely to be explained by the superficiality of their questioning, but when Albert and John do distance themselves somewhat from Porphyry's text, their questions are also similar when the one commentary is compared to the other. That concerning the number of universals is to be found with John as Q. 14, with Albert as Q. 6. True, Henry poses the same question in his Q. 6, but Manlevelt instead of this raises the same question about the number of categories in his Q. 22.

There are differences as well. For example, John on a par with Thomas and Henry is consequently speaking only of universals, while Albert speaks about predicables as well as universals.

Henry chooses a somewhat more traditional opening to his commentary than Thomas does by raising a couple of preliminary questions concerning the scientific status of an investigation into the universals, omitted by the author of the present text. As soon however as it is the universals themselves that are at issue, Henry is remarkably close to Thomas in the questions that he raises.

Thomas's first three *questiones*,¹²¹ concerning the necessity of knowing the universals for building up scientific knowledge, are taken up together by Henry in Q. 4,¹²² while Thomas's Q. 4, whether a universal is in

120 Andrews 1999, 109 ff.

121 Circa initium Porphirii, utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam; Utrum scire quid sit genus etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem faciendam; Utrum noscere quid sit genus sit necessarium ad assignationem diffinitionem.

122 Utrum cognitio quinque universalium sit necessaria et ad cognitionem praedica-

the intellect, is rephrased by Henry as Q. 5: whether a universal is something extramental. Both have a *questio* (Thomas's Q. 7 and Henry's Q. 8, respectively) on genus as the principle of its species. Whether an individual is predicated of only one is Thomas's Q. 11 and Henry's Q. 10. An explicit question on an individuating principle is raised by Henry (Q. 11), but not by Thomas. The answering of Henry's Q. 14, whether being is said univocally of the ten categories, plays a pivotal role in Thomas's Q. 21, whether there is one genus of all things. The wording of Q. 15 by Henry is exactly the same as Thomas's Q. 25: 'Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo'. From there on both philosophers go on to ask whether inferiors can be predicated of superiors (Thomas Q. 26, Henry Q. 16). Whether something differs from itself is again a question taken up by Henry (Q. 17) and Thomas (Q. 28) alike. Henry's Q. 18 and Thomas's Q. 37 both seem to turn on the necessity of the specific difference for the division of a genus, while the more general question whether differentia is dividing the genus and constituting the species is asked in Q. 19 (Henry) and Q. 36 (Thomas) respectively. Apart from a few more general *questiones* shared by both, attention should also be drawn to Henry's last *questio* (Q. 24), 'Utrum corvus potest intelligi albus et Aethiops nitens candore', echoing Thomas's penultimate *questio* (Q. 44) 'Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus'.

Henry Totting of Oyta is not one of the best-researched among the late-medieval philosophers, but with all due provisions one can be fairly sure that he was an Ockhamist (if one is allowed to use this label) working in Prague, Paris and Vienna in the second half of the fourteenth century.¹²³ In the introduction to his edition of the *Quaestiones in Isagen Porphyrii* Schneider draws some interesting parallels with Ockham's thoughts on the matters touched upon by Henry.¹²⁴ A comparison between Henry's commentary and that by Thomas Manlevelt promises to be even more interesting. Here there is a striking similarity of *questiones*, which is all the more remarkable because the questions are only loosely prompted by the original text. In other words: what shows itself here according to the criteria laid down by Andrews is an obvious mark of a continuous tradition. A closer textual scrutiny of both texts should

mentorum, ad diffinitionem et ad divisionem, nec non ad ea, quae requiruntur ad demonstrationem.

¹²³ For information on Oyta, it is still Lang 1937 we best turn to.

¹²⁴ Henry Totting of Oyta 1979, 3 ff.

reveal any similarity in preliminary arguments to further strengthen the plausibility of this shared tradition. It might even be that this particular tradition was started by Manlevelt himself, just like the tradition concerning the so-called ‘descensus copulatin’ was supposedly started by him and then picked up by Albert of Saxony.¹²⁵ Ideally, such scrutiny of both authors’ commentaries on the *Isagoge* will bring to light some signs of direct influence in the form of common arguments and turns of phrase. It will be interesting to find out if the one author (Henry) does indeed quote and reject views which the other author (Thomas) sets forth as his considered opinion – the surest sign one can wish for that the one may have read the other.

5.5.5. *Thomas Manlevelt’s commentary, questio by questio*

Let us not get carried away. Let me begin with taking a look at the text to be edited below. Thomas Manlevelt – I have made this remark before – does not start his investigation by raising the traditional questions either on the very subject of the treatise, the universal as such, or on the status of logic as a science. Instead, in Q. 1 he places the subject matter¹²⁶ of the first and second halves of his commentary on the Old Logic in perspective: is it necessary to know about the universals (i.e. the subject matter of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, commented on in the present text, the *Questiones libri Porphirii*) to have complete knowledge of the categories (i.e. the subject matter of Aristotle’s treatise, commented on in the *Questiones super Predicamenta*). What strikes the reader about this very first *questio* is the unconcerned way in which God is brought up in a logical context.¹²⁷

In QQ. 2 and 3 one learns that knowledge of the universals is necessary to completely be able to make logical divisions and definitions.¹²⁸ In short, without knowing the universal there would be no science whatsoever.

125 See above, subsection 2.2.7 of this Introduction, for the discussion by Read, Brands and Kann on this particular topic.

126 Every field of scholastic science has its own *subiectum*. This *subiectum* lends a unity to a particular science, distinguishes a particular science from other sciences, fixes a place for this particular science within the whole of all sciences, and so forth. For a discussion of this *subiectum* as it was looked upon around the year 1300, with an emphasis on the *subiectum* of theology, see Krop 1987, 33 ff.

127 Q. 1 DIST. 1, 1^{rab}; Q. 1 CONCL. 6, 1^{va}.

128 To put it in a few words, *divisio* (division) is simply the way to descend from a highest genus to its lowest species – by doing what the word says: making divisions. Just as categorizing is simply the way to ascend from the lowest species to the highest

In Q. 4 it is stated that the mental universal,¹²⁹ which is a natural universal, is in the mind in a subjective manner,¹³⁰ and that two such universals may be in the mind simultaneously. The attention paid to the respective universals in the process of knowing presents itself as a topic, which is to recur in the remainder of Manlevelt's text. More will have to be said about this in future studies. Note the token-character of the universals in actual use,¹³¹ and the tendency towards a psychological-epistemological account of logic. Manlevelt seems to be breaking new ground here, oddly foreshadowing the psychologically oriented logic of Port-Royal by some centuries.

Q. 5 presents us with the rather disturbing conclusion that 'genus' is equivocal, and even that a concept in a sense is equivocal.¹³² This matter

genus – by putting things together. That which divides a genus, constitutes a species, in Porphyry's treatment of the predicables. Now the theory of the predicables, which was universally held to be the proper introduction to Aristotle's treatment of the categories, was exemplified by the tree of Porphyry. But this tree of Porphyry was the result of a dichotomizing process of division, taking one of the categories, substance, as its starting point. So in a way the theory of division seems to be even more basic than the theory of the predicables. No wonder, then, that division, the theory of which was developed by Boethius, is generally accorded an important role in the medieval scheme of thinking. In his treatise *De divisione* Boethius provided not only medieval logic but all of medieval philosophy with some of its basic conceptual tools. It is a study of different sorts of division – e.g. the division of a genus into its species or the division of a whole into its integral parts – and as such forms an important part of the logical heritage on which the scholastic period built. Boethius' *De divisione* was indeed part of the canon of the *logica vetus*, which means that all subsequent medieval philosophizing on the subject was wont to take this tract as its starting point. Logical divisions and definitions, then, are more or less complementary ways of classifying terms or concepts. Simply put, division is the laying out of a term or concept in its underlying terms or concepts (for example: a genus in its respective species). Thus: animals (genus) are either rational animals (species) or irrational animals (species). Definition is the pinning down of a term or concept by combining the genus it belongs to with its specific difference. Thus: a man (species) is an animal (genus) that is rational (difference). Much more about this in Manlevelt's own distinctions on divisions in Q 2, 2^{ra} and on definitions in Q 3, 2^{vb}.

129 A universal as it is to be found functioning within our mind, in contrast to its being found functioning in writing or speech.

130 That is to say: as an accident inhering in a subject.

131 A token in this sense is an individual instance of a universal. For a clear exposition of the narrowed particular meaning of an utterance-token in a particular context in juxtaposition to the general meaning of an utterance-type, see Nuchelmans 1973, 4. See also above, section 1.3, especially the foot-note relative to this subject.

132 A term is called equivocal, in a generally accepted Aristotelian manner, if the one term goes with different meanings. In the first *distinctio* to Q. 12 'utrum aliquod individuum sit terminus communis' (10^{vb}), Manlevelt gives a general definition of equivocity in a common noun: "Commune equivocum" dicitur istud quod competit

is taken up in some detail in the second *questio* of the commentary on the *Categories*: ‘*utrum aliquis conceptus sit equivocus*’, added as an appendix to the present edition. This is certainly a matter deserving further study.¹³³

Q. 6 states the relationship between *genus* and *species*: there are always more than one *species* to one *genus*. The exact way *species* are contained under a *genus* is explained in Q. 7. Furthermore, in Q. 6 one learns that *species* underlie being as well as *genus*. A sharp line is drawn between *genus* as a building block in our conceptual framework, and things in reality falling under a *genus*.

The conclusions of Q. 8 definitely stand in need of further investigation. Is every genus by itself predicated¹³⁴ of several things (first conclusion), or is no genus so predicated (fourth conclusion)? And is every genus predicated of several things by some significate of it (sixth conclusion), or is no genus thus predicated? Might this apparent contradiction have anything to do with different levels of supposition?¹³⁵ The three main types of supposition do play an important role in the settlement of several questions to come.¹³⁶

pluribus ratione diversorum conceptuum, sive isti conceptus sint simplices, sive compositi, ita videlicet quod istud commune competit uni mediante uno conceptu simplici, et alteri mediante alio, et tertio mediante tertio, quamvis ex istis conceptibus unus conceptus componatur’. A more detailed exposition of the diverse types of equivocation is given here in the distinctio to Q. 5 ‘*utrum genus sit equivocum*’ (5^{ra}).

133 The more interesting is this theorizing about the possibility of there being equivocal concepts, as this seems to be a glaring contradiction to what Ockham holds: ‘*Aequivocatio vero nullo modo est conceptuum*’. (*Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 19. *Opera Philosophica* pars II, 266).

134 Predicating is the labelling of a certain thing by a certain term. What is at stake here is whether the highly individual things in the outside world can be adequately labelled by such a highly general term as a genus happens to be. Further on in his commentary, in the distinctio to Q. 26 ‘*utrum inferiora predicentur de superioribus*’ (26^{ra-7b}) Manlevelt makes a distinction between predicating in a large sense and in a strict sense. In a large sense, it extends to all kinds of predication, whether true or false, affirmative or negative, etc. In a strict sense, it is restricted to affirmative, true predication.

135 Supposition in medieval logico-semantic theory is the way a term in a proposition stands for something. This something can be either a thing or things in the outside world (personal supposition), or the concept itself (simple supposition), or the word itself in its written or spoken form (material supposition). As remarked in footnote 99 to subsection 2.2.7 above, Dutilh Novaes has recently proposed an intensional interpretation of at least Ockham’s theory of supposition, contrary to the more common referential interpretation (Dutilh Novaes 2008).

136 Thomas Manlevelt delivered some short but highly influential tracts on the ‘new’ logic while lecturing in Paris in the 1320’s. One of these tracts, explicitly referred

In Q. 9 it is explained that every genus is essentially predicated. This does mean that a genus cannot also be predicated *in quale*. This is made

to in our commentary on the *Isagoge*, was on the theory of supposition (Q. 25, AD 3., 25^{va}). The commentary on the *Isagoge* does not contain any theorizing about supposition, apart from a main dividing of supposition into material, personal and simple in the *distinctio* to Q. 15 'utrum homo sit species animalis' (14^{vb}), but a theory of supposition is presupposed by the scant references to supposition made use of in the commentary. For example, throughout Q. 26 'utrum inferior predicentur de superioribus' (25^{vb}–26^{vb}) use is made of the diverse subtypes of personal supposition, also in relation to the predicate or the copula in a proposition. It will be worthwhile to see in how far these references are compatible with the elaborate theory presented in Manlevelt's tract on supposition, once its critical edition is published. The contents of Manlevelt's tract on supposition, meanwhile, are neatly brought into a diagram by Maierù 1972, 314. This diagram visualizes four levels of division and subdivision of supposition, according to Manlevelt. The first and main division is into material, simple and personal supposition. Of these three, only personal supposition is further subdivided, first into determinate, distributed and confused personal supposition. Then confused personal supposition is further subdivided into merely confused personal supposition and confused and distributive personal supposition. Finally, the confused and distributive personal supposition is again subdivided into mobile and immobile. The first thing to be remarked about the initial threefold division of supposition as advocated by Thomas Manlevelt is that it is very much like the schematization to be distilled from Ockham's *Summa logicae*. (For a visualization, see Spade 2002, 274.) The only differences are that before making the tripartite division into simple, material and personal supposition, Ockham distinguishes between proper and improper supposition, and that he infuses one level of division of the personal supposition: personal division is first subdivided into discrete and common personal supposition, and then common supposition is further subdivided into determinate and confused, whereas Manlevelt skips the common personal supposition. Ockham's distinction between proper and improper supposition is not worked out in too many details, and needs not distract us. Suffice it to say that with improper supposition we have to think of the reference a term has when it is used figuratively and not literally. If Ockham's discrete personal supposition is roughly to be equated to Thomas Manlevelt's distributed personal supposition, the pictures of both schematizations completely match. An even more perfect match to Ockham's scheme, down to every detail of the personal supposition, is to be found with Albert of Saxony, who however makes no mention of improper supposition. This Albert of Saxony is worth mentioning if only because according to Brands 1996 he has severely criticized Thomas Manlevelt's theory. But a possible misunderstanding must be put aside now. From the likeness of the schematizations of the supposition theories by Manlevelt, Ockham and Albert of Saxony the impression might arise that all medieval theories of supposition were alike, and that all of them started off with a tripartite division of supposition into simple, material and personal division. But the truth is far from that. Spade (2002, 272–275) put in diagrams the divisions of supposition proper by medieval thinkers from the thirteenth century handbook-writer Peter of Spain (d. 1277) onward, and a quick glance at these diagrams shows that this threefold division was to be found with hardly anyone apart from the three nominalists just mentioned. This picture is confirmed by the diagrams in Maierù 1972, 306–317.

clear by the example of the genus ‘coloured’, that is predicated *in quale* of substance, albeit in an accidental manner.¹³⁷

Q. 10, which most certainly stands in need of a fuller treatment than it is rewarded in this bird’s eye view, addresses the key matter of Manlevell’s undertaking: whether genus (the most all-compassing of universals) differs from individuum (the least all-compassing of predicates, and therefore not even counted among the universals, even though it may seem to get a hint of the status of a universal in the enumeration referred to before).¹³⁸ As names of first intention,¹³⁹ genus and individuum do not differ, both signifying beings in reality which, after all, are all individual in nature. Here as in so many other places, one is again reminded that the generality of the universals is in their second-intentional use, not in their first-intentional use. In their first-intentional use, all universals signify things in reality, which are individual in nature. In their second-intentional use, all five universals signify signs or names which in their turn, and significatively taken, are predicated of more than one of these individual things. (Each occurrence of these signs, one should keep in mind while studying Manlevell’s commentary on the *Isagoge*, is an individual occurrence of such a particular sign – whether spoken, written or mental.)

That is why in Q. 11 it is stated that individuum in its strict sense (i.e. in its second-intention use) is univocally predicated of more than one thing. It is, namely, predicated univocally of so many signs that in their turn, and significatively taken, are predicated of only one thing.

Q. 11 nicely lends itself to a comparison with Manlevell’s undisputedly authentic tract on supposition; by which it will turn out that the countering of the second initial argument is in full accordance with

137 Q 9 CONCL. 2, 7^{vb}: ‘aliquod genus predicatur in quale in primo, sicut patet de hoc genere “coloratum”, quod predicatur in quale de substantia.’ Q 9 AD 4., 8^{ra}: ‘genus predicatur tam in quid quam in quale de suis propriis speciebus, sicut hoc genus “corpus animatum” (...). Predicatur etiam genus in quale accidentale quamvis non de suis speciebus.’

138 Q 37 CONCL. 5, 36^{rb} that is: ‘(...) omne quod dividit genus, vel est species, vel individuum, vel est proprium, vel accidens, vel differentia specifica.’

139 Simply put, as a name of first intention a term itself refers to things in the outside world. As a name of second intention a term refers not to a thing in the outside world, but to a concept or a term which (as a name of first intention) in its turn refers to things in the outside world. Thus, ‘man’ in ‘I see a man in the street’ is a name of first intention, while ‘man’ is a name of second intention in ‘Man is a species.’

that tract. The third and final conclusion of Q. 11 treats *individuum* in its first-intention use as a transcendent term.¹⁴⁰

The fifth conclusion of Q. 11 brings up an interesting argument about the shared individuality of the whole Sortes and Sortes except his finger.¹⁴¹ This argument was to be further developed in the mid-fourteenth century by William of Heytesbury and Albert of Saxony. It has recently been named the ‘Socrates-Minus Argument’.¹⁴²

Q. 12, whether *individuum* is a general term, offers some distinctions on univocity and equivocity, in their relationship to generality.¹⁴³ Thomas Manlevelt seems to toy with the possibility of there being equivocal concepts – a theme taken up in Q. 2 of his commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, to be added as an appendix to the present edition. His conclusions

140 A transcendent term, in this context, is a term that is applicable to everything there is in the outside world, like ‘being’, ‘something’, ‘thing’. Now what can be said of all things (*ens, unum, verum, bonum*, sometimes supplemented with *res* and/or *aliquid*, the last two originally stemming from Avicenna), can be said of several things as well. But on the other hand, what can be said of several things cannot always be said of all things. On this simple truth rests the distinction drawn by Ockham, which allows him to say in a straightforward manner why ‘ens’ cannot be one of the categories: ‘accipiendo “universale” pro illo quod praedicatur de pluribus, et non de omnibus, per quod “ens” excluditur.’ (*Expositio in librum Porphyrii de praedicabilibus*, Prooemium, *Opera Philosophica* II, 16, l. 195–198.)

141 Q. 11 CONCL. 5, 9^{vab}: ‘Quinta conclusio est ista quod “individuum” strictissime et propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis. Que declaratur sic: et (I) capiatur hoc individuum mentale “iste homo” demonstrando Sortem vel Platonem, et (II) vocetur totus Sortes A, et Sortes preter digitum B, et vocetur individuum mentale Sortes C, tunc sic: (III) C predicatur univoce de A et de B, igitur C predicatur de pluribus, et C est individuum propriissime acceptum, igitur individuum propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus. Et quod C predicatur univoce de A et de B, declaratur, quia hec est vera: “A est iste homo, et B est iste homo”, quia idem est conceptus proprius absolutus ipsius A et ipsius B.’ Etc. The whole man without his finger also figures in Q. 34 AD 4., 34^{va}: ‘aliquod animal est pars integralis animalis, sicut totus homo preter digitum est animal, et tamen est pars integralis animalis compositi ex digito et tali residuo.’

142 The ‘Socrates-Minus Argument’ is called so after the present-day ‘Descartes-Minus Argument’, originally invented by Peter van Inwagen. The gist of both these arguments is that arbitrary undetached parts of physical objects, like ‘all of Socrates except his finger’ simply do not exist. See Fitzgerald 2009. It would be an interesting point of further investigation to find out in how far Manlevelt’s argument is in line with the Socrates-Minus Argument developed by William Heytesbury and Albert of Saxony.

143 Manlevelt distinguishes here between complex and incomplex equivocal terms. His example of a complex equivocal, ‘Sortes or Plato’, is not known to me from any other medieval philosopher.

offer a suggestion of a theory on what now would be called something like ‘the uniquely referring use of denoting phrases’¹⁴⁴ which is quite compatible with present-day insights on the subject.¹⁴⁵

Q. 13 lays a link to Manlevell’s treatment of the *proprium* in Q. 41. The fourfold possible relationship between *proprium* and *species* established there in a traditional Porphyrian fashion is foreshadowed here when it comes to the possibility of a property of one individual to be found in another individual. This is indeed possible, except however for property in its strictest sense: belonging to some individual alone and totally and always.¹⁴⁶ An intriguing distinction is added, namely that between an individual for this moment, and an individual *tout court*,¹⁴⁷ again turning on the theory of the ‘uniquely referring use of denoting phrases’.

After the group of *questiones* 5–13 in principle concerned with *genus*, but automatically returning to *individuum*, QQ. 14–27 highlight the second universal, *species*, but the focus of attention is automatically turned upward back to *genus*, then even still further up to the conceptual realm of the transcendent terms and again downward to the *individuum*.

The core of nominalist teaching is hit upon right away in Q. 14, where in the seventh conclusion it is stated that every *species* in the sense of a universal is a *sign*.¹⁴⁸ The first thing to note is that the idea that

144 That is to say: a phrase denoting one, and only one unique individual thing in the outside world.

145 Without, of course, quite anachronistically wishing to attribute to Thomas Manlevell the precise ideas on this subject as developed by philosophers like Russell or Strawson.

146 Manlevell’s thoughts on this subject stand in need of a closer scrutiny, which however will be postponed to a later occasion. One may wonder, for instance, if a property belonging to some *individual* alone and totally and always can justly be called a property at all. A property, after all, belongs to a *species*, and not to an individual.

147 That is to say: an individual, the circumstances being as they are, as opposed to an individual, no matter what the circumstances. Thus, ‘Sophroniscus’s son’ is an individual’s name if said Sophroniscus happens to have only one son. Q. 13 DIST., 12^{ra}: ‘potest “individuum” adhuc accipi dupliciter, quia quoddam dicitur individuum *ut nunc*, et quoddam *simpliciter*. *Individuum ut nunc* potest istud dici quod pronunc non competit alicui nisi uni soli, ita quod non competat pluribus, quamvis sine nova impositione posset pluribus competere, et talia individua sunt omnes termini habentes tantum unum suppositum. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Porphyrius quando dicit quod filius Sophronisci sit individuum, idest, iste terminus “filius Sophronisci”, si solus sit ei Socrates filius. *Individuum vero simpliciter* dicitur istud quod non potest univoce pluribus competere sine nova impositione, sicut “Socrates” et “hoc album” et “hoc veniens”, etcetera.’

148 Q. 14 CONCL. 7, 13^{ra}: ‘omnis “species” quinto modo accepta est signum simplex vel compositum.’

a concept, in the sense of a conceptual act, is a sign is by no means self-explanatory. It is rather a basic Ockhamist tenet, arrived at by the Venerable Inceptor after quite some deliberation.¹⁴⁹ It will not be without significance that the ‘ad oppositum’ takes into explicit consideration the opinion of the ‘moderns’, that is: the Ockhamists. A small but interesting thing is that in his treatment of the first counter-argument to his tenth conclusion Manlevelt speaks of the ‘radix Aristotelis’, and not about Ockham’s razor.¹⁵⁰ After all, what Ockham was supposed to have done, and what Manlevelt was ostensibly doing in Ockham’s footsteps, was nothing other than truly adhering to the teachings of the Philosopher. One of the meanings of species is that of ‘similitudo representativa’. In this sense species is a sign or term as well, according to Thomas Manlevelt in his sixth conclusion.¹⁵¹ For William of Ockham the main struggle had been to choose between the species in its sense of ‘similitudo representativa’¹⁵² and the concept in its sense of ‘conceptual act’ as the candidate for the generalizing capacity of signs or terms.¹⁵³ It would be interesting to see what Manlevelt would have to say about this matter in his commentary on *De anima*, referred to in Q. 26, but alas, this commentary is not otherwise known to us.

In Q. 15 the different ways in which man can be said to be a species of animal are expounded. Ample use is made here of the theory of supposition. Manlevelt’s trinity of material, personal and simple supposition is

149 See Maurer 1994, esp. p. 387. With William of Ockham a *fictum* theory of the concept is only slowly abandoned for an *intellectio* theory.

150 Q. 14 AD ARG. CONTRA CONCL. 10, I, 13^{va}: ‘Ad primum istorum dicitur quod ista conclusio est asserenda et non dubitanda utendo radice Aristotelis primo Physicorum, ubi elicitur quod pluralitas sive diversitas non est ponenda sine ratione cogente.’ This last phrase, forbidding us to accept a plurality (of things, or causes) if there is no rational need to do so, is to be found in the works of Ockham with slight alterations: ‘entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate’ or even closer ‘pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate’. This is what came to be called ‘Ockham’s razor’. Manlevelt could not have referred to this razor, however, for the simple reason that the term only came into use centuries after Ockham’s death. Moreover, the ‘radix Aristotelis’ was already known to John Duns Scotus as well, and had thus been in use in Franciscan circles for quite some time.

151 Q. 14 CONCL. 6, 13^{ra}: ‘aliqua “species” quarto modo accepta est signum vel terminus, quia conceptus lapidis que est similitudo representativa lapidis, est terminus mentalis de quo dicit Aristoteles, tertio *De anima*, quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis’.

152 Quite literally, a likely image in the mind, representing the things in the outside world.

153 Once again, see Maurer 1994.

not as straightforward as one might think in retrospect. Thomas Manlevelt is in accord on this matter with Albert of Saxony, for example, who also adheres to this main tripartition of supposition. But things are quite different with a thinker like John Buridan, for whom simple and material supposition are one and the same thing.¹⁵⁴ This once again corroborates my conviction (already firmly based on so many other grounds) that Manlevelt is not in any sense to be sided with the Buridan camp.

Q. 16 again leans on the different ways of supposition 'genus' may have, to explain the interrelationship between genus and species. A remarkable feature of Manlevelt's treatment of genus in its simple supposition (i.e. genus as a universal as such), is that he sees a genus-species relationship between 'universale' and 'genus' (i.e. 'universale' stands as the genus to 'genus' as one of the five lowest species, the other four being 'species', 'differentia', 'proprium' and 'accidens') as well as between 'genus' and 'this or that genus'.

Q. 17 affirms that if a species is rightly defined, genus forms part of its definition, while Q. 18 holds that any definition of species of which genus forms no part, is not a right definition.

Q. 19 makes room for something other than the species specialissima coming in a sense directly before the individuals, and that is 'individuum' – in its capacity as a sign, one may safely gather. And this again may give the impression that *individuum* is accepted *de facto* if not *de jure* as somewhat approaching the status of a sixth universal.¹⁵⁵

Q. 20 is in fact concerned with this matter. Every appellative term¹⁵⁶ is a universal, so if 'individuum' in its strict sense (i.e. in its secondary use) is to be reckoned an appellative term, it must indeed be accepted as a universal. And it is just its non-appellative character that prevents 'individuum' from really being a universal.

The transcendent terms find their treatment in Q. 21. In line with William of Ockham and the generally held Franciscan opinion since John Duns Scotus' ontological breakthrough, Thomas Manlevelt holds

154 See Maierù 1972.

155 Manlevelt is, however, quite explicit about *individuum* not *really* being a universal in the first conclusion of Q. 20, 18^{vb}: 'nullum individuum est universale'. On the candidature of *individuum* as sixth predicable see also above, section 5.3 See also Bos 1987, 73.

156 An appellative name (*nomen appellativum*), in contrast to a proper name (*nomen proprium*), is used to refer to a class of things, instead of a single thing. In the course of Q. 20 Manlevelt is using appellative and proper terms and concepts in exactly this sense.

that 'being' – which is not a universal – is a univocal concept. Just like the universals, the transcendent terms should be looked upon from a semantical point of view as predicates.

In the sixth principal argument of Q. 22 one is presented with the opinion that only the categories substance and quality exist in reality, which opinion is attributed to 'the moderns'. Of course, one can safely substitute the name of William of Ockham and his followers for 'moderns' here. Not only does Manlevelt willingly accept this reduction of the number of real categories; in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* he is even willing to go a decisive step further, by questioning the very existence of substance as well,¹⁵⁷ so that it is left to the category of individual qualities to make up reality in its entirety. This makes one wonder about the status of concepts as mental qualities: they would not have a (mental) substance either. In their second-intention use however, i.e. as categories not of things in reality but of signs or names or predicates, Manlevelt in a sense accepts the traditional number of ten as a starting point from where to lay bare the inefficiency of precisely this tenfold division of the categories.¹⁵⁸ In this procedure he is to be ranked with the Franciscan

157 See above, section 1.2 of this Introduction, for our résumé of Robert Andrews's findings on this matter, and also for our author's apparent shyness in the face of his own drastic conclusions.

158 Traditionally, the number of categories is taken to be ten, and no more or no less than ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, condition, action, affection. After all, Aristotle said there were ten, specifying them as the ten just mentioned (*Categories* IV, 1b25–27). The English terms are taken from the translation by Ackrill. Apart from the consistent numbering of ten categories in the little treatise of the same name, however, Aristotle does not seem to pay too much attention to this exact number of ten in other works where the categories are brought forward. True, the well-known list of ten from the *Categories* is taken over without any ado in (or rather: from) the *Topica* (*Topica* I, 9, 103b22–104a1). But in the *Analytica posteriora*, for example, posture and condition are placed within another category, so that there are only eight categories left (*Anal. post.* I, 22, 83b17). In the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* posture and condition are left out altogether (*Metaphys.* VII, 1017a22–30), while time is left out as well in the eleventh book (*Metaphys.* XI, 12, 1068a7), so that there are only seven categories left, just like in the *Physics* (*Phys.* V, 2, 226a23). An even shorter list is given in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where only the first six of the original categories are retained (*Ethica Nicom.* I, 6, 1096a25). But Aristotle not only tends to shorten the list of categories now and then, at one point at least he seems to lengthen the list of categories by one. In the seventh book of the *Metaphysics* he rather carelessly includes motion in an informal list of categories (*Metaphys.* VII, 4, 1029b25). Now in the *Categories* motion was treated among the so-called *post-predicamenta*, but historically motion has tended to be promoted by many a philosopher to the status of 'eleventh category'. Thus Avicenna, who is one of the medieval philosophers who originated the systematic discussion of the problem

mainstream (John Duns Scotus;¹⁵⁹ William of Ockham¹⁶⁰). On the other hand, his way of arguing is quite unlike John Buridan's handling of the matter.¹⁶¹ Note that the question concerning the number of the categories is usually and quite naturally not treated in a commentary on the *Isagoge*, but in a commentary on the *Categories*. This may rank as an added sign that Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* is really meant to be the first part of an integrated commentary on the whole of the old logic, of which his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* forms the second part. In his countering of the initial arguments Manlevelt again gives testimony of his Ockhamist background, by sharply keeping apart the three levels of language¹⁶² – spoken, written and mental – without putting them in the usual hierarchical order. Over and over again Thomas Manlevelt stresses the token-character of all linguistic items in mental or extramental reality.

of the number of categories, in his commentary on the *Physics* concludes that motion should be accepted as a category (Avicenna, *III. Physic.* 3. and 2. cap. Cf. Avicenna *III. Metaphys.* 3).

- 159 On John Duns Scotus on this matter, as well as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, see Bos and Van der Helm 1989. Especially from Duns Scotus onwards, not only positive terms are studied, but also non-positive terms, such as 'blindness', fictional terms (for instance 'chimera'), terms of second intention, negative terms etc., which complicates the interpretation of the categories, and the establishing of their number.
- 160 Ockham takes a traditional stance when it comes to the number of categories. In his commentary on the *Categories*, the only thing Ockham has to say about their number is that it is difficult to prove that there are only ten categories (Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 7, §1 (*Opera Philosophica* pars II, 161)). In the *Summa logicae* Ockham does not really say very much more: there are held to be ten categories by all authors, but when it comes to interpreting their views, there are differences between his contemporaries as compared to the classical authors. Ockham seems to approve the number of ten, following Averroes in his interpretation of them, namely that they are the incomplex terms with which to answer the diverse ways of posing questions about a substance or an individual instance of substance (*Summa logicae*, I, cap. 41 (*Opera Philosophica* pars I, 116)). The reference is to Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, VII, t. 14 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, f. 77^v). Even where Ockham is most explicit about this matter, in the *Quodlibeta*, he takes the number of ten categories for granted, only stressing with ever so much insistence that they are incomplex terms, and not real things in the extra-mental world (*Quodlibeta* v, q. 22 (*Opera Philosophica* pars II, 569)).
- 161 On Buridan, see King 1994.
- 162 On the threefold division of language, see Spade 2002, 51–86. On Manlevelt's Ockhamist way of dealing with the supposed hierarchy between the three levels of language, see above, section 5.4. The starting point for all subsequent discussion on this matter is right at the beginning of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* (16a3–8), where we are told that 'spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words' (tr. E.M. Edghill).

In Q. 23 the status of the highest genera as principles of things is affirmed, but not without Manlevelt classifying the different senses in which something can be called a 'principle'.¹⁶³

Not unimportant for a thinker so deeply occupied with the strictly individual nature of extramental as well as mental reality is the affirmatively answered Q. 24: whether we can have knowledge of things infinite. After all, if we are to have knowledge of reality, which only exists of individuals; and if these individuals presumably are infinite in number; we must have knowledge of things infinite. But what – one would be tempted to ask Thomas Manlevelt – happens to the universal, all-embracing character of our knowledge, if this knowledge in its turn consists of individual instances (tokens) of concepts, propositions and judgements, and if this knowledge, moreover, is spread among so many individual minds, while these minds are not even substances, but only some kind of amalgam of individual mental qualities?¹⁶⁴

163 Manlevelt tends to treat the first predicable, genus, in close connection with the notion of 'principium'. This is not surprising, considering that 'principium' (principle) is the Latin translation of the Greek 'γενος', which has a strong physicalistic flavour, not only in the pure biological sense, but also in the genealogical sense. And of course there is the grammatical sense as well. In no less than three *questiones* Manlevelt devotes *distinctiones* to a classification of the diverse types of principle. It turns out that these classifications are compatible. In the *distinctio* to Q. 5 'utrum genus sit equivocum' (4^{vb}–5^{va}), one learns that genus can be called 'principle' in two distinct ways. First as the *principium productivum* ('pater genus filiorum'). Second as the *principium contentivum*, which comes in two variations: *cicumscriptivum* ('locus in quo quis generatur vel producitur') and *predicativum* ('animal dicitur genus hominis'). Two more types of principle are introduced in the *distinctio* to Q. 7 'utrum genus sit principium suarum specierum' (6^{vb}). The *principium compositivum* (of which there are two: matter and form) and the *principium terminativum*, which is the formal cause. Now, if we are aware that the *principium productivum* is the efficient cause of a thing (either in a universal or in a particular manner), the *principium productivum*, the *principium compositivum* and the *principium terminativum* together yield the four Aristotelian causes. The *principium contentivum* falls outside of this scheme of Aristotelian physical causes. In the two *distinctiones* to Q. 23 'utrum genera generalissima sint principia rerum' (22^{rb}–22^{va}), which basically are a working out in detail of the classification in Q. 7, the special status of the *principium contentivum* is accentuated by its being called the *principium logicale*. In the second conclusion of Q. 23 (22^{vb}) the *primum principium contentivum* is subdivided in 'per se' (either quiditative or non-quiditative) and 'per accidens'. The *principium terminativum*, on the other hand, is subdividing into *intrinsicum* (with further subdivisions) and *extrinsicum* (with further subdivisions). It might be worthwhile to compare this detailed schematization of the diverse types of principle with the equally detailed schematization in a Thomistic mold, as to be found in Gredt 1929, Volume I, 211 ff.

164 This breaking down, as it were, of the individual and the individual's thinking is even more remarkable in the light of the short philosophical history of dealing with the

The relationship by which it can be said that individuals belong to a species is subject matter of Q. 25. With the help of the distinction between *actus exercitus* and *actus significatus*,¹⁶⁵ it is explained that the proposition that several men are one man, which may be said to be true in its transitive sense, is nevertheless false in its proper sense. In the course of answering this question, individuals are presented by Manlevelt in their bare individuality.

The proper way of concepts fitting into a conceptual framework is established in Q. 26. In a large sense, every term can be predicated of any other term ('An animal is a man'). But in a strict sense, i.e. in the sense that a term is truly affirmed of another term, a categorically lower term can never be predicated of a categorically higher term, but only serve as its subject ('Man is an animal'). And that is why as a universal, a species is 'part' of a genus, such as stated (and qualified) in Q. 27 (man is an animal, but horses are animals too).

The third universal, *differentia*, is abundantly treated in no less than thirteen separate *questiones*: 28–40. Again Manlevelt's preoccupation with the individual is in the forefront. In this, his handling of the third universal is a confirmation of the impression made by his handling of the first two universals. The very title of the first of these *questiones*, whether something can differ from itself (Q. 28), makes it clear that to Thomas Manlevelt *differentia* is more than just the third constituent making up a proper definition: *Species = Genus + Differentia*. Other *questiones* are just as out of the ordinary. Differences between one individual and the other are treated, whereby attention is paid to the role of separable and inseparable accidents,¹⁶⁶ respectively (Q. 29 and Q. 30). The specific difference gets its treatment in Q. 31 and Q. 32. From the first conclusion of Q. 32 one can make up the strict sense of individuality employed by Thomas Manlevelt.¹⁶⁷ On the other side of the

subject at all. Before Thomas Aquinas's *De unitate intellectus*, philosophers never seem to have shown much interest in the individual's thinking at all. For a recent reminder of this, in the context of review of a book on Averroes's commentaries on *De anima*, see Janssens 2010, p. 160.

165 On *actus exercitus* and *actus significatus* see Nuchelmans 1987.

166 The distinction between separable and inseparable accidents is introduced in the *Isagoge* itself, immediately after the definition of what an accident is (v 2, around line 13.1), together with the enduring examples. To be asleep is a separable accident, being black is an inseparable accident of the raven and the Ethiopian. On the way the medieval commentators treated this aspect of Porphyry's exposition, see Van Rijen 1989, 136 ff.

167 Q. 32 CONCL. 1 32^{rb}: 'Prima conclusio est ista quod aliquid facit per se differre quod

creational spectre, even God and His rationality get to be regarded from the differential point of view in Q. 35.¹⁶⁸ Not to mention the specimen of Trinitarian syllogistic, a subject matter then popular in Parisian circles, which is to be found in the second conclusion of Q. 29.¹⁶⁹

Of course, the more obvious questions are asked as well: concerning the relationship of *differentia* to *genus* and *species*, respectively (Q. 36), and the role of the *differentia* in making divisions (Q. 37) and definitions (Q. 38). Whether more and less are applicable to difference in itself is the subject matter of Q. 33. The Porphyrian definition of *differentia* itself and its possible alternatives are scrutinized in Q. 39 and Q. 40. The eighth conclusion of Q. 40 deserves attention. Manlevelt seems to imply here, when stating that there can be more definitions of one and the same thing,¹⁷⁰ that the traditional idea of one essential definition applying to one thing (along with several nominal definitions) is to be abandoned.

The fourth universal, *proprium*, is treated in one *questio* only (Q. 41). But within this limited space, Manlevelt neatly juxtaposes the 'realistic' common opinion holding that a *proprium* is a thing in reality, and the modern (Ockhamist) view by which it is superseded, namely that a *proprium* is not a thing but a term, and a second intention term at that, just like all other universals.

To the last of the five universals, *accidens* – which had already been given an important enough role in the treatment of the other four – four *questiones* are dedicated. The first of these, the traditionally asked question whether an accident can come and go without its subject perishing with it (Q. 42) is seized upon by Manlevelt to fine-tune in an Ockhamist manner our understanding of the various senses of 'accidens', 'adesse et abesse' and 'subiectum accidentis' – discerning between thing and term; first and second intention; logic and reality.

non est differentia specifica, quia omne quod est, facit seipsum ab alio per se differre, quia seipso a quocumque alio differt, et tamen non omne quod est, est differentia specifica.'

168 Q. 35 *passim*.

169 On the subject of logic and trinitarian theology in Paris in the fourteenth century, see Maierù 1984. Maierù's article centres on Pierre d'Ailly. Other thinkers mentioned are Gregory of Rimini, and Henry Totting of Oyta, who around 1375–1380 gave attention to paralogisms on material *de divinis*. The table of contents of this latter philosopher's *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii* were compared with Manlevelt's commentary in the foregoing subsection 5.5.4.

170 Q. 40 CONCL. 8, 38^{va}: 'unius rei possunt esse plures diffinitiones proprie dicte, utpote diffinitio naturalis et diffinitio dialetica.'

In the fifth conclusion Manlevelt seems to develop his own brand of a double-truth theory.¹⁷¹ He does not shy away from discerning truth for the natural philosopher from truth for the theologian – a firmness that is somewhat mitigated again in the ninth conclusion.¹⁷²

Q. 43 presents us with an analysis of the diverse senses of ‘unity’,¹⁷³ before deciding in what senses a subject and an accident can be said to be

171 The infamous ‘double-truth theory’ holds that a proposition can at the same time be true in theology and false in philosophy and vice versa. It is ascribed to Siger of Brabant (see Krop’s introduction to Siger of Brabant 1992) and the Averroists, and was condemned by the clerical authorities. Mahony 1982, 619 n. 68, however, holds that Siger did not maintain this theory, and neither did any of his contemporaries. De Rijk 1977, 274 points out that somewhat later Autrecourt and Mirecourt did hold on to the view that certain truths of revelation are opposed to philosophical propositions demonstrable by reason. Robert Holkot even dares to distinguish a logic of faith (*logica fidei*) from the natural logic (*logica naturalis*).

172 Q. 42 CONCL. 9, 40^{va}: ‘Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius quam exercitive determinationis.’

173 In the second *distinctio* to Q. 43 (41^{rb-va}) Manlevelt makes a list of no less than ten different types of unity. This list, however, is incomplete, ending as it does in an ‘etcetera’. And of the kinds of unity that Manlevelt does list not all are really discussed in any detail. The items on the list which are more or less thoroughly examined by Manlevelt, are subdivided into unities by itself, *per se*, and unities by accident. Of the unity *per se* Manlevelt gives four types. First there is the *unum essentialiter* (matter and form, among which he one is the potentiality of the other), second, there is the *unum secundum gradus accidentalis* or *gradualiter*, which comes in two varieties, depending on whether the oneness has extension or not. An example of the former would be whiteness, the gradations of which, while mutually exclusive, take place in exactly the same spot. Mind, the unity under consideration is that among the shades of white, not between the white and its subject. An example of the latter would be gladness, the mutually exclusive degrees of which are not to be localized extensionally, but take place in an individual subject, that is, in our soul. It might well be that Manlevelt is breaking new ground here, transferring his findings from the external world to the internal world, trading the fixed point in space for the intellective soul, serving as an anchor for the gradual unity of a man’s happiness. For my happiness might strengthen or diminish, but it nevertheless is my happiness. Interesting enough, of course, is the pinpointing of the intellective soul as the non-spatial individuating instance of a mental accident. In doing this, Manlevelt stresses the boundaries between the non-spatial inner-world and the spatial outer-world. If we take the example of Sortes, it must be conceded that the spatial body of Sortes is the individual subject of his whiteness, and the non-spatial intellective soul of Sortes is the individual subject of his happiness. Unfortunately, the commentary on the *Isagoge* is not the place for Manlevelt to work out the apparent connection between the spatial and the non-spatial unity of Sortes. One should rather look for such a theory in a work Manlevelt refers to elsewhere in this manuscript, namely his commentary on *De anima*. It would really be a pity, should a manuscript of this commentary never turn up, seeing the importance Manlevelt attaches to the individuality of the intellective soul. In fact the intellective soul comes in as an honourable third in a short list of examples given by Manlevelt of the third kind

‘one.’ The third conclusion adds zest to the discussion by holding that in one of the discerned senses, even God can be said to have His accidents.¹⁷⁴

In Q. 44 Manlevelt goes out of his way to show in what sense Porphyry could justly hold that a raven can be understood to be white. In doing so, Manlevelt gives an exposition of the way a thing understood (or believed, or willed) and the understanding (or believing or willing) of the thing are interrelated.

Q. 45 is the rather spectacularly worded final chord: whether an accident is a substantial genus. The ‘natural’ tie between terms and things is reflected upon in a critical manner; all terms, either substantial or accidental, are downgraded to the status of accidents. The first and last of the five universals, *genus* and *accidens*, are thus contrasted and correlated all the same. With which we seem to have touched upon the heart of Manlevelt’s view on logic and reality: two realms only thinly connected to each other on the humble level of the accident.

of unity *per se*: the one by indivisibility. Honourable, because the other examples are God and an angel. The fourth kind listed as unity *per se* is the *unum continuatione*, whether corporeal (as in the parts of a piece of wood) or incorporeal (as in the parts of the sun). Lesser kinds of unity are the unity of place or subject (like the whiteness and sweetness of milk have their unity) and the accidental unity in a strict sense, to wit the aggregate of a subject and an accident. Thus the answer to the main question ‘*utrum ex subiecto et accidente componatur aliquod per se unum*’ is: no. Which is to say that all the single individual things making up our extramental world, consisting as they do of accidents inhering in a subject, do not possess so strong a unity after all. Further types of unity are hardly touched upon: unity of number, of species, of genus, of definition, ‘et cetera’.

174 Q. 43 CONCL. 3, 41^{va}: ‘accidente isto modo accepto, scilicet, pro uno predicabili accidentaliter, Deo potest competere aliquod accidens, quia: capiatur ista propositio “Sortes sedet”, que tantum sit vera per unam horam, et vocetur A, tunc hoc accidens “sciens A” competit Deo, quia hec est vera: “Deus est sciens A”, et hoc accidens potest adesse Deo et potest abesse, sicut de se notum est.’

